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Disaggregating corporatism: A gendered perspective of Argentine labor incorporation

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The University of Arizona, 1991
DISAGGREGATING CORPORATISM:
A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE
OF ARGENTINE LABOR INCORPORATION

by
Eva Johnson

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the
COMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES (Graduate)
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1991
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This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:

Paul G. Buchanan
Assistant Professor of Political Science

Date
In loving memory of my mother,
Alice Holley Johnson
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This work further disaggregates the Argentine corporatist state at the time of initial labor incorporation by analyzing gender. The analysis focuses on the separate set of inducements and constraints implemented as a result of incorporation measures by the populist regime of Juan Domingo Perón (1946 to 1955) which served to manipulate and control the gendered division of the Argentine work force. Labor legislation, labor force organization by the state, and labor contracts negotiated under the auspices of the state are utilized to accomplish the disaggregation.
CHAPTER I

A GENDERED DISAGGREGATION OF THE CORPORATIST STATE DURING THE POPULIST REGIME OF JUAN DOMINGO PERON

Is it really possible to understand workers' experience without considering female workers and their experience? ...I think not.¹

Historical descriptions of women in the Argentine labor force demonstrate that women actively participated in the industrialization process begun in the 19th century. Women filled the ranks of workers, joined labor organizations, and participated in labor unrest. Despite historical descriptions of their many roles, however, studies of labor-state relations have subsumed the history of women workers and their relationship to the state within the general history of the labor movement. It is my intention to apply existing and new historical research on women workers in Argentina to study the gender-based methods of labor incorporation.

**Labor Incorporation** by the Argentine Corporatist State

Initial disaggregation of the corporatist state in the work of David and Ruth Berins Collier analyzes the inclusionary and exclusionary measures found in the labor law(s) granting state recognition to labor organizations. These laws reveal the different power relations and political contexts associated with corporatism and how they vary among Latin American corporatist states.

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²The period of initial incorporation of the labor movement is defined as "...the first sustained attempt on the part of the state to support and shape an institutionalized labor movement..." in response to "...the social question on the part of the elements of the elite that shaped state policy." David Collier and Ruth Berins Collier, "Initial Incorporation of the Labor Movement in Latin America: A Comparative Perspective," paper presented at the 1986 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Eugene, Oregon, abstract and 21.

³The corporatist state is a "...system of state-group relations...to the degree that there is (1) state structuring of groups that produces a system of officially sanctioned, non-competitive, compulsory interest associations; (2) state subsidy of these groups; and (3) state-imposed constraints on demand-making, leadership, and internal governance. Corporatism is a non-pluralist system of group representation. In contrast to the pattern of interest politics based on autonomous, competing groups and to the total suppression of groups, in the case of corporatism the state encourages the formation of a limited number of officially recognized, non-competing, state-supervised groups. Collier and Collier, 1979, 968.


⁵Collier and Collier, 1979, 967.
Argentina's incorporating labor law is considered to be the Professional Associations Decree of 1945 (No. 23,582). Passed during General Edelmiro Farrell's military regime, the decree was influenced by then-head of the Department of Labor, Juan Domingo Perón. The law continued in effect after the election of Perón as president in 1946.

The inclusionary populist regime of Perón appeared in Argentina, as in other parts of Latin America, in response to the political, social, as well as international and internal economic crises of the 1930s. Marked by the political and social crises of oligarchic authority, this era also included growing demands for recognition by various sectors of society. Workers sought to improve their political and economic status. Women sought inclusion in the political arena by demanding the right to vote and hold office. Female workers, like their male counterparts, sought to improve their status in the work force.  

In response to the economic crisis, the Argentine populist regime expanded the role of the state in economic development as it continued the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) economic policies begun after the

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*For discussion of demands made upon the state for inclusion of women, see Marifran Carlson, ¡Feminismo! The Woman's Movement in Argentina from its Beginning to Eva Perón, (Chicago: Academy Chicago Publishers, 1988). See particularly "Feminism and the Perón's", ch. 10. Carlson also addresses the divisions among women according to class.*
military coup in 1943. ISI featured horizontal industrial growth based on the production of consumer goods to expand domestic markets. Agricultural export earnings subsidized urban manufacturers producing consumer goods. Added to increased working class wages, consumer goods consumption increased among the working class.

As the ISI project instituted by Perón encouraged industrial expansion, the need for industrial workers increased. Industrial production doubled as did the number of workers employed in the industrial sector; the number of women workers in the industrial sector also grew. Unlike earlier industrial demands for workers which had been filled by European immigrants, the years after the crises of 1930s saw industrial demand for workers filled by internal

7After the installation of Farrell in 1944, national interests were promoted through a priority for arms production, followed by consumer goods made from local raw materials. Tariffs were manipulated and import quotas were imposed on goods competing with domestic goods. However, economic measures during the latter years of Perón's first regime resembled the "deepening" industrialization projects of subsequent military authoritarian regimes. David Rock, Argentina 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 251-252 and 289-319.

8According to the Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina, between 1927 and 1938 there had been a steady decrease in the production of consumer goods. By 1946, the bank's annual report stated that the internal demand for consumer goods had increased as a result of the increase in the population and the better standard of living.

In 1948, industrial production had increased 34.5 percent from that of 1943. Compared to 1947, the major increases in production included consumer products, e.g., electrical appliances and machines, as well as clothing. Banco Central de la República Argentina, Memoria anual, décimosegundo ejercicio 1946, (Buenos Aires: 1947), 33; Ministerio de Finanzas de la Nación, Banco Central de la República Argentina, Memoria anual, décimocuatro ejercicio 1948, (Buenos Aires: 1949), 13.
migrants. Women made up the majority of this internal migration. By 1947 women represented 28 percent of all wage earners in all sectors of the economy; in the industrial sector, women made up 28 percent of the work force, and represented 61 percent of the garment industry workers, 29 percent of the chemical workers, and 47 percent of the textile workers. As women filled the demand for additional workers in the ISI expansion, they benefitted from improved wage structures that far exceeded the privileges granted women workers in the past.

Incorporation by the state during the populist regime of Juan Domingo Perón has been hailed as the most important historical moment in Argentine labor history. Incorporation signals the state's opening of bureaucratic channels to selected labor organizations through inclusionary measures which combine inducements and selected constraints to "...encourage and reward labor cooperation with government." Labor cooperation was necessary for the populist regime to quell growing demands for labor recognition, to garner popular political support, and to sustain a labor force to accomplish its economic goals. With the opening of bureaucratic channels to labor, the

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10Ibid.

populist state implemented institutionalized support in the form of the right of 
legally recognized unions to negotiate with private enterprise, implementation 
of social security and minimum wage programs, worker's compensation for on-
the-job injury, and more. Additional benefits included monthly family wages, 
payment for the birth of children, cash and time off for marriage, death 
benefits, and vacation time and access to union-operated vacation resorts. 
These work-related payments and privileges, however, were not equally 
distributed within the industrial labor force nor were they enjoyed by 
unorganized workers in other economic sectors. The allocation of these 
benefits points to the critical role played by the Peronist state in the 
distribution of labor benefits.

The state bureaucracy allocated special privileges to those labor 
organizations that agreed to the state's terms of incorporation. In return for 
these inducements, labor guaranteed support for the populist regime against 
social, political, and economic groups that opposed the state's distributive 
economic project. In the Argentine case, opposition to the populist regime


and selected labor organizations included most of big business (the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange, the Rural Society, and the Industrial Union), most of the press, the navy, the most conservative parts of the army, and during the latter part of Perón's regime, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.

While the state bureaucracy distributed benefits as inducements for labor cooperation, it also enforced constraints to control the newly incorporated labor organizations. To control labor, the populist regime increased state intervention in collective bargaining by requiring that unions negotiate with private enterprise under state supervision, and created supervisory and regulatory mechanisms in the Ministry of Labor to monitor the internal life of the unions and union representatives.

Labor ties to the Peronist Party served as the mechanism to secure labor's electoral support. The Peronist Party, with Perón as its unquestioned

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14 Epstein, 1989, 16.

15 Measures to monitor the activities of the unions were passed which allowed the state to supervise union elections, finances, and membership lists, confer subsidies, withdraw the legal status of unions, and confiscate union property. Buchanan, 1985, 65.

16 Samuel J. Valenzuela, "Movimientos obreros y sistemas políticos: un análisis conceptual y tipológico," Desarrollo Económico 23 (Octubre-Diciembre 1983), 339. Valenzuela describes the various types of labor links to the state, or insertion, as social democratic, contestive, pressure groups, state-developed, and confrontationalist. The pattern of establishment of ties between a political party and labor organizations depended on the respective political system as well as the characteristics of the political parties and labor organizations themselves. From the standpoint of labor, the character of insertion depended on how the labor organization achieved its organizational consolidation, the unity or disunity of the labor movement, the strength of the links between the party and labor organization, and regime type.
leader, served as the organizational connection which garnered votes for Perón's presidential candidacies of 1946 and 1951."

Women, as new beneficiaries of the state, served as a new source of political support once they were granted the right to vote in 1947 as an inducement to gain their support. To organize and control the new pool of female voters a female branch of the Peronist Party was created: the Peronist Feminine Party (PPF). It served the triple purpose of maintaining political support, discouraging women's participation in the organizations

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"For how these newly incorporated voters cast their ballots in 1951 and the women legislators elected at the national and provincial levels, see Estela dos Santos, Las mujeres peronistas (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1983), 64-68."
controlling labor,\textsuperscript{19} and encouraging women's adherence to the state-approved roles for them in all sectors of the Argentine society.

The populist regime's attempt to solicit the support among women demonstrates that gendered inducements and constraints formed an important part of the regime's strategy. An analysis of the process of implementing gendered inducements and constraints in the work force further disaggregates labor-state relations beyond that done to date.\textsuperscript{20} To accomplish this, selected labor contracts are analyzed herein. The labor contract reflects the end result of negotiations between organized labor, capital, and the state. Examination of those negotiations reveals the desire of the state to maintain the division of the work force by gender as well as ethnicity or class. These divisions of the

\textsuperscript{19}It appears that the organization of women in unions or work place did not take place as much as it did through the basic units and the PPF. A separation of women from the more politically powerful organizations for men was seen as a way to allow women to be free to develop their own ideas and not be dominated by men while acquiring their own political expertise. Eva Perón herself stated that "...just as only the workers could wage their own struggle for liberation, so too could only women be the salvation of women." Thus, women's issues were seen separate from the issues of workers; there was no attempt to stimulate a consciousness among women of themselves as workers. See Hollander, 1974, 49.

labor force reinforce and complement each other, keeping labor docile and manipulable.\textsuperscript{21}

Historically the gendered division of the work force relates to concerns about reproduction. Women's role in society as reproducers heretofore rendered them expendable in the work force. Men, on the other hand, are seen as vital to the reproduction process for only a brief moment and thus can be more easily removed from it and utilized for economic production. The emphasis by dominant male elites on reproduction benefits the maintenance of a gender-divided work force. This conflictual relationship between female and male workers parallels the conflictual relationships defined by ethnicity and class.

To analyze labor-state relations through the inclusionary inducements and exclusionary constraints implemented at the time of labor incorporation, the following questions about gender will be addressed: (1) Since labor organizations were the instruments of labor incorporation, what was the participation of women in labor organizations? (2) What form did women workers' link to the state take? (3) Additionally, as legislation passed in 1945 incorporated the industrial labor force, did gendered labor legislation exclude or limit women's incorporation? (4) Finally, how were women

workers affected by the male-dominated labor negotiations between the state, labor organizations, and private enterprise?

The Organization of Working Women

Women's participation remained limited within the male-dominated, skilled trade unions which had been the focus of the incorporating legislation. Historically women's participation in labor unions has been discouraged or manipulated; the exclusion and manipulation result from the types of jobs and industries open to women and the gender conflicts existing within labor itself. Traditional notions of gender roles reinforce domination by men in labor organizations who guard their political and social power and limit the access of women within their ranks.22

Argentine women were organized in the work force before labor incorporation and actively took part in strikes in the 19th and 20th centuries. Occasionally, their strikes and demands led to success in achieving concessions from private enterprise. Yet these were the exceptions rather than the rule.23


Although women participated in male-dominated labor unions, separate women's labor organizations also formed. Most were short-lived, but others were successful over the long-term. Their mobilization was influenced by socialists, communists, anarchists, as well as by the Catholic church. Of the secular groups, the socialists most readily accepted women and actively lobbied for legislation on their behalf, but Catholic groups had larger female memberships.

The first attempt to create unions strictly for women in Argentina occurred in 1894 with the founding of the Cosmopolitan Society of Women Seamstresses. The organization divided and failed to gain support, but this did not discourage future attempts. In 1903 the Socialist Feminist Union was formed for wage-earning women, regardless of trade, but dissolved in 1907. Other attempts to organize women workers included the Society of Tobacco Workers, the Resistance Society of Women's Dressmakers and Tailors, and the Anarchist Feminist Center. These societies were short-lived. Anarchist and socialist attempts to organize women did not survive, according to

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Navarro, because of lack of members and because of "...difficulties with the police..." as many of the organizers were foreign-born rendering them subject to deportation due to union activities.26

But where the socialists and anarchists did not succeed in organizing women workers, "...women were flocking to..." the Circles of Catholic Workers.27 Founded in 1892 with an original membership of 60 workers, in 1912 the Circles had reached 22,939 members, and by 1930 membership reached 30,891. These organizations were to

...foster the moral education of workers, improve their condition, support legislation in their favor, establish placement agencies for the unemployed, and undermine the influence of socialists and anarchists.28

In 1920 the church founded its most important workers' organization, the Federation of Catholic Female Employees. Most of its members were clerical workers and seamstresses. The federation's membership reached 8,012 women in 1932; by 1939 its membership had risen to 18,500, and by 1940 membership climbed to 18,675. Other church labor organizations for women which arose included the Women's Home and Domestic Workers Association,

26Navarro, 1985, 173.

27Ibid., 176, 169-170. Historically, union membership has not been broken down by gender. Even in the recent work of Checa and Amado in 1988, they were unable to attain figures by gender for current union membership. The only numbers used by Marysa Navarro are for the Catholic unions; for membership in other unions Navarro used data of strikers differentiated by gender between 1915 and 1930 to judge women's participation in unions. From this she judged that women's participation had remained stable from 1915 to 1930.

28Ibid., 185.
Young Women's Protection League, Catholic Women Employees Union (for clerical workers), Catholic Union of Needleworkers (seamstresses, embroiderers, menders), and the Catholic Union of Women Workers of New Pompeya.29

Secular labor unions also attracted women. The textile unions, although not created for women only, indicated the growth of unions before labor's initial incorporation, but showed their instability as well. Women increasingly found employment within the textile work force as industrialization expanded and were actively involved in labor organization and strikes. They also served as representatives on the directive commissions of the Textile Workers Union.30

Textile unions depended heavily on female members. Women were more active in strikes/conflicts in the textile industry because "...men were more fearful of losing their jobs and were less willing to accept labor organizations."31 The fluctuations in membership in the two major textile unions of the period, the socialist Textile Workers Union and the communist Federation of Textile Industry Workers, reveals the instability of the unions.32

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29Ibid., 186.


31Ibid., 83. The name of the interviewee is not cited.

32According to Horowitz, textile industry salaries were low especially for women and minors. Female workers made up 63.9 percent of the textile industry work force;
In 1934, for example, the Textile Workers Union had only 140 dues-paying members and the communist union had 25. In 1934, the socialist union membership had grown to 1,275 and by 1935 to 1,510. But union membership varied monthly; in 1934, one month there were 883 dues paying members and in another 2,030.33

Unlike the socialist and anarchist organizations, however, membership in Catholic labor organizations remained stable. Not surprisingly, church organizations maintained a vertical hierarchical control over women, and emphasized cultural heritage to reinforce the value of women's traditional roles. However, the state began to usurp the church's role in the control of women's lives in the early 19th century through social legislation. By the 1940s, the organization of women was also taken over by the state through a feminine branch of the Peronist Party. It, too, sought to protect women from socialist and anarchist influence and maintained a vertical and hierarchical control over women.34

60.2 percent were Argentines; Italians and Spaniards each composed a little over 11 percent of the personnel. "The percentage of women who were native born was very high, 70.5. One reason for this is that most of the women were young, the age group in which there were the fewest foreigners." Horowitz, 1979, 116.

33Ibid., 215-216. Horowitz does not state in which months these membership variations occurred. The information was taken from the May 1 and August 1934 issues of El Obrero Textil, and seem to indicate that the data comes from perhaps the spring and summer of 1934. See endnote number 93, p. 249.

34Each branch of the Peronist Party had to maintain membership quotas; the party considered that quotas not filled with Peronists would be filled by other political persuasions. dos Santos, 1983, 43.
The Peronist Party initially attempted to organize women through the formation of the María Eva Duarte de Perón Feminine Centers, the Peronist Feminine Union, and the Peronist Association for the Political Rights of Women. These organizations were dissolved in 1949 with the creation of the PPF. Founded by Juan and María Eva Duarte de Perón, the PPF functioned as one of three branches of the Peronist Party. The other two branches being the political branch traditionally identified as "the party", and the General Confederation of Labor (CGT).

This mass mobilization served to separate women from the more powerful political organizations of men. By segregating the Peronist Party by gender, the link to the party, and ultimately to the state and its bureaucracy, was not the same as that of labor organizations. The PPF's connection to the state developed as an ideological link concentrated in the person of María Eva Duarte de Perón. The concentration of this linkage ultimately became one of the major obstacles to developing a long-term relationship with the state and its bureaucracy for women. Thus, the death of Eva Perón in 1952 resulted in a loss of legitimacy for public action by women and the rupture of

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Ibid., 44; Susana Bianchi and Norma Sanchis, El partido peronista femenino: Primera parte (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1988), 68.

Many works have been written about María Eva Duarte de Perón. Some of these works include: María Flores, The Woman with the Whip: Eva Perón (Garden City: Doubleday, 1952); Nicholas Fraser and Marysa Navarro, Eva Perón (New York: Norton, 1980); J. M. Taylor, Eva Perón: The Myths of a Woman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).
the ideological link between gender identity and the state.\textsuperscript{37} The failure to
de-personify and institutionalize women's links to the state through the
political party established precarious grounds for future relations between
women and the state.\textsuperscript{38}

One example of the affect of the weak link developed for women can
be seen in the state agencies controlling women in the work force. In later
economic policies of the populist regime, women's position in the work force
eroded, as well as salaries in general; at the same time, agencies within the
Ministry of Labor previously developed to address women's issues in the work
force also disappeared. The Women's Labor Division functioned under the
General Directorate of Labor and Direct Social Action within the Secretariat
of Labor and Welfare in 1943. A year later, Perón created a special
Women's Division of Labor and Assistance in the Department of Labor and

\textsuperscript{37}Nancy Caro Hollander, 1977, 188-192; and Susana Bianchi and Norma Sanchís,
El partido peronista femenino: Segunda parte (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de

Dos Santos points out that for the newly elected female legislators, the death of
Eva Perón was also a catastrophe, calling the new female legislators "...orphans just
after birth." dos Santos, 1983, 68.

\textsuperscript{38}María del Carmen Feijoó, "The Challenge of Constructing Civilian Peace:
Women and Democracy in Argentina," in The Women's Movement in Latin America:
Feminism and the Transition to Democracy, ed. Jane S. Jaquette (Winchester, Mass.:
Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1989), 93.
Welfare. But by 1954, no department, division, or section existed within the Ministry of Labor that dealt directly with women.  

Within the PPF itself, Eva Perón saw to each detail, selected its leadership, and defined its character. In her speech before the first assembly of the PPF, she outlined women's roles as "...missionaries of Perón..." throughout the country, stating that in each center women should serve as seeds for Peronism, disciplined soldiers for national liberation, and as responsible for the doctrine and consolidation of the work of Perón. Perón himself saw the mission of these units as that of indoctrination, education in theory, and exaltation of the spiritual values of the movement. Hence, the objectives were to indoctrinate and control its membership. 

The PPF neighborhood units (unidades básicas) offered educational courses, instructed in the political process, provided medical attention and legal advice. In the economic realm, women were taught to purchase and

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39 Figures 1 and 2 in unpublished charts from Paul G. Buchanan, "Regime Change and State Development in Post-War Argentina" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1985); Hollander, 1973, 151.

40 The young women selected by Eva Perón herself as leaders within the organization were expected to dedicate themselves totally to their work in the PPF and the neighborhood units. Their personal lives were under her close scrutiny and the leaders were removed if they did not conduct themselves according to Eva's wishes. Bianchi and Sanchías, Primera parte, 1988, 75-78.

41 See Eva Perón's speech to the first assembly of the PPF on July 19, 1949 in Eva Perón: Discursos completos, 1949-1952 (Buenos Aires, Editorial Megafón, 1986), 103-107; and Bianchi and Sanchís, Primera parte, 1988, 68-76.

42 Bianchi and Sanchís, Primera parte, 1988, 79.
prepare regional products. Most of the classes offered, however, reinforced women's traditional roles and cultural aspects, i.e., folk dancing, hairdressing, manicuring, and decorating, sewing, and cooking.⁴³

Women with previous political or labor union experience were discouraged, but not totally restricted, from joining the ranks of the PPF for fear they might question the role and position assigned to women.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, as a result of women congregating in these neighborhood units, they shared their experiences and gained a new political reality; they became more outspoken, active participants in the political sphere. As their activation increased, so did their visibility. Through their education in the units, they became more aware of their marginalized situation; they acquired an understanding that permitted them to question the subordination to men's authority. Yet despite a heightened awareness of their subordination, the informal link developed between the PPF and the state's bureaucracy left women without access to bureaucratic channels. Women remained excluded from institutional-level power.⁴⁵

The successful organization of women in the PPF stemmed from the fact that through Peronism women found their attitudes and values reflected and they felt a part of the pueblo—the nation. From this respect, Peronism

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...had a central importance in the constitution of the identity of the subject and is a clear indicator of the significance of the orientation that politics of the state was looking to imprint in the conduct of the women and the social function which it reserved for them.

Yet as women were being organized in their own party branch, there was no apparent attempt to actively encourage their participation in labor unions. This separation reinforced the labor force division and, like the church and its organizations, the PPF served to reinforce the value of women's traditional roles in society. For working women, the lack of power within labor organizations restricted their access to channels to improve their working conditions and benefits. These conditions were further encouraged by gendered labor legislation.

**Gendered Labor Legislation**

Manipulation and control of women's participation as an expendable labor force has historically focused on the need to reinforce women's role in reproduction through gendered labor legislation. Regulation of women workers at the state level is double layered; not only are they regulated by general labor legislation which controls the entire work force, but additionally by restrictions on their participation through labor legislation that separates them from the male work force.

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*Bianchi and Sanchez, 1988, 21.*

*Hollander, 1977, 188.*
There are advantages and disadvantages of labor legislation that applies only to women workers and a fine line exists between whether it should be defined as protective or restrictive. Legislation on behalf of women workers can be viewed as necessary to curtail the abuse of women workers by employers—i.e., protective. It can also be argued that this form of legislation only reinforces women's secondary status within the work force—i.e., it is restrictive. Over the long-term, such gender-specific legislation proves to be discriminatory and restrictive for female workers.

Legislation affecting women in the work force began as early as 1813 at the local level in Argentina with coercive, anti-vagrancy laws which forced women into peonage at the behest of local officials. Legislation and enforcement varied according to the economic need of the area and corresponded to the decline in women's traditional crafts. The early passage of legislation manipulating women in the work force marked the transition to

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49 Anti-vagrancy laws, labor contracts, and involuntary servitude resulting from indebtedness served as mechanisms employed by local authorities to meet the labor needs of important sectors of the economy. Women served as expendable labor depending upon the available male labor pool. Poor women or women convicted of vagrancy were also used for public projects in Córdoba due to a shortage of male labor. Donna J. Guy, "Lower-Class Families, Women and the Law in Nineteenth-Century Argentina," Journal of Family History 10 (Fall 1985), 69.

50 Ibid., 66-69.
the institutionalization of state intervention in women's labor force participation. It also represents an historical transfer of control and manipulation of women's lives from the Catholic church to the Argentine state.

As the economic sphere changed and urbanization increased at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, increasing numbers of women entered the industrial work force. Social reform groups sought to improve the working conditions of lower-class women workers by presenting protective legislation proposals to the Argentine congress. It is significant that most of these social reformers were not of the working class and proposed reforms did not necessarily represent working class women's interests. Additionally, differences of opinion as to the value of protective legislation created a cleavage among women's groups. However, most Argentine congressional representatives—all men—agreed that state intervention on behalf of working women was necessary and progressive; new social and economic situations demanded the change.51

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In the congressional debates on the first protective legislation in Argentina, the social and economic issues can be observed. Representative Julián Peras stated that "...there is a collective interest in the state intervention in the labor contract...a social interest which determines this intervention of the state between capitalism and the worker." Representative Alfredo L. Palacio noted that "...the women and children, that is to say the trustees of the future of the country, wait." Mercado, 1988, 41.

A contradiction can be found, according to Mercado, in the testimonies of the businessmen with regard to protective legislation. On the one hand, representatives of
The first legislative proposals for protective legislation, offered in 1896 by the Socialist Party, included an eight-hour workday for women, prohibition of child labor for those under 14 years old, and equal salaries for women and men doing the same job. This proposal failed to pass in Congress. In 1905, however, the Socialists succeeded at passing the first legislation which applied only to women in factories and shops. The law required a day of rest for women and children, prohibited night work for children, and required that seats be provided for women in houses of commerce.52

This legislation was followed in 1907 by Law 5.291, also proposed by the Socialists, which granted special privileges to female and children industrial workers in the Federal Capital. Privileges proposed in this law included: 30 days leave after childbirth and preservation of jobs for women on maternity leave; prohibition of employment of women and minors of 16 years or younger in dangerous/unhealthy industries; prohibition of employment of women and minors in night jobs from 9 p.m. until 6 a.m.; and permission for women to nurse their children for 15 minutes every two hours without

private enterprise testified that the jobs were so simple which are performed by women and children that special protection was unnecessary; and, on the other hand, these simple jobs were so essential that a variation could provoke a variation in the output of male workers, a change in production, and the ruin of affected industries in general. Ibid., 43-44.

52Ibid., 43-44.
counting this time as rest time. Where the same industries existed in the federal territories, the application would be determined by the territories.\textsuperscript{59}

Further protective legislation passed the Argentine congress in 1924 when law 5.291 was repealed and replaced by law 11.317. The sections of this law which applied to women included the abolishment of the putting out system for those employed in an establishment that practiced such a system; a ban on night work and any work performed in unhealthy conditions; limited women to a maximum of eight hours a day or forty-eight hours of work per week; reaffirmed the weekly day of rest; prohibited termination of employment because of pregnancy; and granted a maternity leave of six weeks before and six weeks after delivery. Establishments employing a specified minimum number of women also had to provide a day care center for babies under two years of age. This law remained unchanged in its content until 1974 and has been only partially modified since then.

In 1934, Law 11.933, the Law for the Protection of Maternity of Women Workers, was enacted forbidding work 30 days before and 45 days after childbirth. Other benefits of this law included a maternity subsidy equivalent to a salary not more than 200 pesos, free medical care, and a layette. A maternity fund was established which was funded equally by workers, managements, and the state.

\textsuperscript{59}Taken from Ley No. 5.291, Capítulo III "Disposiciones especiales para la Capital de la República" as reproduced in Mercado, 1988, 73-74.
Although Argentine gendered labor legislation can be considered impressive, as it was passed earlier in the industrialization process than more industrialized countries (e.g., the United States), it did not include adequate compliance mechanisms. Not until Perón's first regime did the state seek to enforce the provisions of this legislation.

Upon being enforced during Perón's regime, protective legislation limited women's participation in the workforce. For this reason, it may be seen as ultimately restrictive. Maternity leaves before and after childbirth, paid time for women nursing children, and providing day care centers, etc., changed the woman's status of cheap labor to that of expensive labor and reduced employment opportunities. Limited workdays, prohibition of night work, exclusion from certain industries and businesses for physical and/or moral reasons, as well as the expectation of low wages, all served to isolate women in the workplace. Although these laws also offered a reprieve from abuses if enforced, at the same time they made women less attractive to employers. More importantly, restrictions from night work (and its wage differentials) and from certain industries removed the possibility of obtaining better jobs.

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*As the Colliers point out, laws may be passed but not implemented and if implemented, applied differentially. Collier and Collier, 1979, 971.

*For an example, see the wool and cotton contracts, "Convenio de salarios y condiciones de trabajo en la industrial del algodón," Gaceta Textil (Septiembre 1950), 12-25; "Convenio de salarios y condiciones de trabajo en la industria de la lana," Gaceta Textil (Agosto 1950), 19-43.
These restrictive measures, however, were hailed as inducements to women workers once they were enforced by Perón as head of the Department of Labor and later as president. Yet implemented and enforced as ostensible inducements they actually served as constraints; for they appeared to be protecting women while serving as control mechanisms for a sector of the labor force in the incorporating process. These gendered restrictions did not apply to male workers. On the contrary, they privileged male workers by limiting female competition for better positions—an inducement for one sector of the work force at the expense of another sector.

Additional inclusionary measures were extended to women workers during Perón's regime. For example, in 1944, piecework became illegal in all branches of the industry and women working in their own home for employers came under a minimum wage regulation. Additionally, women working as telephone operators were incorporated into the restrictive legislation.⁵⁶

A part of Perón's rhetoric espoused to the principle of equal pay for equal work for all workers; however, the rhetoric never became reality. Increased labor costs, loss of a less-expensive labor force, and objections from male workers all possibly contributed to the fact that equal pay never became law for all women in the work force. Nonetheless, by 1949 laws were presented to the House of Representatives calling for equal pay for equal

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work. Additionally, during the September congressional meetings, representatives questioned why the Minister of Labor had not enforced the equal pay for women in the most recent labor contracts signed.

Subsequently, women's salaries did improve (although they did not reach equality with men workers) and a minimum wage 20 percent below that of men was implemented for women workers in the food industry. In 1949, congress passed legislation which granted women textile workers the right to equal wages; however, as observed in the labor contracts from the various textile industries, the legislation was not enforced.

As the Argentine economy reached a crisis level in 1952, workers' wages eroded. As a result of the economic crisis, Perón's second five-year plan called for a "deepening" economic phase. Economic and social policies were reversed. New policies favored agricultural over urban development, capital and profits over labor and wages, heavy over light industry, and exports over domestic consumption. Industrial growth goals were redirected toward the heavier industries--such as steel, chemicals, metals, and eventually motor vehicles--while energy projects sought to increase the national output of

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57 Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Diputados, Tomo II, 1949, 23 de junio a 20 de julio, 1554-1555; Tomo III, 1949, 21 de julio a 11 de agosto, 2392.

58 Ibid., Tomo V, 1949, 15 de septiembre a 29 de septiembre, 3401-3402.

59 See Chapter II.
oil, coal, and electricity. These areas traditionally excluded women from their work force.

In addition to limited job opportunities in strategic economic sectors, the second five-year plan imposed a two-year freeze on wages reducing even further the earning power of female workers already receiving fewer wages than male workers. This freeze eroded the real income of industrial workers which had already been declining. Between 1950 and 1952 there were annual reductions in hourly real wages ranging from more than 4 percent to 11 percent. Workers' wages declined between 1951 and 1953 by more than 20 percent from 1950 and by nearly 30 percent relative to 1948.

**Conclusions**

Labor incorporation for female industrial workers encompassed a separate set of gendered inducements and constraints. The limited participation of women in male-dominated labor organizations and the formation of a successful women's organization failed to create a viable link to the state. Without a bureaucratic link between the state and women

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60 In 1946, women made up less than 1.0 percent of the work force in extractive industries; 1.5 percent of the workers in the petroleum derivates industries; 10 percent of the metal workers; and 1 percent in the electric and gas industry workers. Ministerio de Asuntos Técnicas, Publicación de Dirección Nacional del Estadística, Censo general de la nación. Tomo I, Cuadro 4 (Buenos Aires, 1946), 44-45.

workers, it appeared as if women workers had been included as a viable actor before the state, but in reality these measures proved to be pseudo-inclusionary.\textsuperscript{62}

Labor legislation also hinted at inclusionary steps for women workers' incorporation. But upon close scrutiny, implementation of restrictive legislation further hindered women's incorporation by placing obstacles in the way of participation as equals in the work force. Their chances to step into positions of authority and earn higher wages were undermined by legislation manipulated for the state's benefit.

Women workers were affected by other forms of restrictions as revealed in the labor contracts which resulted from male-dominated negotiations between the state, labor organizations, and private enterprise. As will be illustrated in the following chapter, many contradictions existed despite the promulgation and implementation of labor legislation with regard to female workers. Women consistently received lower salaries than men for the same jobs performed, were excluded from higher-paying jobs with more responsibility, and simultaneously found their lower salaries further depleted by labor contract deductions.

CHAPTER II
THE LABOR CONTRACTS

Labor contracts provide a significant way to measure the effects of labor incorporation and gendered inclusionary and exclusionary measures adopted by the Argentine state. They reveal the contradictions inherent within the capitalist state: the division of the labor force by gender to maintain elite male control, the functional need for a cheap, expendable labor force at the level of production, and the explanations given by elites to defend the view that women should serve as primarily reproducers and caretakers. The contracts also demonstrate contradictions in laws promulgated and the failure to implement the laws ostensibly benefitting women workers.

Gendered wage differentials, explicit and implicit limitations within job classifications and work schedules, and unequal distribution of benefits typify many labor contracts. Twenty-six labor contracts from 1947 to 1954 were evaluated from various industries in Argentina.\(^\text{63}\) These contracts included:

three wool textile, three cotton textile, and one rayon textile industry

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\(^{63}\)These contracts were made available to me in the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (Ministry of Labor and Social Security) Library in Buenos Aires, June and July 1988; copies of original contracts were preferred and choosing the types of industries was not a conscious decision on my part, but dependent upon copies of original contracts. Copies of the contracts revealing unequal salary structures according to gender were not printed in the Boletín Oficial during Perón's regime.
contracts; three general textile industry contracts; five leather industry contracts; three clothing industry contracts; two tobacco and two meat industries; and one contract each from the wine, food, glass, and liquor distillers and industry contracts. It must be noted that these twenty-six

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Initially, union agents, business representatives, and state officials negotiated benefits and wages for workers. These negotiations covered workers at the national and regional level. By 1954, a few individual companies negotiated with union representatives and representatives from the Department of Labor.

Eighteen of the twenty-six contracts covered all affiliates of the unions represented in the contracts from 1948 to 1954. These inclusive contracts covered the clothing, textile, wine, food, glass, liquor distillers, leather, and meat industries. (Clothing industry labor contract number 113/48, signed 26 July 1948; wool textile industry labor contract number 145/48, signed 10 September 1948; wool textile industry labor contract number 20/49, signed 28 April 1949; clothing industry labor contract number 28/49, signed 24 February 1949; cotton textile industry labor contract number 11/50, signed 30 June 1951; clothing industry labor contract number 34/50, signed 17 April 1950; wine industry labor contract number 66/50, signed 1 January 1950; food industry labor contract number 95/50, signed 9 July 1950; glass industry labor contract number 134/50, signed 24 August 1950; liquor distillers industry labor contract number 144/50, signed 20 September 1950; leather industry labor contract number 145/50, signed 25 September 1950; wool textile industry labor contract in Gaceta Textil, Agosto 1950, pp. 19-43; leather industry labor contract number 59/54, signed 25 July 1954; meat industry labor contract number 58/54, signed 15 July 1954; leather industry labor contract number 46/54, signed 14 June 1954; leather industry labor contract 65/54, signed 7 July 1954; leather industry labor contract number 124/54, signed 28 June 1954; and textile industry labor contract number 130/54, signed 9 June 1954.)

One 1950 tobacco industry contract included workers within a 60 kilometer radius of the Federal Capital of Buenos Aires, and two textile contracts, in 1947 and 1949, encompassed a 100 kilometer radius. (Two contracts were negotiated for workers within a 100 kilometer radius of the Federal Capital. They are: cotton textile industry labor contract number 76/47, signed 29 April 1947, and textile industry labor contract number 18/49, signed 25 February 1949. Tobacco industry labor contract number 128/50, signed 8 August 1950, included tobacco workers within a 60 mile radius of the Federal Capital.)

Five labor contracts negotiated in 1954 affected only workers in individual companies in the Federal Capital. Two of the contracts with one individual private enterprise were negotiated the Textile Industry Workers' Union, one by the Labor Federation of Meat and Meat Derivative Industry Workers, and another by the
contracts represent only a small fraction of the contracts signed during Perón's regime. According to Ernesto Ceballos, between 1944 and 1951 the number of labor contracts negotiated and signed reached approximately 2,056. Nonetheless, they serve as an indication of gender discrimination within the labor negotiating process.

Several characteristics typified these negotiations. These characteristics include: the maintenance of a corporative hierarchy within the labor force, nationalist tendencies, the appearance of a reversal of historic ethnic discriminations, and a continued gender segregation of the work force. Typical of corporatist policies, only legally recognized labor unions represented workers within each industry in contract negotiations. Representatives of these unions were allowed to take time off for union activities without repercussions, manage union business, and recruit members within the work


“Labor contract number 28/49, 32; labor contract number 34/50, 88; labor contract number 220/54, 5; and labor contract number 46/54, 5.
In contrast, unauthorized labor unions and their membership did not enjoy such privileges.

Corporatist control flowed down to the union and then to the individual workers through a vertical hierarchy. Offsetting the disciplinary rigor demanded by corporatist controls, the state granted union members special privileges such as preference in hiring. Unions benefitted as well. Contracts required that employers deduct monthly dues from the employees' paycheck, thereby ensuring full union coffers. Along with this mechanism to fund unions through the salaries of workers, the state also monitored workers' affiliation with approved organizations by insisting that along with union dues, employers submit a list of all employees to the unions whether or not the employees were affiliated with the unions. This list of all employees enabled unions to monitor workers. Additionally, one contract specifically required that the employer notify the respective union of the names of new employees.67

Union bank accounts, as well as the Eva Perón Foundation and the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), benefitted further. As a result of

67Labor contract number 46/54, 6; labor contract number 128/50, 8.

68Job preference for union members: labor contract number 46/54, 6; labor contract number 28/49, 4; labor contract number 113/48, 3. Deduction of union dues: labor contract number 134/50, 33; labor contract number 59/54, 3; labor contract number 46/54, 6; labor contract number 65/54, 2. List of employees with union dues: labor contract number 66/50, 29; labor contract number 134/50, 34; labor contract number 59/54, 3. Names of new employees: labor contract number 220/54, 2.
labor contracts, a portion of employees' wages were funneled back to the negotiating parties and to other organizations. A number of the contracts required that employers withhold the first month's wage increase awarded within the respective contract to pay subsidies to unions and welfare organizations. Of the contracts stipulating these deductions, the disbursement of these funds was inconsistent.

Most labor contracts studied gave 50 percent of the first month's wage increase to the Eva Perón Foundation (FEP), 40 percent to the respective union, and 10 percent to the CGT. Four other contracts called for the first months' increase to be distributed equally between the union and the FEP, excluding any distribution to the CGT. Other contracts reveal variations in this distribution pattern. They could, for example, stipulate that funds be deposited in the respective union's bank account; direct wage increases be used for the construction of a technical training center for union members; or

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*Labor contract number 203/54, 3; labor contract number 65/54, 3; labor contract number 46/54, 6; labor contract number 58/54, 10; labor contract number 59/54, 5; labor contract number 124/54, 4; labor contract number 97/54, 3; labor contract number 171/54, 3.

By Law 13.992/50, the Eva Perón Foundation was to work independently of the state to promote essential social services.

**Labor contract number 95/50, 3; labor contract number 128/50, 9; labor contract number 134/50, 34; labor contract number 144/50, 4.
require the funds be deposited in the account of the Ministry of Labor and distributed at its discretion.\textsuperscript{71}

In addition to employers deducting funds from workers' paychecks, businesses also paid monthly fees to support social benefits for employees. These conditions were also stipulated in contracts signed toward the end of Perón's regime. Contracts obligated employers to pay from $5 to $30 per month per employee to the respective union to subsidize employee social works, benefits, and medical service assistance which, according to one contract, "...had been or would be..." instituted by the respective union. In one instance, employers also contributed $15 per month per worker to the individual unions' general coffers.\textsuperscript{72}

Not only did employers subsidize union income, but contracts also required that businesses support military conscription laws through the payment of partial salaries to and/or guarantee the jobs of returning employees who fulfilled their military obligation. The monthly salary paid varied dramatically from industry to industry and from union to union, with

\textsuperscript{71}Labor contract number 66/50, 29; labor contract number 34/50, 33; labor contract number 28/49, 27; labor contract number 130/54, 4.

\textsuperscript{72}Labor contract number 46/54, 6; labor contract number 59/54, 4; and labor contract number 65/54, 2; labor contract number 203/54, 3.
the highest monthly salary of $120 per month and the lowest of $40 per month.\textsuperscript{73}

Nationalist objectives were also reflected in the required ethnic makeup of the work force. Stipulations in the contracts called for preferential hiring of native-born Argentines whose opportunities in the industrial work force had been historically limited. Industrialization in Argentina originally depended upon immigrant labor from Europe, a process that led to discrimination against natives entering the urban industrial work force. Perón, however, reversed that favoritism with his nationalist project; contracts gave hiring

\textsuperscript{73}Saving the worker's job while away on required military service: labor contract number 113/48, 3; labor contract number 28/49, 4; labor contract number 144/50, 2; labor contract number 220/54, 2; labor contract 46/54, 3; labor contract number 124/54, 2.

Salary of $120 per month granted for workers in liquor distilleries (labor contract number 144/50, 2). Salary of $40 per month granted for wine industry workers (labor contract number 66/50, 27).

The earliest contract found to require a monthly payment while serving in the military was for the wool textile industry (labor contract number 145/48, 3) requiring that men fulfilling military duty receive $50 per month. In the clothing industry a $200 flat sum was to be paid upon a man's entry into military service (labor contract number 28/49, 4). The wine industry stipulated a $40 per month payment by the employer while serving (labor contract number 66/50, 27), while the tobacco industry granted 50 percent of the man's monthly salary (labor contract number 128/50, 3). Also in 1950, the glass industry called for a payment of $80 per month (labor contract number 134/50, 27), while liquor distillers paid $120 per month for those hired after the contract was signed while for those hired before the contract was signed were paid $85 per month (labor contract number 144/50, 2).

In the leather industry male workers entering military service were paid a one-time payment of $200 (labor contract number 46/54, 3). Another leather industry contract of the same year granted men $50 per month if they had worked less than 18 months with the company and $100 per month to those who had been with the company 18 months or more while fulfilling military requirements (labor contract number 59/54, 3). Wool workers were paid $100 per month while serving (labor contract number 124/54, 2).
preference to Argentine nationals and required that orders in the work place be given only in Spanish.\textsuperscript{74} In spite of these nationalist efforts, Spanish-speaking immigrant employees received the same monthly family wage afforded Argentine nationals if the immigrant's family resided in Argentina with them.\textsuperscript{75}

Contracts placed specific limitations on women in the work place. These limitations included: educational prerequisites within job classifications, shorter work schedules, lower salaries, and discriminatory family financial subsidies. Some of these discrepancies can be explained by the presence of relatively fewer women in labor unions. Few women moved into the upper echelons of union hierarchies, and a negligible number represented women's issues during the labor negotiations. Only two women took part as members of the negotiating teams in the 26 labor contracts analyzed.\textsuperscript{76}

Within the labor contracts reviewed, educational prerequisites for employment limited women's opportunities for advancement to better-paying jobs. At first glance this seems illogical because in Argentina, historically a

\textsuperscript{74}Preference to Argentine nationals: labor contract number 128/50, 2. Orders in Spanish in the work place: labor contract number 113/48, 27; labor contract number 34/50, 35; labor contract number 46/54, 5.

\textsuperscript{75}Labor contract number 144/50, 4. The family wage is explained more fully below.

\textsuperscript{76}Elvira G. de Leniz represented the Workers, Tailors, and Seamstresses Labor Union, in labor contract number 28/49 and María Angelica Billalba represented the Argentine Federation of Leather Industry workers in labor contract number 145/50.
leader among Latin American countries with regard to literacy, female education had improved at the high school and university levels. The overall number of students in institutions of higher learning increased and the number of women attending universities and preparing for professional careers also increased.77 An historic Argentine commitment to education continued under Perón, and the Peronist constitution guaranteed free public school education for all citizens.

Nevertheless, other educational requirements shaped economic gender roles in a much more obvious way. Of the schools devoted to technical industrial education, and only a few specifically trained women. Perón continued this tradition because the 1949 constitution stipulated that education for rural men train them as laborers and that education for rural women prepare them for domestic responsibilities.78 Beyond its clear gender and class

77From 1931 to 1940, the number of women studying beyond the high school level increased 68.52 percent. From 1941 to 1950, a 139.51 percent increase in the number of women studying beyond high school occurred. Between 1951 and 1960, the number of women in institutions of higher learning increased even more--153.62 percent.

The number of national colleges and high schools in all of Argentina increased as well. In 1939 there were 14 institutions for men, 5 for women, and 48 where women and men studied. By 1948 there were 30 educational institutions for men, 17 for women, and 76 women and men with a total of 123 in the country. In the Capital Federal there were nine establishments for men, three for women, and no mixed institutions in 1939. By 1948 the institutions for men increased to 12, there were four for women, and no mixed institutes existed. Estadística Año 1948 y Año Retrospectiva Años 1939-1948. Ministerio de Educación de la Nación, Título I, 513.

781949 Constitución de la Nación Argentina, Section IV(2).
bias, this ignored the migration of rural women to the urban, industrialized areas where they sought better employment opportunities.

Women migrated to industrialized areas as the demand for their skills in the interior decreased.\(^7\) Between 1869 and 1947, the percentage of the rural population dropped from 71.4 percent to 37.5 percent.\(^8\) Women's lack of technical skills meant that those who migrated were employed in the lower-paying jobs which did not require specialized knowledge in the industrialized sectors. For women migrating to job opportunities in the industrialized sectors, the lack of industrial education most affected their chances for better-paying positions.\(^9\) Educational opportunities in Argentina did increase overall to prepare the work force to fulfill required roles in ISI. Trained workers were needed to manage new industrial equipment and methods of production and the number of industrial and commercial schools increased from 1939 to 1948. The enrollment increased as well, although male students far outnumbered female students.

Of the 125 industrial training centers in Argentina in 1948, only four trained female and male students; none exclusively trained women. These


\(^8\)Ministerio de Asuntos Técnicas, Censo general de la nación. Tomo I, Cuadro 27 (Buenos Aires, 1946), LXVIII.

\(^9\)Sec. I (3) of the 1949 Constitution guarantees the right of all individuals to the equal opportunity to exercise the right to learn and improve oneself.
four mixed industrial training centers were located in the jurisdictions of Chubut, Entre Ríos, Santa Fe, and Tierra del Fuego. Women's enrollment was extremely low in these industrial schools, and their enrollment actually decreased from 1939 to 1948. Student enrollment in technical schools in 1939 totaled 10,377, with only 70 women enrolled (less than one percent). By 1948, of 21,914 students enrolled in industrial schools, only 105 students were women, again making up less than one percent. This seemingly small decrease (from .00675 percent in 1939 to .00479 percent in 1948) is significant when compared to the large overall increase in the number of students in industrial education as well as to the industrial goals of Perón's regime. (See Tables 1, 2, and 3)

Women's enrollment in commercial schools did, on the other hand, increase. In 1939, there were 6,603 men enrolled in commercial schools compared to 2,700 women—29 percent of the total number of students. By 1948, of a total 21,884 students enrolled in commercial schools, 8,451 were women. Women comprised 39 percent of the students in 1948, a 10 percent

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In Chubut there was only one training center and it trained both women and men. Entre Ríos had eight centers of which seven trained men only and one trained women and men. Santa Fe had 12 training centers with only one for a mixed student population and Tierra del Fuego had only one center which was for both female and male students. Estadística Año 1948 y Año Retrospectiva Años 1939-1948. Ministerio de Educación de la Nación, Título VII, 569.

Ibid., 659; Título IV, 543, 651; and Título I, 513.

Ibid., Título VII, 570-571; Título IV, 652-653; and Título IV, 544-545.
Table 1. Enrollment in Industrial and Commercial Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In all of Country</th>
<th>In the Federal Capital</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Industrial Institutes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>10,377</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>20,914</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Other Industrial Institutes** |      |       |      |       |
| 1939           | 1,367 | 0     |      |       |
| 1948           | 2,524 | 0     |      |       |

| **Commercial Institutes** |      |       |      |       |
| 1939           | 6,603 | 2,070 | 3,374 | 1,701 |
| 1948           | 13,433 | 8,451 | 6,552 | 3,862 |

Table 2. Total Number of Industrial and Commercial Educational Institutions in Argentina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Industrial Institutes in All of Argentina</th>
<th>Commercial Institutes in All of Argentina</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No of Schools</td>
<td>Number Mixed*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For Women and Men

### Table 3. Number of Industrial and Commercial Educational Institutions in the Federal Capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Industrial Institutes in the Federal Capital</th>
<th>Other Institutes in the Federal Capital</th>
<th>Commercial Institutes in the Federal Capital</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No of Schools</td>
<td>Number Mixed*</td>
<td>For Men</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For Women and Men


Increase from 1939. By 1946, approximately 244,733 commercial establishments existed in Argentina. These included banks, insurance companies, investment houses, wholesale commerce, industrial, immediate consumer products, and durable goods for consumers. Yet despite increased enrollment in commercial schools, relatively fewer women were employed in commerce than in the industrial sector. In 1946 of 538,712 employees, only

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85 *Censo general de la nación, 1946, Tomo III, 244-245.*
13 percent of those employed in commerce were women.\textsuperscript{86} By 1960, only 9.94 percent of the 904,289 Argentines employed in the commercial sector were women, down from the 1946 census; whereas in industrial manufacturing, 24.5 percent of the workers were women, and in the service industry, 46.65 percent were women.\textsuperscript{87}

The consequences of limited educational opportunities adversely affected women in the industrial work force. Perón encouraged professional training and education as evidenced in the 1950 labor contract for tobacco employees. Employees were granted time off to attend a university or a technical school with no restrictions specified according to gender.\textsuperscript{88} Even if given time off for attending classes in specific instances, in general the lack of training institutes for women limited their opportunity to advance to more specialized, responsible, and higher-paying jobs. This limitation shows up in the educational requirements in various contracts. For example, mechanical personnel in the glass industry had to complete specialized training in an industrial school before being hired.\textsuperscript{89} The wool industry required that candidates for supervisory positions and specialized operators complete

\textsuperscript{86}Ibid., Cuadro 1, 252-253.


\textsuperscript{88}Labor contract number 128/50, 4.

\textsuperscript{89}Labor contract number 134/50, 30.
specified technical training and pass the final examination in the textile schools. Few women met the prerequisites.

Educational requirements were not the only means of limiting women's access to more responsible positions. Labor legislation passed in the early 20th century, but never enforced, placed another limitation on women's upward mobility in the industrial work force. Perón's enforcement of the restrictions on women's work schedules limited the number of hours each week they could work and restricted their work schedule to day-time hours.

Excluding women from night work reduced opportunities for higher earnings as well as promotions. For example, cotton and wool textile workers earned higher wages on the night shift, and were considered first for vacancies in higher-paying jobs. In 1947, the cotton industry contract stipulated that permanent night-shift workers earn 15 percent more than the day-time workers in the same jobs. Rotating shift workers earned ten percent more on the night shift. The 1949 cotton industry contract granted a 20 percent increase in wages for permanent night-time employees; rotating night-shift employees earned 13.33 percent above their regular wages. The 1949 wool industry contract implemented the same night-shift wage differentials.

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*Labor contract number 20/49, 3; 1950 wool labor contract in *Gaceta Textil*, 20.

Limitation on the number of hours per week a woman could work also hindered her earning higher wages. Labor contracts required overtime pay for weekend work requiring one and one-half times the regular wages for Saturday work and twice the normal wage for Sunday hours. Although overtime for working mothers might burden them more, women did not have the opportunity to choose her work schedule rather than the state deciding for her.

State reprieves from hours restrictions were not designed to benefit women, but rather for economic and production expediencies. In 1947, Resolution of the Secretary of Labor and Social Security No. 130/47 authorized cotton spinning factories to permit extraordinary work schedules using women workers over 18 years of age between 6 a.m. and 9 p.m. during any time of the year. Decree No. 7.490/47 authorized spinning factories to begin an exceptional schedule to complete the demands of production in "...according with the necessities of the Plan of the Government."^93

A temporary reprieve from the restricted hours for women workers was implemented through the Resolution of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, decree number 207/50. From July 26, 1950 to May 31, 1951, Argentine women silk weavers over the age of 18 throughout the country were

^92Labor contract number 76/47, 18; labor contract number 18/49, 13; and labor contract number 11/50, 13.

allowed to work between 6 a.m. and 9 p.m. A temporary lift of hours restrictions for women in the agricultural industry was implemented on August 24, 1950, through the Disposition of the National Direction of Labor and Direct Social Action. Women working in the preparation and packaging of green peas were allowed to work on Saturdays and Sundays between October 15, 1950 and December 15, 1950, during their highest production season. Thus, it can be assumed that the "protective" nature of hours restrictions had little to do with women's welfare but for economic benefit.

Not only did a limited work schedule preclude women from earning higher wages, regular wages stipulated in the labor contracts were less than those for male workers due to their sex and lack of industrial skills. The 1949 Argentine Constitution guaranteed the right to a just retribution for work, as well as a moral retribution and material source to satisfy the vital necessities of life. It does not, however, guarantee equal wages for equal work.

Equal pay for equal work might have been a part of Perón's rhetoric, but it was not implemented within the labor contracts evaluated. Nevertheless, women's wages did improve during Perón's regime despite the fact that they were lower than men's. In 1945, a fixed minimum wage was set

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*Ibid., 223-224.*

*1949 Constitución de la Nación Argentina, Sec. I, No. 2.*
in the food industry giving women a minimum of 20 percent below that of men. This was an improvement over the 40 percent of men's wages which women had been receiving in the past. Nancy Hollander writes that in 1949 women in the textile industry were given the right to equal wages with men. She states that "...(i)t is not possible to document whether in fact this last measure was actualized." The labor contracts indicate that equal pay for equal work failed to be institutionalized as did enforcement of equal pay for equal work in all industries analyzed.

Contradictions with regard to gender and wages can be found within each of the labor contracts. In two instances, contracts specifically state that women personnel be assigned inferior jobs.\textsuperscript{98} At the same time, other contracts specifically stated that women would earn the same wage as a man if they performed the same jobs.\textsuperscript{99} In one of the clothing contracts calling for the same wages for women in the same job, it also stated that women would automatically earn 20 percent less than the fixed wage for a man in the same category for work done by hand. Even where women and men were listed for the same job with the same responsibility, their wages were listed


\textsuperscript{98}Labor contract number 145/50, 2; labor contract number 65/54, 3.

\textsuperscript{99}Labor contract number 20/49, 6; labor contract number 34/50, 41; labor contract number 134/50, 26; 1950 wool industry labor contract in \textit{Gaceta Textil}, 21-22; labor contract number 59/54, 4.
separately and the women's wages averaged 72 to 85 percent of the wages of men.\textsuperscript{100}

In many of the contracts, gendering of wages can only be detected by close examination. Distinctions appear in sections which do not specifically list the sex of the worker (hombre/mujer) and wages. Instead, these sections are gendered by language and it is less obvious that the salaries for female workers are less than those for male workers.\textsuperscript{101} (For example: oficial/oficiala, aprendiz/aprendiza, primer de mesa/primera de mesa, planchador/planchadora.) Another way to ensure lower wages for women was through their exclusion from work with machinery. For this reason, the majority of women's jobs in the textile and garment industries were performed by hand.\textsuperscript{102}

A few examples do exist where women received equal pay for equal work. In the 1950 wool contract, wages for piecework were the same for women and men.\textsuperscript{103} Additionally, in some instances women under 18 were paid the same wages as men under 18 years of age upon entering the work force. Women and men trainees received an increase of 100 pesos per month

\textsuperscript{100}Labor contract number 34/50, 16 and 41.

\textsuperscript{101}See labor contract number 113/48, 5-24; labor contract number 28/49, 5-34; and labor contract number 34/50, 11-12 and 28-29.

\textsuperscript{102}For examples, see labor contract numbers 34/50, 20/49, and 18/49.

\textsuperscript{103}1950 wool labor contract in Gaceta Textil, 20-21.
until they reached the minimum wage established for adult workers (18 years of age) according to "...their respective sex." However, the longer women stayed in the work force, their wages decreased in comparison to wages of men with the same tenure. (See Tables 4, 5, and 6.) Wages for women in higher, more responsible positions varied less than those in lower-paying positions compared to men's wages in the same positions. (See Table 4.)

### Table 4. Monthly Salaries by Position and Length of Service for Female and Male Workers in the Cotton Industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of Service</th>
<th>Age 20</th>
<th>Overseer</th>
<th>Overseer/In-Charge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Convenio de salarios y condiciones de trabajo en la industria del algodón." Gaceta Textil (Septiembre 1950).

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104 Labor contract number 124/54, 2.
Table 5. Monthly Minimum Salaries for Female and Male Textile Workers from Ages 14 to 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Hours Per Week</th>
<th>Women's Salary</th>
<th>Men's Salary</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>92.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>91.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Labor Contract Number 130/54.

Table 6. Monthly Minimum Salaries for Female and Male Textile Workers from Age 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of Service</th>
<th>Women's Salary</th>
<th>Men's Salary</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Year</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>85.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To 3 Years</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>86.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To 5 Years</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To 7 Years</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>1165</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To 9 Years</td>
<td>1015</td>
<td>1235</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To 12 Years</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>1285</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To 15 Years</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To 18 Years</td>
<td>1180</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>84.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To 21 Years</td>
<td>1215</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To 24 Years</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>1480</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To 27 Years</td>
<td>1245</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To 30 Years</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>81.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Labor Contract Number 130/54.
Over time, the labor contracts revealed differing patterns of gender inequities. In the cotton industry, where women outnumbered men, women earned from 70 to 82 percent of the wages of men in 1947. By 1949 the variations were between 70 percent to 86 percent, and in 1950, the lower wages increased to 79 percent, while the highest percentage had decreased to 85 percent.\textsuperscript{105}

In contrast, men outnumbered women workers in the wool industry and wool industry contracts reveal a somewhat different variation in working women's wages. In 1948, women's wages in the labor contract were consistently 70 percent of the wages of men. By 1949 their wages ranged from 57 to 85 percent of men's wages, and in 1950, the percentage rate had improved to a range of 70 to 89 percent.\textsuperscript{106}

Clothing industry contracts were early and dated from 1948 and 1949. In an industry where female workers outnumbered males,\textsuperscript{107} women's wages were a very low percentage of those earned by men compared to the cotton and wool industry average wages referred to above. Women's wages ranged between 63 and 80 percent of the wages of men. By 1949, the percentage

\textsuperscript{105}Labor contract numbers 76/47, 18/49, and 11/50.

\textsuperscript{106}Labor contract numbers 145/48, 20/49, and the 1950 wool contract in Gaceta Textil.

range widened to a rate of 53 to 85 percent of men's. The wages for women for work done by hand averaged from 69 to 75 percent of that of men's.\textsuperscript{108}

Other textile industries had their own history of gendered wages. In one of the two textile contracts of 1954, women earned from 81 to 94 percent of men's wages.\textsuperscript{109} In the rayon textile contract of 1954, women's salaries averaged 87 percent of those of men.\textsuperscript{110}

Leather industry contracts evaluated were also negotiated during the later years of Perón's first regime. One was signed in 1950 and three in 1954. They, too, reveal a continuing disparity between the wages of women and men workers. In 1950 women's wages averaged between 71 to 78 percent of men's wages. Women apprentices earned 89 to 93 percent of men apprentices in one 1954 contract. In the same year women apprentices began at the same wages as men apprentices, and each earned $100 more each month until reaching the minimum salary of adult workers according to their gender. After reaching adult age, their wages reflected the gender of the worker. In two other leather industry contracts, women earned 81 percent and 87.4 percent of men's wages.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{108} Labor contract numbers 113/48 and 28/49.

\textsuperscript{109} Labor contract number 130/54.

\textsuperscript{110} Labor contract number 220/54.

\textsuperscript{111} Leather industry labor contract numbers 145/50, 46/54, 59/54, and 124/54.
Wage increases were granted on a flat-rate basis in the food industry contract of 1950. Women and men adults were granted a $4 per day increase with a $3 per day increase for minors regardless of gender. The two meat industry contracts reflect little variation in the percentage difference between women's wages compared to men's wages. Women in both contracts earned 87 to 89 percent of men's wages.

According to the 1950 tobacco industry contract, women earned a flat sum of $40 per month less than men. Female workers who were minors automatically had $15 per month deducted from their wages for each year under 18 years of age. At the age of 18 women earned 88 percent of a man's salary; at 18 years and six months 89 percent; and at the age of 19 their wages equaled 90 percent of men's. By 1954, wages for female workers under 18 years of age in the 1954 tobacco contract averaged 95 per cent of men's and women over 18 earned 81 percent of men workers' wages. Clearly women were better off in this industry than in those associated with textiles.

Other industry contracts also reveal salary discrepancies. The 1950 wine industry contract mandated women's salaries be 79 to 84 percent of men's, while women in the glass industry in the same year received from 72

112 Labor contract number 95/50.
113 Labor contract numbers 58/54 and 78/54.
114 Labor contract numbers 128/50 and 203/54.
to 94 percent of the men's salaries. Also in 1950, liquor distillers paid women from 84 to 88 percent of the salaries of men. It can be seen from these contracts that salaries for women consistently remained lower than those of men. However, the percentages of women's salaries compared to men's were inconsistent from industry to industry.

This inconsistency in compensation for women workers can also be found in the distribution of the family benefits. Family benefits represent a direct form of controlling and encouraging a specific family model and its perpetuation through economic reward. Benefits varied widely among the labor contracts. Despite this variance, the evident goal of the maintaining the traditional family is consistent.

State documents define women's and men's societal roles within the context of traditional family norms. The 1949 Argentine Constitution identifies the family as

...the primary and fundamental nucleus of society, and it [the family] will be the object of preferential protection on the part of the state.

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115 Labor contract numbers 66/50, 134/50, and 144/50.
116 For an in-depth review of the role of the family as seen by Perón's regime, see Emilio Pollak Reid, "La familia en el Segundo Plan Quinquenal," Revista de Trabajo y Previsión, 1:4 (May 1953), 22-44.
117 1949 Constitución de la Nación Argentina, Sec. II.
It declares further that the state will protect matrimony, guarantee the legal equality of the spouses, and protect patria potestad. This contradiction—granting equality among spouses but at the same time recognizing the authority of the man as the head of the family with patria potestad—evidences the two-sided philosophy espoused by the Perón regime, traces of which can be seen in the labor contracts in the family benefits offered workers.

Economic incentives for workers in all labor contracts reviewed encouraged reproduction among married couples. This implied that reproduction was more important than female production in the factory. The manipulation of the family wage served as an encouragement to increase the birth rate among Argentines, as a mechanism to institutionalize the reproduction of the work force, and to control women in the work force. These incentives for legal reproduction came in three forms: (1) a one-time payment for legal marriage and/or paid days off at the time of marriage; (2) a one-time payment for the birth of a child and/or days off for birth of a child with varying requirements for legitimacy and legal recognition; and (3) a monthly stipend paid to workers for each child, also with varying requirements for legitimacy and legal recognition.

\footnote{Informe del despacho de la mayoría de la comisión revisora de la Constitución en el debate en general, cumplido por el Dr. Arturo Enrique Sampay. In Constituciones de la Argentina (1810-1972), ed. Arturo Enrique Sampay (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1975), 496.}
Marriage benefits varied among labor contracts which stipulated them. Female and male workers were granted additional pay at the time of marriage, ranging from 25 days to one month's salary, or a flat rate of 200 pesos at the time of the marriage.\footnote{Labor contract number 113/48, 28; labor contract number 28/49, 30; labor contract number 34/50, 37; labor contract number 124/54, 3; labor contract number 46/54, 3; labor contract number 128/50, 4. Labor contract number 113/48, 28; labor contract number 28/49, 30; labor contract number 34/50, 37; labor contract number 128/50, 3. Labor contract number 46/54, 3 and labor contract number 128/50, 4.}

In addition to additional wages at the time of marriage, four contracts also paid employees for marriage. A majority of the labor contracts (seventeen) granted paid days off at the time of the marriage. The number of days granted varied among contracts from a low in 1949 of seven days paid leave to a (one contract) high of 15 days off in 1954. The majority of the contracts granted workers ten days off.\footnote{Labor contract number 18/49, 16; labor contract number 171/54, 2, and labor contract number 97/54, 2; labor contract number 76/47, 17; labor contract number 20/49, 8; labor contract number 28/49, 30; labor contract number 34/50, 37; labor contract number 128/50, 4; labor contract number 134/50, 28; labor contract number 144/50, 3; labor contract number 145/50, 3; labor contract number 46/54, 3; labor contract number 59/54, 3; labor contract number 65/54, 2; labor contract number 130/54, 3. Wine industry labor contract number 66/50, 24; leather industry contract number 124/54, 2.} (See Table 7 for a breakdown of benefits by industry.)
Table 7. Marriage Benefits by Industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry/Contract No.</th>
<th>Payment at Marriage</th>
<th>Paid Days Off</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 mo</td>
<td>25 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76/47</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/49</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145/48</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/49</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No #/50</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220/54</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Textile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/50</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97/54</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130/54</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171/54</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113/48</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/49</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34/50</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>66/50</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95/50</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128/50</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203/54</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Glass</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>134/50</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquor Distillers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144/50</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145/50</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46/54</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
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<td>59/54</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124/54</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58/54</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78/54</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The economic reward for marriage continued beyond the time of the legal marriage contract. Once married, the state rewarded workers again for the birth of legitimate children. In order to receive the wage, workers had to prove legitimacy or recognition of illegitimate children with legal documentation showing proof of marriage and legitimacy or recognition.\(^{121}\)

Requirements for legitimacy or legal recognition of children contradicted the 1949 Constitution, which granted equality to all citizens regardless of legal state at birth.\(^{122}\) Such legitimacy requirements effectively discriminated against single mothers in the work force with illegitimate children.\(^{123}\)

Rates of reward for children varied significantly in the amount paid each month and to whom it was paid. A 100 peso per month wage was the most common amount among the contracts. The 1954 textile, 1950 liquor distillers, 1949 wool, and 1948 clothing contracts specified that the payment go to the father, and three contracts—all leather-related industries—required that

\(^{121}\)Wool industry labor contract of 1950 in Gaceta Textil, 22.

\(^{122}\)1949 Constitución de la Nación Argentina, Chapt. 2, Art. 28.

\(^{123}\)In the Argentine adult population in 1947, 47 percent of the population was single. Among the population of adult women, 42.7 percent were single, 47.4 percent were married, 8.8 percent were widows, 0.6 percent were divorced, and 0.2 percent had an unknown status. The illegitimate births in the country in 1947 made up 27.8 percent of all births; however, the number of illegitimate births in the Capital Federal was far lower than the national average at 11.2 percent. Thus legitimacy requirements more adversely affected women outside of the Federal Capital. Ministerio de Hacienda, Economía y Previsión, Censo general de la nación, Tomo I, (Buenos Aires, 1948), LXXV-LXXVI.
the child be legitimate.\textsuperscript{124} Four contracts paying $100 per birth had no specifications as to the gender for the worker or legitimacy requirements.\textsuperscript{125}

As early as 1948 workers in the wool industry received $150 at the time of the birth of a child; the contract also stipulated a $40 one-time payment to women workers.\textsuperscript{126} Women in the glass industry received the full $150 for illegitimate children whereas males received it only for legitimate children.\textsuperscript{127} A 1954 textile contract negotiated with one company in the province of Buenos Aires, required a one-time payment for legitimately born or legally recognized children, excluding women with illegitimate, legally unrecognized children.\textsuperscript{128}

The 1950 wine industry contract paid workers $180 for the birth of a legitimate child.\textsuperscript{129} Birth of legitimate or legally recognized children afforded workers a $200 payment in the wool leather industry in 1954,\textsuperscript{130} while workers covered by a rayon textile contract negotiated with one individual company,

\textsuperscript{124}Labor contract number 130/54, 3; labor contract number 144/50, 3; labor contract number 28/49, 30; labor contract number 113/48, 29; labor contract number 65/54, 2; labor contract number 46/54, 3; labor contract number 145/50, 3.

\textsuperscript{125}Labor contract number 76/47, 17; labor contract number 18/49, 16; labor contract number 20/49, 8; labor contract number 34/50, 37.

\textsuperscript{126}Labor contract number 145/48, 3.

\textsuperscript{127}Labor contract number 134/50, 3.

\textsuperscript{128}Labor contract number 171/54, 2.

\textsuperscript{129}Labor contract number 66/50, 24.

\textsuperscript{130}Labor contract number 124/54, 2.
were paid a $250 payment for legitimate children. A contract negotiated between two individual companies and textile unions in the Federal Capital afforded women and men workers a $300 payment.

As in the wage for legal marriage, instead of paying the worker a lump sum of cash, some contracts called for paid days off at the time of the birth of the child. The majority of the contracts granted two days off, and one contract called for a ten-day paid leave. One contract—for textile workers negotiated with two individual companies in 1954—three days off were given to women. This granting of leave specifically for women at the birth of the child seems irrelevant, particularly if legally established maternity benefits were actually being enforced. (See Chapter 1.)

There was a continued strengthening of the legal requirements for family benefits, particularly in industries where men outnumbered women. This came in the form of the monthly family wage which varied in amount and requirements. Contracts from the earlier years of Perón's regime, from

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131 Labor contract number 220/54, 3.

132 Labor contract number 97/54, 2.

133 Five of the labor contracts granted employees two days off at the time of the birth of a child: labor contract number 28/49, 30; labor contract number 34/50, 37; labor contract number 66/50, 24; labor contract number 220/54, 3; labor contract number 46/54, 3. Three contracts granted three days off: labor contract number 128/50, 4; labor contract number 144/50, 3; labor contract number 97/54, 2. One contract granted ten days off to its employees: labor contract 113/48, 28.

134 Labor contract number 97/54, 2.
1947 to 1950, stipulated a monthly payment of $10 per child to workers. There were also variations in the legal requirements by industry type and in benefits paid. Some, more than others, included women in social benefits whether or not they outnumbered men in the particular industries. Beginning in the 1950 contracts, however, a different trend emerged in industries where men outnumbered women. Benefits for women became more restrictive according to requirements for legal births and/or legal recognition. Conversely, in industries where women outnumbered men begin to increase, women's benefits began to increase.

Two cotton textile contracts, in 1947 and 1949, required legitimacy or legally recognized children. This represented an advance because the earlier 1947 contract restricted female recipients to widows and women with disabled husbands. The 1948 and 1949 clothing industry contracts paid all workers the monthly stipend for up to four children; one contract only paid $10 per month for the first child and $5 for the other three included in the benefit. In the wool industry, where men outnumbered women, two contracts from 1948 and 1949 show conflicting benefits for female workers. (See Table 8) One included single women workers in the family wage package and the other granted the benefits only for married men with a legal obligation.

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135 Labor contract number 76/47, 17; labor contract number 18/49, 16.
137 Labor contract number 20/49, 8.
and men workers in the leather industry received the monthly wage for legitimate children only as a result of the 1950 leather industry contract.\textsuperscript{138}

Table 8. Personnel in the Cotton and Wool Industries by Percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Adults</th>
<th>Minors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>51.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>10.18</td>
<td>50.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>13.21</td>
<td>62.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>66.75</td>
<td>31.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>68.58</td>
<td>15.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>62.65</td>
<td>22.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By 1950, a few of the industry contracts raised the female wage. As the amount increased, however, restrictions increased. Two 1950 contracts for wine and liquor distillery workers required legal paternity and paid only to

\textsuperscript{138} Labor contract number 145/50, 3.
male workers; one even paid $15 per month for the wife.\textsuperscript{139} The tobacco contract of the same year also required legitimacy but did include widows.\textsuperscript{140}

The only contract to pay $20 per month in 1950 was the glass industry contract which awarded the stipend to all male workers and included women with illegitimate children, but excluded other women, i.e., widows and women with disabled husbands.\textsuperscript{141} Three contracts in 1954 also called for $20 per month per child. One, a leather industry contract, paid for up to four children but did not specify female or male workers or legitimacy of the child.\textsuperscript{142} Another 1954 leather industry contract granted male workers only the monthly benefits.\textsuperscript{143}

Three contracts in 1954 paid the highest amount per month per child at $25. Two textile contracts show, like the two earlier wool textile contracts, a contradiction regarding women's benefits. One awarded the monthly benefits to women without regard to the child's legitimacy; but another, negotiated between the union and an individual company, stipulated that only

\textsuperscript{139}Labor contract number 66/50, 26. Men workers received $15 per month for their wife as well as their children in labor contract number 144/50, 4.

\textsuperscript{140}Labor contract number 128/50, 6-7.

\textsuperscript{141}Labor contract number 134/50, 30.

\textsuperscript{142}Labor contract number 46/54, 3.

\textsuperscript{143}Labor contract number 59/54, 3.
the father of the family or widows who have not remarried receive the monthly payment for legitimate or legally recognized children.

The evaluation of these 26 contracts by categories such as wage differentials, educational prerequisites, and the implementation of a family wage, reveal a pattern of manipulation of the work force by gender according to the state's economic goals. Educational requirements for higher-paying jobs, work schedule limitations, and wage differentials excluded women from higher and equal salaries. By supplementing the salaries of men, family wages theoretically make it economically feasible for men to support a family without the woman's salary. Thus, the family wage can be seen as the implementation of the regime's intent to encourage women's exclusion from the workforce. The family wage counteracted efforts to promote equal wages. Benefits which are simultaneously equal for women and men render female workers less attractive as a cheap source of labor. In industries where men outnumbered women, family wages offered higher benefits paid and more legal restrictions. Where women outnumbered men, the family wages offered higher benefits encompass more varying lifestyles of women workers.

The manipulation of inclusionary and exclusionary economic benefits for women reveals an increase in control of women's participation in the industrial work force as the state moved into a "deepening" industrialization.

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14 Labor contract number 171/54, 2; labor contract number 97/54, 2; labor contract number 124/54, 2.
phase during the latter years of Perón's regime. During the same era, relations between Perón and labor began to deteriorate. Contrary to his populist rhetoric, Perón found himself having to shave workers' benefits and curb salaries to attempt to curtail a spiraling inflation rate and decreased production. Tightening control over labor to attain his economic goals reversed the populist trend. Like earlier control measures, Perón's effort to control the economy affected women more severely than men. Chapter 3 addresses the significance of these gendered control measures to the theories of labor incorporation and their possible influence on other political theories.
CHAPTER III
CONCLUSIONS

Many questions emerge about the role of the corporatist state in gendered labor issues. How did the corporatist state under the populist regime of Juan Perón incorporate women industrial workers? What inducements increased support? What constraints helped control this newly recognized sector of the labor force? At first glance, the improvements for women workers were tremendous for the time period—even advanced compared to more industrialized countries. But upon close scrutiny, as these inducements were offered women workers, the constraints implemented to control them negated the inducements.

One of the major political advances for Argentine women as a whole, the right to vote and hold office in 1947, ended a long demand before the state for those rights by groups other than the Peronists. To control this new voting mass, the PPF was created to educate women politically according to the Peronist ideology, protect them from socialist and communist influence, encourage women's traditional roles, and direct their activities away from labor organizations. By creating this special organization of women through the person of Eva Perón, a permanent link to the state's bureaucracy failed to materialize and affected their long-term relations with the state. Additionally,
by encouraging women to organize away from labor organizations, the number of women rising through the ranks of labor organizations and ultimately reaching the labor negotiation level remained very low. More often than not, women's interests failed to be addressed during negotiations between the state, labor organizations, and private enterprise.

As the neighborhood units of the PPF attempted to educate women politically and socially according to the Peronist creed, other educational opportunities increased for women during Perón's regime. Public education for all citizens became a part of the constitution, but educational opportunities continued to be gendered and ethnically biased. With fewer technical institutes to train women for industrial jobs and the increasing numbers of women who studied in commercial institutes, education did not lead to better job opportunities in the industrialized work force for female workers, although it did open doors in the commerce and service sectors.

Although hindered by educational requirements, women in the work force were promised better wages. Equal pay for equal work was a part of Perón's political rhetoric, but was rarely implemented. The few instances where female workers did receive the same wages as male workers were the younger women entering the work force. But as women neared the traditional age of reproduction and caretaking, the percentage they earned compared to a man's wages decreased and continued to lower as they aged. Although proportionately higher than in other industrialized nations, women's
wages remained lower than that of their male counterparts for those few women who reached higher, more responsible positions. The wage gains for workers, female or male, quickly eroded due to union deductions for dues and social benefits from wage increases gained from labor negotiations. Earning less before the deductions meant that these deductions (which were equally applied across all wage categories) eroded women's earning power even more.

Women in the industrial work force were also supposed to benefit from the implementation of protective labor legislation passed earlier in the century. This legislation appeared to improve women's conditions within the work force but in reality it controlled their participation in the work force, limited their work schedules, and excluded them from higher wages and promotion opportunities. Similarly, laws granting maternity leave for women created the demand for additional wages for female workers who were already considered an expendable, lower-wage segment of the work force.

The above controlling measures negatively affected women's participation in the work force. Family subsidies to workers created other distinctions because women's receipt of the benefits depended on their private (moral) lives. Marriage and child birth benefits encouraged workers' submission to the heterosexist norms of society. For women this meant the submission to the control of husbands. Although the 1949 Argentine constitution guaranteed equality of spouses, it also condoned patria potestad which continued the rights of husbands to rule over all members of the family
and exemplified the contradictory rhetoric of Perón's regime toward the situation of Argentine women.

The monthly family wage proved to be another controlling measure levied upon women. Numerous inconsistencies existed in the contracts for this and many other benefits offered workers. The amount paid per month and the number of children covered by the wage varied dramatically in the contracts. In no contract were widows, female workers with disabled husbands, nor single mothers covered by the wage at the same time. The majority excluded single mothers. This exclusion of single mothers in particular condemned the "immoral" actions of women. Moreover, the amounts paid for the monthly family wage increased as economic conditions worsened in Argentina; this serves as an indication that supplemental wages for male workers during economic crisis were designed to discourage women's participation in the work force and thereby make room for men.

Analyzing Argentina's initial labor incorporation and the type of link developed with the state by workers according to gender, offers new insights into an important historical moment in labor history. It serves to differentiate among the many divisions of society with which the populist regime had to deal; moreover, it illustrates how separate control mechanisms were devised to maintain the segregated work force. It serves also as a basis from which to monitor subsequent regimes and the measures implemented to maintain the segregation of the work force by gender.
Disaggregating the corporatist state and labor relations by gender, using the paradigms designed by the Colliers for the general study of labor incorporation, adds to the body of knowledge already existing regarding the changing relations between labor and the state during the populist regime of Juan Domingo Perón. Terence Ball paraphrases numerous others when he writes that, "...criticism is the sincerest form of flattery..." If this is the case, then is the feminist work which adds to a body of knowledge through the use of old pillars of thought flattering the exclusion of women? Does this mean that historians and political theorists who work to integrate women into the old pillars of historical documentation and political theories complement those who have totally excluded women as a whole from consideration?

I do not think it is. I chose to add to the body of existing knowledge by taking a theory which excludes one-fourth of the industrial work force, and address the contradictions and incoherencies that exist within the idea of initial incorporation. More importantly, further disaggregating the corporatist state by gender does two things. First, it adds to a continuous unveiling of the various forms the corporatist state uses to control women (or other interest sectors) to achieve the goals of the regime(s). It offers a different perspective, not just because it addresses women, but because it offers more information with which to evaluate incorporation and the corporatist state.

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Additionally, this view offers women, not just Argentines, in labor organizations and labor negotiations insight into the discriminatory benefits programs, gendered labor legislation, and their long-term effect on women workers. Works adding to the body of knowledge of women in the work force should be used not just by academics but, more importantly, by women working to achieve equality in the work force.

Second, disaggregating the corporatist state, according to David Collier, offers better insight in the reconsideration of whether the bureaucratic-authoritarian (B.A.) regimes which followed the populist regime represented a new phenomenon in Argentine history. By taking the new information from disaggregating the corporatist state, scholars can observe the similarities and differences between the populist and B.A. regimes.\(^\text{146}\)

The further disaggregation of the Argentine corporatist state shows that the relationship between the state and female workers differed from the relationship between male workers and that state regardless of regime. Consequently, the initial incorporation of female workers by the state differed and reveals how two separate corporatist state labor projects existed. Male labor incorporation came at the expense of women's continued subjugation. It appeared that female workers, and women in general, made great strides to equality under Perón; however the institutions remained male dominated and continued the manipulation and exclusion of women. This suggests that

\(^{146}\)Collier and Collier, 1979, 978.
subsequent regimes should also be analyzed by gender to evaluate the true nature of the state.
APPENDIX

LIST OF LABOR CONTRACTS

1. Contract Number: 76/47
   Type of Industry: Textile, Cotton
   Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Textile Workers' Association, Argentine Textile Workers' Federation
   Components of the Textile Workers' Confederation of the Republic of Argentina
   Date Contract Signed: 29 April 1947
   Effective Dates of Contract: 17 January 1947 for a minimum of 18 months
   Radius of Contract: Within 100 kilometer radius of Federal Capital

2. Contract Number: 113/48
   Type of Industry: Garment
   Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): National Federation of Clothing Industry Workers (FONIVA) and the Workers', Tailors' and Seamstresses' Labor Union
   Date Contract Signed: 26 July 1948
   Effective Dates of Contract: 1 April 1948 until 31 December 1948
   Radius of Contract: Union affiliates

3. Contract Number: 145/48
   Type of Industry: Textile, Wool
   Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Tanners' Labor Union and the Argentine Wool Labor Union
   Date Contract Signed: 10 September 1948
   Effective Dates of Contract: 1 April 1948 for one year
   Radius of Contract: Union affiliates
4. Contract Number: 18/49  
Type of Industry: Textile, Cotton  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Textile Workers' Association and the Argentine Federation of Textile Workers  
Date Contract Signed: 25 February 1949  
Effective Dates of Contract: 17 July 1948 to 31 December 1949  
Radius of Contract: Within 100 kilometers of Federal Capital

5. Contract Number: 20/49  
Type of Industry: Textile, Wool  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Textile Workers' Association  
Date Contract Signed: 28 April 1949  
Effective Dates of Contract: 22 March 1948 to 31 December 1949  
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates  
Number of Workers Affected: 35,000

6. Contract Number: 28/49  
Type of Industry: Garment  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Workers', Tailors', and Seamstresses' Labor Union and the National Federation of Clothing Industry Workers  
Date Contract Signed: 24 February 1949  
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 January 1949 without ending date  
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates  
Number of Workers Affected: 80,000  
Negotiators: Female negotiator, Elvira G. de Leniz, representing the Workers', Tailors', and Seamstresses' Labor Union

7. Contract Number: 11/50  
Type of Industry: Textile Cotton  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Textile Workers' Association  
Date Contract Signed: Not available  
Effective Dates of Contract: 30 June 1951 for two years  
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates

8. Contract Number: 34/50  
Type of Industry: Garment  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Workers', Tailors', and Seamstresses' Labor Union  
Date Contract Signed: 17 April 1950  
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 January 1950 without ending date  
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates  
Number of Workers Affected: 100,000
9. Contract Number: 66/50  
Type of Industry: Wine  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Argentine Labor Federation of Wine Workers  
Date Contract Signed: Not listed in contract  
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 January 1950 for one year  
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates

10. Contract Number: 95/50  
Type of Industry: Food  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Food Industry Workers' Union  
Date Contract Signed: 9 July 1950  
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 May 1950 to 30 April 1950  
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates  
Number of Workers Affected: 250,000

11. Contract Number: 128/50  
Type of Industry: Tobacco  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Tobacco Workers' Union  
Date Contract Signed: 8 August 1950  
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 January 1950 to 31 March 1951  
Radius of Contract: Within 60 kilometers of Federal Capital

12. Contract Number: 134/50  
Type of Industry: Glass  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Glass Industry Workers' Union  
Date Contract Signed: 24 August 1950  
Effective Dates of Contract: 6 May 1950 for two years  
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates

13. Contract Number: 144/50  
Type of Industry: Liquor Distillers  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Liquor Industry Labor Union  
Date Contract Signed: 20 September 1950  
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 April 1951 to 31 March 1952  
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates
14. Contract Number: 145/50
Type of Industry: Leather
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Argentine Federation of Leather Industry Workers
Date Contract Signed: 25 September 1950
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 April 1950 for two years
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates
Negotiators: Female negotiator representing the Argentine Federation of Leather Industry Workers

15. Contract Number: Not available, contract taken from Gaceta Textil, August 1950
Type of Industry: Textile Wool
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Textile Workers' Association
Date Contract Signed: Not available
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 July 1950 to 30 June 1950
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates

16. Contract Number: 46/54
Type of Industry: Leather and Cloth Gloves
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): National Federation of Clothing Industry Workers
Date Contract Signed: 14 June 1954
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 March 1954 for two years
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates

17. Contract Number: 58/54
Type of Industry: Meat
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Labor Federation of Meat and Meat Derivative Industry Workers
Date Contract Signed: 15 July 1954
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 March 1954 for two years
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates

18. Contract Number: 59/54
Type of Industry: Leather, Preparation and Dying
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Argentine Federation of Leather Industry Workers
Date Contract Signed: 25 July 1954
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 March 1954 to 29 February 1956
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates
19. Contract Number: 65/54  
Type of Industry: Leather  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Argentine Federation of Leather Industry Workers  
Date Contract Signed: 7 July 1954  
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 March 1954 for two years  
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates

20. Contract Number: 78/54  
Type of Industry: Meat  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Labor Federation of Meat and Meat Derivative Industry Workers  
Date Contract Signed: 16 August 1954  
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 March 1954 for 2 years  
Radius of Contract: one-company contract with Compañía de Industria Argentinas de Buenos Aires, S.A.

21. Contract Number: 97/54  
Type of Industry: Textile  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Textile Workers' Association  
Date Contract Signed: 30 July 1954  
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 March 1954 for two years  

22. Contract Number: 124/54  
Type of Industry: Leather/Wool Warehouses  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Unified Labor Union of Wool and Leather  
Date Contract Signed: 28 June 1954  
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 March 1954 for two years  
Radius of Contract: Union affiliates

23. Contract Number: 130/54  
Type of Industry: Textile  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Textile Industry Workers' Union  
Date Contract Signed: 9 June 1954  
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 March 1954 to 28 February 1956  
Radius of Contract: National
24. Contract Number: 171/54  
Type of Industry: Textile  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Textile Industry Workers Union  
Date Contract Signed: 10 August 1954  
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 March 1954 for two years  
Radius of Contract: One company Reysol, S.A., in the Province of Buenos Aires

25. Contract Number: 203/54  
Type of Industry: Tobacco  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Federation of Tobacco Workers  
Date Contract Signed: 4 October 1954  
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 March 1954 for two years  
Radius of Contract: One company, Schelp & Schelp S.R. LTDA.

26. Contract Number: 220/54  
Type of Industry: Textile, Rayon  
Name(s) of Negotiating Union(s): Textile Industry Workers' Union  
Date Contract Signed: 21 June 1954  
Effective Dates of Contract: 1 March 1954 for two years  
Radius of Contract: One company contract, Ducilo S. A. producer of rayon
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