DEVELOPMENT OF DEVICES FOR MEASURING
SELECTED WORLD VIEWS

by

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STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

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ABSTRACT

Contemporary approaches to the unresolved question of whether human beings possess any degree of self-determination or whether they are totally determined by outside forces were reviewed and discussed. Two questionnaires were obtained to measure individual beliefs in this area, Wrightsman's Philosophies-of-Human-Nature with two relevant subscales, and Liverant's Social Reaction Inventory. Three additional questionnaires and a set of incomplete sentences were developed to explore the area conceptually. The total set of six measuring instruments was given to ninety-one individuals from ten different religious backgrounds, including one group composed of those who professed no religion, agnosticism, or atheism.

Differences among religious groups and between sexes were not significant for any of the six tests. Several of the measuring instruments were significantly correlated, though only one correlation was over .50. Profiles across the tests, both for religious groups and for individuals, were discussed. The incomplete sentences were used to throw light on particularly deviant profiles. Possible revisions of the questionnaires were discussed, but it was felt that no one of the measuring instruments used was satisfactory for the proposed goal of correlating
beliefs about Freedom-Determinism with human functioning in several areas of life. A new attempt to develop such an instrument was proposed.
INTRODUCTION

This is a report on the current status of the ancient controversy of free will vs. determinism. That such a topic could be chosen for a thesis in psychology is in itself an indication of a changing zeitgeist in the scientific world today. The rash of recent books and articles devoted to the topic suggests increasing interest in it as a concomitant, and perhaps as a consequence, of increasing awareness of its importance in human functioning. That one’s personal belief-system is of central importance in determining the degree of attained satisfaction with life has long been recognized by clinical psychologists. The new tide includes a new look at subjective factors by psychology in general; as they return to respectability, new attempts are being made to measure empirically both their scope and their influence on human behavior.

The following pages will suggest:

1. The inevitability of a set of metaphysical assumptions about the nature of man and the world as a basis for human functioning.

2. The unprovable nature of such world-views or cosmologies.

3. The emotional ("religious") nature of the world-view held by many supposedly objective, rational scientists.
4. The nature of some alternate world-views (concepts concerning the nature of man) including variants of freedom and determinism.

5. Some of the consequences following from commitment to these alternatives, including scientific, political, and psychological consequences.

The writer admits to a personal bias against both of the absolutist positions: total freedom as advocated by Sartre, or total determinism as conceptualized by Skinner. Since only the latter is of concern to modern psychology, the major emphasis in this introduction will be on the Skinnerian viewpoint and the alternative "intermediate" conceptualizations of a number of psychologists who are currently being labeled "humanistic." The evidence to be presented here supports this middle position, which holds that varying degrees of self-determinism are part of man's potential and that belief in some such capacity is essential to optimal human functioning.

First of all, can man function without metaphysical assumptions about the world? Skinner says "yes." He claims that he is only interested in observing "facts" and that when enough "facts" have been gathered they will "automatically" produce a theory, or at least a theory can easily be induced from them. But a rather impressive number of psychologists and philosophers (including philosophers of science) stand arrayed against him. There are far too many to list
here, but several approaches to the problem can be cited.

A recent book by Wallraff (1961) indicates the interdependency of psychology and epistemology.

Physiological Psychology leads, almost inevitably, to a representative theory of perception; behaviorism aids and abets operationism which, consistently applied, is equivalent to logical empiricism; functionalism in Psychology supports pragmatism; hormic psychology prepares the way for a teleological philosophy; psychoanalysis, like Marx's doctrine of ideology, leads to relativism and irrationalism; elementistic sensationism requires a doctrine of implicit thought or unconscious inference, while gestalt phenomenology provides a background for neointuitionism. These affiliations are natural and inevitable, and should be openly acknowledged (Wallraff, 1961, p. 6).

Hobbs (1962) claims that one of the tasks of psychotherapy is to help the client find a more serviceable cosmology, the latter being an essential part of being human.

All approaches to psychotherapy seem to have a more or less elaborated conception of the nature of man, which they, in essence, teach to the client. In doing so, they tie in with an ongoing process which is a unique and most exciting and engaging characteristic of man. Man constantly engages in building and repairing and extending and modifying cognitive structures that help him make personal sense of the world. The individual has got to have a cognitive house to live in to protect himself from the incomprehensibilities of existence as well as to provide some architecture for daily experiencing. He has to build defenses against the absurd in the human condition and at the same time find a scheme that will make possible reasonably accurate predictions of his own behavior and of the behavior of his wife, his boss, his professor, his physician, his neighbor, and of the policeman on the corner. He must adopt or invent a personal cosmology. When he invests this cosmology with passion, we may call it his personal mystique (p. 746).
The individual seeks psychotherapy (or some other source of cognitive control) when his cosmology, his personal system for imposing order on the world, breaks down to an alarming degree. With increasing anxiety, order must be restored (p. 747).

Frankl (1963) is representative of modern Existentialistic psychotherapists who consider that current patterns of neurosis are due more to the lack of meaning and values in modern life than to the sexual repressions of society. Frankl's claim is that man must commit himself actively to some value in order to live a meaningful life, and that under stress conditions the ability to construe the situation in a meaningful way may make the difference between life and death.

The personality theorist, George Kelly, is an example of the "cognitive" school of psychology which points out the central position of "belief-systems" in human functioning. He calls his system "Constructive Alternativism," and in essence he postulates that all men continually do what science tries to do in a more systematic way—to extend their understanding of life in order to predict and control their situation. Each man has theories, tests them, and weighs his experimental evidence. All thinking is based, in part, on prior convictions, but the more careful scientific and philosophical systems try to make these convictions or assumptions explicit. Their denial of holding such convictions simply means that the beliefs have remained implicit and unrecognized.
In short, a "fact" can only be called one in terms of a context of postulates. A "fact" is a selected element of on-going phenomenal experience which is presumed to be significant because it relates to other selected elements. The basis for the selection is the set of assumptions about the world held by the individual concerned, be he scientist or the mythical average man. Hadley Cantril (1950) recognizes that the way a scientist poses his problem determines where he will come out, for the way the problem is posed will determine what particular aspect of a dilemma is to be studied and what techniques will be used or devised for carrying out the investigation. The choice of variables studied out of the total existing determines results, and Cantril writes that the choice depends on explicit or implicit assumptions about the world.

However, man's need for a cognitive superstructure to deal with the problematical world and the inevitability of the superstructure's resting on the foundation of a few key assumptions might be granted, and it might be held that the assumptions of modern science have been proven true. Again, there are many voices raised against this, but the most telling objection is the very controversy with which this study is concerned. When psychology cannot agree on the nature of man in an area as basic as his capacity for some degree of self-determinism vs. total determinism by external forces, one is justified in wondering whether many of our assumptions are not only unproven but also are unprovable.
The physicist, Margenau (Maslow, ed., 1959), says that we used to think that scientific propositions were universally valid, testable by everyone, "objective," and unrelated to commands or commitments. But now, with the advent of many-valued logics, non-Euclidean geometries, non-commutative algebras, etc., even applied sciences like physics clearly show the limitations, the conditioning by accepted postulates of all scientific pronouncements that go beyond the statement of descriptive particulars. He feels that scientific theorems and normative values are "in the same leaky boat" (p. 46).

This point should not need further emphasis. The essence of the scientific method is the holding of all hypotheses and conclusions as tentative and subject to revision. But the antagonism toward such areas of research as parapsychology suggests that most psychologists cling to the materialistic "weltanschauung" as more than just a theory; they hold it as an objective, proven fact, even as the only way to view the world realistically and intelligently. The furor during the 1950s over the theories of Velikovsky (Stecchini, 1963) brings into sharp focus the inability of many scientists to remain objective and impartial toward a drastic revision of a basic scientific assumption, in this case Newton's principles claiming the absolute stability of our solar system, which were assumed proven by selected portions of the work of Laplace. Although the Velikovsky hornet's nest was stirred primarily within the ranks of the astronomers, with some repercussions in a variety of
other scientific areas, its importance to psychology and the social
sciences is pointed out in an excellent review of the whole "Velikovsky

Stecchini writes:

The psychological assumption that gave Velikovsky his original
subjective stimulus to investigate ancient traditions, namely
that mankind lives in subconscious fear of cosmic cataclysms,
could explain the panic and the emotional irrationality of many
reviewers. A valuable clue to the cause of such a reaction is
given by the professor of philosophy at St. Louis University
who, while associating himself with the effort of the scientists
to suppress the book, complained that they did not fully realize
the enormity of the crime committed by the publishing industry,
for the book destroyed the foundation of Judeo-Christian beliefs.
The article concluded that the Catholic Church should come to
the rescue by placing the book in the Index. But, after the
painful experience with Galileo, the Catholic Church has
accumulated more wisdom in scientific epistemology than that
revealed by our scientific community. The Cardinal
Bellarmine of this case was Professor Harlow Shapley who was
indefatigable in his campaign, started before the publication
of the book, to alarm the scientific world of the impending
catastrophe. How similar are the two personalities! Cardinal
Bellarmine was the epitome of the bureaucratic personality
and Shapley has devoted his life to the new Leviathan of
scientific bureaucracy. The spirit of the new bureaucracy was
revealed by the A.A.A.S. meeting (Dec. 30, 1950) held in
response to Velikovsky's book. At that meeting it was proposed
that henceforth any publication that presents new scientific
hypotheses should not be allowed to be printed without the
Imprimatur of a proper professional body.

Every bureaucratic organization that wants to be accountable
only to itself attempts to base its power on a transcendental
absolute, and Velikovsky was threatening the transcendental
absolute of the church of scientism. The reaction against
Velikovsky's book confirms once more the common observa-
tion that the great mass of natural scientists has not yet
assimilated the implications of the great scientific trans-
formation that started at the end of the last century (on the
foundations laid by Berkeley, Hume, and Hegel), and clings
to scientism, the crude mechanical determinism of the eighteenth century, with insufficient awareness of all the knowledge that has been accumulated in two hundred years on the problem of human perception. What has happened is that when science was still operating on scholastic premises, there were developed mechanical clocks. Since early clocks were connected with astronomy and often took the form of orreries, they influenced the interpretation of the cosmological revolution brought about by Copernicus, Bruno, and Galileo. The recent book The Myth of Metaphor (New Haven, 1962) by the philosopher Colin Murray Turbayne, who explicitly appeals to the arguments of Berkeley and Hume, examines the pervading influence of the metaphor of the mechanical clock, and observes, in the Introduction, that as a result of it there has been founded a church, more powerful than that founded by Peter and Paul, whose dogmas are now so entrenched that anyone who tries to re-allocate the facts is guilty of more than heresy; he is opposing scientific truth (pp. 28-29).

Stecchini notes the "religious" (in the sense of emotional commitment to a dogma) overtones of the "Velikovsky affair." The metaphor of the clock may well be important, but it is also significant that the scientific assumptions which were violated by Velikovsky carry the theme of uniformity and stability, both astronomical and geological. It is possible that such assumptions have become the refuge of modern men who have given up belief in God as an ordering principle in the universe as well as a guarantor against catastrophe. If an unchanging "Natural Law", the basic tenets of which are already known to man, had not replaced God as a focus of dedication and commitment, it would be difficult to explain the emotional intensity of the reaction against Velikovsky, even with the theory of some form of race fear of catastrophe.
Rollo May (Nunokawa, ed., 1965) supports the idea that modern science plays the role occupied by religion and magic in earlier times as chief support against anxiety.

Cyril Richardson proposes the thesis that one can discover the chief anxiety-allying methods of a historical period by noting what the reformers in the subsequent period attacked. This interesting hypothesis strikes me as being exceedingly fruitful for further study. Thus, Luther and the other leaders of the Protestant Reformation attacked the reliance on external sacramentalism of late medieval Catholicism, and the leaders of the Renaissance attacked the scholastic symbolism and corporate authority of medievalism as opposed to their new individualism and naturalism. Thus, the reformers following the disintegrating phase of Hellenistic culture (for example, the early Christians) attacked the vapid and arid rationalistic philosophies of the Hellenistic time. I should only add to Richardson's hypothesis that it seems to me the "motif," the particular "genius" or "charter" (in Malinowski's sense) of a given historical period, will be what, in deteriorated form, is obsessively clung to at the time of disintegration of the period. With regard to the present period, we shall indicate below that the dependence on science as a form of magic is what many persons in our day cling to as a method of allaying anxiety and may well be what the next age will attack. These propositions are suggested not as answers but as hypotheses for future psychocultural investigations (p. 78).

This necessarily sketchy look at the role of metaphysics in modern science can conclude with a recent article by Ludwig Immergluck (1964) which illustrates the height of confusion that can be reached in the attempt to defend absolute determinism. Immergluck writes

... the notion that behavior, as indeed all other events in nature, is lawfully related to antecedent and attendant events, and that such relationships may be quantitatively described, has been indispensable in at once liberating psychology from its metaphysical ancestry and bringing it into the fold of natural science (p. 270).
Psychology is to disavow metaphysics and philosophy. Yet, in the next breath, Immergluck himself speaks of the "broad acceptance of philosophical determinism" as a valuable thing; and a few pages later he objects to Boring's truncated model of determinism (which admits partial freedom), asking "on logical grounds alone, is this a feasible model or does it merely serve an unwitting, albeit understandable, temptation to circumvent a basic and consistent philosophical commitment?" (p. 276).

It seems we are to commit ourselves to a logical philosophical position as long as we choose the "right" one—i.e., total determinism. On what grounds is total external determinism more "logically consistent" than a measure of self-determinism on the part of a complex, rational organism? What proof have we that the world is inherently intellectually logical and consistent? This appears to be one of the implicit assumptions of most scientists. Perhaps it is a necessary one for a lifetime dedication to the "search for truth"—the belief that order will be found on all levels of reality; so that ultimately through his expanding knowledge man can be master of the world if not of himself. Yet Stecchini (1963) suggests "It is now time for a sober and factual reconsideration; William James properly called 'tough minded' those who can face reality and who do not believe a priori in uniformity and regularity" (p. 30).

Whitehead (1930) has written:
The doctrine of the Uniformity of Nature is to be ranked with the contrasted doctrine of Magic and Miracle, as an expression of partial truth, unguarded and uncoordinated with the immensities of the Universe. Our interpretations of experience determine the limits of what we can do with the world (p. 99).

For all their claims to pure empiricism and objective facts, the Behaviorists are as firmly rooted in a set of metaphysical beliefs as any other group, from the primitive fetishists who place their faith in a bit of carved stone to the modern humanists who set an absolute value on man and the fulfillment of his potential.

Hobbs (1962) neatly summarizes the ideas advanced here:

Man by his nature is going to erect cognitive structures to increase his feeling of control over his destiny, and there is no way of establishing the validity of a particular order-giving structure independently of the individual who is going to use it. The concept of insight can have meaning only as a part of the process of elaborating on some particular system for interpreting events. There are no true insights, only more or less useful ones (pp. 446-447).

What are these philosophical viewpoints, then, which divide psychology into three major camps, with Behaviorists and orthodox Freudians aligned on the side of determinism against the so-called "third force" of humanistic psychology? Skinner is the outstanding spokesman for the determinists. In his early utopia Walden II (1948) the hero expresses his conviction that "all that happens is contained in an original plan" (p. 247). In a later statement (1953) Skinner says:

The hypothesis that man is not free is essential to the application of scientific method to the study of human behavior. The free inner man who is held responsible for his behavior is only
a pre-scientific substitute for the kinds of causes which are discovered in the course of scientific analysis. All these alternative causes lie outside the individual (p. 247).

Nor is Skinner an isolated exception among psychologists.

Recent paperback compilations of authors on the subject of freedom-determinism give the impression that a majority of the selected writers favor determinism (Morgenbesser and Walsh, ed., 1962, and Hook, ed., 1961). Books are still being published (Vivian, 1964) that are completely devoted to arguments and evidence for determinism. Vivian sees only a single choice of belief systems: either total determinism with ultimate responsibility relegated to an hypothesized First Cause, or indeterminism and chance. And neither alternative admits human freedom. He also makes the claim, but without offering evidence to support it, that the more people are determined, the more they feel free. Still another indication of belief in determinism on the part of current academic psychologists (if not on the part of their subjects) is to be found in the Psi Chi Newsletter (Spring 1964, pp. 11-12). A student at Ohio University named Richard S. Uhrbrock in a paper entitled "Is Anybody Learning?" reported on a research project in which he questioned students in a course in industrial psychology which had featured Morgan and Skinner as to the students' belief in free will and found that 26 accepted it as compared with 7 who denied it. His conclusion was that we must no longer neglect to lay the "ghosts of the straw men of yesteryear" (e.g.,
the old-fashioned belief in freedom) and that Skinner is the one to aid in clarifying the issues.

The Behaviorists thus offer us a choice between the Calvinist world of complete pre-determination with "matter" and "natural law" taking the place of God as "cause" or a world of complete indeterminism and chance. To these we can add the unconscious determinism of Freud, presenting a world in which unconscious biological forces and external pressures combine to crystallize rigid patterns by the age of five or six. Presumably these patterns can be altered only through the intervention of outside help.

The views of those who favor some capacity for freedom and self-determination in man are less easily summed. Their main arguments include:

1. Anything "whole" has some degree of freedom; whereas its "parts" are determined by the role they must play in the functioning of the whole. Kelly, Angyal, Smuts, etc. have discussed this concept.

2. Man is not a passive reactive mechanism, but an active organism who alters his intake to create a new beginning. Murray's "pro-active man" was an expression of this idea. Before him there were Smuts' and Adler's concepts, and still farther back Aristotle's "self-moving" man as a real "agent" (Hook, ed., 1961, Taylor).

3. Man is a complex organism with more than one alternative action available to him much of the time. Recent books by Fromm
(1964) and Barron (1963) have stressed this aspect of man.

4. Through self-awareness, man can gain insight into his former automatic and unconscious habits and can attain a measure of freedom. The modern ego psychologists, for the most part offshoots of the Freudian movement, advance this view.

5. A somewhat less defensible hypothesis is advanced by Zavalloni (1962) and Adkin (1959). They suggest something like a return to outmoded "faculty" psychology, advocating, respectively, a "volitional factor" and an "initiative factor" to account for man's "will."

Since these are highly controversial hypotheses, rejected or ignored by much of current academic psychology, it may be in order to quote some of the theorists in somewhat greater detail. Kelly (1955) presents an interesting conceptualization, suggesting that determinism and freedom are opposite sides of the same coin, two aspects of the same relationship. Superordinates control their elements; elements are determined by their superordinates. Thus Kelly said:

Man can enslave himself with his own ideas and then win his freedom again by reconstruing his life. . . . Ultimately a man sets the measures of his own freedom and his own bondage by the level at which he chooses to establish his convictions. The man who orders his life in terms of many special and inflexible convictions about temporary matters makes himself the victim of circumstances. Each little prior conviction that is not open to review is a hostage he gives to fortune; it determines whether the events of tomorrow will bring happiness or misery (p. 78).

Elsewhere Kelly returns to this theme of the free superordinating systems and the determined subordinates.
The changes that take place, as one moves toward creating a more suitable system for anticipating events, can be seen as falling under the control of that person's superordinating system. In his role identifying him with his superordinating system, the person is free with respect to subordinate changes he attempts to make. In his role as the follower of his own fundamental principles, he finds his life determined by them (p. 78).

Angyal (1965) presents the dichotomy in terms of autonomy-homonomy. Every organism seeks autonomy (self-assertiveness, freedom, mastery); but the complementary side of the coin is homonomy (the individual's place in a larger whole--physical environment, social group, cultural patterns, etc.). Dreikurs (1963) similarly, expanding the theories of Adler, describes freedom as possible only to "functional wholes!"; and they in turn are recognizable through their purposiveness. Where one acts as a whole, controlling subordinate elements for the goals of the whole (and of course within the limits of the environment's coercive power), then there is freedom. Where one recognizes and/or is bound by demands (physical or otherwise) of a larger context (natural or man-made law) or by unintegrated, non-cooperating elements of the whole, one is not free.

Also Dreikurs, Angyal (1965), Barron (1963), Alan Watts (1965), and others point out what the Behaviorists too often ignore--the essentially active role of the organism. Life, even at the lowest levels, is not totally passive to external manipulations.
Lewis Way (1962) in discussing Adler's concept of human self-
determination quotes the work of Smuts which originally helped to formu-
late the holistic, active conceptualization of freedom. Way writes:

Heredity and environment can be treated, from the psycholog-
ist's point of view, only as predisposing factors, never as
determining agents. Accordingly, we must adopt a viewpoint
different from that of the ordinary determinist if neurosis is
to be adequately explained. Where life and mind are con-
cerned we must reckon with an internal activity in the organ-
ism itself which will play its part in moulding every develop-
ment. Life does not merely react to the environment; it acts
upon the environment. The presence of this active principle
in life has already been tacitly assumed in speaking of "over-
compensation," a mode of describing events which would be
meaningless on the assumption that the human being were
merely a passive agent. Just as the organs of the body can
only be comprehended in terms of their functioning, so mind
requires for its explanation the concepts of striving and
purpose. Without a purposive concept of life and of the
human mind we should be physiologists rather than psychol-
ogists, and limited to a terminology of stimulus and response.
But everywhere we find that the human being does not merely
respond to outside forces, but is seeking to transform the
environment into a shape more nearly suited to his individual
needs. We find that, in the mental sphere, he is not passive,
either towards the events of his own body or towards those of
the external world, but is constantly seeking to shape and to
build from the materials which these present either his
neurotic structure or his successful compensations (pp. 47-48).

This is how Smuts sums up the matter: "If an external 'cause'
is applied to an organism or a living body it will become
internalized and transformed, and it will be experienced as a
stimulus, which in its turn will be followed by a response.
The response is not the mere mechanical effect or equivalent
of the cause, and this is due to the complete transformation
which the latter has undergone. In the moment which elapses
between stimulus and response, a miracle is performed; a
vast series of organic changes is set going of which compara-
tively little is known as yet. The inorganic becomes organ-
ism... And, as a result, the response is not the mere
passive effect of the stimulus, but is the free and spontaneous movement of the organism itself under the influence of the appropriate stimulus. The passive, external stimulus has been recreated into an active free response of the organism. Anything passing through the organic whole undergoes this change, this appropriation of it by the whole as its own. Any action issuing from it has the stamp of the whole upon it. The procedure is transformative, synthetic, recreative, holistic, and the result is 'new' in one degree or another. From this it will be seen that, if the concept of causation is to be retained in connection with organic or psychical activities, it will have to be substantially recast. The resultant activity of an organism under a stimulus is never merely the effect of that stimulus, as it would be in the case of mechanical action, but always of the stimulus as transformed by the organism; the organism appears as the dominant element in the causal concept, and the stimulus appears in a minor role. The more active the state of the organism, and the more thorough its reaction to the stimulus, the less is the influence of the stimulus on the response, which appears as the free and almost original action of the organism. The organic response is often so great compared to the stimulus, it is so out of all proportion to it, and so transcends it in every way, that the organism appears clearly as the real cause, and the stimulus merely as a minor condition or excitation" (pp. 56-57).

Furthermore, with increasing complexity as we come up the phylogenetic scale, the potential variability of the response repertoire increases. Barron (1963, p. 262) expresses it:

The essence of our human freedom is this, that matter has acquired the capacity to work radical modifications in itself. Thus, among its "available responses" is the ability to act in such a manner as to increase its own flexibility, or deliberately to maximize its own response variability.

Allport (1955) comments:

Relative freedom, we know, depends upon the individual's possession of multiple possibilities for behavior. To state the point paradoxically, a person who harbors many determining tendencies in his neuropsychic system is freer than
a person who harbors few. Thus a person having only one skill, knowing only one solution, has only one degree of freedom. On the other hand, a person widely experienced and knowing many courses of conduct has many more degrees of freedom. It is in this sense that the broadly educated man is freer than the man narrowly trained.

Today we are witnessing the frightening things that political leaders with one-channeled minds can do. What alarms us is their simplistic view of social and political reality. They know only one solution; and this solution is totalitarian and spurious. Their lack of tolerance and fear of dissent reflect their own lack of freedom. One-channeled minds can never comprehend that truth may have many channels (p. 85).

The neo-Freudians, among others, emphasize the role of self-awareness in permitting freedom. On the one hand Kubie (1958) points to the rigid patterns characteristic of "inner unconscious determinism" as the essence of neuroticism and illness rather than a condition present in all men.

The measure of health is flexibility, the freedom to learn through experience, the freedom to change with changing internal and external circumstances, to be influenced by reasonable argument, admonitions, exhortation, and the appeal to emotions; the freedom to respond appropriately to the stimulus of reward and punishment, and especially the freedom to cease when sated. The essence of illness is the freezing of behavior into unalterable and insatiable patterns... Any moment of behavior is neurotic if the processes that set it in motion pre-determine its automatic repetition, and this irrespective of the situation or the social or personal values or consequences of the act (pp. 20-21).

Fromm, in his most recent book (1964), has swung over from orthodox Freudian determinism; and he writes now of alternativism—of man's unique capacity for awareness of consequences which permits him to choose between alternative possibilities if he recognizes the facts
before he is emotionally committed to one of the possible paths of action. However, man may recognize too late that some time earlier on the chain of action he could have chosen differently. Allport (1955) writes at some length on the subject.

Even when we take the view of the scientist we note that certain conditions make for relatively more or less freedom for the individual. One of the conditions we are most sure of is self-insight. A therapist of even the most deterministic persuasion assumes that a patient who achieves a high degree of self-objectification, who sees his personal equation clearly written out, is at last in a position to weigh his inclinations, comprehend his limitations, and follow with some success a self-chosen course of action. If this were not so every system of therapy would operate on false pretense. Psychotherapy gives hope that a corrected self-image, a more rational assessment of one's behavior, will reduce compulsions, induce order, and free channels of development to accord with chosen aims. Hence even a 'scientific psychology concedes that self-knowledge may lead to a relative freedom (p. 84).

Pears (1963) sums the idea briefly:

Some accounts, at least, of the therapeutic processes of psychoanalysis represent them as "setting a man free" from unconscious motivations, and so allowing him genuinely and substantially to decide his future. If this representation is correct, psychoanalytical theory is self-limiting, as it were, and would give no ground for any general doctrine of determinism and absence of freedom. It would rather be a theory about degrees of freedom, and suggest factors which, unknown to us, limit our freedom, the removal of which would increase our area of free choice (p. 121).

Jung's individuation theory can be cited as an early expression of what is now called "self-actualization" with its emphasis on the need for individual integration for full self-expression. Progooff (1953) writes of Freud's determinism and goes on:
Quite a different approach is necessary if one would direct the modern man to a road that goes beyond his spiritual impasse. First, he must have a sense of freedom, or at least of the potentiality of freedom, as being within the bounds of human nature. Jung has articulated this very thoroughly and stressed it from several different angles in order to demonstrate the fact that the psyche is inherently creative. Man is caught in a trap only if he permits himself to be, for the very nature of the psyche is to integrate itself and to build a unity out of the disjointed segments of personality. Jung's conception of Individuation is essentially a road of freedom, pointing out that it is not only within man's power to find and experience the meaning of his life, but that his psychological health requires him to do so (pp. 289-291).

The last sentence of the preceding quotation leads us into the final consideration of the introduction—the consequences of man's belief-system, both his self-concept and the "meaning" he finds or creates in his life. The scientific consequences of commitment to belief in determinism are the easiest to sum. Held as a working hypothesis for specific experiments, it can be highly productive within the limits set by its own rigid picture of man and the world. But, as Myers (1965) pointed out in an answer to Immergluck, unproven assumptions can result in poor research design; and it is really more scientific to face the fact that neither free will nor determinism has been proven in any absolute way.

The political consequences of assuming determinism have been most fully treated by Szasz. On the credit side Nettler (1959) suggests that it mitigates judgment and punishment of people who "cannot help" their actions. Whitlock, a British psychiatrist, discussed the
legal consequences in a chapter in his recent book (1963); and the September 1962 issue of the Arizona Weekly Gazette, the Maricopa County, City of Phoenix official newspaper, was devoted to mental disorder and its relation to criminal responsibility. Both sources show the morass of vague terminology and conflict, not just between authorities representing psychology vs. authorities on law, but between opposing psychiatric "experts." Such material is relevant to our question because, as Whitlock says,

the disputes between lawyers and psychiatrists center very largely on whether or not a given offender was free to choose his particular act which has brought him into court or whether he could not help it owing to some peculiarity of mental circumstances before-hand (p. 64).

Whitlock sums up his discussion with:

Despite much controversy over the problem it is held that we can and do exercise freedom of choice and that this freedom is likely to be curtailed the more our decision is influenced by emotional conflict and tension. It follows that small children and those suffering from serious mental illness are likely to be more limited in their range of choice than is the case with normal healthy adults (p. 70).

But Szasz (1963) is most emphatic in his concern over the consequences of a legal system based on determinism, even though initiated in the name of humanitarian principles.

In Anglo-American law, the citizen is treated as a reasonable adult; in Soviet law, as a confused child. This is the crux of the difference between them. "The Soviet litigant or accused is treated less as an independent possessor of rights and duties who knows what he wants and must stand or fall on his own claim or defense than as a dependent member of the collective group, a youth whom the law must not only protect
against the consequences of his own ignorance but must also
guide and train. The Soviet judge may upbraid or counsel
those who come before him, explaining to them what is right
and what is wrong. The atmosphere of the trial may approxi-
mate that of our juvenile or domestic relations courts (Berman,
1949, p. 457)." As a result, the criminal trial in the Soviet
Union focuses on establishing whether or not the defendant was
a "bad boy," not on whether a crime was committed. Berman
called attention to similar tendencies in American law. He
observed that, in the name of public policy, our substantive
law has been steadily eroded. This is due to a change in
attitude. We no longer think of the person before the court
as a reasonable man. Instead, we think of him, in Berman's
words, as someone a little more helpless, a little more
dependent, a little more like a youth to be protected and guided
than a mature and independent man to be held to have intended
the natural and probable consequences of his acts (p. 462).
Accordingly, there has been a slow but steady drift in American
law toward considering not only persons formally discredited by
psychiatrists, but everyone, a little bit "insane," hence
"irresponsible" and in need of government "therapy" (p. 219).

Szasz continues:

In a sense the Soviet system is nothing but a vast attempt to
"treat" mankind. For that therapeutic venture, psychoanalysis
is an unwanted distraction and competition, just as the formal
religions of the West are unwanted, distractions and competition
for those who want to remake man through psychoanalysis
(p. 219).

The essential difference between the Soviet legal system and
the original Anglo-American one, according to Szasz, is that theirs is
a "parental" one, ours an "adversary" system. Other typical parental
systems are the Inquisition (and Catholic Church in general) and the laws
of the Pueblo Indians. Szasz fears that we are on a similar path of
"juristic despotism based on paternalistic therapeuticism." But, in a
democracy, if all become children, who is left to play the role of parent?
According to Skinner the behavioral engineers, as exemplified by the
hero of Walden II, are being groomed to fulfill this destiny. In Plato's
terminology they are the "philosopher kings" of the future. But that
some people do not look forward with pleasure to this "brave new world"
fast approaching us is shown by such books as The Brain Watchers
(Gross, 1962) and The Naked Society (Packard, 1965). Pursuing the
question of "utopias" and "dystopias," to use Walsh's term from his
excellent summary of this area (Walsh, 1962) would take us far afield,
yet it is relevant to our topic. Whether men are conceived as free and
capable and worthy of equality, or helplessly determined and in need of
parental control by the few (self-appointed?) superior ones is highly
relevant to the type of political and juridical system we support.
Strict determinists who endorse the dogma because it is logical (some
events are known to be determined, therefore to be consistent all must
be) must also logically support an intellectual aristocracy with absolute
power to be used (theoretically) in a parental, benefic way for the sub-
jects, the rest of mankind. Plato was unquestionably one of the great
intellects of mankind; perhaps the modern child of philosophy, psychol-
ogy, will bring his vision to pass. In the meantime, we who still prefer
democracy with all its faults can watch with interest the various com-
munistic experiments with centralized states and can cast a jaundiced
eye on Skinner's insistence (1955) that "the scientific conception of man"
(i.e., as determined) is no threat to the traditions of Western democracy.
Allport (1955) like Szasz is concerned with democracy and determinism.

Up to now the "behavioral sciences," including psychology, have not provided us with a picture of man capable of creating or living in a democracy. These sciences in large part have imitated the billiard ball model of physics, now of course outmoded. They have delivered in our hands a psychology of an "empty organism," pushed by drives and molded by environmental circumstance. What is small and partial, what is external and mechanical, what is early, what is peripheral and opportunistic--have received the chief attention of psychological system builders. But the theory of democracy requires also that man possess a measure of rationality, a portion of freedom, a generic conscience, appropriate ideals, and unique value. We cannot defend the ballot box or liberal education, nor advocate free discussion and democratic institutions, unless man has the potential capacity to profit therefrom. In *The Measure of Man*, Joseph Wood Krutch points out how logically the ideals of totalitarian dictatorships follow from the premises of "today's thinking" in mental and social science. He fears that democracy is being silently sabotaged by the very scientists who have benefited most from its faith in freedom of inquiry.

Curiously enough, many of the ardent adherents to the "empty organism" theory of human nature are among the most zealous fighters for democracy. No paradox is more striking than that of the scientist who as citizen makes one set of psychological assumptions and in his laboratory and writings makes opposite assumptions respecting the nature of man (p. 100).

Finally, the area of the most central interest in terms of this study is the one dealing with the psychological results likely to follow from the assumption of total determinism. The greatest concern over the consequences of belief in such total "external" determinism and over the moral irresponsibility which follows logically from it is usually found among the therapists among psychologists, who are less committed to Science as God and more to Man, or rather to individual men
and women. Otto Rank (1950) painfully cut his emotional ties to Freud to the extent of declaring, "The 'psychology of the unconscious' unveils itself to us as one of the numerous attempts of mankind to deny the will in order to evade the conscious responsibility therefrom" (p. 234). As have philosophers since the days of Aristotle, Rank believed that man attained freedom through the ability for self-consciousness.

Carl Rogers' concern with freedom, expressed so strongly in his address to the American Humanist Association (1964), is well known. Rue Cromwell, who has worked with Rotter's concept of internal vs. external locus of control, has written (1960):

... by far the most important thing which occurs in successful counseling is that the individual regains the dignity of seeing himself in control, of being responsible for the situations he gets into, of being able to make his own decisions effectively. He becomes able and ready to solve most problems for himself (p. 8).

Glasser, in his recent book (1965), centers his therapy around helping the patient to accept personal responsibility for his actions rather than blaming others. Mowrer (1964) has discussed the danger that orthodox Freudian psychoanalysis often turns neurotics into psychopaths, with its emphasis on determinism and the irresponsibility of the patient who was "warped" as a helpless child. Someone else caused it, and someone else should cure it. Glasser (1965) gives an example of this increasingly prevalent attitude, which equates psychiatry with orthodox medicine and expects the omnipotent doctor to cure the helpless patient,
whether by drugs or carving. In Glasser's case he tells of "an imposing woman who sat down, looked directly at me, and stated in all sincerity, 'I'm here, Doctor. Do psychiatry!" (p. 46).

Even Immergluck (1964), in his arguments for total determinism, admits that the subjective experience of freedom may be a necessary illusion. He admits that when we come to our own self-image, we demand some inner spontaneity, some capacity to transcend our own antecedents and concurrent confines. Carl Jung also believed that if will were an illusion it was a very necessary one for life.

Erikson (1964), a modern ego psychologist, expresses this even more strongly.

The fact is that no person can live, no ego remain intact, without hope and will. Even philosophical man who feels motivated to challenge the very grounds he stands on, questioning both will and hope as illusory, feels more real for having willed such heroic enquiry; and where man chooses to surrender his sense of having willed the inevitable to gods and leaders, he fervently endows them with what he has renounced for himself (p. 118).

Erikson defines "will" as "the unbroken determination to exercise free choice as well as self-restraint, in spite of the unavoidable experience of shame and doubt in infancy" (p. 119).

A search through the last twenty years of Psychological Abstracts turned up forty-nine references to "will" or "free will," but these are certainly not exhaustive. Sixteen of the listed references were published in the United States, while thirty-three were foreign, distributed
over a half dozen countries. Most of the articles or books were in support of free will, though those from Russia were centered around definitions of the "will" and how to train it. Only two of the U. S. references were clearly in support of determinism; one by Skinner and one by a follower of Freud. This, combined with the fact that the letters in the American Psychologist responding to Immergluck were uniformly pro-freedom, suggests that determinism is not so universally accepted as a psychological fact as some beginning courses in psychology imply. Royce (1961) has gathered an impressive list of modern psychologists who question total determinism, and he quotes Robert W. White, director of the psychological clinic at Harvard:

Thus far the scientific study of man has unwittingly contributed to the trend toward apprehension and uncertainty. All three views of man--the social, the biological, and the psychodynamic--display that one-sided determinism which selectively views the person as the helpless product of forces. . . . But equally we have insisted that some attempt should be made to examine the gap in the scientific account so that natural growth and the activity of the person can be put back into the story. . . . precisely here lie the very facts about human nature that offer man the hope of influencing his own destiny. . . . Even though he be a nexus of biological, psychodynamic, social, and cultural forces, a person serves to some extent as a transforming and redistributing center, responding selectively to create a new synthesis. Under reasonably favorable circumstances personality tends to continue its growth, strengthen its individuality, and assert its power to change the surrounding world (pp. 364-365).

But there is still very little empirical research bearing on the actual effects on human beings of their belief in external determinism (fatalism) as against belief in some measure of internal control of their lives.
The one exception known to the writer is the body of research stemming from Rotter and his concept of internal vs. external locus of control.

Rotter traces his concepts in part to the work of Adler, Kantor, and Lewis, and he calls his system a "social learning" theory. The unit of investigation for his study of personality is the interaction of the individual and his meaningful environment, including conceptualized goals and threats which the individual is seeking to approach or avoid. Goals and needs are considered equivalent, with the first term used when aspects of the environment are emphasized, the second when the stress involves aspects of the individual. Rotter also postulates that the occurrence of a behavior is partly determined by the nature or importance of goals or reinforcements but also partly by the individual's expectancy that these goals will occur. Thus the behavior potential involves the situation, the value the individual places on his goals, and his expectancy of achieving the goals. Different behaviors may be substituted as alternate means to the same goal, and Rotter groups these interrelated sets of behaviors as need or goal categories or clusters. In this way, classes of behavior can be predicted.

Out of this conceptual system, Rotter and his students have developed a series of experiments in the realm of expectancies, as they are considered an essential element in understanding and predicting behavior. (Apart from Rotter, it might be mentioned here that self-determination does not deny the possibility of prediction, though it is
not likely to be "absolute." Clear insight into a person should permit some prediction of his choices.) Rotter limits his initial claim to Americans in learning situations, but says of them that they have developed generalized expectancies in regard to whether or not reinforce-
ments, reward or success is dependent on their own behavior or is controlled by external forces, especially luck, chance, or (in experi-
ments) experimenter-control. There is evidence from numerous experi-
ments that such expectancies, tending toward belief in internal or external locus of control, are largely consistent from individual to individual. In an excellent summary of relevant work (Rotter, 1966) Rotter writes:

1. . . . If subjects perceive a situation as one in which luck or chance or experimenter control determines the reinforce-
ments, then they are less likely to raise expectancies for future reinforcement as high following success as if they perceived the reinforcement to be dependent upon skill or their own efforts. Similarly, they are less likely to lower expectancies as much after failure. They are less likely to generalize experiences of success and failure or expect-
ancies of future reinforcement as much from one task to another similar task. The pattern of extinction is markedly different involving a reversal of the typical 100% vs. 50% partial reinforcement findings. When perceived as skill-
determined, 100% reinforcement takes longer to extinguish than does 50% reinforcement. Finally, under conditions where they perceive the task as luck, chance, or experimenter-
controlled they are more likely to raise expectancies after a failure or to lower them after a success. In general, under skill conditions behavior of a subject follows what might be considered a more logical or common sense model. It is particularly important that many of the learning paradigms utilized by psychologists are of the type where reward is experimenter-controlled. These results suggest that generalizing "laws of learning" from such studies is a dangerous procedure. In substance, one main interpretation
of these studies is that research in human learning should be understood or interpreted in light of the position on a continuum of internal to external control that the task and procedure will be perceived by the subjects.

2. Not only do subjects in general differentiate learning situations as internally or externally determined but individuals differ in a generalized expectancy in how they regard the same situation. Such generalized expectancies can be measured and are predictive of behavior in a variety of circumstances. These characteristic differences in viewing behavior-reinforcement contingencies can be measured in children and adults by different methods with reasonably high inter-correlations between different methods of measurement (pp. 24-25).

After discussing the development and testing of one scale to measure I-E belief--that is, belief in an internal or an external locus of control--Rotter continues:

4. Most significant evidence of the construct validity of the I-E scale comes from predicted differences in behavior for individuals above and below the median of the scale or from correlations with behavioral criteria. A series of studies provides strong support for the hypothesis that the individual who has a strong belief that he can control his own destiny is likely to (a) be more alert to those aspects of the environment which provide useful information for his future behavior, (b) take steps to improve his environmental conditions, (c) place greater value on skill or achievement reinforcements, and be generally more concerned with his ability, particularly his failures, and (d) be resistive to subtle attempts to influence him (p. 25).

Here we have solid evidence concerning the claim of the cognitive personality theorists that "beliefs" are highly important and also evidence to support the concern of many writers over possibly deleterious effects from widespread teaching of total determinism. Those subjects who conceived themselves as responsible for the results of
their actions were genuinely more effective in those actions. One assumption that is drawn is that internally-oriented individuals are more involved in what they do, which is another way of saying that they see a meaningful connection between their behavior and its consequences; and this is highly important in psychotherapy, as Simmons (1960) points out in his dissertation (p. 12). Therapy can be viewed as a process of getting patients to change expectancies (beliefs) and try out alternate behaviors (to reconstrue their world, according to Kelly, 1963); and to accomplish either, the patient must become involved in the therapy. If I-E expectancy (belief in personal effectiveness) influences this involvement, it is an important factor in successful therapy, as well as an agent in other learning situations.

Glasser's insistence on his therapy as a two-step process fits in here: first the therapist must get the patient involved with him; only then can he point out the necessity of the patient's accepting responsibility for his own actions and hope that the latter will be able to change his "unrealistic" behavior (1965). An involved person is one who is personally committed to something--goal or value; someone with a purpose toward which he moves (or away from it if it is aversive) as a more or less integrated whole. Glasser emphasizes also the making of "plans" by his patients, while Rogers stresses the involvement with the therapist, and Frankl urges the need for commitment to a goal or value to give meaning to life.
The question of the "absolute truth" of some degree of internal control (to use Rotter's term which is presumably not quite so offensive to the hard-shelled scientist) remains unproven, and perhaps unprovable as said before; but the case is being built ever more strongly that "belief" in internal control may indeed be necessary for optimum functioning, whether or not the belief be illusory. And surely therapists must continue to distinguish between degrees of this when a book about treatment of aggressive children can be entitled Controls from Within (Redl and Wineman, 1952).

When the present research project was first contemplated, much of the preceding material was still unread. Rotter's manuscript came into the writer's hands after the research to be described below was already completed, or the final version of the I-E scale would have been used. A preliminary version (Rotter, Liverant, and Crowne, 1961) had been obtained from Dr. Rue Cromwell in Nashville, Tennessee, on the basis of a suggestion from Dr. Lawrence Wrightsman of the same city. Both Dr. Wrightsman and Dr. Cromwell responded most helpfully to letters from the writer, sending copies of their requested scales as well as relevant reprints of their own work in the area. At this initial stage of the research project, the writer was searching the literature for any sort of objective questionnaires on the topic of belief in free will or determinism. It was immediately apparent that a vast
amount had been written on the subject, but that most of it was theoretical and philosophical in nature.

Failing to find widely tested and validated instruments, the writer postponed the original project of comparing results on a questionnaire concerning beliefs with results in the areas of creativity, health, effective functioning, satisfaction with life, etc. and proposed a thesis attempt to develop additional measuring instruments and to compare them with the two obtained through correspondence: Wrightsman's Philosophies-of-Human-Nature Scale, which contained two seemingly relevant subscales, and Liverant's Locus of Control scale, officially known as the Social Reaction Inventory.
PROCEDURE

Three scales were eventually developed by the writer, plus a page of sentence stems to be completed by each subject and assessed subjectively by the experimenter in lieu of a personal interview with the subject. The completed scales used in the study, including those from Wrightsman and Cromwell, are included in Appendix A.

Various questionnaires have been developed to measure religious beliefs (Dudycha, 1933; Barron, 1963; Thurstone and Chave, 1929; Ferguson, 1945; Lowe, 1949; Funk, 1955; Orr, 1955), but none were found to be adequate for ascertaining belief in freedom vs. determinism. Lawrence Wrightsman's article (1964) provided the first lead to a scale which sounded relevant, and a personal letter brought a copy of the scale, permission to use it, and a suggestion that a relevant scale by Liverant could be obtained from Dr. Rue Cromwell. This was similarly obtained through personal correspondence, with permission to use it as long as proper credit was given to the deceased Dr. Liverant.

Dr. Wrightsman's Philosophies-of-Human-Nature Scale conceptualizes such philosophies as having six bi-polar components: Trustworthiness, Altruism, Independence, Strength of Will and Rationality, Complexity, and Variability. In his development of the scale, Likert-type items were written to measure each component. After two item
analyses, a final form of the scale was assembled, which included 14 items on each of the six subscales. Those which seemed relevant to the Free Will-Determinism issue were Strength of Will and Rationality, and Independence: the first was described as "the extent to which people understand the motives behind their behavior and the extent to which they have control over their own outcomes"; the second was described as "the extent to which a person can maintain his convictions in the face of society's pressures toward conformity" (Wrightsman, 1964, p. 744). The whole scale was administered to the subjects in the present study, but only those two subscales were used in the statistical comparisons.

The Liverant Locus of Control scale, known formally as the Social Reaction Inventory, consists of 60 paired statements from each of which the subjects are asked to select the one they consider to be more true for them. The items are assigned to six subscales for which they are constructed on an a priori basis. These six areas are conceptualized as academic recognition, social recognition, love and affection, dominance, social-political, and general philosophy. The order is constant throughout the scale, so that every sixth item relates to academic recognition, etc. Many of the Liverant statements offer a choice between personal control of results and some variety of chance or luck.

In order to explore a variety of approaches, different formats were used in the scales constructed by the writer. Two series of brief
quotations were selected from some of the vast literature on the subject. The original quotations and their sources are presented in Appendix B. One series consisted of 22 short paragraphs on the subject of freedom vs. determinism; the other series included 12 paragraphs on the subject of responsibility vs. denial of human responsibility. Sets of each of the series were given to 50 students in psychology at the University of Arizona, the majority of them being graduate students. The students were asked to rank in order the 12 responsibility paragraphs on a continuum from the most extreme statement of responsibility to the one most strongly denying responsibility. They were asked further to sort the 22 paragraphs relating to freedom-determinism into five piles along a continuum from the strongest acceptance of human freedom and choice to the strongest statement of determinism. Exact instructions given to the subjects are presented in Appendix B.

For the Freedom-Determinism Scale, 10 paragraphs were selected which two-thirds to nearly all the subjects had placed in one or an adjoining one of the five classes, and which gave representative class positions from one extreme to the other. No paragraph fit well into class four, and the decision was made to use two paragraphs, in spite of their having more scatter than the rest, because they expressed a viewpoint often seen in psychological literature. On an a priori basis this view should have expressed the position of class four, doubting the truth of freedom but considering it a necessary illusion. However, the
paragraphs proved equally unsatisfactory in the final evaluation of the completed study.

The final Responsibility Scale was composed of eight paragraphs that had been ranked by the majority of the students in two to three adjoining positions. The selected paragraphs were fairly evenly distributed over the series from one extreme to the other. The final form of the preceding two scales (Freedom-Determinism and Responsibility) presented each paragraph quotation followed by Likert-type responses. The subject was asked to circle the response which most closely expressed his opinion of the statement; the choices were "strongly agree," "agree," "uncertain," "disagree," "strongly disagree."

A different approach was tried out in the questionnaire on Responsibility and Guilt, the hope being that incidents more or less close to life experiences might draw out something more than "lip service" approval or disapproval for abstract theories about life and man. Four incidents, one of them in two parts, were invented. Both sexes and several ages were involved, and some of the situations were designed to be particularly "close to home" to the university students marked to be subjects of the study. Following a brief statement of the incident, questions were asked to determine who if anyone of the involved people the subject considered responsible for the outcome; whether or not he or she should feel guilty about the situation; whether or not the subject answering the question would feel responsible and/or guilty in
a similar position; and if a means of resolving the guilt was available to them, if they believed they would react in that way.

The final measure consisted of sentence stems, mostly of one or two words but occasionally of four or five, which the subject was asked to complete according to his own beliefs about the nature of the world, man, life, etc. This produced some of the most interesting material of the study, though for the most part it was not susceptible to statistical treatment.

A preliminary data sheet was also prepared, asking for a variety of demographic data: sex, age, school subject, place of birth, religion, family income (average, above, or below), number of early moves, etc. Subjects were not asked for their names.

As it was considered desirable to give the questionnaires to individuals with a wide variety of backgrounds, the original plans were to give a set to ten subjects from each of ten religious backgrounds: Bahai, Catholic, Episcopal, Hindu, Humanist, Jewish, Mormon, Metaphysics, Southern Baptist, and Atheist. It was also planned to give the questionnaires to ten clinical and ten experimental psychology students. It was realized that these numbers were too small to be anything but suggestive, but it was hoped that at least a diversified range of opinions would be obtained in this way, and the final goal was basically an assessment of the value of the different questionnaires.
For the most part subjects were sought in the different religious centers which serve the students near the campus of the University of Arizona. The total set of questionnaires made a formidable bundle, and as was to be expected, the return rate was not high in most cases, so that additional sets were given out and even then the quota was not filled for several groups. Ninety-one completed sets were finally assembled, the numbers of the respective groups being Bahai, 3; Catholics, 9; Episcopalians, 13; Hindus, 10; Humanists, 7 (plus one member who wrote "religion is foolish" where religious affiliation was requested and therefore was placed in the final group to be described below); Jewish, 8; Mormons, 10; Metaphysicians, 11; Southern Baptists, 9. It proved so difficult to locate avowed atheists that a final group was made up of those who answered "atheist," "agnostic," or "none," to the religious affiliation blank. In this way, a group of 10 was assembled for use in the analysis of variance. The individual not yet accounted for was a Unitarian who was included with the psychology students. Six experimental psychology students and nine clinical psychology students completed the questionnaires, providing most of the members of the last group (atheist, agnostic, or no religion).

The choice of the different religious backgrounds was based on the desire to obtain divergent viewpoints. The Hindus were the only representatives of the Far Eastern religions. The Bahais were considered representative of the Near East and also of a relatively modern
religious movement. Jews, Catholics, and Protestants represent the western world in general. Southern Baptists were chosen as a more fundamentalist and Episcopalians as a more liberal sub-group within the Protestants. The Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) are a distinctive offshoot in relatively modern times, with apparently somewhat divergent basic beliefs and strong in-group feeling. All of the subjects in these groups were contacted through the local campus religious centers, except the Hindus who were reached with the help of a graduate student in the psychology department.

The Metaphysicians were sought as an example of a still more modern religious movement which has developed mostly in California in this century, though there are affiliated churches in most of the larger cities of the United States and a few churches in other countries. A local group was known to the writer, and subjects were obtained from its members. They are distinguished from the other subjects of this study in being considerably older for the most part, and in having no contact with the University at present though many members of the group had attended college when younger. The Humanist subjects were contacted by mail, with the cooperation of their campus group, and eventually produced one of the best return rates of any group (eight out of ten questionnaire sets mailed out were filled out and returned). The group lacking religion (though they were far from lacking strong beliefs as will be seen) was made up almost entirely of psychology students,
and this fact has undoubtedly introduced some bias into their results.

Valuable cooperation was extended by each of the groups and individual subjects, some of whom made considerable effort to help complete the quota from their group. Many expressed interest in knowing the results of the completed study, and it is hoped that they will find something of value here.

The study is considered exploratory in a very preliminary way. The initial hypotheses were (1) that the area is multi-dimensional so that different measuring instruments, approaching from different angles, would draw comparable but far from identical response patterns; (2) that the different religious backgrounds would produce different response tendencies; (3) that males and females would differ, with the latter holding a somewhat more positive view of human nature.

Six questionnaires were given in all, in addition to the incomplete sentences, as follows:

Test 1: Wrightsman's subscale on Will and Rationality from his Philosophies-of-Human-Nature Scale. The scoring system was altered to eliminate negative numbers, so the final score could range from 0 to 84, with 42 marking the point of neutrality. Wrightsman considers the middle 28-point range to represent positions of relative neutrality, so that scores above 56 or below 28 represent a strong opinion on the question of human capacity to understand one's own
motives, to improve one's conditions through motivation, and to influence one's own fate in life.

Test 2: Wrightsman's subscale on Independence from his Philosophies-of-Human-Nature Scale. The scoring was treated as described above. Possible range and strong opinions are as stated above. A high score represents the view that people are able to stand on their own feet uninfluenced by the pressures of others.

Test 3: Liverant's Social Reaction Inventory. The possible range is from 0 to 60, with the higher score representing belief in internal rather than external locus of control.

Test 4: Freedom-Determinism Scale. The possible range is from 0 to 40, with the higher score representing endorsement of human capacity for freedom, through agreement with short paragraphs on the subject. It will be abbreviated as the F-D scale.

Test 5: Responsibility Scale. The possible range is from 0 to 32, with the higher score representing endorsement of human responsibility, through agreement with short paragraphs on the subject. It will be abbreviated as the R scale.

Test 6: Responsibility and Guilt Questionnaire. The possible range is from 0 to 31, with either extreme representing denial of human responsibility. A relatively low score (5-9) represents a narrow assignment of responsibility to a single individual in most of the described situations. A score of 10 to 12 represents an intermediate position,
with society, groups, etc. considered partially responsible. Scores above 12 represent a wider assignment of responsibility (to fate, chance, natural law, etc.). A negative correlation of this test with the others is to be expected according to this conceptualization, as a high score is to some extent a denial of human responsibility. (There were no scores under 5 in the present study.)
RESULTS

A Pearson product moment coefficient of correlation was computed for the 87 subjects who had completed all six tests.

Table 1
Pearson r for the Six Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>-.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.24*</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>-.23*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level

Test 1 was significantly correlated with all the others, the relationship to test 6 proving negative as anticipated; but the low level of the correlations supports the complex nature of the field which the different instruments approach in different ways. Test 2 was not significantly correlated with any measure except Test 1. The highest correlation was between the writer's Freedom-Determinism and Responsibility scales, tests 4 and 5. Tests 1 and 3 were also
correlated with test 5 at better than the .01 level of significance.

A one-way analysis of variance was computed for each test across the nine religious groups (omitting the Bahais since only three sets of questionnaires were obtained from them), and between the two sexes. None of the comparisons were significant, the variations within groups outweighing between-group variance. The F scores are presented in Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix C. Means and standard deviations are presented below for the religious groups and for the two sexes for each test.

### Table 2
Religious Group Means for Each Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Test 1</th>
<th>Test 2</th>
<th>Test 3</th>
<th>Test 4</th>
<th>Test 5</th>
<th>Test 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>50.78</td>
<td>40.56</td>
<td>46.22</td>
<td>27.56</td>
<td>21.78</td>
<td>13.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>52.90</td>
<td>49.50</td>
<td>45.67</td>
<td>26.90</td>
<td>22.10</td>
<td>13.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanist</td>
<td>51.00</td>
<td>50.29</td>
<td>46.29</td>
<td>24.57</td>
<td>21.57</td>
<td>13.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>57.50</td>
<td>40.63</td>
<td>42.88</td>
<td>29.14</td>
<td>21.38</td>
<td>11.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mormon</td>
<td>58.50</td>
<td>42.20</td>
<td>47.50</td>
<td>29.90</td>
<td>23.80</td>
<td>9.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphysician</td>
<td>48.82</td>
<td>38.36</td>
<td>49.91</td>
<td>29.64</td>
<td>24.09</td>
<td>12.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Baptist</td>
<td>55.22</td>
<td>39.44</td>
<td>49.89</td>
<td>27.56</td>
<td>22.89</td>
<td>12.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>45.40</td>
<td>34.70</td>
<td>46.70</td>
<td>27.10</td>
<td>20.40</td>
<td>12.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3
Means for Each Sex on Each Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Test 1</th>
<th>Test 2</th>
<th>Test 3</th>
<th>Test 4</th>
<th>Test 5</th>
<th>Test 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>52.40</td>
<td>41.50</td>
<td>44.44</td>
<td>28.33</td>
<td>22.48</td>
<td>12.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>51.22</td>
<td>41.58</td>
<td>47.27</td>
<td>27.33</td>
<td>22.04</td>
<td>11.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4
Religious Group Standard Deviations for Each Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Test 1</th>
<th>Test 2</th>
<th>Test 3</th>
<th>Test 4</th>
<th>Test 5</th>
<th>Test 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>7.59</td>
<td>12.72</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episcopal</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>10.21</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>12.12</td>
<td>12.43</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanist</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>8.84</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>9.35</td>
<td>16.36</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>2.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mormon</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>11.83</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphysician</td>
<td>14.51</td>
<td>6.53</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Baptist</td>
<td>8.93</td>
<td>11.05</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>15.23</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>12.79</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5
Grand Means and Standard Deviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Test 1</th>
<th>Test 2</th>
<th>Test 3</th>
<th>Test 4</th>
<th>Test 5</th>
<th>Test 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grand Mean</td>
<td>52.06</td>
<td>41.84</td>
<td>46.07</td>
<td>27.73</td>
<td>22.21</td>
<td>12.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>10.72</td>
<td>11.47</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of all the religious groups, the Mormons endorsed both freedom and responsibility most consistently. They received the highest group mean on tests 1 and 4 and the lowest on test 6, the latter assigning responsibility to a limited number of immediately involved individuals. They also received the second highest group mean on test 5 and the third highest on tests 2 and 3. The Metaphysicians would be ranked next as generally endorsing freedom and responsibility. They scored highest on tests 3 and 5, second highest on test 4, but were low on tests 1 and 2. The Jews and Southern Baptists were also among the top three scorers on three tests each.

The group which most strongly rejected freedom and responsibility was the one classed as "No Religion" which was almost entirely composed of graduate students in psychology. They received the lowest group mean on tests 1, 2, and 5, and the second lowest mean on test 4. The Humanists were high on test 2 and low on tests 4, 5, and 6 (the latter being a "high" score in terms of numerical value but representing a partial rejection of responsibility through diffuse assignment to society or non-human factors). The Hindus ranked next with a high score on test 2 ("independence," which was largely uncorrelated with the rest of the tests) but a low score on tests 3 and 6 (the latter again a high numerical score due to assignment of responsibility to "non-human" factors).
The means for each sex across the six tests were almost identical, although the males received a slightly higher score on test 3, suggesting a somewhat greater feeling of being in control of their own lives.

A comparison of relative variance shows the "No Religion" group most variant on tests 1, 3, and 4, and second most variant on tests 5 and 6. The Hindus are among the most variant groups on four of the six tests. The Metaphysicians and Humanists are among the most variant groups on two tests each.

The Jews and Metaphysicians showed low variance on three tests each and the Southern Baptists and Humanists were low on two tests each.

Wrightsman's report (1964) on his scale indicates the same tendency found in the present study for a much higher proportion of people to endorse "strength of will and rationality" than to endorse "independence." His correlation of the two subscales was positive (.30 as against the .32 of the present study), in spite of the fact that many of his means in the different college samples were negative for "independence" and positive for "strength of will." The present study produced similar results. Thirty-two individuals had positive scores on both subscales while 39 individuals were positive on "strength of will" but negative on "independence."
Information accompanying the Liverant "Locus of Control" scale stated that for a college population which answered all 60 items, the mean was found to be 44 and the standard deviation was 10. In the present study the mean was 46, and the standard deviation was 7.8, so the results are fairly close. Liverant reported that lower means were produced by hospitalized schizophrenics and conscientious objectors. Each answer in the direction of internal control is given one point, so the higher the score, the stronger is the belief in or feeling of personal control of life. The "No Religion" group produced a disproportionate share of the extreme scores on this test in the present study. Nine of the ten individuals (of whom eight out of the nine were psychology graduate students) received a score outside the range of plus or minus one standard deviation. Six of these were clinicians; four were high against two low. One high and one low scorer were experimental psychologists. In this case, the field seems very far from unanimity.

Both the Freedom-Determinism and the Responsibility scales were scored as Likert-type questionnaires, with a neutral category entitled "uncertain." Almost all the 91 subjects received positive scores on both scales. The two individuals who received negative scores on the F-D scale and the three who received negative scores on the R scale will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

A biserial r was computed for the items in both scales, using the nearest possible approximation to the top .25 and to the bottom .25
of the distributions. Percentages refer to the proportion of individuals in each quarter who responded to the item in the direction of freedom or responsibility respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>High Quarter (N = 21)</th>
<th>Low Quarter (N = 22)</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Positive Responses</td>
<td>% Positive Responses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>.40</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Freedom Scale, item 1 failed to discriminate between the extreme groups. Item 7 received the next lowest biserial r and an additional count against it was the high number of responses which were marked "uncertain." Items 2, 4, and 10 also had over ten responses marked "uncertain." Since item 2 had the third lowest biserial correlation,
it might also be eliminated, leaving seven items in a revised version of the scale.

Table 7
Responsibility Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>High Quarter (N = 18) % Positive Responses</th>
<th>Low Quarter (N = 22) % Positive Responses</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Responsibility Scale, item 4 received the lowest biserial r and item 7 the next lowest. Item 5 had a large number of "uncertain" responses. Eliminating these three items would leave five in a revised version for a possible replication study.

The Responsibility and Guilt Questionnaire includes a mixture of subjective material but an objective score was derived from it by counting the "targets" to which responsibility was assigned in the various fictitious incidents. Weighted scores were used; assignment of responsibility to a single individual received one point; "society" or a
group of people such as "hospital authorities" counted as two points; "fate," "natural law," "God," "chance," etc. received three points each. The latter assignments could be construed as a denial of human responsibility, and it was theorized that this measure would therefore show negative correlations to the other tests which were attempting to measure belief in freedom and consequent responsibility. Two of the correlations were significant at the .05 level (to tests 1 and 4) and the others were in the expected direction with the exception of test 2.

This questionnaire, like the final sentence completion measure, was partially designed to substitute for interview material, and it was hoped that these measures would throw light on the accuracy of the more objective measures. They will be considered further in the following discussion of results.

In checking the final measure, the incomplete sentences, it was noted that some of the sentences contained references to sex. A check of all the questionnaires revealed the fact that no females made such references. Five of the six male Humanists mentioned sex in one of their sentences, as did two psychology students. One of the latter checked "no religion," and although the other wrote in "Southern Baptist," in view of the content of his sentences any allegiance to this or any other Christian denomination is highly dubious. But even if he is included with the religious groups vs. the groups espousing a philosophical orientation or denying religious orientation, Chi Square
shows the difference to be significant at a very high level. The figures are presented in Appendix C, Table 3.
DISCUSSION

While the primary goal of this study was the development of a satisfactory instrument to measure belief in freedom vs. determination by external forces, an attempt was also made to delimit the area conceptually to some degree through the use of instruments designed to tap related areas. From the point of view of "face validity" and also according to the purposes of the test authors, tests 1, 3, and 4 should have approached the primary issue of human freedom and should therefore have been most highly correlated with each other. Tests 5 and 6 were primarily oriented toward tapping belief in human responsibility which most writers on the subject make contingent upon some degree of freedom. Accordingly these should have been highly correlated with each other. Test 2, independence of conformity pressures, was correlated with test 1 according to Wrightsman's previous work, and again "face validity" would suggest some relationship to human capacity for freedom.

Inspection of the results of the Pearson r will demonstrate how few of these expectations were realized. Tests 1, 3, and 4 were correlated with each other, but only at the .05 level of significance. The correlations were almost identical—around .24 to .25. Tests 5 and 6 were correlated in the expected negative direction, but not significantly.
Test 2 was correlated with test 1 at the .05 level, but uncorrelated with the other four tests. If Wrightsman's measure is adequately tapping the area, many individuals apparently believe that man is theoretically free but actually unable to resist conformity pressures.

In contrast to the above mentioned expectations, tests 4 and 5 were the most highly correlated (.52) of all the measures, and the obvious question is whether this is largely due to the similar "format" of the measures (paragraphs expressing theoretical belief positions in somewhat fuller detail than do the single sentence items of the first three tests) or if this correlation represents a valid relationship between beliefs in freedom and in responsibility. The purposes of these two tests are much more obvious than is the case with the other measures, and "looking good," or making one's religion "look good" (i.e. idealistic) is of course very easy to do. However, the fact that the next highest correlations (also significant at the .01 level) were from the other two "freedom" tests to test 5 would seem to provide some support for the general tendency to relate human freedom to human responsibility. If this tendency is indeed widespread, it is another factor to give pause to the advocates of total determinism. The other responsibility measure, test 6, was significantly correlated at the .05 level to two of the freedom tests rather than to its fellow measure of responsibility. Again, the tie between the ideas of freedom and of responsibility seems to be confirmed.
The third hypothesis, that males and females would differ on the various measures, was not borne out by results. Their means were nearly identical for five of the six tests, and on test 3 the slight difference was non-significant. Wrightsman's finding that females tended to score higher than males was not supported.

The differences between the religious groups were somewhat greater, and do suggest some trends, though the very small numbers involved make any suggestions highly tentative. The lack of significance in the analyses of variance shows the within-group variance to be too large for the most part to permit a precise description of the beliefs of most of the groups. But the Mormons stood out as consistently high in their endorsement of both freedom and responsibility, and the Metaphysicians would rank next in terms of relative group means. On the other end of the scoring continuum, the "No Religion" group and the Humanists received the most low scores. The former, as mentioned, was composed almost entirely of graduate students of psychology. The latter included a psychology student who received some of the lowest scores of all 91 subjects, and who was therefore partially responsible for depressing the group means of a group which had the smallest number of subjects. The results suggest that many psychology students take a somewhat more negative view of man's capacity for freedom and responsibility than do most religious students. But that this is not true of all the psychology students is obvious from the variance on most of
the tests. The "No Religion" group was among the most variant on five of the six tests. Only the Hindus approached this record, falling among the most variant groups on four of the six tests. The intermediate level of most of the latter's group means, added to the considerable variance, makes any attempt to characterize the Hindus' beliefs a highly dubious endeavor.

Another way to consider group variance is to count the number of individual test scores in each group which fell in the range outside of plus or minus one standard deviation. Four of the nine religious groups had a third or more of their scores in this area—Bahais, Jews, Metaphysicians, and No Religion, while the Mormons just missed being included. All of these groups would be classed as holding minority group status within our society, and three of them are the "youngest" of our selected religions as well as probably the smallest in numbers.

It is possible that freedom and responsibility are actually emphasized by the doctrines of these groups through historical accident. It is also possible that individuals with the capacity for strong beliefs would be attracted to or willing to remain in such minority groups. It has also been theorized that minority groups help to maintain themselves through inculcating members with the value of holding emphatic beliefs, using the beliefs as rallying points for in-group feeling.

There is less need for extreme freedom and responsibility where sacramental means of grace are supplied by the Church (Catholic
and Episcopal), where faith is all-sufficient (Baptist), or where a great
deal is pre-determined by Karma (Hindu). For the group without religion,
we can postulate that faith in Science has at least partially replaced the
missing faith in God, church, or man. Psychology may attract
individuals who lack a religious faith and who are glad to find an
alternative (scientific) frame of reference for understanding man and
the world, even though the psychological view is somewhat negative
concerning man's potential. Or psychology may be "converting" its
apprentices to the "proper" view of man.

Sigma scores were computed for the nine religious groups
across the six tests by dividing the difference between the respective
group means and the grand means by the appropriate test standard
deviation. They are presented in Figure 1 in Appendix C, and give a
graphic representation of the contrasting group profiles.

The two most frequent raw score profiles in the total N include
a positive score on Strength of Will and Rationality, Freedom-Determinism,
and Responsibility, with Locus of Control above the grand mean, but the
individuals sharing this combination divide almost evenly between those
with a positive score in Independence and those with a negative score on
this scale. There were 20 in the first group, 24 in the second group. If
Wrightsman's scale is an adequate measuring instrument, the second and
slightly larger group, though endorsing man's possession of potential
insight, self-control, freedom, and responsibility for his actions, seem
to feel that for many people the freedom is more potential than actual, since most people are not capable of resisting (or at least do not resist) the conformity pressures of their fellows. Smaller groups of 12 and 13 respectively have positive scores on Strength of Will, Freedom-Determinism, and Responsibility, with a Locus of Control score below the grand mean and a division between positive scores on Independence and negative scores on this scale. Here we begin to suspect some possibility of conflict: individuals who believe in the concept of freedom (or at least pay lip service to it) but who do not actually feel very free or in control of their lives. A closer study of some of the individual questionnaires should throw some light on such possible conflict.

Still smaller groups (4 and 5 respectively) show a profile with both of Wrightsman's subscales negative, Freedom-Determinism and Responsibility positive, and a division between those above and below the mean on Locus of Control. Here man's freedom seems to be mostly theoretical or potential rather than actual. Five individuals shared the unusual combination of negative scores on Will and Rationality and positive scores on Independence: two Hindus (one of them a psychology student) and three psychology students (one also a Humanist). Four individuals out of the total number of 91 received a negative score on either the Freedom-Determinism Scale or the Responsibility Scale: two of them psychology students, one a foreign-born Episcopalian who is studying speech correction, and one an adult chiropractor who has
become interested in spiritual healing in recent years. It is at least thought-provoking that these unusual patterns which see man as less free, less in control of himself, and less responsible, come from individuals who are preparing for (or are actually in) careers dedicated to helping people who cannot cope with life without help. It is probably useless to speculate if they were taught to see man in this way by their educational training, or were drawn to such fields of work because they perceived man's inadequacy and need for help from stronger (luckier?) fellowmen.

Perhaps the complexity of the topic can be seen even more clearly through a closer look at some of the individual test scores and answers to the final measure. One young Episcopalian is distinctive on two counts. She was born in South Africa, and she is a cripple in a wheelchair. She is also an only child, and she records many moves in her early life, plus a family income above average. Her score on Will and Rationality is 65, which puts her among the extreme high scores on that measure, above a standard deviation from the mean, thus giving emphatic assent to man's capacity for self-insight and self-determination. She also scores within the same relative range on the Freedom-Determinism Scale, further affirming her belief in human capacity for freedom. Yet on the Independence scale she has a negative score, and she is well below one standard deviation from the mean on the Locus of Control scale. When it comes to actualizing human freedom, we must
suspect that she does not really feel very free herself. She is below the mean though not in the extreme group on the Responsibility Scale, and she is among the extremely high scorers on the Responsibility and Guilt Questionnaire, indicating reluctance to assign responsibility too strongly or too narrowly. Both these last attitudes are understandable for one who spends her life in a wheelchair subject to a physical inadequacy for which she can hardly feel responsible. In her incomplete sentences she says that both her greatest pleasure and her purpose in life are helping other people. She also writes, *I wish* "that I could walk,"

*Secretly I* "am afraid I won't walk," *My greatest fear* "is of failure," and *Eventually* "I hope to be independent." Should we then chalk up her very high scores on freedom and self-determination as wishful thinking, projection of her deep desire for but fear of not gaining independence, while her other test scores would be judged as more realistic in terms of her experience in life? Genuinely helping others is a constructive way to feel personally more adequate, to offset the dependence of a wheelchair. Would she be better off if she gave up her "illusions" of man's freedom, and stopped seeking more of it for herself? She writes, *The future* "is big, happy, exciting," and *I love* "to be happy." It would seem to be a healthier way to face life to go on being happy and increasing her feeling of freedom, even if only slightly, through the satisfaction of helping others.
Another foreign-born (in England) Episcopalian is also female, an only child, and hopeful of a career which involves helping others through speech correction. She had a barely positive score on Strength of Will and Rationality; negative scores on Independence, Freedom-Determinism, and Responsibility; one of the lowest scores on Locus of Control, more than two standard deviations below the mean; and she scored above the mean on Responsibility-Guilt. The scores seem quite consistent, giving an over-all picture of a conception of man as possessing little insight or self-determination, and even less independence of conformity pressures, lacking freedom and valid responsibility, so that the burden of the latter must be shared with others. Her incomplete sentences partially support this picture. She writes, Responsibility "is a burden," Most people "are influenced by society," and I want to know "why society has so much influence." She says Freedom "is important to man's nature," which leaves one in doubt as to her belief in its reality, and Natural Law "basically governs man," which sounds unfree. Yet a number of other sentences challenge the preceding picture. She writes, My greatest fear "is of conventionality," strongly suggesting that though most people are conforming rather than independent, she is determined to be different and thinks that it is at least possible though difficult. She is clearly ambivalent about her fellow human beings, saying I love "people," but also My greatest pleasure "is being with nature." She is one of the few subjects who considered the mother
rather than the nurse responsible in the first incident of the Responsibility and Guilt Questionnaire, and her comments suggest either superficial contact with psychology or aspirations toward psychological knowledge. She wrote, "The problem was psychological with the mother; the nurse was just an innocent victim." In response to the propriety of the mother's feeling guilty, this subject wrote "maybe, depending on background mother-daughter relationships." She also added that the "environment" should be assigned part of the responsibility for the outcome of the incident.

Her general pattern of responses and scores has much in common with academic psychology as taught today in most places, but why has she apparently accepted this view of man in contrast with many of the psychology graduate students who endorse freedom? There is insufficient information to venture far, but one clue may be the fact that her family had below average income; another may be the fact of several changes of residence during her childhood, a condition which has been found correlated with dogmatism in a recent study at the University of Arizona; and still more speculatively we may wonder about her relationship with her mother in view of her response to the first incident in the Responsibility and Guilt Questionnaire. She also blames the parents in the case of the boy described in the second incident in the same questionnaire, stating that they should feel guilty because "simple trust was lacking." Here again, projection from her
own relationship with her parents seems a possible explanation for an unusual answer. As with the preceding subject, it seems possible that this individual has been attracted into work which will involve "helping others" partly to increase her own sense of adequacy, to attain reassurance about her own worth. In the meantime she stands with one foot in each of two conceptual worlds, clinging to faith in God and prayer (I believe "in man and God," God "is all powerful," Prayer "is a means of human security"), yet writing Secretly I "don't agree with organized religion," and Science "represents rational knowledge." Her frame of reference is obviously far from being as clear and integrated and consistent as her test profile would suggest, with its negative scores. We are left with the possibility that the negative profile is as much a key to her uncertainty over what to believe as it is to an organized "scientific" (i.e. determinist) view of man.

Still another interesting individual subject is the chiropractor who took the tests as a member of the Metaphysical group to which he was attracted through his interest in spiritual healing. He was more than two standard deviations below the mean on Strength of Will and Rationality, and over three standard deviations below the mean on Responsibility, but scored almost on the mean on the other measures. The outstanding fact of this profile is the rejection of human responsibility in spite of endorsement of human freedom as a theory (Freedom-Determinism Scale) and through personal experience (Locus of Control).
Here we appear to have an individual who, in contrast to the last two subjects, feels fairly free, considers himself more free than most people (positive Liverant vs. negative Wrightsman scales), but who does not wish to regard man (or himself?) as responsible. Personal data can help clarify this profile, and in this case some is available to the writer. Without going into the mitigating circumstances, the essential fact is that this individual is providing no support for an ex-wife and five children. It is futile to argue about whether or not an a priori rejection of responsibility makes it possible to take this course, or if having embarked upon the course he found it necessary to reject earlier ideas of responsibility because of cognitive dissonance. In either case, the life details seem to provide some support for the validity of the measurement results.

The incomplete sentences provide additional material to clarify this individual's world view. The central belief is that God expresses in and through man: and when man discovers this, "finds" his nature—all is well. The subject writes, God "in his creation works by law and order, as his expression, I am God," I believe "in Universal law and order and that man is God--his image." Natural law "is God's law and man is successful when 'in tune' with it." Responsibility "to God's consciousness is the first step of living." The purpose of my life "is to 'find' myself and be an example to others," Prayer "is necessary for one to 'find' himself." I wish "everyone could be happy and find
themselves." *Life* "is to be enjoyed, appreciated and lived--most don't!"

I can't "understand why people don't want to understand." Peace of mind "every man's desire--and can be had by understanding." Guilt "downfall of man, the only good of it is that it hurts enough to force man to find help."

As can be seen, responsibility is centered around living up to one's concept of God and one's own full potential, rather than as something owed to other people. Yet this man's life is devoted to seeking to heal others or to teaching them to heal themselves. He writes, *My greatest pleasure* "seeing others help themselves," and *I want to know* "how people can help themselves quickly and easily." He is not responsible; it is up to them to learn to help themselves, but this is largely to be done through understanding, "finding" their God-like nature. The subject's life is being devoted to forwarding this. His rejection of responsibility and guilt may well be the defense mechanism of denial; and when he says, *Secretly I* "am satisfied with my life in spite of so-called failure," we may feel skeptical. But his test profile makes a little more sense as we see him conceptualize himself as a person with greater understanding than most people, one who has "found" himself and now, freely and without responsibility, is seeking to teach others to do the same.

One of the most negative profiles was provided by the only individual out of 91 subjects who listed himself as an Atheist. He is a graduate student in clinical psychology and his scores were negative on
both the Wrightsman scales and on the Responsibility Scale; Will and Rationality almost two standard deviations below the mean; and Responsibility over two standard deviations below the mean. His Locus of Control score was almost one standard deviation below the mean, his score on Freedom-Determinism was below the mean but still positive, and he was almost on the mean on Responsibility and Guilt. The general view of man indicated by this profile seems fairly close to the view advocated by most academic psychologists, except that the subject accepts the possibility of a qualified degree of potential human freedom. Was this view simply accepted from psychology, or was it already there and reinforced? Background data is meagre: the subject is the next to youngest of six children in a family of average income, a circumstance which might suggest childhood limitations and corresponding feelings of lack of freedom. As in the case of the English Episcopalian, we have a strong hint of problems in parental relationships. In the Responsibility and Guilt Questionnaire, this subject when asked for his probable action in the second incident (the boy who drank and had a car accident) wrote, "... probably have to pay my fine also; my parents wouldn't understand and my acts would depend on theirs." The general tone throughout this questionnaire is a pragmatic one. Guilt is approved when it would serve a constructive purpose but rejected otherwise. Similarly, responsibility is rejected in some cases, assigned narrowly in others, and broadly in still others, depending on individual
circumstances and the subject's interpretation of the incident.

The sentence completions help to clarify an apparently fairly consistent view of the world which is based on modern materialistic scientific assumptions or theories plus a strong humanitarian "drive." He writes, Science "is the great orderer of the world." God "is a theoretical concept which evolved over time." The world "is the only place to live." Chance "plays a large part in our life." His pragmatic approach is shown by Guilt "serves a purpose for some people," and Purpose "is important but not as important as work." But the humanitarian urges which perhaps drew him into clinical psychology show most strongly of all: I believe "we can all serve humanity," My greatest fear "is I won't be able to contribute enough," The purpose of my life "is to make others happy," I wish "I were better qualified to help others," and Responsibility "is necessary if we plan to do something for the world." The cynic may remark that he is over-compensating for childhood feelings of inferiority as the fifth of six children in his drive to help others; the skeptic may feel he "protests too much" and look for evidence of a reaction formation; but a conviction of human need for help combined with a strong desire to provide such help and a degree of faith in science to support any personal inadequacies would seem to provide a fairly workable frame of reference in this case.

Another psychological graduate student came in as a member of the Humanists and she provides us with one of the more complex
profiles. She is also foreign-born (Germany) and an only child. She distinguished herself by receiving the lowest score on the Freedom-Determinism Scale of the 91 subjects. Her Will and Rationality score is more than one standard deviation below the mean. In contrast to these measures, this subject received one of the highest scores on the Independence scale, more than two standard deviations above the mean, and her Locus of Control score was almost one standard deviation above the mean. Her results on the two measures of responsibility were both near the mean. Her high Locus of Control score suggests that she actually experiences life as self-determined or inner-directed rather than outer-controlled. In spite of this feeling, has she simply accepted the scientific view of man as determined by outer forces and helpless to alter or control his own nature and life? It is of course possible that the history of Germany in this century might have contributed to her conceptualization of man as a puppet in the control of forces too strong or too incomprehensible for him. But she endorses responsibility. Even though man is helpless to do other than he does, he must be held responsible as this is a necessary tool used by society to mold its members.

We can integrate her high Independence score with the rest of the test profile if we interpret it as what Kubie calls the rigidity or compulsivity of neuroticism. In those terms, independence would not mean flexibility to conform or not at the individual's discretion, but
would be his already determined patterns of action manifesting them-

selves regardless of what the current environmental situation produced.

Or could this be a genuinely "optimistic" view of man's ability to stand up to conformity pressures which is held partly as a sub-conscious over-compensation for the acceptance of determinism which seems to conflict with personal experience as indicated in the high Locus of Control score?

The incomplete sentences of this subject are often somewhat evasive, perhaps because of reluctance to reveal personal feelings or because of the understandable attitude that the topics are too abstract for adequate treatment. For example she wrote, The world "is round." Peace of mind "is a concept hard to define accurately." Freedom "is an abstract--what do you mean by it?" Guilt "here we go again--is a feeling." The purpose of my life "is to live." She also wrote, A search for meaning "is best left to the very young," Science "man's hope," and Cause "can also be investigated by science." Apparently she has given up any hope of philosophical answers and settled for the unambiguous, solid world of experimental science.

This subject was one of only three out of 91 who checked only number four of the alternatives on the last page of the Responsibility and Guilt Questionnaire, thus endorsing the strongest statement of "hard" or total determinism. The other two individuals who similarly checked this statement were also graduate psychology students. Of the remaining
13 psychology students, 12 checked number two, the statement of partial determinism and responsibility. The remaining student checked number one--complete freedom and responsibility.

We turn now to examine the questionnaires of the previously mentioned Humanist whose scores were analyzed with the "no religion" group since he wrote "religion is foolish" in the space where religion or philosophical orientation was requested. As background data we have only the facts that he is a Junior in English in the University and that he was the oldest of three children, growing up in a family of average income, with about seven changes of residence before the age of 12. He received the lowest score on Strength of Will and Rationality of the 91 subjects (14) which puts him more than three standard deviations below the mean. He was one point higher than the lowest score on Independence, which put him just short of two standard deviations below the mean. He received the lowest score on Locus of Control, was more than one standard deviation below the mean on Freedom-Determinism, was almost one standard deviation below the mean on Responsibility, and was more than one standard deviation above the mean on Responsibility and Guilt. The test profile is thus consistently negative, expressing a view of man as lacking in any kind of freedom; one might suspect almost lacking in hope or the feeling that life is worth living.
The incomplete sentences support such a view and can be quoted almost at random. The world "is nasty, ugly, and violent." I believe "in individual action--nothing else." Chance "plays a large part in life." Peace of mind "impossible to attain." The future "looks grim: Man is bent on folly." Freedom "a concept hardly worth dying for." A search for meaning "is all-important--What else is there?"

My greatest fear "is of death, though I realize its inevitability." Purpose "none--the search for meaning is life's purpose." Death "is inevitable, nevertheless terrifying." Science "is vastly over-rated, the emotions vastly under-rated and repressed." Prayer "is foolish; man should realize that he's alone." Guilt "is meaningless and destructive." Sin does not exist; it is a stupid, evil, and degrading concept." God "is dead. In fact, never existed save in imagination." Truth "is relative." The purpose of my life "is unknown to me." Life "is not worth the effort." Most people "are imbeciles and are actually vicious children."

He paints a gloomy picture. If we stopped here, we might assume that only his fear of death holds him back from suicide. He has rejected the world-views of both science and religion and probably been exposed to Existentialists in his studies, since English majors must read current literature, and the foregoing is much like some of their work. There is also a glimmer of humor or even the suggestion that the subject is doing a little "leg-pulling" when he writes I can't.
"answer questionnaires seriously," and I want to know "about your sex life." In spite of the consistency of the whole test profile and the quoted sentences, the possibility that he is being overly dramatic must be considered. But even given a depressed mood when he responded to the questionnaires and a tendency toward exaggeration, this is still far from a comfortable way of construing the world. He does make a few positive statements; that he loves a very few people and enjoys being with them; and that responsibility is shared by man and his environment, so at least man is an active force, not a passive puppet, though apparently a baffled and frequently futile or destructive force. The subject's membership in the Humanists is presumably part of his search for meaning in life, for a more hopeful way of construing the world, but these questionnaires hardly suggest that he has found much satisfaction. Or is this orientation actually a convenient excuse for ruthless self-expression without having to worry about guilt or sin? Unfortunately we have no personal data on which to draw to explain the genesis of his views, but he would be an interesting subject for psychological study.

The preceding examples illustrate the variety of combinations possible in test profiles and give some idea of the complexity of the area. It is also probable that the discrepant results are as much due to the inadequacy of the measuring instruments and the small number of subjects involved as to the conceptual complexity of the area or any
within-subject conceptual conflict. The study must be considered exploratory in a very preliminary way.
CONCLUSION

The original goal of this study was to develop a measure for belief in freedom, and at the same time to explore the related area of belief in responsibility. That these are not uni-dimensional concepts has been demonstrated by the varied profiles of individual subjects, and the goal seems nearly as remote as it did in the beginning.

Revised versions of the Freedom-Determinism and Responsibility scales have been suggested, which might be tried again as a means of reaching theoretical beliefs in these areas. Their correlation of .52 was the highest attained by any two measures in the present study and the suggested refinement might raise this still more.

Liverant's original Locus of Control scale is too long and repetitious, and a much-revised version has been developed by Rotter--his I-E scale mentioned in the Introduction. However, present plans include the construction of another questionnaire which will bring in aspects of locus of control which are not covered by the I-E scale. This will be factor-analyzed in an attempt to delimit more clearly the dimensions of this whole conceptual area.

Wrightsman's Will and Rationality subscale correlated modestly but significantly with all the other measures, but his Independence subscale for the most part seemed unrelated to the other measures. Since
the one useful subscale consists of only 14 items and these are imbedded in a long (and for our purposes irrelevant) questionnaire, this seems less likely to be worth including in a follow-up study.

The Responsibility and Guilt Questionnaire as it stands is of limited usefulness as an objective measure, and is not directly relevant to the question of freedom-determinism, but the format (judgments concerning short stories) seems worthy of further exploration. The incomplete sentences also provided valuable material for attempted idiographic assessments of the more deviant across-test profiles.

Future plans still include a comparison of belief in freedom with functioning in various activities of life.
APPENDIX A

DATA SHEET AND MEASURING INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE STUDY
Data Sheet for the Study of Selected World Views

We are asking your help in answering some attitude questions about the nature of "man" and the world in which we live. You are not asked to put your own name on this, but to choose a nickname or "false" name to put on each of the questionnaires or answer sheets so that results on the different measures can be compared. We would also appreciate your answering the following questions so that the answers of people with different backgrounds can be compared.

Nickname:________________________________________________________________

Your sex ________ College or University __________________________

Class in College (Fresh, Junior, Grad., etc.) __________________________

Major subject __________________________________________________________

Religious preference (try to be as specific as possible, such as Reformed Presbyterian, Southern Baptist, Orthodox Jewish, etc. Include philosophical affiliation such as Humanist, Agnostic, etc. If no preference, put none) ____________________________________________________

Is your religious preference the same as your parents? Yes  No

Your birth order? (Circle one) Only child  Oldest  2nd  3rd  4th
Other:__________ Number of brothers and sisters? _________________

Place of Birth: __________________________________________________________

Birthdate: _______ _______ _______
day month year

Family Income while growing up (check one):
Above Average _____     Average _____     Below Average _____

Number of times your family changed its residence before you reached age 12. If too many to keep account, write "many" _____
Research Questionnaire on Philosophies of Human Nature

Instructions: We are asking your help in answering some attitude questions about human nature. Each represents a commonly held opinion and there are no right or wrong answers. You will probably disagree with some items and agree with others. We are interested in the extent to which you agree or disagree with such matters of opinion.

Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree by circling the number in front of each statement. The numbers and their meaning are indicated below:

- If you agree strongly - circle +3
- If you agree somewhat - circle +2
- If you agree slightly - circle +1
- If you disagree slightly - circle -1
- If you disagree somewhat - circle -2
- If you disagree strongly - circle -3

First impressions are usually best in such matters. Read each statement, decide if you agree or disagree and the strength of your opinion, and then circle the appropriate number in front of the statement. Give your opinion on every statement.

If you find that the numbers to be used in answering do not adequately indicate your own opinion use the one which is closest to the way you feel. An answer sheet is provided for you to circle the appropriate number for each question. Please put your chosen nickname or "false" name on the answer sheet to permit comparisons with the other measures.
1. Great successes in life, like great artists and inventors, are usually motivated by forces they are unaware of.

2. Most students will tell the instructor when he has made a mistake in adding up their score, even if he had given them more points than they deserved.

3. Most people will change the opinion they express as a result of an onslaught of criticism, even though they really don't change the way they feel.

4. Most people try to apply the Golden Rule even in today's complex society.

5. Children who are popular will not necessarily be popular in adulthood.

6. I find that my first impression of a person is usually correct.

7. Our success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our own control.

8. If you give the average person a job to do and leave him to do it, he will finish it successfully.

9. Nowadays many people won't make a move until they find out what other people think.

10. Most people do not hesitate to go out of their way to help someone in trouble.

11. A person's reaction to things differs from one situation to another.

12. People can be described accurately by one term, such as "introverted," or "moral," or "sociable."

13. There are few things in life where our own preferences exert an influence over the result.

14. People usually tell the truth, even when they know they would be better off by lying.

15. The important thing in being successful nowadays is not how hard you work, but how well you fit in with the crowd.

16. Most people will act as "Good Samaritans" if given the opportunity.
17. Different people react to the same situation in different ways.

18. It's not hard to understand what really is important to a person.

19. Attempts to understand ourselves are usually futile.

20. Most students do not cheat when taking an exam.

21. We don't have enough leaders who courageously do what is right, regardless of public opinion.

22. "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" is a motto most people follow.

23. Each person's personality is different from the personality of every other person.

24. I think I get a good idea of a person's basic nature after a brief conversation with him.

25. There's little one can do to alter his fate in life.

26. Most people are basically honest.

27. The typical student will cheat on a test when everybody else does, even though he has a set of ethical standards.

28. Most people give to the Community Chest or United Givers Fund because they want to, not because somebody exerts pressure on them.

29. People are quite different in their basic interests.

30. If I could ask a person three questions about himself (and assuming he would answer them honestly), I would know a great deal about him.

31. If a person tries hard enough, he will usually reach his goals in life.

32. People claim they have ethical standards regarding honesty and morality, but few people stick to them when the chips are down.

33. Most people have the courage of their convictions.

34. The average person is conceited.

35. People are pretty much alike in their basic interests.
36. I find that my first impressions of people are frequently wrong.

37. The average person has an accurate understanding of the reasons for his behavior.

38. If you want people to do a job right, you should explain things to them in great detail and supervise them closely.

39. Most people can make their own decisions, uninfluenced by public opinion.

40. It's only a rare person who would risk his own life and limb to help someone else.

41. People are basically similar in their personalities.

42. Some people are too complicated for me to figure out.

43. If people try hard enough, wars can be prevented in the future.

44. If most people could get into a movie without paying and be sure they were not seen, they would do it.

45. It is achievement, rather than popularity with others, that gets you ahead nowadays.

46. It's pathetic to see an unselfish person in today's world because so many people take advantage of him.

47. If you have a good idea about how several people will react to a certain situation, you can expect most other people to react the same way.

48. I think you can never really understand the feeling of other people.

49. The average person is largely the master of his own fate.

50. Most people are not really honest for a desirable reason; they're afraid of getting caught.

51. The average person will stick to his opinion if he thinks he's right, even if others disagree.

52. People pretend to care more about one another than they really do.
53. Most people are consistent from situation to situation in the way they react to things.

54. You can't accurately describe a person in just a few words.

55. In a local or national election, most people select a candidate rationally and logically.

56. Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it.

57. If a student does not believe in cheating, he will avoid it even if he sees many others doing it.

58. Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help other people.

59. A child who is popular will be popular as an adult, too.

60. You can't classify everyone as good or bad.

61. Most people have little influence over the things that happen to them.

62. If you act in good faith with people, almost all of them will reciprocate with fairness toward you.

63. It's a rare person who will go against the crowd.

64. The typical person is sincerely concerned about the problems of others.

65. People are pretty different from one another in what "makes them tick."

66. There are two kinds of people; the strong and the weak.

67. Most people have an unrealistically favorable view of their own capabilities.

68. Whenever a cashier has overcharged me, I didn't think it was intentional.

69. Most people have to rely on someone else to make their important decisions for them.

70. Most people with a fallout shelter would let their neighbors stay in it during a nuclear attack.
71. There's little hope in trying to change a person's basic nature after he reaches adulthood.

72. When I meet a person, I look for one basic characteristic through which I try to understand him.

73. Most persons have a lot of control over what happens to them in life.

74. Most people would cheat on their income tax, if they had a chance.

75. The person with novel ideas is respected in our society.

76. Most people exaggerate their troubles in order to get sympathy.

77. If I can see how a person reacts to one situation, I have a good idea of how he will react to other situations.

78. People are too complex to ever be understood fully.

79. Most people have a good idea of what their strengths and weaknesses are.

80. It's a good idea to lock your door at night.

81. A person can be successful in life without having to be popular with others.

82. The average person is resentful when he doesn't get his way.

83. Often a person's basic personality is altered by such things as a religious conversion, psychotherapy, or a charm course.

84. Every person has some strong points and some weaknesses.

85. Most people vote for a political candidate on the basis of unimportant characteristics such as his appearance or name, rather than because of his stand on the issues.

86. Most people lead clean, decent lives.

87. The average person will rarely express his opinion in a group when he sees the others disagree with him.

88. Most people would stop and help a person whose car is disabled.
89. People are unpredictable in how they'll act from one situation to another.

90. People are so complex it is hard to know what "makes them tick."

91. If one wants to succeed badly enough, he can overcome almost any obstacle in the path of success.

92. Nowadays people commit a lot of crimes and sins that no one else ever hears about.

93. Most people will speak out for what they believe in.

94. People are usually out for their own good.

95. When you get right down to it, people are quite alike in their emotional makeup.

96. Give me a few facts about a person and I'll have a good idea of whether I'll like him or not.

97. In order to get nominated, most candidates for political office have to make basic compromises and undesirable commitments.

98. Money is the most important factor influencing public policies.

99. Politicians spend most of their time getting re-elected or re-appointed.

100. A large number of city and county politicians are political hacks.

101. People are frequently manipulated by politicians.

102. Politicians represent the general interest more frequently than they represent special interests.

103. If you don't watch yourself people will take advantage of you.

104. Most people can be trusted.

105. Human nature is fundamentally cooperative.

106. No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it.