

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA
1903-1960's

by

Mohamed Zayyan O. Aljazairi

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1 9 6 8

STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

SIGNED: Mohamed Zulfikar A. Al-Jaziri

APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR

This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:

William J. Wilson
W. J. Wilson
Assistant Professor of
Oriental Studies

Dec. 16, 1967
Date

TO

MY WIFE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to his Thesis Director, Assistant Professor, Dr. William J. Wilson, in Oriental Studies, University of Arizona, for his many valuable suggestions and continued willingness to be of assistance throughout the author's program. I am thankful to Professor James A. Beatson for his guidance and advice during the period of graduate study. The author is indebted to King Abdul-Aziz University, Saudi Arabia, for the opportunity to attend graduate school. Lastly, the author wishes to express his gratitude to his wife for her patience and understanding during the course of instruction.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF TABLES	viii
ABSTRACT	ix
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Historical Background of the Al-Saud Family	1
The Egyptian Expedition of 1811	4
The Wahhabi Movement	14
II. IBN-SAUD'S FOREIGN POLICY	21
Emergence of a New State in Arabia	21
Ibn-Saud and the Turks	23
Ibn-Saud's Relations with the Hijaz	28
Ibn-Saud and Asir	32
Ibn-Saud and the Yemen	33
Northern Borders Problems	35
Saudi Arabia - Egypt Relations	36
III. THE STATUS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE KINGDOM OF THE HIJAZ	38
The Government Structure	38
The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Hijaz	39
IV. THE GOVERNMENT FROM 1951-1966	47
Establishment of the Council of Ministries, 1953	47
The Transfer of the Office of Premier from King Saud to Faisal	49
New King Proclaimed in Saudi Arabia	51
V. FOREIGN RELATIONS 1926 - 1960	55
Developing Diplomatic Relations	55
Saudi Arabia and the Arab League	59
Saudi Arabia and the United Nations	62
Saudi - Egypt - Yemeni Relations	66
Yemeni Question	68
Recognition by the United States and Russia's Support	70
The United States' Mediation	71

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

	Page
The United Nations' Observers	72
Peace Agreement at Jiddah and Harad Conference	73
Extra! Extra!	75
Khartum Agreement, 1967	76
 VI. SAUDI RELATIONS WITH THE TWO BLOCS	 79
Saudi Relations with the Western Bloc	79
Saudi - British Relations in the 19th Century	79
Saudi - British Relations 1906-1950's	83
Saudi - United States Relations	103
Economic Factor	103
Saudi - Russia Relations	111
 VII. NEUTRALIST POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC PACT	 115
Neutralist Policy of Saudi Arabia	115
 VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	 123
 APPENDIX A. ROYAL PRONOUNCEMENT CONCERNING THE POLICY OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBSOIL AND SEA BED OF AREAS IN THE PERSIAN GULF CONTIGUOUS TO THE COASTS OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA	 132
 APPENDIX B. ROYAL DECREE REGARDING TERRITORIAL WATERS OF SAUDI ARABIA	 135
 APPENDIX C. ROYAL DECREE NUMBER 2716 SEPTEMBER 18, 1932	 140
 APPENDIX D. ANGLO - SAUDI ARABIAN BURAIMI ARBITRATION AGREEMENT JULY 30, 1954	 141
 APPENDIX E. EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE KING OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE PRESIDENT (TRUMAN)	 154
Note from the King of Saudi Arabia to the President, October 15, 1946	154
Note from the President to the King of Saudi Arabia, October 28, 1946	156
 APPENDIX F. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY AND AMIR FAISAL, PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF SAUDI ARABIA	 164

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

	Page
APPENDIX G. THE CHARTER OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE SIGNED BY SAUDI ARABIA, PAKISTAN AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, MARCH 15, 1956, IN MECCA	170
APPENDIX H. LETTER SENT BY GENERAL-SECRETARY ANWAR AL-SADAT TO KING SAUD, THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE	175
APPENDIX I. MAPS	176
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	179
Books in Arabic	179
Books in English	179
Documents	181
Newspapers and Periodicals	182

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. The Al-Saud Family	5-6
2. The Government from 1926-1953	40
3. The Government from 1959 to 1963	54
4. Chronological table of developing diplomatic relations	57-58
5. Bloc patterns in the Arab League	63
6. Classification of neutralist and participation in gathering and major initiatives	118

ABSTRACT

The present study was designed around two related subjects: (1) diplomatic relations of Saudi Arabia, and (2) the development of the Saudi Government. This thesis is an effort to provide a detailed account of developing Saudi foreign policy, to concentrate on some current issues such as the Yemeni problem and the Buraimi dispute, and to find the cycles in which the Saudi foreign policy runs.

The principal findings of this study are as follows:

1. The political-religious alliance succeeded in founding a strong State. During the regime of Ibn-Saud, 1902-1953, most of the territories which came under the control of the first Wahhabi State(1747-1818) were taken.

2. He developed the structure of the Government from a tribal system to a modern Government starting with the Constitution of 1926 of the Kingdom of the Hijaz to the establishment of the Council of Ministers in 1953.

Saudi foreign policy runs in the following cycles:

1. Regional cycle which is devoted to:
 - A. the Arab League Charter;
 - B. solidarity of the Arab Nation, motivated by the fact that Saudi Arabia is the homeland of the Arab race;

C. in the Yemeni question King Faisal stood firmly on the principle of the right of self-determination to the Yemenis.

2. International cycle in which the policy is:

A. devoted to the UN Charter;

B. neutralist system (Saudi Arabia is out of the two satellites); and

C. desirous of Islamic solidarity, motivated by the Saudi Arabian position in the Islamic world. It is the homeland and center of Islam. Saudi rulers believe that Saudi Arabia can act as a bridge between the extremist Arab nationalist states and the Islamic countries.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Historical Background of the Al-Saud Family

The history of the Saudi family began, according to the Saudi Chronicler, by a migration of a citizen from Al-Hasa who went in 1446 to visit a cousin, Ibn-Dira, the chief of the Duraus settlers in central Arabia. His cousin granted him two villages in the Wadi Hanifa and to this land began the migration of the Duru. From these migrants came the Saudi family. A Royal Chronicler of the Saudi Prince wrote a book titled A History of the Kings of Al-Saud in which he said: "Saud Bin-Mohamed, Bin-Miqran, Bin-Morkhan, Bin-Ibrahim, Bin-Mosa, Bin-Rabia, Bin-Mani, Al-Muridi, from the tribe of Al-Masaleekh the branch of Anaza from Wail, Bin-Sa'ad, Bin-Rabia, Bin-Nizar, Bin-Ma'ad, Bin-Adnan Saud is the real founder of this Dynasty. He was the governor of Al-Diriyah. He left four sons."¹ The dynasty passed through a period of struggle before it established itself as a leading power in Arabia.

¹S. Hathlul, History of the Kings of Al-Saud, 1961, p. 6.

Before 1745 the Saudi Dynasty was a local family. Arabia was divided and ruled by many local Amirs: (a) the Sharifs in the Hijaz; (b) Banu Khalid in Al-Hasa; (c) Al-Muamor in Aluyiana; (d) the Imam in the Yemen; (e) the Idrisi in Asir; (f) Al-Abu-Said in Musqat and Oman.

Al-Saud family history is divided into three phases: first, 1747-1818; second, 1818-1891; third, 1902-present.

The first phase. The first period started after the alliance between Mohamed Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab and the Amir Mohamed Ibn-Saud in 1747. Diriyah became a very important center of the movement after this religious-political alliance.

Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab invoked a Jihad against the neighbours. The first goal of Mohamed Ibn-Saud was to occupy Riyadh. He spent many years until he succeeded in occupying it.

His son Abdul-Aziz succeeded him to the throne in 1765. He continued his father's policy of conquest. He ruled thirty-nine years and succeeded in getting the loyalty of the tribes in the Najd. He occupied Al-Hasa as well as Mecca and Medina, the two Holy Cities in the Hijaz. His raids reached Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Oman which were subjected to his authority. Al-Hasad came

under the Wahhabi authority and continued until the invasion of Ibrahim Pasha in 1811.² Their influence extended to the islands of Qatar and Bahrain.

The Sharif of Mecca, Khalib, led a campaign to suppress the Wahhabis in 1791 but it failed. In 1798 he led another campaign which also failed.

The Governor of Iraq led a campaign against the Wahhabis and entered deeply into Al-Hasa in 1798 but he failed completely to capture the country. Abdul-Aziz was assassinated by an extremist Shiite in 1803.³

His successor, Saud, was considered the greatest ruler in the first period of the Al-Saud Dynasty. In his regime the state reached its zenith. With his authority strengthened in the Hijaz, he added Oman and Bahrain to his realm. His influence extended to Yemen. He also put great pressure on Iraq. He beseiged Basrah for 12 days. He invaded Iraq in 1805 and in 1808 beseiged Korbala, the great shrine of the Shiite. He also turned to Syria and the Hijaz suffered heavily because of him. He put great pressure upon the Sharif of Mecca, Khalib. The Wahhabis forces stopped the Syrian pilgrimage until

²Ibid., p. 7.

³M. Khariabah, Introduction to Modern Arab's History, 1960, p. 359.

they forced the Sharif to ask for a peace agreement. Saud led the pilgrimage in the year 1806. The Sharif of Mecca became a Wahhabi vassel.

Saud's special interest was with the islands in the Persian Gulf - Qatar and Bahrain. The Saudi relations with Oman and the British interference will be discussed in Chapter VI.

The Wahhabi Empire reached its peak point in 1811. It was destroyed by the Egyptian expedition in 1818.⁴

The Egyptian Expedition of 1811

It was possible that the Wahhabi Empire would extend its frontiers to the Mediterranean and the religious reform of the Wahhabism would extend to all the Arab world.

The Turks already had extended their indirect control over the Hijaz in 1524 and annexed Yemen to the Ottoman Empire. The Turks had never gained effective control of Arabia. The Napoleonic invasion had contributed great successes to the Wahhabis.⁵

In 1806 the relations between Saud and the Amir of the pilgrimage of Syria and Egypt became strained

⁴Ibid., pp. 360-362.

⁵H.R.P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, 1956, p. 157.

Table 1. The Al-Saud Family.





Table 1 (Continued).



because Saud asked the Egyptians and the Syrians to stop the tradition of the Mahmal (in which were carried the robes of Kaaba annually and with testimony). In 1807 Saud prevented the pilgrimages from Syria and Egypt from entering the Hijaz unless they stopped at Al-Mahamal. Saud prepared a very big army in Medina and ordered it to prevent the pilgrimage from Istanbul and Syria, so it returned. Saud also took another measure against the soldiers and settlers, Turks in Mecca, by expelling them.

This extremist fanatic policy of Saud caused an uprising against him. The people of the Hijaz suffered economically because of Saud's prevention of the pilgrimage upon which they depended. Many of the Hijazis emigrated to Egypt and Istanbul where they complained to the Sultan and to Mohamed Ali-Pasha, the Governor of Egypt.

In 1807 the Sultan ordered the governor of Egypt to free the Holy Cities from the Wahhabis. Mohamed Ali-Pasha had not confirmed his position in Egypt. In 1811 Mohamed Ali responded to the call.⁶

The Royal Chronicler, Amir Saud Bin-Hathlul says: "The Sharif of Mecca corresponded with the Muslim countries and encouraged them to fight the Wahhabis; he charged them with unreal actions and said that the Wahhabis are

⁶H. Wahba, The Island of the Arabs in the 20th Century, 1956, p. 232.

Khorajiates and they charged the Muslim and treated them as unbelievers."⁷

The Turks decided to retake the Hijaz from the Wahhabis because of their religious position and its significance for the Islamic Caliphate.

Istanbul needed the Holy Cities for prestige in the eyes of the Muslims. Mohamed-Ali sent an army of 14,000 men under the command of his son Tusun. The Wahhabis' army was estimated at about 7,000 men. The Egyptian army came by land and by sea. It tried to enter Medina but was defeated by the Wahhabis. The Egyptian army then received more supplies and beseiged the city which surrendered to them in 1812. They entered Mecca without further military resistance in 1813. The Egyptians imprisoned the Sharif of Mecca and sent him to exile to Salonika where he died in 1816. The Egyptian army was defeated in Torabah by the Saudis.

Amir Saud died in 1814 and was succeeded by his son Abdullah. In 1813 Mohamed Ali himself led his army against the Wahhabis but he was defeated. He returned to Egypt and his son Ibrahim Pasha continued to conduct the war in Arabia. Ibrahim occupied Asir and Oasim.

⁷S. Hathlul, History of the Kings of Al-Saud, 1961, p. 8.

Abdullah Ibn-Saud who retired in Qasim, had opened negotiations for the following reasons: (1) He felt his position in the Najd to be insecure. (2) Some of the tribes in Najd had submitted to the Wahhabi authority; yet they had never fully accepted it. Many of them were joining the Turks. (3) Many Najdis felt that the recent defeat of their master had completely destroyed his chance of winning.⁸

Abdullah concluded the following agreement with the Sublime Port in 1815:

(1) That Abdullah acknowledge the Sultan of Turkey as Suzerain; (2) that he would give hostages for insurance of future conduct, and even present himself in person in Constantinople if called upon to do so; (3) that he deliver over Diriyah, his capital, to a governor appointed by the Sultan; (4) that he restore the jewels taken from Medina on the occasion of his father's visit in 1809.⁹

War broke out in the next year, 1816, when Abdullah raided some tribes in the Hijaz. Mohamed-Ali began another expedition to suppress the Wahhabis. His son Ibrahim Pasha defeated them. The Egyptian army beseiged Al-Rass and completed the occupation of Qasin in 1817. They then moved to the Wahhabi capital. It surrendered in 1818 after

⁸H.R.P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, 1956, p. 118.

⁹Ibid., p. 119.

five months of seige. He imprisoned Amir Abdullah and sent him to Egypt and from there to Istanbul. Habiz Wahba explains why the Wahhabis were defeated. He says:

The Najdis accused Abdullah of not being a capable military man because he met the Egyptians. Also Abdullah showed that he was not a good politician when he signed the Treaty because the Egyptians were running short of supplies and were in a critical position.¹⁰

The Egyptian expedition achieved its goal and put an end to the Wahhabis' Empire in Arabia. The Egyptians did not succeed in establishing a firm policy to administer the Najd, but instead left a vacuum and the Najd returned to anarchy.

Did Mohamed-Ali send an expedition to Arabia merely to obey the orders of the Sublime Port? The answer is no, because Mohamed-Ali's goal in the Ottoman Empire appeared clearly in his later campaign in Syria and Palestine. But Western resistance stopped his desires in the London Conference in 1840. (This is not the place to discuss Mohamed Ali's ambitions in Arabia, in the Hijaz, Asir, and the Najd.)

The Egyptian expedition in the Najd did not last very long. In 1820 Mishari Ibn-Saud returned from Qasim after he escaped from the Egyptians. He occupied the

¹⁰H. Wahba, The Island of the Arabs in the 20th Century, 1956, p. 225.

capital and the local ruler abdicated in favor of Mishari. At this time Turkish troops arrived in the Najd led by Abush-Aga. But Ibn-Muammer, the ruler of Riyadh, declared himself to be a Turkish vassel.

Turki Ibn-Abdullah arrested Ibn-Muammer and his son Mishari and killed them. In 1821 a new Turkish campaign arrived in Najd led by Husain-Bed, joined the previous Turkish commander and founded a base for their activities in Tharmada. Many dissatisfied local leaders joined them. The Turks occupied Riyadh. Turki Ibn-Abdullah escaped but returned in 1823.¹¹ He occupied Riyadh and neighbouring cities and regions. Also he occupied Qasim, Al-Hasa and part of Oman. He had good relations with Kuwait.

In 1829 he succeeded in driving the Turks from the Najd. He received a delegate from Buraimi. He almost reestablished the first Wahhabi Empire. However, he was assassinated in 1834 and was succeeded by his son Faisal. Another Egyptian army reached Riyadh in 1837 and controlled Najd in 1839. The local rulers accepted the Egyptians, who appointed local rulers in Hail, Shammer Mountain, and Al-Hasa. Faisal was arrested and sent to Egypt. He lived in exile twice - from 1818-1828 and from 1838-1843,

¹¹M. Khariabah, Introduction to Modern Arab's History, 1960, pp. 367-369.

but afterwards he returned from Egypt. Al-Hasa came under his control. He regained all the Wahhabi territories except the Hijaz. Faisal Ibn-Turki was the greatest man in the second Wahhabi State. He has been compared with Saud the Great in the First Empire. He had good diplomatic experience. His second return from exile in Egypt is considered the beginning of the modern history of Arabia. He died in 1865.

Faisal was a very strong man in the Second State. His death left a vacuum, which in turn led to the decline of the second Wahhabi State.

Faisal was succeeded by his son Abdullah. A quarrel was raised between the brothers Saud, Abdullah, Mohamed, and Abdul-Rahman.

Saud appealed to the ruler of Bahrain in his struggle against Abdullah; the latter appealed to the governor of Baghdad, Midhat Pasha, to help him against his brother, Saud, who had taken Al-Hasa. Midhat sent an expedition by land and by sea to Al-Hasa and occupied it. The Turks did not transfer Al-Hasa to Saud. Midhat Pasha himself came to organize the province and established fortifications.

In 1874 Abdul-Rahman requested the Turks to evacuate Al-Hasa but they refused. He fought them but he was defeated.

"The throne passed from 1865-1876 eight times among Abdullah, Saud, Abdul-Rahman and Saud's sons."¹² This gives a clear picture of the anarchy which led to the decline of the Second State until 1891, when a new strong state emerged in Hail. Ibn-Rashid interfered in the Saudi family quarrel.

The Saudi also interfered in Qasim affairs. When a revolt was raised against Ibn-Rashid, Abdul-Rahman went to help the revolutionaries but he was defeated. After his defeat he went to Al-Hasa where he met the Turkish Governor.

The Turkish ruler put before Abdul-Rahman the following suggestions: (1) Abdul Rahman would be the Amir of Riyadh and would be under the Turkish Government and its protection. He should recognize the Turkish sovereignty paying about \$1,200 annually as a symbol of recognition. (2) The Turkish Government would guarantee to protect him and supply him with arms. (3) He would be Qaim-Maqam Deputy to the Turkish Government.¹³

Abdul-Rahman refused this offer. He went to Kuwait to ask for refuge. The Kuwait ruler refused. He went to Qatar where he stayed for two months, later

¹²S. Hathlul, History of the Kings of Al-Saud, 1961, p. 50.

¹³Ibid., p. 53.

moving to Bahrain. In 1892 finally the Kuwaiti ruler allowed him to come and welcomed him. He stayed for twelve years with his family. Ibn-Rashid occupied Riyadh and this was the end of the second Saudi State.

The Wahhabi Movement

Before we talk about this movement and its founder, we should talk about its roots. The Wahhabis are the followers of the Hanbalite school, the most conservative of the four schools in Islamic law. It emphasized adherence to the letter to the Hadith and the Koran. The Wahhabis followed the doctrine and the ideas of the great Hanbalite scholar Taqi Al-Din Ahmed Ibn-Taiyimiya, 1262-1328. He was an outstanding scholar in religious law and interpreter of the Hadith and the Koran. His main ideas are the following: (1) Muslim communities should follow the life of the prophet and his companions, follow the Sharia literally. The Muslims should not follow the philosophers and the Sufis because they are contradictory to the classical spirit. (2) A strict prohibition of any special respect to tombs or of prayer to them, or asking the help from saints or sacrificing to them. (3) The denial of the exaggeration of the prophet and rather more respect for his message. (4) The opening of the the door of Ijtihad.

Ibn-Taiymiyah's movement aroused the Sufis and the old school against him and also aroused the anger of the fanatics who include most of the judges and the high officials. He was persecuted and imprisoned, but later freed and returned to preach his ideas. In some way he could be compared to Martin Luther in the Christian church because both of them preached the reformation of the church.

What we wanted to say here is that this preacher and this movement did not succeed because the officials were against it. His movement was reformed again in the hands of the Wahhabis.

The founder of the Wahhabi movement was Mohamed Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab, born in 1703 in the Najd from a high class family. His grandfather was one of the greatest scholars in the Najd. His father was the judge of the city of Uyaina.

Sheik Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab studied the Hanbalite school law and he was much interested in the books of Ibn-Taiymiah. He went on a pilgrimage to Mecca and moved to Medina. He stayed there and studied religious law. He continued his trip and traveled to Al-Hasa,* Iraq and Syria. Wahhaba says that Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab traveled to

*Eastern part of Saudi Arabia today.

Persia and learned Eastern wisdom. Najib Ullah says that:

He spent four years in Basra as a tutor; five years in Baghdad, where he married a wealthy heiress; one year in Kurdistan; two years in Hamadan; and four years in Isfahan, where he studied Greek philosophy and Neoplatonism. He went for a while to Qum, another city in Persia, where he was considered a Hanbalite scholar.¹³

Madi says that he traveled to Istanbul but this is in doubt. According to Madi the factors which affected Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab were the following:

1. The society in the Najd was far removed from the right path of Islam. The Wahhabi Chronicler wrote a work considered very valuable and containing vast information about Wahhabism and early Saudi family history. Bishr described the situation in the Najd which caused reaction against Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab, who had called for the reformation as follows:

At that time polytheism had become widespread in Najd and elsewhere. The belief in trees, stones, tombs and the buildings over them, and in the blessings to be had from tombs, and in sacrifices to them had increased; (also) belief in seeking the help of the Jinn, and in sacrificing to them, and in placing food before them and putting it in the corners of the houses to cure the sick, and belief in the good or evil power of the Jinn had increased; (finally) belief in oaths to other

¹³Najib Ullah, Islamic Literature, 1963, p. 170.

than God and other polytheistic actions, both major and minor had increased.¹⁴

2. The influence of the Ibn-Taiymiah's ideas grew.

Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab decided to preach for the reformation of the church in Islam. He chose the Najd, his native country, to preach his doctrine which can be summarized as follows:

1. The unity of God: No prophet or saint was to ask his help or attempt - tawsil - to be near or close to God.

2. The prohibition of building domes or houses over tombs was ordered.

3. War against all innovations was declared.

4. Jihad, or the Holy War was declared against the people who did not obey this doctrine. (This explains Wahhabis' raids to Iraq, Yemen, Hijaz and Syria.)

In another word the Wahhabis wanted a rebirth of the ideals of Mohamed's beliefs and deny the beliefs of the Sufis and the Traditionalist such as the denial of the special respect to the saints. The Wahhabis emphasized the prohibition of wine, tobaccos and tombstones for the dead. There was arguing between the Ulema of Egypt and the Wahhabis about the tobacco.

Wahhabis refused to set up for visiting any mosques other than these three mosques: Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem.

¹⁴R. B. Winder, Saudi Arabia in the 19th Century, 1965, p. 12.

Mohamed Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab started preaching in the Najd, but faced resistance from the Najdis. There was a gulf between him and the Najdis; even his father disagreed with his preaching. He also harshly criticized the innovations of the Najdis who as a result persecuted him. He was forced to leave the town, Hurymila, which had been the first town to accept his preaching, and go to Uyainah. The Governor was Uthman Ibn-Muamer who welcomed Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab and married him to his sister and encouraged him in his preaching. However, he was forced to leave this refuge because the Governor of Al-Hasa threatened Ibn-Muamer with stopping his aid if the Governor of Uyainah did not kill Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab. Uthman decided to get rid of his brother-in-law. Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab chose Daraiya where a local Amir had ruled for generations. There were three persons who arranged for communication between the Sheik and the Amir Mohamed Ibn-Saud and Mishari Bin-Thunian the legitimate sons of Ibn-Saud. The Amir converted to Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab's doctrine and converted his tribes and other tribes to his teacher's gospel. The Amir promised to protect the Shiek and to spread his preaching. This alliance was made in 1744. The Wahhabism spread in most of the Arabian Peninsula and also outside in the Islamic world: (a) In the Sacatra Kingdom on the Neiger River in the Sudan, 1804-1900. The Wahhabi preacher who spread

Wahhabism in this area was called Uthman. He was from the Nomadi tribe. He visited Mecca, met with the Wahhabis, and became converted to their doctrine and preached it. He suppressed the paganism, spread the faith, and founded the Kingdom. Its population was ten million persons.¹⁵

(b) Punjab - India, 1820-1830; Bengal, 1820-1860. An Indian pilgrim adopted Wahhabi doctrine and preached it in India because the Muslim life there was mixed with Hindu ideas. He succeeded in establishing an Islamic State based on the Wahhabi doctrine. The British suppressed it in 1840 but the Wahhabism continued. The greatest sect of the Wahhabis there is the sect of Farazis.

(c) Sumatra - Malaysia. Wahhabism started in 1803; also a pilgrimage visited Mecca and returned to preach the Wahhabism there, but the followers of this man entered into a war with other Muslim sects. The Dutch Government decided to suppress it and war continued for sixteen years with the Dutch until the latter succeeded in suppressing it. (d) Sanusi movement in Libya, which started in 1844. The founder was called Mohamed Ali-Sanusi. He was studying in Mecca when the Wahhabis captured it. He associated with them and adopted some of their ideas. The Sanusi State

¹⁵M. A. Madi, Modern Renaissance in Arabia - Saudi Arabia, 1952, p. 60.

is similar to the Saudi State because both Kings are the Heads of State and the Imam of their believers.¹⁶

Wilfred Smith described the Wahhabism as follows:

They (the Wahhabis) call a halt to decadence, summoning Muslim society back to its first purity and order...it (Wahhabism) was puritanical, vigorous, simple. Its message was straightforward: a return to classical Islam. It rejected the corruption and laxity of the contemporary decline, the accommodations and cultural richness of the Medieval Empire. It rejected the introverted warmth and other worldly piety of the mystic way. It rejected also the alien intellectualism not only of philosophy but of theology. It rejected all dissensions. It insisted solely on the law. The classical law says the Wahhabis is the sum and substance of the faith.¹⁷

Mohamed Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab was a productive writer.

He wrote the following books: Al-Tawhid (The Unity); Tafsir al-Oaran (the interpretation of the Koran in more than one volume); Kashf al-Shubuhah (The Discovery of the Doubts); Al-Kabiar wa Al-Masial (The Greatest Sins and the Questions); a summary of The Big Interpretation, the original of which is in many volumes; Fatwats and Correspondence on the Sharia.¹⁸

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 65-69.

¹⁷W. C. Smith, Islam in Recent History, 1957, p. 42.

¹⁸O. Bishr, The Title of Glorious in History of Najd, 1955, p. 100.

CHAPTER II

IBN-SAUD'S FOREIGN POLICY

Emergence of a New State in Arabia

The key figure in the modern history of Saudi Arabia is Ibn-Saud as he is known in the West. His real name is Abdul-Aziz Ibn-Abdul-Rahaman and he was born in 1880. He migrated with his father to Kuwait when he was 12 years old. Kuwait offered him good training in politics. It was a battle field for international politics. Germany's ambition was to get the Baghdad railroad concession from the Sublime Port. Germany wanted Kuwait to be the end point for it so it could spread its influence in the Persian Gulf. Russia put obstacles before Germany's plan. England also was mindful of its own colonies in the Orient. It wanted to keep away other powers from the mines and the oil of the area. Each of these countries was trying to get the Kuwaiti ruler's friendship. Abdul-Aziz stayed ten years and witnessed many events which helped him later to build his State. He learned the foreign political systems. Fortunately the Kuwaiti ruler was a very astute politician. The Kuwaiti ruler had stayed in India for a long time where he met the British politicians. At this time the

conflict between Kuwait and Ibn-Rashid in Hail arose. Saudi refugees sided with the Kuwaiti ruler, Mubark. Abdul-Aziz participated in the battles against Ibn-Rashid.

The Kuwaiti ruler encouraged Abdul-Aziz in 1899 and supplied him with a division of troops. Ibn-Saud entered Riyadh, but he was unable to conquer it.

In 1902 he decided to make a second attempt for the following reasons: (1) The Saudi followers were persecuted by Ibn-Rashid. (2) Ibn-Saud disliked his life of protection under Mubark after having lost his Kingdom in Riyadh.

His main goal from this campaign was to retake Riyadh. He proved to be a very capable military commander, which was evident from his plan not to meet his strong enemy in open battle, but to depend on the booty from the tribes and to get the support of tribes which were pro-Ibn-Rashid.

The Royal Chronicler, Saud Ibn-Hathlul gives the names of the forty men who accompanied him. It is the only source which mentioned them.¹⁹ Ibn-Saud Abdul-Aziz succeeded in occupying Riyadh in the middle of January, 1902. The occupation of Riyadh was considered the first stage for the third Saudi State. Ibn-Saud occupied Sadir,

¹⁹S. Hathlul, History of the Kings of Al-Saud, 1961, p. 58.

Washm Mahmal, Majma, and by 1903 most of the Qasim region were under his control. Ibn-Saud's success got the attention of the Sublime Port because it saw in his power dangers harmful to its interest in Arabia encouraging other local rulers to follow his example. Thus its prestige would drop and it might lose its territories in Arabia. Riots broke out in Basna, Iraq and in the Yemen. The latter opposed the idea of the Jihad against the Turks in June 1904, so the Turks decided to act.²⁰

Ibn-Saud and the Turks

The Sublime Port felt the critical international position for the Ottoman Caliphate and the instability within the Ottoman State so Abdul-Hamid and his officials thought seriously on the matter. Their action was aimed at two things: (1) To win the sympathy of the Islamic people and to unite them around the Sublime Port. The Sultan showed special interest for the people in the Hijaz. (2) To show the power of the Sublime Port and to show that it was still able to suppress and put down any revolt against it.

It acted quickly and supported Ibn-Rashid against Ibn-Saud, because it thought that if Ibn-Saud got strong enough he would not be a vassel to the Turks and that he

²⁰M. A. Madi, Modern Renaissance in Arabia - Saudi Arabia, 1952, p. 278.

might, in fact, follow a pro-British policy. It sent an army of 8,000 equipped soldiers which joined Ibn-Rashid's army. It met Ibn-Saud's army in June 1904. Ibn-Saud defeated the united army in September 1904.²¹

The Turks, after their defeat, changed their policy toward Ibn-Saud. The Turks sent a delegate to negotiate with Ibn-Saud. They asked Abdul-Aziz to send his father to Iraq. He went with the Kuwaiti ruler. The Turks suggested that the Qasim region be an independent neutral zone and act as a buffer state between Ibn-Rashid and Ibn-Saud. They asked also that two military posts be there. However, Ibn-Saud refused these suggestions. The Turks were ready to recognize Ibn-Saud as their deputy in the Qasim region and independent ruler in the Najd. The negotiations failed, and began again before the agreement was concluded between the two sides. In the second round the situation in the Yemen changed rapidly for the worse and the Turkish commander was ordered to leave to the Yemen immediately. Ibn-Saud defeated Ibn-Rashid in April, 1906.

Ibn-Saud sent a warning message to the Turkish commander in Qasim to leave the region. Ibn-Saud offered transportation to the Turkish soldiers to Iraq and to

²¹Ibid., pp. 109-113.

Medina. The Turkish influence came to an end in the Qasim and Najd provinces.²²

The year of 1912 Ibn-Saud spent in diplomatic correspondence with the Ottomans who were busy at that time with the Balkan war. The Arab's Amirs remained neutral. Idrisi stood with the Italians. The Turks asked Ibn-Saud to send his troops against Idrisi or to protect Asir from the Italians, but he refused.

In this period Jamal Bacha contacted Ibn-Saud to act as mediator between him and the Sharifs in Mecca; but Jamal Bacha changed his policy and started warning Ibn-Saud that he would send an army to cross the Najd from the north to the south.

The Governor of Basrah was more realistic and knew the power of Ibn-Saud. He sent a letter to Ibn-Saud asking his opinion in the Arab's affairs and the Arab's stand concerning the Ottomans. Ibn-Saud replied to him as follows:²³

...I know that your consultation with me is no more than to know what are my goals. This is my opinion and you can explain it as you want. The Turks are responsible for the differences between the Arabs....I suggest that you invite the Arab's Amirs, powerful and weak, to a conference in a neutral country so they can confer freely, away from any Ottoman interference. The

²²M. Khariabah, Introduction to Modern Arab's History, 1960, p. 406.

²³Ibid., p. 410.

purpose of this is to determine one of two matters; that the Arab countries should be one unit governed by one ruler or be divided into valiyates and renew their frontiers and appoint a capable person to govern each of them and to tie these valiyates by many common interests. They should be administratively independent and the Turks would be the supervisors of them...²⁴

The Governor of Basrah was pleased with the suggestion. He transferred it to Istanbul but Istanbul ignored the suggestion. To complete the story of Ibn-Saud-Ottoman relations, we will talk now about another area of conflict.

Ibn-Saud captured Al-Hasa in 1913. The province of Al-Hasa, during the pre-Islamic period, was under the Persians. After Mohamed it converted to Islam. The first one, who made it a center for military and political operation was Tahir Al-Qarmati. It came under Saudi control in the first Saudi State in the regime of Abdul-Aziz, 1791. After the capture of Dariyah, 1818, Ibrahim, the Egyptian, controlled it so it was transferred to the Turks, and continued until Faisal Ibn-Turki retook it. It was transferred in the period of anarchy and civil war between Faisal's sons again to the Turks. It became part of Basrah valiyat because of Midhat Basha who conquered it in 1871. When Ibn-Saud regained his capital and strengthened his power in central Arabia and Qasim

²⁴S. Hathlul, History of the Kings of Al-Saud, 1961, p. 97.

the Turks were busy with war in the Balkans. In 1913 he captured it for the following reasons: (1) His relations with the Turks became worse because they encouraged the Sharif of Mecca. (2) Al-Hasa was a Turkish center of military and political operations in Arabia. It was a center for supplies for Ibn-Rashid's wars against Ibn-Saud.²⁵

Ibn-Saud captured the Turkish troops and transferred them to Bahrain. The conquest of Al-Hasa made him a participant in the politics in the Persian Gulf. From here he contacted the British. Al-Hasa was to be a great source of revenue in the future after the discovery of oil.

The reaction of the Turks was not strong toward Ibn-Saud. They were afraid of losing Ibn-Saud and consequently not only Al-Hasa, but central Arabia also. They tried to win him to their side. The Turks sent delegates who met Ibn-Saud near Kuwait. The Ottomans recognized him as Governor of the Najd and Deputy of Al-Hasa.

At this time there were Turkish-British negotiations of which Ibn-Saud did not know and which led to an agreement in 1913. Arabia was divided between them in another

²⁵M. A. Madi, Modern Renaissance in Arabia - Saudi Arabia, 1952, p. 124.

detailed agreement in 1914. Ibn-Saud's territories were put under the Turkish State. But World War I broke out and the agreement was not put into practice.²⁶

Ibn-Saud's Relations with the Hijaz

In the Conference of Kuwait, 1916, there was manifest a friendly relation between Ibn-Saud and Sharif Hussein and Ibn-Saud encouraged the Arabs to assist in his fight against the Turks. In central Arabia, Ibn-Saud defeated Ibn-Rashid who was allied with the Turks. However, in 1917 Sharif Hussein claimed to England that Ibn-Saud did not participate in the Arabs' problem. Doubt began between the leaders. Britain tried to be a mediator between them. By the end of World War I, Ibn-Saud found himself surrounded by Hashimite States in Jordan, Iraq, and the Hijaz. A State border problem started between Ibn-Saud and Iraq concerning the pasture for the nomadic tribes. England arranged a conference between Ibn-Saud and Iraq and Jordan in Kuwait and it lasted for two meetings. This conference did not accomplish anything. Such were the relations between Ibn-Saud and Hussein until 1919 when Ibn-Saud defeated Hussein in the Battle of Tarabah. England sided with Hussein so Ibn-Saud did not get the fruit of this battle.

²⁶M. Khariabah, Introduction to Modern Arab's History, 1960, p. 413.

King Hussein found himself forced by the people of the Hijaz to abdicate in favor of his son, Ali, in order to induce the Wahhabis to return to the Najd, but this did not convince Ibn-Saud and he captured Mecca and besieged Jiddah for almost a year and sent his troops to Medina. He besieged it until it fell. King Ali Ibn-Al-Hussein signed a treaty with Ibn-Saud and abdicated the rights of the Sharifs to the sovereignty of the Hijaz to Ibn-Saud. This treaty was signed December 17, 1925. The terms of articles of the treaty and the transfer of the rights of the Sharifs to Ibn-Saud ensured the safety to the officials of the Government, military or civilian, and the tribes were ensured the safety of their persons and their properties. By the terms of Article 3, Ibn-Saud ensured general forgiveness to all mentioned above. Article 4, the soldiers have to give up their weapons, planes and the military equipment immediately. Article 8, Ibn-Saud agreed to keep the officials in their posts. Article 9, King Ali had the right to carry his personal properties. Article 11, King Ali had to leave the Hijaz after four days. Article 12, all the ships which belonged to the Hijaz were transferred to Ibn-Saud. This treaty contained 17 articles.²⁷

²⁷H. Wahba, The Island of the Arabs in the 20th Century, 1956, pp. 413-415.

Islamic World Conference: Ibn-Saud contacted the Muslim powers to reach an agreement concerning the government of the Hijaz.

In 1924 when he captured the Hijaz, King Ibn-Saud declared that he would let the matter of government be determined by all Muslim countries. "We have sent a telegram to all Muslim countries to send their delegates to the Islamic World Conference in Mecca."²⁸ England and Egypt tried to be mediators between him and Sharif Ali but Ibn-Saud refused this mediation.

The problems which faced Ibn-Saud in the international affairs were the following: (a) his status as de facto ruler of the Holy Land of Islam in relation to the rest of the Muslim world, (b) the problem created by the impact of Wahhabism's ideas with the other schools of religious thought, (c) fixing the frontiers which concerned both his neighbors in the Peninsula and the powers holding mandates in the Arab rectangle, and (d) the question of his relations with the United Kingdom and with other powers.²⁹

After Ibn-Saud received the oath of the people of the Hijaz proclaiming him the King of the Hijaz and Sultan of the Najd, he held a strong position. At this

²⁸Ibid., p. 225.

²⁹G. Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 1955, p. 466.

time a supreme judge of the Egyptian court came to Jiddah. At the end of the visit a seven point agreement was made concerning the status of the Hijaz, which would be discussed by the Islamic World Conference. Also a minister from Iran came to see the situation in the Hijaz. Two weeks after the first declaration, Ibn-Saud announced that he had cancelled the idea of the Islamic World Conference. However, the King then changed his mind and agreed to arrange for an Islamic World Conference, although the Conference would not discuss the status of the Hijaz. Also Ibn-Saud made it clear to the sixty assembled delegates that temporal matters were to be excluded from the discussion. The question of the worship of saints and of their tombs and shrines proved especially controversial. In addition to these difficulties, there was a new incident connected with the Egyptian Mahmal which arose. Among the difficulties also was the reconciliation between the Whabi, the conservative sect, and the liberal Muslims. These were the main causes of the failure of this Congress. Also the Muslim delegates mostly were politicians and the Whabi were theologians. The Conference or the Congress did not accomplish anything. There are three views about this Congress. George Lenczowski says it had achieved its purpose for Ibn-Saud by bringing him implicit or

explicit recognition from many Muslim States.³⁰ George Antonius considers it very valuable. He says: "Insofar as it brought the Wahhabi doctors into direct contact with the views of the rest of Islam it was exceedingly useful, for that contact gave Ibn-Saud an opportunity to start on the task of reconciling the two views."³¹

Hafiz Wahba says: "But the Congress did not accomplish anything for the Hijazians. All the hopes to develop the Hijaz were not realized."³²

Ibn-Saud and Asir

Asir was ruled by the Idrisi Dynasty after Mohamed Idrisi died in 1923. A struggle broke out between the two countries. This encouraged the Imam of the Yemen to interfere and utilize this opportunity to extend his realm over Asir. The descendents turned to Ibn-Saud, the old ally of Mohamed Idrisi. Sayyid Hassan Ibn-Ali surrendered his external sovereignty to Ibn-Saud on November 20, 1930. Its internal sovereignty as well became fully a part of the Saudi domain but before 1930 both sides signed a treaty called the Protectorate (Mecca) Agreement. Asir, the Hijaz,

³⁰G. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 1962, p. 544.

³¹G. Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 1955, p. 459.

³²H. Wahba, The Island of the Arabs in the 20th Century, 1956, p. 304.

Najd and its Dependencies signed on October 21, 1926. The important article of this Treaty is that in Article 1 Al-Hassan Ibn-Ali Alidrisi acknowledges the ancient marches described in the Treaty of 1926 made between the Sultan of the Najd and Imam Mohamed Adrisi and which were at that date subject to the house of Adrisi as being in the virtue of this agreement under the suzerainty of His Majesty the King of the Hijaz, Sultan of the Najd. In Article 2, the Imam of Asir may not enter into political negotiation with any Government or grant any economic concession to any person except with the sanction of His Majesty the King of the Hijaz. In Article 3, the Imam of Asir may not declare war or make peace except with the sanction of His Majesty.

These terms mean that Asir came under Saudi monarchy and had not the right to contract with other countries. The Imam had no right to give any part of his territories of Asir described in Article 1.³³ This Treaty was a step of King Ibn-Saud to extend his authority over Asir and finally Asir came under Saudi suzerainty.

Ibn-Saud and the Yemen

In 1934 a conflict broke out between Ibn-Saud and the Yemen because Ibn-Saud extended his authority over Asir.

³³J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near East and Middle East, V. II, 1956, p. 148.

Imam Yahya regained some cities. The Yemen took the advantage of rebellion in Asir against the rule of Ibn-Saud. So a war broke out and is known as the Seven Weeks War. Commander in Chief was Amir Faisal. He gained victory and swept many territories and defeated the Yemeni troops. The Imam sued for peace and the war was concluded by the treaty known as the Treaty of Taif, Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. The importance of this Treaty is that: In Article 1, the state of war existing between the Yemen and Saudi Arabia is terminated as from the moment of signature of the Treaty and there was forthwith to be established friendship between Their Majesties the Kings and their countries and peoples. In Article 2, each of the two recognizes the full and absolute independence of the kingdom of the other part and his sovereignty over it. In Article 6, the two parties undertake immediately to withdraw their troops from the country. In Article 9, the two parties undertake by all moral and material means at their command to prevent the use of their territory as a base and center for hostile action or enterprise against the country of the other party.³⁴ The friendly relations between Saudi Arabia

³⁴M. Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, V. II, 1960, pp. 214-223.

and the Yemen continued until the death of Imam Yahayh and succession of his son when the revolution broke out in the Yemen in 1962. Then the relations became strained.

Northern Borders Problems*

As we mentioned before, Ibn-Saud was surrounded by Hashimites on the northern border - Iraq. Ibn-Saud met at the Kuwait Conference which did not accomplish any agreement. Later he had to negotiate with Britain, who held the mandates for the territories after his annexation of the Jabl Shammar.** Ibn-Saud concluded the following treaties: (a) The Treaty signed in 1922 is known as the Almohamarah Agreement. (b) The Hadda Agreement was signed on November 2, 1925. By the terms of this Treaty the parties fixed the frontiers between Najd and Transjordan. (c) The Bahra Agreement was signed on November 1, 1925. Provisions were made for regulation of tribe migration from Najd into Iraq and Jordan. (d) Also Aqir protocol changed some articles in the Treaty of 1922.

The Treaty of 1922 had solved the border questions between Najd and Iraq and between Najd and Kuwait and changed some articles in the protocol of Aqir in the same year (1922).

*See Appendix A dealing with the Saudi subsoil and sea bed in the Persian Gulf.

**South Hail, in the Qasim region.

Another treaty of friendship was signed in 1933 between Saudi Arabia and Jordan. According to Article 1, permanent peace and friendship shall prevail between Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In Article 2, each of the two parties undertook to preserve good relations. According to Article 3, both sides will appoint officials in the zones in the frontier who shall be responsible for the organization of general cooperation.³⁵

Saudi Arabia - Egypt Relations

The first contact of Egypt with Ibn-Saud as we mentioned was when delegates from Egypt came as mediators between Ibn-Saud and the Sharif. However, Ibn-Saud refused this mediation and suggested that Egypt lead the call for an Islamic World Conference.

These contacts made the relation strained until 1936 when Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed a treaty of friendship and brotherhood. The Egyptian Government recognized Saudi Arabia as full and absolutely independent. There should be between the people of the two countries a peace and friendship to prevent the use of their countries as a base and center for any hostile action. Establishment of a diplomatic relation between the two countries was to be set up. King Ibn-Saud was to insure

³⁵Ibid., pp. 212-214.

that the visits to Mecca for the pilgrimage be made easily. According to this article (6) the two sides would sign a postal and other agreements. After the two countries signed this treaty they continued exchanging official notes from 1936 to 1939 about some projects, roads, which would be built in the Holy Cities in the Hijaz by the Egyptian Government. In 1945, the Egyptian King, Faruq, paid a State visit to Ibn-Saud. The meeting of the two Kings is known as the Radwa Meeting.* From this meeting came the first step in the Arab League when it moved from the protocol stage to a political organization and made a firm base for brotherhood and friendly relations between the two Kings. Another State visit was paid to Ibn-Saud by the President of Syria. In the next year, 1946, Ibn-Saud paid a State visit to Egypt. In 1948 the second meeting of King Ibn-Saud with the Hashimite King of Jordan took place when the latter paid a visit to Saudi Arabia. (The first meeting was in 1930 with the King of Iraq about the frontiers problem.³⁶)

*Radwa: Name of a mountain in the Hijaz.

³⁶M. A. Madi, Modern Renaissance in Arabia - Saudi Arabia, 1952, pp. 177-226.

CHAPTER III

THE STATUS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE KINGDOM OF THE HIJAZ

The Government Structure

Ibn-Saud knew how to establish his authority over the tribes. He taught them how to respect the authority of the Government. During the first period of the Ibn-Saud rule he used the sword. The major elements upon which were based the political theory and Saudi Government are the following:³⁷

The royal family. The Saudi Government is a monarchy. (a) The King held the high office of the State. (b) The office of the Prime Minister was also the King's. (c) He exercised his authority as Sheik of Sheiks. (d) The King also was to be known as the Imam of the believers.

The tribes. The tribes were also considered a political base of the Government structure because the heads of the tribes ruling in their small communities are responsible for keeping order in their tribes. The head of all these Sheiks is the King.

³⁷G. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia, 1960, p. 138.

Religious leaders. The Saudi State arose from a political-religious alliance. Mohamed Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab allied himself with Amir Mohamed Ibn-Saud. The word and the sword united. The house of Al-Saud leads the political life of the country, while the Wahhabi house leads the religious life.

There is a consulative council.

The constitution of the Government is the Koran and Sunna - religious law - Sharia.

There are Western laws regulating administration and industrial affairs.

From the conquest of the Hijaz in 1926 until 1948 there were three minister's offices - Minister of Defense, Minister of Finance, and Minister of State.


The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Hijaz

On August 29, 1926, King Abdul-Aziz issued this Constitution of the Kingdom of the Hijaz divided into eight parts. The most important are the following:

Departments of the Kingdom of the Hijaz. Sharia Affairs, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Financial Affairs, Public Education, and Military Affairs are the main divisions.

Legislative Assembly (Consulative). Article 28, a council should organize in the capital. This should consist of the Agent-General, his Advisors, and six Notables

Table 2. The Government from 1926-1953.



who shall be nominated by His Majesty the King. Article 31, all decisions made by the Legislative Assembly should be put into effect after they have been passed to His Majesty the King. Article 10, if the Government asked the Council its opinion about some projects, decrees, or laws and it refused to sign it and disagreed, the final word is His Majesty the King. Article 13, the King has the full right and the power to dismiss the Council or to change some of its members anytime. The Council members are appointed by His Majesty. It has no power to issue the laws or decrees; just give its opinion. From its name we can know what it is - Majlis Al-Shura - (Consultative) the King is the sole holder of the legislative authority and he practices it by his own determination or by the suggestion of this Council.³⁸ He founded this Council as a gift to the people. The Council has no limited number but is as His Majesty decides. We can raise this question, Why did His Majesty found this Council? There are two reasons: (1) The Hijaz is the center of the State for contact with the foreign world; the administration has to be modern. (2) This province of the State had known something of modern government under the Turks and in the Sharif periods. Its people were willing to be governed by the modern system.

³⁸M. Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, V. I, 1960, p. 237.

Councils of Jiddah and Medina. Article 32, a committee shall be elected in Jiddah and Medina and be called the Administrative Council. This shall be consisted of the Deputy Governor "Qaimaqam", his assistants, the Chief Official and four Notables; the latter will be chosen and nominated by His Majesty the King. Article 34, in accordance with Article 31 of the Legislative Assembly, all decisions made by the two Councils above mentioned shall be passed to His Majesty the King for sanction. Once they are sanctioned by His Majesty they must be put into effect.³⁹ This above article emphasizes the authority of the King over the two Councils.

General Municipal Councils. Its members shall be landlords, members of special crafts, and notables who will be selected by His Majesty the King. Any member selected to a Municipal Council should be a subject of His Majesty. Every resolution passed by the Councils in turn will be submitted to the Legislative Assembly and will pass to His Majesty the King. The directors of the Councils should act in accordance with the resolutions by the General Councils and approved by His Majesty.⁴⁰ From the articles mentioned above we can understand the following: (1) His

³⁹Ibid., p. 240.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 242.

Majesty the King was the highest chief of the authority.

(2) He practiced it with the full power in the whole of his realm.

The Council of Deputies: Majlis Al-Wukala. This Council came into being under the Viceroy of the Hijaz, Amir Faisal. This Council appeared in December, 1931, when the Constitution was issued. This decree established four members and a president, the Deputy for Foreign Affairs and the Vice-President of the Consulative Assembly. The Council of Deputies, as defined by this decree was to have been a strong Government organ. The Council issued all instructions to the Government departments. This authority was spelled out as being delegated by the King. In reality the Council had been functioning for several years. It was acting as an executive group in the Hijaz Government. This was one force of the decree of this Council and its functions. Let us look in the Royal Decree, Number 2716, dated September 18, 1932.⁴¹ Article 6 states: "Our present Council of Deputies shall immediately formulate a new Constitution, a new order for the succession to the throne, and a new regulation for governmental organization and shall submit them to us that we may issue our orders concerning them." From the above article we understand that it has

⁴¹Middle East Institute, Middle East Journal, 1956, V. 11, pp. 2-3.

the power to issue the laws and decrees for the Kingdom. But in fact, it has not. Now I quote from a lecture in political science in Riyadh University by Minister Ahmed Zaki Ymani (now Minister of Oil in Saudi Arabia). He said, "The Council of Deputies lived for a short period and continues in name only and has no trace in practical life. This Council did not issue any of these decrees but the article showed clearly that the King did not want to make the Legislative Assembly the only source to issue the decrees and the laws."⁴² This was the government system in the Hijaz. How was the situation in Najd? The King ruled Najd and Al-Hasa on a personal basis without ministerial intermediaries because the traditional patriarchal pattern of government served most effectively. He did have subordinate leaders of the small groups of people and a body of advisors somewhat less formally organized. Out of this advisory group developed the Royal Cabinet. The most illustrative names are the following:

Dr. Abdul Allh Al-Damalaji who was the first one out from Najd who served the King as doctor at first in 1915. He knew French so he participated in many conferences with the foreigners and was awarded a high office and became Deputy Vice-Minister in 1925. In 1930 his service came to an end in Saudi Arabia.

⁴²A. Zaki, Lectures in political science in Riyadh University, 1960.

Fuad Hamzah was a Palestinian refugee who accompanied the King in 1928 and became Deputy Vice-Minister. He represented Saudi Arabia in the Vichy Conference and the Ankara Conference during World War II.

Hafiz Wahba is an Egyptian politician. He accompanied King Abdul-Aziz in his campaign against the Hijaz. The King sent him to Egypt to develop the friendly relations between the two countries, but he failed. He was appointed as Director of the Education Department and became a Minister. Later he became a Minister in London and served as Ambassador from 1930 until 1956 when Saudi Arabia severed its relations with Britain. He assisted the King in foreign affairs and participated in many conferences.⁴³

J. B. Philby was the famous and illustrious advisor. He worked as mediator between the Hashimites and Ibn-Saud but he was devoted to the latter. He converted to Islam and was called Abdullah and lived in Riyadh. His sons still live in the Royal Institute in Saudi Arabia and have monthly allowances.

Royal Order. This consolidated the Sultanate of Najd and its Dependencies into a Kingdom and united it with the Hijaz on April 19, 1927.

⁴³M. Khariabah, Introduction to Modern Arab's History, 1960, pp. 428-430.

Acting on the basis of the petition made to us by those of our subjects who solve and bind in the Sultanate of Najd and its Dependencies, we have ordered that the Sultanate of Najd and its Dependencies shall become "THE KINGDOM OF THE HIJAZ AND NAJD AND ITS DEPENDENCIES" and that our title will be the King of the Hijaz and Najd and its Dependencies.⁴⁴

Signed (Abdul-Aziz)*

⁴⁴Europa Publication, Middle East Survey and Directory, V. III, p. 263.

*See Appendix B for the Royal Order, 1932.

CHAPTER IV

THE GOVERNMENT FROM 1951-1966

New Ministries. As we mentioned, there were in 1948 three Minister offices, Finance, Defense, and State. New Minister's offices were founded in June, 1951 and the Ministry of Interior was reestablished. Then within less than a year five Ministries were founded: Communications, September, 1953; both Education and Agriculture in December, 1953; Commerce in March, 1954; and Health. A number of new independent or subordinate agencies were set up.⁴⁶

Establishment of the Council of Ministries, 1953

This began in October, 1953 when King Abdul-Aziz ordered the formation of the Council of Ministers. The Decree's preamble states that the King decided to establish a Council of Ministers in part, because of the increase in number of the obligations and diversifications of the responsibilities placed upon the State. Article 1 sets forth the provisions of this Decree. A Council of Ministers is to be formed under the Presidency of Saud, Crown Prince of the Kingdom and Commander in Chief of the armed forces.

⁴⁶Middle East Institute, Middle East Journal, V. 11, 1956, p. 4.

The Ministers may look into all the affairs of the nation whether foreign or domestic; it has authority over the earlier Council of Deputies. The Deputy of the President of Ministers' Council was Amir Faisal. After the promulgation of the Decree, King Abdul-Aziz died and the Crown Prince Saud became the King in his own right. King Saud issued the Royal Decree Number 380 on May 11, 1958. Article 11 states that the Council of Ministers shall consist of (a) the President of the Council of Ministers, (b) the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers who shall be appointed by the Royal Command on the recommendation of the President, (c) the Departmental Ministers who shall be appointed by Royal Command, (d) Ministers of State who shall be appointed members of the Council by Royal Command, and (e) Advisors of His Majesty the King who shall be appointed members of the Council.⁴⁷

This article means that the Ministers' advisors are appointed by Royal recommendation or the President of the Council who was usually King Saud or his brother Amir Faisal. The Council is to approve the following more specific items: (a) the annual budget, approval of the year and balance sheet of the State, (b) internal agreements, (c) concessions and monopoly contracts granted to individuals

⁴⁷M. Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, 1960, V. I, p. 240.

or companies, (d) the formation of stock companies, (e) the creation of new positions and jobs, (f) all contracts for the employment of foreigners. Article 19 states that no laws or agreements or international treaties or concessions shall be issued except in accordance with the Royal Decrees drafted after approval of the Council of Ministers.⁴⁸

The Council comprises the following departments:

(1) the office of the President of the Council, (2) the Secretariat-General of the Council, (3) the branch of the experts, (4) general office of the officials, (5) the military branch, and (6) Technical Assistants Department. According to Articles 8 and 44, the King is at the top of the pyramid. He gives the orders to his Prime Minister and the latter will be responsible before the King concerning the Council. The Prime Minister is the second direct authority. After him comes the Deputy of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers' organized committee. In the service of the pyramid are spread the entire number of officials.

The Transfer of the Office of Premier
from King Saud to Faisal

King Saud succeeded his father to the throne in 1953. Crown Prince Faisal was the Viceroy of the Hijaz.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 244.

Saud relied solely on the tribes and religious leaders. The tribes were kept loyal to the Government.

In 1955 the power passed to Amir Faisal. He was Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Viceroy of the Hijaz. He continued in these offices until 1958 when the foreign relations became complicated with the United Arab Republic.

The King was responding to the pressure of the royal family to hand over all powers to Amir Faisal. He undertook his task. The most pressing matters were finance and foreign relations. Amir Faisal issued a communique on April 18, 1958 explaining the concerns of his Government in its foreign relations.⁴⁹

The Decree which was issued on March 24, 1958, gave Faisal full powers to govern in fiscal, internal and foreign fields. However, King Saud did not consider the transfer as final and he tried to regain the power from his brother Faisal. The differences increased in December, 1960, regarding the degree of detailed information about the revenues. Faisal was unwilling to accept the point of view of Saud so he tendered his resignation. King Saud appointed a new cabinet in which he personally assumed the premiership. Saud offered to appoint Faisal as Deputy

⁴⁹G. DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, pp. 93-94.

Prime Minister but Faisal was not ready to become Deputy Prime Minister as long as his responsibilities in the Government were not clarified. Faisal's return to power was in November, 1961; the King suddenly fainted and Faisal was appointed King's Deputy.

New King Proclaimed in Saudi Arabia

The differences between the two royal brothers reached its climax in 1964. The decision was taken by the royal family and religious leaders who had the authority to issue a Fatwa. They deposed King Saud and proclaimed his brother as the Monarch and transferred the power from King Saud to the Crown Prince and Prime Minister. The main points in the text are as follows: (1) The enlargement of the difference; (2) The fact of civil strife; (3) The need to find a decisive solution to these differences and disputes which recur from time to time; (4) Studying the situation in the light of development of events and re-viewing the state of the King's health; (5) The fact that His Majesty the King is unable to carry out the affairs in the State.

The Fatwa. The royal family and the religious leaders decided the following: (1) His Majesty King Saud shall be the King of the country. (2) His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and the President of the Council of

Ministers, Amir Faisal, shall carry out all the internal and external affairs of the Kingdom without referring to the King.

The text was signed by Grand Mufti and religious leaders and his brothers and uncles. Also the Council of Ministers made decision number 653 dated March 30, 1964, which is as follows:

(1) While His Majesty King Saud remained as King of the country all the responsibilities are transferred to His Royal Highness the Viceroy of His Majesty, and Crown Prince, Amir Faisal. (2) His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Viceroy is asked to approve the Royal Decree attached to this decision in his capacity as Viceroy. Signed, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, Khalid Ibn-Abdul-Aziz.⁵⁰

So Amir Faisal issued a Royal Decree number 52 dated March 30, 1964. In this decree he approved the decision of the Council of Ministers.

The dethronement of the King. On November 2, 1964, a statement broadcast over Mecca Radio said:

The decision to depose the King and proclaim his brother as the Monarch was taken by the Council of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly, after considering a letter from the royal family and religious leaders which decided the following: (1) To dethrone Saud, (2) to proclaim Faisal as lawful King of Saudi Arabia, (3) and to ask Faisal to agree to the proclamation.

⁵⁰Middle East Institute, Middle East Journal, V. 18, 1964, pp. 352-353.

Thus ended the 11 years of rule of the King Saud which brought to a climax the struggle for power between the two brothers.⁵¹

Khalid appointed Deputy King, Crown Prince. Khalid also acted as Deputy Prime Minister. King Faisal continued in the post of Prime Minister and also that of Foreign Minister. He was, during his father's lifetime, the country's expert on foreign affairs. Faisal has held the post ever since.

On March 29, 1965, King Faisal made a statement in a broadcast over Mecca Radio:

Since the position of Crown Prince is a fundamental factor for the continuation and firmness of the reign, now the country enjoys stability, advancement and prosperity. Thanks to its adherence to Islam. It gives me great pleasure to announce...that I have chosen my brother Prince Khalid Ibn-Abdul-Aziz as Crown Prince to rule after me.⁵²

This decision was made by the royal family headed by Mohamed Ibn-Abdul-Aziz who was the pretender to the throne in his father's life. Radio Mecca quoted Prince Mohamed: "He would rather stay away from positions and titles."⁵³

The shape of the Government and the post ministries continued until 1966.

⁵¹Regional News Service, Middle East Mirror, V. 16, 1964, p. 2.

⁵²Ibid., V. 17, p. 4.

⁵³Ibid.

Table 3. The Government from 1959 to 1963.

Ministry	26 March 1959	2 July 1960	21 December 1960	11 September 1961-1963
Prime Minister	Amir Faisal*	Amir Faisal*	King Saud+	King Saud+
Foreign Affairs	" " *	" " *	Assuwayl	Assuwayl
Economics and Finance	" " *	Amir Musaid	Talal	Nawaf
Defense and Aviation	Amir Fahd	Sultan	Amir Mohamed	Mohamed
Interior	Faisal*	Faisal*		Faisal Turki
Communication	Sultan	Sultan	Badr	Abdullah Saad
Education	Fahd	Fahd	Abdul-Aziz	Abdullah Dabbagh
Agriculture	Khald	Khald	Abdullah	Abdullah Dabbagh
Health	Rashad	Rashad	Nasif	Nasif
Trade	Amir Faisal*	Salah	Shata	Shata
King's Counsellor	Mashal	Mashal		
Oil and Mineral Resources			Turiqi	Turiqi
Labors works X				Nassir
Broadcasting X				Balkhayr
Press X				
Pilgrimage				Hussein Arab

* 1 Also holds other post(s), he was Prime Minister in 1959 - 2 July 1960.

+ 2 King Saud held the post of Prime Minister on December 21, 1960 and continued until 1963; he was also the King.

X 3 These two ministries are new posts; they were two departments and Pilgrimage Minister founded in 1962.

Combination of two tables with some changes, Tel-Aviv University, Middle East Record, V. I, II, 1960-61.

CHAPTER V

FOREIGN RELATIONS 1926 - 1960

Developing Diplomatic Relations

The Department of Foreign Affairs was founded in Jiddah in 1926. Its function was to run the foreign policy of the State under the supervision and the control of His Majesty King Ibn-Saud. When the Constitution of the Kingdom of Hijaz was issued in August, 1926, the Department of Foreign Affairs was divided into four sections: (1) political; (2) administrative; (3) legal; (4) and consular.

The Directorship of Foreign Affairs was assigned by His Majesty the King. The Department was directly connected with the Royal Court but it received the orders of the Agent-General in connection with the administrative and consular sections.⁵⁴ The Department appointed a consular in Egypt as a Minister, and a Minister in London in 1930.

After four years the Department was changed and it became a Ministry by a Royal Order. The King appointed in 1934 Amir Faisal the Viceroy of the Hijaz and a Minister

⁵⁴M. Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, 1960, V. I, p. 236.

of the Foreign Affairs. Fuad Hamaza became Deputy of the Ministry. It became the first Ministry founded in Saudi Arabia. After ten years from its change to a Ministry it did not open consulates or embassies except in Palestine in 1935 when it appointed Mr. Al-Kuhaimi a Consul in Jerusalem. In 1942 it opened another one in Turkey.

After World War II it opened many embassies and consulates in Paris, Washington, Rome, Beirut, Amman, Tehran, Mexico, Indonesia, Pakistan and many other countries (see Table 4). In 1955 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reorganized in the light of the development of the Saudi foreign affairs. It issued new orders. The Ministry composed the following sections now: The General Diwan, this consists of the following sections: (a) Political Administration, (b) Arabian Administration - Arab League, (c) Department of Protocol, (d) Consular Department, (e) Palestine Department, (f) Public Relations and Press, (g) Western Department. The second section is the Diplomatic and Consular Missions which can be found by a Royal Order.

Also it is possible to open an embassy or consulate by a Royal Order.

Amir Faisal continued as a Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1926-1960 when he resigned from the office

Table 4. Chronological table of developing diplomatic relations.

Country	1926-											
	1948	1950	1955	1957	1958	1959	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Egypt	X											
Great Britain*	X											
Syria	X											
Turkey	X											
U.S.A.	X	X										
Iraq	X	X										
Palestine	X	X										
Jordan		X										
Iran		X										
Lebanon		X										
Pakistan		X										
India		X										
Spain				X								
Mexico				X								
Italy				X								
Pakistan				X								
France*					X							
Libya					X							
Indonesia					X							
The UN						X						
Cuba											X	
Yemen											X	
Tunisia											X	
Switzerland											X	
Japan											X	
Sudan											X	
Germany F.R.											X	
Ethiopia											X	

Table 4 (Continued).

Country	1926-												
	1948	1950	1955	1957	1958	1959	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	
Venezuela							X						
Sweden							X						
Kuwait							X						
Guinea								X					
China R.								X					
Malay A.F.									X				
Morocco									X				
Nigeria									X				
Sengal									X				
Austria										X			
Greece										X			
Norway										X			
Denmark												X	

*Saudi Arabia stopped its diplomatic relations with France after the Suez Canal crisis also with Britain after Buraimi problem.

for a year. He returned to the office in 1961 and serves at the present time (see Table 3).⁵⁵

After King Abdul-Aziz captured the Hijaz the following States recognized him. The first State was the Soviet Union in 1926 which sent an Ambassador called Karim, a Muslim. (Later the Saudi Government cut off its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union for the security of the State.) Switzerland followed in 1927, Germany in 1929, Iran in 1930, the United States and Iraq in 1931, and Italy in 1932. Egypt recognized the independence of Saudi Arabia and established diplomatic relations in 1926. The United Kingdom followed in 1930, Palestine in 1935, Turkey in 1942, and Syria in 1944.

Saudi Arabia and the Arab League

In 1944 Saudi Arabia participated in the Conference of Alexandria and sent delegates but did not sign the protocol which was signed by five States at that time. The Saudi Government signed the protocol in 1945 after conferring with the King. Saudi Arabia was an original member, even though they did not sign immediately.

Saudi Arabia signed the following treaties:

(1) Pact of the League of Arab States, 1945; (2) Joint

⁵⁵M. T. Sadik, The Development of Government and Administration in Saudi Arabia, 1965, pp. 71-73.

Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of the Arab League, June 17, 1950; (3) Extradition Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia on May 23, 1953; (4) Convention concerning the nationality of Arab residents in countries of which they are not nationals signed on May 23, 1953; (5) Convention of the Arab Union for communication and telecommunications signed on February 12, 1953; (6) Convention on the privileges and immunities of the League of the Arab State in April, 1954; (7) Convention for facilitation of trade and regulation of transit trade among States of the Arab League on February 23, 1954; (8) Convention for settlements of current transactions of the transfer of capital among States of Arab League on February 23, 1954.⁵⁶

In the Arab League Council sessions from 1945-1964, Saudi delegates held the post of Chariman as the following:

1.	Session:	6	Date:	March 1946	Place:	Cairo
2.	"	8	"	Feb., 1946	"	"
3.	"	13-II	"	Feb., 1951	"	"
4.	"	21-I	"	March, 1954	"	"
5.	"	30	"	Oct., 1958	"	"
6.	"	41-I	"	March, 1964	"	"
7.	"	41-Extra	"	May, 1964	"	"

⁵⁶M. Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, 1960, V. II, p. 427.

8. Session Extra Date: Sept., 1964 Place: Alexandria

This was at the level of the Heads of State. The Chairman was the delegate of Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is an active member in the Arab League and shows its responsibilities in the Arabs' questions such as the problem of the Algerian Budget and the problem of the Palestinian organization. Saudi Arabian policy toward the Arab League was expressed by King Saud on the occasion of his accession to the throne.

Our foreign policy as regards the Arabs is based on the Arab League Charter...we sincerely work for the achievement of greater Arab unity ...I seize this opportunity to call for the closing of ranks. We should work concertedly on matters which need our attention, namely the protection of the rights of our Palestinian brethren.⁵⁸

In 1961 King Saud emphasized the loyalty of his country to the Charter of the Arab League and its support for the liberation of Algeria, Oman and Buraimi.

Saudi Arabia shared in the total budget of the Arab League and it paid in 1945, 7.00%; in 1953, 15.50%; in 1958, 14.57%; in 1960, 11.46%; and in 1964, 10.97%.

⁵⁷R. N. Macdonald, The League of the Arab States, 1965, pp. 348-367.

⁵⁸Tel-Aviv University, Middle East Record, V. I, 1960, p. 427.

The traditional dynamic rivalry between the Saudi Royal House and the Hashimite Kings of Jordan and Iraq was evidenced on the League Council at least until 1956.

The Saudis also moved closer to friendly relations with Iraq and away from Egypt, both before and after the 1958 Iraqi revolution. From 1959 to 1961 the tendency was for improved relations between the Saudis and the Egyptians.⁵⁹

After Faisal gained the throne he adopted a new policy. The Yemeni problem made the situation worse and because of this he called for an Islamic alliance. Saudi Arabia came into close alliance with Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan. (See Table 5 for the blocs in the Arab League until 1963.)

Saudi Arabia and the United Nations

King Faisal said at the plenary session of the United Nations in 1945 at San Francisco:

...This charter does not represent perfection as visualized by the small States. Nevertheless, it is doubtless the best ever produced by people representing fifty States many of which have suffered much in their struggle for liberty and the defense of humanity....We the sons of the Near East and Middle East and particularly of the Arab Nations are filled with happiness and joy at the collapse of these powers of evil...

⁵⁹R. N. Macdonald, The League of the Arab States, 1965, pp. 78-79.

Table 5. Bloc patterns in the Arab League.*

YEAR	EGYPT	NEUTRAL	IRAQ
1946	Saudi Arabia, Syria Yemen, Lebanon		Jordan
1950	Saudi Arabia, Yemen	Lebanon	Jordan, Syria
1955	Saudi Arabia, Jordan Yemen, Syria	Libya Lebanon	None
1958	Yemen, Syria	Lebanon, Libya Sudan, Tunisia Jordan, Morocco	Saudi Arabia
1960	Yemen, Syria, Sudan, Morocco	Tunisia, Jordan Saudi Arabia, Libya	None
1963	Algeria, Kuwait Yemen	Tunisia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Jordan Libya	Syria Lebanon

*R. N. Macdonald, The League of the Arab States, 1965, p. 79.

indeed the world is indebted for its survival to the allied nations, which engaged themselves in war, sacrificing the best of their youth and wealth for the security of mankind....In such a moment as this we should not forget the resolute efforts of the late F. D. Roosevelt in the cause of peace and his farsighted action in initiating this Conference....Let us practice and preserve the principles which we have here put down on paper...let this Charter be the solid foundation upon which we shall build our new and better world.⁶⁰

Saudi Arabia had signed the declaration by the United Nations in Washington, D. C. It was signed at first by 26 nations and one of these latter adherents was Saudi Arabia. The original members of the United Nations, numbering 51, are those States which took part in the San Francisco Conference or had previously signed the declaration of the United Nations, and which signed and ratified the Charter. Among them was Saudi Arabia in 1945. Saudi Arabia shared in the United Nations' budget by .07%.

Saudi Arabia is a member in the United Nations and related agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); Education, Scientific and Culture (UNESCO); World Health Organization (WHO); International Bank for Reconstruction (Bank); International Development Association

⁶⁰G. DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, p. 152.

(IDA); International Finance Cooperation (IFC); International Monetary Fund (FUND); International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); International Postal Union (UPU); International Telecommunication (ITU); World Meteorological Organization (WMO).⁶¹

Saudi Arabia supports the United Nations and is loyal to its Charter. In Saudi Arabia is an office belonging to the United Nations and a representative from the United Nations.

Saudi Arabia is in the bloc of cooperation with the Arab and Islamic countries, and in the Afro-Asian bloc, and stresses the principles of Bandung. Saudi Arabia proposed many questions concerning Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Lebanon, Oman, Southern Arabia, Suez crises and the problem of Buriami. Saudi Arabia works with the Arab States and the Afro-Asian nations. On July 20, 1960, 25 Afro-Asian nations had requested that the question of Algeria be included in the agenda of the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly. The Saudi Arabia representative said that he was authorized by the provisional Government of Algeria to state on its behalf that it would accept the result of a free Plebiscite organized by the United Nations.⁶²

⁶¹United Nations, General Assembly, No. 341-343, 1957-1961, pp. 26-27.

⁶²United Nations, U.N. Review, V. 31, pp. 40-41.

Saudi Arabia also had requested consideration of the question of Buriami. In the Yemeni problem the United Nations' peace observers came to watch the borders between the Yemen and Saudi Arabia, as we shall see.

Saudi Arabia's attitude to the right of veto was one of being strongly against it. It believed that the right of veto would lead to trouble. Saudi delegates to the United Nations' session in 1945 discussed this with the Americans chiefly concerned who had invited the Saudis for a discussion of it.⁶³

Saudi - Egypt - Yemeni Relations

Saudi Arabian - Egyptian Mutual Defence Pact. On October 27, 1955, Saudi Arabia and Egypt signed a treaty for defence. By the terms of this Treaty they would affirm security and peace, and settle all their international differences by peaceful methods. Any armed attack on the territory or forces of one of them was to be considered as an attack on them both. They would establish a Supreme Council.⁶⁴

Military Pact between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic and the Yemen in 1956. The Governments of

⁶³G. DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, p. 153.

⁶⁴M. Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, 1960, V. II, p. 242.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen in order to strengthen the Arab League Charter and tighten military cooperation, eager to maintain independence of their countries, and to preserve their security, as stated in Article 1. According to Article 2, they will settle all international disputes by peaceful means. These States consider any armed aggression committed against any State as against them all.⁶⁵

They have decided to set up a higher council, a Military Council, and a Joint Command as stated in Article 5.

The Government of Egypt depended on the terms of this Treaty and went to the Republic of Yemen after a revolution broke out there. The Treaty of Solidarity between Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and the United Arab Republic was signed on January 19, 1957.

This Treaty contained five main articles and four supplementary articles. The terms of this Treaty concerned the aid of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia to Jordan. The total amount is 12,500,000 pounds. Saudi Arabia paid the first amount and none of the other two States paid. Therefore, Saudi Arabia ended it also. This amount was instead of the British aid to Jordan.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 250-252.

Yemeni Question

In 1962 the old Imam of Yemen was dead. After a week a coup-d'etat took place in Sana. Sallal declared that Yemen become a republic and that the new Imam Mohamed Al-Badr, son and heir to the previous Imam had been killed.

The republican leader asked the Egyptians for a military aid who had already arrived before the revolt broke out.

Egypt recognized immediately the new regime and was followed by some other Arab Republic States and a number of Western countries. The Imam Al-Badr was not killed. He succeeded in escaping to the Saudi borders. He gained tribal followers. This encouraged his family and mountain inhabitants to resist the new regime.

A month before the revolt in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Jordan concluded an agreement for "coordination of foreign policy", as well as close military cooperation.⁶⁶

Sana and Cairo Radios claimed attacks on the north by the Saudis and Jordanians but Jordan and Saudi Arabia denied these stories by way of King Hussein and King Saud who as foreign correspondents penetrated about five miles into Yemeni territory and established the following facts:

⁶⁶G. DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, pp. 110-114.

(1) In no quarter of Saudi Arabia is there any zest for a military against Yemeni revolution.. (2) An aircraft piloted it seems by Egyptians, scattered bombs in open country around Saudi Arabia.⁶⁷ (3) Prince Faisal answered questions about the subject of possible Saudi assistance to the Imam. Faisal said, "Saudi help for the Imam depends on a request from the Imam."⁶⁸ The Saudis and Jordanians are giving the Imam some limited logistical support, but in the main, money, food and some ammunition are being given.

DeGaury described the situation as follows:

In December, 1962, there were attacks from the air on Saudi frontier posts and on the last day of the year there began a series of attacks by Ilyushin bombers on the Saudi towns of Najran and on the coastal area town of Jizan. Faisal ordered general mobilization. He announced that Saudi conditions for ending the conflict were withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the Yemen and that all direct and indirect assistance was to stop. After that the Yemenis were to be left to determine the Government they wished to have by themselves even if it were a republic.⁶⁹

The Saudi Government's attitude concerning the problem was that it had strong relations and ties which

⁶⁷The Economist, "King Saud and the Waves", 1962, V. CCXIII, NO. 6384, p. 670.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 673.

⁶⁹G. DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, p. 116.

bind the two States. King Faisal said: "We did not interfere hoping that the people of Yemen would be left alone to determine their fate. You know the Imam is still alive... there is a treaty between this country and the Government of His Majesty...we supported the lawful Government of Yemen."⁷⁰

The Prime Minister of the United Arab Republic stated to the National Assembly, "In accordance with our principle of supporting Arab people we sided with the Yemeni revolution until it realized its aims."⁷¹ Three Egyptian warships were at Hodida as well as troops. The United Arab Republic has come to the aid of the Yemeni Republic with pilots and commando units.

Recognition by the United States and Russia's Support

The Yemeni Republic is also locked in a struggle with the Red Chinese who are sharply extending their influence in the Yemeni Republic. Already Peking has sent \$45 million in aid, 3,300 Chinese technicians to work for the Republican Government and is training 800 students.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 162.

⁷¹The Economist, "Peace Push", 1965, V. CCXVIII, No. 6385, p. 1194.

Russia gave moral support to the Republican side in the United Nations. Russia charged the United Kingdom with interference in Yemeni affairs.⁷²

On December 19, 1962, the United States accorded recognition to the Yemeni Republic. On September 21, 1962, on the eve of the Yemeni revolution the Egyptian paper Al-Ahram published the text of letters exchanged by Presidents Kennedy and Nasser. In November, President Kennedy wrote to Nasser, Sallal and Kings Saud and Hussein, offering his good offices towards a settlement. His aim was to establish some guarantee of non-interference by one State in the affairs of another.⁷³ He proposed that Hussein should withdraw from the problem and Saudi Arabia should withdraw its support to the royalists. However, what the United States sought from the recognition was not achieved because Nasser did increase the troops, units and tanks.

The United States' Mediation

King Faisal talked in his speech at Tiaf on September 5, 1963 about American mediation to put an end to the Yemeni tragedy and Saudi Arabia accepted the

⁷²United Nations, Year Book, 1965, p. 64.

⁷³H. Ingrams, The Yemen History, 1963, p. 141.

mediation. He said:

The agreement, which was to be fulfilled in letter and spirit provided for the following: (1) Saudi Arabia would stop its aid to the royalists and prevent royalists leaders from using Saudi territory as a base for their fight in Yemen. (2) The United Arab Republic would simultaneously withdraw its troops from Yemen in stages as soon as possible. At the same time the Egyptian forces were to stop all military activity in the battlefield. (3) The United Arab Republic was to stop all attacks on the territory of Saudi Arabia. (4) The setting up of a demilitarized zone, extending 20 kilometers on either side of the Yemeni-Saudi borders where no armed forces or military equipment would be allowed to enter. (5) The stationing of neutral observers on both sides of the frontiers in the demilitarized zone to carry out patrols outside of the zone in order to ascertain that Saudi Arabia aid had stopped and that the United Arab Republic's forces were being evacuated through the ports and airports of Yemen. (6) Cooperation of both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic with any mediator acceptable to both sides with a view to reaching an agreement on the disengagement.⁷⁴

President Kennedy's representative, Mr. Bunker, came to Saudi Arabia before this agreement was reached. After the agreement was concluded, it was communicated by the Americans to the United Nations and was adopted by it.

The United Nations' Observers.

On April 29, 1963, the United Nations reported that the Yemeni Republic, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab

⁷⁴G. DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, pp. 172-173.

Republic were concerned with the situation in Yemen which might threaten the peace of the Middle East. The United Nations sent Mr. R. Bunch and he visited Saudi Arabia, Sallal, and Nasser. Riyadh agreed to stop supplying the royalist side with weapons and money. In further reports on May 27, 1963, the basis of information provided by Von Horn, the Chief Military Observer, was that the United Nations' observers along the border of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen were very necessary and that this required not more than 200 men. The United Nations' observers stayed for four months and after that they left because the United Arab Republic stopped financing them. That the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia are still seeking peace with honour is not doubted. The seeking of peace brought Nasser to Jiddah and he desired to end the civil war in Yemen. King Faisal also wants to see 50,000 Egyptian troops in Yemen removed from Arabia.

Peace Agreement at Jiddah and Harad Conference

Both leaders had good reason to stop the Yemeni conflict. The result of these two desires was the signing of a cease fire agreement in Jiddah in 1964 and this agreement contains three points: (1) It provides for withdrawal of all Egyptian troops from Yemen within thirteen months. (2) It also envisages the establishment of a 50-man council, including both royalist and republicans

which will govern Yemen during the next 15 months to determine what type of government will run the Yemen. (3) These provisions are set forth assuming the cease fire sticks. (Two previous efforts to end the fighting came to naught.)⁷⁵

Nasser was willing to let Yemenis themselves choose their own government. I think Nasser realized later that there should be peace in Yemen in order that he might face the internal problems in the United Arab Republic; likewise King Faisal thought the Yemenis should determine their future.

The United Nations, Arab League and most world countries hoped that the Harad Conference for peace talks would succeed. As a result of the peace agreement at Jiddah, the Harad Conference opened in December, 1964, where royalist and republican delegations met to work out what sort of government should run the country for the next year. King Faisal wanted the 60,000 Egyptian troops out of Yemen because he believed in the right of self determination for the nations.

It is hard for both sides to agree because they have been fighting for five years. The republican side did not suggest at the Harad Conference returning to

⁷⁵Newsweek, "Death of a Dream", 1965, V. LXVI, No. 16, p. 29.

pre-revolution days. After many weeks of meetings it stopped and joined with Nasser and Faisal to exchange the different opinions. The republican Yemenis suggested the Harad Conference broke down because the Jiddah agreement left out some key points. King Faisal declared that, "The Harad Conference was swaying between success and failure."

Extra! Extra!

After I wrote all these pages I read this declaration in Al-Ahram, an Egyptian newspaper, of May, 1966. Nasser said in his speech in a public meeting that:

We still support the Yemeni revolution. We will not accept the offer to leave Yemen before we are sure that the revolution will be successful. We will attack Jizan and Najran. If a soldier comes from Saudi Arabia, we shall be in Yemen more than 20 years from now. If Faisal established an airport near the borders and bought 12 airplanes from England we shall destroy them in five minutes. We consider the Yemeni revolution our revolution and all Arabs' revolution. We easily could separate Jizan and Najran from Saudi Arabia because they belonged to Yemen in past history. We consider the peace agreement no longer effective because Faisal broke it, and that the Harad Conference failed.

King Hussein had recognized the republican side as we mentioned. Later he paid a State visit to Saudi Arabia and declared; "We will never recognize the bloody baths in Yemen and we will never accept the worst situation

in Yemen."⁷⁶ King Faisal said; "We will never accept a mediation in the Yemeni problem - because there was a Kuwaiti attempt to solve this question - till the Egyptian troops withdraw from Yemen."⁷⁷ Therefore, the Jiddah Peace Agreement ceased to be effective and the Harad Conference also was broken.

Khartum Agreement, 1967

The United Arab Republic put before the meeting of the foreign ministers in the Arab League points for peace in Yemen.

In the Arab Summit Conference on August 29 - September 1, 1967, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic concluded the following agreement:⁷⁸

1. Establishment of the Triad Committee to supervise the carrying out of the agreement. The United Arab Republic would choose an Arab State. Saudi Arabia also would choose a State and the Foreign Arab Minister's Conference would choose a third State, or the two countries together would choose the third.

2. The Committee would sponsor a plan for the withdrawal of the United Arab Republic's troops from Yemen and enforce it.

⁷⁶The Ministry of Information, News from Saudi Arabia, V. III, No. 138, 1966, p. 4.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 3.

⁷⁸Al-Medina, Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, September 1, 1967, No. 1049.

3. Saudi Arabia would stop the military aid to all the Yemenis.

4. The Committee would be an intermediary until the Yemenis could establish the peace and stability following the desire of the country for the complete independence and integrity.

5. The Committee will consult Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic in all the difficulties which would meet the Committee, until it would reach an agreement which would satisfy all the parties.

Saudi Arabia chose Morocco as its representative; the United Arab Republic chose Iraq and both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic agreed that the third State would be the Sudan. The Committee started its work. In September it called for a National Conference for the Yemeni parties to reach an agreement among themselves and to solve their internal problem. The Committee announced that: "It realized that all parties agreed on a cease fire and a permanent peace in Yemeni land."

Al-Madina, a newspaper in Saudi Arabia reported:

The Cairo newspaper Al-Ahram said on September 26, 1967, that the United Arab Republic had started withdrawing its troops from Yemen according to Article 2 of the Agreement in Al-Khartum and Saudi Arabia announced that it stopped all aid to the Yemenis. The United Arab Republic's troops decreased by half of what it was at the beginning of this year, 1967.

There were until now four attempts to solve the Yemeni question and to establish peace and stability and to secure the independence. The Yemen has continued for five

years in civil war. The Egyptian army and economy has suffered heavily. The United Arab Republic lost money which it needed for internal projects and foreign debts. The attempts which were made to solve the question are the following:

1. When the United States recognized the Republic in 1962, it believed that it had secured in exchange the withdrawal of the Egyptian army. Nasser failed to withdraw.

2. The second attempt was made in 1963 by the United Nations' Secretary General who obtained promises from Nasser and Saud that they first begin withdrawal. Saud complied but Nasser did not. The United Nations' Supervisor resigned and the Secretary General gave up.

3. The third attempt was made, the Jiddah Peace Agreement, in September, 1964. It was to cease fire, withdrawal of the Egyptian troops, and establishment of council from both sides, but this also failed.

4. The fourth attempt was made, the Khartum Agreement in September, 1967, and the establishment of the Triad States Committee to supervise the Egyptian withdrawal and to find a peaceful solution to the problem.^{78a}

^{78a}Ibid., September 27, 1967, No. 1071.

CHAPTER VI

SAUDI RELATIONS WITH THE TWO BLOCS

Saudi Relations with the Western Bloc

Saudi - British Relations in the 19th Century

England considered the route to India as vital to its security. The British officials looked to the Persian Gulf as an area in which no foreign powers had the right to establish footholds. They wanted it to be open to the British commerce and maritime interests, and to be kept out of foreign threats. This led them to draw more attention to the Arabian Principalities in the Persian Gulf and later to interfere in quarrels among them. As a result of a commercial and religious war the first attack on a British ship was in 1797.

Britain signed a treaty on October 12, 1798, with Imam of Musqat. It was a defensive measure against Napoleon's expedition. By the terms of this treaty, a friendship between Britain and Musqat had been founded. Musqat would not give the French and Dutch an opportunity to seat themselves in Musqat. It prevented a French vessel from entering into water at Musqat. In case of hostilities between the French and the British ships,

Musqat by land and by sea and by the people should take part in the hostility with the English. Musqat gave permission to the British to establish a factory and to mount guns.⁷⁹

Saud the Great, 1803-1814, showed special interests in the Persian Gulf. The Wahhabis interfered in the Islands of Qatar, Bahrain and Trucal Oman. The local rulers were allied against the Wahhabis in 1808, but the Wahhabis won victory over them so the allies appealed to the British maritime leaders in the coast. The Wahhabis put a ruler on the Island of Bahrain. The local Princes appealed to the British navy, the Iranian officials and the ruler of Musqat who helped them with British aid.

The Wahhabi Empire reached its zenith in 1811 but it started to collapse after the Egyptian campaign reached Uiriyah in 1818.

Winder described the British attitude to the Egyptian expedition as follows:

The British in India welcomed Ibrahim's progress with open arms. At least they reasoned a new power would not have the predatory habits of the Wahhabis...if the British sea power in the

⁷⁹J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near East and Middle East, 1956, V. I, pp. 64-65.

Gulf could combine with Ibrahim's land armies, a crushing blow could be struck against the pirates.⁸⁰

The British Government sent a mission to search for an alliance with Ibrahim and offered aid to reduce the Wahhabi power completely but the mission came to failure.

The Wahhabis controlled Oawasim tribesmen and encouraged their activities in the coastal area and attacked the British ships. Britain took action and by its alliance with the Imam of Musqat drew a treaty on January 8, 1820, for the suppressing of piracy and slave traffic and forced all the Sheiks to respect the conditions of the treaty. The treaty contained 11 articles. By the terms of Article 1, "There shall be a cessation of plunder and piracy by land and sea on the part of the Arabs." According to Article 4, "The pacificated tribes shall all continue in their former relations...they shall be at peace with the British Government, and shall not fight with each other." Article 9 stated, "The carrying off of slaves from the coasts of Africa or elsewhere and the transporting of them in vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature."⁸¹

⁸⁰R. B. Winder, Saudi Arabia in the 19th Century, 1965, p. 140.

⁸¹J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near East and Middle East, 1956, V. I, p. 89.

In 1821, Ibrahim Basha was still in Oiryaih. In this year an Ottoman campaign under the command of Hussein-Bek occupied Riyadh and arrested many Saudi Princes. Turki Ibn-Abdullah escaped but he returned in 1823 and succeeded in regaining the throne.

Delegates from Oman came and asked Turki to appoint for them a ruler and judge and the division of army. In 1829 he occupied Al-Hasa. Turki, after he had reached his highest position in the Persian Gulf, made direct diplomatic contact with the British. He asked for friendly relations in 1831. The reply in general friendly terms was transmitted through the resident in the Persian Gulf as follows:

Your communication has reached me and given me gratification....Your disposition to a friendly understanding is met with reciprocal feeling and the terms of amity which existed between this Government and Imam Saud will still remain in force.⁸²

The Imam's sovereign extended over the coastal area either under his direct rule or tributary status.

Faisal Ibn-Turki renewed the old treaty with the British Government in 1843. The British resident

⁸²R. B. Winder, Saudi Arabia in the 19th Century, 1965, pp. 82-83.

in Bushir visited Riyadh in 1865 and renewed the old treaties though not by an actual written document.⁸³

Saudi - British Relations 1906-1950's

Sir Per Cox sent a cable on September 16, 1906, to the British Government in India clearing the privileges if the British Government put a fixed policy toward Ibn-Saud.

1. To ignore Ibn-Saud's offer to sign a treaty might lead him to be our enemy.

2. If we make our friendship with Ibn-Saud this would help us to maintain a friendship with the Imam of Musqat and other local rulers.

3. Our help to Ibn-Saud would stop the piracy in the Persian Gulf.

4. It appeared very clear that the Turkish interference in the central Arabian affairs would lead ultimately to a uniting of all tribes under Ibn-Saud; if we did not help them they will seek the assistance from the others.

However, the British Government in India rejected Per Cox's suggestions because they thought that this would lead to direct involvement in the Arabs' affairs.⁸⁴

Ibn-Saud sent a letter in October, 1906, to the Sheik of Qatar. He asked him to sign a treaty with

⁸³G. DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, p. 13.

⁸⁴H. Wahba, The Island of the Arabs in the 20th Century, 1956, p. 245.

the British. The letter was transferred to Sir Per Cox. Ibn-Saud suggested in his message to retake Al-Hasa, to help Ibn-Saud by its revenue and to establish the order and discipline inbetween the tribes so he would suggest signing a secret treaty with the British and it would be responsible for protecting the coastal area from any Turkish attack; in return he would establish some kind of diplomatic relations.⁸⁵

On November 9, 1907, the British Government in India asked Sir Per Cox's thoughts of how to reply to Ibn-Saud and also asked the British Ambassador in Istanbul. He advised leaving the whole problem alone and warned them from the interference in Arabia's affairs.⁸⁶

In 1911 Ibn-Saud met Shakespear and discussed with him his plan to retake Al-Hasa; however, Shakespear warned him that the British would assume its responsibility to protect its allies. In 1912 Ibn-Saud received news of the war breaking out in the Balkans. The Turks were so busy in the Turco-Bulgarian war that Ibn-Saud took Al-Hasa in 1913. Before he was engaged in this expedition, Ibn-Saud first secured the British support.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 246.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 247.

Shakespear reached Riyadh in March, 1914. He was the British political agent in Kuwait. He was told by his Government to join Ibn-Saud, to remain with him, to encourage the Arabs to defeat the pro-Turkish forces and to prevent any arms and supplies to the Turks through the desert, to promote the Arab ideas of a rising against the Turks and above all to report.⁸⁷

At this time hostilities broke out between the pro-Turkish Ibn-Rashid and Ibn-Saud. The latter went in a campaign against Ibn-Rashid, accompanied by Shakespear who was killed in the battle.

In 1913 the Ottoman Empire and the British Government signed a treaty dividing Arabia between them by fixed lines from Qatar across the desert to meet the boundary between Aden and Yemen. North of the line is Turkish territory, including Al-Hasa and Najd and south of the line is, therefore, a British territory.

Historian J. B. Philby said: "Whether the Turks then had hopes of the recovery of Al-Hasa with the British help or approval, or whether they were activated by motives of spite against Ibn-Saud or whether the Turkish envy acted from some more sordid motive we shall never know."⁸⁸

⁸⁷G. DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, p. 17.

⁸⁸J. B. Philby, Saudi Arabia, 1955, pp. 270-271.

World War I broke out before the terms of the Treaty were put into effect. Britain and the Ottoman Empire were involved in the war so both sides tried to win Ibn-Saud to their side. Ibn-Saud sided with the British. He arranged an expedition against Ibn-Rashid.

The British, especially Sir Per Cox, thought that the time was suitable to find a firm base for their policy with Ibn-Saud. Sir Per Cox said that the British motives were pushed by their position. Their left flank was in danger because of the Bedouins' attack; also their negotiation with Hussain was successful and they knew that Ibn-Saud might put some difficulties before the Sharif's plan. Sir Per Cox met Ibn-Saud on December 26, 1915, and signed the following treaty:⁸⁹

Treaty of 1915. Britain signed this Treaty in 1915. They purchased Ibn-Saud's neutrality at 5,000 pounds of sterling a month. The British Government acknowledged and admitted that Najd, Al-Hasa, Qatif, and Jubail and their Dependencies and Territories were the countries of Ibn-Saud. According to Article 2, in the event of aggression by any foreign power, the British Government, after consulting Ibn-Saud, may act considering what is most effective for protecting his interests and

⁸⁹H. Wahba, The Island of the Arabs in the 20th Century, 1956, p. 248.

countries. According to Article 3, Ibn-Saud promised to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement or treaty with any foreign nation.⁹⁰ This Treaty, containing seven articles, continued for 12 years.

Saudi-Hijazi-British relations. Britain, at this time, was negotiating with the Sharif of Mecca about the revolt against the Turks. Ibn-Saud did not know about this negotiation. The Sharif of Mecca, Hussein Ibn-Ali, declared himself the King of the Arabs and revolted against the Ottoman Empire. In 1916, Hussein sent 5,000 pounds sterling to Ibn-Saud. He repeated these payments many times. Ibn-Saud knew it meant that he would be his vassal. Ibn-Saud sent the following message to the Sharif: "My Father: We and you are in this war. Its fruits are for us; our troops have been sent to assist you, but I wanted more than this. I am willing to send you one of my brothers or my sons to fight with your sons and in this war would be the great victory."⁹¹

The Sharif of Mecca sent the following reply: "Maybe you are mad or drunken. You don't know why we revolt or for what purpose we seek."⁹²

⁹⁰J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near East and Middle East, 1956, V. II, pp. 17-18.

⁹¹S. Hathlul, History of the Kings of Al-Saud, 1961, p. 116.

⁹²Ibid., pp. 111-112.

Ibn-Saud wrote to the British political agent in Iraq asking for an immediate meeting. After Sir Per Cox read the Sharif's message he assured Ibn-Saud of his independence and asked his assurance not to fight the Sharif. Ibn-Saud promised him upon two conditions: (1) That the Sharif would not interfere in the Najdi affairs; and (2) not to speak in the name of all the Arabs and not to claim himself the King of the Arabs.

When Ibn-Saud was in Iraq he visited Al-Basrah and saw the modern weapons of the war. In this meeting the British asked Ibn-Saud to fight Ibn-Rashid and promised him help because the latter started to threaten the Arabs' troops which worked with the British. The British found that the Arabs' revolt was very helpful. In this time many British delegates visited both leaders as mediators but all the efforts failed.

In 1917, Mr. Hogarth, and Ronald Stuzor arrived at Jiddah. They were sent by the British political agent in Cairo. However, the Sharif refused to allow them to go to Najd. So other delegates came from Bahrain. The problem which concerned the British in this time was to confiscate the supplies which were sent to the Turks.⁹³

⁹³Ibid., pp. 112-113.

In 1920, the British Government reduced the subsidy of Ibn-Saud. It also informed Ibn-Saud that King Hussein offered to meet him. The British Government sent a mission to Al-Hasa to meet Ibn-Saud. He met with political agents and the result of the interview was the following: (1) Ibn-Saud claimed very earnestly and with some warmth that the British were making his position most difficult by lack of support. (2) He complained that the apparent support of claims of King Hussein to Syria had aroused much resentment in Najd.⁹⁴

Ibn-Saud considered that such a meeting with the Sharif was quite impossible. He also charged the Sharif with wanting to utilize the Syria Jihad* in order to reinstate himself in the eyes of the Muslim world and at the same time to discredit him. Therefore, he earnestly urged as a vital necessity that the following action be taken to restore confidence and to prove to the people of Najd that he had not trusted Great Britain in vain.

1. His Majesty's Government to guarantee at once in writing the maintainence of the existing status quo on the frontiers.

⁹⁴United Kingdom, Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series, V. XIII, p. 216.

*Jihad means the Holy War.

2. His Majesty's Government to guarantee that the Sharif refrain from aggressive policy.

3. The Mecca and Medina pilgrimage is to be opened to people of Najd.

The Civil Commissioner said he regarded Ibn-Saud as by far the strongest man in Arabia at present and as able to maintain his position and authority whether or not he received assistance.⁹⁵

The foreign office of the United Kingdom decided in 1920 to make a decision on the whole question of the political and financial obligations to be incurred in the future by the United Kingdom Government in Arabia. The office gave a geographical definition and divided Arabia into ten areas as follows: Najd, Hail, Kuwait, Bahrain, Muscat, Trucial Coast, Hadramaut, Yemen, Asir, and Anazah. The British Government was already in treaty relations with all the ten areas except the Anazah, Hail and Yemen.

Ibn-Saud was at this time in receipt of a subsidy of 5,000 pounds a month. He also received recently an additional present of 5,000 pounds as a mark of appreciation from the United Kingdom for having restrained his followers from making the pilgrimage. The high commissioner at Baghdad suggested that his subsidy should be increased to 100,000 pounds a year paid quarterly.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 217.

Ibn-Saud increased his power and occupied the Jable Shammer and the Hijaz. He started from here to contact, on a wide scale, foreign countries in the Islamic world.

Before the fall of Medina and Jiddah the British political agent later in Iraq, arrived in the Hijaz to negotiate with Ibn-Saud. Britain recognized him as the Independent King of the Hijaz, Najd and its Dependencies. Also it welcomed his application for buying weapons and signed the following treaty:

Treaty of Jiddah, 1927. This Treaty recognized Ibn-Saud. According to Article 1, "His Britannic Majesty recognizes the complete and absolute independence of the dominions of His Majesty the King of the Hijaz and Najd and its Dependencies."

According to Article 8, the Treaty could be amended automatically to prolong the agreement for seven years. This Treaty still continues in effect. In Article 6, it is stated that Ibn-Saud would undertake to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with Kuwait and Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. Between 1927 and 1945 there were two important events in the Saudi-British relations: (1) Riot in the desert, and (2) meeting between Ibn-Saud and Churchill.

Riot in the desert. Ibn-Saud had faced a serious problem between 1928-1930 from the Ikhawan, the nomadic tribes who settle on the land and build mud houses instead

of tents. The first project to settle the nomadic tribes started in 1911-1930 and spread rapidly. These Ikhwan were fanatical and literally followed the Sharia. They put many difficulties before Ibn-Saud for the modernization in Saudi Arabia. They protested and resisted the using of the telephone and other modern inventions. The Ikhwan held a meeting in 1926. They protested against Ibn-Saud for the following: (1) sending his son, Saud, to Egypt; (2) sending his son Faisal to England - the "infidels"; (3) the usage of the telephone and telegraph; (4) the collection of taxes; (5) the tolerant policy to the tribes of Iraq and Jordan to graze in the land of Najd; (6) his prevention of the trade with Kuwait (If they are infidels they should fight them; if not, Ibn-Saud should stop the boycott.); (7) his tolerant policy and his silence to the Shiit people of Al-Hasa (He should force them to enter the Sunit School or they should be fought.).

When this meeting was held, Ibn-Saud was in the Hijaz. He came in a hurry to Najd and held a conference. After this conference the religious leaders issued a Fatwa explaining the religious view and gave Ibn-Saud the full power and the right to act according to the religious law, the right to collect taxes, to invite the Shiit, kindly, to adopt the Sunit School, and to prevent the Mohamal testimony. Also the King could use the telephone

and the telegraph. Therefore, Ibn-Saud removed the causes for the rebellion. The leader of this revolt was Faisal Ad-Dwaysh. He put another diplomatic difficulty before Ibn-Saud. He raided, with his followers, the Iraqi frontiers and killed many soldiers and civilians. Also he raided Kuwait and Jordan in 1927-1928. British planes bombed the tribes and the followers of Ad-Dwaysh but Ibn-Saud persuaded the British to stop fighting Ad-Dwaysh. He arranged with the Iraqi Government for a meeting with the British. The British, Iraqi delegates and the Saudi King met but the conference failed, and the revolt continued.⁹⁷

Ad-Dwaysh sent two messages. The first was to the King of Iraq and the second message was to the Administrative Inspector of southern Iraq, Mr. Glob. Ad-Dwaysh told the King of Iraq that he revolted against Ibn-Saud but the British airplanes forced him to leave Iraq. He asked His Majesty to stop the British airplanes from fighting him or to advise him on what the King of Iraq would want him to do. Ad-Dwaysh asked Mr. Glob to give him a British nationality.⁹⁸

⁹⁷S. Hathlul, History of the Kings of Al-Saud, 1961, pp. 185-191.

⁹⁸Ibid.

J. B. Philby stated; "He - Ad-Dwaysh - surrendered to the British, unwilling to face his own sovereign, and King Faisal of Iraq, inclined to accord him refuge in Iraq, perhaps in the hope of using him some day against Ibn-Saud." Ibn-Saud heard that Ad-Dwaysh had entered Kuwait. He sent a cable to the British political agent in Iraq which said: "The British Government has secured to the Saudi Government not to accept the rebellions in Iraq, Kuwait and Jordan, and now they are in Kuwait. I request that the British should kick them out of Kuwait or allow our troops to follow them and to capture them." Ibn-Saud received a reply saying that the British were arranging to kick the rebellions out of Kuwait. The British imprisoned them in a ship. Ibn-Saud sent a cable asking the British to hand the criminals over to him. The British replied to him asking him to arrange for a meeting to discuss the rebellions and to sign a treaty.⁹⁹

Khabar and Wadha Conference. The negotiations between Ibn-Saud and the British started a year before for the handling of the rebellions. On January 19, 1930, the British Government delegated the Chief of the Consuls in the Persian Gulf, the Consul in Kuwait and the Chief Commander of the British aircrafts in Iraq. The Saudi

⁹⁹J. B. Philby, Saudi Arabia, 1955, p. 264.

delegates were Habiz Wahba and Yousif Yasin. The Conference, held for two weeks, ended by a treaty. The British Government agreed to hand Ad-Dwaysh to Ibn-Saud but they insisted on the saving of his life. In return, the Saudi Government had to hand over all the booty that the rebellion got from their raids in Iraq and Kuwait.¹⁰⁰

Cairo, February 17, 1945. The following is from the account of Churchill.

The Prime Minister acted as host to the King of Saudi Arabia, Ibn-Saud. The party included the King's sons, and brothers, and his ministers - it may well be of interest, for Ibn-Saud is now the master of the Arab World. He was not in the least overawed by his English visitor whose Zionist sympathies were no doubt known to him. After luncheon, presents were handed to our party who had been graded into three classes.

Churchill made no promises. He had been concerned with the problem of Palestine on and off ever since it began, and he knew only too well that there was no solution which both Jews and Arabs would willingly accept. Probably he only wanted to meet Ibn-Saud through curiosity, as a statesman and warrior possessing a career which was almost as long as his own, and in his brief report of the meeting he did not mention any political discussion at all.¹⁰¹

Saudi - British dispute over Buraimi. The Buraimi oasis extends over an area of 35,000 square kilometers, consisting of eight villages with a population of 25,000.

¹⁰⁰S. Hathlul, History of the Kings of Al-Saud, 1961, p. 199.

¹⁰¹D. Haworth, The Desert King, 1964, p. 257.

The oasis played very important roles as a great center of the Wahhabi movement. The Wahhabi relations with Buraimi started in the regime of Saud the Great. He sent a mission in 1808 to Oman to teach them the Wahhabi doctrine. When the British sided with the Omans in the fighting, the Wahhabis used Buraimi as a base for their operation. The Wahhabis did not stay long in the Buraimi. In 1819 the Wahhabi control came to an end.

The Wahhabis tried again to regain their control over Buraimi in the second Saudi State. Turki sent a division of troops and they occupied it. Imam Faisal Ibn-Turki, in 1844, sent Abdullah Ibn-Battala with a troop to center in the oasis.

The chief tribes asked the British for aid which was turned down. An agreement was reached between the Wahhabis and the local leaders on a basis to pay tribute of \$M.T.5000 annually to Riyadh.¹⁰²

The Wahhabis' effective control in the oasis lasted from 1853-1869 and was made possible for many reasons:

1. Faisal Ibn-Turki got very strong in Arabia after his return from captivity in Cairo. He retook the throne and extended his sovereignty in Al-Hasa. He sent his officials to collect taxes as symbols of his control.

¹⁰²J. B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, 1964, p. 69.

2. The death of his strong opponent in the Hijaz, Mohamed Ibn-Aun the Sharif of Mecca facilitated his control.

3. The final help came with the deposition from power of the most steadfast opponents of the Wahhabis in south-eastern Arabia.¹⁰³

In 1866 Abdullah Ibn-Faisal, who had succeeded his father as Amir, signed a treaty on April 21 which read:

1. The resident in the Persian Gulf would become the medium of friendship between the Amir and the British Government.

2. The Imam assured the resident in the Persian Gulf on the part of the Imam that he would not oppose or injure British subjects residing in territories under the authority of the Imam.

3. The Imam assured the resident in the Persian Gulf on the part of the Imam that he would not injure or attack the territories of the Arab tribes in alliance with the British Government...further than in receiving the Zakat religious taxes that have been customary of old.¹⁰⁴

The collection of the Zakat in the Sharia is a symbol of sovereignty because it is only collected from the subjects of the State and it is the main revenue in the Islamic State. It is used for the defense, civilian works, welfare and social security. It carried political

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 81.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., pp. 84-85, quoted from a collection of treaties...related to India, II volumes, 1892, X, 116.

implications and the citizens admitted the suzerainty of the State. If we went back further to the history of the first Islamic State in the time of Caliph Abu-Baker, the successor of the prophet Mohamed, when the tribes rejected paying the Zakat, Baker considered this action as a denial of the suzerainty of the State. The Saudi Government put forth a legal argument in 1955 in support of the Saudi's claim to the disputed areas. It reads in part:

...a true tax, leviable only by a sovereign and due from the individual subject. Zakat is not a political tribute, nor is it a voluntary gift to a solely religious leader....Zakat is the chief general tax imposed on the Muslims; on him who has the right to collect it rests accordingly the duty to protect those who pay it. No collection, as has been said without protection...and the preservation of public security....¹⁰⁵

The Saudi evidence is the tax registers reproduced in Volume III of the Saudi Memorial between 1866 and 1909. There was no conflict over Buraimi except when King Ibn-Saud, in 1905, paid a visit to the Abu-Dhabi where the two rulers had met Sir Per Cox who warned Ibn-Saud that, "Any interference by him in the affairs of Trucial Oman would not be welcomed by the British."¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵J. B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, 1964, p. 293.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 104.

Ibn-Saud did not take any further action. The Ottoman and the British signed a treaty fixing the frontiers in 1913. After Ibn-Saud captured Al-Hasa he had friendly relations with the British. Ibn-Saud was recognized by the Port as Governor of Najd.

When World War I broke out in 1914, it did not affect Ibn-Saud's position in Al-Hasa and the British signed a treaty in 1915 with Ibn-Saud. It recognized his independence.

Ibn-Saud visited Buraimi occasionally between 1925 and 1929. The local Amir collected Zakat, enforced the regulations, and maintained order.

In 1947-1948, Ibn-Saud sent out a survey company many times. Abu-Dhabi protested against this survey but the Saudi Government replied to the British Government that the camp was in Saudi territory and in the area of tribes owing allegiance to Saudi Arabia and issued a statement explaining the frontier lines between Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Abu-Dhabi. A conference was held in 1952 discussing the frontier questions between the Saudi and the British. The next move was in July, 1952; a camp was set and Saudi Arabia sent an Amir to the oasis accompanied by 40 soldiers. There was going to be open war but by the United States

Ambassador's mediation, both sides reached an agreement for arbitration.*¹⁰⁷

On July 30, 1954, the main points of it were the following:

1. Both sides would remain where they were pending arbitration.

2. There was to be a five-man tribunal of one Britain, one Saudi and three neutrals - Pakistan, Cuba and Belgium.

3. The committee is requested to decide: (a) the location of common frontiers between Saudi Arabia and Abu-Dhabi, and (b) sovereignty in the area.

4. In conducting its proceeding it should regard all considerations: (a) historical facts relating to the rights of Saudi Arabia, (b) the traditional loyalties of the inhabitants of the area, (c) the tribal organization, and (d) the exercise of jurisdiction.¹⁰⁸

The committee met in Geneva in 1955 to arbitrate the dispute.

On November 9, 1955, the Saudi Government suggested that a neutral commission be appointed to supervise affairs in the disputed area.

*See Appendix D for the text.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 163.

¹⁰⁸M. Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, 1960, V. II, p. 686-689.

In November, Saudi Arabia put the case before the Arab League. The political committee announced its support of the Saudi case and urged the British to withdraw its troops and demand a return to arbitration.

King Saud "charged the British Government with having withdrawn from the arbitration because they found that they had a losing case. He declared that he would continue to try to establish his right to the Buraimi Oasis by diplomatic means."¹⁰⁹

The State Department was sympathetic toward the Saudi case and it took into account the world opinion and feared Russian interference in the problem. Russia showed King Saud their support on the frontier issue in an offer of material and moral help.

The United States regarded the British reoccupation of the Buraimi as an act of aggression. "The dispute of Buraimi has become an issue not only between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia but also between the United Kingdom and the United States. The old Anglo-American rivalry for oil rights within the area has again come to the front."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹Time, V. LXVI, No. 24, December 12, 1955.

¹¹⁰Council for Middle East Asia, Middle East Affairs, 1956, V. 7, p. 63.

In November, 1958, the Saudi Government claimed the territory of Kharal-Odaid which it said had been illegally occupied by Abudbi military forces under the British command. The British Government recognized Abudbi sovereignty over the area.

The Saudi Government protested to the United Nations and published several thick volumes of a "Memorial" of its case for Buraimi. In 1958, Prince Faisal, now King, said that "the diplomatic relations with Britain could be resumed if the British either accepted arbitration again or withdrew from Buraimi."¹¹¹ The latest development in the dispute came in 1960 when the United Nations asked the Swedish Ambassador to Spain to arbitrate with a view to possible placement of a United Nations' force in Oasis.¹¹² On November 12, 1961, King Saud declared:

We have tried everything possible to settle by peaceful means the dispute that has been created by the British aggression against that part of our country, Buraimi. However, in the event that the Swedish Ambassador, the mediator of the United Nations, fails in his present efforts we will not hesitate to take all the steps that we deem fit to recover this Arab part of our country.¹¹³

¹¹¹Time, V. LXXI, No. 17, April 21, 1958.

¹¹²M. Spencer, Political Evaluation in the Middle East, 1962, p. 318.

¹¹³Tel-Aviv University, Middle East Record, 1961, V. II, p. 381.

Saudi - United States Relations

Economic Factor

Ibn-Saud was dependent on the pilgrimage. "It was the main source of his income and the pilgrimage was a sensitive meter of the world trade. In 1930 and 1931, the number who came was disastrously small. As the Kingdom, new in size and administration, began to grow, it gained a little in complexity."¹¹⁴ All the gold that came in was the King's personal property and all that was paid out was his personal bounty. The foreign debts and the internal debts were more insidious. There were three persons who came in contact with Ibn-Saud at this time. The first one was Philby, then Crane, and the third one was Twitchell. By this stage of Saudi Arabian developments, the American mining engineer, Karl S. Twitchell, had begun to play a major role in the opening of Saudi Arabia to Western business. King Ibn-Saud asked him to make water and mineral surveys.

"The King then enlisted Twitchell's services to interest American and British capital in mineral development in Saudi Arabia. Ibn-Saud found that Standard Oil of California wished to apply for an oil concession in Saudi Arabia."¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴D. Haworth, The Desert King, 1964, p. 220.

¹¹⁵J. A. DeNova, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1963, p. 206.

The first oil concession granted by Ibn-Saud was given to Southern California in 1933. There was a lively competition among the American oil men, Twitchell was one, and representatives of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Ibn-Saud decided in favor of the United States because he believed Americans to be practical, efficient, disinterested politically, anti-imperialist, and because they offered immediate payment in gold.

This is what Ibn-Saud said: "I tell you, Philby, if anyone were to offer me a million pounds, he would be welcome to all the concessions he wanted in my country."¹¹⁶

In 1937, Ibn-Saud had received a very advantageous offer from Japan, but believing it to be motivated by political considerations, he rejected it. Germany also had designs on Saudi oil and in the same year Dr. Fritz, German Minister to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, who was stationed in Baghdad, visited Jiddah. Late in 1934 another step was taken toward the development of the natural resources of the country by the creation of the Saudi Mining Syndicate Incorporated in the Bahamas. The Syndicate represented British and American capital to undertake to exploit various minerals.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶D. Haworth, The Desert King, 1964, p. 223.

¹¹⁷G. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 1962, p. 549.

Establishment of diplomatic relations. This Treaty, signed November 7, 1933, between Saudi Arabia and the United States was signed in London by Hafiz Wahba, the Saudi Minister in England and the Minister of the United States in England to establish diplomatic and trade relations.¹¹⁸

American interests and the number of American citizens residing in Saudi Arabia had been increased. The State Department suggested that the consulate staff and mission in Cairo should go to Saudi Arabia to study the situation. This was in 1939. The American Minister in Egypt reported as follows:

1. American financial interests in Saudi Arabia have recently materially increased.

2. The Americans' activity connected with American interests in Saudi Arabia is now increased.

3. Other important countries are giving increased attention to Saudi Arabia.

4. Southern California Oil Company, on May 31, obtained an exclusive concession for a period of 60 years covering practically all of Saudi Arabia. An initial cash payment in gold of \$1,200,000 will be made to the King and an annual rental of \$170,000 is to be paid until oil is discovered. The King told Mr. Lenahan that the Japanese, working jointly with the Italians and Germans, aided by the British Minister, had each offered much larger sums for smaller concessions.

¹¹⁸M. A. Madi, Modern Renaissance in Arabia - Saudi Arabia, 1952, pp. 369-372.

5. The King believes that the Japanese, Italians and Germans have in mind additional territory, as well as oil concessions.

6. The King feels that to grant the Petroleum Development, Limited another concession would be to give the British a further grip on his country.

7. Mr. Lenahan believes it to be of the utmost importance to the Southern California that a legation be established so that the interest of the country be safeguarded.

Mr. Rogers, the executive of Southern California said:

The situation should be treated by our Government as a political problem and that the required financial aid should be extended to the King under the Lend-Lease Act. We felt that the United States of America should use this opportunity of cementing friendships between Saudi Arabia and the United States by going directly to the financial assistance of the King.¹¹⁹

Ibn-Saud obtained financial aid from Great Britain and this aid increased from 1941 to 1945 to about \$2,500,000. These grants were supplemented by American Lend-Lease.

Airport. American Joint Chiefs of Staff reached a decision to secure a good airport in the Middle East. The Americans wanted a secure airport in the Persian Gulf area. The choice fell on Dahrán in Saudi Arabia. Negotiations were conducted in 1943. The agreement was concluded in 1943. It provided for three years. Other steps for

¹¹⁹W. Williams, America and the Middle East, 1958, pp. 45-48.

closer relations with the United States were taken. In 1942, at the request of the King, an American agricultural mission arrived in Saudi Arabia. An American military mission also came.

These closer relations prepared for a meeting between King Ibn-Saud and the President of the United States in 1945 in Egypt. Ibn-Saud also met Churchill. The two Heads of State talked over the Palestine problem. This meeting was in February, 1945; and in March, 1945, Saudi Arabia declared war on Germany and subsequently her representatives took part in the United Nations Conference at San Francisco.¹²⁰

In April, President Roosevelt, referring to the memorable conversation which they had not so long ago, sent a letter to King Ibn-Saud.¹²¹

After President Roosevelt died, the new President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, exchanged letters with Ibn-Saud concerning the Palestine problem. In October, 1946, King Ibn-Saud said in his letter:

You, Roosevelt, expressed your hope that it would be solved, and in which you expressed the readiness of the United States to assist the displaced

¹²⁰G. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 1962, p. 533.

¹²¹United States, Department of State Bulletin, 1945, p. 623.

persons, among whom are Jews, because it contradicts previous promises made by the United States and statements made from the White House.

In reply to this letter, Harry S. Truman said in his letter:

The Government and the people of the United States have given support to the concept of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The United States takes the position that these people should be prepared for self-government and also that a National Home for the Jewish should be established in Palestine.*122

The agreement between the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United States concerning the Dahran airport concluded on June 12, 1949.¹²³

In 1957, the United States was permitted to use the airport, which remained under the complete authority of the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia. The Government of Saudi Arabia announced, on March 16, 1960, that it would not renew the 1957 agreement.

The Saudi spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, denied that the Dahran airport served as a military base for any foreign country.

*See Appendix E for the two letters.

¹²²United States, Department of State Bulletin, 1957, V. 15, pp. 848-851.

¹²³United States, United States Treaties and other International Agreements, 1965, V. 2, Part 2, pp. 1474-1482.

The Saudi Government announced that: "All that the American Government has there is the right of passage for certain aircraft and for the supply of oil. It is not the seat of any military force, nor is it a store for military arms. The passage of arms and warlike material is not permitted."¹²⁴

The United States-Saudi Arabian Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed in 1951. By the terms of this Treaty, the Saudi Arabians were to obtain military arms and equipment from the United States. The United States would also make available adequate numbers of qualified United States Army, Navy and Air Force personnel to provide training in the use of equipment, as well as for tactical training. The United States-Saudi Arabian Agreement on Cooperation was in April, 1957. This was reached during the visit of King Saud to the United States.

Friendship relations. In the Yemeni problem, as we mentioned before,* John F. Kennedy sent letters** to Nasser, Sallal, Kings Saud and Hussein offering his good offices toward a settlement. He suggested that Jordan should withdraw from the problem and Saudi Arabia should

¹²⁴G. DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, p. 94.

*See Chapter V, Yemeni Question.

**See the text in Appendix F.

withdraw their support to the Imam. However, the tension increased after the Egyptian's threat to attack Najran in Saudi Arabia. John F. Kennedy and Amir Faisal exchanged letters in 1963.* The President of the United States assured Saudi Arabia as follows;

1. Saudi Arabia can rely upon the friendship and cooperation of the United States in handling various tasks confronting your country in the future.

2. The United States is firmly and deeply concerned with the stability and progress of Saudi Arabia.

3. You may be certain of the full support of the United States in safe-guarding the entity of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.

4. I am well aware that to attain your objectives, you should enjoy peace - from within or outside the country.

5. I share your anxiety over the tension now prevailing in the region.¹²⁵

King Faisal paid a State visit to the United States after he became King of Saudi Arabia and top level talks took place between the Heads of the two countries. The United States was anxious to avoid direct involvement in Middle East disputes. At the end of the talks, a joint communique issued at the White House renewed a pledge of

*See the text in Appendix F.

¹²⁵Council for Middle East Asia, Middle Eastern Affairs, 1963, V. 14, p. 47.

United States concern for Saudi Arabian territorial integrity in the event of a crisis in the Middle East.¹²⁶

United States-Saudi Arabian Defense Construction of Military Facilities Agreement. This Agreement was signed by Saudi Arabia and the United States at Jiddah on June 5, 1965. It dealt with the plans of the Government of Saudi Arabia to undertake construction of certain military facilities and the services which the United States Army Corps of Engineers was prepared to render to aid completion of this program.¹²⁷ The Defense Transfer of Aircraft and Equipment Agreement was signed on November 11, 1965.

Saudi - Russia Relations

The first contact with Russia was in 1903 when King Ibn-Saud sent a letter to the Amir of Kuwait and stated that if Great Britain would not support him against Ibn-Rashid, who allied himself with the Turks, Ibn-Saud would accept the offer of Russia. This meant that Russia had contacted Ibn-Saud.

After Ibn-Saud's conquest of the Hijaz, the Soviet Union was the first State to recognize the new regime in

¹²⁶Regional News Services, Middle East Mirror, 1966, V. 18, No. 2, pp. 2-3.

¹²⁷United States, United States Treaties and other International Agreements, 1965, V. 16, Part I, p. 840.

the Hijaz in 1926 and sent Karim Khan as Minister and he was the first Foreign Minister in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi policy toward the Soviet Union has been consistently correct though not very warm in tone. A further proof of friendship was shown in the visit of Prince Faisal to Moscow in 1932 at the head of the Government delegation. The Prince saw Stalin and Molotov. As a consequence of Faisal's visit the number of Russians coming to Mecca increased. In 1938, King Ibn-Saud terminated his acceptance of a Soviet diplomatic mission in Jiddah.

Soviet writers praised the Saudi policy of neutrality and its opposition to the Baghdad Pact.¹²⁸

Saudi's position concerning the political thought of Russia's dealing with the Middle East was that it was of less importance than Egypt or Syria. The Soviet Union looked to Saudi Arabia as closer to the Western bloc and its companies served as a base for the Western bloc. Despite this, Russia, during the third and fourth decades of the 20th Century, assumed, in the view of less development of this country, that the national movement should not be put under careful watch on the condition that it had to continue its policy of being anti-British. However, the situation was changed in the fifth decade. The hopes

¹²⁸G. DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, p. 121.

of Moscow were not fulfilled. It considered that Saudi Arabia had transferred to the American bloc after the extension of oil companies' projects in Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the Soviets praised the Saudi rulers for their position for liberation and independence of Buraimi. They supported Saudi Arabia in their anti-British dispute over Buraimi Oasis. This Soviet attitude towards the Saudi rulers was influenced by the policy of the Soviet Union in the third decade when Moscow considered Ibn-Saud the ruler of the whole world in the future. However, the Soviet Union changed its attitude in 1950-1955. Maybe they considered any attack on Saudi rulers as an attack to Islam, because they are the Keeper of Islamic Places.¹²⁹

The first break in the alliance occurred following the King's visit to the United States early in 1957 when Saud came to understand the importance of fighting communism. He returned to the Middle East, friendly to the Eisenhower Doctrine. The King's visit brought about a new orientation openly anti-communist. Saudi Arabia has no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

A recent Russian article described diplomatic and trade relations between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia

¹²⁹L. Walter, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, 1959, pp. 181-182.

from the beginning on February 16, 1926. The Russians attempted to improve trade with Arabia. When Amir Faisal went to Russia in 1932, he visited factories, military academies and units and went to Leningrad. The Trade Treaty between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia was not concluded but Saudi Arabia does import goods from Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.¹³⁰

¹³⁰G. DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, p. 76.

CHAPTER VII

NEUTRALIST POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC PACT

Neutralist Policy of Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia can act with twin policies because it is a religious and nationalist State. It is the home land of Islam and the Arab race. It may appear that the twin policy is contradictory but Islam and Arabism are a unit. The twin policy is not strong in world politics. The United Arab Republic believes and works in three directions: African cycle, Arab cycle, and Islamic cycle - the latter because of Alazhar University which is one of many centers in the Islamic history. Russia acts both as an Asiatic State and an European State in international politics.

Early in 1955, twenty-nine States from Asia and Africa decided to convene the Bandung Conference. Saudi Arabia was one of them - and proclaimed the very ideas which were entertained by all these representatives on important foreign matters. They declared their full support for fundamental principles of human rights and for self determination for all people of all nations.

The Belgrade Conference. At the Conference itself, which was held in Belgrade in 1961 and attended by 28

countries - among them Saudi Arabia, the basic platform to be developed was in nonaligned policy; action lay in achieving international cooperation and coordination through voluntary participation and through full respect for the individuality of each country. Nonalignment, in the Arab point of view, did not mean isolation from the East and West.¹³¹

Saudi Arabia participated in the preparatory conference in Cairo, as we said, and also in Belgrade. King Saud did not go to Belgrade himself - it was reported that tribal heads and religious leaders had opposed his going to a country which had officially adopted the communist-atheist creed. Shaykh Ibrahim Al-Swayl, the Foreign Minister, appeared at the Conference as the King's personal representative. In his speech, he stressed Saudi's policy of nonalignment and his desire for international justice and security, participation in the fight against imperialism and cooperation with the United Nations.¹³²

Both Amir Faisal and King Saud each, when officiating as Prime Minister, asserted the country's wish for absolute neutrality.

¹³¹F. A. Sayegh, The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World, 1964, pp. 229-255.

¹³²Tel-Aviv University, Middle East Record, 1960, V. I, p. 427.

King Saud said on November 12, 1960; "As regards the outside world, we shall continue to pursue our frank and clear policy of befriending. We proclaim to all, our policy of neutrality."¹³³

King Saud declared on November 12, 1961: "Our foreign relations are conducted on the basis of mutual respect and absolute neutrality in cooperation with the Afro-Asian bloc and by stressing the principles of Bandung."¹³⁴

From the table, we can see Saudi Arabia's policy transition now in the process of moving away from a given form of neutralism.

Islamic Pact - new policy of Saudi Arabia. One of the aspects of Saudi Arabia policies is the calling for Islamic solidarity. It is represented in the area of the Islamic bloc and this policy had been adopted recently for ten years - but the activity of Saudi rulers started in 1965. If we looked for the reasons to adopt this policy, apparently they remain the following:

1. Saudi Arabia is the original home for Islam and from here the Islam started and established its empire.

¹³³Ibid., V. I, p. 427.

¹³⁴Ibid., V. II, p. 380.

Table 6. Classification of neutralist and participation in gathering and major initiatives.*

Classification of Saudi Neutralist	Ban- dung 1955	Brioni 1956	Casa- blanca 1961	Cairo 1961	Bel- grade 1961	Cairo 1961	Cairo 1962	Co- lombo 1962	UN Dis- armament Com- mittee	Neutralist Proposal A/4522
Originally outside both cold war camps	X	X	-	-	X	X	-	X	-	-

X indicates participation in gatherings or initiatives.

- indicates non-participation.

*Combination of two tables from Sayegh, F. A., The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World, 1964, pp. 16-20.

2. Direction of five prayers daily to the Muslim - every corner in the world, and it has the center of pilgrimage and the Holy Cities.

The idea for an Islamic Pact started in 1956 when King Saud, President Nasser of the United Arab Republic and President of the Republic of Pakistan, Skander Mirza, signed the Charter* of the Islamic Congress. In this Charter, there are three main points: (1) The Islamic Conference represents the Muslim group from their different countries. (2) From the Conference it founded: (a) High Council, (b) General Secretariat. The High Council is headed by Saudi Arabia with headquarters in Mecca. (3) The main purpose of the Conference is to work, to organize the Muslim peoples and to develop a faithful relationship between Islamic countries. The Charter, signed on March 15, 1956, was the end of the story until 1965. After ten years, Saudi Arabia recalled the Islamic Pact or Islamic Alliance. In Saudi Arabia, there is a Muslim World League and its constituent assembly which were formed during the pilgrimage in 1962. This assembly comprises representatives from Arab countries, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Indonesia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Mauritania, Philippines and Sengal. The aim of the assembly, which

*See Appendix G for text.

has been calling for an Islamic Summit Conference since its foundation, is to serve the cause of Islam and to contact Islamic societies in various parts of the world. To coordinate their cooperation among leading members are Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt and Northern Nigeria.¹³⁵

In 1966, King Faisal had travelled to Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey and Mali, preaching "Islamic Solidarity", a movement whose political goals are clear - whose religious appeal is to "Traditional Islamic Principles."

This is what the Prime Minister of Sudan, Azhari, said about the Islamic Pact when he paid a State visit to Saudi Arabia: "We are strengthened and encouraged to carry out our role, especially after the upholding of the Islamic call for solidarity and King Faisal, who exhorted us to rally around it."¹³⁶

If we look at the publications issued by Saudi Arabia's Government, or its newspaper, we see how they call for an Islamic Summit. An article in a Saudi magazine said:

Out of much discussion, there arose the suggestion from Somalia that there should be a meeting of

¹³⁵Regional News Services, Middle East Mirror, 1966, V. 18, p. 4.

¹³⁶Saudi Arabia Office of Publication, Information, Saudi Arabia, 1966, V. III, No. 137, pp. 137-138.

the Heads of the Islamic States. Since all Islamic States are not Arab, such as Pakistan, the Islamic Summit, as it was called, has been widely discussed since then. There is no doubt that Faisal does occupy a special position in Islam.¹³⁷

The following is another example of a Saudi newspaper editorial:

When the Islamic Nation marches on the same road, when the Islamic call for solidarity is realized, it will be possible for the unified Islamic Nation to attain a decisive victory in order to serve Islam. The forces opposing the Islamic call undoubtedly realize that the meeting of the Islamic Nation on one target means the end of all designs contradictory to the Islamic message.¹³⁸

From these statements, we can understand that there are opposite sides for the call of an Islamic Summit or Islamic Alliance. The extremist nationalists opposed the call for Islamic Alliance. It would be better to start from the beginning with President Nasser about the Islam. Nasser, in his book Philosophy of Revolution said:

When I went with the Egyptian delegation to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, my belief in the possibilities of the strength of the Islamic tie grew very strong. Kabba should become an institute of great political power. The pilgrimage is vital because of its functions as a periodical political conference in which the envoys of Islamic State leaders met in order to lay down

¹³⁷Ibid., V. III, No. 2.

¹³⁸Ibid., V. II, No. 2, p. 6.

in this "Islamic World Parliament" the broad lives of their national policies. I remember that I mentioned some of these thoughts to His Majesty, the King Saud.¹³⁹

In the next year he signed the charter of the Islamic Conference. Later he opposed the Islamic Alliance, when King Faisal arose to the call of the Islamic Summit in 1966. Nasser attacked this call. Why? What is the harm of an Islamic Alliance? Why does the United Arab Republic reject it? As the United Arab Republic can play as a bridge between African States and the Arab States, Saudi Arabia can play the same rule between the extremist Arab nationalist States and Islamic countries. Saudi Arabia can follow two policies because it is both a religious and nationalist State. It is the Home Land of Islam.

¹³⁹J. Nasser, Philosophy of Revolution, 1953, pp. 111-113.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Saudi history may be divided into three phases. The first phase lasted from 1747-1818. There were two events which took place that affected the future of the Saudi family as a strong power in Arabia.

1. The Saudi family and the founder of the Wahhabi movement were allies. This was very successful. The Saudi family is indebted to this movement for the spread of their power among the tribes. The orientists could be controlled by two means: (a) a very strong political leader with the sword in his hand, or (b) a religious leader who could affect their spiritual life. In other words, the Saudi ruler carried the sword in one hand and the word in the other. He is both the temporal and spiritual leader. He is the King of the Nation and the Imam of the believers.

2. The second event was the Egyptian campaign. It was a destructive expedition. The Sublime Port wanted to put an end to the emergent State. The Saudi control spread from coast to coast, going from north to south to the Holy Places in the Hijaz where it destroyed the tombs of the saints and the innovations. The Sharif of Mecca led a campaign in 1791 to suppress the Wahhabis but he failed.

Iraq led another expedition in 1798. The Wahhabi Empire reached its zenith in 1811 but Mohamed-Ali's expedition put an end to the Wahhabi Empire in 1818.

The second phase lasted from 1818-1891. The greatest leader in this period was Turki. This phase was ended by civil war in the royal family.

The third phase, with which we were mainly concerned, started from 1902 when Ibn-Saud regained the throne. He was the strongest man that the Saudi family has ever seen. He was well trained in politics during his refuge in Kuwait. He was a capable commander in the battlefield. He succeeded in retaking all the territories which came under the control of the first Empire. He united most of Arabia in modern history which had never had this experience before except in the time of Mohamed and the Orthodox Caliphate.

The Sublime Port faced a critical international position in that time. It tried to suppress the new emergent State in Arabia by supporting the Turkish puppet, Ibn-Rashid. However, Ibn-Saud succeeded in driving the Turks from Qasim Province in 1904. In 1913, he also drove them from Al-Hasa Province. Ibn-Saud was the first ruler in modern history to drive the Turks from central and eastern Arabia.

The British contacted Ibn-Saud and concluded a treaty with him in 1915. During this period, the British

also contacted the Sharif of Mecca. They induced him to rise against the Turks. Al-Hussein Ibn-Ali over-estimated his power. He declared himself the King of the Arabs and talked about the Arab Kingdom. He ignored the growing power of Ibn-Saud. He declared himself the Muslim Caliphate. Ibn-Saud enumerated Hussein's faults. The border's problem aroused the conflict. The British left their ally alone to face his fate with the new master of Arabia. Ibn-Saud captured the Hijaz. The Sharif abdicated to Ibn-Saud on December 17, 1925.

Ibn-Saud turned his attention south to Asir. He signed a treaty in 1926 with the Idrisi, who transferred the suzerainty of the region to Ibn-Saud. In 1934, the war broke out between Ibn-Saud and Yemen where the Saudi troops swept the Yemeni army; the war concluded with a treaty of friendship in 1936.

Ibn-Saud signed a chain of treaties fixing the northern borders with Iraq, Kuwait and Jordan. In 1926, Ibn-Saud issued the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Hijaz. It was divided into eight parts. The departments of the Kingdom of the Hijaz were the Legislative Assembly, Councils of Jiddah and Medina, General Municipal Councils and the Council of Deputies.

In 1927 he issued a Royal Order constituting the Sultanate of Najd and its Dependencies into a Kingdom and

uniting it with the Hijaz. Another Royal Order, issued in 1932, changed the name of the country to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In 1953, Ibn-Saud established the Council of Ministers because of the increase in the obligations and responsibilities placed on the State. In 1953, Ibn-Saud died, after he established this strong State. He tried his best to modernize the country. He settled the nomadic tribes and instituted the use of many modern inventions. He exploited the country's resources. He was a very successful politician when he kept his country from the political implications in the oil concession to the foreign companies. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Saud, who continued from 1953-1964, when he was dethroned.

The Department of Foreign Affairs was founded in 1926 and changed to a Ministry in the first ten years; it was not very active until World War II. It opened many Embassies and Consuls in cities such as Paris, Washington, Rome and Tehran. Saudi Arabia signed the protocol of the Arab League in 1945. It is very active and follows a firm policy of solidarity with the Arab States. It is devoted to the Arab League charter and has signed most of its treaties.

Saudi Arabia tried to maintain friendly relations with the Arab States - Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Persian Gulf States, North African States and Yemen.

After the Republic of Yemen was declared in 1962, the United Arab Republic became involved in Arabia's affairs. The relations were complicated between Yemen, the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. The new regime in Yemen was extremist. They claimed Saudi territory. Najran, Jizan and the Egyptians attacked Saudi territories. The Imam of Yemen is still alive, therefore, Saudi Arabia held its recognition of the Yemeni Republic as did the United Kingdom. Saudi Arabia put a condition for ending the conflict by withdrawal of all foreign armed forces. The United Arab Republic had been offered three opportunities to put an end to the civil war and the withdrawal of its troops: (a) United States recognition, (b) United Nations' observers coming to help with the withdrawal, (c) Jiddah Peace Agreement, and (d) the last opportunity which came after the Arab Summit Conference in September, 1967, and the new agreement for peace in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia contacted the British when they got a foothold in the Persian Gulf in the regime of Saud the Great. In the second Saudi State, Turki made direct contact with the British. In 1831, his son renewed the relations. The British resident in the Gulf visited Riyadh in 1865. In the third Saudi State, modern period, the British Consulate in the Persian Gulf was in favor of putting a firm policy toward the new emergent strong man in Arabia.

Ibn-Saud asked to sign a treaty with the British but the British delayed until World War I broke out; they signed a treaty in 1915. It continued until 1927 when Ibn-Saud signed another treaty which renewed automatically.

Saudi-British relations were friendly; in 1928-1930 a riot arose against Ibn-Saud in his realm. The rebellions caused a conflict on the Saudi-Iraqi borders. The British bombed Saudi parts. Later the rebels got a refuge in Iraq but Ibn-Saud insisted that they hand him the rebels. The British agreed and handed them over.

The only problem which caused difficulty in the Saudi-British relations was the dispute over Buraimi Oasis. The Saudi control goes back to 1808 in the regime of Saud the Great. The problem of suzerainty over the oasis arose in the modern period. The Turkish-British Treaty of 1913 did not affect Ibn-Saud's position. The dispute became complicated in the 1950's when the search for oil started. The Saudi Government signed a treaty for arbitration in 1954. The problem went to the United Nations but until now it still hangs.

Saudi-American relations were influenced by economic factors. In 1933, Ibn-Saud gave oil concessions to the Southern California Oil Company. In 1933, Saudi-American diplomatic relations were established.

Other further steps for close relations with the United States came in 1943 when Ibn-Saud gave certain aircraft passages and oil supplies to the Americans at Dahrhan airport. In 1945, Ibn-Saud and F. D. Roosevelt met. Saudi Arabia has no diplomatic relations with the Eastern bloc. It has trade relations with some Eastern countries.

The principal findings of this study are as follows:

1. The political-religious alliance founded a very strong State extending from coast to coast from the Red Sea shore to the Persian Gulf and from the Syrian plains in the north to the edge of the empty quarter in the south.
2. The most important contribution of the Saudi family is the unity of most of the Arabian peninsula, instead of the weak Amirates and the local Sheiks of the tribes. It became a State with centralized authority.
3. The Saudi State stood strongly in the face of foreign ambitions and interests; against the Turks and the Egyptians in the first Saudi State and in the modern period. It succeeded in driving away the Turks and the Egyptians and their puppet shadows like Ibn-Rashid.
4. The Saudi family history faced some conflict inside the royal family which led to decline, such as the quarrel between Faisal's sons in the second State and the differences between Saud and his brothers in the third State;

however, strong leaders united the family in the face of the foreign dangers and also kept the unity of the State.

Saudi policy can be summarized as this:

1. In the Islamic cycle, it calls for an Islamic Pact and Islamic solidarity. It wants to act as a bridge between extremist Arab nationalist States to get the support of the Islamic countries for Arab problems.

2. In regional policy, Saudi Arabia pledges devotion to the Arab League charter, strong support for Arab problems, liberation of Arab lands, political and financial support for Algerian liberation, Oman, and southern Arabia's strong stand on the Palestine question.

3. In international politics it pledges devotion to the United Nations' charter and support for peace in Africa-Asian Arab blocs.

4. It does not want entry in the two cold war camps - East and West.

5. It maintains good relations with the West and the United States. There is no prejudiced attitude toward the Russians, but no diplomatic relations exist. There are, however, trade relations with some Eastern countries.

Saudi Arabia is not in either of the two satellites. This can be shown clearly in the United Nations' voting records; for example, Saudi Arabia voted in favor of a Soviet amendment to the 43 Power Resolution concerned with

ensuring complete independence of colonial peoples. This proposal is not contradictory to the Saudi foreign policy and its principals. It also voted in favor of a similar proposal of 43 Afro-Asian States condemning alien subjection, affirming universal right to self-determination.

Saudi Arabia, now that it has seemingly solved its internal problems and has become a united nation with certain definable goals and policies, hopes to become a leader in helping the Western and Eastern blocs of nations find solutions to their problems.

APPENDIX A

ROYAL PRONOUNCEMENT CONCERNING THE POLICY OF
THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA WITH RESPECT TO THE
SUBSOIL AND SEA BED OF AREAS IN THE PERSIAN GULF
CONTIGUOUS TO THE COASTS OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA*

We, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn 'Abd al-Rahman Al Faisal Al Sa'ud,
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,

After reliance on God Almighty, being aware of the
need for the greater utilization of the world's natural
resources which are the bounty of God, and of the desir-
ability of giving encouragement to efforts to discover and
make available such resources,

Recognizing that by God's providence valuable re-
sources may underlie parts of the Persian Gulf off the
coasts of Saudi Arabia, and that modern technology by the
grace of God makes it increasingly practicable to utilize
these resources,

Appreciating that recognized jurisdiction over such
resources is required in the interest of their conservation
and prudent utilization when and as development is undertaken;

*Middle East Institute, Middle East Journal, V. 4,
1950.

Deeming that the exercise of jurisdiction over such resources by the contiguous nation is reasonable and just, since the effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve these resources would be contingent upon cooperation and protection from the shore and since self-protection compels the coastal nation to keep close watch over activities off its shores which are of a nature necessary for the utilization of these resources; and

Considering that various other nations now exercise jurisdiction over the subsoil and sea bed of areas contiguous to their coasts,

Declare the following policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with respect to the subsoil and sea bed of areas of the Persian Gulf contiguous to the coasts of Our Kingdom:

The subsoil and sea bed of those areas of the Persian Gulf seaward from the coastal sea of Saudi Arabia but contiguous to its coasts, are declared to appertain to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to be subject to its jurisdiction and control. The boundaries of such areas will be determined in accordance with equitable principles by Our Government in agreements with other States having jurisdiction and control over the subsoil and sea bed of adjoining areas. The character as high seas of the waters of such areas, the right to the free and unimpeded navigation

of such waters and the air space above those waters, fishing rights in such waters, and the traditional freedom of pearling by the peoples of the Gulf, are in no way affected.

This Pronouncement is made for the information and guidance of all whom it may concern.

May the Faithful always put their trust in God!

Promulgated in our Palace at Riyadh on the first day of the month of Sha'ban of the year of the Hegira 1368, corresponding to the twenty-eighth day of the month of May in the year 1949.

APPENDIX B

ROYAL DECREE REGARDING TERRITORIAL WATERS OF SAUDI ARABIA*

We, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn 'Abd al-Rahman Al Faisal Al Sa'ud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, after reliance on God Almighty and in view of our desire to define the territorial waters of the Kingdom, have decreed as follows:

Article 1. For the purposes of this Decree,

(a) The term "nautical mile" is the equivalent of 1852 meters;

(b) The term "bay" includes any inlet, lagoon or other arm of the sea;

(c) The term "island" includes any islet, reef, rock, bar or permanent artificial structure not submerged at lowest low tide;

(d) The term "shoal" denotes an area covered by shallow water, a part of which is not submerged at lowest low tide; and

(e) The term "coast" refers to the coasts of the Gulf of Aqaba, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

*Middle East Institute, Middle East Journal, V. 4, 1950.

Article 2. The territorial waters of Saudi Arabia, as well as the air space above and the soil and subsoil beneath them, are under the sovereignty of the Kingdom, subject to the provisions of international law as to the innocent passage of vessels of other nations through the coastal sea.

Article 3. The territorial waters of Saudi Arabia embrace both the inland waters and the coastal sea of the Kingdom.

Article 4. The inland waters of the Kingdom include:

(a) the waters of the bays along the coasts of Saudi Arabia;

(b) the waters above and landward from any shoal not more than twelve nautical miles from the mainland or from a Saudi Arabian island;

(c) the waters between the mainland and a Saudi Arabian island not more than twelve nautical miles from the mainland; and

(d) the waters between Saudi Arabian islands not farther apart than twelve nautical miles.

Article 5. The coastal sea of Saudi Arabia lies outside the inland waters of the Kingdom and extends seaward for a distance of six nautical miles.

Article 6. The following are established as the base-lines from which the coastal sea of Saudi Arabia is measured:

(a) where the shore of the mainland or an island is fully exposed to the open sea, the lowest low-water mark on the shore;

(b) where a bay confronts the open sea, lines drawn from headland to headland across the mouth of the bay;

(c) where a shoal is situated not more than twelve nautical miles from the mainland or from a Saudi Arabian island, lines drawn from the mainland or the island and along the outer edge of the shoal;

(d) where a port or harbor confronts the open sea, lines drawn along the seaward side of the outermost works of the port or harbor and between such works;

(e) where an island is not more than twelve nautical miles from the mainland, lines drawn from the mainland and along the outer shores of the island;

(f) where there is an island group which may be connected by lines not more than twelve nautical miles long, of which the island nearest to the mainland is not more than twelve nautical miles from the mainland, lines drawn from the mainland and along the outer shores of all the islands of the group if the islands form a chain, or along the outer shores of the outermost islands of the group if the islands do not form a chain; and

(g) where there is an island group which may be connected by lines not more than twelve nautical miles long,

of which the island nearest to the mainland is more than twelve nautical miles from the mainland, lines drawn along the outer shores of all the islands of the group if the islands form a chain, or along the outer shores of the outermost islands of the group if the islands do not form a chain.

Article 7. If the measurement of the territorial waters in accordance with the provisions of this Decree leaves an area of high sea wholly surrounded by territorial waters and extending not more than twelve nautical miles in any direction, such area shall form part of the territorial waters. The same rule shall apply to a pronounced pocket of high sea which may be wholly enclosed by drawing a single straight line not more than twelve nautical miles long.

Article 8. If the inland waters described in Article 4, or if the coastal sea measured from the base-lines fixed by Article 6, should be overlapped by the waters of another State, boundaries will be determined by Saudi Arabia in agreement with the State concerned in accordance with equitable principles.

Article 9. With a view to assuring compliance with the laws of the Kingdom relating to security, navigation, and fiscal matters, maritime surveillance may be exercised in a contiguous zone outside the coastal sea, extending

for a further distance of six nautical miles and measured from the base-lines of the coastal sea, provided however that nothing in this Article shall be deemed to apply to the rights of the Kingdom with respect to fishing.

Article 10. Our Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Finance are charged with the execution of this Decree.

Article 11. This Decree will come into effect as from the date of its publication in the official gazette.

Promulgated in our Palace at Riyadh, on the first day of the month of Sha'ban of the year of the Hegira 1368, corresponding to the twenty-eighth day of the month of May in the year 1949.

APPENDIX C

ROYAL DECREE NUMBER 2716

SEPTEMBER 18, 1932*

Relying on God and compliance with the telegrams submitted to us by our various subjects in the Kingdom of the Hijaz, Najd and its Dependencies and in deference to public opinion in our country and in view of our desire to unite the sections of this Arabian Kingdom we have ordered the following:

Article 1. The name of the Kingdom of Hijaz, Najd and its Dependencies shall be changed to THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA and our title shall be henceforth the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.**

*M. Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, 1960, V. I, pp. 242-243.

**In this book, two signatures appeared under the Royal Decree: Abdul Aziz (countersigned Faisal, Crown Prince). In another periodical, Middle East Record, V. I, the signature of Abdul Aziz only appeared.

APPENDIX D

ANGLO - SAUDI ARABIAN BURAIMI ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

JULY 30, 1954*

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;

Considering that there is a dispute as to the location of the common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi and as to the sovereignty of the Buraimi Oasis; that Abu Dhabi is a State for the conduct of whose foreign relations the Government of the United Kingdom is responsible; and that His Highness the Sultan Said bin Taimur has appointed the Government of the United Kingdom to conduct all negotiations and proceedings on his behalf for the settlement of the dispute in so far as it relates to the territory in the Buraimi Oasis claimed by him to belong to Muscat and Oman;

Considering that it has proved impossible to settle the dispute by direct negotiation;

Desiring nevertheless to find a permanent solution by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the

*M. Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, V. II, pp. 686-691, and from J. B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, pp. 281-289.

United Nations and with the tradition of friendship and good will that has long existed between them;

Have accordingly decided to submit the dispute to an independent and impartial tribunal for arbitration; and, for this purpose,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I. The Tribunal shall consist of five members selected as follows:

(a) Each of the two Parties to the present Agreement shall nominate one Member, provided that if either Party fails to nominate its Member within 60 days from the date on which this Agreement comes into force, the other Party may ask the President of the International Court of Justice to make the nomination.

(b) The three remaining Members, none of whom shall be a national of either Party, shall be chosen by agreement between the two Members nominated under paragraph (a) of the Article; of the three, one shall be designated by the selecting Members as President of the Tribunal. If, within a period of 90 days from the date on which the appointment of the last-named Member under paragraph (a) is notified to the other Party, the membership of the Tribunal is still incomplete or the President has not been designated, either Party may request the President of the International Court of Justice to make the appointments or designation required.

(c) If any Member of the Tribunal should die, resign, or become unable to act before the Award has been given, the vacancy shall be filled by the method laid down in this Article for the original appointments.

(d) If the President of the International Court of Justice is a national of either Party, or is prevented from acting as requested in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article the Vice-President of the Court may be requested to take the necessary action. Any nomination, appointment, or designation made by the President or Vice-President of the Court under this Article shall be final and binding on both Parties.

Article II. The Tribunal is requested to decide:

(a) The location of the common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, within the line claimed by the Saudi Arabian Government in 1949 and that claimed on behalf of Abu Dhabi at the Dammam Conference in 1952;

(b) Sovereignty in the area comprised within a circle whose center is in Buraimi village and whose circumference passes through the point of junction of latitude 24 degrees 25 minutes north and longitude 55 degrees and 36 minutes east.

Article III. Each Party shall be represented before the Tribunal by an Agent, who shall be responsible for its part in the proceedings. Each Agent may be assisted by such advisers, counsel, and staff as he deems necessary.

Article IV. In conducting its proceedings and in formulating its Award, the Tribunal shall have due regard to all relevant considerations of law, fact, and equity brought to its attention by the Parties under Article V and VI or disclosed through the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by Article VII. In particular, but without being limited thereto, it shall take into account the following factors in so far as it deems them relevant;

(a) Historical facts relating to the rights of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia and his forefathers and the rights of the other Rulers concerned and their forefathers.

(b) The traditional loyalties of the inhabitants of the area concerned.

(c) The tribal organization and way of life of the tribes inhabiting the area concerned.

(d) The exercise of jurisdiction and other activities in the area concerned.

(e) Any other considerations brought to its attention by either Party.

Article V.

(a) Within a period of six months from a date to be fixed by the President of the Tribunal as soon as possible after the organization of the Tribunal, each of the two Parties shall present simultaneously to the Tribunal a

Memorial setting out its submissions regarding the territories and frontiers in dispute, and the considerations on which its submissions are founded.

(b) After the period fixed in paragraph (a) of this Article, each of the two Parties shall have the right, within a further period of six months, to present to the Tribunal a Reply to the Memorial presented by the other Party.

(c) On the application of either Party, the Tribunal may, if it thinks fit, grant an extension of either or both of the periods fixed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article.

(d) The Tribunal shall be responsible for communicating the Memorial and the Reply of the one Party to the other Party and shall inform the Parties how many copies are required.

(c) After the submission of the Reply of each Party, there shall be no further written submissions, except as provided for in Article VII (b) or Article X (b), unless the Tribunal otherwise directs, and then only within such limitations as the Tribunal may prescribe. If either Party is permitted to make further written submissions under this paragraph, the other Party shall have an opportunity of commenting upon them and of submitting documents in support of its comments.

Article VI.

(a) Subsequent to the conclusion of the written proceedings called for in Article V, the Tribunal shall sit for the purpose of hearing oral arguments by the Parties. Subject to the provision that each Party shall have an equal opportunity to be heard, both on principal argument and in rebuttal, the Tribunal shall prescribe the procedure and time limits to be observed.

(b) With the consent of both Parties, the Tribunal may dispense with oral arguments.

Article VII

(a) In addition to considering the submissions of the Parties, the Tribunal shall have power on its own initiative to call witnesses (other than the Ruler of any of the territories concerned), to conduct enquiries, and to visit particular localities in the area in dispute whenever it deems such proceedings useful. Any such examination of witnesses, enquiry, or visit may be delegated by the Tribunal to one or more of its Members or to one or more other impartial persons whom it may appoint for that purpose. "The area in dispute" means that area referred to in Article II (b) of the present Agreement and all other land claimed by both Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi between the Saudi 1949 claim and the claim put forward on behalf of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi at the Dammam Conference in 1952.

(b) The Tribunal shall inform each Party whenever it resolves to exercise any of the powers specified in paragraph (a) of this Article, and each Party shall have the right to appoint representatives (not exceeding four in number) for visits to the area in dispute to be present at the proceeding; to put questions to any witness, under the control of the Tribunal or person or persons conducting the enquire; and to receive any reports of enquiries or visits and to comment thereon orally or in writing.

(c) Either Party may request the Tribunal to exercise, with respect to any particular witnesses, localities, or subjects of enquiry, any of the powers specified in paragraph (a) of this Article, but the Tribunal may decline at its discretion to accede to such a request.

Article VIII.

(a) Any written submission by either Party shall contain a statement certifying the authenticity of the documents quoted or referred to therein and copies of all such documents quoted or referred to therein and copies of all such documents shall, where possible, be annexed to the submission.

(b) At the request of the Tribunal, either Party shall, if possible, produce the original or an authenticated copy of any document referred to in its written submissions or oral argument, and if unable to do so shall

explain to the Tribunal the reasons for such inability. Inability to produce the original or an authenticated copy of any document shall not preclude its consideration by the Tribunal in determining the weight to be given to the document concerned.

(c) The Tribunal shall satisfy itself as to the authenticity of any documents disclosed in the course of any proceedings which it may conduct under the powers conferred on it by Article VII.

Article IX.

(a) The Parties shall present their written submissions and any documents annexed thereto in both English and Arabic, together with a translation into such other language or languages as the Tribunal may request.

(b) The Parties shall present their oral arguments in either English or Arabic. The Tribunal shall make such arrangements for translation and interpretation as it deems necessary.

(c) The Tribunal shall provide for the keeping of a verbatim record of each of its sittings, other than its private deliberations. Copies shall be made available to the Parties as soon as possible.

Article X.

(a) If the Tribunal considers it necessary, it shall have the right to arrange for an expert opinion to be given by any person or persons selected by it.

(b) Any expert opinion given under paragraph (a) of this Article shall either be in writing and communicated to the Parties, or be given orally before the Tribunal in the presence of the Parties. In either case the Parties shall have the right to comment upon the opinion and, under the control of the Tribunal, to put questions to the person or persons responsible for it.

Article XI. The Tribunal may, if it thinks fit, determine the location of the frontier in dispute section by section, and may give its Award in respect of each section when it is ready to do so without waiting until it is in a position to give its Award in respect of the whole frontier in dispute.

Article XII. The Tribunal shall have the power to determine all questions of procedure not regulated in the present Agreement, including the power to fix the dates and places of its sittings and to decide upon the public or private character of each.

Article XIII.

(a) The Award of the Tribunal, and all decisions on questions of procedure, shall be given by majority vote.

(b) The Tribunal shall give the reasons for its Award.

(c) The Award shall be given in the language selected by the Tribunal and shall be printed and communicated to the

Parties simultaneously. There shall be communicated to the Parties at the same time translations of the Award into English or Arabic or, if the Award be given in some other language, into English and Arabic. The Tribunal shall state which text or texts are to be regarded as authentic. The original of the Award and all official translations thereof shall bear the certification of the President of the Tribunal.

(d) The Award of the Tribunal shall be final, binding upon both Governments (including the Rulers on whose behalf the Government of the United Kingdom is acting) and without appeal.

Article XIV.

(a) As part of its Award, the Tribunal shall appoint an expert commission, composed of one member nominated by each of the Parties and a neutral chairman nominated by the Tribunal, to direct the demarcation on the ground of the frontier line fixed by the Tribunal. If either Party fails to nominate its member of the commission within 90 days after the Tribunal has requested it to do so, the right to make the nomination shall pass to the Tribunal.

(b) The demarcation commission thus appointed shall erect such markers and take such other steps as it deems necessary to demarcate the frontier line adequately in relation to the needs of the various areas through which it

may pass. The chairman of the commission shall have power to authorise slight deviations from the line defined by the Tribunal, not to exceed at any one place one kilometre to either side or five kilometres in length, where the nature of the terrain presents unusual difficulties to demarcation.

(c) The demarcation commission shall endeavour to complete its work within two solar years from the date of the Award of the Tribunal. On completion, it shall submit to both Parties a full report of its activities, including such maps, photographs and other data as will enable the frontier line to be accurately maintained thereafter.

(d) The members of the demarcation commission shall be remunerated at a rate to be fixed by the Tribunal at the time of their appointment. The remuneration and all expenses of the commission and its work shall be borne by the two Parties in equal shares, to be paid in such manner as may be arranged between the Parties and the commission.

(e) In the event of the death, disability or resignation of either the Saudi or the British member of the commission, his Government shall name a successor within 90 days after receiving notice thereof, and if it fails to do so the other Party may request the President of the International Court of Justice to make the nomination. In the event of the death, disability, or resignation of the neutral chairman, either Party may request the President

of the International Court of Justice to appoint a successor. If the President of the International Court of Justice is a national of either Party or is unable to act for the purposes of this paragraph, the Vice-President may be requested to take the necessary action.

Article XV. After the Tribunal has given its award, either Party may publish any of the proceedings in the case.

Article XVI.

(a) The Tribunal shall have the power to engage such staff, and at such remuneration, and to rent such premises and purchase such equipment, as it considers necessary, and to make all such arrangements as may be requisite for the holding of any oral hearings or for visits to any particular localities by the Tribunal or by any person or persons appointed by it under Article VII (a).

(b) The records and papers of the Tribunal and the personal effects of its Members, as well as the records, papers and personal effects of each Agent, shall be considered inviolate, and shall be exempt from all dues, inspections or border formalities.

Article XVII.

(a) The President and the other Members of the Tribunal shall be entitled to payment of their expenses and to remuneration on a scale to be agreed by the Parties.

(b) The remuneration of the President and Members of the Tribunal and the expenses of the Tribunal shall be

borne by the Parties in equal shares, and shall be paid in such manner and at such times as may be arranged between the Parties and the Tribunal. The Tribunal shall, subsequent to its Award, deliver a final account of all the expenses incurred.

Article XVIII. Each Party shall pay the expenses of the presentation and conduct of its own case before the Tribunal.

Article XIX. The Tribunal shall have the power to decide any question that may arise as to the interpretation of any provision of the present Agreement.

Article XX. The present Agreement shall come into force on the date of signature.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

Done in duplicate at Hedda this thirtieth day of July, 1954, corresponding to the twenty-ninth day of Dhu'al-qada, 1373, in the English and Arabic languages, both texts being equally authentic.

G. C. Pelham, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

Faisal, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

APPENDIX E

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE KING OF SAUDI ARABIA
AND THE PRESIDENT (TRUMAN)*

Note from the King of Saudi Arabia to
the President, October 15, 1946

In my desire to safeguard and strengthen in every way possible the friendship which binds our two countries together, and which existed between the late President Roosevelt and which was renewed with Your Excellency, I reiterate my feelings on every occasion when this friendship between the United States on the one hand, and my country and the other Arab countries on the other hand, is endangered, so that all obstacles in the way of that friendship may be removed;

On previous occasions I wrote to the late President Roosevelt and to Your Excellency, and explained the situation in Palestine; how the natural rights of the Arabs therein go back thousands of years and how the Jews are only aggressors, seeking to perpetrate a monstrous injustice, at the beginning, speaking in the name of humanitarianism,

*Department of State, Bulletin XV, p. 848, and in Documents on American Foreign Relations, V. VIII, 1945-1946.

but later openly proclaiming their aggressiveness by force and violence as is not unknown to Your Excellency and the American people. Moreover, the designs of the Jews are not limited to Palestine only, but include the neighboring Arab countries within their scope, not even excluding our Holy Cities.

I was therefore astonished at the latest announcement issued in your name in support of the Jews in Palestine and its demand that floodgates of immigration be opened in such a way as to alter the basic situation in Palestine in contradiction to previous promises. My astonishment was even greater because the statement described to Your Excellency contradicts the Declaration which the American Legation in Heddah requested our Foreign Office to publish in the Government's official paper Omm Al-Qura in the name of the White House, on August 16, 1946, in which it was stated that the Government of the United States had not made any proposals for the solution of the Palestine problem and in which you expressed your hope that it would be solved through the conversations between the British Government and the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States, on the one hand, and between the British Government and the third part on the other, and in which you expressed the readiness of the United States to assist the displaced persons among whom are Jews. Hence, my great astonishment when I read your Excellency's statement and my incredulity

that it could have come from you, because it contradicts previous promises made by the Government of the United States and statements made from the White House.

I am confident that the American people who spent their blood and their money freely to resist aggression, could not possibly support Zionist aggression against a friendly Arab country which has committed no crime except to believe firmly in those principles of justice and equality, for which the United Nations, including the United States, fought, and for which both your predecessor and you exerted great efforts.

My desire to preserve the friendship of the Arab and the East towards the United States of America has obliged me to expound to Your Excellency the injustice which would be visited upon the Arabs by any assistance to Zionist aggression.

I am certain that Your Excellency and the American people cannot support right, justice, and equity and fight for them in the rest of the world while denying them to the Arabs in their country, Palestine, which they have inherited from their ancestors from Ancient Times.

Note from the President to the King of Saudi Arabia,
October 28, 1946

I have just received the letter with regard to Palestine which Your Majesty was good enough to transmit

to me through the Saudi Arabian Legation under date of October 15, 1946, and have given careful consideration to the views expressed therein.

I am particularly appreciative of the frank manner in which you expressed yourself in your letter. Your frankness is entirely in keeping with the friendly relations which have long existed between our two countries, and with the personal friendship between Your Majesty and my distinguished predecessor; a friendship which I hope to retain and strengthen. It is precisely the cordial relations between our countries and Your Majesty's own friendly attitude which encourages me to invite your attention to some of the considerations which have prompted this Government to follow the course it has been pursuing with respect to the matter of Palestine and of the displaced Jews in Europe.

I feel certain that Your Majesty will readily agree that the tragic situation of the surviving victims of Nazi persecution in Europe presents a problem of such magnitude and poignancy that it cannot be ignored by people of good will or humanitarian instincts. This problem is worldwide. It seems to me that all of us have a common responsibility for working out a solution which would permit those unfortunates who must leave Europe to find new homes where they may dwell in peace and security.

Among the survivors in the displaced persons centers in Europe are numbers of Jews, whose plight is particularly

tragic inasmuch as they represent the pitiful remnants of millions who were deliberately selected by the Nazi leaders for annihilation. Many of these persons look to Palestine as a haven where they hope among people of their own faith to find refuge, to begin to lead peaceful and useful lives, and to assist in the further development of the Jewish National Home.

The Government and people of the United States have given support to the concept of a Jewish National Home in Palestine ever since the termination of the first World War, which resulted in the freeing of a large area of the Near East, including Palestine, and the establishment of a number of independent states which are now members of the United Nations. The United States, which contributed its blood and resources to the winning of that war, could not divest itself of a certain responsibility for the manner in which the freed territories were disposed of, or for the fate of the peoples liberated at that time. It took the position, to which it still adheres, that these peoples should be prepared for self-government and also that a national home for the Jewish people should be established in Palestine. I am happy to note that most of the liberated peoples are now citizens of independent countries. The Jewish National Home, however, has not as yet been fully developed.

It is only natural, therefore, that this Government should favor at this time the entry into Palestine of considerable numbers of displaced Jews in Europe, not only that they may find shelter there, but also that they may contribute their talents and energies to the upbuilding of the Jewish National Home.

It was entirely in keeping with the traditional policies of this Government that over a year ago I began to correspond with the Prime Minister of Great Britain in an effort to expedite the solving of the urgent problem of the Jewish survivors in the displaced persons camps by the transfer of a substantial number of them to Palestine. It was my belief, to which I still adhere, and which is widely shared by the people of this country, that nothing would contribute more effectively to the alleviation of the plight of these Jewish survivors than the authorization of the immediate entry of at least 100,000 of them to Palestine. No decision with respect to this proposal has been reached, but this Government is still hopeful that it may be possible to proceed along the lines which I outlined to the Prime Minister.

At the same time there should, of course, be a concerted effort to open the gates of other lands, including the United States, to those unfortunate persons, who are now entering upon their second winter of homelessness

subsequent to the termination of hostilities. I, for my part, have made it known that I am prepared to ask the Congress of the United States, whose cooperation must be enlisted under our Constitution, for special legislation admitting to this country additional numbers of these persons, over and above the immigration quotas fixed by our laws. This Government, moreover, has been actively exploring, in conjunction with other governments, the possibilities of settlement in different countries outside Europe for those displaced persons who are obliged to emigrate from that continent. In this connection it has been most heartening to us to note the statements of various Arab leaders as to the willingness of their countries to share in this humanitarian project by taking a certain number of these persons into their own lands.

I sincerely believe that it will prove possible to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the refugee problem along the lines which I have mentioned above.

With regard to the possibility envisaged by Your Majesty that force and violence may be used by Jews in aggressive schemes against the neighboring Arab countries, I can assure you that this Government stands opposed to aggression of any kind or to the employment of terrorism for political purposes. I may add, moreover, that I am convinced that responsible Jewish leaders do not contemplate

a policy of aggression against the Arab countries adjacent to Palestine.

I cannot agree with Your Majesty that my statement of October 4 is in any way inconsistent with the position taken in the statement issued on my behalf on August 16. In the latter statement the hope was expressed that as a result of the proposed conversations between the British Government and the Jewish and Arab representatives a fair solution of the problem of Palestine could be found and immediate steps could be taken to alleviate the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe. Unfortunately, these hopes have not been realized. The conversations between the British Government and the Arab representatives have, I understand, been adjourned until December without a solution having been found for the problem of Palestine or without any steps having been taken to alleviate the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe.

In this situation it seemed incumbent upon me to state as frankly as possible the urgency of the matter and my views both as to the direction in which a solution based on reason and good will might be reached and the immediate steps which should be taken. This I did in my statement of October 4.

I am at a loss to understand why Your Majesty seems to feel that this statement was in contradiction to previous

promises or statements made by this Government. It may be well to recall here that in the past this Government, in outlining its attitude on Palestine, has given assurances that it would not take any action which might prove hostile to the Arab people, and also that in its view there should be no decision with respect to the basic situation in Palestine without prior consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

I do not consider that my urging of the admittance of a considerable number of displaced Jews into Palestine or my statements with regard to the solution of the problem of Palestine in any sense represent an action hostile to the Arab people. My feelings with regard to the Arabs when I made these statements were, and are at the present time, of the most friendly character. I deplore any kind of conflict between Arabs and Jews, and am convinced that if both peoples approach the problems before them in a spirit of conciliation and moderation these problems can be solved to the lasting benefit of all concerned.

I furthermore do not feel that my statements in any way represent a failure on the part of this Government to live up to its assurance that in its view there should be no decision with respect to the basic situation in Palestine without consultation with both Arabs and Jews. During the current year there have been a number of consultations with both Arabs and Jews.

Mindful of the great interest which your country, as well as my own, has in the settlement of the various matters which I have set forth above, I take this opportunity to express my earnest hope that Your Majesty, who occupies a position of such eminence in the Arab world, will use the great influence which you possess to assist in the finding in the immediate future of a just and lasting solution. I am anxious to do all that I can to aid in the matter and I can assure Your Majesty that the Government and people of the United States are continuing to be solicitous of the interests and welfare of the Arabs upon whose historic friendship they place great value.

I also take this occasion to convey to Your Majesty my warm personal greetings and my best wishes for the continued health and welfare of Your Majesty and your people.

APPENDIX F

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY AND
AMIR FAISAL, PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF SAUDI ARABIA*

Your Highness:

As Your Highness assumes new and important responsibilities upon your return to Saudi Arabia, I wish to recall your visit to the White House on 5 October. I then told you and wish to reiterate now that Saudi Arabia can rely upon the friendship and cooperation of the United States in handling various tasks confronting your country in the future. The United States is firmly and deeply concerned with the stability and progress of Saudi Arabia. I am confident that Saudi Arabia, under your resolute and wise leadership, will go ahead successfully with the modern development and reform which you obviously desire. By pursuing this course, you may be certain of the full support of the United States in safeguarding the entity of the Saudi Arabian kingdom.

I am well aware that to attain your objectives you should enjoy the indispensable peace afforded by an

*Council for Middle East Asia, Middle Eastern Affairs, V. 14, 1963.

atmosphere free of vituperation and agitation from within or outside the country. I share your anxiety over the tension now prevailing in the region, which hinders your plan to strengthen the government machinery and social progress in Saudi Arabia. As I told you in Washington, the United States desires to be helpful in finding means to ease such tensions.

What I am looking forward to for the two countries in the future is not merely maintaining the friendly relations which had a good start during the era of your exalted father, His Majesty the late Abd al-Aziz. I am also looking forward to a new chapter in Saudi-American relations, whereby the bond linking the pursuit of enlightenment shall be firmly applied through out mutual belief in mankind and our support for the firm rights of self-determination, progress, and freedom.

I wish you success and extend to you my personal regard. I pray God that He may protect you and the Saudi people and grant you peace.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Your Excellency:

I received the text of the cable which you addressed to me and which was submitted to me by His Excellency your ambassador in Jidda on 8 November 1962.

In this message Your Excellency has reminded me of the visit which I had the opportunity to pay to the White House on 5 October, during which you mentioned to me - and you have repeated this in your recent message - that the Saudi Arabian Kingdom could rely on the United States' friendship in handling the various tasks which it will face in the future. This was because the United States is anxious to see stability and progress prevail in the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.

You also expressed your confidence that the government which I head will continue to adopt modern methods and proceed in the reforms which are our obvious desire, and that in our march toward these goals we can rely on U.S. support to safeguard the entity of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.

As Your Excellency said, to achieve these goals it is necessary to create an atmosphere of calm and safety which cannot be disturbed by hostile campaigns, accusations, and provocations. You also added that you share with me the anxiety regarding the tension which is surrounding the region and which might hamper our determination to strengthen the regime in our country and lead our society toward progress. You also pointed out what Your Excellency told me during our meeting in Washington: that the United States desires to find means which would lead to decreasing this tension.

Your Excellency has also expressed your hope not only to maintain the sincere relations between our countries - which had a fruitful start during the reign of my late father, King Abd al-Aziz - but also to start a new era of American-Saudi relations. This era will be distinguished by the fact that the link between our two states is to be based on the continuous and enlightened pursuit by each of us of his interests with a profound belief in mankind's indisputable right to realize its wish for progress and freedom.

I express to Your Excellency my deep thanks for the good and sincere feelings toward my country and the good wishes for its progress and development contained in your message. I also thank you for your sentiments with regard to myself. I wish to remind you that the strengthening of the sincere relations and cooperation between the United States and this country obtaining since my father laid its foundation, has been and continues to be the subject of our attention and care.

I was happy to see in your message to me and during our meeting in the White House your determination to strengthen these relations further. On our part, we do not spare any effort to strengthen these relations on the basis of an awareness of the real interests of our two countries. For this purpose, my government will continue

to strengthen the traditional relations of friendship and sincerity and increase and develop avenues for fruitful cooperation between the two countries in various fields.

We appreciate Your Excellency's awareness of the prevailing atmosphere of tension in the region and of the futile accusations and grudges which, in our opinion, would only dissipate constructive and fruitful efforts and divert attention from the actual and fundamental questions of the region's peoples. Such questions are: combating backwardness, raising the standard of living of the population, exploiting all their resources, increasing their national income, and providing them with democratic channels of power, under which they can express themselves, their hopes, and aspirations in a constructive freedom aimed at realizing their capabilities in various fields.

We are confident that righteous men have no doubt that we had no share in stirring up such attacks, campaigns, and accusations. While expressing our deep regret at such a situation, we wholeheartedly desire to remove and uproot its causes.

Nevertheless, we are determined to implement our resolution to provide our country with modern governmental establishments suitable to and consistent with our country and its nature, under which the citizen will enjoy his fundamental human rights and become aware of and utilize

his potentials for his own benefit and that of his society. We are also determined to implement our comprehensive reform policy, which will benefit all classes of the people. To realize these objectives, we will depend upon our own efforts and upon our latent energies in particular. However, the present society is almost unified, and its borders have been or are about to be eliminated. We are, therefore, resorting to friendly states to accord us their resources and past experience, foremost among which is the United States of America.

No obstacles will hinder our comprehensive reform policy. We sincerely hope that the factors which compel us to devote a greater part of our efforts and resources to defend our existence against any attempts and campaigns will abate so that we may direct all our potentials and energies to constructive development.

Finally, I thank Your Excellency once again for your letter and for the good wishes for the welfare of the two countries and all mankind. It pleases me to extend to you similar feelings and hopes. I take this opportunity to wish Your Excellency once more good health and happiness and productive growth and constructive prosperity for the future of the two countries' relations.

Sincerely,

FAISAL

والمرمزة شجوية اختيارية مستقلة عنه شخصيات أعلامه .
 وميثاق المجلس أعل يتألف من الأركان الرئيسة له المرشحين على هذا الميثاقه ومصف
 يتضمون الديق مستقبله بموافقة المجلس الدولي سرافقة اجماعية .
 ومبين على ميثاقه في المجلس الدولي حاله مستقبله على اعتراف دولته بالمقررة
 امتثانا قانونيا وافرا شجوية الديقاية بالرئيس الذي يتقدم مع القوانين السائة في دولته .

(المادة الثانية)

الذين من من المرمزة الاساسي قنونة اراسد القنة والدعوة لاسلامية ورفع مستوى المسلمين
 تقا قبا واقصا دارا ، واقشاء صلوات جديك اوقنونة الكسامة بينهم وتسيبه جرد وهم
 تحقنا المتمازرة والناكزة ، والناكزة بصفة عامة في شترة المسلمين ومسالمة لهم على كل ما من
 شأنه انه يرد عليهم في شترة بلادهم بالخير والشفقة .

ويهدف في اعراض المرمزة ما يأتي :

ا - دراسة احوال المسلمين وظروف حياتهم في شترة بلادهم من انماهم الدينية وثقافة دينية .

والدينامية .

ب - تقديم الخدمة الفنية للمسلمين فيما يتصل بمستواهم العلمي والمادي وتهيئة بيئة عامة .
 ج - اشاء وترويج الصلوات الاقتصادية والالوية بها في ذلح لتهيئة لهما عك
 والتنمية الزامية والصناعية والبياد وتغزير رسائل المراسلات بجميع انواعها
 واقشاء وترويج المراسلات التي تقدم الفرض من الاقراض السالفة لمرمزة .
 د - تسيبه الاقراض الشرعية والقانونية المنظمة لاهوال المسلمين واملا قانونهم وترويج
 ما يحلهم قمره من نوا .

هـ - اشاء وترويج الصلوات الثقافية والشارحة في اموه التعليم بجميع مراحلها وترويج
 والديف المراتية والشجوة لنشر العلم والثقافة بين جماعات المسلمين :

و - اتخاذ القرارات اللائحة لعقد المؤتمر أو مجلسه الدائم في الزمالة الدولية
 وفي الدرجة ، وكذلك التبريد لدرجة اهتمامه أفرعك والدولة لإلهام
 على عقدها ونجما ، والقيام بكل ما شأنه ترتيبه الدول بين الوساطين
 بصفة عامة أو التفريغ بينهم أو تفسيره شاملاهم ومالهم وترتيب العلاقات
 الشخصية فيما بينهم .

(المادة الثالثة)

المجلس الدائم هو الهيئة التنفيذية في المؤتمر وهو الذي يسهر على تنفيذ المهام وتنفيذ
 ما يتخذ في شأنه والفروض الجسدية في المادة السابقة من قرارات .
 وينقل في اختصاص المجلس الدائم تقرير رسائل القادر من الهيئة الدولية والمكتبية وتنشيطه
 في نطاقه والفروض المحددة في المادة الثانية .
 ويعتقد المجلس الدائم كل عام برئاسة هيئة صاحب البلاغ الملحق بموجبه بدعوية
 آل سدر عقب رسم الحجج ، ويجهز العقار في أي وقت آخر في عامه اسلوبا بالقائه
 أعضاء .

(المادة الرابعة)

كل مسلم في أي بلد كان عضو في المؤتمر له نأمة بجه مسلم رسما لها أختلاف الظروف .
 على أنه لتنظيم الضميمة ينضم الأعضاء إلى عاملين وشركتين وتنشيطه .
 وتنظم لائحة الضميمة التي يحددها المجلس الدائم بقوله كل فرجه من الأعضاء والزمائم .

(المادة الخامسة)

يعود المجلس الدائم كلما رأى ذلك إلى عقد مؤتمر اسلوبا عام عقب رسم الحجج بكرة أو في
 أي وقت آخر في عامه اسلوبا .
 وتلك هيئة عامل المهة في مهنة المؤتمر العام والدستراك في المدارك في الترميمات

التي تنزل بحكمها العينة أو العبارات التي يزلونها الجاسب المذموم . ويكون
 الكسح حريص في العينة أو العبارات المتنازلة أو قلنا في الزلافة وعلى غيرها من الأجزاء . بقدر الجهد الأول .
 والتمحيصات المطلوبة للعينة أو العبارات سالفة الذكر ترفع إلى المجلس الأعلى لتنفيذ ما يربح
 امتقانه تنفيذها مثلا .

(المادة السادسة)

تكونت للمؤتمر سكرتيرية عامة دائمة مقرها بالقاهرة . ولها أن تختص في فرعها إلى أي
 بلد آخر .

وتشرف السكرتيرية العامة سه سكرتير عام واحد ساقده سه المرطفتين ، ويديه المجلس الأعلى
 بالقرارية الطائفة السكرتير العام لمدة خمس سنوات قابلة للتجديد .
 ويديه السكرتير العام المرطفتين اللذين يفسيران الأعمال في السكرتيرية العامة .
 ويضع السكرتير العام نظاما داخليا للأعمال السكرتيرية والادارية وشؤون المرطفتين
 ويديه في مأموره لهذا الميثاق أرك سكرتير عام للمؤتمر .

(المادة السابعة)

يعد السكرتير العام متصرف ميزانية المؤتمر ويدينه على مجلس الأعلى للموافقة عليه قبل بدء
 كل سنة مالية .

ويعد المجلس نصيبا لكل عضو من الأعضاء في النفقات .
 ويبرهن المؤتمر أنه يتبدل بقرارات الأفراد أو الجماعات أو الهيئات .

(المادة الثامنة)

تتميز الامتيازات والحصانة والديبلوماسية للمؤتمرات الجاهل الأولى غير احتمسبهم بأمم أصلا .
 كما تتمتع للمؤتمرات والقرارات والقرارات التي يعينون في المؤتمر شكريه المرطفتين .
 وتكونت حرة الباني التي يتخذها المؤتمر وهيئاته منزهة وكذلك أولئك من جهات ولا يملك .

(المادة الخامسة)

إذا رأى أحد أعيان المجلس الدولي أنه يوجب منه أن يبلغ المجلس عن أي الوثائق التي قد يكون متلقيها من بينته .
ولا يوجب الدليل أنه يعتبر الوثائق التي لم يرد بها بيانات لهذا المبدأ من وثائقه
مبتدأ - يد - باجماع رأى الفعاليات على هذا المعنى .

(المادة العاشرة)

يكون من مبرراته تلتزم أعضا المجلس الدولي في تقديم هذا التماسه على أنه يجب التمسك به الى حيث لا يمكن
أشد اجماعا وأشد صلابة لخدمة المراسم .

(المادة الحادية عشرة)

تتخذها الاجراء في المادة المذكور من هذا التماسه من وجوب على كل عضو من أعضا
المجلس الدولي على الاعتراف بالمراسم وتنفيذية الاعترافا قانونيا . يودع كل عضو
رأيه التمسك به والتنفيذية لاربعين المذكور لدى السكرتيرية العامة الدائمة بمبرم صدرها .
وتنقل السكرتيرية العامة الدائمة ايلع صورا من التماسه بعد التمسك به عليه من أعضا المجلس
الدولي بالسكرتيرية العامة الدائمة للزم التمسك .

على أنه التماسه يعتبر سارا طبقا لمرتبوع عليه مباشرة .

حرره هذا الميثاق باللغة العربية في برن ٣ من شبان سنة ١٩٤٨

(الموافق يوم ١٠ من مارس سنة ١٩٤٨) من نسخة واحدة تحتفظ بالسكرتيرية

العامة الدائمة وتسلم صورة من مطابطة الأصل لكل عضو من أعضا المجلس الاعلى

رئيس المجلس
السكرتيرية العامة الدائمة

سعد السعود

جاءت بال...

APPENDIX H

LETTER SENT BY GENERAL-SECRETARY ANWAR AL-SADAT TO
KING SAUD, THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE*

Valiant Congress
GENERAL SECRETARATE 11, HASSAN SAHBI STREET,
ZAHLEA, CAIRO
PHONE: 67154, 67155
605471 - 603763 - 606708



المؤتمر الإسلامي
مكتبه العام
11 شارع حسن صبري
الزاهلية
القاهرة
67154 - 67155
605471 - 603763 - 606708

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

حضرة صاحب الجلالة الملك سعود بن عبد العزيز آل سعود المعظم
رئيس المجلس الأعلى للمؤتمر الاسلامي - حفظه الله ورواه

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته وحده .

فان المؤتمر الاسلامي الذي يمتزج بقيادة جلالكم الحكيم بمره ان يعرب
جلالكم من مدى تقديره واحترامه بما تنتهه اليه من مساهمتكم الكريمة في تحقيق
رسالته واعلاء كلمته تحفة رسالة الاسلام واعلاء كلمة الدين .
وياني ان هذه المؤسسة الاسلامية الكبرى لم ترفع قواعدها الا بكم تشجيع
جلالكم لها . ولم تكن لتنهض بنا نهضت به من جليل الاعمال في هذه الفترة
الوجهية من سنها لولا ما انضم عليها جلالكم من بركم وطمحكم وما اسديتموه
اليها من ساس توجيهيائكم وسديد آرائكم . وبذلك رمت يد جلالكم الكريمة
على المؤتمر كافة المسلمين في شتى انظارهم فلهجت ألسنتهم بانثناء على حاسي
الديار المقدسة وراعي المؤتمر الاسلامي العامل لخير الاسلام . الساهر على جمع
المسلمين على كلمة سواء .

واني يا صاحب الجلالة كمكثير للمؤتمر الاسلامي ارفع اليه بقلام جلالكم
مخافات قلوب المسلمين الشاكرة . ودعواتهم الحارة ان يحفظ الله جلالكم
حسي للاسلام وزنا للمسلمين .

والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله

المكثير العام
انور السادات

(انور السادات)

٧ شعبان سنة ١٣٧٦
٩ مارس سنة ١٩٥٧


*N. Alkadri, The Great Challenge, 1966.

APPENDIX I


MAPS

Following are two maps illustrating the areas covered in this study: (1) Saudi Arabia and the Near East, and (2) Buraimi.

(1)



(2)



S. ANGELON

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books in Arabic

- Alkadri, N. The Great Challenge (Attahdi Alkabir). Beirut, 1966.
- Bishr, O. The Title of Glorious in History of Najd (Inwan Almajd Fii Tarich Najd). Vol. 2, Cairo, 1955.
- Hathlul, S. History of the Kings of Al-Saud (Tarich Muluk Al-Saud). Riyadh Press, Saudi Arabia, 1961.
- Khariabah, M. Introduction to Modern Arab's History (Moquadimah Fii Tarich Al-Arab Al-Hadith). Damascus University Press, Damascus, 1960.
- Madi, M. A. Modern Renaissance in Arabia - Saudi Arabia (Annahadat Al-Haditha Fii Jazirat Al-Arab, Al-Mamlakah Al-Arabiah As-Saudiyah). Rebirth Arabic Book House, Cairo, 1952.
- Nasser, J. Philosophy of Revolution (Falsafat Athaworah). Cairo, 1953.
- Sadik, M. T. The Development of Government and Administration in Saudi Arabia (Tatawour Nizam Alhukam wa Al-Idarh Fii Al-Mamlakah aA-Arabiah as-Saudiyah). Najd Commercial Press, Riyadh, 1965.
- Wahba, H. The Island of the Arabs in the 20th Century (Jazirat Al-Arab Fii Al-Karn Al-Ishrin). Cairo, 1956.
- Walter, L. The Soviet Union and the Middle East (Al-Ittihad Al-Sofiati wa Al-Shark Al-Ousat). Arabic translation, Commerce Office, Beirut, 1959.

Books in English

- Antonius, G. The Arab Awakening. Khayat's College Book Cooperative, Beirut, 1955.
- DeGaury, G. Faisal. F. A. Preager, New York, 1967.

- DeNova, J. A. American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939. University of Minnesota Press, 1963.
- Dickson, H.R.P. Kuwait and Her Neighbours. G. A. Unwin Ltd., London, 1956.
- Donpertz. The Middle East Today. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963.
- Eddy, W. A. Franklin D. Roosevelt Meets Ibn-Saud. American Friends of the Middle East, Inc., New York, 1954.
- Hagarth, D. G. Arabia. Clarendon Press, London, 1922.
- Harari, M. Government and Politics of the Middle East. Prentice, Hall, Inc., New Jersey, 1962.
- Haworth, D. The Desert King. McGraw Hill Book Co., 1964.
- Ingrams, H. The Yemen History. Camelot Press Ltd., United Kingdom, 1963.
- Kelly, J. B. Eastern Arabian Frontiers. F. A. Preager, New York, 1964.
- Kheiralla, H. G. Arabia Reborn. New Mexico University Press, 1952.
- Lenczowski, G. The Middle East in World Affairs. Cornell University Press, New York, 1962.
- Lipsky, George Arthur. Saudi Arabia. New Haven Press, Connecticut, 1960.
- Macdonald, R. N. The League of the Arab States. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1965.
- Philby, J. B. Arabian Days. Robert Hale Ltd., London, 1948.
- _____. Saudi Arabia. F. A. Preager, New York, 1955.
- Public Affairs Institute. Regional Development for Regional Peace. Undated.
- Sanger, R. H. The Arabian Peninsula. Cornell University Press, New York, 1954.

- Sayegh, F. A. The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World. Chandler Publishing Corporation, 1964.
- Smith, W. C. Islam in Recent History. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1957.
- Spencer, M. Political Evaluation in the Middle East. J. B. Lippincott Co., 1962.
- Ullah, Najib. Islamic Literature. Washington Square Press, 1963.
- United Nations' Office of Public Information. Every Man's United Nations. United Nations Publications, 1964.
- _____. General Assembly. No. 341-343, 1957-1961.
- _____. UN Review. Vol. 31, 1956.
- _____. Year Book. 1965.
- _____. Year Book. 1966.
- Williams, W. America and the Middle East. Rinehart Inc., 1958.
- Winder, R. B. Saudi Arabia in the 19th Century. St. Martin's Press, 1965.

Documents

- Hurewitz, J. C. Diplomacy in the Near East and Middle East. A Documentary Record, 1535-1956, D. Van Nostrand, Inc., 2 Vols., 1956.
- Khalil, M. The Arab States and the Arab League. A Documentary Record, Khayats, Rul-Bliss, Beirut, 2 Vols., 1960.
- United Kingdom. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. First Series, Vol. XIII, Oxford University Press, London, 1963.
- United States. United States Treaties and other International Agreements. Vol. 16, Part I, United States Government Printing Office, 1965.

_____. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 15, United States Government Printing Office, 1945.

_____. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 36, United States Government Printing Office, 1957.

Newspapers and Periodicals

Al-Medina, Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, September 1, 1967, No. 1049.

"Arabia Felix", The Economist, October 27, 1962, pp. 212-213.

Council for Middle Eastern Affairs, Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 7, 1956-1957; Vol. 13, 1962; Vol. 14, 1963.

"Crowded Arabia", The Economist, November 17, 1962, p. 645.

"Death of a Dream", News Week, September 6, 1965.

"Egypt and Yemen, Second Time Lucky?", The Economist, January 1, 1966, p. 20.

"End to the Affair?", The Economist, October 19, 1963, p. 235.

Europa Publications, Middle East Survey and Directory of the Middle East and Who's Who in the Middle East, Vol. I, 1948; Vol. III, 1950; Vol. V, 1955; Vol. VII, 1957; Vol. VIII, 1958; Vol. IX, 1959; Vol. XI, 1961; Vol. XII, 1962; Vol. XIII, 1963; Vol. XIV, 1964; Vol. XV, 1965.

"King Saud and the Waves", The Economist, December 17, 1962, p. 670.

Middle East Institute, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 4, 1950; Vol. 11, 1956; Vol. 12, 1958; Vol. 18, 1964.

News from Saudi Arabia, Vol. III, No. 138, 1966.

News Letter, Near East Report, Vol. I, No. 9, 21, 1957; Vol. X, 1958.

"Nothing but Good Will", The Economist, December 4, 1965, p. 1065.

"Peace Push", The Economist, December 11, 1965, p. 1194.

Regional News Services, Middle East Mirror, Vol. 16, 1964;
Vol. 17, 1966; Vol. 18, 1966.

Saudi Arabia, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1966; Vol. III, No. 138, 1966.

"Saudi Arabia", Al-Medina, September 15, 1967.

Tel-Aviv University, Middle East Record, Vol. I, 1960;
Vol. II, 1961.

Time, New York, Vol. LXVI, No. 24, December 12, 1955;
Vol. LXXI, No. 17, April 21, 1958.

"Two-Way Test", The Economist, March 2, 1963, p. 779.

"The U.A.R., Cairo", Al-Ahram, May 6, 1966.

"Yemen", The Economist, April 3, 1964, p. 34.

Zaki, A. Lectures in political science in Riyadh Uni-
versity, 1960.