SOME REFLECTIONS ON A MUDDLED DEBATE:
ANOTHER LOOK AT MORGENTHAU
AND HIS CRITICS

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STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

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ABSTRACT

The debate between Morgenthau and his critics has occupied a central position in the literature in international relations throughout the last two decades. My purpose in this thesis is to analyze that debate.

My discussion deals mainly with the controversy over power, the national interest, and diplomacy. I also concern myself with the contributions which both Morgenthau and his critics can make to a theoretical understanding of political man in particular and international relations generally.

If scholars are to engage in a sophisticated intellectual dialogue, it is necessary that they understand each other. Unfortunately, the most striking feature of this debate is that Morgenthau and his critics have misinterpreted each other, and have been rather dogmatic in their respective positions. In short, the debate has been characterized by muddled thinking. It is my hope that I have cleared the air of some of that muddled thought.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It has been almost a decade now, since William T. R. Fox looked at the study of international relations as bursting with an activity "which is ambiguously labelled 'theoretical.'" That the search for theory continues to be a main concern of scholars in the field, and that for the most part discussion of various approaches to theory remains polemical in nature, is evidenced by a plethora of recent articles and journal publications. To suggest that the debate between Morgenthau and his critics has occupied a central position in much of this literature in the past decade is to suggest the obvious. Not so obvious, perhaps, is the extent to which this debate has been characterized by misunderstanding, and intellectual dishonesty.


The purpose in thesis is to analyze the muddled debate between Morgenthau and his critics. The analysis is organized in chapters according to the following considerations: methodological and theoretical assumptions; political ethics and the concept of the national interest; and theoretical prescriptions of statesmanship, diplomacy, and the world state. The organization of the material which follows caused some difficulty, however, and clarification of what is involved in this thesis and of several terms which are used is needed.

First, there is no coherent body of literature that can be sufficiently designated as the "debate" between Morgenthau and his critics. Most of the critics have responded in sporadic manner to the various theoretical positions which emanate from Morgenthau's contributions. And while the critics share in common a reproach to Morgenthau at some point or other, they do not necessarily agree


3. The exception to this statement is Ghazi A. R. Algosaibi, "The Theory of International Relations: Hans J. Morgenthau and his Critics," Background, VIII (February, 1965), 221-253. While Algosaibi presents a fairly thorough explication of Morgenthau's theory, I found his critical commentaries and his analysis of Morgenthau's critics to be lacking. Our points of disagreement will be evident. Furthermore, Algosaibi did not deal explicitly with several questions which are raised in this thesis. Nor did he include in his analysis several critics which are included in this thesis.
with each other. I think this will become evident, although a qualification should be made with respect to the second chapter.

In Chapter 2 I deal with the methodological dispute which has evolved between Morgenthau and what may be loosely defined as the "systematic" school in international relations theory. The term "systematic" is somewhat misleading, however. It is not meant to indicate the systems approach to international relations theory. Nor is it meant to suggest that all scholars which are placed in this school share similar theoretical assumptions. Morton Kaplan and J. W. Burton, for example, would find as much at fault with each other as they do with Morgenthau. But the scholars which I do include in this discussion are similarly opposed to Morgenthau's methodological assumptions, especially his view "of the eternal laws of politics."

Further, these theorists ostensibly reject Morgenthau's use of the power concept as a basis for a theory of international relations and opt for a more systematic approach to theory.

Second, this thesis does not embody a full explanation of everything which Morgenthau has written, nor does it include a thorough analysis of all his critics. The concern is solely with international relations theory. Hence, Morgenthau's discussions of substantive issues, of
foreign policy, of American and international politics, and of ethics, and any critical commentaries on these discussions, have been incorporated if they were found relevant to the debate over theory.

The method employed in this thesis is textual analysis. The framework which ties the analysis together is Morgenthau's view of the purpose of theoretical inquiry. This view is presented in the opening pages of Chapter 2. Any inferences which are made on my part are fairly explicit, and I should like to think, well-founded.

One final caveat is offered to the reader. This thesis is not conceived of as a wrecking operation. The debate between Morgenthau and his critics inheres with a problem which is somewhat analogous to a problem faced in many of our large cities—the problem is smog. We cannot rid cities of smog by wrecking their structures, for the problem of smog is related to hot air and atmospheric inversion. If the structures are ruined, the hot air remains.

The purpose in this thesis, therefore, is not simply to dispose of Morgenthau and his critics. Their debate is worthwhile and important to the development of international relations theory. But I believe that the fundamental requisite to a sophisticated critical analysis of theoretical approaches in international relations is clear
thinking. And it is hoped that the findings in this thesis will contribute to the clearing of some of the hot air from the debate between Morgenthau and his critics. We shall begin with theoretical and methodological assumptions.
CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS:
WHEN PURITY AND CONTINENCE BECOME
INTELLECTUAL SOPHISTRY

Eugene Meehan's argument that "political scientists must abandon the search for a definition of 'political' and begin thinking in terms of the phenomenon that they find interesting or significant,"1 is the vogue with most contemporary students of politics. The position complements the sensible methodological statement by Francis Sorauf: "The methods and techniques the political scientist uses in acquiring his data depend on the nature of the data he seeks."2 The discipline is in a position to look back over eight decades of methodological and conceptual controversy and realize the futility of such exercises. While the pursuit of analytic purity may provide conduits for publication, the search ultimately results in fundamentalist and obscurant polemics. As Meehan avers, the end of conceptual


misery may be realized by a "simple move from the essentialist to the nominalist meaning" of political inquiry. If Morgenthau and his critics share an intellectual affinity for the views of Meehan and Sorauf, it is rarely expressed in their dialogue.

Morgenthau's Theoretical Purity

Morgenthau's perception of the function of international relations theory is a theme which persists in many of his works. An exposition of Morgenthau's view of the purpose of theoretical inquiry has immediate bearing on the discussion which follows. It is also relevant for an understanding of the scholar's concern for normative evaluation and policy prescription, interests which will be canvassed in the following chapters.

International relations theory, according to Morgenthau, performs theoretical, intellectual, and practical tasks. In the former role, it serves the function of any

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3. Meehan, loc. cit. It is recognized that the dispute over the scope and purpose of political inquiry is not necessarily linked to the debate over the proper methods and techniques to be used in inquiry. However, in practice an inextricable relationship over the scope and purpose of inquiry and the methods of inquiry is usually evident. As Sorauf goes on to state: "And since the data a discipline seeks are largely set by the goals and self-image of the discipline, we come back again to the ferment in political science over goals and trends. In the broadest terms, the particular patterns of skills /methods and techniques/ a political scientist possesses depend to a great extent on his views of the discipline and of the job of the political scientist." Sorauf, Ibid.
social theory, "that is to bring order and meaning into a mass of unconnected material and to increase knowledge through the logical development of certain propositions empirically established." In its intellectual role as political theory, international relations theory: "presents not only a guide to understanding, but also an ideal for action. It presents a map of the political scene not only in order to understand what the scene is like, but also in order to show the shortest and safest road to a given objective." The four practical functions of theory to be performed, unique to the study of international relations, are: to provide a justification for foreign policy decisions; to develop systematic and sound principles for foreign policy; to be an intellectual conscience, a sort of intellectual super-ego, judging sound principles of foreign policy; and lastly, to prepare the ground for a new international order.

Although Morgenthau's position with respect to the purpose of inquiry in the study of international relations


5. Ibid., "The Commitments of Political Science," The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 49.

6. Ibid., "Functions of a Theory of International Relations," pp. 73-75.
is explicit and personal, he at times intimates a rather "permissive" theoretical stance. He eschews "academic formalism which in its concern with methodological requirements tends to loose sight of the goal of knowledge and understanding which method must serve." Hence adherence to "respectable" methodological techniques must not preclude other approaches to the development of theory. The view is reflected in Morton Kaplan's contention that if "theorizing stops, rather than starts, with overly simple models, there will of course be no progress and even no really operational knowledge." In conjunction with this stance is the statement that the validity of international relations theory "does not depend upon its conformity with a-priori assumptions;" thus "the content of theory must be determined by the intellectual interests of the observer." Hypothetically, there can be as many "theories of politics as there are legitimate intellectual perspectives from which to approach the political scene."


Unfortunately, the tolerance hinted above is not consistently held. The contemporary concern with quantification, empirical science, and systematic classification, according to Morgenthau, is nothing but a new "scholasticism" which forces inquiry to "retreat even more from contact with the empirical world into a realm of self-sufficient abstractions."¹¹ Scholars such as Abraham Kaplan and Harold Lasswell, he feels, thoroughly misunderstand political theory and empirical research,¹² for they "are unable to see that a political science enclosed in nothing but an empirical framework is a contradiction in terms and a monstrosity."¹³ The various "intellectual interests and perspectives" which are justified in political inquiry are obviously forgotten.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., p. 29. Morgenthau's general criticism of Lasswell and Kaplan focuses on their methodological assumptions and their work Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). While one may wish to disagree with Morgenthau's criticism of their theoretical and methodological views, his rejection of the authors' analysis of Machiavelli cannot be refuted: "The authors believe that political science can be 'straightforward empirical' and that Machiavelli and Michels so conceived it . . . . But do the authors not recognize the fact that Machiavelli was a political philosopher steeped in the ancient tradition, that his empirical inquiry is enclosed within a philosophical framework resting upon the pillars of fortuna and virtu, concepts which come straight from classical antiquity . . . ."

¹³ Ibid., p. 31.
Professor Morgenthau's philosophy of the social sciences is presented in *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, an early work in which the crusade against "scientism" in social inquiry is initiated. Two essential criticisms are leveled against empirical science. The first objection is based on moral considerations: "The failure of the dogmatic scientism of our age to explain the social, and more particularly, political problems of this age and to give guidance for successful action calls for a re-examination of these problems in the light of the prerationalist Western tradition." 14 The second remonstrance is methodological, but inextricably linked with the moral admonition:

The analogy between natural and social world is mistaken for two reasons which lie in the domain of practical control and theoretical structure. On the one hand, human action is unable to mold the natural world and the social world with the same degree of technical perfection. On the other hand, the very concept of physical nature as the paradigm of reason, from which the analogy is derived, is invalidated by modern scientific thought itself; and it is only in rationalistic philosophy and science that it still leads a ghostlike existence. 15

Further, it is asserted that "no quantitative extension of scientific knowledge can solve those perennial problems which art, religion, and philosophy attempt to answer." 16

15. Ibid., p. 126.
16. Ibid., p. 123.
Most unsatisfactory in this work is Morgenthau's use of the word "scientism" to describe what he is primarily critical of on both methodological and moral grounds. One is never quite certain what this term means. At one point, for example, Morgenthau argues: "Scientism believes that the same kind of knowledge and of control holds true of the social world, and the social sciences simply emulate this model. The 'method of the single cause' is but a faithful copy of the method of the physical sciences."\textsuperscript{17} Now if we were to take this statement at face value to denote all that is meant by scientism, Morgenthau obviously has reserved his objections to the naturalistic approach to the methodology of the social sciences. He would not, it would seem, be opposed to the phenomenological approach to methodology, for phenomenology, like Morgenthau, "directly argues that the phenomena of the social sciences are not qualitatively continuous with those of the natural sciences, and that very different methods must be employed to study social reality."\textsuperscript{18} However, as noted below, Morgenthau's theory eschews a phenomenological concern which, contrary to

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 127.

naturalism, maintains,

that what is needed above all is a way of looking at social phenomena which takes into primary account the intentional structure of human consciousness and which accordingly places major emphasis on the meaning social acts have for the actors who perform them and who live in a reality built out of their subjective interpretation.19

One can only surmise that if Morgenthau has escaped placing his feet in either methodological camp, his critical equilibrium suffers by having them firmly implanted in thin air.

Moreover, Morgenthau's explicit affinity for the moral light that "prerationalist Western tradition" can throw on social problems would lead him to logically reproach eminent phenomenologists, Max Weber for example,20 who view the contributions of scientific investigation relevant to the solution of man's social problems. And upon close examination, Morgenthau's rejection of "scientism" on moral grounds is weak. Most of his criticisms are addressed to the well-known inadequacies of 19th century liberalism

19. Ibid. The term "phenomenology" as it is presented in this thesis and as it is discussed by Natanson should not be confused with the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Natanson distinguishes the use of the term to denote "all positions that stress the primacy of consciousness and subjective meaning in the interpretation of social action." It is interesting to note that Richard Snyder calls his decision-making scheme a "general phenomenological approach." See Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, An Approach to the Study of International Politics (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1962), p. 100.

20. Weber is cited by Natanson as the most articulate spokesman of the phenomenological viewpoint presented above. Natanson, op. cit., p. 274.
and of the rational optimism of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Few contemporary social scientists, and this was especially true of Weber, would disagree with Morgen- thau's main point—that science cannot replace the moral dimension of man's life. Normative evaluation and prescription may be an undertaking of the scientist, but it is an "extra-professional" activity. As one prominent philosopher of science puts it:

No development of Science will solve our great problems, however. Even if we give Man all the means of achieving whatever good he chooses, the final choice still rests with him . . . . But beyond this science cannot tell Man what is right and what is wrong. All the progress Science can make throughout human history will be wasted if Man fails to answer the eternal question correctly.22

Nor does Morgenthau sufficiently explain why "scientism" is incapable of helping man solve his social problems or adding to our understanding of the empirical world. He does state that "with the exception of technical problems of limited scope" the social scientist is no more competent "than the layman to solve social problems." But are we to


assume that hunger, disease, and increasing birth rates in the underdeveloped nations are simply "technical problems of limited scope?" Apparently the answer is yes, for as Morgenthau further states: "Social problems, such as marriage, education, equality, freedom, authority, peace are of a different type . . . . They are the result of those conflicts in which the selfishness and the lust for power, which are common to all men, involve all men." In point of fact, Morgenthau would have us exchange the dogmatism of his scientific straw man for a dogmatism of a different nature, the authority "of ill-informed men who, while devoid of scientific knowledge, possess insights of a different and higher kind." His concluding insight reads:

The key to those laws of man is not in the facts from whose uniformity the sciences derive their laws. It is in the insight and the wisdom by which more-than-scientific man elevates his experiences into the universal laws of human nature. It is he who, by doing so, establishes himself as the representative of true reason, while nothing-but-scientific man appears as the true dogmatist who universalizes cognitive principles of limited validity and applies them to realms not accessible to them.

Can dogmatic more-than-scientific man comprehend the sound judgment of Raymond Aron, who like himself is skeptical of an operational science of politics?

25. Ibid., p. 212.
26. Ibid., p. 220.
There is no lack of partial studies of a purely scientific character, in the strict sense of that term as used in physics or chemistry. How vulnerable are the silos in which nuclear missiles are stored? Given the explosive force of thermonuclear warheads, the average deviation in range, and the 'hardness' of the sites, how many missiles are needed on an average to destroy an enemy device? The method of analysis, in such a case, is no different from that used in the natural sciences.  

The answer is an unqualified no, for dogmatic more-than-scientific man has gone beyond stipulating the limitations of science, and in the process, has precluded an awareness of the contributions which science has to offer.

Professor Morgenthau's philosophy of the social sciences results in a muddled polemic which obscures the real methodological issues that exist between himself and science. In a succinct manner, Ernest Nagel elucidates the insufficient base of Morgenthau's position:

The recommendation to use scientific method is the recommendation of a way for deciding issues of factual validity and adequacy; it is not the recommendation of an exclusive way in which the universe may be confronted and experienced. Until Mr. Morgenthau recognizes this difference between questions of validity and of origin, he will be fighting with windmills.


Morgenthau's fight with windmills is not left with *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*. In the essay cited above in which Morgenthau discusses the functions of theory, he contends that the scientific approach to inquiry results in elucidating or obscuring the obvious.\(^{29}\) The statement suggests that he has failed to do his homework. For example, not only was new knowledge and understanding gained by Stouffer's study of the American soldier, but the investigation corrected the faulty intuition adhered to prior to the inquiry.\(^{30}\) Furthermore, Stouffer's research has much in common with the significance Morgenthau places on the

\(^{29}\) Morgenthau, "Functions of a Theory of International Relations," p. 77. Morgenthau's criticism of the current study of comparative politics is equally unwarranted: "The comparison of different political institutions and systems requires logically a tertium comparationis, that is, a proposition which provides a standard for comparison . . . . Comparative government, in order to be an academic discipline at all, then, requires a theory of politics that makes meaningful comparisons possible. In the absence of such a theory, it is not fortuitous that comparative government is hardly more than the description of, or at best a series of theories about, individual political institutions and systems without comparison." "Commitments of Political Science," p. 43. Professor Morgenthau is apparently not familiar with the Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics. It may be to his advantage to examine, at least for a starter, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965). This contribution is anything but lacking in comparative analysis.

"quantity and quality of the armed forces." Morgenthau's own position, then, should cause him to be more hesitant in dismissing the study as irrelevant and "an innocuous intellectual pastime engaged by academicians for the benefit of other academicians."  

One is further befuddled by many similar contradictions which inhere in Morgenthau's own theoretical works. In the opening pages of *Politics Among Nations*, for example, he argues that the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences in foreign policy analyses are "two popular fallacies" which a realist theory of international politics will avoid. Yet in the closing pages of the same work, we find a lengthy analysis of Russian diplomacy and foreign policy that intimates a concern for motivations and ideology. Discussing the ostentatious display by the Russian embassies at diplomatic receptions in the thirties, Morgenthau explains:

The purpose of this extravagance was not to show the bourgeois inhabitants of the Western world how well off the Russian people were. The purpose was rather to compensate for the political inferiority from which the Soviet Union had just barely


escaped and into which it feared it might sink again.  

Furthermore, the Russian diplomat is regarded as the exponent of a philosophy which considers diplomatic relations "only a temporary expedient, not the normal and permanent way of carrying on relations with Capitalistic states. It believes in the inevitability of the breakdown of capitalistic societies." With this assessment, Morgenthau is in complete agreement with a social psychologist's contention that "ideological factors clearly have a significant impact on the relations between nations."

Are we to assume at this point that Morgenthau has abdicated his realistic bent in theory? Did he forget his initial warning that "even if we had access to the real motives of statesman, that knowledge would help us little in understanding foreign policies and might lead us astray?" Or has Morgenthau made it his forte to knowingly lead his readers "astray"? Perhaps a more sufficient

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34. Ibid., p. 543. (Italics added)

35. Ibid., p. 550. (Italics added)


37. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 6. Inis L. Claude makes a similar case against Morgenthau in Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 64. However, Claude's criticism is with reference to
explanation is that Morgenthau has simply contradicted himself.

The contradiction is even more indubitable in a major theme which emerges from Morgenthau's *The Purpose of American Politics*. The treatise opens with the statement:

The present crisis of American politics is, like its predecessors, essentially a crisis of the national purpose. It is not primarily the immediate objectives of our policies and the actions which seek to achieve them that are at fault. It is rather that these policies have lost the organic connection with the innermost purposes of the nation.38

The national purpose, as Morgenthau sees it, is the establishment of equality in freedom, a historic achievement which reflects the liberal conservatism and the revolutionary liberalism of the American political tradition. "To maintain that achievement of equality in freedom within the United States has, then, been the fundamental and minimal purpose of America."39

In addition, Morgenthau contends that his analysis of the national purpose goes beyond a narrow or ideological interpretation. To argue that this is impossible, says

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39. Ibid., p. 33.
Morgenthau, "is to fall into the error of logical positivism, which denies the validity of philosophy because philosophic knowledge is uncertain and subject to abuse. It is to fall into the error of atheism, which denies the validity of religion on similar grounds."40 Indeed, Morgenthau states quite emphatically that his insights have much in common with the intuitive nature of philosophy and religion which "express in rational or symbolic terms the reality of an inner experience, which is not less real for not being of the senses. The same holds true of the idea of the national purpose. As in philosophy and religion, the task here, too, is to maintain and restore the validity of the idea while avoiding the pitfalls of error and abuse.41 And those pitfalls will be overcome; the authority of "more-than-scientific" man has been asserted.

The American purpose is organic, states Morgenthau, and historically constant. We have simply lost track of it. If the crisis of the national purpose is to be overcome, then "the American purpose, established in the eyes of the world by deeds, must again become the foundation upon which, supported by the modern techniques of propaganda and foreign aid, the world-wide influence of America must rest."42

40. Ibid., p. 8.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 310.
The American purpose has always carried within "itself a meaning that transcends the national boundaries of America and addresses itself to all the nations of the world."\textsuperscript{43} And the American purpose has always demanded an expansion of "the area of equality in freedom in order to maintain equality in freedom at home."\textsuperscript{44} In the modern age this expansion of the American purpose is more urgent than ever, for now our purpose "cannot be accomplished within the limits of the North American continent, since it is challenged by a universal creed that knows no national boundaries and possesses the means of universal destruction."\textsuperscript{45}

Now how can Morgenthau prescribe a purpose and philosophy for American foreign policy to follow, which is a legitimate theoretical enterprise given the purposes he ascribes to theoretical inquiry, if he has not analyzed the purpose of American policy in the past? The answer is quite simple; he cannot. Indeed, \textit{The Purpose of American Politics} is devoted to each task. Witness just one among many assessments of the motives behind American policy in the Cold War.

And it must be said at once that the United States rose to the occasion with a stronger sense of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 34.
\item \textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 36.
\item \textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 5.
\end{itemize}
purpose and greater vigor of mind and appropriateness of action in 1946, when the threat to American survival was not yet acute but only foreseeable, than it did in the late fifties, when the threat was real and was clearly approaching the point of becoming unmanageable. On both occasions, however, American initiative was torn by two contradictions, unresolved purposes...46

It would seem that if the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences are "two popular fallacies" in foreign policy analyses, Morgenthau cannot avoid them. And as we shall see in Chapter 3, this concern in *The Purpose of American Politics* causes theoretical inconsistency with respect to Morgenthau's analysis of the national interest. More about this later.

A more smiting enigma in Morgenthau is the fact that his realist orientation in theory closely parallels several

46. Ibid., p. 172. It must be remembered that in this work Morgenthau engages in empirical evaluation of the motives and purposes in foreign policy and prescribes a purpose for American foreign policy to follow. His recognition of the link between ideology and political action is also evident in *Defense of the National Interest* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 210 (Italics added). In a discussion of the basic principles of ideological warfare, Morgenthau notes: "The great political ideologies of the past which captured the imagination of men and moved them to political action, such as the ideas of the American and French Revolutions and the slogans of Bolshevism and Fascism, were successful not because they were true, but because they gave people something they were waiting for, both in terms of knowledge and in terms of action." And in *Politics Among Nations*, p. 89, Morgenthau states that the ideological element is a necessary factor in mobilizing public support for a foreign policy: "To rally a people behind the government's foreign policy and to marshall all the national energies and resources to its support, the spokesman of the nation must appeal to biological necessities, such as national existence, and to moral principles, such as justice, rather than power."
trends evident in the systematic school of inquiry which he explicitly rejects, behaviorism and game theory for example. For instance, he urges scholars to place themselves "in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these alternatives this particular statesman acting under these circumstances is likely to choose." The approach is inherent in decision-making simulation and game theory. The scholar assumes the position of a statesman in a bargaining or policy situation and attempts to choose in a rational manner amongst alternative approaches to the problem being tested. In discussing the merits of game theory, Rapoport elucidates the resemblance more precisely:

It [game theory]... assumes perfectly rational players... Game theory is primarily a decision theory. It too casts situations into sequences of states. But each successive state is determined by a decision made by a rational being who foresees all possible outcomes and chooses a course of action which in some way is

47. Ibid., p. 5. (Italics added)
likely to yield the best outcome under the circumstances.48

Morgenthau's implicit agreement with behaviorism is evident when he ostensibly eschews a concern with the psychological motives and value preferences of statesmen, a view incidentally, that the purists in game theory similarly share.49 By disavowing the relevance and discrepancies of sub-national variables, Morgenthau's model generates a rather static and simplistic view of national actors. The result is a "black box" image of states which, as J. David Singer points out, "comes from some of the simpler versions of S-R psychology, in which the observer more or less ignores what goes on within the individual and concentrates upon the correlation between stimulus and response; these are viewed as empirically verifiable, . . . ."50 In short, the result is a behavioristic rather than behavioral view of nations.

It may be that Morgenthau is unaware of the complementary nature of his theoretical focus and that adhered to


49. Meehan, op. cit., p. 320.

in the systematic school. Yet I cannot believe that he has dismissed the systematic approach to theory without an understanding of its substantive content. What seems more likely is that Morgenthau is a victim of his subtle conceptual trappings. His sophistry lies not in denying a generous range of theoretical interests; we have observed his explicit acknowledgement of the legitimacy of all intellectual perspectives. It lies, rather in condemning all methodological commitments which seemingly fail to serve the functions Morgenthau personally ascribes to theoretical inquiry. "There is a strong tendency" in Morgenthau's position, (to use his own words) "to force theory into a Procrustean bed by judging it by its conformity with certain pre-established" theoretical "criteria rather than by its intrinsic contribution to knowledge and understanding."

51. Morgenthau, "The Commitments of Political Science," p. 45. So that the argument presented here is not misconstrued, I should like to clarify my position. I am not suggesting that Morgenthau carries on the same theoretical activities as game theorists or social psychologists and behaviorists. What I am saying is that he makes certain theoretical assumptions about the nature of political behavior, decision-making, and inquiry which are made by theorists in the systematic school. Yet he completely dismisses these theorists as irrelevant to international relations theorizing. He seems unaware, not only of complementary theoretical assumptions, but to the contribution these theorists can make to his own theoretical understanding of international politics. And lastly, his rejection of these theorists on methodological grounds has not been supported by the substance of his arguments. Morgenthau qua "more-than-scientific-man" equals the dogmatism of any scientist.
The Continence of His Critics

To this point, we have discussed Morgenthau's lack of methodical fair play with his critics. His remonstrations have been myopic and in effect obscurantist. That many of his critics have been unfair to Morgenthau and equally fundamentalist in their arguments will be clear from the analysis which follows.

Although Rapoport implicitly has some embarrassing things to say to Morgenthau, his discussion of game theory would cause Ghazi A. Algosaibi discomfort. Algosaibi has argued that Morgenthau's theory is inconsistent and that part of this inconsistency "can be traced to a juxtaposition of empirical and normative elements." Morgenthau's assumptions, the argument follows, are norms. And among these is the "concept of a completely rational foreign policy." However, Morgenthau is aware of this inconsistency and cautions that reality is deficient and "must be understood and evaluated as an approximation to an ideal system." Of course, this shortcoming will be found in any theoretical framework, whether the model assumes rationality or non-rationality in decision-making at the national


53. Ibid.

level. And the models employed in the systematic school, whose most important characteristic "is a clear trend to make the study of international relations as scientific as possible," are similar to Morgenthau's in this respect. Many schemes which are employed, including the "perfectly rational players" in game theory, are normative, although Algosaibi's use of the term normative in this sense is not entirely satisfactory.

Rapoport states that "game theory


57. Algosaibi uses "normative assumptions" to include "ideal" models or conceptions of political phenomenon and prescriptions offered by Morgenthau for the attainment of peace in contemporary international politics (i.e., diplomacy and statesmanship discussed by Algosaibi on p. 247 of his article). Now Morgenthau does state that rational foreign policy is "good" policy; but Algosaibi never mentions this explicitly and fails to make a necessary distinction between policy analysis, theoretical constructs for empirical investigation, and normative judgments (of what is good in itself). Algosaibi lets the cat out of the bag when he states that Morgenthau "is presenting not only an observable fact but also a norm to be attained. It could not be otherwise for experience is that not all statesmen have thought in these terms." p. 245. But it could "be otherwise" for other theorists who do not make normative judgments about foreign policy assume rationality in their theories. The point is that Algosaibi obscures Morgenthau's position, for Morgenthau makes the distinction we are discussing: "Yet it (realism) shares with all social theory the need, for the sake of theoretical understanding, to stress the rational elements of political reality; for it these rational elements that make reality intelligible for theory. Political realism presents the theoretical construct of a rational foreign policy which experience can never completely achieve. At the same time political realism considers a rational foreign policy to be good policy . . . political
is largely independent of special assumptions. Independence from special assumptions obtains, because game theory is entirely "normative." 58

Ideal schemes are not limited to game theory. George Liska's concept of a general single equilibrium system is a mixed analytical-normative concept. Liska assumes, implicitly at least, that a stable equilibrium in the international system is "good" and disequilibrium is "bad." 59 Morton Kaplan acknowledges that the various international systems he employs are "heuristic models. Except for the first two models, the international systems described here never had historical counterparts." 60 And heuristic systems models, albeit ideal for the scholar, inhere with theoretical inconsistency: "Systems cannot be isolated empirically, and it is unconscionably difficult to

realism maintains not only that theory must focus upon the rational elements of political reality, but also that foreign policy ought to be rational in view of its own moral and practical purposes." Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, loc. cit. (Italics added)

58. Rapoport, loc. cit.


60. Kaplan, loc. cit.
stipulate the empirical elements in a system that has been isolated analytically."61

The list could go on; it is not neoteric. The theoretical schemes employed by Rosenau, Guetzkow, and Snyder and his colleagues are ideal conceptions of what is thought necessary for the development of international relations theory. In addition, it should be noted that the genuine utility of the systematic schemes which are purported to serve a conceptual function in the theoretical works of two of Morgenthau's critics, Professors Raymond Aron and J. W. Burton, seems dubious.

Now this is not the place to discuss at length the respective theories of Professors Burton and Aron.62 The point I should like to make, however, is that in each case the general theoretical analyses of international relations have not been deduced from the conceptual models employed. Aron's historical sociology and Burton's cybernetics model seem to be thrown in to the substantive analyses as evidence of scientific embellishment. To this extent the theories of Aron and Burton have much in common with Morgenthau's theory. That is, their theories are the result, not of


meticulous verification and systematic testing of specified hypotheses, but rather the practical and historical judgment of each scholar. Indeed, dispensing with the conceptual frameworks would probably add clarity and elucidation to the theoretical analyses presented.

A similar dilemma is encountered in the theoretical approach which focuses on decision-making at the national level. In his criticism of the decision-making model developed by Richard C. Snyder (another critic of Morgenthau's theoretical model) and his colleagues, Herbert McClosky points out that no scholar could deal with all the variables in that model and expect to complete more than a very few studies in his lifetime. After generations of empirical application, a narrow-gauge theory of foreign policy decision-making may emerge. Hence, the genuine utility of the decision-making framework for the purpose of developing a general theory in international relations is suspect. As McClosky avers: "Until a greater measure of theory is introduced into the proposal and the relations among variables are specified more concretely, it is likely to remain little more than a setting-out of categories, and like taxonomy, fairly limited in its utility." A comparable

64. Ibid., p. 291.
viewpoint is evident in William Bluhm's comparison of Snyder's scheme with Thucydides' analysis of decision-making in the Peloponnesian War. Bluhm concludes:

We are tempted to wonder whether Professor Snyder will ever succeed in constructing a general theory of international politics by proceeding as he does. Does scientific precision require that we operate in such a tedious inductive fashion? Might not the student of international politics better take a grand general theory like that of Thucydides as his starting point, operationalize it part by part, and check out its elements with the careful case method which Snyder recommends? . . . such a procedure would at least produce great economies of time and effort. Perhaps it is also a way of bringing together great insight with methodological precision.65

The last sentence in Bluhm's argument is not without general merit. Indeed, with the exception of Burton and Aron, the systematic paragons presently in fashion, while admirably exuding large doses of conceptual heat, have been notably deficient in general theoretical light. Their unfair criticism of Morgenthau's "rationalism" then, seems to suggest a methodological continence equal to Morgenthau's theoretical purity.

Morgenthau's theory is founded on a method which is historical and empirical; it has been reproached for several reasons. The reproaches will be summarized according to Morgenthau's conceptual level of analysis and his theoretical

use of the power concept. We shall reserve comment on his prescriptive judgments and use of the national interest concept for later chapters. With respect to the first task, it is interesting to note the difficulty which plagues several critics in their interpretations of the problems which inhere in Morgenthau's level of analysis. They are far from being unanimous.

While Inis Claude subjects the implications and Morgenthau's use of the "balance of power" concept to penetrating criticism, he concludes his general analysis by arguing that balance of power theorists have provided a sound basis for a theory of world order, since they maintain a "steady focus on the state as the object of central concern." Kenneth Waltz, on the other hand, contends that Morgenthau is a first-image pessimist; he is guilty of single-factor analysis due to conceptual emphasis on human behavior. Although the pessimistic assumptions of a fixed human nature help to shift attention to social-political institutions, Morgenthau's main problem, according to Waltz, lies in failing to draw a clear conceptual relationship between his political theory and his theoretical assumptions.

67. Ibid., p. 273.
about man. While Waltz suggests, however, that Morgenthau displays admirable sophistication and discernment in his political commentary.

While the two interpretations adumbrated above may seem only slightly contradictory, they are at direct odds with the observations offered by J. David Singer and James P. Speer. Speer's thesis is that Morgenthau's theory of national and international politics is consistently related to his theory of human nature. Morgenthau achieves theoretical clarity, according to Speer, by raising a conceptual framework from the domestic to the international level. However, the process results in befuddling analysis of world order and the development of the world state. Singer's view of Morgenthau's level of analysis is quite the opposite of Speer's. Singer contends that Morgenthau presents a simplistic image of nation-states and human behavior, since his theoretical focus is on the international system. The problem here is not so much where Morgenthau is looking, but rather where his critics are looking at him.

69. Ibid., p. 38.
71. Singer, op. cit., p. 81.
Morgenthau's theory is based on a conception about human nature which posits power as the essential principle for understanding all politics: "International politics, like all politics, is the struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always its immediate aim."\(^7\) Algosaibi argues that if we start with the principle that politics is the pursuit of power, we will view "international relations as battlefields of unending clashes of power. Periods of peace will be accounted for as deviations from the rule."\(^7\) The objection is also noted in Stanley Hoffmann's criticism: "It is particularly uncomfortable when one's basic postulate about human nature is such that history cannot be anything but a tale full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."\(^7\)

Raymond Aron contends that Morgenthau's power theory does not adequately distinguish the political milieu in domestic politics from the ecology of international politics. Morgenthau's realist school, Aron argues, defines "politics as power and not international politics as the absence of an

\(^7\) Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 27.

\(^7\) Algosaibi, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

umpire or of police."\textsuperscript{75} Morgenthau's theory only implicitly recognizes the difference between national and international politics:

The insistence with which Hans Morgenthau reminds us that survival constitutes and must constitute the primary objective of states, amounts to an implicit admission of the Hobbesian situation among states, hence the essential difference between international and national politics. Nonetheless, the fact remains that this avowal is implicit rather than explicit.\textsuperscript{76}

In a conjoint vein, several critics have charged that Morgenthau's power concept is too broad and ambiguous to be meaningful. Algosaibi notes that power in Morgenthau's theory "is so broadly defined that it fails to distinguish politics from other types of action . . . Morgenthau's power concept would not take notice when an activity involving power becomes political and, therefore, does not provide a criterion of the political in the direction indicated by Kaplan."\textsuperscript{77} Kaplan's systems approach to international relations theory has led him to raise the same objection. The power principle does not provide a completely satisfactory definition of politics, according to Kaplan, since power cannot be "the individuating or distinguishing element of the political; otherwise family relations either would be


\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 596.

\textsuperscript{77} Algosaibi, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 239.
political or would not involve power or influence relations."\(^{78}\)

Snyder's analysis of the concept of power is similarly devastating: "The power explanation of state motivation is a postulate—it is an assumption and one which is taken for granted rather than subjected to verification and testing."\(^{79}\) Power is purported to be both a cause and a motive of all human behavior. As such, the term is as ambiguous as it is ambitious: "If all participants in the social system are assumed to seek power," Snyder argues, "and if power is defined as all the means to any given end, one cannot imagine power being absent."\(^{80}\) The term is meaningless as an analytic tool and empirical referent and "too weak to perform the inclusive functions claimed for it"\(^{81}\) in theory.

The criticisms adumbrated above are indeed nullifying to Morgenthau's theory and use of the power concept. Unfortunately, they are somewhat inaccurate and tend to echo with logical contradictions.


Morgenthau would certainly concur with Algosaibi that given his definition of power "it is difficult to imagine any relationship whatever that does not involve power." He argues that the ubiquity of the struggle for power is found in all social relations and on all levels of social organization: "The tendency to dominate, in particular, is an element of all human associations, from the family through fraternal and professional associations, from local political organizations to the state." But the assertion that Morgenthau's power concept fails to "provide a criterion of the political" is simply absurd. Morgenthau devotes a chapter in *Politics Among Nations* to an evaluation of political power. While discussing the nature of political power, he states: "When we speak of power, we mean man's control over the minds and actions of other men. By political power we refer to the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large." Further, political power must be distinguished "from force in the sense of the actual exercise of physical violence." The definition offered is fairly

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82. Algosaibi, *loc. cit.*
83. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 34.
explicit. It is certainly no more nebulous than others currently in fashion. Furthermore, it seems odd that this criticism should come from Kaplan. Kaplan's systems definition of political is based on the "concept of sovereignty" and may include "religious institutions." As Meehan points out, his systems definition is rather useless in domestic politics.

Now what emerges from this discussion is an awareness of Morgenthau's conceptual level of analysis. Speer's statement that "the lust for power [in Morgenthau's scheme] which storms through interpersonal relations, is also the most marked characteristic of relations among classes and interest groups within national societies, and the same holds true at the international level where states are seen much as interest groups locked in a struggle for power," is wholly correct and exposes the inadequacies of the other views presented. In an essay which focuses on power, Morgenthau contends that the lust for power is an "all permeating fact which is of the very essence of human existence." Thus a complete definition of Morgenthau's

86. Meehan, loc. cit.
87. Ibid., p. 185.
88. Speer, op. cit., p. 223.
conceptual level of analysis would include the views of Waltz (human nature), Claude (state), and Singer (international system). However, Speer's criticism of Morgenthau's political commentary on the development of the world state will be criticized in a later discussion which sides with Claude and Waltz on that matter.

Aron's contention that Morgenthau's theory does not distinguish domestic from international politics is as absurd as the argument that he fails to provide a criterion of the political. In a critical fashion, Aron poses the question which he feels Morgenthau does not answer: "But if it should be true that the aspiration for power plays the same role in international politics as in all politics, the specific nature of power politics among nations would disappear. The moment the essence of international politics is identical 'with the essence of politics, with its domestic counterpart,' why could war not be eliminated from one as from another?"90 Oddly enough, Morgenthau asks the same question: "What, then, accounts for the instability of peace and order in the relations among states, and what accounts for their relative stability within states? In other words, what factor which exists within national

societies is lacking on the international scene?"91 And more than once he answers:

The answer seems obvious--it is the state itself. National societies owe their peace and order to the existence of a state which, endowed with supreme power within the national territory, keeps peace and order. This indeed was the doctrine of Hobbes . . . 92

The presence of three conditions--"overwhelming force, supra-sectional loyalties, expectation of justice--makes peace possible within nations. The absence of these conditions on the international scene evokes the danger of war."93 "There can be no permanent international peace without a state coextensive with the confines of the political world."94

Not only is Morgenthau's answer explicit (contrary to Aron's insistence on an implicit recognition), but it is similar to Aron's expressed view, and perhaps more sufficient. Aron introduces his general theory with the statement:

But so long as humanity has not achieved unification into a universal state, an essential difference will exist between internal politics and foreign politics. The former tends to reserve the monopoly on violence to those wielding legitimate

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92. Ibid., see also pp. 38, and 102.
93. Ibid., p. 502.
94. Ibid., p. 509.
authority, the latter accepts the plurality of centers of armed force. Politics, insofar as it concerns the internal organization of collectivities, has for its immanent goal the subordination of men to the rule of law. Politics, insofar as it concerns relations among states, seems to signify—in both ideal and objective terms—simply the survival of states confronting the potential threat created by the existence of other states. . . . States have not emerged, in their mutual relations, from the state of nature.95

Missing in Aron's view is Morgenthau's Aristotelian emphasis on supra-sectional loyalties which will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. It should suffice to note, however, that if Professor Aron enjoys burning straw men, he should in all fairness apply the first match to his own trousers.

There is trouble with Algosaibi's juxtaposition of "battlefields of unending clashes of power" with periods of "peace as deviations from the rule." He, along with Hoffmann, indicates a misunderstanding of Morgenthau's concept of power. It was pointed out above that political power in Morgenthau's scheme is relinquished with the actual exercise of physical violence or force. As we shall see later in this thesis, diplomacy, which acts as a catalyst for the different elements of a nation's power,96 has historically been the successful instrument in international


96. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 141.
politics used for the purpose of preventing war. The principle of power is also explanatory of the "peace" and "battlefields" maintained in domestic politics: "The whole political life of a nation, particularly of a democratic nation, from the local to the national level, is a continuous struggle for power." In fact, Morgenthau shows rather convincingly that his theoretical use of the power concept is analogous to the views put forth by the authors of The Federalist.

Algosaibi seems to have confused Morgenthau with one of his critics, Inis Claude, who uses the term "to denote what is essentially military capability—the elements which contribute directly or indirectly to the capacity to coerce, kill, and destroy." And Hoffmann, who often expresses in his writings a knowledge of the classics of literature, should be more reserved in his judgment of Morgenthau's theory, which implicitly places the latter in the same league with Macbeth's view of life: "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." One of

97. Ibid., p. 568.
98. Ibid., p. 34.
99. Ibid., pp. 9 and 171-72.
100. Claude, op. cit., p. 6.
Hoffmann's major theoretical contributions seems to have more in common than Morgenthau with Macbeth. 101

There are additional difficulties with the critics' depreciation of power as a useful analytical and empirical concept. While Snyder and Algosaibi have dwelled on the ambiguity and imprecision of the concept, they have been equally willing to incorporate the principle into a systematic theory. Snyder asks:

Can the power concept be strengthened to the point where it can serve as a general theory in the most complete sense, as a basis of a frame of reference for the whole field, or should it be limited to a role as one subordinate concept in a system of concepts? Can some of the functions attempted by the power concept be better performed by another concept or set of concepts? 102

101. I am referring to Hoffmann's concluding essay in The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965). On the first page of this essay, entitled "The Sound and Fury: The Social Scientist Versus War in History," we find the statement: "Crucial as revolutions have been in the life of most nations, they appear nevertheless like exceptional developments, avalanches that suddenly bury the road on which travelers are moving. Wars, on the other hand, have blasted open many roads, and they have been constant companions to the travelers. Revolutions interrupt and transform but also define the international milieu. Revolutions tear up the fabric of domestic law and order and inflict occasional wounds on the body politic. Wars are the seamless web and ceaseless wound in international relations." p. 254. Of course, this is not to imply that Hoffmann's essay is a "tale told by an idiot." And only the individual reader can judge whether the essay "signifies nothing."

102. Snyder, "Toward Greater Order in the Study of International Politics," loc. cit. Snyder does not answer the question he has posed in this essay. An attempt to strengthen and narrow the power concept has been made,
And Algosaibi states in his concluding analysis that "attempts at synthesis, which so far have been vague outlines, could materialize, thus providing the possibility of incorporating a revised version of Morgenthau's power approach as part of a general theory." At the same time, Algosaibi bemoans the fact that there is no dominant figure or focus in the systematic school comparable to Morgenthau. Yet, it seems obvious that any operational theory which can unite the different approaches of Kaplan, Snyder, McClelland, and the others will necessarily be as ambiguous as Morgenthau's power theory. Ambiguity and imprecision will be a logical consequence of any general or macro-theory of international relations. Aristotle was aware of the limits to precise analysis, and his sensible warning should be heeded today by theorists in the systematic school: "It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each however, and the reader is referred to K. J. Holsti, "The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations," Basic Issues in International Relations, ed. Peter A. Toma and Andrew Gyorgy (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967), pp. 105-118. Holsti's theme is that if power is to be useful, it must be conceived only as "a process, a relationship, a means to an end, and even a quantity." p. 117. Morgenthau presents power as a means (in the same sense that Holsti does) and an end in the behavior of states. And his view that power is also an end causes Holsti to part company with him.

class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits." 104

Moreover, both Algosaibi and Snyder have overlooked the fact that the power concept and the assumptions about human nature from which the principle is derived in Morgenthau's theory, have been analytically and empirically accepted by theorists in the systematic school. Charles McClelland, a leading systems theorist, has written an essay which recognizes power as the central organizing idea in political inquiry. In the same essay, McClelland develops a scheme for research in international relations that includes the analytic use of power. 105 The two analytic systems in Kaplan's theory which have historical counterparts—the balance of power and the loose bipolar system 106—are utilized analytically and empirically in Morgenthau's theory. 107 Both Aron and Hoffmann accept the power concept, albeit with some refinements stipulated. 108


However, at times each scholar sounds very much like the Morgenthau they criticize. Aron argues that it is justifiable "to regard the concept of power as the fundamental, original concept of all political order, that is, of the organized coexistence among individuals." And at one point Hoffmann asserts that "power politics will continue with its physical dangers and its moral dilemmas." In George Liska's scheme power is subordinate to the unifying concept of equilibrium, an equally ambitious and ambiguous principle.

Thomas Schelling's unique approach to game theory, termed a mixed motive game, is also similar to Morgenthau's theory in this respect. Schelling assumes that conflict is an inherent feature in all social life and is not distinctly opposite from compromise. Indeed, bargaining in Schelling's scheme reflects the clash of interests among nations and the need to accommodate these interests if violence is to be avoided. Schelling, like Morgenthau, further assumes that effective means of bargaining and diplomacy are most necessary for the institutionalization of

109. Ibid., p. 595.
111. Liska, op. cit., pp. 331-32.
nonviolent and formal modes of handling conflict and power at the international level.\textsuperscript{113}

Lastly, J. W. Burton, a recent and most vociferous critic of Morgenthau's assumptions concerning human nature and use of the power principle, cannot escape empirical recognition of the role power plays in contemporary international politics. While Burton eschews both the theoretical and policy implications of Morgenthau's position, and opts for a theoretical model based on the open communications in the relations of "nonaligned" states in the Cold War, he admits:

This description of recent trends in International Relations theory should not be interpreted as implying that descriptions of relations between states that are based on power have now lost their relevance or that policies relying on power will necessarily give place to others . . . . We are likely to see an increase in the number of power situations, especially in the developing areas and where racial conflicts occur.\textsuperscript{114}

Thus, according to one of Morgenthau's most caustic critics, the analytic postulates in Morgenthau's theory are empirically verified by contemporary international politics.


\textsuperscript{114} Burton, op. cit., pp. 21-22.
What these arguments from the systematic school amount to, I believe, is intellectual sophistry. The critics in this case are really not concerned with the ambiguity of the term qua term. They are opposed to the methodological assumptions from which the concept is derived, a concept which so far has not been evenly fitted into their theoretical schemes.

Algosaibi and Benno Wasserman are contemptuous of the "unscientific" character of Morgenthau's theory. Their rejection of Morgenthau's theory on scientific grounds seems fairly representative of most of the opposition to Morgenthau in the systematic school. It is clearly evident in the writings of McClelland, Fox, Burton, and Snyder. Wasserman even contends that the main obstacle to the scientific study of international relations is the influence which Morgenthau's theory has had in the discipline.

In *Politics Among Nations*, however, Morgenthau states that his theory is scientific, a seemingly paradoxical

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stance given his deprecation of "scientific-man" in *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*. Yet once we understand how Morgenthau conceives science, his position is less clouded. In the latter work Morgenthau was opposed to "scientific-man" qua naturalist (his position with respect to phenomenology was neither very clear or consistent), and not to empiricism per se. His notion of science is derived from the most important function he ascribes to any inquiry into social phenomena which, as we have noted, "is to bring order and meaning into a mass of unconnected material and to increase knowledge through the logical development of certain propositions empirically established." The notion is similarly stated in *Politics Among Nations*: "In most other branches of the social sciences this purpose would be taken for granted, because the natural aim of all scientific undertakings is to discover the forces underlying social phenomenon and how they operate."\(^{117}\) In other words, science to Morgenthau is a common sense understanding and knowledge of the empirical world.\(^{118}\) Thus scientific knowledge does not depend on any one particular technique or method of inquiry, although Morgenthau tends toward obscurantism when he rejects certain techniques and methods of

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\(^{117}\) Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 16.

\(^{118}\) See his essay "Common Sense and Theories of International Relations," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXI (Summer, 1967), 207-14.
inquiry that can add to an understanding of the empirical world.

Why, then, should scholars in the systematic school reject Morgenthau's theory as unscientific, if it fulfills the aim of scientific inquiry as he sees it? We are given a hint from Wasserman's objection which intimates a closed, naturalistic view of scientific inquiry. Scientific knowledge, says Wasserman, "consists of theories or hypotheses whose truth or reality has to be established by critical experiment or testing."\(^{119}\) We also find a clue in Algosaibi's contention that the "function of theory is the deduction of meaningful generalizations."\(^{120}\) In short, knowledge of the empirical world is unscientific if it is not derived from the naturalistic method of inquiry, and any theory in the social sciences is unscientific if it is not deduced from that method of inquiry. In effect, the critics

\(^{119}\) Wasserman, op. cit., p. 67. "Naturalism" as used in this thesis refers to the general philosophic assumptions and the specific methodological approach of positivism as discussed by Natanson and Popper. Natanson's definition will suffice: "I use the designation 'naturalism'... to refer to that approach to social science which holds that the methods of the natural sciences, scientific method generally, are not only adequate for the understanding of social phenomena but indeed constitute the paradigm for all inquiry in this field. A conjoint thesis of naturalism is that of the qualitative continuum between problems of the natural and of the social sciences." In Natanson, op. cit., p. 272. See also Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), p. 52.

\(^{120}\) Algosaibi, op. cit., p. 237.
in this case are equalling Morgenthau's obscurantism. Nothing can be known, and as Hume and so many others have pointed out this includes the naturalistic method of inquiry, unless it is known through naturalism. According to James Rosenau, the discipline is sold:

"Today, workers in the field talk of quantifying data, of building models, of testing hypotheses, of verifying constructs, of comparing abstract and empirical formulations; they have, in short, acquired a new language, the language of the scientific method."

However, most of the objections to Morgenthau’s "unscientific" theory that come from Algosaibi are rather pedestrian and unwarranted. Algosaibi simply doesn't seem to understand the basic tenets of science as he has defined it. For example, Algosaibi argues:

One could indeed, have little objection if Morgenthau stated that his theory is the conclusion that all men, and states, seek power. It is a different matter, however, when the proposition is offered not as a conclusion but as a statement to be demonstrated. Morgenthau is a prisoner of his assumptions. These assumptions force the analysis and conclusions to be in line with his advance judgments.

In the first place, while scientific propositions are conclusions to the extent that they are findings deduced


123. Algosaibi, loc. cit.
from empirical investigation, they are never conclusive in the sense that they are not subject to demonstration and verification.\textsuperscript{124} In other words, while theories are conclusions, they are similarly hypotheses. Secondly, Algosaibi's statement inheres with contradiction. On the one hand, we are told that Morgenthau's theory is not offered as a conclusion; on the other hand, we are told that his assumptions force his conclusions "to be in line with his advance judgments." Thirdly, no scientist can avoid being a "victim of his assumptions." Analytically deductive generalizations are logically linked to one's premises and assumptions. As Kaplan puts it: "one cannot pull cognitive rabbits out of truly empty hats."\textsuperscript{125}

Now when Algosaibi argues that Morgenthau's assumptions "force" certain conclusions, he has something else in mind. He precedes this argument with the statement: "the deduction of meaningful generalizations" in theory "results from the careful investigation of the facts. Morgenthau reverses the order; he starts with certain generalizations

\textsuperscript{124}. Popper, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 40-42. This is not to suggest that Popper would be uncritical of Morgenthau's position. Popper's first methodological rule, that he "who decided one day that scientific statements do not call for any further test, and that they can be regarded as finally verified, retires from the game," (p. 53) is anathema to the dogmatism and laws of "more-than-scientific-man" discussed in the beginning of this chapter.

which he holds to be timeless and immune to change. If I understand his position, Algosaibi is asserting that Morgenthau's theory is both dogmatic and lacking in empirical support. Yet Morgenthau's main theoretical contribution, *Politics Among Nations*, is complete with a most careful examination of historical facts that affords a wide empirical base to his theory. Indeed, Algosaibi seems to agree, although he may not understand the historical method: "How a theory could be so weak in both its assumptions and conclusions yet be so convincing in its empirical discussions is a puzzling question."  

Has Algosaibi failed to realize that those "convincing empirical discussions" in Morgenthau's theory support his assumptions and conclusions? And those assumptions and conclusions are at the base of Morgenthau's theory of power. Hence an even more puzzling question which needs to be raised is why Morgenthau's assumptions and conclusions are so readily accepted in the systematic school by many of his critics who purport to reject his theory on methodological grounds. Apparently, what is legitimate buckshot for the goose, is not for the geese—they are scientists. Morgenthau's empirical discussions have increased our knowledge, and brought order and understanding to the

social world. His theory has performed a vital function for science, for as Maurice Mandelbaum avers: "it is the task of social science to attain a body of knowledge on the basis of which the actions of human beings as members of a society can be understood." The naturalist method has yet to prove itself capable of that task in the study of international relations.

The reader would probably be disappointed if something was not said about the debate over "realism." It is related to the debate over science in international relations theory. In the opening pages of Politics Among Nations Morgenthau argues that the "theoretical concern with the world as it is, and with the historical processes as they actually take place, has earned for the theory presented here the name of realism." Tucker, Wasserman, and Algosaibi concern themselves at length with the reality of Morgenthau's "realism." The anxiety is perhaps

128. Maurice Mandelbaum, "Societal Facts," The Structure of Scientific Thought, ed. Edward H. Madden (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), p. 167. The argument presented here should not be misinterpreted. I am contending that Morgenthau's theory is empirically based and that his assumptions and empirical statements have been accepted by many theorists in the systematic school. I have no sympathy for Morgenthau's dogmatism as a theorist, but I do recognize the contribution which his theory has made.


130. See the discussion by Algosaibi, op. cit., p. 244.
most clearly expressed by Algosaibi: "How can a theory be labelled 'realist' if it is inconsistent with itself and with reality?"\textsuperscript{131}

Yet as Algosaibi himself points out\textsuperscript{132} and as stated above, Morgenthau is explicitly cognizant of his inconsistency. I am reminded of Charles Burton Marshall's story of a man who tried to board a train with a mongoose on a leash. The conductor told him pets were forbidden. The man insisted the mongoose was not strictly a pet, because it was needed to kill snakes he saw in delirium tremors. The conductor said this was unacceptable, since snakes in delirium tremors were not real. The passenger replied that for that matter it was not a real mongoose.

What was needed to avoid this dispute between the conductor and passenger was a criterion to judge the reality of snakes in delirium tremors. However, Morgenthau does provide a criterion to qualify his theory as "realism." Realism, as Morgenthau defines it, is not wholly contingent upon empirical consistency. Rather, it denotes a comprehensive philosophy which includes but goes beyond his theoretical assumptions in international relations.\textsuperscript{133} Thus to criticize Morgenthau on grounds of inconsistency in this

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{132} Ibid., p. 245.
  \item \textsuperscript{133} "Morgenthau, \textit{Politics Among Nations}, pp. 4-15.
\end{itemize}
matter is to criticize a straw man. And Morgenthau seems to anticipate such criticism:

Hence, it is no argument against the theory presented here that actual foreign policy does not or cannot live up to it [rationality]. The argument misunderstands the intention of this book, which is to present not an indiscriminate description of political reality, but a rational theory of international politics.134

Either Tucker, Wasserman, and Algosaibi have failed to read this important passage, which is taken from Morgenthau's discussion of realism, or they have seen fit to judge Morgenthau's propositions according to their own assumptions and not his. In either case, poor scholarship is evident.

Further, I believe the criterion offered by Morgenthau to distinguish his theory from others is generally sufficient. His six tenets of political realism certainly set his approach apart from such scholars as Woodrow Wilson and Charles Beard. Both Beard and Wilson have been cited as early practicing realists,135 yet neither would find much comfort with Morgenthau's principles of realism. In point of fact, Morgenthau's theory explicitly rejects Wilson's view of international morality and Beard's approach to the national interest.

134. Ibid., p. 8.

135. See the discussion in Joseph Tanenhaus and Albert Somit, The Development of Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967), pp. 75-78.
Theorists in international relations must recognize that for a macro-theory to be entirely consistent with the empirical world requires nothing less than including all variables which impinge upon the relations of states within the theoretical framework. This stipulation is an absurd requirement for any theory. And given the complex nature and scope of the phenomenon in the study of international relations, it is difficult to rebut Sidney Verba's contention that no "model and no theorist, no matter how committed to holistic principles, can encompass the totality of a situation."136

Rapoport tells us that if Galileo had taken reality and meticulous fact gathering too seriously, he would never have enunciated the general law of falling bodies. Galileo's law probably does not account for more than 1% of all falling that takes place on this planet. Galileo, like Morgenthau, found reality deficient:

Therefore his law is factually false. But it is true, nevertheless, in a deeper sense. Without such an ideally true and factually false law, mathematical physics would have never left the ground.137


137. Rapoport, op. cit., p. 51. I am not alluding here to any of Morgenthau's normative judgments, i.e. that rational foreign policy is good policy, but only to his theoretical statements, i.e. that foreign policy is rational—that international politics is the pursuit of power.
And without such factually false laws, international relations theory may never have left the ground.

I think it is fair to conclude this chapter by recognizing that as theorists of international relations both Morgenthau and his critics have a great deal in common with Galileo and his law of falling bodies and with each other. Unfortunately, any common grounds of agreement which exist between Morgenthau and his critics on the issues presented above tend to be obscured by the polemical character of the debate which has evolved between them. In short, the theme in this chapter should not be interpreted as suggesting that Morgenthau is a game theorist or empirical scientist or that members of the systematic school are necessarily realists. It rather suggests an apropos insight from contemporary cinema: "What we have here," said Cool Hand Luke, "is a failure to communicate."
Kenneth Thompson has remarked that "the focal point in the debate over Morgenthau's theory has centered on his concept of the national interest." Thompson was correct. And nowhere in the debate between Morgenthau and his critics has the "problem of smog" been so acute; nowhere has their thinking been so muddled. Morgenthau's position on the national interest has caused the most blatant contradiction in his theory. Yet only two critics have brought this contradiction to the fore, and none have spelled it out explicitly. Instead, critical commentaries with respect to the "focal point in the debate" have been misleading, inaccurate, and of little merit.

The national interest in Morgenthau's theory has been subjected to both logical and moral criticisms. An analysis of the moral admonitions necessitates a cursory discussion of Morgenthau's political ethics, particularly when these judgments bear upon his views of international politics. This discussion will be reserved for the second

part of this chapter and will reveal the inconsistency in Morgenthau's position. The immediate analysis is concerned with the logical rebuttals.

**Logical Utility: The Critics**

Morgenthau's statement that the "main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power" set the stage for a maze of criticism which dates back to the early fifties. As early as 1952, Myres MacDougal implied that Morgenthau failed to employ his criterion of the American national interest in his analysis of conflict situations in international politics. "Despite his insistence upon the 'national interest of the United States' as the 'one standard of evaluation,'" said MacDougal, "it is not surprising that Professor Morgenthau offers few criteria for identifying that interest under contemporary world conditions." Seven years later, Kenneth Waltz opposed Morgenthau's position on the national interest for similar reasons. Waltz criticized Mr. Morgenthau for not giving substantive meaning to the concepts of power and interest, and he questioned the utility of these concepts.

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for policy guidance. Waltz intimated that his views were shared by many in the profession: "he [Morgenthau] has often been questioned as to the meaning of power and the content of interest . . . . Can we approximate an objective understanding of power and interest, and if we can, will we thereby discover the necessities of state action. We should still like to see the map."

More recently, Ghazi Algosaibi stated very candidly that he found it impossible "after many efforts, to comprehend what really is signified in 'defining interest in terms of power.' . . . anyone who expects to find many answers regarding the determination and realization of the national interest in Morgenthau's discussion is bound to be disappointed."

Several other critics have focused their comments on the empirical limitations of the concept as employed in Morgenthau's theory. Raymond Aron has argued at length that the consistency of a state's national interest "over long


5. Ghazi A. R. Algosaibi, "The Theory of International Relations: Hans J. Morgenthau and his Critics," Background, VIII (February, 1965), 240. It should be noted that Mr. Algosaibi defended the "moral dignity" of the national interest as presented in Morgenthau's theory. See his discussion, pp. 241-243.
periods of history" cannot be empirically supported. In other words, according to Aron's argument, the national interest of any state is subject to a host of interpretations which reflect the value preferences of national leadership, the influence of sub-national systems, and the impact of novel characteristics in the international system, nuclear bipolarity, for example. Stanley Hoffmann has been skeptical of Morgenthau's conception of the national interest as a reliable guide for foreign policy. "The conception of an objective and easily recognizable national interest, the reliable guide and criterion of rational policy, is one which makes sense only in a stable period in which the participants play for limited ends, with limited means, and without domestic kibitzers to disrupt the players' moves." In our period of history, Hoffmann goes on, a rational policy is most impossible to achieve.

Directing his comments to the same problem, Benno Wasserman states unequivocally that Morgenthau's theory "fails to explain the manner in which states behave--as


shown by history—because the realists do not make the vital
distinction between national interest and interpretations of
national interest."8 History tells us that the national
interest "is an interpretation and this in turn depends on
an interpretation of the facts or realities of the situation
and not upon the facts or realities . . . ."9 Wasserman
concludes his analysis by suggesting that international
relationists should study all national behavior in order to
help "develop a unified general science of human behavior."10

The most recent and vituperative attack on the
national interest concept in Morgenthau's scheme comes from
James Speer. Speer's criticism includes most of those
adumbrated above and indicates that he has gleaned a great
deal from the literature, not of Morgenthau, but of his
critics. With such literary support, Speer's reprobation of
Morgenthau on this issue admits of no doubt. He goes so far
as to say that Morgenthau himself is unsure of America's
national interest, and that Morgenthau's use of this concep-
tion in his theory suggests popular but meaningless scholar-
ship.

8. Benno Wasserman, "The Social and Psychological
Approach to the Study of International Relations," Basic
Issues in International Relations, ed. Peter A. Toma and

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 130.
The suspicion arises, which scholars have long since noted, that Morgenthau has no clear conception of the components of the national interest, even in his own thought, and that this explains why he has come up with the immensely popular and essentially meaningless phrase 'the national interest defined in terms of power.'

These are indeed nasty words, but Speer does not let up. He carries them into his discussion of Morgenthau's analysis of substantive issues in contemporary international politics. "Morgenthau again and again intimates that there are substantive interests at stake between the Soviet Union and the United States, other than the mere maximization of national power, but he does not say what they are." So it is obvious to Speer that Morgenthau does not know what he is talking about and, therefore, "the national interest can have no intellectual or rational content; it is essentially meaningless and mindless . . . ."

Morgenthau's Position

Since Speer's critique includes in altered form several of the others which have been presented, we may conveniently begin with an examination of it. Three questions need to be raised in regards to Speer's analysis. Does Morgenthau give an explicit indication as to what is

12. Ibid., p. 223.
13. Ibid., p. 218.
meant by defining interest in terms of power? Does Morgen-thau imbue America's national interest and the general con­cept of power with rational and intellectual content? And lastly, does Morgenthau employ the concept as a tool in his analysis of American foreign policy and substantive Cold War issues?

Defining interest in terms of power has for Morgen-thau both theoretical and normative implications. I should like to reserve comment on this latter aspect for the second section of this chapter. Now with respect to it's theoretical use, Morgenthau employs the concept of interest defined in terms of power as a device to distinguish political activity from other forms of activity in international relations. It is a necessary concept in Morgenthau's scheme for the development of a political theory of human activity. And Morgenthau states its utility quite clearly:

This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion. Without such a concept a theory of politics, international or domestic, would be altogether impossible, ... for without it, we could not distinguish between political and nonpolitical facts . . . .\[\]

The meaning of the concept is certainly not difficult to understand; it is neither complicated or obscure.

The individual or nation qua political actor pursues interests which are conditioned by power considerations in two ways. First, in the pursuit of interests the actor attempts to increase his power position in relation to other actors. Second, the objectives which the actor desires to achieve must be commensurate with the power that is available.

Three quotations taken from Morgenthau's works should suffice to support this explanation. On the idea of interest Morgenthau states: "The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place."15 And in regards to power he remarks: "And the political realist asks: 'How does this policy affect the power of the nation?' (Or of the federal government, of Congress, of the party, of agriculture, as the case may be.)"16 "A foreign policy, to be successful, must be commensurate with the power available to carry it out."17

I should offer a word of caution to the reader. I do not necessarily agree with Morgenthau nor do I necessarily find his concept useful for theoretical purposes. But "interest defined in terms of power" is a conceptual construct in Morgenthau's scheme, and he does give it

15. Ibid., p. 8.
16. Ibid., p. 12.
meaning. As such, the concept is a rational theoretical model—an "ideal" type. But as Carl Hempel tells us, ideal types have always served and will continue to serve as legitimate models in theoretical inquiry in both the natural and social sciences.  

Any reader who is at all familiar with Morgenthau's two most noted works, *In Defense of the National Interest* and *Politics Among Nations*, is well aware of the rational and intellectual fervor with which Mr. Morgenthau approaches his analysis of the American national interest and his evaluation of national power. In the former work Morgenthau deals extensively with the national interest; in the latter volume he presents a thorough discussion of power. A cursory explication of the intellectual content which Morgenthau gives both to power generally and the national interest specifically will be illustrative.

According to Morgenthau, the hard core or permanent interest of all nations "is to do what they cannot help but do: protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations." In other

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words, all nations seek to survive: "The survival of a political unit, such as a nation, in its identity is the irreducible minimum, the necessary element of its interests vis-a-vis other units."\(^{20}\) In addition, Morgenthau maintains that there are substantive interests which a nation qua political actor in international politics will view as vital to the maintenance of its security. These interests may presumably be understood through an historical analysis of a nation's experience.\(^{21}\) Morgenthau applies his method to the American experience, and in the opening pages of *In Defense of the National Interest*, he delineates the national interests of the United States.

The American interest in the Western Hemisphere has always been clear. "In the Western Hemisphere we have always endeavored to preserve the unique position of the United States as a predominant power without rival . . . . The Monroe Doctrine and the policies implementing it express that permanent national interest of the United States in the Western Hemisphere."\(^{21}\) The preservation of the eminent American position in the Western Hemisphere has always been contingent upon a stable balance of power in Europe. A breakdown in this balance could only result in an immediate

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 94.

\(^{21}\) Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest*, p. 5.
threat to American security, and "we have always striven to prevent the development of conditions in Europe which would be conducive to a European nation's interfering in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere or contemplating a direct attack upon the United States."22 For this reason the United States has, with the exception of the War of 1812, "pursued policies aiming at the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe."23 The American view of conditions in Asia has never been as clear as it has been in regards to Europe. Nevertheless, since the turn of the century, and despite ambivalence and confusion, "one can detect a consistency that reflects, however vaguely, the permanent interest of the United States in Asia. And this interest is again the maintenance of the balance of power."24 Therefore, the national interest of the United States, upon which its security depends, is to preserve its position of strength in the Western Hemisphere and the balance of power in Europe and Asia.

In Politics Among Nations Morgenthau devotes three chapters to a comprehensive examination of the essence, elements, and evaluation of national power. According to Morgenthau, the elements of a nation's power are: geography,

22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 6.
natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, and the quality of government.\footnote{25} These are the factors which must be taken into consideration in order to determine the power of a nation in the pursuit of its interests. And in calculating a nation's power three errors of evaluation have been typically evident.

The first disregards the relativity of power by erecting the power of one particular nation into an absolute. The second takes for granted the permanency of a certain factor that has in the past played a decisive role, thus overlooking the dynamic change to which most power factors are subject. The third attributes to one single factor a decisive importance to the neglect of all others.\footnote{26}

Hence the statesman must guard against ill-founded calculations in evaluating his nation's power resources.

Now this discussion has been brief, and it can hardly do justice to the intellectual quality of Morgenthau's theory. But despite what critics have said, interest and power exude intellectual and rational meaning in Morgenthau's works. It is difficult to understand how any serious scholar could doubt that Morgenthau fails to articulate substantive "interests at stake between the Soviet Union and the United States." Speer's arguments are interesting in this respect. He seems so committed to a critique of

\footnote{26. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 153.}
Morgenthau's position on the national interest that without realizing it, he includes a passage in his own article which should displace any doubt of substantive interests. After discussing an essay by Morgenthau on power, Speer states:

Moreover, this problem [American security as against Russian security] is termed a 'concrete' problem, as though substantive national interests other than the mere drive for security were involved, and—to compound the confusion—there are commingled with this problem two others in which substantive German and Arab-Israeli interests could be said to be involved as well as security interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. 27

The cat has been let out of the bag. The unification of Germany and peace in the Middle East are substantive interests which are at stake between the Soviet Union and the United States, Mr. Speer, and as early as 1951, Mr. Morgenthau had established his position on the German problem. "Germany is today both the main battleground and the main stake in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both powers have one legitimate interest: to withhold control of all of Germany from the other." 28

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27. Speer, op. cit., p. 223.

only way to secure that interest, and thus preserve the balance of power in Europe, would be "the neutralization of a unified Germany."²⁹

Moreover, in his discussion of substantive issues in the Cold War Morgenthau never loses sight of his criterion of the national interest defined in terms of power. It is the guiding framework for his analysis of American involvement in Viet Nam and is explicitly stated in his volume dealing with that issue. Quotations taken from the first and last essays of this work should suffice to make the point. Speaking of the miscalculation of available power and the foreign policy of prestige which reflects that miscalculation, Morgenthau states: "It is here that our policy in Viet Nam is at fault. It illuminates the peculiar immaturity of our relationship to power by erring both ways: it claims both too much and too little in view of the substance of our power."³⁰ A similar view is expressed in a criticism of the isolationist and globalist approaches to the problem of Viet Nam. "For both extremes, it is all or nothing, either total involvement or total abstention. Both refuse to concern themselves with the concrete issues of foreign


policy on their own merits, that is, in terms of the interests involved and the power available."  

The framework of analysis is also evident in Morgenthau's thoughts on the United Nations, Asia, Africa, foreign aid, and China. And even Mr. Wasserman asserts that Morgenthau's assumptions "that states use power in support of the interests that their statesmen pursue--are, in general, empirically accurate."  

Mr. Speer has no excuse for failing to come to grips with Professor Morgenthau's rational evaluation of national power. He has claimed in his critique to have examined several editions of that work. And in each edition Morgenthau presented his discussion of power.

31. Ibid., p. 81.
32. Morgenthau, "The Yardstick of the National Interest," The Impasse of American Foreign Policy, pp. 119-130.
37. Wasserman, op. cit., pp. 119-120.
It would seem that Speer's inability to recognize the content which Morgenthau has given to the American national interest, and Morgenthau's use of the concept interest defined in terms of power in his analysis of substantive issues, is a result of Speer's failure to examine several of Morgenthau's important works with care. On In Defense of the National Interest Speer comments: "We may note in passing his extolling of the 'moral dignity of the national interest,' in his In Defense of the National Interest... which is a continuation of his rather lonely crusade for a revival of Diplomacy."38 And with reference to Morgenthau's work on Viet Nam his remark is: "And Morgenthau's Viet Nam and the United States, a collection of essays published in 1965, contains only a passage on the new isolation-globalism..."39 These are the only places in his critique where Speer alludes to these works. Yet for the most part these contributions contain the evidence which is needed to elucidate the shallow quality of Speer's criticisms. To use his own words, perhaps "this explains why he has come up with the immensely popular but essentially meaningless" criticism of Morgenthau. It is one thing to disagree with the rational and intellectual content of Morgenthau's concept and its use by Morgenthau in political

39. Ibid., p. 221.
analysis; it is quite another thing to argue that rational and intellectual content is lacking. And to Mr. Speer and the others, only one comment is deserving: non sequitur.

Now, the criticisms that the concept of the national interest is ambiguous and empirically inconsistent are accurate, but the substance of the arguments are weak. Morgenthau knew this when, in an early defense of his position, he said:

It has been frequently argued against the realist conception of foreign policy that its key concept, the national interest, does not provide an acceptable standard for either thought or action. This argument is in the main based upon two grounds: the elusiveness of the concept and its susceptibility to interpretations. . . . The argument has substance as far as it goes, but it does not invalidate the usefulness of the concept. 40

Morgenthau has never alleged that his conceptualization of the national interest defined in terms of power is entirely free from ambiguity or empirically consistent. He has without exception recognized that the national interest "contains two elements, one that is logically required and in that sense necessary, and one that is variable and determined by circumstances. The former is, then, of necessity relatively permanent while the latter will vary with circumstances." 41 The logically required element of the


41. Ibid., p. 91.
national interest refers to security and those interests deemed necessary to security in the course of a nation's history—the balance of power in Europe, for example—regardless of the variable element. The latter element refers to various interpretations by national leaders and sub-national systems.

Therefore, while Morgenthau notes that historically American foreign policy has developed through three periods—the realist, the ideological, and the utopian—which denote a variety of interpretive judgments as to what the national interest is, the "logically required interests" have usually been recognized.

Still it is worthy to note that underneath this political dilettantism . . . there lives an almost instinctive awareness of the perennial interests of the United States, /sic/ this has been especially true with regard to Europe and the Western Hemisphere, for in these regions the national interest of the United States has always been obvious and clearly defined.43

In addition, the criticism which emanates from Stanley Hoffmann is subject to some question. The theme of Hoffmann's argument is that a rational approach to and understanding of the national interest makes sense only in a stable period when "the survival of the main units is rarely at stake in the game, and a hierarchy can rather

43. Ibid., p. 4.
easily be established among the other more stable and far less vital interests that are at stake.\textsuperscript{44}\ For this reason, Hoffmann doubts whether a rational policy can be achieved "when survival is almost always at stake, and technological leaps have upset the hierarchy of 'stable' factors."\textsuperscript{45} But can this case really be made without qualification, especially with reference to the United States? I am not at all convinced that it can.

The American position with respect to Western Europe has been fairly consistent throughout the Cold War. American statesmen have made it clear that they will not tolerate Soviet encroachment upon that territory. And the American position on Berlin has been unequivocal and intransigent. Moreover, this situation has been bipartisan. Regardless of changes in national leadership, the maintenance of the balance of power in Western Europe has been considered essential to American security.

The Cuban Missile crisis is another case in point. While the Kennedy administration was indecisive in its handling of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, there was no doubt as to what our general position would be when Soviet missiles were detected in Cuba. Castro's successful revolution did not alter America's position of power in the Western Hemisphere;

\textsuperscript{44} Hoffmann, \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
the successful deployment of Russian missiles in Cuba would have drastically altered the power of the United States relative to that of the Soviet Union. And this alteration in power, had it been achieved, would have resulted in consequences extending far beyond the Western Hemisphere.

In addition, the approach to strategy was calculable and rational. "Domestic kibitzers" were overshadowed by strong national leadership. As such, the Cuban Missile crisis tends to support Sidney Verba's view of rationality in decision-making. Verba has written that "the greater the emergency, the more likely is decision-making to be concentrated among high officials whose commitments are to the over-all system. Thus it may be, paradoxically, that the model of means-ends rationality will be more closely approximated in an emergency when the time for careful deliberation is limited." 46

This is not to say that Hoffmann's remarks are wholly misleading. The American position with respect to Asia, particularly on China, Korea, and Viet Nam, has been ambivalent, and calculations of strategy and the power resources necessary to implement strategy have been myopic. As I noted before, however, Mr. Morgenthau has qualified his

position on the national interest in Asia and has been quite critical of American foreign policy in that area. But in making his point, Mr. Hoffmann has overstated his case and has been unfair to Morgenthau's position.

Lastly, Morgenthau is cognizant that historically both the national interests of a state and the power used by a state to secure those interests are subject to change. He has made this point very clear. "Yet the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated . . . . The same observations apply to the concept of power."

The point to be made is that, contrary to Wasserman's argument, Morgenthau does make the vital distinction between the national interest and interpretations of the national interest. One may not agree with this distinction, but it is made nonetheless. We must remember the rational intent in Morgenthau's theory. "The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible." 47


Professor Morgenthau has never made it his purpose to develop a "scientific" theory of political behavior which is derived from a systematic and empirical investigation of all elements (rational and irrational, contingencies and interpretations) which constitute national behavior and interpretations of the national interest. He does not use the national interest model as a "data collection" bag. This may be Wasserman's grand and elegant purpose; it is not Morgenthau's. And to criticize a scholar for not doing what he never set out to do is in poor scholarly taste.

Its Moral Dignity: The Critics

Turning our attention to the moral admonitions against Morgenthau, we can locate them on a continuum ranging from charges of amorality on the left to a Machiavellian crusade of universal nationalism on the right. The parameter on the left has been established by Ernest Nagel, who has argued that Morgenthau "defines the good life . . . in terms of domination over others; but he thereby deprives himself of any basis for evaluating political behavior except in terms of successful assertion of power. His political ethics is thus inherently amoral . . . ."\(^\text{49}\)

Donald Brandon's criticism of Morgenthau on this issue differs from Nagel in two ways. Brandon is a theologian; he is not a social scientist. Yet it is altogether fitting that his views be presented, since they are relevant to the analysis which terminates this chapter. In addition, Brandon disagrees with Nagel's charge that Morgenthau's ethics are inherently amoral. Mr. Brandon recognizes the concern Morgenthau has for the "moral dilemma" of political action, and he acknowledges the clear moral implications found in Morgenthau's position on the national interest. He also agrees with Morgenthau's assertion that the conflict between the realists and idealists is not one between "principle and expediency, morality and immorality." However, Brandon claims that whereas the utopian view of political life is perfectionist, Morgenthau's notions are cynical. Moreover, Brandon says, Morgenthau's theoretical separation of "political-man" from "moral-man" leads to a rejection of natural law, and consequently, a rejection of the "necessity for statesmen and peoples alike to attempt

50. Donald Brandon, "Neither Utopian or Realist: Must Our Political Thought Swing Between Two Extremes," Worldview, V (June, 1962), 7.
51. Ibid., p. 5.
52. Ibid., p. 3.
53. Ibid.
to reflect ethics in their public and private lives," and a failure to take account of the "historic American sense of mission." 54

Lastly, Brandon insists that Morgenthau's morality is not enough. In the face of the apodictic essence of natural law, it is simply moral "lip-service." Thus, Morgenthau's moral posture precludes a concern for peace and the necessary transformation of international politics. His criticism is stated with the weight of authority.

Despite lip-service to moral principles, nowhere in the writings of the contemporary realist can one find any expression of the principles of international common good; of the moral obligation of all nations, and particularly of the Great Powers, for the pursuit of peace . . . as well as the search for national security, and the need for a return to natural law as the necessary condition of a transformation of international relations. 55

Several of Brandon's objections have been reflected in statements by other critics. Stanley Hoffmann also criticizes Morgenthau for distinguishing political man from the ethical dimension of his nature. "Political man should properly be seen as the 'integrator' of moral man, economic man, religious man, and so on--not as a creature reduced to one special facet of human nature . . . even in world affairs, the drive for participation and community plays a

54. Ibid., p. 8.
55. Ibid., p. 5. (Italics added)
Hoffmann suggests that all this is due to a theoretical assumption which posits "political man interested exclusively in the control of the actions of others for the sake of control." \(^57\)

Hoffmann further argues that the morality of the national interest is invalidated by certain unstable periods of history in which a consensus is lacking that "assures at least the possibility of accommodation of national objectives; the conflicts of interests which are involved are not struggles between competing international moralities." \(^58\)

Myres MacDougal alleges that Morgenthau presents a Hobbesian view of political morality and, in a manner analogous to Brandon and Hoffmann, claims that Morgenthau does not take into account those interests of the United States which extend beyond power relations.

To neglect the growing common demands and identifications of the peoples of the world for a 'profound and neglected truth' from Hobbes that 'the state creates morality,' is as fantastic as it is potentially tragic. Certainly it neither accurately reflects the aspirations of the free peoples of the world nor effectively promotes the clear interest of the United States in a more efficient organization of these peoples . . . \(^59\)

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\(^56\). Hoffmann, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 31.  
\(^57\). \textit{Ibid.}  
\(^58\). \textit{Ibid.}, p. 33.  
\(^59\). MacDougal, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 112.
Lastly, we have the criticisms of Robert Tucker which focus solely on Morgenthau's position on the national interest and morality. Tucker's critique is an interesting case. One is never quite sure where Tucker is going with his arguments; he is ambivalent. He begins by claiming that Morgenthau, who views universal morality as an ideological guise in foreign policy, has no place in his theory for a distinction between those policies of a state which are moral and those policies which are not. For Tucker, it is "easy to see why one of the most meaningful problems that the student of international politics can examine, the difference between a power policy which is and a power policy which is not moral, is irrelevant according to Professor Morgenthau's theory."60

Mr. Tucker then proceeds to recognize Morgenthau's concern for the moral requirements of the national interest, although he finds this concern a "mystery," since Morgenthau rejects in his theory "moral principles universally binding on all states."61 Tucker explains his reasoning in the following manner: "There is, of course, some mystery as to how the national interest can have a 'moral dignity' if international politics is simply a struggle of power against


61. Ibid., p. 221.
power, implying thereby, that principles of morality do not apply to international politics." 62

Finally, Professor Tucker argues that the implication in Morgenthau's position is to condemn the legitimate interests of other nations and to project one's own interests as the legitimate moral standard for the world.

Thus, the logical consequence of asserting the moral supremacy of the national interest is to assert the moral inferiority of all other national interests . . . . If the national interest is considered the highest moral principle, and an international society with a superior moral claim over national interests a chimera, then one automatically projects the national moral standard onto the international plane. 63

Thus we conclude this discussion with the view that Morgenthau is not only a moral cynic, but that his ethics at the international level will result in a crusading moralism with the standard "of power against power" as the guide for action.

**Morgenthau's Position**

The arguments sketched above clearly misrepresent Morgenthau's view of ethics and the national interest. Moreover, the objections which emit from Hoffmann and Nagel suggest that neither scholar has a very thorough understanding of normative discourse. Mr. Nagel's contention that

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., p. 223.
Morgenthau's "political ethics is inherently amoral" is self-contradictory. A system of ethics is concerned with judgments as to the goodness or badness and the wisdom of human action. An amoral position implies an attitude which is outside the moral realm and, therefore, ethically neutral. Perhaps Mr. Nagel simply disagrees with what he considers Morgenthau's ethics to be--"The successful assertion of political power" without qualification. If this is his objection, then it will be dealt with when I distinguish Morgenthau's position from that, say, of Plato's Thrasymachus and Hobbes.

Now, when Mr. Hoffmann asserts that what is moral in the dignity of the national interest "is not the national interest as such but its reasonableness," he is not in disagreement with Morgenthau. Morgenthau has always maintained that there "can be no political morality without prudence;" thus, political action at the international level is moral, at least in part (prudent national suicide, if such a course of action is possible, would certainly be ruled out by Morgenthau), if it is prudent and reasonable. But Hoffmann goes on to argue that a reasonable pursuit of national interests "is one which makes sense almost only in

64. Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 34.
a stable period." What Hoffmann is contending is that moral political action, as Morgenthau sees it, is contingent upon other nations following that same moral standard. Hence, he questions how nations can be reasonable and accommodating "in a period when one state's interest all too often resides in eliminating another state."67

I should not have to remind Mr. Hoffmann that a moral standard does not lose its status simply because its efficacy is humbled by events in the real world. Nor should I have to remind Mr. Hoffmann that the following of one's moral standard of action does not depend upon others following that same moral standard. This is true at the national level, and it is also true at the individual level.

Throughout the Cold War, the United States has at times acted with prudence and in an accommodating spirit; at other times it has not. But in those former cases, American action has not always responded to or met with similar actions by other nations. In our era, the moral milieu in international politics may well resemble, as Hoffmann

66. Hoffmann, loc. cit. Hoffmann's argument is based on his understanding that Morgenthau suggests "that all national interests (as they are defined by statesmen) are to be given free play and recognition" regardless of the consequences which such a policy may have for one's own nation. Of course, I make it quite clear that this is not Morgenthau's view. Morgenthau is saying, in essence, live and let live; but, he is hardly saying turn the other cheek at all costs.

67. Ibid.
suggests, "the pluralism of the jungle." But surely Mr. Hoffmann does not offer the norm of that jungle as a moral criterion for political action. Yet this is the logical and moral implication of his argument here. As a serious ethical consideration for the most powerful nation in a world of nuclear-bipolarity, it is an implication which courts disaster.

Leaving aside the normative complications in Messrs. Nagel and Hoffmann, it is still necessary to distinguish Morgenthau's ethics and moral view of the national interest. This discussion may be facilitated by a framework of questions derived from the commentaries of his critics. Does Morgenthau make a distinction between moral man and political man which causes him to discount ethical restraints in political action? Is Morgenthau a cynic? Is his ethics comparable to those of Hobbes or Thrasymachus? Does Morgenthau's view of the national interest preclude a concern for peace and transformation in the international order as a moral necessity? Does it imply that the interests of other nations are inferior? These are the questions which need to be answered below.

It has been established that Morgenthau's moral standard for judging political action generally is one of prudence and accommodation. This moral criterion reflects Morgenthau's pessimistic and Augustinian conception of human
nature which recognizes "both the inevitability and the evilness of the lust for power" and the moral corruption of human action. 68 Man can not act in relation to his fellow man, says Morgenthau, and expect his actions to accord with abstract moral principles, for the realm of action excludes the realm of pure morality. "As soon as we leave the realm of our thought and aspirations, we are inevitably involved in sin and guilt." 69 The best man can do, therefore, and this goes for both private and public action, is choose, "since evil there must be, among several possible actions the one that is least evil." 70 Thus, in presenting the implications which his ethics has for moral action in international politics, Morgenthau asserts:

Realism, then, considers prudence--the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions--to be the supreme virtue in international politics. Ethics in the abstract judges actions by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences. 71

Now, it is fair to say that Morgenthau does make a distinction between the moral and political dimensions of human nature. This distinction was evident when Morgenthau's position in regard to interest and power was evaluated. But

69. Ibid., p. 188.
once again, we must remember the rational character of his theoretical assumptions. "Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs." 72

In other words, the separation which Brandon and Hoffmann speak of serves a conceptual function in Morgenthau's theory. Morgenthau's empirical conception of man is quite pluralistic. And both of these positions are made explicit by Morgenthau when he states:

The realist defense of the autonomy of the political sphere against its subversion by other modes of thought does not imply disregard for the existence and importance of these other modes of thought . . . . Political realism is based upon a pluralistic conception of human nature. Real man is a composite of 'economic man,' 'political man,' 'moral man,' 'religious man,' etc. A man who was nothing but 'political man' would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. 73

Furthermore, while Morgenthau does reject the "influence of natural law," 74 his conceptual separations have never caused him to disregard either the necessity for statesmen to reflect ethics in their public actions or the drive for participation and community. Nor have Morgenthau's

72. Ibid., p. 11.
73. Ibid., p. 14.
pessimistic notions about human nature forced his moral commentaries into degenerate cynicism.

James Eayrs has characterized the "brutal realism" of Plato's Thrasymachus and of Nietzsche with the following words: "The brutal realist is a realpolitiker of an extreme kind. Ethics, he insists, have no place in politics. Might makes right. What is good for the state is good." 75 In twentieth century political life this is the realism of Stalin and Hitler. But for the Bolshevist and Nazi regimes Morgenthau has harsh words: "This is perhaps the most dangerous manifestation of political escapism; for, while here the political facts as facts are recognized, their moral significance is obscured." 76 And on the idea of "reason of state" Morgenthau has this to say: "The importance of this conception has been literary rather than practical. Mankind has at all times refused to forgo ethical evaluation of political action." 77 In fact, Morgenthau holds the influence which morality plays in the lives of

of men in high esteem. Witness this statement which is a far cry from cynicism:

Morality is not just another branch of human activity, co-ordinate to the substantive branches, such as politics and ethics. Quite to the contrary, it is superimposed upon them, limiting the choice of ends and means and delinating the legitimate sphere of a particular branch of action altogether. This later function is particularly vital for the political sphere. For the political actor is peculiarly tempted to blind himself to the limits of his power and thereby to overstep the boundaries of both prudence and morality.

A more specific comment on Hobbes should have been considered by Hoffmann and MacDougal, for Morgenthau does recognize the need for community, and he is critical of Hobbes's rather one-sided view of the nature of the state. "The state is indispensable for the maintenance of domestic peace;" says Morgenthau, and "such is the true message of Hobbes's philosophy. Yet the state by itself cannot maintain domestic peace; such is the great omission of Hobbes's philosophy." Hobbes was in error, according to Morgenthau, because he failed to recognize that the state "far from being a thing apart from society, is created by society." And Morgenthau's reflections on power do


anything but avoid an awareness of the drive for participation. He considers civic duty, elections, voting in assem-
blies, pressure group activity, juridical decisions, and executive enactments as activities in which "men try to
maintain or to establish their power over other men." 81

Any critic who would put Morgenthau in the same league with the "brutal realists" or with the theorists of "reason of state" should recall the grounds upon which Morgenthau has rejected their unity. "Man is an animal longing for power, but he is also a creature with a moral purpose, and while man cannot be governed by abstract moral principles alone, he cannot be governed by power alone either." 82 It does not seem inappropriate to add--such is the true message of Morgenthau's political ethics.

In light of what has just been said, it is difficult to comprehend how Mr. Tucker could portray the moral standard of the national interest in such bleak and nasty words. Morgenthau's moral standard of prudence guides his discussion of interest and power. And contrary to Tucker's charge that the moral dignity of the national interest will result

81. Ibid., p. 34.

82. Hans J. Morgenthau, "About Cynicism, Perfectionism, and Realism in International Affairs," The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 130.
in the view that other national interests are morally inferior, Morgenthau has stated:

For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them. And we are able to do justice to all of them in a dual sense: We are able to judge other nations as we judge our own, and having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own. Moderation in policy cannot fail to reflect moderation of moral judgment.83

Tucker simply doesn't understand Morgenthau's position. This misunderstanding becomes even more evident when he argues that given Morgenthau's notion of the national interest "it logically follows that in the state the individual has a moral obligation to obey the law only when it is to his self-interest to do so."84 Yet this is neither the logical nor the textual implication of Morgenthau's view.

According to Morgenthau, there exists an essential difference between national society and international society, for in the latter "no agency is able to promote and protect the interests of individual nations."85 Further, in international society there is no consensus on moral principles or recognition of legitimate social institutions

83. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 11.
84. Tucker, op. cit., p. 221.
85. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest, p. 36.
which embody those principles. The consequence of this situation for Morgenthau is clear: "In the absence of such institutions it would be both foolish and morally wrong to ask a nation to forego its national interests, not for the good of a society with a superior moral claim, but for a chimera."\textsuperscript{86}

Within a national society, however, there are social norms and a state which protect and promote the interests of the individual. Moreover, there exists a minimum consensus on universal moral principles. As a consequence, says Morgenthau, the individual qua political actor in national society may have "to subordinate his interests and even sacrifice his very existence to a supra-individual moral principle . . . . National societies of this kind can exist and fulfill their functions only if their individual members are willing to subordinate their individual interests in a certain measure to the common good of society."\textsuperscript{87}

For the statesman, then, the primary interest and moral imperative is to protect and secure one's own national values and institutions. It is moral folly for a nation to embark upon an international crusade for whatever intentions, for such a crusade is not only lacking in prudence and

\textsuperscript{86. Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{87. Ibid., pp. 35-36.}
accommodation, but may eventually end in national self-destruction. This is what history has told us, and this is the reason which requires the "moral dignity of the national interest."

This reason also implies a duty for the individual citizen. If a nation is destroyed, its people lose the institutions and norms which protect and promote their individual interests. It is both prudent and morally imperative, therefore, that the individual citizen support, with his life if necessary, those national policies which reflect the moral dignity of the national interest. It would seem that Mr. Tucker has raised the implications, not of Morgenthau's views on this matter, but rather those of his own.

It is even more an enigma how Mr. Brandon could fail to be cognizant of the concern which Morgenthau has had for peace and the transformation of international society. Morgenthau's position on the preconditions for the development of the world state will be evaluated in chapter four. It should suffice to note, however, that the entire thrust of Morgenthau's main theoretical contribution is aimed at the problem of peace in the twentieth century. Politics Among Nations is dedicated with the words:

While at all times the promotion of the national interests of the United States as a power among powers has been the main concern of American foreign policy, in an age that has seen two world wars and has learned how to wage total war with nuclear weapons the preservation of peace has
become the prime concern of all nations. It is for this reason that this book is planned around the two concepts of power and peace. These two concepts are central to a discussion of world politics in the mid-twentieth century. It seems that Mr. Brandon has been so taken with the "truth and beauty" of natural law that his critical perception has been blinded by a-priori and unwarranted assumptions. I shall eagerly await Mr. Brandon's publication dedicated to the problem of peace and natural law in the mid-twentieth century. For only when "the influence of natural law" becomes public, will a comparison with "cynical realism" become possible.

I should like to recall what Stanley Hoffmann said when he was evaluating the contribution of Raymond Aron's theory. Hoffmann said that "a genuine discussion which implies, of course, that anything less is not genuine of Aron's ideas requires that we argue from within, not without, his own positions, just as it is from within that he examines and challenges international relations." Hans Morgenthau may not merit any more, but he surely does not deserve any less. What follows is an attempt to criticize Morgenthau from within his own position.


Conflict Between Purpose and Interest

It may be recalled that in addition to the plethora of objections which have already been reviewed, there was the claim put forth by William Brandon that Morgenthau's stand on the national interest denied a sense of mission in American foreign policy. I have specifically reserved comment on this criticism, not because it is accurate, but because it is crucial to an understanding of the argument I now wish to develop.

The error in Brandon's charge should be clear from what was said about The Purpose of American Politics in chapter 2. In that work Morgenthau does prescribe a three-fold purpose to guide foreign policy in our era. This purpose is to maintain the achievement of equality in freedom in America; to offer equality in freedom as a model for the world to emulate; and to expand the area of equality in freedom beyond the territorial limits of the United States. Moreover, this guideline is presumably not an esoteric insight which Morgenthau pulls from the heavens. The criterion reflects an organic and unique sense of mission in America's history. "The answer to the crisis of the national purpose must evolve, as it has in the past, from the character of the natural and social environment within
which the purpose of America is to be achieved."  

So Brandon is quite obviously mistaken in his argument.

Now, while most of Morgenthau's critics have refrained from commenting on this work, two in particular, Samuel MaGill and James Speer, have evaluated it at length. In fact, Mr. MaGill's analysis is in the form of a reply and rebuttal to Mr. Brandon on the very point alluded to above. MaGill's view is worth noting.

MaGill essentially agrees with my position and asserts: "This latest development of Morgenthau's thought, however, does not diverge significantly from his earlier work, it only explicates more fully his basic position. The purpose of a nation . . . ought to be the moral criterion for a nation's foreign policy."  But MaGill has gone a step further. The national purpose, according to MaGill's interpretation, serves not only as a guide for policy, but as the moral criterion which gives policy direction. The implication in MaGill's analysis is that the national purpose and the national interest are really synonymous. And for MaGill, there is no contradiction. "This national purpose serves to establish priorities of importance in foreign


policy. National self-preservation is the first order of business, but this necessity, unless linked to the second and third elements is shallow and the very substance of the American purpose is subordinated. "92 The first order of business, then, is to preserve equality in freedom at home; the second and third orders of business are to set an example for others to follow and to extend our way of life to other nations.

Speer came to a similar conclusion in his analysis of this work, although his statement exemplifies his persistent misunderstanding of what is meant by defining interest in terms of power. "Morgenthau, in effect, equates the national interest not with power but with a governed world in which 'equality in freedom' may flourish."93 Of course, the national interest has never been equated with power in the manner in which Speer would have us believe. Morgenthau has imbued the concept of national interest with concrete, historical meaning, and this has been discussed thoroughly enough in this thesis to foreclose a redundant exercise.

What is important to note is that both MaGill and Speer have raised an interesting point which I think is rather accurate. Morgenthau terminates a discussion of the

92. Ibid., p. 8.

93. Speer, loc. cit.
feasibility of America leading a free association of nations dedicated to the achievement of equality in freedom with the comment: "The national interest and the national purpose of America would then merge with their interests and purposes." In other words, the national interest and purpose of America are the same, and they may become the same for other nations, so long as those nations are willing to accept the American destiny and mission. We are now close to the inherent dilemma in Morgenthau's scheme.

I cannot accept MaGill's view that there is no contradiction in equating the American purpose with the American national interest as Morgenthau has articulated them, at least not entirely. It is acceptable to say that there is no contradiction with the first requisite of the national interest—self-preservation—and the minimum requirement of the American purpose—preserving the achievement of equality in freedom at home. Nor is there any contradiction between self-preservation and the second requirement of the American purpose, that is, to offer the model of equality in freedom for the nations of the world to emulate. The reason for this is obvious.

Without the American state to secure the social norms and institutions which protect and promote the

interests of its citizens, there would be nothing to preserve equality in freedom within the nation. And the achievement of equality in freedom is inextricably linked to America's norms and institutions. Without the state, and without the achievement of equality in freedom, there is nothing to offer the world, except perhaps, a conquered nation. They are mutually supporting. But it is here that the joyous relationship ends in Morgenthau's theory, and it is here that the relationship has always ended in practice, particularly in the Cold War.

Mr. Morgenthau has made it quite clear to us that the successful procurement of self-preservation is contingent upon the maintenance of substantive interests which go beyond immediate national security. He has told us that historically the United States has sought to uphold the balance of power in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Asia. The wise and moral statesman will always seek to preserve the balance of power in these areas, since any alteration of power is a threat to American security. It is morally indefensible for any statesman not to seek this goal.

However, the measures which must be taken to secure the balance of power in Latin America, Europe, and Asia are rarely, if ever, conducive to the extension of equality in freedom. Morgenthau himself has stated that the failures of
American foreign policy "teach us that neither the export of American institutions nor verbal commitments without deeds will serve our purpose." But what about the "deeds" of military intervention, the support of corrupt dictatorships, and the control of national economies? These are the "deeds" which remain the stigma in the minds of millions throughout the world—not the achievement of equality in freedom within the United States. And these actions often result, sometimes unwisely, from the "moral and wise" statesman's attempt to follow the very guidelines which Mr. Morgenthau sees as necessary for the preservation of American security.

I have the feeling that a peculiar brand of "utopianism" has crept into Morgenthau's theory, and I don't think he is aware of it. In 1951, *In Defense of the National Interest*, when Morgenthau was arguing for the standard of the national interest as a guide for American policy, he was unremitting in his criticism of utopian statesmen like Woodrow Wilson who had not followed that standard. His objection is interesting to note.

It is the same propensity for such moral and philosophical abstractions which has impeded the objective investigation of what other peoples want. Having provided in good measure for the protection of life, and taking this biological security for granted, we concentrate our efforts upon the

95. Ibid., p. 311.
preservation of liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This being natural with us, we erect our limited experience, subject to the conditions of time and space, into a universal principle that claims to be valid everywhere and at all times. Thus we assume . . . that what we are allowed to take for granted all men take for granted, and that what we are striving for is the object of the aspirations of all mankind.96

Of course, this was 1951, and those statesmen who did not consider what other peoples want were the idealists and utopians like Wilson. However, in 1960, in The Purpose of American Politics, when Morgenthau was contending that the model of equality in freedom is the standard which we should offer to the world, he insisted that the American purpose was unique and without precedent. This view is also worth noting:

This purpose is fundamental, since the distinctiveness of America as a nation among nations is predicated upon it . . . . Without the achievement of that purpose, America would share with other nations, both aspiration and failure. What makes America unique among the nations is that it has achieved at least in a certain measure what other nations--by no means many--have aspired to.97

Professor Morgenthau appears to have committed the same error which he has criticized Wilson and others for committing. If the achievement of equality in freedom is unique and indigenous to the American experience, and if


many nations "by no means" have aspired to it, what makes Mr. Morgenthau so convinced that other peoples will want to accept our "way of life" today? That question remains to be answered, and the answer, to be acceptable, must have more to it than the authority of "more-than-scientific-man."

But even if this question were to be answered, Professor Morgenthau must explain to us how American statesmen can pursue policies aimed at maintaining a favorable balance of power, and the actions which that goal often entails, and at the same time, lead the nations of the world into a supranational world order based on the moral imperatives of avoiding a nuclear calamity and achieving equality in freedom. "More-than-scientific-man" has asserted the vision and has called for the impossible. A moral crusade and universal conquest are ruled out. How are nations to be convinced? "This plausibility of the American purpose,

98. Morgenthau argues that because of the nuclear threat, "it becomes the task of all governments to make themselves superfluous as the guardians of their respective territorial frontiers by transferring their nuclear weapons to an agency whose powers are commensurate with the worldwide destructive potentialities of these weapons." p. 308. This position is understandable and is reflected in *Politics Among Nations*. But to my knowledge, Professor Morgenthau has never made it clear why the nations of the world will accept the achievement of equality in freedom if they have rejected democracy. He simply asserts: "The uncommitted nations seek first of all equality; the Communist ones, freedom. America . . . can offer a model to both. That much is obvious." p. 309. And I must question why "that much is obvious."
established in the eyes of the world by deeds, must again become the foundation upon which . . . the world-wide influence of America must rest." If I may employ a colloquialism, the nations of the world will be "snowed" by our deeds. I can only conclude this chapter with one of Professor Morgenthau's own statements: "Here, too, deeds speak louder than words."cciónalism, the nations of the world will be "snowed" by our deeds. I can only conclude this chapter with one of Professor Morgenthau's own statements: "Here, too, deeds speak louder than words." 99

99. Ibid., p. 310.

CHAPTER 4

STATESMANSHIP, DIPLOMACY, AND THE
WORLD STATE

It may be recalled that the "most noble" function which Morgenthau ascribes to international relations theory "is to prepare the ground for a new international order" capable of controlling and harnessing nuclear power. This function of theory was reflected in Morgenthau's dedication of Politics Among Nations which was presented in chapter 3. In the last section of that work Morgenthau concludes:

If the world state is unattainable in our world, yet indispensable for the survival of that world, it is necessary to create the conditions under which it will not be impossible from the outset to establish a world state. As the prime requisite for the creation of such conditions, we suggested the mitigation and minimization of those political conflicts which in our time pit the two superpowers against each other and evoke the specter of a cataclysmic war. This method of establishing the preconditions for permanent peace we call peace through accommodation. Its instrument is diplomacy.

The prescription for diplomacy as a method for bringing about the preconditions for peace has not remained exempt


from the negative comments of Morgenthau's critics. The purpose in this chapter, therefore, is to evaluate these criticisms in reference to Morgenthau's position. In addition, it is necessary to raise an issue which is central to this discussion—the issue of the "old" and "new" Morgenthau. I shall begin and end on this point.

Some Introductory Notes on the Old and New Morgenthau

The view has often been expressed, and not solely by Morgenthau's critics, that there is an old and new Morgenthau, that the themes of his important early works have been drastically altered in his most recent writings. I do not share that sentiment. In Politics Among Nations Mr. Morgenthau has made some factual changes in his historical analysis; he has stressed different elements in his discussions of power and the balance of power, nationalism, and supranational organization; he has added sections on nuclear disarmament and the European Communities; and he has completely rewritten certain chapters—the one on the United Nations, for example. But these changes are a result of Morgenthau's attempt to clarify his own position, and to update and expand his analysis of contemporary international politics in light of recent developments. His basic theoretical assumptions have remained unaltered. As Morgenthau puts it: "I felt the need to change the emphasis and
elaborate here or there while leaving assumptions, tenets, and theoretical structure intact."³

It is especially relevant to open this chapter by raising the contention that there is an old and new Morgenthau, particularly when that contention comes from certain critics who claim that Morgenthau's prescription of diplomacy and the world state is not in keeping with his views of man or political society. They are wrong on both counts. Two such critics are Ghazi Algosaibi and James Speer. I should like to briefly examine Algosaibi's position here and deal with Mr. Speer later.

Algosaibi states categorically that in Politics Among Nations Morgenthau "tries to escape from the prospect of doom he put forward in Scientific Man Versus Power Politics."⁴ In support of his interpretation, Algosaibi cites several passages in the Politics which presumably indicate a theoretical change in position. For example, he states that "Morgenthau's introduction of the category of status quo nations which seek just to maintain their power constitutes an important qualification to, if not a departure from, the

³. Ibid., "Preface," p. i.

original assumption that all states seek power." He also alludes to Morgenthau's acknowledgement that diplomacy has often been successfully employed to prevent war and that organized violence in domestic politics has become a rare exception. So in Mr. Algosaibi's opinion there is a "clear difference" between the two works. "In the first of the two books, heavy emphasis is placed on human nature and the role of the statesman. Although reference is still made to human nature and statesmanship in Politics Among Nations, it is sporadic and with much less emphasis."

I can accept the opinion of Mr. Algosaibi, but I must reject the clear implication of that opinion. In the first place, Algosaibi's contention that Morgenthau's category of status quo nations is a qualification to, or even more, a departure from, his assumptions that all states struggle for power does not accord with Morgenthau's analysis. How could it? Morgenthau entitles his chapter on status quo nations, "The Struggle for Power: Policy of the Status Quo," and he states more specifically: "The policy of the status quo aims at the maintenance of the distribution of power which exists at a particular moment in history.

5. Ibid., pp. 246-247.
6. Ibid., p. 246.
7. Ibid., p. 248.
One might say that the policy of the status quo fulfills the same function for international politics that a conservative party performs for domestic affairs.\(^8\) While the status quo power in domestic and international politics is not opposed to any change whatsoever in the existing power distribution, it must constantly seek to obstruct any changes which would alter its own position of power to a lesser status.\(^9\) As a consequence, the status quo participant is in the forefront of power politics. Two examples would be the United States in the period of the Cold War and the Conservative Party in nineteenth century British politics.

Moreover, Morgenthau begins his discussion of the policy of the status quo with the statement that all politics is the struggle for power.\(^10\) Immediately following this introduction there is the paragraph in which Mr. Morgenthau recognizes that there is a decline of violence in domestic politics. However, Algosaibi has taken that statement out of context, for Morgenthau qualified this comment. It reads: "In the domestic politics of Western democracies . . . organized violence as an instrument of political action on an extensive scale has become a rare exception.

Yet as a potentiality it exists here, too . . . . The difference between domestic and international politics in this respect is one of degree and not of kind.\textsuperscript{11} The reason it is imperative to clarify this statement is precisely because Morgenthau, in a rebuttal to "pacifist liberalism," made a similar point in \textit{Scientific Man}, although the substance of the discussion was of a different nature.

For the absence of organized violence during long periods of history is, in domestic no less than in international relations, the exception rather than the rule . . . . Furthermore, liberalism is on the safe ground when it opposes violence in the domestic field; for there it has replaced to a considerable degree domination by actual violence with a system of indirect domination, originating in the particular needs of the middle classes and giving them the advantage in the struggle for political power.\textsuperscript{12}

Furthermore, Morgenthau's conception of politics as a struggle for power is also presented in \textit{Scientific Man}: "Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal . . . ."\textsuperscript{13}

The consistency does not end here. Morgenthau evaluates the essence of political power in each work and

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 195.
there is no difference in that evaluation. Nor is there any difference in Morgenthau's analysis of the "depreciation of political power" in the Politics with his critique of the "repudiation of politics" found in Scientific Man. And in the latter volume, Morgenthau concludes that only wise statesmen can save the world from the tragedy of "scientism;" in the former work, he concludes that only wise statesmen can offer the world a solution, however tenuous, of preserving the peace.

One can certainly agree that reference to human nature and statesmanship "is sporadic" in the Politics. But there is no "less emphasis" on human nature and statesmanship in the Politics, if by that phrase Algosaibi connotes importance. Mr. Algosaibi fails to take account of the different focus and aim in each book. Politics Among Nations is Morgenthau's theory of international politics and his concern is primarily with international politics. Scientific Man Versus Power Politics is a polemic against rationalist philosophy and science, and international politics is mentioned only in conjunction with this critique.


And if Algosaibi's "observation has any significance," it is just that. Quite obviously, both books are not identical in content; but there is, clearly, consistent thought on those factors and issues—normative and empirical—which are raised in each work. In what follows, the primary concern is with the issue of diplomacy.

**Diplomacy and Statesmanship**

If diplomacy is to become a viable prescription in any theory, it necessarily depends on competent, and to use Morgenthau's words, wise statesmen. In the midst of discussing the old and new Morgenthau, Mr. Algosaibi criticizes Morgenthau on this very point. Since diplomacy can only be made to work with statesmen, it is a weak prescription for peace. "Here is the greatest weakness of the theory. What is a statesman? ... how does one tell the difference between a statesman and a Hitler?" And an even more important question for Algosaibi is: "How can humanity produce a statesman? Morgenthau rules out education and does not suggest any alternative. Preserving the peace, then, remains a haphazard process."18

In reply to his first question, Algosaibi asserts that to say a statesman possesses "'extraordinary moral and

intellectual qualities'" is not enough. One can agree that this is not enough, but it is not all that Morgenthau gives us to understand statesmanship. I would hope that Mr. Algosaibi is not demanding a personality account of the ideal statesman. To describe the ideal personality of the scientist would be as difficult a task, if not as impossible. But I have the feeling that when Algosaibi questions how one can tell the difference between a statesman and a Hitler, he is looking for external characteristics. In Morgenthau's theory the distinction is easy to make; it is no more difficult than distinguishing the scientist from the intellectual charlatan. A statesman for Morgenthau is one who follows the nine rules of diplomacy which are set out in the concluding chapter of the Politics. The first fundamental rule is that diplomacy must be divested of the crusading spirit. For a starter, that is how one distinguishes between a Hitler and a statesman in Morgenthau's theory. And if one looks for more specific comments on Hitler, one will find numerous admonitions emanating from Morgenthau's works. A passage has already been cited in chapter 3.

Keeping in mind that the statesman must remain sensitive to


traditional standards of morality and the available power resources of a nation, we can understand this remark.

The national suicide of Germany in the last months of the Second World War . . . the self-extinction, in other words, of Germany's national power and the life of its leader—were both the work of one man. That man was unfettered by those traditions and institutional safeguards by which healthy political systems try to provide for continuity in the quality of diplomacy and thus tend to inhibit the spectacular successes of genius as well as the abysmal blunders of madmen.21

Algosaibi believes that statesmanship is the most "mystical element" in Morgenthau's theory—the new Morgenthau is much more empirically inclined—an element which tends to contradict his convincing empirical discussions. And, says Algosaibi, if "the most important work of Morgenthau is to follow in the future, it could well be predominantly empirical and, consequently, less pretentious and less vulnerable than his present works."22

But the new Morgenthau is just as mystical as the old, and his most recent edition of Politics Among Nations concludes with the same mystical solution to peace which it has in the past. While Morgenthau does not tell us how to


produce statesmen—any more than Algosaibi can tell us how to produce a scientist—he at least alludes to an "empirical referent."

If authority were needed in support of the conception of international peace presented in these pages, it can be found in the counsel of a man who has committed fewer errors in foreign policy than any of his contemporaries—Sir Winston Churchill. Viewing with concern the contemporary scene . . . Mr. Churchill called for peace through accommodation—as he has done in almost fifty speeches since the outbreak of the Cold War.23

Preserving the peace may well be a haphazard process, and it may or may not depend upon statesmen. But because he has misunderstood the place of statesmanship in Morgenthau's scheme, Mr. Algosaibi has misconstrued the intent in Morgenthau's theory, and the nature and purpose of political theory generally. I shall have more to say about this later, but first a few words about J. W. Burton's analysis of Morgenthau's position on diplomacy.

Burton's criticisms of Morgenthau with respect to the latter's assumptions about human nature and politics were given brief notice in chapter 2. The theme of Burton's general theory is that a "power model" of international politics cannot explain all international relations, especially the novel development of nonalignment in the Cold War. Therefore, according to Burton, and his comments are

directed explicitly at Morgenthau, the implications of a power model are misleading both for theory and practice. And political scientists who "have been attracted by the political realism of theories of power politics . . . have not been able to suggest alternatives to the fatalistic conclusions to which they are led."\textsuperscript{24}

Burton's purpose, however, is not simply to criticize current power theories and to attempt to fit the evolution of nonalignment within existing power models. Rather, Burton purports to develop a theory which is deduced from a model of nonalignment and communication.

In short, the role of the new nations is that of a model, or more accurately, the presentation of an alternative model to the orthodox power image which has so greatly dominated and constrained thought on International Relations . . . . It would be scientific to use nonalignment to test the value of our power model rather than to adopt an image of nonalignment which conveniently fits into it.\textsuperscript{25}

The most essential theoretical basis of nonalignment is cybernetics, presumably borrowed from Karl Deutsch, and it gives Burton's theory a predictive capacity that claims a great deal: "The structures and procedures can be predicted; ad hoc arrangements for consultation, central organizations with limited powers conferred by consent, and


\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 232.
unanimity as a principle of decision-making in any matter regarded by a member as being vital to it."\textsuperscript{26}

But since communication and association is central to Burton's theory, diplomacy, as in Morgenthau's scheme, plays a vital role, although Burton attempts to distinguish his view of diplomacy from the one which Morgenthau posits in the concluding section of \textit{Politics Among Nations}. I think enough has been said to clarify Morgenthau's position on power and interest. But for the purpose of rebutting Burton, I shall allude to the specific section of the \textit{Politics} which is referred to in Burton's critique.

"In the traditional view," Burton begins, "one expounded by Morgenthau, the objectives of diplomacy are defined in terms of national interest, and supported by power."\textsuperscript{27} This is an accurate statement as far as it goes, but it is lacking substantively and is taken out of context. Morgenthau is cognizant of the decline of diplomacy in the twentieth century and the revolutionary impact which the atomic age has had upon traditional modes of attaining national security. The substance of Morgenthau's argument goes something like this. The irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power without compromise

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\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 233.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p. 250.
\end{flushleft}
is the integrity of a nation's territory and of its institutions. Yet under the impact of the atomic age, the security of one nation is dependent upon the security of all nations; thus, it is in the national interest to make them all secure. This is just one basic tenet of four fundamental rules of diplomacy, the other three being: divesting policy of the crusading spirit; looking at the political scene from the point of view of other nations; and lastly—and perhaps most important for Burton's proceeding analysis—nations must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them, that is, all issues with the exception of national security.  

Yet Burton goes on to argue that discretion, in Morgenthau's scheme, is limited to the "possibilities of sacrifice of worthless rights for real advantage . . . . A 'good,' that is successful, diplomat was one who was aware of the viewpoint of others, not so as to accommodate them, but so as to frustrate them."  

At this point, one is simply awed by Mr. Burton's intellectual dishonesty. It would be acceptable, if Burton were to discuss inconsistencies in Morgenthau's theoretical prescriptions. But he has not done this. Again he has taken Morgenthau out of context and has failed to develop

the substantive meaning of Morgenthau's argument. The shadow of worthless rights denoted by Morgenthau is a diplomacy that thinks in legalistic and propagandistic terms, a diplomacy which Burton himself eschews, and which Morgenthau argues forces a statesman to think that an issue cannot be compromised. Perhaps when Burton argued that, "policies of power politics are policies of escape from negotiation, and particularly from adjustment," he exempted Morgenthau as a power theorist. It seems more likely, however, that Burton simply did not do his homework.

The giving up of the shadow of worthless rights is one of five prerequisites listed by Morgenthau for compromise amongst statesmen. In point of fact, Mr. Burton refers in his discussion to Part 10 of Politics Among Nations; he does not present Morgenthau's title for this section of his treatise: "The Problem of Peace in the mid-twentieth century; Peace Through Accommodation." The substance of this part of the Politics is perhaps best expressed in Morgenthau's concluding remark that:

For the world state to be more than a dim vision, the accommodating process of diplomacy, mitigating and minimizing conflicts, must be renewed. Whatever one's conception of the ultimate state of

international affairs may be, in the recognition of that need and in the demand that it be met all men of good will conjoin.33

And this statement is certainly incongruent with Burton's contention that the good diplomat for Morgenthau is one who desires, not to accommodate others, but to frustrate them. Moreover, Burton's apprehension over policies which, because of a "breakdown in communication" are "directed toward goals attainable only by force,"34 is echoed in Morgenthau's belief that no "diplomacy relying only upon the threat of force can claim to be both intelligent and peaceful."35 And Burton's argument that "for practical purposes, modern diplomacy is now far more, and not less important, in relations between states,"36 coincides with the entire thrust of Morgenthau's writings.

I should not want to suggest, however, that Burton and Morgenthau do not differ on their respective judgments as to what constitutes the quality of a good statesman. A comment made by Aristotle perhaps best exemplifies that difference: "We call a good ruler a 'good' and 'prudent' man, and we say of the statesman that he ought to be

33. Ibid., p. 569. (Italics added)
While Morgenthau has always urged that the statesman ought to be prudent, Mr. Burton seems to assume that statesmen must possess the nobility of Aristotle's good ruler. There is a certain Wilsonian flavor to Burton's position on open diplomacy, and at one point, he seems to anticipate such criticism:

If nonalignment described in these terms has a utopian flavor, this may be at least in part because Western thinking has for such a long time been expressed by references to power analogies. . . .

I should like to offer a similar suggestion to the open-minded Mr. Burton. If my presentation of Morgenthau's prescription for diplomacy appears "unrealism," this may be at least in part, because I have attempted to state what Morgenthau has said on the matter and not what I think he has said. It is quite impossible, and this holds true for both the statesman and the scholar, to use an ax and expect to destroy either thin air or metal structure.

**Diplomacy and the World State**

The arguments of Professor James Speer will now be introduced to this discussion. Mr. Speer's critique is


focused primarily on Morgenthau's prescription for diplomacy and the world state, although, as noted in chapter 3, he has a good deal to say about power and interest. The criticisms which will be delineated below have much in common with those discussed previously; they are neither very new nor very accurate.

Speer's two main criticisms are: that Morgenthau's prescriptions are erroneous, since they cannot be implemented in an era of international politics which is anathema to a revival of diplomacy; and that this inadequacy reflects mistaken theoretical assumptions about the nature of political man and society, and the ecology of international politics. The latter argument develops something like this. Morgenthau has correctly distinguished the anarchic milieu of international politics from the governed nature of national societies. But what he has failed to perceive, according to Speer, is that the primary


41. Hoffmann makes the same point in op. cit., p. 37.
psychological phenomenon in international politics is not power but fear. "In such a milieu the precisely Hobbesian passion is fear, and the power thrust ought properly be seen as a secondary phenomenon, that is, as a reaction to fear."42 "Power becomes a means whereby fear may be allayed, but all the power there is not enough."43 Moreover, says Speer, the great national powers in contemporary international politics do not define the national interest "in terms of substantive economic or social interests. Instead, the modern ecology of international politics ensures that each of the great national actors defines the national interest in terms of national security--security as the opposite of insecurity /intimating that Morgenthau would disagree/, as the answer to fear."44

The preceding theoretical anomaly is ineluctably related to an even greater weakness in Morgenthau's thought. Morgenthau's theoretical assumptions about political man, argues Speer, are antithetical to his assumptions about political society. "This theory, which holds that a society becomes viable and orderly only as it develops among its members over the years a common sense or sentiment of

43. Ibid., p. 224.
44. Ibid.
community, is altogether at odds with Morgenthau's own theory of politics and human nature. Speer then questions how a "supra-Hobbesian predicament" at the international level can be solved by a "gradual Lockean solution" which "makes world community the prerequisite of world government."

Affectionate and empathetic man, who would submit his ego to the warm bonds of community, is quite the opposite of Morgenthau's power-lusting egoist who will kill love for power. Both theories cannot be right; one cannot abstract Dr. Jekyll for sociological purposes and Mr. Hyde for political purposes and still expect the two to congrue when they are brought together into a theory of the state.

In concluding, Mr. Speer states quite unequivocally that "Morgenthau's view that the 'state is created by society' precludes his giving any weight at all to any government's reciprocal action upon the society it governs . . . ." And since Morgenthau has been incorrect in both his assumptions about human nature, and about political order and community, he relies on the mistaken prescription of "the slender reed of diplomacy, rather than upon

47. *Ibid.* It should be noted in passing that nothing can be made "to congrue," since that verb--to my knowledge--does not exist.
government, to create the order out of which a sense of community can grow. 49

The reader has probably noted that Mr. Speer has employed the debaters trick of using several arguments against Morgenthau which are unfair. These arguments are unfair because Morgenthau's system includes and accepts their logic. For example, and this is most ironic given Speer's depreciation of the national interest in Morgenthau's theory, Mr. Speer argues that the great national actors define the national interest "in terms of national security," and he hints that Morgenthau would not accept this view. Yet this is also Morgenthau's interpretation of the essential element in any state's national interest; he does not, like Speer, limit his interpretation to the great powers. But Speer is inclined to think that Morgenthau defines the national interest in terms of substantive economic and social interests.

Furthermore, Morgenthau would not find much at fault with Speer's contention that "all the power there is" is insufficient to allay man's fear (lust for power in Morgenthau's theory). Morgenthau has stated that "the selfishness of man has limits; his will to power has none. For while man's vital needs are capable of satisfaction, his lust for power will be satisfied only if the last man became an

49. Ibid.
object of domination . . . ."50 And lastly, Speer's argument that Morgenthau fails to give any acknowledgement "to a government's reciprocal action upon the society it governs" is not true. Morgenthau does not, like Hobbes, deny or dismiss the sociological bases of political power. That much is evident. But neither does Morgenthau reject the role of the state. And this much would be evident to anyone who read Morgenthau with care. While discussing the World State, Morgenthau asserts:

> The history of national societies shows that no political, religious, economic, or regional group has been able to withstand for long the temptation to advance its claims by violent means if it thought it could do so without too great a risk . . . . Society has no substitute for the power of the Leviathan whose very presence, towering above contending groups, keeps their conflicts within peaceful bounds.51

Professor Speer seems to have found an old and new Morgenthau within the textual covers of Politics Among Nations. The old Morgenthau's "Mr. Hyde," a power-lusting political animal, is quite antipathetic with the new Morgenthau's "Dr. Jekyll," an empathetic and warm communal animal. Of course, this would be a theoretical contradiction, if Professor Morgenthau had not qualified his conceptual distinction of political man. But he has done this in both

Scientific Man Versus Power Politics and Politics Among Nations. The two quotations which follow are necessary to make the point.

Political realism is based upon a pluralistic conception of human nature. Real man is a composite of 'economic man,' 'political man,' moral man,' 'religious man,' etc. A man who was nothing but a 'political man' would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints.52

One may separate it from conceptually from the other ingredients of social action; actually there is no social action which would not contain at least a trace of this desire to make one's own person prevail against others.53

Actually, Morgenthau's view of political society is a composite of Hobbesian and Lockean insights which is similar to Aristotle's in one important respect. Aristotle recognized that man in political society was neither a Dr. Jekyll or a Mr. Hyde, but rather a man with quite a complex nature.

The polis is composed of unlike elements. Just as a living being is composed of (the different elements of) soul and body, or the soul of the different elements of reason and appetite, of the household of man and wife, or the property of master and slave, so the polis is composed of

52. Ibid., p. 114. Morgenthau also states: "Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and the moral requirements of the contemporary world." p. 10. See further references in chapter 3, pp. 66-67.

different and unlike elements—among them not only the various elements already mentioned.  

There is a further difficulty with Speer's critique of Morgenthau in reference to Hobbes; it is self-contradictory. On the one hand, he has argued that the primary psychological drive in the state of international anarchy is the Hobbesian passion of fear. Morgenthau is incorrect, therefore, when he posits the lust for power as the primary psychological phenomenon in international politics. Yet on the other hand, Speer tells us that: "Morgenthau posits at the international level a super-Hobbesian predicament, in which the actors on the world scene are motivated by the lust for power ...." This contradiction results from a misunderstanding of Morgenthau's position, and a reliance on the authority of Hobbes only when that authority suits the purpose of Speer's argument.

For Morgenthau, the international state of anarchy is similar to Hobbes's state of nature, in that actors are fearful of their security and are driven to acquire power to protect their security against others. However, statesmen

54. Aristotle, op. cit., p. 102. (Italics added) And Morgenthau's statement that citizens "must be able to expect from society at least an approximation of justice ..., they must feel loyalties to society as a whole which surpass their loyalties to any part of it," (p. 502) would be similarly acceptable to Aristotle.

have used reason in the past to balance power drives amongst the actors. Therefore, war has not been a constant feature of the international state of nature, a state similar to Locke's in this respect.

Now, while Hobbes did characterize man in the state of nature as an animal living in "continual fear and danger of violent death," he concluded his analysis with: "The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death . . . ." Fear in Hobbes's scheme, therefore, motivated men to seek peace. But apparently Speer does not share that view. He states: "Moreover, fear tends to drive out reason. Hence, if the fear be great . . . a rational diplomacy will have but intermittent opportunities at best, and its accomplishments will tend to dissipate in the next crisis when fear again reaches a climax." Yet ironically enough, this is precisely the assertion by Hobbes which Speer should have alluded to in light of his own position on the development of a world state. In his final analysis, Speer suggests that the whole question of whether power or fear is the primary psychological phenomenon in


57. Ibid., p. 109.

international politics is really not all that important, whereas the establishment of the great "Leviathan" is.

The better thesis would appear to be, that, whether men and states are seen as power-lusting or as fearful, they are to be tamed or reassured only by government and that only within a governed ecology can a phyla of empathetic community grow and prosper. In short, world government is the beginning of community in its fuller sense, rather than its culmination.59

And Speer concludes that a theoretical prescription for a world state must be "adequate to break the cycle of self-confirming fear and, hence, of continuing violence."60 His own position, therefore, is clearly Hobbesian.

How does man in Hobbes's scheme take the initial step to extricate himself from a life of continual fear and violence? He relies on reason. "And reason suggests convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement."61 Speer's statement that, "this is not to say that any such government will be established; quite possibly it will not, this side of a liquidating third world war,"62 may reflect his dismissal of reasonable international negotiation. But we are still left with the question of how mankind, going on the assumption that mankind is not doomed

59. Ibid., p. 227.
60. Ibid.
to a third world war, can contract an international "Leviathan."

Since Mr. Speer is so sensitive to the ecological differences in interpersonal, national, and international relations, he would surely not call for the millions throughout the world to contract a sovereign. The feasibility of such a contractual solution in the state of nature on the international level depends upon accommodating and reasonable representatives from the various nations of the world. Professor Morgenthau provides us with those representatives; he prescribes statesmen. And I am afraid that the logical implication of Mr. Speer's theory of world government would be to accept that provision.

One can easily argue, as so many have, that the diplomacy which Morgenthau prescribes is a remnant of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and not at all conducive to the realities of the twentieth century. But for anyone who takes man's ability to solve his political problems in contemporary international relations seriously, the prescription for a revival of diplomacy must be acceptable. The nations of the world simply do not have mechanized robots to accomplish the task.
Some Concluding Notes on the
Old and New Morgenthau

It should be quite apparent to the reader that I disagree with Morgenthau as much as I agree with him. And it goes without saying that I find Morgenthau's theory open to criticism. It has been easy to pick at Morgenthau at one point or another and to elucidate his dogmatic, inconsistent, and at times, shallow thinking. But why do we pick? Why do we extend the effort? Why is Morgenthau important?

The answer to this question, and it is an answer which I think is shared by most in the discipline, is that Morgenthau made the all important breakthrough in thinking about international politics in a theoretical and systematic manner. His works initiated a change in an area of inquiry which typically had been concerned with study of diplomatic history and legal speculation. And as the preceding analysis suggests, his contributions have been voluminous. Morgenthau has written on topics which range from political ethics and foreign policy, to science and international relations theory. As a consequence, Morgenthau has been in the mainstream of the literature, and he has been the target of criticism, not only from international relations theorists, but from philosophers of science and theologians.

63. See Algosaibi's fine discussion op. cit., pp. 250-251.
I shall go out on the limb and argue that Morgenthau is a political theorist in the tradition of Hobbes and Machiavelli. He not only tells the world what is; but he gives the world vision, he argues for what may be and what ought to be. This is a view that is rarely expressed, and for good cause, for I also believe that most international relations theorists don't accept Morgenthau for this very reason. They eschew his theory on the whole, because it contains "normative," "mystical," and "unrealistic" judgments.

Algosaibi tells us that Morgenthau's theory is no longer in the mainstream. He is correct. Morgenthau's realism, generally, has given way to the vogue of "scientific inquiry." But Algosaibi is also kind. I have heard comments, and I am sure this is true of the reader, to the effect that Morgenthau is washed up in the discipline. He is to international relations theory what Galileo is to science. His theoretical approach is irrelevant and his contributions belong to the past. He is an old Morgenthau for a different reason; he has stopped where he began. When the critic argues that Morgenthau's "type" of theory is washed up, I must part company with him.

64. Ibid., p. 261.
For most of these critics, the purpose of inquiry is to develop a scientific body of knowledge. One critic has gone so far to say that "the study of international relationships may possibly, like modern physics, evolve toward the discovery of some inherent relationship among its ordering concepts of such elegant simplicity as Einstein's statement that energy is equal to mass multiplied by the square of the speed of light."  

Now, I do not wish to engage in any polemics against this mode of inquiry. It is legitimate, and it is relevant to our understanding of what is in the real world. But to exchange the dogmatism of "more-than-scientific-man" for the dogmatism of "scientific-man" is to deny a concern for what may be and what ought to be. While a scientific theory may exude elegance and simplicity, the extent to which this theory could offer the world a vision of hope, or national decision-makers a criterion for foreign policy, is questionable. Moreover, while scholars are busy developing

65. William T. R. Fox, "The Uses of International Relations Theory," Theoretical Aspects of International Relations, ed. William T. R. Fox (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 40. Despite his skepticism as to whether such a discovery would be generally acceptable or even possible, Fox's comment is directed implicitly to Morgenthau. "But whether or not a student of international relations will ever attain a comparable level of general theoretical insight, he is not likely to be able to leap to that level of insight simply by closing the door of his study and speculating about power, the national interest, and the state of nature in world politics."
pre-theories and anti-theories, the peoples of the world and national decision-makers may have nothing more to guide them than the prescriptions which emit from Morgenthau's theory.

Political theorists have always endeavored to address themselves to the political problems of their age and to seek solutions to those problems. To eschew Morgenthau's realism may be understandable, but to dismiss Morgenthau's approach to theory, in an era in which man faces the greatest political problem in history--his very survival--is tantamount to turning our backs from politics, and thus from political theory. It is a move which mankind and international relations scholars can ill afford to make. And because Morgenthau has not made that move, he is neither washed up or irrelevant.

66. Stanley Hoffmann has characterized Raymond Aron's theoretical contribution as an "anti-theory." "But whoever considers Aron's conception of the social sciences as the only valid one will admit that his anti-theory is the most thorough and systematic of all legitimate theories." The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 33. I can agree with Hoffmann that Aron has offered us an anti-theory; I can hardly agree that Aron's theory is the most systematic in the field.
CHAPTER 5

REFLECTIVE BANALITY

I suspect that members of all theoretical approaches in the discipline may dismiss the preceding exegesis as reflective and desultory banality. While schematic and methodical imagination may be lacking on my part, it is suggestive of the hackneyed erudition which has developed between Morgenthau and his critics. My purpose in this paper has not been to add to an already befuddled mess; rather, it has been to expose the mess for what it is. But to simply leave the mess exposed is not enough.

The debate between Morgenthau and his critics brings to mind an anecdote which was a favorite of Freud. It is rather apropos and goes something like this. A priest and a rabbi were debating the issue of whether Jesus was indeed the son of God. The rabbi used every possible persuasion to convince the priest that belief in Jesus was a matter of faith which could not preclude other approaches to theological inquiry. Finally the priest gave in. All right, he replied to the rabbi, legitimate knowledge of God demands many more approaches than my narrow and fundamental Catholicism. I know you would agree, stated the rabbi, after all, we know that the coming of the messiah lies in the future.
Now wait a minute, exclaimed the priest, I thought you said that inquiry into the nature of God was a matter of faith and must be much more eclectic than one partial approach. That was quite a different, cried the rabbi, for now you have been told the truth.

Freud had an affinity for unjustly criticizing theologians and religious schools of thought. He would, like the rabbi in the narrative, feel quite at home in the debate between Morgenthau and his critics. And the debate has not been an esoteric development in the discipline. As Kenneth Thompson has pointed out, "much of the literature of international politics is a dialogue, explicit or not, between 'Morgenthau and his critics.'"¹ The dialogue, as we have seen, is laden with fundamentalist arguments, dishonesty, and lack of understanding.

Perhaps more words of praise should have been diffused with the critical comments in this paper. It is certainly the norm which pervades most panel discussions in the discipline. It is not deserving. If Algosaibi's contention that the concern with theory "is a sign that the field is acquiring a new sophistication"² is representative


of the views held by most international relationists, then the discipline is in trouble. It may be helpful to reconsider what we mean by sophistication. It would seem more fruitful, however, if scholars were more critical of what is being "critically" published in the field, while at the same time, perfecting "their skills at the game they prefer instead of worrying about its values relative to other contests in which they could alternately engage." 3

At the risk of losing my professional ticket, let me go one step further. If Morgenthau and his critics can develop a scholarly sophistication which extends beyond polemics, then the critical analysis of their debate which follows in the future may surpass reflective banality. And if reflective banality is surpassed, the roads to international relations theory may not be any less diverse, but they will surely be less dim.

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