THE ORIGINS OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN
CONFRONTATION IN BERLIN, 1948

by

Judith B. Leonard

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1964
STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

Judith Leonard

APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR

This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:

H. E. BATEMAN
Professor of History

May 5, 1964
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express her most heartfelt gratitude to the faculty of the Department of History of the University of Arizona for advice and encouragement rendered with unhesitant willingness. Deepest appreciation is extended to Dr. Herman E. Bateman, under whose direction this thesis was completed, and whose guidance and understanding have been inestimable. Special thanks are due Professor Russell C. Ewing, Head of the Department of History for his generous support. Finally, the author is indebted to the personnel of the University of Arizona Library for their invaluable advice on sources and special materials.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STATEMENT BY THE AUTHOR</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND: A SURVEY OF RUSSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: 1941 - 1945</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING: THE MAJOR AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE BERLIN OCCUPATION</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE ERA OF HOPE: RUSSO-AMERICAN ENCOUNTERS IN BERLIN FROM MAY, 1945 - OCTOBER, 1946</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE PATTERN OF DECAY: RUSSO-AMERICAN CONFLICTS TO THE BERLIN BLOCKADE OF JUNE, 1948</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. EPILOGUE: HISTORICAL OPINIONS</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF REFERENCES</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

The Berlin blockade of June, 1948 was the result of the inability of the United States to formulate any definitive policy toward the Soviet Union. Relations between these two powers during World War II were not in accord with any consistent policy, and American attitudes toward Russia were, on all levels, uncertain.

Following the surrender, the negotiated basis for the occupation of Berlin was incomplete, for many aspects of occupation were left either to verbal understanding, or to faith in Russian co-operation. During the first year of occupation, the United States and the Soviet Union dealt with one another in a spirit of friendly competition which made four-power occupation appear to be a workable arrangement.

However, when the Soviet Union was defeated at the polls in October, 1946 a new era began. Russia initiated a gradual process of undermining quadripartite authority in Berlin. This program culminated in complete blockade. The pattern of decay in Russo-American relations in Berlin demonstrates the effect of the inability of the United States to deal with the questionable goals of a very recent ally.
CHAPTER I

THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND: A SURVEY OF
RUSSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: 1941 - 1945.

In order to appreciate the American problem vis-
a-vis Russia in Berlin immediately following the war, it
is necessary to understand the antecedant temper of
Russian-American relations, and, more specifically, the
American attitudes toward Russia. To achieve that under­
standing, an extensive examination of American wartime
sentiments toward Russia is essential. This survey pro­
vides the necessary background to the understanding of
later events in Berlin.

The sources which have been examined in trying to
recapture the wartime temper include a wide variety of
media. The memoirs and diaries of the officials of the
Department of State are a competent source of information
about American feelings toward Russia. Somewhat less
official are the writings of the legislators in both
the House and the Senate. These people were in closest
contact with the diplomats and statesmen, but were also
very much affected by their responsibility to constituents
at home. This makes their opinions a strange mixture of
what they felt and what they felt compelled to feel. Even farther from the centers of actual foreign entanglements was the press. Its representatives had actual contact with the policy makers but were not honor-bound to report accurately. The distorted products of sensationalism often provided a far less than truthful picture of the situation. Nevertheless, this was the only source of information open to the public and certainly accounted for much of the distortion of truth which the public was given to absorb.

The American people, whose views were expounded and digested by the methods of public surveying, provide the fourth and final expression of American sentiment. Keeping in mind the built-in fallacies of public surveys and the misapprehensions under which Americans are often forced to act, the statistics as to American popular attitudes toward Russia provide a final addition to the picture that existed in American eyes of American-Soviet relations. Considering the democratic system under which the United States government was operating, the pressure exerted by popular sentiment was a considerable one. The effect that this pressure had in molding official foreign policy can never be accurately calculated, but it cannot, for that reason, be ignored.
The need for Soviet-American cooperation did not really come to the fore until 1941 and United States entry into the war. At this time the new relationship as partners against the same enemy made the problems of trust and mutual loyalty very real indeed. The previous period of 1939 to 1941 reflected a new low in American-Soviet relations; the Russians were convinced that United States neutrality was a fraud, since a rash of loans and military aid toward Britain and France pervaded the entire period.\(^1\) The new association brought on by our declaration of war in 1941 caused much speculation and revaluation. It was now pointed out in the United States that no boundary disputes or specific grievances marred Soviet-American relations, and that our common interest in the defeat of Nazism and post-war security held every promise of continuing cooperation.\(^2\) These, however, were arguments reflected by politicians and the press. The people were slow to change. Gallup Polls and *Fortune Magazine* surveys did their best to keep a running account of American public opinion. Many of their figures and charts are very telling. For example,

\(^1\) David J. Dallin, *The Big Three: The United States, Britain and Russia* (New Haven, Yale Press, 1945), p. 257. Mr. Dallin was a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

following the German attack on Russia, the Gallup Poll asked the question, "Which side do you want to win?" The findings show that 72% favored Russia, 4% favored Germany and 24% did not have a preference. Of this same group 22% said they expected Russia to win. In the fall of 1941, another survey found that 33% of those polled regarded Germany and Russia with equal contempt.3

Two studies taken with only a four month interval reveal a sudden and probably unnoticed reversal in American attitudes. In October of 1941 14% of the people questioned said that we should refuse all aid to Russia. In February of 1942, following the American entry, only 4% were found to persist in that view. Also revealed in the February survey was the fact that as compared with the October findings, twice as many Americans were willing to accept Russia as a full partner. In both surveys, results showed that the majority favored cooperation and not full partnership.4

The period following the American entrance shows a definite change in the pattern of American sentiments toward Russia. In spite of considerable fluctuation, the general trend was toward increased inclination to trust her and to

3 Walsh, "What the people think of Russia." The Public Opinion Quarterly (1944) no. 4 p. 515.

4 Ibid., p. 516.
favor full post-war cooperation. Certain highlights in the war brought on drastic reversals in the upward trend; for example, when the Germans reached Stalingrad in August of 1942, when Stalin began pressing for a second front in June of 1943 and when Pravda began circulating rumors about Western plans for a separate peace in January of 1944.

But with the initiation of a second front in June of 1944, confidence was at a new high.

Other crises in the war saw less drastic changes. In March, April, May and June of 1942, the Germans were continuing their advance toward the heart of Russia. During these months, American feelings toward Russia fluctuated constantly. Early 1943 brought the decisive Stalingrad victory and respect for Russia reached the highest peak yet recorded. On November 19, 1942, The National Opinion Research Center asked the question, "Do you think we should continue to cooperate with Russia after the war?" 80% of those polled answered, "yes." 7

Early in 1943 a new conflict in Soviet-American relations occurred when the American ambassador to the Soviet Union accused Russia of concealing from her people


6 Walsh, p. 516.

7 Cantril, p. 372.
the truth about American aid. The downward swing in the
trend of trust and loyalty was once more reversed with the
dissolution of the Commintern in May 1943. A *Fortune* sur-
vett revealed that 80.7% of those polled answered positively
to the question of working with Russia as an equal partner
after the war.\(^8\) Americans seemed to place great hope on
the apparent abandonment of the aims of world domination by
Soviet Russia. The prospects for the future suddenly seemed
bright. But in the summer of 1943 several events cast a
new shadow over this happy picture. Russia began her per-
sistent nagging for a second front, Stalin failed to attend
the second Quebec conference and the well-known pro-American
Ambassador Litvinov was recalled from Washington.\(^9\)

The end of 1943 was marked with the successes of the
Moscow conference and once again the polls struck a new high.
For the first time a majority of those polled, precisely
51%, answered in the affirmative to the broad question of
trusting Russia completely.\(^10\)

On December 29, 1944, following the Teheran con-
fereence and the *Pravda* accusations about alleged British
plans for a separate peace, a *Fortune* survey asked Americans
how they felt about our future relations with Russia; the


\(^9\) Walsh, p. 518.

figures read as follows: 48.3% were of the opinion that we would probably get along better than in the past, 22% believed we would not get along as well, 20.1% held that relations would probably continue as before, and 9.6% were undecided.11

Significant as these figures may be, they do not reflect the views of those in the position to act upon them. For a summary of the more official viewpoints, it is necessary to consult the speeches and writings of those whose opinions became the guidelines for the actual policy that was followed. For the purpose of organization, the war period has been divided into four major phases, each one of which offers its own unique pattern of conflicting sentiment. Once again it must be stressed that for this inquiry the period prior to the American entrance is of little consequence.

The first phase began with American entry into the war and closed with the Russian victories at Stalingrad in the autumn of 1942. During this period Russia was continually trying to extract from her allies, guarantees as to territorial gains and boundary demarcations. Franklin Delano Roosevelt believed that Russia had the right to demand these guarantees for her own security, but that

11 Cantril, p. 372.
nothing could be settled until the post-war status of Germany was known.12

Secretary of State Cordell Hull visited Russian Foreign Minister Molotov in June of 1942 and reportedly was met with cordiality and warmth.13 Later that month the United States demonstrated its friendship for Russia by signing into law the Lend Lease Act. The west also cancelled all consular representation to Finland in an attempt to force the Finns to end the war that country was fighting with Russia.14 In general, both the State Department and the White House reported sympathy for Russian demands and anxiety for Russian-American co-operation. Although fears and rumors about Russia's aims circulated widely, many responsible periodicals published positive statements on the subject of unity of Soviet-American goals. And on November 15, 1942 the Free World printed a statement from the front page of the Russian newspaper, Pravda, "We are fighting a great war of liberation. We are fighting it not alone, but with our allies. Long live the victory of the fighting Anglo-Soviet-American Alliance." The article went on to say that similar sentiments could be found daily

13 Ibid., p. 1174.
14 Ibid., p. 1177.
throughout the Soviet press.\textsuperscript{15} Reports such as these apparently had a considerable effect on the American regard for the Russian government. Even those who could perceive underlying sources of conflict between the United States and Russia expounded a program of forgiveness for Russia's sins and extension to Russia of complete confidence and sincerity. Thus on the whole, it appears that 1942 was characterized by an almost unanimous effort to harmonize with Soviet Russia, and avoid conflict wherever possible.

The second wartime phase coincides with the year 1943; it is marked primarily by the Russian demands for a second front and the foreign ministers conference in Moscow in October 1943. These and many other events were to alter and reverse the American attitudes many times during this one year period.

The beginning of 1943 was clouded with indecision. High officials of the United States Department of State questioned Russian post-war aims. Would Russia try to take over Eastern Europe? Was Russia planning on cooperating with the West? During the early months, Secretary of State Hull and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden held numerous conferences in an attempt to answer some of these

\textsuperscript{15} "What does Russia Want?" \textit{Free World} (April, 1943), p. 368. This article was based on a survey of the Russian press and news opinion.
questions. Hull sensed that by March of 1943 many Americans were beginning to feel that after the war "...Russia will do as she pleases, take what she pleases, and confer with nobody." On March 9 the Honorable Overton Brooks, a Democrat from Louisiana, gave one of the earliest indications of the changes in attitudes that were coming about. He pointed to Russia's record as aggressor in Poland, and her former alliance with Hitler. He warned the United States not to be blind to Russian motives.

Probably the biggest fear in the minds of Americans was that Russian military victories were giving Russia a new military power and confidence which would increase her territorial ambitions proportionately. It was this unilateral increase in strength which many began to point out in the spring of 1943. In June of 1943, Stalin began pressing for a second front in Western Europe to take the pressure off the Russo-German theatres in the East. It was both the Anglo-American refusal to provide that second front and the fear of Russian retaliation for

---

16 Hull, p. 1247.
17 Hull, p. 1248.
that refusal that gave the pattern of friendly relations a sudden downward thrust. Many unfortunate and irresponsible statements emanated from the American radio and press, and rumors gained wide circulation that it was the American plan to see Germany and Russia bleed each other white.\textsuperscript{20}

The problems were further increased due to the publication of results of American opinion polls. Failing to understand the democratic right of freedom of speech, Russia regarded all such findings as officially endorsed.\textsuperscript{21} Mutual mistrust soared on both sides.

The summertime events of 1943 gave no new basis for optimism. Ambassador Litvinov, who had been decidedly Pro-American was recalled from Washington as was the Pro-Western ambassador to London. This event coincided with the Sicilian campaign which was described in the Russian army paper \textit{Red Star} as having failed to divert a single German division from the Russian border.\textsuperscript{22} The lack of accord regarding Russia increased steadily. On August 29, 1943 the \textit{New York Times} expressed its belief that Russia would take her place equally in the triumvirate that would undoubtedly arise in the administration of post-war

\textsuperscript{20} Visson, p. 30.

\textsuperscript{21} Andre Visson, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{22} "Red Enigmas," \textit{Newsweek}, 22 (August 30, 1943), p. 20.
Europe. Elsewhere there were many other evidences of Pro-Russian feelings. It was felt that old barriers of distrust between Russia and the West were disappearing rapidly. Although Russia was seen as a powerful post-war factor, the feeling was widespread that with many casualties and so much land ravaged she would undoubtedly devote all her energies to reconstruction at home.

But only one month later, in October 1943, there occurred another series of anti-Russian publications. New suspicion seemed to be a result of Russia's refusal to share military secrets or permit Western visits to industrial or military plants. Sharp conflicts were evident regarding the Allied program for post-war Germany since the West was now pressing for unconditional surrender and Russia had recently thrown her support to a Free German Committee dedicated to the mere overthrow of the Nazi regime. The American people were beginning to forget the dismantlement of the Comintern in June and were once again fearful of Russian world revolutionary aims. Strong advocates of both sides served only to perpetuate the already confused picture of pros and cons. On one hand supporters


24 Murray, "Turn of the Tide," Contemporary 164 (September, 1943), p. 132.

pointed out that Russian reestablishment of the Orthodox Church and the newly restored right of priests to wear robes on the streets gave new hope that Russia was softening her once time rigid and secular regime. Yet many articles wisely concluded, "It is foolish to deny the conflict of interest between Russia on the one hand and America and Britain on the other."  

By the end of October a new source of conflict had arisen. Many began to fear that Russian fighters were surpassing their American counterparts, and there was great concern that this record of superior achievement would convince Russia that she had the right to dictate the peace. "Even in the political sphere, the performance of the Red Army has sapped the prestige of the Anglo-American bloc." But elsewhere friendly publications persisted. "Russia is very much like the United States, torn between her own Russia-first, isolationist policy and a genuine desire for a permanent rapprochement with the United States and Britain." And on November 15 Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes said that there never really was a rift between the United States and Russia. "In certain respects

26 Ibid., p. 36.

27 "Behind the Kremlin Front," Business Week (October 23, 1943), p. 44.

we could do well to learn from Russia; yes, even to imitate Russia." Later that month similar sentiments were expressed by the Honorable John Coffee, a Democrat from Washington, when he said, "I hate those who are trying to start trouble between the United States and Russia - none exists. They are our friends."30

In spite of all evidence to the contrary, Albert Carr sums up the year 1943 as one which provided a great many reasons to be optimistic about Russia. In 1950 Carr said that only a small group of pessimists had offered any real opposition to the primarily Pro-Russian atmosphere.31 The second phase came to a close with the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in November of 1943. The resulting Moscow Pact is considered by some the apex of Soviet-American friendship.32

Thus, although the unanimity was not as extensive in 1943 as it had been in 1942, there was, nevertheless, an obvious Pro-Russian majority in existence as the year 1943


31 Albert Z. Carr, Truman, Stalin and Peace (Garden City, New York, 1950), P. 13. Mr. Carr was a member of the Inter-Allied Reparations Mission to Germany in 1947 and then became the economic advisor to President Truman.

32 Carr, p. 21.
came to a close. The small but determined minority, however, was destined to make itself heard. As is so often the case, both sides became convinced that they were right about Russia and their spokesmen clamored with equal vehemence on the subject of Russian friendship. On January 16, 1944 Undersecretary of State Stettinius gave a speech in which he said that anything but full cooperation with Soviet Russia after the war would be "tragic blundering." He went on to say he had nothing but great admiration for the Russians. And looking back over the beginning of 1944 Secretary of State Hull wrote that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were closer than ever. Throughout 1944, he said, relations continued to be good, although the spread of Russian power over Eastern Europe was seen even then as a threatening explosive for the future.  

The British press expounded with equal enthusiasm on the subject of its Eastern partner. In March 1944 the Spectator wrote that confidence between Russia and the West had been increasing steadily and that cooperation had not only been well intentioned but effective. It expressed complete understanding of Russia's demands for a second front and stressed the fact that Western material aid could

34 Hull, p. 1436.
do no more than partially pay for the disproportionate sacrifice in Russian lives. 35

Several months later Commonweal printed a glowing description of British enthusiasm for the Russians. According to the article even the well-known horrors of the Soviet regime such as the secret police, deportation and disregard for small nations had done nothing to mar the British admiration for Russian achievements and the surge of hope which the British had experienced as a result of recent Russian heroism. 36

Nevertheless, all was not well in the winter of 1944. Pravda began its accusations about British plans for a separate peace. Rumors were circulated about Russian plans to divide the Soviet Union into sixteen federated states, and the United States examined these plans for possible underlying motives. The second front had not yet been established and Stalin's cries of broken promises did not in any way simplify the already confused state of affairs. But in June many began to feel that the invasion of Normandy had initiated a new "Era of Good Feelings." On July 17 Life Magazine wrote that the fears and suspicions of the past had ended with Normandy and the Big Three had


finally become a living reality. The relief and gratitude for the second front carried the good relations through the summer and into the fall of 1944. In September praise for Russia could still be heard in many corners of the United States. And even in November words of praise and friendship continued to fill the halls of Congress. The legislators insisted that the United States had and should continue good relations with Russia despite ideological differences. Many of them felt that the United States and Russia had always been friends who were more than willing to help each other. They could see no reason for not continuing as such.

Elsewhere Russia was described as increasingly nationalistic. Stress was placed on the popularity of the Russian national anthem and the earlier dissolution of the Comintern. It was said that the cordiality at Teheran was obviously a sign of the coming harmony in peace negotiations. "There is every reason to expect full cooperation in peace."

38 U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2d Session, 1944, XC, Part 11, A 4421.
40 Harris, p. 107.
But already those in the know could foresee the shadows. "By the fall of 1944 my associates and I were beginning to wonder if Stalin and his government weren't abandoning their former policy of co-operation which they had underlined at the Moscow Conference." 41

On December 14, Reverend Edmund Walsh, head of the School of Foreign Service in Washington, said that the record of Soviet diplomacy did not give assurance that she was ready to co-operate with the West in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. 42 The feeling was that the extent of Russia's co-operation had been only in the military sphere.

About the same time Sumner Welles also recorded his opinions. "At the moment when I write these lines, there have suddenly developed glaring evidences of a tragic lack of accord between the Soviet Union and the British Empire and the United States..." 43 Welles contended that no traditional reasons for antagonism between the United States and Russia existed, but that the mistake had been the failure to cement relationships in the early years of the war when the partnership was young. He did admit that United States aid to Russia and President Roosevelt's personal

41 Hull, p. 1459.
friendship with Stalin had accomplished a great deal toward allaying the deep Russian suspicions of American motives. But he believed that in spite of these mitigating forces a great deal remained to be done. 44

As proof that the disquieting feelings were more than mere premonitions, Hull sent Ambassador Harriman to Moscow on September 18 to discover the possible reasons for recent Russian refusals to co-operate with the West. Hull suspected that Stalin was still disturbed over the second Quebec Conference which Russia did not attend. Harriman was instructed to investigate the situation. His final report confirmed the suspicions of a reversal in Russia's former policy of co-operation, but denied the second Quebec Conference as a possible explanatory factor. Harriman said that although Russia still wanted peace and good relations with the West, she expected her superior military strength to allow her to dictate the peace. Harriman went on to predict a persistent Russian veto in any world organization which required unanimous decisions by all permanent members. 45

Probably no one was more qualified to sum up the foreign affairs of 1944 than Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who wrote that when 1944 ended many differences

44 Ibid.
45 Hull, p. 1459.
between the United States and Russia were apparent but it appeared that with good will and understanding they might be resolved.\textsuperscript{46}

Thus it seems that the beginning of 1945 revealed a history of Soviet-American relations which had far more entries on the credit than on the debit side. Russia had signed the Atlantic Charter, American polls had shown a steady increase in its pro-Russian ratings, the American press had frequently lauded the Soviet Union, Congress had voted and maintained a lend aid policy toward Russia, and Stalin's praise of the United States and the fight for world democracy had become a frequent reward.

These pluses, however, did not eliminate the indelible marks made on the debit side. Russia had barred all foreign correspondents from the front lines in spite of constant American demands to the contrary. A substantial American segment pointed to rigid Russian censorship, failure of the Soviet press to acknowledge American aid, and non-application of the Atlantic Charter to Eastern Poland and the Baltics.\textsuperscript{47} In 1945, a new bone of contention was added. Russia was insisting that the United States desired a long war in which to continue amassing industrial fortunes resulting from the wartime boom.

\textsuperscript{46} Hull, p. 1471.

\textsuperscript{47} Dallin, p. 260.
Russia pointed to the peak figures in the American stock exchange and contended this was further proof of American motives for postponing an armistice. And American leaders continued to disagree about their future with Russia. For example, Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, who was advocating complete dismemberment of Germany after the war, said that those who felt we had to maintain a strong united Germany as a bulwark against Russia were absolutely missing the point, for there was no evidence whatsoever that Russia or Communism would in any way threaten the United States in the future. The history of Soviet-American relations, he contended, pointed only to a community of interests.

Secretary Morgenthau was not alone in his views. For example, Honorable Augustus Bennett said in the House that no historical basis for Soviet-American friction could be found. According to Congressman Bennett, there was no reason to expect anything but full cooperation between these two nations in the coming peace.

As for Yalta, Secretary of State Stettinius noted, "a high degree of frankness and cooperation" between

48 Ibid., p. 265.


Stalin, Churchill and President Roosevelt. Speaking of cooperation up to that point, however, Stettinius reported that Anglo-American relations had developed to a very high level but that relations with the Soviet Union had been far from satisfactory most of the time.51

In the month of March a new and serious rift between the United States and Russia came into the open. Certain Anglo-American talks with German leaders were scheduled to take place in Berne, Switzerland. The subject of these talks related specifically to a cease fire in a locality which contained no Russian troops. Upon hearing of these talks, to which Russia was not invited, Molotov cabled Ambassador Harriman demanding that negotiations in Berne be broken off. Harriman then told Stettinius that it was his firm belief that since Yalta, Russia had been under the impression she could force the United States to do anything. The correspondence over the Berne negotiations was cold and nasty and the insulting Russian messages "showed clearly the Soviet distrust of our motives and promises."52 It was later revealed that when President Truman took office he found a cable from Stalin to President Roosevelt sent during this same period. In it Stalin had accused the


United States and Britain of making a deal with Germany arranging for Germany to fall to the West and concentrate on the war in the East. When the news of the cable became public, many began to feel that a break with Russia was imminent. Only weeks later, on May 12, the United States cancelled Lend Lease to Russia. Although the cancellation was replaced almost immediately by a partial lend policy, the bulk of the damage had already been done.53

It is clear that by April, the month of the San Francisco United Nations Conference, the subject of Soviet-American relations had reached a new level of importance, vieing with the defeat of Germany and the ending of the war itself. On April 23, 1945, Secretary of War Stimson wrote in his diary, "Contrary to what I thought was a wise course, they have not settled the problems that lie between the United States, Russia, and Great Britain and France, the main powers, by wise negotiations before this public meeting. . . ."54

On April 3 the New York Times printed an article on its front page in which it said that Washington officials were very depressed about Soviet-American relations;

53 Carr, p. 57.

so much so that some were advocating postponement of the San Francisco Conference.\textsuperscript{55}

The month of May saw the end of the war in Europe. Following that victory Russo-American relations were on a new basis and the critical test of the varied speculation as to post-war cooperation was practically brought into focus. On the 9th of May, Honorable Sam Hobbes, a Democrat from Alabama, read to the House the test of a speech given by Raymond Moley, advisor to President Roosevelt. The irony of that speech was only to become clear in the months to come. In it he said that "Russia-haters" had been trying for months to drum up trouble between the United States and Russia and they had been wrong on every count. For example, three weeks ago they had predicted that Russian troops would stop at the Oder River and force the West to take Berlin, but they had been all wrong. Russian blood, not American, had been shed in Berlin. Their sacrifices had enabled our sons to live. Once again, it is only in light of events to come that these words take on their full meaning.\textsuperscript{56}

Former Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, wrote a memorandum to himself on May 19, 1945; not until 1948 was


\textsuperscript{56} U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Session, 1945, XCI, Part II, A 2169.
this memorandum found, locked in the drawer of his desk. It is particularly revealing because it was not written for publication.

... (A) war to end all wars, the war will have been futile, for the result will be merely the transfer of totalitarian dictatorship and power from Germany and Japan to Soviet Russia which will constitute in the future to be as grave a danger to us as did the Axis... A future war with Soviet Russia is as certain as anything in this world can be certain.57

Even after the surrender in Europe, there was little argument about Russian aims. In 1945 David Dallin wrote that the breakdown in relations was rapid and apparent; already Germany had become the showplace for the execution of Soviet-American policies. And of that showplace Dallin wrote that the sharp line between the Western and Soviet spheres was already being drawn.58 The occupation of Berlin, however, had not as yet begun.

And yet Albert Carr declared that it was the month of June that brought new hope for the future of Soviet-American relations. Stalin sent President Truman a cable thanking him for the continuation of partial lend lease. The tone of the cable was very cordial. In reply President Truman cabled Stalin, "I am looking forward with great pleasure to meeting you in the near future and discussing


58 Dallin, p. 266.
with you in full our common problems."\textsuperscript{59} The anticipated meeting was, of course, the Potsdam Conference and it is difficult to see how the preliminary interchanges could have been more encouraging.

Although considerable distortion may accompany comments made with the benefit of hindsight, it is felt that the following two which have been chosen overcome any such objections. In reporting a discussion with an unidentified American official, Col. Frank Howley wrote,

\begin{quote}
I asked one very high American official why we had followed such a policy. 'By the fall of 1945' he replied, 'I knew that our appraisal of Russia was wrong, and that Russia was our enemy -- not our friend. Yet we would not have been justified in breaking our early engagements, or in accepting this appraisal as a fact so soon after Russia had suffered twenty million casualties fighting the same enemy we had fought.'\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

And finally, by way of summary and possible explanation of the often unintelligible American policy toward Russia, Averill Harriman introduced a statement to the \textit{Congressional Record} in August of 1951. "The primary objective of the American and British governments in our relations with the Soviet Union during the war was to keep the Soviet Union as an effective fighting force against Hitler." Of the tone of those relations, Harriman went on

\textsuperscript{59} Carr, p. 63.

to say, "... (W)e had constant difficulties with them throughout the war and they treated us with great suspicion." 61

These events and experiences constitute a fluctuating pattern of Soviet-American relations. This pattern provides a necessary but broad background to an understanding of the developments in Berlin. It must, therefore, be supplemented by a detailed analysis of the negotiated basis for four power occupation.

CHAPTER II
THE FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING:
THE MAJOR AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS
CONCERNING THE BERLIN OCCUPATION.

By March of 1945 the outcome of the war in Europe was clear. The final strategy had only to be planned and agreed upon. One of the major maneuvers which had not been decided was how and where the meeting of the Western and Russian troops would take place. Both sides saw the dangers of collision and casualties due to failure to identify one another. Furthermore, high military officials could not agree on the plans for advancing over Germany. Thus in late March General Eisenhower compiled the essence of his plan for the attack on Germany and sent a copy of those plans to Stalin.\(^1\) Churchill, who was also informed, flatly opposed the decision to allow Russia to take Berlin. He felt the Western strategy ought to include a sudden eastward thrust to capture the nation's capital. On March 29, 1945 Churchill embodied his view in a written protest to Washington.\(^2\) He expressed his opinion that great prestige would eventually come from taking Berlin.


\(^2\) Ibid., p. 400.
Secretary of State Marshall then asked Eisenhower for a detailed explanation of his plans. In reply Eisenhower explained that because "Berlin itself is no longer a particularly important objective," he planned to stop at the Elbe River and await the arrival of the Russian troops. In a letter dated March 31, 1945, Churchill recorded his disapproval, "... I do not consider myself that Berlin has yet lost its military and certainly not its political significance."  

Charges that Eisenhower was unaware of Hitler's presence in Berlin have been answered by the General himself, who wrote that even before Western troops began their advance across Germany, it was known that the German government was trying to get out of Berlin and go south. When, however, General Bradley blocked all roads leading southward from Berlin, such movement was impossible. Thus the German administrative machinery was forced to remain in Berlin, and Hitler, who was in Berlin at the time, had no choice but to make his last stand in the nation's capital.  

In reporting the decision to stop at the Elbe, the New York Times declared that it was not clear whether the

3 Ibid., p. 401.
5 Eisenhower, p. 415.
decision had been a matter of military necessity or the result of policy handed down from Big Three agreements. "One school of thought holds that the American and British should have driven on and captured Berlin for eventual post-war prestige purposes. . . . The other believes it would not have been worth it."6

And later when the decision was pointed to as one of the major blunders of the wartime period, Admiral Leahy rose in Eisenhower's defense. Leahy insisted Eisenhower knew that crossing the Elbe to take Berlin would only require immediate withdrawal in order to comply with occupation agreements. Furthermore, General Bradley had announced a lack of supplies, a situation which could in no way have supported an effective advance on Berlin.7

Finally, General Eisenhower had considered the matter of casualties. "When Ike asked me what I thought it might cost us to break through the Elbe to Berlin, I estimated 100,000 casualties.8

Of course, regardless of how far fetched it may seem, some relentless critics sought to blame the entire


7 "He made a military decision in the field forest on the Elbe, to which he knew he would have to withdraw anyway as soon as German resistance collapsed. Leahy, p. 350.

decision on President Roosevelt. According to these people Roosevelt had long since conceded to the Russians the right of taking Berlin. A refutation of such idle talk seems almost pointless, but at the risk of involvement in a needless dispute the remarks of former Secretary of State Stettinius might be cited: "I know of no evidence to support the view that F.D.R. agreed to allow the Red Army to capture Berlin." He went on to point out that Eisenhower himself had admitted that the decision that American troops should not push on into Berlin was made in March, 1945 solely on military grounds. Thus, according to Stettinius, the charges were unfounded.

The end of the war found Russian troops throughout the city of Berlin and Western troops halted one hundred miles west, at the Elbe River. For the first time, military leaders had to pause to consider the high-level agreements that had been reached regarding defeated Germany and occupied Berlin.

Discussion of various post-war problems had begun almost as early as the war itself. Probably the first mention of the treatment to be accorded to Germany was made in August of 1941 during the discussions leading up to the Atlantic charter. This proposal was incorporated into the

document as point 6, which declared that after the defeat of Nazism, Germany would be an independent nation, free from all outside domination. 10

By January of 1943, however, it was clear that Allied intentions had been altered, for on the fifth day of the month an Inter-Allied Declaration from London warned Germany that the Allies planned "to reserve all their rights to declare invalid any transfer, or dealings with, property, rights, and interests... of open looting or plunder, or of transactions apparently legal in form."11

The official status of Berlin in 1945 was defined in the agreements worked out by a prominent wartime administration, the European Advisory Commission (E.A.C.). Ordered into effect by the 1943 foreign ministers conference in Moscow, the Commission made its headquarters in London and began recommending action which was subject to ratification by each of the Big Three.

The most extensive recommendation regarding Germany and Greater Berlin was made in the fall of 1944. On September 11, the Commission announced, "Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st of December, 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided into three


11 Ibid.
zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the three powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation by the three powers."\(^{12}\) In this same declaration the zonal boundaries within Berlin were established although the assignments to each nation were not made. Article five of that document provided that "an Inter-Allied governing authority (Komendatura) consisting of three Commanders, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the 'Greater Berlin' area."\(^{13}\)

On November \(^{14}\) the Commission announced an agreement on the organization of control machinery for post-war Germany. This agreement prescribed a central control council made up of representatives of each of the Big Three nations. The head of each nation's delegation was to be the commander-in-chief of its respective armed forces. These leaders would have exclusive control over their own zones of occupation, coming together as members of the Control Council only to discuss matters affecting Germany as a whole.\(^{14}\)


\(^{13}\) Ibid. Approved by the governments of the United States of America, February 2, 1945, the United Kingdom, December 5, 1944, and the Soviet Union, February 6, 1945.

\(^{14}\) Gablentz, p. 4.
As for Berlin, it would be administered by a Komendatura consisting of representatives of each occupying nation. Each representative or commander, as he was to be called, "will serve in rotation, in the position of Chief Commander, as head of the Inter-Allied Governing Authority," the Komendatura. This Inter-Allied Authority of Berlin would operate under the general direction of the Control Council for all Germany and was to receive orders through the Coordinating Committee. 15

Three months later at Yalta, a report was issued announcing full agreement on the plans for post-war occupation of Germany. At this time it was also decided that France would be invited to take over a zone of occupation and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Council. 16 Thus, on May 1, 1945 the European Advisory Commission announced extensive amendments to the November 1944 agreements. Provisions were included which gave France a zone carved out of the British and American

15 Ibid.

16 U.S., Dept. of State, The Conferences of Malta and Yalta 1945, Washington, 1944, 936, "It was agreed that a zone in Germany to be occupied by the France forces, should be allocated to France. . . . It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be united to become a member of the allied central commission for Germany." p. 937.
zones. France was also to be included in the administration of "Greater Berlin."17

This, in general was to be the status of post-war Germany and the relationship of Berlin to this broad plan can readily be seen. But the problems relating specifically to the early plans for Berlin must be examined independently. One of the earliest of these problems came out at the time of the first European Advisory Commission talks on Berlin. On September 24, 1944 the New York Times declared that the United States was in favor of replacing Berlin as the capital of Germany.18 The Times reported wide speculation on the feelings of Great Britain and Russia. The extent of this controversy was not revealed until much later. It was discovered that those who had favored the move had done so because they had regarded Berlin as a symbol of Prussian militarism. They insisted that to perpetuate it was to bypass an important opportunity to strike at the very essence of German unity and strength. Furthermore, they had contended that there was no better memorial to victory then a new capital, hand-picked by the nations conquerors. Politically and financially it was also believed that Berlin had lost its

17 Gablentz, p. 7.
position as the nerve center of Germany.\textsuperscript{19} Despite all the arguments, however, Russia wanted to see the capital in her zone and the West was anxious for a listening post in the East.\textsuperscript{20} The objections were overruled; Berlin would remain the capital of a united Germany.

On the subject of post-war planning for Berlin, Potsdam, the final Big Three Conference, made few additions. Its effect was merely to affirm the decisions of the E.A.C. and Yalta. Lucius Clay wrote that in spite of apparent differences between the West and Russia, there was a spirit of unity at Potsdam which seemed to promise the solutions to those differences. "Outwardly good will and good intent pervaded everywhere."\textsuperscript{21} And, according to Clay, all seemed optimistic about this experiment in international understanding, hoping this might even be the key to everlasting peace.

The months of May and June were filled with the planning and preparing for joint occupation of Germany, as well as with the signing and ratifying of all documents dealing with armistice and surrender. On May 9, heads of the German armed services were required to meet in Berlin.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Clay, p. 13.
to ratify the surrender papers. Since the official surrender to the West had already taken place, Eisenhower himself did not appear in Berlin. As the representative to what he regarded as a purely Russian affair, Eisenhower sent Air Chief Marshall Tedder.

One month later, on June 5 General Eisenhower, the military governor, and Lucius Clay, his deputy commander left their headquarters in Frankfurt to go to Berlin and sign the "Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany." In essence these documents informed the German people of the Allied plans for German occupation. 

"... (T)he area of 'Greater Berlin' will be occupied by the forces of each of the four powers. The administration of the 'Greater Berlin' area will be directed by an Inter-Allied Governing Authority." At this meeting of the occupying nations, Russia made it clear that she wanted the Western forces to withdraw to their zones before the Control Council got underway. This elicited the famous Truman wire of June 14 which told Stalin that the

---

22 Eisenhower, p. 427.

23 Ibid., p. 435.

24 Edgar McInnis, Shaping of Postwar Germany (New York, Praeger Co., 1960), p. 101. Mr. McInnis had been an assistant professor of political science at Oberlin College and at the University of Toronto. He was a Rhodes scholar and president of the Canadian Institute for International Affairs. From 1960 Mr. McInnis was a Professor of history at York University.
United States insisted on simultaneous withdrawal and entrance to Berlin. It was in this wire and its notorious reply that the early discussion of access took place.\textsuperscript{25} In his reply, Stalin fixed the earliest date of entrance at the end of the month. July 1 was agreed upon.\textsuperscript{26} Prior to that entrance, another high level meeting was held in Berlin and once again Eisenhower did not attend. Representatives from the other nations included Sir Ronald Weeks from Great Britain and Marshal Gregori Zhukov from Soviet Russia; Lucius Clay represented the United States. At this meeting it was agreed that twenty-five thousand troops from each nation would occupy Berlin and that four days would be allowed for the entrance and transfer of those troops.\textsuperscript{27}

Once again the question of access was raised. The Russians insisted that demobilization of Russian troops was already taxing their facilities. Thus Clay agreed to relinquish any demands for exclusive corridors and to settle for a right of way on one railroad line, one highway, and two air corridors, reserving the right to reopen the question in the Allied Control Council.\textsuperscript{28} With the adjournment of the June 29 meeting the preliminaries were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25} Reference to that discussion appears below.
\item \textsuperscript{26} McInnis, p. 107.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Clay, p. 25.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
complete. The papers had been signed and the agreements were drawn up. The experiment which would test their success began.

These agreements on Berlin form the legal basis for quadripartite occupation. A full understanding of the events in Berlin, however, requires that this legal background be constantly evaluated in light of the prior Soviet-American relations. While following the developments in Berlin it is also necessary to keep in mind that it was the breakdown in understanding and trust which was of greatest consequence. The account of daily events is a mere vehicle through which to demonstrate that collapse.
CHAPTER III

About mid-day on April 30, 1945 the dictator of the Nazi regime, Adolph Hitler, fired a revolver into his mouth.¹ Not more than one hundred yards away, the Russians hastened to hoist a Soviet flag over the capitulated area. And only two days later, the head of German artillery, General Weidling, signed the surrender papers in Berlin. The Allies wasted no time in securing the German signature on documents conceding unconditional surrender. On the 7th and 8th of May, two sets of capitulation papers were executed in Zhukov's Berlin headquarters.² The war in Europe was officially over.

The city of Berlin was little more than a field of smoking ruins. Prior to the war its population had reached the peak figures of four million; now less than three-fourths of that number remained. Of the one-quarter of a million buildings in 1938 almost 12% were completely demolished, 8% were damaged beyond repair, and at least

¹ McInnis, p. 102.
² Ibid.
50% were partially ruined. Every one of the one hundred eighty-seven churches had been bombed; sixty-nine were beyond repair. Only one hundred sixty-two out of five hundred schools were left standing by the bombs.³

As rumors of defeat and surrender reached the inhabitants of Berlin, citizens are said to have prayed openly for the arrival of Anglo-American forces. Fears of Russia seemed to approach the realm of wild superstition. Nevertheless, as Russian forces occupied the city, Berliners merely drew their shutters and accepted their fate. No riots or frantic insurrections hindered the Soviet take-over. No secret attempts to usurp the government were uncovered and not a single demonstration of mass opposition has ever been recorded.⁴ Berliners did not even seem stunned at the speed of the sudden calamity.

For less than one hundred years Berlin had been the political capital of Germany. During that short time, however, it had become the financial and cultural center as well. Even with its exceedingly great losses in civilian and military citizenry Berlin in 1945 still contained the greatest concentration of scientists and men of letters of

³ Ibid.

all of Germany. Contributing further to its status as a vital center was the location of both postal and railroad controls in downtown Berlin.

The division of Berlin into three and later four sectors had given Soviet Russia the eastern part of the city. When the French were included in the Allied occupation their sector was taken from the Anglo-American zones, leaving the Soviets with the largest single sector fully intact. Having acquired the eastern sector Russia was now in full possession of all former national government buildings, many industrial plants and the bulk of the city's inhabitants. Thus Russia had acquired a numerical advantage in both population and territorial expanse.

The occupation of Berlin from 1945 to 1948 can be divided into three phases: the first began immediately upon formal capitulation of the Germans and can be described as the period of exclusive Soviet control; the second phase began with the American entrance into Berlin on July 1 and can be summed up as four-power rule, with at least an aura of harmony and attempted co-operation; and

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Harold Zink, Military Government in Germany (New York, MacMillan Co., 1947), p. 353. Mr. Zink was the chief historian for the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and was a professor of political science at Ohio State.
the final phase was marked at its inception by the election of 1946. Following the political catastrophe for the Russians, the tone of East-West relations in Berlin bore evidence of intense strain. It was at the close of this last period that Russia finally resorted to the imposition of a blockade. But as the first phase began, a short three years earlier, the air of unity seemed to belie even the slimmest possibility of such an outcome.

In spite of the fact that the administrative machinery for Berlin had been formulated well before the end of the war, Russia succeeded in postponing Allied entrance for a full two months. The headstart which the Russians gained during that period was never entirely overcome by the West. Various single motives have been attributed to the Russian insistence on such a delay. Among the imputed goals was the opportunity to remove all industrial machinery from Greater Berlin, a project which the Soviets initiated at the first possible moment. Sole occupation also gave Russia an opportunity to organize the city administration according to her own design, a task which the Soviets wasted no time in undertaking. Finally, the Russians may have seen this two-month period as an ideal

---


9 Hill, p. 39.
time for organizing and supervising the formation of sympathetic political parties in Berlin. This too was to be accomplished by the arrival date of her Western Allies.\textsuperscript{10}

Since the time available to Russia for her independent escapades was limited, she could afford no delay. A team of German workers was organized to remove and destroy all rubble. A Russian decree ordered all city facilities and services to begin operating as before. Berlin radio stations were placed under Russian supervision and began broadcasting almost immediately. By May 13 buses and trains were running again, and postal and telegraph services were restored soon after.\textsuperscript{11}

Under the guise of obtaining reparations, the Soviets succeeded in removing most of the usable machinery and equipment. Their task was greatly facilitated by the placement of reliable Communists in the Berlin police force as well as in the Soviet appointed provisional government. American reports estimated that twenty-five hundred pieces of machinery had been left intact after the Berlin bombings. It was estimated that twenty-two hundred of them were removed by the Russians.\textsuperscript{12}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 40.
\item \textsuperscript{11} McInnis, p. 40.
\item \textsuperscript{12} \textit{The New York Times} (July 5, 1945), p. 5.
\end{itemize}
Probably the most far-reaching Russian activity at this time was the organizing of municipal administration. On May 17 the City Magistrat, or executive branch, was reinstated.\textsuperscript{13} Communist sympathizers were immediately appointed to fill key positions. Similar appointments were made to high posts throughout the twenty administrative boroughs which constituted the city's political organization. Communist front organizations were rapidly set up; they included such prominent groups as the Free German Trade Union Association and the Kulturbund.\textsuperscript{14} On June 10 the Soviets put their signatures to the charters of four new political parties for the city of Berlin: the Communist Party of Germany (K.P.D.), and three non-Communist parties.\textsuperscript{15} While carrying on negotiations with their Western Allies the Russians hastened to enact many city ordinances and regulations. These, along with most of the other unilateral acts were never to be wiped out. For two full months Russia continued to cement her foundation in Berlin and to forestall Western entrance. While alone in the city, Russia saw to it that all Berlin clocks

\textsuperscript{13} McInnis, p. 105.

\textsuperscript{14} Four Year Report, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{15} U.S., Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, European and British Commonwealth Series 39, Background, October 1952, 3.
were set on Moscow time. Only a short time later the Allies entered the city.

Because the miscalculations regarding Berlin have had such serious consequences, critics have tended to exaggerate the lack of preparation by the Western forces. In actuality, planning for the occupation of Berlin began as far back as the fall of 1944. At that time Brigadier General Holmes called on Colonel (Later Brigadier General) Frank Howley and invited him to lead a military detachment to Berlin. The appointment had come from General Eisenhower. Twenty-five American and twenty-five British officers were to accompany Howley on this mission. On November 14, 1944 the British and American appointees separated for training. At this time Aachen was the only German city of any importance that had been captured. Perhaps this added to the remoteness of the Berlin training program. In any event, Russia turned down the invitation to participate in the program. The French were not invited.

The American training group under the leadership of Frank Howley worked on the Berlin project throughout the winter of 1945. They studied the city from maps and

16 McInnis, p. 105.
17 Howley, p. 18.
18 Ibid., p. 19.
air-damage pictures, trying to locate every last school, hospital, and water pump. They spent long hours in selecting a building for joint Allied headquarters, and even planned the military attack on Berlin, not realizing it would be an exclusively Russian project.

In the early spring of 1945 the officers and staff in Barbizon, a town just outside of Paris, finally finished their program of study. In April the group left Barbizon, just in time to learn of Eisenhower's decision not to take Berlin. Of this decision Howley wrote that it was probably the last time in history that so important a decision was made on such a limited basis. Only the military aspects were considered; the political ones were ignored.19

After the armistice was signed, preparations for the actual advance on Berlin had to be concluded. Major General Floyd Parks, commander of the First Airborne Army was made first American commander of Berlin under Lucius Clay, and Howley's Military government unit was attached to Parks' headquarters.20 Early in June, Parks sent word to Howley to move into Berlin. On June 17 Howley's unit consisting of five hundred officers and one hundred twenty vehicles left their temporary quarters in Bielefield and headed for Berlin. When Howley's company was a short one

19 Ibid., p. 25.
hundred miles from Berlin, their travel was suddenly halted by a Russian roadblock. After being taken before a Russian officer to whom he purportedly had to pay his respects, Howley was informed that a certain Russo-American agreement had limited his company to thirty-seven officers and fifty vehicles. Howley knew of no such agreement. The pattern was to become a familiar one: hours of delay, childish bickering, and repeated phone calls to superiors. The final orders to give in to the Russians were also to become familiar. Thus thirty-seven men and vehicles crossed the Elbe River and found themselves within shouting distance of Berlin. Even then things did not go according to plan. The Russian lead car took the American unit to Bablesburg, a Berlin suburb where it was given food and lodging. During the night, Russian guards surrounded the buildings that housed the American officers. "Scarcely believing that the Russians actually were treating us like enemies," Howley and his officers were forced to submit to these indignities.

The next morning the group was refused permission to enter Berlin. A few managed to escape into the city unbeknownst to the Russian guards. The others learned

21 Clay, p. 31. "Where these figures came from was always a mystery; it was another early incident of arbitrary action."

22 Ibid., p. 35.
that they had been detailed to the quarters of the forthcoming Potsdam Conference and that they were expected to prepare the place by cleaning and making small repairs. Messengers were sent to the remaining forces which had been stopped at the roadblock, and personnel and equipment suitable for housekeeping were secured. According to his report, Howley then told his men, "Gentlemen, we are never going to Berlin. The Russians are hostile and they've merely granted us an armistice." He also suggested that there be no trade, i.e., that Russia keep all of Berlin which "was nothing but rubble anyway," and that the United States keep Saxony and Thuringia whose fields were fertile and highly productive. Howley told his men to plan on moving into a small town in Thuringia. On June 30 he received orders to abandon those plans. He was to leave for Berlin the following day. Furthermore, Russia was taking over Saxony and Thuringia, and he had three days to remove all the American troops. But even then the Russians refused to vacate the American sector of Berlin. Howley's

23 Ibid., p. 41.

24 Thus according to Howley the American detachment under his command was confined to Babelsburg from June 17 until June 30, and the incident at the Dessau Bridge took place on June 17. Clay's report, however, does not concur. "Without explanation they were halted and forced to spend the night in Babelsburg, a Berlin suburb just outside the city limits. The following day, July 1, they continued to Berlin. . . ." Clay, p. 31.
orders were to move in during the night and raise the colors over the American sector. Since it was the Russian custom to sleep to 11:00 A.M. they would probably not discover the act until it was a fait accompli. The takeover went as planned and the eleven o'clock Russian protests were to no avail.25 When Russian officers visited each American commander to order him out, the commander pointed out the bad impression that all this was making on the German people. And when the Americans stressed how unwise it would be to display any rifts at this early stage, the Russians gave in.

The first few days in Berlin were frantic. Americans were trying to recruit German hands to help in the organization and arrangement of American quarters. Russia held gala parties every evening where it soon became apparent that vodka was being used as a truth serum to extract as much information as possible from American officers.26 But after July 4 a serious attempt was made to get down to business. An official ceremony was held to initiate the occupation. The principal Russian speech took credit for having won the war singlehandedly and implied that it could have been done with or without American aid.27

25 Clay, p. 31.
26 Howley, p. 47.
27 Ibid., p. 48.
Flags were exchanged and guns were fired in salute. When the proceedings were over Howley received orders to occupy all the American boroughs by midnight.

When all the occupying forces had taken their places it was time to organize the Komendatura, or Allied Governing Authority for Berlin. Parks asked Howley to outline a proposal for the operation of the Komendatura. The essence of this plan was that each commander be in charge of his own sector and that no unanimity amongst the four Allies be required for the passage of bills.28 Prior to the first conference with the Russians, the American commanders held a preliminary meeting. There it was discovered that Clay was opposed to administering the city on a divided basis and insisted that all issues be decided unanimously.29 Thus from the start it seemed as though internal problems as well were to test the American strength and diffuse her efforts in Berlin.

When the meeting with the Russians was finally held, unanimity was demanded. And despite Howley's statements to the contrary, it became a permanent requirement for municipal legislation. According to Howley, proceedings

---

28 Ibid., p. 53.

29 Howley issued a strong protest, "After all, we don't know the Communists; we didn't even have diplomatic relations with them until 1932. (sic.) There are going to be many questions that can't be solved on a unanimous basis." Howley, p. 54.
at this meeting were a good indication of things to come. Russia had prepared all the papers and the United States, not wishing to quibble over periods and commas, or anything else for that matter, had signed on the dotted line. 30

The second Allied meeting actually can't be called the first meeting of the Komendatura. It was held in temporary quarters on the eleventh of July. For the entire period of occupation, Anglo-American leaders were to regret the ordinance which was signed at that meeting. It read:

The Inter-Allied Komendatura has today assumed control over the City of Berlin. Under specific notice of all existing regulations and ordinances issued by the Commander of the Soviet Army Garrison and Military Commander of the City of Berlin (these ordinances) shall remain in force. 31

Howley felt that with this ordinance the United States gave its consent to Russian rule of Berlin. From that time on the Russians produced a steady stream of

30 This attitude constituted the major gap between Howley and Lucius Clay. Whereas Howley regarded these early compromises as foolish weakness, Clay noted "It is possible that this desire to make a success of quadripartite government led us in the early months to take compromise positions which merely deferred the real issues that finally forced the breakdown of the effort. I still feel that we had no alternative other than to attempt wholeheartedly to work in the four-power harmony to which as a nation we had subscribed at Yalta and in the European Advisory Commission." Clay, p. 29.

31 Howley, p. 61.
mysterious preoccupation regulations which had never before
been revealed. 32

Included in this confirmation were the appointments
of all city officials. The loyalty and attachment for the
Russians that was instilled in these workers was never
matched by the United States or any other occupying
power. 33 Because they were appointed by Russians those
officials continued to feel responsible to them long after
the arrival of all Western occupants.

Thus with the issuance of the first official
ordinance, the operation of the Berlin Komendatura had
begun. A relatively intact building in the American sector
was chosen as its permanent headquarters. Meetings were to
be held once a week. Russia attempted to initiate the
activities by assuming the role of host, a role to which
some Americans admitted she seemed strangely entitled. 34

As was declared at the first Inter-Allied Meeting,
the administration of Berlin was to be on a divided-city
basis, with all sectors working independently on matters

32 U.S., Department of State, Office of the U.S.
High Commission for Germany, Berlin: Development of Its
Government and Administration, September 30, 1952, 3.

33 Zink, Military Government in Germany, p. 257.

34 Harold Zink, The U.S. in Germany 1944 - 1955
not relating to the city as a whole. Howley's group, which came to be called the United States Group Control Council, became the core of the administrative personnel for the American sector. They, too, chose a block of buildings in the American zone where the damage had been light. The buildings, which were located in the Zehlendorf District, turned out to be the precise buildings which had housed the former Luftwaffe Command.

As the entire American zone of Germany was under Army command, the status of the Council resembled that of an embassy representing the Army in diplomatic affairs. Over the months, however, a steady number of civilians were hired to replace army personnel and the make-up of the council became increasingly non-military. This tendency reached its peak in October, when all of Germany with the exception of Frankfurt and Berlin came under the jurisdiction of the State Department. Representatives of this council, along with delegates from each of the four Allied nations came together as the Berlin Komendatura.

35 Major General Floyd Parks was actually the commander and Howley was his deputy.

36 B.U. Ratchford and W.D. Ross, Berlin Reparation Assignment (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1947), p. 7. Drs. Ratchford and Ross were the economic advisors for the Office of Military Government for Germany from 1945 to 1946. They are both professors of economics at Duke University.

37 See discussion below.
The first problem confronting the new occupants of Berlin was the question of food and fuel supply. Following the settlement of the Komendatura plan at the first meeting, the Russians promptly raised the question of supplies by assigning that responsibility to the United States. Frank Howley, one of the American representatives to that body, reported that an icy blast swept the room at the horror of this first unexpected reversal. The American and British officials had been specifically instructed that all food and fuel would be supplied by the Russians since they were in control of the areas which had traditionally fed Berlin. The American controlled provinces of Bavaria, Baden and Wuerttemberg were not agricultural and could not easily produce food for even one sector of Berlin. The eastern provinces under Russian control, on the other hand, were fertile, productive lands that had supplied most of Germany in the past. The assignment was impossible. Clay promptly announced, "It is not our plan to bring food into Berlin." Zhukov, the Russian commander, claimed that their warehouses in the East were depleted. Clay finally

38 Howley, p. 57.

39 Ibid.
agreed to supply the American sector with the stipulation that this be a temporary arrangement.\textsuperscript{40}

Eventually the Allied Control Council arranged for an equal exchange of rations amongst all sectors. In the meantime supplies for the United States sector had to be carried through the Soviet zone on Soviet controlled railroads. As time went on the Soviets made this task increasingly difficult by systematically removing most of the track.\textsuperscript{41} The problem of food supply was rendered more unmanageable by the swarms of refugees arriving in Berlin each day. The majority of these arrivals were German citizens who had escaped to the East during the war. They could not be turned away.

After the matter of food supply had been so arranged, the Komendatura turned its attention to the question of fuel. Zhukov insisted that coal be brought from the Ruhr, and the agreement reached provided for exactly that, although the Russians did agree to contribute some coal from her eastern provinces.\textsuperscript{42} So far it appeared as

\textsuperscript{40} "... (A) satisfactory agreement was reached on the immediate problem of feeding Berlin's population... . . . At first sight it would seem that the Russian view prevailed but closer examination suggests that the agreement represents a tolerably good compromise... ." \textit{The London Times} (July 11, 1945), p. 4.

\textsuperscript{41} Zink, \textit{Military Government in Germany}, p. 257.

\textsuperscript{42} Clay, p. 28.
though the Russian "hosts" were directing the entire proceedings, and their Western "visitors" were merely responding politely.

Nevertheless the *New York Times* continued to sound optimistic. On July 12 the *Times* reported that the Western Allies had agreed to bring food and fuel to supply those sections of Berlin under their jurisdiction. And for the sake of uniformity, they had agreed not to change the rules for civilian conduct laid down by the Russians prior to Western arrival. "It was emphasized that the whole arrangement was temporary. . . ." 43

In many ways, however, the Russian obstinacy on the question of food supply held a great unforeseen prize for the West. It transformed the area into an independent economic unit. As this was the result of Russian doing, it was to provide a natural repudiation to the charges of Western aims to divide Berlin. The unofficial partition of Berlin into independent food-receiving areas was in effect the first step in making Berlin a divided city. 44

By far the most explosive issue which divided the occupying nations was the question of transportation between West Berlin and West Germany which necessarily included a right of way through Russian occupied territory.

44 McInnis, p. 108.
The first consideration of this problem took place at the
time of the earliest discussion on occupation itself. The
subject is as widely disputed and as generally disagreed
upon as Eisenhower's decision to forego a military attack
on Berlin.

In November of 1944, when the European Advisory
Commission was drawing up the agreements on German
occupation, the question of access was naturally raised.
Berlin was to be an isolated area, situated in the midst of
Soviet controlled territory. Obviously, the right of
transit between both centers of Western control was an
absolute necessity. Six months prior to the November
meeting, American Ambassador to the European Advisory
Commission, John Winant, visited Washington and raised the
question of access to the War Department. He contended
that since Russia was insisting that the presence of
Western forces in Berlin naturally presumed the right of
access, provisions should be included in the occupation
agreements to safeguard that right. The Civil Affairs
Division, however, opposed such an inclusion, maintaining
that such details should be left to the local commanders
in Berlin. By the time of the November meeting, Winant was
convinced that the inclusion of specific provisions on
access rights was entirely unnecessary since such rights
clearly followed from the occupational arrangement.
Furthermore, an insistence on such an inclusion would do considerable damage in arousing Soviet suspicion and in displaying Western attitudes of mistrust. Thus according to Winant himself, the omission was by no means accidental, but was, on the other hand, carefully weighed and calculated.  

At Yalta the question of access to Berlin was discussed on a lower level. The United States Joint Staff Planners recommended, "that the general principal be accepted of freedom of transit by each nation concerned, between the main occupied area and the forces occupying Berlin and similar isolated areas." Very few specific transport lines could be agreed upon, however, since it was not possible to predict which railroads, bridges, canals, and roads around Berlin would be operative after the German surrender.  

Notwithstanding the various technical obstacles, the best explanation for the omission of a specific agreement by both the European Advisory Commission and the Yalta conference was the Western desire to display faith in Russia. The West could not have placed any greater reliance on Russian sincerity. As things stood in July 1945

---

45 Clay, p. 15.
46 McInnis, p. 100.
47 Stettinius, p. 37.
the entire communication between Western zones of Germany and all sectors of Berlin depended entirely on Russian goodwill.48

Thus, when the German defeat was an accomplished fact and the war in Europe was over, no written agreements or even spoken ones for that matter, spelled out the Western rights of access to Berlin. It was expected apparently that the military commanders stationed in Berlin would settle these "details." But things did not go according to plan.

On June 14 President Truman wrote a letter to Stalin primarily to discuss simultaneous withdrawal from Saxony and Thuringia and entrance to Berlin. In that letter Truman raised the question of access by demanding "free access of air, road and rail from Frankfurt and Bremen to Berlin for United States forces." Four days later, on June 18, Stalin sent his reply to Truman by cable. In it he gave his consent to the simultaneous transfers in addition to promising "all necessary measures" for free access by air, road and rail. Western rights clearly included the right to transport food and supplies and the right to

receive goods in Berlin and export goods to Western zones. But once again there were no signed agreements.

Nevertheless, much of the significance of the access question appears in the light of later events. So many critical details awaited the planners of occupied Germany, that the access question seemed minute by comparison. Admiral Leahy wrote that after the Truman-Stalin exchange he received a cable from Ambassador Winant advising him of the proposed simultaneous transfers. The cable also described the provision of free access to the capital. According to Leahy, he was not informed as to the details of the access agreements. "It didn't seem too important at the time. I don't think one of us placed any significance on right of access or foresaw any possible repercussions of a lack of written agreement." 50

Because of the "agreements" in the June exchange, Stettinius reports that the military regarded the discussion of access as redundant. Since the matter had been settled by the high command, there was nothing more to discuss. 51

---

49 U.S., Department of State, European and British Commonwealth Series 61, Background, October, 1960, 11.

50 Leahy, p. 382.

51 Stettinius, p. 38.
The June 29 meeting attended by Clay, Weeks and Zhukov provided the next opportunity for a discussion of access rights. At this meeting the Russians contended that most of their transportation lines were needed for Russian demobilization. According to Clay this contention seemed perfectly reasonable. Therefore he was willing to be restricted to one highway, one railroad line, and two air corridors, provided it was only a temporary arrangement. However, because Clay did not want to go on record as having assented to particular routes to the exclusion of all others, he did not permit this limitation to be put on paper.52 In addition, "It was agreed that all traffic—air, road, and rail—would be free from border search or control by customs or military authorities."53 This principle of freedom from search and seizure was to become a vital and unexpected issue in the months ahead, but unfortunately it, too, was to remain an unwritten agreement. Because of an intense desire to display trust and friendship, United States officials failed to get both these rights plainly spelled out by the Russians.

With the settlement of the two major preliminaries, food and transportation, the occupation per se was ready to begin. Although the first year and the greater part of the


53 Ibid., p. 27.
second saw many encouraging accomplishments, friction set in almost immediately. Already there was trouble on the railroad line which necessarily ran through Russian occupied territory in connecting West Berlin to West Germany. Armed Russian soldiers attempted to board all trains in order to check American identification. Clay complained to Sokolovsky, the Russian high Commander for Germany. Stressing that the United States would not tolerate the inspection by armed Russian soldiers, Clay threatened to station American armed guards on all trains in order to resist. At first Sokolovsky adhered to the Russian right to inspection, but when Clay reminded him of the tense situation that would be brought about by the presence of armed guards, Sokolovsky relented. He promised no more trouble. Although no written promises were made at this time the gentlemen's agreement on this issue was respected until the spring of 1948.

Also in the summer of 1945, Russia began charging that the United States was digressing from her assigned air corridors in order to fly over Soviet military installations. According to Clay, these charges were without basis. Only a few planes flew to Berlin each day and they

54 Ibid., p. 115.
55 Ibid.
were all carefully checked. Clay speculated that the charges were intentionally trumped up for future reference.56

On a broader scale, the Russians had taken control of most of the radio and press headquarters in Berlin. This the Americans recognized early as a powerful Russian victory. On October 4, the Honorable Clare Booth Luce, a Republican from Connecticut, reported to the House of Representatives:

The two most potent aids in bringing democracy to the German people are the press and the radio. Both are in Russian hands. The six Berlin newspapers are in Red Army control. Berlin radio is the mouthpiece of Marshall Zhukov and hour after hour it feeds the Germans Russian propaganda.57

Finally, Russia gained control of still another powerful tool when she was able to arrange the appointment of a Moscow trained ex-soldier as Chief of Police. Most of the other key positions in the police force were also held by Communists. In the early part of the occupation Russia controlled the judiciary branch of the Magistrat. As head of this very important body the Russians had appointed an untrained, uneducated locksmith named Mittag. Since Russia was finally embarrassed enough to remove him,

56 Ibid.

the Allies did have a voice in his replacement. But this, too, took several months. 58

The American soldiers were not exactly on their best behavior either. Personnel in the Group Control Council was always a serious problem. Most of the soldiers seemed to fall into two classes. Either they had been sent to Berlin against their will and were protesting by doing as little work as possible, or they had come to Berlin to see the sights and were determined to pull strings and get out when the "vacation" was over. 59 Obviously neither group made very effective workers and their attitudes seemed to infect the entire installation. In addition to doing considerable damage on the inside, these groups managed to do a great deal to hurt the American reputation in Germany. Their activities on the outside can be summed up very simply: wine, women and black market. Because of a few flagrant trespasses in these areas, the American charges of extensive Russian violations obviously lost much of their force. 60 In addition to decline in prestige, estimates of the loss to the United States War Department

58 Howley, p. 98.

59 There is a conflict on this point. According to Clay only a minority of the soldiers fell into this category. He insisted, however, that this relatively small group did manage to spoil the reputation of all Americans in Berlin. Clay, p. 64.

60 Ratchford and Ross, p. 9.
due to black market activities run from two hundred fifty to four hundred million dollars. These estimates are based on testimony from both the State Department and the War Department.

Up to this point, military government in Germany had consisted of a large number of state and local officials who reported to a central army commander. In Washington, the responsibility for the entire project was vested in the War Department. This had not been designed as a permanent arrangement, however, and in October of 1945 offices all over Germany were separated from the War Department and put under the control of the State Department. Berlin, however, remained under Army command and became known as the Office of Military Government of the United States (OMGUS). As the headquarters for army control it came under the leadership of General Lucius Clay. In its new capacity, the Berlin office assumed full responsibility for representation on the Allied Control Council.

Notwithstanding the many disruptive incidents, the resumes of Berlin occupation in 1945 were for the most part,

---

61 Ibid., p. 10.

62 Clay, p. 55.
positive. In 1945 there seemed to be a real desire for co-operation. In Berlin the representatives of the West met with Soviet representatives in an apparent atmosphere of good will. Soviet officials visited the American sector informally without their interpreters.

According to Eisenhower, the record of Berlin in the summer and early autumn of 1945 represents "the peak of post-war cordiality and co-operation," that has ever been achieved with Russian officials. "We in Berlin," he wrote, "did not see any reason why American democracy and the Russian system could not exist side by side." Finally, and more specifically, agreement was reached in many vital areas of city administration during the early months of occupation. A uniform court system was established, as was a common scale of rations and taxation. The denazification procedures were agreed upon and sweeping school reforms were put into effect. On the whole, it may be said that although Russia caused considerable

---

63 The second phase of Berlin occupation, i.e., July 1, 1945 until October 20, 1946 is symbolized primarily by trust. Four Year Report, p. 14; During the first year, four power rule in Berlin functioned with relative smoothness, McInnis, p. 111.

64 Clay, p. 17.

65 Eisenhower, p. 475.

66 McInnis, p. 112.
trouble and began many unnecessary incidents, she always managed to stop short of disrupting four-power rule.67

On January 27, 1946 the New York Times printed the results of an extensive survey on the situation in Berlin. The survey had been conducted by the Associated Press and was the result of a series of interviews with top Berlin leaders as well as trained technical and professional men stationed in Berlin.68 It was found that all committees had begun work in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, with each nation determined to make few concessions. This situation had lasted for several weeks with no apparent change. As a result of this temporary deadlock anti-Russian and anti-British feelings had risen steadily in the American sector. It was believed that many of these false impressions were still prevalent. The past three months had witnessed a maturing of trust and co-operation, and agreements were reached on "an overwhelming majority of issues." On the whole, no serious problem existed in Berlin that could not ultimately be settled by four-power talks. As for Russia, there was general agreement that she had made as many concessions as anyone. All agreed that there were no power blocs in Berlin and that "... the Americans and the Russians have been together on various problems more

67 Ibid., p. 111.
often than they have been apart." Lucius Clay himself said, "We have reached a situation where we can get mad and argue about one point, reach a compromise and not have it affect our personal relations or any subsequent points we might take up."69 But the interviews with some of the leading department heads are probably most revealing.

Colonel D. Robinson, deputy director of the finance division reported, "Generally speaking the Russian position has been closer to the United States on finance matters than the British or the French." Leo Werts, deputy director of the manpower division said that everyone was accusing Russia of refusing to compromise. Actually the number of concessions she had made to the United States far exceeded the ones the United States had made to her. Finally, J. D. Canding, the agricultural expert for Berlin, told the Associated Press, "If I had to pick a delegation to do business with and get it over fast I would pick the Russians because they work harder and speak candidly.70

In spite of the encouragement and optimism of this report, the "happy situation" in Berlin continued to be marred by a steady stream of Russian infractions. During this period, Russia's activities constantly brought four-power rule to the brink of dissolution. In the first

69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
months of 1946 the problem of Russian reparations was re-opened. Although Russia had removed hundreds of pieces of industrial equipment during the early months of occupation, Zhukov had given his solemn promise that this large scale removal program would not continue. But as 1946 began the removal of machinery to Moscow was begun once more. Many officials felt that the low standard of living that these removals imposed affected Russian popularity on all economic levels.71

In the political sphere the Russians were equally aggressive. Since June of 1945 there had been four political parties in Berlin: the Communist party (K.P.D.), the Social Democratic party (S.P.D.), the Catholic Center party (C.D.U.), and the Liberal Democratic party (L.D.P.). All four had been endorsed by the Russians during her period of sole occupation. Now the K.P.D. wanted a merger with the Social Democrats.72 Obviously the Communists would benefit by the increased power and membership of such a large a political bloc. Thus Russia proposed a plebiscite for March 31, 1946 in which the question of an

71 Hill, p. 174.

S.P.D. – K.P.D. merger would be raised. When the time came for the election, Russia interrupted the voting in her sector since there was every indication that the majority opposed such a merger. In the Western sectors where the voting was carried on as planned, the decision was in fact in opposition to the union. In flagrant opposition to the majority will, a merger was effected in the Eastern sector. This was the first step in the political division of Berlin and the first indication of the methods to which Russia would resort if necessary. The new East Berlin party was called the Socialist Unity Party (S.E.D.).

All this time the Komendatura and its various departments and agencies continued to meet regularly. Their meetings, according to Howley, were often stormy, but slow progress was being made in reorganizing the city's functions. The temper of the meetings was not isolated

73 U.S., Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, European and British Commonwealth Series 39, Background, October, 1952, 4.

74 "When the polls opened in the Russian sector they were closed an hour later by the Red Army, on the grounds that the organizers had failed to comply with certain mysterious regulations..." Howley, p. 105.

75 U.S., Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, European and British Commonwealth Series 39, Background, October, 1952, 4.

76 Shell, p. 88.
from the current rapport of the occupying nations. Moreover, it was outside these meetings that most of the interzonal disputes originated. Very little time seemed to elapse between the settlement of one conflict and the eruption of another.

In January one such incident came in the form of the disappearance of three municipal judges in Berlin. They were said to have refused to render judgments in accord with the views of the German Communists. One judge had lived in the East and was admittedly arrested by the U.S.S.R.; the other two had lived in West Berlin and were arrested by unknown German police. In February this event was brought before the Coordinating Committee, and the Soviets refused to comment. The record shows that Clay made the following statement, "I regard the entry into American zones by any zonal authority for such purposes and without our concurrence as an unfriendly act. It is one that will be resisted to the full." This incident is

77 Clay, p. 133; There seems to be a discrepancy in the number of judges. Regarding this same incident, Howley wrote, "... I might call it, 'The Case of the Four Missing Judges.' Actually there were five, but since the Russians admitted they had snatched the fifth man and brazenly defended the act, there was no mystery attached to his disappearance." Howley, p. 110.

78 Clay, p. 134.
regarded as one of the earliest efforts by the Russians to intimidate those Germans who opposed Communism. \textsuperscript{79}

January and February were filled with dozens of such occurrences. In mid-January, the Soviets tried to seize twelve locomotives which were being used in the American sector of Berlin. \textsuperscript{80} In January and February buses were held at gunpoint by Soviet soldiers. On February 3, Soviet soldiers stormed into a reception and shot an American in the hip. \textsuperscript{81} In late January Soviet soldiers tried to arrest German maids who had gone to work in American homes. \textsuperscript{82} On May 1, the police record of the American sector of Berlin showed forty-two violations by Soviet personnel. \textsuperscript{83}

In April there was a more serious incident which came close to erupting into a full blown international affair. Soviet workers were sent to remove railroad track in the American sector on the grounds that it was an authorized reparations item. When the United States

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Ibid., p. 138.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Finally Sokolovsky and Clay made an oral agreement promising that if either found a criminal from the other's sector, that criminal would be returned immediately. "For many months this agreement proved effective, and it did much to relieve the growing tensions at the time it was made." Clay, p. 138.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Clay, p. 138.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Clay, p. 138.
\end{itemize}
officials protested, Soviet troops were sent to protect the workers. To resist the troops, American tanks were sent to the scene. Soviet workers were forced to leave. After two very tense days, the affair was ironed out by the two Commanders. No track was removed.

Inter-zonal transportation never ceased to be a problem. Berlin sectors were clearly becoming economic appendages of the major German zones. Since only Russia's zone was linked to her territory, this arrangement was inherently inequitable. Although the actual number of incidents was small at first, there were always enough to interrupt the smooth functioning of inter-zonal traffic.

In the summer of 1946 an increasing number of Soviet inspired attacks on occupying powers began to appear in the East Berlin papers. For example, the Soviet controlled Berlin Zeitung printed the text of a speech by Herr Grotewohl which pointed out the slow progress of the

84 Ibid., p. 139.

85 Dr. W. Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of Germany (London, Stevens and Sons, 1947), p. 55. Dr. Friedmann was a Doctor of Jurisprudence and a member of the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office. During the war he was a member of the Legal and Economic Division of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and from May of 1945 until October of 1946 he was associated with the Military Government of Germany.
Western sectors of Berlin. On June 22 an article appeared in the same paper which accused American military government personnel of having been friendly with Hitler. On August 14 another article in an East Berlin paper criticized Western methods of denazification. Finally Clay entered a complaint against these attacks and an agreement was made prohibiting malicious criticism of any occupying power by the East Berlin press. The agreement was short-lived. Shortly thereafter an article appeared in an East Berlin paper charging the West with profiteering in German exports. On September 18 the United States officials announced that if attacks of this sort persisted, four power rule would be considered null and void.

On the whole, however, most officials regarded these incidents as relatively minor reversals in a trend of increasing co-operation. Progress was being made in Berlin, and most of its leaders were still optimistic about smoothing out the rough spots.

Essential to the American democratic plan for Berlin was the holding of free city-wide elections as early

86 Clay, p. 134. Mr. Grotewohl had been a S.D. party leader who had worked with the communists for a party merger. He then became one of the leaders of the new S.E.D. party.

87 Ibid., p. 135.

88 Ibid.

89 McInnis, p. 111.
as possible. Thus almost immediately the United States delegation began pressing for such elections which they knew could not be held until the adoption of a temporary constitution. Although Russia initially turned away from such talk, she eventually gave her consent to the drafting of a constitution. On July 19, 1946 a temporary constitution was unanimously approved by the Komendatura. It provided for a legislative body or city assembly which would consist of one hundred thirty elected officials and an executive body, otherwise known as the City Magistrat. The latter would be led by the chief executive, the Oberburgermeister. Article 36 provided that all acts be unanimously approved by the Komendatura.

As the pre-election activities got underway, Howley began to feel that the true Russian ambitions in Berlin were slowly revealing themselves. Of the period, Howley wrote, "The period of comradely love in Berlin had passed: savage political war raged."

---

90 Four Year Report, p. 14.

91 U.S., Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, European and British Commonwealth Series 39, Background, October, 1952, 3.


93 Howley, p. 121.
The election date was set for October 20, 1946 in spite of the persistent Russian cries that Berliners were not ready. Kotikov, the Russian representative to the Komendatura vehemently opposed the election. He argued that Berlin should wait until all of Germany had held elections so that Berliners could benefit from everyone else's experience. Many Americans were convinced that Kotikov thought the Communists would lose. When the Komendatura had been unable to agree on a date, the issue had been referred to the Allied Control Council. According to Howley, Kotikov had been far wiser than his superior, Sokolovsky. The latter felt quite sure that the Communists would win and willingly put his signature to the October 20th date.

Howley was convinced that the Russians resorted to any and all underhanded methods of assuring votes. At one time or another in the several months prior to October 20, they were discovered using bribes, intimidation, violence and subterfuges. With the elections only a few weeks away the Russians banned distribution of fresh fruit and vegetables in West Berlin. Two weeks prior to the election, Russia required the Lord Mayor, whom they had

---

94 Ibid., p. 120.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., p. 118.
appointed during their sole occupation, to reduce drastically the supply of electricity to West Berlin.\footnote{97} In the Western sectors, pre-election activity was intense and businesslike. In the East it was frantic. Red banners, posters and flags covered the streets, giving the impression that there were thousands of sympathizers.

Finally the long-anticipated day arrived and 92.3\% of the eligible voters in Berlin went to the polls. The returns of that election showed that 48.7\% of the people had voted for the Social Democratic party, 22.2\% had chosen the Christian Democratic party, 19.8\% had favored the Soviet dominated Socialist Unity party, and the remaining 9.3\% had voted for the Liberal Democratic party.\footnote{98}

The constitution was approved, giving the city assemblymen two year terms. The magistrat was to consist of eighteen members and each one required unanimous Allied approval.\footnote{99}

The results of the October election brought about the end of the second phase of the Berlin occupation, a phase which most high officials agreed seemed founded on a

\footnote{97} "At that time, 50% of all power used in Berlin was produced locally, the other 50% coming over lines from Chernowitz, near Halle, in the Russian zone."Howley, p. 123.

\footnote{98} U.S., Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, European and British Commonwealth Series 39, Background, October, 1952, 4.

\footnote{99} Ibid.
sincere desire to achieve success. After their overwhelming defeat, the Russians refused to make even the smallest concession. Increased tension eliminated almost all East-West social functions. The former dignity of the Komendatura meetings disintegrated.\textsuperscript{100} In apparent desperation, Russia invented a new story and worked diligently at circulating the rumor that the West planned to leave Berlin in two months. Swarms of terrified Germans jammed the American sector.\textsuperscript{101} As the year 1947 began, a new era of Allied relations in Berlin was also beginning.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{100} McInnis, p. 115.
\textsuperscript{101} Howley, p. 131.
\end{flushright}
CHAPTER IV

The first Berlin election, carried out under the supervision of quadripartite inspection teams, seemed to stun the Soviets and make them realize that their hope of gaining Germany by legitimate political methods was futile. Following the publication of the results and the news of the overwhelming Communist defeat, the Russians wasted little time in demonstrating their new tactics. Having lost the election, they tried to nullify its effects by resorting to article 36 of the Temporary Constitution which required all elected officials to receive unanimous approval by the Komendatura. Furthermore, they insisted that the new Berlin government could not oust the old Russian appointees. Even the outgoing Lord Mayor Werner, whom the Russians had appointed, refused to vacate his office. In a threatening letter Werner warned the newly elected Ostrowski that he would be thrown out if he

1. Clay, p. 139.
2. Four Year Report, p. 15.
attempted to enter the city hall. In the meantime Ostrowski was harassed by the Communists. He was repeatedly summoned to Russian headquarters and was questioned thoroughly. As for the other elected officials, the Soviets gave their approval to all but two. However, they refused to allow the magistrat to remove Soviet appointed officials. This was destined to become an impossible situation in which the Lord Mayor who was a Social Democrat would be saddled by deputies from the Communist Party whom he could not rely upon.

Ostrowski came to the conclusion that the whole arrangement was hopeless. Thus in an apparently desperate attempt to rescue the city government, Ostrowski made an undercover deal with the S.E.D. party in which he allegedly agreed to support Communist measures. When his own party, the S.P.D., learned of this deal they voted to disavow the new Oberbergermeister. Almost six months had elapsed since the election and still Berlin did not have an operative city government. To replace Ostrowski, the city assembly

3 Howley, p. 139.

4 "One night the Russians would ply him with liquor, overwhelming the Lord Mayor with good fellowship. The next night, they would put out the welcome mat for sure and greet him with smiles, honeyed words and tattered platitudes about the solidarity of labor. The third night would be another thing again - they would work him over in earnest, giving the unfortunate German one of those terrible mental third degrees. . . ." Howley, p. 145.

5 Zink, The U.S. in Germany 1944 - 1955, p. 344.
elected Ernst Reuter, but the Russians refused to accept this substitution. Finally, the whole matter was referred to the Allied Control Council where no solution could be reached until the time of the blockade. In the meantime Louise Shroeder, a very competent woman, held the position of acting mayor.

Although the spotlight in the early months of 1947 was on the city government dispute, other developments were equally significant. On October 21, the day following the election, almost every German technician in the city was visited at his home by Russian secret police. According to Howley, each one received orders to leave for Russia and was given a choice of taking or leaving his family. A full year earlier all of them had been assembled by the Russians and offered higher living conditions in exchange for living in the Russian sector. Many of them had signed contracts. Whether or not they had been coerced is not known. Now they were given no choice. On October 22 over four hundred highly skilled Germans were shipped out of

6 Ibid., p. 345.
7 Howley, p. 140.
9 Howley, p. 135.
Berlin. On October 25 the British issued a formal protest. The United States, however, could not participate in that protest, for it had engaged in a similar enterprise in the early days of the occupation. Since Russia had restricted her activities to the Russian sector, and since there was no outward appearance of force, the United States could do nothing but demand more information. The issue was eventually referred to the Allied Control Council and nothing more ever came of it.

In the last months of 1946 the United States sent a new commander to Berlin. The man had had little contact with the Russians and was unable to accept the charges of their malicious intent. At the time of his arrival a battle was being waged in the Berlin educational system.

10 According to Clay there was never any precise determination of the number involved. Howley, on the other hand, makes specific reference to four hundred. Clay, p. 135; Howley, p. 136.

11 Howley, p. 136.

12 Ibid., p. 137.

13 The name of this commander is not available. General Clay does not mention his name, nor does Col. Howley. Regarding the omission, Howley gives the following explanation: "A new commander, whose tenure was destined to be shortlived and whose name I prefer to omit on grounds of compassion, arrived in Berlin with virtually no equipment except a set of wondrous notions about what dandy fellows the Russians were." Howley, p. 141.
Although the system was almost entirely in Russian hands, the office of high superintendent was held by Dr. Nestriepke, a non-Communist. Russia had been trying for months to oust Nestriepke and the Western powers had fought diligently to keep him in. When the new commander assumed control he refused to believe that the Russian plan was a calculated maneuver. At his first meeting he proposed that Dr. Nestriepke be removed. This according to Howley put the entire education system in Russian hands and it "was one of the last sacrifices to the false god of Getting Along with the Russians." 

An ominous event occurred early in 1947. Russia ordered that its sector of Berlin be supplied separately. This amounted to the official dissolution of the Joint Food Administration, another step in the transformation of Berlin into a divided city.

Events outside of Berlin had apparent effects on the operation of the Allied administration. For example, in the month of March a foreign ministers conference was held in Moscow, and Clay was asked to attend. He wrote that although the Allied Control Council continued to meet after his return, it was clear that their meetings were

14 Howley, p. 142.
15 Ibid., p. 143.
16 Friedmann, p. 57.
without substance. The conference in Moscow had gone very badly and most of the time was spent in answering charges and countercharges. Thus it became evident that the Berlin situation was a reflection of the whole pattern of international relations.

The statements of two high officials offer a reliable indication of how feelings toward Russia were developing in Washington. In July of 1947 James Byrnes announced his conviction that Russia was not trying to cause a war. He advised that the United States continue in an honest attempt to co-operate with her to the fullest. He conceded that up to that time efforts to collaborate had met with little or no success. Also from Washington, however, came the words of Henry Stimson urging that the time had come to dismiss as "naive and dangerous" the failure to recognize the fact that Russia was led by men bound to destroy democracy. Nevertheless, in 1947 Stimson too refused to accept the inevitability of war.

Early in 1947 the Soviet press in Berlin began circulating rumors about the superiority of Russian air

17 Clay, p. 154.


and military strength.\textsuperscript{20} To compete with the constant stream of fighter planes that the Russians flew over Berlin, Clay ordered an American formation to fly over the city in the design of the letters "U.S." On July 2 a group of B-29's were ordered to fly over the city in a display of air power. In spite of Soviet protests, Clay persisted in this aerial show of military dexterity only because he felt it necessary to avoid the appearance of Russian superiority.\textsuperscript{21}

But despite these and other indications to the contrary, many Americans refused to give up hope of success in Berlin. In 1947 some members of the United States press were still expressing optimistic viewpoints. In January of 1947, \textit{International Affairs}, reported, 

"... Berlin provides an invaluable guide to the intentions and purposes of the four Allies in Europe. It is the most important capital in Europe where the West and the East are trying to come to terms, and trying in remarkable cordial personal relations, to get to know each other."

\textsuperscript{20} By 1947 the press had been entirely reorganized along party lines and Russia was able to forbid the sale of any newspapers but her own in the East sector. For that reason the figures of sales and distribution of Berlin newspapers could be considered a rough indication of political trends in Berlin. Friedmann, p. 127.

\textsuperscript{21} Clay, p. 159.

On the other hand, the New York Times had long since developed an overwhelmingly pessimistic attitude toward Berlin. And on June 19 it declared, "The Americans have fought a losing battle, partly because the Communists already held most appointive offices and partly because the Americans always defend principles down to the last ditch but not across it."23

As a general rule it appeared that Americans in Berlin were losing all hope of finding a solution, whereas those at home were far more optimistic. Somehow the latter seemed to find it easier to overlook the local setbacks and the daily clashes.

At the end of 1947, Harold Zink wrote, "All in all, the experience in the Berlin district seems to indicate that the four Allies can work together with some degree of success to deal with complicated problems, at least if the political level is not too high."24

And because of the natural American emphasis on public opinion, many people attached a great significance to the fact that the German people did not seem very enthusiastic about the Russians. "... Russia has lost

24 Zink, American Military Government in Germany, p. 358.
the first round. The Soviets have failed to gain the political allegiance of the Germans."25

But in almost every instance where there was a thorough understanding of the Berlin situation and a complete familiarity with the daily events, the tone was far more discouraging. In a speech made on November 18, Secretary of State Marshall pointed out that a short two years earlier, the American people had thought very highly of the Russians, and that now there was nothing but hostility.26

In the same month Lucius Clay and Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith were recalled to Washington to give their views of the German situation. It was during that visit that Clay predicted the Berlin blockade. He added that in his opinion the Berlin situation could result in war. But it was Clay's contention that evacuation was unthinkable, for Berlin would only be the beginning. Soon the United States would be forced out of West Germany and finally out of Europe. It was necessary to keep Berlin at all costs, he argued.27


27 Clay, p. 41.
The widespread publicity of American plans to remain in Berlin was probably an effort to counter the increasingly prevalent rumors that the Western exodus was just a matter of time. On October 12, the New York Times demonstrated that even it was becoming convinced. "While there undoubtedly is no official plan for the withdrawal of the Western Allies, there is room for speculation."28

On October 27 the Times attempted to assure its readers that upon closer investigation it had become clear that no such official plan existed. The article made reference to Clay's promise that only arms or a peace treaty would drive the Americans out of Berlin.29

But the one who was probably most qualified to evaluate the situation was Col. Frank Howley, the man who spent all his waking hours trying to cope with the daily explosions and the frequent disputes. According to Howley, relations between the United States and Russia were deteriorating fast as 1947 drew to a close. An economic merger which was brought about in the American and British

zones only added to Russian resentment. At the end of 1947 the United States began to realize the futility of her highly conciliatory policy, and for the first time since she had come to Berlin she actually began to assert herself.

In the early months of 1948 the press became one of the major battle fields for the East-West conflict. Reports from major Berlin newspapers as well as those from the New York Times were a good indication of the fears and premonitions which the Berlin situation was inciting. During January and February confiscation of West German literature reached a new high in East Berlin. This activity was contrary to the many agreements on free interchange. On February 17 and 18 the U.S.S.R. police in Berlin seized copies of James Byrnes' *Speaking Frankly* which had been printed in the American zone. In March all Western trade union papers were removed from East Berlin newsstands.

---

30 In January of 1947, the United States and Great Britain agreed to an economic merger of their zones. "This agreement involved pooling resources, allocating supplies according to need, common food rations, and a common import-export program." The French would not agree to join. William G. Carleton, "The Revolution in American Foreign Policy 1945 - 1954" (Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Co., 1955) p. 52.

31 Howley.

32 Clay, p. 353.
The Soviet papers, on the other hand, began to predict repeatedly that the West would be pulling out of Berlin in the near future. On January 11, the Soviet paper *Taegliche Rundschau* accused Britain and the United States of favoring a partitioned Germany. It went on to say "There is no room in Berlin for adherents of the partition of Germany."

Elsewhere in that paper an editorial made virtually the same accusation. "Britain and the United States have begun the dangerous methods of violating the Allied Control mechanism which will unavoidably lead to a change in the occupation status of Berlin."

By their chosen omissions the Russian papers managed to further these rumors. They suppressed any British or American comments which underlined the Western determination to remain in Berlin. When General Hays, the representative of Great Britain, made a strong statement to that effect in an attempt to counter the recent campaign, his words appeared nowhere in the East Berlin papers.

Disquiet in the occupied city was also forcing the American press at home to devote more attention to Berlin. The reports were not promising. Russia began tightening

---

34 Ibid.
controls in Berlin. She dismissed all Germans from her employ who were not living in the Russian sector of the city. She also began a policy of demanding passes for all German vehicles moving from Berlin to the Soviet zones.\footnote{Ibid.}

On January 25 the \textit{New York Times} reported that two cars of a Berlin train going from Berlin to the British zone were stopped by Russian inspectors. When the British refused to submit to a Soviet check, the train was forced to return to Berlin. Several days later the Soviet Union began seizing all sealed trains going from Berlin to the British and Americans zones. As a result of this new restriction the West threatened a high level protest.\footnote{\textit{The New York Times} (January 25, 1948), p. 26.}

Throughout January and February the Soviets continued to add one interzonal restriction after another. In early March Clay wrote a special report to the chiefs of staff describing a new contemptuous attitude on the part of the Russians. He did not predict war, but he did foresee a blockade within several weeks. Regarding war, however, Clay did say that the possibility could no longer be precluded. Fortunately the report instigated a military build-up by the United States, a build-up which was to mean
the difference between success and failure in the months to come.38

The month of March also saw an abrupt ending to the Allied Control Council. At the last meeting, on March 20, Sokolovsky demanded a report on all agreements reached by the three powers at the recent London Conference. The Western reply was that such a report could only come through official government channels. Of the moments that followed, Clay wrote, "Rudely interrupting and without explanation, the Soviet delegation, following what must have been a prearranged plan, rose as one... and walked out of the conference room." This was destined to be a permanent adjournment. According to Clay, it set the stage for the forthcoming blockade.39

By April it seemed as though Americans were prepared for the worst. The tension seemed so high that newspapers were discussing the possibility of war. Many felt that Russia had gone too far, and that she could not back down without losing face. On April 9, the U. S. News and World Report predicted, "...the pressure is likely to increase rather than subside."40

38 Clay, p. 354.

39 Ibid., p. 355.

On April 2 the New York Times printed a detailed analysis of the documents relating to Berlin. The study had been conducted by the State Department in an attempt to determine the legal basis for recent Russian actions. The article pointed to the European Advisory Commission agreements of November, 1944, and stressed the fact that the official viewpoint was that the right of access had been implied, although not spelled out. The article also discussed the June 5, 1945 Instrument of Surrender. Here too, the right of transport had not been defined but it was felt that the geographical sectors of Berlin would have been meaningless without such an implicit understanding. Since that time the four power Transport Directorate had reached many agreements about precise railroad lines open to the United States. Reference was made to particular check points to which Western trains were required to report. Obviously the recent Russian denial of use of these lines was at least a direct violation of the latter agreements. The article reached the following conclusion: 1) The U.S.S.R. was trying to oust the West from Berlin. 2) The United States was bound and determined to stay. 3) If a blockade was imposed, the United States

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
would have to find some way of supplying Berlin, and 4) The U.S.S.R. was trying to make Berlin the capital of Germany under Russian control.44

Reports from the floor of Congress indicated a new concern over the Berlin situation. After reporting on an article from the Washington News, which told of the almost complete stoppage of all rail and highway communication to Berlin, the Honorable Boggs of Louisiana admitted, "I cannot imagine a more serious threat to the peace of the world."45

The following day, April 2, 1948, the Honorable Forrest Donnell, a Republican from Missouri, reported that on March 31 the Russians had ordered all motor and rail passengers as well as all freight leaving or entering Berlin be inspected. When the United States had refused to submit to such an inspection, the Russians had halted all trains. The congressman proposed that a study be made of all pertinent Allied agreements relating to Berlin. The matter was assigned to the Foreign Relations Committee.46

On every level the United States was trying to confirm her understanding of the transportation agreements.

44 Ibid.


Major General Floyd Parks, who had been present at the June 29 signing of the four-power pact, was asked for a statement on his understanding of its meaning. Parks was emphatic in his confirmation that the United States had been given specific routes to Berlin for the passage of supplies and personnel. In return for these rights the United States had agreed to furnish complete passenger and freight lists, a practice which she had faithfully abided by. 47

The extensive investigations shed little light on the sudden Russian demand for complete on-the-spot inspections. There were rumors that the British were losing patience and that General Robertson in Berlin was threatening an end to attempted co-operation. 48

On April 29 the Soviets finally revealed their true aims by making an extensive proposal to the Western powers. In essence the plan was as follows: If the West agreed to dissolve four-power rule in Berlin and give the city to Russia, Russia would provide the food, fuel and all necessary supplies. The Allied Control Council would resume administration of the rest of Germany and transportation rights in and out of Berlin would be guaranteed to the West. Britain and the United States could maintain troops and whatever else they needed in Berlin to perpetuate the

Allied Control Council and Russia would end all objections to the economic merger of British and American zones.\textsuperscript{49} Obviously the offer was out of the question. The West had no intention of voluntarily accepting the status of visitor in Berlin. There was nothing to discuss.

A rather technical aspect of the Berlin situation was the mechanics of Berlin currency. At the end of the war, the West had given the U.S.S.R. plates from which to print occupational currency. The arrangement was for the United States to redeem that money with gold or American dollars. The system was a complete failure.\textsuperscript{50} From 1945 to 1948 price and wage controls were only effective in those areas which were controlled by all the Allies: food, fuel and rent. For manufactured goods the system was meaningless. Manufacturers could never be sure of replacing their raw materials at a stable price. Barter began to threaten normal business transactions. Confidence in the currency was badly needed. Small local banks were operating in the American zone with little or no connection to outside banks or even to each other. In December of 1946 a central banking system was established in each zone, but an interzonal connection was still lacking. In


\textsuperscript{50} U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2d Session, 1948, XCIV, Part 12, 4859.
February of 1948 a board of directors, similar to the Federal Reserve Board was established in Frankfurt to coordinate banking for the three Western zones. Their main vehicle was the Bank Deutscher Laender which was operated by Germans under Allied supervision.\footnote{Clay, p. 202.}

As far as the currency was concerned the United States continued to redeem the Soviet printed bills with American dollars. Since mid-1947, however, the West had been trying to get Russia to agree on a new printing system under Allied control.\footnote{Ibid., p. 156.} Each time the Allies had introduced the subject, Sokolovsky had abruptly ended the discussion.\footnote{Ibid.}

But on March 20, 1948, Sokolovsky walked out of the Allied Control Council; this amounted to a de facto liquidation of Allied Authority in Germany.\footnote{Howley, p. 177.} Therefore, two days later on March 22, the United States proposed a currency reform for West Germany. At this time the reform did not include Berlin, for the United States still hoped to agree with the Russians on a single currency for the entire city.\footnote{Ibid., p. 184.}

\footnote{Clay, p. 202.}  
\footnote{Ibid., p. 156.}  
\footnote{Ibid.}  
\footnote{Howley, p. 177.}  
\footnote{Ibid., p. 184.}
In the meantime the U.S.S.R. had stepped up her pace of interzonal interference. On March 30, Soviet Deputy Military Governor, General Dratvin sent a letter to the United States Military Government. The letter announced the following restrictions which were to go into effect on April 1: 1) United States personnel going through the Soviet zone must show identification of affiliation with United States Military Administration. 2) Military freight going from Berlin to Western zones must be inspected by the Soviet Union. Britain and France received similar letters.56

On March 31, General Gailey of the United States Military government sent the following reply to the Soviet Union: "The agreement under which we entered Berlin clearly provided for our free and unrestricted utilization of the established corridors. . . . I do not consider that the provisions you now propose are consistent with this agreement."57

On the following day a dinner was held at the home of General Lucius Clay at which leaders of the French, British, and American forces agreed not to give in to the

56 U.S., Department of State, European and British Commonwealth Series 1, The Berlin Crisis, November, 1948, 1.

57 U.S., Department of State, European and British Commonwealth Series 1, The Berlin Crisis, November, 1948, 2.
Russians. On April 2, during a teleconference held with the Department of the Army in Washington, Clay was told that the Americans in Berlin could be supported by a very small airlift. They were not to be evacuated. On that same day Gailey received Dratvin's reply to his letter of protest. "... (C)oncerning the orderless and uncontrolled traffic of freight and personnel" through the Russian zone there are no agreements.

The inspection ordinance went into effect and the constriction it created came to be called the Creeping Blockade.

Western protests were to no avail. Each day brought more impossible Russian restrictions. During April the Russians continually increased their requirements for detailed forms to be attached to all mail leaving Berlin. With the closing of the Hamburg and Bavarian routes, all traffic going to Berlin was routed through one checking station at Helmstedt. Also during April the Russians expelled the United States signal corps stationed in Berlin to receive communications from the United States West

---

58 Clay, p. 360.
59 Clay, p. 360.
60 U.S., Department of State, European and British Commonwealth Series 1, The Berlin Crisis, 2.
61 McInnis, p. 119.
German zone. In the first years of occupation approximately 17% of the goods manufactured in West Berlin were being shipped to West Germany. By May 1, 1948 the Russians had effectively reduced it to 5%.

Throughout the month of May, Western protests continued to be ineffective in reversing or even retarding the rapid pace of Russian demolition. Although the Allied Control Council had officially come to an end on March 20, the Berlin Komendatura continued to operate throughout this period. On April 20, however, the Soviets announced that they could not agree to a schedule for the May meetings. The Soviet representatives proposed that henceforth each meeting merely set the date for the one to come. Three weeks later, at the May 13 meeting, the Soviet delegation refused to agree to a date. No further meetings were held in May. The next meeting was destined to be the last. On June 16, the Russians staged a walkout very similar to the one at the March 20 meeting of the Allied Control

62 U.S., Department of State, European and British Commonwealth Series 1, The Berlin Crisis, November, 1948.
63 Howley, p. 172.
64 61 U.S., Department of State, Office of U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Berlin: Developments of its Government and Administration, September 30, 1952, 39.
Quadripartite rule came to an abrupt end for occupied Berlin.

Two days later, on June 18, the West enacted its new currency plan into law; it was to affect all of the Western zone, not including Berlin. At this time all outgoing railroad traffic from Berlin had been stopped, all barge traffic had ceased, and all passenger travel in and out of the city had been halted. 66

On June 19, the West issued an invitation through the Komendatura to discuss a new currency for Berlin. The invitation was turned down. 67 Three days later Russia did agree to a quadripartite meeting of Berlin powers to discuss the currency problem. 68 At the meeting Russia insisted that the city's currency be the same as that of the surrounding area, but she refused to accept four-power control. Clay told Sokolovsky that the United States would agree to Soviet currency for Berlin under two conditions. First, the United States wanted access to the money that Berliners paid for food supplied by the United States zone; and secondly, Clay demanded specific trade agreements which

65 Howley, p. 174.
66 Clay, p. 362.
67 U.S., Department of State, European and British Commonwealth Series 1, The Berlin Crisis, November, 1948, 4.
68 Ibid.
would keep Berlin trade out of Soviet domination. Discussion went on for hours. The West became convinced that the new mark would come entirely under Soviet control.69 No agreement was reached. Thus Clay advised that the new Western marks, called the Deutsche Mark, be introduced in the Western sectors of Berlin. Russia ordered the new East marks to be issued in East Germany and all of Berlin.70 This was June 22. The Russian currency which Berliners were forced to accept in exchange for the old marks, was worn out and faded. Because the exchange was so poorly organized, the city government went bankrupt overnight.71 The next day the West extended their so-called D-Mark to West Berlin. It was announced that the Soviet marks would be permitted to remain with equal status.72 That same afternoon Sokolovsky told the City assembly that Berlin was part of the Russia zone. The assembly discussed this contention for four hours and finally told the Russians that it could not accept its validity. Following this defeat the S.E.D. party stated a riot which impelled

69 Clay, p. 363.


71 Howley, p. 188.

72 Clay, p. 364.
the assembly to move its headquarters to the Western zone. 73

On this very day, June 23, the Soviets announced the suspension of all railroad and barge traffic into Berlin due to "technical difficulties." The Russians also ordered that the main switch be thrown to disrupt the supply of electricity to West Berlin. They "explained" the latter was due to a shortage of coal. 74

On the following day, June 24, after offering the recent Western currency reform as justification, the Soviet Union imposed a full blockade on the city of Berlin, isolating it from all Germany, both by land and by water. 75

On that day the supplies that had accumulated in West Berlin were as follows: food stock — thirty-six days; coal stock — forty-five days. 76 Two days passed and West Berliners saw the beginning of Operation Vittles, an ingenious scheme which was to provide them with a lifeline by air, a lifeline which would ultimately allow these people to survive a month-long effort by the Soviet Union to starve them into capitulation.

73 Four Year Report, p. 17.

74 U.S., Department of State, European and British Commonwealth Series 1, The Berlin Crisis, November, 1948, 4.

75 Howley, p. 192; Clay, p. 364.

76 Clay, p. 364.
Concluding the account of the Berlin occupation with the imposition of the blockade is itself an evaluation of that story. Clearly, Berlin occupation did not end with the blockade or even with its termination nine months later. However, the blockade of June 1948 did mark the end of an era in Russo-American relations.

When the Allies emerged from the war in 1945 Americans differed among themselves on the nature of Russo-American relations. For that reason, United States attitude and actions were far from consistent. In effect Americans seemed to be waiting for some decisive revelation which would expose Russia as friend or foe, for a miscalculation in either direction would be devastating. The early post-war events brought the United States no closer to a decision. No prior event, including the San Francisco Conference, or the London Foreign Ministers' Conference, provided so decisive or unmistakable a solution to this problem, as did the Berlin blockade. Following the blockade, the United States could no longer mistake Russian intentions in Berlin. Tactics commensurate with those practiced by the Russians would no longer be avoided, lest
the Soviet Union be offended. The United States finally had to accept the fact that her plans for Berlin were at odds, and not in harmony with, those of the Soviet Government.

The question of success or failure in Berlin does not admit of a simple answer. Certainly the Berlin experiment had not provided the key to world peace and understanding as so many had hoped it would. However, as the cleavage in Russo-American goals was an a priori fact which eventually would have become clear, the Berlin experiment may be interpreted as an invaluable revelation. In this concentrated setting the United States and Russia were forced to realize the inherent conflict which existed in their respective ambitions. Russia was shown in no uncertain terms that she could not dictate the peace by the use of force and violence. Thus the situation which the Berlin blockade fully uncovered was not a happy one; it was, however, a true picture of the Russo-American conflict which had up to that time been camouflaged by the remnants of wartime dependence.

For Berliners the blockade was the beginning of a nightmare which grew continually worse in the years that followed. They were forced to accept the fact that their city had become the center for an international feud. But there, too, the United States reaped unexpected profits.
The constant comparison between Eastern and Western sectors had served the United States well in Germany and throughout the world.¹

In spite of these apparent advantages, the blockade obviously could not be regarded as an unmitigated blessing. It was, after all, the unmistakable symbol of failure of co-operation and the almost certain forecast of the conflict ahead.

This, then, is the place of the Berlin blockade in the broader picture of Russo-American relations. It was a moment of truth, the start of a new chapter in the story of East-West relations.

Clearly the job of the historian does not end here, however. The recounting of past events is only a small part of the task of the historian. The judgments and conclusions which he draws in connection with those events offer the real value of his work. These judgments may assume many forms and are very often dependent on the author's views of the basic responsibilities of the historian. On the subject of the Berlin occupation it would be tempting to dwell on the question of individual or

¹ "When we refused to be forced out of the city of Berlin, we demonstrated to the people of Europe that with their co-operation we would act, and act resolutely, when their freedom was threatened. Politically it brought the peoples of Western Europe more closely to us." Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday Co., 1956), p. 131.
departmental failures. Such a concern, however, seems to have little merit. It is far more significant to seek a basic understanding of why the failure came about and to attempt to determine its possible implications for the future. Several noted historians have undertaken this very task.

In 1951, Professor Samuel Flagg Bemis published the latest edition of *A Diplomatic History of the United States*. In bringing the study up to date, Professor Bemis discussed the East - West communication which came about following World War II. His introduction to that chapter provided concise explanation of the gulf between Russia and the United States. Following the war, according to Bemis, the policies of the greater powers diverged radically into two post-war worlds.

There was the One World of Western preference. "It rested on the political thought of Burke, and Bagehot, and Woodrow Wilson. . . . It envisioned collective security for individual liberty and political democracy, functioning nationally and constitutionally under a new league of

---

nations, backed this time by an international force of righteousness."

This world was in opposition to the revolutionary world of Marx and Lenin and Joseph Stalin. The latter was based on totalitarian power, to be seized and wielded in the name of the proletariat.

The conflicting policies and ambitions of these worlds were so much in opposition, according to Bemis, that when their existence became evident, "The best that men could hope for seemed a long armed peace." Once again, these words were not offered as an explanation for the Berlin failure, but for the over-all breakdown in relations which followed the Axis surrenders of 1945.

In 1953 the Cornell University Press published a book by a group of American scholars entitled Governing Post-War Germany. At the head of the list was Edward H. Litchfield, former director of Civil Administration O.M.G.U.S. and Dean of the School of Business, Cornell University. The book is a collection of specialized articles dealing with particular aspects of German occupation. Litchfield wrote the introductory articles dealing with the objectives and legal foundation for German occupation. In evaluating the occupation, Litchfield asserted

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 929.
only that it was not as effective as it might have been.\(^5\) In an apparent effort to explain its shortcomings, Litchfield stressed the fact that the entire effort was launched and completed without a single agreement as to basic objectives. Beyond "peace," "democracy," and "denazification," the United States had no idea of her plans or goals for occupied Germany. The generalities accepted at Potsdam were never buttressed by specific programs and the concepts merely faded into meaningless, inapplicable terms. This failure to state any four power objectives was not just the result of East-West conflict, according to Litchfield. The Western powers themselves did not even reach any agreement until the 1947 Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference.\(^6\)

Beyond the failure to reach agreement was the confusion as to Germany's status as a nation. Germany's sovereignty or the lack of it continued to hamper any Allied progress of governing the country completely.\(^7\) Furthermore, the United States itself could not agree on her objectives for Germany. "... after reading the cables for the critical years, 1945 to 1948, one could not

---


\(^6\) Ibid., p. 6.

\(^7\) Ibid.
avoid the conclusion that as far as the United States was concerned if there were failure it was not in Berlin, but in Washington. Litchfield contended that the absence of Washington policies in advance of occupation forced the local leaders in Germany to make on-the-spot decisions which a fortiori did not consider the picture as a whole. This American and Allied failure to determine their objectives seems to be Litchfield's entire explanation for the ineffectiveness of German occupation.

Several years later, in 1957, Harold Zink, noted historian for O.M.G.U.S. published his extensive work, The United States in Germany, 1944 to 1955. In summing up its significance Zink wrote, "The blockade of Berlin and the final breakdown of the Allied Control Authority convinced the United States that there was no possibility of cooperation with the Russians in Germany." Speaking of its effect on the German people, Zink went on to say, "The bold and courageous efforts of the United States to deal with the emergency in Berlin went far to convince Germans, not only in Berlin but elsewhere, of the American interest

8 Ibid., p. 9.

in German affairs and of the constructive character of its policy.\textsuperscript{10}

And finally, speaking of the German occupation as a whole, Harold Zink wrote, "In retrospect the American occupation in Germany seems to compare favorably with other occupation experiences of the United States. Indeed there is some basis for concluding that it surpassed any previous occupation in effectiveness and achievements."\textsuperscript{11}

In 1959, John Snell of Tulane University published his book, \textit{Dilemma over Germany}. Snell went back to the beginning of World War II and traced the attitudes and problems over Germany through the date of publication. With regard to the failure of quadripartite rule in Berlin, Snell made reference to Yalta. Why, he asked, were the American representatives so vague in their demands? Were they already afraid of offending Russian sensitivity?\textsuperscript{12}

For Russia's part, he asserted that she had unnecessarily agreed to allow Western forces to take over a share of Berlin, which in his opinion, Russia could easily have prevented. But the Yalta negotiators could not really be blamed entirely, Snell wrote. They had the undesirable but

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 97.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 360.

essential task of "papering over the cracks in an alliance which could not be sacrificed until victory was won."\textsuperscript{13}

As for the problem of Russian attempts to dominate Germany, Snell proposed that the world must learn to accept the fact that Central Europe was destined to be controlled by either Germany or Soviet Russia. Since Germany was broken and devitalized during these years it was Russia's perfect opportunity to seize power.\textsuperscript{14}

In general, Snell contended that the negotiators and leaders of the 1940's cannot be blamed for the American failure in Germany if only because the years which followed proved that no easy solution was available.

Without a profound change of policies in Moscow, the price of world peace - or even the unhappy approximation of peace that we call the Cold War - is likely to be the indefinite prolongation of the dismemberment of the German nation and the continued absorption of the German people into Eastern and Western supranational associations.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1949 Drew Middleton, a correspondent for The New York Times published his work, The Struggle for Germany.\textsuperscript{16}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 168.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 251.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 250.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Drew Middleton, The Struggle for Germany (Indianapolis, Bobbs - Merrill Co., 1949). Drew Middleton was a war correspondent for the Associated Press and then for the New York Times from 1939 to 1945, and remained in Germany from 1945 to 1946. In 1948, after a brief stay in the Soviet Union, Mr. Middleton became Chief Correspondent in Germany for the New York Times.
\end{itemize}
In essence Middleton attributed the blockade entirely to Russia's persistent goal of "domination of the country." He held that when the 1947 London Conference failed Russia had to look for new ways of reaching that goal. The Soviet Union apparently chose to mobilize her Eastern zone as a base for political warfare in Germany. If this base was to be effective, the West had to be removed entirely. This necessarily directed the Russian aggressions to West Berlin. When the plans for a united West Germany were made known in the spring of 1948, the Russians had to act rapidly. "The Berlin blockade was clamped around the city in the hope that it would force the West into another meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at which the Soviet delegation could again bid for control of all of Germany." Thus according to Middleton, the Berlin blockade was a necessary step in the long range Russian goal of German domination. The obvious implication is that regional developments and the increase in interzonal entanglements in Berlin played a relatively small part in producing the Berlin blockade.

In direct opposition, is the viewpoint of J. Nettl who discussed the blockade in his book, *The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany*. Nettl found it difficult to understand why the Russians chose the spring of 1948 for

---

17 Middleton, p. 114.
18 Ibid., p. 115.
the blockade. According to Nettl the setting for the eruption had existed since October of 1946 when the city election had created a situation inherently contrary to Russian concepts of administration. Furthermore, Berlin was the center of the Soviet zone, but Western influences made it an anomaly in a Communist controlled area. All the developments throughout Eastern Germany were reported in the Berlin newspapers within twenty-four hours. The Russians were forced to face this fact at the 1947 London Conference when the Western representatives produced the precise figures on Russian reparation demands. According to Nettl, the Russians were horrified. In summary Nettl described Berlin as "a hole in the iron curtain." For Russia, the Blockade was a necessary attempt to repair that hole by removing Western forces from the city.

The American ambassador to Moscow during this period was Walter Bedell Smith. In 1955 he published, My Three Years in Moscow. Smith dwelt on the great Russian fear of the German nation. Lenin, he wrote, was always attempting to impress the Russian people with the power of Germany. Smith believed that Germany was either a great potential threat or a worthy and valuable associate in the

19 Nettl, p. 107.

20 Ibid., p. 108.

21 Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co., 1950).
eyes of most Russians. Seldom was she anything in between. The war had taught Russia that Germany could not be accepted as a full partner; therefore, Russia did not want a reconstructed Germany. Bizonia, and later Trizonia\textsuperscript{22} were seen as great international challenges and the Russians began to recognize that something more than diplomatic methods would be necessary to halt the Western plan. Thus, the blockade was primarily an effort to halt economic and monetary reform in Germany. The hope of ousting the West was at most secondary.\textsuperscript{23}

This aspect of economics which Smith touched on lightly in his explanation of the blockade is given a great deal of attention in the examinations of other American scholars. Marshall Shulman, associate director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, relied heavily on the matter of economic and monetary reform.\textsuperscript{24} Shulman asserted emphatically: "The blockade was a counterthrust by the Soviet Union to the currency reform in West Berlin and the West's firm denial of Soviet control over the Ruhr; . . . . \textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{22} Bizonia was an economic merger of the zones of Great Britain and the United States. Trizonia included the French zone.

\textsuperscript{23} Smith, p. 231.


\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 18.
He elaborated on his thesis by saying that Russia was in the process of searching for the outer limits of her area of control. Thus, when the West began to announce plans for a united West Germany, a situation which would not only impede Russian expansion, but which would place the Ruhr under complete Western control, Russia fought desperately to prevent it. Shulman regarded the blockade as an interesting phenomenon in East-West relations. "The significant point about the blockade was that it represented a wary test of wills by measures short of force." 26

Many historians agree with this interpretation by Marshall Shulman. In his discussion of the Berlin blockade, Foster Rhea Dulles 27 went into great detail about the European Recovery Program, also known as the Marshall Plan. This plan for economic aid to Western Europe was apparently seen as a great threat by the Soviet Union.

However, Russian anxiety over the intimacy between Western Europe and the United States was something that grew slowly, according to Dulles. It took the dynamic development of a West German merger to force Russia to such an act of aggression. "In part because of the very success of the Marshall Plan, the conflict between Soviet Russia

26 28 Ibid., p. 67.

and the Western democracies grew increasingly tense. Its focus remained on Germany.\textsuperscript{28} When the Western powers merged their zones, "it was the last straw." Russia retaliated with the blockade.

Former President Harry S. Truman's views on the causes of the blockade are most pertinent. By way of introduction Truman described the Berlin situation prior to the blockade: "We made every effort to talk reason and co-operate with them, and we meant it. But for reasons best known to them they either could not, or would not, believe us."\textsuperscript{29}

Elsewhere, however, Truman became much more specific in his analysis. He noted that just prior to the blockade, Russia had suffered serious setbacks in Italy, France and Finland. Furthermore, Yugoslavia had developed a taste for independent action. Compounding these failures the Marshall Plan was showing signs of startling success. "The blockade of Berlin was international Communism's counterattack."\textsuperscript{30} In essence, then, Truman was convinced that the blockade was Russia's attempt to "probe for soft spots in the Western Allied positions," around the Russian perimeter. This drive to attack those soft spots was seen

\begin{flushright}
29 Truman, p. 214.
30 \textit{Ibid.}, p. 123.
\end{flushright}
as a necessity in the face of recent Western successes in the contest for control of Europe."31

It is clear from this survey that one explanation cannot be offered for the American shortcomings in Berlin. Whether the American occupation was a failure or the best that could be expected under the circumstances is also a matter of frequent controversy. What must be generally conceded, however, is that Russia and the United States were not able to co-operate in Berlin and four power rule was dissolved. American plans and hopes for a limited occupation and a rehabilitated Germany were never realized; the United States was forced to reconstruct her foreign policy along the lines of a defensive Western world. The various evaluations by American scholars are probably all part of a greater more comprehensive truth, and yet they fail to consider the effect of Soviet-American wartime relations. Because of the pattern of the events that followed the surrender of Germany, historians tend to judge the wartime alliance as a Western toleration of Soviet Russia. The facts do not warrant such an assumption.

Russia was an American ally for almost four years. In spite of all ideological conflicts, Russian efforts in the war could not be minimized. Although the American intimacy with Russia had not approached that of Great

31 Ibid., p. 131.
Britain and the United States, the Western need for Soviet aid and friendship had been very great. The Soviet role in winning the war against the Axis was still vivid in the minds of American leaders in Germany. Once again the words of Howley's unidentified official come to mind. "... we would not have been justified in breaking our early engagements, ... so soon after Russia had suffered twenty million casualties fighting the same enemy we had fought." Americans will probably never fully appreciate the truth of these words or the number of serious mis-calculations that they accounted for.

32 Howley, p. 274.
LIST OF REFERENCES

DOCUMENTS


PUBLISHED MEMOIRS


CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

U.S. **Congressional Record. 78th Cong., 1st Sess.,** 1943, LXXXIX, Part 9, A 1081.


BOOKS


**ARTICLES**

"Behind the Kremlin Front." *Business Week*. October 23, 1943, p. 44.


"Russian Foreign Policy." *Life*. 15. October 18, 1943, p. 36.


NEWSPAPERS