REPRESENTATION AND DEMOCRACY

by

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A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1969
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PREFACE

American political science is presently caught up in the exciting challenge of building empirical theory. At the same time, the American people rarely have been so concerned with the nature and quality of their political life. Normative theory is addressed to that kind of concern. In view of the lure of seemingly limitless opportunities in empirical theory, normative theory is now a minority enterprise. Yet this should not be so. Political science must offer visions of better worlds as well as an understanding of the world of which it is a part. The need of the people and of political science amply justify, then, engaging in normative theory.

In a time of radical questioning of national ends and means one is led to a searching re-examination of long held assumptions about the national community. Is this a community? Are we held together only by the slender thread of customary forms? If what we share is more than this, is substantive, how has its vitality become so drained that we find ourselves awash in a sea of divisiveness and discontent? Among all the problems these questions point up, two appear to be critical and at the same time appropriate for consideration within the context of normative theory.
The first problem is that of national values. Are these myth or reality? If the latter, what is their nature and meaning? How are they kept relevant, dynamic, able to play their integrative role in the community?

The second problem is that of democracy. Is it now little more than a vacuous ideal? Or should we reject the notion that efforts to realize it more fully are vain in a nation of 200 million people beset by a myriad of complex social, economic, and political problems?

Our judgment is that there are national values, and that their vitality affects critically the quality of community life. If this is so we need to ask how the understanding and appreciation of these values can be nourished. We would argue, too, that in America democracy is a national value. We need to explore as well, then, the possibilities of incorporating democracy more fully into our political life.

In the essay which follows we will focus on certain aspects of the problems of national values and democracy. The emphasis on moral values is due in part to the fact that these are perhaps the most difficult of all national values to relate to the problems of issues which confront the political community. The emphasis on moral values also represents a reaction to certain concepts presently held of the bearing
of morals on politics. Representative government poses problems for the realization of democratic values. Our effort will be to redefine the role of the representative in order to better make some of these values part of the deliberation by the representative body.

The prescriptions developed from our inquiry reflect a severely limited response to the problems of national values and democracy. The need obviously warrants far more attention. But if our effort is in no sense exhaustive, it can stand at least as a testimony to our concern.

So many members of the Department of Government of The University of Arizona have stimulated and contributed to the thoughts reflected in this thesis. Dr. Conrad Joyner's abiding interest in the relation of morals to politics has been a stimulus to my own interest. I would like particularly to acknowledge the unfailing encouragement of Dr. Philip Chapman. It is impossible to adequately express my appreciation for Dr. Chapman's willingness to challenge or suggest implications of certain of the arguments, and for his sustaining interest, patience, and help during the many months of translating ideas into words.
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ABSTRACT

We assume that democratic decision-making is a political value, and, further, that there are two aspects of democratic decision-making, participation and deliberation, which are themselves values. Our inquiry focuses on deliberation, and is concerned with the problem of incorporating the values of democratic deliberation in a representative system of government. A normative model of Responsible Deliberation, developed from an analysis of democratic decision-making, is our response to this problem.

In assessing the possibility of correspondence between Responsible Deliberation and deliberation by the representative body, we look first to the degree of correspondence which now obtains in America. One area of particular discrepancy is debate on national values. We suggest reasons for the neglect of national value debate, reasons why this neglect should be remedied, and, by means of a discussion of moral values, the nature of value deliberation. We conclude that deliberation by the representative body can approximate Responsible Deliberation more nearly than it now does, and offer guidelines for effecting a closer approximation.
THE MIDTOWN MEETING

The citizens of Midtown are assembled in the Town Meeting Hall. Somewhat under nine hundred people live in Midtown. The pattern of life in the town has remained relatively unchanged for a number of years, and it has suited residents. Up until six months ago nearly seventy-five of the men of Midtown had worked in a plant in Main City, some twenty-five miles away. This plant had closed down, and the men put out of work by the closing had been unable to find other work. Another company recently had indicated a desire to locate in Midtown, promising employment for those now without jobs and income. The coming of this new plant would raise problems for Midtown, however. Company officials had stated that the plant would need to be located on the river near Midtown. Some of the farmers nearby were reluctant to part with such premium grazing land, and were concerned also that the noise and smoke would disturb their livestock. Having the new plant would also mean that between two and three hundred new people would be added to Midtown's population. The citizens were not certain how they could cope with such a strain on the town's facilities. What concerned them even more, though, was the effect of so many "new" people on
the character of Midtown. Company officials and townspeople alike realize that locating the plant in Midtown would be ill-advised unless the people were in favor of the move. The citizens of Midtown are met together, therefore, to try to formulate a community position on the new plant.

"Well, I know I speak for the men who don't have jobs. If the new plant doesn't come to Midtown there's not much we can do but move somewhere else."

"If seventy-five families move away from Midtown I don't know how I could manage to keep my dry-goods store going."

"Businesses wouldn't be the only ones hurt. How could we pay off the bonds on the Library? Or keep up our share of the Rural Fire Station?"

"Think of what would happen to the elementary school! And would we be able to support both the Methodist and the UP Churches?"

"If all those new people come here, though, some chain grocery store is sure to move in. With transportation costs what they are I'm not sure I could compete."

"It seems to me more people will be hurt in the pocketbook by not having the new plant than by letting it come in. You can't stand in the way of progress, Fred. Besides, you know we'll still be loyal to you and not let a chain drive you out of business."
"It's all right for you to say we gotta give way to progress. But I'm asking, is every change progress? Progress always seems to mean, 'Move over, Mr. Farmer; we want the best pasture of yours.' Don't forget, we do all our trading in Midtown. We pay most of the taxes for the Consolidated High School, too."

"Will's brought up a good point there. I've been wondering if we have any idea what changes there'll be in Midtown if we get the plan plus some two hundred new people. Will that be progress?"

"I've wondered about that, too--about the people, I mean. What kind of folks do you suppose they'll be? Will they want to change things here?"

"You know me; I always try to imagine the worst so I'll be prepared for anything. I've been thinking if some wild city kids move in we'll have to retire Earl and maybe get a regular policeman with a car."

"I don't think we should get too excited about a 'wild' element moving in. But even if they're all nice people there could be some real problems. Supposing they don't agree with us about how we spend the town budget?"

"Don't worry about that, Henry. We can outvote 'em in Town Meetings."

"But what if they should build some of those crazy modern houses? And wouldn't want to go to the trouble of
having gardens like the rest of us? Midtown wouldn't be Midtown without all our gardens that people drive for miles to admire."

"Well, we could fix that, Emily. We could all agree not to sell any of the lots we own in town. Make all of them build on that vacant land north of town. Then if they want to be different it won't ruin it for the rest of us."

"You've all brought up some good points here. And you're right. All change isn't necessarily progress. But the way I see it, Midtown's going to change if we get the plant or if we don't. Either way some of us are going to be hurt. If we don't take the plant it seems to me more of us will suffer, though. Too many we know and love will have to leave Midtown. It won't just be the financial loss, either. Everyone will lose friends and neighbors. Life just wouldn't be the same. And if we do get the plant, you and Will won't be the only ones affected, Fred. I think enough's been said that we can realize we'll all feel the difference.

"If we did what some of you have suggested, though, more than Midtown's interest in culture and reputation for beautiful gardens would be lost. I've been here long enough to maybe know better than the rest of you what Midtown's greatest asset is: that's the people, and the way you stand by each other no matter what. You wouldn't be happy. You'd end up not liking yourselves if you were to shut out the new
people by outvoting them or making them all live north of town."

"You're right, Reverend. But I guess we can't help but be a little scared thinking about how they could change things here."

"They sure could, and they probably will. But that's not to say the change all has to be one way. We have a pretty nice town here, and a life we all enjoy. Why wouldn't other people like it just this way, too?"

"Don't you fellows remember what the company official said at the Rotary luncheon when he was here? Said they'd had experience coming into small towns before, and would help all they could making adjustments."

"Sure, I remember now. He said the manager would move to Midtown before they even started to build the plant, and work out with us how we'd fit the new people into the town. I imagine they have some ideas on how we can get our ideas across to them. Guess the idea of the plant was too new for us to have paid much attention to what he was saying then."

"Well, they needn't think they're the only ones who know how to make new folks welcome. We could set up some committees of our own. Show 'em the gardens and the Library, all the things which make us proud of Midtown."
"If it's settled then that we want the new plant, the next item of business is where it will be built. As you all know there's only three places on the river with enough space."

"Yes, we know. And I want to declare here and now that one won't do at all. My great-grandfather founded this town. He especially planned the cemetery in that beautiful spot overlooking the river, and I for one just won't have anybody's final resting place disturbed, progress or no progress."

"Miss Lucy's right. Tom's and my family both would have to be moved, and we don't see why all of us who've lived together all our lives have to be separated after we're gone."

"It looks like the place by the cemetery is out. Too many of you feel too strongly about that."

"Well, some of us feel strongly about having it right across from the town proper, too. That would ruin the river view for a lot of us. And the noise would be too close to town. What's the point in living in a small town if you can't enjoy the birds' singing, the sound of the katydids, even leaves falling in the autumn?"

"I agree. I think there's just so much change a body can put up with."
"That leaves my pasture land, don't it? I guess you folks figure it's easier to push one man out than to give up any yourselves."

"Now, Al, nobody's trying to push you out. You've said a dozen times that you had half a mind to quit raising cattle, that corn and hogs was enough for you to take care of."

"Ed and Otto said you could graze your cattle on their land as long as you needed to."

"Well, you've fixed it so about the only argument I got left is that I don't want to sell. And you all know that I couldn't keep on livin' here if I was to be thought of as that mean, selfish old-man-Wallace. Guess I'm the only stumblin' block left to what you all want, so I'll just remove that one, and we can wind up the meetin'."

"Thanks, Al. Only thing we have to do now is vote on accepting the plant. We can work out the other details later."
THE VALUES OF DEMOCRATIC DECISION-MAKING

If the foregoing account were expanded to indicate that every citizen of Midtown had been present at the town meeting, and had participated in the discussion, we would have a paradigm case of democratic decision-making.

The rationale for democratic decision-making is based on the doctrine of political equality. Since men first began to reflect critically about the nature of politics, they have contended with questions of the respects in which men are "naturally" equal, and the respects in which they ought to be accorded an "artificial" equality (i.e., of status). Questions of distributive justice have revolved on the relevance of different equalities and inequalities (of condition, need, merit, dessert). One of the basic forces behind the Protestant Reformation was the conflict between the conception of the Church as a community of believers (implying equality) and the actuality of an hierarchical Church, involving and accentuating several forms of inequality among the believers. This challenge to the inequalities of status inherent in organic structure was ultimately given political expression. The claim was made that men should have political equality. The claim was
supported by the assumption that all men qua men have the same natural rights. Since government's role is to protect these rights insofar as men are not able to do so individually, then all men should have an equal voice in government.

For those committed to political equality, democracy is a political value. But there are two aspects of democratic decision-making itself which also are seen to have value, both from a normative and a practical standpoint. One of these aspects is participation; the other is deliberation.

It is asserted that every member ought to participate in making political decisions. This assertion derives from the same assumption underlying the claim for political equality: that all men have equal moral status, are of equal moral worth. "All the participants will be exposed to the consequences; all of them should, therefore, have opportunities to contribute to the making of central decisions."  

[Each man ought himself to have some say in his own future, and ... each man ought to count, to

1. Simple men shared this assumption with the theorists, as is shown by the soldier's eloquent reply to Ireton in the Putney debates: "the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live as the richest he." John H. Schaar, "Some Ways of Thinking about Equality," The Journal of Politics, XXVI (November, 1964), p. 877.

count as being himself, and not merely as one instance among many of the human species. . . . Each man should be free to take some steps to shape the future of his community according to his own wishes, and therefore he should have some say in how the political and legal decisions should be made.3

And the act of participating is viewed as a positive good, good in itself and practically so. Working out decisions together gives men a sense of their common problems and goals, as well as of themselves as a political community. Involving men in these decisions gives them an awareness of the implications of their actions and the responsibilities they are assuming.

There are other practical reasons, too, for every member to participate. A political decision, arrived at through the democratic process, will usually represent a compromise. If the decision is to be considered legitimate, the citizens must accept not only the procedure by which the decision was reached, but the substance of the decision itself. It is assumed that full and free participation by the citizens is more likely to result in substantially acceptable policy decisions.

There are values in deliberation by all the citizens independent of the values of participation. If the members of the political community are politically equal then the

substantive interests, the opinions and values of each, should be considered in reaching decisions which will affect the members and their interests and values. Also relevant are their common interests and values as a political community. The deliberation preceding a decision has value because it affords an opportunity for all these interests, opinions, and values to be expressed, to be reasonably debated, and to be evaluated by all the citizens together insofar as they may bear on an eventual decision. Ideally the resultant compromise will reflect considerations of and concessions to these interests, opinions, and values, a compromise that does not necessarily conform to anyone's original preference, but one that everyone can accept. Practically, such a decision will be an effective one; that is, it will have the consent of and be supported by the citizens who have shared in the responsibility for making it.
Democratic decision-making is possible only when it is practicable for every member of the political community to meet together to discuss and decide political issues. In the Western world some form of representative government has developed in larger political communities. Representative government poses the question (for those committed to democratic values) of how the advantageous features of democratic decision-making can be carried over into a representative system. The usual approach to this question has been to view it as a problem of the nature of representation. Yet the concepts of representation set forth in the different theories of representation have not been wholly satisfactory answers to the question.

Historically, debate over the nature of representation has crystallized around two questions: 1) should the representative (a) act as the advocate of the particular interests of his constituency, or (b) act primarily with a view to the well-being of the entire community; 2) should the representative (c) follow the manifest will of his constituents, or (d) follow his own judgment and the promptings
of his conscience? Logically there are four possible answers to these questions. But historically the debate has for the most part taken the forms of answers (a)-(c) and (b)-(d), which we may refer to as Delegate and Trusteeship theories, respectively.

Delegate theories stress the necessity for representing particular interests, and insist that decisions by the representative body be an expression of the people's will. Because representatives are only to be agents of the people's interests and will, the position of Delegate theories is that all the citizens are equally capable of acting as representatives. Trusteeship theories stress the importance of representing the common interest, and insist that reasoned debate be the basis for decisions by the representative body. Because representatives must be able to form a judgment of the common interest and to engage in reasoned debate, the position of Trusteeship theories is that special qualities must be possessed by those who act as representatives. There are problems in each type theory, problems due to each being only a partial view of the requirements of democratic decision-making, as well as problems of implementing the system of representation each advocates.

Edmund Burke remains perhaps the most articulate spokesman for the Trusteeship concept of representation, or,
as he called it, Virtual Representation. In Burke's view, members of the representative body are trustees of the people's interests. Representatives should not be bound to narrow, parochial interests, but reason together and act under the guidance of "common interest and common sentiment." The representative should maintain close ties with his constituents, but he should not act on their instructions, or he would in effect represent no more than shifting, often contradictory opinion. Burke held that representatives need not even be elected by those they represent. So long as representatives act in the general interest their decisions are legitimate.

Reasoned debate and consideration of the common interest are essential if representation is to be consistent with democratic ideals. But the formulations of the Trustee-ship theory have evoked charges of elitism and ambiguity. Even without an explicit recommendation that representatives should be selected from a particular elite group, the assumption that representatives can judge better than the people themselves what their best interests are sets the representatives as a group above the people. The representatives are then in the position of deciding what the people should want rather than representing what the people do in fact want. "When thinking about what laws to lay down for [people] ... to disregard what they actually want ... is
to be no longer laying down laws for them, but to be
seeking, . . . in a roundabout way, to impose our wills on
them."¹ This same point can be made against presentday
advocates of Trusteeship representation, who maintain that
political issues are now so complex and technical that only
the representative, given his long familiarity with the
problems and the expertise available to him, is capable of
making sound decisions.

If the representative is to consider and promote the
general or common interest, the question arises: What is
this interest? Can it be so precisely expressed as to serve
as a standard against which policy can be measured? Burke
assumed that the representatives would know, without having
to articulate exactly, what this interest was. But, it is
asked, would this interest be anything other than the
interest of the "better" men of wisdom and virtue Burke felt
should be chosen as representatives? In any case, if there
is a genuine national interest, defining that interest is
not the prerogative of the representatives alone.

Representatives, according to the Delegate theory,
are to act in accordance with the instructions given them by
their constituents. Decisions made by the representative
body are to be an expression of the public will. But,
critics maintain, the theoretical and practical problems

¹. Lucas, op. cit., p. 166.
attending the proposals of the Delegate theory are unsurmountable. How are representatives to reconcile many separate interests in order to make decisions? How can they work out a "public will" from the many diverse "wills" they represent? In other words, at what point are their instructions to be considered no longer binding so that accommodation and compromise are possible? It can also be asked how provision is to be made for inclusion in debate of the interests and values of the political community.

There is a third, equally formidable problem in the Delegate theory. If the representative is expected to act according to his own considered judgment, or to act in the interest of all rather than in the interest of a particular constituency, then the nature of the representative's constituency is not so critical. When, however, the representative is expected to be an agent of the will of his constituents, then the question of the constituency does become important.

Is the representative to embody the attitudes and attributes of those he represents, or is it enough that he discern and act according to the will of his constituents? For the former to be possible each constituency would have to be homogeneous to a high degree. Since few such constituencies can be found, or even contrived, it becomes necessary to decide in what respects similarity should be
required. Even if it is accepted that the representative only need register the will of his constituency, difficulties still abound. What "will" does he register? Proponents of the single-member district answer, "the will of the district's majority." Proponents of proportional representation counter that the will of the district's minority must be represented as well. Both positions are washed away by the tide of studies which disclose no majority or minority will as such, but majority and minority wills which shift with time and different issues.

Let the representative inform himself on the people's will on each issue, then, and vote accordingly. Ascertaining the wills of thousands of individuals in a constituency, on hundreds of separate issues, would be a staggering task. Nor does this method answer the problem of representing minority opinion.

An alternative proposal is to select representatives of "interests." Through a system of proportional representation the representatives would be chosen on the basis of the number in the electorate who shared a common interest, whether economic or vocational. Opponents cite two shortcomings of this approach. Is the one interest, whatever it is, one that all the people care to have represented? And if the legislative body is comprised of representatives of single interests, would there be good will enough, or
disposition to make concessions sufficient for the resolution of issues? If so, would tying the people to a single interest so polarize and divide them that they might find it difficult, if not impossible, to accept a decision which compromised that interest?

Because of the theoretical shortcomings and practical difficulties of the Trusteeship and Delegate theories of representation, there has been a tendency to rationalize the system the way it is. The political system in the United States, for example, "works;" the people accept what their representatives do so long as the representatives are chosen and legislation is passed in the proper manner. Apparently it is to be sufficient that legitimacy be conceived in procedural terms. But to grant that procedural criteria are sufficient is to dismiss the importance of the type and quality of representation within the legitimate procedure. Such a dismissal is not consistent with a commitment to democratic values. So long as we are committed to these values deliberation and resolution of political issues by the representative body, substantively as well as formally, will be of critical concern.
THE PROBLEM OF RECONCILING REPRESENTATION WITH DEMOCRACY: RESPONSIBLE DELIBERATION

If the Delegate and Trusteeship theories of representation offer incomplete or in some ways unsatisfactory answers to the question of reconciling representation with democracy, it might be advantageous to look at the problem from a different perspective. We might view the problem as being one of determining how, under conditions of representative government, the values of participation and deliberation by the citizens can be incorporated into the decision-making process. In our present inquiry we propose to focus on the question of deliberation. However, certain prefactory remarks are necessary.

In a critical sense the values of participation and deliberation, in the context of democratic decision-making, depend upon each other. Thus, making the problems of participation and deliberation analytically distinct should not imply that a resolution of one is an adequate answer to the broader problem of maintaining democratic values under conditions of representation. Any adequate answer, while recognizing that full participation is impossible in a representative system of government, would suggest feasible
opportunities for citizen participation at various stages of the decision-making process. Such considerations are outside the scope of a study of the problem of deliberation alone. Having elected to focus only on the problem of deliberation, we clearly acknowledge the limitations of any resolution which may grow out of our inquiry, since it will not fully take participation into account. That is to say, even if we find that it may be possible to incorporate the values of democratic deliberation into deliberation by the representative body, these values would be realized more fully if at the same time the values of participation were to be brought into the decision-making process of a representative system of government.

The problem of deliberation, as we conceive it, is one of designing a deliberative process for the representative body that will retain as many as possible of the values characteristic of deliberation in a direct democracy. These values may be summarized as follows: the interests, opinions, and values of every citizen, as well as the interests and values of the community, are expressed, debated reasonably, and evaluated with a view to an eventual resolution which can be accepted and supported by the citizens. Our approach to the problem will be to construct a normative model of deliberation by the representative body, Responsible Deliberation, based on an analysis of democratic deliberation. As we do so
we will consider the possibility of Responsible Deliberation being adopted by a representative body.

Our first task is to analyze deliberation in democratic decision-making. The abridged version of the Midtown meeting, with which we began, can serve as the basis for this analysis. The principal elements of the Midtown meeting, and which, by extension, would be essential to democratic deliberation, are:

1. Everyone was able to express his interests, opinions, and values as an individual and as a member of the community. All views, interests, and values, whether economic, social, aesthetic, or moral, were included insofar as they were relevant to the issue.

2. There was available sufficient information for a rational discussion and decision.

3. Where strong feelings were expressed against a suggested course of action, an alternative was sought, so that an acceptable compromise was eventually possible.

4. The settlement of the issue was a working out of a General Will, in Rousseau's sense, where "a general view really does emerge, which is not simply the sum of the initial views of the members separately, but has been developed by the process of argument out of the interplay of debate."

1. Lucas, op. cit., p. 47.
5. Community interests and values were important considerations in the discussion as well as in the resolution.

The model of Responsible Deliberation is a translation of these five features into the deliberation by the representative body. Five propositions comprise the model. Following each of these propositions is a discussion wherein we draw from the American national experience in order to judge the present degree of correspondence as well as the feasibility of a closer approximation to the Propositions.

1. Proposition: On any public issue deliberation by the representative body should include all relevant views, interests, and values of all citizens.

COMMENT: The absence of direct participation by the citizens is probably more critical at this stage than at any other. Even overlooking the loss of the values of participation itself no one can express an interest, opinion, or value with quite the same force as the one who holds it. Within these limitations, however, what is required is that representatives do ascertain and include in debate the relevant interests, opinions, and values of all of their constituents. That is, here the representative is to act as his constituents' agent, giving expression to their individual interests and values. Agency is predicated on adequate
communication. If the representative is to express his constituents' views he must be informed of these views. Preferably this would be accomplished through a representative-constituent relationship where there is an interchange of information, ideas, feelings, and opinions, with both parties willing to contribute, to listen, and to learn.

Even then there could be no certain guarantee that every relevant view and interest will be included. As is true now, the range of divergent viewpoints brought into the deliberation depends upon the urgency attached to a resolution and upon the conscientiousness of the representative. We can only recommend that the range of viewpoints be as broad as possible.

It should be noted, though, that there are even now factors which encourage the representative to be sensitive to the views and interests of the citizenry. There are the political demands arising from periodic elections, and the fact that the members of the representative body themselves hold many of these viewpoints. Most are aware, too, that certain views and interests have a skewed distribution among the membership as compared to the total population, and in some instances accept as part of their responsibility bringing compensatory advocacy into the debate.

2. **Proposition:** Sufficient information relating to both ends and means should be available so that
rational deliberation and resolution are possible.

COMMENT: Because of the extensive data and expertise accessible to the representatives, this body can well set the standard for informed debate.

3. Proposition: Strongly held feelings or positions should be brought out in the course of the deliberation so that if a particular course of action is wholly unacceptable to a significant number of people alternatives may be found, making possible an acceptable resolution.

COMMENT: Most strong feelings or positions held by a significant number of persons are given public expression or form the basis for an interest group; so representatives are aware of them. When these feelings and positions are generated by a single issue the representative soon learns of them, through his mail, and probably through the media. Knowing them he then can, if he will, accommodate them in the resolution of the issue.

4. Proposition: The resolution should be a compromise, not necessarily anyone's particular view, but a consensual view, reflecting, where necessary, concessions made and positions modified.

COMMENT: In no group is it possible to equalize influence. But in a representative body, where each member
has a vote equal to every other, and where it is accepted that issues are resolved through compromise, the same working out of a consensual decision is as possible as in any group where there is democratic decision-making.\(^2\)

5. Proposition: Community interests and values should be important considerations in the deliberation and in the resolution.

COMMENT: There is no reason why community interests and values cannot be an important consideration in the deliberation and in the resolution. In fact, as we shall see, their inclusion in deliberation is essential to their continuing vitality and creation. These interests and values do not, however, always play as vital a part as they might. It is worthwhile, therefore, to examine the reasons why they do not, as well as the reasons why they should.\(^3\)

2. The problems of carrying out Propositions 3 and 4 are not so simple as the commentary following each Proposition would indicate. We have chosen not to explore these difficulties further because our present concern is with Proposition 5. However, here again we must acknowledge that resolving the problems of Proposition 5 will not be a resolution of all the problems inherent in realizing Responsible Deliberation.

3. Since interests for the most part are an outgrowth of values, we will, for convenience, generally restrict our discussion to values.
COMMUNITY VALUES

In small communities the members are usually aware of their shared values. The residents of Midtown, for example, recognized their common commitment to the cultural values their Library represented, the aesthetic values exemplified by their gardens, and the social value of mutual support which the minister pointed out. In larger communities shared values generally have a more diffuse, abstract quality. Direct interrelationship among all the members of a larger community is not possible. Because this is so, communal ties, including those of community values, tend to be less concrete in their form. For example, a town may value its tradition of encouraging newspaper editors to speak out freely on issues of concern to the townspeople. A nation, whose members share a similar value, will state this value in more categorical terms, as freedom of the press. Abstract values are more difficult to conceptualize, and to translate into specific community action.

Let us take an hypothetical case to illustrate the course such a translation can take, and to point up some of the difficulties which may attend it. Equality is a value held by Americans. But to say this is not to give the value
any exact political meaning. On the next level of specificity the value may be expressed as equality of opportunity. So stated the value is still not policy, but it can serve as a ground for a policy of state supported education for all. The final translation could be a law allocating Federal funds to poorer school districts so that the expenditure per student is equalized nationally. At any point in the translation of the abstract value into specific action a counter-claim could be made that, for example: 1) the promotion of other modes of equality was more vital to the community; 2) free public education would not achieve equality of opportunity; 3) equalizing the cost per student would not result in equality of education. Or, it could be argued, justice, another American value, should take precedence over equality; that years of racial injustice warrant compensatory opportunities; that education for those oppressed in the past should be of higher quality and be more generously funded.

When abstract values are given meaning in the context of an ideology their translation into action is a more certain enterprise. But when discrete abstract values are held by a community, there is an unsureness about the values' relation to action, as well as a potential for conflict between values in any given situation. Thus it is not readily apparent either how to demonstrate the relevance of
such values to public issues, or how to weigh one value against another when they come into conflict in the context of a public issue. Not unexpectedly, then, representatives prefer to debate issues in tangible terms. Doing so allows positions to be less ambiguous, and at the same time to take a form more amenable to compromise. However, this aversion by the representatives to debate in abstract terms means in effect an aversion to debate in terms of community values.

There is another reason for the reluctance to include community values in national debate in America. This reason is to be found in a concept which is widely accepted, and is an outgrowth of the doctrines of individualism and the secular state, doctrines traditionally central to American thought. The assumption underlying the concept is that the nation-State should have no corporate values or interests, since these are bound to conflict with those of the individual. Since the nation-State is an unselective community it has no right to subject its members to such conflict. Individuals can form groups and associations for the purpose of expressing their corporate values. The government's job is only to arbitrate and reconcile these various interests in the making of national policies.¹

This commitment to social and political pluralism, and the "interest politics" pluralism implies, was reinforced by the rise of the totalitarian state, where the state is "the ultimate and fundamental source of values," where all other associations are derivative. "Contemporary liberalism does not generally accord priority to any one specific community; it tends to conceive society as a complex of interacting communities, reference or interest groups, with government policy the consequence of a series of compromises between them."  

is an agency for the coordination and integration of diverse social, economic and political interests." Fear of popular majorities in the early days of the American Republic added support for the view set forth in this concept. Later, behaviorism's, and especially for political science, Arthur Bentley's denial of the reality of anything but outward, observable actions or behavior seemed to many to certify the soundness of this view of government's role. 


3. Ibid. Even though they are only supportive of, and not part of, the reason for the neglect of national values in representative deliberation, it might be well, nevertheless, to mention two arguments directed against value consideration. In one case the argument is made that there are no values on which all the community agree; therefore there are no national values. In the other, the argument is made that, even if there are such values, they will, through socialization, be a part of every representative's "value system," and thus are sure to receive at least implicit consideration. Both of these arguments are spurious. It is doubtful if they would be at all convincing if they did not accord with a point of view already accepted, but accepted on other grounds. Briefly, the first argument errs in the assumption that a national value must be unanimously held. 'We shall subsequently discuss the nature of national or community values; suffice to say here that this nature is
Despite the difficulties of dealing with intangible values, there are compelling reasons why these values should be a part of representative deliberation. These reasons will become clear as we turn now to a concept of the nation and the State unlike the view discussed above, the view which saw the nation as a congeries of separate interests and the State as a "referee" of those interests. A "referee" State is not the only alternative to a totalitarian State. It is possible to recognize the reality of a national community without, in Gregor's words, according priority to that community.

Part of the meaning of community is a sharing of interests and values. Men form various communities, suited to meeting their different associational needs and to carrying out their corporate purposes. The tie that binds those within a community is the particular expression the members have given to their common felt need for association: an expression of shared interests and values. The purpose of community is through collective action to further those completely misread in the argument. The second argument is valid insofar as it supposes that representatives hold the values they do through the process of socialization. Values are not furthered by "implicit" consideration, however. It would be interesting, for example, to hear the reaction of labor leaders if a representative who was a member of the labor movement were to justify his behavior by explaining, "Everyone knows I'm a labor man, so there was no need for me to try to push that bill."
interests and express and realize those values. Among the
different communities men form there are political communi-
ties. All political organizations are not communities.
Empires and sanitary districts, for example, may be solely
functional organizations. A political community exists if
the members recognize common interests and values, and at
the same time there are means agreed to by the members for
settling disputes and deciding questions which may arise
within the community and which have to do with how the
community is to act. An historical development, the nation
is presently the most inclusive viable political community.
It is not critical to the reality of this community whether
it was formed by men who shared interests and values, or
whether the interests and values developed within a group
formed for other reasons. Nations have been formed for
numerous reasons. But those nations which have persisted
through time have done so in part because they were or had
become a national community. The sustaining life of the
national community is the shared interests and values of
those within it. Smaller groups or communities exist because
of men's need to express corporate values which do not belong
to all within the national community.

The State, or government, is vital to the nation in
several respects. The national community cannot take collect-
ive action effectively without a means of authoritatively
settling disputes which arise among the members of the community, and which cannot otherwise be settled. A national community also requires: means of protection from external threats; a method of making the rules which govern its common life; and, means for enforcing enough conformity in the members' behavior so that common life is possible.

Some, fearing the concentration of power in government offices necessary to carrying out these responsibilities of the State, attempted to bar an extension of that power by contending that the State has, and should have, no duties beyond defense, law, and order. This idea of minimum government did not prevail against the eventual expansion of government activities which the proponents of the idea feared. But in their zeal to restrict government the advocates of minimum government ignored a role of the State which has no relation to government "power," but is nevertheless essential.

The State is an instrument of the national community, and the national government is the only organ through which that community can express itself as a community. It is through the government that the people have a sense of themselves as a national community. And this will be possible (in a democratically oriented country) only as the people feel they are participating in making the decisions of government; as the government is seen as a forum where national interests can be defined, and national values expressed and
reinterpreted; and as these interests and values are believed to be actively promoted by the government.

When this relation between the State and the nation is not kept explicit, the people can lose their sense of national community, along with the feelings of pride and allegiance this implies. The government may be perceived as a hostile, even threatening, force; or a burdensome intruder into men's private affairs; or a bestower of benefits, the allocation of which is dependent upon political pressures. Too, when the people are only dimly aware, if at all, of the values of the national community, the government may find it difficult to translate a policy incorporating a value commitment into effective law.  

Our position, then, is that a nation in the fullest sense is a community, with shared interests and values. The State serves the national community, not only by performing certain functions necessary to the nation’s continued existence, but by acting as the instrument through which the interests and values of the national community are expressed

4. The response to the 1954 Brown v Board of Education decision by the United States Supreme Court, and the subsequent Civil Rights Acts, may be cited here. Many people (and not alone those who disagreed with the substance of the judicial and legislative acts) perceived these actions as an attempt by a few to impose their values on all. Public debate on the issue was conducted in terms of national values. But long neglect of this approach to an issue blunted its persuasiveness, even evoked at times a cynical reaction.
and advanced. We hold that such a concept of the nation and the State represents more truly a satisfying of men's need for a particular form of community than does the truncated version accepted by so many in America today.  

If the concept of nation and State for which we have argued is accepted, then Proposition 5 of the model of Responsible Deliberation is warranted. The problem then becomes one of determining how community values are to be introduced into and dealt with in deliberation.

5. Support for this conclusion might be found in the concern with the "American national purpose" during Eisenhower's second term and the Kennedy years. A nation's purpose is to further the interests and values of the national community. The failure to discuss the national purpose in these terms during the late 1950s and early 1960s may account for "Educating more scientists" and "Going to the moon" becoming statements of America's national purpose.
As we noted previously, values held by a community can be on two general levels of specificity. Not only is their relation to action different at each level, but the approach to their realization varies as well. The United States as a nation is committed to certain abstract values such as freedom, equality, and justice. These values must be made specific if they are to be translated into government action. But there are features of them as abstract values of which the translator should be aware. In the first place, to help understand to what extent they are realizable, these might appropriately be called Ideal values. No nation can aspire to achieve perfect freedom, or perfect equality, or perfect justice. It is in the nature of an ideal to be at once a norm and a goal. We are able to judge if a particular act or condition is just (the ideal as norm). But we could never be certain that we had succeeded in bringing about all forms of justice. The open-ended nature of human experience makes it impossible for us to completely define justice or to specify in advance all acts and conditions which would be just. (Even if this were possible, if we could make explicit

a conception of the whole of justice, still we could not exercise the control over men and events necessary to achieve a state of perfect justice.) For this reason justice must remain always to some extent a goal. In striving to realize these Ideal values, then, our approach is both positive and negative. That is, we prescribe altered conditions we judge will be more just, and we proscribe certain types of injustice. Our purpose is to come closer to the Ideal value by either adding one form of justice to, or avoiding one form of injustice in, our common life.

The second observation we must make about Ideal values is that so long as we hold more than one we will have to compromise them. "Freedom is radically different from Justice, and we have to compromise Justice, however all-embracing we make it, if we are to have Freedom at all. . . . For Freedom entitles a man to act as he chooses, not as some rule lays it down. . . . Freedom is inherently unfair." We must bear in mind that every step taken to approximate one Ideal value is done at the expense of one or more other values. "The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, the realization of some of which must

2. Lucas, op. cit., pp. 242-243; see also p. 170 ff.
inevitably involve the sacrifice of others."\(^3\) Thus, a part of evaluating a proposed resolution of an issue is to weigh the consequences of the resolution for all the nation's Ideal values.

A nation has other values which it conceives more precisely. In the United States there are, for example, such political values as a democratic-republican form of government, political equality, and tolerance of dissent; such economic values as free-market capitalism; such social values as social equality and social mobility; such moral values as the worth of the individual and the sanctity of marriage. These values are part of the national tradition, reflected in the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the Gettysburg Address, the characters of national heroes, folklore and song, literature and art. Because these values are stated more precisely it is possible to realize them more completely, in the sense that it is possible to judge more accurately to what degree they have been realized. But, as is true of Ideal values, where more than one is held each is vulnerable to compromise. On any given issue: two or more Ideal values may conflict; a specific value may conflict with an Ideal value; specific

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values may conflict (one social value may conflict with another social value, e.g., or a political value may conflict with an economic value). In resolving these conflicts, recognition of the difference in the levels of specificity of values can prove useful. Where two Ideal values conflict, these values could be translated into more specific formulations appropriate to the particular issue. In these terms the preferable choice might be more apparent. If two specific values conflict, weighing them against one or more Ideal values could be of help in deciding which was to have preference. When an Ideal and a specific value conflict, either or both could be re-stated on the same level of specificity and then weighed by using either of the above suggested procedures.

Bearing in mind the nature of national values, and the inherent limitations on their realization, we turn to the question of how they become part of deliberation. The first requisite, of course, is that representatives accept the imperative of Proposition 5. In order to follow that injunction they must consider the issue from the point of view of national values. The "facts" of any issue are not self-explanatory. Different facts will be relevant to and have different meanings for different points of view. Extending the minimum wage, for example, will not have the same significance from the economic point of view as it
does from the political or social points of view. And to take the economic point of view is to select only those facts which are germane economically.

We expect our representatives to look at the facts of an issue from every relevant point of view. One purpose of the model of Responsible Deliberation is to serve as a reminder of what points of view should be considered relevant by the representatives. Proposition 5 states that the point of view of national values is relevant.

There are two steps in deliberation and resolution: bringing out the salient features of the issue from all relevant points of view, and weighing conflicting claims within a particular point of view, as well as those between all points of view. To include national values in deliberation means, then: to look at an issue from the point of view of national values (viewing an issue within the context of national values may be understood as somewhat analogous to Rousseau's idea of expressing the General Will, i.e., thinking in terms of what one shares with all others in the community); to consider resolutions from the perspective of their possible effects on the furtherance of the values—which values can be advanced with the least compromise of other values; and weigh value claims against other claims in arriving at a resolution. This is not to say that deliberation will be changed by including national values, only that
another consideration will be included. Political argumentation is by its nature imprecise and tentative. Argument on questions of value is similar in kind; to include it in political debate is only to add a further degree of conditionality. J. R. Lucas is instructive on the nature of political and value debate. He makes these points: (1) "Arguments on moral and political questions are unlike many other arguments, in that they are interminable; that is, they lack a rigid decision procedure, whereby we can demonstrate the cogency of valid arguments, and point out the invalidity of others." Lucas notes that a geometer, for example, can dismiss certain questions on grounds they are irrelevant to his argument; it is not possible, however, in morals or politics to formulate antecedently what will be relevant or good reasons. (2) "Apart from the purely deductive arguments of mathematics and logic, arguments are characteristically dialectic in form. . . . The logic of moral and political argument . . . is a logic of one side of an argument and another, of prima facie cases which may be countered, and presumptions which may be rebutted. The parallel is with the law courts . . . and the typical connective of argument is not 'therefore' but 'but.' . . . An argument is not conclusive unless, although there are opportunities for countering it, no reasonable man feels

himself able to do so."

(3) "[P]olitical and moral thinking differs from more academic disciplines in that in the former we . . . have to reach a decision and give an answer, and cannot, as academics can, 'suspend judgement.' When we have to make up our minds and cannot postpone decision, then weak arguments are better than no arguments; weak arguments are not fallacious arguments, but only ones that are not as conclusive as we could wish." A decision is the goal of moral and political argument: "the whole object of political argument is not to have to agree to differ, but to reach some workable agreement which shall be the basis of action, action we can co-operate in taking together."

Having remarked on the character of deliberation on values in general (and its similarity to political debate), we must recognize, too, that there is a difference between values, in the precision with which they can be formulated and discussed. Economic values, for example, are often liable to expression in quantifiable terms. Because of the uncertainty as to the meaning of morality, moral values are

5. Ibid., p. 22.

6. Ibid., p. 21.

7. Ibid., p. 316.

perhaps the most intractable for deliberation. In an effort to clarify how values can be dealt with in Responsible Deliberation, then, we shall examine moral values as the most difficult case.
MORAL VALUES

Our first task is to arrive at a working concept of morality. There is no agreement, even among moral philosophers, as to a definition of morality. There is, however, a general consensus on several things which can be stated about morality. Morality is both rational and emotional, personal and corporate; its purpose is to direct attitudes and guide action; it is "other-considering," and universal in the sense that moral precepts are to apply not to "everybody alike," but to "anybody."

"Right," "wrong," "good," "bad," "duty," "ought" are the central terms in the moral vocabulary. These terms have a moral meaning, though, only as they are used from a "moral point of view." Quite broadly stated, the moral point of view is one which is principally a consideration for the welfare of human beings, including certain standards of what constitutes that welfare.¹ Implicit in the moral point of view is a concern for the quality of life: that of one's own, through the integrity of one's intentions, actions and their consequences; and their consequences; and that of all men, through interpersonal relationships, interactions which

¹. Warnock, op. cit., p. 67.
rebound to the benefit of everyone involved. To want to do the moral thing is to want to do the right thing, in the sense that by so doing oneself and others will be benefited in one way or another.

To apply moral terms is to commend or to show approval (or their opposites). In this respect moral terms are emotive. But there must be reasons why something is commended or approved; and in this respect morality is rational. I like it is not an adequate answer to Why is x valuable? One is expected to reply: X has features a . . . d; a has value-bearing feature p, . . . d has value-bearing feature s, in order to justify an answer to the question, Why is x valuable? In the same way, I want to, is reason enough to do something. I ought to, implies the need for reasons. Ought is an action-guiding concept. It expresses the notion that one is liable to direction by reasons in the case which would motivate one if one gave them due consideration. Ought is a compelling term. Its use, therefore, should be rationally justifiable, and

2. "'Good' is used in commending things or persons, and what varies are the standards which are used to determine the goodness of the specific kinds of objects evaluated." Luther J. Binkley, Contemporary Ethical Theories (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1961), p. 159.

not a rhetorical device or a play on men's emotions, or it loses force.\(^4\)

Moral notions are formed from the point of view of anybody. That is, we prescribe action that anyone should do in the specified circumstances. It is required of moral notions, too, that anybody "should be able to and should want to use them in the same way and for the same purpose."\(^5\) Thus, "it follows that only those features of our lives can be incorporated into these notions that are shared by any of us and are recognizable by any of us."\(^6\) In morality there is this further dimension of rationality, then, in as much as moral notions and their use are public, and they apply to anyone.\(^7\)

There are two conclusions which, for our purposes, we can draw from the foregoing. The first is that in some

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\(^4\) John Plamenatz makes an interesting comment on the interplay of reason and emotion in morality. "[T]he appeal to the reason of a moral being is ... always also an appeal to the feelings, though to feelings which only rational beings, who control and persuade others and themselves, are capable." "Responsibility, Blame and Punishment" in Philosophy, Politics and Society, Peter Laslett and W. C. Runciman (eds.) (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1967), p. 175.


\(^6\) Ibid., p. 55.

\(^7\) The "rules of rationality result in my being under the same obligation as anyone else when I am in a certain situation." Ibid., p. 159.
way or another morality has to do with men living together in relationships which are mutually beneficial. Moral ideas and the vocabulary of morals express men's response to their common need to better their life together, to relate to one another in ways which increase the well-being of each and all. To take the moral point of view is to consider actions or conditions insofar as they promote men's welfare through more satisfying interrelationships. The second conclusion is that, despite the emotive aspect and the lack of certitude, morality is rational. And to the extent that it is, rational discussion and argument about morals is possible and necessary.⁸

Before we can go on to the relation of moral values and moral argument to political deliberation, we must establish first that there are corporate moral values. The denial of a corporate morality is voiced by moral relativists, in response to the position that morality is absolute; that there are eternal, unchanging dogmas, moral principles which apply to all men everywhere. In its extreme form the relativist argument maintains that what is moral is nothing more

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⁸ Warnock, op. cit., p. 69, states clearly the qualifications we must always keep in mind when we talk about the rationality of morality and the precision possible in moral argument. "While the . . . notion of 'the welfare' of human beings surely has . . . a perfectly clear and determinate core or centre, no one would wish to deny that it has also an extensive penumbral fringe of vagueness and indeterminancy; there is much room for diversity of opinion as to what constitutes 'the welfare' of human beings."
that what each individual thinks he ought to do, or what he thinks is good or right. (It is interesting to note the parallel between moral relativism and the concept of the State wherein it is claimed that there should be no promotion of national values since these might conflict with those of the individual. Where those holding the latter view stop short of "anarchy" by endowing groups with value-bearing rights, moral relativists, on the other hand, have found no comparable constraint.)

Absolutism v. relativism in morality is an unnecessary polarization, however. The truth in the absolutist position is that there may be a best way for men to interrelate. But a best way cannot be delineated in moral categories. (Religious categories are used to state a best way: for example, the Christian contention that the best way is the way of love, which is beyond moral rules.) If a morality were absolute the principles comprising this morality would be in the form, "A ought always to do x." To let one's actions be guided by absolute moral principles, however, is neither possible nor justifiable. A morality consists of more than one principle. And there are many situations where acting on one principle will entail acting contrary to another (e.g., it could be necessary to lie in order to save a man's life). It is impossible to imagine any set of principles which would never come into this sort
of conflict. Nor are we warranted in claiming that any action is always good or right without exception. The most we can claim is that an act is good or right unless the facts show it to be otherwise. Sir W. David Ross points up this feature of moral judgments with his concepts of *prima facie* and "actual" right or good.\(^9\) As in the example above, "not to lie" may be right *prima facie*. But in a situation where a man's life could be saved by a lie, with no other wrong involved, "not to lie" would here be an "actual" wrong. H. L. A. Hart\(^10\) makes a similar point with his argument for what he calls the defeasibility of all moral judgments.

Even moral judgments in the limited form, "A ought always to do x under circumstances n . . . t," will not do as absolute moral principles. For it is possible that new, unforeseeable conditions could come about so that A ought not do x under circumstance n, for example.

A morality, then, cannot be absolute. Nor has a morality ever been absolute in the sense that it has achieved the acceptance of all men everywhere. To this extent there is truth in the relativist position. But


morality is not wholly relative. Men have varied and do vary in their moral rules. A basic reason why this is so is that how men think they ought best to interrelate will depend somewhat upon their concept of human nature, and of what constitutes harmony in human affairs consonant with the welfare of each and all. So long as there is no final knowledge of the nature of man and of the good life, men will have diverse ideas of what men ought to be and do, hence diverse moral rules.

However, "we all have . . . the conviction that at least some questions as to what is good or bad for people, what is harmful or beneficial, are not in any serious sense matters of opinion."\(^{11}\) Within the context of all their experience men have found certain things to be good or bad in their lives. This experience has given these things a universally warranted assertion of moral value. Moral rules based on these judgments of moral values include injunctions against lying, cheating, murder, and the arbitrary infliction of harm. It may be that community would be impossible without the observation of such rules. In any case, as William points out in his discussion of moral relativism, the relativist claim that basic moral judgments among men are

\(^{11}\) Warnock, op. cit., p. 60.
different and even conflicting, has not been established by any sociological or anthropological studies.\textsuperscript{12}

The extreme relativist position that what is good or right for one person need not be good or right for another involves a logical contradiction. Such a position violates the consistency and universalizability implicit in the concept of morality itself.\textsuperscript{13}

What is important for our present purpose is that there are moral communities, that within these communities there is agreement on certain moral rules and convictions. What is held to be right and wrong, good and bad, obligatory and not, may have become accepted through custom, developed from past experience of living together, or may be the result of a common heritage, which could include environmental factors (e.g., rules governing utilization of scarce resources) and sacerdotal practices. The obligations of membership can vary according to differences in the community structure. Communities' moral values and rules can vary, also, insofar as these tend to be compatible with other values and ideals of each community.

The fact that standards of morality differ among communities does not mean that moralities are vacuous, or

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\item \textsuperscript{12} Frankena, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 92 ff.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
developed capriciously. As we noted, a moral precept is not mere preference; it is both approval and reasons for that approval. Approval is given and reasons are selected from the moral point of view, i.e., from a concern men share to relate to one another in a manner most beneficial to each and all. There can be no predetermined best mode of interrelating. But so long as men take the moral point of view they will continue seeking better modes of interrelating.

Men cannot be moral as isolated individuals; only as they live with others is the moral life possible. Since moralities are developed in and by communities, it is not surprising that the specific character of each morality depends in part on the non-moral characteristics of the community in which it appears. The men within each community work out their morality on two levels. They choose what they as individuals shall be and do: personal morality. And they choose what they as a community shall be and do: corporate morality. The morality of an autonomous moral agent differs in kind from the morality of a number of men acting together. Generally the moralities will be compatible, however, when they are the moralities of a particular moral community and of the individual members of that community.

It is part of the meaning of community that a member, to the extent that he identifies with the community, is aware of himself as an individual and as a member of the
community. Morally, he is concerned with his own acts as an individual, and with his own acts as a member as well as the acts of others in the community. He "will be guided in his actions not simply by his own individual views of what is right and wrong, but by a respect for the moral values shared by other members of his community."¹⁴ Personal and corporate moralities can conflict, of course. As a member of a community no man can expect that his personal ideas of right and wrong will or can always prevail. But in cases of serious conflict each man can choose the point beyond which he will not compromise his personal morality for that of the community. A realistic and adequate idea of "good," nevertheless, must include what is good for the community and for each person in it. (Hume's concept of Social Utility as the basis of corporate morality is open to criticism here. What a society finds useful [to its life as a society] cannot be said to be "good" in this wider sense if it is not at the same time good for the individual members.) The absolutist view of morality errs in denying the moral autonomy of the individual; the relativist view errs in denying the significance of corporate morality.

¹⁴ Lucas, op. cit., p. 281.
DELIBERATION ON MORAL VALUES

In our discussion so far we have argued that morality is about the interrelationships of men which are most beneficial to each and all, that morality can be dealt with rationally, and that there can be and are corporate moral values. Before we turn to the deliberation about these values we need to restate two characteristics of moral values and see what their implications are for debate.

Because we are unable to know for certain what is morally best, we are not warranted in making a moral judgment into a moral principle (a ought always to do x). A community, like the individual moral agent, is not justified in carrying a moral judgment beyond the assertion that: x is good unless other facts show it to be otherwise. What this means for considering national moral value can be assumed to be a moral principle, to be "applied" in a given issue. The moral value must also take the form: x is good unless other facts show it to be otherwise. In deliberation on any issue where x is relevant, then, all other facts should be studied in relation to x, in order that a judgment be made as to whether or not in this case x is an "actual" good. The facts will include empirical facts, about the
persons involved and about the circumstances, as well as
other moral and non-moral values which may be relevant.

A moral value is a judgment that $x$ is good or right. The judgment, as we noted previously,\(^1\) is analyzable into
what R. M. Hare terms primary and secondary evaluative
words.\(^2\) "Good" or "right" is the primary word. Hare calls
primary words prescriptive; we suggested that these words
express approval or disapproval, and to this extent are
e emotive. $x$, the secondary word, is whatever is judged
"right" or "good." Hare calls secondary words descriptive.
What he means is that secondary words do not by themselves
carry any moral import.\(^3\) We cited this characteristic of
secondary words as the basis for reason in morality. A

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{1.} Supra, pp. 43-44.
\item \textbf{3.} Julius Kovesi's distinction between Complete and Incomplete moral notions should be mentioned here. The
former he defines as concepts formed from the moral point of
view, and "all we need to know in order to judge it good is
in the term that specifies that act in question." Op. cit.,
p. 135. Incomplete moral notions are concepts formed from
the non-moral point of view, and additional facts are
required before we can say that they are bad or good.
"Murder" and "killing" would be two examples of the differ-
tent types of notions. This distinction does not refute the
distinction Hare wishes to make between primary and secondary
words, however, because it is redundant to make a more judg-
ment about a Complete moral notion. There is nothing
informative about the statement, "Murder is wrong," since the
notion of wrong is implicit in the term "murder."
\end{itemize}
moral judgment is merely idiosyncratic unless relevant reasons can be given for asserting that \( x \) is good.

The implications of this feature of moral judgments, or values, for deliberation are two-fold. First, because reasons are called for in judging \( x \) to be good, rational debate on moral values is possible. And second, because reasons bearing upon \( x \) are the basis for judging \( x \) good, it is possible that circumstances and experience can affect men's moral evaluation of those reasons. To illustrate what can, and often does happen: \( x \) is judged good because of reasons \( a \ldots d \), or because \( x \) has moral value-bearing features \( m \ldots p \). In time men may come to reinterpret "\( x \) is good," in that they now warrant their judgment by reasons \( c \ldots g \), or because of features \( o \ldots r \). Now, because \( x \) is asserted to be good for different reasons, or for different features that it has, it is in fact no longer the \( x \) of the original judgment. Reasons \( a \ldots d \), or features \( m \ldots p \), defined the \( x \) originally judged good. Reasons \( c \ldots g \), or features \( o \ldots r \), now define what is judged good. So the correct statement of the reinterpreted value would be "\( x_1 \) is good." Because in the transition from accepting certain reasons to accepting others as warrant for the moral judgment made, there is usually no concurrent change in the designation of \( x \) to \( x_1 \), people are not always aware that the particular moral value has been reinterpreted,
or even changed. But in the logic of moral judgments, when there is a change in the reasons that made \( x \) a moral value, then, strictly speaking, \( x \) is no longer that moral value. It has been changed or reinterpreted to \( x_1 \). When we are aware of the way in which moral values change or are reinterpreted, we can know how we are to proceed when the need arises for change or reinterpretation of moral values.

The implications of these two features for deliberation are: first, since rational debate on moral values is possible, rational debate to the extent that it is possible, should be the way moral values are dealt with in deliberation; second, since moral values can be changed and reinterpreted, the dynamics of moral values should be recognized in deliberation so that these values continue to be made relevant to the life of the people whose morality it is.

We should mention here certain other characteristics of deliberation of moral values. In weighing the alternatives of furthering value \( x \) or value \( y \), all facts and conditions should be brought out which would in any way make exceptionable in the present case the assertions that \( x \) and \( y \) are good. Or, in trying to decide whether value \( x \) or value \( y \) should take precedence in the resolution of the issue, what Paul Edwards\(^4\) calls first- and second-order

reasons are pertinent to the debate. First-order reasons are those given for judging \( x \) and \( y \) good (or the features of \( x \) and \( y \) which are worthy of approval). Second-order reasons are those given for thinking that a first-order reason is a good reason.\(^5\)

Consequences are also an important consideration in deliberation of moral values. Argument from consequences must be highly tentative, though, because we cannot be sure that action \( A \) will bring result \( B \), or that result \( B \) will in fact be the best result. It is well to remember the tentative nature of all moral argument, however.\(^6\) This must be so, not only because we do not have "any method of demonstrating beyond doubt the cogency of valid moral arguments or the invalidity of others,"\(^7\) but because, since no moral judgment is absolute, no decision involving moral values can be final.

5. It should be noted that choosing value \( x \) over value \( y \) does not necessarily mean that \( y \) is no longer a value; only that \( x \) supersedes \( y \) in this case. An example of making this kind of choice can be seen in the Midtown meeting when the citizens chose not to out-vote the new members of their community, nor to restrict them to the north end of town. Their Library and their gardens did not cease to be values to the residents of Midtown, but in this situation they decided that the way they would behave toward the new people was an over-riding consideration.


THE IMPORTANCE OF DELIBERATION ON NATIONAL VALUES

Responsible Deliberation is not over moral values alone and the eventual political resolution will rarely if ever coincide with the resolution of the question with which moral argument is concerned, i.e., "What is the morally right course?" Or, expressed another way, "[I]f the object of the argument is to reach agreement here and now on a plan of joint action, it cannot be always a purely moral argument,"¹

What is true of moral values is true of other national values as well. A political decision rarely can be made solely on the basis of the merits of the values involved in the issue. But this is not to say that it is any less important that moral, and other national values, be included in deliberation, as is asserted in Proposition 5. We have discussed in some detail the ways moral values are perhaps the most elusive to deal with. On the other hand, much that is appropriate in the treatment of moral values applies to other values, particularly the more abstract values. We pointed out previously certain characteristics of values in general: they may be expressed at different levels of specificity; no one value can be realized

¹. Lucas, op. cit., p. 316.
perfectly; in any given situation two or more values are almost certain to conflict, and any decision to take a certain course of action which will advance one or more values. In addition, some characteristics of moral values belong as well to other values: approval or rejection of a value must be supported by reasons, reasons which are liable to public, rational argument; no value is absolute, nor is any interpretation of it unchanging; to be an "actual" value in a given situation a value must be warranted so by a consideration of all the circumstantial facts.

All of these characteristics have implications for the manner in which values are deliberated, and we have suggested some of these in the course of our examination of moral values. It is important to understand how to deal with values in debate because, we contend, values should be a part of national debate. The inclusion of values has importance not only for the quality and thoroughness of the deliberation, but also for the vitality of the values themselves. We have maintained that the State is the only vehicle available for the articulation of national values, and so should be responsible for this articulation. The representative body deliberates and resolves public issues, issues which affect and are affected by national values. We can further maintain therefore that there should be articulation and incorporation of these values in this deliberation.
And just as, in the course of deliberation, national values should influence the resolution of issues, so should the values themselves be subject to criticism and re-evaluation. As J. R. Lucas notes, "to be living and vigorous a morality must be dynamic, often questioned and rediscovered and re-endorsed." This observation applies to other values as well.

Providing a means for the discussion and reinterpretation of national values is important, too, because this same means affords a forum for those who may disagree with any of these values, and want to change them.

Additional benefits of incorporating national values in deliberation by the representative body are the resulting awareness by the people of their shared values, and a concomitant renewed sense of themselves as a national community.

2. Ibid., p. 351.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF RESPONSIBLE DELIBERATION
AND ACTUAL DELIBERATION BY THE REPRESENTATIVE BODY

We have taken the position that a commitment to democratic values implies a commitment to the values of participation and deliberation in democratic decision-making. When representative government is a necessary expedient, those committed to democratic values will seek ways of introducing into this decision-making process as much as is possible the values lost by the preclusion of participation and deliberation by all the citizens. Our present inquiry focused on this problem insofar as it concerns deliberation.

To this purpose we developed a concept of Responsible Deliberation. In this model we included the salient features of the deliberation of democratic decision-making. The proposals of Responsible Deliberation are: 1) the relevant interests, opinions, and values of all the members of the political community are to be expressed; 2) sufficient information on the issue is to be available; 3) strongly held feelings and positions are to be made known and accommodated in the resolution; 4) the resolution is to be a compromise all can accept; 5) community interests and values are to be considered in the deliberation.
We may now ask, what relation can the idea of Responsible Deliberation have to actual deliberation by the representative body? Some indication of the possibilities of correspondence between the two was given in the comments following the five propositions as originally stated. In the light of the subsequent discussion, we now can offer some more general judgments about the feasibility of realizing Responsible Deliberation. As before, our remarks are meant to apply to American national politics.

The model of Responsible Deliberation is meant to be a guide for deliberation, at once a norm and a goal. Responsible Deliberation as a goal is subject to certain qualifications. Debate on public issues cannot be endless, and is rarely complete. The object of this debate is resolution of the issue, a decision about what action the national community will take. The need for action, for a decision, is a limiting factor in deliberation. The resources of the representatives themselves need also to be considered. We must recognize that representatives will have imperfect information and knowledge. And our expectations should not place too great a burden on their energies and good will. We cannot require, for example, that representatives be able either to ascertain or to consider every national value

1. Supra, pp. 22-25.
relevant to a given issue. First of all, because of the nature of values, no tidy list of all national values can be compiled. Then, too, individual representatives will weigh values differently, and will tend to see issues in terms of the values they hold to be more significant.

On the other hand, Responsible Deliberation, as a norm, can serve as a reminder to the representatives of what should be included in their debate, and to the citizens of what should be expected of debate by their representatives. It is not possible to specify to what extent Responsible Deliberation as a goal is attainable. First, of course, Responsible Deliberation must be accepted as a goal. If we can assume that Responsible Deliberation would serve democratic values, then all that is needed for its acceptance is the representatives' desire to promote these values. No radical institutional or procedural change is required. The critical factors are the attitudes and perspectives of the representatives, and the effects of these attitudes on the substance and quality of deliberation.

For Responsible Deliberation to be effective as a goal it would be helpful to restate the model as norm, in the form of guidelines for deliberation by representatives. In this form we can bring together all the principal recommendations we have suggested so that they may be considered as a whole and evaluated as a means of bringing the values
of deliberation in democratic decision-making into deliberation by the representative body. Because in our inquiry we developed only Proposition 5 in any detail, many of the guidelines are quite brief. Much more needs to be said, especially under I, IV, and V. The following, then, should be regarded only as a partial set of guidelines.

I. The representative shall try to establish as much direct contact with his constituents as is possible so that he can be kept informed of their individual interests, opinions, and values.

II. When an issue comes before the representative body the representative shall act as agent for his constituents' individual interests and values, introducing into the debate those interests and values relevant to the issue.
   A. The representative shall make every attempt to avoid selective perception of his constituents' interests and values. He shall also try to avoid any judgment, beyond their relevance to the issue, of what interests and values should or should not be introduced.
   B. At this stage the representative shall view his role as solely that of instructed delegate.

III. The representative shall avail himself of the data and expertise accessible to him. He shall have
sufficient information relating to both ends and means, and relating to the different positions on the issue, so that he can contribute to rational deliberation and resolution.

IV. The representative shall keep informed of strongly held feelings or positions held by a significant number of persons pertinent to particular resolutions of an issue. He shall consider the need for unity among the people, and make special efforts to devise a resolution of the issue which will not alienate any group of significant size.

V. The representative may be an advocate of a position on an issue, using whatever skills he may possess to promote his position in debate. But he shall at the same time be willing to modify his position and accommodate the views of others if necessary so that a consensual resolution is possible.

VI. The representative, recognizing that through the government the people gain a sense of themselves as a national community, and that the government is the instrument both for expressing national interests and values and for promoting these interests and values, shall accept his unique responsibility for incorporating the interests and values of the political community into the deliberation.
A. The representative shall look at every issue from the point of view of national interests and values, and introduce into debate those interests and values which seem to him to be relevant to the issue.

B. The representative shall include national interests and values as significant considerations in debate on political issues.

VII. So that deliberation on values will be meaningful, the representative shall follow the rules of normative discourse and value argumentation.

A. The representative shall discuss values rationally. He shall give and expect to be given reasons to support or reject a value, and, if necessary, to justify the original reasons.

B. The representative shall discuss and deal with values in a manner appropriate to certain features of values and their relationships.

1. He shall not assume or assert that any value is absolute. Since a value may be considered absolute *prima facie*, but in certain circumstances may not be an "actual" value, the representative shall apprise himself of the facts of any situation calling for a value determination, and then judge what are in fact the actual values in this case.
2. The representative shall translate values into the level of specificity suitable to weighing them against other values, and to relating them to proposed action.

3. The representative shall weigh the consequences of each issue resolution for all national values. Realizing that in any given situation values can conflict, he shall evaluate resolutions on the basis of which values would be advanced and which values would suffer by this advancement.

4. Since values can be only imperfectly realized, the representative shall judge resolutions by the degree of advancement toward value realization that they make possible.

5. The representative shall contribute to and encourage participation in the constant debate, re-endorsement, and reinterpretation of values which is needed if values are to retain their vitality and their relevance to the life of the community.

VIII. The representative shall include the claims of national interests and values in his weighing of all claims precedent to deciding an issue. He shall not consider any of these claims to be absolute. Whatever weight
he gives them shall be tentative, conditional, and subject to his own judgment of their importance to the issue. Insofar as he is able, however, he shall form his judgment from a national and not a personal perspective.
RESPONSIBLE DELIBERATION AND THE
VALUES OF DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION

When we first outlined the model of Responsible
Deliberation we remarked that the model was to be a norma­
tive one, and that we would be concerned about the extent to
which it would be possible for deliberation by the representa­
tive body to correspond to Responsible Deliberation.

After exploring the possibilities of such a
correspondence, we have concluded that no precise measure
can be given. If Responsible Deliberation is accepted as a
goal by the representatives, the requirements of certain of
the Propositions, or guidelines, can be fully met. Because
of the limited human resources of the representatives and
the exigency often associated with reaching a decision, the
requirements of the Propositions, or guidelines, can only be
approximated in varying degrees.

As a normative model Responsible Deliberation is
subject to two necessary limitations. Since participation
by all the citizens in the deliberation is precluded by
representative government, any value of democratic delibera­
tion will be diminished by the loss of direct participation.
And, as we have acknowledged, the potential for realizing
the values of democratic deliberation in a representative system cannot be achieved without a resolution of the problem of participation. Nevertheless, we suggest that, within the limitations just noted, the values of democratic deliberation would be retained in Responsible Deliberation.

If all the citizens are politically equal, each has the same right as every other to have his interests, opinions, and values brought into the deliberation, debated reasonably, and evaluated fairly in the working out of a decision on the issue. As a member of the political community each citizen also has the right to expect that the interests and values of the community will likewise be expressed, debated, and evaluated. Each has the right to expect that strong feelings he may have on a particular resolution be considered, as well, and that the eventual decision will be formulated so that it is acceptable to the citizenry.

Following the prescriptions of Responsible Deliberation, the representatives would ascertain and, acting as the people's agents, bring into deliberation all the relevant interests, opinions, and values of their constituents, including strong feelings any of them may have on a particular resolution of the issue. The representatives would inform themselves on the issue, be able to argue facts and values, and, to the best of their abilities, conduct reasonable debate, which
would include a consideration of all relevant interests, opinions, and values. The representatives would look at the issue from the point of view of community interests and values, and would consider these interests and values in their deliberation. The representatives would arrive at a resolution of the issue, through accommodation and compromise, which would be acceptable to the people. In their debate, evaluation, and working out of a decision, the representatives would take a broad perspective, acting as surrogates for all the people.

If these prescriptions were followed, we would argue that the values of democratic deliberation would be part of deliberation by the representative body insofar as the limitations of a representative system would allow.
CONCLUSION

Our model of Responsible Deliberation is a normative model. Any realization of Responsible Deliberation depends upon the will and dedication of the representatives that Responsible Deliberation be a goal of the representative body. This will and dedication depend, in turn, upon a commitment by the people to democratic values, and to the furtherance of these values in their political life.

There are ways, too, of maintaining and reinforcing this commitment. Government leaders can, by their attitudes and actions, nourish and strengthen the people's commitment to democratic values. There is a need as well for a continuing evaluation of the governmental process, so that through this process these values can become more of a reality in the life of the community. We have argued that national values are vital to the life of a national community, and that bringing these values into national debate is essential to insuring their continued vigor and relevance. If democratic values are national values they, too, must be discussed, re-examined, and re-endorsed.

To keep our commitment to democratic values meaningful, then, we need to relate them to issues which confront us, to
support them by our attitudes and actions, and to continue in our efforts to find new ways of realizing them in our political life. The concept of Responsible Deliberation is meant to be part of this effort.
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