CIA: AN APPRAISAL

by

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STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>&gt;Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Definition of Intelligence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence Cycle</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Problems</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of CIA</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requirement for CIA</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>THE ROLE OF CIA IN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clandestine Operations</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Importance of CIA's Activities</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>CIA ROLE IN POLICY MAKING</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nondiplomatic</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the CIA Make Policy?</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>CIA CONTROL BY DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secrecy</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Question of Control</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td></td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

Throughout presidential administrations from Washington to Nixon, intelligence collection, evaluation, analysis, and dissemination has made an important contribution to policymaking in the United States Government. Prior to the Cold War, the predominant opinion was that an intelligence agency was not needed or wanted in peacetime. However, since World War II, presidents have foreseen a requirement for an agency which would collect, overtly and covertly, intelligence data and would coordinate the information into a product which could be utilized by decision makers. Modern strategic warfare has necessitated a reduced response time to crises. There is no longer time to organize an intelligence structure to perform these tasks after a crisis situation has arisen. To satisfy this need for a continuous intelligence operation, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established.

The structure and activities of the Agency have always been the object of controversy and criticism. Not only does the Agency collect and produce intelligence, but it also conducts clandestine operations. Critics argue that it is incompatible for an intelligence organization involved in clandestine activities to operate from within a free, democratic society.

Utilizing a historical-analytical approach, this study will probe the validity of this concern. The inherent secrecy of the Agency, as well as the classified nature of its activities, make this the only feasible research method to employ. The premise of this study is that
it is vital for the United States Government to maintain an intelligence agency in peacetime as well as in wartime. The thesis will be that, due to the strategy employed by Cold War antagonists, the CIA must operate with a certain degree of secrecy from both the American people and a large contingent of the Government's officials. However, through numerous formal and informal controls imposed on the Agency, the CIA is prevented from becoming a threat to our free, democratic society.
CHAPTER I

GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE

King John: How goes all in France?
Messenger: From France to England, never such a power for any foreign preparation was levied in the body of a land. The copy of your speed is learned by them; for when you should be told they do prepare, by tidings come that they are all arrived.
King John: O, where hath our intelligence been drunk? Where hath it slept? ("Where Hath It Slept?" Dec. 11, 1960, p. 26)

Definition of Intelligence

From earliest history, intelligence information has been a vital factor in the schemes of men and nations. While faulty information has lost battles and wars, accurate intelligence data has often turned defeat into victory. In The Art of War, Sun Tsu defined intelligence as the foreknowledge that enabled a wise sovereign and good general to strike, conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men ("The Administration 'The Man With the Innocent Air,'" 1953, p. 12). This definition by a great tactician is no more satisfactory than many others that could be offered to emphasize that modern strategic intelligence, based on specialized information, encompasses world politics. The 1948 Eberstadt Report described intelligence as the "first line of defense" in the Atomic Age (Eberstadt et al. 1948). The Hoover Commission of 1955 formulated a definition which its members considered to be the standard description for governmental intelligence:
The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operations and which is immediately or potentially significant to planning (U. S. Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of Government 1955, hereafter referred to as U. S. Commission). The analysis of the intelligence community and specifically the CIA will, in this study, include a combination of the various definitions.

**Intelligence Cycle**

Although no single definition of intelligence has achieved universal acceptance, certain aspects of intelligence production remain constant. The intelligence cycle, whether intelligence estimates are formulated over a relatively long period of time or are produced under crisis conditions, incorporates four basic phases: collection, evaluation, analysis, and dissemination.

There must be data collection so that the problem can be defined. A collection plan is usually formulated to be used as a guide for organizing the collection effort. Included in the plan are the essential elements of information required, the collection agencies involved, and collection methods to be employed.

A combination of personal observation and technical collection methods are used to gather necessary information. The complexities and uncertainties of national behavior cause unavoidable errors of judgment by intelligence analysts. Because of the time involved and the
accuracy required, technical methods are used increasingly by collectors and analysts.

Information is collected by attaches, diplomats, scientists, tourists, refugees, defectors, etc. This data is derived from personal observation, publications, technical journals, and other overt sources. Both overt and covert intelligence collection is accomplished by using radio, radar, infrared sensors, and satellites. These technical methods are usually more reliable and less dangerous than collection by personal methods.

Whether information is collected overtly or covertly depends on the type of problem being considered and the availability of the data. Approximately 90% of all intelligence information is collected by overt methods. Normally the analyst does not dictate to the "field" collectors any specific procedures for obtaining required information. However, the rule of the intelligence analyst is not to require covert collection if overt methods will suffice (Zlotnik 1964, p. 15).

Governmental intelligence must furnish several different types of basic information to the decision makers. Potential plans and possible reactions to a course of action are vital data that should be available to policymakers. To gather this information, intelligence collectors must often penetrate a country's intelligence apparatus and obtain data covertly. Policymakers also require general background information on friendly and potentially unfriendly nations. This data includes economic conditions, transportation facilities, military geography, culture and history of the country and its people, biographical
sketches of leaders, policy motivation, natural resources, technical development, etc. In addition, the intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of a country affect decisions on national security and world stability. Both overt and covert methods are used to collect this valuable information (Zlotnik 1964, p. iii).

Subsequent to information collection, the data must be evaluated. This is done to determine the pertinence, credibility, reliability, and accuracy of the information. To aid the intelligence analyst, the information reported usually contains a "field" evaluation of the source's reliability. Information is then rated with the assistance of a reliability code such as the one below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appraisal of Source</th>
<th>Appraisal of Content</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Completely true</td>
<td>1. Confirmed by other source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Usually reliable</td>
<td>2. Probably true</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Fairly reliable</td>
<td>3. Possibly true</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Not usually reliable</td>
<td>4. Doubtful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Unreliable</td>
<td>5. Improbable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Reliability cannot be judged</td>
<td>6. Truth cannot be judged</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Overt sources provide a large portion of the reliable information. In many cases, conclusions reached by intelligence analysts are not appreciably different from those that could be reached by scholars using information available in university libraries.

The next step in the intelligence cycle is analysis (Zlotnik 1964). Information is examined to distinguish component parts and to
determine interrelationships; known information is combined with recently collected data, and the information is then ready for interpretation. The probable meaning and significance of the information is predicted in terms of past, present, and future factors. Because this stage is so important, electronic data-processing has been gradually replacing human judgment. Gaming and mathematical measuring are faster and more accurate. The demand on the human analyst to produce rapid, honest, and objective intelligence estimates becomes greater as world problems become more complex. In order to produce a cogent, reasoned, concise, and carefully researched estimate, the assistance of electronic data-processing is invaluable (Zlotnik 1964, p. 66).

Dissemination is the final step in the intelligence cycle. Interpreted information in written or oral form must be made available to the decision makers. This information can be in the form of a warning of impending trouble or a guide on which policy can be based. A considerable part of the national intelligence effort is devoted to a watch for symptoms of imminent hostilities. The Watch Committee of the National Indications Center is responsible for this function. This Committee acquaints decision makers with any current information which is of immediate importance. The information is furnished to policymakers in a "raw" form without evaluation or interpretation. Although the intelligence apparatus can operate on a crisis basis, the information produced daily is sufficient for most decisions.

In addition to furnishing intelligence for crisis situations, general information to assist policymakers in formulating long-range
plans must be provided (Scott and Harrison 1965, p. 459). Not only is information furnished prior to decision making but also after the fact. Data supporting a decision that has already been made is termed "back-stopping." Under modern political conditions the most important task of intelligence is to supply governmental decision makers with complete, timely, and accurate information on any situation at any time.

While intelligence prediction has not been infallible, the estimator can make claim to something better than mere "soothsaying." The analyst knows a country's declared intentions; he understands that a country has limited capabilities; he identifies alternate courses of action; and he predicts probable courses of action and estimates their consequences. The future role of the intelligence services will be to keep policymakers fully and accurately informed of anything happening or about to happen—politically, economically, or militarily—in the world (Kirkpatrick 1968, p. 283).

Problems

Intelligence prediction is not and probably never can be a precise profession. Unless all information on a situation is known, it is difficult if not impossible to forecast with any certainty what will happen in the future. There are always intangibles, unpredictables, and unknowableables. The best the analyst can do is to keep a relatively high "batting average." Under ideal circumstances, intelligence can do little more than define a general level or area of tension. Even with these difficulties, governmental decision makers often expect precise prediction (Kirkpatrick 1968, p. 102).
Intelligence services are hampered by external problems. Governmental criticism and political pressures are two of these. Because intelligence requires a large outlay in personnel, equipment, and money, proper operation of the system is of great concern. Certain operations must be conducted in secret; thus, when embarrassing incidents or failures occur, intelligence services become the object of criticism. Their clandestine activities are questioned, investigations are conducted, and changes in operational methods are demanded. Intelligence officers can become frustrated because they cannot release information which could dispel the criticism and exonerate their actions.

Another external problem is diplomatic maneuvering. National objectives cannot be attained when policy decisions are implemented by agencies operating on assumptions which are contrary to the decisions. Mrs. Roberta Wohlstetter has written (Toma and Gyorgy 1967, p. 340): "The uncertainty of strategic warning is intrinsic since planners may reverse their decisions or undertake last minute changes in the nature of their actions."

In addition to external problems, intelligence services can be plagued with internal difficulties. The intelligence apparatus is complicated by the scale of its activities. The system not only collects data and produces estimates but is also used for clandestine operations. Because the intelligence apparatus must include several different functions, it can be a victim of its own operation. Information can be collected and interpreted by the same organization which will implement decisions based on this data. This produces a serious
occupational hazard: prejudice. It is very difficult to objectively evaluate information about a situation while being operationally involved. Intelligence can be slanted to favor the operation. The result could be either a "technical" or "behavioral" surprise which could endanger national security. Both could be caused by a lack of information or by faulty analysis furnished to decision makers.

"Technical" surprise occurs when an opponent is successful in concealing a particular capability or course of action. "Behavioral" surprise occurs when an opponent's behavior is incompatible, or seems to be incompatible, with a set of expectations. Post mortems of past intelligence failures frequently show that inefficiency is a result of faulty analysis rather than non-availability of information (Zlotnik 1964, p. 37). Although this could be an honest error, it could also be caused by subjective or prejudicial judgment.

Establishment of CIA

Although there are inherent problems in any intelligence organization, history has shown that a nation cannot survive without an active intelligence system which operates in peacetime as well as wartime.

The long and--until World War II--sporadic history of American intelligence is almost unknown to most people, and even when it is known, it is unwillingly acknowledged. Through the years, the United States Presidents who have borne the responsibility for national security have made statements that acknowledged the existence of both overt
and covert intelligence activities and have revealed the importance of those activities which support governmental policies and operations.

The modern United States intelligence organization, the CIA, had its origin in the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Former President Truman has stated (Truman 1956, p. 56): "The war taught us this lesson--that we had to collect intelligence in a manner that would make information available where it was needed and when it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form."

Before World War II, the highest echelon of United States intelligence was at departmental level. There was no mechanism to provide the President and those who assisted him in formulating national policy with coordinated intelligence analysis. During World War II the Central Office of Information was established. It was patterned after the British intelligence apparatus and was headed by General William J. Donovan. A split over the question of the propriety of propaganda activities in an intelligence organization occurred, and the section which retained these activities became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). General Donovan, perhaps the most brilliant intelligence officer since George Washington, became the OSS Director.

The first center of area studies in the United States Government was located in the OSS. Not only did the Office's personnel collect and produce intelligence information, but they also conducted code-breaking and clandestine operations for the Department of War. The OSS made a lasting impact by the stimulus it gave to the use of scholarly techniques in intelligence analysis and to the implementation
of a coordinated intelligence system. Hundreds of academicians, many of whom later served as officials in the CIA, first proposed a centralized national intelligence community while assigned to the OSS. The lessons of Pearl Harbor and World War II were well learned (Zlotnik 1964, p. 1,2).

Former President Truman wrote in his memoirs (Presidents of the United States on Intelligence 1964, p. 10): "On becoming President, I found that the needed intelligence information was not coordinated at any one place. Reports came across my desk on the same subject at different times from the various departments, and these reports often conflicted." As a result of this situation, Truman decided to establish a central intelligence organization. Before this could be accomplished many questions had to be answered and diverse opinions had to be considered. What authority would and should the new organization have? What agencies should be disbanded or centralized? What function should the new agency perform? What check should be placed on the agency's activities? After much debate and compromise, a central intelligence agency was established.

On 20 January 1946, President Truman issued an Executive Order establishing the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). The Group was placed under the supervision of a National Intelligence Authority whose members included the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Group's structure was based on General Donovan's vision of a central intelligence organ responsible for producing national intelligence. The new organization operated on two basic
principles: its mission was primarily to coordinate intelligence produced by the various governmental departments, and it would perform only those other functions which the National Intelligence Authority decided could best be achieved centrally. The Executive Order establishing the Group directed the other government organizations to cooperate (Kent 1949, p. 78):

Within limits of available appropriations, you shall each from time to time assign persons and facilities from your respective Department, which persons shall collectively form a CIG and shall under direction of the Director of CI assist the National Intelligence Authority. The Director of CI shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof.

The 1947 National Security Act created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to replace the CIG and placed this new agency under the newly formed National Security Council (NSC). Former President Truman reminisced (Hillman 1952, p. 14):

One of the basic things I did was to set up the CIA. Admirals Leahy and Souers, and the State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce Department all helped me to set it up. Strange as it may seem, the President up to that time was not completely informed as to what was taking place in the world. Messages that came to the different departments of the executive branch often were not relayed to him because some official did not think it was necessary to inform the President.

The CIA basically operates under the NSC in the following manner: When the Council is considering a certain policy, it requests the CIA to present an estimate of the effects such a policy may have. The Director of the CIA sits with the NSC staff and reports any developments. The estimates he submits represent the judgment of the CIA and a cross section of the CIA's advisory councils. The Secretary of State
makes a final recommendation using the information submitted, and this recommendation is then forwarded to the President for final approval.

Although the CIA was originally patterned after the OSS, it has gradually evolved into an organization with four primary tasks: intelligence production, foreign espionage, counterespionage, and a variety of secret functions best termed "political warfare." In order to perform these tasks, the CIA is divided into several major departments. The intelligence and planning division collects information and implements operations using both covert and overt methods. The science and technology division conducts research and analysis and indexes evaluated information. The support division appraises all incoming information and prepares estimates on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis (New York Times, April 26, 1966)

The individuals who perform the Agency's functions are unique in both role and character. The CIA Director, who reports directly to the President, is the one man in Washington from whom the President can obtain the intelligence viewpoint. His report contains a complete account of all military, diplomatic, and economic information plus a digest of all cables that have arrived during the day. The Director must be a combination of administrative expert, imaginative scholar, courageous master spy, political sensitivist, master judge, and nonpartisan politician. He performs four primary tasks. He coordinates the Agency's activities with the Bureau of the Budget. He is the principal intelligence officer of the United States who works with foreign intelligence services and governments. He is the personification of the United
States intelligence effort and the President's "right-hand man" (Kirkpatrick 1968, p. 277-78). During the years of the CIA's development, the power of the Director has increased. He has the right, without Civil Service control, to hire and fire employees. The 1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law which would require the disclosure of its functions, official titles, salaries, or number of personnel. Public Law 110 gave the Director full authority to spend any amount, using a personal voucher, without furnishing an accounting of the appropriations. The period of the Director's greatest power was during the Dulles-Wisner-Bissellera. The CIA was dominated by the "Bold Easterners" who had attended Ivy League schools, had money of their own, and had a spirit of "derring-do" combined with a willingness to take risks. These individuals tended to favor the clandestine function of the Agency. During the Kennedy Administration, the "Bold Easterners" were replaced by the "Prudent Professionalss." These individuals were bureaucrats who were more concerned with the Agency's coordination and administrative functions than with clandestine operations (Alsop 1968). The more recent Directors, including Richard Helm, have continued this latter tradition.

In addition to the Director and Deputy Director, the CIA employs approximately 16,000 people. One of the CIA's biggest problems is recruitment of qualified personnel. The Agency's prime requirement is for young men and women with liberal arts training and a strong sense of history. They should be keenly aware of the forces of economics and politics and be fluent in at least one foreign language. Intelligence, resourcefulness, personality, persuasiveness, willingness
to work anonymously, and willingness to serve in any foreign country are prerequisites. The CIA's campus recruitment problem has been made a public issue. The Agency does not advertise but depends on personal contact. Problems and failures in recruitment are publicized by the mass media, but the CIA attempts to avoid disclosure of the names of personnel successfully recruited (Sofokidis 1967, p. 3).

The statement has been made that there are more liberal intellectuals "per square inch" in the CIA than anywhere else in government. The educational background of the employees spans several different fields (New York Times April 26, 1966, p. 30).

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<tr>
<th>Field</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sociological Sciences</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Administration</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Science and Math</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological Life Science and related fields</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and Military Science</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximately 18% of the CIA's professional employees have had experience in education. The Agency would be able to staff any college from its corps of analysts, half of whom have advanced degrees. A majority of the employees have a Bachelor of Arts degree; 16% have a Master of Arts degree, and 5% have a Doctor of Philosophy degree. Each year several thousand CIA employees attend some type of non-Agency program in management, science, language, area studies, liberal arts, or certain technical fields. Nearly half of the CIA personnel have served more than 15 years and approximately 75% are over 35 years old. This is an eloquent testimonial to the dedication of the CIA's employees and to the fact that criticism of the Agency has not affected their morale.
The goal of the CIA's Director and employees is to perform as well in peacetime as in wartime and to furnish vital intelligence information to planners who provide for United States security (Sofokidis 1967, p. 3,4).

The National Security Act tasked the CIA with five basic functions (Ransom 1965a, p. 79):

1. Advise the NSC on intelligence related to national security.
2. Make recommendations to the NSC for coordination of intelligence activities of department and agencies of government.
3. Correlate and evaluate intelligence and provide for its appropriate dissemination within the government.
4. Perform additional services determined by the NSC that can be done centrally.
5. Perform other functions and duties relating to national security intelligence as the NSC directs.

It is the responsibility of the CIA to collect, evaluate, collate, and interpret a vast amount of intelligence information from all over the world which the President must have in order to make the decisions required in times of peace or national danger. The Agency is geared to receive information, evaluate it, and produce intelligence 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Nobody in the CIA from the Director to the lowest employee is guaranteed a night's uninterrupted sleep or an unbroken weekend.

The CIA has been made the guardian of national intelligence production, the advisor to the United States strategic planners, and
the coordinator of the United States intelligence system. Former President Truman summarized the CIA's importance in these words (Presidents 1964, p. 12):

We have the CIA, and all the intelligence information agencies in all the rest of the departments of government, coordinated by the CIA. This Agency puts the information of vital importance to the President in his hands . . . . You are the organization, you are the intelligence area that keeps the Executive informed so he can make decisions that always will be in the public interest for his own country. . . . Those of you who are deep in the CIA know what goes on around the world - know what is necessary for the President to know every morning. . . . It is necessary that you make that contribution for the welfare and benefit of your government.

Requirement for CIA

Oleg Penkovskiy (1965, p. 102) in the Penkovskiy Papers stated:

"We [Russia] spy everywhere. There is no country on earth where we do not have our intelligence officers recruiting, arranging meetings, doing everything possible to establish permanent networks - Whether the country is friendly or not is not important. We spy on neutrals as much as we spy on the NATO countries." The GRU, Russia's foreign intelligence network, has three main divisions: strategic, operational, and combat. Not only does the GRU conduct military, political, economic, and scientific intelligence activities, but also propaganda, provocations, black-mailing, terroristic acts, and sabotage. Due to the nature of these intelligence activities, many are performed covertly. Russian philosophy advocates that espionage and covert operations are a necessary and appropriate activity of government.

Russian intelligence personnel are selected in several ways for various reasons. Candidates are recommended by the local Communist
Party or can be transferred from a non-intelligence position within the party organization. Personnel are also chosen because they have an established official "cover." Many of these persons have important social and political connections both inside and outside Russia (Penkovskiy 1965).

Many individuals in the late 1940's believed that, in order to compete with this regimented, highly effective intelligence system, a central intelligence organization should be established. The advent of Cold War diplomacy brought about the need for a centralized system which would coordinate collected information and disseminate the finished product to the decision makers. To perform this function, it is necessary that information be collected covertly as well as overtly. Important strategic and tactical plans and intentions of opposing nations are classified. In this era of international competition, any nation that can obtain this information has the advantage. This advantage could mean survival.

Covert collection of information is not a unique idea. In 1777 General George Washington (Presidents 1964, p. 2) told his Intelligence Chief, Colonel Ellas Dayton: "The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged--all that remains for me to add is that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favorable issue."
The prominent role of intelligence in decision making and Cold War competition has been expressed by two former Presidents who served during times of Cold War diplomacy and national crises. In a 1961 letter to Allen Dulles, President Eisenhower (Presidents 1964, p. 19) wrote: "As I think you know, I wish you and your associates in the CIA well in the tremendously important job you do for our country. Upon the work of your organization there is an almost frightening responsibility." In April 1965, President Johnson ("What's CIA?" 1966, p. 80) stated: "We have committed our lives, our property, our resources, and our secret honor to the freedom and peace of all mankind. We would disgrace all the sacrifices Americans have made, if we were not every hour of every day vigilant against every threat to peace and freedom. That is why we have the CIA."
CHAPTER II

THE ROLE OF CIA IN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Coordination

Intelligence shares with all other governmental activities the conditioning effect of prevailing organizational ideas and habits. Coordination is a primary function of organizational structure. The CIA is, by law, the central point of coordination for intelligence information collected by both the Agency and other governmental departments. The United States intelligence community, which comprises a variety of activities and agencies, is dependent on the principle of cooperative action.

The 1947 National Security Act tasked the CIA with responsibility for central intelligence coordination and national intelligence production. In order to perform these activities, the Agency uses many different methods. The CIA obtains information from all intelligence collection agencies and combines the data into an intelligence viewpoint. The Agency performs the necessary coordinating functions which will insure vigorous, logical performance of various operations involving strategic intelligence production. In addition, the CIA must establish clear jurisdictions for the various departmental intelligence organizations and then police these areas. This is necessary to avoid duplication and disagreement. The Agency manages most interdepartmental
projects, regulates personnel policies, and performs any other activity which the National Security Council directs (Kent 1949, p. 91-107).

National intelligence produced in the United States Government represents the coordinated views of the entire intelligence community. Although the CIA is the final arbitrator and editor of the coordinated intelligence estimate, a spirit of teamwork governs the interagency, intelligence relationship. On occasion the CIA must collect and produce intelligence information which it cannot obtain from other sources; however, this action does not supplant the work of other agencies. The information collected from all sources within the intelligence community is evaluated, analyzed and interpreted and, with final CIA approval, presented to the policymakers as daily reports and national estimates. During this coordination process, the Agency does not commit itself to any one choice of alternatives. This makes the intelligence estimate as objective and free from bias as possible (Kirkpatrick 1968, p. 263-64).

In order to supervise the activities of the various intelligence-community agencies and to produce the national estimate, the CIA must pursue a coordination policy with all levels of Government including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Defense (DOD), the State Department, the Intelligence Advisory Board, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), the National Security Council (NSC), and the President.

There is close cooperation between the CIA and the FBI. They keep each other informed on items of mutual interest and concern. Both are active in combating international conspiracy and national subversion.
Conspirators often alternate between the United States and their native country. Each agency furnishes the other with information about the activities of these agents and aids in their capture. Although it is understood that the CIA should be restricted to foreign operations, the Agency's domestic activity has become so extensive that a special section, the Domestic Operations Division, was created to direct activity in this area. The Division does not usurp the FBI's domestic authority but is used as an auxiliary branch of the Agency's foreign operations section. Personnel who work in the department interview refugees, aid defectors, and coordinate foreign espionage activities. The CIA is restrained, by law, from having any police force or internal security power. Although there is cooperation between the two agencies, each has a definite responsibility in a different area of national interest (Kirkpatrick 1968, p. 80).

The CIA is the central agency for all governmental intelligence; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is the central coordination agency for all defense information.

The 1948 Eberstadt Report recommended that a central authority be established in the DOD to coordinate information produced by the various branches of the military and to produce the DOD's national intelligence input. This was finally accomplished in 1961 when the DIA was established.

The DIA assumed responsibility for coordination of all requirements for intelligence issued to or from the Pentagon; for production of the DOD daily intelligence report; and for preparation of the DOD
contribution to the national estimate. Although these were the DIA's official functions, the agency's activities overlapped the CIA's operations in certain areas, especially that of covert, operational intelligence. During the early McNamara era, the DIA served as an independent, bureaucratic agency supervised by no one outside the Pentagon. The CIA viewed the DIA as a powerful rival. No longer, however, does the CIA consider the DIA as a competitor, partly because the DIA is simply no match for the CIA in terms of expertise and professionalism. In addition, the DIA's early efforts in the operational field were so meager or inept that the CIA soon relaxed. Currently, there is a close and effective relationship between the agencies for each realizes that national security and survival considerations must transcend departmental jealousy (Alsop 1968, p. 246-48).

Between the State Department and the CIA, there is an immediate and often automatic exchange of important intelligence data. Political intelligence furnished by the State Department constitutes a major input to national intelligence production. The Intelligence and Research Bureau provides an analysis of the information collected by the department.

Overt intelligence collection is largely the State Department's responsibility. Covert collection activities are shunned by State Department personnel since their task is to operate openly, utilizing diplomatic methods. Clandestine operations could damage the department's image in international politics and could compromise its personnel and policies.
Although a good relationship between the two agencies is mutually desired, certain problems do exist. In the past the CIA has tended to regard the intelligence product of the department as "academic" research rather than intelligence evaluation. Additionally, leadership and mutual respect within the intelligence community have created problems. Since both are active in foreign operations, though using diverse methods, policy and personal clashes have resulted. However, even though there are differences, as with the DOD, personal and policy disagreements have been sacrificed to the more important intelligence goal (Dulles 1965, p. 56-57).

The Intelligence Advisory Committee's membership includes representatives from the State Department, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Atomic Energy Committee (AEC) and the FBI. The Committee is chairmanned by the CIA Director and is authorized to formulate final conclusions concerning the meaning of current intelligence (Knappen 1956, p. 175).

The highest ranking committee under the NSC is the USIB. As the review board for the intelligence community, its members analyze all relevant intelligence data, supervise certain substantive intelligence operations, and solve administrative problems within the intelligence community. Six intelligence organizations are represented on the Board: CIA, AEC, FBI, DOD, National Security Agency, and the State Department. These members establish guidelines and priorities for the intelligence collection effort. The CIA Director was originally both the chairman of the Board and the Agency's representative on the Board.
This allowed the Director to participate in policy discussion and also exercise final approval authority for the same policy. Currently the Director acts only as Board chairman while the Deputy Director of the CIA has replaced the Director as a Board member. It is debatable whether this change accomplished the desired end.

The CIA's role in matters of intelligence interpretation is largely one of molding the estimates of the other USIB agencies in order to reach a consensus (Zlotnik 1964, p. 5-7). The CIA's responsibility to the USIB was outlined by former President Kennedy in a letter to the CIA Director, John McCone:

> As the government's principal intelligence officer, you will assure the proper coordination, correlation, and evaluation of intelligence from all sources, and its prompt dissemination to me and to other recipients as appropriate . . . work closely with heads of all departments and agencies having responsibility in the foreign intelligence field . . . chairman the USIB, assuring efficient and effective operation of the Board and associated bodies and maintain a continuing review of programs and activities of the United States agencies engaged in foreign intelligence with a view to assuring efficiency and effectiveness and avoiding undesirable duplication (U.S. Congress 1962, p. 37).

The function of the NSC is to advise the President with respect to integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies which relate to national security. Statutory members of the NSC include the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Director of Emergency Planning, and the Director of the CIA. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs acts as executive officer for the NSC, and the President presides as chairman. Although the National Security Act placed the CIA under direct supervision by the NSC, the Director still has immediate, direct access to
the President without first reporting to the Council (Zlotnik 1964, p. 3,4).

The final link in the chain of coordination is the President. He is the CIA's ultimate supervisor. Most of the President's policy decisions are based on information which the CIA has directly or indirectly collected, interpreted, edited, coordinated, and disseminated.

The two most important products of the CIA's coordination efforts within the intelligence community are the National Intelligence Survey and the National Intelligence Estimate.

The Survey is an encyclopedia of facts on all the countries in which the United States has an interest. It is ten times the size of the Encyclopedia Britannica. In most cases, the information on each country is organically separable and can be published in part rather than as a composite product (Zlotnik 1964, p. 43).

The National Intelligence Estimate is produced by a nine-member Board of National Estimate which is chairmanned by the CIA Director. The Estimate is the most authoritative report on national intelligence and is intended to present a detailed interpretation of information which the President can use as a guide in policymaking.

Although not analogous to a Supreme Court decision, the Estimate does represent the result of intelligence coordination at the highest level. Criticisms and comments from authorities are invited even after the Estimate is published. Any disagreement with the report's content is footnoted in the Estimate. The CIA refines and edits the Estimate before final publication. These national estimates are
invaluable to decision makers when considering policies which affect national security (Zlotnik 1964, p. 33).

Coordination, vitally important to the intelligence community, is usually achieved but not without problems. The 1948 Eberstadt Commission reported that the CIA was sound in principle but needed improvement in practice. Better lateral teamwork was required in the relations among the various intelligence contributors. Satisfactory coordination was not achieved within the intelligence community (Eberstadt et al., 1948, p. 74-76).

Although many problems have been corrected since 1948, several still exist. Due to the need for consensus in the intelligence community's final estimate, the reports may be "watered-down," or exceptions may be relegated to footnotes. Vagueness can result, and important information may be ignored by policymakers. Another problem occurs because upper-echelon personnel tend to place greater credence in reports produced in their own department rather than on reports submitted by other intelligence community members. Reliance on an outside intelligence agency, the CIA, causes anxiety and reluctance within other departments. If a department official has a choice, he will usually accept the conclusions of his departmental analysts (Sapin 1966, p. 322). Perhaps the greatest problem of intelligence coordination lies in the formidable task of insuring that all individuals and departments which have an interest in the information actually do receive it. This can best be illustrated by examining the intelligence effort during the Korean War.
The CIA was still a young organization and was suffering from bureaucratic "growing pains." The Agency was primarily responsible for obtaining information concerning the North Korean and Chinese Communist plans.

General MacArthur's forces were moving north without too much opposition, but there was considerable speculation about the likelihood of the Chinese taking some action in North Korea. On October 20, 1951, the CIA delivered a memorandum to President Truman which predicted that the Chinese would move into Korea far enough to safeguard the Suiko electric plant and other power installations along the Yalu River. Throughout the following spring, the CIA reported that the North Koreans might at any time decide to change their tactics from isolated raids to a full-scale attack with the aid of Chinese troops (Truman 1956, p. 331, 372). Although information about certain Chinese and North Korean plans was known, the exact time of an invasion could not be predicted. From available accounts, information concerning an imminent invasion was received; however, this vital data was not coordinated with the proper officials.

The chief criticism of the intelligence community was that crucial intelligence information was available within the State Department, Defense Department, and the CIA but was not utilized. The departments merely routed the "raw" intelligence around to the appropriate agencies without producing a joint intelligence estimate. The CIA, which was responsible for a coordinated effort, never organized the intelligence
collectors so that a national intelligence estimate could be produced (Ransom 1965a, p. 133).

In testimony before a Senate investigation committee, CIA Director, Rear Admiral Hellenkoetter, asserted that the CIA knew that a heavy concentration of Chinese troops had gathered at the border. He insisted that the CIA's role had been to report the information but not to concern itself with the end result. This same investigation disclosed the following exchange (Ransom 1964, p. 155):

Senator Saltonstall: They really fooled us when it comes right down to it; didn't they?
Secretary of State Acheson: Yes, sir.

In retrospect the "surprise" attack was not so much a failure of intelligence as the incorrect use of it. The intelligence collectors did supply a copious amount of information that could have alerted policymakers to the existing dangers. However, adequate use was not made of available information or coordination channels.

Clandestine Operations

Like a giant octopus it extends its tentacles into all corners of the earth, supports a tremendous number of spies and secret informants, continually organizes plots and murders, provocations, and diversions (Penkovskiy 1965, p. 384).

The prosecutor's remarks at the trial of former Russian intelligence chief, Oleg Penkovskiy, illustrate the Russian propaganda "line" concerning the CIA's clandestine operations. Although the Agency's activities are exaggerated in this statement, it does indicate the concern of the Russian officials. Regardless of the propaganda position of either country, both realize that these activities do exist and will
continue as long as each perceives a danger to its national security from potential "secret intentions" of the other.

The CIA's two primary roles within the intelligence community differ greatly. Coordination is dependent upon the cooperation of all members of the community. The Agency's activities are performed in secret. In addition, the goal of each role is different. The goal of intelligence coordination is to produce an estimate to be used as a guideline by decision makers. The goal of clandestine activities is to covertly collect vital information which cannot be obtained overtly and to covertly implement operations that are necessary for United States national and international policy achievement and whose success could not be attained diplomatically.

The CIA employs various methods to perform its covert operations. CIA cameras and other detecting equipment have been placed in United States spacecraft to collect information from nations that have closed societies and are potential enemies. "Black Radio" activities are another method utilized. The Agency receives and transmits secret messages and covertly monitors and records international radio broadcasts. Subversion of both individuals and countries is another CIA activity. The Agency assists defectors to escape and then uses these individuals to obtain information about conditions in their prior homelands. In addition, the CIA is active in "spontaneous" coup d'etat and revolutions within various countries. These efforts are timed to meet the requirements of the internal situation, the international political situation, and United States foreign policy objectives (Blackstock 1964,
All of these activities are performed under the supervision of the National Security Council and the President and are implemented to promote United States national and international interests.

There is an inherent difficulty in obtaining information about clandestine activities: their secret nature. Unless classified information is released by the agencies involved, or disclosed by an inquiring free press, credence cannot be lent to speculation concerning the CIA's covert collection and operational activities. Throughout the years of the Agency's existence, the CIA has been accused of involvement in various foreign governments' operations and of failure in its collection efforts. It is impossible to accurately evaluate the CIA's activities since its failures are usually exposed publicly while its successes often go unheralded. The following is a list of both collection and operational covert activities that have been attributed to the CIA:

**COLLECTION**

1. In 1947 the CIA reported the imminent Soviet move into Greece and Turkey. The Agency was asked to prepare an estimate of the situation. This was presented to the White House on March 3, 1947, together with an evaluation which was prepared by the State Department. The result of this CIA estimate was the Truman Doctrine.

2. In 1948 the CIA failed to provide accurate information on developments in Palestine.

3. In 1948 the CIA failed to predict the uprising in Columbia.
4. In 1948 the CIA failed to predict the fall of Czechoslovakia.

5. In 1948 the CIA failed to predict and to evaluate the meaning of Tito's defection.

6. In 1948 the CIA failed to anticipate the rapid disintegration of the Chinese Kuomintang (Farrago 1954, p. 102-115).

7. The CIA predicted that Russia would develop the A-bomb by 1951. Russia developed the bomb in 1949.

8. In 1954 the CIA discovered secret, test missile sites in Russia.

9. In 1955 the CIA precipitated a "bomber panic" reporting that Russia had many more bombers than the United States. This was later proven erroneous.

10. Critics have accused the CIA of failure to notify the United States Government of the impending 1956 French-British, Suez invasion. Certain government officials have stated that the attack was no surprise. This question is still debated.

11. In 1956 the CIA obtained Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin. Allen Dulles considers this his greatest coup.

12. The CIA failed to predict the 1956 Hungarian uprising.

13. The CIA failed to predict the launching of the first Sputnik in 1957. This was not an authentic failure since the Agency did know that Russia had the capability.

14. The CIA failed to predict the outbreak of hostility in South America during Vice President Nixon's 1958 visit.
15. In 1959 the CIA perpetrated a "phony missile" gap.


17. The CIA failed to predict the Russian atom tests in 1961.

18. In 1962 the CIA furnished information about the Soviet missile build-up in Cuba which enabled the United States to gain an international diplomatic victory ("U.S. Intelligence" 1963).

**OPERATIONS**

1. The CIA, behind a front organization, the Western Enterprises, Inc., trained and equipped Nationalist Chinese troops for espionage and commando raids on mainland China.

2. The CIA supported the guerrilla, Nationalist Chinese troops that had fled to Burma after World War II. These troops conducted raids into China from their Burmese base. Burma repeatedly requested the troops to leave; however, this was not accomplished until 1961. Afterward Burma turned leftward.

3. The CIA supported the coup that ousted King Farouk and brought Nasser to power. The Agency later encouraged Premier Naguiik, but it was too late.

4. The CIA plotted the coup which ousted Mossadegh from Iran and brought Shah Pahlevi to power. This is generally considered a success since Mossadegh was anti-American.

5. The CIA established an independent intelligence organization in West Germany under Reinhard Gehlen. Gehlen sent agents into East Germany during the 1953 riots.
6. The CIA is credited with supporting Armas in his successful attempt to overthrow the Red regime in Guatemala.

7. The CIA built an underground tunnel into East Berlin and tapped the Soviet-East Germany telephone lines.

8. During the Hungarian uprising, Gehlen and the CIA supplied arms to the revolutionaries.

9. The CIA urged military intervention in Lebanon.

10. The Singapore premier, Lee Kuan Yew, accused the CIA of subverting and bribing his country's security officers. The United States denied this charge, but Lee produced a letter from Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, which indicated guilt.

11. The CIA supported General Phoumi Nosavan in Laos (de Gramont 1962, p. 31).

12. The CIA was accused of supporting the rightist army in the Algerian revolt. Although never proven, this charge led to strained relations between France and the United States.

13. The CIA provoked the 1965 war between India and Pakistan.

14. The CIA is feared by normally rational Africans due to the Agency's activities on that continent.

15. The CIA contaminated sugar being shipped from Puerto Rico to Russia.

16. The CIA plotted to assassinate Nehru.

17. The CIA has been accused of murdering Patrice Lumumba.

18. The CIA was accused of kidnapping Moroccan agents who were in Paris.
19. The CIA plotted to overthrow Nhrumah.

20. The CIA engineered the Indonesian coup.

21. The CIA provides technical assistance to Latin American countries and helps to establish anti-Communist police forces. This is criticized because the CIA is often upholding a dictatorship that is corrupt.


Positive evidence of the CIA's involvement in many of the previously listed activities cannot be provided. However, three operations for which the CIA was primarily responsible and for which sufficient documentation is available are the U-2 flights, the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the student subsidy program. These operations will be examined emphasizing the methods utilized and results derived from three of the CIA's most publicized activities.

Prior to initiating the U-2 flights, President Eisenhower worried about Russia's reaction when the flights were discovered. Despite misgivings, Eisenhower decided to implement the flights, subsequent to Russia's denunciation of the "Open Skies" proposal. The flights were made at high altitude over Russia and other potentially unfriendly countries to gather information unavailable through other sources. Khrushchev had known about these flights but had done nothing because he had no missiles that could be effective against the high-altitude U-2. Not until he could present proof of these flights would
he make his move and capitalize on the propaganda value to be gained by the exposure of United States spying.

The CIA had prepared a list of possible questions and suggested answers to be used as a guideline for press releases in case the flights were discovered. These releases were to be cleared through the State Department and the CIA before they were announced. This was not done after Gary Powers' U-2 plane was shot down. Even though Khrushchev had released a speech reporting the U-2's capture, the United States Government decided to keep the "cover" story that the U-2 was actually a weather plane. James Hagerty, Eisenhower's press secretary, implicated NASA, even though it had been decided that only the State Department would make official comment. Pressed by the reporters, NASA made a hasty statement drafted from the CIA form sheet, a statement which was not cleared through the CIA, State Department, or the White House (Wise and Ross 1962, p. 49-85).

After Khrushchev produced the partially destroyed U-2 at an international press conference, Eisenhower broke the first rule of espionage and admitted United States involvement. In addition, he maintained that the United States had a right to continue these operations. Our allies as well as our enemies were surprised and disgusted at Eisenhower's action. One country simply does not declare that it has the right to spy on another, even if these activities do exist. Foreign relations are, after all, supposed to be conducted in an open diplomatic forum according to international statecraft rules.
Premier Khrushchev used the U-2 incident to ruin the scheduled Paris Summit Conference. This conference was organized in an attempt to reach an agreement between Russia and the United States for the cessation of nuclear testing. Instead, Khrushchev utilized the conference as a propaganda forum. Allen Dulles later stated that Khrushchev used the U-2 incident to "torpedo" the Paris Summit Conference because he was not ready to talk seriously about the main topic--Berlin. Although Eisenhower indicated that he might continue the U-2 flights, they were not resumed. President Kennedy (Public Papers 1962, p. 8) issued the following statement on 25 January 1961, soon after his inauguration: "Flights of American aircraft penetrating air space of the Soviet Union have been suspended since May 1960 - I have ordered that they not be resumed." "On March 17, 1960 I ordered the CIA to begin to organize training of Cuban exiles, mainly in Guatemala, against a possible future day when they might return to their homeland" (Eisenhower 1965, p. 533).

In 1960 the "special group," including representatives from the CIA, State Department, the Pentagon, and the White House, met at the direction of President Eisenhower, to plan the Bay of Pigs invasion. After Kennedy became President in January 1961, he authorized the CIA to continue the plans begun under Eisenhower. However, he warned that he might discontinue the operation at any time.

Although this was a "secret" operation, word of the impending invasion was "leaked" to the press. Many accusations were made concerning the sources of these leaks, the CIA being publicized as the
most probable offender. The responsible party destroyed the invasion's element of surprise, forced President Kennedy to issue false statements, and caused, in part, the embarrassment and loss of prestige which the United States suffered. At a Presidential news conference in April 1961, Kennedy (Public Papers 1962, p. 258-265) was asked about possible invasion plans:

Q. Would this Government oppose any attempt to mount an offensive against Castro from this country?
A. If your phase to "mount an offensive" is as I understand it, I would be opposed to mounting an offensive.

Q. Mr. President, has a decision been reached on how far this country will be willing to go in helping an anti-Castro uprising or invasion of Cuba?
A. First, I want to say that there will not be, under any conditions, an intervention in Cuba by the United States Armed Forces. This Government will do everything it possibly can, and I think it can meet its responsibilities to make sure that there are no Americans involved in any actions inside Cuba.

During this period, President Kennedy received a communiqué from Premier Khrushchev concerning the United States involvement in Cuban affairs. Kennedy (Public Papers 1962, p. 286) dispatched a message to Khrushchev on 18 April 1961:

You are under a serious misapprehension in regard to events in Cuba. For months there has been evident and growing resistance to the Castro dictatorship. More than 100,000 refugees have recently fled from Cuba into neighboring countries . . . . It is not surprising that, as resistance within Cuba grows, refugees have been using whatever means are available to return and support their countrymen in the continuing struggle for freedom. . . . I have previously stated and I repeat now, that the United States intends no military intervention in Cuba. In event of any military intervention by outside force we will immediately honor our obligation under the inter-American system to protect this hemisphere against external aggression. . . .
As the planning for the Bay of Pigs operation progressed, it was necessary for the CIA to change its role from that of friend to that of advisor, and then to director, and finally to planner. This was the result of the inability of various Cuban refugee groups to agree on a plan, target, or method of operation. Cooperation was almost nonexistent, and, as the Cubans failed to take action, both sides became disgruntled. The CIA's plans included the expectation that if the expedition failed the rebels would simply "melt" into the mountains and join the Cuban anti-Castro guerrilla forces. Although the CIA never explicitly claimed that a general Cuban uprising was imminent, the Agency expected the guerrillas to join the invasion after a beachhead had been established. No matter what the outcome of the invasion would be, the CIA believed that the cost would not be excessive, either militarily or politically, as long as the United States was not actively, militarily involved (Schlesinger 1965, p. 249).

Top CIA deputy Richard Bissell was encouraged on one hand to continue preparation for the invasion, while he was cautioned on the other to be ready to accept a more modest objective. On the day of the invasion, Secretary of State Dean Rusk decided to modify the CIA's plans. Two air strikes were planned in order to spearhead the invasion by destroying Castro's small air force. The first strike was made; the second, however, was cancelled because of political pressures. Secretary Rusk and his advisors believed that another strike would implicate the United States as an active participant in the invasion. Bissell as well as Charles Cabell, CIA Deputy Director, urged Rusk to
reconsider his action. Rusk refused. Although Cabell had the authority to do so, he did not petition the President for a reversal of Rusk's decision. Subsequent to the invasion disaster, Rusk's refusal to sanction a second air strike was considered a primary reason for the Bay of Pigs failure (Murphy 1961, p. 230).

In retrospect many circumstances contributed to the invasion's failure. The Cuban refugees charged that double agents infiltrated the CIA planners and that the Agency did not trust the Cuban leadership. The Agency also failed to discover Castro's destruction of the Cuban underground. Mass arrests of guerrilla leaders were made immediately prior to the invasion. The CIA was also accused of giving bad advice to both the Cubans and United States Government officials, of releasing secret information about the invasion to the press, of giving instructions that were contrary to Kennedy's orders, and of erroneously informing the Cubans that the United States would "back them all the way." This last charge was partially correct since the second air strike was discontinued.

The CIA was also charged with releasing misleading reports which sought to place virtually the entire blame for the Cuban debacle on President Kennedy. Kennedy publicly admitted his part in the disaster, and several years later former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara disclosed the Joint Chiefs of Staff participation. A high-level position paper which sought to discourage any publicity concerned with intelligence or political warfare was published during this period. Again the CIA was charged with an indirect attempt to improve the
Agency's image when the Penkovskiy Papers were released. Officials who were disenchanted with the CIA believed this was another attempt to exonerate its participation in the invasion.

There were numerous reasons for the Bay of Pigs failure. They included aspects of security, intelligence, policy, and operations. Perhaps the most vital reason was the United States failure to understand that it could not accomplish by covert methods that which it was unwilling to attempt with diplomacy or direct military action. Policy-makers were not adequately informed of the capabilities and limitations of the instrument of foreign policy that they had chosen to employ. The men in charge chose to operate outside the organizational structure of the normal foreign policy channels and, consequently, forfeited a considerable amount of expertise and judgment available in Washington. No really detached group of experts critically evaluated the invasion's chances of success or failure (Kirkpatrick 1968, p. 684).

The White House was careful not to single out the CIA as the "scapegoat." Stories from the President's staff suggested that the Pentagon was as much if not more to blame. This was later confirmed by McNamara. Whether the CIA was responsible for the invasion's failure or unjustly accused, the Agency lost much of its prestige. The disaster forced an examination of policies, practices, and personalities within the organization. South Dakota Senator Francis Case was understandably astonished that the reputation of the United States military and diplomatic corps could be debased by an agency which was not a part of either establishment. Subsequent to Presidential and Senatorial
investigation of the CIA's activities, Allen Dulles resigned, and the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence, a review board for intelligence operations, was revived (Wise and Ross 1964, p. 195).

In addition to the turmoil and reassessment which the disaster caused at home, the Bay of Pigs invasion was politically disastrous abroad. It suggested that the United States was unwilling to tolerate any regime that had a revolutionary domestic policy, a neutralist foreign policy, and an antagonism toward American's foreign business interests. The reaction in Europe was mild dismay, coupled with irony. NATO countries were privately pleased over Washington's embarrassment while Canada gingerly supported the United States, and England was dismayed at the United States involvement. South American reaction was generally unfavorable. The Mexican government stated that it was the Cuban people's right to decide their fate without outside interference. The enormity of the United States loss of prestige was not completely dispelled until after the Cuban missile crisis (New York Times Apr. 20, 1961, p. 1).

In 1966, Ramparts magazine (Welsh 1966) revealed the fact that "secret" money was being given to certain student groups and private organizations to subsidize overseas conferences and activities in an effort to counter Soviet activity among international organizations. The National Student Association was the most active participant in this program, having received funds from 1952 to January 1967. Included among the organizations which received money from the CIA were
labor unions, student councils, churches, international health and relief operations, cultural societies, women's clubs, and jurists' associations. The implication of the *Ramparts* article was that the beneficiaries of the funds were either bought, badgered, or corrupted by the CIA. This was emphatically denied. Government officials stated that most of the recipients did not know from where the money came and were not expected to take orders, perform espionage functions, or even promote official United States foreign policy views.

Programs of private, secret assistance had been conducted pursuant to National Security Council policies beginning in October 1951. A high-level, senior interdepartmental review committee had approved these CIA activities. In December 1960, after a public-private committee had investigated these activities, a report was published specially endorsing the programs. Robert Kennedy publicly stated that it was unfair to allow the CIA to "take the rap" for secretly financing the private groups. The basic decisions for secret subsidies had been made by the Executive Branch in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. All relevant government agencies had been approached for approval, and none had vetoed the program (*New York Times* Feb. 22, 1967, p. 17).

The expose accomplished what Communist propagandists had tried and failed to do for years: it slandered American students and scholars abroad and discredited much of the work of the private foundations. Officials active in United States intelligence expressed the belief that some of their most effective weapons had been blunted by the
disclosures. They argued that the funds involved were "only a frac­
tion" of the investments made by Communist nations in covert attempts
to penetrate Western and neutralist countries. Perhaps the real trag­
edy of the disclosure was that the organizations which received CIA
funds were doing the same things which they would have been accomplis­
ing if another source of money had been available. Jed Johnson ("Play­
ing It Straight" 1967, p. 6), president of the United States Youth
Council, rationalized: "It is better that we had the money to do what
I think was worthwhile and meaningful work internationally—even if it
was clandestine and covert—than abandoning our programs." World reac­
tion to the CIA's activities was generally unfavorable. Spain's Falan­
gist newspaper, Arriba, stated that the students who accepted United
States scholarships financed by the CIA had demonstrated that their in­
telligence was prostituted by the dollar. Reports that Indian student
and youth groups received funds from foundations connected with the CIA
shocked and dismayed the leaders of the Indian youth movements. Al­
though the immediate public reaction was severe, a survey of New York
Times (Feb. 26, 1967) correspondents indicated that critical opinions
tended to be subdued after a period of time.

President Johnson appointed a committee to examine the CIA's
activities involving private and student groups. A direct result of
the committee's report was Johnson's decision that all secret financial
support for the activities of American educational and private groups
would be discontinued by 31 December 1967. The only exception would be
cases in which the Secretaries of State and Defense would agree that
activities were justified by "overriding national security reasons"

The CIA's clandestine activities are considered by many individuals to be highly dangerous to the democratic process and a threat to peace. Paul Blackstock (1964, p. 302) in the *Strategy of Subversion* enumerated a number of problems which he believed were inherent in covert operations:

1. Covert operations are not understood by the policymakers or administrative bureaucracy which employs them.
2. The effectiveness of covert operations has been overrated.
3. The use of covert operations is lost in the power struggle between competing bureaucracies.
4. Divided policymaking and operational responsibility limit the effectiveness of covert operations and make reliable intelligence estimates difficult to produce.
5. Using political emigres and covert operations present serious problems of leadership, timing, security and control.
6. Clandestine agencies can sabotage foreign policy by bureaucratic deception and delays.
7. Covert operations can be propagandically exploited.
8. Certain covert operations can be compromised and exposed.
9. Covert operations involve personal and professional hazards.
10. Covert operations give the impression that this is the only reason for an intelligence agency.
11. Covert operations should have no policymaking function.
12. Covert operations do not belong in an open society.
13. Covert operations present problems of management and control.

These latter three points will be discussed in Chapters III and IV,

Former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey offered this opinion of the CIA's activities during the student subsidy investigations (Wise and Ross 1967, p. 19-32): "This is one of the saddest times that our government has had, in reference to public policy . . . I'm not at all happy about what the CIA has been doing and I'm sure that out of this . . . will come a reformation of that agency, with closer supervision of its activities."
The CIA has been hampered by the fact that it combines intelligence collection and operations within the same organization. Advantages of combining these responsibilities in one central agency have been lessened by the emphasis, in the public mind, on clandestine operations and by the Government's failure or inability to describe the organization in perspective (Kirkpatrick 1968, p. 5).

The CIA has been accused of political bias, blind anti-Communism, faulty evaluation, and dramatization of facts. Whether by accident or design, in less than a decade, the CIA has created a world-wide image which is matched in flamboyance only by the myth of the Nazi "fifth column." In the past, one of the most outspoken critics of the CIA's covert activities has been its founder, former President Harry Truman. He believes that with all the Communist propaganda and assaults on the West the last thing that the United States needed was the stigmatization of the CIA as something akin to a subverting influence in the affairs of nations. In 1963, he remarked (Wise and Ross 1967, p. 68):

I never had any thought . . . when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak and dagger operations . . . complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in part attributable to the fact that this quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role . . . original assignment as the intelligence arm of the President . . . and that of its operational duties be terminated or properly used elsewhere.

Importance of CIA's Activities

The CIA is considered a misfit in our democratic society, but it is allowed to exist because it has proven its necessity. Public statements regarding intelligence are rare, primarily for security
reasons. One cannot release much information about an intelligence service—particularly about its successes—without a potential enemy obtaining free, valuable information. Even though this is true, a number of statements have been released by Government officials indicating their evaluation of the CIA's activities and importance. In the *Congressional Record* (Feb. 17, 1964, p. 2900) Senator Dodd was quoted as giving the Agency a "Triple A" rating. He further stated that he had never encountered any government agency or body of men whose ability and dedication were more impressive. Stewart Alsop (1968, p. 251) wrote that there were too many people in the CIA, approximately 16,000, and too much money spent, approximately one-half billion dollars a year. However, there is no department in the Government against which similar charges could not be made. Alsop gave the Agency an overall grade of "B minus." It is not a secret government nor a *stadt in stadt*, but neither is it a brilliant "nest" of daring spies. It is a prudently professional bureaucracy, and as such, often performs a rather tedious and uninteresting but indispensable function. The 1955 Hoover Commission reported that the fate of the nation might well depend on the accurate and complete intelligence data which the CIA collected and produced (*U. S. Commission* 1955).

The centralized intelligence system, coordinated by the CIA, develops priorities for each member of the intelligence community, collects a portion of the necessary information, and produces one truly *national* intelligence estimate. The alternative would be various competing estimates which would confuse decision makers and render
policymaking impossible. In addition to collection and production of intelligence, the CIA is sometimes used as a "fire brigade" to remedy the results of an inadequate foreign policy (Tully 1962, p. 208).

Since it is the principal diplomatic agent of United States foreign policy, the State Department's mission is basically incompatible with covert intelligence responsibilities. State Department representatives must operate openly as recognized officials of the United States Government. As a result, the CIA is often in a better position to obtain information which is necessary for policymaking. Another reason for excluding covert intelligence operations from the State Department is that inevitably such activities will attract attention and discredit the veracity of diplomatic efforts. Although the basic objectives of the CIA and the State Department are similar, the method of operation must vary (Ransom 1965a).

The CIA keeps constant surveillance on the world situation. Information collected overtly and covertly is the basis for national policy decisions. Intelligence is increasingly becoming our "first line of defense." So long as the Communists are openly antagonistic and so long as they use techniques of subversion, the countries to which they are hostile have both the right and duty to use secret intelligence methods to protect and defend themselves. When combatting the secrecy employed by potential enemies, overt intelligence collection is not adequate. Special techniques unique to clandestine operations are required to penetrate these closed societies. This
requirement is satisfied by the various functions performed by the CIA (Dulles 1965, p. 51).

The President, to whom the CIA reports, relies on the judgment of the Agency and depends on the accuracy of its predictions. No one is in a better position to evaluate the importance of the Agency. In November 1959, President Eisenhower (Presidents 1964, p. 14) was quoted:

In war nothing is more important to a Commander than facts concerning strengths, dispositions, and intentions of his opponent, and proper interpretation of these facts. In peacetime necessary facts are of a different nature. They deal with conditions, resources, requirements, and attitudes prevailing in the world. They and their correct interpretation are essential to the development of policy to further our long term national security and best interests. To provide information of this kind is a task of an organization [the CIA] . . . No task could be more important . . . Upon the quality of the CIA's work depends in large measure the nation's position in the international scene.

In 1960 Eisenhower stated (Wise and Ross 1967, p. 287):

No one wants another Pearl Harbor. Intelligence activities . . . have a special and secret character . . . They are divorced from regular visible agencies of government . . . These activities have their own rules and methods of concealment which seek to mislead and obscure . . . It is a distasteful but vital necessity.

On 27 September 1961, President Kennedy (Public Papers 1962, p. 632) made these remarks upon announcing the appointment of John McCone as CIA Director:

I would like to say one word about my very strong feelings of appreciation and regard for the present Director of the CIA. He has a record almost unique, if not unique, in the history of this country . . . . I know of no man who is a more courageous selfless, public servant than Mr. Allen Dulles.

Former President Johnson (Sofokidis 1967, p. 3) also gave his impression of the CIA's value: "In the two and a half years of working with these
men, I have yet to meet an '007': In a real sense they are American professional students; they are unsung just as they are invaluable."
CHAPTER III

CIA ROLE IN POLICY MAKING

Central intelligence production today is a separate, government staff function performed by full-time specialists. They are responsible for producing a national intelligence estimate which is used as a guideline for policymaking. The effectiveness of this decision making depends upon the rapport between the intelligence producer and consumer and the accuracy of the information provided. This necessary relationship between the intelligence analyst and the policymaker has resulted in the charge that the CIA, which is responsible for the final intelligence estimate, actually, directly and indirectly, makes policy. This situation occurs for two primary reasons. The CIA's responsibility for editing and approving the National Intelligence Estimate results in the policymakers formulating decisions based primarily on the CIA's interpretation of the data. In addition to legitimately influencing policy, the CIA has been accused of deliberately manipulating the facts to produce an estimate which will support a decision in which the Agency has an operational interest (Ransom 1965a, p. 161-74).

The legislators who drafted the 1947 National Security Act established a definite division between national intelligence and national policy by stipulating that the CIA Director was to be an advisor to rather than a decision maker on the National Security Council. They envisioned the Agency's task as collecting, evaluating, interpreting, and
disseminating information but not participating in policy decisions. Policymaking was to remain the prerogative of the State Department and the President.

Completely unbiased, objective predictions are expected. The Gaither Report, published by a special committee of nongovernmental experts, determined that no matter how objective an intelligence estimate, the crucial factor is the way in which the information is viewed and acted upon by the policymakers. It is fundamentally the decision makers themselves who can prevent deception and faulty evaluation from causing the defeat of policy (Ransom 1964, p. 162).

**Nondiplomatic**

The CIA performs two primary functions for the policymakers. One is to furnish decision makers with a single intelligence estimate, a consensus of the opinions expressed by all members of the intelligence community. The other is to serve the formulators of national security policy in any capacity which they request.

Although it is unquestionably the task of the CIA to collect and produce intelligence, the Agency is not to be otherwise involved in policymaking. This reasoning has an inherent, fundamental difficulty. Simply possessing information enables the CIA to exercise a strong influence in decision making. Because the Agency has many facts at its disposal from which to choose freely, the possibility of exerting undue influence becomes even stronger. This makes the Agency a positive, important factor in policymaking even if in an indirect manner. Although the CIA is responsible for obtaining a consensus of intelligence
community opinions, in actuality, it has the predominant role in the community and as such could overrule dissenting views. The Agency also maintains a dual role within the community. It is not only a participant in the collection of information, but it is also responsible for producing a coordinated estimate based on information collected by all the intelligence-community contributors. This, in reality, makes the CIA both player and umpire, witness and judge.

Because the danger of a biased estimate exists, it is important that an intelligence system have the ability to facilitate differing viewpoints. In intelligence as in other aspects of government, the absence of a contrary view can be harmful. In order to alleviate this danger, dissenting opinions are footnoted in the final intelligence estimate. These footnotes minimize the risk of an over-zealous effort to "hammer out" a consensus which could result in the "lowest common denominator" intelligence. Since the CIA, by virtue of its dual role, is not merely central but dominant in the intelligence community, it is important that dissenting viewpoints be recorded. Senator Henry N. Jackson espouses this opinion. He has remarked that the United States must have more than one intelligence agency and hierarchy of experts. Consensus can be very costly if "streamlining" and "unifying" result in a "watered-down" estimate which contains faulty interpretation and prediction. Life and death issues concerning national security are too important to sacrifice healthy competition in the name of efficiency (U. S. Congress 1963).
Although many officials have their own opinions of the CIA's proper role, only the President has the authority to define what the Agency's objectives and activities will actually be. One of the CIA's functions is to furnish information to departments and officials outside its own organization. Top-level foreign policy officials as well as middle-level functionaries are placed in the position of accepting and acting upon information that is produced outside their own agencies. Allen Dulles (New York Times Apr. 28, 1966, p. 28) believed this was the best procedure: "Policy must be based on the best estimate of facts which can be put together ... by an agency with no axes to grind and itself is not wedded to any particular policy."

Foreign policy is based primarily on intelligence data. The world situation has grown so complicated that the President does not have time nor resources to perform his own evaluation of "raw" intelligence. He must rely increasingly on the CIA's estimate. This presents the problem of how to maintain the integrity of the intellectual function while at the same time assuring the necessarily close link between decision-making and problem-solving activities which the CIA is designed to support. One solution to this problem is the organizational division which exists between foreign policy planners and intelligence collectors. Not only are there separate intelligence units within most of the major national security organizations, but there is also a separate intelligence agency on a par with these other units--the CIA. In addition, the CIA has separated its collection and evaluation divisions in an effort to prove, in practice, that effective evaluation can be
produced within an agency that is also engaged in collection activities. Just as collection and evaluation can be combined in the CIA under proper conditions and adequate compartmentalization, intelligence and policy can be combined in the United States Government. Although separation is desirable to prevent biased estimates and undue influence, a certain amount of selectivity on the part of the intelligence analyst is useful to the policy official. However, any judgment offered by the analyst should be focused on the problem that concerns the decision maker.

The realms of intelligence analysis and policymaking cannot be completely separated. This blurred line between policy and intelligence is sometimes invisible and unavoidable. An intelligence estimate cannot alone determine major policy decisions. However, the complex nature of world politics has resulted in increased intelligence participation in national decisions (Sapin 1966, p. 300-304).

**Diplomatic**

Two criticisms of the CIA which recur most often are that the Agency causes senior policymakers to excessively rely on covert activities, and that the CIA is too influential in foreign affairs. Periodic exposure of the CIA's "cloak-and-dagger" operations has left the impression that the CIA is the real power behind United States foreign policy, and that the restricted aims of the Agency are the principal goals of the United States Government. Subsequent to the Bay of Pigs disaster, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey lamented (Cook 1961, p. 569):
I want my position to be crystal clear. The Pentagon, the military services, and the intelligence services of the nation are to be servants of the policymakers. They are not to be policymakers in themselves. If we have learned anything in recent months, it is that the preponderance of the emphasis on the part of the military, the CIA, and the other intelligence services was overwhelmingly involved in policymaking functions of the Government, to the point where actions of military and CIA made policy through their pre-emption of the field.

Three of the CIA's most difficult problems in the foreign, diplomatic realm are the issue of "cover," the relationship between the CIA and the State Department, and the relationship between the CIA and the Ambassador.

Diplomats generally abhor the idea of clandestine activities. However, Cold War diplomacy depends, in a large measure, on covertly collected information. To perform many of these covert operations, it is necessary for CIA personnel to have a "cover" under which they can work in relative freedom. The most expeditious "cover" available is that of a member of the official United States legation. The CIA often offers the shorthanded State Department the use of its personnel on a part-time basis in return for this "cover." The CIA usually identifies itself to the host government and works in close cooperation with the country's officials, its local intelligence organization, and the local police force. Although this "cover" allows the CIA agents to accomplish their tasks while enjoying diplomatic immunity, there is a risk in relying too heavily on diplomatic "cover" for covert operations. If relations are severed between countries or war erupts, the CIA is separated from many of its sources of information (Wise and Ross 1964, p. 252).
When President Kennedy took office, State Department resentment of the CIA was very evident. The Agency had higher living conditions abroad, better communications, and more ample travel funds. In differences of judgment, State Department officials were convinced that the CIA would win the disputes regardless of the merits of the situation. Much of the problem resulted from the unusual relationship between the Secretary of State and the CIA Director. These two men were John Foster Dulles and his brother, Allen. John Foster Dulles had entrusted the CIA with many responsibilities which properly belonged to the State Department ("Breaking Up the CIA, Part I" June 19, 1961, p. 3).

Conversely, the CIA resented the State Department. Because the Agency was under the State Department's jurisdiction while serving abroad, many exceptionally able people in the CIA had to "take a back-seat" to some less able foreign service officers. The CIA personnel had usually served in the country for a longer period of time than the politically appointed, State Department officials and were more knowledgeable and experienced in the area.

Another problem which confused the CIA-State Department relationship was the fragmentation of authority within the Department. As a result, the CIA intelligence officer sponsoring a particular proposal would choose the channel most likely to grant approval. All too frequently the channel that was most likely to approve was also the least informed about the particular situation. The most serious consequence was that the "right hand" of the State Department did not always know what the "left hand" had approved.
The CIA-State Department relationship has improved in recent years. Both Allen and John Foster Dulles are now gone, and both organizations have been restructured to facilitate greater efficiency. Finally, the CIA has been placed under tighter foreign control, primarily through ambassadorial supervision (Hilsman 1967, p. 65-76).

During the Kennedy administration, the ambassador had problems controlling the CIA's activities and was increasingly at odds with CIA officials. In underdeveloped areas, the host government often preferred to work with the CIA bureau chief, believing him to have readier access to top-level policymakers in Washington. In order to correct this situation, President Kennedy was forced to issue a statement re-emphasizing the authority of the ambassador to supervise the activities of all agencies on the "country team" and to determine the various roles of each agency (Dulles 1965, p. 85).

A 1963 Senate investigation (U. S. Congress 1963) of the ambassador's role concluded that the basic function of the ambassador in regard to the "country team" is to make each unit work as a part of the whole. In order to do this, the ambassador must project himself as a representative of the Government, not as a member of the State Department. He must convey the attitude that all agencies are sharing a cooperative task. The responsibility of the ambassador is clear. However, at times he does not fully accept this responsibility as a positive obligation. When he does, the relationship between the CIA and the ambassador is usually harmonious.
Does the CIA Make Policy?

Public officials, the mass media, and the American people have expressed three different opinions on this question: Yes, No, and Under certain circumstances.

Critics of the CIA's role in policymaking insist that the Agency is not only entrusted with collection and clandestine operations but also has authority to act on its own information while implementing policies which its recommendations have helped to form. How can the CIA avoid being a policymaker under these circumstances? A number of Government officials have expressed the opinion that the CIA is, in fact, a policymaker. Former President Truman was quoted (Washington Post Dec 22, 1963, p. 11): "For sometime I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times a policymaking arm of the Government. This has led to trouble and may have compounded our difficulties in several explosive areas." Mayor John Lindsay of New York agrees with this statement. In a New York Times article (Apr. 25, 1966, p. 20) Senator Stephen Young of Ohio remarked: "Wrapped in a cloak of secrecy, the CIA has in effect been making foreign policy." Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy was quoted in the same article: "The CIA is making foreign policy and in so doing is assuming the roles of the President and Congress."

The myth about the CIA that is most harmful is that it makes foreign policy. It never implements policy or furnishes support of a political nature without the approval of United States Government
officials from outside the Agency. This is the rebuttal offered by the defenders of the CIA against its critics. Senator Thomas Dodd has reasoned that since the CIA is answerable to the National Security Council and the President, it cannot make its own foreign policy but can only execute the United States policy goals. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk said of his relationship with the CIA: "I would emphasize ... that the CIA is not engaged in activities not known to the senior policy officers of the Government" ("What's CIA?" 1966, p. 80). John McConne, former CIA Director, stated the Agency's position before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee (U. S. Congress 1962, p. 38): "The CIA is not in a position of policymaking. It develops facts and reports them promptly, clearly, and properly." Representative Arends (Congressional Record Feb. 17, 1964, p. 6372) of South Dakota has strongly defended the CIA's position:

To assume to assert that the CIA shaped policy and then executed it when that policy was at odds with official policy of the State Department not only demonstrates a lack of knowledge of coordination and control procedures in the executive branch but further implies that the Director of the CIA and other officials of the CIA are violating their oath of office by willfully disregarding the views and instructions of the President ... These assertions and implications are false.

Former President John F. Kennedy repeatedly asserted that it was wholly untrue that the CIA followed a course of action that was contrary to that of the United States Government. At his monthly news conferences in September and October of 1963, President Kennedy (Public Papers 1964, p. 659-768) answered the question of the CIA's policymaking activities:

Q. Has the CIA undertaken certain independent operations, independent of other elements of the American Government?
A. I must say I think the reports are wholly untrue. The CIA does not create policy, it attempts to execute it in those areas where it has competence and responsibility . . . . but I can assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities. . . .

Q. Does the CIA make its own policy?
A. No, that is the frequent charge, but that isn't so. The CIA coordinates its efforts with the State Department and Defense Department.

Although both these positions have certain valid points, the most logical answer is that under certain conditions the CIA does, primarily indirectly and unintentionally, make policy. An April 28, 1966, New York Times survey revealed that every well-informed Government official and former official with recent knowledge of the CIA and its activities confirmed that the CIA does not directly initiate actions unknown to high-level policymakers or directly make its own policy. However, the CIA on occasion does form policy concerning methods, not willfully, but simply because of its capacity to mount an operation and pursue it without guidance from the Government. This judgment of "on-the-scene" operations is delegated to the director of field activities.

In addition, Washington policymakers do, at times, fail to establish a "clear-cut" operational policy. When this policy vacuum occurs, the CIA field personnel are involuntarily propelled into decision-making activities which are not their proper responsibility. Under these circumstances, the CIA has the opportunity to overstep its boundaries of responsibility. In these cases, however, the CIA does not make policy
in any formal way nor does it operate outside the confines of government-directed decisions.

Does the CIA make policy? Sometimes—but only decisions involving methods, not goals.
CHAPTER IV

CIA CONTROL BY DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES

The CIA is criticized by the mass media and by Congress for three primary reasons: its influence in policymaking, its secrecy of operation, and its alleged freedom from Government control. The first criticism has been discussed in Chapter III; the latter two will be examined in this chapter. The solution to the problems of both influence and secrecy depends upon the adequacy of control. Are controls available? If available, are they utilized? These questions must be answered before an estimate of the CIA's danger or importance to our democratic society can be made.

Since 1950 the CIA has grown like a delicate child who in adolescence has become the bully on the block. In 1955 the problem was how to unleash the CIA; since 1961 the problem has been how to restrain the CIA in order to prevent it from embarrassing the United States Government and provoking international resentment. The Agency has been accused of being the third force in the United States Government, rivaling the Executive and Congress and the Departments of State and Defense.

Revelation that the United States was waging an intelligence war with vigor and determination shattered the illusion of a "moral" Cold War (de Gramont 1962, p. 16, 37). Part of the public disenchantment with the CIA was a result of this revelation. In shattering the
illusion, the problems of an effective intelligence organization in a free society were revealed. Because the Agency operates in an open society, its flaws are often all too apparent; however, its operations still remain mostly secret. Under normal circumstances, the CIA neither lauds its successes nor justifies its failures. As a result of this secrecy, the Agency has been labeled an "invisible government" which operates without either a mandate from the people or a restraint by the Government. Former President Truman (Presidents 1964, p. 8) has described the dilemma of a secret organization in a free society:

I consider it very important to this country to have a sound, well-organized intelligence system, both in the present and in the future...I told Smith [Director of the Bureau of the Budget] that one thing was certain--this country wanted no Gestapo under any guise or for any reason.

In December 1963, Truman (Hilsman 1967, p. 62) expressed his fears about this situation: "We have grown up as a nation respected for our free institutions and for our ability to maintain a free and open society. There is something about the way the CIA has been functioning that is casting a shadow over our historic position."

Secrecy

The increasing power of the CIA in both the intelligence community and foreign affairs has emphasized the question of the compatibility of a secret organization in a popularly elected, representative government. The existence of a large, secret bureaucracy, sometimes pivotally important in making foreign policy and in implementing those policies, causes special problems. How does the existence of the
potential source of an invisible government affect a democratic society? How do you control a secret organization? How does one assess the value of such an agency's activities?

The need for secrecy in certain intelligence operations versus the Congress and public's right-to-know and the press' duty to find out and report constitute a dilemma. In a Cold War atmosphere, the phrase "provided national security is not involved" destroys much of the practical meaning for any statement of censorship principle. "National security" cannot be assigned a standard operational definition. If common agreement existed on what is and is not in the national security interest, the controversy over secret information and policy would subside. Thus, the central problem for a democratic government is to decide precisely what types of information require secrecy and when this restriction should be imposed (Ransom 1964, p. 166, 223-26).

The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and needs not be further urged—all that remains for me to add is that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favorable issue (Presidents 1964, p. 2).

President George Washington spoke these words to his Intelligence Chief, Colonel Ellas Dayton, in July 1777. Since that time, many other Government officials have shared this opinion. By Executive Order #10240, September 1951, President Truman imposed "minimum standards" for handling security information within all Executive agencies of the Government. President Eisenhower modified the order, limiting the number of agencies working with classified information and eliminating the lowest classification, "restricted." Eisenhower was interested not only in
information being released but also in the extent to which it was pub-
licized. He established the Office of Strategic Information which dis-
tributed a "balance sheet" to Government officials. This sheet was to be used as a guide for deciding whether dissemination of information would help or harm United States interests. Former Secretary of De-
fense McNamara was also concerned with the release of information. In 1961 he stated that in a democratic society the public must be kept in-
formed of the major issues; however, information that can materially assist the enemy must not be disclosed (Ransom 1964, p. 218).

Although it has been Government policy to protect much of its information and many of its operations, the CIA still finds itself criticized for adhering to a policy of strict secrecy. This causes the CIA another problem. Since the Agency does not disclose information, it cannot defend itself when criticized. For reasons of security, the CIA cannot deny or confirm published reports, true or false, favorable or unfavorable (Congressional Record Feb. 17, 1964, p. 2900). Is se-
crecy a protection or a threat to the United States national security? What dangers may result from the disclosure of information? What are the disadvantages of secrecy?

The demand for more information is based partially on the be-
lief that the American people would reach the right conclusion from an enlarged body of published facts. According to this viewpoint the democratic way of life requires that government be operated in full view of the people; they have a right to know all, and thereby they would be able to make the correct decisions which ultimately have their
roots with the people. In the modern world of complex situations and problems, it is not possible to have government by all the people. The American people have an opportunity to elect policymakers, including Congressmen and the President, whom they must trust to make the correct decisions. If the public received all of the information which it wants but rarely needs, this disclosure would also give vital information to potential enemies. If the CIA would release information concerning its sources, personnel, organization, and activities, this data would destroy many of the Agency's most important operations. In addition, much of the United States Cold War strategy would be ruined without any effort on the part of those who are now compelled to use clandestine methods to garner this classified information. Before any information is released, United States Government officials must decide if this action would be of greater value to American democracy or to the opponent (Morgenstern 1959, p. 225-35).

Serious observers of the Washington scene generally agree that certain information should remain classified for at least a specified period of time. This is especially important when delicate diplomatic negotiations are in progress and when decisions which will affect the course of international policy are being decided. Strategic decisions must be reached by a careful preparatory process. In this long process, if possessors of differing opinions had the opportunity to argue their views in the press, the result would be chaos. America would have not integrated, but disintegrated, policy. Until the President has approved the policy recommended by the Congress, National Security
Council, etc., a Chief Executive should have the right not to accept the advice of his principal advisors without penalty of public disclosure and criticism. Douglass Cater in his book, *The Fourth Branch of Government* (1959, p. 114) addressed himself to this issue:

I am convinced that leaks to the press of matters in a discussion stage, of working papers, or oral, Council deliberations, of bits and pieces of the vast paraphernalia that goes into careful, reasoned, sensible policymaking, play into the enemy's hands. Publicized differences of view among the President's chief advisors afford a ruthless enemy the best of chances to make trouble . . . . In the face of the Soviet will and power and fixed determination to give such a chance is to flirt with survival.

Wide dissemination of information might disclose areas of special CIA interest and thereby endanger secret information and personnel sources. Senator Joseph McCarthy charged that the CIA was "red" infiltrated. He wanted a CIA member to appear before his investigating committee to testify concerning the Agency's personnel, activities, and sources. Allen Dulles, with President Eisenhower's approval, refused.

In 1955 the Hoover Commission reported that there was no valid ground for the suspicion that the CIA was being infiltrated by any organized, subversive or communistic clique. The Congressional and Presidential investigative committees appointed in more recent years have confirmed these findings.¹

¹ The frustrations of life in the CIA are many and varied, but despite these frustrations, the CIA has never produced a defector nor has it ever been penetrated by "the opposition." This cannot be said of Russia's KGB which produced Oleg Penkovskiy, a defector; nor of the British MI-6 which was penetrated by Kim Philby (Alsop 1968, p. 251).
The CIA's sources of information require secrecy to adequately accomplish assignments and to protect their lives. Since these sources are known to the President and National Security Council, there is little or no danger to the United States Government or the American public. It is interesting to note that the same journalists who print classified material and disclosure of activities and sources strongly insist upon the protection of their own secrets. They would rather go to prison than reveal their sources (Morgenstern 1959, p. 239, 250).

In a 1955 speech before a group of Harvard alumni, Robert Culter, Special Assistant on National Security in President Eisenhower's Administration, presented a case for secrecy. He enumerated four factors which are considered before information is released to the public: the skillful use of diplomacy, the complication of today's decision making, the nature of the opponent, and the nature of the opponent's warfare. One of the most fallacious arguments that recurs is that there is no point in withholding information from Russia "since she would get it at any rate." This may be true, but Russia would often obtain it much later. The time delay could be very valuable since Cold War tactics are often based on "split-second" timing. In addition, an effort would have to be made to acquire the information and evaluate it. This would require a large network of agents and would make the likelihood of detection much easier and less expensive. Since the United States receives nothing gratis from any potential opponent, it is ironic that certain United States officials, press personnel, and private citizens should desire the disclosure of their country's plans and operations.
Throughout the history of the democratic society, government-imposed secrecy for intelligence operations and reports has been regarded as an acceptable practice and a traditional necessity. There have always been legitimate state secrets in a democracy not only in wartime but also in peacetime. The number of secrets has tended to vary in proportion to the government's concern about threats to national security.

What is the role of free speech and free press in the United States? Is it enough today merely to assert these great principles in order to guarantee the right of their exercise in secret and sensitive areas? Robert Culter in Douglass Cater's book, The Fourth Branch of Government (1959, p. 113-16), has suggested that the press must make clear how release of classified information will contribute to national survival, and they must prove that widespread, public disclosure of United States secret projects will strengthen the free world's cause, will persuade neutralist countries to be better disposed toward the United States, will rally subject peoples to democracy's side, and will cause the Communist regimes to operate at a disadvantage. Congressman George Mahon of Texas (Ransom 1964, p. 229) has been more emphatic:

I think the damage that has been done to this country by the spies and subversives is just a drop in the bucket compared to the damage that has been done by the release of public information as to national defense procedures and programs and developments, through the Department of Defense, through Congress, and through industry, and through trade journals and so forth.

Since the Government classifies that information which it considers important to national survival, how do "leaks" occur? One veteran Washington reporter stated that a leak or exclusive story is not merely an example of the reporter's persistence or skill. More often it is
caused by the necessity of some official to place a situation before the public, with a "spurious sense of drama," in order to gain attention for his cause. This action is usually motivated by some common human frailty such as vanity, desire for vengeance, or demand for recognition. The power struggle within the United States Government and among the governments doing business in Washington produces the most constant source of information. Conflict among the rival sub-governments, the communiques from foreign embassies, and the struggle between the Executive and the Congress are the primary contributing factors. Since the real damage caused by public disclosure is often the fact that the information revealed is partial or biased, the Government should consider how to improve the flow and content of information rather than how to completely avert "leaks."

An inadequate secrecy policy affects the progress of United States defense measures and the safety of the country. Secrecy is of paramount importance. The problems are: (1) how to avoid over-classification so that individuals who have knowledge that could contribute to decisions are not excluded from the decision-making process; (2) how to reduce the tension between the need to engage in covert activities and the importance of national reputation; and (3) how to maintain the confidence among various Government officials, the press, and the public (Cater 1959, p. 125).

One of the factors which can lead to excessive secrecy and the danger of manipulated information is that Government agencies have become "public relations" conscious. This has led to a centralization of
the public-information function in various departments and agencies, in
hope of enhancing the departmental image in the public mind. This
threat to the freedom of press has caused the mass media to attack the
issue of Government secrecy. V. M. Newton, Jr., managing editor of the
Tampa Morning Tribune, wrote in an editorial (Cater 1959, p. 116):

To me the most insidious and dangerous thing about this fight
for freedom of information is that it does on day after day
... Our public servants tell us that a little secret gov­
ernment is all right and particularly so when they are involved.
Yet we can no more have a little freedom, a little justice or
a little morality.

C. P. Snow in Science and Government expressed perhaps the primary
danger to democratic society from those individuals and agencies who
suppress information (Hilsman 1967, p. 62): "The euphoria of secrecy
goes to the head ... I have known men, prudent in other respects,
who became drunk with it. It induces an unbalancing sense of power.
... It takes a very strong head to keep secrets ... and not to go
slightly mad. It isn't wise to be advised by anyone slightly mad."

"National security" has become a convenient label for almost
any category of information that the Administration in power wants to
protect from disclosure, even though at times the only "security" in­
volved may be denial of information to the opposition party. An elab­
orate classification system can actually endanger security by hampering
scientific progress, alienating allies, and making difficult the exist­
ence of a well-informed electorate. One presumption is that much of
the classified material is not worth being classified but contains only
well-known data, trivia, and antiquated information. Should this be
ture, it not only points out the wasted expense in handling the
classified documents but also fosters confusion in the ranks of Government officials and policymakers. In addition, it excludes individuals who could add expertise to policymaking discussions because they theoretically do not have a "need-to-know" (Rabi 1960, p. 41).

Since World War II, government secrecy has been extended far beyond the traditional peacetime boundaries. Democratic man's "right to know" about what his government is doing is now challenged by a new concept of "need to know" and by the government's increasing ability, in the name of national security, to manipulate the news as an instrument of policy. The burden of proof has shifted from government, one required to defend its secrecy, to Congress, the press, or the individual citizen. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., adviser to the Kennedy Administration, has alleged that secret activities are permissible only so long as they do not affect the principles and practices of our society (Hilsman 1967, p. 79).

Former Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon (Congressional Record Apr. 9, 1956, p. 5923) has asserted that whenever there is government by secrecy, the freedom and liberties of the American people are endangered. Walter Lippman has recommended that an intelligence agency should be concerned only with espionage, research, and analysis. Other activities such as propaganda, intervention, and "dirty tricks" should not be included. He further argued that black propaganda, secret intervention, and intrigue were incompatible with our free society (Felix 1967, p. 22). Critics of government secrecy generally agree that the American people have a constitutional right to factual information concerning the plans,
policies, and actions of their government. These same individuals perceive one irreparable flaw in any defense the CIA makes for its need of secrecy: even in the best of circumstances, the Agency's operations are contrary to the conventional democratic philosophy. This philosophy calls for self-determination by people abroad and for an enlightened electorate at home. The CIA's code of secrecy and clandestine activities defy both (Bagdikian 1963, p. 109).

In The Espionage Establishment, David Wise and Thomas Ross (1967, p. 4) have asserted that the CIA has become a wellspring of secret power within the American society. Vast resources of talent and public money have been allotted for activities which have been conducted, for the most part, away from public view. The CIA has not directly challenged United States Government leaders in an effort to seize power, but the Agency's covert operations have provoked international events which have changed the course of United States foreign policy. The U-2 incident revealed the extent to which clandestine activities are shaping the nation's destiny. As a result of this incident, the Paris Summit Conference with the Russians was ruined (Wise and Ross 1967).

In order to protect its secret operations, the CIA has attempted to create the impression that all of its functions are sacrosanct and so inseparable that disclosure of one would undermine all of the others. Critics claim this position is false. Covert operations are a valuable instrument of policy, but historical records indicate that they are extremely difficult to effectively control. From time to time members of the press and government alike have initiated proposals which would
establish boards of impartial reviewers who would render judgments in the more serious clashes over secrecy. These recommendations have never been adopted.

The American democratic system is inspired by the ideal of a visible, identifiable power which is subject to the normal checks and balances of a popularly elected government. Congressional representatives of both parties supervise and sometimes legitimatize the Chief Executive's power and act as the public's "eye" to the intricate maneuverings of the Government. Without adequate information, the people's representatives cannot perform their role effectively (Ransom 1964, p. 168). If knowledge of CIA activities is not available to most Government officials, the mass media, and the general public, can the Agency be effectively controlled?

**Question of Control**

The expanding role of intelligence in support of those who formulate United States national security policies is increasingly evident. For an alert and effective defense, the nation requires an adequate intelligence system. However, it must remain the servant of national policy, subject to effective, continuous review and control by the United States Government. No agency should be permitted to operate without some form of independent, critical, outside examination. At the heart of the information versus secrecy issue is the question of "privilege" of the Executive as opposed to the "rights" of Congress and the public. Law and custom have placed certain types of information beyond Congressional and public scrutiny. This secrecy presents two basic problems: Can the
potential danger to our democratic society from the need of secrecy be prevented? How can there be adequate control over functions that require secrecy? (Ransom 1964, p. 175, 219-20).

The CIA has had more than its share of inspections, investigations, and reviews, but there continues to be a clamor for more. The cost of these is tremendous, and many of the reports quickly find their way to the bottom file-drawer. Few of the recommendations are ever adopted. In 1948 President Truman directed the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report. This report was highly critical of certain aspects of the intelligence community, especially that senior positions were held by military personnel. It recommended that a civilian be appointed CIA Director. This was done when Allen Dulles was appointed. Also in 1948 the Eberstadt Commission's report was published. This report, although critical in some respects, generally praised the CIA for doing an effective job. The Agency has also been reviewed by the Doolittle Committee, the Clark Committee, and the Hoover Commission. The 1954 Doolittle Committee evaluated the CIA as doing a "creditable" job. However, it secretly recommended that certain changes be made (Kirkpatrick 1968, p. 88, 146).

The most extensive and well-known investigation of the CIA was the 1955 Hoover Commission. The U.S. Commission (1955, p. 1-76) made several recommendations:

1. The CIA should be reorganized internally to produce greater emphasis on certain of its statutory functions. [The results of this recommendation are classified.]

2. The CIA should increase the annual salary of its Director. [This has undoubtedly been done.]
3. The CIA should authorize the employment of retired military and armed services personnel without arbitrary limitations on the number of such employees. [This has been done.]

4. The CIA should institute measures for rechecking the security status of all personnel at periodic intervals. [This has been done.]

5. The responsibility for procurement of foreign publications and for collection of scientific intelligence should be removed from the State Department and placed in the CIA. [This is still a joint endeavor.]

6. Congress should appropriate the funds necessary to construct an adequate headquarters facility for the CIA. [New headquarters are at Langley, Virginia.]

7. Steps should be taken to introduce highly selective methods of choosing members of the Coordinating Committee of Atomic Energy intelligence. [Information is classified.]

8. Comprehensive, coordinated programs should be developed to expand linguistic training among personnel serving in the CIA. [This has been done.]

9. The President should appoint a committee of experienced private citizens who would have the responsibility to examine and report to him periodically on the work of government foreign-intelligence activities. This committee should also give such information to the public as the President may direct. [This was done at least in one case. A committee of private citizens approved the CIA's student subsidy program.]

10. The Congress should consider creating a joint Congressional committee on foreign intelligence, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. In such a case the two committees, one Presidential, one Congressional, could collaborate on matters of special importance to national security. [This is now the controversial "Watchdog Committee" proposal. This subject will be examined in detail in this chapter.]

The most recent investigation was initiated by President Johnson in February 1967 to review the student subsidy controversy (U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin 1967a, p. 665-68). The recommendations of this committee were discussed in Chapter II. Approximately 150 resolutions for tighter Congressional control have been introduced during recent years, but none has been approved.
The CIA did have a "watchdog" committee at one time. It consisted of the CIA Director and the Under Secretaries of State and Defense. They reviewed all projects of the Agency and determined their feasibility. The recommendations were reported to the National Security Council and key members of Congress. During this period, the CIA was not involved in any disastrous failures, and only one security "leak" occurred (New York Times Apr. 25, 1961, p. 34).

Senator Eugene McCarthy ("Speaking Out" Jan. 4, 1964, p. 10) has stated that the issue is not one of Executive control or of efficient administration. It is a question of Congressional responsibility. Do the elected representatives of the people have the right to know what a critically important agency is doing? He has advocated a "watchdog" committee which would insure that the judgment and will of the Congress are reflected in the major decisions and operations of the CIA. Proponents of such a proposal, including Senators William Fulbright and Mike Mansfield, provide additional reasons for the requirement. The intelligence system is too important not to be supervised by officials outside the Executive Branch. 2 The prestige of the central intelligence system is at a low level on Capitol Hill, among large segments of the relevant bureaucracy, and with the general public. A

2. There are four Congressional Committees to which the Agency must report: the Senate and House Armed Services Committees and the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. Advocates of the "watchdog" proposals claim that these committees have a low status and that the division of jurisdiction makes adequate control impossible. See John V. Lindsay, "An Inquiry Into the Darkness of the Cloak and the Sharpness of the Dagger," (March 1964).
permanent, well-staffed Joint Congressional Committee might be able to promote and defend the central intelligence system while simultaneously guarding the public interest. Finally, the American system is based on the unwillingness to accept government activities on "faith," without proper institutional devices for determining whether the faith is warranted (Ransom 1964, p. 189). Senator Fulbright has argued that although it has been said that the CIA is closely supervised by the National Security Council, this body met only once in 1965 and 1966. Furthermore, formal NSC machinery in existence in earlier years has atrophied. Fulbright advocated the creation of a new committee which would establish a more efficient coordination of the various governmental intelligence activities ("CIA Oversight" July 22, 1966, p. 578-81).

The major proposal which the advocates of the "watchdog" theory have sponsored is the Mansfield Resolution. This would establish a Joint Congressional Committee on the CIA by enlarging the currently active Foreign Relations Committee. Members of this committee would supervise the activities of the CIA, study the problems relating to intelligence production, and coordinate the use of intelligence. This resolution would also allow Congressional foreign-affairs experts to contribute their judgments concerning the possible consequences of clandestine activities (Ransom 1965a, p. 146-49).

Congressional critics of the Mansfield Resolution argue that Congress is a well-known fountain of more leaks than any other body in Washington. A bipartisan "watchdog" committee would give the minority, as well as the majority, dissidents an unparalleled opportunity to
obtain the "secrets" of the Executive Branch. They would then be able to make political "capital" of mistakes and controversial policies. However, if the committee members were carefully chosen to avoid all danger of a security leak, it would probably exercise little real control. Finally, although advocates of the proposal claim that the committee could perform the same function as that which supervises the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), this is not a viable comparison. The AEC has developed its own set of experts, and these Congressmen now have a vested interest in their own ideas about atomic energy and its prospects. Hardly any Congressmen would have expertise in clandestine operations or a vested, personal interest in their outcome (New York Times Apr. 29, 1966, p. 78).

Many Congressmen tend to criticize what they don't know and won't understand. The resolutions for change originate primarily with these Congressmen. The CIA is required to give a fundamental briefing on organization, methods of operation, and intergovernmental relations to the "key" members of Congress on the Senate and House Armed Services Committees and the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. These members probably know more about the agency than many of its own personnel do.

The real issue in Congress is whether the Foreign Relations Committee should review the CIA's activities. The underlying problem from the CIA viewpoint does not concern intelligence, but whether the Agency would be required to reveal to policymakers information which would be detrimental to national security if disclosed publicly. A New York Times (Apr. 27, 1966, p. 28) survey indicated a widespread feeling
among Government officials that the "watchdog" committee would do the Agency's vital functions more harm than good, and that it would not provide the solution to the central problem of control.

The advantages or disadvantages of a "watchdog" committee have never been tested, for the Mansfield Resolution has not been adopted. In 1960 the bill was defeated by a 59-27 vote. In July 1966, following a secret session, the bill was again defeated by a 61-28 margin. Perhaps the Congress has never adopted the Mansfield Resolution because its members fear that the security of the CIA would eventually be compromised, and also because they believe that some of the blame for CIA failures would be allotted to the Congressmen who had reviewed and approved the operations. Knowledge is accompanied by responsibility. Congress may not be willing to accept both (McCarthy 1964, p. 10).

Even though Congress has never been able to adopt a resolution for stricter control, charges continue to be made that there is little or no control over the CIA's activities. The Agency is accused of shaping foreign events, unduly influencing policy, and charting its own course regardless of Government guidelines. The solution to this problem is not to dismantle the organization but to bring it under stricter control. Critics claim that the CIA is the only major federal agency over which Congress exercises no direct, formal control. This is not entirely true since the Agency must report to four congressional committees. The members of these committees, it is argued, have no real control over the Agency's activities because the CIA reports only that
information which it believes the committees' members should possess (New York Times Apr. 29, 1966, p. 18).

The CIA Director and Deputy Director are the only politically responsible officers within the Agency. They report directly to the President. It is the President's prerogative to have the Director or other members of the Agency testify before investigative committees. In the past, CIA participation has been denied, as in the McCarthy Hearings. In addition to the President, the National Security Council is authorized to supervise the Agency's activities. However, many decisions are never discussed in the NSC (Wise and Ross 1964, p. 5).

One of the most difficult problems involves control "by responsible political authority" of espionage, counterespionage, and overseas political warfare. Beyond a certain point, the secret agent, spy, propagandist, or guerrilla cannot be supervised; however, the State Department should have the right of veto over activities which may have diplomatic consequences. There is always the danger that freedom from restraint could inspire laxity and abuses which might prove costly to United States international prestige. The CIA's activities do require scrutiny and supervision. There must be some means of supervision other than the vague, seldom-convinced, ad hoc Congressional and Presidential committees. None of these has had a comprehensive view of the Agency's activities. It is necessary to establish a permanent committee to review the actions of the CIA and impose sanctions should indiscretions occur (Ransom 1965b, p. 13).
Do the critics have a valid argument? Is there no real control over the CIA?

The Agency's defenders believe that the CIA must continue to have a strong "voice" in the highest levels of Government. Efforts to weaken or eliminate certain activities would be contrary to the national interest. Through its operations, the CIA collects information which is unavailable from other sources and implements United States' policy which would not be effective without the use of covert methods. However, the Agency does not perform either of these tasks without adequate supervision. In actuality, the Agency's activities are restricted by a number of checks and balances both internal and external. Unless there is a massive conspiracy within the organization, the CIA will never be a threat to our free democratic society (Kirkpatrick 1968).

Although the internal controls which the Agency has are not publicized, certain information is available. The Agency has gradually adopted a stricter internal security program. All of its personnel are periodically re-evaluated to determine if there is any reason for denying them access to the Agency's information. Apparently this has been an effective system since the CIA has never had a defector or infiltrator. The qualities of the CIA Director can also be a restriction upon the Agency. When Allen Dulles was Director, the CIA concentrated on clandestine activities; however, since that time, Directors have been more inclined to favor the Agency's administrative functions. The President "holds the key" to the type of organization which he wants since he appoints the CIA Director (New York Times Apr. 29, 1966, p. 1).
The CIA operates in a competitive American system in which the Agency is not the only source of information. Science and technology provide the Government with much invaluable data which the CIA could not produce. As a result, the Government officials do not have to rely solely on the CIA's information, and this reduces the Agency's power.

Whenever bureaucracy is institutionalized and centralized, there is a risk of minimizing the policy discretion and flexible maneuverability of the decision makers. Fortunately such a bureaucratic structure does not exist in the United States Government. The United States has a governmental separation of powers and a pluralistic bureaucracy. There are several agencies which rival the CIA for power and influence. These include the confederated armed services, the DIA, the DOD, the State Department, and the FBI. None of these organizations is likely to relinquish its position to the CIA (Ransom 1964).

Another control over the CIA is the Bureau of the Budget. A great deal of comment has been made in the press and public about the way in which the CIA's budget is handled. The general impression is that the Congress either gives the Agency a "blank check" appropriation, or that it is munificent in its funding. This is not true. For all its fearsome reputation, the CIA is under far more stringent budgetary control than most of its critics know or will concede. The Bureau of the Budget has approximately three members who have access to the CIA's files. These individuals review the Agency's proposed expenditures and grant their approval or disapproval. Frequently the Agency is overruled, and its budget is either altered or reduced. The Bureau
of the Budget makes no policy judgments but weighs proposed expendi-
tures against the total money available. Instead of a "blank check,"
the CIA has an annual budget of little more than $500 million (New York

One of the major bulwarks of liberty is a citizenry sufficiently
informed about government activities and policy to participate in a
meaningful form of self-government. The mass media, with their competi-
tion to be "first in news," provide this information. Although no ex-
cuse can be made for publishing legitimately secret intelligence
information, the principle that every citizen, or at least his representa-
tives should be adequately informed must be maintained. The American
public can apply pressure to its representatives who in turn apply pres-
sure to the President. Pressure of this nature was evident after the
Bay of Pigs, U-2, and student subsidies incidents (Ransom 1964).

The ambassador controls the CIA's activities in foreign coun-
tries. As a member of the "country team," the Agency is under State
Department jurisdiction and direct ambassadorial supervision. In the
past, the ambassador has had a difficult task and often has been unable
to adequately control the CIA's activities in foreign countries. This
has been due partially to the failure of the ambassador to exert strong,
personal influence and partially to the fact that the ambassador did
not have meaningful support from the President. President Kennedy took
action to remedy this situation. During his administration, he dispatched
a letter to all ambassadors directing them to exert their authority and
take charge of the entire diplomatic mission in their respective
countries. In addition, all communications with Washington were to be routed through the ambassador's office for approval. Thus, the CIA's frequent practice of completely by-passing the mission chief was supposedly ended. In the final analysis, the effectiveness of the ambassador to control the "country team" depends largely on his strength of personality (Alsop 1968, p. 100). Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk affirmed this ("Breaking Up the CIA, Part II" June 26, 1961, p. 1):

"We expect our ambassadors abroad to take charge of the relations of the United States with the country in which they are posted and if necessary to take charge of all the officials who are there working with them."

One of the restraints against the possibility of bureaucratic tyranny is the power of Congress to control appropriations. Both the House and Senate have five-man subcommittees of their Appropriations Committees. These members can question the CIA about any activity or operation. In addition, Congress has the power to disapprove or reduce the appropriations which the Agency requests. Other congressional committees have the power to investigate the CIA's activities. These include the House and Senate Armed Services Committee, the Senate Judiciary Committee, the House Un-American Activities Committee, and the House Foreign Relations Committee. The number of members on these committees is restricted, for security reasons, to those Congressmen with the longest seniority, the most respect, and the greatest knowledge (New York Times Apr. 27, 1966). As has been mentioned previously, the Congress has failed to adopt any resolution which would change this
procedure. Massachusetts Senator Leverett Saltonstall has provided a reason (Unna 1958, p. 46): "The difficulty in connection with asking questions and obtaining information is that we might obtain information which I personally would rather not have. . . ."

The ultimate control over the CIA is the Executive Branch of Government. The Agency is responsible only to the President, both directly and through the National Security Council (NSC).

An NSC subcommittee exists to supervise the CIA's Cold War operations and mission. The 1947 National Security Act authorized the Agency to pursue activities only after NSC approval. Before approval is granted, the NSC judges whether the activity is completely in consonance with established United States policies and objectives and if the operation will be advantageous to United States security and prestige. After the NSC assesses the proposed operations, it forwards its recommendations to the President ("What's CIA?" 1966, p. 75).

The NSC, a legally organized element of the Government, assists the President. In addition, each President gathers around him a group of advisers, devoted to him and his administration's welfare, upon whom he can rely.

In December 1954, President Eisenhower appointed a special body, the 54-12 Group, to assist him on national security matters. The Group was composed of the President's special assistants for national security affairs, the CIA Director, the Deputy Secretaries for State and Defense and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The members met once a week and concentrated almost exclusively on
intelligence operations. The Group approved all proposed operations and expenditures of the Intelligence community which might have proved to be embarrassing or which had political implications. This Group was phased out and replaced in 1956 by the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This Board was a "watchdog" group which supervised the CIA's activities and evaluated the Agency's performance. The Board ceased to function but was reactivated by President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs disaster (New York Times Apr. 27, 1966). Subsequent to the disaster, Kennedy remarked: "It's a hell of a way to learn things, but I have learned one thing from this business—that is, that we will have to deal with the CIA" (Hilsman 1967, p. 63). President Kennedy did do something. By Executive Order, 19 February 1961, Kennedy established the Intelligence Advisory Board, reactivating the Board which functioned during the Eisenhower Administration. This new Board was composed of the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of State, and several ambassadors, scientists, and military leaders. President Kennedy (Public Papers 1962, p. 352) in a letter to the Board members, emphasized the function which they were to perform:

I am establishing this Board [Intelligence Advisory Board] for the purpose of providing me periodically with independent evaluations of the objectives and conduct of United States foreign intelligence activities and of the performance of the several agencies engaged in foreign intelligence and related efforts. It is my desire that the Board should meet periodically to analyze objectively the work of the Governments foreign intelligence agencies. . . . I am especially anxious to obtain the Board's views as to the overall conduct and progress of the foreign intelligence effort as well as its advice as to any modifications therein which would enhance acquisition of intelligence essential to the policymaking branches of the Government in the areas of national security and foreign relations.
Control of intelligence must remain primarily a Presidential responsibility since this is the only branch of the Government to which the Agency must directly report.

Evaluation

Adequate controls have indeed been established. Nevertheless, one question of critical import remains: are these controls being properly utilized for optimum efficacy? While available institutionalized forms of control are sufficient and could be effective, it is the will of the political officials who must apply these controls that is important and sometimes lacking. Even when control is adequate and effective, a more serious question is whether the very existence of an efficient CIA causes the United States Government to rely too heavily on clandestine activities and thus endanger the democratic process. Regardless of the controls available and their utilization, the CIA's international and national image, as a result of its operations, leaves something to be desired (New York Times Apr. 25 1966). Is the CIA's importance to United States national security vital enough to overshadow its "blackened" image and to negate the potential danger to our democratic society?

Perhaps the best method in which to answer this question is to examine the statements made by United States Presidents. These are the individuals who not only exercise direct control over the Agency but benefit most from its information and expertise. In November 1959, President Eisenhower stated (Presidents 1964, p. 14-15):
Success cannot be advertised: failure cannot be explained. In work of Intelligence, heroes are underrated and unsung... the reputation of [CIA] for quality and excellence of performance... is a proud one.

At an October 1963 news conference, President Kennedy explained (Presidents 1964, p. 22):

... So I think that while the CIA may have made mistakes, as we all do, on different occasions, and has had many successes which may go unheralded, in my opinion in this case [accusation that CIA makes policy or implements independent activities] it is unfair to charge them as they have been charged. I think they have done a good job.

President Johnson also praised the Agency (Presidents 1964, p. 27):

Your countrymen... cannot know of your accomplishment in the crucial business of the CIA. It is the loss of those in our intelligence agencies that they should work in silence—sometimes fail in silence, but more often succeed in silence. Unhappily, also, it is sometimes their lot that they must suffer in silence. Secrecy in this work is essential... The best intelligence is essential to the best policy. So I am delighted that you have undertaken, as far as security permits to tell the public that it is well served by the CIA... Express my deep confidence in the expert and dedicated service of the personnel of the CIA... 20 years ago, this country had no broadscale professional intelligence service worthy of the name. Today, it has a strong and vital one—the best in the world.

There is no national consensus on the requirements of national security, the prerequisites of democracy, or the ways in which national security may be protected and democracy threatened by the CIA. Only posterity will be able to judge the success with which the United States manages to balance security with democracy.
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90


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