

THE LEADERSHIP OF POST-WAR JAPANESE

CONSERVATIVE PARTIES 1946-65

by

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ABSTRACT

The governments of post- World War II Japan have been dominated by conservative parties. The present government is controlled by the Liberal-Democratic Party (Jiyu-Minshuto). The purpose of this study is to ascertain whether certain characteristics such as age, place of birth, education and occupation are common to the elite or leadership elements of post-war Japanese conservative parties. Further, by comparing the statistics relating to the Japanese elite group with statistics compiled on elite groups in China, more specifically, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, we may determine whether or not comparative studies of elites of different nations will yield any significant results.

In the end, the first aspect of this project is a study of the elite of one nation, Japan. The results substantiate similar studies conducted by other Asian scholars. With respect to comparative elite studies involving elites of different nations, it would appear that the results obtained will have significant value only if conducted under very controlled conditions.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Political parties were developed in Japan in the late nineteenth century and did not develop along democratic lines. The first parties were created by samurai, members of the warrior class, of the lesser han (fiefs); e.g., Okuma Shigenobu of Hizen and Itagaki Taisuke of Tosa. These samurai leaders used their parties as instruments to wrest control of the government from the samurai of the larger Satsuma and Choshu han. In turn the leaders of the "Sat-Cho clique," e.g., Yamagata Aritomo and Ito Hirobumi of Choshu, who had dominated the government since the Meiji Restoration of 1868, were forced to create their own parties and the Japanese government acquired a veneer of party government.

Beneath this veneer, the government was conducted by the various party leaders, in their roles as elder statesmen (genro), in combination with the various financial cliques (zaibatsu) and the military. In the twentieth century the genro government fell host to severe economic, social and political problems and succumbed in 1918. In 1918 Hara Kei, the "Great Commoner," became Premier and this marks the beginning of a sharing of the control of the government by party politicians and a true party government.

One explanation of the reason why political parties did not develop along democratic lines relates to the nature of the Meiji

Constitution. The concept of parties was advanced in the 1870's, but parties had no particular status and were regarded as nuisances. In 1889 and 1890 through the efforts of Ito, a new constitution was promulgated under the auspices of the emperor. This constitution which, was loosely modeled after the German and British constitutions, set up a "transcendental government"¹ which floated above the party politics and perpetuated a political system that was controlled by the genro.

"The Period of Normal Government" (Kensei no Jodo)² which was of brief duration, lasting only until 1932, is one of the most interesting periods in Japanese political history. This period is characterized by both contradictions and conflict. The contradictions arise because on the surface the Japanese government appeared to be on the road to democratization, as evidenced by the passage of the Universal Manhood Suffrage Act in 1925 which expanded the electorate from three million voters to thirteen million voters. However, in that same year the Diet passed the Peace Preservation Law which gave the police power to combat "dangerous thought," and more particularly the authority to eradicate the Marxists and Socialists.

The fact that the period was marked by a great deal of conflict can be evidenced by the fact that the period is also known as a time of "government by assassination." Three premiers were assassinated

1. Peter Duus. Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 83.

2. Robert K. Reischauer. Japan: Government and Politics. (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1935), p. 132.

(including Hara) and in 1932 the Japanese government was taken over by the military. The ascension of the militarists to power in 1932 marked the end of effective party government in Japan until 1946. Parties were not officially banned, but they were "voluntarily" dissolved in 1940 and a year later a national party was formed, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, which was a wartime patriotic front organization. Unfortunately for Japan, a truly democratic party government did not develop until it was imposed upon the nation after it suffered a disastrous military defeat in 1945.

The unconditional surrender of Japan in September of 1945 marked the end of World War II and the beginning of a period of occupation by American troops under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur, as Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), sought to dismantle Japan's war machinery and to democratize the government. To this end measures were enacted that thoroughly revamped Japan's economic, social and political systems. Specifically, one of the most dramatic moves was the renunciation of the divine status of the emperor, an act that was a result of the terms of surrender laid down by the Allies at Potsdam.

On the economic level, a system of land reform was initiated and efforts were made to break up the zaibatsu or large financial cartels that had dominated the nation's economy. On the political and social levels many significant reforms were instituted, particularly with respect to the recognition of women's rights and the right of labor unions to organize. Leaders of the wartime government were, in

some instances, tried as war criminals, and in others merely purged. Political parties were again formed in late 1945 by conservatives as well as the now legally recognized Marxists and Communists, and a new constitution was drafted by the SCAP and his advisors. The Bill of Rights Directive (SCAP Directive) of October 1945 guaranteed political freedom and encouraged political activity.³ In April 1946, an election was held for the seats in the Diet or national legislature and as a result of that election the Diet was controlled by a coalition of the conservative parties.

Since 1946 the Japanese government has been dominated by conservative parties, with the exception of the Socialist-Democratic coalition of 1947 to 1948. From 1945 to 1955 several conservative parties competed for power; for example Nihon Shimpoto (Progressive Party), Kaishinto (Reform Party), and Kokumin Minshito (People's Democratic Party). However, in 1955 the Liberal party (Jiyuto) and the Democratic Party (Minshuto) merged to form the Liberal-Democratic party (Jiyu-Minshuto). Today, this party continues as the dominant political force in Japan and the main conservative force.

Under the post-war Japanese constitution of May 1947 which was promulgated in November of the previous year,⁴ the Japanese instituted a cabinet type of government, with the prime minister being selected from the House of Representatives (lower house) of the Diet. In

3. Hugh Borton. Japan's Modern Century. (New York: Ronald Press, 1955), p. 466.

4. Ibid., p. 468.

actuality the prime minister is the head of the party which holds a majority of seats in the House of Representatives. The prime minister in turn is responsible to the Diet for their actions. This is in contrast to the Meiji Constitution of 1889 where no such responsibility existed, but rather the prime minister was responsible only to the emperor. The new constitution also made the judiciary independent of the executive branch and incorporated many of the basic human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the first ten amendments to the American Constitution. One unique feature of the Constitution pertains to Article Nine; under the provisions of this Article Japan renounced war as a sovereign right and the use of force or the threat of force to settle international disputes.

As mentioned above, conservative parties have dominated post-World War II Japanese government: accordingly, any study of conservative leadership or elites would be a study of the leaders or potential leaders of Japan. The object of this paper is to ascertain whether or not an analysis of conservative elites, based upon certain criteria, such as occupation or education, will serve as a means of projecting the quality and character of the leaders of the future. On a more practical level, failing all else, this paper will also serve to indicate the quality and the character of the present-day leadership.

The methodology employed in this project is loosely modeled after techniques utilized by Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner in World Revolutionary Elites.⁵ Quite naturally, the first step in the

5. Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.). World Revolutionary Elites. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965).

development of this study was the method of determining who were the leaders or elites of the various conservative parties. To this end a simple formula was adopted. Each year in the Asahi Nenkan⁶ (Asahi yearbook) a membership list of all Japanese political parties is published and the list is broken down in terms of cabinet positions and party committees. For the purposes of this study, the leaders were identified as either prime minister, cabinet member or committee chairman. Accordingly, by going through the Asahi Nenkan from 1946 to 1965, the author compiled a list of four hundred and seventy-one (471) names of leaders. It was decided at the start that any attempt to research the backgrounds of so many people would prove to be most difficult and so the author resolved this problem by taking a ten per cent random sample from the list of 471.

To insure that the random sample would indeed be random, a simple procedure was adopted according to the guidelines set down by Hubert Blalock in his book, Social Statistics.⁷ In compiling the list of names the author placed the name of each individual on an index card and the card was numbered. Finally, after all the names were numbered and recorded, the author consulted a list of random numbers in the appendix of Social Statistics. The list of random numbers was simply a list of numbers that had been arranged at random and by consulting the list and removing the numbered index card that corresponded to the

6. Asahi Nenkan (Asahi yearbook). (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Co., 1946 to 1965).

7. Hubert Blalock. Social Statistics. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960).

number on the list a ten per cent sample of forty-seven names was taken. To further clarify this method of random selection, one might say that as forty-seven represents ten per cent of the 471 names so the names that corresponded to the first forty-seven on the list of random numbers were chosen (see Appendix A for the random group).

With the completion of the random selection of forty-seven names, the author was then ready to research the backgrounds of the individual leaders. For the most part, information pertinent to this study could be found in several Japanese language personnel directories and who's whos.⁸ More specifically, the bulk of the necessary information was obtained from the Nihon Jinjiroku (Japan personnel list)⁹ and the Choshakuen Daicho: Bunka Jimmeiroku (Writer's and professional people's register).¹⁰ With the information derived from these sources uniform criteria were established, e.g., age, place of birth (urban-rural differentiation), education and occupation. Each of these criteria will receive special attention in the following chapters.

8. H. V. Gillis and Pai Ping (compilers). Japanese Personal Names. (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, 1942); H. V. Gillis and Pai Ping (compilers). Japanese Surnames. (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, 1943); Japan's Biographical Encyclopedia and Who's Who. (Tokyo: Rengo Press, 1960); Japan's Biographical Encyclopedia and Who's Who. (Tokyo: Rengo Press, 1964).

9. Yukio Moriyama (ed.). Nihon Jinjiroku (Japan personnel list). (Shuppanbu: Chuo Tanteisha, 1963). #38.

10. Chosakuken Daicho: Bunka Jimmeiroku (Writer's and professional people's register). (Kyogikai: Nihon Chosakuken, 1956). #9.

Some Problems of Analysis

Because of the insufficient data supplied by the above-mentioned sources, and because of a further lack of more informative sources, certain sections of this work lack a good deal of information. In an attempt to remedy this problem, the author has referred to similar projects and compared their results with his. The studies used for comparative purposes are Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi's Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan,¹¹ Herbert Passin's Society and Education in Japan,¹² and James Abegglen and Hiroshi Mannari's "Leaders of Modern Japan: Social Origins and Mobility."¹³ To this end both the similarities and differences when relevant to this project will be cited. Furthermore, in an effort to give these compiled statistics a more balanced examination, the results of this study will be compared with the results of elite studies of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) found in World Revolutionary Elites.

11. Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi. Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

12. Herbert Passin. Society and Education in Japan. (New York: Columbia University Teacher's College, 1965).

13. James Abegglen and Hiroshi Mannari, "Leaders of Modern Japan: Social Origins and Mobility," Economic Development and Cultural Change. Vol. LX, No. 1, Part 2, 1960.

CHAPTER 2

AGE AS A FACTOR

For the purposes of this work an analysis of the age of the elite members of the conservative parties as a criterion for determining or measuring party traits will be examined from two standpoints: birth date and age at leaving college. The first category is self explanatory. The second category, although there exists a paucity of available information, will indicate how closely the random sample group conforms to patterns established by typical Japanese students. To further clarify this point an additional explanation must be given. Most of the sources of information used in this study provide only the graduation date and in most cases only the date of graduation from college or the university and not from the middle school. Also, using age as a factor in this elite analysis, a comparison will be made between the average age of the Japanese Conservative party leadership and the average age of both the Kuomintang elite and the Chine Communist Party leadership element.

Birth Date

Based on the data at hand (there was no information available on two of the forty-seven individuals in the sample group), the average Japanese conservative party leader was born in 1899. Thus, when we consider that this study covers leaders up to and including 1965, this

would indicate that the average age was sixty-six as of 1965. In Masumi and Scalapino's study, based on statistics for 1958, the average birth date for all conservative party members was 1910.¹⁴ Hence their statistics show that the average age is fifty-seven. The large discrepancy between these two figures might be explained by the fact that several members of the random sample group died during the period under consideration at an advanced age, and their ages were still averaged in up to and including the 1965 membership. However, the Scalapino study used statistics that were compiled only on living, active party members.

In comparing the relative age of the leaders with the relative age of the overall party membership, the leaders are several years older. The fact that the leadership of the conservative party is relatively old can be substantiated by the fact that of the forty-five birth dates extant in the sample group, only six men (13.3%) were born after 1910. One further substantiation of this fact is that statistics based on the year 1968 show the average age of faction leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party as sixty-seven years.¹⁵ The faction leaders most certainly must be considered members of the elite group of the Jiyu-Minshuto. With respect to the relative ages of conservative party members in general, the figures indicate that the conservative party membership is older than their counterparts in the other parties.

14. Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi (1962), 73.

15. Nathaniel B. Thayer. How the Conservatives Rule Japan. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). Appendix.

Figures were determined by compiling the average age of the membership list of the Liberal-Democratic Party of 1968.¹⁶

Thus one can see that when the criterion of birth date and age computed as of 1968 is applied to the leadership of the Japanese conservative party one finds that the leaders of the party are older compared to the general membership, and that the party membership as a whole is older than its liberal counterparts.

As Table 1 reveals (page 12), the average age of the Japanese elite group is higher than all of the Chinese elite groups. Interestingly enough, though not surprising, is the fact that the biggest discrepancy in age exists between the Japanese conservative elite (average age 66 years) and the Chinese radical (one would hesitate to use the word liberal) elite of the Chinese Communist Party (average age 47 years). To put it another way, both the Japanese and Chinese conservative elite groups' average age is greater than the CCP's elite group age. Thus it would seem that the conservative elite group members in both China and Japan are older than their respective liberal counterparts.

Age at Graduation From College

There is a distinct lack of information in this category, which has been used to project the class or status of the sample group. Many scholars of Japanese history and government have accepted the fact that the leadership elements in the conservative parties come

16. Ibid.

Table 1. Average Age of Party Elites.

<u>Party Elites</u>	<u>Average Age of Members</u>
Japanese Conservatives	66
Chinese Communist Party	46.8
Kuomintang	54.9*

*The figures for the ages of the Chinese elite are based on figures for post-1945. The studies of R.C. North and I.D. Pool in their "Kuomintang and Chinese Elites" indicate that the average age of the elite membership in both the KMT and the CCP tends to rise over a period of years. R.C. North and I.D. Pool, "Kuomintang and Chinese Elites," in Lasswell and Lerner (eds.) World Revolutionary Elites. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965.

from an elite background, and this project tends to substantiate this supposition. In setting up a hypothetical construct to project the elite status of the sample group, the author added the average age of the group at graduation from college or university, which was twenty-two, to the average birth date (1899), and arrived at the year 1921.¹⁷ This firmly establishes the fact that the average leader had a pre-war education. Further, since the average age at graduation for the average pre-war college or university graduate was twenty-four,¹⁸ as compared to the sample group's twenty-two, this study would tend to show that, at least, the average leader who attended college or university was part of an educational elite. This will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

The two year difference between the averages, if it doesn't conclusively establish the educational superiority of the average leader, might at least tend to support the view that a privileged background would provide the money and the opportunity to attend and finish school. Of course, the evidence presented in this section is too flimsy to prove the elitist nature of the Japanese leadership, but rather serves as a broad hint. Chapter 4 will more clearly elucidate this point.

This criterion for analysis was not applied in the elite studies of the KMT and the CCP and hence there was no way to make a comparison between them and the Japanese elite groups' age at

17. North and Pool (1965), 383.

18. Herbert Passin (1965) Appendix, Table v.

graduation from college. This is not to say that the criterion is not valid. As this method of analysis is unique only to this study, it does not imply that further elites studied will not utilize this criterion as one deserving more attention.

CHAPTER 3

PLACE OF BIRTH AS A FACTOR

In analyzing the data pertaining to the place of birth of the study group it can be demonstrated that the leadership of the conservative parties truly represents all areas of Japan. This can be shown by the fact that of forty-eight existing Japanese administrative regions (prefectures), thirty-one are represented by conservative leaders. The prefectures represented are, on Honshu: Aichi, Akita, Chiba, Fukui, Hiroshima, Hyogo, Ibaraki, Ishikawa, Kanazawa, Kyoto, Miyagi, Nagano, Niigata, Okayama, Shiga, Tochigi, Tokyo, Toyama, Wakayama, Yamagata, Yamanashi, Yamaguchi; on Shikoku: Ehime, Kagawa, Tokushima; on Kyushu: Fukuoka, Kagoshima, Kumamoto, Nagasaki, Oita and Saga. Of this number, twelve have two representatives. These are, on Honshu: Akita, Hiroshima, Hygo, Ibaraki, Niigata, Shiga, Tochigi, Yamagata, Yamanashi; on Kyushu: Fukuoka, Kagoshima, and Saga. Only two, Kyoto and Tokyo, have multiple representation (three).

The fact that the metropolitan areas of Tokyo and Kyoto have only a small representation relative to the whole, tends to strengthen the accepted view that the conservative parties draw their vast support from rural areas and are weaker in the larger metropolitan districts. Once again we find that the random sample technique as applied in this particular instance substantiates what has been shown to be the case in similar studies.

One other fact that should be mentioned is that it would appear that the leaders for the most part represent the areas in which they were born. This supports the political axiom that party leaders, in order to remain leaders, have to be repeatedly elected in their home districts and having roots in their district is a distinct advantage. Unfortunately, the materials that were available do not indicate whether or not the increased population and the increasing urbanization of Japan, with a potential change in the constituency of the leaders' political base, will bring about a concomitant change in the leadership.

There are several reasons why a comparison was not made with respect to birthplace as a criterion between the Japanese conservative elite and the Chinese elite group (the KMT and CCP). The major consideration was given to the avowed purpose of this study, that is using several criteria to examine and qualify these characteristics common to the leadership element of Japanese conservative parties. Hence, it would serve no purpose to compare the information pertaining to birthplace to the elite of a wholly different geographical area. Secondly, due to the obvious problems that would confront the researcher in trying to isolate the diverse factors that exist in a comparison of the geographical data between an island nation and a continental nation. One further complication arose from the above-mentioned fact that the data relating to Japan could not be broken down into an urban-rural differentiation.

CHAPTER 4.

EDUCATION AS A FACTOR

There is no questioning the relevancy of education as a criterion for analysis of an elite group in a modern society. This is particularly true with respect to Japan, where beginning with the Meiji Restoration (more particularly, the establishment of Tokyo University in 1877)¹⁹ the school system was revamped particularly to facilitate the modernization of Japan. Since that time certain Japanese universities have supplied the bulk of political and business leaders.

One of the factors producing this phenomenon revolves around the batsu or clique system, whereby graduates of universities having belonged to a particular clique, go on to acquire positions in the government or with particular businesses or industries because the leaders of the government or business clique attended that particular university before them. The standard example to demonstrate this is the fact that the Law Faculty of Tokyo University provided the key to admittance to government service.²⁰ Other examples along the same vein illustrate the pervasive nature of the cliques. "Keio, one of the two leading private universities of Japan, has its dominant influence in insurance companies and in department stores; Waseda, the other leading

19. Herbert Passin. (1965), 142.

20. Ibid., 129.

private university, in certain newspapers and the construction industry."²¹

An examination of the educational background of our sample group tends to support the fact of the interrelationship between success and the university from which one has taken a degree. Forty (85.1%) of the forty-seven subjects in the sample group attended a university. Only two did not attend even a college, but these did attend middle school. Of the forty who attended a university, twenty (50%) attended the "Big Three" (Todai [Tokyo University], Kyodai [Kyoto University], and Tokyo Commercial College). Of this number, seventeen (36.2%) attended Tokyo University.

In contrast to the above figures we find that of the Liberal-Democratic Party membership as of 1962 seventy-four percent had university educations and thirty-three percent were graduates of Tokyo University.²² In both instances the leadership reflects a higher percentage of university and Tokyo University graduates than does the party as a whole.

A brief analysis of the available statistics with respect to what department the subjects in the sample group received their degrees in demonstrates even further the cliquish and elitist nature of the group. The three major areas of study proved to be law, economics, and political science, in that order. Eighteen (38.1%) of the leaders graduated with degrees in law, nine (19.2%) graduated with degrees in

21. Ibid., 134.

22. Ibid., 147.

economics, and four (8.5%) with degrees in government. A further breakdown of the figures reveals that, as might be expected, the statistics favor Tokyo University. Nine of the eighteen who received law degrees (50%) and four of the eight who received degrees in economics (50%) received their degrees from Todai. These figures further attest to the value of a degree from Tokyo University to a member of the party leadership of Japan.

As can be seen, the maxim that a university education in Japan is the key to success in politics rings true and the corollary that a degree from Tokyo University will insure a greater degree of success in politics also appears valid. The statistics also demonstrate the fact that the leadership of the conservative Japanese parties does indeed reflect the elite nature of the group.

In comparing the statistics on education between the Japanese elite group and the Chinese elite groups, one finds that the bulk of the elite groups have attended universities. No one definite figure can be given for the Chinese elites because of the manner with which the statistics were presented in the study of North and Pool in World Revolutionary Elites. However, the statistics indicate that a great many of the Chinese elite attended universities in China, Japan, and in other nations, but because many individuals attended several universities in several nations, the statistics were nonadditive. To illustrate this point, the statistics reveal that 54.8% of the Communist Central Committee attended either a Chinese University, a Chinese military school, or received a classical education; and 72.4% of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee received a similar education.

At the same time 59.5% of the Central Committee of the CCP attended universities in the Soviet Union, in contrast to 5.4% of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT. Simple arithmetic shows that by adding 54.8% and 59.5% one arrives at a figure larger than 100% ($54.8\% + 59.5\% = 114.3\%$). Also, 11.9% of the Central Committee of the CCP attended a Japanese university or Japanese military school compared to 26.1% of the CEC of the KMT.

Hence with respect to education all that can be said about the Chinese elite groups is that a greater preponderance of conservative elites have received their university education in China than their Communist counterparts. The majority of the Communist leaders, on the other hand, have attended universities in the Soviet Union, whereas only a small fraction of the conservative elite has attended Soviet universities. Again, one disclaimer must be inserted to the effect that the statistics compiled on the Chinese elite are quite dated and, considering the changing world scene, one would expect the figures relating to leaders who attended Soviet universities to have changed drastically. To conclude, it would appear that as is the case with the Japanese elite, a university education is important to the Chinese elites, but one cannot make the same correlation between attendance at a particular university or universities and the incidence of success in politics in China as one can make with respect to Japan.

CHAPTER 5

OCCUPATION AS A FACTOR

In analyzing the data with respect to occupation, one immediate problem relates to the fact that the source books used to gather information on the subjects were in many instances sketchy and brief. This served to frustrate any attempt to gather pertinent information on family background and occupational background. Thus there was not enough material to attempt to establish a meaningful construct of a selected leader's previous occupation, except in the case of the prominent leaders, i.e., Yoshida Shigeru and Kishi Nobosuke. It therefore served no purpose to try to ascertain if the majority of the leaders served in a particular occupation previous to and during World War II.

In the selection of data for this chapter one must consider the occupation listed in Table 2 as the secondary occupation of the members of the sample group, because it is quite obvious that all of the leaders are firstly politicians or they would not be found in the sample group. In addition, many of these men are businessmen to the extent that they are the heads of corporations, or serve on the boards of directors of corporations. To add to the confusion, we might expect that the information supplied in the directories was either supplied by the individual himself or someone close to him. Thus, the occupational categories in the table below are not those of the author's

Table 2. Occupations of Japanese Conservative Leaders.

Occupation	Number	Percentage
Politician	17	36.2%
Businessman	10	21.3
Lawyer	7	14.9
Public Corporation Executive	5	10.6
Educator	4	8.5
Diplomat	1	2.1
Writer	1	2.1
Minister	1	2.1
Farmer	<u>1</u>	<u>2.1</u>
TOTAL	47	100.0%

determination, but are designated by the compilers of the personnel directories and are of the individual's own choosing.

In light of the information supplied in Chapter 3 relating to the educational background of the leaders, one would expect that a preponderant number of the group would be lawyers, politicians or businessmen. In fact, this is exactly the case, for thirty-four (72.4%) of the forty-seven members are engaged in these three occupations, as Table 2 illustrates.

In comparing the careers of the Japanese elites with the careers of the Chinese elites, the one most glaring difference centers around the fact that the Japanese elite do not have military backgrounds. In fact, out of the random sample of forty-seven, not one Japanese leader had a military career, in contrast to the fact that 35.6% of the Central Committee of the CCP were military men, as were 37.2% of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT.²³ This is not surprising in lieu of the fact that the military has never played an important role in Japanese political parties. One must also consider that at their inception, both the KMT and the CCP were revolutionary parties and had to rely on military strengths and skills to conduct both a civil war and a defensive war against Japan. Therefore it is not surprising to encounter such a large percentage of Chinese elites with military backgrounds.

The statistics relating to the careers of the remainder of the Chinese elite group do not deviate too sharply from the statistics

23. Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (1965), 384-5.

relating to the careers of the Japanese leadership element. 45.5% of the Central Committee of the CCP and 50.2%²⁴ of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT had careers in party organization as compared to 36.2% of the elite of the Japanese conservative parties. All the groups have roughly corresponding percentages of members in the fields of education and journalism.

To offset the lack of Japanese conservative elites with military backgrounds in contrast to the Chinese elites, 21.3% of the Japanese leaders are businessmen. This, as is the case with China's large group of military careerists, can be explained because of the traditional close ties that exist between Japanese conservative political parties and the Japanese business community. However, in all other respects there are no additional career or occupational differences between the Chinese elite groups and the Japanese elite.

24. Ibid.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

Based on an analysis of age (date of birth), birth place, education and occupation of the members of a randomly selected group of leaders of post-war Japan's conservative parties, it would seem that the most relevant factors are those pertaining to age and education. With respect to the remaining factors of birth place and occupation, the statistics relating to these areas only support the view that no one particular area of the nation provides the greatest amount of leaders; nor does one particular occupational grouping (with the exception of those who classified themselves as politicians) take precedence over another grouping. To this extent the occupational backgrounds of the leaders are relatively varied.

The statistics relating to education and age provide the most revealing information and in the end support results published in previous studies. These results verify the fact that the political success of conservative party leaders in Japan is directly related to the educational background of the individual. To phrase it another way, an individual who has attained a university degree, quite naturally, would have a more successful chance of entering the mainstream of Japanese government and business. The more prestigious the university attended, Tokyo University being the pinnacle, the more likely the

probability that one will have a greater chance for success. To further refine the analysis, if one has a degree from a particular department of a particular university, i.e., the Law Faculty of Tokyo University, more opportunities for political success will be available. From the statistics obtained for this paper, one cannot determine if this phenomenon will continue. With respect to age as a viable category for analysis of an elite group, the information obtained reveals the relative old age of the leadership of Japan's conservative parties.

In the final analysis this study does not add any new information that previous leadership studies have not already disclosed. With respect to the methodology employed in this work, it would seem that the random sample technique reflects a fairly accurate picture of Japanese political conservative leadership. However, it must be pointed out that the differences between the statistics gathered for this work and the statistics compiled from previous studies can be attributed to the random sample method of analysis. The other studies utilized statistics based on entire groupings and thus more accurately reflected the nature of that particular group.

With respect to the relevancy of the methodology employed in comparing statistics gathered from additional elite studies with statistics relating to conservative Japanese elements, it would appear that the technique can prove quite fruitful. However, many problems can arise through geographical differences, differences in both party and government structures and finally problems arise from the staleness of the material related to the other studies. Unless one is able to compile a study of an elite group along the very same lines as similar

comparative studies, it tends to be quite difficult to correlate the statistics so that the similarities and differences can be noted with any degree of certitude.

Thus with respect to the four factors (age, birth place, education and occupation) utilized in this project, only three (age, education, and with some modification, occupation) could satisfactorily be employed to compare Japanese conservative leadership and the leadership elements of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. Even in this endeavor the reliability of the data can be called into question due to the relative age of the data relating to the Chinese elites.

APPENDIX A

THE RANDOM SAMPLE GROUP

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BIRTH DATE</u>	<u>BIRTH PLACE</u>	<u>EDUCATION</u>	<u>OCCUPATION</u>
Ando Masazumi	1876	Tokyo	Todai	Politician
Akita Daisuke	1906	Tokyo	Todai	Politician
Arita Kiichi	1901	Hyogo	Todai	Businessman
Ashida Hitoshi	1887	Kyoto	Todai	Diplomat
Funada Kyoji	1898	Tochigi	Todai	Educator
Hashimoto Tomisaburo	1901	Ibaragi	Waseda	Politician
Hayakawa Takashi	1916	Wakayama	Todai	Politician
Hirabayashi Taichi	XX	Yamanashi	elem.	Politician
Hori Shigeru	1901	Saga	Chuo	Educator
Inaba Osamu	1909	Niigata	Chuo	Lawyer
Ishida Hirohide	1915	Akita	Waseda	Writer
Izumiyama Sanroku	1896	Yamagata	Todai	Politician
Kano Hikokichi	1904	Yamagata	Kyodai	Businessman
Kato Takenori	1915	Okayama	Chuo	Politician
Kaya Okinori	1889	Hiroshima	Todai	Pub. Corp. Exec.
Kishii Nobosuke	1896	Yamaguchi	Todai	Politician
Kita Reikichi	1885	Niigata	Otani U.	Educator
Kitamura Tokutaro	1886	Kyoto	Kansei	Businessman
Kitazawa Naokichi	1901	Ibaraki	Tokyo Bus. College	Businessman

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BIRTH DATE</u>	<u>BIRTH PLACE</u>	<u>EDUCATION</u>	<u>OCCUPATION</u>
Kono Ichiro	1898	Kanagawa	Waseda	Agriculture
Kuarishi Tadao	1900	Nagano	Hosei U.	Minister
Kusaba Ryuen	1895	Yanagawa	Otani U.	Politician
Matsunaga To	1887	Nagasaki	Nihon U.	Politician
Matsuno Koichi	1905	Akita	Today	Lawyer
Miki Bukichi	1884	Kagawa	Waseda	Politician
Miyazawa Kiichi	1919	Hiroshima	Today	Politician
Miki Takeo	1907	Tokushima	Meiji U.	Politician
Moriyama Kinji	1918	Tochigi	Today	Pub. Corp. Exec.
Murakami Isamu	1903	Oita	Waseda	Pub. Corp. Exec.
Nakano Shiro	XX	Aichi	XX	Businessman
Narahashi Wataru	1902	Fukuoka	Lyon U.	Politician
Ogawa Hanji	1909	Ishikawa	Ritsu-meikan	Pub. Corp. Exec.
Onoki Hidjiro	1895	Kyoto	Jr. Coll.	Businessman
Oshitani Tomizo	1893	Shiga	Kansei U.	Businessman
Otsubo Yasuo	1899	Saga	Today	Lawyer
Sakomizu Hisatsune	1902	Kagoshima	Today	Businessman
Sase Shozo	1902	Chiba	Hosei U.	Lawyer
Shimazu Tadahiko	1899	Kagoshima	Seiken Gakuen Col.	Businessman
Sonoda Sunao	1913	Kumamoto	Middle	Agriculture
Tachibana Naoji	1908	Toyama	Waseda	Politician
Takechi Yuki	1894	Ehime	Meiji U.	Educator
Tanaka Isaji	1906	Hyogo	Rissumei-kan U.	Lawyer
Tomabechi Hidetoshi	1884	Fukui	Tokyo Sch.	Educator For. Lang.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BIRTH DATE</u>	<u>BIRTH PLACE</u>	<u>EDUCATION</u>	<u>OCCUPATION</u>
Tsutsumi Yasujiro	1889	Shiga	Waseda	Businessman
Uchida Tsuneo	1907	Yamanashi	Todai	Pub. Corp. Exec.
Yoshida Shigeru	1879	Tokyo	Todai	Politician
Yoshino Shinji	1888	Miyagi	Todai	Politician

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