A Study of Anima and Related Words
in Vergil and Prudentius
by
Gerard Hinrichs

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

in the College of Letters, Arts, and Sciences,
University of Arizona

1935

Approved: Major professor
Date Jan 29, 1935
Table of Contents

Section I  Introduction to the problem.......page 3
Section II  Literary setting of the words...... "  15
Section III Classification of meanings........ "  24
Section IV Precedents for Prudentius' usages. "  44
Section V  Significance of findings.......... "  60
Bibliography ............................................. "  68
I. Introduction to the Problem.

The Golden Age of Patristic literature (roughly from 350 to 450 A. D.), of which Prudentius was the chief poet, produced such outstanding orators and writers as Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, and John Chrysostom, in the East; in the West, Jerome, translator and commentator of the Scriptures, Ambrose, watchful administrator, moralist, and poet, and Augustine, who collected the accumulated riches of three centuries of apologetics, exegesis, controversy, religious belief and practice, philosophy, and history, added to them, clarified them, and organized their Oriental, Greek, and Roman elements into the first systematic Christian philosophy.

Christianity entered upon a phase of rapid development numerically and doctrinally after its official State recognition and protection by Constantine in 313. But the presentment of the Christian doctrine and life in truly literary form remained to be accomplished; the library of the educated man was still pagan; paganism continued conspicuously in the domain of education—in letters, the arts, philosophy, science.

With the entry of a large part of the cultivated urban population of the Empire into the newly favored religion, the suspicion with which the Christian of the preceding century had regarded pagan learning changed to
a consciousness of the appropriateness of celebrating
the lives and deeds of the Prophets, of Christ, of martyrs
and saints in classic forms, to a consciousness of the
desirability of completing in detail the demonstration
of the accord between his life and beliefs and the science
of the day. In answer to this latter tendency there arose
religious teachers eminent in both scriptural and tradi-
tional lore and profane letters, arts, philosophy, and science.

An instance of the critical temper of the age is
apparent in the scandalized reaction of the Christian
intelligentsia of Cappadocian Caesarea to Basil's literal
interpretation of the six days in the Biblical creation
story. Basil's brother, Gregory of Nyssa, met the situation
with skill and acumen, first calling attention to the
didactic objective of Basil's hésélies on the Creation,
and then complaisantly demonstrating the academic possibility
of interpreting Genesis in the light of the science of
the day—incidentally, in a thoroughly evolutionistic
fashion, as the science of the day included the apparent
fact of spontaneous generation.\(^1\) Augustine, in De Genesi
ad Litteram, 1, 19, bears witness to the prevalent deplor-
able practice of Christians desirous of parading their

\(^1\) Gregory of Nyssa, Apologetikon pros Petron ton
adelphon autou, peri tes Exaemorou.
superior knowledge, who quoted Scripture in apodictic explanation of points of natural science and astronomy, ignorant both of science and of the sense of the texts adduced, with the result that their better informed non-Christian auditors became contemptuous of all Scripture.

Side by side with the prose literature that sprang up to satisfy this intellectual curiosity, to silence the voice of heresy, and to instruct a population culturally pagan, in the fourth century a Latin Christian poetry appeared, classic in form, to celebrate Christian belief, life, and tradition. Among Prudentius' predecessors, Damasus wrote metrical inscriptions for the tombs of martyrs buried in the catacombs, and laudatory verses on saints and martyrs. Ambrose composed the first liturgical hymns in the West, with popular success—e.g., the Aeterne Rerum Conditor, the Deus Creator Omnium, the Iam Surgit Hora Tertia, the Veni Redemptor Omnium, and many others. Hilary's liturgical hymns, because of their learned air, never gained popular favor. Sedulius, besides lyrics, wrote the Carmen Paschale, a poem in five books narrating in Vergilian hexameters Old Testament prodigies and the life of Christ as worker of miracles. Another lengthy work in Vergilian hexameters is the Evangeliorum Libri Quattuor of Juvenous, a versification of the Gospel story. Contemporary with Prudentius was the priest and
bishop Paulinus of Nola, a charming poet and kind of Christian Horace, who in his epistle to Jovius points out that the Christian poet’s sources are the beauties of creation considered as the works of God, and the Scriptures, which contain His word and the account of His wondrous works. Besides casual poems, Paulinus attempted translations of Psalms, and wrote metrical inscriptions, poems recounting the life and miracles at the tomb of Felix of Nola, and epistles to the poet Ausonius, who had tried to dissuade him from devoting himself entirely to religion and the ascetic life.

Prudentius, a cultivated and prominent Spanish layman and ardent advocate of the widespread cult of the martyrs, writing between 393 and 405, mirrors the religious intensity and thought of the time in polemical, allegorical, and liturgical poems of notable length and poetic power, classical in form. The two books Contra Symmachum contain a refutation of paganism as represented by Symmachus, prefect of Rome, whose attempt to restore the altar of Victory to the Roman Senate had been defeated by Ambrose and whose Memoirs in defense of the cult of the gods had years before been answered by Ambrose. Prudentius, writing from the vantage point of one who had led an active life as a high government official, in the first book (658 hexameters) signal-
izes the triumph of Christianity over paganism in spite
of the latter's occasional struggles, and in the second
(1131 hexameters) attacks the Memoirs of Symmachus point
by point, taking his cue from Ambrose' work. The Apotheo-
sis (1085 hexameters) attacks various classes of heretics
who denied the divinity of Christ, and in a lengthy pas-
sage on the nature of the soul (lines 782 to 951) points
out the difference between Christ's divine nature as the
consubstantial Thought of the Father and the inferior
nature of the human soul because of its creation from
nothingness by arbitrary fiat. The third polemical work
is the Hamartigenia (960 hexameters), a poem on the origin
of sin which attacks the Gnostic dualism of Marcion with
animus characteristic of Prudentius' rhetorical power
and religious conviction.

The Psychomachia (915 hexameters), an allegorical
or symbolical poem of moral and perhaps historical intent
much esteemed during the Middle Ages, depicts spiritual
duels between the personalised Virtues and Vices--Faith
against Idolatry, Modesty against Lust, Patience against
Anger, Humility against Pride, and others of which the
last recounts the victory of Concord over Heresy.

Prudentius' lyrics or liturgical hymns exemplify
great variety of metrical forms masterfully employed,
a sustained lyrico gift, and ardent personal participation
in two important contemporary religious movements--one,
the call heard by chosen souls to segregate themselves
singly or in communities from the "world" and to devote themselves to a life of Christian perfection, e. g., Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Paulinus of Nola; the other, the increasingly popular and empire-wide cult of saints and martyrs and the concomitant veneration of their relics and tombs—an important liturgical and doctrinal addition to the Christian life.


The Peristephanon is a group of fourteen lyrics recounting the lives and deaths of various Spanish and Roman martyrs with full attention to the horrible details; these poems range from a few lines to over eleven hundred lines each. It was Prudentius' sincere admiration for the invincible constancy of martyrs under torture that impelled him to celebrate their sufferings as exploits more remarkable than the classic gesta of ancient heroes.

The Dittochaeon is a collection of forty-nine quatrains—inscriptions explanatory of Old and New Testament scenes depicted in churches.
The Praefatio is a brief autobiography in which Prudentius relates how he turned, in a sort of spiritual awakening, with a guilty memory of his youthful amours and the realisation of a worldly preoccupied life, from a life of recognised public usefulness to celebrating the praises of God in verse, a change which he describes as the abandonment of spiritual folly for the purpose of singing his way to divine favor since he is impotent to earn it:

Atqui fine sub ultimo
peccatrix anima stultitiam exuat;
saltem voce deum concelebret, ei meritis neguit.

--Praefatio 34-36.

This spiritual diffidence finds expression in prayers at the conclusion of the Hamartigenia, lines 931-966, and of the Psychomachia, lines 888-915, and is at the root of the necessity, repeatedly expressed, that he felt, of enlisting the offices of those powerful advocates, the martyrs:

Ista comantibus e foliis
munera, virgo pueraque, date!
ast ego sert a choro in medio
texta feram pede ductylico,
vilia, mactida, festa tamen.

Sic venerari ess sa libet
ossibus altar et impositum,
illa (so. Eulalia) dei sita sub pedibus
prospicit haec populosce suce

2. All quotations of Prudentius are from the edition of Bergman, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, vol. 61; Vienna, 1926.
Vellem sinister inter haedorum greges
ut sum futurus, arma dinoecer
atque hoc praecipue diceret rex optinus:
"Romanus orat, transfer hunc haedum mihi,
sit dexter, agnus induatur vellere."—Peristephanon
10. 1136-1140.

For similar instances see Peristephanon 1. 118-120, 4.
141-200, 2. 561-584, 5. 545-576, 6. 143-182, 9. 93-106,

Gennadius, writing between 480 and 500, refers to
a poem by Prudentius on the Biblical account of creation:

Prudentius vir saeculari litteratura eruditus
composuit (trochaon) de toto veteri et novo testamento
excerptis. Commentatus est et in morem graecorum exaeremon
de mundi fabrica usque ad condicionem primi hominis et
praevirationem eius.—De Viris Illustribus, quoted in
Bergman, Prudentii Carmina, p. VIII.

Because all codices lack this work, Bergman is inclined
to believe Gennadius mistaken:

Quare cogitare possis de Gennadii errore et confusione
cum Hexaemero Ambrosii aequalis omissa.—Ibidem, p. XIII.

But he adds the significant note:

Sed fortasse iniuria de fide Gennadii dubitandum
est. Exstat enim apud Notkerum Balbulum (A. D. 830-912):
'Si...metra (sc. opera poetica) requisieris, non sunt
necesse necessariae gentilium fabulae, sed habes in Christ-
ianitate prudentissimum Prudentium De Mundi Exordio, De
Martyribus, etc.'—Notatio De Illustribus Viris 7, in
Bergman, p. XIII.

Prudentius was well acquainted at least with
Ambrose's poems and his refutation of Symmachus, and it
is not improbable that he versified Ambrose's Hexaemeron,
which Ambrose had in turn adapted to his Western auditors
from Basil. However, in the absence of considerable
poetic merit attaching to Prudentius' versification, there would be little reason for posterity to hand down a commentary on Genesis second-removed from Basil, after Gregory of Nyssae and Augustine's monumental works on the subject.

Tertullian is particularly conspicuous among the Christian writers who influenced Prudentius. The Hamartigenia follows mainly the lines of Tertullian's first two books against Marcion. In the Apotheosis Tertullian is again Prudentius' more immediate inspiration, with, however, an explicit variation on Prudentius' part in the passage on the nature of the soul (782-951). In Peristephanon 10 (Sancti Romani Martyris contra Gentiles Dieta), drawing mainly upon Tertullian, Prudentius develops the martyr's confession of faith into an elaborate polemic against heathenism and an exposition of Christianity. The exhibition of the heathen Pantheon in Contra Symmachum 1. 43 sqq. has its counterpart in Tertullian.

Among his pagan masters Prudentius drew heaviest from Vergil. Among possible special problems involving

8. The exposition of this dependency has been made the subject of a Doctor's thesis at the Catholic University of America at Washington, D. C.: Vergil in the Works of Prudentius, Mahoney; Catholic Education Press, Brookland, D. C., 1934.
their relationship as poetic spokesmen of two great ages of Latin literature is the question of the terminology used by each with respect to the nature of the human soul—a subject of importance in the works of both. The conception of the soul, and its relation to its origin, as found in Prudentius—e. g.,

absurde fertur deus aut pars esse dei (Apotheosis 884)—is assertedly different than the several conceptions to be found in Vergil, as, for example:

deum namque ire per omnis terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum;
hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum, quemque sibi tenuis nascentem arcessere vitas.
—Georgic 4. 231-234. 9

Both poets, however, use the same word for the soul—_anima_. Again, is there more than nominal affinity between _anima_ as the spectral form of Anchises in Elysium and the same word in the following:

non animas animae pariunt, sed lege latenti fundit opus natura suum, quo parfusa anhelent vascula vitalisque adsit scintilla coactis.—Apoth. 918-920.

New concepts of such an entity as the human soul, embodied and disembodied, are built up in response to a need, whether it be literary or philosophical or religious. Between the age of Vergil and the age of Prudentius had come, among many other things, the rise and establishment of the Christian world-view, an integral part of which is the doctrine of the immortality of the human soul.

9. All quotations of Vergil are from the Oxford edition by Hirtzel, 1900.
In that interval the Gospel story had successfully been made the basis of a mode of life, which, however, had continually in self defence to clarify its political, ethical, philosophical, and social implications. Defence of it as a life was, since it was a success, simple in principle: it was a business of pointing out what in its own right and in the nature of things was the secret of its soundness. Among other things, thinkers elaborated theories on the nature of that part of the individual which they confidently believed to survive the individual's death. The immortality of that entity was the religious fact whose philosophical verisimilitude was made the objective of inquiries into its activities and nature.

Now a number of authoritative opinions regarding that nature, such as the Platonic, Stoic, Lucretian, Ciceronian, Neo-Platonic, together with popular notions of spirit worlds inhabited by ghosts of the dead, were in existence, and the Christian, whose education was in the lore of pagan antiquity as well as of Christian catechetics and who shared the popular conceptions of the day, inherited them all. He accepted concepts that supported his belief, rejected them if they denied it outright or as soon as he saw them incompatible with it.

Prudentius, like Vergil, reflected the thought of his own time—the conclusions of his predecessors and
the concepts of his contemporaries. But Prudentius asserted that those concepts and conclusions relative to the human soul had changed notably since Vergil's day. The problem of this thesis is to discover what that difference of conception consists in, and the factors that gave rise to it.
II. Literary Setting of the Words.

An attentive reading of Vergil and of Prudentius discloses influences intimately connected with their conceptions of the soul. For example, the Bucolics, Georgics, and Aeneid exemplify three poetic genres whose respective genius Vergil found hospitable to the portrayal of three different world outlooks, each involving a different conception of the soul. On the other hand, Prudentius is too uncompromisingly the exponent of the Christian outlook to deal seriously with other systems except to plunder or to demolish them, but he does plunder them and admit their elements into his outlook. The indication of such general trends necessarily prefaces a detailed study of the words used by these writers for the soul.

The Lucretian atomistic world view appears in Vergil's Sixth Eclogue, treated in the light fancy of the pastoral convention:

Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta semina terrarumque animaeque marisque fuissent et liquidi simul ignis; ut his exordia primis omnia et ipse tener mundi conceperit orbis; tum durare solum et discludere Nerea ponto coeperit et rerum paulatim sumere formas; iamque novum terrae stupeant luceosere solem, altius atque cadant summotis mibibus imbres; incipient silvae cum primum surgere, cumque rara per ignares errant animalia montis. hinc lapides Pyrrhae iactos.—Ec. 6. 31-40.
According to this theory, the soul is a subtle body composed of the finer atoms—air, fire, vapor, and a nameless fourth element. They are enclosed within and they impart motion to the visible body, which is made of the grosser atoms of earth and water and serves as a containing vessel. The irrational part, or anima, comprising the air, fire, and vapor atoms, is scattered throughout the body; the nameless rational or intelligent element, referred to as animus, found in men and gods, is seated in the breast. Death is the dispersal of the soul atoms, anima and animus, to their respective atmospheres when the body can no longer contain them. This theory does not admit of the immortality of the anima or the animus in either a personal or a pantheistic sense; but such a logical conclusion is not relevant to Vergil’s pastoral theme.

In the Fourth Georgio Vergil caps his account of the admirable social organization of bees with a reference, in explanation of their apparent intelligence, to the Stoic doctrine of the animus mundi:

His quidam signis atque haec exempla seouti esse apibus partem divinae mentis et haustus aetherios dixere; deum namque ire per omnis terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum; hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum, quemque sibi temis nascentem aressere vitas: scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri omnis, nec morti esse locum, sed viva volare sideris in numerum atque alto succedere caelo.

—Georg. 4. 219-227.
The universe is a huge creature kept alive by masses of warm or inflamed air. This inflamed air is the reasoning, directing, motivating agency of the universe as a whole, and the source, by derivation, of the life-particles that animate and are the source of intelligent action in men, birds, fish, and animals, including Vergil's bees. Vergil adds that these many parcels of intelligent life are said not to be lost but to return to the fund of the World Reason and to be conserved there.

In the Aeneid, for ethical and patriotic reasons integral with his literary objective, Vergil gives this theory a different turn. His plot obliges him to adopt a development of it in the direction of the personal survival of the life-particles, and to add to this a variant of the Pythagorean doctrine of reincarnation. Pius Aeneas is the irresistible agent of an essentially ethical World Reason (spiritus, mens); his descendants, the gens Romana, are to carry on his mission. The life-particles of men past, present, and to come are not lost, but neither are they returned to the World Reason and absorbed. The great criminals against the World Spirit's unfolding plan of civilisation retain their individuality and personality in everlasting punishment in Tartarus;  

the great benefactors of humanity retain theirs for everlasting happiness in Elysium (e.g., Anchises). The greatest part, who have allowed their reasonable fire to be implicated in mundane (earthy: unethical, unrational) activities more or less, retain their individuality and personality until purged in Hades, lose their personality (memory) for a time after drinking of the river Lethe, and are reincarnated with their pristine rational vigor to start a new life as furtherers of the universal plan of Reason.

In this theory the life-particle or fragment of the World Reason is the real person as opposed to the irrational, earthy body, yet separated from the body it loses rather than gains reality and vigor, even in the case of the blessed Anchises, who can weep for joy but cannot return the hard embrace of his son. The presence of two different conceptions of the soul is suggested by the spectral Anchises and the doctrine of the life-particles derived from the World Spirit, and is confirmed by the incompatibility of such passages as the following:

Isque ubi tendentem adversum per gramina visid
Aenean, alaoris palmas utrasque tenendit,
effusaeque genis lacrimae et vox excidit ore:

sic equidem ducebam animo. . . .

neq me mea turpe fessellit.---Asn. 6. 684-690.

quam metui ne quid Libyae tibi regna nocerent!

---Ibidem, 6. 694.
hinc metuant cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque...
—Aen. 8. 733.

concretam exemit labem purumque relinquit
aetherium sensum atque aurae simplicis ignem.
—Aen. 6. 746-747.

scilicet immemores supera ut convexa revisant
rursus, et incipient in corpora velle reverti.
—Aen. 6. 750-751.

quae gratia currunt
armorumque fuit vivis, quae cura nitentiae
pascere eque, eadem sequitur tellure repostos.
Aen. 6. 653-655.

At any rate there is a cleavage between elements having
to do with mobility, power, clearness or purifying power
(air and fire), and physical elements associated with
inertness, heaviness, obscurity, and filth. With the
former is identified ethical reason, vigorous and clear;
with the latter, an unstable, passion-toasted body. As
a result, reason is a substance of fiery air and ethical
activity; the body is a substance of filthy earth and
passionate (unethical) activity. The rational substance
survives death because it is a particle of the World
Fire or Reason, but chiefly for the purpose of reward
or punishment, or purgation and reincarnation according
to the great ethical plan.

The discrepancy between the philosophical conception
of the life-particle and the popular imaginative notion
of the spectre is even more pronounced in the Fourth
Georgic, where they appear in unrelated episodes and
are treated separately. Compare Georgic 4. 319-327
(quoted on page 16) with Georgic 4. 486-505, with par-
The destination of the disembodied life-particle is different than that of the body wasted into the weak shadowy semblance of its living form and imagined to recover its living vigor and solidity upon emerging from the region seen only in dreams into the light of day and felt reality. Akin to the latter conception is the following:

Moerim, saepe animas imis excire sepulcris, .................vidi.—Ecl. 8. 98.

No explicit or implicit reference is made to the soul in the following quotation, and candidus is masculine:

Candidus insuetum miratur limen Olympi sub pedibusque videt nubes et sidera Daphnis. ..............

'deus, deus ille, Menalipa!' —Ecl. 5. 55-57, 64.

Prudentius descants on a single theme: the body is a fragile, terrestrial substance preoccupied with
terrestrial things, the mind is a strong, heavenly
substance concerned about heavenly things.

Deus, ignee fons animarum,
duo qui socians elementa,
vivum simul ac moribundum,
ominem, pater, effigiasti.

ut, dum generosa caduce
ceu carcere clausa ligantur,
pars illa potentior extet,
quae germen ab aethere traxit.

Si terrea forte voluptas
luteum sapit et grave captat,
amimus quoque pondera victus
sequitur sua membra deorsum;

at si generis memor ignis
contagia pigra recuset,
vehit hospita viscera secum
pariterque reportat ad astra.


Occasionally, as in the above quotation, he works
out that theme almost entirely in Stoic terms, but
to suppose that he thereby tolerates the idea of the
emanation rather than the creation of the soul would
be to forget the fundamental seriousness that he attaches
to that point in his Christian belief:

Sed fortasse animam, domini quia fluxit ab ore,
compositam factamque neges, velut ipsa dei pars,
quod dictu sceius est, taetras trahit obliter culpas
et pessum damnata ruens chaos intret opertum.
sit res illa dei, non abnuo, pars tamen illa
haudquaquam dicenda dei est, quae tempore coepit.

—Apoteosis 820-835.

Prudentius is professedly the militant apologist and
lyrist of the Christian life and faith, the ardent pan-
egyrist of its martyrs, the unsparing satirist and dem-
olisher of its foes within and without, drawing manner
and material familiarly and abundantly from both secular
and sacred sources.\[11\]

**Hymnis continet dies
 nec nox ulla vaeet, quin domimum canat;
pugnet contra hereses, catholicam disputat fidem;
conciliet sacra gentium,
labem, Roma, tuis inferet idolis;
carmen martyribus devoveat, laudet apostolos.
— Praefatio 37-42.

Vergil’s terminology for the soul embodied is:
\textit{anima}, pars divinae mentis, haustus aetherius, vita, ignis,
vigor igneus, semen; disembodied, it is referred to as
\textit{anima}, sensus aetherius, aurai simplicis ignis, manes,
ubra, imago, simulacrum, forma, effigies, facies, figura; the World Soul is deus, mens divina, mens, \textit{spiritus}.
For the embodied soul Prudentius uses the following terms:
\textit{anima}, ignis, ignis pretiosus, vigor igneus, ignis
caelestis, vitalis scintilla, socius calor; \textit{spiritus},
flatus, simplex flatus, res flabilis, halitus; mens,
\textit{animus}, sensus vis, vis ardua; vita, vegetamen, semen,
elementum, pigmentum, factura non pars dei, res illa
dei; natura, liquida natura, tenuis natura, natura
fervens, liquor animae (liquida anima), substantia;
germania cordis amici, hospita limi recentis, regnane
dominus; for the disembodied soul: \textit{anima}, \textit{spiritus}, \textit{an-
imus}, mens; alumna, incola coeli, patronus, vir corus-
cans indus tria gemmis, perennis consula, inferi, umbror-
um populus. Of these we are interested in the underlined.
11. See page 11 for paragraph on Tertullian. In the fifteen pages of Bergman's Index Imitationum (Prudentii Carmina), Vergil is the most important name by far, with Horace, Ambrose, Claudian, Lucan, Lactantius, Ovid, and Seneca trailing at a distance. The Index Locorum Sacrae Scripturae, pp. 450-455, is almost equally divided into New and Old Testament passages.
III. Classification of Meanings.

Since the thesis is concerned only with the four words anima, animus, spiritus and mens as designating the soul or the entity to which man's life, feeling, and thought are referred, we shall pass over other meanings found for the words, e. g., life, courage, thought.

1. In Vergil, outside of such philosophical passages as Georgio 4. 219-227 and Aenid 6. 724-751, the word anima refers to the individual's "life" as something detachable from his body:

Lucantem animam nexosque resolveret artus. —Aen. 4. 605.

Nascendi cui tres animas Feronia mater (horrendum dictu) dederat, terna arma movenda (ter leto sternendus erat; cui tamen omnis abstulit haec animas dextra et totidem exuit armis). —Aen. 8. 564-567.


Now the life-substance is blood, now air:

Undantique animam diffundit in arma cruore. —Aen. 10. 908.

mene Iliacis occumbers c Hamp non potuisse tuaque animam hanc effundere dextra! —Aen. 1. 97-98.

vomit ille animam. —Aen. 9. 349.

confixi exspirant animas. —Aen. 223. 883.

When the life-substance is air, it is dissipated
into the breezes at death:

\[ \textit{omnis et una} \]
\[ \textit{dilapsus calor atque in ventos vita recessit.} \]
---Aen. 4. 704-705.

Other instances, in which \textit{anima} means "life" without explicit mention of its being an entity are Aeneid 12. 230; 2. 118; 9. 443; 10. 348; 11. 163; 10. 854; 5. 483; 6. 436; 3. 140; 4. 385; 3. 654; 9. 683; 9. 580; 10. 601; Georgic 3. 495; 4. 204; 4. 238; 4. 526.

The \textit{anima} disembodied is a dream figure or "double" of the body, a shadowy replica of the body at death even to details of dress and disfigurement. While the name \textit{anima} is common to the individual's embodied "life" considered as something detachable and to the airy, contentless replica of his body that symbolizes the survival of his conscious life and identity, the two concepts are distinct; the first being an association of the individual's life with his breath (\textit{anima}: air), the second, of the individual's conscious life or identity with the configuration and other characteristics of his body.\textsuperscript{12} There is no basis for continuity between the entitized "life" and the mythical "ghost" or spectral "double" of popular animistic belief; there is merely a point of contact, namely, the secondary

\textsuperscript{12} Anima, de Manibus sensu mythico, non psychologico. Lexicon Totius Latinitatis, Forcellini, article "anima", approving a special work by Doederlein.
meaning of "life" for anima, abetted by the implicit primary meaning of "air." The first concept derives from the physical efficacy of the breath, the second starts from the body as determining the individual's identity. See Aeneid 6. 684-694, 6. 750-751, 6. 653-655, quoted on pages 18-19, the quotations from the Fourth Georgic on page 20, and the following:

Circumstant animae dextra laevaque frequentes;

........................

at Danaum proceres Agamemnoniasque phlanges ut videre virum fulgentiaque arma per umbras, ingenti trepidare metu; pars vertere terga, seu quondam petiere rates, pars tollere vocem exiguum: inceptus clamor frustratur hiantis.

----Aen. 6. 486, 489-493

Continuo auditae voces vagitus et ingens infantumque animae flentes...----Aen. 6. 426-427

inclusas animas superumque ad lumen ituras lustrabat studio recolens, ommemque suorum forte recensebat numerum, carosque nepotes fataque fortunasque virum morisque manusque.

----Aen. 6. 680-683

inde alias animae, quae per iuga longa sedebant, disturbat laxatque foros. ----Aen. 6. 411-412

illae autem paribus quae fulgere cernis in armis, concordes animae nunc et dum nocte premuntur, heu quantum inter se bellum, si lumina vitae attigerint....

----Aen. 6. 838-839

tua me, genitor, tua tristis imago saepius occurrrens haco limina tendere adegit; ter frustra comprensa manus effugit imago, par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno.

----Aen. 6. 695-695, 701-702
Animae, quibus altera fato
 corpora debentur, Lethaei ad fluminis undam
 securos latices et longa oblivia potant.
 --Aen. 6. 713-715

O pater, anne aliquas ad caelum hinc ire putandum
 est
 sublimis animas iterumque ad tarda reverti
 corpora? quae lucis miseris tam dira cupido?
 --Aen. 6. 719-731

See also: Aeneid 6.817, 669, 319, 364; 4.342.

Further illustrative of the connection between the
 body and the mythical anima:

manibus date lilia plenis,
purpureos spargam flores animamque nepotis
his saltem accumulem donis, et fungar inani
munere. --Aen. 6. 883-886

inferimus tepido spumantia cymbia lacte
sanguinis et saori pateras, animamque sepulcro
condimus et magna supremium voce citemus.
--Aen. 3. 66-68

egregias animas, quae sanguine nobis
banc patriam peperere suo, decorate supratis
muneribus, maestamque Evandro primus ad urbem
mittatur Pallas, quem non virtutis agentem
abstulit atra dies et funere mersit aoebo.
--Aen. 11. 24-28

Salve, sancte parens, iterum salvete, recepti
nequiquam cineres animaeque umbraeque paternae.
--Aen. 5. 80-81
(Of. Cinerique haeo mittite nostro munera.
--Aen. 4. 623.)

vinaque fundebat pateris animamque vocabat
Anchiseae magni manisque Acheronte remissos.
--Aen. 5. 98-99

Moerim saepe animas imis excire sepuloris
...........vidi. --Ed. 8. 98
A connecting link between the embodied and the disembodied *anima* is asserted in the following line:

```
    vitaque oem gemitu fugit indignata sub umbrae,
```

*Aen. 12. 953,* in which *Turnus*’ “self” (see *Aen. 12. 648*, quoted on page 23) continues as the mythical “double.” No explicit mention is made of air or blood as the substance of *Turnus*’ “self,” but the disembodied *anima* (called *vita* here) can only be that “self” pictured as the tenuous “double” or *Manes.*

Vergil’s philosophical version of the *anima* is on a different plane and parallel to the popular mythical account thus far elucidated. It is evoked for a purpose. Instead of symbolizing a carry-over of identity or “self” post mortem by the inheritance of physical features by a tenuous, hypostatized life-energy or life-cause (air), the philosophical version asserts a *de iure* permanence of the *anima* based on the physical and ontological superiority of its stuff, namely, clear fiery air:

```
Principio caelum ac terram camposque liqueutis lucentemque globum lunae Titaniae astra spiritum intus alit, totamque infusa per artus mens agitat molem et magno se corporis misset. Inde hominum pecudumque genus vitaeque volantium et quaes marmoreo ferto monstra sub aequore pontus. Ignibus est ollis vigor et caelestis origo seminibus, quantum non nozia corpora tardant terrenique hebetant artus moribundaque membra.
```
Hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque, neque auras
dispiciunt clausae tenebris et carcere caeco. Quin et supremo sum lumine vita reliquit, non tamen omne malum misericordiae nec funditus omnes corporeae excedunt pestes, penitusque necesse est multa diu conoreta modis inolescere miris. Ergo exercetor poenis veterumque malorum supplicia expendunt: aliæ panduntur inanes suspensae ad ventos, aliæ sub gurgite vasto infectum eluitur aedus aut exuritur igni—quisque suos patimur manis; exinde per amplum mittimur Elysium et pauci laeta arva tenemus—donee longa dies perfecto tempore orbe conoretam exemit labem, purumque relinquit aetherium sensum atque aurum simplicia ignem. Has omnis, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos, Lethaenum ad fluvium deus evocat agmine magno, scilicet immemores supera ut convexa revisant rursus, et incipient in corpora vells reverti.

—Aen. 6. 724–751.

See also Georgio 4. 219–237, quoted on page 16.

This theory has it that the motive force in man is not a terrestrial element—aer, sanguis—but a particle of a divine substance—aether, ignis. It is a parcel of fiery air derived from the fiery substance of the World Spirit or World Mind. Its connatural activity is rational and ethical. It is the "self" in the sense of Cicero's phrase, "mens cuiique est quiesque."—Somnium Scipionis 12. It is the agent of the World Spirit's plan of civilisation for men—an ethical program for the good of incarnate animas. It is impeded in this activity by the gross, lawless, terrestrial body. But except in the rare cases of the perpetually punished or the perpetually rewarded
anima, its disembodied condition is subservient to its normal, vigorous, incarnate state, whatever the ethical disadvantages of that state. Again, Vergil conceives the philosophical anima as a conscious physical agent in close working relationship with the body, and not as an immaterial thought-agency that commands the activity of the body. This latter concept derives from Plato and is approved by Cicero:

Eius doctor Plato tripliqem finxit animum, cuius principatum, id est, rationem, in caput silent in arce posuit, et duas partes ei parere voluit, iram et cupiditatem, quae suis locis, iram in pectore, cupiditatem subter praecordia, locavit.—Tusc. Disp. 1. 20.

Even in his philosophical account Vergil pictures the disembodied anima as a tenuous "double," that is, a form with human outlines. This is true of the passage in the Sixth Aeneid; in the Fourth Georgic, where the carry-over of the individual's identity and responsibility to the afterlife is not required by the literary objective, the fiery life-particles disembodied are spoken of as "viva" without characteristic corporal configuration.

The words spiritus and mens of Aeneid 6. 726, 727 and of Georgic 4. 220 designate the self-active and activating substance of fiery air that vitalizes and directs the corpus of the universe. Its plan is to bring every part and member of the universe into
ordered (rational and ethical) activity, as interdependent parts of a harmonious unitary organism. Its relation to the corpus of the universe is the same as that of the philosophical human anima to its body.

Animus is not found in Vergil for the embodied or the disembodied life-particle, nor even for the World Soul. Nor is anima found for the World Soul. If the selection of spiritus and mens for the World Soul is significant, it possibly supports Vergil's conception of the World Soul as an irresistible ethical force with an intelligent, rational plan. Animus as the life-particle in Vergil is wanting in the note of unwavering force—a defect from which spiritus is clear in Vergil. For anima, see Aeneid 6. 486, 489-493 on page 36; for spiritus, the following:

divini signa decoris
ardentisque notate coulos; qui spiritus illi,
quis vultus vocisque sonis vel gressus eunti.
—Aen. 5. 648.

And animus has associations of lawlessness that make mens the preferable word when speaking of the World Reason:

dum Turnus Rutulos animis audacibus implet.
—Aen. 7. 475.

quae prima laborum
causa fuit belloque animos ascendit agrestis.
—Aen. 7. 481-482.
Whether advisedly or not, Vergil does not use *anima* but *vita* for the philosophical *anima*. But that the story of the Aeneid supposes the identification is clear. See page 28.

3. The Words in Prudentius.

Nothing is clearer or more insisted upon than that the embodied *anima*, *animus*, *spiritus*, or *mens* is a thinking stuff personalized, an entity of a stuff and activity different those of the body; see Cathe-merinion 10. 1-4, 21-32 on page 31, and the following:

'Errat,' *ait, 'qui lactamen cum sanguine nobis et carnis et venis ferventibus et vitioso felle putat calidisque animam pessare medullis. Non mentem sua membra premunt nec terea virtus oppugnat sensus liquidos belove lascisit, sed cum spiritibus tenebrosum moote dieque congredimus.—Hamartigenia 509-515.

Nemo habitum naturae aut inritamina pessans corporis accusset; facile est frenare rebelles affectus carnis nimisque retundere pulsus materias fragilis et viscosa vieta domare. Quippe animus longe praestantior, utpote summe aethere demissus; subjectos si velit artus imperio quassare gravi iussisque severis dedere, regnanti domino vis nulla resistit.—Hamartigenia 523-530.

anne fides capit, ut substantia (sc. anima) flante inspirata deo cruciatum sentiat, utque inferni petat ima poli baratroque coquatur. Crede animam non esse deum, sed crede creatis maiorem cunctis, ipsum quoque crede creatam. Formata est namque ore dei, quae non erat ante, sed formata habitu pulcherrima pictaque rebus divinis et plena deo similisque creanti, non tamen ipsa deus, quoniam generatio non est, sed factura dei est.—Apotheosis 783-792.
Est similis, saeculis quod non consumitur ulla, quod sapiens iustique sapax reginae rerum imperat, ante videt, perpendit, praecavit, infinit verborum merusque epifex instructaque milie artibus et caelum sensu percurrere docta. His animam similis sibi conditor effigivit.

--Apodeosis 503-507.

Errat, quisque animas nostrorum fine oculorum aestimat, involvit vitreo quos lucida palla obice, quis speculum concreta coagula tenunt impedientque vagas obducto humere fenestras. Humne animarum oculis dense vegetamine guttae volvuntur teretes aut palpebralibus extra horrescunt saeulis oiliove umbrante teguntur? Illis viva acies nec pupila parva sed ignis trajector nebulae vasti et penetrator operi est. Nil ferrugineum solidusque tuentibus obstat, nocturnae oedum nebulae, nigrantia oedunt nubila, praetenti oedit teres area mundi, nec tantum aequis visu transmittit hiatus spiritus, oppositos sed transit lumine montes, Oceani fines atque ultima litora Thylae transadigit voluereaque oculos in tartara mittit.

--Hamartigenia 867-882.

Prudentius exhaustively utilizes the metaphorical possibilities of the physical elements of fire and air connoted by the words, when relating the heavenly or-igin and destination of the thinking substance, its mobility in thought, its power of transcending the spatial and temporal limitations of the body and mater-ial universe:

Expertus dubitas animas percurrevi visu addita corporeis oculis, cum saepe quietis rore soporatis cernat mens viva remotos distantesque locos acies per rura, per astra, per maria intendens; nec enim se segregat ipsa ante obitum vivis ex artubus aut fugit exul sanguinis et carnis penetralia sequre medullis eruit abductamve abigit de pectore vitam,
viscera sed sede manens speculatur acutis
omnia luminibus et, qua circumtulit aereum
naturas levis intuitum nullo obice rerum
disclosa, ante oculos subjectum prospexit orbem
atque orbis sub mole situm sordens elementum.
Obiaceat interea tellus nec visibus obstat,
quin el stelligerum vultus convertat ad axem,
nil intercurrens obtutibus impedit ignem
pervigilis animae, quamvis densea gravetur
nubila et opposito nigrescat vellere caelum.
Sic arcana videt tacitis coeptura futuris
corporibus Iohannis adhuc nec carne solutum,
munere sed somni paulisper carne sequestra
liber ad intuitum sensuque oculisque peragrans
ordine dispositos venturus solibus annos
procinotum videt angelicum iam iamque creandi
orbis in excidium tristes et percepit aure
mugitus gravium mundi sub fine tubarum.
Haeo ille ante obitum membrorum carcer eaeptus
secedente anima, non discedente videbat;
nonne magis filatus sine corpore cuncta notabit
corporis involucris tumulo frigente repotis?
certa fides. --Hamartigenia 892-921

!non occidet! inquit,
'Anterior qui spirat homo, iust ille perenne
supplicium, quod subjectos male rexerit artus,
nec mihi difficile est liquidam circumdare flammis
naturam, quamvis perflabilis illa feratur
more noti: capiam tamen et tormenta adhiebo
ipse incorporeus ac spirituum sator unus.
--Contra Symmachum 2. 184-190

But he makes it clear that the soul is not fire or air.

Est alter, est intrinsecae,
violare quem nullus potest,
liber, quietus, integer,
exsors dolorum tristium.

Hoc, quod laboras perdere
tantis furoris viribus,
avs est solutum ac fictile,
quocumque frangendum modo.

Quin imo nunc enitere
illum secare ac pleeters,
qui perstat intus, qui tuaa
caloat, tyranne, insaniam!
Huno, hunc lacesse, hunc discute, 
inviotum, inexsuperabilem, 
nullis procellis subditum 
solique subjectum deo! — Peristephanon 5. 157-172.

cresavit
nempe manus dominus corpus mortale lutumque
composuit digitie. numquid manus articulatim
est digesta dei? numquid vola? numquid at uinges
claudere flexibilese patulam seu tendere palmam?
ista figura manus nostrae est, quam non habet in se
incircumscriptus dominus, sed tradita forma est,
humanis quae nota animis daret intellectum.
ut per corpoream speciem plasmasse feratur
corporis effigiem, sic est plasmata vice sim
flatu incorporeo res flabilis, oris et esse
fertur opus, tenus per quod constructa refusit
forma animae atque rudi factam se munere sensit.
si non est factura manus caro nostra, nec oris
est factura anima flatu et spiramine coepta
inque locum deducta aliquem;...—Apotheosis 857-872

See also Apotheosis 830-832; 850-851, on page 47, and
Apotheosis 724-728 and Peristephanon 10. 325, 336-337,
on page 48. Unlike Vergil, whose philosophical embodied
\textit{anima} is reasonable fiery air, and whose popularly con-
ceived \textit{anima} is air or blood, Prudentius dissociates
the life-substance from all other elements, and conceives
it as an element apart—life-stuff or thought-stuff
stronger than the fragile terrestrial stuff of which
the body is made or by which (e.g., fire) the body
can be brought into subjection.

As designating the embodied individual rational
substance having its own activity incompatible with that
of the body, the four words are used interchangeably,
e.g., \textit{anima} and \textit{animus}. 
Hi rapiant artus, tu rape, Christe, animam!
---Peristephanon 11.110, 177-178

Hic corruptelis animique et corporis aeger
oravi quotiens stratus, opem merui.
---Peristephanon 11. 177-178

**anima and spiritus:**

Deus, ignee fons animarum.—Cathemerinon 10.1
et spiritus et caro servit.—Cathemerinon 10.8

**anima and mens:**

Mundum, quem coluit, mens tua perdidit.
---Praefatio 35

Atqui fine sub ultimo
peccatrix anima stultitiam exuat. ---Praefatio 31-32

**anima and spiritus, animus and mens, spiritus and mens:**

Flevit negator denique
ex ore prolapsum nefas,
cum mens maneret innocens
animusque servaret fidem. ---Cathemerinon 1. 57-60

Vigil vicissim spiritus,
quodouque restat temporis. ---Cathemerinon 1.77-78

But anima and mens are used in a further sense not found
for animus and spiritus. Now anima is used to designate
the source of vital activities in a body not conceived
as having its own earthy appetites and activity:

Nee igitur tua, sancte, manus
caespite composita madido
effigiem meditata suam,
ute foret rata materies,
ore animam dedit ex proprio.—Cathemerinon 3.96-100

Quis potuit fluidis animam suffundere membris?
---Apotheosis 763

 corpus loquor atque animae vim;
finxerat hoc digitis, animam sufflaverat ore.
---Apotheosis 777-778
Again, *anima* is used as designating the source of vital activities to the detriment of its own higher activity.

Norat enim flatu ex proprio vegetamen inesse corporibus nostris animamque ex ore perenni formatam non posse mori...—Hamartigenia 830

Unde fluens anima structum vegetaverat Adam.
—Hamartigenia 846

Again, we have *anima* as the source of all vital activities and in close working relationship with the body, with no hint of an ethical dualism.

*Anima*e hominum venis vitalibus intus sic interfusas intellego, sanguis ut ex his accipiat motumque le vem tenerumque vaporem, unde pererratis vegetet praecordia membris, frigida succendat, riget arida, dura relaxet. Sic hominis vitam sibi temperat atque gubernat vivida mens, quam to fi uo conponere temptas murorum genio, qui nusquam est nec fult umquam. Quin et corporibus versat mens viva regendis sumnum consilium, fida ut tutacula nudis invalidisque paret, metuenda pericula vitet.
—Contra Symmachum 2. 379-389

fingamus tamen esse aliquam, quae talia curet, umbram sive animam, per quam res publica fatum hauserit et calidis animetur tota medullis..
—Contra Symmachum 2. 404-406

*Mens* shares this last usage in the two instances appearing in the above quotation.

In their designation of the disembodied life-entity all four words are used of the immortal life-entity surviving by reason of the superior quality of its substance, e.g., *anima*:

Credo equidem—neque vana fides—corpora vivere more animae. —Cathemerinon 3.196-197
Orie opus, vigor igneolus
non moritur, quia flante deo
compositus superque fluens
de solio patris artificis
vim liquidae rationis habet.—Cathemerinon 3.186-190

**animus:**

Cum lux animum nova vexat. —Cathemerinon 10.84

**spiritus:**

erupit volens
vocem secutus spiritus. —Peristephanon 2.487-488

**mens:**

Illio, precor, optime ductor,
famulam tibi præcipite mentem
genitali in sede sacrori,
quam liquerat exul et errans.—Cathemerinon 10.165-168

Only three—*anima*, *spiritus*, and *mens*—are used of the immortal life-entity pictured as a tenuous "double" of the body, corresponding to Vergil's mythical *anima* in physical makeup:*anima:*

iaotataque animas mille laboribus
iustorum in patriam scandere praecipit.
—Cathemerinon 5.111-112

**spiritus:**

spiritibus puris et ab omni labe remotis.
—Hamartigenia 841

**mens:**

Est aula nam duplex tibi,
hic corporis, mentis polu.
—Peristephanon 2.551-552

In one instance *spiritus* is the surviving life-entity in the shape of a dove.

Emicat inde columba repens
martyris os nive candidior
visa relinquere et astra sequi;
Changes from one term to another in the first sense, and from the first to the second sense and vice versa, disclose no fixed rule or even a general tendency based on the words themselves. Anima and animus are used interchangeably in Cathemerinon 10.44, 84; anima and spiritus in Nastartigenia 836, 841; anima and mens in Cathemerinon 10.152, 166; spiritus and mens in Peristephanon 2.448, 552 (mens as the "double" is found only here). Animus is used only once, as noted here, and consequently is not found used interchangeably with spiritus or mens. The same is true of changes between the words as used to designate the embodied life-entity and as used to designate the disembodied life-entity. The single occurrence of animus for the disembodied life-entity, in contrast to its frequent occurrence for the embodied life-entity, and the fact that its single occurrence carries the first meaning noted above rather than the meaning of the "double" suggests a significance to which I have found no clue in the characteristics that I have tabulated for the words. One clue is the fact that Prudentius uses the words in other senses than as the entitized human life-source—e.g., Holy Spirit, demon, the Second Person of the Trinity, "life", thought, courage.
Prudentius' confidence that the life-entity survives for an eternity of reward or of punishment is so serene that his philosophical problem is not the basis of the soul's permanence de jure, but the possibility of its punishment. See Contro Symmachum 2. 184-190, on page 34; also Apotheosis 783-785, on page 32; also Apotheosis 900:

quae peccare valet, valet et succumbere poenae.

Cicero had preferred animus to anima to designate the mind-substance—a verbal expedient designed to keep explicit Cicero's distinction between his own conception of the mind and those conceptions which link mind with the terrestrial element implicitly named by the word anima, namely, air.

Anima sit animus, ignisve, nescio.
--Tusc. Disp. 1. 60

Quae est ei (animo) natura? Propria, puto, et sua; sed fac ignem, fac spirabilem.
--Tusc. Disp. 1. 70

He was desirous of proving the de jure permanence of the mind. In Prudentius that permanence and its basis in the substance of mind are assumed as incontestable. So that that reason for a distinction of terms is not present. The reasons for the distinction noted between anima and mens, against spiritus and animus will be sought in the next section.

The present section, as far as Prudentius is concerned, is based on a classification of instances
which I append in their entirety:

A. The words as designating the embodied Mind-substance that commands the activity of the body rather than animates it.

1. *Anima*. Praefatio 35; Cathemerinon 3.31; 4.33, 35; 6.90; 10.1; Apotheosis 786, 794, 807, 814, 820, 851, 854, 869, 871, 879, 888, 909, 913, 916, 918, 926, 948; Hamartigenia, Praefatio 55; Hamartigenia 143, 389, 594, 511, 543, 616, 517, 654, 819, 867, 871, 892, 908, 919, 931, 940; Psychomachia, Praefatio 64; Psychomachia 8, 713, 893, 899; Contra Symmachum 2.20; Contra Symmachum 2.73, 215, 373, 1042; Peristephanon 10.438, 449; 11.26, 62, 118, 183; 13.13, 64; Diitochaescon 8. (60 times)

2. *Animus*. Cathemerinon 1.60; 6.47; 7.20; 10.27; Hamartigenia 89, 376, 527, 678, 891, 717, 739, 755; Psychomachia 57, 905; Contra Symmachum 1.81, 213; Contra Symmachum 2.97, 147, 156, 439, 480, 637, 706, 1021; Peristephanon 2.210; 3.95, 143; 10.732, 771; 11.177. (30 times)

3. *Spiritus*. Cathemerinon 1.77; 6.115; 7.24, 300; 10.8; Hamartigenia 880; Contra Symmachum 2.190, 377; Peristephanon 3.33; 10.739. (10 times)

4. *Mens*. Praefatio 32; Cathemerinon 1.3, 32, 59; 2.16, 49, 111; 6.13, 33, 114, 136; 7.10, 19; 9. 82; 10.34; Hamartigenia Praefatio 56, 57; Hamartigenia 61, 278, 342, 382, 425, 512, 532, 608, 639, 886, 700,
42

894, 945; Psychomachia 6, 351, 386, 741, 767, 774, 840; Contra Symmachum 1.375; Contra Symmachum 2. 103, 145, 164, 249, 323, 333, 629, 876, 1058, 1072; Peristephanon 1.99; 2.208, 224; 10.79, 313, 346, 388, 435, 582, 858, 966; 12.18; 13.13; Epilogue 4. (62 times)

B. The words as designating the embodied animating and directing substance:

1. Animā. Cathemerinon 3.100 (186-190); Apotheosis 763, 777, 778; Hamartigenia 830, 846; Contra Symmachum 2.379, 405. (8 times)


C. The words as designating the disembodied life-substance:

1. Animā. As the "double": Cathemerinon 5.111, 131; Hamartigenia 864; Psychomachia 914; Contra Symmachum 1.91, 424, 445; Peristephanon 2.289. (8 times)

As simply surviving: Cathemerinon 3.197; 10.44, 129, 152; Hamartigenia 836, 887, 923, 960; Psychomachia 90; Contra Symmachum 291, 531; Peristephanon 3.166; 4.199; 6.71, 97; 8.10; 10.471, 1110; 13.48; 14.83. (30 times)

2. Animus. Cathemerinon 10.84. (Once)

3. Spiritus. As the "double": Hamartigenia 841, 930; Contra Symmachum 1.446; Peristephanon 1.96; 5.368; 10. 533; 14.91. (7 times)
As a dove: Peristephanon 3.164. (Once)

As simply surviving: Peristephanon

2.489; 5.571; 7.88; 10.1081; 12.27. (5 times)

4. Mena. As the "Double": Peristephanon 2.552. (Once)

As simply surviving: Cathemerinon 10.

166; Peristephanon 1.30; 5.359; 361; 10. 519; 13.88.

(6 times)
IV. Precedents for Prudentius' Usages.

The purpose of this section is to account for Prudentius' terminology and meanings for the soul in so far as they differ from Vergil's.

The difference between Prudentius' use of the four words for the embodied and the disembodied soul and Vergil's use of anima alone is not wholly due to Prudentius' later appearance on the scene. The Stoic animus and mens of Cicero, with their Platonic and Aristotelian additions, do not appear in Vergil's terminology for the human soul. But these terminological lacunae do not mean that that development was unknown to him and unutilized—that he was unacquainted with the writings of Cicero and ignorant of Plato. Rather he uses a terminology and a conception of man that shall be in keeping, as far as the ethical and patriotic purpose of his epic allow, with the conceptions of the early age in which he has laid his story. To add literary verisimilitude and to clinch the plot which he uses as the vehicle of his purpose, he adds a few Stoic and Pythagorean elements to the early animistic conceptions of his story, with the result that the narrative is seen in the light of a world-view and is accorded new significance. The key passage (Aen. 6. 724-751) is
long enough to create a powerful impression as on an initiate into doubly mysterious secrets, but short enough for Anchises to divert our attention elsewhere before we advert to the change from the mythical to the philosophical plane, and back, without a corresponding change in terminology for the human life-entity. The doctrine of the Stoic animus is in this passage, and the doctrine of the Platonic nous as rightful, because divine, master of the volitional and acquisitive drives in the individual is at the base of the ethical lessons taught by the tragedies of Dido and Turnus—but the corresponding terminology, for reasons of literary unity, is avoided.

In the case of the Christian poet it should be remembered that Prudentius is not a juggler of concepts, but intends his words to designate things. As a poet he strives for verbal and conceptual variety, but his primary concern is for the things he is talking about. For example, he gives no indication that he is aware of having introduced another conception of anima and mens in the instances tabulated under B on page 43, nor that there is any incongruity in referring to the same disembodied life-entity now as simply that and again as a dove and again as a "double" stretched out on a purple couch in heaven breathing aromas wafted
from eternal flowers, drinking nectar, and refusing to touch the tongue of the rich man in hell with so much as a wetted fingertip. Whether you think of the anima as commanding the activity of the body or as being in close working relation with it, you are thinking of the same anima. And that anima survives in a disembodied condition, whether the latter is pictured as a "double" or a dove, or is asserted to survive without mention of its shape, and whether it is called anima, animus, spiritus, or mens.

But did Prudentius have precedents for his use of the four words for the embodied and the disembodied soul, or did he innovate; and for his use of anima and mens as against spiritus and animus?

A. Precedents for Prudentius' use of the four words as designating the embodied mind-substance that commands the activity of the body rather than animates the body.

Cicero had already made the mind-substance a separate element, identifying it with the fifth element posited by Aristotle as the substance of the stars:

Aristoteles....cum quattuor nota illa genera principiorum esset complexus, e quibus omnia orirentur, quintam quandam naturam oenset esse, e qua sit mens. Cogitare enim et provideire et discere et docere et invenire aliquid et tam multa alia seminisre, amare odisse, cupidere timere, angi laetari, haec et similia eorum in horum quattuor generum inesse nullum putat; quintum genus adhibet vacans nomine et sic ipsum
Aristotle referred to the heavenly bodies, *aetheria*, and not to *animum*, the soul, as the fifth element. Cicero has confused his theory with that of the Stoics, who held that the stars were spirits and that the souls of men were of the same substance as the heavenly bodies.

Prudentius employs the imagery of that identification, and accepts the idea that the mind-stuff is different than all material elements:

Ac primum facili referuntur (sc. spiritus puri) ad astra volatu
unde fluens anima structum vegetaverat Adam;
nam quia naturam tenuem declivia vitae
pondera non reprimunt nec tardat ferrea conpes,
concretum celeri relegens secut aera lapso
exsuperatque polum fervens scintilla remensum
carcereos exosa situs, quibus haeserat exul.
---Hamartigenia 845-851.

More fortunate in his cosmological quest than Cicero had been, Prudentius can refer its origin to the will-act of the Christian God, a non-material life-and-thought substance who commands but does not animate the universe:

Illa quidem flatus domini est, sed spiritus et vis
non est plena dei tanto moderamine missa,
quanto flans voluit flandi servare tenorem.
---Apotheosis 830-832.

13. See Hamartigenia 856-862.
Haeo cum te videas mortali in corpore posse,
curr non aeternum potuisses infundere credas
(Compare these passages with Apotheosis 857-872 on
page 35 and with Apotheosis 724-728 and Periplus
10. 336-340 on page 48.)

Credite, nemo deum vidit, mihi credite, nemo:
visibilis de fonte deus, non ipse dei fons
visibilis, cerni potis est qui nascitur, at non
innatus cerni potis est, latet os patris illud,
unde deus, qui visibilem se praestitit olim,
tale aliquid formans in sese, quale scuta est,
passio, qua corpus aibi vindicate; ardua nam vis
est inpassibilis, quoniam natura superni
ignis ad horribilas nescit descendere poenas
neo capitis humanis angoribus excruciaris,
pura, serena, micans, liquido praeberta motu,
subita neo cuiquam, dominatrix utpote rerum,
cui non principium de tempore, sed super omne
temps et ante diem maiestas cum patre summo,
immo animus patris et ratio, via consiliorum,
quae non facta manu neo voce creata iubentis
profutit imperium patrio ructata profundo.
— Apotheosis 77-93.

Capiam tamen et tormenta adhibebo
ipse incorporeus ac spiritus aeternus.
— Contra Symmachum 3. 189-
190.

non siout sculptor ab aerie
rudere decereant institus vivere massam,
sed deus omnipotens orbem sine semine finxit.
Nih erat omne, quod est; nil id procedere et esse
atque novum fieri mox et grandescere iussum est.
— Apotheosis 724-728.

quidquid usquam est, una virtus condidit.
— Periplus 10. 325.

Haeo non labore et arte molitus deus
sed iussione, quam potestas protulit,
mandavit esse; facta sunt, quae non erant,
verbo oreavit omniformem machiram,
virtus paterna semper in verbo fuit.
Moreover, from these quotations it is clear that while the Vergilian and Ciceronian soul is a particle of the World Soul or at least of the same nature or substance as it, Prudentius makes it clear that the human soul is not, like the Son and Holy Spirit, of the same substance as God, but came into existence from previous nothingness by the arbitrary fiat of the Creator. In short, with Vergil and Cicero the divinity is a communicable substance, with Prudentius it is incommunicable:

_Nec vero deus ipse, qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quaedam et libera, segregata ab omni concretionis mortali, omniaque sentiens et movens, ipsaque praedita motu sempiterno. Hoc e genere atque eadem e natura est humana mens._—Tusc. Disp. 1. 27.

The concept of creation is Oriental and is foreign to the Greek mind—ex nihilo nihil fit. With it is associated the problem of the origin of evil and the problem of the one-ness of God. The Gnostic theory of emanations from the Godhead was philosophically and religiously unacceptable because it ultimately laid responsibility for evil on the Deity. Creation was to be understood as production of everything from nothingness, or else God would not have been the only being in existence eternally. Irenaeus worked out
such a philosophical refutation thoroughly in his polemic Adversus Haereses, book 2, in the last quarter of the second century. Theophilus of Antioch, writing about the same time, shows how Genesis 1. 1 was understood and philosophically justified at that time:

Plato et qui eum sequuntur, Deum quidem fatentur ingenitum et patrem et creatorem omnium esse; sed deinde statuunt duo esse ingenita, Deum et materiam, quamque Deo coaevam esse dicunt. Quod si Deus ingenitus et materiam ingenita, non iam Deus creator est omnium secundum Platonicos, nec Dei constabit monarchia, quantum in ipsis est. Deinde, quemadmodum Deus, quaternus ingenitus, etiam immutabilis est, ita et materia, si esset ingenita, immutabilis quoque et Deo aequalis foret; quod enim genitum est, verti et mutari potest, ingenitum nec verti potest nec mutari. Quod autem magnum esset, si Deus ex materia subjiciat mundum faceret? Opifex enim apud nos, cum materiam ab aliquo acceperit, ex quidquid placuerit effingit. Dei autem potestia in eo spectatur, ut ex nihilo faciat quaecumque voluerit; Quemadmodum animam et motum dare non est alterius cuiusquam praeter quam Dei. —Ad Autolycom 2, 4.

Ao primo quidem (prophetae) summo consensu docuere Deum ex nihilo omnia creasset. Nihil enim Deo coaevum, sed, cum ebi ipse locus sit, nec ulla re egest, ac saeculis antiquior sit, hominem facere voluit cui innotesceret; hunc hominum mundum praeparavit. Nam qui creatus est, multis rebus eget, increatus autem nulla omnia. Habens igitur Deus suum ipsius Verbum in propriis visceribus insitum genuit illud cum sua sapientia, praeferebatur ante Omnia. Hoc Verbo usus est administrum operum suorum, et per illud omnia condidit. Vocatur principium eo quod principatum habeat et dominatum eorum omnium, quae per ipsum creata sunt. Hic igitur cum sit spiritus Dei et principium et sapientia et virtus Altissimi, descendebat in prophetas, ac per eos de mundi creatione et ceteris rebus loquebatur; nondum enim erant prophetae, cum mundus crearetur, sed tantum sapientia Dei quae est in eo, as sanctum Verbum eius quod ei semper adest. Mozayes autem, qui multis annis ante Salomonem fuit, vel potius Verbum Dei sic per sum veluti per instrumentum loquitur: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. —Ad Autolycom 2, 10 (Latin trans.)
Creation posited, the problem of evil was referred to the ambition of the devil and the gullibility of man:

Inuentor uitiem non est deus, angelus illud degener infami conceptum mente creatus, qui prius augustum radiabat sidus et ingens ex nihilo splendor nutrito ardebat honor. ex nihilo nam cuncta retro, factumque quod usquam est, at non ex nihilo deus et sapientia uera spiritus et sanctus, res semper uiua nee umquam oeepta, sed acrios etiam molita ministros. horum de numero quidam pulcherrimus ore, maiestate ferus, nimiis dum uiribus auctus inflatus, dum grande tumens esse altius effert ostentatque suos licio istantius ignes, persuasit propriis genitum se uiribus ex se materiam sumpsisse sibi, qua primitus esse inciperet nascique suum sine princepe oeeptum. ---Hamartigenia 159-173

'nil', ait, 'absque deo factum, sed cuncta per ipsum, cuncta, neo est aliqui quies quam nisi factus ab ipso'. sed factus de stirpe bonus, bonitatis in usum proditus et primo generis de fonte serenus, deterior mox sponte sua, dum decolor illum inficet inuidia stimulisque instigat amaris. arsit enim scintilla odii de fomite soli et dolor ingenii similitud status conflauit iniquum. uiderat argilla simulaorum et structile flatu concealuisse dei, dominum quaestu conditioni inpositum, natura soli pclagique polique ut famulans homini locupletem fundere partum posset et effusum terreno addicere regi. inflauit fermento animi stomachante tumores bestia deque acidis uim traxit acerba medullis, bestia sorde carea, cui tumo sapientia longi corporis enodem serubat recta iuuentam, complicat ece nouos sinuoso pectore nexus insolutus nitidam spiris tormentibus alium. simplex lingua prius uaria sicat arte loquendi et discissa dolis resonat sermone trisulco. hinc natale caput ultiorum, princeps ab illo fluxit origo mali, qui se corruptere primum, mox hominem didicit nullo informante magistro. ---Hamartigenia 183-205.

Cicero preferred to designate the mind-substance as animus and mens; he disapproved of anima because of
its physical connotation. See Tusc. Disp. 1. 60 and 70 on page 40, and the following:

Humanus autem animus, decerptus ex mente divina, cum alio nullo, nisi cum ipse deo, si hoc fas est dictu, comparari potest. Hic igitur, si est exculsus, et si eius acies ita curata est, ut ne casuaretur erroibus, fit perfecta mens, id est, absoluta ratio.

--- Tusc. Disp. 5. 39.

Neo enim tu es, quem forma ista declarat; sed mens eiusque is est quisque, non ea figura, quae digito demonstrari potest. Deus te igitur scit esse; siquidem deus est, qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providit, qui tam regit et moderat et movet id corpus, cui praesupitus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps deus: et ut mundum ex quada parte mortaleo ipse deus aeternus, sic fragile corpus animus sempitermus movet.—Sommum Scipionis 24.

But Prudentius confidently utilizes the physical connotation for its metaphorical possibilities in bold figures, because the immortality of the soul to him is not a conclusion but a belief. And he did have precedents in pagan and Christian literature for such a use of anima and spiritus:

Notandum est, quod hoc loco animum et ut proprie et ut abusive dicitur, posuit. Animus enim proprie mens est, quam diviniorum anima nemo dubitavit, sed nonnumquam sic et animam usurpantes vocamus.—Macrobius, Somn. 1, 14, 3.

Animam non secundum quod rationalis est, dixit, sed secundum id quod animatum corpus anima facit.

---Prosper, Psalm. 105, 15.

Graviores catenas induit mundus, quae ipsae animas hominum constringunt.—Tertullian, Ad Martyres 3.

Etsi corpus includitur, etsi caro detinetur, omnia spiritui patent, Vagare spiritu, spatiare spiritu, et non stadia opaca aut portius longas

Propterea enim praedixit spiritum promptum, ut ostenderet quid cui debet esse subjectum, scilicet, ut caro serviat spiritui, infirmior fortiori, ut ab eo etiam ipsa fortitudinem assumat. Colloquatur spiritus cum carne de commun saluté, nec iam de incommodis carceris, sed de ipso agone et proelio cogitans.—Ad Martyres 4.

Definimus animam dei flatu natam, immortalem, corporalem, effigiatam, substantia simplicem, de suo sapientem, varie procedentem, liberam arbitrii, accidentiis obnoxiam, per ingenia mutabilem, rationalem, dominatricem, divinatoricem, ex una redundantem.—De Anima 22.

Obessa mens hominis et undique diabolo infestatione vallata vix occurrit singulis, vix resistit....Tot persecutiones animus cotidie patitur, tot periculis pectus urgetur, et delectat hic inter divini gladios diu stare, cum magis concupiscendum sit et optandum ad Christum, subveniente velocius morte, properare.—Cyprian, De Mortalitate.

Sed illi spiritus contaminati ac perditi, quibus veritas et notum est et invisa, insinuant se mentibus eorum, et instigant nesios in furor em. Hi enim, quandiu pax est in populo Dei, fugitant iustos et parent. Et cum corpora hominum occupant animasque divexant, adiurantur ab his, et nomine Dei veri fugantur.—Laetantius, Divinae Institutiones 5.

Non perspiciunt altius vim rationemque hominis, quae tota non in corpore sed in mente est...Animus vero, in quo solo est homo, quoniam subiectus est non est, nec bona eius inspici possunt, quae in sola virtute sunt posita, et ideo tam stabiles, et constantes, et perpetuus sit necesse est, si uitae virtus, in qua est animi bonum.—Div. Instit. 5.

Hi vero, quia ignorabunt aut dubitabunt animas hominum immortales esse, et virtutes et vitae terrae honoribuses aut poenis asstimaverunt.—Ibidem, 6.
Eius prope divina mens, quia non tantum animantium quae sunt in terra, sed etiam sui corporis est sortita dominatum, in summo capitae collacata, tamquam in arce sublimis speculatur omnia et contueatur... Et igitur mens et ignis ille divinus tamquam caelo tegitur.—Constantius, De Opificio Dei 3.

Ratio evidens est; quia cum omnia vitae nostrae usus in corporis animasque consortio sit, resurrectio autem aut boni actus praemium habeat aut poenam improbi, necesse sit corpus resurgere, cuius actus expenditur. Quomodo enim in iudicii vocabitur anima sine corpore, cum de suo et corporis contubernio ratio praestanda sit?—Ambrose, De Excessu Satyri.

B. Precedents for the use of anima and mens as designating the embodied animating and directing substance.

Anima in Cathemerinon 3. 100, in Apotheosis 763, 777,778, and in Hamartigenia 630, 846 owes its use to the Biblical account of the origin of man's life:

Formavit igitur Dominus Deus hominem de lima terrae, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem.
—Genesis 3.7 (See Bergman on Oath. 3. 100).

Anima in Contra Symmachum 2. 379, 405 and mens in Contra Symmachum 385, 387 correspond to the spiritus and mens of Vergil in that they are the source of the body's vital activities and in close working relationship with it. See page 30. However, there is no reason to suppose that Prudentius regards anima and mens as a stuff of fiery air, whatever his inconsistency in saying that the anima gives
warmth and motion to the body. He has merely substituted for the moment another concept of the soul in order to silence an adversary.

Symmachus had objected to the abandonment of the cult of pagan deities on the ground that the destinies of Rome were planned by its presiding genius or spirit, just as the anima of a man guides that man's life. This concept of anima answers approximately to the one we have treated under A: the embodied mind-substance which commands the activity of the body rather than animates it. Prudentius takes exception to this conception of the soul on the ground that it ignores the intimate, friendly, vital relationship existing between the body and its anima or mens—a relationship which history shows to have been lamentably lacking between the supposed genius of Rome and its strife-torn political and social corpus.

Q. Precedents for the use of anima, animus, spiritus, and mens for the disembodied soul.

The sepulchral inscriptions of pagan and Christian antiquity collected in Buescheler's "Carmina Epigraphica Latina" testify to the prevalent use of anima, animus, spiritus, and mens for the disembodied soul. Here is a summary of findings made by Judson Allen Tolman, Jr., in a work entitled "A Study of the Sepulchral Inscrip-
tions in Buecheler's "Carmina Epigraphica Latina"*, chapter V, section 1: Inscriptions which show a belief in Immortality, Terms used for the Soul: *anima* is used for soul fifty times, for the vital principle about half as often. *Animus* for soul is rare. "It is nowhere used for *anima*, meaning the vital principle." "Only three good examples are found of *animus* as soul." *Spiritus* is used for soul in twenty-six inscriptions; *mens* in ten. The frequency rate of these words in Prudentius is similar: *anima* twenty-eight times; *animus* once; *spiritus* thirteen times; *mens* seven times.

But Prudentius uses *anima*, *spiritus*, and *mens* for the disembodied soul as a "double." Vergil, of course, uses *anima*, and so does Lucan in his Pharsalia:

> At non in Pharia manes iacuere favilla, nec cinis exiguae tantam compescuit umbram. Prosluit busto, semiaustaque membra relinquens degeneresque rogum sequitur convexa Tonantis, qua niger astriferis conectitur axibus aer, quaque patet terras inter lunaeque meatus, (semidei manes habitant, quos ignea virtus innocuus vita patientis aetheris imificit) et aeternos animam collegit in orbes. Non illuo auro positi nec ture sepulti perveniunt. Illio postquam se lumine vero implevit, stellasque vagas miratur et astra fixa polis, vidit quanta sub nocte iaceret nostra dies, risitque sui ludibria trunci.

--9. 1-14

But Prudentius, imitating Lucan in Peristephanon 14.89-118, substitutes *spiritus* for Lucan's *anima*—he has used *anima* in line 83, nine lines back.
Prudentius followed a reputable model, for Lucan in the passage quoted follows Plato (Republic, Book X) and Cicero, De Re Publica, Book 6. Cicero's terms for the disembodied soul are animus and mens, in this place. See Vergil, Ec. 5.56-57, on page 20. He had good Biblical precedent in the text: Spiritus carnum et ossa non habet. Luke 24.39.

Besides the authority of the text from Luke quoted above, a Christian like Prudentius could arrive at the conception of the disembodied soul as a "double" by taking the Gospel parable of Lazarus and Dives at face value and then building up a conception of the soul to fit the details of the parable. Prudentius has done this in Hamartigenia 922-930, (To which prefix Hamartigenia 893-921, on pages 33 and 34).

Certa fides rapidos subterna nocte caminos,
qui pollutam animam per saecula longa perenni
igne coquunt, oculis longum per inane remoti.
pauperis expositos, nec setius, aurea dona
iustorum dirimente chao rutilasque coronas
eminus ostendi poenarum carcerem mersis.
Hinc paradisicolae post ulcera dira beato
proditur infelix ululans in peste reatus
spiritus inque vicem meritorum mutua cernunt.
—Hamartigenia 922-930

Witness Tertullian, two centuries earlier,
starting from the same parable to test the accuracy
of previous speculation on the soul and to justify
the conception for which his education in pagan
letters had given him a predilection:

Quantum ad philosophos satis haec, quia
quantum ad nostros, ex abundant; quibus corporalitas
animae in ipso evangelio relucet. Dolet apud
inferos anima cuiusdam et punitur in flamma et
cruciatur in lingua et de digito animae felicioris
implorat solacium roris. Imaginem existimae exitum
illum pauperis laetantis et divitis maerentis? Et
quid illic Lazari nomen, si nihil anima sub terris? 

Tertullian asserts this view confirmed by the
"vision" related by a woman:

As for Prudentius' figure of the spiritus of Eulalia as a dove (Peristephanon 3. 164), he had good Biblical precedent:


Vidit Spiritum Dei descendentes sicut columbam et venientem super se.—Matthew 3.16.

Vidit caelos apertos et spiritum tanquam columbam descendentes et manentem in ipso.—Mark 1.10.
V. Significance of Findings.

Prudentius, then had precedents for his use of all four words—*anima, animus, spiritus, and mens*—for the soul conceived as an agent commanding the body; for his use of *anima* and *mens* as the principle of life and thought; for his use of the four words for the truly disembodied soul; for the use of *spiritus* for the soul pictured as a dove; for the use of *anima, spiritus, and mens* as the "double." Had he used *animus* for the "double," he could have appealed to the doctrine and imagery of Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis*:

_Hanc tu exerce in rebus! sunt autem optimae curae de salute patriae: quibus agitatutus et exercitatus animus velocius in hanc sedem et domum suam pervolabit. Idque oocius faciet, si iam tuam, quum erit inclusus in corpore, eminebit foras et ea, quae extra erunt, contemplans quam maxime se a corpore abstrahet. Namque eorum animi, qui se corporis voluptatibus dediderunt, earumque se quasi ministros praebuerunt, impulsuque libidinum voluptatibus obedientium deorum et hominum iura violaverunt, corporibus elapsi circum terram ipsam voluptantur; nec hunc in locum, nisi multis exagitati saeculis, revertuntur._—Ille discessit; ego somno solutus sum. —26.

There were several starting points for the elements in which Prudentius' conception of the soul differ from Vergil's conceptions. Just as Cicero in the first book of his Tusculan Disputations tries to conceive a nature that can logically be
said to be the source of the "transcendent" properties of thought, and comes to the conclusion that these properties cannot be linked with anything material or corporeal; so Prudentius and his predecessors in the Faith look for that conception of the soul which shall square with the narrative, parables, and doctrine of the Gospel, with the writings of the Old Testament, and with such vivid experiences as the dauntless and contemptuous fortitude of martyrs under torture.

The Lucretian concept of the soul was, of course, unacceptable as such. Tertullian's idea of the soul as the condensed vital breath of the Creator was quickly condemned.

Illi qui animas ex una propagari asserunt, quam Deus homini primo dedit, atque ita eas ex parentibus trahi dicunt, si Tertulliani opinionem sequuntur, profecto eas non spiritus, sed corpora esse contendunt et corpulentis seminibus exoriri: quo perversius quid dico potest? Neque hoc Tertullianum somniassse mirandum est, qui etiam ipsum creatorem Deum non esse nisi corpus opinatur.—Augustine, Epistula ad Optatum 4. 14.

The division of the soul into three parts was repudiated by Gregory of Nyssa, writing about 379:

Ceterum, etsi superiores oratione declaratum est triplex esse vivendi facultate discrimen, ut alia sit vita quae quidem nutriatur, expers tamen sit sensus; alia et nutriatur et sentiat, careat autem facultate rationis; alia denique et ratione utatur et perfecta sit perque facultates ceteras omnes diffusa, ut et in iis existat et tamquam eximium quiddam intelligentiae vim habeat; nemo tamen idcirco existimet
tres in humano opificio animas existere, seorsum certis quasi limitibus circumscriptas, ut naturam hominis ex pluribus animis conflatam putare debamus. Nam vera et perfecta anima reapse unica quaedam est, intelligens, immaterialis, sed per sensus naturae illi crassae mixta.—De Hominis Opificio 14 (Latin Trans.).

Different forms of a trichotomy were held by several Fathers, as for example:

Resurrectio est carnis quae oecidit. Nam spiritus non cadit. Anima in corpore est, quod sine anima non vivit. Corpus, anima discendente, non est. Nam domus est animae corpus, et spiritus domus animae. Tria haec in ipsis, qui sinceram spem et fidem minime dubiam habuerint in Deo, salvabuntur.—Justin, De Resurrectione 10 (Lat. Trans.).

Et quoniam tria sunt quibus homo constat, spiritus anima et corpus, quae rursus duo dicuntur quia saepe anima simul cum spiritu nominatur; pars enim quaedam eiusmod rationalis qua carent bestiae, spiritus dicitur; principale nostrum spiritus est, deinde vita qua coniungimus corpori anima dicitur, postremo ipsum corpus, quoniam visibile est, ultimum nostrum est...Hic spiritus etiam vocatur mens, de quo dicit Apostolus 'Mente servio legi Dei'(Romans 7. 35), qui item alio loco dicit, 'Testis est enim mihi Deus, cui servio in spiritu suo'(Romans 1.9).—Augustine, De Fide et Symbolo 33.

Neque duas animas esse dicimus in (uno) homine, sicut quidam Syrorum scribunt, unam animalem, quam animatur corpus, et immixta sit sanguini, et alteram spiritalem, quae rationem ministrat; sed dicimus unam esse eamdemque animam in homine, quae et corpus sua societate vivificet, et semetipsam sua ratione disponat, habens in se libertatem arbitrii, ut in sua substantia eligat cogitatione quod vult. 

—Gennadius, Liber Ecclesiasticorum Dogmatum (written about 470), 15.

The doctrine of the indwelling of the second person of the Trinity and his human soul in the soul in the soul of the Christian, the indwelling of the
Trinity in the soul of the Christian—such matters disputed with various conceptions of the unicity or complexity of the human soul have left faint echoes in Prudentius, giving rise to overtones of whose presence he was conscious as an amateur theologian and in which he delighted as a poet. E. G.,

Mox ipse Christus, qui sacerdos verus est, parente natus alto et ineffabili, oibum beatis offerens victoribus parvam pudici cordis intrabit casam monstrans honorem trinitatis hospitae; animam deinde spiritus complexibus pie maritam, proles expertem diu, faciet perenni fertilem de semine, tunc sera dotem possidens puerpera herede digno patris inplebit domum.

—Psychomachia Praef. 59-68.

But the idea of the soul that prevailed around Prudentius’ time derived from Plato and Aristotle as discussed by Cicero; it included the immateriality of the soul and the further Christian idea of the incommunicability of the divinity with its corollary, the inferior created quality of the human soul. In his letter to Jerome, Augustine writes:

Incorporesam quoque esse animam, et si difficile tardioribus persuaderi potest, mihi tamen fatesor esse persuasum. Per totum quippe corpus, quod animat, non locali diffusione, sed quadam vitali intentione potest. Nam per omnes eius particulias tota simul adest, nec minor in minoribus et in maioribus maior, sed alios in eos, in omnibus tota et in singulis tota est.—Epistula ad Hieronymum 2.4.
Prudentius explicitly rejects the Tertullian conception of the soul as a body, as something concerned with space, and inclines to a view akin to Augustine's. Tertullian's definition of the soul included the words "corporalem" and "ex una redundantem." Note the difference in Prudentius' statement:

Vitandus tamen error erit, ne traduce earnis transfundi in subolem creataur fons animarum sanguinis exemplo, cui texta propagine vena est. Non animas animae pariunt, sed leges latentii fundit opus natura suum, quo parvula anhelent vascula vitalisque adsit scintilla coactis.

—Apotclesis 915-920.

For Augustine's idea of the soul compare the passage from his De Fide et Symbolo on page 62 with Turner's interpretation:

The soul and body together form one substance—man. The soul gives being and species to the body. It acts on the body. The body, however, has no independent power of acting on the soul; whatever power the body possesses is conferred on it by the soul itself. Between soul and body is interposed a subtle element, partaking at the same time of the material nature of the body and of the spiritual nature of the soul; it is analogous to light and air. The function of this element is to mediate between the soul and the organs of the body, and to unite, in some mysterious manner, soul and body in one substance.—History of Philosophy, pages 232-233.

This is Turner's interpretation of Augustine's doctrine in De Immortalitate Animaee, 15 and in the De Quantitate Animaee, 30—neither of which I have had the opportunity to consult. But that the spiritus in
the passage from De Fide et Symbolo, if not the *anima*, is utterly immaterial, is clear, and that the *spiritus* is the soul is also clear. This concept is contemporary with Prudentius, and is in accord with his idea of the nature of the soul as learned from its activities as inflexible will and from its creation by a *command* of an immaterial God. See pages 34 and 35.

The *anima* "qua conjungimus corpori," being a subtle element analogous to light and air, would seem to have a form or configuration like that of a soul that Prudentius would picture as a "double." If so, the conception would be an ingenious solution of the double problem: the spectral *anima* would provide the soul with a point of contact for the physical sufferings of hell, while the immaterial "self" or central reality of the soul (the *spiritus*) would be the logical source of such properties as inflexible will and "transcendent" thought.

*Voluntas est quippe in omnibus,* omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt.—Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, 14. 6.

That the immateriality of the *spiritus* is asserted in Prudentius is shown by the passages adduced. Furthermore, Prudentius does not maintain Augustine's distinction between *spiritus* and *anima*. All four
words--anima, animus, spiritus, and mens--designate the soul for him, the same entity. Secure in his conviction that a future life of reward or punishment will be his, and that that life is linked to the present one by his personal accountability to a Creator and Judge, Prudentius employs all available terms that symbolize or assert the continuance of his identity beyond the grave. The important thing to him is not the origin of the concepts he uses nor their strict compatibility, but rather the varied expression of a fact. Like Vergil he is a poet. Unlike Vergil, who for literary reasons confined his terminology for the soul to the word anima (of the group we have studied) while availing himself of concepts of animus, spiritus, and mens in their contemporary significance, Prudentius employed both terms and concepts to the limit of their poetic possibilities--his objective being the celebration of the Christian life and belief with every device of classical poetry.

Not only did the concept of the human soul change since Vergil's day, as we have seen, but the origin of the concept was transferred from the realm of folklore and philosophy to the realm of revealed religion. That is to say, revealed religion effectively asserted the need of the concept and its ethical basis, and the concept was accordingly built up from previous
suitable elements of folk-lore and philosophy and from significant psychological observations and studies in Christian life and doctrine.
1. Bergman, Ioannes, Aurelii Prudentii Clementis Carmina; Vienna, 1928, Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky.


10. Oehler, Franciscus, Quinti Septimii Florentis Tertulliani Quae Supersunt Omnia, Tomus II; Leipsic, 1854, Weigel.


