THE IMPACT OF FRENCH RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA ON FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF POLITICS

by

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STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

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I express deep gratitude to Dr. Peter A. Toma, University of Arizona, without whose help and expert guidance this study would not have been possible; sincere appreciation to Mrs. W. Joseph Showalter for her patient assistance; and deep gratitude to my many other friends, unnamed but not forgotten, who assisted and encouraged me during the research and the writing of this thesis.
PREFACE

On January 27, 1964, France accorded diplomatic recognition to the Chinese People's Republic. While much speculation has been heard as to the meaning of this event, little systematic analysis has been put forward. This study is intended to fill that gap. Hopefully, this study will also yield conclusions which will be applicable outside of the immediate range of this study--i.e., shed light on the general conduct of French foreign policy.

The scope of this study will be determined by the questions which it seeks to answer. The basic question to be answered is: What are the effects of French recognition of China? To answer this question, four general areas of inquiry will be selected for a systematic examination of the problem. While these areas of inquiry cannot definitively describe the total impact of French recognition of China, they will serve to measure the effect of the French initiative.

The first area of inquiry to be examined will be French diplomatic policy since recognition. Has the impact of recognition been felt in subsequent French diplomatic behavior? Specifically, has France come to advocate Communist China's entry into the United Nations and other
international organizations? Has France encouraged her allies and former colonial dependencies to do likewise? Or has France been content to leave unsettled the question of China's recognition and entry into international organizations?

A second area of inquiry will be French economic policy since recognition. Has France significantly increased its trade or aid to Communist China since according it recognition? Or has the amount of such intercourse been at the same levels as it was prior to recognition? If no significant increase in trade or aid has occurred since recognition, speculation as to French economic motives in recognizing China may have been false.

A third area of inquiry will be the impact of recognition on French diplomatic and economic policy. The consequences of recognition caused important modifications of French policies vis-à-vis France's allies, its adversaries, and the uncommitted nations.

Finally, the impact of recognition on the international scene will be examined through an analysis of the responses of three nations most concerned with the French initiative: Communist China, Soviet Russia, and the United States.

Thus, the Chinese Communist response to recognition will be examined. Did the Chinese encourage or merely accept
the French decision? The Chinese had customarily insisted that a nation break diplomatic ties with Nationalist China as a *sine qua non* prior to diplomatic exchange with Peking. Was the waiving of this requirement unique to Chinese acceptance of diplomatic ties with France? If so, why? What are the other customary conditions which the Chinese demand for recognition? To what extent does Chinese acceptance of French recognition constitute a break from previously stated conditions for recognition? What advantages did China expect to gain by accepting recognition? Have these expectations been fulfilled?

Next, the Russian response to recognition will be examined. For example, what was the official Russian statement on China's recognition? Was there any indication that private Russian response to the French initiative differed from their public policy?

Last, the United States response will be examined. What conclusions did the United States draw from the Chinese recognition? Was United States policy helped or hindered by this recognition? What was United States diplomatic reaction to French recognition of Peking?

Thus, by examining French economic and diplomatic policy since the time of recognition and by analyzing the United States, Soviet, and Chinese responses to recognition,
this study will aim to evaluate the impact on French foreign policy vis-à-vis Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the United States.
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The diplomatic impact of French recognition of Communist China was far greater than it would have been had it represented only a simple acknowledgment of China's political existence. In extending diplomatic recognition to each other, France and China were demonstrating their diplomatic independence from their major alliance partners. To the extent that they were successful, they diminished by that much their respective alliances. The primary motive, therefore, for French recognition of China was to weaken the bipolar system of international politics.

After the announcement of diplomatic relations, France has supported Communist China's entry into the United Nations and other international councils. There can be little doubt that China desired French recognition. This is demonstrated not only by the many advantages which China could obtain by the establishment of such ties but also by the concessions which China granted to secure recognition.

The Soviet Union publicly proclaimed its support of recognition. However, there is substantial reason to believe that the private reaction of Soviet leaders was far less enthusiastic about the establishment of relations between France and China.
The United States opposed the French policy of recognition. While France believed that recognition would not endanger its vital interests, the United States considered the French initiative to be harmful to its efforts to contain China. However, once recognition of China became a certainty, the United States attempted to secure the maximum diplomatic advantage from the situation. It did this by urging Chiang Kai-shek to maintain his ties with France.

French recognition of China had two very important consequences for the Western alliance system. First, by successfully defying the United States, France weakened American leadership of those alliances. Recognition of China was clearly a move opposed by the United States and yet it was powerless to prevent the occurrence. The second consequence of recognition was that the alliances themselves were weakened. There were two reasons for this. First, France made no attempt to coordinate its action with its allies. Second, by emphasizing that recognition was an act of diplomatic independence from the bipolar international system of alliances, France thereby weakened its own bloc. French recognition of China accelerated the change of the international system from a bipolar to a multipolar world of power politics.
On January 27, 1964, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a brief communique making official its recognition of the People's Republic of China:

The Government of the French Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China have decided by mutual agreement to establish diplomatic relations.

They have agreed to this end to designate Ambassadors within a three-month period.\(^1\)

A similar and simultaneous communique was issued by the Communist Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries had been long expected. Although no exact date can be given to mark the beginning of France's intention to recognize China, the idea never seems to have been too far from Charles de Gaulle's mind. In an article published shortly after recognition, C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times relates that in February, 1961, de Gaulle declared that the

\(^1\)French recognition of Communist China was made official in a short communique issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at noon on January 27, 1964.
... U. N. is nothing but anarchy and it won't change if China comes in. As for diplomatic relations between France and China, we are not opposed to the thought.2

If Mr. Sulzberger has accurately quoted the French President, de Gaulle evidently considered recognition of Communist China a matter of timing and not principle. Equally evident is an apparent indifference to the possible consequences of China's admission to the United Nations.

A diplomatic and economic mission headed by M. Georges-Picot is often cited as the beginning of the official steps which eventually led to recognition.3 M. Georges-Picot, a former diplomat, led an ostensibly private, six-member delegation whose announced purpose was to increase Sino-French trade. On September 19, 1963, the Georges-Picot mission arrived in Peking.4 It remained in China until late October.

Although the Chinese may have only sought to develop economic rapprochement with France, the French government seems to have introduced the idea of political rapprochement

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3See, for example, Robert Oakeshott, "What France Is up to," Far Eastern Economic Review, XLIII, No. 9 (February 27, 1964), 459.

and recognition into the discussions. The problem of French diplomatic recognition was apparently brought up by M. Georges-Picot. The most explicit account of these discussions with the Chinese representatives indicates that he suggested that France establish diplomatic ties with Peking on a "two Chinas" basis. The Chinese Premier Chou En-lai reportedly rejected this formula. If this report is accurate, the French government could not have had many illusions about relations with Peking—a rupture of diplomatic ties with Nationalist China was still Peking's sine qua non for an exchange of ambassadors.

Meanwhile, other events were indicating that the question of diplomatic ties with Communist China was being considered by French officials. On October 11, 1963, Mr. C. L. Sulzberger, a New York Times correspondent with direct access to the highest members of the French government, had an interview with Foreign Minister M. Gouze de Murville. Sulzberger was bluntly informed that the

5 Audrey Donnithorne, "The Foreign Policy of the Chinese People's Republic," Political Quarterly, XXXV, No. 3 (July-September, 1964), 319-320.


French considered it "quite normal" that there be a rapprochement with Communist China due to "the situation in which we find ourselves after the Moscow Treaty." On October 15, 1963, Mr. Sulzberger explained in his column the French position on its growing contacts with Communist China:

The French Government now considers "it would be logical" for France and China to "draw closer together" and, since Peking is known to desire establishment of diplomatic relations with Paris, the question appears to be under study here.

This French mood is a direct result of the continued drift apart of the United States and France and signature of the recent Moscow test-ban treaty which, Paris maintains, hurts only French and Chinese interests. There has not yet been any decision to recognize Peking and there is full awareness that such a move would produce an emotionally hostile American reaction.

French officials were clearly dissatisfied with what they considered to be a tacit pact between the Soviet Union and the United States which they believed detrimental to the best interests of the two aspirant atomic powers--France and Communist China. The French attitude was prompted by the realization that the United States had disregarded France's interests in a search for a diplomatic détente.

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8 Ibid.

with the Soviet Union. The French were particularly bitter because they had consistently warned the United States of their opposition to a nuclear test-ban treaty since Soviet-American-British negotiations began in Geneva in 1958. The test-ban treaty did not affect the major powers who signed the agreement because they had finished testing. The minor powers who signed the treaty did not suffer because they never intended to test. Since France and China were the only nations which intended to conduct nuclear tests, French officials confided to Sulzberger that "it should surprise nobody if the two outcasts are pushed toward each other."\(^\text{10}\) Sulzberger concluded that should France recognize China, it would be because de Gaulle wished to reiterate France's independence from Soviet-American domination and the treaty which he considered to be "the keystone in [a] diplomatic arch being built over France."\(^\text{11}\)

The task of taking "unofficial" soundings of the highest Chinese communist leaders on the prospective French recognition was given to former French Prime Minister M. Edgar Faure. This was not Faure's first visit to Peking. In 1957, Faure had visited China and reported his conversations with Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and other Chinese

\(^\text{10}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{11}\) Ibid.
officials. Writing in his book, The Serpent and the Tortoise, Faure declared himself:

... in favour of a fresh policy, more open, more assured and bolder, on the part of the western powers (and France in particular) towards the communist countries (and China in particular).12

To conduct such a foreign policy,

France must, first of all, make every effort to regain the initiative—her present eclipse on the great world political scene can only be temporary—and, more especially to set the course of the West towards a happier approach to the Chinese problem. ... 13

Clearly evident in Faure's analysis is the strong sense of nationalism and desire for national renewal which is later found in Gaullist foreign policy statements. Specifically, Faure proposed that France recognize Communist China. Formosa should be accorded only consular representation. Faure believed that a decision to recognize Peking would serve to increase France's prestige and help to ameliorate inter-bloc tensions. He added, however, that if France were obliged to act alone on this proposal "no one could blame us for this attitude...."14 Furthermore, Faure stated that a more conciliatory policy by the West would "encourage in the inmost spirit of this or that leader ..."
"those sentiments and impulses which tend towards hu-
manity." France and the other Western powers could, by
multiplying cultural, economic, and diplomatic contacts with
Communist China, aid its more progressive and pacific
tendencies and eventually its reintegration into the inter-
national community.

Faure's past relations with Communist Chinese leaders
made him a useful intermediary to carry on exploratory nego-
tiations on possible French diplomatic recognition of
Peking. Prior to his departure, Faure conferred with
President Charles de Gaulle, Prime Minister Georges
Pompidou, and Foreign Affairs Minister Gouve de Murville.

Despite official denials, it was evident that Faure's mission
was "unofficial" in name only and that he was sufficiently
acquainted with de Gaulle's views on Franco-Chinese rela-
tions to discuss the subject fully should the occasion
arise.

15 Ibid., p. 128.

16 Both de Gaulle and Faure were aware of each
other's views on China. See Edgar Faure and Roger Massip,
"Edgar Faure Expose au Figaro l'Objet et les Résultats
de son Voyage en Chine [Edgar Faure Reports to the Figaro,
the Object and the Results of his Voyage to China]," Le
Figaro (Paris), January 9, 1964, pp. 4-5.

17 Ibid., p. 4.

18 Ibid., and Observer, "China and France: A Tale of
Two Cities," United Asia, op. cit., p. 100.
On October 22, 1963, Faure and his wife arrived in Peking. He was not treated as an ordinary non-communist Western visitor. He met with Mao Tse-tung, Lin Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, and Chen Yi. Little as yet is known of the actual negotiations between Faure and his hosts. It is known, however, that the question of renewing Sino-French diplomatic relations was discussed "in a very complete way." It is also known that he informed the Chinese officials that "the French government would be disposed fully and officially to recognize the people's Chinese Republic, without any preconditions." Whether this statement refers to French or Chinese or all preconditions remains ambiguous, particularly in the light of subsequent events. However, there can be no question that Faure recognized the extent of Chinese opposition to the "two Chinas" formula from his previous conversations with Chinese leaders.


asserted that "Chiang Kai-shek indeed could not represent China." 23

Chinese accounts of Faure's visit to China stress the prospect of amicable relations between the two nations and Faure's contribution to the development of closer ties. Yet beyond mutual friendships lay mutual interest. On October 23, Faure spoke at a banquet in his honor held in Peking. He stated somewhat ambiguously that "we [France and Communist China] have passed through the tests and now we can proceed with our progress and our independent positions in international affairs." 24 This oblique assertion would seem to imply that both nations formerly had what they considered to be insufficient "progress" and "independent positions in international affairs" (vis-à-vis the dominant powers in their respective alliances?), which both had a common interest in changing. On October 31, 1963, Chou En-lai spoke on the same theme: "Now [after both nations had suffered foreign occupation and resistance during World War II] both our two peoples are striving for the sovereignty and independence of their countries." 25 He


concluded: "This is what we have in common and it is a tie making for friendly exchanges." France and China were clearly not fighting for their "sovereignty and independence" from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Striving for sovereignty and independence in this context would seem to refer to France's frequently stated opposition to American "hegemony" and China's denunciation of the Soviet Union's "big-power chauvinism." If this supposition is correct, both governments considered the establishment of diplomatic ties to be a symbolic gesture implying de facto recognition if not approval of each other's diplomatic independence as well as a de jure acknowledgment of each other's existence. Franco-Chinese recognition was also to be a rapprochement.

After the completion of the Faure mission to Peking in late November of 1963, negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two nations were continued between the Chinese and French Embassies in Berne, Switzerland. Even less is known of the Berne negotiations than of the Faure discussions. Two subsequent reports, however, shed some light on the proceedings. The first,

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26 Ibid.

27 These are respectively, French and Chinese terms for the Soviet-American bipolar dominance of world affairs. For more complete explanation, see Ronald Steel, "Where France and China Agree," The New Leader, XLVII, No. 12 (June 8, 1964), 19-22.

published in Le Figaro on January 21, 1964, stated that as of a week before the official announcement of diplomatic relations only a few relatively minor protocol questions remained to be settled. Faure's discussions with Chinese leaders may well have established that diplomatic representatives would be exchanged in principle, leaving the Berne negotiations to determine in fact how recognition would take place. A second report carried in The Times (London) on January 28, 1964, asserted that the Chinese insisted during the Berne negotiations that they would not send an ambassador unless the Nationalist Chinese vacated the Paris embassy within three months. If this report is accurate, Chinese representatives maintained throughout the discussions their "one China" position. The French problem, therefore, became not one of how to recognize two Chinas but how to make the break with the Nationalist Chinese as face-saving as possible. The Communist Chinese government, apparently, consented to the three-months' waiting period as a necessary discretion to obtain recognition. The text of the recognition communique supports this argument.

29Le Figaro (Paris), January 21, 1964, p. 3.
31See above page 1, footnote 1.
Despite many denials, reports persisted of an impending French recognition of China. On December 11, a U. P. I. Paris dispatch reported that France intended to recognize Communist China in the near future.\textsuperscript{32} This report, said to have been the consequence of a "premature leak" which may have embarrassed the French government, caused a "flurry of diplomatic activity."\textsuperscript{33} This speculation was founded on more than press rumors. On December 12, 1963, de Gaulle was quoted as saying: "We have considered this\textsuperscript{Recognition} for a long time. It is possible, I say it is probable, that we will have diplomatic relations with China."\textsuperscript{34}

Couve de Murville, however, acknowledged only France's interest in establishing commercial and cultural links with China.\textsuperscript{35} The French Foreign Minister stated that the establishment of diplomatic ties was prevented by the problems of Vietnam, Formosa, and Franco-American

\textsuperscript{32}Erasmus, "General de Gaulle's Recognition of Peking," \textit{The China Quarterly}, \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{34}Sultzberger, "The Bitter Tea of General Chiang," \textit{New York Times}, \textit{loc. cit.}

Furthermore, the Taipeh government claimed to have received assurances that no recognition of Communist China was planned. If the Taipeh report is correct, the French government may have been guilty of diplomatic deception for on December 19, 1963, Le Monde reported that de Gaulle refused to give just such assurances to the visiting American Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Noteworthy also was Cove de Murville's opposition to Rusk's suggestion that the West favor the Soviet type of peaceful communism over the more bellicose version advocated by Peking.

Background – 1964

In January 1964 the events which were to culminate in recognition occurred in rapid succession. On January 8


de Gaulle's emissary to Peking, Edgar Faure, had a lengthy interview with Roger Massip of Le Figaro.\footnote{Edgar Faure and Roger Massip, "Edgar Faure Expose au 'Figaro': l'Objet et les Résultats de son Voyage en Chine /Edgar Faure Reports to the 'Figaro' the Object and the Results of his Voyage to China/", Le Figaro (Paris), loc. cit.} This interview was later learned to have been personally approved by President de Gaulle.\footnote{Observer, "China and France: A Tale of Two Cities," United Asia, op. cit., p. 103.} In it, Faure strongly advocated the establishment of diplomatic relations between Paris and Peking. These relations could be established without any preconditions. France need not break ties with the Nationalists. However, France must recognize the communist authorities in Peking as being the legitimate government of China. Since France had broken ties with China because of the Indo-Chinese war, France must initiate recognition proceedings. Faure denied that recognition would be a disservice to the United States government. Indeed, he believed that French recognition of China would be beneficial to the West in that it would alleviate the impasse of America's Asian policy and would aid Peking's reintegration into the international community. As Faure later elaborated:

"France is a country with world responsibilities and has a historic mission. From this point of view France has a role to play with regard to China."
France has no more colonial interests in Asia, but she knows Asia. We have in France men who are among the best specialists on Asia.

Because of this historic mission, because of this Asian vocation, France could make the Chinese opening for the West.

France must apply peaceful co-existence to China and make sure that China takes that road.

The Faure interview was an obvious trial balloon launched by the Gaullist government to test foreign and domestic opinion. Presumably, French officials were not disappointed by the reaction to Faure's proposal because soon thereafter France's allies were informed that France would recognize China. This was followed by a curt exchange of notes between Paris and Washington. By January 20, 1964, French newspapers were writing about recognition as an inevitability and were already analyzing the possible consequences of Sino-French diplomatic ties.

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44 Le Figaro (Paris), January 22, 1964, p. 4.

Finally, official spokesmen acknowledged what unofficial sources had long predicted--France would recognize China. In a dispatch published on January 19-20, it was reported that M. Francois-Bénard, then leading a six-member French parliamentary delegation to Peking for talks on economic and cultural cooperation, expressed his approval on hearing of the impending recognition. He added that he would not be surprised if France announced the establishment of ties while his delegation was visiting Peking during the latter half of January. On January 22 Foreign Minister Couve de Murville confirmed that France would definitely accord diplomatic recognition to Peking. In a statement given to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French National Assembly, he justified the decision on two grounds. First, de Murville contended that recognition was advisable because it would tend to facilitate China's entry into negotiations on the problems of Southeast Asia. Second, he maintained that recognition was advisable since China was no longer a cipher in a monolithic bloc but an independent force in international relations. France, de Murville concluded, had agreed to recognize China without conditions.

46 Ibid., p. 2.

47 Ibid.
France would not, however, initiate a diplomatic rupture with the Nationalist Chinese. Indeed, France hoped to maintain her ties with the Nationalist regime on Formosa. The French position on Peking's U. N. membership was deliberately left undefined. These views were conveyed to Chiang Kai-shek shortly before recognition by de Gaulle's special envoy and the former Free French Ambassador to China, General Zinovi Pechkoff.48

On January 27, 1964, France and China simultaneously announced their intention to establish diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level. French officials again insisted that recognition did not mean that France would break relations with the Nationalist Chinese government on Formosa.49 They also reemphasized that relations with Peking did not necessarily imply French support for Communist China's entry into the United Nations.50 France, it would seem, was trying to maintain a "two Chinas" policy.

The Chinese statement at the announcement of diplomatic relations differed significantly from that of the


50 Ibid.
French. On the day following the Sino-French joint communique, the Chinese Foreign Ministry asserted:

It was in the capacity of the sole legal Government representing all the Chinese people that the Government of the People's Republic of China entered into negotiations and reached agreement with the Government of the French Republic on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. According to international practice, recognition of the new government of a country naturally implies ceasing to recognize the old ruling group overthrown by the people of that country. Consequently, the representatives of the old ruling group can no longer be regarded as representatives of that country to be present side by side with the representatives of the new government in one and the same country or international organization. It was with this understanding that the Government of the People's Republic of China reached agreement with the Government of the French Republic on the establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of ambassadors between China and France. The Chinese Government deems it necessary to reaffirm that Taiwan is part of China's territory and that any attempt to detach Taiwan from China or otherwise to create "two Chinas" is absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese Government and people. 51

This declaration was clearly meant to provoke a severance of ties between France and the Chinese Nationalists. Peking was still unwilling to procure French recognition at the cost of abandoning its insistence that it alone represented China.

Available evidence indicates that Chinese negotiations had dropped their insistence that France relinquish all diplomatic ties with the Nationalist Chinese as a sine

qua non for the announcement of recognition but that they refused to send a diplomatic representative to Paris until the Nationalists abandoned the Chinese embassy. By permitting France to recognize China prior to the termination of French ties with the Nationalists, the Peking authorities tolerated a necessary discretion to facilitate recognition. However, by allowing a three-month margin for the exchange of ambassadors, the Chinese leaders allowed themselves time in which they could reject recognition if the French failed to sever ties with Taipei. It is highly doubtful that Peking let the French believe that they would accept a "two Chinas" solution. Both nations apparently expected Taipei to quickly sever relations with France thereby permitting Paris and Peking to exchange ambassadors.

This arrangement would have been an ideal solution to the problem of finding a face-saving formula for the recognition of Peking if the Nationalists had immediately broken off relations with Paris. Peking evidently agreed to the recognition arrangement in the firm belief that once the Paris-Peking link was established, Chiang Kai-shek would promptly sever all ties with France. The communist

authorities probably thought that many Western nations advocated a "two Chinas" policy but they never attributed that desire to Taipei. 53

These calculations were disrupted by a determined American effort to salvage what they could from an admittedly unpleasant diplomatic position. In the weeks prior to the announcement of the Paris-Peking tie, American officials worked to dissuade Taipei from making a precipitate break in relations with France. 54 Their objective was to put the "two Chinas" issue to a test. If the Nationalists could be restrained from breaking with Paris then the French would either have to bow to Chinese pressure and split with Taipei or the Chinese would have to accept the "two Chinas" formula. If the former possibility were realized, Gaullist diplomacy would be obliged to make a humiliating volte-face. If the latter occurred, the United States would then be able to extricate itself from its awkward policy of non-recognition.

The Nationalists chose to maintain their ties with France. 55 Consequently, the French were faced with an

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embarrassing dilemma. On January 29 it was reported that France had asked Peking for an "explanation" of its January 28 statement.\textsuperscript{56} Paris further noted that ambassadors had not been exchanged yet and that "as for the future, we will see, when the time comes, what changes should be made."\textsuperscript{57} French officials were evidently playing for time. However, French opposition to Peking's demands was already weakening. After a meeting in which de Gaulle and his ministers discussed the Sino-French disagreement, an official source reported:

The thesis of two Chinas has no meaning in international law and there is no example of a capital having an equal \textit{diplomatic} representation of two governments of the same country.\textsuperscript{58}

French authorities also hinted that they would support Peking's entry into the United Nations.\textsuperscript{59}

On January 31, 1964, President de Gaulle's long-awaited press conference was held. The French leader did not comment on the "two Chinas" problem. He chose instead, as Information Minister Alain Peyrefitte had predicted, to


\textsuperscript{58}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{59}Ibid.
emphasize the "constructive" side of his Far Eastern policy. After discoursing on Chinese history, de Gaulle went on to assert that China must now be considered "a sovereign and independent power." In addition, "China's own mass, her value and her present needs, the scope of her future" mean that China will have an important impact on the course of international and, especially, Asian affairs. Indeed, "there is in Asia no political reality . . . which does not concern or affect China." In particular, the much-desired neutrality of Southeast Asia could not conceivably be guaranteed without Chinese consent. For these reasons, France decided to recognize China. Recognition, however, did not imply approval of the Peking regime. It "merely acknowledges the world as it is." However, "if


62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid., p. 258.
"the affinities which manifestly exist between the two nations" could be developed, closer cooperation between France and China might result and this, in turn, might eventually lead to the attenuation of inter-bloc hostilities. de Gaulle's press conference left unresolved the difficult diplomatic situation in which France had become entangled. If France were to establish relations with Peking, it had to break its ties with the Nationalists or, preferably, maneuver the Nationalists into doing so. The latter objective was accomplished by a statement from M. Pierre Salade, France's envoy to Taipei. He asserted that France intended to exchange representatives with Peking and that, consequently, Nationalist diplomats could not represent China. Thus, France no longer had any obstacles to exchanging representatives with China. On February 15, 1964, Communist Chinese Chargé d'Affaires, Sung Chin-Kuang, reached Paris and one week later the French Chargé d'Affaires, M. Claude Chayet, arrived in Peking. Exactly three months to the day after the announcement of diplomatic recognition—on April 27, 1964—the French

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65 Ibid.
67 Ibid. See also Erasmus, "General de Gaulle's Recognition of Peking," The China Quarterly, op. cit., p. 197.
Ambassador, M. Lucien Page, and the Chinese Ambassador, Huang Chen, took up their posts. Thus, recognition was complete.

Purpose of French Recognition of China

In his January 31 press conference, de Gaulle alluded to three principal reasons for the recognition of China. First, diplomatic ties were necessary because China's growing influence in world affairs obliged France to acknowledge its reality. In particular, China must be dealt with if any solution were to be found to the conflict in Southeast Asia. Second, de Gaulle believed recognition was advisable if trade and cultural cooperation were to be increased. Third, recognition might some day help to mollify the rigid hostilities which existed between the communist countries and the West.

Without denying the validity of these reasons, there is ample evidence to suggest that other considerations also induced France to grant recognition to the Peking regime. Most often cited is the French president's repeatedly stated desire that France be independent of the "double hegemony" exercised by the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the

68. Ibid. See also Hinton, op. cit., p. 151.
In practice, this concern was most frequently shown by de Gaulle's repeated demonstrations of diplomatic independence vis-à-vis the United States. Although this motive went unmentioned in de Gaulle's press conference, his Minister of Information Alain Peyrefitte said shortly after recognition:

The recognition by Paris of the Chinese government is a manifestation of the independence of French policy and this undoubtedly explains certain reactions. The neutralization of North Vietnam like South Vietnam, guaranteed by the interested great powers, offers the chance to put an end to an interminable war. Those who since 1945 have grown accustomed to see the world divided into two blocs and who judge everyone by their adherence to one or the other of those blocs are annoyed by the independence of French government policy.

French officials plainly wanted recognition to be viewed as a symbol of de Gaulle's aversion to the bipolar international system which had emerged at Yalta.

France believed this bipolar international system had been detrimental to French interests as it minimized the margin for diplomatic maneuver with which France might hope to increase its influence and prestige. The bipolar


70Le Monde (Paris), February 5, 1964, p. 18.


system had most recently been manifested in the nuclear test-ban treaty of August, 1963, which France had refused to sign. Insofar as recognition of China was meant as a gesture against the bipolar international system, the action was directed against the Soviet Union as well as the United States. There is some evidence to suggest that France's demonstration of diplomatic independence was intended also to convince Soviet leaders that they could not deal with Western Europe simply by signing a treaty with the Americans.73 The nations of Western Europe, particularly France, must be considered as independent entities. If France could compel the Soviet Union to negotiate with France on significant international issues, French diplomatic autonomy would be assured. The resultant increase in France's influence and prestige might be employed to realize de Gaulle's long-cherished goal of a general European settlement in which a Europe would emerge extending "from the Atlantic to the Urals."74

Recognition of China, it would seem, was also part of de Gaulle's tiers monde /third world/ policy. France sought to increase its prestige in its former African and


Asian colonies as part of an effort to augment its influence in international affairs. The much-heralded French rentrée en Asie (reentry into Asia) could be aided by recognition of Peking since two of France's former Asian colonies—Cambodia and North Vietnam—were on friendly terms with Peking. In addition, Paris undoubtedly gained prestige with some members of the tiers monde insofar as much of Gaullist diplomacy had anti-American overtones to it. Since American policies were unpopular in many non-aligned nations, Gaullist defiance of the United States could not help but aid France's determined effort to secure closer ties with these areas.

Finally, French recognition of China served to diminish Peking's diplomatic and economic isolation. By so doing, it gave China a greater opportunity to avoid dependence on the Communist bloc. Indirectly, therefore, recognition may have helped to reduce the cohesion of the communist system.

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76 Raymond Aron believes that the popularity of the Sino-French tie among the non-aligned nations is based on the fact that Sino-French relations represent an agreement between Gaullist nationalism and Chinese socialism. The non-aligned nations hailed this development since they are generally strongly nationalist and socialist. See Aron, "La France Gaulliste et la Chine de Mao (Gaullist France and Mao's China)," Le Figaro (Paris), loc. cit.
This same effect may be noted insofar as France’s recognition of China highlighted China’s analogous opposition to its senior alliance partner’s and alliance policies. de Gaulle might have calculated that by encouraging Chinese independence he could obtain a counterweight to balance against Soviet power in Europe. If the Soviet Union were forced to pay greater attention to its eastern frontiers, Soviet military power in Central Europe might have to be depleted. The necessity of reducing its military power in Central Europe might increase the possibility that the Soviets would seek a resolution to the problem of a divided Germany. A reduction of Soviet military power in Europe and German reunification would bring closer to realization de Gaulle’s dream of a Europe stretching from “the Atlantic to the Urals.”

**Economic Considerations**

In the early stages of Sino-French rapprochement, the desire for economic and cultural ties was cited as a major reason why France might one day extend diplomatic recognition to China. While the hope for cultural relations was never

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78Drew Middleton, "France Seeking a Larger Role in Asia," *New York Times* (January 19, 1964), Sec. 4, p. 4E.
given much credibility as a motive for recognition, the hope of economic gain was considered by some to have been important. It was thought that France would be the recipient of much of the Chinese trade which had formerly been with the Soviet Union. As Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, China would be obliged to seek trading partners in the West. If Sino-French diplomatic relations were cordial enough, China might make France its major trading partner in the West.

The preponderance of evidence—both statistical and political—indicates that the hope of immediate economic gain was not a primary motive for French recognition of China. Statistically, France's exports to China represented less than 1% of its total exports at the time of recognition. Clearly, recognition would have to prompt an enormous increase in trade for it to be economically important to France. This did not occur. The volume of Sino-French trade both before and after recognition indicates that the establishment of diplomatic ties


80 Ibid.

did not have a very pronounced impact. The figures are as follows:\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>1st quarter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French imports*</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French exports</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>245+</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL TRADE</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All figures given represent value of trade in millions of New Francs (NF).

+Fall in French exports due chiefly to a 50 million NF decrease in cereal sales.

Later statistics show that France's total trade with China increased in 1965 by 47.1% to about 584 million NF.\(^3\) This would seem to be a considerable increase until it is compared with the increases in trade achieved by other American allies engaged in commerce with China:\(^4\)

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\(^2\) Statistics from Ibid., p. 15 and a research report on Sino-French trade compiled for the author under the direction of P. H. M. Jones of the Far Eastern Economic Review. (Letter from P. H. M. Jones to F. Kendall Brown dated October 25, 1965.)

\(^3\) Percentage increase quoted in and total trade derived from statistics given in Arizona Daily Star (Tucson), May 28, 1966, p. 11.

\(^4\) Ibid.
Table 1.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Trade*</th>
<th>Per Cent Increase over 1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>220.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>96.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All figures given in millions of dollars.

The statistics show that France ranked fourth in its trade increase with China. Indeed, the three nations which increased their trade most substantially were ones which did not extend recognition to the Peking regime. The volume of France's trade when compared to that of the other nations also ranked fourth among those listed. The Chinese manifestly do not insist on diplomatic recognition as a *sine qua non* for trade. Recognition did not result in an impressive gain for France *vis-à-vis* China's other trading partners.

In addition, the types of goods which China supplied could not be considered crucial to the French economy. These goods included raw silk, tin, sheepskins, furs, wool
and hair, antimony, and pig bristles. Such goods could be acquired easily from other suppliers or supplanted by other materials. French exports were more important to China. They included such staples as wheat, barley, iron and steel, and wheat and flour. These commodities could greatly aid China's underdeveloped industry and undernourished population.

Despite the quantitative and qualitative insignificance of Sino-French trade, it might be contended that recognition could have been prompted in part by the hope of a large increase in such trade although it has not subsequently materialized. Available evidence indicates, however, that French officials did not entertain any notable expectation of a larger and immediate increase in Sino-French commerce. Three obstacles were cited by M. Francois-Bénard as greatly limiting trade between the two nations. First, China had few exportable products or materials which would interest French businessmen. Second, China lacked the necessary capital with which it could purchase French goods. Consequently, Sino-French trade would have to be financed largely by France's

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85 For a more comprehensive list of goods exchanged in Sino-French trade, see Appendix I.

86 Le Monde (Paris), February 21, 1964, p. 6. M. Francois-Bénard is a French deputy who led a parliamentary mission to China to discuss economic and cultural affairs.
extension of long-term credits to China. Third, many products could not be sold to Peking because they were listed as strategic goods subject to embargo.

More explicitly, *Le Figaro* quotes M. Jaques Duhamel as saying: "Recognition of Peking was not dictated by economic reasons." Even President de Gaulle, in his generally optimistic statement on Sino-French relations, warned against "illusions" that there would be any great increase in trade. He conceded that this trade would "remain limited for some time to come." Furthermore, many economic observers were of the opinion that insofar as any economic motive could be attributed at all to French recognition of China, it would have to be only as a very long-term prospect. Thus, it is doubtful that an expectation of early economic gain could be considered as a motive for France's decision.

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CHAPTER II

CHINA AND FRENCH RECOGNITION

Ideological Background

For the Communist Chinese, ideology must precede or at least appear to precede activity. Thus, for example, "a shift in Peking's foreign policy line tends to facilitate China's progress in the field of foreign relations."90 Mao Tse-tung's policy of "leaning to one side" had, since its inception in 1949, provided the ideological basis of China's policy of alliance with the Soviet Union.91 Although shifts in ideological emphasis and foreign policy can certainly be detected during the thirteen years,92


92 See, for example, Panch Shila or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
no major change occurred in the letter if not the spirit of the 1949 declaration until January 21, 1964.

On that date a *People's Daily* editorial was published which clearly indicated that henceforth China proposed to lean toward \"the vast intermediate zone.\" While the Sino-Soviet alliance was not specifically denounced, China's leaders made it abundantly clear that they would not align themselves with the Soviet Union insofar as the Soviet leaders had sought a détente with the United States.

The Soviet leaders' hankering for U.S.-Soviet co-operation to dominate the world is but an idle dream. By undermining the unity of the socialist camp, the Soviet leaders violate the interests of the people of the Soviet Union and all other socialist countries and cater to the needs of U.S. imperialism.

The world, according to the *People's Daily* editorial, was divided into three parts—the \"socialist camp,\" the zone of \"U.S. imperialism and its lackeys,\" and the \"vast intermediate zone.\" The categories were deliberately ambiguous. The Chinese did not specify which countries were lackeys of U.S. imperialism. Significantly, the editorial did not indicate whether the Soviet Union was to be considered a

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94Ibid., p. 8.
member of the socialist camp or a lackey of U. S. imperialism. More clearly defined were the countries to be included in the vast intermediate zone. These countries fell into two groups. The "first intermediate zone" was comprised of the independent countries and those striving for independence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. There are two characteristics of these countries. First, they are oppressed by imperialist domination. Second, they furnish the locale for the national revolutionary movements which seek to overthrow their oppressors and exploiters. Since the United States is the primary oppressor and exploiter, the spearhead of the people's revolutionary struggles is and will continue to be against the United States. Left unsaid was that these countries were also the less economically developed and non-Caucasian countries of the world.

The People's Daily editorial added that a "second intermediate zone" exists. This zone includes the whole of Western Europe, Oceania, Canada, and other capitalist countries. The Chinese also include in this list


97 Ibid.
the American people, including the workers, farmers, revolutionary intellectuals and other enlightened persons," although little hope is shown that they will flock to the anti-American banner. The countries of the "second intermediate zone" have two characteristics:

While their ruling classes are exploiters and oppressors, these countries themselves are subjected to U. S. control, interference, and bullying. They therefore try their best to free themselves from U. S. control. In this regard, they have something in common with the socialist countries and the peoples of various countries.

The Chinese thus posit a hierarchy of exploiters and oppressors in the non-communist world. Since only "U. S. imperialism and its lackeys" remain unexploited and unoppressed, all other nations and peoples can and should unite to form "the broadest possible united front and intensify their common struggle."

The CPC [Communist Party of China] is trying to make itself the leader, and only common member, of two disparate coalitions: its leftist de jure friends, whom its Communist opponents accuse it of trying to weld into a "Fourth International," and its bourgeois hoped-for de facto friends, the "third world."

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98 Ibid., p. 8. Hinton includes as members of the "second intermediate zone" the following: "France, West Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and in some versions Italy." See Hinton, op. cit., p. 45.


100 Ibid., p. 8.

This can be done in spite of differences in their social systems and political convictions. The formation of such a broad "anti-U. S. imperialist united front" would isolate and ultimately destroy "U. S. imperialism":

This united front has the unity of the international proletariat as its core and the unity between the international proletariat and the oppressed nations as its foundation. It means uniting closely with the masses of the people, who constitute over 90 per cent of the world's population, uniting with all the political forces subject to U. S. aggression, control, interference or bullying and making use of every possible contradiction, all for the purpose of isolating U. S. imperialism, the main enemy of the people of the whole world, to the maximum extent and dealing it the hardest possible blow.102

If a change in Communist China's line on foreign relations is intended to advance its foreign policy goals, then an examination of the "intermediate zone" doctrine will indicate the diplomatic advantages which China sought to achieve. China has long emphasized the existence of common interests between the countries which she now holds to comprise the "first intermediate zone" and the "socialist camp." Consequently, an explanation of the diplomatic advantages which China presently seeks can be found particularly by studying its assertion of a common interest between China and the "second intermediate zone."

The primary bond between China and the capitalist countries (except the United States and its "lackeys") is their common interest in establishing and maintaining the political and economic independence of the "second intermediate zone" from the United States. To the extent that these capitalist countries strive for such independence, China can find a common area of agreement with them.

In the imperialist countries which are in sharp contradiction with the United States, some monopoly capitalists follow the U.S. imperialists, but there are also others who desire in varying degrees to oppose the United States. In the struggle against the United States, the people of the world can take united action with the latter on some questions and to a certain degree.

While the area of agreement is necessarily restricted because the socialist and capitalist systems are basically irreconcilable, the limited accords which are possible can generate certain diplomatic advantages for China.

Three diplomatic advantages stand out as possible consequences from the application of the intermediate zone doctrine. First, by dealing with all capitalist countries, save for the United States and "its lackeys," China can attempt to "exploit the contradictions" which clearly exist among the Western powers. This aim can be furthered

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because the intermediate zone doctrine emphasizes the conflict of interests between the United States and the less powerful capitalist countries. If relatively cordial relations can be established between China and virtually all countries but the United States, American hostility toward China will seem to be all the more unreasonable and arbitrary. Since the United States has frequently berated its allies for dealing with China, agreements between China and the less powerful capitalist countries may serve to undermine the cohesion of the American alliances. Thus, the United States might be diplomatically isolated as the one intransigent country.

A second diplomatic advantage made possible by the use of the intermediate zone doctrine is that it permits China greater flexibility in seeking recognition from capitalist governments. By considering the United States to be virtually the only country with which even minimal diplomatic coexistence is impossible, the Chinese doctrine lessens, in effect, the hostility directed at other capitalist countries. As these countries encounter a more receptive attitude in Peking toward diplomatic and economic contacts, non-recognition policies may seem more unrealistic and unwise. If enough countries were to

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recognize China, China would be able to enter the United Nations without abandoning its insistence that the Nationalist Chinese regime on Taiwan be ejected. Even if China were unable to secure compliance with this demand, wider recognition would lessen her diplomatic isolation and tend to increase that of the United States and the Chinese Nationalists. This might allow Peking to shift more responsibility for its militancy onto "U. S. imperialism."

The third diplomatic advantage permitted by the application of the "intermediate zone" doctrine is that it forbids any meaningful agreement with the United States by a "socialist" country. By demanding the broadest possible united front to isolate "the most ferocious and most arrogant aggressors in the history of mankind," the Chinese attempted to set limits beyond which "socialist" diplomacy could not safely venture. While countries of the intermediate zones might be expected to seek agreements with the United States, for a "socialist" country to do so would be to inexcusably thwart the policy of isolating (and thereby to aid) U. S. imperialism:

Some people ask why is it that Marxist-Leninists and the revolutionary people cannot take united action with the new leaders of the

C.P.S.U., yet can unite with personages from the upper strata in the nationalist countries, and strive for united action with them in the anti-imperialist struggle, and can even exploit the contradictions among the imperialist countries in the struggle against the United States?

The reason is that in the contemporary world opposition to or alliance with U. S. imperialism constitutes the hallmark for deciding whether or not a political force can be included in the united front against the United States.

The crux of the matter is that, so far from opposing U. S. imperialism, the new leaders of the C.P.S.U. are allying themselves and collaborating with it to dominate the world. They have thus set themselves in opposition to the united front against U. S. imperialism. If they really opposed U. S. imperialism and did so by actual deeds, we would readily take united action with them. But their so-called opposition to U. S. imperialism is only verbal and not genuine. We must tell them the truth: So long as their line of Soviet-U.S. collaboration against world revolution remains unchanged, and so long as they do not abandon their alliance with U. S. imperialism and reaction, we absolutely refuse to take any "united action" with them.

Since Sino-American relations had long been stalemated, the other members of the communist bloc (notably the Soviet Union) could justifiably suspect that the intermediate zone doctrine was, in part, intended to inhibit their ability to deal with the United States. The intermediate zone doctrine clearly sanctioned, for example, Chinese trade negotiations in Western Europe while permitting them the luxury of denouncing Russia's partial test-ban treaty with the United States.

An additional advantage which China could secure from the use of the intermediate zone doctrine is as much economic as diplomatic. By de-emphasizing its hostility towards many capitalist countries, China could facilitate more cordial and open trade relations. In this way, it could obtain a supply of much-needed industrial goods which had been greatly reduced as a result of its dispute with the Soviet Union. No damage would be done to China's reputation as a communist militant since trade would not be conducted with U. S. "imperialists." Moreover, this trade also had a diplomatic purpose. As China's trade relations with the countries of the "second intermediate zone" increase, the allies' tendency to comply with American warnings on trading with China would probably decrease. The United States would thereby be placed in the difficult diplomatic position of seeming to be unilaterally responsible for the rancor existing in Sino-American relations. This might result in producing considerable diplomatic pressure on the United States by the various countries of the "intermediate zone" to diminish its opposition to China's foreign policy objectives.108

In summation: The primary value of the "intermediate zone" doctrine lies in its utility as a means of isolating the United States diplomatically. China is prepared to reach limited agreements with certain capitalist countries insofar as they are not "lackeys of U. S. imperialism" and to the extent to which such agreements will intensify that country's estrangement from the United States. Thus, China's relations with these capitalist countries are only secondary to her objective of using them as tools for diplomatic leverage against the "U. S. imperialism." For the intermediate zone doctrine to be effective, China must be able to act in concert with a capitalist country which is actively pursuing policies inimical to those of the United States. This doctrine has become especially essential because membership in the communist bloc no longer necessarily indicates unremitting hostility towards American foreign policies. Opposition to the United States, not membership in the "socialist" bloc, has become for Peking the main criterion by which countries are judged.109

109 The Chinese have even asserted that "capitalist" de Gaulle is the leader of France's anti-American struggle rather than the French Communist Party. See Andre' Fontaine, "Le Plongeon [The Plunge]," Le Monde (Paris), January 22, 1964, p. 2.
The Chinese Response to Recognition

The "intermediate zone" doctrine was promulgated less than one week prior to the announcement of French recognition of China on January 27, 1964. Because of its timing and applicability, the doctrine was clearly meant to be a justification for the diplomatic step that was by then almost inevitable. Quite conceivably, China could have continued to use Mao Tse-tung's earlier recognition criteria to explain the decision to exchange ambassadors with France, viz.:

"The Government of the People's Republic of China is willing to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign government which is willing to observe the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty."

An explanation based exclusively on this format would have been adequate since there were no territorial grievances between the two governments. It would also suffice to

110 See, for example, André Fontaine, "Malgré les Réseves Américaines le Gouvernement Francais Serait Décider à Reconnaitre la Chine Populaire," Le Monde (Paris), January 18, 1964, p. 1.

acknowledge the "stability and permanence" of the Chinese regime. 112

The Chinese evidently believed, however, that the occasion presented by the announcement of French diplomatic recognition was a particularly significant moment to unveil a new doctrine. They may have considered the event significant because France would be the first major power to extend recognition to China since Great Britain had done so shortly after the establishment of the communist regime. Another consideration, however, may have been more decisive. France was the major dissident power in the NATO alliance. Consequently, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two nations could not fail to emphasize the analogous situation which a discordant China faced in the communist bloc. Thus, recognition took on a symbolic meaning it otherwise would have lacked.

The symbolic value of being accorded diplomatic recognition by France was a great diplomatic advantage to China. Indeed, it has been suggested that the principal reason both countries exchanged recognition was the symbolic significance implied by such a step. 113 Neither the Chinese


nor the French needed to recite the numerous and obvious parallels between their foreign policies—the worldwide press comment did it for them. To have done so overtly would have served only to gratuitously irritate relations with their respective alliance partners. China could remain content that it had provided France the opportunity to hand the United States a diplomatic snub.

Notwithstanding this discretion, neither country sought to deny the diplomatic advantages which were conferred by the rumored "Paris-Peking entente." The concurrence of policies in this "entente" was striking. It was based on a common desire to enhance their national power and prestige. As Max Frankel put it:

"There can be little doubt that their objective is big-power status, for China and her as yet under-developed billions and for France and her as yet unpersuaded fellow-European millions.

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Both share a desire not only to puff themselves up but also to cut down their erstwhile mentors.116

The common objectives led to analogous opinions of the international system of alliances. A diplomatic understanding was all the more probable whenever both became fully aware of the other's alliance difficulties and the similarities between their alliance policies. This awareness sharpened with the signing of the test-ban treaty in August 1963. While the French had long been sensitive to a divergence of interests in Sino-Soviet relations, they pointedly and publicly commented on China's isolation within the communist bloc resulting from the test-ban treaty.117 They further noted that this situation resembled their own isolation within NATO.118

In each alliance, they maintained the major power had advocated and signed the 1963 test-ban treaty. In each alliance, virtually all members had joined with the major power in signing that treaty. And in each, the dissident nuclear aspirants felt abandoned by a major


118 Ibid.
power which valued nuclear détente over alliance unity. Consequently, in each, the alliance dissidents considered their interests ignored, their nuclear programs endangered by a treaty directed at insuring the status quo, and their countries isolated diplomatically. All other powers, it seemed, had either finished nuclear testing or had never intended to test.

Meanwhile, the Chinese had repeatedly used the Franco-American nuclear strategy debate as an indirect means of denouncing the Soviet Union's "big-power chauvinism." They indicated that they, like the French, were attempting to combat the domination of their major alliance partner:

Through the early months of 1963, the Chinese newspapers, radio, and New China News Agency released a series of articles highlighting the growing stresses and strains in the NATO alliance over the question of national nuclear forces. The broadcasts expressed sympathy for the French position and described the multilateral force as a crude attempt by the United States to continue her control over the NATO countries by being the only power to control nuclear weapons. While the Chinese never openly drew the relevant analogies to their own situation, prior to the intensification of the Sino-Soviet controversy at the time of the test ban negotiations in June, the implication of their remarks was clear.

Implicitly, therefore:

The Chinese have sought to make their case for a Chinese nuclear capability by analogy, by stressing France's need for such a force and the United States' attempt to dominate the Western alliance by being the only nuclear power in it.

The Chinese have made it clear that their presentation of the contradictions within the NATO alliance includes arguments that apply equally to Sino-Soviet differences. The Chinese, again like the French, saw in the test-ban treaty an attempt by the two major alliance powers to maintain their nuclear preeminence at the expense of their alliance partners. Indeed, they considered the treaty to be "a United States-Soviet alliance against China pure and simple." Thus, both France and China considered themselves to be in a similar predicament. It is not surprising that they used similar tactics in their struggle for "big-power status." One means of enhancing national power was the accretion of nuclear weapons and a striking force capable of delivering them. Both France and China concluded that the possession of such weapons systems was an important source of intra- as well as extra-alliance power. Hence,

120 Ibid.
each decided that it must build such a force to protect its national interests as much in dealing with alliance partners as in deterrence against ostensible enemies. By this means, they sought to break the "double hegemony" of the two "colossi" and thereby to advance their claims as major independent nuclear powers.123

Another means whereby the prospect of "big-power status" could be enhanced would be to gain diplomatic leverage from alliance with third powers or association with the "third world." France sought to use links with Germany and China as well as her "traditional influence" in the tiers monde to support its claim to status as a world power.124 Indeed, recognition of China was itself an integral part of France's attempt to secure friends among the uncommitted nations. Similarly, China sought to augment her status as a world power by maintaining close ties with the "fraternal" parties and governments of Albania, North Vietnam, and North Korea. Outside of the communist bloc, China exercised its influence both through friendly regimes and through the "Marxist-Leninist" parties

123 These Gaullist phrases indicate the intensity of President de Gaulle's distaste for the postwar bipolar international system. See Aron, "La France Gaulliste et la Chine de Mao (Gaullist France and Mao's China)," Le Figaro (Paris), loc. cit.

or factions in various countries. Finally, China sought diplomatic and economic links with many industrial nations in the West. While the immediate aim may be trade or recognition, the eventual hope is that these nations will one day take part in an anti-American coalition. This latter tactic formed the basis for the above-mentioned "intermediate zone" doctrine. Clearly, if China could organize these two coalitions or France its own coalition, the resulting bloc might serve as arbiter in the struggle between the two major alliance powers.

Nevertheless, neither France nor China alone was sufficiently powerful, militarily or diplomatically, to rival the two major powers. However, each could use the other to compensate for some of its own weaknesses. China needed a supplier of industrial goods and credit to overcome the deficiency caused by its estrangement of the Soviet Union. China also desired diplomatic recognition which would diminish its isolation and increase its access to the uncommitted nations. France could use closer relations with China to demonstrate both the independence and global nature of its foreign policy. This would make French policies more appealing to the tiers monde. Rapport achievement, consequently, was diplomatically advantageous insofar as it both symbolized and advanced the common interests of France and China.
It can be seen that similar foreign policy objectives and viewpoints led to similar tactics and the discovery of common interests. These analogies invested French recognition of China with its symbolic significances. However, to assert a complete parallelism of predicaments, perspectives, and policies for the sake of editorial symmetry would be incorrect. Indeed, France and China are as likely to be enemies as allies. Since both are attempting to gain influence among the uncommitted nations, they often compete for the allegiance of the same people. China's commitment to aiding the establishment of communist governments runs directly counter to France's desire to retain influence with her former colonies by dealing through French-educated élites. In addition, significant differences exist between the international situations of the two countries:

The CPR /Chinese People's Republic/ is engaged in a direct struggle with the United States, over Taiwan and many other things, and feels that both its security and the achievement of its external objectives are therefore in danger. The trend toward détente has probably decreased the chances of a major war between the CPR and the United States markedly less than it has decreased the chances of such a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. These considerations, or their analogue, do not apply to France. There is very little direct clash of interests between

France and the Soviet Union, and France would be in danger from the Soviet Union only in the context of general war or something approaching it, not in the context of a direct Soviet strike against France alone. Thus Soviet-Western détente, by diminishing the chances of general war over Europe, has had much more value and brought greater freedom of maneuver to France than it has to the CP. The French third force policy therefore has a larger element of opportunism in it, the Chinese third force policy a larger element of fear.126

Notwithstanding the immense symbolic value French diplomatic recognition had for China, a more tangible advantage lay in its possible effect on the former French colonies of Africa. These nations, often sensitive to French influence, might well be expected to follow, at least partially, the initiative of their mentor and accord recognition to Peking. Wider diplomatic representation among the uncommitted nations of Africa could have two effects. First, Chinese influence on the continent would probably increase. This development the French would not view as an unmixed blessing. Paradoxically, Chinese influence in Africa might increase as a result of China's relaxation of its hostility towards France. With both France and its former colonies classed as members of an "intermediate zone," the Francophile nations of Africa might be less inclined to doubt assertions of China's good intentions. A second effect might be to increase the

126 Hinton, op. cit., pp. 148-149.
number of votes in the United Nations for Peking's admission. This might facilitate China's entry into the organization. Other uncommitted nations might also follow this example because of France's prestigious position on the United Nations Security Council. French recognition could thus quite tangibly affect China's position in international relations.

Finally, another significant diplomatic advantage which French recognition could confer on China would be the possible disruptive consequences of France's *retrée en Asie.* China may well have hoped that French diplomatic initiatives for a settlement in Southeast Asia and its criticisms of American policy there would complicate an already tangled situation. Rapprochement between France and China could persuade France to believe a settlement of the Vietnamese war possible and could increase French pressure on the United States to mollify its policy commitments.

It is apparent, from the foregoing discussion, that China believed that French recognition potentially conferred

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128 The phrase literally means "reentry into Asia." For an official discussion of French thinking on Asia, see *Le Monde* (Paris), January 23, 1964, p. 18.

both long- and short-term advantages. The long-term advantages which China sought, embodied in her "intermediate zone" doctrine, pictured China as the leader of a vast and diverse anti-American coalition. Viewed in this context, French recognition was the first move in an effort to establish China as a third world power. China's assessment of the immediate advantages emphasized the favorable impact which specifically French recognition would have on China's current diplomatic problems—relations with the USSR, recognition, and the conflict in Southeast Asia.

There can be little doubt that China encouraged the establishment of diplomatic relations with France. This is attested to not only by the numerous diplomatic advantages which China believed available but also by its diplomatic activity prior to France's decision to accord recognition. As early as October 16, 1963, G. L. Sulzberger noted that the Chinese were "courting" France. Although it remains ambiguous whether this early cordiality reflected more a desire for economic rather than diplomatic ties, the subsequent and overtly political mission led by Edgar Faure was accorded an unusually warm reception in Peking.


Chinese were not anxious for recognition, they would hardly have encouraged this high-level visit.

Chinese public statements, however, were very restrained. The first overt mention by a Chinese leader of France's rapprochement came in response to questions posed by a French correspondent to Chou En-lai during his African tour. Chou remarked that the Chinese government had noted "an evolution in France's attitude," and that he would like to visit France. This comment was shortly followed by an equally oblique hint espousing a "normalization" of relations between China and France. However, only economic and cultural relations were specified. Yet even these innocuous remarks were not reported in the Chinese press. Indeed, Chinese diplomats were so cautious that it was not until Chen Yi's statement reported on January 11, 1964, that the Chinese openly asserted that France should recognize China. China, Chen said, was still waiting for France to act. On the same day, the news of Sino-French rapprochement was indirectly disclosed in China by a New

132Jean-Francois Kahn, "L'Attitude de la France à l'égard de Pekin a Marque 'une certaine évolution' Declare le Premier Ministre Chinois /France's Attitude with Regard to Peking Has Shown 'a certain evolution' Says the Chinese Prime Minister/", _Le Monde_ (Paris), December 28, 1963, p. 1.


134Ibid., January 11-12, 1964, p. 4.
China News Agency release which characterized the United States as opposing the development of Sino-French relations. The official reticence was broken again on January 17 by a member of Chou En-lai's entourage who declared that only one China existed and that any recognition must be accorded on that basis. Thus, despite diplomatic circumspection and reserve, China clearly indicated its desire to exchange ambassadors with France.

Another indication that China was anxious for French recognition was shown by the unique arrangements which the Chinese permitted for the establishment of relations. In its recognition statement, China declared its agreement to appoint an ambassador to France within three months even though France had consular relations with the Nationalists. China had never previously committed itself to establishing ambassadorial relations with another nation while that nation retained representatives on Formosa. Since 1950 Great Britain had been allowed to maintain consular relations with the Nationalist and the Communist Chinese governments but had not been permitted to


send an ambassador to Peking. France alone was allowed to have full diplomatic ties with Peking and a chargé d'affaires on Formosa. Presumably, this privilege was extended to the French in recognition of its independence from "U. S. imperialism." Great Britain was apparently still considered a "lackey" of the United States.

Chinese acceptance of French recognition did not, however, mean an acceptance of the notion of "two Chinas." No nation was allowed to maintain ambassadorial relations with both Chinese regimes. Thus, an absence of ambassadorial contact with the Nationalists still remained the sine qua non for opening such ties with Peking. A second requirement which Peking has used, on occasion, to determine whether it would exchange ambassadors is the political acceptability of the government in question. Israel, for example, recognized Peking in 1950 but has yet to have the honor reciprocated. Hence, China's attitude toward


139 Hinton, op. cit., p. 151.

140 The Chinese government denounced the "two Chinas" interpretation immediately following recognition. See, for example, Le Monde (Paris), January 29, 1964, p. 1.

141 Max Frankel, "Delicate Choices for U. S." New York Times (January 18, 1964), p. 4. In 1961 Communist China refused to reciprocate recognitions with Senegal because it also recognized the Nationalist government. In 1962 the Nationalist government broke relations with Laos when a double recognition was attempted.
recognition seems to more closely resemble that of the United States than the traditionally pragmatic criteria used by most European nations.\textsuperscript{142}

A final condition for recognition seems to be an absence of territorial grievances.\textsuperscript{143} The establishment of diplomatic relations with France did not represent an alteration in these three basic requirements. The Sino-French diplomatic arrangements were rather a tactical concession by China to facilitate recognition.

Any assessment of French recognition of China must concede that much of the substantive advantage which China received resulted from the immediate impact of the decision. First, and most obviously, China acquired in Paris the status and prerogatives of a sovereign nation. This was important to Peking because its "stability and permanence" had long been subject to political if not military doubt. Second, China gained diplomatic stature which necessarily constituted a loss for the rival Nationalist regime. Third, recognition accorded China the opportunity to emphasize her disagreements with the Soviet Union and the United States, since the Sino-French rapprochement could not fail to excite

\textsuperscript{142}Donnithorne, "The Foreign Policy of the Chinese People's Republic," \textit{Political Quarterly, op. cit.}, p. 320.

\textsuperscript{143}See above page 111, footnote 45.
speculation on the obvious analogies between the French and Chinese alliance policies. Fourth, China obtained diplomatic recognition by at least two Francophile African nations very probably as a result of the French initiative. The impact of recognition on the policies of the African nations was probably attenuated, however, by French urging that they not recognize China in the immediate future. Finally, China profited diplomatically insofar as recognition emphasized and encouraged Franco-American disagreements over Southeast Asia. Thus, China's expectations of the short-term advantages of recognition were largely fulfilled.

A more cautious estimate must be given of China's success in realizing the long-term advantages of recognition as envisioned in the doctrine of the "intermediate zone." In this context, recognition is only part of a more general policy and must be assessed by its contribution to that policy. Since the full impact of events and China's doctrine have yet to be felt, judgment on its success must be tentative.

144 These were Tunisia and Congo (Brazzaville). See Hinton, op. cit., p. 47.

Four long-range advantages stand out as possible consequences of the application of the intermediate zone doctrine. First, China's doctrine was principally meant as a means to increase China's ability to exploit the "contradictions" which divide the United States and its allies. Recognition itself was a divisive issue between the United States and France. Aside from this, however, China's new doctrine has not been perceptibly responsible for splitting the Western alliance. Even while asserting its tiers monde policy, France has not sought to coordinate it with China's intermediate zone ambitions and thus give credence to speculations of Sino-French collusion. Second, the intermediate zone doctrine has not significantly thawed China's relations with Western capitalist countries or triggered a spate of recognitions from the allegedly bullied nations of Europe. Indeed, further recognitions may have been discouraged by China's unwillingness to make any important compromises to secure French recognition.

146 Hinton judges China's chances of splitting the Western alliance system as being "slight." See Hinton, op. cit., p. 46.

147 Such speculations are found, for example, in Hinton, op. cit., pp. 473-474; and, Jacques Soustelle, "de Gaulle and China," The New Leader, XLVII, No. 8, (April 13, 1964), 16.

Third, the intermediate zone policy has not notably aided China in breaking up the Soviet-American détente. The Soviet Union contends that the Chinese doctrine "objectively whitewashes" the lesser "imperialist" powers.\textsuperscript{149} It also holds that direct dealings with the most powerful "imperialist" nation are necessary for the cause of peace.

Finally, the hope of increased trade which China has held out as a consequence of closer relations has little basis in fact.\textsuperscript{150} Recognition is not a \textit{sine qua non} for trade. In reality, China maintains a larger volume of trade with several nonrecognizing nations than it does with many which have accorded recognition to Peking.

From the above discussion, it would seem that the main benefits to China of French recognition were those which were the immediate consequences of the decision. Therefore, despite China's elaborate doctrinal justification of Sino-French rapprochement, it would seem that "the Paris-


\textsuperscript{150}China has offered large business contracts to West Germany, Belgium, and Japan in exchange for recognition. See Editors of Deadline Data on World Affairs, "France -- 'Grandeur' versus Atlantic Unity," \textit{On Record}, II, No. 7 (1964-1965), 47. However, at the time of French recognition, Australia, Canada, and Japan were among the top four traders with China. All three of these nations recognized Nationalist China. See Jones, "The Peking-Paris Entente," \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review}, op. cit., p. 15.
"Peking"tie is thus neither particularly broad nor stable. It is simply a useful platform for both in their struggles against allies and adversaries."151

The Official Response

The Soviet Union officially welcomed French recognition of China. On January 22, 1964, Chairman Khrushchev expressed his "satisfaction" with the impending initiative to France's ambassador to Moscow, M. Maurice DeJean. Izvestia gave a more explicit account of Soviet opinion on January 28 in an article by the important commentator Nikolai Polyanov. After noting the consternation which the French move had caused among France's NATO allies, Polyanov sought to clarify the Soviet position by denying persistent speculations in the Western press that the Soviet Union was secretly displeased with the affair:

It attracts notice that people in the West are also engaging in all kinds of speculations concerning the "Soviet reaction" to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Chinese People's Republic and France. Some newspapers try to cast a shadow over a clear sky and to create the

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152 Le Monde (Paris), January 23, 1964, p. 3.

153 See, for example, comments by Max Lerner in "New Alignments in Asia?" Current, No. 47 (March, 1964), 15-18.
impression that allegedly in the Soviet Union there is "also displeasure" at the decision of the governments of France and of the Chinese People's Republic.

Nothing can be more remote from reality than this kind of guessing. It is widely known that the Soviet Union is a consistent exponent of the development of cooperation among all states, in the interests of the peoples of these states, in the interests of maintaining and strengthening peace. That is why it considers the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Chinese People's Republic and France a step that will benefit the strengthening of the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. This step also fits in with the aims of all the socialist states.154

The editorial concluded that the establishment of diplomatic relations with China was a demonstration of France's "realistic approach" to foreign affairs. "If the French government is inspired by this approach in quests for solutions to other important international problems, France and the whole world can only gain from this."155 The Soviets were apparently hinting that a non-recognition policy was equally indefensible in the case of East Germany. Barring this unexpected development, however, recognition of China was the most that could be hoped for from France's diplomatic "realism."


155 Ibid., p. 23.
Another aspect of Moscow's reaction to the Sino-French understanding was an evident delight with the anti-American overtones of the French move. The Soviet army publication *Krasnaya Zvezda* said that the French initiative demonstrated de Gaulle's "unwillingness to submit to pressure by the United States which has been caused many inconveniences by his 'policy of grandure'."  

Pravda also cited recognition of China as evidence of France's diplomatic independence. It pointed out "the ostentatious tendency of the Gaullist government to emphasize the independent nature of its diplomatic positions."  

Editorial speculation, however, went no further than this. Anti-American motives were not used as proof of a pro-Soviet attitude. Conversely, the official reaction of the Soviet Union gave no indication of any suspicions that it considered recognition to be a hostile act by either France or China. Publicly, the only motives which the Soviets adduced for Sino-French rapprochement were their mutual desire to acknowledge the existence of each other's government and take a diplomatic slap at the United States.

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157 Ibid. Also noted in *Le Figaro* (Paris), January 29, 1964, p. 4.
The Ideological Response

There is ample reason to believe that the Soviet government was not as pleased with the Sino-French rapprochement as its diplomatic statements would suggest. The strongest indication came on February 14, 1964, in an ideological counterattack by Mikhail A. Suslov against China's "intermediate zone" doctrine. Suslov, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and a leading Soviet ideological spokesman, denounced China for its alleged "great-power chauvinism and petty-bourgeois adventurism." China, he said, had followed its own "egoistical interests" and had subordinated the "Communist and National liberation movement" to its own ends. Beneath the cover of its "ultra-revolutionary verbiage and slogans," the Chinese leaders were seeking to advance the "egoistical interests" by ferociously attacking the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its allied "Marxist-Leninist" parties. Consequently, they were splitting the international communist movement. Despite this danger, China's denunciations had mounted to such intensity that it no longer directed most its anger at the "imperialists" but rather at the other communist parties.


159 Ibid.
In their campaign to discredit both the Soviet and its allied parties, the Chinese had not only used "lies and slander dished up by imperialist propaganda," but were also aligning themselves with "the most aggressive circles of imperialism."160 Because of this, the Chinese leaders used a double standard for judging diplomatic intercourse with the "imperialists." They considered any Soviet attempts to improve relations with the United States to be a "conspiracy with the imperialists" and did their utmost to hinder such developments.161 However, the Chinese were "making feverish relations" with France, Britain, Japan, West Germany, and Italy.162 Suslov added tartly:

The Chinese leaders consider that when they themselves develop such activity it is an expression of the policy of real "revolutionaries," but when other Socialist states to the same thing it is revisionism and "treachery."163

The Soviet theoretician was plainly attacking China's intermediate zone doctrine and, indirectly, its justification for rapprochement with France. Suslov believed that such a rapprochement was the consequence of Peking's unremitting hostility towards the United States.

160Ibid.

161Ibid., p. 9.

162Ibid. Note that these are the nations which China has included in its "second intermediate zone."

163Ibid.
By so strongly emphasizing that the United States was incomparably the worst of all the "imperialists," China was obliged to admit, in effect, that some "imperialists" were better than others. This reasoning had two dangerous results. First, "peaceful coexistence" with the United States was made all but impossible. Second, capitalist countries other than the United States were given the unnecessary advantage of being treated as allies. Rapprochement on this basis could only damage the unity of the communist bloc and retard the struggle against "imperialism." Therefore,

The C. P. S. U. Communist Party of the Soviet Union holds that side by side with a determined struggle against U. S. imperialism, the major international exploiter and policeman, all anti-imperialist forces must also carry on a struggle against the aggressive, reactionary forces of British, French, West German and Japanese imperialism. The Chinese theory of an intermediate zone, on the other hand, objectively whitewashes the imperialists of Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan for whom this is advantageous.164

Despite the dangers inherent in an intermediate zone policy, the Chinese leaders had persisted in their activities. Because of this, "ruling circles of the imperialist powers" had succeeded in getting "the measure of the secret Chinese policy."165 Said Suslov: "That accounts for the change that is in evidence in the policy of the leading capitalist

164 Ibid., p. 10.

165 Ibid.
In the short interval between the explicit formulation of the intermediate zone doctrine (January 21, 1964) and the Soviet rejoinder (February 14, 1964), the "imperialists" had already taken advantage of China's new stance. Within that three-week period, the only major change in policy by a leading capitalist state with regard to China was France's decision to extend diplomatic relations to the Peking regime. The Soviet leaders could not have easily objected to Sino-French diplomatic relations per se. They had long advocated recognition and United Nations standing for the Chinese Communist government. Yet, they apparently had perceived that this recognition also had been a rapprochement. Suslov was, therefore, suspicious of the motives which might have impelled China to seek an understanding with such countries as France: Are they looking for partners among the monopolistic groups of these countries for the struggle against what they term as modern revisionism? Suslov answered his rhetorical question affirmatively:

It is quite likely that in following their erroneous, anti-Leninist line, the Chinese leaders will virtually land themselves in the same boat with reactionary, bellicose elements of imperialism as has already happened in connection with

166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
the C. P. R. Government's refusal to sign the Moscow partial test ban treaty.168

The Soviet leaders believed that China's rapprochement with intermediate zone Western nations might well be as much anti-Soviet as anti-American in its purpose. Hence, the intermediate zone doctrine could also be considered as being potentially a blueprint for a tacit anti-Soviet alliance. If, as seems probable, this was one of the unstated purposes behind China's desire for a Sino-French rapprochement, then the Soviets could only mistrust the development notwithstanding the necessity of diplomatic approbation. More ominously, France might try to offset Soviet power in Europe by aiding Moscow's adversaries in Asia. The use of French influence on behalf of China in Africa, the large-scale extension of credit for trade, and even the provision of critical technical data could greatly augment China's power and influence.169 Consequently, France's attitude toward its ties with Peking became a matter of crucial interest to the Soviet leaders.

The Unofficial Response

There is ample evidence indicating private Soviet diplomatic concern. Michel Tatu, a special correspondent

168Ibid.

169See, for example, speculations that France may have helped China's nuclear development program-in Hinton, op. cit., pp. 472-474. Also Soustelle's "de Gaulle and China," The New Leader, loc. cit.
for the influential *Le Monde*, documented Moscow's unofficial misgivings. These misgivings centered around the fear that France intended to use relations with China as a means of worsening the Sino-Soviet rift. The Soviets were apprehensive that France might try to play one against the other and thereby weaken both. Still remembered were the strikingly similar objections raised by the "Chinese dogmatists" and the "French extremists" to the Soviet-approved test-ban treaty of 1963. Such considerations could easily excite Soviet suspicions. Accordingly, French diplomatic activity was closely watched. As one unnamed Soviet observer told Tatu:

> It is up to the French leaders to show by their actions whether they intend to make this recognition an act of realism which it is and should remain or a provocation.172

Eastern European sentiment was even more openly suspicious of Sino-French rapprochement. While such suspicions do not necessarily indicate the Soviet attitude, they do indicate the extent of disquietude over the development. *Borba*, an official Yugoslav newspaper, considered China's intermediate zone doctrine to be at least partially

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171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.
directed at the Soviet leadership. It concluded: "This aspect of Chinese-French rapprochement shows its motives and goals in a peculiar light."173 Czechoslovak comments were even more caustic. While perfunctorily praising the move as "a positive contribution to peaceful co-existence," Rude Pravo pointedly emphasized that France and China had taken similar positions on the nuclear test-ban treaty and "other measures for the relaxation of world tension."174 Prace continued this line of attack by asserting that France and China had recognized each other "to extricate themselves from a certain state of isolation."175 The implication was clear: recognition was a rapprochement of two nuclear pariahs.

From the Soviet ideological response to China's intermediate zone doctrine, from its unofficial statements of concern for French diplomatic intentions, and from certain speculations appearing in the Eastern European press, it must be concluded that the Soviet Union was not as satisfied with French recognition of China as its public


175 Ibid.
statements would indicate. The Soviet leaders were sus-
picious of Sino-French ties insofar as they tended to
divide the communist bloc and could be used to strengthen
China's diplomatic, economic, and military position.
CHAPTER IV

THE AMERICAN REACTION

Background

American officials had been aware of France's desire to eventually recognize Peking at least since mid-October of 1963.\textsuperscript{176} The French had not indicated at that time that immediate diplomatic steps were planned and, as a result, no public response by the American State Department was reported. However, after the Faure mission in late October of 1963 speculation on French intentions to establish ties with Peking increased. American efforts to dissuade the French from recognizing Peking began in November, 1963.\textsuperscript{177} Perhaps with the intention of meeting some of France's criticisms the American government conducted a review of its own China policy.\textsuperscript{178}

On December 13, the American statement on relations with China was presented in a speech by Roger Hilsman,


\textsuperscript{177}Middleton, "France Seeking a Larger Role in Asia," \textit{New York Times}, \textit{loc. cit.}.

the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. The speech seemed to reflect a more conciliatory American attitude toward China. Mr. Hilsman stated that while the United States respected "the right of others to view the matter otherwise":

We find important differences in the willingness and ability of the Soviet Union and Communist China, at the present stage of their respective development, to reach limited agreements which can bring some reduction of the terrible dangers and tensions of our present-day world. We believe that policies of strength and firmness, accompanied by a constant readiness to negotiate—policies long and effectively pursued with the Soviet Union—will best promote the changes which must take place on the China mainland before we can hope to achieve long sought conditions of peace, security and progress in this half of the globe.

Hence, he concluded:

We pursue today towards Communist China a policy of the open door: we are determined to keep the door open to the possibility of change, and not to slam it shut against any developments which might advance our national good, serve the free world, and benefit the people of China.

The Hilsman speech caused widespread conjecture that a shift in American policy toward China was about to occur. These conjectures were soon silenced. On December 18, at a press conference held at the United Nations, the American

180Ibid., p. 206.
181Ibid.
Ambassador, Adlai Stevenson, asserted that any improvements in Sino-American relations depended on China. As long as China persisted in its aggressive policies in Asia such improvements were impossible. Mr. Stevenson also saw no hope of a change in American policy on the question of Peking's United Nations membership. Thus, despite the momentary speculation caused by Hilsman's speech, no substantial change in American policy with regard to China took place.

Consequently, when the American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, visited Paris in mid-December of 1963, an unchanged American policy quickly came into conflict with a developing French policy emphasizing increased contacts with Peking. In his talks with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, Rusk reportedly asserted that it was to the West's advantage to favor the Soviet conception of peaceful coexistence over the revolutionary militancy of China.

China, not the Soviet Union, represented the greatest threat to Western interests. Opposed to this was the French


183 A. F., "À la Veille de sa Cloture la Session de Conseil Atlantique fait apparaître Peu de Divergences sur l'Attitude à Suivre à l'Égard de l'Est / On the Eve of its Closing the Atlantic Council Session appears to have Few Differences on the Position to Follow in Regard to the East," Le Monde, loc. cit.
attitude, expressed by de Mürville, that the existence of a détente depended essentially on the attitude of the Soviet Union. The Soviets were unquestionably more powerful and hence more of a threat to European security. Western efforts should not, therefore, be directed at favoring one communist power over another but instead should be aimed at obtaining a settlement in Central Europe. Indeed, Soviet power in Europe might be partially offset by the necessity of diverting attention to its eastern frontiers. Accordingly, France gave the United States no assurance that it would not recognize China. Involved in the Franco-American disagreement was not only a divergence of views with regard to the appropriate diplomatic strategy to pursue in dealing with the consequences of the Sino-Soviet split, but also two completely different ideas on the nature of that split. Indeed, each nation had dissimilar opinions on the nature of the international system. As Kissinger states French and American views differed

... about the significance of the Sino-Soviet split and about policy toward Communist China. The United States, convinced of the importance of intentions in the conduct of foreign policy, is tempted to back the Communist power which

professes the more peaceful goals. de Gualle, believing that an equilibrium is the only reliable basis for stability, is more concerned with establishing a counterweight to the stronger Communist partner. He is prepared, if necessary, to play off its weaker Communist opponent against it. The United States, with its global responsibilities (e.g., the defense of Formosa), sees in Communist China an objective threat to its interests. de Gaulle, leading a country primarily concerned with European affairs, considers a Russia extending its power into the center of Europe as the principal danger. China, to him, is a distant country which could become useful in diverting Soviet energies. What is involved here is a certain divergence of American and European interests; . . .

Another reason for the Franco-American disagreement on China policy may be traced to the different treatment accorded each by Peking. The United States, in part because of its role as protector of the Nationalist regime on Formosa, was considered by Peking to be the supreme enemy of China. As such, it was the object of unremitting hostility. France, as part of the intermediate zone between the two antagonistic nations, could be dealt with by Peking insofar as such dealings could be justified as contributing to China's power and influence. Not


186 Since its establishment, Communist China has singled out the United States for abuse. See Lee, "Communist China and Western Europe," Current History, op. cit., pp. 144-145.
unexpectedly, France and the United States disagreed on the desirability of recognition.

The Diplomatic Response

Therefore, when Edgar Faure publicly advocated French recognition of China in a semi-official interview on January 9, 1964, the United States Department reacted critically. Press Officer Richard I. Phillips announced:

Quite obviously, we do not think that French recognition would be a service to us or to the other free nations. . . .

It has been repeatedly made clear that the United States opposes recognition of Communist China as it would enhance Peking's ability to promote its announced goal of imposing communism on other nations through any means at hand, including force and violence.188

More specifically, the United States feared that French recognition of China would have two harmful consequences. First, Washington thought that the establishment of a Paris-Peking tie might undermine American diplomatic, economic, and military efforts to contain Chinese influence in Asia.189


Recognition of China, for example, might prompt Japanese recognition of Peking or disparage South Vietnamese resistance to Viet Cong insurgency. Second, French recognition might induce the French-speaking nations of Africa to follow France's example and thereby increase the probability that Peking would be admitted to the United Nations. The impact of these consequences could be especially severe since some might be felt at the time of the American elections in the fall.190

When it became apparent after January 15191 that France definitely intended to recognize Peking in the near future, the American State Department decided to secure the maximum possible diplomatic advantage from an admittedly unsatisfactory predicament by pressuring Nationalist officials into delaying any immediate break with France.192 Since the French had previously stated that they would not initiate a rupture in relations with Taipei,193 one of two possibilities could result—either France would be forced into a humiliating reversal and capitulate to Peking's

190Ibid.


demands by acknowledging that only the communist regime represented China, or Peking would have to accept the "two Chinas" thesis. A third possibility also existed—that either nation would denounce the whole arrangement and refuse to go through with recognition. From the American viewpoint, this would be the best possible outcome. However, it was highly unlikely that Paris or Peking would abandon so easily the results of many months of diplomatic activity. After a brusque exchange of notes between Washington and Paris in mid-January, American officials knew that the French could not be dissuaded from establishing ties with Peking.

Aware of this, the American government continued its efforts to restrain Chiang Kai-shek from precipitating an open break in relations with France. If Peking accepted the "two Chinas" formula to obtain French recognition, the United States would then be able to offer recognition on the same basis. This would extricate America's Asian policy from the awkward predicament in which it had been entangled since 1949. If, as seemed more probable, Peking rejected the "two Chinas" idea, Paris would be confronted by an embarrassing dilemma. At a minimum, Gaullist foreign


policy would not be credited with a major diplomatic coup which fell short of success only because of Nationalist intransigence. Plainly, if France wanted to recognize Peking, it probably would have to force the Nationalists to break ties with Paris. This would be the least embarrassing means of preparing the way to exchange ambassadors with China.

Despite this rigorous diplomatic activity, statements by American officials remained cautious. President Lyndon Johnson, in a news conference held just prior to recognition said that the United States had made clear its "views and the general effect it [recognition of China] would have on the Alliance and on the free world." 196 Nevertheless, since "the Government of France is responsible for its foreign policy," recognition was "a matter for them to decide." 197 The American president was unwilling to express more than his government's "concern" over the French decision. He was even less willing to engage the French in a futile and acrimonious debate which would have done nothing to prevent recognition. Even after the formal announcement of diplomatic relations on January 27, the public response of the American government to the French


197 Ibid.
decision continued to be restrained. On that day, the State Department issued a statement calling France’s action “an unfortunate step, particularly at a time when the Chinese Communists are actively promoting aggression and subversion in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.”

The Domestic Response

Less officially, the American reaction to the French move was not so mild. On January 23, the United States Senate had passed a bipartisan resolution warning France of the highly adverse American reaction which might be aroused by the decision to recognize China. American officials privately confided their “bitterness” and Alain Clément of Le Monde reported from Washington that beneath the bland official pronouncements lay a cold fury that presaged a more hostile American attitude toward the French government.

There were two principal sources of American discontent with the way in which de Gaulle chose to recognize


China. First, Washington believed that by linking recognition of China with the proposal to neutralize Southeast Asia, France had compounded American difficulties in Asia without acquiring the means necessary to contribute constructively to any resolution of the conflicts which beset the area. France did not possess sufficient military, economic, or political power to contain the Chinese influence which the decision to recognize had augmented. France's "realism," therefore, was illusory at best. The task of containing the expanding Chinese influence fell to the United States. It alone bore the brunt of the consequences arising from France's rentrée en Asie.

Second, Washington resented the peremptory way in which the French leader chose to establish ties with China. By emphasizing that recognition was a gesture of diplomatic independence, France seemed to be needlessly jeopardizing its relations with the United States. This feeling was heightened when de Gaulle took the occasion of his January 31 press conference to make condescending remarks about the American Constitution. France seemed to be


deliberately seeking to offend American sensibilities. This could only harm the Atlantic Alliance. As Max Frankel wrote:

There are many here who credit the French with wisdom and insight on this or that issue, but few who will condone the blunt and repeated assertion of a single will inside a diverse coalition.

If France had offered collusion and cooperation to untangle the mess in Southeast Asia, officials say, if France had continued to press for a much more powerful voice in Western nuclear strategy, if France had come up with some seductive formula to strike a bargain with Premier Castro or to establish a joint Western policy for two Chinas, then she might have found a responsive group of men in influential places here.

On January 31, Under Secretary of State George W. Ball summed up the American response to French recognition of China. Condemning France's action by implication, he said:

Restrain to this same degree as that exercised by the United States is not always felt by powers that play a more limited role in world affairs. Because their interests are geographically restricted, they often do not feel the same high degree of concern for the implications or repercussions of their actions.

Nonetheless, actions taken by one Atlantic nation in disregard of the obligations of total world responsibility can be both self-defeating and destructive. And if, in fact, members of the Atlantic Community persistently pursue courses of action that ignore the realities of interdependence.

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the effective policies of the Atlantic nations will be reduced to their lowest—and weakest—common denominator. 205

Under Secretary Ball’s criticisms were ignored by Paris. France informed Taipei that its diplomats could no longer claim to represent China. 206 On February 10, 1964, the Nationalist government severed relations with France thereby allowing Peking and Paris to exchange ambassadors. France had again successfully defied the United States.


CHAPTER V

THE IMPACT OF RECOGNITION

Sino-French Relations since Recognition

Since the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic ties in January of 1964, relations between the two countries have been generally poor. The initial Chinese warmth toward Paris has been replaced by an undisguised hostility. While France is still considered to be a member of the "intermediate zone," this status does not negate the fact that France is a "bourgeois" and, hence, an "imperialist" power. Specifically, China has been unwilling to abandon its revolutionary appeal among the uncommitted nations, including the Francophile nations of Africa. China has also shown no enthusiasm for France's proposal to neutralize the former French-held areas in Southeast Asia.\(^\text{207}\) The Christian Science Monitor relates that:

> A persistent story is circulating in diplomatic circles and has been also printed in the French anti-Gaullist press. It says that

Mao Tse-tung had received the French Ambassador, Mr. Lucien Paye, about two weeks before the Chinese atomic explosion but had failed to inform him of the impending test, although the Chinese had informed several African Governments in advance. Mr. Mao is said to have given Mr. Paye a chilly reception informing him that French and Chinese policies had "little relationship to one another." He is also said to have told the French Ambassador that Southeast Asia was only a small part of China's "planetary" foreign policy. A new diplomatic move there would depend upon the United States attitude, Mao is supposed to have added. He is also reported to have said that Peking would continue to aid African and Asian revolutionary movements "wherever they may be" i.e. also in French-speaking Africa.


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208 Editors of Deadline Data on World Affairs, Quoted in "France -- 'Grandeur' vs. Atlantic Unity," On Record, op. cit., p. 49.


210 Ibid.
Nations than it had been for similar efforts by the Soviet Union and India. Indeed, there is ample evidence to suggest that Peking does not want to make a "re-entry into the Society of Nations."211

Sino-French relations have been further irritated by China's refusal to grant France a "favored position" for its Embassy in Peking.212 Consequently, French emissaries remain limited in their ability to travel in China and their access to high Chinese officials. This problem has apparently been compounded by the lack of cordiality in the contacts which do occur.213

Perhaps, in part, as a result of Chinese intran-sigence, French officials have been reluctant to advocate Chinese claims to jurisdiction over Formosa. Couvé de Murville stated that the question of jurisdiction still remained unsettled and Prime Minister Georges Pompidou subsequently recommended that Formosa's future standing be

211 Donnithorne, "The Foreign Policy of the Chinese People's Republic," Political Quarterly, op. cit., p. 321. See also Christian Science Monitor (Boston), May 31, 1966, p. 14. Peking says that it will refuse to enter the United Nations so long as that organization is dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union.

212 Edmond Taylor, "French Africa," The Reporter, XXXII, No. 6 (March 25, 1965), 30.

213 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
decided through self-determination. Both of these positions are vigorously opposed by China which is especially sensitive to any denial of its asserted right to ownership of Formosa.

The greatest source of friction between France and China, however, remains their clash of interests on the African continent. France has become increasingly alarmed at the rise in Chinese revolutionary activity in Francophile Africa. Moderate pro-French officials in the Congo (Brazzaville) have been assassinated by groups which are reportedly aligned with Peking. Moreover, China has begun to attack French policy in Africa directly. Peking has denounced French activities in Gabon and the Congo (Brazzaville) and demanded independence for the remaining French possessions. In retaliation, French officials have suppressed the seventh edition of Peking's Paris-based publication, Revolution, which carried these demands. France has also attempted to discourage the French-speaking nations of Africa from any precipitate decision to grant

216 Ibid.
217 Hinton, op. cit., pp. 151-152.
218 Ibid.
recognition to Peking.\textsuperscript{219} This move may have been at least partially motivated by a desire to mitigate the consequences of Chinese subversion among the Francophile nations of Africa.

More recently, China has reemphasized the "intermediate zone" aspect of its relations with France. At France’s July 14, 1966 Bastille Day celebrations in its Peking Embassy, Chen Yi proposed that France join China in a struggle against the "United States imperialist plan for aggression and war."\textsuperscript{220} The Chinese Foreign Minister made it clear that this joint effort would be directed against not only the United States but its "accomplices and flunkies" as well.\textsuperscript{221} The implication of Chen Yi’s proposal was that France and China should form an alliance against both the United States and the Soviet Union. French Ambassador Lucien Paye and his colleagues were unenthusiastic about the Chinese overture.

France’s poor relations with China have limited the advantages which it has derived from recognition. Undeniably, France has succeeded in acknowledging the


\textsuperscript{221} Ibid.
"reality" of China. Furthermore, it has demonstrated its independence from American "hegemony" and called attention to the analogous situation of the two nuclear dissidents. As a result, France has once again stressed the multipolarity of the international system and increased its appeal among the non-aligned nations. However, France has not managed to increase significantly its economic or cultural intercourse with Peking. Paris has also completely failed in its attempt to mollify Peking's hostility towards the West or bring the Chinese back into the "Society of Nations." In short, the symbolic and practical advantages which France has succeeded in obtaining from the establishment of relations with Peking have been only those which immediately resulted from the act of recognition itself. No important advantage has yet resulted from the development of Sino-French relations after recognition. In addition, France has had to cope with the negative consequences of recognition. Principally, this has meant that French foreign policy has had to respond to increased Chinese subversion in the Francophile African nations which have followed France's example.

Impact of Recognition on the Non-aligned Nations

The most striking instance of Chinese subversion following recognition by a French-speaking African nation occurred in the Congo (Brazzaville). On January 21, 1964,
the former French Congo announced its intention to establish diplomatic relations with China. 222 This move was probably prompted by the widespread knowledge that France was about to accord recognition to the Peking regime. 223 On February 24, Congo (Brazzaville) formally inaugurated diplomatic ties with China. 224 Within a year of recognition, pro-Chinese activity reached alarming proportions.

Edmond Taylor reported:

... the murder in Brazzaville last month of three moderate and pro-French officials—the president of the supreme court, the attorney general, and the director of information—by terrorists belonging to the youth organization of the National Revolutionary Movement, the Republic of the Congo's only political party. According to earlier reports in the French press, the youth groups of the movement, and for that matter both the party itself and the government, had been infiltrated by Chinese agents. The murders were an alarming revelation of the stranglehold that the Chinese appear to have acquired on the political life of the country... 225

The pro-French leaders of other African countries were greatly concerned about the increasing Chinese influence which was being directed against them. They repeatedly...


224 Mezerik (ed.), *China: Representation in the U. N.,* op. cit., p. 84.

warned the French about the Chinese Communist threat to their security and added that the threat was military as well as economic and political.\textsuperscript{226} The African leaders confided to de Gaulle that his Chinese policy and French troop withdrawals had hindered their ability to resist Chinese pressure. After their private entreaties failed to gain French support, a group of the Francophile African presidents decided in January, 1965, to speak publicly of the dangers which they faced from Chinese-directed subversion.\textsuperscript{227} Members of the group included: Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast, Diori Hamani of Niger, Maurice Yaméogo of Upper Volta, and Philibert Tsiranana of Malagasy. They were supported by Léopold Senghor of Senegal. The African leaders emphasized the example of Niger, where an unsuccessful coup d'état led to the disclosure that the rebels had been trained and armed by China. Moreover, captured documents revealed that the Niger coup was only part of a systematic Chinese plan to eliminate entirely the numerically small and vulnerable pro-Western elites from Africa. As President Houphouët-Boigny warned, the Chinese were training terrorists:

\textsuperscript{226}Ibid., p. 30.
\textsuperscript{227}Ibid.
... to assassinate those who are aware of the Chinese peril and replacing them with servile leaders who would open the gates of Africa to the Chinese. Those who are pushing the Chinese toward Africa, are pursuing a most unwise policy, for with the aid of our resources the Chinese will one day sweep away Europe like a mere straw.228

If Chinese subversion of pro-French African regimes continues, France may be forced to take stronger countermeasures than the discreet requests it has already presented to its former West African colonies to postpone consideration of Chinese recognition.229 These requests may eventually prove to be ineffective. Nevertheless, they can give France three immediate advantages. First, by delaying the establishment of Chinese embassies on the African continent, France can retard the pace of Chinese subversion. This subversion, if left unchecked, could sharply diminish the number of pro-French regimes in Africa. Second, French attempts to limit Chinese influence in Africa can only enhance French influence among the Francophile African leaders who plainly fear Chinese subversion. Third, France may be able to secure diplomatic leverage in its negotiations with China by retaining its influence with a number of French-speaking African nations whose

228Ibid.

pro-Peking recognitions France could elicit in return for
Chinese favors.

Despite French warnings, three African nations (in
addition to the former French Congo) decided to establish
ties with Peking. They were: The Central African Republic,
Dahaney, and Zambia. However, two of the African
nations—the Central African Republic and Dahaney—broke
off relations with Peking in early January 1966 because of
Chinese interference in their internal affairs. Clearly,
Chinese subversion of pro-French regimes remains
a threat to French political and economic interests on the
African continent. This threat is both direct and indirect.
Directly, nations, such as the Congo (Brazzaville), which
are subverted and orient their foreign policies more toward
Peking diminish correspondingly France's influence in
Africa. Indirectly, pro-Gaullist governments, such as
Malagasy, which fear Chinese subversion are alienated by
de Gaulle's overtures to Peking. In either instance,

230Kuebler, Relations with Red China, loc. cit.
Tunisia, a pro-French Arab nation, recognized China just
prior to the establishment of the Sino-French tie. Tunisia
probably recognized Peking as a result of France's known de-
cision to grant recognition to China. Note Zambia is not a
Francophile African nation.

231Seymour Topping, "Red China Sizzles as U. S.

the consequences of recognition have not been favorable for France.

Recognition has also proved to be less than completely successful in promoting France's rentrée en Asie. One of President de Gaulle's objectives in recognizing China was to pave the way for neutralization of Southeast Asia. A neutralized Southeast Asia would, by definition, exclude American but not necessarily French influence. This plan was greatly hindered, however, when Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk supported Peking's demand that American troops must leave South Vietnam before any conference on neutralization would be called. Sihanouk's opposition to de Gaulle's proposal was particularly damaging to French hopes since France had depended on the Prince to be the Asian advocate of Gaullist-inspired neutralism. French tiers monde ambitions of expelling American influence from Southeast Asia and supplanting it with their own have consequently received a sharp setback. Thus, recognition has failed so far to effect one of its most important Asian objectives.

While France has had to contend with the harmful consequences of recognition in Africa and Asia, it has not been troubled by the effect of its Chinese tie in the

Prior to 1964, all the Francophile, sub-Saharan African nations except Mali and Guinea followed France's policy by not voting against the Nationalist Chinese regime in the United Nations.\textsuperscript{234} If these twelve Francophile nations (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo \[\text{Brazzaville}\], Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta) reversed their votes, Peking would secure a majority in favor of its entry. Since 1960 the Nationalists had retained their United Nations membership by fluctuating margins:\textsuperscript{235}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Favor Nationalists</th>
<th>Against Nationalists</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12 (one absent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The twelve Francophile nations had been among those who favored the Nationalists' United Nations membership


\textsuperscript{235} Mezerik (ed.), \textit{China: Representation in the U. N. loc. cit.}, passim.
in 1963. Therefore, if they reversed their positions, the vote would be fifty-three to forty-five in favor of admitting Peking. If Communist China's membership was not deemed an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority, then Peking's admission to the United Nations would be a certainty. The potential effect of even a less substantial shift in the voting behavior of the Francophile African nations is evident.

The next vote on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations occurred on November 17, 1965. The result of the vote was a forty-seven to forty-seven tie with twenty abstentions. The net loss of support for Nationalist representation was ten votes; the net gain in support for Peking's cause was six votes. Since Taipei gained four votes (Gambia, Israel, Malawi, and Malta), its total loss came to fourteen votes. Of this loss, seven can be attributed to France and its African followers: three nations (France, the Congo Brazzaville, and the Central African Republic) reversed their votes to favor Peking; three others (Cameroon, Chad, and Mezerik (ed.), China: Representation in the U. N., op. cit., p. 98.
and Senegal) now chose to abstain; and one (Dahamey) did not vote. France and the French-speaking African nations plainly had a great impact on the 1965 voting. Seven-tenths of the net loss and one-half of the total loss in voting strength suffered by the Nationalists was due to the changes in voting behavior of France and the Francophile African nations. Half of Peking's net gain could also be attributable to France and its African followers. In the United Nations, it was not France but Nationalist China and its ally the United States which had to suffer the consequences of French recognition of China.

Impact of Recognition on the Western Alliance System

French recognition of China weakened both American leadership of the Western Alliance and the alliance system itself. Recognition was not the only development which tended to impair American authority over its allies. 239 However, the purpose, methods, and consequences of French recognition of China all contributed to reducing the amount of effective control which the United States was able to wield within its alliance system.

239See, for example, the effects on the Western Alliance of the nuclear strategy debate in Raymond Aron, The Great Debate (translated by Ernst Pawel; Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), p. 244.
First, American leadership of the Western alliances was damaged by French purposes in recognizing China. American officials would probably have opposed the establishment of a Sino-French tie even if France had made significant efforts to minimize its impact on American policy. However, the ostensible purposes of recognition—
to acknowledge China's existence, to develop economic and cultural relations, and to reduce interbloc hostilities sufficiently to settle such outstanding problems as the conflict in Southeast Asia—did not weaken American leadership as much as did France's less publicized motives.

Gaullist spokesmen and French officials emphasized that recognition was as much a symbolic gesture of independence from American domination as it was a diplomatic move intended to acknowledge reality. By asserting that their diplomatic activity was directed more toward achieving national independence than alliance interdependence, French officials made it clear that French cooperation within the Western alliance system depended on the extent to which the alliance system served specifically French goals. This outlook was directly contrary to the American view that the heterogeneous alliance could not

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serve the interests of any one ally. France, by stressing the independence and even third-force aspects of its Asian policy, indicated that recognition was not an isolated act of defiance against the Western alliance system. American leadership was undermined to the extent to which France's particularistic aims dictated that it oppose American alliance policy.

The methods employed by Gaullist diplomacy in establishing ties with China also tended to undermine the authority of the United States within the Western alliance system. France did not consult with American authorities in making its decision. The United States was informed of French intentions only shortly before recognition was to take place and long after "informed sources" considered the French move to be a virtual certainty. In addition, there is little evidence to suggest that Paris attempted to coordinate its recognition of China with American diplomatic activities. Indeed, the consequences of France's initiative would be felt in the fall session of the United Nations and would virtually coincide with the American

241 See above, Chap. IV, pp. 86-87.

elections. American leadership was weakened insofar as it demonstrably could not persuade France to ameliorate the impact of its decision on American or alliance interests. Even more damaging to American leadership was the fact that French authorities publicly stated that recognition of China should be considered to be a gesture of French diplomatic independence. In so doing, they insured that the establishment of Sino-French relations would be viewed by both alliance and non-alliance powers as a defiance of the United States. Since the United States was manifestly powerless to prevent France from carrying out its plans, American authority within the alliance system was revealed to be inadequate. While other alliance powers might deplore France's defiance of the United States, France nevertheless had established a precedent by successfully ignoring American protests with impunity. The implication was clear: If France could declare its independence from American hegemony, other

allies could do likewise. The further erosion of American authority became a distinct possibility.

The consequences arising from French recognition of China have also tended to weaken American leadership of the Western alliance system. In Asia, recognition seriously embarrassed the Japanese government whose non-recognition of China and adherence to its alliance with the United States had long been the object of attack by opposition political parties. Japanese leaders were hard pressed to prove that their non-recognition policy was not the result of American diplomatic pressure. Relations with the United States and American leadership suffered to the extent to which pro-American Japanese officials were forced to make defensive justifications for their relationship with the United States and worry about its domestic political cost.

The impact of France's recognition of China was particularly severe on SEATO. Even if France had chosen only to acknowledge China's existence diplomatically, the SEATO pact (established to contain Chinese influence) would have suffered disunity. However, in explaining


245 Ibid.
France's recognition of China, de Gaulle linked the establishment of the Sino-French tie with plans for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. Privately, French officials even conceded that Thailand, not a part of former French Indo-China, would have to be neutralized. The clear implication of French policies was not disagreement within SEATO but rather the abandonment of SEATO entirely. France, in effect, not only acknowledged China's existence but also its predominance in Southeast Asia. Consequently, SEATO and American leadership in Southeast Asia were seriously weakened.

Not all the consequences of recognition, however, tended to weaken American leadership of the Western alliance system. One countervailing tendency was the dissension recognition caused in Franco-German relations. Since their treaty of January, 1963, the two powers had agreed upon the necessity of consultation on political matters affecting Franco-German relations. Despite this treaty, there was no France-German consultation prior to French recognition of China. West Germany, like the United States, was informed

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of the decision after it had been made. When West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard visited de Gaulle on February 13-14, 1964, he complained that France had ignored the 1963 Treaty provisions calling for consultation between the two nations. The French replied that West Germany had not consulted with France prior to signing the 1963 Test-Ban Treaty or prior to accepting the American multilateral force. The breakdown of political cooperation between France and West Germany strengthened American leadership of the Western Alliance by reducing the probability that the United States would be faced with a West German-supported French diplomacy opposing American policies.

Finally, the Germans were suspicious of French statements that "realism" made recognition of China necessary. If realism dictated that France recognize China then the same argument could be cited to justify a French move to recognize East Germany. Furthermore, West German suspicions were aroused by de Gaulle's inclusion of East Germany in his New Year's Eve message and the stopover in


250 Le Monde (Paris), February 18, 1964, p. 5.
East Berlin of a French parliamentary mission. These suspicions may well have been fanned by hints made by American officials. French denial notwithstanding, West Germany refused to support France's rapprochement with China. Indeed, West Germany stated that its recognition of China would be conditional upon an American decision to do likewise. American leadership was strengthened inasmuch as West Germany supported the American position and was estranged from its continental ally.

Despite this countervailing tendency, American leadership of the Western alliance system was perceptibly weakened. The United States had to contend with the stronger pro-Peking sentiment in the United Nations, the increased possibility of Chinese subversion in Africa, the demoralization and weakening of SEATO, and the French disruption of NATO unity. France also had to confront


253 Le Figaro (Paris), February 14, 1964, p. 3.

254 Raymond Aron was one of the few French observers who noted that the United States bore the major responsibility for coping with the consequences of recognition. Raymond Aron, "Risques Calculables? /Calculable Risks?/," Le Figaro (Paris), January 25-26, 1964, pp. 1, 18.
some negative consequences of recognition—i.e., the increase in Chinese subversion in Francophile Africa, the decline of Franco-German cooperation, and the worsening of Franco-American relations. However, France willingly chose to endure these consequences to secure its tie with China. The United States had no choice but to accept the consequences of a decision which it opposed.

It has been contended that "the main purpose of cross-alliance relationships between secondary alliance members (i.e., between France and China) is to gain [diplomatic] leverage as against the alliance hegemon."255 Since "only the hegemonic power can satisfy the demands represented by these cross-alliance overtures between secondary powers," the conclusion is drawn that "the basic impulse [for these overtures] is from within the alliance, not from without."256

This argument seems to ignore the purpose, methods, and consequences of Gaullist diplomacy. First, the immediate purpose of de Gaulle's recognition of China and proposal for the neutralization of the formerly French areas of Southeast Asia was to increase France's influence in Asia. This rentrée en Asie was part of Gaullist plans


256 Ibid.
to augment French power and prestige among the non-aligned nations of the tiers monde. Greater French influence among the third world nations would improve France's diplomatic stature in Europe. France's global diplomacy could be used to support French claims of being a great power. Eventually, France aspired to be the leader of Europe.

France's motive in strengthening her diplomatic position in Europe was not to bolster the unity or strength of the NATO alliance. On the contrary, de Gaulle hoped to make France, and the Europe which it would lead, strong enough to be a third force capable of dealing on equal terms with both the United States and the Soviet Union. The primary motive, therefore, of French overtures to China was to weaken the bipolar international system of alliances by increasing French power and influence sufficiently to make it a third force in world affairs. Since the French felt that their vital interests were not directly threatened by China, they did not mind if recognition also increased Chinese influence in the third world. Indeed, any augmentation of Chinese power would be favorable to French interests as it would serve as a counterweight to Soviet power in Europe. Thus, France hoped to be the

dominant European power able to build a Europe free of American influence and stretching from "the Atlantic to the Urals."

To achieve the multipolar international system envisioned by France, Gaullist diplomacy must not only seek negotiatory leverage vis-à-vis its own alliance "hegemon," the United States, but also vis-à-vis the other alliance "hegemon," the Soviet Union. French aspirations are no longer limited to the objective of gaining greater influence within NATO. de Gaulle once proposed the establishment of a tripartite NATO directory consisting of Britain, France, and the United States and had this plan rejected. Since that time, he has sought to secure French primacy in a unified Europe equal in power and influence to that of the Soviet Union and the United States. Indeed, the French president hopes that "Europe" will ultimately include the European territories of the Soviet Union. These objectives plainly require the consent of the Soviet Union as well as that of the United States.


259 Gaullist ideas of European "unity" do not imply integration. Rather "unity" to French officials means an association of independent nations.
The need for Soviet consent to Gaullist European plans is particularly evident when the requirements of those plans are examined. First, any unification of Europe from "the Atlantic to the Urals" will certainly require Soviet agreement. Second, a withdrawal of Soviet and American military forces will also require Moscow's consent. Third, since one of the primary reasons for the confrontation of the two superpowers in Central Europe is the tension resulting from the division of Germany, the reduction of tensions necessary for a united Europe will require the reunification of Germany. A settlement of the German problem will certainly need Soviet assistance. Finally, any abatement of inter bloc hostilities will also necessitate Soviet cooperation. Clearly, the scope of Gaullist European plans dictates that French foreign policy do more than gain diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis its own alliance hegemon. French aspirations are such that it must also seek negotiatory power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The purpose of French recognition of China was to create a third force having influence with both superpowers rather than the more limited goal of gaining influence within one alliance. The basic impulse for French overtures to China was not from within but from outside the Western alliance system.
A second reason for asserting that the primary motive of French overtures to China was not the hope of securing greater influence within the Western alliance system is the methods which France used in recognizing China. In establishing relations with China, France did not consult with its major alliance partner. The United States was simply informed of the French decision. The decision to recognize China was made despite explicit American warnings that it would harm Franco-American relations. Even worse, French officials pointedly remarked that recognition was a gesture of independence from the United States and the alliance which it led. By so openly defying the United States, France could only jeopardize its already poor relations with its trans-Atlantic partner. It is difficult to believe that France would be so indifferent to the diplomatic methods it employed and the hostility which their use engendered if it still wished to acquire greater influence within the Atlantic Alliance. The more French tactics embittered American leaders, the less likely the United States would be to grant France any


261 See above, Chap. I, p. 25.
demands it might make for changes within the alliance. Indeed, since the United States was trying to contain Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, American leaders could and did conclude that French recognition of China was contrary to the best interests of the Western alliance systems.

Finally, the consequences of France's cross-alliance overtures to China indicate that Gaullist diplomacy was seeking more than an increase in French negotiatory power within the NATO alliance. As C. L. Sulzberger pointed out:

Despite temporary satisfaction in Paris and Peking because they theatrically recognize each other, they both ignore the folly of disrupting their own alliances. For, if neither Washington nor Moscow is bound to a bloc, it becomes easier for each to deal with the other, imposing terms on everyone.262

French officials already knew from the test-ban treaty of 1963 that the United States and the Soviet Union were quite capable of dismissing the objections of their secondary alliance members in dealing directly with each other. If France intended primarily to gain influence within NATO, then disrupting the alliance by recognizing China would seem to be a most ill-chosen means of achieving the objective. Assuming French officials were aware

of this probable consequence, it is doubtful that their main purpose in recognizing China was to gain diplomatic leverage within NATO vis-à-vis the United States.

In conclusion, insofar as France was able to successfully defy the United States, it diminished by that much American leadership of the Western alliances. By acting outside of and, indeed, against the Western alliance system, France weakened the strength and unity of those alliances. Finally, insofar as recognition aided France in creating and leading a third force group of nations, it accelerated the change of the international system from a bipolar to a multipolar world of power politics.

Impact of Recognition on the Communist Bloc

The impact of French recognition was far less pronounced on the communist bloc than it was on the Western alliance system. This was due principally because the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, was not publicly opposed to recognition of China. Thus, Soviet leaders could and did claim that French recognition was in the best interests of world peace and the Soviet Union.

There were, however, some aspects of recognition which could not be considered favorable to Soviet interests. China represented French recognition as being part of the doctrine of the intermediate zone. This doctrine had
three consequences which gave French recognition a greater impact on Soviet and bloc interests than it otherwise would have had.

First, the intermediate zone doctrine attempted to limit Soviet ability to negotiate with the United States. A member of the "socialist camp" could deal with the non-communist nations which were supposedly oppressed by the United States but not with the United States itself or its "lackeys." Thus, China sought to inhibit relations between the superpowers while considering its own relations with France—a secondary power and a member of the intermediate zone—to be in the interests of communism. Although China's doctrine does not seem to have significantly affected Soviet diplomatic behavior, it did succeed in giving recognition an anti-Soviet connotation.

Second, China sought, through the intermediate zone doctrine and French recognition, to increase its status and influence among the non-aligned nations. China's potential for political gain as a result of recognition was particularly great in Africa where weak Francophile regimes might be tempted to follow France's lead and accord recognition to Peking. Moscow could not consider any gain in Chinese influence among the non-aligned nations necessarily to be in the interests of the Soviet Union as China had often competed with the Soviets for influence in the third world.
Again, recognition does not seem to have been in the best interests of the Soviet Union.

Finally, China's intermediate zone doctrine gave recognition an anti-Soviet connotation in that the doctrine represented—both theoretically and practically—China's determination to pursue a completely independent diplomacy \textit{vis-à-vis} many Western nations with which it had previously had little contact. The anti-Soviet overtones were enhanced because the first intermediate zone nation with which Peking established contact after the promulgation of its doctrine was France. By securing ties with the major dissident nuclear aspirant within the Western alliance system, China emphasized the analogous situation which prevailed between Peking and Moscow. Thus, the establishment of a Sino-French tie tended to harm China's relations with the Soviet Union and thereby to weaken the unity of the Communist bloc.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

French recognition of China was far more than a simple acknowledgment of China's political existence. de Gaulle believed that the "two world colossi"—the United States and the Soviet Union—exercised a "double hegemony" over the conduct of international affairs since the Yalta agreements of 1945. This bipolar alignment of powers greatly limited France's room for diplomatic maneuver since all international actions were judged by the extent to which they contributed to or diminished the two alliance systems. This arrangement had most recently been symbolized by the nuclear test-ban treaty of 1963. The treaty, in effect, sacrificed the interests of the two dissident nuclear aspirants in each alliance—France and China—to the interests of the two superpowers.

Consequently, both France and China refused to sign the 1963 treaty. Instead, both denounced their major alliance partners and called for an end of the bipolar configuration in the international system. Each sought to increase its prestige among the non-committed nations and thereby to augment its influence with respect to its more
powerful allies. By these means, both hoped to secure greater diplomatic autonomy.

In extending diplomatic recognition to each other, France and China were demonstrating their diplomatic independence from their major alliance partners. To the extent that they were successful, they diminished by that much their respective alliances. Recognition also served both nations as a means to enhance their prestige among the non-aligned. French recognition reduced Peking’s diplomatic isolation from both the first and the second "intermediate zones." Chinese recognition of France increased France’s prestige with many neutral nations dissatisfied with America’s Asian policy. There is no evidence to suggest that this was collusion. However, neither nation objected to a limited increase in the other’s influence as neither felt that its vital interests were greatly endangered by the other. Both considered that recognition was more inimical to the interests of the two superpowers.

The primary motive, therefore, for French recognition of China was to weaken the bipolar system of international politics. It chose to accomplish this by creating, in effect, a third force with both France and China as its de facto leaders. These considerations, taken together with an evidently meager growth of Sino-French trade would seem
to lead to the additional conclusion that the much-publicized economic motive was not a significant cause of French recognition.

After the announcement of diplomatic relations, France has supported Communist China's entry into the United Nations and other international councils. However, France has also cautioned the Francophile nations of Africa to refrain from any precipitate rush to recognize China. There were three reasons for this action. First, France wished to prevent an accelerated Chinese subversion of these pro-French African regimes. This could only reduce French influence in Africa. Second, France hoped to retain the support of many African leaders who were hostile to the expansion of Chinese influence on the continent. An open disagreement between France and her former colonies on this issue would only split Francophile Africa. And third, France sought to forestall recognitions which might eventually be used as diplomatic leverage to secure future concessions from Peking.

There can be little doubt that China desired French recognition. This is demonstrated not only by the many advantages which China could obtain by the establishment of such ties but also by the concessions which China granted to secure recognition. While Peking never abandoned its opposition to the "two Chinas" formula, it did abandon its
insistence that ties with the Nationalist regime be severed as a *sine qua non* to the announcement of relations. It apparently consented to this diplomatic discretion on the tacit understanding that French relations with the Nationalists would be broken within three months after the proclamation of Sino-French recognition.

The Soviet Union publicly proclaimed its support of recognition. It asserted that the move furthered the goal of peaceful coexistence. However, there is substantial reason to believe that the private reaction of Soviet leaders was far less enthusiastic about the establishment of relations between France and China. They were skeptical about French motives for recognizing China and showed concern that France might extend substantial aid to its dissident alliance partner.

The United States opposed the French policy of recognition. While France believed that recognition would not endanger its vital interests, the United States considered the French initiative to be harmful to its efforts to contain China. It believed that recognition would encourage an already militant China and hinder the anti-Chinese resistance presented by America's Asian allies. It doubted that recognition would inspire a more pacific attitude in Peking or convince the Chinese leaders to support the neutralization of Southeast Asia.
However, once recognition of China became a certainty, the United States attempted to secure the maximum diplomatic advantage from the situation. It did this by urging Chiang Kai-shek to maintain his ties with France. Since de Gaulle had already made known his intention to recognize Peking, this move had the effect of either forcing Peking to accept the "two Chinas" formula or compelling Paris to capitulate to Chinese pressure and inducing a break with the Nationalists. France chose to force the Nationalists to sever relations with France.

French recognition of China had two very important consequences for the Western alliance system. First, by successfully defying the United States, France weakened American leadership of those alliances. Recognition of China was clearly a move opposed by the United States and yet it was powerless to prevent the occurrence. The United States could expect no automatic support from France simply because the two nations were allies. Indeed, French support of American policies seemed to be predicated on the extent to which they furthered specifically French objectives.

A second consequence of recognition was that the alliances themselves were weakened. There were two reasons for this. First, France made no attempt to coordinate its action with its allies. They were informed rather than consulted. Second, by emphasizing that recognition was an
act of diplomatic independence from the bipolar international system of alliances, France thereby weakened its own bloc. French recognition of China accelerated the change of the international system from a bipolar to a multipolar world of power politics.
APPENDIX

FROM RESEARCH REPORT OF THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW

Sino-French Trade, 1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Imports</th>
<th>NF's000</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pig bristles</td>
<td>6,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gut, inedible</td>
<td>5,172</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>1,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hempseed</td>
<td>1,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanning materials</td>
<td>1,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tung oil, etc.</td>
<td>1,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citronella oil</td>
<td>2,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other essential oils</td>
<td>4,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheepskins</td>
<td>1,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furs</td>
<td>4,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaiting materials</td>
<td>1,691</td>
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<tr>
<td>Raw silk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wool, hair, etc.</td>
<td>6,851</td>
</tr>
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<td>Table linen</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wooden hat shapes</td>
<td>1,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gems, etc.</td>
<td>3,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>13,201</td>
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French Imports (cont'd)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antimony</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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French Exports  

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<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urea</td>
<td>19,116</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammonium nitrate</td>
<td>2,379</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammonium sulphate</td>
<td>12,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammonitrates of below 23% nitrogen</td>
<td>17,385</td>
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<td>Dyestuffs</td>
<td>2,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayon yarn</td>
<td>1,038</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viscose fibres</td>
<td>4,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used gunny sacks</td>
<td>3,067</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iron and steel</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Machinery</td>
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<td>Watches</td>
<td>1,036</td>
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<td>Others</td>
<td>8,958</td>
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<td>288,207</td>
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French Imports from China  

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Animal hair</td>
<td>1,154</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pig bristles</td>
<td>6,495</td>
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### French Imports from China (cont'd)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Item</th>
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<th>1st Qtr. 1965</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gut, inedible</td>
<td>5,574</td>
<td>1,241</td>
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<tr>
<td>Green tea</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>429</td>
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<td>Black tea</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>256</td>
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<td>Oilseeds, etc.</td>
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<td>725</td>
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<td>Tanning materials (gall nuts)</td>
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<td>751</td>
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<tr>
<td>Molybdenum ore</td>
<td>2,432</td>
<td>3,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tungsten ore</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>1,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthracite</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tar residue</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citronella oil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other essential oils</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sheepskins</td>
<td>9,269</td>
<td>879</td>
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<tr>
<td>Furs</td>
<td>8,616</td>
<td>1,680</td>
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<td>Raw silk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wool, hair, etc.</td>
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<td>1,152</td>
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<tr>
<td>Misc. textile articles</td>
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<td>248</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wooden hat shapes</td>
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<td>200</td>
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<td>Hair for wigs</td>
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<td>544</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gems, etc.</td>
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<td>515</td>
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<td>Tin</td>
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<td>8,804</td>
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<td>Antimony</td>
<td>6,922</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>12,735</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>152,198</td>
<td>54,648</td>
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### French Exports to China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1st Qtr. 1965</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>94,611</td>
<td>3,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>38,890</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wheat flour</td>
<td>20,776</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urea</td>
<td>3,368</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dyestuffs, etc.</td>
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<td>1,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayon yarn</td>
<td>3,469</td>
<td>398</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viscose fibres</td>
<td>3,715</td>
<td>2,366</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iron and steel</td>
<td>31,889</td>
<td>4,806</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nickel</td>
<td>9,003</td>
<td>191</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aluminium</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,226</td>
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<td>Machinery</td>
<td>8,365</td>
<td>1,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor cars</td>
<td>1,138(169)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorries</td>
<td>711(5)</td>
<td>336(17)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Optical, measuring and medical instruments</td>
<td>4,099</td>
<td>2,260</td>
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<td>Others</td>
<td>21,166</td>
<td>13,241</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>244,868</td>
<td>34,049</td>
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</table>
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Ball, George W. "The Reallocation of World Responsibilities," Vital Speeches, XXX, No. 10 (March 1, 1964), 293-296.


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