

CULTURES OF MODERNITY IN THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN COLD  
WAR ALLIANCE

by

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DEDICATION

For my parents

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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the cultural and intellectual factors in the remaking of US-Japan relations which transformed as the two countries transitioned from enemies to allies after 1945. Diverging from the traditional approaches of diplomatic and political history that, focusing on state actors, describe policymaking processes, I comparatively study public discourses in 1940s-early 1950s America and Japan where various groups and actors – politicians, bureaucrats, journalists, scholars, and intellectuals – participated and created. Both peoples shared a similar discourse concerning modernization and, indeed, developed parallel ideas about modern Japanese history and the causes of Japanese militarism, the postwar democratization of Japan, and the making of a postwar Asian peace. They believed in the European progressive view of history, variously interpreted, and judged Japan to be “underdeveloped,” compared with the “advanced West,” having become an unlawful aggressor nation in the 1930s. Such views of a “failed” modernity and subsequent war rationalized Allied occupation and democratization reforms in post-surrender Japan. The more influenced by Marxian theories, the more critical they were of Japan’s incomplete modernization, and the more enthusiastic for Allied – or American – intervention in postwar reforms. American and Japanese discourses on the reform of Japan’s political organization, namely constitutional revision, show similar reformist plans from reconstruction of the constitutional monarchy to republican options. Those adopting Marxist analyses found the root cause of Japan’s undemocratic and aggressive nature in the emperor system called for its elimination; those who did not believe that democratization required the overthrow of monarchy suggested reforming Japan’s imperial institution to make democratic government function better. In addition, both Americans and Japanese shared the Wilsonian idea of internationalism, and they expected Japan to reenter the postwar Asia-Pacific as a totally demilitarized, democratic, and pacifist country that could contribute to peace and development of the region. With the Cold War, the US policies for Asia and Japan altered. So did the internationalist visions, causing political debates in the United States and Japan. My work ultimately shows such parallel and intersecting cultures where US-Japan relations were rehabilitated in the immediate-postwar years.

## INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the cultural and intellectual foundations on which US-Japan relations were grounded in the immediate postwar era, the so-called Occupation period from 1945 to 1952. Through the course of the Occupation period, the relationship between the United States and Japan dramatically changed from WWII adversaries to victor-and-vanquished and finally to Cold War allies. This new relationship did not simply mean the shift from enemy to friend. The Occupation period was a critical time for the United States, absorbed as the country was in reframing the world order as a new hegemon, turning itself fully towards internationalism, and engaging in the Cold War with the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union. According to its new foreign policy, the United States redefined Japan as its “democratic” friend in Asia and sought to keep the country on the American side in the new bipolar world. The Occupation was also a crucial time for Japan to realign its diplomacy with “liberal” nations, such as the United States, Britain, and Western Europe, and resume its pursuit of national interests within the world system dominated by them, rather than challenge it as Japan had done during the wartime. When we consider the continuity of this paradigm and the centrality of the US-Japan alliance system in Japanese diplomacy during the Cold War, a close examination of political thoughts during the Occupation becomes more important to better understand postwar US-Japan relations.

In this study, I identify parallel groups of “modernist” thinkers in America and Japan – including intellectuals, scholars, journalists, bureaucrats, and politicians – and follow how different strands of thought played out within the evolving postwar political environment, forming what I call a “middle ground.” Despite their differences, both the Americans and the Japanese believed in the European progressive view of history, considered Japan to be still underdeveloped, and therefore agreed on the advisability of democratizing reforms. They also

shared the Wilsonian vision of internationalism and independently devised similar designs for a postwar Asian order. Thus, my work ultimately shows how such a cultural confluence facilitated the quick forging of a positive postwar political relationship between two former enemies.

Both in the West and in Japan, political and diplomatic historians have led the study of postwar US-Japan relations. Among prominent scholars of the field are Roger Buckley, Richard B. Finn, Akira Iriye, John W. Dower, Howard B. Schonberger, and Michael Schaller from Britain and the United States; and Hosoya Chihiro, Hata Ikuhiko, Takemae Eiji, Amakawa Akira, Igarashi Takeshi, and Iokibe Makoto from Japan.<sup>1</sup> These scholars' explanations of the relationship between the United States and Japan assume that diplomatic relations are ultimately the products of policymakers who struggle among themselves over the designs of their governments' foreign policies. They have thus meticulously examined policymaking processes and bureaucratic negotiations in Washington and Tokyo and between the two and have also illuminated political leaders' world views and the pursuit of respective national interests.

Regarding the postwar relationship between the United States and Japan, America's Cold War

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<sup>1</sup> Their leading works include: Roger Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: McArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Akira Iriye, *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999); Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent: The Kent University Press, 1989); Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Hosoya Chihiro, *San Furanshisuko Kōwa heno Michi* (The Road to the San Francisco Peace) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1984); Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu (Ministry of Finance, History of Finance Office), ed., *Shōwa Zaisei-shi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan: Amerika no tai-Nichi Senryō Seisaku* (A History of Finance of the Showa Period from the End of War to Peace vol. 3: American Occupation Policies for Japan) (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1976); Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swan (New York: Continuum, 2002); Amakawa Akira, "Sengo Seiji Kaikaku no Zentei: Amerika ni okeru tai-Nichi Senryō no Junbi Katei" (The Premises of Postwar Political Reform: The Preparatory Stages of American Occupation Policy toward Japan), in *Gendai Gyōsei to Kanryōsei* (Modern Administration and the Bureaucracy), ed. Taniuchi Yuzuru et al. (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1974), 131-199; Igarashi Takeshi, *Tai-Nichi Kōwa to Reisen: Sengo Nichi-Bei Kankei no Keisei* (The Peace with Japan and the Cold War: The Formation of Postwar Japanese-American Relations) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986); Iokibe Makoto, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku: Sengo Nihon no Sekkeizu: Jō · Ge* (United States Occupation Policies for Japan: A Design for a Postwar Japan 2 vols.) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1985).

vision and strategy had particular weight with these scholars.

Japanese scholars and American historians of Japan have contributed Japanese perspectives to the America-centric narrative of post-1945 US-Japan relations.<sup>2</sup> For instance, in *Embracing Defeat*, definitely the most significant work on the Allied Occupation of Japan in the West, John W. Dower complicates the picture of this whole period by uncovering various aspects of post-surrender Japanese life and recreating the dynamism of the Occupation in which a wide range of peoples participated – American occupiers, Japanese conservative leaders, intellectuals, labor unions, communists, women, and children. Nevertheless, in terms of the question of what helped reestablish the US-Japan relationship during this period, Dower’s discussion, just like other diplomatic historians’, clearly points to America’s Cold War interests and collaboration with Japanese conservatives as the key factors.

A younger generation of diplomatic historians has begun to explore “cultural” causes in the reconstruction of US-Japan relations after 1945. For example, in *America’s Geisha Ally*, Naoko Shibusawa argues that the reason why the Americans accepted their World War enemy in Asia as a Cold War ally was the perception of the Japanese as women or young children in American culture.<sup>3</sup> While she downplays the role of the US government in promoting “cultural diplomacy” and explains the shifting images of the Japanese as a cultural phenomenon semi-independent of the state, Hiroshi Kitamura describes a front of American “cultural imperialism,” the US scheme to remold Japanese minds by endorsing Hollywood’s re-penetration of the Japanese film industry. In contrast with Shibusawa’s work, his *Screening Enlightenment*,

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<sup>2</sup> Masumi Jun’nosuke’s *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō · Ge* (Postwar Politics 1945-55 2 vols.) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1983) and Hayashi Shigeru’s and Tsuji Kiyooki’s *Nihon Naikaku-shiroku 5* (A History of the Japanese Cabinets vol. 5) (Tokyo: Daiichi Hōki Shuppan, 1981) account Japanese politics during the Occupation period in detail. John W. Dower sheds light on the Japanese political scenes by focusing on former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru in *Empire and Aftermath*. Similarly, as the subtitle indicates, Richard B. Finn’s *Winners in Peace* narrates the Allied Occupation by including Japanese political actors – particularly Yoshida – in the story.

<sup>3</sup> Naoko Shibusawa, *America’s Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

although not the main theme of the book, takes Japanese responses into consideration; complementing her thesis, he suggests that Japanese receptivity supported America's cultural expansion and the re-forging of friendship between the two nations.<sup>4</sup>

Political and diplomatic history provides us with rich information about precisely how specific policies are planned, negotiated, and implemented by state actors. This top-heavy approach, however, leaves us with the impression that policymaking is a different realm totally detached from that of society. In the extreme case, this approach, as notable American professor of Japanese history Carol Gluck comments, produces an unintended effect: the "concentration on bureaucratic paper fosters a kind of document blindness that makes the policy seem the clear reality and renders everything but what is written invisible."<sup>5</sup> Whether dealing with only one country or many, scholars of traditional political and diplomatic history only assess the top layers of bureaucratic and political interaction. The "cultural" approaches taken by younger scholars of US-Japan relations carry similar limitations. Shibusawa studies only one side of the Pacific – America –, and Kitamura explores the US political use of a cultural power ("soft" power) only through movies: in other words, one cultural approach is unilateral, and the other remains top-down and America-centered.

Comparative research on political discourses in both the United States and Japan provides me with a way to transcend these limitations. I bridge the two countries by taking a comparative approach, and I connect the realms of politics and culture by putting the former in the context of the latter. Politicians and bureaucrats are the products of their cultures: they develop their ideas, opinions, and policies in the environments in which they live. By locating

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<sup>4</sup> Hiroshi Kitamura, *Screening Enlightenment: Hollywood and the Cultural Reconstruction of Defeated Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).

<sup>5</sup> Carol Gluck, "Entangling Illusions – Japanese and American Views of the Occupation," in *New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations: Essays Presented to Dorothy Borg*, ed. Warren I. Cohen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 182.

the state actors in the political culture in which they participate, I can avoid treating them as if they constitute an entity separate from society. As the following chapters show, my study tracks similar intellectual currents and developments in both American and Japanese public discourses. This allows me to suggest truly how cultural forces could facilitate, if not dictate, the formation of postwar US-Japan relations.

I do not pretend that my approach is entirely original. I am greatly influenced by Akira Iriye, a leading Japanese historian of US-East Asian relations. He has emphasized the importance of comparative approaches and cultural studies in diplomatic history for half a century, but I find his work never outdated and always provocative. My thesis that culture worked as a supporting agent of the postwar alliance between the United States and Japan is an expansion of the argument that Iriye makes in *Power and Culture*. He shows that during the Pacific War, American and Japanese policymakers shared Wilsonian visions for an international order and developed similar war aims and peace plans. In his concluding remarks, he suggests that such shared ideas – “cultures” – ultimately led to the normalization of American-Japanese relations after the war.<sup>6</sup> Although his research is not about the postwar years, my findings agree with him that cultural affinity did exist between the United States and Japan.

It was not only Wilsonian internationalism, as Iriye stresses, however, that bound the United States and Japan in a constructive way; it was the ideological concept of modernity that had remade both domestic and international environments. While there were disagreements over methods and degrees, the Americans and the Japanese agreed that Japan was not fully modern or democratic and therefore should go through further democratization. Accordingly, the US government began to plan post-surrender reforms for Japan as early as the summer of 1942. As scholars of Japanese history have noted, because the Japanese had followed their own

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<sup>6</sup> Iriye, *Power and Culture*, 261-268.

evolutionary path to democratization for over seventy years prior to the end of World War II, they had been prepared to implement many reforms by themselves after the war. This explains the general acceptance of domestic reforms by both Americans and Japanese and their overall success.

In terms of international relations, as Iriye proposed, the Americans and the Japanese reimagined a Wilsonian world order embracing the expansion of liberal democracy, the end to colonialism, open trade, and great-power cooperation to maintain peace. As pointed out by Iriye's critics, the post-1945 order was not the same as that of post-1917.<sup>7</sup> Wilsonian internationalism, which had offered a progressive alternative to the balance of power and imperial order in the 1910s, transformed through World War II and the Cold War. Franklin D. Roosevelt's internationalism altered that of Woodrow Wilson by calling for a vindictive peace with Germany and Japan and by applying a realist idea of "four policemen" to a system of collective security. The Cold War internationalism of the Harry S. Truman administration adapted a policy of realpolitik further to fulfill Wilsonian premises of world peace and employed the idealist rhetoric that disguised realism.<sup>8</sup> Yet, they were both variants of Wilsonianism, and we can find only disagreements among internationalists, rather than the denial of Wilsonian ideals, not only in the United States but also in Japan. The reviewers of Iriye's work are right in pointing out that while he emphasizes the continuities in America's wartime policy toward Japan even after the beginning of the Cold War, the Cold War affected the Occupation course.<sup>9</sup>

However, considering the endurance of the Wilsonian internationalist vision, Iriye is not wrong

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<sup>7</sup> Sadao Asada, ed., *Japan and the World 1853-1952: A Bibliographic Guide to Japanese Scholarship in Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 360.

<sup>8</sup> About Wilsonianism, see Amos Perlmutter, *Making the World Safe for Democracy: A Century of Wilsonianism and Its Totalitarian Challengers* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: US Foreign Policy since 1900* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); David Steigerwald, *Wilsonian Idealism in America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

<sup>9</sup> Asada, ed., *Japan and the World 1853-1952*, 360-361.

in finding its influence in the remaking of American-Japanese relationship during the late 1940s-early 1950s. My study thus supports and advances Iriye's theses.

I analyze 1940s-early 1950s American and Japanese public discourses by studying books, periodicals, and newspapers, in addition to official documents, obtained from the American National Archives and the Japanese National Diet Library. Due to the availability of secondary literature on political and diplomatic history and my objective to observe a larger context of political discussions beyond inside the government, I explore more non-governmental, published texts than governmental records. The sources cover a broad political spectrum from the left to the right of the center. On the American side, I look at five major newspapers – the *New York Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Atlanta Constitution*, and the *Chicago Tribune* – and various journals and magazines – such as *Amerasia*, the *New Republic*, the *Nation*, *Pacific Affairs*, *Far Eastern Survey*, *New York Times Magazine*, the *Atlantic Monthly*, *Saturday Evening Post*, *Newsweek*, *Time*, *Life*, *Reader's Digest*, *Harper's Magazine*, and *Collier's*. I also read books written by individuals, many of which were published under the auspices of “private” research organizations, particularly the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). Needless to mention, *Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey* were IPR publications.

On the Japanese side, I use three national newspapers – the *Asahi Shinbun*, the *Mainichi Shinbun*, and the *Yomiuri Shinbun* – and four major popular journals – *Kaizō* (Reconstruction), *Chūō Kōron* (Central Review), *Sekai* (World), and *Bungei Shunjū* (Literature Spring and Autumn).<sup>10</sup> Japanese sources are fewer than their American counterparts, but the number of

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<sup>10</sup> With its production put under the control of labor, the *Yomiuri Shinbun* became the paper of the extreme left by late 1945; at the request of Prime Minister Yoshida, GHQ's Civil Information and Education (CIE) Section, which had been already alarmed by the *Yomiuri* newspaper company's radicalism, ordered President Baba Tsunego to remove the alleged communists from the editorial room in June 1946; see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 313, 317. The Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) in GHQ judged *Kaizō*, *Chūō Kōron*, and *Sekai* as liberal-leftist and *Bungei Shunjū* as liberal-center.

Japanese articles is greater. This is true because Japanese publications carried more articles about Japan than American ones. Although the Allied Occupation of Japan was just one subject of American foreign involvement for the Americans, it was the major subject for the Japanese. Since the Occupation ruled many aspects of Japanese life and directly affected their future, Japanese public discourse on democratization reforms and peace and security issues was naturally more extensive. However, because Japanese sources are rarely digitized, they are harder for the researcher to access.

Considering the fact that Japanese publications had been put under censorship during the Occupation period, I checked censored materials, too – though only general magazines and not newspapers – to see if the authors of articles were forced to revise their writings and, if so, why and how. In early September 1945, the Occupation authorities put the Japanese print and broadcast media under surveillance in order to foster a liberal democratic movement and to control public disturbance and agitation against the Allied forces. The Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) in the General Headquarters (GHQ) placed newspapers on pre-censorship footing a month later and extended it to books, magazines, films, dramas, radio programs, lyrics, and art works. The CCD loosened up its grip in mid-1947 and gradually transferred broadcasting stations and publishers to post-censorship over the next year. Censorship was finally abolished at the end of October 1949.<sup>11</sup> Although I found that few of the essays on the themes studied here were ordered to be edited, I indicate in footnotes whether or not they were revised after

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<sup>11</sup> About censorship, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 382-399; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, Chapter 14; Matsuura Sōzō, *Senryō-ka no Genron Dan'atsu* (Suppression of Speech under the Occupation) (Tokyo: Gendai Jānarizumu Shuppankai, 1969). The list of forbidden contents is in Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 387-388; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 422; Matsuura, *Senryō-ka no Genron Dan'atsu*, 26-27, 53-60. Considered as liberal-leftist by the CCD, *Kaizō*, *Chūō Kōron*, and *Sekai* were put on the pre-censorship list of two ultra-rightist and twenty-six ultra-leftist periodicals when most publications were under post-censorship constraints; see Okuizumi Eizaburō, ed., *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi Mokuroku Kaidai Shōwa 20-nen-24-nen* (User's Guide to the Microfilm Edition of Censored Periodicals: 1945-1949) (Tokyo: Yūshōdō, 1982), 512-525; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 391; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 435.

ensorship and why.

We can only guess the actual effect of censorship on Japanese public discussion. It is undeniable that censorship set the framework for permissible public discourse, but the exchange of ideas about democracy and democratization in post-surrender Japan were still relatively open, lively, and diverse. There seem to have been certain areas where information control severely affected – whether in the short or long term – such as Japanese memories of the Asia-Pacific War and views of the American occupiers.<sup>12</sup> However, this needs continuing research and is surely not the subject that I explore in my study.

It should be noted that these publications and writers occupied different socio-political positions in the United States and in Japan. In America, the experts on the Far East in general, or on Japan in particular, were “intellectuals.” Western reporters of Asia and Japan could be considered public intellectuals as well. Many of these intellectuals were involved in Washington’s policymaking structure and/ or the Occupation government in Japan. Young scholars – often with missionary as well as academic backgrounds – were mobilized for America’s wartime efforts to defeat the Japanese or to devise post-defeat policies for Japan. After Japan surrendered, some remained in the US government, some served the military government in Japan, and many eventually entered or returned to academia. These Asia/ Japan experts, while being state actors, also played a role in the public sphere. They often participated in semi-private think tanks, such as the IPR, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), or the Foreign Policy Association (FPA). Founded on Wilsonian internationalist ideals in the 1910s-1920s in part to raise an awareness of the American public on the issues of foreign affairs, these

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<sup>12</sup> See Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 392-393, 396-397; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 412-426. Also see Etō Jun, *Tozasareta Gengo Kūkan: Senryō-gun no Ken’etsu to Sengo Nihon* (The Closed Linguistic Space: Occupation Censorship and Postwar Japan) (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1994); he argues that press censorship during the Occupation period had a long-lasting effect on Japanese public discourse and thought.

think tanks published numerous journals, booklets, and books. Although they were more professional than newspapers and general magazines, these publications provided American intellectuals with valuable space to express and exchange their opinions and ideas. Considering the close interactions between the government and these research groups and individuals, even if conflicts existed among these elites, we can conclude that general knowledge of Japan was produced from the top down in American culture. Filtered, and simplified, through journalism, their views reached a public that had little contact with the Japanese.

On the other hand, Japanese intellectuals were more independent from the state. There were no private organizations that sent out specialists to the government in order to influence the formulation and implementation of policy, or that produced publications for the purpose of educating the general public. Some Japanese scholars did serve (and had served) in the government as ministers, as party members, or as special advisors, but their service was on a more individual level and short-term. Many politicians had ideological and/ or political affiliations with certain intellectual groups – like the socialists and the Rōnō-ha Marxists – but not with think tanks. Equally important, general magazines allowed (and had allowed since the Taishō period) intellectuals to publish papers and to exchange dialogues with one another. *Kaizō* and *Chūō Kōron* had been the two major “liberal” magazines during the Taishō democratic movement; *Sekai* joined them in 1946; *Bungei Shunjū* had been a general magazine with a primary focus on literature but also carrying commentaries on contemporary issues. It was not unusual, either, that newspapers had short essays and roundtable discussions of intellectuals. In addition, the Japanese editorial staff was highly educated. It is worthy of note that journalists such as Hasegawa Nyozeikan had played a leading role as public intellectuals since the Meiji period. Japanese intellectuals, in short, had different relationships with the government and the

public than their American counterparts.

A discussion of the thought of American and Japanese policymakers and public intellectuals raises the problem of labeling, that is, how to conceive and define “conservatives,” “liberals,” “progressives,” and “Marxists.” These labels are commonly used in the literature of postwar US-Japan relations, Japanese politics, and Japanese intellectual history. There seems to be a vague agreement on what these terms mean in general, but no one provides clear explanations about them. In fact, it is often unclear as to how scholars group American and Japanese individuals into these categories and why. I myself realize both the convenience and difficulty of using labels whose relative meanings change according to contexts and which cannot convey the complex and often contradictory ideas that individuals hold.

Normally, “liberals,” “progressives,” or “radicals” are used as terms oppositional to “conservatives,” “reactionaries,” or “moderates.” The binary divide between the “left” – the former three – and the “right” – the latter three – is often misleading but commonly used. The ideological and political connotations that this categorization contains in postwar America and Japan are: the leftists are the representatives of the “people” who strive to promote their rights and freedoms against the oppressive “state” ruled by the political and business elites on the right. In effect, this view reflects historiographical and political trends. In postwar Japan, academia and journalism have been influenced by “progressivism” (*shinposhugi/ kakushinshugi*). The conservative-versus-progressive (*hoshu-tai-kakushin*) paradigm was applied to politics, where such a conflict seemed to exist between the majority party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the largest opposition party, the Socialist Party, during the Cold War – though mainly over the peace issue. The dualistic perspective thus has long been dominant in Japanese academic and public discourse up to the 1990s. In the case of the United States, the similar type of

progressivism did not rise until the late 1960s-1970s when a young generation of Marxist-inspired scholars of US international relations and Asian affairs began to question American liberalism, which had shaped America's world view and justified its foreign involvement. They criticized US Cold War policies as capitalist-driven, expansionist, and hegemonic. The emergence of the new progressives in effect split the liberal group into two parts: the more radical liberals, with whom the progressives identified, and the more conservative liberals, whom they opposed (see Appendix 2).

The American revisionist school of US foreign relations and that of Japanese history went hand in hand. Junior scholars of Japanese studies invalidated modernization theory, which had been the mainstream American approach to modern Japanese history since the 1950s. As a social scientific method to analyze and measure the degrees of a country's transformation to (Western European- and American-styled) modernity, modernization theory was criticized for its universalistic application, Eurocentric premise, and state-centric approach. Simultaneously, modernization theorists among Japanologists were accused of focusing on Japan's "successful" transformation into a modern nation and therefore ignoring not so successful aspects of modernization and people's actual lives. As recent scholars clarify how modernization theory provided theoretical justification for American foreign intervention in Third World countries since the 1930s, revisionist critics of the 1960s-1970s called modernization theorists Cold Warriors.<sup>13</sup> American Japan scholars who believed in the assumptions underlying modernization theory and viewed Japan as a model country for underdeveloped countries were deemed guilty for assisting American expansionism. Revisionists criticized not only US Cold War policies but

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<sup>13</sup> Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2003).

also Occupation policies. They questioned the “moderate” nature of Occupation reforms for having failed to ignite a “radical” revolution and the so-called “Reverse Course” for having abandoned democratizing reform in favor of Japan’s economic rehabilitation under “conservative” and capitalist leadership.

John W. Dower and Howard B. Schonberger have been the most vocal critics of the American and Japanese “conservatives” in the American scholarship of the Occupation of Japan. Dower criticizes “ethnocentric” and elitist Japan hands in the State Department, such as former ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, for limiting the possibility for a truly democratic revolution by suggesting cooperation with Japanese conservative leaders. On the other hand, Dower idealizes the “progressives” (many of whom were China hands) like Canadian diplomat and Japanologist E. H. Norman and Sinologist Owen Lattimore, who advocated supporting a people’s revolution in order to destroy what they considered the roots of Japanese authoritarianism and militarism. Identifying certain Japan hands with the pressure group for reversing Occupation policies and accusing modernization theorists – particularly Edwin O. Reischauer – of being advocates of the Cold War, Dower and Schonberger characterize these people as conservatives.<sup>14</sup>

We need a different conceptualization that transcends this dualistic and value-judgmental analysis. As we shall see in succeeding chapters, “conservatives” and “progressives” were divergent modernist groups. In general, both American and Japanese policymakers and intellectuals held a Eurocentric view of historical progress but disagreed in terms of the degree and methods of change in Japanese society that they desired. The conservatives preferred

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<sup>14</sup> Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 217-224; Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*. Also John W. Dower, “Occupied Japan as History and Occupation History as Politics,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 2 (February 1975): 489-491; John W. Dower, “E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History,” in *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman*, ed. Dower (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 3-101.

evolutionary reforms built upon the past, while the progressives sought a revolution to break the future from the past. Traditions were accommodated for the reformist ideas of the former but denied in the thinking of the latter. These differences, and not ethnocentrism, as Dower claims, distinguished the Japan hands (“conservatives”) from the China hands (“progressives”): both were ethnocentric. What Dower and Schonberger intentionally or unintentionally ignore is the fact that the progressives applied Marxian “universalism” to Japanese history and viewed the Japanese as backward, too. I strongly doubt if they saw the Japanese “people” as more than an abstract idea or an instrument to accomplish the American objective to remake Japan into a peaceful and democratic country. In fact, the progressives later found in disappointment that the majority of ordinary Japanese were less revolutionary than they had expected. Both conservatives and progressives were essentially American liberal internationalists who, believing in the virtue of remaking the international order under American leadership, sought to mold Japan into a modern nation according to an Anglo-American model – rather than a fascist or Communist alternative.

Another myth created out of the revisionist scholarship is the idea that the conservatives supported US Cold War policy and the progressives opposed it. Although it is true that the former group advocated the Reverse Course and accommodated the US government’s post-Occupation policy for Japan, it developed criticisms against the security alliance between the United States and Japan, which was the pillar of US Cold War strategy in Asia. The progressives, who believed in the Potsdam peace terms, objected to changing the primary focus of the Occupation policy from demilitarization and democratization to economic reconstruction. However, unlike the revisionists emerging in the Vietnam era, they accepted America’s capitalist expansion and competition with Communism. They were no more than critics who proposed

different strategies for Asia that they believed would work better than the government's policies; they did not fundamentally challenge the American premises of the Cold War.

In the case of postwar Japan, many prewar liberals became identical to “conservatives” (*hoshu*), and Marxist-influenced scholars, old and young, to “progressives” (*kakushin*). Prewar liberals were born in the early-to-middle Meiji period and lived through the Taishō democratic movement at their mature ages. They included broadly: bureaucrats and diplomats who sought to set the course of Japanese diplomacy in alignment with the 1920s Washington system framed by Anglo-American-Japanese cooperation; party politicians who tried to establish and defend the practice of constitutional government; and scholars and intellectuals who aimed to expand people's political and social rights within the limits of the Meiji political and legal structure. These “liberals” are contrasted with the “militarists,” and, in fact, many of them were marked for removal from public office between the 1930s and 1945. While they occasionally questioned specific policies, however, they did not oppose Japanese imperialist ambitions per se and failed to take effective action to stop militarism. Although this portrayal of prewar liberals is not totally inaccurate, it originates from the question of “what went wrong with Japan during the 1930s” and the postwar effort to look for and blame the culprit. The scholarship has normally argued that because prewar liberals had elitist and aesthetic attitudes towards society, they failed to analyze history with social scientific theories and lacked the intention to take concerted action of resistance; thus, Taishō liberalism collapsed before rising militarism and overseas aggression.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> See Kuno Osamu, Tsurumi Shunsuke, and Fujita Shōzō, “Nihon no Hoshushugi: ‘Kokoro’ Gurūpu” (Japanese Conservatism: The “Kokoro” Group), in *Sengo Nihon no Shisō* (Postwar Japanese Thought) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1959; repr., Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 100-152; Tada Michitoshi, “Kaisetsu: Nihon no Jiyūshugi” (A Commentary on Japanese Liberalism), in *Gendai Nihon Shisō Taikei 18: Jiyūshugi* (An Anthology of Modern Japanese Thought vol. 18: Liberalism), ed. Tada (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1965), 7-46; Tatsuo Arima, *The Failure of Freedom: A Portrait of Modern Japanese Intellectuals* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); Peter Duus and Irwin Scheiner, “Socialism, Liberalism, and Marxism, 1901-1931,” in *Modern Japanese Thought*, ed. Bob

The liberals of prewar Japan gradually became branded as conservatives in post-surrender Japan. Those who were more leftist than prewar liberals – often called “postwar democrats” (*sengo minshushugisha*), “progressive men of culture” (*shinpo-tekkin bunkajin*), or “enlighteners” – emerged with a resolution to rebuild Japan. Armed with Marxian historical analyses, the so-called “Modernists” (*kindaishugisha*) and the Marxists – the Rōnō-ha (Labor-Farmer faction) and the Kōza-ha (Lectures faction) – held future-oriented visions which negated the past and sought the next stage of historical development, whether it was bourgeois democracy or socialism. They not only radicalized Japan’s intellectual world with systematic social scientific theories but also began political activities. They thus moved the axes of political thought to the left, and, with this paradigmatic shift, the prewar liberals became grouped with conservatives, or “old liberals” (*ōrudo riberarisuto*) (see Appendix 1).<sup>16</sup> Although prewar liberals also shared a progressive view of history, considered Japan backward in comparison with the “West,” and sought to liberalize Japanese society, the term “liberal” in postwar Japan usually referred to those younger and more radical like the Modernists – in contrast to Marxist-Leninists.

It might be confusing to call only the Modernists “modernist,” since all the groups including Marxists were basically modernist thinkers. The Modernists were a younger generation of intellectuals who were born in the 1910s-1920s and came of age when Japan was entering the time of militarism. They believed in the need to remove all “feudal” or “pre-modern” elements from Japanese society and to establish a civil society. They had particular concerns about the establishment of the “independent self,” which they defined as being

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Tadashi Wakabayashi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 167-181.

<sup>16</sup> Tada, “Kaisetsu: Nihon no Jiyūshugi,” 42-44. There is no scholarly consensus about the definition of “old liberals” (*ōrudo riberarisuto*); in a narrow sense, the term “old liberal” seems to refer only to certain prewar liberals (such as Yoshida Shigeru, Shidehara Kijūrō, and late Meiji-Taishō literary critics and intellectuals, who founded and contributed essays to the journal called “Kokoro”), but in a broad sense, it is used to mean “prewar liberals” whose thought and attitudes to political and social changes in postwar Japan seemed conservative compared to those of “postwar democrats.”

“modern” and saw as both means and end of Japan’s modernization.<sup>17</sup> Japanese Marxists emerged in the 1920s and livened up the leftist movement since then. As I will explain more in the following pages, they diverged into two schools, Rōnō and Kōza, by the end of the decade. Despite the agreement that there were still a lot of feudal remnants embedded in Japanese society, they disagreed ultimately about which historical stage Japan was in: bourgeois or feudal. The Rōnō-ha influenced socialists whereas the Kōza-ha was communists. State suppression targeted Kōza-ha members in the late 1920s-early 1930s, extending to Rōnō-ha by the late 1930s. After Japan surrendered and the Occupation began, both groups gained opportunities to start political activities. They were active in forming political parties, leading labor movements, and publishing essays in general magazines and newspapers.

There was one more crucial factor in differentiating the “conservatives” from the “progressives” in postwar Japan: the peace and security issue. Both hoped that once the Occupation was over, Japan could remain neutral in the Soviet-American conflict, free from American political, economic, and military influence, and regain full autonomy. However, when many prewar liberals accepted America’s peace and security terms as the best deal available for Japan in the midst of the Cold War, the Modernists and the Marxists criticized them as “realists”

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<sup>17</sup> The term “Modernists” was originally used by a group of Marxists to criticize them. The Marxists, who believed in historical determinism and aimed to achieve a socialist revolution under the leadership of the working class, complained that the “Modernists” were interested in the question of individuality rather than class and set the future goal as the formation of bourgeois society rather than proletarian society. This went along with the “subjectivity debate” (*shutaisei ronsō*). The subjectivity debate began in Shimizu Ikutarō et al., “Zadankai: Yuibutsushikan to Shutaisei” (A Forum on Materialism and Subjectivity), *Sekai* (February 1948): 13-43. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) launched an attack against the Modernists in the August 1948 issue of its magazine *Zen’ei* (The Vanguard); see Hidaka Rokurō, “Kaisetsu: Sengo no ‘Kindaishugi’” (A Commentary on Postwar Modernism), in *Gendai Nihon Shisō Taikei 34: Kindaishugi* (An Anthology of Modern Japanese Thought vol. 34: Modernism), ed. Hidaka (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1964), 18-21; Hidaka Rokurō, “Kaisetsu: Sengo Shisō no Shuppatsu” (A Commentary on the Beginning of Postwar Thought), in *Sengo Nihon Shisō Taikei 1: Sengo Shisō no Shuppatsu* (An Anthology of Postwar Japanese Thought vol. 1: The Beginning of Postwar Thought), ed. Hidaka (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1968), 33-34. About the Modernists and subjectivity, see J. Victor Koschmann, “The Debate on Subjectivity in Postwar Japan: Foundations of Modernism as a Political Critique,” *Pacific Affairs* 54, no. 4 (Winter 1981-1982): 609-631 and *Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). About the characteristics of the Modernists’ thought, see Andrew E. Barshay, “Postwar Social and Political Thought, 1945-90,” in *Modern Japanese Thought*, ed. Wakabayashi, 286-300.

or “pragmatists.” Whereas the Modernists pointed out the risks of realist and pragmatic thinking, the Marxist economists were discontented with the compromise of national independence, the economic burden of rearmaments, and the closing of the China market. The opponents of the San Francisco system formed the “progressive” force against the “conservative” advocates.

In sum, any understanding of Occupation discourse must grapple with the changing labels and categories discussed above. By carefully analyzing the thought of the “conservatives” and the “progressives,” I aim not only to clarify them but also to re-conceptualize them. This is absolutely important for my work, which examines the parallel and interacting contours of political discussions in 1940s-early 1950s America and Japan and shows the cultural and intellectual foundations of postwar US-Japan relations.

Part I will identify and introduce the major strands of thought by examining how different groups of American and Japanese journalists, intellectuals, and policymakers discussed modern Japanese (under)development, and in relation to it, the causes of militarism during the 1930s, and how they viewed the place of the Allied (American) Occupation in historical progress. In Chapter 1, I comparatively analyze the writings of American progressives, conservatives, and anthropologists, and in Chapter 2, those of Japanese conservatives (prewar liberals) and progressives (Modernists and Marxists). I will illuminate that they all held a progressive view of history and agreed that Japanese society was not fully “democratic” or “modern” and therefore should be reformed. Even if they disagreed about approaches and methods, they thus gave a general consent and impetus to Occupation reforms. Additionally, I

will show that although American thinkers had no doubt that the United States should take leadership in recreating Japanese society as well as world order, the more influenced by Marxian theories, the more critical of Japan's "failed" modernity, and the more interventionist they became. Likewise, Japanese Marxian and Marxist theoreticians and politicians received the Occupation of Japan and Allied cooperation in bringing progress in Japan and the world more positively than the others.

Part II investigates American and Japanese discourses on the reform of Japan's political system, namely constitutional revision, in order to case-study how discussions developed in regards to an actual democratization program. I look at how the Americans and the Japanese viewed the Japanese monarchy, how they sought to alter it, and how they reimagined the new status of the emperor in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. American progressives suggested abolishing the imperial institution, whereas conservatives – significantly Hugh Borton, who drafted the policy document on governmental reform – advocated transforming it into a British-style monarchy. Unlike scholars who have focused on General Douglas MacArthur's political motives to intervene in constitutional amendment in February 1946 and the "radical" nature of the draft made by his subordinates, I will stress the fact that the "conservative" option prevailed; the American occupiers, by deciding to preserve the Japanese sovereign and following Washington's directive settled in favor of it, worked to liberalize Japan's limited monarchy. The American public, too, accepted the democratized imperial institution in the end rather than calling for its utter elimination. In Japan, numerous reform plans that ranged from those of prewar liberals to those of communists were suggested by various individuals and groups. All except for the communists agreed on the preservation of the emperor system and considered it necessary to give more legal sanction to the practices of monarchic rule and to extend the

guarantees on people's rights and freedoms. Although it is undeniable that MacArthur's intervention in constitutional reform determined the ultimate form of the new constitution, I will demonstrate that the middle ground had existed by then between the Japanese conservative and moderate progressive stands and it was indeed the course that the SCAP draft constitution took.

Part III delves into another area of shared public discourses, the debates about the making of a US-Japan Cold War alliance that took place during the late 1940s-early 1950s in America and in Japan. In Chapter 5, I will follow the development of the discussions between American progressives and conservatives to the point where disagreements disappeared. Contrary to the widespread, simplistic view that the progressives opposed US Cold War policies toward Japan and the conservatives supported them, I will point out that both believed in American liberal democracy and capitalism and wanted to keep Asia friendly and open to the United States. I will show that they had misgivings about the effectiveness of US peace and security terms with Japan and yet neither developed theoretical criticisms that could overturn America's Cold War paradigm. Chapter 6 reconsiders the peace and security debate in Japan. The conservatives and the progressives demanded that Japan make peace with all Allied nations and maintain neutrality in the divided world, but that consensus broke down after the Korean War. With a combination of realism and skepticism in regards to the Soviet Union, the conservative camp decided to make a political and military alliance with the United States, and some progressives and the public came to lend support to it. Although some other progressives – the key members of the Peace Study Group (*Heiwa Mondai Danwakai*), which lobbied for an overall peace and unarmed neutrality – relentlessly refused to accept “realism” and “pragmatism,” even they did not deny American liberalism and economic leadership. I address American and Japanese discussions about emerging US Japan policies ultimately as divergences

and convergences of Wilsonian internationalist thought.

This comparative study of American and Japanese public discourses is meant to examine shared thoughts expressed by various individuals within and without the government on specific issues – the modernization of Japan, the reform of the Japanese governmental structure, and the making of the US-Japan alliance. The goal of analyzing political discussions as a totality requires broad research and coverage of sources. However, due to a plethora of sources in some instances and a scarcity in others, I face the tasks of limiting the range of my research and of being selective in the sources that I actually use. Besides these challenges, shared by all historians, there are additional limits that inhere in my particular approach. I recreate a historical context from public texts and peruse a variety of writings in that context. This approach might be criticized for lacking a close examination of individual writers' lives and ideas. In order to analyze my sources better, I read as many primary documents written by the same authors as I could and some secondary works about them, but doing more of this is beyond the scope of my study. Related to this, my attempt to redefine such labels as “conservative” and “progressive” and to group politicians and intellectuals into certain categories can be questioned. I acknowledge that by using this simplistic sorting method, I overlook subdivisions among each group and overlaps between different groups. However, I categorize people based mainly on their historical analyses about modern Japan and secondly on their political, social, and professional associations. I believe that my grouping according to these specific conditions is fair at least. It is also important to mention that my focus is on “elites.” I cite some letters from “ordinary” people and public opinion polls to see their interactions with the major currents of thought and the shifts in their stances. While I do include the populace in public discourse, however, I pay secondary attention to them.

Moreover, because this is a study of “thought” rather than policy politics, I do not, unlike many political and diplomatic historians, discuss the process of policy implementation inside the government per se or the political activities of pressure groups. Some critics may claim that I underestimate the importance of power relations between the United States and Japan in order to highlight their cultural and intellectual affinity. But let me repeat again that by taking postwar US-Japan relations as a case study, my research simply tries to suggest how culture could assist the formation of rapprochement between the two. It does not deny the components of power balance and national interests or argue that culture determines foreign relations.

My research is ultimately a work on the history of the early postwar relationship between the United States and Japan. By taking a bi-national approach and exploring the cultural and intellectual factors in the remaking of the American-Japanese relationship after 1945, I offer an unusual perspective to the study. Moreover, my contribution, no matter how small it may be, extends to other fields. In a broader context, my methodology keeps pace with the development of diplomatic history, now often called “international history,” which emphasizes transnational and non-state-centric approaches. My dissertation can be taken as a piece in the new scholarship of international history. I contribute to the history of the Allied Occupation of Japan by shedding more light on Japanese history and perspectives than other diplomatic historians usually do. By doing so, I reevaluate Japanese agency not only in the establishment of postwar US-Japan relations but also in Occupation reforms. Of course, this has been long acknowledged by Japanese scholars and American historians of Japan. Nevertheless, it is not reflected in the Western narrative of the Occupation of Japan. I also challenge the binary view of “conservatives” and “progressives” that is common in the works of postwar US-Japan

relations and Japanese political and intellectual histories. When we look at them without the conventional lenses, we will get different pictures of them. Thus, my work is revisionist and offers suggestive theses to different but interrelated fields of historical studies.

PART I

## CHAPTER 1

## RATIONALES FOR THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF JAPAN UNDER ALLIED OCCUPATION: AMERICAN ANALYSES OF JAPANESE HISTORY AND SOCIETY

At the request of the US Army, Hollywood movie director Frank Capra produced a series of war propaganda films during the Pacific War. The very first one, “Prelude to War” (1942), depicted World War II as a battle between the Allied and the Axis Powers, democracy and totalitarianism, freedom and enslavement. Directed at the European theater, Capra’s *Why We Fight* series had only one film about “evil” Japan, titled “The Battle of China” (1944). Despite a delay in production, Capra and his team simultaneously worked on making another propaganda film called *Know Your Enemy-Japan*. It was released on August 9, 1945, three days after the atomic bomb incinerated Hiroshima and the day the second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. With the war suddenly over, and the Allied Occupation of Japan about to begin, the movie was withdrawn at the end of the month by the order of newly appointed Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964).<sup>1</sup>

Frank Capra’s *Know Your Enemy-Japan* explained the origins of Japan’s aggression in reference to Japanese historical backgrounds and their socio-cultural systems and values. The film traced the roots of Japanese belligerence to the Shinto religion and samurai culture. According to the filmmakers, Shinto myths of the foundation of Japan convinced the Japanese of the holy status of the emperor and their divine genealogy. Reflecting Japanese wartime propaganda, the film depicted Shinto as the ideological foundation of the Japanese drive for conquest. The film argued that the Japanese believed in their mission, as the very first emperor Jinmu had declared, to place the “eight corners of the world under a [Japanese] roof” (“*Hakkō Ichiu*”). Thus, Shinto was considered the cult that taught the Japanese to dominate the world.

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<sup>1</sup> John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 15, 18.

Samurai ethics and acts were portrayed as treacherous, fanatical, and barbaric. The film presented the invasions of Korea directed by Hideyoshi in the late sixteenth century as evidence of Japanese militancy and a long-standing ambition to invade Asia. The Japanese simply resumed campaigns against China and Korea three centuries later – this time with modern weaponry.

The narration of Capra's film asserted that with the seclusion policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Japan had kept living in the middle ages, missing all political, intellectual, and technological advancements occurring in the West. When Commodore Matthew Perry came with warships in the mid-nineteenth century, the Japanese finally realized a gap in power between themselves and the "white hairy barbarians." Accordingly, Meiji Japan embarked on a modernization program by adopting military technologies and political systems from the West. However, the film blatantly said that Japan's transformation was a "crude joke." The Japanese continued to live in a medieval hierarchical society under the emperor, who was elevated once again to the status of supreme dictator. The state was not run by representatives of the people, but ruled by military leaders who surrounded the emperor, and, beneath them, wealthy industrialists and political elites. In spite of industrialization, the masses, mostly peasants and workers, enjoyed no improvement in their standard of living and yet diligently worked for the sovereign emperor. The film stated that, not having learned ethical and moral values from the West, the Japanese were indoctrinated through emperor worship, Shinto myths, and samurai codes in school. The purpose of education was to create obedient and loyal subjects dedicated to their divine mission to conquer the world. The narrator dramatically described a history of Japanese territorial expansion from the 1890s to the 1940s and concluded the film by suggesting the inevitability of a US victory in the Pacific War.

As John W. Dower comments, Frank Capra's *Know Your Enemy-Japan* was a "potpourri of most of the English-speaking world's dominant clichés about the Japanese enemy, excluding the crudest, most vulgar, and most blatantly racist," and despite the movie's premature shelving, it remains a valuable source for understanding common American views of Japanese history and society.<sup>2</sup> My interest, however, is not in recounting the already well-known portrayals of Japan in Capra's movie. Using the film as a window into the sources of America's public knowledge of Japan, I would like to analyze the American "experts'" discourse on Japan as reflected in the movie. In the United States, the experts included journalists and scholars of Japan and Far Eastern affairs who were involved in publishing enterprises, private research organizations – most importantly the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) –, and various government agencies. As specialists, many expressed their ideas about Japan through various publications, and some of them even played a direct role in the making of US post-surrender policies for Japan. Although the boundary between the state and the non-state was blurred, they formed a group of "intellectuals" who were responsible for making ideas about Japan in wartime and postwar America.

In this chapter, focusing on three different groups, "progressives," "conservatives," and socio-cultural anthropologists, I comparatively analyze each group's views of Japan, illuminate its approaches to occupation reforms, and clarify the correlations between these two. This comparative study of these American intellectuals' thought will provide a new analytical framework and interpretation for the study of them. There are few critical and thorough analyses of American Japan/ Asia experts' arguments and the underlying presumptions that they held in regards to Japan and the occupation of the country. In the studies that do exist, scholars use

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 20.

different but interchangeable labels for what I call “progressives” and “conservatives,” based on their views of Japanese history and society and their attitudes toward the occupation enterprise.

The “progressive” group is known as the pro-China faction, radical reformers, New Dealers, or Cold War critics. The “conservative” group is also called the pro-Japan faction, moderate reformers, reactionaries, or Cold Warriors.<sup>3</sup> Under this analytical framework, historians

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<sup>3</sup> About anti-Japanese racism in wartime American culture, see Dower, *War without Mercy*; “Race, Language, and War in Two Cultures,” in *Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays* (New York: The New Press, 1993), 257-285, “Graphic Others/ Graphic Selves: Cartoons in War and Peace,” in *ibid.*, 287-300; “Graphic Japanese, Graphic Americans: Coded Images in US-Japanese Relations,” in *Partnership: The United States and Japan 1951-2001*, ed. Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler (New York: Kōdansha, 2001), 301-333. Dower’s *War without Mercy* has a chapter on anthropologists’ studies on Japanese “national characters.” There is a short discussion about American wartime attitudes toward the Japanese and anthropological research on Japan, also in Sheila K. Johnson, *The Japanese through American Eyes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 1-17. Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu (Ministry of Finance, History of Finance Office), ed., *Shōwa Zaisei-shi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan: Amerika no tai-Nichi Senryō Seisaku* (A History of Finance of the Showa Period from the End of War to Peace vol. 3: American Occupation Policies for Japan) (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1976), 59-75 introduces American intellectuals who influenced policymaking and public opinion and discusses public intellectuals-policy planners by dividing them into the “China Crowd” and the “Japan Crowd”; Iokibe Makoto, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku: Sengo Nihon no Sekkeizu: Jō* (United States Occupation Policies for Japan: A Design for a Postwar Japan vol. 1) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1985), 177-282 mentions a series of Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) meetings on Far Eastern affairs and analyzes the division in the opinions of State Department officials regarding postwar policy for Japan with special focus on the “Japan hands” such as George H. Blakeslee (1871-1954) and Hugh Borton (1903-1995); there is a study of Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) members’ thoughts and discussions about a postwar Japan by Yui Daizaburō, *Mikan no Senryō Kaikaku: Amerika Chishikijin to Suterareta Nihon Minshuka Kōsō* (An Unfinished Occupation Reform: American Intellectuals and Abandoned Plans for the Democratization of Japan) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1989); Marlene J. Mayo specifies the backgrounds of “experts” in the policy-planning body in “American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts,” in *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952*, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 3-51. About postwar policy-planning, in addition to *Shōwa Zaisei-shi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan*, 3-122, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku: Jō*, and “American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan,” also see Iokibe Makoto, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku: Sengo Nihon no Sekkeizu: Ge* (United States Occupation Policies for Japan: A Design for a Postwar Japan vol. 2) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1985), Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), 201-229, and Hugh Borton, *American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan* (New York: Columbia University, 1967). “Joseph C. Grew: The Emperor of Japan and Planning the Occupation” in Howard B. Schonberger’s *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1989), 11-39 and Theodore Cohen’s *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal*, ed. Herbert Passin (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 14-48 also have some coverage of US postwar policy planning for Japan. About the revisionists’ views of “progressive” and “conservative” and criticism about “modernization theorists” like Edwin O. Reischauer, see the introduction of this dissertation; also Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 3-5, 286; John W. Dower, “Occupied Japan as History and Occupation History as Politics,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 2 (February 1975): 490-491; John W. Dower, “E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History,” in *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman*, ed. Dower (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 3-101; John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 217-224; Sheldon Garon, “Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese History: A Focus on State-Society Relations,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 53, no. 2 (May 1994): 346-366; Laura E. Hein, “Free-Floating Anxieties on the Pacific: Japan and the West Revisited,” *Diplomatic History* 20, no. 3

emphasize differences and conflicts between these two groups and project their own political stances.

Particularly in the American scholarship on this subject, which has been led by two revisionist historians of the Allied Occupation of Japan and the Cold War, John W. Dower and Howard B. Schonberger, the progressives receive positive appraisal, and the conservatives harsh criticism. For example, Dower argues that the conservatives were ethnocentric and elitist since they had no faith in the capability of the Japanese people to govern themselves in democratic systems, and that their biased views influenced the writings of other Asia experts. On the other hand, the “more progressive, less racially and culturally condescending” were the “New Deal liberals, leftists, and Asia specialists more associated with China than Japan.” Dower claims that the “very notion of inducing a democratic revolution [did not die] of ridicule” because, unlike the conservatives, the progressives believed in the universal appeal and workability of democratic principles and in the desirability and possibility of radical democratization of Japan. As to the anthropologists, Dower critically discusses their “national character” studies and yet maintains that they took notice of the pliability of the Japanese national character and, unlike the conservatives, found there the possibility of a democratic revolution in postwar Japan.<sup>4</sup>

Unlike these scholars, I will show first that the progressives, conservatives, and anthropologists were all Euro-centric modernist thinkers who adopted the theory of society’s progressive evolution from the primitive to the medieval to the modern. According to the developmental view of history, American intellectuals judged that Japan was still incomplete in

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(Summer 1996): 411-437.

<sup>4</sup> Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 217-224; the quotes are from pp.218 and 220. Also see Dower, “Occupied Japan as History and Occupation History as Politics,” 490-491; Dower, “E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History,” 31-34, 39-100. In his most recent book, *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9/11, Iraq* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010), John W. Dower criticizes “generalists” on the left as well as on the right, but he continues to stress that “Japan specialists” focused on Japan’s historical and cultural “peculiarities”; see pp.404-407.

transition from “feudalism” to democracy, and this assumption formed the foundation of the idea that Japan was backward and that its delayed evolution explained the very “aggressive” nature of the Japanese nation. Both differences and similarities in American experts’ analyses of Japanese history and society contributed to reinforcing the kind of popular stereotypes about Japan that appeared in Frank Capra’s movie. Second, I will stress the fact that most – if not all – of these Americans were Wilsonian internationalists who believed in international cooperation as a means to maintain peace and order and in the leading role of the United States in forging such cooperation in the postwar world. Combined with the view that Japan was underdeveloped and therefore aggressive, such a belief justified the objectives of the Allied Occupation of Japan: the demilitarization and democratization of Japan. Nevertheless, the experts disagreed about the methods, degree, and extent of Japanese postwar reforms. By identifying major strands of thought on Japan in wartime America, this chapter will offer a new way to look at American Japan/ Asia experts and consequently will redefine the meaning of “progressives” and “conservatives” as well.

### **E. H. Norman and Marxian Analysis of Japanese Historical Development**

Discussion of the progressives cannot begin without E. H. Norman (1909-1957). His influence on American specialists on Asia was of particular significance. It is no exaggeration to say that the progressive school of thought originated in Norman’s work. Born to a Canadian missionary family and reared in Japan, Norman attended Harvard University’s graduate program in Japanese history between 1936 and 1939. After finishing a master’s program in one year, he began to study briefly under Columbia University professor Hugh Borton (1903-1995). Simultaneously, he worked as a researcher for the Institute of Pacific Relations. He joined the

Canadian Foreign Service right after he completed his doctoral dissertation in 1939.<sup>5</sup> Once the war ended, he was immediately assigned to SCAP Civil Intelligence Section (CIS). He was put in charge of the Canadian Liaison Mission a year later and stayed in Japan until December 1950.<sup>6</sup>

During the first half of the 1940s, Norman published several works through the IPR. Among his publications was an IPR Inquiry series book, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State*, published in 1940, one year before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Originally his Ph.D. dissertation, it was his very first major work, and many other researchers consulted it. Besides a few articles, he also released *Soldier and Peasant in Japan* in 1943 and *Feudal Background of Japanese Politics* in 1945. In these works, Norman negatively evaluated Meiji developments and suggested that Japanese authoritarianism, as well as overseas aggression, had originated in the Meiji political and social structures.

Under the influence of Marxism, E. H. Norman developed the thesis that the Meiji Restoration of 1868 had been an “incomplete” bourgeois democratic revolution.<sup>7</sup> He believed that despite industrialization, “feudal remnants” had not disappeared and Japan had not experienced either political or economic liberalism. Japan’s failure to complete the transition to modernity was clearly due to the social character of the leadership of the Restoration. In the normal course of history, he argued, the bourgeois class played a role in destroying feudalism and pushing society towards the next stage of development. Under Tokugawa rule, however, the bourgeois class did not mature enough to lead a bourgeois revolution. Instead, it was the lower-

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<sup>5</sup> Kudō Miyoko, *Higeki no Gaikō-kan: Hābāto Nōman no Shōgai* (A Tragic Diplomat: Life of Herbert Norman) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), 115-118, 125.

<sup>6</sup> Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 152.

<sup>7</sup> Kudō, *Higeki no Gaikō-kan*, Chapters 5-8. E. H. Norman was influenced by Marxism through his college education and personal connections with Marxist activists and theoreticians; he had personal contacts with Tsuru Shigeto, Hani Gorō, Maruyama Masao, Nakano Yoshio, and Watanabe Kazuo (1901-1975; French literature professor at the Imperial University of Tokyo) (about Tsuru, Hani, Maruyama, and Nakano, see the chapters on Japan in this dissertation). Although he was not a Marxist theorist in a narrow sense, Norman, like many other progressives, became embroiled in the hysteria of McCarthyism and accused of being a communist spy in the 1950s.

class samurai from the outside domains (*tozama han*), such as Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa, and Hiizen, backed by the merchants in Ōsaka and Kyōto and a few aristocrats around the Imperial Court, who had overthrown the Tokugawa regime.<sup>8</sup> Norman thought that although these anti-feudal leaders had replaced the old autocratic, paternalistic state with a modern bureaucracy and military and had encouraged industrialization, they had hampered the development of democracy.

For Norman, this blocking of the emergence of bourgeois democracy in Meiji Japan was lamentable but to a significant degree “determined” by Japanese feudal traditions.<sup>9</sup> According to him, one of the key traditions that characterized Japanese modernization during the Meiji period (1868-1912) was the tie between feudal lords and the growing merchant class. As a mercantile economy penetrated Japan’s society during the Tokugawa period, the merchants increased their wealth and power from trade and money-lending. The feudal lords and samurai grew dependent on the merchant class for financial aid and economic policy advice, and these two classes had even merged by marriage or by adoption.<sup>10</sup> This explains why it was not the bourgeois class but a samurai-merchant coalition that overthrew feudalism. Indeed, this alliance continued throughout the Meiji period and even after. Norman described how the Meiji state had sold state-owned enterprises to the great merchant houses at low prices and had consequently helped empower the financial oligarchy, especially the zaibatsu.<sup>11</sup> Thus, he suggested that the feudal-merchant relationship before the Meiji period had greatly facilitated the government-business

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<sup>8</sup> E. H. Norman, “Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State,” in *Origins of the Modern Japanese State*, ed. Dower, 114, 156-157.

<sup>9</sup> Norman strongly believed in the power of culture and tradition, almost to the point of sounding determinist. Such a stance is summarized in his statement: “The will of man striking obliquely at the glowing stream of historical development, its channel already partly fixed, can bend its course to this side or that, but cannot block it altogether. So it was in Japan; the design lay with the Meiji architects, but the material was largely ready at hand, a legacy of the preceding age.” See *ibid.*, 111.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 124-127, 157-168.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 236-239; the quote is from p.238.

alliance and the growth of monopoly capital, rather than an independent middle class of capitalists, in modern Japan.

Norman also traced the Meiji policy of government control of industry to the Tokugawa period. It was of utmost importance that “samurai bureaucrats” in the outside clans had already led the modernization of the military and the development of monopoly industries.<sup>12</sup> Aware of the urgency of military buildup and the scarcity of private capital for industrialization, the Meiji leaders decided to hasten the establishment and improvement of strategic industries by building state-sponsored factories, going against laissez-faire capitalist models. Even after the government transferred many public enterprises to private companies, state control over industry was maintained through subsidies that tied the government closely to big businesses.<sup>13</sup> Equally important, Norman noted that the bureaucracy had emerged out of this early Meiji policy. The bureaucracy, led and staffed by the former feudal and aristocratic classes, worked as an intermediary between the Meiji oligarchy and business interests, and would retain this distinctive position up to the 1930s.<sup>14</sup>

In *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State*, while identifying the feudal legacy in Meiji Japan, Norman actually praised modernization under the new leadership, though not unconditionally. He believed that Japan had needed to modernize industry in order to maintain independence in late-nineteenth-century Asia under the threat of Western imperialism. With industry underdeveloped and without sufficient accumulated private capital, government assistance was particularly necessary. For instance, he defended the Meiji state in the following:

since the 150 years of isolation had left deep marks on Japanese economy and society by stunting its national growth, Meiji Japan had to wrestle with those accumulated disabilities inherited from Tokugawa practices. The Restoration was not merely a continuation of

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 169-175.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 224-242.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 113-114, 235-241.

Hideyoshi's policy of trade expansion, for the simple reason that in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Japan was faced with a struggle for existence as an independent power against the menace of foreign capital. It was a race to overtake the advanced Western nations with their machine technology and armaments, and Japanese economic and even political independence was at stake; Japan had to enter the race with the handicap of a tariff fixed by the unequal treaty system which lasted for a century.<sup>15</sup>

The greatness of Meiji Japan appeared much clearer to Norman when he compared it with Qing China, which “failed” to modernize itself to defend national sovereignty. Norman wrote: “It is to the credit of these Meiji leaders that, understanding the trend of the times, they resolutely set about reshaping the defenses and economic foundations of the country. In contrast we might note the utter incapacity of the Manchu Dynasty to accomplish a similar task in China.”<sup>16</sup>

Accordingly, Norman forgave autocracy in early Meiji Japan because it successfully modernized the country. He explicitly stated, “It was only through an absolutist state that the tremendous task of modernization could be accomplished without the risk of social upheaval which might attend the attempts to extend the democratic method in a nation which had emerged so suddenly and so tardily from feudal isolation.” He applauded the Restoration leaders as the “ablest, most self-sacrificing of clan military bureaucrats who [had] utilized to the full and with remarkable dexterity those autocratic powers which they [had] steadily strengthened.” Norman even called these military bureaucrats the “spearpoint of advance, the vanguard of modernization, in the establishment of a modern state in Japan.”<sup>17</sup>

In a later book, however, Norman shifted his attitudes toward the Restoration leaders and blamed them for establishing autocratic rule. He criticized them for crushing social forces

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 216; about the pressure of Western imperialism and Japan's economic and technological handicaps, also see 111-112, 153-154, 208-209, 215-218, 224-225, 241.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 231.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 209. Norman was not totally unsympathetic with the agrarian population who, burdened by heavy taxes to fund rapid modernization, had been dispossessed of land and become tenant or semi-tenant class and working class; the hardship of these poor farmers could be contrasted with the favored treatments of the big merchant families who had benefited from Meiji industrial policies and of former feudal lords and upper-class samurai who had been compensated with government bonds for their properties; see *ibid.*, 177-187, 198-208, 243-273; E. H. Norman, “Feudal Background of Japanese Politics,” in *Origins of the Modern Japanese State*, ed. Dower, 391-394.

surging from below and preventing democracy from growing thereafter. He developed the analysis that the Meiji Restoration had been the consequence of internal developments during the Tokugawa period and therefore it had been not merely a “revolution from above” but also a “revolution from below.” He argued that the expansion of a money economy had ultimately disrupted the feudal class structure and led to the collapse of the Tokugawa regime. As mercantilism enriched the merchants, it impoverished the samurai and the peasants, and this reduced their loyalty to the Shogunate and corroded the source of government revenues. With economic distress worsened by natural calamities, the poor peasants and urban dwellers frequently rioted against the authorities in the late Tokugawa period, and Norman interpreted this as an indirect cause of the fall of Tokugawa. The intellectual environment was not favorable to the Shogunate; emboldened by national learning (*kokugaku*) and Dutch learning (*rangaku*), the samurai rebelled against the feudal government. The discovery that in some clans, the peasants directly joined the anti-Tokugawa force as soldiers assured Norman that the Meiji Restoration could have been a social revolution.<sup>18</sup> However, once the Shogunate was overthrown, the new leaders immediately turned “counterrevolutionary.” Norman maintained that in order to control agrarian revolts, the Meiji government set up a professional army manned by conscripts, and with this, the state gained a means to demonstrate strength and legitimacy and to indoctrinate the people. Thus organized as part of the modern nation-state building project, the conscripts would soon become an agent of Japanese colonial expansion, armed with modern weapons.<sup>19</sup> Norman harshly commented:

[The samurai leaders] strengthened their position in the early years of the Meiji period when, with their autocratic habit of rule, their ingrained contempt for the common people and their

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<sup>18</sup> Norman, “Japan’s Emergence as a Modern States,” 118-142, 154-155; “Feudal Background of Japanese Politics,” 382-383; E. Herbert Norman, *Soldier and Peasant: The Origins of Conscript* (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943), 23-34.

<sup>19</sup> Norman, “Feudal Background of Japanese Politics,” 402-403; *Soldier and Peasant*, 37-43, 45-48, 53-57.

genius for mass control, they stubbornly and successfully resisted all attempts by the people, or rather by the most consistent champions of the people, to share with them political responsibility and power.<sup>20</sup>

Norman, who linked the underdevelopment of democracy and Japanese militarism in the 1930s, assigned to the Meiji Restoration leaders particular responsibility for laying the foundations for autocracy at home and aggression overseas. He came to conclude that the “leaders of the Meiji Government had blocked the road toward further democratization of Japanese society and economy and had set their faces resolutely toward the path leading to reaction at home and aggression abroad, the trend toward more militarization in every aspect of Japanese life was irrevocably determined.”<sup>21</sup>

What was so deplorable for Norman was the defeat of the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement (*Jiyū Minken Undō*) of the 1870s-1880s. According to John W. Dower, Norman regarded the movement as “potentially the most hopeful gesture toward a more egalitarian society in presurrender Japan.”<sup>22</sup> This political activism developed alongside the revolts of ex-samurai against the Meiji government’s policy of discontinuing their feudal privileges and the provision of security bonds. These rebellions, the biggest of which was the Satsuma Rebellion, were crushed by force in the same way as agrarian revolts.<sup>23</sup> Simultaneously, influenced by modern European political thought, the former samurai class demanded representative, constitutional government and a guarantee of liberal rights to challenge the Meiji oligarchy. Norman compared the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement with the Meiji Restoration and considered it to be a popular movement that, despite ex-samurai leadership, different classes of

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 388.

<sup>21</sup> Norman, *Soldier and Peasant*, 57.

<sup>22</sup> Dower, “E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History,” 26.

<sup>23</sup> Norman, “Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State,” 187-195; “Feudal Background of Japanese Politics,” 394-414, 421-434.

the people supported for their own ends.<sup>24</sup> Regarding the failure of this liberal movement, Norman attributed it to the “political immaturity of the Japanese people, who [had] lacked the traditions of democratic action and organization.”<sup>25</sup> However, more critical was state repression: the Meiji government confronted the people’s political activities by using force and by passing regulations which restricted freedom of assembly and freedom of speech. In Norman’s analysis, the making of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (Meiji Constitution) had given a final blow to the democratic movement: with the absolutist constitution, the Meiji oligarchs had established an autocratic, centralized government.<sup>26</sup>

Norman did not extensively discuss post-Meiji history in any of his works, but his view of it was as gloomy as that of Meiji history. His narrative of Taishō Democracy focused on its limitations rather than accomplishments. While Norman regarded the gradual expansion of voting rights and the eventual realization of universal male suffrage as the greatest achievement, he did not highly evaluate the development of party politics. Parliamentary democracy did not function from the opening of the Imperial Diet with political parties so divided and easily maneuvered by the oligarchy. Political parties also developed ties with landed and business groups, or the zaibatsu, and became bodies that represented few ordinary people. To Norman, the harassment of the labor and socialist movement by the bureaucracy since the late Meiji period seemed nothing less than continued autocratic repression of democracy.<sup>27</sup>

The importance of E. H. Norman’s theses on Japan is that he found the major cause of the incompleteness of the Meiji “Revolution” in the lingering feudal traditions and proposed the interrelation between them and the authoritarian, illiberal nature of the Japanese state and the

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 195-198, 274-296; *ibid.*, 414-421, 441-449.

<sup>25</sup> Norman, “Feudal Background of Japanese Politics,” 449.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 443-463.

<sup>27</sup> Norman, “Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State,” 295-301, 311-312.

emergence of militarism in the 1930s. What is noticeable is that Norman held a progressive view of history that assumed capitalist democracy was superior to feudalism, a higher stage of history, and was inherently peaceful. By stressing the feudal legacy that lingered in modern Japan by taking a deterministic view of history, he contributed to promoting the idea that a still-feudalistic Japan was inferior and therefore threatening to world peace.

Equally significant was that through the lens of Marxist class analysis, Norman described the alliance among the civil and military bureaucrats, the moneyed classes, and politicians. Although brief, he also mentioned the problem of the surplus population and the underdevelopment of the domestic industry, and, under the influence of Leninist theory of imperialism, indicated that industrial and financial interests had pushed Japan into imperialist ventures in search for raw materials and foreign markets, too.<sup>28</sup> However, Norman did not single out the ruling elites as being responsible for Japanese aggression or, for that matter, extensively discuss Japan's socio-economic conditions or international relations. These issues and ideas that Norman presented, however, influenced other writers and were developed by them.

### **Progressives and Adaptations of the Norman Theses**

Chief among those who focused on the socio-economic foundation of Japanese militarism was T. A. Bisson (1900-1979), a Foreign Policy Association (FPA) researcher who became an editor of *Amerasia* and IPR's journal *Pacific Affairs*. He also worked in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the Pacific War. For Bisson, who had been a missionary in China for several years during the 1920s, China was the primary interest.<sup>29</sup> But he published many articles and books about Japan as well during the 1930s and 1940s, and, indeed, he joined

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 264-273; *Soldier and Peasant*, 52-53.

<sup>29</sup> Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 91-96; *Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu*, ed., *Shōwa Zaiseishi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan*, 71.

SCAP Government Section (GS) after the war to engage in economic reform programs.<sup>30</sup>

Lacking expertise in Japanese history, Bisson's early works were more journalistic and less systematic than E. H. Norman's. Bisson did not overtly connect Japan's authoritarianism and aggression to its feudal traditions, but he critically discussed how the collaboration of the Japanese ruling elites drove the nation into fascism and militarism, thus complementing one of Norman's theses.<sup>31</sup>

In *Japan in China* published in 1938, for example, Bisson explained that the Japanese government had been ruled by the military, bureaucrats, and aristocrats and that the capitalists and landowners had penetrated into politics by developing political connections with these groups and newly-established political parties by the 1920s.<sup>32</sup> Bisson argued that Japan's economic problems had essentially caused Japanese fascism and aggression during the 1930s, and placed responsibility upon the ruling classes that "[had become unwilling] to undertake drastic social reforms that would trench on their own privileged position." Exploitative industrial capitalism and the underdevelopment of the agricultural sector had left the peasants impoverished and the domestic market underdeveloped, but neither the capitalist nor landowning classes had taken any measure.<sup>33</sup> Military officers from poor rural backgrounds had thus decided to take over the government and planned overseas expansion as a solution to Japan's economic deadlock. The parties, the capitalists, and the bureaucrats had not necessarily agreed with the military cliques, but through a shared interest in expansionist policies, they had connived with

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 99; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 160.

<sup>31</sup> According to Howard B. Schonberger, Bisson was heavily influenced by his friend Norman and traced the origins of Japan's authoritarianism and expansionism in the nature of the Meiji Restoration; see Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 96. It is unknown precisely when Bisson got acquainted with Norman, but Bisson seems to have developed a similar view by the late 1930s; it is in T. A. Bisson's *Shadow over Asia: The Rise of Militant Japan* (New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1941) that I can find the influence of Norman's *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State*.

<sup>32</sup> T. A. Bisson, *Japan in China* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1938), 196-197.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 198-200.

them.<sup>34</sup>

Unlike E. H. Norman, many so-called progressives, including T. A. Bisson, had no training as Japanologists. As non-specialists in Japanese politics and society, they easily indulged in Eurocentricism and carried an apparent animosity toward Japan generated by the ferocity of the war and by wartime propaganda, as well as very little knowledge of Japan and, in some cases, identification with China. Many of them easily made reductionist arguments that the Japanese were militant because of their historical and cultural backwardness. IPR-affiliated researchers on Asia and the US military's intelligence office personnel Andrew Roth (1919-2010) and Owen Lattimore (1900-1989) were two such examples.<sup>35</sup> As non-specialists in Japan, they relied on Norman's and Bisson's works and transformed their theses into more generalized, biased ones.<sup>36</sup> Widely read by the American Occupation personnel, Roth's *Dilemma in Japan* and Lattimore's *Solution in Asia*, both published in 1945, can be considered very influential pieces in popularizing the critical analysis of modern Japan.<sup>37</sup>

Andrew Roth's book tried to analyze Japan in order to suggest a proper postwar policy for the country, but he developed his discussions from the flawed and prejudicial premise that Japan was uncivilized and savage. As he explicitly stated that the purpose of his book was to "analyze and understand the reasons for the backwardness and barbarism of Japan," it is not

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 200-235. By 1945, T. A. Bisson's research became more sophisticated and more focused on analyzing the socio-economic foundation of Japanese militarism. He became more convinced that the economic structure dominated by the capitalist-landowning classes was the major cause of foreign aggression and began to see the military as an instrument of it; see T. A. Bisson, *America's Far Eastern Policy* (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), 152-155; T. A. Bisson, *Japan's War Economy* (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), vii-xi.

<sup>35</sup> Roth was in the Office of Navy Intelligence (ONI), and Lattimore was in the Office of War Information (OWI); see Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu, ed., *Shōwa Zaiseishi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan*, 71.

<sup>36</sup> Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 96, 296-297; both Roth and Lattimore were associated with Bisson.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.; Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," 40; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 595. *Dilemma in Japan* was published in September 1945 in the United States; see Andrew Roth, *Dilemma in Japan* (London: Victor Gollancs Ltd., 1946), 8.

difficult to notice his lack of objectivity.<sup>38</sup> Mixing Norman's historical study of modern Japan with Bisson's interest in Japanese socio-economic conditions, Roth asserted, "Japan's militarism, like German Nazism, is an organic disease with roots in Japan's past inability to find a peaceful solution to its economic problems."<sup>39</sup> This "inability" originated in Japan's "unfinished" transformation from feudal-agricultural to modern-democratic, industrial society. He explained that the former samurai and merchant classes in the Meiji government had established modern industries, but failed to develop the agricultural sector. Exploited by the landlords and the emerging capitalists, the farming population remained poor and had little purchasing power; without a large domestic market, therefore, the industrialists searched for markets overseas. While he drew on Norman's work, Roth did not consider the international context of the late nineteenth century, where Western imperialism had imperiled Asian sovereignties, and instead explained the causes of Japanese militarism in terms of industrial capitalists' interests. Like Bisson, Roth argued that the underdeveloped domestic market had "compelled Japan's industrialists and bankers to indulge in aggressive trade and expansion that [had come] to be linked inevitably with the militarists' drive for territorial conquest by force of arms."<sup>40</sup> Roth's discussions about the democratic movements during the Meiji and Taishō periods recalled Norman's. Political parties, which were the pawns of the zaibatsu, could not possibly have adopted liberal reforms. The Japanese state kept repressing the emergent democratic forces.<sup>41</sup>

In contrast to Roth, Owen Lattimore's description of Japan was brief, for the objective of his book was not to assess Japanese political life and socio-economic conditions, but to

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<sup>38</sup> Roth, *Dilemma in Japan*, 15.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 57.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 58-61, 76-78, Chapters 7-10. These chapters discuss Taishō liberalism, the peasant movement, the labor and socialist movement, and communist activism; pp.76-78 and a part of Chapter 7 mention the Freedom and People's Rights Movement.

discuss what vision America should have for postwar Asia as a whole. Although his discussion on Japan was short, it effectively illuminated the progressives' portrayal of modern Japan. Citing Norman's work, Lattimore wrote: the "'new' Japan of the Meiji Era (1868-1912) was founded by men whose minds were colored by the strongest feudal traditions in the society of old Japan," and the "'revolution' against the shogunate, quickly consolidated as a counterrevolution under the Meiji Era."<sup>42</sup> The understanding that Meiji Japan had embarked on economic modernization as an effort to recover full autonomy from the Western powers distinguished Lattimore as well as Norman from other writers.<sup>43</sup> But, this insight did not restrain Lattimore from seeing Japan's military engagement as an inevitable result of its imperfect modernization. He wrote, "From the beginning, the development of an internal market was made subsidiary to the development of markets abroad for Japan's new products," and the "Japanese who conquered Japan created a remarkable dual system, combining a highly cartelized industry with an agriculture which preserved the social outlook of feudalism."<sup>44</sup> Lattimore thus concluded that "[m]ilitary aggression [had been] the only possible outcome of Japan's social system."<sup>45</sup> About Japanese fascism, too, he made a similar analysis. Compared to the German case, Lattimore believed that Japanese fascism was more deeply rooted because it was "guided by medieval brains." He continued, "So medieval was the texture of society in Japan when 'modernization' began that the monstrosity of fascism could be created by keeping the minds of men and women unchanged, while introducing new technical skills for their hands."<sup>46</sup> In other words, Lattimore attributed the development of fascism at home and overseas expansion during the 1930s, as well as the "failure" of the Meiji "Revolution," to an unchanged Japanese feudal culture and mentality.

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<sup>42</sup> Owen Lattimore, *Solution in Asia* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1945), 36-38.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 38-39.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 39-40.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

Nathaniel Peffer (1890-1964), a former Far Eastern correspondent for the *New York Tribune* and professor at Columbia University, developed an analogous, but more amateurish and Eurocentric view in *Basis for Peace in the Far East*, a book published in cooperation with the IPR's International Secretariat in 1942. In his section on Japanese modernization, he argued that a military feudal oligarchy had simply become a capitalist feudal oligarchy supporting industrialization and that the "old social organization, the old habits of thought, and the old attitudes [had] persisted."<sup>47</sup> One of the crucial causes of overseas expansion was the underdevelopment of Japanese society. Like other writers, Peffer explained that since Japan remained agrarian and poor, the Japanese needed to rely on foreign markets.<sup>48</sup> Japanese underdevelopment was more than economic; it was also cultural. As for the development of totalitarian rule in Japan, he thought of it as something natural and ingrained in Japanese feudal culture rather than as a transnational phenomenon of modernity. He described feudalism as an "authentic expression of the spirit of Japanese institutions and Japanese civilization." He admitted that feudalism was not unique to Japan and that such a system had once ruled most of Europe. Yet, he asserted, "Nowhere else was there so complete a subservience on the part of all except a small caste and nowhere else was the cleft between the classes so wide. Nowhere else was authoritarianism so strongly entrenched."<sup>49</sup>

The fundamental reason why such feudal mentality and social relations remained in Japan was that the Japanese had not undergone the intellectual and cultural developments that had contributed to moderating and weakening feudalism in the West. According to Peffer, lacking Christian humanism, egalitarianism, and humanitarianism of eighteenth-and-nineteenth-century Europe, feudalism did not erode in Japan. In fact, Japanese feudalism was "more

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<sup>47</sup> Nathaniel Peffer, *Basis for Peace in the Far East* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942), 83-84, 146-147.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 146-150.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

primitive than ever feudalism was in Europe, a dangerous anachronism in a world in the machine age. ... In Japan feudalism was – and on the whole still is – simple, stark, primitive.”<sup>50</sup> The cause of Japanese militarism was thus rooted in Japanese feudal culture. To be sure, Peffer did not excuse the West for its imperialist ventures. But he explained that what was at stake was “uncontrolled militarism, not the economic imperative, that drove Japan on its imperialistic career, militarism uncontrolled because Japan in spirit still [dwelled] in the feudal age.”<sup>51</sup> In this way, Peffer presented his conviction that Japan was not simply emulating, in order to compete with, Western imperialist powers, but backward, and, therefore, menacing to the world.

Japanese-American political scientist John M. Maki (1909-2006) was another progressive writer who developed a critical view of feudalistic Japan. After obtaining a master’s degree in English literature, he changed his major to Japanese studies and studied in Japan in the late 1930s. Once the war broke out, he was ordered to an internment camp. On his release, he began to work for the government’s intelligence agencies. After the Japanese surrender, Maki, like T. A. Bisson, served in SCAP’s GS. Later, he pursued an academic career and earned a Ph.D. in political science.<sup>52</sup> He published his very first work, *Japanese Militarism: Its Cause and Cure*, in 1945, and, as the title indicates, he tried to explain the causes of Japanese militarism by tracing them to Japanese history and the characteristics of the modern Japanese state. Maki’s research was better documented than Nathaniel Peffer’s, but the entire book was similarly influenced by Eurocentric and deterministic views.

For Maki, the Pacific War was “inevitable as far as Japan was concerned, because of the

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 155-156.

<sup>52</sup> Special Collections and University Archives of the University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, “Maki, John M. (John McGilvrey), 1909-,” <http://www.library.umass.edu/spcoll/umarmot/?p=760>; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 159, 305-306.

forces that drove her leaders and her people to militarism and aggression.”<sup>53</sup> He recognized that many factors explained the war, but he emphasized that Japanese militarism was rooted in a mentality and way of thinking carried over from a feudal past. This reflected the thesis shared by the progressives that the Meiji “Revolution” had been incomplete. Maki considered it natural that having lived in feudal culture, the Meiji leaders had set up an undemocratic government and taken an anti-laissez faire policy. He also held that the submissiveness of the Japanese people, which he defined as a feudal trait, was responsible for the establishment of an authoritarian, expansionist state.<sup>54</sup> He stated:

Feudalism as the economic and political structure of the country disappeared with the collapse of the Tokugawa regime, but the feudal psychology remained in Japan as the dominating factor in the establishment of a new form of oligarchic government. This feudal attitude of unquestioning acceptance of the control of authority was the foundation on which the modern authoritarian state was based in Japan.<sup>55</sup>

Moreover, Maki agreed with Peffer that the continuation of feudal culture in Japan was due to the fact that Japan had missed the intellectual currents that had developed in the West during the eighteenth and nineteenth century largely due to Tokugawa seclusion. Maki maintained:

It is impossible to determine the extent to which the seclusion policy retarded the development of the Japanese nation. Yet the effects have been great, for it removed Japan from contact with an Occident that was in a stage of tremendous development. A few of the results of Renaissance thought percolated into Japan, but the flow of those ideas was just beginning when the country was closed. But what is more important is the fact that Japan had no experience with the ideas or philosophies underlying liberalism, capitalism, democracy, the Industrial Revolution, and all the other great currents of thought and action that swept through eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe and America.<sup>56</sup>

According to Maki, two important developments during the long Tokugawa period molded modern Japan: the solidification of a feudal form of government and society and the maturity of an insular, anti-foreign mentality. When building the modern Japanese state, the Meiji leaders

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<sup>53</sup> John M. Maki, *Japanese Militarism: Its Cause and Cure* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), 10.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 12-13, 57-58, 84-88, 90, 137, 155, 181.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 57.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 136-137.

actively learned new technologies from the West to make Japan strong, but fearing that Western political thought might destroy the feudal foundation of the Japanese political and social institutions, they were selective in adopting Western ideas.<sup>57</sup> Maki found these attitudes not only in the Meiji oligarchs but also in the militarist leaders of 1930s Japan. While amassing modern armaments, they suppressed all sorts of foreign thought that conflicted with authoritarian and absolutist forms of government.<sup>58</sup> Maki thus believed that Japanese feudal culture and mentality, along with other factors, could explain the origin of their militarism.<sup>59</sup>

As we have seen, key issues discussed in E. H. Norman's scholarly study were adopted and transformed into simplistic, ideological arguments by others. Norman's analysis of the feudal origins of the modern Japanese state backed up the idea that Japan was backward, lagging behind the West, "retarded," and therefore it was authoritarian, which, in turn, explained its aggressiveness. Featuring Norman's economic analysis, T. A. Bisson related Japanese backwardness in the agrarian sector to the causes of Japan's overseas expansionism and found the ruling elites responsible for Japan's incomplete shift from a feudal-agrarian to a modern-democratic industrial society, and for driving the country into fascism and militarism in the end. Running through these analyses were ethnocentric descriptions of Japanese history and society. Norman himself stressed the continuity of feudal culture in modern Japan and reinforced the view that a nation's historical course was determined by its culture, which, Norman and others implied, was static. By so doing, Norman made the Japanese appear unable to change their society because of their feudal past. Those who lacked scholarly discipline easily fell for these

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 137, 149-151.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 151-154.

<sup>59</sup> For example, in Chapter 7, as reasons why the Japanese had become chauvinist, Maki added the nationalization of samurai culture through education, conscription, and propaganda, continuous victory in war since the late nineteenth century, and Western tolerance of Japanese expansionist policy. He also mentioned Japan's geopolitical and economic factors such as the fear of Russia and recession since the 1920s.

biased views. Accordingly, as I will show later, many progressives called for radical postwar reforms. Cynical about whatever democratic developments the Japanese might have attained in the prewar era and pessimistic about the chance for spontaneous democratization in Japan, they demanded the Allies' active intervention in thorough-going occupation reforms.

### **Conservatives' Analyses of Japanese Modernization: Its Success and Limitations**

The "conservative" group seems to have originally referred to the "Japan Crowd," or Japan specialists, in the State Department, led by former Ambassador to Japan (1932-1942) and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (1942-1944) Joseph C. Grew (1880-1965) and his staff members, whom the progressives attacked for their seemingly "moderate" attitudes toward a peace settlement with Japan, particularly in regard to the treatment of the Japanese ruling elites. Political outlook, rather than historical argument, identified certain policy-makers and critics as "conservatives" in contrast with the progressives. Nevertheless, there were some similar tendencies in the views of modern Japanese history among "conservative" scholars and journalists who were around the State Department's Japan hands.

Edwin O. Reischauer's (1910-1990) view of Japan is worthy of note. Like Norman, Reischauer was a son of an American missionary family born and raised in Japan, who returned to the United States for his college education. After graduation, he enrolled in graduate school at Harvard University. He studied Japanese and Chinese, and engaged in research not only in the United States but also in France, Japan, China, and Korea under Japanese colonial rule. Reischauer received a doctoral degree in 1939, the same year that Norman finished his dissertation. During World War II, Reischauer served with US Army Intelligence Service and with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee's (SWNCC) Subcommittee for the Far East

(SFE).<sup>60</sup> After the war, he became one of the leading Japanologists in America. He even served as ambassador to Japan during the 1960s. About a decade later, he would meet criticism from his former student John W. Dower for being a “modernization theorist” who supported America’s Cold War.

Reischauer had his own view of Japanese development during the 1940s, which differed from the progressives’. As Dower discusses at length in *Origins of the Japanese Modern State*, Reischauer’s interpretation of Japan’s emergence as a modern nation-state was generally positive. Whereas Norman emphasized Japan’s failure in modernizing itself, Reischauer saw a largely successful transformation of the state. The roots of failure for Norman were exactly the recipe for success according to Reischauer. Both agreed that Japan’s internal economic and intellectual developments had set the gradual stage for its transformation into a modern state.<sup>61</sup> In Reischauer’s analysis, what was especially indispensable for Japan’s rapid change during the Meiji period was the maintenance of national unity and the establishment of competent bureaucracy under the previous Tokugawa rule. Like Norman, comparing Japan’s “success” at modernization with China’s “failure,” Reischauer asserted:

The contrast between the political unity and efficient administration the Japanese revolutionaries inherited from the Tokugawa, and the political disunity and disrupted central government the Chinese revolutionaries inherited from the Manchu dynasty, does much to explain the more rapid progress the Japanese made in modernizing their country, and the entirely unprecedented economic and military supremacy Japan was soon to win in the Far East.<sup>62</sup>

Reischauer did not unconditionally approve of the peaceful feudal rule under Tokugawa. He thought, like the progressives, that the political system set up by the Tokugawa Shogunate had been backward, compared with the West’s, and had hampered historical growth by rigidly

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<sup>60</sup> Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations at Harvard University, “Edwin O. Reischauer,” [http://harvarddealc.org/about/BP\\_Reischauer.htm](http://harvarddealc.org/about/BP_Reischauer.htm); Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 210; Iokibe, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku: Jō*, 195-196, 198.

<sup>61</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer, *Japan Past and Present*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 96-98, 102-108.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 118.

controlling society. He stated:

The long peace of the Tokugawa era was, of course, in many ways a blessing to the land. Yet by holding back the wheels of normal social and economic progress and fixing on the nation an antiquated political and social order, the Tokugawa preserved in Japan an outdated feudal structure than they could have lasted in a freer society. What had been essentially a reactionary political and social system when founded in the early seventeenth century was preserved almost intact until the middle of the nineteenth century.<sup>63</sup>

Yet, it was more significant for Reischauer that successful modernization during the Meiji period had rescued Japan from its underdevelopment and had brought it to a stage comparable with the West's.

Edwin O. Reischauer praised the Meiji leaders' policies. Somewhat like Norman in *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State*, Reischauer judged it a right decision that the Meiji government had established public enterprises, aided private industries, and encouraged a swift adoption of Western technology, because without industrial development economic growth and military buildup could have not been possible.<sup>64</sup> The Meiji leaders mustered the manpower resources necessary for industrialization and military growth. Through universal education, the Meiji oligarchy also turned a country of feudal fiefdoms into a united nation of literate, skilled, and patriotic workers and soldiers who could contribute to Japan's modernization.<sup>65</sup> It is interesting that Reischauer treated these Meiji policies as "advanced" in retrospect. When government control of business became common in the twentieth century, he thought that "Japan proved to be in the vanguard of this world-wide economic trend."<sup>66</sup> More ironically, he even identified Japan as a "[pioneer] in the modern totalitarian technique of utilizing the educational system for political indoctrination and . . . , in fact, decades ahead of countries like Germany in

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 94-95.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 130-133.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 127-130.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 132.

perfecting these techniques.”<sup>67</sup> Certainly, Reischauer was not unaware of the expense of rapid modernization. He acknowledged that success owed much to a large population of poor peasants who had not benefited from Japan’s transformation.<sup>68</sup> Nevertheless, it was undeniable to him that the Meiji leaders modernized the country so successfully that Japan’s status matched the West’s. The Meiji programs, Reischauer commented, had “made Japan within a few short decades a world military power and won recognition of equality from the occidentals, who had in the past tended to look upon all Asia as essentially ‘barbarian’ and outside the family of civilized nations.”<sup>69</sup>

Reischauer’s discussions about Taishō Democracy and the rise of the military during the 1930s can also be contrasted with the progressives’. He agreed that democracy had unfortunately not fully grown in prewar Japan. But still, democracy, however imperfect, greatly developed during the Taishō period (1912-1926). Contrary to the progressives, Reischauer viewed the business groups as one of the propelling forces of the liberal democratic trends. In his analysis, as the original Meiji oligarchs passed, the political center diffused among different groups, such as military officers, bureaucrats, businesses, rural landowners, political parties, and the intelligentsia, but it was industrial and financial interests that dominated politics by the 1920s. Reischauer regarded the businesses as a liberal, Western-minded coalition that had countered the military and supported democratization. For example, by opposing high taxes for armaments and military conquest that had paved the way for their overseas economic interests, the business men who had controlled political parties effectively reversed the policy of colonial expansion during the 1920s. Even under the influence of big business interests, party politics

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 129.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 133.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 134.

was normalized.<sup>70</sup> The electorate was gradually increased, and universal manhood suffrage was realized by the mid-1920s. Reischauer also mentioned that the intellectuals and urban workers, who had been the leaders of the Taishō democratic movement, had pressured the government to lower the tax requirement and to give the voting right to all men, rich and poor. In the same period, they also founded leftist parties and became more active than ever in labor unionism. Their influence in parliamentary politics might have been still weak, but they definitely became a powerful political and social force.<sup>71</sup> Reischauer thus shed light on the achievements rather than the failings of Taishō Democracy.

Regarding the end of the liberal decade in the 1930s, Reischauer cited a number of structural causes, some of which were outside of Japan's control. One was the world depression of 1929. Reischauer sympathetically argued that high tariffs set up throughout the world had a detrimental impact on Japan's economy, which was heavily dependent on trade. Japan had a large population to sustain, and the decline in international commerce was a pressing problem.<sup>72</sup> The second cause was found in the inherent limitations of Taishō Democracy. Reischauer viewed the Taishō democratic movement essentially as an urban phenomenon. The majority of the population living in the countryside remained conservative and did not rejoice at the political, economic, and social trends of the 1920s. Military officers and enlisted soldiers from rural backgrounds naturally developed anti-liberal, anti-capitalist sentiments, and drove the nation into fascist totalitarianism during the 1930s.<sup>73</sup> Thus, Reischauer argued that underdevelopment in the agricultural sector had ultimately pushed Japan into fascist rule and colonial expansion. But, he paid attention to political causes and not only economic ones.

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 144-150.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 150-152.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 160-162.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 156-160.

For Reischauer, the most critical cause of the collapse of parliamentary government was the flaws in the Japanese political system outlined in the Constitution of 1889 that allowed the military to control the government. That is, the independence of the military from the civilian government gave an inordinate amount of power to the military. The military could bypass the government to execute its policies by claiming its direct relationship with the sovereign emperor and loyalty to him. The military could also cripple the formation of a cabinet by vetoing the appointment of generals and admirals as ministers. What had granted such power to the military were Articles 11 and 12 of the Meiji Constitution, which placed the armed forces directly under the emperor; also the revived rule in the Regulations of the Army and the Navy required appointment of only a general or a lieutenant general and an admiral or a vice admiral on the active list as ministers of the Army and of the Navy (*gunbu daijin gen'eki bukan-sei*).<sup>74</sup> By taking over Manchuria through a *fait accompli* in 1931 and by assassinating government leaders, the military incrementally gained more political power in the 1930s.<sup>75</sup> The problem of weak civilian control of the military reflected another aspect of Taishō Democracy's limits. Taishō liberals succeeded in realizing universal manhood suffrage and representative democracy under the absolutist Meiji Constitution, but without amending it, which only the emperor could do in theory, it might have been difficult to inhibit the military's arbitrary actions.

For Reischauer, the businessmen and the bureaucrats were reluctant followers who were unable to stop the militarists, rather than collaborators. As the military was politically more powerful, in spite of their apprehensions, the business groups cooperated with the militarists; the bureaucrats, whose role was to balance the interests of political parties and big businesses against

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<sup>74</sup> The custom to appoint incumbent top military officers (among generals/ admirals and lieutenant generals/ vice admirals) ministers continued between 1900 and 1913.

<sup>75</sup> Reischauer, *Japan Past and Present*, 162-163, 165-167.

those of the military, thus drifted toward the militarist course.<sup>76</sup>

Hugh Borton presented similar analyses of the origins of 1930s Japanese militarism. Born to a Quaker family, he went to Japan in 1928 to engage in the Society of Friends' services. Then, he met British diplomat and Japanologist Sir George Sansom (1893-1965), and by attending Sansom's lectures, he was drawn into Japanese studies. Back to the United States in 1932, he entered Columbia University's graduate program to major in Japanese history. Borton studied mostly in the Netherlands, where Japanology was more advanced than in the United States, and worked briefly in Japan as well. In 1937, he earned a Ph.D. from Leiden University in the Netherlands and took a teaching position at Columbia University, eventually rising to professor of Japanese studies. He became friends with Edwin O. Reischauer during his graduate years and briefly worked with Norman at Columbia. Joining the State Department in 1942, he drafted many policy documents regarding postwar Japan.<sup>77</sup> His analyses of Japanese politics and society, which became the basis of many post-surrender reform plans, were thus in a way more important than Reischauer's. But their views were almost identical.

In *Japan since 1931*, published in 1940 as a part of the IPR Inquiry series, with E. H. Norman's *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State*, Borton argued, more specifically than Reischauer, that the shortcomings of the Meiji political structure allowed the military to control the government and terminated the short-lived parliamentary democracy. He explained how Articles 11 and 12 in the Meiji Constitution and the revised Regulations of the Army and the Navy weakened civilian control over the military, and correctly analyzed that Japan was virtually under "dual government."<sup>78</sup> This duality was lessened as other government branches and

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 163-167, 169-171.

<sup>77</sup> Iokibe, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku: Jō*, 191-201.

<sup>78</sup> Hugh Borton, *Japan since 1931: Its Political and Social Developments* (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), 8.

business interests acted more on the military by the end of the 1930s.<sup>79</sup> Consequently, all walks of life were gradually put under totalitarian control. Objectively observing these changes, Borton, like Reischauer, did not believe that the cooperation among the military, the capitalists, and the bureaucrats was either solid or inevitable.<sup>80</sup> To be more precise, he looked at the relations among the ruling elites differently from the progressives. He stressed that since the Meiji Restoration, the military had always occupied a prominent position and been antagonistic to all the other groups – capitalists, industrialists, landowners, bureaucrats, and political parties – even if they had not been completely independent of one another.<sup>81</sup> To Borton, things had significantly changed since the 1931 Manchurian Incident, after which the military had apparently begun to increase political influence over the other groups.

The differences in Borton's perspective from the progressives' can also be seen in his discussions about Japan's social and economic conditions. He agreed with the progressives that Japan's shift from an agricultural to an industrial society had been incomplete. Due to the underdevelopment of the primary industry on which the majority of the Japanese lived, purchasing power remained limited. Japanese industrialization, therefore, required overseas expansion in search of larger markets.<sup>82</sup> However, he did not count on such an economic grand theory or blame state policy favoring industry since the Meiji period for the rise of militarism in 1930s Japan. Borton implicitly criticized the state for the prevalence of tenancy and agrarian indebtedness, but he also showed a sympathetic understanding of the pressure that a surplus population and an inadequate amount of arable land had on the Japanese economy.<sup>83</sup> In addition, he acknowledged that, whether they had provided a systematic solution or not, the Japanese

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 8-9.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 14-16, 36-55.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 36.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 13-14, 87.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 87-91.

government had initiated a series of reforms to alleviate socio-economic distress since the 1920s.<sup>84</sup> Reform measures certainly became tied to the purposes of war mobilization and of defraying unnecessary discontent after 1937, but Borton suggested that the state and the people were in a reciprocal relationship.<sup>85</sup> For instance, the Japanese labor unions and socialist politicians turned into supporters of the war, partly out of patriotism and partly due to the opportunities that they gained from the war.<sup>86</sup> Unlike the progressives, then, Borton did not unconditionally criticize the ruling elites or depict a polarized society of the exploiting and the exploited.

Hugh Byas (1875-1945), British editor of the American newspaper the *Japan Advertiser* and correspondent for the *Times* of London and the *New York Times*, held a viewpoint similar to that of Reischauer and Borton. Having reported from Tokyo since the mid-1910s, Byas well knew the inner working of the Japanese government. In volumes published during the Pacific War, he provided a closer look at intricate politics inside the government and the military and, by so doing, humanized the Japanese to a greater extent than many other writers. He basically agreed with Reischauer and Borton that the developments in 1930s Japan had resulted from military control of the government. Byas explained that chauvinist nationalists in the Army had not only caused the Manchurian Incident, but also defied the cabinet by abusing the emperor's supreme command and the Regulations of the Army and the Navy. Worse still was that they had assassinated cabinet members, bureaucrats, and business leaders. Through the use of terror, the military exerted more influence on the government and eventually dragged the nation into overseas aggression.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 91-93, 101-105.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 93-97.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 98-101.

<sup>87</sup> Hugh Byas, *The Japanese Enemy: His Power and His Vulnerability* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), 93-95.

Although he identified the same political factor in the rise of militarism in 1930s Japan as Reischauer and Borton did, Byas seems to have been in the final analysis a weaker theoretician. Like the progressive critics, he contrasted Japanese backwardness with the West's advanced stage. Byas called Japan the "only nation in [the twentieth] century [that] [combined] modern military and industrial power with religious and political ideas inherited from the primitive ages of mankind." Japanese "peculiarities [had] not been modified by contact with the general stream of human progress," he said.<sup>88</sup> In other words, he believed that the Meiji "Revolution" had brought an incomplete modernity to Japan.

For Byas, a great mass of tradition lay beneath the modern façade of Japan's political system. Although they abolished feudal rule, the Meiji leaders put in its place a restored imperial regime and made a state cult of the old Shinto religion. The real problem was not necessarily the presence of the semi-holy emperor itself but the continuation of what Byas termed as "figurehead government." This meant that the governing structure was organized under a titular ruler but standing behind the throne were various groups vying for actual power. Unlike in centralized civil government, the political center was formally fixated on the emperor but in reality fluid behind the scenes in the Japanese government. When control shifted to the militarists in the 1930s, thought Byas, Japan entered an age of militarism.<sup>89</sup> In addition, he argued that the fundamental ideology of the Japanese political organization was the Japanese conception of the government as a family unit. The government members acted as a group and simply followed a consensus when one was reached.<sup>90</sup> This explained why Japanese fascism, unlike that of contemporary Germany, did not have a dictator: the Japanese government was basically one family unit headed by the figurehead. He argued from a Eurocentric perspective, and in a rather

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<sup>88</sup> Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), 3.

<sup>89</sup> Byas, *The Japanese Enemy*, viii, 38.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 35-38.

racist tone, that that the “reason why no dictator [had] arisen [was] that political Japan [was] not a nation of individuals but a hive of bees working, buzzing, and fighting collectively in defense of the hive.”<sup>91</sup>

In general, the “conservatives” like Edwin O. Reischauer, Hugh Borton, and Hugh Byas shared similar views of modern Japanese history with the progressives. First, they agreed that the Meiji Restoration had been an “incomplete revolution.” Measuring Japan’s historical development in comparison with that of the “West,” they thought that democracy and individualism had not yet matured in Japan. Also, the conservatives acknowledged that modern industries were the product of government assistance, and the underdeveloped agricultural sector supported industrialization by providing cheap labor. They often mentioned the ties between financial-industrial interests and the political parties, the military, and the bureaucrats as well.

Nevertheless, the conservatives clearly lacked the Marxian grand narrative of the progressives. Neither Japan’s socio-economic structure nor its feudal remnants were stressed as the critical causes of Japanese aggression. For the conservatives, the flaws in Japan’s political structure and specifically in the Meiji Constitution allowed the military to wield political clout in the government during the 1930s. Unlike the progressives, the conservatives also had more trust in, and sympathy with, the Japanese political and business leaders, separating them from militarists. They directed their attention to the divisions among the ruling elites rather than their collaboration. Thus, although they believed in Japanese underdevelopment, they did not necessarily trace it to Japanese feudal traditions or the nature of the Meiji Restoration. The military’s rise might have proved the immaturity of Japanese parliamentary democracy, but it was rooted in the specific problems in Japan’s political institutions, which had little to do with

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid., vii-viii.

feudalism. Even Byas, who spoke of Japanese cultural “backwardness,” did not discuss it as the direct cause of Japanese fascism and militarism. He pointed out, for example, that Japan had not always been expansionist during the feudal period.<sup>92</sup> Based on these analyses, the conservatives did not think that the Allies needed to “overhaul” Japan and therefore proposed democratization reforms of a relatively limited extent in comparison with the progressives’ plans.

### **Socio-Cultural Anthropologists and the Themes of Japanese Feudal Society and Culture**

Along with scholars of Japanese studies, Asia specialists, and journalists, social and cultural anthropologists also contributed to the public discourse on Japan during the war. They not only published books and articles on Japan; they participated in the IPR and also worked for the American government as analysts. Anthropologists who emerged in the early twentieth century stressed empiricism in the study of non-Western cultures and took a relativist stance. Yet, they were not free from Eurocentric evolutionary theory: they commonly analyzed “Oriental” Japan in comparison with the “Occident,” meaning Western Europe and America. Whether value judgments were involved or not, the stage of Japanese development was measured by the yardstick of the “civilized” West that enjoyed liberal democracy, individualism and equality, industrial capitalism, and technological and material superiority. Some tried to find similarities between Japan and the West and differences among Western countries, going beyond the East-versus-West paradigm. But as a whole, anthropologists discussed differences in cultural values and behaviors between Japan and the West. Even if unintended, they generalized about both Japan and the West, mystifying the former vis-à-vis the latter.

This problem was ingrained in the disciplines of anthropology. The oppositional terms, such as the Oriental and the Occidental, and civilized and primitive, were commonly used.

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 40-41.

Notable cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1887-1948) was not an exception. Her study of Japanese social values and behavioral patterns, which was the task assigned by the Office of War Information (OWI) in summer 1944, was turned into a book *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* in 1946. In this work, sticking to cultural relativism, she paid respect to Japanese culture and urged the Americans to try to understand it, even if it appeared so “alien” and “bizarre” to them. She thought it wrong for the Americans to impose their systems and values on the Japanese.<sup>93</sup> Yet, her analysis of Japanese moral values and behaviors was based upon the shared assumption that the Japanese were fundamentally different from the Westerners in general and the Americans in particular. Benedict’s comparative study lent insight and fairness to her discussions about Japan, but it was still binary and shallow by today’s scholarly standards. By comparing Japan with the “Oriental” and “tribal” “primitive” nations in Asia and the Pacific while simultaneously contrasting it with America, Benedict reinforced the readers’ belief that Japanese culture was totally uncivilized.

One of the agreements among anthropologists was that Japanese social relations and behaviors were molded by the remaining elements of the former feudal system. Hierarchy and loyalty to superiors, in contrast to equality and individualism, were held up as elements of this feudal heritage. By holding that feudal traditions continued to characterize modern Japan, anthropologists supported the widely shared Eurocentric view of the progressives that the Japanese had not completely modernized their country and therefore were backward.

John F. Embree (1908-1950), for example, explained how Japan’s feudal past remained influential in its political and social structures in *The Japanese* and *The Japanese Nation*, published in 1943 and 1945 respectively. Embree was professor of anthropology at the

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<sup>93</sup> Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, with a new foreword by Ian Buruma (New York: First Mariner Books, 2005), see 1, 11, 14-15, for instance.

University of Hawaii and, like Benedict, involved in the US government's war efforts. But unlike her, he had conducted field work in rural Japan in the mid-1930s, which was turned into a book, *Suye-mura: A Japanese Village*, in 1939. Due to his expertise on Japanese society, he served in the Japanese Area Studies of the Civil Affairs Training School for the Far East set up at the University of Chicago. His 1943 work was part of the Smithsonian Institute's war background studies series as well. Embree wrote that the Meiji leaders adapted European forms and concepts of government, but the hierarchical organization and the custom of leadership rotation and group responsibility inherited from the Tokugawa Shogunate remained.<sup>94</sup> Industrialization since Meiji had transformed Japan from an agrarian to an industrial society, but it had not necessarily broken the feudal social structure and family organization.<sup>95</sup>

Benedict repeated the same point. Since she was not an expert on Japan, she drew from other scholars' works, especially Norman's, to discuss Japanese history from the late Tokugawa to Meiji periods. While relying heavily on Norman's analysis, Benedict did not transfer to her work his criticism against the Meiji oligarchs for thwarting democracy. Yet, taking the thesis that the Meiji Restoration was not revolutionary but counterrevolutionary, she explained how the new Japanese leaders recreated hierarchies in all new structures from the government, the military, state religion, to industries.<sup>96</sup>

Eurocentric as they might have been, these anthropologists were not racists. They defied scientific racism, which was the assumption and approach that social scientists and anthropologists had taken since the late 1800s. A new generation of anthropologists stressed that human intelligence had nothing to do with biological differences and that the cultural

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<sup>94</sup> John F. Embree, *The Japanese Nation: A Social Survey* (New York: Farrar & Rinehard, Inc., 1945), 43, 59, 222-225.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 54; John F. Embree, *The Japanese* (Washington, D.C.: The Smithsonian Institution, 1943), 15.

<sup>96</sup> Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, 60-95.

environment created human social characters. Benedict wrote in a rather ethnocentric language that “it [was] only when one [had] noted the intensely human commonplaces of any people’s existence that one [appreciated] at its full importance the anthropologist’s premise that human behavior in any primitive tribe or in any nation in the forefront of civilization [was] *learned* (italic in original text) in daily living.”<sup>97</sup> Likewise, Embree condescendingly reminded the readers:

The Japanese, . . . , to be understood as a people whose basic mental and psychological abilities and processes are similar at birth to those of Americans or Germans or Chinese, but owing to a radically different system of child training and cultural values the personalities of adult Japanese born and bred in Japan are often difficult for Americans (including many Americans of Japanese ancestry) to understand. They are, however, not for the reason either to be magnified as having mysterious Oriental minds or to be dismissed as being quaint, childlike people of no importance in the modern world.<sup>98</sup>

Unlike the progressives, anthropologists did not maintain that feudalism had contributed to Japanese militarism. Like Byas, Embree contended that Japanese unwillingness to engage in foreign expansion during the Tokugawa period proved that feudal culture itself did not make the Japanese an overseas aggressor. He believed that cultural analysis could only “help” to comprehend Japanese behaviors. Japanese militarism was caused by multiple factors, such as the threat of Western imperialism in Asia, the effect of industrialization on the Japanese economy, and the Japanese belief in their superiority developed out of their ignorance of Western culture.<sup>99</sup>

Despite Embree’s insight, anthropologists’ wartime studies of Japanese social values and behaviors persisted in analyzing the Japanese people’s “aggressive” nature, which was linked to lingering feudal traditions. Their research conformed to the general view that the Japanese were aggressive because they were socially, ideologically, and mentally backward. According to John

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>98</sup> Embree, *The Japanese*, 38.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 35; *The Japanese Nation*, 235-239.

W. Dower, the anthropologists in effect played an important role in reinforcing such a view among the public: non-academic readers easily reduced anthropological analyses to racist statements.<sup>100</sup>

Few anthropologists appeared as Eurocentric as evolutionary theorist Douglas G. Haring (1894-1970). An anthropologist who had been in Japan as a missionary for several years, he published *Blood on the Rising Sun* in 1943. He also edited *Japan's Prospect*, which was published by the School for Overseas Administration at Harvard University with the cooperation of the American Council of the IPR in 1946, and also contributed two essays to the book. The ideas of such a trusted authority on Japan represented the limits of mid-twentieth century anthropology more than those of Benedict and Embree.

Like other socio-cultural anthropologists, Haring dismissed racism and tried to shift scholarly attention from biology to culture. "The most significant differences in persons, . . . , are not the results of biological endowment and accidents of growth. These significant differences occur in the realm of ideas and beliefs," he asserted.<sup>101</sup> Haring also challenged the unilinear evolutionary theory of the nineteenth century that all societies would follow the same deterministic historical progress. He suggested that social development could rather be attainable only when people strived to achieve higher societal goals.<sup>102</sup>

Haring did not shy away from expressing his belief that the highest form of society was democracy and, by and large, the West had reached that stage. He praised the "Occident" for having pursued and invented democratic ideals and institutions since the time of Greco-Roman

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<sup>100</sup> Dower, *War without Mercy*, 129, 133-134, 141-144.

<sup>101</sup> Douglas G. Haring, *Blood on the Rising Sun* (Philadelphia: Macrae Smith Company, 1943), 196.

<sup>102</sup> Douglas G. Haring, "The Challenge of Japanese Ideology," in *Japan's Prospect*, ed. Haring (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), 265-267.

civilization.<sup>103</sup> “Human existence is a never-ending pursuit of objectives,” Haring said, and the objectives had been to achieve democratic ideals for the “Occidentals.”<sup>104</sup> For him, democratic ideas essentially meant faith in individual freedom and equality; and democratic society would provide legal systems to safeguard the people’s rights and representative civil government.<sup>105</sup> Haring believed that democratic ideals were universal “human ideals” and that with democratic “patterns of thought and action, ... men of many kinds may live and work together in safely.”<sup>106</sup> He thus reasoned that because Japanese society was undemocratic, the Japanese were militaristic and because they were militaristic, they were overseas aggressors.

For Haring, the absence of democracy was not unique to Japan but common in the “Orient.” He maintained, “[*the democratic*] ideal goals differentiate Occidental and Oriental cultural heritages (italic in original text),” and argued that the democratic ideas had been absent or denied not only in Japan but also in China, India, and Indonesia.<sup>107</sup> But he found in Japan all sorts of antitheses to democracy: hierarchical social relations, the presence of a hereditary, religious ruler and a Shinto cult that permeated the whole nation. These features all culminated in an oligarchic, military government. He thought that contemporary Japan was not only characterized by hierarchical human relationships, but the Japanese still acted according to feudal moral concepts. Defining feudal ethics as unconditional obedience and loyalty to their superiors, Haring contrasted these with the free-spirited individualism of the West.<sup>108</sup> That the contemporary Japanese set up the semi-divine emperor as an absolute ruler and mobilized the people with Shinto was the sign of backwardness.

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 262, 265-266.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 266.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 262-265; *Blood on the Rising Sun*, 205-207.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 267.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 266.

<sup>108</sup> Haring, *Blood on the Rising Sun*, 29, Chapter 4. He views Confucianism as the ideology opposite to political democracy; “The Challenge of Japanese Ideology,” 266.

Compared with the West, which had destroyed absolutism with the ideals of the Enlightenment, Japan seemed an anachronism of tyranny and superstition. In Haring's analysis, the Japanese were simultaneously feudalistic, primitive, and aggressive. By drawing Walter Bagehot's theory from his book published in 1873 and adding twentieth-century psychoanalysis to it, Haring explained that Japan was aggressive because Japanese society was organized, as primitive tribal societies were, by religious and magical beliefs. According to him, this was characteristic of all aggressive nations. The Japanese government sanctioned the compulsive routine performance of Shinto, and it bred a conformist mentality among the people. A democratic society was composed of people who had questioned the habitual patterns of their culture and had been freed from them. This suggested that while democratic societies were unlikely to be driven into foreign aggression, undemocratic nations living in conformity, like the Japanese, tended to engage in such militaristic actions.<sup>109</sup> Under the Japanese government ruled by cliques and lacking democratic governance, Japan naturally became militaristic.<sup>110</sup>

Overall, Haring presented the view that the Japanese were understandably aggressive; in spite of their efforts at modernization, they were enmeshed in their old culture and had not adopted Western democratic thought and practice. He wrote: "Defenders of many an outmoded ideology have manifested bitter hatred and cruel, ruthless outbursts against those whose continued existence threaten their beliefs."<sup>111</sup> As his statements show, Haring believed in historical progress and in the supremacy of Western civilization. By removing the optimism implied in the doctrine of unilineal evolution, he actually portrayed the Japanese as incapable of

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<sup>109</sup> Haring, "Religion, Magic, and Morale," in *Japan's Prospect*, ed. Haring, 209-215, 244-251. John W. Dower discusses how socio-cultural anthropologists were influenced by Freudian psycho-analysis; *War without Mercy*, 118-138. Both Benedict and Embree did mention pseudo-scientific studies of Japanese behaviors, too; see, for example, Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, 258-259 and Embree, *The Japanese*, 23. However, their general discussions about Japanese social behaviors did not take such an approach.

<sup>110</sup> Haring, "The Challenge of Japanese Ideology," 263-264; *Blood on the Rising Sun*, 95-99, 101-103, 201-210.

<sup>111</sup> Haring, "The Challenge of Japanese Ideology," 266.

bringing their society up to the level of the West. Locating the cause of Japanese militarism in nothing but their old, undemocratic culture, he made Japan appear inferior, sick, and wrong.

In conclusion, those who believed in Eurocentric developmentalist history – the progressives, the conservatives, and the socio-cultural anthropologists – argued in various ways that because Japan was undemocratic, it became fascist and aggressive. Interestingly, the anthropological studies of Japan, such as the works of Ruth Benedict, John F. Embree, and Douglas G. Haring, by focusing on surviving elements of feudalism, agreed more with the progressives' arguments than with those of the conservatives. Despite their cultural-relativist viewpoint, the anthropologists, in line with the progressives, affirmed the causal link between Japanese “backwardness” and imperial aggression. Yet, for exactly the same reason, the anthropologists – other than Haring – were only reluctant supporters of the Allied efforts to force radical reforms on post-surrender Japan. Accordingly, they shared the conservatives' temperate attitudes toward the American goal of democratizing Japan.

### **Progressives as Active Interventionists: Advocating a Hard Peace and a “Revolution”**

Based on their analyses of modern Japanese history and society, the progressives were eager to support the radical democratization of Japan once the war was over. As Wilsonian idealists, they believed in international cooperation in order to promote democracy and peace. The progressives had no doubt that the Allied powers should work together not only to defeat the Axis Powers – Germany, Italy, and Japan – but to recreate a new world order in the aftermath of victory. It was, therefore, considered the Allies' responsibility to set conditions for postwar peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, and this included demilitarizing and democratizing Japan. The progressives thereby justified foreign intervention in Japan's internal

affairs, and strongly advocated the remaking of Japan into a democratic, peaceful country by completely wiping out the seeds of aggression.

The progressives' proposed peace terms with Japan did not disagree with the Allies' general plans. In fact, they followed the official policy of a "hard" peace with Germany and Japan. As a lesson from World War I, the US government decided to impose "unconditional surrender" not only on the military but also on the enemy state as a whole. This meant forcing a unilateral peace by denying the enemy country's right to negotiate; permanent demilitarization to prevent the reemergence of militarism; the punishment of military officers; and, more importantly, a wide range of domestic reforms to destroy the foundations of aggression and to promote democracy through occupation. These punitive measures were justified as the means to maintain world peace.<sup>112</sup>

President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill expressed the Allies' unconditional surrender policy for the Axis Powers for the first time at the Casablanca Conference convened in January 1943. It was at the Cairo Conference of November where the Allies – the United States, Britain, and China – formally declared the unconditional surrender policy against Japan. At the Conference, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek agreed that the Allies would keep fighting until Japan accepted unconditional surrender; all the former Chinese territories that Japan had acquired since 1895 were to be returned to the Republic of China; Japan would also be stripped not only of Korea but also of the Pacific islands that it had gained since World War I and all other territories that it had "taken by violence and greed." Although not included in the official communique, Roosevelt and Chiang had conversations

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<sup>112</sup> See Iokibe, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku: Jō*, Chapter 3. The policy of unconditional surrender was developed by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Norman H. Davis (1878-1944), who was the president of the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) and the chair of the Subcommittee on Security Problems set up in the State Department's Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.

about the form of an occupation of Japan and the necessity for the destruction of the Japanese political structure.<sup>113</sup>

T. A. Bisson suggested his plan for a peace settlement in response to the Cairo Declaration. Originally submitted to the IPR meeting held at Atlantic City, New Jersey, in January 1944, it was published in article form in the March 1944 issue of *Pacific Affairs*.<sup>114</sup> He agreed with the desirability of a “harsh” peace that forced decolonization, disarmament, reparation, and a series of political and socio-economic reforms onto Japan. He asserted, “When the costs and sacrifices of defeating Japan’s ruthless aggression are placed in the reckoning, nothing less should be expected or desired.”<sup>115</sup> Bisson recommended purging the militarists, punishing them as war criminals, and replacing the entire leadership. As he believed that army leaders, industrial capitalists, and landlords had led Japan’s overseas expansion, he wanted to break their power. Bisson proposed that new leaders should be capable of changing Japan’s fundamental economic system to benefit poor farmers and industrial workers, which would, in turn, strengthen democratic government by creating greater equality. In his view, the ideal new force should be drawn from the political left of center, namely, anti-monarchist liberals and Marxists, some of whom had been arrested as political prisoners.<sup>116</sup> The objective of these measures was to clear out the causes of Japanese militarism and to let Japan reenter the world community as a democratic and responsible member state. Bisson emphasized that the United Nations’ guidance would be indispensable to achieve these goals.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 155-169.

<sup>114</sup> See footnote 1 in T. A. Bisson, “The Price of Peace for Japan,” *Pacific Affairs* 17, no. 1 (March 1944): 5; Yui, *Mikan no Senryō Kaikaku*, 165-169.

<sup>115</sup> Bisson, “The Price of Peace for Japan,” 8.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 9-10, 12-22.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 8-9, 13-14, 21, 24-25.

Some progressives believed that Japan deserved to be ruthlessly punished. For instance, Nathaniel Peffer believed that the Japanese had to pay a high price for the war that they had started. It was “necessary to carry the war to Japan and to leave ruins on Japanese soil” through America’s massive air power. This was not only meant to destroy the Japanese industrial capacity to wage war but also to accomplish a grim didactic goal. As Peffer argued, “Much of the country must be devastated, and the Japanese left amid ruins. Thus only can they learn that war is a terrible business.”<sup>118</sup> It was also important to punish the Japanese for their imperialist past. To achieve a long-term peace in the Far East, and to teach a “terrible lesson, a lesson that [could] not be conveyed by defeat in itself,” the Japanese must be “crushed – maimed and left helpless, beyond recovery for a long period.” What he suggested was that Japan should withdraw from all the concessions that it had gained and be reduced to its territorial dimension of the pre-Meiji era.<sup>119</sup> Without providing any details, he also referred to the need for the removal of the militarist groups and a change in the Japanese mentality.<sup>120</sup> In his view, it was imperative for the Allies to take a severe course toward Japan, a “nation of a martial tradition . . . , a nation for which war [was] in the nature of things and the loftiest activity in nature.”<sup>121</sup>

The *New York Times* Far Eastern correspondent Hallet Abend (1884-1955), too, believed that aggressors like Japan deserved a hard peace. Like Peffer, he called for bombing cities and killing civilians as punishments. He wrote, “Ruin must be brought to [Japanese] cities and villages to teach them a lesson concerning what they have inflicted upon other peoples.”<sup>122</sup> Once defeated, Abend thought that Japan should abandon its colonies, and be physically and

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<sup>118</sup> Peffer, *Basis for Peace in the Far East*, 73.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, 56, 67-69; the quote is from p.56 and p.69.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 73-74.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 70.

<sup>122</sup> Hallet Abend, *Pacific Charter: Our Destiny in Asia* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1943), 49.

mentally disarmed; it meant the destruction of the military forces, the punishment of the militarists, a change in the form of government, and the remaking of the system of education.<sup>123</sup>

Although he did not suggest an occupation of Japan, Abend did not question the right of the Allies to deny Japan's sovereignty. He stated:

It must be clear that until Japan can learn to be a good neighbor to all nations bordering on the Pacific Ocean she cannot expect complete self-determination. Unless Japan fashions for herself a government which can be counted upon for peaceful co-operation in the maintenance of stability in the Far East, the victors must reserve the right to intervene in Japanese domestic affairs. Until the Japanese evince a real will to international decency ... their country must be one of the underprivileged lands of the world.<sup>124</sup>

The supporters of punitive measures for Japan accepted the structural and cultural causes of the war and believed in the virtue of the Allies' initiative in reforming Japan. Their faith in their own democratic system, their lack of confidence in the Japanese capability to democratize their own country, and their objective of securing a peace seemingly justified punitive treatment of Japan. Like Bisson, Andrew Roth stressed that although a minority, there were groups of Japanese people who could lead democratic changes, and yet, a democratic revolution would be possible "*only with [UN] sympathetic assistance*" (italic in original text).<sup>125</sup> He justified democratization reforms by the occupation authorities "simply [as] enlightened selfishness on [the Allies'] part, an effort to eliminate one of the basic causes of aggression in the past," rather than as a "matter of humanitarianism."<sup>126</sup> Roth also reasoned that the "entire parade of shameful episodes in Japan's modern history" necessitated the United Nations' taking "*penal*" and "*corrective*" (italic in original text) actions toward the Japanese.<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 14, 32-35, 39-45, 47, 49-50.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 295.

<sup>125</sup> Roth, *Dilemma in Japan*, 193. Chapters 6 through 10 discuss the potential democratic forces that Roth identified; his acknowledgment that they were a minority can be found on pp.94-95.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 133; he uses the expression, "enlightened" self-interest, on p.24, too.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 188.

Likewise, John M. Maki decided that the Japanese were “not fitted to do [the] task [of democratization] alone,” so it was the Allies’ responsibility to replace their ideas and systems with new ones. He also worried, like Bisson, that if the Allies failed to complete the destruction of Japanese militarism and to promote the birth of a pacifist Japan, it would result in wasting the lives of the American and the Allied troops who had died in the war and cause additional deaths in a future war. Maki thus suggested that the Allies should initiate demilitarization and democratization reforms after putting Japan under foreign occupation.<sup>128</sup>

America’s role was particularly grave. The progressives greeted the emergence of the United States as an international power with great excitement. They believed that the United States had the military might and the political influence to recreate an Asia-Pacific order. Defeating Japan and remaking it was an important part of America’s job. In *The Future of Japan* published in 1945, which was initially a paper submitted to the IPR conference in January, George Washington University professor of government William C. Johnstone argued that US leadership in dealing with Japan was appropriate because America had fought against Japan for a long time and was the most powerful country in the Pacific.<sup>129</sup>

Andrew Roth was more idealistic. He poetically expressed his view of America’s mission and future. Regarding the US role in the occupation of Japan and status in the Pacific, he wrote:

The burden of decision falls upon us. Ours is the heavy responsibility and the glowing opportunity to decide whether we shall leave Japan little better than it was before Pearl Harbour or help launch it upon a new road. The task of paving the way for the emergence of a Japan with a peaceful and democratic orientation will be a major test of our maturity and enlightenment in the sphere of international affairs. Its success accomplishment will require

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<sup>128</sup> Maki, *Japanese militarism*, 2, 8-10, 154, 230-231, 241. The quote is from p.10; Maki’s reference to the casualties is on p.9; his call for occupation is on pp.10 and 230.

<sup>129</sup> William C. Johnstone, *The Future of Japan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 9, 154-158. His paper was submitted to the IPR conference held at Hot Springs, Virginia, in January 1945. The Johnstone Report was produced by a special project team headed by him. It was based upon surveys regarding the “future of Japan” taken by groups of professors at various universities. See Yui, *Mikan no Senryō Kaikaku*, 148-151, 165-166, 169-175.

courage, vision and a type of social engineering on an international scale which is unprecedented for the United States. Should we attempt it and succeed in any measure, it will establish the United States as the political and moral leader of the Pacific.<sup>130</sup>

Few presented as ambitious and paternalistic a vision as Roth did, but the progressives did not question that American would, could, and should play a key role in postwar Japan.

The progressives' plans to root out the systems and ideology of Japanese militarism were comprehensive. They suggested the purge of the militarists and their collaborators, the setting up of new leaders, changes in the Meiji political structure that required constitutional revision; the destruction of Emperor worship and educational reform; the encouragement of free speech and the release of political prisoners; and the breakup of the industrial capacity of war and of the economic structure that some of the progressives believed to have caused Japanese overseas expansion.<sup>131</sup>

For the Allies to thoroughly demilitarize and democratize Japan, the progressives also believed that occupation reforms must be radical, even if they might prove chaotic to Japanese society. Andrew Roth clearly raised a voice against an undue concern for stability in postwar Japan. He warned that democratic changes of Japan could not be achieved if occupation forces took a moderate course in order to avoid disorder. Roth said, "No society can purify itself – as Japan must – without a certain amount of disorder and instability." The American war of independence was one example: "Certainly the American Revolution was accompanied by considerable 'disorder' and 'anarchy', [but there is no] patriotic American who would suggest that [the Americans] should have traded their democratic liberties for the 'stability' of colonial servitude."<sup>132</sup> John M. Maki also expressed his preference for a "revolution" or a civil war,

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<sup>130</sup> Roth, *Dilemma in Japan*, 200.

<sup>131</sup> See Roth, *Dilemma in Japan*, 14, 198; Lattimore, *Solution in Asia*, 44-49, 182-191; Abend, *Pacific Charter*, 32-50, 295-296; Peffer, *Basis for Peace in the Far East*, 67-69, 73-74, 135-137, 156-168; Maki, *Japanese Militarism*, 226-250; Johnstone, *The Future of Japan*, 7-8, Chapters 4-12.

<sup>132</sup> Roth, *Dilemma in Japan*, 54.

equivalent to Western examples, in order to completely break Japan from its past.<sup>133</sup> For him, too, chaos was not something to be feared but rather to be welcomed.<sup>134</sup>

The progressives' call for a "revolution" was tied with their analysis of Japanese society and their distrust of the existing leadership. The progressives found the origins of Japanese militarism in the underdevelopment of their society and culture and criticized the cohort of political, economic, and military leaders for having impeded democratic transformations and oppressed peoples at home and overseas. The progressives believed that intellectuals, students, industrial workers, peasants, and small businessmen formed "democratic forces," and that the United Nations should support real "liberals" and radicals, such as long-time parliamentary democrats, Taishō liberals, socialists, and communists, as Japan's new leaders.<sup>135</sup>

Despite their advocacy of a hard peace, however, the progressives all agreed that a certain degree of Japan's economic recovery should be guaranteed. They especially opposed as too drastic a measure the proposed goal of reducing Japan to an "agricultural and pastoral country" as Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau recommended. The progressives were well aware of the interrelation between peace and the economy. In their analysis, Japan's economic conditions had set a course for foreign aggression, and, without economic development, Japan might launch a war again against neighboring countries. Morgenthau's draconian policy was thus judged counterproductive to the objective of maintaining a peace in the Pacific. Owen Lattimore said, "We have never hated an enemy as we

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<sup>133</sup> Maki, *Japanese Militarism*, 232-233, 245-246. Maki identified the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the Reformation, the Industrial Revolution, and the Renaissance as exemplary "revolutions"; he argued that Japan needed a "complete break with her past" on p.232.

<sup>134</sup> See *ibid.*, 250.

<sup>135</sup> Roth, *Dilemma in Japan*, 10-11, 199, also see footnote 125; Johnstone, *The Future of Japan*, 14-17; as to Bisson's view of an ideal leadership of a new Japan, see footnote 116.

hate the Japanese, but we do not hate them to the point of starving several million of them,” and recommended leaving some industry in Japan.<sup>136</sup>

Even if Japanese war-making industry needed to be dismantled, and heavy industry must be put under control, the progressives thought that the Japanese should be allowed to retain some industrial capacity and to access raw materials and markets overseas. T. A. Bisson, for instance, maintained that because “foreign trade would be Japan’s ‘lifeline,’” the “outside world [would] have to undergird [Japan’s economic] development by providing Japan with the fullest access to raw materials and markets.”<sup>137</sup> The balance between punishment and economic rehabilitation, however, was a tricky issue. Concerned about the plight of the oppressed Asians, more than that of the Japanese aggressors, the progressives still disagreed about how much industrial strength should be stripped from Japan and how Japan should pay war reparations to Asian countries. Some of the progressives, like Bisson, sought for a way to prop up the Asian economy as a whole by harnessing Japan’s manufacturing power, and thought that promotion of trade between Japan and Asia would provide a solution to everyone’s economic problems.<sup>138</sup>

Although the progressives supported the Allied policy of unconditional surrender, which included a demand for radical domestic reforms on Japan, interestingly, not all progressives accepted the plan of the occupation of Japan. As early as 1942, Nathaniel Peffer mentioned the impossibility of putting Japan under foreign control, an argument that he developed in an article published in *Harper’s Magazine* in April 1944.<sup>139</sup> Basically, there were two reasons why he was opposed to military occupation of Japan. First, he was certain that once Japan’s military and

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<sup>136</sup> Lattimore, *Solution in Asia*, 184. About industrial imitations, also see Maki, *Japanese Militarism*, 243-244.

<sup>137</sup> Bisson, “The Price of Peace for Japan,” 22. Abend also mentioned his advocacy for fair trade, see Abend, *Pacific Charter*, 45-46.

<sup>138</sup> Bisson, “The Price of Peace for Japan,” 10-12, 22-23; Peffer, *Basis for Peace in the Far East*, 56-57, 135-137, 156-168; Johnstone, *The Future of Japan*, Chapter 6.

<sup>139</sup> Peffer, *Basis for Peace in the Far East*, 136. Once the Occupation began, Peffer actually did not oppose it at all; see Nathaniel Peffer, “The Japanese Hope: A Liberal Core,” *New York Times*, September 2, 1945, 6, 23.

industrial might was completely crushed by war, Japan would never be able to rise up again: second, he was extremely skeptical of the feasibility of occupying a foreign country.

Regarding the first reason, Peffer explained that if Japan lay in ruins, the world would regain an equilibrium of power and establish an international organization to prevent future aggression. The presence of Russia, China, America, and Britain could all check Japan's reemergence. He stressed, "We are worrying overmuch about the future Japan. There may be no need to worry at all, if she is completely beaten now."<sup>140</sup> He thought that the idea of democratizing Japan was great, but it was not indispensable for peace. The other reasoning was the impracticality of military occupation. Peffer expected that the Japanese would fiercely resist foreign invaders, so occupation campaigns would take forever at the cost of many more American lives. Moreover, even if a military government could finally be established in Japan, the difficulties did not end there. The Allies would have to rule the country through Japanese functionaries, but Peffer anticipated the problems inherent in securing Japanese collaborators. He also doubted if democracy could be taught by conquerors. He feared that forced democratization reforms would rather cause a new eruption of nationalism among the Japanese. An Allied occupation of Japan, he warned, would simply give credence to the Japanese militarists' claim that they had fought a defensive war.<sup>141</sup> Thus, while sharing with the progressives the negative assessment of Japanese modernity and the hatred of Japanese militarism, Peffer did not support military occupation of Japan at all.

### **Conservatives as Cautious Interventionists: Seeking a Moderate Policy for Japan**

The conservatives, as Wilsonian internationalists, agreed with the progressives that Japanese militarism should be dismantled for the sake of world peace. The conservatives,

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<sup>140</sup> Nathaniel Peffer, "Occupy Japan?," *Harper's Magazine*, April 1944, 385-386; the quote is from p.386.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, 387-390.

associated with the policy-making establishment in Washington, were naturally guided by the Allied policies of unconditional surrender and military occupation to plan Japanese postwar reforms. But they called for relatively more moderate changes than the progressives, partly because of their assessment of modern Japanese history and society, partly because of their pragmatic outlook.

Edwin O. Reischauer, for instance, expressed his support for the Allies' objectives of making a peaceful and democratic Japan and believed that the Allies should guide Japan through the process of democratization.<sup>142</sup> Yet, he argued that ultimately, Japan should be responsible for its own reform. He modestly stated, "We and our allies can choose the initial direction [the Japanese] are to take, but only they can determine where Japan will go."<sup>143</sup> He also had faith in Japanese political leaders' ability to democratize the country. Using the analogy of the pragmatic Meiji leaders who had instantly decided to part from feudalism and embark on modern nation-state building, he said that the "Japanese [were] making another abrupt about-face."<sup>144</sup> This quick shift, however, was not entirely surprising for Reischauer. In his view, Taishō Democracy in the interwar years had laid a foundation for Japanese postwar democratization. Many Japanese were familiar with the significance of popular representation thanks to the success of parliamentary democracy during the 1920s. Equally important, liberal thinkers reemerging in post-surrender Japan, assisted by the purge of militarist or ultranationalist leaders, could usher Japan towards a democratic course, not by revolution but by reforming dysfunctional systems.<sup>145</sup> Reischauer was content with the return of prewar Japanese democratic currents after

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<sup>142</sup> Reischauer, *Japan, Past and Present*, 187, 191-192.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, 191-192.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, 191.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, 189.

the war under the leadership of the emperor and court advisors, moderate bureaucrats, business leaders, parliamentarians, as well as intellectuals of the Taishō period.<sup>146</sup>

To understand the conservatives' reform plans more fully, we need to look at State Department documents. Early State Department policies toward postwar Japan, written by Japan specialists, can be contrasted with the progressive plans. As scholars have revealed, policy drafts underwent revision over time as a result of personnel changes among top-ranking officials and periodic reorganization of the policymaking body. Nevertheless, despite a series of modifications, the original suggestions continuously shaped the basic policies for post-surrender Japan.<sup>147</sup>

One of the drafts prepared by George H. Blakeslee (1871-1954) was “General Principles Applicable to the Post-War Settlement with Japan.” Specialist in the Far East who taught at Clark University and was an editor of Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) journal *Foreign Affairs*, Blakeslee was the chair of the East Asian planning group set up as early as the summer of 1942 within the State Department Division of Special Research. The planning group's policy documents were submitted in the next summer to the Territorial Subcommittee (TS), one of the interdepartmental subcommittees belonging to the highest policy planning organ in the State Department, the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.<sup>148</sup> Based upon the ideals in the Atlantic Charter and the policy of unconditional surrender, Blakeslee's basic postwar policies for Japan were not dissimilar to those of the progressives.<sup>149</sup> He argued for the decolonization of

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid., 171-173, 184-185, 189.

<sup>147</sup> About policy history, see Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu, ed., *Shōwa Zaiseishi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan*; Iokibe, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku*; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*; Borton, *American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan*; Mayo, “American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan.”

<sup>148</sup> Iokibe, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku: Jō*, 66-74, 179-191, 220-226; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 202-204; Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu, ed., *Shōwa Zaiseishi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan*, 26-32; Borton, *American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan*, 5-10; Mayo, “American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan,” 18-23.

<sup>149</sup> About the influence of the Atlantic Charter and the unconditional-surrender policy on early policy drafts on postwar Japan, see Iokibe, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku: Jō*, 222-223, 226-228; Borton, *American Presurrender*

Japanese colonies and mandated islands, the disarmament of Japan, and the making of a Japanese government which “[would] respect the rights of other states.” The purpose of these measures was to “prevent Japan from again becoming a menace to international peace.” When all of these goals were met, Blakeslee recommended, Japan should be “[restored] to full and equal membership in the family of nations.” In addition, he agreed with the progressives that Japan should not be “[denied] ... an opportunity for a prosperous existence” and, “after permanent conditions of peace [had] been established, [should] have access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world.” He was also concerned about the contradictory goals of Japanese industrial demilitarization and economic rehabilitation.<sup>150</sup>

Serving as Blakeslee’s secretary throughout the war, Hugh Borton produced many policy drafts on Japanese politics, a subject in which he specialized. In “Japan: Postwar Political Problems,” he agreed with the basic plans of a peace settlement with Japan laid out by Blakeslee,

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*Planning for Postwar Japan*, 6, 9-10.

<sup>150</sup> George H. Blakeslee, “General Principles Applicable to the Post-War Settlement with Japan,” T-357, July 28, 1943, *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley A. Notter, 1939-1945* (Bethesda, MD: Congressional Information Service, 1987), microfiche. T-357 questioned UN role in controlling Japanese industry and in intervening in Japanese political reforms. Revised by adopting comments of Territorial Subcommittee (TS) members, T-357a (September 29, 1943) affirmed, “such measures of disarmament, of military inspection, and of temporary restriction of Japan’s economic activity as the United Nations shall deem indispensable for security purposes,” and stressed that Japan would be subject to economic restrictions rather than that it would be promised an equal opportunity to achieve prosperity. It also clearly stated what kind of Japanese government the United Nations sought and what measures the UN should take to facilitate the democratization of the Japanese political system, including UN support for “moderate political elements.” Issues on reparations and industrial restrictions were left unsolved. The Country and Area Committees (CACs) was organized in summer-fall 1943, and one of them, the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East (IDACFE) (or the Far Eastern Area Committee, FEAC), was set up in October. The East Asian planning group, reassigned to the Division of Political Affairs in January 1943 and to the Office of Special Political Affairs in January 1944, participated in the IDACFE/ FEAC. George H. Blakeslee, the head of the planning group, was appointed as the chair of the new committee. CAC documents on Japan were drafted by the IDACE/ FEAC, and they were sent to the State Department’s new, highest decision-making body on a postwar world, the Postwar Programs Committee (PWC), established in January 1944. T-357a became CAC-116/ PWC-108 (March 14, 1944) on “Japan: The Postwar Objectives of the United States in Regard to Japan.” A three-stage occupation plan was added in CAC-116a/ PWC-108a (April 17), and with minor changes, the document was resubmitted as CAC-116b/ PWC-108b (May 4). The information about the CAC, the IDACFE/ FEAC, and the PWC is from Iokibe, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku: Sengo Nihon no Sekkeizu: Ge*, 4-12, 22-24; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 204-206; Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu, ed., *Shōwa Zaiseishi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan*, 40-52; Borton, *American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan*, 11-12, 14-15; Mayo, “American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan,” 23-36 CAC/ PWC documents are from *State Department Documents of the Post-War Programs Committees, 1944*, T1222, vol. 2, NA, microfilm.

and developed more detailed plans for Japanese political reform based on his analysis of the Japanese political structure. Referring to specific legal obstacles to civilian control over the military and parliamentary democracy, Borton suggested amending the Meiji Constitution. He also judged it reasonable to promote freedom of the press and recommended strengthening the Japanese understanding of a Bill of Rights through education.<sup>151</sup>

As to UN intervention in Japanese governmental reform, like Edwin O. Reischauer, Borton did not completely oppose it, but believed that the Japanese could undertake it by themselves. Through harsh wartime experiences, the Japanese would have recognized that the current political leadership and form of government were not desirable.<sup>152</sup> Moderates and liberals would emerge as new leaders, whom, like Reischauer, Borton found among former prime ministers, advisors to the emperor, military officers, young diplomats, business leaders, and university professors. Borton anticipated that “[w]ith the necessity for reform following the defeat and less of dignity and prestige of the military after the present war, liberalism [might] find that it really [had] a chance not merely of survival but of leadership.”<sup>153</sup> Therefore, all the United Nations needed to do was to “assist the Japanese as best it [could] to inaugurate their own reforms as quickly as possible . . . , rather than to jeopardize the chances of their success by official enforcement of them from without.” More precisely, Borton explained that the United Nations could indirectly lead the Japanese to democratization by recognizing only a Japanese government that was deemed acceptable and by providing it with a chance of economic

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<sup>151</sup> Hugh Borton, “Japan: Postwar Political Problems,” T-381, October 6, 1943, 2-5, 8-11, *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning*, microfiche.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 7, 12.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, 12-15; the quote is from p.15.

betterment. These actions would teach the Japanese of the benefits of establishing a democratic government.<sup>154</sup>

Although the US government did not openly release postwar policies for Japan that were still fluid, the progressives began to attack the State Department's seemingly "soft" plans at the beginning of 1944. It was when former ambassador to Tokyo Joseph C. Grew began to express his support for a "moderate" peace.<sup>155</sup> As leader of the Japan Crowd in the Far Eastern Affairs Division in the State Department, Grew replaced Stanley Hornbeck, who led the China Crowd, as the head of the Division in spring 1944, and filled key posts in the Division and in other policymaking organs for Japan with his intimates. Furthermore, Grew was appointed as under-secretary of state at the end of 1944. Apparently, alarmed by these personnel shifts, as the war was nearing its end, the progressives began to criticize Grew and his Japan hands.<sup>156</sup>

The progressives publicly censured the conservative camp for categorizing many collaborators with the militarists as "liberals." *Amerasia*, for example, criticized the conservatives for "[clinging] to the myth of the 'liberal' element in the Japanese ruling class which [would] come to power once the militarists [had] been crushed and discredited" and for "[completely lacking] comprehension of the nature of the Japanese political and social

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<sup>154</sup> Ibid., 7-8; the quote is from p.8.

<sup>155</sup> Actually, Grew's favorable view toward Japanese "moderates" and "liberals" can be seen in his book, *Report from Tokyo: A Message to the American People* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942). Yet, the progressives began to criticize Grew for his moderate stance after he gave a speech to the Illinois Education Association in Chicago on December 29, 1943. The address is available in Joseph C. Grew, "Address: War and Post-War Problems in the Far East," *Department of State Bulletin* 10, no. 8 (January 1, 1944): 8-20. Criticisms from the progressives, and from the public, can be found, for example, in "The 'Peace-Loving' Emperor of Japan," *Amerasia* 8, no. 1 (January 7, 1944): 6-8; "A New State Department Approach to the Japanese Emperor," *Amerasia* 8, no. 5 (March 3, 1944): 75-76; "Hirohito a Prince of Peace?," *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1944, 13; "Policy toward Japan," *New York Times*, January 2, 1944, E8; Paul Winkler, "Son of Heaven," *Washington Post*, January 4, 1944, 6.

<sup>156</sup> See "A New Far Eastern Policy? Japan Versus China," *Amerasia* 8, no. 12 (June 9, 1944): 179-189; Pacificus, "How to Deal with Japan," *The Nation*, October 14, 1944, 436-437; Pacificus, "Dangerous Experts," *The Nation*, February 3, 1945, 128-129; "AMG Plans for Japan," *The Nation*, June 16, 1945, 667; "Soft Peace for Japan?," *The Nation*, June 23, 1945, 683-684; T. A. Bisson, "What Program for Japan?," *The Nation*, July 14, 1945, 28-29. About the reorganization at the State Department in early 1944, see Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 25.

system.”<sup>157</sup> Similarly, Andrew Roth decried the conservatives’ recommendations by stating, “Like many other inaccurate theories, the concept of the uncompromising struggle of the ‘moderates’ against the militarist extremists had its basis in an inaccurate evaluation of actual facts.”<sup>158</sup> Owen Lattimore agreed that the Japanese “moderates” and “liberals” had actually connived with the military in Japan’s overseas expansion, agreeing with the objective, if not with the timing.<sup>159</sup> The progressives concluded that the “moderate” and “liberal” elements should not be relied upon as the leaders of a new Japan but should instead be purged.

There were numerous official policy drafts which examined postwar Japanese issues more carefully and more extensively than the progressives’ discussions. Despite their criticism, the State Department plans agreed with the progressives, and they became the basis of many “radical” reforms for post-surrender Japan. The policy-planners decided on the advisability of purging Japanese military and political leaders, destroying nationalistic social and religious organizations, and democratizing the government under a new leadership; also of releasing political prisoners, promoting a freedom of speech, encouraging labor and popular movements, and promoting liberal education; and of destroying the war-making industry and reforming the underdeveloped agricultural sector.<sup>160</sup> Both conservatives and progressives were concerned about essentially the same problems in Japan.

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<sup>157</sup> “The ‘Peace-Loving’ Emperor of Japan,” 6-7.

<sup>158</sup> Roth, *Dilemma in Japan*, 34.

<sup>159</sup> Lattimore, *Solution in Asia*, 46-47.

<sup>160</sup> See, for example, George H. Blakeslee et al., “Japan: The Postwar Objectives of the United States in Regard to Japan,” CAC-116/ PWC-108, March 14, 1944, *State Department Documents of the Post-War Programs Committee, 1944*, T1222, vol. 2, NA, microfilm; Beppo R. Johansen, “Japan: Political Parties or Agencies,” CAC-111a/ PWC-113 March 23, 1944, *ibid.*; Earle R. Dickover, “Japan: Nullification of Obnoxious Laws,” CAC-123/ PWC-114, March 22, 1944, *ibid.*; Hugh Borton, Earle R. Dickover, and Eugene H. Dooman, “Japan: Political Problems: Institution of the Emperor,” CAC-93/ PWC-116, March 21, 1944, *ibid.*; D. C. Blaisdell, George H. Blakeslee, and Hugh Borton, “Japan: Occupation Problems: War Criminals,” CAC-105/ PWC-119, March 24, 1944, *ibid.*; Borton, “Japan: Abolition of Militarism and Strengthening Democratic Processes,” CAC-185/ PWC-152, May 1, 1944, *ibid.* Also Eugene H. Dooman et al., “Japan: The Education System under Military Government,” CAC-238/ PWC-287a, November 6, 1944, *State Department Documents of the Post-War Programs Committee, 1944*, T1222, vol. 4, NA,

Indeed, the main differences between them lay over the degree of punishment that should be inflicted upon the Japanese aggressors and who should reform Japan and how. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the fundamental factors dividing the conservatives and the progressives originated in their ideological views toward, and in assessments of, modern Japan. Their denunciation of Japanese militarism and the Marxian analysis of Japanese history and society convinced the progressives of the need for a radical revolution. All necessary measures should be taken to completely destroy the foundations of power and wealth held by political, social, and economic elites and to empower the less privileged classes and the leftist intelligentsia. On the other hand, the conservatives, who had relatively positive views toward modern Japanese development until the 1930s, tried to encourage reforms by supporting the return of the Japanese moderates and liberals who had been overshadowed by the militarists. While the progressives looked for Japan's rebirth by eradicating its past, the conservatives sought only to remove impediments to Japan's further progress along its historical course.

### **Socio-Cultural Anthropologists' Attitudes toward the Occupation of Japan**

The socio-cultural anthropologists' stance toward the Allied occupation of Japan was closer to the conservatives'. As cultural relativists, they doubted the morality or feasibility of ruling another culture and forcing it to adopt Western systems and values. A prime example of this view was Japan anthropologist John F. Embree, who wrote at length about why he opposed a military occupation of Japan in one of the September 1944 issues of *Far Eastern Survey*.

Embree asserted that whether long-term or short-term, an American occupation would not even be possible. He anticipated that Russia and China would not be likely to welcome the

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microfilm; J. R. Friedman, "Japan: Workers' Organizations during the Period of Military Occupation," CAC-254/PWC-290a, November 15, 1944, *ibid.*; "Japan: Economic Policies during Military Occupation," CAC-222/PWC-296b, November 16, 1944, *ibid.*; Robert A. Fearey, "Japanese Postwar Economic Considerations," T-354, July 21, 1943, *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning*, microfiche.

presence of a large American force, and even the American public would resist keeping American GIs in Japan once the war was over. Without a big force, the military occupation could not be run effectively. Governing Japan only for a brief period could not be better; American administration would end up half-done, and arbitrary foreign rule would leave only a bad impression to the Japanese people.<sup>161</sup>

The most serious concern for Embree, however, was the difficulty of cultural understanding. Imagining a hypothetical case that an occupation government was established in Japan, Embree lectured on the importance of training civil affairs officers at the very least in the Japanese language and culture and, ideally, in colonial administration as well. Otherwise, American administrators would carry racial prejudices with them and fail to meet Japanese problems with culturally sensitive attitudes. Embree implicitly complained about an “army official connected with a training school [who] [said] that he saw no harm in a Civil Affairs officer being subject to racial prejudice.”<sup>162</sup> Besides, without knowledge of Japanese history and society, occupation officials would not know how they should communicate and work with the Japanese.<sup>163</sup>

Also, Embree, who had lived in a Japanese village with his wife in the 1930s, did not agree with the policy of changing the Japanese systems and values by force. He criticized the conceit and ignorance of “Civil Affairs officers [who], reflecting the general American desire to reform people, [would] not be content with simply trying to run the Japanese nation . . . , but [would] attempt to change its structure – to ‘improve’ it after the American pattern, [despite] “lacking a real understanding even of American social structure.” He warned that “[hurried and ill-conceived reforms] [would] . . . not be successful but [would] only serve to create hatred for

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<sup>161</sup> John F. Embree, “Military Occupation of Japan,” *Far Eastern Survey* 13, no. 19 (September 20, 1944): 173, 174.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, 173-174; the quote is from p.173.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, 173-176.

the Western barbarian and lead to a further reaction against the West.”<sup>164</sup> While knowing that a military occupation of Japan was forthcoming, Embree still expressed his pessimism about its success. Referring to the ultimate goal of making Japan a pacifist nation, he commented that a “military occupation of Japan [contained] more risks for the United States ... What we [did] there and the memories we [left] behind us might well determine whether we win or lose the peace in the Pacific.”<sup>165</sup>

Even after the Occupation began, Embree continuously opposed it. He pointed out the difficulty of developing democracy in Japan under foreign rule, and suggested leaving the task to the Japanese themselves. Sharing the American conservatives’ view of modern Japanese history, he had faith in the Japanese potential to democratize, especially when Japan’s defeat in the war weakened the political influence that the military had gained since the 1930s.<sup>166</sup> “[T]here is no reason why the broad trend from feudalism to representative government in Japan, which was interrupted in the Nineteen Thirties, should not develop in the postwar years,” he argued.<sup>167</sup>

Ruth Benedict was more supportive of the Allied Occupation of Japan than Embree. She accepted the military occupation itself and was satisfied with the US government’s policies for Japan. Her satisfaction was expressed in her statement that the Americans should be “proud of their part in the administration of Japan” regardless of various partisan criticisms.<sup>168</sup> Benedict did not necessarily think that the use of force to democratize Japan was wrong. For her, “how” the stick should be used to meet the objective was of particular importance. She said that the

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<sup>164</sup> Ibid., 176.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> John F. Embree, “How to Treat the Japanese: A Complex Issue,” *New York Times*, September 9, 1945, 51-52.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>168</sup> Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, 297.

“problem [was] to use that amount of hardness, no more and no less, which [would] break up old and dangerous patterns of aggressiveness and set new goals.”<sup>169</sup>

Benedict then defended the US government’s decision to rule Japan through the Japanese governing structure, judging it as a practical and appropriate way for the occupiers to exercise power in Japan. That style, in her analysis, suited the social order and cultural values of the Japanese people. First, according to Benedict, the Japanese were obedient to the paternal figures heading social hierarchies, and they were used to wielding power behind the actual political authority. She thought that these culturally conditioned patterns of behavior indicated the workability of indirect rule.<sup>170</sup> Second, by not undermining the legitimacy of the Japanese government, the Americans could avoid excessive humiliation for the Japanese and demonstrate their good intentions. Benedict emphatically explained why the techniques of mortification and punishment, which were common to convince wrongdoers of their sins in the West, were unnecessary and undesirable in Japan. The Japanese had already learned the errors of their course of aggression from its consequences, the defeat. Superfluous attempts to impose a sense of dishonor would rather encourage the Japanese to revenge themselves on the Americans.<sup>171</sup> Thus, unlike the progressives, she fully backed up the “softened” peace with Japan.

There was another reason why Benedict supported the US government’s “moderate” attitude toward Japan. She did not believe that the United States, or any other outside nation, could “create by fiat a free, democratic Japan.” She emphasized that “[i]t [had] never worked in any dominated country. No foreigner [could] decree, for a people who [had] not his habits and assumptions, a manner of life after his own image.”<sup>172</sup> Benedict tended to discriminate between

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<sup>169</sup> Ibid., 299-300.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 300-302.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., 299, 304-309.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid., 314.

Japan and the “West,” and she, as an anthropologist of Native American cultures, hardly had real knowledge about Japanese political and social history. But she argued that the Americans should respect the democracy that the Japanese had developed and would continue to shape by themselves.<sup>173</sup> She accordingly criticized those progressives, or “Western writers who [had] based their hopes upon ideological mass movements in Japan, who during the war magnified the Japanese underground and looked to it for leadership in capitulation, and who since VJ-Day [had] prophesied the triumph of radical policies at the polls.”<sup>174</sup> Benedict was convinced that it was a right policy for the Americans to promote spontaneous reforms, rather than to concoct a Western-style revolution.

Douglas G. Haring did not share moderate attitudes toward the Allied Occupation. Haring did not question the desirability of the military occupation or forced democratization; he took them for granted. He believed that the infringement of Japan’s national sovereignty was justifiable for the purpose of achieving world peace. Not all cultures had the right to exist as they were, and the culture of a nation menacing to others definitely had to be altered. He clearly stated:

Back of the form of government of a nation is the general ideology of its people. Not only political autonomy but cultural autonomy also requires limitations carefully defined in terms of law and responsibility. The notion that every people should remain undisturbed in enjoyment of traditional mores and stateways is a sentimental by-product of such considerations as the desire of anthropologists to preserve specimen societies intact for study. Only those traditional ways that involve no disturbance of the freedom of other peoples can be tolerated in a rapidly dwindling world. When the people of a nation cherish ideas that threaten the peace, the alternative to war is to change those ideas.<sup>175</sup>

Since Haring assumed democratic nations were peaceful, and almost everyone else did, too, it was beyond question that the undemocratic and militant Japan had to be reformed. For Haring, the key to successful democratization was to replace Japanese ideas and practices, which he

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<sup>173</sup> Ibid., 302-304, 310-311.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., 302.

<sup>175</sup> Haring, “The Challenge of Japanese Ideology,” 272.

regarded as the roots of their aggression, with democratic ones. He suggested that to achieve this, the occupation authorities should definitely change Japanese education and promote a free press.<sup>176</sup>

Haring also believed that democratizing Japan was a difficult but necessary task for the United Nations to embark on. Like many other people, he basically viewed World War II as the struggle between democracy and totalitarianism. Without achieving democratization of Japan, he thought, the Allies could not claim the victory of the democratic ideals that they had been fighting for.<sup>177</sup> So as not to have “the wartime toll of flesh and blood” “paid in vain,” the “ideals of individual worth and scientific honesty, together with practical political expression of those ideals” had to “gain spontaneous acceptance in Japan,” Haring argued as did the progressives.<sup>178</sup>

Generally speaking, the more Eurocentric and idealistic the rhetoric, the more interventionist. As the progressives and others like Douglas G. Haring held negative views of wartime Japan for being “feudalistic” and undemocratic, and were intoxicated by the Allies’ power and mission to remake Japan and to recreate an order in Asia, they were eager to support military occupation and radical reforms of Japan. In contrast, the conservatives and socio-cultural anthropologists like John F. Embree and Ruth Benedict, while agreeing with the ultimate objectives of the occupation and general reform programs, voiced reservations about one-sided imposition of changes on the Japanese in disregard of their history and culture, and suggested taking a moderate course toward Japan.

## **Conclusion**

American analyses of prewar Japanese history and society and their attitudes toward the Allied Occupation of Japan varied. The progressives argued that, influenced by their feudal

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<sup>176</sup> Ibid., 275-282; *Blood on the Rising Sun*, 189, 212-213, 215.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., 282-283; *ibid.*, 197-198.

<sup>178</sup> Haring, “The Challenge of Japanese Ideology,” 283.

legacy, the Japanese had since the Meiji Restoration taken the course of authoritarianism and militarism, rather than a path to democracy and pacifism. The Meiji oligarchs established a new autocratic state ruled by military, economic, and political elites, and the masses lived under oppression of these dominant groups. The Japanese leaders collectively ventured upon foreign conquests, inflicting tremendous suffering not only on the Japanese people but on Asian populations. Believing that for Japan to become a democratic and peaceful country, its whole structures should be fundamentally changed, the progressives called for radical reforms in post-surrender Japan, including a sweeping purge of the old leadership and its replacement with leftist elements.

On the other hand, the conservatives thought that Japan had been steadily modernizing itself to an industrial and democratic nation-state since the Meiji period, if its process was imperfect. They thus recommended that the Allies should remove only the direct causes to the rise in the military's political influence and indirectly facilitate Japan's democratization. Without viewing the Japanese ruling elites as a monolithic organization, the conservatives proposed to rely on Japanese "moderates" and "liberals" in leading a new Japan.

The socio-cultural anthropologists discussed feudal traditions in Japanese society and culture in part to analyze the roots of Japanese aggressive nature. Out of respect paid to different cultures and pessimism toward the Allies' ambitious scheme to change Japanese culture, the anthropologists, with some exceptions, took a negative stance toward the progressives' radical visions for a postwar Japan and sided more with the conservatives' moderate attitudes.

Despite differences in opinions among the progressives, the conservatives, and the socio-cultural anthropologists, there was a general intellectual commonality. They were all influenced by a Eurocentric historical narrative that measured Japanese development against the

yardstick of the West's "progress," real or imaginary. Although they were all Eurocentric theoreticians, the progressives were particularly so. One crucial reason is that, by applying Marxian universalist theory to Japanese history and judging it "underdeveloped," they found Japan to be "backward." Secondly, many in the progressive camp were not experts on Japan, and they developed scholarly arguments into more culturalist ones. This tendency was reinforced by their lack of understanding of Japanese history and culture and by their misunderstanding of Western history and culture. They accepted romantic views of Western civilization, and, while accusing Japan of being an aggressive, expansionist power, many of them remained blind to the crude reality that Western nations had been belligerent colonialists, too. They thus easily reached the conclusion that because Japan, unlike the West, was undemocratic, it had become an unlawful aggressor nation.

As an amalgamation of negative stereotypes about the Japanese, Frank Capra's *Know Your Enemy-Japan* not only reflects wartime American understanding of Japan but also showcases a process in which general knowledge of Japan was produced. Political motivations and circumstances behind the making of the film to a great extent explain the inaccuracies and the racist tone in the descriptions of the Japanese. However, the film's historical narrative of Japan, which stresses Japan's feudal past and the distinctive socio-cultural traits traced to it, was clearly drawn more from studies by progressives, supplemented by socio-cultural anthropologists, and not by the conservatives. The former two groups' arguments might have accorded well with wartime America's feelings of hatred of Japan and lust for revenge. By publishing more than the conservatives, they might have had more influence on public discourse concerning Japan. John W. Dower notes that "[m]ore than any other single source from the war years, *Know Your Enemy-Japan* ... captured the passions and presumptions that underlay not

only the ferocity of the clash in Asia and the Pacific, but also the sweeping agenda of reformist policies that the Allied Powers subsequently attempted to impose upon defeated and occupied Japan.”<sup>179</sup> Given the extremely limited sources of knowledge available to the filmmakers, this observation makes more sense. Capra’s team presented simplistic, ideological arguments. This is not surprising. We have seen how scholarly knowledge tended to be distorted, digested, and passed on by non-Japan experts among progressives.

It should also be noted that American intellectuals were Wilsonian internationalists. They accepted the promises in the Atlantic Charter, and supported great power cooperation to defeat the Axis and to remake peace and order in a postwar world. Regarding the Allies’ unprecedented postwar plan to turn Japan into a democratic and law-abiding member of the world community, however, the progressives, the conservatives, and the anthropologists disagreed among one another. Indeed, an examination of the ideological premises underlying their thought about Japan and their postwar policies suggests that the more negative views the Americans held of modern Japanese history and society, the more interventionist they were. It is ironic that the progressives who, unlike the conservatives and anthropologists, called for the Allies’ active intervention in the democratization of Japan for the sake of the Japanese people actually ignored their will and doubted their ability to lead democracy. By disregarding historical and cultural conditions particular to Japan and trying to force a revolution on the Japanese, the progressives advocated imposing Westernization on Japan.

Equally important, although the degree of systemic changes and the leadership of a new Japan that the progressives and the conservatives sought were different, they came up with similar postwar reform programs for Japan. In fact, as I will show in Chapters 3 and 5, one of

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<sup>179</sup> Dower, *War without Mercy*, 23.

the few critical issues that divided these two groups was about the Japanese emperor system. Otherwise, their proposed policies for postwar Japan were not all that different. This explains why the progressives were overall satisfied with early Occupation reforms devised by the conservatives.

These observations disagree with John W. Dower's discussions of American policymakers and experts on Japan and Asia. His evaluations are misleading because, first, not only the conservatives but also the anthropologists and the progressives held ethnocentric views of Japan. Second, the role of the latter groups in reinforcing and spreading negative views of Japan in public also seems to have been greater than the former. Third, it is too simplistic to interpret the progressives' seeming sympathy with the Japanese leftists and working masses as people-centric. There is little doubt that some, like E. H. Norman, who had lived in Japan and had personal acquaintances with Japanese intellectuals, genuinely wanted to help liberalize Japanese society for the Japanese. However, the progressives' class perspective originated more in their adoption of Marxian theory than in their consideration of Japanese welfare. In fact, igniting a radical revolution was a method to achieve the goal of removing the roots of Japanese militarism for the peace and order in the Asia-Pacific region. The democratization of Japanese life was thus not the end but the means. The progressives might have detected the power of opposition and grassroots movements in Japan, but they considered these as political tools to replace the existing Japanese ruling structure, and clearly did not believe that a spontaneous revolution would be possible. Their advocacy of the Allies' active intervention in the democratization of Japan signified their lack of faith in native democratic forces.

Lastly, it should be once again noted that the conservatives in the State Department drafted and supported basic postwar political reforms that lay the foundations of "US Initial Post-

Surrender Policy for Japan” (SWNCC-150/4/A). The conservatives and the progressives shared similarly “radical” reformist visions for postwar Japan, and thus it is inaccurate to simply conclude that the conservatives tried to restrain democratization because of their elitist, ethnocentric, and non-Marxian perspectives. It is true, however, that they preferred less radical changes and less foreign intervention in the Japanese political and economic systems, particularly regarding the treatment of the emperor institution and the ruling elites and industrial and agricultural policies. These differences have distinguished the conservatives from the progressives and the later revisionist scholars and made each side a critic of the other. Nevertheless, the conservatives in the State Department made many political reform plans similar to the progressives,’ and for reappraisal of the wartime Japan experts, this fact deserves more attention from American historians.

## CHAPTER 2

## JAPAN IN ITS COURSE OF DEMOCRATIZATION: JAPANESE VIEWS OF JAPAN'S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE OCCUPATION

A month after the day the Japanese instrument of surrender was signed on the *USS Missouri*, the founder of the publishing company Bungei Shunjū and the literary magazine of the same name (Literature Spring and Autumn; 1923-current), Kikuchi Hiroshi (Kan) (1888-1948), published an essay on the recent war. He insightfully identified the direct causes of Japan's entering the lost war as the military's mistaken belief in Germany's eventual victory in Europe and its miscalculation of America's productive power. Reflecting upon the developments in the 1930s, however, he also commented that the establishment of Manchukuo had set the logic in Japanese policymaking and that the stifling of healthy political discourse by the growth of the military and right-wing organizations had helped drag the nation into war. While admitting that he shared a feeling of utter "mortification" (*munen*) at Japan's defeat, Kikuchi judged the Pacific War an unnecessary war (*shinakuttemo sunda sensō*) waged despite the fact that Japan had not faced a national crisis.<sup>1</sup> He added to his scathing criticism of the state's policy a reflection that the Japanese, including the literati like himself, had been so submissive to official authority that they had allowed the rise of militarism.<sup>2</sup> But he primarily blamed the authoritarian state and high-handed officials for suppressing people's free thought and action and proposed that the bureaucracy had to be overhauled for Japan to become democratic.<sup>3</sup>

This essay is indicative of public discourse in immediate post-surrender Japan. Kikuchi responded to the emerging debate about the war – how it started and ended, who was responsible

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<sup>1</sup> Kikuchi Hiroshi (Kan), "Goshinki" (An Essay), *Bungei Shunjū* (October 1945): 2; there was no censorship yet for the magazine, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi* (Periodicals Censored by the Occupation Forces) (Tokyo: Yūshōdō, 1982), microfilm, reel 13. *Bungei Shunjū* suspended publication after the March 1945 issue because of a fire and resumed publication in October. The Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) in the General Headquarters (GHQ) viewed the magazine as liberal-to-center.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

for it, and who should atone for Japan's defeat – and also to the shift from wartime to peacetime accompanied by demilitarization and democratization reforms. Even before the American occupiers' propaganda campaign started, he held the military responsible for beginning the unwinnable war. Just like many other Japanese who, as of early October 1945, were uncertain of the extent of Japan's democratization, Kikuchi did not have a grand vision for a new Japan. But to promote liberalism, he demanded securing the right to free speech that had been repressed by the state and reforming the bureaucratic establishment.<sup>4</sup> His reflection upon the intellectuals' inaction and indifference to politics may have drawn him to political activities. Joining in Hatoyama Ichirō (1883-1959)'s movement to form a new political party, Kikuchi supported the organization of the Liberal Party (*Jiyūtō*).<sup>5</sup> Like the party leader, however, he was soon purged by the Occupation authorities, dying a few years after the purge.

Kikuchi Kan's essay was one among an innumerable number of publications during the Allied Occupation (1945-1952), part of a Japanese public discourse that was rich, diverse, and complex. Given thousands of publications, a wide range of discussions, and shifting perspectives of various writers, it is nearly impossible to comprehensively study them. Indeed, there is no single study in English on Japanese public discourse in the Occupation period. The subject is well worth studying, however, because it not only calls attention to Japanese visions for a new democratic Japan, but it demonstrates general agreement with the Allies' ultimate objective of democratizing Japan.

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 2; as a publisher and a writer, Kikuchi faced press censorship and even the danger of terrorist attack; according to him, he once became an assassination target and had his private house guarded by policemen.

<sup>5</sup> Hara Yoshihisa, *Sengo-shi no Naka no Nihon Shakaitō: Sono Risōshugi toha Nan de Attanoka* (The Japan Socialist Party in Postwar History: What Was Its Ideal?) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2000), 20-21; Masumi Jun'nosuke, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō* (Postwar Politics 1945-55 vol. 1) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan, 1983), 140-141; Shinobu Seizaburō, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 1: Senryō to Minshushugi* (A History of Postwar Japanese Politics 1945-1952 vol. 1: The Occupation and Democracy) (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1965), 201; Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai (Society to Study Parliamentary Government), *Seitō Nenkan Shōwa 22-nen* (The Yearbook on Political Parties: The Twenty-Second Year of Showa) (Tokyo: Nyūsusha, 1947; repr., Gendai Shiryō Shuppan, 1998), 6, 121, 123.

No one questions the role of the Allied forces in demilitarization and democratization reforms enacted during the Occupation period. They provided an impetus for these reforms and set the parameters for the degree and extent of change, but they were surely not the sole agent. As scholars have shown, there were prewar political and intellectual foundations in Japan that accorded, and yet sometimes conflicted, with the Occupation authorities' reform programs. The Japanese government, having already prepared for reform in such fields as the electoral system, land ownership, and labor rights since the Taishō period, took the initiative in introducing bills even before the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP)'s direct intervention.<sup>6</sup> My study of early postwar Japanese discourse documents the existence of native agency for democratization and illuminates the intellectual convergence of reform-minded Japanese and Americans.

Although a Western literature on postwar Japanese intellectual history exists, it is limited in quantity, and the scholarship usually focuses only on select patterns of thought by Japanese scholars and intellectuals termed “Modernists” (*kindaishugisha*) and “Marxists.” No one questions the significance of these thinkers in postwar Japanese intellectual history. As the promoters of the activism of citizen groups and labor organizations, they were powerful intellectuals in postwar Japan's socio-political arena. This is probably why the Modernists and the Marxists have caught many scholars' attention. However, the selectivity of this scholarship has caused the unintentional underrepresentation of the other groups, such as the “Old Liberals”

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<sup>6</sup> For example, see Iokibe Makoto, *Senryō-ki: Shushō-tachi no Shin-Nihon* (The Occupation Period: Primer Ministers' New Japan) (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1997), 59-63, 148-159, 164-179, 199-226; Iokibe Makoto, *Nichi-Bei Sensō to Sengo Nihon* (The Japanese-American War and Postwar Japan) (Ōsaka: Ōsaka Shoseki, 1989; repr., Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2005), 202-224. Iokibe categorizes reform programs into three groups: Japanese-led, General Headquarters (GHQ)-led, and in-between; some were started on the initiative of the Japanese government, some were directed by GHQ, and most were joint works. Also see Shinobu, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 I*, 172, 185, 214-215, 217-219, 220-222; Hayashi Shigeru and Tsuji Kiyooki, eds., *Nihon Naikaku Shiroku 5* (A History of the Japanese Cabinets vol. 5) (Tokyo: Daiichi Hōki Shuppan, 1981), 42, 45-47; Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swan (New York: Continuum, 2002), 229, 235-454.

(*ōrudo riberarisuto*), often referred to as Taishō liberals or “conservatives,” who were as influential as the Modernists and the Marxists in postwar Japan.<sup>7</sup> I suspect that previous coverage of prewar liberals was the reason for their being skipped in the postwar period.<sup>8</sup> The lack of scholarly interest in them might also be due to their being labeled as “conservative” after 1945. The binary analytical framework of conservatives-versus-progressives, the latter of which included the Modernists and the Marxists, or the paradigm that depicts progressive political and social groups fighting against the conservative political and business elite, may have prevented scholars from closely studying postwar conservatives. However, prewar liberalism remained an important current of thought, which is evidenced by the many essays written by Taishō liberals like Kikuchi’s.

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<sup>7</sup> There are not many English works on postwar Japanese intellectual-cultural history despite their high quality; see John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999); Andrew E. Barshay, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Marxist Traditions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Andrew E. Barshay, “Postwar Social and Political Thought, 1945-90,” in *Modern Japanese Thought*, ed. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 273-355; Andrew E. Barshay, “Imagining Democracy in Postwar Japan: Reflections on Maruyama Masao and Modernism,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 18, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 365-406; J. Victor Koschmann, “The Debate on Subjectivity in Postwar Japan: Foundations of Modernism as a Political Critique,” *Pacific Affairs* 54, no. 4 (Winter 1981-1982): 609-631; J. Victor Koschmann, “Intellectuals and Politics,” in *Postwar Japan as History*, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 395-423; J. Victor Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996); Curtis A. Gayle, *Marxist History and Postwar Japanese Nationalism* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Laura Hein, *Reasonable Men, Powerful Words: Political Culture and Expertise in Twentieth-Century Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). In comparison, the Japanese scholarship on postwar Japanese intellectual-cultural history is broader and more critical. Reevaluation of various schools of postwar Japanese thought already began in the 1950s; see Kuno Osamu, Tsurumi Shunsuke, and Fujita Shōzō, *Sengo Nihon no Shisō* (Postwar Japanese Thought) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1959; repr., Iwanami Shoten, 1995); Umemoto Katsumi, Satō Noboru, and Maruyama Masao, *Maruyama Masao Taiwa-hen 2-3: Gendai Nihon no Kakushin Shisō Jō · Ge* (Dialogue with Maruyama Masao pts. 2-3: Progressive Thought in Modern Japan 2 vols.) (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō Shinsha, 1966; repr., Iwanami Shoten, 2002); 35 volumes of *Gendai Nihon Shisō Taikai* (Anthologies of Modern Japanese Thought) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1963-1968); 16 volumes of *Sengo Nihon Shisō Taikai* (Anthologies of Postwar Japanese Thought) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1968-1971); Tetsuo Najita, Maeda Ai, and Kamishima Jirō, eds., *Sengo Nihon no Seishin-shi: Sono Saikentō* (A Spiritual History of Postwar Japan: Reappraisal) (1988; repr., Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001); Shisō no Kagaku Kenkyūkai (Society for the Science of Thought), ed., *Kyōdō Kenkyū Tenkō: Jō-kan · Chū-kan · Ge-kan* (Joint Study on Tenko 3 vols.) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1959, 1960, 1962).

<sup>8</sup> See Sharon H. Nolte, *Liberalism in Modern Japan: Ishibashi Tanzan and His Teachers, 1905-1960* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Andrew E. Barshay, *State and Intellectual in Imperial Japan: The Public Man in Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Tatsuo Arima, *The Failure of Freedom: The Portrait of Modern Japanese Intellectuals* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); Atsuko Hirai, *Individualism and Socialism: The Life and Thought of Kawai Eijirō (1891-1944)* (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986).

In fact, many different people from a wide spectrum of political thought – late Meiji-Taishō liberals, socialists, communists, and “postwar democrats” (often interchangeably called “Modernists,” “Progressive Men of Culture” (*shinpo-teki bunkajin*), or postwar “enlighteners”) – formed post-surrender Japanese public discourse and discussed the democratization of Japan. Japan’s defeat and acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, subsequent to the Allied Occupation, opened a socio-political space for many. The result was the reemergence and dominance of modernist ideology. The Japanese, from postwar conservatives to communists, shared a developmental view of history and, aligning Japan to the unilinear course of progress, envisioned democratization of Japan in various ways. Intellectuals, journalists, and politicians criticized Japan’s wartime leadership, analyzed the causes of Japanese militarism, and, like the Americans, found faults with the modern Japanese political system, society, and culture. Their reasoning and visions for a democratic Japan varied just as much as did those of American policymakers and scholars, but they fundamentally agreed that Japan should become a liberal, democratic country. Under foreign occupation, democratic reforms that had been considered in Japan but not realized during the past decades and totally new ones could be promoted and became reality. Whether overawed by, resigned to, or taking advantage of the new circumstances, the Japanese carried their own ideas of democratization and, for this reason, were more inclined to give their consent to the Occupation forces’ democratization programs.

This chapter is ultimately an attempt to recreate Japanese public discourse regarding the democratization of Japan at the beginning of the Occupation, mapping different strands of modernist thought by drawing from a wide, but limited, range of publications. Due to the multitude of available sources, I focus on the written or oral remarks made by leading

intellectuals and political figures on a limited range of topics.<sup>9</sup> More specifically, I compare their analyses of Japanese modernity and the roots of Japanese militarism first and then turn to their world views and definitions of the Allied Occupation in the progressive course of Japanese history. By illuminating the similarities and differences in Japanese views of democracy, which parallel those of the Americans, the chapter complicates our understanding of post-surrender Japanese public discourse and suggests that postwar Japanese democratization occurred out of the dynamism of multiple, overlapping political-intellectual currents, Japanese as well as American.

Before I start, I need to clarify my terminology in order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding. To describe intellectuals, literary critics, and politicians, I try to use the more neutral labels of prewar liberal, socialist, communist, and Modernist, rather than “conservative” and “progressive,” which often carry misleading or pejorative political connotations. Categorizing people is always arbitrary and relative, so I use these labels in a general, rather than strict, sense. I will clarify the characteristics of various groups’ thoughts throughout this chapter, but let me remind you that I use different labels based mainly on Japanese thinkers’ views of modern Japanese politics and society. Their political and academic backgrounds, too, certainly influenced their thought; therefore, their political affiliations, political goals, and the degree of influence from Marxist theory help me distinguish a liberal from a socialist, a socialist from a communist, and a prewar liberal from a Modernist. If I use terms such as “conservative,” “moderate,” “progressive,” and “radical,” they simply mean the degree to which individuals took a critical view of Japan’s past and advocated change.

I discuss the two schools of Marxism later, but here I need to briefly explain about my

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<sup>9</sup> I acknowledge that the groups and individuals that I discuss are selective. I do not analyze novelists, religious groups, or local grassroots organizations.

definition and usage of the label “Marxist.” The term can be used for those who adopted Karl Marx’s economic theory and/ or his analysis of society and history, and those who sought to lead a socialist revolution modeled after the Bolshevik Revolution. Marxian revisionist economists, anti-communist/ Soviet socialists, and Communist Party members, therefore, can all be identified as Marxist, but I use Marxist only to describe the theories or theoreticians of the two Marxist schools. I call most Socialist Party members socialist and Communist Party members communist even if they were also influenced by Marxism and used Marxist language.

### **Postwar Beginnings: Examining Japan’s Defeat in and Entry to the Pacific War**

Where the Japanese, after their acceptance of surrender, immediately shifted their focus from continuing the war to “reconstructing” (*saiken*) the war-devastated country, two interlocking issues emerged. First, as Kikuchi Kan’s essay indicates, the Japanese sought to figure out why Japan had lost, and this question naturally developed into the issue of the responsibility of the Tōjō Hideki (1884-1948) cabinet for deciding to go to war and of the wartime leadership for mismanaging state policy. Discussions extended to the responsibility of people, the emperor, political parties, journalists, and intellectuals, but the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (known as the Tokyo Trial) officially held only top military and bureaucratic leaders responsible and left the matter of war responsibility unsolved for decades to come. The second issue was the democratization of Japan. As stipulated in the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese anticipated demilitarization and democratization reforms, even if no one was certain about their exact degrees and extent. This led various political and social groups to resume their activities and spurred reexamination of the problems underlying Japanese politics, society, and culture. Unexpectedly radical and sweeping Occupation policies stimulated public discourse concerning democracy and democratization. Analyses of Japanese democracy

led inevitably to evaluations of Japanese development in the modern period, proposed reasons for the rise of militarism, and suggested visions for democratization. Fixing perceived deficiencies in Japanese democracy became a goal for the Japanese as well as for the Americans. Inherent in the task of reconstructing Japan, these discussions developed along with Occupation politics.

Inquiry into the reasons for Japan's defeat began right after its acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Treaty. Having realized America's technological and material superiority, the Japanese attributed Japan's defeat to their own scientific weakness. As early as August 21, 1945, the *Yomiuri Hōchi Shinbun* asserted that "[r]egarding the causes of defeat, it would not be an exaggeration to say that they [were] ascribed to the standard of science inferior to the enemy's and the low level of national culture" and stressed the importance of the advancement of the arts and sciences in building a new Japan.<sup>10</sup> However, it was Prime Minister Higashikuni(-nomiya) Naruhiko(-ō) (1887-1990)'s official report on Japan's disadvantage in war production, given to the Eighty-Eighth Session of the Imperial Diet on September 5, that showed the public that the critical factors contributing to defeat were not simply the leadership's mishandling of the war or the lowered national morale, but the huge gap in material power and, by extension, a poverty of science on the part of Japan.<sup>11</sup> The revelation of underdeveloped Japanese scientific research

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<sup>10</sup> “Atarashiki Nihon’ Kensetsu heno Nidai Dōhyō” (Two Great Guides to the Construction of a “New Japan”), *Yomiuri Hōchi Shinbun*, August 21, 1945, 1. Also see “Nihon Saiken heno Michi: Yagi Hakase Kataru” (Road to Japan’s Reconstruction: Doctor Yagi Speaks), *Mainichi Shinbun*, August 17, 1945, 2; “Kagaku Rikkoku he” (Developing a Country Committed to Science), *Asahi Shinbun*, August 20, 1945, 2.

<sup>11</sup> Higashikuni(-nomiya)'s address is from Tsuji Kiyooki, ed., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi 1: Seiji* (Primary Sources for the History in the Twenty Years after 1945 vol. 1: Politics) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1966), 9-13. The records of Imperial Diet proceedings are available on the National Diet Library's online database; also go to:

[http://teikokugikai-i.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/TEIKOKU/swt\\_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=576&SAVED\\_RID=3&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV\\_ID=5&DOC\\_ID=1230&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=6&DPOS=5&SORT\\_DIR=1&SORT\\_TYPE=1&MODE=1&DMY=638](http://teikokugikai-i.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/TEIKOKU/swt_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=576&SAVED_RID=3&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=5&DOC_ID=1230&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=6&DPOS=5&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=1&MODE=1&DMY=638).

The newspapers also published the speech and the government's report on war production on September 6, 1945. In his personal opinion, the prime minister spoke of the causes of defeat to a press corps on August 28; he mentioned utter destruction of military power, the atomic bomb and Soviet entry to war, excessive state control tying down the

naturally led many to press for greater emphasis on research and development to help reconstruct Japan economically and culturally.<sup>12</sup>

At the same time, the disclosure of Japan's productive weakness raised another question: if Japan's inferior material base made defeat in a long-term war inevitable, why did the political leaders decide to go to war? The first arrest of class A war criminal suspects on September 11, 1945, many of whom were cabinet members under Tōjō, probably increased the trend to criticize the Tōjō government for starting an unwinnable war. The September 22 editorial of the *Asahi Shinbun* showed the shift of public attention from making sense of Japan's defeat to blaming the leadership for declaring war. The writer wrote:

Every transition, new start, and new construction requires severe critiques of the past. Rigorous self-criticism should be a real step toward change. However, what has been heard so far in Japan is, namely, only the reasons for defeat and national repentance. But what is the benefit of describing the process of the defeat and explaining that the decline in material power and the inferiority of scientific power led to the defeat? The public voice asking why Japan started a war to lose sounds far more earnest. It is obvious that Japan is far behind the United States materially and scientifically. If our leaders did not know this fact, they cannot be more ignorant and incompetent; if they knew and impelled the people into the war, they certainly deserve to die a thousand times over for this crime.<sup>13</sup>

Many followed the accusation against the Tōjō cabinet. First among them was Nomura Kichisaburō (1877-1965), a former Navy official appointed ambassador to the United States through whom the Tokyo government sought a deal with the US government before the Pearl Harbor attack. Nomura confessed in the September 25 *Yomiuri Hōchi Shinbun* that he had opposed war and blamed the Japanese military for having miscalculated America's war potential

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people too much, the leaders' inflexibility and myopia, and the lowering of national morals; see *Yomiuri Hōchi Shinbun*, August 30, 1945.

<sup>12</sup> In addition to footnote 10, see "Shasetsu: Heiwa Kensetsu no Michi" (Editorial: The Path to Establishing Peace), *Yomiuri Hōchi Shinbun*, September 6, 1945, 1; "Shasetsu: Heiwa Kokka no Shimei" (Editorial: The Mission of a Pacifist State), *Mainichi Shinbun*, September 10, 1945, 1; "Kagakusen no Haiin" (The Causes of Defeat in Scientific War), *Asahi Shinbun*, September 14, 1945, 1; Morito Tatsuo, "Kagaku-teki Seishin" (A Scientific Mind), *Mainichi Shinbun*, October 15, 1945, 2.

<sup>13</sup> "Shasetsu: Sensō no Sekinin Hatashite Ika" (Editorial: How Should War Responsibility Be?), *Asahi Shinbun*, September 22, 1945, 1.

on its decision to go to war.<sup>14</sup>

Four months after the end of the war, Baba Tsunego (1875-1956), the longtime liberal journalist and president of Yomiuri Hōchi Newspaper Company, observed that public concerns all boiled down to the question of why, knowing that Japan could not win, the Tōjō cabinet had started the war, instead of why Japan had lost it. In *Kaizō* (January 1946) (Reconstruction; 1919-1955), he himself scathingly criticized an already arrested and imprisoned Tōjō Hideki for having begun the war, prolonged it by clinging to power, and then tried to avoid taking responsibility through suicide.<sup>15</sup>

These opinions led to the view that the Pacific War had been brought on by the political leaders, and that the Japanese people had been unwillingly dragged into it. Old Liberal philosopher and educator Abe Yoshishige (Nōsei) (1883-1966), who was appointed to the Shidehara cabinet's minister of education in January 1946, presented this line of argument in his essay in the January 1946 issue of *Sekai* (World; January 1946-current), Iwanami Publishing House's (Iwanami Shoten) new magazine.<sup>16</sup> The Pacific War, he said, was "caused by some members of the military cliques," and he explained that a "certain circle of military personnel's big gamble had mobilized all the armed forces and the whole nation, caused this irreparable great humiliation and crushing defeat, and inflicted terrible suffering on the people."<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Nomura Kichisaburō, "Haisen kara Kensetsu he" (From Defeat to Reconstruction), *Yomiuri Hōchi Shinbun*, September 25, 1945, 1.

<sup>15</sup> Baba Tsunego, "Gunkoku Seiji-ron" (On Militarist Politics), *Kaizō* (January 1946): 26-29; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi*, reel 87. *Kaizō* was a leading general interest magazine during Taishō Democracy. The magazine was suppressed in June 1944 and republished in January 1946; see "Fukkan no Kotoba" (An Address of Republication), *Kaizō* (January 1946): 1. *Kaizō* was judged as liberal-to-leftist by the CCD and put on the pre-censorship list of two ultra-rightist and twenty-six ultra-leftist periodicals after most publications shifted to post-censorship; see Okuizumi Eizaburō, ed., *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi Mokuroku Kaidai Shōwa 20-nen-24-nen* (User's Guide to the Microfilm Edition of Censored Periodicals: 1945-1949) (Tokyo: Yūshōdō, 1982), 512-525.

<sup>16</sup> As a liberal-to-leftist magazine, *Sekai* was continuously subject to pre-censorship; see Okuizumi, ed., *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi Mokuroku Kaidai Shōwa 20-nen-24-nen*, 512-525.

<sup>17</sup> Abe Yoshishige (Nōsei), "Gougi to Shinjitsu to Chikei towō" (With Resolution, Truth, and Wisdom), *Sekai* (January 1946): 12, 16; he wrote this essay in November 1945; there were a couple of places that were erased

### Taishō Liberals' Views of Japanese Modernization and the Origins of Militarism

It was liberals of the Taishō period who led the attack on the Tōjō cabinet for starting the Pacific War and held it directly responsible for Japan's entry into the unwinnable war. However, they viewed the war as the end result of a longer period of military government which had begun in the 1930s. Looking back over the deplorable developments during the past decade, they sought the causes for the rise of militarism.

In *Sekai* (January 1946), for example, Imperial University of Tokyo professor of law Yokota Kisaburō (1896-1993) criticized the Japanese leaders for having diverged from domestic and international democratic rules since the Manchurian Incident with war as the result. He concluded that the “destructive tragedy that Japan [had] experienced with the recent war” was “nothing but the consequence of militarism, bureaucratism, and totalitarianism in the past.”<sup>18</sup> Looking back to Japan's political course since 1931, the venerable liberal Iwanami Shigeo (1881-1946), the founder of Iwanami Publishing House, wrote in the same volume of *Sekai*, “since the military cliques rose to power, taking advantage of the Manchurian Incident, the domestic situations dashed into a direction opposed to the great principles (of the Charter Oath), and even important national policy upon which the fate of the country depended fell into the hands of the militarists and bureaucrats who were out of touch with the people.”<sup>19</sup> Hatoyama Ichirō's Liberal Party likewise accused the military and the bureaucracy of having strayed from the Charter Oath in the 1930s and asserted that “our country's military cliques and bureaucrats [had] destroyed the parliamentary system and political parties with fascistic dictatorship in the

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because the CCD judged them as nationalistic and critical of SCAP, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi*, reel 178.

<sup>18</sup> Yokota Kisaburō, “Kokusai Minshu Seikatsu no Genri” (The Fundamentals of International Democratic Life), *Sekai* (January 1946): 66, 77; the quote is from p.77; he wrote this essay in October 1945; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi*, reel 178.

<sup>19</sup> Iwanami Shigeo, “*Sekai* no Sōkan ni saishite” (On the Launch of *Sekai*), *Sekai* (January 1946): 190; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi*, reel 178.

course of the development of parliamentary politics and eventually driven the nation into a reckless war and caused an unprecedented defeat.”<sup>20</sup>

These opinions reflected a historical view that Japan’s liberal democracy had begun with the Meiji Restoration and gradually developed but “gone off track” (*kidou kara hazureta*) in the 1930s.<sup>21</sup> The Charter Oath, the five-article proclamation issued by Emperor Meiji in March 1868, was interpreted as ideal democratic principles which had guided Japanese democracy.<sup>22</sup> The Freedom and Popular Rights Movement (*Jiyū Minken Undō*) of the 1870s and 1880s that led to the establishment of the national Diet and Constitution, the Movement to Protect Constitutional Government (*Goken Undō*) that pressured the oligarchy to end nonparty government in the second decade of the twentieth century, and the realization of universal manhood suffrage in 1925 all signified healthy political development from the Meiji to the Taishō period, that deviated from its normal course during the 1930s. Iwanami Shigeo proudly proclaimed that “Japan’s rapid progress during the less-than-a hundred year period since the Meiji Restoration [had] been viewed as a threat by the world. It [had been] nothing but a result of dedicated Japanese efforts to develop by following the Charter Oath and by comparing

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<sup>20</sup> The statement is from Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai, *Seitō Nenkan Shōwa 22-nen*, 29, 135. The quote is from the statement issued as the party’s official statement against Communism on February 22, 1946. The reference to the Charter Oath is in the proclamation of the formation of the Liberal Party; see p.127. Hatoyama Ichirō made similar comments in September 7, 1945’s *Yomiuri Hōchi Shinbun* regarding the causes of Japan’s defeat.

<sup>21</sup> The expression, “gone off track,” is used in “Hakkan no Ji” (A Publishing Address), *Sekai* (January 1946): 4; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken’etsu Zasshi*, reel 178.

<sup>22</sup> As fundamental government policy, the Charter Oath pledged: 1. Deliberate councils shall be widely established and all matters decided by public discussion; 2. All classes, high and low, shall unite vigorously carrying out the administration of affairs of state; 3. The common people, no less than the civil and military officials, shall each be allowed to pursue his own calling so that there may be no discontent; 4. Evil customs of the past shall be broken off and everything based upon the just laws of Nature (*tenchi no kōdō*); 5. Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundation of the imperial rule. The Charter Oath, of course, did not intend to promote the democracy developed during the following decades; as Marius B. Jansen explains, for example, Article 1 did not support representative government, and “deliberate councils” and “public discussion” were only for lords of the feudal domains. The Oath was more like incipient nation-building principles, but the clauses surely seem to contain liberal thought and can be reinterpreted as more progressive than originally meant. Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 338-339; the translation of the Charter Oath is from p.338.

themselves with advanced countries.” But, unfortunately, “progressive reform of the Restoration [had] lost sight of the principles of the Charter Oath on its halfway (to realization)” in the 1930s, Iwanami added.<sup>23</sup>

Shidehara Kijūrō (1872-1951), the second postwar prime minister, shared this interpretation. In effect, his career itself symbolized the political shift of the early 1930s. He was the foreign minister, who had developed the so-called “diplomacy of cooperation” (*kyōchō gaikō*) with Britain and the United States, also known as “Shidehara diplomacy,” during the 1920s. He served as foreign minister in the Hamaguchi Osachi cabinet (July 1929-April 1931) that ratified the London Treaty on the Limitation of Naval Armament, which the Navy severely criticized as encroachment on the emperor’s supreme command under the Meiji Constitution. When Shidehara served the next cabinet as foreign minister, the Kwantung Army bombed South Manchuria railways. When the failure to stop the extension of the front by the military led to the resignation of the cabinet in December 1931, Shidehara’s career as foreign minister ended. He stated on November 28, 1945 in his address to the Eighty-Ninth Session of the Imperial Diet, the “modern democratic trend has gradually grown, but the development has in the past recent years been hampered under the pressure of the reactionary group.” Believing that the “root of that [modern democratic] thought [had] not died,” Shidehara called for “restoring and stepping up” (*fukkatsu kyōka*) democracy, which had been disrupted by rising militarism.<sup>24</sup>

Some critics grudgingly recalled how the military grew powerful and party politics collapsed during the 1930s. Baba Tsunego described a series of events in 1931-1932 – the abortive coup in March, the Manchurian Incident, another failed coup in October, and the

<sup>23</sup> Iwanami, “*Sekai no Sōkan ni saishite*,” 190-191.

<sup>24</sup> Shidehara’s address is from: [http://teikokugikai-i.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/TEIKOKU/swt\\_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=28529&SAVED\\_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV\\_ID=5&DOC\\_ID=4175&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=88&DPOS=7&SORT\\_DIR=1&SORT\\_TYPE=1&MODE=1&DMY=28824](http://teikokugikai-i.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/TEIKOKU/swt_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=28529&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=5&DOC_ID=4175&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=88&DPOS=7&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=1&MODE=1&DMY=28824).

establishment of Manchukuo – as the attempt of small groups in the Army to dominate politics. Taking over Manchuria invigorated the military, he continued, and the military came to exert power in the government through two more, this time more successful, coups, one in May 15, 1932, and the other in February 26, 1936. The two coups were especially significant in the political course that Japan had followed in their aftermath: the May 15 Incident ended representative government, and the February 26 Incident brought back the policy of appointing top-rank military officers in active service to cabinet positions (*gunbu daijin gen'eki bukansei*).<sup>25</sup> Baba lamented that under the increasing influence of the military, Japan had joined the Axis and plunged into war with the United States.<sup>26</sup> The Imperial Rule Assistance Association (*Taisei Yokusankai*) organized by former prime minister Prince Konoe Fumimaro (1891-1945) and his reform bureaucrats and progressive intellectuals in order to mobilize the nation in the time of crisis under the slogan of “One Party, One Nation” liquidated political parties and supported the military government once the Pacific War began.

These discussions extended to the explanation of defects in the political system which had empowered the military and ended democratic life. The direct causes of the military's control of government were considered to be the emperor's prerogative of supreme command stipulated in Articles 11 and 12 of the Meiji Constitution and, as Baba mentioned, the special rule to appoint active top military officers as ministers. Among those who focused on the military's

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<sup>25</sup> The custom to appoint incumbent top military officers (among generals/ admirals and lieutenant generals/ vice admirals) ministers continued between 1900 and 1913.

<sup>26</sup> Baba, “Gunkoku Seiji-ron,” 30-31. For the similar discussions on the rise of military rule and the end of party politics, also see Oka Yoshitake (1902-1990; professor of law at the Imperial University of Tokyo), “Nihon no Kanryō” (The Japanese Bureaucrats), *Sekai* (October 1946): 23-24; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi*, reel 178; Yabe Teiji (1902-1967; professor of law at the Imperial University of Tokyo; former Shōwa Kenkyūkai (Showa Research Association) member), in “Honsha Zadankai: Seiji no Saiken to Demokurashī 3” (Yomiuri Hōchi Newspaper Company Roundtable Discussions: Political Reconstruction and Democracy pt. 3), *Yomiuri Hōchi Shinbun*, October 3, 1945, 1; Miyazawa Toshiyoshi (1899-1976; professor of law at the Imperial University of Tokyo; a member of the Shidehara government's Committee to Study Constitutional Problems (*Kenpō Mondai Chōsa Iinkai*)), “Kenpō Kaisei ni tsuite” (On Constitutional Revision), *Mainichi Shinbun*, October 19, 1945, 1.

leverage over the government was Minobe Tatsukichi (1873-1948), a former professor of law at the Imperial University of Tokyo and member of the House of Peers, who had been attacked in 1936 for holding the theory that the emperor was an “organ of the state” (*Ten'nō kikan-setsu*), an idea which had functioned as the basis of Taishō Democracy. In the January 1946 issue of *Sekai*, he argued that “it [was] unquestionable that the so-called independent prerogative of the supreme command and the system to appoint military officers (on active duty) to army and navy ministers [had] greatly contributed to the realization of military dictatorship.”<sup>27</sup>

Miyazawa Toshiyoshi (1899-1976), Minobe’s student and professor of law at the Imperial University of Tokyo, in his analysis in the October 19, 1945 *Asahi Shinbun*, similarly concluded that the prerogative of the supreme command independent of both the cabinet and the Diet had interrupted constitutional government and even caused the defeat in war.<sup>28</sup> As derivative issues, he mentioned a self-righteous and powerful bureaucracy, the absence of a cabinet responsible to the legislature, and a weak Diet as factors allowing the rise of militarism, or the dysfunction of parliamentary government. Often discussed in the context of democratization, these became rational bases for reform plans, especially constitutional revision.<sup>29</sup>

Many found faults not only with Japanese political institutions but also at the level of culture and society. Some prewar liberals focused on the failure not only of the political leadership but also of the Japanese people themselves – including the intelligentsia – to explain

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<sup>27</sup> Minobe Tatsukichi, “Minshushugi to Waga Gikai Seido” (Democracy and Our Diet System), *Sekai* (January 1946): 25; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi*, reel 178. Minobe, however, believed that the problems simply lay in the regulations for the governmental organizations and the military system so that there was no need to revise the Meiji Constitution itself; see Chapter 4 in this dissertation.

<sup>28</sup> Miyazawa, “Kenpō Kaisei ni tsuite,” 1. Besides Baba, Minobe, and Miyazawa, also see Kanemitsu Yasuo, “Shintō Kessei no Kōsō: Ge” (A Plan to Form a New Party: pt. 3), *Asahi Shinbun*, September 17, 1945, 1.

<sup>29</sup> See Oka, “Nihon no Kanryō,” 17-27; Yabe, in “Honsha Zadankai 3,” 1. Party platforms and draft constitutions reflected these issues; see Chapter 4 in this dissertation.

the rise of military rule and the entry into war. Abe Yoshishige discussed how leaders who had failed to “control nature” (*shizen no kokufuku*), or subjugate “selfishness” (*rikoshin*), had lost sight of national interests and the mutual relationship between the state and the people and as a result had erred in state policy.<sup>30</sup> He also cited the Japanese people’s “apathy and negligence” (*mukiryoku to taiman*) as a reason for their failing to stop the war.<sup>31</sup>

*Sekai*’s launching address likewise attributed Japan’s “digression” since the 1930s to the “ignorance, short-sightedness, lack of education, immorality, and inferior human characters of a handful of military officers, politicians, bureaucrats, and their followers” and the “powerlessness of culture, no substance in ethics, and the negligence, cowardice, and irresponsibility of the intelligentsia.”<sup>32</sup> To fix these, *Sekai* emphasized the importance of education, but its suggestion indicated what it saw as problems embedded within Japanese culture. The author maintained that the “promotion of the substance of sciences” and the “purification, deepening, and spreading of religion and art” were necessary to “eradicate bigoted and irrational nationalism” and “mythicism,” indicating his criticisms of the underdevelopment of scientific thinking and the abuse of Shinto, the imperial myth, and Japanese history.<sup>33</sup>

Democracy might have slowly developed since the Meiji Restoration, but few believed that liberal democracy had truly matured and taken root in Japanese society. On Japan’s democracy since Meiji, Yabe Teiji (1902-1967), professor of law at the Imperial University of Tokyo and former Shōwa Kenkyūkai (Showa Research Association) member, asserted that it had never been really democratic due to the survival of feudalistic elements. In the October 3, 1945 issue of the *Yomiuri Hōchi Shinbun*, he argued that in contrast to a modern society established on

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<sup>30</sup> Abe, “Gougi to Shinjitsu to Chikei towo,” 11-16

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>32</sup> “Hakkan no Ji,” 5.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

the basis of liberal ideas, a vertical feudalistic social structure had ruled all human relations, making blind followers of the Japanese, with militaristic and authoritarian statism the end result. Thinking of egoistic sectionalism also as a moral issue, Yabe held that the failure of Japanese morality had been revealed in the recent war.<sup>34</sup>

Developing these viewpoints further, Kimura Takeyasu (1909-1973) explained in *Sekai* (March 1946) why Taishō Democracy had failed, or why democracy had never functioned in Japan. Professor of economics at the Imperial University of Tokyo Kimura, a student of Taishō liberal Kawai Eijirō (1891-1944), wrote that although democracy and liberalism were already known concepts, neither ideology had taken root in the people's lives; instead feudalism had survived beneath the surface veneer of modernism. To him, this was the cause of all the political shifts from the 1930s to the period of the Occupation. In his analysis, in a culture where liberal ideology was not firmly established as the driving force of society, people moved from one ideology to another, pursuing their own interests according to changes in external conditions. This was why Taishō Democracy had been quickly swallowed by statism; advocating nationalism, the wartime leaders had sought their own interests; once-progressive thinkers had become reactionaries during the 1930s, transforming themselves into supporters of democracy after 1945.<sup>35</sup> Kimura emphasized that to democratize Japan, the Japanese needed to learn the basis of liberalism, which was to respect individual freedoms and human rights, and foster this ideology as a universal principle of the nation; without this “inner revolution” (*uchi kara no kakumei*), democratization instigated by the Allies could not succeed.<sup>36</sup>

Thus, Taishō liberals who returned to the political and intellectual scenes after August

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<sup>34</sup> Yabe, in “Honsha Zadankai 3,” 1.

<sup>35</sup> Kimura Takeyasu, “Saiken no Zentei” (The Premise of Reconstruction), *Sekai* (March 1946): 4-6; there was forced revision in this essay, judged by the CCD as critical of Allied policy, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi*, reel 178.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-4, 6-9.

1945 analyzed the origins of 1930s Japanese militarism by critiquing Japanese modernization. They argued that although democracy had grown healthy since the Meiji period, the military and the bureaucrats had deviated from that normal political course and driven the nation into militarism. While pinpointing who should take accountability for this aberration, Taishō liberals identified structural causes of it: weak legal sanctions for democratic government inherent in the Meiji Constitution and the Japanese failure to understand modern political and social systems. Hence, what they had in mind for democratization was to revive and reform parliamentary democracy by removing institutional defects and reeducating the people.

This actually meant bringing Japan back to the progressive course first begun under Meiji. Writing on democratization in postwar Japan, Iwanami Shigeo called for “recollecting the spirit of the Meiji Restoration and living up to that of the Charter Oath.”<sup>37</sup> Indeed, this view and resolution were shared by many top political leaders. Higashikuni Naruhiko, an imperial family member appointed the first postwar prime minister, pledged to rebuild Japan by “returning to the spirit of the Charter Oath that Emperor Meiji himself had sworn by the gods of heaven and earth” in his speech given to the Eighty-Eighth Session of the Imperial Diet on September 5.<sup>38</sup> The next day, rightist socialist Mizutani Chōzaburō (1897-1960) also commented in the *Asahi Shinbun* that the Japanese should be able to democratize the country in their own way if they “serenely reviewed Emperor Meiji’s Charter Oath, read it in their hearts, and practiced it by their own action.”<sup>39</sup> When he formed a cabinet in October, Shidehara Kijūrō, too, announced that democratic politics would be reestablished based upon the Charter Oath.<sup>40</sup> Even Emperor Shōwa

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<sup>37</sup> Iwanami, “*Sekai no Sōkan ni saishite*,” 191.

<sup>38</sup> Tsuji, ed., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi 1: Seiji*, 11; see footnote 11 for the website address of the speech; also see Shinobu, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 1*, 173-174.

<sup>39</sup> Mizutani Chōzaburō, “Shintō Kessei no Kōsō: Chū” (A Plan to Form a New Party: pt. 2), *Asahi Shinbun*, September 6, 1945, 1.

<sup>40</sup> Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 148-150.

(1901-1989) asked the drafters of his renunciation of divinity to refer to the Charter Oath in order to stress that democracy had been a tradition since Meiji.<sup>41</sup>

According to Peter Duus and Irwin Scheiner, Taishō liberals' "arguments for democratization did not grow out of a comprehensive understanding of how societies were organized, nor did it link political analysis to an understanding of basic human drives. Instead, it relied on an implicit optimistic faith in the inevitability of progress, in the triumph of morality over interest, and in the possibility of social harmony."<sup>42</sup> It is not hard to see these characteristics of prewar liberal thought, often explained as a reason why Taishō liberals failed to protect constitutional government from the militarists, in their analyses of the origins of Japan's militarism and in their attitudes toward postwar democratization. Their lack of a systematic understanding of Japanese society and a sanguine hope for progress are noticeable when their thought is contrasted with that of Marxian and Marxist theoreticians.

### **The Modernists and Marxian Critique of Japanese Underdevelopment**

Kimura Takeyasu's essay is suggestive of another major strand of thought in postwar Japan. A younger generation further developed the critique that Taishō liberals made concerning Japan's underdevelopment as a modern nation. More influenced by Marxist historiography, a new group of intellectuals and scholars, many of whom would be called "Modernists," argued that in comparison with the West – real or imagined – Japan was still full of the remnants of the feudal, or if not feudal, then pre-modern, past, and this had prevented the Japanese from developing the autonomous self. Accordingly, they considered modernizing the Japanese social structure and mentality as the goal of postwar democratization reforms.

One of the notable Modernists was Maruyama Masao (1914-1996), a young professor at

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 185.

<sup>42</sup> Peter Duus and Irwin Scheiner, "Socialism, Liberalism, and Marxism, 1901-1931," in *Modern Japanese Thought*, ed. Wakabayashi, 181.

the Imperial University of Tokyo faculty of law. In his famous “The Logic and Psychology of Ultrationalism” published in the May 1946 issue of *Sekai*, he described how the Japanese state had made brutal, loyal soldiers and irresponsible political leaders out of the Japanese. He stated that unlike modern European states, the Meiji state had not only monopolized political power but also dictated moral values: the Meiji oligarchs had created a hierarchical national polity headed by the emperor, who personified political power and spiritual authority, and propagated service to the sovereign as his subjects’ fundamental moral duty.<sup>43</sup> Maruyama argued that this social identity and sense of morality had prevented the Japanese from establishing the independent self, and found the lack of autonomy particularly evident in the behavior of Japanese soldiers and political leaders, in contrast with the Germans whom he considered a model of the modern individual.

According to Maruyama, the Japanese soldiers’ inhuman acts toward the prisoners of war had been caused by their sense of power derived from their identification of the self with the state, not from the ego; on the other hand, the German medical experiments on prisoners had been “objective” atrocities (*kyakkan-teki gyakutai*) committed by the “free subject” (*jiyū-naru shutai*) against the “object” (*mono*). Maruyama’s analysis of the Japanese soldiers’ psychology and conducts came from his own experience in the military and his observation of the statements and attitudes of the defendants in trial. He was greatly bothered by the fact that the soldiers had physically abused the prisoners but also sincerely worked to improve their living conditions in the camps without experiencing the mental struggle inherent to these contradictory acts. He solved the puzzle and explained that because the state was the source of ethics as well as the exerciser of political power, the soldiers had not questioned ethical issues of state policy. Losing

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<sup>43</sup> Maruyama Masao, “Chōkokkashugi no Ronri to Shinri” (The Logic and Psychology of Ultrationalism), *Sekai* (May 1946): 3-6; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken’etsu Zasshi*, reel 178.

the state, the source of authority and power, with Japan's defeat in war, the Japanese defendants just collapsed, unlike their "impudent" (*futebuteshi(i)*) German counterparts.<sup>44</sup> Maruyama observed that the Japanese wartime leaders, unlike the Nazi rulers, had no "sense of subjective responsibility" (*shutai-teki sekinin ishiki*), either, because the oligarchs, just like the soldiers, had felt empowered by the sovereign above them and considered themselves loyal subjects rather than the exercisers of ultimate power. Maruyama analyzed that while the Germans were realists who understood that politics was essentially immoral and brutal, the Japanese failed to realize this, completely confusing Machiavellianism and idealism.<sup>45</sup> Thus, for the establishment of a modern independent self, Maruyama suggested destroying the national polity since Meiji, and even the imperial household.<sup>46</sup>

Another leading Modernist was Kawashima Takeyoshi (1909-1992), also professor of law at the Imperial University of Tokyo like Maruyama. In his essay published in *Sekai* (June 1946), focusing on the Japanese family system, Kawashima similarly wrote how the "feudalistic" or "pre-modern" social structure had hampered the Japanese from becoming autonomous individuals.<sup>47</sup> Kawashima defined the democratic-modern social relationship as the one established upon "equal subjects" (*byōdō-naru shutaisha*) who could act on their own judgments

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 7-9.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 12-13. When it comes to Maruyama's pro-German view, Masao Miyoshi criticizes his blindness to European modernism, or faults of German rationalism. Miyoshi comments that although such an attitude was common among the elite in developing countries, it was "unusual" (*ijō*) that a man of such keen intellect like Maruyama was also unaware of problems of European modernity and content with finding irrationality in Japanese ultranationalism. See Masao Miyoshi, "Dare ga Ketteishi Dare ga Katatteirunoka: Sengo Nihon ni okeru Shutaisei to Seiyō" (Who Determines and Who Speaks: Subjectivity and the West in Postwar Japan), in *Sengo Nihon no Seishin-shi*, ed. Najita, Maeda, and Kamishima, 287.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 14-15.

<sup>47</sup> Kawashima Takeyoshi, "Nihon Shakai no Kazoku-teki Kōsei" (The Family-like Structure of Japanese Society), in *Gendai Nihon Shisō Taikēi 34: Kindaishugi* (An Anthology of Modern Japanese Thought vol. 34: Modernism), ed. Hidaka Rokurō (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1964), 236-249. According to the editorial note, this essay greatly influenced the trend of using such words as "feudalistic" and "pre-modern" in post-surrender Japan; see p.236. The essay was originally published in the June 1946 volume of *Sekai*; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi*, reel 178.

and recognize one another's individuality.<sup>48</sup> He concluded that in not conforming to this vision, the Japanese case was undemocratic or pre-modern, and found the key problem in the Japanese family structure, which he viewed as the epitome of Japanese social relations.

In his analysis, there were two types of the family system in Japan, that of the “feudalistic ruling class” (*hōken-teki shihai kaikyū*) and that of the “populace” (*minshū*). The family structure of the ruling elite was “Confucian”; it was hierarchical, and order was maintained by authority wielded by the patriarch and compliant obedience of the subordinates. In the Japanese elite family where only formalistic performance of duties to the patriarch mattered, equality, rights, and individuality, all what the modern Western family espoused, were completely missing.<sup>49</sup> In comparison, Kawashima characterized the commoner's family not as hierarchical but as cooperative and somewhat egalitarian. In the family of the farming class in which all the members had to be engaged in labor, authority hardly emanated from the patriarch, and each person held a semi-independent position. Yet, even this family type was neither democratic nor modern because “order” kept people from developing “rational self-reflection” (*gōri-teki jishu-teki hansei*); habitual practices of customs and moral ties born out of communal life created order and gave it an inviolable authority. Thus, in the commoner's family, too, people did not act as autonomous individuals and lived as part of the “object” (*kyakutai*).<sup>50</sup> Kawashima maintained that these were not simply the characteristics of the Japanese family relationship but permeated the whole society and therefore the demolition of the family would be required as the first step to complete structural change in the democratization of Japan.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 239-241.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 238-241, 243.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 241-244.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 248-249. Kawashima suggested changing the family law in the civil code and equalizing the classes by modernizing the land law and the relations of production, all he considered the foundations of the feudalistic-Confucian structure.

Among many others, sociologist Shimizu Ikutarō (1907-1988), writing in *Chūō Kōron* (Central Review; February 1946), also presented Modernist concerns about absence of autonomy, viewing it as a symptom of Japan's modernization since Meiji. Like Maruyama and Kawashima, Shimizu found "Japanese thinking and behaviors" (*Nihonjin no shii to kōi*) to be dictated by "customs" (*kanshū*) and "trends" (*ryūkō*), so they were illogical, habitual, and not autonomous.<sup>52</sup> By this "feudalistic human nature" (*hōken-teki ningen no honshitsu*), the Japanese had entered war, continued it, and been defeated, he asserted.<sup>53</sup> According to Shimizu, the problem originated in the underdevelopment of scientific thinking and knowledge. He explained that in the West, the progress of sciences had gone hand in hand with the establishment of the autonomous self; sciences developed out of criticism against "customs" and "trends," and scientific knowledge freed humans from tradition and nurtured the critical, autonomous mind.<sup>54</sup> In Japan, however, this had not occurred because the "militaristic-feudalistic force" (*gunji-teki hōken-teki seiryoku*) since Meiji had utilized new technology only to develop armaments and never promoted social sciences. Shimizu added that the remaining feudalistic mentality and system in Japanese society had also helped suppress the development of social sciences.<sup>55</sup>

Thus, the Modernists developed a sharp critique of the Meiji state and society rooted in their analysis of the lack of autonomy on the part of the Japanese and suggested it as a reason why Japan had drifted into war. Democratization meant creating a truly liberal civil society by destroying the Japanese political and social structures and making modern individuals out of the

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<sup>52</sup> Shimizu Ikutarō, "Jishusei no Kaifuku" (Regaining Autonomy), *Chūō Kōron* (February 1946): 9-10; there was no censorship for this issue, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi*, reel 26. *Chūō Kōron* was a leading magazine of Taishō Democracy; the magazine was suppressed in July 1944 and republished in January 1946; see "Saiken no Ji: Warera no Shihyō" (An Address of Reconstruction: Our Principles), *Chūō Kōron* (January 1946): 1. Along with *Kaizō* and *Sekai*, the magazine was under pre-censorship until censorship itself halted; see Okuizumi, ed., *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi Mokuroku Kaidai Shōwa 20-nen-24-nen*, 512-525.

<sup>53</sup> Shimizu, "Jishusei no Kaifuku," 9-10. Shimizu wrote that "Japan's defeat was a defeat in the strategic, political, and economic fields and yet, more fundamentally, a defeat of Japanese thinking and behaviors"; see p.9.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-12.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 12-13.

Japanese. Espousing subjectivity and individualism, their ideology actually conflicted with Marxist determinism and Communism, as later revealed in the so-called “subjectivity debate” (*shutaisei ronsō*) and in the communists’ attacks on the Modernists.<sup>56</sup> But their critical analyses of Japanese modernization and advocacy of radical democratization reforms were influenced by Marxist theory – especially Kōza-ha – and kept in step with socialists’ and communists’ political and social activities, forming the “progressive” camp together.

### **The Marxist Analyses of the Development of Modern Japan: Kōza-ha and Rōnō-ha**

Marxism was undeniably a powerful strand of thought in postwar Japanese public discourse. It did not only affect the Modernists’ analyses of Japanese modernity; late Meiji-Taishō socialists and communists got the chance to reappear on the political and intellectual stage with Japan’s defeat and the beginning of the Occupation. Among various politicians who began to prepare for organizing political parties as early as mid-August 1945 were socialists.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> The debate is in Shimizu Ikutarō et al., “Zadankai: Yuibutsushikan to Shutaisei” (A Forum on Materialism and Subjectivity), *Sekai* (February 1948): 13-43. The Japan Communist Party launched an attack against the “Modernists” in the August 1948 issue of its magazine *Zen’ei* (The Vanguard), differentiating them from Marxists; see Hidaka Rokurō, “Kaisetsu: Sengo no ‘Kindaishugi’” (A Commentary on Postwar Modernism), in *Gendai Nihon Shisō Taikei* 34, ed. Hidaka, 18-21; Hidaka Rokurō, “Kaisetsu: Sengo Shisō no Shuppatsu” (A Commentary on the Beginning of Postwar Thought), in *Sengo Nihon Shisō Taikei 1: Sengo Shisō no Shuppatsu* (An Anthology of Postwar Japanese Thought vol. 1: The Beginning of Postwar Thought), ed. Hidaka (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1968), 33-34. About the Modernists and subjectivity, see the works of Koschmann and Barshay.

<sup>57</sup> Hara, *Sengo-shi no Naka no Nihon Shakaitō*, 6-21; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 139-161; Shinobu, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 1*, 179-180, 186-189, 195-205; Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai, *Seitō Nenkan Shōwa 22-nen*, 4-14, 120-121, 145, 157, 193-194; Nihon Shakaitō 50-nen-shi Hensan Iinkai (Japan Socialist Party Fifty-Year History Editorial Committee), ed., *Nihon Shakaitō-shi* (A History of the Japan Socialist Party) (Tokyo: Shakai Minshutō Zenkoku Rengō, 1996), 59-72. Thinking to form a party with former proletarian party members, Hatoyama Ichirō contacted socialists such as Nishio Suehiro (1891-1981), Mizutani Chōzaburō, and Hirano Rikizō (1898-1981), the central figures in the creation of the Socialist Party. On the meeting, they agreed that they could not organize a political party together. But the soon-to-be Liberal Party consulted many people; Hatoyama met Marxist economists Ōuchi Hyōe (1888-1980), Arisawa Hiromi (1896-1988), and Minobe Ryōkichi (1904-1984) to discuss economic situations; Baba Tsunego, Abe Yoshishige, Arisawa, and socialists Mizutani, Kawakami Jōtarō (1889-1965), and Katayama Tetsu (1887-1978) participated in the free discussion meeting (*jiyū kondankai*); Iwanami Shigeo and Hasegawa Nyozeikan (1875-1969) were at least contacted for the gathering; Ishibashi Tanzan (1884-1974), another liberal journalist, Minobe Tatsukichi, and Kikuchi Hiroshi joined the Liberal Party. See Hara, *Sengo-shi no Naka no Nihon Shakaitō*, 13-14, 20-21; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 139-141; Shinobu, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 1*, 201; Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai, *Seitō Nenkan Shōwa 22-nen*, 6, 8, 121, 123; Nihon Shakaitō 50-nen-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Nihon Shakaitō-shi*, 59; Awaya Kentarō, ed., *Shiryō Nihon Gendai-shi 3: Haisen Chokugo no Seiji to Shakai 2* (Primary Sources for Modern Japanese History vol. 3: Politics and Society

Communists and other “political prisoners” who were released in October by the Occupation authorities followed them. When the Progressive Party (*Shinpotō*) was organized by former Minseitō (Constitutional Democratic Party)/ Greater Japan Political Association (*Dai-Nihon Seijikai*) members and the Liberal Party was formed under the leadership of former anti-militarist Seiyūkai (Friends of Constitutional Government Party) members, the Socialist Party (*Shakaitō*; JSP) was founded by combining three prewar socialist groups in November, and the communists founded its own party (*Kyōsantō*; JCP) in the following month.<sup>58</sup> The socialists and communists, as well as various Marxian intellectuals, occasionally voiced their opinions and wrote in national newspapers and general magazines. The theories of the two Marxist factions, Kōza-ha (Lectures faction) and Rōnō-ha (Labor-Farmer faction), were revived in post-surrender public discourse with the JSP, the JCP, and related intellectuals’ activities. The Kōza-ha and the Rōnō-ha were not only factions among scholars but also provided basic theoretical foundations for the political plans of the Socialist Party and the Communist Party.

The debate among Japanese Marxists traced back to the 1920s-1930s.<sup>59</sup> It was originally triggered by the Comintern’s 1927 Theses presented to the Japanese Communist Party. The Comintern’s analysis asserted that although the bourgeoisie had held hegemony, the Japanese state had been ruled by a “bloc of the capitalists and the landlords.” The Japanese

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immediately after the Defeat pt. 2) (Tokyo: Ōtsuki Shoten, 1981), 44-50, 53-56.

<sup>58</sup> The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association (*Yokusan Seijikai*) was reorganized into the Greater Japan Political Association in March 1945; about the Progressive Party and Liberal Party members, see Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 139, 144; Shinobu, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 I*, 16-18, 63-65, 200-205. About the JSP, rightist Shakai Minshūtō (Socialist People’s Party), centrist Nihon Rōnōtō (Japan Labor-Farmer Party), and leftist Nihon Musantō (Japan Proletarian Party; *Rōnō* group) formed the Party under the leadership of the first two; Hara, *Sengo-shi no Naka no Nihon Shakaitō*, 3-6; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 149-140; Shinobu, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 I*, 179.

<sup>59</sup> The Kōza-ha was led by Noro Eitarō (1900-1943), Yamada Moritarō (1897-1980), Hirano Yoshitarō (1897-1980), Hani Gorō (1901-1983), Hattori Shisō (1901-1956), and Ōtsuka Kin’nosuke (1892-1977). The Rōnō-ha included Yamakawa Hitoshi (1880-1958), Arahata Kanson (1887-1981), Inomata Tsunao (1889-1942), Ōmori Yoshitarō (1898-1940), Ōuchi Hyōe, Tsuchiya Takao (1886-1988), and Sakisaka Itsurō (1897-1985). About the membership in these two factions, see Germaine A. Houston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 37.

peculiarity was that the bourgeois class dominated the state “with all its feudal attributes and relics for the organization and protection of capitalist exploitation,” especially in the agrarian sector. Judging that Japan had not fully arrived in the bourgeois-democratic stage, the Comintern called for a “two-stage” revolution; the Japanese task for the moment was to bring about a bourgeois revolution, but after its realization, it should immediately shift to the struggle for a socialist revolution.<sup>60</sup>

At the time, the Comintern also criticized Yamakawa Hitoshi (1880-1958), a left-wing Meiji socialist closely working with the communists, for having abandoned the vanguard party concept and endorsed instead the organization of a proletarian mass party. Disliking the Comintern’s interference, Yamakawa separated himself from the Communist Party and published a magazine called *Rōnō*. The *Rōnō* group disagreed with the Comintern’s analysis and argued that the time had been ripe for a socialist revolution. The dispute over the development of Japanese capitalism thus began. But a wholesale arrest of Communist Party members made by the police in 1928 and 1929 destroyed the party and ended open debate between the communists and the *Rōnō*-group.<sup>61</sup>

The debate resumed in 1932-1933. Surviving the red purge, the Communist Party managed to rebuild its headquarters by 1931. The Comintern issued new Theses twice in 1931 and 1932; the second one was drafted with Japanese communists Katayama Sen (1859-1933) and Nosaka Sanzō (1892-1993). The 1932 Comintern Theses kept the 1927 Theses’ analysis of the expansion of Japanese capitalism in a semi-feudal society and two-stage revolution theory, but

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<sup>60</sup> Hijikata Kazuo, “Nihon-gata Fashizumu no Taitō to Teikō” (The Rise of Japanese Fascism and Resistance), in *Kindai Nihon Shakai Shisō-shi 2* (A History of Modern Japanese Social Thought vol. 2), ed. Furuta Hikaru, Sakuta Keiichi, and Ikimatsu Keizō, *Kindai Nihon Shisō-shi Taikēi 2* (An Anthology of Modern Japanese Intellectual History bk. 2), ed. Miyazawa Toshiyoshi and Ōkōchi Kazuo (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1971), 126-127; Hoston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan*, 35-36, 65-68, the quotes are from p.66 and p.67.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 127-128; *ibid.*, 36, 65, 68; Koyama Hirotake, *Sengo Nihon Kyōsantō-shi: Tō-nai Tōsō no Rekishi* (A History of the Postwar Japan Communist Party: A History of Intra-Party Struggle) (Tokyo: Kobushi Shobō, 2008), 14-15.

clarified the superstructural nature of the Japanese emperor system. The Comintern defined the “absolutist” Japanese emperor system as the main prop of the state. Its analysis had asserted that the emperor system “[had rested] on a parasitic feudal class mainly as a landlord, and on the other hand, also [stood] on a rapacious bourgeoisie that [had been becoming] wealthy rapidly.” Advanced from the 1927 Theses, the emperor system was linked to the “capitalist-landlord” bloc as the central force. Accordingly, the 1932 Theses set the overthrow of the emperor system as a slogan; along with it, the Comintern also called for the abolition of large landownership, the realization of the seven-hour work system, and the establishment of soviets to achieve a “bourgeois-democratic revolution with a tendency to change perforce into a socialist revolution.” These theories and slogans remained the Communist Party platform until the party was destroyed by continuing state repression in the mid-1930s.<sup>62</sup>

Meantime, Japanese Marxist scholars ventured to analyze the development of Japanese capitalism in comprehensive ways in 1931.<sup>63</sup> The result was the seven-volume work, *Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsu-shi Kōza* (Lectures on a History of the Development of Japanese Capitalism) that led to the origin of the name Kōza-ha. The study was published by Iwanami Shoten between 1932 and 1933, but the writing had started even before the issuance of the 1932 Theses. The subsequent debates on Japanese development had been richer than the Comintern’s analysis. As Germaine A. Hoston argues, “As the most complete and provocative interpretation of the Japanese state, they had a significant impact on the continued debate on Japanese

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<sup>62</sup> Hijikata, “Nihon-gata Fashizumu no Taitō to Teikō,” 128-131, 136-137; Hoston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan*, 36-37, 68-74, the quotes are from p.73.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 131-132; ibid., 41-42; Mōri Kenzō, “Fashizumu-ka ni okeru Nihon Shihonshugi Ronsō” (The Debate on Japanese Capitalism under Fascism), in *Kindai Nihon Keizai Shisō-shi* 2 (A History of Modern Japanese Economic Thought vol. 2), ed. Chō Yukio and Sumiya Kazuhiko, *Kindai Nihon Shisō-shi Taikai* 6 (An Anthology of Modern Japanese Intellectual History bk. 6), ed. Miyazawa Toshiyoshi and Ōkōchi Kazuo (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1971), 146.

capitalism that had begun with the '27 Theses.”<sup>64</sup> There were debates not only with the Rōnō-ha but also among the Kōza-ha. But the Kōza-ha theoreticians basically agreed with the Comintern that the Japanese state had been in the stage of semi-feudal absolutism under the emperor system; feudalistic rule had remained in the villages, and monopoly finance capital had developed on the basis of feudal remnants such as cottage industries, handicraft industries, and small-scale manufacturing.<sup>65</sup> The second phase of the debate between the two factions continued until 1937-1938, the time the state extended the crackdown on Marxists to the Rōnō-ha.

Many Kōza-ha scholars, except a few, did not become public intellectuals after 1945, but returning Japanese communists resumed political activities, following the lines of the Comintern's 1932 Theses.<sup>66</sup> The JCP platform set the immediate goal at “completing the bourgeois democratic revolution ongoing in our country in a peaceful and democratic means” and promised to develop Japanese society into a “social system more advanced than the capitalist system, in other words, a socialist system in which people [did] not exploit others,” afterward.<sup>67</sup> To achieve a bourgeois revolution, overthrowing the absolutist semi-feudal emperor system was unavoidable. In the statement “Appeal to the People” (*Jinmin ni Uttau*) published on October 10 on their release from prison, Tokuda Kyūichi (1894-1953), Shiga Yoshio (1901-1989), and other

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<sup>64</sup> Hoston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan*, 74; Hijikata agrees on the impact of the 1932 Theses on the debate on the development of Japanese capitalism, see “Nihon-gata Fashizumu no Taitō to Teikō,” 131.

<sup>65</sup> Hijikata, “Nihon-gata Fashizumu no Taitō to Teikō,” 132-133; Hoston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan*, Chapters 5-8; Mōri, “Fashizumu-ka ni okeru Nihon Shihonshugi Ronsō,” 131-171.

<sup>66</sup> I can find articles written by Hani Gorō, Hirano Yoshitarō, Hattori Shisō, and Shinobu Seizaburō mainly in *Kaizō* and *Chūō Kōron*, but the number is relatively small compared with the Rōnō-ha's essays; communist members such as Kamiyama Shigeo (1905-1974), Nakanishi Tsutomu (1910-1973), and Kazahaya Yasoji (1899-1989) contributed essays as often as these Kōza-ha scholars. The postwar debate about the development of Japanese capitalism slowly started in 1946 and fully developed in 1948 in other, more specialized journals; see Koyama Hirotake, ed., *Nihon Shihonshugi Ronsō-shi Ge: Sengo no Ronsō* (A History of the Debate on Japanese Capitalism vol. 2: The Postwar Debate) (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1963), 24, and a list of materials. About the fact that the JCP's policy followed the 1932 Theses, see Nihon Kyōsantō Chūō Inkaï (Japan Communist Party Central Committee), *Nihon Kyōsantō no 65-nen: 1922-1987 Jō* (Sixty-Five Years of the Japan Communist Party: 1922-1987 vol. 1) (Tokyo: Nihon Kyōsantō Chūō Inkaï Shuppankyoku, 1988), 101; Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai, *Seitō Nenkan Shōwa 22-nen*, 200-201.

<sup>67</sup> The party principles were agreed on at the convention held on December 1, 1945 for the first time after the end of the war; Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai, *Seitō Nenkan Shōwa 22-nen*, 194.

communists disparaged the emperor system as the source of all brutality at home and overseas and asserted that “[w]ithout eliminating this emperor system, or the combined body of the emperor and the imperial court, the military, the bureaucrats, the nobles, the parasitic landowners, and the monopoly capitalists, the people would not be democratically freed, neither would world peace be established.”<sup>68</sup> Thus, to communists, democratization of Japan meant a two-step process: completing the bourgeois revolution by getting rid of all feudal remnants and proceeding to a proletarian revolution.

The Rōnō-ha also took up socio-political activities after the end of the war. Rōnō-ha socialists such as Yamakawa Hitoshi, Arahata Kanson (1887-1981), Suzuki Mosaburō (1893-1970), and Sakisaka Itsurō (1897-1985) had been arrested in 1937 (the first Popular Front Incident; *Jinmin Sensen Jiken*). The American occupiers’ October 1945 order to release political prisoners annulled the accusation against them, too.<sup>69</sup> While Arahata, Suzuki, and Sakisaka became Socialist Party members or theoreticians, Yamakawa did not join the Party. Instead, he tried to form a “democratic popular front” (*minshu jinmin sensen*) to induce a proletarian revolution. Significantly, his call for the organization of a “democratic front” went together with the hugely celebrated return of Nosaka Sanzō from Yanan and the communists’ platform of making a “democratic united front”; these evoked in concert a large response from socialists, labor unions, the *Asahi* newspaper, as well as prewar liberal Ishibashi Tanzan (1884-1973) and longtime party politician Ozaki Yukio (1858-1954).<sup>70</sup> Although Yamakawa worked to mediate between the JSP and the JCP, his efforts bore no fruit.

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 206. This statement was written mainly by Tokuda; see Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 156-157. It was published in *Akahata* (The Red Flag), the JCP’s official newspaper, and 10,000 copies were distributed; see Nihon Kyōsantō Chūō Inkai, *Nihon Kyōsantō no 65-nen*, 99-100.

<sup>69</sup> Shinobu, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 I*, 186. The first roundup numbered over 400 people. The second Popular Front Incident (1938) targeted Rōnō-ha economists including Ōuchi and his disciples, Arisawa Hiromi, Wakimura Yoshitarō (1900-1997), and Minobe Ryōkichi. See Hein, *Reasonable Men, Powerful Words*, 64-69.

<sup>70</sup> Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 161-166; Shinobu, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 I*, 249-262.

Some Rōnō-ha economists who had been also rounded up in 1938 (the second Popular Front Incident) played an influential part in postwar Japan as public intellectuals and as government officials and economic advisors. Ōuchi Hyōe (1888-1980) and his disciples, Arisawa Hiromi (1896-1988), Wakimura Yoshitarō (1900-1997), Minobe Ryōkichi (1904-1984), and Takahashi Masao (1901-1995), vigorously published on Japan's economic situation and policies, especially in *Sekai*. They had connections not only with the JSP and labor unions but also with the Yoshida Shigeru (1878-1967) government and businesses. It is well known that Arisawa worked in the Coal Committee established by the Yoshida cabinet and formulated the “priority production system” (*keisha seisan hōshiki*); Ōuchi chaired the Statistics Commission, a new government body set up in the Prime Minister's Office; Minobe headed the Bureau of Statistics reorganized in the Premier's Office at Ōuchi's request; and Takahashi worked for SCAP's Division of Statistics and Research.<sup>71</sup>

We can find major points of the Rōnō-ha theory in Yamakawa Hitoshi's “Minshu Sensen no Tame ni” (For a Democratic Front) published in the February 1946 issue of *Kaizō*. He argued that even if it had not been a complete revolution, Japan had entered the stage of bourgeois democracy since the Meiji Restoration. He insisted that by then, the burgeoning bourgeois class had amassed wealth and power around new industries and weakened the samurai rule that had relied upon agricultural production. It was not accurate to call the Meiji Restoration a bourgeois revolution, however, for it was lower-rank samurai from the ruling class who had overthrown the Tokugawa government and taken political power from the old regime. The bourgeois class had still been politically and economically too immature to lead a revolution. But, the Rōnō-ha judged that despite remaining feudal elements, the transformation from feudal to bourgeois

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<sup>71</sup> About the Ōuchi group's relationship with the government and role in economic policies during the Occupation, see Hein, *Reasonable Men, Powerful Words*, Chapter 4.

society had been essentially completed during the Taishō period. Yamakawa argued that the Freedom and People's Rights Movement was the first progressive movement in which middle- and lower-class farmers and urban merchants had turned against the Meiji oligarchy. Although the establishment of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary politics in 1890 had tamed this revolutionary force, bourgeois parties had been born and grew since then. Bourgeois democracy had been established by the first half of the Taishō period when party politics and majority rule became the standard procedures of constitutional government, replacing oligarchic politics.<sup>72</sup>

In terms of capitalist development then, Yamakawa concluded that Japan had evolved to the stage of bourgeois society by the 1920s. Capitalism that had been nurtured under the tutelage of the bureaucracy since Meiji had fully developed through a series of wars overseas. “[Japanese capitalism],” Yamakawa asserted, “had already matured by the World War and entered the stage of imperialism corresponding with oligarchic rule of monopoly finance capital.”<sup>73</sup> Yamakawa continued to explain that since the mid-1920s, the bourgeoisie had turned “reactionary” (*handō-ka*) in response to the emergence of the proletariat. When political power shifted from parties to the combined forces of the rising military, the bureaucracy, and the zaibatsu during the 1930s, the bourgeoisie became increasingly fascist.<sup>74</sup> For the democratization of Japan after 1945, therefore, Yamakawa tried to ignite a socialist revolution by organizing working masses under all proletarian parties against a “bourgeois, reactionary force.”

The JSP, ruled by rightist and moderate socialists, took this Rōnō-ha's one-stage

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<sup>72</sup> Yamakawa Hitoshi, “Minshu Sensen no Tame ni” (For a Democratic Front), *Kaizō* (February 1946): 6-7; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi*, reel 87.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-10. About Yamakawa's and other Rōnō-ha Marxists' analysis of Japanese fascism made after the Manchurian Incident, see Hoston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan*, 261-262. It is clear that Yamakawa's essay published in 1946 kept the same analysis. The other Rōnō-ha scholars agreed with Yamakawa that fascism was a phenomenon in the stage of monopoly capitalism, but they, like prewar liberals, also explained why political parties got weakened before the powerful military and bureaucracy, attributing it to the underdevelopment of democratic institutions in Japan.

revolution thesis and set as its goal the realization of social democracy. In the announcement of its formation, the Party referred to war responsibility, reflecting liberals' and Marxists' condemnation of Japan's leadership. It asserted that "our country's politics and economy [had] been in the past left to the privileged few's whim at the sacrifice of the working popular masses." The privileged classes included the military cliques that, "using the independence of the prerogative of supreme command as a pretext, [had] hampered normal operations of constitutional government, or claimed to be the driving force of politics, and in the end committed a great crime, called the Great East Asia War, that [had] destroyed the Japanese nation-state"; the bureaucrats that "[had] exercised clumsy and unplanned control and unjustly impoverished the people's lives by colluding with the military"; and politicians that had made or cooperated with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. While holding these groups responsible for the war, the JSP found a structural cause in Japan's capitalist transformation. It argued that "[e]verything [had] been staged in capitalist institutions which constituted a violent, exploitative system of the zaibatsu capitalists that [had] leapt for war profits." The Socialist Party thus pledged to "wage a daring struggle with the remaining forces of the past (*kyū-jidai no zanzon seiryoku*)" to establish social democracy (*shakai minshushugi*). This politically meant to ensure people's freedom and reestablish parliamentary democracy and economically to stabilize national life by adopting socialist economic planning.<sup>75</sup>

Actually, the Rōnō-ha's theses and the Kōza-ha's resembled each other. Both had basically agreed that the Meiji Restoration had been an incomplete bourgeois revolution. Capitalism had grown under the Meiji state policy through wars, and amassed monopoly capital spurred Japanese militarism overseas further. These Marxists explained Japanese militarism in

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<sup>75</sup> Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai, *Seitō Nenkan Shōwa 22-nen*, 158.

the context of capitalist growth. Whether or not because Marxist theorists regarded militarism as intrinsic in the Japanese state structure and economic base, they seemed to see the military as a function of the absolutist state focused on the emperor or the grown bourgeoisie. Compared with Taishō liberals, thus, they showed little prior interest in delving into the role that the military had played or the direct causes of the rise of military government.

The fundamental difference between these two Marxist groups was the Kōza-ha's emphasis on "feudal remnants" that had kept Japanese society from growing into bourgeois democracy, the basis of the Kōza-ha Marxists' two-stage revolution theory. To the Kōza-ha, with the feudalistic emperor system, the Japanese state could not have been identified as bourgeois democracy. The Kōza-ha had also stressed the need for eliminating vestiges of feudalism in the rural sector, an inherent contradiction in Japanese capitalism. While acknowledging the imperfect nature of Japanese democracy, the Rōnō-ha, like Yamakawa, had more positively evaluated the development of parliamentary government as evidence that Japan had already entered the bourgeois stage. The Rōnō-ha had regarded the emperor system as a British-style "bourgeois monarchy," and not an absolutist imperial apparatus. In the Rōnō-ha Marxists' view, the economic base in the rural sector had not been semi-feudal but already capitalistic.<sup>76</sup> All of these elements had supported the Rōnō-ha's thesis that Japan would evolve into the socialist stage of history with the next revolution.

Post-surrender Japanese public discourse thus began with self-reflection upon, and criticism of, the recent past and the process of Japanese modernization since the Meiji Restoration. Among intersecting intellectual currents remained that of Taishō liberals; the Modernists and the Marxists, who developed more critical and theoretical reviews of modern

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<sup>76</sup> Hoston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan*, 183-184, 186-205, 224, 228-239.

Japanese developments, formed other strands of thought. Despite the differences in their analyses, these Japanese thinkers, whether influenced by Marxist theories or not, commonly believed in a progressive course of history, the incompleteness of Japanese modernization, and the necessity of democratizing Japan's political and social cultures. To achieve the goal of democratization, Taishō liberals had in mind advancing Taishō Democracy by mending the shortcomings of the Meiji state structure; the Modernists idealized a civil society composed of autonomous, responsible individuals freed from the feudal or pre-modern structure; Rōnō-ha/ socialists aimed at bringing Japanese society from the bourgeois to the socialist stage of history; and the Kōza-ha/ communists sought to complete a bourgeois revolution and to establish a people's republic. Although they did not necessarily share the same future vision, they thus all advocated postwar democratic reforms.

### **The Allied Occupation and American Role in Japan's Modernization**

Given such powerful intellectual and political currents for democratization, we now know that even without a foreign occupation, the Japanese could have "democratized" the country, even if the outcome would have been different from how it actually turned out. In reality, the Allied forces, composed mainly of Americans, placed Japan under control and ordered extensive democratization directives. Their programs were surely too radical or too conservative, depending on where you set the goal of democratization, but how did the Japanese look at the Occupation and the role of the Americans in Japanese democratization?

Marxists who had been in opposition to the state positively received Japan's defeat and the Allied Occupation. Like the Allies, they themselves saw the Second World War as a battle of democracy over fascism and militarism. Democracy was not simply the antithesis of authoritarianism. Led by Labor Party-ruled Britain, New Deal-America, and socialist Russia, the

Allies represented the modern democratic society that had been emerging from feudalism and bourgeois democracy toward socialism.<sup>77</sup> Although optimism about America's revisionist capitalism varied among Japanese communists and social democrats, the sweeping demilitarization and democratization directives of the Americans appeared, without a doubt, revolutionary to them.

Whether their reaction was genuine, naive, or politically calculated, the communists rejoiced at the beginning of the Allied Occupation. In "Appeal to the People," those released from prison first expressed "profound gratitude" (*shinjin no kansha*) that the "occupation of Japan by the Allied forces for the liberation of the world from fascism and militarism paved the way for democratic revolution in Japan," and announced their active support for it.<sup>78</sup> The communists welcomed the Allied forces, most of which were American, as a "liberation army" (*kaihō-gun*).<sup>79</sup> It was natural for those who had been imprisoned since 1928, such as Tokuda Kyūichi and Shiga Yoshio, to personally feel "liberated" by the Allies that had defeated the Axis and by the Americans who had ordered their release. SCAP's democratization policies, most of which went far beyond Japanese expectations, may have given enough reasons to make the communists believe in the Americans' goodwill, at least until SCAP's intervention in a general strike scheduled on February 1, 1947 burst such an illusion.

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<sup>77</sup> About this world view, see Suzuki Yasuzō, "Minshushugi to Shakaishugi: Gendai Nijjisseiki ni okeru Minshushugi no Hatten" (Democracy and Socialism: The Development of Democracy in Twentieth-Century Society), *Kaizō* (June 1946): 3-14; Ogura Hirokatsu, "Sekai Keizai to Minshushugi" (The World Economy and Democracy), *Sekai* (September 1946): 30-41; Taira Teizō, "Sekai Jōsei to Minshushugi: Shin-Minshushugi-ron" (The World Situation and Democracy: On New Democracy), *Kaizō* (February 1946): 15-24; there was no forced revision in these articles, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi*, reels 87 and 178. Ogura Hirokatsu (1902-1968) was a member of the Democratic Scientists' Association (Minshushugi Kagakusha Kyōkai, or Minka), a nation-wide organization found in January 1946 under the leadership of Marxist scholars and working closely with the JCP; see Kuno, Tsurumi, and Fujita, *Sengo Nihon no Shisō*, 50; Gayle, *Marxist History and Postwar Japanese Nationalism*, 41, 44, 131-134.

<sup>78</sup> Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai, *Seitō Nenkan Shōwa 22-nen*, 206.

<sup>79</sup> There were discussions among communists on the appropriateness of calling the Allied forces that included capitalist-imperialist countries a "liberation army." Masumi Jun'nosuke describes that the decision was made based on their naïve expectation that they could use the Allies for their ends and also on their misunderstanding of the relationship among the Allies; see Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 156-157.

But the communists' favorable attitude to the foreign occupiers was also related to the fact that they treated the Allies as a united democratic force and believed in the continuation of their friendship. On the establishment of the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) announced in late December 1945, the JCP commented that it proved that international cooperation was going well and the United States and the Soviet Union had no intent on starting war against each other; it even brushed aside the possibility of war between them only as the "wishful thinking" of "aggressive militarists."<sup>80</sup> As of October 1946, Shiga celebrated in *Kaizō* the "success" of the "democratic Allied countries led by the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union" in "beating up fascism and the group of militaristic-reactionary states, their common enemy."<sup>81</sup> He also expressed his strong faith in the Grand Alliance, stressing that America, Britain, and Russia had denounced the risk of war and tried to cooperate in establishing peace.<sup>82</sup> The Allies' demands for demilitarization and democratization seemed compatible with the communists' goal of achieving a two-stage revolution. The JCP thus pledged to fulfill the Potsdam Declaration and anticipated the Allied Occupation's giving "great impact on the completion of bourgeois democratic revolution."<sup>83</sup>

Rōnō-ha Marxist Yamakawa Hitoshi also acknowledged that the Allied forces were a powerful agent of the democratization of Japan. Yamakawa first apprehended that the occupation forces would impose military rule over Japan and suppress socialists and labor unions.<sup>84</sup> But unexpectedly radical democratization directives from the occupiers changed his

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<sup>80</sup> Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai, *Seitō Nenkan Shōwa 22-nen*, 207.

<sup>81</sup> Shiga Yoshio, "Mitamura Hihan ni Kotau" (Respond to Mitamura's Criticisms), *Kaizō* (October 1946): 50; there was not forced revision for the essay, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi*, reel 87.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>83</sup> Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai, *Seitō Nenkan Shōwa 22-nen*, 195, 207. At the party convention held on December 1, 1945, the JCP set the implementation of the Potsdam Declaration as a goal. In the statement released about the establishment of the Allied Council for Japan in the same month, the Party expressed its hope that the organization would greatly contribute to the completion of Japanese bourgeois revolution.

<sup>84</sup> Shinobu, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 I*, 178-179.

attitude by the end of 1945.<sup>85</sup> A promoter of a people's democratic revolution, Yamakawa appreciated SCAP's demilitarization orders which, he thought, inaugurated a revolution by destroying the ruling elite: SCAP "first disarmed the ruling class by dismantling the military and destroyed, or at least paralyzed, a part of the machinery of the old regime by abolishing the military police and the political secret police, dissolving reactionary organizations, and arresting political criminals." The purge of those deemed responsible for the war was more than welcomed. Yamakawa was pleased that it "gave a destructive blow" (*hakai-teki na ichigeki wo ataeta*) to the government.<sup>86</sup> The zaibatsu dissolution was similarly crucial to "[overturning] the economic and class basis of the ruling machinery."<sup>87</sup> He even applauded the removal of militarists, bureaucrats, and capitalists, asserting that "there [was] no doubt that [this was] essentially the process of a political revolution changing the locus of state power." Yamakawa's main dissatisfaction with the occupiers was that the purge of the old ruling class was not thorough enough. He understood the reasons for SCAP's decision to utilize the existing political structure, but this complaint also suggested that he perhaps relied on SCAP's authority to democratize Japan to a significant degree.<sup>88</sup>

However, these Marxists never depended solely on the Allies for Japanese democratization. They knew that a "revolution from above" was not sufficient and that they needed to lead a "revolution from below." Shiga Yoshio did not reject the role of external factors in promoting revolutionary changes at home. Just as Western pressures since Commodore Matthew Perry's visit to Edo had facilitated the dissolution of Tokugawa's feudal regime in the mid-nineteenth century, the Allies' democratization orders catalyzed the revolutionary process.

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<sup>85</sup> Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 161.

<sup>86</sup> Yamakawa, "Minshu Sensen no Tame ni," 6.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

Shiga did not think that democracy was given by Allied fiat; the Allies only supplied the conditions favorable to the establishment of democracy. What was important was that the Japanese people utilized the given circumstances and fought for democracy. Against the ridicule that the JCP got once aboard the democratization bandwagon, Shiga defended the communists; he stressed that they had fought against the imperialists since before the war and, by taking advantage of the opportunity given by the Americans, worked to organize a proletarian movement to lead a revolution.<sup>89</sup>

Yamakawa Hitoshi also believed that democratization required the rallying of native democratic forces. He certainly appreciated the Americans' breaking the power of the old ruling class and promoting democracy but was alarmed that the reactionary elements were not annihilated. Yamakawa claimed that these elements remained in the state apparatus, sabotaging democratization, and he warned somewhat prophetically that those purged from public would come back to turn the tide of democracy as soon as the Occupation forces left. To further democratization, he suggested forming a united democratic front led by the JSP and the JCP, also comprised of a wide range of popular organizations.<sup>90</sup>

The Modernists who developed a critical analysis of the modern Japanese state and culture also thought of Japan's defeat as an opportunity for revolutionary change. To Maruyama Masao, August 15, 1945 was the day when the "national polity, which [had] been the foundation of the entire structure of ultranationalism, lost its absoluteness and left its destiny to the people who finally became free subjects for the first time."<sup>91</sup> Shimizu Ikutarō also concluded that Japan's defeat was "never meaningless" because it clearly proved the "weakness (*muryoku*) of

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<sup>89</sup> Shiga, "Mitamura Hihan ni Kotau," 49-50.

<sup>90</sup> Yamakawa, "Minshu Sensen no Tame ni," 10-14; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 161-162.

<sup>91</sup> Maruyama, "Chōkokkashugi no Ronri to Shinri," 15.

the Japanese-style thought and behaviors.”<sup>92</sup>

Measuring Japanese modernity in comparison with the West’s and agreeing with the Allies that Japan should be democratized, however, the Modernists emphasized more than the Marxists that the Japanese themselves should realize the necessity of, and actively initiate, democratization reforms. Kawashima Takeyoshi insisted that democratization should be an action decided “internally” (*uchi kara*) rather than imposed “externally” (*soto kara*).<sup>93</sup> Believing that democratization required the establishment of autonomy, Shimizu warned that “[i]f the condition of autonomy was not met, ‘democracy’ would have to remain an empty word forever.”<sup>94</sup> Referring to the foreign occupation, he added, “Exactly since the state lost autonomy, it has become an urgent need that the individual people composing the state think and behave with well-acquired autonomy.”<sup>95</sup>

Others did not receive the Occupation forces as such an active revolutionary force. Those who interpreted the development of Japanese democracy since Meiji more positively than the Marxists and the Modernists thought that Japan could continue to democratize itself without external pressure. Nevertheless, they rationalized the Occupation as a “good influence” on modernization of Japan. As discussed before, prewar liberal Iwanami Shigeo believed that democratization was bringing Japan back to the “normal” course of its historical development since the Meiji Restoration and the Japanese needed to strive for it by recalling the principles of the Charter Oath. But comparing postwar Japan to Meiji Japan, he considered the Occupation a trigger of Japanese modernization just as the advent of Commodore Matthew Perry had been a century before. On the benefits of demilitarization and democratization, he commented: “if freed

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<sup>92</sup> Shimizu, “Jishusei no Kaifuku,” 9.

<sup>93</sup> Kawashima, “Nihon Shakai no Kazoku-teki Kōsei,” 248.

<sup>94</sup> Shimizu, “Jishusei no Kaifuku,” 11.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

from the military cliques' oppression and the bureaucrats' selfishness, the Japanese succeeded in constructing an ideal nation-state, General MacArthur would be thanked by our people forever."<sup>96</sup>

Shirakaba-ha (White Birch school) literary writer Nagayo Yoshirō (1888-1961) also believed that democratization was a universal historical course that Japan had followed. He even declared in the January 1946 issue of *Sekai*, "Once Japan lost in war, it would have automatically moved to nowhere else than that direction. Therefore, it was determined that Japan would have to become a democratic, liberal state."<sup>97</sup> Despite his belief that democratization could have started without an occupation, he still called it the "grace of Heaven" (*ten'yū*) that Japan came under America's tutelage. He said that in the past, the Japanese had learned from Europe, overlooking America, so it was quite fortunate that "fate [had] reached the Japanese to study and absorb American culture anew, which was completely opposite to Japanese culture." American culture equated to an increased emphasis on the importance of science. As commonly recognized by the Japanese, Nagayo believed that science had been underdeveloped in Japan and it was why Japan had been defeated. It was "necessary [for Japan] to adopt elements that it [lacked] for the health of the Japanese ethnic nation" (*minzoku no hoken*), Nagayo wrote.<sup>98</sup>

Similarly, Hasegawa Nyozeikan (1875-1969), a leading liberal journalist during Taishō Democracy, treated Japan's new circumstances as an opportunity to promote incomplete modernization of Japanese culture. In the December 1945 issue of *Bungei Shunjū*, he critically observed that the popular democracy craze in postwar Japan was false and shallow since other than a select few, the Japanese in general, including even intellectuals, had not understood

<sup>96</sup> Iwanami, "Sekai no Sōkan ni saishite," 191.

<sup>97</sup> Nagayo Yoshirō, "Kore koso Ten'yū" (This Is Providential Help), *Sekai* (January 1946): 107; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi*, reel 178.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 111-113; the quotes are from p.112 and p.113.

democracy or liberalism.<sup>99</sup> Warning the Japanese against abusing the terms, he emphasized that to reconstruct Japan as a liberal, democratic country, following the example of the men of Meiji, the Japanese should go to the United States, England, and France and humbly study their cultures, politics, and economies from scratch.<sup>100</sup>

A Marxian scholar who had been a member of the Shōwa Kenkyūkai and had worked for the South Manchurian Railway, Taira Teizō (1894-1978) more enthusiastically advocated democratization reforms by stressing the fact that the Japanese had pursued democracy for a long time and democratization was a universal phenomenon. He claimed that “[i]n the past, there [had] been once and again movements for democracy, a few-year long, a few-decade long, fierce movements sacrificing valuable blood,” so democratization directives from the Allies were far from unfamiliar.<sup>101</sup> They were surely an obligation to fulfill but a “kind of democracy that the Japanese should realize by themselves.”<sup>102</sup> Taira called democratization “what any progressive nation would desire and carry out of its own accord without being ordered from outside”; Japan was no exception. He thus tried to assure the Japanese that SCAP’s democratization programs were nothing to be feared; they were “only what many other countries [had] already reached and realized,” and so not as radical as they might look.<sup>103</sup>

Although he did not welcome the Allied powers as a revolutionary force, Taira positively accepted it. He thought that the Japanese now enjoyed equality and freedoms thanks to the Americans.<sup>104</sup> Besides, he believed in the general goodwill of the occupiers and the fairness of their policies toward Japan. He praised the Americans by stating clearly that “there

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<sup>99</sup> Hasegawa Nyozeikan, “Make ni Jōjiru” (Taking Advantage of the Defeat), *Bungei Shunjū* (December 1945): 3; there was no censorship for this issue, see *Senryō-gun Ken’etsu Zasshi*, reel 13.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 3-4.

<sup>101</sup> Taira, “Sekai Jōsei to Minshushugi,” 15.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 16-17.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

[was] no room to doubt what the United States that [had] won the war fighting for democracy [was] trying to do ... [was] a fair policy to achieve peace and prosperity of the world which a victor would rarely take.” He agreed with the Allied powers that Japan’s democratization was necessary for peace in Japan and in the world, too. He asserted, “If Japan wants to enjoy peace and prosperity as a member of the world, there is no other way but to realize democracy as its own problem, of its own accord, and on its own responsibility.”<sup>105</sup>

Although many acknowledged America’s critical role in Japan’s reconstruction, there were mixed attitudes toward the occupiers. Some held sanguine views about the Americans when the Occupation started. Shirakaba-ha writer and social activist Mushanokōji Saneatsu (1885-1976) insisted in *Sekai* (January 1946) that because the conditions given by the Allies were acceptable, Japan could stop fighting. Seeming to appreciate the generous offer, he wrote that “it was very fortunate that the enemy was the United States, a liberal country, and intended to be good friends with Japan.”<sup>106</sup> Old Christian socialist Abe Isoo (1865-1949) also expressed his faith in the Americans’ good nature regarding their occupying Japan. In the September 13, 1945 issue of the *Yomiuri Hōchi Shinbun*, Abe, an American-educated pioneer in Japanese socialism, stressed that he knew the Americans very well and described them as “very generous” (*hijō ni doryō ga hiroku*) and “rather overly nice” (*mushiro ohitoyoshi*). Unlike the Japanese, he added, the Americans were not devious and had the grace to admit their wrongdoing and therefore, “regarding their attitudes toward the Japanese, [he believed] that the Americans [would] not do so vicious things.”<sup>107</sup>

Not everyone was quite so optimistic about the Occupation. Old Liberal and Minister of

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 15-16.

<sup>106</sup> Mushanokōji Saneatsu, “Haisen to Jibun no Nozomu Sekai” (The Defeat and the World I Hope for), *Sekai* (January 1946): 103; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken’etsu Zasshi*, reel 178.

<sup>107</sup> Abe Isoo, “Atarashiki Nihon no Seiji” (New Japanese Politics), *Yomiuri Hōchi Shinbun*, September 13, 1945, 1.

Education Abe Yoshishige uttered his concerns about America's democratization of Japan.<sup>108</sup> He knew that by accepting the Potsdam Declaration, Japan had the duty to follow the Allies' orders, but worried if they would simply impose their political systems and cultural values on the Japanese. As to democratization, he stated, "Although reason and justice underlying the democratic spirit should be accepted," the Americans should "not try to reproduce American democracy as it [was] in Japan that [had] different history and tradition." He also feared that Americans would try to Christianize the Japanese; he pointed out that forcing Christianity, surely a minor religion in Japan, on the Japanese totally contradicted with the concept of religious freedom that the Americans endorsed. Related to this, Abe asked the occupiers not to infringe on the Japanese right to free speech, referring to the press censorship that had already begun in early September 1945. By comparing the United States with the Japanese military, he expressed his hope that unlike the Japanese, the Americans who claimed the guarantee on people's free discussion should act according to their word.<sup>109</sup>

Showing friendly feelings toward America, Nagayo, too, strongly opposed the United States' interfering too much with Japan. Like Abe, he was worried that the United States might be planning on the complete destruction of Japanese culture. Referring to the possibility that the Americans might "force democracy after entirely eradicating the Japanese character entangled in the marrow of the Japanese national polity deemed harmful to world peace," Nagayo called this "castration (*kyosei*) of the Japanese ethnic nation as a whole," which would result in national

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<sup>108</sup> In his welcoming speech to the American Education Mission given on March 8, 1946, while referring to the things to be greatly changed in Japanese education, Abe directly asked the Americans to respect Japanese tradition and not to impose their culture on Japan; Kaigo Tokiomi and Shimizu Ikutarō, eds., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi 5: Kyōiku Shakai* (Primary Sources for the History in the Twenty Years after 1945 vol. 5: Education and Society) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1966), 5-7, in the education section; originally in *Monbu Jihō* (Education Reports) no. 827.

<sup>109</sup> Abe, "Gougi to Shinjitsu to Chikei towō," 16-17; I interpret this part as his expression of doubt and hope, rather than belief and assurance, that the United States would not infringe Japanese freedom or ignore and destroy Japanese culture. As mentioned in footnote 17, ironically, there were a couple of places that the CCD considered nationalistic and critical of SCAP and erased.

ruin.<sup>110</sup> Believing that without the Allied forces, the Japanese could democratize the country by themselves in the way that the victors wanted, but avoiding radical measures that they might impose, he asked them to leave the task to the Japanese. “It will be hard for the Allied countries to imagine how much truly rational Japanese patriots have been angered at the delusion and tyranny of their own country and how strongly they feel the necessity to inflict considerable punishment on it,” Nagayo said. He stressed that it was no one else but the Japanese themselves who had endured absurd despotism (*geretsu sono mono no bōsei*), and even if they had been forbidden from attacking the state in public, they had never lost the critical spirit. He thus asked the Americans to trust in the “pacifist patriotism” (*heiwa-na aikoku-shin*) of the Japanese and to relax their command.<sup>111</sup>

Unlike Abe and Nagayo, who implicitly complained about the Allied Occupation of Japan, rightist socialist Morito Tatsuo (1888-1984) diplomatically, but explicitly, asked for the end of the Occupation. He stated that stripped of autonomy, Japan was standing in a “most humiliating” (*konoue-nai kutsujoku*) position. But he did not use the sense of mortification as the reason why the Occupation needed to be terminated.<sup>112</sup> He argued that the foreign occupation was counterproductive to the objectives of the Potsdam Declaration. As the Allies sought to make Japan pacifist, Morito advocated that Japan make a new start as a peaceful nation. However, he did not believe that the outsiders’ destroying Japanese military capability could transform Japan into a pacifist country. According to him, there were only two scenarios; losing their independent spirit and self-respect, the Japanese would become servile and fall into decay; or with their sense of pride hurt, Japanese nationalism would be reinforced, transforming

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<sup>110</sup> Nagayo, “Kore koso Ten’yū,” 108.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 107-109.

<sup>112</sup> Morito Tatsuo, “Heiwa Kokka no Kensetsu” (Construction of a Peaceful Nation), *Kaizō* (January 1946): 14; there was forced revision in this essay, judged as “critical of the US or the Occupation” and “referring to racism,” see *Senryō-gun Ken’etsu Zasshi*, reel 87.

Japan into an aggressive nation once again. In either case, Morito considered the Occupation self-defeating, hampering the realization of pacifism. Out of nationalistic and rational motives, he urged the Japanese government to appeal to the Allies to return autonomy to Japan.<sup>113</sup>

Thus, there were differences in the degrees of enthusiasm that the Japanese had in regard to the Allied Occupation and associated democratization programs. Those who were more influenced by Marxist-Leninism accepted the Allied powers, including the United States, which was, by their definition, a capitalist-imperialist country, as a revolutionary force. For Japanese Marxists, the American Occupation authorities clearly seemed to help promote the revolution that they had sought since the 1920s by dropping charges against them and allowing them to resume political activities and also by ordering sweeping democratization reforms. Taking the Allies' intervention as the great opportunity for furthering the modernization of the Japanese state and society, to make maximum use of it, Marxian and Marxist theorists sought to organize native democratic forces; it was an attempt to complement "revolution from above" with that "from below" to realize true revolution.

On the other hand, non-Marxists saw more of a crisis with Japan placed under foreign rule and forced to democratize. Democratization itself was not a problem. Like the Marxists, they shared a modernist view of history and believed that Japan had followed a progressive course since the Meiji Restoration and would continue to do so. They agreed with the principles in the Potsdam Declaration and understood their obligation to administer the provisions, too. Nevertheless, they believed that the Japanese should possess the initiative in democratization reforms and also take a gradual and cautious step in the matter. At the bottom was their view that the Occupation was after all disgraceful and undesirable and their positive appraisal of Japan's

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 4-6.

accumulated experience and achievements since Meiji. Their belief that the extent and pace of democratization programs should accommodate Japan's conditions made them skeptical of any radical attempt by the foreign occupiers or Japanese revolutionists.

## **Conclusion**

With Japan's defeat in war and the beginning of the Allied Occupation, various modernist thinkers, liberals, socialists, and communists, returned to participate in a growing public discourse. Rōnō-ha socialists, communists, and a younger generation of liberals called the Modernists contributed to radicalizing political discourse of the past, and the Occupation played a significant part in this shift, by ordering democratization programs that these groups would support, by purging the old leaders, and by supporting communists to counter an anticipated resistance from militarists and right-wing nationalists. The Occupation authorities thus promoted democratization in post-surrender Japan, but this was not simply rule by fiat; it was grounded on the native thought that Japanese political and intellectual leaders – returning and new – had developed, which combined with the Occupation to create a shared realization of the need for reform between occupier and occupied.

Of particular significance was that the Japanese themselves, finding the shortcomings of the Japanese state and society rooted exactly in its underdevelopment, and attributing them to Japanese militarism since the 1930s, pursued further modernization. For prewar liberals, the factors contributing to the demise of parliamentary government and the rise of militarism and myopic nationalism lay in weak legal guarantee of civilian control over the military and lack of self-control, rationality, and science – what modern nations had to have. Old-time liberals who thought that other than these, there was a great democratic tradition in Japan aimed to fix the problems and to normalize and upgrade Taishō Democracy. The Modernists and the Marxists, on

the other hand, identified the development since the Meiji Restoration basically as a default and looked for more fundamental changes. The Modernists, taking the Kōza-ha theory, judged Japan as still feudal or pre-modern and yet, unlike communists, envisioned Japan's becoming a bourgeois democratic society; they suggested breaking up the whole political and social structures and establishing a civil society composed of autonomous individuals. Socialists and communists sought for a socialist revolution of a different kind; while socialists tried to immediately achieve a socialist revolution and realize social democracy under monarchy, communists aimed to first sweep away all the feudal remnants – including the emperor system – and then embark on a proletarian revolution. Wherever they set their goals for democratization, the Japanese had a unilinear progressive view of history and, based on it, tried to make Japan “modern.”

Even if these politicians and intellectuals all agreed with the need for democratization, just as they had different visions for a new Japan, their responses to the Allied Occupation varied. The Potsdam Declaration's demilitarization and democratization order prepared the Japanese for what might come, but once the Occupation started, the speed and degree of democratization reforms demanded by the Americans surprised many Japanese, leaving some confused, and making some others exuberant. The more they were influenced by Marxist-Leninism, the more receptive they were to the external force in bringing about a revolution in Japan, taking it as an aid to the realization of their own political goals. This stance was clearly taken by the communists and leftist socialists like Yamakawa Hitoshi. The Modernists likewise welcomed the opportunities of democratization brought by Japan's defeat and the Occupation, but they stressed the importance of Japanese initiative in reform programs, as if to suggest their later debate with the communists over the issues of subjectivity and materialism. Taishō liberals

and moderate socialists were not against the Allied influence on Japan's modernization, but they observed with some trepidation changes imposed on the Japanese. As I showed, some of them, like Nagayo Yoshirō and Morito Tatsuo, could not help but express mild opposition to the humiliating reality that Japan was put under foreign occupation or at least the belief that democratization should be done by the Japanese themselves. Thus, even though the Japanese agreed that the Occupation marked a major turning point in modern Japanese history, they expected different degrees of foreign involvement in Japan's postwar democratization.

There were interesting parallels between Japanese and American thoughts. Taishō liberals' analyses of modern Japanese history and society and their ideas of democratization were almost identical to those of American Japan specialists, and the Modernists' and Marxists' to those of other Asia experts. Japanese prewar liberals and American Japan experts identified the political structure under the Meiji Constitution and the regulations of the armed forces as critical causes of the rise of military rule during the 1930s; they both affirmed general success of Japan's modernization since the Meiji Restoration and, while agreeing with the principles in the Potsdam accords, believed that the Japanese were capable of democratizing their country and therefore too much Allied intervention in Japan's domestic reform was unnecessary and inappropriate. Marxian and Marxist theoreticians stressed the incompleteness of the Meiji Revolution in bringing about bourgeois democracy and remaining Japanese feudal culture, and regarded them as the basic reasons why Japan slid into militarism and launched reckless overseas aggression in the 1930s. They – both Japanese and American – looked for Japan's complete transformation from a feudal to a democratic society and welcomed the Allied Occupation to for their own ends: for the Japanese, to utilize this historical event to achieve a democratic revolution; for Americans, to reengineer Japanese society so as to make it a non-threatening country to Asian-

Pacific security.

It was in such a mix of ideas and attitudes of various individuals and groups who sought Japan's reconstruction that the Allied Occupation commenced. Democratization reforms carried out during the Occupation not only developed from the victors' visions and goals, but were also born out of Japanese political and intellectual currents that intersected and conflicted with those in the Allies.

PART II

## CHAPTER 3

## REDEFINING THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY: AMERICAN THOUGHTS ON THE EMPEROR INSTITUTION

The Constitution of the Empire of Japan, often called the Meiji Constitution, was amended in 1946, formally by the emperor's prerogative, pursuant to constitutional rules, and the revised constitution was promulgated on November 3 and enacted six months later on May 3, 1947. In his memoirs, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas MacArthur writes that the revision of the Meiji Constitution was "probably the single most important accomplishment of the Occupation."<sup>1</sup> As he comments, it was definitely the most significant of all the reform programs in restructuring the legal framework of the political organization of the Japanese state.

The Meiji Constitution was written by the Meiji oligarchs on the model of the Prussian constitutional monarchy and officially established by the emperor in 1889 (enforced in 1890). Accordingly, the constitution invested the emperor with extensive political power. The "sacred and inviolable" emperor was proclaimed as the "head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty" and exercising them (Articles 3 and 4). The legitimacy of his governance was drawn from a "line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal" (Article 1).

The emperor's ruling power, stipulated in the very first chapter, included legislative power, supreme command of the armed forces, and the right to appoint officials. The Imperial Diet and the cabinet were the bodies that gave consent to and assisted the throne. Built upon this semi-absolutist system were more features which undermined the healthy function of parliamentary government. The Imperial Diet, consisting of two Houses, a House of Peers and a

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<sup>1</sup> Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 302.

House of Representatives, was far from representing the popular will. The Upper House, which was given equal power to the Lower House, was not an elected body but instead composed of the imperial family, the nobility, and others nominated by the emperor. Until universal male suffrage was established in 1925, the Lower House members represented the affluent class of landlords and industrialists. The cabinet's collective responsibility to the Imperial Diet was not explicitly declared, and civilian control over the military was critically weak; neither was the power of the prime minister over other ministers of state. Besides the legislature and the administration, there were advisory bodies to the emperor that complicated the decision-making process: the senior statesmen (*genrō*), the Privy Council (*sūmitsuin*), a group of former prime ministers and Privy Council chairs called the *jūshin*, and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal (*naidaijin*). Under the Meiji Constitution, civil rights, or the "Subjects'" rights, were guaranteed with restrictions and in reality often violated by the authorities.

The postwar constitution guaranteed more liberal laws. Three principles – popular sovereignty, the guarantee of fundamental human rights, and pacifism – formed the pillars of the new constitution. The emperor was transformed into the "symbol of the State and of the unity of the people" with whom sovereign power resided (Article 1). The other articles in Chapter I divested the emperor of political power and relegated him to the performance of ceremonial acts as designated by the Diet and the cabinet. Chapter II, composed only of Article 9, renounced "war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." Guarantees of the people's rights were extensively expanded in Chapter III, as the number of articles, which increased from fifteen to thirty-one, demonstrated, now including even gender equality and social rights. The Diet was made the "highest organ of state power" and the

“solo law-making organ of the state” (Article 41). With peerage abolished, the House of Peers was reorganized as the House of Councillors, composed of elected members. The supremacy of the House of Representatives was established with its prerogative to initiate and pass bills into law. The cabinet, composed of civilian officials (a majority of whom were to be chosen from Diet members), became responsible to the Diet. The power of the prime minister was strengthened over other ministers.

Both American and Japanese scholarship on constitutional revision has tended to focus on the politics of the American Occupation of Japan. Perhaps because they have been led by diplomatic, political, and legal scholars, some of whom were former government officials, they have centered on narrating the policymaking procedure. Based on archival documents, the existing literature recounts all the details of the intricate constitutional revision process, which involved various parties ranging from the Japanese government officials and the Diet to the General Headquarters (GHQ), Washington, and the Allies. In these studies, scholars have commonly stressed the Japanese government’s inept reluctance to amend the Meiji Constitution and GHQ’s swift action to make a liberal constitution and force it upon the Japanese government.

Historians have also pointed out the “revolutionary” nature of the GHQ constitution and at the same time its “conservatism” in preserving the emperor institution, critically relating it to the issue of “war responsibility” of Emperor Hirohito. Leftist critics refer to the fact that transformed by the new constitution from the sovereign and divine ruler into the symbolic, pacifist emperor, Hirohito remained as the reigning emperor until his death, without taking any responsibility – whether legal, political, or moral – for Japan’s war in the Asia-Pacific. We know that the main factor in the maintenance of the emperor institution and the retention of Hirohito on

the throne (at least during the Occupation period) was the United States and specifically SCAP, which directed the occupation of Japan. The American occupiers saved both the emperor institution and Hirohito not only by adopting a constitutional monarchy in the new constitution; they also decided not to arrest or try Hirohito as a war criminal in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East or force him to abdicate at any point during the Occupation.<sup>2</sup>

Rather than discussing the debates only among policymakers, this chapter examines American public discourse regarding the Japanese imperial institution and Emperor Hirohito. There were two options regarding the treatment of the emperor system – abolition or retention – suggested by the progressive group and by the conservative-anthropologist group respectively. I will first discuss their proposals in relation to their analyses of Japan’s political structure where they found the roots of 1930s Japanese militarism and to their visions for occupation goals. Then, by shedding light on the thought of Columbia University professor Hugh Borton and General

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<sup>2</sup> Takayanagi Kenzō, Ōtomo Ichirō, and Tanaka Hideo, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei: Rengōkoku Sōshireibu-gawa no Kiroku ni yoru 1: Genbun to Hon'yaku* (The Process of the Making of the Constitution of Japan: Based on GHQ Records vol. 1: Documents) (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1972); Takayanagi Kenzō, Ōtomo Ichirō, and Tanaka Hideo, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei: Rengōkoku Sōshireibu-gawa no Kiroku ni yoru 2: Kaisetsu* (The Process of the Making of the Constitution of Japan: Based on GHQ Records vol. 2: Comments) (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1972); Satō Tatsuo, *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seiritsu-shi 4 kan* (A History of the Making of the Constitution of Japan 4 vols.) (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1962, 1964, 1994) (I have not obtained these volumes); Theodore H. McNelly, “‘Induced Revolution’: The Policy and the Process of Constitutional Reform in Occupied Japan,” in *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*, ed. Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 76-106; Koseki Shōichi, *The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution*, ed. and trans. Ray A. Moore (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997); Nakamura Masanori, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the ‘Symbol Emperor System,’ 1931-1991*, trans. Herbert P. Bix, Jonathan Baker-Bates, and Derek Bowen (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992). Also see Iokibe Makoto, *Senryō-ki: Shushō-tachi no Shin-Nihon* (The Occupation Period: Prime Ministers’ New Japan) (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1997), 169-178, 199-226, 264-277; Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 89-106; John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 346-404; Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1989), 11-39, 54-60; Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: Perennial, 2001), 533-618; Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swan (New York: Continuum, 2002), 270-292; Masumi Jun’nosuke, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō* (Postwar Politics 1945-55 vol.1) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan, 1983), 76-130; Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu (Ministry of Finance, History of Finance Office), ed., *Shōwa Zaisei-shi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan: Amerika no tai-Nichi Senryō Seisaku* (A History of Finance of the Showa Period from the End of War to Peace vol. 3: American Occupation Policies for Japan) (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1976), 217-231.

Douglas MacArthur, who played the most influential roles in determining the framework of the GHQ draft constitution, I will illuminate the fact that the GHQ draft developed out of “conservative” plans for Japanese governmental reform. Finally, I will trace how and why American public views of the emperor system evolved through wartime to postwar years and show that American attitudes also ultimately followed the conservatives’ views rather than the progressives’. My study thus reveals that the conservative American experts’ modernization plan for Japan’s political structure prevailed in both state and public levels of political discussion.

### **American Experts’ Views toward the Emperor Institution in Pre-Meiji Japan**

American policymakers and intellectuals were in substantial agreement that the emperor had been a figurehead for centuries. As Frank Capra’s propaganda film *Know Your Enemy-Japan* explained, there had been no real power delegated to the emperor during the long period of samurai rule. Cabot Coville (1902-1987), a Japanese language officer and former American Embassy secretary in Japan, wrote that “[d]uring the long shogunate era, government [had] tended to center about military power and the emperorship so far [fallen] into desuetude that the incumbent, living in seclusion away from the seat of government and often in poverty, [had come] to embody little more than a religious significance, and that not an active one.”<sup>3</sup> Canadian Japanologist and diplomat E. H. Norman similarly presented the imperial family as a powerless entity during the Tokugawa period. He described the position of the imperial house as “sufficiently ‘harmless’ and non-political,” “relegated to the cloistered obscurity of Kyōto without any vestige of political power.”<sup>4</sup> The American understanding of the emperor’s position in the

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<sup>3</sup> Cabot Coville, “Status of the Japanese Emperor,” T-315, April 1943, 2, *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley A. Notter, 1939-1945* (Bethesda, MD: Congressional Information Service, 1987), microfiche. Coville’s biographical information is from Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 203-204.

<sup>4</sup> “The Future of Japan: A Canadian View,” *Pacific Affairs* 17, no. 2 (June 1944): 196; this was written in response to

pre-Meiji period can be summarized by the phrase which is commonly used to characterize the British monarchy: “the emperor reigned, but did not rule.”<sup>5</sup>

American assessments of the emperor system since Meiji, however, diverged in accordance with their analyses of modern Japanese history and society. While acknowledging that the modern imperial institution and emperor-worship were the creations of the Meiji oligarchs, Americans made different judgments about the role that the emperor and the emperor system had played in Japan’s political development.

### **The Emperor System as a Source of Militarism: Progressives Call for Abolition**

The progressives, like the Japanese Kōza-faction Marxists, defined the imperial institution as the cornerstone of Japanese authoritarianism and militarism. They argued that the Japanese emperor system had checked the development of liberalism and promoted aggression in prewar Japan. Andrew Roth, for instance, judged the emperor institution as the “most powerful political instrument of internal repression and external aggression developed in modern times.”<sup>6</sup> Similarly, John M. Maki called the emperor the “foundation on which internal authoritarianism and external aggression [had] been built.”<sup>7</sup> Believing that the imperial house entailed innate danger to democracy and peace, the progressives insisted that, along with the militarists, the capitalists, and the landlords, the emperor and his family also had to be overthrown after the war.

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T. A. Bisson’s essay, “The Price of Peace for Japan,” *Pacific Affairs* 17, no. 1 (March 1944): 5-25, The authorship of “The Future of Japan” was not clarified, but it has been believed to be Norman; see Kudō Miyoko, *Higeki no Gaikōkan: Hābāto Nōman no Shōgai* (A Tragic Diplomat: Life of Herbert Norman) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), 149-150.

<sup>5</sup> The expression, “the emperor reigns but does not rule/ govern,” can be found in Owen Lattimore, *Solution in Asia* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945), 31; Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), 324; Douglas Gilbert Haring, *Blood on the Rising Sun* (Philadelphia: Macrae Smith Company, 1943), 99.

<sup>6</sup> Andrew Roth, *Dilemma in Japan* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1946), 74; also on p.196, he said that “[the emperor system] [was] an obstacle to democracy, an incentive to war and an excuse for atrocities.” It is most likely that Roth’s view was influenced by Norman’s.

<sup>7</sup> John M. Maki, *Japanese Militarism: Its Cause and Cure* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), 245.

The most concrete argument was developed by E. H. Norman. He emphasized how the Japanese political leaders had used the emperor institution to propagate patriotism and to suppress opposition to the state. In one notorious historical event, dubbed the High Treason Incident of 1910-1911, a number of socialists and anarchists were arrested, indicted, and executed for allegedly plotting to assassinate the Meiji Emperor. As Norman explained, this was the government's attempt to stem the tide of the emerging leftist movements. The state authorities used the assassination plot as a pretext to round up radical activists as traitors.

Norman also cited another case, the murder of socialist activist Ōsugi Sakae (1885-1923) by military police. The fact that the newspapers praised the military police's act as patriotic and that the murderer got a light sentence led Norman to conclude that this event clearly "[showed] how the Emperor system [had] succeeded both in choking the voice of popular indignation and corrupting the standards of justice." The reason why the military policeman was praised for killing Ōsugi and absolved of a felony was exactly because he "had behind him the moral sanction deriving from the Emperor institutions (sic)." This incident illustrated the formidability of "Japanese Caesarism . . . both in the depths of its moral nihilism and its greater success in stifling public opinion."<sup>8</sup> These examples showed how state suppression was justified for the sake of the national polity (*kokutai*), i.e. the political and mental constitution of the Japanese nation-state headed by the emperor that had stifled the growth of democracy.

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<sup>8</sup> "The Future of Japan: A Canadian View," 197-198; the quotes are from p.198. Norman compared the Ōsugi case with a similar incident in Italy; according to Norman, unlike the Japanese military police who was given a light sentence and could go back to the post of a military officer, the Italian counterpart was, after once released, put back in prison by the government in response to popular criticisms and he never returned to public affairs. John W. Dower mentions the similarity between Norman's historical analysis of modern Japanese development and Maruyama Masao's thesis on the national polity (*kokutai*); John W. Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," in *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman*, ed. Dower (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 83. In this "The Future of Japan," we can see the real resemblance between Norman's view of the emperor system and Maruyama's. About Maruyama, see Chapter 2 in this dissertation.

The progressives thought that the emperor institution worked to visit violence on foreign nations as well. They asserted that imperial myths had given the Japanese a sense of racial superiority and armed them with the belief in a divine mission to rule the world.<sup>9</sup> Like the Ōsugi case, Norman also saw an absence of humanism and moral judgment in Japanese soldiers' brutality against enemies. Because the emperor was considered the determinant of ethical standards, the Japanese indulged in atrocities without a sense of guilt as long as they were done in the name of the emperor.<sup>10</sup> Andrew Roth likewise attributed Japanese emperor worship to the "bestial atrocities of the Pacific War" and called it the "ideal auxiliary to aggression" and the "religion of a ruthless militarism."<sup>11</sup> T. A. Bisson, another leading opinion leader of the progressive school, also defined the emperor institution as the source of a "morale of fanaticism [of] the Japanese troops."<sup>12</sup>

Viewing the emperor system as the linchpin of Japanese authoritarianism and militancy, the American progressives insisted on the abolition of the institution following Japan's defeat. They maintained that although it was the militarists, the bureaucrats, and the statesmen who had used the emperor system to execute state policies, the imperial institution in whatever form was

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<sup>9</sup> "The Future of Japan: A Canadian View," 200; Norman called the emperor institution as the "chosen instrument to indoctrinate the people with a racism as malignant as Nazism, with an unscientific tribal exclusiveness." Also see Roth, *Dilemma in Japan*, 196; "[t]he Emperor cult, or State Shinto, has persuaded the Japanese ... that they are a nation with a 'divine mission' to rule the world" and Bisson, "The Price of Peace for Japan," 18; "[the medieval ideology] has enabled the ruling trinity to implant the 'maser race' theory in the consciousness of the Japanese people, leading them to believe that they are divinely ordained to rule the world."

<sup>10</sup> "The Future of Japan: A Canadian View," 198-199; on p.200, Norman also wrote that the emperor institution had "[indoctrinated] the people ... with a contempt for human life whether Japanese or foreign, a contempt which [had] nothing in common with the qualities of courage or sacrifice since it [was] nourished by an inhuman and anti-social fanaticism." Norman contrasted the mentality of the Nazis with that of the Japanese. Unlike Maruyama, Norman found the psychology of the Nazis who committed atrocities and that of the Japanese alike.

<sup>11</sup> Roth, *Dilemma in Japan*, 81-82. Like Norman, Roth also said on p.82, "To the indoctrinated Japanese soldier all military duties are performed on behalf of the Emperor. Consequently the atrocity-committing soldier feels he has no personal responsibility and the most despicable act is ennobled because it is performed on behalf of the god-Emperor"; on p.196, Roth wrote that "[d]eath on the battlefield [was] acclaimed as the highest attainment, and the most bestial tortures [were] condoned, because both [were] done in the name of the Emperor."

<sup>12</sup> Bisson, "The Price of Peace for Japan," 18.

undesirable and, worse, obstructed the democratization of Japan. Here a question remains: why did the progressives not call for reform, instead of the overthrow of the emperor system?

Progressive opinion leaders had little faith in the possibility of liberal change of the emperor institution. E. H. Norman commented, “it is difficult to see how such a dehumanizing and barbarizing institution could even be converted by some act of political legerdemain into an instrument making for peace and humanistic enlightenment.”<sup>13</sup> He pessimistically predicted that “if [the Japanese people] [were] to remain saddled with the Emperor system and all its trappings it would seem almost impossible for them to make any progress along the path of freedom and political understanding. . . . They would only too readily relapse back into the morbid and sullen tribalism of their past, incapable of making an effort to become citizens of a nation which [was] prepared to live harmoniously amongst its neighbors.”<sup>14</sup>

Preference for radical reform was also influenced by the progressives’ mistrust of the “liberal” elements in the ruling political circles, including the emperor. They refused to separate the emperor or “civilian” officials from the “military” officers; rather, they found them all responsible for Japanese overseas aggression. Therefore, the progressives objected strongly to the opinion favoring reliance on the emperor and civilian leaders in the democratization of Japan. Stressing the inseparability of “civilian” and “military” spheres in the Japanese ruling oligarchy, an *Amerasia* writer argued: “[this approach] ignores the fact that every element in Japan’s ruling class favors a powerful autocratic regime; that there is no ‘liberal group’ willing to abandon the institution of an absolute, semi-divine monarch, able to demand unquestioning obedience from his

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<sup>13</sup> “The Future of Japan: A Canadian View,” 199.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 202-203.

subjects.”<sup>15</sup> T. A. Bisson likewise argued that since the “‘good’ members of the oligarchy [were] the natural allies and associates of the ‘evil’ militarists,” it was an unwise policy to use the emperor and his civilian advisors in the administration of a postwar Japan.<sup>16</sup>

The emperor was considered an undemocratic figure who had to go, not because he had been made the symbol of absolutism and chauvinism, but because he himself had been part of such national systems and policies. Bisson developed an abolitionist stance from a Japanese Kōza-ha Marxist perspective that the emperor himself embodied the triumvirate of the oligarchy – the landlord, the zaibatsu, and the military. He claimed that the “Emperor [united] in himself all the diverse aspects of the oligarchy. ... he [was] ... the biggest landlord, a leading member of the *Zaibatsu* (sic), the supreme head of the state and commander-in-chief of the army and navy.”<sup>17</sup> As Bisson envisioned the Japanese political structure as the “old landlord-*Zaibatsu*-militarist *cum* Emperor system,” the abolition of the imperial institution seemed as crucial as the destruction of the other ruling classes in the democratization of Japan.<sup>18</sup>

Norman referred more specifically to the emperor’s role in Japanese militarism. Regarding Emperor Hirohito’s attitude toward Japan’s war in China, Norman said that it was an “active and sympathetic interest rather than revulsion or even indifference,” suggesting that the emperor was potentially a war criminal.<sup>19</sup> He more clearly claimed that Emperor Hirohito “[could not] hope to escape some responsibility for the odious deeds and policies of his reign.” Whether

<sup>15</sup> “The ‘Peace-Loving’ Emperor of Japan,” *Amerasia* 8, no. 1 (January 7, 1944): 6-8; the quote is from p.7.

<sup>16</sup> T. A. Bisson, “Japan’s Strategy of Revival,” *The New Republic*, August 27, 1945, 242-244; the quote is from p.243.

<sup>17</sup> T. A. Bisson, “Making Japan Over,” *The New Republic*, May 28, 1945, 745; about the basis for his identification of the emperor as the “biggest landlord” and a “leading member of the *Zaibatsu*,” Bisson probably referred to the imperial property including land and stocks.

<sup>18</sup> T. A. Bisson, *America’s Far Eastern Policy* (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), 155. Similarly, Owen Lattimore depicted the emperor as the “ideological pillar of the feudal system” and “at the same time a main pillar of vested interest in the new, capitalistic structure”; see *Solution in Asia*, 40.

<sup>19</sup> “The Future of Japan: A Canadian View,” 199-200.

the modern Japanese emperors had been “puppets, partial puppets, or even active political participants,” Norman argued, the incumbent emperor had to take responsibility for the institution’s “[inability] to check the course of Japanese political and diplomatic degeneration.”<sup>20</sup>

The third reason for the progressives’ advocacy of the elimination of the imperial institution was their simple belief in Japan’s need for revolution, or a complete shift to a republican form of government. The progressives, who pressed for the democratization of Japan through the empowerment of the underprivileged masses and by removing all the ruling elites, would not have let the imperial house continue. Besides that, the imperial institution, whose origin and legitimacy were based on myths, was considered mystical or anti-modern. Bisson asserted, the “conditions of the modern world are not favorable to the maintenance of concepts such as those associated with the God-Emperor cult in Japan. In the world of modern industrialism and science such myths tend to wither and die.”<sup>21</sup> Owen Lattimore similarly expressed his modernist ideology that “[b]elief in things like imperial divinity [had] no natural place in an age of chemistry, plastics, electronics, and stratosphere navigation.”<sup>22</sup> The timeless existence of the mystical emperor institution carrying on the tenets of ancient mythology should be ideally discontinued when Japan was being transformed into a truly modern democratic nation.

Thus, believing that the retention of the emperor system would do nothing less than harm to the ultimate objective of democratization, the progressives demanded abolishing it. They developed a holistic strategy, measures to discredit and eradicate all the past practices, beliefs, and memories related to the imperial institution. A critical step was to punish the present emperor.

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 200. Hallet Abend also mentioned Emperor Hirohito’s connivance at atrocities and his war guilt; see Abend, *Pacific Charter: Our Destiny in Asia* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1943), 36-42.

<sup>21</sup> Bisson, “The Price of Peace for Japan,” 20.

<sup>22</sup> Lattimore, *Solution in Asia*, 188.

The progressives suggested dethroning Emperor Hirohito and then interning him with his family, or trying him as a war criminal.<sup>23</sup> Additionally, they proposed that State Shinto should be banned, and all the imperial myths disproved. Furthermore, T. A. Bisson recommended the replacement of the Meiji Constitution with a new one in order to eliminate the rationale for imperial rule and to promote democracy. He argued that the emperor's divine status articulated in the constitution and the notion of the constitution being a "gift" from the emperor inherently contradicted the principles of democracy.<sup>24</sup> Andrew Roth made the further suggestion of using education and propaganda and strengthening leftist groups in order to undermine the emperor system.<sup>25</sup> The progressives' stance was that if the Japanese spontaneously decided to remove the imperial institution, the Allies should endorse it; if not, their intervention, direct or indirect, could be justified. Bisson clearly stated that "[i]f the Japanese [turned] against the Emperor and [dethroned] him, the act should be applauded and supported. If they [did] not, the act must be done for them as soon as their acquiescence [could] be reasonably taken for granted."<sup>26</sup>

## **The Emperor System as a Liberal Pacifist Force: Conservatives and Anthropologists**

### **Demand Retention**

Unlike these progressive commentators, the conservatives and the anthropologists

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<sup>23</sup> Bisson, "The Price of Peace for Japan," 19; "Japan's Strategy of Revival," 242; Roth, *Dilemma in Japan*, 85-87, 197; Lattimore, *Solution in Asia*, 189; Abend, *Pacific Charter*, 34, 36-37, 39-42; Maki, *Japanese Militarism*, 247-248; William C. Johnstone, *The Future of Japan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 97-98. Bisson and Roth recommended trying Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal. Abend also thought that the incumbent throne should be deposed as a war criminal, but he did not necessarily call for the abolition of the imperial institution itself. Maki opposed the execution of the emperor and his family in order not to fuel a nationalist movement. Bisson took an abolitionist stance, but in "Making Japan Over," he suggested that if the emperor was to be retained, he should be made a "genuinely constitutional monarch"; see p.746. Likewise, while clearly preferring the destruction of the imperial institution, Maki demanded "at least its reduction to a relatively harmless position" and the demythicization of the emperor.

<sup>24</sup> Bisson, "What Program for Japan?," *The Nation*, July 14, 1945, 29. In "Making Japan Over," Bisson mentioned the necessity for a new democratic constitution in a way to turn the absolutist emperor to a truly constitutional monarch; see footnote 23.

<sup>25</sup> Roth, *Dilemma in Japan*, 87-88, 196-197.

<sup>26</sup> Bisson, "The Price of Peace for Japan," 19.

retained their view that the emperor had remained divine and essentially powerless, and his status as a nominal ruler had been used by the real power-holders even after the Meiji Restoration. They found the causes of the dysfunction of democratic government and the subsequent rise of the military in the 1930s in the Japanese political structure itself, and they focused on reforming it so that normal functions of a constitutional monarchy would be established. Also taking Japanese loyalty to the emperor into consideration, the conservatives and the anthropologists opposed the abolition of the emperor institution per se.

Unlike the progressive group, they did not consider the imperial institution as the root cause of Japanese aggression. Joseph W. Ballantine (1888-1960), a former counselor at the Tokyo Embassy, said positively that he did “not believe that Japanese militarism [had] its roots in the emperor or any other single institution” and “[i]t [was] probable that even if there had been no emperor institution Japanese militarism would not have been essentially affected.”<sup>27</sup>

Anthropologist John F. Embree agreed and asserted that the “existence or nonexistence of an Emperor in Japan [had] little to do with the basic causes of Japanese foreign policy.”<sup>28</sup>

These critics believed that the emperor institution had been simply used by the oligarchs. Hugh Borton, a Columbia University professor of Japanese history who was a key member of the State Department’s policy drafting group for postwar Japan, explained that the emperorship had been merely the “instrument of the Japanese military in the achievement of their aims.”<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Joseph W. Ballantine, “Japan: Institution of the Emperor: Statement Read by Mr. Ballantine at the Meeting of the Committee on Post-War Programs, April 26, 1944,” PWC-145, April 26, 1944, 5, 3, *State Department Documents of the Post-War Programs Committees, 1944*, T1222, vol. 2, NA, microfilm. Ballantine’s biographical information is from Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 203; Iokibe Makoto, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku: Sengo Nihon no Sekkeizu: Jō* (United States Occupation Policies for Japan: A Design for a Postwar Japan vol. 1) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1985), 258-259.

<sup>28</sup> John F. Embree, *The Japanese Nation: A Social Survey* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1945), 261.

<sup>29</sup> “Japan: Political Problems: Institution of the Emperor,” CAC-93/PWC-116, March 21, 1944, 1, *State Department Documents of the Post-War Programs Committees, 1944*, T1222, vol. 2, NA, microfilm. Besides Hugh Borton, Earle

Ballantine similarly stressed how the institution had been used as a tool of the military bureaucracy to forward their policies of aggression and rebutted the progressives' abolitionist argument as ahistorical.<sup>30</sup> Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew concurred and likewise defended the emperor institution by explaining that it “[had] quite simply been used as a convenient façade to justify and to consecrate [the cult of manifest destiny and of military aggression] in the eyes of the people.”<sup>31</sup>

Thus, the conservatives and the anthropologists were in basic agreement that, despite all the power vested in him by the Meiji Constitution, the emperor was in practice far from an absolute monarch: he was really just a nominal ruler – a figurehead. They emphasized that the emperor did not directly exercise his prerogatives; he followed the decisions of his advisors.<sup>32</sup>

British journalist Hugh Byas viewed the emperor as a “figurehead,” who was “all powerful, but an automaton in the hands of his servants.”<sup>33</sup> He wrote that the “Japanese Emperor [was] clothed with supreme power but forbidden to use it. He [did] not govern. He [was] a dictator who [could

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R. Dickover, a foreign service officer who had been assigned to Tokyo, and Eugene H. Dooman (1890-1969), former ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew's deputy official in Tokyo, were also drafting members of this document. But Borton was the chief drafter; see Iokibe Makoto, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku: Sengo Nihon no Sekkeizu: Ge* (United States Occupation Policies for Japan: A Design for a Postwar Japan vol. 2) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1985), 41-44.

<sup>30</sup> Ballantine, “Japan: Institution of the Emperor,” PWC-145, 2-3.

<sup>31</sup> Joseph C. Grew, “Japan: The Institution of the Emperor: Statement Read by Mr. Grew at the Meeting of the Committee on Post-War Programs, April 26, 1944,” PWC-146, April 26, 1944, 4, *State Department Documents of the Post-War Programs Committees, 1944*, T1222, vol. 2, NA, microfilm.

<sup>32</sup> About the view that the emperor was a politically weak figurehead, see Coville, “Status of the Japanese Emperor,” T-315, 2-3; Hugh Borton, *Japan since 1931: Its Political and Social Developments* (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), 4-5; Byas, *Government by Assassination*, 12, 17, 302, 321, 324-325; Hugh Byas, *The Japanese Enemy: His Power and His Vulnerability* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), viii, 41-42; Embree, *The Japanese Nation*, 20-21, 59, 66, 261; Haring, *Blood on the Rising Sun*, 99; Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, with a new foreword by Ian Buruma (New York: First Mariner Books, 2005), 29, 117, 125.

<sup>33</sup> Byas, *Government by Assassination*, 17. Byas's concept of the “figurehead government,” which meant that in the Japanese government, the political center was formally set in the emperor but actually diffused among various groups and individuals vying for power, was shared by Coville; Coville analyzed that this had caused “confusion and dangerous deferment of decision in the matter of where control of power should lie”; see “Status of the Japanese Emperor,” T-315, 2-3; the quote is from p.3.

not] dictate but [could] only register the decrees of others.”<sup>34</sup> Byas called the modern Japanese emperor specifically a “British-style monarch” who “[reigned] but [did] not govern.”<sup>35</sup> A diplomatic historian at the University of Buffalo, Julius W. Pratt (1888-1983), also observed that the “powers exercised personally by the Emperor [had] borne no resemblance whatever to those of a Hitler or a Stalin. They [had] fallen far short of those of a President of the United States and [had] probably not exceeded those of a King of England.”<sup>36</sup> The conservative group thus believed that the emperor’s traditional position in politics and society had not fundamentally changed and, like in the past several centuries, he was a divine but politically powerless head of state.

Accordingly, the conservatives and the anthropologists set forth the idea that the modern Japanese emperor was the “symbol of national unity.” The word “symbol” was universally used, by both the progressives and the conservatives, for the pre-modern and the modern emperor. As a synonym of figurehead, it referred to the pre-Meiji emperor as a sacred symbol or the symbol of authority of the actual rulers. The post-Tokugawa emperor was rendered as the symbol of national unity, morality, and strength. In the eyes of the progressives, however, who associated the imperial system with Japan’s imperialist course, the emperor institution also became the “dangerous symbol of the Japanese chauvinism that [had] brought death and suffering to millions of non-Japanese, and which [had] led the Japanese themselves to the most dangerous position they, as a people, [had] ever known.”<sup>37</sup> On the other hand, the conservatives and the

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<sup>34</sup> Byas, *The Japanese Enemy*, 42.

<sup>35</sup> Byas, *Government by Assassination*, 321, 324.

<sup>36</sup> Julius W. Pratt, “The Treatment of the Japanese Emperor: Prepared by Julius W. Pratt (For the Council on Foreign Relations), PWC-147, April 4, 1944, 7, *State Department Documents of the Post-War Programs Committees, 1944*, T1222, vol. 2, NA, microfilm. Pratt’s biographical information is from Iokibe, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku: Ge*, 64.

<sup>37</sup> Maki, *Japanese Militarism*, 122. William C. Johnstone alluded to Japanese nationalism built around the imperial myths and depicted the emperor as the “symbol of the country’s ‘uniqueness’ and its ‘greatness’ as a nation”; see Johnstone, *The Future of Japan*, 85.

anthropologists, who still viewed the imperial house as a mere puppet of the oligarchs, dissociated the emperor from Japanese militarism and claimed that he was just a symbol of Japanese unity.<sup>38</sup> This meant that for them, the emperor's status as the sovereign was a matter of formality, and he was a nominal head of the Japanese constitutional monarchy, however dysfunctional it might have been.

The conservatives' view of Emperor Hirohito could be contrasted with the progressives', too. Although the progressives were eager to designate the present emperor as a war criminal who had, with the militarists, brought about wars of aggression, the conservatives considered him as a pacifist liberal who, like other moderate and liberal members of the government and big businesses, was powerless in the end to check the military's actions. As a titular ruler, Emperor Hirohito had not overtly expressed his opposition to war, but he had preferred peace.<sup>39</sup> The conservatives even claimed that the emperor did not look for war in the Pacific, either. Hugh Byas wrote that “[i]t [was] fair guess that [the emperor] [had been] one of the most miserable men in Asia on the night of December 7,” suggesting Hirohito's dislike for war and his powerlessness<sup>40</sup> In his public speech given at the very end of December 1943, Joseph C. Grew also informed the American audience that “many of the highest statesmen of Japan, including the Emperor himself, [had been] laboring earnestly but futilely to control the military in order to avoid war with the United States and Great Britain.”<sup>41</sup> America's Japan policy-planning group naturally shared this

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<sup>38</sup> As to the use of the phrase, the “symbol of national unity,” and similar variations, see Borton, *Japan since 1931*, 5; Coville, “Status of the Japanese Emperor,” T-315, 8; Byas, *Government by Assassination*, 320, 324; Wilfrid Fleisher, *What to Do with Japan* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1945), 15, 23; Pratt, “The Treatment of the Japanese Emperor,” PWC-147, 3; Embree, *The Japanese Nation*, 64, 110, 175, 261; Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, 33, 128-129.

<sup>39</sup> Coville, “Status of the Japanese Emperor,” T-315, 3; Byas, *The Japanese Enemy*, 46-49, 68; Fleisher, *What to Do with Japan*, 17-22.

<sup>40</sup> Byas, *The Japanese Enemy*, 49.

<sup>41</sup> Joseph C. Grew, “Address: War and Post-War Problems in the Far East,” *Department of State Bulletin* 10, no. 8

stance: Cabot Coville indicated that the emperor had tried to prevent Japan's entry into war with the United States; by citing from Byas and Sir George Sansom, a noted British historian of Japan and diplomat, Julius W. Pratt absolved the emperor of responsibility for the present war.<sup>42</sup>

Based on these views, the conservative group made different recommendations from the progressive group in regards to the treatment of the emperor institution in postwar Japan: retaining, rather than abolishing, it. Not only the historical and cultural understanding but pragmatism motivated the conservatives and the anthropologists to take an anti-republican option. They were very aware of the importance of maintaining stability and order during foreign occupation of Japan, and certain that the emperor system could work as a stabilization force. Joseph W. Ballantine pointed out the fundamental contradiction that the occupation authorities, in charge of the task of administering Japan, would at the same time encourage revolts. He clearly stated, "We take it as axiomatic that the military authorities will not permit social upheavals and revolutions during the period of military government." When a shortage of Allied personnel in the occupation government was considered, chaos and disorder must be undesirable.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, Ballantine argued that a radical policy would be counter-effective to the ultimate objective of the Allied occupation of Japan to make Japan a democratic and peaceful nation. He emphasized that it was unlikely that "such disorders would hasten the bringing about of conditions which would promote the security of the United States and permit the eventual withdrawal of the occupation forces."<sup>44</sup>

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(January 1, 1944): 11. This was a speech given to the Illinois Education Association in Chicago on December 29, 1943. To the State Department's Postwar Programs Committee (PWC) members, too, Grew made the same point that Hirohito had opposed war with the United States; see Grew, "Japan: The Institution of the Emperor," PWC-146, 1.

<sup>42</sup> Coville, "Status of the Japanese Emperor," T-315, 8; Pratt, "The Treatment of the Japanese Emperor," PWC-147, 7-8.

<sup>43</sup> Ballantine, "Japan: Institution of the Emperor," PWC-145, 4.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

For the successful operations of Allied military government, thus, the conservatives demanded the maintenance of the imperial institution. The first technical issue that occupation personnel would encounter, due to their small numbers, was to secure the cooperation of Japanese government officials. In his policy draft regarding the imperial institution, Hugh Borton opposed virtual termination of the emperor system by occupation authorities because it would possibly make it difficult to gain support from Japanese personnel. He explained that the deposition of the throne would not give Japanese functionaries the incentive to serve under foreign rulers and that “[i]f such a situation developed, it might cause a breakdown in the entire administrative structure.”<sup>45</sup> Both Ballantine and Joseph C. Grew followed Borton’s argument and gave full support for his recommendation not to remove the emperor institution.<sup>46</sup> Particularly Grew repeatedly stressed how valuable the throne would be for the Allies’ purposes. As the emperor had been used very effectively to mobilize the Japanese for war efforts, Grew “[said], without qualification, that the Emperor [could] be used equally well – indeed far more easily – as a façade to justify and to consecrate ... a new order of peaceful international cooperation.”<sup>47</sup> Grew was quite confident that the “Throne [could] and [would] become a powerful asset,” rather than a liability.<sup>48</sup>

The conservatives were also reluctant to overthrow the emperor system because they did not think that the Japanese would acquiesce in such a drastic demand. They anticipated that the Japanese people would remain loyal to the throne even after Japan’s defeat in war. Hugh Borton predicted, very accurately, that the Japanese would probably not regard Japan’s defeat as the

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<sup>45</sup> “Japan: Political Problems: Institution of the Emperor,” CAC-93/ PWC-116, 2-3; the quote is from p.3.

<sup>46</sup> Ballantine, “Japan: Institution of the Emperor,” PWC-145, 4; Grew, “Japan: The Institution of the Emperor,” PWC-146, 3.

<sup>47</sup> Grew, “Japan: The Institution of the Emperor,” PWC-146, 4-5; the quote is from p.5.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

emperor's responsibility.<sup>49</sup> Wilfrid Fleisher (1897-1976), *New York Herald Tribune's* Tokyo correspondent and managing editor of *Japan Advertiser*, also said that "even in the humiliation of a crushing defeat the Japanese [would] not turn against the Imperial throne but [might] seek to avenge the shame brought upon the throne and the blot upon their history by rising against the war lords who [had] led them into this adventure."<sup>50</sup> Moreover, Fleisher speculated that even if a revolution occurred, the Japanese would preserve the emperor system as well.<sup>51</sup> Julius W. Pratt similarly argued that the past Japanese political and social movements did not indicate that their leaders would seek the establishment of a republican form of government.<sup>52</sup> Daniel C. Holtom (1884-1962), a missionary and professor who had lived in Japan and became an authority on the Shinto faith, warned that the attempt to eliminate the imperial institution would alienate the Japanese from occupiers. He wrote that "[v]iolation of [Japanese love and loyalty to the emperor] would make Japan a smouldering volcano of resentment and intrigue," and asserted, "[i]t would be folly indeed if in our zeal to tear out of Japan the things in her that make for war we tore out the things that make for peace."<sup>53</sup> Considering the Japanese people's favorable attitudes toward the throne, the conservative camp thus emphasized how ineffective and impractical a forced abolition of the emperorship would be.

Some applied one of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, self-determination, to the Japanese, as a reason to oppose the elimination of the emperor system. Cabot Coville advocated

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<sup>49</sup> Hugh Borton, "Japan: Postwar Political Problems," T-381, October 6, 1943, 5, *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning*, microfiche.

<sup>50</sup> Fleisher, *What to Do with Japan*, 16.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 16-17.

<sup>52</sup> Pratt, "The Treatment of the Japanese Emperor," PWC-147, 5.

<sup>53</sup> Daniel C. Holtom, "Shinto in the Postwar World," *Far Eastern Survey* 14, no. 3 (February 14, 1945): 30. Holtom's biographical information is on p.29; also from the Online Archive of California, "Guide to the Daniel Clarence Holtom Papers," <http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt1s2023xp/>.

the continuation of the emperorship because he thought that given a choice, the Japanese would certainly choose a form of monarchy rather than republicanism.<sup>54</sup> Hugh Borton agreed and also suggested that unless the Japanese demanded a complete break from the past, the United States should not support the abolition of the monarchy which the progressives called for.<sup>55</sup> Joseph W. Ballantine similarly expressed his conviction that “permanent change – whether reform or elimination of the institution – must for the most part be a development coming from the will of the Japanese themselves and not from force imposed from the outside.”<sup>56</sup>

Thus, the conservatives favored retaining the throne while occupying Japan. Hugh Borton’s policy drafts, which became a major source of US post-surrender policies for Japan, recommended placing the emperor and his family under protective custody but suspending only some of the powers of the emperor. “This procedure,” Borton contended, “without impairing the essential authority of the theater commander, should keep in office the maximum number of Japanese officials who would be willing to serve directly under the supervision of civil affairs officers.”<sup>57</sup> This policy also meant excluding Emperor Hirohito from a list of war criminals.<sup>58</sup> Julius W. Pratt also championed this position and claimed that the emperor was “not the true ‘war criminal and there should be no thought of punishing him as such.”<sup>59</sup> Wilfrid Fleisher warned against indicting Hirohito as a war criminal as well.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Coville, “Status of the Japanese Emperor,” T-315, 11.

<sup>55</sup> Borton, “Japan: Postwar Political Problems,” T-381, 5.

<sup>56</sup> Ballantine, “Japan: Institution of the Emperor,” PWC-145, 5.

<sup>57</sup> “Japan: Political Problems: Institution of the Emperor,” CAC-93/ PWC-116, 3-5; the quote is from p.4. This document underwent a series of revisions through April and May 1944, adding a harsher tone to the treatment of the imperial institution, but the basic stance did not change; see CAC-93a/ PWC-116a, CAC-93b (preliminary)/ PWC-116a (alternative), CAC-93c/ PWC-116b, CAC-93d/ PWC-116c, and CAC-93e/ PWC-116d.

<sup>58</sup> Also see “Japan: Occupation Problems: War Criminals,” CAC-105/ PWC-119, March 24, 1944, 2-3, *State Department Documents of the Post-War Programs Committees, 1944*, T1222, vol. 2, NA, microfilm.

<sup>59</sup> Pratt, “The Treatment of the Japanese Emperor,” PWC-147, 9.

<sup>60</sup> Fleisher, *What to Do with Japan*, 16.

It is not surprising that those who believed that Emperor Hirohito was a liberal pacifist and that the emperorship should be preserved opposed naming him as a war criminal. However, they did not necessarily regard the retention of Hirohito on the throne as indispensable or probable. In his policy draft, Hugh Borton recommended that the emperor held in custody and kept in seclusion might be either the reigning one or his successor, suggesting no assurance of Hirohito's present status after the war.<sup>61</sup> This uncertainty was based upon the view that even if he was not a war criminal, Emperor Hirohito, as the sovereign, did assume certain responsibility for war, both in a political and in a moral sense. Therefore, abdication was a possible option for the emperor. Joseph C. Grew, who tried very hard to dissuade the State Department's high-rank officials from abolishing the emperor system, indicated that Hirohito might well step down. Grew commented that "[he] personally [found] it difficult to see how Hirohito could remain on the throne after the defeat of his country, for face-saving and the acceptance of personal responsibility when things [went] wrong [were] powerful factors in Japan."<sup>62</sup> If Grew suggested Hirohito's spontaneous resignation, Wilfrid Fleisher thought about forced retirement. While opposed to the elimination of the imperial institution and the designation of Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal, Fleisher found Hirohito responsible for Japan's militarist past. He thus proposed deposing Hirohito as a punishment and making his oldest son, Akihito, the monarch of a new Japan.<sup>63</sup>

In comparison with the progressive group, which ambitiously aimed to remove the emperor institution to democratize Japan, the conservative group focused on the depoliticization and demythization of the emperor system to achieve the same goal. Like the progressives, the

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<sup>61</sup> "Japan: Political Problems: Institution of the Emperor," CAC-93/PWC-116, 4.

<sup>62</sup> Grew, "Japan: The Institution of the Emperor," PWC-146, 1.

<sup>63</sup> Fleisher, *What to Do with Japan*, 22, 32-35, 108, 120.

conservatives considered the liquidation of the military caste, the destruction of State Shinto, as well as the illegitimizing of militant-nationalist ideas, crucial.<sup>64</sup> The anthropologists in particular put forward the opinion that the real enemy was not the emperor institution itself but the Japanese beliefs and practices, and emphasized the importance of educational reform.<sup>65</sup> The main difference from the progressives was that as anti-abolitionists, the conservatives envisioned a British-style constitutional monarchy as the ideal form of government for Japan, and they had faith in democratic changes by the hands of Japanese “liberals.” They studied more carefully than the progressives about problems in the Japanese governmental structure, and developed reform plans to remake the malfunctioning Japanese constitutional monarchy. Such attempts naturally included the revision of the Meiji Constitution.

### **Hugh Borton and the US Policy for Japanese Governmental Reform**

The United States’ original plans for constitutional amendments were initiated by the conservatives, many of whom were Japan policy-planning officials in the State Department.<sup>66</sup> The

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<sup>64</sup> See Coville, “Status of the Japanese Emperor,” T-315, 9-10, 12; Hugh Borton, “Japan: Abolition of Militarism and Strengthening Democratic Processes,” CAC-185/ PWC-152, May 1, 1944, *State Department Documents of the Post-War Programs Committees, 1944*, T1222, vol. 2, NA, microfilm; Beppo R. Johansen, “Japan: Political Parties or Agencies,” CAC-111a/ PWC-113, March 23, 1944, *ibid.*; Earle R. Dickover, “Japan: Nullification of Obnoxious Laws,” CAC-123/ PWC-114, March 22, 1944, *ibid.*; D. C. Blaisdell, George H. Blakeslee, and Hugh Borton, “Japan: Occupation Problems: War Criminals,” CAC-105/ PWC-119, March 24, 1944, *ibid.*; Eugene H. Dooman et al., “Japan: The Education System under Military Government,” CAC-238/ PWC-287a, November 6, 1944, *State Department Documents of the Post-War Programs Committees, 1944*, T1222, vol. 4, NA, microfilm.

<sup>65</sup> For instance, see Holtom, “Shinto in the Postwar World,” 32-33; Douglas G. Haring, “Religion, Magic, and Morale,” in *Japan’s Prospect*, ed. Haring (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), 209-258; Douglas H. Haring, “The Challenge of Japanese Ideology,” in *ibid.*, 159-285.

<sup>66</sup> Besides Hugh Borton, Cabot Coville also mentioned the emperor’s constitutional status and the political problems derived from it in “Status of the Japanese Emperor,” T-315, 4-7; without providing details, he suggested constitutional change by commenting that “safeguards would be necessary against reassertion of dominance by the military, and modifications in the status of the emperor to that end would be axiomatic requirements” on p.11. Among journalists, Hugh Byas likewise touched on the constitutional problems concerning the military’s abuse of the emperor’s power and weak civilian control in *The Japanese Enemy*, 41-42, 63-65; Wilfrid Fleisher more specifically discussed how the Japanese governmental system should be changed in Chapter 2 of *What to Do with Japan*; his proposals included the revision of Articles 11 and 12, the establishment of strict civilian control, the setting up of a responsible cabinet and of the supremacy of prime minister over other ministers of state, and the concentration of the executive and legislative powers in the cabinet and the Diet.

progressives, who idealistically set fomenting revolution in Japan as a goal, might not have found the use of advancing concrete ideas of governmental reforms. For the conservative Japan experts, the collapse of parliamentary democracy and the increase of the military's political influence during the 1930s originated in the anomaly of the Japanese constitutional monarchy. They thus believed that if the governmental system was reconfigured by some changes in the Meiji Constitution, Japan could develop into a healthy constitutional monarchy like Britain.

Hugh Borton was the central figure in drafting US policies for the amendments of the Meiji Constitution. He was the main drafting official of the SWNCC-228 series, an independent policy draft on constitutional reform.<sup>67</sup> SWNCC-228 was not produced in the US government until early October 1945, but Borton had been nursing his ideas since 1940, and his analysis of the Japanese political system and vision for its reform laid the foundations for SWNCC policies. Given that SWNCC-228 sent to SCAP finally in January 1946 provided basic principles for GHQ Government Section (GS), which, by MacArthur's order, prepared a draft constitution in February, Borton's recommendations for Japan's constitutional revision were clearly influential in setting the course for remaking the Japanese constitutional monarchy.

In his book, *Japan since 1931*, published in 1940, Hugh Borton already noted major problems in the Japanese governmental structure that originated in the Meiji Constitution. He explained that despite wide-ranging executive powers vested in the emperor, he always acted on the advice of his advisors, and was a symbolic figure rather than an absolute monarch; although the main executive branch, the cabinet, was supposed to work as the emperor's advisory agent, problematically, the organization of elder statesmen, the Privy Council, also served as an

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<sup>67</sup> Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 210.

executive body and exerted influence over the government; in addition, the legislative organ, the Diet, was too weak to check the executive, and the Diet even lacked the power to control the budget; and the emperor's supreme command of the armed forces, stipulated in Articles 11 and 12, and the regulations regarding the appointment of Army and Navy Ministers (*gunbu daijin gen'eki bukan-sei*), diminished civilian control over the military, as a result making a system of "dual government."<sup>68</sup>

These observations developed into T-381, "Japan: Postwar Political Problems," which was the State Department's first policy draft as to necessary political reforms in postwar Japan that Borton composed in October 1943. In the first place, Borton proposed the need for strengthening the power of the cabinet over the military to end the functions of "dual government." One method was to eliminate the privileges of the military given by the Meiji Constitution and contained within the military regulations. Borton suggested, "If it were necessary to amend the Constitution in order to deprive the military of their exclusive right to advise the throne on military matters, amendments can be offered on the initiative of the Emperor," in accordance to constitutional provisions.<sup>69</sup> The second method was to clarify the responsibility of the cabinet. Article 55 simply stated: "The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it." To prevent the Army or Navy Minister's independent action, Borton argued, the cabinet members' individual *and collective* responsibility to the throne should be clearly stipulated in the constitution. He even regarded as desirable limiting ministership only to Diet members and making a cabinet responsible to the Diet. Along with these, Borton advised

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<sup>68</sup> Borton, *Japan since 1931*, 3-10.

<sup>69</sup> Borton, "Japan: Postwar Political Problems," T-381, 2-4; the quote is from p.4. The preamble and Article 73 declared that the emperor assumed the initiative right to amend the Meiji Constitution and submit a plan to the Imperial Diet.

strengthening the powers of the legislative body by enabling elected representatives to participate more directly in state affairs and giving the Diet complete control over budgetary matters.<sup>70</sup>

As to the emperorship, Borton explicitly expressed his opposition to abolishing it against the will of the Japanese people. Yet, without providing specific suggestions, he mentioned the advisability of “[defining] the powers of the Emperor in terms of a constitutional monarchy,” “effected through changes in the Imperial Household Laws or in the Constitution.”<sup>71</sup> Although he did not recommend expanding the chapter on “Rights and Duties of Subjects,” Borton alluded to the importance of the Japanese adopting a Bill of Rights.<sup>72</sup>

These ideas recurred in PWC(Post-War Programs Committee)-152/ CAC(Country and Area Committees)-185, which was Borton’s report draft on “Japan: Abolition of Militarism and Strengthening Democratic Processes” submitted in May 1944.<sup>73</sup> But it was after the Allied Occupation of Japan began that he drafted a policy document as to the reform of the Japanese governmental structure which entailed constitutional amendments.

At the beginning of October 1945, Hugh Borton drafted the preliminary document of the SWNCC-228 series.<sup>74</sup> Entitled PR-32, “Politico-Military Problems in the Far East: Reform of the Japanese Governmental System,” this draft contained the consistent reform plans that Borton had

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 8-11.

<sup>73</sup> See “Inauguration of Basic Governmental Reforms,” in Borton, “Japan: Abolition of Militarism and Strengthening Democratic Processes,” CAC-185/ PWC-152, 4-5.

<sup>74</sup> About the authorship of PR-32, there is Robert A. Fearey’s name (former private secretary to US ambassador Joseph C. Grew; 1918-2004) on the last page of the document, but the fact that Borton was the main drafting officer of the SWNCC-228 and a comparative study of various sources suggest that it was Borton. Besides his previous drafts, he prepared basic guidelines for the revision of the Japanese constitution for Political Advisor (POLAD) to the Supreme Commander George Atcheson, Jr. (1896-1947). Written on October 10, 1945, this directive was identical to PR-32. This source is in *Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East, 1945-1948*, T1205, vol. 8, NA, microfilm. Atcheson’s memorandum that demanded a policy draft is: The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, October 4, 1945, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East*, vol. 6, 736.

worked out in the past several years. In the first place, he tried to confirm that observing the Potsdam Declaration and the “US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” SCAP should not impose the reform of the political system upon the Japanese. Borton stressed that the “Japanese authorities should be given reasonable opportunity to alter Japan’s governmental system” and that only if they failed to do so, the “Supreme Commander should indicate to the Japanese authorities his desire that the Japanese Constitution be amended.”<sup>75</sup> The draft report thus warned that SCAP’s direct intervention should be a “last resort,” worrying that forced reforms would “reduce the possibility of their acceptance and support by the Japanese people for the future.”<sup>76</sup>

The ultimate objectives of the reform were to make a cabinet responsible to the Diet, to set up civilian control over the military, and to elevate the power of the Diet. Borton was certain that by these changes, workable parliamentary democracy would emerge and then could prevent an abuse of “dual government.” Reproducing the reform suggestions in his previous policy drafts, Borton listed: the establishment of collective responsibility of a cabinet to the House of Representatives; the elimination of the military’s privileges of direct access to the emperor and the making of a requirement that Army and Navy Ministers should be civilians, in case that Japan would ever be permitted to rearm; the empowerment of the Diet by allowing it to convene on its initiative, and the strengthening of the Lower House by giving it complete control over the budget and setting up its supremacy over the Upper House and the Privy Council in legislative matters.<sup>77</sup> Adding a provision for the guarantee of fundamental human rights for the Japanese and foreign

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<sup>75</sup> “Politico-Military Problems in the Far East: Reform of the Japanese Governmental System,” PR-32 Final, October 8, 1945, 1, 3, *Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East, 1945-1948*, T1205, vol. 8, NA, microfilm; the quotes are from p.1; the reference to the Potsdam Declaration and the US initial Post-Surrender Policy is in Appendix A: Facts Bearing on the Problem on p.3.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-2.

residents was recommended, too.

As if considering these reforms sufficient to normalize the functions of representative government, Borton did not necessarily propose to change the emperor's status or drastically cut back his prerogatives. Looking to the British constitutional monarchy as a model for the Japanese governmental reform, he probably did not regard maintaining the throne's theoretically extensive powers as contradictory with democracy.<sup>78</sup> Except for hinting that Articles 11 and 12 should be revised or removed, Borton suggested only clarifying the emperor's relationship with the executive branch (Article 55) and taking away his power to initiate amendments to the constitution.<sup>79</sup>

The gist of the PR-32 report was sent to Political Advisor (POLAD) to the Supreme Commander George Acheson, Jr. (1896-1947) on October 16, 1945. The memorandum sent from the State Department to Acheson gave the utmost importance to “[providing] for government responsible to an electorate based upon wide representative suffrage” and making the “executive branch of government derive its authority from and responsible to the electorate or to a fully representative legislative body.” Additional provisions should be provided to assure “[c]omplete control by an elected congress of financial and budgetary matters” and “[g]uarantee of fundamental civil rights to all persons within Japanese jurisdictions, not to Japanese only.” If the Japanese chose to retain the emperor system, State Department officials instructed the POLAD to make sure:

- (1) A cabinet to advise and assist the Emperor should be chosen with advice and consent of and responsible to representative legislative body, (2) No veto over legislative measures should be exercised by other bodies such as House of Peers or Privy Council, (3) Emperor should initiate amendments to constitution recommended by cabinet and approved by legislative body, (4)

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 4-5; see Appendix B: Discussion about Borton's preference of the British model to the American for the reform of the Japanese governmental system.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 1-2.

Legislative body should be permitted to meet at will, and (5) Any ministers for armed forces which may be permitted in future should be civilians and all special privileges of direct access to throne by military should be eliminated.<sup>80</sup>

As this document shows, putting aside the question of the emperor system, the State Department recommended reestablishing constitutional government by extending the power of the Imperial Diet, eliminating the privileges bestowed on the House of Peers, the Privy Council, and the armed forces, and setting up representative, responsible government, and strengthening the guarantee of basic human rights.

Renamed SWNCC-228, and after revisions in SWNCC Subcommittee for the Far East (SFE), the policy document was redirected to SCAP in early January 1946.<sup>81</sup> By then, some changes had been made. The impression that the Japanese had the right to decide on their governmental form was weakened, and this, although SCAP was still restrained from achieving the objective by force, affirmed that the task was left to the occupiers' discretion. SWNCC-228 also tried to clear away the impression that Washington was willing to support the preservation of the emperor system. The part that suggested Japan's future rearmament was removed. The whole document was reorganized, made complicated and lengthened: it first set up the required changes and then gave separate recommendations for the case that the emperor institution was abolished and for the case that it was retained. However, the basic objectives remained unchanged: the establishment of a responsible cabinet; civilian control of government; a fully representative legislative body; and guarantee of fundamental civil rights.<sup>82</sup> As additional measures, SWNCC

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<sup>80</sup> The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson), October 16, 1945, *FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East, vol. 6, 757*; also in Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 15-16; Okurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu, ed., *Shōwa Zaisei-shi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan*, 219-220.

<sup>81</sup> Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of State, January 7, 1946, *FRUS, 1946. The Far East, vol. 8, 98-103*.

<sup>82</sup> "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System," SWNCC-228, January 7, 1946, 1-2, *Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East, 1945-1948*, T1205, vol. 8, NA, microfilm. This revised version is inserted under the November 27, 1945 cover page.

recommended that in case that the Japanese decided to retain the imperial institution, SCAP should make sure that the emperor would act only on the advice of the cabinet and he would be “deprived of all military authority such as that provided in Articles 11, 12, 13, and 14.”<sup>83</sup>

Washington’s stance toward Japanese governmental reform thus followed the policy formulated by Hugh Borton, who, unlike the progressives, envisioned moderate reform modeled on the British-style constitutional government. SCAP observed the policy and contributed to remaking the Japanese limited monarchy rather than destroying it.

### **SCAP General Douglas MacArthur and the GS Draft Constitution**

As Supreme Commander, General Douglas MacArthur personally decided to protect Emperor Hirohito and the imperial institution as early as fall 1945 in order to maintain order and stability in Japan. By the end of January 1946, he contemplated if he should directly intervene in Japanese constitutional amendment in which the fate of the emperor system was at stake. As many scholars have argued, MacArthur’s decision was politically motivated. When the establishment of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington was agreed on at the Moscow Conference in late December 1945, MacArthur feared that the authority of Occupation policy was to be placed under the FEC. To minimize the FEC’s interference with constitutional revision, he decided by late January 1946 that before the first meeting of the FEC scheduled to convene in late February, the Japanese government should devise a new constitution liberal enough to satisfy the Allies; otherwise, GHQ should initiate constitutional reform.

The *Mainichi Shinbun*’s scoop of one of the Japanese government’s drafts on February 1 gave GHQ the first opportunity to look at an official plan, but the negative review by the

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<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-3. Article 13 of the Meiji Constitution stipulates: The Emperor declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties, and Article 14: The Emperor declared a state of siege.

Government Section (GS) spurred the American occupiers to take over the authority of constitutional revision from the Japanese government.<sup>84</sup> GS Chief Major General Courtney Whitney (1897-1969) commented to MacArthur the next day that the leaked draft was “extremely conservative in character,” “[leaving] substantially unchanged the status of the Emperor with all rights of sovereignty vested in him.” He recommended that MacArthur “orient [the reactionary group] before the formal submission of a draft than to wait and force them to again start from scratch once an unacceptable draft had been submitted to which they were committed.”<sup>85</sup>

Following this, MacArthur ordered his subordinates on February 3 to write an alternative draft and handed his “Three Basic Points” as “musts.” With MacArthur’s guidelines, the GS members also used SWNCC-228 as a “control document” and completed a draft constitution only in a week.<sup>86</sup>

Douglas MacArthur played a crucial role in determining the course of constitutional revision as Hugh Borton recommended. MacArthur’s three principles stated that:

I. Emperor is at the head of state. His succession is dynastic. His duties and powers will be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and responsive to the basic will of the people as provided therein. II. War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection. III. The feudal system of Japan will cease. No rights of peerage except those of the Imperial family will extend beyond the lines of those now existent. No patent of nobility will from this time forth

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<sup>84</sup> GS official Milo E. Rowell (1903-1977) had studied the problems lying in the Meiji Constitution, consulting law experts, including Japanese (whose identities are unknown), and made recommendations to constitutional amendments by early December 1945. But the purpose was only “to furnish a tentative check list to provide a basis for conversations with [Japanese] authorities and governmental representatives,” and there was no contact between the Matsumoto Committee and the GS. See “Report of Preliminary Studies and Recommendations of Japanese Constitution,” submitted by Rowell on December 6, 1945 in Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 1*, 2, 4; also see further discussions by Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 2*, 16-18. About the *Mainichi* scoop and the GS review of it, see “Memorandum for the Supreme Commander: Subject: Constitutional Reform (Matsumoto Draft)” in Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 1*, 40, 42; Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 205-208. About MacArthur’s decision to intervene in constitutional decision, see Koseki, *The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution*, 68-69, 73-79; Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 208-215; Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 92-93; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 360-363; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 274-276; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 109-111.

<sup>85</sup> “Memorandum for the Supreme Commander: Subject: Constitutional Reform (Matsumoto Draft)” in Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 1*, 40, 42.

<sup>86</sup> “Summary Report on Meeting of the Government Section, 6 Feb 1946,” in *ibid.*, 126-131; “6: Conformity with SWNCC 228” is on pp.130-131.

embody within itself any National or Civic power of government. Pattern budget after British system.<sup>87</sup>

As the US government avoided making a decision regarding the treatment of the emperor system, MacArthur set his mind on retaining it, favoring constitutional monarchy rather than republicanism. He at the same time radicalized America's position about the Japanese military by going beyond the simple nullification of Articles 11 and 12; his second point was the basis of the pacifist clauses of Article 9 in today's Japanese constitution. The third point was meant to promote the elimination of class differences; it was perhaps not unrelated to the fact that the GS plan would abolish the House of Peers.

What the GS did regarding the emperor was to clarify his "actual" role by codifying it. Unlike Borton, the GS members were not amenable to leaving the gap between theory and practice of imperial powers intact. In the February 4 meeting, the members agreed that they needed to completely break the absolute powers and rights of the emperor "precisely defined and guarded in the present Japanese Constitution." By making a constitution "less flexible than the British, ... but less precisely drawn-up than the French," they decided to turn the emperor's role into "that of a social monarch, merely."<sup>88</sup>

Accordingly, the GS draft revoked the concept of imperial sovereignty – the right inherited from a lineal succession of the throne unbroken for ages eternal stipulated in the preamble and Article 1 of the Meiji Constitution – and proclaimed the principle of popular sovereignty. The draft constitution declared in the very first article that the emperor would become the "symbol of the State and the Unity of the People, deriving from the sovereign will of

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<sup>87</sup> "Three Basic Points Stated by Supreme Commander to be 'Musts' in Constitutional Revision. Government Section Paper Prepared about 4 Feb 1946," in *ibid.*, 98-101.

<sup>88</sup> "Summary Report on Meeting of the Governmental Section, 4 February 1946," in *ibid.*, 100-107; the quotes are from p.104.

the people.” As ordered by MacArthur, the rule of dynastic succession was retained in the second article as in the Meiji constitution. Yet, Article 3 that declared the emperor as sacred and inviolable was deleted. In the third article, the GS draft instead unequivocally stated that the “advice and consent of the Cabinet [should] be required for all acts of the Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet [should] be responsible therefor.”<sup>89</sup> By stressing that the emperor would act only upon the advice and approval of the cabinet once again, the fifth and sixth articles defined the emperor’s broad but restricted functions. Such new roles encompassed appointing the prime minister as designated by the Diet; convoking and dissolving the Diet; proclaiming general elections; attesting the appointment and resignation of Ministers of State and other officials; promulgating constitutional amendments, cabinet orders, and treaties; receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers; and performing ceremonial functions.<sup>90</sup>

As the GS constitution remade the emperor into an entirely symbolic figure who would play only a ritualistic part in state affairs, it turned the cabinet and the Diet into governmental bodies completely independent of the emperor. The GS draft announced that executive power would belong to a cabinet (Article 60). By eliminating the Privy Council and extra-constitutional executive organs, the GS attempted to insure that the cabinet, and only the cabinet, would assume executive power, too. In addition, Article 61 made the cabinet “collectively responsible to the Diet” in order to establish a solid parliamentary cabinet system.<sup>91</sup> The Diet, composed of only one house of elected representatives, was declared as the “highest organ of state power,” as well as the

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<sup>89</sup> “(Draft) (as Submitted to the Japanese Government by the General Headquarters, SCAP, on February 13, 1946) Constitution of Japan,” in *ibid.*, 266-303; the first through the third articles are on p.268.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 270.

<sup>91</sup> The chapter on the cabinet is in *ibid.*, 288-291; Articles 60 and 61 can be found on p.288.

“sole law-making authority of the State” (Article 40).<sup>92</sup> The right of amending the constitution was unexceptionally bestowed on the House.<sup>93</sup> According to the GS plan, the Diet would gain complete control over financial matters, including the expenses of the Imperial Household.<sup>94</sup>

A few more crucial changes are worth mentioning. Following the first chapter on the emperor, a new chapter on Japan’s renunciation of war was inserted, and stated that “[w]ar as a sovereign right of the nation [was] abolished” and “[n]o army, navy, air force, or other war potential [would] ever be authorized” (Article 8)<sup>95</sup> Originated in MacArthur’s directives, the second chapter not only invalidated the emperor’s prerogatives of supreme command but declared Japan permanently demilitarized. The third chapter was renamed as “Rights and Duties of the People” rather than of “Subjects.” The GS draft doubled the number of articles, fifteen under the Meiji Constitution, to thirty-one. It stressed the principle of fundamental human rights and expanded the guarantee of freedoms to include social rights.<sup>96</sup>

These constitutional amendments proposed by the GS were designed to make a democratic Japanese government, and the GS officials considered the alterations of the rights and powers of the emperor of particular importance. On submitting their draft to the Supreme Commander, the GS staff explained to him that they sought to destroy the “idea and practice that unprincipled and irresponsible leaders of government could commit all kinds of wrongs in the name of the Emperor” that had developed from the Meiji Constitution.<sup>97</sup> To achieve this, the GS decided to make a “constitutional monarchy with sovereignty reposing in the people by modifying

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<sup>92</sup> The chapter on the Diet is in *ibid.*, 282-289; Article 40 is on p.282.

<sup>93</sup> See Articles 59, 89, and 92 in *ibid.*, 288, 300, 302.

<sup>94</sup> The chapter on finance is in *ibid.*, 296-299.

<sup>95</sup> The chapter on renunciation of war is in *ibid.*, 272-273; the quote is from p.272.

<sup>96</sup> The chapter on rights and duties of the people is in *ibid.*, 272-283.

<sup>97</sup> “Explanatory Notes to Constitutional Review,” in *ibid.*, 304-321; the quote is from p.306.

the Emperor system and making the Emperor the ceremonial head of the state.”<sup>98</sup> The GS members believed that by doing this, the emperor should “[remain] as a focus and the center of respect around which the people’s thoughts, hopes and ideals [could] be fused into a cohesive whole, but forever deprived of that mystic power which [had] been used from time immemorial by unscrupulous leaders to exploit the people to evil ends.”<sup>99</sup> Accompanying this depoliticization of the emperor was the creation of parliamentary democracy under the titular monarch. The centralization of the executive power in the cabinet would prevent any other party from advising the emperor. The establishment of a responsible cabinet and the reinforcement of the powers of the Diet were aimed at normalizing the functions of representative government.

The GS draft turned out to be more drastic than Washington and MacArthur had expected. Its final form was determined by the drafting officers’ legal knowledge and aspirations for the democratization of Japan. Nevertheless, Washington’s policy and MacArthur’s personal directives influenced the framework of the SCAP draft constitution. Following their instructions, the GS tried to reform the Japanese governmental system based on the same recognition that the role of the throne needed redefining so as to prevent the future abuse of its constitutional power and also to establish the foundation for workable parliamentarianism without abolishing the imperial institution. What the American occupiers did was to remake the Japanese constitutional monarchy rather than abolish it altogether. Although SCAP made many radical changes in the Japanese political system, it thus followed the conservative option proposed by Borton and backed up by MacArthur rather than embracing the progressives’ recommendations.

### **Public Views of the Japanese Emperor in Wartime America**

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 304.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 308.

Wartime American journalism's portrayals of the Japanese political system carried the conservatives' views rather than the progressives'. Though more simplistic and sensationalist than scholarly works, newspapers and magazines separated the Japanese emperor and civilian government officials from the militarists, and depicted the former as pitifully powerless before the military now ruling the government. Reprinting an article from the April 1942 issue of *Command and General Staff School Military Review*, the *Chicago Daily Tribune* explained that the civil authorities had no power over the armed forces, and the present government – led by the prime minister who was a general and served by high-ranking military officers on the active list as the army and navy ministers – was under the control of the military. To the Japanese, the “emperor is god, and as such he is clothed with supreme power – but he is forbidden to use it himself,” the article said. Instead, the military, as the instrument of the emperor, used his power.<sup>100</sup>

This military rule of the Japanese government was dated back to the early 1930s and considered as the cause of the war. In the August 26, 1942 article on the *New York Times*, former Tokyo correspondent Otto D. Tolischus (1890-1967) asserted that the “War of Greater East Asia” was “first and foremost the direct result of a now successful effort by a military clique, known as the ‘Manchuria Gang,’ to seize power in Japan.” He explained that in opposition to the conciliatory foreign policies of the “capitalist-democratic” government in the 1920s, the military launched independent actions in Manchuria; and subsequently, “patriots,” inside and outside the military, began to plot assassinations against cabinet members and business leaders.<sup>101</sup> Thus, Japan was apparently “plunged into the war because a virtual revolt of military extremists and Nazified ultranationalist organizations had swept out civilian control.” Not only had civilian

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<sup>100</sup> “The Fanatical Japanese Army and Its Tools of War,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, June 21, 1942, H4.

<sup>101</sup> Otto D. Tolischus, “Japan’s War Plot is Laid to Clique,” *New York Times*, August 26, 1942, 8.

officials been subject to the threat of mass assassinations, but the emperor could have also been exiled in Kyōto if he had opposed war, Tolischus said.<sup>102</sup> He even wrote that important cabinet members, like the minister of foreign affairs, and even the emperor had possibly not been informed of the exact military schedule so that the attack on Pearl Harbor was a sincere surprise to them, as well as to most Japanese.<sup>103</sup>

The division of the government into two groups – civilian and military – was epitomized by the polarized images of General Tōjō Hideki and of Emperor Hirohito. According to the report from Robert Bellaire, the former British United Press (UP) manager in Tokyo, General Tōjō, then the premier of Japan, was a warlord who undermined the emperor and sought to establish himself as a dictator. In August 11, 1942's *Los Angeles Times*, Bellaire portrayed Tōjō as a counterpart of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini and the emperor as a “virtual prisoner in the Imperial Palace” who was denied access to his intimate advisors and outside information by Tōjō.<sup>104</sup>

About a month later, Otto D. Tolischus of the *New York Times* likewise contrasted dictator Tōjō with the emperor. Unlike Bellaire, Tolischus differentiated the Japanese dictatorship from those in Germany and in Italy. He explained that like the Shogun who had ruled the country on behalf of the emperor but had himself been just a nominal head of the feudal Bakufu, Tōjō was merely the chief of the military clique.<sup>105</sup> Yet, as a new Shogun, this Japanese dictator concentrated all the military and civil powers in himself. Tolischus remarked that now Tōjō's “pinched but scowling visage [was] the very symbol of the New Japan, and to the outside world it

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<sup>102</sup> Otto D. Tolischus, “Tokyo Terrorists Led Japan to War; Emperor in Peril,” *New York Times*, July 29, 1942, 1.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 1, 4.

<sup>104</sup> Robert Bellaire, “Tojo, Japan's Premier, Aims at Dictatorship,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 11, 1942, 4.

<sup>105</sup> Otto D. Tolischus, “Leader of the Japanese Gang,” *New York Times*, September 13, 1942, SM8. In his August 26, 1942 article, the author also mentioned that Tōjō Hideki was part of the military machine and he had no absolute power to control the military.

[had] completely replaced that mild-mannered and bespectacled Emperor whom he [had] stripped of the last vestiges of real power, though leaving him the role of a god who [was] in Tojo's own keeping."<sup>106</sup> As this description summarized, not the emperor but the military, or specifically General Tōjō, represented militarized Japan.

Indeed, the Office of War Information (OWI) decided to avoid overtly criticizing the emperor in person so as not to provoke the Japanese. However, as the progressives' writings and Frank Capra's *Know Your Enemy-Japan* demonstrate, it does not mean that American critics were prohibited from commenting on Hirohito, the emperor institution, or Shinto beliefs. No matter how influential the OWI policy was on American journalists, their views of the emperor were often based on the conservatives' analysis of the Japanese governmental system.<sup>107</sup>

Despite temperate descriptions of the Japanese emperor in American journalism, however, the public's attitude was, as if echoing the voice of the progressives, unfriendly to him. Such hostility was expressed in response to Joseph C. Grew's address given in Chicago on December 29, 1943. His speech on "War and Post-War Problems in the Far East" carried several messages to the audience. As he had been doing as directed by the OWI since summer 1942, Grew presented a formidable image of Japan to urge on America's full commitment to the war effort, and underscored the ultimate Allied objective to punish Japanese militarism.<sup>108</sup> Yet, Grew now turned himself against the tide of anti-Japanese racism that he had in some way contributed to summoning. He commented that the "prejudice [was] all-embracing" in the public atmosphere and accused the Americans of not being "able or willing to admit that there [could] be anything

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 18. According to Wilfrid Fleisher, the OWI's policy of avoiding making criticisms against the Japanese emperor came from the State Department's decision; see *What to Do with Japan*, 27.

<sup>108</sup> Grew, "Address: War and Post-War Problems in the Far East," 9-10. About the OWI's coordination of Grew's speaking tour, see Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 17-18.

good in Japan or any good elements in the Japanese race.”<sup>109</sup> Although having depicted the “Japanese” collectively, Grew now clearly separated the Japanese people from the military, placing war responsibility on the latter.<sup>110</sup> While still portraying the “rank and file of the Japanese” as “simply like sheep, helplessly following where they were led,” Grew recounted to the audience how sincerely anti-war many Japanese had been and how they had suffered from the militarists’ policies.<sup>111</sup> For him, the truly liberal but powerless emperor and statesmen around him were no exceptions.<sup>112</sup>

As to US postwar policies for Japan, Grew admitted that they were still developing but expressed his strong opposition to a punitive peace settlement. This reflected his public rebuke of the extremist progressives, both within and without the government. He called non-experts on Japan, or those who demanded retribution due to a lack of first-hand knowledge of, or long-time experience in, Japan, “armchair theorists,” and claimed that the “approach to the peace table should be guided by those who intimately [knew] the Japanese people.” Insinuating that the progressive critics were subjective, narrow-minded, and impractical, Grew argued that a peace with Japan “should be formulated on a basis of plain, practical common sense, without pride or prejudice, or the vindictiveness which [was] inherent in human nature – formulated with the paramount objective of insuring the future peace and security of the Pacific area and of all the

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<sup>109</sup> Grew, “Address: War and Post-War Problems in the Far East,” 10-11.

<sup>110</sup> The tendency to separate the Japanese people from the militarists could be found in Grew’s summer 1943 speeches; see Joseph C. Grew, “Address by the Former American Ambassador to Japan,” *Department of State Bulletin* 8, no. 482 (June 5, 1943); “Radio Address by the Former American Ambassador to Japan,” *Department of State Bulletin* 9, no. 126 (August 28, 1943). According to Iokibe Makoto, this shift first occurred in late April 1943; Iokibe, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryō Seisaku: Ge*, 32-33. Howard B. Schonberger says that only in mid-1943, Grew finally judged it safe to express his favorable view of the Japanese emperor and liberals; Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 18.

<sup>111</sup> Grew, “Address: War and Post-War Problems in the Far East,” 12-13; the quotes are both from p.12.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-12, 15.

countries contiguous thereto.”<sup>113</sup> Grew explained that vindictive measures would inevitably fail to achieve the long-term goals of the Allied Powers; only by treating the Japanese fairly, according to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, the Allies could secure the necessary cooperation to reform Japan and foster the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Specifically, Grew preached on the importance of giving reasonable commercial opportunities to Japan. Correcting the American popular conception that Shintoism was the “root of all evil in Japan,” Grew supported the retention of Shintoism, asserting that Shintoism would be an “asset, not a liability.” He also mentioned the desirability of constitutional amendments in a way to remedy Japan’s constitutional monarchy and parliamentary government.<sup>114</sup>

Joseph C. Grew’s defensive and moderate attitudes toward the Japanese laid him open to public censure. Both progressive critics and the public immediately responded to his speech. In the January 7, 1944 issue, *Amerasia* criticized “[t]hose who [advocated] [the] respectful treatment of the ruler of Japan” for “[choosing] to ignore the fact that in modern Japanese history the Emperor [had] always served as the instrument of absolutism and national chauvinism.”<sup>115</sup> The writer of the article insisted that it was of no use to “combat this form of Japanese political warfare by pamphlets glorifying Japan’s peace-loving Emperor, or by relying on non-existent ‘liberals’ among Japan’s great financiers and industrialists to institute a peaceful and progressive regime after Japan’s military defeat.”<sup>116</sup>

On January 2, 1944, the *New York Times* published an opinion less castigatory than *Amerasia*, but similarly critical of Grew’s stance toward the emperor and Shintoism. The author

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 9, 15-18.; the quotes are all from p.16.

<sup>115</sup> “The ‘Peace-Loving’ Emperor of Japan,” 6.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 8.

called the political system of Japan a “theocracy in which all sovereign powers [were] vested, not in the people but in the Emperor as the godhead of the nation.” Then he asserted that it was “contrary to [American] professions ... to sponsor an autocratic theocracy incapable of developing a real democracy based on self-government by the people, and therefore always subject to domination by cliques which [could] dominate the Emperor.” In addition, comparing modern Shinto with Nazism, the article identified the Japanese religion as something to be eradicated rather than maintained. The concluding remark argued in opposition to Grew that “anything resembling defense of Shinto and the Japanese Emperor [seemed] out of place while [American] forces in the Pacific [were] fighting against everything they [symbolized].”<sup>117</sup>

Grew was not the first or the only one who publicly presented a favorable view of the Japanese “liberals” and proposed the retention of the Japanese emperor. Some Americans unequivocally recommended making a peace with the emperor and respecting Japanese religious freedom before Grew did in December 1943.<sup>118</sup> Nevertheless, as an essay in the January 4, 1944 *Washington Post* commented, Grew’s advocacy for the emperorship undeniably “caused consternation in a good many quarters [because] it had been considered as an axiom that no permanent reform could be achieved in Japanese political thinking unless this stultifying influence were erased from it.”<sup>119</sup> This suggested that the public had simply taken it for granted that the emperor system must be removed in order to demilitarize and democratize Japan. Besides the fact that Grew was a State Department official, the reason why his address drew so much attention was probably the timing. Since the fall of 1943, reports on Japan’s critical war situations and

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<sup>117</sup> “Policy toward Japan,” *New York Times*, January 2, 1944, E8.

<sup>118</sup> See Stanley Washburn, “Preparing for Peace,” *New York Times*, June 28, 1942, E8; “Hirohito,” *Washington Post*, December 16, 14; “‘Smash Japs, Keep Hirohito,’ Dr. Myers Says,” *Atlanta Constitution*, September 24, 1943, 24.

<sup>119</sup> Paul Winkler, “‘Son of Heaven’,” *Washington Post*, January 4, 1944, 6.

subsequent domestic political movements appeared more frequently than before. In December, the representatives of the UK, the US, and China met in Cairo and declared their advocacy of an unconditional surrender for Japan. As the public just began to envision a postwar world, naturally expecting harsh terms with Japan, Grew's seemingly moderate stand was a shock to many Americans.

Until the end of the war, competing opinions as to the treatment of the Japanese emperor were occasionally exchanged, but as reaction toward Grew demonstrated, the progressives' position continuously prevailed in the American public. The Americans were more susceptible emotionally, if not theoretically, to the progressives' harsh opinions of him. Viewing the emperor as the symbol of Japanese backwardness and militarism, American public opinion favored punishing him after defeating Japan.

After Germany's surrender in May 1945 let the Americans direct their attention to Japan, Gallup polled public opinion regarding the Japanese emperor. The survey was about Emperor Hirohito and not about the imperial institution. But the result showed that a large majority favored a severe handling of the emperor, clearly reflecting the influence of the progressives on the public. As many as thirty-three percent demanded executing the emperor; seventeen percent called for putting him on trial; eleven percent thought it appropriate to imprison him in an indefinite period; and nine percent desired to exile him. In comparison, less than ten percent advocated a temperate policy for the emperor; four percent argued that nothing needed to be done with someone who was a mere figurehead, and only three percent suggested using the emperor to run Japan.<sup>120</sup> In

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<sup>120</sup> George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971*, vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1972), 512. The survey was taken between June 1 and 5, 1945. The result was also published in June 29's *Los Angeles Times* under the title "Japan Emperor's Death Favored"; see p.5.

other words, seventy percent desired a punitive action, siding with the progressives, and only seven percent supported a lenient policy that the Japan Crowd in the State Department had been striving to implement.

The discussion about a peace settlement with Japan intensified further toward the very final phase of the war. During August, Congressmen and servicemen, fueling the debate, sided with vengeful hardliners.<sup>121</sup> Public atmosphere was thus in favor of punishing the emperor, but hostile emotions were gradually abated by Japan's defeat and the progress of Occupation reforms.

### **The Japanese Emperor in Postwar America: A Mirror of Japan's Change from Militarism to Democracy**

Once Japan surrendered, the Americans, cheered by their victory, immediately shifted their focus from militarily defeating the Japanese to physically and mentally remaking the "feudal" and "aggressive" nation into a democratic and peaceful one. Reportage from Tokyo filled in the American public on the demilitarization and democratization reforms swiftly taken up by the Occupation authorities. Such news, through the American press, told the Americans that their civilizing mission in the former enemy country was being successfully carried out, thus taming the hitherto threatening images of Japan.

Following the "US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" (SWNCC-150/4/A) and the

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<sup>121</sup> For moderate opinions, see Stanley Washburn, "Letters to the Times," *New York Times*, July 8, 1945, 33; Joseph Lezar, "Letter to the Editor," *Washington Post*, July 9, 1945, 6; Percy Whiteing, "Japan Reveres Hirohito, but Not as a 'God'," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, August 11, 1945, 3; Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," *Washington Post*, July 12, 1945, 7; "Emperor Can't Do Any Harm, It'll Bring Our Boys Home," *Atlanta Constitution*, August 12, 1945, 9\_A; "Hirohito Pro-US, British, Says Former Missionary," *Atlanta Constitution*, August 12, 1945, 6\_A. For harsh opinions, see Gladstone Williams, "Hirohito Should Be Held Responsible," *Atlanta Constitution*, August 3, 1945, 8; "Hirohito's Weakness Called Myth," *Washington Post*, August 5, 1945, M5; C. P. Trussell, "Many Congressmen Are Hostile to Any Leniency to Hirohito," *New York Times*, August 11, 1945, 8; "Hated Hirohito Finds Little Love Wasted on Him," *Atlanta Constitution*, August 11, 1945, 2; "Servicemen Want Emperor Hirohito Deposed," *Atlanta Constitution*, August 11, 1945, 2; "Punishment Demanded," *Washington Post*, August 12, 1945, M2; "Halsey Still Thinks Hirohito Should Hang," *Atlanta Constitution*, August 13, 1945, 10; "Hirohito Trial Suggested," *New York Times*, August 16, 1945, 5; Drew Pearson, "Merry-Go-Round," *Washington Post*, August 17, 1945, 4.

longer and more detailed “Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan” (JCS(Joint Chiefs of Staff)-1380/15), SCAP sent major reform directives to the Japanese government during the first several months of the Occupation. The very first task was to abolish the Japanese armed forces and to completely suspend war production. It was accompanied by the removal of the militarists who were considered responsible for Japan’s totalitarian rule and foreign aggression. On September 11, 1945, General Douglas MacArthur gave the Japanese government the first order to arrest war crime suspects; with additional orders, over a hundred Japanese were rounded up by early December. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was set up on January 4, 1946, bringing twenty-eight to court four months later. SCAP also embarked on a full-scale purge of public service personnel on the same day.

Along with these demilitarization directives, GHQ gave various instructions to promote the democratization of Japan. To secure basic civil liberties, the headquarters issued an order on September 10, 1945 to ban restrictions upon freedoms of speech and of the press (though it began pre-censorship of Japanese publications at the same time); on October 4, the Japanese government under Premier Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko was ordered to abolish all suppressive laws and police organs, such as the Peace Preservation Law and the Special Higher Police, and to release political prisoners. A week later, General MacArthur demanded the “Five Great Reforms” to a new prime minister, the liberal diplomat from the 1920s and 1930s, Shidehara Kijūrō, touching on wider fields than the previous SCAP directives: MacArthur urged the enfranchisement of women, the encouragement of labor unions, the liberalization of school education, the reform of the judicature for the protection of the people, and the democratization of the economic structure. In

the meeting, the Supreme Commander also gave the prime minister an unofficial request to change the Meiji Constitution (though, four months later, dissatisfied with the government's plan, SCAP decided to make its own draft constitution).<sup>122</sup> GHQ subsequently issued a series of directives which transformed the educational system, dissolved the zaibatsu, instituted land reform, and abolished State Shinto by December 1945.

As scholars have revealed, the genesis of these reforms and the processes of their implementation were complex. Although American agency – Washington policymakers, MacArthur, and GHQ staff – tends to be stressed, Japanese agency was significant. Having themselves considered many of SCAP-directed reforms for decades, the Japanese were well-prepared to devise reforms and often preempted the American plans. For example, without much GHQ intervention, the Shidehara cabinet successfully reformed the electoral law which realized the enfranchisement of women and drafted the Labor Union Law by December 1945. In areas where the Japanese government was not ready to implement change or the American occupiers judged the Japanese reforms to be insufficient, SCAP actively intervened in. Even in those cases, provided only with the outlines of Japanese democratization by Washington, the GHQ staff often

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<sup>122</sup> According to Iokibe Makoto, John K. Emmerson (1908-1984), a State Department Japan specialist who had served Joseph C. Grew, had known Takagi Yasaka (1889-1994), a professor at the Imperial University of Tokyo, pioneer of American studies, and former member of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), and contacted him to discuss constitutional problems sometime in late September or early October 1945; with journalist Matsumoto Shigeharu (1899-1989) and Konoe's advisor Ushiba Tomohiko (1901-1993), Takagi was working for former prime minister and then general affairs official of the Office of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Prince Konoe Fumimaro, acting as a liaison between Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido Kōichi (1889-1977) and the Office of the Political Advisor (POLAD). When Takagi met Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers (1896-1973), MacArthur's military secretary, he was informed that GHQ planned to officially request constitutional revision but persuaded Fellers not to make it a blatant order from SCAP to the Japanese premier; accordingly, MacArthur suggested constitutional revision to Shidehara Kijūrō without including it in his "Five Great Reforms Directives." See Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 163, 172-173. About the Takagi-Emmerson connection and the instructions on constitutional reform sent from the Secretary of State to the Acting Political Advisor in Japan (George Atcheson, Jr.), also see Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 15-16; Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu, ed., *Shōwa Zaisei-shi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan*, 218-220, 237-238; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 79-86; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 349.

relied on the expertise of Japanese bureaucrats, scholars, social activists, and intellectuals.<sup>123</sup>

However, SCAP's prompt moves to direct the demilitarization and democratization of Japan appeared to the Americans as if the Occupation authorities were transforming a backward former enemy into a democracy. The press reports focused on what SCAP, or specifically "General MacArthur," did to Japan. The Japanese were mere students of democracy whose capability was being tested, and were beneficiaries of America's benevolent occupation. The progress of democratization seemed proof that the Japanese were able students and the Americans were accomplishing the objectives of the Occupation. Whether this narrative accurately reflected the reality in Japan, the announcements of SCAP directives, the passages of new bills, the normalization of parliamentary politics, as well as the photos of women's and children's happy faces signified that Japanese democratization was smoothly underway under America's direction.

The Japanese emperor was an important icon of Japan's rebirth as a democratic nation. Determined to retain the emperor institution and Hirohito himself, SCAP helped the Japanese maintain the monarchy in a modified form. SCAP did try to engineer American public opinion toward the throne, but the Japanese emperor's transformation into a pacifist constitutional monarch was more organic. Accompanying the dismantling of the Japanese military and the punishment of the militarists, a series of political actions aimed to destroy what the Americans believed to be the source of Japanese aggression and fanaticism – the "god-emperor." The throne's public appearance and renunciation of his divinity reduced his rank to the position of a mortal ruler, and this transformation was finalized by the reform of the Meiji Constitution. Additionally, the abolition of State Shinto and wartime ideological indoctrination eradicated the

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<sup>123</sup> See footnote 6 in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

key institutions to instill imperial myths and absolute loyalty to the emperor in the Japanese people. Dispelling the cast of mysticism and absolutism, the reformers transformed the emperor into an apolitical human figure. Symbolizing Japan's shift to democracy, he showed that Japan posed no threat to the Americans.

The famous picture of General Douglas MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito, taken when the emperor visited the Supreme Commander on September 26, 1945, represented the new relationship between the United States and Japan as victor and vanquished and as occupier and occupied. With this photo, MacArthur attempted to show to both the Japanese and the Americans his supremacy over the emperor and benevolence toward him.<sup>124</sup> At the same time, MacArthur's political calculation began the process of humanizing the divine-emperor in the American press. *Time* magazine, which published the picture on October 8, 1945, titled the news of the MacArthur-Hirohito meeting as "Descent to the Earth": "... it seemed that the Son of Heaven had stepped down to a very earthy earth. The photograph was especially painful, for it showed MacArthur, in informal attire, towering over the fussily dressed Emperor (whom no mortal is supposed to behold from above). ... As nothing else could, the imperial homage to MacArthur told the people that Japan was truly beaten."<sup>125</sup>

In the issue published twelve days later, *Life* similarly entitled the news as "Ex-God Descends: Hirohito Calls on General MacArthur." By paying a visit to MacArthur, the article explained, the "Son of Heaven, Hirohito lost a good deal of his Shinto divinity." Differences in

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<sup>124</sup> Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 236; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 293-295; Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 91-92, 102. About the idea of the MacArthur-emperor meeting, Iokibe says that Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru sounded out its possibility on September 20, 1945; see p.101. Without denying that thesis, Dower argues that Colonel Sidney F. Mashbir (1891-1973), an intelligence officer, could have first tapped the Japanese Foreign Ministry's intentions as early as September 3; see p.293.

<sup>125</sup> "Foreign News: Japan," *Time*, October 8, 1945, 38.

their heights and attires – the “big, ribbonless American soldier and the little Japanese emperor” – clearly showed that MacArthur was now a boss more powerful than the Japanese sovereign.<sup>126</sup>

The emperor in the photo, who subordinated his authority to the American general and disrobed his mystic cast, represented not only Japan’s utter defeat by the United States, but also the erosion of his legitimacy as a divine ruler to American viewers.

The demystification of the emperor was also promoted by the Japanese authorities’ attempts to head off America’s strong public opinion in favor of punishing the emperor in the form of abdication, arrest, or trial.<sup>127</sup> Well aware of American hostility toward the throne, the Japanese top-rank officials in the Court and in the Foreign Ministry launched a campaign to assuage American public sentiment in September 1945.<sup>128</sup> This was an effort to convince the Americans of Emperor Hirohito’s innocence regarding the Pearl Harbor attack, by charging then Prime Minister General Tōjō Hideki with sole responsibility and claiming that the emperor had taken a pacifist stand. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Marquis Kido Kōichi (1889-1977) told to the American press on September 24 that the emperor had been urged by Premier Tōjō to ignore peace appeals from the US government and had not known anything about the Pearl Harbor attack until it had actually occurred.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> “Ex-God Descends: Hirohito Calls on General MacArthur,” *Life*, October 20, 1945, 40.

<sup>127</sup> The Americans kept calling for the arrest and trial of the emperor, or his abdication at least, until October 1945. After that, the request for such treatments of the emperor was expressed as a Japanese (often communist) demand in the reports from Tokyo. It was in January 1946 that Washington decided not to try the emperor; in mid-June, SWNCC-55/7 officially decided not to indict Hirohito as a suspected war criminal; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 257-258; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 299, 308. Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers in GHQ, MacArthur’s military secretary specialized in psychological operations, advised the Imperial Court not to publicly mention the emperor’s abdication in the fall of 1945; when an imperial family member and some Japanese liberal intellectuals voiced their favorable view for abdication in the early months of 1946, the GHQ staff began a campaign against the option of abdication and officially shelved it in September; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 259; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 323.

<sup>128</sup> Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 258-259; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 287-289, 291, 293, 300-301.

<sup>129</sup> “Hirohito Aide Says Japan Chose War,” *New York Times*, September 25, 1945, 2; “Hirohito Advised to Ignore US Peace Appeals,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 25, 1945, 4. Kido Kōichi misled the readers by saying that the emperor had known nothing about the Pearl Harbor attack in advance. The emperor did know the military plan; what

On September 25, Emperor Hirohito himself gave a brief interview with a couple of American correspondents, which was coordinated by Japanese officials and authorized by MacArthur.<sup>130</sup> According to Frank L. Kluckhohn of the *New York Times*, the emperor denied his involvement in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by alluding to Tōjō's mishandling of the declaration of war. Hirohito was quoted as saying that "he had [had] no intention of having his war rescript employed as former premier Hideki Tojo [had] used it when Japan [had] launched her sneak attack on Pearl Harbor" and that "he had expected Tojo to declare war against the United States in the usual, formal manner, if necessary."<sup>131</sup> Going beyond the issue of the Pacific War, the emperor expressed his opposition to war as an instrument of policy. Kluckhohn reported that the emperor "did not believe an enduring peace could be established and maintained at the point of the bayonet or by the use of the weapons of war" and was convinced that the "solution of the problem of peace [would] lie in the reconciliation of free peoples, both victor and vanquished, without recourse to any armaments."<sup>132</sup>

The US press projected the emperor not only as a pacifist but also as an accessible human ruler. Kluckhohn depicted Hirohito as being of the average Japanese height, wearing rimless glasses; the emperor "looked solemn," "[talking] with emphasis" and "[looking] straight into [Kluckhohn's] face as he spoke." The correspondent also commented that "[i]t was apparent that

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he, or anyone, did not expect was that the Pearl Harbor attack would happen before the formal declaration of war was made to the US government; see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 256-257; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 291-292. Kido also denied the emperor's abdication in this interview. In addition, he explained about the advice that he made to the emperor in late 1941, uttered his belief that Japan had been compelled to enter the war by America's diplomatic offense and to continue to fight only to convince the United States to negotiate an equal peace with Japan, and revealed his cautious attitude to Japan's democratization.

<sup>130</sup> The American correspondents needed to submit questions in advance, and answers were actually written by the Foreign Ministry; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 291. *Time* called the press interviews granted to the American correspondents the emperor's propaganda effort in its October 8, 1945 issue; see p.38.

<sup>131</sup> "Tell American Newsman He Opposed War," *Washington Post*, September 26, 1945, 2.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

the war had been a strain on [the emperor] and, although he looked well, he had several nervous mannerisms and his hand shook slightly,” in a way authenticating the claim that the sovereign had not desired the war.<sup>133</sup> UP President Hugh Baillie (1890-1966), the other American journalist who could meet with Emperor Hirohito, also described the emperor’s appearance. Baillie’s impressions of Hirohito were slightly different from Kluckhohn’s but similarly noted the emperor’s serious and simple character. According to Baillie, Hirohito was taller than expected, wore steel-rimmed spectacles, and had his hair not so shortly cut. While sincerely engaged in a conversation with Baillie through his interpreter, the emperor seemed to tense up. Baillie informed the American readers that the emperor “had a rather scholarly air reminiscent of a traditional college professor.”<sup>134</sup> There was no image of an all-powerful and sacred monarch or of a military conqueror in these press reports.

In the interview with the Americans, the emperor also showed himself as a proponent of democracy by expressing his favorable view of Japan’s democratization. He denied the possibility or desirability of a revolution, but asserted that a Japanese-style democracy, even if not exactly the same as the American or British examples, would certainly evolve in time. Nevertheless, he stated his personal belief that a constitutional monarch patterned after the British model would be the suitable form of a new Japanese government. The emperor felt assured that Japan would rejoin the world community as a peaceful and democratic nation. Moreover, he threw his support behind educational reform so as to “foster a search for truth, initiative, broad-mindedness and the correct kind of world outlook,” which indirectly denounced patriotic

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Hugh Baillie, “Worried about Food: Hirohito Says Japan Is ‘On Road of Peace,’” *Atlanta Constitution*, September 26, 1945, 2; Hugh Baillie, “Hirohito Predicts Nippon Democracy,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 26, 1945, 6.

education during the war. He also referred to the importance of a free press and free exchange of information with other countries, which had not been permitted in Japan for a long time.<sup>135</sup>

Meantime, what the Americans considered as the cultural sources of Japanese militarism and ultranationalism were liquidated by the American Occupation authorities. Following Douglas MacArthur's directive of "Five Great Reforms" that included educational reform, GHQ issued another directive on the "Administration of the Educational System of Japan" on October 22, 1945. The directive ordered to replace military and nationalist education programs and teachers with new curriculum and staff. Next day, the *Atlanta Constitution* headlined "MacArthur Sweeps War Teachings from Japan's Entire School System" and explained that this move attempted to "end the teaching of feudal militarism and other ideologies such as put Japan on the path to war."<sup>136</sup>

The abolition of State Shinto came into the spotlight, too. On October 6, the representatives of the State, War, and Navy Departments disclosed their policy for targeting the national Shinto establishment that had contributed to the "dissemination of Japanese militaristic and ultranationalistic ideology."<sup>137</sup> Under the headline "US Bans Japs' Shintoism as State Religion," the *Chicago Daily Tribune* hailed the measure against the Shinto "cult" as "one of the most drastic yet determined upon in remaking Japan into a peaceful nation."<sup>138</sup> This guiding

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<sup>135</sup> "Text of Press Interview with Hirohito," *Washington Post*, September 26, 1945, 2; the text was also in Baillie, "Hirohito Predicts Nippon Democracy." The emperor's belief in the prospect of Japan's democratization and preference of the British monarch as a model for Japanese governmental form were also mentioned in "Tell American Newsman He Opposed War" and Baillie, "Worried about Food." Important to mention, in the interview, the emperor stressed that Japan was in urgent need for food and housing and indirectly asked foreign aid.

<sup>136</sup> "MacArthur Sweeps War Teachings from Japan's Entire School System," *Atlanta Constitution*, October 23, 1945, 1; also see "Gen. MacArthur Strikes at Education of Japs," *Los Angeles Times*, October 23, 1945, 6.

<sup>137</sup> Bertram D. Hulen, "State Shintoism in Japan Must Go," *New York Times*, October 7, 1945, 1, 29; "US to Ban Jap Shintoism as State Religion," *Los Angeles Times*, October 7, 1945, 1, 8; "US Bans Japs' Shintoism as State Religion," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 7, 1945, 1.

<sup>138</sup> "US Bans Japs' Shintoism as State Religion," 1.

principle was turned to the SCAP directive of the “Abolition of Governmental Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State Shinto” in December. GHQ ordered the Japanese government to completely separate political and religious affairs by forbidding any governmental support for Shintoism. All Shinto teaching in schools was also to be banned, which included the removal of wartime religious practices, doctrines, and slogans. On December 16, the *New York Times* delivered the sensational news that General MacArthur ordered the abolition of national Shinto, which “through the glorification of warrior ancestors [had] led the empire down the path of military aggression to defeat.”<sup>139</sup> The paper reported that with the Shinto directive, Japan’s militaristic and ultranationalistic ideology such as the divinity of the emperor and the superiority of the Japanese ethnicity would be dismantled.<sup>140</sup>

The so-called “declaration of humanity” (*ningen sengen*) by Emperor Hirohito himself appeared to the Americans to signal the death knell for Japanese militarism. Focusing on a part of the imperial rescript released on January 1, 1946, the American press announced that the emperor renounced his divinity. In the New Year’s Day edict, the emperor actually reaffirmed liberal principles, proclaimed in the Charter Oath of 1868, and appealed to the Japanese people for their resolve and unity in reconstructing Japan. He emphasized the moral ties between himself and the people and reminded them that he was always with them, even in this difficult time. Here, the English text read that the throne declared: “The ties between us and our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine and that the Japanese people are

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<sup>139</sup> Lindsey Parrott, “Japan Ordered to End Aid to Religion that Bred War,” *New York Times*, December 16, 1945, 1.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, 1, 7.

superior to other races and fated to rule the world.”<sup>141</sup>

To the Americans, the renunciation of divinity by Hirohito was understood as a revolutionary event in Japanese democratization. The *Washington Post* declared that “at one blow, Hirohito [had] smashed the theoretical foundations upon which Japanese government and society [had] rested.” With the emperor repudiating his own divinity, the newspaper continued to describe, he “[axed] ... the roots of Japanese militaristic and feudalistic ideology” and “removed ... a very important obstacle to the democratization.”<sup>142</sup> *Time* called the emperor’s proclamation an “ideological hara-kiri ... committed on the anachronistic body of Shintoism.”<sup>143</sup> Combined with the GHQ directive of abolishing State Shinto, *Newsweek* assessed the New Year’s rescript as the “most important development in Japan since the surrender.”<sup>144</sup>

Constitutional reforms were also critical to the Americans in that they formally nullified the emperor’s status and ended Japan’s absolutist political structure. There was evident public interest in the liberalization of the Meiji Constitution after the MacArthur-Shidehara meeting held in October 1945. Lacking a deep knowledge of constitutional law, however, most Americans did not engage in discussions about how the Japanese constitution should be amended; they simply looked for a way to demote the emperor from his position of absolute ruler to that of constitutional monarch, either by simply denying the emperor’s divinity or by reducing his wide-ranging prerogatives. The mere fact that by MacArthur’s order, the Japanese began to reform their

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<sup>141</sup> “Text of Hirohito New Year Rescript,” *New York Times*, January 2, 1946, 15. The Japanese text used the word, *akitsumikami*, or a “god incarnate,” for “divine”; “races” was a translation for *minzoku*. About how the idea for the “declaration of humanity” developed, how the text was drafted, and how it was received by the Americans, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 236-237; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 308-317; Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 179-188.

<sup>142</sup> Barnet Nover, “Revolution in Japan,” *Washington Post*, January 3, 1946, 5.

<sup>143</sup> “Foreign News: Japan: Diversion from Divinity,” *Time*, January 14, 1946, 27.

<sup>144</sup> Compton Pakenham, “Religious Emancipation Is the Jap’s, by MacArthur’s Grace,” *Newsweek*, January 14, 1946, 45.

political institutions impressed the Americans as a sign of progress in the democratization of Japan.

Thus, it was not surprising that the American press, more positively than their Japanese counterpart and the American Occupation authorities, reported on Japanese “conservative” attempts to revise their constitution. When the amendment plan of former Prime Minister Prince Konoe Fumimaro was revealed, the *New York Times* received it without much criticism. Konoe initiated a study on constitutional reform as early as the beginning of October 1945; informed of the State Department’s thinking through his contact with POLAD George Atcheson, Jr., Konoe made amendment proposals similar to Washington’s.<sup>145</sup> A headline of the October 23 *Times* read “Konoye Indicates Curb on Emperor: Says that Proposed Changes in the Constitution Include Limiting of His Powers,” and quoted Konoe as recommending reducing the emperor’s powers, if not replacing imperial sovereignty with popular sovereignty. In addition, he proposed making the cabinet responsible not only to the emperor but also to the Lower house, strengthening the power of the Lower House, and possibly turning the Upper House into an electoral body as well.<sup>146</sup>

The *New York Times* introduced the content of Konoe’s outline for constitutional amendments in mid-November. The article disclosed that regarding the emperor’s prerogatives, the Konoe plan deprived the throne of exclusive control over the armed forces and the power to make war or peace without consultation with the Diet, and it even abolished the Privy Council, the emperor’s consultative body. Although Konoe had not dramatically alter his constitutional thought since October, the article explained that the “report, if true, [represented] a marked change

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<sup>145</sup> See footnote 122; the details of the Konoe draft are in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.

<sup>146</sup> Lindsey Parrott, “Konoye Indicates Curb on Emperor: Says that Proposed Changes in the Constitution Include Limiting His Powers,” *New York Times*, October 23, 1945, 5.

in Prince Konoye's attitudes," and highly evaluated the elimination of the Privy Council as "one of the outstanding changes in the Constitution."<sup>147</sup>

About two weeks later, the *Los Angeles Times* carried the rough plan of the Shidehara government's committee on constitutional revision, which was nearly identical to Konoe's: the government would leave the principle of imperial sovereignty intact but agreed to limit the emperor's prerogatives, such as his right of military command and diplomatic powers, and to transfer most of his powers to the Diet. The article did not raise questions about this "New Jap Order to Strip Hirohito of Most Powers," thus basically approving the method of constitutional amendments.<sup>148</sup> The emperor's nominal status as the sovereign did not matter to the Americans as much as to the Japanese, as long as his powers – whether theoretical or practical – were symbolically and legally restricted.

The appraisal of Japan's prominent constitutional scholar Minobe Tatsukichi evidenced how little the Americans knew about constitutional debates in post-surrender as well as interwar Japan and how they understood differently from the Japanese the significance of constitutional revision. Minobe was a prewar liberal noted for advocating in the 1910s-1930s the theory that the throne was just an "organ of the state" (*Ten'nō kikan-setsu*) against the absolutist interpretation of the emperor's sovereign powers. American conservatives and progressives universally named Minobe as one of the leading "liberals" on whom the Americans should count for democratizing Japan.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> Clinton Green, "Konoye Proposals Ready for Throne: Reduction in Emperor's Rights and End of Privy Council Reported Proposed," *New York Times*, November 16, 1945, 4. What was inaccurate is that Konoe's proposal did not make the cabinet responsible only to the Diet. Green correctly mentioned Konoe's intention to make changes in the principle of imperial sovereignty, but despite the fact that it involved more than Article 1, he touched only Article 1 (actually by explaining about Article 13).

<sup>148</sup> "New Jap Order to Strip Hirohito of Most Powers," *Los Angeles Times*, November 28, 1945, 8.

<sup>149</sup> About the American view of Minobe, see Borton, *Japan since 1931*, 10-11; Byas, *Government by Assassination*,

In fact, precisely because he believed in the workability of his own theory, Minobe was among the most reluctant to revise the Meiji Constitution, and he was a member of the Shidehara cabinet's committee on constitutional revision whose draft was considered too "conservative." Minobe's fame as an anti-militarist, liberal scholar shone, however, and the Americans looked to him as the ideal person for liberalizing the Japanese political system. But, in October 1945, Minobe defended the Meiji Constitution by explaining that it was just like England's and the non-militarist Japanese, even Emperor Hirohito himself, did not literally take the wording in Article 3 that the emperor was "sacred and inviolable." Nevertheless, the *Washington Post* took Minobe's remark out of context and turned it into headline-grabbing news: "Mikado Knows He's Not Divine, Noted Jap Scholar Reveals." The article began with the statement: "One of Japan's foremost authorities on the constitution said today Emperor Hirohito doesn't believe he is descended from the sun goddess, and the constitution doesn't surround him with such divinity."<sup>150</sup>

Minobe's appointment as a member of the Privy Council in January 1946 got great coverage in the *New York Times*. On January 27, Lindsay Parrott (1901-1987) reported this as the "first real step taken to date to liberalize the tight little circle surrounding Emperor Hirohito." More importantly, Parrot asserted to the readers, "Coming as it does after Emperor Hirohito's New Year's declaration denying his own 'divinity' to which it is a logical corollary, Dr. Minobe's appointment seemed like a clear indication that the Emperor himself is now in favor of a constitutional theory denominating the monarch as the leader of the state under the Constitution rather than as the absolute ruler that he is in theory." Parrott was also hopeful that since the Privy Council was authorized to deal with matters of constitutional interpretation, Minobe would

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271-275: Johnstone, *The Future of Japan*, 14; Maki, *Japanese Militarism*, 166.

<sup>150</sup> "Mikado Knows He's Not Divine, Noted Jap Scholar Reveals," *Washington Post*, October 15, 1945, 14.

contribute to liberal reform of the Japanese political organization.<sup>151</sup>

Another article that appeared in the *Times* next day covered the same story, welcoming Minobe's nomination, but misrepresenting both the form of the Japanese government and Minobe's aversion to amending the constitutional provisions concerning the emperor. The writer presented Minobe as the "man who long before Japan's surrender had laid the basis for constitutional government resting not on the rule of a theoretically absolute god, but on human organization" and described Minobe's appointment as Emperor Hirohito's second attempt to "[convert] Japan from a primitive theocracy to a modern nation" after his renunciation of his divinity.<sup>152</sup>

Understanding the issue of Japanese constitutional revision in such superficial ways, the American public simply accepted the Shidehara government's draft constitution, which was rewritten between late February and early March 1946 based on the GS draft.<sup>153</sup> More detailed and radical than Konoe's outline and the original government proposal, the new draft made public on March 6 turned the emperor into the "symbol of the state and of the unity of the people" who would play only a ceremonial role of the government, transferred all sovereign powers to the people, and extensively guaranteed the people's rights and freedoms. In American eyes, this clearly marked the end of absolute monarchy and Japan's rebirth as a modern democratic state. General Douglas MacArthur issued a statement to approve a new constitution, to note its significance, and to praise the Japanese accomplishment. He rhetorically claimed, "The Japanese

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<sup>151</sup> Lindsay Parrott, "Hirohito Appoints Liberal Adviser," *New York Times*, January 27, 1946, 16.

<sup>152</sup> "Progress in Japan," *New York Times*, January 28, 1946, 18.

<sup>153</sup> The February 11 issue of *Newsweek* reported that the government's original draft did not change the emperor's status so much; see "Japan Eternal," *Newsweek*, February 11, 1946, 40. In the March 18 issue, both *Newsweek* and *Time* mentioned that SCAP had very likely intervened in the drafting of a new constitution; "Japan: Future Tense," *Newsweek*, March 18, 1945, 56; "Japan: We, the Mimics," *Time*, March 18, 1946, 33.

people thus turn their backs firmly upon the mysticism and unreality of the past and face instead a future of realism with a new faith and a new hope.”<sup>154</sup>

Most Americans did not share such an optimistic view, as conveyed by MacArthur, that the Japanese were becoming democratic overnight, but did believe that the adaption of the principles of liberal democracy in the new constitution was undeniably a great achievement for the Japanese. The *Washington Post* wrote that the draft constitution “[represented] a complete break with the past [and] it [provided] for as liberal and democratic a form of government as one could desire.”<sup>155</sup> When the draft constitution was finally promulgated on November 3, 1946, after a long-process of revision, the emperor officially became a constitutional monarch, assenting to demote himself from a divine ruler.<sup>156</sup> The Americans celebrated Japan’s shift from the “peculiar regime of a feudal monarchy plus modern totalitarianism, in which [Japan] [had gone] to war for domination of the Far East, into a new stage of political development,” and congratulated MacArthur on his remarkable work in Japan.<sup>157</sup>

Thus, alongside many other political events, the Japanese emperor was transformed into a human, constitutional monarch. Constitutional amendments changed the political system under the Meiji Constitution, which the Americans imagined either as a primitive theocracy, a feudal monarchy, or an absolutist autocracy, and changed the emperor from an all-powerful divine ruler

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<sup>154</sup> “Texts Pertaining to New Japanese Constitution: MacArthur’s Statement,” *New York Times*, March 7, 1946, 3.

<sup>155</sup> “Japan’s Constitution,” *Washington Post*, March 10, 1946, B4. The author cast a doubt on MacArthur’s optimism. In fact, the Americans, while highly evaluating MacArthur’s handling of democratization reforms, continuously asked how much Japan actually had changed since the surrender.

<sup>156</sup> See Lindsay Parrott, “Japanese Receive New Constitution from the Emperor: Hirohito Promulgated Organic Law in Rescript to Nation – Reduces Own Status,” *New York Times*, November 3, 1946, 1. Parrot said that the rescript was the “monarch’s most important act since his New Year’s proclamation in which he told his subjects that the long-held creed of the Emperor’s divinity rested on a ‘myth’” and, with this, the emperor “[gave] his consent to the reduction of his own throne to the status of a ‘national symbol.’”

<sup>157</sup> The quote is from Lindsay Parrott, “Japanese Approve New Constitution,” *New York Times*, October 8, 1946, 8. Glorification of MacArthur and the Occupation of Japan can be seen in “Japan’s Future,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, November 6, 1946, 20.

to merely the symbol of the state and of national unity. If Hirohito used to be a symbol of militarist Japan, he was now a mirror of a new Japan, democratized by American hands. The transformation undertaken by the emperor was in effect a symbolic representation of the larger changes that would transform the state itself. As he ceased to be the target of retribution, American opinion shifted away from “republican” themes advocated by the progressives to embrace more conservative visions for postwar Japan’s political system by late 1946.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter has showed that there were two ways of democratizing the Japanese political structure: create a republican form of government by abolishing the imperial institution, or normalize the constitutional monarchy established in the Meiji period. Both proposals, one made by the progressives, the other by the conservatives and the anthropologists, aimed to modernize the Japanese governmental system, but developed from different understandings of the origins of Japanese authoritarianism and militarism and the role that the emperor system had played in them. The US policy for the Japanese imperial system took the conservative course of action. It was in a way a natural consequence since conservative policy-planners in the State Department laid the foundations for US post-surrender policies for Japan. One of them, Hugh Borton, was especially influential since his ideas formed the bases of SWNCC-228, the instruction on Japanese governmental reform. Equally important was General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo, who gave unequivocal support to constitutional monarchy rather than republicanism in implementing SWNCC-228.

The American public was not sufficiently knowledgeable about Japan enough to make a judgment on scholarly arguments or to make a pragmatic political decision. During the war,

America's general attitude was hostile to the emperor who seemed to symbolize imperial Japan. Once Japan surrendered and was put under Allied control, however, the public attitude toward the emperor gradually changed. The Americans learned that Japan was de-feudalized and democratized by the American Occupation authorities; with the roots of Japanese militarism removed, and seed of democracy sowed, Japan ceased to be a menace. Japan's shift from a feudal and militarist nation to a democratic and pacifist one was well represented by the emperor, who himself was turned into the modern constitutional monarch in American imagination. After all, the Americans gave tacit acceptance to Japan's new form of government that the American conservatives had envisioned to make.

In fact, even if the US government or SCAP had decided to eliminate the imperial institution, the American public would not have opposed it at all. The fate of the emperor system was essentially not a significant issue to the Americans. What they wanted to accomplish was first to defeat the enemy and second to destroy the causes of the war that the Americans had been fighting against and trying to exterminate. As long as these goals were met, methods did not really matter. Thus, when the democratization of Japan was underway, the wartime images of the emperor and the imperial institution passed into oblivion. In American public discourse, under the tutelage of the United States, Japan was reborn as a constitutional monarchy headed by the symbolic emperor.

Significantly, this very likely made possible America's gradual acceptance of Japan as an ally during the Occupation period. Scholars have noted that along the seemingly successful democratization of Japan and the beginning of the Cold War, Japan ceased to be a threat to

American eyes.<sup>158</sup> Public opinion polls agree that with the emergence of a new enemy, the Soviet Union, and later Communist China, American views of Japan clearly shifted between 1947 and 1952.<sup>159</sup> But when we rethink the original purpose of Occupation reforms, “democratization” meant removing what the Americans considered to be the roots of Japanese militarism. It is true that the Americans never believed that the Japanese completely got rid of their feudal traditions and fully embraced democracy. But as the disappearance of the emperor who embodied imperial Japan signified, the Americans believed that many structural causes of Japan’s aggression – absolutist rule of the divine emperor, his military and civilian officials, and State Shinto and all religious and educational teachings – were at least gone. The transformed Japan thus assured many Americans that it was not menacing and clearly less so than Communism. While Japan was categorized as a democratic and pacifist nation, Communist countries were now seen as totalitarian aggressors, the enemy of the “Free World.”

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<sup>158</sup> See Hiromi Chiba, “From Enemy to Ally: American Public Opinion and Perceptions about Japan, 1945-1950” (PhD diss., University of Hawaii, 1990); James F. Hilgenberg Jr., *From Enemy to Ally: Japan, the American Business Press, and the Early Cold War* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993; originally Ph.D. dissertation completed in 1978). Naoko Shibusawa adds to their analyses that the image of Japan as a woman or a young boy should have contributed to softening American hostility toward the Japanese; Naoko Shibusawa, *America’s Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

<sup>159</sup> See “June 9 (1946): Occupation of Germany and Japan,” 582; “September 18: Attitudes toward Russia,” 599; “March 9 (1947): Most Admired Person,” 633; “July 30: Peace Terms for Germany and Japan,” 663 in Gallup, *The Gallup Poll*, vol. 1; “April 18 (1949): Japanese People,” 806; “July 11: Communist China,” 831; “November 16: Japan,” 865; “November 28: China,” 868; “January 11 (1950): China,” 882-883; “January 11: Russia,” 883; “June 2: China,” 915; “July 10: Communist China,” 924-925; “August 16: Military Forces in Germany and Japan,” 932; “December 30: Korea,” 955; “February 5 (1951): Japanese Army,” 964; “September 14: Japan,” 1007-1008; “September 24: Communist China – Admission to UN,” 1010-1011 in Gallup, *The Gallup Poll*, vol. 2.

## CHAPTER 4

## REFORMING THE LIMITED MONARCHY: JAPANESE THOUGHTS BEHIND THE MAKING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION

The scholarship on Japanese constitutional reform during the Allied Occupation has produced a lot of meticulous work that reveals a complicated amendment process in which both Japanese and Americans were involved. In narrating the story, scholars commonly describe how the Japanese government failed to make liberal changes to the Meiji Constitution and, as a result, led the American occupiers to write a draft constitution and impose it on the Japanese. We also know that while Japanese officials and other “conservatives” had no intention to change the principle of imperial sovereignty, “liberals” and “progressives” tried to establish popular sovereignty.<sup>1</sup>

Historian John W. Dower, for instance, follows this narrative. He attributes the Japanese government’s lukewarm attempts at constitutional reform to officials’ social background, and

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<sup>1</sup> Takayanagi Kenzō, Ōtomo Ichirō, and Tanaka Hideo, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei: Rengōkoku Sōshireibu-gawa no Kiroku ni yoru 1: Genbun to Hon'yaku* (The Process of the Making of the Constitution of Japan: Based on GHQ Records vol. 1: Documents) (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1972); Takayanagi Kenzō, Ōtomo Ichirō, and Tanaka Hideo, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei: Rengōkoku Sōshireibu-gawa no Kiroku ni yoru 2: Kaisetsu* (The Process of the Making of the Constitution of Japan: Based on GHQ Records vol. 2: Comments) (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1972), Satō Tatsuo, *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seiritsu-shi 4 kan* (A History of the Making of the Constitution of Japan 4 vols.) (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1962, 1964, 1994) (I have not obtained these volumes); Theodore H. McNelly, “‘Induced Revolution’: The Policy and the Process of Constitutional Reform in Occupied Japan,” in *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*, ed. Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 76-106; Koseki Shōichi, *The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution*, ed. and trans. Ray A. Moore (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997); Nakamura Masanori, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the ‘Symbol Emperor System,’ 1931-1991*, trans. Herbert P. Bix, Jonathan Baker-Bates, and Derek Bowen (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992). Also see Iokibe Makoto, *Senryō-ki: Shushō-tachi no Shin-Nihon* (The Occupation Period: Prime Ministers’ New Japan) (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1997), 169-178, 199-226, 264-277; Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 89-106; John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 346-404; Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1989), 11-39, 54-60; Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: Perennial, 2001), 533-618; Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swan (New York: Continuum, 2002), 270-292; Masumi Jun’nosuke, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō* (Postwar Politics 1945-55 vol.1) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan, 1983), 76-130; Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu (Ministry of Finance, History of Finance Office), ed., *Shōwa Zaisei-shi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan: Amerika no tai-Nichi Senryō Seisaku* (A History of Finance of the Showa Period from the End of War to Peace vol. 3: American Occupation Policies for Japan) (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1976), 217-231.

writes that “privileged men born in the Meiji period” were unwilling to change the “essence of the Meiji Constitution – the centering of sovereignty in an ‘inviolable’ emperor.” Dower explains that, having naïve faith in the flexibility and workability of the constitution, they believed that, once civilian administrators regained government control from the militarists, things would go well without revising the constitution. Such expectations went along with their wishful thinking that the Allies would pursue a lenient policy for governmental reform, following the Potsdam Declaration’s proclamation that the future form of government would be decided “in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.” Dower argues that the “Japanese conservatives utterly failed to comprehend” that postwar democratization was made possible not by the Meiji Constitution or returning civilian officials but by the American occupiers and that these American officials considered making drastic changes in the constitution absolutely crucial to ensure democracy in Japan.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the Japanese government failed to respond to what the Japanese people – from private organizations and individuals to journalists – wanted: they sought more “liberal and progressive” alternatives that the Americans eventually provided for them.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the Japanese government itself invited the General Headquarter (GHQ) to intervene in constitutional reform. The Japanese government “paid the price for its inflexibility with awesome swiftness” by GHQ, asserts Dower.<sup>4</sup>

Although I respect other scholars’ work and rely on it as an intellectual starting point, I find this dominant narrative too focused on differences between “conservative” and “liberal/progressive” and the discontinuities between prewar and postwar, and therefore lacking a close

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<sup>2</sup> Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 351-352; the quotes are all from p.352.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 355-356.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 360.

examination of the formation of a middle ground in Japanese discourse. As Dower's description shows, it is conventional for scholars to portray the Japanese government with derision as ideologically too conservative, myopic, and inept.<sup>5</sup> While some scholars acknowledge the "conservatives'" efforts to modify the Meiji Constitution, their criticism of the government overwhelms this point. Some insightfully argue that the conflict between the Japanese government and GHQ was essentially a culture-clash, attributing Taishō liberals' training in German constitutional theory to their failure to change the Meiji Constitution along the lines of Anglo-American legal tradition.<sup>6</sup> But even such a thesis is based upon the premise that "conservatives" ultimately "failed." I believe that this perspective prevents us from inquiring into what changes they suggested *and why* they thought their plans were sufficient to democratize the Japanese political system.

The constitutional amendments proposed by the "conservatives," or Taishō liberals, in fact, reflect their understanding of the growth of Japanese democracy during the Taishō period and the causes of its collapse during the subsequent decades. It is worth noting that the return of Taishō liberals to the political and intellectual spheres after Japan's surrender marked the reinstatement of their legal interpretation of the Meiji Constitution, which had been defeated by the absolutist tendencies during the mid-1930s. It is not fair, however, to say that Taishō liberals simply tried to bring back the pre-1930s norms; finding fault with the constitution and given the freedom and opportunity to alter it, they went beyond the thought of 1920s legal theorists like Yoshino Sakuzō (1878-1933) and his idea of "democracy" (*Minponshugi*; government for the

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<sup>5</sup> Besides Dower's *Embracing Defeat*, also see McNelly, "Induced Revolution"; Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, Chapters 1, 3, and 5; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*.

<sup>6</sup> See Tanaka Hideo, "The Conflict between Two Legal Traditions in Making the Constitution of Japan," in *Democratizing Japan*, ed. Ward and Sakamoto, 107-132; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 352, 354-355; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 270-273.

welfare of the people) and Minobe Tatsukichi's theory of the "emperor as an organ of the state" theory (*Ten'nō kikan-setsu*).

Actually, understanding Taishō liberal thought is the key to making sense of why the "conservatives" came to support the GHQ draft constitution in the end. Scholars simply attribute their support to their pragmatic political decision-making, resignation, or self-delusion, but this does not fully explain why.<sup>7</sup> Taishō liberals such as Yoshino and Minobe in effect had developed the view that the emperor was a constitutional monarch whose power was restricted by law and who was virtually a nominal head of the state; by employing the concept of joint governance by the monarch and the people (*kunmin dōchi*), they argued that people were also part of the governing body and justified the promotion of representative government.<sup>8</sup> Their efforts and a certain degree of success at developing democracy while adhering to the formality of imperial rule during the Taishō period made them reluctant to radically change the Meiji political structure after the end of the war. But Taishō liberals' theories also indicate their pliability. Scholars have always mentioned prewar liberals' refusal to give up the national polity, or *kokutai*, but these scholars have failed to note that the national polity in their imagination was not an authoritarian state headed by the absolute monarch; it was a system of indirect rule by an essentially apolitical emperor under the management of the people and based upon the idea of the concert between ruler and ruled. As this chapter will show, this political theory provided many "conservatives" with a rationale for accepting the symbolic emperor and popular sovereignty in the postwar

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<sup>7</sup> Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei* 2, 55-104; McNelly, "'Induced Revolution,'" 83, 86, 91; Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 102-109; Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 222-226; Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 97-98, 99, 104; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 374-78, 387, 400, 403-404, Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 283; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 113-114, 121, 126-127. Also see footnotes 71-73.

<sup>8</sup> See the abridged versions of Minobe's and Yoshino's writings are available in WM. Theodore de Bary, Carol Gluck, and Arthur E. Tiedemann, eds., *Sources of Japanese Tradition vol. 2: 1600 to 2000 Part II: 1868 to 2000* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 155-180.

Japanese constitution.

Taishō liberals' interpretation of *kokutai* helps obscure the orthodox conservative-liberal/progressive dichotomy. It is common to argue, like John W. Dower does, that “liberals/progressives” and the general public who had looked for a constitution as liberal as GHQ offered, welcomed the new constitution and have defended it ever since.<sup>9</sup> However, this is not quite accurate for several reasons. First, as Theodore H. McNelly points out, continuity existed between the prewar and postwar constitutions; the latter carries “conservative” attributes, specifically, by preserving the emperor system in a depoliticized form, which all the parties in Japan and the United States, except Japanese communists and American progressives, proposed. In other words, the new constitution actually took a moderate course.<sup>10</sup> Second, as I will discuss later, there were more similarities than differences between “conservative” and “liberal/progressive” amendment plans in terms of their acknowledgement of the shortcomings of the Meiji Constitution and proposed changes to it. Nevertheless, the literature on Japanese constitutional reform tends to overlook resemblances.

Third, scholars usually mention that the Japanese people were dissatisfied with the government's conservative draft constitution and demanded more radical amendments, referencing certain public opinion polls.<sup>11</sup> However, I find the people's attitudes to the issue of constitutional revision rather ambivalent. Ordinary people's opinions expressed in their letters to national newspapers and public opinions polls actually show that their views overlapped with those of the so-called conservatives as well as liberals/progressives. Out of a sense of respect for

<sup>9</sup> McNelly, “‘Induced Revolution’,” 101; Tanaka, “The Conflict between Two Legal Traditions in Making the Constitution of Japan,” 118-119, 125; Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, Chapter 2; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 352-353, 355, 359-360, 386; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 273, 282.

<sup>10</sup> McNelly, “‘Induced Revolution’,” 101.

<sup>11</sup> See footnote 9; esp. Dower and Takemae.

the emperor, the majority would likely have supported any draft that retained the emperor system and yet separated the throne from political responsibility for the security of the imperial household. They supported the new constitution due to its moderate, rather than revolutionary, nature.

Lastly, it is worth noting that when the Japanese today discuss whether or not the postwar constitution should be revised, many think only of Article 9. In that sense, it is not wrong to conclude that “liberals/ progressives” and the majority of the Japanese have been opponents of war and defenders of pacifism and therefore have fought against constitutional reform in order to retain Article 9. But it is also true that there were among “conservatives” those who did not consider it necessary to change Article 9 since they interpreted the clause as allowing rearmament and the right to self-defense and found it useful to deflect American demands for Japan’s military commitment.<sup>12</sup>

Many demilitarization and democratization reforms were enacted during the Allied Occupation. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, there were native political and intellectual grounds for democratization in Japan. As Japanese historians have argued, while some reform plans were introduced by the occupiers, in some other cases, having already prepared for reform, the Japanese government took the initiative in introducing bills without the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers’ (SCAP) direct intervention. Many others were modified at GHQ’s requests.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> It is well-known that the so-called Ashida Amendment to Article 9 which added “In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph” was made to leave room for rearmaments and the right of self-defense. It is also known that the real author is Kanamori Tokujirō (1886-1959) rather than Ashida Hitoshi (1887-1959); see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 289, 291.

<sup>13</sup> I employ Iokibe Makoto’s categorization of democratization reforms into three types, Japanese initiative, GHQ initiative, and joint work; see Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 164-169 and Iokibe Makoto, *Nichi-Bei Sensō to Sengo Nihon* (The Japanese-American War and Postwar Japan) (Ōsaka: Ōsaka Shoseki, 1989; repr., Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2005), 202-224. About the fact that there had been preparation for various reforms since the Taishō period, also see Shinobu Seizaburō, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 I: Senryō to Minshushugi* (A History of Postwar Japanese Politics 1945-1952 vol. 1:

Constitutional revision was this last case: the Japanese began to examine the Meiji Constitution right after the Occupation started and continued to do so for months, before SCAP eventually intervened in the drafting process. Dissatisfied with the Japanese government's revision plan, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the Government Section (GS) staff to write a draft constitution in early February 1946, and the GS forced its draft on the Japanese government. However, by then, not only the Japanese government but also various political parties and intellectuals had released their drafts, and some actually had influenced the GHQ draft. Public discussions on a new constitution had also started in fall 1945. The study groups' and individuals' ideas reflected what defects they perceived in the Meiji state and what kind of democracy they pursued, varying from Taishō liberalism to republicanism. Yet, the ultimate question on constitutional revision was centered on how to compromise on the emperor's status and a democratic form of government. A Japanese consensus was clearly forged around saving the emperor system while fixing the loopholes in the Meiji Constitution that the militarists had abused. Although the Japanese government draft was rewritten after the GHQ draft and went through more changes in Diet committees, the basic form did not change and appealed to a large number of the Japanese from Taishō liberals to moderate socialists. This chapter thus analyzes the Japanese public discourse on constitutional revision, going beyond the conventional interpretation to complicate it. I will illuminate how the Japanese discussed constitutional amendment as their own issue and why they widely approved the new constitution.

### **The Initial Stage of Constitutional Review: September-October 1945**

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The Occupation and Democracy) (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1965), 172, 185, 214-215, 217-219, 220-222; Hayashi Shigeru and Tsuji Kiyooki, eds., *Nihon Naikaku Shiroku 5* (A History of the Japanese Cabinets vol. 5) (Tokyo: Daiichi Hōki Shuppan, 1981), 42, 45-47.

The review of the Meiji Constitution slowly started in September-October 1945. Neither the Potsdam Declaration nor the “US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” (SWNCC-150/4/A) explicitly required the Japanese to revise the Meiji Constitution. The American Occupation forces that were setting up a military government after their landing in late August did not impose constitutional review on the first postwar cabinet under Higashikuni(-nomiya) Naruhiko(-Ō), either. Nevertheless, the Higashikuni cabinet’s Legislative Bureau and Foreign Ministry embarked on outlines of constitutional revision as early as mid-September 1945. With Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam conditions that ordered demilitarization, democratization, and decolonization, the governmental officials were aware of the necessity to revise the existing constitution. Their deliberations on the Meiji Constitution entailed their attempts mainly to solve the problems that would arise with the abolishment of the Japanese military forces. The officials’ reviews of the Meiji Constitution, however, also reveal the Japanese efforts since the early twentieth century to democratize the political structure within the system of monarchical sovereignty.

One of the earliest attempts at constitutional revision was the report submitted on September 18, 1945 by Iriye Toshio (1901-1972), Director of the First Department in the Bureau of Legislation, who suggested deleting the articles regarding the military and reexamining the emperor’s prerogatives, the Imperial Diet’s function and power, and the existence of the Privy Council. Iriye believed that once the military was abolished, the emperor’s prerogatives of military command and all the other clauses concerning the armed forces would be annulled. Regarding democratization of the Meiji political system, he inquired into the need for strengthening the Imperial Diet while reducing the emperor’s power. He questioned “[i]f the

clauses on the (Emperor's) prerogatives stipulated in the Constitution should be approved, or even if they could, whether they should be reduced and the extent of the Imperial Diet's involvement should be expanded." His following suggestions to reexamine the membership and power of the House of Peers, the legitimacy of the Privy Council, and the duration of a Diet session reflected his concerns about the weakness of Japanese democratic politics.<sup>14</sup> Additionally, Iriye acknowledged the need to establish responsible government and to strengthen the guarantee on free speech. Nevertheless, he did not expect the basic principles of the Meiji Constitution to be completely changed. At the Department meeting held on October 23, his suggestions were limited only to changes indicated by the Potsdam Declaration. He supported preserving the national polity, declaring that "[the Japanese] national polity with the Emperor as the subject of sovereignty would not be changed."<sup>15</sup>

Discussions on constitutional revision at the Foreign Ministry achieved agreements on the need to modify the Meiji Constitution along the line of the Legislation Bureau's suggestions. The September 23 lecture given at the Ministry by Tokyo Imperial University professor of law Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, one of the disciples of the renowned Minobe Tatsukichi, however, shows more specific reasoning for constitutional revision. The issue of utmost importance regarding the constitution pertained to the independence of the emperor's supreme command over the military. Taishō liberals attributed the rise of militarism and the demise of Taishō Democracy during the 1930s to the abuse of the emperor's prerogative of supreme command, the problem in Japan's political organization that had originated in the Meiji Constitution, and so did Miyazawa. Like

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<sup>14</sup> "Shūsen to Kenpō" (The Termination of the War and the Constitution), at <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/024/024tx.html>.

<sup>15</sup> "Kenpō Kaisei no Kihon-teki Tachiba" (The Basic Position on Constitutional Revision), *ibid.*

Iriye, Miyazawa argued that once the armed forces were disbanded, the emperor's supreme authority over them simultaneously disappeared; therefore, Articles 11 and 12 should be deleted.<sup>16</sup>

Since the vanishing of the independent supreme command means the disappearance of the system that has given Japanese government its characteristics, [such a reform's] qualitative and political impact would be extremely great. In our country's system, the supreme command and the administration have continued a dualistic rivalry; specifically, the administration has not been allowed to interfere with military command and has constantly been under the pressure (of the military); along with the end of the independence of military command that has assumed an aspect of the so-called "double government," the Naval General Staff, the Imperial Headquarters, and the system of reporting directly to the Throne should be abolished, and its consequences are worth paying attention to.<sup>17</sup>

As to democratization, Miyazawa stressed that the Meiji Constitution did not stand in contradiction to democracy, but he agreed that some provisions should be modified to promote democratic development. Like Yoshino Sakuzō and Minobe, the legal theorists whose ideas functioned as the pillars of Taishō Democracy, Miyazawa denied the absolutist interpretation of imperial sovereignty and believed that democracy and imperial sovereignty did not contradict each other. Now that the military was dissolved and all the emperor's powers were placed under the cabinet's supervision, democracy would be more easily secured.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, Miyazawa pressed for reforms to strengthen and democratize the function of the Imperial Diet and to promote parliamentary democracy just as Iriye's First Department of the Legislative Bureau proposed, which included the reorganization of the Upper House and the extension of a Diet session.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Article 11: The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy; Article 12: The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy.

<sup>17</sup> "Potsudamu' Sengen ni motozuku Kenpō, Dō-fuzoku Hōrei Kaisei Yōten (Miyazawa Toshiyoshi Kyōju Kō)" (Main Points of Revision of the Constitution and Its Appended Statutes Based on the Potsdam Declaration) (Lecture of Professor Miyazawa Toshiyoshi), at <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/025/025tx.html>.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. A couple of divisions in the Foreign Ministry created proposals on constitutional reform in early October, but they were of the same kind as the Legislative Bureau's and Miyazawa's; see "Jishu-teki Sokketsu-teki Shisaku no Kinkyū Juritsu ni kansuru Ken (Shian)" (The Matter regarding an Urgent Establishment of an Autonomous and Prompt Policy (Tentative Plan), "Teikoku Kenpō Kaisei Mondai Shian" (A Tentative Proposal on the Problem of Revision of the Constitution), and "Kenpō Kaisei Taikō An" (A Proposal on an Outline of Constitutional Reform) at <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/029/029tx.html>, <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/031/031tx.html>, and

Because, for the Higashikuni cabinet in charge of a smooth transition from wartime to occupation, constitutional revision was not a priority, formal cabinet-wide discussions never started. However, the deliberations in the Legislative Bureau and the Foreign Office served as a basis of constitutional revision when the subsequent cabinet formed by Shidehara Kijūrō organized a study group after he received the unofficial order for constitutional reform from General Douglas MacArthur. What is clear is that officials in the Higashikuni cabinet were aware of the flaws in the Meiji Constitution and willing to reform it in order to normalize democratic practices, if not to overhaul the entire political structure with the emperor as the head of the state. Their vision was built upon the ideas prevalent during the 1920s, in the heyday of the Taishō democratic movement, but they did not suggest merely returning to the pre-1930s system. Taishō democrats had tried to promote democracy under a constitutional monarchy by championing liberal interpretations of the Meiji Constitution, the constitution theoretically established by the emperor, rather than by proposing alterations of it. As a result, the problem of what Miyazawa characterized as “double government” and the innate weakness of parliamentary democracy and responsible government had never been fixed. The demilitarization and democratization orders from the victors surely posed challenges to the Japanese government, but also gave it an unprecedented opportunity to amend the constitution so as to make the political structure healthier.

### **The Beginning of Official and Public Discussions on Constitutional Revision: October 1945**

GHQ officials made informal contacts with some Japanese officials and scholars in late September-early October 1945 as the Higashikuni cabinet’s Legislative Bureau and the Foreign Ministry were reviewing the Meiji Constitution. It was not until early October, however, that

General Douglas MacArthur officially suggested the idea of Japanese leaders' themselves liberalizing the Meiji Constitution. He met with Prince Konoe Fumimaro, former prime minister and then general affairs official of the Office of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, on the fourth of October and with former diplomat and newly appointed prime minister Shidehara Kijūrō a week later.

Konoe was one of the few who had already been contacted by the Office of the Political Advisor (POLAD) in GHQ and advised on the State Department's instructions on constitutional reform.<sup>20</sup> Taking constitutional revision as his task, he undertook an investigation of the Meiji Constitution by consulting a former professor of law at the Imperial University of Kyōto, Sasaki Sōichi (1878-1965). In the meantime, not yet convinced of the urgent need to change the constitution, Shidehara reluctantly established a Committee to Study Constitutional Problems (*Kenpō Mondai Chōsa Iinkai*) led by Matsumoto Jōji (1877-1954), a former professor of commercial law at Tokyo Imperial University and a newly appointed minister of state. Looking at the members, it is clear that the staff and activities of the Legislative Bureau and the Foreign Ministry were transferred to this so-called Matsumoto Committee, named after the chair; the Committee consisted of several professors and Cabinet Legislative Bureau officials, including Minobe Tatsukichi, Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, and Iriye Toshio.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, two study groups were set up in October. But soon Japanese and American officials questioned the qualifications of Konoe Fumimaro in leading constitutional revision, for he was not a cabinet member then and had served as prime minister twice between 1937 and 1941. In response, GHQ severed its connection with him, and this left the Shidehara cabinet's

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<sup>20</sup> About the Konoe-POLAD connection, see footnote 122 in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

<sup>21</sup> About the members, see Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 175.

Committee the sole legitimate body to study the Meiji Constitution.<sup>22</sup>

Simultaneously, constitutional reform became a public issue in mid-October. Early Japanese responses were in general positive toward revising the Meiji Constitution, taking it as part of democratization, but also as a duty according to the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration. The *Asahi Shinbun*'s editorial on October 13, 1945 declared that "it [had] been generally anticipated that the revision or renewal of constitutional provisions would be sooner or later at stake in Japan's postwar process based upon its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration." Arguing that the "provisions of the Potsdam Declaration [were] already very clear, and there [was] no room in the great policies of the state and the nation determined to obey them or for debate," the editorial prodded the government to undertake constitutional revision without hesitation and without any delay.<sup>23</sup>

The *Mainichi Shinbun*'s editorial published a similar opinion on the same day. While Japan was undergoing its "greatest changes in history" (*yūshi irai no daihendō*), the writer asserted, reexamining the Meiji Constitution was just a "matter of course" (*tōzen*). In contrast with *Asahi*, however, this editorial explained more clearly why the Japanese should change the constitution, following the directives from the Allies. Not just simple acceptance of Japan's defeat or support of democratization but also a sense of humiliation, as subtle as it may be, and future-oriented pragmatism underlay the editor's motives. He stressed that the Japanese government, NOT GHQ, should take the initiative in revising the constitution, and, in so doing, it could not

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<sup>22</sup> The *Asahi Shinbun* and the *Mainichi Shinbun* on November 3, 1945; Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 172, 177; Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 16-19; Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 90; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 273; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 88-94; Shinobu, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 I*, 190-191; Tsuji Kiyooki, ed., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi I: Seiji* (Primary Sources for the History in the 20 Years after 1945 vol. 1: Politics) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1966), 61-62.

<sup>23</sup> "Shasetsu: Kintei Kenpō no Minshuka" (Editorial: Democratization of the Constitution Granted by the Sovereign), *Asahi Shinbun*, October 13, 1945, 1.

only provide new principles of the state to the Japanese people but also dispel the Allies' suspicion about the Japanese political system.<sup>24</sup>

Some scholars began to publicly express their opinions about constitutional revision, too. Unsurprisingly, those who worked with the government were the first ones to do so. Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, a member of the Committee to Study Constitutional Problem, also acknowledged in the *Mainichi Shinbun* on October 19 that amending the constitution was linked to the fulfillment of the Potsdam Declaration. To be sure, he had misgivings about constitutional reform; he stated that “our present constitution [did] not fundamentally contradict the democratic trend” and “to reestablish constitutional government [did] not necessarily require alterations of constitutional provisions.” He had already expressed these views to the Foreign Office in late September. But he also admitted to the public that the Meiji Constitution had defects that had occasionally hampered constitutional democracy, and the independence of the prerogative of supreme command was notably one of the problems. He thus advocated fixing the constitution in order to promote democracy.<sup>25</sup>

Minobe Tatsukichi was more cautious than Miyazawa. He remembered Japan's undemocratic, militarist past but insisted that there was no urgent need to revise the constitution. As a leading Taishō liberal, he believed that, if correctly interpreted and managed, the Meiji Constitution posed no obstacle to democracy, and argued that the revision of various laws and regulations could suffice to maintain the normal operation of democratic politics. Minobe, however, resigned himself to accept constitutional revision. Considering it not an improper move,

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<sup>24</sup> “Shasetsu: Kenpō Kaisei no Jūyōsei” (Editorial: The Importance of Constitutional Revision), *Mainichi Shinbun*, October 13, 1945, 1.

<sup>25</sup> Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, “Kenpō Kaisei ni tsuite” (On Constitutional Revision), *Mainichi Shinbun*, October 19, 1945, 1.

he called for deliberate, thorough discussions at least.<sup>26</sup>

### **Japanese Groups and Individuals that Wrote Draft Constitutions**

Although the official Japanese move towards constitutional reform started in October 1945, the Matsumoto Committee was not the only group that reviewed the Meiji Constitution and wrote a draft constitution. Between November 1945 and February 1946, many different groups and individuals released draft constitutions. Even after he was disqualified to lead constitutional revision, Konoe Fumimaro continued to work. By the time GHQ abolished the Office of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in late November 1945, Konoe had finished writing a draft and submitted it to the emperor. His law consultant, Sasaki Sōichi, gave his own draft separate from Konoe's to the emperor only a few days later. After GHQ named Konoe and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido Kōichi war criminals, Konoe committed suicide in mid-December. The *Mainichi Shinbun* secretly obtained the late Konoe's outline of constitutional revision and published it on December 21.<sup>27</sup>

The Matsumoto Committee continued to revise drafts until early February 1946. But Matsumoto Jōji made clear his "Four Principles" on constitutional revision in the House of Representatives on December 8, 1945 and let the basic framework of a new constitution known to the public. It was, however, when one of the Committee's drafts was leaked to the *Mainichi Shinbun* on February 1, 1946, that the details were disclosed to the Japanese for the first time. This well-known "scoop" by *Mainichi* convinced the GS staff of the need to directly intervene in

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<sup>26</sup> "Minshu Seiji wo Habanda Kenpō Kaishaku no Ayamari" (Misinterpretation that the Constitution Has Hampered Democratic Politics), *Asahi Shinbun*, October 15, 1945, 2; Minobe Tatsukichi, "Kenpō Kaisei Mondai" (The Issue of Constitutional Revision), *Asahi Shinbun*, October 20-22, 1945, 1; also see Minobe Tatsukichi, "Minshushugi to Waga Gikai Seido" (Democracy and Our Diet System), *Sekai* (January 1946): 24-31.

<sup>27</sup> Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 21; Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 177; Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei* 2, 15; *Mainichi Shinbun*, December 21, 1945, 1.

the constitutional reform program. A week later, Matsumoto submitted a draft to GHQ only to be completely dismissed.<sup>28</sup>

Political parties, born one after another at the end of 1945, also reviewed the Meiji Constitution and made draft constitutions. The Communist Party (JCP) did not complete its draft constitution until late June 1946, but it was the first party among many that published its basic principles. The Party announced the “Substance of a New Constitution” (*Shin-Kenpō no Kosshi*) on November 11, 1945. The Liberal Party released its draft on January 21, 1946, followed by the Progressive Party and the Socialist Party (JSP), publishing their drafts on February 14 and on February 24 respectively.<sup>29</sup>

Constitutional revision was not the realm of politicians alone. Private groups and individuals also worked on making new constitutions. Among these was Takano Iwasaburō (1871-1949), a former professor of economics at the Imperial University of Tokyo and founder and president of the Ōhara Institute of Research in the Taishō period. Not only did Takano cooperate on the formation of the JSP and help the Party draft a new constitution after the war; he also organized a private group to study the Meiji Constitution, the Constitutional Research Association (*Kenpō Kenkyūkai*), at the beginning of November 1945. The main members were

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<sup>28</sup> About the details, see Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, Chapters 3 and 5; Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 2*, 10-16, Chapters 3 and 5.

<sup>29</sup> Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 39, 42-45. Koseki writes that the Communist Party's national meeting was held on November 9, 1945 and the outline of a new constitution agreed upon at the conference was released the next day. But the meeting was convened on November 8, and the outline made on the eleventh was published on the *Asahi Shinbun* and the *Mainichi Shinbun* the next day (Koseki's “source” shows this date). See Nihon Kyōsantō Chūō Inkaï (Japan Communist Party Central Committee), *Nihon Kyōsantō no 65-nen: 1922-1987 Jo* (Sixty-Five Years of the Japan Communist Party: 1922-1987 vol. 1) (Tokyo: Nihon Kyōsantō Chūō Inkaï Shuppankyoku, 1988), 100; Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai (Society to Study Parliamentary Government), *Seitō Nenkan Shōwa 22-nen* (The Yearbook on Political Parties: The Twenty-Second Year of Shōwa) (Tokyo: Nyūsusha, 1947; repr., Gendai Shiryō Shuppan, 1998), 194; Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 2*, 37, on the chronological table; also the November 12, 1945 *Asahi Shinbun* and *Mainichi Shinbun*. The other parties' drafts can be found in the January 22, February 15, and February 24, 1946 newspapers respectively.

from a who's who list of well-known liberal thinkers. Among them were independent scholar of law Suzuki Yasuzō (1904-1983), whom Canadian Japanologist and diplomat E. H. Norman had contacted on constitutional revision in late September; Morito Tatsuo, Takano's assistant at Tokyo Imperial University, an Ōhara Institute researcher, and soon-to-become a JSP member who served the Katayama cabinet as minister of education; journalist and political critic Iwabuchi Tatsuo (1892-1975); another liberal journalist and Yomiuri Newspaper Company president Baba Tsunego; writer and social critic Murobuse Kōshin (1892-1970); and former Waseda University professor of literature and of politics and economics Sugimori Kōjirō (1881-1968). They finished a draft constitution on December 26, and it was published nationally two days later. Takano prepared a separate draft and released it two days afterwards; it was published in the February 1946 issue of *Shinsei*, Murobuse's new magazine.<sup>30</sup>

Shortly before them, Inada Masatsugu (1902-1984), a constitutional scholar and professor at Tokyo University of Literature and Science, turned in his draft constitution through Miyazawa Toshiyoshi to Minister of State Matsumoto Jōji on December 24, 1945. He then organized a Constitution Discussion Society (*Kenpō Kondankai*) with Ozaki Yukio, a party politician since Meiji; Un'no Shinkichi (1885-1965), a lawyer; and Iwanami Shigeo, the founder of Iwanami Publishing House. The group wrote a new draft constitution that was submitted to the

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<sup>30</sup> Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 27-31, 35, 37, 70-71; Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei* 2, 39, on the chronological table. The Constitutional Research Association's draft constitution was published on the December 28, 1945 *Asahi Shinbun* and *Mainichi Shinbun*, and Suzuki Yasuzō's explanation of the Association's attempts was also released the next day on the *Mainichi Shinbun*. Suzuki also wrote an article "Minshu Kenpō no Kiso Riron to Kōsō" (The Basic Theory and Vision of Democratic Constitution) to the January 1946 issue of *Kaizō* (pp.32-42; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi* (Periodicals Censored by the Occupation Forces) (Tokyo: Yūshōdō, 1982), microfilm, reel 87) and introduced his draft constitution which was basically the same as the Association's draft. According to Koseki, Suzuki met a "certain diplomat" and a foreign war correspondent twice in late September 1945 and discussed the issue of constitutional reform; the author confidently identified the diplomat as E. H. Norman; see pp.28-29.

Shidehara government at the beginning of March 1946.<sup>31</sup>

Tokyo Imperial University formed its own Constitutional Research Committee (*Kenpō Kenkyū Inkai*) at the motion of University President Nanbara Shigeru (1889-1974). The Committee was chaired by Miyazawa Toshiyoshi and led by the six special members, including law professors Takagi Yasaka (1889-1994), Suehiro Izutarō (1888-1951), and Oka Yoshitake (1902-1990), and philosophy professor Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960). The other regular members included Wagatsuma Sakae (1897-1973), Yokota Kisaburō, and Maruyama Masao from the faculty of law, and Ōuchi Hyōe, Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961), and Ōkōchi Kazuo (1905-1984) from economics. Because their activities started when the Japanese government submitted a draft constitution to GHQ officials, they turned from making their own draft to reviewing the government draft.<sup>32</sup>

Besides these groups and individuals, there were Kiyose Ichirō (1884-1967), a party politician and attorney; Fuse Tatsuji (1880-1953), a social activist and lawyer; and the All Japan Lawyers' Association (*Dai-Nihon Bengoshi-kai Rengōkai*) that made their own draft constitutions.<sup>33</sup>

### A Political Spectrum of Draft Constitutions

These groups' and individuals' draft constitutions carried different ideological shades from Taishō liberalism to republicanism. Leaving the emperor in place as head of the state, one

<sup>31</sup> Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 45-46. The National Diet Library website on the making of the Constitution of Japan (go to <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryō/02/055shoshi.html>) shows that Inada submitted his draft constitution to the Japanese government on December 24, 1945, but according to Koseki, it was February 24, 1946.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 47. About the membership and the date of the establishment of the Committee, see Tokyo Teikoku Daigaku Kenpō Kenkyū Inkai (The Imperial University of Tokyo Constitutional Research Committee), "Tokyo Teikoku Daigaku Kenpō Kenkyū Inkai Hōkokusho" (The Imperial University of Tokyo Constitutional Research Committee's Reports), available at [http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryō/02/002\\_1/002\\_1\\_0011.html](http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryō/02/002_1/002_1_0011.html).

<sup>33</sup> Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 2*, 16; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 273.

group aimed to democratize the political system by clarifying the function of the Diet and the cabinet in exercising sovereignty on one hand while assuring the guarantee for fundamental human rights on the other. Without abolishing the imperial institution, others suggested transforming the emperor into truly a “reigning” emperor and greatly expanding legal protection of the people’s rights so far as this included social rights. Some others differed from this in calling for a Soviet-style or American republic.

The Konoe draft is clearly categorized as the first type in attempting to reform and restore the political system that functioned during Taishō Democracy. Regarding imperial sovereignty, Konoe proposed replacing Article 4 stipulating “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution,” with “The Emperor in exercising the right of sovereignty shall rely on the support of the people.” This simply restated the general principle of indirect rule indicated in Articles 5 and 55 that the throne exercised the legislative power through the Imperial Diet and the administrative power through ministers of state.<sup>34</sup> However, Konoe also thought of restricting the prerogatives of the emperor by transferring some of them to the Diet; for example, he suggested that instead of the emperor, the Diet should be able to dissolve itself and, when convening it, a Constitutional Provisions Deliberative Committee, formed by members of both Houses, should directly petition the emperor to do so; likewise, Imperial Ordinances should be issued after consultation with the Constitutional Provisions Deliberative Committee; the emperor must declare war, make peace, or conclude treaties with the agreement of the Diet or the Constitutional Provisional Deliberative Committee. While he wondered if it was already unnecessary when

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<sup>34</sup> Article 5: The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet; Article 55: The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it.

Japan was being demilitarized, Konoe changed one of the most controversial articles, Article 11, on the emperor's supreme command of the armed forces, by placing the power under ministers of state instead of the throne.

The other suggestions referred to reforming the legislative and administrative bodies by giving the Lower House complete control of budgetary issues; changing the House of Peers into a House of Special Deliberations composed of elected members; setting up a procedure for the appointment of a prime minister, assuring him superiority to other ministers, and making ministers of state responsible to the Diet; and abolishing the Privy Council. As to the rights of the subjects, with the clause "within the limits of the law" in the Meiji Constitution weighing on his mind, Konoe recommended "dispel[ling] the impression that under the present Imperial Constitution, subjects [had] freedom of action within the limits of the law." Konoe's plan supported guaranteeing equal rights even to foreign nationals.<sup>35</sup>

Matsumoto Joji's draft sought to make similar changes. He announced his "Four Principles" in the December 8, 1945 Budget Committee during the Eighty-Ninth session of the Imperial Diet, and declared that 1. There would be no change in the principle of sovereignty; 2. The prerogatives of the emperor should be restricted while expanding matters that required Imperial Diet resolution; 3. The responsibility of the ministers of state should extend to all matters of state, in a way that prevented any other party from controlling state affairs, and ministers of state were responsible to the Imperial Diet; 4. Given the reality that the rights and freedoms of the people had been infringed upon by the laws unrelated to the Imperial Diet, the guarantee of the

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<sup>35</sup> The Konoe draft is in Suekawa Hiroshi, ed., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi 3: Hōritsu* (Primary Sources for the History in the Twenty Years after 1945 vol. 3: Laws) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1966), 61-62. The official title is "Teikoku Kenpō no Kaisei ni kanshi Kōsa-shite Etaru Kekka no Yōkō" (The Outlines Drawn from Consideration of Revision of the Imperial Constitution). Also see footnotes 64-65.

rights and freedoms of the people and protective measures against any violation needed to be strengthened.<sup>36</sup>

The Matsumoto draft submitted to GHQ in February 1946 followed these policies. Based on his first principle, Matsumoto did not alter the first four articles deciding on the emperor's status as a ruler, except rewording Article 3 "The Emperor is sacred and inviolable" into "exalted and inviolable." Like the Konoe draft, Matsumoto proposed that the issuance of Imperial Ordinances and declaration of war, peace-making, and conclusion of treaties – if not the authority to dissolve the Diet – should require the deliberation of an Imperial Diet Standing Committee and/ or the consent of the Diet. The cabinet, responsible to the Diet, ran state affairs, including the command and organization of the military. Besides, according to the Matsumoto plan, the House of Peers was transformed into a House of Councilors composed of appointed and elected members, and the Lower House was given the priority in passing the budget bill. Regarding the people's rights and freedoms, the draft simply mentioned that any unlawful violations were forbidden.<sup>37</sup>

It is a fair criticism that the Matsumoto draft did not dramatically change the Meiji Constitution, but Matsumoto was not so different from any other Taishō liberal like Minobe who believed that democracy could work if the Diet and the cabinet were empowered and if specific rules were provided by supplementary laws. Their aim was to normalize and develop imperial democracy of the Taishō period. The "conservative" nature of the government draft as well as of the Konoe draft was derived from this stance.

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<sup>36</sup> Matsumoto's address is from Dai-89-kai Teikoku Gikai Shūgiin Yosan Iinkai Giroku (Sokki) dai-7-kai (The Seventh Proceedings of the Eighty-Ninth Imperial Diet House of Representatives Budget Committee (Stenography)), December 8, 1945, 4-5; available at <http://teikokugikai-i.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/089/0080/main.html>.

<sup>37</sup> "Kenpō Kaisei Yōkō" (The Outlines of Constitutional Revision), known as the Matsumoto Draft, or Draft A, and Matsumoto's explanations to GHQ about the draft are in Suekawa, ed., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi* 3, 62-64.

Both the Progressive Party and the Liberal Party followed the pattern of these two drafts. The Progressive Party's constitutional outline first restated the party principle of "preserving the national polity, sticking to democracy, and establishing responsible government centered on the Diet." The Party did not question imperial sovereignty; the emperor's authority to rule was derived from its long history and the people's faith in the emperor system. Calling it the "center of the unity of the Japanese nation-state," the Progressive Party supported maintaining the imperial institution. Despite its staunch advocacy for the emperor system, reflecting upon Japan's entry into the war, the Party made its willingness to amend the Meiji Constitution clear. The Progressive Party declared:

regarding the recent great war, the misery of the defeat was brought about by the misuse of the emperor's prerogative of declaring war by those who had heavy responsibility for assisting him. Therefore, reflecting upon the past and preparing for the future, in order to prevent this type of mistake, we made it fundamental principles of constitutional amendment to make the practice of democracy complete by expanding and reinforcing the power of the Diet and having the Diet involved in the management of the (emperor's) prerogatives, and not to let the negligence (of basic human rights) happen again by respecting them by revising the constitution.<sup>38</sup>

Accordingly, the Party redrafted Article 4 of the Meiji Constitution to say "The Emperor shall exercise the rights of sovereignty with the advice of the subjects and according to the provisions of the Constitution" and also added that the three branches were respectively in charge of exercising legislative, administrative, and judicial power. The draft allowed the Diet to share some of the emperor's prerogatives.<sup>39</sup>

The Liberal Party's draft similarly modified the Meiji political system. Written mainly by Keiō University professor of law Asai Kiyoshi (1895-1979) and Kanamori Tokujirō (1886-1959), a former director general of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau and the minister of state-to-be in charge of constitutional revision under the first Yoshida cabinet, the party draft was influenced

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<sup>38</sup> The Progressive Party's policy and outlines on "Kenpō Kaisei Mondai" (The Issue of Constitutional Reform) are from Suekawa, ed., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi* 3, 75.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

by Minobe Tatsukichi's legal theory.<sup>40</sup> Literally taking Minobe's corporatist interpretation and "emperor as the organ of the state" theory, it set "The possessor of sovereignty shall be the Japanese state," but asserted "The Emperor shall be the superintendent of sovereignty" and restated "The Emperor shall be of a line unbroken for ages eternal."<sup>41</sup> What made this draft different from the aforementioned three drafts is that the Liberal Party also specified that the emperor would be acquitted of any legal or political responsibility, which had been only a tacit rule. Another small difference involved the emperor's prerogatives; the Liberal Party's draft assigned most of them to ministers of state rather than the Diet.<sup>42</sup>

In spite of these variations, the drafts of the Progressive Party and the Liberal Party contained more similarities than differences. Both drafts removed Articles 11 and 12 on the emperor's control of the military; reformed the House of Peers into a House of Councilors; set the predominance of the Lower House in passing legislation and the budget; abolished the Privy Council; and recommended not indiscriminately restricting people's liberty.<sup>43</sup>

Of importance is the shared view that these changes would make the Japanese constitutional monarchy more like the British one. Prime Minister Shidehara Kijūrō commented on constitutional reform in early November 1945 that it would follow the rule of British democracy rather than American democracy due to fundamental similarities between the Japanese and British political systems.<sup>44</sup> Matsumoto Jōji also had the British monarchy in mind in amending the Meiji Constitution. He explained to the GS, after his draft constitution was rejected,

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<sup>40</sup> Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 45.

<sup>41</sup> The Liberal Party's "Kenpō Kaisei Yōkō" is in Suekawa, ed., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi* 3, 75-76.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 75-76.

<sup>44</sup> "Shidehara Shushō to Kataru: Eikoku-shiki no Kunshusei" (Talking with Prime Minister Shidehara: The British-style Monarchy), *Asahi Shinbun*, November 11, 1945, 1.

that it may not look so different from the existing constitution but it “[marked], in practice, a big step forward toward parliamentary democracy after the English pattern.”<sup>45</sup> Likewise, when the Liberal Party published its outline of constitutional revision, party leader Hatoyama Ichirō defended the party’s retaining the monarchy by asserting that “it [was] not different from the English revering the authority of the king and taking him as their pride.”<sup>46</sup>

While similarly thinking about the British monarchy as a model, other groups’ drafts did more than shrink the emperor’s prerogatives and empower the Diet and the cabinet: they got to the heart of the problem of sovereignty, radically expanded the articles on people’s rights and duties, and even included provisions on socialist economy. The Socialist Party and the Constitutional Research Association were those which made draft constitutions that resembled today’s constitution. Although the Communist Party sought to overthrow the emperor system, the Socialist Party supported it, taking a stance that once democratization was achieved, it would not obstruct the realization of social democracy.<sup>47</sup> In late November 1945, the Standing Committee decided to take the stance that sovereignty resided in the state, as Minobe Tatsukichi had argued three decades before, thus urging the maintenance of the emperor system. The Party, however, declared that it would “greatly reduce the emperor’s prerogatives based upon the spirit of democracy” and “seek to realize democracy and socialism under the emperor system.”<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> “Letters from Dr. Matsumoto to General Whitney, dated 18 Feb. 1946, inclosing supplementary explanation of constitutional revision” is in Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 1*, 352-365; the quote is from p.360.

<sup>46</sup> “Hatoyama Sōsai Danwa: Taiken Jikō wo Chōsei” (Talks with President Hatoyama: Adjust the Clauses on the Prerogatives), *Asahi Shinbun*, January 22, 1946, 1.

<sup>47</sup> It is worth noting the significance of this disagreement over the emperor system; it contributed to the failure of the realization of a united front between the two parties, despite repeated petitions from the JCP, leftist socialist Yamakawa Hitoshi’s ardent call, and certain expectations from the people. See Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai, *Seitō Nenkan Shōwa 22-nen*, 165-167, 170; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 161-167; Shinobu, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 I*, 195-197, 200, 233-234, 249-254, 256-257, 259-267; Nihon Kyōsantō Chūō Inkaikai, *Nihon Kyōsantō no 65-nen*, 101-103.

<sup>48</sup> Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai, *Seitō Nenkan Shōwa 22-nen*, 165.

About this party decision, JSP member Mizutani Chōzaburō explained in the December 10 *Mainichi Shinbun* why it was right for the Party to advocate the retention of the emperor system. Mizutani's reasoning went beyond just rebutting the JCP's Kōza-ha Marxist theory; he believed that there was no need to remove the imperial family that the Japanese had revered and hoped to maintain. Mizutani first challenged the communist argument by pointing out that modern European history proved that abolishing the monarchical system was not a necessary condition to eliminate feudal remnants. He then wrote that "it should be true public sentiment to preserve the [Japanese] imperial family and emperor that, unlike other countries' imperial families, [had] been the center of ethnic worship, in a form that [removed] all that the abolitionists identified as evils." What Mizutani had in mind was in line with the Japanese government's plan to make the emperor a British-style monarch by transferring most of political power to the Diet and allowing the throne to share just part of it.<sup>49</sup>

The socialists' proposal differed from those previously discussed in that it reduced the emperor's prerogatives to the point where he played only a ceremonial role in state affairs. The other groups' outlines kept the principle of imperial sovereignty, simply separating the nominal possessor and the actual exerciser of sovereignty. In comparison, the JSP's "Outlines of a New Constitution" (*Shin-Kenpō Yōkō*) stipulated "Sovereignty shall reside in the state (a cooperative body of the people including the emperor)" and divided political power between the Diet and the emperor, most to the former and only a part to the latter.<sup>50</sup>

The Socialist Party draft did not officially define the emperor as a "symbol," but the

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<sup>49</sup> "Taiken ha Tettei Shukugen: Shakaitō Ten'nōsei Shiji no Riyū" (Complete Reduction of (the Emperor's) Prerogatives: The Reasons for the Socialist Party's Support for the Emperor System), *Mainichi Shinbun*, December 10, 1945, 1.

<sup>50</sup> Suekawa, ed., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi* 3, 76.

Party meant to transform him into one by assigning only ritualistic roles to him. As early as November 1945, longtime labor activist Katō Kanjū (1892-1978) developed the idea of turning the emperor into a symbol and expressed it in the article “Constitutional Debate as Political Debate” published in the January 1946 issue of the journal *Jiron* (Commentary on Current Events). He argued:

In view of its historical development, the imperial institution should always exist as a ceremonial and ritual symbol of the harmony of the Japanese. The emperor system is a product of history; the fact that it is not absolute is something to which history truly attests. That is to say, as one can see from history, the imperial institution was frequently exposed to crises. The reason why the emperor’s position was preserved in such cases was not because he was absolute. Rather, it was the common feeling of the Japanese, in various periods of their history, that it was in their mutual interest to avoid the disorder that would arise from the abolition of the emperor as an historical institution, and they thought that by protecting the emperor they could maintain the unity of the country.<sup>51</sup>

Katō was not a member of the JSP drafting committee, but there was a consensus about the emperor’s status in the Party. At the Central Executive Committee held in mid-January 1946, Chief Secretary Katayama Tetsu (1887-1978) made a statement that the emperor could stay on the throne as a “symbol of honor” (*eiyo no shōchō*), and party members reaffirmed his position.<sup>52</sup>

Accordingly, the emperor’s new tasks in the JSP draft constitution were limited to appointing prime minister chosen by the Speakers of the Houses, signing treaties and laws passed in the Diet, and formally representing the state before foreign countries. The suggestions for new legislative and administrative systems were in line with the other drafts: the cabinet should be responsible to the Diet, the House of Peers replaced with a House of Councilors composed of elected representatives of various occupational groups, the primacy of the Lower House in legislation assured, and the Privy Council abolished.<sup>53</sup>

However, provisions on people’s rights and duties were extensive. Not surprisingly, the

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<sup>51</sup> The quote is from Koseki, *The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution*, 41.

<sup>52</sup> Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai, *Seitō Nenkan Shōwa 22-nen*, 167.

<sup>53</sup> Suekawa, ed., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi* 3, 76-77.

socialists did not merely stress the guarantee of civil liberties and equality but also added social rights including the right of existence and the state's provision of educational institutions and the protection of labor. It was also characteristic that the JSP claimed that proprietary rights should be subject to restriction for the public good.<sup>54</sup>

The Constitutional Research Association's "Outlines of a Draft Constitution" (*Kenpō Sōan Yōkō*) went a step further. Japanese scholars have noticed similarities between this draft and GHQ's and found evidence that Lieutenant Colonel Milo E. Rowell (1903-1977) in the Government Section, one of the Steering Committee members guiding the drafting of the GHQ constitution, studied the Association's proposal immediately after its publication. Although he made many suggestions to it, Rowell praised the draft as "outstanding[ly] liberal" and most provisions as "democratic and acceptable."<sup>55</sup> One such "liberal" provision concerned the sovereignty of Japan.

In making outlines, the Association referred widely to the Japanese draft constitutions privately prepared in the 1870s-1880s before the adoption of the Meiji Constitution and to various foreign constitutions. But modeled specifically after the German Weimar Constitution, the Association draft claimed popular sovereignty by asserting "The sovereignty of the Japanese state shall proceed from the Japanese people."<sup>56</sup> Unlike the German constitution, however, the Association's did not advocate a republican form of government; considering public sentiments

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>55</sup> Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 1*, 26-39; Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 2*, 18-21. Also see Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 35, 70-71. There is no evidence that Rowell had personal contact with the Association members. They went to submit a copy of their draft to the Japanese government and another to GHQ.

<sup>56</sup> Suekawa, ed., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi* 3, 80; "Kenpō Minkan Sōan no Ito: Suzuki Yasuzō-shi ni Kiku" (The Intentions of the Private Draft Constitution: Asking Mr. Suzuki Yasuzō), *Mainichi Shinbun*, December 29, 1945, 1; Suzuki, "Minshu Kenpō no Kiso Riron to Kōsō," 35.

toward the imperial family, the Association decided to preserve the emperor system. The founder of the Association Takano Iwasaburō and the main writer of the draft Suzuki Yasuzō actually preferred a republic over a constitutional monarchy, and this led Takano to write a separate draft that proposed republicanism under a president. Suzuki, alternately, understood that under the current circumstances, reforming the absolutist nature of the imperial institution legitimized by the constitution would be ideal. Accordingly, the Association stripped actual political power from the emperor, as the Socialist Party did, basing this on the principle of the British constitutional monarchy where the “sovereign reigned but did not rule.”<sup>57</sup> The Constitutional Research Association declared that the emperor did “not directly take on the government, and the chief executive of all state affairs [was] the cabinet” and had the emperor “conduct only state rituals commissioned by the people” (*kokumin no itaku ni yori moppara kokka-teki girei wo tsukasadoru*).

Other changes suggested by the Association were similar to other draft constitutions; legislative and budgetary matters were assigned to the bicameral Diet, giving the primacy to the “First House,” and the administration was made responsible to the legislature in running the state.<sup>58</sup> The clauses pertaining to people’s rights and duties were more detailed than the JSP’s but similarly promised the protection of political freedoms and social equality and rights. Besides popular sovereignty, what distinguished the Association’s draft from the others is that it included the “right to maintain a standard of wholesome and cultural living.” This clause of the right of existence was adopted in the current constitution’s Article 25 at the persistent request of Socialist

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<sup>57</sup> About Suzuki’s and Takano’s views on popular sovereignty and the emperor system, see “Kenpō Minkan Sōan no Ito,” 1; Suzuki, “Minshu Kenpō no Kiso Riron to Kōsō,” 33-40; Koseki, *The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution*, 31-32, 37-39. Takano’s draft is in Suekawa, ed., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi* 3, 81-82.

<sup>58</sup> Suekawa, ed., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi* 3, 80-81.

Party members, especially Morito Tatsuo, who participated both in the JSP drafting committee and the Constitutional Research Association.<sup>59</sup> More socialist than the party's draft, the Association's also mentioned restrictions on private economic activities and rights to ownership in a separate chapter on the economy.<sup>60</sup>

The most radical drafts were written by the Communist Party and Takano Iwasaburō. Different from the socialists and most Constitutional Research Association members who envisioned establishing social democracy under constitutional monarchy, they did not believe that true democracy could coexist with the emperor system and therefore advocated republicanism without an emperor. The JCP's "Substance of a New Constitution," earlier than any other group or individual, proposed popular sovereignty, administered by a Democratic Diet, and the protection of various rights and freedoms, political to social and economic.<sup>61</sup> In the draft constitution released in late June 1946, exactly when Diet deliberations of the government draft in the Ninetieth Session began, the Party declared that "Japan [was] a people's republic state" and "Sovereignty of the Japanese People's Republic [resided] in the people."

To make a transition from "absolutist feudal" society to a socialist one, it was not only the emperor system that should be destroyed. The JCP draft also suggested removing "parasitic landowners" and "zaibatsu-like monopoly capital" and putting key industries and financial institutions under state control. The most complete draft constitution made of a hundred articles,

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 80. About the discussions on Article 25 in the Subcommittee (Article 23 in the government draft), see the July 29, July 30, and August 1, 1946 proceedings on the National Diet Library's online database of Imperial Diet Proceedings. The debate was about whether the "right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultural living" was included in the "right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" in Article 13 (Article 12 in the government draft). Morito played a key role in convincing the members of the Subcommittee on Revision for the Imperial Constitution to have a separate article on the right of existence.

<sup>60</sup> Suekawa, ed., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi* 3, 81.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 77.

its provisions on people's rights and duties were very extensive and more specific than the socialists', but similarly covered basic human rights, class and gender equality, and social security and rights.<sup>62</sup>

The aforementioned Takano's draft was similar to the JCP's in urging the adoption of a republican political system and declaring popular sovereignty. It is interesting to note that his draft went so far as to propose the nationalization of land and the means of production if necessary.<sup>63</sup>

### **America's Response to Constitutional Reform**

GHQ, by order of General Douglas MacArthur, directly intervened in the Japanese government's efforts to reform the Meiji Constitution in February 1946. By rejecting the government's draft and handing in a GHQ draft, the American Occupation authorities made it clear for the first time that the government's revision plan or any other draft of a similar kind was unacceptable and they were looking forward to bolder changes. MacArthur's decision also marked a significant turning point in "America's" move to change the Japanese constitution: it was he and the GS who determined exactly what the United States expected of constitutional reform. As discussed in Chapter 3, the US government's basic policy toward constitutional amendment sent from Washington to GHQ neither decided on the fate of the emperor system nor went beyond general instructions. By taking a lead in constitutional revision, MacArthur stood in the forefront of protecting the emperor system from an unpredictable abolitionist order from Washington or other allies that were hostile to the emperor. At the same time, by assigning the task to the GS, he was responsible for radicalizing the American stance on a new constitution,

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<sup>62</sup> The JCP's draft constitution is in *ibid.*, 77-80.

<sup>63</sup> Suekawa, ed., *Shiryō Sengo 20-nen-shi* 3, 81.

rejecting the “conservative” plan. The GS attempts to compromise between the objective of retaining the emperor system and that of liberalizing the Japanese political organization led the officials to take the middle road.

Until February 1946, there were little communication regarding constitutional reform between the GHQ staff and the Shidehara cabinet. Yet, it is hard to say that the Japanese “conservative” ideas were detached from US government officials’ stance. The memorandum sent from the State Department to the POLAD in October simply suggested ensuring the establishment of representative, responsible government, the supremacy of the elected legislative body in passing bills and deciding on budgetary matters, and the expansion of guarantee of fundamental civil rights and considered the creation of a democratic government particularly important to transform the Japanese constitutional monarchy into a healthy one.<sup>64</sup> Familiar with the State Department’s policy through the POLAD, Konoe Fumimaro integrated these instructions in his draft.<sup>65</sup> Despite small differences, moderate draft constitutions written by several other Japanese groups that attempted to alter the political system along this line did not necessarily contradict what Washington was thinking.

New instructions sent from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) to SCAP in January 1946 (SWNCC-228) were longer and more specific than this October 1945 guidance from the State Department. However, Washington’s basic principles did not change; they made similar suggestions to promote representative democracy, strengthen the guarantee for basic human rights, and, in case of retaining the emperor system, get rid of the emperor’s military

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<sup>64</sup> The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Acheson), October 16, 1945, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East, vol. 6, 757*; also in Koseki, *The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution*, 15-16; Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu, ed., *Shōwa Zaisei-shi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan*, 219-220.

<sup>65</sup> See Footnote 35.

authority and require him to act on the cabinet's advice. Believing that constitutional reform should not be "imposed," SWNCC instructed GHQ just to "indicate" America's reform directives to the Japanese and warned that giving orders to the Japanese government should be a "last resort."<sup>66</sup> MacArthur decided to take the last resort at his discretion.

When he ordered the GS staff to amend the Japanese constitution, MacArthur gave them three principles to be followed. Interestingly, except for one general rule, even his memo conformed with the Japanese conservative drafts. MacArthur's first key note pointed to the retention of constitutional monarchy. It asserted the "Emperor [was] at the head of the state" and "His succession [was] dynastic." He added in a rather vague manner that "[the Emperor's] duties and powers [would] be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and responsive to the basic will of the people as provided therein." SCAP's second note was the basis of Article 9 in the present constitution, the clause of the renunciation of war, that cannot be found in any Japanese draft constitution. MacArthur asked the GS staff to abolish Japan's military forces as well as its right of war as an "instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security." MacArthur's last point ordered de-feudalization. This, however, mostly meant deprivation of the rights of the peerage, except those of the imperial family, and withholding of political power from the nobles.<sup>67</sup>

Integrating MacArthur's three principles as well as SWNCC-288's directives, the GS

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<sup>66</sup> Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of State, January 7, 1946, *FRUS, 1946. The Far East*, vol. 8, 98-103; SWNCC-228 ("Reform of the Japanese Governmental System") is also available in Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 1*, 412-438. Also see Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 15-16; Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu, ed., *Shōwa Zaisei-shi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan*, 218-219.

<sup>67</sup> MacArthur's three principles ("Three Basic Points Stated by Supreme Commander to Be 'Must' in Constitutional Revision. Government Section Paper Prepared about 4 Feb. 1946") are in Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 1*, 98, 100.

staff revised the Meiji Constitution in a week between February 4 and 11 and readily presented it to Japanese government officials on the thirteenth. The outcome of the GS's a week-long constitutional study and drafting was compatible with the Socialist Party's and the Constitutional Research Association's proposals. While Washington did not take a stand over the treatment of the emperor, MacArthur, knowing Hitohito's popularity among the Japanese and his political usefulness, and allegedly admiring his noble personality, determined to save him.<sup>68</sup> He thus ordered the GS to democratize the Japanese political and social structures without abolishing the emperor system.

With a constitution, modeled not only after the American Constitution but also after the constitutions of Britain, the Soviet Union, Scandinavian countries, and Weimar Germany, GHQ attempted to reestablish the emperor system as a British-style constitutional monarchy.<sup>69</sup> As the "symbol of the state and the unity of the people," the emperor would become the ceremonial ruler and entrust the people with sovereignty. People's rights and freedoms were expanded to include social and economic rights. The renunciation-of-war clause, the origin of Article 9, truly distinguished the GHQ draft.<sup>70</sup> Scholars have debated who was the original advocate for it, MacArthur or Shidehara, but many conclude that it was more likely to be MacArthur. It is not certain if there was an agreement between SCAP and the Japanese prime minister that a no-war clause should be established in a new constitution, but there were discussions on the principle and mutual consent to it between the two in late January 1946.<sup>71</sup> Besides, as the Japanese nation had

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<sup>68</sup> About the MacArthur-Hirohito meeting and MacArthur's decision to retain the emperor, see Iokibe, *Senryo-ki*, 90-102; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 69-71, 115-116.

<sup>69</sup> Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 277.

<sup>70</sup> The GS draft ("Draft: As Submitted to the Japanese Government by the General Headquarters, SCAP, on February 13, 1946") is in Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 1*, 266-303.

<sup>71</sup> See Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 200-204; Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 82-86; Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 2*, 43-45; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 122-128; Yoshida

undergone demilitarization and democratization according to the Potsdam Declaration, pacifism aligned to the state of many Japanese moderates' and liberals' ways of thinking.

On February 13, 1946, GS officials met Matsumoto Jōji, then foreign minister Yoshida Shigeru, and Shirasu Jirō (1902-1985) from the Central Liaison Office, and, showing them their draft, demanded that they should rewrite a constitution based upon it. GHQ's sudden direct intervention in constitutional reform and its draft totally stunned the Japanese government. As Yoshida later wrote in his memoirs, the content of the MacArthur constitution was quite unexpected and difficult for the Japanese officials to accept (*tondemonai mono*); especially the preamble starting with "We, the Japanese people" and the emperor's status as the "symbol" perplexed him.<sup>72</sup> But as we know, the Japanese government eventually accepted the GHQ draft. There is a scholarly consensus that there were various reasons for the Shidehara cabinet's decision to rewrite the draft constitution following the GHQ one, more than simply that the government was in no position to negotiate with GHQ.

One was the correlation between constitutional revision and saving the emperor system; the Japanese government was persuaded by MacArthur and the GS that revising the Meiji Constitution along the lines of their draft was the only way to protect the emperor system from other Allies against him.<sup>73</sup> The fact that the emperor himself approved the American draft

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Shigeru, *Kaisō Jūnen 4* (Reminiscence of Ten Years vol. 4) (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1958; repr., Chūō Kōronsha, 1998), 207-208.

<sup>72</sup> Yoshida Shigeru, *Kaisō Jūnen 2* (Reminiscence of Ten Years: vol. 2) (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1957; repr., Chūō Kōronsha, 1998), 26.

<sup>73</sup> Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 2*, 83-84; McNelly, "'Induced Revolution,'" 82; Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 107-108; Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 223-224; Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 97-98; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 374-375; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 281; Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu, ed., *Shōwa Zaiseishi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan*, 225; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 113-114, 121, 126-127; Shinobu, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 1*, 279; Yoshida, *Kaisō Jūnen 2*, 27-29.

encouraged the Shidehara cabinet to accept GHQ's offers.<sup>74</sup> Pragmatic thought played a part as well. Minister of Health and Welfare Ashida Hitoshi (1887-1959) convinced other cabinet members that if GHQ published its draft, newspapers and public opinion would be likely to support it and begin to attack the government; therefore, the cabinet should modify the GHQ draft and release it as a government draft.<sup>75</sup> Another motive was related to the hatred of foreign occupation. According to Yoshida Shigeru, since the ultimate goal of the Japanese was to end the Occupation as soon as possible by showing the Allies that Japan was a democratic, peaceful country, the government found it wiser to go along with GHQ's constitution.<sup>76</sup>

Thus, on February 22, the cabinet agreed to rewrite a constitution based upon the GHQ version. As its translation was distributed to the cabinet members at the February 26 meeting, they reconfirmed their previous decision. Assisted by Vice Director General Iriye Toshio and Director of the First Department Satō Tatsuo (1904-1974) from the Bureau of Legislation, Matsumoto Jōji started to revise the government draft. Subject to the scrutiny of the GS, a new draft was completed by March 5. The cabinet approved it and published it the next day.<sup>77</sup>

### **Individual Intellectuals on the Issues of the Emperor System and Constitutional Reform**

Without proposing a draft constitution, Japanese intellectuals participated in the debate over constitutional reform. Like constitutional drafters who tried to reconfigure a form of government by changing the emperor's status and power, intellectuals, too, primarily addressed

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<sup>74</sup> Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 2*, 95-97; Yoshida, *Kaisō Jūnen 2*, 28-29; Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 225; McNelly, "'Induced Revolution,'" 83; Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 99; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 378; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 283; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 121-122, 128.

<sup>75</sup> McNelly, "'Induced Revolution,'" 82; Iokibe, *Senryō-ki*, 223; Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 99; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 375, 377; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 280.

<sup>76</sup> Yoshida, *Kaisō Jūnen 2*, 32.

<sup>77</sup> Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 2*, 100-104; Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 108-109, 111; Shinobu, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 1*, 280-281.

these issues. As some voiced a desire for a republic without the emperor, their discussions also dealt with whether the emperor system should be retained or abolished and why. It is not clear exactly which individual's or group's constitutional reform proposal these intellectuals agreed with, but the variations of their opinions paralleled the wide spectrum of submitted draft constitutions.

The group of people who supported the preservation of the emperor system all agreed that the absolutist political system under the Meiji Constitution should be changed: that is, the emperor's prerogatives should be radically reduced to depoliticize him and return him to what he was supposed to be: a moral authority living with the Japanese people and symbolizing the nation. Old Liberal scholar of Japanese history Tsuda Sōkichi (1873-1961) clearly addressed this opinion in his essay published in the April 1946 issue of *Sekai*.<sup>78</sup>

Tsuda had established himself as an authority of ancient Japanese history. His positivist analysis of primary sources made him critical of the national foundation myth tightly linked with the story of the emergence of the imperial family promoted by the state. Considered a libel on the imperial family, his works were banned from publication, and he was forced to resign from university in the early 1940s.<sup>79</sup> The editor of *Sekai* asked Tsuda to write an essay about the imperial household as constitutional revision became a political issue in late 1945-early 1946. The main purpose of his essay seems to have been to introduce his interpretation of the founding of Japan and the history of the imperial family to academia and the general public. However, this article turned out to be controversial; by arguing that the imperial household had existed as a

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<sup>78</sup> Tsuda Sōkichi, "Kenkoku no Jijō to Bansei Ikkei no Shisō" (Circumstances of the Foundation of the Country and the Idea of an Unbroken Line of Emperors), *Sekai* (April 1946): 29-54; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken'etsu Zasshi*, reel 178.

<sup>79</sup> Gen Itasaka, ed., *The Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, vol. 8 (Tokyo; New York: Kōdansha, 1983), 112.

moral authority to be loved and respected for centuries, Tsuda publicly expressed his full support for the retention of the emperor system. Worried that his essay might exert political influence in favor of the “reactionary forces” in the upcoming general elections in April, chief editor of *Sekai* Yoshino Genzaburō (1899-1981) wrote unconventionally long closing remarks about the article.<sup>80</sup>

Tsuda Sōkichi harshly criticized the Meiji oligarchs for creating an absolutist monarchy with the Prussian-model constitution. He argued that historically speaking, it was abnormal to bring the imperial family to the political front.<sup>81</sup> Despite the fact, the Meiji leaders made the emperor a direct ruler – if only nominally – and, in so doing, risked the stability of the imperial household. Since the emperor was officially the sovereign, his advisors could cast their responsibility for mishandling state affairs onto him under the Meiji political system.

Tsuda also decided that the state’s imposing and promoting a hierarchical relationship between the emperor and the people was against both tradition and modernity. Oddly for a positivist historian, he asserted that the Japanese imperial household had persisted for centuries because it and the people had maintained good rapport with each other out of mutual affection. However, mistaking that their relationship was antagonistic, the oligarchy unnecessarily tried to secure the emperor’s position by strengthening his power over the people, restricting the latter’s activities, and forcing them to “submit themselves to the power and solemnity of the imperial family rather than feel affection for it.”<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> See Henshūsha (Editor), “Tsuda Hakushi ‘Kenkoku no Jijō to Bansei Ikkei no Shisō’ no Happyō ni tsuite” (About the Publication of Doctor Tsuda’s “Circumstances of the Foundation of the Country and the Idea of an Unbroken Line of Emperors”), *Sekai* (April 1946): 128-135; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken’etsu Zasshi*, reel 178. About the identification of the editor, Yoshino, see Hidaka Rokurō, “Kaisetsu: Sengo Shisō no Shuppatsu” (A Commentary on the Start of Postwar Thought), *Sengo Nihon Shisō Taikei 1: Sengo Shisō no Shuppatsu* (An Anthology of Postwar Japanese Thought vol. 1: The Start of Postwar Thought), ed. Hidaka (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1968), 26-27.

<sup>81</sup> Tsuda, “Kenkoku no Jijō to Bansei Ikkei no Shisō,” 38-49.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 50-51.

In addition, Tsuda complained that imposing on the people the Confucian idea of loyalty to the sovereign “did not correspond with the spirit of the modern state and modern national life.” He thought that not only the feudalistic sovereign-subject relationship but also the methodology of nurturing a sense of loyalty to the emperor was anti-modern. He found it “contradictory with the spirit of modern state or modern philosophy” to teach the idea of the unbroken lineage of the imperial family by explaining the ancient myth as a historical fact and forcing the performance of religious rites of emperor-worship in school.<sup>83</sup>

Like many other Taishō liberals, Tsuda criticized the recent military officials and state bureaucrats for leading the nation to war. They abused all the anti-modern traits of Japanese political, social, and cultural systems to implement their wartime policies. Tsuda angrily accused the military of making its decisions and actions look like orders from the emperor by emphasizing imperial sovereignty; to mobilize the nation, it solicited devotion to the war by propagating the idea that it was for the sake of the emperor; and the military establishment aroused patriotism by mystifying the imperial family and explaining that the essence of the national polity resided in it, which was totally the “obstinate and bigoted thought that did not conform to intelligence of modern people.”<sup>84</sup>

Thus, Tsuda hoped to “normalize” the emperor system instead of getting rid of it, indicating his support for constitutional amendments. He suggested that the imperial household’s political role should be reduced to a passive one once again as it had been so until the Meiji period, and representative government should be fully established.<sup>85</sup> He believed that the emperor

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 51-52.

<sup>85</sup> Referring to the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement of the 1870s-1880s, Tsuda mentioned that there had already been these ideas during the early Meiji period and implied his stance that they should have been realized back

system could coexist perfectly with democracy and that by depoliticizing the emperor, the Japanese could secure the stability of the imperial household. Noting that the imperial family had survived the political turmoil of earlier times, Tsuda maintained that as the “imperial household’s ruling position [could] be adjusted by being within the people and externalizing the will of the people,” the imperial family could surely “embody democracy as the spirit of modern state.”<sup>86</sup> Significantly, Tsuda developed the idea of a “symbolic” emperor, expressing his view that the imperial family had lived as the national symbol and should be so, and this was where his concept of the unbroken lineage of sovereigns lay. Believing that when state management was left to the people themselves, the emperor could live with and within the nation, Tsuda stated “that the imperial household could be the center of national unity and the living symbol of national spirit would give meaning to its existence.”<sup>87</sup>

Political scientist Rōyama Masamichi (1895-1980) articulated a similar stance in favor of reforming the Japanese constitutional monarchy. Rōyama’s article in the January 1946 issue of *Chūō Kōron* discussed the national polity and the underdeveloped nature of Japanese democracy to give general suggestions for constitutional reform.<sup>88</sup> Like Tsuda, Rōyama was critical of the national polity based on the emperor system created during Meiji. He explained that a national polity did not necessarily conflict with democracy if it “was a mere idea on faith without a coercive power.” However, in reality, by determining all political, social, and moral norms, the Japanese national polity had interfered with democratic practices.<sup>89</sup> He lamented the state’s abuse

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then. See *ibid.*, 50.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> Rōyama Masamichi, “Waga Kokutai to Minshushugi” (Our National Polity and Democracy), *Chūō Kōron* (January 1946): 9-19; there was no censorship on this issue, see *Senryō-gun Ken’etsu Zasshi*, reel 26.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

of the concept of the national polity during the past decade.<sup>90</sup>

In addition to the discord of the national polity with democracy, Rōyama pointed out a shortcoming in “Japanese democracy,” or *Minponshugi*, the idea and term developed by Yoshino Sakuzō. According to his definition, democracy was a political ideology consisting of three principles; one, democracy was to work toward the realization of peace and happiness of the people; two, the people should participate in government; and three, sovereignty should reside in the people. Short of meeting the third criterion, Japanese democracy could not function healthily; without popular sovereignty, government could not take responsibility to the people and therefore became dysfunctional.<sup>91</sup> This is how the “oligarchs in the middle” (*chūkan katō seiryoku*) had mishandled Japanese politics, Rōyama analyzed.<sup>92</sup>

Accordingly, he called for constitutional reform in order to depoliticize the national polity and to democratize governmental form. Like Tsuda, Rōyama envisioned a national polity essentially as a spiritual bond between the emperor and the people embedded in history and therefore compatible with democracy. He thus proposed to reform constitutional monarchy instead of abolishing the emperor system. He shared with many others the notion that the clauses regarding the emperor’s prerogatives and his advisory bodies should be modified to promote representative, responsible government. As to sovereignty, Rōyama advanced Minobe Tatsukichi’s corporatist theory and recommended joint sovereignty of the emperor and the people. Since the people were in charge of state matters in practice, Rōyama found it appropriate to codify joint sovereignty in a new constitution.<sup>93</sup> Like Tsuda, he also thought that this constitutional

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 12, 15.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 17-19.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 18-19.

amendment could “tie the emperor directly with the people” (*Ten ’nō to jinmin towo chokketsu-suru*) and “stabilize and eternalize [the] national polity” (*waga kokutai wo anko eien narashimuru*).<sup>94</sup> He was certain that the emperor would agree with these changes. Rōyama stated:

There was the part “we are with you, our subjects” in the imperial edict to which we graciously and respectfully listened at the time of the end of the war. There should not have been even one Japanese who was not moved [by it]. It is already the emperor’s mind to share the burden of rule with his subjects. Therein lie the progressive spirit of our country’s national polity and the way toward democracy, which is the world’s political principle.<sup>95</sup>

Tsuda and Rōyama represented moderate conservatives and liberals who, respectful of and devoted to the imperial family, suggested remaking constitutional monarchy by altering the emperor’s legal status and power. Marxist-influenced intellectuals, on the other hand, preferred replacing monarchy with republicanism. Maruyama Masao, a leading Modernist intellectual, for instance, expressed his view that the national polity and even the imperial household should be abolished in his essay published in the May 1946 *Sekai*. As discussed in Chapter 2, this was related to his criticism that the national polity permeating the social and mental realms had prevented the Japanese from developing the independent self. To him, the emperor system and democracy could not coexist. Envisioning a modern democratic society as one composed of autonomous citizens, Maruyama thought of overthrowing the emperor system as a precondition for breaking the prescribed sense of belonging.

He actually judged that the national polity had already begun to collapse with Japanese surrender. He described August 15 as the day when the “national polity, which had been the foundation of the entire structure of ultranationalism, lost its absoluteness and left its destiny to the

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

people who finally became free subjects for the first time.”<sup>96</sup> To completely destroy the national polity, Maruyama made an implicit proposal to abrogate the imperial household in his depiction of the emperor-people relationship, using a diagrammatic metaphor. He wrote, “If the state where the emperor is situated at the center and all the people support him at various distances from him is represented as a concentric circle, its center is not a dot but a vertical axis perpendicularly piercing it.”<sup>97</sup> In Maruyama’s mind, the existence of the emperor who embodied absolute values along with this unbroken lineage generated a centripetal force, making it impossible to atomize the Japanese; therefore, by breaking it, the people could finally be freed as individuals. This differed radically from the opinions that stated that democracy could advance even if the emperor system was retained as long as the absolutist cast was removed from it.

Rōnō-ha Marxist Yamakawa Hitoshi did not hold the overthrow of the emperor system as political agenda, but like many others, he harshly criticized the emperor system since the Meiji period. Moreover, he questioned the validity of the retention of the emperor system in the February-March 1946 *Bungei Shunjū*.<sup>98</sup> Yamakawa agreed that the Meiji oligarchs invented the current emperor system and that absolutist imperial rule could not accord with democracy: similar to Tsuda, Rōyama, and Maruyama, he complained about the lack of scientific, rational explanation of national history in legitimizing the authority of the emperor system, the enslavement of the Japanese mentality by emperor worship, and the absence of popular sovereignty.<sup>99</sup> But he added a Marxian explanation to these arguments. According to Yamakawa, the emperor system was

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<sup>96</sup> Maruyama Masao, “Chōkokkashugi no Ronri to Shinri” (The Logic and Psychology of Ultrationalism), *Sekai* (May 1946): 15; there was no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken’etsu Zasshi*, reel 178.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 14. Maruyama seemed to include the emperor himself in those individuals who had to become free subjects; he seemed to believe that the imperial household was also bound by the unbroken line and needed to be freed from it.

<sup>98</sup> Yamakawa Hitoshi, “Jinmin no Kenpō” (People’s Constitution), *Bungei Shunjū* (February-March 1946): 9-12; there was no censorship for this issue, see *Senryō-gun Ken’etsu Zasshi*, reel 13.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 10-12.

innately undemocratic because it had been made as and served the political machinery of the reactionary ruling class. He described:

[The] emperor system was the structure devised to strengthen anti-revolutionary bureaucratic politics in order to check the development after the political revolution begun with the Meiji Restoration – the development of the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement during the Meiji period, namely in order to place limits on Japanese democratization. For legally embodying this plan and providing grounds to the development after that, the current constitution was drawn up by the drafters’ great deal of effort. When our country’s capitalism entered the so-called stage of imperialism, thus, this scheme developed into the imperialistic-fascist political organization of the bureaucracy-military-monopolistic capital combination.<sup>100</sup>

Yamakawa thus targeted eliminating the reactionary elites rather than the emperor system itself. He criticized the “conservative” constitutional reform plans as the ruling class’s continuing efforts to sabotage democratization.<sup>101</sup> He, however, did not unconditionally accept the retention of the emperor system, either, even if it was transformed into a new form. Although he suggested changing the throne from the ruling emperor to just a reigning emperor as in Britain, he commented, the “significance of the existence of such a monarch is a different matter,” indicative of his skepticism toward monarchy.<sup>102</sup> He was willing to leave the issue open to public discussions and wrote:

on the issue of making a new constitution, we cannot avoid facing the question of the maintenance or abolition of the emperor system. But we should not take the abolition of the emperor ‘system’ simply as meaning removing the emperor. The Japanese people should calmly, intelligently, and rationally criticize, probe into, and decide as what concept the emperor can be maintained or whether there is no longer any room for his retention as whatever concept when democracy is completely realized.<sup>103</sup>

As a promoter of a “democratic popular front,” Yamakawa might have tried to compromise with the communists on the issue of the emperor system.<sup>104</sup> Whether seen in this light or not, his stance was more radical than the Socialist Party’s and less so than Maruyama Masao’s.

### **The People’s Views of the Emperor System and Constitutional Revision**

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 9-10, 12.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>104</sup> See footnotes 47 and 110.

Now we turn to the Japanese people's attitudes toward the emperor system and constitutional reform. Not surprisingly, the majority advocated the retention of the emperor system, but they did not support the absolutist monarchy or national polity established in the Meiji period. They expressed their reverence to the emperor not as an absolute ruler but as a moral authority and their belief in the emotional tie between him and the people. Although they did not engage themselves in the scholarly debate on sovereignty or side with a particular draft constitution, by reimagining the emperor system and the national polity this way, they supported revising and not abolishing Japan's constitutional monarchy.

The Japanese people were gradually drawn to the debate on the emperor system in October-November of 1945. As the issue of the emperor system became more politicized, public interest grew more, but the majority constantly supported the continuance of the emperor system. According to the government, the prime minister received about 850 letters from Japanese citizens between October 9 and November 15, and only twenty-one wrote about the emperor system at this early date. Nevertheless, twenty petitioned for the maintenance of the emperor system and the protection of the national polity; only one demanded the abolition of the emperor system.<sup>105</sup>

Meanwhile, the people started to express their opinions as to the emperor system in newspapers' columns, too. According to the *Asahi Shinbun*, as many as 2,889 letters arrived for the newspaper's column "Koe" (Voice) during November, and 174 were about the emperor system. Seventy-eight percent (136 out of the 174) defended the emperor system, twelve percent (twenty-one) preferred its abolition, and the rest (ten percent; seventeen), without taking a stance, suggested critical reexamination of national history and free discussions.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> *Asahi Shinbun*, November 17, 1945, 2.

<sup>106</sup> "Tōsho-ran 'Koe' kara" (From the Readers' Letters Column 'Voice'), *Asahi Shinbun*, December 12, 1945, 4.

The advocates' opinions varied from those unconditionally defending the emperor system to those giving the reasons and conditions for their support, but they all indicated what the "emperor system" was in their minds. According to the research data, one responder proposed promptly passing a law to preserve the national polity, and three brushed aside even the necessity for public discussions, considering it un-Japanese. Because they did not define the national polity or the emperor system, it is hard to guess exactly what form of these systems they defended. Yet, it is most likely that they uncritically accepted the current ones just as they were. The large majority, 124 out of the 136, on the other hand, indicated their images of the emperor system and the national polity. They revered the emperor as the patriarch of the Japanese nation and conceptualized the national polity headed by the imperial family as a family state. Believing in the moral bond of the emperor, the father, with the people as his children, they kept faith in the emperor system. The remaining nine supporters suggested how the emperor system should be reformed; two clearly stated that the Japanese constitutional monarchy should be changed on the model of the British style, and seven suggested depoliticizing the emperor and turning him to the object of national worship by cutting down his prerogatives.<sup>107</sup>

There are two interesting observations about these results. One is that although, as of November 1945, there were no extensive public discussions yet on constitutional reform, these opinions conformed to conservative and moderate liberal constitutional revision plans. The differences among the three opinions, one emphasizing the faith in the family-like relationship between the emperor and the people, and the others proposing the British-style monarchy or reducing the emperor's political power to make him a sacred national figurehead, blurred since all

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

the conservative and moderate liberal groups and individuals had these ideas in mind. This leads to the second observation: the data showed the likelihood that the vast majority of the supporters for the emperor system could lean toward any reformist group's constitutional amendments. Because they believed in the family tie between the emperor and the people and viewed him as a moral head of the nation, rather than a political head of the state, as long as this status was secured for the emperor, his nominal political power did not matter to them. Thus, while wavering between conservative and liberal ideas, the supporters of the emperor system showed a tendency to agree with turning the emperor from a ruling emperor to a "reigning emperor."

The public opinion survey conducted by a private opinion poll research institute between December 1945 and early February 1946 backs up these observations. 5,000 copies of a survey on constitutional revision were distributed to more than a dozen groups of people ranging from politicians, bureaucrats, and businesses to academics, students, workers, and women, and approximately 2,400 of these were returned to the institute. Out of the returned surveys, 2,184 (ninety-one percent) supported the retention of the emperor system while 205 (8.5 percent) opposed it. Among the supporters, 381 (sixteen percent) advocated the imperial institution just as it was, which indicated that they did not find constitutional change necessary. But the majority looked forward to certain alterations. 1,084 (forty-five percent) supported the emperor who, put outside the political sphere, would stand as the head of the Japanese nation, as its moral center, and 680 (twenty-eight percent) suggested letting the emperor and the Diet share political power based upon the concept of the concert between ruler and ruled.<sup>108</sup> Published in the February 4,

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<sup>108</sup> "Kenpō Kaisei to Yoron" (Constitutional Revision and Public Opinion), *Mainichi Shinbun*, February 4, 1946, 1. The data was released on February 3 and published on the *Mainichi Shinbun* the next day. It is not explained who returned the surveys, so it is possible that certain groups' opinions were more represented than others'. Besides, the survey method is not clear; although there is chance that multiple-choice answers were given, it is more probable that

1946 *Mainichi Shinbun*, this survey was praised, somewhat misleadingly, as evidence that the people “did not take either a radical private revision plan or the government’s plan” and kept to the middle path.<sup>109</sup> The people chose a moderate course, but the opinions of the majority of the supporters did encompass “conservative” attitudes.

The communists’ taking a clear anti-emperor stance caused controversy among the party members as well as with the socialists.<sup>110</sup> As the above data reveal, while the JCP did appeal to some Japanese, it failed to garner popular support; or worse, it alienated many Japanese. Among the letters sent to the *Asahi* column during November 1945, twenty were a response to Party leader Tokuda Kyūichi’s remarks broadcast on the radio on November 21.<sup>111</sup> Two (ten percent) supported Tokuda, but fifteen (seventy-five percent) opposed him.<sup>112</sup> According to the *Yomiuri Hōchi Shinbun*, public opinion polls taken from the audience of the radio show demonstrated that ninety-five percent (3,174 out of 3,348) answered in favor of the emperor system, and only five percent (164) were against it.<sup>113</sup> Despite the differences in methods and numbers between *Asahi*’s data and *Yomiuri*’s, both agree that a large number of people did not support the JCP’s radical stance toward the emperor.

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the participants in the survey were asked to fill in questionnaires.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Communist Nosaka Sanzō came back from Yanan in January 1946 and immediately called for the formation of a Democratic United Front. At the meeting with party leaders Tokuda Kyūichi and Shiga Yoshio, they agreed to separate the issue of the retention of the imperial household from that of the abolition of the emperor system and to make the decision on the former left to the people. This was the Communist Party’s compromise in order to appeal to the masses and to form a united front with the Socialist Party. But the JSP, ruled by rightist and centrist members, never agreed to cooperate with the JCP. See Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Jō*, 158-167; Shinobu, *Sengo Nihon Seiji-shi 1945-1952 I*, 249-254, 256-257, 259-267, 290-294. Also see footnote 47.

<sup>111</sup> There were round-table discussions among Tokuda Kyūichi and politicians/ lawyers Kiyose Ichirō and Makino Ryōzō (1885-1961). Kiyose served as Tojo Hideki’s chief defense counsel in the Tokyo Trial. Both Kiyose and Makino joined Hatoyama Ichirō’s cabinet in 1955 as minister of education and minister of justice respectively.

<sup>112</sup> Three (fifteen percent) did not take a stand; “Tōsho-ran ‘Koe’ kara,” *Asahi Shinbun*, December 12, 1945, 4.

<sup>113</sup> “Jinmin no Koe ha Nani wo Sakebu: Kaku-Chōsa Kikan no Dai-1-kai Yoron Shirabe” (What the People’s Voices Clamor for: The First Survey of Public Opinion by Each Opinion Poll Organization), *Yomiuri Hōchi Shinbun*, December 9, 1945, 2.

Some bothered to write letters to newspapers to express their reactions to Tokuda Kyūichi's abolitionist argument. A letter to the *Mainichi Shinbun*'s column "Kensetsu" (Construction) published on November 24 criticized Tokuda for being "agitative (*sendō-teki*) from beginning to end," "mixing up his view on the emperor with his hatred coming from the suffering incurred in prison, his anger toward the oppression by the authorities." He, however, understood Tokuda's experience, and commented "with all due respect" that "His Majesty would have sympathized [with Tokuda] if he had listened to this." Instead of agreeing with Tokuda that the emperor system should be eliminated, the author ended up stressing the importance of bureaucratic reform.<sup>114</sup>

Similarly, a letter to the *Asahi Shinbun*'s readers' column published on November 28 1945 complained about Tokuda's argument. The writer first pointed out that unlike Tokuda, the public neither regarded the emperor as a dictator nor attributed all the people's misery to the imperial system. He then commented that Tokuda's view was not only ungrounded but so emotional that "[w]hen each and every word became violent and dogmatic, the listeners could not help but raise their eyebrows at it." He even spat that it would be "vain to discuss with the Communist Party."<sup>115</sup>

Individual letters contributed to newspapers did not merely accuse the JCP but also expressed personal opinions regarding the emperor system, touching on the question of political democratization. The overall trend between October 1945 and March 1946 agreed with the data shown by the *Asahi Shinbun*'s collection of the letters during November. Many supporters stressed the tradition that the emperor was essentially a religious rather than a political leader,

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<sup>114</sup> "Kensetsu" (Construction), *Mainichi Shinbun*, November 24, 1945, 2.

<sup>115</sup> "Koe" (Voice), *Asahi Shinbun*, November 28, 1945, 2.

advocating depoliticizing and popularizing him and expressing their unchanged respect and affection for the imperial family.

For instance, a letter published in the December 2, 1945 *Asahi Shinbun*'s column tried to discuss the true nature of the emperor from which he had deviated since the Meiji period and suggested normalizing the imperial institution. As is obvious from the dating of the letter, the writer wrote this essay in response to the November 21 roundtable discussions on the radio. He did not take sides regarding the issue of sovereignty, considering it more or less nonsense for a Japan placed under Allied occupation. He instead focused on why Japan had lost autonomy, namely why Japan had entered a hopeless war which inevitably would end in defeat and occupation. He stated, "If we discuss the constitution, we have to begin with [asking] where the causes of the defeat are," and argued, "To put in plainly, it is the fundamental cause of Japan's defeat that the emperor who should be a religious being got caught in the swirl of politics and prerogatives." This implied his acknowledgement of the problems in the Japanese political organization under the Meiji Constitution and his accusation of the military and the bureaucrats for misleading the nation. His discussions stressed that it was not until Meiji that the emperor ceased to be just the supreme religious authority and exercised sovereignty and suggested that the emperor's role should be returned to his historically normal one. He wrote, "Japan became an imperial state prevalent in the world since early Meiji. ... We should beseech the emperor to go back around Kyōto and return to what he had been."<sup>116</sup>

The author's motive for suggesting this change was in a way nationalistic. He was worried that unless the emperor system was depoliticized, various cliques in the government

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<sup>116</sup> "Koe," *Asahi Shinbun*, December 2, 1945, 2; according to the newspaper, the author was then the chair of the International Japan Society (Kokusai Nihon Kyōkai), but I am unable to identify this association.

would take advantage of the emperor's status and power and mismanage state affairs once again; consequently, the Occupation would continue forever, leaving Japan without autonomy. He warned that "as long as the current emperor system stayed the same, the Occupation forces would not withdraw." He emphasized again that the "pre-Meiji emperor [was] real, and the current emperor system [was] fundamentally wrong" and that the "Japanese nation could not rise up again if it did not reform this [emperor system]."<sup>117</sup> Thus, differentiating the "true" emperor system from the post-Meiji one, he supported the retention of the imperial institution, believing that it could coexist with democracy. The writer preferred as radical a constitutional reform as completely depoliticizing the emperor by removing prerogatives and possibly even sovereignty from him.

This is a relatively advanced opinion expressed by ordinary people. When they voiced their views on the emperor and the imperial system, they normally focused on the innocence of the emperor and their unchanged emotional tie with, and loyalty to, him. In one of the letters introduced in the January 24, 1946 *Asahi Shinbun*, a man, then unemployed, asserted, "The ruler-subject relationship in our country has not been [about the latter's] kneeling down before the power holder but has been conceived as Japanese people's religious and blood relationship," and here lay the reason for the survival of monarchy. He added, "It should be accepted that the feelings of respect and love for the imperial household live in the Japanese people's blood; we cannot do everything in life only with rational thinking." This said, the writer defended the retention of the emperor system, answering the question of whether it would obstruct democracy or not. To him, the emperor system would not, and could instead be a force for promoting

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

democracy. He critically observed the public call for democracy as a temporary fever. He anticipated that once the boom was gone, the Japanese would begin to reexamine democratization reforms objectively, and out of a sense that democratization was actually forced on them by the Allies, they would eventually revolt against democracy. To keep order, peace, and democracy, he believed that democracy should be “built upon the fusion and harmony with [Japan’s] situations.” He disparaged too theoretical stances and demanded establishing “Japanese-style democracy” (*Nihon-teki minshushugi*) by maintaining the emperor system.<sup>118</sup>

A town council chair, and former journalist, took part in the debate over the emperor system. Published on the January 27, 1946 *Asahi Shinbun*, his letter revealed that he had joined the emperor’s European tour during the early 1920s when he had been crown prince. By portraying the emperor as humanistic, friendly, and peace-loving, the writer defended the emperor system. He also placed responsibility for the political developments since the 1930s onto the military and the bureaucrats. He argued that the “evil subjects” (*akushin-domo*) had misled the emperor to war against his will and blamed them for “separating our emperor (*warera no Heika*) from the people by deifying him.” He thus welcomed the humanized and popularized emperor since it was what the emperor had originally been. He was glad that the Japanese “could finally bring the emperor back to the emperor living with the people (*jinmin to tomo ni oru Heika*).”<sup>119</sup>

Similar views were shared by the people who could meet the emperor when he started a tour in February 1946.<sup>120</sup> A middle-school teacher wrote in a letter published in the March 2, 1946 *Asahi Shinbun*’s column that he was moved to tears by the emperor’s visiting his class and

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<sup>118</sup> “Koe,” *Asahi Shinbun*, January 24, 1946, 2. The writer identified himself as unemployed, but there is no more information about his background in his letter.

<sup>119</sup> “Koe,” *Asahi Shinbun*, January 27, 1946, 2.

<sup>120</sup> Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 284-285.

determined to devote himself to the reconstruction of the school as the throne wished. He declared that now the “old existence severing the emperor from us fell” and the emperor and the people were finally tied as one, they would lead a new Japan.<sup>121</sup>

Another letter published on the same date described how a Japanese man went through different emotional and ideological shifts to rediscover his reverence to the emperor and the fundamental problems in the Japanese political structure and mentality. In the newspapers column, the head of a railway office told a story of when the emperor had toured the Tokyo station. Before the emperor came, the writer and the others present there were ordered to take off their hats a couple of times. He refused once, claiming his free will; when a policeman gave an order at the second time, however, he hesitantly followed it and felt his freedom violated. According to this railway officer, the emperor’s visit to the station gave him an unprecedented opportunity to test his true feelings toward the throne. He confessed: “During the war, I believed myself willing to get on a Tokkō (*kamikaze* “special attack”) plane for the sake of the emperor. But after the end of the war, I had doubts about the concept of absolute loyalty. There was self-awakening. I wanted to know what attitudes I would take before the emperor.”

What he found, however, was himself bowing and crying to the emperor as he passed, which was an automatic reaction. Simultaneously, he was surprised and saddened to find a lack of respect for the emperor in the Japanese crowd that, not so long before, had been so good at following orders like “marionettes” (*ningyō*). He then felt ire against the police who did not respect both his own free will and the emperor’s. He concluded that “His Majesty [was] not a god but a human; he [wanted] to get closer to the people” and scolded both the authorities and the

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<sup>121</sup> “Koe,” *Asahi Shinbun*, March 2, 1946, 2.

Japanese for making the emperor just a “puppet” (*ningyō*) and as a result entering into war.<sup>122</sup> It is not clear from this exactly what political change he supported, but he definitely blamed the intermediary officials for controlling the emperor and appears to have advocated a popular and apolitical emperor, as many other Japanese did.

### ***Mainichi* Newspaper and Constitutional Amendment**

Newspapers provided space for public discussions on the emperor system and constitutional reform, but they, particularly the *Mainichi Shinbun* that scooped the Konoe draft in December 1945 and one of the government drafts in February 1946, tried to lead public opinion.<sup>123</sup> *Mainichi* first gave full support to constitutional revision without clarifying exactly what changes they looked for. But by reacting to conservative revision plans, the newspaper diverged from the conservative camp and identified itself with the moderate liberal camp.

The October 23 *Mainichi* editorial expressed its support for constitutional reform by reminding the readers that it would not threaten the emperor system and explaining why democratization of the political structure was reasonable. *Mainichi* asserted that as the unprecedentedly peaceful transition from war to surrender evidenced, the emperor occupied the key place in Japanese society. With the issuance of the imperial rescript announcing the end of the war, the people quit fighting without delay or disturbance, which showed “how strong and deep belief in the emperor our people [held] at the bottom of their hearts.” In the writer’s view, this was rooted in the history of Japan. He argued: “Such great faith was never nurtured in the

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> The *Asahi Shinbun* did not pay as much attention as the *Mainichi Shinbun* to the issue of constitutional revision. There was an editorial on January 15, 1946 discussing the issue of the emperor system that was dividing various parties (which could have formed a democratic people’s front if they could reconcile their political stances, particularly on the emperor system). Since production was placed under the control of labor in fall 1945, the *Yomiuri Hōchi Shinbun* became overtly pro-communist; therefore, it spoke for the JCP’s abolitionist stance.

Japanese spirit overnight. This is the product of a long history and clearly a natural phenomenon in a country, and just as each country's king or emperor had a peculiar historical tradition, the Japanese emperor had a unique and yet far longer and more deeply rooted tradition than the other countries'." Here lay the reasons why, while monarchies had been overthrown during the modern period, the Japanese emperor had not been deposed and would never be. Thus, even when the emperor's prerogatives were virtually reduced in Japan under foreign occupation, the editor was certain that it would not affect the people's attitudes toward him at all. He explained, "the people's faith in the emperor is not attributed to various prerogatives belonging to him, or never due to seeing the emperor as a political powerholder," and therefore he supported changing the clauses on the emperor's power in the constitution.<sup>124</sup>

This said, the editorial recommended promoting the establishment of popular, representative government. He said that the idea of "people-based" politics (*minpon seiji*) had existed in Japan since before (modern) Western thought developed; nevertheless, the "cliques" (*batsuzoku*) had always dominated government, getting hold of the imperial court and failing to reflect popular opinions on political decision-making.<sup>125</sup> Thus, it was high time to leave government to the people and realize representative government with constitutional amendments.

As of late October 1945, the *Mainichi Shinbun*'s stance was vague. It simply insinuated its support for the emperor system, a reduction of the emperor's prerogatives, and the normalization of parliamentary democracy, not so different from what conservative leaders had prepared to do. By the end of the year, however, the *Mainichi Shinbun* decided that modifying the

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<sup>124</sup> "Shasetsu: Ten'nō-sei to Minshu Seiji" (Editorial: The Emperor System and Democratic Politics), *Mainichi Shinbun*, October 23, 1945, 1.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

Meiji Constitution along the line of Taishō liberalism was unsatisfactory and a new constitution should codify the emperor's status as it actually was rather than a nominal one. While showing a certain understanding of the intended changes and the reasoning behind conservative draft constitutions, *Mainichi* refused to accept any proposal short of declaring the emperor a ceremonial ruler as he had historically been.

For instance, the December 17, 1945 editorial commented on Matsumoto's basic stance toward constitutional revision, focusing on the issue of sovereignty. Regarding Matsumoto's intention not to change the principle of imperial sovereignty, the writer understood that Matsumoto found nothing amiss with it because, until the 1930s, it had not been a problem. The editorial explained that as Taishō liberal Minobe Tatsukichi argued, it had been interpreted that sovereignty resided in the state and the emperor exercised it as the head of the state on behalf of the entire nation; the *Mainichi Shinbun* editor also noted that the emperor's being the superintendent of the rights of sovereignty was no more than a formality, and in reality three branches of the government had been the supreme decision-making organs. He knew that following the British example, Matsumoto tried to normalize the Japanese constitutional monarchy by establishing clear-cut lines of authority and responsibility of the three branches and by strengthening the Diet through constitutional amendments.<sup>126</sup>

Yet, to the writer, unless the clauses on imperial sovereignty were altered, healthy constitutional monarchy would not be realized because some people might abuse the emperor's power once again, thus threatening the security of the imperial family. This, in his view, was still probable in Japan where, unlike in Britain, democratic ideas were not permeated yet in society.

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<sup>126</sup> “Shasetsu: Tōchiken no Gainen ni tsuite” (Editorial: On the Concept of Sovereignty), *Mainichi Shinbun*, December 17, 1945, 1.

He rationalized his point by saying:

In England, since there is no written constitution, there is no law prohibiting the emperor's prerogatives in practice, but on the basis of the spirit of the unwritten constitution, the principle that [the sovereign] reigns but does not rule is already established and has become the steadfast faith of the people. . . . . [In our country], . . . keeping the constitutional articles regarding sovereignty may lead to its misuse by part of the people and do harm to the imperial household in the future. In our country where democratic thought is not well developed, this should be seriously considered.<sup>127</sup>

When the *Mainichi Shinbun* featured the late Konoe Fumimaro's outline of constitutional reform several days later, the editorial criticized it for being "lukewarm" (*bion-teki*), specifically because it did not touch on the stipulation on imperial sovereignty, and called it the "fundamental shortcoming" (*konpon-teki kekkan*). In the December 21 paper, the editor developed the reasons why and how the principle of sovereignty should change. Adding to the concerns that some people may turn imperial sovereignty to their own account, he pointed out that since the current constitution had been created when democratic politics had not been practiced, the basic principles were irreconcilable with democracy.<sup>128</sup> He also emphasized the importance of changing the clauses on imperial sovereignty because it had been the foundation of militarist ideology. The military had destroyed the normal operations of parliamentary democracy with the absolutist interpretation of the emperor's sovereignty, and this right-wing ideology had not vanished yet. Therefore, the editorial maintained, "to prevent the reemergence of this wrong idea, it is necessary to abolish the articles on sovereignty that have been tied to this ideology in the past and will likely be in the future, and to have articles that represent democratic political thought and enable the completion of it instead."<sup>129</sup>

More specifically, the *Mainichi Shinbun* supported making the emperor just "stand in the

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<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> "Shasetsu: Bion ni Sugiru Kenpō Kaisei-an" (Editorial: A Too Lukewarm Constitutional Revision Plan), *Mainichi Shinbun*, December 21, 1945, 1.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

supreme position of the state as the symbol of honor and perform national ceremonies” as the Socialist Party and the Constitutional Research Association contemplated to do so. *Mainichi* did not forget to mention that these changes would never wipe out the people’s emperor worship.<sup>130</sup> The editor concluded with repeating the importance of codifying the emperor’s “real” status in a new constitution in order to prevent the rise of militarism again, not to cause unexpected trouble to the emperor, and to lead democratic development in the right direction.<sup>131</sup> Thus, the comments on the Liberal Party’s new constitutional outline and on one of the Matsumoto Committee drafts published on January 23 and February 1, 1946, while acknowledging the attempted changes and their theoretical backgrounds, continued to press for a change in the principle of sovereignty and its codification.<sup>132</sup>

### **The March 5 Government Draft Constitution and Its Reception**

Rewritten based upon the GHQ draft, the government’s draft released on March 6, 1946 naturally resembled the draft constitutions of the Socialist Party and of the Constitutional Research Association. The question that we now have is: although many had taken part in the constitutional debate by then, how did the Japanese receive the government’s new draft? Indeed, the government won approval from the majority.

Unsurprisingly, national newspapers, except the then pro-communist *Yomiuri Hōchi*, welcomed the new government draft. In spite of having not taken a clear stand on constitutional revision, the *Asahi Shinbun* accepted the government’s revision plan, repeating already familiar arguments and taking changes made to the draft for granted. In terms of the emperor’s becoming

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> See “Shasetsu: Jiyūtō no Kenpō Kaisei-an” (Editorial: The Liberal Party’s Constitutional Revision Plan), *Mainichi Shinbun*, January 23, 1946, 1; “Shasetsu: Kenpō Kaisei Shian ni taisuru Gigi” (Editorial: A Doubt on the Tentative Constitutional Revision Plan), *Mainichi Shinbun*, February 1, 1946, 1.

the symbol of the state and national unity by handing over the rights of sovereignty to the people, the *Asahi* editorial on March 7, 1946 assessed it as the “result of harmonizing Anglo-American democratic thought with the national feelings of the Japanese people” and rejoiced that the emperor’s prerogatives were greatly cut back.<sup>133</sup>

That the *Asahi Shinbun* took a pro-emperor, anti-ruling elite stance common among many Japanese was indicated in the newspaper’s “vóx pópuli, vóx Déi” (*Tensei Jingo*) on the same day. This short column accused the “conservatives” in the government for being an obstacle to democratization by criticizing that the Shidehara cabinet had spent so much time to devise the new constitution. Taking the emperor’s new year rescript that expressed his commitment to working with the people for Japan’s reconstruction as a democratic, pacifist country, the writer asserted that to “directly link the emperor to the subjects” (*kun-shin chokketsu*) would foster “prompt and thorough” democratization.<sup>134</sup> It is ironic that, in fact, Prime Minister Shidehara Kijūrō wrote the imperial rescript.

Once its opinions were adopted in the government draft, the *Mainichi Shinbun*, which had constantly urged the government to make bolder constitutional reform, chose to discuss the next task: to change Japanese moral values in accordance with a new constitution to provide a solid foundation for it. Advancing the December 21, 1945 editorial, the *Mainichi Shinbun* argued that under the Meiji state structure, people’s morality was centered on their total loyalty to the emperor and sacrifice on his behalf; now that the absolutist state was replaced with a democratic government, the Japanese had to obtain “democratic morality” (*minshushugi-teki dōtoku*), or

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<sup>133</sup> “Shasetsu: Kakkiteki-na Heiwa Kenpō” (Editorial: An Epochal Pacifist Constitution), *Asahi Shinbun*, March 7, 1946, 1.

<sup>134</sup> “Tensei Jingo” (vóx pópuli, vóx Déi), *Asahi Shinbun*, March 7, 1946, 1.

“universal social morality” (*fuhen-teki shakai dōtoku*) of individuality, freedom, equality, humanity, and peace.<sup>135</sup> The *Mainichi* editorial wrote that with the legal shift in the emperor’s status from that of sovereign to a living symbol of Japanese national unity, accompanied with the acquirement of democratic ideas, the people would be less governed by their awe of him; they would instead develop a sense of affection for him and rediscover a traditional vision of the emperor in a new Japan.<sup>136</sup> This was in a way the restatement of the newspaper’s stance that the emperor system and democracy could go along together and the declaration of its support for the government’s constitutional revision plan.<sup>137</sup>

Political parties also made official comments on the government’s new draft constitution one after another on March 8, 1946. The communists, of course, vehemently attacked it. They questioned the ability of the government full of “war criminals,” including the emperor, to write a new constitution and therefore the legitimacy of the draft. The JCP announced that the draft was nothing but the conservative government’s efforts to preserve the emperor system with a “progressive-looking façade” (*shinpo-teki na gaikei*) in response to internal and external pressure, thus deceiving the world and obstructing Japanese democratization. Although the communists’ arguments were ideologically driven, they rightly noticed the government’s, and GHQ’s, intentions to retain the emperor system and found the continuity of the Meiji Constitution. As others pointed out later, too, the JCP asked why the government draft did not clearly declare popular sovereignty in the first article in line with other democratic constitutions. The Party

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<sup>135</sup> “Shasetsu: Minshu Kenpō to Shin-Dōtoku (Editorial: Democratic Constitution and New Morality), *Mainichi Shinbun*, March 8, 1946, 1; also see “Shasetsu: Ten’nō-sei Mondai no Kaiketsu” (Editorial: The Problem of the Emperor System Solved), *Mainichi Shinbun*, March 9, 1946, 1.

<sup>136</sup> “Shasetsu: Ten’nō-sei Mondai no Kaiketsu,” 1.

<sup>137</sup> The March 8 *Mainichi* editorial implicitly attacked the communists, who targeted the immediate destruction of “feudal” thought which they maintained was established on the emperor system.

argued that the very first chapter, which was spared to stipulate the emperor's status and power, was proof of the government's attempt to maintain the national polity headed by the emperor; in fact, this organization is kept in the current constitution. Choosing the abolition of the emperor system as a slogan, the communists did not accept turning the emperor into the "symbol" of Japan and of Japanese unity based upon the supreme will of the people, which they complained merely "[attested] the sacredness of a line of emperors unbroken for ages eternal that the militarists [had] utilized and violated the main object of the Potsdam Declaration, the principle of democracy." As to the renunciation of war clause, the Party did not believe it sufficient to prevent war.

Anticipating that as long as the emperor system existed, militarists and bureaucrats would take advantage of the emperor's position and launch a new war of aggression, the JCP demanded the removal of the emperor in any form, returning to the original abolitionist stance.<sup>138</sup> The communist comments were a total denial of the government draft.

On the other hand, while making some suggestions, other parties approved the new draft constitution as a whole. The Socialist Party issued an announcement that the new government draft was "progressive, having a strong resemblance to our Party's draft, and we [expressed] our support to its clarifying the faithful fulfillment of the Potsdam Declaration and zeal for democratic politics."<sup>139</sup> Likewise, the Liberal Party and the Progressive Party endorsed the government draft constitution, believing that it has integrated their proposals for constitutional reform. The Liberal Party declared that it supported the draft in principle (*gensoku ni oite sansei*), arguing that the three pillars of the draft constitution – the maintenance of the emperor system, the respect for

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<sup>138</sup> See *Asahi Shinbun* and *Mainichi Shinbun*, March 8, 1946, 1. The JCP statement is shortened in the *Mainichi Shinbun*.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*

fundamental human rights and democratization of the political organization, and pacifism and the renunciation of war – perfectly agreed with the Party’s policy.<sup>140</sup> The Progressive Party chairman of the Executive Council also made an oral statement that the Party “favorably [welcomed] (*kōkan wo motte mukaeru*) [the government’s] revision plan in general.” About the issue of sovereignty, he commented: “It has been reckoned so far in Japan that sovereignty resides in the emperor and he exercises it by himself, but in reality, this has never been practiced, and influential retainers have managed in any time period. In accordance with the reality, the government draft made a change in the national polity this time.” He was also delighted at the expansion of the clauses on the people’s duties and rights. Like the Liberal Party, the Progressive Party found the party draft’s intended reforms reflected in the government’s constitution and expressed its support for it.<sup>141</sup>

It might be naïve not to consider political calculations of these parties; knowing GHQ involvement and MacArthur’s endorsement, they might have judged it unwise to oppose the government draft; they might also have felt that led by the newspapers, the public was leaning toward constitutional reform along a moderate-liberal line, and therefore, they should go with it to win the first postwar general elections scheduled in the following month. But considering that there lay a fine line between the so-called conservative drafts and liberal ones, the responses of the Liberal Party and the Progressive Party should have been genuine. There is no space to recount later discussions exchanged in the House of Representatives Committee and Subcommittee on constitutional revision, but neither the Liberal Party that became the government party as the result of the April elections nor the Progressive Party tried to sabotage meetings with a barrage of

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid. Chairman of the Progressive Party Executive Council Saitō Takao’s remarks published in *Asahi* and *Mainichi* are slightly different, probably because they were orally presented. The direct quote is from the *Mainichi Shinbun*; Saitō critically commented on the renunciation of war, but it is not reported in the *Asahi Shinbun*.

ideological arguments. By the time, both parties, especially the Liberal Party then in charge of passing the government draft constitution, probably thought that they needed to enact a liberal constitution to satisfy the Allies so that they could save the emperor and end the Occupation as soon as possible. Yet, equally important, they did not see fundamental differences between their drafts and the government's.

Scholars and intellectuals commented on the new draft constitution, too. The essay written by Morito Tatsuo, a Constitutional Research Association member closely working with the Socialist Party, reminds us that both the Association and the JSP, negating revolutionary options of late eighteenth-to-nineteenth century Western liberalism and Marxism and rather accommodating the Japanese people's favorable view toward the emperor, took moderate attitudes toward constitutional revision. Morito praised the government draft written by "replacing the original conservative plan and giving in to progressive views within and without Japan" as a "very fine job for a government plan" (*seifu-an to shite ha jōjō no deki*). The key issue was over the emperor system. In regards to it, he wrote:

About [the emperor system], I have always believed that by getting rid of the abolitionist theory and the national polity preservationist argument, to complete democracy while maintaining the emperor system would be the most appropriate solution. For this problem cannot be solved only with logic or emotions, and [we] can reach a reasonable conclusion only by considering the victor nations' aims and the international trend on one hand and respecting our country's tradition and popular feelings on the other, in other words by taking these two major realistic facts into full account. In that it took realistic progressive democracy by removing the reactionary theory on the preservation of the national polity and simultaneously not taking idealistic republicanism, the revision plan can surely be called a good constitution according to the reality.<sup>142</sup>

Although Rōyama Masamichi had not articulated how to come to terms with the emperor's role and popular sovereignty, he now gave full approval to the government's amendments to the Meiji Constitution that became much closer to those of the Socialist Party and

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<sup>142</sup> Morito Tatsuo, "Kenpō Kaisei Sōan Yōkō wo Hyōsu" (Assessing the Outlines of the Constitutional Revision Draft), *Asahi Shinbun*, March 12, 1946, 1.

the Constitutional Research Association. Like Morito, Rōyama positively evaluated the government's draft as "a totally new draft constitution that adjusted every principle of democracy to our country's current conditions to the maximum level."<sup>143</sup> The compromise made between democracy and Japan's native institutions meant the issue of the emperor system and sovereignty. The reason why Rōyama accepted the government draft, despite the fact that it went a step further from his proposal, is probably that both were inherently akin to each other. As discussed before, while revering the emperor as the head of the Japanese nation and supporting the retention of the emperor system, he had spoken for shrinking the emperor's prerogatives and depoliticizing him. At the same time, he had suggested codifying the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the emperor AND the people – if not popular sovereignty – and establishing parliamentary government. It was not clear from these where his idea stood, but in the March 8, 1946 *Asahi Shinbun*, Rōyama explicitly rejected the "conservative" draft that did not change the emperor's status on paper and favored the government's new draft and the others of a similar kind.<sup>144</sup> By keeping the imperial institution but reforming it in a way not to conflict with democracy, the government's proposal was totally preferable to him. Rōyama commented, "Considering the democratization of the Japanese national polity fairly without bias, this draft constitution is a reasonable and realistic conclusion anyhow."<sup>145</sup>

The response of Kanamori Tokujirō, an organ theorist who drafted the Liberal Party's constitutional amendments, is worth notice. His interpretation of the government draft and support for it showcase how Taishō liberals, including those who wrote "conservative"

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<sup>143</sup> Rōyama Masamichi, "Kenpō Kaisei Sōan Yōkō wo Hyōsu," *Asahi Shinbun*, March 8, 1946, 1.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

constitutions, came to accept a “progressive” one. Indeed, Kanamori called the part on sovereignty “most shocking” (*mottomo shigeki-teki*) and expressed his surprise at changes made since Matsumoto had announced his Four Principles in December 1945.<sup>146</sup> However, he found not much novelty in substance as it might look and the organ theory still effective in explaining the emperor’s new status. About a theoretical ground of this, he said:

In my opinion, the so-called organ theory for which we used to be harshly criticized by the people offers the most correct answer. There exists a collective national will, or the general will of the Japanese people as the supreme will. Then, the emperor acts, embodying this supreme will in himself. The first article in the [government’s constitutional] outline states the emperor “is the symbol of Japan and of national unity,” but I interpret it as meaning the expression of this [idea].<sup>147</sup>

Regarding the reduction in imperial prerogatives, Kanamori probably saw less difference from the actual political practice and from the Liberal Party’s draft. As many Taishō liberals had argued, he repeated to say: “Calm and natural, the constitutional monarch does not cling [to his prerogatives] at all, and his subjects and officials have acted with his power in their backs. Things were just returned to reality, and with this, the criticism against the monarch based on the people’s false impression will disappear.”<sup>148</sup> Aware of the shortcomings of the Meiji Constitution, Kanamori agreed on the need for revision. Even if the government draft turned out different from the previously reported ones, he could rationalize the aimed changes from a Taishō liberal’s point of view and in the end endorsed them.

The Japanese people also received the government’s new draft constitution favorably. In the readers’ column in the March 10, 1946 *Mainichi Shinbun*, for example, a man expressed his joy and relief. He first wrote, like Kanamori, how surprised he was at the government’s new revision plan, since it was radically different from the one leaked in the previous month. Yet, he

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<sup>146</sup> Kanamori Tokujirō, “Kenpō Kaisei Sōan Yōkō wo Hyōsu,” *Asahi Shinbun*, March 9, 1946, 1.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

fully supported the emperor's new status by stating:

That the emperor's position was finally clarified is more delightful than any other thing. I suspect that the reason why the Japanese have been in a state of bewilderment, restless having nothing to rely on, is because they have not been sure what would happen to the emperor. Though there is a view that the Japanese country and the emperor are separate things, speaking of our feelings, it has been thought that as the emperor's position was not settled, we could not know what would happen to us and the future of the country.

He also thanked the Allies. He became convinced, by looking at the draft, that they were “fulfilling justice, freedom, and generosity as promised,” and felt encouraged to work for Japan's reconstruction with them.<sup>149</sup>

There were short comments in the March 8, 1946 *Mainichi Shinbun*. A Tokyo Imperial University student supported the draft constitution. Touching on the emperor's new status, he said that however his position was stipulated, the Japanese people's feelings would never change. He interpreted that pacifism reflected the emperor's intention and indicated his advocacy, too.<sup>150</sup> A female clerk at an electronic distribution company, on the other hand, had a doubt about the emperor's ceasing to be the superintendent of sovereignty and becoming just a symbol. But she still expressed her determination that she would work for making the relationship between the emperor and the people closer in accordance with a new constitution.<sup>151</sup>

The public opinion poll taken by the *Mainichi Shinbun* in May 1946 showed that the large majority of the Japanese supported the revised emperor system under the government's draft constitution.<sup>152</sup> Out of 2,000, 1,702 (eighty-five percent) voted for it, and 263 (thirteen percent) against. These 263 included not only the communist supporters but also the traditional national

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<sup>149</sup> “Kensetsu,” *Mainichi Shinbun*, March 10, 1946, 3.

<sup>150</sup> *Mainichi Shinbun*, March 8, 1946, 2.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

<sup>152</sup> “Shin-Kenpō Sōan heno Yoron” (Public Opinion regarding the New Draft Constitution), *Mainichi Shinbun*, May 27, 1946, 2. Of 2,000, 1,738 (eighty-seven percent) were men, and only 262 (thirteen percent) women. It is worth noting that the majority polled was from the educated class; about sixty percent finished higher education, and about thirty percent were middle school graduates.

polity preservationists and the supporters of other kinds of the imperial institution. Therefore, when asked if they were for or against the retention of the emperor system, the number of supporters increased by one percent (1,711), and that of opposition decreased by two percent (215). According to the newspaper, even among those who proposed republican government were supporters of the emperor. Those in favor of the existence of the emperor accounted for eighty-seven percent (1,738).<sup>153</sup> In any case, these data demonstrate that over eighty-five percent of the population accepted the emperor's new status and popular sovereignty. As various letters illustrated, it is reasonable to infer that whether familiar with all the legal and political debates or not, most of the Japanese who revered the emperor were satisfied with his depoliticized but still honorable status as a ceremonial ruler and accepted the new constitution.

### **Conclusion**

The Japanese government's constitutional revision bill was submitted to the Imperial Diet by imperial order – according to the formal procedure of constitutional revision stipulated in the Meiji Constitution – on June 20, 1946. Deliberations at the House of Representatives' plenary session began five days later, followed by the Committee on Revision for the Imperial Constitution headed by Ashida Hitoshi from July 1. A Subcommittee formed on the twenty-third carried further discussions to make specific alterations on the draft. After the modified version was passed in the plenary session by 421 votes to 8 on August 24, it was sent to the House of Peers. Through deliberations at the plenary session, the Special Committee on constitutional revision, and the Subcommittee, the bill underwent additional revisions and was approved in the Upper House on October 6. It was voted for once again in the Lower House the next day. The

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

Constitution of Japan was promulgated finally on November 3.<sup>154</sup>

One of the heated debates that took place in the Diet was centered on the issue of the national polity, or *kokutai*. Whether or not the national polity was changed by the amendments to the Meiji Constitution was linked to the emperor's new status. Many argued that now that the locus of sovereignty shifted from the emperor to the people, the national polity had surely changed. To such arguments, however, new Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru from the Liberal Party and Kanamori Tokujirō, appointed Minister of State in charge of the Constitution, responded that the national polity had been maintained. John W. Dower comments that their "explanations were ruled by an emotional logic rather than any legal precision or historical accuracy."<sup>155</sup> Kanamori, in fact, admitted that he did not employ legal arguments because the question of the national polity should be solved only by "heart" (*kokoro*).<sup>156</sup> Still, whether agreeable or not, the remarks made by Yoshida and Kanamori represented what Taishō liberals had argued. In their defense of the new constitution, they repeated the Taishō liberals' analysis of Japan's modern developments, the emperor's historical position, and the relationship between the monarch and the people to rationalize that the national polity remained the same.

In the June 25, 1946 House of Representatives plenary session, Yoshida explained the national polity as follows:

the Japanese Constitution, as you know, was based upon the Charter Oath. This Charter Oath just put Japanese history and conditions into words, and the spirit of the Oath itself is the national polity of Japan; it [represented] Japan. When we read the Oath, it is clear that Japan is democratic or exactly what "democracy" (*demokurashi*) represents, and has never been the polity under absolute monarchy or oppressive government. On looking at the previous emperors and the poems and the like of enlightened monarchs and wise ministers, there has been no tyrannical

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<sup>154</sup> The bill was sent to the Privy Council on October 12, 1946 and passed on October 29.

<sup>155</sup> Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 388.

<sup>156</sup> Dai-90-kai Teikoku Gikai Shūgiin Teikoku Kenpō Kaisei-an Iinkai Giroku (Sokki) dai-10-kai (The Tenth Proceedings of the Ninetieth Imperial Diet House of Representatives Committee on Revisions for the Imperial Constitution (Stenography)), July 12, 1946. 8-9; available at <http://teikokugikai-i.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/090/1440/main.html>.

government that ignored the people's will in Japan unlike in other countries. To consider the people's minds is the Japanese national polity. Therefore, democratic government was not established for the first time by the new Constitution, but it merely expressed the things that have already been in Japan again in different words. ... The existence of the imperial household is the Japanese people, or the Japanese national polity itself that naturally emerged. There is no distinction between the imperial family and the people, that is, the monarch and the people are one; they are one family. It is beyond dispute that the monarch and the people are not in an antagonistic relationship. ... The national polity is not changed even the slightest by the new Constitution.<sup>157</sup>

Here Yoshida recited the idea of the benevolent emperor and his belief in the “concert between ruler and ruled.” We can also detect Yoshino Sakuzō's ideology of *Minponshugi*. Redefining the national polity as a corporate body headed by the imperial household, Yoshida affirmed its continuity under the new constitution that retained the emperor as the symbol of the state and of the national unity.

Kanamori agreed with Yoshida. He imagined that the Japanese nation-state “[existed] on the foundation that the feelings rooted deeply at the bottom of our hearts [were] closely tied to the emperor and the people [were] united with the emperor as the center of adoration (*akogare*).”

Taking this as what the national polity meant, Kanamori also asserted that the “national polity [did] not change one iota.”<sup>158</sup> Later, Kanamori distinguished the *kokutai*, national polity, from the *seitai*, form of government, and identified the change brought about in the location of sovereignty with the shift in the “seitai” rather than “kokutai.”<sup>159</sup>

Thus, the official transformation of the emperor into a ceremonial monarch and the declaration of popular sovereignty, which had been suggested by the GHQ Government Section as well as the socialists and Constitutional Research Association members, could be contextualized

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<sup>157</sup> Dai-90-kai Teikoku Gikai Shūgiin Giji Sokki-roku dai-5-gō (A Stenographic Record of the Proceedings of the Ninetieth Imperial Diet House of Representatives No. 5), June 26, 1946, 13; available at <http://teikokugikai-i.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/090/0060/main.html>.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., 13, 14.

<sup>159</sup> This is from Kanamori's explanation of the national polity given to Deputy Chief of GS Colonel Charles L. Kades (1906-1996). “Kanamori 6 Gensoku” (Minister Kanamori's Six Principles on the Constitutional Reform) is available at <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryō/04/122/122tx.html>. Kanamori himself translated the *kokutai* as “Japan's national character” and the “character of nationhood” rather than the “national polity.”

in Taishō liberals' mode of thinking. Theodore H. McNelly says: "The position of the emperor under the new Constitution seems to me to accord adequately both with the practice of democracy and the centuries-old Japanese monarchical tradition in which the emperor was nominally a powerless monarch who fostered political stability while legitimizing change."<sup>160</sup> Indeed, this is how the "conservatives" felt and why they approved the new constitution. Ten years after the enactment of the postwar constitution, Yoshida Shigeru wrote about his unchanged view of the national polity and understanding of the emperor's status. This suggests that the "liberal" draft was compatible with "conservative" thought. He frankly confessed, "It is a fact that when we first heard [the] word[, the symbol of the people], it struck us as really strange (*makoto ni iyō*)."<sup>161</sup> However, he explained that he had interpreted it as simply expressing the Japanese national polity.

He maintained:

I believe that as a popular sense of the Japanese, the imperial family and the people are inseparable one body. I take the words stipulated in the Constitution, "The Emperor is the symbol of the people and the symbol of national unity," as clarifying the inseparable unity between the imperial household and the people. Those of the same parents form a family, and those of the same ancestry comprise a people and a country. It should be said that the ancestors of the imperial family are those of the Japanese people, and the imperial household is the head family of our nation. In other words, the groups of families surrounding our imperial family at the center are the *Yamato* people and the Japanese nation and constitute the Japanese state. It is Japanese tradition and history that since ancient times, the monarch and the subjects rely upon and help each other like a family and make a country.<sup>162</sup>

Surely Yoshida's historical view is not substantiated, but of importance here is how the emperor's new position in the new constitution fitted into the minds of Taishō liberals like Yoshida.

GS Chief Courtney Whitney reported to General Douglas MacArthur on February 2, 1946, that one of the Matsumoto Committee drafts published by the *Mainichi Shinbun* a day before was "poorly received by the press and the public," suggesting that the government ignored

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<sup>160</sup> McNelly, "Induced Revolution", 102.

<sup>161</sup> Yoshida, *Kaisō Jūnen* 2, 57.

<sup>162</sup> Yoshida, *Kaisō Jūnen* 4, 82.

the Japanese people's demands for liberal changes.<sup>163</sup> This observation was half right and half wrong. As demonstrated in this chapter, although the newspapers made it appear that the general public demanded the draft constitution of the Socialist Party or the Constitutional Research Association rather than that of the government, the Liberal Party, or the Progressive Party, ordinary people probably did not understand the differences in legal debates regarding sovereignty, and they supported the new constitution due to its moderate revisions. In this sense, MacArthur can take credit for the success of constitutional revision; his decision to retain the emperor was not merely politically calculated but fair to the majority of the occupied people. My examination of "conservative" and "liberal/ progressive" drafts, independent intellectuals' thoughts, and public attitudes thus show how rich and active native discussions were and where the political-intellectual middle ground was formed, and suggests why the postwar Japanese constitution was broadly accepted and has been preserved to this day.

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<sup>163</sup> "Memorandum for the Supreme Commander: Subject: Constitutional Reform (Matsumoro Draft)" is from Takayanagi, Ōtomo, and Tanaka, eds., *Nihonkoku Kenpō Seitei no Katei 1*, 40.

PART III

## CHAPTER 5

## EARLY US COLD WAR POLICY FOR JAPAN: THE CONVERGENCE OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONALIST THOUGHT

The year 1947 was crucial for the US Cold War policy for Europe; it marked the start of the containment of Soviet expansion. On March 12, 1947, identifying Communists as totalitarian aggressors, President Harry S. Truman declared America's economic as well as political commitment to supporting "free peoples" and urged the Congress to authorize four-hundred million dollars worth of aid to Greece and Turkey. In summer, Secretary of State George C. Marshall (1880-1959) proposed a multi-year economic reconstruction program for Western Europe, officially called the European Recovery Program (ERP) and commonly known as the Marshall Plan. The fall of neutral Czechoslovakia into the Soviet sphere of influence by a communist coup persuaded the Congress to approve the Marshall Plan in early April 1948. Over the next four years, the United States provided approximately thirteen-billion dollars in material and financial aid for European countries.

The beginning of the Cold War affected US policy for occupied Japan. Concerned about Japan's economic conditions and the communization of Asia, the Truman administration decided to shift the primary objective of the Occupation from "demilitarization and democratization" to "economic reconstruction." This policy change was first called the "Reverse Course" by Japanese critics and thereafter has been known by that name. NSC(National Security Council)-13/2, a new policy giving priority to economic recovery, was passed by the Council in summer 1948 and approved by Truman in October. Washington announced the Nine Principles of Economic Stabilization in December, and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas MacArthur proclaimed the Occupation policy shift on New Year's Day 1949. In the

following month, Truman sent Detroit banker Joseph M. Dodge (1890-1964) to Tokyo to implement the new economic policy.

This chapter examines trends in American public discourse about the US government's Japan policy between 1947 and 1952. We know why, during this five-year period, American policymakers decided to make its former enemy, Japan, into an ally. Many scholars have described how new policies were formulated in the process of bureaucratic negotiations in this early Cold War period.<sup>1</sup> We do not know, however, how American intellectuals and journalists, who had shown so much interest in US post-surrender policy for Japan and publicly expressed their opinions during and after the war, developed a political debate about US Cold War policy for Japan.

The scholarship on this subject is surprisingly limited. For example, there are only a few studies of popular magazines' attitudes toward US Occupation policy for Japan. Howard B. Schonberger's biographical account of *Newsweek's* foreign affairs editor Harry F. Kern (1911-1996) shows how the magazine, in cooperation with the American Council on Japan (ACJ), an American Japan Lobby newly organized to change the course of the Occupation, led the offensive

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<sup>1</sup> See Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu (Ministry of Finance, History of Finance Office), ed., *Shōwa Zaisei-shi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan: Amerika no tai-Nichi Senryō Seisaku* (A History of Finance of the Showa Period from the End of War to Peace vol. 3: American Occupation Policies for Japan) (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1976); Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Roger Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Hosoya Chihiro, *San Furanshisuko Kōwa heno Michi* (The Road to the San Francisco Peace) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1984); Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: McArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002); Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1989); Masumi Jun'nosuke, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Ge* (Postwar Politics 1945-55 vol. 2) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan, 1983).

against the US Occupation policy in regards to the Japanese economy in 1947.<sup>2</sup> It is also known that Henry Luce (1898-1967) of Time Inc., having backed up the leader of the Chinese Nationalist government (KMT) Chiang Kai-shek since the 1930s, continued to garner American support for him after 1945: Luce was a spokesman for the China Lobby.<sup>3</sup> When we look at *Newsweek*, *Time*, and *Life* articles about postwar Japan and China, we can easily see their political motivations and attempts to influence US policy for East Asia. Yet, the existing studies simply disclose the activities of the interest groups: the opinions in these three magazines, even though they were widely circulated, represented merely part of the larger discourse regarding American policies toward East Asia. Nor does James F. Hilgenberg, Jr.'s *From Enemy to Ally: Japan, the American Business Press, and the Early Cold War* provide a full enough picture. As the subtitle of the book indicates, he examines only leading American business magazines' views of the American Occupation of Japan.<sup>4</sup> Thus, more empirical research is needed to paint a bigger picture.

The other problem is that no single work sufficiently answers the question of how a consensus in regards to Washington's new policy for Japan emerged in early Cold War-period America. Researchers agree that according to the evolving international circumstances, the Americans accepted the shifts in US policy toward Japan. Except for Luce publications' abortive efforts to persuade the American public not to abandon Chiang at the verge of his defeat in the civil war, *Newsweek*, *Time*, and *Life* essentially supported the making of a US Cold War policy for East Asia designed to fight against Communism. Hilgenberg's work shows that the business community's opinions, too, remained in sync with the official policies throughout the Occupation

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<sup>2</sup> Schonberger, "Harry F. Kern: The Japan Lobby in American Diplomacy," in *Aftermath of War*, 134-160.

<sup>3</sup> T. Christopher Jespersen, *American Images of China, 1931-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

<sup>4</sup> James F. Hilgenberg, Jr., *From Enemy to Ally: Japan, the American Business Press, and the Early Cold War* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993); originally Ph. D. dissertation completed in 1978.

period. Chiba Hiromi's Ph.D. dissertation "From Enemy to Ally: American Public Opinion and Perceptions about Japan, 1945-1950" reveals how the American public views of Japan changed, based upon a wide range of newspapers, rather than specific magazines.<sup>5</sup> Yet, her analysis simply supports the thesis that the intensification of the Cold War led to the American public's acceptance of Japan as an ally. Taking this situational logic for granted, scholars fail to see how the Cold War actually affected intellectual discussions and justified the new policy for Japan.

The only exception is Naoko Shibusawa. Her *America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy* attempts to find a cultural cause for the changes in America's attitudes toward Japan.<sup>6</sup> Advancing Sheila Johnson's analysis in *The Japanese through American Eyes*, Shibusawa argues that the images of Japan as feminine and/ or immature helped the Americans accept their former enemy as a junior partner of the Cold War.<sup>7</sup> She chooses to minimize the effect of situational forces, however, and thereby neglects to analyze the cause and effect of image shifts. Too selective and too narrow, her research does not seem to sufficiently support her thesis. Nevertheless, it is of value for its critical view of traditional American thinking about race and gender, through which she tries to explain how the Americans unconsciously rationalized their new relationship with Japan. Although my focus is not on the hierarchical view of race and gender in American culture, I agree with Shibusawa that we need to place the question – why the Americans came to accept the shifts in US policy toward Japan – in the larger context of American thought:

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<sup>5</sup> Hiromi Chiba, "From Enemy to Ally: American Public Opinion and Perceptions about Japan, 1945-1950" (PhD diss., University of Hawaii, 1990).

<sup>6</sup> Naoko Shibusawa, *America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

<sup>7</sup> Sheila K. Johnson, *The Japanese through American Eyes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). Johnson finds that in the Occupation period through the 1950s, the intimacy between Japanese women and American GIs and the feminine aspects of Japanese culture were common themes in American publications, as if they reflected the power relations between the two countries.

particularly American liberal internationalist thought.

Unlike other scholars, I look at a variety of publications and also analyze the opinions of American intellectuals, journalists, and ex-government officials who were Asia specialists. My research shows how divergent groups of liberals – normally categorized into “conservatives” and “progressives” – formulated and accommodated the US Cold War paradigm in Asia, to the point where few ideological differences existed between them.

Indeed, this thesis disagrees with scholars who simply portray the conservatives as “Cold Warriors” and the progressives as their “opponents” and suggest that McCarthyism killed potential opposition.<sup>8</sup> It is true that after the editorial staff of *Amerasia*, one of the radical journals, was alleged to be involved in espionage, it ceased publication in 1947. The Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) was also accused of being pro-Communist and underwent investigations in the early 1950s.<sup>9</sup> It is hard to speculate how much McCarthyism affected the whole discussions about US Japan policy and what *Amerasia* and the IPR could and might have done without pressure from the state. Considering the fact that there were plenty of other publications, however, we can hardly overestimate the significance of *Amerasia*. Besides, when we place the debate between the “progressive” and “conservative” Asia specialists in the context of postwar American intellectual currents, the conflict thesis does not hold. As the study of Richard H. Pells shows, the American liberal camp diverged into anti-Communist liberalism and progressivism during the late 1940s, and

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<sup>8</sup> See Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, esp. pp. 3-5 and Chapters 1, 3, and 5; John W. Dower, “Occupied Japan as History and Occupation History as Politics,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 2 (February 1975): 490-491; John W. Dower, “E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History,” in *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman*, ed. Dower (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 31-34, 39-100; John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 217-224.

<sup>9</sup> About the allegations against *Amerasia* and the IPR, see John N. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars and American Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974).

the former prevailed over the latter, forming a Cold War consensus.<sup>10</sup> Likewise, we can see how the opinions between the “progressives” and the “conservatives” converged according to the changes in the international environment and why they came to support Truman’s foreign policy toward Japan/ Asia: it was their belief in liberal internationalism and fear of Communist expansion.

The process of this intellectual convergence reflected how Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Wilsonian vision for postwar Asia was transformed and absorbed by the Truman administration. The realization of Roosevelt’s new Asian order hinged on the achievement of four conditions: cooperating and coexisting with the Soviet Union; helping China emerge as a new force for the peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia; weakening Japan’s power by decolonization, demilitarization, and pacification; and promoting the Asian colonies’ (eventual) independence and modernization. When the first two of these premises were shaken by the rift between the United States and the Soviet Union and the Chinese civil war by 1947, discussions about US policy for Japan emerged between two liberal internationalist groups: the conservatives who diverged from Roosevelt’s vision of power relations in postwar Asia, and the progressives who held onto it. In describing the debates during the early Cold War period, the following sections show how internationalists’ shared interest in ensuring that Japan remained democratic and Asia became stable and developed for the security of the region, and in turn for American benefits, ultimately helped forge a consensus for the US Cold War policy for Japan, generating no fundamental opposition to the peace and security settlements with Japan. Believers of American liberal democracy and capitalism and commitment to preserving an international order, both conservatives and progressives grew concerned about Communist expansion to Asia and became only mild

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<sup>10</sup> Richard H. Pells, *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s* (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1989).

critics of the Truman administration's policies.

### **Reverse Economic Policy for Japan?: Debate Begins**

Beginning in the fall of 1945, the Americans were already reading about the success of the Occupation of Japan under the leadership of SCAP General Douglas MacArthur. The inundation of reports about the swift modernization reforms remaking the “feudal” and “militarist” Japan at the hands of American occupiers reflected, and reinforced, the American view that they and they alone had brought all the changes to the Japanese: native agency was ignored. As most initial reform directives were implemented within a year, the ultimate objective of the Occupation – to remove the roots of Japanese militarism through demilitarization and democratization – appeared almost immediately fulfilled.

While Japanese society seemed to be making progress thanks to the Americans, nevertheless, there was no illusion that it had completely rid itself of “tradition” and become a clone of America. In the December 3, 1945 issue of *Life*, the author's report about the “Life in Tokyo” showed both changes and continuities only three months after the Occupation had begun. This photo-essay described some of the early programs, such as the demobilization of the Japanese military and the abolition of State Shinto, and the economic crisis in the immediate aftermath of the war. Many photographs displayed the American GIs mingling with Japanese women.<sup>11</sup> At the same time, the illustrated article focused upon how the Japanese still led their traditional lives, indicating the challenge lying before the American occupiers. The Japanese “[maintained] their medieval customs and [bowed] to the emperor”; even the communists who announced their manifesto to overthrow the emperor were not freed from worshipping him; and the “people still

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<sup>11</sup> “Life in Tokyo,” *Life*, December 3, 1945, 105-106, 108-111.

[followed] their ancient etiquette” at weddings, funerals, and tea parties.<sup>12</sup>

On August 25, 1946, *New York Times* correspondent Lindsay Parrott published in *New York Times Magazine* his assessment of the first year of the Occupation under the title “Japan a Year after: Still a ‘Gamble’.” He summarized the demilitarization and democratization of Japan and declared that “[t]wo stages of the occupation [had] succeeded beyond hopes.”<sup>13</sup> However, well aware of Japan’s bad economic situation and believing that chaos would likely breed militarism, Parrott urged the Allies to tackle economic issues in the next phase.<sup>14</sup> In terms of the degree of actual change to Japanese society and culture, he judged reforms to be far from complete, too. Parrott condescendingly said that, to his surprise, the Japanese had demonstrated their capability of practicing democracy and enjoying freedoms, but were yet to understand the underlying principles behind these reforms.<sup>15</sup>

These challenges did not mean that the reform process had failed. Until the end of 1946, the Americans enjoyed the superficial success story of the Occupation. The December 2 1946 issue of *Life* carried “A Report on Japan,” one of the first works detailing the organization, activities, and objectives of the Allied Occupation. The author, Noel F. Busch, commented that the American public knew little about the Occupation because the whole story, extremely difficult to tell, had not yet been told, and also because the Occupation was “sensationally successful.” “[W]hile scandal and failure make news, success only makes history,” said Busch. He praised this “precious historic opportunity” for “being wisely utilized.”<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 106-107, 110-113; the quotes are from p.106 and p.112 respectively; about the description of the communists, see pp.110-111.

<sup>13</sup> Lindsay Parrott, “Japan a Year after: Still a ‘Gamble’,” *New York Times Magazine*, August 25, 1946, 18, 45; the quote is from p.18.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 45, 47-48.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 47-48.

<sup>16</sup> Noel F. Busch, “A Report on Japan,” *Life*, December 2, 1946, 105-106; the quotes are all from p.105.

In early 1947, however, journalists' reevaluations of the Occupation began to entail more criticisms, particularly concerning US policies for the Japanese economy. The reports informed the readers how Japan's economic engine had been stalled by low production, shortage of goods, and chronic inflation that had fueled labor strikes. Indeed, the Japanese economy suffered from hyper-inflation caused by the shortage of raw materials and consumer goods and worsened by the Japanese government's deficit spending policy. Unable to reach an agreement about Japan's war reparations, the Allies left the issue of the scale of industrial production and trade permitted for Japan unsettled, and this made it difficult for the Japanese government to make a long-term economic plan and for businesses to restart production. The cost of the Occupation forces that accounted for a third of the budget added a burden on the Japanese.<sup>17</sup>

The American public discussions were divided between those who, contributing the economic difficulty to the Japanese leaders, urged further democratization and those who, blaming the punitive economic policy, demanded reversing it. Both essentially argued for the success of the American Occupation, namely the success of democratization of Japan, but the second group more quickly than the first group began to discuss US policy for Japan, placing it not in the context of World War II but in that of the Cold War.

Conservative Japan experts followed the journalists' focus on the failure of economic policies in occupied Japan. They criticized the Allies and the Occupation authorities for the stumbling Japanese economy and demanded policy shifts throughout the early Cold War years. Two points commonly underlay their opinions. First, they argued that economic recovery was necessary for a successful occupation and democratization of Japan; motivated by Cold War

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<sup>17</sup> See Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu, ed., *Shōwa Zaisei-shi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan*, 241-268.

concerns, they extended this reasoning to say that economic stabilization of Japan was also the key to stopping the expansion of Communist influence in Japan and Asia as a whole. Second, apprehensive about the financial burden of the Occupation on American taxpayers, they also claimed that by boosting Japanese industry, the United States would be able to reduce the costs for the Occupation of Japan. These arguments reflected America's growing perception of a Communist threat and lessening fear of the Japanese menace.

As early as the beginning of January 1947, in *New York Times Magazine*, Lindsay Parrott urged the Allies to devise new economic policies for Japan so that they could prevent a leftist totalitarian government from evolving from the current economic hardships. He observed that the right-wing totalitarianism whose roots had been eliminated by wide-ranged Occupation programs was less likely to resurge, but feared more that, facing an economic crisis, an incipient democratic government might easily fall before violent extraparliamentary forces led by the communists in the absence of Allied supervision.<sup>18</sup> Considering that the Japanese economy, like that of Britain, relied on the export of manufactured goods, Parrott called for softening war reparations demands and reopening trade routes. "If, through greed, we strip Japan of the machinery she needs in order to manufacture, or through selfishness deny her manufacturers necessary markets," warned he, "we shall create made-to-order conditions for a new totalitarianism with the slogan, 'Democracy Means Starvation.'"<sup>19</sup> Parrott also expressed his doubt about the breakup of the zaibatsu and the purge of the managerial class, both of which seemed counter-

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<sup>18</sup> Lindsay Parrott, "The Old Is on Trial, the New Being Tried," *New York Times Magazine*, January 5, 1947, 47, 50. In another essay, published about seven months later, Parrott modified his view about the possibility of a swing-back to the old regime and considered it as likely as a communist takeover; see "Japan Still Worships at Shinto Shrines," *New York Times Magazine*, August 10, 1947, 21.

<sup>19</sup> Parrott, "The Old Is on Trial," 50. He also argued in "Japan Still Worships at Shinto Shrines" that to sustain the large population, Japan needed to manufacture for export; see p.20.

productive to fixing Japanese economic problems.<sup>20</sup>

Parrott began to identify left-wing authoritarianism as the new enemy, but, as of January 1947, still connected the democratization of Japan to the pre-surrender vision of Pacific security.<sup>21</sup> By the summer, however, he accepted the reality of the Soviet-American rift and viewed Japan as a strategic asset. He argued that due to its location and industrial power, Japan had “enormous potential military value ... as a base or an ally (voluntary or involuntary) to any aggressive power or group which [sought] to dominate Asia and the Pacific.”<sup>22</sup>

More people envisioned, like Parrott, world-wide Communism as a threat to America’s geopolitical interests and demanded economic policy shifts for Japan. On March 10, the *Washington Post* published an article written by Wayne Coy (1903-1957) titled “Japan Economic Crisis Is Occupation Peril.” As the title indicated, Coy feared that “United States occupation policy in Japan [was] threatened by the current economic crisis in that country.”<sup>23</sup> He argued, in sympathy with the Japanese government, that their economic problems resulted from the high costs of the Occupation, the Allies’ indecision on the reparations issue, and even the zaibatsu dissolution.<sup>24</sup> Coy agreed with the goals of democratization and pacification of Japan but thought that economic instability risked their accomplishments and thus asked for US intervention to stabilize the Japanese economy. Simultaneously, he seemed to view America’s international commitment in terms of the fight between democracy and Communism. Coy said that the “challenge to the kind of government which we [did] not like [was] a very real thing in the Far

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 47. He made his oppositional stance clearer in “Japan Still Worships at Shinto Shrines”; see p.20.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 50.

<sup>22</sup> Parrott, “Japan Still Worships at Shinto Shrines,” 11.

<sup>23</sup> Wayne Coy, “Jap Economic Crisis Is Occupation Peril,” *Washington Post*, March 10, 1947, 5; Kimberly Zarkin and Michael J. Zarkin, *The Federal Communications Commission: Front Line in the Culture and Regulation Wars* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006), 165-166.

<sup>24</sup> Coy, “Jap Economic Crisis Is Occupation Peril,” 5.

East” and considered America’s financial power crucial to establishing democracy and winning security in the region.<sup>25</sup>

Not only newspaper correspondents but Japan specialists defended changing economic policies. Judging the US Far Eastern policy based upon wartime strategic concerns and international relations now irrelevant, they called for revision. Unlike the journalists, however, they did not normally exaggerate a Communist threat during the very early Cold War years. In *Far Eastern Survey*’s December 1948 issue, for instance, Joseph W. Ballantine, who was a former counselor at the Tokyo Embassy and director of the Far Eastern Affairs Division in the State Department, tried to explain the soundness of a new US policy for Japan.<sup>26</sup> Having opposed drastic postwar reforms, expressed faith in Japanese prewar “liberals,” and rejected the Marxian interpretation of Japanese militarism, Ballantine publicly denounced the contention that punitive economic measures would ensure democracy and pacifism in Japan. Believing the opposite to be true, he asserted that the “prospect for Japan’s democratization and rejection of war as an instrument of policy [would] in the long run depend primarily on whether she [was] afforded tolerable conditions for her national existence.”<sup>27</sup> To alleviate the general fear of the resurgence of Japanese aggression, he claimed that Japan had been demilitarized, and stressed that a prosperous and progressive Japan would assure the peace and order of the Far East, which would serve America’s national interests and those of all other allies.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ballantine then worked for the Brookings Institute and engaged in the activities of the American Council on Japan (ACJ), a Japan lobby formed under the leadership of *Newsweek* editor Harry F. Kern; Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 143-144, 150-151.

<sup>27</sup> Joseph W. Ballantine, “The New Japan: An American View,” *Far Eastern Survey* 17, no. 24 (December 22, 1948): 286-287; the quote is from p.287. Ballantine made the same point in “Japan: Nationalization vs. Free Enterprise?,” *Far Eastern Survey* 19, no. 3 (February 8, 1950): 30.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 287-288.

One of the other active advocates for the Reverse Course was Helen Mears (1900-1981).<sup>29</sup> During the war, she published a book and articles on Japan that actually reflected her antipathy for, and lack of understanding toward, the Japanese; but during the first half of 1946, she worked in Japan as a member of a Labor Advisory Committee of SCAP and at some point seemed to develop a critical view of the Western powers and their harsh treatment of defeated Japan that led her to become a proponent of the Reverse Course.<sup>30</sup>

In May 5, 1948's *Far Eastern Survey*, Mears, like Wayne Coy, placed the responsibility for Japan's economic problems on the US government, arguing that the huge occupation expense and attempted reparations programs put restraints upon the recovery of Japanese industry and forced poverty onto the Japanese.<sup>31</sup> Her complaints pointed not merely to America's seemingly repressive economic policy but to the basic assumptions and goal of the policy: reducing Japan's industrial capacity only to a subsistence level in order to keep the country weak and unaggressive. She explained that Japanese industry, converted to war production and subsequently destroyed, was already too debilitated to sustain a minimum standard of living even with American help. In view of Japan's economic conditions, Mears, just like other critics, found it quixotic to believe that the Japanese could be democratic and peaceful.<sup>32</sup> She thus suggested lessening reparations and

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<sup>29</sup> Swarthmore College Peace Collection, "Helen Mears Papers, 1862-1981: Collection: DG210," <http://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/DG201-225/dg210mears.htm>.

<sup>30</sup> See Helen Mears, *Year of the Wild Boar: An American Woman in Japan* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1942); Helen Mears, "The Japanese Riddle," *Atlantic Monthly*, September 1943, 100-104.

<sup>31</sup> Helen Mears, "Footnote on Reparations and Reform in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey* 17, no. 9 (May 5, 1948): 109-110. Also see Helen Mears, *Mirrors for Americans: Japan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), 253-257; "We're Giving Japan 'Democracy,' but She Can't Earn Her Living," *Saturday Evening Post*, June 18, 1949, 12; "The Russians Are Making the Most of Our 'Imperialist Rule' in Japan," *Saturday Evening Post*, April 29, 1950, 12; "Japan: Challenge to Our Prestige," *Harper's Magazine*, July 1950, 73-77. In *Mirrors for Americans*, Mears criticized the centuries-long practices of Western imperialist powers and their hypocritical attitudes toward the Japanese; she defended the Japanese excuses for foreign expansion and denounced the West's punitive policies and biased assumptions against Japan.

<sup>32</sup> Mears, "Footnote on Reparations and Reform in Japan," 109-110; *Mirrors for Americans*, 258, 260; "We're Giving Japan 'Democracy,' but She Can't Earn Her Living," 12; "Japan: Challenge to Our Prestige," *Harper's Magazine*, 73-

later opening trade and providing foreign aid for Japan to promote democracy and welfare.<sup>33</sup>

Leading American business magazines advocated helping Japanese economic reconstruction. When the Occupation started, the businesses in general supported reforming Japan, though some, such as the *Wall Street Journal*, were against it due to their opposition to state intervention in the economy.<sup>34</sup> During the early Cold War years, however, the business press, with the *Wall Street Journal* as the leading voice, began to criticize the Occupation authorities' economic policies, especially on reparations. Like many others, they were worried about the growing tension between democracy and Communism and argued that economic stability was crucial for successful political and social reforms. Additionally, they expressed concerns about the heavy costs of the Occupation shouldered by American taxpayers.<sup>35</sup>

Contrary to these supporters of the Reverse Course, the opponents of the policy were not persuaded to abandon the Rooseveltian plans for Japan and Asia. They continued to consider Japan, rather than Russia, as the ultimate menace and to believe that only complete transformation of Japanese society and culture would mold Japan into a non-aggressive nation in the Far East. The reason why they opposed any Occupation policy shift was essentially their mistrust of Japan. The progressives had been dissatisfied with the US government's "moderate" policies for Japan, specifically retaining the emperor institution and working with "reactionaries." They could not believe that with the democratization half-done, the roots of Japanese militarism were eliminated. In their judgment, the failure of the Japanese economy was caused by the Occupation's "soft" policy toward the old-line Japanese political and business leaders, which allowed them to stall

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<sup>33</sup> Mears, *Mirrors for Americans*, 259-260; "The Russians Are Making the Most of Our 'Imperialist Rule' in Japan," 12; "Japan: Challenge to Our Prestige," 76-78.

<sup>34</sup> Hilgenberg, Jr., *From Enemy to Ally*, 31-37.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 50-51, 54-55; also see Chapter 5 for the details of the business community's concerns of the Cold War.

economic development. They argued that Japanese economic problems could be overcome only by sweeping away these undemocratic elements and that helping Japanese industrial recovery when the political and economic structures were still under the control of the old guard simply meant facilitating the resurgence of Japanese expansionism. A violation of the Potsdam promises, this outcome, they thought, would be dangerous, undesirable, and totally unacceptable to all the Asian and Pacific nations.

For instance, in the *New Republic*'s February 10, 1947 issue, a British Far Eastern correspondent, Hessel Tiltman (1897-1976), insisted that neither the purges of political and business leaders nor the "radicals and incompetents" around General MacArthur had caused the economic crisis; he instead ascribed the problem to the "Japanese government and business circles [that had] made deliberate and often successful efforts to sabotage" democratization reforms.<sup>36</sup> Tiltman complained that MacArthur had failed to bring about a political revolution in Japan because his attempt to eliminate the undesirables from public office was not far-reaching enough, and, not coupled with the efforts to build up the alternative democratic forces, it just created a large pool of reactionaries on probation that would likely come back.<sup>37</sup> He thus suggested that further democratization would be the only solution to Japan's economic conditions.

The CBS correspondent William Costello agreed with Tiltman. Costello also argued in the March 31, 1947 issue of the *New Republic* that Japan remained undemocratic in large part because the conservatives had ruled the political and economic sectors, resisting many of Occupation reforms, and worried that they would capitalize on US policy shifts to the detriment of

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<sup>36</sup> Hessel Tiltman, "Letter of the Week: Tokyo Breakdown," *The New Republic*, February 10, 1947, 3, 46; the quotes are from p.46.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

democratization.<sup>38</sup>

Not surprisingly, T. A. Bisson took the same stance as Tiltman and Costello. One of the leading progressive critics, Bisson had lived in Japan for over a year between 1946 and 1947 to serve SCAP's Government Section (GS). In the December 17, 1947 issue of *Far Eastern Survey*, he harshly blamed the Japanese political and economic leaders for causing economic problems by mishandling the economy and tactically sabotaging its rehabilitation.<sup>39</sup> He blamed the Occupation authorities for their tolerance of the old guard and, actually, a policy that "merely [highlighted] the fact that the Japanese political, business, and bureaucratic group which [had] exercised control [was] thoroughly responsible for the untoward result."<sup>40</sup> Contrary to the supporters of the Reverse Course, Bisson argued that no one but the Japanese ruling elites themselves deprived the Japanese people of a decent livelihood and drained American taxes away.<sup>41</sup> He thus reasoned that there was no legitimate basis for softening economic measures, as the Japanese government requested, either by reducing reparations payments or by providing foreign loans and credits to promote foreign trade. In his analysis, the reparations program being agreed upon by the Allies was not harsh and should be retained so as not to alienate the Soviet Union and China; moreover, pessimistic about the prospects for the revival of Japanese trade, Bisson was skeptical of the effectiveness of foreign aid.<sup>42</sup>

But the most important factor in Bisson's opposition to such a new policy was his conviction that going against the Potsdam pact would help the reemergence of an expansionist

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<sup>38</sup> William Costello, "Report from Tokyo," *The New Republic*, March 31, 1947, 28-29; also see Costello, *Democracy vs. Feudalism in Post-War Japan* (Tokyo: Itagaki Shoten, 1948), 12-13, 96-97.

<sup>39</sup> T. A. Bisson, "Reparations and Reform in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey* 16, no. 21 (December 17, 1947): 242-244.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 244.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 246.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 244-246.

Japan, endangering peace and stability of the Far East. He clearly stated:

There is a broader and more significant issue at stake, however, than the expense involved in the occupation. It is American security and the hope of establishing peace. What attitude toward world problems may we expect from those Japanese leaders who have engineered the job of “sabotage recovery to get a soft peace”? The train of misery which they have brought upon their own people through this callously conceived and ruthlessly executed program is the index of their true character and inner purposes. May we expect that these men, controlling the “workshop of the Far East,” will hereafter refrain from again using economic penetration as a means to political domination of neighboring countries? Is this the type of leadership, finally, which will give Japan the “peacefully inclined and responsible government” stipulated in the Potsdam Declaration? Is the task of democratization in Japan really accomplished?<sup>43</sup>

In *Prospects for Democracy in Japan*, published as one of an IPR series of studies on postwar Japan in 1949, Bisson continued to attack the Japanese leadership and to warn the Americans of the risk of rebuilding Japanese industry.<sup>44</sup>

Australian diplomat and representative of the British Commonwealth in the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) W. Macmahon Ball (1901-1986) joined with Bisson in opposing the Reverse Course.<sup>45</sup> In *Japan: Enemy or Ally?*, also published under the auspices of the IPR in 1949, Ball shared the progressives’ Marxian analysis of Japanese militarism, their missionary zeal to bring a revolution to Japan, and their distrust in the Japanese leaders’ ability to develop a healthy economy, with or without American policy change. Like Bisson, Ball was “unable to escape the conclusion that the economic and financial policy of the Japanese Government [had] been carefully calculated to frustrate the Allied aims of 1945.”<sup>46</sup> Under the present circumstances, he then asked, “Is it not more likely that Allied concessions and credits will be used, not for the welfare of the Japanese people, but that the old guard, which still controls Japan’s economy, will use its new resources to do what it formerly did: maintain a semi-feudalism at home and extend an economic

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 246-247.

<sup>44</sup> See T. A. Bisson, *Prospects for Democracy in Japan* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), Chapters 6 and 7.

<sup>45</sup> *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, “Ball, William Macmahon (1901-1986),” <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/ball-william-macmahon-12166>.

<sup>46</sup> W. Macmahon Ball, *Japan: Enemy or Ally?* (New York: The John Day Company, 1949), 104.

imperialism abroad?”<sup>47</sup> By 1949, Ball was irritated by Russian diplomacy and suppression of free thought, the “negation of all that is best in Western civilization,” but aware of the risk of a third world war, he called for negotiation and compromise, working within the framework of the wartime alliance.<sup>48</sup>

Thus, there were two conflicting schools of thought about the causes of Japanese economic problems and the methods to fix them. While one group attributed Japan’s economic hardships to oppressive Occupation policies and proposed softening them, the other blamed the Japanese political and business leaders and stressed the need to remove them. Although both tried to save the Allied Occupation of Japan from a catastrophe, in other words, to accomplish the task of demilitarization and democratization of Japan, they disagreed about the means and ends: one asserted that economic development was a pre-condition for democratic growth, and the other insisted that thorough democratization promised economic recovery. However, while the latter remained faithful to the paradigm of the Potsdam peace treaty, the former diverged from it, whether due to skepticism of the underlying premises, or because of a growing awareness of the costs of America’s international commitment or of new strategic concerns before the advancement of the Communist front. As US official policy settled on using Japan as a strategic ally in the Cold War (though the policymakers were in constant disagreement over exact approaches), the public intellectuals supporting the new policy gradually overwhelmed those favoring the old policy. We will see how the advocates of the Reverse Course accommodated and co-opted the critics by the end of the 1940s-early 1950s.

### **Confirming Success of Occupation Reforms**

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 106; also see pp.185-188.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 193-194; the quote is from p.193.

By focusing on the failure of economic programs in Japan, both supporters and opponents of the Reverse Course contributed to rendering the Occupation a foiled enterprise. However, they thought that SCAP had done a great job in laying a foundation for democracy for the Japanese. Among SCAP's achievements were the dismantling of the military, the arrest and trial of thousands of soldiers and a few dozen political and military leaders; the transformation of the emperor from sovereign and supreme commander to the symbol of the state and the unity of the Japanese people; the liquidation of the zaibatsu; the purge of a few hundred thousand "undesirable" individuals from their offices; the abolition of State Shinto; the defeudalization and demilitarization of educational programs; the redistribution of land to tenant farmers; and the expansion of guarantee of civil liberties. Nevertheless, Washington's inability to cope with its conflicting objectives – decentralization and reconstruction of the Japanese economy – and to set a coherent policy caused a public debate between two camps, until the Cold War resolved the dilemma in favor of the group calling for rehabilitation. But the Americans universally praised SCAP's achievements: the Americans introduced democracy to the Japanese, and the Japanese were now learning it.

In contrast to her criticism elsewhere of Western imperialism's hypocritical punishment of Japanese imperialism, Helen Mears enumerated a series of Occupation accomplishments: "We've given [the Japanese people] a new constitution guaranteeing the utmost in individual liberty. We've given them a brand-new Labor Ministry, a new protective Labor Standards Law, .... We've broken up their big-business corporations and enforced a system for redistributing land ownership. We've revised their educational system, ..., and given women the vote."<sup>49</sup> While as

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<sup>49</sup> Mears, "We're Giving Japan 'Democracy,' but She Can't Earn Her Living," 12. Her article invited protest from General Douglas MacArthur; see Douglas MacArthur, "Letters to the Editorials: General MacArthur Protests Post

Supreme Commander, General Douglas MacArthur was deemed responsible for the failure of economic policy, he was also given credit for success.

For Russell Brines (1911-1982), the Associated Press (AP) Tokyo Bureau Chief and author of *MacArthur's Japan*, MacArthur was not a target of criticism at all. He presented many reforms as if they were MacArthur's work and praised them. He commended MacArthur, the "chief architect of the occupation," for "[t]o an amazing extent, . . . [conducting] a one-man job in Japan."<sup>50</sup>

While satisfied with the demilitarization and democratization of Japan, the conservatives at the same time complained that the Occupation had gone too far in the attempt to engineer an imperious scheme for a foreign nation. They therefore justified the incompleteness of the Occupation reforms and recommended modifications. British diplomat and Japan historian George B. Sansom refuted the progressives in general in his review of W. Macmahon Ball's book. In his article in November 2, 1949's *Far Eastern Survey*, Sansom first pointed out Ball's intellectual arrogance and lack of insight in assuming that democracy could be, and should be, implanted in Japan by foreign powers. He thought that a Japanese version of democracy, suited to and evolving out of their own history and tradition, should be developed by the indigenous people, as any democracy in the West had been, rather than imposed by conquerors. Without native agency, he feared, democracy could not take root or grow in Japan. Sansom lamented the Allies' blindness to this simple truth about the process of democratic growth and their ignorance of both Japanese history and the history of Western democracy, which was a relatively recent political system with

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Editorial," *Saturday Evening Post*, July 30, 1949, 4.

<sup>50</sup> See Russell Brines, *MacArthur's Japan* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1948), 46-50, 52; the quote is from p.52. American Heritage Center Collections, University of Wyoming, "Guide to Journalism Resources," <http://www.uwyo.edu/ahc/collections/guides/journalism.pdf>.

many variations.<sup>51</sup>

While highly critical of Ball and others who believed in the wisdom and justice of forcing democracy onto the Japanese, however, Sansom did share the view that despite modernization since the nineteenth century, the Japanese people had lived in a feudal society and culture and that the Occupation authorities had brought good changes to them. He commented, “[The occupation] has failed in so far as it attempted the impossible and the unreasonable, but in other respects it has been very successful. . . . the Japanese people have been shaken up, stimulated, forced to come out of their shell and learn some of the facts of life which will be useful for future reference. They have gained some elementary knowledge of the theory and practice of democracy, even if they have not always been impressed.”

Nevertheless, Sansom pressed for either cancelling or modifying the initial radical aims of the Occupation, which he thought were too idealistic to realize. He wrote, with some optimism, “One need not waste much regret on the imperfections of occupation policy in its effect upon the Japanese people, nor be much surprised that it has been revised, and let us hope improved, until it appears in some cases to have been reversed.”<sup>52</sup>

Similarly dismayed by radical claims made by the progressives, Harvard University scholar of Japan Edwin O. Reischauer judged Occupation policy shifts as appropriate. He observed that what foreign occupiers could do had been accomplished by 1948 and concluded that “[w]hat was now needed was for the Japanese themselves to adjust the new rules to Japanese realities by assimilation and adaptation, and to gain experience in living and governing themselves

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<sup>51</sup> G. B. Sansom, “Can Japan Be Reformed?,” *Far Eastern Survey* 18, no. 22 (November 2, 1949): 258-259.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 259. In his review of *The Political Orientation of Japan*, an official report of democratization changes by the Government Section of SCAP, Sansom also wrote that the Occupation reforms had been relatively well-handled but run by too much idealism; see Sansom, “The Political Orientation of Japan,” *Pacific Affairs* 24, no. 3 (September 1951): 306-312.

according to democratic processes.”<sup>53</sup> Also, to correct the conceited assumptions about Japanese backwardness and America’s initiative in changing Japan, he stressed that Japanese society had made progress since the Meiji period – probably more than the progressives had thought – and in fact the success of the Occupation relied upon it. In the 1953 version of *Japan Past and Present*, Reischauer wrote:

[The democratic reforms] depended entirely on certain basic features of Japanese society which the Japanese themselves had been creating during the past century – such fundamental things as universal education, efficient communication facilities, and experience with democratic processes. The supposed lack of democratic foundations made the American reform program radical; their actual presence made it successful.<sup>54</sup>

Thus, by focusing upon what was done, rather than what was not done, owing to Japanese democratic foundations, Reischauer justified the Occupation forces’ decision to give administrative responsibility to the Japanese.

During the second half of the Occupation period, more people with firsthand experience of the Occupation, questioned the premises of the reforms and advised adapting them to Japan’s realities so that democracy would be sustained. One such person was Harold Quigley, a political scientist at the University of Minnesota who had served SCAP GS Chief Courtney Whitney. Quigley, like Sansom, lamented Orientalist bias and egotism in the belief that the Allies should teach democracy and ignite a revolution.<sup>55</sup> Another critic of SCAP reformist zeal was Dallas Finn, a graduate student of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy who had lived in Japan as a teacher. She complained that uncompromising SCAP officers had enforced changes in the Japanese school system based on an American model unsuited to the Japanese environment,

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<sup>53</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer, *Japan Past and Present*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 212.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 211.

<sup>55</sup> Harold S. Quigley, “Evaluating the Japanese Occupation,” *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no. 17 (October 10, 1951): 178; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 156.

provoking national resentment.<sup>56</sup> Joseph W. Ballantine agreed with Finn and urged modifications of unworkable educational reforms.<sup>57</sup>

The radicalism of Japanese leftist movements further convinced the conservatives of the need to curb democratization reforms. In *The United States and Japan*, published in 1950, Edwin O. Reischauer wrote that labor unionism had become too radical, impeding democratic electoral procedures and obstructing the Occupation goals. He thus defended SCAP's decision to intervene in it.<sup>58</sup> Ballantine feared that labor strikes were causing widespread hunger and chaos, thereby undermining the democratic form of government, and he, too, approved of SCAP's move to deny public workers the right to strike.<sup>59</sup> What both men were insinuating was the fear that Japan would fall to leftist totalitarianism: Communism.

Also troubled by a potential Communist takeover was Robert A. Fearey (1918-2004), a former private secretary to US ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew. Fearey clearly expressed his annoyance at communist-led labor unions in *The Occupation of Japan*, published in 1950 under IPR auspices. He complained about the communists' use of violent tactics and the fact that the majority of workers followed the dictatorship of the leaders without knowledge of true unionism. In his view, SCAP was forced to step in to thwart their radicalism. Fearey also justified the Reverse Course for the sake of democracy on the grounds that it would benefit labor; he argued that under better economic conditions, workers could earn economic dividends and thereby increase political influence.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Dallas Finn, "Reform and Japan's Lower Schools," *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no. 19 (November 7, 1951): 193-199; Dallas Finn, "Reform and Japanese Higher Education," *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no. 20 (November 21, 1951): 201-206.

<sup>57</sup> Ballantine, "The New Japan: An American View," 287-288.

<sup>58</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer, *The United States and Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 277-279.

<sup>59</sup> Ballantine, "The New Japan: An American View," 287.

<sup>60</sup> Robert A. Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan: Second Phase: 1948-1950* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), 78-87; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 151-152.

On the other hand, progressive critics continued to embrace the original objectives of the Occupation and believe in the necessity for a thorough destruction of what they viewed as the foundations of the Japanese feudal and authoritarian systems. Exasperated by SCAP's compromise with the Japanese conservative leaders, short of full commitment to the mission to democratize Japan, they attacked the official policies and claimed that the Occupation was failing. Nonetheless, while exaggerating the incompleteness and ineffectiveness of Occupation reforms, the progressives in fact approved of SCAP's wide-ranging programs. T. A. Bisson observed that the initial moves had "opened the path for successful completion of the struggle for a democratic Japan which the people gave every evidence of being willing and anxious to conduct."<sup>61</sup> Specifically, he commended the removal of restrictions on political and civil liberties, the purge of hundreds of wartime Diet members, the expansion of the electorate, and the decision to give unions the right to organize.<sup>62</sup> Besides, he recognized that "much of the authoritarian structure of government in Japan [had been] either swept away or drastically modified" thanks to revisions in the Meiji Constitution and other laws and the reorganization of the political organization.<sup>63</sup>

W. Macmahon Ball also suggested that whatever the actual effects were, the Allies had taken up "reforms [that] would provide the indispensable conditions for the growth of a spontaneous liberal movements in Japan."<sup>64</sup> Like Bisson, Ball considered the civil directive, the Labor Union Law, the purge, as well as the new constitution – all done in the first year of the occupation – as important moves to promote political democratization of Japan.<sup>65</sup> He could not deny that constitutional amendments "[gave] the Japanese people the kind of representative

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<sup>61</sup> Bisson, *Prospects for Democracy in Japan*, 33.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 33, 42.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 19-22, 76-85; the quote is from p.19.

<sup>64</sup> Ball, *Japan: Enemy or Ally?*, 148.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter 6.

institutions and the kind of civil rights that [had] been established in Western democracies.”<sup>66</sup>

Ironically, these progressives did not necessarily count upon the Japanese leftist and grassroots groups as leaders of a new democratic Japan. T. A. Bisson realized by 1949 that, contrary to his expectations, the Japanese socialists and communists were ideologically too divided to organize a viable political force.<sup>67</sup> Also, revolutionaries were a minority, and most Japanese did not join with them against the government. He wrote: “Fifty years of indoctrination under the old regime left effects on patterns of thought and action that could not be wiped out in a few months . . . . This heritage was a fortress of the old Japan which the occupation could not take by storm.”<sup>68</sup>

These statements signified Bisson’s acknowledgment that his belief that the Japanese socialists and communists would work together to lead a people’s democratic revolution proved too optimistic.

This fact did not disappoint W. Macmahon Ball, who looked for a milder political course. He had little faith in “real liberals and revolutionaries in Japan, mostly in jail,” who were “too few and inexperienced in executive responsibility to assume leadership.” Considering them radical, he doubted “whether SCAP would have encouraged their ambitions, since their past experiences had driven so many of them to the ‘extreme Left.’”<sup>69</sup>

In fact, there was a clear difference between empowering the Japanese people with liberties and rights and encouraging them to express themselves on the one hand and, on the other, allowing a leftist “extremism” to take over government. This was evident in many writers’ attitudes toward labor strikes. Like the conservative critics, W. Macmahon Ball was irritated by strikes that impeded industrial production and undermined the military occupation and by their

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 149.

<sup>67</sup> Bisson, *Prospects for Democracy in Japan*, 44, 58-63.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 34-35.

<sup>69</sup> Ball, *Japan: Enemy or Ally?*, 165.

increasing militancy partly due to communist leadership. He did not regard the development of this type of labor unionism as “democratic” and considered General Douglas MacArthur’s decision to intervene justified.<sup>70</sup>

William Costello, too, defended SCAP’s move to prohibit general strikes for pragmatic reasons. He was skeptical of the effectiveness and democratic nature of labor strikes, lamenting that a “Communist minority which had plunged eagerly into the labor movement was exploiting the legitimate grievances of the workers.” In his view, “Communism” was the opposite extreme of “fascism,” and the job of the Occupation was making sure that the pendulum would not be swinging back to the right or moving too far to the left.<sup>71</sup>

Miriam S. Farley, who worked in SCAP on Japanese labor issues and became an editor of the *Far Eastern Survey* afterwards, in fact clarified that the aim of SCAP’s labor policy was to promote a middle-of-the road democracy. Supporting the labor movement was the means to achieve this goal. In *Aspects of Japan’s Labor Problems*, published in 1950 with IPR backing, Farley revealed that SCAP’s Labor Division had assumed that only by siding with workers could it prevent “[leaving] them an easy prey either to a resurgence of militarist doctrines or to a new totalitarianism of the left, regarded as equally distasteful.”<sup>72</sup> She did believe that labor protests had been an “authentic, if clumsy, expression of public opinion” and deemed SCAP’s meddling regrettable.<sup>73</sup> But still, she thought that labor activities had been uncompromising and excessive, failing to win majority support and making SCAP intervention inevitable. In Farley’s view, the Occupation authorities were “forced into the position of appearing to suppress and discredit a

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 157-161.

<sup>71</sup> Costello, *Democracy vs Feudalism*, 8-9, 21, 93-95, 202-207; the quote is from p.8.

<sup>72</sup> Miriam S. Farley, *Aspects of Japan’s Problems* (New York: The John Day Company, 1950), 28-29.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 159-160; the quote is from p.160.

manifestation of popular political initiative, ... whether by [their] own tactical errors or those of Japanese labor.”<sup>74</sup>

There was little evidence that even T. A. Bisson envisioned any political course more radical than Western liberal democracy. Obsessed with eliminating the emperor system, the conservative politicians, the bureaucrats, the military, and the zaibatsu, all of which, according to his Marxian analysis, had founded Japanese authoritarianism and militarism, Bisson regarded class struggle in the same light as democratization. His discussion thus always concentrated on criticizing the failure to destroy the political, social, and economic establishments. Even if he was dissatisfied with the Occupation authorities’ “soft” attitudes toward the Japanese leaders, however, he agreed with the general objectives and policies of the Occupation. Bisson’s support for the socialists – especially the left-wing members – and communists did not mean that he hoped that they would ignite a socialist revolution for the proletariat at all. He considered them particularly qualified to lead the democratization of Japan because of their good record of anti-state activities. Essentially, he compared the leftist socialists to the British Labor Party and liked the communists because they aimed to abolish the imperial institution.<sup>75</sup> Considering them simply as a counterforce against the ruling elites, Bisson barely analyzed the political and ideological stances of the leftist political parties and popular movements, other than to admit their weakness and portray them as victimized by SCAP and the Japanese government. Bisson’s recognition of a lack of public support for these groups proved that his vision for a new Japan was illusionary. He could break the logical deadlock only by continuously placing the blame on Occupation policies and deploring the political illiteracy of the Japanese majority.

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 44-56, Chapter 11; the quote is from p.160.

<sup>75</sup> Bisson, *Prospects for Democracy in Japan*, 44-45.

Shown above are the inconsistencies in the progressives' arguments which drifted toward those of the conservatives. One contradiction was that while exaggerating the failure of Occupation reforms, the progressive experts agreed with their conservative counterparts that SCAP had brought the groundwork of democratic life to Japan. The progressives also found a divergence between their hopes and Japan's reality: the Japanese opposition that they had expected to emerge to replace the old regime could amass neither political strength nor popular support, marking the defeat of their future vision for postwar Japan. In addition, the Japanese opposition group was too radical to many American progressives who were looking for a revolution. As American liberals, they were not tolerant of extraparliamentary activities of Japanese radicals. Thus, the progressives' assessments of the democratization of Japan were akin to those of the conservatives, and therefore, while repeatedly calling for thorough democratization, they hardly developed effective counterarguments against the conservatives.

### **Regional Economic Integration: The Idea of Linking Japan with Asia**

As Washington officials were prepared to rebuild the Japanese economy by promoting their trade with Asia, conservative critics also endorsed the plan for tying Japan to the Asian economic sphere. The Roosevelt peace itself did not unconditionally deny Japan commercial opportunities abroad. It proposed to allow Japan to reenter the international community once demilitarization and democratization were accomplished. In terms of power balance in the Far East, Japan was to decline as China emerged as a stabilizing force and other Asian countries began to slowly gain independence and undergo modernization. War reparations programs were part of the plan to debilitate Japanese industrial power by transferring their facilities to China and other Asian countries and to help their political and economic development. The envisioned future was

that a weakened Japan would join a rising Asia. Sticking to this Rooseveltian policy for postwar Asia, the progressives were upset about the Truman administration's plan to prioritize Japan over Asia and bolster the Japanese economy in order to promote order and prosperity in Asian countries. Yet, a regional economic plan for Asia, something like a Marshall Plan for the Far East, that the conservatives suggested by speaking for the welfare of Asia and by gradually adapting the Cold War logic, led to the virtual dissipation of the progressives' opposition.

The conservatives, who advocated reversing economic policy for Japan, maintained that Japan's economic rehabilitation was needed for stability and development there and in Asia as a whole. Against those who complained that, by shifting the focus from China to Japan and from economic deconcentration to reconstruction, the US Far Eastern policy had fallen apart and would now endanger overall Occupation goals, the conservatives argued that modifications of the means would save the ends. Joseph W. Ballantine admitted that there were many inconsistencies in American policy in Asia but defended alterations in the approaches by stressing "with utter sincerity that the United States [sought] to safeguard its national interests ... by an overall policy of constructive effort toward economic and political stability everywhere." He then asserted that establishing a self-sufficient Japan would "serve equally the enlightened self-interest of China, and that of all our other allies, as well as the interests of the United States."<sup>76</sup>

Yole Granada, a former staff member of the Natural Resources Division of SCAP, likewise developed an argument that the efforts to recover Japanese industry and trade would be beneficial to the Asian nations. In the October 9, 1948 issue of the *Nation*, she claimed that because it was industrially and technologically the most advanced, Japan could best serve the war-

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<sup>76</sup> Ballantine, "The New Japan: An American View," 288.

torn and underdeveloped Asia as the supplier, and though still cautious and suspicious, Asian countries themselves were growingly interested in trading with a disarmed Japan.<sup>77</sup> Granada also used the Marxian analysis of Japanese militarism to counter her opponents: if the best way to preclude the emergence of Japanese overseas aggression was to alleviate their internal economic problems, the US decision to help Japan's economic rehabilitation was a logical conclusion. She added that promoting free trade and economic interdependence between Japan and Asia based upon the principles of liberal internationalism would do no harm to the region.<sup>78</sup>

These American experts viewed promotion of economic ties between Japan and the rest of Asia as equivalent to a Marshall Plan in the Far East, a measure necessary to block Communist expansion. In IPR journals of mid-1948, Jerome B. Cohen called for an "integrated and cooperative Far Eastern economic recovery program, similar to the one which [the Americans] [were] now pursuing in Europe," to rehabilitate not only the Japanese economy but that of Asia as a whole. This former Japanese language officer in the US Naval Intelligence and member of the US Strategic Bombing Survey team, who became an economics professor at the College of the City of New York, referred to a Marshall Plan for Asia. He argued that only multinational economic assistance would inhibit the Russians from attacking US policy and encourage Asian countries to trade with Japan, thus preventing a power vacuum in the region.<sup>79</sup> Russell Brines defended "support for Japanese industry" more explicitly as "part of a kind of 'Marshall Plan' for

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<sup>77</sup> Yole Granada, "Letters to the Editors: Rebuilding Japan: Fears and Realities," *The Nation*, October 9, 1948, 411. She published an article in favor of the US policy of economic reconstruction in Japan in August 14's *The Nation*, and a week later, the magazine put the letter from Harold Strauss, a chief editor of Alfred A. Knopf and a former member of the Civil Information and Education (CIE) Section of SCAP, that disagreed with Granada's position; see Granada, "Should We Rebuild Japan?," *The Nation*, August 14, 1948, 180-182; Harold Strauss, "Letters to the Editors: Rebuilding Japan: The Moral Issue," *The Nation*, August 21, 1948, 214. The source that I use here is Granada's response to Strauss. Also see footnote 83.

<sup>78</sup> Granada, "Letters to the Editors: Rebuilding Japan: Fears and Realities," 412.

<sup>79</sup> Jerome B. Cohen, "Japan: Reform vs. Recovery," *Far Eastern Survey* 17, no. 12 (June 23, 1948): 142; also see Jerome B. Cohen, "Japan's Economy on the Road Back," *Pacific Affairs* 21, no. 3 (September 1948): 277-279.

Asia; a dual-purpose program that went as far as possible toward guaranteeing American aims in Japan and simultaneously promised the long-range economic stability the Orient needs.” The underlying fear was the “Soviets having succeeded, . . . , in creating chaos and turmoil as a prelude to eventual control.”<sup>80</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer similarly imagined an Asian economic bloc centered around Japan to counter Communism. In April 23, 1949’s *Saturday Evening Post*, he called for a coherent multinational economic plan for Asia, while mentioning the rapid growth of Communism in Japan and in the Far East and the importance of utilizing Japan’s industrial power to help build up free states in the region.<sup>81</sup> In these views, the well-being of Asia depended upon Japanese industrial and commercial recovery and increasingly became equivalent to blocking Communist influence.

What was so tricky about these arguments is that while modifying the original policy for Asia, they embraced the progressives’ liberal internationalism: helping out political and economic advancement in Asia and securing peace and security in the region. In fact, by proposing a large scheme for multinational economic reconstruction, the Marshall Plan and the economic program for Japan were meant to subdue the Western European and Asian fears of German and Japanese recoveries.<sup>82</sup> It worked to tame the progressives. Chief editor of Alfred A. Knopf and a former member of the Civil Information and Education (CIE) Section of SCAP, Harold Strauss, for example, acknowledged Japan’s economic difficulties, yet still questioned the morality of subordinating the plight of the Chinese and other Asian peoples to the goal of boosting Japanese industry. In the *Nation* published on August 21, 1948, he commented that such a policy was a

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<sup>80</sup> Brines, *MacArthur’s Japan*, 153.

<sup>81</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer, “It’s Time We Encouraged the Japanese to Build a Democracy of Their Own,” *Saturday Evening Post*, April 23, 1949, 12.

<sup>82</sup> Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 88.

“callous and amoral disregard of the issues of World War II and the rights of the other nations of Asia.” He pointed out that by trying to open Asian markets for Japanese industrial products to reduce their – and American – economic burdens, the United States ironically vindicated Japan’s justifications for overseas expansion and helped accomplish its ambitions without resorting to arms. But what Strauss could suggest was to give equal aid to all Asian nations in order to strengthen their industry as much as that of Japan.<sup>83</sup>

Another former CIE officer Robert B. Textor also called for a way to “promote effective, equitable reintegration of the economies of Japan and other Asian countries.”<sup>84</sup> His book published in 1951, *Failure in Japan*, promoted an argument against the Japanese government and business and favored popular movements, which was common among the progressive critics. Yet, by then, the author tolerated some American policy decisions – such as cancelling the follow-up zaibatsu dissolution plan and purging anti-government radicals.<sup>85</sup> He also agreed that Japan needed to trade with Asia to buy resources and sell goods and that by connecting Japan with “non-Communist” Asian countries and providing development aid for the latter, the United States should prevent further Communist infiltration.<sup>86</sup> These interests in Asian development lent support to the Point Four program of 1949 and subsequent foreign aid for Asia by the US government. The progressives did not fundamentally object to making an Asian economic sphere through the integration and inclusion of Japan as long as it would not sacrifice the Asian peoples; it became acceptable as a method to block Communism.

Thus, in their request for recovering Japanese industry and trade, the conservatives asked

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<sup>83</sup> Strauss, “Letters to the Editors: Rebuilding Japan: The Moral Issue,” 214.

<sup>84</sup> Robert B. Textor, *Failure in Japan: With a Keynote for a Positive Policy* (New York: The John Day Company, 1951), 197.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 68-69, 106-107.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 197, 201-202, 224.

for a regional economic development plan for Asia through which both Japan and Asia could benefit. Importantly, except for the use of Japan as the engine of Asian economic development, this did not necessarily jettison the original policy of promoting order and prosperity in the Far East. Therefore, even if they were never satisfied with the degree of democratization and were always suspicious of the Japanese leaders, the progressives could not disagree with the idea of developing a Marshall Plan for Asia. Both groups were ultimately interested in protecting American interests – securing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific theater, but now the threat came more from Communism than from Japan. Opposition from the progressives thus was being muted, and they were siding with a general US Cold War policy in Asia. As we will see, the debate about peace and security treaties with Japan developed in this context.

### **Peace and Security Settlements with Japan: Defining Japan's Role in Asia**

Diplomatic negotiations about the termination of the Allied Occupation of Japan first began in 1947. General Douglas MacArthur called for an early peace in March 1947, and the State Department took the initiative in preparing for it. Nevertheless, the timing was not ripe: the US government was internally too divided on peace terms to reach an agreement, and so were the Allies. It was only in the late fall of 1949 when the US government undertook the shelved plan for a peace with Japan, despite a continuing rift among the State Department, the military, and MacArthur. The disagreements were resolved only by the outbreak of the Korean War to the delight of military hardliners. Appointed special advisor to the secretary of state, John Foster Dulles (1888-1959) continued negotiations with the Japanese government, as well as with the Allies, and drafted peace and security treaties during 1950-1951.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, Chapters 5, 9, 14-16; Finn, *Winners in Peace*, Chapters 11, 17-19.

At the San Francisco Peace Conference held in September 1951, the status of war and the Allied Occupation of Japan officially ended. At the same time Japan restored independence and reentered the world community, it became America's Cold War ally in Asia – theoretically equal but in effect a junior partner. Japan regained sovereignty over four main islands and only residual sovereignty over the Ryukyu and the Bonin islands, which were put under American administration. Japan also made a bilateral military alliance with the United States and joined America's Pacific security system, formed by multiple pacts, including the Mutual Defense Treaty concluded with the Philippines and the ANZUS Security Treaty with Australia and New Zealand. According to the US-Japan security pact, Japan obliged itself to rearm and allowed American forces to remain in Japan proper: the supplementary administrative agreement on facilities and status of stationing US military forces essentially gave them special privileges which would interfere with Japanese sovereignty.

The settlements at San Francisco contained additional problems. First of all, the peace excluded the key Communist countries: the Soviet Union and China. The delegate of the Soviet Union, having objected to the American-dictated peace settlements, refused to sign a peace with Japan. Neither the People's Republic of China (PRC) nor Taiwan was invited to the conference to represent China due to the disagreement between the United States and Britain. Thus, Japan missed the opportunity to normalize relations with the Soviet Union or the PRC; later at Dulles's insistence – to get Senate approval of the treaties with Japan – Japan chose to make a peace with Taiwan. Second, the economic aspects of peace remained unresolved. Although Britain had dropped proposals to demand reparations and impose various economic sanctions upon Japan, serious negotiations about trade followed during the 1950s. Japan was made liable for

compensation for Southeast Asian countries at least and would conclude reparations agreements with various countries in the 1950s-1960s.

A consensus about ending the Occupation through a peace with Japan emerged in late 1949-1950, following the “fall” of China and the outbreak of the Korean War. By then, debating whether the Occupation course should be altered rather than whether the Occupation should be terminated, neither conservatives nor progressives thought that it was time for the Americans to leave Japan. Once Douglas MacArthur announced that Japan was ready to make a peace in March 1947, *Newsweek*, which was becoming the leading pressure group for the Reverse Course, featured the economic crisis in Japan to disprove his judgment. The April 14, 1947 issue carried an article entitled “Japan: Signals of Economic Storm,” and the writer attacked MacArthur for trying to leave Japan under terrible economic conditions in order to pursue his political ambitions in the United States and to “‘get out from under’ in the event of a total economic collapse in Japan.”<sup>88</sup> William Costello, a critic of the Reverse Course, also criticized MacArthur, the “victim of his own ‘propaganda of success’,” for trying to “get out from under as soon as possible.” Costello argued that although Japan’s economic plight was caused by the Japanese elites, “[since MacArthur knew] the occupation [could not] possibly end before the crisis [became] acute, he [tried] to absolve himself by placing the blame on unsettled reparations and foreign trade bottlenecks rather than on the ineffectual Japanese administration now in power.”<sup>89</sup>

These criticisms did not arise when the State Department declared its readiness to conclude a peace with Japan in the fall of 1949, despite the fact that the Japanese economy was still in critical condition. The Reverse Course officially took place between late 1948 and early

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<sup>88</sup> “Japan: Signals of Economic Storm,” *Newsweek*, April 14, 1947, 37.

<sup>89</sup> Costello, “Report from Tokyo,” March 31, 1947, 29.

1949 when Washington sent SCAP the Nine-Point Economic Stabilization Program and Detroit banker Joseph M. Dodge as MacArthur's special financial advisor. The Program instructed Dodge to reconstruct the Japanese economy by balancing a budget, controlling wages and prices, and promoting production and exports. Under Dodge's drastic austerity measures, the Japanese economy had not yet recovered.<sup>90</sup>

Nevertheless, developments inside and outside Japan convinced the conservatives that it was high time to end the Occupation. Alerted by the rise of anti-foreign nationalism and Communism in Japan, they decided that the Allies should let the Japanese govern the country by themselves. They held that since the communists capitalized on growing nationalism and increased political influence, the Occupation forces must go to save incipient democracy. Edwin O. Reischauer wrote, for instance, that the "biggest reason for the growth of communism in Japan [was] the mounting irritation and dissatisfaction of the better-educated Japanese with continued American control" and claimed that SCAP should give back administrative powers to the Japanese.<sup>91</sup> The conservatives were also quick to reaffirm Japan's importance in US strategic plans for Asia when China was falling into the hands of the communists. On September 26, 1949, *Newsweek* accepted the State Department's move to conclude a peace treaty with Japan since "Japan ... [had] emerged as the key to a projected Pacific security pact. China [had been] completely and finally written off, and even Formosa [would] be allowed to go to the Communists by default."<sup>92</sup>

On the other hand, the progressives' attitudes to a peace with Japan were unclear as of

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<sup>90</sup> Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 468-470; Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu, ed., *Shōwa Zaisei-shi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan*, 391-442.

<sup>91</sup> Reischauer, "It's Time We Encouraged the Japanese to Build a Democracy of Their Own," 12; also see *Japan Past and Present*, 214-215.

<sup>92</sup> "And Next a Japan Peace Treaty," *Newsweek*, September 26, 1949, 34.

1949, but they accepted it as inevitable in the following years. One crucial reason for their eventual reception was their difficulty in responding in a timely and constructive manner to the regime shifts from the Nationalist government to the Communist government (CCP) in China, which had long been considered America's key partner in Asia. Circumstances were clearly not in the favor of the progressives. While they cautiously watched the events in hope for a possibility that the US government opened diplomatic relations with the PRC, by appealing to anti-Communist sentiments, America's China Lobby continued to call for aid to Chiang Kai-shek's KMT. Also, the conclusion of Sino-Soviet friendship, followed by the Korean War and the Chinese entry to the war, gradually made it difficult for the United States to make a deal with the PRC. At the same time, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy attacked leading progressive Asia specialists such as Owen Lattimore, T. A. Bisson, and Philip Jaffe (1895-1980) – though not silencing Lattimore.<sup>93</sup>

However, the opinions of American analysts of China had been divided, and those who were open to the idea of establishing diplomatic relationship with the PRC had developed only a scattered voice by 1949-1950. According to John N. Thomas, IPR members, unfamiliar with the CCP, published “only ... infrequent and shallow coverage of the Chinese Communist movement,” and they tended to avoid causing a controversy with the KMT during World War II.<sup>94</sup> This tendency continued after the war, and made an open debate about the Chinese scene and US policy difficult until 1948-1949.<sup>95</sup> Because of their hostility to Communism, pro-nationalist Americans easily transformed themselves into Cold Warriors, giving support to new US policy for Japan.

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<sup>93</sup> Harry Ransom Center, the University of Texas at Austin, “The Philip J. Jaffe Collection of Leftist Literature,” <http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/collections/books/holdings/jaffe>.

<sup>94</sup> Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, 21-22, 24-25; the quote is from p.21.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 51-57.

Meanwhile, those sympathetic to the CCP tried to convince the Americans that the Chinese communists were popular agrarian reformers, rather than Marxists, and there was a room for diplomatic negotiations. However, caught by political developments in the United States and Asia between 1949 and 1950, this pro-PRC faction could hardly form a counterforce.

The other reason for the gradual drift of the progressives' stance toward US policy for Japan was their acceptance of the Cold War paradigm in Asia. They kept urging the completion of the democratization of Japan, but they began to see its importance in the context of the Cold War rather than that of World War II. For example, the *New Republic*, the progressive magazine, which had already switched sides from Cold War critic to supporter during 1948, showed a mixture of discontent with the failure of Occupation reforms and anxiety over its repercussions in US policy for Asia. As early as May 30, 1949, the editor wrote familiar criticisms of the remaining "reactionary" forces in Japan and SCAP's unsuccessful democratization efforts, but agreed that Japan should be allowed to trade and admitted into the Free World, lest Japan "[would] join the Communist world of China and the USSR." Also believing that democratization would "help the Japanese make the buttress truly invincible," the author demanded that the Occupation forces should continue to reform as far as time permitted.<sup>96</sup> By 1951, however reluctantly, many progressive critics accepted Japan's importance – whether ideological, economic, or politico-military – in US Cold War strategy in Asia and could only point out the flaws in Dulles's peace and security plans.

About the US decision to make a peace with Japan without Russian approval, there was no strong opposition from either conservatives or progressives. It is not surprising that some

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<sup>96</sup> "Time to Leave Japan," *The New Republic*, May 30, 1949, 5-6; the quotes are from p.6.

conservative writers blamed the Soviet Union for blocking peace settlements. Robert A. Fearey stated that due to interest in expanding its influence over Japan, the Soviet Union had interfered with the Allies' peace plans "[b]y insisting on a procedure for preparing the treaty which [had] been unacceptable to all other interested nations, with the probable exception of Communist China."<sup>97</sup> The author of *Riddle of MacArthur* published in 1950, John Gunther (1901-1970) also complained about the obstructionist Russia and demanded making a peace with Japan without Soviet agreement.<sup>98</sup> In *Toward a New Far Eastern Policy*, published in late 1950 as the Headline Series of the Foreign Policy Association (FPA), Edwin O. Reischauer similarly but more mildly pointed out the difficulty in gaining Russian consent and voted for concluding a peace as soon as possible with or without the Soviet Union.<sup>99</sup>

Although many acquiesced to a separate peace, both conservatives and progressives had misgivings about the US peace plan.<sup>100</sup> They were worried about Russia's refusal to sign a treaty and the absence of the PRC, and left uncertain about the prospects for Japanese economic recovery without resolving the issue of Japan-Asian trade. The progressives especially called into doubt the idea that a peace without Soviet assent would bring real peace to Asia. The Soviets might strengthen their ties with the Chinese communists, deepening the division between them and the United States further and posing a military threat to Japan; without taming the Soviets, no treaty would prevent them from independently approaching Japan; moreover, they could stir anti-American opposition in Asian countries by fanning their dissatisfaction with the peace

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<sup>97</sup> Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan*, 182; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 150-151.

<sup>98</sup> John Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur: Japan, Korea and the Far East* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 225; *Encyclopedia Britannica*, "John Gunther," <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/249545/John-Gunther>.

<sup>99</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer, *Toward a New Far Eastern Policy* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1950), 30-31; also see *The United States and Japan*, 311-312.

<sup>100</sup> Some showed certain understanding of Soviet claims; see "A Peace Treaty for Japan," *The New Republic*, October 31, 1949, 6-7; Freda Kirchwey, "A Treaty with the Past," *The Nation*, September 1, 1951, 164-165.

arrangements.<sup>101</sup>

But more attention was paid to the matter of Japan's trade with Asia, including Communist China. Many Japan experts believed that since Japanese economic recovery depended upon conditions in Asia, it was important to accommodate Asian demands in the treaty provisions and to help normalize Japan-Asian relations. Some also felt that the peace package boded ill for Japan's economic reconstruction, mentioning the disagreements between Britain and the United States over the policy of integrating Japanese and Asian economies, as well as the treatment of the PRC.<sup>102</sup>

Indeed, the decision not to invite either China, particularly the PRC, pertained not only to security but also to economic issues. To American Asia specialists, the isolation of Japan from Communist China was not inevitable. They considered China trade crucial to Japan, as it had long been, and were open to the option of tolerating it. Edwin O. Reischauer suggested the necessity for allowing commerce between Japan and Communist China even if a peace could be concluded without the Soviets or Chinese.<sup>103</sup> Although pessimistic about whether the volume of Sino-Japanese trade would return to prewar levels and concerned that commerce might give the PRC political leverage over Japan, Robert A. Fearey gave reluctant support to it.<sup>104</sup> Helen Mears

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<sup>101</sup> See Claude A. Buss, "US Policy on the Japan Treaty," *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no.12 (June 13, 1951): 119; "The Japanese Treaty: Will It Stick?," *The Nation*, August 4, 1951, 83; Kirchwey, "A Treaty with the Past," 164-165; Freda Kirchwey, "Beyond San Francisco," *The Nation*, September 15, 1951, 203-204; Miriam S. Farley, "San Francisco and After," *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no.16 (September 26, 1951): 162-164; Miriam S. Farley, "Japan and US: Post-Treaty Problems," *Far Eastern Survey* 21, no.4 (February 27, 1952): 33-34, 37-38; Textor, *Failure in Japan*, 206-207; Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan*, 187-188.

<sup>102</sup> See Hessel Tiltman, "Japan's Peace Treaty," *The Nation*, June 2, 1951, 511; Buss, "US policy on the Japan Treaty," 114-116, 118-119; "The Japanese Treaty: Will It Stick?," 83; Kirchwey, "A Treaty with the Past," 165; Kirchwey, "Beyond San Francisco," 204; Farley, "San Francisco and After," 163-164; Farley, "Japan and US: Post-Treaty Problems," 33-34; Textor, *Failure in Japan*, 197, 199, 201-202. Unlike other writers, Kirchwey did not pay attention to Japan's economic problems at all; she sympathized with the Asians who feared the revival of Japanese militarism.

<sup>103</sup> Reischauer, *The United States and Japan*, 311-312.

<sup>104</sup> Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan*, 102-103, 170-173.

similarly anticipated that by reestablishing trade relations between Japan and mainland China, the United States might lose Japan to the Communist sphere, but she also entertained the possibility that America could attract both Japan and China to its own side. The underlying idea was that a solution to economic problems would detract from the allure of Communist ideology. In *Harper's Magazine* published in July 1950, she said, "if we could regularize the relationship between China and Japan, and simultaneously arrange for long-term generous economic programs for both countries, we might help Sino-Japanese relations to develop as a stabilizing factor not only in the Far East but throughout Asia."<sup>105</sup>

Progressive writers also promoted this strategy. Robert B. Textor argued that Sino-Japanese trade was significant to both countries – more so than Sino-Russian trade – and it would help drive the PRC away from the Soviet Union.<sup>106</sup> An editor of the *Nation*, Freda Kirchwey (1893-1976) also desired rapprochements between Japan and Communist China to lessen Cold War tensions.<sup>107</sup> In the *Nation* of September 15, 1951, she claimed that "[i]f Japan should come to an agreement with Communist China, as both its economic and security needs urgently [dictated], ... [it] might bring about a stable balance of power in Pacific Asia."<sup>108</sup>

As to the subject of Japanese security, both conservatives and progressives tacitly accepted the US government's decision: to retain American forces in Japan, not to allow Japan to adopt a neutral policy, and to urge Japanese rearmament. Nevertheless, they suggested modifications or made lukewarm objections regarding the US security plan for Japan. Some,

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<sup>105</sup> Mears, "Japan: Challenge to Our Prestige," 78.

<sup>106</sup> Textor, *Failure in Japan*, 206-207, 213.

<sup>107</sup> Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, "Kirchwey, Freda. Papers, 1871-1972: A Finding Aid (MC280)," <http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/deepLink?collection=oasis&uniqueId=sch00306>.

<sup>108</sup> Kirchwey, "Beyond San Francisco," 204.

without opposing to placing Japan under the US politico-military umbrella, called for a moderate policy. For example, Robert A. Fearey believed that the US forces should provide military protection for Japan, but, considering Japan's historical, legal, economic, and political backgrounds, did not endorse forcing the country to rearm itself.<sup>109</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer agreed with Fearey that the United States should defend Japan from foreign aggression, but only as a temporary measure. He also judged that under current circumstances, Japanese remilitarization was not advisable, and Japan should be guaranteed peaceful neutrality.<sup>110</sup> Paying attention to the sensitive Japanese public, former Thomas C. Smith (1916-2004), former Japanese language officer and Stanford University professor of Japanese history, suggested, more specifically, concentrating American forces in Okinawa – unless there was security threat from the Soviet Union – and strengthening only a national police force for Japan's internal order.<sup>111</sup>

Others envisioned a different type of security for Japan: UN, rather than US, protection. John Gunther mentioned that Japan should be placed under “international” security, suggesting UN collective security, and should “ideally follow Article 9” of the new Japanese constitution, leaving a room for the option of rearmament.<sup>112</sup> Like Gunther, Robert B. Textor, too, proposed that Japan should be protected by the United Nations. However, like Fearey and Reischauer, Textor was also opposed to Japanese rearmament for the time being due to its economic and political costs, but suggested that Japan could eventually be allowed to have a military and join the other UN

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<sup>109</sup> Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan*, 106, 183-185, 188.

<sup>110</sup> Reischauer, *Toward a New Far Eastern Policy*, 28-31; *The United States and Japan*, 43-44, 314-315; *Japan Past and Present*, 220.

<sup>111</sup> Thomas C. Smith, “Japan Won't Take Sides,” *The Nation*, August 12, 1950, 143-144; his biographical information is from “In Memorial: Thomas C. Smith,” <http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/senate/inmemoriam/thomascsmith.htm>. About Okinawa, Hessel Tiltman also defined it as “integral to the American strategic position in the western Pacific” and justified the US not returning it to Japan; see “Japan's Peace Treaty,” 511.

<sup>112</sup> Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur*, 225.

forces.<sup>113</sup> As Chapter 6 of this dissertation will show, this idea was probably the closest to what many Japanese intellectuals demanded, but the Japanese vision was more radical: it suggested leaving Japan unarmed and totally dependent on UN forces.

Some others simply expressed concern in their opposition to the US-Japan defense alliance. Familiar with Japanese hostility to the US security treaty with Japan, Helen Mears repudiated it in favor of neutrality. Yet, in her article published in March 22, 1952's *Nation*, she did little more than summarize why the Japanese were not happy about the new security arrangements.<sup>114</sup> Freda Kirchwey was critical of the US-Japan bilateral military pact, too, which was concluded despite Asian fears of Japanese militarism and at the risk of tightening the Sino-Russian bonds. However, she did not demand a repeal of the pact or offer an alternative plan, other than calling for establishing peaceful relations between Japan and the PRC.<sup>115</sup>

In fact, these critics' scant attention to the problems in the US-Japan security pact and mild disapproval of it suggested their lack of interest in Japan as a "military" ally. Both conservatives and progressives viewed Japan as the strategic key in America's fight against Communism in Asia but expected Japan to play a "non-military" role in US Cold War policy: serving as a model liberal and democratic country. America's task was to ensure that Japan remained democratic, and, by doing so, the United States could demonstrate its commitment to democracy and its leadership qualities to the Asians.

Edwin O. Reischauer clearly stated that "Japan [was] of more value to [the United States]

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<sup>113</sup> Textor, *Failure in Japan*, 11-12, 31-32, 197, 218-220. The *New Republic* also expressed its support for UN security and Japan's eventual participation in UN forces; see "The Challenge of a Japanese Treaty," *The New Republic*, October 16, 1950, 5-6.

<sup>114</sup> Helen Mears, "The Japanese 'Insecurity' Treaty," *The Nation*, March 22, 1952, 277-278; also see "Japan: Challenge to Our Prestige," 78, for her support for Japanese neutrality.

<sup>115</sup> Kirchwey, "Beyond San Francisco," 204.

and to the cause of world peace as an ideological rather than as a military ally.” He explained further that “[u]nless the Japanese [could] demonstrate that democracy [was] the safest and most direct route for the peoples of Asia as well as those of the West to the peace, prosperity and freedom they [longed] for, [the Americans could not] expect many Asians to remain true to the ideals of democracy.”<sup>116</sup> Thus, to save Japanese democracy, Reischauer, like other conservatives, emphasized the importance of economic aid for Japan, as well as of a long-term economic plan for Asia – and he was personally open to the idea of cooperating with Communist regimes if they were independent of foreign control and willing to make deals with the Free World. Conservatives also urged the Americans to be sensitive to Japanese demands, whether they were about modifying Occupation reforms, ending the Occupation, or negotiating over peace and security arrangements.<sup>117</sup>

The progressives had similar views except one: to save the seeds of democracy in Japan, the Americans should not overturn reforms and should keep siding with popular movements. A longtime critic of the moderate Occupation policy and of the Reverse Course, T. A. Bisson continued to express his belief that Japan’s economic recovery was impossible under the undemocratic Japanese leadership. In the February 2, 1952 *Nation*, he demanded a “strong statement by President Truman that the United States [stood] behind the reforms introduced under the occupation . . . [to] help to stem the tide [of reactionism] now running in Japan,” and equally important, in order that the “good-will generated by the constructive measures of the occupation [was] not to be lost at a time when it [was] desperately needed to bolster American prestige in

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<sup>116</sup> Reischauer, *Toward a New Far Eastern Policy*, 29.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 18-25, 27-31, 35-52; Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan*, 103-106, 136-137, 162-167, 174; Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur*, xii-xiii, 142-143, 225; Mears, “Japan: Challenge to Our Prestige,” 73, 78; “The Japanese ‘Insecurity’ Treaty,” 277-278.

Asia.”<sup>118</sup> Robert B. Textor also asserted that “[America’s] best chance of turning Japan into a political and military asset against communism [was] to promote a certain minimum of personal freedom and economic security for every Japanese.”<sup>119</sup> He also argued that by successfully turning Japan into a democratic nation, “[the Americans could] dramatize to Asia [their] program of greater economic security and workable social services through enlightened governmental action.”<sup>120</sup> Thus, despite continuing disagreements over methods of democratization and economic reconstruction in Japan, American public intellectuals agreed that by promoting Japanese political and economic stability, the United States could make the best use of Japan in its overall policy for Asia.

To sum up, in accepting the Cold War paradigm, American academics and journalists – both conservative and progressive – basically went along with the US government’s peace and security plans for Japan. If they did not expect Japan to become a military partner, they still considered Japan an important political and ideological ally. They began to see the importance of Japanese democratization and economic rehabilitation in terms of US Cold War strategy in Asia, linking it to Asian political and economic developments. Mixed with uncertainties about prospects of such a future and mistrust of Japan, the shortcomings of the San Francisco Peace and US-Japan security plans invited some opposition, but never divided American opinions to risk the conclusion of the treaties itself.

### **Limitations and Possibilities of Alternative Courses: Philip Jaffe and Owen Lattimore**

Most progressive critics idealized the postwar Asian order espoused by Franklin D.

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<sup>118</sup> T. A. Bisson, “Japan: Recovery and Reaction,” *The Nation*, February 2, 1952, 103.

<sup>119</sup> Textor, *Failure in Japan*, 1.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

Roosevelt. Their opposition to the “moderate” Occupation policies and to the Reverse Course manifested their belief in Rooseveltian internationalism. However, they hardly developed or expressed it, along with criticisms against the Truman Doctrine – the departure of the Truman administration’s foreign policy from that of its predecessor. There were some exceptions:

*Amerasia* editor Philip Jaffe and Owen Lattimore, former editor of the IPR journal *Pacific Affairs*.

In the very last issue of *Amerasia* published in July 1947, Philip Jaffe wrote a thirty-seven-page long essay to voice his strong objection to the Truman Doctrine. Here, he vehemently criticized the supporters – and “isolationist” opponents – of the new foreign policy for lacking Roosevelt’s long-term vision and strategy, and urged them to return to the Roosevelt postwar plan. As a Rooseveltian internationalist, Jaffe believed that the sustenance and development of American democracy, prosperity, and power required expanding trade opportunities and, to achieve this, the United States should help recreate a world order which had been shaken by the devastations of war and growing nationalist ferment. America should, argued Jaffe, assist in bringing political and economic stability by aiding revolutionary movements overseas – whether they were to gain independence from colonial rule, to uproot feudalist and fascist elements, or to transition from capitalism to socialized economies. Only this could normalize and promote international commerce, and create the conditions for peace, order, and progress in America, as well as in the world.<sup>121</sup>

Jaffe hailed Roosevelt’s vision because of its pragmatism rather than its idealism. Not anti-capitalist or cynical of America’s rise to the world’s superpower, he thought that Roosevelt took a right policy to protect American interests. He wrote:

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<sup>121</sup> Philip Jaffe, “America: The Uneasy Victor: A Study of the Truman Doctrine and Its Opponents,” *Amerasia* 11, no. 7 (July 1947): 200-201, 212.

... America needs Europe and Asia at least as much as, if not more than, Europe and Asia need America. There is nothing to prevent a capitalist America from being “American-Century minded” in the best sense of the phrase, and at the same time pursuing a genuinely democratic foreign policy in the Roosevelt tradition. Such an America could be the industrial plant for a world that is struggling to emerge from the bondage of colonial slavery and the devastation of war. In such a setting, all nations would benefit from America’s vast productive powers, and America in turn would benefit from the purchasing power unleashed by the development of free and expanding economies in hitherto backward areas.<sup>122</sup>

Jaffe agreed with Roosevelt that to make a postwar order under US leadership was thus not merely for the welfare of other nations but ultimately for that of America, and threw support to Roosevelt’s strategy that appeared future-oriented, realistic, and workable.

Jaffe also endorsed Roosevelt’s collaborationist policy. It was based upon the wisdom that the United States, even though it had “reached this pinnacle of wealth and power,” could not take leadership in an alienated world.<sup>123</sup> This idea backed up Roosevelt’s support for the emerging popular forces, and equally important, his intent to cooperate with the Soviet Union. To reinforce Roosevelt’s accommodationist approach toward the Russians, Jaffe stressed to his readers that capitalism and Communism could coexist, without one system forcing itself upon the other. He argued that the international relations of the past three decades were proof that different social systems could harmoniously live together, and reminded the Americans that the Russians believed so as well and tried to cooperate with the United States.<sup>124</sup>

Moreover, using the Leninist theory of capitalist expansion, Jaffe maintained that the Soviet economic system was in nature not expansionist and therefore would not engage in territorial aggrandizement. Russia’s economy was managed so that it would not cause an imbalance between production and consumption, which had motivated capitalist countries, like the United States, for overseas expansion in search for markets. What the Russians needed was “not

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid., 212.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 196.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 205-208.

the attainment of new foreign markets,” Jaffe insisted, “but rather the assurance of peace and security in which to continue the expansion of her limitless but still largely undeveloped internal market.”<sup>125</sup>

This, however, did not mean that the Soviet Union would never resort to force against foreign countries. Security concerns – pressure from capitalist countries and the resurgence of fascism – could prompt the Russians to take action toward their neighboring countries for self-defense. Yet, the Soviet Union was too weak to operate in power politics, Jaffe concluded, so that was why it was willing to cooperate with other powers.<sup>126</sup> To him, there still seemed a good ground to pursue Russo-American friendship.

Thus, Jaffe considered it a great mistake that the Truman administration abandoned Roosevelt’s ideals and policies. He criticized the United States, now replacing Britain as a hegemon, for attempting to restore the prewar status quo for its industrial and financial interests. The supporters of the Truman Doctrine, whom Jaffe called “American Centurions,” reversed Roosevelt’s anti-colonial stance and aided the oppressive fascist leaders in Asia; they developed anti-Communist propaganda to justify this new course and portrayed the Soviet Union as aggressively expansionist, now extending its influence to Asia and firing up nationalist movements. By turning against decolonization and naming the Soviet Union an arch-enemy, the Truman administration put international cooperation at risk.<sup>127</sup> For Jaffe, this new “internationalist” policy undermined the ultimate goal of securing markets for American goods. It would not ease social tensions or help economic development in other countries but rather fail to

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 210.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 197, 199-201.

normalize and invigorate world commerce. Jaffe critically called the Truman foreign policy the “‘internationalism’ of men with no sense of history; men forced to face the problem of the world market with no guide other than the traditional ideas and prejudices of their class.”<sup>128</sup> Jaffe found it absurd, too, for the “American Centurions” to focus on a non-existent threat of Soviet expansion and to portray nationalist movements as being masterminded by the Russian communists.<sup>129</sup>

For Jaffe, the “isolationist” critics were worse than the Truman internationalists. Jaffe advocated American foreign aid programs in principle, though he was critical of how so many billions were to be spent under the Truman Doctrine. Jaffe believed that American resources could be, and should be, used to restore the world economy, which would raise the well-being of both America and other countries, providing a crucial condition for the maintenance of peace.<sup>130</sup> Yet, the isolationists did not understand this simple rule, complained Jaffe. According to him, being anti-New Dealers and anti-internationalists, they completely missed the basic truth that American capitalism required customers with purchasing power not only at home but also overseas. With a saturated domestic market, the American economy would face a recession; as a result, the wages of workers would be lowered, productive power of industry weakened, and investment opportunities reduced. Since isolationist policies neglected to cultivate foreign markets, the Americans could find no outlets for surplus goods and consequently, Jaffe predicted, go on territorial acquisition by military means, which was the norm of the imperial past.<sup>131</sup> In his view, an “isolationist ideology ... actually [led] more directly and more certainly to war than does the Truman Doctrine, even though that doctrine at the moment [appeared] to be symbolic of militant American

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 202.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 203.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., 198-199, 217-218.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., 222-225.

expansionism.”<sup>132</sup> Loath for their war policies to be overseen by the United Nations, the isolationists might choose to defect from the organization, leading to its demise.<sup>133</sup> Thus, the isolationists’ alternative program promised only a grim future: a shattered peace, a divided world, continuing poverty and violence – a complete repudiation of Roosevelt’s vision.

Jaffe criticized the Truman administration’s policy for Asia for reversing that of the Roosevelt administration. Like other progressive critics, Jaffe did not question that the United States should help recreate Asia. “We had it in our power, without effective opposition from any other country, to set such countries as the Philippines, China, and Japan on the road to stability and prosperity,” he said.<sup>134</sup> It was the approach of the Truman administration that Jaffe railed against. He insisted that US attempts to empower undemocratic forces were contrary to the principles of Roosevelt and to American interests. Believing that by helping popular movements could the United States make a peaceful, stable, and friendly Asia and let its markets open for American products, Jaffe criticized America’s general policy for Asia – the Philippines, China, Southern Korea, and Japan.

Arguing this way, Jaffe disagreed with Roosevelt over China. While the late president had decided to keep siding with Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist government with reserve, Jaffe attacked this policy as inherited by Truman: by 1947, the George C. Marshall Mission had failed to mediate between the KMT and the CCP, and the civil war had broken out. Not because he supported the CCP, but because he knew that the KMT was reactionary, corrupt, and unpopular, Jaffe decided that it was a bad bet to aid Chiang. He concluded that the United States had wasted

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 225.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., 213

money only to lose the favor of the Chinese people and to imperil trade opportunities with them.<sup>135</sup>

As for Japan, Jaffe shared the progressives' opinions: General Douglas MacArthur's lukewarm attitudes toward the Japanese old guard politicians and the zaibatsu failed to meet the aim of the Occupation – laying the foundations for a peaceful, democratic Japan. Jaffe also claimed that despite the fact that the Japanese industrialists' "sabotage" had worsened economic conditions and encouraged labor strikes, the Occupation authorities tried to crack down on the labor movements, viewing them as dangerously "leftist," rather than attempting to dismantle the system of monopoly capitalism. Thus, the Occupation policies, Jaffe warned, paved the way for the resurgence of Japanese militarism, an anathema to the United States and the world.<sup>136</sup>

Jaffe's arguments in this essay were different from those of many other critics of the Reverse Course in clearly dismissing the general belief in Soviet expansion and in not vilifying communists. This might be because he wrote this article in the summer of 1947, before the Cold War tensions heightened, following the Czechoslovak coup, the passage of the Marshall Plan, and the Berlin Blockade. He might have changed his political stance in the late 1940s, joining the chorus in support of the Truman administration's diplomacy; he might have continuously identified himself with the progressive group of Henry Wallace. Either way, Jaffe's political stance did not stand, as American liberals forged a Cold War consensus by 1950, defeating Wallace's foreign policy, the true successor of Roosevelt's. But it was still of value that Jaffe tried to debunk the "premises" of American Cold War policy whereas most critics opposed the "strategies." He was also different from most progressive Asia experts, who, blaming the failure of the Japanese leftist groups to fully grasp and understand democratic principles, did not object to SCAP intervention in

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<sup>135</sup> Ibid., 213-214.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid., 214-216.

labor activism or doubt the Communist threat from within or without; he kept faith in Japanese “democratic” forces.

Jaffe strongly advocated the expansion of American capitalism and foreign aid programs, like many Cold War internationalists. However, as long as he believed in the peaceful nature of the socialist economy and coexistence between capitalism and Communism, it seems unlikely that Jaffe would support the plan to make Japan a bulwark against Communism or support the militarization of containment policy. In fact, Jaffe criticized American liberal intellectuals for encouraging the American public to fear the Soviet Union. He wrote, “It is this group that forms the breeding ground for the professional and pathological ‘anti-Sovieters’ who, for reasons of personal spite or monetary reward, have become the well-paid literary hatchet men of the extreme right ... [and] have been responsible for creating the wave of anti-Soviet sentiment that has prevented the American people from thinking clearly and farsightedly about their role in the postwar world.”<sup>137</sup>

If Jaffe appeared a little too theoretical and too idealistic, clinging to the principles of Rooseveltian diplomacy, Owen Lattimore was willing to modify it in accordance with the current situations in order to formulate a realist policy. Like Jaffe, Lattimore was a Rooseveltian internationalist who supported international cooperation, the coexistence with the Soviet Union, and the creation of a liberal economic order in the postwar world. In regards to the liberation of Asian colonies, which he thought was inevitable, desirable, and yet difficult in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Lattimore decided that gradual decolonization was an ideal course, as did Roosevelt.<sup>138</sup> Moreover, before the war ended, both expected China, under Chiang

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid., 204.

<sup>138</sup> Owen Lattimore, *Solution in Asia* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945), 158-159, 202-206.

Kai-shek, to replace a defeated Japan as a new Asian leader and that four powers – China, the United States, Britain, and Russia – should play major roles in Asia.<sup>139</sup> By the end of the 1940s, however, when the Chinese civil war was turning in favor of the CCP, Lattimore had to admit that China could not become a new powerhouse and that the American policy for China had completely failed.<sup>140</sup>

Yet, this realization did not mold him into a Cold Warrior who sought to make Japan the “workshop of Asia” in order to check Communist expansion. Lattimore refused to overestimate the Soviet influence throughout Asia, nor was he willing to apply a bipolar world view to the map of Asia. He well knew that although the Asian democratic movements were inspired by Marxist ideology, their driving force was nationalist at its core. Even if “communists” took power, it did not necessarily mean that they would import Russian-style political and economic systems and close all the doors to the United States and Western Europe. Also, it was obvious to Lattimore that the Soviet Union was not willing or able to control Asia with the political, economic, or military means at its disposal. Thus, he continued to believe that capitalism and Communism could coexist, which made the idea of making Japan an American ally illegitimate. He denied that option, as well as the original Roosevelt plan, and proposed a new balance-of-power theory that Asia as a whole, including both China and Japan, could form a “third force” between the United States and the Soviet Union. To Lattimore, this seemed more “realistic” than what the US government was preparing to do with Japan.

Although both Jaffe and Lattimore argued that the Soviet Union was not trying to extend

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<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 163, 181-182; about Chiang and the importance of China, also see 147-149, 170-171.

<sup>140</sup> Owen Lattimore, *The Situation in Asia* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1949), 6, 142-151; Owen Lattimore, “Rebuilding Our Policy in Asia,” *Atlantic Monthly*, January 1950, 21.

its power all over the world, they offered different reasoning. Lattimore completely disagreed with Jaffe, who believed in the Leninist theory and Soviet goodwill and claimed that Russia was non-expansionist. In fact, like many Cold Warriors and Cold War critics, Lattimore viewed the Soviets as expansionist, if not recklessly aggressive. Ideologically driven but cautiously realist, the Russians would take action only when conditions both within and without were met, and they would only aim at what the conditions allowed. Lattimore explained the characteristics of the Soviet foreign policy as follows:

Russian policy throughout the world consists of something more than agile, catlike pounces on opportune mice that happen to pop out of decaying political structures. It is based on a formidable combination of the Communist theory of how history unfolds, phase by phase, and those methods which the existing resources of the Soviet state enable it to use whenever a theoretical phase has ceased to be theoretical and has become an actual situation. ... The Soviet method, following [the] Communist theory, is to go into action whenever it looks as though a "step forward" can be taken. A step forward, according to this combination of theory and method, is always a step forward, even when it does not reach all the way to control of the state by Communists.<sup>141</sup>

Lattimore observed that the Soviet Union would not exert a lot of influence in Asia, as it had not in the past decades. Russia's limited resources did not encourage expansion of the state, nor did conditions in Asia favor such expansion.<sup>142</sup> Thus, while labeling the Soviet Union as expansionist, Lattimore insisted that there was no need to exaggerate or overreact to the threat of a Communist advance.

Even if he did not dread the specter of Communism, Lattimore did consider the Soviet Union to be America's competitor and believe that the United States should win the geopolitical race for the expansion of American free-enterprise capitalism. He thought, however, that the Truman administration's containment policy needed revision to become sound and effective. It appeared to Lattimore that the policymakers made an ill-advised grand strategy, based upon their

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<sup>141</sup> Lattimore, *The Situation in Asia*, 53-54.

<sup>142</sup> Lattimore repeatedly argued that the Soviet Union was unlikely, and unable, to control China and the rest of Asia; for instance, see *ibid.*, 12, 43-44, 50, 52, 87-98, 102, 164-172.

optimistic assessments of American power, the world situations, and their inability to predict the consequences of a chosen policy.<sup>143</sup> Aware of American ascendancy, advocate of realism Lattimore said: “All American policy must give full weight to the importance of power politics, because never before in history have the components and units of power been so massive and so easy to mobilize and bring into play.” He warned that “however, one of the defects of our policy [had] been obsession with what power [could] do – our own and that of Russia – to the point of neglecting the limits of power” and that “there [had] been so strong an emphasis on the danger of another war and the necessity for preparedness that American policy [had] to a definite and dangerous extent hampered its own maneuverability if it should turn out, in the next few years, that peace [was] preferable to war.”<sup>144</sup>

As for US policy for Asia, Lattimore thought it unwise and called for reconsideration. One of his arguments was that the United States could not control Asia, as the Soviet Union could not, thus dismissing both the alleged Communist threat and the overestimations of the American ability to control the region.<sup>145</sup> He pointed out that since they did not consider Russia or Communism as threatening, Asian countries had few incentives to participate in the conflict between the two superpowers on the side of the Americans.<sup>146</sup> If the United States forced the Asians to sacrifice themselves for American interests, then they would turn against America and approach the Soviet Union, playing off one off the other.<sup>147</sup> What the United States should do was not to attempt a futile hegemony in Asia but to “get Asia to participate in [US] policies.”<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid., 217-220; “Rebuilding Our Policy in Asia,” 23.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 218-219.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., 42-43.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., 10-12, 78-85.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 230-231.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 230.

As specific measures, Lattimore proposed that the US government should proceed with decolonization and foreign aid programs. Noticing a lack of American attention to Asian independence movements and economic difficulties, he argued that the Marshall Plan should be used to help not only European but also Asian economies, and foreign aid should assist national liberation and modernization rather than the restoration of European colonial rule in Asia. He thus urged the Americans to respond to what the Asians needed and treat them as partners of primary importance.<sup>149</sup>

Nevertheless, this was not merely an ethical argument but a calculated policy suggestion to create in Asia an environment friendlier to America than to Russia. Lattimore believed that by taking this policy, the Americans could “cultivate the maximum field of legitimate operation for American private enterprise in trade, in contracting and engineering, and in supplying and installing machinery.”<sup>150</sup> In his view, by exerting more influence than the Soviet Union, the United States could make Asia a virtual buffer against the Russian enemy.

In effect, what Lattimore suggested was an alternative containment “strategy.” He anticipated that an Asia emerging out of colonial control would collectively form a “third force” between the United States and the Soviet Union. According to his definition, a “third country” was a neutral one that would deal with both powers and become a satellite of neither. He observed that the emergence of third countries in Asia would be led by China, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia and spread to Europe, too. In his geopolitical vision, the balance of power between America and Russia should be maintained by the presence of third countries in Asia and

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<sup>149</sup> Ibid., 231-233; Lattimore critically mentions Europe’s use of Marshall money against the nationalist movements in Asia on pp.10, 49, and 58. Also see “Rebuilding Our Policy in Asia,” 22-23.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., 233.

Europe.<sup>151</sup>

One of the bases of this idea was Lattimore's conviction that the fear of Communist expansion was overblown. He emphasized not only that the Soviets were not capable of or intent on controlling Asia but also that the Asians were nationalists rather than communists.<sup>152</sup> The other basis of his geopolitical strategy was Lattimore's optimism that Asia, though conditionally, would be pro-Europe/ America. He accepted that Soviet ideology and political vision had attracted many peoples in Asia but still believed that it would depend on future policies of the major powers into which political and economic systems – Euro-American or Soviet – Asian countries would be drawn more.

Lattimore thus argued that to win Asia, the Truman administration should replace the current policies of “revulsion” with the policies of “attraction” that he recommended.<sup>153</sup> He wrote with confidence: “The colonial, colonial-European, and third-country policies that I have outlined would enable us to take up the adjustment of our relations with Russia backed by the good will of countries independent of us but benefiting by association with us, and therefore having a vested interest in remaining free of control by Russia.”<sup>154</sup>

Lattimore, who proposed an alternative method to contain the Soviets, certainly opposed the Reverse Course and the subsequent plan to make Japan America's ally. One major reason was Lattimore's belief that the United States could not control Asia. He claimed that owing to limited raw materials, the United States could not make a workshop out of Japan.<sup>155</sup> It was also

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid., 221.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., 37, 52, 98.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., 86-103; also see footnotes 142-147.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., 237.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 7, 48; “Rebuilding Our Policy in Asia,” 22; Lattimore, “What Kind of Peace for Japan,” *The New Republic*, June 11, 1951, 14.

unthinkable on realist and moral grounds that the United States would secure Asian resources by force for Japan. Lattimore said that “America [had] made enormous sacrifices to break Japan’s imperial grip on Asia and the Pacific. Even war scares about Russia [were] not enough to make American public opinion reverse itself and demand an American conquest, on Japan’s behalf, of Japan’s old fields of aggression in Asia.” He called it “strategic as well as political folly,” too, to send American or American-led Japanese troops in Asia where Russia placed little strategic importance.<sup>156</sup>

Lattimore also insisted that the United States could not prevent Japan from taking an independent course against American interests. Behind his misgivings about American optimism concerning their own power to control Japan was a hint of his mistrust in the Japanese. Lattimore anticipated that Japan would play off US needs against Soviet offers, rather than act as an obedient American ally, and might counter American attempts to create a new Asian order. He asserted:

A Japan made strong enough by American subsidy to hold an economic ascendancy over the rest of Asia, and strong enough to be an American ally against Russia if it wants to be, is automatically a Japan strong enough to double-cross America and make its own deals with Russia and with the rest of Asia. . . . The general stabilization that will eventually emerge between America and Russia will in large part be brought about by the realization that Asia cannot be brought fully under the control of either of them. It is unwise to overlook the historical part played by Japan in transforming an Asia under control into an Asia out of control. There are Japanese who realize that Japan will only be able to become free by taking its place – not a dominant place – in an Asia out of the control of either of the two superpowers.<sup>157</sup>

Also, the Japanese would be unlikely to welcome the political and military tutelage of the United States, and trying to force American demands upon them, Lattimore worried, would turn the Japanese – leftist as well as rightist – against America and encourage their drift into the Russian orbit and penetration into Asia.<sup>158</sup> In his view, the US new policies for Japan would lead only to these unmanageable situations and weaken the American position vis-à-vis the Soviets and the

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<sup>156</sup> Lattimore, *The Situation in Asia*, 125-126.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, 123-124; also see p.7 and “What Kind of Peace for Japan,” 14.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, 7, 47-48, 130-134.

Asians.

Lattimore recommended that the United States ensure Japan's reintegration into Asia as a "third country." The Japanese should be allowed to make deals with the Soviet Union and Asia as well as the United States and to play a part in balancing the two superpowers as a member of the Asian buffer countries.<sup>159</sup> Interestingly, he also expected Japan to contribute to economic development in Asia by leading industrialization, a view that modified his original plan for postwar Japan.<sup>160</sup> Lattimore had suggested divesting Japanese heavy industries of their war-making potential and transferring their industrial products to Asian countries in order to secure the peace in Asia and help economic rehabilitation of the region.<sup>161</sup> By the late 1940s, he estimated that Japanese military aggression was unlikely to revive and decided that Japanese industrial power could be unleashed in Asia.<sup>162</sup> Besides, Lattimore believed that Japan, short of natural resources, could be effectively contained by allowing trade with mainland China; as a supplier of crucial raw materials that Japanese heavy industries needed, China would gain leverage over Japan. This policy promised additional merits in that, by satisfying Japan's commercial interests in China, the United States could tame the Japanese and prevent the surge of anti-American nationalism.<sup>163</sup> To Lattimore, the policy of making Japan one of the "third countries" that could freely deal with Russia and Asia seemed more promising than that of making it an American satellite.

With these arguments, Lattimore continued to oppose the peace and security settlements that the US government was preparing for Japan during the late 1940s and early 1950s. He

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<sup>159</sup> Ibid., 123, 225, 235-236.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., 130.

<sup>161</sup> Lattimore, *Solution in Asia*, 182-186.

<sup>162</sup> Lattimore, *The Situation in Asia*, 130.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., 129-134; "What Kind of Peace for Japan," 14.

believed that Japan should make a peace not only with the United States but also with the Soviet Union and Communist China; Japan should be permitted to trade with Asian countries, especially China; and Japan could be left neutral, without a security alliance concluded with the United States. Lattimore envisioned the whole of Asia as a neutral zone in the Soviet-American contest and placed Japan in it. Drawing a realist policy from real-world assessments, he understood peace in relative terms of power balance and tried to devise a strategy whereby the United States could pursue American interests more effectively.

If Jaffe was a Cold War critic who stuck to the Rooseveltian world view, Lattimore was a critic of a different kind: like many other Cold War critics, he tried to offer an alternative policy to contain the expansion of Soviet influence. Even among critics, he was rare in developing a substitute geopolitical plan for Asia: the idea of “third countries” that included China and Japan. If adopted, this might have negated the need for making Japan a workshop or an American ally. However, neither Jaffe nor Lattimore could overturn the mainstream fear of Communist expansion, which seemed to spread in Asia in 1949-1950. Also, Lattimore’s alternative Asia policy had similarities to what the conservatives and other progressives suggested: the promotion of Asian economic integration and Sino-Japanese commerce. Gradually adapted to the general Cold War policy, his criticisms of the containment policy, like others, did not stand.

## **Conclusion**

Through the analysis of the ideas of American conservative and progressive Asia specialists, we have seen how their debate about US policies toward Japan developed to form a general consensus during the early Cold War period. Public discussions emerged in 1947 over the Occupation’s economic policy for Japan, specifically whether the Reverse Course was justifiable

or not. The conservatives insisted that to save an adolescent democracy in Japan, which was the objective of the Occupation, economic health should be restored by replacing the dismantling policy with that of reconstruction. On the other hand, the progressives believed that both Japanese democracy and Japan's economy would start functioning well only if complete destruction of the foundations of Japanese authoritarianism was accomplished. In the course of the debate, the conservatives gradually had the progressives on the defensive. The conservatives refuted the progressives' claims by denouncing their excessive expectations from the Occupation and embracing the general success of basic reform programs. They argued that what the occupiers had to do was to loosen their political grip and to allow the Japanese to experiment with democracy and modify it in accordance with their peculiar needs. Recognizing the impossibility – and undesirability – of a leftist revolution in Japan and content with many of the initial reforms, the progressives could hardly justify demands for further radical programs. When the conservatives envisioned the Japanese economic recovery program as a larger Asian development plan, too, the progressives, who were interested in the improvement of Asian welfare, could not object to it. By the time that a peace with Japan arose as a new foreign policy issue in 1949-1951, clear-cut ideological differences between the two groups no longer existed. The debate over the peace and security arrangements with Japan also posed no overt challenge to the US Cold War policy in Asia.

This signified the transformation of the liberal internationalist paradigm in response to external developments. When the US-Soviet alliance was collapsing and the hope for a stable and unified China was waning, the Rooseveltian idea of balance of power for postwar Asia lost ground. The success of Japanese democratization – though the degree was debatable – marked the

accomplishment of a condition for the Rooseveltian peace and allowed the Americans to redirect their attention from the threat of militarist Japan to another threat: Communism. When the Americans perceived Communist expansion in Asia as a threat to their national interests and aimed to defend Asia by using Japan, their pre-1945 internationalist vision for postwar Asia changed into a Cold War scheme. The progressives lost out to the conservatives in this process, though both were essentially internationalists.

Unlike many other progressive critics, Philip Jaffe and Owen Lattimore questioned the intention and power of the Soviet Union to extend its influence overseas and suggested alternative policies to secure an Asia that would be open and friendly to the West. Expressed in 1947 and in 1949-1950 respectively, these Cold War critics' ideas reflected changes in international atmospheres. Jaffe, in his view of Russia, seemed more idealist than Lattimore, but writing his essay before he observed the heightening of the Cold War tensions in Eastern Europe, Jaffe could afford to be optimistic about the possibility of continuing US-Soviet friendship. Lattimore was more inclined to analyze foreign affairs from a realist perspective, but he might have developed skepticism about the Soviet Union by 1949. Lattimore saw Communist Russia as capitalist America's competitor, rather than a friend, and proposed a strategy to win Asia based upon realism. By developing such anti-Communist view, Lattimore accommodated a Cold War world vision. Even these Cold War critics reflected the shift in America's internationalist paradigm from that of World War II.

Significantly, there was little Marxian criticism against American capitalist expansion itself during the late 1940s-early 1950s. As even Jaffe and Lattimore clearly stated that the United States should support democratic movements in Asia to secure America's capitalist interests, there

was a consensus for the virtue of establishing a liberal international order under US leadership. It was considered beneficial to American national interests and good for the world as a whole. Holding that promoting political and economic development in Asia would not only serve the US foreign policy but help the Asian peoples, too, the progressives joined the conservatives in promoting American foreign aid programs. Both embraced Asian modernization and envisioned Japan as the model and leader of it. In this way, the Marxist-influenced revisionist critics of the Cold War and of “modernization theory” who emerged in the late 1960s-1970s are wrong in comparing themselves with the 1940s-1950s progressives. There were no such simple equations that the conservatives were modernization theorists and Cold Warriors and the progressives were otherwise.<sup>164</sup>

It is true that the progressives developed more active criticisms about America’s stance toward the Soviet Union and the Cold War. However, according to diplomatic historian Thomas G. Paterson’s definition, generally speaking, both conservatives and progressives were not Cold Warriors but Cold War critics. They were not “tough-minded” “realists” who were blind to American power and eager to militarize the Cold War; they were “realists” who were aware of the limits of power and believed in the possibility of diplomatic negotiations.<sup>165</sup> Some – if not all – conservatives and progressives looked for a way to moderate the US Cold War strategy for Asia. Edwin O. Reischauer and Owen Lattimore were similarly skeptical of tightening the US-Japan military alliance and putting restrictions on Sino-Japanese trade, and they entertained the option of integrating Japan economically with mainland China and Asian countries, even if they were run

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<sup>164</sup> See footnote 8.

<sup>165</sup> Thomas G. Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 101.

by communists. But as Paterson observes, Communist hostilities that seemed to spread in Eastern Europe and in East Asia between 1948 and 1950 silenced many Cold War dissenters who ultimately viewed the Soviet Union as America's competitor and did not accept Communist expansion.<sup>166</sup> America's Asia experts, who likewise shared Cold War rationales, failed to press modifications of the US policy.

It is hard to guess what would have happened if, as Reischauer and Lattimore recommended, the US government had taken moderate policies for Asia in the early 1950s. Considering that by not allowing a Sino-Japanese rapprochement and trying to save Southeast Asia from Communism and tie it with Japan, the United States made its intervention in Indochina inescapable, flexible attitudes to Asian situations might have removed an American cause for the Vietnam War at least. We know that this did not happen, and actual revision of US overall policy for Asia had to wait for changes in international and domestic conditions that were all occurring in the late 1960s-1970s – the US escalation of its military involvement in Vietnam and the contingent collapse of the Bretton Woods system, rise of antiwar movements and the New Left group, as well as the Sino-Soviet split. Without these conditions and with a large political-intellectual consensus for American democracy and capitalist expansion among American liberal internationalists, it was hardly possible to radically alter the US Cold War policy in the late 1940s-1950s.

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid., 101, 103-113.

## CHAPTER 6

### RECONSIDERING THE JAPANESE PEACE AND SECURITY DEBATE: THE THRESHOLD BETWEEN TWO INTERNATIONALISMS

On September 4, 1951, an international conference was convened in San Francisco, California, to make peace with Japan. Fifty-two countries gathered, including Japan, and after five day-long proceedings, forty-nine countries signed a peace treaty. This officially ended not only the state of war with Japan but also the Allied Occupation and restored Japanese independence. After the peace conference, another meeting was held between the Japanese and American delegates. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1893-1971), his foreign policy adviser John Foster Dulles, and two senators signed a US-Japan mutual security pact. With this bilateral treaty, Japan and the United States entered into a military alliance. Ratified by the Diet in the fall and subsequently by the Senate early in the following year, both peace and security treaties came into effect in late April 1952.

The San Francisco peace treaty and the US-Japan security pact marked the beginning of the Cold War alliance between the United States and Japan, the pillar of US containment policy in Asia. Oriented to America's political and strategic interests, the treaties were not without their problems. The peace treaty excluded the signatures of the main Communist countries, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). With its claims not accepted, the Russian delegate refused to affix its signature to the instrument of peace. Neither the PRC nor Taiwan was invited to the conference as Britain and the United States could not reach an agreement on which government should represent China. In addition, the peace and security treaties gave Japan semi-independent status. The Ryukyus and Bonin islands remained under American administration. That US military forces were allowed to station in Japan with special privileges, including the

right to intervene in Japanese domestic disturbance, signified that Japan was put under US hegemony.

Accordingly, there had been, and continued to be even after 1952, debates on this “partial” peace and Japan’s military alliance with the United States. The scholarship on postwar US-Japan relations has revealed the reformulation of Washington’s policy for Japan dictated by the development of the Cold War, the negotiations among the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), the Department of State, and the Pentagon over the treaties with Japan, and Prime Minister Yoshida’s role in the treaty-making process.<sup>1</sup> Japanese intellectuals’, socialists’, and labor unions’ opposition to both treaties as well as the war-weary public’s ambivalent attitudes have also been discussed, but few thorough examinations into them exist.<sup>2</sup> Since only perfunctory attention has been paid to critics’ arguments and motives and public opinion polls, this lack of careful study has perpetuated a simplistic dichotomy of the “conservatives” versus the

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<sup>1</sup> See Ōkurashō Zaiseishi-shitsu (Ministry of Finance, History of Finance Office), ed., *Shōwa Zaisei-shi Shūsen kara Kōwa made dai-3-kan: Amerika no tai-Nichi Senryō Seisaku* (A History of Finance of the Showa Period from the End of War to Peace vol. 3: American Occupation Policies for Japan) (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1976); Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Roger Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Hosoya Chihiro, *San Furanshisuko Kōwa heno Michi* (The Road to the San Francisco Peace) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1984); Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: McArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).

<sup>2</sup> See Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, 371-372; John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 553-555; James L. McClain, *Japan: A Modern History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002), 559; Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swan (New York: Continuum, 2002), 506-509; J. Victor Koschmann, “Intellectuals and Politics,” in *Postwar Japan as History*, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 401-403; Andrew E. Barshay, “Postwar Social and Political Thought, 1945-90,” in *Modern Japanese Thought*, ed. Bob Takashi Wakabayashi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 309-311; Laura Hein, *Reasonable Men, Powerful Words: Political Culture and Expertise in Twentieth-Century Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 114-129; Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 704-707; Igarashi Takeshi’s “Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan” in *Journal of Japanese Studies* 11, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 323-356, discusses the arguments on peace and security among the conservative parties, the progressive parties (the Socialist Party and the Communist Party), and the Peace Study Group intellectuals; Masaru Tamamoto’s “Unwanted Peace: Japanese Intellectuals in American Occupied Japan, 1948-1952” (PhD diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1988) studies the peace and security debate by focusing on the Peace Study Group and the ideas of “Old Liberal” members.

“progressives,” pro-American versus anti-American, militarist versus pacifist.

The real picture was more complex. The public debate on peace and security emerged in late 1949 when Cold War tension was mounting. Valuing Japan's political and strategic importance in America's Cold War strategy in Asia, the US government prepared peace and security settlements with Japan. To end the Occupation as soon as possible, the Japanese government sought to negotiate over peace and security terms with the United States, virtually the sole occupier of Japan. Although disagreeing about Japanese rearmament, both worked for an early peace, even without Soviet approval, and a security alliance between the two countries. A large number of Japanese intellectuals, scholars, and journalists as well as the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP), on the other hand, refused to make a peace in this emergent Cold War paradigm and instead hoped to reach a peace in the international environment during World War II. Thus, they clamored for an “overall peace” (*zenmen kōwa*), a peace with all countries, including even Communist Russia and China, and Japan's “unarmed neutrality” (*hibusō chūritsu*), which was to prohibit Japan from rearming itself and siding with either camp. In effect, the opposition group led a powerful movement and gained enormous popular support.

Nevertheless, the supporters of a “partial peace” (*katamen kōwa*), i.e. a peace only with the “Free World” and a military alliance with the United States, prevailed over those of an overall peace and unarmed neutrality. The outbreak of the Korean War greatly contributed to tipping the balance between these two groups by splitting the advocates of a comprehensive peace into Cold War realists and into their opponents. The Korean War convinced many critics that the United States and the Soviet Union would be unlikely to reach a peace agreement over Japan. Besides,

the war fueled their fear of Russian military expansion and led them to question the feasibility of defenseless neutralism. They took the power vacuum theory and came to support Japan's making an alliance with the United States for its security. The remaining opposition found such "realist" or "pragmatic" reasoning false and dangerous. They, as public intellectuals, determined not to fall in that thinking or give up the hope that coexistence of the two blocs would be possible, as it had been, through diplomatic negotiations. However, the public, too, accepted the American peace draft in order for Japan to regain autonomy sooner rather than later and the role of US military in Japanese national defense for the time being.

Significantly, the disagreements between Japanese Cold War realists and critics entailed another issue of debate: Japan's trade with Asian countries. The core members in opposition to the partial peace and the US-Japan security alliance demanded that Japan's right to trade with Asian countries, especially the PRC, should be respected. Believing in the importance of China in Japan's economy, they were concerned that by joining in US containment strategy, Japan's trade would be restricted to Southeast Asia. Although they criticized America's militant Cold War strategy, however, they took for granted US political and economic leadership – if not dominance – in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the world. They expected the United States to provide financial aid to Asia and Japan as well to promote their economic developments, which the US government prepared to do as part of Cold War policy.

This chapter thus closely looks at the Japanese peace and security debate and provides an alternative interpretation to the traditional narrative. I trace how public discussions on Japan's peace and security issues evolved in the late 1940s-early 1950s political context. Given that Japanese public intellectuals played a leading role in shaping the contours of the debate, I analyze

a broad range of their writings in periodicals and newspapers and unravel their basic arguments and the shifts in their opinions along with political developments. I show the nature of the debate technically as that between divergent Wilsonian internationalists and, in recreating the public discussions, illuminate the political and intellectual factors in Japanese acceptance of the San Francisco peace and the US-Japan security pact.

### **The Origins of Pacifist Discourse and Intellectuals' Collective Action: Late 1948-Early 1949**

Having experienced war, Japanese intellectuals had tremendous interest in maintaining peace. But it was a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Statement issued on July 13, 1948 that inspired the Japanese intelligentsia to work together for peace. Right after the Soviet Union imposed a blockade against the other Allied Powers in Berlin, eight social scientists issued a joint statement on peace and war through UNESCO, officially called "A Statement by Eight Distinguished Social Scientists on the Causes of Tensions Which Make for War."<sup>3</sup> Their cooperative work first caught the attention of the chief editor of *Sekai*, Yoshino Genzaburō, and he began to contact various intellectuals to do the same. Through sociologist Shimizu Ikutarō, Yoshino organized a discussion group.<sup>4</sup>

Responding to his call, over fifty Japanese scholars gathered to discuss the UNESCO Statement in November and December 1948. The participants varied in generation, specialization, and ideology; they included Gakushūin University president Abe Yoshishige,

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<sup>3</sup> The eight signatories were: Gordon W. Allport, professor of psychology at Harvard University; Gilberto Freyre, professor of sociology at the University of Bahia, Brazil and professor at the Institute of Sociology, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina; Georges Gurvitch, professeur de sociologie, Université de Strasbourg, Administrateur du Centre d'Etudes Sociologiques, Paris; Max Horkheimer, director of the Institute of Social Research in New York City; Arne Naess, professor of philosophy at the University of Oslo; John Rickman, M.D., editor of *British Journal of Medical Psychology*; Harry Stack Sullivan, M.D., chairman of the Council of Fellows at the Washington School of Psychiatry and editor of *Psychiatry, Journal for the Operational Statement of Interpersonal Relations*; Alexander Szalai, professor of sociology at the University of Budapest and president of the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs; the statement was in a supplement to *Sekai* (April 1950): 1-6.

<sup>4</sup> Igarashi, "Peace-Making and Party Politics," 343.

philosopher and soon-to be minister of education in the Yoshida government Amano Teiyū (1884-1980), professor of politics and former member of the Showa Research Association Rōyama Masamichi, professor of American history Takagi Yasaka, philosopher of law and Ōsaka City University president Tsunetō Kyō (1888-1967), Japanese historian Tsuda Sōkichi, Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960), Marxist historian Hani Gorō (1901-1983), professor of Marxist economics at the University of Tokyo Ōuchi Hyōe, and his disciples Arisawa Hiromi and Wakimura Yoshitarō, Marxian professor of economics at Hitotsubashi University Tsuru Shigeto, professor of psychology at the Tokyo Institute of Technology Miyagi Otoya (1908-2005), professor of Japanese political thought at the University of Tokyo Maruyama Masao, professor of law at the same university Kawashima Takeyoshi, Tsurumi Kazuko (1918-2006), and Takeda Kiyoko (1917-).<sup>5</sup> They managed to reach a consensus and produced their own statement, which was published in the March 1949 issue of *Sekai*. This was the beginning of their peace activism.

In their formal statement, they began by elaborating on their motives. Their foremost concern was about peace. Now that Japan had lost autonomy, its national security was dependent upon the great powers. The growing tensions among them naturally caused grave apprehension among the Japanese intellectuals.<sup>6</sup> Their decision to hold a symposium and work on a joint statement came from other reasons, too: their regret over their past inaction and new determination not to repeat the same mistake. In the words of the foreword to their statement, “looking back upon ourselves we Japanese scientists are shamefully aware that ... we as a whole succeeded little in serving as [a] brake upon the country’s march into the war of aggression and

<sup>5</sup> “Heiwa Mondai Tokushū ni tsuite” (On the Special Edition on the Problem of Peace), *Sekai* (March 1949): 2-4; the list of the participants is on p.5; there seems to have been no forced revision, see *Senryō-gun Ken’etsu Zasshi* (Periodicals Censored by the Occupation Forces) (Tokyo: Yūshōdō, 1982), microfilm, reel 179.

<sup>6</sup> “Sensō to Heiwa ni kansuru Nihon no Kagakusha no Seimei” (A Statement by Japanese Scientists on the Problem of Peace), *Sekai* (March 1949): 6; the English translation is on pp.16-19.

certainly showed ourselves to be lacking in both courage and efforts in attempting positively to prevent such a war.”<sup>7</sup>

While accepting blame, however, the Japanese intellectuals found the state’s repression on free speech responsible for limiting their influence on public opinion. Emphasizing that the “freedom of speech and opinion is the indispensable condition for preventing war and defending peace,” they were now committed to fully employing the right of free discussion to spread their knowledge and opinions among the people. In order to influence society, the discussants also realized that they needed to take concerted, united action: “If we are hereafter to make our knowledge really an active force, ... there develop among social scientists, among natural scientists, and between them together, both the sincere cooperation and a strong organization, establishing in this way a bulwark for Reason to defend itself.”<sup>8</sup> Taking the opportunity offered by the UNESCO Statement, the Japanese intellectuals thus met and confirmed their role in maintaining peace together.

In response to the UNESCO Statement, they agreed on ten points. First, they concurred with the Statement that war was not inevitable and men were capable of preventing it. “War is not a natural phenomenon dropping like a murrain from heaven,” they declared. While admitting that it was difficult, they “[recognized] a possibility, an increasing possibility, of [their] preventing war and of laying [the] foundation for peace through [their] intelligence and endeavors.”<sup>9</sup> Rephrasing the second point made in the UNESCO declaration, they also suggested the “possible reformation of the present,” in other words, the “fundamental change in the social organization and in the

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 18-19.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 6-7; 18.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 7; 18; Point 1 responding to Paragraph A in the UNESCO Statement.

mode of thinking” to maintain peace.<sup>10</sup>

Specifically, the Japanese scholars stressed the importance of adopting socialistic economic systems and referred to the misuse of nationalistic symbols, myths, and traditions and racial arguments. They made it clear that the realization of the “maximum degree of social justice through planning and adjusting the advance of productive forces and the utilization of resources” was the necessary condition for keeping peace. To break monopolies, not only should economic democratization be undertaken in an individual country; the international flow of resources, labor, as well as investment should also be overseen by the United Nations.<sup>11</sup> Regarding the danger of nationalism, the Japanese intellectuals observed that the leadership of a country, whether underprivileged or privileged, tended to promote nationalism for mobilization purposes.<sup>12</sup> In addition, they insisted that racism was not scientifically proven and rather a product of political, social, and economic environments, and that securing all men equal “right and opportunity for the enjoyment of welfare” would contribute to peace.<sup>13</sup> Since misunderstanding among nations would be fostered by restriction on freedom of speech and lead to war, the Japanese scholars argued that the right of free speech should be fully protected, and that, ideally, the United Nations should take responsibility for providing objective reports to all the people in the world.<sup>14</sup>

The scholars’ role in contributing to world peace was two-fold. One, as the UNESCO Statement made clear, the Japanese intellectuals also believed that cooperation among scientists was crucial. They argued, “all scientists, irrespective of the particular branch or the country he may belong, should cooperate in search of truth and welfare by forming themselves into a strong

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 7; 18; Point 2 responding to Paragraph B.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 7-8; 17-18; Point 3 responding to Paragraph C.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 8; 17; Point 4 responding to Paragraph D.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 8; 17; Point 5 responding to Paragraph G.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 8; 16; Point 8 responding to Paragraph F.

organization both nationally and internationally for the defense of freedom in research and expression.” They considered the establishment of an international research institute necessary to enable scientists to work together and to prevent the exploitation of the sciences.<sup>15</sup> Two, the Japanese scholars proclaimed that educating the people and politicians was scientists’ most imminent task. Due to the development of atomic and biological weapons, men were now exposed to the danger of extermination when a war broke out. Teaching the people and political leaders about the danger of a future war was thus declared as an “urgent responsibility upon the present-day scientists.”<sup>16</sup> Speaking specifically of Japan, the Japanese scholars’ statement stressed the importance of education to root out militarism and to instill the pacifist principle in the people.<sup>17</sup>

Unlike the UNESCO Statement, the Japanese intellectuals included their view of the growing Cold War tension. They said that they “[recognized] candidly that there [existed] what [was] called ‘two worlds’.” However, as they made explicit at the very beginning of the statement, they did not believe in the inevitability of war. They identified mutual misunderstanding and lack of communication between the “two worlds” with critical causes of war among many. They thus expressed their hope that scientists’ study should pave the way for peaceful coexistence.<sup>18</sup>

Although the Japanese intellectuals collectively issued a statement on peace in response to the UNESCO declaration in early 1949, their statement did not yet deal with Japan’s future peace or security. Throughout the year, there were not many journal articles discussing Japan’s

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 8-9; 16-17; Point 7 responding to Paragraph , H, I, J, and K.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 9; 16; Point 9 responding to Paragraph E and K.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 9; 16; Point 10 responding to Paragraph E.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 8; 17; in Point 6.

peace terms and security issue, either.<sup>19</sup> Although knowing that the conflict among the Allies would affect Japan, the Japanese were still not fully aware of the extent of the impact of the Cold War upon them. Discussions on Japan's peace and security did not become really political until the fall, when the Chinese civil war came to end with the communist victory and US State Department officials began to make treaty provisions. Nevertheless, this cooperative work by the Japanese intellectuals was clearly the beginning of their pacifist movement, and this prepared for their future activities.

### **The Beginning of the Peace and Security Debate: Demand for Overall Peace and Unarmed Neutrality**

Japan's peace and security had been placed on the agenda in the spring of 1947. General Douglas MacArthur called for an early peace, and State Department officials had prepared for peace terms as well. The Japanese government also sent its peace plan to Washington through Allied Occupation officials. Yet, this move did not bear fruit due to the divisions among American policymakers and the Allies.<sup>20</sup> It was not until late 1949 that peace and security arrangements with Japan became a politically volatile issue.

Japanese public discussion had gradually evolved since the early spring of 1949, when the conflict between the "Free World" and the Communist bloc had repercussions in Asia. It was first a response to general apprehension for the post-Occupation security of Japan that began to

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<sup>19</sup> There were fewer than ten articles about the peace and security issues during 1949; see *Sekai*, May and June 1949, *Kaizō*, January and November 1949 (I do not have copies; both were written by foreign reporters), *Bungei Shunjū*, October 1949, and *Chūō Kōron*, May, June, August, and November 1949 (I do not have copies of the August and November articles; one of them was written by a foreign reporter).

<sup>20</sup> Under the direction of Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi, the Japanese government also prepared peace negotiations to no avail. See Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 95-106; Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 156-158, 201-209, 245-246; Masumi Jun'nosuke, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Ge* (Postwar Politics 1945-55 vol. 2) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan, 1983), 343-345.

arise when US Army Secretary Kenneth Royall (1894-1971) questioned the strategic importance of Japan and implied that the United States had no responsibility for defending Japan. Royall later reversed his statement, but this caused the Japanese to start contemplating Japan's future security.<sup>21</sup> The Cold War tensions heated up in Europe when the North Atlantic Treaty was bringing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into existence. As the Chinese communist forces had controlled the North and were driving the Nationalist troops southwards, the British Commonwealth and the Philippines promoted a plan to create an anti-Communist alliance system in the Pacific equivalent to the NATO.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, the Japanese repeatedly called for "permanent neutrality" as Japan's future security plan, as if it was a slogan: there was no developed argument behind it. Simply because Japan had been demilitarized and renounced war in the new constitution, rearmament was out of the question. In addition, MacArthur's opposition to Japan's remilitarization and endorsement of a neutral Japan as the "Switzerland of the Pacific (*Taiheiyō no Suisu*)" seem to have limited political options other than unarmed neutrality and greatly influenced public opinion. The Japanese continued to reiterate that Japan should establish its status as a neutral, pacifist country, following the example of Switzerland.<sup>23</sup>

It was in November 1949 that Japan's peace and security finally became a politically

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<sup>21</sup> Royall's comments were made on February 6, 1949, and reported to Japan on February 11. He denied the report on February 25; see Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 164-165; Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 247; "Shasetsu: Nihon no Jikaku" (Editorial: Japanese Awareness), *Mainichi Shinbun*, March 1, 1949, 1; Tsunetō Kyō, "Sensō Hōki no Mondai: Jō" (The Issues of the Renunciation of War: pt. 1), *Sekai* (May 1949): 15.

<sup>22</sup> Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 168-169; Tsunetō Kyō, "Sensō Hōki no Mondai: Ge" (The Issues of the Renunciation of War: pt. 2), *Sekai* (June 1949): 29-30.

<sup>23</sup> Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 166-167; Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 247-248; "Shasetsu: Nihon no Chūritsu" (Editorial: Japan's Neutrality), *Mainichi Shinbun*, March 3, 1949, 1; "Shasetsu: Chūritsu heno Michi" (Editorial: The Path to Neutrality), *Asahi Shinbun*, March 4, 1949, 1; "Shasetsu: Eisei Chūritsu no Kahi" (Editorial: The Advisability of Permanent Neutrality), *Asahi Shinbun*, April 12, 1949, 1; "Shasetsu: Heiwa Kokka no Shisō-teki Haikai" (Editorial: The Ideological Background of A Pacifist Nation-State), *Yomiuri Shinbun*, April 19, 1949, 1; Tsunetō, "Sensō Hōki no Mondai: Jō," 14-22; Tsunetō, "Sensō Hōki no Mondai: Ge," 25-32; "Kantōgen: Eisei Chūritsu to Kokudo Hozen" (Foreword: Permanent Neutrality and National Defense), *Chūō Kōron* (June 1949): 2-3; Ryū Shintarō, "Heiwa wo Shiranu Kokumin: Sesō Zakkan" (Miscellaneous Thoughts on the Times: The People who Do Not Understand Peace," *Bungei Shunjū* (October 1949): 16-21.

controversial topic. By then, despite continuing disagreements between the State Department and the Pentagon, the US government had resumed preparations for a peace with Japan. Secretary of State Dean Acheson and British Foreign Secretary Earnest Bevin had already agreed in September that the United States should make an early peace settlement with Japan, even without the Soviet Union. Having working on drafting a peace treaty, the State Department released it in early November.<sup>24</sup> Thus, discussion of the Sixth Extraordinary Session of the Japanese Diet convened at the end of October naturally focused on the issue of Japan's future peace and security. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru officially announced his intentions to accept a "separate peace" if a comprehensive peace was impossible. While already skeptical of the workability of permanent neutrality, he uttered his objection to Japan's rearmament and his indecision over the stationing of foreign troops in Japan. The Socialist Party maintained that Japan should seek an overall peace and remain unarmed and neutral, providing no military bases for any country; the JSP thus set the "Three Principles on Peace" (*Heiwa San-Gensoku*) against the government.<sup>25</sup> A wide range of people, from politicians and businessmen to scholars, intellectuals, critics, writers, and even athletes, expressed and exchanged their opinions on newspapers in November and December 1949.<sup>26</sup>

Under these circumstances, most scholars who had participated in the discussion on the

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<sup>24</sup> Hayashi Shigeru and Tsuji Kiyooki, eds., *Nihon Naikaku Shiroku 5* (A History of the Japanese Cabinets vol. 5) (Tokyo: Daiichi Hōki Shuppan, 1981), 197; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Ge*, 350; Nihon Shakaitō 50-nen-shi Hensan Iinkai (Japan Socialist Party Fifty-Year History Editorial Committee), ed., *Nihon Shakaitō-shi* (A History of the Japan Socialist Party) (Tokyo: Shakai Minshutō Zenkoku Rengō, 1996), 168-169; Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, 373-374, 378-381; Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 168-177; Schaller, *Altered States*, 24-25.

<sup>25</sup> Hayashi and Tsuji, eds., *Nihon Naikaku Shiroku 5*, 198, 214; Nihon Shakaitō 50-nen-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Nihon Shakaitō-shi*, 170-171, 192-204; adding "opposition to rearmament," the Party made the "Four Principles on Peace" (*Heiwa Yon-Gensoku*) its official stance in January 1951.

<sup>26</sup> See *Asahi Shinbun*, November 8, 1949, 1; *Asahi Shinbun*, November 10, 1949, 1; *Mainichi Shinbun*, November 10-12, 1949, 1; *Yomiuri Shinbun*, November 10-12, 1949, 1; *Yomiuri Shinbun*, November 13, 1949, 1; *Asahi Shinbun*, November 14, 1949, 1; *Yomiuri Shinbun*, November 19, 22-23, 1949, 1; *Asahi Shinbun*, December 11, 1949, 1; *Asahi Shinbun*, December 15, 1949, 2; *Asahi Shinbun*, December 26, 1949, 1.

UNESCO Statement met again. They had already established the Peace Study Group (*Heiwa Mondai Danwakai*) in early 1949 and engaged in educational activities on peace all over the country. The Study Group picked up the issue of Japan's peace settlement in the fall and held another symposium under the chairmanship of Abe Yoshishige and the vice-chairmanship of Ōuchi Hyōe from December 1949 to January 1950.<sup>27</sup> The Study Group's official statement was published in the March 1950 edition of *Sekai* just as it had been a year before. The Group's motives to convene a conference, exchange thoughts, and present its view to the public did not change; the members were committed to taking an active role in preserving peace. In the foreword of the statement, they declared, "With full awareness of shame for having been unable to play a part for peace in deciding our own fate at the time of the outbreak of the war, we have come to feel strongly that, this time, it is up to us to do our best in shaping our own future." "[L]ed by the will to peace and the love for [their] country," these intellectuals gathered and discussed the peace and security problems.<sup>28</sup>

The Peace Study Group's statement was short, consisting of only three paragraphs and lacking detailed explanations. However, it contained the basis of a pro-overall peace and neutrality argument. The members' interest in the maintenance of peace led to their conclusion that Japan should make an overall peace and remain neutral. First, they expressed their hope for a comprehensive peace because it would enable Japan to trade freely with Asian countries,

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<sup>27</sup> The participants were not exactly the same as those in the previous meetings on the UNESCO Statement, but they still included Rōyama Masamichi, Takagi Yasaka, Tsunetō Kyō, Watsuji Tetsurō, Hani Gorō, Arisawa Hiromi, Wakimura Yoshitarō, Tsuru Shigeto, Miyagi Otoyā, Maruyama Masao, Kawashima Takeyoshi, Tsurumi Kazuko, and Takeda Kiyoko. Yokota Kisaburō and Iriye Keishirō (1903-1978) attended as experts on international law and international affairs; see "Kōwa Mondai ni tsuite no Heiwa Mondai Danwakai Seimei" (A Statement by the Peace Study Group on the Problem of the Peace Settlement for Japan), *Sekai* (March 1950): 60-61; the English translation was published in a supplement to the April 1950 issue, 18-26.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 62; 18.

especially China, and this, they believed, would ensure Japan's "economic self-support" (*keizai-teki jiritsu*) and "political independence" (*seiji-teki dokuritsu*). They could not accept a separate peace because it would make the national economy "[dependent on] and [subjugated] to a specific country," clearly referring to the United States. They also argued that the failure to sustain national livelihood might lead Japan to overseas aggression once again. In order not to disrupt peace, the Study Group stated, "We value Japan's economic and political independence more highly than the would-be advantages which a separate peace might appear to promise."<sup>29</sup> A sense of nationalism went along with a reflection of Japan's past militarism.

The second point made by the Study Group was that the tensions between the "two worlds" would run high if Japan joined in either camp by concluding a partial peace. It violated the "spirit of peace in [the] Constitution," and the members suggested, to be true to the principle of the new constitution and "atone for [its] guilt in the last war," Japan should make efforts to reconcile the two worlds from a neutral position.<sup>30</sup>

Finally, the Study Group made its stance on Japan's defense clear. The statement expressed strong opposition to a military pact with the United States and instead proposed "inviolable neutrality" (*chūritsu fukashin*) along with admission to the United Nations. The members could not accept a military agreement with the United States because it was against the Constitution of Japan and it was an arrangement to aid war overseas. Since only reaching a peace with all the Allied countries could secure Japan's neutrality and make its participation in the United Nations possible, an overall peace was desirable. It was a critical precondition for Japan's

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 63; 20; the Study Group members also argued that an overall peace would promote Japan's democracy, believing "[the further progress in the democratization of Japan required] as its necessary condition the establishment of the free communication and sincere cooperation with all the countries in the world." See p.62 and p.19.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.; 20-21.

gaining a neutral status.<sup>31</sup>

The Peace Study Group was not so naïve as not to recognize that the Cold War made an overall peace difficult. Yet, its members believed that it was natural to wish and even to demand that Japan should restore peaceful relations with all the Allied countries to which it had surrendered by accepting the Potsdam Declaration. The Study Group also hoped that the Allies could settle disputes among themselves. Observing that “there still [lay] underneath these conflicts the strong sense of international justice, such as was exemplified in the International Military Tribunal,” the Study Group members believed in the possibility that Japan could make a comprehensive peace.<sup>32</sup>

Simple as it seemed, the statement contained the core arguments for an overall peace and unarmed neutrality. These were repeated by many individual writers and developed further as the rift between the “Free World” and the Communist bloc came to look unmendable and as the Japanese government and the US government prepared for a partial peace and security alliance between the two countries. As the Study Group made explicit, many Japanese intellectuals abided by the principle of pacifism stipulated in the new Japanese constitution. They interpreted it to mean not only that an already demilitarized Japan was prohibited from having military forces once again, but also that Japan was forbidden from “inducing” conflict. A separate peace only with the Free World led by the United States would not officially end the war with the Soviet Union and China, and it might give them a justification to launch an attack against Japan. An unconstitutional military pact might provoke the Communist neighbors into attacking Japan and cause an armed conflict in East Asia as a whole. The conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 63-64; 21-22.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 62; 19.

Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in February 1950 made this scenario more probable and strengthened the Japanese intellectuals' argument that Japan should remain unarmed and neutral in the Cold War.

As to Japan's post-Occupation security, which the Study Group did not fully explain, many argued that Japan should rely on the United Nations, rather than be protected by the United States. If it became a member of the organization, Japan could receive collective security. They optimistically expected the United Nations to respect Japan's unarmed neutrality, taking into consideration its constitutional constraints, and accordingly to exclude Japan from the duty of joint operations.<sup>33</sup> Peace with all the Allies was the precondition for Japan's participation in the United Nations and collective security, ultimately securing Japan's unarmed neutrality and enabling the Japanese to live up to pacifist idealism.<sup>34</sup>

Many intellectuals opposed a separate peace and a security pact, worrying about the economic, political, and social impact on Japan. They anticipated that such treaties would disrupt domestic stability which was considered essential to the maintenance of peace. As the Peace Study Group's statement showed, many shared the Marxist view that Japan's economic conditions

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<sup>33</sup> See Charter of the United Nations Chapter Seven: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.

<sup>34</sup> See Tsunetō, "Sensō Hōki no Mondai: Jō," 19-22; Tsunetō, "Sensō Hōki no Mondai: Ge," 25-26, 30-32; Tsunetō Kyō, "Sensō Hōki no Jōkō to Anzen Hoshō no Mondai" (The Article of the Renunciation of War and the Problem of Security), *Kaizō* (April 1950): 12-14; Tsunetō Kyō, "Tai-Nichi Kōwa no Hōshiki to Anzen Hoshō no Keitai" (A Formula for a Peace with Japan and a Form of Security), *Sekai* (April 1950): 4-8; Amano Teiyū, "Eikyū Heiwa heno Netsugan: Shi-shite Ikiru Kakugo" (A Fervent Wish for Permanent Peace: A Resolution to Live for Absolute Pacifism without Arms), *ibid.*, 16-17; Abe Yoshishige, "Heiwa heno Nengan" (The Dearest Wish for Peace), *ibid.*, 9-11; Shimizu Ikutarō, "Kōwa Kaigi ni Yosū" (To the Peace Conference), *Sekai* (October 1951): 51; Nakano Yoshio, "Heiwa wo Hoshō-senu Anzen Hoshō" (A Security that Does Not Secure Peace), *ibid.*, 96; Hirano Yoshitarō, "Kōwa ni taisuru Iken, Hihan, Kibō: Hachijū-shi no Kotae" (Opinions, Criticisms, and Requests to a Peace: Responses from Eighty People), *ibid.*, 188-189; Takeuchi Yoshimi, *ibid.*, 209; Kawashima Takeyoshi, *ibid.*, 224; Yamakawa Hitoshi, "Wansu Moa Hiroshima he?" (Toward Hiroshima Once More?), *Kaizō* (March 1951): 18; Yamakawa Hitoshi, "Hibusō Kenpō no Yougo: Nihon ha Futatabi Gunbi wo Motsubekika" (A Defense of the Constitution of Demilitarization: Whether Japan Should Have an Army Again), *Sekai* (October 1951): 32-37; only Hirano and Yamakawa were not Peace Study Group members.

would determine whether or not the country could remain peaceful. They thought that a peace without the People's Republic of China – Japan's important trade partner – would be detrimental to Japan's economy and therefore to the peace of Asia.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the solution to divide Japan from China was totally unacceptable.

Additionally, Marxian economists warned against the potential negative consequences of Japan's military alliance with the United States and rearmament. Rōnō-ha Marxist Yamakawa Hitoshi, for example, expressed the fear that remilitarization would ruin democracy in Japan. He argued that in Japan, where democratization was still underway, rearmament would result in a return of militarism and monopoly capital. "Remilitarization would become a funeral bell to Japan's democracy," he pessimistically predicted. Yamakawa was also concerned about the rise of Communism in Japan. Rearmament would cause economic hardships for the working masses and attract them to Communism. He thought it likely that the Soviet Union would indirectly invade Japan, taking advantage of internal division. To defend the country from Communism, Yamakawa stressed, rearmament should be postponed. He added that a "minimum" level of military capacity was useless against superpowers anyway. Putting an economic strain on the Japanese nation, it would just make the country more vulnerable to Communism; thus, rearmament would jeopardize Japan's national security rather than strengthen it.<sup>36</sup> University of Tokyo economics professor Arisawa Hiromi was similarly worried about the cost of rearmament on the Japanese economy. He simultaneously expected that a political debate pertaining to the constitution and Japan's

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<sup>35</sup> Also see Abe, "Heiwa heno Nengan," 11; Shimizu, "Kōwa Kaigi ni Yosū," 51-52; Ōuchi Hyōe et al., "Tōronkai: Tandoku Kōwa to Nihon Keizai" (A Forum: A Partial Peace and Japanese Economy), *Sekai* (October 1951): 115-116; Arisawa Hiromi, "Nihon Shihonshugi to Saigunbi" (Japanese Capitalism and Remilitarization), *Sekai* (March 1951): 27-35.

<sup>36</sup> Yamakawa, "Wansu Moa Hiroshima he?," 17-18; "Hibusō Kenpō no Yougo," 25-27, 29-32, 41-46; the quote is from p.43.

rearmament would contribute to splitting the nation and as a result weakening national defense against invaders – very likely a “Communist army that [might] come to raid Japan on the pretext of liberating the labors and farmers.”<sup>37</sup> A separate peace and a military alliance with the United States were thus grave concerns to many Marxian thinkers.<sup>38</sup>

Finally, the place of nationalism also figured in arguments favoring comprehensive peace and unarmed neutrality. As the Peace Study Group revealed, a loss of political and economic independence was a disquieting issue to Japanese intellectuals. In the view of many Marxists, and Communist Party members, the conclusion of peace and security agreements dictated by America’s Cold War strategy meant “subordinating” Japan to the United States. If American troops were allowed to station in Japan even after the Occupation, Japan would virtually remain under US control; Japan’s autonomy would be nothing but a nominal status.<sup>39</sup> To some, it was unbearable to imagine that according to a security treaty, Japan would rearm itself with American capital and end up providing soldiers as “human bullets” (*nikudan*) for the American troops rather than for national defense.<sup>40</sup>

Also, many expressed displeasure at the fundamental problem: the US policy shift from

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<sup>37</sup> Ōuchi et al., “Tōronkai: Tandoku Kōwa to Nihon Keizai,” 109-111; Arisawa, “Nihon Shihonshugi to Saigunbi,” 35-36; Abe Yoshishige, Arisawa Hiromi, and Yokota Kisaburō, “Tōgi: Heiwa no Tame no Bōbi” (A Debate: Armament for Peace), *Kaizō* (March 1951): 131-134, 137-139. The quote is from p.36; on p.31, Arisawa also said, “The Communist threat is becoming imminent as if it aims at the heart of Japanese capitalism like the sword of Damocles overhead.”

<sup>38</sup> Also see Ōuchi et al., “Tōronkai: Tandoku Kōwa to Nihon Keizai,” 99-100, 107-111; Ōuchi Hyōe, “Katamen-teki Kōwa no Zenmen-teki Kiketsu: Shōwa Nijūnana-nen-do Yosan no Tokushitsu” (Overall Results of the Partial Peace: Characteristics of the Budget for the Twenty-Seventh Fiscal Year of Showa), *Sekai* (February 1952): 116-121; Ōtsuka Hisao, “Saibusō ni kansuru Iken, Hihan, Kibō” (Opinions, Criticisms, and Requests on Rearmament), *Sekai* (May 1952): 162; Ōkōchi Kazuo, “Kōwa ni taisuru Iken, Hihan, Kibō,” *Sekai* (October 1951): 213-214; Ōtsuka and Ōkōchi did not participate in the Peace Study Group.

<sup>39</sup> Tsuru Shigeto, “Tai-Nichi Kōwa to Sekai Heiwa” (The Peace with Japan and World Peace), *Sekai* (October 1951): 7; Tsurumi Kazuko, “Kōwa ni taisuru Iken, Hihan, Kibō,” *ibid.*, 226; Nakano, “Heiwa wo Hoshō-senu Anzen Hoshō,” *ibid.*, 95-96.

<sup>40</sup> Yamakawa, “Wansu Moa Hiroshima he?,” 17; also see Yamakawa, “Hibusō Kenpō no Yougo,” 28; Abe Yoshishige, “Sekai to Ajia to Nihon tonon Heiwa no Tachiba kara” (From a Position Seeking Peace of the World, Asia, and Japan), *Sekai* (October 1951): 66; Takashima Zen’ya, “Kōwa ni taisuru Iken, Hihan, Kibō,” *ibid.*, 181.

demilitarizing to remilitarizing Japan. The chair of the Peace Study Group criticized America's frivolity. Abe Yoshishige stressed that according to the Potsdam Declaration, Japan had been reborn with a pacifist constitution. Therefore, the United States should abide by the spirit of Potsdam and should not change the policy for Japan to further its own selfish national interests. Abe argued that the United States "had moral responsibility" for Japan's unarmed pacifism, and angrily commented that "scrapping it in only five years [was] ... to play on (*moteasobu*) Japan."<sup>41</sup> This clearly showed his mixed feelings, frustration at the failed idealism of international peace and justice on one hand and nationalistic sentiment on the other.

The peace and security debate thus began at the end of 1949. From that time forward, many intellectuals, most of whom were Peace Study Group members, led a movement for an overall peace and unarmed neutrality; they continued to do so even after the San Francisco Peace Conference. In a way, these Japanese intellectuals' arguments were framed by the wartime American idea of postwar world peace. They considered continuing Allied cooperation as a crucial condition for maintaining peace not only in the world but also in Japan and tried to remain true to the objectives of demilitarization and democratization of Japan. They also expected, as the Potsdam Declaration proclaimed, their country to be allowed to participate freely in international trade and regain full autonomy once the Occupation was terminated. They thus made reasonable demands based on Wilsonian idealism adopted by the Roosevelt administration during the war.

However, along with political developments, critics of overall peace and unarmed neutrality gradually increased. They realized that international relations had dramatically changed since 1945; the coalition of the Allies whereby Japan had been brought to unconditional surrender

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<sup>41</sup> Abe, "Heiwa heno Nengan," 13; Abe, "Sekai to Ajia to Nihon no Heiwa no Tachiba kara," 66-67; the quote is from p.67.

had collapsed, and they, divided into the democratic capitalist camp and the Communist camp, had engaged in the Cold War. When the Korean War began, it greatly influenced the political and intellectual trend in Japan in favor of separate peace and security alliance with the United States.

### **The Impact of the Korean War: Growing Dissent and Division**

Peace and security negotiations between the United States and Japan made great strides during 1950. The outbreak of the Korean War in particular catalyzed compromise among American policymakers and General Douglas MacArthur regarding Japanese remilitarization. It also clearly changed the public mood and key intellectuals' opinions in Japan.

The discussions concerning Japan's peace and security among the Allies and American policymakers had been accelerated by late 1949, but negotiations between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff stalled for months. State Department officials pressed for an early peace, allowing the Japanese to regain sovereignty over their territory, except the former mandated islands in the Pacific and the Ryukyus. A bilateral security pact could be made without full Japanese rearmament as a precondition, only to enable small American forces to remain in Japan. Eager to keep Japan under the American military aegis, the Pentagon opposed the State Department's treaty provisions. In part to break the deadlock, and in part to deflect McCarthyist attacks against the State Department, Secretary of State Dean Acheson appointed Republican foreign policy consultant John Foster Dulles as his adviser on Japan in early April 1950.

Knowing the disagreements among American policymakers, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru took action. In late April, he sent emissaries to Washington, bypassing General Douglas MacArthur. By then, Yoshida had become certain that an overall peace was impossible under the current international circumstances, and in order to quicken the end of the Occupation, he was

willing to conclude a separate peace with the United States. Well aware that the US government sought to keep stationing American forces in Japan, he proposed through his messengers that the Japanese government could offer base rights. However, he staunchly opposed Japanese rearmament. When Dulles visited Tokyo in late June 1950 and asked Yoshida to prepare for rebuilding an army, the prime minister objected to his request. Yoshida explained that Japan could not afford remilitarization and the nation was ideologically, psychologically, as well as physically not ready to accept it. He bluntly brushed aside “thinking about rearmament itself” as the “height of folly” (*gu no kocchō*) and the “dream of a fool (*chijin no yume*) who [did] not know world situations.”<sup>42</sup>

While Dulles was still in Japan, the Korean War broke out. This event sped up compromise between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and promoted Japanese rearmament. Washington proceeded to conclude a separate peace and a bilateral security treaty with Japan by September 1950. The State Department simultaneously opened discussions on a peace treaty with Far Eastern Commission member countries. About two weeks after the Korean War started, to replace American forces that would be deployed from Japan to Korea, McArthur ordered Prime Minister Yoshida to organize a seventy-five thousand strong national police reserve and increase the Japan Coast Guard’s staff by eight thousand. According to the general’s directive, the Japanese National Police Reserve was set up in August. In the following month, the US National Security Council (NSC) approved NSC-60/1, which endorsed Japan’s remilitarization.

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<sup>42</sup> Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 170-177, 246-272; Schaller, *Altered States*, 24-30; Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 248-257; Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, 373-377; Hayashi and Tsuji, eds., *Nihon Naikaku Shiroku* 5, 198-199, 201-205; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Ge*, 350-358; Yoshida Shigeru, *Kaisō Jūnen* 2 (Reminiscence of Ten Years vol. 2) (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1957; repr., Chūō Kōronsha, 1998), 182-183.

In January 1951, the second round of Dulles-Yoshida talks began. During his meetings with Yoshida that continued from late January to early February 1951, Dulles persistently pressed rearmament on the hesitant prime minister. Yoshida did not support Japan's unarmed neutrality, especially when the "Free World" and the Communist bloc engaged in an armed conflict in Korea. But he believed that America's military presence would suffice to protect a demilitarized Japan from a potential communist attack. Nevertheless, Yoshida very reluctantly agreed on slow military buildup, thus reaching basic agreements on peace and security settlements with Dulles.<sup>43</sup>

Along with these political developments, Japanese newspapers that had unanimously advocated neutralism until late 1949 became more receptive to the option of a partial peace. The *Asahi Shinbun*'s editorials still represented the pro-neutrality voice, but the *Mainichi Shinbun* and the *Yomiuri Shinbun* were shifting to accept a separate peace with the United States.<sup>44</sup> In an editorial comment entitled "The Dream of Permanent Neutrality" on March 26, 1950, Baba Tsunego, president of the *Yomiuri Shinbun*, stressed that he was tired of war so he did not object to neutralism. Yet, he questioned how the Japanese could defend their country without a military if the Soviet Union tried to invade it. Baba thought that the PRC had been made a "Soviet satellite" (*Soren no eiseikoku*) with the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet treaty. Without American Occupation forces, he imagined, Japan could have been absorbed into the Soviet orbit as well. Mentioning that Belgium, in spite of its neutral status, had been invaded by Germany during World War I, and another neutral country, Switzerland, armed itself for self-defense, Baba argued that neutrality

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<sup>43</sup> Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 290-293; Schaller, *Altered States*, 31-36; Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 270-285; Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, 383-396; Hayashi and Tsuji, eds., *Nihon Naikaku Shiroku 5*, 205-206, 208-210; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Ge*, 359-368, 373-375; Yoshida, *Kaisō Jūnen 2*, 203-205; Yoshida, *Kaisō Jūnen 3* (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1957; repr., Chūō Kōronsha, 1998), 136-148; Yoshida, *Kaisō Jūnen 4* (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1958; repr., Chūō Kōronsha, 1998), 23-25.

<sup>44</sup> The chief editorial writer of the *Asahi Shinbun* was Ryū Shintarō (1900-1967), a member of the Peace Study Group.

would not be protected without arms.<sup>45</sup> In the *Mainichi Shinbun* editorial on May 2, 1950, another writer criticized the advocates of a comprehensive peace for being too idealist. Like many others, he hoped that the United States and the Soviet Union could resolve the Cold War and reach an agreement on peace with Japan. However, since it was unlikely to happen, he wrote, the Japanese had to think what would be a “realistically possible form of peace” under given circumstances rather than simply look for an overall peace.<sup>46</sup>

If the Sino-Soviet alliance made in February 1950 stirred skepticisms against an overall peace and unarmed neutrality, the outbreak of the Korean War in late June emboldened critics of these options. When an armed conflict began in Korea, Japan’s former colony that had long been considered of geostrategic importance against Russia, many Japanese, including intellectuals, began to feel uneasy about leaving their country defenseless. As the risk of a Communist invasion seemed more probable, the pacifist argument for unarmed neutrality was viewed as too theoretical. Social democrat and Tokyo Metropolitan University Professor Seki Yoshihiko (1912-2006) stated that “Japan’s security [had] become a realistic matter after the Korean War” and scoffed at the ideas of comprehensive peace and unarmed neutrality. To him, Communism was ideologically combative and incapable of coexistence. The North Koreans’ invasion of the South was nothing but evidence of the communists’ aggressive nature. Like the *Yomiuri Shinbun* and *Mainichi Shinbun* editorials, he expected a Soviet invasion of Japan, doubted the feasibility of neutrality, and suggested taking a “realistic” approach to the peace and security issues.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Baba Tsunego, “Nichiyō Hyōron: Eisei Chūritsu no Yume” (Sunday Editorial Comment: The Dream of Permanent Neutrality), *Yomiuri Shinbun*, March 26, 1950, 1.

<sup>46</sup> “Shasetsu: Zenmen Kōwa no Jōken” (Editorial: Conditions for an Overall Peace), *Mainichi Shinbun*, May 2, 1950, 1.

<sup>47</sup> Seki Yoshihiko, “Shakai Minshushugi to Kokusai Minshushugi” (Social Democracy and International Democracy), *Chūō Kōron* (October 1950): 11, 15-16, 19; Seki actually attacked the Socialist Party that supported an overall peace, permanent neutrality, and the renunciation of war; also see Ashida Hitoshi, “Eisei Chūritsu Fukanō-ron” (The

Facing emerging criticisms, the Peace Study Group, at the forefront of the pro-overall peace and neutrality argument, was forced to clarify its stance.<sup>48</sup> The statement published in March 1950 had already drawn questions and opposition as well as support. Now that Japan's security became a pressing issue after the Korean War began, Study Group members felt the need to convene a meeting to clarify their thoughts on war, peace, and security.<sup>49</sup> They once again gathered in September 1950 and published a statement on peace in the December edition of *Sekai*, this time elaborating more on the world situations and the logic behind their pacifist position.

The Study Group's fundamental stance toward peace was unchanged, however. Having developed arguments on peace since their discussion of the UNESCO Statement, the members amalgamated their views into their new statement. In the first place, it emphasized that peace could not be achieved by war and that the wrong belief in war as a method to realize peace should be discarded. Based upon this reasoning and the principle of the pacifist constitution, the Study Group objected to justification for rearmament and declared its continuous support for Japan's unarmed neutrality, leaving national security to the United Nations policing forces.<sup>50</sup>

Reflecting Marxian scholars' views, the statement also commented on the relationship

Argument on the Impossibility of Permanent Neutrality), urgent special issue, *Bungei Shunjū* (July 1950): 2-7; Abe Shin'nosuke, "Shimittareta Genjitsu: Roku-Gatsu Nijūgo-Nichi Igo no Nihonjin" (Mean Realities: the Japanese after June 25), *ibid.*, 40-43; "Kantōgen: Ensen Shisō ni tsuite" (Foreword: on War-Weariness), *Chūō Kōron* (April 1951): 1-3. As the title indicates, Ashida did not think neutralism would be possible; like Seki, Abe also criticized the Socialist Party's "unrealistic" pacifist policy; *Chūō Kōron*'s foreword, too, complained that the pacifist arguments were theoretical and emotional, derived from a fear of war.

<sup>48</sup> Shimizu Ikutarō was instrumental in issuing the third statement on peace. This one was drafted by Maruyama Masao, Tsuru Shigeto, and Ukai Nobushige (1906-1987; University of Tokyo professor of law); Koschmann, "Intellectuals and Politics," 402.

<sup>49</sup> "Mitabi Heiwa ni tsuite" (The Third Time on Peace), *Sekai* (December 1950): 22; the participants included Abe Yoshishige, Rōyama Masamichi, Takagi Yasaka, Watsuji Tetsurō, Hani Gorō, Ōuchi Hyōe, Arisawa Hiromi, Wakimura Yoshitarō, Tsuru Shigeto, Miyagi Otoyā, Maruyama Masao, Shimizu Ikutarō, Tsurumi Kazuko, and Takeda Kiyoko, see p.24.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 25-28, 41-49; Chapters 1 and 3. They were written by Maruyama Masao and Ukai Nobushige respectively; see Midorikawa Tōru et al., "Mihappyō Tōron: 'Heiwa Mondai Daiwakai' ni tsuite: 1968-nen 6-gatsu 16-nichi" (An Unpublished Debate on the Peace Study Group: June 16, 1968), special issue, *Sekai* (July 1985): 28.

between domestic stability and world peace. It said that the Japanese had to deal with the “threat from within” (*uchi kara no kyōi*) posed by reactionary elements rather than from outside. Without fixing socio-economic problems, the Japanese would seek a solution by starting aggression overseas, becoming a threat to the world again. Implementing a New Deal-style reform program was suggested to prevent the rise of Japanese militarism. Besides, the Study Group believed that economic interdependency could cause war. Especially because the Japanese economy depended largely upon international trade, the Japanese should seek to shield their domestic economy from volatile international situations. Thus, Japan should establish a self-sufficient economy, if necessary by adopting economic planning to supplement liberal economics. The statement claimed that this solution would best secure Japan’s peaceful living by minimizing the possibility of its engagement in war.<sup>51</sup>

One more additional point made by the Peace Study Group concerned the fixed view of “two worlds.” The statement criticized the tendency to dichotomize the world into two blocs of conflicting ideologies and to see a showdown between the two systems as inevitable. It was simplistic, inaccurate, and dangerous; it ignored the similarities between the two sides, their efforts to avoid war, the differences among various countries in each camp – i.e. between the Soviets and the Chinese, the presence of other conflicts in the world, and the possibility of change in international relations. Since world situations were never static, the statement stressed, hopefully, a rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union would be possible, and should be realized to maintain world peace. For these reasons, the Study Group declared that in principle, it stood by Japan’s neutrality.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 49-52; Chapter 4. Tsuru Shigeto wrote this chapter; see Midorikawa et al., “Mihappyō Tōron,” 28.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 29-41; Chapter 2. This was Maruyama’s essay; see Midorikawa et al., “Mihappyō Tōron,” 28.

This clarification of the Study Group's stance on peace did not end the debate with the pro-partial peace and security pact group. It continued even after the San Francisco Peace Conference, but one of the most vocal critics of an overall peace and unarmed neutrality was economist and former Keiō University president Koizumi Shinzō (1888-1966). He wrote a series of essays between October 1951 and May 1952, defending the separate peace and the security treaty with the United States.<sup>53</sup> In doing so, Koizumi stressed that he sought peace. He expressed his dissatisfaction with the stereotyping of supporters, like himself, of the partial peace and the military agreement with the United States as automatically warlike. He asserted that differences in opinions were over the means and not the end and therefore he was also a peace-seeker.<sup>54</sup>

Koizumi's main argument against the proposals of a comprehensive peace and neutralism was that they were too theoretical. He argued that under the current international circumstances, an overall peace was simply impossible. It was apparent that unless the United States and the Soviet Union reached a peace plan for Japan, a peace settlement with all parties would not materialize, but their negotiations were likely to fail.<sup>55</sup> Unarmed neutrality was not realistic, either. Koizumi believed that neutrality required military preparations to uphold it and that nonaggression pacts alone could not guarantee Japan's security. Even if both the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on Japan's neutral status, they might subsequently breach it. Koizumi reminded the readers that the Japanese had already learned about the

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<sup>53</sup> Koizumi never attended the Peace Study Group meetings; he was invited to the first one on the UNESCO Statement in 1948 but could not attend it due to sudden illness; he did not receive even an invitation afterwards. See "Heiwa Mondai Tokushū ni tsuite," 5; Koizumi Shinzō, "Watashi no Heiwa-ron ni tsuite" (About My Thought on Peace), *Sekai* (May 1952): 251-252. According to the first editor of *Sekai* Yoshino Genzaburō, however, simply because Koizumi was not a signatory to the establishment of the Peace Study Group, he was not invited to the meetings; see Midorikawa et al., "Mihappyō Tōron," 23.

<sup>54</sup> Koizumi Shinzō, "Heiwa-ron: Setsu ni Heiwa wo Negau Mono to shite" (On Peace: As an Individual Earnestly Hoping for Peace), *Bungei Shunjū* (January 1952): 65.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 68; Koizumi Shinzō, "Kōwa no Seiritsu wo Negau" (Hoping the Passage of the Peace), *Sekai* (October 1951): 199.

unreliability of such international treaties from the Russians' violation of the neutrality pact in August 1945. In effect, the PRC and the USSR had made an alliance, setting Japan up as a hypothetical enemy, and they were involved in the Korean War. Seeing Japan's security already under threat, Koizumi declared the option of neutrality unthinkable.<sup>56</sup>

Moreover, while the advocates of unarmed neutrality proposed that Japan's security would be left to the United Nations, Koizumi pointed out that in actuality, the organization was divided by the Cold War, and the UN forces, mostly composed of American troops, were now fighting the communists in Korea. Therefore, being defended by the American-led UN forces contradicted the policy of neutrality. The Peace Study Group expressed hopes that the United Nations would cease to be the "battlefield of power politics between the two worlds" and truly become an "arena to realize One World by peaceful means." While Koizumi, too, shared this hope, he questioned whether it meant that Japan had to remain totally defenseless until such an idealistic form of the United Nations came into being.<sup>57</sup>

Koizumi also developed an anti-Soviet, realist argument. He strongly mistrusted the Russians, who, he observed, had established a totalitarian regime and, with little respect for humanity, oppressed an uncountable number of people in the name of revolution. Sharing none of the West's humanistic spirit, they justified brutality with Communist ideology and were culturally "inferior to the British and the Americans." Koizumi went on to reason that this was why the Soviets often neglected treaties and massacred prisoners of war or retained them as forced labor, just as they had done with Japanese prisoners of war in Siberia. Koizumi also found the Russians

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 65-67, 71; Koizumi Shinzō, "Heiwa-ron Meian" (The Results of the Peace Debate), *Bungei Shūnju* (May 1952): 38.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 71; "Watashi no Heiwa-ron ni tsuite," 246-247.

essentially aggressive. He argued that historically, they had borne intense hatred against foreign countries and adopted an expansionist policy under the Czars. Russian nationalism was simply disguised with Marxist rhetoric, now vilifying capitalist countries as class enemies and encouraging overseas invasion.<sup>58</sup> Koizumi thus concluded that the Soviet Union was likely to launch an attack wherever there was a power vacuum, and the Korean War provided the clear evidence of this. He even argued that if the United States, South Korea, or the United Nations had displayed military preparedness and resolution to fight, the North would never have attacked the South. Therefore, he insisted that Japan should not remain neutral without arms, leaving a vacuum in Northeast Asia. If the country was incapable of defending itself, the US military presence was necessary for national defense.<sup>59</sup>

Koizumi criticized the Peace Study Group for being irresponsible; it simply uttered idealistic sentiments. It overlooked the realities affecting Japan, including Soviet and Chinese hostility against it, and failed to offer a “concrete plan” for peace which could lead to compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>60</sup> Koizumi believed that the separate peace and the security alliance with the United States offered the best workable deal to Japan and welcomed them. Even without the Soviet Union and China, the peace treaty was endorsed by a large number of countries, so it should be more beneficial to sign it and maintain friendship with the signatories than to refuse it and alienate them. Importantly, the peace could end the Occupation, even if Japan could not recover full autonomy. The US-Japan military pact would help prevent a total war rather than invite it. To Koizumi, the merits of the settlements with the United States prevailed

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<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 73-74; *ibid.*, 247-251.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 72-73, 75; *ibid.*, 242-243, 250-251; “Kōwa no Seiritsu wo Negau,” 199-200; “Heiwa-ron Meian,” 35-38.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 67-68, 76; *ibid.*, 245-247, 251; “Heiwa-ron Meian,” 38-39.

over the demerits.<sup>61</sup>

Many prewar liberals agreed with Koizumi. They understood the limits of the peace settlement on one hand and, on the other, found more advantages in the partial peace and the security treaty with the United States. They took it for granted that it was impossible for a defeated country to be offered an impeccable peace by victors and that it would not be easy for Japan to regain full independence. Since America's peace plan was acceptable, the Japanese should rather sign it to end the Occupation immediately and fix remaining problems later on.<sup>62</sup>

Some gave even more enthusiastic support for the peace and security treaties with the United States. Tsuda Sōkichi shared Koizumi's distrust of the Soviet Union and endorsed Japan's joining in the "Free World." The Soviet Union, he described, was the "root of power and action threatening world peace," which "embodied the essence of the Soviet state." The country tried to "destroy world civilization, or at least reverse the direction of its progress." The Japanese had witnessed the Russians' "uncivilized and particularly inhumane" (*hi-bunka-teki, toku ni hi-jindō-teki*) nature from the end of the war. Tsuda proposed that as a progressive member of the world, Japan should join in the Free World's fight against the Soviet Union, and strongly supported the San Francisco Peace.<sup>63</sup>

Some focused on other benefits of signing the separate peace and the military pact with the United States. Former Hōsei University professor of economics and member of the Showa

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 69; *ibid.*, 252; *ibid.*, 39; "Kōwa no Seiritsu wo Negau," 199.

<sup>62</sup> See Tanaka Michitarō, "Kōwa ni taisuru Iken, Hihan, Kibō," *Sekai* (October 1951): 184-185; Suzuki Taisetsu, *ibid.*, 179; Yanaihara Tadao, *ibid.*, 191-192; Hasegawa Nyozeikan, *ibid.*, 200; Arahata Kanson, "Nakano Kyōju ni Kotau" (Responding to Professor Nakano), *Sekai* (February 1952): 169, 104; Tanaka and Yanaihara were Peace Study Group members; Suzuki participated in the discussion meeting on the UNESCO Statement in 1948 at least; see "Heiwa Mondai Tokushū ni tsuite," 5.

<sup>63</sup> Tsuda Sōkichi, "Kōwa ni kansuru Shokan" (My Opinions of the Peace), *Sekai* (October 1951): 201. Tsuda participated in the discussion meeting on the UNESCO Statement in 1948 at least; see "Heiwa Mondai Tokushū ni tsuite," 5.

Research Association Taira Teizō, for instance, thought that Japan should not risk trade by persistently demanding unarmed neutrality, upsetting its foreign relations. He asserted that “[s]ince [there] were not many, among those very closely connected with Japan, that sincerely desired its maintenance of true neutrality, Japan’s insistence on it would make its economic subsistence impossible and thus increase the risk of being invaded in the name of liberation.”<sup>64</sup>

Even within the Peace Study Group were those who held similar opinions. Never a monolithic body, the Study Group’s official statements were not unanimously agreed on by the participants, even if shared by the majority, and they did not reflect the voices supporting a partial peace and a US-Japan security alliance.<sup>65</sup> Differences in reasoning in favor of a comprehensive peace and unarmed neutrality gradually widened by late 1951.

For instance, Peace Study Group member Rōyama Masamichi took a realistic attitude about the organization’s activities. While agreeing that, ideally, Japan should seek an overall peace and unarmed neutrality, he pointed out that from the beginning, the Study Group’s arguments were abstract, lacking pragmatic plans.<sup>66</sup> Already well aware that the peace settlement for Japan depended on international developments, he became more sensitive to the link between the two after the Korean War. Rōyama thought that backed by the Soviet Union, Communist China was emerging as a new expansionist power in East Asia, invading Korea now and targeting Japan next. So the security issue was “not a matter of hopes and demands” any more, but “Japan’s resolution was at stake.” Simultaneously, he began to criticize pacifists who were “mere

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<sup>64</sup> Taira Teizō, “Saibusō ni kansuru Iken, Hihan, Kibō,” 167.

<sup>65</sup> “Heiwa Mondai Tokushū ni tsuite,” 23; “Kōwa Mondai ni tsuiteno Heiwa Mondai Danwakai Seimei,” 61, 64.

<sup>66</sup> Tsuchiya Kiyoshi et al., “Minzoku, Dokuritsu, Heiwa ni tsuite” (On Nation, Independence, and Peace), *Chūō Kōron* (June 1950): 5-7, 11.

bystanders assuming an uncritical attitude toward changes in international relations.”<sup>67</sup> He accepted the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the security pact between Japan and the United States in the end, and even Japan’s rearmament with certain conditions as well. Nevertheless, he highly valued the intellectuals’ cooperative efforts to elucidate their thought on peace and to educate the public and believed in their right to express “hopes.” He explained that was the ultimate reason why he had joined the Study Group.<sup>68</sup>

The chairman of the Peace Study Group, Abe Yoshishige, surely one of the spokesmen for a comprehensive peace and unarmed neutrality, was not so different from Rōyama. Abe took his entreaty as a natural demand and as the exercise of right and fulfillment of duty. Yet, he had no illusion about the difficulty of their peace plan without the Allies’ reconciliation. He even recognized that it was America that exerted most influence over Japan’s future course during and after the Occupation.<sup>69</sup> Besides, Abe often revealed his anti-Soviet, pro-American stance, and it became tied to realist arguments on security after the Korean War broke out. This indicated that, caught in a dilemma between idealism and realism, he came to hesitantly compromise his claims.

Abe had not been uncritical of the US Occupation policy, but he favored America over Russia. He publicly stated that he was “glad that the United States [had] occupied Japan and not the Soviet Union,” regarding the latter as an anti-liberal, oppressive country. Abe declared that he “never believed that true freedom could finally be gained under a Soviet-like socialist system”

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 5-7; Rōyama Masamichi, “Wareware no Seishin Jōtai to Kokusai-teki Kiki: Genzai no Nihon no Seiji-teki Unmei” (Our Psychological State and International Crises: The Political Fate of the Present Japan), *Kaizō* (February 1951): 18-20; the quotes are from p.20 and p.15.

<sup>68</sup> Rōyama Masamichi, “Heiwa San-Gensoku to Kōwa Jōyaku” (The Three Principles of Peace and the Peace Treaty), *Sekai* (October 1951): 207-208; Rōyama Masamichi, “Bōeiryoku Zenzō to Kenpō Mondai” (A Graduate Increase in Defense Capacity and the Constitutional Problem), *Sekai* (May 1952): 154-155.

<sup>69</sup> Abe, “Heiwa heno Nengan,” 11-12; Abe Yoshishige, “Sekai Heiwa ni Yosuru Ichi-Nihonjin no Negai” (A Japanese Hopes for World Peace), *Bungei Shunjū* (July 1950): 38-39; Abe Yoshishige, “Shinzen to Fusō to Dokuritsu to” (Friendship, Peace, and Independence), *Sekai* (December 1950): 53-55; Abe, “Sekai to Ajia to Nihon tonon Heiwa no Tachiba kara” 65; Abe, Arisawa, and Yokota, “Tōgi: Heiwa no Tame no Bōbi,” 135.

and, though discontented with suppression of freedom of speech under American rule, he was certain that free speech would have been totally prohibited under Soviet control. He also brushed aside the view that some Study Group members voiced that “Russian Communism established upon the people [was] truly pacifist and never imperialist.”<sup>70</sup>

After the Korean War, Abe could not deny the possibility of a Communist invasion and gradually accepted America’s military umbrella and a partial rearming of Japan. When the North Koreans invaded the South, he accused the Soviet Union of backing it.<sup>71</sup> At the same time, Abe blamed the United States for failing to prevent the Soviet policy for Korea. It must have been predictable, given the Soviets’ territorial interests in East Asia from the end of World War II. America’s “negligence” (*taiman*) caused the Korean War, he asserted.<sup>72</sup> Abe thought it deplorable that the UN forces crossed over the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel but ultimately defended the action; they needed to show power to the North to discourage the latter from attempting another invasion, and he appreciated their operations in Korea, essentially contributing to Japan’s security.<sup>73</sup>

The lesson that Abe learned from the Korean War was that a power vacuum should not be created. Against Japan’s remilitarization, he now maintained that the United States, which had demilitarized Japan, had responsibility to defend it from a potential Soviet invasion, and he agreed that Japan should compromise on offering military bases to the United States. Abe announced, “we have to admit that it may provoke countries in conflict with America but could prevent a foreign invasion and internal disturbance in Japan as well.” Also, he confessed, still “opposing Japan’s rearmament, I cannot confidently assure the people that without remilitarization, Japan’s

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<sup>70</sup> Abe, “Heiwa heno Nengan,” 12; Abe Yoshishige, “Saigunbi no Mondai wo megurite” (Over the Issue of Rearmament), *Sekai* (March 1952): 27-28, 30. The quote is from p.12.

<sup>71</sup> Abe, “Shinzen to Fusō to Dokuritsu to,” 54-55.

<sup>72</sup> Abe, “Saigunbi no Mondai wo megurite,” 24.

<sup>73</sup> Abe, “Shinzen to Fusō to Dokuritsu to,” 54-55, 60.

security would be absolutely fine, and a vacuum would never be filled by an invasion”; unwilling to leave the country without policing forces against domestic and foreign agitators, he voiced his support for at least setting up police reserves, if not a regular army.<sup>74</sup>

When the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the security pact between Japan and the United States came into effect, Abe blamed both America and Russia for their failure to reach an overall peace but held the latter more responsible for being uncooperative.<sup>75</sup> Watsuji Tetsurō, another Peace Study Group member, agreed. He criticized the Soviet Union for opposing the “peace draft seeming to be written based on the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations” without clear reasons, and stressed that it was the Soviet Union that had hampered the passage of a comprehensive peace. Watsuji also pointed out that not ending the state of war by signing the peace treaty, the Soviets themselves were causing the military alliance between Japan and the United States and Japan’s rearmament. All in all, he felt satisfied with the peace treaty signed as it was by a large number of countries, even though some key states did not sign. The abandonment of the goal of an overall peace and unarmed neutrality was thus justified by condemning the Soviets’ aggressiveness and lack of cooperation.<sup>76</sup>

By the fall of 1951, public opinion also drifted toward supporting a partial peace and US-Japan security alliance. Concerns about Japan’s security heightened after the outbreak of the Korean War. More people gradually supported establishing national defense forces rather than neutralism, if not actual engagement in operations. The Japanese reluctantly accepted the stationing of American forces as long as it was temporary. According to the *Yomiuri Shinbun*

<sup>74</sup> Abe, Arisawa, and Yokota, “Tōgi: Heiwa no Tame no Bōbi,” 130-131, 134-139; Abe, “Sekai to Ajia to Nihon tonō Heiwa no Tachiba kara,” 65-67; Abe, “Saigunbi no Mondai wo megurite,” 22-23, 26-29; the quotes are from pp.22, 28-29.

<sup>75</sup> Abe, “Saigunbi no Mondai wo megurite,” 25-26.

<sup>76</sup> Watsuji Tetsurō, “Sovieto no Sekinin” (The Responsibility of the Soviet Union), *Sekai* (October 1951): 75-77.

public opinion poll conducted at the beginning of August 1950, 37.4 percent endorsed the reorganization of the Japanese military while 34.8 percent opposed it. 30.8 percent believed that Japan should involve itself in the Korean War, but only 10.1 percent proposed sending troops, and 18.1 percent answered “cooperation by industrial production.” A small majority (56.8 percent) opposed any kind of involvement out of fear of war.<sup>77</sup>

The *Mainichi Shinbun*'s research released on September 3, 1950 showed that only 9.6 percent preferred total reliance of Japan's security on the UN forces and 58.7 percent responded that Japan should increase self-defense capacity while relying upon either the United States or the United Nations. However, to the question on lending military bases to the United States, 40.4 percent opposed it, and 31.1 percent answered affirmatively.<sup>78</sup> Two months later, the *Asahi Shinbun* public opinion poll showed that more people (53.8 percent) supported the establishment of “military forces,” but about three-quarters of them answered that the operations should be limited only to the defense of Japanese territory. Regarding Japan's peace, 45.6 percent chose an “early peace with the United States and pro-American countries” while 21.4 percent preferred to wait until the United States and the Soviet Union could resolve disagreements. Nevertheless, 37.5 percent could not approve allowing American troops to station in Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty, and 29.9 percent answered in the affirmative.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> “Honsha Zenkoku Yoron Chōsa: Amerika wo Dō Omou?” (The *Yomiuri Shinbun* Nation-Wide Public Opinion Poll: What Do You Think about America?), *Yomiuri Shinbun*, August 15, 1950, 1. In this survey, 65.7 percent answered that they liked America most, and 1.6 percent chose the Soviet Union. The result reversed on the question “Which country do you dislike most?”; 67.9 percent responded that they disliked the Soviet Union most, and 1.6 percent, the United States. Out of the people who opposed Japan's involvement in the Korean War, 39.7 percent answered in the negative “because they hated war,” 6.5 percent, “because they did not want their family members to die,” and 5 percent, “because Japan would be air-attacked.”

<sup>78</sup> “Honsha Yoron Chōsa: Waga Kuni Anzen Hoshō no Michi” (The *Mainichi Shinbun* Public Opinion Poll: The Course of Our Country's Security), *Mainichi Shinbun*, September 3, 1950, 1. 10.9 percent thought that Japan's security should fully rely on America, and 7.4 percent answered that Japan should defend itself without relying on any other country.

<sup>79</sup> “Honsha Yoron Chōsa: Kōwa to Nihon Saibusō” (The *Asahi Shinbun* Public Opinion Poll: Peace and Japan's

By the spring of 1951, when John Foster Dulles and Yoshida Shigeru reached agreements about the basic peace and security plans, more people showed positive attitudes toward Japan's remilitarization and military alliance with the United States. According to the *Mainichi Shinbun* public opinion survey published on March 3, 1951, 64.9 percent worried about the possibility of a Communist invasion after American forces were withdrawn from Japan. Sixty-three percent voted for Japan's military buildup, and 19.5 percent against; yet, while about a quarter endorsed "immediate" remilitarization, about a third responded that it should keep pace with economic recovery. 59.5 percent expected US troops to stay in Japan for a while, if not permanently; in comparison, only 9.6 percent made objection to the option. Also, 70.4 percent preferred Japan's participation in a type of Pacific security alliance.<sup>80</sup>

When the San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded, the majority of the Japanese welcomed it. The *Asahi Shinbun* public opinion poll showed that sixty-nine percent positively evaluated America's friendly attitudes, but fifty-six percent were "dissatisfied with and had ill feeling toward the Soviet Union." Seventy-one percent agreed that Japan should have its own military as an independent country, and sixteen percent disagreed.<sup>81</sup> In another survey conducted by the *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 11.4 percent were "not satisfied" with the peace treaty, but 71.9 percent

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Rearmament), *Asahi Shinbun*, November 15, 1950, 1. In the public opinion survey released on November 8, 56.8 percent answered that Japan should cooperate with the UN forces, 9.2 percent responded that Japan should not, and 34 percent did not know. See "Honsha Yoron Chōsa: Chōsen Jihen to Kokuren Kyōryoku" (The *Asahi Shinbun* Public Opinion Poll: The Korean Incident and Cooperation with the United Nations), *Asahi Shinbun*, November 8, 1950, 1.

<sup>80</sup> "Honsha Yoron Chōsa: Daresu Tokushi ni Kotaeru: Kōwa to Anzen Hoshō ni tsuite" (The *Mainichi Shinbun* Public Opinion Poll: Responding to Special Envoy Dulles on Peace and Security), *Mainichi Shinbun*, March 3, 1951, 1. The *Yomiuri Shinbun* public opinion survey showed a similar but slightly different result. 47.3 percent supported Japanese rearmament, and 23.6 percent disapproved. Regarding the stationing of American troops, 45.2 percent answered in the affirmative, if it was temporary, and 16.7 percent opposed it. See "Honsha Zenkoku Yoron Chōsa: Saigunbi Dō Arubeki?" (The *Yomiuri Shinbun* Nation-Wide Public Opinion Poll: What Should Rearmament Be like?), *Yomiuri Shinbun*, March 26, 1951, 1.

<sup>81</sup> "Honsha Yoron Chōsa: Kōwa Jōyaku wo Dō Omou?" (The *Asahi Shinbun* Public Opinion Poll: What Do You Think About the Peace Treaty?), *Asahi Shinbun*, September 20, 1951, 1.

were “satisfied.” About a third suggested that the peace treaty should be immediately approved in the Diet, another third thought that it would need careful deliberations, and only 1.6 percent did not want the treaty to be passed. Public responses to the US-Japan security pact were similar. About rearmament, fifty-eight percent were in favor of it, but about two-thirds of it were worried about the cost.<sup>82</sup> These data show that the majority of the people were aware of problems pertaining to the peace and security treaties but were willing to accept the partial peace, conditional rearmament and temporary reliance on American forces, and the US-Japan security pact.

Inside the Socialist Party and labor unions, too, opinions began to diverge after the Korean War. As their official stance toward the Korean War, the Party and the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sōhyō) denounced North Korea and supported the UN efforts. “The Problem on Korea and the Socialist Party’s Attitude” drafted in early July 1950 declared that the “direct cause [of the Korean conflict] [was] North Korea’s attempt to unite Korea by the use of armed force” and that the Party “[provided] moral (*seishin-teki*) support for the maintenance of law and order by the United Nations.” Sōhyō also made a similar statement a few weeks after. However, the JSP objected to Japan’s active cooperation with the UN forces and did not change its demand for an overall peace. Likewise, the party accepted the establishment of the National Police Reserves unless it was turned into a military and financially tasking to the Japanese nation.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> “Honsha Yoron Chōsa: Kōwa Hijun to Saigunbi” (The *Yomiuri Shinbun* Public Opinion Poll: Ratification of the Peace Treaty and Rearmament), *Yomiuri Shinbun*, October 8, 1951, 1. About a third wanted the security treaty to be approved immediately, about a third believed that it required careful deliberations, and only 2.9 percent opposed ratification of the treaty. About two-thirds of those who supported Japan’s rearmament thought that Japan could not afford to have a military yet and reluctantly agreed to accept tax rise if necessary.

<sup>83</sup> Nihon Shakaitō 50-nen-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Nihon Shakaitō-shi*, 192-194; the quotes are from p.193.

The rightist members in the JSP and Sōhyō questioned the wisdom of calling for an overall peace and Japan's neutrality. At a Central Labor Union Congress held in early August 1950, they declared that the party's peace offensive did not work, given Japan was already placed on America's defensive front. Neutrality was nonsense, too, where there were only two worlds – democratic and totalitarian. To destroy international Communism and maintain peace, they argued, Japan should ally with the West and actively cooperate in UN forces' operations in Korea.<sup>84</sup> When the Central Executive Committee drafted a new resolution about the party's foreign policy at the end of December, the moderates mildly criticized the JSP's official policy and suggested that the Party should discuss the content of an overall peace rather than simply insisting on it. In the Sōhyō Convention in March 1951, there was a debate among labor unions. While one group stuck to the Socialist Party's objection to a separate peace, a military alliance, and rearmament, the other cast doubt on Japanese neutrality and accepted the stationing of foreign troops.<sup>85</sup>

These skeptics' opinions never succeeded in modifying the JSP and Sōhyō's official stances, but they lingered. The disagreements actually led to a party split in late October 1951. After the San Francisco Peace Conference, the Foreign Policy Committee met to discuss the peace and security treaties. Among the three plans submitted there, one approving both treaties, the second opposing both, and the third supporting only the peace treaty, the Central Executive Committee voted for the last option and turned it in to the Party Convention. When Sōhyō pressured the Socialist Party to push through its official position, the leftists rejected the Committee's decision. Unable to reach a consensus, the Convention was closed, and the party

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 194-196.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 203.

split into the rightist and moderate members and the leftist ones.<sup>86</sup> It was only three days before the ratification of the treaties in the Lower House.

In the Twelfth Extraordinary Session of the Diet, both the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Pact were approved. Not surprisingly, all Government Party members supported both treaties. While the rightist socialists at least casted votes for the peace treaty, the leftist socialists, backed by Sōhyō, opposed both. So did the Communist Party. The peace treaty passed the Lower House by a majority of 307 votes to 45, and the security treaty by 289 to 71 in late October; in the Upper House, the former was ratified by 174 votes to 45, and the latter by 147 to 76 in mid-November.<sup>87</sup> This result reflected the political and intellectual trends since 1950. Despite the fact that they had reservations, the majority of the Japanese accepted the separate peace and the US-Japan military alliance. As we already know, the peace and security debate did not end, however; it continued for the next decades to come.

### **Another Area of the Peace and Security Debate: Intellectuals and the Question of “Realism”**

Even after the San Francisco peace treaty and the US-Japan security pact were signed and ratified, some Peace Study Group members continuously argued against the pro-partial peace and security alliance intellectuals. Both sides hoped for world peace and the best possible peace and security arrangements for Japan. Although they knew that international circumstances would determine what Japan could achieve, they believed that Japan should make a claim rather than passively accept whatever conditions the Allies offered. They also took it as valuable that intellectuals engaged in educational and enlightenment activities in concert for peace.<sup>88</sup> However,

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 212-217; Masumi, *Sengo Seiji 1945-55-nen: Ge*, 387-390.

<sup>87</sup> Hayashi and Tsuji, eds., *Nihon Naikaku Shiroku* 5, 218; Nihon Shakaitō 50-nen-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Nihon Shakaitō-shi*, 212-218; Igarashi, “Peace-Making and Party Politics,” 334, 337.

<sup>88</sup> Tsuru, “Tai-Nichi Kōwa to Sekai Heiwa,” 4-5, 21-22; Tsuru Shigeto, “Koizumi Hakase no Heiwa-ron ni tsuite” (On

the opinions of the intelligentsia diverged; while some looked at the Cold War from an anti-Russian, realist perspective and sought a politically practical solution, others questioned that way of thinking itself and suggested a distinct role that intellectuals should play in the maintenance of peace.

Koizumi Shinzō's essay published in January 1952 invited counterarguments from younger scholars who joined in the Study Group, and these illuminated the differences in thought between the two sides. Marxian economist Tsuru Shigeto was the leading respondent to Koizumi's criticisms. As economist, Tsuru had impressive credentials: he had served as economic adviser to SCAP's Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) and vice president of the Economic Stabilization Board (ESB). He admitted one of the points that Koizumi made: the call for an overall peace and unarmed neutrality was an expression of hope, and there was no concrete peace plan to replace the offered peace.<sup>89</sup> However, he attacked other arguments by unraveling fallacies in Koizumi's thought.

According to Tsuru, Koizumi uncritically took given conditions as they were, ignoring other dimensions and possibilities. For example, Tsuru argued that Koizumi wrongly mixed up the cultural and power-political aspects of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union; the differences in ideology and social system would not necessarily lead to a war, and the two states could negotiate politically, so a showdown between the two was not inevitable. Similarly, the power vacuum theory that Koizumi used was erroneous because it was drawn from the fixed realist idea that peace would be maintained through tension between the two camps, American and Russian; Tsuru insisted that Japan and other smaller states did not have to

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Doctor Koizumi's Essay on Peace), *Sekai* (March 1952): 34-35, 41.

<sup>89</sup> Tsuru, "Tai-Nichi Kōwa to Sekai Heiwa," 5.

subordinate themselves to the superpowers and could play independent roles in the world.

Referring to a “social scientific truth that actions taken based on certain assumptions make them real,” Tsuru warned Koizumi of the underlying danger of his thought.<sup>90</sup>

There was one more critical problem in Koizumi’s arguments. To Tsuru, Koizumi’s views on the Cold War and on the power vacuum ultimately seemed to reiterate America’s official stance, taking it without much thought. For instance, about peace talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, Tsuru asked Koizumi why the Russians should withdraw troops from Siberia, and the Chinese from Manchuria, part of their own territory, as a condition for Americans’ retreat from Japan, which was a foreign land to them; thinking that this was an unacceptable demand to make of the United States itself was the evidence of Koizumi’s unconscious bias for America.<sup>91</sup>

By pointing his finger at Koizumi’s way of thinking, Tsuru disapproved of other seemingly pro-American realist thinkers’ in general. Likewise, Modernist thinker Maruyama Masao found faults with the so-called pragmatists’ thought patterns. Facing accusations aimed against the Peace Study Group that its ideas were “not realistic,” Maruyama charged that “realist” thinkers were, in actuality, merely blind sycophants, harmful to society. Like Tsuru, he pointed

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 17-19; “Koizumi Hakase no Heiwa-ron ni tsuite,” 36-42; also see Nakano, “Heiwa wo Hoshō-senu Anzen Hoshō,” 95 and Nakano Yoshio, “Heiwa-ron no Yūtsu: Watashi ha Soren no Bengoshi deha Nai” (The Blues of the Thought on Peace: I Am Not a Defender of the Soviet Union), *Bungei Shunjū* (March 1952): 69-72. Nakano attacked Koizumi’s application of the power vacuum theory to the case of Korea and pointed out that the theory was a mere hypothesis.

<sup>91</sup> Tsuru, “Koizumi Hakase no Heiwa-ron ni tsuite,” 36-37; Tsuru analyzed that the American foreign policy shifted to realism, retaining idealism, so the Americans tended to mix up the ideological and realist dimensions of the Cold War. Koizumi responded to Tsuru’s criticism against him and the United States that if he was relatively more critical of the Russians than the Americans, Tsuru was the contrary; he thought it was unfair for Tsuru not to point out that the Russians also failed to separate foreign policy from ideology. He also disagreed with Tsuru that states would not clash but ideology and social system do. See Tsuru, “Tai-Nichi Kōwa to Sekai Heiwa,” 12-19; Tsuru, “Koizumi Hakase no Heiwa-ron ni tsuite,” *Sekai* (March 1952): 38-42; Koizumi, “Watashi no Heiwa-ron ni tsuite,” 244-245; Nakano Yoshio similarly maintained that Koizumi’s criticism against the Soviet Union was emotional and irrational. See Nakano, “Heiwa-ron no Yūtsu,” 67-69.

out that “pragmatists” neglected to see the multiple dimensions and plasticity in any given event; they looked at a given reality only from a certain point of view and accepted it as the reality. By resigning themselves to a *fait accompli*, they simply followed the course that the ruling elite set. These very same “pragmatists” had let Japanese society slip into fascism and war in the 1930s and 1940s.<sup>92</sup> Intellectuals’ responsibility for this outcome was especially grave. They had demonstrated a tendency to adjust their stances to the existing reality, rationalizing their intellectual “submission” (*kuppuku*) as the evolution of their thinking, and that was how they had failed to act as a brake on Japan’s political course in the past. If they made the same mistake again, Maruyama said, paraphrasing Karl Marx’s comment on history repeating itself, it would not be a “tragedy” this time; it would be “just a farce” (*chaban*).<sup>93</sup>

Maruyama thus disparaged pragmatists, or scholars who gave in to realism and changed their opinions, but at the same time he suggested the role that intellectuals had to play: they should not be uncritical conformists. Other scholars agreed with Maruyama. Sugi Toshio (1904-1990) as well as Nakano Yoshio (1903-1985), both literature professors and Peace Study Group members, also defended their activities as a fulfillment of intellectuals’ duty. Nakano called “pragmatists” “compromisers” (*dakyōya*) and claimed that they, including himself, had contributed to the war. Reflecting upon this experience, he came to believe that the intelligentsia should take an absolutely unyielding attitude to war and this would be the only “realistic” way to prevent it.<sup>94</sup> Likewise, Sugi supported the advocates of an overall peace. By providing counterarguments, they helped clarify what the champions of a partial peace did not reveal, and this was the “task”

<sup>92</sup> Maruyama Masao, “Genjitsu’shugi no Otoshiana: Aru Henshūsha heno Tegami” (The Pitfalls of “Real”-ism: A Letter to an Editor), *Sekai* (May 1952): 122-125.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 127.

<sup>94</sup> Nakano Yoshio, “Jiyūshugisha no Kōshō: Heiwa no Mondai to Watashi” (A Liberal’s Loud Laugh: The Problem of Peace and Me), *Bungei Shunjū* (December 1951): 45-47.

(*ninmu*) that intellectuals had to perform. He continued to argue that they should choose “reason” (*dōri*) over “interests” (*rieki*) and criticized Koizumi for abandoning this moral sense and succumbing to realism.<sup>95</sup>

These Japanese intellectuals thus criticized “realists” and “pragmatists.” To them, the realists’ binary view of the world, bias for the United States in opposition to skepticism toward the Soviet Union, and acceptance of “reality” were dangerous to peace. Intellectuals’ adherence to reason and idealism could counter a path to war. It is worth noticing that behind many arguments for an overall peace and unarmed neutrality lay this assumption. Indeed, the intelligentsia’s strong commitment to the cause of peace very successfully rallied a massive force against a partial peace and security alliance with the United States, and continued to do so during the following decades. Nevertheless, it is also true that, as they admitted to themselves, they offered not an alternative policy workable under the existing circumstance but only their moral principle. That was never sufficient to convince either politicians or people of the desirability and feasibility of scrapping the established peace and defense system altogether. Intellectuals’ activism could at least pressure the government into revising Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors as well as the United States.

### **Converged Economic Interests: Japanese Search for American Capital and Asian Trade**

It is well known that Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru wanted to maintain commercial relations with the PRC, but, pressured by the US government, he had to give up China trade to deal with Taiwan. It was one of the demerits of making an alliance with the United States that Japan’s trade partners were restricted by America’s containment policy in Asia and, based on the belief that the Japanese economy needed trade with mainland China, why the Peace Study Group

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<sup>95</sup> Sugi Toshio, “Chishikijin no Ninmu ni tsuite” (About the Duties of Intellectuals), *Sekai* (March 1952): 110-111.

and supporters of overall peace opposed a partial peace. Exactly because they believed in the Wilsonian ideals, they demanded Japan's right to enter free international commerce as well as to preserve national autonomy. However, believing in the importance of expanding Japanese trade with Asia and US financial aid to develop the economy of the region, they, in fact, envisioned a similar Asia policy to that of US containment policy.

By the time the US government set on the "Reverse Course" in late 1948-early 1949, there had been a general agreement in Japan that the Japanese needed to establish a self-supporting economy and prepare for reentering international commerce. Over the following year, there emerged a consensus among Japanese economists that in order to feed a large population and secure a healthy living standard, Japan needed capital accumulations through trade. Considering the costs of imports and shipping fees and Japan's geographic position, Asian countries, China through India, were viewed as natural trade partners. Economists also agreed on the government's role in overseeing Japan's international trade.<sup>96</sup>

There were disagreements, however, between non-Marxian and Marxian thinkers over two issues: one was how much Japan should rely upon international trade, and the other was how hopeful Japan's commercial relations with Southeast Asia would be. Although they never sought

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<sup>96</sup> Nakayama Ichirō, "Sekai Keizai heno Sanka" (Joining the World Economy), *Bungei Shunjū* (November 1947): 10-16; Arisawa Hiromi et al., "Zadankai: Sekai Keizai to Nihon no Jiritsu" (Roundtable Discussion: The World Economy and Japan's Independence), *Chūō Kōron* (July 1948): 24; Tsuru Shigeto, "Infurēshon Shūsoku heno Mitōshi" (The Prospects for Subsidence of Inflation), *Sekai* (January 1949): 31-33; Nagata Kiyoshi and Ichimada Hisato, "Keizai Antei wo meguru Taiwa" (Discussion on Stabilization of the Economy), *Kaizō* (January 1949): 4-9; Ichimada Hisato, "Genka no Nihon Keizai wo Tenbō-suru" (Reviewing the Current Japanese Economy), *Kaizō* (December 1949): 48-52; Tsuru Shigeto, "Kokusai Keizai to Nihon" (The World Economy and Japan), *Sekai* (January 1950): 31-32; Arisawa Hiromi, "Sengo Kyōkō to Nihon Shihonshugi: Hitotsu no Sobyō" (A Sketch of the Postwar Depression and Japanese Capitalism), *Sekai* (March 1950): 24-26; Ōkita Saburō, "Ajia Keizai to Nihon Keizai" (The Asian Economy and the Japanese Economy), *Sekai* (April 1950): 44-49; Nakayama Ichirō, "Keizai Hatten to Chingin no Mondai" (Economic Development and the Wage Issue), *Kaizō* (April 1950): 50-53; Tsuru Shigeto et al., "Zadankai: Kiro ni Tatsu Nihon Keizai" (Roundtable Discussion: The Japanese Economy at the Crossroads), *Sekai* (November 1950): 94-116; Tsuru Shigeto, "Nihon Keizai no Fuan to Kadai" (Anxieties and Problems of the Japanese Economy), *Sekai* (April 1951): 62-66; Nakayama Ichirō, "Nihon Keizai ni okeru Shihon-teki Tokushitsu" (Characteristics of Capital in the Japanese Economy), *Kaizō* (May 1952): 10-12, 20-24.

to establish an autarkic economy, Marxian economists warned of the risk of economic interdependency: they argued that since business cycles in other countries or international situations could easily affect trade, the Japanese economy should never depend solely on foreign commerce. The backup plan was investing in domestic development. Marxian economists strongly suggested that the government should devise a comprehensive national land development plan, following the example of America's Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).<sup>97</sup> Written by Tsuru Shigeto, the aforementioned third statement on peace issued by the Peace Study Group clearly reflected this stance.

Under the late 1940s-to-early 1950s international and domestic conditions, it was reasonable that Marxian economists doubted the prospects for expanding Japanese trade. They were pessimistic particularly because the United States was planning to restrict trade with China. To them, China was the most indispensable trade partner in Asia for Japanese economic reconstruction. Leading Rōnō-ha Marxist economist and vice chairman of the Peace Study Group Ōuchi Hyōe asserted, "Japan can abandon Southeast Asia but not China. America and China are the wheels of the Japanese economy." This view was reinforced by the underdevelopment of the Southeast Asian economy, to which the United States tried to tie the Japanese economy. Ōuchi's disciples Arisawa Hiromi and Minobe Ryōkichi expressed their skepticism about the feasibility of the US plan by questioning how US development assistance to Southeast Asia would help creating a stable market for Japan.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Tsuru, "Nihon Keizai no Fuan to Kadai," 66-71; Tsuru Shigeto, "Hassenman-nin to Kokunai Shigen" (Eight-Hundred Million People and Domestic Resources), *Chūō Kōron* (April 1951): 4-18; Arisawa Hiromi, "Kokudo Sōgō Kaihatsu toha Nani ka" (What Is Comprehensive National Land Development), *Sekai* (November 1951): 119-123. Unlike Arisawa and Tsuru, Ōuchi and Minobe were skeptical of national development program; see Tsuru et al., "Zadankai: Kiro ni Tatsu Nihon Keizai," 106-116.

<sup>98</sup> Ōuchi et al., "Tōronkai: Tandoku Kōwa to Nihon Keizai," 115-116. Also see Ōuchi Hyōe et al., "Ajia no Genjitsu to Nihon" (The Reality in Asia and Japan), *Kaizō* (February 1951): 57-59; Arisawa Hiromi, Ōkita Saburō, and

Non-Marxian economists did not share these concerns. They did not oppose national development programs, but believing that they would not be possible without capital accumulations by trade, they prioritized the importance of trade. They were also more hopeful that America's economic aid to Southeast Asia would open its market for Japan and emphasized that trade relations with the United States and Southeast Asia would be more critical than those with China.<sup>99</sup>

As Japanese scholar of economic thought Aiko Ikeo points out, there were no fundamental differences in opinion between the Marxian and the non-Marxian groups: they agreed on the necessity of developing the Japanese economy, and they knew the importance of trade.<sup>100</sup> Besides, Marxian economists, like non-Marxian counterparts, did not object to trading with Southeast Asia, if they preferred China, and greatly expected American economic support. While not wanting America's political intervention in Japan, Ōuchi and Minobe desired American capital for Japan's economic development.<sup>101</sup> Minobe even doubted if Japan could sustain its economy without American guardianship.<sup>102</sup> Aware that foreign aid to Southeast Asia's economic development had not worked as yet, Arisawa and Wakimura Yoshitarō proposed that Japan should invest capital into the region and build up commercial ties.<sup>103</sup>

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Wakimura Yoshitarō., "Zadankai: Tōnan Ajia to Nihon Keizai" (Roundtable Discussion: Southeast Asia and the Japanese Economy), *Sekai* (December 1951): 56-69. The quote is from p.115.

<sup>99</sup> Nakayama, "Keizai Hatten to Chingin no Mondai," 52-53; Nakayama, "Nihon Keizai ni okeru Shihon-teki Tokushitsu," 23-24; Ōuchi et al., "Ajia no Genjitsu to Nihon," 57-58; Akamatsu Kaname, "Nichiyō Hyōron: Chūkyō Māketto-ron" (Sunday Review on the China Market Argument), *Yomiuri Shinbun*, August 5, 1951, 1; "Dokuritsu no Toshi wo Mukaete Ge: Keizai to Chūgoku Mondai" (Entering upon the Year of Independence 2: The Economy and the Problem of China), *Mainichi Shinbun*, January 3, 1952, 2; Ishibashi Tanzan and Nakayama agreed that trade with China was not vital to Japan.

<sup>100</sup> Aiko Ikeo, "Economic Development and Economic Thought after World War II: Non-Marxian Economists on Development, Trade and Industry," in *Economic Thought and Modernization in Japan*, ed. Shirō Sugihara and Toshihiro Tanaka (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1998), 137-141.

<sup>101</sup> Tsuru et al., "Zadankai: Kiro ni Tatsu Nihon Keizai," 108-109.

<sup>102</sup> Ōuchi et al., "Tōronkai: Tandoku Kōwa to Nihon Keizai," 112.

<sup>103</sup> Arisawa, Ōkita, and Wakimura., "Zadankai: Tōnan Ajia to Nihon Keizai," 56-69.

Japanese aspirations and visions to reconstruct their economy did not conflict with US interests in assisting Japan's economic recovery by opening an American market and connecting Japan with Southeast Asia. Japanese economists considered "Asia" – whether including China or not – important for Japan to reconstruct its economy: Asian countries could serve Japan as the providers of cheap raw materials and the markets of Japanese industrial goods. Even Ōuchi Hyōe expected, like US government officials, that with promoted trade with Asia, Japan could become the "workshop of Asia" (*tōyō no kōjō*).<sup>104</sup>

American revisionist and post-revisionist scholars of the 1970s and 1980s agree that the effort to link the Japanese economy with that of Southeast Asia was part of the US containment strategy in Asia, and this determined America's incremental and eventual military commitment to Vietnam. Japanese critics of partial peace and US-Japan security alliance refused to accept the America-centric view of the divided world and realist thinking, and, led by Marxian and Marxist theorists, proposed securing Japan's economic recovery and independence by not rebuilding the military forces and by maintaining its neutral position in the Cold War. They demanded an overall peace because they wanted to retain Japan's freedom to have diplomatic and commercial relationships with its neighboring countries, especially Communist China. Importantly, however, they, as the supporters of revisionist capitalism, did not oppose capitalism per se, even if they were against the classical liberal form of it. They expected Japan's commercial expansion to Southeast Asia and even America's financial assistance to both Japan and Southeast Asia. It is worthy of note that except for the China market, the economic aspect of US containment policy for Asia accommodated Japan's needs. Although it did not prevent the Japanese government or any critics

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<sup>104</sup> Ōuchi Hyōe, "Zenmen Kōwa no Keizai-teki Kiso" (The Economic Basis of an Overall Peace), *Asahi Shinbun*, June 22, 1950, 2.

from demanding fixing the unequal nature of the security pact and pursuing better relationships with the Soviet Union and China, the US-Japan alliance system did not totally clash with Japan's commercial interests.

### **Conclusion**

Transcending generational, disciplinary, and ideological differences, Japanese intellectuals worked together to lead a pacifist movement in the early postwar period. It first began in response to the UNESCO Statement in late 1948 that expressed a belief in social scientists' role in the maintenance of world peace. As the Cold War intensified and American officials resumed preparing for peace settlements with Japan, the Japanese intellectuals' activities developed into a campaign for achieving an overall peace and unarmed neutrality. However, the outbreak of the Korean War gave the Japanese a sense of anxiety about Japan's national security. Although the threat of Communist invasion felt far from imminent, it seemed probable, and unarmed neutrality quickly lost appeal. While ambivalent about Japan's rapid rearmament and the stationing of American troops, the people grew more receptive to these options. As agreements on Japan's peace settlements between the United States and the Soviet Union seemed impossible, the Japanese were ready to accept the American peace draft. Even if it did not return full autonomy to Japan, they were in general satisfied with the San Francisco Peace.

The international developments following the Korean War did not strengthen only the voice of the advocates of a partial peace and US-Japan security pact; it also turned many who had demanded a comprehensive peace and unarmed neutrality into supporters of peace and security treaties with the United States. Anti-Soviet sentiments and the acceptance of realism underlay in the logic behind their acceptance of the separate peace and US-Japan security pact. The shift in

stance toward Japan's peace and security among intellectuals, the public, and even the JSP showed that there was growing general support for the Yoshida government's policy. At the same time, the anti-realist pacifist intellectuals formed a counterforce against the San Francisco system, developing a symbiotic relationship with the leftist socialists, labor unions, and pacifist civilian groups during the 1950s.

This study of the Japanese peace and security debate clarifies what was at stake. First of all, it was not necessarily a debate between a pro-American, anti-Russian group and an anti-American, pro-Russian group. Although one was clearly more skeptical of the Soviet Union and fond of America than the other, neither supported Communism. Unlike the Americans, the Japanese were not particularly afraid of world-wide Communist expansion. Including Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, they agreed that, ideally, Japan should make peace with all the countries including the Soviet Union and Communist China. They all knew that Japan could not afford massive rearmament, too. The key difference was over the question of whether unarmed neutrality would be possible and whether it could save the country from foreign invasion. The pro-separate peace and security pact group shared a realist view of the world and did not believe that the Japanese could defend the country without arms. After all, uncertainty prevailed over the idealism of unarmed neutrality. Besides, anti-Soviet realism made it easier for the Japanese to justify the United States' militant approach against the Soviet Union, at least in Northeast Asia. Still, many hoped for the continuation of peaceful coexistence, which was Franklin D. Roosevelt's vision for a new world and a harmonious relationship with the Soviet Union. However, once the conflict broke out on the Korean peninsula, the US efforts to contain the Soviet power by resorting to force became acceptable to realist thinkers concerned about Japan's security. On the other

hand, the Truman administration's combative approach, a departure from Roosevelt's policy, offended anti-realist pacifists.

The second issue that divided the intelligentsia was the intellectual's role in society. They all believed that they had not only the right but the duty to speak out and take collective action in the name of justice. However, while the "realists" and "pragmatists" tended to seek a politically workable solution, the "anti-realists" seemed to believe that intellectuals should not be politicians but "idealists." They were critical of the realists because they were aware of not only the fallacies but also the danger of realist thinking. They thought that the realists would set society off in the wrong direction by accommodating their stances to any given power reality. Intellectuals, they seemed to believe, should be vocal protesters, never succumbing to political reality but instead aiming to achieve their ideals. This belief led them to remain a counterforce. They were not anti-American but opposed only the militancy of the US Cold War policy. They were motivated more by an anti-realist, idealist approach to achieve peace and by a strong sense of mission as public intellectuals.

Lastly, although these critics continued to resist accepting the "reality" of the "divided world" and to preach the danger of America's Cold War, they agreed that Japan could restore its economy by increasing international trade and relying on American financial assistance. Desire to trade with China led many to oppose the partial peace, but they did not object to the US plan to promote economic integration between Japan and Southeast Asia, even if they doubted the feasibility of the plan. Japanese interests in developing their economy thus did not necessarily conflict with American containment policy for Asia: in fact, they were accommodated in it.

The debate on Japan's peace and security was more complicated than has usually been

portrayed. It was mainly led by those from the center-right and -left in the Japanese political spectrum and showed the clash between two internationalist schools of thought, similar to that between American liberal internationalists. Japan's center-right Cold War realists formed the dominant force, but, unlike their American counterparts, the center-left Cold War critics remained powerful and influential. In post-Occupation Japan, the former balanced the latter, who were becoming more radical as the leftists came to power in the Socialist Party and in Sōhyō, and their complete opposite, which was the reemerging pro-rearmament group urging rapid military buildup, as did the US government. This ideological balance in postwar Japan's political spectrum illuminates why the Japanese, while sharing the same liberal internationalist culture, were not entirely in accord with the US Cold War policy.

## CONCLUSION

This dissertation examines intersecting political cultures of early postwar America and Japan and finds in them the origins of the reformation of the political relationship between the two countries that occurred during the Occupation period (1945-1952). Unlike traditional political and diplomatic historians who have focused on bureaucratic negotiations among policymakers in explaining the making of foreign relations, I study public discourses in 1940s-early 1950s America and Japan. Unraveling major strands of thought, I have shown both similarities and differences among them not only within one country but also over national boundaries. The Americans and the Japanese shared cultures of modernity, where various political discourses concerning US-Japan relations during this period – from the causes of the Japan’s overseas expansion during the 1930s to the postwar democratization of Japan and the remaking of Asian peace and order – developed in parallel. It was in such intellectual-cultural environments that friendship between the United States and Japan was recreated after 1945.

As shown in Part I, both American and Japanese thinkers held a Eurocentric progressive view of history and argued in one way or another that Japan was not fully democratic – or “modern.” American “progressives,” or Asia experts who were commonly influenced by the Marxian analysis of Canadian diplomat and Japanologist E. H. Norman, attributed Japan’s underdevelopment to the “incomplete” nature of the Meiji “Revolution” of 1868 and emphasized remaining feudal culture in Japanese society as the crucial cause of Japanese militarism. Anthropologists who studied Japanese socio-cultural structures and behaviors did so by comparing them with those of the advanced “West,” and featured Japan’s feudal traits. “Conservatives,” or Japan specialists, such as Harvard University professor Edwin O. Reischauer

and Columbia University professor Hugh Borton, agreed that Japanese democracy had not matured unlike in the West, but they believed that it had grown healthy since the Meiji Restoration and ceased to function only in the 1930s specifically because of the weak legal framework to which to assure democratic government that the military had abused to control the government.

The Japanese had analogous perspectives and analyses. Japanese Marxian and Marxist scholars developed the thesis – more theoretical than that of American progressives – that the Meiji Restoration had marked only an imperfect revolution in transitioning Japanese society from the feudal stage to that of bourgeois democracy. While the Rōnō-ha school of Marxists decided that the bourgeois revolution had been completed by the 1920s, Kōza-ha Marxists judged it more accurate to conclude that Japanese society was still in the feudal phase. Modernists, adopting the Kōza-ha theory, likewise stressed the feudality, or pre-modern-ness, of Japanese society and its byproduct, absence of independent-minded citizens. Wherever they envisioned the goal of modernization, Soviet socialism or British social democracy, according to the Marxian stage theory, these Japanese thinkers agreed with American progressives and anthropologists that Japan's lingering feudal attributes made it less developed than the West, and thus drove it into a war of aggression. On the other hand, Japanese prewar liberals argued, like American conservatives, that even if the principles and practices of democratic government had not been well established, democracy had made great progress since the Meiji Restoration in accordance with the spirit of the Charter Oath. Without using Marxian theories, they identified the main reason why militarist rule had taken over the government during the 1930s specifically as weak civilian control over the military under the Meiji political structure.

Similarities between American and Japanese thought were not limited to their views of

history and their discussions about modern Japanese development, but could be found in their expectations of the Allied Occupation of Japan. American progressives, in part due to their Marxian view, and in part due to their arrogant faith in American power and ideology, ignorance of Japanese history and society, and anger and sense of vengeance toward the Japanese enemy, called for a hard policy for post-defeat Japan. They demanded complete and forced destruction of the existing political, social, and cultural systems by the Occupation forces to democratize and pacify Japan. In the name of peace, order, and democracy in the postwar Asia-Pacific, they justified a punitive and interventionist policy toward Japan. In comparison, while also sharing Wilsonian internationalist ideals, conservatives sought a more moderate peace for Japan. Unlike the progressives who identified Japan's political and business leaders collectively as the exploiting imperialist group, the conservatives found "liberal" Japanese leaders and believed that the Allies could rely on them to democratize Japan. They based this stance on the view that the Japanese military that had controlled the government during the 1930s had misled Japan into war, and with militarists removed, the Japanese could restore and strengthen democratic rule by themselves; their past experiences during the Taishō period were the proof of their capability. Even if they also believed in the superiority of Western culture, taking the position of cultural relativism, anthropologists were less eager to support the bold US scheme to change Japanese culture that the progressives strongly advocated.

In Japan, too, the more Marxist the viewpoint, the more welcoming it was to the foreign occupiers as a democratic force for Japan. Japanese Marxian and Marxist politicians and intellectuals vilified the remnants of feudalism and wanted to eliminate these impediments to Japanese society's transition to a higher historical stage. Their theories and personal experiences

surely motivated them to take a radical stance: Marxists had endured state repression since the 1920s, many imprisoned, some killed, and some others fleeing outside Japan. Modernists had observed the state strengthening its control over intellectuals' activities in the 1930s, and some of them, like Maruyama Masao, served in the military; they were thus convinced of the cruelty of the Japanese state and the need to fundamentally change it. For them, Japan's defeat in war and the subsequent Allied Occupation's goal of demilitarization and democratization constituted good fortune; with the help of the Allies, they could launch a democratic revolution and turn Japan into a "progressive" country like the United States, Britain, or the Soviet Union.

Prewar liberals, in contrast, while agreeing with the desirability of democratization reforms modeled after the West, were more cautious; they did not think that the Occupation authorities should force revolutionary changes on the Japanese. As non-Marxists, they did not believe in the necessity for revolution. Like American conservatives, they were proud of the democratic institutions and practices that they had observed and, in some cases, helped Japan attain, since the Meiji Restoration, and they were optimistic that they could further reform society based on accumulated past experiences. Thus, they envisioned getting rid of the particular causes of Japan's diversion from that normal course of modern development during the 1930s and promoting the evolutionary democratization process.

The Occupation began with these parallel and intersecting thoughts and expectations of both victor and vanquished. Both Americans and Japanese agreed that something had gone terribly wrong with Japan, the end result being total war and destruction, and that the country should undergo democratizing reform. The discussions about Japanese constitutional revision – the most important political reform during the Occupation period and the subject examined in Part

II – revealed similar ideas among the Americans and the Japanese regarding this particular democratization program. American experts on Japan and Asia came up with essentially the same postwar reform plans for Japan, but differed mainly in their attitudes toward the Japanese emperor as well as existing political and business leaders. American conservatives supported reforming the Japanese limited monarchy, while their progressive counterparts suggested eliminating the emperor system. These differences in American proposals reflected their analyses of the cause of Japanese militarism. The conservatives, who judged that the loopholes in the absolutist Meiji Constitution and the regulations of the armed forces had allowed the military to control the government, considered it sufficient to fix them and reestablish the legal basis of democratic government. On the other hand, the progressives, who defined the emperor system as the mixed body of the feudal landlord, the bourgeois capitalist, and the militarist, and viewed it as the ideological source of Japanese fanaticism, thought that the democratization of Japan was conditional on the removal of the imperial institution. As we have seen, the conservative option prevailed in American policymaking circles in Washington and in Tokyo, and as a result, the Occupation government chose to liberalize the Japanese constitution without abolishing the emperor system.

The Japanese debate was more active and open, involving diverse groups of individuals from cabinet officials to party politicians, private research groups to individual scholars, newspaper editors to ordinary people. Taishō liberals and moderate socialists proposed revising the constitutional monarchy and establishing representative and responsible government. They sought to depoliticize the emperor and turn him into a truly ritual head of the state, though they disagreed among themselves whether or not his nominal status as the sovereign should be left

intact. Communists, following the Kōza-ha theory, did not tolerate the emperor system under which, in their analysis, semi-feudal absolutism and bourgeois capitalism dominated society, and they aimed to overthrow it to achieve a Soviet-style socialist revolution. The great majority of the Japanese endorsed the retention and reform of the emperor institution as liberals and socialists suggested, rather than the republican option that communists sought for. They thus approved the new constitution which, while maintaining the monarchy, assigned only a symbolic role to the emperor.

The similarity between the thought of American progressives about the social impact of the emperor system and that of Japanese Kōza-ha Marxists was striking. Influenced by Kōza-ha Marxism, both E. H. Norman and Maruyama Masao argued that the Japanese national polity, *kokutai*, headed by the emperor framed not only the political structure but also determined moral values; since service to the state/ sovereign was considered moral, the Japanese, without a sense of guilt, but rather out of a sense of loyalty, automatically executed state policies, which were often inhuman and brutal to Japanese and foreign nationals. Norman unequivocally supported the abolition of the emperor system, and Maruyama indicated his wish for the same. Both thinkers also touched on the issue of individualism that appeared missing in feudalistic Japan. By doing so, Norman probably reinforced the stereotypical image of the collectivist and backward Japanese among Americans and simply explained why the elimination of the emperor institution would be necessary to democratize Japan. Less materialist and determinist than Norman and Kōza-ha Marxists, Maruyama was very concerned about the absence of the independent self in Japanese society, which he saw as crucial to the construction of a mature civil society. For him, modernization required complete reform of Japan's social structure AND the mentality of

individual Japanese, and the destruction of *kokutai* was one important way to promote the establishment of a modern man.

Considering that almost all Japanese politicians and thinkers except communists favored liberalization of the constitutional monarchy and so did public opinion, the US decision – or, more precisely, the decision of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas MacArthur – not to forcefully remove the emperor system was politically right and just to the occupied people. US intervention in constitutional amendment gave leverage to those Japanese groups that were already willing to stipulate the emperor’s “actual” role only as a nominal head, rather than to those who insisted on leaving on paper his theoretical power as the sovereign. Nevertheless, a middle ground was formed between these two schools of thought, which envisioned the emperor essentially as a ritual symbolic ruler like the British king, and the SCAP draft constitution agreed to such native intellectual currents. The conventional narrative that focuses on the failure of the “conservative” Japanese government to make a liberal constitution and SCAP’s intervention in constitutional revision misses this significant confluence of thought that, in my opinion, explains the success of the reform and the survival of the postwar constitution.

Discourses on alliance-making between the United States and Japan were probably more controversial than the debate about the treatment of post-surrender Japan. If the Americans and the Japanese – willingly or unwillingly – accepted the Occupation and agreed with the advisability of democratization reforms of Japan, they had different ideas about the post-Occupation relationship between the United States and Japan. Part III has shown that these discussions in America and in Japan developed out of Wilsonianism, which had defined the fundamental

principles of US foreign policy and reshaped international relations since World War I.

Disagreements originated out of the divergences from the Wilsonian vision due to the beginning of the Cold War. When Cold War hostility emerged toward the end of the Second World War, American policy was reformulated to deal with the new situation. Accordingly, US policy for Japan became a matter under reconsideration beginning in 1947. The departure from the wartime peace plan triggered contention among Americans and Japanese. In the course of America's policy change during the early Cold War, both struggled to redefine Japan's role in Asia.

American progressives, who were staunch supporters of Franklin D. Roosevelt's plan for a postwar Asia, were disquieted by the Truman administration's transformation of the plan. Believing in the value of weakening a militarist Japan, propping up China as a force for stability, and helping to gradually decolonize and develop Asia, progressive critics opposed the so-called Reverse Course that put Japan's economic rehabilitation ahead of political reform. Dissatisfied with the "moderate" Occupation policy for the Japanese ruling class from the very beginning of the Occupation, they never thought that Japan could become fully democratized unless the political and business elites were wiped out. Anticipating that Japanese militarism would likely return under the current conditions and predicting that the new Occupation goal of reconstructing Japan's industry would simply assist that outcome, the progressives disapproved the policy shift. The conservatives, who never considered the cause of Japanese militarism to be deeply rooted in Japanese society and culture, did not think it necessary, or even possible, for foreign occupiers to completely change Japan. They were worried less about the return of militarism than about the effect of economic instability, namely the growth of leftist radicalism, on the undergoing democratization of Japan. Consequently, they justified the US government's efforts to rebuild

Japanese industry. In contrast to the progressives, the conservatives approved the Truman administration's new Asia policy, which sought to reassign the role of regional leadership to Japan, rather than China, and strengthen, rather than weaken, Japan's industrial power. But both groups believed in democracy and capitalism, a faith that set them against Communism, and in America's role in developing and stabilizing Asia. Even if they were skeptical of the military aspect of a US-Japan alliance and of the policy of severing ties between mainland China and Japan, both conservatives and progressives agreed on the place of Japan in Asia under the containment policy and thus accommodated the US peace and security alliances with Japan.

The peace and security treaty debate was more intense and divided in Japan. Under the leadership of the Peace Study Group began the movement for an overall peace and unarmed neutrality. Various intellectuals, as well as politicians, demanded that Japan should make peace with all the Allies – including Communist Russia and China – and maintain a neutral status even without armed forces of its own. In their view, forging friendships with all the Allied powers would clear many obstacles to Japan's peaceful living. It would remove the seeds of an unnecessary war; it would allow Japan to expand trade opportunities – especially with China – and thus to reconstruct its domestic economy. Overtures with all the major members of the Allies would eventually enable Japan to enter the United Nations and leave its national defense to UN forces. All Japanese agreed that these were ideal case scenarios. But some people viewed US-Soviet reconciliation as impossible and argued instead for a separate peace, which meant a peace without the Soviet Union and perhaps China as well, and a bilateral security alliance with the United States. The outbreak of the Korean War convinced this group that the Cold War in Asia had reached the point of no return and a partial peace and security pact with the United States

were the only and best workable plan for Japan. More Japanese and even those who were the Peace Study Group members came to agree with this opinion and approved the San Francisco peace and the US-Japan security pact in the end.

The Japanese were also searching for their country's place in the changing external environment. Even when the Grand Alliance was breaking down, those who demanded an overall peace and unarmed neutrality continued to view international relations in the framework of the Rooseveltian postwar peace, and to believe that the defeated and demilitarized Japan should reenter the world as a country totally committed to the cause of peace. In contrast, those who accepted a partial peace and security alliance with the United States situated Japan in the divided world and imagined Japan could obtain a new footing by joining in the "Free World." Inevitably, the policy of the main occupier, the United States, would determine peace terms; even so, the Japanese ideologically sided more with the United States and Western Europe than with the Soviet Union. The Japanese sought capitalist democracy rather than Communist democracy. Even if they did not necessarily believe that a militant approach should be taken against the Communist bloc, both peace groups commonly sensed the Communist threat from without or within, the former from the Soviet Union, the latter from domestic communists. In addition, the Japanese, all interested in securing commercial opportunities in Asia, expected the United States to use its economic power to promote regional development. Thus, they also subsumed Japan under the US Cold War scheme.

What distinguished the Japanese debate from that in America was Japanese intellectuals' unyielding challenge to power politics and devotion to their role in enlightening the public. While American Asia experts were all "realist" thinkers who disagreed about what policy would be

pragmatic, many Japanese intellectuals were idealists who countered the concept of realpolitik and tried to warn the people of the falseness and risk of such thinking. They also pointed out the danger of succumbing to the given “reality” and “pragmatically” choosing a way out from limited options. Japanese intellectuals strongly believed that doing this was their mission. Reflecting upon the recent conflict, they deeply regretted not doing enough to stop war and thus committed themselves to fulfilling their duty this time. Their negation of realism and their moralistic stance never dispelled security concerns, fueled by the Korean War, however. Nevertheless, their activities in behalf of an overall peace and unarmed neutrality, corresponding to their general fear of another war, had large resonance in the public. Without their collective action, the movement for a comprehensive peace and neutralism might have been less widespread and less powerful.

In fact, in terms of the issue of war and peace, American liberals – both conservatives and progressives – were militant by postwar Japanese standards. Having been completely defeated in World War II, occupied, and demilitarized, and having accepted the pacifist constitution afterwards, the Japanese developed a strong anti-war ideology, which viewed a military force itself, not to mention involvement in overseas hostilities, as absolutely impermissible and wrong. Americans had fewer reasons to develop an aversion to war and resistance to force. They believed their participation in the war was just, and saw victory as the fruit of overwhelming military power. War became a legitimate means to achieve peace. Americans do not seem to have ever fundamentally challenged this idea during or after the Cold War. Indeed, the Japanese and the Americans have lived in different “pacifist” paradigms after World War II; one has denied resort to force for the maintenance of peace, and the other has completely justified it.

Japanese public discussions regarding the Occupation and post-Occupation terms

represent another area of divergence from American thinking. The Japanese side was naturally more dynamic than Americans'. These events directly affected Japan's political and social life, national newspapers and general magazines featured them, and the people in all walks of life were more eager to pay attention to public debates. US policies toward Japan, however, were only one facet of US foreign affairs, and once the war with Japan ended, it was not a serious daily concern to Americans. Also, Japanese intellectuals played a more influential role in raising public awareness. As the constitutional discussion and the peace and security treaty debate showed, intellectuals from various backgrounds participated in them. They were tied to the political realm but also very active in society. American Asia experts, on the other hand, were only a fraction of the intelligentsia and more closely connected to the state than the Japanese counterparts. Even if they publicly expressed their opinions, the scale of their activities was much smaller, and their purpose seems to have been to add some pressure to the policymakers rather than to educate and influence the public. Thus, unfamiliar with Japan and less interested in the country, ordinary Americans could not be real participants in public discourse and essentially followed US government policy for Japan.

Despite such differences, Japan's political and intellectual culture was more akin to that of the United States and Western Europe than to the Soviet Union. Certainly, this does not mean that culturally dissimilar countries do not establish amicable relations. Yet, it is important to note that common ground was formed in favor of social democracy and revisionist capitalism rather than Communism in Japan and in the United States and many European countries. Many Japanese in the "conservative" and "progressive" camps – prewar liberals, socialists, and a younger generation of liberals called Modernists – basically stood for the expansion of political

and social rights and state intervention in the economy; as American liberals, the conservative and progressive groups of American Asia experts both espoused similar values. Accordingly, as to postwar Japan, both sides imagined it to become democratic without taking a Communist path. In addition, both Japanese and Americans shared the ideas of Wilsonian internationalism – the belief in liberal democracy, open commerce, decolonization, and international cooperation to maintain peace. Thus, distinguishing the disputants of the peace and security issues as pro-American/ anti-American or Cold Warriors/ Cold War critics tends to exaggerate their differences. They all believed in American internationalist ideas but simply disagreed over specific policies – or ways to implement those ideas.

My attempts to put 1940s-early 1950s American and Japanese cultures in a broader international context while identifying major currents of intellectual thought in each nation yield a revisionist interpretation of the history of this period. I not only diverge from the approaches of political and diplomatic history, but I also question and challenge the dominant scholarly perspectives as well. Interestingly enough, scholars of the Occupation of Japan have critically missed the Eurocentricism that colored the outlook of wartime American experts, and failed to see that they were all modernization theorists of one stripe or another. American revisionist scholars of the 1960s-1970s, like John W. Dower, who identified themselves with wartime “progressives,” have attacked the “conservatives” for siding with the Japanese “conservative” leaders and advocating only “moderate” reforms and for eventually abandoning reform to support the Reverse Course. Dower in particular has argued that ethnocentrism had prevented American conservatives from believing in the need for and possibility of sweeping democratization reforms in post-surrender Japan. In addition, Dower harshly criticized his mentor at Harvard University

Edwin O. Reischauer, who had been a member of the conservative camp; Dower not only pointed out the inadequacy of modernization theory that Reischauer shaped his approach to Japanese history, but, equally important, castigated the theory as the working ideology of American foreign intervention and accused the theorists of being Cold Warriors. But, in fact, 1930s-1940s American progressives, most of whom were non-specialists on Japan, were more ethnocentric than conservatives. Believing in the backwardness of Japanese culture and having little faith in the Japanese people's capability to democratize their own country, the progressives called for active intervention in Japanese society. Also, they themselves applied Marxian modernization theory to the model and goal of American-style democracy and capitalism.

It is also surprising that American revisionists of the Vietnam era have been so uncritical of the Wilsonian internationalist ideology that wartime American Asia experts all shared and that the progressives used to rationalize America's punitive and interventionist policy for Japan. The premise was that the use of American power to defeat and reform Japan was absolutely desirable and justifiable for the sake of peace, order, and prosperity. The method proposed by the progressives based on this presumption is highly questionable. Their enthusiastic advocacy of "revolution," or chaos-induced occupation, by empowering Japanese leaders who were not particularly popular or experienced in administration, reflected what "they" wanted to force on Japan and not necessarily what the majority of the Japanese people might have wanted. As I have shown, there were "conservative" elements in the Japanese liberal and socialist camps, and the people were inclined to support them; although many Marxist-influenced radical thinkers and activists emerged in postwar Japan and they contributed to moving the center of the Japanese political spectrum leftward, the Japanese as a whole were still less revolutionary-minded than

American progressives and revisionists expected them to be. That the great majority of the Japanese desired to retain the emperor system is one such example. In effect, the American progressives' attitude toward the democratization of Japan contradicted one of the objectives of the Potsdam Declaration, which stipulated that a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" should be "established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." As Andrew Roth admitted, the progressives were well aware that occupation and forceful reform of Japan was essentially a "selfish" project to meet the Allies' interests, and yet they never doubted its nobleness and justified the means used to attain the ends. Their idealistic policy for postwar Japan was not only one-sided, but also politically naïve and irresponsible. To realize their vision, many progressives recommended doing something more radical than what the native population might desire, without hesitating to risk social order. They clearly neglected the importance of maintaining stability and of seeking cooperation from local people in the land they would occupy and administer.

Idealization of these progressives by later American revisionist scholars leads us to an ironic observation: a younger generation of 1960s-1970s scholars who valued Wilsonian idealism also supported America's cultural imperialism. They were right to point out the connections between the Reverse Course and the US containment policy for Asia and to identify that overall policy with a cause of later US involvement in Vietnam. American and Japanese "conservatives" who lent their general support of the Occupation policy shift thus gave the revisionist scholars a good reason to label them "Cold Warriors." However, as I have already discussed, the progressives' opposition to the Reverse Course did not necessarily mean that they were against the Cold War altogether. Besides, the progressives were motivated by biases against Japanese society

and culture and eagerness to revenge the enemy and to recreate the Asia-Pacific order. By dismissing this point and agreeing with the progressives that the US Occupation authorities should have reformed Japan more than they actually did, the revisionists, too, have excused intervention in and social engineering of a foreign nation in the name of peace and democracy. It is hard for me to accept a view of them as having challenged the dominant ideology of American foreign policy in itself, whether it was their intention or not, though they certainly succeeded in revealing some evil aspects of US involvement in international affairs.

The evaluations of the American progressives and conservatives by Japanese diplomatic and political historians are opposite to those of American revisionist scholars. Japanese scholars portray the progressives as pro-China radicals or New Dealers who tried to change Japan out of both cultural biases and idealistic motives. Simultaneously, Japanese researchers appreciate the wisdom and success of the conservatives, or the pro-Japan group, who knew better about Japan, made efforts to parry and modify the punitive demands from the progressives.

However, Japanese scholars are also impressed by the efficient organization of America's post-surrender policy-planning, the quality of policy drafts which became the basic Occupation directives, and the Americans' ability to administer and reform Japan. Leading diplomatic and political scholars – all old enough to have experienced the war and/ or the Occupation – have critically studied Japanese politics and diplomacy between the 1930s and 1945 and admitted that it was ultimately the fault of the Japanese government that Japan entered war with the United States. They thus accept Japan's total defeat and the subsequent Allied Occupation and various demilitarization and democratization projects. Their acceptance also comes from their appraisal that historically speaking, the Occupation of Japan was fairly well-done, and their view that

reforms were necessary and beneficial to the modernization of the country. Thus, they themselves believe in the legitimacy of the Wilsonian international order that Japan had tried to challenge in the 1930s-1945 and of modernization themes.

Some Japanese scholars do not take a critical stance toward American progressives: they are, like American revisionists, unsuspecting of the progressives' reformist idealism and wish that the democratization of Japan during the Occupation could have been more radical than it actually was. By arguing this way, they not only accept the criminality of Japan's overseas aggression, the legitimacy of the foreign occupation of Japan, and the necessity for democratization reforms; they clearly excuse active foreign intervention in Japan's modernization. Like everyone else, they, too, share the view of the modernization theorist and take for granted the justice of Wilsonian idealism.

Considering the political and intellectual discourse of immediate post-surrender Japan, the postwar Japanese scholarship on the Asia-Pacific War and the Allied Occupation makes sense. As I have showed, the Japanese themselves – from prewar liberal to Marxist – were modernization theorists. Once Japan was defeated and was placed under Allied control, they critically reflected on Japan's incomplete modernity to which they attributed the war's causes in one way or another and envisioned fostering the modernization process. As a lesson from World War II, many Japanese also learned not to digress from the dominant international order and to fit Japan into America's Wilsonian vision. Living in this culture, postwar scholars have carried basically the same perspectives. Having grown up in postwar Japan, I am aware of the predominance of such interpretative narratives and its influence on myself. The recurrent and never resolved issues of "war responsibility" and constitutional revision, particularly concerning Article 9, and the continued US-Japan security alliance are evidence that these discussions are still

heavily affected by the WWII paradigm, and here lies the reason why many scholars question if the “postwar” has ever ended.


In this work, I have reexamined the remaking of the US-Japan relationship in the early postwar period by removing the subject from “postwar” periodization and placing it in a larger context of modernist culture that both the Americans and the Japanese – and many other peoples in the world – inhabited. In so doing, I have tried to depoliticize and objectify the subject and thereby provide a fresh way of looking at it. I have also redefined and clarified various labels such as “conservative” and “progressive,” whose meanings have been prescribed in the postwar culture. A transnational and comparative approach de-Americanizes our view and refocuses on Japanese perspectives, too. I have shown that the postwar relationship between the United States and Japan sprang from shared modernist cultures. Both peoples developed parallel ideas out of separate contexts and essentially for their own good. They were not perfectly identical but compatible. Of course, cultural factors alone do not determine foreign relations; cultural affinities do not guarantee friendship; neither do cultural differences preclude chance of peace. Domestic politics and economic interests affect foreign affairs, but to the extent that ideology frames our world views and interest calculations, cultural studies of diplomatic relations can be of great value. Thus, by illuminating the intersecting cultures of modernity in which the postwar relationship between the United States and Japan was shaped – and which have also informed the scholarship on the subject – this work has suggested a new way of studying postwar US-Japan relations, one that until now has been dominated by the fields of political and diplomatic history. As historians of foreign relations have enriched their studies by incorporating the approaches of intellectual and cultural history, the history of the post-1945 American-Japanese relationship can

take a new turn to this direction as well for further analysis and development.


APPENDIX 1

POLITICAL SPECTRUM GRAPHS: JAPAN

Prewar Japan (-1945)




Postwar Japan (1945-)




APPENDIX 2

POLITICAL SPECTRUM GRAPHS: AMERICA

America (1930s-)



America (late 1960s-)



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