BIBLICAL AND CLASSICAL VIEWS
OF PERSONALITY

by
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STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

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APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR

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The problem that motivated this thesis was the lingering impression that the traditional Christian doctrine of man was more influenced by Greek thought than by biblical thought. As a student of theology and as a working pastor I have come across distinctly non-biblical thought both in theological works and in the mind of the average parishioner concerning the nature and destiny of man. Of course, this should not be surprising because it has long been known that Greek thought made a large impact upon and contribution to Christian theology. The purpose of this thesis is simply to investigate the nature and character of the thought concerning man and his destiny which is found in the three Greek philosophers that most heavily influenced Christian theology and to compare these conceptions with the ideas found in the Bible. The three philosophers are Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. In this investigation the differences will be stressed.

The texts and translations which have been used are as follows: The Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version, New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1952; The Dialogues of Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett, New York: Random House, 1937; The Works of Aristotle Translated into
English, under the editorship of W. D. Ross, Oxford: at
the Clarendon Press, 1910-1930; and The Enneads of
Plotinus, translated by Stephen Mac Kenna, Boston: Charles
T. Branford and Co., n.d.

This thesis is the result of the impact of two
academic institutions upon my mind. The biblical sec-
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CHAPTER I
BIBLICAL VIEW OF MAN

Hebraic psychology seems near and familiar to us because a great many of the terms that are used in the Bible are also a part of our vocabulary, such as spirit and heart. However, frequently these terms mean something quite apart in their context from what they mean to us. The method of treatment in this chapter will be that of tracing the meaning of the terms in both the Old Testament and the New Testament.

First of all, I think it is quite important to establish that the biblical thought is not analytic but synthetic. The biblical language is concrete and not abstract. The Hebrew word for truth is not used in abstraction like the Greek word \( \alpha \lambda \gamma \theta \epsilon \lambda \alpha \). It is used concerning the credibility, fidelity, and faithfulness of people or God. The word that is translated "truth" is simply a construction of a participle of the verb that means "to confirm or support." The Hebrew would not ask: "What is truth?" He would say "God is true" by which he would mean "God is faithful." In the words of the great biblical scholar H. Wheeler Robinson: "The conception was concrete and religious, not metaphysical and abstract." "It is important to get rid of the Greek ideas about the soul which are so often read into the quite different Hebrew
conception. The Hebrew conceived man as an animated body and not as an incarnate soul. "1

The place to start is with the second creation myth in Genesis. The seventh verse of the second chapter reads: "then the Lord God formed man of the dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being" (RSV). The word "ground" in Hebrew is the feminine form of the masculine noun "man". Ground is 'adāmāh, and man is 'ādām. Of course, this is where the English word "Adam" originates. Man is thus closely allied to the ground, and by his very name "he seemed to be connected with the 'ground'."2

The phrase "the breath of life" simply means that this molded piece of ground had received the necessary condition of life. This was common to all animals, and the Hebrew from his view of man knew that breath and blood were the two requisites of life. However, the word "breathed" is used as a special term to indicate that man was somehow uniquely connected with the Creator in a manner in which the other animals were not.3

The clause, "and man became a living being", is of

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3 Ibid., p. 38.
considerable interest to our investigation. The Revised Standard Version happily translates the Hebrew word *nephesh* as "being" instead of "soul". The word *nephesh* means the principle of life and sensibility in any type of animal.⁴ Man has become a "living being" by the breath of God. The important point here is that man was not given a soul which would reside in his body. "Nephesh is not a spiritual entity which enters the body at birth and leaves it as such at death; it is simply the principle of life which makes the body effective, and the body is the real basis of personality."⁵

This says something about the usual view of the immortality of the soul which people often consider the Bible to be supporting. Man in view of the passage just studied clearly becomes man by the grace of God and has no existence independent of God. Immortality is usually held to mean the indestructibility of the soul. This is not the position of this passage. For the Hebrew the obvious difference between the living and the dead was either the presence or absence of breath. "To the Hebrew the soul is not an esoteric and mystical abstraction; it

⁴Ibid., p. 12.

is breath, and the breath which is the principle of life naturally comes to be regarded as the centre of the consciousness of life, and of all its physical or psychical phenomena." Therefore, a falsely "spiritual" tone has been translated as "soul".

It is important to point out that the Hebrews had no word for "body". They did not need one, for there was no distinction made between body and soul such as we are apt to make. The word nephesh simply meant man. Terms originate through definition and antithesis, and therefore, they needed no term for what we call the "body".

The Hebrew did not see the center of consciousness in the brain, for he probably called the brain "the marrow of the head." Being unaware of the nervous system and its function, he did not appreciate the controlling function of the brain through the nervous system. The Hebrew put the physical organs of the body into three classes: the central, the peripheral, and the general. The four central organs were the heart, liver, the kidneys, and the bowels. They all had psychical functions. The heart, leb,

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8 Robinson, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament, pp. 69f.
was the most important of these four organs. The heart was probably considered of more importance because of its central position in the body and because of its connection with blood.\(^9\) Blood was thought of as the vitality of life, for when the blood flowed from a man, his life left him. Therefore, blood came to be identified with life, and this is the reason for the importance of blood in the Bible.

There is no clear distinction between nephesh and ḥēb in the Old Testament; however, ḥēb seems to be one of the attributes or functions of nephesh.\(^10\) Sometimes they seem to have a parallel usage. An example of this is in Deuteronomy 6:5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy ḥēb and with all thy nephesh, and with all thy might." However, as a result of the syncretism of these two ideas ḥēb came to denote the intellectual aspect and nephesh the emotional aspect of consciousness.\(^11\) It should be emphasized that the usage was not clear cut and definite.


The next word that was of critical importance to the Hebrew was *ruach*. It meant breath, wind, or spirit.\(^\text{12}\) The original meaning, like that of *pneuma*, was wind. From that usage it passed over to denote the mysterious wind-like influences, the demonic forces, which were supposed to account for what is abnormal and strange in human affairs. The idea of the abnormal gradually changes until after the Exile it means phenomena that are more normal; however, it always retains its more original associations.

"It stands for those more exceptional and unusual endowments of human nature which suggest God as their immediate source, the more normal nephesh being taken for granted. It links man to God, as though it were a door continually open to his approach."

"Through his own ruach, that is, through his conscious life viewed in its higher possibilities, he was in touch with the ruach of God, the source of man's greatest achievements."\(^\text{13}\)

The most impressive things to a nomad on the desert were the winds. They were unseen and yet the most powerful things in his life. Through their effect upon the sand they even changed the shape of the ground. It is


\(^{13}\text{Robinson, Religious Ideas of the Old Testament, p. 82.}\)
easy to see how this *ruach* could be used for the unseen and yet terrible power of God. In its earlier usage it does not refer to the breath of man but to his exceptional displays of superhuman power. The *ruach* of Yahweh was upon Samson when he tore the lion asunder (Judges 14:6). After the Exile it comes to be a part of the normal constitution of man, and it then means what amounts to a higher synonym of *nephesh*.

This means that there is no trichotomy in the Old Testament of body, soul, and spirit. The parallel usage of these terms rules out the analytical interpretation of these terms which has been frequently advanced. The *nephesh* is the totality of man, and the *leb* appears to be quite often the operating force within the man. The *ruach* is the motive power of the man. The important thing is that man is a unity and not a duality. To the Hebrew the thing that distinguishes man from animals is his relationship with God.

The *imago Dei* concept has played a great part in Christian thinking about man, but it can safely be said that it was not as important an idea in the Bible as it was to theologians. The word *tselem*, which is translated

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"image", literally means "something cut out" and denotes "form". Whether it meant that the Hebrews considered God to have a form after which man was patterned, or whether it referred to some spiritual semblance is a matter of some debate. The actual dispute is not important to the question at hand. The meaning of the phrase is that man is clearly marked off from the rest of the animals, and this is because of his likeness to God. A great many people think that this refers to the idea that man somehow has a part of God in him. This notion ignores the meaning of the word, which does not refer to essence but to semblance.

The final word which we shall take up is the word basar which means "flesh". As ruach, tselem, and lev distinguish man from animals, the word basar clearly distinguishes man from God. It refers to man over against God as frail or erring. An interesting example of this usage is Isaiah 31:3: "The Egyptians are men, and not God; and their horses are basar and not ruach." This is a distich of Hebrew poetry, and the two clauses are parallel.

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Basar is equated with 'adham and ruach with 'elohim; therefore the strength of God is contrasted with the weakness of men.

It has other meanings such as blood-relations, but one that is rather important is its use to refer to all mankind. An example of this is Genesis 6:12: "And God saw the earth, and behold, it was corrupt; for all flesh had corrupted their way upon the earth" (RSV). In this sense it presents mankind as a solidarity, but in doing this it still refers to man over against God.

Before we go further, it might be a good thing to summarize the impact of these six words: 'adham, nephesh, ruach, lēb, tselem, and basar. The result of considering these words, especially nephesh, ruach, and lēb, leads us to unity of personality. The manner in which they are used often as synonyms indicates that each word stands not for a separate part of man but for different aspects of the totality of man. 'adham, which has a close relationship with the Hebrew word for ground, shows us man's close tie with the earth from which he came and to which he shall return. The word tselem gives us a picture of man's lordship over nature through his unique relationship with the Lord. Basar gives a picture of man in his weakness and limitations. Man's lordship over nature and his uniqueness do not rest in his own autonomous constitution.
This is important to realize. Since he depends for life upon the grace of God, what he is in relationship to the rest of the creation and to God is not in his own constitution as such, but comes from the breath of God.

Man in the Old Testament is not considered in isolation. Just as the Hebrews' experience of the desert winds shaped their thinking, so their life on the desert travelling from oasis to oasis, always living near the margin of life and extinction, shaped their thought of man in society. For them man as an individual did not exist. To be cut off from the group meant extinction, that is, to be an individual meant that you would literally die. Life, if it was to be maintained at all, had to be maintained within the clan or group. One means of execution for crimes was to cut the nomad out of the group, "out of the land of the living."\(^{18}\)

Man rightly considered is not an individual in a voluntary association, for man is a member of the community. The relationship between God and man in the Old Testament is either between God and the community of man or between God and a man who represents the community. God's dealings with Abraham are not only with Abraham the person but also with Abraham insofar as he is to be the

father of the Hebrews.

H. Wheeler Robinson calls this group solidarity "corporate personality". In early Israel the ramifications of this "corporate personality" in matters of law was severe. The whole family might be destroyed for the sin of one of the members. In the seventh chapter of Joshua there is the story of Achan's entire family being stoned to death with him because of his sin. The severity was later mitigated, and the principle of personal responsibility for sin emerges. While this is usually attributed to Jeremiah and Ezekiel, we find it already in Deuteronomy 24:16: "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, nor shall the children be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin."

Although this personal responsibility for a person's own sin developed, there still remained the basic idea of corporate consciousness. Even when the eighth century prophets were inveighing against Israel and Judah, they considered themselves members of the nation. Ezekiel and Jeremiah, while they consider the relationship between God and man a personal affair, still say that this individual relationship is always within the corporate community. Israel's relationship with God remained corporate.

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while a sense of individual relationship grew within the nation. 20

What happens to the Israelite when he dies? What is his ultimate destiny? Death is seen as a weak form of life. Man becomes a mere shadow of his former self. There is a relative weakness on the part of the dead as compared with the vitality of the state of the living. This is precisely why the Israelite yearned for a long life. It was a sign of the Lord's favor. "In short, the normal Israelite view, which dominates the conception of man in the Old Testament, is that to be in sickness of body or weakness of circumstance is to experience the disintegrating power of death, and to be brought by Yahweh to the gates of Sheol; but to enjoy good health and material prosperity is to be allowed to walk with Him in fullness of life." 21

Therefore, it is not quite proper to say that the Israelite had no conception of life after death. He had one. Life after death was weakness and lack of vitality. This is a far cry from the idea of the indestructibility of an immortal soul which leaves the body at death to

20 Ibid., p. 71.

enjoy perpetual bliss. This brings us to the New Testament and the view of man that prevails there. It is quite proper to begin with St. Paul, for here we find a certain body of beliefs attributable to one man. The rest of the New Testament, especially the Gospels, will be related to Paul's thought.

There are several words which Paul uses that have a direct relationship with the words considered in the Old Testament section.

The Greek word sarx is the word that is used chiefly to translate the word basar in the Septuagint (LXX). Like basar, it means flesh. Another word that is used for the translation of basar is soma, which means body. It literally means the material substance that covers the bones of a human or animal. With the exception of one passage (I Cor. 15:39) Paul confines his use of sarx to the human flesh. Sarx for Paul means the whole body, or rather the whole person, considered from an external, physical point of view. Moreover he uses it for the

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23Ibid., p. 437.
incarnation of Christ. Frequently the term sarx is used as a personal pronoun. An example of this is Ephesians 5:28f: "He that loves his own wife loves himself: for no man hates his own sarx."

There are four stages in the usage of the word sarx. Often the meanings pass from one into another so any rigid classification is impossible. The first way is purely physical, and it is important to remember that when it is used this way, sarx is good and not evil. Paul uses it in this sense frequently, for example in Romans 1:3: "the gospel concerning his Son, who was descended from David according to the flesh." The Son of God could not become sarx (John 1:14) if sarx were evil.

The second meaning of sarx, like that of basar, is to denote man in his weakness. The Synoptic Gospels use it in this sense. "Sarx and blood have not revealed it to you" (Matt. 16:17). In other words, the weakness of man's understanding is not a source of Peter's belief. God revealed it to Peter. Here the weakness of man over against the strength of God are being contrasted.

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27 Ibid., p. 154.
The next usage is that sarx is weak against the power of sin. The famous saying of Jesus: "The spirit indeed is willing, but the sarx is weak" (Mk. 14:38) illustrates this usage. 28

The last meaning is peculiar to Paul. In this sense sarx is something sinful in itself. It is a development of the previous meanings, but a significant change has come about. Sarx no longer is limited to the physical sense. It rather refers to man's sinful condition, his alienation from God. The sins of the sarx are not all physical. Paul states in Galatians 5:19f: "Now the works of the sarx are plain: immorality, impurity, licentiousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmity, strife, jealousy, anger, selfishness, dissension, party spirit, envy, drunkenness, carousing, and the like." Clearly some of these sins have no connection in Paul's mind with the sarx as a physical phenomenon. 29

It is easy to see how confusion has arisen about Paul's thinking about body and soul. People see the word sarx used in this latter sense, and they identify it with the physical body. Paul, being a good Hebrew, could never say that anything God had made was intrinsically evil. In

28 Ibid., pp. 154ff.

this usage of the word *sarx* we still see the same unity of the personality. The personality has set itself over against God. The conflict in man between spirit and *sarx* is a moral conflict and not a metaphysical clash.  

The other word that translates *basar* in the LXX is *soma*; however, this word does not result in the idea of alienation from God, as does *sarx*. The word *soma* has all the variation of meanings that we saw in *sarx* with the exception of the last one.  

*Soma* is akin to the word "personality." It is significant that Paul never proclaims a resurrection of the *sarx*, but he does for the *soma*. Paul says that the *soma* is the temple of the Holy Spirit (I Cor. 6:19). He would never say this of the *sarx*.

Paul's doctrine of the resurrection bears directly upon our problem. We saw how the Old Testament did not have very much to say about the ultimate destiny of man. Paul does not state in his doctrine of the resurrection that the soul and the body separate. He states that the physical body is changed into a spiritual body, the mortal body is changed into a body immortal (I Cor. 15:42-49).

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30 Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 158.


32 Ibid., p. 28.
In other words, man as a whole does not divide into two or three parts at death, with some continuing and others ceasing to exist. Man as a whole personality continues his existence. Man is not a metaphysical dualism but a unity, and this unity is not broken by death. The unity is changed from physical to spiritual, and Paul admits that this is a mystery. The important point for our consideration is that man does not possess an indestructible soul that survives death, while the destructible body perishes. It is the sarx or the alienation that dies, not the soma or personality. There is not an immortality of the soul but the resurrection of the body.

The Greek word psyche is often used to translate the Hebrew word nephesh in the LXX, and Paul uses it frequently in the same way. Like nephesh, psyche means the whole person or life. Sometimes it is used as a personal pronoun: "My soul magnifies the Lord" (Luke 1:46). We frequently use our words "life" and "person" in the same way. In general the Bible does not use nephesh or psyche in the sense of "the immortal soul which is delivered from future punishment." The Bible does not assert that there is a body-

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33 Owen, op. cit., p. 194.
34 Smith, op. cit., p. 139.
mind dualism. What it does assert is that man is whole, and that there are different ways of looking at him. The various words for man simply relate to the different aspects of his nature. 36

The last important word is pneuma which translates ruach. Pneuma and psyche are sometimes used as synonyms in the New Testament. 37 The opposite of pneuma in the New Testament is nekros or death. 38 The pneuma of man is always considered in relation to the pneuma of God. We find this in Romans 8:16: "It is the Spirit himself bearing witness with our Spirit that we are the children of God." The spirit of man is that which marks him out for his special destiny. 39 It must be remembered that it was the breath of God blown into the nostrils of man that made him a living being. The resurrection of the body is brought about by the power of the Spirit. "We know that the whole creation has been groaning in travail together until now; and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we wait for adoption as sons, the redemption of our own bodies" (Romans 8:22, 23 RSV). It is the Spirit that will

36 Ibid., p. 196.
37 Smith, op. cit., p. 141.
38 Ibid., p. 142.
change the body from a body of corruption to a body of redemption.  

Paul contrasts the *pneuma* and the *sarx*. The spirit and the flesh are at war within man. He urges his readers to walk not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit. Paul's idea is not that the *sarx* is inherently evil, but that it represents man's rebellion against God. As in the Old Testament the *basar* is weak; it is not sinful in itself. It rather provides through its weakness the occasion for sin, the point at which sin finds an opportunity in man. "He (Paul) nowhere betrays the outlook of a metaphysical dualist."  

*Pneuma* does not represent a soul within man. It represents another kind of man, a man who has the fruits of the Spirit. In this sense *pneuma* and *sarx* are opposites, but it is an ethical dualism and not a metaphysical dualism.

"It is also obvious that the antithesis between 'the flesh' and 'the spirit' has nothing in common with mind-body dualism. 'The flesh does not stand for one part of man, his 'body', which is bad. 'The flesh' stands, rather, for a certain kind of man.

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41 Romans 8:4.

It stands for the kind of man in whom the whole person (the spiritual and psychical aspects, just as much as the physical, to revert to our earlier usage) is misdirected, because he is turned in upon himself in self-centeredness and self-satisfaction.

"The Spirit" represents, not another part of man, his 'soul', which is pure, but rather another kind of man. It represents the kind of man in whom the whole person (the physical and psychical, just as much as the spiritual aspects) is directed outward in love toward God and his neighbor.\textsuperscript{43}

Man's pneuma is dependent upon God's pneuma. Man does not stand alone, and he derives his uniqueness not from within himself or his own inherent dignity but from his relationship with God. This is where the biblical thought differs markedly from ideas common today about the dignity of man. Man's dignity is not because of his indestructible soul but because of his relationship with God.

Thus the biblical view of man is that he is a living body with various qualities. There is no sharp division between body and soul. The soma continues into a future life although that soma is changed from a soma of sarx to a soma of pneuma. This is the point of difference between the Old and New Testaments. The difference is not a difference of contradiction but a difference of development.

The thing that distinguishes man is ruach or pneuma.

\textsuperscript{43} Owen, op. cit., p. 193.
Ruach is that which dominates man to move him to certain actions. It is the disposition of his character. This he receives from the ruach of God. When we speak of a "changed man", this would mean in biblical thought that ruach has entered man, and he is no longer a man of the sarx but a man of the pneuma. The products of this ruach or pneuma are the fruits of righteousness, love, and justice.

Like the Old Testament the New Testament uses the words for the internal organs to designate certain aspects of human nature. The word kardia or heart has the meaning of will in the New Testament. It does not represent a soul within man.

To the biblical writer man was unitary and manifold. He was a whole person who expressed himself in a plethora of ways. The biblical writers were not competent psychologists or philosophers, nor did they pretend to be. However, it seems that the manner in which they used these words would indicate that they were not dualists but believed man to be a unity.

"Any attempt at a successful interpretation of

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45 Smith, op. cit., p. 152.
46 Smith, Ibid., p. 185.
the Bible seems bound to take note of the fact that Israelite thinking, like that of the so-called 'primitive' peoples of the present day, is predominantly synthetic. It is characterized by what has been called the grasping of a totality. Phenomena are perceived for the most part as being in some sort of relation; they have a share, or (to adopt Levy-Bruhl's expression) they 'participate', in some sort of a whole. This recognition of the mental activity of the Israelites as predominantly synthetic, the awareness of totality, is important.47

"Thus one finds that it is this awareness of a totality which governs what is apparently the normal conception of man both in the thinking of the above-mentioned 'primitive' peoples and in that of the Israelites."48

The primary concern of the biblical writers was not metaphysical but religious,49 and the questions of sin and righteousness are explained not in terms of a metaphysical dualism but in terms of alienation from God and communion with Him. It is through this religious and ethical consideration that they formulated their idea of man. Man as a whole was alienated from God, but through the endowment of the ruach man could be directed toward God. In all this man remains a unity, a whole person.

The idea of the "corporate personality" that H. Wheeler Robinson found in the Old Testament is also

47Johnson, op. cit., p. 7.
48Ibid., p. 8.
present in the New Testament. Jesus described His relationship with His disciples as one of the vine and the branches. "I am the vine, you are the branches. He who abides in me, and I in him, he it is that bears much fruit, for apart from me you can do nothing. If a man does not abide in me, he is cast forth as a branch and withers; and the branches are gathered, thrown into the fire and burned" (John 15:5-6). St. Paul uses the figure of the Body of Christ to describe the corporate nature of the Christian community. "For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ" (I Cor. 12:12). "Now you are the body of Christ and individually members of it" (I Cor. 12:27). He also uses the figure of the olive tree into which members are grafted (Romans 11).

Man is not thought of as living by himself. He achieves his personality through being a member of a living organism called the ekklesia. The parallel to the Old Testament conception of the Chosen People is obvious. Life is to be found only in the group, and man cannot properly be understood apart from the group.
CHAPTER II
PLATO'S VIEW OF MAN

To the Greek the word psyche meant primarily the principle of life in any living thing.¹ In this it was much like the Hebrew concept of nephesh. The Greek verb psychō means "I breathe,"² and the basic meaning of psyche according to Liddell and Scott is simply breath.³ So apparently the word psyche was used originally to differentiate between the animate and the inanimate.

We find that one of the fragments of Anaximenes asserts that our soul which is air is that which holds us together.⁴ It was with the Orphics that we begin to get some idea of the immortality of the soul, and this represented an infusion of eastern thought into Greek thought.⁵ It was through the ecstasy of the worshippers of Dionysos that the soul revealed its true nature. It was when the soul was out of the body that it revealed this true nature.⁶

¹Grube, G. M. A., Plato's Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), p. 120.
³Ibid., p. 798.
⁵Grube, op. cit., p. 121
⁶Burnet, op. cit., p. 81.
The Milesians had no idea of personal immortality in connection with their use of the word psyche. "It meant to them little more than the animate character of a thing. Anything that lived had a soul, but not necessarily a mind or personality."7 It was through the Pythagoreans that the idea of a soul separate from the body was introduced into Greek thought, and in this the Pythagoreans show the influence of the Orphic cults. Russell makes the same claim for the origin of this mystical strain in Greek thought: "This mystical element entered into Greek philosophy with Pythagoras, who was a reformer of Orphism, as Orpheus was a reformer of the religion of Bacchus."8 The Orphic cults had their origin in Thrace but show a distinct relationship to the ideas from Egypt.9

The Pythagoreans practiced a rule of life that was believed to purify the soul, and they believed in a reincarnation of the soul.10 This was foreign to the Greeks, and it is to be regarded as an infusion. The purification of the soul was not by way of Bacchic orgy but by way of

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9 Ibid., pp. 16f.
10 Fuller, op. cit., p. 41.
ascetic self-denial. Pythagoras linked metempsychosis with ethical retribution.\textsuperscript{11} It is at this point that a view of asceticism comes into Greek thought. The Pythagorean rule is probably best known for its rules of abstinence.\textsuperscript{12} The followers of Pythagoras deepened this idea of purification, and they used music to this end. Also, they went on to conceive of the intellectual life as the highest, and this intellectual life was the type that would release one from the Orphic "wheel of birth".\textsuperscript{13}

There is a distinctly non-biblical idea here in the idea that the purification of the soul could come about by the denial of the physical, and there is implied the idea that the physical is somehow evil. In the later Pythagorean idea of intellectual purification there is a stress on intelligence as unique to the soul that is foreign to the biblical idea.

"It was probably under Orphic influence that the Pythagoreans developed their way of life as a gradual process of purification. But to them this immortal pysche was the intellectual power of man and purification lay to a large extent through the strictly scientific, which to them meant a mathematical training, though some of them seem to have laid a great deal of emphasis on number-magic and on ritual. From them must have come the conception of the intellect as the noblest and immortal part of man, of

\textsuperscript{11}Windelband, W., History of Ancient Philosophy (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), pp. 31f.
\textsuperscript{12}Burnet, op. cit., p. 96.
\textsuperscript{13}Tbid., p. 97.
This view of the uniqueness of the soul in the Pythagoreans is non-biblical because the biblical writer conceived man's uniqueness to lie not in his intellect but in his relationship with God. This view of the Greeks will lead to an inherent immortality while the biblical view led to a conditional immortality, the condition being man's relationship with God.

With this small background study which leads us to the _Phaedo_ we will commence a study of the Platonic view of the soul. It is convenient that we begin this with a study of the _Phaedo_.

The immediate problem with which Socrates is dealing is death. He is asked by his friends how he can face death with such imperturbability. He even sends his wife away, because her weeping causes interference in the discussion. Socrates is recorded as saying: "I want to explain to you how it seems to me natural that a man who has devoted his life to philosophy should be so cheerful in the face of death."\(^{15}\) The answer that Socrates gives

\[^{14}\text{Grube, op. cit., p. 121.}\]

is that the true philosopher is half-dead already, because he has been aiming at dying and death all of his life. Death, in essence, is the separation of the soul from the body. This is good, for the body leads the philosopher astray in his investigations. Therefore, his purpose in life might be better achieved if the soul were to be separated from the body. 16

In the Phaedo the soul is linked with the Forms. The conflict between good and evil is seen as a conflict between the soul and the body, and the soul is essentially rational as opposed to the body which is essentially emotional and subject to passions. 17 Therefore, the Phaedo must be not so much about immortality but about the nature of the psyche. 18

There are four main arguments for immortality in the Phaedo. The first argument is really not of great importance to this paper, for it involves a Pythagorean idea of rebirth from death. Socrates says: "Then here is a new way by which we arrive at the conclusion that the living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and this, if true, affords a most certain proof

16 Ibid., pp. 82f.
that the souls of the dead exist in some place out of
which they come again." Socrates is trying to justify
the old Orphic notion of the cycle or "wheel of birth",
and he is not really making reference to the nature of
the soul. The only thing that we can receive from this
is that like the rest of nature it dies and rises again.
In a sense this is not immortality in the strictest view.
It is akin, and this is understandable from its Thracian
source, to a fertility resurrectionism.

The next three arguments for immortality are more
germe to our problem of the nature of the soul. Strictly
speaking, the second argument can only attest to the pre-
existence of souls and not to their survival after death.
This proof involves the Platonic doctrine of recollection,
which was earlier described in the *Meno* in reference to
the teaching of virtue. Here the epistemological position
is more developed than in the *Meno*. In the *Phaedo*
the entities known are perfect and not to be found in this
world. They have a reality of their own. Socrates is
reported to say: "And must we not allow, that when I or

\[\text{19} \text{Phaedo, 72.}\]

\[\text{20} \text{Bluck, R. S., Plato's Phaedo (London: Routledge}
\text{and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955), p. 56.}\]

\[\text{21} \text{Ibid., p. 62.}\]

\[\text{22} \text{Ibid., p. 9.}\]
any one, looking at any object, observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the other, although similar, was inferior."23

These first two arguments form a unit, and together they are an attempt to prove the immortality of the soul. The existence before and after death of the soul is proven in the first part of the argument, and pre-existence of the soul is proven in the second argument. However, the first argument tells us nothing of the nature of the soul. The second argument tells us that the soul is primarily mental, for the pre-existence of the soul is really established by an epistemological discussion. "It proves the ante-natal existence of the soul to be a consequence of the doctrine of the Forms."24

The third argument establishes the distinct difference between the body and the soul. Plato differentiates between the variable and invariable, compounded and uncompounded, and the seen and unseen. The variable, compounded, and seen are attributable to the body, and the invariable,

23 Phaedo, 74.
24 Taylor, op. cit., p. 188.
untecppouri and unseen are attributable to the soul. He goes on further to say that the soul is dragged into this confusion of the world of the body by being associated with the body, and that the soul can more truly exercise its cognitive functions apart from the body. The unchanging, eternal, immortal, pure estate of the soul apart from the body is the way of wisdom.

Plato assumes two kinds of existence. One is of the eternal, unchanging Forms, and the other is of the composite, mortal and ever-changing. The first is divine, and the second is not. Socrates in reply to Cebes expressly states: "That the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and that the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable." Since it is the very nature of the soul to rule over the body and to apprehend the Forms, the soul must be similar to the Forms and akin to the divine. The soul viewed by itself is eternal and simple; however, man viewed as a whole with the body is a dichotomy. The soul is to rule over the body. The moral problem of man is

25Phaedo, 78.
26Ibid., 79.
27Ibid., 80.
28Grube, op. cit., p. 127.
conceived in terms of a mind-body dualism, and once the
dualism is broken by death the moral problem would cease
to exist.

The obvious divergence from the biblical view is
plain. The moral problem in the Bible is not conceived
in terms of a metaphysical dualism with two entities
opposed to each other. It is rather conceived in terms
of man's total rebellion against God, both mind and body.

The fourth argument is concerned with the imper­
ishable nature of the soul. The life-giving nature of
the soul cannot admit the possibility of death. If it is
immortal, then it is imperishable. At death the soul
since it is not perishable enters into another world.29

One might well say that a better translation of
psychē would be "mind" in the manner in which it is used
in the dialogue.30 However, this is not altogether proper,
for the soul's function is more than pure cognition. "The
truth is that the apprehension of the Forms is in part
cognition, in part enjoyment of possession and satisfac­
tion of a desire."31 However, it would be safe to say
that cognition is the distinctive nature of the soul as
opposed to the passions of the body. It is the intelli-

29Phaedo, 105-106.
30Grube, op. cit., p. 122.
31Hackforth, op. cit., p. 12.
gence of the soul which sets it over against the body.

It is in the _Phaedo_ that we have the extreme position of Plato in regard to the mind-body dualism. If the _Phaedo_ were taken by itself we would have pure intellectualism divorced from life. Its final aim would be "the eternal preservation of the soul in the cold storage of eternally frozen absolute Forms."[^32] The _Symposium_ forms a healthy counterpart to the _Phaedo_. The way Plato resolves the apparent cold nature of the soul's activity with life in the body is through the concept of _Eros_ in the _Symposium_.[^33] There is a distinct difference between the _Phaedo_ and the _Symposium_. In the former there is the emphasis upon purity, death, and immortality. In the latter there is the emphasis upon love, beauty, and life.[^34] The goal of _Eros_ is the union of the lover with the Beloved.[^35]

If the true function of the soul is cognition, then the recurrent problem with which man is confronted is how to apprehend the Form. The Form of the Good is the final form in the soul's quest for knowledge. In the _Symposium_ the Supreme Beauty is equated with the "Form of Good". A. E. Taylor says: "There can be, at least, no

[^34]: Grube, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
doubt that the 'form of good' is identical with the Supreme
Beauty, the vision of which is rep\textsuperscript{38} in the Symposium
as the goal of the pilgrimage of the philosophical lover.\textsuperscript{36}
The pursuit of truth is for Plato a moral issue; therefore,

The pursuit of truth is for Plato a moral issue; therefore,

the nature of eros is the nature of man's moral character.

Eros is a climb to beauty which is first physical
and then mental.

"Those whose creative instinct is physical have
recourse to women, and show their love in this way,
after forever; but there are some whose creative
desire is of the soul, and who conceive spiritually,
not physically, the progeny which it is the nature
of the soul to conceive and bring forth. If you ask
what that progeny is, it is wisdom and virtue in
general."\textsuperscript{37}

The astounding thing is that Plato sees a similarity
in the eros of Phaedrus and Pausanias with the eros
of which Socrates speaks. He does this by a series of grada-
tions of eros.

"Plato's conviction is that it is the same impulse
which prompts love between individuals (provided that
it is something more than mere physical desire) and
the search of the philosopher for truth or, we might
add, of the mystic for God. The extended range of
meaning this gives to the term 'love' seemed no doubt
paradoxical to most of his original readers, and may
well seem so to us."\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{36}Taylor, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 287.

\textsuperscript{37}Hamilton, W., \textit{Plato: The Symposium} (London:

\textsuperscript{38}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 26.
At any rate Plato apparently thinks of *eros* as the moral orientation within the *psychē* which drives man toward creativity and production. The highest creativity is the apprehension of the Form of Good, and this is the culmination of various gradations of erotic activity the lowest of which is the sexual activity with women. Homosexual activity is far superior, for it is only by this method that *eros* can transcend the physical to the spiritual. In the *Symposium* Plato provides the motive force for the philosophical quest. He gives us a description of this ascent:

This is the right way of approaching or being initiated into the mysteries of love, to begin with examples of beauty in this world, and using them as steps to ascend continually with that absolute beauty as one's aim, from one instance of physical beauty to moral beauty, and from moral beauty to the beauty of knowledge, until from knowledge of various kinds one arrives at the supreme knowledge whose sole object is that of absolute beauty, and knows at last what absolute beauty is.\(^{39}\)

*Eros*, then, is the path to the Good. It is a path that leads step by step up the procreative ladder from the physical to the spiritual and thence to absolute beauty or the Good.

Although knowledge for the soul is motivated by *eros*, we still have cognition as the distinctive feature of the soul. Plato in the *Symposium* does not alter this theory. The *Phaedo* was abstract, and the *Symposium* tried

\(^{39}\)Ibid., p. 26.
to deal with man in a realistic psychological fashion. Yet both of them place the true function of man on an intellectual plane, and epistemology is a real issue in both the dialogues. There is not the radical distinction between body and soul in the Symposium that is found in the Phaedo, and there is some awareness of the impossibility of separating the body and the soul.

There is a moderate view to be found in the Charmides. Socrates is quoted as saying:

"I dare say that you have heard eminent physicians say to a patient who comes to them with bad eyes, that they cannot cure his eyes by themselves, but that if his eyes are to be cured, his head must be treated; and then again they say that to think of curing the head alone, and not the rest of the body also, is the height of folly. And arguing this way they apply their methods to the whole body, and try to treat and heal the whole and part together."40

He then goes on to say that the whole body cannot be cured apart from the soul, and that it is a great mistake to attempt the cure of the body and soul separately.41 "Health and virtue—in this case the virtue of moderation—are parallel to each other, complete each other. Everything depends upon the soul, but the ultimate aim is the health, physical and moral, of the whole man."42

However, this moderate view which is expressed in

40Charmides, 156.
41Ibid., 157.
42Grube, op. cit., p. 123.
the earlier dialogue does not remain, for the intellectual elements receive more stress. This is the consequence of the epistemological problem that always confronts Plato with his doctrine of the Forms. Since the Forms are pure abstractions, then the soul must be abstracted in a radical fashion from the body to be able to adequately apprehend the Forms. In other words, his epistemology and metaphysics determine his anthropology.

The vindication of emotion in the Symposium leads us directly to the problem which is the concern of the later books of the Republic. The conflict of the pure intellectualism of the Phaedo and the eros of the Symposium is resolved by dividing the soul into different parts. The psychē is divided into three parts after the three divisions of the state. Plato was aware that man is a social animal, and he went on to reason that the divisions of the soul must follow the divisions of the state. The nature of the society must correspond to the nature of the individual.

The three chief social functions are deliberative and governing, executive, and productive. These three functions find their counterpart in three corresponding elements in the human soul. ⁴³ A. E. Taylor cautions

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against attaching too much importance to this tripartite division of the soul. He claims that it is not metaphysical but merely a working account of principles in the soul. He calls them "determining motives". Of course, it is up these three types of motives in the soul that the eros proceeds on its quest for the Good.

"Must we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State; and that from the individual they pass into the State?—how else can they come there? Take the quality of passion or spirit;—it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it, e.g. the Tharcians, Scythians, and in general the northern nations; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of the love of money, which may be, with equal truth, attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians."45

The question of how much status these principles have is a little ambiguous. Do the three principles act independently or as one? If the soul is one with different bents, then the problem of opposition among the bents arises. If there is opposition, there must be different principles. However, the idea of three principles of a different kind destroys the unity of the soul. Plato rejects the theory that the three principles are one by an appeal to the Law of Contradiction.

44Taylor, op. cit., p. 282.
45Republic, 435-436.
"The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same, we know that they are not really the same, but different."  

Plato rejects plainly the view that the three principles are really one in the soul. "Possibly all that can be said on this matter is that according to Plato the soul has in it different organs or capacities and that from their difference, different tendencies of soul arise."  

Plato's argument for the tripartite division of the soul is then based upon the internal conflict which goes on within the individual and his theory of the close relationship between social and individual psychology. Basically these three parts of the soul are the capacity for the common appetites, the tendency to spirited and resolute behaviour, and the capacity for thinking. The capacity for thinking is akin to the Philosopher King and rulers, the tendency to spirited and resolute behaviour is akin to the Auxiliaries or Guardians who execute the will of the rulers, and the common appetities to the common people who are ruled by the rulers (deliberative part...
of government) and the Guardians (executive branch of government).  

It would seem that what has happened in the change from the Phaedo to the Republic is a change from placing the conflict in man between his soul and his body to a conflict within the soul. In the Phaedo the soul is "a unity and it does not include anything beyond the reason or the intellect. Pitted against it at every turn is the body as the seat of sense-perception, of passions and desires, of pleasure." Plato speaks about the body being the chains which imprison the soul. The three principles of the soul in the Republic set the conflict within the soul, and the appetitive principle appears to be akin to the body in the Phaedo.

The status of these principles is hard to ascertain, but since Plato uses the analogy to the social organism for his view of the individual, it is just, I believe, to give these principles more independent status than A. E. Taylor apparently wants to give them. Plato stresses this point in his recognition of the clash of the principles within the individual. In his analogy to the state one cannot help but be impressed by the fact

50 Cornford, op. cit., pp. 119f.
51 Grube, op. cit., pp. 125f.
52 Phaedo, 67.
that there are three separate classes within the state. However, the issue does not seem capable of satisfactory resolution. 53

In both of the views in the Phaedo and in the Republic the crowning glory of man is in the rational endeavour. This is the thing that is unique to man. In the Phaedo the aim of the philosopher is to rid himself as much as possible of the shackles of the body so that his soul can apprehend the Forms. In the Republic the aim of the philosopher is in subjugating the other two principles to the direction of the philosophic principle. The people who do this are the rulers of the state. The basic difference then between the two is that the conflict in the Phaedo is external, and in the Republic it is internal. The common aspect is that the rational is the highest.

The same tripartite division that is found in the Republic is also found in the Phaedrus. In the latter the comparison is with an image of a team of two horses and a charioteer.

"Of the nature of the soul, though her true form be ever a theme of large and more than mortal discourse, let me speak briefly, and in a figure. And let the figure be composite—a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the winged horses and the charioteers of the gods are all of the noble and of noble descent, but those of the races are mixed; the human charioteer drives his in a pair; and one of

53 Murphy, op. cit., p. 39.
them is noble and of noble breed, and the other is ignoble and of ignoble breed; and the driving of them of necessity gives a great deal of trouble to him."54

It is obvious that this is the familiar tripartite division that we found in the *Republic*. However, there is one particular difference. In the *Phaedrus* the tripartite division exists without the presence of the body and in the gods also.55 This is a step further away from the *Phaedo* where the conflict in man was measured in terms of the clash of the body and the soul. Here the conflict continues, but the soul is not in the body. There does not seem to be the hesitancy about the tripartite nature of the soul in the *Phaedrus* that is found in the *Republic*.

The control of the two horses by the charioteer indicates again that the good life is conceived as a life in which the feelings and passion of a man are controlled by his rational part.

"From then on the good life is the proper functioning of every part of the soul in its proper place and a man is master of himself when his feelings and his passions are obedient to his intellect—the charioteer of the *Phaedrus*—as a state is its own master and happy when the councillors' commands are obeyed by the rest of the people and when each of the three classes is satisfied with its position."56

54 *Phaedrus*, 246.


In the *Timeaus* we find again the tripartite division of the soul. However, there is some difference in that the location of the passions and feelings of the soul are placed in the body. As we saw in the *Phaedrus* both discarnate and incarnate souls had the three divisions, and it is difficult to see how this can be squared with this view of the physical locations of these two lower principles that we find in the *Timaeus*. First of all, the immortal soul is placed in the body by God, and the soul since it was created by God is divine.

"Now of the divine, he himself was the creator, but the creation of the mortal he committed to his offspring. And they, imitating him, received from him the immortal principle of the soul; and around this they proceeded to fashion the mortal body, and made it to be the vehicle of the soul, and constructed within the body a soul of another nature which was mortal."57

The rational soul was framed by the Demiurge, and the other two parts of the soul were made by the created gods. Because of this the rational soul is immortal, and the other two parts are mortal.58 The feeling part of the soul is placed nearer the head since it is more noble than the passionate or appetitive.

"Wherefore, fearing to pollute the divine any more than was absolutely unavoidable, they gave to the

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57 *Timaeus*, 69.

mortal nature a separate habitation in another part of the body, placing the neck between them to be the isthmus and boundary, which they constructed between the head and the breast, to keep them apart. And in the breast, and in what is termed as the thorax, they encased the mortal soul; and as the one part of this was superior and the other inferior they divided the cavity of the thorax into two parts.

"That part of the inferior soul which is endowed with courage and passion and loves contention they settled nearer the head."59

"That part of the soul which desires meats and drinks and the other things of which it has need by reason of the bodily nature, they placed between the midriff and the boundary of the navel."60

It is interesting to note that sexual reproduction is excluded from the appetitive part of the body, for that part ends at the navel. Therefore, eros is not treated as merely a part of the appetitive soul. In the Symposium we found the three different stages of eros in relationship to immortality; the reproductive immortality, the immortality of fame, and the immortality of wisdom. In the Timaeus immortality is excluded from the appetitive soul.61

The tripartite division of the soul is also found in the Laws. Man is described as a puppet of the gods, and the various strings control his behaviour. Man is encouraged to grasp the string of reason. "According to

59 Timaeus, 69.
60 Ibid., 70.
61 Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 292.
the argument there is one among these cords which man ought to grasp and never let go, but to pull with it against all the rest; and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason.\textsuperscript{62} Reason is here presented as in conflict with the rest of the principles of the soul. In the world-soul we find such elements as "will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion, true and false, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, love, and other primary notions akin to these."\textsuperscript{63} Different from these primary notions are the secondary notions which might be called physical objects although this is not entirely clear.\textsuperscript{64}

It is apparent that Plato insists on the primary and supremacy of the spiritual principle throughout the universe, and he vindicates the autonomy of the intellectual.\textsuperscript{65} Now, the parallel between the world-soul and the soul of man is obvious.\textsuperscript{66} The description of the world-soul contains many of the attributes of the appetitive and feelings principles. Apparently, the soul with its threefold division is presented here as not necessarily

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{62} Laws, 644-645.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 897.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Solmsen, Friedrich, Plato's Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1942), p. 140.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 145.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, p. 75.
\end{itemize}
incarnate.

In these passages that have been used I think that it is apparent that there is a tension between two points of view. On the one hand we have in the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws* a presentation of the discarnate soul with all three of the principles. In the *Phaedo* and the *Timaeus* we have the appetitive and feeling parts of the personality definitely located in the body. Plato appears to waver between the religious view of a divine soul essentially disassociated from the physical and a more secular view where the soul is itself the source of motion and conflict.67

The soul in all of these dialogues is unique because of its rationality. "Throughout the emphasis is on the reason, the intellect, for virtue is always, to him, a matter of knowledge."68 From the *Symposium* we receive the picture that the main thrust of man's life is for immortality, and this thrust is called eros. Eros takes three definite forms: the immortality of procreation, the immortality of reputation, and the inherent immortality wrought by wisdom. The highest immortality creates the problem of knowledge. There are two separate worlds. The world of Forms is the world of knowledge. The world which we see is merely the world of opinion. Therefore, if man

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68 *Grube, op. cit.*, p. 147.
is to achieve true immortality it must be by means of the rational soul. In all of these dialogues the highest function of man is epistemological. In the *Phaedo* it is a clear-cut clash between the body and the soul. This is abandoned for a later idea of the clash within the three parts of the soul. Even in the *Timaeus* where the two lower parts of the soul have a physical location, the soul is still made of three parts. The rational part of the soul is divine. It must be divine if it is to apprehend the Forms, and the thrust to apprehend the Forms is the *eros*.

In the *Phaedo* the simple soul is immortal. In the other dialogues it is only the rational part of the soul which is immortal. The soul then seems to be the link between the world of the Forms and the world of appearances. The division of the soul and body in the *Phaedo* and the tripartite picture in the rest of the dialogues is definitely non-biblical. The frame of the conflict is radically different in the Bible and Plato. One is in terms of knowledge and the other in terms of relationship to God.

Plato, then, thinks of the moral problem in epistemological terms. Knowledge is virtue. I think that it is at this point that he differs from the biblical point.

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of view. The Bible would frame man's moral problem not in terms of knowledge but in terms of his relationship with God. The unique characteristic of man from the rest of the created order is not knowledge per se but his relationship with God from which knowledge issues. I think that this is a basic point of view. The biblical point of view would be credo ut intelligam, and Plato's point of view can be said to be without too much distortion intelligo ut credum.

In all of the dialogues the soul is thought to be immortal, and this is a consequence of its divinity. The soul is in itself immortal.70 This is, of course, non-biblical. The only divinity in the world is God. The continuance of the soul after death is not the result of its divinity but the result of the power of God. Man is dependent upon God for his immortality and not upon his apprehension of the Forms or his own divinity.

The biblical emphasis is upon the continuance of the whole personality after death by the resurrection of the total personality. Something similar to this is found in the Republic and the Phaedrus. However, the fundamental difference is that the continuance is dependent upon the epistemological attainments of the soul and not upon the grace of God.

70Taylor, op. cit., p. 306.
The dualism that is found in Plato is hard to interpret away. In the *Phaedo* it is a dualism between body and soul. In his later years he traced the dualism to an inner conflict. This is found in the *Timaeus* and the *Republic.*

"In view of this persistent dualism it is clear that the three faculties of Plato's psychology are not independently co-operative powers, but merely different phases, sometimes sharply dissociated, sometimes merging into one another, of the activity of what we may call, using terminology strange to Plato, the personal element of our being."  

It would seem that the weight of evidence is that they are more independent than Paul Elmer More or A. E. Taylor are willing to admit. Plato's references to the Law of Contradiction, the three classes of the state, and two horses and the charioteer tend to support a view that is stronger than the interpretation held by these two Platonists.

It is certain that Plato thought in terms of conflict between the rational and the irrational, between the cognitive and the appetitive, between the soul and the body. Since this conflict never ends in Plato's thought, the dismissal of the *Phaedo* as being Socratic and not *Platonic* would appear to be out of order. The important point is that Plato placed the conflict in terms of intel-

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72Ibid., p. 128.
lect or cognition over against the emotions or appetites. I believe that you simply cannot ignore the Phaedo, and whether or not the Phaedo is ignored, there is in Plato this thought of a deep conflict which is deep enough to be a metaphysical conflict.

Lord Russell states that the doctrine of immortality in Paul can hardly be understood apart from Plato's theory of immortality. I think in the light of our study thus far this notion can be dismissed. They have little in common with the exception of the word "immortality".
CHAPTER III
ARISTOTLE'S VIEW OF MAN

In the treatise De Anima Aristotle states that the soul and the body stand in relation to each other as do form and matter. He says: "The soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it."¹ This relationship of form to matter does not imply the existence of separate entities, such as soul and body. "His central proposition is that soul and body are aspects of a single substance."² He says rather clearly:

"That is why we can wholly dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the body are one: it is as meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp are one, or generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the matter. Unity has many senses (as many as 'is' has), but the most proper and fundamental sense of both is the relation of an actuality to that of which it is the actuality."³

If the soul and the body are simply aspects of the same substance, then the question of immortality of the soul is immediately raised. If the soul is inseparable from the body, then it would follow that with death the soul perishes with the body. Aristotle states that "it

¹De Anima, 412a20, 21.
³De Anima, 412b.

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indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its body."\(^4\) However, Aristotle qualifies this statement significantly by saying that there may be parts of the soul that are separable from the body. "Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all."\(^5\)

The part of the soul which is separable from the soul is the "mind or the power to think".\(^6\) It is considerably different from the soul, because the mind is eternal but the soul is perishable. The mind is alone capable of existing apart from the body, and the soul is incapable of this separate existence.\(^7\)

Therefore, Aristotle not only has the problem of relating the psyche and the soma but also the nous and the psyche.\(^8\) He has stated that the psyche and the soma are inseparable, and that the nous is separable from the psyche and the soma. If immortality is to be a live issue, it must rest in his doctrine of the nous. It would seem best to build this chapter around these three concepts, starting with the soma and the psyche and then proceeding

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\(^4\) Ibid., 413a.
\(^5\) Ibid., 413a.
\(^6\) Ibid., 413b24.
\(^7\) Ibid., 413b.
\(^8\) Allan, op. cit., pp. 63f.
to the nous.

Aristotle sets the question of the study of the soul by not limiting the investigation to man. He apparently assumes in this question that soul applies not only to man but also to all living things. He says:

"We must be careful not to ignore the question whether soul can be defined in a single unambiguous formula, as is the case with animal, or whether we must not give a separate formula for each sort of it, as we do for horse, dog, man, god.

"Further, if what exists is not a plurality of souls, but a plurality of parts of one soul, which ought we to investigate first, the whole soul or its parts?"

His basic definition of a soul is that it is a form "having life potentially within it." The soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially within it. The body so described is a body which is organized. This type of a definition will fit even living plants. At this point Aristotle is deviating from the original meaning of psyche which meant "breath", and he is giving to the word a meaning that is akin to nutrition. "The minimal soul is the nutritive;

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10 De Anima, 402b6-10.
11 Ibid., 412a21.
12 Ibid., 412a29-413b1.
13 Ibid., 413b1.
for this exists in all living or 'besouled' beings—in plants and animals alike."\(^{14}\)

It is important to point out that although Aristotle rejected an idea of evolution, he had a belief in a finely graded series of species or forms of life. Thus, plants possess only the simplest forms of soul, and this simplest soul is nutritive and reproductive.\(^{15}\) We are starting at this basic level in the study of the soul. It is interesting to point out that the study of soul is, then, not primarily the study of theology but of biology and belongs to the physical sciences.\(^ {16} \)

There are three grades of the soul in Aristotle's hierarchy. There are the plant, the animal, and man. The animal soul is sentient, and the human soul is rational. Each of these succeeding stages assumes or presupposes the previous soul. Each of these three stages is constituted by their specific activity which is their form or purpose.\(^ {17}\)

To return to our vegetable soul we find that if it is to reproduce, which is its primary function or form, then this assumes assimilation of food.\(^ {18}\) The reason that

\(^{14}\)Ross, op. cit., p. 129.

\(^{15}\)Allan, op. cit., pp. 67ff.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., p. 66.


\(^{18}\)Ibid., p. 97.
it does this is to perpetuate itself. This is strangely akin to the Platonic doctrine in the Symposium where the natural end of man through eros is immortality, and the first stage of erotic immortality is simple reproduction.\textsuperscript{19} Aristotle says something similar when he states that the purpose of reproduction is that the vegetable soul "may partake in the eternal and divine."\textsuperscript{20} The tendency of the soul to reproduce so that it may be eternal is always on the same plane. It never ascends, as it were. "The most natural act is the production of another life itself, an animal producing an animal, a plant a plant."\textsuperscript{21} In other words the reproduction follows its own nature. If it is to reproduce, it must have nutrition, and then the nature of the vegetable soul is characterized by reproduction and nutrition. This reproduction and nutrition are in accord with its purpose or form, which is to partake of the eternal.

The next step in the natural scale of Aristotle is the animal soul. This is the beginning of conscious life. In the animal there is an alternation between the nutritive soul and the sentient soul. When the animal is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19}Hamilton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 90
\item Taylor, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 227.
\item \textsuperscript{20}De Anima, 415blf.
\item \textsuperscript{21}Ibid., 415a29f.
\end{itemize}
asleep, only the nutritive soul is in operation, and when
the animal is awake, then both the nutritive soul and the
sentient soul are in operation. 22 The sentient soul is
not actual but only potential in the embryonic animal. 23

The basic sense to the animal soul is the sense
of touch. It is the only common and indispensable sense. 24
Taste is a modification of touch. Sight is not necessary,
for an animal must only touch an object to know when it
has come in contact with something nutritive. Taste is
necessary for the animal to know food and what is good for
it from what is not food and thus bad for it. 25 Thus, both
touch and taste are necessary senses for an animal if it
is to fulfill its basic nutritive function. A plant does
not need these.

The other senses are not necessary for existence
but for well-being. 26 One might say, then, that for Aris­
totle there are an ascending series of senses from the
lower animals to the higher animals. These are: touch,
taste, smell, hearing, and sight. 27

22 Mure, op. cit., p. 102
23 Allan, op. cit., p. 68
24 De Anima, 414a2f.
25 Ross, op. cit., p. 130.
26 Ibid., p. 131.
27 Ibid., p. 130.
Sense is defined as that which is capable of receiving the form of an object without the matter. "By a 'sense' is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter."28 "It is indifferent what in each case the substance is; what alone matters is what quality it has."29 This is the old distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Sense is concerned only with secondary qualities.

If an animal is to survive it must have tactual sensation, and taste is a type of tactual sensation. Taste is a type of touch, "because it is the sense for what is tangible and nutritious."30 Therefore, touch and taste are common to all animals.31 There are special senses in addition to the previously mentioned two senses. These are smelling, hearing and seeing, and their distinction is that they operate through external media. Of these senses seeing is primary, and hearing is superior when it comes to developing intelligence. Both hearing and seeing are important for knowledge, but hearing is most important for the reason that rational discourse is only possible by hearing.32

28De Anima, 424a18f.
29Ibid., 424a22f.
30Ibid., 434b21.
31De Sensu, 436b13.
32Ibid., 436b13-437a17.
These five senses are not unrelated. The unity in diversity has its basis in one common sense organ which is the heart. Touch comes immediately to the heart, and the special senses come through the blood vessels.\textsuperscript{33} "Aristotle virtually admits the presence of thought in all perspective discrimination, but he is perfectly clear that these functions in some form belong to sense and not to reason."\textsuperscript{34} The difference between man and the other animals is that in man all sense-function is rationalized. Sense-perception in man goes directly into thought without a break.\textsuperscript{35}

Desire is found in all animals, for all of them feel hunger and thirst.\textsuperscript{36} However, imagination is found only in the animals that are deliberative.\textsuperscript{37} Imagination involves memory, for memory cannot exist without imagination. The memory is not of the original sensation but of the imagination of the original sensation.\textsuperscript{38}

It is clear that a great deal of what we could

\textsuperscript{33}Mure, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{36}\textit{De Anima}, 414b12.
\textsuperscript{37}\textit{Ibid.}, 434a2.
\textsuperscript{38}Mure, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 119.
call thought today is for Aristotle a matter of sensation; however, we have now reached the high plane of sensation or the animal soul. Our next step is reason, but we must remember that no reason takes place without first sensation. Man is unique from the rest of the animals in that he possesses the power of calculation and thought. He has all of the previously mentioned powers, but he is differentiated from the others by reason. "What distinguishes man from all other living beings is mind (nous), which is combined in him with the animal soul." Since the animal soul is born and perishes, the animal soul has no immortality. The immortality of man does not come from his soul but from his mind which is unoriginated and imperishable. We may say that man has basically three categories: nutrition, sensation, and thought. The first is found in vegetables, animals, and man. The second is found in animals and man, and the third is found only in man.

Since the reason is peculiar to man it is best that a major portion of this chapter be spent upon reason.

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39 De Memoria, 449b31.
40 De Anima, 415a7ff.
42 Ibid., pp. 186f.
Along with reason the special senses, especially as they contribute to what is commonly called thought, must be studied, for Aristotle recognized that these higher senses were differently managed in the rational animal.  

Aristotle distinguishes a two-fold nous, the active and passive reason. The passive reason is the blank tablet on which is written the sense impressions. It is this passive reason that decays and passes away at death. Mind must have the same distinction which we saw earlier in the soul, the distinction between form and matter.

"Since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two factors involved, (1) a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the class, (2) a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all (the latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its material), these distinct elements must be found within the soul." The passive reason is that which is molded by the active reason. The active reason does not create out of nothing. It works on the material given to it, and it makes the potential into the actual. While the passive reason rises and passes away with the body, the active

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43 Ross, op. cit., pp. 142 and 148.
45 Allan, op. cit., p. 80.
46 De Anima, 498b27ff.
47 Ibid., 430a10-14.
48 Ross, op. cit., p. 149.
reason is eternal. "Mind in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which it forms)." 49

"When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not, however, remember its former activity because, while mind in this sense is impassible, mind as passive is destructible), and without it nothing thinks." 50

It would not take much to see that Aristotle is not talking about immortality in either the sense of the Bible or Plato.

"Thus the immortality of mind or reason is not a personal immortality of separate men, but a share in God's immortality. It does not appear that Aristotle believed in personal immortality, in the sense in which it was taught by Plato and afterwards Christianity. He believed only that, in so far as men are rational, they partake of the divine, which is immortal." 51

The active reason is actuality. It is not molded, but rather it molds the passive reason and leaves an imprint upon the passive reason. The molded passive reason is the place of the memory, and, therefore, memory does

49 De Anima, 430a17-19.
50 Ibid., 430a22-25.
51 Russell, op. cit., p. 172.
not survive death. This means that the passive reason is somehow connected with the sentient soul while the active reason is not. "He evidently thinks of the passive reason as being, like sense and imagination, an integral part of the soul which is the actuality of a particular body and cannot survive it."53

If there are to be two types of mind or reason, then there must also be two types of knowledge. The one type of knowledge is received through the senses and is worked upon by the active reason. However, this implies that there is an intuitive knowledge already existing in the actualized active reason.54 The active reason already knows when the passive reason only knows potentially.55 The active reason would know intuitively, because it is divine. This knowledge of the active reason receives no impression from the sense but exists outside of date and circumstance.56 It is impassible. If this is the case, then it is properly the study of metaphysics and not natural science. The function of the active reason is apparently to see the similarities that exist in the

52 De Anima, 408b24-29.
53 Ross, op. cit., p. 151.
54 Allan, op. cit., p. 80.
55 Ross, op. cit., p. 151.
56 Ibid., p. 152.
memory of the passive reason, and thus the active reason orders experience which is made available through the passive reason. 57

The real crux of the problem of man is that of the relationship of reason to the higher senses, memory, and imagination.

The factor that distinguishes the lower animals from the higher animals is the capacity of memory. "By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and from sensation memory is produced in some of them, though not in others. And therefore the former are more intelligent and apt at learning than those which cannot remember." 58 Man is further distinguished from the higher animals in that he can organize his memory, as was stated above. However, this means that the higher animals must have something like passive reason if they are to have a memory. Thus the unique thing about man is not only his reason but also his voluntary recollection. 59

In order to adequately deal with imagination some reference must be made to the sensus communis. It is the nature of all of the five senses. "We must think of sense

57 Metaphysics, 980b27-981a1.

58 Ibid., 980a28-980b1.

as a single faculty which discharges certain functions in virtue of its generic nature but for certain purposes specifies itself into five senses and creates for itself organs adapted to their special functions."\(^{60}\) It is by this unspecialized sense that we are able to appreciate conjunctions of common qualities.\(^{61}\) Also, when the sense organs are not being used, the sensings and imaginings still exist. In other words we are always aware that we see even when we are not seeing.\(^{62}\) The *sensus communis* has the capacity of judgment, for in receiving various sensations it forms them into a whole.\(^{63}\) This capacity for judgment is usually a function of the mind; however, in Aristotle it is placed in the animal soul. It is important to point out that self-consciousness does not appear in the sub-human animals but only in man. Nevertheless, this is still bound up with the animal soul of man.\(^{64}\)

It would appear that the mind alters the *sensus communis* in man from that of the rest of animals. The significant difference is that man is self-conscious of his senses when not being used, and the sub-human animals

\[^{60}\text{Ross, op. cit., p. 140.}\]
\[^{61}\text{De Anima, 425a23-26.}\]
\[^{62}\text{Ibid., 425b18-26.}\]
\[^{63}\text{Mure, op. cit., 110ff.}\]
\[^{64}\text{Ibid., p. 112}\]
are not. There is an ascending quality to the sensus communis which is to be thought of in terms of a higher development with man at the top of the scale.

The same can be said for imagination. In the lower animals there is a vague sensual imagination. Imagination is akin to the sensus communis in that it makes judgment possible. Aristotle says that simple perception is infallible, but the combination of various perceptions is liable to error. It is, then, the function of the imagination to make judgments, but this function is of a higher order than that found in the sensus communis.

"Whereas Sensus Communis discriminates only between sensa and is universally present in the animal world, is the power of distinguishing between an appearance as such and a sensum, and not all animals possess it." Imagination is not found in the lower animals but only in the higher animals.

Memory is yet a higher rung on this scale which starts with sensus communis and goes through imagination to memory. Memory seems to be deliberate imagination.

"Memory, he adds, is impossible without an image. It is

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65 De Anima, 428b25-429a2.
66 Mure, op. cit., p. 117.
67 Griffin, op. cit., p. 21.
therefore a function of that part of the soul to which imagination belongs. But it is not the present image, but the past event that is remembered."\(^6\) As was stated before it is here that the passive reason which retains the impressions comes in. "The process of movement involved in the act of perception stamps in, as it were, a sort of impression of the percept, just as persons do who make an impression with a seal."\(^7\) We have already found out that the active reason is immortal and the passive reason mortal; therefore, as the memory ends at death so does the passive reason. The impression must be made upon something if it is to be remembered, and the only thing there is on which to make an impression is the passive reason.

The next step in the scale involves recollection. Recollection is not simply the appearance of past images. It is the recalling of these images from the sub-conscious where they have been forgotten.\(^7\) Recollection involves a voluntary act of inference, and it works on the principles of association.\(^7\)

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\(^6\) Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

\(^7\) De Memoria, 450a30-450b1.

\(^7\) Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

\(^7\) Mure, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
We have already discussed passive and active reason. Passive reason is connected with these functions that have just been discussed, and active reason is from the outside and not a part of the animal soul. The impression of all this is that Aristotle wants to conceive of man as a unity or totality. Imagination is the only way by which reason can have association with the lower mental faculties, but the price is that imagination is liable to error. Direct intuition is the only knowledge that is certain, and this is the function of the active reason. When the active reason comes in contact with the sentient animal and the lower mental faculties, certainty is gone and only probability is left.\(^72\)

This indicates that finally man is not a unity, for the highest part of man is separable. Aristotle builds a magnificent system of a gradual scale from nutrition up to recollection in order to present man as a whole. "Where Aristotle offers us a scale of faculties (special sense, common sense, imagination, reason), Plato simply opposes the mind to the senses, and treats the latter as an ingenious mechanical device."\(^73\) Aristotle opposes the division of man into parts.

\(^{72}\)Ross, op. cit., p. 148.

\(^{73}\)Allan, op. cit., p. 74.
"The problem at once presents itself, in what sense we are to speak of the parts of the soul, or how many should we distinguish. For in a sense there is an infinity of parts: it is not enough to distinguish, with some thinkers, the calculative, the passionate, and the desiderative, or with others the rational and the irrational."74

"It is absurd to break up the last-mentioned faculty (appetitive): as these thinkers do, for wish is to be found in the calculative part and desire and passion in the irrational; and if the soul is tripartite appetite will be found in all three parts."75

While Aristotle criticizes Plato for dividing man, he finally does it with the active reason. If the active reason is functioning, it will affect the whole man, for if man is a unity, nothing can finally be abstracted.

However, Aristotle's criticism of Plato leads us to a further consideration, and this is the place of desire in man. Desire is one of the causes of movement along with imagination.

"These two at all events appear to be sources of movement: appetite and mind (if one may venture to regard imagination as a kind of thinking; for many men follow their imaginations contrary to knowledge, and in all animals other than man there is no thinking or calculation but only imagination)."76

The other cause of movement besides that of desire is what

74 De Anima, 432a24-27.
75 Ibid., 432b5-7.
76 Ibid., 433a9-13.
might be called practical thought. Therefore, it appears that movement is what might be called the will, and the will is prompted by desire and practical thought.

"To sum up, then, and repeat what I have said, inasmuch as an animal is capable of appetite it is capable of self-movement; it is not capable of appetite without possessing imagination; and all imagination is either (1) calculative or (2) sensitive. In the latter all animals, and not only man, participate."78

Aristotle makes the strong point that movement never takes place just by virtue of the mind. The mind must work with the desire to produce movement. "As it is, mind is never found producing movement without appetite."79 However, the appetite can run counter to the mind.80 Since mind is always right and imagination and appetite may be wrong, the movement originated by appetite may only be apparent good.81 There are, then, two types of desire. There is the wish or rational desire, and this desire is good. It desires the good because it is based not only upon desire but also upon mind. The second type of desire is appetite or irrational desire. This type desires only

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77 Ross, op. cit., p. 145.
78 De Anima, 433b27-31.
79 Ibid., 433a23.
80 Ibid., 433a25.
81 Ibid., 433a27.
the apparent good, for reason is not present. All actions are initiated by desire and pleasures, and pains are bound up with the activities. "Pleasure and pain must be the feeling tone which accompanies the conversion of desire into action." "Pain institutes the flight from the present activity and pleasure intensifies the achievement of a fresh activity."

Plato set the appetite against reason, and Aristotle realized that they were inevitably interwoven. Reason, if it is to be efficacious, must have the agency of desire. At this point it would seem that Aristotle is nearer to the synthetic approach of the Bible. Man is to be conceived as a whole and not different parts striving against each other. There is one significant difference, and this is Aristotle's view of the mind.

The mind is the thing that performs the great act of discovering laws and forming general ideas. In other words, it synthesizes our experience. When the mind

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82 Ross, op. cit., p. 145.
83 De Anima, 413b23.
84 Griffin, op. cit., p. 37.
85 Allan, op. cit., p. 79.
works with the imagination, it is fallible, but when the
mind receives by its nature direct intuition, then it is
not fallible. It is the function of the mind to actu­
alize the vegetable and animal souls. The actual mind
or reason is separable from the rest of man, but whether
it has any independent existence after the separation
from the soul is a matter of question. The highest
faculty in man, which is the divine element in man, is
reason, and its essential nature is contemplative.

We have seen the close relationship of passive
reason to imagination, and imagination seems to exist to
help thought. Reason receives from imagination forms
that are intelligible. The active reason is a pure
substance, and it is identical in all men. Because of
this, the mind receives direct intuition, for the mind is
divine. "It seems, from these passages, that individu­
ality—what distinguishes one man from another—is con­
ected with the body and the irrational soul, while the

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86 Ross, op. cit., pp. 147f.
87 Grote, George, Aristotle (London: John Murray,
1872), Vo. II, p. 222.
88 Allan, op. cit., p. 83.
89 Ethica Nicomachea, 1177a7-18.
90 Mure, op. cit., p. 167.
91 Ibid., p. 175.
rational soul of mind is divine and impersonal." "The irrational separates us, the rational unites us." 92

In a sense Aristotle's monism breaks down in man, for in order to protect the rational and make it free, he had to finally isolate it from the rest of man. The reason is immortal, but it is an impersonal immortality. Aristotle is closely akin to the Bible in his attempt to treat man as a whole. However, the unique thing about man was apparently his reason, and in order to keep man unique this reason finally had to be treated as something separable. Plato is distinctly non-biblical when he divides man into two or three parts, and yet he is akin to the Bible in a personal immortality. The similarity of Aristotle and Plato is that they consider man unique because he is rational. Aristotle is faced with an epistemological problem, the relationship between the animal soul and reason. He crosses the gap with the passive reason and imagination, but the active reason is still separate and eternal. The Bible conceives man in totality, and his immortality is a resurrected totality. It is not an immortality of the soul or the reason. It is a resurrection of the body or total personality. Plato and Aristotle make immortal only parts of man. The Bible makes

92 Russell, op. cit., p. 172.
immortal the whole man, and yet Aristotle's attempt and achievement of the whole man is impressive. Aristotle's use of the word psyche seems much closer to the New Testament usage of the word than does Plato's. Nous was to Aristotle what psyche was to Plato.

There yet remains one topic with which we must deal, and this is his earlier treatment of man in the Eudemus. It was a book of consolation, and adopts Plato's doctrine of the Phaedo on the pre-existence and transmigration of the soul. This was a much earlier work, and the De Anima represents his mature thought on the subject. Therefore, I think that we can dismiss this doctrine in the Eudemus as being germane to this discussion of Aristotle's view of the soul and mind.

In relationship to the freedom of the will in Aristotle, I think that his treatment of desire, rational and irrational, is particularly good. Man without his rational faculties being strong is subject merely to the apparent good. It is only when his rational faculties are strong that man becomes truly free to choose what is truly good. His connection of freedom with truth and reason is very gratifying.

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CHAPTER IV

PLOTINUS'S VIEW OF MAN

Bertrand Russell says: "The metaphysics of Plotinus begins with a Holy Trinity: The One, Spirit and Soul. These three are not equal, like the Persons of the Christian Trinity; the One is supreme, Spirit comes next, and the Soul is last."¹ In order to understand Plotinus' doctrine of the soul it must be set in the context of its relationship with his other metaphysical ideal. Nothing can be known of the One. The One cannot even be named. "Certainly this Absolute is none of the things of which it is the source—its nature is not what can be affirmed of it—not existence, not essence, not life—since it is That which transcends all these."² "Once you have uttered 'The Good,' add no further thought: by any addition, and in proportion to that addition, you introduce a deficiency."³ Plotinus seeks to explain the universe through a unity, but the human mind is unable to understand the unity.⁴ If a person cannot understand it or talk about it, it might be best to leave it there.

¹Russell, op. cit., p. 288.
²Enneads, III, 8, 10.
³Ibid., III, 8, 10.
If the One is the source of everything, then Plotinus has the problem of showing how the One is the source of multiplicity, and this is done through Nous. "The standpoint of Plotinus is perfectly clear, and perfectly in accord with Idealistic thought. The temporal is immanent in the eternal. There is no clear line of demarcation between the Absolute and the Particular." It is with this Intellectual-Principle that we begin to have plurality and multiplicity.

W. T. Stace correctly estimates the situation when he writes:

"There grew up a tendency to exalt the conception of God so high above the world, to widen so greatly the gulf which divides them, that it was felt that there could be no community between the two, that God could not act upon matter, nor matter upon God. Such interaction would contaminate the purity of the Absolute." There was needed an intermediary between the Absolute and the world, and this intermediary was the Logos. Stace claims that this idea is not really Greek but rather has "the characteristic ring of Asiatic pseudo-philosophy."

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7Stace, op. cit., p. 370.

8Ibid., p. 371.
The logical absurdity of the inability to pass from God to the world was solved by mystical intuition. This problem was solved by the poetic metaphor of God or the Absolute "overflowing".

"The One, like the Good, must spend itself, must pour from itself its essence till every possible form and degree of existence was actualized. Just, then, as light pours from the sun, so being emanates from the One. But the moment that the effulgence of being has separated itself from its source it becomes other than, different from, and less than the One."  

The Absolute then produces the Intellectual-Principle.  

Plotinus describes this emanation in these terms:  

"It must be a circumradiation—produced from the Supreme but from the Supreme unaltering—and may be compared to the brilliant light encircling the sun and ceaselessly generated from that unchanging substance."  

"At the same time, the offspring is always minor: what then are we to think of the All-Perfect but that it can produce nothing less than the very greatest that is later than itself. This greatest, later than the divine unity, must be the Divine Mind, and it must be the second of all existence, for it is that which sees The One on which alone it leans while the First has no need whatever of it."  

What this means is that there is a sort of reverse process in the emanation. The second returns to the first, but

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11 Enneads, V, 1, 6.

12 Ibid., V, 1, 6.
contrary to the original overflow, the second cannot reach the first. It can only reflect it and lean upon it.

Dean Inge thinks that the word *Spirit* is the best English word for this *Intellectual-Principle*. It is incorporeal, timeless, invisible, and supremely real.\(^1^3\) This *Intellectual-Principle* is "a single, unified system of the many Forms that constitute the intelligible structure of the universe."\(^1^4\) The *Intellectual-Principle* eternally contemplates the One, but it is inferior because to contemplate or to know means that it is not self-sufficient.\(^1^5\) "As it comes into existence, all other beings must be simultaneously engendered—all the beauty of Ideas, all the Gods of the Intellectual realm."\(^1^6\)

As the *Intellectual-Principle* overflows from the One, the *Soul* overflows from the *Intellectual-Principle*. "Thus Plato knows the order of generation—from the Good, the *Intellectual-Principle*; from the *Intellectual-Principle*, the *Soul*.\(^1^7\)


\(^{1^6}\)Enneads, V, 1, 8.

\(^{1^7}\)Ibid., V, 1, 9.
"The next level of reality is constituted by the soul which proceeds from the Intelligence and has the cosmological function to animate and administer the sense world in accordance with the patterns of the Intelligible world. Within the realm of the soul the chief distinction is between the world soul which governs the entire body of the world and the individual souls which rule the particular bodies."18

The soul in turn is the creator of the material world, and matter has no independent reality.19 Plotinus says: "Let every soul recall, then, at the outset the truth that the soul is the author of all living things, that it has breathed life into them all, whatever is nourished by earth and sea, all the creatures of the air, the divine stars in the sky."20 The material world has no eternity to it, but the soul does.21 All the material world including minerals is thought of by Plotinus in biological terms.22 Matter is considered by Plotinus to be the ground of all plurality and hence evil.23

The Intellectual-Principle is opposed to distinction and partition, but the soul which is without distinction and partition still becomes divided. When it divides,

18Katz, op. cit., p. xix.
20Enneads, V, 1, 2.
21Tbid., V, 1, 2.
22Katz, op. cit., p. xx.
23Stace, op. cit., p. 375.
it enters the body. "Thus the gist of the matter is established: one soul the source of all; those others, as a many founded in that one, are, on the analogy of the Intellectual-Principle, at once divided and undivided." There are three types of souls. The highest type which has never broken away from the All-Soul is looking toward the Intellectual-Principle, the other two are concerned with a lower level, the one with the Intellectual and the other akin to animal life.

"The souls whose tendency is exercised within the Supreme have the greater power; immune in that pure seat they create securely; for the greater power takes the least hurt from the material within which it operates; and this power remains enduringly attached to the over-world: it creates, therefore, self gathered, and the created things gather around it; the other souls, on the contrary, themselves go forth; that can mean only that they have deserted towards the abyss; a main phase in them is drawn downward and pulls them with it in the desire towards the lower." The higher soul longs and is directed toward the One while the lower souls become entangled with the body and are directed downward.

"Reason tells us that the body as, itself too, a composite, cannot for ever hold together; and our senses show us its breaking up, wearing out, the

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24 Amnhead, IV, 1, 1.
25 Ibid., IV, 3, 5.
26 Ibid., IV, 3, 6.
27 Ibid., IV, 3, 6.
victim of destructive agents of many kinds, each of its constituents going its own way, one part working against another, perverting, wrecking, and this especially when the material masses are no longer presided over by the reconciling soul."28

The soul becomes imprisoned in the body by its desire to create. The soul returning to the Intellectual-Principle contemplates the inward realm of essence and desires to produce something like it that can be seen by looking outward rather than inward.29 If the soul remains in the Intellectual-Principle, then it is immune, but if it seeks to produce in the lower sphere, then the soul becomes a prisoner. "It has fallen: it is at the chain: debarred from expressing itself now through its intellectual phase, it operates through sense; it is a captive; this is the burial, the encavernment, of the Soul."30 It is ironic that the soul from noble motives should be imprisoned. "All degeneration is no doubt involuntary, yet when it has been brought about by an inherent tendency, that submission to the inferior may be described as the penalty of an act."31 This is the descent of the soul.

28 Ibid., IV, 7, 1.
29 Russell, op. cit., p. 293.
30 Enneads, IV, 8, 4.
31 Ibid., IV, 8, 5.
Since the body is composite, it must have a principle of unity, for life is not simply a fusion of lifeless matter. Of course, this principle of unity is the soul. "The sovran principle, the authentic man, will be as Form to this Matter or as agent to this instrument, and thus, whatever that relation be, the soul is the man." The soul in relationship to the body is in every part of the body; however, this does not make the soul divisible. The soul is indivisible, because it exists in a not spatial world. The categories of quantity and extension do not apply to souls because they are spiritual. Dean Inge gives a good account of this divisibility and indivisibility of the Soul.

"The true account is to say that Spirit subsists in itself without descending into the body; that from it proceed the Universal Soul and the individual souls, which exist together up to a certain point, and form one Soul in so far as they do not belong to any particular being. But though on their higher sides they are united, they presently diverge, as the light divides itself among the various habitations of men, while still remaining one and indivisible. The Universal Soul remains in its heavenly abode; our souls, though not cut off from the higher world, have to seek the places assigned to them in this world."35

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32 Pistorius, op. cit., p. 82.
33 Enneads, IV, 7, 1.
34 Whittaker, op. cit., pp. 44ff.
The body thus makes the illusory divisions in the soul, but the soul is not really divided. It is only apparently divided, and the appearance of division is the result of the body. "The bodies are separate, and the ideal form which enters them is correspondingly sundered while, still, it is present as one whole in each of its severed parts, since amid that multiplicity in which complete individuality has entailed complete partition, there is a permanent identity."36 Thus the soul is divisible and indivisible. Its principle of unity is the World-Soul, and the principle of multiplicity is the particular body.

The relationship of the soul to the body is unique. It is in the body but not of it. As we have seen before, the soul generates the body as a habitation for itself. "Since go forth it must, it will generate a place for itself."37 This is simply a continuation of the doctrine of emanation. The soul is present in the body, but it remains pure from all admixture and is always true to itself.38 By the creativity of the soul it begets its own prison. "The Soul while on earth is, after all, living in the midst of its enemies, and it is often its own worst enemy."39

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36 Enneads, IV, 2, 1.
37 Ibid., IV, 3, 9.
"Individual Souls, as if desiring a more independent life than the blessed community of the spiritual world, separate themselves partially from this close intercommunion, and animate particular bodies."  

The material world is the bottom of the pyramid. It is the farthest from the One. The white light of the One is split into many colors, and in the material world these colors are faded. Matter is non-existence, and yet this non-existence has a certain amount of existence. It is privation and stands in opposition to the Intellectual-Principle. "By its absolute want of all form, that is, of all proper being, matter is at the opposite extreme to things intelligible, and is in its own nature ugly and evil." Matter is evil because of its negative character. It is utterly destitute of anything. Therefore, matter is non-being. "In a word, when we call Matter evil we are right only if we mean that it is not amenable to modification by the Good; but that means simply that it is subject to no modification whatever."

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42Enneads, II, 4, 16.
43Whittaker, op. cit., p. 68.
44Enneads, II, 4, 16.
45Ibid., III, 6, 11.
The body receives its unity through the soul, as we have seen, and the soul is throughout all the body. Each organ is fitted with a special function, and these special functions are related to the brain which is the central organ. However, the real unity of the body is not the brain but the soul.\textsuperscript{46}

Like Aristotle, Plotinus finds the lowest phase of the soul in the vegetative manifestation. The vegetative soul of the plant is the same principle that is found in man. It is the principle of growth, and it is not uniquely human. "In this sense, then, 'existence' could be called the lowest and primary manifestation of soul. Apart from any activity of the human soul, the bare existence of the body, even without the principle of growth, is a manifestation of soul."\textsuperscript{47} Since matter is non-existence, anything which exists, such as simple vegetation, must be a manifestation of the soul.

The next step in the ladder is sensation. Sensation implies that this knowledge is not the self-knowledge of the Intellectual-Principle but depends upon stimulation from some other entity. "A first principle is that the knowing of sensible objects is an act of the soul, or of

\textsuperscript{46}Whittaker, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 45f.

\textsuperscript{47}Pistorius, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 102.
the living conjoint, becoming aware of the quality of certain corporeal entities and appropriating the ideas present in them. Self-knowledge is intellection, but this knowledge is perception. Perception is not simply passive reception of stimulation, for it involves the direction and control of the sense organs. "This outwardly directed activity would not be necessary if the object simply left its impression on the soul." Perception is teleological, and its aim is utility.

Memory cannot belong to the spiritual world because it is involved in time. Memory is about the past, and the Intellectual-Principle is eternal. "Souls that descend, souls that change their state—these, then, may be said to have memory; which deals with what has come and gone." The souls that have not descended have "no yesterday, no last year." The soul, when it is engaged in true contemplation, does not remember anything. Memory is not a part of the highest estate of the soul.

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48 Enneads, IV, 4, 23.
49 Pistorius, op. cit., p. 103.
50 Whittaker, op. cit., p. 46.
51 Pistorius, op. cit., p. 103.
53 Enneads, IV, 4, 6.
54 Ibid., IV, 4, 7.
Pain is a result of the ensoulment of the body. In its unmixed state the soul has no pain, but as a result of the soul's being in the body it is no longer unmixed. Body and soul form a temporary unity.56

"Pain is our perception of a body despoiled, deprived of the image of the soul; pleasure is our perception of the living frame in which the image of the soul is brought back to harmonious bodily operation. The painful experience takes place in that living frame; but the perception of it belongs to the sensitive phase of the soul."57

The feeling of pain or pleasure belongs to the body, but the perception of the feeling belongs to the soul.58

Error, too, is a result of the ensoulment of the body. The rational power in its own estate is unmixed, but in the body it becomes weak.59 "Still, the right reason of that highest is weaker by being given over to inhabit this mingled mass."60 Reason is not the highest faculty of the soul, but it is definitely higher than desire. The reason controls the desires in the higher person. It is the base person that is subject simply to his desires.61

57Enneads, IV, 4, 19.
58Whittaker, op. cit., p. 50.
59Ibid., p. 51.
60Enneads, IV, 4, 17.
61Pistorius, op. cit., p. 110.
Through his perception and memory man is self-conscious. Man is aware of his perceptions, and he can organize his perceptions through the reason that is in him because of his soul. Through his reason man is always interested in intellection, and this reason is intuitive. Finally, all self-consciousness and memory are detrimental to the higher faculties of the soul, or to the higher soul.

"In any case the more urgent the intention towards the Supreme, the more extensive will be the soul's forgetfulness, unless indeed, when the entire living has, even here, been such that memory has nothing but the noblest to deal with: in this world itself, all is best when human interests have been held aloof; so, therefore, it must be with the memory of them. In this sense we may truly say that the good soul is the forgetful."63

The highest phase of subjective life is intellectual self-knowledge, but this is not the highest possible life. In the highest possible life even thought disappears. In the center of the mind there is the supreme unity which is beyond self-knowledge.64

When the soul enters the body, it becomes captive to all the pains and pleasures of the body. These serve as a detriment to its intellectual attainments. The soul

62 Emmeads, IV, 3, 30.
63 Ibid., IV, 3, 32.
64 Whittaker, op. cit., p. 53.
in its pure state is unmixed, and in this pure state it is free from all the base mass that is the body. Man becomes free only by conquering the pains and pleasures through intellect. This can only be completely done when the soul is free of the body. While the soul is in the body, the soul can best control the body through its seeking or return to the Supreme.

Man's redemption and his freedom consist in the return striving for the source of his emanation. The soul is the source of unification of the multiplicity of the body; however, even the soul has lost some of its unity by being in the body. Therefore, its salvation consists in returning to the general soul. Even the general soul is short of complete unity and seeks to return to the Logos, and the Logos in turn seeks the One. 65

Plurality and multiplicity to Plotinus are the ground of evil. Since matter is plural, then matter is the cause of evil. 66 The soul is basically a unity, and therefore, the aim of life is to escape the multiplicity of the world. This means that true knowledge does not come from without but from within. Intuitive introspection

65Ibid., p. 54.
66Enneads, V, 5, 2.
67Stace, op. cit., p. 375.
is the source of truth. Intuitive introspection is a seeking of the Supreme. It is not a rational process but a mystical state.

The object of life is to flee from the material world of the senses.

"The first step in this process of liberation is 'katharsis,' purification, the freeing of oneself from the dominion of the body and the senses.... The second step is thought, reason, and philosophy. In the third stage the soul rises above thought to an intuition of the Nous. But all these are merely preparatory for the supreme and final stage of exaltation into the Absolute One, by means of trance, rapture, and ecstasy."67

We have seen that Plotinus thinks of the soul in three different phases. There is the vegetative, the rational, and the intuitive phase. The vegetative phase survives death, but it does not survive as a part of the individual.

"It does not disappear, neither is it accepted as an indispensable concomitant of the higher phase of the soul. It simply becomes the vegetative power of some other entity. It is immortal, but because it clings not to the individual but to the body, it has nothing to do with the immortality of the human being."68

As we have seen, the rational soul in the body involves memory. Memory is essential to personality. If there is no memory, there is no ego. Plotinus expressly

67 Ibid., p. 376.

68 Pistorius, op. cit., p. 94.
states that intellection is timeless, and in pure intellection there is no such thing as memory. "There can be no memory in the intellectual world, not merely of earthly things but none whatever: all is presence. There; for nothing passes away, there is no change from old to new."  

The soul lives forever, but the ego ceases to be. This is not personal immortality in the usual sense of the term. Plotinus makes this idea quite clear. He says: "There will not even be memory of the personality; not thought that the contemplator is the self—Socrates, for example—or that it is Intellect or Soul."  

This is akin to the case where a drop of water returns to the ocean from whence it originally came. The drop is immersed in the ocean and ceases to be a drop but becomes the ocean. The Soul in its absolute contemplation of God becomes God. The soul "has become one simultaneous existence with the Supreme."  

When the body perishes, the reasonable phase of the soul perishes also, for the reasonable phase of the soul involves memory. At death the reasonable soul either

69Enneads, IV, 4, 1.  
70Ibid., IV, 4, 2.  
71Pistorius, op. cit., p. 96.  
72Enneads, IV, 4, 2.
perishes or is taken up into the intuitive soul. 73

The matter of reincarnation is ambiguous in Plotinus.

"It is plain, I think, that Plotinus does not take the doctrine of reincarnation very seriously, as scientific truth. He is inconsistent. Sometimes he speaks of a purgatory for disembodied souls; sometimes the bad (as we have seen) are reborn in lower animals, and sometimes retribution in kind falls upon them in their next life as human beings."74

If the soul returns to eternal contemplation, then one might ask why it returns. Pistorius thinks that there is ambiguity at this point, and he also says that the evidence seems to weigh in favor of no reincarnation.75

In summation we might say that the soul belongs to a general soul of which the third hypostasis is the source. Because of this all souls are immortal. At death the soul returns to this general soul. Personality ends with death because memory and self-consciousness end with death. There may be some doubt about reincarnation, but the soul is definitely pre-existent before birth.

Thus we see that among the three Greek philosophers we have studied, Plato alone believes in personal

73Pistorius, op. cit., p. 97.
immortality. All three agree that immortality is bound up in the divinity of the soul or the nous. The basic disagreement of the Greek philosophers with the biblical writers is that the immortality of the soul rests upon the divinity of the soul. The three hold to an inherent immortality while the biblical writers hold to a conditional immortality. All three Greek philosophers hold that immortality is connected with the shedding of the appetites, desires, and wishes of the body; the biblical writers hold to a resurrection of the total personality.
CONCLUSIONS

Although some comparisons have been drawn during the course of the thesis, it might be well to summarize the salient points of each chapter and to draw more comprehensive comparisons.

One factor that stands out before we begin this summary is the different type of thought that we see between the biblical writers and Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. The mental activity of the biblical writers is predominantly synthetic. They did not see man in parts but in totality, and when they did mention the parts, it was by way of reference to the whole.\(^1\) On the other hand, Greek philosophical thought tended to be more analytical. Plato through his doctrine of Forms attempts to analyze reality into various entities. Aristotle with his emphasis upon inductive reasoning, his syllogisms, and his doctrine of the ten categories is seen to be a part of this same analytical tradition.\(^2\) Plotinus retains something of Plato's theory of Forms in his Nous.\(^3\)

Along with this difference of synthetic and analytical thought is the difference between the abstractions

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\(^1\)Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 7.


\(^3\)Ibid., p. 375.
of the Greeks as over against the concrete thought of the Bible. In the Bible God is the Father. He is not the Absolute One, nor the Demiurge, nor the Prime-Mover. It has been reported to me in conversation with fellow ministers that when Joseph Haroutunian, a professor of theology at McCormick Theological Seminary, heard Paul Tillich refer to God as the Ground of Existence, he immediately rose with the affirmation that God was not the Ground of Existence but the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Professor Haroutunian was obviously inveighing against abstraction in favor of concrete, biblical imagery.

Because of this difference the method of treatment in the chapter on the Bible was different. The approach was to take words that were applied to man and trace them through the Bible in order to get a picture of the nature and destiny of man.

The picture of man that we get in the Bible is that man is first of all a part of the created order, and his uniqueness in the created order is his peculiar relationship with God. Man is an essential unity. He is not a soul incarnate in a fleshly body but rather an

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4 Johnston, op. cit., p. 234.
animated body. Man is not inherently dignified nor immortal. His immortality is conditional upon his relationship with God. If by the grace of God man is given immortality, this immortality is not the continuance of a soul but the resurrection of the total personality (or what is called the resurrection of the body). Generally the various words that are used for man indicate different aspects of the whole person. Ruach and pneuma are used to stress his uniqueness through his spiritual relationship with God. Basar and sarx are used to stress man's weakness and solidarity with the created order. Nephesh and psyche are used to point to the animating principle of man. In the New Testament the word soma is used to designate the total personality.

In Plato we have what might be called two general tendencies. In the Phaedo there is a radical separation of the soul from the body. Evil rests in the body, and virtue is to be found in the soul. The soul is inherently

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5 Robinson, H. Wheeler, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament, pp. 69f.
6 Johnston, op. cit., p 234.
7 Smith, op. cit., pp. 154f.
8 Owen, op. cit., p. 194.
9 Robinson, J. A. T., op. cit., p. 28.
10 Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo, p. 12.
immortal because it is divine. Its uniqueness is derived from its rational character. In the other dialogues we have the picture of a tripartite division of the personality, and the highest part of the personality is the rational part. It is only this part that is finally immortal. In either the dualism of the Phaedo or the tripartite division of the personality in the other dialogues we have a picture of man that does not present an essential unity. There is always strife and conflict within the personality that has a metaphysical basis.

This is in radical opposition to the biblical view of man that holds him to a unity. The moral issue in the Bible does not revolve around the intellect over against the passions but in the intellectual and the passions (or the total man) in alienation from God and the rest of mankind as a result of his alienation from God. The Bible does not conceive the uniqueness of man to be essentially in his intellect but in his relationship with God. The self-consciousness and intellect of man are not

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11Grube, op. cit., p. 127.
12Hackforth, op. cit., p. 11.
13Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 292.
essential but derivative. Man's immortality is not dependent upon his inherent divinity but upon the grace of God.

In Aristotle there is a singular attempt to achieve a unified view of man, and in this sense Aristotle is far more biblical than Plato. However, Aristotle is finally faced with the same intellectual problem that confronted Plato. The active reason is the only part of man that is immortal, and the immortality of the active reason is impersonal. The immortality of the soul in Plato is personal, but the active reason in Aristotle is finally impersonal. At this point Plato is more akin to the Bible than Aristotle. Aristotle's massive attempt to picture man as a unity breaks down because he is faced with the epistemological problem. Since it is the reason that sets man off from the rest of the vegetative and animal world, then this part of man must be unique. In spite of his attempt to picture man as a unity, Aristotle finally makes man into a metaphysical duality. This is in radical distinction from the Bible.

Plotinus gives a view of man that is more akin to the Phaedo than any other work used in this thesis. The body is evil, and the soul to be free from this evil must

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14 Russell, op. cit., p. 175.
return to the world-soul. This is its salvation. It is an introspective asceticism. Of all the views given in the thesis Plotinus is by far the most removed from the biblical idea. In the Bible sárβ or basar in the sense of physical flesh are never thought of as intrinsically evil. They may be significant in that they are the source of man's limitations and weakness, but not evil. Again in Plotinus there is an impersonal immortality which is opposed to the biblical view. The moral problem in the Bible is solved not by fleeing the world into introspection but by re-orienting the entire personality. Sárβ and basar can be used for good or ill, depending upon the orientation of the personality. As in the other two Greek philosophers, Plotinus holds to a doctrine of inherent immortality as opposed to the biblical view of conditional immortality.

One might say in conclusion that there is little if any correspondence between the Greek thought and the biblical thought about man. "The Biblical ideas are in themselves essentially different and remain in uneasy alliance with the Greek partners that are forced upon them."16

15Stace, op. cit., p. 376.
16Owen, op. cit., p. 44.
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Notes

References to biblical works are taken from The Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version, New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1952.

References to the works of Plato are from The Dialogues of Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett, New York: Random House, 1937, except as noted.

Charmides
Laws
Phaedo
Phaedrus
Republic
Timaeus


Books


