

HENRY LANE WILSON, AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO, 1909 to 1913

by

John E. MacDonough

A Thesis

submitted to the faculty of the

Department of History and Political Science

in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in the Graduate College

University of Arizona

1 9 4 1

Approved:

Russell Bunnig
Director of Thesis

May 19, 1941
Date



To the University of Arizona

Library

University of Arizona

Library

E9791
1941
42

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. MEXICO IN 1910	1
II. THE MADERO REVOLT AND THE TERMINATION OF THE DIAZ REGIME	15
III. FROM THE DE LA BARRA ASCENDANCY TO THE INAUGURATION OF MADERO AS PRESIDENT	34
IV. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN HENRY LANE WILSON, AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO, AND FRANCISCO MADERO, PRESIDENT OF MEXICO	43
V. THE ACTIVITIES OF WILSON AND THE TERMINATION OF THE MADERO REGIME	73
VI. THE END OF THE MADERO REGIME AND THE RESIGNATION AND DEATH OF WILSON	94
BIBLIOGRAPHY	113

m.R.

CHAPTER I

MEXICO IN 1910

In 1910 the representative of the United States in Mexico was Henry Lane Wilson. His rank was that of ambassador. The son of James Wilson, he was born in Indiana, November 3, 1857, and graduated from Wabash College, Indiana, in 1879. The father had been a United States Congressman from 1857 to 1861, saw service for the North during the entire Civil War and in 1866 was appointed minister to Venezuela by President Johnson. Wilson later removed to the state of Washington, engaged in law, banking, journalism, investments, and real estate and accumulated a large fortune which was swept away in the financial panic of 1893. He then became active in politics, and in 1895 successfully managed the campaign of his brother, John Wilson, for election as a Republican candidate for the United States Senate. In 1897 Henry Lane Wilson accepted from McKinley the appointment as minister to Chile. ¹ While serving in Chile, Wilson received credit for greatly improved relations between Chile and the United States. In 1911, after he had left Chile, the National University of that country conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Philology, and Fine Arts, an honor never prior to that time conferred on a North American. In 1904 Wilson returned to the United States, and

1. Graham H. Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular Practice, p.235. Stuart comments on this appointment of Wilson's as "resting upon political influence rather than on merit, not an uncommon situation to have the United States represented at some foreign capital by representatives qualified in no respect whatsoever for the position."

actively campaigned for the Republican candidate for President, Theodore Roosevelt; and in March, 1905, in response to his request for an European post, he was appointed minister to Belgium. In 1909 the position of ambassador to Mexico was offered to Wilson, and he accepted it in December of that year. The appointment was generally ascribed to the results of political influence.² By virtue of the fact that the United States was the only country sending to Mexico a representative of the rank of ambassador, Wilson, though but a new appointee to the diplomatic colony in Mexico City, immediately became dean of the diplomatic corps. This position was of no small importance since it carried a certain measure of authority, and the ability to initiate meetings of the corps.

Economically, Mexico in 1910 was in a relatively prosperous position. Her banks of issue had assets of \$368,000,000. Federal receipts for the period 1903-1910 were \$53,000,000 and expenditures for the same period were \$47,600,000. The Mexican national debt in 1910 stood at about \$220,000,000, but because of the apparent stability of the government, negotiations had just been concluded in Paris for a new foreign loan of about \$100,000,000 to convert the five per cent loan of 1899 into a four per cent obligation. Mexican foreign trade for 1910 totaled \$227,000,000, exports amounting to \$130,000,000 of this sum, clearly a favorable balance of trade. The United States took seventy-five per cent of Mexican exports and furnished fifty-eight

2. Robert Hammond Murray, "Huerta and the Two Wilsons," Harper's Weekly, Vol. IXII, No. 3092, (March 25, 1916), pp. 301-306; Edward I. Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico, p. 137; Ernest Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage, p. 561.

per cent of Mexico's imports. Mexico's agricultural production in 1910 totaled \$87,500,000; industrial production totaled \$113,500,000. Public works representing the expenditure of nearly \$210,000,000 were in evidence.³ The 1910 copper yield gave Mexico second place in world production. The petroleum industry had grown from 10,000 barrels in 1901 to 13,000,000 barrels in 1911. There were one hundred and thirty-five textile factories in operation. Harbors had been constructed at Vera Cruz and Puerto Mexico, and the drainage of Mexico City had been completed. American capital amounted to more than fifty per cent of all the capital invested in Mexico. In some fields, American capital very heavily dominated. Americans owned seventy-six per cent of the mines, seventy-two per cent of the smelters, sixty-eight per cent of the oil, and sixty-six per cent of the copper.⁴

In 1910 Porfirio Díaz was president of Mexico, having been in office since the success of his third revolt against Sebastian Lerde de Tejada in 1876. There had been one single interruption from 1880 to 1884.⁵ Díaz was supreme, until his last few years, when there became attached to him a group of men called Científicos. For the most part they were men of ability, shrewd and ambitious. They recognized that their only actual bond of interest was to perpetuate Díaz in power, and they brought their whole influence to bear upon him to keep him in his chair. In the last years of his office, Díaz,

3. George Curtis Peck, Madero Revolution from An American Viewpoint, p. 22.

4. Ibid., p. 29; Herbert Ingram Priestley, The Mexican Nation, A History, p. 391.

5. From 1880 to 1884 Díaz relinquished the office to General Manuel Gonzales, generally reputed to be little more than a figurehead. Peck, op. cit., p. 6.

according to his son, was actually afraid of his ministers and advisers.⁶

Though apparently firmly entrenched in power, Díaz was not without his organized opposition which had appeared as early as 1903. In 1905, "Benito Juárez Democratic Clubs" spread throughout the state of Nuevo León, and a state convention adopted a platform with a plank of "no reelection for governor or municipal president." The opposition to Díaz rule received added stimulus in 1908 as the result of an authorized interview which General Díaz had given out to James Creelman and published in Pearsons Magazine for March, 1908. In the Creelman interview Díaz was quoted as declaring: "No matter what my friends and supporters say, I retire when my present term of office ends and I shall not serve again ... I recommend an opposition party in the Mexican Republic ... if it can develop power not to exploit but to govern, I will stand by it."⁷ In the light of subsequent events this interview appears to be a piece of duplicity. Blas Urrea in Obras Políticas gives the following interpretation of the Creelman interview: "General Díaz was seeking the support of public opinion abroad for his next reelection and hoped incidentally that the resulting foreign reaction might be reflected in the form of the awakening in Mexico of a similar sentiment favorable to his plans."⁸

6. Frederick Starr, Mexico and the United States, p. 229.

7. Peck, op. cit., p. 34. Following Díaz' announced retirement, an organization proposing to name the Governor of the state of Nuevo León, General Bernardo Reyes, for the vice-presidency came into being. Gruening, op. cit., p. 91.

8. Gruening, op. cit., p. 91.

The promised retirement of Díaz was accepted with scepticism. It was hoped, however, that he would allow a free choice of vice-president, who, with Díaz in his eightieth year, would in all probability succeed him before the expiration of the six-year term. Scarcely a month had passed after the publishing of the Creelman interview when Díaz called together Mr. José Limantour, his minister of finance, Ramón Corral, Governor of Sonora, and Mr. Oligario Molina, the minister of fomento (public works) to tell them that every day he was urged to accept reelection and that he wished to consult with his friends before making a decision.⁹ The result of this interview was that in April 1909, the candidacy of Díaz was formally announced for his eighth term. It was evident that Díaz was determined not only to be reelected but also to secure the office of vice-president for his own candidate, the hated Ramón Corral.¹⁰

The effect in Mexico of the Creelman interview was to start a whirl of political agitation. Demagogues began fierce attacks upon the Científicos, especially upon Limantour. In the fall of 1908 there appeared the book La Sucesión Presidencial en 1910, written by the liberal, Francisco I. Madero, son of a wealthy and conservative family. It was a mildly expressed protest against the Díaz regime, though it abounded in praise of the declining executive. It circulated widely throughout the Republic, being twice reprinted before

9. Peck, op. cit., p. 35.

10. Corral was hated in Mexico partly because it had been alleged that he had engaged in the traffic of Yaqui Indians to the cotton estate owners in Yucatan, and partly because he replaced the popular idol for the vice-presidency, Reyes.

1910. The anti-reelectionists, whom Emilio Vásquez-Gómez was leading against the candidacy of Corral for the vice-presidency, soon came out openly against the election of Díaz as well. In January 1909, there appeared the Democratic party also a party of protest against re-election. In response to the personal conviction of Díaz that he ought to make some effort to retain his power, the Reelectionist Club was created, drawing its support from the wealthy and conservative classes.

Reelection was the outstanding issue. There were some who were willing to sanction the reelection of Díaz, but they were reluctant to support Corral. Even Madero himself, in his text, had expressed this sentiment when he wrote, "The nation would be satisfied now if it were permitted to name the Vice-President."¹¹ Corral's opponents, while voicing approval of Díaz for president, urged the candidacy of General Reyes for vice-president. But suddenly, it was announced from the Reyes headquarters that he could not accept the honor which his adherents had proposed for him, and Reyes flatly declared his support for both Díaz and Corral.

The Madero faction, however, was oblivious to the reason for Reyes' sudden reversal. They had founded a newspaper, Nuevo Mexico, and they organized clubs throughout the land. Following the Reyes' statement declining the nomination for the vice-presidency, the Madero movement undoubtedly inherited part of the unrest, if not the major part of the organization which had been created by Reyes.

11. Wilfrid Hardy Callcott, Liberalism in Mexico, p. 171.

Diaz, doubting the sincerity of Reyes in declining the nomination dispatched him to France, ostensibly on a military mission,¹² and with the field thus definitely left clear, Madero fell heir to a very considerable anti-Corral sentiment. Madero interviewed Diaz and confided to him the project of organizing a political party. A national convention was called in Mexico City on April 15, 1910, and by a vote of one hundred and fifty-nine to twenty-six, Madero was nominated for the presidency, with Francisco Vasquez-Gomez as running mate, on the ticket of the Anti-Reelectionist party.

But Diaz had no intention of allowing a free election.¹³ Madero's attacks, increasing in vehemence in the course of his tours, irritated Diaz. Madero urged the people "to rise against the existing tyranny and fight with what weapons they could find for the rehabilitation of constitutional government."¹⁴ Diaz revived his policy of ruthless

suppression; anti-re-electionist meetings were broken up, and journalists were imprisoned. On June 5, 1910, Madero was arrested at the railway station in San Luis Potosí on the complaint that he had concealed one Roque Estrada in his house.¹⁵ Estrada had been accused of a mis-

demeanor, but was Madero's secretary, and his presence in the home of

Madero was not entirely avoidable. Both men were seized and jailed.

Madero's correspondence was opened and examined by the government

which was then in a position to establish that he had planned an armed

12. Priestley, op. cit., p. 397.

13. Gruening, op. cit., p. 92.

14. Peck, op. cit., p. 38.

15. Starr, op. cit., p. 261.

revolution. Madero was then charged with sedition based on the speech he had made at the railway station in San Luis Potosi, and he was taken to San Luis Potosi, as the jurisdiction within which the offense had occurred, and confined in the penitentiary. It does not appear that Diaz was particularly concerned respecting Madero's incipient revolutionary activities, for following the declaration that the government ticket of Diaz and Corral had been elected on June 26, 1910, Madero was released on eight thousand pesos bail, though restricted to the limits of San Luis Potosi, from which he subsequently escaped and made his way to the United States.

While the Madero campaign against Diaz had been going on, many revolutionists not content to await the results of the elections, had gathered on the border. Occasional armed conflicts between government forces and revolutionists occurred on or close to the boundary. These rebel attacks were often shared in by men of considerable education and ardent political partisanship. Such border disturbances added greatly to the tasks of the United States federal officers, whose regular concern was with cattle thieves, smugglers, and fugitives. Successful cooperation with the Mexican government was made difficult by the inability of the government of the United States legally to arrest propagandists or forbid traffic in arms and ammunition where there was no breach or procurable evidence of breach of the United States neutrality statutes. The problem for both governments was aggravated by a general antipathy in Mexico toward Americans who for business reasons had entered Mexico in steadily increasing

numbers. Responded to in kind, this mutual border feeling was intensified by attacks across the line, and on July 31, 1910, border rancor was greatly inflamed by the killing of two Americans, officers in a semi-military organization intended solely for local protection.¹⁶ Feeling ran high in Texas, but was not expressed in reprisals until precipitated by the act of a Mexican, Antonio Rodríguez, who for the alleged rape and murder of an American woman was burned alive in Rock Springs, Texas, in November, 1910. This caused fresh reprisals by Mexicans, which were now directed not only against the persons of American citizens but also against the United States government. Demonstrations both peaceful and violent were reported from far within the interior of Mexico. The anti-American feeling was subtly employed as a foil by the revolutionists. Under the guise of protesting against American deeds of violence toward Mexicans, the revolutionists in reality attacked the Díaz government. Together with the Orozco revolt in Chihuahua, this spirit of anti-Americanism was perfectly synchronized in timing with the Madero revolt.

Following his escape to the United States in October, 1910, Madero joined the group of revolutionary leaders who had preceded him and had already established a revolutionary junta in San Antonio, Texas. Madero was immediately pronounced its provisional president. At first, the revolutionary group made efforts to reconcile their differences with the Díaz government. The electoral executive committee of the Anti-Reelectionist party collected evidence of one hundred and fifty frauds

16. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1911,
p. 348. Hereafter this will be cited as Foreign Relations, 1911.

which was duly presented to the Mexican courts. A hearing was refused to the plaintiffs, who appealed for a new election to the National Congress. But the Congress declined to entertain the petition and recognized Díaz and Corral as having been duly elected. The opposition was then convinced that there remained only the last resort of rebellion.¹⁷

September, 1910, was a month given over to official celebration of the one-hundredth anniversary of the Dolores proclamation of the independence of Mexico.¹⁸ Correspondence between Mexico and the United States in regard to United States participation in the celebration of the Mexican centennial was carried on between the state department and the Mexican embassy in Washington. The United States was invited to participate in the celebration and accepted, sending a delegation of senators and representatives from Congress. A striking feature of the centennial was the presentation of monuments to Mexico by the European nations. Spain gave a monument of Isabella the Catholic, Emperor William presented one of Humboldt, and France erected a monument to Pasteur. We were slow in accepting the idea, and as a nation did nothing. The American residents in Mexico, however, promised to give a statue of George Washington, and the Mexican Government accepted the offer, the dedication taking place on Sunday, September 11, 1910. President Díaz, Vice-President Corral, the cabinet, and the American commission

17. Peck, op. cit., p. 40.

18. For the opinion that during the period of the official celebration, Mexico was seething with unrest, see Starr, op. cit., p. 262.

representing the United States occupied the platform. Wilson made the formal address of presentation in the course of which he expressed the hope that the life of Washington might be an inspiration to the rising generation in Mexico.

Up until this time Wilson's official activities had been more or less confined to the single matter of an extradition case.¹⁹ Wilson's first official act indicating that affairs of the embassy were under his management was a report on April 15, 1910, that he had requested the arrest and detention of Jacinto and Helidora Garcia charged with murder in California. There was much correspondence in May and June, and the state department instructed Wilson to press for an extension beyond the time provided for in the extradition agreement which existed between the United States and Mexico.²⁰ Notwithstanding that this correspondence was his first concern, Wilson sought to lighten the embassy duties by requesting permission from the state department to change the methods of handling translation. The existing procedure had been for the presentation of the correspondence to the American embassy in Mexico City, and there to have it translated from Spanish to English and forwarded to Washington. The state department declined this request and informed Wilson that in extradition cases the demanding government should furnish the translation of the documents and the cost should be borne by the government seeking the extradition.²¹

Meanwhile, from the United States, Madero made public the program

19. Foreign Relations, 1910, pp. 723, 724, 726, 727, and 728.

20. The extradition papers were finally presented on July 19, 1910.

21. Foreign Relations, 1910, p. 733.

of revolt which he had formulated during the period of his incarceration, and which he named the Plan of San Luis Potosí. It stated that the June elections of 1910 were void and declared that the government of Díaz was not to be recognized. Madero formally proclaimed revolution against the Díaz government, declaring for the principles of no-reelection, and the return of lands taken from the natives. It was, however, largely a call for a revolution to reform political abuses with relatively little to say of social conditions. The Plan made several references to the conduct of warfare; the shooting of prisoners was prohibited, and attention was called to the duty of every Mexican to respect foreigners in their persons and property. The severest punishment was to be inflicted on soldiers who sacked towns. Civil and military chiefs were enjoined to keep their troops under the strictest discipline and they were to be held personally responsible to Madero for any misbehavior of which the soldiers under their command might be guilty. The Plan proclaimed the formal opening date for the revolt to be November 20, 1910, at six o'clock in the evening. A few days following the publication of the Plan, Madero issued a manifesto addressed to the American people. In this declaration he charged that Díaz, on election day, had committed a shameful fraud. Madero asked for no aid, but craved "the hospitality which all free people have always accorded to those from other lands who strive for liberty."²²

On November 18, 1910, two days before the announced opening of

²² Report of Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, 65th Congress, Second Session, Senate Document, No. 285. Hereafter, this will be cited as 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., Sen. Doc., No. 285.

the revolt, Madero issued a manifesto to the Mexican army, urging it to turn against Diaz and to aid the revolutionary movement. While his appeal met with no substantial immediate response, throughout the entire period of the actual revolution defections from the government forces persistently took place. There were a number of incidents which foreshadowed the outbreak. The private residence of Diaz was stoned, and the windows broken. Groups of anti-reelectionists had been broken up and ridden down by the mounted police. In Puebla, on November 18, 1910, there was a pitched battle with brisk gunfire. Madero had been there on his campaign tour, and had spoken to the populace. Among the people in that city who had been interested in the cause of the anti-reelection party, a man named Aquiles Serdan had become an outspoken leader. He had been active in propaganda, and Madero had recognized him as the chief agent of the cause in Puebla. It was well understood by the police in Puebla that plotting was in progress, and two days before the formal opening of the revolt bitter warfare broke out between Serdan and the police. Of the seventeen persons in Serdan's house, only three women remained alive; Serdan was taken and mercilessly killed. This affair was only an incident, of no great significance of itself. Serdan was not a great man; it is even probable that he was abnormal, but he was the first actual martyr to the cause. Naturally the Maderistas made him a hero, and, after Madero came to power, it was ordered that a monument should be erected to the memory of Serdan.

The day set by Madero for the national uprising, November 20, 1910, was unmarked by any spontaneous movement, any nation-wide outburst. Throughout the Republic the people appeared hesitant, each

section waiting for some other locality to make a gesture before committing itself.²³ On November 22, an insurrectionary provisional government under the presidency of Madero was set up in the state of Chihuahua and on December 1, 1910, for the eighth time, Porfirio Diaz took the oath of office as President of the nation.

23. Peck, op. cit., p. 47.

CHAPTER II

THE MADERO REVOLT AND THE TERMINATION OF THE DIAZ REGIME

With the assuming of office by Diaz, Mexico did not relapse into traditional passivity. The revolt against his government was in that state of lethargy that is merely the lull before the storm. An outstanding factor in the revolt was the almost effortless synchronization of the Madero movement with the gradual rise of an anti-American feeling. The revolters seized upon this feeling and directed it toward their own aim of unseating Diaz. The government found that in combating the rebels it placed itself in the position of defending Americanism or "Gringoism". In part this feeling of anti-Americanism was due to memories of the war of 1846, partially to race antipathy, but in a larger measure to resentment of American commercial aggression and envy of American property and thrift.¹ Demonstrations both pacific and violent had occurred. On November 10, 1910, at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz, opposite Eagle Pass, Texas, an attack was made on the American consulate for which Mexico immediately made an official apology. On November 12, there were anti-American demonstrations in Chihuahua. A boycott of all American goods was started at San Luis Potosi. It was clear to all that the mere existence of this anti-American feeling was one of the strongest assets of the revolution. The revolutionists hoped to embarrass the Diaz government in the eyes of the United States.² Attacks upon consulates, insults to the

1. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 348.

2. Peck, op. cit., p. 45.

flag, assaults upon the persons of American citizens and destruction of their property were acts calculated to hinder the government of Díaz, since it could do no less than attempt to suppress such demonstrations and thus be put in the position of appearing to favor and support Americanism in Mexico. The measures of the Díaz government were interpreted by the people as clear evidence of the close understanding between Científico and "Gringo", and such reasoning multiplied volunteers for the revolutionary army.³ But the immediate cause for the anti-American feeling of November, 1910, was the burning alive at Rock Springs, Texas of a Mexican, Antonio Rodríguez. Díaz himself recognized that a number of politicians adverse to his government had taken advantage of the Rodríguez incident to excite students and the laboring classes in order to discredit the government by such disturbances.⁴

Following the Rodríguez incident there ensued a period of violent agitation against Americans. On November 5, in El Debate, a weekly newspaper controlled by the government,⁵ there appeared an editorial of a most violent character. The Mexican mob of university students, small shopmen, and the better class of artisans held a meeting on the evening of November 8, 1910, and after a number of inflammatory speeches, marched to the office of the Mexican Herald, an American-owned daily, attacked the building with stones and threatened the safety of the employees. The police remained inactive and made little, if any, attempt to protect

3. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 354.

4. Ibid., p. 359.

5. This fact gives some weight to the belief that the Díaz government itself incited the attacks on Americans with a view to justifying American intervention, and thereby suppressing the rebel movement. Peck, op. cit., p. 45.

Americans.⁶ Wilson ascribed the press attacks as being "fomented by certain officials of the government for the purpose of diverting public attention from the growing discontent of the Díaz regime."⁷ He made a statement to the press, criticising the local Mexican authorities and advising all Americans to remain off the streets until they could be certain of protection.⁸ His protests to the Mexican foreign office were most vigorous and he made repeated visits to the secretary, Enrique Creel, to impress upon him the seriousness of the situation. On November 12, Wilson protested again to the foreign office against anti-American demonstrations in Guadalajara, in which the American consul, Mr. Carothers, in protecting himself and his property, shot into a mob surrounding his house and killed one person.⁹ In response to Wilson's continued protests against this spirit and acts of anti-Americanism, there was some activity by the police. Public meetings were dispersed, certain places of amusement, and professional schools and universities were closed. Wilson visited President Díaz and asked for the suppression of the more violent press, El País, the Catholic daily, and El Diario Del Hogar. Díaz assured Wilson that the press had strict orders, and that the paper El Debate had been suppressed.

In agreement with other observers on the scene. Wilson, early in the revolt predicted a quick suppression of the conspiracy and felt that the movement had degenerated into bandit warfare, with the govern-

6. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 354; Peck, op. cit., p. 45.

7. Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile, p. 191.

8. Ibid.

9. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 357.

ment in control in all centers.¹⁰ But circumstances proved to be such that Wilson was forced to revise this opinion. In late November Wilson reported that the revolutionary movement, while apparently unorganized and without respectable leadership, had ramified throughout the Republic and was remarkable for its intensity and bitterness toward the government.¹¹ These sentiments prevailed to a very great extent on all sides, and there was a deep animosity to Vice-President Corral and to the Científico group which surrounded Díaz. It was only respect for and fear of the president which prevented an uprising in Mexico City. It was Wilson's feeling that the danger at that time lay not in the strength or respectability of the Madero movement, but rather that the likelihood of a few successes by the revolutionists would bring about a serious and active movement against the government.

Another factor in the revolt against Díaz, equal in importance to the spirit of anti-Americanism, was the situation existing in the border state of Chihuahua. The leading family of the state was the Terrazas family, ruling like feudal barons over vast estates, employing thousands of Mexicans and keeping them in a position little above that of slavery. The Terrazas family, because of its oppressions and tyrannies, was exceedingly unpopular. A small body of men under the leadership of Pascual Orozco was in open revolt against them.¹² Madero was undoubtedly astute enough to appreciate that this discontented faction opposing the Terrazas clique could be relied upon for

10. Peck, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

11. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 367.

12. Peck, op. cit., pp. 50-52; Starr, op. cit., pp. 263, 336, 347; Callcott, op. cit., p. 173; 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 285, p. 128.

support. Then, too, the control of Chihuahua and the other border states was of prime importance in securing arms for victory or as a haven in case of defeat. There is some controversy on the matter of the synchronizing of the Madero revolt with the Orozco struggle against the Terrazas-dominated state government. One observer states that Orozco and his followers joined the Madero movement in October, 1910.¹³ The version of the American consul at Chihuahua, Marion Letcher, is that Madero in November, 1910, attached himself and his movement to the Orozco rejection of the Terrazas leadership in the state.¹⁴ But whether Madero absorbed a smaller movement to prosecute his own revolt, or whether that revolt was prominent enough to have attracted spontaneous support from Orozco, the fact is that Orozco's animus against the Terrazas family became an alliance with Madero's revolt to unseat Díaz.

As yet, however, there was no national uprising. Not more than two or three per-cent of the people of Mexico were actually involved in the Madero movement.¹⁵ The Díaz administration exerted all possible pressure, and funds from the wide Madero estates were appropriated or at least prevented from reaching the rebels. In an effort to save the capital of Chihuahua all the government forces were concentrated there, and the border consequently was left unoccupied, thus allowing war equipment to flood in undisturbed. The situation from the government viewpoint was relatively quiet, and to American army observers looked

13, Starr, *op. cit.*, p. 347.

14. Peck, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

15. 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Sen. Doc. No. 285*, p. 169.

so promising for the maintenance of government superiority that Brigadier General Hoyt, Commanding General of the United States Army, Department of Texas, was planning a withdrawal of the American troops engaged in border patrol work.¹⁶ Even as late as December 29, 1910, there had been no demonstrations in force outside the state of Chihuahua, where the revolt was directed rather against the unpopular Terrazas family than against the Diaz government.

In addition to the Madero utilization of the spirit of anti-Americanism, and his seizure of the Orozco revolt movement, as factors prominent in the fall of Diaz, there was also the factor of the ability of the revolutionaries to keep themselves supplied with arms and ammunition, and also in some measure to direct the revolt from the relative safety of the United States. During the latter part of 1910 and the early months of 1911, the Mexican embassy in Washington made many complaints of the revolutionary movements allegedly originating in the United States, and requested that some action be taken. Diaz himself, through the medium of Wilson, made a personal request that Madero be prosecuted for attempts to subvert the government of a friendly power from American soil.¹⁷ In reply to all the Mexican correspondence of protests and petition the state department reiterated its position on the border traffic in arms, in accordance with the United States neutrality laws of that period, and informed Wilson that it was a general rule of international law that even in a state of war, the mere trade in arms, ammunition, and other articles of contraband was con-

16. Peck, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

17. Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 358, and 363.

sidered legal and subject to no other penalty other than loss of goods captured. The state department stated that none of the incidents of reputed illegality in the traffic of arms and supplies which had been reported to it had fallen within a breach of any of the rules of international law on neutrality, or had broken the American neutrality statutes.¹⁸ American border officials were consistent in their denials of any breach of the neutrality laws, and American prosecuting officials issued statements that evidence was lacking upon which to base the arrest and detention of Madero or any of the other revolutionary leaders active within the United States. The position of the state department was that the mere fact that a person is engaged in revolutionary undertakings in another country does not render his presence in the United States illegal.¹⁹ Moreover, the state department was of the opinion that if the Mexican government desired to exclude contraband from its territory, "it was clearly her duty and not ours (that of the United States) to accomplish such exclusion, though the police of the border would continue to use every legitimate endeavor to prevent illegal trade, that is evasion of customs. The mere commercial traffic in arms, and the passing of men into Mexico, either singly or in unarmed, unorganized groups does not constitute a violation of neutrality."²⁰

While Wilson continued to keep the state department informed as to the progress of the revolt against the Díaz government, a major part of his correspondence was concerned with the matter of controlling

18. Ibid., p. 550.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., pp. 398, and 460.

the Colorado River which flows through the Imperial Valley in California. In December, 1906, it had overflowed, doing a great amount of damage. The Mexican government had expressed its willingness to permit the United States to do anything that would be considered necessary for controlling the waters of the river. The United States government sent engineers and surveying parties to study the problem. In May, 1908, the Congress of the United States appropriated \$1,000,000 for protection of the lands along the Colorado River. American engineers found that just south of the intersection of the southwestern Arizona boundary and the Colorado River, the river had broken from its accustomed channel and followed another channel bed of a much steeper grade, known as the Río Abejas. The solution of the difficulty appeared to be the construction of a twenty-five mile levee along the west bank of the Colorado River bed, which would close and dam the Río Abejas, thus turning the waters back into their original course. Through the latter months of 1910, Wilson was instructed by the state department to request the consent of the Mexican government to the erection of the desired levee, which would be entirely within the boundaries of the Mexican Republic. Immediate consent was to be requested so that the work might be begun and completed before the period of the floods in the spring of 1911. Wilson pointed out the benefits which would occur to both countries from the construction of the levee and in a number of dispatches to the Mexican foreign office urged haste in making a decision.

In the early discussion between the two governments Mexican official opinion reacted quite favorably toward the proposed construction work. The Mexican government recognized the benefits which would accrue to Mexico, and since the United States was to bear the entire cost of con-

struction, it seemed an entirely desirable project. But, with the violent anti-American feeling, the slightest cooperation with the United States on the part of the Diaz government would be certain to be seized upon by the revolutionists and interpreted as collusion directed against the best interests of the Mexican people. Accordingly, on November 22, 1910, President Diaz, in keeping with Mexican public opinion, was forced to take a new stand on the matter and informed Wilson that he had no authority to permit the United States to erect levees on Mexican territory. Diaz suggested the negotiation of a treaty between the two countries and also the necessity of action by the Mexican Congress on the petition of the United States to construct the levee, and to effect the entry into Mexico of construction materials free of duty charges. In reply the state department instructed Wilson to press for permission to erect the levee and to reassure the Mexican government that the United States had no intent of trying to secure any rights on Mexican territory. But, throughout the month of December 1910, President Diaz remained steadfast in his refusal to grant permission for the work to begin without a formal exchange of notes between the two countries. Finally, in January, 1911, these conditions were met and work got under-way.²¹

Notwithstanding the compliance of the United States with the insistence of the Diaz government for the legal forms that placed the levee construction on a treaty basis, the actual work represented to the Mexican people a symbol of the aggressive strength of the "Colossus

21. For correspondence on the Colorado River controversy see Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 541, 544, 545, 545-546, 551.

of the North." The levee construction became the focal point of attack by rebel bands, using these attacks to demonstrate their opposition to the Diaz government. Wilson protested against the attacks and repeatedly requested government protection for the project, the construction materials, and the laborers, who for the most part were Mexicans. He succeeded in securing permission of the Diaz government for the United States department of the interior to employ non-uniformed guards to act as a police constabulary for the protection of the project. However, the suggestion of sending United States armed troops across the border for the purpose of protecting the work in progress was strongly opposed. Even when the Mexican government finally did send Mexican troops to protect the works, this move was very quickly interpreted by the Mexican people as a further evidence of close collaboration of the Diaz government with the detested Americans.

Up until the middle of February, 1911, the Madero revolution had not been seriously considered. The Maderistas held a few towns in the north but they lacked ammunition, organization, and competent leaders, and they had but few men. On February 7, the government resorted to new censorship, and Wilson reported that "the government gives no information except that favorable to itself."²² In the latter part of February and early March, 1911, Mexico was in a state of much unrest, and Wilson left for the United States to report in person on the Mexican situation to President Taft. Wilson saw the president on March 6, 1911. On the following day all the armed forces of the United States were

22. Peck, op. cit., p. 55.

mobilized and sent south to the international boundary. In a letter to General Leonard Wood, dated March 12, 1911, written from Augusta, Georgia, President Taft explained the mobilization of this country's armed forces when we were at peace and ostensibly had no intent of an imperialistic war on Mexico:

...as you know from the conference held with you and the Secretaries of War and Navy and Admiral Wainwright this whole movement (the mobilization) was prompted by Ambassador Wilson's report to me in person that Mexico was boiling, that General Díaz was on a volcano, that the small outbreaks were only symptomatic of the whole condition in which ninety per-cent of the people were in sympathy with the insurrection, that a general explosion was probable at any time in which case he feared that forty thousand or more Americans would be assailed and American investments of more than \$1,000,000 would be injured or destroyed because of the anti-American spirit of the insurrection.

It seems my duty as Commander-in-Chief to place troops in sufficient number where if Congress should direct that they enter Mexico to save American lives and property an effective movement of the troops near the boundary accompanied with sincere assurances of the utmost good will toward the present Mexican government and with larger and more frequent patrols along the border to prevent insurrectionary expeditions from American soil will hold up the hands of the existing government and will have a healthy mental effect to prevent attacks upon Americans and their property in any subsequent internecine strife.²³

Denying the slightest intention of intervention, President Taft stated, "My determined purpose is to be in a position so that when danger to American lives and property in Mexico threatens, and the existing government is rendered helpless by the insurrection, I can promptly exercise Congressional orders to protect them with effect."²⁴

Simultaneously with the president's issuing of the mobilization

23. Peck, op. cit., p. 60.

24. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 415; Peck, op. cit., p. 66.

order on March 7, the state department wired the American embassy giving notice of the mobilization and instructions to:

inform the President of Mexico through the foreign office that the President (Taft) wishes to express his hope that no misapprehension will result from unfounded and sensational newspaper conjectures as to the military manoeuvres about to take place in Texas and elsewhere, and begs to give President Díaz assurance that the measures have no significance which should cause concern to our friendly neighbor on the South.²⁵

This effort on the part of United States officialdom did not succeed in allaying fears in Mexico that the American mobilization was but a prelude to intervention. In reporting on conditions on March 8, the day following the United States mobilization decree, Dearing²⁶ stated that "the mobilization is the preponderating topic in all circles, the general opinion being that it has some ulterior purpose."²⁷ Upon his return to Mexico Wilson was firm in the opinion that the military precautions of President Taft were an almost exclusively saving factor. "These precautions," he reported, "have also modified anti-American feeling in and around Mexico City."²⁸ But, notwithstanding Wilson's opinion, the feeling persisted in Mexico that the mobilization of United States troops was only the precursor to actual intervention. In April, Wilson found it necessary to write the American consul in Puebla that, "the eventuality of United States intervention should be strongly dep-

25. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 563.

26. Frederick W. Dearing, American Charge d'Affaires, in charge of the embassy while Wilson was in Washington.

27. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 416.

28. Ibid., p. 432.

recated on all occasions."²⁹ The mobilization, which had been so strongly and directly urged by Wilson, had resulted in a widespread fear of intervention. The state department in May instructed Wilson "to officially deny through the local press and otherwise all foolish stories of intervention, than which nothing could be further from the intention of the government of the United States. The government of the United States is not concerned with Mexican internal political affairs and demands nothing but the respect and protection of American life and property."³⁰ The American consul general in Monterrey reported "the worst thing happening in Mexico today is the foolish talk about American military intervention."³¹ There was a continuous flow of notes to Washington from the Mexican government expressing the fear of United States intervention,³² indicating that there could be but little doubt that, as a result of Wilson's action in requesting and bringing about a mobilization of United States troops on Mexico's borders, an actual fear of American intervention pervaded Mexico.³³ This attitude was to be observed in the protests of the Mexican government to Washington, in the reports of American consular officials from widespread sections of Mexico, in the occasions that Wilson found it necessary to reassure Mexican government officials that no American intervention was intended,³⁴ and in Wilson's own later admissions of the existence of a fear

29. Ibid., p. 617.

30. Ibid., p. 481.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., pp. 420, 422, 423, 431-432.

33. Wilson's opinion was that he was "unable to determine anywhere the existence of an opinion that our actions (the mobilization) have been dictated by ambition in the desire for national aggrandizement. There is no such opinion existing among the serious-minded people of Mexico." Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 441.

34. Ibid., p. 431.

of United States intervention.³⁵

On March 17, 1911, President Diaz proclaimed martial law throughout Mexico.³⁶ Immediate death was decreed in cases of those persons interfering with the railroads, telegraph lines, electric power plants, or hacienda property.³⁷ The foreign diplomats and most observers felt conditions were very much worse than at any time in the past. Wilson noted an increase in physical resistance and a growth of popular discontent. Business was suffering profoundly and prices for all necessities were abnormally high. Under these conditions, the Diaz government made a determined effort to save itself.

In Paris, there was a Mexican, José Limantour, former minister of the treasury. Because of his wealth, associations, and social position, if not also because of his political beliefs, he was a member of the Científico group. He was not without his political ambitions, but he had resigned from the cabinet in 1909³⁸ and gone abroad to conduct negotiations for a refunding of Mexican loans. He had then remained abroad until the summons came to him from the tottering Diaz government to return and do what he could to save it. Limantour left France, arrived in New York where he saw Madero's father, Francisco, and brother Gustavo, who, as agents of the revolutionary group, were striving to raise finan-

35. Ibid., p. 617.

36. This is termed by some writers "a suspension of the constitutional guarantees." Madero from his headquarters proclaimed that the Diaz decree was unconstitutional. Peck, op. cit., p. 77.

37. Far from terrifying the people and deterring them from joining in the revolt, the proclamation seemed to add fuel to the conflagration. Callcott, op. cit., p. 174.

38. It is suggested that Limantour had a conflict with those opposed to his political ambitions and rather than struggle for the ascendancy, he chose to retire from the scene. Bell, op. cit., p. 19.

cial support and arrange the buying and shipping of supplies to the rebels. Limantour discussed with them the situation of the revolt but no agreement was reached. Before leaving New York, he also saw the ambassador of the Mexican government to the United States, De la Barra. He discussed with De la Barra the relations existing between the United States and Mexico in view of the recent mobilization of the United States army on Mexico's border.³⁹ Limantour stated that his ability to save the situation was doubtful, because he was embarrassed both by his friends who insisted he accept the vice-presidency, and by the uncompromising attitude of Díaz who was adverse to delegating his powers. It was important to Limantour to ascertain the position of the United States in regard to the recent military activity, and he expressed relief when Wilson assured him that the United States military moves were "primarily to discharge international obligations with not the slightest intention of intervention unless the present government should fall and not be succeeded by a responsible one."⁴⁰

Limantour's next step was to arrange a conference between government officials. On March 24, 1911, the entire cabinet resigned and the appointment of a new group of younger men was effected to initiate the political reforms which were demanded by the opposition. Reyes was cabled to return from Paris to direct the government's military defense. De la Barra was recalled as Mexican minister to Washington to head the new cabinet in the portfolio of the secretary of foreign relations. A series of discussions was opened between the Limantour-dictated gov-

39. Bell, op. cit., pp. 15-38.

40. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 431.

41. Peck, op. cit., p. 100; Priestley, op. cit., p. 400.

ernment of Díaz and the rebels under Madero, looking toward some method of granting the rebel demands, maintaining the Díaz government and steering clear of American intervention.⁴¹ Congress met on April 1, to hear the speech of the president. Practically all the social demands of the rebels were solemnly advocated as government policies, including the principle of no reelection, a guarantee of effective suffrage, the opening of government lands to small purchasers on liberal terms, and the division of unproductive privately owned tracts.⁴² The subsidized press of the capitol naturally supported the new program. Among the demands of the rebels, that expressing opposition to Vice-President Corral was indirectly agreed to. Corral, who was in ill health, asked for a leave of absence on April 10, 1911. At first Congress was in angry debate over the request, for there was a decided feeling that Corral should submit his resignation. However, permission was finally granted for an eight-months leave of absence and within four days Corral had sailed for Europe.⁴³

Negotiations inaugurated by Limantour continued throughout the month of April and the early part of May, 1911. Doctor Francisco Vázquez-Gómez, negotiator for the revolutionaries, demanded the resignations of Díaz and Corral, that all members of the Científico group quit their congressional offices, that the revolutionaries be given the appointments to the governorships of eight or ten states, and that a heavy sum of money be paid by the government to defray the expenses

41. Peck, op. cit., p. 100; Priestley, op. cit., p. 400.

42. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 444; Callcott, op. cit., p. 175.

43. Starr, op. cit., p. 268; Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 452. Corral never returned to Mexico, but died abroad.

of the revolution. The government negotiators appeared willing to abandon the Científicos and to change some of the state governors, but balked at the money payment and the resignation of Díaz. Díaz issued a statement declaring, "I will retire from power when my conscience tells me that my retirement will not deliver my country into anarchy."⁴⁴ On May 4, 1911, Wilson reported that anxiety of the foreign element was seemingly increasing due in part to fear that negotiations for peace would fail and result in anarchy and in part to the popular resentment to supposed impending intervention.⁴⁵

By the middle of April, 1911, both forces were hastening north toward Juárez on the Texas border. In previous fighting, near the border of Arizona, on April 14, 1911, thousands of bullets struck houses in Douglas, Arizona, killing two citizens and wounding eleven. Wilson protested to the Mexican foreign office that recurrence of such incidents would compel President Taft to take action of a kind it was his desire to avoid. With regard to Wilson's complaint, the position of the government was that the firing across the border was the fault of the rebels, and not of the government forces. On May 6, Madero issued a statement declaring all peace negotiations were at an end. Madero declared the proposed attack on Juárez would be abandoned for fear of creating international complications and stated that on the eighth he would commence a movement south to Mexico City.⁴⁶ Notwithstanding Madero's declaration, the attack on Juárez was begun on May 7, and the

44. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 478.

45. Ibid., p. 475.

46. Ibid., p. 477.

city fell on May 10.⁴⁷ After the fall of Juárez, the prestige of the Díaz government was gone. The revolution which had begun in November had triumphed in six months with only one real battle. A minority governing a majority had been dethroned by a minority assuming to speak for a majority, for only a comparatively small proportion of Mexicans had taken part in the movement.⁴⁸

On May 17, 1911, an agreement was reached between the commissioner for the government, Señor Carbajal, and Doctor Francisco Vázquez-Gómez for the Madero forces. By the terms of the armistice, Díaz and Corral were to resign before the end of May, 1911. The ad interim presidency was to be vested in De la Barra. It was further agreed that the minister of war would be appointed by De la Barra, and the remainder of the cabinet would be appointed after consultation with Madero. Limantour was to leave the country and General Reyes, who had been summoned home from Paris to defend the now fallen Díaz government, was to be prevented from entering Mexico. The cabinet was to contain some men who should directly represent the revolutionary movement. Ernesto Madero, uncle of the revolt leader, was made secretary of the treasury, and the Vázquez-Gómez brothers were assigned to portfolios in the cabinet. The governorships of two states, Coahuila and Chihuahua, went to two Madero leaders, Venustiano Carranza, and Abraham Gonzales, respectively. On May 21, the

47. The attack on Juárez had been against the orders of Madero. There was some feeling by the generals in command of the Madero forces that should they not take Juárez they would be killed by their own men. Peck, op. cit., p. 98.

48. Gruening, op. cit., p. 94.

formal treaty of peace was signed designating May 24 as the date for the formal resignations of Díaz and Corral, and Wilson reported that two-thirds of the Republic was in the hands of the revolutionists.

When the people heard of the signing of the treaty of peace, immediate action was demanded, and when on the twenty-fourth the resignations were not presented to the House of Deputies excitement in the capital mounted rapidly and the streets surrounding the National Palace were filled with approximately 75,000 people. The efforts of the mounted police to disperse the people were futile, and a clash occurred with many hundreds being mercilessly shot down. The next day, May 25, the mobs formed again, this time in front of Díaz's residence. Feeling that Díaz was being deserted, and remembering his many kindnesses to Americans, Wilson, in spite of the protests of the embassy staff, went to pay him a visit. Wilson had some difficulty in passing through the crowds which surrounded the house for a distance of seven blocks, but after his arrival he was unable to see Díaz who at the time of the visit was resting after a disturbed night.

The resignations were finally presented to the House of Deputies on the afternoon of May 25, 1911, and at one-thirty o'clock, the provisional president, De la Barra, assumed office. Owing to the fact that some of the new ministers were in exile, the government was not completely installed until a few days later. In a final note to Díaz, Wilson wished him happiness and peace and expressed the sentiments of the diplomatic corps. At four-fifteen o'clock on the morning of the next day, May 26, 1911, Díaz left Mexico City on an armed train for Vera Cruz, and France.

CHAPTER III

THE PERIOD OF THE DE LA BARRA ADMINISTRATION

Following the resignation of Diaz on May 25, 1911, Francisco de la Barra, former Mexican ambassador to the United States, became provisional president of Mexico in accordance with the terms of the Mexican constitution, which provided that where the presidency was vacated it should be assumed provisionally (until an election could be held) by the highest existing cabinet official. De la Barra, as the minister for foreign relations, was the next in line to succession and, following his assumption of the provisional presidency, he remained in office until the inauguration of Madero as president on November 6, 1911. One of the first official acts of De la Barra was to hold a reception for the diplomatic corps, in behalf of which Wilson made a few brief remarks of congratulations to the new president. In a large measure the presidency of De la Barra was purely a nominal one. As president he was surrounded with representatives of the Madero movement and he made no move of importance without first consulting the revolt leader.

The Madero revolt had officially terminated with the treaty of peace on May 17, and the resignation of Diaz on May 25, but actually the unrest and disturbance continued beyond this period. On May 24, three-hundred Chinese residents of Torreon were murdered in the name of the Madero movement.¹ Because of lack of efficient transportation

1. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 564.

and communication systems, many groups engaged in the revolt lacked information concerning the termination of the hostilities and continued fighting; other groups chose to reject reports of peace as untrue. Under such conditions of unrest, the economic situation had grown steadily worse. Almost every establishment of any importance had made heavy reductions in the number of salaries of its employees, while prices continued to rise. Stocks and securities had dwindled in value and exchange was at an abnormal figure. A great deal of specie had been exported, much of it to New York. Over a large part of the interior no crops had been planted and the people faced a scarcity for the ensuing winter. The laboring classes had quit work and made demands, in many cases accompanied by violence, for wage increases, and decreases in working hours. In many localities whole communities refused to pay state and federal taxes, claiming that it was part of the program of the revolution that the poor should be freed from the burden of taxes.² Many large estates were forcibly taken over by large groups of the poor in the belief that the revolution had annulled all old titles and that the lands were to be restored to the people in common holding.

There were many provisions in the treaty of peace which were not in harmony with the aims of the Madero revolt as set forth in the Plan of San Luis Potosí. The Plan had promised an immediate change of all those officials formerly connected with the Díaz government. It was impossible, however, in accordance with the terms of the agreement made in Juárez to carry out this promise. The Plan had pledged that a legal judgment would be secured regarding the acts of the past administration,

2. Ibid., p. 508.

but the terms of the peace treaty arranged for no such judgment. The Plan promised a division of the great landed properties of Mexico, but afterwards it was recognized that it would be impossible to immediately effect such a result.

The ad interim government, at the very time when restless bands all over the Republic were creating a situation verging on anarchy, faced demands upon it for immediate reforms of the educational, agricultural, and judicial systems. In an attempt to meet some of these demands the De la Barra government passed a bill in Congress on May 30, 1911, providing for a new school system for "rudimentary education" to teach the Castilian language "and the fundamental and more usual operations in arithmetic."³ The schools were to be open to all ages and both sexes; and attendance was to be stimulated by the distribution of food and clothing. Another pressing problem facing the ad interim government was that of disarmament of the revolutionary forces. The new government promptly set aside 800,000 pesos from the treasury reserves for the purpose of disarmament of the revolutionary soldiers. But many of the worst class of revolutionaries who, for the purpose of assisting in the revolt, had been released from prison and supplied with arms, now saw no incentive in returning to a calm and honest mode of living. Many who had been prisoners feared that if they appeared to receive payment for their arms, their old crimes would be held against them, and they would again be put in jail.

Madero, following the treaty of peace and the resignation of Diaz,

3. Callcott, op. cit., p. 196.

had gone to his home to rest and await developments. About the end of May he decided to go to Mexico City. A special train conducted him to the capitol and all along the route he was hailed as the savior of Mexico, the conquerer of the great and feared Díaz, the herald of a new and wonderful economic existence to come. He entered Mexico City in triumph on June 7. The provisional president, De la Barra, was dwarfed into insignificance. Madero opened headquarters and proceeded to conclude the remaining matters in connection with the revolution, and to inaugurate his campaign for the elections which were to be held on October 1, 1911. The National Palace soon ceased to be the center of the government, and instead much of the official business of Mexico was transacted in the offices of Madero. Madero appeared to be in full control of the political situation and yet everything was not completely satisfactory. There was no question about his personal attraction; the people almost worshipped him. However, there arose a difference of opinion between Madero and two of his former chief supporters in the revolt, the Vázquez-Gómez brothers. The latter held for a literal interpretation of the Plan of San Luis Potosí. The brother of Madero, Gustavo, desirous of exercising the major influence over the revolt leader, mentally challenged the unselfishness and sincerity of the Vázquez-Gómez brothers, and thus the seeds of dissension were sown. Just how much influence Gustavo Madero was able to exercise over his brother is difficult to determine. There were times when Madero as president would give Gustavo no heed whatsoever;⁴ on

4. At one time Francisco Madero, in order to remove himself from the influence of his brother, appointed Gustavo on a mission to Japan. Bell, op. cit., p. 257.

other occasions, Francisco would turn over to his brother the complete management of affairs. On June 9, 1911, Francisco Madero made his first move toward a complete and unchallenged mastery of the situation, issuing a statement urging that the old Anti-Reelectionist party which had fought the revolution should be reorganized. This move was generally interpreted to be the first in a series tending to firmly establish Madero's domination of the revolutionary elements and to eliminate from the scene any possible competition from other groups which had participated in the revolt.

During July and August, Madero conducted his pre-convention campaign for election to the presidency. Among the forces that were arrayed against him, was part of the army, especially the professional army men who feared the loss of their positions would result from the Madero victory. The Roman Catholic Church, traditionally conservative, had become violently opposed to Madero and soon was advancing the candidacy of De la Barra. The remnants of the old Científico group, ambitious for a return to power, conspired against Madero; and elements of the poorer classes, swiftly becoming disillusioned at what they felt was the failure of the arrival of the new millennium, were murmuring against him. In addition, Madero in his climb to power had naturally displeased some people and was bound to antagonize a miscellany of persons who hoped for some personal profit out of the new regime and who turned against him when they were unable to secure it. The Madero-created Constitutional Progressive party, which was the name Madero had given it, opened its convention in Mexico City on August 31, 1911. The convention was high-lighted by the struggle over the candidacy for the

vice-presidency. The Madero group, as opposed to the faction headed by the Vázquez-Gómez brothers, declared their choice to be a little-known editor from Yucatan, Mario Pino-Suárez, in direct opposition to the candidacy of Francisco Vázquez-Gómez. The Maderos won; the convention was regularly "steamrolled."⁵ The Vázquez-Gómez faction, though effectively ousted from the inner circles of the revolutionary party,⁶ continued their attempt to gain some position of prominence and carried their opposition to the convention floor and finally to the polls; but the Madero machine was strong enough to gain a clear majority vote for Pino-Suárez. Though Madero himself had opposition, there was no serious question about the outcome of his candidacy.⁷ A platform was adopted having planks declaring for a free press, Mexicanization of the railroads, prohibition, and but a single term for president.

There now appeared in the person of General Bernardo Reyes, a possible focal point about which the opposition to Madero might gather. One of the stipulations of the treaty of peace between the now fallen Díaz government and the revolutionists was that Reyes be prevented from entering Mexico, and in accordance with this provision he had been ordered to re-

5. Callcott, op. cit., p. 198. But for opinion that the convention was untrammelled and free and open, see Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 515. However, this opinion of the American Charge d'Affaires (Wilson was on vacation) pertains more to the matter of the adoption of the party platform rather than to the election of candidates for office. In the same dispatch he writes as follows: "The various sessions while turbulent at times, were well conducted and each plank of the party platform was first discussed before being incorporated. The convention seems to prove the possibility of free political assemblies." The omission of any comment on the selection of nominees is significant.

6. Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 513, 514.

7. Ibid.

main in Havana, Cuba. Following the Díaz resignation, Reyes opened negotiations with the victorious Maderistas and was allowed to enter Mexico early in June, 1911. Reyes soon announced his candidacy for the office of president, but his campaign was a failure. He was heckled and his political meetings were broken up. On September 3, two days after the nomination of Madero for the presidency, when Reyes attempted to make an address, an attack was made which forced him to seek refuge in a neighboring house.⁸ When he tried to calm the crowds cries of disapproval drowned his voice and stones were thrown. There is some opinion that these reactions of the populace were not spontaneous, but rather were the result of political electioneering. Wilson shared this opinion, and felt that Reyes had been prevented by violence from prosecuting his campaign, and that the violence had been directed by the Madero family, particularly by Gustavo Madero.⁹

However, the possibility of a union of Madero's opposition was slight and never did materialize. The nearest approach to a cooperation of his opponents came in the early days of September, in the form of a joint demand by Reyes and the Vázquez-Gómez brothers for a postponement of the election, which had been scheduled for October 1. On September 11, Madero telegraphed his comment to the Congress, requesting that no postponement be permitted. While Madero protested the suggestion of the postponement of the election, he did agree to abide by the decision of the Congress, "but I will not," he threatened "be

8. Starr, op. cit., p. 308.

9. Wilson, op. cit., p. 226.

responsible for any results if a postponement were agreed to."¹⁰ Reyes then left Mexico, going to the United States, claiming that the government of De la Barra had furnished him with no protection and that he had been prevented from prosecuting his campaign for the presidency.¹¹

The primary elections were held on October 1, 1911. The Catholic party made a bid for power by supporting the candidacy of De la Barra for the vice-presidency. In the city of Mexico alone, 120,000 votes were cast, something which never before had happened.¹² "On the whole it was undoubtedly the nearest approach to what could be called a fair election that Mexico had ever seen," was the version of an experienced American newspaper observer.¹³ Wilson, too, felt that the elections were free from influence of official measure through the police and army, and were unmarked by untoward incident.¹⁴ The Constitutional Progressive party was determined to take no chances and worked hard to get its voters to the polls.¹⁵ According to the law the people cast their ballots for

10. Callcott, op. cit., p. 200.

11. Starr, op. cit., p. 310.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 520. Wilson's opinion was that while the elections were free from influence of official measure and unmarked by any incidents, they were nevertheless "farcial in character and in a very small degree representative of public opinion." But this judgment is contrary to other opinion. See Starr, op. cit., p. 310; Bell, op. cit., pp. 119, 120; Callcott, op. cit., p. 200; Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 514. Wilson is inconsistent, for as late as September 22, 1911, he stated, "there is an apparent certainty that Madero will be elected President." Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 518.

15. Callcott, op. cit., p. 200.

slightly more than 20,000 electors who in turn voted on October 15, 1911, for the candidates for president and vice-president. The results of this electoral vote were as follows:¹⁶

For President		For Vice-President	
Madero	19,997	Pino-Suarez	10,245
De la Barra	87	De la Barra	5,564
Emilio Vásquez-Gómez	16	Francisco Vasquez-Gómez	3,373
scattering	45	Iglesias Calderón	173
		scattering	51

The election figures revealed the unquestioned leadership of Madero for the office of president. Pino-Suarez, Madero's candidate for vice-president, though not the near unanimous choice for office that Madero was, nevertheless obtained a clear majority of the electoral vote.¹⁷ The inauguration of Madero as president was set for November 20, 1911, but as a result of the discovery of a plot to assassinate him, it was deemed wise to advance the date, and on November 6, 1911, without ostentation, Madero was inaugurated as President of Mexico.¹⁸

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Foreign Relations, 1911*, p. 519.

18. Callcott, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

CHAPTER IV

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN HENRY LANE WILSON, AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO, AND FRANCISCO MADERO, MEXICO'S PRESIDENT

Judged as a whole, Madero's regime was relatively weak. When compared to that of Díaz, the contrast is particularly evident. For approximately thirty years, the Mexican people had been under the domination of one man, Porfirio Díaz, and every factor in Mexican life had been bent toward the perpetuation of the Díaz control. Under Madero, on the other hand, a greater amount of freedom was accorded the press, and before long an unsympathetic press was inventing scandals about him and his family and actively criticising him.¹ In not executing the chiefs who rebelled against him, Madero reversed the military ruthlessness of Díaz. Madero was profoundly trusting; he had a great deal of faith in human nature, was not a good judge of men, and was not a capable executive.² There was one outstanding factor which was vital to the progress of the Madero regime, namely, the attitude toward it of the foreign powers. Particularly important was the attitude of the United States, for, in the first place, because of her geographical position on Mexico's northern border, and, in the second place, the United States was the only country which accredited as her representative in Mexico City a diplomat of the rank of ambassador. The representative of the United States, therefore, automatically assumed the

1. Gruening, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

2. *Ibid.*

position of dean of the diplomatic corps. In such capacity, the American ambassador was usually deferred to in the matter of calling meetings of foreign diplomats, exercised a limited amount of authority and representation of the diplomats as a group, and possessed the power of initiative in joint actions. Future events demonstrate how Wilson utilized his dual capacity of United States ambassador and dean of the diplomatic corps.

Wilson's opinion with respect to Madero was at times inconsistent. Of Madero's election to the presidency, Wilson reported that Madero was elected "by a total vote of 19,989 in a population of 15,000,000."³ This, of course, is a gross misrepresentation, since Wilson states the figure of the total population of Mexico, rather than the total voting population. Moreover, even had he stated the figure as that of the total voting population, it would still have been misleading, since the fact is that the vote was not a direct vote for the candidates, but for electors who were designated to vote for the candidates.⁴ An observer reported, "As a spectator of a curious phenomenon, I watched the voting operations that day (October 2) in two small districts in Mexico City. Nearly 1000 votes were cast in these two districts. It was an interesting exhibit ... Madero received more than ninety per cent of the total in these districts and there were more than 14,000 such districts in the republic of Mexico."⁵ Aside from this apparently deliberate attempt to misrepresent the political support of Madero, Wilson also attempted to discredit the character of the elections, and

3. 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 285, p. 2256.

4. Callcott, op. cit., p. 200; see Chapter III, p. 42.

5. Bell, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

termed them "farcial" and "in a very small degree representative of public opinion."⁶

Further, the attitude of Wilson toward Madero was almost one of complete personal antagonism. Wilson had known of Madero as a speaker in the streets, and considered him of little significance. He looked upon Madero as an imbecile and had publicly referred to him as such.⁷ On May 23, 1911, and again on May 31, 1911, Wilson expressed his fears that the Madero movement "might lead to disrespect of constituted authority."⁸ Wilson reported of Madero, "He is insignificant of appearance, of diffident manner, and hesitant in speech, and seems to be highly nervous and uncertain as to his course in regard to many public questions."⁹ Wilson had condemned Madero even before he had assumed the presidency. As early as July 11, 1911, Wilson expressed the possibility of Madero's failure.¹⁰ The relations between Wilson and Madero became the most menacing element with which Madero was called upon to deal. Internal affairs threatened trouble from every quarter, heavy disbursements were reducing the treasury surplus, but Wilson's demands with the implication of the power of the United States behind them produced a definite irritation. There was a persistence in them which irked Madero. Madero was on the defensive toward Wilson and was so inept at concealing his sentiments that personal antagonisms promptly ensued. The inevitable result was a conflict over almost every item that arose.¹¹

6. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 520; see Chapter III, p. 42.

7. Bell, op. cit., p. 110.

8. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 508.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.; Gruening, op. cit., p. 561.

11. Bell, op. cit., p. 142.

At the commencement of the Madero regime, in November, 1911, Wilson's official attitude toward Madero was one of cooperative helpfulness. During the first week after Madero took office, Wilson recommended that "every possible assistance compatible with our laws be given to the Mexican Government."¹² This attitude of Wilson's swiftly changed. Within two months of Madero's inauguration, Wilson was attributing what he termed the unsatisfactory conditions in the country to certain weaknesses in Madero's character. By January, 1912, Wilson was writing of Madero, "He unfortunately lacks stability of character ... He is unfortunately prone to accept the advice of some relatives and some associates who have no experience in public affairs ... There is a growing distrust toward the Madero administration ... I am inclined to attribute the unsatisfactory conditions that exist throughout the country very largely to certain weaknesses in the character of the President."¹³

What were the situations that could have arisen that would cause Wilson in the short space of a few months to adopt a position of dissatisfaction with the Madero regime? The answer to this question is nowhere more evident than in the matter of Wilson's presentation of the claims of Americans against the Mexican government. Wilson's concern with the American claims was probably his chief work as ambassador. The matter of claims occupied much of his time and energy, and filled the greater proportion of the correspondence between the embassy and the state department. First, let us note how these claims arose! One

12. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 521.

13. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 714.

group was that for damage to property and loss of life arising because of an attack during the Madero revolt on Mexican towns situated near the international boundary, which had resulted in shots being fired across the border into the American towns of Douglas, Arizona, and El Paso, Texas. The Mexican government made some settlement of these claims in July, 1912. However, all the American claimants but one rejected these settlements as inadequate.¹⁴ The United States Congress then informed the claimants that there was no compulsion upon them to accept the awards of the Mexican government as the United States had reserved the right to proceed diplomatically. Congress, by joint resolution, directed the war department to investigate these claims and on November 29, 1913, a commission appointed by the war department returned a report with the following conclusion: "that the United States was not responsible for the damages suffered and not being responsible ... should not take upon itself the duty of settling these claims, or of urging their settlement upon Mexico."¹⁵ Notwithstanding this resolve, the United States, through Wilson, continued to urge the settlement of American claims.¹⁶ Wilson prosecuted the American claims with great energy. He made frequent visits to the National Palace, to the foreign office, to the president, and to other officials in the government. Nor were Wilson's visits always cordial and tactful. He freely

14. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 970.

15. Ibid., pp. 969-981.

16. These and other kinds of claims remained unsettled even after Wilson had resigned from office in October, 1913. See Chapter VI, p. 108. At least one claim, the Chamizal claim, is still unsettled at this writing.

admitted, "I have remonstrated in season and out of season, sometimes in words not compatible with my diplomatic character."¹⁷

A second group of claims that became the source of friction between Wilson and Madero arose from the situation of Americans being employed by the Mexican railways. As early as July, 1911, the union representative of the American employees protested to the American embassy against alleged discrimination. Mr. Frederick Dearing, at that time in charge of the embassy (Wilson being away on a short vacation into the interior) discussed the matter with the president of the company, an American, Mr. E. R. Brown, and was informed that a movement for complete Mexicanization of the railways had been on foot for over a year and that while American employees already in the service should not be discriminated against, Mexicans, everything else being equal, would be given preference in regard to new vacancies.¹⁸ It would appear to be reasonably certain that the protests of the American union employees had some justification. There can be little doubt that after July 1911, and following the success of the Madero revolt, the Madero regime, yielding before the political pressure upon it for jobs, was actively seeking for any loophole by which the number of foreigners employed in Mexico might be decreased. Accordingly the government adopted the position of requiring all railway employees to pass an examination in the Spanish language and stated that in the future all railway communications would be in the native language of the country. Wilson protested strenuously to President Madero, and

17. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 828.

18. The number of employees was 26,106 of whom 25,031 were Mexicans, and 1,075 foreigners, presumably Americans. Foreign Relations, 1912, p.910.

reported to the state department, "I went to see the President with Mr. Calero (the Mexican foreign minister) and persuaded him to take my view of the situation, and he finally promised he would recall the obnoxious order."¹⁹ The American employees discussed the policy of striking. In March, Wilson threatened Madero that the proposed strike of the American employees "would provoke retaliatory measures by United States labor organizations and that American employees of Mexican labor in the United States would be asked to follow the example set by the Mexican Government."²⁰ The controversy between Wilson and Madero continued through February and March, and in April, 1912, the Mexican government advised Wilson that the position of the American employees was intolerable and that "the Government could effectively operate the railways without American employees."²¹ Wilson, in return, sought permission from the state department to use more power than he possessed. "I shall be glad to be instructed to take active steps to secure just treatment for the men" he wrote the department, but the department silently declined to accede to Wilson's suggestion for instructions to take "active steps."²²

On April 16, 1912, the day before the American employees went on strike,²³ Wilson received a letter signed by representatives of the striking employees which read in part, "if our services should be needed by our country in handling troop trains in the Republic of Mexico, we will be able to furnish all the men needed and these men will thor-

19. Ibid., p. 722; italics are mine.

20. Ibid., p. 740.

21. Ibid., p. 918.

22. Ibid., p. 921.

23. Ibid.

oughly know the track they are to run over."²⁴ The fact that a letter addressed to the American ambassador calmly discussed the proposition of American troop trains in Mexico throws Wilson open to the charge that if he had not directly fostered the thought of a United States intervention and thus the termination of the Madero regime, his inaction had allowed these employees to entertain such a possibility. And when it was brought to his attention he made no attempt to obviate the impression.

A third claim that was a definite factor in Wilson's dissatisfaction with the Madero regime was that arising from the censorship in April, 1912, of the Associated Press. Wilson complained of the Madero government, "the government will probably forbid the Associated Press the exercise of its independence",²⁵ and Wilson asked for definite instructions "whether or not to make formal representations."²⁶ The state department in its reply expressed its decision that "no formal representations are desired" by the department.²⁷

A fourth claim that Wilson pressed upon Madero for settlement was a large claim for over 3,000,000 pesos for the massacre of over three-hundred Chinamen killed in the city of Torreon in May, 1911. It appears that there was no justification whatsoever for Wilson's personal service in this matter, other than the fact that the attorney representing the claimants was L. R. Wilfley, a close personal friend and one of Wilson's chief advisers. Madero held that to admit Wilson's

24. Ibid., p. 921.

25. Ibid., p. 779.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 781.

right to press this claim would constitute a precedent. He said that to do so would give notice to claimants of all nations that if they secured an American attorney the ambassador of the United States could be made their active and acknowledged advocate before the Mexican government.²⁸

Still another claim, not American, was pressed by Wilson, namely that of the Tlahualilo Company, a British corporation, with the majority of its stock and bond holders British. Wilson's activity in behalf of this claim was at the direction of the state department which urged Wilson to cooperate with the British minister in Mexico City.²⁹

In each of these five claim situations, the first, that of the claims for damages arising from firing across the border, the second with regard to the claims of the American employees of the Mexican railways, the third with regard to the censorship of the Associated Press, the fourth for damages to the Chinese residents, and the fifth, that of the British corporation, Wilson had not been successful in attaining a settlement in accordance with his wishes. One writer has said that Wilson had pursued an injudicious course, taking up too many claims at one time, and pressing them inopportunately with detriment to his own dignity and with no benefit to the claimants whom he represented.³⁰ Wilson readily admitted "frequently I have been obliged to use methods and an urgency ... perhaps not acceptable to the officials with whom I had to deal."³¹

28. Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

29. *Foreign Relations*, 1913, p. 1005. Wilson had been active on this claim since August, 1910, see *Foreign Relations*, 1913, p. 993. The president of the concern was an American, James Brown Potter, of New York, Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

30. Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-225.

31. *Foreign Relations*, 1912, p. 714.

Wilson's attitude toward Madero had progressively become one of dissatisfaction, then one of criticism, and finally one of open opposition.³² In February, 1912, Wilson attempted to stimulate a movement directed against Madero. Fully aware that "the members of the Catholic Party, the representatives of old families, and the commercial, financial, and foreign interests ... had the profoundest feeling of disgust and distrust for Madero, and that they would gladly assist in his downfall, but for fear of anarchy or United States intervention,"³³ Wilson, nevertheless, consorted with these groups and apparently cooperated with them in their opposition to Madero. Wilson rather vaguely reveals that he "most discreetly ... endeavored to induce leading members of the Catholic Party, of the old regime, of the commercial elements of the city to make some demonstration of a public character,"³⁴ and Wilson believed that such a movement was then under contemplation.³⁴

32. Some writers are of the opinion that Wilson was influenced in his views toward Madero by the relationships alleged to have existed between Wilson's family and western United States and Guggenheim mining interests. Bell, op. cit., pp. 137, 158, 161, 166. The New York Herald in an editorial on February 12, 1912, expressed the viewpoint that the Mexican agitation came from capital and stated that "American financial interests in Mexico ... are clamoring for American intervention." The editorial cautioned President Taft to closely scrutinize the demand for United States intervention in Mexico. It is difficult to corroborate the contention that there was a connection between Wilson and the Guggenheim interests. Some popular authors allege that there was a relationship between them, see Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico, pp. 329-330, but I have been unable to find any conclusive evidence to substantiate such contentions.

33. Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 722-723.

34. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 723. (Italics are mine.)

In still a further instance, Wilson evidenced his antagonism to Madero and his opposition to the continuance of the Madero government. In an interview with De la Barra, Wilson recommended that he "use the utmost diligence in supporting the present Government (of Madero) to the point where it was apparent it could not live, and then to use his influence with (the Mexican) Congress."³⁵ Wilson was quite clearly deeply concerned with the internal politics of Mexico. He had consulted with Madero's opposition and induced "leading members" of these groups to "make demonstrations" (against Madero). In his discussion with a prominent member of the opposition (De la Barra)³⁶ it was clearly discernible that Wilson's concern was directed not toward the possibility of perpetuation of the Madero government, but rather completely contemplative of its downfall.

In addition to the claims themselves as a source of friction between Wilson and Madero, Wilson was also very much dissatisfied with the method of handling the claims, and over this question engaged in a long controversey with both Madero and the state department. Upon assuming office, Madero had retained the claims commission which had been created by his predecessor, De la Barra. Wilson at first seemed inclined to accept this procedure, for he followed the regular routine of furnishing the claimants with the necessary forms and instructions for filing claims. However, he later became dissatisfied with the

35. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 800.

36. De la Barra was a leader in the Catholic party, and was that party's candidate for office; see Chapter III, p. 41. Later he was to flee from the Madero government. Following Madero's assassination, he returned to power in the cabinet of the Huerta government; see Chapter VI, p. 98.

progress that was being made and in January, 1912, recommended to the state department that a more satisfactory method of considering American claims would be by direct diplomatic representation.³⁷ This suggestion having elicited no immediate favorable response, Wilson within a week again recommended diplomatic treatment of American claims.³⁸ He stated his opinion that the claims commission was working very slowly, reported that he had written the foreign office two strong notes urging haste, and had also visited President Madero to urge preferential treatment in the handling of American claims. Wilson's recommendations to the state department for diplomatic action with regard to Mexican claims apparently became so insistent that the department cautioned him, urging a policy of patience, that "the United States desired not to embarrass the Mexican Government any more than was unavoidable and wished to give the Commission ample opportunity to consider and pass upon the cases submitted."³⁹ The department thought it desirable to state to Wilson a clear-cut method of procedure in the matter of claims; accordingly in April, 1912, the department instructed Wilson that he was to bring all claims to the attention of the Mexican government, and was to inform the claimants that legal remedies must be exhausted before having recourse to diplomatic action. The department then stated this principle: "that a government, as a general rule, is not considered responsible for damages caused to alien residents by revolutionists when the revolution-

37. Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 951-952.

38. Ibid., p. 953.

39. Ibid., p. 954.

ary disturbances have passed beyond the control of the parent government."⁴⁰ Later events show that Wilson persisted in his opinion as to how the American claims should be handled, and that in September, 1912, the state department forwarded to the Mexican government a strong note based on information furnished by Wilson.⁴¹ Wilson continued to advocate his proposal for the settlement of the American claims by diplomatic representation, and, following the sending of the note of September 15, 1912, urged that the note be treated almost in the nature of an ultimatum, and that the United States insist that Mexico comply with the demands therein.⁴² Wilson and the state department, however, always remained far apart on the matter of handling American claims and also the later matter of the recognition of Huerta, Madero's successor.⁴³ Agreement between Wilson and the state department was lacking so completely that their divergent viewpoints were ascribed by the state department as the reasons for the acceptance of Wilson's resignation in October, 1913.⁴⁴

In the meantime, political and economic conditions in Mexico were in a situation of unrest. The national elections in October, 1911,

40. Ibid., p. 961. Vol. 6 of Moore's Digest, pp. 809 et seq. on the question of a government's liability for injuries suffered by foreigners within its jurisdiction contains the following statement: "The rule ... which has generally been maintained ... is that while a government is bound to employ all reasonable means to prevent such disorders, it is not required to make indemnity for losses that may result from them, unless ... there is a special obligation of protection."

41. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 834.

42. See Chapter V, p. 77.

43. See Chapter VI, pp. 104-105.

44. Wilson, op. cit., p. 309.

and the inauguration of Madero in November, 1911, were followed by the congressional and state elections. Gustavo Madero, brother of the president, and by far the most politically astute member of the family was the political "boss" of the day. He had drawn up a list of candidates for state and congressional offices behind whom he wished to throw the weight of the Madero-created political organization, the Constitutional-Progressive party. In many cases the candidates favored by Gustavo Madero conflicted with political commitments made by the president prior to his attaining office. Nothing but confusion could result; in some states three or four candidates claimed an original presidential endorsement, and a most scurrilous denunciation of the administration took place by disappointed candidates. Madero hesitated between candidates when a firm and ready judgment might have effected a prompt solution. By dint of much electioneering and political jobbery, Gustavo Madero was successful in securing the election of a majority of Congressional candidates who owed allegiance to the Constitutional-Progressive party and to him personally as its power behind the chair of his president brother. The Maderos further solidified their power when on March 22, 1912, they were successful in electing their candidate, Senator Obregón, as President of the Congress, by a majority of thirty out of one hundred and seventy-eight.

In the months preceeding the sending of the United States note of September 15, 1912, Madero had to combat three revolts. The first had commenced even before Madero had taken office. After his unsuccessful campaign against Madero for the presidency, General Reyes fled from Mexico in September, 1911, charging the Maderos with hindering

his campaign. From the United States, Reyes began to formulate plans for a revolt. In December, 1911, the month following the inauguration of Madero, Reyes crossed the Rio Grande into Mexico and went to Linares in Nuevo Leon, where on Christmas morning his attempts to raise a revolt failed and he was captured and sent under heavy guard to Santiago Prison in Mexico City.⁴⁵ The second attempt at revolt against Madero was inaugurated on February 18, 1912, by Emilio Vásquez-Gómez, previously a candidate for the presidency and in 1910 one of the original leaders in the Madero revolt. Vásquez-Gómez, from San Antonio, Texas, issued a proclamation rebuking Madero, rejecting his election as illegal, and claiming the office of provisional president for himself.⁴⁶

The third revolt against Madero commenced in January, 1912, in the state of Chihuahua. It was led by Pascual Orozco, formerly Madero's trusted friend and close companion. Orozco had been one of Madero's chief assistants during the Madero revolt against Porfirio Diaz. After Madero came to power, Orozco made demands upon him for a money payment for his services.⁴⁷ Some money was paid to Orozco, but it appears his full demands were not met. Orozco then permitted himself to be subsidized by his erstwhile enemies, the Creel-Terrazas family. Aided by the financial backing of this immensely wealthy family, Orozco overthrew the state government, which had been favor-

45. Reyes remained in prison until released in the military revolt against Madero in February, 1913, at which time he met his death in leading an attack on the National Palace.

46. On April 7, 1912, the claims of Emilio Vásquez-Gómez were in turn rejected by the Orozco elements, then in revolt against Madero. *Foreign Relations, 1912*, p. 776.

47. Various estimated at from 50,000 to 100,000 pesos; see Callcott, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

able to Madero, and on February 6, 1912, Orozco himself assumed the governorship, replacing Abraham Gonzales. In an attempt to unseat Orozco, Madero sent federal troops against him, but they were disastrously defeated. The federal forces were then placed under the command of General Victoriano Huerta, who carried out a brilliant campaign resulting in a decisive government victory on July 3, 1912. Orozco fled, leaving the governorship vacant, and Huerta restored the office to Gonzales.⁴⁸

During this period of the first nine months of 1912, there was grave disorder in Mexico. The political mismanagement of the Maderos excited the animus and antagonism of those political candidates who were denied the Madero political support. Moreover, Madero, in his rise to power, could hardly have avoided incurring the displeasure of some dissident factions. Madero, who knew relatively little of handling an army, had to meet the demands of the regular federal army, in addition to the clamorings of his own victorious military supporters. But more important than the unrest in Mexico as a factor affecting relations between the United States and Mexico was the effect on the American state department of Wilson's reports on the

48. Madero had to deal later with two other revolts; one on October 16, 1912, and the one which unseated him in February, 1913. In October, 1912, the followers of Felix Díaz, a nephew of former President Díaz, presuming on the relationship and similarity of names attempted to capture the city of Vera Cruz. Madero forces, however, were successful in suppressing the rebellion on October 22, 1912, and Díaz was sentenced to be shot. His sentence was delayed and he was jailed in Mexico City where he remained until released along with Reyes, during the uprising of February, 1913. Priestly, op. cit., p. 407; Starr, op. cit., p. 314; Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 853, 858.

Mexican situation. Wilson, as dean of the diplomatic corps, possessed an initiative and an authority which in his hands became formidable powers, and a challenge to the free and unhampered actions of Mexico's president. The matter of reporting to the state department the situation in Mexico came to be of important consideration. Interpretations of the Mexican situation differed. The viewpoint as presented by Wilson was extremely pessimistic; never once in any of Wilson's reports was there indicated an expression of confidence in the Madero regime.⁴⁹ Moreover, any view reporting the situation in Mexico in a favorable light was challenged by Wilson as not in accordance with the facts. When others reported that the Madero government was acting with some approach to harmony and not without efficiency,⁵⁰ or that "the government is now stronger than for some time,"⁵¹ Wilson's dispatches were still replete with such phrases as "situation worse," or "profound unrest and apprehension, lack of confidence in the government," or "maurauding bandits."⁵² When Madero expressed his opinion that the situation in Mexico was improving greatly, Wilson, in reporting Madero's statement, cryptically commented, "I have no information to corroborate the optimistic views of the President."⁵³ Those, who in reporting the Mexican situation, expressed a view not in accordance with that held by Wilson were challenged as portraying "Arcadian conditions,"⁵⁴ or as

49. Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 713, 714, 716, 717, 718, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 727, 730, 731, 735, 739, 744, 753, 767, 802, 809, 810, 818, 824, 828, and others.

50. Bell, op. cit., pp. 205, 207, 209.

51. Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 858-859.

52. Ibid., pp. 716, 718, 722.

53. Ibid., p. 730.

54. Ibid., p. 809.

being "biased by their own interests,"⁵⁵ or with being optimistic.⁵⁶

When Calero, Mexican ambassador to the United States, stated that conditions in Mexico were improving, Wilson reported "no one knows better than Mr. Calero that his optimistic views of the situation here are not justified by the facts."⁵⁷ Those who represented that conditions in Mexico were improving were characterized by Wilson as recipients of past government favors and anticipating others yet to come.⁵⁸ In a long statement to the state department Wilson wrote, "I ought to call the special attention of the Department to the many irresponsible representatives of conditions in Mexico which are being made. The information which these people give to the press and the public is with rare exceptions biased by their own interests. There also seem to be irresponsible representatives of the press here, whose attitude seems to be, for reasons of self-interest, to portray Arcadian conditions which do not exist."⁵⁹ Wilson freely predicted the fall of the Madero government.⁶⁰ Unquestionably, Wilson's interpretation of the events in Mexico was that by which the state department was guided,⁶¹ and Wilson's reports to the state department had two very definite results. In February, 1912, after a series of notes⁶² from Wilson, the state department advised Americans in Mexico to use their own judgment in remaining in Mexico or leaving the country.⁶³ Again in March, 1912,

55. Ibid., pp. 809-810.

56. Ibid., p. 810.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., p. 811.

59. Ibid., pp. 809-811.

60. Ibid., pp. 767, 824-825.

61. Ibid., p. 716.

62. Ibid., pp. 713, 716.

63. Ibid., p. 720.

the state department instructed Wilson to advise Americans to withdraw from any particular locality from which withdrawal would be considered prudent. This matter of advising the withdrawal of Americans from Mexico was left to Wilson's discretion, and at a time when no other country found it necessary to advise its nationals to leave,⁶⁴ Wilson published in Mexico City a list of ten of the twenty-eight states in Mexico which he deemed as "known to be dangerous" and from which Americans were advised to immediately withdraw.⁶⁵ In effect this was stating to the people of Mexico that, in the opinion of the United States government, more than one-half the territory of their country was considered as dangerous to life and property.⁶⁶

Wilson's reports to the department voicing his interpretation of the events in Mexico had one other very definite result. They directly influenced mobilization of the United States troops on the Mexican border⁶⁷ and stimulated rumors of United States intervention in Mexico. On January 23, and again on February 3, 1912, Wilson sent reports to the state department which portrayed the situation in Mexico as much upset. Acting on these reports, the department asked President Taft to

64. Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

65. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 735. The ten districts named were: the states of Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero, Culiacán, Sinaloa, and parts of Coahuila, Zacatecas, Morelos, Vera Cruz, and Puebla.

66. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 733. Wilson published his statement as emanating from the state department in Washington. The department took exception to this and informed Wilson that the statement should have read as emanating from the embassy. But obviously the protest came too late to offset the effect of the published statement, and the Mexican public by then had well understood that the territory designated as dangerous was so designated in the opinion of the American state department. (The Italics are mine.)

67. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 716.

have the war department strengthen the border guard,⁶⁸ "but that it should be done quietly so as not to arouse unnecessary animosity."⁶⁹ However, a consolidation of American troops on her northern border cannot pass unnoticed in Mexico.⁷⁰ The Mexican press seized upon the situation and sensational reports were widely circulated. The action was freely interpreted as an expression of official United States displeasure with the Madero government. An immediate United States intervention was freely predicted. To say that the condition in Mexico warranted a United States intervention overlooks the difficulty that, with the first step toward an apparent intervention, the disturbances vastly increased; the mobilization order was not in itself remedial.

Though no United States intervention occurred, the state department, influenced by Wilson's notes,⁷¹ was so seriously considering intervention that on February 24, the department requested Wilson's opinion on a plan for United States troops to cross the boundary line as a police measure, and asked what effect it might have on Americans in Mexico.⁷² Wilson sent an immediate reply with detailed recommendations as to the intervention which now appeared about to become a certainty. He urged that demonstrations in force be made on the frontier, that American war vessels be dispatched to a designated list of Mexican ports, and that Americans be withdrawn from Mexico, and point-

68. Gruening, op. cit., p. 561, asserts it was a mobilization of the entire regular United States Army.

69. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 716.

70. For the effects in Mexico of rumors of United States intervention following a United States mobilization, see Chapter II, pp. 26-27.

71. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 724.

72. Ibid.

ed out that, "if we cross the frontier line, the possibilities are that we shall have to go further."⁷³ At this point the Mexican ambassador in Washington inquired of the state department as to the credit to be given to United States press reports of intervention in Mexico. The department delayed an immediate answer to the Mexican ambassador and quickly notified Wilson to renew an emphatic warning to the Mexican government that there must be no firing across the border into American territory. Upon being informed by Wilson that the Mexican government had promised to prevent such an occurrence, the state department then replied to the Mexican ambassador that the press rumors were false and without substantiation.⁷⁴

On still a third occasion, American intervention was a very real threat to Madero. The occasion was the controversey between Wilson and Madero over Francisco Villa whom Madero had assigned as a border chief-tan to assist Huerta in operations against the rebel Orozco. Villa had reported to Huerta, but afterwards led his followers on maurauding expeditions against a number of American-owned estates in the north. Wilson went to Madero and formally requested the arrest of Villa. Madero was reluctant and Wilson then suggested that Madero was forcing him to "ask my government to send troops across the border."⁷⁵ This suggestion proved effective and Madero then ordered the arrest of Villa.⁷⁶

73. Ibid., pp. 725-726.

74. Ibid., p. 880. The department explained that American troops were massed in Texas, at El Paso, merely as a deterrent to firing across the border.

75. Wilson, op. cit., p. 293.

76. Villa was tried and found guilty of maurauding and sentenced to death. Madero commuted the sentence to one of life imprisonment. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 851.

Relations between Mexico and the United States in the summer of 1912 were noticeably strained. Wilson had been instructed by the state department to communicate to the Mexican minister for foreign affairs a demand for adequate protection for American life and property, and a statement that the government of the United States would hold the Mexican people responsible for any departure from the principles of international law.⁷⁷ Wilson forwarded a note embodying these points and later reported that "it (the note) is variously construed", and "it produced a deep and confusing effect upon the public mind."⁷⁸ Mexico replied to this note with the statement that "the Mexican Government is fully cognizant of its duties ... to enforce respect for the generally accepted principles of international law" and does not recognize the right of the United States to give the warning in its note.⁷⁹ Following this reply to Wilson's note the state department asked Wilson for a copy. The department then stated to Wilson that his note represented certain alterations and omissions from the original text, and Wilson was instructed to file the note as originally written, in addition to his own note.⁸⁰ On May 7, Wilson complied with these instructions of the department.

In the summer of 1912, Wilson sent a number of reports to the state department in which he complained of the conditions in Mexico. On May 15, Wilson reported conditions to be "worse" and the government "inefficient and blundering in meeting emergencies."⁸¹ In June,

77. Ibid., p. 787.

78. Ibid., p. 790.

79. Ibid., pp. 792-793.

80. Ibid., p. 808.

81. Ibid., pp. 809, 810.

Wilson was in Washington and urged the department to detail naval vessels to make visits to both east and west coasts of Mexico.⁸² On July 24, Wilson reported growth of opposition to Madero in a revival of rebel activity. On August 15, and again on August 22, Wilson reported that conditions were worse and that the government was incompetent to meet the situation. On August 26, he stated his doubt that the government could dominate the situation. Wilson forwarded a long complaint to the department on August 28, stating that the Madero administration was growing in anti-American spirit.⁸³ Wilson referred to the matter of the "persecution" of the Associated Press and the "harrassing and discriminating of American interests" in what he termed the almost confiscatory tax on oil and in the treatment of the American railway employees. He recommended that "in view of our patience with the Government ... a positive stand is desirable" and complained about the petty tyrannies of officials. Wilson repeated all the statements of his previous telegrams and asked for the adoption of "some well-defined and positive course," again accusing the administration of being anti-American.

Based on the above and preceding notes⁸⁴ the assistant secretary of state, Huntington Wilson, discussed the Mexican situation with the Mexican ambassador on September 4, and on September 5, he forwarded to Wilson a voluminous note addressed to the Mexican foreign office, Wilson read the proposed note and made some additions.⁸⁵ The completed

82. This request was complied with, Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 818.

83. Ibid., pp. 828-832.

84. Ibid., p. 834.

85. Ibid., pp. 835, 840, 841-842.

note was again submitted to Wilson for his criticism and approval before being forwarded to the Mexican government. The note, dated September 15, was presented by Wilson on September 17, 1912, to the Mexican minister for foreign affairs, Pedro Lascurain. It represented the sum of the contentions and claims of the United States against Mexico and all subsequent correspondence on the matter of United States claims was related to this note of September 15, 1912. It consisted of a number of complaints that for the purposes of discussion might arbitrarily be grouped as criminal and civil complaints. Under the heading of criminal complaints was a two-fold charge: in the first place, that American nationals in Mexico had been murdered and that the authorities "had done practically nothing toward apprehending and punishing the murderers"; and in the second place, that Americans, having been arrested on frivolous charges, were refused admission to bail and consequently were imprisoned in insanitary and filthy jails.⁸⁶

Wilson specifically listed the names of sixteen Americans as having been murdered. The note contended, in regard to these cases, that nothing had been done toward apprehending and punishing the murderers. The records of the Mexican foreign office, as reported in the reply of the Mexican government, indicate that for the great majority of these cases, thirteen out of sixteen, this charge is inaccurate. In only three of the sixteen cases had nothing whatever been done toward apprehending the alleged murderers; in each of the remaining thirteen, an investigation of the deaths had been made. In two cases the defendants

86. Ibid., p. 842.

were serving prison terms.⁸⁷ In one case the defendant had been sentenced to death. In two cases the defendants were standing trial at the time of Wilson's note. In one case the defendant had been arrested, tried, and sentenced, but his release from prison had been obtained in one of the revolutionary turmoils.⁸⁸ In four cases legal proceedings had been commenced against the defendants, who were still at large.⁸⁹

The remaining three cases were the deaths of Patrick Glennon, A. L. Foster, and John G. D. Carroll, killed in Alamos, Lower California, June 11, 1911. These men, among many others, were engaged in a filibustering expedition in Lower California and were killed in skirmishes with Mexican federal forces.⁹⁰ California, in the latter part of 1910 and the early part of 1911, had a number of schemes proposing the invasion of Lower California. One Ferris, an American, published notices in the New York Herald, and the New York World, in February, 1911, soliciting the services of one-thousand men for a military expedition in connection with a proposed invasion of Lower California.⁹¹

87. Respectively nine and fifteen years; Ibid., p. 872.

88. Common procedure practiced by all factions was to empty the jails.

89. The time element might well be a factor in the non-apprehension of the defendants, for in two of these four cases, less than two months had elapsed between the commission of the alleged crimes on July 21, and August 15, 1912, and the sending of the note on September 17, 1912. Ibid., p. 842.

90. Ibid., p. 871. Such killings were the result of political movements in Mexico that had various aims, ranging from the establishment of a socialistic government in Mexico, to a secession of Lower California from Mexico, and a proposed admission of Lower California into the United States.

91. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 407. It was impossible for the United States Assistant Attorney General to obtain sufficient evidence against Ferris to convict him of violating the neutrality laws.. Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 470.

On February 23, 1911, one Simon Berthold was reported to be actively recruiting adventurers in the United States for service in Lower California against the Mexican government. In June, 1911, the ad-interim government of De la Barra was sufficiently strong to employ federal troops in Lower California. Permission was sought and received from the United States to transport Mexican federal forces from Chihuahua across United States territory to Lower California for the purpose of combatting those in revolt against the government.⁹² There were an estimated five-hundred persons in arms, most of whom were aliens, largely Americans.⁹³ It was this type of situation that gave rise to the killings of the above men and the inclusion in Wilson's note of these three cases, which he charged were those of "Americans, murdered in Mexico." With reference to these three cases, it is a principle generally accepted in international relations that the character of their crime placed them beyond the protection of the government of the United States because they voluntarily assumed the risk of their action which was in violation of the sovereignty and peace of the country in which they were received.⁹⁴

92. Ibid., p. 503.

93. Ibid., p. 500.

94. In a case similar to this one, the claims of two Americans for damages suffered while operating with Mexican rebel forces in the 1910-1911 revolt against the Diaz government, a commission appointed by the war department, in pursuance of the joint resolution of Congress approved August 9, 1912, returned the following ruling: "both these claimants were engaged at the time when their claims had their origin in violating the neutrality laws of their own country ... they are barred from asking that Government ... to take upon itself the task of seeking compensation for any damage or injury which may have come to them primarily as a result of their own wrongdoing." Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 969, 970, 971. The neutrality law referred to, was section nine of the Act, approved March 4, 1909,

The second part of the charge that may be classified as of a criminal nature, namely, that pertaining to the refusal of the Mexican authorities to admit defendants to bail, may be dismissed because not based on accurate information. Mexican law, at that time, provided that there be no admission to bail except when the penalty for the crime charged is less than seven years imprisonment. The obvious effect of this law would be to refuse the privilege of bail to those charged with the commission of serious offenses.⁹⁵

The United States note contained a number of charges of a civil nature, including a protest on the censorship of the Associated Press; a claim for suppression of The Mexican Herald, an American-owned daily; and a protest on the alleged confiscatory taxes on American oil interests in Mexico. That the Associated Press was operating under restrictions is true, but whether or not these restrictions were "unnecessary

providing:

Every citizen of the United States who within the territory or jurisdiction thereof accepts or exercises a commission to serve a foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people in war, by land or by sea, against any prince, state, colony, or people with whom the United States are at peace, shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than three years.

95. At the time of the United States note, this law was being studied with the aim of amending it, by enlarging the provisions for admissions to bail. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 874.

Mexico, in her reply charged that "many murders of Mexicans in the United States had gone unpunished", and specifically, "those of: Antonio Rodríguez, burnt alive in Rock Springs, Texas, November 9, 1910; Celso Cervantes murdered by an American policeman in Los Angeles; Damián Ríos, and an unknown Mexican, murdered in Texas, November, 1910; Cruz Rodríguez murdered in Del Río, by an American customs officer; Nicanor Trevino, murdered in Galveston, Texas, in June, 1911; Antonio Gámez, a boy, lynched in Thorndale in November, 1911." Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 871.

and irksome" may better be determined upon a consideration of all the facts in the case. At the time of the note, September, 1912, the Associated Press was making use of the Mexico City-Laredo telegraph wire on a day-to-day basis, paying the regular press charges, the Mexican government reserving to itself the right to suspend the service in what it termed the "interests of public order". The Associated Press in October, 1906, had been granted the use of the telegraph wires under a three-year verbal agreement. In 1909, the Mexican government (then under Díaz) sought to convert the agreement into a formal contract, but refused to press the matter against the opposition of the Associated Press. The contract was renewed verbally for another three-year period. In June, 1912, the Mexican government again sought to replace the verbal agreement by a formal contract and also sought to impose a monthly charge of two-hundred dollars for each additional journal subscribing to the Associated Press service. The Associated Press declined to agree to these provisions and, hence, at the time of the United States note, was utilizing the telegraph on a day-to-day basis.

The United States note contained a claim for damages for what it termed "unfair treatment" to The Mexican Herald. The paper had been a profitable venture during the Díaz regime from which it received a subsidy of eleven-hundred pesos a month.⁹⁶ With the accession of the Madero regime, the subsidy ceased and The Mexican Herald was no longer profitable. It commenced a subtle press attack on the Madero admini-

96. Subsidies to the press were common in the latter days of the Díaz regime. The government paid for the support it received from the press; one daily, El Imparcial, received fifty-four hundred pesos monthly. Bell, op. cit., p. 71.

stration. In March, 1912, upon news of the defeat of the Madero forces by Crozco, it printed in a special edition, in Spanish⁹⁷, a graphic account of the defeat of the government. It extolled the victory of the rebel forces and portrayed the Mexican situation as indicating an imminent fall of the Madero administration. Acting upon administration orders, the police of Mexico City suppressed this one issue as being against the interests of public order. However, permission to continue operating was not denied, but, notwithstanding, the paper voluntarily suspended subsequent editions, and claimed damages against the government for alleged suppression.

The third charge of a civil nature contained in the United States note was that American oil interests in Mexico were taxed "almost beyond endurance." The implication was that only American oil companies were taxed, but the fact is that all oil companies in Mexico, whether Mexican or non-Mexican, were taxed alike. The Mexican government arranged a meeting for the representatives of all the oil companies in Mexico and submitted to them the proposal of a stamp tax of twenty cents per ton, equivalent to three Mexican cents per barrel. The proposal had been accepted without protest by a majority of the companies. That "the tax proposed was less than the tax rate paid by oil in California"⁹⁸ was the contention made by the Mexican government. Nevertheless, a prominent part of the United States note was devoted to the charge that American oil companies in Mexico were being persecuted.

97. The paper was an evening paper normally printed in English.

98. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 644.

Shortly after delivery of the note of September 15, 1912, Wilson left Mexico and returned to the United States on a leave of absence, requested because of illness. He remained there until January, 1913. In subsequent correspondence, in reference to this note of September 15, Wilson devoted his efforts toward maintaining what he termed United States adhesion to the principles and demands therein set forth. The government of Mexico did not reply to the United States note until November 22, 1912, (which was after the presidential election in the United States, resulting in a change of administration), and its reply was a denial and rejection of all the charges contained in the United States note.

CHAPTER V

THE ACTIVITIES OF WILSON AND THE TERMINATION OF THE MADERO REGIME

As President, Madero was interested in striving to fulfill the pledges of his revolution. During the provisional presidency a beginning had been made in the field of education. For needy pupils, twenty-nine food establishments had been opened, sixteen in the Capitol and thirteen in the Federal District, with an average attendance of fifty-eight hundred. Twenty thousand suits of clothing and twelve thousand pairs of shoes were available for distribution as found necessary. The Mexican Congress had appropriated three hundred thousand pesos for educational purposes. Of this amount one hundred and sixty thousand pesos had been expended and fifty schools had actually been opened.

Though his attempts were far from satisfying the masses, Madero in January and February, 1912, had made some efforts to handle the land problem. He had issued two circulars urging the municipal authorities to take over and occupy communal lands.¹ One-hundred and thirty-seven town councils had applied to the federal department of public development for lands, and many of these cases had been settled. Through the cancelling of fraudulent land grants and the repossessing of lands affected by contracts which were broken by the grantees, the government added to its large holdings for distribution to the people.

Under Madero a larger measure of freedom of speech existed, as

1. Callcott, op. cit., p. 220.

exemplified by the fact that of nine papers circulating in the capitol, only two were favorable to the government and the rest were hostile in various degrees. The president was often mentioned in abusive terms and his acts criticized with bitterness. In Congress, members spoke out freely. The opposition to Madero, led in the senate by Francisco de la Barra, had a slight majority. But the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, was controlled by Madero.

The opposition to Madero was partly political in nature and partly motivated by a feeling that the Madero financial administration was corrupt and inefficient. A number of the senate opposition were men who were carry-overs from the Diaz regime. Some were conservative reactionaries who were opposed to Madero's social legislation. However, the Madero financial policies caused the most opposition. Immense sums in the nature of "pacification money" were constantly being paid by the Madero administration to individuals all over the country. Large sums of money were expended in paying off the debts incurred by Madero in his revolt. The treasury reserves were depleted. In the summer of 1911, seven hundred thousand pesos were paid to Gustavo Madero to reimburse him for money expended during the revolt.² The Madero administration, desirous of securing a loan of 100,000,000 pesos wished also to establish loan and banking connections which had not been formerly associated with the treasury operations of the Diaz regime. The opposition, probing Madero's expenditures, thus received additional support from that group of senators friendly to the financial interests formerly connected with

2. Bell, op. cit., p. 96.

the Diaz regime.³

In his dealings with Congress the finance minister, Ernesto Madero, uncle of the president, left himself very much open to questioning and criticism. Originally, he had asked Congress for a loan of twenty million pesos, then he doubled the amount, and finally he set the figure at one hundred million pesos. He announced to Congress that the loan could be secured at eighty-five pesos per hundred pesos par value when in reality the price agreed upon between himself and the provincial French banking syndicate was ninety-two.⁴ The Chamber approved the government bill as written, on January 13, 1913, but in the senate the bill became a political football. For three weeks the bill was in committee and the amount of the proposed loan was reduced to forty million pesos. The bill finally met defeat early in February, 1913, by a twenty to twenty tie vote. With an almost empty treasury, the administration was unable to progress further with its social aims.

In the meantime relations between the United States and Mexico were still in an unsettled state. In view of the impasse that had been created by the United States note of September 15, and the Mexican denial of its charges, Madero was ambitious to improve relations be-

3. Two groups of French bankers were competing to secure the loan; one group with headquarters in the City of Paris, and the second, The Syndicat des Banquiers de Province, a group of bankers from the provinces outside the city of Paris. It was the first of these two groups which had participated in the financial operations of the Diaz regime and had extended to Mexico a loan of one hundred and ten million gold dollars, with sixty-two per-cent of the customs receipts as security. It was the second group which was favored by the Maderos.

4. The loan was to run for fifty years at five per-cent. Bell, op. cit., pp. 235-236

tween the two governments and he sent his foreign minister, Pedro Lascurain, to Washington to discuss the situation with President Taft. Ambassador Wilson, having left Mexico following the sending of the September note, was still in New York in December, 1912, and January, 1913. Wilson felt that the purpose of Lascurain's visit was to secure delay in the hope that a new United States administration would enable the Mexican government to avoid complying with the demands presented in the note of September 15.⁵ Wilson met Lascurain in New York on December 21, and tried to persuade Lascurain to accept his viewpoint as to how the matter of the claims should be handled.⁶ Lascurain saw President Taft and Secretary Knox on January 2, 1913, and made a decidedly favorable impression. Lascurain, at the instruction of Madero, also obtained an interview with President-elect Woodrow Wilson.⁷ The results of this interview are not definitely discernible, but the purpose of the interview is clear from a telegram Madero sent to Lascurain in New York on December 23, 1912:

Before returning here, manage to obtain at all costs an interview with President-elect Wilson for the purpose of earnestly insisting that Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson shall not further continue at this post. If it is necessary, say to him, that the Mexican Government some time ago advised the Washington Government that he was non persona grata, but suspended action in order that the new President may dismiss him without representation from this Government. Explain

5. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 935.

6. Ibid., p. 985. Wilson alleged that his suggestion was made in response to a request from Lascurain. Wilson believed the matter should be handled by setting up an arbitral commission, but the state department rejected this suggestion of Wilson's.

7. Madero admired Woodrow Wilson very much and was delighted with his election as President. Ibid., p. 869.

the Mexican situation to him. Please answer. Francisco I. Madero.⁸

Upon returning to Mexico City early in January, 1913, Wilson was concerned with bringing the state department to share his position on the matter of the American claims against the Mexican government, despite the fact that the state department had already informed Wilson of the procedure it wished him to follow in this respect, namely, the treatment of individual cases as the occasions arose (Wilson had previously suggested collective treatment of all matters).⁹ Wilson requested the department to adopt a fixed policy, either that the United States would or would not hold Mexico liable for the claims. The day following his request Wilson again urged the adoption of his plan of collective rather than individual treatment of claims. A little more than a week afterwards, Wilson wrote the state department an urgent note stating that having assumed the position it had, in the note of September 15, 1912, the country could hardly retrace its steps. He appealed to the dignity of the United States. He stated that the possibility of the downfall of Madero should not be a factor that would deter the United States from taking a strong stand, since this possibility must have been understood when the note was sent. Wilson again urged a policy of collective rather than individual treatment of claims and enclosed a draft of a note, an almost exact repetition of the note

8. Wilson, op. cit., p. 234. I have been unable to find any more evidence on this point of Wilson's being persona non grata with the Mexican government. This may have been the attitude of the Mexican government, but no such statement was made to the United States government.

9. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 924.

of September 15, 1912, which he suggested be sent to the Madero administration.¹⁰

In maintaining his own viewpoint on the matter of claims, Wilson became critical of the attitude of the British government toward the Mexican claims situation, and requested that Washington persuade the British government to a point of view similar to that which he held. "It might be advisable", Wilson wrote to the state department, "for the Department to exchange views with the British Foreign Office for the purpose of arriving at a common understanding relative to the claims question. The British Minister here, (Mr. Stronge) agrees entirely too easily with the Mexican Foreign Office in matters affecting all classes of questions growing out of the revolution, and it might be well to secure uniformity of policy."¹¹ To these urgings of Wilson on the matter of claims the state department did not reply, beyond stating its intention to hold the Mexican government responsible to the full extent of the principles of international law for the injuries suffered by Americans in the Mexican disturbances.

In February, 1913, the opposition against Madero flared into open revolt. The professional politicians were tired of the whole Madero family. Many of the old military clique considered themselves as having been the victims of injustice. As far as is discernible, no outstanding commercial interest, domestic or foreign, was in sympathy with the aims of the Madero regime. General confusion existed, public

10. Ibid., p. 886.

11. Ibid., p. 936..

works projects were in a state of half-completion, lack of success of the government financial program had brought progress of government activity to a standstill. Madero himself was cognizant of the rising tide of opposition, but he still believed the people were with him and that there was strength in the masses. On the morning of February 9, 1913, regiments of the army were incited to rise against the Madero government. They marched to the government prison, and liberated Felix Diaz, jailed following his attempt at revolt in October, 1912, in Vera Cruz, and Bernardo Reyes, jailed after the termination of his unsuccessful revolt in Linares, in December, 1911. The freedom of both men was secured without difficulty and each led a column of men toward the center of the city. The plans of the revolt called for a quick capture of the National Palace with the aid of the corrupted Palace guard. However, this part of the conspiracy had been discovered, and the guard and its commander had been changed. When the rebels under Reyes advanced upon the Palace, their attack was met and repulsed. Reyes was killed, and the loyal Palace commander, General Villar, was wounded. Diaz and his column realizing that plans had gone astray turned their attack upon a government armory and captured it. Upon the arrival of Madero at the National Palace, it was decided to relieve the wounded Villar. Madero, acting upon the advice of his minister of war, Garcia Peña, appointed in charge of the government forces, General Victoriano Huerta, who in June, 1912, had led the Madero forces to a decisive victory over the rebel forces of Orozco.¹²

Ambassador Wilson had been awakened at seven o'clock with news of

12. Bell, op. cit., pp. 273-280.

the rebellion, and within three hours the working forces of the embassy were complete. The embassy was overwhelmed with a mass of fugitives of all nationalities. Wilson sent demands to both the government and rebel forces for protection of foreign life and property. Both warring factions set up artillery and proceeded to bombard each other over the roofs of the residential sections of the city. During the ten days of this promiscuous bombardment, from February 9, to February 19, there was no actual battle; three thousand rounds were fired by cannon at the Ciudadela, the rebel stronghold, and it was hit only eleven times. The bombardment was very much of a sham.¹³ Cavalry troops loyal to Madero were ordered to an attack and destruction against the walls of the Ciudadela. With great energy and industry, Wilson initiated the forming of organizations for the rescue of Americans and other foreigners. A commissariat, a medical aid corps, an American military guard, an embassy post and telegraph office were organized. Committees were created to locate residences for refugees, and to set up relief centers. Even a bank and a newspaper were established for the convenience of the refugees.

To a very great extent the history of Mexico has been molded by the geographical location of the United States on her northern border. For many years under the Diaz dictatorship, Mexico's domestic and foreign policies were dominated by strong United States economic and political forces. On February 12, 1913, the fourth day of the intermittent hostilities, Wilson made a visit to the National Palace to see President Madero and also a visit to the Ciudadela to interview

13. Gruening, *op. cit.*, p. 304, feels a single battery could have demolished the rebel stronghold; Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

Felix Díaz. In each visit Wilson was accompanied by other diplomatic representatives. Of the Díaz visit, in commenting on the hostilities then being carried on, Wilson reported that Díaz had received them with all the honors of war, and that Díaz regretted what was happening, but that Díaz could prove that his attitude from the beginning had been one of defense. Of the Madero visit, Wilson reported that Madero tried to fix the responsibility on Díaz, but that Madero's statements, "made no impression upon me."¹⁴ Wilson told Madero that United States vessels had been ordered to the various seaports as well as transports with United States marines, "which would be landed if necessary and brought to this city (Mexico City) to maintain order."¹⁵

Of greatest importance to Mexico, particularly in times of strife is the factor of official opinion in the United States. Wilson should have been cognizant of this fact, and its effect, when he stated to Madero that United States marines would be landed in Mexico. Madero could hardly have been ignorant of the history of United States foreign policy relative to the courses of events in Latin-American countries. He probably was acutely aware at the time of the recent activities of United States marines in countries bordering the Caribbean Sea. On February 14, 1913, therefore, two days following the conversation between Madero and Wilson, Madero sent his minister of state and trusted

14. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 706.

15. Ibid., pp. 701-703. On the second day of the revolt, Wilson had twice requested that war vessels be dispatched to Mexican waters. In response to these requests, American Navy ships were sent to Mexican ports. However, no mention was made of the sending of United States marines, much less of their landing on Mexican soil or of being dispatched to Mexico City to maintain order. This apparently was a deliberate falsehood by Wilson.

family friend, Pedro Lascurain, to see Wilson. Ascertaining the position of the United States was the all-important concern of Lascurain and Madero. Lascurain asked Wilson whether the United States had any intention of landing troops.¹⁶ Wilson did not offer any categorical reply, but in a verbose answer responded in a general and evasive way. Wilson reports that in response to Lascurain's specific request,

I replied that I had received no instructions in that matter and had no authority therein, but that he (Lascurain) must understand that it was possible that European powers were bringing pressure upon the Government (of the United States) and that if the situation here grew intolerable, involving great danger to foreign nationals, my Government would necessarily have to consider the question of obtaining that protection which the Mexican Government seemed unable to give.¹⁷

This answer, though evasive, led Lascurain to believe that the attitude of the United States was threatening.¹⁸ Wilson was aware of this impression because the final sentence in Wilson's note was, "He (Lascurain) is profoundly impressed with what he believes to be the threatening

16. Ibid., pp. 715-716. This meeting between Lascurain and Wilson is related in two notes, one on February 14, and the other three days later. In one, Wilson alleges that Lascurain told him in confidence that he felt Madero should resign, but this point, even if true, has no bearing on the matter of the concern of Mexico as to the intentions of the United States as expressed in the attitude of its ambassador.

17. Ibid., pp. 715-716. Wilson in this same note stated, "I have not mentioned the intentions of our government on any other occasion except on February 15, 1913." But this statement is false; see Wilson's own account of his meeting with Madero on February 12, 1913, in which he told Madero that, "vessels had been ordered to various seaports, as well as transports with marines, which would be landed if necessary and brought to this city to maintain order and afford protection to the lives and property of foreigners." Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 706-707.

18. Ibid., p. 708.

attitude of our Government."¹⁹ Wilson does not state what caused Lascurain to believe the United States attitude was threatening; the implication is clear, however, that Lascurain's impression came solely from his conversation with Wilson, and Wilson's past conversation with Madero. Had Wilson attempted to relieve Lascurain's anxiety he undoubtedly would have stated this fact, but there is nothing to indicate that Wilson said or did anything that would relieve Lascurain of the impression that the attitude of the United States government was threatening.

The landing of United States marines ostensibly would be for the protection of American lives and American property. But it could only have the contrary result. The Mexican people could interpret such a move either as an expression of the displeasure of the United States with the Madero administration, or as purely a foreign imperialistic venture. In either case chaos would seem inevitable. That Madero was not reassured by Lascurain's visit to Wilson, and that he appreciated the danger of his possible downfall if United States marines were landed are evidenced by the fact that on the day following Lascurain's visit to Wilson, February 15, 1913, the Mexican Charge d' Affaires in Washington handed a note to Secretary of State Knox urging that a landing of American marines be prevented.²⁰

On the evening of February 14, 1913, Wilson, making use of the initiative vested in him as dean of the diplomatic corps, asked the British, German, Spanish, and French diplomatic representatives to

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 709.

come to the embassy for consultation.²¹ The meeting began at one o'clock on the morning of February 15, and lasted about two hours. It was decided that President Madero should be asked to resign. In view of the tension already existing between Wilson and Madero, the former undoubtedly appreciated that he could not present to Madero the results of the midnight conference, and accordingly Spanish Minister Cologan went to see Madero. To the recommendation that he resign, Madero, after determining the participants of the conference and the procedure by which it had been summoned, replied that he did not recognize the right of diplomats to interfere in a domestic question. In the following note, Madero then had the Mexican embassy in Washington submit to Secretary of State Knox, a protest against this diplomatic activity of Wilson:

On the motion of Ambassador Wilson, with part of the Diplomatic Corps, one of its members was commissioned to notify President Madero that he should resign his office to settle the present conflict in the city. The President denied to these diplomatic representatives any right to interfere in the private affairs of the nation and declared to them that he had resolved to die at his post rather than to listen to foreign influence.²²

Upon receipt of this note, Knox wrote to Wilson on midnight, February 15, 1913, stating that President Taft would like to know as soon as possible what the embassy had said to the Mexican government regarding the landing of forces and what part the embassy had in the request to President Madero in regard to resigning made by a part of the diplomatic corps. Wilson did not reply until February 17, until after

21. Ibid., p. 710. Wilson later admitted this decision was reached without the benefit of instructions from the state department, and tried to justify his action by stating that the other participating diplomats also acted without instructions.

22. Ibid., p. 709.

President Taft had sent a reply to Madero on February 16, and then he avoided answering these two specific questions.²³

Later, on the same day that the Spanish minister had conveyed to Madero the request that he resign, Wilson himself visited the National Palace to see Huerta, the general in charge of the Madero defense forces. Instead of immediately seeing Huerta, however, Wilson was ushered into Madero's office, where Madero showed Wilson a copy of the above note which the Mexican embassy in Washington at that very time was presenting to the state department. Wilson told Madero that a considerable part of the telegram was misleading. Later, in a letter to the state department, Wilson criticised the Madero telegram as irregular, false, and misleading and asked President Taft to sharply rebuke what Wilson termed, "the threat on this Embassy."²⁴ Taft, however, had already written to Madero that it appeared Madero had been "somewhat misinformed as to the naval or other measures which had been taken, and that reports which appear to have reached you that orders have already been given to land forces were inaccurate."²⁵

One of the most important factors surrounding Madero just prior

23. Ibid., p. 713. Wilson in his reply referred the department to a number of telegrams, some of which are not at all pertinent to the point, and none of which answer the two specific questions of the department. Wilson, on the seventeenth, sent Madero a note denying he had any purpose of making an "official representation" that Madero resign. Wilson freely admitted he had instigated the meeting, but contended that it was purely "unofficial" and "intended in a friendly way." Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 718. I do not know what Wilson means by "official" and "unofficial" as he had used them here.

24. Ibid., pp. 712, 715.

25. Ibid., p. 715. Taft avoids stating by whom Madero had been misinformed.

to his downfall, was the relationship that existed between Wilson and Victoriano Huerta, the leader of the Madero forces. Wilson denied that he ever knew or saw General Huerta before February 15, 1913, (which was the date of Wilson's visit to the National Palace to see Huerta).²⁶ Wilson's statement may or may not be true, but even if true, that is not to say that Wilson was not aware of Huerta's identity, or did not know his character, or was not cognizant of the feeling that Madero had toward Huerta, or was not aware that Huerta's loyalty to Madero during the revolt was questioned. Wilson may not literally have known Huerta, but he must have been cognizant of Huerta's identity for the embassy military attache, Captain Burnside, spent a month with Huerta in the summer of 1912.²⁷ Moreover, Huerta was much in the public eye as the leader of the government forces against the rebel Orozco, and the Mexican press for many weeks was filled with the praise of Huerta.²⁸ When Huerta returned to Mexico City he was the recipient of the popular applause and many banquets were spread in his honor, and had all this escaped Wilson's attention he could not be said to have been observant.²⁹

Wilson was aware of Madero's feeling toward Huerta, knew that Madero distrusted Huerta and had it direct from Madero's lips that Huerta was "a very bad man."³⁰ Wilson may not actually have known Huerta, but as early as February 10, 1913, which was but the second day in the ten-day revolt in which Huerta finally overthrew Madero,

26. *Ibid.*, p. 768.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 768-775.

28. Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

30. Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

Wilson knew that Huerta's loyalty to Madero was questionable.³¹ But, notwithstanding Wilson's knowledge of Huerta's questionable loyalty, and of Madero's distrust of Huerta, Wilson, on February 15, went to the Palace to see Huerta and was so unbending in his insistence on seeing Huerta, that Madero yielded reluctantly, and only on the condition that his trusted minister, Lascurain, be present at the interview.

There is no agreement as to the method by which the actual relationship between Wilson and Huerta was established. During the morning of February 15, 1913, the seventh day of the revolt, a government battery was sent to the block near the American embassy. Wilson alleges that for the purpose of having the battery removed, he desired to communicate directly with General Huerta. But Wilson himself has given two different explanations as to how his contact with General Huerta was established. In one explanation, he stated that the American Consul General in Mexico City introduced him to a Mexican named Cepeda who volunteered to carry the necessary message to Huerta.³² At a later time, Wilson stated that he went to the crowd outside the embassy, and asked for a volunteer to carry a verbal message directly to General Huerta; and that Cepeda, "whom I had known for some time," said he would carry the message.³³ These two accounts are agreed in one particular; the messenger involved. Cepeda took Wilson's message to Huerta, and returned with a message that General Huerta desired a

31. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 701.

32. Ibid., p. 710.

33. Ibid., p. 768.

meeting with Wilson; Wilson told Cepeda he would be glad to meet Huerta.³⁴ On the same day, Wilson, with the German minister, went to the Palace and asked to see Huerta. Wilson was taken instead to see President Madero.³⁵ To Madero, Wilson made repeated requests to see Huerta, and finally yielding to his insistence Madero allowed Wilson to have an interview, but only in the presence of Minister Lascurain.³⁶ All that transpired during this meeting is not known. Whether or not, even with Minister Lascurain present, Wilson and Huerta could have reached some understanding is a matter for speculation. What is known is that Wilson made six demands with regard to the conduct of the warfare. It reasonably appears, however, that Huerta and Wilson may have reached some agreement, for on February 17, 1913, the day before the overthrow of Madero, Huerta sent a notice to Wilson by messenger that he should expect some action at any moment that would remove Madero from power.³⁷ Following the overthrow of Madero, Cepeda, the same go-between notified Wilson of Madero's seizure.³⁸

On February 17, 1913, the ninth day of the revolt, a rumor reached Wilson that the police had been instructed to arrest De la Barra. The rumor apparently had some weight, for at the time De la Barra had taken

34. Ibid., pp. 768-769.

35. It was during this visit that Madero informed Wilson of the note of protest which Madero had sent to the state department, with reference to Wilson's part in the request that Madero resign the presidency. See Chapter V, p. 87.

36. This fact demonstrates the faith that Madero had in Lascurain, and also that Madero was suspicious of both Wilson and Huerta; Wilson himself reported that a noticeable effort was made to prevent him from talking alone with Huerta. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 712.

37. Ibid., p. 718.

38. Ibid., p. 720.

refuge in the British legation. Wilson wrote a long and confidential dispatch to Minister Lascurain outlining De la Barra's prominence and advising Lascurain that any act of violence toward De la Barra would cause the profoundest indignation in the United States and in all civilized countries.³⁹ Wilson admitted that this circumstance of protest was beyond the province of his diplomatic attributes, but he believed it his duty to make the protest.⁴⁰ Notwithstanding that the dangers facing Madero about to be betrayed by the leader of his army would appear to be much greater than could possibly affect De la Barra under the diplomatic protection of the British government, Wilson on receiving notice from Huerta to expect action, with regard to Madero, exercised no such precautions as he took in the case of De la Barra. Wilson wrote no letter to Lascurain warning him of the danger of Madero. No letter was dispatched to Huerta cautioning him that any act of violence toward Madero would cause the profoundest indignation in the United States and all civilized countries.

Moreover, the concern that Wilson revealed upon hearing of a rumor to arrest De la Barra, whom Wilson knew to be safely ensconced in the British legation, was totally lacking upon Wilson's learning that Madero was a captive. On February 18, 1913, after having been officially informed by Huerta of the seizure of Madero, Wilson officially acknowledged Huerta's note and requested that Huerta strive for

39. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 269-270.

40. Ibid.

the maintainance of order.⁴¹ At the same time, Wilson sent Huerta a personal note stating that he relied upon Huerta's ability and good intentions to have a good result. In neither of these two notes did Wilson indicate the slightest concern for the welfare of the prisoner Madero.⁴² Where the likelihood of danger was so much greater in the case of Madero, as prisoner of Huerta, Wilson said or did nothing that would indicate to Madero's captors that Wilson or the United States or civilized countries would view with indignation any harm or act of violence against Madero.⁴³

Madero had been taken prisoner on February 18, 1913. General Blanquette at Huerta's orders entered Madero's office and the president and his party were overpowered. The vice-president and every cab-

41. Wilson later said that after receiving this notice from Huerta that he "regarded it for some time with incredulity." Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 768-769. But Wilson had been previously notified on the day before Madero's overthrow to expect Madero's removal. Ibid., p. 718. Moreover, Wilson had notified the state department at two p.m. on February 18, 1913, that Madero had been taken captive, (Ibid., p. 720) so that it is difficult to see how Wilson could have been incredulous at five p. m. on February 18, when Huerta notified him of that same fact. Some authors contend that Wilson had reported the fact of Madero's capture at noon, even before it had occurred; and Wilson himself is quoted as having stated that he had known about the plans for the overthrow of Madero for three days. See Gruening, op. cit., p. 568; Callcott, op. cit., p. 223; Sterling, op. cit., p. 472.

42. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 720.

43. In Wilson's own later account of the events on February 18, 1913, he asserts that after learning of Madero's capture, he dispatched one of the embassy messengers with a card to Huerta, reading, "On no account permit any violence against the persons of the President, and Vice-President." Assuming that what Wilson says is true, if Huerta ever received the card, it certainly could not have indicated to him any intentions of Wilson's, because this card was the personal card of Mrs. Wilson, the message was written in her handwriting, and was unsigned. Wilson, op. cit., p. 275.

inet member, but two, were arrested. Wilson was informed by Cepeda at two o'clock that Madero had been imprisoned,⁴⁴ and at five o'clock Wilson received official and direct notice of this fact from Huerta. The time of Madero's being taken prisoner is a matter of importance in the attempt to establish the extent of Wilson's involvement in the overthrow of Madero. One author states that Madero was taken prisoner shortly after noon on February 18;⁴⁵ the earliest official notice that Madero had been overthrown is in Wilson's telegram of two o'clock on that day.⁴⁶ There is a difference of opinion as to the time that Wilson is alleged to have known that Madero was overthrown. The situations surrounding the overthrow seem to indicate that Wilson had knowledge in advance of the exact details in the overthrow of Madero.⁴⁷

44. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 720.

45. Bell, op. cit., pp. 299-300.

46. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 720.

47. Gruening, op. cit., p. 567, asserts that Wilson notified the state department at noon on February 18, 1913, that Madero had been overthrown. Gruening also asserts that Madero was not overthrown until 1:30 p. m., or in other words Gruening contends that Wilson notified the state department that Madero had been taken prisoner an hour and a half before the coup d'etat had occurred. I have been unable to find any substantiation for the contention that the overthrow did not occur until 1:30 p. m. It may very well have, for Wilson notified the state department at two o'clock, and had the overthrow occurred at twelve noon as Bell asserts Wilson would have notified the department earlier. This is assuming, however, two points, namely, that the time for the overthrow would be about a half an hour, and that Wilson would have sent immediate notice of the fact to the state department.

For Gruening's first contention that Wilson notified the state department at noon on February 18, 1913, he quotes a telegram of Wilson's to the department, which is alleged to have been sent at noon on that date, and reads that Wilson understood that federal generals had taken control of the situation. Gruening gives as the source of this alleged telegram a publication Disorders in Mexico, Department of State, Division of Information, Series A, No. 95, Mexico, No. 18. I have been unable to trace either this telegram or the publication. I wrote to the department of state, and the division of research replied on November 17, 1939 that "the Department does not have available for distribution any copies of the

Following the overthrow of Madero, Wilson on the evening of February 18, 1913, invited Diaz and Huerta to come to the embassy so that some agreement might be reached between them. Wilson persuaded them to come to an agreement by threatening them with the possibility of

47. continued:

publication desired."

However, this contention of Gruening, that Wilson had advance knowledge of the overthrow of Madero would appear to have some weight. Wilson is quoted as saying that he had known about the plans to imprison Madero for three days. Marquez Sterling, Last Days of Madero, p. 472; Gruening, op. cit., p. 568; Callcott, op. cit., p. 223, agree and accept this statement as emanating from Wilson. Wilson is alleged to have made this statement on February 18, 1913, the day that Madero was taken prisoner, and this would place the date that Wilson is said to have acquired his knowledge that Madero was to be overthrown as February 15, 1913. I have no substantiation for this fact, though it is true that Wilson saw Huerta on February 15, but it was in the presence of Lascurain (see p. 88) and there is no evidence that Wilson did talk alone with Huerta. He may or may not have done so.

With regard to her interview with Wilson, Mrs. Madero has stated under oath that Wilson told her, "I knew all along that this was going to happen. That is why I suggested that your husband should resign." Mrs. Madero is then alleged to have asked, "But, if you knew all this in advance, Mr. Ambassador, why did you not warn my husband?" To this Wilson is alleged to have replied, "that would not have been good policy, because then he would have prevented it." Source: Gruening, op. cit., p. 570, who based his evidence on Mrs. Madero's sworn affidavit testifying to a conversation between herself and Wilson taken by R. H. Murray, New York World correspondent.

As further indication that Wilson may have known in advance that Madero was to have been overthrown, Callcott, op. cit., p. 223, quotes Wilson as having said that the coup was to have occurred, "in the morning."

United States intervention unless peace could be secured.⁴⁸ The agreement afterwards known as the Pact of the Embassy, was ingenuous in its effort to divide the spoils between Felix Diaz, the remaining living leader of the revolt, and Huerta who had brought the revolt to a successful conclusion. By the provisions of the Pact, Huerta was to be provisional president and Diaz was to name the cabinet and it was agreed that when the elections were held, Diaz should have the support of Huerta for the permanent presidency.⁴⁹ To the assembled diplomatic corps, Wilson announced the provision of the Pact and read to them the names of the new cabinet members.⁵⁰ The agreement was signed and placed in the embassy safe. Wilson realized that in all these arrangements he had been assuming considerable responsibility in proceeding without instructions in many important matters but he justified his activities, because he stated no harm had been done and he believed that Americans in Mexico would be benefited by the Huerta regime.⁵¹

48. Wilson, op. cit., p. 279.

49. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 720.

50. Gruening, op. cit., p. 568.

51. Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 722-723.

CHAPTER VI

THE END OF THE MADERO REGIME AND THE RESIGNATION AND DEATH OF WILSON

During the day of February 18, 1913, the day upon which President Madero was seized, his brother, Gustavo, was also taken prisoner, and on the day following, he was shot. Accounts as to how Gustavo met his death range from stories of death preceded by torture, to shooting resulting from an attempt to escape. Wilson reported the story that Gustavo Madero was killed by the simple process of ley de fuga. Huerta's explanation of the murder was that Gustavo Madero had been killed by soldiers without orders. On this same day, the Cuban minister, Marquez Sterling, wrote Wilson a note of definite warning of the danger surrounding President Madero and the deposed vice-president, Pino-Suárez. Sterling made the offer of the use of the Cuban cruiser, Cuba, in order to transport the deposed executives from Mexico. Also on this same day, Wilson visited Huerta, ostensibly for the purpose of "getting guarantees for public order," and during their conversation Huerta asked Wilson what should be done with Madero, whether it was better to send Madero out of the country or to place him in a lunatic asylum. Wilson, notwithstanding the expression of opinion he had received from the Cuban minister, and aside from the fact of the death of Gustavo Madero early on that day, made no plea for the safety of the president. To Huerta's request, Wilson replied that "Huerta ought to do that which was best for the peace of the country."¹

1. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 723.

That evening the resignations of Madero and Pino-Suarez were effected. Madero signed his resignation upon certain conditions, namely, that friends of Madero not be molested for political reasons, that Madero, Pino-Suarez, Gustavo Madero,² and their families be conducted to Vera Cruz, and that existing state governors be allowed to remain in office. Lascurain, as minister for foreign affairs, succeeded to the presidency and remained in office for forty-one minutes,³ long enough to appoint Huerta to the position of minister of gubernación, who thus became, by the provisions of the Constitution, next in line of succession to the presidency. Upon Lascurain's resignation, therefore, Huerta succeeded to the presidency, entirely in keeping with constitutional procedure.

On February 20, Wilson saw Huerta again, this time at the suggestion of and in the company of the German Minister, Von Hintze.⁴ Up to this time, two days after the capture of Madero, Wilson had not made any request of Huerta with regard to the safety of Madero; and during this visit Wilson made no such request. Wilson did make what he termed "a purely unofficial request", not that Madero's life be spared, but only that the utmost protection be provided to prevent the

-
2. Gustavo Madero had been taken prisoner on the eighteenth, and was dead at the time of this resignation. He had been killed shortly after 1:30 a. m. on February 19, 1913. Bell, op. cit., p. 304.
 3. The time was very short. Bell, op. cit., p. 307, states the time was twenty-six minutes.
 4. The German minister gives the date of this visit as February 19, 1913; Wilson, op. cit., p. 345. But this must be in error, since Wilson reports this visit as occurring on February 20, 1913; Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 724. Also if the visit was on the nineteenth it would not be consistent in point of time with other events on the twentieth such as Señora Madero's conversation with Wilson; Gruening, op. cit., p. 570; and Wilson's conversation with Huerta on the subject of trains for the Maderos in order to leave Mexico. Wilson, op. cit., p. 283.

taking of the lives of the deposed executives without due process of law.⁵ Huerta stated to Wilson that Madero would probably be tried (but upon what charges he did not state). Wilson was aware that Madero was being severely treated, but there is no record to indicate that Wilson made any protest to Huerta.⁶

While Wilson and Von Hintze were at the Palace, Mrs. Madero and her sister-in-law, Mercedes Madero, called at the embassy to see Wilson. Mrs. Wilson telephoned the Palace to inform Wilson that he had visitors, and upon Wilson's return to the embassy he interviewed the two women. Mrs. Madero asked Wilson to use his influence to protect the life of the president and the other prisoners, Pino-Suárez, and General Felipe Angeles. Wilson replied to Mrs. Madero's request by stating that the Huerta government did not desire Madero's death,

5. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 724. The fact is that Wilson apparently deliberately avoided extending the protection of his prestige and office to the luckless Madero. Wilson did request that certain captive cabinet officials should be released, but made no mention of Madero whatsoever. Wilson, op. cit., p. 278.

6. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 724. After reporting this fact to the state department, Wilson was informed that the department hoped no cruel treatment of Madero would take place, and directed Wilson that in his conversations with Huerta he might make use of this thought. However, there is no record of his ever having done so.

Wilson reported that later he "personally visited different members of the Cabinet for the purpose of expressing my deep concern for the preservation of the ex-President's life, and my desire that his treatment should be humane and considerate." Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 768-771. But Wilson does not allege that he made this or a comparable request to Huerta, who was the one person who could have "preserved" the life of Madero; see the reaction of Huerta in response to Wilson's request to Huerta that he release the members of the cabinet who had been taken prisoners. Wilson, op. cit., p. 278.

but on the contrary would protect him,⁷ and that he (Wilson) had received assurances regarding her husband's safety.⁸ Wilson expressed it as his opinion that Huerta would protect Madero.⁹ But later events reveal how completely Wilson had misjudged the situation. Mrs. Madero then gave Wilson a message addressed to President Taft, from Madero's mother, stating that Madero was in danger of his life, and making a plea for the intercession of President Taft in bringing about the fulfillment of the resignation agreement of Madero. Wilson believed Mrs. Madero to be unduly apprehensive and commented that it was unnecessary to send the note, but Mrs. Madero persisted, and Wilson promised to send it.¹⁰

During the night of February 22, 1913, and the early morning of February 23, Madero and Pino-Suarez were killed. Accounts of the assassinations are in wide disagreement.¹¹ Huerta issued an official

-
7. Mrs. Madero alleges that in answer to her request Wilson replied: "it (protecting the lives of the deposed executives) was a responsibility he did not care to undertake, either for himself or his Government." Gruening, *op. cit.*, p. 570.
8. Wilson alleges that he had received "assurances" from Huerta that no violence against Madero "was contemplated", but he avoids stating what these "assurances" were, or that the proposed assurances were ever effected. *Foreign Relations, 1913*, pp. 768-770; italics are mine.
9. *Foreign Relations, 1913*, pp. 768-770.
10. Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 315. No response was ever received to the message. On March 2, 1913, the widow of Madero sent from Havana a letter of inquiry addressed to President Taft, begging to know whether the message of February 20, had ever come into his hands. This inquiry also remained unanswered.
11. Gruening, *op. cit.*, p. 570; Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 321-324. These authors assert Madero was murdered by the officer in charge of the escort, Major Francisco Cardenas, who was later promoted by Huerta, but who fled from Mexico in 1915 to Guatemala, and subsequently made a full confession which was published in *La Nacion*, Havana, April 24, 1916.

explanation, stating that while transferring the two prisoners from the Palace to the penitentiary. the escort was attacked and the prisoners killed in an attempt to escape. Huerta promised that a strict investigation would be made. During the day, February 23, and the day following, Wilson directed efforts to ascertain the exact truth of what happened. The evidence of the last twelve persons claiming to be eyewitnesses of the assassinations was taken, but Wilson found a plain lack of agreement in their statements. Failing to determine the responsibility for the murders, Wilson called De la Barra¹² to the embassy and in a towering rage, and in a raised voice, he so denounced the crimes as to be clearly audible in adjoining rooms. Wilson upbraided De la Barra as being personally responsible for the incidents.¹³ Publicly, however, Wilson took quite a different attitude; he accepted the Huerta version of the killings, and also further recommended that the state department accept the Huerta version and consider the case closed.¹⁴

12. De la Barra, leader of the senate opposition against Madero, later became minister of foreign affairs in the cabinet of Huerta. Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

13. Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 320-321.

14. *Foreign Relations*, 1913, pp. 731, 736. The matter of Wilson's concern with the overthrow of Madero is still a much discussed question. Recently, *Time* stated in an article that "there have been sordid and silly chapters in the story of United States-Mexican relations. On the tawdry side was the dabbling of ... Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson (who helped plan the downfall and murder of Francisco Madero in 1913)." "Mexico, An Age of Trickery", *Time*, Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 27. *Time* based this statement on Ernest Gruening's work, *Mexico and Its Heritage*. A few months later there appeared in the *Editor's Column of Time* a letter signed by W. F. Buckley who asserted that the above quotation in *Time* was "a flagrant falsehood which had persisted for twenty-seven years." *Time*, Vol. 36, No. 24, p. 2. Mr. Buckley stated that Wilson had done everything possible to insure the safety of Madero. The editor of *Time* concluded that from the evidence submitted by Mr. Buckley it

14. Footnote continued:

"appears conclusive that Ambassador Wilson played no improper part in the Huerta-Díaz coup." Time, Vol. 36, No. 24, p. 2.

This correspondence implied that Mr. Buckley possessed evidence which would support the contention that Wilson's relations with Huerta and Díaz had been proper. But, on December 23, 1940, in replying to a request of the present writer for permission to examine his evidence, Mr. Buckley wrote: "I haven't any of these papers, but I would suggest you communicate with Mr. John V. Wilson, a son of Mr. Henry Lane Wilson." A letter addressed to Mr. John V. Wilson on January 10, 1941, has elicited no reply to date.

In his own defense Wilson has written a detailed account of his activities with regard to his efforts to allegedly insure the safety of Madero. Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 768-772. In the entire report Wilson at no time advances the contention that he made a simple, direct request that the lives of Madero and Pino-Suárez be spared. (Wilson had requested Huerta to release the members of the cabinet who had been taken prisoners, and they were all immediately released, but no mention whatsoever was made of Madero. Wilson, op. cit., p. 278.) It is reasonable to believe that had Wilson made any request that the lives of the deposed executives be spared, he would have been anxious to set forth this as a fact. (Wilson did claim that in two telegrams, those of February 19, at 10 p. m., and February 20, at 6 p. m., he had reported his alleged requests for Madero's life.) A careful reading of these two telegrams fails to substantiate Wilson's contention; see Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 723, 724.

In the meantime, following the overthrow of Madero and his subsequent assassination, Victoriano Carranza rose against Huerta, and declared his opposition to the Huerta administration. Carranza was one of the leading personalities of northern Mexico. In 1910, with the sanction of Porfirio Díaz, he had been a candidate for the governorship of the state of Coahuila, but Díaz had later repudiated his support of Carranza. Carranza then joined Madero's revolt, receiving first a military command, and later, in 1911, becoming Madero's provisional minister of war, and was elected governor of Coahuila.

Upon seizing power on February 18, 1913, Huerta sent telegrams bidding for the adhesion of the state governors. Wilson took a prominent part in attempting to gain adhesion of the dissident factors in Mexico to Huerta, and bent all his efforts to secure Carranza's adherence to the Huerta government. On February 20, 1913, Wilson sent a telegram to all American consuls stating that the Huerta government was to be recognized by all foreign governments on the twenty-first.¹⁵ On February 21, Carranza refused to recognize the usurpation, and called on neighboring state governors to join him. Frequently on his own responsibility,¹⁶ and in all possible ways, Wilson endeavored to procure the submission and adhesion to Huerta of all factors in Mexico. On March 6, 1913, Wilson sent Carranza an urgent message recommending immediate terms with Huerta.¹⁷ Carranza, however, declined the suggestion insisting upon the fundamental wrong of Huerta in unconstitution-

15. Ibid., p. 768. In view of later events this statement was untrue.

16. Ibid., p. 738.

17. Ibid., p. 758.

ally deposing and assassinating Madero. Also on the same day, Wilson sent Philip E. Holland, the American consul at Saltillo, the capitol of the state of Coahuila, the following telegram:

Assure Carranza that he is rebelling against a legally-constituted Provisional Government which is strongly fortified in the confidence of the country, and that his overthrow and defeat appear to the Embassy to be inevitable. With all energy and as a solemn warning urge upon him the necessity of immediately making terms with the Provisional Government.¹⁸

This message caused only resentment on the part of Carranza. Carranza told Consul Holland that he was in the fight to stay and that he believed the embassy to be largely responsible for the present condition of affairs. Carranza further told Holland that Wilson's telegram to Holland on February 20, 1913, stating that all foreign governments would recognize Huerta on the twenty-first was not the truth. Carranza expressed his opinion that the United States had not at that time recognized Huerta.¹⁹ In reporting the events of the Carranza rejection of Huerta, Wilson tended to minimize the support of the Carranza movement, and reported that Carranza had only about fifteen hundred followers. However, American Consul Luther T. Ellsworth at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz reported that Carranza had about six thousand men, though claiming twelve thousand. On March 10, 1913, the forces of Huerta and Carranza clashed at Monclova. Wilson reported the results of this battle as a Huerta victory,²⁰ but Ellsworth, closer to the scene of

18. Ibid., p. 767.

19. Carranza was right; the United States never did recognize Huerta. But Wilson's telegram to Holland of February 20. had been so misleading that Holland firmly believed that all foreign governments had recognized Huerta, and as late as March 6, 1913, relying on the statements in Wilson's telegram, he still believed that the United States had recognized Huerta, and he so assured Carranza. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 767.

20. Ibid., p. 762.

battle, reported Carranza's success was unquestionable.²¹ On March 31, Carranza decreed himself provisional president of Mexico.

In addition to making attempts to bring about adherence to Huerta, Wilson also commenced a series of attempts to secure the recognition of the Huerta government by the United States. American recognition, as Wilson continually reiterated, was necessary to the maintenance of Huerta.²² Recognition of Huerta by the United States was very obviously the one factor that would give his government an unquestioned semblance of legality. On the twentieth, at eight p. m., two days following the seizure of Madero and before his assassination, Wilson wired the state department requesting instructions as to the recognition of Huerta.²³ Within possibly an hour or two after sending this request, and without having received a reply thereto, Wilson called a meeting of the diplomatic corps at the embassy to discuss the matter of recognition of Huerta. Wilson expressed the hope his action would meet with the approval of the department.²⁴ On the following day two results of this meeting were evident. Wilson sent a telegram to all American consuls in Mexico, stating that the Huerta government was to be recognized by all foreign governments on February 21, 1913, making a plea for the adhesion of all elements in Mexico to Huerta; and urging the consuls to do all in their power to bring such a result about.²⁵ The second result was noted on the occasion of Huerta's reception for the diplo-

21. *Ibid.*, p. 763.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 768, *et seq.*

23. *Ibid.*, p. 725.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 726.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 732. The state department later suggested to Wilson the propriety of modifying this telegram; but there is no record of this ever having been done. *Ibid.*, p. 747.

matic corps at noon on February 21, 1913. Upon that occasion Wilson made a speech of congratulations with such enthusiasm, and so laudatory in nature, that the British minister (Mr. Stronge) was impressed by what appeared to him to be the imminent recognition of Huerta by the United States. This reaction of Mr. Stronge was reflected in his correspondence with the British foreign office, and became a factor in influencing British recognition of the Huerta government.²⁶

Wilson continued his efforts to effect American consular support for the Huerta government. On February 26, 1913, Wilson wrote to Consul Louis Hostetter at Hermosillo, capitol of the northern state of Sonora, urging him to exert himself without ceasing to bring about the general submission to Huerta.²⁷ Not satisfied that American consuls were exerting sufficient effort as enthusiastically as could be desired to secure adherence to Huerta, Wilson suggested to the state department that it bring pressure on the American consuls to instruct them to work for the submission of all opposition elements to Huerta.²⁸

In his efforts to secure United States recognition of Huerta, Wilson next had to resort to a new pressure, the matter of the American claims against Mexico. Wilson firmly believed that the opportunity was at hand for American interests in Mexico to benefit. He wired the state department, "This Government (Huerta) understands that I expect

26. Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 323. In explaining the British recognition of the Huerta government, the British foreign minister, Sir Edward Grey, was later quoted in the European press to the effect that the congratulatory speech of Wilson on February 21, 1913, had been a factor in influencing British recognition of Huerta. Wilson, while still Ambassador, publicly challenged the accuracy of this account. Secretary of State Bryan reprimanded Wilson, and sent the American ambassador in London to Sir Edward Grey with official apologies.

27. *Foreign Relations, 1913*, p. 751.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 762.

something to be done immediately, and there seems to be every disposition to be grateful to the embassy for its good offices to bring about a termination of the conflict."²⁹ A settlement of the American claims against Mexico undoubtedly would have been satisfactory to Wilson as representing an achievement of which he could be justly proud. Wilson wrote to Huerta on the matter of the claims, sharply criticising the late Madero as having lacked any desire to act in what Wilson termed a spirit of fairness toward the complaints in the United States note of September 15, 1912.³⁰ In reply, Huerta indicated a great willingness to please Wilson, and stated that the American complaints would receive immediate attention and have precedence over all other matters. Wilson urged a settlement of this matter before the new American administration took office on March 4, 1913.³¹

Wilson, a bit dubious as to how far he might be permitted to go in his program of collaborating with Huerta in what he believed to be the safeguarding of American interests, tried to feel out the state department in this regard, and sought the department's approval of the course he had been pursuing. Wilson wrote the state department:

It is assumed that in the course which I have adopted, I have the approval of the Department of State and the President, and an expression to that effect will enable me to proceed with great vigor and more confidence in a delicate question, work which I believe to be not only in the interest of our Government, but also in the interest of peace of this continent.³²

The state department, however, adopted a completely opportunistic position without any apparent intent to recognize Huerta. In reply to

29. Ibid., p. 730.

30. Ibid., p. 736.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., p. 738.

Wilson's specific suggestion for approval of the course he had been pursuing, the department stated that it was willing to receive assurances that the matters outstanding between the United States and Mexico would be dealt with in a satisfactory manner, but recommended that such unofficial activities be kept within the limits of cautious circumspection.³³

With no immediate United States recognition of Huerta forthcoming, Wilson directed his efforts toward the prevention of the adoption by the department of any position that would preclude recognition at a later time. Wilson suggested to the department that if it had no intention of an immediate recognition of Huerta, at least to refrain from so stating, because of the depressing effect which would result.³⁴ The department, while agreeing on February 25, 1913, to this suggestion, very definitely stated to Wilson that in the matter of a United States recognition of Huerta, Wilson was to be guided by President Taft's direction, and that the existing departmental policy was that no formal recognition was to be accorded Huerta except upon specific instruction from the department.³⁵ The department, because of the American press furor over the assassinations of Madero and Pino-Suarez, felt it to be the policy of wisdom to avoid any semblance of approval of the Huerta regime, and on February 26, 1913, reiterated to Wilson that any formal recognition of the Huerta government was to be avoided.³⁶ This statement of policy with regard to the recognition of Huerta, re-

33. Ibid., p. 747.

34. Ibid., p. 738.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., p. 749.

ardless of Wilson's continued urgings and recommendations, was the final position of the Taft government.

On March 4, 1913, the Democratic administration of Woodrow Wilson assumed office with William Jennings Bryan as secretary of state. In accordance with diplomatic custom, Wilson submitted his resignation, but it was not accepted until some months later, on October 14, 1913.³⁷ From March to June, 1913, Wilson dispatched a series of notes³⁸ to the state department with the aim of securing United States recognition of Huerta. Wilson made lengthy pleas for recognition of Huerta, drew an analogy between the legality of the Huerta government and the incumbency of the De la Barra government in 1911, argued that United States recognition was essential to the maintainance of the Huerta government, suggested that non-recognition would appear to be an expression of sympathy for the Huerta opposition, and contended that recognition should be accorded purely as a matter of expediency and in the interests of the American claimants.³⁹ But the Woodrow Wilson administration evidently had no intention of recognizing the Huerta government. Just what its policy was remained unannounced until June 15, 1913; and while declining to accept Wilson's recommendations as to recognition, the administration also declined to accept Wilson's resignation and

37. Before the inaugural of Woodrow Wilson as President, Ambassador Wilson sent a confidential communication to Vice-President-elect Marshall, whom Wilson knew very well, expressing his desire to retire from the post as soon as the public interest would permit. This letter was read to the President and destroyed in his presence. Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 289-290. 56th Cong. 2nd Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 285, p. 2299. Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

38. Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 768, 790, 803, 807.

39. Ibid., pp. 768, et seq.

retained him at Mexico City.

From the beginning the administration found it necessary to step warily in order to avoid any inadvertent recognition of Huerta. When Huerta dispatched to Washington a congratulatory telegram upon the inaugural of Woodrow Wilson, the state department sent a reply to Huerta addressed simply to "General Huerta," which was merely an acknowledgment of the receipt of the congratulatory message. Besides avoiding the recognition of Huerta, the administration was also interested in precluding other countries from recognizing the Huerta government. Accordingly, when Brazil sounded out the United States as to administrative reaction to a Brazillian recognition of Huerta, Bryan suggested that Brazil refrain from so doing.⁴⁰

In addition to avoiding a recognition of the Huerta government, the Wilson administration definitely evidenced a lack of confidence in that government and insisted on keeping American warships in Mexican territorial waters. The warships had been rushed to both Atlantic and Pacific ports in February, 1913, during the revolt which had unseated Madero. Huerta protested the presence of the warships and contended it was a breach of the Mexican Constitution for vessels of a foreign nation to be stationed in Mexican territorial waters. Determined to keep the warships there by one ruse or another, Bryan first contended that the clauses in the Mexican Constitution had reference to foreign fleets or squadrons, and not to a small number of vessels.⁴¹ However, Bryan avoided further protests of the Huerta government by removing the war-

40. Ibid., pp. 790, 805, 806. The recognition of Argentina and Chile, depended upon whatever action was taken by Brazil. However, the Huerta government was recognized by a number of countries including Britain, Spain, and Germany, and Wilson reported each recognition in detail.

41. Ibid., p. 799.

ships and replacing them with others. The state department then notified Wilson to request for the replacements the usual naval courtesies accorded to new ships.⁴² Huerta had made many protests to Wilson with reference to the continued presence of the American ships, and Wilson had relayed these protests to the state department. Meeting with no success in his endeavors to comply with Huerta's requests, Wilson finally had to recommend to Huerta that more satisfactory results might be achieved if the discussions were transferred to the Mexican embassy in Washington.⁴³

On May 7, 1913, Huerta, greatly irritated at the persistent refusal of the United States to accord him recognition, and apparently losing faith in the efficacy of Wilson's efforts to effect this happy result, flatly declared to Wilson that unless and until the United States should decide to recognize him as President of Mexico there would be no settlement of the American claims.⁴⁴ Wilson reported to the department Huerta's statement to him that:

the administration (Mexican) regards as unwise the attitude of the United States in refusing to afford in unofficial recognition, that such an attitude was susceptible to an unfriendly interpretation. He said his Government did not feel it would be justified in view of a hostile public opinion and of the undignified position it would be placed by so doing in concluding the important questions at present pending between the two Governments -- that is to say, the Chamizal and Colorado River cases, and the special and general claims cases. He added that the views of the United States had been accepted in principle by this Government and that whenever the Government of the United States would place the Government (Mexican) in the position of settling the questions as matters between two friendly and sovereign, if not equally powerful countries, their solution might be expected.⁴⁵

42. Ibid., p. 793.

43. Ibid., p. 781.

44. Ibid., p. 799.

45. Ibid.,

Huerta followed this statement of policy with a public statement that, in the future, relations with Wilson would be confined to simple routine matters and no important questions would be discussed with the embassy.⁴⁶ This attitude of the Huerta government quickly permeated subordinate Mexican officialdom. Transactions of business of any kind by Wilson now became practically impossible; no attention was paid to his representations.⁴⁷ Wilson felt the under-secretary of foreign affairs was intolerably insolent in his attitude, and only after threatening Huerta that he would bring matters to a crisis was Wilson able to procure dismissal of the offending employee.⁴⁸ Wilson himself fully understood the situation. He reported to the state department that he was left with hardly the functions of a simple Chargé d'Affaires. Stories were circulating about the attitude of the Woodrow Wilson administration toward Wilson.⁴⁹ President Wilson sent personal representatives to Mexico, while retaining Wilson in Mexico City, and this contributed to the derision of the Huerta government for Wilson, and effectively detracted from the dignity of the embassy.⁵⁰ The situation from Wilson's viewpoint must have been intolerable. Twice he quite insistently offered his resignation and both times it was declined.⁵¹ Wilson felt keenly the refusal of the President Wilson administration to accord recognition to Huerta.⁵² His own inability to induce recognition de-

46. Ibid., p. 800.

47. Ibid., p. 810.

48. Ibid.

49. 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 285, p. 2299.

50. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 808.

51. Stuart, op. cit., pp. 325, 326.

52. Wilson, op. cit., p. 300.

tracted from the respect and deference with which the Mexican people had been taught to regard him.⁵³

On June 15, 1913, the state department made the first clear-cut pronouncement in reference to Mexican affairs and stated its policy to be that recognition would be denied any government established in Mexico by revolution, if the revolution lacked justice. Wilson relayed this statement of policy to Huerta who in turn defined future Mexican policy to be one of ignoring the United States, and stated that while American recognition would be welcome, it had ceased to be essential.⁵⁴

Wilson's attitude toward representing the United States at Mexico City now became rather negative. He ceased attending meetings of the diplomatic corps, and refrained from discussion even of those matters of common interest to all governments.⁵⁵ At the wish of the department, Wilson on July 4, 1913, absented himself from Mexico City and the customary celebration ceremonies, in order to avoid any untoward incidents. Shortly thereafter, the state department requested Wilson to come to Washington. Unattended by any representative of the Huerta regime Wilson left the railway station in Mexico City,⁵⁶ and on July 17, sailed for the United States arriving in New York on July 26. After his arrival, Wilson took a few weeks' vacation, and in the latter part of August he was called to the state department for an interview with the president. His resignation was accepted, effective October 14, 1913.

53. Ibid.

54. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 301, 304.

55. Ibid., p. 304.

56. Ibid., p. 371.

The formal account of the resignation merely stated that Wilson had resigned because of an inability to agree with the administration policy with regard to the Mexican situation. The president requested that Wilson not return to Mexico for fear that his presence might result in street demonstrations.⁵⁷

In the meantime, the Huerta government had become violently anti-American.⁵⁸ There was a rising tide of anti-American demonstrations, and the press published inciting articles inspired by the Huerta regime. Huerta was consolidating his own power. The cabinet, which had been chosen by Felix Díaz, under the terms of the Pact of the Embassy, was soon reorganized and the positions filled with Huerta supporters. Most of the political changes in the government registered the diminution of the Díaz influence. In September, Huerta was attacked in the senate chamber, by Senator Belisario Dominguez of Chiapas who sought to have the senate depose Huerta. Two weeks later, October 7, 1913, the body of Senator Dominguez was found; he had been the victim of a particularly brutal murder. The Chamber of Deputies now ordered an investigation of the Dominguez murder and on October 10, over one hundred members of the Chamber were arrested, and on October 11, 1913, Huerta proclaimed that the legislative and judicial functions were combined with those of the executive and reposed in himself.⁵⁹

Following his resignation, Wilson did not return to the practice of law, though he still maintained his interest in the profession. He visited various sections of the country on a lecture tour, engaged in

57. Ibid., p. 309.

58. Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 810, 811, 812.

59. Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 844-846.

a limited amount of magazine writing and turned his attention to organization work. He was a member of the Sons of Colonial Wars, Sons of the Revolution, Sons of the American Revolution and Loyal Legion, the Lotos of New York, and several other prominent organizations.⁶⁰ He was a contributor of many articles to leading periodicals of a political nature. He wrote occasional works of fiction under a nom de plume. Wilson, during 1915, 1916, and 1917 served as vice-president of the World Court League, and held offices in the Security League and The League to Enforce Peace. In 1923, President Coolidge offered Wilson the appointment as ambassador to Turkey, but because of delays the appointment was never made.⁶¹ Wilson retired from public life in 1928, and was in poor health until the time of his death from pneumonia, December 22, 1932, in Indianapolis, Indiana.

60. Dictionary of American Biography, Vol.20, p.325; the National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Vol. 12, p. 126.

61. New York Times, December 23, 1932.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

1. Ackerman, Carl William.
Mexico's Dilemma.
George H. Doran Co., New York, 1927.
2. Baerlein, Henry.
Mexico, the Land of Unrest.
J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1913.
3. Baker, Ray Stannard.
Life and Letters of Woodrow Wilson.
Doubleday, Page and Co., New York, 1927.
4. -----
The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson.
Harper and Brothers, New York, 1925.
5. Beals, Carleton.
American South.
J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1938.
6. -----
Mexican Maze.
J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1931.
7. -----
Porfirio Díaz.
J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1932.
8. Bell, Edward I.
The Political Shame of Mexico.
McBride, Nast and Co., New York, 1914.
9. Bemis, Samuel F., ed.
American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. Vols. IX, X.
A. A. Knopf, New York, 1927-1929.
10. Beteta, Ramón.
The Mexican Revolution.
Dapp, Mexico, 1937.
11. Blakeslee, George Hubbard, ed.
Mexico and the Caribbean.
G. E. Stechert and Co., New York, 1920.
12. Bulnes, Francisco.
The Whole Truth About Mexico.
M. Bulnes Book Company, New York, 1916.

13. Callahan, James Morton.
American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations.
The Macmillan Co., New York, 1920.
14. Callcott, Wilfrid Hardy.
Liberalism in Mexico.
Stanford University Press, Stanford University, California, 1931.
15. Davis, Sherwood.
Attitude of Mexico Toward the United States.
Unpublished dissertation, Vanderbilt University, Nashville,
Tennessee, 1925.
16. Davis, William Brownlee.
Experiences and Observations of an American Consular Officer
During the Recent Mexican Revolutions.
The Author, Chula Vista, California, 1920.
17. Dictionary of American Biography.
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1936, Vol. XX.
18. Feller, Abraham Howard.
The Mexican Claims Commissions, 1923-1934.
The Macmillan Co., 1935.
19. Fornaro, Carlo de.
Carranza and Mexico.
E. Kennerly, New York, 1915.
20. Fyfe, Henry Hamilton.
The Real Mexico.
McBride, Nast and Co., New York, 1914.
21. Gonzales Roa, Fernando.
The Mexican People and Their Detractors.
Latin-American News Association, New York, 1916.
22. Gregory, Thomas B.
Our Mexican Conflicts.
Hearst's International Library Co., New York, 1914.
23. Gruening, Ernest Henry.
Mexico and Its Heritage.
The Century Co., New York and London, 1928.
24. Hoyt, Agnes Howard.
The Policies of the United States with Respect to Recognition of
Governments in Mexico from 1910 to 1923.
Unpublished dissertation, University of Arizona, Tucson, 1929.
25. Kluckhohn, Frank L.
The Mexican Challenge.
Doubleday, Doran and Co., New York, 1939.

26. Lane, Franklin Knight.
The President's Mexican Policy.
Latin-American News Association, New York, 1916.
27. Latané, John.
United States and Latin America.
Doubleday, Page and Co., Garden City, New York, 1920.
28. McCann, Irving Goff.
With the National Guard on the Border.
C. V. Mosby Co., St. Louis, 1917.
29.
Mexican Year Book of 1914.
Mexico City, n. d.
30.
Mexican Year Book of 1920-21.
Mexican Yearbook Publishing Co., Los Angeles, 1922.
31. Moore, John Bassett.
A Digest of International Law.
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1906.
32.
National Cyclopaedia of American Biography. Vol. XII.
James T. White and Co., New York, 1904.
33. O'Shaughnessy, Mrs. Edith Louise.
A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico.
Harper Brothers, New York, 1916.
34. Palencia, José.
Mexican Government.
Mexican Society of Publications. Mexico, 1937.
35. Parkes, Henry Bamford.
A History of Mexico.
Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1939.
36. Peck, George Curtis.
Madero Revolution from an American Viewpoint.
Unpublished dissertation, American University, Washington, 1926.
37. Pinchon, Edgcumb.
Viva Villa.
Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1933.
38. Plenn, Jamie Harrysson.
Mexico Marches.
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., New York, 1939.

39. Priestley, Herbert Ingram.
The Mexican Nation, A History.
The Macmillan Co., New York, 1923.
40. Richardson, James Daniel., ed.
A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
Vols. 17, 18.
Bureau of National Literature, Washington, 1897-1914.
41. Rippy, James Fred.
United States and Mexico.
A. A. Knopf, New York, 1926.
42. Ross, Edward Alsworth.
The Social Revolution in Mexico.
The Century Co., New York, 1923.
43. Saenz, Moises.
Some Mexican Problems.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1926.
44. Smith, Randolph Wellford.
Benighted Mexico.
John Lane Co., New York, 1916.
45. Starr, Frederick.
Mexico and the United States.
The Bible House, Chicago, 1914.
46. Story, Russell M., ed.
Mexico.
The Inter-America Institute, Claremont, California, 1929.
47. Stuart, Graham H.
American Diplomatic and Consular Practice.
D. Appleton-Century Co., New York, 1936.
48. Tannenbaum, Frank.
The Mexican Agrarian Revolution.
The Macmillan Co., New York, 1929.
49. Teja Zabre, Alfonso.
Guide to History of Mexico.
Press of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico, 1935.
50. Tompkins, Frank.
Chasing Villa.
The Military Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1934 .
51. Trowbridge, Edward Dwight.
Mexico, Today and Tomorrow.
The Macmillan Co., New York, 1919.

52. Tumulty, Joseph P.
Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him.
Doubleday, Page and Co., Garden City, New York, 1921.
53. Turlington, Edgar Willis.
Mexico and Her Foreign Creditors.
Columbia University Press, New York, 1930.
54. Wilson, Henry Lane.
Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile.
Doubleday, Page and Co., Garden City, New York, 1927.
55. Winter, Nevin Otto.
Mexico and Her People of Today.
L. C. Page and Co., Boston, 1923.
56. Winton, George,
Mexico Today.
Missionary Education Movement of United States and Canada, New York, 1916.

NEWSPAPERS

1. Arizona Daily Star, August 15, 1913.
2. New York Times, December 23, 1932.
3. Tucson Daily Citizen, November 21, 1940.

ARTICLES IN PERIODICALS

1. Anonymous.
"The Progress of the World."
The American Review of Reviews, Vol. 40, No. 2, (August, 1909.)
2. -----
"The Week."
The Nation, Vol. 97, No. 2509, (July 31, 1913.)
3. -----
"Mexico, An Age of Trickery."
Time, Vol. 36, No. 3, (July 15, 1940.)
4. Calles, Plutarco Elias.
"A Hundred Years of Revolution."
The Survey, Vol. 52, No. 3, (May 1, 1924.)
5. De Negri, Ramon P.
"The Agrarian Problem."
The Survey, Vol. 52, No. 3, (May 1, 1924.)

6. Gillette, Cassius E.
 "Mexico; Its People and Its Problem."
The Annals, Vol. 54, (July, 1914), American Academy of Political
 and Social Science.
7. Hart, Albert Bushnell.
 "The Postulates of the Mexican Situation."
The Annals, Vol. 54, (July, 1914), American Academy of Political
 and Social Science.
8. Kerr, Robert J.
 "American Citizens in Foreign Countries."
The Annals, Vol. 54, (July, 1914), American Academy of Political
 and Social Science.
9. McCaleb, Walter F.
 "The Press of Mexico."
Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, (August, 1920.)
10. Mondell, Frank W.
 "The Duty of the United States Toward Mexico."
The Annals, Vol. 54, (July, 1914), American Academy of Political
 and Social Science.
11. Murray, Robert Hammond.
 "Huerta and the Two Wilsons."
Harper's Weekly, Vol. 62, Nos. 3092-3097, (March 25, 1916 - April
 29, 1916.)
12. Priestley, Herbert Ingram.
 "Mexican Literature on the Recent Revolution."
Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, (May, 1919.)
13. Rowe, L. S.
 "The Scope and Limits of Our Obligations Toward Mexico."
The Annals, Vol. 54, (July, 1914), American Academy of Political
 and Social Science.
14. Steffens, Lincoln.
 "A Reply to Mr. Wilson."
Harper's Weekly, Vol. 62, No. 3094, (April 8, 1916).
15. Wilson, Henry Lane.
 "Errors With Reference to Mexico and Events that Have Occurred
 There."
The Annals, Vol. 54, (July, 1914), American Academy of Political
 and Social Science.
16. -----.
 "Last Phases in Mexico."
The Forum, Vol. 62, (September, 1919).

17. -----
 "The Latest Phase of the Mexican Situation."
The Independent, Vol. 76, No. 3389, (November 13, 1913).
18. -----
 "What Must Be Done With Mexico."
The Forum, Vol. 62, (September, 1919).

PUBLISHED OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

1. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913.
 Government Printing Office, Washington, 1915-1920.
2. Sixty-Second Congress, First Session, Senate Document, No. 25,
 1911, Vol. 27, No. 25.
Affairs in Mexico.
 Government Printing Office, Washington, 1911.
3. Sixty-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Senate Document, No. 285,
 1920, Vols. IX, X.
Investigation of Mexican Affairs.
 Government Printing Office, Washington, 1920.