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The Brazilian military ideology: Implications for institutionalized democracy

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The University of Arizona, 1994

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THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY IDEOLOGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR
INSTITUTIONALIZED DEMOCRACY

by

Jeffery Bradley Stewart Smith

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VII. CONCLUSION ...................................................... 85
The Brazilian military possesses an institutional ideology separate from that of civil society. This ideology has in the past mistakenly been identified as the National Security Doctrine (NSD). However, the NSD is merely the codification of a flexible and continuous ideology that began to develop in the nineteenth century. The ideology is based on geopolitical theory which the military believes offers an objective and scientific approach to the problems of national security.

According to the ideology, the organic state's national security is in a constant state of peril which grants the military the role of state guardian. As guardians of the state the military also views itself as society's tutor in the process of preparing the nation for the responsible exercise of democracy. As long as the flexible and authoritarian military ideology is present, democracy in Brazil cannot be institutionalized and will, at best, be a limited democracy.
I. INTRODUCTION

Since the mid 1980s Latin America has been swept by a wave of "Democratization". Yet, the occurrence of open election processes and the absence of military governments, i.e. democracy in a procedural sense, cannot be taken as evidence that society and the military have reached a consensus on government.¹ Nor, more importantly, does it mean that democracy is substantive or institutionalized in society. Substantive democracy is that which incorporates the broad spectrum of social sectors into the political system and is founded upon democratic values instilled throughout society at the institutional, societal, and economic levels.²

Institutionalized democracy is based upon the a priori acceptance of institutionalized conflict in which there are no predetermined outcomes based upon the arrangements of the system or the position of its participants. In the course of


democratic conflict, contending - but legally equal - groups employ various strategies to realize their interests and are governed by rules which are agreed upon in advance. This uncertainty of outcomes within agreed upon parameters is a hallmark characteristic of institutional democracy.

This study seeks to demonstrate that in the case of Brazil, there exists an institutionalized military ideology that is discordant from civil society's, and that the presence of this ideology is inimical to the institutionalization of democracy.

This ideology, common to Southern Cone militaries that have in the past been prone to intervene in politics, has been identified as the National Security Doctrine or NSD. However, this ideology has deep roots which transcend both ends of the chronological confines assigned to the National Security Doctrine. Furthermore, the recent abandonment of a specific doctrine and formerly articulated framework couched in the terms or structure of the NSD does not indicate that the military has abandoned the ideology which constituted its basis.

\(^3\)Certain strategies, however, are not accepted as legitimate within the rules established, such as a particular group responding with violence upon failure to achieve their interests. Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 56-58.
Past studies have wrongly identified the NSD as an institutional ideology wholly inherited from (or as some have argued - imposed by) the United States in an effort to both contain and combat the communist threat during the cold war. Others credit the NSD with being an authoritarian response driven by the capitalist structure to correct perceived economic failings. Yet, it is argued here that what has come to be known as the NSD is merely a surface reflection or epiphenomenon of a larger institutional ideology that is fundamentally at odds with that of the great majority of Brazilian society.

ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

There are three parts to this thesis. The first consists of sections two and three which provide a historical perspective on the circumstances surrounding the adoption of geopolitical theory in Brazil. As part of this background the nature of geopolitics as expressed in both European and

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Brazilian writings is also examined.

The second part consists of section four, which traces the development of the NSD as the systematic framework and codification of the military ideology, and section five, which addresses the philosophical contradictions that occur when a geopolitically based military ideology is inserted within the framework of transition to liberal democratic government. The last part, section six, examines problems in the transition to institutionalized democracy (in the form of military prerogatives), and identifies the continued presence of the military ideology.

METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

The case study methodology is employed in this thesis. Brazilian military journals and other writings as well as discussions with present and past officials of the Brazilian military and ESG provided the basis for the conclusions reached. Military journals provide a rich and candid view of the geopolitical influence not readily encountered outside of the realm of publications intended primarily for internal consumption. This aspect of the research provides unique insight into what otherwise is a closed institution.

Data was obtained during research trips to Washington, DC during June 1993 and February 1994. By examining outlets used to express the institutionally sanctioned ideology of the military, it is shown that in spite of the transition to
elected government, there has been little if any change in the corporate perspective of the officer corps.
II. ROOTS OF CONFLICTING IDEOLOGIES

Understanding the implications that different military and civilian ideologies have on the process of democratization requires an understanding of the effect that ideology has on civil-military relations in general. Therefore, it is important to clarify the meaning of the term and how it is employed in this study.

Ideology is a coherent set of value principles and goal orientations that organize reality over time, and which specify the preferred relationship between the real and the ideal, now and in the future. In short, it is a set of beliefs and values that aspire both to explain the world and to change it. However, the use of the term ideology in this study deserves to be qualified. Surely no military, or any other institution, is monolithic. This is particularly true given the nature of the military organization, wherein a large percentage that makes up its body, the enlisted corps, is subject to the command of a small minority - the officers, and particularly those of the high command structure.

It is important to note the impact that this minority exercises over the institution as a whole. It is generally recognized that although the military is ideologically divided into as many parts as is society with respect to political viewpoints, that it is indeed a reflection of society, the institution does act in an autonomous manner when it comes to
corporate identity. Therefore, the term military ideology, as used throughout this study, is meant to be:

the sum of the orientations of the officer class (whatever degree of cohesion) toward society, regimes, and politics. It emanates from the relationships between management and strategy, between self imposed professional standards and responsibility to the client authorities.

Additionally, the term military as used throughout this study is to be understood as the national armed forces. However, the army has been and continues to be the dominant and motivating force of the separate branches of the Brazilian military. It is from the Army that the core of the ideology was and continues to be derived in great measure.

Inherently problematic with a civil-military relationship in which the institutional military ideology differs from that of civil society is the effect such a disparity has on the

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6Concerning the impact of a minority on the ability for the military to coordinate a coup, Sarkesian states that, "coup does not necessarily require intervention by the 'total' institution. Indeed, a handful of determined officers and men is sufficient to overthrow existing regimes in a number of developing countries. The essential element of successful military intervention is for the coup perpetrators to insure the backing, neutrality, or at least indifference of the rest of the military (or at least a sizable part of it)" Sam C. Sarkesian, "A Political Perspective on Military Power in Developing Areas," in The Military and Security in the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts, ed. Sheldon W. Simon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 3-4. Also see Edmundo Campos Coelho, Em Busca da Identidade: O Exército e a Política na Sociedade Brasileira, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense-Universitária, 1976), 24; and Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 17.

7Perlmutter, 7-8.
degree of objective civilian control over the military.\textsuperscript{8} Sarkesian and Gannon, as well as Huntington, recognize that in order for there to be effective or "objective" civilian control there must be a compatibility of military and civilian ideologies.\textsuperscript{9}

A condition of clearly opposing belief systems in the civil-military framework results in the fragmentation of military institutional boundaries, making it unclear what constitutes the military's legitimate sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{10} However, it follows that the legitimate realm of military action is increasingly blurred when civil society is itself fractured over the military's role, as opposed to one in which the civil-military ideological difference is merely binary.

Tracing the historical development of the process of ideological divergence is an integral part of explaining the impact that the military ideology has on democratization. A rough approximation for the beginning of this process of divergence in Brazil is the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-\textsuperscript{8}For a treatment of objective vs. subjective civilian control of the military see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 80-85.


1870), known as the Paraguayan War in Brazil. As a result of the war, the military began to seek improvements in military professionalism and political progress in the larger society. Professional changes were sought as a result of the lessons learned from both the war as well as the consequences of a rapid demobilization. Political changes were sought to accommodate the pressures felt throughout society over the questions of abolition and republicanism.

GENESIS OF PROFESSIONALISM

Much of Spanish America received its independence through wars, whereas with relatively little bloodshed Brazil declared herself free from colonial rule upon Prince Pedro's declaration of independence in 1822. As a consequence, there was no refiner's fire through which the national military would pass which would have given it a well organized structure and mission. Traditionally, internal order and the protection of the territory's sovereignty was chiefly maintained through the use of organizations such as the ordenanças, bandeiras, and milicias, which were structured along military lines. Hayes notes that this arrangement militarized society through the reliance on military structures to govern an otherwise bureaucratically disorganized society, in an effort that sought "general
organization through military organization". The national guard eventually absorbed these organizations and assumed their function. A strong national army was feared by regional and local political bosses, or coronéis. As a result, the main role of defending the nation was supposed to be filled by the national guard. However, at the time of the Paraguayan War the inadequacies of this arrangement became apparent. The national guard's contribution to the war was limited, due to the fact that service in the war was easily avoided or evaded by sending a slave or buying one's way out. This resulted in the national army assuming a role it was ill prepared for.

The Paraguayan War proved to be a watershed event for the military because it was forced to examine its organization and capabilities during the course of the five year conflict. The war took a heavy toll on both personnel and the national budget. Officers that participated in it did not let the lessons of the war go unheeded. McCann suggests that the army underwent some crucial changes as a result of the war; it created a conscious awareness of the need for military modernization, and the military became involved in the

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12Hayes, 62-63.
partisan politics surrounding the question of abolition.¹³

On the heels of the Paraguayan War, reformers within the army embarked on a mission to effect change. In an atmosphere of self-criticism over issues of poor equipment, training and performance, the reformers called for changes in the methods of officer advancement and education. The principle means for addressing these needed changes and for expressing discontent over slow promotions, lagging pay increases and general parliamentary neglect was through the professionalization movement.¹⁴

In 1873, a year after the minister of war released an army self-critique of its performance in the war against Paraguay, a delegation was sent to report on the arms exposition in Vienna. This resulted in a report examining European armies by one of the delegates, in which he recommended that Brazil adopt aspects of the Prussian

¹³Frederick M. Nunn, "Military Professionalism and Professional Militarism," Journal of Latin American Studies 4, no. 1 (1972): 31. The military was concerned with the question of abolition due principally to two factors. First, there were many blacks who participated in the conflict, demonstrating great loyalty and valor. This may account for the use of the Military School as focus for abolitionist propaganda. And second, the monarchy wanted to use the Army to catch runaway slaves, which was perceived as a job for slave-catchers, not for soldiers. See June E. Hahner, Civilian-Military Relations in Brazil 1889-1898, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1969), 11-12.

But it was apparent that Brazil lacked the necessary tools to attain a modern professional military, and frustration continued to build over this state of affairs, especially among junior officers. In 1881 a semi-weekly newspaper was published under the titles O Soldado and Tribuna Militar. Articles appearing in these publications questioned governmental policies that forced the military to remain in its obsolete state. The army's bitter resentment at being neglected and even "victimized" by a bureaucracy that neither understood nor cared about the mission or problems of the military led to an increasingly vocal officer corps.\textsuperscript{16}

**POLITICIZATION**

It became apparent to many officers, frustrated over the lack of progress in attempts at reform, that institutional and career gains could only be accomplished as a result of "defiance, disobedience, and insubordination".\textsuperscript{17} The perception that gains were to be had only through confrontation and force emerged as a result of the concessions that were won surrounding the turmoil of the "military


\textsuperscript{16}Hahner, 9-18.

\textsuperscript{17}Dudley, "Officer Discontent," 64.
question". The "military question" was a series of incidents in which the military as corporation, protecting its rights and the rights of its members, clashed with attempted governmental control and censure.

But discontent and conflict between the military and the government was not the sole product of the military. Nunn notes that after the Paraguayan war, officers began to spread out on social and political issues, and the army itself became a political issue when its members started to publicly express personal opinions.\(^\text{18}\) This was due as much to civilians pulling the military into their debates as it was to the military seeking redress over professional issues.

The armed forces' grievances were used by both Conservatives and Liberals as leverage to try to force competing factions out of office. Interested in strengthening their own positions, many civilians also sought an end to the monarchy in favor of republicanism. As a result, the military was courted as a necessary ally to depose the monarchy.\(^\text{19}\)

Realizing the interplay between these push and pull factors, a Liberal senator, in what may have been an attempt

\(^{18}\)Nunn, "Military Professionalism," 31. Also, Dudley shows that there were divisions in the Army along both vertical (i.e. rank and generation) and horizontal (i.e. branch of specialty) lines based upon issues of professional education and qualifications, pay, and promotions. See Dudley, "Officer Discontent".

\(^{19}\)Hahner, 10-11.
to pacify official discontent in the ranks, was given permission by the Minister of War to give a series of open forum lectures to army officers in 1885. The senator suggested that the officers organize themselves by forming clubs to voice their concerns on professional matters. This encouragement to organize, when coupled with the societal pressures that were at work on the military from conservatives, republicans, abolitionists, and positivists, turned into fuel for politicization.

The Military Club was founded in 1887 and provided a platform to discuss the many ideological currents of the time. The creation of the club gave reformers a corporate voice concerning grievances, and was an overt act of politicization. The club was seen as "the crucible wherein the autonomy of the Army was formed." From this element of the army (the Military Club) came the rebellious troops who conspired with civilian republicans during the 1889 coup.

While military grievances played an important role in the events that led to the 1889 coup, and many would argue that it was an act of pure corporate self-interest, it must be recognized that the army had a far reaching agenda based upon

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20 Dudley, "Professionalization and Politicization," 120.


22 Dudley, "Officer Discontent," 63.
three principles. First, Brazil had a manifest destiny. Second, the potential threat from Argentina required the maintenance of national security vis à vis a competent military. And third, modernization, industrialization, and abolition were long overdue. Herein lies the beginning of a separate vision of what ought to be versus the reality of the established political order of regional personalist politics.

Events such as the formation of the Military Club and the coup itself politicized the military, but article 14 of the 1891 constitution codified the military's role in internal affairs:

As forças armadas de terra e mar são instituições nacionais permanentes, destinadas à defesa da pátria no exterior e à manutenção das leis no interior. A força armada é essencialmente obediente, dentro dos limites da lei, aos seus superiores hierárquicos, e obrigada a sustentar as instituições constitucionais. (italics added)

By establishing that the military was essentially obedient, within the limits of the law, it gave interpretive discretion to the military as a whole, as well as to individual officers, to decide what was and was not legal. Thus, the constitution eroded the function of hierarchical command and the concept of civilian control. As a result, it precluded necessary obedience to civilian authority over the military, since rebellions or interventions could be justified

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23 Dudley, "Professionalization and Politicization," 123.
by the participants as being a response to illegal or unjust actions by the executive.

The army perceived its new role as a national institution whose purpose was not only to maintain national sovereignty and internal security, but also to be responsible for the stability and form of politics and society itself. In a 1913 article from the charter issue of the military journal, *A Defeza Nacional*, the editors wrote that the army was:

> the only truly organized force in the midst of an amorphous mass of ferment - it exceeds its professional obligations at times, to become...a decisive factor of political change or social stability.²⁴

Although both a coherent ideology, as well as a strategy to put the ideology into practice, were forming within the military, the seed that legitimated military intervention in politics had been planted by civilians encouraging the military to intervene in 1889 and then legitimizing future intervention by the inclusion of article 14 in the constitution.²⁵ As the Army editorial demonstrates, a far

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²⁴*A Defeza Nacional*, 1, no. 1, (Oct 1913), 1, quoted in Nunn, "Military Professionalism," 36.

²⁵Article 14 was included in the 1891 constitution at the insistence of Rui Barbosa, a civilian politician. While Barbosa's intentions were to prevent the usurpation of power and keep the military's actions under the "power that legislates", the provisional President, Marshal Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca, realized the destabilizing effect that the inclusion of article 14 would have on military discipline. The tenente uprisings throughout the Old Republic proved that Deodoro's fears were correct. See Edmundo Campos Coelho, "A Constituinte e o Papel das Forças Armadas," *Politica e
reaching conceptualization of purpose was at the center of the developing ideology, so that the seed planted by the civilians germinated into a corporate self-perception of the military as national savior. McCann states that:

It is difficult to assess the impact of an idea, but it is easy to show how an idea is used and transformed into a raison d'être. The editors believed the army was organized and that the rest of society was not, and that the army served as a positive political force.\(^{26}\)

**GENESIS OF IDEOLOGY**

From 1889-1910 the Brazilian general staff's *Revista Militar* focused major attention on the German army. Admiration for Prussian organization led to the training, in Germany, of approximately thirty officers by 1912. The modeling of the Brazilian army on Germany's would continue beyond the end of World War I.\(^{27}\) The defeat of the Germans in the first World War and the subsequent creation of a French military mission did not mean the end to the German influence. Lessons learned from the Germans were both organizational and ideological, and they had a profound impact on those that witnessed the "order and progress" which resulted from the militarization of

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\(^{26}\) Nunn, "Military Professionalism," 36.

society to accomplish national goals.\textsuperscript{28}

The experiences of the Canudos fiasco, the mission to Germany, and the painful lessons of the Contestado made it obvious, however, that the vision of a strong military did not meet with the reality of the ill-trained, ill-equipped and small force that Brazilian military leaders had to work with.\textsuperscript{29} Army officers' frustration over this incongruity led them to examine society in terms of what they perceived to be their constitutional responsibility; that is, to "defend the nation against both external and internal threats".\textsuperscript{30}

What emerged was the concept of a nation in arms which would lead to the enhancement of military power through regional recruitment and training by means of a universal draft.\textsuperscript{31} By 1913 army thinkers had defined the role of the army as the decisive factor, in the midst of an "amorphous

\textsuperscript{28}Leonardo Trevisan, O Que Todo Cidadão Precisa Saber Sobre O Pensamento Militar Brasileiro, (São Paulo: Global Editora, 1985), 23. Among those officers sent to learn from the Germans were important figures such as: Bertoldo Klinger, Euclydes de Oliveira Figueiredo, Leitão de Carvalho and Góes Monteiro. These "visionaries" were among those known as the "young Turks", in reference to the national renovation project that was taking place in Turkey at the behest of the military.

\textsuperscript{29}Canudos and the Contestado were two incidents (1896-97 and 1913-1915 respectively) in which the army suffered humiliating defeats in its efforts to quell rebellions at the two sites.

\textsuperscript{30}McCann, "The Formative Period," 737.

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid, 741.
mass of ferment", of political change and social instability.\textsuperscript{32}

There was a prevalent idea that it was the task of the army to serve as a source for changing Brazilian society by ending regionalism and making the army a national institution.\textsuperscript{33}

This concept of guiding or "tutoring" an otherwise unruly society became an enduring theme among the officer corps well into the 1970s.\textsuperscript{34} The earlier influence of positivism was altered to envision the army as the means whereby society could be transformed. This view evolved into a new holistic conception of "National Defense"\textsuperscript{35} wherein national mobilization included human, technical, economic and psychological aspects.\textsuperscript{36}

Military reformers came to realize by the end of World War I that those with vested interests in the system of regional politics or "system of Governors" would not permit changes that would create a coherent and formidable central

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32}Nunn, "Military Professionalism," 36.
\item \textsuperscript{33}McCann, "The Formative Period," 749.
\item \textsuperscript{34}Ibid, 749-750.
\item \textsuperscript{35}Dois fatores principais marcaram a transformação do ressentimento surdo em hostilidade aberta de setores das forças armadas contra a política imperial: a Guerra do Paraguai e a disseminação do positivismo nas escolas militares que a ela se seguiu" Wilma Peres Costa, "Os Militares e a Primeira Constituição da República" in A Tutela Militar, João Quartim de Moraes, ed. (São Paulo: Edicões Véritce, 1987), 27-28. Positivism and its influence on the military will be treated in section three.
\item \textsuperscript{36}Trevisan, 25.
\end{itemize}
force. Such changes would severely threaten the status quo, and the coronéis strongly resisted such moves.\textsuperscript{37}

By 1922 the officer corps was roughly divided into two camps. The legalists preferred to attempt changes from within the system, while the tenentes advocated sweeping away the intense regionalism and political corruption that had plagued the nation. Tenentismo was the overt manifestation of professional militarism, or translating a "set of attitudes towards state, nation, and society based on the military ethos" into action.\textsuperscript{38} These were basically junior officers (hence the name tenentes) who saw a need for change if the army was to become a professional and capable military force, something identified as a necessity to fulfill its constitutional role.

Thus the military's original conceptualization of its role as moderator between the executive and the legislative branches (as established in 1889) evolved into that of a facilitator for change. This belief solidified and spread as the political system became increasingly ineffectual and the system of state coalitions collapsed in 1930. The words of Bertoldo Klinger captured the sentiments of those who unified the military when he said in 1930 that, "Chegara a hora de

\textsuperscript{37}Nunn, "Military Professionalism," 42.

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid, 30; 46.
According to Carvalho, the years 1930-45 were the years when the Brazilian military institution changed its relationship with the state and society. Yet, if the new conception of mission was to become reality, the divisions within the military would have to be eliminated. By 1937 a unified leadership was achieved through the purge of any significant opposition. The civil war of 1932 and the communist-oriented rebellions of 1935 provided the opportunities for the new leadership to consolidate an ideologically homogenous leadership. It was then possible to implement a military project which would unite the armed forces into an "efficient instrument of political action under the control of its [the military institution] hierarchy". Under the Estado Novo (1937-1945) the military would continue to hone these beliefs.

THE SEARCH FOR ORDER OUT OF CHAOS

The international and domestic political milieu of the early 1930s played an important role in the adoption of a

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39Trevisan, 30.


41Ibid, 207-209.

42Ibid, 221-22.
geopolitical approach to order and development in Brazil. This era witnessed the rise of economic and political problems on a world scale never experienced before. The apparent inability of democratic political systems to address the crises fostered the rise of alternative approaches to national development. Nationalist authoritarianism emerged as one preferred solution, and the fascist model began to accomplish national unity and development where it was adopted in Europe. Given similar problems at home, some in Brazil blamed democracy as the cause of political chaos and also sought an authoritarian solution. A key figure in the organizational consolidation and ideological elaboration of an authoritarian model to address Brazil's problems was General Góes Monteiro.

GENERAL PEDRO AURÉLIO DE GÓES MONTEIRO

In 1930 the political system of rotating the presidency between the two most powerful and wealthiest states collapsed when the incumbent president, Washington Luís, designated a

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43 Even thought there was not a liberal democratic system in Brazil at this time Góes Monteiro remarked that, "[a] fonte de todos os males sociais e pátrios - forjado (o liberalismo) para que a todos se permita a liberdade de se encarniçarem na pratica do mal contra o bem, aumentando o babelismo e as complicações do problema da organização nacional"; and "O sistema representativo, pelo sufragio universal e direto, pela maneira como é aplicado no Brasil, será sempre uma irrisão e uma causa de degradação de costumes políticos"; Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro, A Revolução de 30 e a Finalidade Política do Exército (Andersen-Editores, 1932); 132,180-81 quoted in Carlos Antonio Pereira, "Aspectos Totalizantes da Doutrina de Segurança Nacional," Política e Estratégia 6, no. 2 (April-June 1988): 258-59.
successor from his own state. This set into motion a chain of events which culminated in The Revolution of 1930. The military believed that civil war could only be avoided by removing Washington Luís, therefore, they acted under the planning and leadership of Lt Col Góes Monteiro.\textsuperscript{44}

Góes Monteiro played a pivotal role in the transformation of the army by integrating many diverse strands under one coherent vision.\textsuperscript{45} His reforms would be precursors to the National Security Doctrine decades later.\textsuperscript{46}

Góes Monteiro perceived an inherent link between national security and development. He also thought that the only way to achieve development was through an authoritarian organization of national resources and of society itself, and moreover, that society should be modeled on the only institutions possessing the appropriate characteristics - the army and navy:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{44}Peter Flynn, Brazil: A Political Analysis, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 50; and Smith, 10.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{46}Góes Monteiro, The Brazilian Army, 12. Also see Pereira, 256. Coelho notes that, "Seja como for, e descontadas as diferenças de circunstâncias, a doutrina militar de Góes Monteiro é no essencial, idêntica à doutrina de Segurança Nacional elaborada pela inteligência da Escola Superior de Guerra"; see Edmundó Campos Coelho, Em Busca da Identidade 99,105. While he may overstate the correlation between the two there is nonetheless a direct inheritance of Góes Monteiro's doctrine in the NSD.
\end{quote}
Ficam só o Exército e a Marinha como instituições nacionais e únicas forças com esse caráter, e só à sombra deles é que, segundo a nossa capacidade de organização, poderão organizar-se as demais forças da nacionalidade. O Exército e a Marinha são, por consiguiente, os responsáveis máximos pela segurança interna e externa da Nação, precisando para esse fim serem evidentemente tão fortes quanto possível, de modo que nenhum outro elemento antagônico à sua finalidade possa ameaçar os fundamentos da Pátria. Nestas condições, as forças militares nacionais têm que ser, naturalmente, forças construtoras apoiando governos fortes, capazes de movimentar e dar nova estrutura à vida nacional, porque só com a força é que se pode construir (...). Não pode existir Exército disciplinado dentro de uma Nação indisciplinada. Organização quer dizer disciplina, divisão de trabalho etc.\textsuperscript{47}

It is very clear that Góes Monteiro's view of the army's and state's role with respect to society is an organic one:

O Exército é um órgão essencialmente político; e a ele interessa, fundamentalmente, sob todos os aspectos, a política verdadeiramente nacional, de que emanam, até certo ponto, a doutrina e o potencial de guerra. A política geral, a política econômica, a política industrial e agrícola, o sistema de comunicações, a política internacional, todos os ramos da atividade, da produção e da existência coletiva, inclusive a instrução e a educação do povo-tudo, enfim, afeta a política militar de um país.\textsuperscript{48}

There should be no doubt that Góes Monteiro admired the achievements of those states that had achieved power status through a program of authoritarian nationalism. He notes that:

\textsuperscript{47}Góes Monteiro, quoted in Pereira, "Aspectos Totalizantes," 259.

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid, 258.
Não é difícil de perceber que a base das transformações e reformas introduzidas nesses países (Itália, Portugal, Espanha, Alemanha, Japão e Turquia) é o nacionalismo econômico, dirigido pelo Estado cada vez mais fortalecido....

The nationalist authoritarian ideas and policies of Góes Monteiro fit neatly with the basic precepts of a new emerging "political science" being espoused in military circles that would eventually be reduced in name to geopolitics.

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*Ibid, 259-60.*
III. GEOPOLITICS

It is difficult to pinpoint a specific time when the theoretical framework of geopolitics was adopted by the military. However, the ease with which it was adopted speaks for the influence that nineteenth century philosophies had on both Brazilian society and especially the military institutions, much as had occurred in other Latin American countries. A combination of these influences and the historic concern of Brazil's leaders with maintaining the integrity of such a vast and expanding territory provided an intellectual climate that was very compatible with the conceptions that were emerging in Europe early in the twentieth century.

A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO ORDER AND DEVELOPMENT

In the late nineteenth century Augusto Comte's philosophy of positivism was picked up and taught vigorously in the military academy by Benjamin Constant. Positivism was Auguste Comte's system of philosophy which classified history into three stages of development. In the last or positivist stage a new science of sociology is reached through the scientific method. Comte believed that order existed in society when there was homogeneity of opinions. Comte blamed liberty of conscience and political freedom for social disorder. He believed that societal agreement would be achieved though, as a result of the new objective science of sociology, in which an elite would announce the newly discovered invariable scientific laws to society. Paul Edwards, ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press), s.v. "Comte, Auguste," by Bruce Mazlish.

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who lived in field conditions and concerned themselves with learning battlefield tactics and military strategy -- Constant was in essence a philosopher and had no practical experience concerning matters of war other than teaching military men to be pacifists. In an era of rapid technological progress and social change, Constant secured himself a following among the younger officers who sought a structured and authoritative approach to the times, but the type of positivism that emerged was a less coherent one than that of Comte's. 51

The uniquely Brazilian form of positivism was comprised of the following themes: that the nation should be civilized through education provided by the military; that there was only one true knowledge that would lead to the progress of humanity and that it was to be taught by an intellectual elite; and finally, the concept of "order and progress" through which society's advance would be made possible. The need for authoritarianism to maintain order and accomplish the transformation of society, as well as the themes listed above, constitute part of the baggage that successive generations of officers would inherit. 52

Another essential component to understanding the appeal

51"The ideas of the French positivists were often poorly assimilated, and the result was sometimes a half-baked positivism, full of undigested lumps of thought." Hahner, 80.

52The later adoption of geopolitics as a scientific approach to the problem of national security made up the rest of this ideological baggage.
of geopolitics is Brazil's historic preoccupation with territory. As an expanding Portuguese colony and later as an expanding independent giant, Brazil was surrounded by hostile neighbors. Conflicts were waged on almost every frontier. Due to the vast expanse of the interior that had yet to be settled and developed, it was of even more concern to the military to find ways to integrate the nation through transportation and communication channels. These areas of development were crucial to the outcome of the "inevitable" future conflicts that would occur. Geopolitics would provide the military with a scientific method of relating power, and hence, security to geography.

THE ORGANIC STATE AND LEBENSRAUM

Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), a German zoologist and geographer, is credited as being the first one to articulate the relationship between a country's growth and its geographical space. The result of the influences of zoology and anthropology is apparent in the word which he coined Anthropogeographie, or the synthesis of geography, anthropology, and politics. Ratzel formulated seven dictums or laws which outline the role of a state's living space or

53The Brazilian military has historically been preoccupied with what it perceives to be a constant threat from its Spanish neighbors. For a poignant look at these fears see, Stanley Hilton, "A Brazilian Foreign Office Look at Power Politics in the Southern Cone in the 1920s," Luso-Brazilian Review 27, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 79-97.
growing space - a Lebensraum.

What is most often associated with Ratzel's contribution though, is his analysis of the state as an organism. Ratzel did not employ the word organism in the sense that Spencer or Comte would - that is in a biological sense, nor was his use of the term meant to be an analogy. That is, the relationship between the state and the individual as an organism was described not as an organic whole in which the parts serve the organism, but rather as a symbiotic relationship between the two. There was not a literal or figurative meaning of a biological organism intended. This point is essential to understand the corruption of Ratzel's thought as used by the geopoliticians. The following is what Ratzel meant by the corporeal organic description:

The comparison of the state with highly developed organisms is unfruitful; and if in the past many attempts to approach the state as an organism have borne little fruit scientifically, the main cause is inherent in the consideration and restriction of the analogies between the association of people and the construction of an organic creature. Right in the structural relationships, which are compared

54 There is a great amount of misinformation and confusion concerning the use of the term "organism" as applied by Ratzel. An enormous amount of the literature dealing with geopolitics and Ratzel especially, relies entirely too much on the translations and interpretations found in the works by Hans W. Weigert, Generals and Geographers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), and Robert Strausz-Hupé, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1942). For a comprehensive and more recent treatment of Ratzel's ideas see, James M. Hunter, Perspectives on Ratzel's Political Geography, (New York: University Press of America, 1983).
again and again, is the most striking difference between man's state and the organic creature. There in the state is the most individualized production of Creation, man who sacrifices neither fiber nor cell of his being for the whole for which he is provided with organs in order to be able at any moment to separate himself as a self-sustaining individual; there is in contrast in the corporeal organism a subordination of the parts to the whole, which takes the independence from the part and recognizes the part only in the interest of the whole. (emphasis added)

Even though Ratzel denounced the use of the biological organic metaphor, his use of the term organic greatly influenced one of his followers who was neither a geographer nor zoologist, but rather a political scientist, Rudolf Kjellén.

THE STATE AS POWER

Kjellén (1864-1922), a Swede, used the term organic in the biological sense when he applied it to his analysis of the state. Kjellén sought to explain states, not in terms of the legalistic or juristic concept as had been the convention, but as powers. As a political scientist, he turned to geography for help in his effort to empirically develop an objective scientific system of analyzing states. He called this

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56In spite of the recurring use of the organic reference in statements as literal, with respect to the state, Kristof notes that "Kjellén himself states explicitly that his organic theory of state is only an analogy," Ladis Kristof, "The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4, no. 1 (March 1960): 23.
In his efforts he used the biological organism analogy:

Viewing them in a certain aspect, one cannot but recognize in the great powers biological facts. Out of their own life force by favor of circumstances, turn of events (Konjunkturen), in constant competition with each other, and by way of natural selection, they stand there on the surface of the earth. We see them being born, growing up, and we have seen them die like other organisms. They are forms of life, among all forms of life the most imposing. As such they should be the subject of a bio-political study which seeks to expound the laws of their development.  

It was Kjellén that first used the word Geopolitik or geopolitics. He defined it as, "the study of the state as a geographic organism or phenomenon in space; that is as land, territory, area, or, most pregnantly, as country [Reich]." It is important to note, however, that geopolitics as defined by Kjellén was only one part or subsystem of his proposed system of objective political science. The entire system or "science" was composed of five general sections with each one divided into subsections. These five areas of Kjellén's comparative political methodology correspond to what he

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58 Kjellén, Die Grossmächte (1905) quoted by Johannes Mattern, 145.

59 Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform, (1917), 46, quoted by Kristof, 24-25.
believed were five aspects of the state.\textsuperscript{60} The five general branches are as follows: (1) \textit{Geopolitik}, (2) \textit{Ekopolitik}, concerning the state as a household, (3) \textit{Demopolitik}, concerning the state as demos (or populace), (4) \textit{Sociopolitik}, concerning the state as society or social order and, (5) \textit{Kratopolitik}, concerning the state as a ruling, governing, controlling organization.\textsuperscript{61}

Geopolitics, as a component of the whole, was taken by the German Major General Karl Haushofer and turned into an approach in and of itself. Although Kjellén disapproved of the misuse of the term by the Germans, his objection was due more to the resulting imbalance or distortion of the methodology, as employed by Haushaufer, than it was to the use of the term geopolitics to describe the whole system.\textsuperscript{62}

Yet geopolitics is the term of choice for advocates of the system. Mattern points out that it is the organic sense of being, as described in the geopolitical aspect of the state, that grants the state its individuality.\textsuperscript{63} As a result, all other aspects follow from the individual characteristic of the state. Therefore, because the Brazilians utilize the term in this fashion, geopolitics as used here will refer to the

\textsuperscript{60}Mattern, 146.

\textsuperscript{61}Ibid, 153-54.

\textsuperscript{62}Kristof, 25.

\textsuperscript{63}Mattern, 147.
conceptual framework and underlying premises of Kjellén's system, not just that singular aspect so identified as Geopolitik in his complete system.\(^6^4\)

Kjellén's general framework contained a prescription for attaining national unity and power. The ultimate goal of the state was to achieve both body, formed by territory, and soul formed by the nation, which when joined constitute a geographical individual. Geopolitik is concerned with the location, form and size of the territory. The other four branches seek to perfect the soul through the achievement of harmony. National homogeneity, not of race but of culture, identity and values is key to unity in Demopolitik. Self-sufficiency or autarky is the object of Ekopolitik. Societal harmony is to be achieved through the incorporation of the traditions of all generations of the population in Sociopolitik. And finally, on government, political harmony is reached through corporative representation under the guidance of a king or caesar rising from the masses.\(^6^5\)

With regard to the political and juristic spheres of the state, Kjellén saw individualism and liberal democracy to be

\(^6^4\)The term Geopolitik will be used when dealing specifically with that branch of Kjellén's complete system.

detrimental to harmony. And, according to Kjellén a proper understanding of the relationship between the state and the individual will resolve the "great conflict of liberalism and socialism". This is because the state will permit private ownership of property so long as it is not to the detriment of the state's body. According to Geopolitik the state has a responsibility to preserve and develop the realm, or the state in its corporeal sense, which is more important than the people within it. People can be replaced, but the loss of territory, following the organic analogy, is as the loss of an organ or limb. As a result, internal harmony of the realm is essential to defending its integrity and hence its viability. From this logic, the state grants use of property to private owners only as long as the interests of the state are maintained in doing so.

GEOPOLITICS IN BRAZIL

As early as 1874 there were some in the army that had a basic understanding of the value of a geopolitical approach with respect to Brazil's future power status. Major Sena Madureira, in his report on the international arms exhibition in Vienna, envisioned Brazil as a regional powerhouse

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66 Ibid, 316.

67 Mattern, 147-48.

68 Ibid.
maintaining "the balance of power in South America just as the United States does in North America". Sena Madureira felt that the 'manifest destiny' of Brazil was such that:

Beginning now, our country should establish itself to play the role intended for it by Divine Providence which presides over the destinies of all peoples. The military power of Brazil will inevitably result from the power and influence which she exercises even now among her neighbors on the vast South American continent.

This awareness or geopolitical insight continued without the support of a formal framework until the contributions of Ratzel and Kjellén emerged in the next century. Shiguenoli Miyamoto has classified the development of geopolitics in Brazil into four general eras: (1) its genesis in the 1920s and 1930s, (2) its consolidation in the 1940s, (3) its role in the emergence of the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) and the incorporation of it into the ESG's doctrines and, (4) its role in the military regime.

In the 1920s and 1930s Everardo Backheuser, an army officer, inspired by the writings of Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellén, wrote on the condition of Brazil and possible

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70 Ibid.

solutions for its problems and vulnerabilities. His views would later be published by the Army's library press as part of the coursework in geopolitics. Contemporary military geopoliticians note that Backheuser was the pioneer of geopolitical studies based on "scientific" criteria in Brazil. His ideas meshed nicely with those of Góes Monteiro concerning the authoritarian prescription for development:

Àpos a Revolução de 30, com o espírito renovador que predominou nos primeiros anos, as idéias de Backheuser produziram a política de fortalecimento de nossas regiões limitrofes, dentro do conceito do que "a frenteira é epiderme do organismo estatal, captadora das influências e pressões forâneas e, como tal, regiões que devem estar subordinadas ao poder central e não às autoridades regionais que manifestam menor sensibilidade para esses problemas".

General Golbery do Couto e Silva, a chief doctrinal voice for Brazilian geopolitics, acknowledged that Backheuser's adoption of Kjellén's method was thorough and did not just concentrate on spacial analysis. The following two quotes are provided by Golbery in establishing the purity of the transfer of the "science" from Kjellén to Backheuser:

A Geopolítica (como de resto qualquer ciência abstrato-concreta) pode evidentemente ser encarada em dois quadros diferentes, harmônicos entre si,

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72Shiguenoli Miyamoto has contributed greatly to the study of the roots of geopolitics in Brazil. His work is unique in identifying Backheuser as a contributor not only to geopolitics but also to authoritarian ideology as far back as the 1920s. Ibid, 36-37.

73Carlos de Meira Mattos, Brasil: Geopolitica e Destino, (Rio de Janeiro: Jose Olympia Editora, 1976), 53.
embora cada qual colimando seu objetivo (próprio): o quadro geral - de ciência pura; e o quadro particular - de ciência de aplicação - orientado para determinado setor, o qual, na hipótese especial da Geopolítica, pode ser um único Estado (seja o Brasil), um grupo de Estados, ou até um Continente em conjunto.\footnote{Golbery, 161.}

Furthermore, "a doutrina de Kjellén...é de política e não de geografia"\footnote{Backheuser, 161.}

Backheuser may have been the theoretician responsible for formulating Brazilian geopolitics as a method, but it was Mario Travassos who in the 1930s applied the method "with mastery" in his diagnosis of Brazil's potential, and in doing so had an "immense influence" on his generation.\footnote{Backheuser, 52-53.} This influence was felt beyond the military arena proper: "Dominou também a mente de nossos melhores estadistas e diplomatas emergentes da Revolução de 1930, cujo regime durou até 1945".\footnote{Ibid. 

Mario Travassos addressed the problems of development in his books \textit{Projeção Continental do Brasil} and \textit{Introdução à Geografia das Comunicações Brasileiras}. In these two volumes he examines the viability of Brazil maintaining its

\begin{itemize}
    \item \footnote{Everardo Backheuser quoted by Golbery do Couto e Silva, \textit{Geopolítica do Brasil}, (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio, 1981), 161, no citation provided.}
    \item \footnote{Golbery, 161.}
    \item \footnote{Mattos, 52-53.}
    \item \footnote{Ibid. Mattos goes on to note that Travassos participated in the \textit{Força Expedicionária Brasileira} in Italy as a Colonel, adding to his stature since those who participated in the venture are practically revered.}
sovereignty and becoming a regional power as a function of both its physical location and the extent to which it could exploit that position through the development of communication and transportation infrastructures. Travassos' work has been cited repeatedly by successive generations of students of geopolitics as being a decisive influence on their works.\(^{78}\)

While the Brazilian writers concentrated on the spacial aspects of geopolitics, there are some underlying assumptions to the use of this approach. Geopolitics (in this case the concentration on space) as a tool in the development and security of a nation is only valid within a system that inherently links development to national order and unity. Through the lens of geopolitics, the failure to achieve greatness was perceived to be the result of the divisiveness produced by liberal democracy.\(^{79}\) Therefore, an authoritarian system was needed to implement the changes and tutor society in nationalism and cooperation toward the achievement of the greatness. Without it, policies based on geopolitics were ineffectual.

\(^{78}\)Shiguenoli Miyamoto stated that Travassos was perhaps the most significant Brazilian geopolitician, "Geopolítica e Potência: O Sonho Brasileiro," *Vozes* 83, no. 3 (May-June 1989): 283. He notes that Travassos' work is a geopolitical work par excellence without the political ideals plaguing later writings, "Geopolítica e Autoritarismo," 37.

\(^{79}\)It doesn't matter that there was no liberal democratic system in place, only that it was perceived it to be so by the geopoliticians.
The influence of Kjellén's overall framework on Brazilian geopoliticians was felt beyond his *Geopolitik*, and included the other four areas of emphasis as well, which amounted to a holistic conceptualization of the state. The adaptation of geopolitics as both a means of analysis and its authoritarian implementation on an institutional level occurred as a result of the ESG's National Security Doctrine.
IV. THE INTEGRATION OF GEOPOLITICAL THEORY WITH AUTHORITARIAN PRACTICE

MODERATOR VS RULER ROLES

Geopolitics were institutionalized within the army following its participation in World War II. The Brazilian military experience in that conflict, particularly its lack of preparedness for participating in the war (especially in comparison to the US), had a profound impact on the officers that would constitute the leadership that overthrew the government in 1964.

Great professional prestige was earned by those that participated in the war, as members of the Força Expedicionária Brasileira (FEB), and their label of febianos was and continues to be worn with great honor. This prestige is a result of having participated in the world's largest conflict on the side of the victors. However, it is ironic that it was with the prestige gained through the international experience that the leaders of the subsequent military regime were able to focus so heavily on internal security.

Yet, while the focus of the military turned to internal security, this course of events does not contradict the Brazilian military ideology. Indeed, this shift in focus, from external war to internal security operations, paralleled the involvement in the Canudos and Contestado affairs
following the Paraguayan War.  

This parallel is important in two respects. First, it illustrates the flexibility of the ideology pertaining to operational doctrine. Second, contrary to Alfred Stepan's thesis that the move to internal security was the cause for the switch from moderator to ruler roles, the switch was, in fact, merely a result of the elevation of perceived threat that the military felt was posed to national security.  

The focus on internal security and the resulting exercise of the ruler role versus the moderator role were merely manifestations of the ideology's flexible nature in accommodating the emphasis on national security. In other words, the shift in role was merely a result of a shift in focus from external to internal operations. Both of these shifts were operational in nature, in that they were a means to an end, and as such did not represent an ideological inconsistency.

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80 There is even a parallel in the time frame between World War II and the 1964 coup and that between the Paraguayan War and Canudos.

CREATION OF THE ESCOLA SUPERIOR DE GUERRA (ESG)

In a lecture entitled, "Razões que Levaram o Governo a Pensar na Organização da Escola Superior de Guerra," Marshal Oswaldo Cordeiro de Farias, one of the founders of the Escola Superior de Guerra, detailed the reasons behind the creation of the school. He related a principle lesson of World War II to the possibility of a third world conflagration. The lesson, was that war is no longer fought by armies alone, but rather by entire nations in a state of total war. Henceforth, in future conflicts all aspects of society would have to be mobilized in order to win.

He also stressed the dangerous international environment in which nations are inserted:

Homens de todas as latitudes e de todas as raças - a guerra é global -, homens de todas as idades - a guerra é permanente -, homens de todas as profissões e dos credos mais diversos - a guerra é total -, devemos, pois, olhar bem de frente essa Esfinge dos novos tempos...

The military leaders of Brazil saw an integral and vital

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83 The concept of "total war" is nothing new. Clausewitz and to a greater degree Eric Von Ludendorff espoused this same concept. To provide legitimacy to the newfound lesson, general Eisenhower is cited often in his references to the total mobilization of society. For a fuller treatment of the total war argument see, Pereira, 252-271.

84 Golbery, 10-11.
role for their nation in the next conflict as a partner in the war against communism. Proper governmental organization and economic development were a must if Brazil was to survive the eventual conflict.

In a world of international anarchy, where the threat of war is ever present, the overriding concern behind the creation and mission of the ESG was the concept of national security. In this new vision national security rested upon the country's economy, and both of these were dependent upon a proper (adequada) form of government in which, "o planejamento seja a preocupação maior."\textsuperscript{85} This form of planning was seen as the means to achieve the development of the economy, which in turn would give rise to, "uma organização sólida para as classes armadas".\textsuperscript{86}

Recognizing the complexity of the task - to study, organize and implement a program of national security in an objective and scientific manner -- the founders envisioned that cooperation between various government agencies, the military, and vital civilian sectors within a formal institutional framework would provide the means to achieve their goal. The institutional framework chosen was the Escola Superior de Guerra.

The conditions for the establishment of the ESG were set

\textsuperscript{85}Farias, 15.

\textsuperscript{86}Ibid.
by decree in October 1948. Shortly after being named one of the founders of the school, Lt Col Idálio Sardenberg, outlined seven principles or "truths" that formed the basis for the school. These seven foundational principles or, "verdades fundamentais" were:

1) A Segurança Nacional é uma função mais do Potencial Geral da Nação do que do seu Potencial Militar  
2) O Brasil possui os requisitos básicos (área, população, recursos) indispensáveis para se tornar uma grande potência  
3) O desenvolvimento do Brasil tem sido retardado por motivos suscetíveis de remoção  
4) Como todo trabalho, a obtenção dessa aceleração exige a utilização de uma energia motriz e de um processo de aplicação dessa energia  
5) O impedimento até agora existente contra o surgimento de soluções nacionais para os problemas brasileiros é devido ao processo de aplicação de energia adotado e à falta de hábito de trabalho de conjunto  
6) Urge substituir o método dos pareceres por outro método que permita se chegar a soluções harmônicas e equilibradas  
7) O instrumento a utilizar para a elaboração do novo método a adotar é para a sua difusão consiste na criação de um instituto Nacional de Altos Estudos funcionando como centro permanente de pesquisas.

It is clear that geopolitics were incorporated into the ideological framework utilized in determining these "truths".

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87The school was officially created in August 1949. It should be noted that the ESG was initially conceived of as an exclusively military high command course, however, in 1949 it was designated for both civilians and military, hence the discrepancy in dates. See Cordeiro de Farias, Meio Século de Combate: Diálogo com Cordeiro de Farias, eds. Aspásia Camargo and Walder de Góes (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1981), 409.

General Meira Mattos notes that Mario Travassos' thought was dominant in the Army's Staff College up through 1950 and that the ESG incorporated geopolitical values in its doctrine.\textsuperscript{89} It is thus no surprise that the ESG's doctrine bore a striking resemblance to Kjellén's comprehensive system of analysis of the state.\textsuperscript{90}

The more obvious links are as follows. The inclusion of area and resources in principle two correlates with Kjellén's Geopolitik, while the inclusion of population falls within Demopolitik. While not specifically mentioned in the seven principles, main points of concern for the ESG and future governments (particularly during the military regime) would be economic development and the quest for national economic self-sufficiency. This was Kjellén's concern in his second area, Ecopolitik.

Of particular interest is the relation between Sociopolitik and Kratopolitik and the remaining principles. Sociopolitik deals with the state as society, its form, order and interest conflicts. This area of political science deals with the accomplishment of Sozialität, or new social order, that would eliminate the need for the state to employ a

\textsuperscript{89}Mattos, 52. Backheuser's contribution to disseminating Kjellén's method must not be forgotten or underestimated. Golbery states that, "A posição de Kjellén foi, entre nós, divulgada por Backheuser, com a mais absoluta fidelidade," 161.

\textsuperscript{90}Mattern, 153-54.
"coercive coordinating activity as part of its social politics".91

Kratopolitik treats the state as a system of ruling organization. It deals with the administrative, political, juridical, military and economic aspects of the state, as well as:

the problem concerning and evolving from the relation of state and individual, of state authority and personal liberty, the rights and duties of the state, and those of the citizens, etc.92

It is important to remember that Kjellén envisioned a corporatist political system under the personalist leadership of a king or caesar that would lead the masses into a harmonious relationship with the state.93

Principle five states that the reason up to that point for Brazil's failure to fully develop was due to the "processo de aplicação de energia adotado e à falta de hábito de trabalho de conjunto". This is an outright rejection of liberal democratic politics. However, it is important to note

91Ibid, 151; 154.

92Ibid, 155.

93Holdar, 313. Harmony to Kjellén is not due to consent but rather to submission. The first experience the individual has with the state is a negative one in which the state, as an omnipresent entity, is an invisible force making its punitive presence felt to protect the legal order. "It [the state] exists in the legal order. Commit a crime and see what happens....Viewed objectively the state appears unmistakably as will and force." Rudolf Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform 14, quoted in Mattern, 140.
that the critique of liberal democratic politics is not a critique in toto of democracy. Rather, it was a rejection of what was perceived to be liberal democracy in Brazil at the time when, as previously noted, democracy was never institutionalized to begin with.

Therefore, according to the critique democracy failed because of the inherently conflictual nature involved in the process of arriving at a consensus. This in turn causes the "paralisia da administração pública, impossibilitada de, no meio da aluvião de soluções propostas, discernir o rumo a tomar".9 This problem of individualism and liberal democracy, therefore, was seen as preventing the unity and homogeneity that a state required to achieve its ultimate goal - full national security.

An offshoot of this criticism is the belief that only the elite of society can analyze problems, set goals, and arrive at the appropriate solutions. These goals, or national objectives as they are called, are then delivered to the masses to be acted upon and integrated into their purpose. National objectives are arrived at through the implementation of the ESG method:

Objetivos nacionais são realidades ou aspirações, relacionadas com a integração física, política, econômica, ou social de uma nação, e que, consubstanciados objetivamente no espírito da elite, se transmitem à sensibilidade do povo-massa

9Sardenberg, 10-11.
com hábitos ou necessidades unânimes ou generalizados da coletividade nacional.\textsuperscript{95}

Golbery clarifies the importance of the elite's role of national tutors when he says that the formulation of the national objectives is:

Obra que se completa, na verdade, por uma ampla tarefa educativa, também, que cumpre às verdadeiras elites representativas realizar em profundidade, com perseverança, fé, dedicação.\textsuperscript{96}

And, the solution to the condition of disharmony is embodied in principle seven. It is a closed institution in which "harmonious and balanced" solutions can be achieved - the ESG. In order to attain a convergence of effort in the study and solution of the problems of national security three elements were deemed necessary:

a) um método de análise e interpretação dos fatores políticos, econômicos, diplomáticos e militares, que condicionam o conceito estratégico; b) um ambiente de ampla compreensão entre os grupos nela representados, de forma a desenvolver o hábito de trabalho em conjunto e de elaboração enterdepartamental; c) um conceito amplo e objetivo de segurança nacional que sirva de base à coordenação das ações de todos os órgãos, civis e militares, responsáveis pelo desenvolvimento do


\textsuperscript{96}Golbery, 102.
potencial e pela segurança do País (emphasis added).  

For the ESG founders, geopolitics provided an objective and scientific method of treating national security. The degree of theoretical correlation between Kjellén's approach and the "fundamental truths", and the statements that recognize Kjellén's geopolitical influence on the army, make clear the unmistakable foundation of geopolitics upon which the ESG was created.

Differences between the ESG's and Kjellén's systems of analysis are organizational rather than ideological. Kjellén's system was broken down into five areas of political science, but the ESG scheme incorporated all possible areas of

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97 Sardenberg, 11. Antônio Arruda notes that the central idea behind these principles was that development did not depend only on natural factors, but principally on cultural ones. What was proposed for the new school was something contrary to one of the most unique and ingrained features of the Brazilian national character - individualism; Antônio Arruda, ESG Historia de sua Doutrina, (São Paulo: Edicoes GRD, 1980), 3.

98 According to Backheuser's Army course manual on geopolitics "Esse modo de analisar o fenômeno estatal [referring to Kjellén's system] é processo rigorosamente científico, no molde usado pelas demais ciências, físicas, naturais e sociais, em uma palavra, pelas ciências "de observação". He later states that it was his hope that in the future Kjellén's science of the state would be applied in full. Everardo Backheuser, A Geopolítica Geral e do Brasil, (Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Laemmert, 1952); 16, 69. While this was taken from a 1952 publication, Backheuser had a very complete understanding of Kjellén's system. This is evident as early as 1925 in his book A Política e a Geopolítica Conforme a Kjellén, see Luis W. Cicalese Zignagho, Ciencia Geopolitica (Montevideo: Instituto Militar de Estudios Superiores, 1978), 54-55.
analysis in the process of evaluating national policy and strategy into a subcategory of geopolitics - geostrategy:

No âmbito da Geoestratégia, sabido é que os fatores geográficos condicionam mais ou menos severamente todos os elementos e fundamentos do Poder e do Potencial Nacionais ou militares, e, portanto, proporcionam uma fundamentação e a proposição de diretrizes a qualquer das componentes admitidas da Estratégia Geral. Há, pois, por onde aceitar-se a decomposição da Geoestratégia, também, em capitulos, sem dúvida interdependentes, mas, nem por isso, menos separáveis para análise e estudo mais detido - uma Geoestratégia política, uma Geoestratégia psicossocial, uma Geoestratégia econômica e, finalmente, uma Geoestratégia militar.99

Of utmost importance to this study with regard to the "principles of truth" are two points. First, that only a closed institution made up of elites can "objectively" and "scientifically" analyze the conditions of the state and come to a conclusion as to what the correct path towards national development is. Underlying this is the belief in authoritarian government to ensure the success of the doctrine. Therefore, the second salient point is a corollary to principle one. That corollary states that "Os órgãos responsáveis pela Segurança Nacional têm o dever de zelar pelo desenvolvimento do potencial geral da Nação".

From this it follows that the armed forces derive the right to intervene, through the appropriate bodies (the Armed

99Golbery, 167.
Forces General Staff) in the development process of the nation. As such, the military holds the ultimate veto in any policy process or decision which it may deem as crucial to national security.

The intent was control over the content of both policies and government in an effort to achieve national harmony through homogeneity of action, will and purpose. The founders believed that only in this fashion would Brazil achieve its greatness, and the ESG was to be the institution to provide the doctrinal means to achieve that end. As Tâvora states, "...o fim básico desses estudos é insuflar na consciência de nossa elite - civil e militar - uma compreensão ampla e uniforme dos problemas ligados à segurança nacional." Again, the lens through which the planners saw reality and

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100 Sardenberg, 9-10. "Desse corolário é que decorre o direito das Forças Armadas intervirem, por meio dos órgãos apropriados (o Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas), no processo do desenvolvimento do potencial Geral da Nação."

101 The military came to hold the veto over any issues regarded as having a significant impact on national security. "This is usually done through the National Security Council. The army is the predominant military voice in such judgements." Wayne Selcher, The National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College, 1977), 12. The National Security Council, or National Defense Council as it has been known since the 1988 constitution, holds constitutional responsibility to "Study, propose, and monitor the progress of initiatives necessary to guarantee national independence and the defense of the democratic State." Article 91, paragraph 1-IV.

upon which they based their program to attain national harmony was geopolitics, which was wedded to a conceptualization of the corporatist state as both a means and an end.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE

By 1953 the ESG had developed a general analytical and prescriptive framework, which has come to be known as the National Security Doctrine or NSD.\textsuperscript{103} It is so widely accepted and disseminated within the military that in spite of any internal divisions on other issues, when it comes to security issues the strategic and methodological doctrine of the ESG is the, "dominant vocabulary and frame of reference."\textsuperscript{104} This was accomplished by the NSD being inserted in social science courses at the military academies and utilized as "the basis of study at the Army Command and General Staff School (ECEME) as early as the late 1950s".\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{103}Several other countries would eventually develop their own versions of the National Security Doctrine with variations peculiar to their situation. However, Brazil was the first to develop the concept into a systematic methodological approach to national security. For a brief outline of other countries' adoption of a national security doctrine see Robert Calvo (previously cited), 69-88; David Pion-Berlin, "Latin American National Security Doctrines: Hard- and Softline Themes," \textit{Armed Forces and Society} 15, no. 3 (Spring 1989): 411-29; and Genaro Arriagada Herrera, \textit{El Pensamiento Politico de los Militares} (Chile: Editorial Aconcagua, 1986).

\textsuperscript{104}Selcher, 12. Also Wilfred A. Bacchus notes that there is still a wide degree of influence of the doctrine; \textit{Mission in Mufti} (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 38-39.

\textsuperscript{105}Selcher, 9.
Referring to the means of establishing national objectives and analyzing the nation's power through a formal course of study, General Juarez do Nascimento Fernandes Távora in an address titled "A Segurança Nacional, a Política e a Estratégia," defined the NSD as, "Os conceitos básicos e os princípios gerais que fundamentam e condicionam esses estudos..." The NSD then, is comprised of a set of basic concepts and general principles and not of concrete definitions. The inherently broad scope of the NSD makes it flexible and resilient in order to survive the changes in threat. "De qualquer modo, o Conceito de Segurança Nacional é naturalmente dinâmico. E o que condiciona esse dinamismo é, a nosso ver, antes de tudo, a própria evolução dos meios de destruição dessa segurança." In the official journal of the ESG, Ubiratan Borges de Macedo identifies Alberto Torres and Oliveira Vianna as prime contributors to the NSD. In 1914 Torres wrote of the need for national objectives that would galvanize the will of the nation's individuals toward a greater vision of "real

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107 Ibid, 13. This broad definition has been re-iterated many times in writings on the subject.

108 Shiguenoli Miyamoto identifies these as two of the better known representatives of Brazilian authoritarian thought; "Geopolítica e Potência," 287.
sovereignty", one stronger than the sovereignty offered in the juristic and political forms. Oliveira Vianna espoused a national policy that would establish long term goals transcending the transitory nature of party objectives. He also offered a vision of a national elite that would carry to the masses the national objectives in a tutoring role. But there are some other conspicuously "geopolitical" precepts that are also encountered in Vianna's writings, and he acknowledges the contributions of Ratzel by name. Some of the precepts he mentions are, the belief in an objective means of analyzing society through observation, rejection of the state in a merely juristic role and the acceptance of the state as organic, and the supremacy of the state over the individual.

There is an entire lexicon associated with the doctrine but for the purpose of this study the most relevant concepts and principles are those that constitute the core of the NSD. They are, national security, strategy, and national power.

The search for national security is the driving factor behind the doctrine. The totalizing aspect of war takes on


Hobbesian proportions and as a result all aspects of life within the state are ultimately reduced to their affect on national security. Távora defines national security as the:

maior ou menor grau de garantia que, por meio de ações políticas, econômicas, psicossociais e militares, um Estado proporciona à coletividade nacional, para a consecução e salvaguarda de seus objetivos nacionais, contra ação adversa de fatores internos e externos.\textsuperscript{111}

The way to achieve and maintain national security is through the proper employment of national power, defined as the:

expressão integrada dos meios de toda a ordem de que a Nação efetivamente dispõe, no momento considerado, para promover, no campo internacional e no âmbito interno, a consecução e salvaguarda do objetivos nacionais, a despeito de antagonismos existentes.\textsuperscript{112}

Components of national power are categorized as geographic and non-geographic. Climate, position, population, natural resources are among the first category while political, psychosocial, economic and military factors are among the latter.\textsuperscript{113} National power links the interdependence of security and development. Security is assured through the proper application of national power, which in turn depends upon the development of the nation. Reminiscent of Kjellén's

\textsuperscript{111}Távora, "A Segurança Nacional, A Política e a Estratégia," 14.

\textsuperscript{112}Ibid, 10-11.

\textsuperscript{113}Ibid, 11.
harmonious body and soul of the state, is the dual nature of
development envisioned by this scheme. It is composed of two
convergent components, that of a material nature – or national
potential, and that of a spiritual nature – or well-being.\textsuperscript{114}

In order to utilize national power properly a \textit{Strategy} is
necessary which is defined as:

\textit{a arte de aplicar os recursos de uma nação, ou de
uma coligação de nações – inclusive suas forças
armadas – com a finalidade de promover,
efetivamente, a consecução dos objetivos vitais da
nação (ou coligação), assegurando-os contra
quaisquer inimigos reais, potenciais ou
simplesmente presumíveis.}(italics added)\textsuperscript{115}

In this view the world is considered in a state of
anarchy in which power politics determines who survives and
who perishes. To survive a nation must maximize its power
through security and development:

\textit{A ideia de Estratégia subentende antagonismos,
conflitos ou choques, atuais ou potenciais, de
interesses, pressões e reações, objetivos a
alcançar ou manter, a despeito de tais pressões ou
reações. Assim, a estratégia deixaria de ter
objetivo se os objetivos nacionais de um Estado não
se opusessem, no todo ou em parte, às pretensões,
aspirações ou objetivos de outros Estados.}\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{114}Antonio Arruda, "Doutrina da ESG: Principais Alterações
Ocorridas nas Últimas Quatro Decadas," \textit{A Revista da ESG} 5, no.

\textsuperscript{115}Tavora, "A Segurança Nacional, A Política e a
Estratégia," 15.

\textsuperscript{116}Ibid, 16.
V. REFUTING THE IDEOLOGY

Many critiques of the NSD credit its inception with being a function of US hegemony during the Cold War and focus on the violation of human rights as its most salient evil. They point to the human rights violations as a contradiction of the Christian tradition which the doctrine purportedly defends. However, they fail to discredit the ideology by focusing on the resulting policies of the NSD rather than on the flawed conceptual premises underpinning the ideology. An effective critique is one which questions the ideology and not just the results of its application. This can be accomplished by examining the reasoning employed in its construction.

MISPLACED ENERGY

One of the most often cited critics of the ideology is José Comblin. His arguments are representative of those who

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117 See the previously cited works by Calvo, Comblin and Garreton.

118 Although referring to Argentina, Pion-Berlin's statement holds true for Brazil when he notes that, "It is tempting to pass the military's image of global conspirators off as a mere rationalization, devised to disguise its real goal of eliminating its political enemies. First, the ideas that sustained the image of a regime and nation at risk were not conveniently invented just prior to the onslaught of terror. They had permeated the ranks of the military years before; they were elaborated upon in military journals, speeches, and hemispheric security conferences. Second, despite the defeat of guerrilla forces in Argentina, the armed forces did not abandon their views when no longer needed." See The Ideology of State Terror: Economic Doctrine and Political Repression in Argentina and Peru, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1989), 101.
both attribute to the NSD a US origin and criticize it for its resulting human rights abuses. Comblin's energy, however, is misdirected. He fails to understand the historical development of the ideology and focuses his attack on the mistaken beliefs that the NSD is the ideology and not its manifestation, and that it was "copied" as part and parcel of an imposed doctrine by the US military in an effort to maintain hegemony and combat communism. He claims that the US National War College was the source for the creation of the NSD. As evidence, he uses the fact that in 1964 the Brazilian government created a National Security Council, similar to that of the US.

Yet, the concepts that led to the emergence of the Brazilian military ideology and the resulting NSD existed well before the US adoption of the National Security Council and accompanying rhetoric in 1947. Moreover, both the concept and term of "national security" were used as early as 1930 by Góes Monteiro and the inclusion of a national security council in the constitution dates back to 1934, thirteen years prior to the creation of the NSC in the US.¹¹⁹

THE DEFECTIVE IDEOLOGY

If we accept that divergent ideologies between civil and military society pose an impediment to objective civilian control of the military institution within a democratic

¹¹⁹Trevisan, 38.
framework, then it is necessary to point out those areas of the ideology that conflict most with that of civil society. There are three, the organic conception of the state, the consequent conception of the state being identified with society, and the concept of the supremacy of the state over the individual. These aspects of the ideology justify the tutoring role of the elite, (particularly the armed forces) on behalf of the state, in preparing society for the responsible exercise of democracy.

Kjellén's preference for the organic theory results from his belief in the inadequacy of the juristic interpretation of the state. Kejellén faulted the view that the state was nothing more than the guarantor of the legal order with respect to the individual. Such a view failed to recognize the economic and social intricacies of life. Therefore, according to Kjellén, there was a mistaken understanding of the state as something separate from society, a state not concerned with the social objectives or moral justification of its own function. In Kjellén's view the state was an individual organism with one will and purpose - to survive. The Brazilian military ideology accepts this premise without question:

Assim considerado, o Estado é apenas um supervisor, com a função específica de "fazer justiça". Não é de admirar, portanto, o alto prestígio do Poder Judiciário, como o mais importante órgão de certos regímens democráticos implantados em terras de
gente com pendores individualistas.\textsuperscript{120}

A face jurídica não é, então, de modo algum a mais apropriada a caracterizar o Estado. ... A essência do Estado consta de elementos de direito e de elementos tangíveis, pois o Estado é um ser moral com substratum orgânico, assemelhando-se muito ao modo de ser intrínseco dos seres vivos racionais.\textsuperscript{121}

There are three interrelated problems which the use of this organic analogy poses for democracy. First, the liberty of the individual is sacrificed so that the state will be free to act in the international arena just as the cells of a living organism are subjugated to the higher purpose of the host. Such a conception of the individual's relationship to the state is inimical to that of democratic government, for it enslaves the individual to the will of the state. It is this aspect of the organic conception of state that gives rise to the concept of a tutelary or limited democracy.

Tutelary democracy occurs when there is the toleration or even promotion of liberalized politics by an authoritarian

\textsuperscript{120}Backheuser, A Geopolítica Geral, 15.

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid, 26. For evidence of the incorporation of the organic analogy into the NSD, "Trate-se, antes, de fortalecer o poder nacional, nos vários elementos que o integram, dentro da concepção moderna de que, do ponto de vista da Segurança Nacional, o Estado deve ser encarado como um organismo vivo, sujeito às mesmas regras de evolução e com os campos de vulnerabilidade comparáveis aos que caracterizam a biologia humana"; A. de Lyra Tavares, Segurança Nacional (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1958), 89. See also the previously cited works by Golbery, Mattos, and Umberto Peregrino, História e Projeção das Instituições Culturais do Exército, (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1967).
regime in an effort to either relieve pressures and/or gain support without being held accountable for its actions or being subjected to fair and open elections. Limited democracy occurs once democratization has been initiated. In this case caution is exercised in extending full participatory rights to some groups or individuals by continuing past, or creating new, restrictions. This is done in an effort to keep contentious issues off the agenda of collective deliberation or to prevent too rapid an expansion of the democratization process until all segments of society are sufficiently "prepared" for full citizenship status.122

Both of these aspects were topics of Oliveira Vianna's works in the 1930s. The reasoning behind the justification for such policies does not lie in the rejection of liberal democracy as practiced, for example, in the United States, but rather in the historical lessons of the past. Vianna believed that past failures at implementing a liberal democratic government were the result of the inherently selfish nature of the Brazilian people. Postulating that this was an effect of the tropical climate and the lack of a protestant work ethic, he proposed that democracy would only be achievable in the long term after a period of elite tutoring to overcome the

122 The definitions of tutelary and limited democracies are taken from O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions, 9.
"clan" mentality of selfishness:123

É assim que, democratas, julgavam fundar aqui a democracia à maneira inglesa ou americana, pelo facto da simples conexão do suffragio generalizado aos cidadãos. Não levavam em conta, principalmente, este facto capital — de que no Brasil não existia "povo", no sentido anglo-saxónico da expressão, isto é, massas populares esclarecidas e independentes; mas, sim, uma vasta congerie humana, acumulada nas cidades ou dispersa pelos campos e sertões; congerie de desplantados, de infixos, de semi-nomades, de servilizados, sem pão, sem terra, sem vontade, sem consciência cívica, agrupados em clans, sob a protecção dos grandes proprietários rurais.124

Os indivíduos que se conduzem differentemente, os que, no poder ou fora dele, agem no sentido dos grandes interesses gerais, com sacrifício mesmo dos interesses particulares do seu clan ou do seu partido, são typos de exceção, formam uma pequenissima minoria de homens superiores, fora, por assim dizer, da mentalidade media da sua gente. Estes raros typos de exceção é que nos tem salvado; porque, em boa verdade, tudo o que ha de grande em nossa historia politica provém exclusivamente delles. (italics original)125

According to Vianna the intervention of the elites on behalf of the state and society is not a threat to the citizenry. On the contrary, elite intervention and tutelage is the only hope that the masses have of ever freeing themselves from the oligarchies and eventually being groomed

123 This explains why the modernization theory of the 1950s and 60s fell upon such fertile ground in Brazil during that time period.


125 Ibid, 66.
and ready for the exercise of responsible democracy.\textsuperscript{126} According to the military ideology the core of the elite is the armed forces.\textsuperscript{127}

Following this logic the concept of the military's role as tutor and, therefore, savior of the nation in pursuit of democracy makes sense. This logic also clarifies how democracy could be a permanent national objective (long term goal) but not an actual national objective (current goal) within the NSD framework:

A democracia pode, através de um planejamento adequado, resolver satisfatoriamente as equações desequilíbrio, que condicionam e conciliam, a meu ver, a realização do progresso econômico, com a liberdade política e paz social.\textsuperscript{128}

The second problem with the organic analogy is the confusion of state with society. As an organism whose purpose is to survive in the international arena competing with other organisms, the state is equated with society in its moral aspect. It must be concerned with the economic and societal


\textsuperscript{127}This is in strict accord with Kjellén. In an effort to prevent internal conflict from escalating and endangering the organism there is a need for the "pacification and coordination" of the "conflicting economic interest groups". The two agencies assigned this task according to Kjellén are the army and the bureaucracy. Johannes Mattern, \textit{Geopolitik: Doctrine of Self-Sufficiency and Empire} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), 86-87.

\textsuperscript{128}Tâvora, "A Segurança Nacional," 63.
aspects as well as with legal matters to ensure unity of purpose. "A figura do Estado aparece quando a Nação se apresenta organizada e institucionaliza seus objetivos. O Estado, será portanto, a Nação em termos orgânicos." As a result, the state determines society's interests, goals and form. However:

Through an elite dominated holistic conception of the state, the masses are tutored as to their "real" wants and needs. This is because the parts of the whole cannot serve the whole without the direction of the elite. According to the organic analogy this is tantamount to the organs of the body complying with the will of the brain. Yet, the analogy collapses because this state of compliance is a constant in the human organism. The organs do not arrive at an educated level of behavior through tutelage after which they can express their own desires collectively (democracy), independent of the brain's will. They are forever relegated to compliance.

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129 Peregrino, 116.

This leads to the third problem with the analogy. It is illogical. It is through the life of the individuals that the state exists, whereas the individual parts of the biological organism have no autonomous life or volition. Individuals have varied interests outside the state and, at best, it is only their conduct that is subject to state control, and not their desires.
VI. The Ideology and Transition

Up to this point two steps have been accomplished in establishing the effect of a divergent military ideology on the process of institutionalizing democracy in Brazil. First, the military ideology has been traced throughout its historical development up to the culminating point of its doctrinal manifestation, the NSD. Second, the critique of the military ideology illustrates its contradictory posture vis-à-vis liberal democracy. It is now necessary to determine whether or not the ideology is still present (in Brazil and in what form), and if it is present, to determine its effect on the institutionalization of democracy.\(^{131}\)

Continued dissemination of the NSD through military and ESG publications provides evidence that the ideology is still accepted.\(^{132}\) And while, as previously noted, the NSD is not to


\(^{132}\) Miyamoto notes that the ESG basically stagnated with no new ideological innovations for decades after 1964; Miyamoto, "A Escola Superior de Guerra: Mito e Realidade," in Política e Estratégia 5, no. 1 (January-March 1987): 81. As a result the doctrinal essence of the military ideology (the NSD) remained essentially the same for decades after its elaboration, and a perusal through the Revista da Escola Superior de Guerra reveals that this is still the case. The ESG's doctrine also continues to permeate the writings of the Army's journal A Defesa Nacional and the Navy's Revista Maritima Brasileira. And, while the ESG hasn't influenced government policy making since 1964, it is still the
be confused with the ideology proper it serves as an adequate indicator of the ideology's presence. In addition, the presence of other aspects of the ideology in these journals, such as strictly geopolitical writings, provides further evidence of the ideology's acceptance.

In 1983, the charter issue of the Revista da Escola Superior de Guerra reprinted the original motivations for the school's creation as well as the original arguments and definitions of the NSD. Since its elaboration more than forty years ago it has remained the same in substance, changing only in scope.

Two processes have played important roles in maintaining the viability of the NSD. These were the political liberalization policies of the abertura which eventually led to procedural democracy, and the "fall" of communism with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc.

ABERTURA AND INSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES

The events which led to the coup of 1964 demonstrated to the military that Brazilian society was not ready for, and the political institutions were not capable of maintaining


In other words, the absence of the NSD would not necessarily indicate an absence of the ideology, whereas the presence of the former necessarily indicates the presence of the latter.
democracy in the face of a polarized political environment.  

In the course of the military regime of 1964-1985 the NSD took on a life of its own. The Cold War served as an omnipresent backdrop to the regime's preoccupation with communist insurgency. In a climate where fears of subversion drove the military to focus on internal security, the regime passed institutional acts which related every aspect of daily life to national security.  

However, with the elimination of the armed insurgency there was no justification for further authoritarian measures, and any legitimacy that the regime enjoyed began to wane. As the process of abertura was giving way to procedural democracy, society began to openly question the logic of the NSD and its myopic and anti-democratic vision of national security.  

The argument for democracy could not be ignored because the military ideology had touted democracy as the preferred

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135 It is not within the scope or intent of this study to treat the employment of the ideology during this time period. Its role during the military regime has been treated extensively in other works treating the NSD. See Coelho, Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira (previously cited), and Maria Helena Moreira Alves, _State and Opposition in Military Brazil_, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985).
final form of political organization for decades. And as far as the NSD is concerned, democracy had always been and remains to be, a permanent national objective. As a result, growing pressure from both within and without the regime forced a greater elaboration on the subject of democracy.

In 1974, under internal pressure due to military factionalism and external pressure resulting from the legitimacy problem, the regime began to liberalize politics in the process of distenção, and by 1979 President Figueiredo began the policy of abertura.\footnote{For a fuller account of the process of abertura see Alfred Stepan, ed. Democratizing Brazil (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).}

The end result of the opening of the political process was a return to procedural democracy. Indirect presidential elections were held in 1985, a new constitution was adopted in 1988, and direct presidential elections were held in 1989. Yet, in spite of these procedural changes, the abandonment of authoritarianism was and continues to be conditioned upon the responsible exercise of democracy by society. With this qualifier in place there currently is, at best, limited democracy.

It is with this conditional democracy in mind that the military initiated the transition to procedural democracy. On the eve of that transition, the commander of the ESG stated that:
A tentativa de transposição de modelos democráticos alienígenas pode apresentar, e usualmente apresenta, resultados negativos....O modelo democrático é um produto peculiar a cada uma das sociedades que o adota, o ensaia e conforma ao ambiente histórico-cultural em que vive. Assim, pode-se admitir, numa linha evolutiva, uma configuração própria, que poderíamos denominar, no nosso caso, Democracia Brasileira....A Democracia possui inevitáveis limitações, exige e pressupõe maturidade e constante aperfeiçoamento, mas quem for confiante em sua capacidade criadora estará habilitado a conviver no mundo democrático, onde não existem fórmulas milagrosas ou instituições políticas irretocáveis.137

It is apparent that while the military allowed for the return of procedural democracy, it did not have complete confidence in the ability of civilians to exercise it with full responsibility. As a result, the military established safeguards for itself, in the form of institutional prerogatives to ensure that it could influence policy behind the scenes as well as leave open the option for future direct...

137Euclydes de Oliveira Figeiredo Filho, "Formatura dos Estagiários de 1984 da ESG," Revista da Escola Superior de Guerra 2, no. 4, (December 1984): 12-13. Further evidence of the belief that democracy was unique to each national situation is found in an address given at a seminar on democracy and constitutionalism. Here, the limited nature of "Brazilian Democracy" is pointed out when the lecturer identifies the nations elite as those that, "receberam talentos especiais de Deus, devem interpretar os interesses e anseios do povo, de maneira a contribuir para identificar os objetivos nacionais." Sérgio Tasso Vasquez de Aquino, "Destinação Constitucional e Organização das Forças Armadas," Revista Maritima Brasileira 107, no. 7-9 (July-September, 1987): 52.
intervention.\textsuperscript{138}

Following Stepan’s paradigm, Jorge Zaverucha identified the following areas or institutional prerogatives which the military secured for itself.\textsuperscript{139}

(1) The military control the intelligence gathering operations. In spite of President Collor abolishing the military controlled National Intelligence Service (SNI) (which was utilized for internal intelligence gathering), and establishing a civilian headed agency (Secretariat for Strategic Affairs - SAE) to assume its functions, the military was allowed to create a parallel organization and the archives of the SNI were transferred to the Army’s Information Center - CIE. Furthermore, each of the services retains its own intelligence agency with no civilian oversight.

(2) Each of the armed services ministers holds cabinet status, in effect providing direct access to the President on any issue.

(3) There is no Defense Ministry providing a central

\textsuperscript{138}Institutional prerogatives are those areas in which the military as an institution assumes that it has a right or privilege to exercise control over its internal affairs, extramilitary arenas within the state apparatus, or relationships between the state and political and civil society. Stepan, Rethinking, 93.

civilian directive function over issues of plans, policy and budget.  

(4) There are no legislative hearings on defense matters.

(5) The armed forces control some police. While military police answer to the state governors who pay them, the army controls police armaments and coordinate police operations. This situation creates a dilemma in the event of social unrest as to who has ultimate command authority.

(6) There is a lack of in-depth congressional oversight with respect to promotions. Promotions to the rank of general and above are delegated to the President who, in practice, rubber-stamps the list submitted by the military.

(7) There is a separation of legal jurisdiction, into two areas, one for civilians and another for the military. This provides a feeling of autonomy from civil society and a sense of answering to a higher standard.

(8) The military maintains autonomy with regard to actions during internal disturbances. This is a function of two principle factors. First, since there is a separate jurisdiction for military offenses there is no effective

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140 In 1992 the issue of a Defense Ministry surfaced again eliciting a response that dismissed the idea as not only ineffectual, but even more detrimental to the already suffering state of affairs by creating more bureaucrats; L.P. Macedo Carvalho, "A Controvérsia do Ministério da Defesa," A Defesa Nacional 757, (July-September 1992): 63-67.
control over military actions as long as military ranks are closed. Second, Complementary Law no. 69, ratified in July 1991, re-granted the armed forces the 1967 constitutional status as guardians of law and order. This provides the military with the legal right to act in an independent fashion during internal unrest.

The existence of these institutional prerogatives could indicate nothing more than attempts to preserve corporate interests. But the military journals indicate that it is the presence of the military ideology which motivates military unwillingness to relinquish control over institutional purviews.

THE FALL OF COMMUNISM AND A SHIFT IN FOCUS

In January 1989 a mechanized infantry unit outside Buenos Aires was attacked and held by guerrillas in a 29 hour siege. In March the editorial staff of A Defesa Nacional stated that this served to illustrate two important facts. First, that the threat from the left was still alive, and second, that the successful efforts to remove the constitutional references to "National Security" were attempts to subvert order and make it difficult for the military to combat subversive violence.141

In May of the same year, a lecture was delivered at the ESG identifying the real purpose of those who most influenced

the changes effected in the 1988 Constitution. Their purpose, the lecturer surmised, was not to organize or limit power, but rather to, "estabelecer um plano geral de transformações, mormente econômicas e sociais, tendo em vista a transição para o socialismo".\textsuperscript{142}

However, with the fall of communism and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the focus changed sharply toward economics and Brazil's role in the new international order. While the vernacular utilized is still classic NSD, important changes have occurred with respect to the focus of the ideology and consequently that of the doctrine.

Early evidence of this shift in focus is found in a lecture delivered at the ESG detailing the changing world situation. Ambassador Azambuja noted that the new international order is characterized by three basic components, the end of the Cold War, the consolidation of economic multipolarity, and the emergence of a new multilateralism based upon environmentalism and human rights.\textsuperscript{143}


THE NEW THREAT

According to the military, the new international order has replaced communism as the primary threat to national security.\textsuperscript{144} With the fall of communism, states are focusing their energies on economic competition. Trading blocs are replacing military treaty organizations as arenas of competition. Following this conceptualization, the lines have begun to be drawn along a new axis of conflict. The north has as a primary goal to gain control over the underdeveloped meridional areas of the world that are rich in primary resources. And Brazil, possessing an enormous area of potential resources in the Amazon, is the subject of international designs to take away its sovereignty over the area.\textsuperscript{145} In an ironic twist, the military has adopted the left's economic arguments about imperialism.

In their efforts to gain control of the Amazon region, the international economic elite is believed to be engaged in a conspiracy with the elite of Brazil to destabilize the

\textsuperscript{144}However, this is not to say that socialism is no longer viewed as a threat. In 1993, a prominent ESG professor when questioned about the deteriorating economic situation and the upcoming presidential elections, stated without hesitation that if the results of the elections created the perception of a turn towards socialism, he had no doubt that the military would respond by intervening. Interview not for direct citation.

country. This is done in the hopes that Brazil will not reach its full development potential and the resources will then be left for the international elite to take unopposed. The US is among the leaders of the international conspiracy. To provide a historical sense to the coveting of the Amazon, US designs on the region dating as far back as 1849 are often cited.\textsuperscript{146}

The Brazilian elite (the current government) either wittingly or not:

Trabalham em favor das elites que efetivamente lideram o mundo, como se delas fizessem parte, o que não aconteceria se estivessem interessadas em despertar o gigante adormecido em berço esplêndido e fazê-lo ocupar seu lugar de direito entre as nações, como sonharam os intrépidos e tão esquecidos construtores da nacionalidade brasileira.\textsuperscript{147}

The new international conditions and the adoption of the north-south imperialist rhetoric by the military have had some interesting results. The ESG is courting its once mortal enemy, the left, in an effort to forge broader acceptance of the military ideology:\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{146}As an indication of the seriousness that the US threat poses, Brazilian military leaders became incensed at US military exercises held in the Guyanese amazon in the summer of 1993. Celson Franco, "Militares Levarão a Itamar a Preocupação com Fronteiras," Jornal do Brasil, 16 May 1993, 3.


\textsuperscript{148}As noted before, socialism is not viewed as a valid alternative. The military's acceptance of the left is based upon anti-imperialism and social justice, not socialism. The meaning of social justice is not equality of outcome but
A maior abertura relativa aos públicos-alvos aqui referida, pressupõe uma mudança de tratamento quanto à natureza do inimigo interno, deixando de considerar como tal aquelas que, embora defendendo ideias políticas distintas, ou estratégias diferentes, querem atingir os mesmos objetivos nacionais permanentes. Essa ampliação do horizonte espiritual se situa na mesma linha do novo enfoque introduzido na doutrina, distinguindo oposição de contestação.\textsuperscript{149}

The rationale behind this move is to achieve nationalism in order to stave off internal divisions and strengthening the state's sovereignty in the face of imperialist designs on the nation's resources.

Concrete steps have been taken to create an alliance between military nationalists and the political left. A left wing economist was invited to speak at the ESG; and, recently an entire front page of the \textit{Jornal da Campanha}, a mouthpiece

for the organization Ação da Cidanania contra a Miséria e pela Vida, was devoted to statements by past and present commanders of the ESG under the topic "Hunger, the New Enemy Within". All of the statements were anti-establishment and anti-liberal.\(^{150}\) Also, the Maoist Partido Comunista do Brasil has quoted with approval a manifesto entitled "Armed Forces the Last Line of Defense" written by the recently retired Air Force Brigadier Ivan Frota in his opening bid for president.\(^{151}\)

This development comes on the heels of an increasingly vocal expression of dissatisfaction among the military (especially the younger officers) over pay, resources and professional prospects. In June 1993, it was reported that a semi-clandestine meeting of military officers was held. These officers reportedly consider democracy to be "a system incompatible with the picture of economic and social crisis the country is living through", and believe that the cause of the Brazilian crisis is due "to the destruction of society's values because of corruption, impunity, and the adverse actions of foreign interests".\(^{152}\)

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\(^{151}\) Ibid.

\(^{152}\) "Secretariat Analyzes Reasons for Military 'Dissatisfaction'", (in Portuguese), O Estado de São Paulo, 30 May 1993, 7, translated and reported in FBIS, LAT-93, 104, 2 June 1993, 31-32.
The new identification of threat and a strategy to meet that threat fit perfectly within the military ideology. The only significant difference between the new model of threat and strategy, and that of the NSD, is the change of focus from internal subversion to external threat.

The key factors in this argument are as follows. First, there is international anarchy in which each state seeks to maximize its power along economic lines. Second, national security can only be achieved and maintained by maximizing national power. Third, national power can be maximized only be national development (security and development). Fourth, national development has to occur on three fronts, economic, political and physical (populate and integrate so as not to lose territory). Fifth, economic and political development are only possible if there is national integration of will and purpose - the essence of nationalism. And as a corollary to this last point, the elite are failing the nation in their irresponsible exercise of government, confusing democracy with and absence of responsibility.¹⁵³

VII. CONCLUSION

The NSD is the doctrinal epiphenomena of the military ideology. The ideology was formed over a long period passing through several phases, and continues to exist in its current phase of nationalist developmentalism. The first phase was led by institutional reformers who ultimately politicized the military. This resulted from the frustrations over corporate neglect following the Paraguayan War, and the belief that civilian political ineptness was endangering the mission of the armed forces.

The second phase was led by the tenentes. Reflecting widespread societal discontent with the political system, they saw a tutoring role for the military in educating society on the benefits of discipline. This concept of tutoring society found greater expression through the thought of Góes Monteiro, who consolidated the ideology of authoritarian nationalism (based upon a geopolitical foundation) within the military institution in support of the Estado Novo.

Once a relative degree of institutional consolidation had been achieved, the third phase began. The idea that the armed forces should tutor society in an "objective" and "scientific" manner on the benefits of authoritarian nationalism was provided by formally adopting the framework of geopolitics within the educational institutions of the military. Geopolitics served to both justify policies (due to their
purportedly scientific nature) and aid in the propagation of the ideology (due to the structured nature of the system).

The fourth phase was the development of the ESG and the emergence of the military regime of 1964 as an institutional means to diffuse the ideology among the military and civilians alike, and, more importantly, to put it into practice. The National Security Doctrine was just one aspect of the overall ideology. In its most recent phase the ideology is abandoning the focus on internal subversion in favor of nationalist developmentalism.

Given the guiding "fundamental truths" and the broad and adaptable nature of the doctrine, two important points need to be stressed. First, since the doctrine rests on concepts rather than definitions, it is very adaptable and difficult to refute. Second, and more importantly, constitutional revisions will have no significant impact on the attainment of objective civilian control as long as the military maintains the basic components of its own distinct ideology, e.g. that political intervention is within its purview, because these tenets are held as fundamental "truths" and the higher mission

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154 Um dos pressupostos ligados à Doutrina da ESG é o de que se devem preferir os conceitos às definições. As definições são rígidas e mais condizentes com o rigor das normas legais, ao passo que os conceitos são mais flexíveis e abrangentes. As definições limitam, os conceitos permitem compreensão maior," Arruda, ESG: História de sua Doutrina, 5.
of the military is to defend them.\footnote{Dada uma situação de conflito entre as duas (a doutrina militar e a Constituição), ainda que, do ponto de vista formal, a Constituição tenha precedência sobre todas as outras leis, doutrinas etc., o fato é que, sociologicamente, existirá uma tendência muito maior para que os militares pautem os seu comportamento, em primeira instância, pela doutrina prevalecente em suas corporações, e só em segunda instância pela Constituição," Alexandre Barros, "Problemas de Transição Democrática na Frente Militar: A Definição do Papel dos Militares, a Mudança da Doutrina e a Modernização do País," Política e Estratégia 6, no. 2 (April-June 1988): 210.}{155}

In order for democracy to be institutionalized, the threat of military intervention in the political process must be eliminated. This is accomplished through objective civilian control. However, objective civilian control cannot be achieved as long as there exists a difference between the notion of service to the duly constituted civil authority versus service to some higher and abstract sense of national interest. This differentiation of mission is completely inimical to the principle of objective civilian control.\footnote{Welch and Smith, 239.}{156}

The existence or threat of intervention in politics does not just mean overt political action such as a coup, but also includes discrete influence on the political process through a behind the scenes use of power or threat of its use. If the military retains control over aspects of the state that deal with political conflict, and if its definition of democracy differs from that of elected officials, then conflict between
the military and the government is inevitable.\textsuperscript{157}

In addition, if the military possesses near total autonomy over their own organization, and over the decision to support or defy the government during a time of crisis, then civilian control, and therefore any hopes for institutionalized democracy, do not exist.\textsuperscript{158} The fact that the military did not make any pronouncements concerning the handling of President Collor's impeachment proceedings is not an indication that the military has returned to the barracks. On the contrary, the fact that there was widespread concern over their possible involvement in the matter clearly demonstrates that there still exists a \textit{de facto} veto over issues construed to be of crisis proportion.\textsuperscript{159}

The importance of the Brazilian military ideology is that it allows for the existence of the preceding conditions. The core concept of the military ideology is the maximization of national security based upon the organic conception of the nation-state in an permanently anarchic international order. This conception not only provides for the preparation of meeting a potential enemy with overwhelming national power, it mandates the existence of an enemy at all times. The

\textsuperscript{157}Stepan, \textit{Rethinking Military Politics}, 137.

\textsuperscript{158}Welch and Smith, 53.

\textsuperscript{159}Indeed, their silence on the issue was widely perceived as \textit{permission} to remove Collor from office.
military, as the guardian of national security, is responsible for protecting the integrity of the national organism at all costs - hence, it has a higher purpose. As long as the military ideology continues to exist the prospects for democracy in Brazil will be limited at best.
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