

A TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

by

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PREFACE

My purpose in this thesis has been to analyze the Sino-Soviet dispute in terms of the tactics required to achieve expansion of communism. I have not attempted a chronological examination of the Sino-Soviet conflict. I have tried to focus my attention upon the public statements of Chinese and Russian political leaders in an effort to determine what each considers the most desirable form of tactics. In addition, I have attempted to place this tactical dispute in historical perspective by briefly tracing the development of tactics from Marx through Stalin.

The primary source materials for this project are the statements of the six men whose positions are examined. In the cases of Premier Khrushchev and Chairman Mao Tse-tung, use has also been made of official government publications. Owing to the nature of the Chinese and Russian political systems, the views of Khrushchev and Mao are almost always the same as the official government position and vice versa. Variations between the two tend to be slight. In the analysis of tactical questions, therefore, I have considered a statement by one of these men and an official statement by his government to be representative of the same point of view.

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CHAPTER I

Communism is a body of doctrine which offers a comprehensive explanation of the nature and development of society. Marx borrowed the theoretical foundations of this doctrinal system from Hegel with the idea that society is made up of a thesis and its antithesis. The conflict between the two leads to a synthesis. This synthesis is in itself a thesis and is opposed by its antithesis. This process is the dialectic. Marx accepted the dialectical process, but substituted economic classes for the idealist conception of truth and reality. Employing the dialectical process, Marx advanced an idea of the nature of social development. This development, he claimed, would ultimately lead to a social condition of communism.

Marx addressed himself to an economic analysis demonstrating how the capitalist system would break up through natural development. This breakup would be the result of a conflict between two factors of production characteristic of capitalism. The thesis and antithesis in this conflict are the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The synthesis would be socialist revolution. Although Marx claimed to offer a scientific analysis of capitalism indicating the path developments would inevitably take, he did not confine himself to simple description. His efforts on behalf of the working class in the formation of the Communist International indicates an attachment of superior moral quality to the proletariat.

The followers of Marx have been faced with a serious problem. Marx's dialectical analysis of the capitalist system has proven less than accurate. Collapse of the system has not occurred as Marx predicted. Communists must, therefore, justify their existence on the basis of their superior moral position, not upon the claim to be speeding up the inevitable. Their problem becomes one of tactics necessary to implement this moral claim. If communism is desirable, then how is it to be achieved? Various opposing answers to this question have been offered. The current manifestation of such opposing answers is the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Disagreement over the question of how communism is to be achieved has been represented historically by two opposing lines of thought. On the one hand is the idea as demonstrated by Marx, that the capitalist system will break down, resulting in socialist revolution and eventually communism. Very little in the way of conscious and purposeful human effort is required to bring about this revolution and the transition to communism. Human effort may be expected merely to facilitate developments which will occur naturally. Many communists since Marx may be classified within this general category. Among the most important of these have been Stalin and Khrushchev.

In contradistinction to this group there has been a body of equally illustrious communists who have maintained that in order to achieve socialist revolution and communism there must be a very pronounced and purposeful action on the part of human beings. These communists have contended that if events are allowed to develop naturally, the advent of communism will be delayed, if not completely halted.

They argue that a revolutionary system must be created, that it will not come about in the course of natural development. Among those who are identified with this line of thinking are Lenin, Trotsky, and Mao Tse-tung.

The Sino-Soviet dispute is a continuation of a tactical quarrel that has existed within communism since its inception. The problem exists within the writings of Marx himself. If communism is inevitable, as Marx claims, then why did he devote his life to working for the communist cause? Subsequent writers have merely refined and extended this tactical dilemma. Prior to the Sino-Soviet dispute the conflict over tactics was between various individuals--Stalin and Trotsky, for example. With the Sino-Soviet dispute the conflict has been raised to the level of two independent states. The dispute over tactics has been resolved previously by one individual dominating the other. With the Sino-Soviet dispute resolution has become extremely difficult.

The Sino-Soviet conflict, of course, involves more than a theoretical dispute over the nature and requirements of communist doctrine. Some writers contend that the dispute is simply economic, that it is merely a question of the Russian desire to dominate the Chinese economy conflicting with the Chinese desire for independent development. Others contend that the dispute is merely a result of conflicting imperialist ambitions of two nationalistic powers. Still others contend that the dispute is merely the personality clash between Mao and Khrushchev. A similar contention is that the clash is the product of two different

cultures coming into conflict as a result of natural historical development.¹

These factors are relevant to any consideration of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Overriding importance, however, should not be attached to any one of them as causal factors. When taken in combination they may accurately explain the foundations and the nature of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Any discussion of a communist system, nevertheless, must at some point consider communist doctrine. Communist countries operate completely within this doctrinal framework. It would be inaccurate to say that every action on the part of a communist in history has been predetermined by his commitment to communist doctrine. It would be equally inaccurate to say that communist doctrine has in no way influenced action. It would be accurate, however, to say that the actions of communists have been limited and predetermined to a very large extent by their commitment to communist doctrine. Marxism-Leninism is the conceptual framework to which all facets of communist activity must be related.²

Some writers contend that it is foolish to believe anything communists say. The doctrinal pronouncements by communist governments are

¹ Cyrus H. Peake, "The Road Back to Mainland China," The New Republic (August 17, 1963), pp. 10-11; Daniel Tretiak, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Latin America," Problems of Communism XII (January-February, 1963), pp. 26-32; Richard Hughes, "The Duel of Communism's Big Two," The New York Times Magazine, April 1, 1962, p. 116ff.; Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, trans. Leila Vennawitz (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963), pp. 3-98.

² Karl Wittfogel, "The Operational Ideas of the Communist Doctrine," Problems of Communism X (September-October, 1961), p. 31.

in no way related to their intentions or their actions; that, in fact, these statements are simply efforts to confuse the enemies of communism. The plausibility of such an assumption is doubtful. How could the communists expect to hoodwink the whole world? Think of the effect such an attempt would have on the population of communist countries. It would be impossible for communist governments to communicate with one another through open media (it is impossible to do everything secretly) or with their own people. An examination of communist statements of the past will indicate, I think, a large degree of conformity with actual performance.

Communist doctrine provides both advantages and disadvantages for the student. By way of advantages, communist doctrine requires an explicit statement of the nature of reality, the particular goals that communism seeks to achieve, and the manner in which these goals are to be achieved. Thus, it is possible to scrutinize with some accuracy what communists do, why they do it, and what they might be expected to do in the future. The disadvantages are obvious. Communists do not always conform to doctrinal requirements. Situations arise which are not provided for in the doctrine. Communists are continually modifying their doctrine to fit situations. But be this as it may, on a day-to-day basis communist doctrine is a blueprint for action.

CHAPTER II

KARL MARX

The Dialectic and Capitalist Economy. The ideas of Karl Marx possess significance which extend far beyond a mere analysis of the capitalist economic system. These ideas pertain to the nature, purpose, and development of society. Marx argued that all history is the history of class struggle, and that the character of this struggle is determined by economic conditions. In the capitalist system these conditions are: concentration of capital in fewer and fewer hands, recurrent and increasingly severe economic crises, and the progressive impoverishment of the proletariat.

The binding principle, the principle which gives Marxism its great significance, is the notion of the dialectic. Marx argued that history is divided into various stages marked by changes in the mode of production. The stages of the dialectical process are: primitive communism, slavery, feudal serfdom, the capitalist wage system, transitional state capitalism, state socialism, and, finally, pure communism.¹ Each stage is characterized, except the last, by a conflict between a thesis and its antithesis. In the Marxian system these are defined in terms of economic classes. "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle."² In each stage of historical development economic classes are at war with one another. At the capitalist

¹Bertrand Russell et al., The Meaning of Marx (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1934), p. 24.

²Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: International Publishers, 1948), p. 9.

stage this conflict becomes simplified. "Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: It has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other--bourgeoisie and proletariat."³

The conflict between the bourgeoisie and proletariat is a natural consequence of the capitalist system. As the system develops it experiences crises which become more frequent and severe. In order to overcome these difficulties the system must undertake actions which only add to its difficulties.

For many a decade past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put the existence of the entire bourgeois society on trial, each time more threateningly. . . . In these crises there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity--the epidemic of overproduction. . . . And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive⁴ crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented.

Eventually the point is reached where the capitalist system is no longer able to manage the forces of production, and these forces move to change the character of the economy. The property relations eventually cease to be factors in the development of productive forces and, rather, become restraints upon these forces. "Then comes the period of social

³Idem.

⁴Ibid., pp. 14-15.

revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed."⁵

The bourgeois capitalist system develops by means of a natural evolutionary process. It owes its existence to the continuous revolutionizing of the means of production. It is only natural that these changes bring about changes in the complexion of society. Capitalist production leads to the development of large numbers of industrial workers and to the concentration of the population in urban centers. Production, moreover, becomes centralized, while property concentrates in fewer and fewer hands, thus making fewer capitalists and more workers.⁶ Through its natural development capitalism creates the force that will ultimately destroy it--the proletariat.

In order to meet competition and increase profits the capitalist system keeps expanding. Wages fall while production increases until there ceases to be a market. Since the workers must sell their labor as an economic commodity, they are subject to the vagaries of the market. The proletariat takes over when the market disappears and the system is no longer capable of function.⁷

The factors leading to the disintegration of the capitalist system are: concentration of wealth and production in fewer hands, disappearance of a middle class or petty bourgeoisie, growth of unemployment from automation leading to a larger reserve army, increasing impoverishment

⁵George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (3rd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961), pp. 775-6.

⁶Marx and Engels, op. cit., pp. 10-13.

⁷Chester C. Maxey, Political Philosophies (New York: Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 571.

of the workers, increasing severity of crises from overproduction and underconsumption, and the rise of a militant working class.⁸

When this combination of factors reaches a certain point the bourgeoisie finds itself unable to remain the ruling class of society. Nor is there anything that can be done to prevent this eventuality. The fall of the bourgeoisie "and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable."⁹ The process cannot be stopped; at best it can be speeded up. Modern society "can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal development. But it can shorten and less the birth-pangs."¹⁰

Marx did not claim to have discovered all aspects of the nature of society. Many of his ideas, he admitted, were held by others before him. He claimed only to have synthesized these ideas into a systematic theory of the whole indicating the inevitable pattern of development.

. . . As to myself, no credit is due me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society nor yet the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle and bourgeois economists the economic anatomy of the classes. What I did that was new was to prove: (1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular, historic phases in the development of production; (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society.¹¹

⁸ Russell, op. cit., pp. 22-24.

⁹ Marx and Engels, op. cit., p. 21.

¹⁰ Karl Marx, Capital (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1912), pp. 14-15.

¹¹ Letter from Marx to Wedemeier, March, 1852, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Correspondence (London: Martin Lawrence Ltd., 1934), p. 57.

Nature of the Socialist Revolution. The Socialist revolution, for Marx, is more than a change in the structure of government or a change in the ruling class. The entire social make-up of capitalism must undergo extreme alteration. The bourgeoisie is to be deprived of its position of political power, and to an even greater extent the bourgeoisie is to be destroyed as an economic class. No compromise can be allowed; the revolution must be complete.

While the democratic petty bourgeois wants to bring the revolution to an end as quickly as possible . . . it is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent, until all the more or less possessing classes are driven from power, until the proletariat has conquered the state power and the association of proletarians, not only in one country but in all the dominant countries of the world, has advanced so far that competition with the proletariat in these countries has ceased, and at least the decisive productive forces are concentrated in the hands of the proletarians. For us it cannot be a question of changing private property but only of its destruction, not of glossing over class antagonisms but of abolishing classes, not of bettering the existing society but of founding a new one.¹²

The first step in the socialist revolution is to take political power away from the bourgeoisie and put the proletariat in the position of ruling class.¹³ The bourgeoisie will oppose this attempt every step of the way. When the workers appear to be gaining the upper hand the bourgeoisie will attempt to channel the workers' enthusiasm. This must be prevented by demanding guarantees for the achievements of the workers. Popular support may be obtained by establishing revolutionary governments

¹²Karl Marx, "Address of the Central Authority to the Communist League, April, 1850," in Karl Marx, Capital, The Communist Manifesto and Other Writings, ed. Max Eastman (New York: The Modern Library, 1932), p. 360.

¹³Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, op. cit., p. 30.

alongside the currently existing government to articulate the workers' demands.¹⁴

In order to prevent the oppression that results from the bourgeois control of the state and police apparatus, the workers must be armed and capable of defending themselves against all attempts to put the revolution down by force. Revolutionary workers' councils should take the place of the government in giving directions to the workers. To prevent bourgeois ideology from dominating the workers, clubs should be established to bring revolutionary ideas to the proletariat. The workers' movement should not completely ignore the bourgeois or regular government, however. The fight for the workers' cause should be carried into the popular forums by placing workers' candidates up for election to public office.¹⁵

Marx pointed out in his discussion of the Paris Commune that the workers should not orient themselves toward simply seizing the existing bureaucratic and governmental machinery, but should destroy the bourgeois system in all of its forms.¹⁶ "If you look at the last chapter of my Eighteenth Brumaire you will find that I say that the next attempt of the French revolution will be no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, but to smash it, and that is essential for every real people's revolution on the Continent."¹⁷

¹⁴Karl Marx, "Address of the Central Authority to the Communist League, April, 1850," op. cit., pp. 361-2.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 363-4.

¹⁶Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France," in Karl Marx, Capital The Communist Manifesto and Other Writings, op. cit., p. 400.

¹⁷Letter from Marx to Kugelmann, April 12, 1871, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Correspondence, op. cit., p. 309.

The socialist revolution, the destruction of the bourgeois system, and the establishment of the proletarian state could not take place, Marx maintained, without a violent upheaval.

. . . The antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is a struggle of class against class, a struggle which carried to its highest expression is a total revolution. Indeed, is it at all surprising that a society founded on the opposition of classes should culminate in brutal contradiction, in the shock of body against body, as its final denouement?

The need for violent revolution stems from the fact that the bourgeoisie, by its very nature, is not going to relinquish its position of the ruling class of society without a struggle. The state as a social institution in general can be eliminated only through the process that Marx called "withering away" after communism has been achieved.¹⁹

Force and violence, Marx contended, are natural elements of society. Each stage of the dialectical process is marked by the use of force. This is especially true of the stage of capitalism. The need for and the use of force will only disappear when the stage of communism has been reached. The various elements of capitalism

. . . depend in part on brute force, e.g., the colonial system. But they all employ the power of the State, the concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten, hothouse fashion, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. Force is the mid-wife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power.²⁰

¹⁸Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (New York: International Publishers), p. 147.

¹⁹Michael Oakeshott, The Social and Political Documents of Contemporary Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), p. 135.

²⁰Marx, Capital, op. cit., pp. 823-4.

The proletarian dictatorship differs from the capitalist state in that it is not lawless or irresponsible. It employs force, as do all other types of states, but it does so strictly out of revolutionary necessity. This necessity provides the moral justification for the use of force that the capitalist system lacks.²¹

Generally speaking, the use of force is a dialectical absolute. Marx does, however, make some exceptions that prevent this idea from becoming a hard and fast rule. If the culture and institutions of a country are highly advanced, the workers' goals may be achieved peacefully. Advanced Western countries such as the United States and England may experience successful socialist revolutions without the use of violence.²²

Tactics. According to Marx's class theory, states are organized along class lines. The class character of the states determine the class relationship of production. Economic change, therefore, necessarily involves change in the class composition of the state. Tactics for realizing and succeeding in a socialist revolution must be guided by the need for the conquest of political power.²³

Before the proletariat can seize power, certain conditions must obtain. These conditions are a favorable revolutionary situation and a

²¹ Sidney Hook, Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx (New York: The John Day Company, 1933), pp. 304-5.

²² Karl Marx, Speech at Amsterdam, 1872, in Ibid., p. 291.

²³ Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France," op. cit., pp. 400-3.

party--a Marxist party. A political party cannot produce a revolutionary situation by itself. This situation must occur naturally. A party may, however, be decisive in that it prepares the working class to cope successfully with a revolutionary situation.²⁴ The presence of a revolutionary situation depends upon the economic breakdown of the capitalist system and the lack of political homogeneity among the ruling classes. The Party provides the leadership for the revolution. It organizes and prepares the workers for the revolution, and when it comes leads the way in the conflict.²⁵

The Party is better organized for revolutionary situations than is the working class itself. It possesses, moreover, a better understanding of conditions and what they mean to the working class.

The communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions,²⁶ and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.

The Party clearly and openly states its goals: "Formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat."²⁷ It is equally clear in the statement of the means that it intends to employ: "They (the Party)

²⁴ Hook, op. cit., p. 276.

²⁵ Karl Marx, "Address of the Central Authority to the Communist League, April, 1850," op. cit., pp. 360-1.

²⁶ Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, op. cit., p. 22.

²⁷ Idem.

openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions."²⁸

For Marx the socialist revolution is a result of natural development of forces existing in society. These forces cannot be stopped, but by proper encouragement can be made to bring about the revolution sooner than would have otherwise been the case. The validity of Marx's revolutionary theory, therefore, depends upon the accuracy of his understanding and dialectical prediction of the development of natural forces. This presents a problem for the followers of Marx. If the revolution does not come about as he predicted, then what must be done? Marx himself suggests a possible answer: the Party. The limited function of the Party that Marx prescribed could be expanded to the point of actually making the revolution.

²⁸Ibid., p. 44.

CHAPTER III
VLADIMIR LENIN

The Dialectic. Lenin introduced a radical new dimension into the dialectical system of Marx. Marx argued that the changes which lead to socialist revolution will occur as a result of natural development. Lenin argued that in reality this is not the case. Natural dialectical development will not at some point result in socialist revolution. Marx had argued that when the capitalist system reaches a certain stage of development the workers will spontaneously rise up and seize power. The necessary ingredients for this seizure of power, according to Marx, are a high degree of working class consciousness and the breakdown in the capitalist system. Lenin argued that working class consciousness is not in a high stage of development, nor can it achieve this high development spontaneously. With regard to working class consciousness in the nineteenth century, Lenin maintained that the spontaneous outbursts in the form of strikes were nothing more than an embryonic form of class consciousness.¹ Working class consciousness can only achieve a high level of development as a result of conscious effort directed toward that end.

Lenin argued that the spontaneous development of working class consciousness will be slight and can easily be controlled and channeled off harmlessly by the bourgeoisie. The spontaneous uprisings of the workers against the bourgeois system either die out or are put down by

¹V. I. Lenin, What Is to be Done (New York: International Publishers, 1929), p. 32.

the police with nothing gained.² Since the bourgeoisie will not relinquish power willingly, the workers must seize power by force. This seizure of power, however, will not occur naturally, but rather must be made to occur. Unless the proletarian movement is given some assistance, it will be relegated to nothing more than trade unionism under the dominance of the bourgeoisie. Such assistance should come in the form of a revolutionary party.

. . . The spontaneous development of the labour movements leads to its becoming subordinate to bourgeois ideology . . . the spontaneous labour movement is pure and simple trade unionism . . . and trade unionism means the ideological subordination of the workers to the bourgeoisie. Hence, our task, the task of Social-Democracy, is to combat spontaneity, to divert the labour movement, with its spontaneous trade-unionist striving, from under the wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it under the wing of revolutionary Social-Democracy.³

That the spontaneous development of the labor movement leads to nothing more than trade unionism means Lenin abandoned the belief in inevitable socialist revolution. Revolution requires a high degree of class consciousness which cannot be achieved through the natural development of the capitalist system. Lenin charged that those who believed that the proletarian movement can develop naturally or spontaneously are guilty of khvostism or tailism. Their thinking always trails behind developments. The permanent body of revolutionaries must stay well ahead of the spontaneous developments of the workers in order to provide effective leadership. The "permanent troops" must "take their place at the head of the crowd."⁴

²Ibid., p. 96.

³Ibid., p. 41.

⁴Ibid., p. 161.

The Nature of Revolution. Lenin agreed with Marx concerning the conditions necessary to achieve revolution. The revolution would take place when favorable conditions existed as a result of the breakdown of the capitalist system and when the working class had achieved a sufficiently high state of class consciousness. Lenin disagreed with Marx over whether both of these conditions would inevitably prevail. Lenin argued that the breakdown of capitalism would result from its own internal weaknesses and contradictions, just as Marx predicted. The state of working class consciousness necessary for revolution, however, will not inevitably come about as a result of natural development, but must be made to come about by the stimulation of a revolutionary party. The revolution itself would be a violent overthrow of the bourgeois system by the workers under the leadership of the Party. "The replacement of the bourgeois state by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution."⁵

Although the revolution would be a violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie, Lenin did not advocate the use of terrorism as a tactical device. He contended that there were sufficient outrages committed under capitalism for arousing popular concern. What was really needed was to channel and refine this popular concern toward the constructive purpose of bringing about socialist revolution.⁶

After the workers have forcefully driven the bourgeoisie from power and set up their own control, the revolution will not be over.

⁵Vladimir Lenin, "State and Revolution," in Arthur P. Mendel (ed.), Essential Works of Marxism (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), p. 116.

⁶Lenin, What Is To Be Done? op. cit., p. 75.

Lenin agreed with Marx that revolution means more than a change in the control of the machinery of government. The revolution must include complete social change. All vestiges of the bourgeois system including the bourgeoisie itself must be eliminated. This would be achieved by restricting the activities of the bourgeoisie so that they might not reassert themselves. As a result, the bourgeoisie, as a class, would eventually disappear. Social change would be achieved through the direction of a government based entirely upon the proletariat.

. . . The dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the organization of the vanguard of the oppressed as a ruling class . . . for the purpose of suppressing the oppressors, cannot simply produce a mere broadening of democracy. . . . The dictatorship of the proletariat places a series of restrictions⁷ of freedom upon the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists.

Lenin's abandonment of the inevitability of socialist revolution produces a serious problem for Marxist theory. If the socialist revolution is not inevitable, then what is the justification for having such a revolution? If the natural development of the proletarian movement would only result in trade unionism, then how is the socialist revolution to be brought about? The first question concerning the justification for socialist revolution did not trouble Lenin nor any other communist. He assumed the desirability of socialist revolution as a fundamental truth which he did not attempt to justify. The second question, however, was central to Lenin's thinking, resulting in his preoccupation with the tactical requirements of revolution.

⁷V. I. Lenin, "Sochineniya," Vol. XXI, in Stanley W. Page, Lenin and World Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 1959), p. 19, n. 21.

Tactics. In Lenin's thinking, the revolutionary party must play a dominant role in the realization of socialist revolution. "We said that there could not yet be Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers. This consciousness could only be brought to them from without."⁸ That is, by the Party. The revolutionary party plays a dual role. In the first place it is the representative of the proletariat in political and social relations with other classes. In the second place the revolutionary party develops the proletariat as a political force. "Social-Democracy represents the working class, not its relationship to a given group of employers, but in its relation to all classes in modern society, to the state as an organized political force. . . . We must actively take up the political education of the working class, and the development of its political consciousness."⁹

In order to effectively represent the workers and to develop their political consciousness, the leadership of the workers must be trained professional revolutionaries. These revolutionaries must devote their entire life to the cause of the workers.¹⁰ Their task is to determine the nature of true class consciousness and to bring this consciousness to the workers. According to Lenin, only the Bolsheviks know the true nature of "true class consciousness."¹¹ Pressed upon this matter, Lenin must logically admit that only Lenin knows the nature of "true class consciousness."

⁸ Lenin, What Is To Be Done? op. cit., p. 32.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 56-57.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 116.

¹¹ Page, op. cit., p. 37.

Lenin argued that there should be no restrictions upon the revolutionary activity of the Party. The Party should seek to expose itself to all areas of society in order to become more aware of circumstances and to make revolutionary agitation more effective. ". . . the organization of wide political agitation, and consequently, of all-sided political exposures are an absolutely necessary and paramount task of activity, that is, if that activity is to be truly Social-Democratic."¹²

All avenues of revolutionary activity must be exploited. This includes both secret or illegal activity and open or legal activity. Secret work would involve the dissemination of literature, the working out of revolutionary plans, the organization of revolutionary bodies for towns, districts, factories, and educational institutions. The purpose of this activity is to prepare the organizational framework necessary to insure success when revolution finally occurs.¹³

Legal activity, such as participation in bourgeois parliaments, should be part of a Marxist campaign to better show the masses why such parliaments do not serve the interests of the people. By participating in these bodies the Party may be able to destroy them from within.¹⁴ Marxists should take part in reactionary trade unions to win the support of the workers and to eventually take over control of these unions.¹⁵

¹²Lenin, What Is To Be Done? op. cit., pp. 75-76.

¹³Ibid., p. 116.

¹⁴V. I. Lenin, "'Left-Wing' Communism, An Infantile Disorder," Selected Works, Vol. 10 (New York: International Publishers, 1943), p. 101.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 87-96.

Lenin took a dim view of the value of trade unions for the proletarian movement. He maintained that their function could be easily filled by the Party.

A small, compact core, consisting of reliable, experienced and hardened workers, with responsible agents in the principal districts and connected by all the rules of strict secrecy with the organizations of revolutionists, can, with the wide support of the masses and without an elaborate set of rules, perform all functions of a trade-union organization, and¹⁶ perform them, moreover, in the manner Social-Democrats desire.

In certain cases even compromise with the bourgeoisie could be of value to the proletarian movement. Lenin attacked the idea that compromise with the bourgeoisie constitutes a violation of Marxist principles. Certain compromises are in the best interest of the workers. He cited Brest-Litovsk as an example of compromise which enabled Russia to free herself from the burdens of World War I. ". . . To reject the admissibility of compromise as in general, no matter of what kind, is childishness which is difficult even to take seriously."¹⁷

Lenin argued that he did not intend for the Party to coerce the workers or conduct their revolution for them and then govern Russia without their support and approval. The role of the Party should be to educate the workers and bring them to the level of consciousness whereby they can conduct their own revolution. The role of the Party is to show the workers the way.¹⁸

¹⁶Lenin, What Is To Be Done? op. cit., p. 112.

¹⁷Lenin, "'Left-Wing' Communism, An Infantile Disorder," op. cit., p. 76.

¹⁸John Plamenatz, German Marxism and Russian Communism (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1954), pp. 225-226.

Lenin's efforts to achieve socialist revolution in Russia were successful. This success came at the expense of modifying the principles of Marx. Socialist revolution is not inevitable, but must be made to occur through the efforts of a revolutionary party, Lenin argued. This line of reasoning was adopted by many of Lenin's successors--among them Leon Trotsky. This same position is argued today by Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese communists.

CHAPTER IV

LEON TROTSKY

The Nature of Revolution. Marx set forth the theoretical principles of communism based upon an economic analysis of the capitalist system. Later, Lenin was confronted with the problem of making reality of Marx's predictions; that is, with bringing about socialist revolution. In this effort he was successful. The Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917 confronted communists with a new problem. This was the problem of insuring the success and permanence of the Russian Socialist Revolution. With the death of Lenin soon after the Revolution, the task of making the Revolution secure fell to his successors. Addressing themselves to this problem, Leon Trotsky and Joseph Stalin advanced two contradictory solutions. This contradiction was eventually resolved in favor of Stalin.

The most illustrious member of the communist revolutionary hierarchy after Lenin's death was Leon Trotsky. Trotsky was instrumental in prosecuting the October Revolution and bringing victory to the Bolsheviks in the Civil War. After the death of Lenin, Trotsky came into conflict with Stalin. One of the issues of this conflict was what would be the best course to follow to insure success for the Russian Revolution.

Trotsky believed that a socialist revolution could not be successful in one isolated country. He argued that socialist revolution must continue to occur throughout the world. The economic interdependence

of all countries prevents any one country from conducting itself in any manner it chooses. For a country to ignore this interdependence can only lead to economic disaster. The Socialist Revolution produced in Russia a system which radically differed from international economic standards. The effect, Trotsky argued, was to isolate Russia from the rest of the world. "The central idea of the matter . . . consists in the close interdependence of the nations of the world, which makes it impossible for any one country to develop and maintain, for any length of time, an economic and social system as fundamentally different from that of other nations as socialism is from capitalism."¹

This is not a novel argument, Trotsky contended, but it is inherent in the theory of Marx. He maintained that Marx viewed the international system as a distinct unity. Marxist doctrine, therefore, cannot be applied in a piecemeal manner to isolated situations in various countries, but must, rather, consider the whole international system.

Marxism proceeds from world economy, not as a sum of national parts, but as a mighty, independent reality. . . . To attempt, regardless of the geographic, cultural and historical conditions of the country's development, which constitutes part of the world whole, to realize a fenced in proportionality of all the branches of economy within national limits, means to pursue a reactionary Utopia.²

On the basis of this argument Trotsky contended that the Revolution in Russia would not be successful unless a Bolshevik regime considered the fact that Russia, like all other countries, was a part of

¹Michael T. Florinsky, World Revolution and the USSR (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), p. 149.

²Leon Trotsky, "The Permanent Revolution," Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. Robert A. Goldwin, Gerald Stourzh, and Marvin Zetterbaum (Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 147.

the world economy. The Socialist Revolution had alienated Russia from the capitalist countries of the world, thus isolating her from many of the resources of the world economy.³ This would eventually produce economic stagnation. If the Revolution was to be successful, therefore, Russia must overcome this alienation and reassert itself as an integral part of the world economy. This could be achieved in one of two ways: by conforming to the international system, or by changing this system. Russia could forsake its Revolution and return to capitalism, or socialist revolution could be made to occur in other countries.

To abandon the Revolution was, of course, out of the question. The alternative of changing the international system remained. Although Russia made some economic progress after 1917, Trotsky argued that this progress could not be expected to continue unless the Soviet Union extricated itself from the status of alienation from the world economy.⁴ Change in the international system and economic progress for the Soviet Union could only be insured if socialist revolutions were to occur in at least the more economically advanced countries. Trotsky defined this idea as the doctrine of permanent revolution.

The perspective of permanent revolution may be summarized in the following way: the complete victory of the democratic revolution in Russia is conceivable only in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, leaning on the peasantry. The dictatorship of the proletariat, which would inevitably place on the order of the day not only democratic but socialistic tasks as well, would at the same time give a powerful impetus to the international socialist revolution. Only the victory of the proletariat in the West could protect

³ Ibid., p. 152.

⁴ Florinsky, op. cit., p. 153.

Russia from bourgeois restoration and assure it the possibility of rounding out the establishment of socialism.⁵

Trotsky's idea of the form of revolution was about the same as that of Lenin. The revolution would be an armed uprising and seizure of power by the workers under the leadership of the Party. Trotsky believed that revolution in other countries would take substantially the same form as the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia.⁶

Tactics. Trotsky's tactical position was determined by his commitment to the doctrine of permanent revolution. The proletariat in Russia had been able to seize power before the bourgeois stage had been fully developed. This was made possible, Trotsky argued, by the backward state of the Russian economy. If the Revolution was to be completely successful, however, its momentum could not be allowed to stop, but must go on to destroy capitalism in Russia and extend itself to other countries of Europe.⁷

Trotsky assigned the Communist Party the role of guiding revolutionary momentum. Communist Parties in all countries, with the support of the Russian Communist Party, must strive to seize power on behalf of the proletariat.⁸ Trotsky argued that seizure of power should serve as

⁵Leon Trotsky, Stalin, ed. and trans. Charles Malamuth (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1941), p. 433.

⁶Leon Trotsky, The Russian Revolution: The Overthrow of Tzarism and the Triumph of the Soviets, ed. F. W. Dupee (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959), pp. 304-312.

⁷Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1921-1929 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 154.

⁸Flamenatz, op. cit., p. 276.

the tactical guide for the Communist Party. "Every political party deserving the name aims at seizing governmental power in order to put the state at the service of the class whose interests it expresses."⁹

If the revolutionary momentum, which burst forth in Russia in 1917, is allowed to dissipate, the consequences for the international revolutionary movement will be disastrous. In the first place, Trotsky argued, Russia's isolation from the rest of the world would bring about economic strangulation. Secondly, the proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union must of necessity establish privileged groups to effect desired revolutionary change. Unless these privileged groups maintain their sense of purpose and direction, they will eventually become arrogant and indifferent to the interests of the unprivileged and will, rather, promote their own selfish ends.¹⁰

Trotsky employed references to Marx and Lenin as proof of the validity of the doctrine of permanent revolution. Paradoxically, Stalin employed similar references to prove his position, even though he completely disagreed with Trotsky. This phenomenon of communist theorists attaching two entirely different meanings to the same "authoritative" source is a problem which becomes more and more acute as communism becomes older.

Trotsky, like Lenin, rejected the idea of inevitable revolution advanced by Marx. Communists throughout the world must wage an active campaign to seize political power. Isolated revolutions, even successful

⁹Leon Trotsky, "Itogi i Perspektivy," in Deutscher, op. cit., p. 154.

¹⁰Plamenatz, op. cit., p. 292.

ones, will not be permanent unless they are a part of a continuing process of revolution taking place in other countries.

Although Trotsky was the loser in the power struggle with Stalin, Trotsky's ideas were not destroyed. Stalin himself took advantage of the Second World War to export revolution, but employed tactics quite different from what Trotsky had in mind. Trotsky spoke of seizure of power by the Communist Parties of various countries, not export of revolution by means of the Russian Red Army. As we shall see later, the idea of permanent revolution is present today in somewhat different form in the thinking of Mao Tse-tung.

CHAPTER IV

JOSEPH STALIN

The Nature of Revolution. Stalin did not fancy himself a theoretical innovator. He did not consider it within his providence to quarrel over the validity of the positions of Lenin or Marx. Since he was confronted with problems which were new to communism, he viewed his role as one of interpreter of Marxism-Leninism in terms of new developments, and he considered his word in this regard to be infallible.¹

Marx was concerned with the formulation of communist doctrine. Lenin was faced with the problem of bringing about a successful communist revolution. Stalin was confronted with a dual task. He had to preserve the communist political system in Russia and at the same time seek ways to extend the rule of communism to other nations. Stalin considered the program of socialism in one country as the most likely course of action for the successful realization of these tasks. The doctrine of socialism in one country called for the development of a communist system in Russia as the task of the first order. The success with which this task was realized would determine the success of the extension of communism to other nations.

The doctrine of socialism in one country conflicts with Trotsky's position on the need for permanent revolution. Stalin argued that for revolution to succeed in Russia the proletariat of Europe must give its

¹Plamenatz, op. cit., p. 267.

support, but he did not mean that this support had to take the form of open revolution.

It goes without saying that for the complete victory of socialism, for complete security against the restoration of the old order, the united efforts of the proletarians of several countries are necessary. It goes without saying that, without the support given to our revolution by the proletariat of Europe, the proletariat of Russia could not have held its own against the general onslaught. . . . It goes without saying that we need support. . . . Is not the sympathy of European workers for our revolution, their readiness to thwart the imperialists' plans of intervention--is not all this support? . . . Of course it is. . . . Has this sympathy and this assistance, coupled with the might of our Red Army and the readiness of the workers and peasants of Russia to defend their socialist fatherland to the last--has all this been sufficient to beat off the attacks of the imperialists and to win us the necessary conditions for the serious work of construction? Yes, it has been sufficient Hence, have we favorable conditions, not only to push on with the organization of socialist economy, but also, in our turn, to give support to the West-European workers and to the oppressed peoples of the east? Yes, we have.

The inevitable conflict among capitalist nations contributes to the likelihood of success of socialism in one country. The great capitalist countries (America, England, and Japan) are in constant competition among themselves as a result of their imperialistic ventures. Much time and energy must be spent, therefore, by these capitalist countries to promote the success of their ventures and to prevent any one capitalist country from achieving an advantage over the others. Consequently, the great capitalist countries have little time and energy to devote to interference with the Soviet Union.³

Not only does this competition allow the Soviet Union to develop without interference, but also inevitably leads to war among the capitalist countries. These wars may be turned into civil wars and can be exploited

²Josef Stalin, Leninism: Selected Writings (New York: International Publishers, 1942), p. 20.

³Ibid., p. 17.

by the Soviet Union for the promotion of successful socialist revolutions.⁴ Stalin argued that the workers have become increasingly opposed to fighting and dying in wars which benefit their bourgeois masters. Therefore, should a war occur, the proletariats would rise up in opposition to bourgeois imperialism. When bourgeois war is directed against the Soviet Union, moreover, the workers' opposition is greatly increased by their socialist sympathies.⁵

The doctrine of socialism in one country had important consequences for international communism. The national self-interest of the Soviet Union obscured the dialectical process and diminished the importance of the working class of western Europe. Rather than the international brotherhood of working men on a revolutionary crusade, communism became the example or model of Soviet industrial development. This model applied particularly to the underdeveloped countries. The effect of socialism in one country was to alter Russian orientation from the West to the East.⁶

Stalin maintained that if communism could establish a toe hold in one country, the strength of communism would be enhanced and the possibility of expansion improved. In the first place, socialist revolution would not depend upon the revolt of workers in individual countries, but

⁴Florinsky, op. cit., p. 198.

⁵Historicus [Joseph Stalin], "Stalin on Revolution," Foreign Affairs (New York: January, 1949), pp. 190-193.

⁶Sabine, op. cit., pp. 874-875.

would, rather, be replaced by an international operation directed by the Soviet Union. Countries in which socialist revolutions occur would look to Russia for support and would identify themselves with the communist cause, of which Russia is the living example.⁷

The successful development of communism in the Soviet Union would serve as an example to all countries who are suffering under the burden of capitalism. The presence of a prosperous and happy communist Utopia in the midst of capitalism with its misery and recurring crises would lend great appeal to the communist cause.⁸ The Russians argue this same position today.

In relation to the question of where socialist revolutions are most likely to occur, Stalin adopted the weakest link theory of Lenin. Socialist revolutions are most likely to occur in those places where capitalism is weakest, rather than in the most highly industrialized countries. A weak link in the capitalist chain is defined as a country with a minimum of industrial development, but with a proletariat possessing a revolutionary spirit and, of course, a Communist Party.⁹ This argument is a complete contradiction of Marx, who contended that revolution would occur in those countries where capitalism had achieved its highest stage of development.

There was a definite evolution in Stalin's thinking on the nature of revolution throughout his long tenure in a position of political

⁷Stalin, op. cit., p. 145, 147, 148.

⁸Florinsky, op. cit., p. 129.

⁹Elliot R. Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 157.

power. In the 1920's he adhered to the belief shared by all Old Bolsheviks that socialist revolution would take the form of armed uprisings among the workers under the leadership of the Communist Party. When it became clear that this expectation would remain unfulfilled, Stalin introduced the idea of revolution from above. This meant that some agent outside the body of workers would be the dominant factor in bringing about and prosecuting socialist revolution. This form of revolution ". . . was decreed, inspired, and managed by the great power predominant in that area. Although the local Communist Parties were its immediate agents and executors, the great party of the revolution, which remained in the background, was the Red Army."¹⁰ Stalin's tactical position clearly demonstrates his view of the nature of revolution.

Tactics. Stalin believed in tactical flexibility. He did not consider revolutionary uprising to be the only way of furthering the cause of communism. His tactical dictum was one of opportunism where the forces of revolution must be ever alert to capitalize upon the crises of the capitalist system. The development of favorable revolutionary conditions in one country, moreover, could be stimulated by outside interference.¹¹

Stalin's tactical position was a result of political experience. When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, they expected socialist revolution like that which had occurred in Russia to sweep Europe. This notion was

¹⁰Isaac Deutscher, Stalin (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 554.

¹¹Historicus, op. cit., p. 190.

based upon the belief that World War I had produced such intolerable conditions that the only solution was a forceful overthrow of capitalism.

After it became apparent that extensive revolutionary upheaval in Europe would not be forthcoming and after it was obvious that the revolutions that had occurred had failed, Stalin turned his attention to the colonial and semi-colonial areas. These are the weak links in the capitalist chain and lend themselves most readily to the exploitation of favorable revolutionary situations. The most important of these efforts was directed toward China.¹²

In Stalin's view of the world there was no place for neutrality. Nations cannot place themselves outside of the conflict between the capitalist system and socialism. A country is either wholly within one or the other of these camps. It is not possible to avoid or straddle the issue. For Stalin, nations either support socialism and the Soviet Union or are against them. One is either an enemy or an ally. Any country which does not openly profess to be a friend of the Soviet Union would be considered an enemy and would be treated as such.¹³ This is also the contemporary Chinese position.

This view of the world as a conflict between socialism and capitalism offered tactical possibilities for Stalin and the Soviet Union. Within the capitalist system wars were considered inevitable. Since the socialist countries have no use for war, there would be no wars within the socialist system. The wars that would inevitably occur between

¹²Florinsky, op. cit., p. 173.

¹³David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1961), p. 290.

capitalist countries would be to the advantage of the Soviet Union. When two or more capitalist countries are involved in a war with one another, each country would be willing to accept support from the Soviet Union in order to tip the balance in that country's favor. The Soviet Union, therefore, can play the role of power arbiter by moving in, in the final stages of struggle, on the side that appears closest to victory and into political vacuums left by the defeated imperialist power. In this way, socialism will steadily chip away at the capitalist camp.

The belief that the Soviet Union could remain outside of the struggles among the capitalist countries was destroyed by the German invasion of Russia in 1941. The tactical device of moving into political power vacuums as a result of warfare was put to good advantage by the Soviets during World War II.¹⁴

In Stalin's thinking the key role in revolution should be played by the Red Army. No revolution can succeed unless it has the active support of the Red Army. In other words, socialist revolutions can be expected to fail unless they have the guidance and support of the Soviet Union.¹⁵ Stalin made the Red Army the instrumentality of the proletarian revolution.

Our Red Army has this peculiar quality, that it is a weapon . . . for the liberation of the workers and peasants from the yoke of the landlords and capitalists. Our army is an army for liberating the toilers.

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¹⁴Ibid., pp. 10-17.

¹⁵Stalin as quoted by M. N. Roy, "Josef Stalin, Mephisto of Modern History," The Radical Humanist, December 10, 1950, in Goodman, op. cit., p. 298.

. . . our army is the army¹⁶ of the world revolution, the army of the workers of all countries.

In the early stages of World War II Stalin attacked the Western allies for maintaining an opportunist position and attempting to take advantage of the weakness of the belligerents. Ironically, this critique is an accurate description of Stalin's own tactical position. Stalin charged that the allies wanted

. . . to allow all the belligerents to sink deeply in the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this; to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, "in the interests of peace," and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents. Cheap and easy!¹⁷

Stalin's revolutionary position is similar in some ways to that of Marx, who argued that conditions favorable to revolution would occur naturally and that revolution would come sooner and with less difficulty if favorable revolutionary circumstances were promoted. Stalin argued that the circumstances favorable to revolution would occur naturally, and by taking advantage of these circumstances the Soviet Union could extend its revolution to other countries. Stalin did not agree with Marx, however, that given only the favorable circumstances, revolution would be inevitable. Revolution depended upon a combination of favorable circumstances and assistance from the Soviet Union.

Lenin argued that socialist revolution should take the form of an armed uprising of the workers directed by the Party. Trotsky maintained

¹⁶ Joseph Stalin, speech on the tenth anniversary of the Red Army, Pravda, February 28, 1928, in Goodman, op. cit., p. 299.

¹⁷ Joseph Stalin, "Otchetnyi doklad na XVIII s'ezde," in Goodman, op. cit., p. 306.

that there must be a continuous and permanent effort throughout the world to promote socialist revolutions in the form of armed uprisings. Stalin argued that such revolutionary tactics would be unrewarding. Communists must wait for favorable opportunities and then make the most of these opportunities. Stalin placed less emphasis upon armed uprisings as a revolutionary tactic than upon the exploitation of international conflicts and the use of the Red Army to impose revolution from above.

CHAPTER VI

NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV

View of the World. In the Russian view of the world the most important consideration is world war. The question of war and peace is of overriding importance, and all other issues are subordinate to it. "The most important, the most vital problem of our time is the problem of war and peace. In real life the choice is: either peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems or a devastating war. There is no other alternative."¹

Khrushchev contends that modern nuclear weapons require nations to orient themselves to the maintenance of peace. "Mankind is threatened with an unprecedented catastrophic war of extermination, a war which, if it breaks out, will take a toll of many millions of lives."² Nuclear weaponry has made warfare so devastating as to render it obsolete as an instrument of policy. Should nations attempt to employ nuclear warfare to advance national interests, the resulting cost in terms of destruction would far outweigh any gains.

Further, it must be kept in mind that it is not possible to achieve immediate recovery from nuclear attack. The effects of nuclear war apply not only to present generations of people, but also to those yet unborn.

¹"Let Us Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement . . . ,"
Pravda (January 7, 1963), reprinted as "Pravda Denounces 'Splitters' in
World Communism," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XV (January 30, 1963),
p. 4.

²Nikita S. Khrushchev, For Peaceful Competition and Cooperation
(New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1959), p. 7.

"The consequences of a nuclear war would have their effect on the life expectancy of many generations of people, would produce disease and death and lead to the most monstrous development of mankind."³ As a result, Khrushchev contends, it is impossible for the communists to think in terms of building a socialist system in the cultural centers of the world ravaged by a nuclear war.

Khrushchev attacks the Chinese communists for maintaining that just such an eventuality is a tactical possibility. He charges that the Chinese "paper tiger" thesis in reference to the nuclear capability of Western countries is an underestimation of the threat of nuclear war and its consequences. Soft-peddling this threat and minimizing the danger of nuclear war, moreover, demoralizes the masses and deludes them into thinking that the strength of capitalist imperialism is a myth and can be safely ignored.⁴

The decline of war as an instrument of national policy is not due, the Russians argue, to any change in the nature of capitalism. The capitalist nations are still imperialistic, but modern conditions have altered their ability to make wars. The power of the socialist bloc prevents the imperialists from exercising a free hand in international politics and can, hence, serve as a check upon the incidence of war. "The balance of forces in the world today is such that the

³"Speech by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev . . . , " Pravda (January 17, 1963), reprinted as "Khrushchev's Speech at German Party Congress--II," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XV (February 20, 1963), p. 17.

⁴"Let Us Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement . . . , " op. cit., p. 4.

camp of socialism and peace is able to curb the aggressive forces of imperialism."⁵ Although war can no longer be considered as a desirable means for the promotion of national interests, the nature of the imperialist system may lead to an outbreak of open hostilities. It must be kept in mind, therefore, that the capacity of the imperialists to wage war remains, and only through the vigilance of the socialist countries can war be avoided.

Khrushchev contends that the strength of the socialist bloc now makes it possible for two contradictory social systems to exist peacefully. The imperialist bloc is not in a position to destroy socialism by force, thus placing it in the position where it must "listen to the voice of the masses." As proof of the ability of the socialist countries to contain the aggressive intentions of the imperialists, Khrushchev cites the peaceful settlement of the Cuban crisis in October, 1962.⁶

Soviet military strength in general and nuclear weapons in particular are not intended for revolutionary purposes or for the extension of Soviet hegemony over other countries. The Soviets argue that their capacity to wage war simply serves the purpose of containing capitalist aggression. Within this system of containment it becomes possible to wage ideological warfare. "Our principal weapon is Marxism-Leninism.

⁵Ibid., p. 6.

⁶Nikita S. Khrushchev, "The Present International Situation . . .," Pravda (December 13, 1962), reprinted as "Khrushchev's Report on the International Situation--II," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XIV (January 23, 1963), p. 5.

We shall defeat the capitalist world by using this powerful ideological weapon, rather than the hydrogen bomb. We produced the hydrogen bomb with the soul [sic] object of cooling the ambitions of some excessively zealous politicians and generals in the capitalist countries."⁷

In the ideological war with capitalism the triumph of communism is inevitable. Khrushchev contends that people throughout the world will look at the socialist system in Russia and will see that living standards in this system are the highest anywhere and that individuals are able to develop their talents and abilities as they see fit. When all people become aware that these conditions prevail only under communism, they will naturally choose this system for themselves.⁸ "We believe that all working men in the world, once they have become convinced of the advantages communism brings, will sooner or later take the road of struggle for the construction of socialist society."⁹

The Soviets disclaim leadership of the socialist cause in the ideological struggle for capitalism. At the Communist Parties Conference in Moscow in November, 1960, the Russian delegation suggested that the conference resolution or formula proclaiming the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the leader of the communist movement was a compliment, but only created difficulties for all Parties.¹⁰ It is

⁷Khrushchev, For Peaceful Competition and Cooperation, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

⁸Ibid., pp. 60-61.

⁹Nikita S. Khrushchev, "The International Position of the Soviet Union," Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 448.

¹⁰Nikita S. Khrushchev, "For New Victories . . .," Kommunist (January, 1961), condensed as "Khrushchev Reviews 81st Party Moscow Conference--II," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XIII (February 22, 1961), pp. 14-15.

the Russian view that each country must choose its own course of action. ". . . It is for the proletariat of each country and for its Communist vanguard to determine what forms and methods of struggle the working class of the country should choose in the specific historical situation."¹¹ These methods, moreover, should be based entirely upon local conditions and not upon the experience of some other country. "Since different conditions exist in different socialist countries, it is natural that each Communist Party applies Marxist-Leninist theory in accordance with conditions in its country."¹² The Russians claim, nevertheless, that the course of action fitting local conditions should conform to the broader Russian tactical framework of peaceful coexistence. So, they do in this sense claim ideological leadership.

The Soviet attempt to disclaim leadership of the communist movement is designed to avoid the Chinese charge that as the strongest and oldest communist state Russia should show the way in the ideological struggle with the West in conformance with "true principles" of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. The Russians make allowance for their own theoretical deviation from doctrinal orthodoxy by claiming that there are no "true principles" with permanent meaning. Marxist-Leninist doctrine is flexible, and each country must apply it to its own situation to determine the best way to achieve socialism.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 13.

¹² Ibid., p. 15.

Tactics--The Question of War. Marx devoted very little consideration to the question of war. Generally, he advanced the notion that war is a natural feature of capitalist society and will disappear in the future classless society.¹³ After the establishment of the Soviet state in 1917, the question of war took on a new dimension. Not only was there the notion of war among capitalist countries, but also the issue arose of attack upon the Soviet state. Stalin employed reference to the possibility of this attack and the need to defend against it as justification of his policies.¹⁴

With the advent of nuclear warfare, yet another factor has been introduced into the question of war. Khrushchev contends that this has rendered obsolete the thinking about the revolutionary significance of war. This theoretical position is justified on the grounds that Marxism is not a static doctrine with a meaning fixed once and for all. New developments can have pronounced effect upon theory. Nuclear warfare is, obviously, such a development. "The classics of Marxism have never denied the fact that new types of weapons can not only bring about a radical change in the art of war but can also influence politics."¹⁵

The revolutionary thinking concerning warfare must be changed because of the nature of nuclear weapons. Use of nuclear weapons would

¹³ Frederick S. Burin, "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War," American Political Science Review, LVII (June, 1963), p. 335.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 336-338.

¹⁵ Otto Kuusinen, Speech at Lenin Anniversary Meeting, Soviet News, No. 4255, abridged in The Sino-Soviet Dispute, ed. G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1961), p. 119.

affect all mankind and would be a disadvantage to the cause of socialism.¹⁶ The fact that nuclear war would inflict such destruction upon all countries including the socialist countries as to make it undesirable, however, does not interfere with the spread of socialism. Khrushchev contends that there is no necessary connection between socialist revolution and war. Even though revolutions have succeeded during times of world war, these successful revolutions are possible today without war.¹⁷

Khrushchev claims that his tactical position is predicated upon a concern for the consequences of nuclear war. Tactical questions must take into consideration the realities of the modern world.

A world war, should it prove impossible to prevent, would at once become a thermonuclear war and result in the death of many, many millions of people, the destruction of colossal material wealth and the devastation of whole countries. Those who give no thought to the consequences of modern war, who underestimate or simply discount nuclear weapons as something secondary with respect to the masses of human beings, make a big mistake.¹⁸

Failure to appreciate the significance of nuclear war, Khrushchev argues, is not only a big mistake, but is the product of a deranged mind. International disputes can no longer be settled by resort to arms, nor can communists hope to base their tactical position upon the use of violence. "Only political maniacs and suicides can consider war as a means of settling international disputes and differences. The only rational way of settling international differences and disagreements

¹⁶"The Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CPL," Peking Review, No. 25, January 21, 1963, p. 26.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁸"Let Us Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement . . . ,"
op. cit., p. 6.

is through negotiation and mutually acceptable agreements which take into account the interests of all the parties concerned."¹⁹

The Russians argue that the Chinese are guilty of failing to take into consideration the consequences of modern war. Mao's "paper tiger" thesis is attacked on strategic grounds in that contempt for imperialism will not tame its predatory nature nor stop a war if it's started. A modern war cannot be approached with old yardsticks.²⁰

Khrushchev does not go so far as to claim that the complete abolition of war is possible even though capitalism remains in existence. As long as there are capitalist countries in the world, war can only be avoided. Its total abolition must wait until "mankind has established a society in which there will no longer be the rich and poor, in which all will be equal and all derive equal benefit from the blessings of collective labor."²¹ In other words, the total abolition of war is only possible when communism has been victorious throughout the world.

Khrushchev reasons that war is avoidable today owing to the nature of the international environment. This international environment has changed in such a way as to make the avoidance of war possible. Khrushchev admits that in Marxist-Leninist doctrine there is the notion that wars are inevitable as long as capitalism exists. This notion,

¹⁹Khrushchev, For Peaceful Competition and Cooperation, op. cit., p. 14.

²⁰"Let Us Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement . . . ,"
op. cit., p. 4.

²¹Khrushchev, For Peaceful Competition and Cooperation, op. cit., p. 7.

however, applied to a period when forces opposing war were weak. Today there is a powerful camp of socialism which opposes war. There are also many other countries which are not within the socialist camp, but who oppose imperialism and war. This belief has led Khrushchev to the conclusion that "war is not fatalistically inevitable."²²

Khrushchev argues further that the socialist countries have no need for war. In fact, world war would be to the disadvantage of the socialist countries owing to the destructive nature of thermonuclear weapons. The classes which would benefit from war have long since been abolished in the socialist countries. The socialist bloc has no economic dependence upon countries outside of the bloc, as it is self-sufficient regarding raw materials and markets.²³ In short, socialism is "successfully developing in peaceful conditions and will gain the victory of peaceful economic competition with capitalism, which will be exceptionally important for leading all peoples to choose the socialist way as the only right way."²⁴

Khrushchev contends that the strength of the socialist camp not only deters capitalist attack, but also prevents war among the capitalists themselves. The Chinese look upon conflict among capitalist nations as a source of revolutionary exploitation. The Russians, however, deny that such conflict is to the advantage of socialism.²⁵ In his Twentieth

²²Khrushchev, "The International Position of the Soviet Union," op. cit., p. 448.

²³Ibid., p. 446.

²⁴"Let Us Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement . . . ," op. cit., p. 4.

²⁵Burin, op. cit., p. 353.

Party Congress speech of 1956 Khrushchev obscured the distinction between war among capitalist countries and war between capitalist countries and the Socialist Bloc. He declared that all forms of war are avoidable and by implication undesirable to communist countries.²⁶

The strategy of the Soviets seems to indicate that they desire to avoid war in general. As the Chinese have pointed out at great length, however, there are many forms of armed conflict, and it would be difficult to prove that all of these various forms are to the disadvantage of socialist revolution. The Russians adopt no general rule in this regard, but rather evaluate each instance on its own merits. They have, for example, sought to foment localized conflicts among the non-communist countries. This would be of no cost to the Soviet Union, but highly profitable in terms of creating chaos in the Western camp, placing a heavy military expenditure burden upon the West, and creating favorable situations for communist seizure of power.²⁷

This question of localized conflicts may best be considered in relation to the problem of national-liberation wars. In Khrushchev's thinking, national-liberation war differs from other types of war. Of all the various forms of war, national-liberation war is the only form considered desirable. It is desirable because it constitutes a form of revolutionary struggle, and in this sense contributes to the spread of socialism.

²⁶Ibid., p. 341.

²⁷Goodman, op. cit., p. 324.

These uprisings must not be identified with wars among states, with local wars, because in these uprisings the people are fighting to exercise their right to self-determination and for their social and independent national development; these are uprisings against rotten reactionary regimes and against colonialists. Communists fully and unreservedly support such just wars and march in the van of the peoples fighting wars of liberation.²⁸

Moreover, these wars are inevitable.

There will be wars of liberation as long as imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only possible but inevitable, since the colonialists will not voluntarily grant the peoples independence. Therefore the peoples can win their freedom and independence only through struggle, including armed struggle.²⁹

The Russians adhere to this position, however, only up to a point. Khrushchev is bothered by the fact that these local wars, or wars of liberation, may develop into larger conflicts which would eventually involve the Soviet Union and the United States. He argues at one point that the colonial peoples will inevitably seek independence, that the Soviet Union is committed to the support of these independence struggles, and that the imperialist nations will by nature seek to suppress these efforts. At another he argues that local conflicts will escalate into larger confrontations, eventually involving nuclear weapons. He argues further that "if the peoples of all countries are united and mobilized, if they wage a tireless struggle, uniting their forces both within each country and on an international scale, wars can be averted."³⁰

²⁸Khrushchev, "For New Victories . . . ," op. cit., p. 9.

²⁹Idem.

³⁰Idem.

The Russian policy position skirts this issue. The Russians have courted the neutral nations in an effort to bring these nations into a favorable position vis-a-vis Russia in the arena of international politics. Countries within the Western camp have been encouraged to adopt a neutral posture. This has been more the pattern of Soviet foreign policy than the giving of support to efforts against colonialism. There are two possible explanations for this situation. The Russians may have given up the idea of spreading communism to the colonial areas--a possibility which is extremely unlikely--or they may feel that the national-liberation movement can take care of itself, that nothing can stop the anti-colonialist struggle. Soviet commitment need only be moral support and token economic aid. The Soviet Union must avoid any deep involvement in this struggle, moreover, for fear of bringing about a nuclear confrontation with the West.³¹

Based upon their argument that war can no longer be considered a revolutionary tactic but is undesirable in contemporary international politics, the Soviets claim to be favorably disposed towards disarmament.³² They claim that disarmament will not weaken the revolutionary movement, but will, rather, strengthen it. If there were disarmament, the colonial powers would lose the means whereby they keep their colonies subjugated. The imperialists would be forced to withdraw their overseas

³¹ Kuusinen, op. cit., pp. 114-116.

³² Khrushchev, For Peaceful Competition and Cooperation, op. cit., p. 40.

bases, thus removing a major obstacle to the national-liberation movement. Disarmament would not weaken the national-liberation movement, moreover, as the military capacity of this movement is negligible. The only ones who would be weakened by disarmament would be the occupying colonial powers.³³

Khrushchev admits that his ideas do not conform to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. He justifies his theoretical position by claiming that Marxism-Leninism is not a rigid dogma, but a broad guide for action. He argues that communist doctrine does not have a meaning fixed once and for all, and that answers to questions are the same regardless of the context. In order for communism to be an effective guide, it must be tempered by practical experience. "Revolutionary theory is not a collection of fossilized dogmas and formulas, but a militant guide to practical activity for changing the world and building communism. Marxism-Leninism teaches that theory divorced from practice is dead and practice that is not illumined by revolutionary theory is blind."³⁴

Tactics--Peaceful Coexistence. If war no longer can be considered as a means for the settlement of disputes between nations, as Khrushchev argues, then some other means must be found for resolving the conflict between the socialist and capitalist countries. Khrushchev maintains

³³"The National-Liberation Movement . . . , " Kommunist (January, 1962), condensed as "The Anti-Colonial Movement and World Communism," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XIV (March 7, 1962), p. 4.

³⁴Nikita S. Khrushchev, "Report of the Central Committee . . . , " Pravda (February 15, 1956), reprinted as "Khrushchev's Report to the Party Congress--Concluded," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VIII (March 21, 1956), p. 7.

that this conflict can be resolved through peaceful coexistence and competition. "We in all sincerity say to the capitalist countries, let us compete not to see who can make the largest number of H-bombs and missiles . . . but to see who can build more houses, schools and hospitals, produce more bread, milk, meat, clothes and other consumer goods."³⁵

Through peaceful coexistence nuclear war can be avoided and the differences and contradictions between capitalism and socialism can be settled in a non-violent, competitive way.³⁶

Peaceful coexistence neither abdicates nor compromises the goals of communism, Khrushchev contends. All that is involved is a change in tactics. The fact that Russia is fighting for the cause of communism does not eliminate the possibility of peaceful coexistence. The fight for communism is an ideological struggle and does not involve the relations between governments.³⁷ Although imperialism relies upon war as a tactical device, the strength of the socialist bloc checks the ability of the imperialist nations to make war. The socialist countries, moreover, do not need war to be victorious. The victory of socialism over capitalism is inevitable.³⁸ The strength of the socialist bloc makes it possible for socialism to be achieved peacefully. Today it is possible for socialism to be achieved through parliamentary means.³⁹

³⁵Khrushchev, For Peaceful Competition and Cooperation, op. cit., p. 10.

³⁶Ibid., p. 9.

³⁷Khrushchev, "The International Position of the Soviet Union," op. cit., p. 447.

³⁸"Let Us Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement . . .," op. cit., p. 5.

³⁹Khrushchev, "For New Victories . . .," op. cit., p. 13.

The Soviets appear to be faced with a major tactical dilemma. They claim to fear, and I think sincerely, the consequences of nuclear war and the fact that small brush fire wars may escalate into nuclear war. Yet, they are forced by commitment to Marxism-Leninism to advocate some form of violent revolution. To completely abandon all armed struggle as a revolutionary tactic would be going too far. Consequently, they support the national-liberation movement, but with serious reservations.

Tactics--The Underdeveloped Areas. The Russian position on war and the national-liberation movement is an integral part of the tactical problem regarding the underdeveloped countries. It is in the underdeveloped countries that the national-liberation movement is taking place. The Russians claim to offer economic and technical aid to the underdeveloped countries with no strings attached.⁴⁰ They have committed themselves, moreover, to the support of national-liberation revolutions. "The Soviet Union is doing everything possible to promote the progress of national-liberation revolutions, to achieve the earliest abolition of the shameful colonial system. It has unfailingly lent a helping hand to all peoples rising against imperialism and colonialism."⁴¹ The reservations that the Russians make with regard to the national-liberation movement appear to be related to the degree of conflict between the imperialist countries and the colonial or semi-colonial areas. If the national-liberation movement in a particular country takes the form of armed conflict with the colonial power, then the Russians avoid involvement.

⁴⁰Khrushchev, For Peaceful Competition and Cooperation, op. cit., pp. 26-29.

⁴¹"Let Us Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement . . . ,"
op. cit., p. 8.

Khrushchev contends that peaceful coexistence will further the cause of national-liberation movements and make it possible for the underdeveloped areas to attain economic independence. A situation of peaceful coexistence creates favorable conditions for the further development of the national-liberation movement. Under a state of peaceful coexistence the socialist countries are able to lend moral, political, and material support. If the colonies are struggling for political independence, the Soviet Union can expose the colonists and arouse public opinion. If the struggle is for economic independence, the socialist camp can lend extensive economic aid. "Only if there is peaceful coexistence is there a firm political basis for the struggle waged by the underdeveloped countries for economic independence."⁴²

The Russian tactic in support of national-liberation movements has been to marshall world public opinion against Western colonial powers and to threaten intervention should the colonial powers resort to force to maintain their control. The Russians have not lived up to their commitment to use force, however. Generally, they have been saved by the West backing down.

Several instances may be cited to demonstrate Russia's reluctance to become involved in open conflict and, perhaps, reach a military confrontation with the West. In 1953 while Khrushchev was First Secretary of the Central Committee in charge of its foreign department, the Communist Tudeh Party in Iran was on the threshold of seizing power. Khrushchev refrained from giving the Tudeh the go-ahead to take over. The opportunity

⁴²"The National-Liberation Movement . . . , " op. cit., p. 4.

soon passed and Iran moved into the Western camp. Russia also was reluctant throughout the Algerian Civil War to commit herself completely to the rebel FLN. During the Lebanese crisis of 1958 the Soviet Union, although making loud protests, did not move to meet Western force in kind. China took the opposite position in 1958 by offering to send Chinese "volunteers" to aid the Iraqi rebels.⁴³

Soviet Foreign policy attaches great importance to the support of underdeveloped economies. The Russians contend that development of independent economies in the former colonial areas based upon assistance from the Soviet Union will deal a blow to imperialism. Soviet economic aid to the underdeveloped countries has not been extensive, however. This aid has generally been given to selected countries where the aid may be expected to produce a more favorable relationship to the Soviet Union.⁴⁴

In addition to their unwillingness to support the underdeveloped countries militarily, the Russians attach a second reservation. Frequent warning has been given to the Communist Parties of the underdeveloped areas to be cautious and not unduly hasty in attempting to set up communist regimes. The Russians claim that before socialist revolution can be successful in the underdeveloped countries, a stage consisting of a national front is necessary in order to fight Western political influence

⁴³Dallin, op. cit., pp. 213, 220; "Eisenhower's Topsy-turvy Logic," Peking Review, July 29, 1958, pp. 6-8.

⁴⁴"A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," op. cit., pp. 28-29.

and to root out capitalist economic forms.⁴⁵ This is apparently an attempt to avoid large-scale revolutionary upheavals which might involve Western countries and the Communist Bloc and which could conceivably end in failure. What the Soviets want is for each individual country, with aid from the Soviet Union, to divest itself of all ties with the West, become economically dependent upon the Socialist Bloc, establish a viable socialist system along the lines set down by the Soviet Union, and only then establish a working partnership with the Soviet Union. The Russians figure they cannot afford the humiliation that would result should a country adopt a communist system and be accepted as such by Russia and then renounce communism and become Western oriented.

The Russians base their reasoning for the need of a national front upon the idea that revolutions cannot be stirred up where the conditions are not yet right. The first task in promoting socialism is to bring about those conditions which make the success of socialist revolution inevitable. The main prerequisite for a successful socialist revolution is the existence of a favorable attitude of the masses toward socialist revolution and the active support of these masses for the cause of the revolution. The Party should not engineer a revolution, even though it appears it would be successful, unless there is broad popular support.⁴⁶

The development of favorable revolutionary conditions, moreover, is the responsibility of the Party of each country. The revolutionary

⁴⁵New York Times, September 24, 1962, pp. 1, 4.

⁴⁶"Speech by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev . . . ,"op. cit., p. 18.

struggle cannot be directed by some outside force which is unaware of the local conditions. "The struggle in capitalist countries is an internal matter for the workers' movement in each country. Only the party of the proletariat in the individual capitalist country, and not other states and parties, has the right and is in a position to determine revolutionary tactics and the forms and methods of struggle."⁴⁷

The Russian equivocation and inconsistency toward underdeveloped countries and the national-liberation movement has weakened her position within international communism. The attitude of hesitant and qualified commitment to socialist revolution has weakened Soviet ideological leadership. It is in relation to these questions that the most severe Chinese attacks are directed.

Summary. The Tactical argument of Khrushchev has had serious consequences for Marxism-Leninism. Khrushchev is forced to admit that he has demanded considerable change in the tactical requirements of communist theory. He claims that this change is required by the nature of the modern world and the problems facing communist expansion. Nevertheless, in order to justify his claim to be the heir of Marx and Lenin, he must vindicate his position in terms of what Marx and Lenin said.

Khrushchev argues that Marxism-Leninism requires theoretical re-orientation as new problems arise. "On the basis of the teaching of Marxism-Leninism we must think ourselves, profoundly study life, analyze the present situation and draw the conclusions which benefit the common

⁴⁷Idem.

cause of communism."⁴⁸ This argument is, of course, not peculiar to Khrushchev. Lenin took almost the exact same position in relation to Marx.

Communist doctrine is not a body of dogma, Khrushchev argues, that has one meaning fixed for all time. One cannot simply quote a passage from Marx or Lenin and thereby unquestionably justify a position. New factors exist which did not exist at the time of Marx or Lenin. These new factors are such as to render obsolete many former principles. ". . . One cannot mechanically repeat . . . what Vladimir Ilyich Lenin said many decades ago on imperialism, and go on asserting that imperialist wars are inevitable until socialism triumphs throughout the world."⁴⁹

What communists must do, therefore, is to take the teachings of Marx and Lenin as a foundation or starting point. These teachings must then be made to conform to changing historical conditions. Lenin did this with regard to the teachings of Marx. Modern communists must do it with regard to Lenin. Failure to modernize doctrine will make of communism a sterile anachronism.⁵⁰

Khrushchev's attempt to change communist teachings to fit modern circumstances has compromised Moscow's position as theoretical leader. By destroying the position of Stalin and repudiating his principles, Khrushchev has undermined his own position in the international communist

⁴⁸ Nikita S. Khrushchev, "Speech to Rumanian Communist Party in Bucharest on June 21," Soviet News, No. 4292 (June 22, 1960), abridged in The Sino-Soviet Dispute, ed. Hudson, Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar, op. cit., p. 137.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 136.

⁵⁰ Kuusinen, op. cit., p. 116.

movement.⁵¹ If it is possible to denounce Stalin as the infallible interpreter of Marxism-Leninism, then Khrushchev will be hard-pressed to justify his own ability to interpret the true nature of communism. He has opened himself up to attack within the Soviet Union and has made it possible for Communist Parties of other lands to legitimately criticize the ideological leadership of the Kremlin.⁵²

The upheavals in Central Europe further weakened the position of the Soviet Union. China offered her good offices in an effort to settle the difficulties. The very fact that she was in a position to make such an offer increased her stature in the international communist movement. Central Europe before 1956 was considered the inviolate domain of the Soviet Union. That the Chinese were able to offer intervention in the affairs between the Soviet Union and Central Europe has challenged the dominant position of Russia.⁵³

Generally speaking, the Russians have been able to establish peaceful coexistence and the elimination of war as broad principles of general strategy, but they have been unable to establish these principles as strategic absolutes. They have been unable to say that all efforts should be directed toward the promotion of peace or that all forms of armed conflict must be subordinated to the interest of preserving world peace. They have been unable to force acceptance of this line upon the Communist Parties of other countries through Party

⁵¹N. S. Khrushchev, "Text of Khrushchev's Report to the Party Congress," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VIII (March 7, 1956), p. 3ff.

⁵²The Sino-Soviet Dispute, ed. Hudson, Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar, op. cit., p. 2.

⁵³Ibid., p. 3.

discipline, nor have they entirely followed this line themselves. The introduction of missiles into Cuba hardly seems to conform to the scheme of peaceful coexistence. To an even greater extent they have been unable to gag the Chinese criticism of the Russian theoretical position.⁵⁴

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 30-31.

CHAPTER VII

MAO TSE-TUNG

View of the World. In Mao's view the world is divided into opposites. As early as 1926 he argued that the world is characterized by the conflict between the camp of revolution or socialism and the camp of counter-revolution or imperialism. It is impossible for a nation to avoid siding with one or the other of these two camps. This line of thinking is clearly reminiscent of Stalin's position on the same issue. Any country that is not identified with either of the two camps but is caught up in the middle of this dichotomy will sooner or later be forced to take sides in the struggle. There can be no middle ground in Mao's thinking, because neutrality is practically impossible.¹

The conflict between the camps of socialism and imperialism is the struggle between good and evil. Socialism is the side of good, while imperialism is the side of evil. The Chinese claim the United States is the paragon of evil. Everything that the Chinese consider evil and undesirable is represented by the United States. Every evil occurrence is a product of United States policy. Chinese communists have always held to this view. Only the intensity of the feeling has fluctuated. United States policy in Asia, the opposition to recognition of the Chinese communist regime by the United States, and opposition to Chinese membership

¹Mao Tse-tung, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," Mao Tse-tung: An Anthology of His Writings, ed. Anne Fremantle (New York: New American Library, 1962), p. 53.

in the United Nations by the United States are cited as examples of intransigent American imperialism.² ". . . U.S. imperialism is the common enemy of the people of the world, the international gendarme suppressing the just struggle of the people of various countries, and the chief bulwark of modern colonialism."³

Capitalism is by nature imperialistic, and as long as capitalist nations exist there will be imperialism. Imperialist aggression leads to the exploitation and oppression of colonial peoples. Further, competition for colonies leads to conflict among the imperialist powers.⁴ The conflict between the imperialists and the colonial peoples and the conflict among the imperialists themselves is inevitable and unreconcilable. These conflicts will continue to exist as long as capitalism exists.

The time when the imperialists were able to impose their will upon the world is now coming to an end, however. The appearance of the socialist bloc has challenged imperialist superiority. "I am of the opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. . . . I think the characteristic of the situation today is the East wind prevailing over the West wind. That is to say, the socialist forces are overwhelmingly superior to the imperialist forces."⁵

²Werner Levi, Modern China's Foreign Policy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953), pp. 284-289.

³"More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us," Honggui, March 4, 1963, reprinted in Peking Review, March 15, 1963, p. 20.

⁴Ibid., pp. 14-15.

⁵Mao Tse-tung, Speech at Moscow, November 18, 1957, Chinese Communism: Selected Documents, ed. Dan N. Jacobs and Hans H. Baerwald (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 154.

Mao maintains that this change in the international situation is the product of two factors. First, he argues that the capitalist system is subject to internal weaknesses which are leading to its collapse.

"The imperialist camp is fast heading for division and disintegration. This shows that imperialism is rotting day by day. The insurmountable internal contradictions within the imperialist camp reveal that it is in serious difficulties."⁶ Second, he claims that the military power of the imperialist nations is inferior to the power of the socialist bloc. On the basis of the orbiting of the first Soviet Sputnik on October 4, 1957, the Chinese became convinced that the balance of military power had shifted to the communist bloc. ". . . The Soviet Union is overwhelmingly superior in the field of rockets and guided missiles."⁷

The belief in the military superiority of the communist bloc led the Chinese to adopt a militant tactical position. Since 1957 Mao has argued that the forces of socialism, meaning Russian arms, can crush imperialist countries. This gives communists greater freedom of movement and, Mao argues, opens the way for more aggressive revolutionary tactics.⁸

The change in the international power situation does not mean that the theory of Marx and Lenin has become obsolete.

⁶"Rapid Disintegration of Imperialist Bloc," Renmin Ribao, February 24, 1963, reprinted in Peking Review, March 1, 1963, p. 20.

⁷Sung Tu, "Answers to Readers' Queries on War and Peace," Chungkuo Ch'ingnien, February 16, 1960, in Chinese Communism: Selected Documents, op. cit., p. 160.

⁸Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China Strategy in the Nuclear Age (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 76-83.

The present world situation has obviously undergone tremendous changes since Lenin's lifetime, but these changes have not proved the obsolescence of Leninism; on the contrary, they have more and more clearly confirmed the truths revealed by Lenin and all the theories he advanced during the struggle to defend revolutionary Marxism and develop Marxism.

The nature of socialism has not changed, nor has the nature of imperialism. Imperialist nations still possess aggressive tendencies as they did in the time of Marx and Lenin. "Imperialism has created grave dangers for all mankind through its plans for launching a nuclear war."¹⁰ Due to the superiority of power held by the communist bloc, however, any aggression by the imperialists will be defeated. This defeat, moreover, would be to the advantage of the communist countries, as upon the ruins of imperialism a new socialist civilization could be erected.

As long as the people of all countries enhance their awareness and are fully prepared, with the socialist camp also mastering modern weapons, it is certain that if the U.S. or other imperialists refuse to reach an agreement of the banning of atomic and nuclear weapons and should dare to fly in the face of the will of all humanity by launching a war using atomic and nuclear weapons, the result will be the very speedy destruction of these monsters encircled by the peoples of the world, and the result will certainly not be the annihilation of mankind. . . . On the debris of a dead imperialism, the victorious people would create very swiftly a civilization thousands of times higher than the capitalist system and a truly beautiful future for themselves.

The success of socialism, the Chinese argue, depends upon the unity of the communist bloc. They have been unable to get unqualified

⁹"Long Live Leninism," Red Flag, No. 8, 1960, in The Sino-Soviet Dispute, ed. Hudson, Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar, op. cit., p. 86.

¹⁰"A Great Anti-Imperialist Call," Hung-Ch'i, December 16, 1960, in Chinese Communism: Selected Documents, op. cit., p. 189.

¹¹"Long Live Leninism," op. cit., pp. 93-94.

endorsement for their actions from the Russians, nor have the Russians been eager for the Chinese to acquire nuclear weapons. This, the Chinese argue, indicates some diversity within the socialist bloc. The Chinese idea of communist bloc unity apparently would involve Russian support of Chinese revolutionary tactics.¹²

Although the Chinese have been unable to get general acceptance of their position, they have, since the Korean War, been able to exert themselves to a greater extent within the communist bloc. Chinese involvement in the Korean conflict, the demands for aid that China placed upon Russia at that time, and Soviet compliance with these demands mark the first phase in the rise of China's prestige within the communist bloc.¹³ Yet, the Chinese must be careful not to overstep themselves. They realize that as much as they would like to exert a pronounced influence upon revolutionary tactics, they owe their safety to Soviet arms. As long as China's national well-being is dependent upon the military might of the Soviet Union, the influence of China upon communist revolutionary tactics will be restricted.

The implications of Mao's view of the world are quite simple. "The logic which the imperialists and all the reactionaries in the world will follow and never desert is to cause trouble and end in failure, to cause trouble again and end in failure again until destruction."¹⁴ This view narrowly confines Chinese activity in the international political arena. Her extreme position obliges China to maintain economic and

¹²Hsieh, op. cit., pp. 84-87.

¹³Dallin, op. cit., p. 88.

¹⁴Sung Tu, op. cit., p. 161.

political relations for security purposes with only communist countries. Settlement of any security problem with capitalist countries is out of the question. This position also compromises China's efforts for economic growth by obstructing trade with capitalist countries.¹⁵

Tactics--The Protracted Struggle. Mao's tactical position is to a large extent a product of China's history. The Chinese have suffered considerable humiliation and oppression at the hands of the West for more than one-hundred years. Present Western hostility toward China only serves to exacerbate Chinese alienation built up as a result of nineteenth century imperialism.¹⁶

The practical experience of the Chinese Communist Party also played a key role in the formulation of tactics. The doctrine of the protracted struggle was outlined by Mao and employed by the communists in the war against Japan. After the defeat of Japan they employed a similar strategy in the Civil War against the Kuomintang. The communists were crowned with success by their accession to power in 1949. The Chinese communists claim that the strategy of the protracted struggle is a valid tactical position today. This strategy calls for the use of force, the threat to use force, support of wars of liberation and other revolutionary struggles, indirect aggression or guerilla warfare, and coexistence, but not cooperation, with the West.¹⁷

¹⁵R. G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1962), pp. 58-59.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 56-57.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 90-93.

Although Mao and the Chinese communists claim the success of communism is inevitable, this success depends upon concentrated human effort.¹⁸ Merely to talk about the desirability of revolution is not enough. An active campaign to bring it about must be waged.

A revolutionary party will never achieve the hoped for victory if it merely proclaims the target of revolution without seriously and prudently coming to grips with the enemy in the course of revolutionary struggle and without gradually building up and expanding the revolutionary forces, if it treats revolution simply as a matter for talk, or if it simply strikes out blindly.¹⁹

Successful revolution, moreover, requires a particular type of leadership.

"Only . . . a revolutionary party can lead the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys, winning a thorough victory in the national democratic revolution and winning the socialist revolution."²⁰ This is one concept over which there is no disagreement with the Russians. The emphasis upon the predominant role of the Party has been a characteristic of communist thinking since Lenin.

China's nuclear weakness caused a soft-peddling of the protracted struggle idea from 1955 to October, 1957. With the launching of Russia's first Sputnik, China considered her position improved. Although China's range of activity has been limited by her military weakness, she considers herself secure under the umbrella of Soviet nuclear weapons.²¹

¹⁸Mao Tse-tung, Speech to Supreme Soviet of USSR, November 6, 1957, in Chinese Communism: Selected Documents, op. cit., p. 147.

¹⁹"More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us," op. cit., p. 48.

²⁰"A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," Peking Review, June 21, 1963, p. 21.

²¹Hsieh, op. cit., pp. 15-75.

It is possible that Mao's strategy of the protracted struggle has retarded the appreciation of nuclear war by the Chinese military establishment. The concept of protracted war involves total political, economic, psychological, and military commitment. It rejects the idea of quick, decisive, and truly military war. It places emphasis on strategic withdrawal, avoidance of decisive battles, and abandonment of territory in order to achieve the ultimate victory. It calls for offensive action only when victory appears certain and subordinates military considerations to political-revolutionary objectives. Nuclear war cannot be easily included within such a strategic framework. The acceptance of Mao's strategic ideas by China's leadership and the successful application of these ideas may have prevented the realization that nuclear weapons and modern delivery systems have revolutionized the nature of warfare.²²

Tactics--The Question of War. Although Mao claims to be opposed to war in general, he argues that there are just and unjust wars. Revolutionary wars are just wars and should be supported, while counter-revolutionary wars are unjust wars and must be opposed.²³ Mao does not believe in the inevitability of world war, but rather in the probability of limited war. The Chinese use of limited war for the extension of their

²²Ibid., pp. 13-14.

²³Mao Tse-tung, "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War," in Mao Tse-tung: An Anthology of His Writings, op. cit., p. 77.

control over Southeast Asia is an example of a just war. The Russians fear that limited wars will mushroom into world conflict.²⁴

Mao contends that war is a product of imperialism. As long as imperialism exists there will be war. The strength of the forces of peace, however, can be united and expanded, and a world war can thus be avoided.

Modern war is a continuation of the imperialist policy. Owing to the changes of the balance of the international class forces, a combined struggle by the powerful forces which are defending peace can be relied on in preventing a new world war, and it cannot be said that world war is totally inevitable under any conditions. Nevertheless, as long as imperialism exists, there will be soil for wars of aggression; hence likewise it can be said that the danger of a new world war is not over.²⁵

Although the imperialists are responsible for starting wars, they will suffer from the consequences. "Should the imperialists start a war of aggression, we, together with the people of the whole world, will certainly wipe them off the face of the earth."²⁶

The Chinese challenge the position that it is desirable or possible to avoid all forms of war. They maintain that a condition of war exists when imperialists suppress national-liberation movements or interfere with socialist revolutions. Wars which stem from the nature of imperialism are unavoidable and should be exploited by communist countries.²⁷ "As Marxist-Leninists see it, war is the continuation of politics by

²⁴Chinese Communism: Selected Documents, op. cit., p. 8.

²⁵Wu Chiang, "Our Age and Edward Kardelj's 'Dialectics'," Hung-Ch'i, March, 1962, in Ibid., p. 210.

²⁶Mao Tse-tung, Speech at Moscow, November 18, 1957, op. cit., p. 156.

²⁷"Long Live Leninism," op. cit., p. 88.

other means, and every war is inseparable from the political system and the political struggles which give rise to it."²⁸ The Russians argue that wars of national-liberation and imperialist interference with peaceful socialist revolution can be avoided owing to the strength of the socialist bloc and should be avoided for fear of escalation to nuclear war.

It is impossible, therefore, to avoid all forms of war as long as imperialism exists. A world free from armed conflict depends upon success in the struggle for socialism.

According to the Leninist viewpoint, world peace can be won only by the struggles of the people in all countries. . . . World peace can only be effectively defended by relying on the development of the forces of the socialist camp, on the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat and working people of all countries, on the liberation struggles of the oppressed nations and on the struggles of all peace-loving people and countries.²⁹

The desire and quest for peace should not obscure the fact that violence is still a useful revolutionary tool. "The central task--and the highest form of a revolution--is to seize political power by armed force and decide issues by war."³⁰ The Chinese notion of the nature of revolution, moreover, requires the use of violence. "Revolution means the use of revolutionary violence by the oppressed classes, it means revolutionary war."³¹ The idea that it is possible to extend socialism

²⁸"A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," op. cit., p. 13.

²⁹Ibid., p. 14.

³⁰Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," in Chinese Communism: Selected Documents, op. cit., p. 45.

³¹"Long Live Leninism," op. cit., p. 101.

without violence, without civil war, amounts to revisionism and abandonment of the quest for world communism.³²

The Red Army has the same function in contemporary Chinese communist thinking that it did in the thinking of Stalin. When a communist army is compelled to fight a war against imperialism, it may legitimately go beyond its own borders to pursue and eliminate its enemies. Whenever the Red Army finds itself in such a situation, it is altogether proper to exert revolutionary influence. "Since the armed forces of the socialist countries fight for justice, when these forces have to go beyond their borders to counter-attack a foreign enemy, it is only natural that they should exert an influence and have an effect wherever they go . . . !"³³

The emergence of nuclear weapons as a factor in international politics has not changed the possibility and necessity of revolutionary upheaval. Modern science and technology and the development of their weapons have not rendered the concepts of Marxism-Leninism obsolete. These concepts are accurate today just as they were during the time of Marx and Lenin.³⁴

. . . We have always held that in the final analysis atomic weapons cannot change the laws governing the historical development of society, cannot decide the final outcome of war, cannot save imperialism from its doom or prevent the proletariat and the people of all countries and the oppressed nations from winning victory in their revolutions.³⁵

³²Burin, op. cit., pp. 334-354.

³³"Long Live Leninism," op. cit., p. 100.

³⁴Ibid., p. 90.

³⁵"More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us," op. cit., p. 26.

Mao minimizes the consequences of nuclear war. The atomic bomb is simply a device whereby the imperialist nations seek to blackmail and frighten other nations into accepting their demands. "The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon."³⁶ The advantage in nuclear weapons lies with the socialist countries. As a result, they would benefit from nuclear war. The only possible outcome of such a war would be the victory of socialism and the destruction of the capitalist system. The socialist system could then be swiftly built on the ruins of capitalism.³⁷

Tactics--Peaceful Coexistence. The Chinese reject the Russian position on peaceful coexistence. The Chinese contend that the adoption of a strategy for the international communist movement based upon peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition, and peaceful transition to socialism discards or ignores the historical mission of the proletariat and rejects the revolutionary teachings of Marxism-Leninism.³⁸

The contradictions between capitalism and socialism cannot be settled peacefully. The Chinese regard as erroneous "the view which

³⁶Mao Tse-tung, "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," in Mao Tse-tung: An Anthology of His Writings, op. cit., pp. 178-9.

³⁷"More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us," op. cit., p. 27.

³⁸"A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," op. cit., p. 7.

maintains that the contradictions between the two world systems of socialism and capitalism will automatically disappear in the course of 'economic competition'"39 Peaceful coexistence can only serve as a revolutionary propaganda weapon. Although the communists would always prefer to bring about the transition to socialism by peaceful means, the Chinese argue, it is not possible for this desire for peaceful transition to be made into a new strategic principle for the international communist movement. Marxism-Leninism teaches that the ruling class never relinquishes power willingly. It must be taken by force. This is a universal law of nature.⁴⁰

The Chinese tactical position requires a "revolutionary struggle by the people of all countries and of carrying the proletarian world revolution forward to the end"41 Peaceful coexistence should not be confused with the development of the revolution. Peaceful coexistence amounts to relations between political systems, not between the oppressed and the oppressor. The class struggle always prevails. "Peaceful coexistence cannot replace the revolutionary struggles of the people. The transition from capitalism to socialism in any country can only be brought about through the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country."⁴² The nature and objectives of imperialism make it impossible for peaceful coexistence to prevail.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 8.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 11.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴² Ibid., p. 15.

Imperialism seeks to dominate all countries of the world, to suppress the revolutions of the people, to destroy the socialist countries; in short, to subject everyone to imperialist monopoly capital.⁴³

Further, the abolition of armed forces is impossible. "An elementary knowledge of Marxism-Leninism tells us that armed forces are the principal part of the state machine and that a so-called world without weapons and without armed forces can only be a world without states."⁴⁴ This condition, of course, will prevail only when communism exists throughout the world.

The Russian proposal to cut their armed forces as a disarmament overture with the intention of using the money saved to aid underdeveloped countries has been opposed by the Chinese. They argue that if the Russians cut their armed forces they may lose their military advantage for fighting local wars.⁴⁵ The Chinese maintain, moreover, that disarmament is not possible given the present world situation. The imperialists do not want disarmament, but rather seek to expand their military capabilities. They will never willingly disarm themselves. As their position begins to decline, the imperialists will be forced to rely more and more upon the use of armed forces.

It is exactly because of their downfall that the imperialists depend still more closely on the use of naked violence to enforce their domestic and international policies of opposing socialism, seizing colonies, suppressing their own people, and enslaving the

⁴³ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 14.

⁴⁵ Donald S. Zagoria, A Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 290-294.

whole world; ⁴⁶that they desperately expand their armament in preparation for war.

The Chinese contend that the Soviet acceptance of the limited test ban treaty amounts to a capitulation to the West. All the benefits of this treaty accrue to the West.⁴⁷ The limited test ban treaty does not serve the interests of world peace, does not restrain the United States from preparing for nuclear war or using nuclear blackmail. The only thing it accomplishes is to prevent peace-loving countries, such as China, from increasing their defense capability.⁴⁸

The signing of the test ban treaty puts China in a position where her freedom of action is seriously limited with regard to nuclear weapons. China is now in the position where she must either accede to the test ban agreement and thus renounce any claim to an independent nuclear capability short of what the Soviet Union may be willing to grant, or of openly disregarding and ignoring world opinion by defying the test ban and developing her own nuclear capability.⁴⁹

The Chinese oppose the test ban treaty or any attempt to reach accord with the West. For the Chinese, all evil and wrong-doing stems from imperialism. Consequently, there should be no attempt to compromise with imperialism, for this would be a compromise with evil. "With

⁴⁶Sung Tu, op. cit., p. 164.

⁴⁷"The 'General Line of Peaceful Coexistence' Leads to Capitulation," Peking Review, August 9, 1963, pp. 26-34.

⁴⁸"Statement of the Chinese Government," Peking Review, August 2, 1963, p. 7.

⁴⁹Zagoria, op. cit., p. 294.

the imperialists we should not compromise; for the imperialists are a bunch of creatures that submit to force but never listen to persuasion."⁵⁰ In order to achieve a world without war, imperialism must be eliminated by a long, complicated, and violent struggle.⁵¹

The transition to socialism cannot be achieved by peaceful means. The Chinese oppose the notion that the cause of socialism can be advanced by participation in parliamentary bodies and by social reform. Although the Chinese suggest that communists should take part in parliamentary systems, they caution that in a bourgeois state, parliament is controlled by the bourgeoisie. It is not likely, therefore, that the communists will be able to transform the bourgeois system through parliamentary action.⁵² Communists should participate in parliamentary systems in order to use these systems as forums for attacking bourgeois society and for pointing out to the masses the bourgeois character of the parliament. Political struggles should not be confined to parliamentary processes, because communists cannot hope to bring about the destruction of the bourgeois system by peaceful change. "The emancipation of the proletariat can only be arrived at by the road of revolution, and certainly not by the road of reformism."⁵³

⁵⁰ Sung Tu, op. cit., p. 166.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 164.

⁵² "Long Live Leninism," op. cit., p. 107.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 83.

Tactics--The Underdeveloped Areas. The Chinese regard the present as unprecedentedly favorable for national-liberation movements in the colonial and semi-colonial areas.⁵⁴ This is because imperialism is becoming increasingly unstable. Imperialists must resort more and more frequently to war to further their own political ends and to put down the resistance of oppressed peoples and nations.⁵⁵

In the Chinese view the national-liberation movements and the international socialist revolutionary movement are the two great historical currents of the present time. The most vulnerable areas of imperialism are the colonial and semi-colonial areas--Asia, Africa, and Latin America--and the success of the international proletarian movement depends upon the outcome of the struggle in these areas.⁵⁶

The revolutionary struggles of the world, including the national-liberation movements, cannot be stopped. Communists must, without hesitation, commit themselves to the support of these struggles. "No force on earth can hinder or restrain the peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies from rising in revolution and smashing the yoke they are under. . . . All revolutionary Marxist-Leninists should support these just struggles, resolutely and without the slightest reservation."⁵⁷

⁵⁴Lu Ting-yi, "Unite Under Lenin's Revolutionary Banner," April 22, 1960, in Chinese Communism: Selected Documents, op. cit., p. 172.

⁵⁵"More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us," op. cit., p. 24.

⁵⁶"A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," op. cit., p. 9.

⁵⁷Lu Ting-yi, op. cit., p. 176.

Unless the proletarian parties assume the leadership of the struggles in the underdeveloped countries, the victory of socialism will be impossible. "The revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America cannot be suppressed. They are bound to burst forth. Unless the proletarian parties in these regions lead these struggles, they will become divorced from the people and fail to win their confidence. . . . Victory in the revolutionary struggle will be impossible."⁵⁸

The national-liberation movements in their fight against imperialism should focus their attention upon the aggressive policies of the United States. In this struggle the national-liberation movements will be united in a common front with all peace-loving forces in the world. Each country, however, must fight imperialism in a manner which accords with its own conditions. The Chinese claim that their own experience offers the best pattern for the underdeveloped countries.

In discussing the Chinese Civil War of 1935 Mao advanced the thesis that each country possesses characteristics and problems all its own. It cannot copy tactics and procedures employed by some other country for the conduct of revolutionary war. This idea was advanced to free China from dependence upon the "laws" of the Russian Revolution and civil war.⁵⁹ The Chinese would not, for example, follow the Russian pattern in establishing a one-class dictatorship. Although the proletariat would furnish the leadership, other classes would be allowed to remain. "We

⁵⁸"More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us," op. cit., p. 19.

⁵⁹Mao Tse-tung, "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War," op. cit., p. 76.

have no reason to refuse co-operation with any political party, social group or individual, so long as their attitude towards the Communist Party is co-operative and not hostile."⁶⁰

The most important area where Mao's strategy differs from the Russian pattern is in the replacement of the proletariat as the primary revolutionary element of society by the peasantry. As an indication of the extent to which Mao elevates the status of the peasantry over the proletariat, he talks about the peasantry being the vanguard of the Revolution of 1927, while making no mention at all of the proletariat.⁶¹ While the revolutionary leadership is provided by the party of the proletariat, the main force of the Chinese revolution is the peasantry. Revolution will be victorious, moreover, first in the rural peasant districts, rather than the urban workers' districts.⁶²

This form of revolutionary struggle Mao calls the new democratic revolution.

A new-democratic revolution is a revolution of the mass of the people led by the proletariat and directed against imperialism and feudalism. China can only advance to a socialist society by going through this kind of revolution.

.....
This kind of revolution differs also from a socialist revolution in that it aims only at overthrowing the rule of the imperialists, collaborators, and reactionaries in China, but not at inflicting damage

⁶⁰ Mao Tse-tung, "On Coalition Government," in Mao Tse-tung: An Anthology of His Writings, op. cit., p. 160.

⁶¹ Mao Tse-tung, "Report of An Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," in Chinese Communism: Selected Documents, op. cit., pp. 17-28.

⁶² Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," in Chinese Communism: Selected Documents, op. cit., p. 37.

on any section of the bourgeoisie which⁶³ can still take part in the antiimperialist, antifeudal struggles.

This is the form of revolution which the Chinese claim best applies to the underdeveloped countries. Owing to their lack of industrial development, they cannot expect to conduct a revolution like that of the Russian Revolution of 1917. The new-democratic revolution is directed against imperialism and calls for a united front of all social elements to wage war upon economic backwardness. Only after the underdeveloped countries have become politically and economically independent can they move toward socialism.

Summary. The Chinese possess as much, if not more, nationalistic fervor and desire for self-expression and territorial expansion as the Russians. They realize, further, that success depends upon consideration of the peculiar characteristics of their own situation. Success in other countries likewise must take local problems into account. These local problems should determine the nature of tactical devices.

China's freedom of action is limited by certain practical realities. If the Chinese Revolution is to succeed, it must have substantial support. The Chinese economy is not able to sustain itself plus produce the desired growth. China all but denies herself support from non-communist sources by her tactical orientation. Support must come from communist countries, namely Russia. China cannot, therefore, assert her individuality too forcefully for fear of alienating Russia. The Chinese demonstrate

⁶³Ibid., p. 41.

an awareness of this fact by their outspoken declaration of the need for socialist unity.

The Chinese are not offered an opportunity to demand acceptance of their position by any Russian political instability. Successful economic development and the great Soviet space exploits have produced a highly stable political situation in Russia. Ordinary means of persuasion and diplomacy have not produced acceptance. The most effective device the Chinese have used in their attempt to bring about a more favorable Soviet attitude to the Chinese position has been the doctrinal forum of Marxism-Leninism. The Chinese are attempting to expose the Russian tactical position as communist apostasy. If world communist opinion can be marshalled against Soviet tactics, then the Russians may be forced to compromise with China.⁶⁴

In tracing through the issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute, one is confronted with several areas of disagreement. These are the question of war, peaceful coexistence, and the problem of the underdeveloped countries. One of the most noticeable aspects of the dispute is the inconsistency of both sides. The Russians reject all forms of war, yet claim that wars of national-liberation are desirable and inevitable. The Chinese attack the Russian thesis on peaceful coexistence on the grounds that it deviates from Marxism-Leninism. Yet the Chinese argue that Marxism-Leninism must be adopted to the realities of modern times. The Russians commit themselves to the support of the underdeveloped countries while, at the same time, hesitating to put this commitment into practice.

⁶⁴The Sino-Soviet Dispute, ed. Hudson, Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar, op. cit., p. 6.

Basically, the dispute is an attack of the Chinese upon the Russians. The Chinese charge that the Russians have gotten soft. They have abandoned the proletarian crusade. They have ceased to be revolutionaries, for a revolutionary must possess revolutionary vigor, which the Russians do not. The Chinese justify their position by claiming to represent true Marxism-Leninism. The Russians are false prophets. In short, the Chinese are the only true revolutionaries.⁶⁵

There is a second dimension to the Chinese position. The Chinese contend that Mao is an original theorist, thus ranking with Marx and Lenin. Khrushchev, and Stalin before him, were simply interpreters or practitioners of Marxist-Leninist principles. Mao adds to these principles by bringing communism into an Asian context.

Mao Tse-tung's great accomplishment has been to change Marxism from a European to an Asiatic form. Marx and Lenin were Europeans; they wrote in European languages about European histories and problems, seldom discussing Asia or China. The basic principles of Marxism are undoubtedly adaptable to all countries, but to apply their general truth to concrete revolutionary practices in China is a difficult task. Mao Tse-tung is Chinese; he analyzes Chinese problems and guides the Chinese people in their struggle to victory. He uses Marxist-Leninist principles to explain Chinese history and the practical problems of China. He is the first that has succeeded in doing so. Not only has he applied Marxist methods to solve the problems of 450 million people, but he has thus popularized Marxism among the Chinese people as the weapon for them to use. On every kind of problem--the nation, the peasants, strategy, the construction of the party, literature and culture, military affairs, finance and economy, methods of work, philosophy--Mao has not only applied Marxism to new conditions but has given it a new development. He has created a Chinese or Asiatic form of Marxism. . . . There are similar conditions in other lands of

⁶⁵Boyd, op. cit., p. 48.

South-east Asia. The courses chosen by China will influence them all.⁶⁶

It is doubtful that Mao can be considered an original theorist. True, his application of communist theory to an Asian context is new, but his principles can all be traced to someone else. The most noticeable feature of Mao's thinking is the emphasis upon the peasantry almost to the point of excluding the proletariat. This idea, however, was put forth by Lenin when he realized that revolutionary success in Russia depended upon some consideration of the great mass of peasantry. Mao has merely increased the degree of emphasis.⁶⁷

Mao's tactical position is certainly not new. He believes that communism can be best served by a continuous revolutionary process similar to the permanent revolution idea of Trotsky. Mao believes as did Stalin that the Red Army is a key device for the spread of revolution. The difference between Khrushchev and Mao is that while Khrushchev advocates adoption of new ideas and tactics, Mao contends that there should be strict adherence to the accepted practices of the past.

⁶⁶ Anna Louise Strong, "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung," Amerasia, June, 1947, in Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz, The Future of Communist Society (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1962), p. 142.

⁶⁷ Arthur A. Cohen, "How Original Is 'Marxism'?" Problems of Communism, X (November-December, 1961), pp. 34-42.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing discussion indicates the diversity between the Chinese and the Russians over the tactical requirements of communism. The Russians are in the passive tradition of Marx and Stalin, while the Chinese are in the active tradition of Lenin and Trotsky. The communists themselves recognize the conflict between these positions. One of the most hotly debated issues in the history of communism has been the question of right and left opportunism.¹ Right opportunism is an overly passive position showing too much concern for the protection of past achievement. Such a position is not sufficiently oriented toward achieving new gains. Left opportunism is an overly active policy attempting to shape events which are not grounded in favorable conditions, thus jeopardizing past gains.

Contemporary Russia interjects a new dimension into communism and has had and will continue to have a most profound effect upon the nature of communist doctrine. Up to the present time communists have been concerned with either obtaining political power or maintaining this power. Today, neither of these problems really faces the Soviet state. Communism has established itself within Russia and is in no real danger of being overthrown. The threat of outside interference in Soviet politics, a characteristic fear of the Stalin era, is now no longer present, for the Soviet Union today is one of the most powerful nations

¹ Lenin, V. I., "State and Revolution," op. cit., pp. 186-187.

in the world. A threat to the Soviet Union today, considering the nature of modern warfare, is not a threat to the rule of communism, but is a threat to the continued existence of the Soviet Union as a nation.

Russia's powerful position in the world and the security of Russian communism today allows the Soviet leaders to turn to issues and problems which were not so much the concern of their predecessors. The realities of modern Russian life, moreover, demand that attention be devoted to these issues and problems. The Russians are showing increasing concern for their own material welfare and less concern for the well-being and extension of communist revolution. Lenin and Trotsky could not be pre-occupied with material welfare for several reasons. First, they were confronted with the problem of developing an industrial base equal to that of advanced Western countries. Second, the position of the Communist Party was not secure enough to allow an introspective orientation. Consequently, cohesion was produced by directing attention to the spread of revolution. Third, Lenin and Trotsky were ideologically oriented toward world revolution. Stalin approached the problem differently. He expanded Russia's industrial base by coercing the people, and he made his own position and the position of the Communist Party secure through his maniacal purges. Stalin constitutes a transition from the world revolution position of Lenin and Trotsky to the peaceful coexistence of Khrushchev.

Although the extension of communism to all areas of the world still remains one of the avowed goals of Soviet ideology, Soviet policy is not oriented toward the realization of this goal. Soviet policy is now concerned with the development of the Soviet Union as a social and economic unit. The significance of this policy for revolutionary tactics

is great. Tactics are not governed by consideration of revolutionary developments in various parts of the world, but rather with the material welfare of the Soviet Union and the development of a favorable Soviet position in the international arena.

The Russian brand of communism has lost its spiritual quality. Soviet communism no longer possesses a messianic crusading zeal. The mystique of the workers' revolution as the road to socialism has faded to be replaced with a strategy governed by practical considerations of national interest.

The shift from a strategy of workers' revolution to a strategy of national interest changes the complexion of international politics. The tendency to make revolution less than a doctrinal absolute and substitute in its place a flexible foreign policy is a definite break with orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The policy of peaceful coexistence, which, I feel, Khrushchev sincerely believes in, is more than a tactical ruse for luring the capitalist countries into complacency. Violent revolution in Russian communist theory is no longer a tactical prerequisite. The Russians have so restricted the acceptable uses of violent means of revolution as to virtually abandon it as a tactical device. This abandonment of violent revolution removes the automatic antagonism between socialist and capitalist countries. An example of this antagonism is seen in the relations between Russia and her allies during World War II. Russia was a member of the Comintern up until 1943 when it was abolished. The avowed purpose of the Comintern was the promotion of socialist revolutions. Effective liason between the Soviet Union and her Western allies was hampered by Soviet promotion of a revolutionary cause in the countries with whom she was allied.

The reasoning behind Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence policy derives from two sources. One, discussed at length before, is his appreciation of the consequences of nuclear confrontation with the West. The second is his apparently unswerving faith in the ultimate victory of communism. This victory will be achieved when all people see the superiority of the communist system and the inferiority of the capitalist system. Violent revolution will be unnecessary.

Mao Tse-tung, on the other hand, correctly challenges the Russian doctrinal position as being a deviation from orthodox Marxism-Leninism. He contends that peaceful coexistence amounts to an abandonment of the cause of communism. The success of communism cannot be achieved by the peaceful strategy of the Russians, but must be pursued by an active strategy of violent revolution. The idea that eventually all people will see the superiority of communism and the inferiority of capitalism is an Utopian dream.

The tactical disagreement between Russia and China is a product of the different conditions facing the two countries. The communist regime in China has not existed for as long a period as has its Russian counterpart. The Chinese revolution is not yet complete. The Chinese Communists' attempts to overcome the social, political, and economic problems facing them have been almost completely unsuccessful. Witness, for example, the great leap forward. The failure of Russian agricultural policies has not had such far-reaching effects as have Chinese failures. The Chinese Communists have been unable to provide sufficient food for China's teeming millions, nor have they succeeded in producing extensive

industrialization. Owing to these failures, the Chinese have not produced political stability.

The Chinese Communists are in a position in some ways similar to that which confronted the Russian Communists in 1930. In China, revolutionary changes are not yet complete, and serious economic and social problems are yet to be overcome. The same situation prevailed in Russia in 1930. Yet the Russian Communists could look forward to brighter prospects in 1930 than the Chinese could in 1949. Economic development in China comparable to the Russian experience for the same period of time has not occurred. This is due in large part to the fact that the Russian Communists began with a broader economic base in 1917 than the Chinese did in 1949. The Russians have not been faced with the problem of overpopulation. Russia, moreover, is rich in natural resources, while China is, by and large, resource poor.

Since China is confronted with a different set of problems than confronts Russia, a variation in tactics is expected. The Chinese government must exercise firmer control over the development of China, and frustrations over failures must be directed to some point outside of China. The Chinese government has chosen to direct frustrations and animosities to imperialism and the United States, rather than to allow them to focus on the Chinese regime itself.

The device employed by communists to justify rigorous controls is to stress doctrinal purity. The Chinese claim that doctrine requires that certain actions be taken to achieve certain goals. This is a convenient device for rendering all sorts of actions legitimate. Harsh actions are usually identified with appeals to orthodoxy. The Stalinist

purges, for example, were justified on the grounds that doctrinal purity must be established by eliminating the heretics. As a consequence, action which causes suffering and sacrifice in the name of doctrinal purity takes on a mystical or spiritual quality.

The spiritual quality of Chinese communism involves a messianic crusading zeal. The situation in Asia confronts the Chinese with an opportunity for the export of their doctrine. They claim to have discovered a revolutionary formula which is peculiarly Asian. The matter is simply one of winning converts to the true belief.

China's political relationship to Asia differs from Russia's relationship to Europe. The Russians have already undergone a period of extension of their revolution and have built up a very sizeable empire. The Chinese, on the other hand, have not acquired an extensive empire. Their satellites have taught the Russians that there are some serious drawbacks to possessing an empire. Initially, the Russians were able to exploit their East European satellites for economic purposes. Recently these satellites have become a liability rather than an asset. Political difficulties like the uprisings of 1956 have proved embarrassing to the Soviets.²

What is the significance, then, of the Sino-Soviet dispute for communist doctrine? Although tactical disputes are common occurrences in communist history, the Sino-Soviet dispute constitutes a new dimension. While formerly tactical disputes were between two individuals or

²Victor Winston, "The Soviet Satellites--Economic Liability?" Problems of Communism, VII (January-February, 1958), pp. 14-20.

two groups, now the dispute is between two independent nations. Carrying a theoretical disagreement to this level will certainly affect the unity of the communist bloc. Aside from the disruption of bloc unity, the Sino-Soviet dispute will have serious effect upon the significance of communism as an international force. The disagreement over theoretical questions by two nations in the communist bloc may lead to a crystallization of interpretation of Marxism. In such a situation the doctrine will become relative and will lose the specificity which was the most important characteristic of the theory of Marx. When such a doctrine becomes relative, it loses much of its appeal and vitality. Instead of theory being a guide for the shaping of reality, reality become the determinant of theory. Automatic and conditioned response becomes less frequent as disagreement continues to exist over the nature of the ideological stimulus.³

Whether or not the Sino-Soviet dispute results in complete rupture, it will weaken the appeal of communism. The strength of communism lies in its religious quality--the quality of explanation and guidance. Converts will not move into the fold if the practitioners cannot even agree on the general nature of their religion.

³Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Sino-Soviet Bloc; Unity and Conflict (rev. ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 440.

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