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**THE DECLINE OF RACIAL BOUNDARIES: GENDER AND MODERNIZATION  
IN THE OPENING OF INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE MARKETS**

by

**Andrew William Jones**

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SIGNED: Andrew Jones

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## ABSTRACT

This study argues that the development of individual choice in marriage markets has led to an increase in interracial marriage and an accompanying decline in racial boundaries. I first establish the importance of individual choice in interracial marriage. I do this by examining the persistent tendency for interracial marriage to be engaged in substantially more often by men in some racial-ethnic groups, and by women in others. I propose that a within-group mismatch of gender attitudes and an across-group matching of gender attitudes leads individuals to seek partners across racial lines. A national U.S. probability sample reveals that there are both significant differences in gender attitudes between each of the racial groups, as well as sex gaps in attitudes within each of the groups. Further, the cross-racial pairings for which the gender attitude gaps are smallest are also those for which interracial marriage is highest. Next, I examine the importance of women's employment for the weakening of racial boundaries. Previous research has established that increases in an ethnic group's occupational heterogeneity weaken ethnic solidarity for members of the group. Since occupations are highly sex segregated, increases in women's employment tend to increase an ethnic group's occupational heterogeneity, and hence weaken ethnic group solidarity. I confirm this hypothesis by finding that employed women are significantly more tolerant of interracial marriage than are married women. Last, I find that modernization is also associated with tolerance toward interracial marriage.

## **Introductory Chapter**

This study aims to contribute to our understanding of class, race, and gender. The majority of work in this area has focused on the micro level, especially the “intersectionality” of race and gender, and the ways this affects experience, discrimination, and life chances. This study, in contrast, focuses on the group-level and even the societal level of race and gender by examining micro mechanisms. I agree with Ferree and Hall (1996), that in sociology, class is most often conceptualized at the macro level, race at the group level, and gender at the micro level, and that this pigeonholing is problematic. I will argue in this dissertation that the social structure of American society has developed to the point where gender is beginning to have profound effects on the racial structure, and this, in turn, will affect class and class formation.

Rather than examine the intersection between gender and race, I want to examine how the one creates the other. The link between race and class has been studied extensively (e.g., Roediger 1991; Bonicich 1972; Szymanski 1976; Tomaskovic-Devey and Roscigno 1996; Quadagno 1996). In fact, the racial division of the working class has been a prominent explanation for the weakness of the working class and class politics in the United States. Just as scholars have studied how race determines the salience of class and class consciousness, I want to study how gender affects the salience of race, and, by implication, the salience of class. There has been a paucity of attention to this topic.

One key way that gender affects race and racial boundaries is through exogamy. The existence of separate and definable racial and ethnic groups is predicated by members of these groups marrying within their group (Weber 1978). But partner selection in marriage has everything to do with gender, gender relations, and gender roles. Thus, race and racial boundaries are dependent upon gender. The key question about gender's effect on race is the extent to which gender is institutionalized into the other power relations that determine and reinforce race.

As I will argue in this study, marriage partner selection has become deinstitutionalized, and informal racial group controls have also weakened. This leaves partner selection to a marriage market with surprisingly few social controls. I argue that this "marketization" of partner selection has led to increases in interracial marriage.<sup>1</sup>

### **Theoretical Background**

Marx and Engels (1964:7-8) predict that with the development of capitalism, nationality, and by implication, ethnicity will fade. They write, "All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify.... National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures there arises a world literature." Robert Park

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<sup>1</sup> Now, it must be said that the structure of racial groups in society (e.g., housing and occupational segregation) affects the level and nature of cross-racial contacts in society, but there is surprisingly little, in comparison to the past, that inhibits these cross-racial contacts from becoming romantic.

(1950), working within the liberal tradition, also thought that with increasing industrialization race and ethnicity would fade in importance. Park elaborated the assimilation process in his "race relations cycle."

This assimilation approach has fallen out of favor in recent scholarship. Scholars were responding to the fact that race and ethnicity did not quickly end with the development of industrialization and capitalism. Many of the Marx's predictions about race and ethnicity can be summed up with flaws in his assumptions about how class evolved according to the logic of markets. Both Schumpeter and Weber laid out a critique to Marx's approach, though both stressed that a version of class is important to understanding society.

Schumpeter (1989) argued, contrary to Marx, that institutions evolve "according to their own logic and not the logic of markets" (Averitt 1990). Weber (1978) takes on the issue of ethnicity more directly with his distinction between class and status. Weber says that status groups (including ethnic groups) form when groups of individuals, using some status marker, effect social closure of a market. Through this social closure, they are able to monopolize a market niche for their members. This Weber sees as the basis of ethnic group formation.

Thus, we see that both Schumpeter and Weber faulted Marx for his understanding of the way institutions and groups evolved under capitalism. Subsequent explanations of the failure of assimilation have focused either on institutions that developed independently of markets or on the social closure of markets.

Following the logic of Marx's and Park's arguments, global economic forces tend to break down national and ethnic distinctions (Marx) and bring together people from different continents (Park), and if individual choice in markets is unimpeded by institutional or group factors, assimilation and amalgamation will result. To apply this to interracial marriage, the greater the degree to which marriage choice is deinstitutionalized and free from group influence, the more marriage choice will occur in free markets, and in free markets the frequency of assortative marriage will decrease and exogamy will increase.

### **Outline of Substantive Chapters**

In Chapter 1, I simultaneously test whether individual choice in marriage markets is a plausible explanation for the weakening of racial boundaries, and whether gender is the basis for that choice. I do this by examining what I term the "sex gap in outmarriage" for a number of racial-ethnic groups. This refers to the gap between the number of men versus women of a particular group who outmarry. I compare these sex gaps to the sex ratios of each group and find that in most cases the sex gap in outmarriage is in the opposite direction than if imbalanced sex ratios were the explanation. For example, for Asian-Americans there are more men than women in the prime ages for marriage, and yet Asian women outmarry at a far greater rate than do Asian men. I examine a number of other social factors, such as work and college, that would place men and women of

different races in the same social situations, and find that overall none of these would explain the sex gaps in outmarriage.

Then I examine the gender role attitudes of Asian, Latino, white, and black men and women, using the National Survey of Households and Families, 1987-1988. I find that the cross-racial pairings for which there was the most agreement on gender attitudes were the same as the most common cross-racial pairings in U.S. Census data. I conclude from this that gender attitudes are an important factor in intermarriage.

In Chapter 2, I build on two lines of research that show that women's employment will have dramatic consequences on racial boundaries. First, I build on Michael Hechter's (1978) ideas about the cultural division of labor. One of Hechter's key findings is that when there is an overlap between an ethnicity and men's occupations, exogamy decreases for that group. I reason that due to occupational sex segregation, as soon as women from an ethnic group gain employment, this will markedly increase the occupational heterogeneity of that group, thereby decreasing that group's ethnic solidarity. I operationalize this idea, using General Social Survey data, 1972-1998, by examining the effect of women's employment on tolerance toward interracial marriage.

The second line of research I build on in this chapter is resource dependency. Starting with Weber's (1978) idea that ethnic groups are formed by groups of men trying to protect their interests (an "ethnic brotherhood"), I ask what women's interests are in ethnicity. I reason that when women are economically dependent on men, their interests will be congruent with those of men in their ethnic group. But when women gain

independent sources of income, though employment, they will show less ethnic solidarity than men or economically-dependent housewives.

In the third, and last, substantive chapter, I test more directly the idea that the development of capitalism has led to a weakening of racial and ethnic solidarity. Here, I extend to a consideration of racial boundaries, Inglehart's (1997) research on the clusters of values he finds associated with modernization and postmodernization. Inglehart and his associates (2000) have found, using cross-national data in 65 societies, that in societies that have undergone industrialization there is one cluster of beliefs, and in societies that have transitioned to service economies there is an orthogonal cluster of beliefs. He also finds that there are society-specific, path-dependent beliefs, often based in religion, that somewhat alter these overall patterns of belief in the development of industrial and service economies.

I use one country, the United States, and test (using 1972-1998 GSS data) whether the sets of values associated with modernization (as opposed to traditional values) and postmodernization are associated with a lack of racial solidarity, as measured by tolerance toward intermarriage. I find many of the values in the modernization and postmodernization clusters are indeed associated with tolerance toward intermarriage.

## **Chapter 1**

### **The Sex Gap in Outmarriage: In-Group Attitudes as a Determinant of Exogamy**

Interracial marriage has long been regarded as an inverse indicator of the strength of racial group boundaries, something which represents the qualities of entire groups and their interactions with one another (Hechter 1978; Blau et al. 1982). While group factors are undoubtedly important, there is substantial sex asymmetry in outmarriage for each racial-ethnic group in the United States, something which cannot be explained by group factors. Substantially more women than men outmarry among Asians and Latinos, while for whites and blacks the pattern is reversed. As I will show below, these “sex gaps in outmarriage”—that for a given group, substantially more men than women or more women than men outmarry—are not due to imbalanced sex ratios, or to any number of other opportunities or constraints placed of men and women of a particular racial-ethnic group to meet and marry partners from another group. Rather, this research will show that it is attitudes which are driving these sex gaps in outmarriage, specifically gender attitudes. For each of four groups I study, there are significant differences between men and women in their mean gender attitudes (women have more liberal gender attitudes than do men), and there are also differences in attitudes between the groups themselves. The interaction of gender and group differences in gender attitudes means that often the best match on between men and women on gender attitudes occurs across, not within,

racial-ethnic lines. Thus, the sex gaps in outmarriage are to be explained by the cross-racial matching on gender attitudes, which is itself due to sex gaps in gender attitudes.

That gender is an important factor in intermarriage should not come as a surprise. Marriage is quintessentially about gender and is the only institution which is based upon gender integration. As marriage has become increasingly freed from group controls, individual choices about gender attitudes have come to the fore in mate selection—even where this involves crossing racial-ethnic boundaries.

The importance of attitudes to mate selection is well established. A long line of research supports the idea that people affiliate with and marry those who share similar attitudes (Schooley 1936; Burgess and Wallin 1943; Byrne 1971; Berscheid 1985). Similarity of cultural background, cultural capital, and education have all been associated with marriage choice (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; Kalmijn 1994). Racial endogamy would simply appear to be a confirmation of this pattern, while racial exogamy would appear to be anomalous. When researchers confined themselves to black-white intermarriage, with its relatively low rates, this idea could be maintained. But when the recent outmarriage rates of other racial-ethnic groups such as Asian-Americans and Latinos is considered, in which a third to a half of all marriages are exogamous (depending on whether immigrants or only native-born are included), the exception threatens to become the rule (Table 1.1). I will suggest this is because the ways we habitually think about racial-ethnic boundaries as containing similar members is a fiction

(Barth 1969), that, in fact, these boundaries contain systematic differences in attitudes that fall along class, and especially important for this analysis, along gender lines<sup>1</sup>.

Paradoxically, while exogamy appears to be an exception to the homophily (similarity) rule, I will show, that in many ways, it is a confirmation of this rule. I propose that an important portion of intermarriage can be explained by the attraction of similarity, not difference; that commonly there is a great deal of difference in gender attitudes between men and women within a racial-ethnic group; and that finding a match on these attitudes can often best be done by marrying outside the group. Further, I propose that this attitude matching by outmarriage occurs asymmetrically by gender within a racial-ethnic group, simply because one gender in that group finds more available outmarriage matches than the other. This leads to sex gaps in outmarriage—where, in a given racial-ethnic group, substantially more persons of one gender outmarry than the other.

### **The Sex Gap in Intermarriage**

Table 1.1 presents an analysis of the sex gaps in outmarriage among four racial-ethnic groups<sup>2</sup> using 1980 and 1990 Census data. The advantage of using this data is that

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<sup>1</sup> The tendency to ignore gender in the study of group boundaries and intermarriage is a common one. In their otherwise pathbreaking work on intermarriage, Michael Hechter (1978) and Peter Blau et al. (1982) neither incorporate gender nor the sex gap in intermarriage into their analyses. Hechter (p. 302) only analyzes information on males in his study. Blau and colleagues likewise examine group rates of outmarriage without examining its gender composition. They do note the sex gap in outmarriage (p. 55), but do not analyze it.

Susan Olzak (1992), in her important work on group boundaries, likewise neglects gender. She writes (p. 28): “*ethnic competition intensifies ethnic boundaries when two or more ethnic populations try to acquire the same valued resources, such as jobs, housing, or marriage partners*” [emphasis in original]. This omits the fact that men and women have different interests in marriage (e.g., that a surplus of men means a shortage of women), nor does it recognize that intermarriage tends to weaken ethnic boundaries.

having information from two cohorts reduces the possibility that the pattern is the result of a cohort effect. Further, these data are of the native-born population; this ensures that the effect of “Asian war brides” does not distort the figures.<sup>3</sup>

Were a substantial number of people to outmarry in order to find a partner who held compatible gender attitudes, we would find a pattern of outmarriage similar to that described in Table 1.1. Below, I will explore alternative explanations for these gaps, but here it is only necessary to observe the regularity and magnitude of the gaps. Note that the pattern in the sex gaps in outmarriage are identical for the two cohorts (the Early Baby Boom and the Late Baby Boom—roughly marriages in the 1970s and 1980s). This demonstrates that these patterns are stable over at least two decades. Other research shows that many of these patterns have been consistent over a much longer period.

There are two main patterns in the sex gap in outmarriage in this data. The first is the overall sex gap in outmarriage. These data are summarized in Table 1.2. White males are more likely to outmarry than are white females; and similarly, black males are more likely to outmarry than are black females. For Latinos and Asians, females are

<sup>2</sup> I am not comparing American Indians because there has been considerable shift among recent Censuses in persons who previously categorized themselves as non-Indian who now categorized themselves as Indian (Nagel 1995).

<sup>3</sup> A large number of Asian-white and Asian-black marriages, especially in earlier cohorts, are between American servicemen and women from Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines—the countries where the servicemen were stationed. The reason that these marriages would distort the pattern I am attempting to explain is a matter of opportunity. Asian men and non-Asian American women simply don't have the same opportunities for meeting, let alone marrying, as do Asian women and American men when large numbers of single male soldiers are stationed in an Asian country. Focusing on baby boom cohorts reduces this effect, since “Asian war brides” were a larger proportion of these marriages for earlier cohorts. But focusing only on “native-born” (American-born) eliminates this effect entirely.

Foreign-born were 64.0% of the total U.S. Asian population in 1990, 35.7% of the Latino population, 4.2% of the black population, and 3.3% of the white population (Farley 1996, p. 215).

more likely to outmarry than males. Black males outmarry at three times the rate of black females, but this is from a very low base (of 2-3%, for females), so the actual sex gap in outmarriage is about 5%. A sex gap in outmarriage of similar proportions among blacks has been consistently observed since data on black intermarriage was first collected in the 1870s (Table 1.3). The sex gap in outmarriage for native-born Latinos is also about 5%, but this is from a much higher base of about 30% (for males), so the female outmarriage rate is only about 10-20% higher than that of males. The sex gap in outmarriage for native-born Asians is about 25-30%; females outmarry at a 50% higher rate than do males, but this is on a base of 50% outmarriage (for males). For whites, the sex gap in outmarriage is about 1%; the male outmarriage rate is about 30% higher than the female rate, from a very low base of about 2.5%.

The second pattern in the sex gap in outmarriage concerns the specific groups which are intermarried. Since I am comparing four racial-ethnic groups (Whites, Blacks, Latinos, and Asians), there are four possible in-marriage (White-White, Black-Black, Latino-Latino, and Asian-Asian) and 12 possible outmarriage combinations for each gender.<sup>4</sup> For each of the 12 comparisons in outmarriage between men and women of a racial-ethnic group the gap is in the same direction for both men and women in both the Early Baby Boom and in the Late Baby Boom cohorts. An example from Table 1.1 will illustrate this. To begin, we can compare the percent of black husbands from the early

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<sup>4</sup> There are actually 6 mutually exclusive combinations of outmarriage, but because of different population compositions (as will be made clear below in the Asian-Latino/Latino-Asian pattern) I will treat the 12 comparisons separately. Another advantage in doing this is to consider outmarriage from the perspective of each group. (If we eliminated these redundancies and treated outmarriage on the basis of the groups, from the most to the least populous, there would be three outmarriage comparisons for Whites, two for

baby boom who are outmarried with whites (3.8%) to the percent of black wives from the same cohort who are outmarried with whites (1.0%). The comparable figures for the late baby boom are 5.3%, for men, and 2.1%, for women. Thus, for both cohorts, black men are more likely than black women to be outmarried with whites. A set of comparisons in the black outmarriage rate with Latinos and Asians reveals that black men are more likely to outmarry with both groups than are black women.<sup>5</sup>

A number of different nationalities and ethnic groups are combined in the “Asian” and “Latino” categories, so it is worth examining the outmarriage pattern of different ethnic groups that make up both racial-ethnic categories. Published information is not strictly comparable to Table 1.1, but comparing multiple sources of data that reveal the same pattern holds across a number of different Latino and Asian ethnic groups. Table 1.4 reveals the same pattern of outmarriage among Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, and Korean Americans. For each ethnic group, women are more likely to outmarry with whites and blacks and men are more likely to outmarry with Latinos and other Asians.

Table 1.5 reveals that the same pattern of outmarriage that is true in the 1980 and 1990 Censuses for the aggregated Latino group held true for Puerto Ricans, South Americans, Dominicans, Central Americans, and Cubans in New York City in 1975. For

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Blacks, one for Latinos, and none for Asians. Though redundant, it makes sense to examine the three outmarriage possibilities for each group, for each of the four groups.)

<sup>5</sup> I should note that two of the patterns—that for Latinos, more men than women outmarry with Asians, and that for Asians, more men than women outmarry with Latinos—are seemingly contradictory. This confusion is cleared up by the low total number of marriages involving Asian men (in both cohorts) as compared to the number of marriages involving Asian women. In fact, for both cohorts there are more Latino male-Asian female marriages than there are Asian male-Latina female marriages. Thus, the former pattern, not the latter, is the one that is in need of explanation.

each group, women were more likely than men to marry non-Latinos. And across four of the five groups, men were more likely than women to marry inter-ethnically with other Latinos. A number of researchers have found that among Mexican-Americans, women outmarry more frequently than men. Jiobu (1988:161) found this to be the case in California, using 1980 Census data, as have researchers using marriage records in California (Schoen, Nelson, and Collins 1978) and in a number of counties in Texas and New Mexico, stretching back as far as 1850 (Bean and Bradshaw 1970; Murguia 1982).

### **Explanations for the Sex Gap in Intermarriage**

There are three broad factors that can contribute to an observed pattern of intermarriage: social constraints of various sorts, opportunities for informal contact, and the preferences of those intending to marry (Kalmijn 1998). Before an argument based on preferences can be advanced, the confounding effects of opportunities and constraints must be ruled out.

#### *Constraints*

There are a number of constraints that prevent intermarriage, though none of these clearly explain the pattern of the sex gaps in outmarriage. Antimiscegenation laws equally proscribe the intermarriage of men and women whether, majority or minority. At their height, these laws proscribed marriages between whites and blacks or Asians in most states that had large black or Asian populations (Spickard 1989). The existence or

legacy of these laws would appear to have little affect on the gendered pattern of outmarriage.

If anything, public social pressures against interracial relationships have consistently been stronger against minority male-majority female pairings than against majority male-minority female ones (Stember 1976; Smith 1961). Part of this may be explained by the rule of hypodescent, or the “one-drop rule,” the practice that any African ancestry makes one “black” (Davis 1991). Thus, in the case where men father, but do not acknowledge, children across racial lines, a single white mother raising her “black” child is much more of a threat to the racial order than a single black mother raising her “black” child.

A number of other arguments have been made as to why there is more social pressure against minority male-majority female pairings, arguments which have focused on black male-white female relationships. Empirical evidence supports this as well. Rosenblatt and colleagues (1995:98) found that white women experience more family opposition than do white men to interracial marriages with blacks. There is substantially less opposition to these marriages from black families than from white (1995:119). Yet black male-white female marriages have been more common over the last one hundred twenty years, in multiple settings, than white male-black female marriages (Table 1.3). One could say that this sex gap in outmarriage occurs despite, not because of, the constraints of family opposition.

### *Opportunities*

*Sex ratios.* If constraints do not explain the pattern of the sex gaps in outmarriage, then perhaps opportunities do. The most obvious set of opportunities for outmarriage concern imbalanced sex ratios within a racial-ethnic group. If there are not enough available partners within a group, its members are more likely to marry out. Table 1.6 allows us to examine this idea. When we compare those who are neither currently married nor widowed, we find that among blacks there are more “available” females than males. There are over one million more black women than black men, or 84 black men for every 100 black women in 1990, in this category, even without taking into account the high black male incarceration rate (Wilson 1987). The sex gap in outmarriage among blacks occurs despite this overwhelmingly imbalanced sex ratio. The same pattern holds true when never married men and women are compared.

Earlier, the comparison group for Latinos and Asians was restricted to native born, but for comparison purposes, Table 1.6 also includes figures for the entire Latino and Asian populations, including immigrants. A more conservative analysis would focus on native-born, which I will do in this analysis. For U.S.-born Latinos, there are 76,000, or 4% more “available” males than females. Again, opportunities in numbers of potential partners and the sex gap in outmarriage are in opposite directions. For U.S.-born Asians, there are 39,000, or 12% more “available” males than females. Yet again, the sex gap in outmarriage runs contrary to the sex ratio of available partners. For blacks, Latinos, and Asians, the sex gap in outmarriage contributes to a shortage of available partners for the gender in each group that outmarries less frequently. Rather than a response to an

imbalanced sex ratio of available partners, the sex gap in outmarriage creates an imbalanced sex ratio of available partners.

For whites, there are 8% more “available” men than women. Thus, white males are the only sex-race category for which the sex gap in outmarriage may be in response to a shortage of partners within their racial-ethnic group.

*Local marriage markets: neighborhoods, workplaces, and schools.* But if the sex gap in outmarriage cannot be explained by the opportunities of sex ratios, perhaps it can be explained by the opportunities for men and women of different races to meet in local marriage markets. Neighborhoods, workplaces, and schools are three of these markets sociologists have studied the most (Kalmijn 1998). The question concerning each of these places is whether there is a higher proportion of men or women of a particular race there. Neighborhoods are a place where people are especially likely to meet their mates while they are living with their parents. Thus, the sex ratios in neighborhoods generally should not differ from the sex ratios of the ethnic groups that make up the neighborhoods (except where, as in the case of blacks, there are high male incarceration rates). To the extent that traditional families are more restrictive of their daughters’ than their sons’ dating partners and activities, we would expect females to have lower outmarriage rates than males. And yet the groups that have more traditional gender role attitudes and are more likely to have recently immigrated, Latinos and Asians (Vega 1990; Min 1995a; and Table 1.9, which is explained below), are also the groups which have higher rates of

female outmarriage. Neighborhoods would not appear to explain the sex gap in outmarriage.

Workplaces are another important place where people meet prospective marriage partners. Since more males are employed than females, groups that have the highest proportion of women employed would have the greatest opportunity for those women to marry across racial lines. More black than white women are employed (England 1992), thus the opportunity structure would favor sex gap in black women's outmarriage to a greater extent than it would for white women. Despite the greater workplace opportunities of black women to marry across racial lines, white women are more likely to do so. Latina women are employed (U.S. Census 1993a) at lower rate than non-Latina women are (50% and 53%, respectively). This would lower Latinas' chances to outmarry through contacts at work. Asian women are employed (U.S. Census 1993b) at a higher rate than non-Asian women are (57% versus 53%). This would increase Asian women's opportunities to outmarry men met at work.

Schools, especially colleges, are another important place where people meet prospective partners. Colleges may be especially important, because intermarriage is more common among the college-educated (Kalmijn 1998). Table 1.1 shows us that the same pattern of intermarriage occurred for those who married in the 1970s as those who married in the 1980s. A higher percentage of black males outmarried during both decades than did black females. Yet throughout the 1970s and 1980s a higher (and increasing) proportion of blacks who attended college were female (Table 1.7). For Asians, during both decades, more males than females attended college. Yet Asian

females outmarried at a greater rate than did Asian males. For both Latinos and whites, a greater proportion of males attended in the 1970s and a greater proportion of females attended in the 1980s, but since their outmarriage patterns were similar across both decades, little can be adduced from these numbers. Opportunities do little to explain the sex gap in outmarriage. Often the opportunities are in the opposite direction from the pattern of intermarriage. This is true of black and Asian college attendance; it is true of the employment of black and Latina women; and it is true of the sex ratios for blacks, Latinos, and Asians.

Thus, the sex gap in outmarriage occurs despite, not because of, constraints and opportunities. Despite general sex ratios that would predict another pattern of intermarriage, despite the sex ratios of workplaces and colleges that provide opportunities for a different pattern of intermarriage, and despite a history which proscribed a type of intermarriage—at least in the black-white case—despite all constraints and opportunities a particular pattern of intermarriage persists. Since constraints and opportunities do so little to explain pattern of the sex gap in outmarriage, we are left with preferences. In order to examine the matching on gender role attitudes that I hypothesized earlier, I now turn to the prior literature on the sex gap in attitudes.

### **The Sex Gap in Gender Role Attitudes**

A number of studies provide evidence that sex gaps in outmarriage are due to a desire for gender attitude compatibility. Several commentators have mentioned Japanese American females' dissatisfaction with traditional male roles as the reason for choosing

outmarriage (Tinker 1973; Kikumura and Kitano 1973). The same arguments have been made to explain the greater outmarriage rate of women than men among Korean Americans (Min 1995b:219) and Chinese Americans (Sung 1990:68). Agbayani-Siewert and Revilla (1995:156) suggest that Filipino American men have an intermarriage rate closer to that of Filipino American women because Filipino American men “have a more egalitarian gender role orientation than other Asian American men and thus can get along better with white women than other Asian American men.” They attribute this to the more egalitarian family structure in the Philippines than in the rest of Asia. This is consistent with the narrower (though not absent) sex gap in outmarriage for Filipinos as compared with other Asian American groups (Table 1.4).

Murguia and Cazares (1982:96) argue that the one reason for the greater female outmarriage among Latinos may be that Latina females seek “a greater egalitarianism on the part of majority males as compared to minority males.” The supposition that the sex gap in outmarriage is driven by the sex gap in gender attitudes is supported by evidence on marriage records in three counties in Texas and New Mexico which show that Latina females who outmarry are older than those who are endogamous and that Latino males choose younger partners when they outmarry than when they marry within their group (Murguia 1982:101). An age difference, of course, is a source of power in marriage. Data from Los Angeles marriage records confirms this pattern (Mittelbach, Moore, and McDaniel 1966: 30-34). In both sets of research, the relationship between the relative age of the partners in these outmarriages was treated as anomalous because it does not confirm with Mittelbach et al.’s and Murguia’s hypotheses that those who outmarry are

older than those who marry within their group. Yet, this data makes sense when placed into a gender roles framework.

A similar age pattern appears in Asian American outmarriage. Research on marriage records in Los Angeles County finds that for five Asian ethnic groups, younger men are more likely than older men to outmarry (Kitano, Fujino, and Sato 1998).

Porterfield (1978:62) also found that for the black-white intermarried couples he studied, a reason given by black men for outmarrying is that they perceive white females as less strong and independent than black females.

### **Hypotheses**

In marrying, a person anticipates playing a gender role with the same person for a very long time, presumably for a lifetime. In choosing a marriage partner, we can anticipate that one would prefer to choose someone who shared ideas about gender roles. We can call this principle "gender attitude homophily." Research in a number of societies has consistently show that women have more liberal gender role attitudes than the men in the society. This has been shown to be the case in Germany, Austria, Britain, the United States (Davis and Robinson 1996), India (Ghadially 1988), and in Hawaiian-American society (Howard 1974). An analysis of data from the World Values Survey (Table 1.14) demonstrates the same pattern to be true of a number of Asian and Latin American societies that are relevant to the argument of this paper. Not only do men and women have different mean values within almost all of the societies, each country has a

different mean value, with the mean for the United States being more liberal than the any of the four Latin American or four Asian countries.

We can predict that the same pattern of different group means (across societies) and more liberal female than male means (within societies) may also be true across racial-ethnic groups within the U.S. But what is a sex gap in gender attitudes within a racial-ethnic group, may be homophily on gender attitudes between men and women across groups. This is illustrated formally in Table 1.8. Each of three groups, group 1, group 2, and group 3, have group means in gender attitudes,  $\mu_1$ ,  $\mu_2$ , and  $\mu_3$ , respectively. The mean of group 2 ( $\mu_2$ ) is a more traditional score on gender attitudes than group 1 ( $\mu_1$ ) and group 3 ( $\mu_3$ ) is more traditional than group 2 ( $\mu_2$ ). But within each group there is a sex gap in gender attitudes; men and women within a group have different means on gender attitudes. Thus, the mean for women in group 1 ( $\mu_{f1}$ ) is more liberal than the mean for men in group 1 ( $\mu_{m1}$ ). The same pattern, of different means for men and women within groups, holds across the other groups. But in this illustration, there is no sex gap in gender attitudes between the men in group 1 ( $\mu_{m1}$ ) and the women in group 2 ( $\mu_{f2}$ ), nor is there a gap between the men in group 2 ( $\mu_{m2}$ ) and the women in group 3 ( $\mu_{f3}$ ). In actual practice, we cannot expect there to be no gap between men and women across groups; rather, the strategy is to find the least differences between men and women both within and across groups. This is in practice what gender attitude homophily would mean.

But note that the women in group 1 ( $\mu_{f1}$ ) have no men in other groups that match their gender attitudes, but the men in group 1 ( $\mu_{m1}$ ) do have women in another group ( $\mu_{f2}$ )

that match their attitudes. This is the basis for the sex gap in outmarriage for group 1. On the basis of this asymmetrical matching, we can predict that men in groups 1 will outmarry at a higher rate than women in that group. Likewise, the sex gap in outmarriage for group 3 will involve women outmarrying at a higher rate than men.

There is one other factor to consider: the social distance among groups. For example, evidence suggests that there is greater social distance between whites and blacks than there is between whites and Asians. Forty-five percent of whites in the General Social Survey said they would oppose a close relative marrying an Asian American person, while 65% oppose a close relative marrying a black person (GSS 1990). So, social distance should affect the overall (group) intermarriage rate, while the sex gap in gender attitudes should affect the sex gap in outmarriage. Another way to put it is that the social distance between groups affects the base rate of intermarriage between groups, while the sex gap in gender attitudes affects the discrepancy in outmarriage rates between men and women within a group—the sex gap in outmarriage.

### **Data and Methods**

The analysis in the paper consists of a comparison of patterns found in two data sources: the U.S. Census and the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH). From the Census, I describe patterns of sex gaps in outmarriage—the way that for each of the four racial-ethnic groups I am analyzing, either men or women are more likely to outmarry. From NSFH, I analyze the patterns of sex gaps in gender attitudes. (For each, “sex gaps” refers to gaps, in either outmarriage or gender attitudes, between men and

women of a racial-ethnic group.) The strategy of analysis will be to compare the sex gaps in outmarriage found in the Census data with sex gaps in gender attitudes found in the NSFH. If the sex gaps in outmarriage follow a pattern of minimizing the sex gaps in gender attitudes, then I will have evidence to support my hypothesis.

### *Gender Attitudes Index*

Using the NSFH, I constructed a gender attitudes index from the four questions discussed below. The first two questions (the sharing of household tasks and encouraging independent daughters) are scaled so that higher scores indicate more traditional gender attitudes. I have reversed the scaling of these, so that higher scores indicate more liberal attitudes. Questions 3 and 4 (preschool children suffer if mother is employed and the preference for male breadwinners and female homemakers) are already scaled so that higher scores indicate more liberal attitudes. Each of these questions addresses an aspect of the concept of separate spheres. The traditional view is that separate spheres should be maintained for men and women—men in the public sphere of work and politics and women in the private sphere of family caregiving and household work—even if this arrangement results in inequality. The liberal view is that opportunities and access to both spheres should be given to both men and women, and that a situation of inequality necessitates a sharing of work by men and women within a sphere.

Question 1, “if a husband and wife both work full-time, they should share household tasks equally,” epitomizes the liberal view. If a husband and wife work the

same number of hours in the public sphere, they should work the same number of hours in the private sphere as well. In the traditional view, women's work in the public sphere is problematic; to have men do household work would only compound the problem, by leading to a further breakdown in the separate spheres. Question 2, "parents should encourage just as much independence in their daughters as their sons," also characterizes the liberal view. Independence is a quality that is valued in the public sphere. To encourage independent daughters is to encourage their eventual entry into the public sphere. Question 3, "preschool children are likely to suffer if their mother is employed," provides a justification for maintaining separate spheres, the traditional view. Question 4, "it is much better for everyone if the man earns the main living and the women takes care of the home and family," epitomizes the traditional view that separate spheres should be maintained. The index created from these four questions has a Cronbach's Alpha of .45.

Models were estimated which regressed the gender attitudes index on seven dummy variables (plus a reference category) for each of four racial-ethnic groups times two gender categories. Models were also estimated with years of education (1-20) as a control variable. It is important to control for education because mean gender attitudes become more liberal as respondent education increases. Education is also an important control because of the tendency in the U.S. for educational homogamy and because educational institutions are a meeting place for many future couples.

## **Findings**

Table 1.9 reports results of a regression of gender attitudes on sex-race categories. There are significant differences between white females and all other categories, except Asian females. When education is included as a control, there are significant differences between Asian females and white females, but not between white females and black females. Column 3 shows that there are significant within-group differences between males and females for all of the racial-ethnic groups. This means that gender attitude homophily is an affirmative reason for individuals to marry outside their race.

Changing the reference category several times, led to the results in Table 1.10. The effects of education have been statistically controlled in all the regressions in Table 1.10. In this table, there are no significant differences between the sex-race categories that lie on the same line. Thus, as we know from Table 1.9 there are no significant differences in gender attitudes between black females and white females. Nor are there statistically significant differences in gender attitudes between white males, Asian females, and Latina females. The numbers in parentheses in Table 1.10 refer to the distance, in units based on the gender attitudes index, that other sex-race categories are from the white male mean.

Following a strategy of least differences in gender role attitudes (between different combinations of men and women from each racial-ethnic group), we can deduce from Table 1.10 what pairings would represent gender attitude homophily. Again, because there are different social distances between different pairs of racial-ethnic groups, the relevant sets of comparisons are between men and women in two racial-ethnic

groups at a time. For example, the mean distance between black males and white females is less than the distance between white males and black females. This result supports the hypothesis that marriages involving the former pairing are more common than marriages involving the latter pairing due to homophily on gender attitudes. Likewise, the distance in gender attitudes between Asian males and white females is much greater than the (non-significant) distance between Asian females and white males. This also confirms an earlier hypothesis. Similar sets of comparisons are summarized in Table 1.11. Table 1.11 collects the above hypotheses—that the sex gap in outmarriage is correlated with the sex gap in gender attitudes. A check mark indicates each of the hypotheses which is confirmed. Eleven out of twelve, or actually, 5 out of the 6 independent combinations are confirmed.

### *The Sex Gap in Divorce*

Further confirmation that gender attitudes are related to the observed sex gaps in outmarriage can be found in divorce data on intermarriage.

*The logic of the argument.* As we saw above, there is a sex gap in gender attitudes which leads to a sex gap in intermarriage. But compatibility in gender attitudes is only one dimension upon which people base their choice of marriage partners. The gap in gender attitudes explains the gap in outmarriage, but since people choose partners for a variety of reasons, part of the gap in gender attitudes should remain among spouses. This is what Table 1.12 shows, but divorce data can help us further understand this question.

Although there are “stable, unhappy marriages” (Heaton and Albrecht 1991), marital unhappiness remains a key determinant of divorce. Husbands and wives whose gender role attitudes diverge from their spouse’s attitudes are less satisfied with their marriages than are those whose attitudes match (Lye and Biblarz 1993), and those who do divorce have a greater gap on gender attitudes than those who remain married (Byrne 1971:32-4; Jacobson 1952). Thus, since Table 1.10 suggests it, and because it is consistent with the logic of this argument, we can expect that divorce rates will be higher among white male-black female (WB) couples than among black male-white female (BW) couples; higher among Asian male-white female (AW) than among white male-Asian female (WA) couples; higher among Latino male-white female (LW) than among white male-Latina female (WL) couples.

There are likely to be more external pressures on outmarried couples than on than on inmarried couples, and so a higher prevalence of stable, unhappy marriages among the inmarried. Thus, while it is probably not legitimate to compare the divorce rates of inmarried and outmarried couples as an indicator of their matching on gender attitudes, there is no reason this cannot be done with different combinations of outmarried couples. If anything, individual choice is more important factor for marrying and for staying married for outmarriage than it is for inmarriage, simply because those who marry out often have to overcome social pressures in order to marry. So, the decision to be in an outmarriage is likely to be a highly individualized one. There may be some tendency to put on a happy face in a mixed marriage, simply because so many may have expected it

to fail, but over the long term the same emphasis on individual choice that brought the couple together will, in an unhappy marriage, lead them to separate.

There is no reason to believe that there would be similar differences across different combinations of exogamy in the likelihood of staying in unhappy marriages. Nor is there any reason to believe that majority men face different pressures to stay in unhappy mixed marriages than do majority women. And if there are different pressures for minority women and minority men, there is no reason to believe that these pressures would not be similar across minority groups. Thus, were black women more likely than black men to divorce in their respective exogamous marriages and Asian men were more likely than Asian women to divorce in their exogamous marriages, this would be evidence for gender attitude incompatibility, not for any sort of external pressures.

It is possible that there are particularistic societal pressures that cause exogamous marriages to fail in this uneven pattern. But there is no general reason that can explain it. Furthermore, finding evidence of similar patterns of divorce among exogamous couples across different ethnic groups gives further strength to the argument. Four Asian ethnic groups show different rates of outmarriage and have other cultural differences, so similar patterns of exogamous divorce provide support for the argument that it is influenced by sex gaps in gender attitudes.

*Evidence.* There is limited evidence on interracial divorce, though what evidence there is is striking in its pattern and its consistency with the above thesis. Many states do not collect this evidence, and states that once did no longer do so (Monahan 1976). All previous studies of rates of interracial divorce concern the breakup of marriages between

whites and nonwhites. In almost every case, divorce rates are higher for those interracial combinations where there are greater sex gaps in gender attitudes.

As Table 1.13a shows, divorce rates were higher for white-male/black-female (WB) marriages than for black-male/white-female (BW) marriages in Iowa, 1944-67 (Monahan 1970), and in Kansas, 1952-69 (Monahan 1971). The same pattern held in Hawaii, 1958-62, though this is based on fewer than 50 WB marriages (Monahan 1966:45). This higher rate of divorce held even though 77% of marriages between blacks and whites in Iowa (Monahan 1970) and 85% in Kansas were BW marriages (Monahan 1971). The figures for the sex gap in outmarriage in Iowa and Kansas for this period are comparable to recent national figures for black-white intermarriage (Table 1.3).

The divorce rate is higher for Latino male/white female (LW) marriages than for white male/Latina female (WL) marriages in the two cases where there is published information. LW marriages involving Puerto Ricans had twice the divorce rate of WL marriages (41% versus 20%) in Hawaii, 1958-1962 (Table 1.13c). Mexican male-Anglo female couples had a divorce rate of 25.0, while Anglo male-Mexican female couples had a divorce rate of 23.9 in Iowa, 1944-1967 (Monahan 1970). Thus, the sex gap in divorce is in the same direction for two Latino ethnic groups in their marriages with whites.

A similar pattern holds for five Asian and Pacific Islander ethnic groups in their divorce rates with whites. In general, Asian male/white female (AW) marriages were more likely to end than white male/Asian female (WA) marriages in three periods between 1952 and 1976 in Hawaii for which the data has been calculated (Cheng and Yamamura 1957; Lind 1964; Schwertfeger 1982). This is true of Chinese-white and

Filipino-white marriages in all three periods (see Tables 1.13b-1.13d). It is true of Japanese-white marriages in two of the three periods and is true of Hawaiian-white and Korean-white marriages. Sung (1990b:348) also found the same to be true of Chinese-non-Chinese marriages in New York City, 1981-1986. However, Monahan (1970:468) found the opposite pattern in Asian-white marriages in Iowa, 1944-1967.

### **Conclusion**

An interesting fact suggested by the data in this paper is the continuing significance of a culture of anti-black discrimination. Blacks have outmarriage rates several times lower than either Latinos or Asians (Table 1.1). This is in excess of what can be explained by gaps in status achievement. SES gaps between Latinos and whites are almost as great as those between blacks and whites, and yet Latino outmarriage rates are much higher than black outmarriage rates. Nor is this likely explained by greater black opposition to intermarriage. Blacks have been consistently more tolerant than whites toward intermarriage for at least the last 30 years (Gallup 1968, 1983, 1997). Further, intermarried couples tend to experience less rejection from the black community and families than from their white counterparts (Porterfield 1978; Rosenblatt, Karis, and Powell 1995). Evidence would suggest that the lower black outmarriage rate is a result of a greater white antipathy and rejection toward blacks than toward other minority groups. This would be consistent with the greater rejection of blacks by whites in housing (Massey and Denton 1993). It is also consistent with dating patterns at a multiethnic,

integrated high school, in which blacks tend to be selected last as dating partners by members of other racial-ethnic groups (Peshkin 1991).

At a broader level, the paper has shed light on the homophily (similarity) principle. The homophily principle as an explanation of interracial marriage includes both structural and cultural factors. Structural factors include similarity along lines of educational and occupational status. It is clear that minority groups that have achieved SES status closest to whites also have the highest intermarriage with them. Thus, Asian income and educational achievements are closest to whites, followed by Latinos, followed by blacks. Similarly, outmarriage with whites is highest among Asians, followed by Latinos, followed by blacks. We find a similar pattern among Latino ethnic groups in their outmarriages with non-Latinos. Among Latinos, Cubans-Americans have an SES closest to non-Latino whites, and they also have the highest rate of outmarriage with non-Latinos (Cuban per capita income in 1989, \$16,261; non-Hispanic, \$15,002 (U.S. Census 1993a)); Dominicans have the lowest SES of the groups listed in Table 1.5 (per capita income, \$7,381) and the lowest outmarriage rate.

This paper has also shown that a cultural factor—gender role attitudes—is important in explaining the sex gap in outmarriage (the gap between men and women of a particular racial-ethnic group in their outmarriage rate). This gives support to the view that we cannot understand the action of individuals by merely focusing on their structural network position. As DiMaggio (1992) argues, practical action is always guided by structural constraints as well as by cultural orientations and attitudes. Much of the intermarriage rate can be explained by structural factors (Blau et al. 1982), but this paper

has demonstrated that the sex gap in outmarriage cannot. To understand this sex gap, we must understand the attributes of individuals, no matter how strongly we would like to adhere to the dream of purely structural explanations (Burt 1992; Mayhew 1980). Nor is the topic of intermarriage an insignificant one to the broader issues of social structure. Intermarriage is pertinent to the question of how a key structural grouping—socially-constructed racial groups—are maintained as coherent entities.

This paper also brings to the fore questions about the categories we use in stratification research. To the extent that the categories of race, class, and gender are socially constructed, it is important to know how they are constructed, especially in interaction with one another. In recent decades in the United States, class boundaries in marriage (as measured by education) have become stronger (Kalmijn 1991), while racial boundaries have become weaker (Kalmijn 1998). The present research has suggested that racial boundaries have not weakened in isolation, but that dissatisfaction with within-group gender roles has been a positive force in that weakening. The importance of gender roles to racial boundaries should come as no surprise. Gender boundaries are always crossed in marriage, since marriage has been legally defined (at least to this point) as a cross-gender pairing. The crossing of gender lines in marriage is universal, whereas crossing racial lines is considerably rarer; racial attitudes come into play in only some marriages, while gender attitudes come into play in all marriages.

## **Chapter 2**

### **The Effects of Women's Economic Dependency on Racial and Ethnic Boundaries**

There have been decreases in racial group solidarity in the United States in recent years, if we examine attitudes toward intermarriage, and a weakening in racial boundaries, if we consider the sharp increases in intermarriage. One obvious explanation for a decrease in racial solidarity is that people pursue individualistic solutions to their problems. The specific issue that I address here are the factors that lead to a decrease in racial "loyalty" when it comes marriage markets. Though I focus on attitudes toward intermarriage, I argue below that the change in attitudes toward intermarriage creates an environment that affects the rate of intermarriage.

It has been generally argued that endogamy is crucial for the reproduction of race and ethnicity (Weber 1978; Hechter 1978; Blau 1982). Yet the role of women in these social reproduction processes has often been overlooked. Their interests in ethnicity have often been read off those of the men around them. Nor has adequate consideration been given to the role of gender and sexual ideology in reinforcing racial boundaries. Weber suggests that an "ethnic brotherhood" uses "ethnic honor" to defend ethnic boundaries. But where there's honor among men, there are often women whose comportment is constrained and who do the invisible labor that makes honor possible.

In this chapter I examine the effects of women's labor force participation on racial solidarity (as measured by tolerance toward intermarriage), as well as the relationship between attitudinal support for women's labor force participation and tolerance toward

intermarriage. In addition, I examine the effect of a number of other gender and sexual attitudes on tolerance toward intermarriage.

### **Theoretical Argument**

Weber argues that ethnic boundaries are created to help the market position of a group of men, what he calls an “ethnic brotherhood.” In order to avoid intense competition in a market, a group of individuals bans together on the basis of one or more characteristics (often racial or cultural) to affect social closure—that is to gain group advantages in that market.<sup>1</sup> This is the basis of Weber’s explanation of race and ethnicity, as well as other status groupings. Once an ethnic group has been formed, its solidarity is maintained and boundaries are enforced through “ethnic honor.” Weber argues that endogamy is crucial to maintaining group boundaries, and that ethnic honor serves to ensure endogamy.

Weber’s discussion of ethnic groups and ethnic closure is focused almost entirely on men; he neglects to consider either the position or the perspective of women. Weber has been criticized generally for his neglect to theorize the position of women (Bologh 1990; Sydie 1987). Specifically concerning ethnicity, this neglect to consider women only partly diminished Weber’s argument in his day, but today this neglect undermines

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<sup>1</sup> I focus on labor markets in this analysis. Weber defines the market position around which groups affect social closure more broadly than labor market position. Weber (1978:341-2) includes the economic position more generally. Though ethnic closure can include the monopolization of other markets (e.g., credit, capital), labor markets will be most pertinent market related to the livelihood for the vast majority of respondents to a national survey. An example of this would be the key economic position of the planter

our understanding of ethnicity. When it is assumed that women are wholly dependent on men economically, Weber's attempt to explain ethnicity by only considering the position of men obscures some crucial facts about ethnicity. But when great numbers of women are employed, Weber's explanations of ethnic honor become tenuous, indeed.

Women's employment is a critical factor in understanding how ethnic solidarity may have weakened. There are two reasons for this. The first concerns the decrease in the occupational specialization of an ethnic group that results from women's employment. Since women and men are highly segregated by occupation, any increase in women's employment will tend to decrease an ethnic group's occupational specialization. The second factor concerns the types of human capital investments men and women make while in relationships. Housewives, especially, but women more generally, tend to make more specific investments in relationships than do men. This means that women will tend to have more conservative sexual morality than do men, since women stand to lose more economically if relationships are severed. This conservative sexual morality may very well extend to conservatism toward interracial sexuality and marriage.

### **Women's Interests in Ethnicity**

As Weber argues, ethnic boundaries are created to help the market position of a group of men, what he calls an "ethnic brotherhood." Though Weber doesn't acknowledge the

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class in the South. The planter class' economic market position was not a labor market position, though the

possibility, I argue that women may have a different market position concerning ethnicity than do men.

Women's interests in ethnicity can't just be read off of men's interests. It is through women's economic dependence on specific men that they have interests in ethnicity.<sup>2</sup> Women's general interests are not in ethnic boundaries, and may actually be a force for the weakening of ethnic boundaries. This can be seen most clearly by examining women's interests concerning ethnicity by examining four possible positions women may find themselves in: married and unmarried women without the expectation of paid employment (current and future housewives), and married and unmarried women who are, or expect to be employed.

#### *The Interests of Housewives*

Where women are housewives, they tend to take on their husbands' interests in ethnicity. But there are a few aspects of their interests that differ from their husbands.' Housewives interest in ethnicity is through the specific man on whom she is economically dependent—her husband.

This economic dependency tends to lead housewives to support conservative sexual morality. Since housewives get their livelihoods from one man, any nonexclusive sexuality is a threat that some or all of her resources will be lost. Extramarital sexuality may be accompanied with affection, and along with that resources may flow. Then, again, it may more closely resemble a monetary exchange. The former is more

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vast majority of Southern whites economic position in race concerned their labor market position.

<sup>2</sup> This is an analysis of interests of those who are dependent for their livelihoods on labor markets (and perhaps those with wealth as well). Under conditions of household production, men's and women's economic—and, hence, ethnic—interests will more closely resemble one another.

economically threatening to housewives than the latter. For men, their economic interests lie in enforcing social closure, hence it is in their economic interests to restrict their sexuality to within their ethnic group but not necessarily to one woman.<sup>3</sup> Women have the further burden of generally being stuck with the illegitimate children from cross-ethnic relationships that are not socially or legally sanctioned. This is especially odious when she is economically dependent on the men from her ethnic group who are intent on enforcing ethnic closure. This further reinforces conservative sexual morality on the part of women.

Housewives also make different sorts of investment in their families than do their husbands. Housewives make heavy investments in the human capital of specific others (in her husband and children), while their husbands primarily make investments in their own human capital. Since the husbands' investments are primarily in their own human capital, it is much more fungible or transferable to a new relationship and family than are housewives' investments (England and Farkas 1986). Therefore, it is in housewives' interests to enhance their role and strengthen the stability of their family ties. Thus, we should expect housewives to support traditional gender role and sexual norms as a way of ensuring family stability. Housewives' heavy asset-specific human capital investments may also make them more resistant than their husbands are to change, when family or racial conditions in the society have changed. Housewives have simply made too large of an investment in the old ways to quickly adapt to change.

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<sup>3</sup> It was quite common in American history for men in the dominant group (whites) to have sexual liaisons of varying periods with women from the subordinate group (blacks). Though this was at times socially permitted, marriage never was (Spickard 1989:239-245). Interracial marriage would legitimize the marriage and the mixed-race offspring, and thus was a threat to racial boundaries.

*The Interests of Future Housewives*

Single women who expect to become housewives have quite different interests in ethnicity than do men or than do women who have already married within their ethnicity. To the extent women get economic and social recognition from men, marriage markets are important to women. But marriage markets in these circumstances (where women are economically dependent on men) mean different things to men and women. As Weber argues, it is in the economic interest of high-status men to enforce social closure and to marry within their ethnic group. Even though a particular man in a high-status group may have a taste for women of another ethnic group, it is generally not in his economic interest to marry outside his group. This is because men generally do not gain wealth through marriage and because their economic interest in ethnicity is a collective interest. Though men in this situation may not make a conscious calculation of group economic benefit when he is choosing a partner, neither does he have economic interests that motivate him against conforming to the norms of endogamy. The value of ethnicity for men is in the monopolistic closure of market niches to those outside their ethnicity. To marry across ethnic boundaries would be to weaken those boundaries, and weaken the benefits one's ethnic group enjoys in those closed markets.

Where women are attached to the economy only through their connection to particular men, their economic interests are more individualistic. Women's economic interest in marriage is to get the best deal in a husband, regardless of ethnicity. The social closure of marriage markets (their restriction by ethnicity) is economically disadvantageous to a woman searching for a partner on a marriage market. This is

consistent with the explanation Merton (1941) gives for intermarriage. Merton argues that the most common intermarriages are hypergamous—women will marry outside of their racial or ethnic group in pursuit of economic advantage.

Men pursue economic advantage in labor and capital markets, and unmarried women pursue advantage in marriage markets. It is to men's advantage in economic markets to keep ethnic boundaries strong by keeping marriage markets closed, and it is to unmarried women's advantage to keep marriage markets open. Unmarried women don't have interests in the social closure of marriage markets. Perhaps it is for this reason that ethnic honor is often defended in terms of the sexual honor of unmarried women.

*The Interests of Employed Women in Ethnicity*

Women's employment changes their orientation to conservative sexual morality. No longer wholly dependent on a husband for her livelihood, her sexual attitudes become more liberal (England and Swoboda 1988). But since she makes greater specific investments in relationships than do men, she is still likely to have more conservative sexual morality than men. But more important than the ratio of her general to specific human capital investments is the fact that her employment profoundly changes her interest in ethnicity.

Women's employment is probably a key factor in the weakening of ethnicity. This is because occupational homogeneity within an ethnic group strengthens that group. When women get their occupational status from their husbands, then the occupational specialization of an ethnic group depends on the men in that group. But since women

and men are so segregated by occupation, when women get jobs, the occupational heterogeneity of the ethnic group will almost inevitably increase.

As far back as Durkheim (1893/1984), the argument has been made that occupations are a key source of identity and solidarity in modern societies. The idea is that workers in the same occupations share similar fates and develop similar views of the world. Michael Hechter (1978) tested this argument with regard to ethnic group boundaries. He found that ethnic group endogamy was positively related to male occupational specialization. He argues that when there are already cultural differences between groups, and these groups also become occupationally segregated, their ethnic solidarity will increase. This is what he calls the “cultural division of labor.” Durkheim and Hechter make the same assumption that Weber makes—that the occupations of males and the solidarity between males is what is important. But once women enter paid employment, the picture of ethnic solidarity changes dramatically. Because women and men are so highly segregated by occupation, almost any increase in women’s employment will decrease an ethnic group’s mean occupational specialization. And in so doing, it will increase the number of cross-cutting social ties, thereby decreasing ethnic solidarity and increasing exogamy. Thus women’s employment should be a strong predictor of intermarriage.

### **Men, Women, and Cultural Boundaries**

Aside from any arguments about interests, there is a well-established body of literature that argues that women are less focused on separation from other people, have weaker (or more fluid) boundaries, and are less concerned than men about the “separative self” (Chodorow 1978; Gilligan 1982; Rubin 1983). The implications of this perspective for race would be that women would be less concerned about and less supportive of ethnic boundaries than men, because women are less insistent upon social boundaries in general because of their differences from men in psychosocial development. Johnson and Marini (1998) provide support for this notion in their finding that women are more tolerant than men of friendships across the racial divide.

As I have argued above, questions about the role of housewives or about premarital and extramarital sex can easily be explained in terms of the differing economic interests of men and women, depending on whether they are employed and their asset-specific investments in relationships. But the question of homosexuality is not so easily explained in terms of interests, and is a good indicator of attitudes toward a separative self. Unlike premarital or extramarital sex, homosexuality does not pose a threat to ethnic boundaries or to the resource distribution of existing relationships. Since homosexual relations are non-procreative, they do not pose the possibility of mixed-race children that is the threat to racial boundaries of unregulated heterosexual relations. And though there is the possibility that the resource distribution of stable heterosexual relationships will be upset by homosexual affairs, the likelihood that a partner will have a heterosexual affair is much greater, and hence much more threatening to the heterosexual relationship. It has often been argued that homosexuality is a threat to the pronatalist

policies that accompany nationalism. Nations that are fighting wars or engaging in colonization have a need for a growing population. But where homosexuality is permitted, birth rates decline, hence, nationalists are against homosexuality. Or where ethnic groups are competing for political power, for example, numbers of voters, they may also pursue pronatalist policies. But neither of these circumstances is characteristic of racial-ethnic relations in the contemporary United States. This conflict does not involve war or colonization, and the attending need for high birth rates to supply the necessary soldiers, nor is it clear that a pronatalist strategy is used to gain political dominance. Historically, racial political conflict in the United States has involved the disfranchisement of voters, not an attempt to outbreed an opposing group.

This suggests that what is at stake in homosexuality is the weakening of cultural boundaries that follow a similar logic to racial and ethnic boundaries. Tolerance of homosexuality means a tolerance of crossing boundaries of the accepted cultural order. Traditionally, both cross-racial and same-sex relations have been seen as deviant and highly polluting. This is consistent with the argument that Mary Douglas (1966) makes about cultural objects that are not in their proper place are seen as pollution. Things that are viewed as polluted are a threat to the whole cultural order, the cosmology of a group. Important cultural boundaries are seen as linked to one another, and the crossing of one boundary is seen as polluting to the whole cultural system. Ethnicity, as much as procreative relations, becomes a sacred object, and anything that does not fit into these categories is seen as polluting. Thus, homosexuality is a threat to racial boundaries. To

tolerate homosexuality is to accept the “pollution” of a cultural boundary, and to legitimate the crossing of racial boundaries and the “pollution” it implies.

### **Data and Methods**

The primary question of this analysis concerns the effects of women’s employment on attitudes toward interracial marriage. This gets at the broader question of men’s and women’s economic interests in ethnicity. Secondly, I am interested in determining the relationship of attitudes toward gender roles and sexuality with attitudes toward intermarriage. The key variables in this analysis are sex, women’s employment (which I operationalize by examining housewives), and the interaction of sex and age.

That data set that I use in this analysis is the General Social Survey, for the years 1972-1998. A total of 38,116 respondents were interviewed in these years. A number of the questions I use in my analyses were only asked in some of these years. Each of the control variables (below) was asked in each year of the GSS. To control for the effect of attitude change over the 26 years between when the first GSS was conducted and the most recent one that I use, I have controlled for the year of the GSS survey.

#### *Dependent variable—attitudes toward intermarriage*

The dependent variable in this analysis is a question of whether there should be laws against marriages between blacks and whites. Because it is a dichotomous dependent variable, it is appropriate to use logistic regression analysis in models predicting this attitude. This question was asked each year the GSS was conducted

between 1972 and 1998<sup>4</sup>, except 1973, 1983, and 1986. I have transformed the dependent variable so that it is scaled such that scores indicating more racial tolerance, or favoring intermarriage, are higher. Thus, positive, significant coefficients indicate that a variable is associated with tolerance toward intermarriage.

*Key variables—sex, female employment, and the sex-age interaction*

Sex is important to consider in relation to ethnicity because women have different economic interests than men depending on their employment status, their occupation, and their ratio of asset-specific to general human capital investments when they are in relationships. And the different economic interests of men and women will help influence their relative support for racial-ethnic boundaries. Women are socialized more strongly than are men to conform to conventional sexual morality (and face greater social sanctions when they do not). To the extent the interracial marriage is seen as sexually deviant, we would expect women to be less approving of it than men. On the other hand, some have argued that women are more likely than men to view moral questions in terms of relationships, and thus may not oppose intermarriage when it is framed in these terms. Johnson and Marini's (1998) research supports this interpretation. They found that females are more tolerant than males concerning cross-racial friendships and understanding. (Sex is coded 1 for females, 0 for males.)

The housewife variable comes from a variable on work status. All females who answered that they were "keeping house" were included in this the housewife variable. (Other choices on the work status variable included "working full time," working part

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<sup>4</sup> There was no GSS in 1979, 1981, or 1992, and since 1994, the GSS has been conducted every two years.

time,” “unemployed,” “retired,” or “in school.”) 2.2% of those who chose the “keeping house” category were men. They were excluded from the analysis because the goal with the housewife variable is to learn the position and attitudes of women concerning racial solidarity.

A sex-age interaction term is included to measure the social cohort effect of the female composition of the labor force. Examining women’s employment status through the housewife variable only measures women’s individual labor market experiences, but not the greater social context of many women’s labor market experiences. When the majority of women are employed this will reinforce the attitude change of any individual women far more than when few women are employed. Since women’s employment has steadily increased over the last several decades, a sex-age interaction term will capture these contextual effects.

#### *Gender Value Variables*

Four variables are included that indicate traditional gender roles. Each of these are coded such that higher scores indicate more traditional or conservative attitudes. The first two variables (responses to the statements “It is more important for a wife to help her husband’s career than to have one herself” and “A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works”) are related to support for the housewife role. The “help husband’s career” item directly justifies the housewife role in relation to her husband. The “preschool child suffers” item justifies the housewife role (at least when children are young) in relation to her children. Each of these questions is a four response Likert-type index (from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”). The next variable (“Most

men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women”) is consistent with a traditional separate spheres argument—women belong in the home, men in the public sphere. Though consistent with support for the housewife role, this variable is a little more indirect than the previous two. The responses for this variable are: 1 = disagree; 2 = agree. The next question concerns abortion (“Should it be possible for a pregnant women to obtain a legal abortion if the women wants it for any reason?”). This variable is coded 1 = yes; 2 = no. Luker (1984) found that opposition to abortion was associated with support for the homemaker role.

### *Control variables*

I will now describe the control variables and the rationale for including them. Since the analysis of tolerance toward intermarriage is a fairly new area, there is not a set of standard control variables that are employed. I have borrowed a set from other research on racial attitudes.

The first set of controls is for whether the respondent is white or black. The comparison category is respondents who are neither black nor white. Since, according to Weber, status boundaries are created and enforced by the dominant group, we can expect that members of this group will be more concerned with enforcing boundaries than will be members of subordinate groups. In fact, the level of opposition to intermarriage should reflect the racial hierarchy. Those in the dominant group (whites) will be the most likely to oppose intermarriage. Those lowest on the hierarchy (blacks) will be the least likely to oppose intermarriage. While those in other groups, since they gain little from the racial hierarchy but aren’t as disadvantaged as blacks (Marger 1994), will be substantially

less likely to oppose intermarriage than whites, but somewhat more likely to oppose it than blacks. Prior research has shown that blacks consistently have more tolerant racial attitudes than do whites (Schuman et al. 1997).

The “laws” question concerns marriages between blacks and whites, so both white respondents and black respondents have a more direct interest in this question, while for those of other races this question addresses the racial boundaries more generally. The second dependent variable, the question concerning attitudes toward a “close relative marrying a black,” is really only an interracial marriage question for whites and for “others,” not for blacks. Since it is normative for persons to marry within their race, it goes without saying that blacks will be more tolerant than non-blacks of a close relative marrying a black.

Since one of the predictions of this study is that the increase in women’s employment has led to a weakening of racial boundaries, we would expect that over the period for which I have GSS data (1972-1998), attitudes against intermarriage would have weakened. For this reason, I have controlled for the survey year (the year the GSS was conducted) for each of the models.

In addition to period effects, intermarriage attitudes may be subject to age or cohort effects. Individuals may have formed their attitudes toward intermarriage early in their life and carried these attitudes forward as they grew older, or more conservative or more liberal attitudes toward this topic may be a result of growing older. Analyzing this same GSS variable, Schuman and associates (1997:208) find that for whites, younger cohorts are more tolerant and that over time (1972-1994) each of these cohorts has grown

more tolerant. To control for this variation, I have also included a variable for age of the respondent.

Education is also controlled for in each model. Schuman et al. (1997:118) report that higher levels of education lead to higher levels of tolerance toward intermarriage. Education is also related to individualism; those with lower levels of education are more likely to raise their children toward conformity (Kohn and Schooler 1983). Thus, including an education variable controls for a confounding relationship between education and Inglehart's secular-rational and self-expression measures of individualism. Education is measured in years of schooling (0-20).

It is important to control for region of the respondent, since different regions of the country have had distinctive racial histories. This is most clear-cut in the South with its history of slavery, Jim Crow, lynching, and Ku Klux Klan activism. Stories of miscegenation were an important impetus in Klan recruitment and in lynchings (Blee 1991; MacLean 1994). More recently, the states that had laws against interracial marriage in 1967, when the Supreme Court ruled such laws unconstitutional, were the 16 states in the South census region, plus Missouri. But the South is not the only region to have had extensive white supremacist and antimiscegenation organizing. The Ku Klux Klan was also powerful in the Midwest, as well as in communities in other parts of the nation (Blee 1991). On the basis of this history, one would expect those from the South to be most likely to be against interracial marriage, followed by those from the Midwest.

Since there has been a great deal of interregional migration in the United States, the region the respondent lived in at age 16 is used as proxy for the region he or she grew

up in. The regions are the four broad regions defined by the Census Bureau, as well as those from foreign countries. The South, the Midwest, the Northeast, and Foreign are the regions included in the analysis, with the reference category those who lived in the West at age 16.

## **Results**

Before considering the effect of women's employment and gender attitudes on attitudes toward intermarriage, I will examine the differences in gender attitudes between men and women by various employment status. The t-tests of mean differences will help us interpret the regression analyses that follow.

### *Differences between Men and Women in Gender and Sexuality Attitudes*

In Tables 2.1a-2.1c, I examine whether there are significant mean differences between men and women, and between men and housewives and between men and employed women, on gender role and sexuality attitudes. Table 2.1a reveals that generally men are more conservative than women on gender role attitudes, but that women are more conservative than men on sexuality attitudes. The exception to this is that men are slightly more conservative about homosexuality. Women are substantially more conservative than men concerning premarital and extramarital sex. This finding is consistent with the greater asset-specificity of women's investments in relationships, as compared to men's more general human capital investments. Women are also slightly more conservative than men in their attitudes toward abortion. Men are more

conservative than women on the “husband’s career” and the “kids suffer” questions, substantially so on the latter question. There are no significant differences between men and women on the “women and politics” question. But this first table aggregates together women, who in theory, should have very different attitudes based on their labor market experiences. The next two tables disaggregate women according to whether they are housewives or employed.

Table 2.1b reveals that across each of the gender role and sexuality questions housewives are more conservative than men. This is consistent with the argument that housewives entire livelihoods are tied up in their roles as housewives and that they try to enhance this role. It is also consistent with the argument that ratio of specific-to-general human capital investments is higher for housewives than for any other category, and therefore that this leads to greater sexual conservatism.

Table 2.1c gives further support to these arguments. It reveals that employed women are *less* conservative than men on each of the questions except for the premarital and extramarital sex questions, where employed women are more conservative than men. The results on the latter two questions are consistent with the argument that employed women make greater relationship-specific investments than do men, even though employed women do so at a lower rate than housewives. Tables 2.1b and 2.1c reveal the latter distinction as well: the gap between men and women on attitudes toward premarital and extramarital sex is greater for housewives than it is for employed women. Housewives have the highest level of relationship-specific human capital investments and housewives are the most conservative on these sexuality questions. Men have the lowest

level of relationship-specific investments, and are the least conservative on these questions. Employed women fall somewhere in the middle on both investments and attitudes.

It is interesting that men are more conservative about homosexuality than are employed women. This suggests that for employed women their attitudes toward sexuality reflect their interests, and not some cultural ideas about boundary defense more generally. But men are *less* conservative than housewives about homosexuality. This suggests that housewives are taking on an ideology about homosexuality that has little to do with their interests. This is especially interesting in light of the argument that women are generally less threatened than men by homosexuality and its threat to male's separative selves.

*Women's Employment and Gender and Sexuality Attitudes as Predictors of Attitudes toward Intermarriage*

In Table 2.2, I test whether women's employment, gender and sexuality values, and a number of controls are predictors of opposition to anti-intermarriage laws. The results of the logistic regression in Model 1 show that each of the controls is a significant predictor of tolerance toward intermarriage. Blacks are significantly more tolerant, and whites are significantly less tolerant of intermarriage than are those who are neither black nor white. Tolerance increases with education and decreases with age. Tolerance has also increased over time, with the more recently the GSS was conducted, the more tolerant the respondents have been. Region is also significant. Those who came of age in the South, the Midwest, and the Northeast are less tolerant of those who came of age in

the West, while those who grew up in foreign countries are more tolerant than those who came of age in the West. Perhaps those from foreign countries are more tolerant than those from the U.S. because there are not laws against intermarriage in most countries. Perhaps the reason is because the majority of immigrants are nonwhite and they don't want to be excluded from the possibility of assimilation for themselves or their children that anti-intermarriage laws imply. Most of the controls are significant across each of the models, meaning that these are robust predictors of attitudes toward intermarriage.

Sex is also a significant variable in Model 1, with women significantly less tolerant of legalizing intermarriage than are men. This is consistent with women's dependence on men economically, and their dependence on a racial structure that gains them these benefits. This explanation is further reinforced in the next model. When a variable is added for housewives (in Model 2), the effect for sex almost disappears entirely, falling far below significance. In Model 3, a variable for the interaction of sex and age is added to capture the contextual effects on women's attitudes by cohort. (In other words, this variable is added to test whether women's attitudes toward intermarriage are not just a result of their individual labor market position with relation to ethnicity, but their socialization to this question taking into account the interests of all women in their cohort.) The sex-age interaction is significant, meaning that women are significantly more likely to oppose intermarriage if they come from an older cohort. Importantly, once the effect of older women is taken into account, women are more tolerant of intermarriage than men. This is the opposite effect from Model 1. These first three models provide evidence for the reasons why women are less tolerant of

intermarriage than men. These reasons are women's economic dependency and being raised in a cohort in which women had the expectation of being economically dependent. Once these reasons are taken into account, women are more tolerant than are men.

Models 4 through 8 test whether the effects of sex and economic dependency on intermarriage attitudes are modified once attitudes toward gender roles and sexuality are taken into account. In Model 4, the variables most closely related to housewives' roles ("Help Husband's Career" and "Preschool Kids Suffer") are added to the equations. With the addition of these variables, the housewife variable falls below significance, though the direction of the signs does not change. This is not surprising. Comparing Tables 2.1b and 2.1c reveals large differences between housewives and employed women on these questions. The fact that the "Help Husband's Career" variable is significant, and causes the housewife variable to fall below significance, helps explain the reasons why housewives are opposed to intermarriage. The effect of the "Help Husband's Career" variable on the explanatory power of the housewives variable suggests that housewives' opposition to intermarriage is economic. The addition of the attitude variables in Model 4 does not affect the significance of sex or of the interaction between sex and age. These variables continue to be significant across all subsequent models.

In Models 5 and 6, variables are added for "Women not Suited for Politics" and abortion. Both of these variables are significant (and remain significant in the remaining two models), and adding them does not affect the significance of any other variables. Conservative attitudes toward each of these variables are significant predictors of intolerance toward interracial marriage.

In Models 7 and 8, sexuality variables are added. Conservative attitudes toward premarital sex and extramarital sex are each predictors for intermarriage attitudes. This is consistent with earlier predictions that restricting premarital sex is important in enforcing racial boundaries, since unmarried women have interests in unrestricted marriage markets, which itself is a threat to racial boundaries. The finding for extramarital sex is consistent with the asset-specific investments women make in relationships.

With the addition of the homosexuality variable in Model 8, the premarital and extramarital sex variables fall below significance, while opposition to homosexuality is a powerful predictor of opposition to intermarriage.<sup>5</sup> This is a very interesting finding, since it is not clear that homosexuality has much to do with economic interests in ethnicity. This suggests that, in part, opposition to intermarriage is based on cultural factors that don't have a direct connection to economic interests.

## **Conclusion**

The current research has found that women have more conservative attitudes than men when it comes to tolerance toward interracial marriage, but that when women's housewife status, and the cohort effect of being in a generation in which most other women are housewives, is taken into account, women are in fact more tolerant of intermarriage than men. This is explained extending Hechter's (1978) argument about the cultural division of labor, in which he finds that as an ethnic group's occupational

heterogeneity increases its exogamy rate also increases, to include women. Because of occupational sex segregation, an increase in women's employment tends to lead to increases in an ethnic group's occupational heterogeneity.

In addition, this chapter analyzed the role of women's economic dependency—both directly, and through their asset-specific investments in their families—in promoting conservative attitudes toward gender roles and sexuality. Attitudes toward gender roles and sexuality were then associated with attitudes toward intermarriage. Almost all conservative gender role and sexuality attitudes were significant predictors of intolerance toward intermarriage. Interestingly, opposition to homosexuality was a strong predictor of opposition to intermarriage, even though attitudes toward homosexuality does not appear to be based on economic interests. And this variable washes out the effects of attitudes toward premarital and extramarital sex, variables that do appear to be based on economic interests.

This research's main finding—that women's employment leads to decreased racial solidarity—has two possible interpretations. First, it could mean that women have a greater proclivity than men toward racial tolerance, and that once women are no longer so economically dependent on men, this latent attitude emerges. This argument is consistent with a line of thinking exemplified by Nancy Chodorow (1978). Second, the main research finding could mean that since employed women are at the leading edge of the change toward an ethnic group's greater occupational heterogeneity, women's attitudes change before men's. This argument is consistent with research that shows that

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<sup>5</sup> The highest level of correlation between pairs of these three variables is .41, between premarital sex and

men have been slower to change their attitudes in response to women's employment than have been women (Hochschild 1989). Further research could answer this problem of interpretation with a longitudinal research design that connected women's employment and an ethnic group's occupational heterogeneity to attitude changes. Even establishing the explanatory potential of this gendered cultural division of labor would help clarify this issue. A replication of Hechter's (1978) study of the cultural division of labor that included women's occupations would go a long way in showing that the key mechanism used in the present study is the one driving its findings. A replication of Hechter's study that included gender would have the added benefit of showing that women's employment is important in weakening ethnic boundaries through intermarriage, and not just attitudes towards intermarriage, as the present study does.

This leads us to the question of the relationship between attitudes and behaviors concerning intermarriage. In modern societies, there are very good reasons to believe that attitudes toward intermarriage and its incidence are related. This is because marriage selection has been deinstitutionalized. Gone are arranged marriages, and gone are the family's close links with religion, politics, and household production. When political and economic power ceased to travel primarily through families, the path was opened for young people to choose spouses largely on their own initiative. And when laws forbidding intermarriage were repealed, and when extralegal threats and lynchings ceased, the path was opened for marriage choice across races.

There is a well-established argument in the social sciences that attitudes do not necessarily predict behaviors. This is true because much institutional action has little to do with the attitudes of the persons who carry it out; it is driven by institutional, not personal imperatives. Thus, Merton's (1949) classical distinction between prejudice and discrimination focuses on how institutional and social pressures cause people to act at variance with their beliefs. Institutional demands may cause a nonbigoted person to discriminate, or a bigoted person not to discriminate. Thus, attitudes are often poor proxies for behavior. However, intermarriage attitudes may be an exception to this general rule.

More so than most areas of social life, mate selection in modern societies is unencumbered by institutional imperatives. Most of the constraints that prevent individuals from acting on their attitudes toward intermarriage come from social pressure in their families and communities. And this social pressure is also the result of attitudes. As greater numbers of people become tolerant and accepting toward intermarriage, more individuals seriously entertain this choice for themselves, and as a greater percentage of people in a community support the practice, social pressure against it decreases.

The most convincing argument for the relationship between intermarriage attitudes and behavior is the fact that as attitudes have grown more tolerant, the intermarriage rate has increased. In 1972, 39% of whites favored laws against marriages between blacks and whites, by 1990 21% did, and by 1998 the percentage had fallen to 13%. Similarly, in 1990, 66% of whites said they would oppose a close relative marrying a black; by 1998 this had fallen to 42% (GSS). Accompanying these sharp increases in

tolerance have been dramatic increases in intermarriage. Between 1970 and 1998 the number of interracially married black/white couples increased by 508%, by the mid-'90s representing 7% of the marriages involving blacks (Census Bureau 1999). Schuman and associates (1997:312-4) also demonstrate a consistency between intermarriage attitudes and behavior over time, and argue that the two are related.

If intermarriage attitudes and behaviors are closely related in modern societies, this would throw interesting light on this chapter's primary findings. Because there is high occupational sex segregation, women's employment leads them to develop divergent interests in ethnicity than men. But women's interests in ethnicity would be convergent with those of men if there were equality between men and women, or according to this analysis, if men and women of an ethnicity shared the same occupations. Thus racial and ethnic inequality is dependent upon gender inequality. Though we could imagine a world in which there was gender inequality that supported racial and ethnic inequality, continuing gender inequality ensures that race and ethnic boundaries will be weakened.

### **Chapter 3**

#### **Modernization, Individualism, and the Weakening of Racial Boundaries**

It was once quite common for scholars studying race and ethnicity to argue that modernization would diminish the importance of these factors in the organization of social life. As modernization led to the increasing rationalization of work, jobs would be allocated on a strictly meritocratic basis instead of on a traditional basis of patronage and family ties. This would lead to the attenuation of race and ethnicity as important elements of stratification. Both Karl Marx and Robert Park made arguments of this sort, but with race apparently alive and well, this line of argumentation has seemingly been discredited. Instead, scholars have argued that jobs are not allocated according to merit, but among networks along racial and ethnic lines, and that instead of capitalism breaking down ethnic lines, capitalists use split labor markets (and different pay scales for different ethnicities) to divide the working class (Bonacich). Thus, it is argued that the development of modern, industrial, capitalist societies do little or nothing to undermine race and ethnicity, since opportunities in labor markets continue to be unequal and occupations continue to be segregated.

But, contrary to the impression one would get from reading the literature, race and ethnicity are not only reproduced in labor markets or by political conflict. Race and ethnicity are also reproduced in marriage markets, by individuals marrying within their group. Thus, it is important to study factors that influence whether people marry exclusively within their own group, or whether they choose more widely. As I explain

below, and above (Chapter 2), marital choice is one area of social life in modern societies where there is a fairly close congruence between attitudes and behaviors. So, to answer the question of whether there is something about modernization that is undermining race and ethnicity through marriage markets, I will examine how values that are associated with modernization predict attitudes toward interracial marriage. Fortunately, there is a research program that for over 20 years has studied cross-nationally the values that are associated with modernization—the research of Ronald Inglehart and associates (1997, 2000).

### **Theoretical Background**

Marx and Weber disagreed about the future of race and ethnicity as capitalism developed. Marx suggested they would disappear, while Weber suggested that there was good reason to suspect their continued vibrance. Many think that Weber won this argument, but a closer examination allows us to identify a mechanism that Weber didn't anticipate, a mechanism that undermines race and ethnicity.

According to Marx, as capitalist production spreads throughout the globe, particularistic relations decline and internationalization and transethnic consciousness develops. Class replaces nation or ethnicity as a basis of allegiance. Marx (1848/1964:3-4) writes that with the development of international markets, “national one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible.... The cheap prices of [the bourgeoisie's] commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese

walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate.”

Weber (1946) avers that classes do develop in capitalism, but that status groups thrive as well. And status groups are often at cross- purposes to classes, splitting those with the same class position into different status groups. Weber explains that status groups develop because people are inclined to avoid intense competition for their livelihoods. When faced with this prospect, they will pick any of a number of arbitrary characteristics<sup>1</sup> with which to affect social closure. They use these characteristics to gain monopolistic control over a market niche, while excluding those outside the status group, both from the group and from the market niche it monopolizes. The status group is maintained by two things—its lifestyle and its status honor. Each of these reinforces endogamy—the essential factor in reproducing a status group across generations. I contend that both status honor and lifestyle—and along with them the norm of endogamy—are undermined by the development of capitalistic societies.

The growth of capitalism leads to increasing individualism. This is an old story in sociology. Modernism leads to increasing individualism. Even Durkheim wrote of the cult of the individual. But the shift from industrial to consumer-oriented capitalism (or from modern to postmodern society) also increases individualism. In early stages of

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<sup>1</sup> Weber does point out that physical characteristics are easier to use than other characteristics in creating criteria for group membership. It is here that we can see that race, ethnicity, and status are closely related. Weber uses the term “ethnic honor” as a subset of “status honor,” and one could easily see that “racial honor” would also fit under the same heading. In his discussion of ethnic groups, Weber explicitly uses black-white intermarriage as an example of ethnic group boundaries. Race often takes on the characteristics of a caste; for Weber, a caste is simply a status group that has hardened its lines. Race also often overlaps with class. I am not arguing that classes are decreasing in importance with the development of capitalism, only that the status characteristics of race are declining.

capitalism, production is organized to meet well-defined, customary consumption patterns. But when most of the economy is based on consumer spending, economic institutions (advertising) become reorganized to create demand, to create entirely new markets, and most important for our purposes, to create entirely new wants on the part of customers. This helps to further enhance individualism.

The growth of individualism undermines status honor. As individuals become more focused on themselves and their own goals, and value less the morality of the group, they become less willing than in the past to sacrifice their own personal goals for the honor of the group. And it is status honor, or as Weber put it “ethnic honor,” or for our purposes, racial honor that is invoked to maintain endogamy. Following the logic of status or racial honor, interracial marriage is seen to dishonor one’s race.

The development of a consumer economy also undermines the basis of a unique lifestyle monopolized by a status group. With commodification of its symbols, the distinctive styles of a status group and its symbols can no longer be monopolized. At earlier stages of capitalism, the symbols that a status group defines itself with can be procured on the market, and its group members can be convinced fairly easily to adhere only to those symbols. But with the development of the consumer economy, the imperative to constantly sell new products requires that symbols that had stable meanings and places in society be recycled and used to sell new products to new customers. In this increased commerce in symbols, the symbols of low-status groups are often revalorized and sold as high-status symbols, particularly to the young. Nor, in this environment, are the symbols of high-status groups free from consumption by other populations. To the

extent that status groups are distinct from classes (and this is the reason for coining the concept of status group), lower-status groups can't be excluded from the market for the symbols of a status group. If they have the money, they can buy the symbolic goods. With increasing commodification, market access to these symbols becomes more widely available and consumed.<sup>2</sup>

Along with the undermining of the honor and lifestyles of status groups comes an undermining of their norms of endogamy. This implies that individualism increases with the development of capitalism, and along with it intermarriage across status group lines. As classical theorists tried to explain industrial or modern society, they argued that as modern society displaced traditional society, individualism would increase. For example, Simmel (1908/1955) argued that social networks in the premodern era took the form of concentric circles, while those in the modern era were intersecting circles. Interacting with network partners in different social circles, the modern individual became increasingly individualistic. Even Durkheim (who continually stressed social over individual explanations) argued for increasing individualism with his idea of the "cult of the individual."

More recently a number of sociologists have argued for what appears to be a second shift toward individualism, several generations after the shift toward individualism that the classical theorists detected. Kenneth Gergen speaks of the "postmodern self." Ralph Turner (1976) notes a recent shift in the self from an

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<sup>2</sup> It is true that consumer capitalism creates market segments, but these are too ephemeral to be considered the basis for status groups. It is hard to imagine a market segment lasting from one generation to the next, but such persistence is exactly the defining characteristic of a status group.

“institutional self” that generally orients itself to and conforms to institutional dictates, to an “impulse self” that is much more oriented to self-defined goals and values. And building on Simmel, Bernice Pescosolido and Beth Rubin (2000) have argued that social networks in the contemporary or postmodern era take the form of a spoke structure, leading to yet more individualism than characterized the modern era. Each of these theorists is making a distinction between the selves that they started to see emerge recently and the modern selves that the classical theorists were familiar with.

### **Past Research**

Ronald Inglehart and associates have assembled measures of dimensions they believe to be relevant to the transformation of the self. Inglehart finds two things: 1) that values respond to economic development, and 2) that values are path dependent on the cultural, especially religious, background of a society. A great deal of variance in values across societies can be captured in just two dimensions: the “traditional/rational-secular values dimension” and the “survival/self-expression values dimension.” Their cross-national research shows that a nation’s average scores on the two dimensions are highly correlated with the level of economic development in a society. The traditional/rational dimension is associated with the initial industrialization of a society. The survival/self-expression dimension is associated with the later shift toward affluence or a consumer-centered economy in a society. As such, these dimensions are the best evidence we have for a values shift from pre-industrial to industrial society, and a values shift from industrial to post-industrial society. I believe the values associated with each of these shifts represent increasing individualism, and with increasing individualism I expect

status group boundaries to weaken, specifically racial boundaries as measured through intermarriage.

By using Inglehart's measures with data on attitudes toward interracial marriage in the General Social Survey, I can test whether the value-shifts that Inglehart finds are related to economic development are related to attitudes toward intermarriage. Of course, there are a number of path-dependent, that is, historically and culturally specific features of the United States that lead to intermarriage attitudes. But if I find that attitudes that are seemingly unrelated to intermarriage (such as attitudes toward homosexuality, happiness, or obedient children) are in fact predictors of tolerance toward intermarriage, my argument will be advanced. In the following sections, I will test whether a set of variables similar to Inglehart's traditional/secular values dimension, and another set similar to his survival/self-expression values dimension are predictors of tolerance toward or support of interracial marriage.

### **Data and Methods**

The key question in this analysis is whether variables tapping Inglehart's materialist and postmaterialist dimensions predict tolerance toward intermarriage.

Measures of all of these variables come from the General Social Survey, for the years 1972-1998. A total of 38,116 respondents were interviewed in these years. A number of the questions I use in my analyses were only asked in some of these years; I note in Table 3.1 which years a question was asked. Each of the control variables

(below) was asked in each year of the GSS. To control for the effect of attitude change over the 26 years between when the first GSS was conducted and the most recent one that I use, I have controlled for the year of the GSS survey.

### *Dependent Variables—Attitudes toward Intermarriage*

There are two different measures of intermarriage that I use in this analysis. The first is a question of whether there should be laws against marriages between blacks and whites. Because it is a dichotomous dependent variable, it is appropriate to use logistic regression analysis in models predicting this attitude. This question was asked each year the GSS was conducted between 1972 and 1998<sup>3</sup>, except 1973, 1983, and 1986. The second question asks the respondent's opinion about "having a close relative or family member marry a black person." It is a five-response Likert-type scale varying from "strongly oppose" to "strongly favor." As a continuous dependent variable, I use OLS regression in analyzing this item. This question was asked on the GSS in 1990, 1996, and 1998. I have transformed both dependent variables so that they are scaled such that scores indicating more racial tolerance, or favoring intermarriage, are higher. Thus, positive, significant coefficients indicate that a variable is associated with tolerance toward intermarriage.

There are several reasons I use two measures of attitudes toward intermarriage (dependent variables). First, using two measures improves the validity of my findings. A person may be in favor of eliminating laws that ban intermarriage on libertarian grounds

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<sup>3</sup> There was no GSS in 1979, 1981, or 1992, and since 1994, the GSS has been conducted every two years.

and yet be opposed to a close family member marrying a black person. In fact, the correlation between the two variables is only .352. This suggests that each variable measures a different aspect of attitudes toward intermarriage. If the same pattern of results is found in models using each dependent variable, then the findings will be more robust. Second, since the “laws” intermarriage question was asked in 19 years of the GSS and the “close relative” intermarriage question was asked in only three years, there are more independent variables that can be tested with the “laws” question. The “close relative” question is still important because it gets at personal feelings about intermarriage and is closer to a behavioral question than the “laws” question, which is more about principles. The “close relative” question also permits the use of OLS regression, which allows for the easy interpretation of the total variance (the r-squared) explained by different models and variables.

### *Control variables*

I will now describe the control variables and the rationale for including them. Since the analysis of tolerance toward intermarriage is a fairly new area, there is not a set of standard control variables that are employed. I have borrowed a set from other research on racial attitudes.

Sex is included as a control in each model in order to determine whether men or women have different attitudes toward individualism and intermarriage. Women are socialized more strongly than are men to conform to conventional sexual morality (and face greater social sanctions when they do not). To the extent the interracial marriage is

seen as sexually deviant, we would expect women to be less approving of it than men. On the other hand, some have argued that women are more likely than men to view moral questions in terms of relationships, and thus may not oppose intermarriage when it is framed in these terms. Johnson and Marini's (1998) research supports this interpretation. They found that females are more tolerant than males concerning cross-racial friendships and understanding. (Sex is coded 1 for females, 0 for males.)

Since one of the predictions of this study is that the development of a consumer society has led to a weakening of racial boundaries, we would expect that over the period for which I have GSS data (1972-1998), attitudes against intermarriage would have weakened. For the "laws against intermarriage" question, we have data over three decades (the '70s, the '80s, and the '90s). For the "close relative" question we have data for the '90s (1990, 1996, 1998). For this reason, I have controlled for the survey year (the year the GSS was conducted) for each of the models that have cases from more than one year. A few of the independent variables I am using were only asked in one year; in other cases, a combination of variables only has cases from one year.

In addition to period effects, intermarriage attitudes may be subject to age or cohort effects. Individuals may have formed their attitudes toward intermarriage early in their life and carried these attitudes forward as they grew older, or more conservative or more liberal attitudes toward this topic may be a result of growing older. Analyzing this same GSS variable, Schuman and associates (1997:208) find that for whites, younger cohorts are more tolerant and that over time (1972-1994) each of these cohorts has grown

more tolerant. To control for this variation, I have also included a variable for age of the respondent.

Education is also controlled for in each model. Schuman et al. (1997:118) report that higher levels of education lead to higher levels of tolerance toward intermarriage. Education is also related to individualism; those with lower levels of education are more likely to raise their children toward conformity (Kohn). Thus, including an education variable controls for a confounding relationship between education and Inglehart's secular-rational and self-expression measures of individualism. [Do I need to include interaction terms before I can make this statement?] Education is measured in years of schooling (0-20).

It is important to control for region of the respondent, since different regions of the country have had distinctive racial histories. This is most clear-cut in the South with its history of slavery, Jim Crow, lynching, and Ku Klux Klan activism. Stories of miscegenation were an important impetus in Klan recruitment and in lynchings (Blee; MacLean). More recently, the states that had laws against interracial marriage in 1967, when the Supreme Court ruled such laws unconstitutional, were the 16 states in the South census region, plus Missouri. But the South is not the only region to have had extensive white supremacist and antimiscegenation organizing. The Ku Klux Klan was also powerful in the Midwest, as well as in communities in other parts of the nation (Blee). On the basis of this history, one would expect those from the South to be most likely to be against interracial marriage, followed by those from the Midwest.

Since there has been a great deal of interregional migration in the United States, the region the respondent lived in at age 16 is used as proxy for the region he or she grew up in. The regions are the four broad regions defined by the Census Bureau, as well as those from foreign countries. The South, the Midwest, the Northeast, and Foreign are the regions included in the analysis, with the reference category those who lived in the West at age 16.

Table 3.2 presents the distribution of attitudes toward the “laws” intermarriage question by race and nine Census sub-regions. The regional pattern of attitudes conforms to the racial history described above. The totals show that blacks are the most tolerant of intermarriage, with whites by far the least tolerant, with “others” slightly less tolerant than blacks. Whites are four times as likely as blacks, and two and a half times as “others,” to support laws against interracial marriage. There is also wide variation in tolerance across regions. Both whites and blacks in the East South Central in the region (Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky) are about five times more likely to support laws against intermarriage than are their counterparts in the Pacific region (California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, and Hawaii). But the black/white gap in tolerance remains across region; blacks in the least tolerant region (the East South Central) are about as tolerant as whites in the most tolerant region (the Pacific).

#### *Traditional/Secular-Rational Values Variables*

My main goal in this paper is to test whether Inglehart’s measures of value dimensions associated with modernization also predict tolerance toward intermarriage.

To do this, I have picked the questions in the General Social Survey (GSS) that most closely match the questions Inglehart asked in the World Values Survey (WVS). Questions in the WVS tend to be general, while similar GSS questions tend to be more focused, often with two (or more) questions measuring different aspects of the concept (see Table 3.1). For example, the WVS item, "God is very important in respondent's life" is measured on the GSS in terms of both behavior ("frequency of attendance at religious services") and belief ("importance of believing in God without doubt"). The latter question is consistent with other questions on this dimension about obedience and respect for authority. To be obedient and to respect authority in the religious realm often means to believe in God without doubt.

The WVS question on abortion (that it is never justifiable) is matched to the GSS question that indicates opposition to abortion under the most extreme circumstances (when a women's health is endangered). However, there is a good deal of difference between an abstract statement of opposition (the WVS question) and the specific instance in the GSS question. I initially use this single GSS question, but below (in Table 3.4) I explore the effect of a whole range of abortion questions on tolerance toward intermarriage.

For the WVS item asking whether the respondent has "a strong sense of national pride," I use GSS questions that ask 1) how proud the respondent is to be an American and 2) how important being an American is to him or her.

The fourth WVS question on the traditional/secular values dimension is a complex question that is not replicated on the GSS. It asks whether it is more important

for children to learn obedience and religious faith than it is for them to learn independence and determination. This WVS question combines religion and obedience and determination and independence, while the GSS question does not. But both the WVS and the GSS questions ask about the relative importance of different qualities in raising children. The GSS question asks the respondent to rank five qualities in their order of importance “for a child to learn to prepare him or her for life.” The qualities are “to obey,” “to be popular,” “to think for himself or herself,” “to work hard,” and “to help others when they need help.” Each of these is a separate variable that measures the importance of that variable or quality relative to the other four qualities. Thus, the obedience variable measures the importance of obedience relative to the importance of popularity, hard work, helping others, and independent thought. The two GSS variables that I use are “to obey” and “to think for himself or herself.” These capture the obedience-independence dimension in the WVS question. A previous question addressed religious faith.

The last WVS question on the traditional/secular values dimension asks whether the respondent favors more respect for authority. The equivalent GSS question asks whether obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn. This gets at the same issue, though slightly indirectly, on the theory that someone who favors more respect for authority would also think that value should be taught to children.

Taken as a whole, those on the traditional side of the traditional/secular-rational values dimension are religious, patriotic, respect authority, oppose abortion, and believe

children should be obedient rather than independent. Those on the secular-rational side of this dimension have weaker or opposite values on each of these issues. According to Inglehart (1997), a shift in values along this dimension is associated with the industrialization of a society.

These variables tend to have low levels of correlation among one another. With the exception of those paired to measure the same concept in the World Values Survey, only one pair of variables has a correlation above .30. "Obey" and "Obedience and Respect for Authority" have a .383 correlation. "Believe in God" and "Attend Religious Services" have a .338 correlation. And the variables "Obey" and "Think for Oneself," which are permutations of the same question, have a .504 correlation.

#### *Survival/Self-Expression Values Variables*

Inglehart found a second dimension (orthogonal to the previous one), tapping values of survival versus self-expression, to be associated with the development of the service economy and increasing affluence in societies. People on the survival side of this dimension are not happy, don't trust people, don't sign petitions, believe homosexuality is wrong, and believe that maintaining order and fighting inflation are more important than free speech and democratic participation. Those on the self-expression side of this dimension have the opposite views.

The postmaterialist values index (the importance of maintaining order and fighting inflation as compared to free speech and democratic participation) is identical in both the GSS and the WVS. The wording of the questions about trusting people and

happiness are almost identical on both surveys, with the GSS providing a greater range of responses to the happiness question than the WVS question (see Table 3.1). Likewise on the question of homosexuality, the GSS gives a broader range of responses on what is essentially the same question. The last WVS question, concerning whether the respondent would sign a petition, is absent from the GSS, and has not been included in this analysis.

There are very low levels of correlation among any of these variables. The highest correlation between any pair of these four variables (Postmaterialist index, Trust, Happiness, and Homosexuality) is .137, between Trust and Happiness.

## **RESULTS**

Tables 3.3a and 3.3b report the results of regressing tolerance toward intermarriage on traditional values and controls. Before examining the relationships of interest, let us consider the effect of the control variables (demographic variables and education) in Model 1 from each table. For each of the measures of attitude toward intermarriage, whites are significantly less tolerant and blacks are significantly more tolerant than those who are neither white nor black. This also means that there are significant differences between whites and blacks on these attitudes. This pattern holds across all models in Table 3.4b and across all models for which either variable is significant in Table 3.4a. This means, unsurprisingly, that blacks are more supportive than others of close relatives marrying blacks, but it also means that when the effects of

other demographic variables are controlled, blacks are the least supportive of laws against intermarriage, followed by others, followed by whites. This pattern is consistent with attitudes toward intermarriage by race sans controls.

Concerning laws, women are less tolerant than men when it comes to intermarriage, but when it comes to acceptance of intermarriage in personal terms (support toward a close relative marrying a black), women are more tolerant of intermarriage than men. This is true across all models in which sex is a significant variable. This is true controlling for the effects of race, region, age, and education.

What might explain this gender difference? The fact that women are more tolerant, in personal terms, of intermarriage than men is consistent with research that demonstrates that women are more tolerant than men of interracial friendships (Johnson and Marini 1998). The fact that women are more likely than men to support laws against intermarriage may be due to the fact that women are more strongly socialized than men to follow rules, especially moral rules. Table 3.3a provides evidence of this. In model 1, women are less tolerant of intermarriage than men, but when controls are added for “belief in God without doubt” and “religious attendance,” the sex effect disappears, and the signs of the coefficients flip. This suggests that women’s favoring of laws against intermarriage flows out of their more general conformity to religious and other norms.

#### *Traditional/Secular-Rational Values*

Tables 3.3a and 3.3b test (net of controls) the effects of traditional values on tolerance of or support for intermarriage. Each of these variables is coded in the direction

of traditional values on the traditional/secular-rational values dimension. Traditional values are expected to be negatively associated with support for intermarriage.

In Table 3.3a, Models 2 through 7, I test separately whether each of the five variables that make up Inglehart's traditional/secular dimension predicts attitudes toward intermarriage. Again, I do this by matching equivalent variables from the GSS that match the ones Inglehart used from the World Values Survey. In Model 2, I test the effect of God being important in the respondent's life on intermarriage tolerance. Those who stress the importance of believing in God without doubt are intolerant. Model 3 tests the effect of abortion attitudes. Here, again, traditional values predict intolerant attitudes. Models 4 and 5 test the effect of national pride. The coefficient on the first question, proud to be an American, is not significant, but the coefficient on the second question, important to be an American, is. Patriotism is negatively associated with tolerance toward intermarriage. Model 6 tests the effect of the relative importance of obedience and independence as values in child rearing. Each of the tradition values—that obedience is relatively more important and children thinking for themselves as less important—are negatively associated with tolerance toward intermarriage. And Model 7 tests the effect of obedience and respect for authority as childhood virtues. This variable also has a significant negative effect on tolerance toward intermarriage. Models 2 through 7 show that each of the five dimensions of the traditional-secular index are significant predictors of intermarriage attitudes. All five traditional values are associated with intolerance toward intermarriage.

In Models 8 and 9, I test the simultaneous effect of a number of traditional values variables. (All of these variables could not be included in the same equation because each of the patriotism variables and the “respect for authority” variable were asked in only one year. Instead, I have two models that capture as many of the variables simultaneously as possible.) Model 8 includes variables relevant to the God, Abortion, Patriotism, and Obedience values. Indicators of Abortion and Patriotism are significant in this combined equation; Obedience is significant at the .10 level. Model 9 includes variables relevant to the God, Abortion, and Obedience values. In this equation, only the God variable is significant.

In sum, each of the five of the indicators that make up the traditional-secular values dimension on the World Values Survey is a significant predictor of intolerance toward intermarriage. Thus, traditional attitudes toward God, abortion, patriotism, obedience, and authority are associated with support for strong racial boundaries.

In Table 3.3b, Models 2 through 4, I test separately whether three of the traditional values—those concerning God, Abortion, and Obedience—predict support of intermarriage. There are no cases on this dependent variable for the Patriotism or Authority variables. (The dependent variable in this case—support or opposition to a close relative or family member marrying a black person—actually measures support of intermarriage, not just tolerance toward it.)

Each of these three variables is a significant predictor of support of intermarriage, just as they were in the previous table which examined their effect on tolerance toward intermarriage. As with the previous table, there were no years in which the dependent

variables and all of the independent variables measuring tradition were asked on the GSS on all ballots. Table 3.5 combines in one model all of the tradition variables that were asked in 1990, Table 3.6, all of the tradition variables that were asked in 1998. In Model 5, when the abortion question and the obedience question are included in the same model, the abortion variable remains significant, while the obedience question falls below significance. In Model 6, when the God question and the abortion question are included in the same model, the God question continues to be significant (at the .10 level), but the abortion question falls below significance. The key point is that in each of the models that contains a tradition variable, at least one is significant. Even more revealing is that fully 10% of the total variance in support of intermarriage is explained by variables associated with just two of the traditional dimension variables. (Indicators for all five questions were simply not collected in enough years to include all variables in a single model.) Measures for only two of the five traditional/secular variables explain a third as much of the variance in support for intermarriage as the social and demographic variables (race, sex, age, education, and region). Traditional values are significant and robust predictors of opposition to intermarriage.

#### *Survival/Self-Expression Values*

Tables 3.4a and 3.4b test the effect self-expression values (or postmaterialist or postmodern values) on tolerance of and support for interracial marriage. Each of these variables is coded in the direction of self-expression values on the survival/self-

expression values dimension.<sup>4</sup> Self-expression values are expected to be positively associated with support for intermarriage. In Table 3.4a, Models 2 through 4, I test separately whether three of the self-expression values—Postmaterialism, Trust, and Happiness—are associated with tolerance toward intermarriage. The first two are significant and in the predicted direction; Happiness in these models is not significant. When each of these variables is included in the same model (Model 5), only the Postmaterialist index is significant. In Model 6, I test for the effects of the Trust and Happiness variables, while adding a variable that measures whether the respondent thinks homosexuality is wrong. In this model, both the Happiness and the Homosexuality variables are significant and in the predicted directions. Finally, in Model 7, I include all four self-expression variables in the same equation. Though each of the variables is in the predicted direction, only the Homosexuality variable is significant in this model.

In Table 3.4b, Models 2 through 4, I separately test for the effects of three of the self-expression variables on support toward intermarriage. (A fourth variable, the postmaterialist index, was not asked in the same years as the dependent variable.) All three variables are significant and in the predicted direction. In Model 5, I include all three self-expression variables in the same equation. Again, net of controls, each is significant and in the predicted direction. Just these three variables explain 10% of the total variation in support for intermarriage and fully a third as much of the variance as all of the social and demographic variables (race, sex, age, education, region) combined.

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<sup>4</sup> The key independent variables in these tables are coded such that higher scores indicate greater support for individualistic (self-expression) values, whereas in the previous two tables (Tables 3.3a and 3.3b)

Thus, self-expression values are both statistically and substantively important predictors of support for interracial marriage.

Forty-four percent of the variance in support for intermarriage is explained when traditional and self-expression models (Models 5 in Tables 3.3b and 3.4b) are combined into the same equation. Because many questions were not asked across the same years, indicators for only five of Inglehart's ten variables could be included in the same model, and yet these variables explain half as much of the variance as the social and demographic controls.

That race, or even region, has an effect on intermarriage attitudes almost goes without saying. That age and education have strong and consistent effects on attitudes toward interracial marriage is expected, given what we know about racial attitudes. But it is not obvious that attitudes across a whole range of seemingly unrelated items such as happiness, trust, obedient children, and abortion will be similarly strong predictors. But this is what this analysis has found. Further all nine of Inglehart's (traditional/secular or survival/self-expression) variables for which there were measures in the GSS were significant in at least one model; many were significant across all models.

## **CONCLUSION**

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higher scores indicated less individualism. This is done simply for ease of exposition: for example, it is easier to talk about people having "trust" than having a "lack of trust."

In this chapter, I link measures that Inglehart and Baker (2000) use to show culture shift in 65 societies with GSS data on attitudes toward intermarriage in the United States. I find that both the cluster of values associated with industrialization and the cluster associated with the development of a service economy (and abundance) are correlated with more tolerant attitudes toward intermarriage, and hence with weaker racial boundaries. As I argued earlier, intermarriage may be an area where attitudes and behavior are closely related. With practically no institutional constraints, individualistic marriage choice is highly influenced by individual attitudes. This provides us initial evidence that modernization (especially after the shift to a service economy) may, in fact, lead to a weakening of ethnic bounds—something that a long line of commentators, from Marx to Park, has suggested (Cornell and Hartmann 1998:4-8). This is an idea that has generally fallen out of favor in recent years, as several generations have experienced life in an advanced industrial economy, and yet race and ethnicity seem as resilient as ever. The mechanism that I focus on is, of course, only one mechanism that addresses the question of racial boundaries; the mechanisms that lead to intermarriage leave unaffected many other mechanisms that reinforce racial boundaries, such as segregation (Massey and Denton 1993), wealth inequalities (Conley 1999), or split labor markets (Bonacich 1972). However, my research suggests that it is a mistake to minimize modernization's corrosive effects on race and ethnicity. Rather, the processes that I identify—increasing individualism leading to increases in intermarriage—take generations to manifest themselves, whereas physical segregation and labor market inequalities manifest themselves much more rapidly. Thus, while the long-term thrust of modernization may

be toward a diminishment of racial boundaries, this pattern is just beginning to make itself felt.

A link between different sorts of modernization and a weakening of ethnic boundaries suggests that universalistic theories of ethnic conflict, such as Susan Olzak's (1992), need to be modified, and the propensity toward ethnic conflict treated as a variable. Rather than assume a universal, rational actor that responds identically in similar situations, the present research suggests that we need to consider the ways that culture and values, by determining the salience of ethnicity, mediate the likelihood and intensity of ethnic conflict. Where individualism is the paramount value, ethnicity may become very "thin," and individuals' loyalty to any group identity may be very weak. Olzak makes the ethnic group the unit of analysis, and argues that when two ethnic groups share the same resource niche, they will compete. But with weaker ethnic boundaries, individuals may be less likely to judge ethnicity as salient or to believe that it is a legitimate basis on which to engage in economic competition.

This suggests that ethnic competition theory needs to be qualified both across time and space. Spatially, we should expect more intense ethnic competition in less industrialized societies. A cursory examination of different societies would suggest that this is the case. Ethnic conflicts have been more common and intense in recent years in less developed than in more developed societies. And we should expect a diminishment of ethnic conflict over time as more tolerant and individualistic values develop in response to modernization. This suggests, for example, that we cannot assume that the

**same patterns of ethnic conflict that were true in early twentieth century America apply today.**

## **Chapter 4**

### **Conclusion**

I try to establish three facts in Chapter 1. The first is that individual choice is an important factor in interracial marriage. This is important because it shows that attitudes toward intermarriage are important to its incidence. The second point I highlight is the high rate of outmarriage, especially for Asians and Latinos. Over 50% of recent cohorts of Asians and over one-third of Latinos are outmarrying. This indicates that many of the institutional and group constraints on outmarriage have broken down for these groups. For these groups marriages are occurring in cross-racial marriage markets with fewer institutional and group constraints than ever before. (A little later in this chapter, I will examine some reasons why black outmarriage rates are depressed.) The third important point from this chapter is the importance of gender role attitudes in producing the gender imbalanced pattern of outmarriage. For all six interracial pairings, the outmarriage rate is highest where the sex gap in attitudes is least.

This chapter also shows the importance of attitudes to the overall intermarriage rate. Because mate selection has become so deinstitutionalized, I argue that there is a closer match between attitudes and behaviors in this area than there is in many other areas of social life.

I build on this insight in Chapter 2, where I examine the effects of gender on attitudes of increasing tolerance toward interracial marriage. Here I critically examine Weber's ideas about social closure, in light of women's participation in work and

ethnicity. Weber (1978) explicitly refers to ethnic group formation as a result of an “ethnic brotherhood” seeking to monopolize access to an economic market, most often a labor market. I follow Weber’s arguments to their logical conclusions, by examining the situation in which women in large numbers enter labor markets. I reason that since women tend to be excluded from brotherhoods of all kinds, they will be excluded from ethnic brotherhoods as well. Specifically, I argue that when women are economically dependent upon men, they will follow the ideology of the ethnic brotherhood they are dependent upon. But when women gain paid employment, since they tend to be excluded by patriarchy from the jobs that men hold, women no longer have much economic interest in ethnicity and closed ethnic boundaries. Thus, women’s employment will lead to a breakdown of ethnic solidarity, as measured through intermarriage attitudes. This is essentially what I find in this chapter after analyzing the data.

I extend these ideas about individual choice, gender, and intermarriage in the next chapter. Here I use Inglehart’s cross-national research where he has found two sets of value clusters, the first associated with modernization, and the second associated with the service economies that he variously characterizes as “postindustrial” or “postmodern.” Inglehart and colleagues find that religion may partially preserve values of an earlier era in societies that have industrialized or developed service economies.

Both Weber and Marx were writing during times when the economically advanced countries had industrialized, but before any countries had developed large service economies. Weber’s argument with Marx about ethnicity concerns its persistence in industrial societies. Both thought it could persist in traditional societies, but Weber,

unlike Marx, saw a new basis for ethnicity in industrial societies through the monopolization of markets by an ethnic group. Weber (1978) reasoned that ethnic groups maintain their boundaries in these circumstances through the defense of "ethnic honor." There is abundant evidence that strong ethnicity has survived in industrial societies, and that in some cases it may be stronger than in traditional societies. But Weber does not address whether the mechanism he proposes for ethnic group maintenance, "honor," holds up well in postindustrial or service societies. If the increasing individualism of these societies undermines individuals' adherence to notions such as honor, then ethnicity and ethnic boundaries will be weakened in these societies. Ethnic boundaries are maintained because marrying out is considered to bring shame or dishonor on those doing it, and may cause them to be disowned by the group. But if individuals cease to care about ethnic or racial group opprobrium, and have a strong individualist ethic to support them, ethnic and racial boundaries may be repeatedly breached.

There are likely two sources for the increase in individualism in service societies, the existence of which has been abundantly documented by Inglehart and colleagues (1997; 2000). Service economies employ a great many women. As I demonstrate in Chapter 2, this tends to decrease ethnic solidarity. Service economies are also high consumption and consumer oriented. Individualism and individual choice are the sine qua non of consumer economies. Individual choice on the market is the key ideology of this type of economic system (Frank 2000). It should be of little surprise when this belief leaks into marriage markets.

I test, in this chapter, whether the clusters of values associated with industrialization and post-industrialization are predictive of tolerance toward interracial marriage. For the traditional-modernization continuum, I find that each of the values associated with modernization predicts tolerance toward interracial marriage. And on the post-industrial values dimension (what Inglehart calls the “survival/self-expression dimension”) I similarly find that values associated with post-industrialization also predict tolerance toward intermarriage.

Given the fact that institutional controls on marriage choice (e.g., arranged marriages, anti-miscegenation laws) have almost disappeared in the U.S., and the fact of a rapid increase in interracial marriage in the last three decades, I take my findings in this chapter as evidence that the individualism of the service economy has led to a weakening of racial boundaries. It would appear that while Weber was right about ethnicity under modernization, Marx and Park are right about ethnicity under post-modernization. I believe that this captures the gist of my findings, though I show below that there are limits to marriage markets as a determinant of interracial marriage.

### **The Trend in Interracial Marriage in Contemporary American Society**

There is a large discrepancy between the outmarriage rates for different groups. Some of these differences can be explained by relative group sizes. Smaller minority groups simply have greater numerical opportunities to marry out, and fewer potential partners within their group, than do larger groups.

A comparison of Latino and black outmarriage rates can help show some of the structural factors (and especially group and institutional factors) that impede assimilation through marriage markets. Although today the Latino population in the U.S. is about the size of the black population, in 1990 (the year of many of my comparisons) the Latino population was about three-fourths the size of the black population. Yet approximately one-third of Latinos outmarry as opposed to about 5% of blacks. One reason the black outmarriage rate is depressed is that two-thirds of blacks who outmarry are men, yet there are so many fewer black men than black women available for marriage. As I show in Chapter 1, there are 84 never married, divorced, or separated black men for every 100 black women in these same categories. Add to this the high black male incarceration rate and there are even fewer black males available for the marriage market. In addition, there are a substantial proportion of black males who don't marry at all, or marry quite late: the "retreat from marriage" (Tucker and Mitchell-Kernan 1995). These factors probably account for some of the gap between black and Latino outmarriage rates. The greater residential segregation of blacks from whites than of Latinos from whites (Massey and Denton 1993) also likely contributes to this gap. Especially telling is the high residential segregation of middle class blacks, when for Latinos, middle-class status tends to lead to desegregation.

But apart from all of these factors, white hostility to marriage with blacks is greater than their hostility to marriage with Latinos, and should be considered when examining the gap between black and Latino outmarriage. In 1990, 66% of U.S. whites said they would oppose a close relative marrying a black, while only 44% said they

would oppose a close relative marrying an Hispanic (see Table 4.1). Another reason that Latinos have a higher outmarriage rate than blacks is that Latinos are concentrated in the region where non-Hispanic whites are most tolerant of outmarriage (the West), while half of the black population is in the region where whites are least tolerant (the South). Taking these facts together, a full 40 percentage points separates Western whites' tolerance toward marriage with Latinos (26% oppose) from Southern whites' tolerance of marriage with blacks (79% oppose).

A comparison of data from 1990 and 1998 shows the rapid increases in tolerance in recent years (Table 4.1). In 1998, whites' opposition to a close relative marrying a black was 25 percentage points less than it had been in 1990 (from 66.2% opposed to 41.5% opposed). In less than a decade, white opposition to marriage with blacks fell to the same levels as white opposition to marriage with Hispanics had been in 1990. This decline was consistent across regions. (The question about marriage with Hispanics was not asked in 1998.) This indicates stable opposition to intermarriage is rapidly disappearing in all parts of the country.

Undoubtedly, interracial marriages also influence others on the marriage market. When someone on a marriage market has others in their networks or neighborhood that are intermarried, it legitimizes and begins to normalize this pattern of marriage. Encountering others who are intermarried probably opens up marriage markets further across racial lines. Put more formally, we can expect that the social influence an interracial couple will have on those around them will be to break down market segmentation. And this influence probably has what Marwell and Oliver (1993) call an

“accelerative production function.” As opposition to intermarriage eases, more people engage in it, and as more people engage in it, it no longer seems non-normative, and opposition further eases.

While it is true that personal networks tend to be somewhat racially segregated, the racial segmentation of marriage markets means that many cross-racial network ties are excluded, out of hand, from consideration as marriage partners. Thus, the potential for outmarriage is probably far greater than its incidence, especially for blacks. The fact that there is social disapproval is evidence for this. The GSS provides further evidence. When blacks were asked (in 1998) whether “any of your friends you feel close to” are white, 62% said yes. When asked to list good friends and then state their friends’ races, 15% of blacks listed a white friend (NORC 1999). Whether by the direct or the network question method, this suggests that there are many cross-racial contacts that social opposition blocks from becoming marriages.

### **The Limits of Marriage Markets as Determinants of Interracial Marriage**

Up to this point, I have discussed marriage markets, and attitudes toward marriage markets, as the only factors relevant to the rate of intermarriage. Of course, it’s more complicated than that. While marriage markets are now almost completely free of institutional controls, and are decreasingly subject to informal group controls, labor and housing markets are still subject to institutional racism, and racial constraints in these markets constrain marriage markets. Further, group conflict affects marriage markets.

Discrimination in labor markets leads to lower incomes for racial minorities, and since income is positively related to intermarriage, inequality in these markets will likely decrease intermarriage rates. Here, the very ideology of individual choice, the belief that led to an increase in intermarriage, also helps perpetuate the inequality that discourages intermarriage. The key problems of racial inequality are structural—deindustrialization and uneven spatial development, residential segregation, direct and institutional discrimination in labor markets—and each of these leads to greater social distance between members of different races, and hence depresses the intermarriage rate. Thus, while the ethic of individualism leads to a weakening of racial boundaries, this ethic also leads to an unwillingness to address the structural factors that lead to racial inequality in the first place (Schuman et al. 1997). With weaker racial boundaries, individuals are freer than ever to choose to cross them to choose marriage partners; but with structural inequality in the life chances of people of different races, many will choose not to do so, as marriages tend to be highly homophilous on educational status (Kalmijn 1991).

This economic inequality and social isolation are particularly acute for blacks and Puerto Ricans in inner cities. Thus, while there is some outmarriage among the middle classes of these groups, as previously mentioned, black outmarriage rates are considerably lower than those of other racial-ethnic minorities, and Puerto Rican outmarriage rates are considerably lower than those of other Latino ethnic groups (Gurak and Fitzpatrick 1982).

Discrimination in housing markets also likely decreases intermarriage rates. The segregation of housing markets decreases the opportunities for cross-racial contacts.

Housing markets today are much more of a mass phenomenon than marriage markets. A homeowner does not just buy a house, but a whole neighborhood. When blacks and whites have different utilities for the ideal racial composition, integrated neighborhoods become unstable. (Survey research in Detroit finds that for blacks the ideal racial composition is one that is about 50% white, 50% black, while for whites, the ideal neighborhood has no more than 15% blacks. Neighborhood racial composition is unstable under this preference structure; as neighborhoods become ideal for blacks near 50-50 integration, they lose their desirability for whites, who then flee.) Thus, integration in housing has the paradoxical feature of being very unstable. Any progress made in integration can permanently slip away if a neighborhood tips racially. If left up to markets alone, it is necessary to have consensus across racial groups in order to have integrated neighborhoods. This difficulty in achieving housing integration is a factor that depresses interracial marriage rates. But note the possible effect of interracial families on housing integration. In the absence of intergroup conflict, interracial families can serve to anchor integrated neighborhoods. They are an example of the benefits of interracial interaction, and may serve as role models in interracial communication and acceptance. Thus, interracial marriage may serve to increase housing integration, which in turn serves to increase the intermarriage rate. (Though it should be noted that if there is interracial conflict, the stability of this breaks down. When there is intergroup conflict, intermarried couples especially suffer, being seen as traitors by both communities.)

## TABLES

**Table 1.1. Racial Composition (by percent) of Married Couples 25 to 34: 1980 and 1990 (native-born population)**

	<u>Race of Spouse</u>				Number (000)
	White	Black	Latino	Asian	
<b>White Husbands</b>					
Early Baby Boom	<u>97.3</u>	0.1	1.5	0.5	9,392
Late Baby Boom	<u>96.2</u>	0.2	2.2	0.9	8,599
<b>White Wives</b>					
Early Baby Boom	<u>97.8</u>	0.3	1.3	0.1	9,348
Late Baby Boom	<u>97.2</u>	0.4	1.7	0.2	8,513
<b>Black Husbands</b>					
Early Baby Boom	3.8	<u>94.4</u>	1.0	0.5	851
Late Baby Boom	5.3	<u>91.9</u>	1.7	0.8	697
<b>Black Wives</b>					
Early Baby Boom	1.0	<u>98.4</u>	0.4	<0.1	817
Late Baby Boom	2.1	<u>97.0</u>	0.7	<0.1	661
<b>Latino Husbands</b>					
Early Baby Boom	26.2	0.7	<u>74.1</u>	0.9	465
Late Baby Boom	33.2	1.1	<u>64.0</u>	1.2	431
<b>Latino Wives</b>					
Early Baby Boom	28.5	1.7	<u>68.4</u>	0.5	485
Late Baby Boom	38.7	2.4	<u>57.0</u>	1.0	483
<b>Asian Husbands</b>					
Early Baby Boom	39.7	2.2	11.6	<u>39.7</u>	22
Late Baby Boom	39.9	0.5	10.2	<u>48.2</u>	47
<b>Asian Wives</b>					
Early Baby Boom	71.5	6.3	6.1	<u>13.6</u>	65
Late Baby Boom	70.1	5.0	4.4	<u>19.8</u>	114

*Source:* Farley (1996:264-5).

**Table 1.2. Sex Gaps in Outmarriage**

(gender attitudes are predicted to mirror these)

**Whites**

more women than men outmarry with Blacks  
more men than women outmarry with Latinos and Asians

**Blacks**

more men than women outmarry with Whites, Latinos, and Asians

**Latinos**

more women than men outmarry with Whites and Blacks  
more men than women outmarry with Asians

**Asians**

more women than men outmarry with Whites and Blacks  
more men than women outmarry with Latinos

**Table 1.3. Incidence of Black-White Intermarriages by Sex**

Researcher	Area	Period	#BM-WF <sup>a</sup>	#WM-BF <sup>b</sup>	Ratio <sup>c</sup>	%BM-WF <sup>d</sup>
Hoffman	MI	1 874-1893	93	18	5.2	83.8
Hoffman	RI	1883-1893	51	7	7.3	87.9
Stone	MA	1900	43	9	4.8	82.7
Stone	Boston	1900-1904	133	10	13.3	93.0
Stephenson	Boston	1900-1907	203	19	10.7	91.4
Drachsler	N.Y. City	1908-1912	41	11	3.7	78.8
DePorte	N.Y. State <sup>e</sup>	1919-1929	262	85	3.1	75.5
Wirth and Goldhamer	Boston	1914-1938	227	49	4.6	82.2
Wirth and Goldhamer	N.Y. State <sup>e</sup>	1916-1937	424	145	2.9	74.5
Golden	Philadelphia	1922-1947	44	6	7.3	88.0
Lynn	D.C.	1940-1947	19	7	2.7	73.1
Burma	L.A. County	1948-1959	800	267	3.0	75.0
Barnett	CA	1955-1959	921	254	3.7	78.5
Pavela	IN	1958-1959	72	19	3.8	79.1
Heer	MI	1953-1963	862	267	3.2	76.4
Heer	HI	1956-1964	59	15	3.9	79.7
Heer	NB	1961-1964	6	2	3.0	75.0
Heer	WI	1964	38	5	7.6	88.4
Annella	D.C.	1931-1965	523	295	1.8	63.9
				<u>%BM-WF<sup>f</sup></u>	<u>%WM-BF<sup>g</sup></u>	
Monahan	Iowa	1944-1967	7.80	2.37	3.3	76.7
Monahan	Non-South <sup>h</sup>	1963-1966	3.38	1.26	2.7	72.8
Monahan	South <sup>i</sup>	1963-1966	0.05	0.03	1.7	64.8
Monahan	Non-South <sup>h</sup>	1967-1970	5.36	1.42	3.8	79.1
Monahan	South <sup>i</sup>	1967-1970	0.55	0.21	2.6	72.4
Kalmijn	Non-South <sup>j</sup>	1986	10.10	3.70	2.7	73.2
Kalmijn	South <sup>k</sup>	1986	4.20	1.70	2.5	71.2

Sources: Porterfield (1982); Monahan (1970); Monahan (1976); Kalmijn (1993); Golden (1954).

<sup>a</sup> Number of black male-white female marriages.

<sup>b</sup> Number of white male-black female marriages.

<sup>c</sup> Ratio of black male to black female rates of outmarriage.

<sup>d</sup> Black male-white female marriages as percent of all black-white marriages.

<sup>e</sup> Excluding New York City.

**(Table 1.3 continued)**

<sup>f</sup> Black-white marriages as a percentage of all marriages involving black males.

<sup>g</sup> Black-white marriages as a percentage of all marriages involving black females.

<sup>h</sup> 23 Northern states plus DC; does not include CA, WA, NV, AZ, NM, CO, ND, MN, MI, OH or NY.

<sup>i</sup> 12 Southern states; does not include SC, AR, TX, or OK.

<sup>j</sup> 21 Northern states; same as footnote (h), but does not include IA, MA, or DC.

<sup>k</sup> 12 Southern states; same as footnote (i), but does include SC, does not include MD.

**Table 1.4. Asian American Outmarriage, Ages 18-64, by Sex and Ethnic Group (1980 Census)**

	N	<u>% of Exogamous by Ethnicity<sup>a</sup></u>				Other	
		Total Exogamous (N)	Percent White	Black	Latino	Asian <sup>b</sup>	
<b><u>U.S. Born</u></b>							
<b>Chinese</b>							
Female	1403	36.8	(517)	60.5	3.7	2.1	32.0
Male	1177	37.6	(442)	54.3	0.9	2.7	39.6
<b>Filipino</b>							
Female	1093	56.9	(622)	66.1	6.1	7.1	17.9
Male	922	60.4	(577)	63.0	1.6	9.2	22.8
<b>Japanese</b>							
Female	4682	24.8	(1159)	67.7	2.5	2.2	25.9
Male	3638	23.0	(838)	59.9	1.7	3.0	33.3
<b>Korean</b>							
Female	145	66.9	(97)	60.8	3.1	2.1	31.9
Male	111	69.4	(77)	39.0	1.3	2.6	57.1

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*Source:* Lee and Yamanaka (1990).

<sup>a</sup> Percentages do not total 100 because "Other" category has been omitted.

<sup>b</sup> Includes Asian and Pacific Islanders who are of a different ethnicity than the person in the row category.

**Table 1.5. Latino Outmarriages with Latinos and Non-Latinos  
as a Percent of Total Marriages Involving Latinos, New York City, 1975**

Outmarriages with Non-Latinos

	Puerto Ricans	South Americans	Dominicans	Central Americans <sup>a</sup>	Cubans
Females	16.3	23.0	8.3	25.7	37.2
Males	10.7	17.1	6.6	25.2	28.3
N, Brides	1297	588	151	299	221
N, Grooms	799	456	121	270	161

Interethnic Marriages among Latinos

	Puerto Ricans	South Americans	Dominicans	Central Americans <sup>a</sup>	Cubans
Females	15.2	24.1	29.4	32.0	27.0
Males	16.7	32.4	31.3	29.2	34.6
N, Brides	1208	616	533	372	160
N, Grooms	1252	864	571	314	197

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*Source:* Gurak and Fitzpatrick (1982).

<sup>a</sup>Includes Mexicans.

**Table 1.6. Never Married, Divorced, and Separated Persons 15 years and over by Race and Sex, 1990**

	Total	White	Black	Latino	Latino U.S. born	Asian	Asian U.S. born
<b>MALES</b>	91,955 <sup>1</sup>	78,908	9,948	7,811	4,084	2,649	687
never married (NM)	27,505	22,078	4,319	3,010	1,732	984	342
divorced (D)	6,283	5,359	802	452	303	79	33
separated (S)	1,821	1,821	533	220	115	34	8
Sum <sup>2</sup> (NM,D,S)	35,609	28,684	5,654	3,683	2,150	1,097	382
<b>FEMALES</b>	99,838	84,508	11,966	7,596	4,230	2,864	682
never married (NM)	22,718	17,438	4,416	2,227	1,440	769	290
divorced (D)	8,845	7,284	1,344	670	429	132	43
separated (S)	2,848	1,828	939	379	205	50	11
Sum(NM,D,S)	34,411	26,550	6,699	3,277	2,075	952	343
<b>Male Sum – Female Sum</b>	1,198	2,134	-1,045	406	76	145	39
<b>Male Sum / Female Sum (in %)</b>	103.5	108.0	84.4	112.4	103.7	115.2	111.5
<b>Male NM – Female NM</b>	4,787	4,640	-97	783	292	215	52
<b>Male NM – Female NM (in %)</b>	121.1	126.6	97.8	135.2	120.2	127.9	117.9

**(Table 1.6 continued)**

*Source:* U.S. Census (1991, 1993a, 1993b).

<sup>1</sup>In thousands.

<sup>2</sup>Due to rounding, the sums shown do not precisely equal the sum of the numbers in each column.

**Table 1.7. Females as a Percent of Students by Race in Higher Education, 1970-1990**

	1970	1976	1980	1986	1990
<b>WHITE</b>					
Male	4066 <sup>a</sup>	4814	4773	4644	4861
Female	2693	4262	5060	5267	5862
% female	39.8	47.0	51.5	53.1	54.7
<b>BLACK</b>					
Male	253	470	464	436	485
Female	269	563	643	645	762
% female	51.5	54.5	58.1	59.7	61.1
<b>LATINO</b>					
Male		210	232	290	354
Female		174	240	327	429
% female		45.3	50.9	53.0	54.8
<b>ASIAN</b>					
Male		108	151	239	295
Female		89	135	209	278
% female		45.2	47.2	46.7	48.5

*Source:* U.S. Department of Education (1987, 1989, 1998).

<sup>a</sup> Number of students in thousands.

**Table 1.8. Hypothesized Sex Gap in Gender Attitudes across Racial-Ethnic Groups**

					liberal
	$\mu_{f1}$				
Group 1	$\mu_1$				
	$\mu_{m1}$	$\mu_{f2}$			
Group 2		$\mu_2$			
		$\mu_{m2}$	$\mu_{f3}$		
Group 3			$\mu_3$		
			$\mu_{m3}$		
					traditional

**Table 1.9. Unstandardized Coefficients for Regressions of Gender Attitudes of Respondents on Sex-Race Categories<sup>a</sup>**

	Model 1 Differences (model 1) (model 2)	Model 2	Within-Group
Black males	-.758** (.094)	-.529** (.091)	.560* .499*
Black females	-.198** (.075)	-.030 (.072)	
White males	-.820** (.053)	-.888** (.051)	.820** .888**
Latino males	-2.039** (.136)	-1.401** (.132)	.501# .549#
Latina females	-1.538** (.111)	-.852** (.108)	
Asian males	-1.712** (.370)	-2.158** (.355)	1.491* 1.426*
Asian females	-.221 (.295)	-.732** (.283)	
Education	----	.245** (.007)	
Constant	14.179	11.194	
R <sup>2</sup>	.043	.120	
Number of cases	12053	12041	

---

#p<.10 \*p<.05 \*\*p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

*Note:* Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

<sup>a</sup> Reference category is "White females."

**Table 1.10. Significant Differences in Gender Attitudes by Sex-Race Category\***

bf wf(.812)

bm(.518)

wm(0) af lf

am(-.902)

lm(-1.229)

---

\* Key: bf = black female  
wf = white female  
af = Asian female  
lf = Latina female  
bm = black male  
... ..

**Table 1.11. Findings: Least Differences in Gender Attitudes across Sex-Race Categories**

**Whites**

females -- Black males ✓  
 males -- Latina females ✓ Asian females ✓

**Blacks**

males -- White females ✓ Latina females ✓ Asian females ✓

**Latinos**

females -- White males ✓ Black males ✓  
 males -- Asian females

**Asians**

females -- White males ✓ Black males ✓  
 males -- Latina females ✓

**Table 1.12. Unstandardized Coefficients for Regression of Differences in Gender Attitudes between Husband and Wife on Endogamous and Exogamous Couples**

	<u>Model 1<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>Model 2<sup>b</sup></u>
WL	-1.586** (.578)	-2.817** (.789)
LL	-1.269* (.497)	-2.500** (.731)
LW	-.921# (.554)	-2.152** (.771)
WW	-1.945* (.471)	-2.275** (.714)
BB	-.988* (.483)	-2.218** (.722)
BW	-.765 (.644)	-1.995* (.838)
WB	-.438 (.796)	-1.668# (.960)
WA	-.267 (.813)	-1.497 (.974)
AW	1.231 (.853)	
AA		-1.231 (.853)
Constant	2.000	2.000
R <sup>2</sup>	.004	.004

#p<.10 \*p<.05 \*\*p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

Note: the following symbols represent various race/gender combinations among married couples:

W=White, B=Black, L=Latino, A=Asian. The first letter represents husbands; the second letter represents

**(Table 1.12 continued)**

wives. Thus, "BW" represents couples where the husband is black and the wife is white; "WB" represents couples where the husband is white and the wife is black.

<sup>a</sup>Reference category is "Asian husbands/Asian wives (AA)."

<sup>b</sup>Reference category is "Asian husbands/White wives (AW)."

**Table 1.13a. Sex Differences in Divorce Ratios of Black-White Interracial Marriages in Selected States**

Ratio of Divorces to Marriages by Interracial Combination (Divorces per 100 Marriages)

	State	
(Male/Female)	Iowa, 1944-67	Kansas, 1952-69 <sup>a</sup>
Black/White	15.4	21.1 <sup>b</sup>
White/Black	28.8	23.2 <sup>b</sup>
White/White	23.2	25.9 <sup>b</sup>
Black/Black	42.8	36.7

---

*Sources:* Monahan (1970), Monahan (1971).

<sup>a</sup> Divorces 1952-1969; Marriages 1949-1966.

<sup>b</sup> "White" in the Kansas data refers to Whites and Mexicans.

**Table 1.13b. Divorce Rates per 100 Marriages of Asian-White Marriages in Hawaii, 1952-1954<sup>a</sup>**

Outmarriages with whites

	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Korean
Females	35.1	22.4	24.6	39.9
Males	60.9	33.5	79.2	43.6

Inmarriages

White

26.0	12.6	38.3	9.8	38.3
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*Source:* Cheng and Yamamura (1957).

<sup>a</sup> Divorces 1952-1954; Marriages 1945-1954.

**Table 13c. Divorce Rates per 100 Marriages of Minority-White Marriages in Hawaii, 1958-1962<sup>a</sup>**

Outmarriages with whites

	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Part-Hawaiian	Puerto Rican
Females	30.3	24.4	30.7	25.8	20.1
Males	43.2	43.0	57.5	34.5	41.8

Inmarriages

White

35.4	17.7	46.0	14.7	21.8	46.0
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*Source:* Lind (1964).

<sup>a</sup>Divorces 1958-1962; Marriages 1956-1960.

**Table 1.13d. Percent of 1968 Marriages Ending in Divorce within 9 Years, Hawaii, 1968-1976**

Outmarriages with Whites

	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Hawaiian & Part Hawaiian
Females	7.4	22.9	15.2	15.2
Males	20.8	24.1	13.2	21.3

Inmarriages

White

16.4	0	11.0	12.2	19.3
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*Source:* Schwertfeger (1982).

### 1.14. The Sex Gap in Gender Attitudes in Latin America, Asia, and the United States

#### World Values Survey, Gender Attitude Questions

##### V219 Child Will Suffer

“A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.”

##### V220 Women Want Home/Child

“A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children.”

##### V221 Housewife Fulfilled

“Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.”

#### Average Percent who Agree, for the Three Statements

Country	Female average	Male average	Difference
U.S.	58.7	63.3	4.7
Mexico	66.3	71.0	4.7
Brazil	67.3	71.7	4.3
Argentina	68.0	75.0	7.0
S. Korea	69.3	69.3	0.0
China	73.3	77.3	4.0
Japan	75.7	80.0	4.3
Chile	76.3	78.3	1.7
India	77.0	76.0	(-)1.0

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Source: World Values Survey 1990-93; Inglehart, Basanez, and Moreno 1998

**Table 2.1a. T-Tests of Differences between Men and Woman on Conservative Gender Role and Sexuality Attitudes.**

<u>Question</u>		<u>N</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Difference between Means</u>
Wife should help Husband's Career First (1-4; 4 = "strongly agree")	Men	6604	2.19	0.08**
	Women	8707	2.11	
Preschool Kids Suffer if Mother Works (1-4)	Men	6663	2.62	0.22**
	Women	8748	2.40	
Women not Suited for Politics (1-2; 2 = "agree")	Men	8866	1.34	0.01
	Women	11679	1.33	
Oppose Abortion if Women wants for any reason (1-2; 2 = "oppose")	Men	9705	1.59	-0.02**
	Women	12866	1.61	
Sex Before Marriage (1-4; 4 = "always wrong")	Men	10582	2.09	-0.33**
	Women	13517	2.42	
Sex with Person Other than Spouse (1-4)	Men	10707	3.53	-0.14**
	Women	13845	3.67	
Homosexual Sex Relations (1-4)	Men	10396	3.32	0.04**
	Women	13223	3.28	

\*\*p<.01

**Table 2.1b. T-Tests of Differences between Men and Housewives on Conservative Gender Role and Sexuality Attitudes.**

<u>Question</u>		<u>N</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Difference between Means</u>
Wife should help Husband's Career First (1-4; 4 = "strongly agree")	Men	6604	2.19	-0.22**
	Housewives	2332	2.41	
Preschool Kids Suffer if Mother Works (1-4)	Men	6663	2.62	-0.03**
	Housewives	2342	2.65	
Women not Suited for Politics (1-2; 2 = "agree")	Men	8866	1.34	-0.11**
	Housewives	3653	1.45	
Oppose Abortion if Women wants for any reason (1-2; 2 = "oppose")	Men	9705	1.59	-0.11**
	Housewives	3921	1.70	
Sex Before Marriage (1-4; 4 = "always wrong")	Men	10582	2.09	-0.58**
	Housewives	4534	2.67	
Sex with Person Other than Spouse (1-4)	Men	10707	3.53	-0.22**
	Housewives	4599	3.75	
Homosexual Sex Relations (1-4)	Men	10396	3.32	-0.22**
	Housewives	4400	3.54	

\*\*p&lt;.01

**Table 2.1c. T-Tests of Differences between Men and Non-Housewife (Employed) Woman on Conservative Gender Role and Sexuality Attitudes.**

<u>Question</u>		<u>N</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Difference between Means</u>
Wife should help Husband's Career First (1-4; 4 = "strongly agree")	Men	6604	2.19	0.18**
	Employed Women	6375	2.01	
Preschool Kids Suffer if Mother Works (1-4)	Men	6663	2.62	0.31**
	Employed Women	6406	2.31	
Women not Suited for Politics (1-2; 2 = "agree")	Men	8866	1.34	0.06**
	Employed Women	8026	1.28	
Oppose Abortion if Women wants for any reason (1-2; 2 = "oppose")	Men	9705	1.59	0.02**
	Employed Women	8945	1.57	
Sex Before Marriage (1-4; 4 = "always wrong")	Men	10582	2.09	-0.21**
	Employed Women	8983	2.30	
Sex with Person Other than Spouse (1-4)	Men	10707	3.53	-0.10**
	Employed Women	9246	3.63	
Homosexual Sex Relations (1-4)	Men	10396	3.32	0.16**
	Employed Women	8823	3.16	

\*\*p<.01

**Table 2.2. Logistic Regressions of Opposition to Anti-miscegenation Laws on Controls, Women's Employment, Gender Role and Sexuality Variables.**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Survey Year	.050** (.002)	.048** (.003)	.048** (.002)	.027** (.005)	.020** (.005)	.021** (.006)	.023** (.006)	.023** (.006)
White	-.634** (.141)	-.642** (.141)	-.640** (.141)	-.783** (.232)	-.805** (.239)	-.809** (.242)	-.793** (.247)	-.895** (.258)
Black	1.821** (.165)	1.809** (.147)	1.813** (.165)	-1.676** (.294)	1.763** (.307)	1.820** (.315)	1.708** (.320)	1.744** (.331)
Age	-.031** (.001)	-.031** (.001)	-.027** (.002)	-.021** (.003)	-.022** (.003)	-.023** (.003)	-.022** (.003)	-.002** (.003)
Education	.225** (.006)	.220** (.006)	.221** (.006)	.203** (.012)	.198** (.013)	.190** (.013)	.188** (.013)	.182** (.014)
South at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-1.443** (.063)	-1.449** (.063)	-1.445** (.063)	-1.522** (.126)	-1.497** (.133)	-1.438** (.135)	-1.403** (.136)	-1.365** (.138)
Midwest at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-.525** (.064)	-.530** (.064)	-.530** (.064)	-.647** (.130)	-.628** (.136)	-.584 <sup>#</sup> (.138)	-.559** (.140)	-.542** (.142)
Northeast at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-.267** (.068)	-.273** (.068)	-.274** (.068)	-.312* (.139)	-.265 <sup>#</sup> (.147)	-.283 <sup>#</sup> (.149)	-.334* (.150)	-.356* (.153)
Foreign at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	.266* (.113)	.262* (.113)	-.258* (.113)	-.143 (.213)	-.111 (.224)	-.120 (.228)	-.143 (.242)	-.096 (.241)

**(Table 2.2 continued)**

<b>Sex (1=female)</b>	<b>-.122**</b> (.034)	<b>-.017</b> (.039)	<b>.335**</b> (.100)	<b>.469*</b> (.198)	<b>.506**</b> (.209)	<b>.478**</b> (.214)	<b>.552*</b> (.216)	<b>.446*</b> (.223)
<b>Housewives</b>		<b>-.255**</b> (.046)	<b>-.245**</b> (.046)	<b>-.127</b> (.093)	<b>-.160</b> (.098)	<b>-.131</b> (.100)	<b>-.100</b> (.102)	<b>-.111</b> (.104)
<b>Sex * Age</b>			<b>-.007**</b> (.002)	<b>-.011**</b> (.004)	<b>-.011**</b> (.004)	<b>-.011**</b> (.004)	<b>-.011**</b> (.004)	<b>-.010**</b> (.004)
<b>Wife help Husband's Career First</b>				<b>-.377**</b> (.049)	<b>-.334**</b> (.053)	<b>-.295**</b> (.054)	<b>-.262**</b> (.056)	<b>-.246**</b> (.057)
<b>Preschool Kids Suffer if Mother Works</b>				<b>-.068</b> (.045)	<b>-.044</b> (.048)	<b>-.025</b> (.049)	<b>-.011</b> (.050)	<b>.013</b> (.051)
<b>Women not Suited for Politics</b>					<b>-.434**</b> (.075)	<b>-.384**</b> (.076)	<b>-.356**</b> (.079)	<b>-.274**</b> (.079)
<b>Oppose abortion if women wants for any reason</b>						<b>-.538**</b> (.079)	<b>-.408*</b> (.084)	<b>-.289**</b> (.087)
<b>Premarital Sex</b>							<b>-.110**</b> (.033)	<b>-.031</b> (.034)
<b>Extramarital Sex</b>							<b>-.177**</b> (.069)	<b>-.060</b> (.072)

**(Table 2.2 continued)**

Homosexuality								-.512* (.053)
Sex (1=female)	-.122** (.034)	-.017 (.039)	.335** (.100)	.469* (.198)	.506** (.209)	.478** (.214)	.552* (.216)	.446* (.223)
Constant	-97.69	-94.07	94.92	-51.62	-36.33	-38.59	-42.73	-40.22
N	26024	26024	26024	8010	7250	7006	6811	6591
-2 Log Likelihood	22111.84	22081.34	22066.76	5987.53	5388.58	5156.25	4996.57	752.62
X <sup>2</sup>	6749.85	6780.32	6794.93	1848.24	1754.96	1719.66	1684.12	1781.67
d.f. =	10	11	12	14	15	16	18	19

\*\*p<.01 \*p<.05 # p<.10 (two-tailed tests)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

\* Reference category is "lived in West at age 16."

**Table 3.1. Comparison of questions used by Inglehart and Baker (2000)\* from the World Values Survey and comparable questions from the General Social Survey.**

**Traditional/Secular-Rational Values Dimension**

<u>World Values Survey</u>	<u>General Social Survey</u>	Years question asked
1. <b>GOD:</b> God is very important in respondent's life	a. Importance of believing in God without doubt b. Frequency of attendance at religious services	(1988, 1998) (1972-1998)
2. <b>ABORTION:</b> Abortion is never justifiable	Favor or oppose abortion if woman wants for any reason	(1977-1998, except 1986)
3. <b>PATRIOTISM:</b> Respondent has strong sense of national pride	a. How proud are you to be an American? b. How important is being an American to you?	(1994) (1996)
4. <b>OBEDIENCE:</b> More important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determination	Which thing is the most for a child to prepare him or her for life? Which comes next? Which comes third? Which comes fourth? a. To obey b. To think for himself or herself	(1986-1998) (1986-1998)
5. <b>AUTHORITY:</b> Respondent favors more respect for authority	Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn	(1994)

**(Table 3.1 continued)**

**Survival/Self-Expression Values Dimension**

World Values Survey

General Social Survey

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>1. <b>POSTMATERIALISM:</b> Postmaterialist values index (protecting freedom of speech and giving people more say in government decisions valued more than maintaining order in the nation and fighting raising prices)</p> | <p>Postmaterialist values index (same as WVS) (1993-1994)</p>   |
| <p>2. <b>TRUST:</b> You have to be very careful about trusting people (reverse coded: higher scores = more trust)</p>   | <p>Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in life? (1972-1998) except '75, '77, '83, '86)</p>   |
| <p>3. <b>HAPPINESS:</b> Respondent describes self as not very happy (reverse coded: higher scores = more happiness)</p>   | <p>These days are you very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy? (1972-1998)</p>   |
| <p>4. <b>HOMOSEXUALITY:</b> Homosexuality is never justifiable (reverse coded: higher scores = greater tolerance)</p>   | <p>Do you think sexual relations between two adults of the same sex is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all? (1973-1998, except '75, '78, '83, '86)</p> |
| <p>5. Respondent has not signed and would not sign a petition (absent from GSS)</p>   |   |

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\* Page 24, in Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker. 2000. "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values." American Sociological Review 65:19-51.

**Table 3.2. Percent of Respondents Who Favor Laws Against Interracial Marriage, by Race and Region at Age 16 (GSS 1972-1998).**

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<u>Census Region</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Other</u>
<i>Northeast</i>			
New England	15.9	4.0	*
Middle Atlantic	21.1	3.5	8.2
<i>Midwest</i>			
East North Central	24.5	3.1	6.9
West North Central	25.0	0.0	9.1
<i>South</i>			
South Atlantic	43.5	8.5	37.5
East South Central	53.6	11.0	*
West South Central	33.7	8.3	13.2
<i>West</i>			
Mountain	17.6	7.4	7.9
Pacific	11.1	2.0	1.7
Foreign	18.3	0.8	6.7
Total	27.0	6.6	10.8

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\* Fewer than 20 cases.

**Table 3.3a. Logistic Regressions Predicting Tolerance toward Intermarriage (Opposition to Anti-miscegenation Laws) on Controls and Traditional/Secular Dimension Variables.**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Survey Year	.050** (.002)	.073** (.015)	.052** (.003)	-----	-----	.083** (.010)	-----	-----	.081** (.022)
White	-.634** (.141)	-.524 (.377)	-.660** (.149)	.435 (.567)	-1.120 (1.112)	-.649** (.230)	.253 (.575)	-7.137 (22.714)	-.245 (.526)
Black	1.821** (.165)	1.852** (.500)	1.843** (.173)	3.480** (.927)	.190 (1.215)	1.768** (.266)	3.928** (1.171)	-6.090 (22.737)	1.968** (.696)
Sex (1=female)	-.122** (.034)	.138 (.147)	-.125** (.043)	-.058 (.217)	-.081 (.331)	-.208** (.076)	-.065 (.219)	-.169 (.635)	.079 (.220)
Age	-.031** (.001)	-.036** (.004)	-.032** (.001)	-.036** (.006)	-.025** (.009)	-.029** (.002)	-.035** (.007)	-.038 <sup>#</sup> (.020)	-.034** (.006)
Education	.225** (.006)	.177** (.026)	.208** (.008)	.254** (.040)	.265** (.059)	.219** (.014)	.233** (.042)	.510** (.137)	.203** (.043)
South at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-1.443** (.063)	-1.221** (.265)	-1.466** (.080)	-1.698** (.460)	-1.024 (.672)	-1.476** (.145)	-1.604** (.462)	.299 (1.101)	-.976** (.373)
Midwest at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-.525** (.064)	-.451 (.275)	-.521** (.082)	-.885 <sup>#</sup> (.491)	-.708 (.695)	-.670** (.149)	-.830 <sup>#</sup> (.493)	1.424 (1.234)	-.130 (.395)
Northeast at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-.267** (.068)	.001 (.303)	-.307** (.088)	-1.188* (.487)	-1.043 (.702)	-.447** (.159)	-1.164* (.488)	.207 (1.188)	.306 (.442)

**(Table 3.3a continued)**

Foreign at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	.266*	.066	.210	-.321	-1.705 <sup>#</sup>	.276	-.368	-2.852	.452
	(.113)	(.441)	(.145)	(.715)	(.940)	(.274)	(.711)	(1.941)	(.659)
Believing in God without Doubt		-.371**							-.345**
		(.076)							(.116)
Frequency of religious attendance		-.027						.157	-.008
		(.027)						(.127)	(.042)
Oppose abortion if woman wants for any reason			-.628**					-1.513*	-.082
			(.046)					(.748)	(.258)
Proud to be an American				-.033					
				(.158)					
Important to be an American					-.226*			-.515*	
					(.101)			(.235)	
Important for a child to obey						-.183**		-.517 <sup>#</sup>	-.101
						(.031)		(.292)	(.087)
Less important for a child to think for self						-.081*		.320	-.022
						(.033)		(.314)	(.097)
Obedience and respect for authority							-.379*		
							(.172)		

**(Table 3.3a continued)**

Age	-.031** (.001)	-.036** (.004)	-.032** (.001)	-.036** (.006)	-.025** (.009)	-.029** (.002)	-.035** (.007)	-.038# (.020)	-.034** (.006)
Constant	-97.69	-141.01	-102.37	1.05	3.74	-163.17	2.72	9.69	-158.52
N	26024	1828	18880	957	428	6856	952	189	880
-2 Log Likelihood	22111.84	1281.40	14386.74	579.50	270.23	4694.84	561.25	81.35	583.69
X <sup>2</sup>	6749.85	414.30	4519.53	181.01	61.88	1493.97	186.65	58.62	200.66
d.f. =	10	12	11	10	10	12	10	14	15

\*\*p<.01 \*p<.05 # p<.10 (two-tailed tests)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

\* Reference category is "lived in West at age 16."

**Table 3.3b. OLS Regressions of Attitudes in Support of a Close Relative Marrying a Black on Controls and Traditional/Secular Dimension Variables.**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Survey Year	.064** (.005)	-----	.074** (.006)	.055** (.006)	-----	-----
White	-.457** (.075)	-.590** (.140)	-.443** (.102)	-.586** (.099)	-.729** (.206)	-.535* (.211)
Black	1.205** (.085)	.866** (.168)	1.310** (.116)	1.092** (.114)	1.388** (.236)	.970** (.249)
Sex (1=female)	.087** (.033)	.200** (.071)	.059 (.044)	.093* (.045)	-.002 (.092)	.173# (.105)
Age	-.015** (.001)	-.019** (.002)	-.015** (.001)	-.013** (.001)	-.009** (.003)	-.019** (.003)
Education	.038** (.006)	.026* (.012)	.037** (.008)	.026** (.008)	.047** (.018)	.027 (.017)
South at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-.529** (.053)	-.487** (.112)	-.553** (.071)	-.475** (.071)	-.479** (.154)	-.494** (.161)
Midwest at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-.192** (.053)	-.114 (.113)	-.173* (.071)	-.162* (.072)	-.004 (.146)	-.253 (.165)
Northeast at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-.067 (.056)	.013 (.118)	-.156* (.075)	-.017 (.075)	-.143 (.159)	-.006 (.171)

**(Table 3.3b continued)**

Foreign at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-.140 <sup>#</sup> (.084)	-.117 (.182)	-.173 (.117)	-.089 (.110)	-.220 (.238)	-.332 (.282)
Believing in God without doubt		-.080** (.029)				-.078 <sup>#</sup> (.043)
Frequency of religious attendance		.011 (.014)				-.006 (.021)
Oppose abortion if woman wants for any reason			-.205** (.045)		-.268** (.095)	-.166 (.110)
Important for a child to obey				-.075** (.019)	-.030 (.038)	
Less important for a child to think for self				-.019 (.020)	-.016 (.041)	
Constant	-124.21	3.86	-144.61	-106.57	2.41	3.79
N	4121	887	2182	2217	406	420
R <sup>2</sup>	.306	.274	.352	.301	.406	.302

\*\*p<.01 \*p<.05 # p<.10 (two-tailed tests)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

<sup>a</sup> Reference category is "lived in West at age 16."

**Table 3.4a. Logistic Regressions Predicting Tolerance toward Intermarriage (Opposition to Anti-miscegenation Laws) on Controls and Survival/Self-Expression Dimension Variables.**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Survey Year	.050** (.002)	.328* (.151)	.059** (.003)	.050** (.002)	.309 (.224)	.056** (.004)	.327 (.233)
White	-.634** (.141)	-.233 (.452)	-.808** (.196)	-.632** (.142)	-.533 (.750)	-.859** (.202)	-.450 (.745)
Black	1.821** (.165)	2.195** (.597)	1.506** (.226)	1.820** (.166)	1.357 (.877)	1.492** (.231)	1.469 <sup>#</sup> (.868)
Sex (1=female)	-.122** (.034)	-.048 (.153)	-.098* (.045)	-.127** (.034)	.144 (.224)	-.145** (.053)	.079 (.234)
Age	-.031** (.001)	-.032** (.004)	-.033** (.001)	-.031** (.001)	-.035** (.007)	-.030** (.002)	-.032** (.007)
Education	.225** (.006)	.231** (.028)	.211** (.009)	.225** (.006)	.197** (.041)	.195** (.010)	.145** (.043)
South at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-1.443** (.063)	-1.546** (.294)	-1.312** (.082)	-1.445** (.063)	-1.181** (.386)	-1.288** (.099)	-1.174** (.409)
Midwest at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-.525** (.064)	-.798** (.306)	-.461** (.083)	-.526** (.064)	-.418 (.407)	-.452** (.101)	-.397 (.429)
Northeast at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-.267** (.068)	-.633* (.322)	-.177* (.088)	-.269** (.068)	.452 (.435)	-.246* (.108)	-.587 (.466)

**(Table 3.4a continued)**

Foreign at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	.266* (.113)	-.176 (.512)	.484** (.153)	.268* (.114)	.195 (.771)	.480** (.182)	.552 (.901)
Postmaterialist index		.265# (.143)			.414* (.206)		.269 (.221)
Trust in people			.602** (.048)		.249 (.237)	.564** (.057)	.295 (.249)
General happiness				.008 (.026)	.132 (.169)	-.015 (.041)	.110 (.175)
Homosexuality						.533** (.034)	.682** (.156)
Constant	-97.69	-653.13	-115.41	-98.24	-616.07	-107.37	-648.51
N	26024	1724	14622	25888	826	11582	781
-2 Log Likelihood	22111.84	1181.53	12534.07	21993.47	557.21	9142.72	507.32
X <sup>2</sup>	6749.85	304.79	4108.87	6724.32	134.48	3445.30	155.89
d.f. =	10	11	11	11	13	13	14

\*\*p<.01 \*p<.05 # p<.10 (two-tailed tests)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

<sup>a</sup> Reference category is "lived in West at age 16."

**Table 3.4b. OLS Regressions of Attitudes in Support of a Close Relative Marrying a Black on Controls and Survival/Self-Expression Dimension Variables.**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Survey year	.064** (.005)	.061** (.006)	.065** (.005)	.062** (.006)	.062** (.009)
White	-.457** (.075)	-.527** (.094)	-.461** (.075)	-.479** (.101)	-.620** (.161)
Black	1.205** (.085)	1.202** (.107)	1.220** (.086)	1.361** (.114)	1.428** (.187)
Sex (1=female)	.087** (.033)	.108** (.042)	.087** (.033)	-.013** (.001)	-.033 (.073)
Age	-.015** (.001)	-.015** (.001)	-.015** (.001)	-.013** (.001)	-.015** (.002)
Education	.038** (.006)	.032** (.008)	.038** (.006)	.024** (.008)	.032* (.014)
South at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-.529** (.053)	-.501** (.068)	-.527** (.053)	-.445** (.070)	-.443** (.124)
Midwest at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-.192** (.053)	-.166* (.069)	-.183** (.053)	-.127 <sup>#</sup> (.070)	-.108 (.121)
Northeast at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-.067 (.056)	.012 (.072)	-.066 (.056)	-.124 <sup>#</sup> (.074)	-.136 (.129)

**(Table 3.4b continued)**

Foreign at age 16 <sup>a</sup>	-.140 <sup>#</sup> (.084)	-.097 (.104)	-.128 (.084)	-.136 (.112)	-.127 (.179)
Trust in people		.213** (.045)			.166* (.077)
General happiness			.066* (.027)		.119* (.060)
Homosexuality				.213** (.018)	.196** (.031)
Constant	-124.21	-118.00	-120.64	-119.58	-120.64
N	4121	2566	4091	2155	785
R <sup>2</sup>	.306	.309	.309	.390	.417

\*\*p<.01 \*p<.05 <sup>#</sup>p<.10 (two-tailed tests)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

<sup>a</sup> Reference category is "lived in West at age 16."

**Table 4.1. Percent of Non-Hispanic Whites, by Selected Region, Opposed to a Close Relative Marrying a Black or Hispanic, 1990 and 1998.**

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	<u>West</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>U.S. Total</u>
Oppose close relative marrying an Hispanic, 1990	25.7	59.6	44.2
Oppose close relative marrying a Black, 1990	57.8	79.3	66.2
Oppose close relative marrying a Black, 1998	26.4	58.9	41.5

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