THE BRITISH ROLE IN THE SECOND COALITION AGAINST FRANCE 1797 - 1802

by

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Donald N. Lammers

Date: January 9, 1965
PREFACE

In this brief account of the participation of the British in the Second Coalition against France, I have stressed the English foreign relations with the monarchies of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Little mention has been made of the position played by the British in Naples, despite extensive use of the letters of Sir Arthur Paget, the English minister at that Court, nor has more than a brief reference to Napoleon's Egyptian Campaign been included. Further, in an attempt to limit the span of the paper, no reference has been made to the greatest domestic problem faced by the government of William Pitt at this time - the Union with Ireland. In spite of these omissions, I hope to have presented an accurate picture of the coalition in action and to have given the impression that the alliance was destroyed by its own internal jealousies and dissentions as much as by the growing strength of the French Consulate.

I would especially like to thank Dr. Donald Lammers for the extensive time he devoted to the reading and correction of the several versions of this thesis and both Dr. Lammers and Dr. Robert Vignery for their many helpful suggestions.

J.G.T.
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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to explore the British diplomatic and military involvement in the Second Coalition against the French Directory and, after 1799, the Consulate. First the positions of Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain after the disastrous first anti-French coalition are considered. The struggle of the English to form a new coalition in the face of a threatened invasion by the Republican forces was hampered by an Anglo-Austrian financial dispute and the bitter mutual distrust of Prussians and Austrians. Further French aggressions in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Italy presented a threat to the interests of all of the future coalition members and forced them into first a defensive and later an offensive alliance. In the beginning the British-subsidized coalition made rapid gains and seemed likely to defeat the French. However, internal dissention led by jealousies and misinformation soon estranged the Allies just as France was strengthened by a new administration. The Russians withdrew from the coalition after several incidents of poor treatment from the British and Austrians alike. Austria was thoroughly defeated by the consular armies, and Britain, alone, negotiated the Treaty of Amiens with Napoleon. The attempt has been made to present all of these events from the viewpoint of English motives and activities; it has been based primarily upon the correspondence of Lord William Grenville, Foreign Minister of the Pitt administration.
When Girondist firebrands agitated in the National Assembly for a war against all tyrants, Europe was suddenly stunned by the spectre of the French Revolution militant. The execution of Louis XVI in January of 1793 made republican France an outcast among the monarchies of Europe, and the war against tyrants soon became a desperate struggle of a regicide nation for self preservation. Revolutionary enthusiasm, now transformed into aggressive patriotism, enabled the French to halt the Allied invasions of 1792-93, regain the initiative, and turn the war again from a defensive struggle into one of republican conquest. Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Holland, Sardinia, and Spain had formed a loose coalition because they felt menaced by the threat of further French expansion on the Continent. Their efforts proved ill-planned and irresolute, and were doomed to failure. By 1795, all of the Allied governments had sued the victorious French for peace.

At this time the Allies were prepared to grant moderate French annexations, for Austria, Prussia, and Russia had all profited territorially by the recent Polish partitions of 1772 and 1793. In April 1795, Frederick William II of Prussia made peace with France on terms which

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saved northern Germany from the ravages of war, but surrendered the
Netherlands and the left bank of the Rhine to the French Republic. Hol­
land, conquered and reconstructed as the Batavian Republic, submitted in
May, as did Russia, temporarily immersed in the consolidation of her
Polish provinces.

Austria had struggled on for two additional years with the help
of loans supplied by William Pitt's government, which was naively confi­
dent that financial ruin would soon force France to sue for peace.
Instead, British credit collapsed in the winter of 1796-97. By February
of 1797, the drain of the war forced the Bank of England to suspend cash
payments and to place credit payments on a paper basis. Austria, beaten
in the field and unable to pay her troops without British subsidies,
accepted Napoleon's terms when negotiations were held at Leoben. The
final Treaty of Campo Formio gave Venetia to Austria in exchange for a
secret agreement that France should occupy the left bank of the Rhine.

The British government, now isolated and dissatisfied with
Austria's conduct, sent Lord Malmesbury to Lille to negotiate a treaty
with the victorious Directory. England's control of the seas, her
colonial strength, and her commercial power seemed likely to offset the
French victories on the Continent, and the much desired peace, based on
mutual concessions, seemed imminent. During the conferences, however, a
coup d'etat in Paris placed the French government in the hands of a small
ruling Jacobin group which owed its supremacy to the strength of the army,
which was living on the plunder of foreign conquests. The Directors
terminated the negotiations at Lille by presenting extravagant demands.
The war with France had left the British government in a dangerous position, compounded of military defeats, an enormous debt, political isolation and popular discontent. The year 1795 marked the beginning of a long period of monetary difficulty. With the extensive debt left by the war and the need to maintain a large navy and army until peace could be arranged, the Prime Minister, William Pitt, was forced to invent new measures to provide the necessary capital. Meanwhile, even though trade was flourishing, bad harvests had caused a scarcity of grain. In August 1797, wheat cost 108 s a quarter. On the opening of Parliament the same year, the King was greeted by cries of "Bread", "Peace", and "No Pitt."\(^2\) Fearful of civil rioting, the Cabinet extended the law of treason and introduced the Sedition Bill.

The budget of 1797 was least controversial at best. Pitt arranged for a new loan through the Bank of England to cover immediate government expenses. Taxes were trebled, and the Prime Minister planned to diffuse the additional taxes needed as extensively as possible on a graduated basis, excluding those least able to pay. This left heavy taxes on approximately 700,000 to 800,000 householders and heads of families. In addition, new duties were laid on tobacco, carriages and horses, and an income tax was proposed. Despite these drastic proposals the budget showed a deficit of L 22,000,000. The revenue measures were highly unpopular, and civil unrest was evident all over Britain.

The Ministry also encountered political opposition in Parliament. The New Whigs, headed by Charles James Fox and Richard Sheridan, were

\(^2\) Parliamentary History, XXXI, 1313.
pressing a campaign for parliamentary reform. They urged that a new ministry be formed that would end the Continental war, reestablish sound fiscal policies at home, and enlarge the franchise. Demands for peace and reform also came from radical clubs and great mass meetings. The Old Whigs, under the Duke of Portland, Burke, and William Wyndham, fearful of the possible results of widespread liberal reforms, reinforced Pitt's majority and voted repressive measures to put down the agitation.

While the internal situation in Britain looked menacing, Pitt and his Foreign Minister, Lord William Grenville, realized that the British recovery depended upon the security of knowing that the revolutionary doctrines of France were contained within her own boundaries. The territorial expansion of the French Republic already threatened British commercial interests in Holland. Therefore in late 1797, Lord Grenville began making discreet inquiries among the Continental powers in the search for potential allies.

Frederick William II of Prussia, whom the British never forgave for selling out the First Coalition, died in October of 1797, and Pitt and Grenville hoped that his heir, Frederick William III, could be persuaded to join Great Britain in a new war against France. The new king's wife, a princess of Mecklinburg-Strelitz, was the niece of Britain's Queen Charlotte, and Frederick William had always listened with deference to the Duke of Brunswick, brother-in-law of George III. Pitt, Grenville, and George III all believed that if the Duke could be persuaded to exert

3. William Wyndham Grenville (1759-1834) was the nephew of the Whig leader William Wyndham and a cousin of Pitt. He possessed a great deal of experience in the area of foreign policy and served as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1791 to 1801, when Pitt's ministry resigned.
his influence, Count Haugwitz, the Prussian minister who headed the peace party and who had negotiated the Treaty of Basle with France, could be overthrown. Then, perhaps, the young king would become the chief instrument in forming a quadruple alliance of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Britain. In November of 1797, M.de Luc, a prominent Swiss diplomat in British service, was sent to consult with the Duke of Brunswick and enlist his assistance.4

The Duke of Brunswick, while a man of unusual abilities in war and politics, was a timid negotiator. He wanted to retain George's good favor, yet he saw the risks and problems of this plan quite clearly. Reports to the British ministry from Hanoverian envoys at the Court of Berlin told of the Duke's timidity and dispelled British hopes of his favorable influence on Frederick William III. The Duke himself reported to George III that the conditions which had caused the late king to sign the Treaty of Basle still existed: the treasury was empty; there was mutual hatred and distrust between Austria and Prussia which all but prohibited effective cooperation between the two; there was discontent in the recently annexed Polish provinces which could flare into revolt momentarily; and finally, a British alliance would be unpopular in Prussia where the ruling class felt that British failure to make terms with France was due to selfish motives. As France controlled the Rhine, all her forces could easily be directed at Prussia before the Prussians could mobilize. The Prussians believed that their own interests could best be served by the conclusion of peace with France on the terms agreed

4. A detailed account is to be found in the Dropmore Papers, IV, 8.
to at Rastadt. Haugwitz told Brunswick that he felt it impossible to break the Treaty of Basle so long as France observed it faithfully. He was anxious to end Prussian isolation, however, and agreed to a defensive treaty. If the rumored plans of the French Directory to occupy Hanover and Hamburg were attempted, Prussia would resist this violation of neutrality to the utmost. The British Ministry had to be satisfied temporarily with this answer. Now British efforts in the search for allies shifted to St. Petersburg and Vienna.

Meanwhile, disputes had broken out at the Congress of Rastadt between Austria and Prussia. This conference had been called to establish compensation for the princes who were dispossessed by French annexation of the left bank of the Rhine. France proposed that the Prince of Orange, also dispossessed by French conquests, be compensated by the secularization of ecclesiastical lands in the Germanies. Austria violently protested confiscation of Church property and insisted that if the Prince of Orange were given indemnity in Germany for losses in Holland, then the Austrian Archduke, the Duke of Modena, was equally entitled to receive similar compensation for his losses in Italy. Despite his realization of the dangers further French aggressions would pose to continental Europe, this latest Austrian demand convinced Frederick William III as proof of the impossibility of an Austro-Prussian alliance. At the end of March, 1798, De Luc returned to London to report the deadlock to George III.5

The British search for allies was hurriedly intensified in the spring of 1798, when France invaded Switzerland and, after a prolonged

struggle, succeeded in abolishing its ancient constitution and substituted another of the latest Parisian pattern. With the support of a second French army, a democratic system was likewise established in Holland. A third army entered Rome, interned the Pope in a French prison, and converted the Ecclesiastical States into the Roman Republic. Austria watched the balance of power, so lately established at Campo Formio, being violently overthrown to her disadvantage. The King of Naples and Grand Duke of Tuscany, close relatives of the Austrian Emperor, appealed to Vienna for protection.

Baron Thugut, Imperial Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs for Austria, was a bitter enemy of the French Revolution and the Treaty of Campo Formio. He had remained in office only at the urgent request of Emperor Francis II, expecting to renew the war in more propitious times. The provocation from France came, however, before conditions in Austria had improved appreciably. The resources of the treasury had long been exhausted, and Austria's relations with Great Britain, the only power able to supply any monetary assistance, were strained to the breaking point. The British were considering the withdrawal of their minister from Vienna in February of 1798, due to Austria's attempted concealment of certain articles in Austria's recent treaties with France, which were believed to be prejudicial to British interests. In addition, Austria had failed to fulfill a prior financial agreement with the English. In 1796, Pitt's government had advanced L 1,600,000 to Vienna on the understanding that it was to be repaid by an Austrian loan raised in London. British public credit fell to a low point during the winter of 1796-97, while Britain's own needs were so
demanding that Pitt could not raise the repayment loan. By May, Britain's financial situation had been improved considerably by an increase in trade and the government's emergency tax measures, and a financial convention was made, which Count Starhemberg signed for Austria, but the Austrian government stubbornly refused to ratify the convention for fear of exciting the French; in addition, Baron Thugut believed there was a chance of raising the repayment funds on easier terms in the Germanies. Austria now faced an additional problem. She had allowed the interest on a £4,600,000 British loan made in 1795 to fall into arrears.

In April, Thugut wrote to Grenville stating that Austria declined direct discussion with Prussia concerning the difficulties encountered at Rastadt, and that he would refer all disputes to Czar Paul for mediation. Thugut and Francis II both felt that the aggression of the Directory could be halted only by a superior force. They suggested that Britain and Austria come to an understanding on certain points and form the basis for a quadruple alliance which would later be proposed to Czar Paul and the King of Prussia. However, Austria needed a British guarantee of financial subsidy, not a loan, in a liberal amount for the preparation of her forces and the aid had to be continued through 1799. The Emperor also pleaded for the dispatch of a British fleet to the Mediterranean to protect the King of Naples.

Pitt and Grenville eagerly welcomed the idea of a new coalition and promised to send a fleet to the Mediterranean if the Neapolitan ports would be open to it. They declined to discuss the subsidy until the Emperor had ratified the Convention of 1797, thus recognizing Austria's previous debts, and declared that British confidence could be restored only if Austria disclosed the secret articles of Campo Formio.
The diplomatic deadlock was quickly broken when a Viennese mob pulled down the French tricolor during an attack on the embassy. General Bernadotte, the French Minister in Austria, was forced to flee the country. Thugut, now certain that war with France was imminent, sent M. Ransonet to London to arrange payment for the arrears on the interest of the 1795 Austrian loan, but he refused to ratify the financial convention until Britain named the amount of the subsidy she would pay. He feared to provoke the French further without being positive of possessing adequate means of resistance, and he also felt that Britain might demand the right to control the deployment of the Austrian troops, a concession the Imperial Government was quite unwilling to make.

Meanwhile, the British leaders had successfully persuaded the Prince of Orange to renounce his claims for compensation for his Dutch losses. M. de Luc returned to Brunswick to announce to Prussia and Austria that many of the independent princes in the Germanies had agreed to a personal meeting and to invite the ministers of the great monarchical powers to convene in Berlin to discuss a defensive alliance.

Czar Paul of Russia ruled the fourth of the monarchical powers which was to be involved in hostilities with Republican France. He had no material interests to serve by waging war against the French, but in his romantically oriented mind, he coveted the glory of being universally acclaimed as the champion of conservative principles and the savior of Europe. Paul yielded now to the appeals from Francis II and George III, sparing no efforts to bring Frederick William III into the coalition. He also attempted to strengthen the alliance by reconciling the British and Austrian governments.

The loose coalition which faced France gave little promise of a long life. Frederick William proved hesitant to commit Prussia at all, preferring to remain neutral. Austria realized the great need to join the coalition, but would be unable to do so without a promised British subsidy, as the Austrian treasury could not support her own armies. The British, who were urging the entire project, were already annoyed with Vienna due to Thugut's attitude concerning the repayment of past loans. Parliament would almost certainly require some guarantee that any additional financial grants would be used along lines that coincided with British policy and that Britain would be able to exercise some control over the deployment of the Imperial troops. This condition Francis II had already refused.

The situation in France in 1797 under the Directory seemed to favor even this weak coalition, however. The country was submerged in almost hopeless bankruptcy, originating partially from two fiscal innovations of the National Assembly: abolition of indirect internal taxation (which had constituted one-third of the revenue for the French monarchy) and the transfer of the assessments of direct taxation to local authorities, who often neglected the thankless duty. The gap between the public revenue and expenditures was covered by enormous emissions of assignats, which swamped the money market and fell rapidly in value as a medium of exchange. Under the dictatorship of the Committee of Public Safety all of the difficulties were overcome by placing the entire population and all property of France under requisition for the public safety (1794-95). Popular reaction after the death of Robespierre caused the wholesale confiscation policy to be abandoned. The new Directory
resorted to additional issues of paper money, and, when these lost value, repudiated the national debt. During 1798, all of the taxation proceeds and resources of public credit together did not suffice to provide half the funds necessary for public expenditures. Army contractors, public functionaries, and other creditors were either not paid at all or paid only by "bills of arrears" to be held until money came into the treasury or exchanged for unsold government-held lands. A progressive, forced loan designed by the Directory to stop speculation in government currency failed in its object and swelled the public clamor. The armies, unpaid, ill-fed, and unsupplied with winter gear and sufficient munitions, could hardly be held together. Reinforcements, which were supplied by conscription, abandoned their colors almost immediately and covered the roads as beggars. The government lived from hand to mouth as best it could.7

Thus 1797-98 saw Great Britain, still weakened financially and militarily from the unsuccessful struggles of the first coalition, seeking a defensive alliance with Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Unfortunately the Prussians were reluctant to break their treaties with France, and the Austrians, although anxious to join England, desperately needed financial subsidies to participate. Russia under Czar Paul I was the only power to ally itself with the British unconditionally. The French Republic which was to face this loose alliance seemed to offer an immediate threat to their security, and the monarchies soon began to

7. This summary is based on comments in Thiers' Consulate and Empire translated by P. Lanfrey (12 vols. London, 1893-94). Although this account is essentially true, Thiers often exaggerated the hopelessness of the pre-Napoleonic decade to emphasize the improvements brought by the accession of his hero to power.
search for a defensive alliance guaranteeing their mutual boundaries. Within weeks, further French aggressions in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Italy would prompt them to seek an offensive alliance as well.
When the Conference of Four Powers opened in 1798, Great Britain had not yet settled her dispute with Austria. Vienna had found it necessary to avoid a war which she could not support financially and therefore had conceded most of the demands the French had made in reprisal for the mob attack on their embassy. Top Austrian diplomats were sent to negotiate the details of these concessions at Rastadt. The Directory's representatives at the Conference made further demands that were totally unexpected. They demanded all of the islands of the Rhine, control of commerce along the river, the possession of Cassel and Kehl on the right bank, and destruction of the fortresses along the German banks. The Prussians were now violently alarmed and thoroughly surprised when Austria, intent on avoiding war at all costs, refused to protest. The Prussians believed that French demands endangered Northern Germany, and Frederick William III began to consider yielding to British pressure and joining the coalition.

In Britain during April of 1798, Henry Dundas, the Minister of War, was hurriedly organizing the nation's forces to repel a threatened invasion from France. In a message to Parliament on April 20, 1798, the King reported that "preparations for the embarkation of troops and war-like stores were being carried out with considerable activity in the

1. The basic sources for this chapter are: Dropmore Papers, volume IV, Cobbett's Parliamentary History, volume XXXIII, and the English Historical Documents, edited by A. Aspinal and E. Anthony Smith, (12 vols; New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), XI.
ports of France, Flanders, and Holland with the avowed design of attempting invasion of his majesty's domains." He advised full use of the volunteer and professional forces of the nation for defense. Lord Grenville and Pitt both urged the support of national defense, while Arthur Young wrote fiery, patriotic pamphlets declaring that though "the navy could become the sport of tempests, and the regular troops may be defeated, England will never be overrun for every man that has a horse is part of a corps of cavalry, and her infantry is as numerous as her population." In a lighter vein, Young estimated that "if propriety would allow, enough fox-hunting parsons could be raised to form many an active corps."\(^2\)

The great invasion never came; in February Napoleon, who was to command the attacking forces, reported to the Directory, "Make what effort we will, we shall not for many years gain naval supremacy. To make a descent on England without being master of the sea is the boldest and most difficult task imaginable."\(^3\) The French general then turned his full attention to preparations of the magnificent scheme for the conquest of the East - the Egyptian Campaign.

Pitt wrote to Lord Grenville early in June announcing the French fleet's departure from Toulon on May 19, in the evident belief that it had sailed for Ireland. The next word of the whereabouts of the French fleet arrived with the news of the capitulation of Malta. From French

\(^2\) The King's Message to Parliament, Cobbett's Parliamentary History, XXXIII, 1421. 
\(^3\) Arthur Young, "National Danger and the Means of Safety", English Historical Documents, XI, 73. 
accounts, it is clear that the Grand Master, Ferdinand de Hompesch betrayed his Order to the French for a large bribe. The fortress of La Valletta was so strong that General Caffarelli, commander of the French artillery, declared upon entering, "How lucky for us that we had a friend inside to open the gates."\(^5\)

The British fleet was greatly impeded in the pursuit of the French as it lacked access to a friendly port in the Mediterranean and could not secure needed supplies and repairs. Those ports not actually in French hands were usually being threatened by that Republic with reprisals if they allowed the British to dock. The Anglo-Austrian agreement to grant Naples protection produced favorable results later in June, when the Queen of Naples promised covert help.\(^6\) Soon thereafter, a defensive treaty was signed between Austria and the King of Naples, further encouraging the opening of Neapolitan ports to Britain in defiance of the French.

While the Conference of Four Powers assembled, the French leaders took counsel among themselves. Though they realized that the Four Powers were still divided among themselves and distrustful of one another, France was unable to capitalize upon the situation. The Republic was still close to bankruptcy, and her recent aggressions in Switzerland and Italy had left her disorganized. Her victorious armies and great generals were scattered: Napoleon was in Egypt; Hocke was dead; Pichegru was in exile, and Moreau had been deprived of command for failing to expose

\(^5\) Lord Kieth enclosed this account in a letter to Lord Grenville, undated. *Dropmore Papers*, IV.

\(^6\) Caroline of Naples to Lady Hamilton, forwarded to Grenville, June 18, 1798. *Ibid*, IV, 237.
Pichegru's treason. The vacancies had temporarily been filled by inferior officers who plundered the occupied countries without mercy, embezzled military funds, and often left their troops without needed supplies to forage as they could. The Directory had passed conscription laws to fill the vacancies in the ranks, making every French man between 20 and 25 years of age liable for service in the army or navy. The 20,000 troops who were recruited could not be trained, armed, and equipped for several months. To calm the ruffled nerves of her neighbors and thus gain valuable time, the French ministers at Rastadt were ordered to withdraw the harsh demands on the Germanies which had so angered Prussia.

In July, Czar Paul, infuriated by the expulsion from Malta of the Order of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, of which he was the self-styled protector, instructed Count Woronzow, his London ambassador, to begin negotiations with the British government for an offensive treaty. Pitt in a letter to Grenville welcomed the proposals and stated Britain's terms: "On the condition of Russia furnishing an army of 60,000 men, we should engage to pay L 300,000 preparation money on the ratification, or if necessary, the signature of the treaty; and afterwards L 100,000 per month, with the power of discontinuing payment on a notice and advance of two months; and should also pay after the war, as a debt, a further sum to be computed at the rate of L 50,000 per month for the time the treaty shall be acted upon."^7

Doubts subsequently arose in Pitt's mind as to whether a return to the system of subsidizing foreign powers would be tolerated in Britain. 8 Richard Sheridan, usually an eloquent critic of the Administration, sided

with the government in the subsidy case arguing that while the nation was threatened by invasion from France or Ireland a national emergency required the support of all British subjects. When the situation eased, however, he returned to his stand that the French had a right to choose their own form of internal government and to express their views on government freely. A war fought only to restore the French monarchy should be opposed by all in his estimation. The majority in Parliament supported the Prime Minister, agreeing that this was an emergency situation, but the debates on foreign subsidies grew longer and stormier with each such proposal. In the end Grenville's foreign subsidy policy prevailed until it met with an unexpected obstacle in St. Petersburg.

Austria had sent Count Cobentzl to Russia with a request for Czar Paul's mediation in two matters essential in Austria's plans: first, to prevail upon Frederick William of Prussia to guarantee the neutrality of the German states, thus leaving Austria free to prepare for action in Italy and Switzerland; secondly, to obtain a promise of adequate subsidy from England before the ratification of the Convention of May 1797. In a letter on August 30, Paul instructed Count Woronzow to offer his mediation between Austria and Britain so that the two might resolve their quarrel and present a united front against their mutual enemy. Grenville explained to the Czar that Pitt could spare only L 2,000,000 for foreign subsidies during the next year, of which L 200,000 went to Portugal, L 500,000 to the free Swiss cantons, and L 100,000 per month went to Russia. This was the entire amount Parliament would grant. Britain felt that by maintaining the Mediterranean fleet at a cost of L 1,500,000 both

Austria and Naples would be materially aided. Pitt and Grenville realized that Parliament would hardly subsidize Austria while she failed to discharge her prior financial obligations. They assured Paul that if he could convince the Emperor to ratify the Convention of 1797, Britain would enter into an alliance covering military operations in Switzerland, naval operations in the Mediterranean, and modes of deploying the subsidized Russian armies.\footnote{10}

The Czar was furious at this answer, especially as it was evident that the British economy was recovering its elasticity and could probably provide the additional subsidy demanded with little effort. Finally, however, Count Woronzow was able to convince Paul that the British Parliament made and broke ministries at will and would not permit any dealings with Vienna until the old engagements were fulfilled. Lord Loughborough's description of the problem further reassured Paul of the British position:\footnote{11}

\begin{quote}
The obstinacy of the Court of Vienna seems so perfectly irrational as well as unjust, that I strongly suggest that either Monsieur Thugut has misunderstood or Sir Morton Eden has ill explained the object of his instructions to insist on the ratification of the Convention of May, 1797. M. Thugut stated that his Imperial Majesty's finances were in such a state as to permit no idea of fulfilling at present the engagement of that convention... all this seems to imply that the ratification was to be followed up by an immediate repayment of the money due according to that convention. Our idea, I think, was only to require an avowal of the engagement in form, but to give every reasonable allowance for the pecuniary difficulties of Austria and forebear insisting on immediate payment.
\end{quote}

While the Anglo-Austrian quarrel was doomed to remain unsettled temporarily, the Czar was assured that the British Ministry was not deliberately antagonizing the Austrians.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[10] Lord Grenville to Count Woronzow, August, 1798, \textit{Ibid}, IV; 297.
\end{footnotes}
In late August of 1798, word arrived in London of Napoleon's landing in Egypt. The Turkish Porte declared war against France early in September, and Czar Paul sent a fleet and army to the Sultan's assistance. Lord Grenville immediately dispatched Sir Sidney Smith and Colonel Kochler, both of whom had served with distinction in the East, to help the Turks on sea and land.

The news of Admiral Nelson's victory at Aboukir Bay on August 1, 1798, which cut Bonaparte's Egyptian army off from a route of retreat and also from supplies from France, began to encourage the resistance of countries overrun by the French armies. The Maltese rose against the French garrison and forced them to remain in the fortress of Valetta. The British Mediterranean fleet supplied the rebels and blockaded the island to prevent French reinforcements reaching it. Paul and the British Ministry made an agreement that Malta, once recovered, would be defended by a mixed force of Russians, British, and Neapolitan troops. In a letter to Sir Arthur Paget at Naples, Sir Charles Whitworth, the British Minister in St. Petersburgh, outlined Paul's plans to reorganize and restore the Order of St. John to its governing position on Malta as soon as the French forces there were completely subdued.12

Naples began to arm openly in defiance of French demands. A party of Dutch federalists applied to Rufus King, British minister in that area, for aid in freeing Holland from French occupation. They

insisted on excluding the Prince of Orange from the country, though, and Grenville could not accept this proposal; the negotiations temporarily fell through.13

A most important change in Prussia's foreign policy came at this point. The aggression of the French Directory had thrown the King of Prussia, the Duke of Brunswick, and Count Haugwitz into ever increasing alarm for the safety of Northern Germany. War seemed to be merely a matter of time, and Haugwitz and the Duke were able to convince Frederick William that bolder action might easily be taken without much additional risk. The Prussians still did not feel that they had justifiable reasons to break their neutrality without any direct provocation, but they told the Czar, through Count Panin, the leading Russian minister, that they would intervene in Holland to help with the expulsion of the French once hostilities opened between Austria and France. Haugwitz concluded this proposal with a note to Lord Grenville stating that all Prussian action would depend upon the assistance Britain could give. Exemplifying a new spirit of cooperation, the Duke of Brunswick then drew up a plan by which the Prince of Orange would be restored to power in Holland through the joint action of Britain and Prussia.14 Prussia promised to intervene as soon as Austria and the allies declared war on France. Britain, however, did not want to make a separate agreement with Prussia. Lord Grenville wrote to Count Woronzow, the Russian Minister in London, that only by

joining the Quadruple Alliance could Prussia derive benefit from the L 2,000,000, which was all Britain could spare for the subsidy of foreign powers. 15

The King of Prussia now began seriously to consider joining the coalition, but he insisted that the goals of the alliance and the aims of its members be set down in writing beforehand. The Czar, as the only member of the loosely-knit group entirely trusted by all the others, was to draft the articles of coalition and present them to the Courts of Vienna and Berlin. Lord Grenville presented the following provisions as Britain's goals: first, that France be reduced to her pre-revolutionary boundaries; secondly, that a union be created of Holland and Belgium and the new country be under the government of the Prince of Orange; third, that Switzerland regain her independence; fourth, that the integrity of the German states be guaranteed, and that Austria should be given the control of Lombardy, while Prussia should be asked what territorial compensation she required. While asking no direct compensation for Britain, the proposals would create a unified and strengthened Netherlands under a government friendly to Britain, would assure the English the freedom of Channel trade, give them an entrance port for commercial transactions in Europe, and act as a buffer state against further French expansion. Turkey's quarrel with France and the alliance with England opened new prospects for British trade in the Levant. Grenville fully expected to keep any of the French colonies captured by the British fleets once hostilities commenced.

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At Naples, disaster quickly overtook the hope raised by the destruction of the French fleet in Egypt. The presence of Nelson's fleet in the Neapolitan harbor had put the direction of affairs into the hands of the war party which was led by the Queen. General Mack, leading the Neapolitan army, proceeded to take advantage of the weakened and dispersed state of the French armies in Italy and crossed the Ecclesiastical States in November with 40,000 troops, quickly occupying Rome. But, the French armies under General Championnet and General Macdonald rallied and drove the Neapolitans back to Volturno where, despite a strong position, General Mack lost heart and fled to the French camp. The King and Queen of the Two Sicilies, being without protection, fled to Sicily on Nelson's flagship. The leaderless Neapolitan army disbanded. The city of Naples was taken and transformed into the capital of the Parthenopian Republic.

On December 30, 1798, the Czar replied to Lord Grenville's coalition proposals, saying that he would send an army of 45,000 Russian cavalry and artillery to assist the Prussians in Holland, for which Britain would advance L 400,000 (L 225,000 for preparation and L 37,000 per month). He agreed that Holland and Belgium should be united under the Prince of Orange, and that Prussia should be allowed to enlarge her territory by acquisitions along the French borders. He suggested, however, that Austria not be limited to Lombardy, lest she find it more profitable to deal with the French. He urged Austria to delay hostilities no longer and declared himself ready to take any action for the common aims suggested by the British government.  

Thomas Grenville, Lord Grenville's younger brother, was now sent to Berlin to press Frederick William III to accept the Czar's plan, although it had only feeble support from Count Haugwitz and the Duke of Brunswick. Prussia felt adoption of the plan would lead her closer to hostilities with France and force her to repudiate the Treaty of Basle without preliminary explanation. Further, Prussia was not anxious to ally herself with Austria, who, Count Haugwitz felt, was interested only in the accumulation of power. Count Panin, Grenville, and De Luc urged the Duke of Brunswick to cast his influence in support of a Quadruple Alliance, but Brunswick wavered. In order to please his sovereign, Count Haugwitz proposed a Prussian defensive alliance for the protection of Northern Germany, Denmark and Sweden. He turned down the promise of British subsidies and Russian troops, at the same time assuring Count Panin and Thomas Grenville that the slightest change in the political situation would bring Prussia into the war to free Holland or defend Germany. Frederick William III declared Prussia could go no further and negotiations were terminated. 17

In November of 1798, Napper Tandy, a French general, arrived in Hamburg and was arrested; the local Senate turned him over to the British government. The Directory threatened vengeance for the insult, and the Czar immediately proposed to send an army of Russian, Prussian, British, and Danish troops to defend the threatened city. Sir James Gaufield was instructed by Lord Grenville to try to persuade the principal inhabitants to receive part of the composite force within the gates of the city. 18

As Hamburg was within the line of territory guaranteed neutral by Prussia, the success of this measure would have served the dual purpose of forcing Berlin and Paris into war and providing an especially advantageous starting point for an expedition into Holland. Unfortunately for Britain, the citizens of Hamburg had no wish to enter the conflict with France, and refused to admit the garrison.  

Thus, with Prussia definitely refusing to join the coalition either for hope of territorial enlargement, or under the threat of further French advances, the alliance became a loose, three-sided affair with two of the partners mutually estranged. Britain placed all of her faith in the Russian alliance, while her sentiments toward her Austrian ally were recorded clearly in a note from George Canning, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Arthur Paget:

...We are all in anxious expectation of news of the opening of hostilities, having heard in a way that leaves us little doubt of its truth that the French have declared war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia (the Emperor of Austria). For my part, I have made up my mind to hear that the Austrians are terribly beaten. But I do not care. Next to their setting a good example, the best thing is that they should be made an example for the rest of Europe. Those Powers who will not fight, ought to fall. The only means by which the French could not shake the firmness and decision of this country, would be by shewing in any one instance the possibility of a safe compromise with them....As long as they go on overwhelming everybody who is stupid enough to trust them, We are as safe as We can be until they are finally overwhelmed themselves. Upon these principles, I scarcely care whether the first account you send be of victory or defeat.

War came late in March, 1799, as the Directory learned of the movement of 90,000 Russian troops marching across the Germanies to join

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the Austrian armies. The Czar, whose patience had been worn thin by
Baron Thugut's bargaining tactics, had threatened to withhold aid if
Austria continued procrastinating; Austria began assembling her armies.
The French Directory declared war on the 24th of March 1799.
From the opening of the campaign, even prior to the arrival of Russian troops on the battlefields, the Austrian generals and their armies showed decisive superiority over the French. Archduke Charles defeated General Jourdan at Stockach and drove his army in headlong confusion across the Rhine. Moving into Switzerland, the Austrians dislodged the French under Messena from fortified positions which appeared to defy attack. In Italy, General Kray opened the campaign with a brilliant victory over the French forces that General Scherer commanded at Magnano.

Just after this successful beginning by the Austrian forces, Marshal Souvarow entered the field with a large Russian army and assumed command of the allied forces. He routed three French armies in rapid succession and captured the fortresses of Alessandria and Turin, expelling the French from the entire Italian peninsula except for Genoa and the Maritime Alps. These splendid successes changed the political situation and raised the hopes of France's enemies again.

Frederick William instructed Count Haugwitz to resume negotiations with Lord Grenville on the proposal for joint intervention in Holland and for the restoration of the House of Orange. The British government, knowing from past experience that Frederick William's timidity could prove disastrous to any project which demanded sudden, bold decisions, framed new plans that relied heavily on Czar Paul. Lord Grenville planned on three series of military operations. First there was to be a joint...
expedition of British and Russian troops, in British pay, to recover Holland and Belgium from French occupation and restore the Prince of Orange as head either of the entire Netherlands or of the Dutch Republic, on terms which were quite advantageous to British interests. Secondly, a large army was to be enlisted in Switzerland, composed of Russians, Swiss, Wurtembergers, and the corps of émigrés, who were also in British pay. It was to be commanded by the brilliant General Souvarow, who would proceed to Switzerland as soon as his work was ended in Italy. This army was to operate with the Austrian troops under Archduke Charles to expel General Massena from his remaining strongholds in Switzerland. If successful, the allied forces would then move into France where they would act as a rallying point for royalist dissatisfaction, which was at a high pitch in the western and southern Departments. Finally, after the Netherlands were conquered, the British proposed to land a sizeable body of Russian and British soldiers in Brittany, to capture and destroy the harbor at Brest. George Cadoudal and other French rebels were to distract the efforts of the Directory by raising rebellion within France and were to be encouraged in these activities by generous gifts from the British treasury.

The first of these enterprises moved smoothly through the preparation stages. Paul supplied 18,000 Russian troops and secured the promise of an additional 6,000 from the King of Sweden, which the British government decided not to use. The Prince of Orange, who had maintained constant contact with his Dutch supporters during his exile in Berlin, now attempted to rally his followers for simultaneous uprisings at the appropriate moment. Their efforts were very encouraging, showing dissatisfaction to be widespread among the Dutch people, the army, and navy.
The French garrison was known to be only a skeleton force, and the party in power was understood to be discouraged and divided within itself. Though mustering the needed troops and providing the needed transportation would require several weeks, Lord Grenville felt the favorable conditions would hold. From Berlin, Thomas Grenville pictured the occupation of the Netherlands as a triumphal march rather than a desperate and dangerous campaign.

The campaign got off to a slow start. Sir Ralph Abercromby, who led the British divisions, was prevented from landing for two weeks by poor weather, but when he did land, a fleet of Dutch warships at Texel surrendered to him. Dutch soldiers deserted in crowds after the arrival of the Hereditary Prince of Orange. General Brune still had a few troops that he could count on, but contrary to the expectations of the British Ministry, Abercromby, although reinforced with 10,000 Russian troops, remained strictly on the defensive. Two weeks later the arrival of the Duke of York brought the invading force to a total of 48,000 men. Unfortunately, the 6,000 Dutch deserters who joined the Hereditary Prince of Orange were not put to use, as there was no transportation to help them across the Zuyder Zee. After the Duke of York's arrival, there was another long delay which Brune utilized to the fullest extent to augment his forces. Thomas Grenville's letters to his brother betray astonishment and dismay at the dilatory techniques of the British generals. The staunch supporters of the House of Orange refused to risk rebellion as long as the armed aid they had been promised was withheld.

3. Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, September 27, 1799. Ibid, V.
4. Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, October 1, 1799. Ibid, V.
Despite minor victories for the Allies, the situation was far from encouraging. The enemy's force was daily increasing, while the Allied army could expect no further reinforcements. The autumn rains, which had struck with unusual severity, rendered the roads almost unpassable for the artillery and provision wagons. It was evident that unless some important position could be captured, it was impossible for the Allies to retain their footing in Holland. The city of Haarlem was chosen as an objective, for it was most likely to furnish needed supplies.

The battle for Haarlem raged back and forth as fresh troops were added to either side. In the end, approximately two thousand men were lost on each side. The Allies had forced the French back a considerable distance from the battlefield, but what is true of an insurrection is also true of an invading army: an indecisive success is equivalent to a defeat. Haarlem was the object of the English general, without the possession of which he could not maintain his troops in the increasingly poor weather, and Haarlem was still in the hands of the Republicans. The enemy's force was hourly increasing, and, two days later six thousand infantry arrived to strengthen their already formidable army.

The Duke of York saw the French garrison enlarging daily; after weeks of minor skirmishes without the magnificent victory he expected, the Duke decided to take his troops back to Britain. Elizabeth, Lady Holland, described the situation in her diary in the following manner: 5

The whole Dutch expedition has failed, and the troops are coming back forthwith, tho' there are great apprehensions entertained as to their being able to withdraw without immense loss. They calculate upon losing their rearguard of 3000 men. The position of the troops in Holland has become so unsatisfactory and precarious owing to the inclemency of the weather and various other circumstances, that the Duke of York had decided to withdraw the advanced posts and report the whole matter to the Home office.

The French troops made a determined attack on the retreating British, but were repulsed with decisive losses. On October 17, a truce was arranged between the combatants, and it was agreed to permit the British to re-embark without hindrance. In return, 8,000 French and Batavian prisoners held in England were to be returned to France. The entire result of this expensive expedition was to discredit the British leadership in the eyes of both the English populace and the Russian monarchy. The British public was somewhat pacified by the news of renewed naval attacks upon the French coast, but Lord Grenville expressed great disgust, in private, at the conduct of the whole expedition, especially the lack of guidance by the Duke of York.

This was the disastrous result of the greatest expedition which had yet sailed from Britain during the war. Coming as it did, after the hopes of the nation had been excited by its early successes and when the great conquests of the Allies in the first part of the campaign had led to a very general expectation of the fall of the French Republic, it produced bitter disappointment, and contributed to the impression that the English soldiers had declined tremendously from their former renown.

The Opposition, as usual, magnified the public distress, and pointed to the supposed rashness and imbecility of the Administration. The credulous public, incapable of just discrimination, overlooked the important
fact that the naval power of republican Holland had been completely destroyed by the expedition. Instead of ascribing the failure of the mission to its real causes, inadequacy of means and the jealousies of an Allied force unaccustomed to acting together, they loudly proclaimed that it was utter madness to resist the overwhelming power of France on the land.  

The second phase of the British military plan, the assembling of the mixed Austrian, Swiss, and Russian force to free Switzerland, likewise started auspiciously. Austria agreed to the British plan only because it offered a method for getting General Souvarow, of whom the Austrian generals were quite jealous, out of Italy without rupturing relations with the Czar. Grenville, reassured by Austria's acceptance of the plan, sent William Wickham as the British minister to Switzerland to reopen communications with the French royalists and to hasten the enrollment of 20,000 Swiss recruits. The Count of Artois, younger brother of the late French monarch, stood ready to join Souvarow at the opportune moment. Just as everything seemed ready for the campaign to begin, Thugut refused the British subsidy or even joint action with them. He resolved to hold the Austrian armies in reserve as much as possible for the accomplishment of Austrian aims. Where Austria was not directly

7. William Wickham (1761-1840) had been a fellow student of Lord Grenville's at Christ Church, Oxford, and acted as a secret foreign correspondent from Switzerland from 1790-94. In 1795 he became minister to the Swiss cantons and provided such extensive, accurate information on conditions in Provence and la Vendée that, in 1797, the Directory demanded his expulsion from the Continent on the grounds that he was more of a fomentor of insurrection than a diplomatic agent. In 1799, Wickham returned as a special envoy to the Swiss, Russian, and Austrian armies.
in a position for gains, the British-subsidized Russian and Swiss troops were to be allowed to bear the brunt of the war with France. Having lost faith in the French royalist cause, the Austrian Chancellor was not going to lose a man or a florin to advance it. As he was assured that the Russian forces were strong enough to rout the French in Switzerland, he ordered the Archduke to withdraw the Austrian troops to protect Germany and to prepare to occupy the Netherlands. He said that this was the most effective way for Austria to assist her allies, but it was obvious that this move would be fatal to the British plan of attack. There were other problems, however; Wickham was able to recruit only about 2000 Swiss as opposed to the 20,000 the British had expected. The forces from Wurtemberg had not yet arrived, and Korsakow's Russian army numbered only about 40,000. As the Archduke moved off, the reinforced French army fell upon Korsakow's troops and completely routed them. The Archduke hurried back at receipt of the news, but found the damage irreparable. Lady Holland reported: "On that night word came of a strange defeat the allies have experienced, 17,000 Russians and Austrians captured and slaughtered, Zurich retaken, and many other places in Switzerland; Hotze, the Austrian general, killed."8

Souvarow had crossed the Alps by forced marches under fantastic handicaps of snow, treacherous paths, and few provisions. The Russians arrived only to find that the Austrian positions and armaments that they had counted upon were in the hands of the French. Souvarow fought his way out of the trap with great losses and finally rescued his troops by an outstanding march across the glaciers to Grisons. This decisive

8. Journal of Elizabeth, Lady Holland, October 17, 1799.
defeat also dealt a death blow to the Anglo-Russian expedition in Holland and left the Directory free to dispatch large reinforcements to General Brune.

The Austrians realized that their jealousies and shabby treatment of Souvarow, Korsakov, and the Russian troops were likely to cost them the Russian alliance, but both the Emperor and Thugut were confident of the strength of their victorious Italian armies and both were furious at Paul's perpetual dictates. They decided to dispense with Russian military aid except in situations where the Austrians would remain in complete control. Furiously jealous of the military triumphs of Souvarow as well as his persistence in following Paul's orders rather than those of the Austrian war office, they were determined that the illustrious general would never again assume the command of Austrian troops.

Realizing that unwelcome political isolation might result from the pursuit of this policy, Thugut approached the British in the hope of reaching a secret understanding. He proposed that Britain and Austria come to an agreement between themselves by frankly disclosing the political objectives each had in mind. The Emperor planned to keep all of upper Italy to the Rover Var and the three Papal Legations. He did not want Bavaria or the Netherlands, unless they were enlarged and fortified by the addition of French Flanders. The Netherlands could be given to the Prince of Orange if England also transferred to him the burden of the Austrian loans. If Britain agreed to these arrangements, ratification of the 1797 Convention could be secretly obtained. Austria preferred secrecy so as not to ruin Austrian credit in the Germanies.

Britain was willing, so far as Paul I would agree, to give Austria a free hand in Italy. The English desired strong barriers in
every quarter against the threat of French aggression. The British Ministry, although placing a much higher value on Austrian cooperation than they had done earlier in the year, still looked to the Russian alliance as the only completely sound plank in their Continental coalition. They therefore notified Thugut that they could enter into no negotiations without the concurrence of the Czar, and that the signed Convention must be laid before Parliament before Britain could agree to do all in her power to promote Austrian interests in Italy.

Lord Grenville and his associates also had begun to prepare a new plan for the following spring campaign. In mid-October 1799, Wickham delivered a copy to Souvarow, which the Russian general found much like the one which had so recently ended disaster. It again proposed a combined allied force to be assembled in Switzerland, composed of one-third German, Swiss, and French royalist soldiers and the rest Russian troops with an Anglo-Russian command. The British were to supply the forces' provisions.

Souvarow was at this point very much angered at the Austrian officials, whom he held responsible for his defeat in Switzerland. He was furious at Thugut for removing him from Austria and exposing his army to defeat; with the Austrian General Me las for delaying his march by not providing needed transportation; and with the Archduke for not returning more swiftly to his assistance. His troops now numbered only 28,000, including the remnants of Korsakow's army, and all needed rest, reorganization, and re-equipping. However, when Souvarow suggested one all-out, combined attack against Massena, the Archduke proposed that the Austrians distract the French while the Russians assaulted the
strong fortified positions of the victorious French army. The unfairness of the proposal further infuriated Souvarow. The Austrians, even if Souvarow had been willing to change his mind about them, absolutely refused to accept any plan under which the Russian general would be in command of the Austrian troops.

As winter approached and the armies settled into their winter camps, Lord Grenville suggested that Austria attempt to devise a plan for the military operations for the forthcoming year and submit it to both the Czar and the British Cabinet. It was hoped that the plan would entail joint Austro-Russian armies, and that a way would be found to end the quarrel of their military commanders. Thugut's plan for the campaigns of 1800 discarded Souvarow and excluded the Russian forces from any fields of military importance on the Continent. He declared that the Austrian armies could easily rout the French from Italy and Switzerland if they were reinforced with 30,000 British-paid German mercenaries. The Russians could be utilized with the British troops in Holland, or in raids along the French coast.

Archduke Charles in his memoirs explained the reasons for the rupture of the Austro-Russian alliance:

The Alliance between Austria and Russia blew up, like most coalitions formed between powers of equal pretensions. The idea of common interest, the illusion of confidence based on the same general views, prepares the first advances; differences of opinion as to the means of attaining the desired objects, soon sows the seeds of misunderstanding; and that envenomed feeling increases in proportion as the events of war alter the views of the coalesced powers, derange their plans, and undeceive their hopes. It seldom fails to break out openly when the Armies are destined to undertake any operation in concert. The natural desire to obtain the lead in command, as in glory, excites the rival passions both of chiefs and nations. Pride, and jealousy, tenacity and presumption, spring from the conflict of opinion and ambition; continual contradictions daily inflame mutual
exasperation, and nothing but a fortunate accident can prevent such a coalition from being dissolved before one of the parties is inclined to turn his arms against the other.9

Despite Thugut's blustering about the capabilities of the Austrian forces, Lord Minto reported from Vienna that Austria was daily more eager to reach a thorough understanding with the British government. The revenues from her Italian possessions had proved highly disappointing; French requisitions had impoverished the countryside, and the populace of the occupied states passively resisted the Austrian troops. Gradually, Thugut limited his territorial demands from the Piedmont and Savoy to the Novarese, for which Austria would provide compensation to the King of Sardinia from Genoese lands. He agreed to the restoration of the French monarchy, and consented at last to ratify the financial Convention of 1797. He proposed as terms of the alliance that Britain should relieve the Emperor of repayment of the last Austrian loan. Further, he requested that Britain advance L1,600,000, of which ten per cent was to meet the pressing needs of the Austrian government. Britain was to support Austria in her claim to the Papal Legations, Novarese, and the territory of Genoa.

These proposals seemed acceptable to Lord Grenville, and Wickham was granted extraordinary powers to negotiate the agreement and told to rely on his own judgment when quick decisions were necessary. Wickham, who had always favored the Austrian alliance, sent glowing reports of the Austrian commanders and caused the British to reestimate the relative importance of their two major allies.

Through the letters of M. N'Andre, a Frenchman with no particular scruples against British reimbursement for valuable information, the Pitt Ministry obtained copies of confidential reports to the French War Office telling of the diminishing strength of the Republican armies and undoubted evidence of the Internal dissension which was crippling the Directory. The British economy had again begun to feel the burden of the increased cost of the extended war, and the Cabinet realized that their aims must be accomplished swiftly or not at all.

What few British statesmen understood was the importance of a little-publicized event which was eventually to spell the defeat of the coalition. Early in November, 1799, Napoleon and his most trusted staff members had returned to Paris from an indefensible position in Egypt. Within days, he had arranged a coup d'etat, overthrown the Directory and established his own consular government.

The British were now preparing for an all out effort the following spring, and planned to lend all possible support to the royalists in western France. They believed that Napoleon could maintain his power only by using his armies to suppress the royalist and Jacobin enemies of the regime.

This would by necessity leave him without troops to oppose the Austrian forces in the east. Wickham was urged to foment insurrections in the southern and eastern sections of France, which might further distract Napoleon's attention from La Vendée and thus assist the planned British expeditions in the spring.10

10. Lord Grenville to Wickham, November 30, 1799, Dropmore Papers, VI, 52.
On December 13, 1799, Wickham reported that he had commissioned General Pichegru to enroll French army deserters to act with the Austrians in an invasion of France.\(^{11}\) He enthusiastically estimated the allied forces, and predicted that Napoleon could probable raise no more than 180,000 men, a force inferior to Austria's in number, quality, and equipment. French bankers estimated that Napoleon could raise a maximum of $3,500,000 sterlign, which would prove utterly inadequate to supply the French military needs. Wickham conceded that the Consulate was winning support and ventured, "It seems possible that the war will be conducted with more talents and energy than has lately been the case... (but Napoleon) cannot steer long between Jacobins and Royalists. If he fails to obtain peace, he must lean for support on the former, and forfeit the public favor, as he can only carry on war by resorting to revolutionary methods."\(^{12}\)

Despite his optimism concerning the weaknesses of France and the relative strength of the allies, Wickham felt that Austria was Britain's most important ally, that her alliance must be preserved and strengthened if the British hoped to make any progress in the war. In a letter to Lord Grenville he emphasized this viewpoint: "Are you prepared to throw yourself into the arms of the House of Austria or not? If not, renounce at once every idea of a Continental war against France for neither can you carry it on without her nor force her to carry it on in any but her own way."\(^{13}\) He urged that the British alter their

\(^{11}\) Wickham to Lord Grenville, undated. Ibid, VI, 73.
\(^{12}\) Wickham to Lord Grenville, December 13, 1799. Ibid, VI, 74.
\(^{13}\) Wickham to Lord Grenville, undated. Ibid, VI, 78.
tactics, and flatter and cajole Francis II; thus, England would gain the confidence of Austria instead of dictating military operations and criticizing the political activities of her government. By cooperating, by giving Austrian strategists a free hand, and by praising and pensioning them, the British could wield considerable influence over the Austrian army. He did not suggest, however, that England follow the Austrian lead and ignore the valuable assistance that the Russian Czar had provided. This latter policy seems to have been the result of a great deal of distorted information which reached Lord Grenville. The Duke of York, who blamed the entire Dutch fiasco on the poor discipline of the Russian troops and urged closer relations with Austria partially out of animosity for the Czar's armies, was a major source of this information. Wickham himself was prejudiced in his reports, although not intentionally, as he had many friends among the Austrian military leaders and favored an alliance relying heavily upon Emperor Francis as opposed to one which depended on the erratic behavior of Czar Paul. With these slanted views of the value of their two allies, the Ministers naturally made decisions which favored the Austrian alliances.

Thus in one short year came two changes which would radically effect the fate of the coalition. The new consular government, under Napoleon, would soon strengthen France, making her a much more formidable enemy than in the immediate past. At the same time the coalition was showing new signs of internal dissension, and the British, by re-evaluating their alliances and choosing to support Austria's goals above those of Russia, was laying the grounds for an inevitable Anglo-Russian quarrel.
In January, the First Consul sent a proposal for peace to the heads of the coalition states. Lord Grenville's reply to Napoleon was scathing, despite British public opinion, which was strongly inclined toward peace, and the counsel of Lord Buckingham, his brother, who urged moderation. He still believed that there was a great deal of dissatisfaction in France with the Consulate, that Napoleon was without adequate resources of either men or money to carry on the war, and that he could only maintain his position by making peace. Grenville felt it would be sheer folly for the allies to negotiate instead of proceeding with their plans, crushing France and ending the war on their own terms.

In his answer to Napoleon, Grenville pointed out that the English ministry had never claimed a right to interfere in the internal affairs of France, or dictate to her inhabitants the form of government or race of sovereigns they were to choose; the objective of the war was declared to have been, from the beginning, defensive. It was undertaken not to impose a government upon France, but to prevent its imposing one upon other nations. The existence of the Batavian, Ligurian, Cisalpine, Helvetic, Roman and Parthenopean republics, most of whom had been "republicanized" in a state of peace, afforded ample evidence of the reality of the peril the French government posed to Europe.

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1. This chapter is based primarily upon accounts found in General Fuller's Military History of the Western World, Bruun's Europe and the French Imperium (New York: Harper Brothers Publishers, 1938), Thiers' Empire and Consulate, and The Dropmore Papers.
In the House of Commons, the Opposition, led by Charles James Fox, presented arguments for an immediate peace. Fox stated that the war had originally been declared on the speculation of the dangers the French Revolution posed to religion and the government. He admitted that France had committed great offences, but added that she had been joined in the worst of them by the Allies: Austria had received Venice from Bonaparte; Russia had attacked France. Having pictured the Allies as at least as much at fault for the war as the French, Fox proceeded to ask, "Is then peace so dangerous a state, war so enviable, that the latter is to be chosen as a state of probation, the former shunned as a positive evil?"

On the other hand, Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt argued:

The same necessity which originally existed for the commencement and prosecution, still called for perseverance in the war. The same proneness to aggression, the same disregard for justice, still actuated the conduct of the men who rule France. Peace with a nation by whom war was made against all order, religion, and morality, would rather be a concession of resistance to wrong than a suspension of arms in the nature of ordinary warfare. To negotiate with established governments was formerly not merely easy, but in most circumstances safe; but to negotiate with the government of France now would be to incur all of the risks of an uncertain truce, without attaining the benefits of even temporary peace. France still retains the sentiments, and is constant to the views which characterized the down of her Revolution.

They went on to show that although France frequently represented herself as disinclined to conquest, the declarations were followed up with the seizure of the Netherlands and parts of Switzerland and Italy. "What reliance", asked Pitt, "can be placed on a power which thus uniformly makes peace or truce a stepping-stone to further aggressions; and systematically uses perfidy as an allowable weapon for circumventing its enemies?"

2. Parliamentary History, XXXIV, 1291.
3. Ibid, 1398.
The House, upon a division, supported the measures of the Ministry by a majority of 265 to 64.

Events in France had already belied the weakness on which the allies counted. The majority of French citizens were neither radical Jacobins nor adherents of Louis XVIII. They would have preferred almost any type of efficient government to the corrupt Directory which had trampled upon civil and religious liberties and prolonged the war to serve its own ends. Few Frenchmen would have voluntarily accepted a divine right monarchy and the return of the ancient regime with its inequalities and abuses. To adopt this form of government would be to forego all the principles of the Revolution. The overthrow of the Directory and the formation of the new government by Napoleon were regarded favorably by most of the citizens, primarily as the new First Consul was already famous for his victorious dictation of the Treaty of Campo Formio.

On his accession, Bonaparte offered as conciliatory gestures the repeal of the conscription laws, the reopening of the churches and encouragement of Christian worship, and an invitation to Frenchmen of all political groups to serve the State. All who accepted his government were welcome to its protection, but those remaining insurgents in La Vendée were quickly and thoroughly crushed as an example to others that he would not tolerate internal rebellion. With this show of firmness and efficient government, public confidence increased. Public credit revived and instead of the L 3,500,000 which Wickham had estimated, Napoleon's financial resources now amounted to almost L 13,500,000. This sum was still insufficient to run the government, but was enough to give it a temporary start.
Despite his strong position, Napoleon sincerely desired peace to consolidate his power. He knew that a peace on British terms would destroy the reputation for success on which his authority rested. For this reason, he welcomed the haughty British reply. It had the double effect of silencing the French demand for peace and stimulating the idea that the British prolonged a war from which they profited while others suffered.

The Czar ignored the French proposals, but Thugut returned a courteous reply, leaving the way open for negotiations until the British government officially accepted his terms for an offensive alliance. Napoleon restored good relations with Prussia by promising to evacuate Holland and support Prussian interests in the Germanies.

The negotiations certainly did not halt the strenuous activities of all of the belligerents for the renewal of hostilities in the spring. By February, 1800, the British Cabinet had established its policy for the forthcoming campaign. Wickham had been authorized to conclude treaties with the Electors of Bavaria and Wurtemberg for 12,000 troops to serve under the Austria Archduke Charles; Britain was to pay £1,000,000 for their support. An additional £500,000 was placed at Wickham's disposal for secret service expense. Lord Grenville assured Thugut, on February 13, 1800, that £200,000 would be granted by the British to pay Piedmontese troops serving under Austria's General Melas. In addition, £1,600,000 was loaned to Austria without interest to be repaid at the conclusion of the war. George III renounced any claim to interfere in Austria's military campaigns and promised to support his ally by expeditions along the French coasts.
Territorially, the British agreed that if Emperor Francis II did not want the Belgic provinces, they could be given at his option to the Prince of Orange, to the Archduke Charles as an imperial fief, or to the Duke of Tuscany as a means of facilitating Austrian arrangements in Italy. Britain would transfer the burden of the Austrian debt to the new Belgian overlord as a concession to keep Austria in the war. The Emperor was required to guarantee that France would retain no part of the Netherlands and that he would not negotiate separately with Napoleon. The British planned to garrison the Belgian fortresses with British troops, requiring the new ruler to pay for their support in lieu of interest on the Austrian loans. In this way it was hoped to secure Belgium against the French and to maintain an army ready for immediate service with no direct expense to Britain herself.

Sir Charles Whitworth was instructed to inform the Czar of these agreements and to explain to him that the Russian forces were no longer needed in the area. The Czar already nursed ill-feeling toward the British as the Duke of York had blamed the apparent failure of the Dutch expedition on the lack of discipline of the Russian troops. Paul's own generals, Hermann and Essen, told him in official reports how the British had encouraged the occupation of Bergen, and then left the Russians without support in the face of overwhelming French forces once the Russians had succeeded in the mission. Now came the news that the British had broken their solemn agreement to make no engagements without consulting with him. Paul, furious with this treatment at the hands of the British, applied through Count Woronzow in London for Sir Charles Whitworth's recall and then settled back into watchful inactivity, expecting his allies to plunge on to their own destruction alone.
Lord Minto had been convinced that Lord Grenville's favorable reply would bring the Austrian and British governments into complete accord. He foresaw the avowed English preference for an Austrian alliance quickly overshadowing any ill-feelings between the two.\(^4\) Much to the surprise of the British leadership, Thugut claimed that Lord Grenville had deliberately neglected to mention such essential particulars as an immediate advance of L 200,000 to the Emperor and an agreement to support the Austrian plan to annex the Papal Legations.\(^5\) The controversy flared and an open quarrel was only avoided when Lord Minto conceded on every point, except for the question of the annexation of the Papal Legations, which he referred to Lord Grenville. The British government agreed to advance L 2,400,000 to the Austrian monarchy in three installments, to advise the King of Sardinia to consent to the exchange of territory required by Austria, and to acquiesce to the Austrian annexation of the Legations. The King of Sardinia bluntly refused the exchange of territory, however, and appealed to the Czar, who granted him protection. Despite the extensive British concessions, the Austrians ultimately refused to sign the new alliance papers. The Austrian people were demanding peace. Few desired to continue the war merely to remove the French occupation forces from the Netherlands or to restore the Bourbon monarchy. Thugut now felt that a few timely victories would allow Austria to achieve her goals without further pursuing the British ambitions.\(^6\)

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4. Lord Minto to Grenville, February 23, 1800; Dropmore Papers, VI.
5. Report of Wickham to Lord Grenville, April 15, 1800; Ibid, VI.
While the English efforts at recruiting new troops in the Germanies had been quite successful, Wickham's plans for creating chaos inside of France failed before the growing power and popularity of the Consulate. Political exiles such as Carnot, Barthélemy, Malouet and Mounier returned to France as confirmed supporters of the new regime and were permitted public employment. Even worse, from the British viewpoint, Wickham discovered belatedly that French insolvency had temporarily been overcome, the Bank of France founded, and a new taxation system instituted.

The French planned to move swiftly while the coalition members were still at odds with one another. To isolate Austria in advance, Napoleon wooed the Czar and flattered neutral Frederick William III of Prussia by the suggestion that he might act later as mediator, a move which disguised his own ambitious plan and helped disarm Prussian suspicions without promoting peace.

To the French, the most direct line of attack against Austria lay through Bavaria and down the Danube Valley. Moreau, with 120,000 men, the major forces of the French Republic, opened the campaign in April. Within two months, the French had driven the Austrian forces under General Kray from Bavaria. In the meantime, Napoleon had assembled a reserve army at Dijon, and led it across the Great St. Bernard Pass (May 15-20, 1800) into the Po Valley. This venture had been carefully planned; Napoleon turned on Milan, intending to separate the Austrians from their stores in Lombardy and to block their lines of retreat. He divided his army into three parts, and therefore had only 18,000 men available when on June 14, he stumbled upon the main Austrian army of 30,000 under General Melas at Marengo. The sudden return of
General Desaix with 5,000 French troops spelled defeat for the Austrians despite heavy French casualties. Austria had no enthusiasm for further fighting and General Melas agreed to an armistice, the Convention of Alexandria.

The British view of this catastrophe naturally was one of dismay, but they hoped the Austrians might be brought back into the war if Napoleon's terms for the peace were too harsh. Lord Minto wrote to Arthur Paget on July 16, 1800:

The battle of Marengo, or rather the convention of Alexandria, has made a total change. I am sorry to add that the state of the Austrian army in Germany, despirited and rendered I may say wholly unserviceable by faction and indiscipline, creates a still more serious difficulty than the events in Italy would do alone. These circumstances have rendered an Armistice as necessary to the Emperor as it seems to be thought desirable by the French, and you may expect to hear immediately that the Armistice is extended to Germany. I flatter myself that measures which are in contemplation for restoring the spirit and discipline of the Army in Germany may prove successful and furnish the means of measuring superiority in that quarter. If these hopes are realized there is a fair prospect of seeing hostilities renewed at no distant period.

General Moreau no sooner learned of Napoleon's victory than he swept across the Danube, and dislodged General Kray from his strong position at Ulm, thus driving the Austrians back to Inn. At first Wickham, still an optimist, made light of the Austrian defeats, but Kray's subsequent defeat at Biberbach opened his eyes. A few days later he wrote to Lord Grenville of the confusion and discouragement in the Austrian camp, and of the universal cry of the Austrian people for peace.

While the hostilities between France and Austria were temporarily halted by negotiations which lasted from June, 1800, until

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November of 1801, Francis II signed a new subsidy treaty with the British. Discussions were held between Britain and Austria for a possible general peace. The Austrians naturally were reaping the greatest benefits from the prolonged discussions for they allowed Austria time to regroup her armies wherever possible. Napoleon therefore demanded that the British fleets blockading Malta and Egypt grant a naval armistice as a compensation for the benefits Austria was receiving. He would agree to a meeting at Lunéville to discuss the grounds for a general peace, if this condition were met.

The British also desired to gain time, knowing that the Austrians could not continue to fight at present. The English Mediterranean fleet had captured a French ship from Egypt in November of 1799 that carried letters from General Kleber to the French Directory. However, the messages from the disgruntled Frenchman, who desired to discredit Napoleon, gave the British an entirely false picture of the conditions of the French army in Egypt. Lord Grenville then formed the idea that Napoleon would seize any chance to reinforce Kleber's army. When reports reached Britain that the French citizens were pleading for peace, he wrote to Pitt that this news "may certainly enable us both to raise our demands as to terms, and to insist strictly on the conditions of our project of armistice." Grenville felt that England and Austria had only to stand firm, and they might impose their conditions on the French. Napoleon received word of the British decisions and demanded the liberty of six French frigates to go to Alexandria and return without hindrance or the armistice would terminate within ten days.

Emperor Francis meanwhile joined the Austrian army at Inn, where he found an almost impossible situation. After the British had rejected the French ultimatum, the Austrians were forced to purchase an additional forty-five days of armistice by the surrender of the blockaded fortresses of Ulm, Ingolstadt and Philipsburg. Baron Thugut was replaced in the Austrian foreign office as his policies had failed to gain the Austrian goals and had placed the Empire in this precarious position. Count Cobentzl was sent to Moreau's headquarters to ask for further prolongation of the armistice, while Austria made some secret reforms in the army. When Pitt and Lord Grenville inferred from this journey that the Austrians intended to treat separately for peace with Napoleon, they refused payment of the second installment of the latest Austrian loan. The British ministry then informed the Austrians that the next L 800,000 would be paid only after hostilities were renewed.

So many miscarriages, especially in situations which had seemed to offer all the conditions for easy conquest, caused widespread dissatisfaction in England. The "great effort" of the British government in 1800, which was to produce 70,000 troops, yielded barely 30,000. Pitt had planned to capture Belleisle and Brittany, but the attempt was abandoned at the last minute due to a difference of opinion as to its chances of success.

The British reputation for bravery, masterful planning, and decisive action had seldom fallen so low as during the campaign of 1799-1800. After the fiasco of the Duke of York's Dutch expedition, neither Paul I, the Emperor Francis, nor General Melas would allow their troops to fight under British generals. The incapacity of British officials especially selected for important Continental duties was the
subject of several confidential letters to Lord Grenville. Wickham wrote on March 27, 1800, "I have sworn never to have anything to do with your military men again unless they will learn their own business better before they come abroad, or have a more moderate opinion of their own knowledge and suffer themselves to be instructed. Besides it is not conceived, presence of mind on the field expected, how very cheap we are holden on the Continent." 9 Lord Elgin, British Minister in Constantinople, wrote in a letter to Lord Grenville, "Seeing Englishment in authority here takes away all delight in reading Don Quixote." 10

Meanwhile, the Pitt ministry was having its problems at home as well. George III was opposed to sending any more troops on uncertain ventures and was even meditating, in his more lucid moments, a change of ministry. There were several members of Parliament, both in Lords and Commons, who supported the King's concern about British war commitments. In a speech to Commons on May 8, 1800, Thomas Tywith Jones questioned the purpose of the heavy taxation and carnage, voicing the increasingly popular view that while England controlled the seas, possessed a flourishing trade, and could guarantee the security of her colonies there was no threat presented by the French Consulate. The speaker also pointed out that while the British people bore the heavy expenses of the war, Austria did not repay even the interest on her loans. In the view of the peace faction, Austria and Russia were themselves eager for the territorial expansion which they struggled to deny France. Attacks on the government's war policy were increasingly frequent.

In consequence of the growing distrust of its allies' intentions, Pitt's administration found every proposed foreign subsidy meeting increased Parliamentary opposition. The financial grants of 1799\textsuperscript{11} were easily passed when compared with the lengthy and bitter arguments raised in a similar situation a year later (July 18, 1800).

Time and again the Ministry was attacked for its "foreign policy, spiritless conduct and the mismanagement of the war." In December of 1800, Sheridan moved that a petition be sent to George III asking him to enter into separate negotiations for a speedy and honorable peace. Pitt's majority was able to defeat the motion 156 to 35, but the attacks came more frequently as the demand for peace grew among the British people.

To add to English problems, Czar Paul announced late in 1800 that he was encouraging the formation of a coalition of the neutral Northern Powers, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark, to protest the alleged abuses of British maritime supremacy. Wickham claimed the Czar's behavior was due to an attack of insanity, to which Paul was unfortunately prone. The Russian Emperor had had ample provocation from both the Austrian and British governments to justify his new demands. First, Austria had attempted to overrun and annex principalities whose sovereigns, including the Pope, were under Paul's protection. Then she had flagrantly disregarded the Russians once she had risen to power, largely with the support of the Russian troops. Likewise, the Czar felt that errors in strategy and the lack of proper Austrian support in Switzerland in 1799 had exposed his armies to costly and unnecessary defeats.

\textsuperscript{11} See the debate on the Russian subsidy, June 11, 1799. Cobbett, Parliamentary History, XXXIV, 304.
For these reasons Paul had broken off the Austrian alliance, feeling that he could not remain attached to a power which consistently sacrificed the welfare of Europe for its own selfish aims.

Although the Czar had resented the results of disastrous Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland, his patience completely snapped at the news that the French garrison on Malta had surrendered to the British fleet in September. Contrary to previous agreements with Russia and Naples, the English had hoisted only the Union Jack over the captured fortress of La Valette. Until April of 1800, the British had sincerely planned to return the island to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem when the French forces surrendered. However, late in 1800, glowing reports of the natural resources, the harbor facilities, and the commercial possibilities of Malta flowed in to Lord Grenville from British travelers in the area. As the British saw the hopes they had placed in the Austrian alliance evaporate, Lord Grenville and others began to suggest that the English conquests be retained to offset those of France on the Continent. As early as December, 1800, Sir Arthur Paget reported to Lt. General Pigot that he understood the British definitely planned to hold Malta for themselves.

In contrast to the British program which provoked the Czar so violently, Napoleon sought to win him by offering to return Malta to the Order of the Knights of St. John if the French could retain it until the end of the war. This offer was made just before the garrison surrendered to the British. The romantic sentiment of Czar Paul was especially

13. General Pigot was the British officer to whom the French surrendered Malta.
touched when Napoleon presented him with the sword which Pope Leo X had presented to the Grand Master L'Isle Adam. Further, the French First Consul collected 6000 Russian prisoners who had been captured in Holland, had them reclothed, rearmed, and presented to the Czar as a token of friendship and understanding. Although no longer hostile to the Consular government, the Russians entered into no alliances with them, even when old relations with Denmark and Sweden had brought the Czar into conflict with Britain.

The Armed Neutrality had first been organized in 1780, and issued the Declaration of Maritime Rights. One of its articles was a declaration that ships under the convoy of warships flying national flags were exempted from search by a declaration of the naval officer in charge that the cargoes belonged to the country he represented and contained no "contraband of war." Pitt's government, on the other hand, asserted its right as a belligerent to search neutral vessels under all circumstances for enemy goods or contraband. British cruisers took forcible possession of any Danish and Swedish vessels which resisted search. The violent disruption of trade, much to the British advantage, aroused great dislike for the Pitt ministry in the countries involved.14 The Czar supported the members of the League and laid an embargo on British goods until the British left the Baltic.

The King of Prussia, in retaliation for the confiscation of Prussian merchantmen, sent troops to occupy Cuxhaven, the city which formed the British communication link with the Continent, and joined the League

of Neutrality. The British treated the revival of the Confederation as a declaration of war and dispatched Sir Hyde Parker to assail Copenhagen.

Pitt, realizing the dangers if England was forced into a two-front war, decided that it was necessary to engage the public resources immediately to assure that the people were not depressed by any appearance of vacillation on the part of the government. The Prime Minister was no sooner informed of the signature of the armed neutrality, than he took steps to let the northern powers feel Britain's anger. On January 14, 1801, the British Government issued an order for a general embargo on all vessels belonging to any of the confederated powers. Prussia was excepted only because word had not yet been received of her partnership in the League. Letters of marque were issued at the same time for the numerous vessels belonging to these states who were working on the Baltic Sea. The British captains were so thorough in their captures that nearly one-half of the merchant ships of the Northern Powers soon found their way into English harbors.

The League represented England as a common European enemy, to be regarded as a sordid monopolist, keeping alive a war that served only her particular profit, without regard in her selfish egotism for the rest of the world.

At the end of November, 1800, the war between France and Austria entered its final phase. The French armies, victorious and re-equipped at the expense of Germany and Italy, were in excellent condition. The Austrians were barely supplied, demoralized, and outnumbered. Britain, still suspicious of Austrian intentions, refused Austria the money desperately needed to send the troops into the field. The Archduke John, who had assumed command of the imperial forces, was crushingly defeated at Hohenlinden.
In Italy, General Brune drove the Austrians back across the Tyrolean Alps. In order to save Vienna, the Emperor agreed to negotiate a separate peace. The Treaty of Luneville, signed in February of 1801 pushed the Austrian boundary back to the Adige in Italy, forced the Emperor to cede the left bank of the Rhine to France, stipulated that the lay rulers dispossessed by this cession should be compensated by lands in the Germanies, and deprived the Emperor's brother of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, which was bestowed upon the Duke of Parma, son-in-law of the Queen of Spain.

The British policy of reevaluating their alliances and placing one member before another in importance had backfired dangerously in 1800. Austria, which had seemed to offer the most strength and reliability, had proved an expensive drain on the British treasury. She had sought only to fulfill her own territorial objectives and had not pursued the expressed goals of the coalition. Now she lay totally defeated militarily. Russia, on the other hand, could have been treated with equal consideration by the British, but they chose to ignore the Russians extensively once they decided to rely so heavily upon the Austrian alliance. The inevitable result, beginning with Russian surprise and indignation at such treatment, was the Czar's active resistance to the coalition and his organization of the Armed Neutrality of the North. The British Cabinet saw this last action as one of perversity or insanity on Paul's part, failing to realize that it was a logical outcome of their own foreign policy, but regardless of where the blame for the situation lay, England now faced war on two fronts.
THE END OF THE WAR

In spite of the fact that Russia officially remained a member of the Second Coalition, Britain was now effectively isolated diplomatically. She faced the French armies on the Continent, the ships and guns of the Armed Neutrality on the North Sea and Baltic Sea, and a growing popular demand for peace at home.

The subject of the northern coalition was fully discussed in the parliamentary debates which took place on the King's speech at the opening session. The Opposition stated "that although without a doubt the Emperor of Russia had been guilty of the grossest violence and injustice toward Great Britain in the confiscation of the property of its merchants, yet it did not follow that ministers were free of blame." The Czar had accused the Ministry of violating a Convention in regard to the surrender of Malta to him as a reward for his cooperation against France, and the Whigs questioned the Administration about the existence of such a secret treaty. While supporting the retention of naval supremacy, the Opposition doubted that the present British maritime policy was either just or expedient. Further, they attacked the Ministry for having placed the English fleet in a position which effectively added the Baltic resources to those upon which France could draw and meanwhile, diminished

1. This section is based primarily upon information found in Cobbett's Parliamentary History, volumes XXXV and XXXVI, Coquelle's Napoleon and England, translated from French by Gordon D. Knox, (London: G. Bell, 1904), Bruun's Europe and the French Imperium, and the Dropmore Papers, volume VII.
the effectiveness with which a divided British navy could meet this new challenge.

To this tirade, Pitt and Sir William Grant replied:

As to the question of expenditure, the matter is less doubtful. The question is whether we are to permit the navy of our enemy to be supplied and recruited; whether we are to suffer blockaded forts to be furnished with warlike stores and provisions; whether we are to allow neutral nations, by hoisting a flag upon a sloop or a fishing bont, to convey the treasures of South America to the harbors of Spain, or the naval stores of the Baltic to Brest and Toulon? The honorable gentleman talks of the destruction of the naval power of France, but does he imagine that her marine would have decreased to the degree which it actually has, if, during the whole of the war, this very principle had not been acted upon? Does he not know, that the naval preponderance which we have by this means acquired, has since given security to this country amidst the wreck of all our hopes on the Continent? If it were once gone, the spirit of the country would go with it. ²

On February 5, 1801, just one week before Austria accepted the Treaty of Luneville, William Pitt resigned as Prime Minister, a post he had held for eighteen years. The deciding issue in his defeat was not the government's conduct of the war, but the relatively minor issue of Catholic emancipation to which George III was inflexibly opposed. George believed in the necessity of a legislative union with Ireland while objecting to the proposals for Roman Catholic relief that were associated with it. Pitt had given the Irish Catholics reason to believe that a complete removal of disabilities would follow the union as a matter of royal grace. While on a visit to Weymouth on September 27, 1800, Chancellor Loughborough had shown the King a private letter from Pitt summoning Loughborough to a Cabinet meeting on the question of Catholic emancipation. The Prime Minister had not yet seen fit to mention the plan to George, and the news caused the King great anxiety. At a levee

². Cobbett, Parliamentary History, XXXV, 915.
on January 28, 1801, the day of the swearing-in of new members of Parliament, the King informed Henry Dundas that the idea of Catholic emancipation was "the most Jacobinical thing he had ever heard of," adding, "I shall reckon any man my personal enemy who proposes such a measure." On the first day of February, he received word from Pitt that the Prime Minister would be forced to resign unless the measure could be brought forward with the King's "full concurrence and the whole weight of the government." Feeling that he could not change his position, George accepted Pitt's resignation.

The King sent for Henry Addington to form a government, but before the ministers could receive their seals, the worry and excitement of the crisis caused George to lapse into another attack of insanity. The reconstructed Ministry took office on the eighteenth of February with Addington as Prime Minister and Lord Hawkesbury as the head of the Foreign Office. Pitt and his more intimate friends regarded the new Ministry as a temporary expedient which would allow him to resume leadership under more favorable circumstances. Addington accepted the position only when assured of Pitt's counsel and support.

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4. Ibid.
5. Henry Addington, first viscount Sidmouth (1757-1844) was a personal friend and strong supporter of William Pitt. Elected to Parliament in 1784, he served as speaker in Commons from 1789-1801. He repeatedly tried to talk Pitt out of further concessions to the Irish Catholics, but remained his friend when the Pitt government fell on this issue.
6. Robert Banks Jenkinson (1770-1828), afterwards second Earl of Liverpool, had been a supporter of Pitt, but being opposed to any Roman Catholic concessions, he remained in office under the new Addington Ministry. He had a long history of anti-French sentiments and had served several minor administrative posts before becoming Secretary of the Foreign Office.
The new Ministry seems to have excited feelings of both derision and distrust. In every point of ability, the new Cabinet presented a very unfavorable contrast to the last. It was composed of inefficient members of the late Cabinet such as the Dukes of Portland, Westmorland, and Chatham, and its new recruits were chosen on the basis of conformity with the King's political outlook. The new administration was of Anglican, high Tory views. It had the complete support of George III and possessed overwhelming majorities in both houses of Parliament largely due to Pitt's backing. Even the Whig opposition accepted the Addington government, as it was known to favor peace.

Lady Holland described the new ministry in her diary on February 26, 1801:

The first laugh over, people begin to think this Administration may last, and if they commence negotiations, they will even be popular. Pitt, however, is to be regretted, and there are those who think the whole is a jugglE, that he is, in fact, Minister behind the curtain; but these are just refinements. He certainly solicits persons to take office, and his own friends to hold theirs; but this is a shallow artifice to prevent the odious cry of his deserting the King. The new ministers like to let it appear that Pitt is cordial to them, and account for the resignations by saying those who resign are chiefly of Canning's faction and that Pitt has reprimanded Canning for his intemperate language.  

By March the new Cabinet had yielded to popular demand and opened the negotiations for peace, which were to culminate one year later in the Treaty of Amiens. Throughout the months of bargaining, the British resolve to stand firm crumbled steadily; Addington's reputation for incapacity would have been justified if it had been based on these negotiations alone. Opening with the suggestion that Britain

7. Of this final statement, no proof can be found in the documents available to the author.
retain all of her colonial conquests, with the possible exceptions of Minorca and the Cape of Good Hope, as fitting compensation for French aggrandisement on the Continent, the British ended by signing a treaty which surrendered everything except Ceylon and Trinidad, and ignored every important European issue.

Early in April of 1801 came news that seemed to improve the British position and prestige greatly. First, word came of the defeat of the Danish Navy and, soon thereafter, of the break-up of the Armed Neutrality. Lord Nelson had attacked the League at Copenhagen, its most vulnerable port. After destroying the Danish fleet, his fleet was riddled with holes from the cannon of the shore batteries, and seven ships had been forced aground. He then sent word to the Danish Regent that he would be forced to burn his prizes, loaded with wounded Danes, unless a truce was granted to give him time to remove his ships. The Regent yielded to popular opinion and allowed Nelson's fleet to leave the Harbor, where he joined Admiral Parker. A short while later Lord Parker concluded a convention with the Crown Prince of Denmark agreeing to a suspension of hostilities for fourteen weeks, with the liberty to resume the conflict at the end of the period if either saw fit.®

In early April, word came of Paul I's assassination in St. Petersburg on March 24.® Paul's eldest son, Alexander, accepted the throne from the conspirators, though he was still shaken at the thought of his father's strangulation. He had expected his father to be deposed

peacefully. Anxious to avoid more violence so early in his reign, the young Czar disbanded the League of Armed Neutrality. Count Panin acted for Alexander in raising the embargo on British goods and returning most of the 300 merchants who had been seized by the League members when the war had been declared two months before (February 1, 1801). The British government was quick to recognize an opportunity and distributed £60,000 among the Imperial advisors, followed by proposals for an active alliance soon thereafter.

Following the news from the North came word of General Abercromby's brilliant victory of March 21, in which he had destroyed French supremacy in Egypt. British attempts to dislodge General Kleber's troops from Cairo had failed completely until the general was assassinated by a Muslim fanatic in June, 1800. The less competent General Menow took over command of the army and attacked the British forces outside Cairo, only to be completely defeated. Two Turkish armies then joined the victorious British. Town after town surrendered with little resistance. The terrible heat took a great toll of the British armies, however, and they made sure that the terms offered the French were light enough to insure acceptance immediately.10

In June of 1801, Count Panin and Lord St. Helena signed the treaty in St. Petersburg which ended the quarrel between Great Britain and the Armed Neutrality. Russia conceded to agree to British theory that ships of a neutral nation under convoy of a man-of-war with a national flag were not exempt from search. The right of search was to be more strictly regulated and restricted to naval vessels. Arbitrary

seizures were restrained by heavy penalties. "Paper blockades" were forbidden; in the future the blockading force must be so strong and in such a position as to make an attempt to enter enemy ports plainly perilous. Naval stores and foodstuffs, the bulk of the Baltic trade, were no longer classed as "contraband of war." The treaty was generally felt to be just, but when communicated to Lord Grenville (by Lord Hawkesbury) it received severe criticism. Grenville, like most of the British people, was becoming used to brilliant naval victories which fulfilled English objectives without compromising anything of importance to the enemy. In this case he seemed to feel that concessions to Denmark were an affront to British honor, in spite of the fact that they greatly reduced the war front.

On October 1, 1801, preliminaries to the peace between France and Britain were signed at London by Lord Hawkesbury and M. Otto. One of the primary difficulties had been Napoleon's refusal to restore Egypt to the Turks. Yet, all of the First Consul's efforts to reinforce General Menow proved unsuccessful, and the capitulation of Alexandria to the British removed the chief obstacle for the conclusion of the peace. Lord Hawkesbury wrote to Grenville, "We will retain possession of Ceylon and Trinidad; the Cape of Good Hope is to be made a free port; Malta is to be restored to the Order under the guarantee and protection of a third Power; Egypt is to be restored to the Turks; the integrity of the Turkish Empire is to be maintained; the Kingdom of Naples and the Roman

territory is to be evacuated by the French armies. I am inclined to hope that, under the circumstances, you will consider this an honorable peace."\textsuperscript{13} Lord Grenville was angered at these terms. He felt that surrender of the Cape and Malta was a sacrifice of honor, interests, and even the safety of the monarchy.

While the populace generally went wild with joy at the news of the signing of the preliminaries, many thoughtful men were grieved at the conditions by which the peace had been purchased. They observed that the war had been abruptly terminated, without any of the objects being gained for which it had been undertaken. Supposedly it had been waged to curb the ambition and democratic propagandism of France and to prevent the extension of republican authority in the Low Countries. The preliminary articles contributed nothing to the coercion of France, while at the same time giving the Republic a means of restoring its fleet and recruiting an army for future wars.

The administration's supporters and advocates of peace throughout the country opposed these arguments. Without admitting that Britain's resources were exhausted or that peace was a matter of necessity, it was still possible to see that the question of reducing French military power at this time was almost hopeless. The war had ceased to be a life and death struggle against revolutionary doctrines and had become a war between normal governments; the cost of its maintenance had to be weighed against the advantages which might be gained by its further prosecution. The cost of continuing the struggle was enormous, and the Addington

\textsuperscript{13} Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Grenville, October 1, 1801. \textit{Ibid. VII, 45.}
administration felt that it would be worthwhile to try peace. If the first consul proved he was not sincere, there would be time enough to take up arms again later.

At first, Lord Grenville intended to oppose the Cabinet's policy concerning the treaty with Russia and France. However, public opinion was nearly unanimous in its support of the Ministry. Only a few of the members of the House of Lords would follow Lord Grenville's lead, and in Commons, Windham did not even dare to divide. The British had always disclaimed any selfish motives concerning Malta and the Cape of Good Hope publically and could hardly retain Malta without brushing aside the sovereign rights of the King of Two Sicilies, their ally, which they refused to do at this time.

Lord Cornwallis was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and was to conclude with Joseph Bonaparte a definite treaty between the Consulate and George III (See Appendix, the Treaty of Amiens). When the Preliminaries of London had been signed in October, 1801, Napoleon had sent immediate notice of his ratification, commencing with the phrase, "En conséquence du rétablissement de la paix...." This approach should have given Addington and Hawkesbury at least an idea that the First Consul was determined to regard the preliminary agreement as definitive, and that in permitting this interpretation they would compromise their case in advance. They ratified the agreement nonetheless, clinging to the hope that they would be able to improve their claims.


15. Charles Cornwallis, the first marquess, 1738-1805, had served as the governor general of India and viceroy to Ireland. While an understanding man, he was not a brilliant negotiator.
during the subsequent discussions. For the next five months the British plenipotentiaries sought to strengthen their claims, only to end by pondering the duplicity of French diplomacy and acknowledging themselves outmatched in the battle of wits.

Allegedly, one of Napoleon's chief reasons for considering peace was a desire to restore foreign trade and commerce with France. Early in the war, the Committee of Public Safety had excluded British merchant-men from French ports by a decree which punished attempts at evasion with the confiscation of ships and their cargoes and the imprisonment of the crews. The English merchants and shippers had assumed that these hostile regulations would be relaxed or repealed with the peace settlement. At the first word of the truce and impending peace negotiations, they eagerly crowded into French ports only to find that these regulations were still in effect. Napoleon listened only to the cries of French industrialists who pleaded for protection and refused to grant what the British considered adequate concessions. The British commercial classes soon began to feel that the peace would prove more dangerous to their financial interests than the war.

While the English deplored the lack of a commercial pact with France, Napoleon found a personal grievance in the articles printed about him and his policies in émigré-sponsored newspapers sold in London. He refused to believe that the British government could not maintain the close censorship on all publications which he exercised on the press in France. He expressed his views on the subject frequently, one example being found in a note of instruction to General Andréossy, who assumed
the position of French minister in London in the fall of 1801:16

Whenever they speak to you of trade, reply we cannot here con­sider any proposals calculated to strengthen commercial bonds as long as the English do not show that they are really desirous of emerging from a condition, which is in point of fact but a ces­sation of hostilities, to enter into an actual state of peace. For our relations with England we cannot but see a kind of armis­tice, and this position will appear to us unsatisfactory and dis­tasteful as long as we see the intrigues against the internal government of France being formed in London: two hundred indivi­duals who by the terms of the Treaty of Amiens should be banished from British territory living in Jersey: and libels directed against the present administration of France permitted, if not actually subsidized.

These dissatisfactions had injurious effects on the negotiations at Amiens. Both governments made new demands and insisted more stub­bornly on other points that remained unsettled. One article already agreed upon, the plan to use a Russian garrison on Malta, had to be abandoned. Alexander had turned his interest to Russia's domestic problems and refused to be concerned with foreign entanglements. He proposed that the King of Naples should furnish a garrison until the restored Knights of St. John could command strong enough force for its defense. This suggestion was eventually agreed upon, but the distrust between the two negotiating Powers grew more intense daily.

The treaty was eventually signed on March 27, 1802, and it em­bodied even more extensive concessions than Lord Cornwallis had been empowered to make. The Cabinet ratified the treaty after a great deal of hesitation, rather than disown its distinguished envoy.

More important than the items included in the Treaty of Amiens were those which were excluded. The House of Savoy, whose claims the British had formerly championed, was not mentioned. No assurance was

given that French aggression on the Continent would cease. Compensation for the House of Orange was mentioned in the treaty, but no special definition of territory was made. Belgium remained in the hands of the French without independence, and there was no guarantee that the French controlled continental markets would be reopened to British trade.

The failure of the treaty to provide for a Trade pact was later felt to be the principal factor in the resumption of hostilities the following year. The merchants of London recognized the flaw in the settlement from the beginning and protested that its omission rendered Article I, which promised peace, friendship, and good intelligence between the contracting parties, an empty and hypocritical phrase.

When the treaty was published, the terms proved a great disappointment to the British people. It appeared that Britain had made all of the concessions and gained nothing in return. Egypt, which France had already lost, was returned to Turkey; Malta was to be returned to the Order of St. John; all of the military conquests the British had won in the Mediterranean were to be restored to their pre-war possessors, as were all of the colonial conquests. The treaty meant a return of the status quo ante bellum to the British, but for the French Consulate it meant a tacit recognition of French superiority on the Continent.

Napoleon had refused stubbornly to sign away an inch of territory if it was still held by the French forces. He agreed only to withdraw from the Neapolitan Kingdom and the Papal States, and to acknowledge the Republic of the Ionian Islands, which had been formed under the protection of Russia and Turkey in 1799. Aside from the British, the only victims of the treaty were the Spanish who surrendered Trinidad, and the Dutch who failed to regain Ceylon.
It was hard for the British to find cause for self-congratulation, but the desire for peace was so great that even Pitt joined in urging the ratification of the pact. Lord Hawkesbury defended the settlement saying that nothing essential was lost as long as Britain remained mistress of the seas. Her gain from eight long years of war was a small gain in territory and no new markets, but she was assured of naval supremacy. The treaty had left Britain in a favorable position to renew hostilities if the truce failed to work satisfactorily. At the beginning of the war, in 1798, Britain had possessed 135 ships-of-the-line and 133 frigates; by its conclusion, the numbers had risen to 202 and 277 respectively. France, on the other hand, had seen her 80 ships-of-the-line cut to 39, while only 35 of her 66 frigates remained afloat. The reassurance of this naval supremacy made the greatly-desired peace seem like a safe experiment. Some of the more optimistic Englishmen were certain that Napoleon would be content with the conquests he had already gained.

The Treaty of Amiens was doomed from its inception for several reasons. In the first place, Napoleon admitted that the treaty was merely a truce, in his estimation, to grant time for the regrouping of his forces and the consolidation of his conquests. The Russians had been given the tacit understanding during the war that they would receive Constantinople, a prize that neither the French, British, or Austrians were actually willing to grant. The Prussians looked longingly at Hanover, a personal possession of George III. Finally, the Addington ministry had surrendered all of the territorial conquests which seemed important to the British people. None of the goals of the coalition had been accomplished, and all of its members were discontented with the terms granted
by the French. The distrust and jealousies were present and growing, and it took only the French occupation of Hanover and Naples the following year to bring Great Britain back into conflict with Napoleon once more.
The Treaty of Amiens was signed by the governments of Great Britain and France on March 27, 1802 at Amiens, France. Lord Cornwallis represented the government of George III; Joseph Bonaparte signed for the French Republic. The Treaty of Amiens in its entirety is presented below.

"His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people, being animated with an equal desire to put an end to the calamities of war, have laid the foundations of peace with the Preliminary Articles signed in London the first of October, 1801....

Article 1. There shall be peace, friendship and understanding between H.M., the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, his heirs and successors, on the one part; and the French Republic, H.M. the King of Spain, his heirs and successors, and the Batavian Republic, on the other hand. The contracting parties shall give the greatest attention to maintain, between themselves and their States, a perfect harmony, and without allowing on either side any kind of hostilities by sea or by land, to be committed to any cause or under any pretense whatsoever. They shall carefully avoid everything which might hereafter affect the union happily reestablished, and they shall not afford any assistance or protection, directly or indirectly, to those who should cause prejudice to any of them.

Article 2. All prisoners taken on either side, as well by land as by sea, and the hostages carried away during the war, and to this day,
shall be restored without ransom in six weeks at the latest, to be computed from the day of exchange of the ratification of the present treaty, and on paying the debts they have contracted during their captivity. Each contracting party shall respectively discharge the advances which have been made by any of the contracting parties for the subsistence and maintenance of the prisoners in the country where they have been detained. For this purpose a commission shall be established by agreement, which shall be especially charged to ascertain and regulate the compensation which may be due to either of the contracting powers. Time and place where the commissioners who shall be charged with the execution of this Article, shall assemble, shall also be fixed upon by agreement.

Article 3. His Britanic Majesty restores to the French Republic and her Allies, namely His Catholic Majesty and the Batavian Republic, all of the possessions and colonies which had belonged to them respectively, and which had been occupied or conquered by the British forces in the course of the war, with the exception of the island of Trinidad and the Dutch possession of the island of Ceylon.

Article 4. His Catholic Majesty cedes and guarantees, in full right and sovereignty, to His Britanic Majesty, all of the possessions and establishments in the island of Trinidad.

Article 5. The Batavian Republic cedes and guarantees, in full right and sovereignty, to His Britanic Majesty, all of the establishments and possessions in the island of Ceylon which belonged to the Republic of the United Provinces or to their East India Company.

Article 6. The Cape of Good Hope remains in full sovereignty to the Batavian Republic, as it was before the war. The ships of every
description belonging to the other contracting parties shall have the right to put in there and purchase such supplies as they may need without paying any other duties than those to which the ships of the Batavian Republic are subjected.

Article 7. The territories and possessions of Her Most Faithful Majesty are maintained with their integrity, such as they were previous to the commencement of the war. Nevertheless, the limits of French and Portuguese Guiana shall be determined by the River Arawari.

Article 8. Territories, possessions and rights of the Ottoman Porte are hereby maintained in their integrity, such as they were previous to the war.

Article 9. The Republic of the Seven Isles is hereby acknowledged.

Article 10. The islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino shall be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and shall be held by it upon the same conditions on which the Order held them previous to the war, and under the following conditions:

1. The Knights of the Order, whose langues shall continue to subsist after the exchange of the ratification of the present treaty, are invited to return to Malta as soon as that exchange shall have taken place. They shall there form a General Chapter and shall proceed to the election of a Grand Master, to be chosen from among the natives of those nations which preserve langues if no such election shall have been already made since the exchange of the ratification of the preliminary Articles of Peace. It is understood that an election which shall have been made subsequent to that period, shall alone be considered as valid
to the exchange of every other which shall have taken place at anytime previous to the said period.

ii. The Government of Great Britain and the French Republic, being desirous of placing the Order of St. John and the island of Malta in a state of entire independence on each of these Powers, do agree that there shall be henceforth no English nor French langues, and that no individual belonging to either of said Powers shall be admissible into the Order.

iii. A Maltese langue shall be established, to be supported out of the land revenues and commercial duties of the island. There shall be dignities with appointments, and an Auberge appropriated to this langue. No proof of nobility shall be necessary for the admission of knights into said langue. They shall be competent to hold every office and enjoy every privilege in the like manner as the knights of the other langues. The municipal, civil, judicial and other offices under government of the island, shall be filled at least in the proportion of one-half by native inhabitants of Malta, Gozo, and Comino.

iv. The forces of his Britanic Majesty shall evacuate the island and its dependencies within three months of the exchange of ratification, or sooner if it can be done. At that period, the island shall be delivered up to the Order in the state in which it is now provided to the Grand Master, or Commissioners fully empowered, according to the provisions of the Statutes of the Order, who should be upon the island to receive possession, and that the force to be furnished by his Sicilian Majesty, as hereafter stipulated, be arrived there.

v. The garrison of the island shall, at all times, consist at least one-half of native Maltese; and the Order shall have the liberty
of recruiting the remainder of the garrison from the natives of these countries which possess langues. The native Maltese troops shall be offered by the Maltese; and the supreme command of the garrison, as well as the appointment of the officers, shall be vested in the Grand Master of the Order.

vi. The independence of the islands of Malta, Goza, and Comino, as well as the present arrangement, shall be under the protection of Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain and Prussia.

vii. The perpetual neutrality of the Order, and of the island and its dependencies, is hereby acknowledged.

viii. The port of Malta shall be open to the commerce of all nations who shall pay equal and moderate duties.

ix. The Barbary States are excepted from the provisions of the two preceding paragraphs until, by means of an arrangement to be made by the contracting parties, the system of hostility which subsists between the said Barbary States, the Order of St. John, and the powers possessing langues, or taking part in the formation of them, shall be terminated.

x. The Order shall be governed, both in spiritual and temporal matters by the same Statutes that were in force at the time when the knights quitted the island, so far as the same shall not be derogated from the present treaty.

xi. Stipulations iii, vii, and viii and x shall be converted into laws and perpetual Statutes of the Order in the customary manner.

xii. His Sicilian Majesty shall be invited to furnish 2,000 men, natives of his dominions, to serve as a garrison for the several fortresses on the island. The troops shall remain one year or until the Order of St. John has sufficient forces as judged by the Powers.
xiii. The several Powers specified in paragraph vi shall be invited to accede to the present arrangements.

Article 11. The French forces shall evacuate the Kingdom of Naples and the Roman territory. The English forces shall, in like manner, evacuate Porto Ferrajo, and generally all ports and islands which they may occupy in the Mediterranean or in the Adriatic.

Article 12. The evacuations, cessions, and restitutions stipulated for the present Treaty, except where otherwise especially provided for, shall take place in Europe within one month, in the Continent and seas of America and Africa within three months and within the Continent and seas of Asia within six months of the ratification of the present Treaty.

Article 13. In all cases the restitution agreed upon by the present treaty, the fortifications shall be delivered up in the state in which they may have been at the time of the signature of the Preliminary Treaty; and all the works which have been constructed since the occupation shall remain untouched.

It is further agreed that all articles of cession stipulated, there shall be allowed to the inhabitants of whatever condition or nation they may be, a term of three years to be computed from the ratification of the present treaty, for the purposes of disposing of their property acquired and possessed either before or during the war, in which term of three years they may have full exercise of their religion and the enjoyment of their property.

The same privilege is granted in the countries restored, to all those, whether inhabitants or others, who shall have made therein any
establishments whatsoever during the time when those countries were in the possession of Great Britain.

With respect to the inhabitants of the countries restored or ceded, it is agreed that none of them shall be prosecuted, disturbed, or molested in their persons or properties, under any pretext, on account of their conduct or physical opinions, or of their attachment to any of the contracting Powers, nor on any other account, except that of debts contracted to individuals, or on account of acts posterior to the present treaty.

Article 14. All sequestrations imposed by any of the parties on the funded property, revenue or debts, of whatever description, belonging to any of the contracting Powers, or their citizens or subjects, shall be taken off immediately after the signature of this treaty. The decision of all claims brought forward by individuals, subjects or citizens of any of the others, for rights, debts, property or effects whatsoever, which according to received usages and the law of nations, ought to revive at the period of peace, shall be heard and decided before competent tribunals; and in all cases prompt and ample justice shall be administered in the countries in which the claims are made.

Article 15. The fisheries on the coast of Newfoundland, and of the adjacent islands, and of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, are replaced on the same footing on which they were previous to the war. The French fishermen, and the inhabitants of St. Pierre and Miguelon, shall have privileges of cutting such wood as they may have need of, in the bays of Fortune and Dispair, for a space of one year from the date of notification of the ratification of the treaty.
Article 16. In order to prevent all causes of complaint and dispute which may arise on account of prizes which may have been taken at sea, after the signature of the Preliminary Articles, it is reciprocally agreed that the vessels and effects which may have taken in the British Channel and in the North Sea, after a space of twelve days, to be computed from the exchange of the ratification of such Preliminary Articles, shall be restored on each side; that the term shall be one month from the British Channel and North Sea, as far as the Canary Islands, inclusively, whether in the ocean or in the Mediterranean; two months from said Canary Islands as far as the equator; and lastly, five months from all other parts of the world, without any exception, or any more particular description of time and place.

Article 17. The Ambassadors, Ministers, and other agents of the contracting Powers shall enjoy respectively in the states of the said Powers, the same rank, privileges, perogatives, and immunities which public agents of the same class enjoyed previous to the war.

Article 18. The branch of the House of Nassau, which was established in the Republic formerly called the Republic of the United Provinces, and now the Batavian Republic, having suffered losses there in private property as a consequence of the change of the constitution adopted in that country, an adequate compensation shall be procured for the said House of Nassau for the said losses.

Article 19. The present Difinitive Treaty shall be declared common to the Sublime Ottoman Porte, the ally of his Britanic Majesty, and the Sublime Porte shall be invited to transmit its act of accession thereto in the shortest possible delay.
Article 20. It is agreed that the contracting parties shall on requisitions made by them respectively, deliver up to justice persons accused of crimes of murder, forgery, or fraudulent bankruptcy, committed in the jurisdiction of the requiring party, provided that this shall be done only when the evidence of criminality shall be so authenticated as that the laws of the country where the accused shall be found would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the offense had been there committed. It is understood that this article does not regard in any manner crimes committed antecedently to the conclusion of this treaty.

Article 21. The contracting parties promise to observe sincerely and bona fide all Articles contained in the present Treaty; and they will not suffer the same to be infringed, directly or indirectly, by their respective subjects or citizens, and that said contracting parties generally and reciprocally guarantee to each other all the stipulations of the present Treaty.

Article 22. (Signatures)
REFERENCES


