

THE GOOD-FOR-NOTHING CAMPAIGN? THE IMPORTANCE OF CAMPAIGN
VISITS IN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING CONTESTS

by

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ABSTRACT

The question of whether or not campaigns have an impact on vote choice and mobilization has been debated by a number of scholars. In this dissertation, I explore this question using data from presidential nomination elections, as I argue this setting allows us to better understand campaign effects than the general election. Due to the intra-party nature of nomination contests, voters are not able to rely on partisanship in making their decision among candidates. Instead voters need to use some other source of information in making their decisions about 1) whether or not to vote and 2) which candidate to vote for. I explore these two decisions in depth in my dissertation, focusing mainly on the effect visits have on both. I have compiled data on both the timing and location of all of the candidate visits throughout the presidential nominating contests of 2008, across both the invisible primary and election year campaigns. Using this unique dataset, I explore the different ways in which state visits affect presidential nomination outcomes. Specifically, I investigate the strategy behind the visits, whether or not visits increase turnout, and how visits affect vote choice. By examining these different aspects of nominating campaigns, I am able to address a number of different literatures and theories, including those focused on candidate strategy, presidential nominations, political communication, and whether or not campaigns matter.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Campaign visits have been a large part of almost every campaign at every level of government. Whether a candidate is running for Congress, Governor, President, or even mayor, she will most likely conduct some sort of visit in order to increase her visibility. Most candidates host town hall meetings, participate in debates, or attend a rally at a popular restaurant. Candidates conduct these visits in an effort to increase awareness of their campaign. They want people to know they are running for office, to know what they stand for, and to support them at the polls. Candidates are tasked with getting as much information to voters as they can so that the voters can propel them into office. Visits are a good—and often cheap—way of providing voters with information. Compared to running advertisements, visits are cheap. Instead of having to pay for airtime (as is done with ads) candidates are able to get free media coverage at their rally, town hall meeting, or whatever their visit consists of.

While campaign visits do indeed seem to take a prominent role in most campaigns conducted at all levels of government, campaign scholars have long overlooked them. Most have chosen to focus on different aspects of campaigns, such as strategic spending, the role of advertising, or the role debates play in determining turnout and vote choice, among many others. In contrast to the vast body of work looking at these different campaign activities, visits have received much less scrutiny. Some scholars have examined the effects of campaign visits, but we are still left unsure

of the effects they have on turnout and vote choice. Jones (1998) and Shaw (1999) for example, look at the effect of visits, but do not examine how visits work in conjunction with other campaign activities. Ridout, Rottinghaus, and Hosey (2009) examine the strategy behind visits, but fail to differentiate between the invisible primary period and the actual primary phase. While campaign visits seem to play such a pivotal role in many campaigns, it raises concerns about how much power campaign visits have in explaining turnout and vote choice in campaigns. This dissertation aims to add to this literature.

Specifically, I am to parse out the effects of campaign visits in presidential nominating contests. Presidential nominations are an excellent testing ground for campaign effects. As the following chapter will further describe, presidential nominations are intra-party contests. Voters are not able to simply look at whether a candidate is a Republican or a Democrat and vote according to their partisanship. As Campbell et al (1960) carefully explain partisanship is the driving force behind turnout and vote choice in elections; however, in presidential nominating contests, partisanship is a much less important predictor. So, something besides partisanship must be driving voters in presidential nominations. I argue that campaign visits are one of these aspects. While I do not discount the role of advertisements, debates, and media coverage, I believe our theories of turnout and vote choice are incomplete if visits are ignored.

For this dissertation, I have chosen to look at the 2008 presidential nominating contests. This year is a good testing ground for the effect visits have on turnout and vote

choice for a variety of reasons. First, both the Republicans and Democrats have “open” seats. In neither of these contests was an incumbent President or Vice President running for the nomination. Second, both Republicans and Democrats provided the U.S. with candidates able to make history. The Democratic race quickly winnowed down to Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, the first viable African American and female candidates, respectively. On the Republican side, John McCain would have been the oldest person to be elected President. Further, McCain had the patriotic narrative of being an ex-POW during the Vietnam War, enduring torture and physical hardships in an effort to protect his country. McCain was also a maverick in his party, often reaching “across the aisle” to work for bipartisan solutions to problems. So, the nomination contests of 2008 provided some excitement and uncertainty among American voters. Because of this, the 2008 nominating contests seem to be a good testing ground for the effects of campaign visits.

Multiple Literatures

This dissertation covers a lot of different aspects of campaign visits, which means I also cover many different literatures. Throughout this dissertation, I address the literature on presidential nominations, campaigns, candidate strategy, voter mobilization, vote choice, and political communication. Each of these literatures has been useful in crafting a theory of how campaign visits affect voting behavior in presidential nominating contests. Since there has not been much work done concerning the role of campaign visits in elections, it has been necessary to borrow from these other

literatures in doing so. I begin by offering an examination of the strategy behind the visits, move on to how visits mobilize voters, and then finish by examining how visits affect candidate preference. By looking at each of these aspects of the campaign it is crucial to understand how my dissertation fits into these different research niches.

Do Campaigns Matter?

This has been a question asked by many different scholars and has received different answers. The general consensus seems to be that campaigns do have an effect on vote choice and mobilization, but this effect is minimal (Hillygus and Jackman 2003; Hillygus and Shields 2008). Other scholars argue that campaigns really have little to do with vote choice and mobilization; instead, factors such as partisanship or economic evaluations are much more important in getting people to vote (Downs 1957; Campbell et al 1960; Fiorina 1981). Still others argue that campaigns do indeed have a larger impact than they are given credit for (Holbrook 1996; Holbrook and McClurg 2005). These authors look at debates, conventions, and advertisements and point out that campaigns do indeed have an effect on voter mobilization and candidate preference. Not all of the activities affect mobilization and vote choice, but the campaign does indeed affect whether or not people turnout and the way people vote.

My dissertation explores this question in the context of presidential nominations. I argue in the next chapter that presidential nominating contests are an excellent testing ground for campaign effects because there are fewer heuristic shortcuts available to voters. Voters cannot walk into a voting booth, look for the 'R' or the 'D' behind a

candidate's name and vote accordingly. Instead, we see that in nomination campaigns Republicans are running against other Republicans and Democrats are running against fellow Democrats. Because of this, voters need more information on the candidates. This is where I believe the campaign activities come in. The campaign activities will have more of a role in presidential nominations because the voters are (usually) not as committed to one of the candidates and need to learn about them as the nomination season unfolds. Thus, I believe campaigns do matter, and we will see this in the remainder of this dissertation.

Candidate Strategy

Much work has been done looking at the strategy of the candidates running for office. How are candidates using their resources? Are negative advertisements more effective than positive ads? How much money should be spent in a specific state, given that state's likelihood of propelling a candidate to victory? These are some of the questions explored in terms of candidate strategy in both the general election and nominations literatures.

Turning specifically to presidential nominations, there is an extensive literature concerning candidates' strategic spending habits (Gurian 1986; Gurian 1990; Gurian and Haynes 1993; Gurian and Wolfe 1994; Haynes, Gurian, and Nichols 1997; Norrander and Smith 1985). What these authors demonstrate is that candidates are strategic in their campaign spending. So, building off of this literature, I begin my exploration of campaign visits by looking at the strategy behind visits. Are the same factors that affect

spending strategies the same for visits? By exploring where the candidates were visiting throughout the 2008 nominating contests, I am able to address this question. Visits may not necessarily require as much money to conduct as an advertisement does to run, but candidates still have a limited amount of time and money and need to decide which states to focus on and which to ignore. Is it the number of delegates available in a state that increases the number of visits received? Whether the state has a primary or a caucus? Do earlier states receive more visits than later states? These are some of the questions that are discussed in terms of a candidate's strategy. Overall, I am trying to determine which states receive the most visits and why that is the case.

I also address strategy in terms of mobilization and candidate preference. I explore whether or not visits affect the number of voters who turnout at the polls as well as how they affect which candidate a voter supports. While this may not speak directly to the strategy behind visits, we are able to look at the number of visits each candidate makes to the states and whether those visits had an effect on each candidate's vote share.

Mobilization and Participation

Mobilization, I believe, is one of the aspects of campaigns that will be affected by campaign visits. I argue that the more visits a candidate makes to a state, the more likely those voters are to participate in the election. There has been an extensive amount of research into mobilization efforts, but again, campaign visits have been overlooked. Most of the research looks into the effect debates, advertisements, and political conventions have on turnout, at least with respect to campaign activities.

In their comprehensive book on mobilization, Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) point out the effects race, interest groups, political parties, and the candidates themselves have on turnout and participation. The main point made by Rosenstone and Hansen is that in order to increase voter turnout, voters need to be asked to turnout. They point to what they call the puzzle of political participation. Education and participation have proven to be highly correlated. The more education a voter has, the more likely she is to participate in politics. Education levels have steadily increased in the United States since the 1960s, yet participation and turnout have steadily decreased. So, what is the reason for the decrease in turnout given the increased education levels? Mobilization efforts have declined. In order to get people to show up at the polls, voters need to be mobilized.

I argue that campaign visits can have a mobilizing effect among voters. Campaign visits allow voters to get a look at the candidates and learn about them. Visits allow voters to learn about the candidates and hear what the candidates have to say about their state and the issues that are important to their state. Voters who know more about the candidates running for office are more likely to turnout. However, scholars looking at mobilization efforts have largely ignored visits. The focus has been on advertisements, debates, and conventions (Hillygus and Shields 2008; Hillygus and Jackman 2003; Holbrook 1996; Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Huber and Arceneaux 2007; Popkin 1994; Wattenberg and Briens 1999; West 2005). While these studies do indeed add to our knowledge of voter mobilization, I argue our knowledge is incomplete given

the fact that we do not know how visits will affect mobilization efforts. Using this existing literature on mobilization, I am able to develop a theory about the effect visits have on mobilization in presidential nominating contests. Developing and testing this theory is the goal of Chapter 4.

Candidate Preference

A major question among voting behavior scholars, besides what mobilizes voters, is how do voters choose between candidates. Clearly in general elections partisanship plays a large role in predicting vote choice (see Campbell et al 1960), as do economic evaluations (see Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981). However, some scholars have still pointed to different campaign activities as having the ability to affect vote choice. These activities include advertisements, debates, and media coverage. Despite these findings, it still seems like these campaign activities are mostly helping partisans “come home” (Hillygus and Jackman 2003). I argue that in presidential nominating contests, campaign effects should be much stronger because of the many differences between them and general elections. As mentioned earlier, a big difference is the fact that nominating contests are intra-party whereas general elections are inter-party.

Because of these differences, I suspect that voters are more responsive to campaign effects throughout the nomination season than they are during the general election. So, it is important to develop a comprehensive theory of vote choice in presidential nominating contests. This is one of the goals of this dissertation. Most of the theories concerning vote choice in presidential primaries are centered on either the

idea of candidate momentum (see Aldrich 1980; Bartels 1988) or attrition (see Norrander 2000). These theories tell us that in order to understand why some candidates win we need to understand either why some candidates surge ahead (momentum) or why some candidates fall behind (attrition). Most of the work on candidate momentum focuses on the role the early states (e.g. Iowa and New Hampshire) play in helping a candidate create a bandwagon effect (Kenney and Rice 1994). This momentum a candidate builds is then useful in demonstrating a candidate's viability and electability, thus increasing their overall vote share. The candidate attrition literature brings in the variables of campaign advertisements and spending, finding that ads and spending do indeed affect vote choice. Unsurprisingly, the more a candidate spends, the better she does in the contest (Aldrich 1980b).

However, what both of these theories leave out is the role of campaign visits. I argue that campaign visits can be just as effective as advertisements in predicting vote choice. Campaign visits provide information to voters, just like ads, often at a cheaper price than ads. So, we may actually see that visits have a stronger effect than ads on vote choice. Further, by leaving out campaign visits from models of vote choice we may be left with an incomplete picture of what is actually going on in the minds of voters. Thus, I argue by including campaign visits in a model of vote choice we have a more comprehensive picture of candidate preference in presidential nominating contests.

Political Communication

Political communication can take a variety of different forms. It involves media exposure of the candidates, advertisements, and stump speeches, among others. While my dissertation focuses on visits, I speak to the fact that these are useful in allowing candidates another avenue with which to communicate to voters. In addition, I have found the political communication literature helpful in developing a theory concerning campaign visits. I expect that these visits will affect voters in the same way advertisements do.

Specifically, the work done by Domke and Coe (2010) on religious pilgrimages has proved especially useful. Their book, *The God Strategy*, explores the role visits to important religious monuments or locations have in increasing a politician's approval rating among both religious and nonreligious voters. They point out that roughly 70 percent of the American public wants the president to have a strong sense of religious attachment. Thus, by making pilgrimages to people or places of significant importance to religious groups, politicians are sending a signal that they understand the importance of religion, a message the public appreciates. I apply this same logic to campaign visits. By conducting campaign visits, candidates are not necessarily making religious appeals, but they are able to make more personal appeals to the voters in a specific state. They are able to campaign on issues that are important to the state they are visiting, demonstrating to voters that they understand the concerns of their prospective voters.

In addition to the information on presidential pilgrimages to places of religious importance, the literature on advertisements and media exposure is quite extensive (Adams 1985; Alvarez 1998; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Bartels 1993; Baum and Kernell 1999; Druckman and Parkin 2005; Gilens et al 2007; Haynes et al 2002; Haynes and Rhine 1998; Hetherington 1996; Huber and Arceneaux 2007; Jackson et al 2009; Kendall 2000; Kenski et al 2010; Owen 2008; Popkin 1994; Ross 1992; Shaw 1999; Vavreck 2001; Wattenberg and Briens 1999; West 2005, 2008a, 2010; Zaller 1998). While not all of these authors are focused specifically on presidential nominating contests, they rightly point out how strong an effect advertising and media coverage can have on vote choice and mobilization in elections. In *The Obama Victory*, Kenski and her coauthors offer a detailed look at the role media and messaging played in the 2008 election. This examination is one of the most thorough done on presidential elections, from the nomination stage through the November election, and points out the large impact media and messaging have in shaping voters' perceptions of the candidates as well as their turnout and vote choice.

Clearly a candidate's message and the media coverage of that message are important, but again, visits are ignored. Campaign visits are another avenue through which a candidate can get their message out. They are able to connect with voters through rallies and stump speeches, hopefully convincing voters to go to the voting booth and support their bid for the nomination. Thus, I argue that campaign visits

provide candidates another avenue for messaging. They allow voters to hear directly from the candidates and allow the candidates to communicate directly to the voters.

The Roadmap

The rest of this dissertation explores the importance of campaign visits. These visits are an important part of a candidate's campaign and have been understudied for far too long. Without the inclusion of campaign visits in our models of mobilization or vote choice, there exists a good chance that our theories are incomplete. While advertisements and momentum may indeed be important predictors of vote choice in presidential nominating contests, by ignoring the role campaign visits may be playing our theories are incomplete and not as comprehensive as they might be. The goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate why visits are important and how they affect both mobilization and vote choice in presidential nominations.

Chapter 2 sets the theoretical groundwork for the rest of the dissertation. This theory is centered on the idea that nomination contests are an appropriate testing ground for campaign effects. Because nomination contests are intra-party rather than inter-party (as general elections are) voters are unable to rely on partisanship when making a decision among the candidates running for the nomination. In addition, nominations are more complex than general elections and often involve more rules and mechanisms than general elections. Further, nominations occur over a longer period of time. Not all states hold their nomination elections on the same day, as they do for general elections. I also develop a theory of the importance of campaign visits by

linking the literature on political communication and candidate strategy. I argue that campaign visits are simply another avenue through which candidates can communicate with voters, just like they are able to do through advertisements and media messaging.

In Chapter 3 I examine the strategy behind campaign visits. Specifically, I look at the number of visits the candidates make to each of the states throughout the entire nominating season, invisible primary included, to see if there is something that is driving the number of visits each state receives. The variables I look at are the number of delegates available in each state, whether a state has a primary or caucus, the timing of the contest, whether or not a state holds its contest on the same day as another state, whether or not the candidate is a front runner or long shot, and whether the state uses proportional or winner-take-all delegate allocation (in Republican contests only because all Democrat contests use proportional allocation). In addition, I explore the strategy throughout the invisible primary period and the actual primary season separately to see if the strategies differ between these two phases. Throughout the invisible primary candidates are trying to fundraise and jockey for position in the polls so they are well poised for the actual primary season. Then, during the actual primary season, candidates are trying to win delegates and demonstrate viability and electability. So, because there are different goals of these two different phases, we may see different strategies employed to achieve these different goals.

Throughout Chapter 4, I explore the role campaign visits have on mobilization efforts. Candidates want to win elective office and to do so they need voters to vote for

them. For voters to actually vote, they need to show up at the polls. So, I investigate whether or not campaign visits affect voter turnout. Specifically, I focus on a variety of groups of voters that were important to the candidates in 2008. For the Democrats, I look at African Americans, young voters, and female voters. I believe that African Americans will be drawn to Barack Obama because he was the first viable minority candidate to run for president. Female voters, I believe, will be supportive of Hillary Clinton because she was the first viable female candidate to run in the presidential nomination contests. Finally, I believe younger voters will be drawn to Obama because he was younger than most candidates. In addition, all candidates made a targeted effort at getting younger voters to turn out and vote. For the Republicans, I look to religious voters. The religious voters have been important for the Republican Party and the 2008 Republican nominating contest presented the voters with a former Baptist preacher, Mike Huckabee. Because of this, I believe we may see that religious voters turned out at higher rates than they have in the past. To explore the trend in mobilization, I explore whether or not campaign advertisements, campaign visits, momentum, and attrition explain the turnout rates in 2008. This will allow us to see if visits are having a unique effect on turnout rates.

In Chapter 5 I examine the effect visits have on candidate preference. To do this, I look at both individual-level and state-level predictors. All studies of vote choice in presidential nomination contests focus on either state-level or individual-level predictors. In this chapter, I analyze both levels in the same model by using a

hierarchical linear model [HLM]. By using an HLM I am able to include measures of campaign visits, advertisements, momentum, attrition, issue preferences, age, race, gender, ideology, and party identification. This gives us a comprehensive model of vote choice, as we are able to look at predictors at both levels of campaign effects. While most studies look at advertisements and spending, I am able to include a measure to account for ads as well as one for the number of visits a state received throughout the nomination season. Thus, in this chapter I develop a comprehensive model of vote choice, which will allow us to determine what role, if any, visits play in affecting a voter's candidate preference.

Finally, in Chapter 6 I offer conclusions drawn from the preceding chapters. I am able to bring together what we have learned about the role campaign visits play in presidential nominating contests. I offer a summary of the dissertation as well as a discussion of the lessons learned from this exploration of campaign visits.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

Every four years Americans are inundated with campaign materials from candidates attempting to become the next president of the United States. Citizens are exposed to a number of different advertisements: television commercials, ads on the radio, and even yard signs in their neighborhoods. Further, they face media coverage of candidate visits, debates, and which candidates are ahead in public opinion polls. Presidential candidates spend large amounts of money on these campaign materials in an effort to persuade citizens to vote for them. However, most campaign scholars argue that these campaign activities are for naught. Most seem to agree that campaign activities do little to motivate individuals to come out to the polls on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November and cast a ballot, unless they were planning to vote prior to the campaign season (Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt, 1998; Hillygus and Jackman, 2003). Even in this case, the campaign activities simply allow already-partisan voters to determine which candidate better aligns with their political predispositions (e.g. political party affiliation, political ideology) rather than encouraging those without a party affiliation to come out to vote (Hetherington, 1996; Holbrook and McClurg, 2005; Huber and Arceneaux, 2007).

Despite the evidence from scholars that campaign activities do little more than mobilize the partisan voters who would turn out to vote despite the campaign, every four years we still witness long, hard-fought campaigns among those contending for the

presidency. Why? Because some scholars provide evidence to the contrary, that campaigns do indeed matter, even if it is minimally (Holbrook, 1996; Popkin, 1991; Shaw, 1999). Further, campaign activities allow individuals to best align themselves with the candidates running for office. Through debates, advertisements, and candidate visits to different states, American citizens are able to learn which candidate best represents their political predispositions. Oftentimes, these are citizens who already hold a party affiliation; however, some of these partisans can be swayed by a candidate's personal character and need to be reminded which candidate they should be supporting according to their party affiliation. For example, Hillygus and Jackman (2003) argue that campaign activities mainly serve to help partisans "come home." The debates and conventions make clear which candidate is affiliated with which party and how they stand on the "major" issues. Even if this is the only purpose of the campaign, it shows that campaign activities are needed in order for a candidate to win the presidency.

However, these scholars focus mainly on the general election stage of the presidential campaign. While this stage is important, it is understandable that only minimal campaign effects have been found. Since Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) published the seminal *The American Voter*, it has been widely acknowledged that party identification largely determines which candidate an individual will vote for. Bartels (2000) points out that this trend continues to present day, showing the power party identification still has among voters in the voting booth. If we want to understand the true effects of campaign activities over candidate

preference, we should look at the nomination stage of an election rather than the general election stage.

At the nomination stage, voters are provided with an intra-party contest so they are unable to rely strictly on partisan cues when making their decision. They must look for some other reason to support a particular candidate. Thus, candidates' campaigns should have a stronger effect on voters at this stage of the election cycle. This is what I set out to show in writing this dissertation. I hope to demonstrate that while campaign activities have been shown to have minimal effects at the general election stage, their effects at the nomination stage are much stronger.

I begin this analysis by offering a discussion of the campaign effects (or lack thereof) found at the general election. A review of this literature reveals that campaign effects are indeed minimal at best at the general election stage of a campaign. Thus, I argue that the nomination stage offers a more fecund testing ground for campaign effects. Tied to the idea that nomination contests are intra-party rather than inter-party affairs, campaign activities should produce greater influence over candidate preference at this stage rather than the general election stage. Further, there are a larger number of candidates in nomination contests than in the general election making a voter's choice among candidates more difficult. These candidates are often less well known on the national stage leaving voters less aware of who the candidates are and more susceptible to campaign effects. I then conclude this chapter by offering a review of the copious

amount of evidence that exists in support of this idea. Through this review, we can see that the nomination stage is indeed a great testing ground for campaign effects.

The Minimal Effects of General Election Campaigns

From the early studies conducted on voting behavior, we have seen little support for campaign effects. In fact, the early Columbia studies conducted by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) and Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954), set out to examine what factors affect vote choice. While they were primarily interested in sociological factors affecting vote choice, they examined whether or not the campaign affected candidate preference as well. They conclude that sociological context is most important when choosing which candidate to support. Evidence is provided, through repeated interviewing, that most voters do not change their minds about which candidate they are supporting. Specifically, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954, 283) claim that when we find certain demographic characteristics correlated with vote intention at the beginning of an election season, voters with the same characteristics are more likely to carry out their intention on election day. This shows us that individuals have political predispositions before the campaign even starts and that no matter what sort of campaign effects surround these voters, they are more likely to follow their initial intention than switch their vote preference. When this is juxtaposed with Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet's (1944) findings, which tell us that campaigns serve mainly to reinforce political predispositions, we find very little support for the idea that campaigns matter.

Standing in contrast to the sociological voting studies out of the Columbia school of thought are the social-psychological studies out of Michigan, most famously introduced by Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) in the seminal work, *The American Voter*. In *The American Voter*, we are presented with the funnel of causality, laying out a social-psychological approach to voting behavior. According to this funnel model, individuals learn their party identification through political socialization at a very early age. And through further socialization, individuals develop a psychological attachment to a political party. This attachment to a party shapes that individual's attitudes and opinions, leading that individual to adopt their favored party's positions on issues. These positions and attitudes are what cause individuals to vote for political candidates. Thus, what Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes show is that party identification is what matters for voters, much more so than the campaign activities the candidates hold.

While party identification does indeed appear to have a strong hold over which candidate is supported, the authors of *The American Voter* do point out that in some cases we will see deviating, if not realigning elections, in which the majority party is not victorious, leaving some hope for the idea that campaign effects can influence candidate preference. Nonetheless, they point out that a majority of voters have decided which candidate they will support by the end of the party conventions. As party conventions are held at the very beginning of the general election stage of a campaign, this shows that any possible campaign effects will be small, if they exist at all.

Turning now to the idea of retrospective voting initially developed by Key (1966) and further advanced by Fiorina (1981), we find additional evidence of null campaign effects. Key (1966) explores what affects a voter's candidate preference and more importantly, what motivates an individual to vote against their party identification. He examines the candidates in terms of the "in" party vis-à-vis the "out" party. Instead of thinking of voters as Republicans and Democrats we should think of them as supporting the party in power or not. What we see from his analysis is that when a majority of people disagree with the party in power, the opposition party wins and when a majority of people support the party in power, the "in" party retains its power. Thus, what matters is whether or not people agree with those that are currently in office. It does not really matter what the candidates do while campaigning, but rather it is what the incumbent politician has done while in office, that affects vote choice.

Fiorina (1981) finds support for this idea of retrospective voting. He argues that individuals maintain a "running tally" of how an incumbent's performance is treating them. If that individual feels as though an incumbent has performed well, that incumbent is rewarded with a vote. If the incumbent has performed poorly she is not rewarded with a vote. Again, what we see from Fiorina's work is that incumbent performance is what matters. Rather than carefully watching the campaign and deciding which candidate to support, voters are more likely to evaluate an incumbent's past performance and determine whether or not supporting the incumbent is going to

benefit them in the future. If voters conclude that the incumbent will not benefit them in the future, they will instead support the incumbent's opposition.

While these classics of American politics provide us little to no evidence of campaign effects during the general election stage of a campaign, some more recent studies point out that minimal campaign effects can actually be found. For example, Holbrook and McClurg (2005) explore the relationship between presidential campaign activities and political mobilization in the states. They find that mobilization activities, such as campaign visits and media purchases, are important and that these effects are strongest among partisans. Specifically, they find that the mobilization activities directed at partisans exert the strongest effect on shaping the partisan composition of the electorate. Thus, what we see from these findings is that campaigns are mobilizing partisans. This is important to note, because partisans know who they will vote for if they go to the polls, whereas independents, or even weak partisans, may be more unsure of which candidate to support in the voting booth. So what we see from Holbrook and McClurg is that campaigns exist to mobilize a candidate's core supporters to come out and vote, instead of trying to persuade undecided voters to participate.

Hillygus and Jackman (2003) also support the idea that campaigns exist mainly to mobilize core supporters. They use a panel study to examine how effective debates and party conventions are at influencing voting behavior. What they find is that these two campaign effects mostly help partisans "come home." Republicans who thought about voting for Al Gore over George Bush in 2000 were swayed back to supporting

their party's candidate after watching the conventions and debates, just as wavering Democrats were brought back to support Gore over Bush. They do find some evidence that independents were persuaded to vote for Gore over Bush after the conventions and some were also convinced to support Bush over Gore after watching the debates; nevertheless, the number of "switchers" was overall, quite small. In addition, Hillygus and Shields (2008) analyze what they deem to be the persuadable partisan. They argue that certain partisans (mostly those that *lean* toward one party or the other) can indeed be persuaded to defect from their initial partisan preference based on campaign activities. However, this is only the case when a voter is deeply attached to an issue and her party's candidate takes the opposite stance. If the opposition party's candidate emphasizes the issue strongly enough, that voter will support the opposing party. However, this still does not paint a picture of robust campaign effects.

Like Hillygus and Jackman (2003), many campaign scholars have chosen to focus on presidential debates when looking for campaign effects (Benoit et al 2001; Fridkin et al 2007; Hellweg et al 1992; Jamieson and Adasiewicz 2000; Johnston 1992; Johnston et al 2004; Kenski et al 2010; Pfau et al 2007). Debates are generally a platform the candidate has to explain her stance on the issues and describe the issues she feels are most important. These debates are televised nationally, allowing candidates a national audience when laying out their issue platform. Most scholars agree that debates help inform voters about the candidates, but also agree that debates are more effective at the

beginning of the campaign or in the nomination stage when voters are more unsure of which candidate to support (Benoit et al 2001; Hellweg et al 1992).

In his analysis of the 1984 and 1988 presidential debates, Holbrook (1996) finds that debate performance can directly affect candidate evaluations. He finds that the candidate that was perceived to give the strongest performance receives a bump in support, in some cases even persuading individuals to change their candidate preference. Crotty (2001) argues that the reason that the 2000 presidential debates did not have a strong effect on the candidates' favorability ratings was because neither of them did particularly well and there was no clear victor. Al Gore appeared the most prepared for the debates, but Bush came off looking more laid back and less uptight. Nonetheless, both Crotty and Hillygus and Jackman point out that the debates, at least in the 2000 election, did not do a good job of influencing candidate preference.

Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (2012) analyze the debates between Barack Obama and John McCain and point out that Obama was able to establish an early lead because of the financial crisis that was focused on in the first debate. The debate was supposed to focus on foreign policy, a topic on which McCain was viewed as having an advantage over Obama. However, this debate ended up focused mainly on the current financial crisis and Obama ended up being perceived as the winner, rather than McCain. According to these scholars' data, Obama came out looking better than expected, whereas McCain did not meet expectations, lowering his overall support among voters. Kenski, Hardy, and Jamieson (2010) and Abramowitz (2010) also find that Obama fared

better than McCain in the debates. Abramowitz (2010) points out that while the debates did not cause any significant shifts in the support for these candidates, uncommitted voters that favored Obama solidified their support for him based on the two candidates' debate performances. While these debates may not have shifted voters' opinions, they were able to solidify support for Obama from undecided voters. Thus, what we see from the research on presidential debates is that the evidence for campaign effects is mixed. Debates are able to provide an increase (decrease) in support for a candidate if that candidate does better (worse) than expected. However, this bump in support is usually due to voters solidifying their support for their preferred candidate, rather than voters changing their minds over which candidate to vote for.

There is also reason to question the effect of debate performance on candidate fortunes because of the possibility of selective exposure. In their examination of debate audiences, Kenski and Stroud (2005) find that debate viewers tend to be older, better educated, have higher incomes, and have a stronger partisan attachment than their non-debate viewing counterparts. Debate viewers are also generally more interested in politics, talk more with their friends about politics, and consume news at higher rates than non-debate viewers. These findings raise concerns about who is actually being affected by a candidate's debate performance. So, while some of these viewers may become more informed about the candidates after watching the debate, it is important to remember that a debate audience is made up of people generally more interested in politics than those that tune out debates entirely.

In addition to the debates, the presidential nominating conventions have received some attention among campaign scholars. It is common for a candidate to receive a bounce in support after their convention, which we saw again in 2008 (Kenski et al 2010). Both Obama and McCain received increased favorability ratings after their conventions, with McCain actually benefiting more than Obama. However, while these conventions do often give candidates a bump in support, they have been found to have mostly minimal effects. Hillygus and Jackman (2003) point out conventions mostly help the party faithful “come home.” While this does demonstrate some support for campaign effects, the effects are indeed minimal.

The strongest support we find for campaign effects at the general election stage comes from the research done on political advertisements. Candidates use campaign advertisements to educate voters about themselves, their policy positions, and their opponents. Usually when educating voters about their rivals, candidates are less than honest. Most ads in a general election focus on attacking a candidate’s opposition, which some scholars point to as harmful for voter turnout (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Buchanan, 1991; Dionne, 1991; West, 2005). These authors point out that attack ads generally lead to disenchantment with the political system among the American public, turning many voters off from politics. However, this is part of the point of attack ads. Politicians want to increase turnout for themselves and encourage supporters of their political opponent to stay home rather than participate. As Kahn and Kenney (1999) point out, candidates need to be careful with negative advertising because too much can

cause even initially supportive voters to stay home rather than turnout. They find that when voters perceive ads as just attacking the other candidates with no substantial information in them, they will be turned off from the election altogether and choose not to vote.

However, it appears that not all attack ads are harmful. In fact, Pfau and Kenski (1990) point out that attack ads are actually gaining strength because they are effective at making voters remember the message longer. Because attack ads are viewed as more compelling, they are processed quickly and remembered for a longer period of time than a non-attack ad (Jamieson 1992; Kendall 2000; Kern 1997; Pfau and Kenski 1990; Roberts 1995). Stevens (2005) goes a step further in his analysis of negative advertising. He argues that negative ads are informative, but mostly among political sophisticates. For those uninterested in politics, negative ads actually decrease an individual's knowledge of the candidates.

In addition, Jamieson (2001) points out that if we make better distinctions between advertisements run, we get a better picture of how attack ads actually affect vote choice. She argues that we should classify ads into three groups: advocacy ads, attack ads, and contrast ads. Advocacy ads are those in which a candidate is simply stating their position on an issue. Attack ads are those in which 90% of the ad is devoted to putting down an opponent. In between these two are contrast ads, in which a candidate makes statements about themselves vis-à-vis their opponent. These contrast ads actually increase voter mobilization and a candidates vote share, proving to be the

most effective form of advertising. Advocacy ads increase a candidate's vote share but have no effect on turnout. Pure attack ads on the other hand, actually are found to depress both turnout and a candidate's vote share. Thus, what we see is that negative advertising is ineffective in its purest form. However, when an attack is coupled with some advocacy for that candidate's positions or beliefs, the advertisement can indeed be effective in mobilizing and persuading a voter.

While attack ads are popular among candidates running for office, issue ads are also important, as they provide information to the voters about the candidates' stances on the issues, allowing them to make informed choices at the voting booth. They also allow candidates to set the campaign agenda and focus on the issues they care most about. West (2008) details three ways in which ads affect voters: learning, agenda setting, and priming. He argues that ads allow candidates to express their views on issues, letting the public know which issues they think are most important and where they stand on these issues. Gilens, Vavreck, and Cohen (2007) support the idea that voters are able to learn from political ads. Based on their research, we can see that voters have remained steady in their knowledge of the candidates' issue stances despite a decrease in issue coverage among the media. This, they argue, is due to the fact that ads are becoming more policy focused, helping to supplement the coverage they receive in the media.

Further, ads allow candidates to prime voters to give them a shortcut in the voting booth. Due to the priming effect of campaign ads, voters are able to more easily

associate candidates with issues. Hetherington (1996) points out that it was due to the media's focus on the poor economy and because the Clinton campaign made the economy an issue, that many voters decided to use the economy as a reason to support Clinton over Bush in 1992 (see also Abramowitz, 1995). He points out that even though the economy had been improving, the media focused on how poorly it had been performing and the Clinton campaign kept running advertisements to the same effect, leaving voters with little choice but to vote based on economic issues, showing that staying on message is an important aspect of campaigns and advertisements. Kenski, Hardy, and Jamieson (2010) also exemplify the importance of staying on message in both media appearances and advertisements. The ability of the candidate to paint herself in a certain way when compared to her opponent is an important aspect of campaigning. In addition, Holbrook and McClurg (2005) argue that ads are more important for independent voters rather than partisan voters, in terms of recruiting new voters. They argue that partisan voters are likely to be mobilized by other campaign efforts more than ads, but ads do help increase the level of turnout among independent voters.

The research on campaign visits in general elections is scant. This is mostly due to the unavailability of data on visits. In order to obtain data on campaign visits prior to the 2000s, scholars would have to search various newspapers to figure out candidate schedules. Now, however, various Internet sites, such as *The Washington Post* or *Politico* regularly track candidate schedules. Thus, because these data were difficult to locate,

most scholars looked past campaign visits and focused on campaign spending and advertisements when examining campaign effects. Despite the data limitations to campaign visits, a few pieces have examined the effect of visits on voter mobilization and vote choice.

Jones (1998) examines the question of how campaign visits affect both mobilization and vote choice. He finds that visits increase turnout and affect candidate preference. However, Jones performs an aggregate analysis of Republican and Democratic visits from 1980-1992, in which his number of visits variable is simply the total number of visits made by a presidential candidate of one party throughout those 12 years. He does perform an analysis to test for differences among the various candidates, to determine if one candidate was more appealing than others, but fails to find any difference between the candidates during this time period. However, Jones also leaves out other campaign activities that may be influencing a voter's choice. He is only analyzing visits. While I do argue that visits are an important aspect of campaigning, there are other aspects of campaigning that need to be taken into account, such as campaign advertisements. Candidates run ads from before the nomination season begins to the final days of the general election campaign. Without accounting for these ads, it is hard to generalize from Jones' results. He does find support for campaign visit effects, but without examining other campaign activities, it is hard to be sure that it is truly the visits having this effect, and not other campaign activities.

Shaw (1999) also analyzes campaign visits in presidential elections. He examines the elections from 1988-1996, to determine whether campaign visits affect vote choice. In contrast to Jones (1998), Shaw rightly juxtaposes these visits with campaign advertisements. Advertisements are a big part of a candidate's campaign and need to be included if we want to correctly understand the effect visits are having on candidate preference. What Shaw finds is that visits—while controlling for ads—are significant predictors of vote choice. Specifically, he finds that an additional three appearances produces a 2.2-point increase in a candidate's support. Thus, Shaw demonstrates that visits are an important aspect of campaigning and should be included in models of campaign effects.

In contrast to these two pieces where visits have been shown to have a positive effect on mobilization and vote choice, is the study done by Johnston et al (2004) in which they demonstrate that visits have a negligible, and even negative effect in the 2000 general election. In their analysis, they find that visits had no effect for Al Gore and actually depressed turnout for George Bush. They are unable to provide a substantive explanation for these results and question whether or not the election atmosphere of 2000 was the cause of these troubling results. Nevertheless, there is evidence that visits do indeed have a positive impact on vote choice and mobilization efforts. Johnston et al (2004) simply exemplify the reason more work needs to be done on campaign visits. We have a contrasting set of results so we can be unsure of what effect these visits are truly having on voter turnout and candidate preference.

Thus, what we see from the literature on campaign effects at the general election stage is that campaigns, if they matter at all, have minimal effects. Most campaign effects have been shown through the effects that come from political advertisements. Debates and conventions show little effect, so overall general elections provide us with mixed results in regards to campaign effects. Sometimes they seem to matter; sometimes they do not. However, campaign effects should always be found at the nomination stage of a campaign because of the many differences between the nomination stage and the general elections stage. These differences are examined in the next section.

The Importance of the Nomination Stage

Exploring whether or not campaigns matter at the nomination stage will produce better answers than exploring campaign effects at the general election stage for a number of reasons, all of which can be tied to decision cost. Downs (1957) presents us with an economic voting model, which leads us to conclude that for many individuals, voting is irrational. We should not bother to vote when the costs of voting (be they physical or informational) outweigh the benefits we receive from voting. Aldrich (1980a) points out that the costs of voting in the primary stage of an election are higher than in a general election. First, he states that the physical costs of voting are just as high for a primary election as they are at the general election stage. An individual will have to take time off of work, drive to the polls, or perform whatever action is necessary to get to the polling place on election day, be it for a primary election or general election.

Second, decision costs are higher in a primary election than they are for a general election, for a number of reasons. Information is scarcer during primary campaigns than it is during general elections, so it is harder to acquire, causing those that want this information to pay a higher cost to obtain it. It is not necessarily the case that there is less media coverage of the nomination contest, instead it is the case that there is less media coverage of each of the candidates running in an attempt to clinch a party's nomination. Because there are many more candidates running in the nomination stage than at the general election stage, each of these candidates is vying for media coverage. It is impossible for the media to give each candidate running for a party's nomination equal airtime, so it is left to the voter to do their own research on each of the candidates. In contrast, during the general election the media are able to focus on two candidates vying for the presidency, allowing them to present voters with much more detailed information than they can at the nomination stage.

Because primaries are intra-party contests, voters are not able to rely on partisan cues, as they are in general elections, thus making it more difficult for individuals to make a choice between candidates. In the voting booth, voters are not presented with candidate A, a Republican, vis-à-vis candidate B, a Democrat. Instead, voters need to decide between candidates A, B, C, etc., all belonging to the same party. As discussed previously, *The American Voter* provides us with a large amount of evidence that partisan predispositions are a strong predictor of how an individual is going to vote in an election. While there is also a fair amount of evidence that party identification is

dropping among voters, Bartels (2000) provides us evidence that there has been a revival in partisan attachments as of late. Nonetheless, this resurgence of party identification is almost useless when deciding which candidate to support in a nomination stage (for a counterargument see Mayer 1996, 2003). The issue differences between the candidates are often small and nuanced due to the intra-party nature of nomination campaigns. Both Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton argued for national healthcare reform and all of the Republican candidates—with the exception of Ron Paul—supported the war in Iraq. Thus, the intra-party nature makes it difficult for people to use issue positions as a way to differentiate between the candidates.

In addition, multi-candidate contests are more complex and thus more confusing for individuals. As has been pointed out, there are many more candidates in a primary election than there are in a general election (Aldrich 1980a; Moran and Fenster 1982; Norrander 1993, 2006; Norrander and Smith 1985). Multi-candidate races cause voters to assess a wider variety of candidates, costing them more time and effort to distinguish between them and ultimately make a choice over which candidate to support. Further, the nomination stage itself is more complex because citizens are not voting on who they would like to win the presidency, but rather which candidate they would like to see stand against the opposing party's candidate in the general election. Thus, even in a two-candidate race we see an added complexity, as the victor of the nomination contest does not actually get to hold office, but continues on to the general election.

Primaries often involve more complicated electoral mechanics than general elections. In a primary election, individuals may be voting for a nominee or for a delegate—whose political preferences may or may not be known—who will go on to vote for a nominee. Secondly, there may be different vote counting mechanisms used. Some primaries are winner-take-all contests, in which the candidate with the most votes receives all of the state's delegates at the party's national convention. Conversely, some primaries offer a proportional division of their delegates. In this case, each candidate receives a percentage of delegates based off of the popular vote totals. This proportional division of votes can be complicated further by the use of thresholds, which make it so that a candidate must receive a certain percentage of the popular vote to receive some proportion of the allotted delegates. All of the Democratic primaries and caucuses are now proportional representation contests, but Republican primaries are a mixed bag. Further complicating the Democratic primaries are the use of superdelegates. Superdelegates are public and party officials who are not bound to any candidate via a popular vote. Instead, these superdelegates are able to vote for whichever candidate they prefer based on their own political predispositions. These primary rule complexities, however, may be too esoteric to influence voters' behaviors.

The caucus system, standing in contrast to the primary system, has proven to be an even more complicated process than the primary system. While the number of states using caucuses has decreased, a number of them still exist. In the caucus system, voters meet—or caucus—together and select delegates to a subsequent series of meetings. The

final results for the state may not be known for several months after the final state-level conventions. Thus, the caucus system is a much greater time commitment than the primary, as voters actually have to stay at the meeting until delegates are selected. Participants in primaries, on the other hand, are able to leave as soon as they have cast their ballot.

Finally, because nomination contests take place over a longer period of time than do general elections, we cannot be sure that an event at the beginning of the contest will be evaluated the same at the end of the contest. Unlike the general election, in which voters head to the polls on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November, primaries and caucuses are held on a variety of different dates. The actual date of the nomination election is left mostly to the state's discretion, though the two parties attempt to limit the time frame. The nomination season usually begins in January or February with the Iowa Caucuses and ends in June. Thus, we have a five-month window in which voters are deciding which candidate they will support in their state's primary election. While some nominees are known before June due to the fact they have won enough delegates to clinch their party's nomination, there are some instances where the contests does continue until the very end—most recently the Democratic primary in 2008. Nevertheless, a winner is not known on the eve of the Iowa caucus. Because of this, there are a number of factors (e.g. momentum, candidate withdrawals, political advertisements, candidate visits, and debates) that can affect an individual's candidate preference by the time they are able to cast a ballot.

Morton and Williams (1999, 2001) clearly lay out how this type of sequential voting found in nomination competitions can create an electoral outcome that is different than if simultaneous voting occurred. In sequential voting, those voting early (e.g. Iowa and New Hampshire in the primary season) possess the ability to set the tone for the rest of the campaign. These voters have the power to significantly boost a lulling campaign or end a candidate's run for the nomination, impacting the choices available to voters in future nominating contests (Adams 1985; Aldrich 1980a; Bartels 1987; Bartels 1988; Bartels 1989; Ridout 1991; Steger 2002). In contrast, sequential voting can help ensure that those participating in later primaries have an abundance of information available to them that was not available to those voting in the early primaries. But, the contest may be over before their state primary is held.

Because of the sequential nature of presidential nominations, candidate strategy can be greatly affected. Candidates understand the momentum that can be achieved by early wins and oftentimes campaign heavily in states with early primaries while ignoring those states with later contests. Turnout can also be affected by sequential voting, as voters in states with later primaries may view their votes as meaningless because a candidate may be decided on by the time they vote. Because of this, a number of states have adjusted the dates of their primaries in an effort to make their votes matter. Looking at Table 2.1, we can see that in 2008 a majority of states held their primaries by the end of February. Because of this front-loading, candidates need to be able to do most of their campaigning early in the nomination season. Instead of

spreading out their campaign activities over the course of the nomination season, candidates need to focus their campaign strategy on the first few months.

Table 2.1: List of When States Held Primaries and Caucuses in 2008

	Number of Primaries and Caucuses Held
January	10
February	35
March	6
April	1
May	7
June	4

Note: Not all states hold both Democratic and Republican primaries on the same day, so the total number of primaries/caucuses is greater than 50.

Therefore, what we see is that the costs of making a decision concerning which candidate to support are much higher during the nomination stage than they are at the general election stage, where many voters will simply rely on the 'R' or 'D' next to the candidate's name. However, candidates want voters to turn out to support them at the polls. They do not want voters to sit home and not participate. Because the higher costs of voting depress turnout, we should expect to see candidates more actively campaigning to get people to participate. More campaign activities should drive down information costs, making it easier for voters to decide which candidate to support. Thus, we should see campaign effects playing a bigger role at this stage of the election cycle. Even though evidence suggests that costs of voting are higher and we should expect lower turnout, we still see people turning out to vote in presidential nomination contests. These voters need to be making a choice based on something other than just

party identification, so it appears that presidential nominations presents us with a fertile testing ground to explore the question of whether or not campaigns matter.

The Strategic Candidate

When considering campaign effects, there are two aspects that need to be examined. First, what is the candidate doing to attract attention? There are a number of ways a candidate can attract support. She can run advertisements, visit a state, or appeal to the public through media appearances. A candidate is often strategic in this behavior, attempting to garner as many delegates as possible (Gurian 1986, 1993; Gurian and Haynes 1993; Haynes and Flowers 2002; Haynes and Rhine 1998; Haynes et al 2004; Parmelee 2002; Ridout et al 2004). The second aspect that needs to be examined is how the candidate's behavior is affecting vote choice. In other words, is the candidate's strategy paying off in the voting booth?

The next section explores what we currently know about how campaign activities affect vote choice at the nomination stage. A majority of this work explores how campaign events increase momentum or cause candidates to drop out of the race, thus winnowing down the candidate field. This section, however, analyzes the evidence of strategic candidates in presidential nomination contests. Most studies of candidate strategy fall into three main categories: strategic spending, strategic messaging, and strategic advertisements. Understanding this strategic behavior of the candidates helps us analyze how campaign activities affect voters' preferences throughout the nomination season.

Strategic Spending

Candidates have a finite amount of money and thus need to be strategic in terms of their campaign spending. Much work has been done in an effort to understand how candidates are strategic in their spending. In fact, Gurian (1993a) tells us that when trying to determine how much to spend in a state, candidates carefully compare the importance of the primary to how much they have already spent in that state. He argues that when looking at states that have yet to hold primaries, candidates consider how much media coverage they will gain from winning along with the possible number of delegates they can gain, and then assign each state a value. This value is discounted by how quickly a contest is approaching, as earlier primaries take precedence over those that occur later in the season. Based on these scores, candidates compare the resources they have already allocated to the states to these newly calculated ideal values. Then, those states that fall short of the ideal values are supplemented by the resources the candidate currently has at her disposal. Thus we are left with a portrait of candidates who are very strategic in their spending, directing more resources to states with more delegates and media coverage.

A candidate's strategic spending is further complicated by that candidate's competitive status (Gurian 1986; Gurian and Haynes 1993). Gurian (1986) divides the candidate field into two types of candidates: established candidates and "long shots." Established candidates are mainly concerned with the number of delegates they have. Thus, they'll spend more in contests with more delegates at stake. In contrast, long shot

candidates are trying to make a name for themselves and be seen as viable contenders for the nomination. To do this, they need to build momentum. This requires long shot candidates to spend heavily in early contests no matter the size of the state's delegation. They are simply trying to be taken seriously. Fearing that these results may not have been generalizable beyond the 1976 and 1980 competitions, Gurian and Haynes (1993) replicate this model examining the 1984 and 1988 nomination contests and find supporting results. This leads us to conclude that campaign spending is indeed strategic, and that the strategy is dependent on whether the candidate is viewed as a viable contender or a long shot.

Finally, the type of contest affects candidate spending. Candidates tend to spend more in states that hold primaries rather than in states that hold caucuses (Gurian 1990, 1993b). The strategic candidate wants to maximize their delegate count and media coverage. Primaries typically offer more delegates and media coverage than caucuses (with the notable exception of Iowa, usually the first contest of the season, in which the winner is rewarded with more media attention than in most contests). Thus, candidates spend more in primary states than in caucus states.

Strategic Messaging

Not only are candidates strategic in terms of their spending, they are strategic in their messaging and thus campaign in states where their message will be most heavily covered. Super Tuesday has usually been viewed as an important date in the primary calendar because there is a good chance that by the end of the day, the nominee will be

known. On Super Tuesday a large number of states hold their primaries or caucuses, in an effort by these states to have a greater impact on choosing the nominees. Super Tuesday began in 1988 when a number of Southern states, in an effort to draw attention to Southern concerns, decided to hold their primaries on the same day. The hope of these states was that by holding their primaries early and on the same day, it would cause candidates to carefully consider the problems facing the South and thus campaign heavily and cater to Southern voters, thus casting the national spotlight on the South (for a full treatment of Super Tuesday see Norrande 1992).

However, the plan did not work as well as the South had hoped. What we see with these types of regional primaries, or any date on which multiple contests are held, is that media coverage is actually lessened for each state than if the state would have a unique primary date (Gurian 1993c; Gurian and Wolfe 1994). The media are incapable of covering each state extensively in these cases, so we see that states taking part in a regional primary actually receive less coverage because the media have many contests to cover in a short period of time. The media are only able to fit so much information into their reporting at a time, so when multiple contests are held on the same day, media coverage is lessened in the individual states and more focused on overall results. Because of this, candidates have been shown to be strategic in which states they campaign in during these regional primaries (Gurian and Wolfe 1994). Overall, candidates tend to downplay Super Tuesday states, relative to other states. Because they have a limited amount of time and resources, they cannot actively compete in each

Super Tuesday state. Instead, they tend to focus on specific states within the regional primaries where they feel their message will be well received and where they think they can pick up the largest amount of delegates.

In terms of the messaging done by candidates throughout the nomination competition (mainly through press releases), we see that candidates are indeed strategic. Haynes, Flowers, and Gurian (2002) analyze the invisible primary portion of the nomination season and divide the candidates into three tiers: frontrunners, second-tier, and third-tier. They want to know whether there is a difference in the type of messages used by these three tiers of candidates, and find that there is. Frontrunners mainly use informational messaging, which tends to be neutral or non-strategic. These frontrunners are simply concerned with information dissemination. Second-tier candidates tend to use competitive messaging. In these messages, they are trying to improve their position while harming the position of their opponents. They are thus strategically placing themselves apart from their opponents, in an effort to make themselves seem like the better candidate. Third-tier candidates tend to rely on substantive messaging, in which they are trying to capture support by presenting themselves in a particular manner. These third-tier candidates understand that they are not as well known or as popular as the other candidates, and use these messages as a way to strategically appeal to certain voters in an effort to build up a support bloc.

In addition to being strategic about what they say in their press releases, Haynes and Flowers (2002) argue that candidates are even strategic in terms of when they issue

press releases. They find that candidates are more likely to issue a press release when there is a news event (e.g. straw poll or debate) and not when there is a news lull. In these press releases, candidates are not only able to disseminate information freely through the media, they are able to provide media with possible spin-off stories by positing their position on the issue in contrast to the position of their opponents. Through these press releases, candidates are thus able to gain media attention and be strategic in their messages.

Parmelee (2002) also analyzes the messaging strategy of candidate, but looks at videocassette messages sent to voters rather than press releases. In these videocassette messages, each candidate makes their case for why people should vote for them. The focus of the videos varies from candidate to candidate, but each candidate focuses on some issue or trait that they think will be most helpful in attracting voters. These videocassette messages are thus an important aspect of candidate strategy, because the candidate has complete control over the information in the videocassette. They are able to speak directly to the voters and explain why they are a better choice for the nomination compared to their opponents.

Strategic Advertising

Closely tied to both spending and messaging are candidate advertisements. Campaign advertisements are highly strategic, as they allow candidates to generate a message about themselves—oftentimes vis-à-vis their opponents—and disseminate it to the American public.

Advertising is usually a large portion of a candidate's budget, so we see that candidates are often strategic in terms of where to show ads (Ridout 2004, 2008). The messaging in the advertisements is also highly strategic, as candidates have the ability to portray themselves however they choose and decide whether or not to attack a fellow candidate (Haynes and Rhine 1998; Vavreck 2001).

When we look at how candidates decide where to advertise, we see that candidates are largely strategic in this behavior. Ridout (2004) tells us that candidates are more likely to advertise in states where they believe they have a greater chance of winning, where there are more delegates up for grabs, and in states that are not a part of regional primaries. Further, we see more advertisements in states with primaries rather than caucuses and in states that have early contests (Ridout 2008). This is largely supportive of the results given by Gurian (1986, 1990, 1993a, 1993b) and Gurian and Haynes (1993), which tell us that candidates spend strategically in an effort to either create momentum for themselves or gain a large number of delegates. In other words, candidates do not want to waste their money. They want to advertise where they feel their ads will be well received and benefit them the most; they do not want to advertise in states where they feel it would be a wasted effort.

In addition, we see that candidates are strategic in the messaging of the advertisements. Vavreck (2001) shows that candidates do not send the obvious signals of party identification and ideology in advertisements in an attempt to avoid being labeled a typical partisan, unless a majority of the candidate's constituents are of the

same party. In this case, the candidate is 20 percent more likely to give a party signal. In contrast, when the candidate's party is not the same as a majority of her constituents, they try to signal through their issue positions and character traits. Candidates know that they need to appeal to more than just a select group of partisans in an effort to clinch the nomination. They are thus strategic in their message, trying to remain ambiguous on their party identification and appeal to voters based on issues and traits. Haynes and Rhine (1998) point out that candidates are strategic in their attack ad behavior as well, arguing that candidates tend to focus on attacking the leaders in an effort to distinguish themselves from the others running. Further, frontrunners typically only attack fellow party contenders when attacked first, choosing to focus a majority of their attack ads on potential general election rivals. This is partly in an effort to solidify their position as frontrunner, as it allows them to look prepared for the next stage of the campaign.

Thus what we see from this literature is that candidates are highly strategic in their behavior. They understand that they have limited resources that need to be allocated wisely in order to successfully win the nomination. Spending, messaging, and advertising have been shown to be the most significant aspects of candidate strategy as they are all parts of the campaign over which the candidate has direct control. Candidates are able to control how much they are spending, what kind of messages they are putting out, and what kind of advertisements are being run. However, what we don't see from this literature is how this strategy is affecting vote choice. Are these

campaign activities actually helping the candidates attract support? The answer is unknown based on this work. We are presented with a picture of the strategic candidate, but we are not told whether or not this strategic behavior is successful. Based on existing research we see that campaigns do have an effect on voters, we just cannot be sure how much of this effect is due to candidate strategy. These campaign effects are the topic of the next section.

The Not-So-Minimal Campaign Effects at the Nomination Stage

Much work has been done concerning the dynamics of presidential nomination campaigns. Most of this work centers around two main theories: momentum and attrition. Aldrich (1980a) and Bartels (1988, 1989) advocate for viewing presidential nominations as hinging on the idea of momentum. Aldrich (1980a) defines momentum as a candidate's increased chances of winning the nomination due to that candidate's performance in previous primaries and caucuses as well as his or her ability to generate resources. The candidate's "competitive standing" is only part of the definition of momentum, Aldrich argues. While success in previous primaries and caucuses does affect a candidate's chances of winning the nomination, he argues that the resources a candidate receives due to these previous wins is also important. The inability to raise funds makes winning the nomination impossible; however, momentum increases a candidate's chances of gaining the resources needed to clinch the nomination.

While Aldrich (1980a) discusses how momentum works at the aggregate level, he does not test how momentum influences individual voters. However, Bartels (1988,

1989, 1993) and Kenney and Rice (1994) do analyze how momentum affects an individual's vote choice. Bartels (1989) points out that the presidential candidates had not always acknowledged the idea of momentum. He writes that Jimmy Carter's campaign strategist recognized the importance of winning early on in the nomination season, as the winner is rewarded with much media attention. This media attention then has a strong effect on an individual's candidate preference (Bartels 1993). By winning earlier primaries, candidates are rewarded with media attention, which exposes them to the public more than if they were not building momentum.

In addition to gaining media attention, an early primary win provides a candidate with a sense of viability. Kenney and Rice (1994) examine the 1988 nomination contest and found that due to psychological effects caused by primary and caucus wins (contagion and inevitability) voters are likely to jump on the bandwagon of the "winning" candidate. Thus, the "winning" candidate is seen as a viable contender for the nomination, which can help quell any fears voters may have to the contrary. In addition, Popkin (1994) argues that momentum can be used as a heuristic for voters. Specifically, he is fearful that the "mindless following of the mob, not reasoned policy preferences, determines who wins the nomination" (Popkin 1994, 117). Through these studies we see how significant the bandwagon effect can be on voters.

Norrander (2000, 2006) is an advocate of viewing presidential nominations as a game of attrition. The attrition game can be viewed as a sort of un-momentum, as it analyzes how candidates fall behind or drop out rather than surge ahead (as depicted by

the theory of momentum). Norrander (2000) analyzes a number of factors that could affect the length of a campaign bid, which include initial candidate assets and characteristics, initial contest outcomes, and structural variables. What she finds is that from the mid-1980s through 2004, the presidential nominations can be seen as games of attrition rather than purely results of candidate momentum. While she does include a measure of momentum in her model—measures for whether a candidate won or lost in Iowa and New Hampshire—she argues that momentum alone does not explain why candidates drop out of the race, leaving only one victor. Rather than just momentum explaining nomination outcomes, she argues that we need to also account for spending levels, candidate characteristics, and structural components of the campaign.

While these scholars clearly lay out the importance of momentum in clinching the nomination, they do not analyze how candidate controlled campaign effects influence candidate preference. Candidates participate in a number of activities in an effort to generate momentum (e.g. advertisements and visits), but we do not understand how these activities affect a voter's decision. There has been minimal work done in an effort to understand how candidate activities affect both voter turnout and vote choice.

Early work on presidential nominations analyzed the effects of candidate spending on voter turnout. Norrander and Smith (1985) and Norrander (1991) find that campaign spending is a significant predictor of voter turnout. Norrander and Smith (1985) argue that to correctly model campaign effects we need to control for the differences between the in-party and out-party. When we do this, we see that spending

is more important for the in-party than the out-party. Norrander (1991), in her analysis of the 1988 primaries, finds that spending was only significant for the Republican nomination, not the Democratic contests. Thus, what we see from these works is that candidate spending has helped increase turnout; however, they only analyze aggregate trends and not how this spending actually affected individual vote choice, leaving us unable to understand how spending is related to candidate preference.

Moran and Fenster (1982) also analyze aggregate turnout effects and find that competition increases turnout because this leads people to believe their vote matters more. In addition to increased competition, they find that an increased number of candidates also increases turnout. Finally, earlier contests have higher turnout than later contests because of their perceived ability to set the tone for the rest of the nomination season. Because early contest wins are important in establishing momentum, candidates campaign heavily in these early contest states. Again, because of the aggregate analysis, we are unable to determine exactly how much these candidate activities are actually affecting individual vote choice.

In addition to the work done on the effects of candidate-controlled activities on turnout, there is also work done telling us how this affects vote choice. In his analysis of the 1976 nomination contests, Grush (1980) argues that campaign spending, past performances, and regional exposure were all significant predictors of vote choice. Thus, what we see from Grush is evidence that spending does affect vote choice. Building off of Grush's (1980) work we find much evidence for the ability of spending to

affect a candidate's outcome. In his comprehensive book on nomination dynamics, Aldrich (1980a) describes the importance of money to a campaign: the more a candidate spends in one state, the better that candidate is expected to do. Ultimately, the candidate who spends the most money should be the winner.

Haynes, Gurian, and Nichols (1997) find results in concurrence with Aldrich (1980a, 1980b). Candidates that spend more than their competitors tend to receive greater vote shares. Specifically, they find that in order to increase his or her vote share by 1 percentage point, a candidate needs to increase spending by 3.3 percentage points relative to other candidates. Further affirmative evidence has been found at the nomination stage concerning spending levels as well (Norrander 1993; Parent, Jillson, and Weber, 1987). Overall, we see that the more a candidate is able to spend on advertisements, the more likely that candidate is to win the nomination. However, the problem with these works is that we are again looking at aggregate analyses. Instead of looking at how these candidate-controlled effects are impacting individual decision-making, we just see that state-level spending affects state-level vote totals. Based on these analyses, we are not able to say precisely how candidate strategy affects candidate preference.


In an effort to better understand individual-level candidate preference, Barker (2005) conducted an experiment to analyze how voters responded to different value frames in candidate rhetoric in the 2000 Republican nomination campaign. The participants in Barker's survey were split into three groups and read a fictional

statement about John McCain. One group received an individualistic frame and one group received an egalitarian frame, with the third group serving as a control. He finds that Republican voters respond more to individualistic frames than egalitarian frames. What we see from Barker's work is that the ability of the candidate to control the message of her advertising is an important aspect of candidate strategy as it can affect the way a voter views that candidate. However, as this is an experiment, we are unable to say what the effects are in an actual election. Thus, while Barker presents us with evidence that candidate-controlled campaign effects can impact vote choice, he is unable to show how much of an effect this has on individual preference.

What we see from the research on candidate strategy and on campaign effects at the nomination stage sets the stage for the rest of this dissertation. Candidates are strategic in their behavior. They have limited resources and time, and want to win their party's nomination. Thus they campaign in a way to gain the largest amount of delegates. They advertise, they visit states, they message through the media, all in an attempt to clinch the nomination. In addition, we see that this campaigning is not for naught. Campaign activities have been shown to increase turnout and affect vote choice. Spending has received the most attention, as this is an aspect of the campaign that is clearly under the control of the candidate. Candidates spend a lot of money throughout the duration of the campaign, especially on advertisements. Looking at Figure 2.1, we can see that the candidates did indeed spend a lot of money on campaign advertisements throughout the 2008 nomination contests. Candidates spent millions of


dollars to run advertisements, so clearly they view them as a useful tool in garnering support for their bid for their party's nomination.

Figure 2.1: Total Amount of Money Spent on Political Advertisements by State for Democrats and Republicans Throughout the Nomination Season



The glaring omission among campaign scholars is the study of candidate visits. Candidates make many visits to states throughout the campaign in hopes to convince citizens to vote for them. Figure 2.2 shows the number of visits made by the Republican and Democratic candidates throughout the nomination competition. While campaign visits seem to be an important part of a campaign—considering candidates’ myriad campaign stops throughout the course of a single campaign—they have received scant attention from scholars interested in campaign effects. Domke and Coe (2010) analyze the idea of “presidential pilgrimages” in an effort to understand how presidents try to appeal to religious groups. They argue that in order to build a sense of fellowship with a religious group, it is helpful to visit both people and places highly associated with that group. This is the same kind of reasoning behind campaign visits. In holding a rally or fundraising event in a state, the candidate is attempting to connect with voters on a more personal level, often relating what they want to do if elected to the happenings in that state.

Figure 2.2: Campaign Visits by State for Democrats and Republicans Throughout the Nomination Season



Given the idea that campaign visits should indeed affect vote choice and mobilization efforts, it is necessary to note that these visits have been largely overlooked by nominations scholars. However, there has been good reason for this omission thus far. The data on campaign visits have been difficult to obtain prior to the 2000s. Again, prior to the 2000s the data on campaign visits was not readily available on various websites as it is today. The data on visits had to come from scouring numerous newspapers and putting together the candidates' itineraries. Instead, campaign expenditure data was used. This data was readily available through the Federal Election Commission's website, because candidates had to report their total expenditures by state every month. These expenditure reports provided the total amount of money a candidate spent in each state each month, but based on the reports, there is no way to disentangle what the money was spent on. These reports include spending on advertisements, visits, campaign offices, among others. Using the expenditure reports clearly allows us to create a comprehensive variable, but it does not allow us to analyze how visits and ads are affecting voters differently. Further, these expenditure reports

are only required of candidates that accept matching funds, but fewer candidates are accepting matching funds since 2000 so these reports are not as representative of candidate strategy as they once were. Thus, we need to be analyzing actual campaign visits and campaign advertisement rates instead of the expenditure reports.

While campaign visits have received little attention from nominations scholars, there is no reason to believe they do not have an effect on a voter's candidate preference. Pulling an example from research done at the general election stage, Shaw (1999) shows us that campaign visits do in fact help sway voters one way or another. He uses panel data from 1988-1996 to show that campaign visits did indeed help undecided voters decide which candidate to support. Research at the nomination stage has mostly focused on how candidates need to be strategic about where they visit. For example, Norrander (1992) examines the number of visits made to the South during the first Super Tuesday vis-à-vis the number of trips made to Iowa and New Hampshire. She compiles the list of visits made to these states by looking through various newspaper accounts. When comparing the number of visits made to the South with those made to Iowa and New Hampshire, she finds that the total number of visits made by both Democrat and Republican candidates to Iowa was 846, while they made 655 trips to New Hampshire, and 837 trips to the South. What this shows is that the strategy used by the candidates was to focus on the early states more than the others. This is demonstrated by the fact that Iowa selected only 2 percent of the delegates and New Hampshire selected 1 percent of the delegates, while the Super Tuesday Southern states selected one-third of

all the delegates. Candidates focused on the first two contests more than any other state. While Norrander does not conduct any extensive analysis of these trips, she is able to demonstrate some strategic planning among candidates through a quick look at the number of visits these states received.

Aldrich (1980a) used the candidates' itineraries to measure how the candidates utilized their time. So, he compiled a list of visits made by the candidates. Using this list, he finds that candidates visited primary states more than caucus states. Further, he finds that the particular states visited most often were a good indicator of battleground status. In addition, he examines the strategy behind the visits made. He states that candidates must select which states to actively compete in. Candidates often estimate how well they believe they will do if they choose to compete in a state's primary or caucus. He points to the example of Ronald Reagan choosing not to compete in New York because he felt his conservative message would not be supported, but choosing to compete in Texas where he felt his conservative platform would be welcomed.

In their examination of the 2008 nomination competition, Ridout, Rottinghaus, and Hosey (2009) find that frontrunners will make more campaign visits to winner-take-all states than do long-shot candidates, supporting their hypothesis that the more delegates a state offers, the more campaign visits that state will receive. Further, they find that frontrunners will be more likely to visit primary states than caucus states, because primary states typically offer more delegates than do caucus states. These results support the findings of Aldrich (1980a). Candidates do act strategically when

choosing which states to actively compete in; however, Ridout et al (2009) argue that the strategy is to campaign actively in states that offer the most delegates. Thus, these authors have provided convincing evidence that candidates are strategic about which states they visit, but have not offered an analysis of how this affects candidate preference.

Why should these campaign visits be further analyzed? Why should we expect campaign visits to have any different effect from other campaign activity, such as advertisements? First, campaign visits are cheaper than advertisements. Visits level the playing field a bit more than advertisements, allowing second-tier candidates a more equal footing when compared to top-tier candidates. Further, second-tier candidates may be more likely to “camp out” in Iowa or New Hampshire in order to increase their name recognition and hopefully make a strong showing in one or both of the first two contests in the nominating season. Because second-tier candidates usually do not have as much money as the top-tier candidates they are less able to campaign in a variety of states; so instead, they focus their time and resources on the early states in an effort to build momentum and use that momentum to propel them to victory. In contrast to the second-tier candidates, top-tier candidates have more money and are thus able to wage a multi-aspect campaign strategy in which they are able to visit many states and run a variety of ads in multiple states. Thus, visits provide us with a different aspect of campaign activity. Visits provide a more equal playing field between top-tier and

second-tier candidates, signifying that ads and visits need to be examined separately as they will most likely have different effects.

Visits will help motivate political activists. Political activists are the most likely voters to attend a campaign visit. While there will be others that attend a stump speech, town hall meeting, or campaign rally, political activists will be there as well. These visits allow voters to get an up-close-and-personal view of the candidate running for the nomination. Political activists are going to attend as many of these visits as possible in an effort to gather as much information about their favored candidate. Further, these activists will do more than just attend a visit. They will also help spread that candidate's message. They will talk to their neighbors, friends, coworkers, and peers. Activists energized about their candidate will talk to as many people as they can to help spread that candidate's message. Thus, we can see that campaign visits can have a two-step effect. The visits may directly cause voters to turn out or vote for a specific candidate, or voters will hear about a candidate from a political activist who was able to attend a visit and be indirectly impacted by the visit.

Not all campaign visits are the same. Some campaign visits involve longer speeches, intended for a national audience. However, most visits are simply the standard stump speech, in which candidates are able to show they care about a state just by conducting the visit. Campaign visits can also be "tarmac campaign stops", where a candidate does not venture too far from a local airport. This allows them to conduct a visit, but take off quickly to make another visit that same day. These visits are useful

when there are multiple primaries on the same day (e.g. Super Tuesday) as they allow candidates to make multiple visits to multiple states in one day (Norrander 1992). In contrast to these visits, there are also visits that are used for fundraising purposes. These visits will most likely attract political activists and voters that are already leaning toward supporting that candidate.

Finally, advertisements are generally considered to be broad-based while visits tend to be more narrow-based. Ads can be tailored for a specific state, but generally speak to broader themes and are less focused than speeches during campaign visits. During a visit, a candidate is able to speak to the specific needs of a state. For example, when holding a rally in Michigan, Romney chose to discuss manufacturing issues, something that is of great importance to the state of Michigan. By doing this, Romney was able to show that he understood the issues Michigan voters care about. Visits allow voters to get a close-up view of the candidates, hear what they have to say, and see how they conduct themselves. Ads are more scripted, while visits are less so, allowing voters to get a better view of a candidate's true character.

Conclusion

What should now be evident is that presidential nomination contests provide scholars a fertile testing ground for campaign effects. In comparison to the general election stage, nomination contests provide a much more unclear, complex picture to voters. Throughout a general election there are two candidates. One of these candidates is a Republican, the other a Democrat. In a more exciting election there may be a third

party candidate who (most likely) does not stand a chance of winning the presidency, but may attract enough voters away from one of the major party candidates to ruin her chances of becoming president¹. Third party candidates aside, general elections are typically two-party affairs. Voters have the choice between a Democrat and a Republican. In nomination elections, this is not the case. When voting in a nomination election, voters choose between multiple candidates of the same party, leaving scholars (and in some cases political pundits) wondering how they have made their choice.

Jerit et al (2006) tell us that there is an information environment surrounding each individual voter. They point out that there are a number of long-term individual-level traits and issues that affect political knowledge. However, voters are constantly bombarded with information from news reports and other forms of mass media. I am hoping to show that this kind of information environment applies not only to political knowledge, but also to campaigns. Each campaign is composed of voters situated in an information environment. These voters have a number of individual-level preferences that make them predisposed to favor one candidate over another; however, these voters are still being bombarded by campaign activities. What I hope to show is that individuals are mobilized and base their vote choice off of the various campaign activities they are exposed to throughout the oftentimes year-long (if not longer)

¹ A quick look through the results of all presidential elections in the United States will show that third party candidates have not fared well against major-party candidates. There are multiple reasons why a third party candidate may do poorly, but they are far beyond the scope of this dissertation.

nomination season. Candidates construct political advertisements and travel around the U.S. visiting the different states all in an effort to attract enough votes to gain a party's nomination. I hope that this dissertation sheds some light on what campaign activities—including campaign visits—help attract these voters.

CHAPTER 3

THE “STRATEGY” OF CAMPAIGN VISITS: WHERE ARE CANDIDATES CAMPAIGNING?

Familiarity is important as a threshold requirement. Candidates must become known to do well at election time. –From Darrell West’s (2010) Air Wars.

People think of expectations as “estimates of electoral potential.” Expectations are affected by (1) thinking more about a candidate; (2) the results of earlier primaries and news about the horse-race aspects of the campaign; and (3) learning more about a candidate. –From Samuel Popkin’s (1994) The Reasoning Voter

Every presidential election cycle brings with it campaign rallies, fundraisers, and stump speeches at various locations throughout the United States. These events provide candidates with a unique ability to campaign for votes at the state level. The candidates are able to appeal to voters based on the concerns of that state. For example, at a campaign rally in St. Joseph, Michigan on January 12, 2008, Mitt Romney discussed the implementation of energy efficiency standards and how it would affect the car manufacturers in Michigan. “If we’re going to have caps, for instance, on CO₂, it shouldn’t just be America with the burden being placed on American jobs and American employers—it should be global. And we’re not gonna say we’re gonna put pressures here on Michigan to make it hard to manufacture cars or anything else for that matter in America and then say to the Chinese, ‘Oh, you just go ahead and build a new coal power plant every week’” (Conroy 2008). What we see from this stump speech from Romney is that he was attempting to appeal to the Michigan voters by relating the issue of energy

efficiency to their state and showing that he understands what is important to the voters in Michigan. Michigan is heavily industrial, making the discussion of energy efficiency and car manufacturing completely relevant to Michigan voters.

In addition to appealing to voters through issues important to them, the visits candidates make to states throughout the span of a campaign accomplish the goals presented by West and Popkin. First, by visiting a state, a candidate is able to increase her familiarity with voters. An important aspect of any campaign is electability, and electability requires familiarity (West 2010). By traveling around a state, a candidate is able to introduce herself to the voters, which is an important aspect to gaining support from voters. Domke and Coe (2010) demonstrate how making “pilgrimages” increases a politician’s support. Their work focuses on visiting people or places of significance for religious groups, but nonetheless provides the necessary logic behind the importance of making state visits. They argue that, “officeholders or candidates can convey a sense of fellowship with a key constituency by visiting people or places that have elevated significance to the group” (Domke and Coe 2010, 75). Thus, when Romney visited Michigan in January 2008 (as discussed in the above example), it was unsurprising that he discussed the importance of manufacturing and energy efficiency in his speech. Manufacturing is a big part of Michigan’s economy and by discussing it during his visit Romney demonstrated that he understood the plight of the Michigan voters. He was thus able to convey “a sense of fellowship” with Michigan residents in his effort to obtain their support at the polls. More importantly, when we look at the 2008 primary

results, we see that Romney won 20 of Michigan's 30 delegates. While this obviously does not show causation, it clearly exemplifies one way in which candidates are able to use state visits to generate a sense of fellowship and potentially use this sense of fellowship to catapult themselves to a victory.

Second, candidate visits allow voters to form expectations about the candidates. As stated by Popkin (1994), there are three aspects to expectations. By making state visits, candidates are making voters think about them. Whether a voter is able to attend a rally or simply hears about the visit via their local newspaper or news program, a voter is provided with a bit of information that makes them think—even briefly—about that candidate. In addition, the information a voter receives concerning a campaign visit provides the basis for that voter learning about the candidate. Thus, state visits throughout the campaign seem to be a good way of increasing electoral support.

Despite the apparent benefits of state visits, campaign scholars have largely ignored them. The goal of this chapter is to determine whether or not candidates were strategic in their campaign visits throughout the 2008 nominating contests. I begin this analysis by first discussing what a visit entails. Because there are a number of reasons a candidate may be in a state, it is important to clearly define what a visit is. Second, I review the scant literature that exists on campaign visits, which is mostly focused on the strategic choices candidates have to make when deciding how to use their resources. Finally, I analyze a series of count models in an effort to determine whether or not the number of delegates available, timing of the contest, format of the contest (either

primary or caucus), front-runner status, or whether or not there are multiple primaries in a single day, affects the number of visits a candidate makes to a state. Once the strategy of campaign visits has been established, I will move to the questions of whether or not these visits affect turnout rate or provide a boost in a candidate's chances of being elected. Those questions will be explored in the following chapters.

What's In a Visit?

Every candidate makes appearances in many states throughout the primary season. Generally, we see candidates visiting states as each state's nominating contest draws near. Thus, at the beginning of the season we see a large number of visits to Iowa and New Hampshire, which host the country's first caucus and primary, respectively. These states are valuable to candidates for a number of reasons, including establishing early momentum, proving viability, and demonstrating electability (Aldrich 1980; Bartels 1988; Brady and Johnston 1987; Buell 1987; Moore 1987). Then, we see candidates focus on the Super Tuesday contests, followed by visits to states with later primaries, until a candidate has won enough delegates to clinch the nomination at the fall convention. While this pattern behind visits makes sense, we still do not know what a visit looks like exactly or why these visits are made in the first place.

A campaign visit is an appearance made by a candidate in a state. Visits come in multiple shapes and sizes and can be conducted for a variety of reasons. Campaign visits include attending a campaign rally, conducting a town hall meeting, hosting a fundraiser, and participating in a debate. For example, On January 4, 2008 we see that

Hilary Clinton attended a party event in Nashua, NH, John Edwards held a town hall meeting in Portsmouth, NH, and Barack Obama held a rally in Concord, NH. Looking at the Republican candidates on the same date, we see that Rudy Giuliani held a town hall meeting in Salem, NH, Ron Paul attended a house party in Merrimack, NH, Mike Huckabee attended a rally in Henniker, NH, and Mitt Romney held a town hall in Manchester, NH. Each of these candidates made appearances in New Hampshire in an attempt to connect with the voters and earn their support when they headed to the polls on January 8, 2008. Each candidate met with voters in different ways, but the reason for the visit was the same for each: to win votes.

A candidate wants to win office. To do this she needs to get more votes than her competitors. In order to defeat her competitors, a candidate needs to provide voters with information. The more information a voter has, the easier it is for that voter to make a decision. It is up to the candidate to provide voters with this information (Aldrich 1993). This information given to the voters is even more important at the primary stage of an election. At the nomination stage there are more candidates competing for the nomination and the candidates competing are members of the same party. This makes deciding which candidate to vote for a more challenging decision for voters. Thus, candidates need to try to inform voters through a variety of means. One of these means is visiting the states, an aspect of campaigning that has been overlooked by most campaign scholars.

By visiting states, candidates are making personal appearances and spending time interacting with the voters. The candidates are introducing themselves to their prospective constituents on their constituent's terms. They leave their office in the Capitol building, White House, or Governor's mansion, and hold rallies at important local landmarks, town hall meetings at local restaurants, or make appearances at local pubs. All of this is done in an effort to connect with the voters and show them that they do, in fact, understand the issues that the voters deem important as well as appreciate local customs.

For example, while campaigning in Pennsylvania, Hillary Clinton made a stop at a local restaurant for a cheese steak, a popular choice among many Pennsylvanians (NPR.org). While this may not seem overly important, it does indeed show voters that a candidate understands the important customs of their state. Eating a cheese steak may not win over thousands of voters, but it does not turn them off either. Take, for example, President Gerald Ford's tamale incident. While visiting the Alamo, President Ford was given a plate of tamales, which he proceeded to eat, without shucking them first, something that anyone familiar with this local cuisine would know not to do. This incident received a fair amount of news coverage, most of it slanted in a way to show that the president did not understand Southwest culture.

Thus, what we see when we look at campaign visits is that they are simply another means by which candidates are able to communicate with voters. They are able to make appearances in states and appeal to voters based on state concerns,

demonstrating they understand the concerns of the people. While these visits come in a variety of forms, the strategy behind the visits is the same: win votes.

The Strategy Behind State Visits

All states are not created equal—at least in terms of value to candidates as they compete for their party’s nomination. Based on prior research, we know that candidates pour more resources into the “big” states and the early states. The big states are those with a large amount of delegates available (e.g. California, New York, and Florida), while the early states are those like Iowa and New Hampshire, which set the pace for the rest of the nomination season (i.e. generate momentum for some candidates while ending the chances of others). The idea that these states receive heavier campaigning than “smaller” and “later” states has been convincingly established by nomination scholars (Bartels 1988; Gurian 1986, 1990; Gurian and Haynes 1993; Norrander 2006; Collingwood et al 2012). However, this strategy has not been applied to state visits. By borrowing from the research done on advertising and reviewing the minimal amount of work done thus far on visits, I lay the groundwork for thinking about the strategy behind campaign visits.

Looking at the literature concerning campaign spending and advertising, there is a copious amount of evidence that candidates are strategic in their behavior. Gurian (1986, 1990, 1993a, 1993b) examines candidate expenditure strategy. He argues that candidates focus their monetary resources in an effort to maximize their delegate counts and momentum. The overall goal of each candidate in a nomination contest is to win

her party's nomination. In order to do that, a candidate needs to win enough delegates. In an effort to maximize their delegate count, candidates spend more money in states that have a larger amount of delegates available. Gurian (1986) finds that as the number of delegates increases, the amount of spending increases by a factor of 0.46. According to Gurian (1993b), candidates spend roughly \$1,734 per delegate.

In addition, candidates are more likely to spend more in states with primaries than in those with caucuses because there are more delegates available in primary states. As well as having fewer delegates, caucuses are much more difficult to figure out than primaries, more difficult to mobilize supporters to participate in, and receive less media attention. The selection of convention delegates is a long process, with these delegates selected at later stages and not at the caucuses that occur on the date of the nomination contest. In his test of spending in primaries versus caucuses, Gurian (1990) differentiates between established and long shot candidates. Established candidates are those that are considered front-runners while long shots are just that, candidates who face a difficult time winning the nomination. With the differentiation between established and long shot candidates, there is a significant difference between their spending behavior in primary and caucus states. Established candidates spend roughly \$2199 per delegate in primary states, while in caucus states they spend only \$885. Long-shot candidates spend only \$746 per delegate in states with primaries, while their spending per delegate in caucus states is not statistically significant from zero. Also, according to Gurian (1993b) candidates spend roughly \$64,164 more in states with primaries than in states

with caucuses. Thus, what we see here is that candidates are driven to spend more based on the amount of delegates up for grabs in each state. Further, this can be affected by the format of delegate selection as candidates spend more in states with primaries than in those with caucuses.

Candidates also spend more in states that are not part of a regional primary. Individual states within regional primaries typically receive less media coverage because the media cannot devote as much time to covering these primaries as they can to states that do not share their primary date with another state (Gurian 1993c; Gurian and Wolfe 1994). This is actually the exact opposite result those that organized the first Super Tuesday event in 1988 had hoped for. Super Tuesday was initially organized in an effort to draw more attention to the concerns of the Southern states. Most Southern states decided to hold their primaries or caucuses on the same day so that the candidates and media would acknowledge the issues that were important to the South (Norrander 1992). However, the plan had adverse effects because the media and candidates could not spend as much time and money campaigning in the states as they would have had the contests been on separate days. Ridout (2004) finds evidence that candidates spend more on ads when the number of states with same-day contests is smaller. In fact, he finds that on Super Tuesday in the 2000 contest, many states received less attention than they would have liked. Georgia, for example, was ignored by all of the candidates from both parties, Minnesota received attention from only Bill Bradley, Al Gore ignored Ohio,

and George Bush ignored the New England states. Thus, what we see here is that regional primaries decrease the amount of resources candidates delegate to these states.

Finally, when we look at the timing of the nomination contest, we see that states with early contests receive more attention and thus spending than do states with later contests. The goal behind spending in early contests is to increase momentum (Aldrich 1980, Bartels 1988). According to the theory of momentum, candidates who are able to win in early contests are able to gain more media attention than candidates who perform poorly in early contests. The “winners” thus end up looking more viable and electable when compared with the “losers,” giving them a boost in support in later races. Based on the evidence available, it is clear that candidates do indeed spend more money in states with early contests (Gurian 1986; Gurian and Haynes 1993; Haynes, Gurian, and Nichols 1997; Ridout 2004).

While this evidence is tied to expenditures, there is little reason to believe the same would not apply to state visits. If a candidate’s goal is to win enough delegates to clinch their party’s nomination, we should expect that candidate to visit states that offer more delegates and states with earlier primaries in an effort to gain momentum. As West (2010) demonstrates, familiarity helps a candidate get elected. The more people who know who a candidate is, the better chances that candidate has of being elected. To increase familiarity and in turn, electability, we should expect candidates to increase their physical presence in the states. Because candidates have a finite amount of resources, they need to be strategic in their utilization of these resources. Thus, we

should expect that the number of delegates available in each contest, the format of the contest (i.e. either primary or caucus), and the timing of the contest (either early or late) should have similar effects on visits as they have been shown to have on spending and advertising.

When we look at the scant research done on campaign visits, we see some support for the idea that visits are strategic. Because visits have been largely ignored, it is helpful to look at the research done at the general election stage of an election as well as the nomination stage. According to the study done by Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson (2004) on the 2000 general election, candidates are more likely to visit larger cities than smaller ones. A reason for this is the fact that by visiting larger cities, candidates are able to gain media exposure (mostly by local media outlets) that expands beyond the city itself. Through this exposure, candidates are able to reach a larger amount of voters than just those that attend the event. By visiting a larger city, candidates are able to reach even more voters because they will garner more media attention than they would have had they visited a smaller city. Thus what we see from this study is that candidates are strategic in terms of trying to get the most exposure as possible from their candidate visits. By visiting larger cities rather than smaller towns, they are able to maximize the amount of exposure they receive from each state visit.

In addition to these findings, Ridout, Rottinghaus, and Hosey (2009) demonstrate that nomination candidates are strategic in their state visit patterns as well. These authors show that the more delegates available in a state, the more visits that state

receives. No matter if the candidate is a frontrunner or a long shot, the number of delegates is a strong predictor of state visits. However, frontrunners do make more visits to winner-take-all states than do long shot candidates. Frontrunners also tend to favor primaries over caucuses, while long shot candidates do not seem to differentiate between the two. Frontrunners thus seem to be more strategic in their state visits than do long-shot candidates. Unsurprisingly, long-shot candidates seem to be trying to get delegates wherever they are available, while frontrunners are able to be more strategic with their resources, thus focusing their visits in states with primaries where more delegates are available. Ridout, Rottinghaus, and Hosey (2009) also find that early states (especially Iowa and New Hampshire) receive more visits than other states, which bolsters the idea that momentum is still an important aspect of nomination campaigns. Finally, these authors demonstrate that frontrunners make more visits than long shot candidates, showing that candidates with more money are able to make more visits than others.

While these results show that candidates are strategic in their visit patterns, they do not speak to the timing of the visits. Are visits more likely to be conducted during the invisible primary period in an effort to fundraise and develop early momentum? Or, do more visits occur during the primary season in an effort of the candidates to increase their delegate totals? These are two distinct phases to the nomination season and there are reasons to believe that candidates will employ different strategies to account for the differences in the two phases. The goal of Ridout, Rottinghaus, and Hosey (2009) was to

compare the strategies of long shot candidates with that of established candidates in terms of how delegate totals, delegate distribution, and primary type affect the number of visits a state receive. While they thoroughly analyze the presidential nomination contests of 2004 and 2008, they fail to question whether or not there are different strategies used by the candidates during the actual primary phase than during the invisible primary period. Clearly candidates have different goals at these two distinct phases of the nomination season and because of this most likely have different strategies. The invisible primary period gives candidates time to fundraise and make a name for themselves, thus attempting to jockey into a strong polling position for the beginning of the actual primary phase (i.e. the Iowa caucuses). In contrast, during the actual primary phase candidates are more focused on obtaining the “magic” number of delegates needed to clinch the nomination. Because of this, I argue that to properly understand the strategy behind campaign visits we need to examine the strategies behind visits conducted during these two separate phases of the presidential nomination season.

Why should we expect the strategy behind the visits to differ between these two phases of the nomination season? The easy answer to this question is that the goals the candidates seek to satisfy are vastly different between the two distinct phases of the election. Throughout the invisible primary phase, candidates are trying to make a name for themselves and raise funds for the entirety of the nomination season. To do this the candidates may be visiting states where they feel their message will be well received.

They need to recruit party activists and fundraise to support their campaign and will most likely seek out help from those they believe will be more inclined to support their campaign. For example, McCain campaigned lightly in Iowa and focused on New Hampshire. He knew his message would be better received in New Hampshire than in Iowa and thus targeted his campaign efforts there. In contrast to the invisible primary season, we should expect to see that throughout the nomination season, campaign visits would most likely be used more as a general publicity tool. Visits will help the candidate spread her message through policy appeals and trying to identify with voters. They will shift away from trying to recruit voters and raise funds and place the focus more on how they will govern. Thus, despite the different strategies behind visits, we should also expect visits to have differing purposes depending on the phase in which the candidate is making the visit.

Visits vs. Ads: Are They Any Different?

While visits and ads are both campaign activities geared at trying to mobilize voters and influence candidate preference, there are a number of distinct differences between these two campaign tools. Candidates face the problem of having only a finite amount of time to campaign and limited resources with which to campaign. So, this means that candidates often become strategic with their campaign activities. Since all candidates face the same time constraints they need to decide which states will receive a visit and which states would be better left unvisited (e.g. Ronald Reagan bypassed campaigning in New York because he knew his message would not be well received

there). Further, they also need to decide in which states — or media markets — it is worth spending the money running advertisements to try to influence voters (e.g. states with large pockets of non-partisan voters). Because some candidates are better fundraisers than others they may not have to worry as much about the cost of advertising.

However, not all candidates are able to raise money easily. These candidates will most likely conduct more visits than advertisements, because visits are cheaper to conduct than advertisements. Therefore, visits tend to be a bit more equal than advertisements.

While advertisements can be run by any candidate at any time, the volume of advertising depends on a candidate's ability to fundraise effectively. Visits, on the other hand, place the candidates on a more equal footing.

What we can see here is that there are clear differences between advertising and visiting. However, is there any difference in strategy between these two campaign activities? The answer here is quite unclear. Most studies of campaign activity to date have used the campaign expenditure data. Candidates were required to report their expenditures by state upon acceptance and receipt of matching funds. However, this data is not available for the 2008 nominating contests because not all candidates accepted matching funds. In fact, most of them rejected this money, as they believed they could raise more on their own and then would not be limited by the laws governing the usage of the matching funds. While the expenditure data clearly made analysis of candidate strategy easy due to the fact that candidates did have to report their expenditures by state, this data also created a number of problems. The main

problem with the expenditure data is that it lumps together a number of different aspects of campaign expenditures: advertising, visits, costs of campaign offices, among others. Thus, this data does not allow us to analyze the different effects these activities may have had on the campaign. While this would allow us to see how spending affects different aspects of the campaign, it does not allow us to look specifically at the effects of advertisements or visits. This data simply gives us a measure of how much a candidate spent in a state and does not tell us exactly what the money was spent on. By using the campaign expenditure data we are unable to detect any differences between visits and ads. Thus, by using my own dataset, I am able to begin examining the strategy behind visits.

As noted above, there is some work focused on the strategy of both campaign advertisements and visits. However, as pointed out parsing out the differing effects of ads and visits has been difficult, as the data on expenditures lumps all campaign activity together to simply give us an idea of how much candidates are spending on campaign activities. This leads us to the question of whether or not ads and visits need to be analyzed separately. While most research points to the fact that candidates are indeed strategic in their campaign activity, candidates are clearly able to determine for themselves what kind of campaigning is most effective and worth their efforts.

As candidates have limited time and resources they need to make choices about when and where to campaign. A further choice they have to make is how to campaign. Do visits affect voters differently than ads? Currently the answer to this question is

unclear. There are a number of studies that show the effect ads have on voters in terms of mobilization and vote choice. There are fewer studies conducted on campaign visits and the findings from these studies give contrasting results. Shaw (1999) tells us that visits increase a candidate's vote share. Johnston et al (2004) tells us that visits actually decrease a candidate's vote share. So, the actual effects of these visits have unclear results.

What does this tell us about a candidate's strategy? It tells us that a candidate has a limited amount of time to campaign and a limited amount of resources with which to campaign. It also tells us that there are a number of options a candidate has to appeal to voters: ads, visits, and media appearances, among others. However, what it does not tell us is the differing effects each of these campaign tools has. So, my goal in this dissertation is to begin to unpack the effects of campaign visits. It is clear that candidates take the time to make numerous visits throughout the length of a campaign, but the effect of these visits is unclear. The goal for the rest of this chapter is to determine the strategy behind campaign visits. The goal for the following chapters is to determine the effect these visits have on voter mobilization and candidate preference.

Data, Hypotheses, and Testing Strategy

Based on the literature discussed above, there are a number of hypotheses I will be testing. *First, I expect that states with higher delegate counts will receive more visits than states with small numbers of delegates.* In order to win the nomination, a candidate needs to win a certain number of delegates, so they will focus their visits on the states with

many delegates available. *I also expect that candidates are going to visit states with primaries more than states with caucuses.* States with primaries typically have more delegates than states with caucuses, leading them to receive more attention than the caucus states. Also, primaries are easier for voters to understand and require a lessened time commitment than do caucuses. *Third, I anticipate that second-tier candidates will make more visits than top-tier candidates.* Visits are cheaper than running television advertisements and second-tier candidates typically have less money than the more established, top-tier candidates, meaning that top-tier candidates should do more advertising while second-tier candidates conduct more visits. *Next, I believe that states that hold their nominating contests on days when other states hold their nominating contests will receive fewer visits than states that hold their contest on a unique day.* When there is a singular contest on one day, candidates will be able to focus on that state instead of having to decide which states to focus on when there are multiple contests on one day.

Additionally, I believe that the timing of the nominating contest will affect the number of visits conducted by the candidates. *I believe that states that hold early nominating contests will receive more visits than states with later contests.* Finally, I believe that the method of delegate allocation will affect the number of visits received by the states for the Republican nominating contests. Winner-take-all states should receive more attention because candidates will not have to split the delegates available to them in these states. This should increase the competition, as the candidates want as many delegates as possible. *So, I hypothesize that the Republican nominating contests that use a*

winner-take-all delegate distribution method will receive more visits than those that use a proportional distribution format. This hypothesis is limited to the Republican contests because all of the Democratic contests use proportional distribution.

While, admittedly, most of these hypotheses have been tested in previous research, I will be looking at them at the different stages of the nomination season. I will be looking to see if these hypotheses are the same for visits conducted during both the invisible primary period and the actual primary period. Throughout the invisible primary period, candidates are trying to win support from voters, raise money, and jockey for a higher position in the polls than their competitors. During the actual primary season the candidates are trying to win primaries and caucuses, actually going head-to-head with their competitors. Due to the different strategies at the different phases of the competition, there is reason to believe that the strategy behind visits is going to change when the candidates have to switch from the invisible primary phase to the actual primary season. So, I will be examining these various hypotheses at these two distinct phases of the nomination season.

The data for the dependent variable (number of visits) come from *The Washington Post's* online candidate tracker. Using this online resource I was able to compile data on candidate visits to the various states throughout the 2008 presidential nominating contests. The data are broken down by date, allowing me to differentiate between the invisible and actual primary seasons. The coding scheme I have used is straightforward. My dataset begins January 1, 2007 and ends at the end of June 2008. Using this large of a

window allows me to capture all visits during the invisible primary season as well as all visits conducted throughout the primary season, up until the very last primary. So, for each day between January 1 through June 30 each state is coded as either a 1 or a 0, depending on whether it received a visit (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). By doing this, I am able to pinpoint exactly where a candidate was on each day of the campaign, giving me a comprehensive listing of visits for these two presidential nominating contests. Thus, when I run my statistical models, no visits data is being left out; instead, all visits are accounted for, allowing me to get a complete picture of where candidates are visiting throughout the primary season and whether or not these visits are strategic.

Further, my unit of analysis is not simply a state. Instead, I am examining each candidate in each state separately (i.e. I have multiple observations for each state). My dependent variable is the number of visits a candidate has made to a state. For example, if we look at Arizona, we see that among the Democrat candidates Barack Obama made two visits, Bill Richardson made three visits, Hillary Clinton made five visits, John Edwards made one visit, and Dennis Kucinich made two visits. The rest of the states are coded the same way, so we have the number of visits made to the states broken down by candidate. So, my dataset is constructed in a way that allows me to analyze the differences between candidates. Not all Republicans or Democrats need to be lumped together. I am able to analyze the differences between the different candidates. To account for the clustering problem clearly found in this data I have run the models with standard errors clustered by candidate.

The data for the independent variables also come from *The Washington Post* website. This website provides the number of delegates available in each state, the list of candidates in the race (needed to determine the long-shot or front runner status of each of the candidates), whether a state has a primary or caucus, as well as a list of primary dates, which tells us whether or not multiple states are holding a primary on the same day. The number of delegates variable is continuous in nature, as it is just a simple count of the number of delegates available in each state. Next, the primary or caucus variable is a simple dichotomous variable, with primaries coded as 1 and caucuses as 0. Whether or not a state has its primary or caucus on the same day as another state is also dichotomous in nature, coded 1 if yes and 0 if no. To account for the different phases of the actual primary season, I have created a 3-point ordinal variable. The early states (those prior to Super Tuesday) are coded 1, Super Tuesday states are coded 2, and all states that hold their nominating contests after Super Tuesday are coded 3. Also, a dichotomous variable was created to account for the different delegate allocation methods used by the Republican Party. States with a winner-take-all allocation method are coded as 1, while those using proportional distribution are coded as 0.

The candidate status variable (whether a candidate is top-tier or a second-tier) is coded similarly to the variable used by Gurian (1986) and Haynes, Gurian, and Nichols (1997). Looking at the financial background of the candidates as well as the media exposure each candidate receives, we are able to determine which candidates are considered top-tier and which are considered second-tier. Top-tier candidates are coded

as 1, while second-tier candidates are coded as 0. Gurian (1986) and Haynes, Gurian, and Nichols (1997) demonstrate that top-tier candidates typically enjoy much more media coverage and have greater fundraising/financial success than second-tier candidates.

To account for both media coverage and financial standings of the candidates I use *The Washington Post's* advertising and media tracker. These two resources available from *The Washington Post's* website track the number of media stories run about the candidates as well as the amount of money each candidate is spending on advertising. While the advertising data is not necessarily a perfect picture of a candidate's financial standing, I argue the more a candidate is willing to spend on advertising gives us a good enough idea of the financial status of each candidate. Candidates who receive a large amount of media coverage and spend large amounts on advertising are thus coded to be top-tier candidates while those candidates who do not receive much media attention and spend little on advertisements are coded to be second-tier. I identify the top-tier Democratic candidates to be Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, while the others are then considered second-tier. For the Republicans, I identify the top-tier candidates as John McCain, Rudy Giuliani, and Mitt Romney, with the rest being considered second-tier. While this coding scheme seems arbitrary, it mirrors the coding scheme used by Ridout, Rottinghaus, and Hosey (2009), whose top-tier candidates are exactly the same as those I have deemed top-tier, with the exception of John Edwards. Edwards was coded as a top-tier candidate by Ridout, Rottinghaus, and Hosey, despite Edwards'

quick withdrawal from the race. However, I argue that Edwards is better classified as a second-tier candidate based on his advertising spending and media coverage.

Finally, I include a control variable for candidate withdrawal. As the nomination season drags on, candidates drop out of the race for various reasons. When candidates drop out they are no longer actively campaigning for their party's nomination. Thus, they end all campaign advertisements, visits, etc. To account for candidates dropping out of the race I construct a withdrawal variable. This variable basically works as a candidate counter. I code a withdrawn candidate as 1 when she suspends her campaign. To account for any residual campaign effects, I count a candidate's campaign as suspended one week after their official campaign suspension announcement. For example, Joe Biden dropped out of the 2008 race on January 3, 2008. However, because he spent time campaigning in New Hampshire prior to the primary I am still able to analyze the effects of this campaigning by including him in the analysis for one week after his actual withdrawal date.

My hypotheses are centered on the idea that visits are strategic and to test these hypotheses I have compiled counts of visits the candidates made to the various states throughout the 2008 nominating season. So, based on the structure of my dataset, count models are an appropriate testing strategy. Count models allow the dependent variable to be a count of how many times an event happens. In my dataset, the event in question is a visit to a state. While the dependent variable in this case does appear continuous, ordinary least squares [OLS] regression cannot be used. OLS regression needs to be

linear and the process underlying the count of visits is not linear. While this is a concern for OLS regression, it can be handled by transforming the data by taking the log of the nonlinear data. However, this cannot be done with these visits data because some states receive no visits. Taking the log of zero is impossible, so count models seem most appropriate for these data. Specifically, I will be using the negative binomial distribution to model these data, as the mean of my data does not equal the variance, a requirement for the Poisson distribution. The negative binomial distribution is used to model the number of times an “event” occurs. In this case, an “event” is a state visit. Further, the negative binomial regression does not make as many assumptions as the Poisson model, the model from which the negative binomial is derived. By using the negative binomial distribution, I am able to account for this overdispersion in the data, without affecting the efficiency of the model or the robustness of the results.

Preliminary Support for Hypotheses

Taking a brief look at the data prior to testing the hypotheses, we can see some preliminary support for my hypotheses. Table 3.1 presents the data for the invisible primary period and Table 3.2 presents the data for the primary season. Looking first at the invisible primary period for the Democrats we see that states with early primaries receive more visits than Super Tuesday states and Super Tuesday states receive more visits than later states. Most Democrat candidates made over 100 visits to states that held their primaries prior to Super Tuesday, with the number of visits to states with

primaries on or after Super Tuesday declining. Next, we can see that primary states generally receive more visits than caucus states. Biden and Dodd both conducted more visits to caucus states than primary states, but 96 of Biden's 103 visits to caucus states were conducted in Iowa alone, as were 82 of Dodd's 92 visits. The rest of the candidates do make more visits to primary states than caucus states. When we compare the number of visits to states with unique primary dates to states that hold their primary on the same day as another state, we see that the former receive more visits than the latter. Only Clinton and Kucinich do not fit this mold.

Finally, when we look at the total number of visits made by the candidates, we see that front-runners make more visits than the long shots. This runs counter to my hypothesis concerning front-runners and long shots, as I hypothesized that long shots would conduct more visits than front-runners because visits are cheaper to conduct than running advertisements. While this preliminary look does not show causation, it does give some pause to this hypothesis. However, it may be that front-runners are able to use their better financial positions to visit as well as advertise.

Turning now to the Republicans during the invisible primary, we see the same patterns emerge as they did for the Democrats. Early states receive more visits than Super Tuesday states and Super Tuesday states receive more visits than later states. In addition, primary states receive more visits than caucus states. The only candidate that does not fit this trend is Tommy Thompson, but all 14 of his visits to caucus states were conducted in Iowa, while his visits to primary states were spread out over three states.

Table 3.1: Number of Visits Made by Primary Type and Timing

	Invisible Primary						
	Early Visits	Super Tues. Visits	Late Visits	Primary Visits	Caucus Visits	Multiple Primaries	Single Primary
<u>Democrats:</u>							
Biden	133	8	18	56	103	23	136
Clinton	128	82	60	190	80	136	134
Dodd	134	17	11	70	92	26	136
Edwards	156	45	44	154	94	88	160
Gravel	26	7	14	41	6	19	28
Kucinich	48	49	34	105	26	76	55
Obama	137	77	48	171	91	118	144
Richardson	102	65	30	115	82	91	106
<u>Republicans:</u>							
Brownback	33	7	4	24	20	19	25
Fred Thompson	33	13	10	43	13	29	27
Gilmore	8	3	5	11	5	8	8
Giuliani	92	57	42	164	27	110	81
Huckabee	108	25	27	116	44	70	90
Hunter	62	6	10	53	25	35	43
McCain	134	89	30	213	40	145	108
Paul	54	17	15	64	22	41	45
Romney	173	80	51	234	70	151	153
Tancredo	79	8	4	46	45	14	77
Tommy Thompson	17	1	2	6	14	3	17

So, while he did make more caucus state visits, he visited more primary states than caucus states. Next, when we look at the number of visits to states with a unique primary date vis-à-vis states that hold their primary on the same day as another state, we can see that states with a unique primary date generally receive more visits. Finally,

Looking at Table 3.2 we see the visits patterns that emerge during the actual primary season. First, I will note that there are a large amount of zeroes in this table. This is due to the fact that many of these candidates have dropped out prior to the beginning of the season. Looking first at the Democratic candidates, we see that the number of visits increases across the timing of the primaries. Early states here are receiving fewer visits, while Super Tuesday states are receiving more yet, while states with late primaries receive the most. This makes sense given the fact that after a state votes there are fewer reasons to visit that state and focus shifts to the later states. Similar to the invisible primary season, primary states receive more visits than caucus states. Also, the states that hold their nominating contest on the same date as another state actually receive more visits than states that hold their contest on a unique date. This can also be explained by the fact that states with a unique contest date are earlier in the nomination season and the focus of the candidates shifts to later states. Finally, when we look at the front-runner candidates compared to the long shots, we see the same pattern emerge as it did during the invisible primary period. The front-runners conduct many more visits than the long shots.

When we look at the Republican candidates we can see similar patterns in their visits. The number of visits to the states increases over the primary season. The early states receive the fewest visits, Super Tuesday states are in the middle and the later states receive the most. Again, this makes sense as the focus of the candidates shifts throughout the primary season. They focus on states as their contests draw near. So, the

earlier states receive very few visits after they have voted, while the visits to the later states increase because they have yet to vote. Looking at states with primaries, we see they receive more visits than states with caucuses. This is to be expected because there are more delegates available in these states. When we compare states with a unique contest date to those that hold their contest on the same day as another state, we see that the latter actually receive more visits than the former. Finally, when we look at top-tier vis-à-vis second-tier candidates we see that top-tier candidates again out-visit the second-tier candidates.

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the states, the number of delegates they have to offer and the number of visits they received throughout both the invisible primary period and the actual primary season for the Democratic and Republican candidates, respectively. These are here to demonstrate that it does appear that states with more delegates available do indeed receive more visits. For example, when we look at the Democratic visits, we see that California has 441 delegates available, Illinois has 185, and Pennsylvania has 188. California received 104 visits during the invisible primary period and 21 during the actual primary season. Illinois received 48 during the invisible period and eight during the actual season, while Pennsylvania received 21 during the invisible period and 41 during the actual season. Compare this to Alaska, Vermont, and South Dakota with 18, 23, and 23 delegates available respectively. In the invisible primary period, Alaska and South Dakota received zero visits, while Vermont received only two. During the actual season, Alaska and Vermont received zero visits while South Dakota

received nine. These demonstrate some drastic differences based on the number of delegates available.

A similar pattern emerges when we examine the Republican data in Table 3.4. Looking at California, Florida, and Texas, we see that each of these states had 173, 57, and 140 delegates available, respectively. California received 79 visits during the invisible primary period and 16 during the actual primary season. Florida received 108 visits during the invisible period and 51 during the primary season, while Texas received 48 visits throughout the invisible primary and 19 during the primary season. When we compare these to Delaware, Vermont, and Wyoming with 18, 17, and 14 delegates respectively, we see again some drastic differences in visits received. Delaware and Vermont each received two visits during the invisible primary period while Wyoming received six. During the actual primary season, Delaware and Wyoming received zero visits, while Vermont received one.

While none of this anecdotal evidence shows causation, it sets up nicely the hypotheses. The raw data do seem to back up the hypotheses developed based on the current literature on campaign strategies and visits. The testing of these hypotheses is the purpose of the remainder of this chapter.

Table 3.3: Number of Visits Made by Democratic Candidates Compared To Available Delegates

<u>State</u>	<u>Number of Delegates</u>	<u>Invisible Primary Visits</u>	<u>Primary Season Visits</u>
Alabama	60	6	2
Alaska	18	0	0
Arizona	67	9	4
Arkansas	47	5	1
California	441	104	21
Colorado	71	11	3
Connecticut	60	11	5
Delaware	23	7	2
DC	37	114	25
Florida	105.5	47	5
Georgia	103	14	4
Hawaii	29	2	0
Idaho	23	1	1
Illinois	185	48	8
Indiana	85	0	35
Iowa	57	444	4
Kansas	41	0	1
Kentucky	60	5	9
Louisiana	66	13	2
Maine	34	4	4
Maryland	99	6	4
Massachusetts	121	19	3
Michigan	78.5	18	7
Minnesota	88	5	4
Mississippi	40	3	4
Missouri	88	14	7
Montana	24	1	6
Nebraska	31	3	2
Nevada	33	78	17
New Hampshire	30	205	19
New Jersey	127	8	3
New Mexico	38	15	2
New York	281	60	11
North Carolina	134	11	30
North Dakota	21	0	2
Ohio	161	18	24
Oklahoma	47	5	3
Oregon	65	7	10
Pennsylvania	188	21	41
Rhode Island	32	1	1
South Carolina	54	63	20
South Dakota	23	0	9
Tennessee	85	5	2
Texas	228	17	23
Utah	29	3	1
Vermont	23	2	0
Virginia	101	11	8
Washington	97	9	4
West Virginia	39	3	9
Wisconsin	92	5	8
Wyoming	18	2	3

Table 3.4: Number of Visits Made by Republican Candidates Compared to Available Delegates

<u>State</u>	<u>Number of Delegates</u>	<u>Invisible Primary Visits</u>	<u>Primary Season Visits</u>
Alabama	48	9	3
Alaska	29	0	1
Arizona	53	18	5
Arkansas	34	11	7
California	173	79	16
Colorado	46	8	4
Connecticut	30	6	3
Delaware	18	2	0
DC	19	72	12
Florida	57	108	51
Georgia	72	13	6
Hawaii	20	0	0
Idaho	32	3	0
Illinois	70	25	4
Indiana	57	9	1
Iowa	40	272	3
Kansas	39	0	3
Kentucky	45	0	1
Louisiana	47	7	3
Maine	21	1	1
Maryland	37	10	5
Massachusetts	43	20	3
Michigan	30	53	15
Minnesota	41	3	3
Mississippi	39	4	1
Missouri	58	18	8
Montana	25	1	1
Nebraska	33	0	0
Nevada	34	25	4
New Hampshire	12	212	20
New Jersey	52	7	3
New Mexico	32	0	0
New York	101	39	6
North Carolina	69	7	2
North Dakota	26	3	0
Ohio	88	8	9
Oklahoma	41	11	2
Oregon	30	4	1
Pennsylvania	74	15	6
Rhode Island	20	1	2
South Carolina	33	116	22
South Dakota	24	1	0
Tennessee	55	5	5
Texas	140	48	19
Utah	36	8	1
Vermont	17	2	1
Virginia	63	18	7
Washington	40	4	4
West Virginia	30	2	2
Wisconsin	40	5	9
Wyoming	14	6	0

Results

Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the results from a negative binomial regression. As these models do include multiple candidates across the 50 states and Washington, D.C., I have taken into account the possible clustering in the data by clustering the standard errors by candidate. Most of the variables included in the model are state-specific, so clustering on the candidates will account for any unexplained variance across the different candidates². The models are also separated by party to look at the differences between the Democrats and Republicans in terms of their visit patterns.

The 2008 Democratic Candidates

Looking at Table 3.5 we can see the results for the 2008 Democratic candidates in both the invisible primary and the actual primary season. Looking first at the invisible primary results, we can see that most of my hypotheses are confirmed. Only two hypotheses were not confirmed: the type of contest and top-tier status did not have an effect on candidate visits in the invisible primary phase. Throughout the invisible primary, whether a state held a primary or caucus did not affect the number of visits that state received and neither did a candidate's top-tier status. I anticipated second-tier candidates making more visits than top-tier candidates because they are cheaper than advertisements; however, this appears not to be the case. In fact, throughout the

² I also clustered the standard errors by state, but there was no significant difference between the coefficients or their standard errors with or without the clustering by state.

invisible primary period, top-tier status does not affect the number of visits being made to the states in any way. Throughout the invisible primary period, candidates are trying to make a name for themselves and raise funds, so no matter what status a candidate has (top-tier or second-tier) the number of visits is not affected. In contrast to these variables, a state's delegate count, the timing of the primary, and whether or not a state's primary was held on the same day as a different state were all significant predictors of visits.

The state's delegate count was a positive predictor of visits. What we see from Table 3.5 is that per unit increase in a state's delegate count a candidate increases their number of visits to that state by 0.4%. This tells us that for each additional delegate a state has, that state is likely to receive 0.4% more visits from a candidate. States with large delegate counts are attractive to candidates. Even in the invisible primary phase, candidates target these states because of the value these states have in the actual primary phase.

In contrast to the above results, the timing of a primary and whether a state has a primary on the same day as another state actually decrease the number of visits candidates make to the state. Perhaps unsurprisingly, candidates make more visits to states that come early in the primary season. As candidates are needing to do well in the early states to demonstrate electability and viability, it is clear that they do indeed make more visits to these earlier states throughout the invisible primary period in an effort to best position themselves for the actual primary contests beginning in January.

Table 3.5: Results from Negative Binomial Regression for 2008 Democratic Candidates

	Invisible Primary Visits		Primary Season Visits	
	Coefficient	Percent Change	Coefficient	Percent Change
Delegate Count	0.004*** -0.001	0.4	0.005** -0.002	0.5
Primary Timing	-0.660*** -0.108	-48.3	0.586** -0.22	79.7
Type of Contest	0.344 -0.194	41.1	0.864*** -0.191	137.3
Front Runner	0.606 -0.395	83.3	2.208*** -0.61	809.8
Multiple Primaries	-1.250*** -0.276	-71.3	-1.283*** -0.363	-72.3
Candidate Withdrawal	-0.297 -0.474	-25.7	-3.824*** -1.163	-97.8
Constant	2.540*** -0.393		-2.696*** -0.688	
N	408		408	

Note: * denotes $p < 0.05$; ** denotes $p < 0.01$; *** denotes $p < 0.001$
Standard Errors clustered by candidate

Specifically, we see that per unit increase in the timing, there is a 48.3% decrease in visits. So, states prior to Super Tuesday will receive the most visits, while states after Super Tuesday will receive much fewer visits in comparison. Finally, when we look at states that hold primaries on the same day as another state, we see that these states receive fewer visits than states that hold their primary on a unique date. Specifically, there is about a 71% decrease in the number of visits these states receive. What this tells us is that it is difficult for candidates to make visits to these multiple states, as candidates do have a limited amount of time in which to make these visits.

Turning now to the actual primary season, we see that there are a few hypotheses that change from the invisible primary period. The delegate count and having multiple primaries in a day are still significant and in the same direction as they were during the invisible primary period. However, the timing of the primary is now significant in the opposite direction and the type of contest, top-tier status, and candidate withdrawal are now important.

The delegate count seems to still be driving visits in a positive direction, and a bit more strongly than during the invisible primary period. What we see in terms of the delegate count variable is that per unit increase in the size of a state's delegation the number of visits increases by a factor of 0.5%. So, for each additional delegate a state has to offer, the number of visits received by that state would increase by 0.5%. In addition, we see that top-tier status now matters throughout the actual primary season. In 2008, we saw top-tier candidates make 810% more visits than long shots throughout the

primary season. This large number is probably due to the fact that second-tier candidates drop out over the course of the campaign, leaving the top-tier candidates in the race longer, enabling them to make many more visits than their second-tier counterparts. In fact, this Democratic primary race went until early June with only two candidates in the race for months, each accumulating a large amount of visits, with the second-tier candidates who dropped out months before June making no visits. Top-tier candidates are most likely making more visits because they are trying to maintain their top-tier status as well as increase their delegate counts.

States that had their primary on the same day as another state received fewer visits than states that held their primary on a unique date, just as they did during the invisible primary period. These states received about 72% fewer visits than states that held their primaries on a unique date. This is due to the fact that candidates cannot focus their resources on two or more states equally. Because of time constraints they need to pick between states and devote more resources to the state(s) they feel will most help them win the nomination.

Finally we look at the timing of the primary and the type of contest during the primary season. What we see is that the timing of the primary is now affecting the number of visits received by the states. Most of the early states received a large amount of visits throughout the invisible primary period, and focus shifts to the later states as the campaign goes on. This explains why the coefficient is positive at this stage. It was negative at the invisible primary stage but did not attain significance. At that stage,

focus was on the early states in an effort by candidates to start strong and gain momentum. But now, during the actual primary period, focus shifts to Super Tuesday and beyond.

A final change from the invisible primary period to the actual primary season is that the type of contest now matters. Throughout the invisible primary, whether or not a state held a primary or caucus did not affect the number of visits that state received. However, throughout the primary season, states with primaries received roughly 137% more visits than states with caucuses. As the primary season continues, the focus of the campaigns becomes acquiring the “magic” number of delegates needed to clinch the party’s nomination. States with primaries typically have more delegates than states with caucuses, so it makes sense that candidates tend to focus more on the states with more delegates available as they try to wrap up the nominating season and become the party’s nominee.

Finally, we see that the candidate withdrawal variable is also significant at this stage of the nomination contest. It is significant in the negative direction and decreases visits at a value of roughly 98%. What this tells us is that as candidates withdraw, we see fewer visits conducted. As the nomination season continues, candidates lose momentum, perform poorly in primaries and caucuses, and thus drop out of the race. Due to this, we see a drop in overall visits by Democratic candidates.

The 2008 Republican Candidates

Turning now to Table 3.6, we can see the results for the 2008 Republican candidates for both the invisible primary period and the primary season. I turn first to the invisible primary period and then to the primary season. When we look at the invisible primary season, most of my hypotheses are again confirmed. A state's delegate count, the type of contest, and winner-take-all delegate distribution method positively affect the number of visits, while the timing of the primary and having a primary on the same day as another state negatively affect the number of visits made to a state. The only hypothesis not confirmed is that concerning top-tier and second-tier candidates. Republican top-tier candidates were more likely to make visits than second-tier candidates. Again, I had anticipated second-tier candidates making more visits than top-tier candidates due to the fact that visits are cheaper than most other campaign activities. However, top-tier candidates appear to make many more visits than second-tier candidates, as they were about 205% more likely to make visits to the various states than were the second-tier candidates. Despite the fact that visits are cheaper and should be more attractive to second-tier candidates, it appears that top-tier candidates are able to use their greater financial position to out-visit as well as out-advertise the second-tier candidates.

Table 3.6: Results from Negative Binomial Regression for 2008 Republican Candidates

	Invisible Primary Visits		Primary Season Visits	
	Coefficient	Percent Change	Coefficient	Percent Change
Delegate Count	0.013*** -0.001	1.3	0.010*** -0.002	1
Primary Timing	-0.697*** -0.128	-50.2	-0.106 -0.114	-10.1
Type of Contest	0.690*** -0.188	99.4	0.832** -0.299	129.8
Front Runner	1.116*** -0.232	205.3	0.846* -0.431	133
Multiple Primaries	-1.430*** -0.162	-76.1	-0.660* -0.337	-48.1
Candidate Withdrawal	-1.302*** -0.302	-72.8	-4.551*** -0.769	-98.9
WTA Allocation	0.648*** -0.127	91.2	0.339 -0.216	40.4
Constant	1.736*** -0.295		-0.937* -0.401	
N	561		561	

Note: * denotes $p < 0.05$; ** denotes $p < 0.01$; *** denotes $p < 0.001$
Standard Errors clustered by candidate

The positive predictors for visits during the invisible primary period are a state's delegate count, the type of contest, and the winner-take-all delegate distribution. Per unit increase in a state's delegate count, the number of visits a state receives increases by about 1.3%. This tells us that for each additional delegate available in a state, the number of visits a state receives will increase by just over 1% demonstrating the importance of delegates, even in the invisible primary period. The type of contest a state has also affects the number of visits a candidate makes to the various states. If a state has a primary, they are more likely to receive a visit than a state that holds a caucus instead. Specifically, if a state holds a primary rather than a caucus the number of visits a state receives increases by a factor of almost 100%. States that hold primaries generally have more delegates than states with caucuses, so they are more likely to get attention because candidates need delegates to win their party's nomination. Primaries also have the benefit that they are more easily understood by the voters and require a lesser time commitment than do caucuses.

Finally, the winner-take-all delegate distribution method used in some of the Republican primaries increases the number of visits a state receives. In particular, we see that states with winner-take-all distribution methods actually receive roughly 91% more visits than states with proportional delegate distribution. Winner-take-all distribution drives up competition in the state, as candidates that come in second or third place will not win any delegates no matter how close they may be to the first place

finisher. So, winner-take-all states receive more visits because there is more competition over the delegates available in those states.

The negative predictors for visits during the invisible primary period are the timing of the primary and whether or not a state has a primary on the same day as another state. Both of these predictors show that states with early primaries are more likely to receive visits, as are states with a unique primary date. States that hold primaries on Super Tuesday will receive 63% fewer visits than states prior to Super Tuesday and states after Super Tuesday will receive 63% fewer visits than states that hold their primary or caucus on Super Tuesday. Candidates are trying to make a name for themselves and win the nomination. To do this, they want to show their electability and viability and establish momentum by winning early. So, it should come as no surprise that these candidates are visiting these early states more than states that hold their nominating contest later in the season. Some contests are over after Super Tuesday, making states that hold their contests after Super Tuesday irrelevant to the nomination process.

States that hold their primary or caucus on the same day as another state will receive about 76% fewer visits than states that hold their nominating contest on a unique day. When states hold their nominating contest on the same day as another state, it makes candidates choose among the various states how much time she would like to spend in each state. So, by holding a nominating contest on a day which has no other contest scheduled, a state will increase their chances of receiving attention from the

candidates. As demonstrated here, candidates are indeed more likely to visit states that hold their nominating contests on a unique date rather than a date on which another state has already scheduled a contest.

Finally, we see that the candidate withdrawal variable is significant in the negative direction. The Republicans had three candidates (Sam Brownback, James Gilmore, and Tommy Thompson) withdraw from the nomination contests prior to any of the primaries or caucuses. Because of this, we see that these withdrawals in the invisible primary period decreased the number of visits by a factor of roughly 73%.

Turning now to the primary season, we see some changes, but most of the patterns from the invisible primary still hold true. The only changes are that winner-take-all delegate allocation and the timing of a state's primary are no longer significant predictors of receiving a visit. The direction of these predictors is the same, but they have lost their significance. So, having an early primary or winner-take-all delegate allocation does not help any state receive a visit once the primary season has officially begun. It is only during the invisible primary season—for the Republicans in 2008 at least—that we see these predictors having an effect on the number of visits conducted by the candidates.

The effect of having multiple primaries on the same day is still significant in the negative direction, as it was in the invisible primary period. When a state has a contest on the same day as another state it decreases that state's chances of receiving a visit by a factor of roughly 48%. When there is more than one contest on a single day, candidates

are forced to choose between states, thus making candidates campaign in some states and ignore others.

When we look at the positive predictors for the Republicans throughout the primary season, we see that the same patterns emerge from the invisible primary period. Overall, these results show us that candidates are driven by the amount of delegates up for grabs in the states. The candidates want to be their party's nominee and to do that they need delegates. So, a state's delegate count, the type of contest, and front-runner status—all of which can be tied to higher numbers of delegates—increase the odds of a state receiving a visit.

Per unit increase in delegate count, the number of visits a state receives increases by 1%. If a state holds a primary rather than a caucus, the number of visits that state receives increase by 130%. Primaries generally have more delegates and are less time consuming than caucuses, which seems to be the driving force behind this increased number of visits to these states. Finally, top-tier candidates still make more visits than second-tier candidates. Just like in the invisible primary period and similarly to the Democrats, the top-tier candidates seem to be able to make more visits to the states than their second-tier counterparts. In fact, top-tier candidates make roughly 133% more visits than second-tier candidates throughout the primary season. Again, this may be due to the fact that top-tier candidates stay in the race longer than second-tier candidates. By staying in the race longer, top-tier candidates are able to make more visits. Or, it could be simply that top-tier candidates have more money and are able to

more easily afford to make the visits, despite the fact that visits are cheaper than advertisements. Regardless, it is clear that top-tier candidates are able to make more visits than their second-tier opponents.

Finally, candidate withdrawal is again a significant predictor of campaign visits to the states. As the nominating season goes on, the number of candidates dwindles. Looking at the withdrawal variable, we see that as candidates withdraw, the number of visits made drops by roughly 99%.

Conclusion

In this chapter I demonstrated the patterns and strategy behind the visits candidates make throughout the invisible and actual primary season. These visits the candidates make have been largely overlooked and understudied. Shaw (1999) examines the effect of visits and advertisements on vote choice and Ridout, Rottinghaus, and Hosey (2009) examine the strategy behind campaign visits, but neither of these articles differentiates between the invisible and actual primary seasons. They both just include the total number of visits made to each state by each party. However, as I have shown, there are different patterns that emerge when we separate out the visits by the two different stages. While there are some overlapping factors, there are indeed some differences between the invisible and actual primary stages that emerge from these data. As demonstrated in this chapter, there are different strategies behind the campaigns during the invisible primary stage than there are during the actual primary stage.

Looking at the work done by Ridout, Rottinghaus, and Hosey (2009) we see that visits are strategic during the presidential nominating contests. However, what we do not see is that the strategy changes at the end of the invisible primary period. The strategy of the campaign changes at this point, thus making the strategy behind campaign visits also change. This is important to note, as it signals a change in campaign strategy. Throughout the invisible primary, candidates are trying to raise the necessary funds to run their party's nomination and garner as much media attention as possible in order to make a name for themselves and gain as good of a poll standing as they can. In contrast, throughout the actual primary phase, candidates are focused on getting the necessary number of delegates needed to clinch the nomination. Instead of publicizing themselves, candidates are trying to publicize their success to date. They are more focused on winning the nomination and less on gaining a good poll position.

This chapter has explored the number of visits made throughout the invisible primary period as well as those made throughout the actual primary season in an effort to determine what matters, what does not, and whether any sort of strategy can be deduced from these visits made by the candidates. So, what matters? Clearly the number of delegates available in each state, and whether or not multiple states have contests on the same day are the major predictors of visits. States with more delegates available receive more visits. Candidates seem to be driven by delegate counts. Delegates are needed to win a party's nomination and candidates want to accumulate as many as possible as quickly as possible in an effort to win the nomination. Also, states

that hold their primary on a unique day have been shown to get more visits than states that have their primary on the same day as a different state. Candidates are able to devote more time and attention to states that hold their primaries on a unique day because they do not have to compete in multiple states at the same time. When a state has a primary on the same day as another, the candidates are forced to divide their time among the states. Thus, what we see throughout the invisible and actual primary period is that states with large delegate counts and states with a unique contest date are more likely to receive visits than their counterparts. Both of these variables have been shown to be significant for Republicans and Democrats in both the invisible and actual primary seasons, demonstrating their importance in predicting visits, no matter the phase of the nomination season.

Looking solely at the invisible primary, in addition to the above-mentioned variables, the timing of the nominating contest is important. Throughout the invisible primary period, states with early primaries get more attention from the candidates. The earlier a state schedules its primary or caucus, the more attention that state receives. This makes sense given the fact that early primaries help a candidate further solidify their viability and electability, as well as develop momentum which they hope will carry them to the nomination. Candidates are trying to establish name recognition and raise funds throughout the invisible primary period. If they can do this, they try to use this recognition and fund raising to provide momentum to propel future wins.

Turning now to the actual primary season, the type of contest and top-tier status aid in predicting the number of visits a state receives. States with primaries are more likely to receive campaign visits than states with caucuses. Primaries often carry with them more delegates than caucuses and are less time consuming for voters, explaining why primary states receive more visits than caucus states. In addition, top-tier candidates make more visits than second-tier candidates. Top-tier candidates typically have more resources at their disposal than their second-tier adversaries, which appear to make it easier for them to conduct visits. They are more easily able to fundraise, as they do not have to demonstrate viability and electability. If they do, this is done more easily for top-tier candidates than it is for second-tier candidates.

Now that we can see the strategy behind these visits, we can turn to examining the effect these visits have throughout the campaign, specifically mobilization efforts and candidate preference. The effect of campaign visits on mobilization is the focus of the next chapter and vote choice is the focus of the following chapter. Both of these are important aspects of campaigns and it is unclear the effect visits have on each.

CHAPTER 4

CAMPAIGN VISITS AS MOBILIZER?

Political participation is the product of strategic interactions of citizens and leaders. Few people spontaneously take an active part in public affairs. Rather, they participate when politicians, political parties, interest groups, and activists persuade them to get involved.
– Rosenstone and Hansen (2003, 228)

Campaign mobilization is important. Without mobilization, voters stay home on election day; they do not show up at the polls to support a candidate and they fail to take part in political activities. Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) point to a paradox in American political participation. Turnout in American elections has declined since the 1960s. Fewer and fewer people are showing up to participate in elections. However, education has increased steadily since the 1960s. Increased education usually implies increased turnout, but this is not what we are seeing. So, why do we see this pattern? The answer provided by Rosenstone and Hansen is mobilization efforts have declined since the 1960s. In order to get people to turnout, candidates need to mobilize them. To understand turnout, we need to look at mobilization efforts.

In what ways do candidates mobilize voters? They use advertisements, grass roots efforts, media appeals, and campaign visits. The more information a candidate can provide to a voter, the easier it is for that voter to choose between candidates, go to the polls, and vote. The effects of some of these mobilization efforts are well understood.

The effect of campaign visits on turnout rates is understudied. In fact, very few studies have been conducted looking at the effect of campaign visits on turnout rates

(Jones 1998; Shaw 1999a; 1999b). It is unclear what effect, if any, campaign visits have on voter mobilization, especially at the nomination stage of a presidential election. As established in the previous chapter, the visits candidates make to the states are strategic. They focus on the “big” states, and those that have an early primary. Candidates are trying to build momentum and attract voters to support them. However, candidates need these voters to turn out at the polls. They need voters to not ignore the political advertisements or tune out the media report about their recent activity on the evening news. Candidates need voters to show up at the polls and vote.

One way I argue candidates effectively mobilize voters is through campaign visits. Visiting a state allows a candidate to speak specifically to the voters of that state. A visit allows candidates the opportunity to more personally connect with voters. Campaign advertisements are mass appeals aimed at a larger audience, generally loaded with broad themes and messages. While candidates are able to be more personal in nomination advertisements, as these campaigns are waged at the state—rather than national—level, the ads run are still used to express major themes, speak against opposition candidates, as well as discuss personal qualities of each candidate (West 2008; 2012). For example, one of Hillary Clinton’s campaign advertisements from the 2008 Democratic nomination contest asks voters which candidate they would prefer answer the phone that is ringing in the White House at 3:00 a.m. (Montopoli 2008). The ad is supposed to leave the viewer with the sense that Hillary Clinton has the experience and knowledge required to respond to our country’s needs at all times, whereas Barack

Obama is still unprepared. Clinton is ready; Obama is not. However, the ad does not explain why Clinton is more prepared than Obama.

This is a major problem with political ads. These ads generally are 30 seconds to one minute in length and so do not have time to go into detail on the specifics of the candidate's issue positions. Ads need to be short and persuasive. However, with campaign visits, candidates are able to be more specific about how they plan to handle issues. During a visit Clinton could describe why voters should want her answering the White House phone at 3:00 a.m. instead of Obama. She is giving a speech to a group of supporters and has the time to elaborate on her ideas and stances on the issues. This is why I argue campaign visits are effective mobilizing tools. By conducting a campaign visit candidates are able to persuade voters as well as inform them. Candidates are able to talk at length about where they stand on the issues, what kind of leader they will be, and why voters should support them over their opponents. In addition, visits could have an indirect effect on mobilization as well. We should expect that mostly partisan activists would attend a campaign visit, as those that attend will have a high interest in the campaign and/or candidate. These attendees will likely talk to friends, coworkers, and peers about the visit and encourage others to support their favorite candidate. Thus, we could see a "two-step" effect on mobilization with visits having a direct as well as indirect impact on the turnout rate.

Furthermore, campaign visits allow candidates to make more personal appeals to voters than ads or media spots allow. For example, at a campaign rally in Ladson, South

Carolina, Fred Thompson reassured a voter — who was frightened by the idea of a Rudy Giuliani presidency — that he was “just a Tennessee boy” who best understood the implications of gun control (Davenport 2007). Thompson attended the Land of Sky Gun Show prior to his rally to show his support for the 2nd Amendment and the right to bear arms. He made the case that Giuliani was not a true Republican with respect to the issue of gun control. In fact, he states that prior to running for president, Giuliani “never met a gun-control bill he didn’t like.” While Thompson’s campaign fizzled shortly after the South Carolina primary, Thompson’s discussion of gun control at his rally emphasizes the importance of state visits. During these visits, candidates are able to more personally connect with voters. They are able to discuss the issues that these voters care most about. For this group of voters, it was gun control. So, Thompson discussed his views on gun control. State visits help voters get a glimpse of the candidate, not only an up-close-and-personal look at the candidate, but also a hint of what they stand for.

As Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) argue, voters participate when they are persuaded to get involved. This is what I argue campaign visits do. Campaign visits allow voters to see the presidential candidate and listen to his or her message. They allow the candidates to focus on specific issues important to their voters and make a personal appeal for their support. Visits allow candidates and voters to interact. I argue throughout the rest of this chapter that visits are an effective mobilizing tool because of this interaction between voter and candidate. This interaction provided by a visit should prove to be an effective means of voter mobilization.

Literature Review

There is a vast amount of extant research concerning voter turnout, in both nominating contests and general elections. The early studies of voting behavior use in-depth interviewing to begin to understand why citizens participate in elections. The Columbia voting studies examined the sociological context of vote choice. Lazarsfeld et al (1944) explore voting behavior in Eerie County, Ohio while Berelson et al (1954) analyze behavior in Elmira, New York. Both of these early studies find that personal contacts and a voter's sociological surroundings actually affect voting behavior more than media and campaign effects. People prefer to surround themselves with people who think similarly to them, so it makes sense that personal contacts (e.g. talking politics with neighbors, family members, or coworkers) help influence voting behavior more than the media or campaign effects. It is because of the personal context in which the voter is situated that she participates in elections. An individual's sociological context determines whether or not that individual will participate in the upcoming election.

In contrast to these early Columbia studies is *The American Voter*, the leading work on voting behavior out of the Michigan school of thought. In this book, Campbell et al (1960) argue that it is not simply an individual's sociological context that affects voting behavior, but the voter's psychological attachment to one of the political parties. While they do not minimize the effect of a voter's sociological environment, they argue that this environment is responsible for the voter's psychological attachment to either the Democrats or Republicans. In fact, they acknowledge the role political socialization

plays in a voter's choice of political party. As a child grows up that child learns about political ideology from her family, educators, peers, and employers. All of this leads a child to psychologically attach to a political party, an attachment that is not easily broken. Thus, the Michigan studies argue that people vote because of their attachment to a political party.

Further, Campbell et al (1960) point out that civic attitudes are also linked with participation. Their social-psychological model emphasizes the role of attitudes (formed by political socialization) in influencing participation. They point out that an individual's interest, involvement, sense of political efficacy, and sense of citizen duty have a direct correlation with participation. As these traits increase, so does participation. So, the more interested and involved an individual is in politics, the greater their participation. Also, as an individual's sense of political efficacy and citizen duty increase, so does their participation. These civic attitudes are a result of the individual's political socialization and psychological attachment to a political party.

While these studies were being concluded, Anthony Downs explores the question of why people do not participate. The United States' voter turnout rate is much lower than a number of other democratic countries. So, Downs (1957) develops a rational choice model of vote choice to try to determine why people in the U.S. are not turning out at the polls. What Downs finds is that voters weigh the costs accrued by participating in an election with the benefits they would receive from participating in

the election if their preferred candidate wins. For most voters the costs do not outweigh the benefits so they do not participate; most voters deem voting too costly.

While Downs found an explanation to why some people will not vote, it also raises the question of why we still see people participating in elections. Much work has since been done to more fully understand why people participate. Some scholars point to the fact that Downs' model was too restrictive (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974; Fiorina 1981; Aldrich 1993). For example, had Downs broadened his model enough to include an individual voter's evaluation of democracy (i.e. a "D term") his model would be a lot more accurate at predicting voter turnout (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Aldrich 1993). The D term is defined as how a voter evaluates democracy. How important is democracy to the voter? Is it imperative that democracy be preserved? A voter that does place a high value on democracy will be more likely to vote because of this.

Aldrich (1993) actually defends the rational choice theories of voting behavior. He argues that the D term is just too narrowly defined. In fact, what Aldrich argues is that the onus of political participation is on the candidate. It is the responsibility of the candidate running for office to get people to turnout to vote. This leads to the major conclusion from Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) referenced at the beginning of this chapter. Citizens will participate when they are persuaded to get involved. It is up to the candidates, parties, activists, or other participants in a political campaign to get voters to turn out. They need to convince voters to show up and support them at the

polls. Candidates cannot simply rely on a voter's sociological context or their attachment to a political party to make them vote, they need to actively recruit voters and convince them to turnout on election day.

Looking at the literature on the effect of campaign events on voter mobilization, we can see evidence that the arguments advanced by Aldrich (1993) and Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) are supported. Actively recruiting voters increases turnout at the polls. Holbrook and McClurg (2005) point out that mobilization efforts have the strongest effect on partisans. Specifically, the activities directed at partisans exert the strongest effect on the turnout rate. Partisans are already the most likely segment of the electorate to vote, but actively recruiting them ensures they will not sit home on election day. However, campaign advertisements are more effective in mobilizing independent voters than partisans. Partisans simply need to be asked to participate. Independent voters need more mobilizing. They are more indecisive in determining which candidate to support, so they need more information than do partisans before deciding to vote. Campaign ads are one avenue through which voters can learn about candidates, so it makes sense that ads mobilize independents more than partisans.

These voter mobilization techniques are actually more important during the nomination season than during the general election stage. As Aldrich (1980) points out, the costs of participating in nomination elections are much higher than at the general election stage. The higher cost is due to information availability during the primary season. Information on the candidates is scarcer during the nomination stage because

there are multiple candidates running for a party's nomination rather than the simpler two-candidate fall campaign. These multi-candidate races mean that these nomination elections are intra-party contests rather inter-party contests like the general election. Finally, the nomination season is not over in one day. It plays out over the course of several months. Thus, information is scarcer at the beginning and becomes more abundant over the course of the nomination season. Thus, events at the beginning of the season are going to affect voters differently than events later in the season. In addition, events toward the end of the season do not affect voters that have already participated in the election. For example, if a citizen votes in February, and a candidate delivers a strong speech or an effective advertisement in March, it will not affect those who have already voted. Or, a citizen who votes in March may choose to support the candidate that has been winning in previous primaries or caucuses (Bartels 1988; Kenny and Rice 1994).

In addition to the increased costs of participating in nominating contests, many scholars observe the declining trend of turnout in all elections (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Aldrich 1980; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Leighley and Nagler 2007; Popkin 1994; Putnam 1995, 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). So, due to this, mobilization efforts are important to candidates. They need voters to turn out rather than stay home. As Popkin (1994) and Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) note, while the socio-economic make-up of the electorate has actually laid the groundwork for increasing turnout, it is because candidates have mobilized fewer and fewer voters that we have seen the turnout rate

falling. Popkin (1994, 226) suggests that, “the best way to compensate for the declining use of the party as a cue to voting, and for the declining social stimulation to vote at all, might be to increase our spending on campaign activities that stimulate voter involvement.” So, what Popkin tells us is that voters need to be stimulated. They need candidates to run advertisements, hold rallies, and participate in media interviews. Candidates need to get the attention of voters.

There is evidence that campaign activities as well as campaign strategy are indeed effective at mobilizing voters; however, the evidence concerning campaign visits and rallies is severely lacking. Campaign spending for example, which includes all spending on all campaign activities, increases turnout (Geer 1989; Norrander and Smith 1985; and Ranney 1977). While there seems to be wide agreement on the effectiveness of campaign spending, there are some that disagree (Kenney and Rice 1985). While there seems to be some disagreement about campaign spending, there is reason to believe that if we actually look at the campaign activities separately, we may be able to better understand how much of an impact the different campaign activities are having. These existing studies have the limitation of being unable to separate out the effects of campaign spending on advertisements and spending on other types of activities, such as campaign visits. What I am able to do is examine the effect of spending on advertising and the effect of campaign visits separately. I am able to more fully unpack the effects of campaign activity.

The main focus of this chapter will be the effect of campaign visits on voter turnout. While the impact of the nomination contest rules on turnout rate is fairly well understood, the impact of campaign activities is not as well known (see Rothenberg and Brody 1988 for a thorough treatment of the rules). Jones (1998) presents a study on the effects of campaign visits on voter turnout in the nomination elections between 1980 and 1992. While Jones finds some support for campaign visits increasing turnout in nomination elections, he also finds contrary evidence. Specifically, Jones finds that campaign visits increase turnout for Democratic candidates but has no affect for Republican candidates. While Jones offers an examination of campaign visits, his study does not include a measure of campaign advertisements, another significant source of information for voters. Further, Jones uses an aggregate-level turnout model and covers general turnout. In this chapter, I examine group-specific turnout. So, while this study shows tepid support for campaign visits having a positive effect on voter turnout, I believe that by incorporating other campaign activities in the model, we will have a clearer picture of what is driving voters to turn out to the polls and vote. In addition, I will be able to speak to group-specific turnout instead of general turnout.

Why is there reason to believe that visits will be effective in increasing voter turnout in nomination elections? First, campaign visits allow voters to get an up-close-and-personal look at the candidates running for office. Voters attending a campaign rally, stump speech, or running into a candidate at a local restaurant, have a chance to actually meet or listen to a candidate in person. They are able to hear what the

candidate has to say about the issues, listen to the stump speech and decide whether or not the candidate possesses the qualities they deem important to lead.

Second, campaign visits are a good way for candidates to spread their messages from their current political supporters to potentially new supporters. While not everyone in Portsmouth, NH would have been able to attend the rally held by Hillary Clinton on January 6, 2008, she spoke to a small number of supporters and made her case as to why she was the best Democratic candidate. These supporters then, presumably, went home and spoke to their friends and families about what they heard from Clinton at the rally and thus began spreading the word for Clinton. Campaign visits are thus an inexpensive way for candidates to get their message across and get people involved. Popkin (1994) tells us that stimulating voters and providing them with information are the most effective ways to get them to turnout—campaign visits accomplish both of these tasks.

Finally, campaign visits are an avenue for inspiring grass roots efforts. Meeting with a state political party leader or a county party chairperson may help inspire these already active political leaders to recruit more volunteers to make phone calls, knock on doors, or even hold fundraisers. These leaders may be able to use the visit as a recruitment tool in an effort to increase the state's grassroots campaign efforts. These grassroots efforts can help a candidate in a big way, as voters who are personally contacted are more likely to vote than are those simply contacted by a telephone call or mailed advertisement (Gerber and Green 2000). Barack Obama's grassroots efforts were

a large part of why he won the nomination as well as the general election (Abramowitz 2010). Thus, campaign visits may indeed be an effective mobilization tool. They provide voters with a more personal view of the candidate, more information about the candidate is spread to those unable to attend the campaign event, and grassroots efforts can be motivated.

Hypotheses

To begin exploring the role of campaign visits in mobilizing voters, I have chosen to explore turnout rates of various demographic groups throughout the 2008 nominating contests. I have separated my examination into two groups: Republicans and Democrats. I will be exploring the mobilization of key constituent groups of these two political parties. With regards to the Democratic Party I will look at race, gender, and age. Barack Obama inspired voters with messages of hope and change, something that resonated with African American voters who saw Obama as the first viable African American candidate for the presidency. Thus, *I hypothesize that Obama was able to mobilize African American voters to support his candidacy.*

Similarly, Obama inspired younger voters to turnout to vote. In fact, Obama specifically targeted American youth through his grass roots efforts (Gulati 2010; Cornfield 2010). Not only did Obama target younger voters, he actually was able to get them to volunteer for his grass roots campaign organizations (Owen 2010). Due to Obama's mobilization efforts, *I thus hypothesize that Obama was able to effectively mobilize younger voters, raising their turnout rates from previous election years.*

Hillary Clinton was viewed as the first viable female candidate for the Democratic nomination for the presidency. She was seen as the frontrunner for the nomination at the start of the season, but soon fell behind in the delegate count. However, she was still able to draw out the Democratic nominating contest to June, the official end to the nominating season, demonstrating her campaign's viability. Throughout her campaign, Clinton downplayed gender. However, being a viable contender for the Democratic nomination and also a woman, Clinton was able to excite female voters. They had the opportunity to finally elect a woman to the White House and despite Clinton's efforts to downplay gender, female voters were excited by this prospect. Because of this, Clinton attracted many female voters to show up and support her. Further, *I believe that due to her campaign activities, Clinton was able to increase the turnout rate among female voters.*

Turning to the candidates for the Republican nomination for the presidency, we can see that religious voters were a key bloc with regards to mobilization efforts. In 2008, the Republicans watched as Mitt Romney, Mike Huckabee, and John McCain battled it out for the Republican nomination. Huckabee resonated very well with these voters, as he was able to talk about his role as a preacher and clearly articulate his support for these voters' positions. Romney and McCain, on the other hand, had a more difficult time with these voters. Romney had the difficulty of overcoming the fact that voters were suspicious of his Mormon faith. Further, he had a better fit with moderate voters (due to his moderate record as Governor of Massachusetts), making religious

voters more skeptical of his record. While McCain eventually won the nomination, these voters never truly warmed up to him. McCain often advocated his maverick streak in the Senate, in which he “bucked” the party line, which made social conservatives a bit wary of McCain’s true stances on moral issues. Thus, religious voters were a key voting bloc throughout the Republican nominating contests. Because of this and the unique group of candidates seeking the Republican nomination in 2008, *I believe that religious voters would have been mobilized more in this contest, especially by Huckabee, than in previous contests.*

Data

To test these hypotheses, I draw on data from a couple of sources. The dependent variable is derived from the exit polls conducted in 2004 and 2008. To measure the effect of mobilization I difference the level of turnout in each state in the 2004 general election from the turnout in the 2008 nomination campaigns. The measure is modeled after that used by Kaufmann, Gimpel, and Hoffman (2003), which they used to examine the ideological representativeness of presidential nominating contests. These authors used a similar measure to compare the ideological make-up of the primary electorate compared to the general electorate. However, I am able to use this measure to examine group mobilization. Specifically, I am able to determine the effect of campaign activity on mobilizing African Americans, females, religious voters, and young voters.

To calculate the dependent variable, I first separate the electorate into Democratic and Republican voters. I do this by creating dummy variables in each

dataset (2004 and 2008) for Democrat and Republican voters (i.e. those that voted for a Democratic or Republican candidate). I then calculated the percentage of each state's electorate that each of the four demographic groups (African Americans, females, religious, and young) composed, in each of the election years. Next, I calculated the percentage of Democratic voters that were female, African American, and young. I also calculate the percentage of the Republican voters that identified as religious. Finally, I take the difference between the percentages in 2004 and 2008. By taking the difference we can see the increase or decrease in turnout for each group. A positive value indicates an increase in turnout in the 2008 nomination contests and a negative number indicates a decrease in turnout. Thus, the unit of analysis is the difference in turnout among each group in an individual state.

Because of the continuous nature of this variable, I am able to test these hypotheses using Ordinary Least Squares [OLS] regression. Further, to control for any heteroskedasticity in the models, I am using robust standard errors to ensure a conservative measurement. I run a total of nine models. For the Democratic candidates I look at the difference in turnout among African Americans, females, and young voters. For each of these groups, I run a model for Barack Obama and one for Hillary Clinton, as these were the top two Democratic candidates (and the two that stayed in the nomination race past the first few contests). In regards to the Republican nominating contests, I simply look at the religious voters, an important group to these candidates. In 2008, the Republicans had three leading contenders: John McCain, Mitt Romney, and

Mike Huckabee. So for the analysis of religious voters, I run three models, one for each of these three candidates.

The independent variables used in these models are advertisement spending, campaign visits, candidate momentum, candidate attrition, the type of primary used (e.g. open, closed), and home state advantage. To measure advertisement spending, I have calculated the percentage of ad spending in each state by each candidate. The spending data comes from spending reports available through *CNN's* website. So, for example, the total amount of advertising by Republican candidates in California was \$2,501,386. Mitt Romney spent \$2,449,204 in California, so his advertising value is 97.9%. This advertising variable thus accounts for all spending on advertising by all candidates throughout the 2008 nomination season.

The candidate visits variable is calculated in much the same way, using data available through *The Washington Post's* candidate tracker. I calculated the percentage of visits each candidate made to each of the states. For example, looking at the total number of visits Arizona received from Democratic candidates, we see that of the 13 total visits received, Obama made 2 and Clinton made 5. So, the value for Obama and Clinton is 15.4% and 38.5%, respectively. Similar to the advertisement variable, by calculating the visits variable this way, I am able to account for each candidate's visits to each state.

Momentum is measured in a way similar to Norrander (1993). I identify the top three candidates and assign each candidate a value of 3, 2, or 1, for finishing in 1st, 2nd,

and 3rd place respectively. Then, to account for the fact that voters forget results of previous contests, each value is discounted by a factor of 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 for the first three weeks after each contest date. Calculating momentum in this way allows us to see which candidates are benefiting from any bandwagon effects that come with winning previous contests.

Finally, home state advantage, candidate attrition, and the type of primary used in each state are controlled for. Candidates typically benefit from home state advantage in nomination contests. Candidate's home states are coded as dummy variables, with one representing the home state, and zero representing all other states. Not only are these states predisposed to vote for a candidate originally from the state, other candidates typically campaign less in other candidate's home states because they know the home state candidate will be likely to do well. These candidates need to be strategic about where they spend time and money, so they are likely to campaign less in another candidate's home state because of the advantage those candidates have. Further, I control for candidate attrition. This variable is constructed basically as a candidate counter, in order to account for when a candidate drops out of the nomination race. Finally, I control for the type of primary used in each state. This control is also a dummy variable with closed primaries coded as one, and all other types of primaries (i.e. open, semi-closed) coded as zero. Because closed primaries are only open to registered partisans, we may see mobilization efforts depressed in nomination contests due simply to this fact.

Results

Tables 4.1-4.4 present the results from the OLS regression models. Looking at Table 4.1, Republicans that identified as religious were mobilized by Mike Huckabee. Before running for the Republican nomination, Huckabee was the governor of Arkansas, prior to which he was a Baptist preacher. Due to this background and his strong social conservative beliefs, he targeted socially conservative voters. This mobilization technique seems to have paid off for Huckabee, as the spending he did on advertising did indeed mobilize voters. Per unit increase in advertising spending, Huckabee increased mobilization among religious voters by a factor of 0.087.

Table 4.1: OLS Results for Mobilization of Religious Republican Voters

	<u>McCain</u>		<u>Huckabee</u>		<u>Romney</u>	
	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error
Spending	-0.089*	0.04	0.087**	0.027	0.064	0.055
Visits	0.177	0.138	0.272	0.161	-0.235*	0.107
Momentum	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Home State	-0.01	0.059	-0.187	0.128	-0.008	0.054
Attrition	0.000	0.15	-0.008	0.012	-0.014	0.017
Primary Type	-0.005	0.038	0.049	0.033	0.016	0.032
Constant	0.189	0.102	0.223**	0.076	0.350***	0.08
R-Squared	0.191		0.3107		0.2335	
N	29		29		29	

*denotes $p < 0.05$; **denotes $p < 0.01$

To further support the idea that Huckabee was effective at mobilizing religious voters, we see that McCain and Romney were ineffective at mobilizing this core group of voters. In fact, McCain's spending on advertising actually depressed turnout among religious voters, as did the visits Romney made to the states. While these results may seem concerning, it simply magnifies the effectiveness by which Huckabee mobilized this group of voters.

Table 4.2: OLS Results for Mobilization of African American Democratic Voters

	<u>Obama</u>		<u>Clinton</u>	
	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error
Spending	0.019	0.062	-0.159	0.085
Visits	0.015	0.103	0.061	0.08
Momentum	0	0	0	0
Home State	-----	-----	-0.015	0.03
Attrition	0.002	0.008	0.002	0.009
Primary Type	-0.043	0.027	-0.042	0.027
Constant	0.056	0.055	0.095	0.072
R-Squared	0.1003		0.1993	
N	38		38	

*denotes $p < 0.05$; **denotes $p < 0.01$

Turning now to the Democratic voters, we see that none of the mobilization efforts by Obama and Clinton were effective in getting African Americans or young

voters to turnout at the voting booths. Tables 4.2 and 4.4 present the results for these two groups of voters. None of Obama's or Clinton's campaign activities did anything to mobilize these two groups of voters. Obama excited African American voters. He was the first viable African American candidate for the presidency. Because of this, African Americans were most likely going to turnout for Obama regardless of the campaign activity we saw. Further, African Americans were not likely to be mobilized to support Clinton over Obama, so it is not too surprising to see null effects with regards to African American voters in the Clinton model. Mirroring African Americans in this respect, young voters were not mobilized by Obama or Clinton either. While many young voters were excited about Obama—not to mention the targeting Obama did to excite these young voters (Abramowitz 2010; Cornfield 2010; Gulati 2010;)—they were not mobilized by any of the variables included in this model. While younger voters did turnout at higher rates than in previous years, they may have been predisposed to turnout despite the campaign activity performed by Obama or Clinton. Further, young voters may have been mobilized by newer digital technology rather than campaign visits or advertisements. In fact, Smith (2010) points out that Rock the Vote (an organization aimed at registering and mobilizing young voters) registered 280,000 voters in 2008, compared to only 50,000 in 2006, demonstrating the effects digital outreach can have. It may be this digital outreach, rather than visits or advertisements, which mobilized young voters to turnout at higher rates than they have in the past.

Table 4.3: OLS Results for Mobilization of Female Democratic Voters

	<u>Obama</u>		<u>Clinton</u>	
	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error
Spending	-0.013	0.09	-0.037	0.122
Visits	0.096	0.117	0.124	0.075
Momentum	-0.00001*	0	-0.00002**	0
Home State	-----	-----	-0.058	0.054
Attrition	-0.005	0.007	-0.001	0.009
Primary Type	0.016	0.032	0.015	0.027
Constant	0.291***	0.054	0.271***	0.056
R-Squared	0.0782		0.129	
N	38		38	

*denotes $p < 0.05$; **denotes $p < 0.01$

Table 4.3, however, presents us with significant results concerning the mobilization of female voters. What we see from looking at Table 4.3 is that momentum is a significant predictor of mobilization effects. While the result is actually a bit concerning, as the effect is negative, the effect is substantively negligible. Per unit increase in each of the candidate's momentum, the turnout rate of female voters is depressed by a value roughly equal to zero. This may be due to the fact that momentum volleyed back and forth between Obama and Clinton throughout the length of the nomination season. Because no candidate could really develop a true sense of momentum, neither candidate could be shown to benefit from this dynamic. So, while

momentum is found to be a significant predictor of mobilization of female voters, it had a substantively negligible effect on the actual turnout rate.

Table 4.4: OLS Results for Mobilization of Young Democratic Voters

	<u>Obama</u>		<u>Clinton</u>	
	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error
Spending	-0.167	0.198	-0.22	0.272
Visits	0.237	0.175	0.07	0.078
Momentum	0	0	0	0
Home State	-----	-----	-0.003	0.057
Attrition	0.015	0.01	0.022	0.014
Primary Type	0.038	0.062	0.025	0.052
Constant	0	0.083	0.007	0.079
R-Squared	0.1472		0.1098	
N	38		38	

*denotes $p < 0.05$; **denotes $p < 0.01$

Conclusion

Looking at the effects of campaign activity on the mobilization of these four groups—all of which were crucial throughout the 2008 nomination season—we see a number of interesting results. First, among Republican voters, religious voters were mobilized by Mike Huckabee’s advertising. Huckabee targeted these voters because of his strong socially conservative beliefs and former vocation as a Baptist preacher. He

was able to connect with these voters and so the advertising he did proved to be effective at further mobilizing this core group of Republican voters.

Further, when we look at the three groups of voters important to the Democratic candidates in 2008—African Americans, Females, and the young—we can see that the campaign activity from Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton were ineffective in mobilizing these groups. While there was a significant result for each candidate's momentum, neither candidate was able to get a substantive boost from momentum, as it tended to volley back and forth between Clinton and Obama throughout the length of the Democratic contest.

While the results of the OLS regression models do not tell us a whole lot about what actually mobilized voters in the 2008 nominating contests, we can note that the traditional campaign advertising and visits did little to mobilize these voters. Rather, we may have seen these groups predisposed to vote for their favorite candidate in 2008 for reasons other than campaign activity. Barack Obama presented Americans with the opportunity to support a viable African American candidate for the presidency. Hillary Clinton was the first viable female candidate for the Democratic nomination. Due to the historic nature of these two campaigns, voters may have been mobilized by demographic traits alone. However, these results do tell us that Mike Huckabee was able to energize religious, Republicans to vote. These voters were mobilized by Huckabee's advertising. They were able to connect with Huckabee rather than McCain

or Romney, who actually demonstrated they suppressed religious turnout in the 2008 Republican contests.

The results presented here may not have shown strong mobilization effects in the 2008 presidential nominating contest, but this is not troubling. Turnout in nominating contests is largely lower than turnout in general elections. This is due to the fact that choosing among the candidates is more difficult in nominating contests. In a general election, voters are able to rely on the heuristic of party identification to determine which candidate to vote for. This heuristic is gone in nominating contests. So, because decision making in nomination elections is more difficult, we generally see a lower turnout rate. So, candidates need to work that much harder during the nomination stage to get voters to turn out and vote. Because of this, it is not overly concerning that we see little mobilization effects from this model. Generally, voters are less inclined to turnout in nominating elections. Further, given the excitement surrounding the 2008 nominating contests, the increased turnout rate we saw may be due to this excitement rather than the campaign activities.

While there are some interesting findings in this chapter, there are also a number of limitations. As with all exit poll data, I am unable to analyze the mobilization effects in all 50 states. Exit polls are not conducted in all 50 states, so I am confined to those that do. However, there is no reason to expect that these results would differ with the inclusion of the caucus states that were unable to be included in these analyses. In fact, if we do see any differences in caucus states, we may actually see stronger mobilization

effects, as caucuses have lower participation rates. So, if the results presented here are off, they at least err on the side of caution. They do not oversell the effects visits have on mobilization. By the inclusion of caucus states, these results may only be more pronounced.

In addition, I am simply examining the 2008 nomination season. The 2008 season presented Americans with a number of interesting, and historic, candidates for each party's nomination, but it is only one year. However, to try to avoid the problem of confining myself to simply analyzing one election year, my dependent variable was constructed as the difference between voter turnout in two elections (the general election of 2004 and the nomination elections of 2008). While this may not completely eradicate the idiosyncrasies of a single election year, it should help to alleviate some, giving us a bit more confidence that these results can be generalized. However, to further test this question on mobilization effects, it may be beneficial to look at the Republican nomination contest in 2012. We could then compare the results from 2012 to 2008 to see if the patterns seen in 2008 continue to hold. Further, instead of creating a dependent variable based on the difference between turnout rate in a general election year and a nomination election year, I could compare the turnout rate from the 2012 nomination season with that from 2008. Working with this data in these ways, may help determine the generalizability of these results.

While the models run in this chapter are flawed, they are a step toward trying to uncover the mobilization effects of campaign activity. Further, I have developed a

measure of turnout that is based on exit polls rather than aggregate measures of demographic group turnout. By using exit polls I am using data from actual voters that showed up at the voting booths and participated. The results for the religious, Republican voters confirm my hypothesis that Huckabee was effective at mobilizing this core group of conservatives. However, we see that the Obama and Clinton campaign activities did little to mobilize African Americans, females, or young voters. Nonetheless, voters were excited in 2008. We saw these groups show up at the polls at higher rates than in previous elections. While it may not have been the campaign activity that mobilized these voters, these voters were inspired to turnout, still demonstrating the importance of voter mobilization.

CHAPTER 5

DO CAMPAIGN VISITS MATTER? AN EXAMINATION OF THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION CONTESTS

At the start of 2008, the American public was presented with two highly competitive presidential nomination campaigns—one on the Democratic side and one on the Republican side. This was the first election since 1948 in which neither a current president running for re-election nor a sitting vice-president attempted to become president. The Democratic race endured throughout the entire primary season and pitted a female candidate against a minority candidate. The Republican contest had the more common dynamic of concluding mid-way through the primary season, but the winner was not the frontrunner at the start of 2008. Finally, the fact that at the end of the nomination process, the two nominees came directly from the Senate was also unique (Jamieson 2009). However, as Norrander (2009) points out, the 2008 contest also resembles many of the nomination contests that preceded it. One of the similarities she points to is the amassing of campaign funds and vying for the attention of both public and media attention throughout the invisible primary, or the time leading up to the Iowa caucuses in which candidates are attempting to make a name for themselves as well as generate enough money to last throughout the duration of the campaign. Further, Norrander (2009) points to the fact that the candidates and media were once again focused on the Iowa and New Hampshire competitions in order to determine which candidate would gain an early lead.

How did the differing dynamics of the Republican versus Democratic contests influence voters' choices? One set of the presidential nomination literature constructs aggregate-level models of candidates' victories in specific states and focuses on dynamic elements such as momentum (Aldrich 1980; Bartels 1988) and candidate attrition (Norrande 2000, 2006). A second group of studies focuses solely on individual-level effects (see Norrande 1996 for a detailed review). While some of this research asks how momentum influences voters' choices, they have not truly incorporated the dynamics of campaigns across the states. This examination will be one of the first to fully integrate the aggregate-level campaign variables with individual-level voters' choices by employing a hierarchical modeling methodology.

Why is it important to link aggregate-level effects with those at the individual level? First, it allows for campaigns to matter. Campaigns affect individual preferences at both the aggregate and individual level. A candidate's policy preferences may influence how voters view that candidate, and a candidate that is building momentum also may attract voters that are unsure of which candidate to support. By incorporating both levels, we are able to obtain a better picture of what is affecting a voter's decision. Secondly, in primaries there are fewer predetermined choices. The shortcut of using partisan cues in determining vote choice is gone. Instead, voters need to use some other mechanism in choosing which candidate to support, be it a candidate's policy position, the number of primaries a candidate has won, the number of advertisements to which they have been exposed, or whatever mechanism a voter chooses to use. Finally,

looking at both the aggregate- and individual-level effects will provide for a better understanding of nomination dynamics—both momentum and candidate attrition. This will allow us to explore what factors influence or detract from both momentum and attrition within a nomination campaign. Now, I offer a discussion of the existing theories concerning presidential nominations, focusing on momentum, candidate spending on advertisements, campaign visits, and individual indicators. Then I lay out my hypotheses, discuss my testing strategy, and conclude by offering a discussion of the results from a hierarchical liner model.

Campaign Dynamics and Voters' Choices

As noted, two schools of thought permeate the study of presidential nominations: momentum and attrition. The study of momentum, championed by John Aldrich (1980) and Larry Bartels (1988), looks at factors that help a candidate surge to the front of the pack, with the main idea being that candidates who are not well known but do well in earlier primary races gather a lot of attention and get a number of voters to join their bandwagon. The game of attrition, advocated for by Barbara Norrander (2000, 2006), describes the idea of “un-momentum” in which candidates winnow out over time usually due to a decrease in funds, lack of popularity, etc.

Does Big Mo³ Strike Again?

Aldrich (1980a) and Bartels (1985, 1987, 1988, 1989) advocate for viewing presidential nominations as hinging on the idea of momentum. Aldrich (1980a) defines momentum as a candidate's increased chances of winning the nomination due to that candidate's performance in previous primaries and caucuses as well as his or her ability to generate resources. The candidate's "competitive standing" is only part of the definition of momentum, Aldrich argues. While success in previous primaries and caucuses does affect a candidate's chances of winning the nomination, he argues that the resources a candidate receives due to these previous wins is also important. The inability to raise funds makes winning the nomination impossible; however, momentum increases a candidate's chances of gaining the resources needed to clinch the nomination. Aldrich (1980a) differentiates between a multicandidate race and a two candidate race, and argues that while momentum may affect results differently based on the type of race, it remains an important factor. In both types of races, he argues that the acquisition of resources is not stable. Therefore, in a multicandidate race, we can see one candidate pull ahead due to momentum, whereas in a two candidate contest, we see momentum fluctuate back and forth between the two competitors. To exemplify the multicandidate race, Aldrich (1980a) points to Jimmy Carter's nomination bid in 1976. He writes that Carter was a little known governor of Georgia, but after big wins in both

³ Big Mo, or momentum, was a phrase coined by George H.W. Bush in reference to his win in the 1980 Iowa caucuses.

Iowa and New Hampshire, Carter garnered much media attention and was able to bring in resources at a higher rate than his competitors. Further, evidence for this kind of momentum can also be seen in John Kerry's nomination in 2004 for the Democratic Party, as his early wins in Iowa and New Hampshire led to his winning the primaries or caucuses in 46 states.

In contrast to the multicandidate race, Aldrich (1980a) states that in a two candidate race, as one candidate's resources increases, the other's must decrease. Thus, when the two-candidate race is competitive, like in the 2008 Democratic contest, we see momentum fluctuate back and forth between the two major contenders. Butler (2009) analyzes momentum effects in the 2008 nomination campaigns, which arguably exemplifies both a multicandidate and two-candidate race. Looking at the Republican contest, we see a large number of competitors vying for the nomination. Butler finds that momentum did play a role in this Republican nomination campaign—with John McCain pulling ahead of the other Republican challengers, even though he was not the frontrunner at the beginning of the nomination season. However, if we look at the Democratic contest we see that momentum fluctuated between Obama and Clinton, the two clear frontrunners from the outset of the campaign.

Aldrich (1980a) discusses how momentum works at the aggregate level, but does not test how momentum influences individual voters. Bartels (1988, 1989, 1993) and Kenney and Rice (1994) do analyze how momentum affects an individual's vote choice. Bartels (1989) points out that the presidential candidates had not always acknowledged

the idea of momentum. In fact, many often ignored the Iowa caucuses, which are now seen as pivotal in the primary season because of the big effects this caucus has on future primaries. He writes that Jimmy Carter's campaign strategists recognized the importance of winning early on in the nomination season, as the winner is rewarded with much media attention. This media attention then has a strong effect on candidate vote choice (Bartels 1993). Thus, by winning earlier primaries, candidates are rewarded with media attention, which exposes them to the public more than if they were not building momentum.

Kenney and Rice (1994) also analyze how momentum influences voters' preferences. They analyzed the 1988 nomination contest and found that due to psychological effects caused by primary and caucus wins (contagion and inevitability), voters are likely to jump on the bandwagon of the "winning" candidate. Steger (2007) argues that the Democrats are more susceptible to momentum than are Republicans. He states that due to effects of the invisible primary (especially pre-primary poll standings and endorsements), the Republican nomination process is more predictable than the Democrats. Steger presents evidence that Republican voters are more strongly influenced by pre-primary factors whereas Democratic voters are swayed more by momentum.

Candidate Attrition

Much research has been done that argues presidential nomination contests are best described as games of attrition (Norrander 1993, 2000, 2006). Candidate attrition is

defined as the winnowing down of the field of candidates competing for the nomination. Specifically, a candidate needs to decide whether or not they have enough resources and support to remain in the nomination contest (Norrander 2006). Thus, to explain candidate attrition, many scholars look to the amount of funds candidates have been able to accumulate as well as the amount of delegates each candidate has acquired through previous primaries and caucuses (Norrander 1996).

While the study of candidate attrition has not been examined as thoroughly as the theory of momentum, Norrander (1993) argues that accounting for the winnowing down of the candidate field is needed to correctly model the nomination process. While she finds moderate support for attrition, the narrowing of the candidate field was still a significant predictor for the 1984 and 1988 nomination competitions. Further, in 2004, John Kerry was able to claim victory after John Edwards bowed out of the Democratic contest and George W. Bush clinched the Republican nomination after John McCain and Bill Bradley conceded defeat and dropped out of the race (Norrander 2006). Candidate attrition will increase the support of one or more of the remaining contestants. Thus, attrition affects voters' choices.

Campaign Spending on Advertisements

Candidate spending has a greater potential for influence in primary elections in which voters have fewer voting cues or attitudes, such as partisanship, that would tie them into early choices. Aldrich (1980b) succinctly points out that the more a candidate spends in one state, the better that candidate is expected to do. Ultimately, the

candidate who spends the most money should be the winner. Haynes et al (1997) find similar results in concurrence with Aldrich (1980b). Candidates that spend more than their competitors tend to receive greater vote shares. Specifically, they find that in order to increase his or her vote share by 1 percentage point, a candidate needs to increase spending by 3.3 percentage points relative to other candidates. Grush (1980) also advocates for examining spending effects. He finds that campaign spending matters more early on in the nomination campaign, with the effects diminishing as the campaign moves on. This makes sense when examining nomination competitions through the lens of the attrition game. Early spending should matter more because voters know less about the candidates in the early part of the campaign. By the middle to late portion of the primary season, voters have more information on the various candidates and may be less swayed by new information. Finally, in her examination of the nomination competitions from 1976 to 1988, Norrander (1993) finds candidate spending to have a strong effect. Specifically, she finds that for over half of the candidates, high spending levels increased their vote totals. Thus we see that candidate spending levels play a role in the nomination process.

A major aspect of candidate expenditures in the primaries is on campaign advertisements. Thus, the demonstrated effects of candidate expenditures on vote totals may be through more frequent advertisements. Indeed, advertisements also have been linked to candidate fortunes (Gurian 1986; Gurian 1990; Ridout 2004; Ridout 2008; Vavreck 2001). All of these works show the benefits of campaign spending on

advertisements. Huber and Arceneaux (2007) find similar results. They find that advertisements do in fact persuade voters to vote for a certain candidate; however, they do not educate or mobilize voters. Nonetheless, the results offered by Barker (2005) provide some evidence that this persuadability does have an effect on candidate preference, especially when there are candidates that are not well known and voters cannot rely on partisan cues. Through his analysis of the 2000 Republican nomination contest, Barker shows that when voters were exposed to a specific value frame (individualism), they were more likely to prefer John McCain to George Bush, thus showing the effect persuasion can have in a nomination campaign.

However, is there evidence that spending on advertisements played a role in the 2008 nomination competition? Taking a preliminary look, we can see that some evidence for this is borne out in the 2008 competition. In the Democratic Party, Obama was able to outspend Clinton and the other competitors and ultimately claim victory. Looking specifically at campaign expenditures throughout the nomination competition, Obama spent almost \$74 million compared to Clinton's \$46 million.⁴ However, when analyzing the Republican competition, we do not see such clear-cut effects. Early on in the nomination season, Republican candidate Mitt Romney outspent all of his opponents, but still lost the nomination bid to John McCain.⁵ Further, Mike Huckabee was able to run an effective—though ultimately unsuccessful—campaign against

⁴ Obama spent \$73,989,955 on advertisements, whereas Clinton spent \$46,226,062.

⁵ McCain spent \$11,866,825 compared to Romney's \$30,329,958 throughout the nomination competition.

McCain even though his campaign suffered financially throughout the nomination season.

Campaign Visits

An often overlooked factor that could influence voter's choices of candidates is that of candidate visits to each state. The number of visits a candidate makes to a state ought to increase the amount of votes that candidate receives for a few reasons. First, visits are yet another way of providing voters with information. As Jamieson (2000) points out, during a presidential election, a wealth of information is available to individuals and even those who do not usually pay attention to politics gain some information about the candidates, even if collaterally. Second, campaign visits are potentially an excellent source of grass roots mobilization. While visiting a state, a candidate often makes a more personal appeal to voters, by demonstrating she understands the concerns of the state. Further, it is mostly party activists, or at the very least those most interested in the election, who attend a campaign event in a state. These event attendees then pass along the information they learned to those in their various social groups, neighborhoods, etc. What we expect from visits overall then, is that they are a useful mechanism for providing voters with information, which they can then use when making a choice.

Aldrich (1980a) states that candidates must select which states to actively compete in. He states that candidates often estimate how well they believe they will do if they choose to compete in a state's primary or caucus. He points to the example of

Ronald Reagan choosing not to compete in New York because he felt his conservative message would not be supported, but choosing to compete in Texas where he felt his conservative platform would be welcomed. While Aldrich does not speak directly to candidate visits, we should expect his argument to apply to candidates visiting states in which they feel they will do well and believe their message will be well received.

Most of the work on visits has focused more on the strategy behind visits rather than the impact visits have on vote choice. For example, in their examination of the 2008 nomination competition, Ridout et al (2009) find that frontrunners will make more campaign visits to winner-take-all states than do long-shot candidates, supporting their hypothesis that the more delegates a state offers, the more campaign visits that state will receive. Further, they find that frontrunners will be more likely to visit primary states than caucus states, most likely because primary states typically offer more delegates than do caucus states. These results support the argument of Aldrich (1980a).

Candidates do act strategically when choosing which states to actively compete in; however, Ridout et al (2009) argue that the strategy is to campaign actively in states that offer the most delegates. Thus, these authors have provided convincing evidence that candidates are more likely to visit certain states more than others, but have not offered an analysis of how this affects candidate preference. However, the strategy behind visits explains why we expect the effect of campaign visits to vary across the different states.

This examination aims to rectify this by analyzing how the amount of campaign visits to states affected candidate preference. The goal of campaigns is to provide voters

with information, so that these voters can more easily decide which candidate to vote for (Aldrich 1995; Jamieson 2000; Popkin 1994). Campaign visits provide a further avenue of information to voters. By visiting the various states, candidates are able to connect to voters on a more personal level, often focusing on issues important to the state. A couple of studies have been done on the effects of campaign visits, but have focused on the general election stage of presidential elections (Johnston et al 2004; Shaw 1999).

Shaw (1999) analyzes the effect of visits from the 1988-1996 presidential elections and finds that visits do indeed increase a candidate's vote share. Specifically, he finds that spending an extra day in a state increases a candidate's standing by 0.8 points, while an extra three days in a state raises a candidate's vote share by 2.1 points. Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson (2004) find null and even negative effects for visits and are unable to provide substantive interpretation for their results. They analyze the effect of visits in the 2000 presidential election and find that visits had no effect for Al Gore, and actually depressed support for George Bush. Thus, work needs to be done to more fully understand the effect visits have on vote choice, especially at the nomination stage where campaign effects are arguably even stronger than at the general election stage of an election.

Individual Level Predictors

So far, only aggregate-level predictors have been discussed. However, individual-level predictors also need to be taken into account in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the nomination process. Because fewer heuristic

shortcuts (i.e. partisanship and ideology) are available in primaries, voters are required to look at other aspects of a candidate beside their partisanship. The issue positions of the candidates are one of the things a voter may consider (Kenney 1993; Marshall 1983). While these authors point out the possibility of issues affecting vote choice, there are others that argue issues are not important (Gopoian 1982; Norrander 1986). However, some scholars point out that issue positions can have an impact if candidates stress them throughout the campaign. Aldrich and Alvarez (1994) point out that simple policy positions are not important, but if a candidate is stressing issues that voters feel are important, these issue positions are helpful in attracting support. In 2008 there were a number of issues stressed throughout the primary season, especially healthcare, the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the economy. Further, issue positions may matter more for different types of candidates. In 2008, for example, Mike Huckabee received a lot of support from Evangelical Christians because of his stances on social issues. Thus, there is reason to expect that issues may be important in 2008.

Next, some argue that ideology and partisanship—while less significant predictors than in general elections—still play a role in nomination campaigns. Bartels (1988) states that voters' political predispositions—including ideology and partisanship—can play a role in candidate preference. Specifically, a candidate's intensity of party attachment may influence a voter's reaction to that candidate. However, Hagen and Mayer (2000) argue that partisanship plays a lesser role in the nomination stage, as parties have less control over the nomination process. Ideology on

the other hand, has received more support from scholars trying to parse out how ideology and party identification are affecting vote choice in the nomination stage. If a candidate is campaigning as a moderate, he or she may lose the support of strong partisan voters. Kenney (1993) points to the fact that voters may use ideology and partisanship to infer candidates' issue positions. Thus, while ideology and partisanship play a more moderate role in primary campaigns, both of these indicators have been found to have an effect on candidate preference.

Demographic traits are also needed in models of primary candidate vote choice. Bartels (1988) argues that a voter's demographic traits help create his or her political predispositions. Further, demographic traits also influence vote choice because a person's demographic characteristics influence what kind of constituency groups he or she would belong to (Norranders 1996). In addition, these demographic traits also may play a role in shaping a voter's perception of candidate qualities and issue positions (Marshall 1983). Jackman and Vavreck (2010) look specifically at demographic effects—specifically age, race, and gender—in the 2008 primary season. They find that younger voters are almost two times as likely to prefer Obama to his nomination competitors, whereas female voters were almost two times as likely to prefer Clinton to the other Democratic candidates. Finally, they find that in regards to race, white voters were more likely to vote for Clinton over Obama because of racial cues. Due to symbolic racism, Jackman and Vavreck (2010) argue that white voters moved from supporting Obama to supporting Clinton, especially after the race winnowed down to Obama and

Clinton. Thus, from looking at Jackman and Vavreck (2010) we see that there is some support for the idea that demographic effects played a role in the 2008 nomination contests.

Hypotheses

Drawing from the literature reviewed above, I will analyze a number of hypotheses concerning the 2008 presidential nomination competition. The first hypothesis to be analyzed concerns momentum. *The more primaries and caucuses a candidate wins, the better his or her chances will be at winning the nomination.* Coming straight from the momentum theory advanced by Aldrich and Bartels, I expect to find that candidate preference will be dependent on a candidate's past victories or losses. The more primaries and caucuses won by a candidate, the more people will want to vote for him or her.

Secondly, I expect a candidate's expenditures on advertisements will also affect his or her chances of winning the nomination. *The more a candidate spends on advertisements, the greater his or her chances will be at clinching the nomination.* Building off the argument found in the candidate attrition literature concerning candidate spending, I expect to find that when a candidate spends more than his or her opponents on advertisements, that candidate will garner a larger group of supporters, increasing his or her vote share.

Thirdly, I anticipate that campaign visits will have an effect on candidate preference. *The more a candidate visits a state, the greater the chances of that candidate to win*

that state's delegates. Despite the mixed results offered by the scant research on visit effects, I believe visits will still prove to be an important predictor of vote choice.

Next, I expect that a candidate's issue positions will play a role when a respondent cares about certain issues and when these issues are salient. *When a respondent cares about an issue and there is a candidate with a congruent issue position, the respondent will be more likely to vote for that candidate.* Thus, the more a candidate stresses his or her position on salient issues, the more support they will garner from those voters who hold congruent issue positions.

Lastly, I expect that individual-level demographic variables will also help explain candidate preference. *I anticipate that women will be more likely to vote for Hillary Clinton over the other Democratic candidates.* As this is the first time a woman has been perceived as a viable presidential contender, I expect that she will garner the support of most female voters in the Democratic primaries. Next, *I expect that African Americans will be more likely to vote for Barack Obama over the other Democratic candidates.* Similar to the argument that women will be more supportive of Clinton, I expect that African Americans will be more likely to vote for Obama because he has been perceived to be the first viable African-American presidential contender. Next, I expect to find that age will be a significant predictor of vote preference in the Republican nomination competition, as John McCain would be the oldest presidential nominee in U.S. history. Thus, I hypothesize that *John McCain should resonate among older voters and thus affect these voters' candidate preference.*

Therefore, overall, the more primaries or caucuses won by a candidate, the more money a candidate is willing to spend on advertisements, and the more campaign visits a candidate makes to each state should increase his or her chances of winning the nomination. Further, individual-level demographics (gender, race, and age) will also help to explain candidate preference. In order to test these hypotheses I run a hierarchical liner model using both individual- and state-level data for both the Democrat and Republican nomination competition. The data sources and testing strategy are discussed in the following section.

Data and Testing Strategy

The data in this paper come from a variety of sources. The individual-level data come from the primary exit polls. Using the exit polls presents a number of pros and cons. One of the benefits of using the exit polls is that all of the respondents have actually voted in the primary election, preventing the problem of recalling incorrectly for whom that respondent voted. Also, it ensures that the respondent has had the chance to be exposed to the campaign activities (e.g. ads and visits). Had the American National Election Studies [ANES] survey or National Annenberg Election Study [NAES] survey been used, I would have run the risk of individuals being asked about their vote choice prior to them actually voting. For example, the NAES asks respondents which candidate they would vote for if they had to choose when responding to the survey. This means that an individual being surveyed in January may not actually vote until March, meaning that we would not have an accurate idea of how they were affected by

the campaigns. The major drawback to using the exit polls is that not all states conduct them. Specifically, we do not have exit polls from states with caucuses — with the exceptions of Iowa and Nevada. This means that instead of having data from all 50 states, I only have data from 38 states for the Democrats and 29 states for the Republicans.

The state level data come from a couple of different sources. First, the data for the candidate spending on advertisements variable as well the data used for the momentum variable come from campaign reports found on the *CNN* website, which kept a tally of how much the candidates were spending in each state as well as which candidates won what contests. Second, the data concerning campaign visits comes from the campaign tracker data found on *The Washington Post's* website. *The Washington Post* “tracked” the candidates as they traveled around the country, visiting different states throughout the nomination season.

Dependent Variable

To examine candidate preference, I construct five different models. Using the exit poll question asking respondents which candidate they voted for, I construct models for McCain voters, Romney voters, Huckabee voters, Clinton voters, and Obama voters. Each model will be coded in a way that the candidate of interest (i.e. McCain, Romney, Huckabee, Clinton, or Obama) is coded as one and all the other candidates are coded as zero. After combining all of the exit poll data into two separate datasets (one for Republicans and one for Democrats), we see that there were 25,380 voters who

supported Obama; 23,628 who supported Clinton; 9,992 who supported McCain; 6,677 who supported Romney; and 6,879 who supported Huckabee. Using the exit polls gives us a large enough number of respondents to run models for each of these candidates, something the ANES or NAES would have prevented.

State-Level Independent Variables

In order to measure a candidate's advertising expenditures, I use the percentage of total advertising money spent by all the candidates in each party. For example, in Alabama the total amount of money spent by all Republican candidates was \$230,753. John McCain alone spent \$42,477 so his contribution to the Republican advertisement total was 18.41%.

To measure momentum I use an indicator similar to Norrander (1993). First, each primary contender was assigned a value from zero to three. Those candidates who finished in first place were assigned a value of three, with those finishing in second place being assigned a value of two, those finishing third were assigned a value of one, and those not finishing in the top three were assigned a value of zero. In weeks with multiple primaries, the momentum score is weighted by the number of delegates up for grabs in the contest. Finally, momentum is affected by the fact that voters forget which candidate has won in the past. To account for this forgetting, each momentum score is weighted by a factor of 0.75 after a week has passed, 0.50 after two weeks have passed, and 0.25 after three weeks have passed. After more than 3 weeks have passed, any effect

is dropped. Thus, for each state, the top three candidates will be accounted for, allowing us to see whether or not momentum is being built by any presidential contender.

Campaign visits were measured through a coding scheme that counts the number of visits each candidate made to each state. The data used come from *The Washington Post's* website, which I compiled into a list of how many campaign visits each candidate made in each state. Then, each number of visits is converted into the percentage of total visits made by candidates of the same party. For example, throughout the course of the campaign, McCain made 35 visits to Iowa, while Obama made 73, and Clinton made 63. In total, Democrats made 448 visits to Iowa and Republicans made 220 visits. Thus, Obama's visit score is 16.3%, Clinton's is 14.1%, and McCain's is 15.9%. The whole list for the states included in this analysis can be found in Appendix A.

Individual-Level Independent Variables

To measure the individual-level indicators, I relied on survey responses found in the exit polls. First, to measure the effects of issue positions, I include questions that measure voters' reactions to a number of issues discussed by the candidates throughout the campaign. For the Democratic models, the main issue areas included are respondents' attitudes toward healthcare and the war in Iraq. The exit polls asked respondents what they thought was the most pressing issue facing the United States today. Thus, I created two dummy variables: one for those who thought Iraq was the most pressing issue and one for those that thought healthcare was most pressing. For

the Republicans, the two issue areas I include are the war in Iraq and the economy, as they were not asked about healthcare. These variables were coded the same way as the issue variables for the Democratic models (Specific question wording for all survey questions used can be found in Appendix B.)

Finally, the demographic variables included in the model are: gender, race, age, and religiosity (for Republicans only). *Gender* was coded as a dummy variable with females coded as one and males coded as zero. *Race* was also coded as a dummy variable, with African Americans coded as one and all other races coded as zero. *Age* was coded on a six-point scale, as coded by the exit polls. The categories range from 18-24 year olds to those over 65 years old. Finally, to code *religiosity*, I had to rely on the question of whether or not an individual identified as a born again Christian. Typically, to account for religiosity, a measure of church attendance is used (Brewer 2003; Domke and Coe 2010; Fiorina 2011, Kellstedt et al 2007; Wuthnow 1988). However, this was not asked on every exit poll, so I had to rely on the question of whether or not a respondent identified as born again. Christians who consider themselves to be born again tend to have a stronger religious attachment than Christians who do not consider themselves born again. Born again Christians have had some sort of personal conversional experience that those who are not born again have not experienced.

Control Variables

I include four variables as controls. I include a measure for a candidate's *home state*, as contenders are most likely to win the delegates in their home state. This is

coded as a dummy variable with one representing a candidate's home state and zero otherwise. However, I was unable to create a home state variable for Obama, as the Illinois exit poll is not available. Hawaii could also be considered a home state for Obama, but the Hawaii exit polls were not available either, so the home state variable is not included in the Obama model. Further, I include controls for *party identification* and *ideology*. Partisanship is measured on a three-point scale of Democrat, Independent, and Republican, whereas ideology is measured on a five-point scale ranging from strongly conservative to strongly liberal. A number of candidates were trying to appeal to moderates throughout the 2008 election season, while some were pegged as strong partisans. Thus, based on these perceptions, we may see some variability explained by strong ideologues' and partisans' perceptions of the candidates.

Testing Strategy

As argued earlier, in order to more fully understand the dynamics of the nomination process, both aggregate-level and individual-level predictors need to be included in the statistical model. However, including both levels of data in the same model creates a problem in the data, as the individual survey respondents are nested within states, creating clustering in the data. A number of options are available in order to handle the problem of clustering, including creating fixed effects for each state to account for state-level variance, running separate models for each level of indicators, running separate models for each state, or modeling the data using a hierarchical linear model [HLM].

There are a number of benefits to using an HLM to model these data (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). First, using an HLM allows us to combine multiple levels of data into one model and make predictions at different levels. By combining multiple levels of data into a single model we help prevent the misspecification we may encounter if we were to use only a single-level model. Second, HLMs allow us to explore causal heterogeneity. By using a multilevel model we are able to look at the causal dynamic and determine if it is uniform or if it varies across levels. As Steenbergen and Jones (2002) point out, it is a typical assumption that contextual factors influence political behavior.

Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) exemplify this nicely. In their book, they analyze the environmental context surrounding voters during election time. They argue that citizens are information seekers with political biases. These citizens do not have control over the information they obtain, so it is incomplete and made up of the intersection of their preferences and the informational content to which they are exposed. When they encounter information contrary to their views, they may reassess their positions or discard the information; this is when we see the possibility for the informational environment to influence voters. Thus, Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) show us that the context a voter is located in can influence their behavior, giving us a prime example of how the causal dynamic of voting behavior may be affected by higher-level predictors. A final reason for using an HLM is that it can help us show the generalizability of our

findings. It allows us to show that findings concerning one context (e.g. one state) are the same for other contexts (e.g. multiple states).

Looking at the indicators of vote choice in a presidential nomination contest described earlier, we see that there are clearly two levels of effects that contribute to candidate preference. Because individuals have seen campaign advertisements, been made aware of which candidate has been winning in other primaries and caucuses, and been exposed to candidate visits, the way that individual votes will most likely be conditioned on these contextual variables. Further, because that individual also brings with her a predisposed party identification, ideology, set of issue preferences, and demographic characteristics we should expect these individual-level characteristics to interact with the contextual predictors discussed.

As nomination campaigns are waged at the state level (each candidate is fighting for a state's delegates), I argue that modeling presidential nomination contests as a function of individual preferences nested within state-level contextual effects is the best way to account for campaign effects. This modeling strategy will allow us to combine both levels of effects in one comprehensive model, explore causal heterogeneity, and investigate whether some states are more susceptible than others to certain aspects of the campaign, making the results of the model quite comprehensive. Further, as Steenbergen and Jones (2002) point out, ignoring that hierarchical structure of nominations data can cause a number of statistical problems, most importantly incorrect standard errors and inflated Type I error rates. All of these are major strengths of being

able to use an HLM to model presidential nomination contests. In addition, an HLM has not yet been constructed to model campaign dynamics of presidential nominations, thus doing so would be an important step in developing a more comprehensive understanding of vote choice in these types of elections.

Therefore, in order to properly model the data and explain differences at both levels, I have chosen to run an HLM. Specifically, due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, I have chosen to use a mixed-effects logistic regression with a random coefficient for campaign visits. Using an HLM allows me to formally represent both the aggregate- and individual-level data through their own submodels (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). It further allows me to account for the clustering problem associated with this kind of nested data as well as prevent a loss of efficiency and generalizability of the model, which would come from using any of the other options discussed to account for the hierarchy of the data. Further, there is reason to expect that voters in different states will respond differently to campaign dynamics. Some states are visited more than others (e.g. Iowa and New Hampshire) allowing some voters more opportunities to see and hear the candidates. For example, Iowa and New Hampshire receive a lot of attention because of their early position on the primary calendar (Aldrich 1980; Bartels 1988; Brady and Johnston 1987; Buell 1987; Hagen 1989; Moore 1987). In contrast, a state holding its primary at the end of the nomination season will receive less attention (e.g. Utah in 2008) because by the time these voters participate, a nominee may

have already been chosen. Also, some states are exposed to more advertisements than are other states (e.g. larger states with more delegates).

In addition, minority populations are more prominent in some states (e.g. there is a larger population of African American citizens residing in the South than in the North). There is also variation across and within states due to partisan and ideological identification. Typically, urban areas tend to be more Democratic and liberal while rural areas tend to be more Republican and conservative. Because we see individual voters exposed to differing levels of campaign information based on the state in which they live, we have clustering in the data. While there are a number of ways to handle this clustering (e.g. fixed effects for states, separate models for each state), I argue that using a hierarchical linear model is most appropriate (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Using fixed effects is a popular choice for handling multilevel structures in the data as it allows us to control for all subgroup differences—in this case differences between the states (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). However, by using fixed effects, we are not able to explain why there are differences between the states (i.e. how campaign activities affect various states differently). Thus, using an HLM is the best way to handle these data. Based on this, my model looks like the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 DemVoteChoice = & \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(Age) + \beta_{2j}(Race) + \beta_{3j}(Gender) + \beta_{4j}(Ideology) + \beta_{5j}(PartyID) \\
 & + \beta_{6j}(Healthcare) + \beta_{7j}(Iraq) + \varepsilon_{ij}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{1}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RepVoteChoice} = & \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(\text{Age}) + \beta_{2j}(\text{Race}) + \beta_{3j}(\text{Gender}) + \beta_{4j}(\text{Ideology}) + \beta_{5j}(\text{PartyID}) \\ & + \beta_{6j}(\text{Healthcare}) + \beta_{7j}(\text{Iraq}) + \beta_{8j}(\text{Religiosity}) + \varepsilon_{ij} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{Momentum}) + \gamma_{02}(\text{Advertisements}) + \gamma_{03}(\text{Visits}) + \delta_{0j} \quad (3)$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}(\text{Visits}) + \delta_{1j} \quad (4)$$

What we see from Equations (1) – (4) is that Vote Choice is modeled as a function of state-level effects (momentum, advertisements, and visits) and individual-level effects (age, race, gender, ideology, party identification, and issue positions). Equation (1) lays out the model of Democratic vote choice, while Equation (2) lays out that for Republican vote choice. I argue that the individual-level variables are going to vary across the states, and this variation is explained by Equations (3) and (4). Equation (3) models the intercept of the model as a function of candidate momentum, spending on advertisements, and campaign visits. The intercept in these models explains the variation in the average vote choice for a candidate across the states included in the analysis. Equation (4) models the slopes of the individual-level variables as a function of campaign visits, as there is reason to expect that campaign visits have different effects in different states. Each equation also includes an error term, as we cannot assume that the indicators used explain all of the state-level variation.

Results

As demonstrated by Jerit et al (2006) and Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), when using multilevel modeling a good starting point is the random effects ANOVA model.

By running a random effects ANOVA model, we are able to model vote choice as a function of the grand mean of Y . Looking at the ANOVA equation,

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \delta_{0j} + \varepsilon_i \quad (5)$$

we see two random parameters: δ_{0j} and ε_i . The first, δ_{0j} , tells us the second-level random effect, while ε_i tells us the individual-level random effect. More importantly, however, this ANOVA model provides us with the amount of variation found at the different levels of analysis. We are thus able to determine how much between-state variation (T_{00}) is occurring compared to within-state variation (σ^2). Specifically, the ratio of between-state variation (T_{00}) to the total variation ($T_{00} + \sigma^2$) tells us how much of the variance in vote choice is affected by state-level effects, while the ratio of within-state variation to the total variation tells us how much of the variance is due to the individual-level effects.

When we look at the variance patterns with the models run here we see that in most of the models there is a substantial amount of between state variation. Looking at the models for the two Democrat candidates, roughly 36% of the total variation in the Obama model is due to the between-state variance, while there was only about 3% of between-state variation in for the Clinton model. Even though the intraclass correlation for the Clinton model was low, we see below that this variation is explained by the visits Clinton made to the states. Turning to the Republican candidates, we see that in each of the three models there is a substantial amount of between-state variation. In the McCain

model, roughly 11% of the total variation is due to the state-level dynamics. There was a similar amount of between-state variation, about 10%, found in the Huckabee model. The Romney model proved to have the most between-state variation, as the state-level variables explain about 58% of the total variation in the model.

Turning now to the results of the HLMs, we see that when we take into account these different levels of campaign effects there are a number of interesting results in terms of campaign dynamics⁶. I begin by analyzing the results of the models run for the Democratic candidates, which can be found in Table 5.1. Again, the dependent variable is a simple dichotomous measure of whether or not a respondent voted for the candidate of interest (e.g. when analyzing the McCain voters, if a respondent voted for McCain, she was coded as a 1, otherwise she was coded as a 0). Then, I examine the results from the models run for the Republican candidates, which can be found in Table 5.2. Finally, I conclude by offering a general discussion of the results and lessons learned from these models, as well as what needs to be done in the future to further understand the impact of candidate visits.

⁶ To check for correlation across levels of data, I have run Hausman tests for each model. The results for the Clinton, Obama, and Huckabee models were statistically significant, while those for Romney and McCain were statistically insignificant. What this tells us is that by running an HLM, I am asking a lot of the data and this may not be the most appropriate modeling strategy. However, by running an HLM I am able to account for the intraclass correlation previously discussed, which is better than ignoring it altogether, something many models of campaign effects have done in the past.

Table 5.1: Predictors of Vote Choice for the 2008 Democratic Presidential Nominees

	Obama		Clinton	
	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Odds Ratio</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Odds Ratio</u>
Momentum	0.0001 (0.0002)	1.00	-0.0001 (0.0001)	1.00
Ad Spending	2.46* (0.99)	11.76	-0.03 (0.35)	0.97
Home State	----- -----		0.48 (0.34)	1.62
Campaign Visits	1.44 (1.87)	4.21	1.57*** (0.30)	4.78
Age	-0.21*** (0.01)	0.81	0.20*** (0.01)	1.22
Race	2.56*** (0.04)	12.99	-2.39*** (0.04)	0.09
Gender	-0.38*** (0.02)	0.69	0.43*** (0.02)	1.53
Ideology	-0.16*** (0.01)	0.85	0.11*** (0.01)	1.11
Party ID	0.24*** (0.01)	1.27	-0.31*** (0.01)	0.73
Healthcare	-0.07* (0.03)	0.93	0.05 (0.03)	1.05
Iraq	0.52*** (0.03)	1.67	-0.51*** (0.03)	0.60
<i><u>Variance Components:</u></i>				
Campaign Visits	1.35 (0.18)		0.29 (0.04)	
Intercept	-1.69 (0.67)		-1.07 (0.15)	
Sample Size: Ni/Nj	45,538/38		45,538/38	

* denotes p<0.05; **denotes p<0.01; ***denotes p<0.001


Democratic Contenders

Looking at Table 5.1, we see a number of interesting results. For the state-level predictors, I first note that momentum does not affect vote choice for either Clinton or Obama. This is not an overly surprising result since the Democratic nomination campaign ran the entire length of the primary calendar. Neither Clinton nor Obama were able to wrap up the nomination prior to the last state contest. The last two Democratic primaries (Montana and South Dakota) were held on June 3, 2008. Clinton did not concede the nomination to Obama until June 7, drawing the contest out to the bitter end. Throughout the entire campaign season neither Obama nor Clinton won consistently, meaning that neither was able to build a steady stream of momentum. Instead, both candidates won a number of contests, but neither was able to win a significant number of contests in a row. Thus it is not surprising to find that momentum did not play a role in the Democratic nominating contests, as evidenced by these results.

When we look at the spending and visits variables, we see that spending helped Obama and that visits helped Clinton. Campaign spending was the only state-level indicator that achieved significance in the Obama model, while the campaign visits and momentum variables did not attain significance. Spending had a very strong effect for Obama support, evidenced by the odds ratio of 11.7. This tells us that per unit increase in spending, voters were 1000% more likely to vote for Obama over his competitors. Looking at the amount of spending done by the Democratic contenders, we see that Obama outspent all of his competitors, which may explain why we see this strong effect

for Obama. Campaign visits, on the other hand, seemed to be the important state-level predictor for Clinton vote choice, as spending, momentum and home state advantage did not attain significance. However, campaign visits provided Clinton with a large amount of support, as the number of visits Clinton made to states increased her support by a factor of roughly 378%. Much like Obama outspent his fellow contenders, Clinton “out-visited” them. She made more visits than any other Democratic candidate, exemplifying why visits may have had this effect for her and not Obama.

Figure 5.1: Predicted Random Effects for Clinton Visits



Further, when we look at the predicted probabilities of the random effect of visits for Clinton shown in Figure 5.1, we see that for each state Clinton visited, that visit resulted in a positive gain in support among voters. When we look at the predicted probabilities for the random effect of visits for Obama (not shown), we see that by visiting states did not provide Obama with a significant amount of support in any state. Looking at Figure 5.1, we see that for each random effect, the 95% confidence intervals do not cross the zero line, telling us that campaign visits seem to be explaining the state-level variation found in the Clinton model. What we also see in Figure 5.1 is that there is not much variation in the predicted random effects. But, there was not much state-level variation in the Clinton model, so it is not too surprising to see the low amount of variation in the visit effects. In the case of Obama, all of the 95% confidence intervals cross the zero line, further exemplifying that visits do not explain any of the between-state variation in the Obama model.

Turning now to the individual-level results, we see a number of results that were expected for this race. The race variable tells us that African American voters were strongly supporting Obama and female voters were strong supporters of Clinton. Looking at the odds ratios, we see that African Americans were 1100% more likely to support Obama rather than any of his competitors and women were 53% more likely to support Clinton than any of her competitors. As Obama and Clinton proved to be the most viable African American and female candidates for the presidency in our country's

history, respectively, it is unsurprising that we see these patterns among the individual voters.

We also see that age was an important predictor in an individual's vote choice. Obama spent a lot of time campaigning to attract younger voters, also using a variety of new media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, and text messaging) to gain these voters' support (Cornfield 2010; Gulati 2010; Owen 2010). Obama was also younger than any of the other candidates in the race, which may have increased his popularity among younger voters. Looking at Table 5.1, we see that younger voters were 19% more likely to support Obama in the primary contests, whereas older voters were roughly 22% more likely to support Clinton.

Both Obama and Clinton spent a lot of time trying to attract the moderate voters. What we see from these results is that Clinton did a better job attracting more moderate voters than did Obama. Clinton received about 11% more support from moderate voters than did Obama, while Obama received about 15% more support from the more liberal voters. However, when we look at individual's party identification, those that identified as Democrats were more likely to support Clinton than Obama, by a factor of about 27%. While this initially seems contradictory to the ideological results, many Democratic Party leaders initially favored Clinton over Obama, which may have contributed to the partisan results we see here.

Finally, when we look at the results of the issue positions of these candidates, we see that Obama's position on the war in Iraq appealed to voters, while his position on

healthcare turned them off. Voters who deemed healthcare the most important issue were 7% less likely to vote for Obama. Clinton was a champion of healthcare reform while she served as First Lady, so these voters may have seen Clinton as best suited to handle healthcare reform rather than Obama. However, the healthcare variable does not attain significance in the Clinton model, though it is close to statistical significance and in the right direction. Those that viewed war in Iraq as the most important issue at stake in this election were 67% more likely to vote for Obama over his competitors. Obama campaigned on the fact that he opposed the Iraqi invasion from the beginning and that when he was elected, he would bring the troops home immediately. Clinton, on the other hand, initially supported the invasion of Iraq, and later changed her mind on the issue. Thus, it is not surprising that those that viewed the issue of Iraq as most important supported Obama over his competitors.

Republican Contenders

Turning now to the results of the Republican models found in Table 5.2, we see that there are again a number of interesting results. Momentum was not a significant predictor for the John McCain or Mitt Romney models, but momentum did have a small effect (less than 1%) for Mike Huckabee's support. Huckabee was a little known former governor of Arkansas, with little support nationwide. However, Huckabee was able to win the Iowa caucuses and appealed to a number of Southern conservatives and Christian voters. Due to his surprising win in Iowa, Huckabee was thrust into the spotlight more so than prior to the Iowa contests and was seen as a more viable

candidate. Thus, Huckabee was able to gain a small amount of momentum due to his early Iowa victory.

Looking at the campaign spending variable, we see a pattern of results similar to those of momentum. Spending did not have an effect on vote choice for McCain or Romney, but did have an effect for Huckabee. Per unit increase in spending, Huckabee's support increased by a factor of 145%. Huckabee was not as well financed as his competitors, but the spending he did proved to be effective. Again, this may be due to the fact that Huckabee was not as well-known as McCain or Romney and the advertisements he was able to run provided voters with more information than did those run by his competitors. Also, Huckabee raised most of his money later than his competitors. Due to his increased viability and momentum after his Iowa win, he was able to fundraise more effectively later on and thus compete more effectively through advertisements later in the campaign.

Campaign visits increased support for McCain and had no effect for Romney or Huckabee. In fact, when we look at the fixed effects results for McCain, campaign visits are the only significant state-level predictor. As the number of visits McCain made to the various states increased, his vote share increased by a factor of roughly 1000%. Like we saw in the case of Clinton, McCain made more campaign visits than any of his competitors. This further exemplifies why we need to take campaign visits into account when examining campaign effects.

Table 5.2: Predictors of Vote Choice for the 2008 Republican Presidential Nominees

	McCain		Romney		Huckabee	
	Estimate	Odds Ratio	Estimate	Odds Ratio	Estimate	Odds Ratio
Momentum	0.0004 (0.0003)	1.00	0.0006 (0.0010)	1.00	0.0008* (0.0003)	1.001
Ad Spending	0.08 (0.5700)	1.08	0.36 (1.55)	1.43	0.89* (0.42)	2.45
Home State	-0.43 (0.83)	0.65	0.52 (1.87)	1.69	1.54 (1.66)	4.68
Campaign Visits	2.41* (0.98)	11.13	5.74 (3.34)	310.06	-0.19 (1.66)	0.83
Age	0.19*** (0.01)	1.21	0.06*** (0.01)	1.06	-0.15*** (0.01)	0.86
Race	-0.25* (0.12)	0.78	-0.05 (0.17)	0.95	0.22 (0.13)	1.24
Gender	-0.05 (0.03)	0.95	0.09* (0.04)	1.09	0.18*** (0.04)	1.20
Ideology	-0.48*** (0.02)	0.62	0.42*** (0.02)	1.53	0.28*** (0.02)	1.32
Party ID	0.22*** (0.03)	1.25	0.35*** (0.04)	1.41	-0.06 (0.04)	0.94
Relgiosity	-0.62*** (0.03)	0.54	-0.64*** (0.04)	0.53	1.49*** (0.04)	4.43
Economy	0.17*** (0.05)	1.18	-0.18*** (0.04)	0.84	0.05 (0.04)	1.05
Iraq	0.51*** (0.04)	1.66	-0.65*** (0.06)	0.52	-0.15** (0.05)	0.86
<i>Variance Components:</i>						
Campaign Visits	0.65 (0.09)		2.11 (0.35)		0.60 (0.09)	
Intercept	-0.97 (0.33)		-5.96 (0.95)		-2.99 (0.23)	
Sample Size: Ni/Nj	21,551/28		21,551/28		21,551/28	

*denotes p<0.05, **denotes p<0.01, ***denotes p<0.001

Looking at the random effects results for the Republican candidates, there are a couple of interesting results. The predicted random effects with their 95% confidence intervals for McCain and Romney are plotted in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. In both cases we see that the confidence intervals do not cross the zero line, telling us that visits are significant explanations of variation in both the McCain and Romney models. Further, when we look at the predicted random effects, we see that there is not a lot of variation in the values. There is a bit more in the McCain model, with the values fluctuating between the 2 line and 3 line, whereas most of the effects in the Romney model are close to the 6 line. In the Huckabee model, as in the case of the Obama model for the Democrats, we see that all of the 95% confidence intervals cross the zero line, telling us that the between-state variation in the Huckabee model is not explained by campaign visits.

Looking at the individual-level predictors, we also see a number of noteworthy results. First, as expected with age, McCain appealed to older voters. Older voters were more likely to support McCain by a factor of 21%. Second, older voters were also supportive of Romney, but only by a factor of 6%. Third, Huckabee was able to appeal to younger voters in the Republican primaries. Younger voters were 14% more likely to vote for Huckabee rather than his competitors. Part of Huckabee's appeal to younger voters may stem from his more prolific use of new media compared to his competitors. For example, Huckabee embraced the use of Facebook early on in the campaign, and

next to Ron Paul, maintained a higher number of “Fans” than his competitors, until he dropped out of the race (Gulati 2010).

Figure 5.2: Predicted Random Effects for McCain Visits





Figure 5.3: Predicted Random Effects for Romney Visits



The competition over moderates among the Republican candidates was just as strong as it was among the Democrat contenders. Looking at the results in Table 5.2, it appears that John McCain did the best at appealing to moderate voters. As voters became more conservative, they were about 38% less likely to support McCain. Instead, the more conservative voters were about 53% more likely to support Romney or 32% more likely to support Huckabee. McCain was largely seen as a “maverick” and prided himself on standing up to his own fellow Republicans in the Senate, something that appears to have helped him among the moderate voters.

Another interesting aspect of the Republican contests was the role played by religious voters. Unsurprisingly, Huckabee won the support of the religious voters. Those that identified themselves as born again were 343% more likely to support Huckabee. Huckabee, a former Baptist preacher, largely appealed to the religious voters due to his strong ties to religion. In contrast, born again voters were 46% less likely to vote for McCain and 47% less likely to vote for Romney, showing the strong support Huckabee received from these voters.

Finally, when we look at the issues that may have affected vote choice among the Republicans, we see that there are a number of noteworthy results. Among Republican voters we see that both the war in Iraq and the economy were important issues to them throughout the 2008 nomination campaigns. Those that deemed Iraq the most important issue were 66% more likely to support McCain’s bid for the nomination. Throughout the nomination contest, McCain championed his foreign policy experience,

in an effort to portray himself as the best candidate to be commander in chief. Those that thought the economy was the most important issue were also more likely to support McCain over his opponents. Specifically, they were 18% more likely to vote for McCain than his competitors. Even though Romney campaigned largely on his economic experience, voters who thought the economy was the most important issue were actually 16% less likely to support him.

Conclusion

What I have shown here is that campaign visits are an important aspect of the campaign dynamics we see in presidential nomination contests. Long overlooked, campaign visits have proved to be an effective campaign tool of both John McCain and Hillary Clinton. For both of these candidates, making visits to the states increased people's willingness to support them at election time. Candidates often spend a lot of time visiting states throughout the nomination season in an effort to increase their support among voters, and evidently this works. While these visits did not prove effective for all candidates, they were not all for naught, as Clinton and McCain increased their vote shares due to their visits.

Further, I have shown that incorporating both state-level and individual-level data presents us with a more comprehensive picture of how people make choices. Looking at these results we are able to see for which candidates visits proved more effective, ads were more effective, or momentum had a greater effect, as well as how a voter's individual demographics and issue positions affected their vote choice. We can

look at the results and see that despite the campaign dynamics, age, race, and gender still played a large role in an individual's candidate preference in the Democratic contests and age and religiosity played a large role in the Republican contests. Further, a voter's feelings toward Iraq and the economy proved influential in the voting booth. Also, we are able to see which candidate did a better job of appealing to moderate voters. Overall, by running a Hierarchical Linear Model we are given a more complete picture of the 2008 presidential nomination campaigns, as well as a more comprehensive picture of the campaign dynamics seen throughout both the Democratic and Republican contests.

For all of the benefits of this study, there are also a number of drawbacks. First, by using the exit polls I have only been able to use data from states that conduct exit polls, which was only 38 for the Democrats and 28 for the Republicans. While it would have been nice to include all states, I believe this is a good first step at analyzing both individual-level and state-level effects in the same model. Further, by using the exit polls I am able to be more confident with the responses given to the questions in the survey as they are asked the questions directly after voting. This means the responses to the issue questions were more accurately representing the views of the respondents at the time of voting and there is less time for the respondent to forget which candidate they voted for.

Second, the states that conduct exit polls are those states that hold primaries, not caucuses, with the exception of Iowa and Nevada. I am unable to examine whether or

not these results are applicable to caucus states using this data, but there is little reason to believe they would not hold. In fact, there may actually be more variation among the state-level predictors in the caucus states, at least among the Democratic candidates, as Barack Obama spent more time and effort campaigning in caucus states compared to Hillary Clinton.

Further, this chapter examines only one nomination contest, providing little support for generalizability. However, this is beyond the scope of this examination. I have argued that in order to fully model the dynamics of a nomination campaign, both state-level and individual-level data need to be taken into account. In this chapter, I take an initial step in this direction by modeling the 2008 competition in this way. I find that there is evidence that both state and individual predictors need to be accounted for. Thus, an avenue for future research could include testing this multilevel structure over time, to ensure that the 2008 competition was not an outlier.

Despite these limitations, I believe further examining the impact of campaign visits is a fruitful avenue of research and one that is in desperate need of more attention. Future studies may want to look into the role media plays with respect to campaign visits. Clearly the attendance at campaign events in the states is limited and not everyone that may be interested in hearing what the candidate has to say is able to be there. Media coverage of the visit, especially that of local media outlets, may help spread the information provided through the visit to a much wider audience than was able to attend. Thus we may see visits having a direct and indirect effect on vote choice.

I have found evidence that modeling the nomination process in a way that accounts for both aggregate- and individual-level indicators is needed, as there is a substantial amount of variation at both levels. Campaigns affect voters' preferences through both state and individual level dynamics. Due to the lack of predetermined choices in a primary contest—they cannot rely solely on partisan cues, for example—voters are more susceptible to state-level effects along with individual-level effects. Thus, looking at the results presented from a hierarchical linear model of the 2008 nomination competition, we can see that campaigns matter and that to fully explore nomination dynamics, we need to account for both state-level and individual-level variables.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Despite all of the attention given to campaigns by the popular press, the academic community has expressed much less interest. Compared to other aspects of voting behavior and elections, students of electoral politics have paid scant attention to the dynamics of presidential campaigns and how campaigns influence public opinion. At least part of the reason for this neglect is the widespread belief among students of elections that, if campaigns have any effect on the vote decision, it is minimal in comparison to other factors (Holbrook 1996).

Holbrook (1996) succinctly points out an interesting puzzle in American politics.

He rightly points out the press attention given to the campaign activities of all candidates, often flooding voters with nonstop coverage of candidate activity.

However, among election scholars, the question of “do campaigns matter?” receives mixed answers. Some argue that campaigns have minimal, if any, effects. Rather than campaign effects, it is just a few variables (e.g. partisanship, incumbent evaluation, and economic evaluations) that determine turnout and candidate preference (Campbell et al 1960; Fiorina 1981; Hillygus and Jackman 2003). Others argue that campaigns do indeed matter and are effective in mobilizing voters and persuading them to support a specific candidate (Hillygus and Shields 2008; Holbrook 1996; Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Huber and Arceneaux 2007; Kenski et al 2010; Shaw 1999a, 1999b; West 2005, 2008). This conflicting evidence thus begs the question of which set of scholars is correct.

One of the goals of this dissertation was to show that campaigns do indeed matter and I do believe this goal was met. From looking at the existing research on nomination campaigns as well as the research done in this dissertation, it is clear that

campaigns do indeed matter, especially at the nomination stage. Aldrich (1980) and Bartels (1988) set up thorough arguments demonstrating the importance of campaign activity in presidential nominating contests. Aldrich (1980) presents multiple reasons that campaign activity should be effective at mobilizing and persuading voters.

Nomination campaigns are vastly different from general election campaigns. In nomination campaigns, voters are forced to choose a candidate from an intra-party contest rather than an inter-party contest. Further, nomination elections are more complex and confusing than general elections. Instead of choosing an elected official, voters are choosing an individual to run in the general election. Finally, general elections take place on one day, while nomination contests take place over the course of several months. Because of the prolonged nature of the nomination season, campaign activity may affect voters differently at various points throughout the season.

Candidates demonstrate viability and electability by winning early contests and establishing momentum, which can propel these candidates over the others at different points throughout the season.

Using this literature as a basis for exploring campaign effects in nomination campaigns, I have demonstrated that nomination campaigns are important. They mobilize voters. They also have a strong effect on candidate preference. In addition to simply examining the effect of nomination campaigns on vote choice and mobilization, I have begun to uncover the effects of campaign visits in these campaigns. Scant research has been done on the effects campaign visits have on mobilization and vote choice. I

have argued that by not including campaign visits, we are not correctly modeling campaign effects. Throughout the span of a nomination season, candidates make multiple visits to almost all of the 50 states. By not including these visits in our models of campaign effects, we are ignoring a large part of the campaign. By incorporating these visits into our models, we are able to get a more comprehensive picture of what campaign activities are actually affecting voters, both in terms of turnout and vote choice.

Candidates Are Strategic

The fact that candidates are—and need to be—strategic is not a big surprise. Candidates need to run a campaign with limited time and resources. They need to make decisions about how much time to devote to certain states and how much money to spend on advertising in specific media markets. If candidates were given an unlimited budget, we would see even more ads and visits than we currently do. However—and despite the desires of all candidates to run for office—candidates are not given unlimited budgets. They are constrained to spending only what they can fundraise, or what federal election laws tell them they can spend. While many studies have examined candidate strategy, these strategy studies had only briefly examined campaign visits. The first question explored in this dissertation was whether or not campaign visits are strategic in nature. Do candidates visit the early states more than others? Are they making more visits to states with larger delegate counts? Or, are candidates perceived as top-tier making more visits than those that are seen as second tier candidates?

I have explored these questions in both the invisible primary period and the actual primary season, as the strategy behind visits in these two distinct phases of the nomination campaign should be different. Throughout the invisible primary period, we should expect candidates to be fundraising and trying to make a name for themselves with voters. In the actual primary period, we should expect candidates to be more focused on accumulating delegates and touting their (hopefully) high placement in previous contests.

What we see is that candidates are indeed being strategic in their choice of states to visit. Throughout the invisible primary season, candidates are focused on states with large delegate counts, states that have early primaries, and states that do not have their primaries on the same day as another state. What this tells us is that candidates are trying to put as much focus as possible on states that will help them win the nomination. They are targeting states that will help them gain momentum early in the race in an effort to prove their viability and electability. Visits during the invisible primary period may also be driven by fundraising. Candidates often make trips to California and New York because of the amount of fundraising that can be done there. In future models, I will look into controlling for citizen wealth to see how much of the invisible primary visits are being driven by fundraising goals.

Next, when we look at the visits made during the actual primary season, we see a shift away from targeting early states, to targeting instead the primary states. States that hold primaries rather than caucuses generally have more delegates up for grabs.

Further, caucuses require more time from the voters than do primaries. For a primary, all the voter has to do is show up at the polling place and cast a ballot. At a caucus, voters typically listen to speeches from various party members and vote. Thus, candidates want to target states that hold primaries rather than caucuses, because they are able to accumulate more delegates and because they have a greater chance of actually having their supporters show up and vote. Finally, both Democratic and Republican candidates focus on states with large delegate counts and those that hold their nominating contest on a unique day. In an effort to wrap up the nomination season, candidates are trying to accumulate the number of delegates needed to clinch the nomination and thus target states that have the most delegates up for grabs. Further, states that do not hold their contest on the same day as another state receive more attention because candidates have the time to focus on that state and not have to worry about another contest on the same day.

As a whole, what we see is that candidates are strategic in choosing which states to visit. States with larger delegate totals that hold early contests, and hold primaries rather than caucuses are likely to get many visits, while a state that holds a caucus later in the nomination season with only a few delegates up for grabs will likely be ignored. Candidates need to be strategic about how they spend their time and money. Focusing on these smaller states will not produce the kind of return that larger states will. Thus, the strategy behind why a visit is made may change from the invisible to the actual

primary period, but candidates are still being strategic about how to best utilize their resources, no matter the reason behind the visit.

Voter Mobilization

The classic paradox of voter mobilization tells us that education—an important indicator of turnout—is increasing, but turnout is actually decreasing (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). While we should actually see a positive relationship between these two variables, we actually see a negative one, leaving many scholars examining turnout puzzled. Although this is a troubling finding, the reason behind the inverse relationship is actually quite simple. Voters are not being asked to turnout like they have been in the past. Voter mobilization has declined steadily since the 1960s and because of this, voter turnout has decreased steadily over the same time period. Yes, we should be seeing voters turnout in record numbers, but as Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) and Popkin (1994) point out, voters need to be asked to turn out. Voters need to be stimulated and excited in order to participate. The candidates need to do a better job of reaching out to voters and making them feel like they have a role in the campaign. Because of this lack of voter mobilization, we have witnessed a steady decline in voter turnout over the past several decades.

In 2008, however, voters were excited. They witnessed the first viable African American and female candidates battling for the Democratic nomination. Barack Obama also targeted young voters throughout his campaign, by reassuring them they could make a difference. The Republicans also ran a number of interesting candidates

with Mitt Romney's Mormon beliefs and Mike Huckabee's background as a Baptist preacher. Voter mobilization should have been quite high in 2008 because these important groups were excited about their respective party's candidates.

While these demographic groups did show up in record numbers, there was little evidence found that the campaign activities by these candidates did much to actually mobilize these voters. The strongest effect found was for religious voters in the Republican Party. These voters were drawn away from both John McCain and Mitt Romney to support Mike Huckabee, the former Baptist preacher—and governor—from Arkansas. Huckabee's advertising proved effective in mobilizing these voters. While McCain and Romney tried to make appeals to these voters through their advertising and visits, these voters were actually turned off by a significant amount and instead fully supported Huckabee.

Despite the mobilization of religious voters in the Republican Party, there was no mobilization within Democratic voters. I analyzed three important voting blocs for Democratic candidates: African Americans, females, and young voters. Advertisements, visits, momentum, home state advantage, and the type of primary used were ineffective in mobilizing voters supporting Obama or Clinton in 2008. While this does seem to show that campaign activity in 2008 did not mobilize voters, clearly these groups turned out at higher than usual levels, meaning something mobilized these voters. Given the historical precedence, African Americans and females may have been predisposed to support Obama and Clinton, respectively, solely on the basis of their demographics.

These voters may have been simply predisposed to support these candidates, no matter how much energy a candidate put into recruiting voters.

This does not mean that mobilization did not occur at all throughout the 2008 nomination season. Most of these groups simply were not mobilized by the campaign activity in a specific state by these candidates. This could be due to the fact that the contest between Obama and Clinton became a more nationalized contest. It could be that the nationalization of certain state contests and the national events held by these two candidates completely washed out any state-specific mobilization efforts. Further, because 2008 was a unique year, presenting the American people with a variety of interesting candidates, I would like to compare this election with the one in 2012 to see if there is a difference in turnout patterns between these two elections. This would allow us to get a better picture of who is being mobilized and why it is happening.

Candidate Preference

In a general election, candidate preference is driven by partisan identification. Whether a voter identifies as a Democrat or a Republican largely determines which candidate that voter will support. This general conclusion is why many scholars argue that campaigns really do have minimal effects. If vote choice is largely driven by partisanship, then the campaign activities are ineffective. In a nomination campaign, however, campaign activity should matter more because voters are forced to choose their party's nominee from a slate of candidates all belonging to that same party.

When we look at the results in this dissertation, this is indeed what we see. Campaign activities affected vote choice. For Barack Obama and Mike Huckabee, campaign advertising was most important. Both of these candidates received higher vote shares because of their ads. In contrast, Hillary Clinton and John McCain both benefited from campaign visits. An interesting aspect to note here is that both Clinton and McCain made the most visits within their respective parties. While it may require some more research to fully determine how visits are having the effects they have, it seems as though out-visiting your opponents increases your vote share. Further, the only candidate to benefit from momentum is Mike Huckabee. Huckabee was a surprise winner of the Iowa caucus in 2008 and benefited some from this early win. However, his momentum slowly dissolved, as McCain clinched the nomination shortly after Super Tuesday. Despite McCain winning the nomination, we still saw momentum pick the second place winner in the Republican nomination contest. Norrander (1993, 2000) argues that momentum is actually a good predictor of second place finishers. Neither Obama nor Clinton was ever able to gain momentum. As these candidates volleyed back and forth throughout the entire nomination season, it is not surprising to see that neither ever gained momentum, furthering exemplifying Aldrich's (1980) theory concerning momentum in two-candidate contests.

While I found a number of campaign effects with respect to candidate preference, I was also able to explore individual-level effects by running a hierarchical linear model [HLM] to fully explore the question of vote choice. This model is the first

to explore the question of vote choice in this way. By using an HLM, I was able to explore both the campaign effects as well as individual predispositions. As voters are not going into the voting booths as blank slates, it would be naïve to assume that individual predispositions play no role in determining whom these voters support. Using an HLM lets us look at voters as individuals nested within a campaign environment (in this case, a state), in order to really take a look at the effects campaign activity has on an individual's vote choice.

In terms of individual-level effects, what I have shown is that party identification, ideology, demographics, and issue positions also had an impact in the 2008 nominating contests. While campaign activities also had a role in shaping vote choice, these individual-level predispositions also mattered. African Americans were predisposed to vote for Obama, while females strongly supported Clinton. Religious voters preferred Huckabee to his challengers, as did more conservative Republicans. The war in Iraq also proved to be an important issue, with Republicans preferring McCain to Huckabee or Romney and Obama to Clinton when deciding who they thought would better handle the situation.

If we only looked at individual-level or state-level campaign effects, we would not have seen the results we see here. We may have found different effects at either level, or not found any at all. By using an HLM, however, I was able to put together a more comprehensive picture of how a voter makes a decision. I was able to determine that despite individual predispositions and attitudes, campaign effects still emerge. We

do not have to analyze one level at a time; we can include both in the same model. This gives us a better idea of how voters choose among candidates as well as how strong an effect the various campaign activities have on vote choice.

Contributions

What I have demonstrated in this dissertation is that campaign visits are an important part of the candidates' toolboxes. Candidates have a variety of tools with which to reach out to voters, inform them about the issues, espouse their character, mobilize them, and persuade them to vote a certain way. A candidate needs to inform voters about herself if she wants a voter's support. A voter will not vote for a candidate they have not heard of. Because of this, I have further pursued the effect of campaign visits. Campaign visits are a valuable learning tool for voters. Visits allow a voter to get an up-close-and-personal look at the candidates and allow candidates to provide a more personal message to voters. Visits also provide a candidate with the ability to reach out to party activists, persuade them to support her candidacy, and recruit their friends, peers, and coworkers to support her candidacy as well. Because of the unique nature of campaign visits, their role in campaigning should be quite valuable.

However, we are unsure of the value of campaign visits because they have been understudied by campaign scholars. A few pieces have begun to examine their contribution to campaigning, but overall, their effect on mobilization and vote choice is not well understood (Johnston et al 2004; Jones 1998; Ridout et al 2009; Shaw 1999b). These pieces give us mixed results in terms of visit effects. Johnston et al (2004) point

out that visits have a negligible, if not negative effect on turnout, while Shaw (1999b) points out that visits have a positive effect. Jones (1998) performs an aggregate analysis of campaign visits, but fails to examine other campaign activity, leaving us questioning what effect these visits are truly having on mobilization. Are visits having a unique effect, or are they having an effect because he is leaving out other campaign activity? In my dissertation, I have tried to help parse out the effects of campaign visits by examining first the strategy behind the visits, then the effect they have on voter turnout, and finally their effect on candidate preference. Further, I have included a number of other campaign activities, as I acknowledge candidates are doing much more than just making visits to the states.

In my analysis of candidate preference, I have attempted to bridge both individual-level predispositions and aggregate-level studies of vote choice. To date, studies of candidate preference in presidential nominating contests have analyzed either individual-level indicators of vote choice or aggregate-level campaign effects. I have used a hierarchical linear model [HLM] to bring both levels into the same model. This gives us a more complete picture of what is truly driving a voter's decision-making process. Voters are not just driven by their individual predispositions, nor are they driven solely by campaign activities. Instead, both individual-level predispositions and state-level campaign effects are working together to influence how a voters chooses among candidates running for nomination. I have shown that by using an HLM we are able to combine both levels of data into one model, and that when we do this, we see

significant predictors at both levels. Further, I have been able to parse out the differences between campaign visits, campaign advertisements, and candidate momentum. With these measures, we are able to see a more comprehensive theory on vote choice in presidential nominating contests.

In examining the role of strategy behind the visits, I have uncovered different strategies behind visits made in the invisible primary period vis-à-vis those made throughout the actual primary season. By analyzing the visits during these two separate stages, I am able to speak to the specific strategy used by the candidates throughout the campaign. Clearly the goals of these two separate stages are different, and I have shown that the strategies used to meet these goals are also different. I have built off of Ridout, Rottinghaus, and Hosey (2009) who analyzed the strategy behind visits in 2004 and 2008. While they conduct a comprehensive analysis of the strategy behind visits, they fail to analyze the separate stages of the nomination season. Instead, they have combined both phases into one nomination season. While this does present us with a picture of the strategy behind visits, it is an incomplete one. The goals of candidates at these two distinct stages are different. Throughout the invisible primary period, candidates are focused on fundraising and obtaining high poll standings. During the actual primary period, candidates are focused on winning the nomination. They shift their focus toward the number of delegates and setting themselves up for the general election campaign.

Finally, I have explored the role of voter mobilization in presidential nominating contests in a new way. I have examined group-specific turnout using exit poll data rather than performing an aggregate analysis of turnout. By using the exit poll data from the general election in 2004 and the nominating contests in 2008, I was able to calculate how much turnout had increased or decreased. Using my data on campaign visits, advertisements, and momentum, I was able to examine if any of these campaign activities had an impact on turnout. I found that Mike Huckabee was successful at mobilizing the religious conservatives, but other candidates failed to mobilize voters with state-specific campaign activities. However, this may speak more to the fact that turnout rates are generally lower in nomination contests than in general elections, rather than poor mobilization efforts by the candidates.

Where Do We Go From Here?

The goal of this dissertation was two-fold: to examine the effectiveness of campaign activities and begin to unpack the effects of campaign visits. While I have come up with some answers to the questions I have raised throughout this dissertation, I have also generated more questions than I had when I began. Yes, campaigns matter. In fact, they matter a great deal—at least at the nomination stage of an election. I have shown that even when individual-level traits and characteristics are included in a model of vote choice, campaign activity still matters. However, we are now faced with the question of why we see the results we see. Why were visits effective in persuading voters for Clinton and not Obama? Why were advertisements effective for Obama but

not for Clinton? Was it simply that Obama outspent Clinton and Clinton out-visited Obama? What implication does this have for candidate strategy? More research is needed in order to test these questions.

Further, more research is needed into the timing of the visits. While I have shown that visits are effective, we may be able to better understand these effects if we looked further into the timing of the visits. Do visits that occur closer to the vote date have a larger impact than visits that occur near the beginning of the nomination season? This is something that needs further exploration. Voters may forget visits made early on in the primary calendar, whereas a visit made a few days before election day would be fresh in the voters' minds, and thus have a stronger effect on mobilization and/or candidate preference. In contrast, maybe voters would appreciate an early visit. This may be a way for a candidate to show she takes the concerns of that state seriously, and is not just pandering to these states for votes.

The purpose of campaign visits needs to be examined more than I have been able to do in these few chapters. For example, does a fundraising visit have a different effect than a rally or stump speech? I would guess that those attending a fundraising event would already be supportive of that candidate, while those attending a campaign rally would be more likely to be less committed to a candidate. While I do believe these different purposes may lead to different results, there is no reason to doubt the results presented in this dissertation. This was a first step in determining whether or not campaign visits matter. I have shown that they do. By including fundraising visits in

my visits measure, I have only made the measure more conservative, as I suspect that those attending a fundraising event would be predisposed to support that candidate whether that visit was held or not.

Finally, this dissertation only examines campaign effects in one year. While I have argued that 2008 is indeed a good testing ground for campaign effects, there are still questions of generalizability. Clearly future research is needed in order to determine the generalizability of these results, but I see no reason why these results would not hold in future election years.

In my dissertation, I have explored the role of campaign visits in the 2008 nominating contests. I began by laying a theoretical foundation for which to think about campaign visits and why they should matter. Next, I explored whether or not these visits were strategic, and found that they were. Then, I moved to the role visits played in voter mobilization. Unfortunately, visits were not found to affect voter turnout for any candidate in 2008. Finally, I examined vote choice in a way to include both individual-level and state-level campaign effects. By using this model, I have created a very comprehensive model of vote choice. A model in which we are able to see how campaign activity affects vote choice, while also exploring how an individual's predispositions and traits affect vote choice at the same time. With this model, we are able to look at the results and say confidently that campaigns do indeed matter, and so do campaign visits.

APPENDIX A

**PERCENTAGES OF CAMPAIGN VISITS RECEIVED BY STATES HOLDING
PRIMARIES FROM EACH CANDIDATE**

<u>State</u>	<u>Obama</u>	<u>Clinton</u>	<u>McCain</u>	<u>Romney</u>	<u>Huckabee</u>
Alabama	50.0%	37.5%	50.0%	25.0%	8.3%
Arizona	15.4%	38.5%	-----	-----	-----
Arkansas	16.7%	83.3%	33.3%	0.0%	94.4%
California	16.8%	35.7%	28.2%	24.2%	6.3%
Connecticut	31.3%	18.8%	44.4%	44.4%	0.0%
Deleware	33.3%	11.1%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Florida	26.9%	23.1%	20.5%	27.0%	9.4%
Georgia	38.9%	13.7%	12.8%	31.6%	15.8%
Illinois	-----	-----	35.7%	31.0%	3.4%
Indiana	42.9%	57.1%	-----	-----	-----
Iowa	16.3%	14.1%	15.9%	19.6%	15.3%
Kentucky	21.4%	57.1%	-----	-----	-----
Louisiana	26.7%	40.0%	40.0%	10.0%	0.0%
Maryland	30.0%	60.0%	27.3%	13.3%	20.0%
Massachusetts	31.8%	31.8%	15.4%	52.2%	4.3%
Michigan	16.0%	12.0%	31.5%	33.3%	7.6%
Mississippi	28.6%	57.1%	50.0%	0.0%	20.0%
Missouri	38.1%	28.6%	27.3%	23.1%	11.5%
Montana	57.1%	28.6%	-----	-----	-----
Nevada	18.9%	16.8%	21.1%	31.0%	3.4%
New Hampshire	14.3%	16.1%	22.8%	19.0%	15.1%
New Jersey	27.3%	54.5%	7.3%	0.0%	0.0%
New Mexico	5.9%	5.9%	-----	-----	-----
New York	19.7%	40.8%	51.1%	17.8%	0.0%
North Carolina	29.3%	51.2%	-----	-----	-----
Ohio	37.2%	37.3%	53.3%	23.5%	17.6%
Oklahoma	12.5%	37.5%	13.3%	30.8%	0.0%
Oregon	35.3%	29.4%	-----	-----	-----
Pennsylvania	34.4%	42.2%	-----	-----	-----
Rhode Island	50.0%	50.0%	-----	-----	-----
South Carolina	22.3%	16.3%	35.6%	15.9%	17.4%
South Dakota	44.4%	55.6%	-----	-----	-----
Tennessee	14.3%	28.6%	42.9%	20.0%	30.0%
Texas	35.0%	45.0%	32.7%	14.9%	26.9%
Utah	50.0%	25.0%	3.4%	55.6%	11.1%
Vermont	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	33.3%	0.0%
Virginia	30.0%	40.0%	50.0%	16.0%	12.0%
West Virginia	16.7%	66.7%	-----	-----	-----
Wisconsin	46.2%	30.8%	58.3%	0.0%	21.4%

Note: ----- denotes Exit Poll not available for that state

APPENDIX B

SURVEY QUESTION WORDING AND CODING SCHEME FOR INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL PREDICTORS FROM CHAPTER 5

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:

"In today's Democratic presidential primary, did you just vote for?"

0=Did Not Vote, 1=Joe Biden, 2=Chris Dodd, 3=Hillary Clinton, 4= John Edwards 5= Mike Gravel, 6= Dennis Kucinich, 7=Barack Obama 8=Bill Richardson, 9=Other"

I then created two dummy variables for those that voted for Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. In both cases, 1=voted for Clinton (Obama) 0=did not vote for Clinton (Obama).

DEMOGRAPHICS:

Gender: Females coded as 1. Males coded as 0.

Race: African Americans coded as 1. All other races coded as 0.

Age: 6 categories from young to old, as coded by the Exit Poll.
1=18-24, 2=25-29, 3=30-44, 4=45-49, 5=50-64, 6=65 and older

IDEOLOGY AND PARTISANSHIP:

Ideology: Coded on a 5-point scale. 1=Very Liberal, 2=Somewhat Liberal, 3=Moderate, 4=Somewhat Conservative, 5=Very Conservative.

Partisan Identification: Coded on a 4-point scale, as done by the Exit Poll.
1=Democrat, 2=Republican, 3=Independent, 4=Something Else

I then recoded this to a 3-point scale as follows: Democrat, Independent, and Republican

RELIGIOSITY:

Variable created for Republican models only.

"Would you describe yourself as a born-again or evangelical Christian?
1=Yes, 2=No"

I recoded this to be a dummy variable, so 1=Yes, 0=No.

CANDIDATE ISSUE POSITIONS:

For Democratic Candidates:

“Which ONE of these three issues is the most important facing the country?

1=The economy, 2=The war in Iraq, 3=Health care, 9=Omit”

For Republican Candidates:

“Which ONE of these four issues is the most important facing the country?

1=Illegal immigration, 2=The war in Iraq, 3=The economy, 4=Terrorism”

I have created two dummy variables from this question for both the Democrats and Republicans. For the Democrats, one variable was created for healthcare and one was created for the war in Iraq. For the Healthcare variable, those that believe healthcare is most important were coded 1, all else 0. The same scheme was used to create an Iraq variable. The same coding scheme was applied to the war in Iraq and the economy for the Republicans.

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