AMERICAN MAJOR PARTY PLATFORMS
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

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ABSTRACT

Comparison of Republican and Democratic platforms of the period 1948-64 reveals that the two major parties approach political questions in a highly similar manner, but with variable differences of emphasis. Both parties are strongly committed to Federal action in almost all phases of domestic policy, although the Democrats have fewer reservations about such action, and Republicans show greater interest in questions of economy, inflation, and administration. On issues of foreign and defense policy, the parties are distinguishable largely on the degree of protective nationalism they exhibit, particularly on questions of foreign aid, foreign trade, negotiation with Communists, and relations with allies. The Republicans are more prone to appeals on behalf of free enterprise and local government, the Democrats to appeals on behalf of protecting individuals and their rights. Philosophically, Republicans tend to greater fear the concentration of Federal power; Democrats tend to see Government as a protection against concentrations of power elsewhere in society. However, almost all platform differences are differences of degree, determined by the amount of compromise of many elements,
including the forces represented in the convention, the perceptions of electorate interests, and the various self-images existing within each party.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The United States has a two-party system. This is, of course, a basic, simple truth about the American political system. However, it is a deceptively simple truth, one which may obscure some of the subtler facets of the system. In fact, there are more than two political parties in America, some of which have shown surprising durability and have campaigned for the Presidency over a period of several generations, such as the Socialist and Prohibition Parties. Other so-called "third" parties are relatively temporary phenomena and either die of lack of nourishment or are absorbed into one of the major parties. Others which have burst upon the political scene have been fragments of a major party which bolted for a single election; the "Bull Moose" Party of 1912 and the Progressive and States' Rights Parties of 1948 are the outstanding examples.

However, minor parties are not equal participants in American political contests. They have little, if any, opportunity to win ruling power. This opportunity remains only in the hands of the two major parties, currently the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. Thus the system
remains essentially two-party, and the minor parties are relegate to something akin the status of interest groups, normally having a relatively limited range of issue-concern in contrast to the broad all-encompassing scope of the major parties' interests.¹

The major parties must be broad-based of necessity. If their goal is to win power, they must win the support of enough of the electorate to do so. This, in turn, necessitates a broad approach to issues in order to appeal to the range of individual and group interests within the electorate; even if they do not necessarily win support by their coverage, neither party leaves much ground uncontested to the opposition.²

This breadth creates a dual dilemma for the parties. One horn of the dilemma is the fact that each party is bidding for the allegiance of many interests, some of which are highly conflicting. These interests are sometimes political, sometimes economic, sometimes geographic, but the result is the same in each case: the party must coalesce these interests into a winning combination. In fact, although the United States may not have a coalition party government in a parliamentary-cabinet sense, its major parties are themselves the products of interests in coalition.

¹ See V. O. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (1964), Chapter 10.
² Clinton Rossiter (1960), Chapter 1.
And, like all coalitions, the parties are subject to the inner stresses which are typical of the attempts to compromise differences for the sake of a larger goal.3

The internal divisions have led some observers to conclude that America has not a two-party system, but rather a four-party system, the assumption being that each party actually has two major internal groupings.4 This four-party concept has attained considerable recognition, and it is a useful distinction. There remain, of course, some differences as to the nature of the internal groups. Some favor a simple ideological distinction—the liberal and conservative wings of each party. Others favor a presidential-congressional dichotomy, while a geographical identification is more popular in other quarters. There are, naturally, similarities in all of these schemes; the GOP liberal wing also tends to be its presidential and Northern and Eastern segments, while the Democrats' conservatives tend to be Southern and the so-called "Congressional Establishment."

Occasionally, a wing of a party may be in greater opposition to another branch of its own party than to the other party. In recent decades of Democratic majorities in Congress, this has been seen in the prominent coalition of

3. See Key, Chapters 8, 9, and 11. See also Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (1956).

Republicans and Southern Democrats. However, during presidential elections, when the parties are mobilized in national strength, the wings of each party are usually folded, and differences, if not forgotten, are at least submerged temporarily as the party tries to project a united front against the opposition. This is not always the case, witness the experience of the Democrats in 1948, when part of the party bolted, and of the Republicans in 1964, when the party stayed together in name only. Nonetheless, in the greatest electoral contest, for the highest prize, the two parties are normally whole and united. For all practical purposes, the two parties remain only two in their efforts to win political power.

The other horn of the dilemma of the major parties' breadth of base is that each party is casting its appeals at largely the same targets. Expressed in terms of voters, each party competes for the votes of the large, moderate middle of the political ideological spectrum, where most voters live in a state of relative ideological insensitivity.5 Expressed in terms of groups and interests, the parties strive to cover almost all in the attempt to win the support of as many as possible. There is considerably more overlapping area than uncontested ground, a point which is

logical in terms of election arithmetic. However, the question is not whether there is overlap, but how much of it exists and where it exists.

Among students of politics and the general public alike, there is a curious ambivalence regarding the issue and policy orientation of the two major American political parties. On the one hand, the parties are regarded as being so similar that few, if any, meaningful differences can be found to distinguish them. The Tweedledum-Tweedledee comparison is commonplace.⁶

If this is indeed the case, and the view is widely held, it is remarkable how much activity exists on the assumption that there are real differences between the parties. Certainly the parties regard themselves as significantly different from each other. But this attitude is not confined to party activists and enthusiasts alone. The general public, while seeming to bewail the lack of clearly identifiable differences between the parties, nonetheless tends to identify with one of the parties and treat this identification as if it represented a meaningful distinction between the parties. These voters, whose origins of party identification seldom rest on ideological considerations, come to regard their party as standing for something

⁶. Rossiter, pp. 11-12, 33. Two of the major critics are Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (1951), and E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (1942).
different than the opposition, although there is great variation according to the strength of party identification and the level of sophistication of their own political views. In addition, students of politics have utilized policy and issue differences between the parties as bases of their own studies and research.

This latter view of party differences is supported by the quasi-philosophic concept that in a two-party system the parties compete by offering meaningful choices as to candidates and programs. Although this conception has come to be regarded as highly myth-laden by political scientists, it is a myth which has not been completely discredited either. Hence the dilemma: the two parties are different, but the same. It is to this dilemma that this study will address itself.

The Study

This thesis proposes to examine the dilemma by analyzing and comparing the platforms of the two major parties from 1948 through 1964. Platforms themselves are the object of much difference of opinion. Many observers regard them as merely pieces of propaganda, devoid of meaning, designed to offer something to everyone in order to obtain their electoral support. This project will not attempt to

determine the validity or reliability of platforms as indicators of future party action, although that subject would be a useful one for analysis. The present project will simply regard the platforms as statements of policy, issue, and philosophical orientation and preference.

Platforms will be discussed more fully in a later section. Suffice, at present, to note that the platform is an official party document. I will assume that it reliably reflects attitudes of that portion of the party which attends the convention, formulates the platforms, and nominates the presidential standard bearer and his running mate, those who generally identify most closely with the party. The platforms, then, must conform to a self-image of the party faithful as well as to the image they seek to project to the electorate during the course of the campaign. Therefore, the platforms should be a useful means of identifying and locating the party.

The thesis will focus on a number of concepts. The dominant and central theme will be the assumption that there are no significant differences between the two major parties. The analysis will try to probe more deeply than the conception that the parties agree on the broad goals of government but may differ with respect to specifics of policy, a conception so vague as to be almost devoid of meaning and one that is questionable under the best of circumstances.
If differences exist in the platforms, they will be identified with respect to the nature of the issues and the degree of difference.

Platform pronouncements were identified and categorized into one of five policy areas: communism, military and defense policy, domestic policy, foreign policy, and civil rights. These substantive pronouncements are taken to represent desired policy goals or directions, commitments by the party, and indicators of the parties' interest and values. Subject areas will be examined in order to see how the two parties have stood at a particular time and how their stances compare over a period of time. Each subject area is relatively distinctive, but by no means exclusive; where there is overlap, it is hoped that awkwardness will be as minimal as possible.

Two other concepts will be approached in this study. One is that platforms are so broad that they are simply over-generalized vehicles of high-sounding propaganda. This study will address itself to the qualities of generality and specificity in platform identification of issues and advocacy of policy. The other concept is that the major parties are non-ideological, a firmly held article of faith about our two-party system. It should, therefore, be fruitful to examine presumably vague, general, and propagandistic documents in order to see if there are indeed no ideological or philosophical overtones and patterns.
The platforms must, of course, be placed within an historical context. The time span selected, 1948 through 1964, encompasses a relatively distinct historical period, periods of presidential occupancy by both parties, and a reasonably long enough period to indicate tendencies and consistencies over time.

The Historical Setting

Platforms are, in a sense, the products of their times, and the personalities operative therein, as well as being products of party attitudes. In essence, the platforms cannot be separated from the historical circumstances which surround them. Hence, some attention to those circumstances is in order.

This overview is limited in some of its particulars by limitations on the amount of information available; scholarly and journalistic coverage of political conventions has been much more thorough in the past two elections than in any of the preceding ones. This overview will also restrict itself from including detail where particular issues were at stake; the struggles and conflicts over particular planks will be met in more detail in the analyses of the platforms.

The Election of 1948

In the election of 1948, the incumbent Democratic President, Harry S. Truman, faced Thomas E. Dewey in what
was generally conceded to be a lost cause for the President. There was considerable reason behind this attitude. In 1946, the Democrats had lost control of Congress for the first time in a decade and a half. Truman had been at odds with the GOP Congress and had been consistently frustrated by it for most of that term. His domestic program had gone no place in Congress; his attempts to block Congress had met with several spectacular failures, most notably when his veto of the Taft-Hartley Act was overridden. In the field of foreign affairs he had met with more success, but only through gaining Republican support in a skillful play of bipartisanship on both sides.  

Truman's problems were intensified by a rarity in 20th Century American politics, an attempt by the party in power to dump the incumbent. As W. H. Lawrence reported, an unlikely coalition of Northern liberals (including the Americans for Democratic Action), Northern big city bosses, and Southern conservatives formed to seek an alternative to Truman. They approached General Eisenhower and, later, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas in attempts to persuade them to accept a draft. Both declined, and the Democrats were left with Truman.

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Truman's troubles did not end here. In a convention which was not dominated by the president and his forces, the coalition which had sought to dump Truman itself broke up over a conflict over the platform's civil rights plank. The Northern liberals, headed by Minneapolis Mayor, Hubert Humphrey, and Representative Emmanuel Celler of New York, sought a strong civil rights plank, which was strongly opposed by the Southerners. The controversy was fought to a conclusion. The Northern liberals were successful in inserting their plank into the platform. "The complete platform, as amended, was accepted by voice vote, though the decision was by no means unanimous."11

The result of the conclusive platform fight was a deep party split, and the Southerners left the convention to form the States' Rights Party, the so-called "Dixiecrats." This third party, with the Progressive Party of Henry Wallace, was expected to hurt the Democrats so badly in the elections that few gave Truman a chance to win.

The Republicans also had their divisions in 1948, but none were particularly critical. The moderate wing of the party dominated, as it had in 1940 and 1944, producing the first ballot nomination of Thomas E. Dewey and the most internationalist (or non-isolationist) platform in GOP


history. A brief, concise platform, it "was further unusual in being almost entirely positive in tone—a presentation of a program rather than an attack on the opposition."\(^{12}\)

Full of confidence and unity, the GOP went on to lose the election.

The Election of 1952

The Republicans returned in 1952, again brimming with confidence. Truman's last term in office had been stormy, and there was a strong mood for change in the country. The GOP had two major aspirants for the presidential nomination: Senator Robert A. ("Mr. Republican") Taft of Ohio, the Republican congressional leader, and General of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower, who seems to have become convinced that he was a Republican during the years between 1948 and 1952.

Taft was also known as "Mr. Conservative", and his vigorous pre-convention and convention struggle with Eisenhower reflected the Old Guard-New Order division within the GOP ranks. If Eisenhower was the victor in the various seating contests and for the nomination itself, more of Taft was reflected in the platform, particularly in the domestic planks. The foreign affairs planks reflected the prominent influence of John Foster Dulles, who was serving, with the blessings of both Taft and Eisenhower, as foreign affairs

\(^{12}\) Bain (1960), p. 270.
advisor to platform committee chairman Senator Eugene Millikin of Colorado. Dulles, James Reston commented, was reacting against what he considered the too moderate foreign affairs statements of the platforms of 1944 and 1948. Although Dulles seems to have favored Eisenhower for the nomination, his platform contributions often leaned toward ideas more closely associated with Taft.

The convention's work resulted in Eisenhower's nomination. What differences existed with respect to the platform were compromised; there were no floor fights. The GOP closed ranks and went on to a resounding victory in the elections, capturing control of Congress in the process.

Among the Democrats, a free-wheeling contest for the presidential nomination existed between Vice President Alben Barkley, Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, Governor Averill Harriman of New York, Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, and Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, with Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois in the role of the reluctant dark-horse who won the nomination. The contest for the nomination, however, had little effect on the platform.

Platform committee chairman John McCormack had been given a White House draft platform, but he kept the other members of the drafting committee unaware of this, intending "that the 1952 platform reflect the thinking of the platform

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committees, rather than being a statement handed down from higher authority. The White House draft was revised and reworded, most of the deletions being uncomplimentary references to the GOP since McCormack desired a more constructive platform to contrast with the denunciatory GOP document. However, White House executive aides met with McCormack shortly after they arrived at the convention and tried to re-introduce the flavor of the White House draft. The resultant McCormack-White House version was used as the basic document for the deliberations of the drafting committee.

The platform concentrated on domestic issues, and the points of conflict were cleared up in the platform committee so as to avoid a floor fight and a repeat of the 1948 bolt. The foreign policy planks were prepared in continuing consultation with the White House, the State Department, and party leaders active in foreign affairs. However, the foreign policy area received little attention in the convention.

The Election of 1956

In 1956, the Republicans received considerable assistance from President Eisenhower in the writing of the platform, as is usually the case with an incumbent. There

was very little conflict within the convention; most ques-
tions seemed settled with the decision of Eisenhower to seek
re-election after his heart attack. There was some question
raised concerning the renomination of Vice President Nixon,
but it was a minor question and had no effect on either the
convention or the platform. Civil rights was a temporary
issue, but the rough areas were worked out to satisfaction,
and the platform was adopted smoothly. In fact, the process
was so well-controlled that the platform was released to the
press and the delegates before it was formally presented to
the convention.

Among the Democrats, the contest for the nomination
was fought out largely between Stevenson and Harriman, with
Stevenson the easy winner. This struggle for the nomination
was reflected in a number of platform contests, particularly
with regard to civil rights. There was a floor fight, or
rather a skirmish, on civil rights in 1956, but this time it
was not the Southerners who took exceptions to the submitted
platform; it was the liberal wing represented by Governor
Harriman. However, the more moderate, compromising approach
of Stevenson and the Stevenson supporters prevailed, and the
platform was adopted with a minimum of protest.
The Election of 1960

The Democrats had another strong contest for the presidential nomination, this time knowing that their nominee would not have to face Eisenhower in the election. By convention time, the contenders for the presidential nod were Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, and Stevenson. Although the two-time candidate was not actively seeking the nomination, he was available in case of a convention deadlock. It is difficult to determine the effect of the nomination struggle on the platform. Kennedy supporters were dominant in the convention itself as well as in the platform committee, and thus it is reasonable to assume that Kennedy had some influence on the platform; however, his interest in the platform was an indirect one. More significant, perhaps, was the Johnson candidacy, which restricted the freedom of movement of many Southerners, a point which will be dealt with more thoroughly later in the paper.

As Paul Tillett has pointed out, the Democrats did do some breaking away from tradition in 1960, particularly as to the chairman of the platform committee. The usual case is for congressional leaders to be given the position of chairing the platform committee—the Democrats had used

John McCormack in 1952 and 1956, the GOP had used Colorado Senator Eugene Millikin in 1952 and Connecticut Senator Prescott Bush in 1956. In 1960, however, the Democrats appointed Representative Chester Bowles of Connecticut as Chairman, a freshmen representative.

The work of drafting the 1960 platform under Bowles' chairmanship was actually begun several weeks before the convention opened by a 20-man committee. The sources of their work lay in several months of hearings and consultations in major cities across the country, with party leaders, interest groups and other organizations, and interested individuals. The roots of the platform can be found even further back in the published pamphlets of the Advisory Council of the Democratic National Committee, which had been established in 1956. The platform was largely set before the platform committee even began hearings. It was accepted by the convention with relatively little change, probably the most liberal platform the Democrats had yet produced.

The Republicans had a less easy time of things. Like the Democrats, the sources of their platform could be traced to the work of study groups long before the convention began. In the case of the GOP, the sources were the reports by the Gaither Committee, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Republican Committee on Program and Progress. This last-named committee was particularly important,
having published its report early in 1960. It was headed by the young president of Bell and Howell, Charles Percy.

The Republicans also broke tradition in the choice of their platform committee chairman, Charles Percy, who was not only not a congressional leader, but was in many respects a non-political figure. But there the similarity with Democratic behavior in 1960 ends. What should have been a routine job for Percy became a most difficult one.

The Republican platform, Tillett points out, was initially drafted by Malcolm Moos and Robert Merriam of Eisenhower's staff.16 Under normal circumstances, this draft should have been reviewed by the platform committee, with perhaps a few minor changes made, and then submitted to the convention and passed. However, the circumstances were distinctly abnormal, largely through the intervention of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller.

In late 1959 and early 1960, Rockefeller had considered testing the generally accepted assumption that Vice President Nixon would be the Republican nominee for 1960. However, when his inquiries indicated that he could not obtain enough support from party leaders and power centers to make good his bid, he withdrew himself and pledged his efforts to insuring a strong, progressive Republican

The difficulty that this raised for the party was that Rockefeller had been somewhat critical of the Eisenhower Administration, an unpleasant situation for most Republicans to accept, particularly in an election year. Nonetheless, Rockefeller felt constrained to action when he heard that the platform under consideration was milder than he wanted. He announced that he would contest such a platform on the convention floor if it became necessary.

Nixon did not want a floor fight, which, as Karl Lamb suggests, could only hurt his prestige as party leader. Consequently, Nixon contacted Rockefeller, then flew to New York to consult with Rockefeller into the early hours of the morning. This conference resulted in a fourteen-point agreement, which formed the basis of their recommendations to the platform committee. Chairman Percy was so advised, and the platform had to be revised.

Of this agreement, the New York Times reported that it was apparent that both Nixon and Rockefeller had made some compromises. Nixon moved away from his all-is-well attitude in the direction of the Rockefeller view that more had to be done by government to meet the urgent problems confronting America. Rockefeller moved away from specific demands that would have placed Nixon awkwardly vis a vis the

17. White (1961), Chapter 3.
White House. For example, the agreement left out specifics regarding the economic growth rate and needed additional defense spending.  

This agreement might have been a workable compromise as far as Nixon and Rockefeller were concerned, but it was greeted by considerable protest when word of it circulated at the Republican Convention and within the platform committee. In fact, the committee ignored most of the points of the Nixon-Rockefeller detente. The conservatives, in particular, were incensed at the apparent dictation by Rockefeller. Other committee members reacted against the idea that their work apparently made no difference, that they were to dispose of outside proposals merely as a matter of formality. Moreover, as Lamb has pointed out, the whole Resolutions Committee tended to be conservative in its general outlook. Lamb contrasts the lukewarm reception Rockefeller received early in the committee’s hearings with the more enthusiastic reception accorded to Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater. Goldwater, incidentally, was among those who protested most vigorously over the seeming dictation to the party from the Governor of New York.

Percy, then, was confronted by a party in near civil war. He attempted compromises between various factions and became, in effect, a middleman between the schools of

thought in conflict. However, the conflict could not be resolved until Nixon arrived on the scene to take charge. In a masterful display of politics by persuasion, Nixon took control of the convention. While a number of compromises were made, most of the points of the detente remained, or were inserted, into the platform.

The reworked platform was reapproved by the platform committee and sent to the floor of the convention. There, as reported by Russell Baker, the platform was adopted "with a thunder of ayes, a thin cry of 'no,' and a toot from a brass horn."  

The Election of 1964

In 1964, the Republican Old Guard triumphed in convention for the first time since 1936. The vehicle for this conquest was Senator Goldwater and three years of planning and effort by the party's conservatives. The convention was a complete and utter victory, at least for purposes of the convention.  

This dominance was reflected in the drafting and adoption of the platform. As Theodore H. White describes it, "The Platform Committee was his [Goldwater's]; there were to be no subcommittees, contrary to previous Republican


tradition, to divide in majority and minority reports that might focus argument. It had been well arranged beforehand—the Platform Committee would divide in "panels" to report to the Executive Committee, already dominated by the Goldwater men, and the Executive Committee would, alone, write the platform of the Party."22 The moderates were going to fight the losing cause, and the conflict was not long dormant.

The moderates made no headway in the larger committee, and Anthony Lewis reported their complaint that they were being steam-rollered by Goldwater forces within the committee, led by Senator John Tower of Texas and Representative John J. Rhodes of Arizona. The leader of the moderates in the committee, Senator Hugh Scott, Pennsylvania, indicated that the moderates would fight within the committee and, failing there, might carry the fight to the floor of the convention. On the possibility of compromises in order to avoid a floor fight, Lewis quoted Senator Tower as saying, "Our side has shown a singular disposition to be reasonable and write a consensus platform."23 The moderates did not see things in that light.

When the platform was reviewed by the platform committee, the Goldwater forces "easily beat down moderating amendments." The moderates set themselves for a floor fight. Actually, as Lewis reported, the differences between the moderates and conservatives boiled down to a relatively few issues: extremism, civil rights, and the control of nuclear weapons were the major friction points. The moderates also wanted stronger planks on education, immigration, and labor. There was no fight over the aggressive foreign policy section. What Lewis does not note is that these issues comprised an extraordinary number of points of dispute for a national convention.

The moderates within the platform committee—Senator Scott, New York state GOP leader Joseph Carlino, and Representatives Peter Frelinghuysen, New Jersey, and Abner Sidal, Connecticut—decided that their planks on civil rights and extremism had the best chance of winning broad delegate support in the convention. Governor William Scranton of Pennsylvania hoped that a fight could also be made on the nuclear issue, one on which he had high hopes of gaining Eisenhower's support. Thus these Republicans

25. Ibid.
selected the subjects for the forthcoming floor fight, joined by such other eminent moderates as Rockefeller, Javits, and Keating, all of New York, and Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey, and Henry Cabot Lodge.

If the moderates expected help from Eisenhower, they were to be disappointed. The former President refused to back the moderates' proposed changes, desiring to play the role of peacemaker and unifier. Richard Nixon also stood behind the platform as drafted. However, there was to be no peace until the moderates had been crushed in their attempts at amendment on the floor, and the platform was adopted by a voice vote. There would be no unity as Eisenhower desired it for the remainder of the election. This was a fight that the moderates could not, in all likelihood, have won, and most of the leaders realized it.

It had become clear early in the platform hearings that the Goldwater supporters numbered 70 to 80 of the 100 members of the Platform Committee, all tending to follow the lead of Senator Tower. The problem was one of communication; the moderates and the conservatives simply did not communicate with each other. What moderation there was in the 1964 platform reflected the work of the professionals who filled 11 of the 13 positions in the executive committee and who did the actual work of the larger committee—

members of the Senate and House who, though generally pro-Goldwater, did try to achieve some consensus within the committee. 29

The chairman of the Platform Committee was Representative Melvin Laird of Wisconsin, who had been selected for the position by National Chairman William Miller, a staunchly conservative congressman from New York and later Goldwater's hand-picked running-mate. Paul Tillett raises the question as to whether Laird actually represented Goldwater on the platform committee. Tillett concludes that this might have been the case, but notes that Laird had a restraining influence on the "rabid ideologues" on the committee and that the platform was adopted much as Laird had presented it to the committee. Tillett also notes that the moderates' efforts unwittingly helped Laird play consensus-maker by diverting the attention of the ideologues who would have gone further than did the platform. The platform was, Tillett concludes, "more moderate than the convention from which it emanated." 30 And, as James Reston wrote, this platform was, like all platforms, "a bundle of compromises." 31

30. ibid, p. 28.
Still, the platform reflected a great deal of the thinking of the Arizona Senator who swept to a first ballot nomination victory. Laird denied, however, that the platform had been tailored for Goldwater. Anthony Lewis quoted him as saying, "It is not a Goldwater platform. It is a Republican platform, and I am sure it will be overwhelmingly sustained by the delegates Tuesday. This document truly represents the mainstream of this convention." This last sentence was certainly true, and it tends to refute the first part of Laird's comment. For, as James Reston pointed out at the time, it was a Goldwater convention, and in that sense, the platform was a Goldwater platform.

The two conventions of 1964 were studies in contrasts. Where the GOP had been split by internal dissensions, the Democrats were models of harmony and unity. The platform and its proceedings reflected it, as well as reflecting the President's guidance. It was composed in Washington by Willard Wirtz, at Johnson's direction, and then was sent to the platform committee under the chairmanship of Representative Carl Albert. And, as Theodore H. White put it, "the labor of its members in Atlantic City were almost entirely editorial, adjusting minor points to

interventions made before it." White goes on to say: "All Lyndon Johnson's life and political art had been spent in trying to reconcile differences, to bind and hold them together and, out of them, to make law....Now, in the platform, they were to become the campaign program, the campaign theme." \(^{34}\)

There were no platform struggles, no minority reports, no floor fights or even a suggestion of one. It was, White feels, "one of Johnson's great triumphs..." \(^{35}\)

**Summary**

It is perhaps remarkable that platforms retain their consistency in such varied historical circumstances. Of the ten platforms, none was created in conditions or through processes which exactly matched those of any other platform. However, there is a general similarity of procedure which provides the basic framework of platform construction. Within that general procedure exists considerable variety.

Platforms are the products of Platform (or Resolutions) Committees. Their work, on the surface, appears rather cut and dried. The Committee is divided into a number of subcommittees or panels to consider various facets of the platform. The numbers and work of the subcommittees

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\(^{34}\) White (1965), p. 336.

\(^{35}\) ibid.
may or may not be well-defined and restricted. There is, moreover, considerable variation as to the finality of subcommittee planks.

The subcommittees hold hearings, consider proposals, and recommend planks to the larger Resolutions Committee, which in turn may also hold hearings; either formally or informally it will consider proposed planks, and ultimately present the platform to the Convention. The Convention in turn adopts the platform in the name of the Party. This is the process, at least on paper. Actually, there is both more and less to this process. There is more in the sense of outside influence on the Committee's work and in what goes on "behind the scenes"; there is less in terms of the Committee's autonomy in creating the document.

There is a tendency for most of the platform to be created outside of the Platform Committee, even beyond the use that is made of drafting committees (some of which are preliminary and some of which function only after the committees have done their work). This is nearly always the case for the party in power, although there is variation in the degree of influence an incumbent has or uses. Johnson, in 1964, and Eisenhower, in 1956, had virtually unchallengable influence. Truman, twice, had somewhat less impact, but nonetheless it was still considerable. On the other hand, the initiative was taken away from Eisenhower in 1960
by two men, the leading (in reality, only) candidate for the nomination and a major critic.

Even for the party out of power, outside formation or critical influence is becoming more prominent. In any event, either the incumbent or the leading contender (if he is solidly established) can have a pre-eminent influence on the formation of the platform. Furthermore, if the trend continues in which a single candidate will have emerged clearly dominant by the time of the Convention, a la Kennedy and Goldwater, this may have considerable impact on the construction of future platforms. The effect will be to further limit the autonomy of the delegates.

The delegates are further circumscribed by another growing practice, that of conducting studies, hearings, etc., months and years before the Convention and drawing strongly upon them in building the platform. These practices mean that the Platform Committee and its subcommittees would do little more than review and approve, and occasionally make changes, few of which would be of major importance.

The role of the chairman of the Platform Committee varies according to convention conditions and individual personality. Some chairmen are definitely partisan advocates of a particular candidate, and one suspects that this has an influence on the formation of the platform. Chester Bowles and Eugene Millikin were models of this approach.
Other chairmen, like John McCormack, might be power centers in their own right, using their influence primarily to effect compromises. On the other hand, a chairman modeled after Charles Percy serves something of a broker and middleman function; without power or particular interest of his own, he tries to effect compromise and settlement between conflicting power centers and interests. If the trend is truly toward less autonomy for the Platform Committee, the McCormack model may eventually disappear.
Platform Committees act in the name of the Convention. However, they are not particularly representative of the convention in several respects. One problem is that of representation; each state and territory is equally represented on the Committee (normally totaling 108 members, two per state and territory, though occasionally a state has but a single delegate placed on the Committee), whereas there is a weighted system of voting in the Convention itself. This has been a major reason why Conventions have overturned planks submitted by the Committees.\(^\text{36}\)

Another problem of representativeness is reflected in the members themselves. As Lamb has noted, the Platform Committee begins its work several days before the Convention opens. This means that the members must be able to have more available time than many of the other delegates. As such, Committee members tend to be either older or wealthier, or both, than the average delegate. They are also

\(^{\text{36}}\) David, Goldman, and Bain (1964), p. 268.
likely to be more conservative. Hence, the Committee is likely to be more conservative than is the Convention.\textsuperscript{37} The difference is, of course, seldom put to test; the floor fights, even when they occur, seldom test more than one issue and the rest of the platform is invariably accepted by the Convention as submitted to it, as representative as it may or may not be.

The Role, Purposes, and Functions of Platforms

There is considerable difference of opinion over what the platform is and what it does. Paul Tillett has found two nicely conflicting statements dealing with that subject. He quotes Woodrow Wilson as such: "The platform is meant to show that we know what the nation is thinking about, what it is most concerned about, what it wishes corrected, and what it desires to see attained that is new and constructive and intended for its long future." Another presidential candidate, somewhat less successful, saw platforms this way: "At best, platforms are a packet of misinformation and lies." Barry Goldwater did not elaborate to indicate what platforms were when not at their best.\textsuperscript{38}

The truth is probably that both Wilson and Goldwater have exaggerated the virtues and defects of platforms,

\textsuperscript{37} Karl Lamb in Tillett (1962), p. 60.

\textsuperscript{38} Paul Tillett in Cummings (1966), p. 25.
although there is also some truth in the idealism of Wilson and the cynicism of Goldwater. The point of the platform's usefulness and place in the American political environment needs some consideration, which does not here claim to be exhaustive by any means. However, a number of functions and roles can be identified, if briefly.

One function of the platform is to suggest desired ends and proposed actions for future government policy. Not only does the platform suggest, but it also represents a commitment of sorts. There is, however, a certain skepticism about the meaningfulness of this function in policy terms. David, Goldman, and Bain, for example, suggest that: "The platform function nonetheless remains ambiguous because it is mainly a pronouncement of the presidential wing of the party..." for use in presidential campaigns. The authors note that platforms are really presidential promises of congressional action which do not truly commit the party. 39

However, the authors neglect two other points which may bear on the question: the power of the Presidency on congressional action and the ties which might bind legislators to the party's stated program, whether those ties are emotional, electoral, or institutional. Of course, one cannot overlook the fact that they may ignore parts of the platforms which are convenient to ignore. The test must wait

for a thorough study on the degree of legislative following-
through of platform commitments.

Platforms may also have a role in affecting the issues of the campaign, although there is some disagreement on this point. A July, 1952, article in the New York Times suggested that this role is meaningful, that platforms "stake out the battlegrounds of the campaign." However, in 1956, Cabell Philips, writing in the same paper, said that platforms do not really strongly affect the course of the campaign or the major issues around which the campaign will be framed. "Such issues", he went on to say, "are made by other forces than platform framers and they are conditioned by the pace and circumstances of the campaign itself." He goes on to note the importance of the candidate's personality and outlook. Here again, each of the contrasting views has some merit, although the first one probably needs more qualification than that of Philips. Rather than staking out battlegrounds; they are more re-

 Platforms are also a means of gathering electoral support, particularly from groups which are to some degree

recognizable. Gerald Pomper has written:

In the effort to win elections, parties seek to draw support from a great variety of organized and unorganized interests, political factions and divisions of the electorate. The platform is one of the means of obtaining this support. Interest groups make great efforts to secure favorable planks from platform committees.42

Richard Taylor points out that groups are interested in essentially two things in the convention: a friendly candidate and favorable planks in the platform. He further suggests that they have three major means of obtaining these objectives: 1) delegate strength; 2) lobbying activities within the platform committee; 3) other forms of publicity, as through the press, through demonstrations, and the like.43

However, there is evidence that the groups' activities within the convention and particularly with the platform committee may be of relatively little impact. Much of the platform has already been created by the time the platform hearings begin. The representatives of groups may get some indication of where they stand with the platform committee by the reception that is accorded them, but they are not likely to have much impact on what goes into the platform. In fact, the reception may simply indicate what has already gone into the platform or what would have gone in


in any case. But this does not lessen the need for the groups to secure a favorable plank, nor for the party to win the group's support. The need is both mutual and enduring, but is probably met better, much better, outside of the preliminary activities of the platform committee.

Another important electoral function is one to which Polsby and Wildavsky refer as an "umbrella" function, an aid to unity.

The much maligned party platform is exceedingly important in this regard not so much for what it makes explicit but for the fact that it is written at all. The platform tests and communicates the ability of the major party factions to agree on something, even if on some crucial points, major differences have to be papered over.\(^44\)

The consequences to a party if the major differences are not "papered over" may be disastrous, as could easily have been the case with the Democrats in 1948 and was much the case with the Republicans in 1964. "Party platforms...need to be understood not as ends in themselves but as means to obtaining and holding public office."\(^45\) We do not have ideological parties which care "everything about their pet ideas and nothing about winning elections."\(^46\) There is no percentage in it for the party; it could not win, thus could

\(^{44}\) Polsby and Wildavsky (1964), pp. 61-62.

\(^{45}\) ibid, p. 174.

\(^{46}\) ibid, p. 175.
never put its ideas into effect. "Eventually, ideologues have to make the choice between pleasing themselves and pleasing others."\footnote{47} It is difficult for a party to survive if it does not find a workable compromise between what it thinks the public ought to want and what the public actually does want.

The platform, then, provides a number of functions and purposes. Pomper puts it well:

In conclusion, the platform is both a campaign document and a policy statement. The platform affects policy indirectly by appealing to certain groups for support in the election, by indicating those interests which will be most influential in the formulation of national governmental policy, and by showing who will control the national party organization in the immediate future. According to an old adage, a party platform is like that of a railroad car—"not to stand on, but to get in on." This is true, but the platform also reveals who will get in and on what type of vehicle they will ride.\footnote{48}

To this can be added two more useful, though not essential, functions. One of them is part of one of a political party's larger functions, that of providing information and criticism, to those active in politics and government and to the general public alike. The other function is that of problem perception and recognition. When a problem receives mention in the platform it has in a sense "arrived"; that is, it has received recognition of being a

\footnote{47. Polsby and Wildavsky (1964), P. 175.}
\footnote{48. Pomper, p. 81.}
problem worthy of public attention. This does not mean that all public and electoral issues, even major ones, receive attention in the platform; Eisenhower's health was certainly an important consideration in 1956, yet neither platform mentioned it. Nor does this generalization mean that all problems mentioned in the platform are candidates for governmental action, even if the party emerges victorious; some planks linger long after any reasonable consideration of action has passed and become obsolete. However, these are the exceptions to the recognition function, not the rule. The platforms, like the parties, must be responsive.

The Elements of the Platform

Like Caesar's Gaul, platforms are divided into three parts. These parts are not always separated by clear lines of structural division, nor are they mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, they are the relatively distinct elements which comprise the platform. The elements are: 1) statements of purpose and faith; 2) historical commentary; 3) substantive provisions.

The statements of purpose and faith are, as might be expected, high-sounding phrases, full of idealistic dedication and philosophical pronouncement for the future of the country. For practical analytical purposes, they say relatively little, and the subject matter is stock and
consistent. The parties declare their devotion to America, the people, the Constitution, the Founding Fathers, the blessings of liberty, and the proper role of government in the American political system. They recognize that ours is a world of challenge, threat, and dangers, as well as of great opportunities and hope. They assure that they will strive for the things the people want most—peace, prosperity, and freedom; not just the good life, but the better life. These statements are hallowed by appeals to the spirits of past party notables. They are concluded by at least one commitment of party and country to the Heavenly Father, though, fortunately, this does not seem to have open partisan implications.

In effect, the statements of purpose and faith are ritual, ceremony. In being such, they have both the strengths and weaknesses of ritual. As with ritual, they are virtually automatic and hence liable to lose meaning and perhaps become the object of some cynicism. However, ritual and ceremony also give strength; the automatic quality has a compounding effect. By analogy, the first stone of the Great Pyramid must have had great significance when it was laid; each succeeding stone became less significant in the drudgery and monotony of years of labor. But each stone, insignificant in itself, contributed to the strength of the final structure. So ceremony is a commitment, and each
repetition strengthens the object of the commitment while giving itself meaning in the process. This is the importance of platform statements of purpose and faith, and their relation to the larger electoral and political system. Usually they are found at both the beginning and the conclusion of the platform.

The second element of party platforms, historical commentary, is more varied in substance than are the statements of purpose and faith, but this element, too, has its patterns. The variety naturally stems from the differences in historical circumstance. The consistency is found in general platform construction and in the in-party and out-party pattern of approaching the subject.

Usually the bulk of the historical commentary is to be found after the opening statement of purpose and faith. Here, the platform comments on the preceding three and a half years, at least, often making even earlier references. This was true of both platforms of 1948 (although the GOP had almost no historical commentary at all) and of 1952, the Democratic platform of 1956, and the Republican platform of 1964. In 1964, the Democrats put almost all of their historical commentary at the end (the last three-fourths) of the platform. The rest of the historical commentary will be found under subject areas, with widely varying degrees of length and attention given. The GOP platform of 1956 and
the two platforms of 1960 had virtually all of the historical commentary fragmented within the various subject headings and policy areas of the platforms. However, almost all of the platforms studied did this to some degree.

How much of the platform is consumed by the historical commentary also varies. One extreme was the Democratic platform of 1964. It was the longest of all the platforms under study, covering about 22,000 words, of which approximately three-fourths was an "Accounting of Stewardship", a glowing relation of the accomplishments of the Kennedy-Johnson Administration. In 1964, the GOP indictment of Democratic failures covered over a third of the 9,000 word platform. By contrast, the 1948 Republican platform had the barest of commentary, and both platforms of 1960 had only brief and scattered historical commentary, although all three platforms have considerable comment by implication in the substantive sections.

There is, in historical commentary, an exceedingly logical pattern of in-party and out-party behavior. To put it most simply, the in-party applauds and pats itself on the back, while the out-party condemns and does its patting with a two-by-four, often with vigor. But this is only part of the reaction. The in-party tends to have a much more optimistic view of conditions in this country and the world. The out-party takes a more pessimistic attitude. Obviously,
each side is leading to a basic premise: the in-party that it can and will give more and better of the same, the out-party that it can and will do well what is being poorly done (if at all) now. Whether these premises actually make any difference in the nature of the substantive offerings in the planks will be discussed as part of the substantive comparisons of the platforms.

Another apparent tendency of historical commentary is a penchant for overstatement, not infrequently to the point of the absurd and ludicrous. If the party has been in power, anything that has happened in the world is liable to be tied to that party, either in praise by itself or in condemnation by the opposition. Furthermore, the language is often considerably stronger than is necessary or accurate.

For the party in power, achievements are often couched in the most glittering of contexts. For example, in mentioning Eisenhower's leadership in world affairs and how he impressed the Soviet Union at Geneva, the 1956 GOP platform stated:

That Summit Conference set new forces into motion. The Soviet rulers professed to renounce the use of violence, which Stalin had made basic in the Communist doctrine. Then followed a repudiation of Stalin, the growth of doctrinal disputes within the Communist Party, and a discrediting of Party authority and its evil power. Forces of liberalism
within the Soviet Bloc challenge the brutal and atheistic doctrines of Soviet Communism.\textsuperscript{49}

It is doubtful that Eisenhower was all that impressive.

A historical reference may have the dual purpose of lauding one's own party while simultaneously getting "proper" perspective regarding the opposition. In 1952, the Democratic platform recounted this salvation:

Democratic policies and programs rescued American agriculture from the economic consequences of blight, drought, flood and storm, from oppressive and indiscriminate foreclosures, and from the ruinous conditions brought about by the bungling incompetence and neglect of the preceding twelve years of Republican maladministration.\textsuperscript{50}

Political invective often reaches some of its finest moments in the historical commentary. In 1948, the Democrats had more to say about those twelve Republican years when they wrote: "Ours is the party which was entrusted with responsibility when twelve years of Republican neglect had blighted the hopes of mankind, had squandered the fruits of prosperity and had plunged us into the depths of depression and despair."\textsuperscript{51} In 1956, the Democrats were perhaps not as eloquent, but they more than made their point in this reference to Eisenhower's first term in office: "Our people have now learned that the party of Lincoln has been made captive to big businessmen with small minds. They have

\textsuperscript{49} Porter and Johnson (1956), p. 556.
\textsuperscript{50} ibid, p. 474.
\textsuperscript{51} ibid, p. 430.
found that they are now ruled by a Government which they did not elect, and to which they have not given their consent.\textsuperscript{52}

The Republicans are no less handy in using the language to excoriate the opposition. They were extraordinarily brief (for either party) about it in 1948: "We shall waste few words on the tragic lack of foresight and general inadequacy of those now in charge of the Executive Branch of the National Government; they have lost the confidence of citizens of all parties."\textsuperscript{53} They were much less reluctant to use words, or to mince them, in 1952, when they had this to say about the Democrats:

\begin{quote}
...by a long succession of vicious acts, \textsuperscript{52} the Democrats have\textsuperscript{52} so undermined the foundations of our Republic as to threaten its existence. We charge that they have arrogantly deprived our citizens of precious liberties by seizing powers never granted...that they work unceasingly to achieve their goal of national socialism...that they have shielded traitors to the Nation in high places, and that they have created enemies abroad where we should have friends...that they have violated our liberties by turning loose upon the country a swarm of arrogant bureaucrats and their agents who meddle intolerably in the lives and occupations of our citizens.\textsuperscript{54}
\end{quote}

Much of this kind of overstatement is discounted as simply campaign rhetoric. Nonetheless, even as campaign rhetoric, it not only presents overexaggeration, but also simple untruth, at least not infrequently. However the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} Porter and Johnson (1956), p. 523.
\item \textsuperscript{53} \textit{ibid}, p. 451.
\item \textsuperscript{54} \textit{ibid}, p. 497.
\end{itemize}
historical commentary may still be useful in that the party describes many of its areas of concern which relate directly to the substantive matter of the platform.

The substantive matter of the platform is the heart of the self-image of its program. It is the element in which the party identifies the areas for action and gives some indication of what that action will or ought to be. It is this element that is truly composed of the "planks" of the platform, although a great many of the planks might be more accurately termed "splinters", so brief and fleeting are their appearances. It is this element that provides the vast bulk of material for this study and, for that matter, give the platform its real relevance.

The historical commentary and the substantive provisions are often complementary. The former frequently draws attention to a particular topic or policy area that the latter covers further on. However, seldom is the historical commentary found without explicit related substantive provision found elsewhere, whereas the reverse is often the case. A great deal of comment is found in planks where no explicit historical reference is to be found; the planks infer conditions by the actions and states of being to which they pledge or otherwise commit themselves.

The substantive provisions are usually organized under subject and policy area headings of considerable
variability between parties and from election to election. This has created a problem of categorization for this paper; finding contradictions and inconsistent patterns of substantive organization in the platforms themselves, I have chosen an organizational framework of my own, one which follows no platform's particularly closely but adheres to most of them generally.

A further word about the organization of topics for analysis might be useful at this point. Much of my assigning of topics to particular headings was arbitrary, as must be done in the writing of platforms themselves. The reason behind this is that a number of items could be categorized under several policy areas; there is always some overlapping because public policy itself cannot be rigidly confined in terms of who and what is affected and how. For example, the Negro issue is tied up with civil rights, general education and welfare, housing, employment, labor relations, urban problems, and prosperity, among others. Eastern Europe is both a part of the European world and the Communist world. Communism has, of course, its international implications, its relevancy to defense, and its domestic aspects. At the same time, the domestic side of communism also has had implications for civil rights and governmental administration.

The examples could go on. The point is that no organizational scheme for platforms can exist without
confusion regarding the allocation of substantive items to general policy areas. It is hoped that, in the present paper, such confusion will be minimal.
The major political fact of life since World War II has been the emergence of the Cold War, essentially the conflict between the Communist world, led by the Soviet Union, and the Free or Western world, led by the United States. It is a problem which expresses itself in an extremely broad range of other issues and problems, and few political questions are completely isolated from it. In this chapter, the two major parties' approaches to this problem will be analyzed, at least where they have dealt with it directly in their platforms. Not every side of this issue will be dealt with here; a number of other issues also have links with this one. The whole area of defense, for example, is intimately tied to the problem of communism; other issues are not so closely bound; they will be taken up in turn, separately. For the time being, only the more direct facets of the problem will be covered.

Relations with the Communist World

Like the Cold War itself, realization of it came somewhat gradually to the United States. Its nature and implications were certainly not particularly apparent to
either political party in 1948, at least as expressed in the platforms of that year. Since that time, the parties have expressed a curious mixture of caution and belligerence, of hope and forthright antagonism toward the Communist world, although there has been considerably less caution and hope than the other.

In 1948, both parties were relatively brief in dealing with the question of foreign communism. The Democrats expressed loathing at more length than did the Republicans, and they condemned it more directly. The Republicans stood strongly in opposition to communism, but even without mentioning Russia specifically were less unequivocal about it; they advocated carrying a foreign policy of firmness, one which would on the one hand encourage cooperation and spurn appeasement on the other.

By 1952, the Korean War had been in progress for two years, and the attention that the parties gave to foreign communism tended to center around that war. Thus, both parties assailed communist aggression in practically undistinguishable terms. There were, however, distinctive approaches to the Korean War. The Democrats noted that in the War, the U. N. had hurled back communist aggression, and that there would be continued efforts to effect a "fair and effective" settlement. The Republicans, at somewhat greater length, sharply criticized Democratic handling of the war;
in fact, the GOP platform stated that it was a war that could have been avoided but for Democratic mismanagement and vacillation. And, while the Republicans praised the efforts of the fighting men in Korea, they hardly saw the experience of a "no-win" policy as an unmitigated victory for the non-Communist world.

This difference in attitude toward the Korean War, however, may reflect less of a difference in Republican and Democratic attitudes than a difference between in-party and out-party attitudes. The in-party tends to be more optimistic about the state of the Cold War than is the out-party. In 1956, the Republicans were self-congratulatory about the truce settlement in Korea (for which, incidentally, they claimed sole credit), although it must also be noted that the Democrats said little about that subject at all. The GOP platform announced: "The advance of Communism has been checked, and, at key points, thrown back. The once-monolithic structure of International Communism, denied the stimulant of successive conquests, has shown hesitancy both internally and abroad."55

In 1960, the Republican platform was less ebullient about the state of the Cold War, noting that Communism was growing in vigor and thrust. In 1964, the in-party, the Democrats, were a little more expressive, pointing out that

international communism had lost its unity and momentum, that it was doing badly in the world, and that the world was closer to peace, as a result, than it was in 1960.

However, neither party has gone very far with its optimism, even when in power. If there is one word which is the dominant theme in the parties' approach to communism, it is "firmness"; whether a party is in or out of power, it plays strongly upon this theme. In fact, where the in-party has spoken of its successes, it has attributed them to firmness in dealing with the communists. Both parties speak of a willingness to oppose communist aggression by any and all appropriate and necessary means. If there is any difference between the two parties on this point, it is simply that the Republicans tend to expound at more length.

On one point, there is a relatively clear difference between Republicans and Democrats. This is with respect to the question of accommodations with the Communists, particularly the Soviet Union. Except for 1948, the Democrats have had greater emphasis on this point. In 1952, neither party really broached the issue; the same is true of 1956. In 1960, the Democrats stated that they would favor negotiation with the communists anytime there would be prospects of progress toward peace without the sacrifice of principle. The Republicans, in 1960, said that they would negotiate in earnest with the Soviet Union for just settlements of world
tensions, but at the same time, they condemned communism in the strongest language of any of the platforms studied, noting that the greatest task of the United States was to nullify the Soviet conspiracy. In 1964, the Democrats praised such developments as the test ban treaty and the "hot line" as significant steps toward peace. The GOP platform of the same year condemned those actions, plus a number of others, as showing weakness toward communism. The platform stated that there should be no negotiations without insistence on free world advantages and without consulting our allies first. It further contended that the Democrats had established the hot line and sold farm goods to Russia without compensatory gains for the U.S. or the free world. Combined with other related charges (collaborating with Indonesian imperialism, standing by in the face of the Berlin Wall, the Panama riots, and the maltreatment of American citizens and property abroad), these assertions added up to one major one—that the United States had been engaging in appeasement of the Communists. The platform stated: "The road to peace is a road not of fawning amiability but of strength and respect." 56

Even allowing for the fact that the 1964 GOP platform was more aggressive than those of other years, it is not completely unique. There has been an emerging

difference between the two parties on the issue of accommoda-
dation with the Communists. This difference seems to re-
fect a larger difference, without clearly drawing the
lines. The larger question pertains to the best road to
peace—through strength in the face of a threat or through
efforts to reduce or eliminate that threat peacefully.
While neither party is completely committed to one at the
expense of the other, and while both parties have tended to
emphasize the former, the Democrats have been more receptive
to the latter, at least within the past decade.

The Captive Nations

One of the regular items in the platforms has been
the inclusion of a provision expressing American hopes for
the so-called captive nations, those nations which have be-
come communist. Generally, the approach has been in the
form of a commitment, even if only psychological, to the
eventual freedom of these countries. The tone of the com-
mittment and the nations involved has varied from election
to election in both parties.

The Democrats were the first to mention the subject
in a post-War platform when, in 1948, they stated their
sympathy for the subjugated countries, mentioning Poland as
the only example, and their hope that these countries would
be eventually able to develop as free, democratic countries.
In 1952, the Republicans took up the point and enlarged it.
They stated that they looked "happily" forward to the "genuine independence of those captive peoples." They further repudiated all secret agreements, such as Yalta, which "aid Communist enslavements." They then called for an end to the "negative, futile and immoral policy of 'containment' which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism, which in turn enables the rulers to forge the captives into a weapon for our destruction." 57

Implicit in this call appears to be the idea that not only must communism be contained, but, for the safety of the United States, the captive peoples must be liberated. However, defense may not have been the major consideration behind the inclusion of this plank in the platform. James Reston suggested that the strong appeal to aid the captive nations had a two-fold purpose: 1) to encourage difficulties for the U.S.S.R. within its own sphere, thus giving it second thoughts about enlarging that sphere; 2) to bid for the votes of the foreign-born in the cities as an attempt to break up the Roosevelt coalition. Reston also pointed out, incidently, that the repudiation of the Yalta agreement did not include those provisions whereby the Soviet Union agreed to give free democratic government to Eastern Europe. 58

Whatever the purpose behind the appeal, the pattern was established. The Democrats followed suit in their own 1952 platform by stating that they would not "abandon the once-free peoples of Central and Eastern Europe who suffer now under the Kremlin's tyranny in violation of the Soviet Union's most solemn pledges at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam." The Democrats then stated that they looked forward to the eventual freedom of the peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, as well as "the other nations in Asia under Soviet domination."

This, then, has become the pattern: to indicate concern for the captive peoples, to pledge our hopes for their eventual freedom from tyranny, and to cite the countries named above. There have been some variations in the general pattern. In 1956, the Republicans omitted Albania from the specific citations, but made up for it in 1964 when they included not only the six Eastern European and three Baltic nations already mentioned, but added East Germany, Yugoslavia, Armenia, the Ukraine, Cuba, mainland China, "and many others." But the pattern has been otherwise consistent for both parties.

Communist China

The two parties’ approaches to China as covered in this study span the entire Communist period and the immediate period prior to the victory of the Communists in the civil war. However, both pre- and post-Communist periods receive relatively scant attention in the platforms. In 1948, both the Republicans and the Democrats had brief references to China, stated in terms of continuing friendship and support for China, which meant, of course, the government of Chiang Kai-shek. By 1952, the government of Mao Tse-tung had come to power, and the Nationalists were lodged on Formosa. Our contact with the Chinese Communists was through the Korean War, but neither party made any distinction between the Chinese participation in the war and general communist aggression. As such, each party simply and briefly stated its intention to continue support for the Nationalist government.

In 1956, the approach for each party crystalized. It was, and is, characterized by an unequivocal statement of support for Nationalist, or Free, China and of opposition to recognizing Communist China or allowing it to take a seat in the United Nations, often, particularly in the GOP platforms, including a statement of reasoning, such as the need to protect the "spirit and letter" of the U.N. Charter (as stated by the GOP in 1956) or the danger which Red China poses to Asia (as in the 1960 GOP platform). The only
deviations from this pattern came in the Democratic platform of 1960 and the Republican platform of 1964. In 1960, the Democrats stated, in addition to the usual material, that they looked for softening signs from China. In 1964, the Republicans stated that the United States should not take sides in the Sino-Soviet split, a statement probably aimed more at the Soviet Union than at China, and one which gives the only explicit mention of the Sino-Soviet split in any of the platforms.

Thus, there has been little difference between the two parties regarding the attitude toward China, either one of them. The Democratic innovation of 1960 was perhaps a hint of things that may come in the future, but it was so weak as to hardly qualify as trend-setting at present.

Cuba

The Cuban problem is of relatively recent origin, and it would be difficult to identify a platform trend or tendency in only two elections. However, some elements are identifiable. The two parties are approximating the positions that they have held with respect to China and the captive nations. They oppose the regime and want it ousted. In 1960, both parties stated clearly that they opposed the establishment of a communist-dominated government in this hemisphere, with the Republicans citing the Monroe Doctrine and perhaps stating their opposition more strongly "in
refusing to tolerate" such a regime. In 1964, the contrast between the two parties was more apparent. The Democrats stated that they would work more actively with the OAS to further isolate Cuba and speed the end of Castroism. It was a relatively strong statement, but the Republicans' was even stronger as it stated that they would support, and urge other Latin American countries to do likewise, a Cuban government in exile, such support to be political, economic, and military, both outside Cuba and within. The Republicans would further urge all our allies to join in this effort. However, whether this degree of difference will continue is impossible to answer at this time.

The Domestic Issue

One facet of the Cold War which does indicate a relatively clear distinction between the two parties is the issue of domestic communism and related issues, including particularly "unAmerican" activities and extremism. It represents an important response to the Cold War, perhaps as important as the response to the international threat. In most of the platforms, it has received comparable attention.

In 1948, the problem of domestic communism was approached in a rather similar manner by both parties. The Republicans pledged at one point to root out communism wherever found; at another point, they pledged vigorous
enforcement of the existing anti-Communist legislation, plus the enactment of any necessary new legislation to expose Communists and defeat their objectives in America. The Democrats, after condemning communism and other totalitarian forms of government, both at home and abroad, pledged to defend against it by strengthening the country economically and socially. They pledged to vigorously enforce the laws against internal subversion, to expose and prosecute the "treasonable activities" of domestic "anti-democratic and un-American organizations." And then the Democrats noted that such activities must proceed while observing constitutional guarantees and protections. This last point has been the departure between the two parties as it has developed.

By 1952, the issue of internal subversion had become a volatile one, and this was reflected in the platforms of that year. Also reflected was the strong difference in emphasis which the two parties had acquired. The Republican platform dealt with the problem at some length. It promised to eliminate from the State Department and all Federal offices everyone who shared responsibility "for the needless predicaments and perils in which we find ourselves." It further promised to substitute a governmental organization which was loyal. Later in the platform, the Republicans

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elaborated. They stated that, due to the domestic and foreign appeasement policy of the Democrats, Communists and fellow travelers "serve in many key agencies and infiltrate our American life." The Democratic administration was charged with trying to deny disclosures of this and of frustrating investigations, "dealing lightly with security risks and persons of doubtful loyalty." This, asserted the GOP, had caused American lives, heavy expenditures, the Iron Curtain, the Russian atomic bomb, and "the present threats to world peace." Furthermore, public trust in the government had been shaken by "the Administration's tolerance of people of doubtful loyalty." The Republicans went on to state: "There are no Communists in the Republican Party." They have always fought to expose it and to eliminate it from American life, never compromising with it. They pledged that a Republican President would "appoint only persons of unquestioned loyalty", while overhauling the security programs, cooperating with Congress, and coordinating the intelligence services. Finally, they pledged "fair, but vigorous enforcement of laws to safeguard our country from subversion and disloyalty."61

The entire GOP emphasis was with security and rooting out Communists, except for the one word, "fair", in the

last sentence, which was the only indication that the Repub-
licans would qualify their methods. By contrast, the Demo-
crats were almost exclusively concerned with the methods of
subversives control. Their 1952 platform stated that they
"deplore and condemn smear attacks" on Federal employees.
The Democrats pledged to continue the fight against such
partisan efforts "to discredit the Federal service and
undermine American principles of justice and fair play."
They stated their case in terms of the effect of this on the
morale and prestige of government service. They said vir-
tually nothing about protecting internal security. 62

In 1956, the Republicans continued according to the
1952 pattern, if somewhat less vitriolically. They stated
that they would keep up the level of protection for the
government and for the people from all internal enemies
through the FBI and other intelligence services. At another
point the platform stated: "We have left no stone unturned
to remove from Government...those whose employment was not
clearly consistent with national security." The security
program must provide governmental employees of "unquestioned
loyalty and trustworthiness." 63 The reduction of the GOP's
militancy on this issue in 1956 is illustrated by the

63. ibid, p. 552.
platform provision that the GOP security and loyalty ends would be done realistically and in accordance with constitutional safeguards for the individual.

If the GOP position was mellowing somewhat by 1956, the Democrats hit full-stride into their point of emphasis in their platform of the same year. And their point was not made on the basis of morale or prestige. They pledged a "fair and non-political loyalty program, which will protect the nation against unjust and un-American treatment." Later, under a section entitled "Civil Rights", the Democrats elaborated. They condemned the Republicans for the violation of the rights of government employees "by a heartless and unjustified confusing of 'security' and 'loyalty' for the sole purpose of political gain...", unheeding of either individual suffering or the damage to national prestige. In the last sentence of the entire platform the Republicans were accused of misrepresenting facts and violating rights "in a wicked and unprincipled attempt to degrade and destroy the Democratic Party, and to make political capital for the Republican Party."^65

In 1960, the whole question of domestic communism was practically ignored, except for a Democratic provision

64. Porter and Johnson (1956), p. 536.
65. ibid, p. 542.
which called for improvement in Congressional investigating procedures, noting that freedom and civil liberties are vital to each other. In 1964, the issue of how to fight communism again was raised, with a contrast again between the two parties. The issue was termed "extremism", and was aimed primarily at the far right of American politics.

The Democrats included in their 1964 platform a condemnation of extremism, Right and Left, including the Communist Party, the Ku Klux Klan, and the John Birch Society. The Republicans had no such statement in their platform, but it was not for lack of effort by the moderate wing of the party. However, every effort to include such a proposal in the platform was futile, first within the platform committee, finally on the convention floor; it was one part of the over-all exercise in futility experienced by the moderates in the 1964 Convention. During the floor fight, the moderates proposed two planks condemning extremism. The first was presented by Senator Scott and mentioned the groups by name (in fact, the Democratic plank was almost identical to the Scott proposal). It was defeated by a voice vote, after Governor Rockefeller, in speaking for the plank, was soundly and raucously booed by the galleries. The second proposal was presented by Governor George Romney of Michigan. It was a milder plank, condemning extremism without mentioning names. It, too, was defeated by a voice vote.
The whole experience indicated that the moderates were certainly more in accord with Democratic thinking on this issue than with the most conservative branch of their own party. But the result was not wholly out of character for the GOP pattern from previous platforms.

**Summary**

There has been relatively little difference between the general orientation of the two parties to communism, at least as they have expressed it in their platforms. Nor has there been significant difference in their approaches to Red China or Cuba. However, there does seem to be an observable difference regarding the question of accommodations with the Soviet Union in order to ease the Cold War, with the Republicans tending toward the tougher position. The biggest difference between the two parties, and the difference is pronounced, has been in the realm of domestic communism and how to deal with it. Again, the GOP has taken the much harder position, although it is difficult to speak of this difference in terms of degree; the directions on the whole issue are completely different.
CHAPTER 4

DEFENSE AND RELATED ISSUES

National defense has consistently accounted for about half of all spending by the Federal government in the last two decades, the period covered by this study. Obviously, it is an important policy area, and the one to which this study now directs its attention, along with a number of related issues which belong here at least as properly as elsewhere. In addition to the question of military posture, this chapter will address the issues of disarmament, the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and this country's efforts in space, the last two of which are essentially products of military activities.

American Military and Defense Posture

To begin with a conclusion is usually not considered to be good form, but, on this particular subject, one conclusion can be drawn immediately because of its completely obvious qualities. Both parties believe one hundred percent in defense. In all of the platforms studied, for both parties, the only difference in basic, fundamental position was a meaningless variety in wording.
In each platform, the importance of strong military forces is emphasized, usually two or three times or more. Each platform phrases this need around a variety of themes: we must be able and willing to deter or defeat aggression; we must be able to defend our interests and our security; a strong military is necessary in order to promote peace in the world; our military posture must be modern, balanced, and diversified; our military strength must be clearly and unmistakably superior to that of any potential aggressor; and cost is no object. These premises are so basic that their statement in no more extended form than presented here is often considered sufficient in the platform. Nor are they challenged. In fact, it is rare that they are either elaborated or qualified.

In those instances of elaboration, it is usually with respect to the question of money. The normal position is that the country must spend what it must. This is the view of both parties. In 1956, the Democratic platform stated that American defense spending should be "based on national need, not permitting false economy to jeopardize our very survival." In 1952, the Democrats explicitly rejected the "defeatist view" that the country could not

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afford a defense force of the strength needed. The Republi-
cans, in 1960, stated that there was "no price ceiling to
American security."

The 1960 GOP defense plank was the product of a rare
occurrence in platform deliberations—a conflict over the
question of the party's position on defense. The conflict
in this instance was part of the larger disturbance caused
by the Nixon-Rockefeller detente. In this instance, the
platform committee's draft plank was considerably less
urgent than the Nixon-Rockefeller proposal, particularly in
not specifically mentioning the need for more and stronger
military strength in the decade of the Sixties. Rockefeller,
according to William M. Blair, considered offering a floor
fight in order to strengthen the plank. Such action be-
came unnecessary when Nixon was able to effect several
changes in wording which more closely approximated the
urgency of the Nixon-Rockefeller agreement. The new word-
ing, incidentally, received President Eisenhower's approval
before it was adopted.

Another unique element in the 1960 GOP controversy
was that it was the party in power which indicated dissatis-
faction with the defense situation. Normally, this is left
to the out-party. Thus while the two parties agree on the

necessity of a strong defense posture, they often disagree on the current state of that posture, depending upon who is in power at the time.

While the out-party often charges that the administration is wasting money in the defense program, it is more unusual for the in-party to suggest economy in defense. In fact, in only one of the five in-party platforms was it hinted. In 1964, the Democrats pledged to maintain their Cost Reduction program (a program that the GOP sharply criticized in 1964), although it should be mentioned that the GOP urged not being wasteful in their "no price ceiling" comment in 1960.

While the two parties have been in agreement on the major point of military stature, there have been some variations in some of the component elements of military power. However, in order to see the variations, it will be necessary to look at three major components more closely, noting the similarities as well as variations. These three elements are weaponry, manpower and personnel (including command and leadership), and civil defense.

Weaponry

As with the general posture toward military strength, there is great consistency in the parties' approach to weapons. This is, of course, to be expected given the general position.
From 1948 through 1956, there was near identical consistency in the parties' approach to weaponry. In 1948, each party was more implicit than specific in indicating the need for military weapons superiority and the nature of the weaponry. In 1952 and 1956, each party stated that our weaponry should be technologically advanced and that our arsenal should be flexible and balanced. And, in all four platforms, the parties stressed the need for further development of nuclear energy.

In 1952, there was some conflict within the GOP convention regarding wording emphasis. The conflict reflected the struggle between Eisenhower and Taft. Taft heavily favored an emphasis on strong air power. Eisenhower favored air power balanced with the other facets of military power. As James Reston pointed out, the result was a compromise between the two views; the Military Affairs subcommittee straddled the point, emphasizing both air power and balance. However, the originally drafted plank had favored the Taft position, and G.P. Trussell reported that the plank was not modified until Christian Herter, the top Eisenhower man on the Resolutions Committee, had threatened a floor fight. Considering the later emphasis on balance

and all forms of air power, the 1952 compromise helped to set the pattern. But also considering the tendency to emphasize practically all forms of military power, the 1952 conflict seems academic.

In 1960, both parties introduced some specifics into their provisions for military hardware, while still adhering to the past patterns. The Democrats called for a filling of the "missile gap", combining a criticism of Administration preparedness with a recognition of the importance of missilery. They also called for balanced, strong conventional forces, the first specific reference of that nature. The Republicans went even further, calling for versatile conventional armed forces, a hardened and diversified missile stance, a developed Polaris program, the development of a second strike capability, and the continued development of manned bombers.

In 1964, the Republicans combined a criticism of Administration preparedness with the call for further missile development, particularly an anti-missile defense, and added later that further military research was vital and that firepower, as it was developed, could gradually replace manpower overseas. The Democrats simply pledged more research, continued nuclear development, and further strengthening of conventional forces.
Thus, in weaponry, there is very little to be distinguished between the two parties. The GOP platform of 1960 was clearly the strongest statement, and the most elaborate. But it was hardly enough to be precedent setting, particularly in the light of the 1964 reversion to the earlier pattern of prosaic statement.

For the record, it might be worth noting that only two of the ten platforms specifically cast American intelligence activities as part of our military defense posture. Both platforms were Republican, in 1956 and 1960. It is a distinctive quality in a comparative sense, but hardly a developed one.

Manpower and Personnel.

Again, both parties have pledged enough manpower to meet the needs of the country. There are some variations on the theme over the years, however, and the variations are worth looking into.

The method of meeting manpower needs has occasionally been a platform subject. In 1948, while the Democrats made no specific statement, the Republican platform stated that the GOP favored "sustained effective action to procure sufficient manpower for the services, recognizing the American principle that every citizen has an obligation of"
They were, in effect endorsing universal military training. In 1952, the Democrats were once again silent on the question, but this time so were the Republicans as well, although there was another Taft-Eisenhower split on this point. Trussell reported that Eisenhower had favored such a provision and that Taft had opposed it. It stayed out, and Trussell wrote: "The platform draft, as now composed, was written in what was called 'a philosophy of defense that would make U.M.T. unnecessary.'" How that philosophy would accomplish that task was never made clear, but it seems reasonable to assume that the philosophic intention, at least as expressed, was a concession to Taft, while the realities of the situation at the time favored Eisenhower, and as a compromise to both of them, nothing pertaining to the subject was placed in the platform.

Nothing was said about universal military training in 1960. In 1964, the GOP pledged the eventual replacement of involuntary induction by a voluntary program with "real career incentives." The Democrats noted in that year that they favored keeping Selective Service as long as it was necessary, thus meeting the nation's manpower needs, while being careful, they added to make sure there was no social

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or economic injustice in the system. Thus, support for the system has been mentioned in two platforms since 1948, once by each party. Both parties have mentioned reform; the Democrats by implication. It will be interesting to see future platforms on this point.

If the question of manpower in quantity has received few platform references, explicitly, the point of manpower quality has been more frequently touched, although in a rather sporadic manner by both parties. This issue, if it can really be called an issue, is bound in the concept of professionalism, which has several facets that have made platform appearances.

In 1956, the Republicans made mention of the need for more incentives in order to continue the high quality of armed forces career personnel, adding that encouragement should be given to youths to go into the sciences in order to help the military technologically; whether this benefit was to be provided directly through a career in the military or indirectly through the military benefitting from the technological level of the society is not made clear, but it seems reasonable to assume that the proximity in the platform of the two points (incentives for military careers and encouragement of youth to enter sciences) is deliberate. The Democrats had, that same year, earlier pledged themselves to providing better living conditions and more "fringe
benefits" for armed forces personnel. They also pledged themselves to a "bold and imaginative" defense training program, including the sciences and technical skills. They more clearly stated the same two points that the GOP seemed to be driving at.

In 1960, neither party touched upon careerism in the military, nor did the Democrats in 1964 deal with improving conditions for military personnel. However, the Republicans did have something to say about it in 1964, and from there they moved on to other questions about military professionalism which did have references in earlier platforms. In 1964, the GOP charged that the Democrats had undermined the morale of the military, and they pledged to upgrade both the morale and the professionalism of the military and to protect the integrity of military career service, including adequate pay. However, the GOP was not primarily referring to the living conditions or incentives; the point referred to military leadership and its relationship to civilian leadership.

There have been a few references to military leadership in platforms prior to 1964. In 1952, the Republicans promised to strip the defense posture of "waste, lack of coordination, inertia, and conflict between the services." 72

The target for the implied charge was, of course, the Democratic Administration, but it was also an indictment of the status of the military leadership. In the same year, incidentally, the Democrats stated their full confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1956, the GOP declared that civilian control should be kept over the defense establishment at all times. In 1960, the same party indicated that the Defense Department needed streamlining. The Democrats, in 1960, pledged to re-examine the organization of the armed forces, looking toward a more functional organization. Perhaps Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara is a response to this pledge. If so, it is easier to understand the GOP's disquietude in 1964, when they took a position clearly in sympathy with the military professionals.

The 1964 GOP platform, besides addressing itself to military morale, also accused the Democrats of undermining the understanding between military and civilian leaders. It pledged to return the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the status of being the President's principal military advisors. They further stated that, while firm civilian control should be exercised over the military, there should be more allowance for professional dissent. The Republican statements, of course, do not try to draw the line of demarcation. But that is not the important point; the point is the direction
and emphasis of their attention, which seems clearly a sharp response to the Democrats' handling of the military professionals, particularly by McNamara.

Two conclusions could be drawn from the 1964 Republican stand. The first is that it was simply a response to McNamara and nothing else. The second is that the stand indicates greater GOP sympathy for the military than is normally shown by the Democrats. There might be some truth to both conclusions, but to assert them on the basis of the material in the platforms over the years would be ill-advised. The criticisms of the state of the military establishment have always come from the party out of power. However, in 1964, the GOP was the first out-party critic to cast itself in the role of clear-cut defender of the military. Hence one might conclude that there was a stronger identification with the military among the Republicans than among the Democrats. Unfortunately, at least for the conclusion, there has not been enough evidence over time to establish that conclusion from the platforms.

There was one other issue in 1964 that related to military-civilian relationships. This was the question of where the control of nuclear weapons should properly rest. The Democrats, in their platform, stated that such control should rest solely in the hands of the President. The Republican platform said nothing about the issue. However,
the platform silence did not make this a one-sided issue, for this was another point of conflict between the GOP moderates and the Goldwater forces in the convention. The conservatives had no intention, evidently, of including a nuclear control statement in the platform. The moderates tried in vain to get the statement inserted into the platform, both in committee and on the floor, where it was voted down by voice after having been presented by former Secretary of State Christian Herter. The suspicion is strong that this point, like the plank on extremism, was included by the Democrats in order to accentuate the difference between the Republican convention and platform and theirs.

Civil Defense

One of the regular provisions in platforms, at least since 1956, has been a reference to civil defense. It is also one of the briefest, least controversial (within the framework of platforms), and least distinctive (between the parties). In 1956, the Republicans called for all known steps to be taken to protect the civilian population, while the Democrats asserted that the existing civil defense legislation was obsolete and pledged themselves to provide more realistic protection. In 1960, the Republicans called for an intensified civil defense program, including food reserves. The Democrats commended civil defense groups, but
still indicated that civil defense programs needed review and analysis prefatory to improvement. In 1964, the Democrats, now the in-party, pledged to continue its civil defense efforts, while the GOP pledged to prepare a practical civil defense program. The conclusion to be drawn is obvious—the only difference in civil defense planks is based on in- or out-party status. Neither party has indicated a program, only allegiance to the need for one.

**Alliances and Collective Security**

Thus far, only the defense situation of the United States proper has been discussed. However, American defense also revolves around its alliances, its collective security systems, a fact which has been reflected in the platforms of the two major parties with more regularity than any other single facet of defense posture, with the possible exception of weaponry.

In 1948, the Republicans had no part of the platform which could be construed as a reference to mutual security. The Democrats implied it when they stated that among our defense efforts, America must and will help other nations resist communist aggression, a statement which implies some form of partnership in a military sense.

In 1952, both parties were more clear on the subject. The Democrats stated that the U.S. must seek strong allies,
rejecting the "ridiculous notions" that the U.S. could stand alone. They went on, with pride, to point out such landmarks as the Truman Doctrine, the Rio Treaty, Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, and several other arrangements and actions of the Truman Administration. Reporting in the New York Times, Anne O'Hare McCormack suggested that there might have been some significance in the fact that the Democrats referred to the North Atlantic Treaty, but did not mention NATO itself by name. She noted that this might have had something to do with the fact that General Eisenhower had been so prominently connected with the organization. That may indeed have been the case, but the effect was minimal; the Democratic statement on collective security was not visibly weakened by the oversight.

The Republicans also came out with a strong statement in support of American treaty commitments. Like the Democratic platform, that of the GOP did not mention NATO specifically, although in this case, an article in the New York Times suggests, the absence of NATO might have been due to the fact that Senator Taft had voted against it. At any rate, as James Reston pointed out, the emphasis on collective and regional security was more internationalist

and interventionist than had been previous American (and particularly, Republican) practice. In fact, he noted, this was typical of much of the entire foreign affairs section. Reston also observed that the platform rejected, without actually saying so, the "Fortress America" concept. This emphasis on collective security was evidently an Eisenhower demand.75 C.L. Sulzberger reported that the General had insisted to Dulles that specific reference to "retaliation" be removed from the final text of the platform because it was considered too close to the "Fortress America" idea, an idea associated with Hoover, Taft, and MacArthur and one which lay too far away from the collective security concept that Eisenhower embraced. The reference was removed.76 The Republicans also suggested that all parties of the alliances should contribute on a fair-share basis.

In 1956, the Democrats simply indicated their support of collective security arrangements, indicating further that they should be flexible enough to meet the varied needs of the members, a statement which could be subject to some broad and variable interpretation. The Republicans also indicated continued support, at a little greater length, mentioning that they favored bipartisan development of the

system and that they were satisfied with the strengthening of OAS.

In 1960, the Democrats reaffirmed support for the alliances, indicating that the role of American allies ought to be reviewed in that some of them had contributed little to the alliances. This was the only mention in any Democratic platform of having the allies assume a greater share of the burdens of the alliance network. In 1964, once again, there was a reaffirmation of American commitments, with specific reference to Berlin and South Vietnam.

In 1960 and 1964, the Republicans were as usual longer and stronger in their statements. On two separate occasions in 1960, the GOP pledged that the strength of the alliances would be upheld, military assistance to allies would be pressed forward with the necessary funds and vigor, and, in one statement, that all commitments to allies would be honored "at whatever cost or sacrifice." The GOP also called for free world nations to assume more of the burden for free world security, a call that was repeated in 1964. Additionally, in 1964, the Republicans charged the Democrats at some length for weakening the system of alliances by disregarding allies. The platform mentioned NATO, SEATO, and CENTO specifically; later in the platform, the GOP pledged itself to strengthen and revitalize those three alliances, plus that of the Western Hemisphere. The
platform criticized the Democrats for failing to develop a NATO nuclear policy and for negotiating with the Communists behind the backs of our allies, pledging that the GOP would consult with allies before directly negotiating with the Communists. They had no commitments regarding a NATO nuclear policy to make.

The indications in the platforms lead one to the conclusion that the Republicans, at least on this issue, have become somewhat more internationalist (as opposed to isolationist) than the Democrats since 1948. The turning point seems to have been in 1952. Since that time, the Republicans have put more space and vigor into their statements regarding alliances and collective security, indicating a greater concern for the issue. They have also been more engrossed with the idea of eliciting more financial participation in the alliances on the part of the other allies. There is no real conflict between the GOP and the Democrats (except in terms of some recent criticism of the in-party) on the issue of collective security, but there is a difference in degree of involvement.

Disarmament and Arms Control

In 1948, the Democratic platform advocated the international control of "weapons of mass destruction, including the atomic bomb," and gave support to UN efforts to adopt
American proposals in this direction. The Republicans also declared an interest in working toward arms limitations and controls, based on "reliable disciplines against bad faith." The GOP initially had included a pledge to help the U.N. toward international control of atomic energy. However, as W.H. Lawrence reported, it was eliminated in the full platform committee through the efforts of the "isolationist" group led by Senator C. Wayland Brooks of Illinois.  

The pattern was set; both parties indicated an interest in arms control, providing there was reliable protection. The pattern has remained consistent since 1948, with the variation usually in the degree of emphasis given in the platform.  

In 1952, the Republicans were somewhat briefer in the attention given to the subject, stating that they are "always seeking universal limitation and control of armaments on a dependable basis." The Democrats stated that they were prepared to "join in a workable system for foolproof inspection and limitation of all armaments, including atomic weapons." They also stated that they looked forward to the eventual rechanneling of arms spending into the

progress of America and the underdeveloped world. Later, in the same platform, they stated their intention to put forth vigorous efforts to effect "bona fide" international control and inspection of nuclear weapons.

In 1956, the GOP had disarmament and arms control entries in two different sections of the platform, the Democrats in only one, but the gist of the statements was much the same. The Republicans noted the necessity of effective inspection, supported the "open skies" proposals, and supported Eisenhower's proposal for an international fund for economic development created from savings effected from disarmament. In sum, the GOP would "strive for the acceptance of realistic proposals for disarmament and the humanitarian control of weapons of mass destruction."\(^{80}\)

The Democrats were not quite as specific in 1956, as they stated: "To eliminate the danger of atomic war, a universal, effective and enforced disarmament system must be the goal of responsible men and women everywhere."\(^{81}\) The Democrats noted that America must keep up its armed deterrent strength as long as there is no adequate, enforceable means of international control. But the problem is urgent; man is faced with possible total destruction.

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81. ibid, p. 525.
If the Democrats were urgent and vague in 1956, they were less vague in 1960. They called for the development of new and responsible arms control proposals to break the existing deadlock of mutual nuclear terror. They suggested a national peace agency to provide research, planning, and proposals. Such proposals should include the ending of testing (with safeguards), cutbacks in nuclear weapons, the reduction of conventional forces, and means of preventing surprise attacks and limiting the risks of an accidental war. The Democrats also stated that gradual world disarmament would free resources for fighting world poverty, while facilitating "long delayed" tax cuts. In 1964, the Democrats simply called for a movement forward from the Test Ban Treaty in order to halt contamination and the arms race.

The Republicans in 1960 were relatively brief, calling for maintenance of support for the open skies proposals, while seeking "realistic" methods of disarmament and the suspension of atmospheric nuclear testing, and other testing bans as permissible by verification techniques. In 1964, the GOP had more to say on the subject, almost entirely negative. Again, they supported the open skies proposals, but that was the only statement of unequivocal support for the notions of disarmament and arms control, and even that was suspect in that the context related it more closely to gathering intelligence on the Communists than to
arms control. They stated that they would implement the Test Ban Treaty, but would constantly review America's position under it, implying an extremely strong suspicion of the treaty (which they roundly condemned elsewhere in the platform). They would, as stated pointedly, continue other tests. They further stated that they would never unilaterally disarm; any arms reductions must be accompanied by inspection and protection against violations.

Between the Democratic plank on arms control in 1960 and that of the GOP in 1964, there is some distinction. But between the two parties' stands over the years there has been little to choose between them. Both have been somewhat insistent and urgent about the need for disarmament and arms control. Both have been particularly insistent on means of safeguarding steps made in that direction. This latter insistence indicates a great deal of suspicion, and neither party has a monopoly on it, although the GOP in 1964 manifested it most clearly in their attitude toward the Test Ban agreement and in the reference to unilateral disarmament. But, as a degree of suspicion, it was unique among the ten platforms.

Finally, neither party can claim to be more bipartisan than the other. There were two references to bipartisanship in respect to this subject, one by each party, each time the in-party, 1952 and 1960.
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

The first platform appearance of a provision for the peaceful uses of atomic energy was by the Democrats in 1948 when they simply stated favor for such development with the non-partisan administration of atomic power. In 1952, they virtually duplicated the provision. In 1956, they went into more length, charging the GOP with partisan administration of the AEC (rising out of the Dixon-Yates affair) and of losing U.S. leadership in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. They went on to pledge the restoration of non-partisan administration, expansion of the atomic energy program, the construction of a variety of prototype reactors, the effectuation of a true "Atoms for Peace" program, the stockpiling of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes here and abroad, and comprehensive surveying of radiation dangers for safety purposes.

It was the most extensive statement the Democrats ever made in a platform on this subject. In 1960, they advocated aid for atomic research and stated that they could pursue peaceful atomic uses with the use of freed resources from gradual disarmament. In 1964, the Democrats mentioned, among their scientific accomplishments, that they had made progress in this area.

The Republican never mentioned the subject in a platform until 1956, when their statement matched that of
the Democrats for length, interest, and number of programs. The platform called for vigorous atomic energy development for the sake of scientific knowledge, and for application to industry, agriculture, and medicine, as well as defense. The government and private enterprise, went on the platform, are working together to develop electric power from atomic energy, and the AEC is encouraging vast rural electrification. The platform called for a relaxing of the governmental monopoly on atomic energy and the use of more private funds. It elsewhere suggested that the U.S., for demonstration purposes, must proceed with the prompt construction of the Atomic Powered Peace Ship. Finally, the United States would "generously assist" the International Atomic Energy Agency in developing peaceful uses of atomic energy.

As with the Democrats, their 1956 statement was their most elaborate and extensive. In 1960, they called for the expansion of the Atoms for Peace program and the maintainence of bipartisanship in the program. In 1964, they simply called for more private development of atomic energy.

There is little difference in the two parties' approach to the subject; the Democrats dealt with it considerably sooner than did the GOP. The GOP is interested in more participation by private enterprise. These are the only meaningful differences. The parties' interest and involvement peaked at the same time and has waned at about
the same pace. One final point should be made. In the two 1956 platforms, the parties did present a variety of different proposals; there was, however, no pattern of reasoning to explain the different proposals. It was, nonetheless, unusual for both parties to come forth on the same subject with such a variety of positive proposals. But, since it was a one-year phenomenon, no real conclusions can be drawn.

**Outer Space**

The question of the use of outer space has been of concern in only the last two elections, 1960 and 1964. Hence, the time span is more limited than for other questions, and conclusions must be dubious.

In 1960, the Democrats charged that there was a "space gap" (to go along with the missile gap and the limited war gap), presumably suggesting that the U. S. should be getting into outer space more quickly. They did not actually state a position on the exploration of space, but they did pledge aid for research. The only other reference to outer space was a suggestion that disarmament proposals should include means of employing outer space for only peaceful uses. In 1964, the Democrats were a little more lengthy, noting that the U. S. was in front of the space race and would stay there, that Democrats would encourage private industry's efforts and the peaceful uses of outer
space. Then the Democrats insistently declared that the space race must be won "for freedom and for Peace."

In 1960, the Republicans made similar provisions. They called for research assistance and for bipartisan support for the development of the peaceful uses of outer space and suggested that the U.N. develop a body of law applicable to the peaceful use of outer space. In 1964, the GOP had a somewhat different approach to outer space. They criticized the Democrats for a lack of space preparedness, a statement with primarily military significance. Elsewhere, they pledged to replan the space program in an orderly, yet aggressive manner, without overdiverting needed personnel from fields such as science, industry, education, and health. And still elsewhere, they stated that a crash moon program was less important if it meant ignoring critical social needs such as medical research, crowding, and pollution. It was a definitely temporizing approach.

Summary

There has been little difference between the two parties in their approaches to defense and the related issues since 1948. Both are strongly cognizant of the need for a strong defense position, in terms of weaponry and manpower. Both are committed to civil defense and equally vague about any details. The Republicans have a noticeably
greater involvement in American alliances and in the allies contributing more to the systems. The Democrats have a slightly heavier involvement in disarmament, but both parties are equally insistent that there be adequate protections. And, finally, there has been little in the way of consistently differing approaches by the parties to either the peaceful uses of atomic energy or to the use of outer space.
CHAPTER 5

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Thus far, this study has dealt with two policy areas which have both domestic and foreign implications and aspects. Therefore, some of the material that might be included in this chapter has already been expended. This chapter will be concerned with various facets of foreign affairs, some of which also have domestic implications, but none of which is major enough to require separate handling in a chapter by itself. The focus of attention will be first concerned with the matter of foreign aid (and some general attitudes toward the underdeveloped world), to be followed by international trade, a geographic survey of the world's major regions, and the United Nations, in that order. A few miscellaneous items which practically defy classification will conclude the chapter.

Foreign Aid

Foreign aid has been a subject of each platform since 1948. Each party feels a commitment toward it. However, neither party has been completely at ease with it, whether in power or out. Each party has had its reservations
about foreign aid, although as will become clear, the Republicans do considerably more qualifying of the program than do the Democrats.

When the Democrats mentioned foreign aid in their 1948 platform, it was primarily in terms of support and funds for the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, with a further declaration of opposition to colonialism. By 1952, the concern was almost exclusively absorbed in the underdeveloped world. The platform declared its support of the drives of smaller nations to achieve independence, indicated willingness to see U.S. and U.N. money and skills help the underdeveloped world develop and improve their environment, and asserted that such programs should ever be strengthened and invigorated. It also indicated that disarmament could rechannel arms spending into the underdeveloped countries. In 1956, the platform again stated its opposition to colonialism and its support of helping these nations mobilize their resources and raise their standards of living. It also asserted the party's belief in multilateral aid where possible. Then the party began qualifying its support for the programs, stating that there was need for "a realistic reappraisal of the American foreign aid program, particularly as to its extent and the conditions under which it should be continued." 82 In 1960, the

Democrats qualified this even more, indicating that priorities should be established and that aid should be given where nations want to use it effectively. They further called for an end to the overwhelming concern with military aid, but only as defense requirements were met. Finally, in a less restrictive tone, they pledged to think about the idea of provisioning "food banks" with some of America's surpluses. In 1964, they had no qualifications, calling for continued help to the underdeveloped nations to raise their standards of living, noting particularly the Peace Corps and the Food for Peace operations.

If the Democrats had reservations in 1956 and 1960, they only began to approach the Republican position, which has mentioned qualifications on foreign aid since 1948. In that year, the platform pledged "self-help and mutual aid" to foreign countries with the following reservations:

1) it must be within the "prudent limits of our own economic security"; 2) it must be given only to "other peace-loving nations"; and 3) there must be "businesslike and efficient administration of all foreign aid." The final plank on foreign aid was a little more restricted than the original draft. W.H. Lawrence reported that the "Isolationist" group in the platform committee had attacked the original draft's "blank check" underwriting of foreign aid. At their

insistence, a promise was removed from the draft which stated that "we will implement with appropriations any commitment made by legislative enactment." The points that remained became somewhat standard in the GOP approach to foreign aid.

In 1952, the platform asserted that foreign economic commitments would not be allowed to endanger the sound economic health of the United States, that smaller sums, well spent, would do much more good than "vastly larger sums incompetently spent for vague and endless purposes." The statement continued: "We shall not try to buy good will." In 1956, the platform twice indicated support for the cause of national independence, then on three occasions stated support for aid to friendly nations and allies. The aid was for a variety of purposes—to raise standards of living (as was usually noted by the Democrats), to give protection to these nations from aggression or subversion (particularly of the communist variety), and to help them achieve political and social stability (a point also mentioned by the Democrats in 1960). The GOP again noted that such aid would be given "within the prudent limit of our resources."


The 1960 Republican platform was an interesting blend of willing support for foreign aid and the usual qualifications. They declared their sympathy with the aspirations of the underdeveloped world, pledging continuance of programs to assist them (qualifying it with the word "friendly"). The platform then cited a variety of programs, both strictly American and international. The platform also indicated that American aid (largely through loans and private capital, de-emphasizing grants) would be forthcoming to encourage regional economic groupings. The platform elsewhere called for continued military assistance to allies and for more use of private capital, government loans, and technical assistance rather than outright grants.

In 1964, GOP reservations culminated in the call for a "drastic reorganization and redirection of the entire foreign aid effort." They criticized foreign aid for subsidizing socialism in the world, thus forsaking American interests abroad. The platform called for foreign aid that went only to friends and to non-socialists, while also encouraging the use of private American capital abroad in partnership with foreign nationals.

Thus, the Democrats are more open in their advocacy of foreign aid, with some reservations that it may not be doing the job it is supposed to or that it is being wasted.

on the wrong recipients or that there is too much military aid at the expense of other forms. All but the last named reservation also bother the Republicans, but so does a good deal more, including the use of private capital, the extent of its impact on the national economy, the allocation to nations of questionable allegiance to the United States, and the "giveaway" nature of foreign aid. The difference within the general commitment to helping countries with aid is pronounced.

Foreign Trade

As with foreign aid, both parties seem well committed to its desirability. The question which differentiates their approaches is once again the degree of reservation in their support of foreign trade. It is a difference of emphasis as to who gains, how much, and at what risks in foreign trade.

The Democrats have been more favorably disposed toward international trade, with fewer reservations. In 1948, the platform dealt with the subject briefly, but gave strong support to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program and a strong endorsement to the International Trade Organization. In 1952, they reasserted their stand to expand trade among free nations, and, in two separate portions of the platform, emphasized the benefits of finding new markets.
abroad, greater supplies of raw materials for importing, and of giving more economic independence to other nations since they would need less aid if they were able to trade more. In 1956, their support was less strong and, as William S. White noted, the plank was somewhat counter to the usual Democratic emphasis on free trade. The degree, however, was slight. They repeated earlier pledges toward trade expansion and added an additional pledge, that of working toward the correction of inequities in agriculture, industry, and labor. The latter pledge was an element of protection for the domestic economy, not usually found in Democratic platforms. In 1960, the Democrats issued their strongest statement in favor of trade expansion. They called for expansion in "every possible way", the reduction of foreign trade barriers, efforts to establish stable world market prices for agricultural products and raw materials, more trade with the EEC and the EFTA, and provision for assistance to be given to domestic industries and communities "unavoidably hurt" by import increases. And there would be import increases; as the platform put it: "To sell, we must buy." In 1964, the platform simply pledged to continue efforts under the Trade Expansion Act.

The Republicans stated the crux of their position in a short statement in 1948 and have held the position ever

since. In that year's platform, the GOP stated that it would encourage international, reciprocal trade, with a constant eye on domestic needs and the protection of domestic economic interests. The plank, reported W.H. Lawrence, was watered down somewhat at the behest of Senator Millikin, who was not considered an isolationist, but was a Taft man. 88 Arthur Krock reported that Senator Lodge had placed a strongly favorable plank into the platform draft in order to have something to concede to the isolationists in return for general support on the rest of the platform. 89 It was not the last time that the GOP was caught between advocacy and reservation regarding foreign trade.

In 1952, the plank stated support for expanding "mutually-advantageous world trade", noting particularly that such trade must be truly reciprocal, eliminating discrimination practiced against American exports and thus safeguarding domestic enterprises and labor payrolls against unfair foreign competition. This was a typically Republican position. The straddling was done with reference to tariffs. James Reston noted that the plank accepted the Eisenhower demand that channels of world trade be kept open for purposes of obtaining strategic raw materials. The plank did not

deal with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, an act due to expire in the summer of 1953 and which the Republicans had generally opposed in its inception. 90

In 1956, the approach was again consistent, emphasizing safeguards in the gradual and selective reduction of trade barriers. In 1960, the approach was duplicated, with more insistence on export expansion, the use of the government to help open foreign markets, the encouragement of tourism from abroad, the protection of American investments abroad, and the encouragement of fair labor standards abroad. The platform also stated support of economic and political regional unions abroad, support which may be interpreted as either moral or an indication of willingness to expand trade as well as aid with them. It was not repeated in 1964, but almost everything else was, and more. The Republicans accused the Democrats of negotiating away American interests in world trade and of placing too many controls on exporters. Then, while repeating all of the provisions which had appeared in earlier platforms to encourage American exports and protect against imports, they additionally called for a requirement that imports be labeled to disclose their foreign origin and for more emphasis on sales of farm surpluses to friendly countries through long-term credits repayable in dollars. In addition, they gave high priority to the

balance of payments problem and stated interest in strengthening the international monetary system without sacrificing American policy-making freedom.

The contrast between the Republican and Democratic positions vis-à-vis foreign trade is obvious. The Republican emphasis is on protecting domestic enterprise and expanding American business interests abroad. They fear foreign competition considerably more than do the Democrats, whose approach is that more trade will benefit more in the long run. The Democratic orientation is that trade expansion will benefit everyone, here and abroad; the Republicans are more interested that it benefits business in America and that benefits felt abroad are not felt at American expense. The fear of advantages being given away has been apparent in every GOP platform since 1948; in some years, such as 1964, they state this concern more at length, but it is always there.

**Area Survey of Foreign Relations**

It must, of course, be realized that platforms refer to various areas of the world when they give their attention to such issues as communism, defense, collective security, foreign aid, and foreign trade. In this section, the concern is largely with issues that do not exactly or specifically fit into one of the aforementioned categories and are
relatively unique to particular geographic areas of the world. As such, platform references here deal almost exclusively with items not previously mentioned, items additionally felt worthy of attention by the platform makers.

Europe

Outside of questions of alliances and trade, there is relatively little attention given in platforms to European interests. Only two additional subjects have been mentioned: European unity and the German (particularly, Berlin) question. In 1952, 1956, and 1960, the Democrats indicated their support of the trend toward integration in Europe, while in 1960 and 1964, as noted earlier, they indicated interest in expanding trade with the European countries. In 1948, and 1952, the GOP gave its support to the trend toward unity. Since that time, their interest in European-American relations has been stated primarily in terms of defense and rather suspiciously in terms of trade.

On the Berlin and German situation, the first mention of reunification was in the Democratic platform, where West Germany was welcomed "into the company of free nations" and the pledge was given to support its freedom and to use all peaceful means to effect reunification. In 1956, the Democrats pledged to take into account "the viewpoints and aspirations of different sectors of the European community...in regard to practical proposals for the unification
of Germany."  

The meaning of the statement is thoroughly obscure, almost as much as the Berlin plank in the platform of 1960, which stated that the U.S. would have both the capacity and the will to stand firm on Berlin, but noting that "the ultimate solution of the situation in Berlin must be approached in the broader context of settlement of the tensions and divisions of Europe." Presumably, these two statements are admissions that the U.S. cannot be entirely responsible for effecting German reunification, that there are elements of the situation which lie outside of American control. If so, it is an admission that the Republicans have been reluctant to make in a platform. In 1964, the Democrats simply stood on the commitments to Berlin.

In 1956, the Republicans noted with satisfaction the entry of West Germany into NATO and stated that they would continue to seek German reunification. They said nothing about it in 1960, but took the strong position in 1964 that the Berlin Wall would have to come down before any negotiations could take place with the Soviets over Berlin or Germany, noting further that Germany would be freely unified or not at all.

It is, perhaps, ironic that the GOP took this stand of negotiating directly with the Soviets on this issue and

the Democrats have occasionally admitted that the other European countries must be taken into account in effecting a German settlement. It will be recalled that, in 1964, the GOP platform was particularly insistent about consulting with allies before negotiating with the Communists. Perhaps that insistence was supposed to carry over to all subjects, but the two references are at nearly opposite ends of the platform. At any rate, the Democrats are more inclined to admit American limitations on this question, but it has been by no means a consistently expressed difference.

Latin America

The Democrats have called for continued or better (depending whether they were in or out of power at the time) economic cooperation and strengthened ties with Latin America in every platform since 1948 (mentioning in particular the Alliance for Progress in 1964). The GOP made similar statements in 1948, 1952, and 1956, although their references to Latin America carried frequent references to the Monroe Doctrine, indicating more of a concern for hemispheric security (a point the Democrats had also made in 1952, though not mentioning the Monroe Doctrine by name). In 1964, the GOP stated that they would not permit the "domination of any of our neighbor nations by any power outside this Hemisphere."93 This statement could be construed

as favoring a certain amount of American domination, or it could also be explained as an example of poor phrasing. The platform also indicated concern over the riots in Panama, indicating that the GOP would consider raising the level of Panamanian participation in the Canal. The GOP would also consider building another canal elsewhere.

The references to Latin America are few. There is a slight tendency for the Democrats to emphasize economic cooperation to a greater degree. There is a greater tendency for Latin America to be seen by Republicans in terms of the Monroe Doctrine, by Democrats in terms of the Good Neighbor Policy.

Asia

Specific references to Asia are also sparse. In 1952, the GOP pledged to end neglect of the Far East. In 1956, the Democrats pledged to help free Asian countries get better living standards without succumbing to Communism or any other domination. In 1964, the Democrats pledged to "support our friends in and around the rim of the Pacific", including intercultural exchanges and better understanding. Those have been the only references to Asia at large, excluding the position of China there.

Individual Asian nations have received mention in platforms from time to time. Support for India and Pakistan was voiced by the Democrats in 1952 and in 1960, the former
reference phrased in terms of economic and political development as a hedge against communist subversion, the latter reference phrased exclusively in terms of the struggle against "the age-old problems of illiteracy, poverty and disease." The 1960 platform went on to state: "We will support their efforts in every practical way."  

Vietnam was mentioned in the Republican platform of 1956, in which the GOP stated: "In Indochina, the Republics of Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos are now free and independent." The platform continued that the treaty with South Vietnam had "denied the Communists the gains which they expected from the withdrawal of French forces." Vietnam was not mentioned again in a platform until 1964, when the Democrats pledged a renewed commitment, while the Republicans pledged to move decisively in Vietnam in order to assure victory, confining the conflict as much as possible while assuring against future aggression.

The only other references to Asian nations came in 1952, with the Democrats supporting security pacts with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, and in 1956, with the Democrats noting the treaty commitment with South Korea. There has not been much to differentiate the

two parties' approaches to Asia. It has been difficult, in fact, to determine if either party has an approach.

Africa

If the parties' approach is difficult to ascertain in Asia, such speculation can be quickly ended where Africa is concerned. There is no approach as of yet. The sole reference to Africa was by the Democrats in 1960, when the Democrats welcomed the new nations to the world and stated their hope that there would be "fruitful cooperation" between them and America.

No conclusion will be drawn on this area.

Middle East

There has been regular attention given to the Middle East since 1948, due largely to the existence of Israel and its difficulties with its Arab neighbors. In 1948, both parties pledged full recognition of Israel and its boundaries as set by the U.N. Both parties pledged aid, with the Democrats specifically citing military aid. In addition, the Democrats supported internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of holy places. In 1956, both parties again pledged support of Israel (with slightly stronger wording in the Democratic version, "assistance", than in that of the GOP, "interest"). Both parties stated that they would try to help settle Arab-Israeli differences, the
Democrats specifically supporting relief measures for the relief and reintegration of the Palestine refugees. In 1956, both parties repeated support for Israel, urged the peaceful settlement of Arab-Israeli differences, and promised arms aid to Israel to balance Soviet arms shipments to Egypt, although on this latter point, the Republicans also put great faith in the U.N. to help keep the increased dangers of an armed conflict from becoming a reality. Both parties offered assistance in settling the refugee problem, as well. In addition, the Democrats supported the principle of non-violation of frontiers and that of free access to the Suez Canal, omitted by the GOP.

In 1960, both parties repeated the earlier pledges on support for solving the refugee problem, an end to the conflict (with guarantees for the independence and integrity of everybody involved), and efforts to prevent an arms imbalance in the area (while at the same time trying to halt the arms race there). All of these pledges were repeated by the Democrats in 1964. In addition, both platforms in 1960 pledged to help bring an end to economic hindrances in the area.

It is to be noted that the 1964 Republican platform was the only one of the ten not to address the Arab-Israeli problem. While this was an exception to normal Republican behavior, it may not have been quite as unique as it
appears. In fact, the GOP has not always approached the subject either willingly or easily. W.H. Lawrence reported that the strength of the plank on supporting Israel in 1948 was added after the plank came out of subcommittee. In 1952, James Reston reported that there had been some question as to whether a strong pro-Israel plank should have been included, and that it was inserted largely at the behest of such advocates as New York Representative Jacob Javits, who is himself Jewish with a strong Jewish constituency.

One more point that is occasionally raised in platforms concerns giving aid to the area, including the Arabs. This is primarily a Democratic tendency, occurring in 1952, 1956, and 1964, while the GOP mentioned cooperative efforts in 1952.

To conclude, the Democrats appear more at ease in advocating their Middle East positions, as perhaps befits the party that is more strongly identified with the Jewish vote. However, this has not, usually, prevented the GOP from taking equally strong stands, and very similar ones. It may well be that this is due to the Northern, Eastern,

urban wing of the party, which may give some explanation for
the absence of a Middle East plank in the 1964 GOP platform.

The United Nations

There is a certain amount of similarity in the ap­
proach of the two parties toward the U.N. Perhaps the most
interesting facet of their platform inclusions of the sub­
ject is the difference in the tone of both toward the U.N.
itsel over the years, although the Republicans have had
fewer moments of elaborated support and more of criticism.

In 1948, both parties waxed eloquent about the U.N.
The Democrats stated: "We support the United Nations fully
and we pledge our whole-hearted aid toward its growth and
development." They pledged to work to curtail the use of
the veto and to continue efforts to establish an inter­
national armed force. They stated that they favored grant­
ing a loan to the U.N. so that it could establish head­
quarters in the U.S. and that they favored "such amendments
and modifications of the charter as experience may
justify." 

The Republicans in 1948, asserted that the U.N. was
the world's best hope for providing collective security
against aggression. Republicans would support its growth

99. ibid., p. 431.
and development. They went on to say that the U.N. "should progressively establish international law, be freed of any veto in the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and be provided with the armed forces contemplated by the Charter." It was at least as strong a statement as that of the Democrats, and it did not escape opposition by GOP isolationists. W.H. Lawrence reported that Senator Brooks tried to strike all of the points quoted above, but failed. 100

Neither party was as enthusiastic in 1952. The Democrats pledged continual support and efforts to improve, to strengthen, and to develop the U.N. They also indicated particular support for the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Finally they asserted that Korea "proves, once and for all, that the United Nations will resist aggression." 101 The Republicans gave their support to the U.N., too, and stated that they would help it to be "a place where differences would be harmonized by honest discussion and a means for collective security under agreed concepts of justice." 102 Thus, while neither party was as strong in its statements on the U.N. both still were strongly committed to it.

In 1956, the Republicans covered the U.N. in two nearly identical statements that vigorous support for the organization would continue. The Democrats were more elaborate, deploring the GOP's haphazard use of the U.N., but calling the U.N. "indispensable" for maintaining world peace and settling disputes between nations. The Democrats pledged "every effort to strengthen its usefulness and expand its role as guide and guardian of international peace and security."103 In 1960, the Republicans were stronger in their support for and strengthening of the U.N., indicating that they would work for "the extension of the rule of law in the world." However, the Democrats were again more extensive in their statement, including in their plank the GOP provisions for support and the rule of law, and adding provisions favoring an international police force, disarmament through the U.N., bolder use of the specialized agencies, and the strengthening of the World Court (particularly through repeal of the Connally Reservation, which limits the Court's jurisdiction vis a vis the U.S.).

After the extensive statement of 1960, the Democrats remained silent about the U.N. in 1964 except for pointing out U.S. leadership in its peacekeeping and humanitarian activities. But the Republicans had considerable to say about it. They accused the Democrats of undermining the

103 Porte and Johnson (1956), p. 525.
U.N. by letting the ousted Congolese leadership return after the departure of U.N. forces, by not insisting on the payment of assessments, and by allowing the U.N. to become a forum for "anti-Western insult and abuse." The platform gave its support to the U.N., but indicated that changes should be made in the General Assembly and in the specialized agencies which would reflect population and willingness to meet U.N. obligations. The platform further asserted that Article 19 (without mentioning it by name) should be enforced and that a Charter-amending convention should be called by 1967. Finally the platform stated that Republicans would never surrender sovereignty, security, or free-world leadership to an international group.

In both parties, there seems to have been some dampening of the appeal of the United Nations, but in the Republican party, the process has gone to a greater extent, even allowing for the probability that the 1964 platform was exceptional in its tone.

**Miscellaneous Foreign Policy Planks**

One of the unclassifiable items in the platforms has been the flow of information and persons between nations. In platforms, it is supported if it is mentioned at

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104. Article 19 of the U.N. Charter provides for the loss of a nation's General Assembly vote if it falls behind in its payment of U.N. assessments. The plank was directed at the Soviet Union primarily.
all. Such exchanges may be stated in terms of students, techniques, culture, journalism, ideas, or simply people. Such planks occurred in the Republican platforms of 1952, 1956, and 1960, and in the Democratic platforms of 1952, 1956 and 1960.

Several platforms have included planks opposing any form of discrimination against Americans on the basis of race, creed, color, etc. Such planks were in the Democratic platforms of 1956 and 1960 and twice in the Republican platform of 1956.

Finally, there is the point that emerges almost exclusively in Republican platforms, bipartisanship in foreign policy. The Republicans called for it in 1948, 1956, and 1960. There were no specific references to bipartisanship in the making of foreign policy in any of the platforms of the Democrats. This was perhaps most surprising in 1948, when the use of bipartisanship was so important to Truman's foreign policy. As James Reston saw it, the Democratic refusal to recognize this bipartisanship was likely to make that area of foreign policy a campaign issue, an area that the Democrats had hoped to soft-pedal in preference to domestic issues.105 Ultimately, of course, it had little effect on the election.

On a number of issues, Republicans evince greater skepticism and reservation regarding involvement in foreign affairs, particularly foreign aid, foreign trade, and the United Nations. Where particular areas of the world are concerned, neither party has developed much of an approach, with the exception of the status of Israel in the Middle East. Where the parties do give attention to other areas of the world, the Republicans tend to think more in terms of defense for America and those areas' direct relation to American interests. The Democrats' orientation seems slightly more inclined to consider effects on those areas and indirect effects on the United States.
CHAPTER 6

DOMESTIC POLICY

There is much consistency and repetition of themes in domestic policy, for the parties' orientations remain generally stable on these "bread and butter" campaign issues. The task of this chapter will be to identify those orientations in the major policy areas. The issue of Negro civil rights and opportunities will be held in abeyance until the next chapter.

Governmental Organization and Procedures

This section will deal with those activities which are directly bound up in the operations of politics and the Federal government. Organizational aspects that are more relevant to other policy areas will be considered with those areas.

Civil Service

The core of the administration of the government is the Civil Service, towards which the two parties have a number of differences in orientation. These differences, as well as the similarities, can be seen in the facets of
the Civil Service to which the parties address themselves in their platforms. These are the things which most concern each party, often whether it is in or out of power.

Both parties are highly concerned with good pay (Democrats: 1948, 1952, 1956, 1960; GOP: 1948, 1960, 1964), and merit promotions and opportunities (Democrats: 1952, 1956; GOP: 1952, 1956, 1960). The Republicans are also highly concerned with efficiency and economy (1948, 1952, 1956, and 1960) (the Democrats mentioned it once, in 1956), competency (1952 and 1956), and cleaning out clutter, waste, and duplication (every year except 1960). They have additionally mentioned integrity (1964) and standards and conditions for employment (1960). The Democrats have emphasized working conditions (1952), reorganization and modernization (1952 and 1960), the independence of the Civil Service Commission (1956), and employee morale, rights, and responsibilities (1956). Each party has referred once to retirement benefits (Democrats, 1952; GOP, 1956) and once to means of settling employee grievances and policy (Democrats, 1956; GOP, 1960).

It should be noted that the exact manner of approaching these issues often depends on who is in office at the time, although not exclusively. The importance of noting them in the manner done is that it orients the prevailing attitude of the parties. If any distinction is to
be definitely pointed out, it is the generous attention of
the Republicans to questions of economy and businesslike
efficiency.

Within the Civil Service, the Postal Service re-
ceives considerable attention in the platforms. Here, the
distinction between the two parties is less evident, due
largely to the extensive plank on the subject in the 1956
Republican platform. The number of items mentioned by the
parties has been considerable over the years since 1948,
including efficiency (Democrats: 1952 and 1956; GOP: 1952
through 1964), speed and frequency of delivery (Democrats:
1952; GOP, 1952 and 1956), working conditions (Democrats:
1952 and 1956; GOP: 1956), morale and prestige (Democrats:
1956; GOP: 1952 through 1960), salaries (both parties,
1956), expansion (Democrats, 1956), modernization (both
parties, 1956), and fringe benefits, merit promotions, and
training programs (all by the Republicans in 1956). In
1956, the GOP also suggested that more of the cost of postal
service be borne by users rather than being made up by the
taxpayers. In 1960, the Democrats suggested that the Postal
Service be revamped and upgraded, which probably includes
several of the above mentioned points. There is relatively
little to pick from between the two parties. Perhaps the
most pertinent conclusion is that the Postal Service, like
the Civil Service itself, has occupied less of the recent attention of the two parties than it had in the 1950s.

Ethics and Honesty

This section could as well, and perhaps more accurately, be headed "corruption and scandal" insomuch as this is usually the framework in which the parties approach the subject of ethics and honesty, naturally charging the other party with corrupt or questionable practices and/or calling for legislation to prevent them. The Democrats have dealt with the subject in 1956, 1960, and 1964, while the Republicans broached the issue in 1952, 1956, and 1964. Probably the most extensive and most strongly worded plank came from the Republicans in 1952. It pointed out "the sordid record of corruption" of the Democratic administration, including "fraud, bribery, graft, favoritism and influence peddling."

It further drew attention to alleged alliances between persons in Government and those in the Underworld, particularly involving double-standard enforcement of tax laws. The plank went on to mention "links between high officials and crime", favoritism in the RFC, grain profiteering, postmaster sales, tanker-ship deals, ballot-box stuffing, and contract bribes and payoffs. The plank, among other things, stated that the GOP would clean house and "oust the crooks and gamblers...and restore honest government to the
people."\textsuperscript{106} It is the more usual case for the out-party to bring up the issue, but in 1956 and 1964, the in-party mentioned it in connection with continuance of good honest government.

Another facet of the ethics and honesty issue is that concerning conflicts of interest and favoritism toward private or partisan interests. The Democrats have referred to it in 1952, 1956, and 1960, while the Republicans mentioned it in 1952, 1956, 1960, and 1964. The tendency is for Democrats to accuse the GOP of favoritism toward private (particularly business) interests, while the Republicans charge the Democrats with favoritism for partisan interests.

Congressional Procedures

The ten platforms have suggested four areas of improvement in Congressional procedures, but only one of them has been mentioned more than twice. Two of the other three were merely one-time occurrences. In 1960, the Democrats suggested that Congress' investigating procedures should be improved. The same year, the GOP suggested that congressional appropriating procedures should be altered: a) for new spending, showing cumulative effect on the total budget; and b) for long range spending commitments, given

\textsuperscript{106} Porter and Johnson (1956), p. 505.
clear listing in the budget. In considerably more generalized form, the call was repeated in the 1964 GOP platform. That year, the Republicans also suggested that adequate staff assistance be provided for the minority in Congress.

The platforms have, on five occasions, suggested that there be congressional rules changes (particularly regarding the filibuster) so that majority rule could be effected without minority blockage. On four of those occasions, the Democrats have made the suggestion, 1952 through 1964. The Republicans suggested it in 1960.

When the plank was first offered in 1952, it received some special attention in the press. C.P. Trussell noted that it was strongly supported by President Truman, Senator Humphrey of Minnesota, Senator Herbert Lehman of New York, and Senator William Benton of Connecticut. The three Senators threatened a floor fight if the plank was not included in the platform draft. Trussell also noted that the plank was apparently directed at Senate Rule 22 without actually naming it. However, he noted that Truman, in urging the plank, seemed to have the House Rules Committee in mind as well as the filibuster. The allusion practice became standard for the later planks, excepting that of the GOP in 1960, when it specifically named the Senate filibuster rule.

This issue has strong implications, although not exclusive ones, for civil rights legislation. For that reason, the inclusion of such a plank in 1964 was both to be expected and somewhat of a surprise. As Anthony Lewis reported, President Johnson had always opposed cloture when he was in the Senate and had given no indication that his mind had changed. The major advocate of the plank within the convention was Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania, a frequent critic of the "Congressional Establishment" and advocate of rules reform. 108

The Presidency

Planks dealing with the presidency have been most sporadic and temporary. Outside of questions concerning the election of the President, there have been five planks which have dealt with the presidency, the Democrats offering two and the Republicans three. Actually, one of them could have also been included under the category of congressional procedures; in 1960, the GOP suggested that each party in each house should elect a Policy Committee which would provide an extra link between Congress and the President.

The other planks dealt more directly with the presidency. In 1952, the Democrats offered to deal with presidential succession; in 1960, they suggested that the fact-finding machinery and that for making policy in foreign

affairs should be revamped in order to avoid such embarrassments as the U-2 and Japan trip affairs. In 1960, the GOP proposed that the President have a Selective veto for appropriation and authorization bills; in 1952, they suggested the creation of presidential advisors for National Security and for Governmental Planning and Management.

**Election Procedures**

The most frequently mentioned election reform is that concerning the disclosure of campaign expenditures, a point made by the Democrats in 1952, 1956, and 1960, and by the Republicans not at all. The GOP, for their part, have been the sole advocates (in 1948 and 1960) of Electoral College reform so that popular vote could be expressed more adequately, although in neither instance did the plank become more specific or give guidelines. Other election procedures included in platforms were: the 1952 Democratic provisions for improvement of nomination and election procedures (with no elaboration) and for means of assuring greatest public participation in nominations; the 1960 Democratic call for tax credits for small campaign contributors; and the 1960 GOP condemnation of bigotry and smear in elections.

Given the assumption that the Democrats are the majority party and the party of the less well-to-do, it is
easy to see the reasoning behind their planks. An explanation for the Republican call for Electoral College reform is that the GOP would wish to nullify the effect of urban minorities in the big-city states, another effort against the Roosevelt coalition.

Miscellaneous Items

A number of items have been included in platforms which do not lend themselves to classification in any of the major categories. For example, Republican stands in 1956 and 1960 against illegal lobbying and the improper use of political monies could be included under elections or under congressional procedures.

Both parties have taken stands against executive secrecy, not surprisingly, when they were not in the White House, the GOP in 1952 and 1964, the Democrats in 1956 and 1960. In 1960, the Republicans called for more Federal judgeships, emphasizing selection based on quality. The same year, they also called for streamlining the Defense Department. The Democrats, in 1960, pledged to keep the regulatory agencies independent, but only after they had done some evidently needed housecleaning.

Finally, in 1964, the Republicans called for a constitutional amendment permitting the states to elect one legislative house on a basis other than population. The
Democrats took no stand on the issue, but, as Anthony Lewis reported, there was a major question in the platform committee as to whether to support the Supreme Court's reapportionment decision. Lewis noted that when several mayors, appearing as witnesses, urged such a plank, there was much applause by rank and file members. "But behind the scenes, leaders indicated that they would try to avoid the issue altogether."

The issue had become important partially because of its coverage in the GOP platform and partially by the Tuck bill (which would bar Federal courts from reapportionment cases) and the Dirksen rider (which would delay court action on reapportionment for a year or two), both of which were under Congressional consideration at the time. The whole situation was complicated by the fact that Platform Committee Chairman Carl Albert had voted in favor of the Tuck bill. The major political consideration seemed to be if and how much Johnson would be hurt in the rural areas if such a plank were included or in urban areas if it was left out. 109

Two days later, Lewis reported that the plank would not be included, that LBJ had taken the position that its inclusion would only inflame sentiments and that the way to deal with moves to upset or delay the decision was through "wise tactics in the Senate." Some of the Court's strongest

supporters, such as Michigan Senator Philip Hart, seemed to agree. The proposal to include the plank later lost by voice vote in committee.

**Government Taxing and Spending**

Consideration of how and where the government gets and spends its money provides a number of platform staples and a larger number of singular items. Five topics receive considerable and regular mention in party platforms: budget balancing, tax reduction (or the existence of over-taxation), debt reduction, reduced spending (or the existence of waste and extravagance), and tax revision or reform.

The balanced budget is an extremely popular item in platforms. Republicans tend to refer to it more frequently; although they did not specifically refer to it in 1948, they had two references to it in 1952, three in 1956, one more in 1960, and two in 1964. By contrast, the Democrats carried only one reference in each of the years 1948, 1952, 1956, and 1964, with two references in 1960, although both of the 1960 references were qualified by conditions of full employment and the absence of national emergency, the latter similar to the GOP qualification in 1960.

Republicans are also more engrossed with tax reduction. They had references to it in 1948, 1952 (thrice),

1956 (twice), and 1964 (twice). By contrast, the Democrats offered to lower taxes as permitted by national security needs in 1952, to not increase taxes in 1960, and to eliminate obsolete excise taxes in 1964. The GOP, incidentally, had also offered an excise tax cut in 1964, though they said nothing about obsolete ones.

Continuing the trend, the Republican platforms give more attention to reducing the public debt than do those of the Democrats. Each platform since 1948 has included such a reference, with that of 1952 containing two. The Democrats made such reference in 1948, 1952 (twice, although one was qualified by requirements of defense posture and necessary government services), and 1960 (again qualified). In 1956, the Democrats pledged themselves to review debt management policies in order to reduce interest rates which work to the advantage of the few at the expense of the many.

Reducing government spending and costs had been mentioned in the Republican platforms of 1948, 1952 (twice), 1956 (four times), and 1964 (four references). In 1964, the GOP became specific (rare for either party) and pledged a budget cut of 5 billion dollars. The Democrats referred to this issue in 1952 (a qualified assertion), 1960, and 1964 (when they pledged a frugal government).

Tax revision and reform has been mentioned in a variety of contexts. The Democrats pledged it in 1956 in
order that taxation would stop benefitting the few at the expense of the many. Twice in the 1960 GOP platform, tax reform was mentioned as a means of providing an incentive to investment and expansion. In 1948, 1952, 1960, and 1964, the Republicans called for tax revision in order to reallocate monies to state and local governments. The removal of inequities (unspecified) was cited in references by the Democrats in 1948 and 1952 and by the Republicans in 1956 and 1960. The Democrats called for the removal of tax loopholes in 1952 and 1956. Tax revision has been called upon to give various forms of relief: to low-income families, by the Democrats in 1948, 1952, and 1956, and by the GOP in 1956 (if such reduction remained consistent with a balanced budget); to small businessmen, by both parties in 1956; to middle-income families, by the GOP in 1956 (if it remained consistent with a balanced budget); and to small individual taxpayers, by the Democrats in 1956. Finally, in 1956, the Democrats specifically recommended that the $600 exemption be increased to $800.

The clear indication from the platforms is that the Republican Party is considerably more concerned with where the Government's money is coming from and where it is going and in what amounts. There is further indication of this in most of the other items pertaining to taxation or spending which are covered in platforms. In 1960 and 1964, the GOP
called for improvements in Congressional appropriation procedures and for the establishment of sensible spending priorities. They made particular reference to soundness in government financial policies and management in 1948, 1952, and 1956 (twice). In 1964, they charged the Democrats with effecting burdensome cuts in tax deductions and with using questionable bookkeeping methods and budget manipulations.

The Democrats have had a few miscellaneous items in their platforms as well. In 1948 and 1952, they declared their opposition to a Federal sales tax. Since that time it has not merited consideration. In 1952, during the Korean War, the Democrats advocated "pay-as-we-go" taxation, taxing as the need arose. In 1956, they stated that they believed in "realistic application" of taxes on large corporations, a statement that may have left some unclear as to its meaning. And in 1960, the Democrats stated that they would rely on economic growth to bring in the increased revenues needed.

Economic Prosperity and Well-Being

If the GOP has had an abiding interest in the economies of government, the Democrats have matched it with their concern for prosperity. In terms of general references to prosperity, economic growth, production, and abundance, the Democrats far outweigh the Republicans. In 1948, they had one such reference, two in 1952, six in 1956, two in 1960,
and another in 1964. The Republicans, by contrast had two in 1956 and two in 1960. In addition to these general references, prosperity has been mentioned in a number of other contexts: security (mentioned by the Democrats in 1948 and 1952), stability (both parties, the Democrats in 1952, the GOP in 1956), opportunity (the Democrats, 1952), a higher standard of living (Republicans, 1956, Democrats, 1960), high or full employment (Democrats in 1948, 1952, 1960, twice in 1964, Republicans in 1964), consumer purchasing power (Democrats, twice each in 1952 and 1956), high or fair wages (Democrats, 1960 and twice in 1964), and high or fair profits (by the Democrats in 1960 and 1964). The Republicans also suggested that it was the job of the government to prevent depressions in 1960.

Few provisions regarding prosperity deal in specific figures, although the Democrats promised a five per cent annual growth rate in 1960. The GOP, in a sense, came close to including such a provision in their 1960 platform. Governor Rockefeller, prior to his meeting with Nixon, had been advocating a five to six per cent annual growth rate pledge. Part of his compromise with Nixon was that this specific would be omitted, and that their statement would simply recognize the necessity for economic growth. As it was, anything more specific might have had trouble within the convention. As Austin C. Wehwrein reported, the economic
plank was written by a group headed by Senator Prescott Bush of Connecticut and was rather conservative in tone. Nixon had a difficult enough time retaining a number of the proposals from his agreement with Rockefeller, as already compromised as some of them were. 111

The Democrats were relatively specific on certain items in 1956. They stated that their goals for the next four years were: "1) A 500 billion dollar national economy in real terms; 2) An increase of 20 percent or better in the average standard of living; 3) An increase in the annual income of American families, with special emphasis on those whose incomes are below $2,000." 112

A major item of concern for economic well-being is the problem of inflation, a concern more frequent among the Republicans than among the Democrats. General references to either relieving, fighting, or avoiding inflation were included in the Republican platforms of 1948 (twice), 1956, 1960, and 1964 (three times), and in the Democratic platforms of 1948 and 1960. However, inflation was also mentioned within references of how to deal with it. The Republicans called for tax reduction in 1948, reduced government spending in 1948, and the stimulation of production

at lower prices, also in 1948 (although it was not clear whether the platform meant lower prices for producers or consumers), all as anti-inflation measures. Furthermore they denounced restrictions which hampered full production in 1952, and stated that wages and other costs should be kept in line with productivity in 1960. The Democrats, for their part, called for the continuance of "workable controls as long as the emergency requires them" in 1952, for restrained price increases in 1960, and for price stability in 1960 and 1964.

Fiscal policy was advocated as a means of countering inflation in 1948 and 1952 by the Republicans and in 1952 by the Democrats. Fiscal policy was also regarded as a stimulus to growth (by the Democrats in 1952 and 1956, by the GOP in 1960), a means for stability (1952, by the Democrats), and as a stimulus to defense spending (by the Democrats in 1952).

Monetary policy was cited more often by the Republicans. They cited it as a tool to fight inflation in 1948 through 1960 (the Democrats mentioned it as such in 1960). It has also been mentioned in the context of economic progress (by both parties in 1956), stability (GOP, 1952), the provision of new jobs (GOP, 1956), and both savings protection and sound defense (again by the GOP in 1956). The
SOP has also mentioned the independent freedom of action of the Federal Reserve System, protecting it from the political pressures of the President and Treasury Department (1952) and allowing it "to combat both inflation and deflation by wise fiscal policy" (1956), this latter provision indicating some confusion in GOP understanding of the difference between fiscal and monetary policy.

A more clear-cut distinction was provided in the 1960 platforms, perhaps the clearest differentiation between the two parties on this subject. The Democrats called for an end to high-interest tight-money policies. The GOP rejected the concept of growth through "massive new federal spending and loose money policies." The tendency, then, is for the Democrats to be more concerned with growth, using fiscal policy as a major vehicle, and for the Republicans to be more concerned with stability and a partiality to monetary policy.

Finally, the Republican platform of 1964 made a number of references, in the form of charges, that were new to platforms. They charged the Democrats with not living up to promises for housing construction, for overseeing too many business failures and too few new businesses, and with

weakening the patent system. There were, however, no specific pledges for redeeming the situations.

**Business Enterprise**

The simplest approach in platforms to business enterprise might be a statement such as one included by the Republicans in their 1956 platform: "We believe in good business for all business—small, medium, and large." 114

In point of fact, the platforms do not dispense with the matter either that simply, that briefly, or with the same emphasis. There are no references to medium business, while small business receives considerable attention in platforms. Large business is referred to in only one major context—monopolies. In addition, the consumer receives some attention, which will be noted later in this section.

**Small Business**

There has been a great deal of similarity in the two parties' approaches to small business, both claiming to befriend it and offering assistance. In the ten platforms, the Democrats had fifteen such references and pledges, the Republicans had twenty. Both equally offer tax relief, better SBA administration, and protection against monopolies.

and unfair discrimination. The Democrats tend more to offering credit and loans (1956 and twice in 1952 and 1960). The only GOP loan provision was in 1956, and it was qualified by being offered to small businesses with temporary needs who could not get loans through commercial channels. The Democrats have more frequently advocated extended small business participation in government contracts (1952-1960, compared to the only such GOP provision in 1956). The Republicans clearly differ from the Democrats on the consideration of fewer controls and less regulation, offering to cut down on required paper work as well; mentioned in every platform except that of 1960, six of the twenty GOP small business references were on this point.

Anti-Monopoly Action

The Democrats have had a somewhat larger number of references to action against monopolies (fourteen to the Republicans' ten). The gist of both parties' coverage is approximately the same. However, with the GOP calling for simplification of the administration of anti-monopoly laws on two occasions (1952 and 1956) to no such provisions by the Democrats, and the Democrats promising strength in anti-price discrimination laws in 1956 and 1960 (with no such mention by the GOP), there is some difference. The difference is minor and hardly a point of contrast.
Consumer Protection

Consumer protection has received the bulk of its platform references in 1960 and 1964; fourteen of the total of nineteen such references occurred in those two years. Of the nineteen references, twelve are Democratic, seven are Republican. The first Democratic mention of the subject occurred in 1952; the GOP followed four years later. Both parties are equally concerned about protecting consumers and investors in a general sense, but the Democrats have been more willing to spell out areas of concern, such as drugs and cosmetics (1964), packaging and labeling (1964), and truth-in-lending protection (1960 and 1964).

Both parties have given evidence of concern for federal control, but the Republican statements have tended to be stronger. In 1964, the Republicans simply advocated fewer controls, while the Democrats in 1952 had cautioned against unnecessary control. In 1964, the Democrats emphasized using other public and private efforts, as well as those by the Federal Government, to protect consumers. The other GOP provision against Federal control was also in 1964, where the platform urged that the activities of the FTC, the FDA, and the President be curbed where they dominated consumer market decisions. The provision was unique in that the GOP had advocated strengthening the FDA in 1956.
and 1960. As such, it seems more atypical, at least in its specifics if not in the general philosophy behind it.

Labor Conditions and Relations

The Democratic Party is considered to be the party of labor. There is much in the platforms to belie this condition. Excluding provisions regarding the Taft-Hartley Act, which will be taken up presently, in the Democratic platforms since 1948 there have been 46 provisions, pledges, and the like, supporting action by the Federal government to benefit the working man. There have been 43 such provisions in Republican platforms. The vast majority of both parties' provisions have addressed similar items—unemployment compensation, aid for the handicapped worker, assistance to depressed areas, equal pay for women, improving wages, hours, and working conditions, and so on. From most of the provisions in platforms, the GOP makes a strong bid for the labor vote and considers that it has the welfare of workers at heart.

There have been few areas of distinction. The Democrats, for example, have been clearly stronger in advocacy of the welfare of the migrant worker and farm workers. The Republicans have tended to qualify their commitments of Federal action by provision for state, local, and private action as well. There were seven such provisions in the
five GOP platforms, none in the Democrats'. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the GOP is still strongly committed to Federal action for labor welfare. The real difference between the posture of the two parties on labor management relations is to be found in their stances on the Taft-Hartley Act and in the difference of their interpretation of free collective bargaining.

The Taft-Hartley Act

The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 was passed by a Republican Congress over the veto of President Truman. Nothing, probably, in the two decades since World War II has bothered organized labor as much as this Act. Among other things, it limited unions in terms of picketing, striking (including provision for the use of injunctions against strikes), and union membership by outlawing the closed shop and making provision for states to prohibit the union shop through right-to-work laws. It is probably little, if any, exaggeration to say that organized labor has never forgiven the GOP for this Act.

In 1948, the Democratic platform set a pattern that has been followed by every Democratic platform since. It advocated the repeal of the Act in tones of ringing denunciation, including the charge of unconstitutionality. The Democrats have repeated the procedure every platform since,
including making it the major part of what they called a "Magna Carta for Labor" in 1956.

While the repeal of Taft-Hartley has become a standard ingredient of Democratic platforms, it was received with some surprise when first included in 1948. C.P. Trussell noted this and added that it was particularly surprising in that a great many Democratic Congressmen had voted to override Truman's veto. The significance of the platform provision each election is perhaps open to speculation. It may well be, as Gerald Pomper has noted, that the Taft-Hartley platform provisions are not really intended as specific promises of action, but rather as an indication of a degree of identification and responsiveness to organized labor by the Democrats. Pomper cites only 1952 and 1956 for his point, but there seems no reason why it should not refer to 1960 and 1964 equally as well.

Pomper's point applies to the Republicans as well, and it is on the Taft-Hartley question that the degree of labor identification differs between the parties, for no other issue offers such differentiation in any of the platforms. The GOP attitude toward Taft-Hartley has been that it is good for labor, for individual workers, for employers,

and for the general public. They have consistently, except in 1964 (when they said nothing), indicated their support of the Taft-Hartley Act, stating their willingness to change it as such unspecified changes were necessitated over time.

In fact, the Republican Party seems to be caught in a straddling position with respect to labor. The platforms indicate that they do not wish to be put into an anti-labor position, but by the same token, the GOP is not going to weaken its stand on Taft-Hartley. William S. White reported such a straddling situation in 1952. During the platform hearings, Labor spokesmen advocated the Act's repeal. Industry spokesmen favored planks calling for the end of all union shops and of industry-wide bargaining as well. Both were rejected. 117

The GOP stated in 1956 that union organization and the right to collective bargaining were firm Republican principles. In 1948, the platform said: "Collective bargaining is an obligation as well as a right, applying equally to workers and employers; and the fundamental right to strike is subordinate only to paramount considerations of public health and safety." 118 The Republican Party, in other words, puts conditions on collective bargaining.

This is part of the difference between the GOP and the Democrats which is expressed in their differences over Taft-Hartley.

Actually, both parties give strong support to the notion of free collective bargaining in their platforms. However, each party seems to have a differing conception of what constitutes free collective bargaining. When the GOP speaks of free collective bargaining, it is usually within the context of minimal government activity, a consistent position to take since the passage of Taft-Hartley. When the Democrats speak of the same state of labor-management relations, they imply that it is up to the government to assure that free collective bargaining can take place, in the tradition of the Wagner Act. Hence, with the Taft-Hartley Act, government is not living up to that obligation.

There are other indications, although not many, which indicate that the GOP has its reservations about unions. In 1960, the platform called for the freeing of unions from gangster or racket influence. In 1964, the platform called for measures against labor monopolies as well as business ones. But such points are indeed rare, particularly when considered against all of the provisions in GOP platforms which match those in Democratic platforms. It is the Taft-Hartley dispute which draws the line.
There is evidence to indicate that organized labor carries the grudge from year-to-year, regardless of what is in the platform or is likely to be. In 1952, Joseph Loftus reported that the Democratic platform writers were addressed by Walter Reuther, head of the CIO's United Auto Workers, William Green, AFL President, and George Meany, the AFL Secretary-Treasurer. None of them addressed or attended the GOP convention. The highest labor leader who addressed both conventions was Charles J. McGowan, an AFL Vice President, who, as Loftus reported, "praised the Democrats' reception of labor and said 'the contrast is obvious.'" 119 Loftus implied that some, if not all, of the contrast was in the mind of the beholder and that labor had not sent its more prominent officials to the GOP convention because they expected the contrast.

It might be parenthetically worth noting that the Democrats, in 1952, were faced with a difference of opinion between the unions over the minimum wage provision. The A. F. of L. wanted the minimum wage raised from $.75 to $1.00 per hour, the CIO favored a raise to $1.25. 120 The platform writers compromised and simply advocated a raised minimum wage without mentioning a specific amount.

120. ibid
The difference in labor's attitude can be indicated by the experience of 1960. A. H. Raskin reported that "scores" of labor leaders were at the Democratic convention to voice their concerns over wages, restrictive legislation (such as the Landrum-Griffin Act, to add to Taft-Hartley), unemployment, and automation. The GOP platform differed from that of the Democrats on only one major point, supporting Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin, and matched or nearly matched the Democrats on all the other major items. But, Loftus noted, Meany called the Democratic platform "the most progressive and most constructive in my memory." If so, it was because of the differing approaches to restraining labor legislation and little else.

**Agriculture**

Both parties are strongly committed to Federal action to help the farmer, usually at great length. Only two other policy areas make as many or as great a variety of pledges, indications of program support, or other provisions. In the ten platforms studied, 179 such provisions were found, 95 by the Democrats, 84 by the Republicans. Like those concerning labor, the vast bulk of the agriculture provisions either were consistently similar or were so


infrequent as to make comparison impossible. Also, as with labor, both parties feel a strong commitment toward government action to help the farmer. There are few areas of distinction, but the few, like labor, tend to be clear.

The Republicans are clearly more concerned with impact of government programs on local and private action. There were fourteen such qualifying provisions in their five platforms, compared to four for the Democrats. In some respects, this represents a difference in image as to what each party does for the farmer, a difference neatly expressed in the 1952 platforms where the GOP accused the Democrats of depriving the farmer of his freedom and the Democrats accused the Republicans of being enemies of farm progress. It is a difference of emphasis.

A clearer, though by no means absolute, contrast can be found in the parties' approaches to world trade as it effects agriculture. Here the parties take positions consistent with their general orientation toward trade with other countries, the Republicans more protectionist, the Democrats more concerned with opening up avenues of trade.

The sharpest distinction between the two parties concerns the issue of parity and price supports. Both parties are for high parity in terms of income, although the GOP tends to tie it more closely to the market place.
And a great many of the programs they both advocate are designed to help achieve high parity incomes. The Democrats tend to state the goal a little more strongly than do the Republicans, but the interest is there in both. The difference between the two parties concerns the form of price supports to be used in the process. The GOP has consistently mentioned the use of flexible price supports, although in 1952, they did not mention them at all.

The Democrats have consistently advocated high, rigid price supports, although the 1948 stand might be questioned. In that year, the platform expressed Democratic favor of a "permanent system of flexible price supports." Writing in 1952, C. P. Trussell interpreted the 1948 stand to mean that the Democrats favored a high, rigid price supports system. His interpretation was evidently a common one, but the reasoning behind it, if taken from the platform's words, is somewhat obscure. The whole issue of parity and price supports is, of course, a complex one, and the Republicans did not enhance one's confidence that either party really understood the issue when (in their 1956 platform) they advocated the development of a more accurate measure of farm parity.

Beyond these three mentioned areas of distinction, there is little to differentiate the two parties' approaches in their platforms, at least by a non-specialist in agricultural problems. Perhaps a specialist could note significant nuances in the dozens of provisions that are not readily apparent to the non-specialist. However, one also suspects that the abundance of platform provisions is in large measure a response to the difficulty and tenacity of contemporary agricultural problems. The Democrats may have offered the ultimate solution in 1960 when they pledged to set "new high levels of food consumption both at home and abroad. 124 Unfortunately, they did not elaborate on method.

Health, Education, and Welfare

No policy area receives as much attention as does this one, at least in terms of number of proposals, programs, pledges, and so on. In the ten platforms under study, there were 235 such provisions, an average of twenty-three and one-half per platform. Of these 235, 141 belong to the Democrats and 94 to the Republicans. Obviously, both parties are very heavily identified with governmental action in this area. The greater number of Democratic provisions is due primarily to their practice of going into greater

detail and enumerating programs more than do the Republicans.

Again, the GOP makes more qualifications regarding Federal action than do the Democrats. However, in this area, the Democrats go to greater lengths to emphasize state, local, or private action than in any other area, pointing out the cooperative nature of the proposals. In this regard, the Democrats have 24 such qualifications on Federal action, but are still outnumbered by the GOP's 35. And, of course, the difference between the two parties appears even larger if one considers the relative percentages of qualifying provisions to the total amount.

Again, as with preceding policy areas, it is difficult to find areas and points of differentiation among the vast variety of platform provisions. A few have appeared over the years, largely related to the question of Federal versus local or private or voluntary action. There has been a difference in terms of the two parties' approaches to health insurance. The Republicans started mentioning it in platforms in 1952, with probably their most emphatic statement on the subject. The platform stated that responsibility for such insurance should be divided between "government, the physician, the voluntary hospital, and voluntary health insurance." It opposed Federal compulsory health insurance "with its crushing cost, wasteful
inefficiency, bureaucratic dead weight, and debased standards of medical care."\textsuperscript{125} In 1964, a similar statement was made, but in 1960, the GOP came closer, temporarily, to mentioning social security. The \textit{New York Times} reported that the absence of social security in the medical care for the aged provision was a concession made by Rockefeller to Nixon.\textsuperscript{126} The Democrats, since their first mention of health insurance for the aged in 1960, have tied it with Social Security and thus made it compulsory.

In aid to education, there has been little to distinguish between the parties. Both have, at great length, argued the importance of local control over education. No platform went as far as did the GOP in 1952, in which it was stated that education was the responsibility of states and localities, and then the subject was dropped. It has been more typical for both parties to indicate the need for local control and local responsibility and then to enumerate the assistance that would be given. The only point of contrast between the two parties has been over aid for teacher salaries, which the Democrats advocated in 1952 and 1960 and the Republicans specifically rejected in 1960 because of the implications of Federal controls.

\textsuperscript{125} Porter and Johnson (1956), pp. 503-4.

The Democrats have also offered more detail on housing and programs for urban areas, but the GOP also tends to be strongly committed to housing and slum clearance and urban renewal. The difference again is the consideration of the place of private enterprise, the Republicans being more insistent on the point.

Among other areas in which some distinction might be made are housing for the elderly, health services in rural areas, aid for child welfare and day care facilities, and assistance to the arts. All of these points have been mentioned in at least two platforms and advocated, always (with one exception) by the Democrats. The exception was a provision for housing for the elderly in the GOP platform in 1960.

**Veterans**

In making their appeals to veterans, almost no difference at all can be clearly ascertained between the two parties. The Democrats have had 25 provisions, the Republicans 27, although in light of the fact that this represents a greater proportion of attention given this subject by the GOP, perhaps there is a heavier identification with veterans among Republicans. This is difficult to prove by the provisions themselves. Only in direction of interest are there any differences. The Democrats tend
to be more concerned with housing and compensation, the Republicans with administration (particularly the VA) and veteran's preference laws. But both parties seem equally balanced concerning hospital and medical care and aid in training or education.

It might be of some worth to note that platform interest in veterans has been on the wane. Of the 52 provisions pertaining to veterans in the ten platforms, 41 were in the first six. Of the platforms of 1964, there was no mention of veterans in the Democratic platform, and only one reference in that of the GOP (a reference to veteran preference in government employment). The Vietnam War may rekindle interest in the future.

Finally, there has been some thought that the Republican Party is more backward looking than the Democrats. In that light, two platform provisions are worth noting. In 1952, the Republicans advocated the extension of Veterans aid to Korean War Veterans. In 1960, the Democrats advocated that adjustments be made for World War I veterans. No definite conclusion will be drawn.

**Natural Resources**

Only the area of health, education, and welfare consumes as many platform provisions as does the subject of natural resources. It is a morass of pledges and
indications of interest on subjects which include fisheries, rivers and harbors, public lands, mining and minerals, wildlife and recreation areas, soil, water (fresh and salt), energy, forests, and arid lands, among others. And both parties stock their platforms with voluminous bait for those interested in natural resources. There were 205 such provisions in the ten platforms of which 120 were in Democratic platforms and 85 were in Republican platforms, another instance in which the Democrats were more detailed in the enumeration of programs.

There was a contrast between the number of statements qualifying Federal action on natural resources, although the amount for each party was relatively low on this subject. The Republicans had only nine such statements, the Democrats six. Again, the absolute numbers do not represent as much of a distinction as do the percentages of total provisions committed to Federal action, five per cent for the Democrats as against over ten per cent for the Republicans.

But again, for both parties, the degree of commitment to Federal activity is high. Both favor developing natural resources, and both favor conserving them. And both promise assistance to all of the sectors of interest, with few areas of difference.
The differences in Federal commitment are probably greatest in the area of public lands. While the Democrats are primarily interested in the possibilities of developing such lands, the Republicans are bothered about them even being public lands. Thus, in 1952, they suggested that the economic effects of tax-free public lands on states and localities be studied. In both 1952 and 1956, they complained of the bureaucracy involved. In 1960, they suggested that lands not currently in use be released to states and localities for urban and industrial uses.

The parties' usual difference in Federal commitment is probably least recognizable in connection with wildlife, wilderness, and recreation areas. While the Democrats devote somewhat more space to the subject, they also do more emphasizing of the importance of cooperating with state, local, and private agencies.

The two parties also differ on the international aspect of the fishery industry, a difference which has been noted before. Again, the Democrats emphasize the promotion of world trade and international treaties, while the GOP advocates protection from foreign competition.

Few other points of distinction can be found. The Republicans have advocated mineral and fishery depletion allowances, whereas the Democrats have not. There is a
slightly greater concern for administrative aspects among Republicans as well. The GOP, finally, has supported states' water rights, another point of contrast.

This last named contrast was particularly important in the offshore oil fight which lasted from 1938 into the mid-fifties. It was a struggle by the coastal states to gain title to submerged oil resources. The GOP supported the coastal and Western states on this issue; the Democrats favored a more national approach to the resources. The point appeared in Republican platforms in 1948 and 1952, but not in those of the Democrats. John D. Morris noted that both Eisenhower and Taft supported the states' claims in 1952, but that of the possible Democratic candidates, only Richard Russell of Georgia took such a stand. Most of the Democrats stood with President Truman, who had vetoed states' rights' bills in 1946 and in 1952. However, as in 1948, the Southern delegates managed to have no tidelands oil plank in the platform at all. 127

Occasionally, a natural resources issue has particular election potential. C. P. Trussell reported of such a situation in 1956. In a nearly unprecedented action for an election year, Eisenhower vetoed a $1.6 billion authorization bill for rivers and harbors, flood control, and river

basins projects shortly before the Democratic convention convened. Trussell noted that the attention of the platform drafting committee was drawn to the vote-getting potential of exploiting Eisenhower's action (the last time such a bill was vetoed so close to election was in 1940). The Democrats included a strong plank in favor of the type of projects that Eisenhower vetoed. But, so did the Republicans, who were obviously not against the projects in spirit, but only in their particulars. Perhaps this is an indication of platform unreliability as an indicator of policy.

**Immigration**

The Democrats unquestionably carry a stronger position with respect to immigration. Of the 21 such provisions in platforms, 14 were by the Democrats, 7 by the Republicans (none prior to 1956). Both parties have taken similar stands in favor of refugee relief and for the admission of relatives. The Democrats have twice (in 1956 and 1960) advocated the end of distinctions between native-born and naturalized citizens. In 1960, they favored the extension of due-process rights to non-citizens.

The most apparent issue of difference has been over the quota system. The Democrats have advocated its repeal in every platform since 1952. The Republicans touched upon

the subject of revising immigration laws in 1956 and in 1960, but in each case their approach to the quota system was unclear and equivocal. In 1956, they stated that the policy should be free from "implications of discrimination." They further stated that the country should follow its traditional policy on immigration, which could be considered as providing a haven for the oppressed. However, the traditional policy had also been the quota arrangement. The situation was not clarified in 1960. In the platform of that year, the GOP advocated using individual merit as the guideline for policy. They also suggested that 1960 rather than 1920 census data should be used as the basis for quotas. It appears somewhat contradictory to base an immigration policy on both national quotas and individual merit.

**Miscellaneous Domestic Items**

To label anything "miscellaneous" courts the danger that the object of the label might be construed as superfluous or unimportant. That is not the present intent; the items mentioned in this section are probably no more and no less important to the platform than the vast bulk of other items in the categories of policy already discussed. Their inclusion under the present heading is simply recognition of the difficulty in including them in any other category. However, some organization under sub-headings can still be made.
Before that is done, some mention should be made of the rare, occasional items which deal directly with fundamental Constitutional rights either not previously covered or to be included in the next chapter dealing with Negroes. Such provisions, mentioned in no context other than their own, occurred in two platforms under study, the Democratic platform of 1948 and the Republican platform of 1964. In 1948, the Democrats noted their favorable disposition toward maximum freedom of speech and of the press, urging at the same time the promotion of world-wide freedom of media of communication. In 1964, the Republicans stated their belief in guaranteed free expression by, access to, and independence of all news media with no excessive governmental controls. They also stated their belief in the adoption of a Constitutional amendment permitting the free public exercise of religion.

With the exception of the Democratic statement on world-wide communications, such points are, in a sense, superfluous in that such guarantees are presumably already in the Bill of Rights. However, their inclusion is not as much an advocacy of something new as it is an expression of concern for the status of those rights. Basic rights are also mentioned in the context of other issues, but not many of them. It might be suggested that neither party finds itself so concerned with those rights that it feels the
necessity of making platform statements and policy pro-
nouncements about them. It is, perhaps, a condition on
which to compliment the general political system.

Territorial Possessions

Of the two parties, the Democrats have devoted more
extensive coverage to American territories (including the
District of Columbia). They have also tended to make
stronger statements regarding the independent or semi-
independent status of each of these possessions.

The Democrats urged immediate statehood for both
Alaska and Hawaii in the platforms of 1948, 1952, and 1956,
after which the subject ceased to be an issue as far as
platforms were concerned. The Republican statements were
always more reserved and qualified. In 1948, the GOP ad-
vocated eventual statehood for both territories, while
taking steps to develop Alaskan resources and communication.
In 1952, they favored immediate statehood for Hawaii, while
favoring statehood for Alaska "under an equitable enabling
act." In 1956, they favored immediate statehood for both
territories, taking into account the need for defense pro-
visions in Alaska.

With the District of Columbia, platform provisions
have been framed around three items: suffrage in national
elections, home rule, and congressional representation.
In 1948, the Democrats came out in favor of suffrage, the Republicans for home rule. In 1952, the Democrats advocated immediate home rule and eventual representation; the GOP favored home rule and suffrage. In 1956 the Democrats repeated their 1952 stand, while the GOP declared its favor of all three provisions. In 1960, the Democrats came out for all three; the GOP limited itself to home rule and representation, a stand the Democrats took in 1964 (since suffrage had been extended by then). In 1964, reported Anthony Lewis, the paragraph to give representation (and a non-voting delegate pending such an amendment) was passed by a narrow 39 to 38 vote.\(^{129}\) The GOP had nothing to say about the District of Columbia in 1964. Paul Tillett, citing a Ripon Society Report, suggests that the oversight might have been committed because "Laird took offense at the questioning of Senator Goldwater by George Parker, a Negro delegate from the District of Columbia, who pressed the candidate on his attitude toward enforcement of the Civil Rights Act."\(^{130}\) This may have had something to do with the magnitude of the Johnson vote in the District. Other than 1964, the two parties' stands regarding the District have been relatively similar.


\(^{130}\) Paul Tillett in Cummings (1966), p. 29.
Regarding Puerto Rico, the most frequently taken position has been one of support for progress, growth and development, under the principle of self-determination, a position taken by the Republicans in 1956, and by the Democrats in 1956, 1960, and 1964. In 1948, the Democrats urged immediate self-determination of Puerto Rico's status vis-à-vis the United States; in 1952, they supported the territory's growth and development. In 1952, the GOP supported Puerto Rico's eventual statehood, and in 1960, their platform declared support for Puerto Rico's right to independence when it so wishes. On this subject, the GOP has made the more erratic, but also the stronger, more specific pronouncements.

Every Democratic platform since 1948, inclusive, has mentioned the Virgin Islands. The Republicans mentioned it in only one platform, that of 1960, but they made the strongest statement in the process. They declared their support of the Islands' right to a self-elected governor and to national suffrage and representation, "looking forward to eventual statehood when qualified." The Democrats called for more local self-government in 1948, 1952, and 1956, adding to the last named provision for the self-election of their governor and for the presence of a Resident Commissioner in Congress. In 1960, the same provision for a governor carried over, with additional provision for a
congressional delegate and for presidential suffrage. In 1964, they repeated earlier calls for the governor and for self-government.

Of the other territories, Guam has been specifically mentioned three times and Samoa once. The lone Samoan provision was in the 1948 Democratic platform, a call for maximum local self-government. The Democrats made identical provisions for Guam in their platforms of 1948 and 1956. In 1960, the GOP supported the right of Guam to a self-elected governor and to national representation. The 1960 GOP platform was the GOP's major foray into strong statements regarding the territories.

Women's Rights

It has already been mentioned that both parties have been most consistent in their advocacy of equal pay for equal work. The same holds true of their advocacy of equal rights for women. Every platform has pledged itself to full equality for women, with one exception—the GOP platform of 1964, which failed to mention the subject. The GOP platform of 1956 pledged the party to recommending a constitutional amendment guaranteeing equal rights for both men and women, a pledge which could be interpreted in a variety of ways, but most safely as being for the benefit of women.
Evidently there has been disillusionment among some women over the necessity of having to include this plank every election year. In 1956, the New York Times reported that, at the hearings on the Democratic platform, such a plank was urged by Miss Hazel Palmer, the president of the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs. However, she noted that unless the Democrats were really willing to finally take action, it was pointless to put in the plank. However, Idaho Representative Gracie Pfost protested that its absence would weaken their efforts, a point to which Miss Palmer finally agreed.  

Crime and Law Enforcement

There had been few references to criminal activity in platforms prior to 1960. As mentioned earlier, the Republicans had made charges of Democratic ties with organized crime and corruption and of labor ties with organized crime. In addition, the Democrats charged the Republicans, in 1956, with the maladministration of justice. They stated: "We pledge ourselves to the fair and impartial administration of justice." They then strongly criticized the Republican use of law enforcement powers "for concealment, coercion, persecution, political advantage, and special interests."  

In 1960, the Democrats promised to take "vigorous corrective action" against the underworld in business and labor unions. The Republicans were more concerned with juvenile delinquency, pledging aid to states and localities for research, demonstration, and training projects. They further noted the importance of strengthening family life in welfare programs connected with juvenile delinquency.

In 1964, most of the GOP's emphasis was on lawlessness as it was related to civil rights and interracial tensions, which the Democrats were accused of exploiting. However, the Republicans also mentioned their intention of limiting the flow of obscene materials through the mails. The Democrats, on the other hand, made a more generalized sweep over the whole subject of law and law enforcement and lawlessness. They stated: "We cannot and will not tolerate lawlessness. We can and will seek to eliminate its economic and social causes." Elsewhere they condemned lawlessness, violence, and hatred. Additionally, the Democrats pledged to press the war on narcotics.

Neither party has shown a great deal of inclination to deal with the subject of crime and law enforcement, and certainly no more so than the other party. They have yet to make provisions which are at all comparable, for similarity or difference.

Transportation

Both parties have shown an interest in the development of land, sea, and air transportation, although for the Democrats it is an interest of somewhat more frequent attention, the GOP addressing the subject in 1948, 1956, and 1960 only. Both parties have shown equal concern that such development take place within the framework of competitive free enterprise. If there is any difference between the two parties on the subject, it lies in Democratic interest in two areas that the GOP does not mention. In 1948 and 1952, the Democrats stated their concern for fair transportation rates and charges. In 1952 and 1956, the Democrats noted their pledge to provide aid to states and localities for cooperative programs of highway development. It is typical of the Democratic tendency toward more detail in domestic programs.

Indian Affairs

Indian affairs have been included in both parties' platforms in 1952, 1956 and 1960, and in the Democratic platform of 1964. Each platform pledged help for the Indians in terms of health, education, and welfare. In addition, three platforms stated the importance of preserving the cultural identity of the Indians (Democratic, 1952 and 1960; Republican, 1956) and of maintaining the
consent of the Indians before treaties or other such U. S.-Indian relationships were altered, (Democratic, 1956 and 1960; Republican, 1960). Four platforms called for the end of discrimination against Indians (Democratic, 1952, 1956, and 1964; Republican, 1952). In 1956, both parties called for the settlement of Indian claims on the United States. In addition, the Democrats called for Indian social, economic, and political integration and for Indian handling of Indian fiscal matters in 1952. In 1956, they pledged to help the Indian develop his natural resources. Additional Republican planks have included the elimination of waste in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (1952), the welcoming of Indian advice and counsel in the selection of the Indian Commissioner (1956), and consultation with Indians in the management of their affairs, expanding local self-government (1956).

What distinctions can be made between the two parties in their approaches to the Indians seems to lie along the lines of regularity of commitment. The Democrats have made the more regular commitments in terms of proposed programs, but the difference is not a large one.
Both parties are considerably more verbose on domestic policy than on foreign policy, which is understandable in that domestic issues hit closest to home for most organized interests in America. Both parties are strongly committed to a great deal of Federal action in virtually all of the general areas of government policy, although the Republicans tend to have more reservations about the amount of Federal activity vis-à-vis state, local, or private activity.

Points of clear differentiation are extremely rare. Differences between the parties which represent clear policy contrasts can be found on only a handful of issues—the Taft-Hartley Act, price supports, medical care for the aged, and aid for teacher salaries. In addition, there does seem to be a relatively substantial differentiation regarding the parties' orientation toward tight and loose money, but it is an orientation based upon a perception of the other party's excesses in the use of tight or loose money policies rather than upon a definite position of the party itself.

The Republicans have a tendency to be more disposed toward efficiency, economy, and administrative matters. They also tend to be more oriented toward stability. The Democrats are more oriented toward government activity, toward detail and elaboration of interest and programs. These are general differences of emphasis, of degree of

**Summary**

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The Republicans have a tendency to be more disposed toward efficiency, economy, and administrative matters. They also tend to be more oriented toward stability. The Democrats are more oriented toward government activity, toward detail and elaboration of interest and programs. These are general differences of emphasis, of degree of
involvement. However, when the differences of degree are seen as part of the total sum of commitments, the philosophic considerations behind them seem less distinctive than they would if the differences were considered in isolation.
CHAPTER 7

THE NEGRO AND CIVIL RIGHTS

No issue has been the subject of as much consistent difference of opinion, conflict, and struggle within platform committees and national conventions as have the planks regarding the parties' stands on civil rights. Other policy areas may have occasional struggles, but not convention after convention, over the same subject matter. Thus, in order to put the planks into perspective, some detail regarding the historical circumstances must be included in order to better understand the posture of the two parties.

The Republican Performance

Both parties have been marked by a degree of variability in their performances regarding civil rights since 1948. For the Republicans, the variability has been the result of a rather deep dichotomy which runs through the party's performance on a great many other issues, a split between the more conservative wing of the party and the more moderate or liberal. The tenor of the platform planks on civil rights has tended to be a reflection of the platform itself and of the dominant forces within the
conviction. If this sounds like an altogether obvious point, it is one that is worth making because of the contrast between the Republican situation and that of the Democrats, where the civil rights question generates a more specialized form of family squabble. At any rate, the performance of each party will probably be most usefully approached chronologically, with some summarizing remarks following each.

1948

The 1948 GOP plank on civil rights was one of the more strongly stated of Republican utterances on the subject. It declared the party's favor of legislation to end lynching and its opposition to the poll tax and to the idea of racial segregation in the armed forces. It favored the "enactment and just enforcement of such Federal legislation" necessary to protect the right of equal opportunities of work and advancement in life regardless of race, religion, color, or national origin.

The plank was short on equivocal statements and reservations concerning Federal action, or as W. H. Lawrence put it, it had little or no "straddling", being largely a play for Northern Negro votes in preference to white dissidents in the South. Lawrence also pointed out that the plank was not as strong as it might have been. The
Resolutions Committee had struck from the platform a proposal for a Fair Employment Practices Commission, due to the consideration that FEPC "is like waving a red flag in front of most Southerners." However, Resolutions Committee Chairman Henry Cabot Lodge was reported as saying that the plank would accomplish much the same purposes without specifically mentioning FEPC. 134

1952

The 1952 plank was more reserved and qualified. Its strongest language was used to condemn discrimination and suggest support for the rights that were being denied. Its approach to Federal action was more equivocal. The plank condemned bigotry as being unAmerican and dangerous and stated that all American citizens were entitled to full, impartial enforcement of Federal civil rights laws. Then it went on to assert that states have the primary responsibility in ordering and controlling their institutions, and that the Federal role in opposing discrimination should be to "take supplemental action within its constitutional jurisdiction." The plank further stated that the Republicans would appoint qualified persons to responsible government positions without racial or ethnic distinctions. It promised Federal action toward eliminating lynching, the

poll tax, segregation in the District of Columbia, and discriminatory employment practices, stipulating that Federal action should not duplicate state efforts.

Thus, the platform "straddled". Nonetheless, the New York Times reported, "Negro G.O.P. delegates were persuaded that the plank left room for vigorous action on civil rights." This is, of course, the purpose of straddling—to leave room for interpretation, either for vigorous action or a more restrained approach.

Even in this comparatively ambiguous form, there had been some conflicting views in the construction of the plank. In fact, these conflicts were partially responsible for the milder stance of the 1952 plank than of that of 1948, but only partially. C. P. Trussell reported that the Civil Rights sub-committee had been split over the anti-job-discrimination provision, the four members present being evenly divided between Taft and Eisenhower forces. The other member of the sub-committee, A. M. Lonabaugh of Wyoming, finally arrived and cast his lot with the Taft proposal. The other two filed a minority report.

The relationship between the ideas of Taft and Eisenhower was a rather complex one. As William S. White related, Taft favored a declaration in favor of a persuasive

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commission working against job discrimination. Taft was not considered to be against Federal law as such, but against compulsory Federal enforcement. Eisenhower was understood to have favored leaving the whole situation up to the states. However, many Eisenhower supporters supported stronger Federal action than did Taft, and they wanted to have a plank similar to that of 1948.

The drafting committee submitted the majority and minority reports to the Resolutions Committee, after having failed to come up with a workable plank acceptable to both sides. "Compromise after compromise was formulated, thrashed over, tried out, and thrown out because neither of the warring factions would agree." However, a compromise version was reached in the full platform committee.

The Eisenhower and Taft views were compromised, but there was still dissatisfaction among some pro-Eisenhower forces. Trussell noted that a proposal to readopt the 1948 plank was rejected in committee, as was a Federal FEPC proposal. A pro-Eisenhower group contemplated a floor fight in order to reinstate the 1948 plank. However, they thought better of it when they reasoned that a floor fight might spark a Southern-Taft coalition which might result in Taft's nomination.

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from which it had emerged from committee, a compromise of two relatively conservative approaches to civil rights.

1956

The Supreme Court's 1954 school desegregation decision was an important factor in the deliberations of both parties in 1956. The question of endorsing that decision loomed over the GOP platform construction. Platform committee chairman Prescott Bush indicated that he thought that the subcommittee was working toward a plank that would pledge the Eisenhower administration to seek legislation to enforce the Court's decision. He also said that he thought the Southerners would not be unduly offended by the plank.\textsuperscript{140}

However, a number of Southerners indicated early in the deliberations that they would file a minority report if the plank was too strong for their tastes. It was, and the Southerners put forth efforts to modify the plank in committee. Allen Drury reported that the fight was gaining ground as it became apparent that the Eisenhower Administration began considering a compromise plank acceptable to the South. The Southerners argued that a really strong plank endangered chances of picking up the two Kentucky Senate seats and several closely contested House seats in the

South. Reports stated that such arguments came from, among others, John Sherman Cooper and Thrusston Morton, the GOP candidates for the Kentucky seats. 141

A compromise was finally reached, one in which the plank would uphold the Court's decision, but would also recognize the special problems of the South in dealing with race issues. It was, noted Drury, an Administration concession to the Southern delegates. 142

In addition to the compromise over the school desegregation decision, the plank carried a number of stronger provisions for civil rights. It strongly endorsed the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of citizenship. It stated that the use of violence by anyone would only aggravate conditions. And it noted that progress must continue with all branches of the Federal Government using all legal means to achieve the ideal of equality before the law. The plank went on to point to the GOP's own "impressive record" in civil rights and recommitted itself to advancing the rights of all citizens.

One provision implied considerably more than it stated. It committed the Republicans to Eisenhower's six-point program submitted to Congress earlier in 1956. These

six points were provisions for: 1) a six-man, bipartisan commission with subpoena power in the investigation of denials of the right to vote or other basic rights; 2) a civil rights division in the Department of Justice; 3) authority for the Federal Government to prosecute individuals and public officials who would intimidate, or attempt to intimidate prospective voters in Federal elections; 4) power for the Justice Department to seek Federal injunctions on behalf of the United States or individuals in civil rights cases; 5) authority for individuals to have their cases taken to Federal courts without first exhausting state judicial remedies; and 6) power for the Department of Justice to bring suits "against certain civil rights conspiracies, such as the activities of hooded gangs."143

1960

In 1960, the Republicans presented probably their most militant plank on civil rights. They recognized it as a national problem. They affirmed the right to peaceably protest in business establishments. They pledged vigorous enforcement of voting rights laws and proposed that, by law, an accredited sixth grade education be proof of voting literacy. They stated their intent to carry out school desegregation under the Supreme Court's mandate, pledging

vigorou s support of activities toward that end. They would offer to extend Federal assistance to schools desegregating in good faith. They proposed legislation allowing the Attorney General to bring action in the name of the United States in cases where economic coercion or physical threat was used to block desegregation. The platform also stated its opposition to fixing a specific target date for desegregation three years distant (as the Democrats had done) stating the preference for the simple direction of desegregation without delay. The platform included support for a Commission on Equal Job Opportunity, for the elimination of discrimination in unions and in employment, and for training programs. And the plank favored the prohibition of discrimination in Federally-subsidized housing, in Federal facilities, and in the use of Federal funds for construction of segregated community facilities. Finally, it supported integration in transportation and in other government authorized services.

The militance of the plank was due largely to Rockefeller, or rather to Rockefeller's influence in the agreement he reached with Nixon which was then transmitted to those preparing the platform at the convention. However, the provisions of their agreement had a difficult road before they were finally embraced as part of the platform.
A North-South coalition within the civil rights sub-committee refused to accept the Nixon-Rockefeller plank, in circumstances involving a complex relationship of Southern and non-Southern conservative viewpoints, hurt feelings, and personality conflicts. Of the fifteen members of the sub-committee, there were five Southerners (although none from Georgia, Alabama, or Mississippi). The sub-committee was chaired by Joseph Carlino of New York, a strong Rockefeller man. When Carlino received the Nixon-Rockefeller provisions, he assumed that they would automatically be incorporated into the platform. He was wrong, but in a fit of misjudgment, he proceeded as if those who opposed the incorporation simply did not understand the politics of national conventions and would soon come around. They didn't, and Carlino so antagonized most of the other members of the committee that they took a stance in opposition to the Nixon-Rockefeller proposals and one more amenable to the Southern viewpoint, which was represented by John Tower of Texas, who came to dominate the sub-committee after Carlino's leadership was rejected (he held meetings of the sub-committee of which Carlino was not even aware).\textsuperscript{144} The Tower faction drew up its own plank, which became the

\textsuperscript{144} Karl Lamb in Tillett (1962), pp. 61ff.
majority report to the full committee by an eight-to-seven vote. 145

Before the full committee, Tower presented the majority report. Bayard Ewing of Rhode Island presented the minority report (Carlino by this time having realized the depth of the resentment against him) and moved that it be substituted for the majority report. After some discussion, the minority report was tabled. After more discussion, the majority report was accepted in almost the exact form in which it had been written by the Southern members of the sub-committee (although, as Lamb has noted, it was surprisingly moderate for Southerners). 146 It is well at this point to remember that much of the entire platform committee was incensed at the Nixon-Rockefeller agreement.

A floor fight loomed imminent, and, as reported by W. H. Lawrence, Rockefeller told an NAACP convention that he and Nixon had agreed to fight for their version of the plank. 147 Such a fight, at least on the floor, was not necessary, however, as Nixon arrived to take control of the convention. Nixon's job of asserting control was done largely through quiet persuasion. He had a number of talks with small groups of committee members and explained his

views to them, although without exacting pledges from them. Later, his emissaries could contact the members and put the case to them. "Once Mr. Nixon's views had been made clear, his assistants were in a position to demand whether the individuals were for or against Mr. Nixon on the concrete issue." 148 The delegates were more for Mr. Nixon, and his draft, with some softened language, prevailed in the full committee by a vote of 55 to 45. 149

Thus, the strongest of the GOP's civil rights planks became reality. But, it was not wholeheartedly embraced by much of the party.

1964

In 1964, the Republicans returned to a stance rather similar to that of 1952, a more conservative position. The platform addressed itself to finding means of peaceful racial progress, rejecting lawlessness. It also rejected "inverse discrimination" in the form of bussing, job shifting, and so on. It pledged the GOP to execute and implement the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to improve existing civil rights statutes, and to ensure the right to vote. Finally, it stated the party's willingness to work for equal

149. Polsby and Wildavsky (1964), p. 65
opportunity in jobs and education, noting (in another section) the need for Negro retraining in the face of automation.

The convention was, as has been previously noted, a conservative triumph. However, the moderates, again, were not willing to give up without a fight. Anthony Lewis related that Joseph Carlino offered an amendment to the platform committee that would have called for applying the voting rights section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to state as well as to Federal elections and for broadening the Executive Order against discrimination in Federally-aided housing. The amendment lost by a vote of 68 to 30 in the only roll-call vote in the committee's debate on the platform. 150

However, the moderate forces, gathered around Governor Scranton, prepared to carry the fight to the floor of the convention and drew up proposals for that purpose. Their proposals, grouped together in a single amendment, included: 1) commendation to the GOP for supporting the 1964 Civil Rights Act (a slap at Goldwater, who had voted against it); 2) more personnel in the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division; 3) legislation to implement school desegregation and to apply voting guarantees to state as

well as Federal elections; 4) the elimination of job discrimination; and 5) assurance that Federal-state manpower training programs and vocational education were indeed benefitting all those persons eligible. The proposed substitute was defeated on the floor by a roll-call vote of 897 to 409. 151

Summary

The Republican Party has had periods of quite strong and unequivocal Federal support for civil rights action. These periods have, however, been interspersed with considerably more equivocal support, particularly the platforms of 1952 and 1964. In effect, the Republican Party not only has a Southern branch with which it must compromise, it has its traditionally conservative wing, which of the two is far more important in the party. Southerners have been more important in the Democratic Party which has often had to count on carrying the South—and usually has. In its more liberal posture, the GOP can match the Democrats in their appeal for civil rights votes, Negro and White, at least in the platform.

The Democratic Performance

For the Democrats, the issue of civil rights is critical in the handling; mishandling can, and has, split the party. The division among the Democrats, contrary to the Republicans, is almost exclusively geographic—Northern versus Southern segments of the Party. The Northern branch is the stronger, but not so strong that it normally feels that it can carry the nation all by itself against the Republican forces. Thus, the critical issue for the Democrats has been their ability to satisfy, to some degree, the wills of the two geographic poles of interest. It should also be noted that the Northern wing of the party has an important, strongly liberal appendage, thus broadening the distance between ends of the party.

1948

In 1948, due to an absence of compromise, the Southerners bolted from the Democratic Party after the convention. The plank had not, initially, been as strong as the final version; it had been essentially a copy of the compromised 1944 plank, a point noted by Trussell in his coverage of the platform and its activities. However, in the platform committee, the Northern liberals (led by Mayor Humphrey) proposed a stronger plank. It would have

pledged action along four points: 1) protection from lynchings; 2) provision for equal employment opportunities; 3) provision for full and equal political participation; and 4) provision for equal treatment in the armed forces. The plank, however, was defeated by voice vote in the committee. Humphrey then tried to save the fourth point separately, but this effort failed by a 36 to 28 vote.153

The Southerners were not satisfied with the proposed plank, even without the liberal proposals. When the plank was brought to the floor of the convention, the South offered a states rights plank, introduced by Governor Dan Moody of Texas and sponsored by fourteen other Southern delegates. It was defeated, 925 to 309. Then, the four-point liberal plank was offered to the convention in an amendment proposed by Wisconsin's Andrew J. Biemiller. It was inserted into the platform by a 605 1/2 to 582 1/2 vote.154

The stage was set for the temporary withdrawal of the South from the Democratic Party. However, as Bain comments, "if the southern delegates had not opened the attack on the initial civil rights plank, the more extreme Northern delegates probably also would have gone along." He also notes that the smaller margin of victory of the Biemiller plank

as compared with the vote on the Moody proposal was "undoubtedly due in part to the reluctance of many northern delegates to take the extreme position postulated in the amendment and to push the southern delegates too far." 155

In addition to the four points belatedly inserted, the platform stated a general commitment to the eradication of discrimination of racial, religious, or economic grounds. "We again state our belief that racial and religious minorities must have the right to live, the right to work, the right to vote, the full and equal protection of the laws, on a basis of equality with all citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution." 156

1952

With the experience of 1948 behind them, and the traumatic consequences possible from such a split, a fight over the civil rights plank was hoped to be avoided in most quarters in 1952. Therefore, Trussell noted, the Democrats searched for a compromise, one that could give latitude to the South and still promise strong Federal action in recalcitrant cases. 157

Consideration was given, as an initial compromise, to a plank resembling the Humphrey-Ives bill, which had cleared through the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee just before Congress had adjourned. The bill encouraged states handling their problems themselves and would set up a commission with subpoena powers to advise and supervise but would not be active in states which had their own civil rights laws which met commission standards.

The final plank contained a similar, though not identical, provision. In addition, it contained a provision favoring Federal legislation to secure equal employment opportunities, personal security, free political participation, and to strengthen present civil rights statutes and administrative mechanisms. It is worth noting that these points were identical to the four-point liberal plank of 1948, with the exception of the final point (a replacement for the armed forces provision which was no longer germane, due to Truman's executive order desegregating the armed forces). In 1948, these points generated a party split. In 1952, they were part of a compromise plank. Trussell reported that the Northern delegates were divided as to whether the Democrats had a stronger plank than in 1948, an understandable reaction to a compromise plank. Humphrey stated that it was compatible with the Humphrey-Ives bill.

and he was apparently satisfied. But other Democrats were not as satisfied, including Truman, who wanted a stronger plank, one which had enforcement provisions for ending job discrimination, a compulsory FEPC. Truman was unsatisfied with the original draft's provision for an "effective" system of ending job discrimination rather than an "enforceable" one. The final plank had provision for neither "effective" nor "enforceable." 159

1956

The 1956 plank stated that all citizens "should have equal opportunities for education, for economic advancement, and for decent living conditions." 160 It pledged the Democrats to continued efforts to erase discrimination, requiring the cooperative efforts of individuals, state and local governments, and the Federal Government. The Federal Government, it asserted, must continue its efforts by providing full rights to public education and for voting, occupation, and personal security. The plank then went on to reject all proposals to use force "to interfere with the orderly determination of these [school desegregation]"

matters by the courts."\textsuperscript{161} It recognized the Supreme Court as the law of the land.

This last point is particularly important in that the plank did not specifically mention the school desegregation case. The Democrats, in effect, tried to skirt the controversy by not even mentioning it. It was, comments Pomper, an attempt to gain the support of both Negroes and Southern dissidents; four years later, the Democrats would go clearly after the Negro vote.\textsuperscript{162} William S. White, in covering the platform proceedings for the \textit{New York Times}, reported that the proposed plank was somewhere between the position of the Southerners and that of the Americans for Democratic Action and the NAACP. It was felt that both sides would go along with the proposed compromise, even if somewhat grudgingly. However, the ADA and the NAACP, along with the AFL-CIO, had urged strong platforms, including support of the Court's decision specifically stated.\textsuperscript{163} Senator Lehman was also a leading proponent of this view, as was Governor Harriman of New York and Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois.

\textsuperscript{161} Porter and Johnson (1956), pp. 541-2.
\textsuperscript{162} Pomper (1966), p. 70.
\textsuperscript{163} \textit{New York Times}, August 11, 1956, pp. 1ff.
Nonetheless, the proposed plank was considered to have Truman's support, a stand considered surprisingly moderate and conciliatory from the Southern viewpoint. By the time the convention opened, the compromise was close to settled. Mrs. Roosevelt indicated that she would support the compromise, an important development, noted White, since her "influence among the Negro groups is widely regarded by Democratic politicians as greater than that even of any presidential aspirant." White further noted that the Johnson forces were also lining up behind such a settlement. However, a northern bloc, understood to have Harriman's support, sent a memorandum to the platform committee urging a strong plank, including enforcement of the Court's school desegregation decision.

Two days later, White reported that Harriman had indicated a willingness to support a floor fight to gain endorsement of the Court's decision. However, he couched his willingness in terms of supporting Supreme Court decisions, in other words, in a vaguer plural reference. Truman also indicated support in such terms. However, the stronger

166. Ibid
liberals were not only interested in endorsing "decisions", but in making provisions for enforcement and implementation. 167

Nonetheless, Truman did support the final compromise version. The convention passed the plank, but the hardier liberals put up a floor fight which was, White wrote, rejected by "a howling voice vote." The fight was aimed at including provision for implementing the Court's decision banning segregation in transportation as well as the one dealing with school segregation. The losers also demanded specific provisions for legislation dealing with employment, personal security, and voting rights. They did not get such specificity in the resultant plank, only a promise of Federal effort in those areas. The floor fight had been led by Senators Douglas and Lehman and Governor G. Mennen Williams, Michigan. The plank which emerged was considered to represent a victory for the Southerners, although some of them, particularly the Georgia delegation, still resented it. 168

1960

Like the Republicans, the Democrats issued their strongest civil rights plank in 1960. Among other items,


it included a pledge to fully support the Civil Rights Acts of 1956 and 1960. It then stated that if presently existing legislation proved to be inadequate, the Democrats would seek new legislation for a variety of purposes: to eliminate literacy tests and poll taxes; to assure a first step compliance everywhere to the Supreme Court's desegregation decision by 1963; to give financial and technical assistance to schools with particularly difficult transition problems; to assure equal job opportunities, including provision for an FEPC; and to assure equal access to public facilities and to Federal or Federally-assisted housing. The plank carried little in the way of compromises typical of the two preceding platforms, although a few were present. The difference in 1960 lies largely in circumstances within the convention.

A struggle over the civil rights plank was contemplated. But, as Anthony Lewis reported, as the battle shaped up on the day before the convention, it looked as if the North had all the guns. Johnson's candidacy was the major Southern disadvantage; he needed support from the North and West in order to win the nomination. The Kennedy camp planned to ignore the South and was strongly in favor of civil rights. They were not worried about accommodating the South, as had been the case in earlier conventions. In
addition, proceedings in a year like 1956 were dominated by men who wished to avoid a Southern bolt, men like Rayburn and McCormack. In 1960, the drafting committee was headed by Chester Bowles, a strong Kennedy backer, and the committee had a great many strong civil rights advocates. The difficult dilemma facing the committee's Southerners, led by North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin, was whether to make a fight of things if the civil rights plank was too strong. They had to consider several factors: the reactions of the folks back home; the possible damage to Johnson's candidacy; the chances, as they saw it, that Johnson had of winning.169

When the committee's draft was revealed, it stirred Southern reactions. It included three items which, according to William M. Blair in the Times, were highly obnoxious to the Southerners: 1) legislated authority for the "Attorney-General to sue on behalf of individual civil rights—the so-called Part 3 removed by Southerners from the Civil Rights Act of 1957"; 2) provision for making the Civil Rights Commission permanent; and 3) expressed sympathy for Southern sit-ins, though without referring to them by name (a small concession to the Southerners). Ervin was reported to be very unhappy; he said that he would consult with other

Southerners on future action. Meanwhile, the platform moved to the full platform committee for approval.

After such approval was given, the Southerners quickly repudiated the civil rights plank and prepared to fight it in the convention. They planned to file a minority report, but no bolt was contemplated, at least not seriously. Even after the convention overrode the Southern dissent and adopted the platform by a voice vote, there was no threat of walk-out. As Lawrence reported, the most the ten Southern states did was take exception to the plank and protest, but to no avail. As Blair observed, the plank represented a major victory for liberals, labor, and Negro groups. Kennedy was reported to be happy with it. It may well be, Kennedy's presumed lack of concern for the South notwithstanding, that the selection of Johnson for his running-mate was intended as compensation to the South for the civil rights plank, at least in part.

1964.

In 1964, the civil rights plank was much briefer than had been the case with earlier platforms. It rejected

violence and lawlessness by all sides, and it promised effective enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The key to the plank was, evidently, the use of the word "enforcement", which was considered a stronger term than the GOP platform's "execution" and "implementation". 174

Governor Carl Sanders of Georgia indicated that he might file a minority report if the civil rights plank did not emphasize local implementation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. But few people expected a fight over the point, 175 nor did they get one. The plank was stated in what was generally considered moderate language from its inception. Committee leaders, observed Lewis, had agreed on language which was designed to be somewhat compromising. The plank stated, in addition to the provision for enforcement, that Federal action should be forthcoming only if local authorities defaulted in its implementation. Sanders' concern, and that of several other delegates from the South, was to tone down the language even further. 176 The attempt went nowhere.

At least one Northerner considered altering the proposed plank. Lewis reported that Senator Philip Hart offered to the platform committee a plank calling for the


175. *ibid*

enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment provision for lowering Congressional representation of states that discriminate in voting. The proposal was dropped for lack of support, and the plank—the entire platform for that matter—was adopted in the smooth pattern so typical of Johnson's convention. 177

Summary

There is considerable similarity between the Democrats and the Republicans in their approaches to civil rights, not only in terms of the range of substance and the quality of the substance, but also in their patterns of presentation. For example, both parties have had three strong civil rights planks in their platforms since 1948. In other years, the two parties either compromised the planks or presented clearly more restrained planks. In the Democrats' case, it was usually compromise with the Southerners. In the case of the GOP, the more restrained planks were the result of more conservative forces in control of the convention rather than a matter of compromise with the more conservative viewpoint. But the result in the case of both parties was relatively similar.

There is little to distinguish between the two parties in their strongest planks, except perhaps the Democratic

penchant for an FEPC. In the weaker civil rights planks, the Democrats probably emerge somewhat stronger. But both parties have from time to time advocated the importance of the role of states and localities and indicated a willingness to limit the Federal role, the Democrats almost as much as the Republicans.

The evidence of the platforms suggests that through 1960, the Republicans were competing with the Democrats on an equal footing in the strength of their advocacy of civil rights, a footing that was lost to the GOP in 1964. But the forces that exercise a restraining influence in the Democratic Party and a liberalizing influence in the Republican Party are still present and can exert themselves again. Since historical circumstances have been so prominent in determining the parties' positions, the future posture of the two parties on their civil rights planks must await the unraveling of such future circumstances.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

In 1952, in reference to platforms, a New York Times article stated: "They reflect many of the real differences between the rival parties. Above all, the platform reflects the personality of the party, identifies it as surely as a campaign button." This study has searched for those differences and personalities in the platforms. Some of them have been made apparent as the study has progressed.

Limitations of the Present Study

This study examined platforms, one vehicle by which political parties express themselves, their values, and their policy inclinations. Behind it lies the hope of gaining some insights into the nature of the two parties, their similarities, and their differences, insights which may help lead to broader generalizations concerning the relationship of each party to public policy. Such a study can contribute only a small part to the construction of such a large picture, and thus the results should be viewed most modestly.

Political parties express themselves in many ways—through publications, through the personnel they recruit, and through the utterances and actions of their personnel—both inside and outside the formal governing process. The platform is but one means of party expression, and there is much that must lie outside its framework. The platform is a campaign document, but many other factors have equal and greater impact on the campaign. The platform is a series of policy pronouncements, but other pronouncements, equally and probably more significant, issue forth from candidates, from Congress, from statehouses, from committees, and so forth. The platform is a means of problem and issue identification, but less significant as such than the work of interest groups and interested individuals outside and within the party. The platform is a means of group recognition and identification, but a vehicle of less significance than many other actions of the party and its personnel. The conclusions that are reached from studying platforms must be tempered by the sober realization that there is much that platforms cannot tell us. This does not, of course, mean that platforms tell us but little or nothing of value; the largest star cannot reveal all, or most, or even very many, of the secrets of the universe, and it is puny by comparison—but it may tell us something of use, of itself and of its milieu, and that is enough.
The same platform which appears as such a small part of the total political picture is, in itself, a multifaceted creation with complex implications. This study was, by necessity, a highly generalized one. Such a study seemed needed, but there are perhaps many points of party distinction which may have escaped scrutiny because of the limits of familiarity with every policy area on the part of this student. A specialist, or a team of them, could have more adequately revealed some possible subtle points of difference. For example, the specialist may have been able to find special significance in the fact that in 1952, the Democrats proposed extended water pond construction and the Republicans did not. Thus, a thorough expert in each policy area could, perhaps, uncover many finer distinctions between the parties; the ten platforms would give several hundred opportunities to do so.

Finally, it should be noted that no conscious attempt has been made to evaluate platforms. It would not be within the proper scope of this study to inquire if planks were realistic in terms of practical policy, or if they were contradictory, or meaningful, or needed. Nor have I attempted to ascertain the probable perception of planks on the part of voters. These might be useful points to examine, but not within the present context. My intention has
been simply to present planks as they appeared to be, with such historical data as might further illuminate their significance. And, of course, I have not presumed consciously to give my value judgments on proposed policy itself; that is another field of political endeavor.

Platforms

Much was stated about platforms in an earlier chapter, but on the basis of this study, some further remarks are in order. The first of these is that platforms have a wide range of degrees of generality and specificity. A not-uncommon view exists that platforms consist of nothing but high-sounding phrases and such vague generalities that, in reality, they have little substance upon which to judge them, or for that matter, about which to agree or disagree. This is only partially true. I would suggest that there are three basic levels of specificity in platforms. The most general level consists of the kind of grandiose pronouncement suggested above. There is a good deal of this in platforms, often stated in the form of lofty ideals. They exist, presumably, on the assumption that for some purposes it is good to know that the party has ideals. Such expressions are not meant to be the subject of policy analysis or argument; their presence is their own justification.
The most specific level of platform statement is that which includes well-defined proposals, either in terms of specific figures and data or in terms of specific action toward a well-defined object. Such statements are relatively rare in platforms.

The middle-level is the most common form of platform statement, and if it is often difficult to pin down its policy significance, it is also difficult to say that it is so vague as to have no significance. Such statements are specific in that they define an area of action and the direction to be traveled. Their generality stems from an inability to determine the steps. It is possible to see what the parties want done, and generally what they will do to get there; it is impossible to see how they will get there or, in fact, how far they will go. The direction is known, but one can only vaguely determine the mileage and mode of transportation.

Pomper has suggested as adequate an explanation for this as probably can be found, besides the limits of space in a platform. "When the party seeks to appeal to a wide range of interests, vagueness results. When the party feels that its electoral chances will be improved by an uncompromising appeal to one group, platform statements will become clearer." Evidently, the party is faced with this

dilemma: the clearer the statement, the more appeal it has to specific groups, but the more chance exists of alienating another interest. The statement must, then, be specific enough to attract, but not so specific that it repels. Few platform statements are uncompromising appeals.

Another item of note regarding platforms is that they are often important for what they do not say as well as for what they do say and assert. For analyzing past platforms, we are virtually dependent on recorded recollections of participants and observers to give clues as to why a subject was omitted. For the analysis of future platforms, it is critical that considerable information exist concerning the proceedings and deliberations of drafters, committees, the convention, and outside influences, particularly in their informal activities.

The Two Parties

It has been stated that the two major parties agree on the goals of government and that they disagree on the means of attaining them. There are indications in platforms that both parts of this statement need to be refined. For example, distinctions ought to be made regarding goals. However, this leads to the familiar argument about ends and means and the difficulty in distinguishing an end from a means to an end which may only serve as a means to another
end, and so on. Thus, in terms of public policy, a goal of government might be stated as the welfare of the citizenry. A means to that goal might be public education, which becomes a goal itself. The means to public education may be through local, state, or Federal action, or any degree of combination of the three, any of which can become a policy goal in its own right. The process could go on indefinitely, but at least the point should be clear—it is pointless to try to distinguish or compare the parties in terms of goals and means unless the two are themselves distinguished. Identifying goals with philosophical disposition and means with policy preferences is one way to do this. On this basis, the two parties can be compared.

In terms of policy preferences, it must be remembered that platforms usually give only directions. Without reviewing the details of the entire paper, it can be stated that there have been extremely few clear-cut differences over specific policies. In terms of policy directions, the platforms indicate that both parties are highly similar and both are strongly committed to generally similar action in the same areas of endeavor. The amount of duplication or near duplication is quite high. If opposing wings of the parties have reconciled their differences on the notion that their similarities were greater than their differences, the
two parties could reconcile themselves to each other on the same basis.

The compromising nature of platforms affects the parties' positions. This can be seen in reference to a 1960 study by Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara. In this study, the authors tested party leaders' attitudes on 24 issues in order to determine the degree of difference between the leaders of each party as well as the difference in the attitudes of party leaders with those of party followers. Although the authors framed the issues somewhat differently than do platforms, the results are worth noting.

Of the 24 issues, six had scores which indicated sharp differences between the leaderships of the two parties. These six issues were: public ownership of natural resources, farm price supports, slum clearance and public housing, Federal aid to education, government regulation of business, and the corporate income tax. Of the six, three are points on which sharp differences appear in the platforms. However, in the platforms, the sharpness is expressed in the context of a particular aspect of the problem. Thus, for public ownership of natural resources, the difference is seen in platform expressions on public lands.

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management; for Federal aid to education, the only clear conflict is over aid for teachers' salaries; the conflict over price supports is expressed in terms of flexibility or rigidity. Of the other three issues, two are largely untouched in platforms, per se: government regulation of business and the corporate income tax. All that can be said of those two issues is that the GOP tends to view taxes and government regulation more suspiciously than do the Democrats, but the platforms do not provide nearly the degree of difference found in the McClosky study. The last issue, slum clearance and public housing, has received consistently strong support in both parties' platforms, with the GOP again tending toward more reservations in favor of private enterprise and local action, hardly a division of the magnitude suggested by the McClosky study.

The study found nine issues on which there were moderate differences between party leaders: taxes on large incomes, regulation of public utilities, social security benefits, taxes on business, the enforcement of anti-monopoly laws, reliance on the U. N., minimum wages, regulation of trade unions, and public control of atomic energy. Of the nine, three issues (regulation of public utilities, taxes on large incomes, and taxes on business) have not been platform subjects. The other six issues have shown only mild party differentiation in the platforms, with two possible
exceptions. The parties have differed over public control of atomic energy, with the GOP showing a clearer preference for more private activity. However, the point suffers from lack of emphasis in Republican platforms, weakening the distinction. The same holds true for the regulation of trade unions unless the Taft-Hartley dispute is considered, at which point the difference between the two parties becomes more sharply defined.

The McClosky study found that on the other nine issues, the differences between the party leaders were mild to almost non-existent. These issues were: participation in military alliances, enforcement of integration, tariff levels, immigration, foreign aid, taxes on middle incomes, taxes on small incomes, restrictions on credit, and defense spending. The platforms reflect similar differences on the two tax issues, restrictions on credit, defense spending, and integration. On the four other issues, the platforms reveal somewhat sharper distinctions than most of the issues on which McClosky found moderate differences.

It is particularly interesting to note the differences between the two parties with respect to military alliances and foreign trade (with which tariff questions are integrally bound). The differences stem from one basic difference: the Republicans tend to be more nationally protective. This protective quality has led the
GOP to be more assertive toward foreign military and political commitments while remaining more reluctant regarding foreign economic commitments. The Democrats have been willing to undertake and adhere to both military and economic commitments abroad, but with less militancy regarding alliances and more readily regarding trade (where the platform differences from the GOP position might almost be termed "sharp").

Several conclusions might be offered from the foregoing discussion of the McClosky study's results. The authors suggested, on the basis of their findings, that "the parties submit to the demands of their constituents less slavishly than is commonly supposed." This, they found, was particularly true of Republicans. The analysis of platforms indicates that the parties submerge many of the differences McClosky found and more closely approach the position of the general public. Platforms are documents with which the broad public can identify. The probable reason behind this is that the complex process of compromise, combined with the desire to make a broad electoral appeal, brings the platforms closer to the voters' attitudes than to those of the party leaders. This suggests a question: which more adequately reflects the true nature of the

parties' orientation toward public policy, the platforms or the attitudes of party leaders?

The McClosky study indicates that the attitudes of party leaders significantly affects the parties' approaches to the making of public policy. This point, combined with the analysis of platforms, suggests another, more fundamental question, stated in the form of a lengthy hypothesis. The conflict between the parties' approach to the electorate (as represented in platforms) and their approach to public policy (as represented in the findings of the McClosky study) indicates that each party has a duality of orientation to public problems. Each party reflects the public mass, and yet each carries a life and a will of its own in terms of public policy. The significance, beyond the split-personality quality, is that the parties may be catering to public demands considerably more than they are willing to effect those demands. In other words, what the parties want during the search for power is not necessarily what they will do once in power. The electoral mandate is probably considerably less a mandate than the electorate supposes or than the parties are willing to let the electorate suppose. The significance of this hypothesis is profound for any democracy, and it bears further investigation.

This dichotomy of party approaches to issues complicates the determination of meaningful party differences.
The meaning of the parties must be sought in their electoral stances and in the stands of party leaders and policy makers, but the search is complicated and difficult, a complexity further accentuated by the internal dichotomy of each party along ideological lines. Thus, each party has at least two internal divisions, and electoral-policy making difference and a liberal-conservative split. In each case, the internal divisions appear of greater consequence in the GOP.

Furthermore, the liberal-conservative division affects the parties' general behavior in making both electoral appeals and public policies. Thus, the Republican platforms of 1952 and 1964 offer somewhat sharper contrasts to the Democratic performance in the years 1948 through 1964 than do the other GOP platforms within that period. One concludes that the GOP platforms of 1952 and 1964 more closely reflected the attitudes of party leaders than any of the other platforms, of either party, under study.

Yet, the Republican platforms of 1952 and 1964 were not particularly out of character for the GOP as compared with the other three platforms of the period under study. There is a certain similarity of theme which generally ties all of the Republican platforms together and distinguishes them from Democratic platforms of the same period.
While there have been few real contrasts between the parties and a great deal of similarity, there have also been differences of emphasis apparent in the platforms. The Republicans have a greater partiality for questions of economy, of administration, of protective nationalism, of the activities of private enterprise, and of the status of state and local governments. Democrats are not insensitive to these items by any means. The Democrats show greater affinity for ethnic minorities, for urban and rural workers, and for questions of civil rights. However, the GOP is not insensitive to them either.

In terms of philosophical disposition, there is again a difference of emphasis, largely over the question of how much the government, particularly the Federal government, should do. Both parties recognize and address this question in their platforms. The difference is that the Republicans are more wrapped up in the question and appear to be more disturbed by it. The difference is partially reflected in the tendency for the Democrats to be more program-oriented than the GOP and for the Republicans to be more philosophically attuned than the Democrats. The Democrats are more inclined to mention programs and details of Federal action with substantially fewer reservations as to how far the Federal government should go. The Republicans are more prone to question the extent of that activity.
Perhaps this difference reveals a more fundamental difference in attitude toward the Federal government. The Democrats see the government in more optimistic hues, that it can and must be the friend, protector, and dispenser of good, while the GOP is more pessimistic and suspicious, fearing what Big or Strong Government might become or might destroy. In the light of the strong Republican commitment to Federal activities, one might suggest that the Republicans are consistently more uneasy and plagued by mixed emotions about the relationship of the Federal government to the rest of the society.

In the platforms, this difference in emphasis was expressed at its sharpest in 1964. The Republican platform stated:

Within our Republic the Federal Government should act only in areas where it has Constitutional authority to act, and then only in respect to proven needs where individuals and local and state governments will not or cannot adequately perform. Great power, whether governmental or private, political or economic, must be so checked, balanced, and restrained and, where necessary, so dispersed as to prevent it from becoming a threat to freedom any place in the land.182

The Democratic platform of the same year offered this assessment of government: "Each level of government has appropriate powers and each has specific responsibilities... No government at any level can properly complain of

violation of its power, if it fails to meet its responsibilities."\textsuperscript{183} In many respects, both statements say much the same thing. But behind each can be detected a major philosophic thread, and the one which basically distinguishes the two parties: the Democratic belief in the rightness and necessity of Federal action and the GOP reluctance to use it and fear of a concentration of power at the Federal level.

This discussion should be refined somewhat to take account of the dichotomous nature of the two parties, the fact that both parties have their mutually overlapping "liberal" and "conservative" wings, as the terms are generally used. With the Democrats, the dichotomy is largely, though not exclusively, over Negro civil rights. It is, ironically, a division which can split the entire party, but has relatively little influence over the total platform. For the Republicans, the matter has a greater impact on platforms in that either wing may exert dominant control at a convention and thus determine the nature of many facets of the platform. This is why GOP platforms are more erratic as seen over a period of time.

But the fact remains that both parties are strongly identified with Federal activities, with what the Federal

\textsuperscript{183} Porter and Johnson (1966), pp. 648-49.
government is doing. In this sense, both parties are essentially conservative. Their general attitude when in power is to continue and give more of the same, when out of power to do the same correctly or better than the in-party is presently doing. While advocacy of Federal action is generally termed "liberal", it might be suggested that attachment to the status quo, the earmark of traditional conservatism, means attachment to Federal action. Perhaps new meanings should be sought for the current use of these terms.

It might also be suggested that tenure in power has such a conservatizing effect. The Republicans had what are considered its most "liberal" platforms in 1956 and 1960, i.e. they were the strongest in their advocacy of Federal activities. Even allowing for the fact that the forces in control of the 1952 and 1964 platforms represented a different wing of the party, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the GOP tenure in power from 1953 through 1960 added to the "liberality" of tone of the platforms of 1956 and 1960. The conclusion one draws is that by its stay in power, the GOP was led to embrace many government programs that it might not otherwise have so done, that it developed a commitment to many programs of Federal action as its own.

After all is said and done, it is difficult to balance the amount of similarity between the parties with their
few contrasts and their differences of emphasis without overstatement the case one way or the other. The differences exist, but so does the vast area of similarity. Given the nature of the American political system, perhaps the significance of this relationship is best expressed by Shakespeare: "'tis not so deep as a well nor so wide as a church door, but 'tis enough, 'twill serve."

**Suggestions for Further Research**

As was stated at the beginning of this chapter, there is much that this study could not cover which could stand further investigation with respect both to platforms and to political parties. I would suggest a series of highly refined studies on each policy area which is regularly addressed in platforms. Other studies might deal with the relevance of platforms to ascertain if they are truly addressing themselves to real problems with probably realizable goals in sight. In addition, there is a need to study the relationship between what the parties say they want and what in fact their policy behavior actually is. Finally, as far as platforms are concerned, there is room to investigate the level of awareness and perceptiveness of the electorate to the party platforms, a further step in the studies of political awareness among the general public.
This paper has examined one facet of party performance in the contest for power. In the effort to uncover the nature of our major parties, there is more, however, than simply trying to reveal the self-image of the party of the intentions they so willingly proclaim in the quadrennial struggle and festivity of American presidential elections. It is also vitally important that party performance in wielding power be examined, scrutinized in detail and over time. In fact, it could well be argued that what the parties say is not as important as what they do—that in the best American tradition, actions and deeds are more eloquent than words. Of course, no scale can adequately assess the respective importance of words and deeds in American politics. The important point is that they complement each other in the composition and in the nature of humans and human institutions.

Thus, a thorough examination of party performance in power is needed, encompassing a series of studies, for no single study could be expected to adequately profile the behavior of our parties. This study of platforms has reflected the vast complexity of policy areas, and has probably been limited thereby. As has been mentioned, further work is called for, policy area by policy area. This study has also noted the complex, dichotomous nature of the parties, a phenomenon that has been widely recognized but has
been insufficiently explored in action. Further studies of what the parties say and think about themselves and about each other, and what they do in addressing themselves to political problems may reveal much in terms of what they stand for, what they may be expected to do, and in what circumstances they may so function. No study or series of studies can be expected to give solidly predictive answers about such a dynamic, evolving human institution as political parties. But the need for greater understanding still exists. For such a profoundly important political element, further efforts ought to be made.
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