"THE EVIL THING WITH A HOLY NAME"

The League of Nations as an Issue in the Presidential Election of 1920

by

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INTRODUCTION

Political parties themselves in the United States sprang from a division of opinion among the leaders of the newly-formed government of the United States of America. This difference of opinion was itself born of different philosophies of government, its nature and its relationship to the people of the nation. These philosophies found specific instances of conflict both in the realms of domestic and of foreign affairs. Thus, when in time popular appeal became the basis for gaining political office, these specific instances of conflict became the "issues" upon which elections were fought out.

In every election there are numerous issues, but one or two usually seem to stand out as paramount. Often the issues of a campaign form real and basic divisions of policy and belief. Just as frequently they are mere slogans and phrases, empty of real meaning, which serve to create an apparent difference.

Campaign issues in national politics range from the local domestic field to international relations. In the presidential campaign of 1920, a casual foreign observer might easily have concluded that the whole campaign was being fought over whether or not the United States was to enter the League of Nations. He might also have thought this rather odd, since the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson,
had been one of the chief architects of the League. True, Wilson was not running again. These conclusions, however, would have revealed a paucity of knowledge about a complex situation and, indeed, little comprehension of the American political system.

That the League of Nations was an issue in the 1920 campaign is undeniable, but it was far from being the only one. This paper will attempt to assess just how important the League was as an issue in this presidential election. To do this, the growth of the League idea and the opposition to it will be traced as well as the process of the League's transformation from an idea to a political issue. With this as a background, the pre-convention picture will be developed by noting the attitude of people in general and of would-be candidates in particular. The stands of the parties will be noted in a discussion of the two conventions. In the discussion of the campaign proper, particular attention will be paid to the emphasis given the League issue by the candidates and speakers for the two parties. The views of contemporaries will be utilized in evaluating the results of the campaign. In this fashion, the writer will attempt to place the League of Nations issue in its proper place and perspective in regard to the presidential election of 1920.
CHAPTER I
GENESIS OF AN IDEA AND AN ISSUE

The Rise of the League Idea

From the beginning of history there have been dreams and plans of unions, federations, kingdoms and the like to establish peace throughout the world. The rise of national states, however, seemed to preclude the possibility of any such federation, for these states were extremely jealous of their sovereignty and distrustful of their neighbors. For many centuries men had to be content to merely dream of a "parliament of man, and the federation of the world."

By the opening of the twentieth century there had been many treaties of arbitration signed, in addition to the advancement of other plans to promote world peace, and the Hague Court was perhaps the culmination of this idea of voluntary arbitration of disputes. In the mind of many American leaders, as in the minds of leaders of other nations, there was a gradual development of thought concerning the next step in the effort of nations to make peace more enduring. In 1909 Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State, took note of the tendency of improved methods of communication to knit the world together. To Knox it seemed that the sweep of events would of necessity bring some sort of limitation upon our traditional idea of national sovereignty which allowed nations
unlimited freedom of action at all times.

Theodore Roosevelt's active mind was not one to leave completely to others this concept of world union. He had much to do with the growing use of arbitration treaties, but by 1910 he had moved still further in his thoughts. In that year he spoke before the Nobel Prize Committee at Christiana, Norway where he had gone to acknowledge their recognition of his efforts in behalf of world peace. In his speech Roosevelt suggested still further development of the arbitration principle, the Hague Court, and the idea of world disarmament. Then he went another step forward and said:

Finally, it would be a master stroke if those great powers honestly bent on peace would form a League of Peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others. The supreme difficulty in connection with developing the peace work of the Hague arises from the lack of any executive power, of any police power to enforce the decrees of the court ... 2

Roosevelt realized that world peace could not be enforced or insured by a court alone, any more than a state can govern the relations of its citizens by judicial decrees alone. He voiced no fear of a "super-state" but, indeed, took note that not only must there be some type of an executive but one with force behind it to give weight to its decisions.

2Fleming, pp. 4-5.
With the outbreak of World War I, it became clear that the Hague Tribunal was inadequate as an insurance of peace. There were many suggestions as to an effective substitute but Roosevelt, writing in 1915, observed that

The one permanent move for obtaining peace which has yet been suggested with any reasonable chance of obtaining its object is by an agreement among the great powers in which each should pledge itself not only to abide by the decisions of the common tribunal but to back with force the decision of the common tribunal. The great civilized nations of the world which do possess force, actual or immediately potential, should combine by solemn agreement in a great world league for the peace of righteousness.

In this same period many other Americans were thinking about the formation of some sort of international organization to preserve peace, once the war which had broken out was ended. Woodrow Wilson, whose name was beginning to become almost synonymous with that of the League, was beginning to probe the fringes of the idea of world organization. In the fall of 1914 Wilson had observed to his brother-in-law, Dr. Stockton Axson, that after the war the nations must of necessity link themselves into some great association whereby all would guarantee the integrity of one another in such a manner as to bring punishment automatically upon any one nation which violated the agreement. At this period too, Wilson was expressing the idea that Latin American nations should be brought into a multilateral interpretation of the

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3Fleming, The United States and The League of Nations, pp. 5-7.
Monroe Doctrine. During the period of American neutrality, he proposed to the Latin American republics a treaty which would "join one another in common and mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and of political independence upon republican forms of government." The philosophy of Article X was even now taking shape.

Outside of purely governmental circles, the league idea was taking root. On June 17, 1915 the League to Enforce Peace was formed at a meeting in Independence Hall in Philadelphia. Prominent among the leaders and members were men such as ex-President Taft, President A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard, and businessman John Wannamaker. The appeal of the organization's program is indicated by the fact that within a year it had branches in almost every congressional district in the country. This organization announced that it stood in principle for the United States,' joining a league of nations which bound the members (1) to submit all justiciable questions to an international court of justice; (2) to submit all other questions to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation; (3) "[to] jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces" against any member committing acts of hostility against another before submitting to arbitration or conciliation; and (4) to hold

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4Fleming, The United States and The League of Nations, pp. 7-8.
periodic conferences to formulate and codify international law.

For its program to have real force the League to Enforce Peace felt it must add to its backers, which included men such as ex-President Taft and ex-Secretary of State Elihu Root, other national leaders such as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and President Wilson. In February, 1916 Wilson expressed the hope that the war at least would have the result of creating an international tribunal and of producing some sort of joint guarantee of peace on the part of the great powers. However, the League's backing up to this point had come principally from prominent Republican leaders, and it was not known whether Wilson would be willing to associate himself with such a group. In an effort to enlist Wilson's support, he and Lodge were invited to speak at a dinner held at the Willard Hotel in Washington by the League on May 27, 1916.

Lodge had indicated a growing favor of international co-operation before this. The guests, therefore, were not surprised to have Lodge express his definite support of the League's program. In expressing the opinion that the limit of voluntary arbitration treaties had been reached, Lodge

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6Fleming, *The United States and The League of Nations*, p. 11.

7Aside from a number of speeches, Lodge in 1910 had introduced in the Senate a resolution providing for a commission to consider the expediency of armament limitation and of making the combined navies of the world into an international police force for the preservation of world peace. Fleming, p. 10.
said:

If we have reached the limit of voluntary arbitration, what is the next step? I think the next step is that which this league proposes, and that is to put force behind international peace, an international league or agreement or tribunal, for peace. We may not solve it that way, but if we cannot, it can be solved in no other . . .

I do not believe that when Washington warned us against "entangling alliances" he meant for one moment that we should not join with the other civilized nations of the world if a method could be found to diminish war and encourage peace.8

With Lodge apparently aligning himself with their idea of international cooperation, the diners were anxious to know what stand Wilson would take. All hint of partisanship in the League seemed to vanish when Wilson rose and said, "I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations . . ." The President went on to say that while he had no definite program, he did have a creed of the nations organizing for peace. He felt that it was the time now when some common force would come into being to assure peace and use coercion, not as an instrument of political ambition or selfish hostility, but as an instrument for the common welfare.9

The effect of this meeting was immediate. The League's influence became even stronger throughout the nation. It

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9 Cranston, p. 3.
began to push a campaign to convince Americans that their happiness and prosperity depended on a stable and peaceful world, a type of world which could be brought about only by an international organization of which the United States was a part. Meetings were held in almost every town, while League letters and pamphlets were sent to civic, business, labor, religious, and fraternal organizations and their leaders. Governors and mayors proclaimed League Sundays and Weeks, while national leaders such as Taft toured the country under League auspices. Edward A. Filene, noted Boston business leader, spoke at meetings, predicting the greatest world depression in history, followed by another war, unless a concert of nations was set up after the war then in progress was over.

In the meantime Wilson was faced with the task of winning the presidential election of 1916. He did win on the strength of the slogan "He Kept Us Out of War" and then had to face the futile task of trying to keep the additional promise implied by the slogan. All the while he continued to think through the idea of a concert of nations for peace. In his address to the Senate on January 22, 1917, he told the Senators that he came before them to let them know the policies he was formulating, because the Senate was the body associated with him in the final determination of foreign

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relations. Wilson asserted that no covenant of peace which did not include the New World could possibly prevent future war. He was sure the United States would be willing to add its authority and power to that of Europe to keep peace and justice. To Wilson's mind the "League for Peace" should not be based on a peace dictated by one group of nations to another, but rather it should be one of equality and common participation. Indeed, it should bring government by the consent of the governed, should provide free access to the seas for all nations, and should limit the size of armed forces to that needed for order and not aggression. In summation, President Wilson said:

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power, not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace. If the peace presently made is to endure, it must be peace made secure by the organized major forces of mankind.11

It is reasonably clear that the idea of a definite organization for world peace was taking shape in Wilson's thoughts, at least to the point of seeing that such an organization must provide for cooperative decision and action

against potential aggressors and that it must embrace all na-

tions. He obviously realized that such a league had especially to have the backing of the United States and all major powers to succeed. When Wilson was forced to bring before Congress a message asking that the United States enter the war, he closed it with the general statement that we would fight for a universal dominion of right by a concert of free peoples that would bring worldwide peace and freedom.

On May 26, 1917 Wilson sent a message to the Russian people, who had just recently created a "democratic" government, in which he said:

The free peoples of the world must draw together in some covenant, some genuine and practical cooperation that will in effect combine their force to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase; it must be given a structure of force and reality.

As the new year of 1918 got under way, Wilson came forward with a number of specific suggestions he felt should form the basis of a fair peace. Too, they served as a propaganda instrument to rally the retreating Allied armies. These suggestions became known as Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points," and through every one ran the theme of a concert of free peoples. Point Fourteen specifically said, "A general

12 For the story of this, see Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928), Vols. II-IV, passim.

association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

Wilson further expressed the idea behind this definite association of nations when he spoke on July 4, 1918 and said that the world needed

The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned . . . . What we seek is the reign of law based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.15

So it was that there grew in the minds of American statesmen and political leaders the idea of the League of Nations. The actual Covenant of the League of Nations was to meet with a far different fate than might have been suggested by the growing strength in people's minds of the concept which it embodied.

The Growth of Opposition to the League Idea

No plan of organization or action ever receives universal

14Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, pp. 18-19.
acceptance among men, and the idea of the League of Nations was no exception. The opposition to the League idea had many causes and many spokesmen. A survey of the growth of this opposition and its effects is necessary to an understanding of how the League became an issue in a presidential campaign.

Among the opponents of the League idea in the United States Senate were men like Hiram Johnson of California, William E. Borah of Idaho, and others. These men were ultra-nationalists who refused to accept the idea that international cooperation with a natural limitation of sovereignty did not mean the complete abolition of the United States in favor of some foreign-controlled super-state.

Even the most casual reading of the events of this period would produce the decided impression that the antipathy of Woodrow Wilson and Henry Cabot Lodge for each other had much to do with the defeat of the League Covenant in the Senate. Wilson and Lodge differed on many things during Wilson's first term. Lodge was very angry that Wilson, as part of his attempt to maintain neutrality, refused to improve the United States' condition of military preparedness. During the campaign of 1916 both Wilson and Charles Evans Hughes, the Republican candidate, came out in favor of international cooperation, but the Wilson slogan "He Kept Us Out of War" had a powerful appeal. In an attempt to prove that the slogan was based on fraud and thereby blunt its appeal, Lodge committed a political blunder and sowed the seeds of hatred between himself and Wilson.
Lodge related a story which he said had been told to him by a man who had heard it from another man on a train between San Francisco, California and Ogden, Utah. According to this story, when Wilson sent his stiff warning note to Germany after the sinking of the Lusitania, he tried to add a secret postscript explaining to the German government that the note was not to be taken seriously but was actually just to satisfy outraged public opinion in the United States. When the members of his Cabinet found out about Wilson's plan, they threatened in a stormy Cabinet session to resign and to expose Wilson's action if he carried it through. As a result, Wilson had to back down.

The story, if true, would certainly have wrecked public trust in Wilson. A Democratic speaker, stumping for Wilson, wired him an urgent request for an explanation. In terse phrases Wilson wired a return message which began, "Let me say that the statement made by Senator Lodge is untrue . . . ." The truth of the matter was that it was Bryan, then Secretary of State, who wished to add a postscript that was at least more conciliatory and who later did resign. Lodge seemed to be caught telling an obvious untruth, or at least accepting third-hand gossip as the truth and spreading it. In any event, it was an embarrassing position for the stern aristocrat who was accustomed to vast respect. He was not a

16 Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, pp. 3-5.
man who could stand to be called a liar by anyone, even by the President of the United States. It was the beginning of a dislike for each other which grew to bitter hatred. Wilson's feelings were evident when he refused to speak from the same platform with Lodge later in the year.

Understanding the development of Henry Cabot Lodge's ideas and of his position on international cooperation is of great importance due to Lodge's prime role in defeating the Versailles Treaty. Lodge had always held that the Senate had as much power as the President in the making of treaties and could in fact recommend entering or staying out of any negotiations. The President must actually initiate any negotiations and the Senate may then reject or accept the results or, if it prefers, amend them. McKinley's projected treaty of arbitration between the United States and England was so amended by the Senate (Lodge being part of the group forcing the amendments) that the Senate refused to ratify the wreck of the treaty. Lodge helped see, too, that some of Theodore Roosevelt's and some of Taft's arbitration treaties met the same fate. His philosophy at the time was simply that the arbitration of disputes between the nations was too great a step forward in international relations. "Great and lasting advances," Lodge said, "are those which have been slowly made." However, by 1916 Lodge had apparently matured his views along the lines of arbitration treaties and seemed to be moving, if we are to take his statement at the League dinner as a sincere one, on to the next step. When enmity developed between
himself and Wilson, and the President proposed what amounted to an arbitration agreement between all nations, Lodge must have felt that it was time to bring his position up to date in the light of the new circumstances.

Wilson broached the subject of a future League for Peace to the Senate on January 22, 1917. On February 1, Lodge arose to make his first speech since he had listened to Wilson. It was a long, carefully-prepared speech which in several places foreshadowed the exact arguments later to be used against the Treaty and Covenant. Lodge said that he had considered the idea of a league attractive about two years previously, but in that time he had thought a lot about it and now felt that the idea presented difficulties which could not be overcome. The refusal of any nation to abide by the decision of such a League would probably mean war. Indeed, if we acted to enforce the decisions of the League, we would have to go to war without a declaration by Congress but rather by command of smaller nations. He noted also that there was a strong possibility such a League might interfere with purely domestic affairs such as immigration. Lodge continued by asking just how we would determine if a government really rested on the consent of the governed, something Wilson had mentioned. If we decided that a government was not so established, would we use force to change it? The

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17Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, pp. 10-12.
President had spoken of limiting armies and navies, but why hadn't he mentioned the limitation of merchant marines? On and on Lodge went in a similar vein, raising possibility after disturbing possibility. He concluded this portion of the speech by reminding his colleagues that the great George Washington had warned us against "entangling alliances."

Lodge then turned to a more positive approach by saying that he certainly was not opposed to the using of the power and influence of the United States for peace. Along this line he proposed a program which would include (1) adequate national preparedness; (2) the rehabilitation of international law at the close of the war; (3) "within necessary and natural limits to extend the use of voluntary arbitration, so far as possible" and to mobilize public opinion behind this extension; and (4) to urge a general reduction of armaments by all nations. Lodge admitted that his suggestions were but slight improvements over existing procedures, but said that at least they had the merit of not being too visionary.

Theodore Roosevelt, as has been noted by some of his speeches, had been a long-time backer of world organization to preserve peace, one backed by force. The advocate of the "big stick" policy had felt it a demonstration of weakness and timidity on the part of Wilson for the United States not to

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have immediately entered the war in Europe. Roosevelt had little use for Wilson personally; and when Wilson suggested world organization for peace, Roosevelt wrote in the February, 1917 issue of *Metropolitan Magazine* that Wilson doubtless favored world organization merely in hopes of winning some temporary advantage or acclaim at the expense of the people of the world. Roosevelt then pointed out all the difficulties involved in any League for Peace and repeated Lodge's assertion that the United States might be forced into certain actions by the smaller nations in a League and that there might be interference in our domestic affairs. "These apostles of feeble folly ... offer yet one more quack nostrum for international wrong ...," scoffed Teddy and blythly dismissed his own statements about such organization in 1910 and 1915 as mere speculation.

Roosevelt was as capable of bitter hatred as either Lodge or Wilson, and Wilson's refusal of his application for a commission as commander of a division in France was a blow to his pride that the old Rough Rider could not forgive. He doubtless still dreamed of acquiring new glory.

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20 Cranston, *The Killing of the Peace*, p. 16.

21 This view is suggested by Cox in his autobiography, James M. Cox, *Journey Through My Years* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), pp. 251-253. As a result, Roosevelt and ex-Senator Beveridge met with Colonel George Harvey, the man who had brought Wilson from Princeton to politics, and offered him 20,000 new subscribers for his *War Weekly* if, asserts Alan Cranston, he would make war on Wilson's peace plan with the publication. Harvey's motives for accepting are not clear for there is no evidence that ill feeling...
When it became known that the German government had finally accepted the "Fourteen Points" as the foundation for a permanent peace, Roosevelt made a public announcement that Wilson's negotiations with the Germans were "dangerously close to treacherous diplomacy" and demanded that they cease. He continued, "I most earnestly hope that the Senate of the United States and all other persons competent to speak for the American people will emphatically repudiate the so-called 'Fourteen Points' and various similar utterances of the President." To point up his "suggestion," Roosevelt sent similarly worded telegrams to Lodge, Hiram Johnson, and Senator Poin- dexter of Washington.

The congressional elections of 1918 offered possibilities to the opponents of a league, and presented problems to Wilson and the league proponents. For the Republicans to gain control of the Senate would be to put the high-ranking Lodge in the position of chairman of the all-important Foreign Relations Committee and thus in a position to challenge Wilson's peace plans. In addition, Democratic politicians had appealed to Wilson for his support, warning him that a Democratic defeat at the polls would certainly weaken him at the coming

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21(cont.) toward Wilson blinded his approach to Wilson's international policies. Evidence of a change in political partisanship is lacking for Harvey still described himself as an "Independent Democrat." Granston, *The Killing of the Peace*, pp. 22-23.

22Granston, pp. 26-27.
peace conference. After consideration of the situation, Wilson finally issued his appeal for a Democratic Congress in order that he might remain the nation's "unembarrassed spokesman."

Lodge quickly seized the appeal as something which the Republicans could use to their advantage. Why, here was the President saying in so many words that the Republicans could not be trusted, that they were disloyal! In New York, Roosevelt hammered away at Wilson's policies and at Wilson himself. Colonel George Harvey, meanwhile, acted as righteously indignant as any injured Republican. "Boot the Democratic Congress out of existence," he fumed. On the surface it appeared that the voters took Harvey at his word, for they awarded twenty-five of the forty seats up for decision to the Republicans. The resultant line-up in the Senate was forty-eight Republicans, forty-seven Democrats, and one Progressive (Johnson of California). In actuality, Wilson's appeal and the Republican harping on it appear to have influenced the elections but slightly, and of a certainty Wilson's foreign policy was but slightly involved. Most of the campaigns hinged on issues such as prohibition, woman suffrage,

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24 Lodge ignored the fact that he had backed a similar plea by McKinley for a Republican Congress after the Spanish-American War.

25 See footnote 21, pp. 18-19. Harvey had once made the same appeal in reference to the 1918 elections.

26 Cranston, pp. 36-37.
the tariff, and certain of the now onerous wartime controls. Regardless of the cause, one result was obvious; Henry Cabot Lodge would be chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the Sixty-sixth Congress.

The announcement by Wilson that he intended to go to the Peace Conference personally was an appalling one to those who were against the League idea per se and also to those who feared the creation of a League would add to Wilson's power and prestige. Roosevelt was hospitalized in November, 1918, but he was not too sick to invoke the results of the election and say, "Our Allies and our enemies and Mr. Wilson himself should all understand that Mr. Wilson has no authority to speak for the American people at this time. His leadership has just been repudiated by them." The Review of Reviews disagreed and stated there was no evidence that the country intended the election as a disapproval of Wilson or his policies. In fact, asserted the magazine, Wilson had greater support for his large policies than any president ever had. Whether he shared this latter opinion or not, Wilson stuck to his decision to go to Paris personally.

The composition of the American delegation which was to accompany him to Paris presented Wilson with another Gordian

27The general editorial comment of the time was almost unanimous on this point. See "President Wilson to Face a Republican Congress," Literary Digest, LIX (November 16, 1918), 14-15 and "The Republican Opportunity," Literary Digest, LIX (November 23, 1918), 14-15.

Knot. It is known that he considered the appointing of Senators, but he could appoint no Republicans without at least consulting Lodge, something Wilson could not bring himself to do; and to appoint only Democratic Senators would be to fan the flames of partisanship more fiercely than ever. Wilson's decision was to appoint a delegation predominantly Democratic, with no Senators and but one Republican, the veteran diplomat Henry White. The Republicans bridled over the selection and even asserted that White was at best a neutral Republican. Certainly Wilson rubbed salt in the wounds of Republican pride by not appointing some to the delegation. He apparently assumed that Republicans might work at counterpurposes with him at Paris. However, it is possible that the appointment of some "bona fide" Republicans to the commission, by giving the Republicans a partial claim to the credit for any results, would have salved the pride of the Republicans to the extent of encouraging them to work zealously for the success of the treaty in the Senate. Whatever might have happened, the results could have hardly been more of a setback to the hopes for international cooperation than that which actually took place.

29 Presumably this meant that he was not anti-Wilson and perhaps committed the crime of considering some Democratic policies worthwhile.

30 Wilson had valid precedent for his action in the advice of the Senate to McKinley not to appoint Senators to such groups as it deprived them of their freedom of action on the treaty. Granston, The Killing of the Peace, p. 40.
With no other Republican through whom to work at Paris, Lodge approached Henry White with a request. To White he gave a secret memorandum to be shown to Lloyd George and the other foreign diplomats in strictest confidence. Briefly, the note warned that the League Covenant should not be included in the treaty for if it were so included it was doubtful if the Treaty could be accepted unamended by the Senate. The note concluded with the bland assertion that these were the views of the United States and the Republican Party. Lodge frankly told White that he thought the note would strengthen the position of the foreign statesmen against Wilson; he did not need to add that he thus hoped to prevent Wilson's succeeding and gaining prestige. White put the note in his briefcase, bade Lodge farewell, and promised only to keep him informed. White did not reveal the existence of the note to anyone until after the treaty was written.

The opponents of Wilson and any type of League—later to attain the name of the "irreconcilables" and the "Battalion of Death"—not knowing exactly what they would face when Wilson returned, disagreed on how to fight it. Some, like Beveridge, felt they should fight the League openly. Lodge was fully aware of the general public approval of the idea and proposed that they should avoid a flat denial of the idea but rather should oppose any method which was proposed.

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With bold admission of the fact showing between every line that he was opposing the League, not out of principle but because it wouldn't be a Republican accomplishment, Lodge wrote to Beveridge:

I think it would be a mistake to admit that the League would be a good thing, but I think we should make a mistake if we met the proposition with a flat denial. The purpose of the League . . . that is, the preservation of world peace . . . we are all anxious to see, but what we oppose is the method. Now the strength of our position is to show up the impossibility of any of the methods proposed and invite them, when they desire our support, to produce their terms. They cannot do it. My own judgement is that the whole thing will break up in conference. There may be some vague declarations of the beauty of peace, but any practical League that involves control of our legislation, of our armies and navies, or the Monroe Doctrine, or an international police, and that sort of thing, then our issue is made up and we shall win. We can begin by pointing out these dangers and I am sure it will be done.32

Lodge knew that Theodore Roosevelt was one of Wilson's most uncompromising opponents and thereby of the League, so he sought out the ill Roosevelt. According to Corrine Roosevelt Robinson who was present at the meetings, the two men agreed that, since the bulk of the Senate and the people supported Wilson's plans, they would have to destroy the League bit by bit. Whatever form it took, they would seek to cut out the vital provisions. Amendment after amendment would be introduced, and even if these failed to carry they would serve the purpose of stirring up endless debate. Gradually

The Senate would become divided, disgusted, doubting, and fearful. The one point to be opposed uncompromisingly was the one suggested by Wilson's addresses--that of the protection of the territorial and political freedom of League members. The strategy developed by these two were precisely that which was followed, expanded and filled in as to detail, in the long fight which was to come.

As the end of 1918 approached Lodge did not know, despite the little information he received from White, just what was being hammered out at Paris. But he could still follow his strategy of raising up frightening possibilities, which he did with consummate skill. On December 21, Lodge spoke to the Senate and reminded them of their right to revise and reject treaties, but he insisted that they had the right to advise on their negotiation as well. He praised the close cooperation that had led to victory and said that of course the United States must do its share to insure the establishment of peace. The idea of a league was admittedly attractive "but we ought to be extremely careful that in our efforts to reach the millennium of universal peace we do not create a system which will breed dissensions and wars." He then pointed out the difficulty of discussing the question in the absence of a plan. Lodge did not allow this difficulty to deter him from posing the shadow-threats of

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33Cranston, *The Killing of the Peace*, p. 44.
disturbing possibilities. In the matter of membership, were big and small nations to have the same number of votes? Such an arrangement would surely expose the United States to the danger of being outvoted. This suggested the possibility of having to send troops and ships on the demand of a League run by other nations. Why, this might involve our giving up the Monroe Doctrine! Lodge closed by suggesting that our real duty was to provide for peace now and not to encumber our efforts by trying to provide for wars in the unknown future. Like his earlier suggestions, this latter could hardly be termed visionary or even at all long-range.

Much has been written as to Lodge’s sincerity in proposing his so-called "protective" amendments. The earlier quoted statement of his to Beveridge, the meetings with Roosevelt, and comments attributed to him by Republican Senator Jim Watson suggest to the writer that Lodge’s real objective was defeat of the treaty or, failing that, to so amend it that it would be a Republican treaty and not the one Wilson negotiated. His motives appear to have been personal and partisan rather than of principle.

When the preliminary text of the League Covenant was announced, the general reaction of the people seemed favorable though, according to the New York Sun, Lodge and Knox read the results of Wilson’s accomplishments in silence and

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amazement. In ringing terms Senator Miles Poindexter, on February 19, 1919, declared that the question now was whether or not the sovereignty of the "political heirs of Jefferson, Washington, and Lincoln" was to be surrendered to the control of foreigners under a covenant which threatened the Constitution and indeed was an imitation of the Soviet system in Russia. William Borah arose in the Senate and warned that this "greatest triumph for English diplomacy in three centuries of English diplomatic life" was in reality designed to guarantee every foot of British soil for all time. That even the somewhat naturally anti-British Midwest did not share Borah's fears was obvious when Warren G. Harding of Ohio congratulated Borah on his speech and said apologetically, "Bill, I'd like to get in the fight against this League of Nations but the people of my state are all for it, I'm afraid."

Democratic Senator Reed of Missouri carried the ball for the Anglophobes by noting that the predominance of monarchial governments in the League would clearly deliver us into the control of royalty. That same day he spoke again and, with a neat reversal of logic, asserted that he saw the menace of world Bolshevism in the background of the League. True, Russia was excluded from the League, but the Communists were the most earnest advocates of internationalism. "Its Bolshevism's

35 Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, p. 61.
36 Cranston, pp. 62-63.
fangs are plainly visible in the constitution of the League."  

President Wilson, on his return to the United States, met with leaders of the Senate and House to answer questions about the treaty on February 27. Afterwards Lodge told reporters, "The President seemed actually befuddled about many most important points." Senator Brandegee remarked, "I feel as if I had been wandering with Alice in Wonderland and had tea with the Mad Hatter." A more objective report was made to Henry White in a letter from Representative John Rogers of Massachusetts, ranking Republican on the House Foreign Relations Committee. Rogers said, "He [Wilson] submitted himself to quite rigorous cross-examination for two hours, answering every question . . . as fully as possible and with apparent candor."

Having failed to undermine Wilson's position at Paris by his secret note to Lloyd George and others, Lodge succeeded in accomplishing much the same effect by introducing, on March 3, the famous "Round Robin" resolution which carried the signatures of thirty-one Senators and Senators-elect of the next Congress. It requested that the League Covenant be kept separate from the treaty so that it could be considered carefully.

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37 Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, p. 64.
38 Cranston, pp. 68-69. Lodge evidently was the source of a story that Wilson had admitted that the United States would lose control of immigration and be forced to leave Ireland at the mercy of England.
39 Cranston, pp. 74-78.
Publicity given the resolution accomplished Lodge's purpose for the resolution never reached a vote. The opponents of the League tried to force Wilson to call a special session of Congress after the present session expired on March 4 by tying up some appropriations measures by a filibuster. They wanted to stay in Washington and continue the campaign against the League while Wilson was in Paris. Wilson, however, refused to call a special session, saying that the presence of important business before Congress would require his presence in Washington and that at that moment he had to return to the final sessions of the Paris Conference.

That same night of March 4, Wilson appeared with Taft at the Metropolitan Opera House and told his audience:

> When that treaty comes back, gentlemen on this side will find the Covenant not only in it, but so many threads tied to the Covenant that you cannot dissect the Covenant from the Treaty without destroying the whole structure. The structure of peace will not be vital without the League of Nations and no man is going to bring back a cadaver with him.\(^{41}\)

Wilson was determined not to bring home a cadaver but his rather haughty attitude toward the Senate, made up of men as proud and stubborn as he, helped to assure that whatever he brought back would not live long.

While Wilson returned to the work at Paris, Henry White got in touch with Lodge, first by letter and then by telegram,

\(^{40}\)Cranston, *The Killing of the Peace*, pp. 78-82.

\(^{41}\)Cranston, pp. 82-83.
to ask for his suggestions for amendments to the Covenant. White had been corresponding with Lodge and was worried by his attitude. The reply from Lodge offered no encouragement for Lodge said that Wilson had expressed no desire to hear from the Senate and if he did he would have to assemble the Senate in the usual way. Lodge had laid his course and was not going to be drawn away from it.

Wilson, during the next two months, analyzed the reported speeches of Lodge and solicited advice from such men as Taft, Root, and Hitchcock as to amendments. He became convinced that he would have to secure changes to (1) protect the Monroe Doctrine, (2) protect domestic affairs, (3) provide for withdrawal from the League, and (4) reserve the right to refuse mandates. By April 10 he had secured all four of the changes, though in the case of the Monroe Doctrine he thought the amendment a superfluous one. Lodge did not react with satisfaction at having secured changes he desired. Instead, he cried that now the Monroe Doctrine was called an international engagement and it would be subject to League interpretation. At the same time, Lodge was missing no possible source of votes for the Republican ticket in 1920. When Italy's demands for Fiume received enthusiastic support among

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42 Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, pp. 84-87.
43 Cranston, p. 90.
44 Cranston, p. 95.
the Italian-Americans of Boston, he sent a telegram to their leaders saying, "If Italy is of the opinion that it is necessary to her safety and for her protection that she should hold Fiume, I am clearly of the opinion that it should be hers."

Finally, Wilson issued a call to Congress to convene on May 19 in special session to prepare to consider the Versailles Treaty and the League Covenant. The actual text was to be kept secret until the Germans, who were stalling, signed it. While Congress was organizing, Senator Knox and Colonel Harvey succeeded in replenishing the nearly-empty coffers of the anti-League forces by convincing steelmen Henry Frick and Andrew Mellon that the League would endanger business in the United States. These two gave several hundred thousand dollars to aid in defeating the League.

In the Senate itself, Reed of Missouri returned to the attack by raising the horrible prospect before the Southern Senators of a "colored" League controlled by "mongrel breeds." The danger of Catholicism being forced on the world through the League was raised by Sherman of Illinois who noted that "Catholic nations" were in the majority in the League and that by a suspicious coincidence Wilson had visited the Pope.

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45 Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, p. 100.
46 Cranston, pp. 111-113.
47 Cranston, p. 113.
in Rome. Hiram Johnson of California got a resolution through the Senate demanding the copy of the text of the treaty but Wilson still refused, pointing out that it was still being negotiated. Borah obtained a copy of the text from somewhere and forced the Senate to allow it to be printed as a Senate document by threatening to read it all the way through in a filibuster on June 9. Thus Wilson's secrecy agreement was in substance broken.

Elihu Root had suggested amendments to Wilson which had been largely incorporated into the Covenant. But Root was a Republican and devotedly loyal to the Party. The League to Enforce Peace asked him to declare himself at this point since most of his proposals had been put into the Covenant. Alan Cranston asserts that it was at this point that Lodge and Borah pointed out to Root the division of opinion within the Republican Party on the League question. They then warned Root that if the Republican Party wouldn't fight the League, another party would be formed to do so. Whether the incident is true or whether these are things which the able Root saw clearly for himself, Root did make public on June 22, 1919 a letter he wrote to Lodge suggesting that the Senate, instead of revising the Covenant, ratify it with reservations. These reservations should refuse consent to Article X (something he

49 Cranston, pp. 117-118.
did not propose to Wilson in March), allow no qualifications to the right to leave the League, and not let the Covenant be interpreted as meaning our giving up the right to determine our own policy on what we considered "purely American" questions. The effect of Root's proposals, endorsed by such men as Charles Evans Hughes and National Chairman Will Hayes, seems to have been to reunite Republican opinion in general. Taft castigated Root's switch as "indefensible" but he too was to succumb to the pressure of party loyalty in the months ahead.

The treaty was finally signed on June 28, 1919, and Wilson returned to present the treaty to the Senate. He had wired Tumulty, his secretary, that he felt reservations would either mean nothing or simply serve to keep the United States out while the other members determined whether or not they could accept the reservations. On July 10 Wilson repeated to American reporters his fear that reservations would slow down the establishment of peace and keep the United States technically at war with Germany. When he spoke that day to the Senate and presented the treaty, Wilson urged quick ratification in order for the United States to keep faith with its allies. He said that he would be ready to give the Senators any information they felt they needed. Wilson's presentation speech was not an exceptionally good one as he seemed hesitant

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50 Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, pp. 121-122.
and somewhat uncertain. It won no one to his cause and changed no one's mind. Concerning the speech, Republican opponents made remarks such as Brandegee's characterization of it as "soap bubbles of oratory" and Warren Harding's assertion that it was "utterly lacking in ringing Americanism." For better or for worse, the Versailles Treaty was committed to the deliberations of the Senate.

Among the people at large, the so-called "hyphenates" were the most vigorous opponents of the League. It was not that they opposed the idea of a League of Nations, but specific portions of the Versailles Treaty were the things which angered them. German-Americans felt that their "real" native land had been unfairly treated in the treaty and, indeed, they still hated Wilson for taking the United States to war with Germany. The Irish-Americans were angry at Wilson for not making the independence of Ireland a part of the treaty, and they feared the League might make such independence impossible. The Italian-Americans were angered over the failure to award Fiume to Italy.

Delay and Deadlock

In the newly-organized Congress which was summoned into special session on July 10, 1919, Henry Cabot Lodge assumed his post as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. The

results of the elections seemed to indicate that there would be nine Republicans and eight Democrats on the committee. However, one Republican would be a holdover, Senator McCumber, whom Lodge would not count on as being on his side. Lodge therefore insisted that, to be really fair, both minority parties should have seats on the committee. Hiram Johnson, bearing the label of the defunct Progressive Party, was given a seat which was taken from the Democrats. Lodge put men committed to him—Moses, New, and Harding—in three of the new Republican seats. Thus, with Johnson openly against the League in any form, Lodge could be sure of a majority at all times in actions designed to defeat the League.

Wilson invited the men with some misgivings about the League as it stood, the so-called "mild reservationists," to the White House and tried to persuade them that insistence on reservations actually threatened the peace. He did not attempt to defend all the details of the treaty but said that some things, such as the Shantung Settlement, he was simply unable to prevent. Wilson insisted that he did not object to reservations on their merits, indeed he would have fought for them if they had been proposed while he was at Paris, but now it was too late and such reservations might set the nations to arguing again. Whatever success Wilson had in swaying these

52 Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, p. 129.
53 Cranston, p. 133.
men seems to have been offset by the clever work of Lodge, for the latter was able to keep them all pretty well in line with his plans. Also, certain later actions of Wilson nullified any effect of this conference.

While Wilson was attempting to line up senatorial support for ratification, two important pillars of the League idea fell. William Howard Taft wrote to Will Hays, Republican National Chairman, suggesting several specific reservations which might be used as the basis of compromise after the more extreme Lodge proposals were voted down. One suggestion was the limitation of Article X to five years' duration as far as the United States was concerned. Apparently Taft had begun to feel that the League Covenant could not be ratified except by compromise. But it was Will Hays who scored the telling blow by violating Taft's confidence and making the confidential letter public. The League to Enforce Peace was thrown into utter confusion by this action of their president, Taft. It debated what to do and finally decided to keep Taft as president—he had offered to resign—but to issue a statement against reservations. Such confusion ended the usefulness of Taft and his organization but, what was worse, it induced as great confusion among the other friends and followers of the League as to whether they should favor reservations or not.

There was always the possibility that Wilson's fervent

54Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, pp. 138-140.
desire for a League of Nations would overcome his stubborn insistence on defeating delaying reservations. Senator Jim Watson expressed this fear to Lodge on July 27 and noted that, if such a thing happened, "Then we are in the League, and once in, our reservations become purely fiction." To this Lodge replied with a cold appraisal that this was all too true. "But, my dear James, you do not take into account," he said, "the hatred Woodrow Wilson has for me personally. Never, under any set of circumstances in this world, could he be induced to accept a treaty with Lodge reservations appended to it." 55

Lodge was persistent in applying his strategy of delay and the raising of doubts. For two weeks he persisted in reading to his committee the entire Versailles Treaty. That he was succeeding in tiring the League's supporters was evident in the speech of Knute Nelson of Minnesota when the latter said, "I am imbued with the faith that fundamentally the general purpose of the League is sound and fully warranted . . . ." The desire to try to perfect the League was implied, and Lodge counted on this attempt at perfection to finally kill it. The hearings which Lodge held on the Treaty were little

55Granston, The Killing of the Peace, p. 143. Again the primary source for the story is Watson's autobiography. Watson relates another story of a personal conversation with Wilson in which the President said emphatically that he could never accept any policy "with which that impossible name is identified."

56Granston, p. 146.
more than propaganda sessions against the League in which memorials like that of the Irish-Americans condemned the League as a violation of "the principles on which the war was fought," that is, the self-determination of peoples.

Wilson tried futilely in meetings with the Foreign Relations Committee to convince the Senators that if reservations had to be added, they should be incorporated in a measure passed concurrently with the act of ratification, but not as a part of it so as not to require the resubmission of the treaty to the other members. The matter of compromise was mentioned no further, and the Senators spent their time pecking away at various provisions of the Covenant.

On August 23, the process of amendment began when Lodge got through the committee a provision altering the treaty settlement of some Far Eastern problems. Fifty more amendments, all introduced by Fall of New Mexico, were adopted which struck out American participation in all commissions set up to carry out the treaty except the Reparations Commission. It was becoming obvious that Wilson's Senate support was rapidly vanishing. Despite the fact that his physician said

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59Cranston, pp. 163-165.
his health wouldn't stand it, Wilson decided to tour the West in an effort to drum up a wave of support which would cause pressure on the Senators who were opposing the League. Before he left Wilson gave Senator Hitchcock of Nebraska, his floor leader, a list of reservations which he felt would make clear the position of the United States without destroying the League, instructing Hitchcock to use them as his own to form a basis of working out a compromise. Wilson feared, though he felt he probably would have to accept some reservations, that if he began to openly assent to reservations his enemies would merely demand more and more because they wanted not only to defeat the League but to discredit him. His opponents were largely able to convince the public that Wilson was stubbornly opposed to any reservations.

Finally, on September 11, the committee reported the treaty to the Senate floor. The majority report, signed by nine members, including Johnson, recommended that the attached amendments be adopted. It was asserted that the other members of the League would have to agree since the League would be no good without the United States. However, no recommendation that the treaty be adopted was included in the report. The failure to recommend adoption, even with the amendments, would seem to give the lie to Lodge's protestations.


61Cranston, pp. 169-170. See Appendix A for text of the "Hitchcock Reservations."
that they really wanted the treaty and the Covenant if they were "Americanized." Hitchcock had been rebuffed by Lodge in his attempts to use Wilson's list of reservations as the basis of compromise. Six Democratic members submitted a minority report which deplored the long delay and insisted that the amendments were of no real merit and would serve merely to keep us out of the League. It recommended adoption of the treaty without trying to make it "divinely perfect in every detail." Republican Senator McCreary submitted his own minority report which accused the Republicans of trying to defeat the treaty solely because of hostility to Wilson, and pleaded that the treaty be considered in a non-partisan light. Democratic Senator Shields of Tennessee signed no report at all.

The period from the introduction of the treaty to the two Senate votes on it on November 19 was one of parliamentary maneuver in which the master parliamentarian Lodge emerged as victor. When Wilson fell ill on September 25, there was a great wave of popular sympathy for him. Lodge quickly rushed the fifty fall amendments to a vote in which they were defeated with a resulting false sense of optimism on the part of the League's friends. With the amendments

63 Cranston, pp. 191-192. Also, any favorable results of Wilson's tour had been largely nullified by the team of Senators which stalked him from city to city.
defeated, Lodge switched to his strategy of reservations. In writing later, Lodge said of the maneuver:

If successful in putting on reservations, we should create a situation where, if the acceptance of the treaty was defeated, the Democratic party, and especially Mr. Wilson's friends, should be responsible for its defeat, and not the opponents of the treaty who were trying to pass it in a form safe for the United States.64

In this statement it is plain to see that Lodge was working with one eye on the election of 1920, for he realized that the American people as a whole still favored the Covenant. The primary objective was to place the blame for the treaty defeat on the Democrats while at the same time pointing out the evils of the treaty. Secondly, the people had to be convinced that the Republicans opposed the treaty and League as it stood only because American interests weren't protected. This line of persuasion appeared again in the 1920 campaign. As far as Lodge's sincerity in desiring to merely make the treaty safe for the United States is concerned, his daughter has made this comment:

My father hated and feared the Wilson League and his heart was really with the irreconcilables. But it was uncertain whether this league could be beaten straight out this way, and the object of his reservations was so to emasculate the Wilson League that if it did pass it would be valueless and the United States would be honorably safeguarded. My father never wanted the Wilson League, and when it was finally defeated, he was like a man from whom a great burden was lifted.65

64 Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, pp. 207-209.
In his maneuvering Lodge succeeded in getting all his reservations to the treaty adopted. He had all the Republican Senators to agree to consider any compromises only if they came through him. He, in turn, rejected all attempts at compromise. Thus it was apparent on November 17 that when the treaty came to a vote it would be with the Lodge reservations attached. In view of this situation, Wilson had to decide on some strategy to be used. The plan finally adopted was to attempt to vote down the treaty with the Lodge reservations. Then with Vice-President Marshall giving a favorable ruling, a vote to reconsider the treaty would be carried. Then a motion would be made for adoption of the treaty without reservations. True, the weak point in this method was that it depended on enough "mild reservationists" coming over to the Democrats to carry the treaty, but their support was not considered to be completely lost yet. In view of the strategy adopted, Wilson's note to the Democratic Senators on November 18 was a tactical blunder of major proportions. In stating that he felt that the Lodge reservations really provided for nullification of the treaty and that their defeat would open the way for a genuine resolution of ratification, Wilson said, "I trust that all true friends of the treaty will

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67Bailey, p. 178.
refuse to support the Lodge resolution." The gist of the note became known to the mild reservationists and angered them to the point of assuring they would not help the Democratic plan to succeed.

On November 19, 1919, Henry Cabot Lodge introduced a resolution for ratification of the Versailles Treaty with the fourteen "Lodge" reservations and the preamble prepared by the Foreign Relations Committee. After five and a half hours of fruitless and bitter debate, the treaty was brought to a vote and was defeated 39-55. A motion to reconsider the Lodge resolution failed. Later Senator Underwood made a motion to vote on the unconditional ratification of the treaty. Lodge was willing for this to take place, for he was sure that the "mild reservationists" would vote against it. Also, the move would involve no compromise by the Democrats by which they could gain public favor. With four Senators, including Warren Harding, not voting, this final motion was defeated 38-51. It was deadlock rather than a victory for either side.

The reactions of the foreign press to the Senate vote are interesting. The general tone of the English papers was one of sorrow rather than anger and of a determination to

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69 The preamble provided that the treaty was not to take effect unless the reservations were accepted by three of the four Allies.
"carry on." The French were alarmed, for they had been counting on the support of the United States for their security. Their papers generally favored the treaty with reservations in preference to no treaty at all. Le Temps, spokesman for the French Foreign Office, said that the Lodge reservations merely set forth reservations which would exist in practice anyway. The German press reacted as if the vote were a moral victory for them, and asserted that it had altered the nature of the treaty which they had signed with the assumption that the United States would be a party to it. The American press exhibited no uniform opinion as to feeling about the vote or its meaning for the future.

Thus had the situation developed prior to the opening of 1920, a year which was to bring a presidential election. The idea of a league for peace had grown in the minds of men of both political parties even though some others opposed it from the start. However, opposition to Wilson and all that he stood for became a barrier which proved too great for the League to surmount. As a magazine of the time put it, "Hostility to Wilson has evidently become in some quarters a blinding passion that renders sane judgement difficult in regard to anything that has his stamp on it. The League has his stamp upon it and the peril in which it is thus placed is obvious."


72 "Is Wilsonphobia to Defeat the League of Nations?" Current Opinion, LXVI (May, 1919), 344.
The personal animosity of Lodge and Wilson was certainly a factor in the actions of each. Lodge's objective was the defeat of the treaty, and in that he succeeded. But the fair observer must conclude that Wilson, too, is partially to blame for the treaty's defeat. His job, after all, was to achieve the adoption of the treaty, by compromise if necessary. His defenders insist that for him to have agreed to the Lodge reservations would merely have resulted in greater demands. Early in the game this was undoubtedly true; but at the time of the final vote if Wilson had urged the Democrats to accept the reservations, the treaty would undoubtedly have passed. Had Lodge attempted to regain the advantage by a move for reconsideration so as to "screw on" more reservations, it is unlikely that the "mild reservationists" would have supported a move which would have been so obviously obstructive. The French had contended that such reservations would have existed in practice. If so, no harm would have been done by making them a written part of the treaty. Regardless of where the blame lay, the League of Nations had become enmeshed in the struggle of politics and, to some considerable extent, would be an issue in the following year's campaign unless the unlikely occurred and the treaty was again reported out of committee in some form and adopted.

73 Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal, p. 199. This is Bailey's opinion, one to which the writer subscribes in the main.
CHAPTER II

PEOPLE, POLITICIANS, AND PLATFORMS

Many businessmen become rather apprehensive with the approach of a presidential election because upon the policies of the President-elect and his party depend the prospects of good or bad business conditions, at least in the minds of these businessmen. Nineteen hundred twenty and 1921 were certain to be good business years in the eyes of certain members of the world of commerce because 1920 was "the year." It was to be the year when a Republican President would take office. This was surely a fact to reassure business, in the eyes of staunch Republicans, because

the Republican party is so far committed to a restoration of government by the people and by laws, so far committed to a private control of business and industries and public utilities, so far committed to a policy of . . . economy . . . reduction in taxation . . . that financial interests are looking forward in hopeful confidence to 1920 as the precursor of a prosperous 1921.¹

These were the happy thoughts with which many Republicans welcomed in the New Year.

These same Republicans looked pityingly at the plight of

the Democrats whose chances in 1920 seemed growing daily dimmer due to the continuing selfishness of an "autocrat" who, corrupted by eight years of power, showed a shameless disdain for any but his own "imperial will." Not only was Wilson still clinging to the illusion that his insistence on the unconditional ratification of the Treaty of Versailles could be a winning issue in 1920, but he would not declare himself out of the race so as to allow other men to start their concerted efforts to gain the Democratic nomination. Without a doubt this was to be a Republican year.

Whatever the opinion among the Democrats at large, Woodrow Wilson at least did not share the view that 1920 would be a Republican year without question. He still seemed to feel that the people were behind him in his stand and that their will, expressed through him, was being blocked by the Senate. He seemed to feel that the treaty could still be passed. He stated that he did not object to interpretations accompanying ratification, in a separate measure, but that he felt we must definitely ratify or reject the treaty. To his mind, we must take it or leave it and make a separate peace, for the treaty could not be rewritten. He showed his confidence that the people of the United States were with him by his remarks in a letter read to the annual Jackson Day dinner for the Democratic faithful. Said Wilson:

If there is any doubt as to what the people of the country think on this vital matter, the

clear and single way out is to submit it for determination at the next election to the voters of the nation, to give the next election the form of a great and solemn referendum, a referendum as to the part the United States is to play in completing the settlements of the war and in the prevention in the future of such outrages as Germany attempted to perpetrate. 3

The writer gets the impression that Wilson was not demanding that the 1920 campaign be made a referendum but rather that he was merely expressing a confident belief and saying that if anyone doubted the correctness of his view, the election could be made a referendum, one which he felt sure would sustain his assertion.

At the same Jackson Day dinner, William Jennings Bryan spoke and insisted that the urgent duty of the country was to ratify the treaty quickly rather than attempt to make it an issue in an election campaign. To be sure, since the Republicans controlled the Senate, the responsibility for the final fate of the Versailles Treaty must rest with the Republicans. However, the Democratic minority should be careful not to place obstacles in the way of ratification. Bryan had admitted earlier that should the treaty fail of ratification, it would become a very prominent, if not the dominant, issue. 4

To the New York Times, any attempt to campaign on the


4 Baltimore Sun, January 7, 1920. This was in an interview which was reprinted in the New York Times, January 8, 1920, p. 3.
League of Nations as an issue in 1920 would be to fight the campaign on a dead issue instead of the ones of real concern to the people such as the high cost of living, high taxes, and the problem of labor. "The Treaty will be ratified," it confidently stated, "without doubt, sometime this month, that is to say five or six months before the two conventions meet. No one has ever been very successful in conducting a campaign based on a dead issue." The paper's faith in the future, or perhaps in the Senate and the President, was to prove sadly misplaced.

The debate and maneuvering in the Senate had been tiring for the country at large as well as for the Senators involved. However, the League of Nations seemed still to be favored by a large number of people. In New York some 2,000 women gathered at a meeting of the Women's Non-Partisan Committee for the League of Nations and passed resolutions calling upon the Senate to ratify the treaty "with only such reservations as will not send it back to the Allies or require a separate treaty with Germany." This same viewpoint was expressed to Senators Lodge and Hitchcock by delegates who called on them in behalf of organizations representing a combined total membership of twenty million people. The delegates received

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7 The organizations represented were the American Federation of Labor, The League to Enforce Peace, The National Education Association, The United Society of Christian Endeavor,
assurances from both men that they would work for the eventual ratification of the treaty on a basis that would not require its resubmission to the Allies.

An interesting poll was conducted in early January by the New York Times among some 375 colleges throughout the nation. To the students and faculties of these colleges were submitted four proposals for a vote. They were asked whether they thought the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations Covenant should be (1) ratified with no reservations or amendments, (2) rejected completely, (3) ratified with the Lodge reservations, or (4) ratified on the basis of some compromise agreement. In the 92,466 votes tallied from the colleges, opinion was almost evenly split between unconditional ratification and ratification on the basis of some compromise. The Lodge reservations received the third largest vote (17,322), while only 9,566 votes were cast for rejection. The East and Midwest favored compromise and unconditional ratification, in that order, while the West and South reversed the order of


preference. In a poll conducted at the University of Arizona by the Tucson Daily Citizen, the vote distribution was for the ratification on the basis of compromise as a first choice, with unconditional ratification receiving the second highest vote.

Not everyone was in favor of the League by any means. Mayor William Hale ("Big Bill") Thompson of Chicago castigated the League as a "hellish scheme" which, if ratified without reservations, would destroy American sovereignty with one blow, while with reservations it would accomplish the same thing by piecemeal action. He mailed letters to all the members of the Senate asking them to allow the people to vote on this "un-American" proposal. In a debate with Edward Wheeler, editor of Current Opinion, James Beck, a journalist friend of Roosevelt's, declared to the members of the National Republican Club that the League concept violated our traditions and might mix us up in European politics. Beck went on to state that Wilson's foreign policy since his first election was a "black stain" on United States history.

Anne Morgan, daughter of the financier J.P. Morgan, was of

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9 New York Times, January 14, 1920, p. 3; January 15, 1920, p. 4. For a partial tabular breakdown see Appendix B.

10 Tucson Daily Citizen, January 14, 1920, p. 3. See Appendix B.


the opinion that "the League of Nations is a dream that may be realized in forty years or so." In its present form it wasn't workable. Stuyvesant Fish, Director of the National City Bank of New York, was caustic indeed in speaking of the League. He thought that discussion of an idea so inane would be better suited to a church where pedagogues and preachers would be the speakers. Invoking the words of John Randolph concerning another treaty, Fish said of the Covenant, "It shines and it stinks and it stinks and it shines like a dead mackerel lying in the moonlight."

But as far as the writer can tell by samplings of opinion and the official statements of groups, the people generally favored the League and favored our going into it. In Missouri, Democratic candidate Jacob L. Milligan was elected to the House of Representatives from a normally Democratic district. However, Milligan's campaign had based its main appeal on his espousal of the League. Thus his election would seem to indicate a favorable opinion of the League. Women in general seemed favorably inclined towards the League since it was supposed to prevent wars in which their men would have to fight. This is borne out by the action of the national convention of the League of Women Voters which

passed resolutions favoring entering the League with the least possible delay and opposing compulsory military training. But there were other issues which were equally of interest to women such as child labor legislation, legislation for women in industry, and the extension of the suffrage to women.

It would seem that Wilson had good reason to believe the nation backed his stand, although it must be noted that much of the opinion favorable to the League favored it with reservations or some kind of compromise. It was Republican Senator McCumber of North Dakota, a staunch friend of the League, who voiced a warning to Wilson about the future. In his opposition to the Senate modifications, Wilson seemed to be adopting a policy of "watchful waiting." "And while he is watchfully waiting," said McCumber, "diverse candidates for presidential nomination are touring the country with the hope of engendering such animosity toward the compact as shall prevent the adoption of any League of Nations provision." McCumber feared a possible swing of public opinion against the League due to a combination of weariness and misinformation. The validity of his warning was to appear much later.

Wilson had said that if any doubt existed as to the people's desires concerning the League, the 1920 election could


be made a "solemn referendum" on the League. The general
trend of the Democratic press in early 1920 was against such
a move. In Congress itself, the prevalent opinion among
Senators and Representatives seemed to be against even hav-
ing the Versailles Treaty and League Covenant as issues in
the election. The practicality of settling the question that
way seemed doubtful to them for no one had advanced a defi-
nite scheme for getting a clear-cut "yes" or "no" answer.
Neither could the congressional elections be used as a key be-
cause they were complicated by the influence of many local
issues, not to mention other national issues. The two
guiding lights of the "bitter-enders," Borah and Johnson, as-
serted that a speech by Elihu Root, one suggesting revision
of the League, to the New York Republican State Convention
had put the League before the people as an issue in the cam-
paign which could not be ignored. With great fervor Borah
predicted: "Upon the ides of next November, the death-knell
of the treaty will be heard or we will go into the League
with the backing of 110,000,000 free Americans." To all this
oratory, Hitchcock replied that the Democrats would much pre-
fer to ratify the treaty immediately, but they were not
afraid of having it as a campaign issue if such was

18 A poll conducted by the New York Times on January 10
covered some twenty-two Democratic or Independent-Democratic
papers from various sections. Eighteen opposed attempting to
make the 1920 election any type of referendum. New York
Times, January 10, 1920, p. 2.

All during the early months of 1920, the Versailles Treaty was hanging fire in the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. A long series of bi-partisan conferences had been initiated by the Senators who sincerely hoped to get some form of the treaty passed. The point of effective compromise seemed almost achieved—Lodge seemed to be weakening on his stand against compromise—when the "bitter-enders" upset everything. In a series of consultations with Lodge, they threatened him with a bolt of the party if he allowed a compromise treaty to be ratified. Lodge may have been weakening under the pressure of the pro-League Senators, but this threat to the party struck at the roots of the things he felt most worthwhile. As a result, on February 10 the Versailles Treaty with the Lodge reservations was reported back onto the Senate floor. In the debate of the next month, all the assertions and counter-assertions of the earlier debate were made again. Democratic Senator Reed of Missouri, however, went one step further and on March 18 proposed a resolution calling for Ireland to join the League after she won her freedom from England. It passed 38-36.

After returning to England, the special English ambassador to the United States, Lord Grey, had expressed the opinion

\[20\text{New York Times, February 21, 1920, p. 2.}\]

\[21\text{The few Democratic "bitter-enders" were of course not included in this threat.}\]
in a letter to the London Times that England might accept the Lodge reservations to the treaty if President Wilson did. He also suggested that France and Italy would probably then follow suit. Shortly after this letter was made public, Henry Cabot Lodge proposed a change in the preamble which his committee had written. The change suggested was to require all of the signatory nations to consent to the reservations before the treaty was to take effect. Clearly, Lodge was now taking no chances on the treaty's being put into effect by the unlikely event of Wilson's accepting the Lodge reservations. On March 19 the Versailles Treaty, with the Lodge reservations, was brought to a vote in the Senate for a third time. It failed of passage, 49-35.

Interestingly enough, this vote was almost the exact numerical reverse of the other two votes. Many Democrats had opposed another fight and vote on the League because they were up for re-election and did not want to risk a political blunder either by going against pro-League sentiment in their district or going against the expressed policy of their ailing and semi-isolated leader Wilson. When the vote came, twenty-two Democrats, feeling that the treaty with the reservations was the best they could ever hope for, voted for it. Southern Democrats remained staunchly with Wilson's policy (or what they thought was his policy since liaison between the

\[22\text{See footnote 69, p. 43.}\]
recluse and his legislative supporters was almost nil) and voted against it. Perceiving the switch of many Democrats and fearing that the treaty might get through, the "irreconcilables" also voted against it this time. It was returned to Wilson with a statement of the Senate's inability to ratify. To all intents and purposes, the treaty was dead for the remainder of the Sixty-sixth Congress. There was little to be done to avoid the League's becoming an issue in the 1920 campaign now. Referring to Wilson's suggestion for a referendum, Lodge said, "The treaty is gone . . . . If the president desires to make a campaign issue on the treaty, the Republicans are willing to meet the issue."

Wilson, for his part, seemed now even more willing than before to make the League an issue, indeed the issue, in the 1920 election. In a letter to the Kansas Democratic State Convention he pointed out in no uncertain terms that the League would be an issue. He said:

The issue which it is our duty to raise with the voters of the country involves nothing less than the honor of the United States, and the redemption of its most solemn obligations; its obligations to its associates in the great war and to mankind to whom it gave the most explicit pledge that it went to war, not merely to win a victory in arms, but also to follow up that victory with the establishment of such a concert of nations as would guarantee the permanence of a peace based on justice.  


When the Senate began to consider the resolution introduced by Senator Knox providing for a separate peace with Germany, a statement by Democratic National Chairman Homer Cummings was released which condemned the Knox resolution as "renewed evidence of moral leprosy which is eating out the heart of the Republican party." The statement, more than likely cleared with Wilson, drew attention to the horror generally felt a year earlier when the possibility of a separate peace was mentioned. The statement continued by asserting that the only path of honor and peace was through ratification of the treaty. Clearly, if the treaty and Covenant and their rejection were to figure in the campaign, this effort to get around the problem posed by the rejection would also be included.

For the League and the Senate's action to figure as the issue of the fall election, the Democratic Party would have to take a definite stand for the treaty, presumably without the Lodge reservations. This was the viewpoint of Wilson when he wired an answer to the query from Oregon Democrats as to the necessity for nominating candidates who favored an unconditional ratification. Wilson replied in the affirmative to the query, and added that the Lodge reservations were completely contrary to the maintenance of the nation's honor.

Though his original statement about a "solemn referendum" was not actually a demand, Wilson's subsequent comments and actions indicate an increasing desire for the election to be so construed and fought out. But many Democrats, on the third ballot, had voted for the Lodge reservations since they had lost hope of obtaining anything better. They also wanted to go on record with their constituents as having done their best to bring peace. Now the statement by Wilson made them fear he would attempt to have them defeated when they ran for re-election.

The same fear, no doubt, prompted Democratic Senators and House Democrats to go along with the Republican move late in May to pass the Knox peace resolution. Wilson had intimated that he would veto such a resolution, and Republican leaders were anxious for him to do so. The action would give them additional ammunition to use against Wilson when their convention met in June. The Knox resolution was steered through the Senate by Lodge and passed by a vote of 43-38. It was approved in the House 228-139. Wilson was true to his word and vetoed the resolution, saying, "I have not felt at liberty to sign this joint resolution because I cannot bring myself to become a party to an action which would place an ineffaceable stain upon the gallantry and honor of the United States." Congress sustained his veto.

29 Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, p. 262.
Apparently the Democratic members, while willing to go against Wilson's orders to some extent, feared—or did not feel it necessary in order to satisfy their constituents—to flout them completely.

Wilson was coming increasingly to favor a definite attempt to make the League of Nations the main issue in 1920. Senator Borah of Idaho was determined that just such a molding of the election should take place, motivated by quite different hopes as to the results. Presidential nominees can always modify their previous stands to fit the declaration of the party platform. However, a party would be hard pressed to appeal for popular support if there were no candidates available except those who would have to make radical changes to fit the platform. Borah apparently planned to make the League a dominating issue by forcing all the potential Republican candidates to take a public stand in regard to the League. If he were successful in having prospective candidates take definite stands, he might accomplish several other things as well. He no doubt hoped to have the candidates take stands against the League, in the main. If they did so, they would be publicly committed to stands difficult to repudiate. In such a situation, Borah would have an additional source of pressure to support his fight to have an anti-League plank included in the Republican platform. Any candidates who took pro-League stands would reveal themselves as the ones Borah had to fight to keep from getting the nomination.
Borah's method was simply to mail a letter to all potential Republican candidates with several questions relating to the stand the candidate took on the League. The majority of questions were loaded, such as "Would you be willing to have American sovereignty subordinated to a foreign-controlled organization?" Obviously such questions were designed to draw a reply which would seem anti-League, no candidate wishing to kill himself politically by answering such a question by "yes." The letters and the replies were to be made public. Borah's first letter, released on January 1, was to Governor Frank O. Lowden of Illinois who was being mentioned as a very strong candidate. In Borah's view, both Lowden and General Leonard Wood, prominently mentioned as a candidate, must make definite statements as to their position on the League. Hiram Johnson, an openly avowed candidate, had left no doubt about his position; and Borah felt that Senator Warren G. Harding of Ohio, being mentioned as a good, "reliable" candidate, had "defined his position fairly well." He admitted that in some circumstances a letter might be sent to Harding as well.

30Borah stated he intended to send letters to the Democratic candidates if Wilson didn't run for re-election. His purpose in such a move would obviously be merely to get more publicity for the League as an issue.

31Apparently Borah considered Harding's statement to him during the debate (see p. 27) on the treaty and Harding's vote on the treaty as having defined his position.

32New York Times, January 2, 1920, p. 1. Obviously if Harding were to make a showing in the primaries which indicated he would be a strong candidate, Borah would want a more definite statement of Harding's position.
Borah's success in getting satisfactory replies was varied. Lowden answered the inquiry very promptly but he certainly did not take the anti-League stand for which Borah hoped. Lowden indicated he favored a world court with machinery for the arbitration of disputes rather than an organization which he felt was primarily political. However, he felt that "while the League of Nations, even as modified by the reservations adopted, does not take the form which I believe it should, namely judicial rather than political, I think it is the part of wisdom now to ratify it with such reservations as adopted by the Senate." General Wood made no direct reply to Borah's letter but speeches he made in South Dakota and Michigan made it clear that he was for a league, but one with "Americanizing" reservations. Moreover, he felt that the overwhelming sentiment of the country was for such a league.

Other candidates were making statements about their positions on the League without waiting for a letter from Borah. His colleague, Hiram Johnson of California, announced his candidacy on January 19 and expressed a willingness to meet Wilson's demand for a referendum on the League. In fact he said, "It was our duty in the beginning to go before them and make them understand the provisions of this document. Let us

do it now so that it will be relegated to the limbo of past events as a State paper unworthy of association with Americanism." Senator Miles Poindexter, also announcing his candidacy, characterized the League as something contrary to our real worldwide interests and an unnecessary expense. He could see no reason for the United States to abandon our interests in the Philippines and Mexico and instead to stick our nose into the affairs of Turkey. We had accepted the task of raising the people of the Philippines to the level of a civilized nation and we should not now abandon them to disorder in order to begin the task of reconstruction somewhere else in the world. The Senate defeat of the League Covenant had in effect saved the people of the United States from the necessity of huge taxes to support a 250,000 man standing army and perpetual participation in European political affairs.

General Leonard Wood seemed to be gaining favor among Republicans as a candidate for 1920, especially in the West. One Western paper characterized him as "a man with guts," the type needed for the task ahead and said there need be no fear of a former military man as President. Certainly "a college professor or a pettyfogging pacifist is not the man to put to the task of putting down Wobblies, Bolsheviks, and anarchists."

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But Wood was not conservative enough for the Republican "Old Guard" and did not seem like a man who would submit to their discipline. Harding had been the original choice of this group, but the Ohio Senator's miserable showing even in his own state's primary had caused the Old Guard to swing to Senator Philander Knox. Many people felt Knox was being put forward only as a means of keeping Wood from gaining the nomination. Elderly Boise Penrose, long-time leader of the Old Guard, expressed its opinion of election issues when he said that the reaction against Wilson's high-handedness and his general policies would be the driving force of the election. In his view the League was now a dead issue, though the Republican Party should accept the responsibility for defeating it. In the view of many observers, the favoring of Knox seemed to indicate the Old Guard was moving toward a more anti-League stand, perhaps because of Johnson's victory in the Michigan primary. Knox himself, meanwhile, came out in favor of an international court of arbitration rather than membership in the League even with the Lodge reservations. He felt that since the Treaty of Versailles was almost completely discredited in all its parts, the United States might as well end the "alleged" state of war by a joint resolution which would provide reciprocal rights and obligations between the United States and Germany alone.

38 *New York Times*, May 1, 1920, pp. 1-2; May 2, 1920, p. 3.
The Republican National Committee was exceedingly reluctant to commit itself to an out and out anti-League stand. When in February, Chairman Will Hays had sketched the projected basis of the 1920 platform, he had talked about an economical administration, the reduction of taxes that "kill initiative," and the administration of law and order. Action on foreign affairs had been deferred because the "National Convention would necessarily obtain guidance from the position of Republican Senators and Representatives in the meantime." Johnson's victory in the Michigan primary, whatever its cause, had apparently furnished considerable "guidance." The action of the Senate in regard to the Knox peace resolution had largely committed the Republicans to accepting responsibility for the defeat of the treaty. Wilson had emphasized that his veto would make clear the difference of the two parties' positions on the treaty and the League. By May, the Republican National Committee had decided to have the party go before the country as opposed to ratification of the treaty as Wilson demanded. Will Hays suggested that speeches would be aimed at showing that the Republican Party certainly favored peace and some feasible type of

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41 The League was supposed to have been the big issue in the primary but the New York Times, noting that the weather cut the vote in conservative rural areas and that Johnson's biggest vote came from the industrial cities, suggested that Johnson won as a radical rather than because of his opposition to the League. New York Times, April 7, 1920, p. 10.
Herbert Hoover was not a politician by profession, and party leaders were not sure if he were a Democrat or a Republican. He had become well-known to a sufficient extent to be mentioned as a possible candidate. He had indicated that he would have to support the party which supported the League with the necessary reservations which would clarify in the world's mind the fact that there could be no infringement of our constitution. Hoover allowed his name to be entered in several primaries—he was the most popular of potential Democratic candidates in the Michigan primary—and stated his position on the League clearly. To his friends in Oregon he urged the defeat of "no League" candidates, but also declared that Wilson's insistence on ratification without reservations and Johnson's demand for a final rejection were in effect an "alliance of destruction." He felt that ratification with the Lodge reservations would be the best solution.

There were a number of other men being mentioned as Democratic possibilities, most of whom were very definitely pro-League though in many cases they favored reservations of a milder nature than those drawn up by Lodge. William Gibbs McAdoo, Wilson's son-in-law and the Secretary of the Treasury,

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was a leading contender. McAdoo seemed to favor interpretive reservations only. Attorney-General A. Mitchell Palmer was against any amendments and felt that the acceptance of the League at face value would help to build up machinery which would prevent war. Wilson himself, until he declared otherwise, was always a possibility to run for re-election. Most people felt his health would prevent his running, but Wilson was capable of stubbornly ignoring the views of others and the danger to his own life if he became convinced of the necessity for his taking action.

Governor James M. Cox of Ohio was another frequently mentioned possibility. His administration as governor of Ohio had been efficient and generally popular. Cox had sharply criticized the Republican Senators for delaying ratification of the Versailles Treaty. Later on, Cox had written a fairly long article in the Sunday Supplement of the New York Times which defined his position quite well on the League and other issues. To his mind, the treaty could not help but be an issue because uncertain conditions abroad lowered the prices of the American goods in foreign markets with resultant harm to our domestic economy. He felt that any fear the League might involve us in affairs contrary to our constitution could be allayed by a joint resolution noting that the United States was ratifying the treaty with the idea

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in mind that the purpose of the League was that of keeping peace and that it was not merely an alliance of powers against other powers. The resolution should note too that since the League's central purpose was peace and not controversy, the United States was assuming the League would hold to that central purpose. He ridiculed the idea of "Americanizing" the League by pointing out that the French would have an equal right to insist the League be "Frenchized," the British that it be "Britishized," and so on. Cox noted that any attempt to meet such demands would create a travesty of an international organization.

The major political parties would have to take a stand on the League issue, clear-cut or evasive. Thus it would be in the national conventions that the League and the Versailles Treaty would next be hammered about and further molded into a campaign issue. The city of Chicago, traditional convention city, was picked by the Republicans but the Democrats chose the west coast metropolis of San Francisco as their convention site.

In the early part of May, the Republican National Committee's Advisory Committee on Policies and Platforms met in Washington. They decided on a plan to survey Republican opinion on various public questions which would undoubtedly have a place in the election campaign. The hope was to have

some guiding opinions from a wide sampling of Republicans available for the convention platform committee. Some 100,000 copies of this committee's questionnaire were sent out to various sub-committees of the National Committee, Republican leaders in various areas, labor groups such as the American Federation of Labor, and to colleges on request. Prohibition, regarded as pretty much of a closed issue, was not mentioned in the questionnaire. Neither was the League question included as the National Committee intended to have that issue dealt with primarily by the Republican Senators.

The Republican "bitter-enders" had been worried over rumors in the newspapers that the National Committee had begun to favor a platform plank endorsing the Versailles Treaty with the Lodge reservations. These foes of the League were determined to fight for a plank completely rejecting the League. It certainly would have appeared consistent with the actions of the Republican senatorial leadership for the National Committee to have taken such a stand. The apprehensions of the "bitter-enders" proved ill-founded. The National Committee called on some of them to help draft a suggested plank which condemned the treaty as presented by Wilson but which took no stand on the treaty with or without reservations or amendments. Meanwhile, Henry Cabot Lodge

had drafted a plank on the League question, one which was adopted by the Indiana Republican State Convention in the hope it would serve as a model for the platform plank of the Chicago Convention. Lodge's plank rejected the League of Nations and approved the Senate's action on the Versailles Treaty. The blame for defeating the hopes of the world for peace was laid squarely on Woodrow Wilson. The plank proclaimed that the Republicans favored "an association of nations to promote the peace of the world."

It also stated that should the freedom and peace be threatened as it was in 1914, the United States would be ready to step in. Here again was evidence of Lodge's ability to draw together the diverse sentiments among Republicans. Johnson, Borah, and their group could warmly accept the rejection of the League, while the Taft-Hoover group could read the generalities about "an association of nations to promote peace" and hope that they could remain with their party without deserting the cause of world organization. If the convention adopted a similar plank, it would not completely satisfy everyone but would perhaps partially satisfy the various groups and thus prevent a party split.

The Republican National Convention opened in Chicago at the end of the first week of June. One of the delegates who attracted the most attention was the bristling Hiram Johnson.

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who arrived early, on June 3, and was met at the railroad station by a large crowd. Johnson spoke to the crowd and solemnly pledged himself to fight to prevent the Republican Party from "pussyfooting" or "sulking" on the issue of the League and the Versailles Treaty. He declared that there could be no middle ground; America had to remain American and not fall under the domination of any European power. With this declamation ended, Johnson went forth to do battle.

The keynote speech of Henry Cabot Lodge as permanent chairman of the convention was indeed a "hymn of hate" against Woodrow Wilson. The great mission of the Republican Party was to free the United States from the "Wilson Dynasty." Angrily Lodge asserted, "They must be driven from power, not because they are Democrats, but because Mr. Wilson stands for a theory of administration which is not American. His methods, his consistent, if indirect, assaults upon the Constitution and upon all the traditions of free government strike at the very life of the American principles upon which our government has always rested." Lodge went on to touch briefly on the high cost of living and to point out that a firmer hand was needed in our relations with Mexico. He made a definite point of the "universal dissatisfaction" with the government operation of the railroads during the war period. Such an experiment, regardless of the circumstances, must never be

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repeated. In regard to the League, Lodge repeated his assertion that the "Wilson League" was one that would breed war instead of preventing it. This danger of the League as constituted was what caused the Senate to reject the treaty. Woodrow Wilson was to blame for denying America the chance to accept the treaty because it was he who schemed to foist his league upon the United States as a part of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Committee on Resolutions had begun its meetings while the convention was in the process of organizing. Reports circulated on June 6 that the platform had been completed except for the plank on the League. As regarded this plank, the reports intimated that the committee seemed to favor one following generally the so-called Indiana Plank. It was said that the proposed plank did not reject the League entirely, but declared for reservations and a world court. It was considered likely that there would be some revision to pacify the obstreperous Johnson, although statements from Johnson denied that he was weakening on his stand for a repudiation of the League. Lodge seemed to believe that the convention delegates generally favored the treaty with the Lodge reservations. He wrote to Colonel Harvey, "I think the bulk of the Convention and the mass of the people are in favor of the treaty.

with the reservations which bear my name. But I do not want to make any pledge as to the future." 54 In other words, his reservations had done the job desired, to kill the treaty in the Senate, and he certainly didn't want the Republican Party committing itself to ratify the treaty at a later date under any conditions. The League was dead, now let the reservations die also.

By midnight of June 9 the sub-committee of the Committee on Resolutions which had been working on the planks on foreign relations and the League seemed hopelessly deadlocked. Senator Smoot had offered a tentative plank which read as follows:

We approve the action of the Republican Senators in refusing to ratify the treaty without safeguarding reservations and pledge the Republican party to the ratification of the Versailles Peace Treaty with Germany when these and necessary reservations for the protection of American interests and policies are approved.

Such a plank would have satisfied most of the moderate Republicans but it would have ignored the stand of Johnson and Borah. The result would have probably been to project the fight over the plank onto the convention floor where it would have caused untold havoc. Lodge himself opposed any attempt at compromise on the basis of the Lodge reservations. He said bluntly that if such a plank were reported to the

54 Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, p. 263.
convention, he would leave the chair and fight it from the floor of the Convention. Much has been made of Lodge’s repudiation of his own stand in the Senate but, as has been indicated previously, his sole motive in proposing the reservations was to defeat the treaty by indirection. He certainly did not intend to have his accomplishment negated now.

He was also political realist enough to know what the reaction of Johnson and Borah would be to such a plank. There were too many factions in the Republican Party to take an unequivocable stand on the treaty. The Republican plank must be carefully drawn and designed to satisfy the conflicting elements within the Party, while at the same time furnishing ammunition to fire at Wilson and the Democrats. At 1:30 A.M. the committee adjourned, still deadlocked.

In the meeting convened later in the day, the subcommittee finally managed to work out a plank on the League. From the results, it seemed that Lodge's strategy had been adopted for the plank reported to the convention was a masterpiece of equivocal phraseology. Mention was made of some vague ideal of international association to preserve peace, but it was emphasized that it should be one based on international justice and definite principles of law. The League of Nations as constituted was condemned as being more prone to cause injustice, hostility and war than to maintain peace.

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Membership in the League would deprive the American people of the right to decide what path they wanted to take in reference to a problem and would commit them in advance to the decision of the League. The plank ended by condemning Wilson's stubborn insistence on his own way, and expressed full approval of the action of the Senate. It was clear at least that the so-called "Wilson League" was rejected, but what of a league modified so as to be more "just"? The plank indicated the Republicans were in favor of an "international association" and that they approved the action of the Senate, presumably including the attempt to adopt the Lodge reservations. It is the writer's opinion that the platform in effect placed the Republicans on record against the League but left the verbal back door open in case the swell of pro-League public opinion should prove too strong. The phraseology might be used by the pro-League Republicans to help rationalize their party loyalty as not conflicting with their support of the League. But little was to be feared in the way of a threat to bolt by the pro-Leaguers. Had they put on as much pressure as the "irreconcilables," it is difficult to say what the results might have been for the Republicans and the nation.

Editorial opinion in the nation's newspapers ran the gamut from thorough approval to complete condemnation of the plank. The Chicago Tribune asserted that the plank clearly stated the issue, rejection or ratification, with or without reservations. Both the New York World and the Baltimore Sun evaluated the plank as clearly revealing that Lodge was insincere in regard to his reservations and was really of the same opinion as Johnson all along. The plank was seen as a clear victory for Johnson and the "bitter-enders." The New York Tribune, on the other hand, felt that the platform did not preclude the entry of the United States into the League or the eventual ratification of the Versailles Treaty. It did repudiate the Wilsonian "super-state" idea by basing American hopes less on armed force than on the extension of the principle of arbitration. The Tucson Daily Citizen, a Republican paper, was fervently orthodox in its editorial, expressing the opinion that the Republican platform was a statesmanlike reconciliation of the differences in methods of dealing with the treaty. It continued, "Mr. Wilson brought home a rotten document. Senator Lodge did his best to pare away the rotten parts and save as much of it as was sound. For that we commend him. But for those who refused to have anything to do with the rotten thing, we also have praise." The Citizen was of the opinion that the Republican platform was a

would mean the death of the League for the simple reason that the overwhelming sentiment of the United States against the treaty and Covenant could support the Republican party.

The Richmond *Times-Dispatch*, a Democratic paper, expressed a view which proved very prophetic indeed when it said that the plank was so evasive that it meant literally nothing. As a result it would have its own interpretations during the campaign as the party leaders might believe the political exigencies required.

Democratic spokesmen in general interpreted the Republican plank on the League as being an anti-League plank, although one that was disguised by a "brainstorm of words."

Senator Hitchcock felt that it was now clear that Republican victory in November would mean the final and irrevocable stamp of death on the Versailles Treaty while Democratic victory would mean eventual ratification. On the League as the issue of the campaign, the Democrats were sure to win. Wilson was of the opinion that the Republican action meant the party had accepted his suggestion to make the League an issue, the issue, so that the election could truly be a referendum from the people. "This thing [the League] lies too deep to permit of any political scullduggery, any attempt to sidestep or evade moral and humanitarian responsibilities much too

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solemn to treat so lightly or ignore," he said. Taking a verbal slap at Lodge, Wilson said:

The thinly veiled rejection of the principle of the League of Nations by the Chicago Convention will not fool anyone. The attitude of Senator Lodge and that of Senator Johnson differ only in degree. Both are really opposed to it in any form. One of these gentlemen is disingenuous and evasive and the other is candidly hostile.63

But it is a candidate and not a platform which is elected, and the convention was to have no less trouble selecting a standard bearer. The two strongest candidates at convention time were General Leonard Wood and Governor Frank Lowden of Illinois. Wood faced the old psychological obstacle of the reluctance to place a military man in the White House, sometimes prominent in American sentiment. The Tucson Daily Citizen scoffed at this fear and said Wood was an ideal candidate for a period which required a man with "guts." After all, "a college professor or a pettyfogging pacifist is not the man to put to the task of putting down Wobblies, Bolsheviks, and anarchists." Whatever the general feeling about military men as presidents, Wood was equal to Lowden in popularity and political strength. For several ballots the convention failed to give the necessary majority to any one candidate. It was obvious that Wood and Lowden were so closely matched that

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64Editorial in the Tucson Daily Citizen, January 1, 1920. The activities of the International Workers of the World ("Wobblies") were a problem to Westerners during this period.
neither could be nominated without the other giving in, something neither seemed ready to do. Henry Cabot Lodge had cast his vote with Wood during the balloting but he began to see that if a nominee was to be obtained, it could be done only by compromise. Over the protests of numerous leaders and delegations, Lodge recessed the convention.

Colonel George Harvey had established himself in Room 404 of the Blackstone Hotel, and as the convention proceeded he talked to many delegates and party leaders so as to keep in touch with developments. He too had watched the developing deadlock with concern, and during the recess he conferred with Lodge, Brandegee, Senator Curtis and others such as Murray Crane of Massachusetts. The meeting was not one in which a small circle of men plotted in a "smoke-filled" room, for Senators and other delegates drifted in and out of the meeting. Harvey, Lodge and the more important party leaders came to agreement on the fact that Wood, Lowden, and Johnson—the next highest on the ballot—must be dropped and a compromise candidate chosen. Among the possibilities mentioned was the amiable Senator from Ohio, Warren G. Harding. Harding, although he had made a very poor showing in the few primaries he entered, was from a strong state and had received a fair number of votes on each ballot. Above all, he was very regular politically and was pliable. In relation to the League of Nations, he had followed the Republican leadership in the Senate fight very well. A survey was made of the delegations and it was found that most of them were willing to switch to
Harding. When Harding was called in to the conference, Harvey asked him if he knew of any reason, arising out of his past, which would prevent him from standing with confidence as the Republican candidate before the people. Harding was stunned, perhaps less by the query about his past than the sudden realization that he was being seriously considered for the nomination, and asked for a few minutes alone. He returned to the room shortly and said confidently, "Gentlemen, there is no such reason."

There were at least two more factors working to set up Harding as the compromise candidate. His campaign manager was the Ohio politician, Harry M. Daugherty, who adopted a strategy well suited to as colorless a candidate as Harding. Unable to get even the Ohio delegation completely committed to Harding—he had 39 and Wood 9 delegates—Daugherty went to the convention and button-holed delegates and delegation leaders. From them he got the promise of Harding as their second or third choice, at times even fourth choice. From Jake Hammon, Oklahoma political leader, he got an agreement to swing fifty delegates to Harding if Lowden couldn't win and it seemed that Harding had a chance. Said Daugherty, "I did not care at the time who his first choice was. Our whole plan of campaign was centered on second choice votes. When the Convention assembled, we had . . . the most complete poll

65Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, pp. 265-266.
of delegates from first choice to fourth . . . ."

66 But Daugherty was not one to miss any opportunity. He made an agreement with Lowden's manager to combine to beat Wood. This was to be done by loaning votes to Lowden on several ballots—Harding had picked up votes as the men with only scattered support dropped out—in an effort to stampede the convention away from Wood. After Wood was beaten, the alliance was to cease. Even with a loan of votes, Lowden could not stampede the convention away from Wood. With the development of the deadlock, Lowden released his 307 delegates. Harding had 133\(\frac{1}{2}\) and Wood 299 at this point, the eighth ballot. Harding then was clearly the best bet for a compromise candidate.

In the strategy meeting at which Harvey brought up Harding's name, Calvin Coolidge, Governor of Massachusetts, was the suggestion of Murray Crane for the compromise candidate. Crane, at the time, was engaged in a struggle with Lodge for control of the Republican organization in the state of Massachusetts. He had forced the Republican State Convention to endorse the League of Nations despite Lodge's opposition. Lodge now supported Harding against Coolidge so as to avoid losing control of the state Republican organization completely to Crane.

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67 Daugherty, pp. 36, 50.

On June 12, 1920, the Republican Convention reconvened and the swing to Harding began. By the tenth ballot he had obtained the necessary majority for the Republican nomination. Calvin Coolidge was nominated as the vice-presidential candidate, probably as compensation to Crane. Even when Harding was nominated there was no popular explosion for him. The statement by Colonel Harvey, "He was nominated because there was nothing against him, and because the delegates wanted to go home," no doubt was a good characterization of the situation, at least as to the convention's general attitude.

The English and French press seemed, in general, to interpret both Harding's nomination and the Republican platform as a rejection of the League. The London *Times* hopefully stated that the "vagueness of the platform leaves room for favorable interpretation in strong and honest hands. We have faith in the American conscience." The *Telegraph* expressed the opinion that the Republican platform was deliberately vague for the simple reason that it would be much simpler to criticize Wilson's plan than to propose a satisfactory alternate. No one could be sure just how Harding would interpret the platform plank on the League. The *Morning Post* said simply that a Republican triumph would mean "the League will fall to the dusty stage of pious resolutions." The French press was

69 Cranston, *The Killing of the Peace*, p. 266.
almost unanimous in its belief that a Republican win would doom any chance of America's entering the League. *Le Temps*, *Le Journal*, and others generally concurred in the statement of *L'Echo de Paris* that "the program of the Republican party as it was outlined at Chicago was simply this—no League of Nations. We do not attach great importance to the declaration in favor of an International Court. It is simply declamation, nothing more."

Reaction in America to both the platform and the candidate was as varied as could be. Staunch Republican papers praised both the candidate and the platform. The *Tucson Daily Citizen* took a very complimentary view of Harding and said that in his five and a half years in the Senate, Harding had gained much respect for being a quiet, forceful, determined, capable man with none of the tricks of the demagogue. The *Citizen* went so far as to describe Harding as a "quiet, capable, brainy Senator" who would continue "the line of capable Republican statesmen begun by Lincoln and interrupted only temporarily by Roosevelt and Taft." Hoover met with the Republican nominee and later said that all Republicans could support him for there was nothing to prevent a "forward-looking" interpretation of the League plank. Taft also was

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quite hopeful that Harding would give the proper interpretation to the plank and said "the Republican Party is pledged to an association of nations. That is only another name for League of Nations. With reasonable reservations or the Lodge reservations—and they are acceptable to other nations—we can foresee the establishment of the League." Republican Senator Smoot stated bluntly that the plank sustained the Senate's action but did not repudiate the League. It did not pledge the party to any specific action in the future because future action would be based on conditions existing when Harding was actually President. Senator Poindexter of Washington denied that the plank was a straddle, and said that it condemned the Wilson League directly and all international government by inference. An international tribunal which would be the servant rather than the master of the nations in the settling of disputes was still a possibility. The New York Times was of the opinion that Harding was picked because he was supposedly easy to manage. Sometime during the campaign he would have to take a stand in his own name for he could not "go on through the canvass, facing both ways, even if there is a smile on both faces."

With the furor of the convention having subsided,

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Republican strategists met to decide just what type of campaign Harding should conduct. It was decided to keep Harding's statesman-like profile on his own front porch where he could give chatty little speeches under their watchful eyes.

It was tentatively scheduled that he should make only seven or eight major speeches, and those in the larger cities. Harding's managers were counting on his already being known nationally. When Harding indicated he would spend the next few weeks preparing his acceptance speech which was to be delivered from his home in Marion, he was asked whether or not the League question would be the main feature of his speech. "I have a feeling," said Harding, "that public sentiment makes the paramount issue of a campaign rather than the judgment of the candidate or that of the party managers." With that the reporter had to be satisfied.

The Democrats picked San Francisco for their National Convention, perhaps in hopes that it would help them rally the West and also help avoid the feeling of following the Republicans along, which would have been present in Chicago. All indications were that the convention would adopt a strongly pro-League plank. Early in January the Democratic National Committee had endorsed Wilson's stand on the Versailles Treaty.

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and the League Covenant as well as his administration's record. The Virginia State Democratic Convention adopted a strong treaty plank which was reportedly cleared with Wilson and designed as a model for the National Convention. In part the Virginia plank said:

The Democratic Party of Virginia favors a League of Nations as the surest if not the only practicable means of maintaining the permanent peace of the world . . . We advocate the prompt ratification of the treaty without reservations which would impair its essential integrity.81

There was no dearth of candidates among the Democrats but none of them was really in as strong a position as Lowden or Wood had been at the Republican Convention. Attorney-General Palmer was an avowed candidate but his anti-radical campaigns had stirred up considerable ill-will among many groups which were not radical. William Gibbs McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury and Wilson's son-in-law, was another candidate as was James M. Cox, Governor of Ohio. Over all the would-be candidates hung the possibility that the enfeebled Wilson would run for a third term. Not until the convention was well underway was Wilson's silence interpreted as meaning he would not seek another term. McAdoo, unable to get an endorsement from Wilson, had formally withdrawn his name before the convention opened but it was understood that he would accept a draft.

Homer Cummings, Democratic National Chairman, was selected temporary chairman of the convention which opened June 28, and he gave the keynote address. Much of his speech was devoted to extolling the general accomplishments of the Wilson administration as "vital to the readjustment of our economic and social conditions." With great emotion he recounted the invasion of Wilson's sick-room by the Senator who sought Wilson's political death. Wilson's actions when he brought back the preliminary draft of the Versailles Treaty in February, 1919 were recounted. The revisions suggested by Taft, Root, the Foreign Relations Committee, and others had been largely incorporated into the finished draft. Lodge, however, in joint debate with President Lowell of Harvard, had refused to suggest any constructive amendments. Replying to Wilson's critics, Cummings stated that when he had returned with the finished treaty, Wilson had been willing to accept reservations which did not impair the integrity of the treaty. Apparently with Lodge's statements in mind, Cummings asserted that the text of the League Covenant itself made it clear that the League would not seek to overrule the Monroe Doctrine or to force the United States to act without the consent of Congress. The permanent chairman, Senator Robinson of Arkansas, devoted his speech to a step-by-step

82 Cox, Journey Through My Years, p. 228.
tracing of events from the adoption of the Covenant at Versailles until its rejection by the Senate.

Like their Republican counterparts, the Democratic Committee on Resolutions had considerable difficulty in getting a League plank drawn. Carter Glass of Virginia, acting as spokesman for Wilson, and Senator Kenneth McKellar were trying to put over a fervently pro-League plank. The Democratic Senators who had voted for the Lodge resolutions on March 19 insisted on a plank they could support without repudiating their votes. On the other hand, Senator Walsh, one of the Democratic "bitter-enders," refused to accept the Glass proposal. He spoke for a group which included men such as Senator Pomerence and William Jennings Bryan who favored a compromise proposal. The meeting began at 7:30 on the evening of July 2 and was still deadlocked at midnight. Early in the morning a plank was finally adopted. It followed the Virginia plank with the addition of the phrase "but do not oppose the acceptance of any reservations making clearer or more specific the obligations of the United States to the League associates." Had the Democrats been able to get such an idea into operation during the Senate action, the United States would have entered the League, probably with the Lodge

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84 Cox, Journey Through My Years, p. 228.
The flight to nominate a standard-bearer for the Democratic Party was a long and drawn-out one. McAdoo and Palmer were the early leaders on the balloting, with Cox also running strong. Finally on the forty-fourth ballot Cox gained the nomination. In a sense Cox was a compromise candidate, too, since Palmer and McAdoo could not gain enough votes to break the deadlock. But his victory was due more to good floor strategy in the long process than to any definite arrangement such as made by the Republicans at Chicago. One of his talking points, doubtless, was the fact of his being from the important state of Ohio as well as Harding. The stands of the candidates on the League seem to have had little to do with their fortunes, although Cox's stand was very similar to the plank finally adopted by the convention. Franklin Delano Roosevelt of New York, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was picked as the vice-presidential candidate, largely because of the suggestion by Cox himself.

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88 Bailey asserts that McAdoo's candidacy was killed by the "wet" Irish group's opposition, his politically unfavorable title of "The Crown Prince," and his niggardliness with Treasury patronage. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal, p. 318.

89 See p. 55.

90 Cox, p. 232. Cox suggested to his manager that F.D.R. met the geographical requirements, was an Independent, had a famous name. The request was relayed to Charles Murphy, head of the N.Y. delegation, who said, "I don't like Roosevelt.
When the results of the Democratic Convention became known, Republican leaders from various parts of the country met in Chicago with National Chairman Will Hays. A general decision was made to place the major emphasis on the League, with Democratic wastefulness and inefficiency in the war period coming second. Prohibition would not be mentioned. Cox, meanwhile, was indicating that he would open his campaign in the West, probably California, on a keynote of immediate ratification of the treaty to "keep faith with the boys who went over there." He did intend to propose two clarifying reservations, which were (1) that the United States would sign with the assumption that the League's main purpose was to keep peace and that it would be loyal to that purpose, and (2) the participants must understand that the war-making power of the United States is vested in Congress and cannot be set aside when the United States is supposed to comply with the League decisions.

After a strategy conference with Cox in Ohio early in July, Roosevelt gave out a statement intimating that the League was to be the main issue in their campaign. To this

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90(cont.) He is not well known in the country, but this is the first time a Democratic nominee for the presidency has shown me courtesy. That's why I would vote for the devil himself if Cox wanted me to. Tell him we'll nominate Roosevelt on the first ballot as soon as we assemble." Cf. Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 66-69.


Harding replied, "The Republican party and candidates gladly accept the challenge. We are more than willing to make the election a national referendum on whether we shall have four more years of Democratic Readiness to surrender this Republic."

Following the strategy conference, Cox and Roosevelt paid a visit to Wilson at the White House. It has been said that Cox had never met Wilson before and that up to this meeting Cox was not overly enthusiastic about the League as the main issue. Cox himself states that he had met Wilson several times during the war period and had become very friendly with Wilson. Cox states that he wanted to see Wilson, whose fight for the League he so admired, and assure him that the fight would be carried on. Regardless of how they felt beforehand, Cox and Roosevelt did seem to come out of the meeting with a new enthusiasm.

On July 19, Harding made a statement at Marion which, together with the earlier reply to Roosevelt's statement, made people wonder if he was moving toward a more definite anti-League stand. He called attention to a cable from Colonel Edwin M. House to the Philadelphia Public Ledger which mentioned a preliminary treaty with Germany which was proposed for just after the armistice. Harding asserted that if this

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plan had been followed, the United States would have had peace by Christmas, 1918. It was obvious then that the Democrats were to blame for holding up the peace, because the United States really hadn't been pledged to the League idea from a moral standpoint. Cox, on the following day, emphasized again that the League was to be the chief issue, with such items as an increase of production while reducing waste and a modern budgetary system for the government being next in importance.

The candidates had now been chosen and the convention halls were empty. It remained for the standard-bearers to make formal declaration of their faith and to begin the process of convincing the electorate, not that they should want what the candidates stand for, but that the candidates stand for what the people really want. As the country paused to take a deep breath, it seemed that a national referendum might truly be in the making. The League question was a part of the opposing platforms, although some people had difficulty deciding what type of "wood" had been used for the Republican plank. Platforms, both wooden and political, do not always receive the use their construction might indicate and frequently they also crack under a strain. What the campaign itself was to bring forth as to the League of Nations issue remained to be seen.

"A BANNER WITH A STRANGE DEVICE"

One of the little ceremonies that was so much a part of American politics—at least until the Democratic Convention of 1932—was the formal notification of the party's candidate and his acceptance. This political dance-step, a carry-over from the days of long distances and little communication, by this time was merely the opening gun of the presidential campaign. Here the candidate would raise the banner which was to be the standard of the party in the fight to come. There were those who, later in 1920, began to feel that the Republican banner was showing itself to be disturbingly chameleon-like.

To Henry Cabot Lodge fell the task of "notifying" Harding of his nomination. On July 22, 1920, a large crowd gathered before Harding's home in Marion, Ohio and heard Lodge praise Harding as a great and patriotic American. With one eye on Wilson, Lodge advised Harding "to think with complete unselfishness of your country and your country's interests first, a high qualification for office, not too familiar to us of late and, therefore, peculiarly necessary at this moment."¹

Lodge continued by attacking Wilson's endeavors to get

¹Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, p. 269.
the United States into the League as efforts to make us mem-
bers of an alliance with foreign powers in a fashion which
threatened the independence, sovereignty, and safety of the
United States. The Senator from Massachusetts further lauded
the efforts of the Republicans to prevent such an alliance by
proposing protecting amendments, amendments which Wilson
killed along with the treaty. Lodge then noted:

In this work, you, sir, took a conspicuous part and
we know that you were in full accord with the belief
of your Republican colleagues that the League of Na-
tions, as proposed by Mr. Wilson, and upon which he
and his party still insist, ought never to be ac-
cepted by the United States.2

Thus the "no 'Wilson League'" note was sounded as well as the
theme of "the autocrat." As the final step in making these
the keynotes of the campaign, the candidate would have to echo
Lodge's statements.

Harding's orthodoxy was apparent in his acceptance speech
for he blamed the high cost of living on Democratic financial
policies and proposed tax revision to the needs of peacetime
and the establishment of a protective tariff. Picking up the
cue from Lodge, he emphasized words such as "autocracy" and
"obstinacy" in obvious references to Wilson though he never
mentioned Wilson by name. "I believe in party government,"

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2Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, p. 270.
4Cranston, p. 270. He asserts that Harvey visited Hard-
ing and helped him write this speech.
said Harding, "as distinguished from personal government, individual, autocratic, or what not . . . No man is big enough to run this Republic."  

Moving on to foreign affairs, Harding characterized the Republican Senate fight as having saved our nationality by preventing the trading of independent American power for an obscure and unequal place in a type of "super-state." He expressed sympathy for Europe if "the supreme blunder" had left European relationships inextricably interwoven with the Covenant but this fact only showed how lucky we were to stay out, to be left a free agent of international justice with a "covenant of conscience" rather than having surrendered to a military alliance the right to define American duty to the world. Harding re-emphasized the old shibboleth that the League was a "foreign council" which we did not want to have the power to call our sons to war.  

As to the future, "I promise you," said Harding, "formal and effective peace so quickly as a Republican Congress can pass its declaration for a Republican executive to sign." Since there was to be no "Wilson League," what was the Republican alternative? Said Harding:

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6 Ibid.
7 Cranston, The Killing of the Peace, p. 271.
With the Senate advising as the Constitution contemplates, I would hopefully approach the nations of Europe and the earth, proposing that understanding which makes us a willing participant in the consecration of nations to a new relationship to commit the moral forces of the world, America included, to peace and international justice, still leaving America free, independent, and self-reliant, but offering friendship to all the world.9

Reaction of the nation's newspapers to this speech was as mixed as it had been regarding the Republican platform. The New York World figuratively scratched its head and admitted that although Harding had welcomed a referendum on his party's "defense of the preserved inheritance of our national freedom," he had thrown no light whatever upon his attitude toward the treaty of peace. In the view of the New York Evening Post, "Senator Harding's program is nothing less than a repudiation of our professed ideals of international co-operation for it repudiates the only method of giving them early and effective application." The San Francisco Chronicle viewed Harding as expressing the belief that the nation is safer when constitutional methods are followed. The Philadelphia Public Ledger accepted his policy as similar to that of Taft, while the Washington Post, with brutal brevity, assessed Harding's speech as regarded the League by saying, "He does not pick the League to pieces; he smashes it with a few blows." Adding its own opinion, the New York Times remarked, with more

than a trace of sarcasm, "It is to make the Republican cam-
paign cry: 'The League is dead. Long live the New Relation-
ship.'"

Completely true to character, Hiram Johnson suffered no
doubts as to what Harding meant, or at least admitted to none
publicly. When he was asked in San Francisco as to what he
felt was the real meaning of Harding's acceptance speech, John-
son replied:

Yesterday in his speech of acceptance, Senator
Harding unequivocally took his stand upon the para-
mount issue in this campaign, the League of Nations
. . . There can be no misunderstanding of his elo-
quent words . . . Senator Harding is to be con-
gratulated upon his firm and emphatic stand against
the proposed league.

To Johnson, the election was to be a real referendum, one in
which he felt the people would respond with an overwhelming ap-
proval of the Republican position.

On July 27 Calvin Coolidge, Republican Vice-Presidental
candidate, made his formal acceptance speech. He praised Hard-
ing as a leader but one wise enough to seek counsel—presumably
the counsel of the Senate Republicans. Coolidge expressed the
belief that the property of the nation should be restored to
the people, the government to their control and national af-
fairs administered in accordance with the Constitution. Here
again was the note of condemnation of what the Republicans had


pictured as the attitude of the entire Wilson administration, an attitude they were to insist would be unchanged under Cox or any new Democratic President.

Coolidge repeated Harding's pledge of a peace to be made as soon as the Republican Party was given power by the people's vote. Since the League Covenant and the peace treaty were so closely bound together, this seemed to promise a separate peace with Germany without question. But the Vice-Presidential candidate also echoed the "New Association" idea when he said of the League:

To a League in that form, subversive of the traditions of and the independence of America, the Republican Party is opposed. But our party, by the record of its members in the Senate and by the solemn declaration of its platform, by performance and by promise approves the principle of agreement among nations to preserve peace and pledges itself to the making of such an agreement, preserving American independence and rights, as will meet every duty America owes to humanity.\textsuperscript{13}

The sum total of the Republican statements on the League by the official opening of the campaign seems to the writer to have been an anti-League stand, certainly an anti-"Wilson League" stand. The statements concerning the "principle of agreement between nations" and a "new relationship" indicated nothing at all beyond what the nations had always had and used in their attempts to live peaceably with one another. However, these two speeches of the candidates were so worded, as was the Republican platform, as to leave the verbal "back

door" open for a retreat to a more pro-League stand in the face of political necessity. They were also so worded as to make transition easy to more ambiguous statements on "a league" should the occasion demand it, statements which might be needed to relieve the mental anguish of those Republicans who favored the League but wanted to be loyal to their party.

Up to July, the Democrats had been fairly consistent in hammering at the League of Nations as the chief issue in the campaign. But at the end of July, George White succeeded Homer Cummings as National Chairman of the Democratic Party. On July 29, White made statements to the press which confused the picture considerably. He announced that the League would be a secondary issue and that Cox's acceptance of the President's request for a stand on the League "was subject to a certain degree of elasticity." The main appeal, according to White, would be made on the theme of "Peace, Progress, and Prosperity." "Progressivism" was to be the most important single issue for, as White put it:

I do not think that the League of Nations is the chief issue; it is a secondary issue and one of the chief issues but not the chief one. And I will say very frankly that we do not hear much of the League of Nations out in Ohio. The issue there is opposition to stand-pattism and a fight against the methods of the Republicans. I regard progressivism as the real issue west of the Mississippi.\(^4\)

It would seem that White, like the Republican strategists,

\(^{14}\)New York Times, July 30, 1920, p. 1. No one seems to have noticed White's slight error in geography.
felt that it was politically unwise to concentrate on one issue to the point of excluding all others. Certainly the voters would have other problems on their minds, problems on which the Democrats would need to give some assurance. White probably hindered more than he helped, however, by throwing in the general term “progressivism” which he did not define. Echoing the statements of White, Democratic Senator David Walsh of Massachusetts voiced the belief that the League would not be the main issue of the campaign, despite Republican efforts to make it so. To Walsh, it would be a clear-cut fight on domestic issues. As for the League: “I believe that the Democratic nominee should not stress it too emphatically,” said Walsh. “The country needs a man who will give his attention to strictly American problems for awhile. The people are much more concerned about profiteering than they are about the League of Nations.”

The Republicans did not let the opportunity presented by White’s statements slip by entirely, though they hardly exploited it to the fullest extent. Harding issued a statement from Marion on July 30 that White’s statements about “progressivism” being the real issue were an attempt to soft-pedal the League issue since most Democrats wanted to forget the “whole sorry mess.” He asserted that Cox had not answered his earlier question on just where the Democrats really stood on the

League. With a noticeable lack of originality, Harding hinted darkly that "international bankers" were contributing large sums to his opponent's campaign.

On July 31, Harding officially opened his "front-porch" campaign with a speech to some two thousand factory workers, businessmen, and farmers who came to his home. He admitted that he was not ready to give a full outline of his tax program at the time, but he did make some guarded references to the protective tariff and called for a repeal of the excess profits tax, expressing doubt that the latter tax "accomplishes the end during peace which we want."

The Republican candidate spoke later to a delegation of Wayne County (Michigan) Republicans and pointed out several dangers involved in League membership. Democratic assertions to the contrary, if the League decided on military action the President would be forced to go along even if Congress refused to declare war. He would be forced to do so if he were not to make the Covenant a meaningless scrap of paper. Harding also insisted that the process of Americanizing various nationalities in the United States would be hindered by League membership, for then the "land of adoption sits in judgement on the land from which they came." In any event, industrial and social peace at home was of more importance than international peace. We had, after all, gone to war because of the obligation to ourselves


and not to other nations.

The front-porch campaign ran into a number of difficulties, not all of which were due to a lack of its appeal to the people at large. Apparently the officials of the railroads could not see their way clear to grant the lower "excursion" rates to delegations to Marion. This put something of a crimp in the Republican plans. On August 4, it was announced that Harding would stay in Marion until October and then would tour the big cities. It would seem that the response to the "front-porch" campaign was discouraging enough to make the Republicans feel that Harding should go out and "hustle for election as if he were a wretched Democrat."

But regardless of a change of plans, Harding continued to summon up the dangers of the League in speeches such as that to visiting veterans of the 4th Ohio Infantry Division in which he asserted, "I do not want a council of foreign powers at any time, for any reason, to summon the sons of America to battle."

On August 7, the Democrats officially notified their candidate and Cox gave his formal acceptance speech from his Ohio home. He did not limit himself to the League, though he

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devoted the largest single part of his speech to it. Cox spoke sharply against the profiteering which was so prevalent and then weakened his appeal by hinting that some industrialists were contributing large sums to the Republican campaign in the hope of obtaining special favors. As a cure for radicalism, he suggested a better job be done of teaching the ideals of America to all new immigrants. But he also stated that we should put down those who would overthrow our government. He spoke in favor of collective bargaining but also in favor of the "right to work" and in favor of more definite labor legislation. The speech touched the field of agriculture little except to say that the farmer should get a fair price but that there should be fewer turnovers between the farmer and consumer so as to prevent the "jacking up" of the price on farm goods.

Cox was emphatic in his approval of a reduction of government expenditures and also stated the need for a modern budget system for all governmental departments. As far as business was concerned, he was against the excess profits tax and unafraid to suggest an alternate tax: a small tax on the total business of concerns.

The Democratic candidate devoted many words to the issue of membership in the League. He expressed the view that Harding stood definitely against membership in the League. A separate peace, the alternative indicated by Harding's acceptance speech, would be dishonest as well as bungling diplomacy.
The opponents of the League claimed that it was a military alliance which would drag us into war. Said Cox:

They charge experimentation, when we have as historical precedent, the Monroe Doctrine, which is the very essence of Article X of the Versailles Covenant . . . and not a shot has been fired in almost one hundred years in preserving sovereign rights in this hemisphere . . . The question is whether we shall or shall not join in this practical and humane movement . . . As the Democratic candidate, I favor going in.

Cox continued by mentioning two statements which he favored as clarifying the intent of the United States in signing the Covenant. These would be issued so that no one could misunderstand our view and so that we would have no unvoiced mental reservations. These reservations were: (1) The United States, in carrying out the purpose of the League, must always act in accordance with the Constitution which cannot be altered by the treaty-making power; and (2) in giving assent to the treaty, the Senate had in mind that the purpose of the League is to prevent wars such as the one just ended and not to start more. The continuance of the United States in the League would be contingent on the League's adherence to this fundamental principle.

The speech certainly left little doubt as to where Cox stood on the League and therefore presumably where the

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22 *New York Times*, August 8, 1920. The entire speech is printed on page 8 as it was given.

Democratic Party stood. The question as to the degree of importance, due to White's statements, could no longer be answered as clearly. One editor expressed the opinion that the League was the dominant issue because a decision on it would mean a decision on a clear foreign policy in contrast to the confused policy then existing. As of August, he felt that Harding was definitely against the League of Nations and Cox definitely for it. It was felt that it would be the attitude of the candidates which would determine whether the mandate of the people in November was to be clear or muddled and indecisive.

Republican reaction to Cox's speech served to increase the appearance of a clear picture as to the stands of the parties. Senator New of Indiana claimed that Cox had "straddled" the real issue by making no statement on exactly how he interpreted Article X and whether or not he favored sending American troops abroad. The Secretary of the Republican National Committee, Clarence B. Miller, pointed up the contrast as being one of black and white. He accused Cox of complete surrender to Wilsonian dictation and stated that Cox's speech drew a clear line between the un-American "Wilson League" and the "robust Americanism" of Senator Harding.

Another note was added to the political round by the

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24 Current Opinion, LXIX (July-Dec., 1920), 152.
acceptance speech of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the Democratic Vice-Presidential nominee. A relative newcomer to the national political scene, Roosevelt threw himself vigorously into the campaign. In his speech of acceptance, Roosevelt pointed out that modern civilization is too complex for a nation to live in the world and yet not be of the world, to adopt toward world affairs the dreaming, meditative attitude that once was characteristic of the hermit nations of the Orient. "War may be declared," said Roosevelt, "but peace cannot. It must be established by mutual consent." In clear and definite phrases he pictured the League as

a practical solution of a practical situation. It is no more perfect than our original Constitution . . . was perfect. It is not anti-national, it is anti-war. No super-nation, binding us to the decisions of its tribunals is suggested, but the method and machinery by which the opinion of civilization may become effective against those who seek war is at last within the reach of humanity.26

Meanwhile, Cox was probing one of the possible weak points in the Republican Party, the group of "pro-League" Republicans. The chief newspaper supporter of Senator Lodge in Massachusetts, the Boston Transcript, had claimed that Lodge's notification address and Harding's acceptance speech were a "twofold sentence of death" upon the League. "Hereafter," said the Transcript, "there can not be any such thing as a

Picking up the cue, Cox made a public announcement in which he asked William Howard Taft, most prominent of the Republican "Covenanters," to help defeat in the senatorial elections the Republican candidates who opposed the League, to help elect instead Republican Senators who favored the League. In this way, Taft might remain a Republican but also be true to his favoring of the League. Cox insisted that there was no intention of asking Taft to bolt the party he had served so long and so well to support the Democratic candidates.

It was a cleverly worded statement but if it was designed to really persuade Taft to aid the Democratic cause even in this way, rather than being designed to influence rank and file Republicans of the same mind as Taft, it did not work. In reply to a question from the New York World, Taft expressed hope that Harding, after his election and an approach to the nations with a "new association" proposal, would finally see that it would be wiser to enter the League of Nations with the Lodge reservations. In other words, the Republicans who felt the United States should enter the League should vote for Harding, ignoring what he and other leaders of the party had said, and hope that he would see the

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29 New York Times, August 7, 1920, p. 3.
error of his ways. It was an interesting piece of rationalizing and probably carried a good deal of weight with other Republicans who faced the same problem as Taft.

The Republicans had been quick to seize upon the apparent indication of a Democratic desire to switch emphasis from the League given by the remarks of George White. Yet less than two weeks later, the Republicans were mentioning a shift in emphasis. National Chairman Will Hays gave out an announcement on August 10 that Harding's strategy would now be to stick to his front-porch campaign and to ask the people for a general repudiation of the administrative record of Wilson rather than a repudiation of the League only. The shift was made after Cox accepted Wilson's record unhesitatingly, an action which made the League only a part of the overall issue. Harry Daugherty, Harding's shrewd pre-convention manager, also asserted, "I find the underlying thing in the minds of the people is the demand for a change of administration . . . I believe that determination will decide the campaign." It is to be noted that by enlarging the issue beyond a referendum on the League, the Republican leaders had postponed the need for Harding to make his stand on foreign policy clear and definite.

But in Warsaw, Indiana there was a debate on the League which again raised a question as to just where the Republican

Party stood on the League. The debate was sponsored by a non-partisan group and featured Senator Hitchcock of Nebraska for the Democrats and Major Jackson Morris of Kentucky for the Republicans. Hitchcock repeated the Democratic stand for the League without any impairing reservations. He insisted that the League was not a super-government but rather an agreement entered into by twenty-nine nations of the world in the hope of preventing war. "It is this League or no League," he said. Morris, on the other hand, pointed out that the Republicans merely insisted that the League be an American and constitutional league or none at all. The Republican Party had never said it was against a League of Nations per se and the national platform did not declare against a league.

It was still fairly clear that the Democrats were definitely for active United States membership in and support of the League of Nations. Whether the League was enough to use as a basis for the campaign would have to be determined by the developments of the campaign itself. No one expected the Democrats to ignore completely the issue of farm policy, labor policy, or of matters of finance and the like. It did seem likely that the question of League membership would be their best bet for a main issue upon which a positive campaign could be waged. It was certain that they could not afford to wage the negative type of campaign required if they were merely to

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defend the record of Wilson's administration.

The Republicans, however, seemed unable or unwilling to be definite about either their League stand or the issue they would attempt to emphasize the most heavily. If the acceptance speech of Harding had flung skyward the banner around which the Republicans were to rally, in the rush to adjust it to each eddy of the hazy political air it had become "a banner with a strange (and vague) device."
CHAPTER IV

SLUSH FUNDS AND THE AUTOCRAT

The 1920 campaign proper opened with Cox and Roosevelt, on successive days, making speeches dealing with foreign policy. They were generalized pleas for support of the Democratic program which was represented as promising an immediate peace but one which would also be lasting. It was Roosevelt, speaking in Chicago on August 11, who directed an appeal to the progressives among the Republicans to break with their leaders who had their "eyes on the ground" and to support him and Cox. Instead of vague hints and promises as given by the Republicans, pointed out Roosevelt, the Democratic program promised a definite foreign policy. On his way to make speeches before larger crowds, Cox stopped off at Camp Perry, Ohio to award the Governor's Cup to the winning team at the national rifle matches. There he made only a short talk in which he said he favored the preventing of wars by "arbitration of reason rather than force" when possible. He felt sure that every home in America hoped for the end of the vast expenditures for war materiel and armaments.

From these generalized comments, the Democratic candidates

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1 New York Times, August 12, 1920, p. 3.
turned to a firing of criticisms at the Republican-dominated Senate for its role in the defeat of the Versailles Treaty. Cox, in five speeches made at outdoor meetings as he moved out of Ohio, stressed the League as being the paramount issue. In second place he put the question of whether the post-war economic adjustment was to take place under progressives or reactionaries. Expressing confidence that the people would vindicate the policies of Wilson, Cox attacked Senator Lodge and his co-workers as people trying to scrap the League of Nations only because they wanted to discredit and destroy the Democratic administration. To the people he gave the warning that by voting for the Republican candidates they would express a desire to scrap the League.

In the same vein, Roosevelt, still in the Midwest, blamed the Senate—specifically Senator Harding and the Republican "obstructionists"—for leaving the United States in a position where it could only sympathize with Poland as the victim of Bolshevik aggression and could do nothing due to our being still technically at war and outside the League. "If America had been a member of the League of Nations," he said, "the Polish Nation would not be today fighting Bolshevism with its back to the wall . . . . The events which led up to the present deplorable state of affairs would never have occurred." Roosevelt then took note of the "danger"

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frequently referred to by Republican speakers and stated that
the United States could have aided Poland by using the moral
force of its millions of people rather than by using soldiers
to stem the Red attack. Continuing, Roosevelt asserted that
the world war had caused international law to catch up with
the domestic law of the nations. Now international "bandits"
could no longer carry on without calling down the wrath of
nations on themselves. "The League of Nations," he insisted,
"is but an expression of the new law of nations."

Coolidge, meanwhile, opened the Republican campaign by
making several points which were to be emphasized time and
time again. He urged more of an "America first" idea, a con­
sideration of the vital domestic issues before those of for­
eign affairs. He asserted, "The decision in this election
will not be on an attitude toward world politics but on the
attitude toward the home . . .  [The people] want to learn to
what policies and what men they can most confidently intrust
the welfare and the protection of the home." In line with the
idea of domestic needs, Coolidge warned of the need for an
end of the prodigal wastefulness in private life and public
administration, warned of the danger of a severe economic re­
action, and noted that there should be less government regula­
tion of business and a policy of honesty with the people on
the need for a broad tax base. It wasn't honest to have

unequal taxation so as to make it appear "someone else" is pay-
ing. Finally, Coolidge made reference to the "autocrat"
Wilson by warning against an overly strong executive. He in-
sisted that we needed more cooperation between the branches
of government to restore the government to a more even bal-
ce.

It was Harding who revived the standard Republican issue
of the tariff. California State Senator Frank Flint had sent
him a message indicating that the fruit producers of Califor-
nia were looking to the Republican candidate for relief from
conditions resulting from foreign competition. Harding wired
his reply which praised the California growers for their ef-
forts to get the goods to the consumer at the lowest possible
cost, and asserted, "It is especially necessary that the
great industry should not be permitted to suffer because of
the maladjustment of tariff rates." He continued by point-
ing out this situation as an illustration of how unthinkable
it was to sacrifice the American people for the benefit of
other countries, to surrender the American markets to foreign
producers, no matter how kindly we felt toward our allies.
With a light jab in the direction of Wilson and the League,
Harding concluded, "The Republican method of giving first at-
tention to American interests rather than to those of other
continents will insure against disaster to industries

situated as is this one. To such a policy I gladly subscribe." The last portion of the telegram showed it to be more than a promise of protective tariffs, made it, in fact, another statement of the need for an "America First" policy and a repudiation of the internationalism of Wilson, a part of which would be the League of Nations.

This attitude towards foreign policy received additional emphasis on August 16, when a reporter asked Harding, at his home in Marion, for a comment on the situation in Poland. To this Harding replied that he never had had sufficient information on the foreign situation despite his service on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "Owing to the meagre information the rest of us receive," Harding complained, "no one but the President and possibly the Secretary of State can comment on any foreign situation." His purported lack of information did not prevent Harding from making what seemed to be his most definite statement on foreign policy since his nomination. "There will be none of the present foreign policy if we succeed," he said. "On the contrary, there will be a complete reversal." The Republican candidate did not elaborate but the statement seemed to place him squarely against the League, which was an important part of Wilson's foreign

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9Ibid.
policy and which had been accepted by Cox.

Cox himself spoke at the Ohio Democratic Convention at Columbus on August 17. He hammered hard at one of the Republican assertions about the League, that it could order American troops anywhere at any time, as a deliberate and willful untruth. He pledged that, in justice to our war dead, there would be no separate peace made with Germany if a Democratic administration remained in power. Harding was pictured as a definite "reactionary," as having opposed the new Ohio constitution as being "socialistic," and as having tried to defeat its operation.

On August 18, 1920 the state of Tennessee ratified, as the thirty-sixth state, the proposed Nineteenth Amendment which gave the suffrage to women. With ratification by two-thirds of the states, the amendment went into effect and a new facet of the campaign was opened. There were an estimated 26,883,566 women in the United States of legal voting age as compared with 29,577,690 male voters. With the campaign just underway, the electorate had suddenly been doubled. It should be kept in mind, however, that as the Constitution, up to this point, had left it up to the states to determine the extent of the suffrage, there were some states in which women

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11 It was estimated that there were 48,280 women in Arizona eligible to vote as compared with 81,651 men. *New York Times*, August 19, 1920, p. 2.
had voted for several years. In a number of states, mostly western, many women had voted in the presidential election of 1916. It was true, however, that to win now the candidate's party had to rally successfully the vote of the women on a national scale.

A few days prior to the amendment's final ratification Roosevelt spoke at St. Paul, Minnesota and attacked Harding's record on suffrage. He stated that the first suffrage declaration had caused Harding to say that he would rather support the party stand than take an individual position. Later, he voted "no" in the Senate because Ohio had voted against suffrage, then stalled and vacillated until the last vote on June 4, 1919 when he got on the bandwagon and voted "yes."

For his own part, Roosevelt said, he was glad Tennessee seemed likely to ratify the amendment. Still earlier, the Tucson Daily Citizen, voicing the opinion expressed by other Republicans, had credited Harding with having been responsible for getting the woman suffrage amendment on the way to final ratification. While he had declined to get officially the governors of Connecticut and Vermont to call the legislatures in order to ratify the amendment, he did call Governor Clement of Vermont to an unofficial conference where he persuaded him to call the state legislature to ratify for the good of

the Republican Party and of the nation. The Citizen expressed the hope that the women of Arizona and the nation would remember Harding's deed.

Cox, on hearing of the final ratification, expressed his pleasure at the fact that women could now vote, for he felt satisfied that American women were very much in favor of the League. Mrs. Abbey Scott Baker, political manager of the National Women's Party, made the comment, "The party which shows the greatest skill in organizing the women voters will win the election. The division at present is about 70 to 30 but I don't want to say who is ahead." Harding himself spoke out to welcome the women into the Republican Party, which he pictured as having led in every movement for social and industrial betterment. The Democratic Party, on the other hand, "has notoriously refused to force these enlightened policies in the South, where it completely dominates. Nor will women forget that more than four-fifths of the ratifying states were Republican States."

While Cox traveled to South Bend, Indiana for his first major speech, Harding continued his "front-porch" campaign.

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13Tucson Daily Citizen, July 3, 1920, Sec. II, p. 3.


15New York Times, August 20, 1920, p. 3. Harding also referred to the Democratic "covert purpose" to attack the suffrage amendment, meaning, most likely, the possibility of a reconsideration of the vote in Tennessee where ratification had come by the margin of one vote. The anti-suffrage forces charged that State Representative Harry Barnes (Rep.) had been bribed to cast the deciding vote.
by offering a definite defense of the Senate's action concerning the Versailles Treaty. Expressing joy that the United States Senate was functioning again, he commented that we needed it to save America. A Republican administration would allow the "ninety-six leading men of the Republic to have something to say about foreign relations as the Constitution contemplates." Stating that he preferred the Senate's counsel to that of any and all political bosses, Harding concluded:

I do not hesitate to say that the Senate saved American nationality in 1919 and 1920 when the Executive proposed to surrender it. The Senate preserved our independence when the Executive insisted that a foreign council should decide our future place in the activities of the world and call us to war and our destiny.17

On August 19 at South Bend, Indiana, Cox made a major address which introduced a new element into the campaign. In his speech he stated that the Republican Party was raising a "slush fund"—an extra large campaign fund, the large donors of which expected special economic and political consideration—of fifteen million dollars, of which seven million was to be raised in one place. Cox further accused Senators Lodge, Smooth, Renrose, Watson, and others of favoring the destruction of the League and the forwarding of the special interests which had given "big money" to the Republican fund.

17Ibid.
Branching off a little, he charged the Republicans with a plot to destroy or to render impotent as a public instrument the Federal Reserve System. In the future, only banks controlled by Harding's backers would be admitted as members.

In referring to the League, Cox made a special appeal to the women to support his fight for the League, and he attacked the Republicans for blocking American membership and for trying to destroy the League altogether.

There was no immediate concerted reaction from the Republicans to Cox's new tack. At this particular time, Elihu Root was in Europe helping to work out the details for the League’s World Court. Harding stated that he had heard something of Root's plan though not all of the details. Saying that it might play an important part in the campaign, Harding seemed to imply that when he got more specific about his "Association of Nations" he would do so by using the Root court plan as a base. Reporters drew this implication from the fact that Harding's attacks had always been on the executive and legislative functions of the League.

Harding's reaction to the details remained to be seen, for he gave no indication of understanding that the "Root Court" was designed to function as an integral part of the League which he had condemned. The writer is inclined to evaluate the statement as a grasping at


something which might provide a concrete alternative to the League, Harding himself having no real alternative. It was also probably intended to keep the pro-League hoping for a party stand more favorable to their ideals.

Republican National Chairman Will Hays, speaking in Augusta, Maine, was the first to deny Cox's charges of an excessive campaign fund. He estimated Republican needs at three million dollars and stated they were limiting contributions to $1,000 unless this amount didn't bring in enough funds. Counter-attacking, Hays charged that Cox was dominated by President Wilson and four bosses whom he did not name. The Democrats were also zig-zagging on the League issue. First, they asserted the League must be accepted "without changing the dotting of an 'i' or the crossing of a 't,'" and then they said it would be a secondary issue. More recently, the Democrats had returned to the League as the primary issue. Wherever they decided to stand, the Republican Party was willing to join issue.

Cox returned the fire by stating that if the Republicans denied his "slush fund" charge, he would present proof to back it up. He insisted that should Republican attempts to "buy" the government continue and succeed, it was probable that the people would become so incensed that Bolshevism would increase. Federal cold storage legislation aimed at cutting the

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cost of living was even being blocked by one group. In this speech at Canton, Ohio and others made during the day, Cox spoke in favor of the United States' entering the League of Nations.

The charge by Cox had thrown a new issue into the campaign and confused the picture very much as to the dominant issue. However, Harding and other Republican speakers sounded certain notes consistently. On one occasion Al Jolson and some of the members of the Harding and Coolidge Theatrical League (membership 40,000) came to Marion for a visit. Songs were sung, comparing Harding with Teddy Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln. Harding gave a written speech in which he noted that plays were better if not dependent on one "star." In a similar vein he observed, "We have been drifting lately under 'one-lead' activities and I am sure the American people are going to welcome a change of the bill. For the supreme offering, we need an 'all-star' cast presenting America to all the world."

At another time, speaking to the Chicago Cubs baseball team which was to play an exhibition in Marion, Harding said that the United States team had "muffed our domestic relations and then struck out at Paris." Asserting that as baseball cannot be played by a one-man team, neither could government be

won by a one-man team, at least not well, as had been demonstrated. Neither of these speeches was profound nor a major address but they both clearly show the emphasis placed here, as elsewhere, on the idea that Wilson had been an autocratic, unconstitutional executive as, by implication, Cox also would be. The idea then was to elect an executive who would work along with Congress rather than attempt to drive them or even lead them.

The "slush fund" charge of Cox seemed to produce no cut results either in his favor or to his disadvantage. A congressional committee heard conflicting testimony from Democrats and Republicans. It uncovered questionable practices by both parties but these brought no significant results. The main result seems, to the writer, to have been a weakening of the Democratic effort to make the League, and American membership in it, the primary issue.

Franklin Roosevelt, as the Democratic nominee for Vice-President, had been touring the West during August and reported that he found the people there wanted very much to hear about the League. Westerners, to Roosevelt's mind, did not wish to take any more chances about war. He had attempted to explain the League in simple terms, to point out that our Constitution was supreme and that under the League, with reservations, American constitutional rights could never be

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infringed. It is interesting to note the tack that Roosevelt had taken to combat Republican assertions about League membership threatening our Constitution. It points up a fundamental weakness in the Democratic position, one which had existed from the start. The Republicans had successfully created a picture of Wilson insisting on the treaty with not even minor reservations, whereas little publicity had been given to Wilson's proposed reservations. Therefore, many voters were probably prone to question why, if now they proposed reservations, the Democrats opposed them before. This very question was brought openly into the campaign later.

It was on August 28 that Harding came out with what was clearly a rejection of the League of Nations. In a statement issued from Marion he said, "The Democratic nominee has flatly said he is in favor of going in to the League. I am not." He again asserted that the League was an association based on might, not right, and it had failed in the case of Poland. It was now past restoration. He expressed the belief that humanity would welcome an international court whose verdicts on justiciable questions this country and others would be willing to uphold. This court would be backed by an "association" for "conference" on world problems. As to the nature of the "association," he did not elaborate. Harding stated

24New York Times, August 23, 1920, p. 3. Italics are those of the writer.
that he would not negotiate a separate peace with Germany but that a congressional resolution declaring the war at an end would simply be recognizing a simple fact.

At the end of August, Cox moved into the farm area and spoke to farmers at the Ohio State Fair. He again brought up the Republican campaign fund and showed a document which he said was an official document from Republican headquarters. It spoke of sums of $5,000 and up to be obtained from businessmen. But on the League issue, Cox pictured the League as a factor in stabilizing Europe to the extent she would provide good markets for our goods, especially farm goods. Many economies could be effected in the government as well due to a reduced need for armaments. He pledged quick American entrance into the League and spoke scornfully of Harding's vague "association."

Indications that Harding's mention of using what amounted to a revived Hague Tribunal as a basis of his new "association" had not been received with overwhelming approval came both from abroad and at home. The French newspaper Le Debats gave a brief resume of the stands of both candidates on the League and then asserted Harding had been unfair in his statement that the Polish situation had preyed the worthlessness of the League. The League's authority, stated the paper, had not

then been fully established and it had no way to enforce its decisions. *Le Debats* was certain that the world was too much changed for an improved Hague Tribunal to replace the League. The paper expressed the opinion that Republican opposition to the League was more opposition to Wilson than a deep-seated conviction against the League. It was sure that, regardless of the election results, the United States would be forced to come into the League to serve its own interests. It is worth noting, as did the *New York Times*, that this paper and other French papers had not given unmixed admiration to the League.

At the same time Mrs. Philip Moore, President of the Delegation of the National Council of Women, said that Harding's stand had put the nation's women in a quandary. The ten million women of her organization were pledged to vote for the candidate who would take the United States into the League, either as it stood or with moderate reservations. Now Harding would have to change his stand if he wanted those votes. His "new association" didn't have anybody's approval yet and the League had been too carefully built up to be scrapped. Mrs. Moore admitted that she herself was a Republican, but, although she wasn't quite ready to vote for Cox, she was hesitant about voting for Harding.

During the first week of September, Cox toured the North

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Central states, continuing to make reference to the "slush fund" but also dealing with Republican charges about the League. He asked if Harding's suggestion of "putting teeth" into the Hague Tribunal envisioned the use of force. If so, how was his "association" different from the present League? He pointed out that the Hague Tribunal had been inadequate before and would be so again. As far as the League was concerned, Article X was just the "Keep Off the Grass" sign to aggressor nations. In no case would soldiers be sent without the consent of Congress.

The ranks of Labor were not united behind either candidate particularly. The American Federation of Labor had endorsed Cox but John Potts, Cincinnati labor union leader, asserted that Harding had a better labor record. Potts also expressed doubt that the rank and file of labor would be bound by the A.F. of L.'s endorsement of Cox. Harding himself spoke to a picnic of Marion trade unions, stating that while he believed in unions and collective bargaining, he did not believe in labor's domination of the economy and government any more than he believed in the domination by capital. "We do not want to substitute one class for another," he said, "we want to put an end to all classes."

George W. Wickersham, Attorney-General under Taft, paid Harding a visit in Marion. He mentioned to Harding that there was much in the League Covenant that was good. Harding replied that he had no desire to "fling that all aside" and he hoped those who believed in a "new association" understood that. This conversation caused Wickersham to make a statement afterwards to the press to the effect that Harding had not really rejected the League, recognizing how interwoven it was with the peace of Europe. He said with assurance:

When President Harding, working in accord with a Republican Congress, takes up the work of placing upon a firm, just, and sure foundation the relations of this country to the other nations of the world, I am confident that the logic of accomplished facts will lead to the adoption of the League, so modified as to remove all just doubts as to its undue effect upon American rights and interests.

Though this statement seems strange, when compared with Harding's declaration of August 28, Wickersham also included a remark that was much less strange. He agreed with Harding that the executive authority had been overdone under Wilson.

Again we have the note of "the autocrat."

Moving on through North Dakota, the territory of the Non-Partisan League, Cox stumped as a "progressive" who opposed the "reactionary" Harding who was backed by big business. Only one slight reference was made to the League but later in

Montana, Cox took note of the eight different positions Harding had taken on the League since the beginning of the debate in the Senate. The switches included "mild" reservations and the Lodge Reservations, scrapping the League and resurrecting the Hague Tribunal, and then amendment of the Covenant to save the good in it.

Harding was making, as is usual, speeches on farm policy—he tried to point out how the tariff would protect the farmers too—and other domestic matters all during the campaign. But again and again a certain refrain kept being repeated. Speaking at Augusta, Georgia, Henry Cabot Lodge charged that Wilson's purpose in trying to get the United States into the League was to be able to use the power of all member nations to carry on the war. Though unanimity was required in the actions of the League Council, we could not tell what our representative, under the President, would commit us to. In no uncertain terms the Senator from Massachusetts stated what he felt was the issue when he said:

Mr. Wilson, it is true, is not a candidate but we are fighting Wilsonism, which is a system of government alien to our Constitution and our traditions, and Governor Cox has promised that if elected he would carry out Mr. Wilson's promise and go into the League as presented by Mr. Wilson. The issue is drawn and is so clear that no man can misunderstand it.37

On another occasion Lodge compared Wilson with Napoleon

III and said that he held a reign of terror over his own party. He had tried to absorb the legislative powers—telling Congress what form bills should take, passing on amendments—as well as the executive and had clearly shown himself "an autocrat elected by a plebiscite uncontrolled by any intervening legislative or judicial authority." Harding hit at this point constantly, adding the charge that the Democratic administration in allowing the government to be pulled around by weird economic and social theories had added to the waste and inefficiency rather than curing it. Vice-Presidential candidate Calvin Coolidge pointed out the threat to the Constitution from an autocracy which sought to "save" the people by relieving them of the responsibility of governing. The independence of the legislature must be preserved; no legislature had ever usurped the powers of government.

Upon reaching Idaho, Cox reiterated his charge of a huge Republican campaign fund and upped the amount to between twenty-five and thirty million dollars. Referring to the League, he asserted that it would allow reductions in arms expenditures which could be put instead into reclamation work. He again confessed to uncertainty as to just where Harding stood on the League. In Utah, Cox pointed out that Elihu

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38 New York Times, September 12, 1920, p. 3.
Boot and his associates had been appointed by the League to devise a court whose members would be chosen by the Council and Assembly of the League, the court itself to function as an integral part of the League. Wryly he remarked, "This limb having been cut off, Mr. Harding sitting on the other end," something would have to be done fast by the Republicans.

Harding, in a plea for the women's votes, repeated the assertion that the League, as constituted, would not mean peace but "American boys . . . asked to die in causes in which they would have no heart." Whenever Cox mentioned that he was for "reasonable" reservations, Harding, or more frequently Lodge, would come back with the charge that Wilson could have had the League with reservations but refused it.

In the light of Harding's statement of August 28, it should be noted that the so-called "hyphenated vote" was predominantly with him because of the assumption he was opposed to the League. George S. Viereck, chairman of a "Committee of Ninety-Six," expressed the hope of lining up five to six million voters of German descent to back Harding because of his opposition to the League. The same idea was expressed by the Milwaukee Journal in reporting the meeting of the German-American Citizen's League at Chicago. To German-

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Americans, the League issue was definitely the main one. In Ohio the German-language paper Wachter und Anzeiger stated, "No German-American can vote for Cox. . . . Cox is Wilson. . . . He has a millstone around his neck: Wilson's League of Nations." Italian-Americans were prone to back Harding for the same reason, plus Wilson's failure to give Fiume to Italy. Irish-Americans, of course, resented the failure to secure Irish independence and were convinced the League would make its realization forever impossible.

Up to this point in the campaign the sound and fury, as concerned the League, had been great. A cartoon by George Ding, appearing in the St. Paul Pioneer Press, raised the question of how well the public was listening. Showing Cox and Harding debating in front of a class in school, Ding depicted one student (labeled "The Public") being hit by a bean from the bean-shooter of another student (labeled "The High Cost of Living") and jabbed with a pin by still another student (labeled "Landlords"). The caption queried, "Are All Our Little Boys and Girls Paying Attention to the Lessons?"

In the same vein was the statement by the Washington Post that the high cost of the Presidency [the "slush fund"] was not likely to distract the attention of folks from the high

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47 Current Opinion, XLIX (July-Dec., 1920), 434.
cost of living.

Cox had declared in California that the Republicans in Congress had blocked Wilson's program for curbing profiteering. It was Roosevelt who came forth with a plan for lowering living costs. At Albany, New York he proposed five specific points: (1) make farm life more attractive, (2) increase food production by opening idle land, (3) eliminate unnecessary "middlemen" in the handling of goods, (4) improve and strengthen the anti-profiteering laws, and (5) regulate commodities such as coal to assure the supply and its sale at a reasonable price.

The utter impartiality of machines almost interrupted Cox's campaign as he moved into Arizona. Outside Phoenix, the rails shifted due to improper ballasting and caused one engine and four cars of the campaign special to leave the track. The car in which Cox was riding stayed on the track and he was only shaken slightly. He did not allow the incident to disturb him and made two speeches in Phoenix. Taking note of the Republican harping on the tariff issue, Cox stated that he was in favor of import duties to equalize the price of home-grown and foreign products but he opposed excessive tariffs. He insisted that the Republicans were making

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too much of a minor issue. Attempting to bring the League's importance home to Arizonians, Cox insisted that the final establishment of the League would settle economic conditions in Europe, with the resultant opening of Europe's markets to American products such as our cotton. He also promised action to speed the development of reclamation projects.

From his front porch in Marion, Harding continued to sound the alarm about the dangers of League membership. He said that the Republicans opposed going into the League as long as that going in meant the surrender of anything essential to the dignity or the freedom of conscience and action of the United States. But they did favor any association of nations for the promotion of justice, an association which would not be a council of foreign nations backed by the principle of force with the power to order America's sons into war. He insisted that the essential point was to maintain the freedom of the United States to work out its own destiny and to restore our nation to the stable ways of peace. The Democrats, on the other hand, had tried to put all of our attention on a "dream across the seas." To reduce the cost of living here at home, the nation's biggest domestic problem, we would need to practice increasingly thrift, to increase the efficiency of our production, and to reduce the cost of government. The cost of living could not and should not be

reduced by putting the paralyzing hand of government on our industries.

During the progress of any presidential campaign, "straw votes" of all types appear. One of the first in this campaign was that conducted by the Rexall Drug Company through its nationwide chain of stores. Beginning about the middle of September the poll had registered some 163,624 votes by September 24. It indicated at that point that Harding would carry thirty-three states with a total of 336 electoral votes; all the Western and Northern states. Cox seemed likely to carry some fifteen states with 150 electoral votes. By October 2 the poll indicated Harding leading with 182,491 votes to 117,601 for Cox. Cox's only majorities were registered in the Southern states, and of the 72,928 women polled 42,216 favored Harding.

Throughout the campaign the issue of Irish independence kept coming up. Harding noted that we were sympathetic toward the aspirations of the Irish but that we couldn't give any official help. Under the League it would be impossible for us to back the Irish independence because England would consider it a domestic problem and thus not subject to League jurisdiction. We would also be bound by Article X to preserve

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55 Ibid.
the territorial integrity of England. Cox, on the other hand, insisted that under Article XI we could urge Irish independence as essential to the preservation of peace. Article X was a guarantee only against "external burglary" and would in no way prevent our working for Irish independence. He charged that Harding was as vague on the Irish situation as he was on the League. In mentioning the Senate vote of sympathy for Ireland, the Republican candidate failed to mention that he missed one roll call on the resolution and voted against the proposal on the second vote.

Near the end of September, Harding finally left Marion for some speeches in major cities. His first speech was in Baltimore on September 27. The main points of emphasis were again "anti-Wilson" ones. He criticized the administration for a lack of preparation to deal with post-war problems. He accused Wilson of blocking an attempt to set up a congressional committee to investigate the situation in 1918 and to report on suggested measures. Repeatedly the Administration had neglected domestic issues such as the future of our merchant marine.

At this point a heckler interrupted Harding with a question as to whether he favored the scrapping of the League. Harding replied, "If I believed in one-man government, I could

57 *New York Times*, September 24, 1920, p. 3. See Appendix A for the text of Article X.

answer the gentleman's question." He continued by asserting that he was without a definite foreign policy but that he did oppose going into the League as negotiated. He pointed out that the League was the result of one man's trying to speak for all of America. Cox was quick to seize on the incident, and in a speech in South Dakota he chided Harding for saying he didn't have any definite foreign policy. He asserted that Harding was saying, in effect, "I ask you to go with me. I don't know where I'm going but I'm on my way." Cox noted too that the heckler had been arrested the next morning, an obvious curbing of free speech for which the Republicans were attempting to disclaim responsibility. Cox again insisted, while speaking in Kansas, that the League was Germany's best hope for the future, as it would insure a fair reparations agreement and allow her to regain her place in international circles.

Up to the end of September, Wilson had taken no real part in the campaign. Too ill still to make any speeches in behalf of Cox, he did release a letter written to an Edwin Schwartz in Los Angeles in which he backed Cox's assertion that Article XI would allow us to bring up any question that might threaten international relations. He quoted the text

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of the Covenant to prove his statement. On October 3 he issued the first of a planned series of public statements, addressed as in the past to "My Fellow Countrymen," Wilson rejoiced that the election was to be a genuine national referendum. He asked that the nation's honor be vindicated and that we keep faith with our soldier dead. He charged that the Republicans had concocted a distorted view of "Americanism" which substituted America for Prussia in isolation and defiant segregation. They would make America subordinate in world affairs rather than a leader and the "light of the world" which her founders envisioned. Article X did not impair Congress' right to declare war because the framers of the Covenant had been careful not to infringe any of the constitutional rights of the signatory powers. It has been suggested that Wilson was displeased with Cox's emphasis on "slush funds" and wanted to re-emphasize the League. At any rate, on October 27 he received a delegation of fifteen prominent pro-League Republicans and stressed in his talk with them the moral obligation we had to finish the job by entering the League. He pictured Article X as the redemption of a pledge that Germany would not break loose again. In closing, Wilson repeated his conviction that the nation had never been called on to return a more solemn referendum.

64 Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal, p. 322.
At times, Republican attempts to picture the League as a menace became rather ridiculous. Article XXII, Paragraph 3, of the Covenant stated in part: "Members of the League will entrust the League with general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs."

Mrs. Arthur Livermore, a leader of New York Republican women, vehemently asserted that this was clear proof of the League's iniquity, proof that it would recognize and legalize the traffic in women, children, and drugs. The charge was immediately denied by Raymond Fosdick, former Under-Secretary General of the League, who pointed out that the Covenant strengthened existing machinery for the suppression of such traffic. Fosdick was seconded by the American Social Hygiene Association.

With the opening of October, Democratic leaders seemed to feel that the campaign had to be speeded up. They seemed to feel that Cox's "slush fund" charges had little effect on the public mind and that the public had not been really aroused by the issues Cox was pressing. The tour of the West had produced the impression that the people there were very definitely

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64 (cont.) The visitors included such men as President Lowell of Harvard, and Republican Congressmen such as Senator McCumber.


for the League. The Democratic candidate himself, upon his return, expressed the view that the people of the West were for the League and were angry that the senatorial oligarchy had kept the facts on the League from them. Cox then made a statement which was highly significant, in view of later developments. He noted:

Following the war, with all of its disturbing elements, there is no question but that there was a feeling that a turn in the road was desirable and a political change was generally discussed. The voters, in this enlightened day, think before they act, and they are realizing in the West that the political change which they had in mind meant the reinterment of the same old gang that Roosevelt drove out in 1912.

He continued with the assertion that the farmer was beginning to feel that in his job of feeding humanity he had the right to some protection against loss. Cox stated that in his visit to more than twenty Middle and Far Western states on his trip he had found a lack of organization and in some spots apathy on the part of Democratic workers, but that this did not discourage him.

Cox had intended to impress his hearers with his confidence in the people's response. More significant, however, was his statement that the people had been considering a change from Wilsonism. If this were an accurate observation, the Republican harping on the dangers of Wilson's "autocratic" style of government might well have found fertile ground.

Cox insisted that the people had evaluated the proposed change and rejected it. He gave, however, no basis for that contention.

Europeans realized full well that the election's results would affect them, and they were following the campaign with interest. In the hope that he could better interpret Harding's foreign policy to the French, the Paris correspondent of the New York Times while on a visit to the United States visited the Republican candidate. Harding compared his foreign policy at the time to a notebook which was blank except for "No Wilson League" written on the first page. He stated that the final action on foreign policy would have to be a compromise anyway, so why not let it go at that? The one certain result of the election that Harding foresaw would be the killing of the "Wilson League." After that, the different groups in the Republican Party could be consulted on a Republican plan. The New York Times reporter advised Harding that Europe was more likely to favor a revised League rather than any "new association." Harding expressed interest in this and referred to his speech on August 28 which touched on that possibility. He also expressed his love for France and his admiration for Napoleon "whom he regarded as one of the world's great democrats."

Two days later Harding left Marion for Des Moines, Iowa where he was scheduled for another major speech. En route,

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he made several "whistle-stop" speeches in which he refrained from comment on world history and returned to the main points of the Republican campaign. At Huntington, Indiana he stated:

I have a notion . . . that you are interested in bringing about a change in your government. The reason . . . lies in your common-sense understanding that the Administration failed you in the first place in not preparing to defend our rights in the war, and in the second place by failing as to peace.

At Decatur, Indiana he observed: "One fault with the present Administration is that, instead of putting our own American house in order, so that everyone could go forward, it went to dreaming about American influence in the Old World."

At Des Moines, Harding spoke in words that could be interpreted in no way but as a rejection of the League of Nations. Still present, however, was a vague promise of an "association" based on justice. Said Harding:

I do not want to clarify these obligations: I want to turn my back on them. It is not interpretation, but rejection, that I am seeking. My position is that the proposed League strikes a deadly blow at our constitutional integrity . . . . In simple words, it is that he favors going into the Paris League and I favor staying out . . . . As soon as possible after my election, I shall advise with the best minds in the United States and especially I shall consult with the Senate, with whom, by the terms of the Constitution, I shall indeed be bound to counsel and without whose consent no such international League can be formed. I shall do this to the end that we shall have an association of nations for the promotion of international peace, but one which shall so definitely safeguard our sovereignty and recognize our freedom of action that it will have back of it ... the united support of the American people.

When this speech is added to that of August 28, one gets an unmistakable impression that Harding definitely intended to keep the United States out of the League as it then existed. His statements about the possibility of modifying the League were always so vague and fleeting as to be little more than political "chit-chat." If he had any real idea of a counter-proposal, the International Court seemed to be the best expression of it.

Despite these statements of Harding, Herbert Hoover on October 9 issued a statement that the Republican Party had pledged itself for a league and against only the unmodified League. For his own part, Hoover favored the dropping of some articles. He insisted that the failure of the Democratic Party, the refusal to accept the treaty with reservations, and the resultant holding up of the peace for eighteen months constituted the big issue on which there was to be a solemn referendum. The Democrats had ignored the issues of war taxes, debts, the high cost of living, transportation, and the like and had presented no well-rounded program to Congress. They now cried that they had been unable to get legislation through an antagonistic Congress.

Harding himself moved on into the South with a plea to the South to forget its long-standing tradition of voting Democratic. He accused Wilson of almost overturning the constitutional theory of separate governmental agencies and of putting

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in its place the theory of a master. Wilson tried to tell Congress what to do and attempted to negotiate the peace treaty by himself. As for the League, it was clearly a plan to rule the world by the force of arms.

It was on October 14 that a Republican bombshell was thrown into the campaign. A statement was released which was signed by thirty-one men, mostly Republicans, who favored the League. In it they explained why they supported Harding. The statement contended that Harding's speeches clearly showed he favored taking the best of the League to use in establishing his "association." The signers stated that they had reached the conclusion that it would be best to get the nations to agree to alter Article X which, as it stood, would certainly bind us to go to war if war came. Signers of the statement were men such as Elihu Root, Herbert Hoover, President Lowell of Harvard, and others. The document further stated that the Republicans had always had the larger number of "best minds" and had always stood for world cooperation. The Senate had tried to get the United States into the League with the Lodge reservations but had been blocked by Wilson. It was obvious, asserted the announcement, that Cox, even if he won, couldn't get the Wilson League through the Senate. Despite Harding's statements, the United States would enter


the League under his leadership because circumstances would force him to accept it.

What was the purpose of this abrupt pronouncement? Some pro-League Republicans were deserting to Cox's banner and doubtless it was hoped they could be persuaded that they could support Harding as good Republicans without being false to their support of the League. In other words, it was a concerted effort with the same goal as earlier independent statements by Taft, Hoover, and others. It well may be that, as has been asserted, the document was designed to bolster Harding's backbone and to force him away from the anti-League wing. Certainly, the announcement would carry considerable weight with the many people who respected the opinions of Root, Hoover, Taft, and the other signers.

Cox, in Detroit, immediately fired back at this surprising document with a reply that indicated considerable astonishment at the action of the "Thirty-One." He noted that the signers said the issue was whether we joined the League as it stood or with modifications. It was inferred that whoever is for the Covenant, with or without modifications, is for it and whoever is against it, with or without modifications, is against it. Cox reminded his listeners that Harding had said at Des Moines that it was rejection and not interpretation he


76Ibid.
sought and that he favored staying out of the League. The Democratic candidate asked the signers whether they believed Harding or not. If they did not, how could they honestly support him? As for Wilson's blocking the treaty, Wilson's comment to Senator Hitchcock on his proposed reservations showed that Wilson would have accepted reservations honestly aimed at clarification.

Harding, seemingly picking up the cue from the pro-League Republicans, spoke in Indianapolis on October 15 and insisted that there never had been a line drawn between the "President's League and no association." He really sought to unite opinion either on a modified League or a substitute for the League. He warned those who favored the League in any form to remember that even if Cox were elected, he couldn't secure the Senate's consent to the League with Article X intact. Such an attempt would result in another stalemate, and the foreign policy of this country would progress no further than it had in the time since the peace conference. Even in this speech, Harding did not confine himself to the League but hit at the Democratic policies which had developed an unsound economy and driven business on the rocks. Reactions to Harding's newest statement ranged from the comment of the New York Times that "He and his party are really getting on toward a League of Nations" to the statement of the Boston

78 Ibid.
Transcript that the speech was the "Epitaph of the Evil Thing with a Holy Name."  Just what meaning one got from the speech apparently depended on what meaning one wanted to get from it.

The next day in St. Louis, Harding referred to a statement by Secretary of State Colby to the effect that the League Covenant itself would prevent the signatories from joining Harding's proposed substitute. Harding, in a very clumsy effort to picture himself as the leader to whom the world looked for guidance, mentioned that a French representative had come to him informally and asked that the United States lead the way to a new association satisfactory to all nations. Immediately a hornet's nest fell on Harding. Wilson sent him a letter asking if he had really seen a representative of France, and pointing out the penalties for a private citizen who negotiated with a foreign government, saying he spoke for the United States Government. Cox released a statement asking if the "spokesman" were not really Maurice de Kobra, correspondent for the French newspapers, who had spent a week on Cox's campaign train at one time and had denied then that he was connected with the French government. From Paris came the announcement that no spokesman qualified to speak for France had been sent formally or informally to Harding. The French

79 "A Harding World Court or a Cox League of Nations?" Current Opinion, LXIX (July-Dec., 1920), 431.

Government suggested that Harding may have interpreted an unofficial remark at a banquet or the like as being an official statement. Harding's reply that the French Government was certainly involved in no breach of diplomacy, that the spokesman had merely come informally and had mentioned the sentiment of the French people was a very weak explanation. Neither did his insistence that he was something more than a plain citizen, having served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and being the Republican nominee for President, remove the impression that he had made himself look rather foolish.

For the next few days the candidates produced no new statements or charges. Several polls were published at this point in the campaign which showed a definite trend. The Literary Digest polled some 153,237 of a possible 600,000 voters in the six doubtful and pivotal states of New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, California, and Illinois. Harding polled at least a three-to-one edge in every state, getting 112,554 votes to 31,796 for Cox. The same magazine quoted a poll by Associated National Pictures, Inc., which recorded on a nationwide sampling 88,933 for Harding and 53,652 for Cox. The Rexall Drug Stores poll was continuing and at this point showed 371,461 votes for Harding and 242,432 for Cox. The Literary Digest noted that this latter poll indicated that California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan,

New Jersey, and New York would all go to Harding. The magazine *Farm Journal* also conducted a poll among farmers in the states of California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. The results indicated that Harding would get seventy percent of the farmer vote in these states. The *New York Times* conducted a poll of Eastern college students on their election preference and reported Harding ahead 8,318 to 3,888 for Cox. It is to be noted that the only college where Cox was the favorite was the University of Richmond (Virginia), which was the only Southern college included in the poll. Cox began the process of winding up his campaign with a speech in Madison Square Garden. To a heckler who interrupted him, he replied that the Irish problem had developed into almost a war for extermination and really could no longer be considered a domestic issue. He went on to explain that the League Council was an investigative and advisory body only, and that any conclusions would be sent to our President who would have to submit the plan of action to Congress. Cox stated a willingness, however, to accept a specific reservation, saying that the United States assumed no responsibility

84*Ibid.* See Appendix C for a breakdown of these polls.
to use its armed forces unless authorized by Congress.

Returning to Ohio, Cox again mentioned the fact that three months earlier the American people had apparently been obsessed with the idea of a political change. He stated that this was not a profound consideration but an emotional reaction to the war, against the inconveniences, a desire to shake ourselves free of all thought of war and its tragic conditions. He expressed confidence that the people, in those three months, had considered and rejected the wobbling of Harding and had accepted the Democratic program.

On October 31, both candidates released final statements. Pointing out that a big issue was the need for a constructive domestic program, Warren Harding insisted that a little more Democratic mismanagement and our business, industry, and agriculture would be ruined. He promised to return the government to the people, to protect industry from unfair foreign competition, and to carry out many domestic reforms. Harding insisted that the Democrats had falsely asserted that the Republicans opposed any fraternity of nations for peace, that they had done so in order to convince the people that they had to accept the "Paris League" or nothing. He concluded:

The issue as presented by the Democratic Administration and its representatives is simply the question: "Shall we enter the Paris League of Nations, assuming, among other obligations, the obligation of Article X?"... The answer of the

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Democratic group is "Yes." The answer of the Republican Party and its candidate is "No"... Our opponents have asked the American people to approve their draft of a League. The American people have said "No." This means that the man who is elected President must set his face toward a constructive plan. I have pointed the way.87

Cox, in his statement, confined himself almost entirely to the League question and intimated that he was sure the fight for the League was won. He pointed out that the conscientious voter could see that the election meant the difference between the certain achievement of what the nation hoped for, on the one hand, and continued confusion and indecision on the other. He said in summing up:

I am in favor of going into the League. Senator Harding is in favor of staying out. I am concerned about clarification, he is concerned with rejection.88 Senator Harding says that he will not submit the treaty of peace to the Senate as it is, but that he will change it. Since the President is without the right to make any alterations, this means that he will not submit it at all. This will result in one thing only, controversy and confusion.88

Thus the sound and fury of the campaign came to an end. No matter how much the politicians talked, the verdict could not be registered until the people cast their ballots on November 4. These ballots would determine whether Cox's confidence was well founded or whether, as Harding insisted, the election would mean the final rejection of the "Wilson League."

88Ibid.
CHAPTER V

AVALANCHE AND AFTERMATH

The results of the voting on November 4, 1920 were startling to many people. The numerous straw votes, mentioned earlier, had shown Harding with a fairly good lead throughout the campaign. However, 1920 was not the time of polls on everything and anything and, as shown in our own time, presidential polls can be wrong. Avalanche or earthquake, the vote in 1920 was one-sided in the extreme. With 404 electoral votes out of a possible 531, Warren Gamaliel Harding was chosen to be the twenty-ninth President of the United States.

Of course, the electoral vote does not give a complete picture by any means. The total popular vote in 1920 was 26,748,224 votes, an increase of some eight million votes over that in 1916. Some good part of this increase was due, naturally, to the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. While the Democratic candidates campaigned with great vigor, the Democratic popular vote of 9,128,488 votes was an increase of only 793 votes over that of 1916. The Republican popular vote of 16,141,536 votes was almost double that of 1916 and amounted to a popular plurality of over six million votes.

Breaking the popular vote down further, one notes that the Republicans carried 1,946 counties while the Democrats won only 1,096. Of the total vote 60.35 per cent went to Harding while Cox received 34.13 per cent. In no section of the country did Cox poll less than twenty-four per cent of the total vote. Perhaps of greater importance is the fact that more than two-thirds of Cox's vote was in states carried by Harding. Had a proportional division of each state's electoral votes according to popular vote, as frequently suggested, been in effect, the final count would have been by no means so one-sided as it was. One authority states that while the assumption has been that the Republicans in 1920 had recaptured the Republican votes that had gone to the Progressives in 1912 and the Democrats in 1916, an analysis of percentages by sections, states, and counties seems to indicate more of a change than that.

Woodrow Wilson had deemed the election to be a solemn referendum on whether or not we should enter the League of Nations. Could the election results be so interpreted?

Speaking from the front porch of his home in Marion, Ohio

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2Robinson, The Presidential Vote, pp. 19-21. Only thirteen counties were carried by the Democrats in the Mountain States. In Arizona, only Graham County voted Democratic.

3Ibid.

4Ibid. A breakdown of the popular and electoral vote by states will be found in Appendix D. A breakdown, by counties, of Arizona's popular vote will also be found there.
late in the day on November 4, Warren Harding interpreted the results by stating that the Versailles League was "now deceased." But he added that the next administration was going to "ask for the nations to be associated together in justice, but it will be an association that surrenders nothing of American freedom." Calvin Coolidge, Vice-President-elect, commented, "I doubt if any particular mandate was given in the last election on the question of the League of Nations and if it was the preponderant issue." Cox, on the other hand, seemed to feel that the vote had been a vote against the League, but one brought about because of Republican success in appealing to nationalistic hatreds and in misleading the electorate. He attributed the balance of power in the campaign to the German, Irish, and Italian-American groups whose reasons for being against the League have already been mentioned. Cox insisted that this racial line-up insured the votes of states like Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and others. It has been asserted that for various reasons the "hyphenated" vote in 1916 probably was so scattered that it had little effect on that election.

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7Cox, Journey Through My Years, pp. 272-273.
one way or the other. In 1920 it is more likely that these groups were predominately with the Republicans. Cox also stated his opinion that the Republican campaign to frighten the mothers of the country, to convince them that League membership would mean our sons fighting periodically on European soil, had met with a good deal of success.

Since people do not write an explanation on the ballot of their reason for voting as they do, one can only make what are really "informed guesses" as to their reasons. A contemporary magazine, Outlook, asked representatives of different groups, prior to the election, for whom they would vote and why. Of eight of the leading American novelists queried, only one indicated an intention to vote for Cox. Ida M. Tarbell stated that she felt it was the greatest duty of the United States to enter the League of Nations as it appeared in the Versailles Treaty, clearly stating its interpretation of the Covenant. Important as domestic issues were, they could not be tackled without regard for world conditions.

The seven writers who indicated a preference for Harding all gave some variation of the "autocrat" charge as one

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9Cox, Journey Through My Years, p. 275.

10"Eight Leading American Novelists Answer The Outlook's Question, 'Will You Vote for Cox or Harding?'" Outlook, CXXVI (Sept.-Dec., 1920), 283.
reason for favoring Harding. Owen Wister felt that Harding was the better equipped man both in the domestic and the foreign relations fields, and felt that he would go to no extreme of isolation or entanglement. Stewart White pointed to the state of American unpreparedness for war and the government's inefficiency in the operation of the railroads and so forth during the war. Mary Roberts Rinehart pointed to the wartime "blunders" too and accused the Democrats of fostering an idea of "class taxation," an attack against wealth in the abstract as being a crime. She asserted that the Republican Party was a "middle-of-the-road" party, standing between the autocracy of class and the autocracy of mass. Emerson Hough, stating it would take the country fifty years to recover from Wilson's administration, indicated that he would probably vote for Harding as the lesser of two evils. Opinion on the League among the writers favoring Harding ran the gamut from its being dead to the certainty that Harding favored the League with reservations. Interestingly enough, three writers commented that Cox's "unsubstantiated" charge about a "slush fund" made it clear that he was more like a ward politician or a demagogue than a man who would make a good President.

The same magazine also polled the country's college presidents and some of the leading men in Eastern business circles. A letter was sent to every college president in

11*Outlook*, CXXVI (Sept-Dec., 1920), 283.
the country with the question of whom they would vote for and why. One hundred sixty-eight replies were received representing thirty-eight states and all sections of the country. Eighty-five presidents indicated their intention to vote for Harding, sixty-three for Cox, three for Watkins, one for Eugene Debs, while sixteen announced themselves as undecided at that point. The League of Nations was most frequently mentioned by these men as the main issue to their view. Other issues mentioned were "personal rule," labor, and so on.

The next week this same magazine put a similar query to a number of leaders in business, industry, and finance. Of the ten men asked, five favored Cox and five favored Harding. Of the five pro-Cox men, four definitely indicated that the League was the basis of their vote. W.L. Saunders, Chairman of the Board of Ingersoll-Rand Company, stated that he would vote for Cox because of a belief in the League and a belief that it was our moral duty not to repudiate the treaty. Others such as William Rand, former Assistant District Attorney of New York City, and Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, expressed similar ideas. James McIntosh, general counsel for New York Life Insurance Company, insisted that he was a Republican who would vote for Cox, not

12 "College Presidents Answer the Outlook Question 'How Will You Vote and Why?'" Outlook, CXXVI (Sept.-Dec., 1920), 318-326.
because of the League—that was secondary—but because he felt we should sign the Versailles Treaty and not desert our allies.

Of the five business leaders who announced they would vote for Harding, two mentioned definite opposition to the League, two the return of efficient government, and the one labor leader, T.V. O'Connor, President of the Longshoremen's Association of New York City, added the belief that Harding would give labor a better break. John Hammond, President of the American Institute of Mining Engineers, accused the Democrats of leaving the country unprepared for war, handling the war inefficiently, failing to see the need of a protective tariff, and then trying to surrender American nationalism to a League "super-government." Charles Sumner Bird, manufacturer and Progressive Party candidate for governor of Massachusetts in 1912, also stated opposition to the League and expressed the belief that Cox was not big enough for the job of President. President of the Longshoremen's Association O'Connor suggested that Harding would give labor a fair deal and that a change of administration was needed to restore governmental efficiency and a settled state of affairs.

These polls represent merely samplings of opinions among men and women in positions of some importance and influence.

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The League of Nations seems to have figured very definitely as an issue in the votes of these people, especially the pro-Cox ones. It would be extremely difficult to say whether the League issue was the actual basis of their decision or whether, in the case of the pro-Cox people, for example, they were just "congenital Democrats" who rationalized their vote by accepting the party stand. The frequency with which the "autocrat" and inefficiency charges appeared should definitely be noted. It would seem then that the League question, among the many issues, was a major one but not the major one.

The mass of citizens does not always agree with its leaders, or the so-called "experts." An analysis of the election results in their individual sections was given by news­men to Outlook following the election. C.H. Howell of the Fresno Republican in California suggested that on the Pacific Coast the result was a reaction to Wilson and his type of autocracy. If there were to be somewhat of an autocratic government, Howell thought the people preferred an emotional type such as that of Teddy Roosevelt. He pointed to the decline of agricultural prices, as well as the definite opposition of the "hyphenates," as having hurt the Democrats. The League of Nations, in Howell's view, was not a real issue because the people had become bored with it by the time of the election.

15"What Started the Republican Avalanche?" Outlook, CXXVI (Sept.-Dec., 1920), 499.
In the Pacific Northwest, a profound discontent with the Wilson administration due to its failure to keep up the price of wheat as it had cotton was, according to W.H. Cowles of the Spokane Spokesman, the major factor which defeated Cox. The people there seemed to have been satisfied that Harding supported a League with modifications but was against the "Wilson League." The fact that Cox was not a strong "Dry" was also important in "dry" Washington.

Frank Olds of the Milwaukee Journal admitted that the North Central West was normally Republican, but thought that the independent voters were against the "Wilson Dynasty" for its failure to remove restrictive war legislation and its discrimination against Northern farmers. Voters in general seemed not interested in the League or satisfied that moderate Republican opinion would force the new administration to enter the League. The desire for a change in the hope of checking government waste and bringing about tax reductions was a major motivating factor for Midwest voters in the view of A.W. Stace of the Grand Rapids (Michigan) Press. The vote was also an anti-Wilson one, made easier by Harding's "World Court" stand. In the East, according to New York State Senator F.M. Davenport—the one non-newsman quoted—voters were expressing disgust at the bungling of the problems of the war era, disappointment in the administration's failure to

16 Outlook, CXXVI (Sept.-Dec., 1920), 502-503.
17 Outlook, CXXVI (Sept.-Dec., 1920), 500-501.
straighten out our economic situation, and opposition to a "political" league as envisioned in the Versailles Treaty. 18

The South was not included in this poll as it remained in the Democratic column with the exception of Tennessee. To some degree, the analysis from each section represents the reporter's views as much as it does the view of the large mass of voters. The analysis presented by the New York Senator, in the writer's view, would be the least reliable of all. However, it is most important to note that only once does an analyst suggest that the election could be deemed a referendum against the League. And even then it is against a "political" League, by which the reporter probably meant to imply that the people still favored a "World Court" type of organization.

The votes of the large numbers of newly-enfranchised women undoubtedly had a major effect on the election. They were an unknown quantity to professional politicians in the 1920 election and therefore a disturbing one. At the beginning of the campaign, both professional politicians and men whose knowledge of politics was almost equal to the professional's insisted that the election would turn on the women's vote. Because of this belief, they gave Cox a long start in the race. 19

18 *Outlook*, CXXVI (Sept.-Dec., 1920), 503-504.

Obviously, however, Cox did not poll the major portion of the women's vote. Whereas Cox would have won easily had the women voted for him as a unit, the women served actually to increase Harding's majorities. On the whole, women probably voted as they did due to the same motives as men. The influence of men on the voting of mothers, wives, and sweethearts cannot be measured. Women generally seemed to favor prohibition, and it is likely that the strength of the "wet" element in the Democratic Party made them feel that prohibition would be more efficiently enforced under Harding. Women, after all, were not too bound by party traditions yet. The constant Republican assertion that the League would increase rather than decrease the likelihood of war undoubtedly swung many women to Harding. Many women surely favored the League even then but, again, the Republicans played on the fear that Cox's election would bring no real results anyway. He might still be blocked by a Republican Senate. It was pointed out that Harding's election, on the other hand, would bring a realization of their desires. This argument was re-enforced by the statement of the "Thirty-One" and Harding's own statements concerning a "World Court" which frequently were interpreted as meaning a league, in principle.

Editorial comment on the election was varied, as one could expect, but certain points were emphasized in most cases. Observers of both parties agreed that the election

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20Yale Review, X (January, 1921), 315-320.
vote was a demand for a change in administration. All pro-
Republican papers and many Democratic ones stated that the
election was a rejection of "Wilsonism." Some Republicans
such as Borah and papers such as the Pittsburgh Gazette-
Times said the election was a definite rejection of the
League of Nations. The large majority of Republican newspa-
pers emphasized the rejection of "Wilsonism" as a whole,
especially the aspects of autocratic government, high prices,
and high taxes.

The New York Tribune, a Republican journal, commented,
"The country was weary of Wilsonism in all its manifestations."
The Tribune mentioned extravagance, incompetence, discord
among the allies, poor domestic policies, and even "parlour
Bolshevism" as the "manifestations." The Republican New York
Herald asserted that "Political avalanches that crush every-
thing before them ... are the expression of an embittered
people ... Wilson autocracy, impudent, intolerant, dicta-
torial, and Democratic inefficiency, extravagence, wasteful-
ness, are the sources of the 1920 avalanche."

The Omaha World-Herald pointed to the very nature of the
Republican campaign as evidence of the impossibility of inter-
preting the election as an outright rejection of the League
of Nations. Said the World-Herald, "It cemented together

21 "The Republican Avalanche," Literary Digest, LXVII
(Oct.-Dec., 1920), 11-12.

'Wall Street' power and Non-Partisan League votes. It wrapped radicals and reactionaries in close embrace. It appealed alike to anti-League Republicans, pro-League Republicans, and anti-League Democrats—even to some pro-League Democrats. It put Bryan to bed with Penrose and cavalier with covenanter, bestowing its benignant blessing on all alike."

The comment of the pro-Republican Arizona paper, The Tucson Daily Citizen, was to the effect that the election was a victory for "Americanism," a defeat for "internationalism." The question at issue was the sovereignty of the United States. Said the Citizen, "It happened, of course, naturally, that the Republican party was identified with the cause of Americanism." Democratic papers, generally, refused to accept the vote as a rejection of the League. The consensus was that the vote was merely one for a change. As the New York World expressed it, "The American people wanted a change. . . . All of the restlessness and discontent bred of the war has finally found expression in the ballot box, and the result is Warren G. Harding."

By far the best and most thoroughgoing explanation of the election results, in the opinion of the writer, was given

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by the pro-Democratic Richmond (Virginia) Times-Dispatch. It summed up the Democratic attitude but did so in a way that also provided an analysis that was not merely partisan. Said the Times-Dispatch:

First in importance of the reasons for the people's voting as they did was the national psychology which demanded a change; next, the belief of perhaps a majority of even the Republicans that such party leaders as Taft, Root, and Hughes spoke the truth when they declared that Harding really favored an association of nations; and last, a vague feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of the people, regardless of party, who believed that the President had been unnecessarily arbitrary in insisting on the ratification of the Covenant of the League of Nations as it had been drafted at Versailles. The national unrest, the indefinable desire for a change, admittedly was strong and widespread. It was a psychological condition that was natural following the termination of a great war in which, while the nation was triumphant, a burden of taxation was piled up that bore heavily on the shoulders of the people. During the period of reconstruction, with its high prices and vexatious governmental interference with business, the Administration had had to bear the blame for all the unavoidable, yet annoying, incidents growing out of the process of readjustment.26

Whether the election was a "victory for Americanism and a defeat for internationalism" or merely a victory for "General Grouch," it did mean, in the long run, the end of the attempt to bring the United States into the League of Nations. Warren Harding was not stating a fact when he said, "The Versailles League is now deceased." He was uttering the words which doomed it to a lingering death.

26 Literary Digest, LXVII (Oct.-Dec., 1920), 12.
CONCLUSIONS

After the sifting and integration of the material used in this paper, there are certain conclusions which the writer has reached. They will be presented in the approximate order that they arise from the discussion as set forth in the body of the paper.

Certainly the conclusion is inescapable that the League of Nations idea was one which captured the hearts and minds of America's leaders and citizens. Even the idea of yielding some degree of sovereignty in order to accomplish a great mutual gain seemed widely accepted. Although, of course, the entire populace probably did not understand the League in complete detail, it seems apparent that a large segment had a good idea of what it was and approved of it. The success of the League to Enforce Peace points up this conclusion. The presidential campaign of 1916 seems to have started the destruction of potential American membership. Upon the rock of the mutual hatred that grew up between Lodge and Wilson, the Covenant war, in large measure, smashed. From this point on the question of League membership became more and more one of partisanship. The fact of Lodge's definite opposition to the League of Nations is of tremendous significance, for it meant that the small anti-League group would grow in strength and membership until it dominated the Republican Party during the campaign of 1920.
The writer feels that at the beginning of the year 1920 the people, despite the long debate on League membership, were still decidedly in favor of American participation. The college polls taken by the New York Times bear this out, as do the utterances of the representatives of labor, education, agriculture, and religion. The country's women indeed seemed overwhelmingly favorable. It should be noted, however, that an increasing number of people were beginning to mention some slight modification of the Covenant or perhaps stated reservations of a mild sort.

None of the men most prominently mentioned as possible candidates for the Republican Party were openly enthusiastic about the League of Nations as it had been presented. Some were rather clearly against anything more than a new Hague Court, if that much, while several wisely beat about the political bush. That they were, at least, against the "Wilson League" was rather clear. On the other hand, McAdoo, Palmer, and Cox (Hoover was somewhat between the parties in 1920), who were the leading Democratic aspirants, were all favorable to the League.

The national conventions made the stands of the parties fairly clear, despite the politically "flexible" phraseology employed in both platforms. The Republican plank on the League condemned the League Covenant as being prone to cause injustice, hostility, and war. This would seem to be clearly a rejection of the League. The phrases concerning the Republicans' favoring an "international association" meant
little beyond the leaving open of the back door in case cam-
paign developments necessitated a more pro-League stand. In
this regard, the writer wishes to emphasize a fact which made
a strong impression on him throughout the course of his re-
search. It is simply the fact that Lodge and the anti-League
forces had the political upper hand at all times. Any time
the party might seem to be drifting toward a pro-League stand,
the extreme anti-Leaguers could threaten to bolt the party. A
party split would have ruined the Republicans' chances. It did
in 1912. At no time did the pro-League Republicans threaten
to bolt the party in order to force it to support the League
of Nations. Whenever there seemed to be a divergence between
party loyalty and League support, the pro-League Republicans
rationalized the divergence out of existence. Thus, the Re-
publican Party in 1920, despite the fog of statements during
the campaign, was of necessity against the League of Nations
specifically and the idea in general.

The Democratic convention placed the party clearly on
record as favoring the League. Their plank did state they
would accept any reservations which would make the obligations
of the United States more clear. This was, to some degree, a
concession to the few Democratic "bitter-enders" but even more
it was a wise political maneuver. It showed the Democrats to
be definitely for the League but also that they were not un-
reasonable insofar as the conditions of American membership
went. It is regrettable that such a modification was not
made in Democratic strategy during the Senate debate. Had
it been done, the United States would probably have entered the League with reservations acceptable to her allies. Here Woodrow Wilson must take the blame.

The acceptance speeches of the party candidates reenforce the feeling of the writer that the Republican Party was essentially anti-League while the Democratic Party stood for the Covenant. Harding clearly rejected the League of Nations and made statements about a "new association" which, in essence, meant little more than that he favored peaceful relations among nations. Cox, on the other hand, left no doubt about his favoring League membership. He did point out two statements which it might be wise to make so the world would clearly understand the American view of the League. They amounted to no real change in the Democratic position at all.

The comments of George White, who became Democratic National Chairman in July, 1920, about "progressivism" being the main issue confused the picture somewhat. The writer gets the impression that White was trying merely to point up the overall Democratic philosophy.

Much had been made of Wilson's remark at the 1920 Jackson Day dinner as being a call for the election to be a "solemn referendum" on the question of League membership. In actuality, he merely suggested such a referendum if people had any doubts about the country's favoring such membership. By spring his conviction seemed to be growing that the election would be such a referendum. By election time there was no doubt about it, in his opinion.
It is the writer's contention that only in a limited sense can the election be considered a referendum on the League. The Republican Party was dominated by Lodge and the anti-League forces. Therefore, the victory of Harding, as pliable as he was, could mean only that the United States would not even try to enter the League, modified or not. As for the campaign itself, it is rather clear that the Republicans emphasized the League only as a part of "Wilsonism," something they wished the country to reject. More frequently they hit at "autocracy" and "one-man rule" than they did at the League of Nations. The League was pictured as bad, but still more as a part of the evil and inefficiency of which the country had to rid itself. The Republicans also harped on Democratic mismanagement of agricultural, labor, financial, and war policies.

The Democrats in their campaign made the major appeal on the League issue. Not nearly so much attention was paid to the various domestic issues, and little indeed was said by way of refutation of Republican charges concerning Wilson's administration or the general subject of "Wilsonism." The tangent Cox made with his "slush fund" charge did undoubtedly weaken the strength of the Democratic appeal. The writer did not find any amount of evidence that the charge boomeranged on Cox, however.

As far as the actual voting is concerned, it seems clear that a lot of people who were in actuality for the League would have had to vote for Harding in order for him to win so
definitely. To be sure, the "hyphenated vote" was almost solidly for Harding as an anti-League and anti-Wilson vote. There were numbers of Republicans who were very definitely against the League and would therefore eagerly support Harding. Probably, too, there was a large group of "congenital" Republicans who would back the party candidate regardless. Of these, the ones who were favorable to the League could read things into the platform and pick out certain of Harding's speeches and statements and arrive at a rational explanation of their supporting him.

There were, of course, those who recalled the Senate debate and feared that, even if the Democrats won, they could not get the League Covenant through a Republican-controlled Congress. These people too could look to the vague phrases of the Republican platform for comfort. If the speeches of Harding did not provide enough reassurance, it could be hoped that he would be required by the force of circumstances to take us into the League. In this group were undoubtedly large numbers of women who felt the League offered a real chance of ending the necessity of their men going off to war. It is also the writer's feeling that the Republican hammering on the assertion that the League, as constituted, was more likely to cause war was effective enough to split off many women from the Democratic ranks and bring them to, at least, a half-hearted support of Harding.

Most likely the major factor in the election was a desire for a change. The war years had brought inconveniences
and had aroused antagonisms against the Democratic administration. Cox himself took note of that desire, although he insisted it had subsided by November. The Republican campaign appealed definitely to such a desire in almost every facet. The continued assertions about the "autocrat," Democratic mismanagement, a greater concern for domestic issues, and so on must surely have fallen on fertile ground.

To the writer it would seem, then, that the League of Nations was definitely an issue in the campaign of 1920, but not the only major one from the standpoint of the parties' emphasis or the voters' reactions. The election cannot be considered a rejection of the League or the League idea by the American people because of the multiplicity of reasons for their voting as they did and the crazy-quilt of campaign statements concerning the League. Only in its eventual effect can the election of 1920 be considered a referendum on the League.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

I. Summary of the Hitchcock Reservations Presented to the Senate in February, 1920*

1. A member nation is to judge if it has fulfilled its obligations prior to leaving the League.

2. Matters considered in international law as domestic or relating to internal or coastwise actions of nations are to be exempted from League jurisdiction.

3. Nothing in the Covenant is to be construed as impairing the Monroe Doctrine.

4. The advice mentioned in Article X is "merely advice" which any member is free to accept or reject, and in the United States advice can be accepted only by action of Congress under the Constitution.

5. There is to be an equalization of the six to one vote in the Assembly which is designed to reassure our people.

II. Text of Article X of the League of Nations Covenant**

The high contracting parties undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all States, members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Executive Council shall advise upon the means by which the obligations shall be fulfilled.


**Bailey, p. 385.
APPENDIX B

I. Poll of College Students and Faculties on the League of Nations Covenant and Versailles Treaty*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College</th>
<th>Unconditional ratification</th>
<th>Rejection of treaty</th>
<th>With Lodge reservations</th>
<th>Ratification by compromise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S**</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princeton</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amhurst</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornell</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vassar</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Poll of Students and Faculty at the University of Arizona on the League of Nations Covenant and the Versailles Treaty#

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unconditional ratification</th>
<th>Rejection of treaty</th>
<th>With Lodge reservations</th>
<th>Ratification by compromise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S**</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*New York Times, January 15, 1920, p. 2. Colleges in the South, Midwest and West were polled but the results were not tabulated.

**"S" indicates student vote and "F" faculty vote. In cases where there was no breakdown, the vote is listed under "S."

#Tucson Daily Citizen, January 14, 1920, Sec. I, p. 3. Of the 900 students, only 300 voted.
APPENDIX C

I. Eastern College Pre-Election Straw Vote*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College</th>
<th>Harding</th>
<th>Cox</th>
<th>College</th>
<th>Harding</th>
<th>Cox</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cornell</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>Rochester</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlebury</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>Syracuse</td>
<td>1,058</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.I.T.</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Richmond**</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amhurst</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Williams</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinity</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Princeton</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colgate</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Yale</td>
<td>1,223</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dartmouth</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>Harvard</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td><strong>183</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,313</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,888</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**The University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia, was the only Southern school included in this particular poll.
II. Pre-Election Poll of Farmer Vote by The Farm Journal*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Harding</th>
<th>Cox</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Harding</th>
<th>Cox</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>64%**</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Averages 70% 30%


**Figures given for each candidate are percentages of the total farmer vote in each state.
## APPENDIX D

### I. The Popular Vote in 1920 by States*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>156,064</td>
<td>74,719</td>
<td>3,158</td>
<td>233,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>29,546</td>
<td>37,016</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>66,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>104,587</td>
<td>70,445</td>
<td>5,060</td>
<td>180,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>229,191</td>
<td>624,992</td>
<td>89,280</td>
<td>943,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>104,936</td>
<td>173,248</td>
<td>13,869</td>
<td>292,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>120,721</td>
<td>229,238</td>
<td>15,559</td>
<td>356,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>40,011</td>
<td>52,858</td>
<td>2,106</td>
<td>94,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>90,515</td>
<td>44,515</td>
<td>20,434</td>
<td>155,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>105,849</td>
<td>42,874</td>
<td></td>
<td>148,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>46,579</td>
<td>88,975</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>135,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>534,395</td>
<td>1,420,480</td>
<td>139,839</td>
<td>2,094,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>511,364</td>
<td>696,370</td>
<td>55,240</td>
<td>1,262,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>227,959</td>
<td>634,674</td>
<td>32,481</td>
<td>894,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>185,447</td>
<td>369,195</td>
<td>15,554</td>
<td>570,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>456,497</td>
<td>452,480</td>
<td>9,659</td>
<td>918,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>87,519</td>
<td>38,538</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>126,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>58,961</td>
<td>136,355</td>
<td>2,520</td>
<td>197,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>180,626</td>
<td>236,117</td>
<td>11,700</td>
<td>428,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>276,691</td>
<td>681,153</td>
<td>35,874</td>
<td>993,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>231,046</td>
<td>755,941</td>
<td>50,994</td>
<td>1,037,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>142,994</td>
<td>519,421</td>
<td>73,423</td>
<td>735,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>68,920</td>
<td>11,527</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>82,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>574,699</td>
<td>727,252</td>
<td>30,189</td>
<td>1,332,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>57,372</td>
<td>109,430</td>
<td>12,204</td>
<td>179,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>119,608</td>
<td>247,505</td>
<td>15,523</td>
<td>382,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>9,851</td>
<td>15,479</td>
<td>1,864</td>
<td>27,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>62,662</td>
<td>95,196</td>
<td>1,234</td>
<td>159,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>256,887</td>
<td>611,451</td>
<td>35,506</td>
<td>903,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>781,231</td>
<td>1,871,167</td>
<td>246,108</td>
<td>2,898,513</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>305,367</td>
<td>232,819</td>
<td>538,186</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>37,408</td>
<td>159,997</td>
<td>197,405</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>790,037</td>
<td>1,182,022</td>
<td>59,300</td>
<td>2,021,359</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>217,764</td>
<td>247,746</td>
<td>23,256</td>
<td>488,766</td>
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<td>Oregon</td>
<td>80,019</td>
<td>143,592</td>
<td>14,911</td>
<td>238,522</td>
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</table>
### Appendix D, I (cont.)

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<tr>
<th>State</th>
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<th>Republican</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>503,843</td>
<td>1,218,216</td>
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<td>1,852,618</td>
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<td>107,463</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
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<td>394</td>
<td>66,808</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>35,938</td>
<td>110,692</td>
<td>35,607</td>
<td>182,237</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>206,558</td>
<td>219,229</td>
<td>2,249</td>
<td>428,036</td>
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<td>Texas</td>
<td>287,910</td>
<td>114,758</td>
<td>83,521</td>
<td>486,189</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>56,639</td>
<td>81,555</td>
<td>7,634</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
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<td>68,212</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>89,961</td>
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<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>141,670</td>
<td>87,456</td>
<td>1,874</td>
<td>231,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>84,298</td>
<td>223,137</td>
<td>91,280</td>
<td>398,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>220,789</td>
<td>282,010</td>
<td>7,135</td>
<td>509,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>113,420</td>
<td>498,716</td>
<td>89,274</td>
<td>701,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>17,429</td>
<td>35,091</td>
<td>2,180</td>
<td>54,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>9,128,488</td>
<td>16,141,536</td>
<td>1,478,200</td>
<td>26,748,224</td>
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### II. The Electoral Vote in 1920 by States*

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<th>Republican</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Republican</th>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
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<tr>
<td>California</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Colorado</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>New Mexico</td>
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<tr>
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<td>New York</td>
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<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>No. Dakota</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Ohio</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
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<td>Penn.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
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<td>R. I.</td>
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Appendix D, II (cont.)

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<th>State</th>
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<th>Republican</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
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<td>So. Car.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>So. Dak.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tenn.</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
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<td>Texas</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Utah</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass.</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>12</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
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<td>Wash.</td>
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<td>Miss.</td>
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<td>West Va.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
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<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Wyoming</td>
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</table>

Totals 127 404


III. The Arizona Popular Vote in 1920 by Counties*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Apache</td>
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<td>679</td>
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<td>1,302</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cochise</td>
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<td>9,771</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coconino</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Gila</td>
<td>2,894</td>
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<td>125</td>
<td>6,330</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graham</td>
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<td>2,323</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greenlee</td>
<td>1,131</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maricopa</td>
<td>8,825</td>
<td>11,336</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohave</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,791</td>
</tr>
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<td>Navajo</td>
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<td>1,078</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pima</td>
<td>2,455</td>
<td>3,392</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinal</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>1,493</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>850</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,556</td>
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<td>Yavapai</td>
<td>2,251</td>
<td>3,625</td>
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<td>5,876</td>
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<td>Yuma</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>1,606</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,783</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 29,546 37,016 241 66,803

*Robinson, pp. 138-139.
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Books


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**Guides**


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