

THE GRIEVANCE MACHINERY UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
IN SELECTED WESTERN AMERICAN MUNICIPALITIES

by

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ABSTRACT

Employees in both private and public sectors want their employers to find and remove their dissatisfactions by means of adequate and fair procedures and policies. An organization, public or private, should be a human-centered as well as a work-centered entity. A good human relations program results in good employee morale and eventually improved service for the public.

Public employees of today are becoming members of organizations and unions in order to back up their demands to management. Associations or unions represent employees in their relationships with management. Collective bargaining, an effective industrial relations system in private industry, is being adopted by public employees in both federal and local government. It also includes settlement of employee grievances in many jurisdictions.

A limited research study was performed in an attempt to determine the grievance machinery under collective bargaining system in non-industrial western American cities with populations of 50,000 to 100,000.

The data was gathered through a written questionnaire and it showed that the economic status of the cities and the variables related to union-management cooperation are not dependent upon each other.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The quality and quantity of public service is dependent upon the excellence of its management-employee relations. The growth of large organizations has made necessary the development of formal machinery to resolve employee grievances. In some organizations this machinery has been set up unilaterally by management; in others, it has been negotiated with employee organizations. The latter is performed under collective bargaining, which has become the permanent and pervasive environment of management in private business. In the public service, however, collective bargaining is a relatively recent phenomenon that is gradually growing. As one observer in the field has noted: "The argument over the threat of collective bargaining to the sovereignty of the state generated more heat than light and, as is often the case in theoretical arguments of this kind, has been left in the clouds by the de facto growth of collective bargaining in government."¹

The growth of collective bargaining in the public sector can be largely ascribed to the growth of public employee organizations.

1. Sterling D. Spero, "Collective Bargaining in Public Employment: Form and Scope," Public Administration Review, XXII (Winter, 1962), p. 1.

Jack Stieber, a professor of economics at Michigan State University, gives the most recent statistical information concerning the growth of public employee organizations in one of his articles.² The tremendous increase in public employment contributes to the growth of public employee organizations in the United States. There was an increase of three million in the number of non-agricultural wage and salary employees on the public payroll from 1955 to 1965. Most of this increase occurred at state and local levels. As for union membership in government, Stieber says: "The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that union membership in government rose from 915,000 in 1956 to 1,453,000 in 1964, an increase of almost 60 per cent."³

Official actions giving rise to the growth of employee organizations include the following: the Executive Order No. 10988 of 1962 concerning employee-management cooperation in the Federal Civil Service, state legislative laws, resolutions, ordinances; in the city governments one finds civil service rules, charter amendments, executive orders, and departmental codes. Besides the official actions, there were other factors that caused this growth. Labor unions struggled for the task of organizing government employees. They became more militant, occasionally calling strikes though prohibited to do so.

2. Jack Stieber, "Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector," Challenges to Collective Bargaining, ed. Lloyd Ulman (New York: The American Assembly, 1967), pp. 65-67.

3. Ibid.

The political strength of unions and other employee organizations, especially the AFL-CIO, also tends to make legislative bodies more amenable to establishing more or less formal labor relations between public management and their employees. The reasons for the upsurge of public employee organizations can be summarized as the rapid expansion of the public service work-force; the increase of technical and white-collar workers; the intertwining of government and private interests in defense; urbanization, and international commitments; the drive for efficiency in the government service; the introduction of the idea of a profit motive on a limited scale for public management; and the endeavor of public employees to maintain equal pay scales with private employees.⁴

Labor-management relations in the public service are moving toward the patterns prevailing in private employment. As Sterling D. Spero has already noted, on the following:

The traditional methods for determining working conditions by legislation or unilateral managerial decision are slowly giving way to systems of collective bargaining analogous to that outside government services. This development has been most marked in municipal employment. Yet opposition to determining the working conditions of government employees by negotiation and agreement between the employing authority and its organized workers, is still strong in many quarters. The roots of this opposition lie in the theory of

4. Harry Seligson, "A New Look at Employee Relations in Public and Private Service," Labor Law Journal, XV (May, 1964), pp. 287-299.

the sovereign state under which government, as the custodian of ultimate authority in the community, must exercise the right of final decision in all matters affecting its relations with its servants.⁵

An examination of the current setting of public management at the bargaining table reveals the fact that all public employees are specifically excluded from the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act which regulate employer-employee relations in private employment. Industrial workers in the private sector are protected by these laws. Government employees lack the protection afforded industrial workers. The majority of municipal employees in the United States lack legal authorization for collective bargaining.⁶ Only six states--Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin--have enacted comprehensive labor relations acts regulating mandatory collective bargaining for city and state employees in general. There are other states which permit negotiations or grant organized employees the right to present proposals, to meet, and to confer.

In the absence of statutory provisions, public employers handle labor relations with employee groups in many different ways. Some

5. Sterling D. Spero, "Collective Bargaining in Public Employment: Form and Scope," Public Administration Review, XXII (Winter, 1962), p. 2.

6. Kenneth O. Warner and Mary L. Hennessy, Public Management at the Bargaining Table (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1967), p. 11.

agencies have interpreted the lack of permissive or mandatory collective bargaining legislation as a ban on bargaining. Other jurisdictions, notably New York City and the United States Federal Government, have set up programs administratively by executive order, civil service rules, or policies. Still others allow negotiations on a sub rosa basis.⁷

Legal aspects of collective bargaining at the federal and state levels have been paralleled by many cities throughout the country. Factors affecting the type of organized employee-management relations programs are the size of the local government unit, strength of organized private employees, geographic location, political complexion of local governments, and the type of the work performed by employees.

Thus far, the general picture of the relations between organized public employees and management has been delineated.

As to the western part of this country, the states and cities have not yet adopted comprehensive programs concerning management-organized employee relations, in comparison with the states and cities in other parts of the country. On the other hand, there is no recent scientific research covering collective bargaining either in industrial or in non-industrial western cities. The grievance machinery under collective bargaining process in the selected non-industrial western American cities will be emphasized in this study.

7. Ibid., p. 12.

Statement of the Problem

The present study is aimed specifically to:

1. Determine the status of grievance machinery under collective bargaining in selected western American cities.
2. Test the hypothesis that non-industrial cities generally do not have negotiated grievance procedures.

Scope of the Study

The present investigation was limited to both the "white-collar" and "blue-collar" city employees excluding teachers, policemen, and firemen, of the selected cities with populations of 50,000 to 100,000 according to the Rand-McNally population estimates of 1965; a list of which can be seen in Appendix A.

The reason for excluding teachers was that they are not municipal employees and are covered by separate laws. The study also excluded policemen and firemen, who are public safety employees, because special laws exist for these employees and they tend to be placed in separate categories.

Since at least twenty-five cases were necessary to reach a satisfactory conclusion and the non-industrial cities that numbered over twenty-five fell in the population category of 50,000 to 100,000, this population group was selected to be investigated. All the cities in that category, namely fifty-one non-industrial cities which were

derived from Richard L. Forstall's article entitled "Economic Classification of Places over 10,000, 1960-1963," in the Municipal Year Book, 1967, were selected.⁸

Western cities were chosen because there has not been a comprehensive study on this subject in that area.

Organization of Thesis

Presentation of the study is developed through five chapters. The present chapter offers background to the investigation and delineates the problem. Chapter 2 reviews related studies which are on various aspects of employee-management relations both in the federal and local governments in this country. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology employed in the investigation. The data and findings are presented in the fourth chapter, and the summary, conclusions, and recommendations appear in the final chapter.

8. Richard L. Forstall, "Economic Classification of Places over 10,000, 1960-1963," The Municipal Year Book, 1967 (Chicago: The International City Managers' Association, 1967), pp. 30-52.

CHAPTER 2

RELATED STUDIES

Over the past thirty years a number of studies have been conducted by scholars, scholar students, and by professional and service organizations serving federal and local government on various aspects of employee-employer relations both in the federal and local governments in the United States.¹

These studies are important because of the historical perspective they provide, on the one hand, and the contribution they make in the realm of management-employee relations in the public service on the other.

The first important early contribution is a study conducted by a committee of the Civil Service Assembly under the chairmanship of Gordon R. Clapp.² This is a significant report that focuses attention on the importance of internal democracy in the public administrative unit. It recognizes the importance of employee morale resulting from

1. Willem B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the United States Federal Civil Service (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1966), p. 5.

2. Civil Service Assembly, Committee on Employee Relations in the Public Service, Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman, Employee Relations in the Public Service (Chicago: C.S.A. of United States and Canada, 1942).

policies of constructive dealing with organized employees. On most major points, clear-cut conclusions are reached which provide a firm foundation for progressive policy. In Willem B. Vosloo's opinion, "after more than twenty years this comprehensive work still offers a very discerning analysis of ideological, theoretical and legal questions of importance."³

Other major contributions are found in Sterling D. Spero's writings. In one of his studies Spero deals with the organization movement among a group of American public employees--those of the postal service.⁴ After a short survey of the character and status of unionism in the civil service, the author gives a full account of its history among the United States postal employees. His other study is a basic source on the historical background of labor relations in the public services.⁵ It includes an analysis of the legal rights of public employees, a history of the teachers' unions, and a description of labor policies in federal, state, and municipal governments. Spero presents a well-balanced treatment of his subject. Noticeably lacking is any substantial treatment

3. Willem B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the United States Federal Civil Service (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1966), p. 5.

4. Sterling D. Spero, The Labor Movement in a Government Industry (New York: G. H. Doran Co., 1924).

5. Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer (New York: Ramsen, 1948).

of reasoned conclusions concerning the significance of the civil service system in relation to unionism. Problems of public employer-employee relations are viewed as "a phase of the perennial conflict between authority and liberty in a free society which admit of no final solution but only of working arrangements which leave intact the basic claims of each party."⁶

Morton R. Godine's work is, like Spero's, both historical and analytical.⁷ This is a documented study of the controversial role of organizations of workers in government. The author has presented the subject historically and philosophically. His hypothesis is that staff participation increases operating efficiency and advances the purposes which a democratic society seeks to achieve.⁸ In Willem B. Vosloo's opinion, "the author offers some strong evidence and reasoning in support of his thesis, but the final result can only be termed inconclusive."⁹

6. Ibid., p. 486.

7. Morton R. Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service: A Study in Political Pluralism (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1951).

8. Ibid., p. 60.

9. Willem B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the United States Federal Civil Service (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1966), p. 6.

John Hobart Millet's study is an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.¹⁰ The purpose of this study is to determine the interests expressed in the activities of public employee unions in municipalities over 10,000 population, to analyze the nature of these interests and the methods by which they are expressed, and to consider the problems they raise. Evidence showed that unions probably were a factor in gaining partial fulfillment of expressed interests. Union effectiveness was lessened by small membership, lack of job security, and jurisdictional disputes particularly among the American Federation of Labor Unions. The employee interest may be strong enough so that legal measures cannot prevent its expression. In his conclusion he states that the resulting conflict between employee and employer interests can be best resolved through healthy conditions of respect and communication between the two interests.

Edwin Layne Cling's study is also an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.¹¹ In his study Cling states that employer-employee relations in the City of Milwaukee has progressed to a very high point. This has resulted from a strong industrial union influence in local government.

10. John Hobart Millet, "Public Employee Unionism in Downstate Illinois Municipalities," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1950).

11. Edwin L. Cling, "Industrial Labor Relations Policies and Practices in Municipal Government Milwaukee, Wisconsin," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1957).

In the City of Milwaukee the unions have received the assistance of public officials who have been sympathetic to organized labor for many years. The city's policies and practices have developed without an overall plan for guidance which has resulted in a piece-meal labor relations program. In Cling's opinion, Milwaukee's labor relations program has reached a point where it is difficult to change the public employee unions' important role in the development of policies and practices. City officials, however, can still objectively plan an employee-employer relations program as a part of their public personnel administration activities.

A more recent contribution is Wilson R. Hart's study.¹²

Hart makes a complete survey of recent labor relations practices on the federal, state, and municipal government levels. In this study, Hart compares governmental labor-management relations with private industry in terms of policies and practices. Much attention is given to the feasibility of collective bargaining in the federal civil service as well as to the events and developments preceding Executive Order 10988.

Murray Bernard Nesbitt's doctoral thesis examines the question of whether public employee labor unions can exist and grow within

12. Wilson R. Hart, *Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961).

the context of the merit system.¹³ He examines the legal setting of collective bargaining in government, its patterns and trends. Nesbitt devotes a considerable part of his study solely to the relation between union security and merit recruitment as well as merit promotion. He finds no inherent incompatibility between the merit system and collective bargaining.

In late summer 1962, The Public Personnel Association conducted a survey on current practices related to management relations with organized public employees in ninety-four state and local governments.¹⁴ The purpose was to obtain data concerning formal programs used for negotiation with organized public employees, extent of formal programs, negotiation for management, role of personnel agency as an adjunct of negotiation, informal programs, presentation of the views of public employees, lobbying, the role of unions in grievance procedures, and evaluation of informal programs from a cross-section of state and local governments. The analysis, plus an examination of the raw material leads her to these conclusions:

13. Murray B. Nesbitt, "The Civil Service Merit System and Collective Bargaining," (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1962).

14. Eleanor R. Batson, "A Survey of Current Practice," Management Relations with Organized Public Employees: Theory, Policies, Programs, ed. Kenneth O. Warner (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1963), pp. 137-152.

Personnel officials are not sitting on the side-lines. Regardless of whether the system of negotiation with employee groups be "formal" or "informal," in most cases personnel officials do take active part in the process. Despite rising pressure for state and local governments to bargain collectively (in the industrial sense) the practice is not now widespread in relation to the total numbers of state and local jurisdictions. Most personnel officials prefer to deal informally with employee organizations; they believe this system is preferable to formal collective bargaining. Most personnel officials believe their present system adequately serves employees and management, but their minds are not closed to refinements in present practice. Formal negotiations are a fairly recent feature as the system gained some momentum in the late 50's and early 60's.¹⁵

William B. Vosloo's work is a full study of labor relations in the federal service since the promulgation of Executive Order 10988: Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service.¹⁶ It focuses specifically on scope and effects of civil-servant collective actions and the nature of their formal relationships to the U. S. Federal Government as employer. The study explores the development of federal employer-employee relations against the background of the private sector within the context of the conditions surrounding the "sovereign employer," the requisites of the separation of powers system, the relationship between employee rights and democratic ideology, the implications of employee participation in public agency management and differences between industry and government programs.

15. Ibid., p. 137.

16. Willem B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the United States Federal Civil Service (Chicago: P.P.A. 1966).

A more recent research study on employee organizations in council-manager cities was undertaken by the International City Managers' Association late in 1966.¹⁷ Council-manager cities of 10,000 or more population were chosen. The Association prepared and sent out questionnaires to 624 cities. Sixty-one per cent of them reported that they had employee organizations. The data received was analyzed by population size and by national-regional and metropolitan location of the city. The research revealed the fact that in general, the larger cities and those that were metropolitan central ones were most likely to have employee organizations. Moreover, the north-central region is the most organized area. The western region showed yet another variation. It was relatively high in total organizations and local associations, but it also ranked highest among the regions in local non-affiliated associations. Cities in that region were also relatively high in recognition of organizations, and in acceptance of organization spokesmen, but they were quite low in the signing of formal agreements concerning wages and working conditions.

Harriet Fleisher Berger's study is a doctoral thesis.¹⁸ This study investigates the development of exclusive recognition of employee

17. Winston W. Crouch, "Employee Organizations in Council-Manager Cities," The Municipal Year Book, 1967, ed. Orin F. Nolting David J. Arnold (Chicago: I.C.M.A., 1967), p. 137-140.

18. Harriet F. Berger, "Exclusive Recognition of Employee Organization in the Public Service," (unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, 1967).

organizations for collective bargaining in agencies found in the nine federal establishments in Philadelphia and the City of Philadelphia itself. The study deals with the theory of collective bargaining in the public service which is derived basically from private industry concepts and practices. It appraises the rights, privileges and obligations of each exclusive representative. Finally, certain recommendations are presented as remedies for the deficiencies observed.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This study is descriptive in nature and is based on questionnaire survey and statistical inference. It is focused on management-organized employee relations in selected non-industrial western cities.

The Population

The investigation was limited to fifty-one non-industrial western cities with populations of 50,000 to 100,000. Five were mayor-council cities, forty-six were council-manager cities.

Written questionnaires were sent to all fifty-one cities. Forty-seven of them responded to the initial questions. These answers were tabulated and interpreted in order to test the hypothesis of this study.

Definition of Terms

For the purpose of this research, the following terms are defined:

"Grievance Machinery" - The procedures and policies to channel and dispose of employee grievances at work.

"Collective Bargaining" - A relationship between management and the representative of organized employees. It is

characterized by periodic negotiations resulting in written agreement on a basic rule system to govern the work relationship and organized arrangements for resolving disagreements and problems as they arise from day to day.

"Arbitration" - The terminal step in the grievance procedure, by which an unresolved dispute or grievance is submitted to a third disinterested party for final settlement.

"Merit System" - A public employment system which effectively carries out the merit principle that rests squarely on the idea of getting and keeping employees wholly on the basis of merit. Selection, promotion, career progression, assignment, layoff, and discharge depend solely on the merit of the employee. Neither personal nor political support enters into the merit principle.

"Union Recognition" - The willingness of the city government to negotiate with the unions as representative of its employees.

Collection of Data

A written questionnaire was employed to collect the data. It was sent out to fifty-one non-industrial western cities with populations of 50,000 to 100,000 on May 11, 1968. Thirty-four cities out of fifty-one returned it in fifteen days. Then the investigator planned follow-up

letters and questionnaires to cities which failed to respond to the initial request. The investigator sent out seventeen questionnaires to these cities. Thirteen cities completed the questionnaires and returned them by June 6, 1968. Questionnaires were sent to general managers (city managers in council-manager cities, mayors in mayor-council cities) because the survey covered all city departments except Police, Fire Departments and Public Schools.

Treatment of Data

Tabular Arrangement

The information obtained was arranged in tabular form to accommodate interpretation and evaluation.

Cities in this study were shown in categories in each table corresponding to each question. Economic classification of the selected cities was derived from Richard L. Forstall's article which was in the *Municipal Year Book, 1967*.¹ The functional classification of the cities was based on 1958 Census of Manufactures and Business. The non-industrial cities covered by this study were categorized in seven groups as it can be seen in Appendix B.

1. Richard L. Forstall, "Economic Classification of Places over 10,000, 1960-1963," *The Municipal Year Book, 1967* (Chicago: The International City Managers' Association, 1967), pp. 30-52.

Correlation Coefficient Treatment

In order to see if there is any correlation between the economic status of the cities and the variables corresponding to the questions, the correlation coefficient was employed. This equation can be seen in Appendix D. The determined "r" at the 5% and 1% levels of significance, shown in Appendix E was employed to test the significance of obtained "r"s from the data represented in the tables.

The Analysis of Variance Technique

Since this study involved seven groups of cities, this technique was employed in order to see whether or not the population M's for the cities were equal under each question in the survey. The analysis of variance procedure and the steps taken can be seen in Appendix F. Moreover, each obtained "F" value in the study was tested according to the "F-Ratio" in Appendix G.

In this study each category of the cities was given a specific numerical value as follows: Manufacturing cities, 7; Diversified Manufacturing cities, 6; Diversified Retailing cities, 5; Retailing cities, 4; Wholesaling cities, 3; Dormitory cities, 2; and Resort cities, 1. Positive answers to the questions were given a specific numerical value of (1) and negative answers to the questions were given (0) throughout the tables. Cities in the study were represented by "X," and the scale corresponding to their answers was represented by "Y."

Statistical treatment was employed for 47 pairs of measurements.

Schedules Used and Hypothesis Tested

The schedules of questions used in this study are to be found in Appendix C. A few general points regarding them should, however, be discussed here.

Questions 1 and 2 were included in an attempt to discover whether or not there is any relationship between economic status of the cities and the type of city employee organizations.

Questions 3 and 4 were asked to ascertain managerial and public attitudes regarding the unionism in the selected cities.

Question 5 was aimed to find out the desire of municipal employees for becoming members of an employee organization in the cities.

Questions 6, 7 and 8 were included in an attempt to test the hypothesis that non-industrial cities generally do not have negotiated grievance procedures.

Question 9 was aimed to see if the municipal employees have representation of their own choosing in the grievance process.

Question 10 was asked to see if the cities considered arbitration in the grievance process.

Question 11 was asked to discover whether or not employee organizations are supporters of the merit system in the cities.

Each of the questions comprising the schedules for this survey will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4 of the thesis when the results of this study are examined.

Limitation of Study

This study is, of necessity, limited with regard to the economic structure of the cities, and it is further limited because it is restricted to public employees excluding public safety employees and teachers. Why they were excluded from this study has been explained in Chapter 1 of this thesis.

Summary

This, then, is a summary of methods, procedure, and standards employed throughout the study. In review, we should re-emphasize the fact that the population in this study included only a very small segment of the total western American cities. The feeling of this writer is that a survey of this limited nature is nonetheless valuable and meaningful. It can offer some additional knowledge to the field of employee-management relations in local government.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

Now that the methods employed in the present study and the hypothesis to be tested in it have been reviewed and discussed (Chapter 3), the data and the findings obtained from the study will be the subject of this chapter. The responses of the cities to the questions included in the questionnaire will be examined and their significance noted.

Analysis of the Data

Table 1 outlines the responses of the forty-seven cities to question 1. Seventeen cities of those questioned (36.2 per cent) answered "yes" to this question. A "yes" answer to this question indicated that the municipal employees had nationally affiliated organizations. But, as we can observe from the results of this question, there were relatively few cities (36.2 per cent) comprising the population of this study who took this position.

On the other hand, thirty cities of the total population (63.8 per cent) answered this same question by saying "no," indicating that their employees do not have nationally affiliated organizations. Twelve of these cities were dormitory cities which make up suburban communities where local employment is definitely subordinate to commuting.

TABLE 1

CITIES HAVING AND NOT HAVING NATIONALLY
AFFILIATED EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATIONS, BY
ECONOMIC TYPE, IN NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES

Economic Type of the Cities	Cities' Answers					
	Have		Don't Have		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Manufacturing	4	40.0	6	60.0	10	100.0
Diversified Manufacturing	2	50.0	2	50.0	4	100.0
Diversified Retailing	4	57.1	3	42.9	7	100.0
Retailing	5	50.0	5	50.0	10	100.0
Wholesaling	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Dormitory	2	14.2	12	85.8	14	100.0
Resort	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Total	17	36.2	30	63.8	47	100.0

$r = .259$

$F = -13.33$

A correlation coefficient (r) was performed on the data represented in Table 1, and an insignificant correlation was found between

the economic status of the cities and nationally affiliated organizations. The obtained "r" is not significant because it is smaller than the determined "r" at both 1% and 5% levels of confidence. Consequently, there is no significant correlation between the two variables.

When variance technique was performed on the data represented in Table 1, an F value of -13.33 was found. Since the obtained F is smaller than 2.34 at 5% level and 3.29 at 1% level, we accept the null hypothesis that the population M's for the different conditions are equal. Therefore, cities in the study differ very little in having nationally affiliated organizations.

Table 2 shows the responses of the forty-seven cities thirty-seven of which answered Question 2 positively (78.7 per cent). All the manufacturing cities have independent local employee associations. All the other cities, except the wholesaling category, show a tendency to have independent local associations.

Ten cities of the total population (21.3 per cent) answered this same question negatively, indicating that their employees did not have independent local associations. Four were retailing cities.

A correlation coefficient (r) was performed on the data represented in Table 2, and an insignificant correlation was found between the economic status of the cities and independent local associations. Since this obtained "r" was based on 47 pairs of measurements, there

are 47-2 or 45 df. For this number of degrees of freedom the smallest significant "r" at the 5% level is .288 as it is seen in Appendix E. The obtained "r" is not significant because it is smaller than the determined "r" at both 1% and 5% levels of confidence. Consequently, there is no significant correlation between the two variables.

TABLE 2

CITIES HAVING AND NOT HAVING INDEPENDENT
LOCAL EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS, BY ECONOMIC
TYPE, IN NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES

Economic Type of the Cities	Cities' Answers					
	Have		Don't Have		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Manufacturing	10	100.0	0	0.0	10	100.0
Diversified Manufacturing	3	75.0	1	25.0	4	100.0
Diversified Retailing	6	85.7	1	14.3	7	100.0
Retailing	6	60.0	4	40.0	10	100.0
Wholesaling	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Dormitory	11	78.6	3	21.4	14	100.0
Resort	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
Total	37	78.7	10	21.3	47	100.0

$r = .171$

$F = .16$

The variance technique was performed on the data represented in Table 2, and an F value of .16 was found. Since this obtained "F" is smaller than the determined "F" value at 5% and 1% levels, we accept the null hypothesis that no population difference exists. Therefore, cities in the study differ very little in having independent local associations.

Table 3 shows the responses of forty-seven cities to Question 3. In twelve, managerial attitudes toward unionization of municipal employees were favorable, including three diversified retailing, three retailing and three dormitory cities. These three groups ranked the highest.

74.5 per cent of the total population answered in a negative way, indicating that they are apathetic toward employee unions. Both a resort and a wholesaling city showed 100 per cent apathy.

A correlation coefficient (r) was performed on the data, and an insignificant correlation was found between the economic status of the cities and managerial attitudes towards unionization of municipal employees. Since the obtained correlation coefficient (r) is smaller than the determined "r" at both 1% and 5% levels of confidence, it is not significant. Therefore, there is no significant correlation between economic status of the cities and managerial attitudes towards unionization of city employees.

TABLE 3
MANAGEMENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS
UNIONIZATION OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Economic Type of the Cities	Cities' Answers					
	Favorable		Apathetic		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Manufacturing	2	20.0	8	80.0	10	100.0
Diversified Manufacturing	1	25.0	3	75.0	4	100.0
Diversified Retailing	3	42.9	4	57.1	7	100.0
Retailing	3	30.0	7	70.0	10	100.0
Wholesaling	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Dormitory	3	21.4	11	78.6	14	100.0
Resort	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Total	12	25.5	35	74.5	47	100.0

$r = .042$ $F = .75$

The variance technique was employed for this data, and an F value of .75 was found, which was smaller than the determined "F" value at both 5% and 1% levels. Hence, we accept the null hypothesis that no population difference exists. In other words, prevalent managerial attitudes toward unionization of city employees differ very little from one category to another.

Table 4 shows public attitudes toward unionization of municipal employees in selected non-industrial cities. Nine cities of those questioned (18.4 per cent) answered "favorable" to this question.

On the other hand, 80.9 per cent of the cities had apathetic public attitudes.

TABLE 4
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD
UNIONIZATION OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Economic Type of the Cities	Cities' Answers					
	Favorable		Apathetic		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Manufacturing	1	10.0	9	90.0	10	100.0
Diversified Manufacturing	1	25.0	3	75.0	4	100.0
Diversified Retailing	2	28.6	5	71.4	7	100.0
Retailing	4	40.0	6	60.0	10	100.0
Wholesaling	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Dormitory	1	7.1	13	92.9	14	100.0
Resort	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Total	9	19.1	38	80.9	47	100.0

$r = .070$

$F = .94$

A correlation coefficient was performed on the data represented in Table 4, and it was found to be insignificant at both 5% and 1% levels ($r = .070$, $df = 45$), indicating that no significant relationship exists between economic status of the cities and public attitudes toward unionization of municipal employees.

The variance technique was employed for this data represented in Table 4, and an F value of .94 was found, which was smaller than the determined "F" value of 2.34 at 5% level and 3.29 at 1% level. Hence, we accept the null hypothesis that no population difference exists. Consequently, prevalent public attitudes differ very little from one category to another.

Table 5 outlines the answers of forty-seven cities to Question 5 concerning municipal employees' desire for an employee organization. Thirty-nine cities of those questioned (83.0 per cent) answered positively. This indicated that the municipal employees had a considerable desire for an employee organization.

On the other hand, eight cities of the total population (17.0 per cent) indicated their employees did not have a desire for an employee organization.

A correlation coefficient (r) was performed on the data represented in Table 5, and it was found to be insignificant at both 5% and 1% levels ($r = .094$, $df = 45$), indicating no significant correlation between the two variables.

TABLE 5

MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES' DESIRE
FOR AN EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION

Economic Type of the Cities	Cities' Answers					
	Have		Don't Have		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Manufacturing	9	90.0	1	10.0	10	100.0
Diversified Manufacturing	3	75.0	1	25.0	4	100.0
Diversified Retailing	7	100.0	0	0.0	7	100.0
Retailing	7	70.0	3	30.0	10	100.0
Wholesaling	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
Dormitory	11	78.6	3	21.4	14	100.0
Resort	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
Total	39	83.0	8	17.0	47	100.0

r = .094

F = -.12

The variance technique was employed for this data, and an F value of -.12 was found. Since this obtained value of F is smaller than the determined "F" value of 2.34 at 5% level and 3.29 at 1% level, we accept the null hypothesis; therefore conclude that municipal employees' desire for an organization differs very little from the cities in one category to another.

Table 6 shows the answers of the selected cities to Question 6. Twenty-three cities of those questioned (48.9 per cent) answered positively. A positive answer to this question indicated that grievance machinery was set up unilaterally by management in city departments.

TABLE 6
UNILATERALLY ESTABLISHED GRIEVANCE
MACHINERY IN SELECTED CITIES

Economic Type of the Cities	Cities' Answers					
	Have		Don't Have		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Manufacturing	4	40.0	6	60.0	10	100.0
Diversified Manufacturing	1	25.0	3	75.0	4	100.0
Diversified Retailing	3	42.9	4	57.1	7	100.0
Retailing	6	60.0	4	40.0	10	100.0
Wholesaling	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
Dormitory	8	57.1	6	42.9	14	100.0
Resort	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Total	23	48.9	24	51.1	47	100.0

$r = -.140$

$F = .59$

As it is seen in the table, retailing cities, dormitory cities and a wholesaling city are better than 50% in terms of having unilaterally established grievance machinery.

On the other hand, twenty-four cities of the total population (51.1 per cent) answered this same question negatively, indicating that the grievance machinery was not set up unilaterally by management in city departments. Manufacturing, diversified manufacturing, diversified retailing cities and a resort city are better than 50% on this matter.

A correlation coefficient (r) was performed on the data represented in Table 6, and it was found to be insignificant at both 5% and 1% levels ($r = -.140$), indicating that no significant relationship exists between unilaterally established grievance machinery and economic status of the selected cities.

The variance technique was employed for the data represented in Table 6, and an F value of .59 was found. Since this value is smaller than the determined " F " value of 2.34 at 5% level and 3.29 at 1% level, we accept the null hypothesis and say that there is no significant difference among the cities in terms of having unilaterally established grievance machinery.

Table 7 outlines the answers of forty-seven cities to Question 7. Fourteen cities of those questioned (29.8 per cent) answered positively. Such an answer indicated that the grievance machinery

was negotiated with employee organizations in city departments. As it is seen in Table 7, diversified manufacturing cities are better than 50% in terms of having such kind of grievance machinery.

TABLE 7
NEGOTIATED GRIEVANCE MACHINERY
IN SELECTED CITIES

Economic Type of the Cities	Cities' Answers					
	Have		Don't Have		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Manufacturing	2	20.0	8	80.0	10	100.0
Diversified Manufacturing	3	75.0	1	25.0	4	100.0
Diversified Retailing	2	28.6	5	71.4	7	100.0
Retailing	4	40.0	6	60.0	10	100.0
Wholesaling	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Dormitory	3	21.4	11	78.6	14	100.0
Resort	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Total	14	29.8	33	70.2	47	100.0

$r = .099$

$F = .96$

Thirty-three cities of the total population (70.2 per cent) answered this same question negatively, indicating that mostly

non-industrial selected cities did not negotiate with employee organizations on the grievance machinery.

A correlation coefficient (r) was performed on the data in Table 7, and it was found to be insignificant at both 5% and 1% levels, indicating that no significant correlation exists between economic status of the cities and negotiations on the grievance machinery.

The variance technique was employed for this data and an F value of .96 was obtained. Since this value is smaller than the determined value of 2.34 at 5% level and 3.29 at 1% level, we accept the null hypothesis and conclude that selected cities differ very little in terms of having negotiated grievance machinery.

In order to clarify the data related to unilateral and negotiated grievance machinery in the cities, it was necessary to show the distribution of answers to Questions 6 and 7. This can be seen in Table 8.

TABLE 8
HOW THE GRIEVANCE MACHINERY IS SET UP IN THE CITIES

Cities' Answers	Number	%
Management in city departments	19	40.4
Legislation	12	25.5
Negotiation	10	21.3
Both Management and Negotiation	4	8.5
City Manager	2	4.3
Total	47	100.0

As it is seen in Table 8, the grievance procedure is mostly established by management in city departments. In twelve other cities it is set up by legislation.

Table 9 outlines the answers of forty-seven cities to Question 8. Seven cities of those questioned (14.9 per cent) answered positively. These answers indicated that the cities which signed agreements with employee organizations were in the minority.

As it is seen in Table 9, half of the diversified manufacturing cities signed agreements with employee organizations on the grievance procedure. On the other hand, most of the non-industrial cities (85.1 per cent of the total population) did not have any written agreement on the grievance process.

A correlation coefficient (r) was performed on the data, and it was found to be insignificant at both 5% and 1% levels ($r = -.084$, $df = 45$), indicating no significant correlation between economic status of the cities and written agreements on the grievance procedure.

The variance technique was employed for this data, and an F value of .44 was obtained. Since this value is smaller than the determined value of " F " at both 5% and 1% levels, we accept the null hypothesis and conclude that selected cities differ very little in having agreements on the grievance procedure.

TABLE 9

AGREEMENTS SIGNED ON THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

Economic Type of the cities	Cities' Answers					
	Have		Don't Have		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Manufacturing	0	0.0	10	100.0	10	100.0
Diversified Manufacturing	2	50.0	2	50.0	4	100.0
Diversified Retailing	1	14.3	6	85.7	7	100.0
Retailing	2	20.0	8	80.0	10	100.0
Wholesaling	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Dormitory	2	14.2	12	85.8	14	100.0
Resort	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Total	7	14.9	40	85.1	47	100.0

$r = -.084$

$F = .44$

Since forty cities had employee organizations, 17.5 per cent of those signed agreements on the grievance procedure. This revealed the fact that non-industrial cities in this study are reluctant in signing agreements on the grievance procedure.

Table 10 indicates the answers of forty-seven cities to Question 9 which was designed to see whether or not the municipal employees

had representation of their own choosing in the grievance process. Forty out of forty-seven cities answered positively; namely, 85.1 per cent of the total population recognized the representation of public employees in the grievance process.

TABLE 10
REPRESENTATION OF AGGRIEVED
EMPLOYEE IN THE GRIEVANCE PROCESS

Economic Type of the Cities	Cities' Answers					
	Have		Don't Have		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Manufacturing	10	100.0	0	0.0	10	100.0
Diversified Manufacturing	3	75.0	1	25.0	4	100.0
Diversified Retailing	6	85.7	1	14.3	7	100.0
Retailing	9	90.0	1	10.0	10	100.0
Wholesaling	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
Dormitory	11	78.6	3	21.4	14	100.0
Resort	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Total	40	85.1	7	14.9	47	100.0

$r = .245$

$F = .28$

All the selected non-industrial cities, except a resort city have representation of employees in the grievance process--more than 50%.

A correlation coefficient (r) was performed on the data represented in Table 10, and it was found to be insignificant at both 5% and 1% levels ($r = .245$, $df = 45$), indicating that no significant relationship exists between economic status of the cities and the adoption of representation in the grievance procedure.

The variance technique was also employed for this data, and an F value of .28 was obtained. Since this value is smaller than the determined values of 2.34 and 3.29, we accept the null hypothesis and conclude that cities in this study differ very little in the adoption of representation.

Table 11 outlines the answers of forty-seven cities to Question 10. Seven cities of those questioned (14.9 per cent) answered this question positively. This indicated that these cities had arbitration in the grievance process. Diversified manufacturing cities have the highest ratio of arbitration of grievances--50 per cent.

On the other hand, Table 11 shows that manufacturing cities, dormitory cities, a wholesaling city and a resort city do not have arbitration of grievances at all.

A correlation coefficient was performed and it was found to be insignificant at both 5% and 1% levels, indicating no significant

relationship between economic status of the cities and arbitration of grievance.

TABLE 11
ARBITRATION OF GRIEVANCES

Economic Type of the Cities	Cities' Answers					
	Have		Don't Have		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Manufacturing	0	0.0	10	100.0	10	100.0
Diversified Manufacturing	2	50.0	2	50.0	4	100.0
Diversified Retailing	1	14.3	6	85.7	7	100.0
Retailing	4	40.0	6	60.0	10	100.0
Wholesaling	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Dormitory	0	0.0	14	100.0	14	100.0
Resort	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
Total	7	14.9	40	85.1	47	100.0

$r = .094$ $F = -2.2$

The variance technique was employed for the data, and an F value of -2.2 was obtained. Since this value is smaller than the determined F value of 2.34 at 5% level, we accept the null hypothesis and

conclude that cities in this study differ very little in having arbitration in the grievance process.

Table 12 outlines the answers of forty-seven cities to Question 11. It was designed to see if the municipal employee organizations were supporters of the merit system in city departments. 85.1 per cent of the cities replied that municipal employee organizations were supporting the merit system in city departments.

TABLE 12
EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATIONS AS SUPPORTERS
OF THE MERIT SYSTEM IN THE CITIES

Economic Type of the Cities	Cities' Answers					
	Yes		No		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Manufacturing	7	70.0	3	30.0	10	100.0
Diversified Manufacturing	4	100.0	0	0.0	4	100.0
Diversified Retailing	7	100.0	0	0.0	7	100.0
Retailing	8	80.0	2	20.0	10	100.0
Wholesaling	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
Dormitory	12	85.7	2	14.3	14	100.0
Resort	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
Total	40	85.1	7	14.9	47	100.0

$r = -.094$

$F = -6.1$

Table 12 shows that public employee organizations in the cities, are supporters of the merit system. The ratio of positive answers ranks from 70 per cent to 100 per cent.

On the other hand, negative answers revealed very low percentages, namely 14.3% - 30%.

A correlation coefficient was performed on the data represented in Table 12, and an insignificant correlation was found between the industrial status of the cities and support for the merit system at both 5% and 1% levels.

When the variance technique was performed on the data, an F value of -6.1 was found. Since the obtained "F" is smaller than 2.34 at 5% level and 3.29 at 1% level, we accept the null hypothesis that the population M's for the cities in seven categories are equal. Therefore, the cities in the study differ very little in terms of the loyalty of city employees to the merit system.

Thus far, the interrelation between economic status of the cities and the variables of the employee-management cooperation has been analyzed.

When a correlation coefficient (r) was performed on the data obtained from the answers of the forty-seven cities to all of the eleven questions as a whole, it was also found to be insignificant at both 5% and 1% levels of confidence ($r = .1518$, $df = 45$).

Since the obtained "r"s suggested that there is no significant correlation between the economic status of the cities and the variables in the study, the writer rejects his hypothesis that non-industrial cities in the study generally do not have negotiated grievance machinery.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

The grievance machinery under collective bargaining in selected western American cities has been the subject of this thesis. In Chapter 1, generally the importance of formal machinery to resolve employee grievances in terms of building good employee morale, has been emphasized; the way of setting such machinery in practice has been delineated. It is a relatively recent phenomenon in the public sector. Many jurisdictions are using the traditional method of determining working conditions by legislation or unilateral decision. Opposition to bargaining on the management prerogatives is still prevailing. The concept of "sovereign government" is prevalent in these jurisdictions. The system of collective bargaining is gradually growing in the public sector. Since this development has been most marked in municipal employment in this country, the writer made this study in order to show the state of grievance machinery under the system of collective bargaining in selected non-industrial cities, of the western part of this country.

Through an analysis of related studies in Chapter 2, the value that the authors give to relationships between management and organized public employees was observed. It was noted in some of these past studies that a marked increase had been encountered in the degree of both formal and informal collective negotiations at the municipal level. The highest percentage for the formalization of agreements in some manner was found in the cities.

The remainder of the thesis was concerned with a description and analysis of a research study the writer performed on the selected non-industrial western cities with populations of 50,000 to 100,000. This study was initiated in an attempt to discover whether the selected non-industrial cities are leaving the traditional method of determining grievance procedure by legislation or unilateral decision. In order to see whether they have accepted programs of employee-management cooperation on grievance procedures, they were asked questions on the following:

1. Type of employee organizations.
2. Prevalent management and public attitudes toward unionization of city employees--excluding teachers and public safety employees.
3. Whether they witnessed a desire of employees for organization.

4. Way of setting grievance procedure--unilaterally or bilaterally.
5. Status of representation of employees in the grievance procedure and arbitration of grievances.
6. Loyalty of public employees to the merit system.

Methods and procedures followed in this study were explained in detail in Chapter 3.

The grievance machinery under collective bargaining in the selected cities were of concern in this study. A written questionnaire was used so as to learn details about management-employee cooperation on the grievance procedure. The selected cities were grouped into seven categories--manufacturing, diversified manufacturing, diversified retailing, retailing, wholesaling, dormitory, and resort--on the basis of 1958 Census of Manufactures and Business in order to examine the status of grievance procedures in their administrative systems.

Statistical techniques of Correlation and Simple Analysis of Variance were performed on the data obtained in this study.

The following hypothesis was considered and tested in this study:

Non-industrial cities generally do not have negotiated grievance procedure with employee organizations.

Conclusions

The data of this study, discussed and analyzed in Chapter 4, appear to warrant the following conclusions:

1. There is no significant correlation between economic status of the cities and type of employee organizations.
2. Cities in this study differ very little in having either nationally affiliated organizations or independent local associations.
3. There is no significant correlation between economic status of the cities and managerial or public attitudes.
4. Prevalent management attitudes toward unionization of employees differ very little from one category to another. We can say the same for the prevalent public attitudes in the selected cities.
5. Municipal employees' desire for an employee organization is not dependent upon the economic status of the cities in this study.
6. Municipal employees' desire for an organization differs very little from the cities in one category to another.

7. There is no significant correlation between unilaterally established grievance machinery and economic status of the selected cities.
8. Selected cities differ very little in terms of having unilaterally established or negotiated grievance machinery.
9. There is no significant correlation between negotiated grievance procedure and economic status of the cities in the study.
10. A significant correlation does not exist between economic status of the cities and agreements on the grievance procedure.
11. Cities in this study differ very little in having written agreements on the grievance procedure.
12. There is no significant correlation between the economic type of the cities and the adoption of representation of the city employees in the grievance process.
13. Consideration of arbitration of grievances is not dependent upon the economic status of selected cities.

14. Cities differ very little in having arbitration in their grievance procedures.
15. Loyalty of public employee organizations to the merit system is not dependent upon the economic status of the cities.
16. Cities in the study differ very little in having employee organizations which are loyal to the merit system.

In the light of these conclusions the writer rejected the hypothesis that non-industrial cities generally do not have negotiated grievance procedure under collective bargaining.

Recommendations

This thesis has been an account of a limited research project carried out in an attempt to learn more about a topic of importance to public administrators. There are other aspects related to this topic which were not included in the present study and which could be the subject of future research.

1. The present study dealt only with western cities having populations of 50,000 to 100,000 according to 1965 population estimates. A future research project should include western cities having a population more than

this in order to determine public employee-management cooperation on the settlement of grievances.

2. The present study did not attempt to learn about the relationship between organized public safety employees and management in the western part of this country; and a study which deals with this subject would be worthwhile.
3. A future study could investigate the public's knowledge and understanding of the field of industrial relations in the public service at municipal level in more detail.

It is hoped that these suggestions, together with the present study, will encourage future students of public personnel administration to perform more detailed studies in the field.

APPENDIX A

SELECTED CITIES WITH POPULATIONS OF 50,000 TO 100,000 IN WESTERN AMERICAN STATES*

COUNCIL-MANAGER CITIES

CALIFORNIA

Alameda	Hayward	San Leandro
Alhambra	Huntington Beach	San Mateo
Bakersfield	Inglewood	Santa Clara
Bellflower	Lakewood	Santa Monica
Buena Park	Norwalk	South Gate
Burbank	Ontario	Stockton
Compton	Orange	Sunnyvale
Concord	Oxnard	Vallejo
Costa Mesa	Palo Alto	West Covina
Daly City	Pico Rivera	Westminster
Downey	Redwood City	Whittier
Fremont	Richmond	<u>COLORADO</u>
Fullerton	Salinas	Aurora

*Costa Mesa, Daly City, Downey, and Hayward did not respond to the Questionnaires; therefore, they were not included in the study.

COUNCIL-MANAGER CITIES - Continued

<u>COLORADO</u> (Continued)	<u>NEW MEXICO</u>	<u>UTAH</u>
Boulder	Roswell	Ogden
Colorado Springs	<u>OREGON</u>	
Pueblo	Eugene	
<u>NEVADA</u>	Salem	
Reno		

MAYOR-COUNCIL CITIES

<u>IDAHO</u>	<u>MONTANA</u>	<u>WASHINGTON</u>
Boise	Billings	Everett
	Great Falls	<u>WYOMING</u>
		Cheyenne

APPENDIX B

FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE CITIES

1. MANUFACTURING CITIES (10): 50 per cent or more of aggregate employment is in manufacturing; and less than 30 per cent is in retail trade.

Burbank, Fullerton, Norwalk, Ontario, Palo Alto, Richmond, San Leandro, Santa Monica, South Gate, Sunnyvale, California.

2. DIVERSIFIED MANUFACTURING (4): Employment in manufacturing is greater than retail employment, but less than 50 per cent of aggregate employment.

Compton, Redwood City, Santa Clara, California; Everett, Washington.

3. DIVERSIFIED RETAILING (7): Greater employment in retailing than in manufacturing, but manufacturing is at least 20 per cent of aggregate employment.

Alhambra, Oxnard, Stockton, Whittier, California; Eugene, Salem, Oregon; Ogden, Utah.

4. RETAILING (10): Retail employment is greater than manufacturing or any other component of aggregate employment, and manufacturing is less than 20 per cent of aggregate employment.

Bakersfield, San Mateo, Vallejo, California; Colorado Springs, Pueblo, Colorado; Boise, Idaho; Billings, Great Falls, Montana; Roswell, New Mexico; Cheyenne, Wyoming.

5. WHOLESALING (1): Employment in wholesale trade is at least 25 per cent of aggregate employment.

Salinas, California.

6. DORMITORY CITIES (14): A group of cities which has been designated as of dormitory character, reflects the fact that activities carried on within their corporate limits employ far less than their total working population, many of whom therefore work elsewhere. The Dormitory cities make up the suburban communities in which local employment is definitely subordinate to commuting.

Alameda, Bellflower, Buena Park, Concord, Fremont, Huntington Beach, Inglewood, Lakewood, Orange, Pico Rivera, West Covina, Westminster, California; Aurora, Boulder, Colorado.

7. RESORT CITIES (1): Resident labor force in entertainment, recreation, and personnel services employment, other than private households, totals more than either manufacturing or retail employment.

Reno, Nevada.

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONS THAT WERE SENT OUT TO THE SELECTED CITIES

1. Do the city employees have nationally affiliated organizations?

_____ Yes

_____ No

2. Do the city employees have independent local associations?

_____ Yes

_____ No

3. In your location, what kind of management attitudes to unionization of municipal employees prevail?

_____ Favorable attitudes to unionization.

_____ Apathy toward unionization.

4. In your location, what kind of public attitudes to unionization of municipal employees prevail?

_____ Favorable attitudes to unionization.

_____ Apathy toward unionization.

5. Do the municipal employees have a desire for employee organization?

_____ Yes

_____ No

6. Has the grievance machinery been set up unilaterally by management in city departments?

_____ Yes

_____ No

7. Has the grievance machinery been negotiated with employee organizations in city departments?

_____ Yes

_____ No

8. Does the city government have a written agreement with any employee organization on the grievance procedure?

_____ Yes

_____ No

9. Do municipal employees have representation of their own choosing in the grievance process?

_____ Yes

_____ No

10. Has arbitration been considered in the grievance process?

_____ Yes

_____ No

11. Are the employee organizations supporters of merit system in the city departments?

_____ Yes

_____ No

APPENDIX D

THE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT

$$r = \frac{(N \Sigma xy) - (\Sigma x)(\Sigma y)}{\sqrt{N \Sigma x^2 - (\Sigma x)^2} \sqrt{N \Sigma y^2 - (\Sigma y)^2}}$$

N = number of cities

X = value given to the cities according to their economic status

Y = scale of cities' answers

APPENDIX E

A NUMERIC VALUE OF "r" AT THE 5% AND 1% LEVELS OF SIGNIFICANCE*

Degree of Freedom	5%	1%
df = N-2		
45	.288	.372

*Benton J. Underwood, Carl P. Ducan, Janet T. Spence, and John W. Cotton, Elementary Statistics (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954), p. 231.

APPENDIX F

THE VARIANCE TECHNIQUE THAT WAS EMPLOYED IN THIS STUDY

1. ΣX was found for every group.
2. ΣX^2 was found for every group.
3. Each M_g (Arithmetic mean) and M_{tot} (the grand mean) was found by dividing the appropriate ΣX by its N .
4. SS_{tot} (the sum of squared deviations of every score from the mean of all the scores) was found by the formula as follows:
$$SS_{tot} = (\Sigma X^2) - (N_{tot} M_{tot}^2)$$
5. SS_{bg} (the sum of squares between groups) was found by the formula as follows: $SS_{bg} = (\Sigma [N_g M_g^2]) - (N_{tot} M_{tot}^2)$
6. SS_{wg} (the sum of squares within groups) was found by the formula as follows: $SS_{wg} = SS_{tot} - SS_{bg}$
7. df_{bg} (the number of degrees of freedom between groups) was found by the formula: $df_{bg} = k - 1$
(k stands for number of groups)
8. df_{wg} (the number of degrees of freedom within groups) was found by the formula: $df_{wg} = N_{tot} - k$
(N_{tot} stands for number of cases)

9. MS_{bg} (mean square value between groups) was found by the formula:

$$MS_{bg} = \frac{SS_{bg}}{df_{bg}}$$

10. MS_{wg} (mean square value within groups) was found by the formula:

$$MS_{wg} = \frac{SS_{wg}}{df_{wg}}$$

11. The F-ratio, which is simply a numerical expression of the relative size of MS_{bg} and MS_{wg} was defined by the equation below:

$$F = \frac{MS_{bg}}{MS_{wg}}$$

12. For df_{bg} and df_{wg} of the values in steps (7) and (8), the F's were found and tested for significance at the 5% and 1% levels.

13. The null hypothesis, namely the population M's for the different conditions are equal, was accepted since the obtained F did not exceed the required F at the 5% level (or the 1% level).

APPENDIX G

A NUMERIC VALUE OF F AT THE 5% AND 1% SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS *

df associated with the denominator		df associated with the numerator
df_{wg}		df_{bg}
	5%	2.34
40	1%	3.29

*Benton J. Underwood, Carl P. Ducan, Janet T. Spence,
and John W. Cotton, Elementary Statistics (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954), p. 234.

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