FRANCO-GERMAN POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL
RIVALRY IN MOROCCO
(1904-1909)

by

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CHAPTER I

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION UP TO THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE

The French Protectorate of Morocco includes nearly one-quarter of a million square miles of northwest Africa. This is only a small part of the eleven million square miles of that continent. But, strategically and materially, it is one of the most important parts of Africa. Its northern tip reaches to within nine miles of Spain — at the entrance of the Mediterranean, facing Gibraltar.

At the beginning of this century, imperialistic officials of five European states felt that they had vital interests in this semi-independent Mohammedan country. The governments of Britain and of Spain were keenly aware that it was too close to Gibraltar and Madrid to be in control of unfriendly hands. The French wanted it because it would make a valuable continuation of their Protectorate of Algeria. The Italians wanted it because they wanted a colony in North Africa, particularly after France had snatched away the possibility of Tunis in 1881. And the German officials and businessmen, entering the struggle for colonies and markets late, saw in Morocco their last chance to win desirable land close to Europe.

The land that these European states wanted, is cut off from the rest of Africa by the Atlas Mountains, which form a natural barrier. An enemy controlling them can easily threaten Algeria, the land to the east. The French experienced this frequently during the 19th century, and early 20th, when marauding tribesmen would descend upon the frontiers of the French prize protectorate. The French officials did not feel that Algeria was completely theirs until they controlled the mountains and valleys that spread westward to the Atlantic.

Several parallel chains make up the Atlas Range. These chains contain the most elevated peaks in North Africa. **Jebel Ayashin** rises to 14,600 feet. The parallel chains rise in the northeast near Taza, extend southwest, run almost the full length of the country to touch the Atlantic coast near Cape Guir. The second mountain range, the Er-Rif, forms a northern maritime district, with mountains rising sharply out of the Mediterranean Sea.

The resources of Morocco lie not in the mountains, however, but in the plains and plateaus. There are two main areas of these. One, the wide belt of fertile plain that lies between the Atlas and Er-Rif Mountains. Inhabitants call this the Sebu-Muluya Plain. The second, only a little

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2 *Documents diplomatique: Affaires du Maroc*, 1901-1905. (Hereafter cited as *Affaires du Maroc.*) Frequent references to raids.

less important economically, is the plain and plateau area southeast of the Atlas Mountains, along the Sous River.

Europeans find Morocco an excellent place in which to live. The Atlas Mountains cut off the effects of the desert, helping to give a healthy and pleasant climate to most of Morocco. Several of the mountains have perpetual snow. The temperature in West Morocco rarely falls below 40 degrees F. in the winter or rises above 95 degrees F. in the summer. In the region east of the Atlas Mountains, however, the cold in winter and the heat in summer go to extremes.4

Morocco's wealth lies in its agriculture and livestock. For years the natives have grown enough grain and raised enough cattle and sheep to give the French a good export business.5 The natives grow millet, beans and olives for home consumption. Many of them lead a pastoral life, living on herds and flocks, or game and wild fruits.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the native government could not defend itself from European imperialists. The Sherifian Empire, as the government was called, could not even control the five million Arabs, Berbers, Moors, and Jews who lived within its borders. Sherifs, or descendants of Mohammed, had been ruling Morocco as sultans since

the 8th century. But at no time had they absolute control over all the inhabitants, especially over the nomadic people on the plateaus or over the tribes on the slopes of the Atlas and Er-Rif Mountains. This was particularly true during the rule of weak sultans. Abdul Aziz, Sultan from 1894 to 1908, was such a man.

A lack of national consciousness among the people made the Sultan's task as ruler most difficult. The Berber, Arab, Moor, and Jew lived there almost as separate units.

The most numerous of these people are the aboriginal Berbers who inhabit the mountain regions. Their blood permeates most of the population. They are the oldest inhabitants. Although some of them have Arab traits, most of them have kept their primitive character. They speak their own language, a Hamitic tongue.

The Berbers have a strong sense of independence. The northern group in the Er-Rif Mountains have fought very hard to maintain it. Before the time of the French protectorate, the chieftains of these northern tribes lived like feudal lords. Only the strongest Sultans of the past had been able to get them to acknowledge overlordship.

Two types of people live on the plains: the Arabs and

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7 I. C. Barlow, The Acadir Crisis, p. 17.
the Berbers. The Arabs are the minority, but socially and economically, they are the more important. They consider themselves to be the inheritors of the faith and blood of the Arabs who conquered Morocco for the Prophet in the 8th century. Most of the people living on the plains are Moors, who are a mixture between Berbers and Arabs. The Moors are Mohammedans and speak Arabic.

The Jews are the fourth ethnic group that can be considered native. They have lived in Moroccan cities since the 16th century, when the Spanish expelled the Jews from the Iberian peninsula.

Even the strongest Sultans did not have complete sovereignty over all the tribes now living within the French protectorate. In recognition of this, the natives had two names for the land that the Sultan ruled. The Blad Maghzen was the land whose inhabitants recognized his temporal and religious leadership. The Blad Siba was the land whose people acknowledged only the Sultan's religious leadership. The native chiefs would not allow the Sultan or his officials to enter the Blad Siba without first obtaining permission. If a section of the Blad Siba intervened between the Sultan and his destination, the Sultan had to travel a circuitous route in order to avoid it.10

The Blad Maghzen varied in size. The strong Sultan

10 I. C. Barlow, op. cit., p. 15.
Moulay el Hassan (1873-1894) made it extend to all of Morocco except the inaccessible mountain regions. But the pleasure-loving Abdul Aziz (1894-1908) allowed it to shrink to the area of the Sebu-Muluya Plain.\(^{11}\)

The Sultan used many officials, called Machzen, to administer the part of Morocco he controlled.\(^{12}\) Many of these men were little more than court functionaries. Governors, called Caidas, administered the areas of the Glad Machzen that were not within easy reach of the capital city, Fez. The officials were frequently dishonest. Sir Arthur Nicolson, later Under-Secretary of the British Foreign Office, said that administrative conditions were desperate. In 1906, he wrote: "I do not believe that it is possible to reform this country from within... Self-interest is the sole object of the governing class."\(^{13}\)

Conditions became increasingly worse under Abdul Aziz, who was Sultan during most of the years of this study. His own personal extravagance nearly emptied his treasury. Abdul's taste for such European novelties as bicycles, automobiles and fireworks not only reduced his finances but it lost for him the respect of his orthodox Moslem followers.

René Pinon, a reporter in Fez in 1908, had an interview with the Sultan. In this the Sultan gave a rather pathetic excuse

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\(^{11}\) H. A. Gibbon, op. cit., p. 120.
\(^{12}\) I. C. Barlow, op. cit., p. 160.
\(^{13}\) H. Nicolson, Portrait of a Diplomatist, pp. 81, 95.
for the extravagance that cost him his throne: "They have accused me of buying hundreds of objects of which I had no need, but how was I to know? . . . When I wished a piano they told me that pianos sold by the dozen, and I got a dozen. Automobiles, according to my informers, were also sold by the dozen and bicycles by the hundred. The merchants, leagued with my ministers, have exploited me shamefully . . ."\textsuperscript{14}

Up until 1902, the Sultan had no standing army. He had to call upon the tribes to furnish him with troops when he needed them. Abdul Aziz was having such slight success in getting troops in this manner, that he called in French instructors to train regular troops.\textsuperscript{15} The French gained considerable power from this, because they were able to place native troops with French officers at strategic points throughout the country. The Sultan, however, did not increase his personal control over the military by this method. In 1911, the new Sultan, Mulay Hafid, had to call upon the French to protect him from rebellious tribesmen.

Europeans with special privileges weakened further the slender power of the Sultan. Foreign business people needed special protection. This was evident in the early 19th century. Their governments, therefore, opened or expanded diplomatic offices in the larger Moroccan cities. This soon created the problem of extra-territorial rights. As in

\textsuperscript{14} R. Pinon, \textit{L'Empire de la Mediterranee}, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905}, doc. no. 27.
China, the Europeans lived beyond the control of local officials, having their own laws and courts. And they always had the protection of consular officials. These privileges the Europeans extended to the natives who worked for them. They called these natives protegés.

This practice weakened the power of the Sultan and it increased the political power of the European Consulates. Moreover, it led frequently to a bad system of graft. Rich natives could buy European protection. No European nation represented in Morocco was free from the charge of having its nationals sell protegé certificates at one time or another.16

Sir John Drummond Hay, the British Minister at Tangier during most of the last half of the 19th century, realized the growing political power and conflict that this protegé system created. Therefore he called a meeting of the Tangier Diplomatic Corps in 1879. This meeting led to the Conference of Madrid in 1880. Thirteen governments, including the United States, sent representatives to Madrid. These men adopted a convention that, among other things, regulated the protegé system.17

The Madrid Convention set limits to the number of protegés. Business companies could have only a limited number.

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16 One of the most frequent offenders was the American Consul, Felix A. Mathews. I. C. Barlow, op. cit., p. 20.
17 Ibid.
Consular offices could hire any number they wanted. The proteges came now under the jurisdiction of the Moroccan native courts. Police officials, however, had to notify the patron before making the arrest, stating what action they meant to take. Each European Consulate had to submit to the Sultan an official list of all the proteges belonging to their nationals.

The Europeans did not obey these rules. Too frequently consular officials would allow business companies to hire an illegal number of proteges. They claimed that the phrases in the convention were ambiguous. The London Times correspondent said that the officials submitted inaccurate lists of the proteges, with false statements about their property and finances. Soon the situation grew worse than ever, with many proteges continuing to reduce the Sultan's authority and finances.

The Madrid Convention did more than make an agreement about proteges. It gave the nationals of the signatory powers the right to buy property. It guaranteed the "open door." And it concluded by binding the governments represented to another meeting if Moroccan affairs should change.

An increase in Moroccan foreign trade followed this convention. Englishmen had a great lead there until the early years of this century. British trade with Morocco in

19 H. A. Gibbon, op. cit., p. 126.
1900 was 34 million francs, while French trade was 19 million francs. The leading imports to Morocco were textiles, tea and sugar. Britain controlled most of the textile and tea imports, while France led in the importation of sugar. France took most of Morocco's exports, particularly wool, leather goods, and almonds. The French Protectorate, Algeria, bought Moroccan cereals, sheep and cattle.

In 1903 British and French trade through Moroccan ports was about equal. French trade in that year reached a total of 24 million francs; British, 26 million. From then on French trade increased while British trade dwindled.

Germany started out the 20th century as a weak fourth in trade with Morocco. Even Spain had more trade there than had industrial Germany. The Germans bought almonds, wax, olive oil, hides, and grain. They sold metalware, nails, perfume, and chinaware. They consistently imported from Morocco more than they exported to it. In 1900 they bought 8 million francs worth of Moroccan goods, selling to Morocco only 4 million francs worth. By 1906 the German part of Moroccan trade was 9 per cent of the total; by 1910 it had risen to only 13 per cent.

Despite the attempt to internationalize Morocco at the

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20 I. C. Barlow, op. cit., p. 34.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 41.
23 Affaires du Maroc, 1910-12, doc. no. 546.
Madrid Convention, the French made considerable military and political gains there during the next two decades. By 1902 they had secured the right to support the Sultan with troops supervised by French officers. In addition to this, the French had the authority to station troops at strategic points along the frontier. 24

The Sultan's need for money gave further control over Moroccan affairs to the French officials. In 1904 the French drew up a contract for a loan of 62,500,000 francs, bearing 5 per cent interest. A mortgage of 60 per cent of the custom returns in all the "open ports" of Morocco guaranteed this loan, with the French having the right to supervise the collection. To do this, the French officials set up a controller of the customs in each of the eight treaty ports. 25

Thus, by controlling the army and the customs, the French were well on their way towards getting political control of the Moroccan government by 1904.

To make certain that this peaceful penetration could continue, French statesmen did their best to secure friends among the Mediterranean powers. Theophile Delcassé, who became Colonial Minister in 1894 and Foreign Minister in 1898, worked hard to accomplish this. Delcassé was a Provençal of energy and imagination, who believed in a vigorous foreign policy with the aim of securing Morocco for France.

24 Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905, doc. no. 27.
25 Ibid., doc. no. 170.
Delcassé's first success in colonial bargaining came in 1901, when he completed the Franco-Italian Agreement. A series of letters between M. Barrère, the French Ambassador in Rome, and the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, defined this Agreement. Italy left the close observance of the terms of the Triple Alliance in order to have a free hand in Tripolitania. In return, the Italian government promised to give a free hand in Morocco to France.  

Delcassé's next success in the task of securing Morocco came with the signing of the Anglo-French Agreement. This Agreement settled the outstanding French and British colonial difficulties in various parts of the world.

It does not matter for this study whether Delcassé, Edward VII, Paul Cambon, or Lord Lansdowne was the principal agent for the creation of this Agreement. They all contributed. But it was Delcassé who had worked toward this understanding for several years, and at the time he considered it to be the outstanding achievement of his life.  

After ten months of bargaining, the French Ambassador, Paul Cambon, and Lord Lansdowne signed the Agreement in London on April 8, 1904. It was composed of three distinct instruments: a declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco; a declaration on Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides; and

27 *Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905*, doc. no. 198.
a convention on Newfoundland, Senegambia, Senegal, Iles de Los, and Nigeria. 28

In the nine articles of the Egypt and Morocco Declaration, Britain recognized the predominant interest of Britain in Egypt. Concerning Egypt, Britain declared that she had no intention of altering its political status, while France promised not to interfere in any way. France guaranteed liberty of commerce for thirty years with the privilege of renewal, while the British promised to uphold the Treaty of 1888 on the neutrality of the Suez Canal.

In addition, Great Britain promised not to interfere with the action of France in Morocco. The British Government promised to help the French bring about the administrative, economic, and military reforms necessary to keep peace. The French also stated their intention of not changing the political status of the country and agreed to insure commercial liberty for thirty years. To insure free passage of the straits of Gibraltar, the French agreed not to erect fortifications on the coast between Melilla and the right bank of the Sebu. The Declaration provided for the French coming to an understanding with Spain, and communicating this accord to the British. The last article provided that the British and the French should lend each other diplomatic support to

28 G. H. Stuart, French Foreign Policy, pp. 116-117. For the text of the Egypt and Morocco Declaration, see Cooke and Stickney, Readings in European History, pp. 92-95.
secure the execution of this Declaration.

This was the public declaration. Actually there were five secret articles that contained the real intentions of the Declaration. These were not published until 1911 at the time of the Agadir Crisis. The first article of these secret agreements provided that the economic and strategical provisions of the published declaration remain intact - in case either government found itself forced to modify its policy in Egypt or Morocco.

The second article declared that the British had no present intention of making any changes in Egypt, but it provided that if it should become desirable, France would not oppose this, on the condition that Great Britain would have similar understanding towards French action in Morocco. The third article specified the part that would go to Spain should the Sultan lose his authority. This was to be the territory around Melilla, Ceuta, and the straits. The next article provided that even if Spain declined to enter into this agreement, it was nonetheless binding upon the British and the French. The last article referred merely to the terms of the repayment of the Egyptian debt.

According to these secret articles, in short, the British would support a French Protectorate in Morocco provided the French would do three things: (1) guarantee commercial

29 G. H. Stuart, op. cit., p. 119.
liberty, (2) give to Spain, a weak power, the land facing Gibraltar, (3) uphold the British desire to make a Protectorate out of Egypt.

The French Foreign Office had the task of settling the problem of Spanish interests. Article VIII of the published Egypt and Morocco Declaration ran as follows:

The two governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the coast of the Mediterranean. In regard to these interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government. The agreement which may be come to on the subject, between France and Spain, shall be communicated to his Britannic Majesty's Government.

Upon the announcement of the public articles of the Anglo-French Agreement, the Spanish officials appeared to be furious, since they had not been consulted; their government, in fact, had been treated as a quantité négligeable. The Spanish Ambassador declared to Delcassé that: "This Anglo-French Agreement will have serious consequences and involve unforeseeable complications." 31

Spanish pride was about the only heritage left to the Spanish after the cession of Latin America and after the

30 British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vol. III, doc. no. 32. (Henceforth referred to as: British Documents.)
recent defeat in the Spanish-American War. So the task of making Spanish diplomats agree to French terms became more difficult. Delcassé gave the work of negotiating to Jules Cambon, at that time Ambassador in Madrid. Delcassé outlined to Cambon and to the Spanish Ambassador just how far he would be willing to go. On April 18th, Cambon had his first meeting with the Spanish Foreign Minister on this subject. When the Spanish Foreign Minister contrasted the new terms with the terms that had been offered in 1902, the French Ambassador replied that the earlier conversations had been more or less private; that he had repeatedly declared that France would not abandon Fez; that the new concessions exceeded public opinion; and that they could not be enlarged. 32

Cambon continued his negotiations throughout the summer. He complained to Delcassé about the egregious obstinacy of the Spanish, while the Spanish complained about the treatment they received. Cambon finally arranged an agreement with the Spanish on October 3, 1904. This consisted of a short public declaration and a secret convention of 16 articles. The public declaration simply stated that the two governments had fixed the extent of their rights in Morocco, and that they would both adhere to the Anglo-French Declaration. 33

The secret convention worked out in detail the boundaries indicated in the Anglo-French secret articles relating

33 Ibid., pp. 154-155.
to Spanish interests. In substance, it stated that Spain had the right to extend her control over the territory bound by the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the Muluya River, and the right bank of the Sebu River.34

Foreign Minister Delcassé felt so secure after the Moroccan Agreements with Italy, Great Britain, and Spain, that he started urging reforms upon the Sultan almost immediately. A month after the completion of the Spanish Agreement, Delcassé sent a program of reform to Saint-René Taillandier, the French Chargé d'affaires in Tangier. Taillandier had instructions to go to Fez and to stay right with the Sultan until the reforms were accepted.

The program of the Taillandier Mission made the following demands upon the Sultan: the appointment of French instructors to completely reorganize the Moroccan army; the signing of a treaty excluding other nations from political power; and the authority for the French to control all Moroccan finances.35

While Taillandier pleaded the French cause at Fez, a storm was rising at Berlin and Tangier. France and Britain had not consulted a proud nation: Germany.

The German Chancellor, Bernhard von Bülow, had not heard about the signing of the Anglo-French Agreement until he read

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34 *British Documents*, vol. III, doc. no. 97.
35 For details of the reforms of the Taillandier Mission, see *Affaires du Maroc*, 1901-1905, pp. 178-184.
about it in the newspapers. He apparently took the news quite calmly. In a reply to the Reichstag on April 12, 1904, he made the best of the matter, as was his habit, by reviewing it in a cheery manner. He said:

We have no reason to suppose that this agreement is directed against any Power whatever. It seems to be an attempt to eliminate the points of difference between France and Great Britain by means of an amicable understanding. From the point of view of German interests we have nothing to complain of, for we do not wish to see strained relations between Great Britain and France, if only because such a state of affairs would imperil the world . . . Concerning Morocco, which constitutes the essential part of this agreement, we are interested in this country as in fact in the rest of the Mediterranean, principally from the economic point of view . . .

Despite this public speech, historians know now from the official documents that the officials in the German Foreign Office felt the Entente Cordiale (as the Anglo-French Agreement was usually called) to be a blow to German interests and pride. In the documents in Die Grosse Politik, Chancellor von Bulow, Foreign Minister Baron von Richthofen, and the influential Friederick Holstein describe with increasing anger their reactions to the developments in Morocco.

Counsellor Holstein wrote:

Morocco today is one of the few countries where Germany can compete freely in trade. Since

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36 Bulow's Memoirs, vol. II, p. 74. Radolin, the German Ambassador in Paris, had informed him in March that such an agreement was likely. The German Government, however, was never officially informed. Die Grosse Politik, vol. XX, doc. no. 6369.

37 Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905, doc. no. 227.
Morocco is on the point of starting a network of railways, Germany would suffer great injury owing to French monopoly. Even more alarming would be the injury to German prestige if we looked on with folded arms while national interests were given away. If we allow ourselves to be trampled upon in Morocco, we invite similar treatment elsewhere. 38

There is no proof that the Germans knew anything about the secret articles of the Entente Cordiale until the French published them in 1911. In Die Grosse Politik there is no sign that the German officials suspected that there was more on Morocco in the Anglo-French Agreement than appeared in the published articles. But they had suspicions elsewhere. Bülow and Holstein suspected a secret deal on China, 39 or some alliance against Germany. 40

The Kaiser, his Chancellor, and the officials in the German Foreign Office, wanted to do something to stop French action in Morocco, but they differed about what it should be. Bülow and Holstein did not keep the Kaiser informed about all phases of the Moroccan situation, as the absence of the usual imperial marginal notes on the documents indicates. Kaiser William II had too little concern about the Moroccan situation to please his ministers.

Chancellor von Bülow states in his correspondence that he thought it best to play the sphinx, and to let the

38 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XIX, doc. no. 6090.
39 Ibid., doc. no. 6274.
40 Ibid., vol. XX, doc. nos. 6837-6847, passim.
mysterious actions of the Germans influence Delcassé to divulge his plans. Probably that would mean that France would have to give Germany either guarantees or compensations.\(^4^1\)

Kühlmann, newly-appointed German Chargé d'affaires in Tangier, discovered the aims of the Taillandier Mission to Fez. To him this looked very much like a leap towards a French Protectorate. German officials, principally Dr. Vasseil, Consul at Fez, encouraged the Sultan to resist the program. When the Sultan called together an Assembly of Notables from the Blad Maghzem, Kühlmann approved, calling this "a skillful anti-French move."\(^4^2\)

Chancellor von Bülow waited several months after the signing of the Anglo-French Agreement before he decided to do more than play the sphinx. That policy seemed to have had no effect upon the French. So Bülow decided that the situation called for more action.

On February 7, 1905, Kühlmann told Cherisey, the French Chargé d'affaires at Tangier, that France had not told any of her plans to Germany, and he hinted that the French would regret it. "Most Germans," he added, "thought solely of economic interests in Morocco, but the influential colonial party had other ideas, and the Kaiser might act."\(^4^3\)

The French officials in Paris and Fez felt the change

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41 *Die Große Politik*, vol. XX, doc. nos. 6512-6537, *passim*.
in the German policy. The elaborate reports from the Taillandier Mission in Fez indicate a stiffening of the Sultan's attitude towards the French. The Sultan was polite, but he became increasingly elusive. Dr. Vassel had been doing a good job in bolstering up the Sultan's will to resist. The Sultan and his Ministers did not believe that the French would go beyond words, and they acted accordingly. They did not want to lose control over their people until they had to.

Convinced that the French would not fight over Morocco, Chancellor von Bülow decided upon a dramatic diplomatic move at Tangier. Against the Kaiser's better judgment, Bulow announced in the Kölnische Zeitung that the Kaiser would visit Tangier shortly. The Kaiser was planning to take a pleasure cruise in the Mediterranean. When the Kaiser learned about the preparations for a political demonstration, he wired that he might not land, that he was traveling incognito, and that he wanted no audiences. "To change the program," replied von Bülow, "would be a triumph for Delcassé." On March 31, 1905, the Kaiser landed at Tangier, and in the course of the festivities of that day, he told the Sultan's representative that Germany desired complete independence for Morocco, with equal treatment for all nations, and

44 Documents diplomatique francais, vol. VI, doc. nos. 51-85.
45 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XX, doc. no. 6564.
46 Ibid., doc. no. 6534.
he urged the Sultan to follow the advice of the Notables in not accepting the French reforms.47

This talk aroused considerable resentment in Paris and London. The French and British governments and people did not like the brash way in which William II announced Germany's refusal to be pushed aside. Although the visit had the effect that von Bülow wanted, the Kaiser did not forgive him for the embarrassing consequences. Later that year William II wrote this to Bülow:

Do not forget that you personally prevailed upon me, against my will, to go to Tangier for the sake of the success of your Morocco policy. Read through my telegrams prior to the Tangier visit ... It was to please you, for the sake of the Fatherland, that I landed, mounted a strange horse in spite of my equestrian disability due to my shrivelled left arm, an act which might have caused me to come within a hair of losing my life. This was your adventure. I rode among Spanish anarchists because you wanted it, and your policy was to benefit by it.48

This Tangier visit led to a conference where the representatives from the countries that had signed the Madrid Convention negotiated again to reach another agreement. At this Conference, at Algeciras, the French and the British worked together. Their actions created a new relationship in Europe. The desires of the French and British diplomats there at Algeciras, under the pressure of events forced by the Germans, transformed the Entente Cordiale into something much bigger than a colonial agreement.

47 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XX, doc. no. 6589.
CHAPTER II

THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE

Two weeks after the Kaiser's visit to Tangier, Foreign Minister Delcassé asked the German Ambassador, Prince Radolin, to come to see him. Delcassé informed Ambassador Radolin that if there was any misunderstanding between their two countries, the French were ready to discuss the matter. Radolin said that the French had waited too long, and that the time for separate negotiations had passed.¹

A letter from Chancellor von Bülow to Delcassé reaffirmed the German position.² Since the German statesman made it clear that they would not negotiate with him, Delcassé wanted to make certain of British support - just in case that the German stand on Morocco should turn to action. The Foreign Minister, therefore, asked Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to the Court of St. James, to see Foreign Minister Lord Lansdowne as soon as possible. On May 17th, 1905, Paul Cambon visited Lord Lansdowne in the Foreign Office. There Lord Lansdowne gave Cambon words of encouragement regarding Britain's support in a

¹ Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905, doc. no. 250.
² Documents diplomatique français, Second Series, vol. VI, doc. no. 361.
crisis. Cambon took the words to mean much more than Lansdowne intended. He came away from the conversation with the impression that the Foreign Minister had offered an alliance. Cambon immediately wrote a report on this which he closes with these words:

I am able to write M. Delcassé that if the circumstances demand it, that if we have serious reasons for believing an unjustifiable aggression possible, the British government will be ready to confer with the French government on the measures to take. "You may be sure," Lgrd Lansdowne told me, "that we are all ready."3

Later that week Lord Lansdowne wrote a careful letter in response to a note from Paul Cambon, making certain that his remarks had not been misinterpreted. In this he gives his own version of the talk, concluding with: "I do not know that this account differs from the one you gave to M. Delcassé, but I want to make sure that you understand that there must be full and confidential discussion between the two governments first."4

Their future actions show that Cambon and Delcassé interpreted Lansdowne's words according to their own desires, even after this cautious letter. On May 25th, Cambon wrote to Delcassé saying that the entente could in fact amount to an alliance.5 And Delcassé made his last stand in the Cabinet by quoting this alliance as a defense for his actions.

3 British Documents, vol. III, doc. no. 94.
4 Ibid., doc. no. 96.
5 Documents diplomatique francais, Second Series, vol. VI, doc. no. 399.
While statesmen in Paris, Berlin, and London were making up their minds about what stand to take on Morocco, Sultan Abdul Aziz came to a decision. Near the end of May, 1905, the Sultan rejected the French demands and adopted the German private suggestion of inviting the powers to an international conference.  

None of the powers answered this invitation immediately. Even the German government waited a while, in order to see what France and Britain would do.

Foreign Minister Lansdowne assured Delcassé that the British government would follow the French in whatever decision they wanted to make. This, of course, meant declining the invitation. The two governments, however, waited two weeks before they declared their decision. Finally, on June 5th, first the British and then the Germans made their announcements concerning the Sultan's invitation.

On that day Lord Lansdowne telegraphed this message to the Consulate at Tangier:

Inform Moorish government that proposal to invoke assistance of all the governments having representatives at Tangier to take part in a discussion of reforms ... is, in our opinion, wholly undeserving of encouragement. Such a discussion would involve participation of a large number of Powers, many of whom have no interest worth speaking of in Morocco affairs.

6 Documents diplomatique francais, Second Series, vol. VI, doc. no. 429.
Chancellor von Bülow sent a note to all the signatory powers of the Madrid Convention, stating that the Imperial government believed that a conference such as the Sultan had proposed offered the best means to introduce reforms, and for that reason it had accepted the Sultan's invitation. 8

In his memoirs von Bülow writes his reasons for sending this note. He thought this to be the best way to secure the commercial interests of Germany, as well as of other nations, against the danger of Delcassé's tunisification of the country. He thought that he would have the support of most of the powers in such a conference. Theodore Roosevelt would favor it, as he favored all "open doors." Bülow hoped that Roosevelt would have good effect upon British policy, and that he would strengthen the pro-German influence of the London Times correspondent in Tangier. 9 France would be left a minority, and she would have a colonial agreement replaced by an international settlement. 10

On that same day in June, 1905, when Britain and Germany sent off their decisions regarding the Conference, Prime Minister Rouvier announced that France must choose between Delcassé and himself. He feared that his Foreign Minister was leading France directly to war with Germany.

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8 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XX, doc. no. 6541.
9 The correspondent was the influential W. B. Harris. Ibid., doc. no. 6558.
10 Ibid., doc. no. 6559.
For some time Prime Minister Rouvier had been worried about Delcassé's opposition to Germany. He had made a point of letting the Germans know that he did not share his Foreign Minister's views. On April 26th Prime Minister Rouvier dined with Prince Radolin and he told the Ambassador that under no circumstances did he want to see trouble between Germany and France. He said that most Frenchmen inclined more towards the German than towards the British side. France and Germany must stand together to preserve the peace of the world. So long as he was the head of the state, this would be his purpose. He guaranteed the status quo in Morocco, with no limitation to the commerce of other nations. By the end of the evening, Ambassador Radolin had the idea that Rouvier would sacrifice Delcassé if Germany felt that the Foreign Minister was dangerous to German interests.

Radolin immediately reported this talk and his impressions to Chancellor von Bülow. The German Chancellor needed no more. He started to work towards Delcassé's dismissal. Von Bülow considered Delcassé to be a man most dangerous to German prosperity. In his official correspondence he speaks about the number of times that Delcassé had lied and misrepresented in order to advance France over Germany.

The German Chancellor made it plain to Prime Minister

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11 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XX, doc. no. 6241. Also, Affaires du Maroc, 1901-04, doc. no. 381.
12 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XX, doc. no. 6281.
Rouvier, by means of the German Ambassador and official correspondence, that the French Foreign Minister was hateful to Germany. During this time, Foreign Minister Delcassé persisted in his attitude towards the Germans. He told his Prime Minister that he did not believe in conceding anything to the Germans in Morocco.13 Prime Minister Rouvier became more convinced daily that this was not the right attitude to take. He knew that his country was not prepared for war. Since Delcassé would not change his opinion, Prime Minister Rouvier decided that he must change his Minister.

So, on June 5th, 1905, Prime Minister Rouvier went to see President Loubet. He told the President that he was opposed to his Foreign Minister’s policy regarding Morocco and Germany. The Prime Minister told his President that he planned a Cabinet meeting on the next day where his colleagues would have to choose between him and Delcassé.14

In that Cabinet meeting both the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister stated their opposing points of view. Delcassé spoke first. He stated his opinion that France should refuse to accept the proposal for a conference. He said that Germany was bluffing, and that a conference was useless. He maintained that Lord Lansdowne had offered France a British alliance, and that, with this support,  

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French policy could be aggressive without fear. 15

Prime Minister Rouvier spoke after him, maintaining in the following words that Germany was not bluffing:

Germany is disturbed and humiliated by your encirclement of her. In our Morocco dispute she sees an excellent occasion to break the ring, and she is preparing for extremities. Besides, she knows that England has offered us a military and naval alliance . . . a few days ago Bulow sent a friend of his to tell me that if we accept the proposal of the British government, Germany will declare war . . . Are we in a condition to sustain a war against Germany? No. Even with the aid of the British Fleet, we shall be in for a worse catastrophe than in 1870. We should be criminals to indulge in such an adventure. France would never recover. 16

At the end of the session, all of the Ministers sided with the Prime Minister. M. Delcassé had to resign. In the opinion of the Cabinet, he had sinned against the cardinal principle that diplomacy should not outpace military preparation. The Prime Minister himself, therefore, took over the foreign affairs portfolio.

The day after the fall of Delcassé, Kaiser William II arrived early in the morning at von Bülow's house in Berlin. The German Chancellor was still in bed. William II awakened him with the announcement that his Chancellor was now Prince Bernhard von Bülow. 17

This was von Bülow's reward for destroying one of the

15 Ibid., doc. no. 597.
sources of danger to his country. When von Bülow wrote later about his actions at this time, he said:

It was not the magnitude of our commercial and political interests in Morocco that decided me to advise the Kaiser to resist—but the conviction that in the interests of peace, we could no longer swallow such provocations. I desired war with France as little at that time as before or after... But I did not hesitate to confront her with the issue of war because I trusted to my skill and strength to prevent it, while at the same time to overthrow Delcassé, and to frustrate the aggressive phase of French policy.18

The German troubles, however, were far from over with the fall of Delcassé. In fact, the German tactics, in attempting to handle the internal affairs of a neighboring country, made her future work more difficult than ever. Three days after taking over the Foreign Ministry, Rouvier begged the German government not to press for a conference which would humiliate France. The humiliation, replied von Bülow, was on the side of Germany which could not now throw over its promise to the Sultan.19

The Prime Minister then suggested a preliminary program in advance. When the German Foreign Office agreed to this, Rouvier seemed to change his mind. This produced a stalemate that lasted for two weeks. Some progress was made at the end of June when Rouvier sent a despatch to Ambassador Radolin. In this he pointed out the position of France, his intention of maintaining the independence of the Sultan, and the crying

19 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XX, doc. no. 5910.
need for reforms. As to a conference, Rouvier insisted that it would be dangerous if not preceded by an agreement, and useless if it followed one. This time he did not, however, absolutely refuse a conference. Nevertheless, he wished to know precisely what the Germans wanted. 20

At this time President Theodore Roosevelt sent notes to both Prime Minister Rouvier and to Chancellor von Bülow. Roosevelt's friendship for the German Ambassador, Baron Speck von Sternberg, influenced him to do his best to stop the German-French stalemate over Morocco. Roosevelt's notes urged the French to accept the conference and urged the Germans to be considerate.

This opinion probably had some influence. In any case, on July 8th, 1905, the French and German governments accepted the principle of an international conference on the following basis: sovereignty and independence of the Sultan, economic liberty without any inequality, and need of both financial and military reform. 21

The next step was to formulate a program for the conference. For this purpose Chancellor von Bülow ordered Dr. Rosen, German Minister at Tangier, to go to Paris to arrange the details. There Dr. Rosen, with the French Foreign Office, arranged a program for the conference. This program,

20 Documents diplomatique français, Second Series, vol. VI, doc. no. 591.
21 Ibid., doc. no. 599.
signed September 28th, 1905, outlined the procedure for the conference, and determined that it should take place at Algiers in Spain on the coming January. The main discussions of the conference were to determine the following subjects:

1. Organization of the police.

2. Regulation for the suppression of contraband.

3. Financial reforms, especially the forming of a State Bank.22


The French government was anxious to know whether the new Liberal government would sustain the assurances of Lord Lansdowne, or whether it might go even further. On January 10, 1906, Ambassador Paul Cambon asked Foreign Minister Grey whether the British government "would be prepared to render France armed assistance" in case of German aggression, and whether it would sanction the continuance of the naval and military conversations that had been going on for some months.23

Sir Edward Grey stated his personal opinion that if France were attacked by Germany in consequence of the Moroccan

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22 G. H. Stuart, French Foreign Policy, p. 197.
agreement, public opinion in England would be strongly moved in favor of France. 24

When Sir Edward Grey retu
from a few days' vacation, he found Paul Cambon anxiously waiting for a more definite statement as to whether France could count upon British assistance. After talking with Haldane, the Minister of War, and with the Prime Minister, Sir Edward Grey was able to give Cambon this answer:

A good deal of progress has been made. Our military and naval authorities have been in communication with the French, and I assume that all preparations are ready, so that if a crisis arises, no time will be lost for want of a formal engagement . . . I have taken an opportunity of expressing to Count Metternich my personal opinion . . . that, as in the event of an attack upon France by Germany arising out of our Moroccan agreement, public feeling in England would be so strong that no British government could remain neutral. 25

British diplomatic support in the following months left the French with no doubts about British friendship. The first positive evidence of this came during the Algeciras Conference.

The Conference of Algeciras, called by Winston Churchill a milestone on the road to Armageddon, convened on January 16, 1906. Representatives of all the thirteen signatory powers of the conference of Madrid, except Norway, came. Russia, not represented at the first conference, sent

25 Ibid., doc. no. 250.
representatives to this. Most powers sent two delegates. France sent Paul Revoil and Eugene Regnault. Germany sent Herr von Radowitz and Count von Tattenbach. Great Britain sent only Sir Arthur Nicolson, her able Ambassador to Spain.

At the first meeting the delegates unanimously chose the Spanish delegate, the Duke d'Almodovar, to be President of the Conference. As a precautionary measure, they decided to discuss the less important projects first. So from January 16 to February 20th the delegates debated peacefully upon the questions of contraband of arms and reforms in imposts and customs duties.

At the end of the first week of the Conference, German delegate Radowitz was able to make this cheerful report: "So far it is clear that our endeavor to win the confidence of all the powers who stand for equal rights and the preservation of common interests in Morocco, has proved a success." 26

This optimistic mood did not last. On February 20th the delegates started discussing the finances of Morocco. They all felt that some form of state bank was necessary. The type of bank this was to be, however, started violent controversy. The Germans produced a project that provided for an administrative council of twenty-six members, chosen by the thirteen members of the conference. This project also provided that the signatory powers divide the capital of the

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26 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XX, doc. no. 6631.
bank equally among themselves. The State Bank was to receive all the revenues of the Empire, including the customs duties that had already been guaranteed to the French loan.

The French delegates submitted a project that gave the French most of the control. Their plan called for a State Bank controlled by four Directors from the Banks of France, England, Spain and Germany. These four Directors were to divide the capital of the bank into fifteen equal parts, reserving thirteen portions for each of the signatory powers, and reserving two of these portions of capital for France in payment for her Moroccan loan made in 1904.  

The German delegates opposed this vigorously. They knew that this would give the French almost complete control over the State Bank, since the English and Spanish Directors would be sure to uphold French desires.

The delegates discussed the two proposals for two weeks. Then, against German protests, the delegates voted on the two proposals. The result was ten votes in favor of the French proposal, and three against it. Only the Austrian and Moroccan delegates went along with Radowitz in support of the German proposal.

This gave an indication to the German government of what would happen when they took up the next important

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27 Documents diplomatique, Protocoles et Comptes rendus de la Conference d'Algeciras, no. 3.
28 Documents diplomatique francais, no. 20, Annexe.
problem, that of the Moroccan police. On March 6th the delegates started discussing this. Chancellor von Bülow and the Foreign Office official, Friedrich Holstein, were determined at the beginning that the French should not have the main control of the police. They said that control of the police meant control of Morocco.29

The discussion started with M. Bacheracht, the Russian delegate, pointing out how well equipped the French and Spanish were to control the police. They both had many under-officers of the Mohammedan faith who knew how to handle the natives.30

The French delegate, Revoil, then outlined the French plan, which described the Russian suggestion in greater detail. Revoil said that for the eight treaty ports hardly more than 2,000 to 2,500 policemen, under the direction of about 16 officers, would be necessary. These officers should be French and Spanish, but that the Sultan should be consulted in their appointment.31

The German delegates contended that the police organization should be the Sultan's affair alone. Or if that could not be allowed, at least an international group should control it.32

For a while the Germans blocked the French proposal

29 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XX, doc. nos. 6649-6650.
30 A. Tardieu, La Conferéance d'Algeciras, p. 237.
31 Ibid., p. 259.
32 Ibid., p. 261.
of entrusting the police to French and Spanish officers. But in doing this, Herr von Radowitz made such a determined stand that even his friends at the conference thought his position to be too uncompromising. The Italian delegates in particular did not like von Radowitz's action. That was not too strange, however, since their main delegate, Visconti-Venosta, from the very beginning, had acted more like a neutral than as a representative of a state in the Triple Alliance. What was more important was that the Austrians left the Germans to stand alone on this issue. Francis Joseph expressed the Austrian attitude to the German Ambassador. On March 10th he said that he was for backing down on the police question. "A vote on the police," the Emperor said, "would find Britain, Spain, and Russia, and probably the United States, on the side of France, with Italy folding her arms. This grouping is to be avoided."33

It was not avoided. The Austrians, however, did their best to save the German position. On March 18th, Count Welsersheimb, the Austrian delegate, proposed a compromise solution of seven parts: (1) the Sultan to have supreme command of the police troops; (2) the Sultan to place French officers in charge of the organization of the police troops at Tangier, Saffi, Rabat, and Telanan; (3) the Sultan to place Spanish troops in charge of the police at Mogador,

33 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XX, doc. no. 6755.
Larache, and Mazagan; (4) the Sultan to name an officer of superior rank to be in charge of the police at Casablanca, and, at the same time, to function as Inspector-General of all the police troops; (5) the police to be Moroccan, and the Inspector-General to be Swiss, Belgian or Dutch; (6) the pay to come from the State Bank; and (7) the Inspector-General to give an account of his work to the diplomatic corps at Tangier. 34

The leading clerk in the German Foreign Office, Friedrich Holstein, refused to consider the Austrian compromise. But Chancellor von Bülow, by this time fearing war more than he feared the sinister influence of Holstein, finally had the courage to ignore and then dismiss the mystery man who had dominated the German Foreign Office for several years. Holstein, who frequently took charge of matters in the Foreign Office without the knowledge of his superiors, would never accept a position of greater responsibility than that of Vortragender Rat, or speaking counsellor. He is too controversial a figure to be more than mentioned here. He is known to have had great influence over Chancellor von Bülow, probably because of some blackmailing material he had in his private cabinet. 35 Von Bülow had his last interview with him

34 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XX, doc. no. 6756.
35 Baron Holstein did not send in his resignation until April 4th, 1906. But he writes in his memoirs that he had his last interview with the Chancellor on February 26th, and that he ceased to have anything to do after March 12th.
early in March, 1906.

With complete control of the Foreign Office by the 12th of March, Chancellor von Bülow instructed Radowitz to accept the Austrian compromise. By the end of March the French and German delegates reached an agreement on the police.

The German government had to concede more for this than did the French. The final agreement accepted the Austrian compromise with this amendment: French and Spanish police officers, and not a Swiss Inspector-General, were to take charge of the Casablanca police. The Inspector-General was to supervise the police in the eight treaty ports, but his authority was limited to supervising and to reporting to the Tangier Diplomatic Corps. 36

Settling the police question brought the conference to a close, except for the execution of formalities. The final session took place on April 7, 1906, with the signing of the General Act.

The General Act of the International Conference consisted of 123 articles divided into seven sections, covering the organization of the police, regulations for the suppression of the illicit trade in arms, the State Bank, the establishment of a better system of taxes and revenue, and the regulation of customs. 37

37 Affaires du Maroc, 1905-06, doc. nos. 89-90.
When it was all over, von Bülow and the Kaiser tried to view their diplomatic isolation with as calm a countenance as they could. An Imperial telegram gave Austria, "the brilliant second," a pat on the back. But German officials knew that they had suffered a great humiliation. The Germans had the right, based upon a previous conference, to insist upon the internationalization of Morocco. But as they came to the means of effecting this in the conference, they found themselves isolated and outvoted.

The French, British, and Russian delegates worked together openly. The delegates from states that had few interests in Morocco sided with France. And the Italian delegate, Visconti-Venosta, just watched the proceedings and voted with France also, although his country had been a member of Germany's Triple Alliance since 1882.

On April 5th, 1906, von Bülow defended his Moroccan policy before the Reichstag:

Was it our duty or our desire to fight about Morocco? No, gentlemen, not about Morocco. We have there no direct political interests or aspirations . . . But we have economic interests in an independent, rich and undeveloped land . . . Our aim was to show that Germany could not be treated as a negligible quantity; that the basis of an international treaty could not be shifted without the consent of all the signatories, than in an economic area, independent and of great importance, the door must be kept open for foreign competition . . .

He ended his speech by saying that he had upheld the

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\text{38 Bülow, } \textit{Memoirs}, \text{ vol. II, p. 303.}
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principle of the open door and that he had upheld German prestige. At the end of the talk, Prince von Bülow fainted, and had to be carried from the Reichstag chamber.

Reports in Die Grosse Politik show that von Bülow felt the diplomatic isolation suffered at Algeciras to be a great blow to German pride. He told his ministers in his official correspondence that Germany had taken a beating, but he ordered them to make the best of the situation by not admitting it.

Typical of the attitude of the German diplomats are the concluding words of a telegram to the Foreign Office from Ambassador Baron Spech von Sternburg:

Yesterday I found President Roosevelt in very high spirits. He said: Inform His Majesty the Emperor of my heartiest congratulations on this epoch-making political success at Algeciras... The Emperor has done all he wished to do at the conference and the world must be deeply grateful to him for it. Tell His Majesty that I shall forward to him through you my congratulations in writing.

Baron von Sternburg rounds off his message with these words: "Even though the foregoing does not appear to agree with the facts, I am convinced that the words from the President came entirely from the heart." 40

Other German statesmen also realized that the facts did not agree with Theodore Roosevelt's jovial enthusiasm. The German feeling that their country was being encircled had

40 Ibid., doc. no. 7141.
prompted von Bülow to insist upon the conference. The German isolation during this conference increased this feeling more than ever. German diplomats started to draw closer to the Austrians, their only friends at the conference. This allied friendship grew into a bond that made the Germans in 1914 support the Austrians in actions of which the Germans did not entirely approve. The political alignments of Europe were definitely divided into the French-British Entente and the German-Austrian Alliance at the time of this conference. After taking even more definite shape during times of subsequent international tension in Morocco and in the Balkans, these two alignments stood threateningly face to face in 1914.
A period of calm followed the strain of the Algeciras Conference. The French relaxed their forward policy for a while. The technical restrictions of the Act of Algeciras had something to do with this. But a more important cause for the change in the French attitude towards Morocco came from a marked anti-colonial feeling in France.\(^1\)

Auguste Jaurès, the Socialist leader in the Chamber of Deputies, had much to do with this swing towards moderation in the French foreign policy. In 1905 Jaurès was able to unite all the socialist groups in the Chamber into one working unit. This influential group in the government opposed colonial expansion, and they undoubtedly had some effect upon whatever aggressive tendencies that the Foreign Office might have had.\(^2\)

The French government took such an anti-colonial attitude, indeed, that months passed before it carried out the Moroccan police and banking provisions, for which its diplomats at Algeciras had fought so hard. Because the French, together with the Spanish who had to follow the lead of the

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1 André Tardieu, *Le Mystère d'Agadir*, p. 19.
more powerful state, took so long in supplying the officers, and because they were so casual in recruiting an adequate number of native policemen, the European interests in the eight treaty ports were not sufficiently protected. This lack of police protection allowed a series of incidents to happen, which distressed the civilian population, and which tried the patience of the French, and, incidentally, of the German officials as well.

The first of these incidents took place in May, 1906. A native assassinated a Frenchman at Tangier. The Sultan did not give the French Legation the apology or the indemnity it demanded. To get this satisfaction as quickly as possible, the French sent a flotilla to Tangier, where it stayed for several weeks.4

Later that year, in August, the bandit Raisouli became Caid, or Governor, of the area just outside of Tangier, where he exploited the natives by demanding special tribute. Raisouli's strong-armed methods, under the protection of the civil authority, so intimidated the native traders and shopkeepers in the Tangier area that foreign business suffered. Scores of foreign business companies complained to the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier, begging them to see that the native tradesmen got more protection.5

3 W. B. Harris, The Times, Nov. 11, 1906.  
4 Affaires du Maroc, 1906-1907, doc. nos. 9, 11, 16.  
5 Ibid., doc. nos. 103, 114, 134, 154.
Just at this time in France (October, 1906) Georges Clemenceau took the place of M. Sarrien as Prime Minister. Clemenceau appointed Stephen Pichon to be Foreign Minister. In his first address to the Chamber, Stephen Pichon informed the country that the Foreign Office stood for calm and peaceful penetration into Morocco along the lines indicated in the Algeciras Conference, but he insisted that the moment demanded more action, such as a naval demonstration, to bring order back to Tangier. He closed his talk with these words:

Since the Act of Algeciras has intervened it has regulated from the international point of view, the respective status of all the Powers in Morocco. It is by virtue of this Act that we consider ourselves obliged today to take the measures I have just indicated to you. It is absolutely impossible for us to leave the lives of our citizens at the mercy of the outlaws who threaten to become masters of the city of Tangier. It is impossible for us to allow another Power the opportunity of profiting by these circumstances, by substituting itself for us in the defense and safeguard of French citizens.6

Early in December, 1906, the French and Spanish sent warships to Tangier. This demonstration of force, plus strong words from the Sultan, led to the native administration's supplying sufficient native policemen to drive Rai-souli out of Tangier and back into the Er-Rif,7 where his

bandit methods could disturb only mountaineers. 8

Although the French knew that they had not organized the police system even up to the strength outlined in the Act of Algeciras, the Foreign Office was sufficiently slow in remedying this to allow two more incidents to occur.

In March 1907, natives killed Dr. Mauchamp, a well-liked Frenchman in charge of the French dispensary at Marrakech. The Governor of Marrakech made no attempt to arrest the guilty. And once more Sultan Abdul Aziz was dilatory in making formal apologies and in paying indemnities. The French, therefore, sent in troops from Algeria to occupy and to keep the frontier city of Oujda. 9

Then in July and August, 1907, the most serious of these minor incidents occurred. On July 30th a mob of natives in Casablanca attacked some European laborers who were constructing a railroad that came too close to a native cemetery. The natives killed nine Europeans, three of whom were French. 10

When the French Foreign Office heard of this, it decided to send a strong naval and military force to occupy the city.

8 Besides disturbing mountaineers, however, Raisouli was able to annoy a Sir Harry MacLean and the British Government. In 1907, Sir Harry MacLean, a British subject who had great influence with Sultan Abdul Aziz, had gone into the Er-Rif Mountains to confer with Raisouli. The British Government had to pay $100,000 ransom to Raisouli to obtain MacLean's release late in 1907.


10 British Documents, vol. VII, doc. no. 78.
The French warship Galilee arrived on August 2nd at Casablanca, with instructions from Tangier to wait until more ships joined her, but in the meanwhile to take whatever action the Captain considered best. The Captain allowed his emotions to lead him to premature action. He sent ashore a small landing party, at a time when such a token force would be inadequate. The natives at Casablanca had quieted down after their initial excitement. But the arrival of armed Frenchmen provoked a fight near the gates. To make the French retreat easier, the Galilee bombarded the city. It continued bombarding the city long after the landing party returned. During the disorder and suffering that followed, local tribesmen came in and pillaged the stores that remained standing.  

On August 7th, French and Spanish troops arrived. They had to take the city by force. Before the occupying forces restored order to Casablanca and its environs, they had killed several thousand natives.  

The French had to keep on increasing the size of this occupying force, bringing it up to a total of 15,000 men at the end of a year.  

The Consulates at Casablanca had evacuated the Europeans from the city immediately after the first disturbance. About a third of these evacuees were Germans. These civilians, of

13 Ibid. (The Spanish, also, sent in 600 men.)
course, resented the time and property they lost before they could return. Carl Ficke, a German merchant and newspaper correspondent at Casablanca, accused the French of purposely arousing the natives by a wanton disregard of their prejudices, thus creating a disturbance calling for military action.\(^\text{14}\) German newspapers gave considerable attention to the bombardment and to the occupation, and they blamed the French for the whole affair, since they had neglected to organize an effective police force in the city.\(^\text{15}\) German business people living in Morocco not only censured the French for bombarding a city, but charged them with a conscious effort to destroy German interests.\(^\text{16}\)

Notwithstanding the complaints of German nationals, the German government made no trouble over the bombardment and occupation. On August 6, 1907, Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador to Berlin, presented the official account of the Casablanca bombardment to the German Foreign Office, which received it with consideration. Foreign Minister Tschirschky told Jules Cambon that "France has all our sympathies in her work of chastisement in order to safeguard the interests and to guarantee the security of all the Europeans."\(^\text{17}\)

The Spanish Ambassador reported to his government that the German Foreign Office had accepted the Spanish explanation, but that

\[^{14}\text{British Documents, vol. VII, doc. no. 122.}\]
\[^{15}\text{Ibid., doc. no. 65.}\]
\[^{16}\text{Affaires du Maroc, 1906-1907, doc. no. 131.}\]
\[^{17}\text{Die Grosse Politik, vol. XXIV, doc. no. 8287.}\]
it had complained that the presence of French and Spanish troops in Moroccan ports was an "infringement of the Act of Algeciras which had contemplated the creation of a police force composed of Moors."18 Carrying out her friendly policy, Germany sent instructions to her officials in Morocco not to oppose the French and Spanish military action that had resulted from the Casablanca affair.19

At the end of the year, Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador to France, was instructed to ask the French two questions: how much compensation did the French intend to give them for the loss of German property in Casablanca, and how long did the French intend to occupy the city and the surrounding area?20 In the spring of 1908, Chancellor von Bülow followed this up by asking his Foreign Minister to consult with Jules Cambon in an effort to secure a definite statement of her plans from France.21

In discussing this, Foreign Minister Schoen22 said that Germany did not agree that France had exercised a European mandate, as Pichon had claimed, and he urged French withdrawal from the Casablanca area as soon as order had been fully restored.23

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18 *British Documents, vol. VII, doc. no. 78.*
19 *Die Grosse Politik, vol. XXIV, doc. no. 8224.*
20 *Affaires du Maroc, 1906-1907, doc. no. 241.*
21 *Die Grosse Politik, vol. XXIV, doc. no. 8327.*
22 William Schoen had taken over the Foreign portfolio from Tschirschky during the winter of 1907.
23 *Affaires du Maroc, 1906-1907, doc. no. 450.*
By this time, however, the internal affairs of Morocco made the problem even more complicated. Early in 1908, the question of continued French military occupation of the Casablanca area became involved with a contest for the throne of the Sultan.

Abdul Aziz's continued subservience to the French made many of his subjects disloyal to him. Some of these discontented natives got together, and on August 16th, 1907, they proclaimed the true Sultan to be Mulay Hafid, who was at that time Governor of the Marrakesh district in the south. Mulay Hafid, who was actually the elder half-brother of Abdul Aziz, had a sterner, more vigorous character than the Sultan's. He quickly took up the challenge. Mulay Hafid led a revolt that within a few weeks won the allegiance of most of the natives living in southern Morocco. During the winter of 1908, the French officials had to watch helplessly this mass changing of allegiance that threatened to bring civil war to the whole country. They did not attempt to interfere or to give more material support to Abdul Aziz, because they did not have adequate armed strength in Morocco, except in the area around Casablanca. Furthermore, they felt that more aid to the Sultan would weaken further the

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24 Affaires du Maroc, 1906-1907, doc. no. 413.
25 Native troops that followed Mulay Hafid's orders were fighting against the French army of occupation during the winter of 1907-08.
26 Affaires du Maroc, 1906-1907, doc. no. 415.
loyalty of his subjects. Meanwhile, the business people in Morocco, particularly the Germans, viewed the social unrest with increasing alarm.

Sultan Abdul Aziz made the French position even more difficult. On September 21, 1907, he moved from the capital, Fez, to go to Rabat, on the plea that he would be in a better position to bring the southern rebels back to their allegiance. On the other hand, the closeness of Rabat to the French military forces at Casablanca made an increasing number of natives consider him to be the helpless puppet of France.

Within a few weeks most of the tribes of the Blad Machzen had proclaimed their allegiance to Mulay Hafid, leaving Abdul Aziz in control of Rabat and Casablanca only. Early in January, 1908, the people of Fez proclaimed Mulay Hafid to be their Sultan. Mulay Hafid started moving north towards the capital city in an unopposed march that became a triumphant procession, and in June he took possession of Fez.

Abdul Aziz, recognized as Sultan by the natives of Rabat and Casablanca only, drew closer to French supervision, and he sought the advice and help of French Consul Regnault

27 W. B. Harris, The Times, December 11, 1907.
28 Ibid.
29 Affaires du Maroc, 1906-1907, doc. nos. 495, 496.
31 Ibid.
constantly. The French officials in Morocco did all they could to uphold Abdul Aziz, maintaining that he was the legal Sultan. Abdul Aziz, for his part, promised to do all that he could for the French, such as promising to pay a huge indemnity for the damage at Casablanca, if the French would help him with arms against his brother. The French could do no more than give him official support. In August, Foreign Minister Pichon weakened the official government position slightly by stating that France would continue to support Abdul Aziz until Mulay Hafid had proven his power before all the people.

It soon became apparent to observers that the French and German officials were taking opposing sides in the rivalry between the two Sultans. As early as August, 1908, the German Chargé d'affaires, Wangenheim, told his Foreign Office that the defeat of Abdul Aziz would mean a defeat for France, and he urged a policy of vigorous support of Mulay Hafid as a means of increasing German commercial prospects in Morocco. German business companies urged their consular offices to take more aggressive action, saying that the people really wanted Mulay Hafid, and that if the French

32 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XXIV, doc. no. 8355. During the autumn and winter of 1907, the Consul Regnault, 1st Consul of Tangier, spent most of his time at Rabat, where he could be close to the Sultan.
33 Ibid., doc. no. 8411, and Affaires du Maroc, 1908-1910, doc. no. 403.
34 W. B. Harris, The Times, July 28, 1908.
withdrew their protection from Abdul Aziz, the civil strife, so harmful to German business, would end. 36

In the spring of 1908, the French made a suggestion that met with German approval. They proposed another international agreement with all the signatory powers of Algeciras signing it. 37 The French and Spanish would work out a note under the supervision of the powers, sending this note to Mulay Hafid, showing him the conditions upon which the powers would recognize him as Sultan. This attempt to use international diplomatic action delayed the recognition of Mulay Hafid for several months. 38

As the summer months of 1908 passed, the German business people in Morocco became increasingly suspicious of French motives. They sent in an increasing number of letters to their consular offices, saying that the conditions caused by the rivalry hurt their trade, and that they believed that the French postponed recognition hoping that the unrest would give them a European mandate to take the country as a protectorate. 39

The German Ambassador to Spain, von Radowitz, let the French government know in forceful language that the stock of German patience was at an end, and that the Germans could no longer tolerate the interruption of their trade with the

36 Die Große Politik, vol. XXIV, doc. no. 8411.
37 Ibid., doc. no. 8340.
38 Affaires du Maroc, 1908-1910, doc. no. 419.
Moroccans.40

These reports from Morocco regarding the reduction of trade influenced Stemrich, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, to make the following suggestion: Germany should either recognize Mulay Hafid immediately, or, if that was inadvisable, Germany should send a consular official to Fez, "in order to apply himself to our interests there, which amount to several million marks, and at the same time to maintain such relations with Mulay Hafid that the expected French intrigue be stopped if possible."41

Other German officials took up the idea of sending a German consul to Fez. Wangenheim, Chargé d'affaires at Tangier, on August 27, 1908, recommended Dr. Vassel, former official at Fez.42 On August 28th, acting Foreign Minister Stemrich reported to Chancellor von Bülow that France was sending a messenger to Fez to begin independent negotiations, and he therefore urged haste in sending Dr. Vassel to Fez, saying that Vassel could easily reach there before the Frenchman, who was traveling on a mule.43

On the 29th of August, 1908, Chancellor von Bülow telegraphed the Foreign Office to send Dr. Vassel to Fez, with instructions for him to influence Mulay Hafid to give the

42 Ibid., doc. no. 8409.
43 Ibid., doc. no. 8414.
concessions for the new ports at Larache and Tangier to German companies. 44

French and English statesmen voiced their anger on learning about the arrival of a German Consul in Fez, a move that practically amounted to German recognition of Mulay Hafid. Sir Eyre Crowe's comment about this being: "A piece of sharp practice on the part of Germany; she wishes to be first in with Mulay Hafid," 45 did not go beyond the strictures uttered by other officials. Sir Edward Grey wrote:

I should say that Germany had already placed herself in the wrong; she ought not to have sent her Consul back to Fez without any consultation with the Powers interested, and she ought surely, before . . . recognizing the new Sultan, to have sounded the French and Spanish Governments. 46

Once more the German Foreign Office had gone too fast in Morocco. Even Austrian Foreign Minister Ashrenthal felt that his allied neighbor should have waited until a time when recognition would not be "determined by one Power, but determined by an agreement among the collective signatory powers of the Conference of Algeciras." 47

The French protested against this de facto recognition of Mulay Hafid directly to the German Foreign Office. 48 At the same time Foreign Minister Pichon said that this action

44 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XXIV, doc. no. 8415.
45 British Documents, vol. VI, doc. no. 95.
46 Ibid., doc. no. 96.
had changed the plans for official recognition. The latest French plan called for the French and Spanish working out concrete proposals with Mulay Hafid, and upon Mulay Hafid's promise to obey these proposals, to submit them to the signatory powers for final approval.⁴⁹

Less than two weeks after the arrival of Dr. Vassel in Fez, the French and Spanish officials obtained the consent of Mulay Hafid to their demands. On September 14, 1908, the French and Spanish governments presented their joint note to the signatory powers.⁵⁰

This agreement bound Mulay Hafid to the following provisions: (1) acceptance of all the articles of the Act of Algeciras; (2) acceptance of all other treaties concluded by his predecessors; (3) assumption of all the debts of Abdul Aziz; (4) the granting to France and Spain the right to supervise contraband trade; (5) the submission of the problem of the Casablanca bombardment to an international commission to decide the amount of damages to be paid.⁵¹

The thirteen states represented at the Algeciras Conference signed the note by November 12, 1908.⁵² Mulay Hafid, now undisputed Sultan, continued to rule under these terms until the French became political masters of Morocco in 1912.

⁴⁹ Affaires du Maroc, 1908-1910, doc. no. 430.
⁵² Ibid., doc. no. 114.
⁵³ Affaires du Maroc, 1908-1910, doc. no. 33.
Just before the powers accepted the note that made Mulay Hafid the legal Sultan, the French and German officials became involved in a serious disagreement over six Foreign Legion deserters. This created a situation that made the French and German statesmen almost as worried about a war as they had been during the Tangier crisis in 1905. This crisis, called the Casablanca Deserters Crisis, was the second of the three Moroccan crises that might have involved the European Powers in a colonial war. Only the sincere desire for peace on the part of both French and German leaders kept this from happening.

On September 25, 1908, German Consul Lüderitz sent the Consular Secretary Just to assist six Foreign Legion deserters to escape to a German ship anchored in the harbor of Casablanca. Lüderitz gave Secretary Just safe-conduct passes for the six men, only three of whom were German. When Secretary Just and the deserters were pushing off in a dingey to row out to the ship, the French harbor police saw them, overtook them, and forced the deserters to accompany them. A French officer threatened Secretary Just with a pistol when the consular official tried to prevent the arrest of the men.

This seemingly trivial affair had widespread implications.

53 Besides the three Germans, there was a Swiss, an Austrian, and a Russian Pole.
The solution to the dispute depended upon an interpretation of sovereign power. It became a question of whether the French had sovereign power over: (1) the soldiers in the French Foreign Legion; (2) the people within the treaty port of Casablanca.

The Germans contended that service in the French Foreign Legion did not deprive Germans of their national rights, and therefore the German Consul was acting within his authority in protecting German deserters.\textsuperscript{55} The Germans maintained, furthermore, that the French military occupation of the district around Casablanca did not give sovereign rights over German nationals to France. In any case, they said, the use of armed force against any consular agent with recognized diplomatic immunity, would be intolerable anywhere.

The French maintained that the German jurisdiction did not cover German subjects in a foreign army, and that desertion was considered always a crime punishable by the proper military authorities.\textsuperscript{56} Besides this, only three of the six deserters were German; what right had the Consul in helping a Swiss, an Austrian, and a Russian to escape from French authority?\textsuperscript{57}

Both governments seemed anxious at first to settle the matter, and each suggested solutions. On October 17, 1908,

\textsuperscript{55} Die Grosse Politik, vol. XIV, doc. nos. 8362-8364.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., doc. no. 8362.
\textsuperscript{57} British Documents, vol. VII, doc. no. 119.
Foreign Minister Schoen made a proposal that the French accepted. Schoen proposed that a board of arbitration review the international aspects of right and wrong involved in the dispute, that France express her regrets for the acts committed by her officers against the German prerogatives, and that Germany express her regrets for the Consul's giving safe-conduct passes to persons outside German jurisdiction. In accepting this the French Foreign Office interpreted it to mean that the question of apology was not to arise until after the decision of arbitration. After this disagreement delayed matters for a few days, German Foreign Minister Schoen created another difficulty by stating that the question of the German Consul's authority could not come into the arbitration discussion. Then, on October 30th, Chancellor von Bülow made the settlement even more involved by demanding the immediate release of the three German prisoners. The French Foreign Office replied that "It would be impossible for the French government to give the wished-for satisfaction... but that if the arbitration court declared France guilty..." then France would do what was demanded.

The French, therefore, were insisting that the incident should be considered as a whole, that no expression of regret

58 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XXIV, doc. no. 8381.
60 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XXIV, doc. no. 8383.
61 Ibid., doc. no. 8384.
for any part of it be made on either side, since this might prejudice the question when it was submitted to the arbitra-
tors. The Germans wanted apologies first, and secondly, the submission of the problem to the arbitrators.

Germany insisted upon her demands, and the French refused to yield. Once more the relations between the two countries became strained. The newspapers mentioned the in-
creasing possibilities of war. And Sir Edward Grey informed the British Foreign Office that "The Admiralty should be kept in readiness to make preparations in case Germany sent France an ultimatum and the Cabinet decided that we must assist France." German Foreign Minister Schoen showed his nervous-
ess in his correspondence; he said that he feared "that we might have to bring up the heavy artillery, and with the dis-
turbances in the diplomatic relations, we might have to threaten by sending ships to Casablanca."

In early November Kaiser William II told Foreign Minis-
ter Schoen that he must solve the Moroccan problem. The Kaiser was worried about the excitement caused by the recent annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He felt that Morocco was a small matter compared to the danger in the Balkans. William II wrote the following instructions:

63 The Times, October 24, 1908, giving quotations from sever-
al French and German newspapers.
64 British Documents, vol. VII, doc. no. 137.
In view of these circumstances this wretched Moroccan affair must be brought to a conclusion, quickly and definitely; there is nothing to be made of it, it will be French anyway. So let us get out of this affair with dignity, so that we may finally have done with this friction with France, now that great issues are at stake. 66

With definite orders that he must find some solution, Foreign Minister Schoen met with Ambassador Jules Cambon in almost daily conferences. The two men carried on negotiations until November 7th, when Schoen became ill. By this time, however, the two governments had reached a formula agreeable to both. 67

This is the note that the German and French governments signed on November 27, 1908: 68

The German and French Governments regret the events that took place at Casablanca on the 25th of September and which gave rise to the exercise of force and to the aggressive acts on the part of subordinate officials. They have decided to submit all the questions which have arisen in this connection to a court of arbitration. By mutual agreement each of the Governments bind themselves to express their regret at the conduct of these officials, according to the decisions that the arbiter shall give on the questions of fact and law.

They then signed a note fixing the rules of the arbitral procedure that stated that the tribunal should consist of

68 Signed by Kiderlen-Waechter and Jules Cambon. Kiderlen-Waechter, the acting Foreign Minister, disapproved of the way Schoen handled the negotiations, and he claimed the whole credit for the peaceful settlement — an opinion not shared by others. British Documents, vol. VII, doc. no. 144
five arbitrators chosen from the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague.

The Arbitration Court at the Hague handed down its decision on May 22, 1909. It decided in favor of France, but it rebuked both countries for exceeding their authority. 69

The opinion of the press seemed to favor the Hague verdict. The Times of London on May 24th had a complimentary editorial on the way in which the French and German governments had settled their differences, and it lauded the fairness

69 The text of the final decision:
Conflict between exclusive Consular jurisdiction established by the capitulations and exclusive military jurisdiction of an Army of Occupation should, in the present instance, be decided in favor of France, as Casablanca was at the time occupied by the French military forces. In view, however, of absence of universally accepted doctrine on the subject of concurrent Consular and military jurisdictions, German Consulate was not to blame for protecting deserters at their request. But Secretary to German Consulate committed a fault of manifest gravity in attempting the embarkation on a German steamer of deserters not of German nationality, and in making the Consul sign to that end a safe conduct for six instead of three persons. In signing the safe conduct Consul committed an unintentional fault. Further, under circumstances German Consulate had no right to grant protections even to deserters of German nationality, though error in so doing cannot be described as a fault either international or the reverse. On the other hand French military authorities should have confined action to preventing embarkation and have left deserters in custody of German Consulate pending decisions as to competing military and Consular jurisdictions. They should have respected, so far as possible, de facto protection exercised by German Consulate, which course would have contributed to maintaining prestige of Consular authority in Morocco. Threats made with aid of revolver and blows dealt at Moorish soldier attached to German Consulate, after he had ceased to resist were not justified. (This appears in British Documents, vol. VII, doc. no. 145.)
of the Hague decision. The editorial commented upon the favorable acceptance of the verdict by the majority of the German newspapers. 70 Le Temps declared that it was a decision acceptable to all, one "which had furnished an honorable solution to a dispute which, however trivial was its origin, had almost set Europe on fire." 71

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70 The Times, May 24, 1909.
71 G. H. Stuart, French Foreign Policy, p. 261.
CHAPTER IV

MINING CONCESSIONS

During the period following the Algeciras Conference, business people exported quantities of agricultural products and native manufactured goods. The main commercial struggle during this period, however, was over a natural product that does not appear on any export list of the time. This natural product was the iron that lies in the Er-Rif and Atlas Mountains. Even the French, with their special privileges, had been impeded from mining the iron because of the irregularities in the Moroccan custom of granting concessions. Several French companies finally received concessions to mine iron in the Er-Rif Mountains in 1905 - but then the Tangier crisis and the Algeciras Converence interrupted any mining they had intended. One of the problems that concerned the delegates of the Conference of Algeciras was the working out of a mining law that would force the Sultan to give concessions according to established European laws.

The mineral resources in Morocco have never been

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1 Chief exports in 1907, 1908, and 1909 (in order of value): (1) hides and skins, (2) wool, (3) oxen, (4) eggs, (5) slippers, (6) almonds, and (7) barley, Statesman's Yearbook, 1911.

2 Affaires du Maroc, 1906-1907, doc. no. 21.
extracted from the ground to any great extent. To this day the main wealth of Morocco is agricultural. But in the period just before the country became a French Protectorate, the European nationals, supported by their governments, worked hard to get at what they considered the chief economic good of the country - the iron, gold, copper, silver, lead, and antimony that lie in its mountains. After the Algeciras Conference the Germans were the chief competitors of the French in securing rights to mine these minerals. This rivalry continued until they settled their differences in the Accord of 1909.

John Bakeless, in his study of the causes of the World War, says this about the Morocco rivalry:

The Moroccan question, which repeatedly led Europe to the verge of war, was partly a result of the Franco-German conflict over iron. Moroccan exports are mainly agricultural; but the German iron-masters, facing a probable shortage of ore in the future ... coveted the mines, as yet unworked, known to exist in that country.

One group of Germans, in particular, made the competition to get mining concessions into a national struggle. In 1907 the six Mannesmann brothers founded the Marokko-

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3 The principal mineral exploited is phosphate, the output of which was 2,783,636 metric tons in 1946. Other important minerals are: anthracite (221,800 metric tons), iron ore (125,200 metric tons), manganese (55,200 metric tons), lead (15,300 metric tons). From the Statesman's Yearbook, 1948.

Mannesmann Compagnie, which within two years had fourteen establishments in various cities of Morocco. This company traded in most of the local products, but the chief concern of the Mannesmanns was the attempt to get a monopoly of the country's minerals. Their big chance came in 1908, when Mulay Hāfid was rising with sufficient power to challenge his half-brother as Sultan. The Mannesmanns planned to help the pretender as much as they could; then if he did become Morocco's Sultan, the Mannesmanns would reap their reward in concessions.

By the middle of 1908, it was the Marokko-Mannesmann Compagnie against all the other French and German companies combined. French and German companies had formed a syndicate early in 1907, called the Union of Mines, as the best means of exploiting the mineral resources of Morocco. These companies organized the syndicate according to a charter stating that the French companies should hold 60 per cent of the capital; the German, 20 per cent; the English, 10 per cent; the Spanish, 6 per cent; the Italian, 4 per cent; and the Portuguese, 2 per cent. All other German companies interested in obtaining mining concessions joined this syndicate — all, that is, except the Marokko-Mannesmann Compagnie.

5 The President and eight directors were to be French; the Vice President and two directors, German; and the other directors were to be an Englishman, a Spaniard, an Italian, and a Portuguese.
6 The chief German companies: Krupp, Gelsenkirchen and Thyssen.
During the summer of 1907, the Union of Mines sent a group of engineers into the Ex-Rif and Atlas Mountains to prospect for more iron and gold. Before the syndicate could start mining, however, it had to wait for the new mining law regulating concessions. The Conference of Algeciras had determined that the Sultan Abdul Aziz should issue concessions only in conformity with the European mining laws. The delegates of the Conference commissioned a group of experts to work on this mining law. During the period when the experts were working on it, the Sultan did not grant any concessions. Before the mining law was completed, however, Mulay Hafid's bid for power had forced Sultan Abdul Aziz to flee to Rabat - stopping all work on the mining law at the same time.

The Mannesmann brothers looked upon the Mulay Hafid rise to political power as an excellent opportunity to advance their interests. The Marokko-Mannesmann Compagnie sent agents south very soon after the natives of Marrakesh had proclaimed Mulay Hafid to be their Sultan. These agents went south to assist the cause of the pretender to the Sultan's position with ready money. During the few months when Mulay Hafid was winning the allegiance of the native population, the Marokko-Mannesmann Compagnie continued to

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7 Affaires du Maroc, 1906-1907, doc. no. 37.
8 Ibid., 1908-1909, doc. no. 21.
extend money to the man who was to be the next Sultan.10

The Mannesmanns' reward came in October, 1908. At that time Mulay Hafid, who was not officially recognized as Sultan until November, signed a concession, proposed by the Mannesmanns, giving them the right to mine most of the area in the Er-Rif and Atlas Mountains.11

At first the German officials in Morocco, particularly the Consul Rosen, favored the activities of the Mannesmanns. When Dr. Vassel went to Fez, before the official recognition of Mulay Hafid, he supported the interests of the Mannesmann brothers.12 By the beginning of 1909, however, the German Foreign Office started to withdraw its support from the Mannesmanns. On January 15, 1909, Dr. Rosen told W. B. Harris, the London Times correspondent, that two agents of the Mannesmanns had gone to Fez to make the final arrangements on their new mining concessions. He assured Harris, however, that this would not hurt the prospects of the international syndicate.13

The German Foreign Office at the end of January, 1909, instructed Dr. Vassel, the Consul in Fez, not to support the Mannesmann claim to the extensive mining concessions that had been given to them in October. A few days later Foreign Minister Schoen sent a letter to the Marokko-Mannesmann

10 The Times, August 21, 1908.
11 Affaires du Maroc, 1908-1909, doc. no. 22.
12 Andre Tardieu, Le Mystere d'Agadir, p. 43.
Compagnie, instructing it to come to terms with the Union of Mines. Schoen said that he had heard that the Krupps had offered the Mannesmanns one-fourth of the German share of the Union of Mines, and he urged the brothers to take the offer. The Mannesmanns refused to do this, continuing to make plans to take over the mining monopoly that Mulay had given to them.¹⁴

This period of stalemate between the Marokko-Mannesmann Compagnie and the Union of Mines might have continued for some time had not the French and German governments come to a commercial and political agreement over their Moroccan interests. Government officials in Paris and Berlin decided that they must have more peaceful conditions in Morocco. The home governments went over the heads of the bickering industrialists in Morocco, by arranging an agreement that brought comparative economic peace to Morocco for nearly two years. Because the French made many economic concessions to the Germans in this agreement, the German government put sufficient pressure upon the Marokko-Mannesmann Compagnie to keep it from causing trouble. Although the Mannesmann brothers refused to join the Union of Mines, they lost to the syndicate most of the mining concessions that Mulay Hafid had given to their company. The agreement that helped bring about more peaceful conditions was called the Franco-German

Accord of 1909.
CHAPTER V

THE FRANCO-GERMAN ACCORD OF 1909

Europeans and natives suffered commercial losses during the civil strife preceding the recognition of Sultan Mulay Hafid in November, 1908. Furthermore, men stopped working on such public works as the harbor improvements at Larache and Tangier, which caused considerable outcry, since the Sultan Abdul Aziz had given the concession to do this work to a German company. Uncertainty of travel, also, stopped most of the usually active trade with the interior.

During this period of decline in commerce, an increasing number of German officials realized that they must settle their differences with the French in Morocco. Only by doing this, they reasoned, could they help restore the political order necessary for any worthwhile exploitation of the resources of the country. French statesmen, also, began to realize that if their nation was to profit to the fullest from its diplomatic closeness to England and Spain, it must

1 Foreign trade declined from $12,423,350 in 1907 to $10,637,755 in 1908. The decline in domestic trade was much greater. From the Statesman's Yearbook, 1911.
3 W. B. Harris, The Times, January 19, 1909.
come to some sort of understanding with Germany about Morocco.  

Historians can now trace the steps that the diplomats took to come to a peaceful solution of the French and German differences. The German, French, and British official documents give a definite record of the way in which they accomplished this.

Efforts to come to some sort of economic adjustment started in 1907. One evening in August, 1907, the French and German Chargés d'affaires in Tangiers talked at length about the possibility of coming to an agreement on economic affairs in Morocco. They reported the purport of this discussion to their superiors. Chancellor von Bülow's comment on the margin of the report was, "what form should this agreement take?"  

Sir Edward Grey informed the French government on August 22, 1907, that von Bülow:

was most anxious for an improvement in the relations between France and Germany. He thought this could be effected by a display of tact on both sides, especially on the part of the local representatives of the two Powers. He was convinced that France had no intention of attacking Germany. And he gave most formal assurances that Germany had no intention of attacking France, nor of creating difficulties for her in Morocco. . . . All Prince von Bülow wanted was that German traders and merchants should not be unfairly treated by the French authorities, and should not be excluded from fair competition.

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5 Affaires du Maroc, 1908-1910, doc. no. 41.  
6 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XXIV, doc. no. 8280.  
The unrest in Morocco during the next few months delayed any attempt to transfer such feelings into any sort of action. "When the cannons speak in Morocco is a bad time for diplomacy," said Foreign Minister von Tschirschky.  

By September, 1908, however, Baron William von Schoen, who became Foreign Minister during the previous winter, felt that the time was opportune to press once more for some sort of economic agreement. Foreign Minister von Schoen told Ambassador Jules Cambon that:

Germany had no intention of creating difficulties for France, whose special interests we fully realize . . . . An understanding, mainly in the economic field, perhaps by insuring equality in the Morocco market, appears to me not too difficult.  

Jules Cambon made the next move. On October 28, 1908, he told Foreign Minister Schoen that the mutual interests of France and Germany in the Eastern question (this was after Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina) made it desirable for the two states to come to an understanding about Morocco.  

The French Minister of Finance, M. Caillaux, on December 14, 1908, told German Consul von Lancken:

It is absolutely essential that Morocco be removed as an eventual object of strife in our relations. If this does not happen, we move towards a conflict with certainty. For France it is a life question to maintain a far-reaching political position in Morocco. 

8 Die Grosse Politik, vol. XXIV, doc. no. 8292.  
9 Ibid., doc. no. 8439.  
10 Ibid., doc. no. 8463.  
11 Ibid., doc. no. 8471.
Consul Lancken told Caillaux that Germany only wanted the open door in Morocco, but that many feared that France would not even give her that. Caillaux then asked what guarantees Germany wanted. Lancken replied: "It would be the business of France to come forth with proposals." Caillaux said that he thought his government would be willing to do so.\textsuperscript{12}

Ten days later, Prince Radolin, German Ambassador to France, reviewed the Moroccan situation in a letter to Chancellor von Bülow, closing his letter with the suggestion for an agreement founded on the basis "that France guarantee us there the 'open door,' and for this we could leave them the greatest political freedom of action." To this Kaiser William II added the marginal comment: "Right, I have sounded that again and again."\textsuperscript{13}

Wangenheim, former German Consul at Tangier, wrote a report on January 5, 1909, that did much towards formulating the Foreign Office's ideas on this subject. He said that the conflict of interests between Germany and France in Morocco was bound to lead to a defeat for Germany. The French would dominate the new Sultan sooner or later, then the French Legation in Tangier would be the center of the Moroccan government. That would eliminate German influence and it would reduce German business. "At best, German

\textsuperscript{12} Die Grosse Politik, vol. XXIV, doc. no. 8471.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., doc. no. 8472.
merchants would be able to vegetate in Morocco only by the grace of France . . . " To eliminate this, Wangenheim said, Germany should spare no pains in coming to an agreement with France as soon as possible. He urged his government to allow France to go the limit in military and financial control. "In a Morocco administered by France the chances for the economic development of Germany doubtless would be infinitely greater than in the Morocco of today that stands bound by the all-paralyzing Algeciras Act . . . "

This report so impressed Baron William von Schoen that the Foreign Minister put his Chief Counsellor, Erkert, on the job to develop the project further. On January 8, 1909, Erkert wrote a long note on the subject. He started this note with this statement: "We must seek a new basis for our Morocco policy . . . " He suggested that Germany grant political power to France in return for guarantees to German trade. In addition, Erkert suggested that France should have greater control of finances through more control in the State Bank. He proposed that German companies do more work in Morocco through syndicates that would assure Germany equality of trade. The French companies in these syndicates would have the main share so long as they treated the German companies and investors fairly.

These two reports formed the basis for the negotiations.

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15 Ibid., doc. no. 8478.
that began on January 9, 1909, after Foreign Minister von Schoen reminded Ambassador Jules Cambon that none of the promised French proposals for economic cooperation had ever been presented. Baron von Schoen said that Germany was "ready now as ever to enter into an exchange of ideas." Cambon said that France wished to form an agreement, and he asked Schoen if he had anything in mind. Schoen said that a formula for French and German cooperation in financial matters that would give a considerable political predominance to France, would be easy to arrange. Cambon promised to take the matter up in Paris when he arrived there in a few days.\(^{16}\)

During the rest of the month, the French and German Foreign Offices exchanged proposals and counter-proposals.\(^{17}\)

The exact phraseology of the terms whereby Germany acknowledged the French political predominance in Morocco caused some difficulty.\(^{18}\) Foreign Minister Schoen, after several days' discussion, was able to change Cambon's expression, "The Imperial Government resolves not to oppose any political action of the French Republic," to a more acceptable wording, "The Imperial Government decides to pursue only economic interests in Morocco."\(^{19}\)

The negotiations carried on by the Foreign Offices of

\(^{16}\) _Die Grosse Politik_, vol. XXIV, doc. no. 8479.
\(^{17}\) _Affaires du Maroc, 1908-1910_, doc. nos. 98, 100.
\(^{18}\) _Ibid_. , doc. no. 100.
\(^{19}\) _Die Grosse Politik_, vol. XXIV, doc. no. 8485.
France and Germany came to a conclusion on February 7, 1909, and the next day the Foreign Ministers sent copies of the agreement to the other states in Europe.

Since the agreement, called the Franco-German Accord of 1909, formed the basis for the French and German relationship in Morocco for the next two years, it is important enough to quote here in its entirety:

The Government of the French Republic and the German Imperial Government, animated by an equal desire to facilitate the execution of the Act of Algeciras, have agreed in stating the import which they attach to the clauses, in view of avoiding all cause of misunderstanding between them in the future.

In consequence, The Government of the French Republic, firmly attached to maintaining the integrity and the independence of the Sherifian empire, resolved to safeguard there economic equality, and consequently, not to hinder German commercial and industrial interests there, and the Imperial German Government, pursuing only economic interests in Morocco, recognizing on the other hand that the special political interests of France are there closely tied to the consolidation of internal peace and order, and resolving not to interfere in these interests,

declare that they will not pursue nor encourage any measure of a nature to create in their favor or in favor of any power whatsoever an economic privilege and that they will seek to associate their nationals in the affairs for which they may obtain the contract.20

Public and official opinion in Germany, France, and England received enthusiastically the news of this agreement.21

21 Affaires du Maroc, 1908-1910, doc. nos. 121, 125, 126.
Andre Tardieu, the French statesman and author, said that French public opinion saw in the Accord the end of German political opposition. 22

The London Times reported that Clemenceau could not conceal his happiness over his opinion that the "Accord was no more nor less than Germany's withdrawal from Morocco and the end of the policy of pinpricks." 23

Graham Stuart, a historian who has studied this period carefully, writes in his book, French Foreign Policy, that "France accepted the arrangement at its face value, as an agreement which dissembled nothing, which implied no clandestine concession, and which on the part of Germany was the abandonment of her policy of chicanery and the inauguration of a policy of conciliation." 24

The governments were prompt in congratulating the men responsible for the Accord. The Kaiser telegraphed his expressions of satisfaction to Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador in Paris. The French government, on its part, gave the Grand Order of the Legion of Honor to Prince Radolin and to Baron von Schoen.

If France required further proof of the change in the German official attitude, Chancellor von Bülow gave this on January 8, 1909. Receiving Jules Cambon to discuss the

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22 Andre Tardieu, Le Mystère d'Agadir, p. 41.
23 The Times, February 10, 1909.
24 G. H. Stuart, French Foreign Policy, p. 265.
Accord, von Bülow said:

Now Morocco is a fruit that is ripening for you, and you are sure of picking it; we only ask one thing of you, that is to be patient and to have regard for German public opinion. 25

This friendly feeling on the part of the French and German governments did not last two years. But during the time it did last, French and German business prospered, and the French progressed in their desire to bring political order to Morocco. 26 The Accord of 1909 indicated a peaceful way by which the French could have taken over the political control of the country.

they did not wish to follow the pattern of the Accord of 1909. Later this led to more trouble between the two nations. 1909. Later this led to more trouble between the two nations. The scope of this thesis does not include, however, a study of these subsequent actions, which led to another Moroccan crisis.

The Accord of 1909 remains a testimonial of how the French and Germans could have proceeded in Morocco, if they had continued to wish a compromise solution to their quest for land and resources.

26 Affaires du Maroc, 1908-1910, doc. no. 251.
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