BRITISH POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA 1906-1914

The following pages may be considered a tribute

to the efficiency of British diplomacy, which did not save
peace, but which did prevent the British crown a
preponderance of force at a minimal cost. And in this
day of thinking in terms of economics, that was success,
however temporary. The scheme in which England did this
so far as Russia was concerned is the central theme.

A Thesis

submitted to the faculty of the

Department of History and Political Science

in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in the Graduate College

University of Arizona

1940

Approved: [Signature]  Jan. 17, 1940

Major Professor  Date.
PREFACE

The following pages may be considered a tribute to the efficacy of British diplomacy, which did not save peace, but which did gather around the British crown a preponderance of force at a minimum cost. And in this day of thinking in terms of economics, that was success, however temporary. The manner in which England did this so far as Russia was concerned is the central theme.

The story leads necessarily to those places where a conflict of Russian and British interests took place. There was so much material that the crises throughout the period usually related could be merely referred to, so that most attention is paid to the plans Britain made for Russia around and in back of the main events.

The writing was done under the supervision of Dr. O. H. Wedel of the University of Arizona, whose aid and assistance could have been no greater. The materials used were found in the library of the University of Arizona and in the Hoover War Library at Stanford University. Emphasis is placed upon British documents.

Tucson, Arizona
January, 1940

W. R. L.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE. ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN ASIA PRIOR TO 1906.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some fundamental differences between England and Russia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England's world position</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of conditions at the end of 1905</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER TWO. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 31, 1907

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeciras conference</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions in Russia favorable for an agreement</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions regarding Tibet and Afghanistan</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia, Persia and Germany and the Bagdad railway</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England and Germany and the Persian question</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England and India and the Persian question</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British bargaining points: the Straits and a port on the Persian Gulf</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zones in Persia</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of the Persian Gulf</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Russian agreement and Germany</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER THREE. BRITISH SCHEMES IN THE BALKANS DURING THE ANNEXATION CRISIS

British interests in the Balkans

British interests in Turkey and the young Turk revolution

Britain's pro-Turkish attitude in the Balkans

Again the Straits

England's bolstering of Isvolsky

British diplomatic support to Russia

Isvolsky and the Baltic and North seas negotiations with Germany

Bulow-Harding communique and Isvolsky

Nicolson's advice to Isvolsky

Proposed Turko-Bulgarian alliance

Prince Ferdinand and the grand duke's funeral

Britain's support to Austro-Italian aims and Isvolsky

End of the crisis; Grey's summary

British plans for a Balkan alliance continued

German ascendancy in Turkey; Britain's failure

CHAPTER FOUR. GREY'S PLAN FOR THE TRIPLE ENTENTE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE TO NEGOTIATE A DEUX

Grey's general policy

Nicolson's proposal for an Anglo-Russian alliance

British bargaining with Germany; the Bagdad railway; a political understanding
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entente negotiations with the triple alliance</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British attitude toward the German navy</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continued British bargaining with Germany</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grey and Kiderlen-Waechter</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet maneuvers at Molde</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isvolsky and the Agadir crisis</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sazonov and Potsdam</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary from the annexation crisis to 1912</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FIVE. THE CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS AT LONDON</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entente and Near East; Tcharykov</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And again the Straits</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tcharykov's recall and the Balkan alliance</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British diplomacy in the Turkish-Balkan dilemma</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria's success and again the Straits</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grey and Kiderlen-Waechter</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British position in the event of war</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion and the ambassadors' conference</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scutari</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey and Bulgaria and Sazonov's schemes</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis in entente diplomacy</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER SIX. NAVAL AGREEMENTS</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entente military forces</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Italy and Tripoli; the Mediterranean and strategical questions
Haldane mission
Naval agreements and Russia
Grey-Cambron letters
Von Sanders' mission
Russian war plans
Russia grows strong
Franco-Russian plans for an Anglo-Russian naval agreement
Grey's visit to Paris
Anglo-Russian naval conversations
Summary of naval agreements and British policy

CHAPTER SEVEN. THE "SINGLE-MINDED AMERICAN" IN PERSIA
Russian politico-commercial policy in Persia
English anti-Russians and Germanophiles.
Persia and Germany and the Bagdad railway
Shuster's appointment
Shuster's objectives
Shuster's appointment of Major Stokes
Russian ultimata to Persia.
Buchanan's mistake in St. Petersburg
Anglo-Russian relations strained; tsar's reassurances; French aid to better relations.
Russian plans for Asia; oil in Persia
Conclusion.
Chapter One

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN ASIA PRIOR TO 1906

Prior to the actual accomplishment, many people believed that Great Britain and Russia could never unite politically because of the very many differences between the two countries. An autocratic government, the political exiles of Siberia, the merciless use of Cossacks, the Jewish pogroms, all these were thought strange and difficult for the average Englishman to understand, much less to sympathize with. Moreover, England and Russia had been at swords' points traditionally over a vast area, in the Straits, in Persia, in Middle Asia and in the Far East. Great compromises would be necessary if these nations were ever to dissolve their differences to an extent sufficient to their becoming allies.

In the very nature of the expansion of the two countries, certain fundamental differences are apparent. The Russian Empire was a contiguous thing and its expansion had been by way of gradually swallowing territory lying just beyond its successive frontiers. By this method, Russia had gone East, South and West, until her Empire spread across Eastern Europe and Siberia to the Pacific. To the West she found obstacles in the form of other states generally more highly developed in the sense of national unity and industrial progress. But to the East and South, her opposition for considerable space was more that imposed
A band of Cossacks discovered the eastern limits of Asia at a very early time, and then turned their attention to the South, where they met the Chinese in the valley of the Amur. This meeting terminated Russian expansion in the Far East until it met English as well as other European interests in China during the 19th century.

When the Cossacks crossed the Ural mountains as hunters, explorers, fur-traders, as the frontiersmen of Russia, a mountain system running diagonally across Asia deflected their progress much to the North, but some of them, seeking gold rather than furs, followed the rivers of the mountains toward their sources. They were followed by a stream of settlers who made their homes on the choice land of Asia from the Urals over to Lake Baikal and who pushed South until by the middle of the 19th century they had reached the edge of the Kirghiz Steppe and the shores of the Aral Sea. At the same time, in great likeness to England's use of Australia, those tissues of the Russian state which were politically as well as socially undesirable were deposited east of Lake Baikal and were followed, in many cases, by their families who remained there permanently after the expiration of the terms of imprisonment of their relatives. This migration was augmented by serfs released from their bonds in 1861, until by 1891, the authority of the Russians was established over the entire area from the Caspian Sea to Chinese Turkestan.
and as far south as the borders of Afghanistan.

It was on this southward expansion that Russia began to encounter the English. For while Russia built her empire by starting from within the continent and working out toward the edges, England, whose people had come by boat around to Asia, built hers by starting at the edges and working inland. Thus it was, that in Asia, "while Holland, Spain, and France possessed valuable, if localized, areas, and Germany and the United States were late to join the ranks of imperial powers, the Empires of Russia and Great Britain dominated the great Asian expense even before the middle of the 19th century, easily overshadowing the others." (1) And so. Great Britain and Russia met each other at many places throughout this largest of continents; these meetings generated much friction which was alleviated by the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907. This accord, in turn, permitted the alliance between the two countries in 1914.

But the concept alliance connotes other nations too, and it is in this regard that attention should be turned, ever so briefly to England's relations with other powers, because the British points of friction were not confined to those with Russia. Her scattered possessions throughout the world probably gave her a more varied and greater number of contacts with other nations than those experienced by any other power; hence a foreign policy of numerous

It is true that prior to 1890, England had found general agreement with the Central European Powers, headed by Germany. There was no alliance with the leader of these powers, but there was a great amount of mutual respect. Moreover, the Central Powers were largely uninterested in the various parts of the world where England had spent so much effort and money in building up an empire. Germany's leadership on the continent was primarily concerned with preserving the peace of a satiated state. England's policy was generally directed toward preserving her empire. European peace was desirable to both of these powers.

But by 1890, conditions were showing the effects of a changing order of things. A new era was coming over the world, called by some the New Imperialism. New, because it sought after raw materials as well as markets; new, too, because all the European powers began to indulge in this pursuit. Navies and merchant marine became important to the various states; strategic points, naval bases, coaling stations, and the political control of the hinterland around these bases and stations, as well as of the territories in which these raw materials were to be found entered into the larger picture. Yet 1890 has another and perhaps deeper interest so far as England's policy was concerned, because it was then that the diplomacy of Germany's Bismarck became a phase of German history, and younger and
more ambitious men took control. Promptly in 1891, France and Russia began conversations which ripened into a formal understanding in 1894. At this point, according to William L. Langer, England's policy of "splendid isolation" began to veer to one of dependable alliance, in fact, one might say, to one of any alliance.\(^{(2)}\)

England from 1894 was faced with two blocs of powers: Germany, Austria and Italy in the Triple Alliance; Russia and France in the Dual Entente. If she could play one bloc of powers off against the other, she could still maintain her "splendid isolation"; she could preserve that peace and *status quo* which would be most conducive to her welfare. This, however, did not happen. Actually, there was some danger that both blocs would unite against her.\(^{(3)}\)

Whatever may be the strength of the arguments already well stated as to the effects on England's policy of the danger of a European coalition against her, of her continuous castigation by nations generally during the Boer war, of her fear of the German fleet building program and rivalry in trade, or of the poor showing of her army in South Africa, she did turn her attention to seeking agreements with other nations that she might not be exposed on too many fronts at once without a friend to help.

It was in the Far East that England first succeeded in finding a friend. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 has been considered a great landmark in British policy,


\(^{(3)}\) *Idem.*
generally; but here it is important in a peculiar way, for it was, to a large extent, an alliance between Japan and England to check Russia.

England had for many years prior to 1902 been engaged in trade in east central and southeastern China. She played a leading part in developing the Far East, in opening up China. During this time, she gradually began to find common interests with Japan. In fact, it was England's treaty with Japan in 1894 which first recognized the latter as an equal among the greater powers of the world by the provision which later abolished the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the British Consular Courts in Japan. It was England's warships which occupied Hamilton Islands when Russia tried to establish herself in Korea in 1884. It was England again who furnished the money for China to pay Japan so that the latter could withdraw from and England could occupy Wei-hai-wei as a check on Russia's position at Port Arthur. And what was more important to the development of Japan's goodwill toward England was the British refusal to join Russia, France, and Germany in making her give up part of the spoils of war she had won from the Chinese in 1894-5. So, when the choice of an agreement between Russia and England was before the Japanese emperor and the genro, late in the year 1901, it is understandable that those dignitaries decided that England was the safer choice.
However, since this alliance involved Russia and her aims, a brief review of the conditions existing in the Far East up to 1902 is necessary, especially in regard to Russian expansion. China, prior to the Sino-Japanese war, had felt constrained from time to time to grant concessions to the other powers. But it was not until China's poor showing against Japan in 1894-95 that it became entirely evident just how weak China was in military and naval effectiveness. China had given a fairly good account of herself in the Tongking war with France and she had also successfully overcome Yakub Beg in Western Turkestan, but her weakness before the comparatively youthful Japan indicated that she was ripe for cutting up by the strong western powers. Russia, as well as others, began to gird themselves for the rush for concessions, spheres of influence and leaseholds.

In this Russia may be said to have taken the lead, since she invited other nations to join her in compelling Japan to give up the Liaotung peninsula, which China had ceded to Japan as part of the price of war. Just why England did not participate in this typical action of preserving the integrity of a country due to be cut up is not certain. However, the British public had shifted their fondness for China to Japan and had speculated upon her as a future friend in the Far East. There is no ex-
Russia, backed by French capital, and through the agencies of the Russo-Chinese Bank and the Franco-Belgian Syndicate, was reaching out to dominate the Chinese government through loans to pay its war debt to Japan, to finance the building of railroads in, and the general development of, Manchuria, and to penetrate into the British sphere, the Yangtze valley through railroad building. She also secured territorial advantage through the lease of Port Arthur and environs on the Liaotung peninsula. England's policy lacked singleness of purpose and was manifested in a variety of forms, none of which brought her good results. She collaborated with Germany in lending money to the Chinese government; she obtained the moral and ineffectual support of the United States on the "open door" theory; she agreed with Russia on the railroad building question; she occupied Wei-hai-wei as a temporary check on Russia's territorial advantage; and she failed to get Germany to stand with her through their agreement of October 26, 1900, in opening up Manchuria to the nationals of all countries. (5)


Russia at first intended to make no reply to Secretary of State John Hay's note to the powers on the open door policy, September 6, 1899; when she did reply, as well as in her note to England with regard to the Anglo-German agreement of October 26, 1900, she said, in effect, that Russia would preserve the status quo in Manchuria. The Anglo-German agree-
In the meantime, the Russians obtained Masampo by lease from the Korean government for a coal and naval station, which was a definite move against Japan's interests in Korea. But the outbreak of the Boxer rebellion two months later, in May, 1900, postponed any Japanese action against Russia for the time being. During the Boxer rebellion, Russia had the opportunity to throw additional troops into Manchuria to protect her interests there, but she did not withdraw them after the rebellion was suppressed. Moreover, she proposed to China that they sign a convention which would give Russia complete control, practically, of Manchuria, as well as financial control of a large area in northern China, including Mongolia, and this, coupled with increased activity which seemed to Japan seriously to threaten her interests in Korea, caused her to send Count Hayashi to England to see just what help he could get in case of Japan's challenge to Russia through war. England tried to get Germany to stand with her on the basis of the Anglo-German agreement of October 26, 1900, which Germany refused to do insofar as it applied to Man-

...
About the first of April, 1901, Count Hayashi was instructed to open informal discussions for an Anglo-Japanese treaty. Both governments were feeling Russian pressure; England in Middle Asia, and Persia and Japan in Korea. Japan favored the inclusion of Germany in the agreement, who is credited with proposing the idea, but with the tenseness of the Anglo-German affairs at the time, England prevailed in restricting the alliance to the two nations, but she deferred to Japan in limiting its scope to the exclusion of India. In the meantime, Count Ito of Japan, in September of the same year, had gone to Russia in the hope of reaching an agreement with Russia in regard to Korea. In this situation, with the British trying to hurry Japan, and with Count Ito in St. Petersburg trying to persuade his government to postpone consideration of the English agreement, the alliance was signed on January 30, 1902. It provided for the protection

(6) It is in regard to this general situation that William L. Langer thinks that Germany was playing a very intriguing political game, in that Germany was urging England to take up Japan's request for help and to challenge Russia then and there in the hope that England would need to beg Germany for assistance. In that event, Germany would be in a position to demand a very great deal in the way of a quid pro quo for her timely aid. But England was too wary; apparently she scented the trap, if she did not know it was there, and chose to talk rather than to fight, and this at the risk of estranging Japan. In view of this, it is easy to understand why the Anglo-Japanese alliance was reputedly of German suggestion. For references to this problem see note (5), supra.
of British interests in China and of Japanese interests in China but particularly in Korea. Each was to remain neutral in case of war between one of the signatories and a single third power, in the protection of these interests against aggression; but in case two or more powers attacked, then both parties were to prosecute the war and conclude peace as partners. (7)

There is little doubt but that the alliance was directed against Russia. So far as England was concerned, in view of her efforts to include India within the scope of the alliance, and in view of her slight interest in Korea, she made the alliance not so much to protect her interests in the Far East as to prevent Russia and Japan from joining together against her. Moreover, England had recognized Russia's dominant interest in Manchuria on three important occasions: publicly, she had recognized the Russian interests in railroads in the exchange of notes between the two governments of April 28, 1899; and privately, she had recognized this situation in the negotiations with Germany in 1900, and also in the negotiations with Japan in 1901. William L. Langer sums it up with, "What it comes to then, is that the English made the agreement with Japan in order to prevent an understanding between Russia and Japan, which would have rendered the British position in the Far East almost hopeless....

The important thing for England was not what was in the alliance, but the fact that there was an alliance."(8)

In the Far East, the Russo-Japanese war settled many of the problems there for the time being, and before the war was brought to a close, there was a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance which included India within the scope of the British interests which Japan was therefore pledged to protect in case of aggression by a single power.

While it is doubtful if one can explain the whole of England's colonial and expansion policy in terms of her concern over India, as some would do, it is nevertheless a very large factor in tracing the issues between Russia and England which were resolved territorially in the agreement between the two countries in 1907. India's geographical position is particularly important in view of the rivalries of the two countries in Asia, since it is attached to the Asian land mass by a ridge of mountains among which are the highest in the world, and since this

---

(8) Langer, op. cit., II, 783; Clyde, op. cit., p. 378, especially the latter in explanation, saying, "They (Russia) could ill afford, they thought, to withdraw their army (from Manchuria) to please Japan, or to establish an open door policy to please Japan, England and the United States." See also G. Lowes Dickinson, The International Anarchy, 1904-1914 (New York, 1926), p. 256. But in view of the preponderance of British shipping, 49.9 per centum of all shipping in China (Grover Clark, Economic Rivalries in China (New Haven, 1932), p. 34) British interests might be said to have been as important in China as Japan's in Korea.

Ward and Gooch, op. cit., III, 293, "It placed Great Britain in a position to exercise a restraining influence over Japanese statesmen."
natural northern frontier stood squarely in the way of Russia's rapid growth to the south in central Asia. Control of the passes in these mountains became of great strategic importance to England.

India is slightly larger than Europe, if Russia is excluded from consideration, and it has rich plains which follow the Indus from the west coast, and the Ganges from the east coast up to a point close to the mountain ranges wherein is to be found the sources of these two rivers. The mountain ranges curve convexly toward the north from the northwest to the northeast, upon the other side of which are the important plains of Russia and the scene of large Russian colonizing activities during the latter half of the 19th century.

To the northwest, the mountains flatten off considerably into a vast plain, dissected by other mountain ranges, which is Afghanistan and Persia. To the north, the mountains are higher, more rugged and more inaccessible and contain upland plains, called the Pamirs, which are approximately 14,000 feet in altitude and which are surrounded by peaks rising as high as 20,000 feet. To the northeast, the famous Himalayas rise to yet greater heights and over toward China is found Tibet, a large upland plain which slopes gradually toward the east.

As has been seen, the Russian expansion to the east had, to some extent, been turned south in the search of
gold in the rivers rising out of this mass of mountainous country and had been supplemented by millions of Russian peasants intent upon establishing themselves upon the free land available there in much the same way that the north American continent was settled by other European peoples. Russia's territorial expansion was enormous during the period between 1505 and 1895. "...from a muscovite principality of some 800,000 square miles into a contiguous empire of over 8,500,000 — and average advance of better than fifty square miles a day. Never had the world seen such an organized agglomeration of contiguous territory." (9)

In view of such prodigious ability, it is easy to understand England's alarm when this expansion during the last half of the 19th century came ever closer to the mountain ranges which over-look India. England was at the same time expanding fanwise to the north in India and both nations were intent upon obtaining more territory while each was intriguing ahead of their territorial gains with the rulers and chieftians of the tribes whose lands separated the advances of these two rivals.

Moving from east to west across middle Asia, Tibet was the first in point of direction which felt the effects of Anglo-Russian rivalry. This is a territory of upland plains with an average altitude of approximately 12,000

feet and surrounded by walls of higher peaks. It is the home of four or five millions of people whose government, a theocracy, owed at least nominal allegiance to China.(10)

Early advances by the British East India Company to establish friendly relations with Tibet received a cold response but Russian penetration into what is now Russian Turkestan, the capture of Tashkent in 1865, and the retention of part of the territory occupied by Russia during the revolt of Yakub Beg in Chinese Turkestan after China had suppressed the revolt in 1878, convinced England that such activity was not merely precautionary measures to protect Russian frontiers.(11) By 1890, England, through her agent, the Indian government, had concluded a treaty with China which not only settled the boundary dispute between the Tibetans and the people of Sikkim, a native state on the northeast frontier and annexed in 1850 by the East India Company, but also gave the British a market in the town of Yatung, Tibet, in 1893. This was unsatisfactory for trade purposes, however, and in 1899 and again in 1901, Lord Curzon, then viceroy of India, tried to open direct negotiations with Tibet. These efforts

---


(11) Achnor, *op. cit.*, p. 206; Steiger, *op. cit.*, p. 634. This Mohammedan uprising against Chinese authority in 1863 resulted in the establishment of a powerful state in middle Asia under Yakub Beg with whom both England and Russia negotiated treaties. While this may be considered as but an incident, it nevertheless aptly illustrates the intense rivalry between England and Russia in middle Asia.
were particularly trying to the British patience because letters directed to the Lama were returned with seals unbroken and with directions to proceed through the Chinese government in order to negotiate diplomatically with Tibet, while the tsar received a mongol, named Dorjief and an emissary of the Lama, at the imperial Russian court. The tsar contended that this reception was merely a religious matter and had no political significance, but England readily pointed out that Tibetan and Russian religions had very little in common and viewed the whole affair as indicating nothing else but Russian political intrigue.(12)

From the Chinese and Tibetan viewpoints, relations with England meant British trade, especially in tea, which neither wanted(13) and so with tea and religion both confronting Lord Curzon, he sought permission, which was finally granted, to substitute force for diplomacy so that English troops entered Lhasa in August of 1904. This virile policy ended with a treaty concluded between China and Great Britain which re-affirmed Chinese suzerainty over

(12) Steiger, op. cit., p. 641.

(13) Robert K. Douglas, Europe and the Far East(New York,1913), p. 254. The dislike of Tibetans for the British becomes clearer with the explanation that the Tibetans drank much tea, most of which came from China. It was freighted through packed in bricks and when prepared for drinking in the Tibetan manner, was permitted to ferment, becoming a drug-like necessity for the people and therefore provided a good source of revenue through taxation for the Lamas and through its sale for the Chinese. British trade would bring cheaper and inferior teas from Assam, thus cutting down the income of both Tibet and China.
Tibet but which gave England the right to occupy a part of southwestern Tibet, the Chumbri valley, until the Tibetan indemnity was paid, as well as the right to maintain a representative in Tibet. This convention then, did recognize China's suzerainty over Tibet, although previous British policy would seem to deny such a bond, but the "...British government...repeatedly intervened to prevent any move for the incorporation of Tibet as an integral part of China; this almost inaccessible mountain region tended to become the focal point of British, Russian and Chinese diplomatic intrigues."(14)

Farther west, on India's mountainous frontier lies the historical buffer state of Afghanistan. It is perched high up on this mountain wall which becomes a broad upland plain over-looking the plains of India to the south and those of Asiatic Russia to the north. The weakest part of the semi-circle of mountains which guard India is the Afghan frontier. There are four main land routes into India from the northwest, of which three are via the mountain passes Bolan, Khyber and Gormal and one by way of the Makran coast. Most of the invasions of India have come sweeping down through these mountain passes onto the rich plains below and the strategic importance of Afghanistan is indicated by its domination through the centuries by Persians, Huns, Turks, Mongols, and by the rivalry for its

control by England and Russia in the modern period. (15)

Thus it was, when Russia coming from the north arrived at the Afghan frontier in the 70's and contracted a treaty in 1878 with the amir which put Afghanistan under the protection of the Russian government, that England forced the amir from the throne, put on one more inclined to British views, and took over Kalat, the Khyber pass, and the Kurram valley. Russia took the Pendjeh area in 1885, a district on the northwest border of Afghanistan, and the pamirs in 1890. This latter area, the highest tablelands in the world, is unsuitable for any colonization such as it is known today and it marked the farthest advance which Russia made to the south in Middle Asia.

Finally, in 1895, the two imperialistic powers settled the Afghan boundary problem by Russia's being permitted to keep the pamirs and by extending the boundary of Afghanistan east to the borders of Chinese Turkistan. This created a strip of territory, in places only a few miles wide, as a buffer between India and Russia. It should be noticed, however, that this part of Asia is one of the most inaccessible places in the world; that the strip of territory, mentioned above, while only a few miles wide, is extremely difficult terrain for any kind of military maneuvers; and most important, that between this strip of territory and India, the Hindu Kush are aligned, their crests and rugged

(15) Stamp, op. cit., passim.
slopes making any sort of travel even more difficult than the area lying to the north. (16)

With the boundaries generally agreed upon, and with Afghanistan's importance as a buffer state considerably increased by the agreement of 1895, control over the government was of greater importance. While the arrangements with the amir whom England had elevated to power in 1880 were reasonably satisfactory, upon his death in 1901, his son became a rather difficult problem and it was not until a mission was sent to Kabul in 1904 that a definite agreement was reached with the new amir. England was reinstated as advisor on Afghanistan's foreign relations, and generally, the agreement which England had had with the old amir was reaffirmed. (17) Russia's anxiety concerning the new agreement was relieved upon the assurance that the status quo remained. (18)

---


(17) Ward and Gooch, op. cit., III, 329ff. Gooch says that the difficulties in dealing diplomatically with such rulers as the amir were enormous because England was confronted in the old amir with a man who throttled trade, intrigued with the hill tribes, and wanted to send a representative to St. James, while his son refused to come to India to discuss a new agreement similar to his father's, spurned the customary subsidy, wrote insolent official letters to the British and boasted that he was as powerful as the mikado. England's prestige throughout Asia suffered considerably when England was finally forced to send a mission to Kabul to confer with the new amir.

(18) Great Britain, Foreign Office, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, IV, No. 466. (Hereinafter cited as B. D.)
Afghanistan must also be considered in connection with Baluchistan and Persia because her western boundary meets both these other territories and they are all a part of a great plateau which stretches from what geographers call the Armenian knot in the west to the Pamir knot in the east. The boundaries of these three countries, then, have no great or important natural lines and it is only from the east that one may enter Persia without a difficult mountain journey. Mountains draw close to the Persian Gulf in the south, leaving only a narrow, barren coastal strip; the Erzburg mountains in north Persia present the same sort of condition near the Caspian Sea with the difference that the land is more fertile and the general development more pronounced. The locations of the villages and towns there are determined by the availability of water from mountain streams and constitute the most prosperous part of Persia; Tehran, the seat of much Anglo-Persian-Russian intrigue, is located in this region. Eastern Persia is the only part which is predominantly great desert plains and the Sistan region is a drainage basin which is separate from both northern and central Persia.(19)

Persia also has a rather long and intricate history as it concerned England and Russia, and it was perhaps the most important subject of the Anglo-Russian agreement of

(19) Stamp, op. cit., pp. 146ff.
1907. However, the importance of Persia is strategic in relation to the Persian Gulf, which in turn brings into consideration the Ottoman Empire to the west, the Bagdad and other railway projects, the Straits question, and the interests of the European powers generally in this area. Any land route through Constantinople from the rest of Europe to India must necessarily pass through Persia, and any railroad through Turkey connecting the Mediterranean and eastern oceans must terminate finally on the Persian Gulf.

Russia's southward movement described briefly above also brought her southern frontier east of the Caspian Sea to the northern boundary of Persia, and her expansion in the area between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, which was a part of her larger program to find an outlet on the Mediterranean, found opposition from both Persia and Turkey as well as from European powers generally. This latter expansion found England moving through diplomacy and war in collaboration with other states to keep Russia bottled up in the Black Sea, to preserve the Ottoman empire, and to no small extent, to maintain Persia, also, as another buffer state against Russia.

A personal element was ejected into the Persian and general Anglo-Russian rivalry which adumbrated the agreement of 1907 when Arthur Nicolson was sent to Tehran in 1885. There he learned during his stay of two
and a half years as diplomatic representative of Great Britain that the Russian movement was as a tidal wave, and came to the conclusion that the only solution to the whole problem throughout Asia was an agreement with Russia, (20) and while this conclusion was premature, never-the-less, he was the British ambassador at St. Petersburg when such an agreement was actually concluded. In this man's thinking, Germany also played an important part, which was especially true of events in the Near East where Germany began to penetrate commercially.

Nicolson was without company in this general apprehension of German activities, because Russia, while she was probably secretly relieved when England acquired her interest in the Suez canal and fastened financial holds upon Egypt, saw in Germany's railroad program in Turkey, not only the possible revivification of an empire believed to be dying, but also a political threat, since railroads might facilitate Turkey's concentration of troops in the Erzerum area. She protested to Germany that her economic interests, growing constantly greater since 1893, might develop into political control of Turkey, but indicated that Russia would condone such commercial development if Germany would assure her of a free hand in Constantinople. But with Russia in Constantinople, Germany's interests in Turkey would be sure to

(20) Harold Nicolson, Portrait of a Diplomatist (Boston, 1930), p. 45.
remain commercial, and furthermore, such an agreement would tend to destroy the alliance with Austria as well as it would tend to estrange England. Russia then threatened to attempt an agreement with England, which failed to move Germany, and this obstinacy caused Russia to use every measure possible to thwart any more concessions being granted to Germany in Turkey.(21) However, England's position in this regard was relatively secure, because the German railroad building program was to end at Baghdad, which was 500 miles from the Persian Gulf and a distance which not only depended upon small stern-wheelers for transportation but also was unfortified.(22)

It was at about this time that Lord Curzon, viceregal of India, sent his important memorandum on the Persian question (September 21, 1899) to the British government which urged the formulation of a definite policy in this regard. The situation in Persia was rapidly reaching a climax, thought Lord Curzon, because Russian influence in northern Persia was definitely superior to that of England's and it was being extended to central Persia. Moreover, Russia had concluded an agreement with Persia ten years before by which the shah promised not to let any other but Russian interests build railroads in Persia, and this agreement was now extended for another ten years.

(21) and (22) Langer, op. cit., II, 629ff.
Russia, however, had no intention of building any railroads in northern Persia, because England would then build them in southern Persia; so she contented herself with lending the shah a large amount of money secured by the revenues of the northern and central parts of the country.

Curzon thought that England should either oppose Russia or seek an agreement with her, but above all, she should not get a foothold on the Persian Gulf. The British government agreed with Curzon substantially, and would have negotiated for a settlement of all Anglo-Russian difficulties throughout Asia; but Russia would not have improved her standing in Persia by any such agreement unless she could get a port on the Persian Gulf, which England would not consider.(23)

It is in regard to the gulf problem that Curzon showed his great energy on behalf of preserving the Indian empire by nipping in the bud any and all attempts of other powers to establish themselves there, as well as by developing the northwest province defensive scheme in India itself.

The following quotation is a rather well-put summation of some of the problems which confronted England in this area: "Even more vital to the safety of India and

the prestige of the Empire was the maintenance of our position in the Persian Gulf, where the East India Company had opened a factory in 1763, and a Political Agent had resided since 1812. We had rooted out nests of pirates and destroyed their fleets, suppressed slavery, surveyed and buoyed the Gulf and kept down plague. The racial chiefs referred their disputes to the Resident at Bushire, and had bound themselves to have no dealings with any other power. We had a protectorate over Bahrein and preferential relations with Koweit. Despite our well-known interests, however, Russian emissaries, officers, ‘explorers’, doctors ‘studying plague’ swarmed in the Gulf. The termination of the Boer War restored to Great Britain her freedom of action; on May 15, 1903, Lord Lansdowne made the most momentous declaration of British policy since Sir Edward Grey’s pronouncement in 1895. ‘Firstly, we should promote and protect British trade in the Gulf. Secondly, we should not exclude the legitimate trade of others. Thirdly, we should regard the establishment of a naval base or fortified port in the Gulf by any other power as a grave menace to British interests, and we should clearly resist it by all the means at our disposal.’”(24)


With regard to the Boer war and British policy toward Russia in this area, see Langer, op. cit., II, 668, where he says that when the Boer war broke out Lord Salisbury told the German ambassador that England was in no position to check Russia from seizing the Bosphorus; nevertheless, England concentrated the Mediterranean fleet at Salonika, and Russia, whether she thought she could not expect any
Russia's position in northern Persia was practically unassailable: her frontier was close to Tehran; the Caspian Sea was practically a Russian lake; the Cossack Brigade at Tehran, officered by Russians lent to Persia, was the only effective and dependable military force in Persia; her railroad construction was penetrating to the south and threatening Herat; the Russian bank at Tehran had the full support of the Russian exchequer; she had built roads in northern Persia; and she had attempted to penetrate into Selistan. In addition to Russia's activities, France, Germany, Holland, and Italy maintained diplomatic missions at Tehran, so that the future of Persia seemed to the British foreign office in 1905 to have become a part of the general eastern question.

The British, on the other hand, had rather closely followed Russian activities in the north by similar moves in the south. They had fostered British trade and influence by every means at their disposal; they had built roads, made the Karun safe for navigation, given the Imperial Persian Bank full support, and extended the network of the Indo-European telegraph system. Russian activities in the Selistan had been countered by the establishment of a British consularship there. When Russian troops had been used to assist Persia in keeping out possible plague carriers from India across the Afghan

help from Germany and Austria, or whether she felt she had better not antagonize the British where the fleet would be effective, turned her attention to Persia and Afghanistan.
border, the British minister at Tehran told one of the Persians that any use of Russian troops to suppress a revolt in Persia would mean British troops in the Seistan, or on the Persian Gulf, or both. This message was intended to reach Russian ears and it probably did.(25)

Throughout this period prior to the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, the constant in Anglo-Russian differences in Persia was the question of a Russian port on the gulf. This, once granted, it was felt by the British, would mean a railroad from Meshed to the gulf, which would not only run through the Seistan and cut across England's communications by land to India, but would also permit an encroachment on England's private lake, the Persian Gulf, that would be but the opening wedge for other powers.

At the close of the year 1905, then, England's position throughout the Asian expanse was essentially favorable as regards Russia. Turkey, although considered a weak state, and which the Russians believed must surely fall sooner or later, was holding up very well; Persia, too, was still a buffer state, for although its ruler continually spent the country farther into

(25) B. D., IV, Nos. 321; 322; 323.

With regard to the money lent to Persia during this period, beginning with 1900, the Russian loans were as follows: 1900, £2,000,000 or $9,730,000 at normal exchange; 1902, £1,000,000 or $4,365,000; and other advances from time to time to meet Persian current expenses such as the advance in June, 1905, of £80,000 or $389,000. British loans were: £200,000 or $973,000 in 1903; and £100,000 or $486,500 in 1904.
debt, England had the upper hand in the south and felt that the Russian financial monopoly was badly cracked; Afghanistan was still under the ever-watchful British eye; and Tibet had been disciplined by British troops. Japan had proved her ability as England’s able soldier in the Far East and had left Russia badly deflated both in finances and morale.

The Anglo-Russian points of friction throughout Asia were soon to be adjusted after a fashion not unlike the settlement of the French and British differences in 1904. Traditionally, democratic England and autocratic Russia could never unite, but such a union, once accomplished, if skillfully used and judiciously controlled, would not only make British Asian interests safe, but also would be a powerful tool with which to threaten, if not to use against, other powers, and at the same time would prevent other powers using Russia to frustrate British policies.
Chapter Two

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 31, 1907

In politics, as in architecture, the laying of the foundation must go before the building of the roof; so the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 was a rather carefully built footing, imbedded in the solution of traditional problems and nicely sized so as to accomplish neither more than was feasible nor less than was possible. The agreement covered only those points of friction between Russia and England which concerned Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia. The enormous amount of detail they discussed in order to achieve an accord but illustrates the size of the undertaking. The value of the accomplishment, (or the roof, to make the analogy more complete), would not be the fact that the differences were dissolved and that they remained so. England's position as delimited by the agreement did not depend so much upon the conditions as they existed throughout Asia, but rather as the general European situation was adjusted to what British minds thought was most conducive to her welfare. The essence of any conclusion regarding English policy toward Russia at this time is the answer to the question: was England more concerned with Russia as a factor in Asia, or did she deem the settlement of the Asian question the sine qua non to other and more important considerations.
The origin of the Anglo-Russian agreement, its development, and fruition could be considered as a continual advance. However, it was not until the time of the Algeciras conference that circumstances were most favorable for the beginning. Russia was there given an excellent exhibition of the diplomatic assistance which England was able to give to a friend, France, at a time when Russia was in need of financial aid which would be more likely to materialize if a peaceful settlement at Algeciras was affected. Russia suggested that representations should be made at Berlin to urge the German government to accept what seemed to her a reasonable solution. England was able to reply that British policy was already clear to Berlin in view of the Anglo-French treaty concerning Morocco but that any pressure which Russia was able to impose upon Berlin would be very valuable. (1) This might be considered as the complement to France's refusal to stand with Russia, Germany and the United States in order to counterpoise the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. (2) But perhaps more important was the general situation within Russia which needed not only cash to maintain the government, but also, time for reorganization of the

(1) B. D., III, Nos. 283; 303; 304.
(2) B. D., IV, No. 209.
country and peace to permit the utmost effort to be directed toward the settlement of domestic troubles.

The military and reactionary groups within Russia were, for the time being, without their former influence at the Russian court. The far eastern policy had failed; England was strongly dominant throughout Asia and ready to conclude an agreement in that area; while Germany was bolstering up Turkey and penetrating into northern Persia. But any discussion of the negotiations which lead up to the Anglo-Russian agreement cannot be complete without repeated mention of Germany. The words Germany and Germans, the phrase a third power, the references to Morocco, as well as many other intimations and half-veiled statements, continuously run through the material until one might contend that the whole policy of England was directed toward inhibiting Germany as much as possible, and that Russia was constantly in fear of offending her powerful western neighbor. (3)

However that may be, throughout the discussions with regard to Tibet and Afghanistan, England was able to keep only Anglo-Russian interests to the front, since they were the only two important powers interested in those two countries, and the agreement as to them merely committed to writing that which had been substantially committed to writing that which had been substantially

(3) E. D., III, Nos. 422; 168. Consideration of German interests were, of course, more important in the settlement of the questions in Persia, discussed below.
agreed upon verbally between England and Russia.\(^{(4)}\)

In the main, Tibet was to be left to her own devices under Chinese suzerainty, but English commercial agents and Russian and English subjects were permitted to maintain direct commercial and religious relations, but neither of the powers were to send political representatives to, nor obtain any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mines or other rights in, Tibet. As for Afghanistan, England retained her influence over foreign relations of that country, and commercial opportunities were to be equal for the citizens of both England and Russia.\(^{(5)}\)

It is with regard to the settlement of the Anglo-Russian difficulties in Persia that Germany played such an important part — as an outsider, to be sure, but nevertheless, a large factor in both Russian and English thinking. Germany was steadily increasing her commercial activities in northern Persia and at the same time, she was sponsoring the development of the Bagdad railway.

Both of these legitimate pursuits were viewed in St.

---

\(^{(4)}\) B. D., IV, No. 549. In this memorandum respecting the Anglo-Russian convention, it is pointed out with reference to Afghanistan that Russia agreed in writing whereas formerly she only stated verbally the nature of her interests there; and with regard to Tibet, the provisions of the agreement did "...not go beyond the assurances in 1904 by Lord Lansdowne to the Russian Ambassador."

\(^{(5)}\) Ibid., pp. 618-20, for a full text of the convention between the United Kingdom and Russia relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet and signed at St. Petersburg, August 31, 1907. For an English translation, see Ward and Gooch, \textit{op. cit.}, III, 358ff. See also, \textit{idem}, where Curzon is quoted that Russia's recognition of Afghanistan as outside her sphere merely repeated an engagement eleven times renewed since 1869.
Petersburg with anything but enthusiasm.(6)

The commercial activities in Persia were non-political, of course, but Russia thought that any such activity would not only tend to sustain Persia, but would also make her another Morocco, as well as substantially to impair Russian commercial interests there. This apprehension was accentuated with the rumors that Germany intended to establish a bank at Tehran which could mean only more intensive German activity than before. While Russia had, by this time, given up the hope of driving through Persia to the gulf because she meant to avoid anything which might antagonize Great Britain(7), she nevertheless did not welcome any German encroachment into her position in northern Persia, which would endanger her primacy there, if and when, Persia fell.

Germany, however, was a very strong neighbor, both admired and feared by the Russians, who felt they must keep on good terms with her, even though Russia traditionally opposed the Bagdad railway and any other development in Turkey which might have the effect of strengthening the government which Russia hoped would fall. But

(6) B. D., IV, Nos. 464; 323. These documents refer, among other things, to the sudden occupation by Turkey of the Passova district, which had been settled by treaty, and interpreted by Grey as the work of Germany, though the evidence was not clear enough to justify any protestations; Grey said that this must be noted down as among the many instances of Germany's desire to cause embarrassment to Russia and Great Britain in the Middle East.

the Russian ministerial council had finally concluded that any further resistance to the Bagdad railway development was useless, inasmuch as it would have to be stopped for several decades to benefit Russia materially.

Since the dual alliance could not be used to restrain French financiers from participating in the Bagdad railway project, the Russian council decided that the best use to which the railway could be put would be as a bargaining point, provided that no branch roads were built towards the Persian border.\(^{(8)}\)

With this in view, Isvolsky, while visiting at Berlin, was able to propitiate Germany by withdrawing the Russian objections to the Bagdad railway in return for a free hand in the Russian sphere in Persia,\(^{(9)}\) although his continuously solicitous attitude toward Germany caused some apprehension at the British foreign office, which was encouraged by Clemenceau, to the effect that the German emperor would succeed in reviving the Drei-Kaiser-bund and in making terms with Russia behind England's back in the face of the Anglo-Russian negotiations.\(^{(10)}\)

Great Britain also did her best to show her

\(^{(8)}\) Selbert-Schreiner, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 459ff.

\(^{(9)}\) Nicolson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 177; \textit{E. D.}, IV, Nos. 230; 231; 258.

\(^{(10)}\) \textit{E. D.}, IV, No. 232. See \textit{ibid.}, No. 269, concerning a conversation between Grey and Benckendorf during which the latter told Grey that Bulow, in speaking of Persia, had used a word which translated into English meant Persia was a "fair field" for Germany, but that in German it had more the meaning "field to expand": to which Grey said, "Only in a commercial sense", but then added admittedly that-com-
great concern for Russia's feelings on the Bagdad railway project, and by innuendo, held out the promise of England's cooperation with Russia and France (11) conditioned, of course, upon the consideration of friendly relations between England and Russia.

Two other unconnected but cogent instances may be mentioned here which helped to provide the basis upon which England's apprehensions rested that German activities were directed against shattering any possible Anglo-Russian agreement. These instances also indicate the adroitness with which the British foreign office was able to use them to England's advantage. The first was with regard to the rumor that the renewed Anglo-Japanese alliance contained a secret clause to the effect that the maintenance of Turkey was included within the scope of the alliance. Count Benckendorff showed copies

(11) E. D., IV, No. 218. Spring-Rice, chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg, reported a conversation with Isvolsky to the effect that the Bagdad railway project raised the question as to whether England should participate with France in a project inaugurated by Germany, but so far, England had refused German advances because she was not willing, so long as Russia opposed the project, to enter into a combination which Russia might regard as an unfriendly act. See also footnote (10).
of the supposed secret clause to Sir Edward Grey, who said that perhaps Count Lamsdorff was as well, or better, able than he to guess at their origin and motive. (12)

The other instance was in connection with a joint loan which Persia needed very badly, and for which she appealed to London where she was refused. At the same time she was trying to get a loan from Russia, and if possible, a joint loan from Germany, England and Russia. The British foreign office waited for, and was rewarded with, confidential disclosures from Isvolsky that Germany was trying to become a third party in Persia in this manner, while she was secure in the correct assumption that since Russia herself could not finance the loan, she would prefer England to Germany, as well as only two, instead of three participants. (13)

But if England was having trouble with Germany’s interference, she was also faced with the Indian government’s fear of, and protests against, Russia’s use of Persia as a highway to India, as well as with the alternative, in the case that she stayed within her sphere in

(12) B. D., IV, No. 213. The only interpretation possible to Grey’s words would seem to be that Germany thus hoped to show Russia that Lamsdorff made a big mistake in not joining Germany in standing against the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, because England and Japan intended to preserve Turkey, although they knew Russia wanted her to fall. Grey’s minute: “At last Russia giving England a chance to expose lies.” Campbell-Bannerman: “This... worth all the lies put together.”

(13) B. D., IV, Nos. 223; 329; 330; 344; 345.
Persia, of pressing on through Turkey to Bagdad and hence to the gulf.(14) Moreover, there were large groups in England who felt that Russia was a ruthless and barbaric country; that she denied all liberty to her subjects; and that she used the harshest methods in suppressing freedom of speech and even thought.(15) These were considerations which had to be kept in mind so far as parliamentary criticism was concerned, regardless of the extent to which concessions might be useful successfully to conclude the agreement with Russia.

England, however, had two bargaining points which, as the need arose, she might possibly use. The first of these concerned the Straits question. England had decided that while Russia would probably gain an advantage by being able to use the Straits for her warships, nevertheless, such a condition would not fundamentally alter the strategic position in the Mediterranean, inasmuch as Russia was believed likely to be able to obtain the sultan's permission to use the Straits, anyway.(16).

The other bargaining point was the possible concession of a port on the Persian Gulf to Russia if necessary to reach an agreement, and while this would doubtlessly cause many Englishmen to rise to great heights oratorically.

(14) B. D., IV, No. 321; Nicolson, op. cit., p. 176.
(15) Nicolson, op. cit., p. 152.
(16) B. D., IV, Nos. 244; 264.
at such a brazen defiance of Lansdowne's statement of policy in 1903 concerning the Persian Gulf, nevertheless, it was in Grey's mind. This second point was not needed, but the first, i.e., the Straits question, was particularly important to the completion of the agreement with Russia.

The precise point to which England withdrew in regard to her traditional policy toward the Straits is obscure, but generally England informed Russia that she would be willing to discuss the question, with the view to relaxing the restrictions on the use of the Straits at some future time. This concession from England,

(17) B. D. IV, No. 350. In this document Grey, in writing to the king, thought that some port on the gulf to Russia would be necessary to reach an agreement.

(18) Ibid., Nos. 275; 264; 265 and enclosures. Nicolson, op. cit., p. 200n, says that Isvolsky thought the Straits would be open to only Russian ships, while Hardinge meant that they should be open to everybody, and condemns Isvolsky because he did not incisively perceive this point before he assumed too much from England. This is questionable: first, because the point was too big to be casually overlooked except by one grossly negligent and while one is reminded of the Buohlau bargain, nevertheless, careful and literal translations of the Russian memoranda on this question show that the point was very much in evidence. In the first of these memoranda: "We attach also very great importance to the fact that Sir Edward Grey has not made any objection to a project of arrangement which would give Russian warships the exclusive right to use the Straits from both ends while the naval forces of other powers could not enter the Black Sea."; in the second: "In his memorandum of April 26 past, Sir Edward Grey recapitulates the conversations which he has had with Count Benckendorff..., does not exclude the right of entrance to the Black Sea to warships of other waterside powers of the Black Sea and admits the usage of the Dardanelles and the Straits as far as entrance of the Black Sea by all the powers on complete equal basis." It is submitted that Isvolsky saw the point when one considers both memoranda; whether he chose to admit it is another matter.
while it did not mean that England automatically withdrew from her position in that regard(19), would permit Russia to open international negotiations on the Straits question without England's former antagonism to Russian aims.

This question was inextricably connected with the negotiations with regard to Persia. The English plan was that Persia should be divided into spheres of influence obviously for the purpose of giving to Russia something which she already had, i.e., northern Persia, in return for southeastern Persia which England already had. This would commit Russian penetration and infiltration into Persia to merely consolidating the position already attained; besides, "spheres of interest" was a phrase acceptable to the public ear in view of its use in other parts of the world in previous settlements of territory between the powers.

(19) B. D., IV, No. 275; minute by Grey, "The memorandum (Isvolsky's on the Straits question) does not mention that good relations in Asia are preliminary conditions to a discussion of the Straits, but perhaps that is understood."

See Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 (New York: 1925), p. 159: "The question of the Straits was not mixed up with those Anglo-Russian negotiations about Persia." Cf., Nicolson, op. cit., p. 178, "On suggesting that England would entertain proposals regarding the Dardanellos, Isvolsky and the Russian Staff warmed considerably to the question of settling Persia."

See also, B. D., IV, No. 260, which is a letter from Nicolson to Grey, reporting a conversation with Isvolsky, who, it is said, stated that the fact that the British government was willing to discuss the Straits question was "...a great evolution in our relations and an historical event."
The military party in Russia apparently did not want Persia divided into spheres of influence for strategic reasons. (20) That party was most difficult for Isvolskuy to reconcile to an agreement with England throughout Asia because it meant inhibiting military activities in all that area so long as the agreement existed. A change in the status of the Straits to Russian advantage would seem to compensate for any military hopes frustrated in central Asia and especially in Persia, because the best way from Russia to the Persian Gulf or to India through Afghanistan was by way of the great plateau of which Persia was a geographical unit.

Thus, the division of Persia into three zones, the northern to Russia, the middle, neutral, and the southern to England, against the desire of the military strategists of Russia, was a military as well as a political and commercial settlement. Moreover, the British foreign office believed that even if Russia was a country with whom it was impossible to secure a lasting agreement, it would place England in a position to watch Russian activity, to know at the precise places where it exceeded the terms

(20) B. D., IV, No. 367. See the enclosure of this document, reporting a conversation between Lieut-Colonel Napier and General Palitzin, of the Russian general staff, and a minute by Grey: "If the Russian Government at the instigation of the military party, refuse to recognize our proposed sphere of influence, the obvious conclusion is that they have aggressive intentions against India for which they want Seistan as a base." See also, ibid., No. 353.
of the agreement, and to prepare for any steps which might be necessary to meet it. (21)

In addition to the question of the Straits, and the division of Persia into three zones, that of the status of the Persian Gulf must also be included in this rather complicated strategical and political maneuvering involving the negotiations for the Anglo-Russian agreement. Lord Lansdowne's declaration of English policy in 1903 in regard to the Persian Gulf meant that it was to remain an English lake. Near the close of the negotiations with regard to Persia, the British attempted to incorporate into the proposed treaty with Russia a statement similar to the Lansdowne declaration. This would mean that Russia would be committed publicly to a policy of upholding British primacy in the Persian Gulf, and the Russian government, in an official memorandum, stated that such a provision must be left out because it concerned other powers; and that to include the clause would create "umbrage" and might become the cause of an incident similar to that which followed the Anglo-French agreement regarding Morocco. (22)

Public opinion in both countries would take diverse views; the Russians would probably be against it and the

(21) R. D., IV, No. 421.

(22) Ibid., No. 431. See a minute by Charles Hardinge (ibid., No. 458), to the effect that if Russia were given a port on the gulf, Germany would want one, which Russia realizes, and therefore, she would accept the provision that the status quo should exist.
Englishmen for it. England also wanted Russia tied to neutrality in case of a contest with another power (Germany!) in the gulf, but the provision was not considered of vital importance, and it was dropped as an integral part of the treaty in order not to lose the opportunity for an agreement with Russia. (23)

Considering these three points together, viz., the Straits question, the status of the Persian Gulf, and the division of Persia into spheres of interest or zones, it becomes apparent that the men in charge of the negotiations for England were perfectly willing to woo Russia with all the inducements in their power to offer. At the same time, they were trying to get Russia as far away from the German camp as possible, and they were constantly speculating on the influence which Berlin had at the Russian court.

Russia's refusal to admit the Persian Gulf into the formal agreement with England was consistent with the withdrawal of Russian objections to the Bagdad railway project, since the ultimate terminus of a railroad across Turkey would be on the gulf. Russia could not afford to be put in the position of giving with one hand what she withdrew with the other. As for the Straits

(23) B. D., IV, No. 429; also Nos. 434; 440, in which Grey telegraphed to Nicolson: "We have reason to believe that the French Ambassador will be instructed to support reference to Persian Gulf in Preamble"; Nicolson's reply requested this not be done, because it would show that England had discussed it with outside interests and therefore Isvolsky might consult other powers and no doubt this would be Germany.
question, England had turned Russia to seek from others what formerly England had refused. This point must be kept in mind along with an earlier Russian offer to Berlin not to oppose German aspirations in Turkey in return for a free hand in Constantinople. As for the Russian zone in Persia, Russia was forced to bargain with Germany for what she had long before considered to be hers.

These considerations cannot be lightly dismissed, especially from a larger view of Russian ambitions which included an understanding with Japan as to the Far East, and a tightening of the dual alliance through an agreement with England. It is fairly obvious that with so much accomplished Russia would either stand still, violate her agreement with England, or pursue a Balkan and Turkish policy which would sooner or later conflict with German and Austro-Hungarian interests. (24)

The Anglo-Russian agreement can conceivably be regarded from many different standpoints. In view of the long struggle between Russia and England over the wide area in middle Asia, the signatures on the piece of paper committed each government to a recognition

(24) Sydney B. Fay, Origins of the World War (New York, 1929), I, 214ff. See also, E. D., IV, No. 219, for some gossip that Izvolsky had wanted to succeed Count Kafniss at Vienna prior to going to Copenhagen, but that the Austro-Hungarian government had privately told the tsar that they did not want him.
of certain rights and duties and did not materially change conditions as they existed prior to signing the agreement. The fact that England could appeal on moral grounds to the treaty if Russia violated it does not seem to be very convincing as a primary reason for concluding the treaty.(25) As a defensive measure for India, the treaty, providing it remained in force, would lessen the expenditure necessary for the defense of the Indian frontiers, which, of course, included Persia. (26) The motives of good morals and less money do not explain the repeated references to Germany through out the British Documents which deal with this phase of English policy toward Russia. That the agreement was directed against Germany, especially after time and Russo-German friction should strengthen it, seems certain. The question as to just what way it was directed toward Germany brings up several possible views. One opinion is that the fear of Germany was one of the main motives behind the agreement which made it not a question of getting Russia to join England against Germany, but solely a question of preventing Russia from joining Germany against England.(27) This is similar to another opinion

(25) B. D., IV, No. 421.

(26) Ibid., No. 549, in which it is stated that the agreement with Russia secured for England in Persia that which the Indian government was willing to purchase from Persia, and therefore this method cost nothing and was better since Russia agreed to it.

that England allied with Japan to prevent Japan and Russia from combining against England. Another opinion holds that there was no possibility of uniting with a third power to frustrate Russia throughout Asia and that the agreement with Russia was the natural complement to that with France.(23) It should be noted in regard to this view that both Russia and England seemed to agree that the only approach to India was through Persia(29), and that an agreement with Germany might possibly have been just as effective against Russia in Persia as the agreement with Russia was against Germany had there been only consideration for the safety of India.

All these opinions have as their basis that England was on the defensive, in attitude as well as in action. But it is always difficult to ascertain when any action in football or in war ceases to be defensive and becomes offensive, and it is an even greater task to discover whether or not the diplomatic policy of one country toward another is motivated by aggressive aims. There are certain considerations which would seem to indicate that the British policy toward Russia at this time was merely the completion of the foundation upon which was to be built an aggressive rather than a defensive


(29) B. D., IV, No. 476, and enclosure.
diplomacy. That England intended to use at least the threat of Russian and French armies, as well as the diplomatic concert of England, Russia and France, against any power or combination of powers in central Europe has a fairly substantial basis. Sir Edward Grey (30), Sir Charles Hardinge (31), Mr. Spring-Rice (32) and Sir Arthur Nicolson (33) all envisaged this use of the Anglo-Russian agreement in connection with the Anglo-French accord and the dual alliance.

To say that this was defensive, that it was no conscious policy of encircling Germany, that the agreement with Russia was made to prevent Russia and then France from being pulled into the German orbit on the continent omits the very practical consideration that

(30) B. D., IV, No. 550. "I am quite pleased, from the point of view of general policy, that events are bringing Russia and us together. But a combination of Britain, Russia and France in Concert must for the present be a weak one...Ten years hence, a combination of Britain, Russia and France may be able to dominate Near Eastern Policy."

(31) Ibid., No. 544. Harding hoped that Russian policy would concern itself with the Near East where it would not be easy for Germany and Russia to work together.

(32) Ibid., No. 532. "I venture to warn you (Grey) that difficulties here (Persia) may be beginning. It is not necessary after the Moroccan experience to point out why."

(33) Ibid., No. 516. "Essential as a friendly Afghanistan may be to our position in India, equally essential...is a friendly Russia to our general international position.... If we wish....to avert the possibility of any Power assuming a position from which she could dictate to others a close understanding with France and Russia, is, I submit, an object for the attainment of which every effort should be made."
such a policy was accompanied by English action diplomatically. This assuming-to-act may not be considered offensive by some, but England did act which implies much. That England expected Russian and German ambitions to clash in the Near East which would strengthen the Anglo-Russian agreement implies England's support to Russian aims, at least diplomatically. In view of Germany's commercial expansion into Turkey and Persia, it would appear that England wished Russia to take the initiative to stop her. Insofar as England intended to remain in the background, her action could be called defensive, but to the extent that she intended to aid and abet Russia in her ambitions which were also English, and to the extent that England intended to use Russia as her agent, she certainly was not on the defensive.

There is no doubt that at the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement, many of the men connected with the formation of British policy expected strongly to support both Russia and France diplomatically in the future. Such support could only be at the expense of other powers and the one power referred to almost constantly was Germany. Since France was busy in Morocco she was naturally reluctant to run the risk of even diplomatic friction in connection with any matter which might react unfavorably on her there, and since Russia was weak after the war with Japan and with her internal troubles,
the British did not expect the combination of England, France and Russia to be very effective. But trouble was in the air over the Balkans, to which England's new friend Russia was turning her attention. In the crisis of 1908, one may expect to find further indications as to just how far England's policy toward Russia was concerned with Anglo-Russian differences as opposed to general European considerations.
Chapter Three

BRITISH SCHEMES IN THE BALKANS DURING THE ANNEXATION CRISIS

The success of British diplomacy which, in a few years had turned the cold of isolation into the warmth of entente was accompanied by ever increasing responsibility. If one of the better reasons for concluding the Asiatic agreement with Russia was the lessening of England's responsibility for the defense of her Indian frontiers(1), the British were penny wise and pound foolish. If Germany can be criticized adversely for tying her might and power into the Balkan question and if she can be said to have had no vital interests in Austria-Hungary's problem of a weltering mass of nationalities within and without her borders, England can be censured far more effectually for her part in the Balkan problem. But England had more at stake than mere interference for Russia's sake, or for maintenance of the Anglo-Russian entente; she was following a line to a larger will to power, and to a closer grasp on her partners in her two ententes.

Russian interests in the Balkans were to become English diplomatic interests. Only by saying that war is not the ultimate end of diplomacy may England's interference

in these problems be explained. Even before the signing of the agreement of 1907, the possibility that Germany could appease the Russian appetite in the Balkans and thereby revive the Drei-kaiser-bund, in effect, was confronting the British foreign office. England was determined, however, to keep her hand in the Macedonian problem and to work with Russia.

Prior to the young Turk revolution in July, 1908, England's plans had to resolve themselves into a single pattern made up of many-sided figures. Her commercial interests in Turkey were not receiving the consideration to which she believed herself entitled, and her political influence at the Porte was only spasmodically hopeful. Parliamentary considerations at home demanded that something definite in the way of reforms be accomplished in Macedonia through the concert of powers.

(2) B. D., V, Nos. 158; 159; 160; 161. See also Ed. note, following No. 161, referring to G. P., xxii, pp. 410-1; pp. 411-12; pp. 55-6.

(3) B. D., V, Nos. 217; 212; 215; 183.

(4) Ibid., No. 174: Grey, "And there is general evidence, in big things and little (in Turkey), of indifference, if not of ill-will. It is quite evident that we must go on another tack, and I am considering what our policy should be." See also, ibid., No. 147, in which Adam Block, British delegate on the council of administration of the Ottoman public debt, reports that in spite of the Anglo-French entente, French and German capital was "...laying an economic foundation on which they will later be able to build a political edifice."

(5) Ibid., No. 156.

(6) Ibid., No. 177.
England's desire to cooperate with Russia in settling the Turco-Persian frontier question was conditioned by the attitude which she should take toward the Moslems generally, in view of the large number of them under British rule. However, England felt there was no need to curry the sultan's favor. It was at the time when England and Russia were working on a plan of reform for Macedonia, accepted in principle by the other powers, that the young Turk revolution broke out. This occasioned much rejoicing in the British foreign office.

The British felt that the meeting at Reval between Tsar Nicholas and King Edward precipitated the Turkish revolution. This meeting, however, was particularly important to the British from a larger view. They felt that if they could come to terms with Russia about Macedonia, they would be able to secure the cooperation of France and Italy. In this way, the four powers would be able to force Germany and Austria into line. With the young Turks in control of the Turkish government, many of England's problems there were automatically solved. In regard to the problem of giving support to a

(7) B. D., V, Nos. 167; 186.
(8) Ibid., Nos. 187; 188; 192; 193.
(9) Ibid., No. 207.
(10) Ibid., p. 194. See also, Nos. 212; 215; and especially 217, in which Nicolson and the tsar agreed that England and Russia were the two powers most interested in the Near East(!) and should, therefore, work together there.
constitutional government in Turkey, Grey said, "We must be careful not to give Russia the impression that we are reverting to an old policy of supporting Turkey as a barrier against her and should continue to show willingness to work with Russia when possible."(11) The easiest way to accomplish this was to give Russia support in the Balkans, an area not mentioned in the Anglo-Russian agreement and within the field of the central European powers.(12)

This view of English policy at the beginning of so very critical a period becomes clearer when the actual declaration of Bulgarian independence was made known at the British foreign office on October 5, 1908. Grey wrote to Nicolson, "If as I expect, Turkey contents herself with a protest against Bulgarian and Austrian action but asks for compensation for her interests, I hope that we may find ourselves in agreement with Russia in adopting an attitude friendly to Turkey in the consultation of the

(11) B. D., No. 207. See also, No. 204, in which Grey explains that British support to a constitutional regime in Turkey would make it more difficult to refuse a constitution to British Mohammedan subjects, especially in Egypt, whereas, hitherto, England had been able to argue that Moslems under British rule were better off than under the Turkish.

(12) Ibid., No. 399. England did not mind if Austria and Servia fought; it might even increase British trade in the Balkans at the expense of Austria; so long as Russia did not join in. England was also supporting Russia in being against Bulgaria's declaration of independence, "...especially as we feel that the Bulgarians are being egged on in their aggressive intentions by the Austrians." (Ibid., Nos. 274; 283.) This policy changed with Russia's and also when a scheme of England's became possible, as will be seen below.
powers. Feeling here is that the new regime in Turkey has been badly treated and deserves consideration. It is too soon to make any proposal to the Russian government and the situation is very delicate and complicated, but this is the line I wish to follow." (13) Clearly England hoped to draw closer to Russia by giving her diplomatic support in the Balkans and at the same time to gain the favor of Turkey where so long before Germany had the foremost role.

This was a difficult plan to follow, but the British foreign office went ahead with it. England was sure that Russia would work with her but for a compensation which would most likely take the form of a privileged right in the use of the Straits. There were two objections to Russia's probably price: first, that Turkey might not be in accord; and secondly, that the British public were not prepared for the concession to Russia. (14)

Turkey did object when Grey sounded the Turkish ambassador on October 9, although Grey pointed out that

(13) B. D., V, No. 301. See also No. 303 and minutes, to the effect that England believed Russia had given her consent to Austrian and Bulgarian action. England was to assent to a conference as requested by Russia only if it was not to be used to further spoliation of Turkey. Grey told the Turkish ambassador on October 5, that England would refuse to recognize either the annexation or Bulgarian independence till the views of other powers, especially Turkey, were obtained (ibid., No. 296). England, Grey said, could not permit the rights of any power to alter an international treaty without the consent of other parties to it.

(14) Ibid., Nos. 312; 314; 334.
the Russian aims could not be denied forever. In reply, the ambassador said his government would feel that this would leave Turkey open to a coup de main at Russia's convenience. (15) Nevertheless, to break this resistance, the British foreign office planned to negotiate a loan from England, France, and Russia and to guarantee their support of the young Turk movement. (16)

The British cabinet gave Grey a free hand on the loan to Turkey. They balked at endorsing Isvolsky's plan of limiting to Russia and the other waterside powers of the Black Sea ingress and egress of the Straits. They agreed to this in time of peace, provided that Turkey declare in time of war between Russia and any other power that the same rights be given to both belligerents. Harding wrote to Nicolson, "England would never send ships through the Straits to the Black Sea unless Turkey were England's ally, but the reciprocity idea in time of war is a shop-window ware, since the public do not understand the strategy." (17) England went that far to support Russia and especially to support Isvolsky by giving him something "to take home with him" after Aehrenthal's coup. But this plan was conditioned upon Turkey's acceptance of it without pressure at this particular

(15) B. D., V, No. 349.

(16) Ibid., No. 338, minutes.

(17) Ibid., No. 372. See also, Nos. 358; 377. The latter is Grey's memorandum on this question.
time lest it mean the overthrow of the young Turk regime. (18)

To bolster Isvolsky further at St. Petersburg, King Edward sent an autograph letter to the tsar to be delivered in person by Nicolson (19), while Isvolsky himself carried back to Russia a private letter from Grey which the former thought would carry great weight with the tsar. (20) Both these persuasive notes bound highest praise of Isvolsky to assurances of England's support to Russia. But Grey had no sympathy with the Servian and Montenegrin clamor for territorial compensation: "If they are afraid of the Austrian advance, they had better sit still, put their own houses in order, make friends with Turkey, and hope that she will get strong under the new regime. But I do not want to cold-shoulder Isvolsky on the Servian question if the Russians are keen about it and will do my best to support him." (21)

(18) It is not to be inferred that England expected so easily to give up her historical objection to Russia's privileged use of the Straits. The solution here was satisfactory to Russia and surely had the effect of turning Russia more determinedly to the pursuit of greater Russian gains in the Balkans. This was important in England's plan to keep the entente strong and to secure her ascendency in Turkey.

(19) B. D., V, No. 409.

(20) Ibid., No. 397.

(21) Ibid., No. 412. See also, No. 416, reporting Grey's conversation with the Servian minister in which he said that England would give Russia diplomatic support in her attitude about Servian demands and laid stress upon this, but that it must not be expected that England should push matters to the point of provoking a conflict.
This did not mean support to Russia in war, however, even if Germany should help Austria, although Grey told Benckendorff that England would fight on the side of France against Germany in a war concerning Morocco. Grey did not know if England would fight with France against Germany over the Balkan question if France were drawn in and invaded by Germany. That would have to be taken up in cabinet and no decision could be made until the case actually arose. (22)

Throughout the crisis, England was put in the difficult position of not knowing what Russia's attitude and demands would be. This was especially true of questions concerning Servia and Montenegro. As Nicolson wrote to Grey, Isvolsky's position on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a little tangled and hampered by the various secret arrangements concluded between Russia and Austria-Hungary which seemed to be emerging piecemeal into publicity. (23) While England had agreed to give the utmost diplomatic support to the Servian and Montenegrin demands, she nevertheless realized clearly that Russia had probably given Servia assurances which could be very difficult to carry out, especially in view of the fact that any indication of Russian assistance would be

(22) B. D., V. No. 441. It was at this time, November 10, 1908, that Benckendorff told Grey that if the British government would at once ask for a vote of credit from the house of commons it would make the difference between peace and war.

(23) Ibid., No. 498.
greatly magnified at Belgrade.(24) On January 24, 1909, Isvolsky told Nicolson that the problem of finding a consideration for Servia was insoluble(25), but as late as February 16, the British foreign office still did not know what Isvolsky's plans were for Servia and Montenegro. Nicolson was reiterating from St. Petersburg that the real question revolved around Russia's possible intervention on behalf of Servia.(26)

To digress here for a moment, England was determined to keep the triple entente together after once having accomplished agreements with France and Russia. This was a difficult task, and from time to time, it seemed as if England would lose Russia. England's best friend at St. Petersburg was Isvolsky, and while the French and Russian alliance was not apt to suffer were Isvolsky displaced, those in the British foreign office reasoned that the reactionaries in Russia would make short work of drawing away from the Anglo-Russian understanding were they to come in control of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs.

Because of this conclusion, the British foreign office did everything in its power to sustain Isvolsky and to keep the French favorably disposed toward him. An example of this occurred in the fall of the year 1907.

(24) &. D., V, No. 525.
(25) Ibid., No. 530.
(26) Ibid., No. 605.
Isvolsky was negotiating with Germany in regard to some questions in the Baltic and North seas. As a consequence, the French became upset over what they called written proof that the negotiations between Russia and Germany were initiated by Isvolsky and had resulted in an unsigned agreement which went beyond the maintenance of the status quo in the Baltic and North seas to include secret clauses. Meanwhile, Von Schoen was authorized by the kaiser to tell Benckendorff that there would be no political discussions at the Windsor state banquet, which Benckendorff telegraphed to St. Petersburg. Thereupon, Schoen informed Cambon that the Baltic negotiations were initiated by the Russian government and also made known to the British that discussions on the Bagdad railway had been going on for many months between him and Isvolsky. The British told Benckendorff the whole story and advised him to telegraph Isvolsky that he should inform the French government immediately as to what the negotiations were. The British then confided to Cambon that this would make Isvolsky angry with the Germans and therefore he would be drawn closer to France and England. As Hardinge put it, "I trust that we shall hear no more of such nonsense from Paris as that Isvolsky must go."(27)

(27) B. D., VIII, Nos. 135; 139. See also, ibid., No. 133, in which Hardinge states, "The French are stupid and would, to satisfy their petty amour propre, like Isvolsky to fall and Mouraview at Rome take his place. I would regard any change at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at St. Petersbourg a disaster for us."

See also, ibid., IX, 1, No. 28, which relates that when
At the same time, England's timely warning and her solicitous attitude toward Isvolsky was not without its benefit to English policy. The following letter, written a few days after the above incident, on January 2, 1908, by Nicolson to Hardinge, now becomes clear: "The stars in their courses are drawing him (Isvolsky) nearer and nearer to us. He sees, I think, clearly that German policy in the Middle East will not work to the advantage of Russian interests, and he is, for the moment, a little hipped with France who has been unduly sensitive to his Baltic and Bagdad causeries, he is disposed to lean more on us, and it will be well to encourage him and to show ourselves appreciative."(28)

The interests of France and Russia were in Morocco and the Balkans respectively, with England trying to bring them ever closer together. As for Morocco, the British did not want to know officially what the French were doing.

Isvolsky showed some nervousness with regard to Austria-Hungary's and France's exchange of compliments, the French told Isvolsky that in case of difference of opinion about Austria-Hungary, France would take the Russian view, and that the French expected the same thing from Russia with regard to Russian and German friendly advances; minutes by Spicer and Grey, "French retort to Isvolsky is very much to the point. France already caught Russia negotiating with Germany about the Baltic behind France's back and this is a good reminder that such agreements must not be undertaken by Russia without France."

(28) B. D., VIII, appendix, p. 723. See also, B. D., V, No. 372, in which Hardinge says, "we must do our best to support him (Isvolsky), such as he is."
there, in order not to find it necessary to object. (29) When the Germans objected to what the French were doing, England directed the admiralty to keep in readiness during the Casablanca incident lest Germany send France an ultimatum and the British cabinet decide to assist France. (30) England also told Russia that in the event of an unprovoked war of Germany against France, that she, England, would help France, but that the German emperor would hardly be prepared to face a combination of France, Russia and possibly England (31).

In spite of such energetic behind-the-scenes action on the part of the British, Isvolsky was, at least to the English eyes, playing the part of a suspicious friend who from time to time needed repeated assurances of England's support. Although he had not made known to England his plans as to Servia, yet Isvolsky censured the British severely when the official communiqué of conversations between Bulow and Hardinge was issued. The communiqué indicated that Germany and England were of one mind as to the questions in the Near East, which meant to Isvolsky that England had taken the side of Germany and hence Austria-Hungary, because German had refused to assure him

(29) B. D., VIII, No. 91.
(30) B. D., VII, No. 132.
(31) Ibid., Nos. 133, 135. See also, Ibid., V, No. 441; and footnote No. 23, supra.
that Russian and German policies were the same in the
Balkans. (32) To substantiate his former assurances of
diplomatic support, Grey sent a telegram through Nicolson to Isvolsky to the effect that England would "...rally
to the side of Russia and France in the Near East...." if
Germany did not follow England's view. This pleased
Isvolsky; he agreed that there could be no harm in putting
Bulow's assurances to the test. (33)

In spite of British diplomacy, the idea expressed
by Isvolsky on October 5, 1908, to compel Austria to
submit to a conference and thus reverse Algeciras could
not be worked out. (34) The Austro-German alliance was
too strong. Kiderlen-Waechter proposed that France,
England, Germany and Russia make representations at
Belgrade. (35) It seemed to Isvolsky that France indicated
approval of the German proposal, but Nicolson was able
to soothe him somewhat by saying that France was not ad-
vocating it but wanted only to get his views. (36) Isvolsky
said that Kiderlen-Waechter's proposal would put
Russia in the wrong unless she agreed to it. Nicolson's
advice was to put through the Servian statement that she

(32) B. D., V, Nos. 567; 570; 571.

(33) Ibid., No. 568. See also, No. 572, in which Isvolsky
told Nicolson that Russia might abandon England and France
completely and reverse her whole international policy.

(34) Ibid., No. 504.

(35) Ibid., No. 611.

(36) Ibid., No. 612.
would abide by the decision of the powers; if Germany did not accept it, the onus of provoking war would be on Germany's head because she refused to preserve peace by agreement. (37)

Probably with Nicolson's suggestion, Isvolsky advised Servia to maintain her peaceful attitude and to leave her case entirely in the hands of the powers. (38) Austria, however, would have no conference nor would she admit that Russia had the right to act as the protector of Servia. Germany suggested just an exchange of notes since a conference was out of the question. (39) Even in the exchange of notes, Isvolsky did not consult England or France, but made his peace Austrian. This was deplored by the British who seemed to rely upon bargain-making when events were at their sharpest crisis. (40)

A rather curious interplay during this crisis involving Bulgaria sheds some further light upon British policy. England was not concerned over a war between Austria and Servia because the occasion could even increase British trade in the Balkans at the expense of Austria, so long as Russia did not participate. (41)

(37) E. D., V., No. 612. Grey refused to admonish Servia without Russia's permission even in case of war because that would be going "...behind their backs." (Ibid., No. 611.)
(38) Ibid., No. 619.
(39) Ibid., Nos. 657; 673.
(40) Ibid., Nos. 690; 693; 701; 807; 813.
(41) Ibid., No. 399.
Support of Servian and Montenegrin claims was merely good politics toward Russia. But for Bulgaria's future, England had a very definite hope. The British urged, even sponsored, an offensive and defensive alliance between Bulgaria and Turkey, relying, however, upon Isvolsky to bring it about. He was urged that such an alliance would so materially strengthen Russian positions in the Balkans as to be tantamount to an easy settlement of the Servian and Montenegrin difficulties. (42)

This plan involved payment of an indemnity to Turkey for Bulgaria's declaration of independence which was to be financed by French bankers. (43) What was most important, England would not only have succeeded in getting Russia firmly to support Turkey, but also would have considerably narrowed the area of possible influence left open to Germany and Austria-Hungary. But in the midst of the negotiations, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria asked the tsar to be invited to Grand Duke Vladimir's funeral.

(42) B. D., V, Nos. 513; 515; 517; 518; also, p. 570, private letter to Nicolson.

(43) Ibid., Nos. 529; 536; 542. This plan consisted of the payment of a sum of money to Turkey: Turkey wanted 120 millions of francs and no rectification of frontiers; Bulgaria wanted to pay only 82 millions of francs with a rectification of frontiers; the French would lend only 100 millions of francs. After pacing the floor of the Russian foreign office for nights on end, Isvolsky thought up a plan all by himself as follows: to give back to Turkey bonds which Russia held and to let Bulgaria pay to Russia what would have been the interest on them and to Turkey 82 millions of francs to be advanced by the French bankers. The bonds which Russia was to return to Turkey were in the amount equal to the difference between the figure Turkey asked and the figure Bulgaria wanted to pay.
As Nicolson told Isvolsky, such premature recognition of the Bulgarian independence would violate the agreement of the three powers, would estrange Turkey, and would make it impossible for Russia to reproach Austria in her violation of the treaty of Berlin before a conference was called. Isvolsky said that, failure to invite Ferdinand and give him honors as head of a state would throw Bulgaria into the arms of Austria; and furthermore, it would be against sentiment in Russia. This was a heavy blow to the British foreign office, for if their plans had materialized regarding Russia, Bulgaria and Turkey, the British position in the Near East would have been politically dominant as opposed to Germany. (44)

The British plans included another thrust at the triple alliance which involved Italian aims across the Adriatic. Their diplomatic support had been promised with regard to the Danube-Adriatic railway early in 1908, if the Austrian Novi-Bazar railway scheme, and if the Macedonian reforms, were accepted. (45) They later agreed to support the Italian proposal at Gettinde with regard to any arrangement Italy and Austria should make

(44) B. D., V, No. 584. Minute by Ass't Clerk Tilley, "Recognition of Bulgaria in this way may throw England instead of Bulgaria into Austria's arms. Russia can't expect England to follow her lead here, and such drastic action would be a reason for England not to follow Russia's lead as regards Servia." Grey's minute: "We must stand aside; can not follow suit."

(45) Ibid., Nos. 251; 253; 254; 259.
concerning Montenegro. Because of this, Isvolsky took Nicolson to task, saying that Italy and Austria had no right to come to an agreement as to Montenegro without a word to any of the other powers except Great Britain because Russia was "...fifty times more concerned about Montenegro than Servia through traditional and intimate ties.

Nicolson explained that England had merely given effect to a previous promise.

Thus the Bosnian crisis came to an end. It left cancers in many places and showed the excellence of diplomacy backed by force that could be immediately effective. Against this diplomacy, even the British with all their talk of giving the strongest diplomatic support to Russia were at times extremely nervous, as is shown by Grey's minute: "...if Sir C. Hardinge has opportunity in conversation with M. Cambon he might let

(46) B. D., No. 828. Isvolsky's words were, "C'est un coup mortel à ma position; je n'ai qu'à donner ma démission." There are at least two possible explanations for Isvolsky's hysterical outburst. The first is that the Montenegrin and Russian royal families were so closely tied together that extreme pressure might be thus brought to bear for Isvolsky's dismissal by the tsar. Along this line see René Fulop-Miller, Rasputin: the Holy Devil (New York, 1928), passim, who shows how close the daughters of King Nicholas of Montenegro, Militza and Anastasia, were to the tsar and tsarina. They had introduced Rasputin to them in 1907, and were, as wives of two Russian grand dukes, otherwise very close to the immediate royal family. They were likewise, especially during Rasputin's early years at the Russian capital, among his few very closest friends and admirers. Another explanation of Isvolsky's manner may lie in the assumption that it was his desire to lead the entente and this clearly showed to him such independent action on the part of England as to be inconsistent with that leadership.
him know that if Austria offers a reasonable sum (to Turkey) we shall work for its acceptance. It must be remembered in all we say that it is necessary to avoid the impression that we are making for a settlement between Austria and Turkey to the prejudice of the Slav interests; but the situation is getting so ominous that... whatever settlement first appears practicable should be encouraged." (47)

Grey also summed up the crisis as follows: "Now as to the result: Austria has scored by giving nothing to Servia; but Montenegro gets compensation by the removal of limitations on her sovereignty, and Austria has had to pay 2½ million pounds to Turkey, which she said originally she would never pay. The result would not be so bad if only Isvolsky had withstood German bustling 48 hours.

"Russia has drawn closer to Bulgaria, who is worth many Servias — a result which twenty years ago would have been regarded unfavorably here, but which we now welcome as strengthening Russia's position. She has Bulgaria on her side, she has our goodwill, the Slav feeling is deeply apprehensive of Teuton advance and affronted by Teuton pressure, and it is at Russia's disposal; all of these are improvements in her position if only she is cool enough to see them, wise enough to use them, and will reform her internal government...." (43)

(47) B. P., V, No. 506.
(48) Ibid., No. 823.
With the crisis over, England's policy continued toward the support of Turkey and the marshalling of the entente's diplomacy toward that end. Sir George Buchanan's statement, "It was....in great measure due to the pressure brought to bear on the Porte by His Majesty's Government, that the Turco-Bulgarian protocol recognizing independence was signed on April 19, 1909",(49) indicates the amount of British influence which obtained over Turkey at the time. But this policy toward Bulgaria was not so much a favor to Russia as it was a part of a larger plan as the following show:

Findlay, the British representative at Sofia reported: "As regards M. Groulich's(Serbian representative to London) suggestion that I should be instructed to drop a hint from time to time that an entente between the Balkan Powers would be viewed with satisfaction by Great Britain, I may observe that in accordance with the verbal instructions received in the course of a conversation at the Foreign Office, which I had the honor of having with you(Grey) before proceeding to Sofia, I took the first opportunity of informing the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government would be glad to see a rapprochement between Bulgaria and Turkey, and the establishment of cordial relations with other Balkan States."

Minutes to the above: "If Turkey can be made so strong as to preclude any Bulgarian and Servian attempts against Macedonia, then Serbia and Bulgaria will not quarrel with each other; since Bulgaria has no wish to see Serbia absorbed by Austria-Hungary and thus get Austria-Hungary for a neighbor, she will support Serbia."

(49)Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and other Diplomatic Memorials(Boston, 1923), I, 80.
Grey’s minute: “This is a sound analysis of the situation.”

Isvolsky adhered to this plan so far as the British believed. But the British plans went awry, and during the next year, England’s influence at the Porte waned, until the British foreign office knew that

(50) P. D., IX, i, No. 59.

But when Servia was too "loua" in her discussions, Grey’s minute was (ibid., No. 58), "The Legation at Belgrade should be instructed if the Servianst talk in this loose way to say we cannot discuss views inconsistent with the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey."

See also, ibid., No. 8, to the effect that King Ferdinand liked King Edward’s telegram of congratulations much better than any other and that the emperor’s (William II) "...was like a cold douche (sic)."

(51) Ibid., No. 29. This document is a memorandum written by Nicolson of a meeting between Isvolsky, Beckendorff, Grey and Nicolson during the last of July, 1909. Nicolson says with regard to Isvolsky’s attitude that: "He cordially agreed that it was of great importance that the new Turkish regime should receive all possible support and sympathy as forming the best bulwark against Teuton or Slav aggression."

See also, ibid., No. 23, minutes by Hardinge and Grey, "We have invariably held during the negotiations last winter (this is July 23, 1909) in matters affecting the interests of Turkey in Bosnia and Bulgaria that we could not press upon the Turkish Government the acceptance of terms which would be to the disadvantage of Turkey."

(52) N. V. Tcharykow, Glimpses of High Politics (New York, 1931), pp. 275ff. This author gives the following reasons for the failure of the entente to be effective in Turkey: (1) England’s demands in the Tigris valley of which the Turks did not approve; (It will be shown later how these demands of Great Britain were related to the Bagdad railway, and the desire to frustrate Germany and her railway by securing other and competing concessions in favor of England alone;); (2) the tsar’s failure to visit Constantinople on his way to Rasenogli; (3) France’s refusal to grant a small loan to the young Turks because they would not permit, in return, the French to control Turkish finances. England also refused this loan to Turkey, and it was finally obtained from a syndicate of German and Austro-
Great Britain, therefore, obtained little from the annexation crisis. Not only did she see Russia forced to step aside, but she finally lost her hold on Turkey. Surely the Russians were not unaware of British politics during this time. Russia was helpless against the British Balkan plan which was only half-Russian. She had Hungarian banks. This marked the beginning of the return of German ascendancy in Turkey, according to Tcharykow.

See also, B. D., IX, i, No. 21, in which Grey said that he would press Russian proposals for Turkey to withdraw her troops in the Turco-Persian boundary dispute if Russia would get out of Persia. See B. D., IV, No. 464, in which Grey stated that he knew that Germany was behind the Turkish government in this dispute as early as 1907.

(53) B. D., IX, i, No. 138; minutes by Grey, Nicolson and Mallet.

See also, Ibid., No. 192, in which it is stated that if Turkey is on the side of Germany in a general war, she would be used against Egypt, and therefore it might be well to support Bulgaria to keep the Turks occupied at home.

See also, Ibid., No. 231, Grey to Nicolson, private, September 11, 1911, saying that Turkey would be asked to turn to Germany and Austria-Hungary to stop Italy; "We must hope that before Italy does anything the Turks will have done something to enable us to give this answer (i.e., that the Turks brought this on themselves because they had not treated Italy right) if the appeal is made to us." England had agreed in 1902 (B. D., I, No. 360) that she had no designs on Tripoli and that Italy, in case of alteration of Tripoli's status should get the preference of such alterations, provided that it did not interfere with British interests.
no reason to support Turkey and if it was at the expense of Turkey that the Balkan peoples were determined to enhance their position, she had no course but to follow along. Insofar as there was an inter-entente contest for leadership, the Servian manifestations against Turkey indicate that perhaps Russia was agreeing with England in conference, but working against her plan in the Balkans.

If Grey is to be given credit for perceiving the bad situation developing in the Balkans and for working almost single-handedly for reform, it should be also mentioned that he did his best to turn the Balkan clamors for territory away from Turkey and British interests and toward the allied central European powers. That his policy failed does not mitigate his responsibility there nor does that fact enhance his stature as a lover of peace, unless it be a British peace. (54)

(54) Trevelyan, op. cit., passim, for the opposite view.
Chapter Four
GREY'S PLAN FOR THE TRIPLE ENTENTE AND THE TRIPLE
ALLIANCE TO NEGOTIATE À DEUX

In his foreign policy prior to the world war, Sir Edward Grey strove continually to avoid the past unpleasant experiences of the British foreign office at the turn of the century. He remembered the disagreeable factors in the policy of Lord Salisbury and of his successor in 1892, Lord Roseberry, which, Grey said, "included an attitude so benevolent toward the Triple Alliance that the French sometimes wrote about the 'Quadruple Alliance'. The German government expressed great satisfaction with this; but the policy got us nowhere; the friction with France and Russia would have meant a war sometime or other with one or the other, and for this, Germany gave nothing, with constant trouble with France and Russia.

"This does not mean that we do not still wish to be friends with Germany. I desire friendship; but it must not be on terms which would involve the old disadvantages."(1)

England had no "fear of the German fleet building program" in that she believed herself incapable of

(1) B. D., VI, appendix V, extract from the minutes of the committee of imperial defense, p. 781ff. See also, ibid., No. 174, minutes by Spicer, Grey, Campbell and Hardinge. See also, ibid., V, No. 567 in which Grey says: "I want a good understanding with Germany, but it must be one which will not imperil those which we have with France and Russia."
keeping ahead of German naval construction; at the same
time, she realized that her army was by no means the
equal of any major power. France and Russia supplied
the equilibrium of land forces. This distribution of
power caused England to hope that Russia would make her-
self strong.

Those men in control of the foreign policy of
Great Britain believed "....that policy and strategical
preparedness must go hand in hand. Failure of such har­
mony must lead either to military disaster, or political
retreat. Our own disasters of 1899 were not sufficiently
great to bring this truth of the lesson home to us in all
its force; that was due to the comparative insignificance
of the enemy. With an enemy like Germany we should have
been in the same predicament as was the French government
when it decided to sacrifice M. Delcasse to placate
Germany."(2) In the same way, England saw Isvolsky back
down in face of the threat of the combined land strength
of Germany and Austria-Hungary during the annexation
 crisis. Nicolson related that Isvolsky was deeply im­
pressed by the fact that Russia was not in a position to
go to war with two powerful neighbors, and that he could
not rely upon Russia's obtaining any effective aid from

(2) B. D., VI, No. 76. This document is followed by
a long minute by Crowe of which the above quotation is
a part. Hardinge and Langley(Asst UNDER-Secretary) both
initialed it. Grey's added minute was:"This no doubt
is the real criticism."
France.(3)

Nicolson, fearful lest his Anglo-Russian agreement should soon expire, wrote to Grey, "The Franco-Russian Alliance has not borne the test, and the Anglo-Russian Entente is not sufficiently strong or sufficiently deep-rooted to have any appreciable influence. The hegemony of the Central Powers will be established in Europe, and England will be isolated.

(3) B. D., V, No. 690. See also, ibid., No. 813, in which Nicolson reported that Isvolsky read him some telegrams from the French which he said indicated clearly that France would not give material support to Russia.

This same document (No. 813) also refers to Cartwright's (at Vienna) position which Isvolsky told Nicolson he believed to be England's, and therefore, without French or English aid, he had to backdown. This curious incident is explained by Cartwright in B. D., V, No. 820: Cartwright asked Aehrenthal if approval of Austria's annexation by each power privately would be satisfactory because he thought that the powers would not approve it officially, and, unless it was approved, Austria would not consent to the mediation proposal. Aehrenthal said he would think it over. Then Russia approved it, but England refused when Germany brought the same pressure to bear at London as at St. Petersburg. If Aehrenthal had believed that he had British assurances, Mensdorff would have mentioned it to Grey, contended Cartwright. See ibid., No. 807, in which Harding wrote to Nicolson an account of what happened in London, part of which is as follows: "Fortunately we were aware that Metternich was going to make the Demarche here which had been made at St. Petersburg and we were ready for him and purposely made our reply somewhat stiff, as we resented German interference in this matter altogether. This had the admiral effect of stiffening France who was rather 'wobbly' in her attitude."

See also, ibid., No. 829, in which Cartwright reported the inner circle of Ballplatz as saying that Isvolsky collapsed before German demands because either Berchtold or Aehrenthal had some of Isvolsky's letters, which, Bulow assured him, would not be published if he would agree to abrogate Article XXV (of the treaty of Berlin); Isvolsky invented the ultimatum to justify his conduct to the emperor and the council of ministers.
'Our entente, I much fear, will languish and possibly die. If it were possible to extend and strengthen it by bringing it nearer to the nature of an alliance, it would be then possible to deter Russia from moving toward Berlin... The ultimate aims of Germany surely are, without doubt, to obtain the preponderance on the continent of Europe, and when she is strong enough, and apparently she is making very strenuous efforts to become so, she will enter on a contest with us for maritime supremacy.... If we could keep France and Russia on our side, it would be well, and if we should contract some kind of an alliance with Russia we should probably also steady France and prevent her from deserting to the Central Powers.'(4)

Grey's answer to Nicolson was, "I do not think it is practicable to change our agreement to alliances; the feeling here about definite commitment to a continental war on unforeseeable conditions would be too dubious to permit us to make an alliance. Russia too must make her internal government less reactionary — till she does, liberal sentiment will not believe that Russia can purge her administration to become a strong and reliable power.'(5)

(4) B. D., V, No. 764.

(5) Ibid., No. 823. See also, No. 860, Hardinge to Nicolson: "A reactionary government in Russia would meet with no sympathy at all in this country, and it would be impossible to draw closer to Russia in any way while such a government was in power."
To have made a political alliance with Russia at this time would have negatived the lesson that the English learned at the turn of the century, viz: that diplomacy must be backed by sufficient force as to be immediately effective. For as Hardinge wrote to Nicolson: "Isvolsky should realize the great advantage of war in the Balkans having been postponed to a later date when Russia may be in a better state of preparation, and I only hope that Russian statesmen will take the recent lesson to heart." (6) Grey intended to keep the entente strong and to work with Russia and France in a diplomatic partnership.

The British government believed that to bargain alone with Germany would be a one-sided affair, in the matters of politics and in the matter of the Bagdad railway. England declined to discuss questions with Germany unless at a conference to include France and Russia. Germany refused to sit in that conference because she would be in the minority. (7) As an alternative, the Germans said they were always ready to discuss with England a terminus on the Persian Gulf, but Grey rejected this proposal because it would mean a quarrel with Russia. (8) Moreover, Grey suspected that Germany would extend no proposition which Russia could accept. Since England would be bound to consider Russia's wishes, Germany

(6) B. D., V, p. 781.
(7) B. D., VI, Nos. 266;277.
(8) Ibid., No. 266, Grey's minute.
would then be in a position in which she could say that London had turned down a friendly offer from Berlin.(9) Interspersed with discussions as to the Bagdad railway were feints between Germany and England for a political understanding. One, advanced by Kiderlen-Waechter in April, 1909, provided that the political entente should make increased naval construction on either side a source of satisfaction rather than suspicion; or, a naval convention by which the two powers were to bind themselves for a fixed period not to make war against each other, to join in no coalition directed against either power, and to observe a benevolent neutrality should either country be engaged in hostilities with any other power or powers. Grey, as well as others in the British foreign office, believed this to be but an invitation to help Germany make a European combination which could be directed against England when Germany saw fit to make use of it.(10)

Shortly afterwards, Germany almost broke through England’s determination to negotiate with France and Russia before making any commitments to Germany. The tempting offer proposed to give England the sole right to build, control and exploit an extension of the Bagdad

(9) B. D., VI, No. 266; Grey's Minute to Metternich’s memorandum.

(10) B. D., V, No. 174.
railway from Bagdad to Basra on the condition that England should no longer oppose the increase of Turkish customs dues. (11) Grey's reaction was: "This is what His Majesty's Government have always demanded and what it is imperative for British interests in Mesopotamia to obtain." (12) Isvolsky said that such an understanding would be against the Anglo-Russian agreement. (13) Nicolson pleaded from St. Petersburg that as valuable as the concession to England would be "...it might prove to be the first rift in the lute on which we and Russia have been playing so harmoniously together." (14) Regardless of the realization that the Bagdad railway would not be stopped and that England should "...get in sometime..." (15), the fear that Russia subsequently would barter complete freedom in northern Persia for a free hand to Germany in the Persian neutral or center zone (16) coupled with Nicolson's counsel which always raised up the German bogey-man, caused Grey to refuse any action on the German proposals until they were dis-

(11) The Bagdad railway was subsidized by the Turkish government; certain payments known as kilometric guarantees were to be made on the completion of each kilometer of the road. A rise in the customs dues would provide more money for construction but the burden would bear most heavily on England, the largest trader in Turkey.

(12) B. P., VI, No. 287
(13) Ibid., No. 288.
(14) Ibid., No. 290.
(15) Ibid., No. 296.
(16) Ibid., Nos. 297; 298; 299.
cussed with France and Russia. (17)

This question continued to vex the powers. As Grey wrote in 1912: "The part of the Railway to the north of Bagdad had not entered into the discussion, our point of view being that we required a controlling influence over the section from Bagdad to the Gulf, and also that our position with regard to Koweit and the Gulf generally should not be disputed. I considered that we were free to secure these things by negotiations with Germany if we could. But just as, when M. Sazonov had concluded his arrangement with Germany last year (18), I said to him that the understanding between us was that he would not agree to an increase of Turkish Customs Duties until we had secured a satisfactory arrangement about the Bagdad Railway; so now, of course, if we did secure a satisfactory arrangement with Germany, we could not give our consent to the increase of the Turkish Customs until France also secured a satisfactory arrangement with Germany.

This had for some time been the understanding between France, Russia, and ourselves: that we should negotiate separately but should not give our consent until we were all satisfied." (19)

(17) B. D., VI, No. 301. See also, No. 302, in which Nicolson reported: "Isvolsky was very pleased with this attitude."

(18) This is a reference to the Potsdam agreement, and see Buchanan, op. cit., I, pp. 93-98, for a detailed discussion of this question.

(19) B. D., VI, No. 514.
This plan of negotiation, seemingly of Grey's brain, apparently evolved by stages. It was truly a diplomatic entente; to the extent that orders were issued from London to the diplomatic corps which forbade the use of the term "triple entente" in official telegrams and despatches when referring to this joint action of England, France and Russia. Its probable inception was at Algeciras; but the negotiations preceding the Anglo-Russian agreement, obviously aided by France; the discussions in the fall of 1907 with regard to the Bagdad railway; Grey's quick action when it seemed to him that Germany was pulling Russia away from France in the Baltic and North seas discussions; and the negotiations during the Bosnian crisis all pointed to this system or mode of tripartite communication between the three entente powers. When Grey refused to consider an alliance with Russia after the Bosnian crisis, he intended to accomplish just as much by the use of the diplomatic entente without restricting England's freedom of action. Moreover, the Russian government was not reliable and it needed strengthening, according to Grey; a fortiori, the Russian army could not be depended upon. England could and did rely upon her own navy and upon her own ability to outbuild any other power in naval effectives; therefore, she would find her-

(20) B. D., IX, 1, No. 7. These orders were issued April 30, 1909.
self, if she contracted a political alliance with Russia, committed to the use of her dependable navy to sustain an unreliable army.

To digress, England never wholly understood the attitude of the kaiser with regard to the relative merits of the German and English navies. The German and the Englishman told each other on the one hand of the fears of invasion and on the other hand of the fears of the fleet-building program. The English knew that their army was inferior to that of Germany, but when Goschen observed to the kaiser that "...Germany was so strong by land and by sea that England must bestir herself if she was not to be left behind", the kaiser disagreed. His reply was, "No! No! you are quite wrong about that...I am not the strong man; you must look elsewhere for him." In his report to Grey, Goschen asked, "Can he mean that the King's navy is so much stronger than his that we needn't make a fuss about the Germans' attempts to compete?" (22) Goschen answered his own question: "To my mind it is absolutely necessary to make them (Germans) respect us as a naval power whose supremacy they cannot dispute. If we depart from that principle they will not think us worth conciliating and our relations will get worse than ever." (23) As a corollary

---

(21) For instance, see an amusing report of Lascelles' conversation with Bulow on this subject in 1904, B. D., III, No. 65a.

(22) B. D., VI, No. 328.

(23) Ibid., No. 408.
Grey said, "No understanding with Germany would be appreciated here unless it meant an arrest of the increasing of naval expenditure." (24)

Any discussion of a general political agreement between England and Germany, which would have settled the naval building race, invariably brought forth a complete set of minutes, similar to the following (25):

"This was Bismarck's idea of foreign policy: 'make yourself very strong; then show to those powers which are not willing to submit to you, how disagreeable it is to be opposed by Germany, this will induce such Powers to come to terms and accept German leadership.'

"Bismarck's policy on these lines invariably failed. His successes were due to crushing victories won in war. But German statesmen still believe in his prescription: Witness the attempts to win over France, and, quite lately, Russia."

E.A.C.

"To France and Russia add Great Britain".
W. L.

"A combination of England, Germany, and Austria would not be durable since it would imply the domination of Germany in Europe, and would inevitably end in war between Germany and England, the latter Power being in a position of complete isolation and without even the sympathy of any of the Powers."

G. H.

"Yes; if we sacrifice the other Powers to Germany we shall eventually be attacked."
E. G.
H. H. A.

(24) B. D., VI, No. 344, Grey's minute.
(25) Ibid., No. 169, minutes.
Obviously, any agreement with Germany would indeed be difficult to accomplish. There was need, however, of an arrangement which would be compatible with the requirements of Great Britain and her two friends, France and Russia; a formula which would not fetter England's freedom of action nor disturb the minds of France and Russia. One of Grey's minutes seemed to provide the necessary and new idea: "It strikes me at first sight that if any general political understanding is to be arranged it should be one not between two powers alone but between the two great groups of powers, ourselves, France and Russia on the one side, and the Triple Alliance on the other."(26)

During the following year (1910), the discussions between England and Germany for a mutual agreement continued. These negotiations were shadowed by the idea of the two groups of powers participating in a political understanding. A political understanding with Germany without the approval of France and Russia was out of the question. Kiderlen-Waechter had told Goschen in utmost confidence that France and Russia might be asked to join the naval program. If Germany should ask that France and Russia be taken into the naval agreement, it would be the opportune time for England to try to include them in a general political

(26) B. D., vi, Grey's minute to No. 187.
understanding along the lines suggested by Grey. (27)

Goschen, in writing to Nicolson on October 28, 1910, said, "I don't think anything of Kiderlen's last idea if it is only confined to a naval agreement. France and Russia would not like to see Germany's mind eased as to her navy so that she could turn all her attention to building up enormous land power...."

"It will, however, as Sir Edward Grey says, be a splendid test of Germany's real aspirations when we see how a proposal should such have to be made to extend the idea to a general agreement to which France and Russia and even the other Triplus Powers should be parties, is received by the Imperial Government. In this sense Kiderlen's hinted idea, whatever its scope may be, will be of the greatest service...." (28)

The naval negotiations were interrupted first by the general election of 1910 in England and then by the Agadir crisis. (29) Grey's idea of the two great groups of powers negotiating à deux then advanced another step. As obvious as it was desirable, Grey must have seen clearly that England was the leading member of the triple entente. He was the director of the foreign affairs of that leader. On the continent, Kiderlen-

(27) B. D., VI, No. 403. The kaiser told Goschen that he could not weaken his plan on land or sea because he needed protection against France, England and Russia. Kiderlen's statement to Goschen was in explanation of the kaiser's conversation with Goschen. See idem, bottom p. 537.

(28) Ibid., No. 408.

(29) Ibid., No. 495.
Waechter, in the triple alliance, was Grey's counterpart. So close did these two become that during the Agadir crisis of 1911, Kiderlen-Waechter prevailed upon Grey to cancel fleet maneuvers so that the German and English fleets would not meet at Molde. Otherwise, the kaiser, as admiral of both fleets would have had an opportunity to join them together in one big naval display, — a celebration which would have delighted him — and thereby caused the "quidnuncs" to ask innumerable questions, and to disrupt allies and friends. (30)

This unusual mode of international negotiation had its repercussions in both of England's entente friends, which became marked as England and Germany resumed their discussion in 1912. To allay suspicions in Russia of an untoward friendliness with Germany, Grey wrote to Buchanan at St. Petersburg to inform the minister of foreign affairs in confidence that the conversations with Germany concerning naval expenditures were being resumed. Grey justified his actions by saying that France and Russia had both made agreements with Germany and that it was now England's turn. (31)

Nicolson, who believed whole-heartedly in closest relations with France and Russia, and who also believed that only England could keep Germany from securing the

(30) B. D., VII, Nos: 632 to 638, inclusive.
(31) B. D., VI, No. 495.
hegemony of Europe(32), sent Grey a minute as follows:

"I am afraid that we are rapidly arriving at a very critical moment in our future relations with France, and consequently, indirectly with Russia. The French Government are uneasy and unless we can unequivocably assure them that we retain our complete liberty of action in any possible eventualities, I fear that their confidence in us may wane even to the extent of seriously impairing our relations — and such a result would at once react on our relations with Russia."(33)

Any success in settling the affairs of the two blocs of powers by direct negotiations between the two leaders depended upon the amount of control each leader could exert upon its partners. England's influence over Russia, it was felt, would be destroyed if the reactionaries regained power. A reactionary government would mean revolution, it was thought, with no sympathy from the English electorate for any agreement, entente or alliance with such a government. Moreover, the reactionaries were, in the main, Anglophobic and pro-Germanic.

The men in Russian affairs upon whom the British foreign office depended as friends of England were Isvolsky, Stolypin and later Sazonov, and the tsar.

(32) B. D., IX, 1, No. 108.

(33) B. D., VI, No. 566, Nicolson's minute to Grey, April 4, 1912. See also, ibid., No. 575, in which Nicolson reiterates the thoughts in No. 566, bringing into the argument that an unfriendly Russia meant trouble in Middle Asia.
Isvolsky, however, after the annexation crisis and after he was appointed ambassador to France, became a source of irritation to both the British and the French. During the Agadir crisis, his actions at Paris were very undiplomatic. While the tsar and Benckendorff were both assuring Paris and London that Russia would stand by her obligations to France, Isvolsky told Gambon and Selves that France naturally could not expect more from Russia than France and England had given Russia during the annexation crisis. He then suggested mediation by Francis Joseph, which, of course, France could not accept. (34)

The British began to have some fear for the entente, when Isvolsky's attitude at Paris seemed to coincide with the tsar's coldness to Buchanan at St. Petersburg. (35)

(34) B. D., VII, Nos. 507; 508. Even Benckendorff told London it was hard to work up spirit for a war because Russia had no interest in Morocco.

See also, ibid., No. 504, in which Bertie (at Paris) wrote to Grey: "Isvolsky will not be long for this Parisian world, if he continues to make such suggestions not only to the French Government but to many others as admission of Germany to a share in the Morocco cake, and the reference to Russia or the Emperor of Austria as arbitrators of the difficulties between France and Germany."

(35) Ibid., No. 508. Compare this with Nos. 501; 506. Buchanan wrote from St. Petersburg: "It was curious that on the very day which Isvolsky made the Demarche to Selves (French foreign minister) I should have thought that the Tsar did not wish to speak to me and purposely avoided me." But see also and compare, Buchanan, op. cit., I, 170-171, where Buchanan mentions the incident and explains that he was invited to dinner in honor of the King of Serbia so that he could meet Prince Arthur of Carnaught, who, for some reason, did not attend; Buchanan was the only ambassador there, and this circumstance caused the tsar so much embarrassment that he kept aloof from Buchanan.
A few days later, Isvolsky's position became relatively unimportant when Bertie at Paris explained that the French foreign office had been reassured by St. Petersburg of Russia's determination to adhere to her commitments. (36) England then interfered with Caillaux's negotiations and blundered into successfully preserving the entente from any possible disruption. (37)

In the meantime, Russia had conversed with Germany upon the matters of Turkey, Persia and the Bagdad railway. Sazonov was the negotiator during these conversations which resulted in the Potsdam agreement of 1911. (38) In this instance Grey failed to keep the entente together. The precise point about which the Anglo-Russian tension centered was Sazonov's approval of a rise in the Turkish customs dues. (39) The question of Turkish customs dues was a lever in their hands, as Grey called it, with which

(36) B. D., VII, No. 554.

(37) Trevelyan, op. cit., pp. 256-57; B. D., VII, appendix, memorandum by Crowe. It is obvious that England had three reasons for interfering in this instance, (1) to keep Germany from getting a port in the Mediterranean; (2) to keep Germany from breaking the entente; (3) to help France. England's interference here was the cause of much Anglo-German tension. The British foreign office speculated as to the attitude they should take toward Germany after the incident was closed. They could assume an attitude of dignified reserve, or they could use the incident to inaugurate a rapprochement. Following the latter plan would have meant that Kiderlen-Waechter's plan would succeed, so the British chose the attitude of dignified reserve.

(38) Buchanan, op. cit., I, 93-98; Trevelyan, op. cit., pp. 268-69.

(39) B. D., VI, No. 514; appendix vi, pp. 781ff.
to exert pressure on Germany and to secure good terms
with her (40) to the British mind, Sazonov had shortened
the lever by one third.

Grey was especially embittered by Sazonov's failure
to cooperate in this with England. He felt that Sazonov
had violated the understanding among the entente powers
mutually to approve, prior to its actual consummation,
any pending agreement with Germany. In April of 1910,
Grey had carefully confided to Russia the nature of
England's negotiations with Germany on the same question.
England had been trying to obtain another door to the
Mesopotamian valley besides the Bagdad railway, which
she thought she could secure from Turkey in the form of
a concession in the Tigris valley. At the same time,
she left Germany under the delusion that she was still
considering Germany's general proposal which included
an adjustment of Persian as well as Turkish interests.
Had England obtained this concession, its development
would have seriously impaired the value of the Bagdad
railway. Russia must have recognized that her bargain-
ing power regarding the Bagdad railway would have been
lessened considerably as soon as Germany discovered Eng-
land's true design. Sazonov's negotiations with Germany,
then, were hardly less than a boomerang to England of her

(40) B. D., VI, No. 266, Grey's minute.
own duplicity toward Germany. (41)

From the Bosnian crisis until the year 1912, England had directed the entente with utmost care. To France, in times of stress, she had given her greatest support. She had supported Russia with more caution and with no promises of material aid or armed force. England was not ready to fight for Russian interests. As the British knew well enough, force and the will to use it effectively is the true persuasive factor in diplomacy. England had given Russia no assurances of material aid when diplomacy had failed to gain its point, and in turn, had asked none of Russia.

England had given Russia diplomatic support in the annexation crisis, but at the expense to Russia of postponing the Straits question and of supporting Turkey in a scheme that had little of Russian interests in it. British interests during the crisis were sizable. She hoped for certain benefits from a friendly Turkey, and at the same time, she concentrated Russian efforts upon Balkan matters. Moreover, had Grey's scheme in the Balkans succeeded, Pan-slavism would have directed its efforts entirely against Austrian rather than against Turkish interests.

Russian and Slavic interests in the Balkans were inevitably opposed to Turkey's. Although England's as-

(41) B. P., VI, No. 344; and minutes.
Cendancy failed in Turkey when she tried to push through the Tigris valley concession and Germany regained her influential position at the Porte, the maintenance of Turkey against Slav aggression was still in her policy. Her intrigues in the Balkans for a Turkish-Slav-Bulgarian understanding having failed, she would naturally endeavor to retain a commanding position there through other means. An excellent method would be to sponsor a concert of powers well buttressed by appeals to the public for maintaining peace. Moreover, Russia had disregarded the entente's policy in the Potsdam negotiations while the Pan-Slav agitation against Turkey was also contrary to British plans in the Balkans. Therefore, in both these instances it would be necessary for England to appeal for the action of the powers generally if she wished to maintain her leadership; and this was especially so since Grey's plan for the two blocs of powers to negotiate à deux had not worked successfully.
Chapter Five

THE CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS AT LONDON

The triple entente extended to the Near East in only a very loose way. Of the three powers, Russia had the most direct interest in Turkey, and through the Pan-Slav ideas, in the Balkans. But Russia continually vacillated between one policy and another and never seemed able to arrive at a definite course to follow in either place. Isvolsky had failed to solve the Straits question by diplomacy and almost precipitated a war. Sazonov's diplomatic attempts with regard to the same question were also unsuccessful. Both Sazonov and Isvolsky became entangled in Balkan questions in trying to solve the Straits problem. French interests in Turkey were for the most part financial, and France had no desire to see those interests impaired. Moreover, France did not appear to favor Russian aims in the Balkans. England was in part responsible for the failure of the Russian plans to gain control of the Straits. But other questions, not entirely removed from that of the Straits, were occupying the British foreign office at the same time.

Italy was disturbing the status quo of the Mediterranean by her attack upon Tripoli. The Balkans were ever increasing their unrest. A second Moroccan crisis shaded the European horizon. Into all this, Sazonov and
Toharykov, the Russian ambassador at Constantinople, began their diplomatic soundings for a solution of the Straits problem. The British foreign office first heard about Russia's step on October 16, 1911, through the Turkish government, which feared that Russia would seize the Straits. Grey immediately called to his subordinates for information as to what assurances he had given Isvolsky on the one hand and Turkey on the other in 1908.(1)

A few days later, the British were shocked to hear from Cambon that Tcharykov had told the Turks both England and France supported his plan. The plan included a Russian guarantee of Turkish integrity with Russia's use of the Straits in order to perform the guarantee.(2) Grey telegraphed to both St. Petersburg and Constantinople that he would stand by his assurances to Isvolsky in 1908, but that he would do nothing more without consulting his colleagues.(3) Soon thereafter, Turkey offered to make an alliance with England alone. Grey declined on the grounds that Turkey was at war with Italy; but he informed both France and Russia of the incident, omitting to say that the offer was for an alliance, and expressed the hope that the idea could be broached again after the end of the Turko-Italian war.(4)

(1) B. D., IX, 1, No. 284.
(2) B. D., IX, 1, No. 289.
(3) Ibid., No. 291.
(4) Ibid., appendix iv, pp. 779-81.
When Sazonov requested French support for his plan, to have "...la liberté d'action de la Russie dans les régions avaisant les Détroits...", the French agreed but desired to sound London first. Grey gave a dilatory answer, saying that he would need time to examine it. Sazonov finally discarded the idea.

While England was stopping Russia's moves toward a control of Turkey through the domination of the Straits,

---


This problem is very intricate. Apparently Tcharykov was well liked in Turkey and advocated a Turkish-Russian rapprochement, whereas Sazonov was turning back to traditional Russian policy toward Turkey. Moreover, Sazonov was favoring Italy at the time. Tcharykov blamed the French for Sazonov's change of attitude on the Straits question (B. D. F., 3rd series, I, Nos. 436; 439; 53; 349; ibid., II, No. 198.). Italy was threatening to attempt to force the Straits and actually did exchange a few shots with Turkish forts. Turkey made an official request as to the attitude of the powers with regard to the closing of the Straits. Sazonov wanted the powers to say that Turkey could not close the Straits under any circumstances. Grey thought this not necessary, although he agreed with Sazonov that Turkey could not take defensive measures which would close the Straits (B. D., IX, 1, Nos. 325; 330; 331; 332). Sazonov, on December 11, 1911, made a statement to the press to the effect that raising the question of opening the Straits would serve no purpose (ibid., Nos. 345; 346; 347; 348). Tcharykov had failed.

For those who insist upon England's and Grey's great respect for treaties and lawful methods, see, B. D., IX, 1, No. 332, minutes: "Treaty or no Treaty I think our interest in the grain trade and commercial shipping connected with the Black Sea is such that we could not stand the Black Sea trade being stopped by this wretched war." See also, idem, minute by the legal adviser to the foreign office that a formal opinion from the law officers should not be requested because if they gave the correct opinion it might be embarrassing from the political point of view to His Majesty's Government. Grey did not consult the law officers.
the Balkan problem was becoming more involved. Tscharykov's pro-Turkish policy at Constantinople tended to drive Bulgaria toward Austria. At the same time, Russia, through Hartwig in Serbia, was encouraging that state's ambitions. Grey was apprehensive of Russia's policy in the Balkans. For England to take the initiative in opposing Austria would be a mistake. To propose a Balkan policy to Russia would commit England too deeply in Balkan affairs. Therefore, the only alternative was to wait until Russia would come to a decision.(6)

Grey hoped for a working understanding between Austria and Russia, although he had no desire to oppose the wishes of France. The working agreement, however, resulting from an Austro-Russian understanding would be encouraged only if all the powers were parties to it.(7) This conclusion was based on the thought that England could not intervene on the Russian side in the Balkan war; therefore Grey preferred to see Austria and Russia work together rather than to war against each other.(8)

The British found the Russian policy in the Balkans the antithesis of their hopes. The Grey policy throughout the annexation crisis, and later, had been for a rapprochement between Russia and Turkey and the

---

(6) B. D., IX, i, No. 528, Grey's minute.

(7) Ibid., No. 552, minutes. Sazonov kept Poincare badly informed about Russian schemes (Fay, op. cit., I, 115).

(8) B. D., IX, i, No. 537.
Balkans, particularly Bulgaria. Tcharykov had been fostering this line at Constantinople. His recall in March, 1912, coincided with the formation of the Balkan alliance, which was anti-Turkish in its objectives. Both the recall and the alliance were regretted at the British foreign office. (9)

When Grey first heard about the Russian sponsorship of the Balkan alliance, he was perturbed: "We shall have to keep out of this and what I fear is that Russia will resent our doing so: The fact that the trouble is all of her own making won't prevent her from expecting help if the trouble turns out to be more than she bargained for. On the other hand, Russia would resent still more our attempting to restrain her now in a matter that she would at this stage say did not concern us." (10)

Throughout the summer of 1912, the Balkan question continued to absorb Anglo-Russian diplomacy. As Grey had predicted, Sazonov began to be alarmed by September at the situation which he himself had done so much to create. (11) His visit to England during the latter part of September was hailed by the Russian press with great satisfaction and approval. After he returned to Russia, the press, as expressing public opinion, took the stand

---

(9) B. D., IX, 1, No. 383, minutes.


(11) B. D., IX, 1, No. 694, minutes.
that the triple entente did not support Russia. England was severely criticized for her apparent unwillingness to exert pressure upon Turkey for fear of compromising herself in the eyes of her Mohammedan subjects.(12)

But Grey himself was somewhat surprised at Sazonov's attitude while in England. He expected to be asked to follow a very strong pro-Balkan and anti-Turk policy; instead, Sazonov was very emphatic about the need of putting strong pressure on the Balkan states. As a consequence, there was no question of supporting him in a pro-Slav policy. Nicolson's and Grey's minutes are(13), however, very interesting in this regard. Nicolson said: "We shall have before long to make up our minds whether we will take up the Balkan cause in cooperation with Russia, and risk offending our Moslem opinion and Turkey; or whether to placate the latter, we shall imperil the Triple Entente and probably break it." Grey's minute in answer was: "...there was...no question then(at Balmoral) of supporting him in a pro-Slav policy for he did not advocate it or seem to think it would be the Russian policy. If it becomes Russia's policy, much will depend on the circumstances under which the policy is declared. It may co-incide with an outburst of feeling in the same direction here." (!)

(12) R. R., IX, 1, No. 802; 811.
(13) Ibid., No. 811.
The British found themselves being drawn into the same dilemma as that of the annexation crisis. On the one hand, the preservation of the entente was of utmost importance. As Nicolson frequently said, the Anglo-Russian understanding was more vital to England than to Russia. A break in the relations between the two would give Russia a free hand throughout Asia. This would naturally mean repercussions in the whole Mohammedan world, no less than in India. It was a worse thing, thought Nicolson, than Britain's failure to support the Turkish cause outright. On the other hand, to break off with Russia would mean great difficulties in the maintenance of friendly relations with France. England would then be the supplicant for German support which would not be useful throughout Asia and which would isolate England. (14) Grey, therefore, told Benkendorff that England was quite ready and willing to associate with Russia in all matters concerning the Balkans but that he hoped that Russia would not unnecessarily excite the Moslems. If the Turks won out against the Balkan allies, he would support Russia in insisting that the status quo be maintained and also that the Turks grant some reforms. If, however, the Allies won, he could not see them cut out of their gains. (15) This rather simple statement of policy toward Russia and her aims in the Balkans was not complicated by the success

(14) B. D., IX, 11, No. 57.
(15) Ibid., No. 91.
of Bulgaria and Russia's desire to prevent any power from obtaining an ascendant position in the environs of Constantinople.

As the Balkan war progressed, and the Bulgarians were pushing on towards Constantinople, Russia began to fear that the Bulgarians would by force of arms gain a commanding position of the Straits, a position which Russia had been attempting to gain since the time of Catherine the Great. Russia did not want Bulgaria to capture even Adrianople. Sazonov threatened independent Russian action if Adrianople fell. Later he said Bulgaria could have Adrianople, on the condition that the fortifications be torn down. Grey repeatedly affirmed that Russian protests and threats were useless as long as the fighting continued. Finally the Bulgarians declared that they had no intention of keeping Constantinople even if they captured it. (16)

Sazonov maintained that if Constantinople fell, Russia would have to send part of the Black Sea fleet to guarantee Russian interests there, and insisted that the sultan remain in Constantinople and in control of the surrounding territories. Nicolson's personal opinion favored this plan. (17) Grey, on the other hand, thought that the neutralizing of Constantinople, making it a free port was a possible solution. Nicolson was against the

(16) B. D., IX, 11, Nos. 85; 88; 102; 109; 122; 130.
(17) Ibid., No. 135.
internationalization of the environs of Constantinople. (18) He appeared to be making the choice in favor of the entente with Russia rather than in favor of Turkey, although he agreed with Grey that the Serbian-Austrian question was the kernel of the difficulty in that, "...to me (Nicolson) it is clear that Austria cannot, and from her point of view, should not, permit Servia to establish herself in any shape or form on the Adriatic." (19) Grey initialed Nicolson’s minute. Russia was, however, attempting to protect her future interests in Constantinople from Bulgaria, while encouraging Bulgaria’s ally, Servia. But the “Great Serb” idea was clearly anti-Austrian. Grey said that Sazonov had managed things badly; he should have laid down at the beginning the condition that if Servia obtained some territory, she would have to be content with commercial access to a free port on the Adriatic. Instead of that, according to Grey, he let Involsky and Hartwig talk nonsense to Servia about an Adriatic port which no one could support. (20)

Grey’s policy from the beginning had been cautious. He had been unwilling to make a clear decision between Russia and Turkey, and between support to Russia’s policy in the Balkans and the entente. Germany also faced a dilemma when this trouble started. She could not support

---

(18) B. D., IX, 11, No. 143, minute; Ed. note, (3); cf. No. 135.

(19) Ibid., No. 176, minutes.

(20) Ibid., No. 221.
Turkey against Italy for fear of detaching the latter from the triple alliance; nor could she support Italy against Turkey and jeopardize German standing there. (21) When the Balkan wars broke out, matters were made more complicated. Neither England nor Germany wanted war. After the entente had become more solid, Grey had conceived the idea of the two groups of powers negotiating à deux. During the Agadir crisis, the idea of cooperation between Grey and Kiderlen-Waechter had been used successfully. (22) It is not strange, therefore, that the two men again came to an agreement in this new situation. (23)

Although Grey was cooperating with Germany, the task of keeping the entente together as well as preventing a war became increasingly difficult. Russia requested both England and France to say a "moderating" word to Servia, because Russia's position made it very "...difficult for her to exercise moral pressure on Serbia." Even Nicolson was irritated at this and noted: "Have we not said enough? Servia is bluffing." (24)

Russia also was representing at Belgrade that the French and British governments would not support the claim of Servia on the Adriatic. Cambon took Benckendorff to task

(21) Oswald Henry Wedel, Austro-German Diplomatic Relations, 1908-1914 (Stanford University, 1932), pp. 141-42.

(22) Supra, p. 83ff.

(23) Wedel, op. cit., p. 156ff.

(24) B. D., IX, 11, No. 177, minutes.
about it. French public opinion would not support force to put Servia on the Adriatic, but he had made no announcement of that fact, said Cambon.(25)

Although France and Russia were quarreling between themselves, both were anxious to know what England would do in the event of a general European war. Grey said to Benckendorff that Germany's declaration to stand by Austria's side was for Servia's benefit; but unofficially and personally, it was conceivable (did Benckendorff take this to mean, probable?) that Germany would stay out if France and England did.(26) To Cambon, Grey said that it depended upon whether or not public opinion was aroused, and that it would not be aroused if Servia provoked Austria. If, however, Austria attacked Servia without justification, the question would then depend upon the German attitude. Generally, public opinion would demand that France, Germany and England keep out of trouble.(27)

Public opinion was an important factor for all the powers to consider. The British were compelled to court it assiduously. The public would not permit either France or England to foster the plans of Russia in the Balkans or in Turkey so far as the use of force was concerned. Therefore, public opinion and the necessity to support the entente and also to keep Russia in line, all

(25) B. D., IX, 11, No. 218.
(27) Ibid., No. 328.
seemed to find satisfaction in an ambassadors' conference in which the perplexing and daily problems could be discussed by all the powers together. Moreover, a conference of this nature seemed to be the last logical step of Grey's idea that the two great groups of powers negotiate à deux. Since the proposal came from Grey, it was quite natural that the conference should sit in London. Poincare, however, seemed to have expressed the desire to make Paris the meeting place, where he would preside. Austria did not want the conference to be held in the capital of Russia's ally and preferred London. It was suggested, in order to assuage the French amour propre that Cambon preside in the event of Grey's absence. (28)

The conference did meet and did excellent work (29), but it was Grey's position together with aid from France which enabled the British to hold Russia in line. When Sazonov criticized Germany's apparent friendship with England, and gave as a reason that it was inspired by the German desire to neutralize the British fleet in the event of hostilities, Grey told Benckendorff plainly that the German government was genuinely interested in a settlement

(28) B. D., IX, 11, No. 339. See also, Spender, op. cit., p. 450. This author says that Grey wanted the conference in Paris but Poincare was against it because he did not want Isvolsky to be in a position to influence it, but see Friedrich Stiege, Isvolsky and the World War (New York, 1926), passim.

and had exerted pressure on Austria to make concessions; and that while the official German attitude was to support Austria in a war, this would depend upon reasonable Austrian concessions for the sake of peace. Grey then said that if war broke out between Austria and Russia, he would try to make England, France and Germany stand aside; if this failed, he could not say what would happen but it seemed "...unreasonable and intolerable that the greater part of Europe should be involved in war for a dispute about one or two towns on the Albanian frontier." (30)

Grey's statement, together with the general trend, apparently had its effect upon Sazonov, so that the Russian government was more tractable in regard to the question of Scutari and authorized a demonstration by an international squadron. Although Grey was unusually forceful on the question of a war over the Balkans, he instructed the British squadron which was cooperating to enforce the international blockade at Antivari to stay in close contact with the French. (31)

Grey's policy in this regard is explained in the French attitude with respect to Turkey and Constantinople. Toward the end of March, 1913, the Bulgarians were again threatening Constantinople. Cambon told Grey that France could not permit Russia to go to Constantinople alone, as

(30) R. D., IX, 11, No. 626.
(31) Ibid., No. 817.
Sazonov was threatening, if the Bulgarians succeeded in capturing it. (32) Some days later, Grey told Poklevsky, secretary of the Russian embassy at London, that he had nothing to propose if the Bulgarians entered Constantinople. As far as he could judge, it would be better for Russia to act alone. If, however, the question of the Straits was raised, England would be bound by the agreement made with Isvolsky in 1908. (33)

On April 12, France proposed that an international fleet be sent to Besika Bay. The next day, Sazonov made it known that he did not want an international fleet sent there and Grey was able to reply that England had fallen into line as cautiously as possible only because the French had told him that the Russians had accepted the proposal. (34)

After the Scutari issue was settled by the conference of ambassadors in which Austria prevailed in that the city was to be included in the newly created Albania, the Serbo-Montenegrin combination had to be forced to give up Scutari in order to give effect to the decision of the powers. (35) The problem was difficult. Russia agreed that the decision of the powers should prevail but that it should be enforced by pacific pressure. Buchanan

(32) B. P., IX, 11, No. 783.

(33) Ibid., No. 815. Grey also said that since the question of Constantinople was not raised in his conversations with Isvolsky, this matter would have to be duly discussed before he could give any opinion.

(34) Ibid., No. 843.

was of the opinion that any serious loss of Montenegrin blood as a result of Austrian action would precipitate a war because the Russian government could not hold back against the consequent demands of Russian public opinion and would be forced to act. (36) Grey telegraphed to St. Petersburg for Sazonov's last word as to how far Austria could go. Sazonov replied that even restricted Austrian action would cause the Russian government great difficulties, but if such action were not confined to Scutari, he could not answer for the consequences. (37)

Grey then called together both the French and Russian ambassadors and they agreed that the action by the naval officers of the international fleet to take over the town would be proper. (38) The Montenegrins, however, were adamant at first; but eventually they permitted the troops of the powers to occupy Scutari. (39)

With the issue at Scutari finally under control, the Balkan nations began to fight among themselves. In this, London had no particular interest until Russia began to threaten Turkey. The Turkish government decided to profit by the situation of war which was going on between her former enemies. Servia, disappointed in not getting a port of her own on the Adriatic, demanded a revision of the spoils she and her allies had won from

(36) B. P., IX, 11, No. 928. (38) Ibid., No. 953.
Turkey. Bulgaria, refusing the tsar's summons to settle the matter peacefully, attacked her former allies. With Bulgaria's back turned toward the Porte, Turkish troops during the first part of July began a slow advance toward Adrianople.(40)

Russia objected strenuously to this action by Turkey, and on July 18, called upon all the powers to inform Turkey that she must not advance beyond the line fixed by the treaty of London.(41) But Russia also had other plans besides her concern over Turkey's advance into territory Bulgaria had conquered. From the first of the year, Russian troops had been concentrating in the Caucasus, next door to the Turkish Armenian vilayets.(42) The Germans were very much alive to the possibilities of the situation, and told Grey that if any partitioning was to be indulged in, Germany was going to have her share.(43)

By April, rumors were flying fast around the Turkish capital. It was reported that Germany intended to take Cilicia; that Russia had her eyes fixed on Armenia; that France would seize Syria; and that even Austria-Hungary would ask for something. Turkey then asked England to lend her some British administrative inspectors.

(40) B. D., IX, ii, No. 1139. See R. W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914 (New York, 1937), pp. 639 ff. This author says Grey's attitude was negative as to the Third Balkan war because he seemed to be more interested in carrying out the decision of the conference with regard to Albanian boundaries; but see Wedel, op. cit., p. 162, that Mensdorff had to point Albania out to Grey on a map in November, 1912.

(41) B. D., IX, ii, No. 1160. (43) Ibid., No. 477.

(42) B. D., X, i, No. 476.
for the Armenian provinces (another rumor suggested that this request was a German inspiration). The English began preening themselves with thoughts like the following: We are the only power which could undertake the duties (reforms) and carry them through successfully; we are the only power which would be allowed by the other powers to undertake it, as it is recognized that we have no territorial or political ambitions in these provinces; This proposal offers the only opportunity we ever had of doing anything for the Armenians and we must not shirk it or our prestige will suffer abroad and we will be criticized at home. (44) But Sazonov had no idea of letting the British participate in the performance of Russia's "duty" to the Armenians; she could not "... let the other powers take the lead, while she herself played second violin." When Buchanan appeared astonished that Sazonov could have any apprehensions toward British officers, Sazonov said that they would doubtlessly be Anglo-Indian, and he knew what they were. (45) Sazonov suggested that an autonomous Armenia be created. Grey immediately aligned himself with Germany and France against this proposal. It would have been but the first step to partitioning all of Asiatic Turkey. (46)

The question of Armenian reforms, however, gave Russia the excuse to threaten occupation of the Turkish

(44) B. D., X., 1, No. 479. (45) Ibid., No. 494.

(46) Ibid., No. 511; minutes; Nos. 535;536; minutes. This question dragged on throughout the rest of the year. France, with financial interests in Turkey, rallied to England's side.
territory south of the Caucasus when Turkish troops seemed about to march into Thrace. Russia categorically stated that she would take unilateral action if the Turkish army advanced any farther. Sazonov berated the French for their attitude and especially for their permitting the French banks to advance funds to Turkey. France, on the other hand, would not permit Russia to go alone against Turkey. England would agree that the powers should make representations in concert at the Porte that Turkish troops should advance no farther. Germany refused to do this, but suggested that each power should privately urge Turkey to discontinue the advance. England did not approve the German suggestion because she feared that she would appear to be taking the lead against Turkey. (47)

On August 6, Sazonov said that the Russian government had made its decision but would not say what it was. Grey replied that in this case, England retained "...entire liberty of action." Buchanan told Sazonov that Russia must remember that England had taken into account the Moslem feeling in India, which had to be. Sazonov then asked that the entente powers break off

Germany and England worked together also, except that Germany refused to act in concert with the powers at Constantinople to make Turkey grant reforms and England would not "...put herself conspicuously forward." Turkey finally established reforms in Armenia along the Russian plan and selected two Belgians as inspectors-general for the eastern vilayets. Actually, there was little accomplished (1914; Nos. 543 to 595).

(47) B. D. IX, ii, Nos. 1163; 1173, Minutes; 1175; 1176; 1179; 1180, Minutes.
diplomatic relations with Turkey. Both England and France refused. (48) On August 20, Sazonov told Buchanan that he had the tsar's permission to recall the Russian ambassador from Constantinople even if France and England did not cooperate. That afternoon, Sazonov received a telegram from Constantinople that Turkey would recall troops which had penetrated Bulgarian territory. Sazonov said that there was then no reason to give effect to the measures sanctioned by the tsar. (49)

The tension was relieved and the Turkish threat to Bulgaria subsided, but throughout this crisis, Russia saw both partners of the entente refuse to follow her lead. It is apparent that Grey refused to choose Russia and to drop Turkey, although the issue, in view of the French pro-Turkish attitude, was not clear cut. Friedrich Stieve, in his book, Isvolsky and the World War, contends that Sazonov by his threatened invasion of Armenia was actually attempting to gain control of the Straits by this roundabout method. The refusal of England and France to cooperate forced Sazonov inevitably to the conclusion that the objective could be obtained only by a European war. (50)

(48) B. D., IX, 11, Nos. 1205; 1227; 1228.

(49) Ibid., No. 1247. How far England was responsible for Turkey's capitulation is not clear. See, ibid., Nos. 1248; 1249. At least, Grey was urging Turkey not to provoke Russia, but in view of Germany's refusal to cooperate in concert with the powers, British pressure on Turkey was probably not too strong (ibid., No. 1247, minutes).

(50) Stieve, op. cit., p. 191, and passim.
This conclusion, however, fails to take into consideration the German interests in Turkey. The point is moot, but had England and France acquiesced in Sazonov's moves, a general war would have been probable. Austria could have asked for no better opportunity to solve the Servian problem.

British policy toward Russia during this period must be considered in connection with Grey's position as the leader of the conference of ambassadors in London. Great Britain had become the center of European politics, at least in British eyes. While Grey worked for peace, it was still a British peace.

During and after the annexation crisis, Grey had worked toward an alliance between Turkey, Russia and Bulgaria in order that Russian and Balkan policies would be directed away from Turkey and Constantinople. Grey had failed in this policy, and while Tcharykov seemed for a time to be succeeding where Grey had not, Sazonov finally recalled him and fostered the Balkan alliance which would be directed at least partially against Turkey. Nicolson's solution for the dilemma was to retain the entente with Russia and to drop Turkey. Grey, however, continued to conciliate both powers, and by means of negotiations with Kiderlen-Waechter and the novel conference of ambassadors, seemed well on the road to success. By alternately making forceful statements to Russia and then hiding behind France's disinclination to see Russia in Turkey, Grey kept...
Sazonov from going to far. It is worth noting that Anglo-Russian relations were not seriously strained until the summer of 1913, when Germany refused to cooperate in concert with the powers at Constantinople. Grey's pro-Turkish policy was saved only by the French opposition to the aims of her ally.
Chapter Six

NAVAL AGREEMENTS

As a group of powers giving diplomatic assistance to one another, the triple entente was limited in its effectiveness. The maxim which Crowe, in the British foreign office, frequently repeated set forth force and the ability to use it quickly and effectively as the important factor to success. In this respect, the understanding between Russia and England could hardly be called effective, because up to the summer of 1914, the two countries had never collaborated with regard to combining their individual forces. This view should be qualified somewhat by the fact that the cooperation between the French and English forces was fitted into the Franco-Russian military alliance. The Haldane expeditionary force, developed to alleviate the French burden of defending her entire frontier, soon came to be considered by the Russians as an essential part of their strategy in the possibility of a war with Germany. (1)

Also, it would appear that as early as 1908, the French officers had induced the Russians to agree to a full mobilization in the event of a German mobilization against England. (2)

These matters pertained to the army and to that part of Europe in which France and England had the

(1) Fay, op. cit., I, 210-13, and notes.
(2) Ibid., I, 213-14, Ed. note.
most vital national interest. The undefeatable force of Europe on the sea, however, was the British navy. This fighting force was unquestionably the backbone of England, and there is also no question but that the German fleet building program had much to do with England's antagonism toward Germany. The British Documents as well as history books mention this argument frequently. But there is one point with regard to the supremacy of the British navy and the naval discussions with France and Russia immediately prior to the war, which should be emphasized. This is in connection with the change in the status quo in the Mediterranean resulting from the Italo-Turkish war. There were three strategical questions which deserve attention. The first and second are rather closely inter-related—whether Italy should be permitted to keep the Dodecanese islands, and if not, to whom they should belong; and what should be the status of Albania. Both of these questions in a general way solved themselves. In regard to Albania, Austrian and Italian ambitions cancelled each other so far as important anti-British strategic naval bases were concerned; as to the Dodecanese, the question was not settled up to the time of the war. Italy held the islands but did not fortify them. The British felt that Cyprus was not suitable for building a strategic base there, and if the Dodecanese were to be held by any strong naval power, England would also require some of
the islands (3).

As to the third strategical question, much of the English fear of the German navy and the consequent tightening of the triple entente can be said to have come from Italy's seizure of Tripoli. The map shows that Tunisia and Sicily compress the Mediterranean into two basins, eastern and western. At the congress of Vienna, England obtained Malta, which is strategically important in the Sicilian-Tunisian area. When the French took Tunis in 1881, the Members of the British cabinet exacerbated one another over the question as to whether Malta neutralized Tunisia or Tunisia neutralized Malta; but these disputes did not change the fact that the balance of power in the Mediterranean had shifted in favor of France (4). When the Italians took Tripoli, strategic questions as to the Mediterranean similar to those of 1881 arose, but with this difference: France had now become a friend instead of an enemy of Great Britain.

The Mediterranean situation was so important to the British foreign office in the spring of 1912, that Crowe was given the task of drawing up a memorandum on the question (5). The precise point reviewed by Crowe was the effect of the British evacuation of the Med-

(3) B. D., X, 11, Nos. 221; 953; 1063; and passim.


(5) B. D., X, 11, No. 386.
iteranean on questions of foreign policy. These may be summed up as follows: Italy would be thrown into the arms of the triple alliance; Spain would detach herself from France and England, and cooperate with the triple alliance against France in the event of war; British influence would be seriously weakened at Constantinople, and this in turn would encourage Turkey to attempt the re-conquest of Egypt. These tendencies could be alleviated, and to a certain extent averted, if the powerful French fleet were to take the place of the British Mediterranean squadron. "If Anglo-French cooperation were assured in case of either country being at war with the Triple Alliance, and if the French fleet were in a position to beat those of Italy, Austria and Turkey combined, and to win command of the Mediterranean, Italy would probably continue to refuse allowing her partnership in the Triple Alliance to involve her in a war with the two Western Powers, and Spain would have no inducement to change her present policy. Malta and Gibraltar would be as secure as they are now."

The point becomes clearer with Crowe's statement:

"The...indeterminate position of Italy has been a feature of the general balance of power in Europe...It is to be feared that recent events, arising out of the Tripolitan war may disturb this nice balance of power." Nicolson also added in a minute to Grey: that England had two
alternatives — to join with France or to increase the fleet. In the latter event, naval estimates would have to go up. To guard the Mediterranean would mean less boats in the North Sea to watch Germany. To come to terms with Germany would mean a loss of prestige.

Therefore, Nicolson said that an arrangement with France was the "...cheapest, simplest, and safest."(6)

The failure of the Haldane mission in April, 1912, has been generally stated to have resulted in England's drawing closer to France because it was necessary for England to concentrate more ships in the North Sea; and also in naval estimates being laid before Parliament by Churchill on the basis of sixty percentum superiority in vessels of the Dreadnought class over the German navy.(7) This is at best a half-truth. At least the other half is the fact that Italy had shifted the balance of power in the Mediterranean.

The whole problem has another aspect in connection with Anglo-Russian relations. France and Russia concluded a naval agreement during the summer of 1912. The agreement provided for the French and Russian naval forces to cooperate in accordance with the military convention of 1892. The French Mediterranean force was to protect the outlet

(6) B. D., X, 11, No. 385.
of the Black Sea against navies of the triple powers. (8) Cambon had told Nicolson that when Russia had first mentioned plans for the agreement, France had suggested that England be invited to have a part in it. The conversation occurred, apparently, on May 4. Nicolson, in a minute to Grey on August 4, was of the opinion that a possible naval arrangement with both France and Russia would make the British position more secure. He also stated that Germany, in face of so strong a naval combination, "...would be disposed to slacken her rate of construction as she would be convinced that she could not hope to compete." Parliamentary considerations were the only obstacle in the way. (9) Did this mean that England, by a naval combination with France and Russia, expected Germany to stop building a fleet in order that the English position in the Mediterranean would not be jeopardized?

On August 5, Poincare left France for a visit to St. Petersburg. While he was there, he told Sazonov of the Anglo-French naval arrangements. Poincare suggested that there should be a like cooperation between the British and Russian naval forces. The British could help the Russians in the Baltic as the French had agreed to help Russia against Austria in the Mediterranean. Poincare asked if Sazonov would take advantage of his trip

(8) D. D. F., 3rd series, III, Nos. 207; 206.
(9) B. D., X, 11, Nos. 383; 384; 407.
to England to discuss this matter. (10)

The British and French naval agreements to which Poincaré referred, provided generally for England to keep her main fleet in home waters, while France was to concentrate her fleet in the Mediterranean. England was to protect the Anglo-French interests in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, i.e., east of Malta, while France was to protect Anglo-French interests west of Malta. Both fleets were to cooperate, however, for the purposes of a general engagement, and were to use each other's ports as required. This agreement was not to affect the political freedom of either government as to "...embarking on a war." (11)

It was with two sets of naval agreements already in existence between France and Russia on the one hand


(11) E. D., X, 11, Ed. note, p. 602; D. D. F., 3rd series, IV, No. 398, with regard to the communication of the British admiralty concerning the English channel.

Cambon said that sending nine-tenths of the French fleet to the Mediterranean would expose her to attack by Germany without any guarantee that the British fleet would come to her aid. In short, the agreement was unilateral (this must mean that France's major concern at the time was the Mediterranean) (E. D., X, 11, No. 401).

Churchill said: "It is not true that the French are occupying the Mediterranean to oblige us. They cannot be effective in both theatres, and they resolve to be supreme in one (ibid., No. 403)."

Bertie told Poincaré not to present his objections to the British cabinet at that time, because the time was not ripe; that as long as Grey remained, he might be sure that there would be no abandonment of the spirit of the entente (ibid., No. 405).
and France and England on the other, that Sazonov, in September 1912, discussed the question of a possible Anglo-Russian naval agreement in the event of a war with Germany. Grey's memorandum on the discussion shows quite plainly the strategical disadvantage of England's attempting to help Russia in the Baltic. Were the British navy to sail into the Baltic, Germany, by taking Denmark, might close the outlet, catching the British fleet as in a mousetrap. But Grey carefully indicated to Sazonov that by virtue of the Anglo-French naval agreements, and the determination of the British government to maintain the superiority of its fleet over that of the German, the French would be entirely free for the Mediterranean. (12)

Clearly, Russia was to receive the same benefits from the existing arrangements even if there were no Anglo-Russian naval agreement.

Sazonov's report to the tsar corresponds with Grey's memorandum, except that he was more forceful with regard to England's determination "...to strike a crippling blow at German naval power." Sazonov also reported his conversation with King George V, to whom he attributed the words: "We shall sink every single German merchant ship we shall get hold of", in the event of war. (13)

By the end of 1912, England and Russia had no direct naval or military understanding. Indirectly, both were

(12) B. D., IX, 1, No. 805.
(13) Stieve, op. cit., p. 89.
tied together through the agreements with France. The Anglo-French naval accord needed strengthening in the view of the French. The Atlantic and channel coasts had only the flimsy protection of Bertie’s assurances that the entente would stand as long as Grey remained its guiding spirit. The wishes of the two powers with regard to the political effect of the naval agreements were set down in letters exchanged between Grey and Cambon. Clearly the two governments were not bound in a political alliance, but they did envisage the possibility that the governments of France and England might see eye to eye in taking action against an aggressor third power or in preserving peace. (14) The letters in a sense did constitute a written political agreement. Great Britain was honor bound to the full implications of an arrangement which could not easily be undone. As Winston Churchill said, France had a tremendous weapon with which she could compel England’s intervention because she could say, “...on the advice of, and by arrangements with your naval authorities, we have left our northern coasts defenceless. We cannot possibly come back in time.” (15)

These Grey-Camton letters were the basis of Poincare’s statement to Sazonov that London would for the moment confine itself to full diplomatic support; “...this


would not exclude more substantial assistance in the case of necessity." Isvolsky, also, in February, 1913, reported that while he had learned that Great Britain was not bound by any definite political obligations, yet from the tone of the assurances from London, France relied upon British armed support in the event of a conflict with Germany and that "...the plans of the Franco-British cooperation at sea are worked out down to the smallest details."(16)

Whatever encouragement Russia may have obtained from the assurances from Poincare and Isvolsky, Russia's threats against Turkey in the spring and summer of 1913, were made without the encouragement of England and France. In fact, Grey used very sharp language to Benckendorff during this period, and France likewise was opposed to any Russian moves which might possibly impair Turkish finances.(17) Toward the end of the year, Germany proposed to send a military mission to Turkey, headed by General Liman von Sanders, who, with 42 German officers, were to reorganize the Turkish army. Moreover, Sanders was to be in executive command of the army corps stationed at Constantinople. England agreed that Russia was justified in her objection to a German commander in the Straits area, but the difficulty lay in finding the best procedure to follow in objecting to it.(18) Sazonov wanted to hold back

(17) Supra, Chapter 5, passim.
(18) B. D., X, 1, No. 379.
and wait to see what Germany would do, but in the event that the Germans did nothing, he wanted the three Entente powers to put financial pressure upon Turkey, and if she did not respond to less stringent measures, to use force as a last resort. When Buchanan doubted that England would be willing to go so far, Sazonov indicated plainly that if England failed to give Russia support in this issue, the result would likely be fatal to the Anglo-Russian understanding. (19)

Apparently Sazonov was bluffing. The situation again raised the question of the Straits, but at a conference of Russian ministers over which Kokovstov presided, January 13, 1914, it was decided not only to continue the negotiations with Germany in regard to the Sanders mission, but also to refrain from using force to gain the Russian aims in the Straits, without the active cooperation of England and France. (20) The Russian militarists were also uncertain as to the use of their troops. If a war were to start in the neighborhood of Constantinople, all agreed that the main objective would be the seizure of the Straits as soon as possible. If the war were against the central powers, Sukhomlinoff would have no troops to spare for attacking Constantinople except the 8th corps, which would be free provided that Rumania remained neutral. (21)

(19) B. D., X, 1, Nos. 438; 439; 459; 465, minutes; 468.
(20) B. D., X, 11, Ed. note, p. 779.
(21) Stieve, op. cit., pp. 230-46, appendix, III.
Sazonov not only seemed to agree with the army's general staff, but he had repeatedly reported to the tsar that before taking any decisive steps, Russia would be compelled to assure herself of the support of the London cabinet. (22) Therefore, when he threatened a break in the Anglo-Russian understanding, Sazonov was apparently testing the British reaction.

The British, however, were beginning to take stock of their entente with Russia. Germany settled the question of Sanders by giving him a promotion which led to his relinquishing command of the corps stationed at Constantinople, but even Nicolson resented Russia's assumption that England would follow her lead without previous British authorization. (23) Moreover, Russia appeared to be definitely asserting herself in other ways. Buchanan's long reports from St. Petersburg contained much suggestive material. As a result of a German press campaign against Russia in March, 1914, both Sazonov and Sukhomlinoff had audiences with the tsar. In subsequent press interviews from both, it appeared that the tsar and a majority of his closest advisers favored a stronger and more resolute

(22) Stieve, op. cit., p. 225.
(23) B. D., X, 1, No. 465, minutes; 470; 471.

England could not object too much to Sanders taking command as originally proposed, because Limpus, an English naval officer, already held, theoretically, a similar position in the Turkish navy. It is interesting to note that the British foreign office did not know what Limpus' title was until Germany pointed out that it was the same title in the navy as Sanders was to be given in the army (ibid., No. 403, minutes).
foreign policy. Buchanan also reported that Russia intended to increase the strength of her armies; that the government was taking prominent Duma members into its confidence for better cooperation and for facilitating the vote of necessary credits; that by 1917, Russia would have a peacetime army of 1,750,000, and a navy in the Baltic which would be troublesome to Germany in a war in which England also participated. Minutes by Nicolson and Grey in the British Documents show the effect of the prospect of Russia's becoming strong. Both were concerned that Russia would be inclined to listen to overtures from Germany.\(^{(24)}\)

Towards the last of February, 1914, Sazonov had suggested a conference of the ambassadors of the Entente powers in London, because, said Sazonov, while the Entente deliberated, the triple alliance acted.\(^{(25)}\) During the following months, Sazonov had repeatedly told Buchanan that it was necessary to convert the Anglo-Russian understanding into an alliance of a purely defensive nature. He dwelt upon the fact that Russia could never be sure of what England would do, should Russia become involved in a war with Germany; and that Europe, instead of Persia, seemed to be the rock upon which the Anglo-Russian understanding would be wrecked. Buchanan also reported a growing tendency in Russia to look upon England as a

\(^{(24)}\) B. D., X, 11, No. 528, minutes.

\(^{(25)}\) Ibid., p. 774, Ed. note; No. 554.
fair weather friend and as not dependable in time of a storm. (26)

This campaign against British complacency seemed to be climaxed during an audience Buchanan had with the tsar, who said that he wanted a closer bond with England. When Buchanan suggested that an alliance would not be probably, the tsar mentioned an understanding similar to the one between England and France—not regarding troops, because the tsar had troops to spare—regarding cooperation between the British and Russian fleets. This despatch from Buchanan brought more minutes showing definitely that the Russian campaign was having its effects. Crowe thought there should be no objection to discussing with Russia an informal arrangement similar to the one with France. Nicolson approved the idea; but Grey thought that if the French agreed, it would be well to let the Russians know what had passed between the Anglo-French naval authorities and he wished to postpone discussions of anything as long as possible. (27)

The day before the tsar's talk with Buchanan, Sazonov wrote to Isvolsky: "...it would be useful if MM. Poincaré and Doumergue availed themselves of the personal Meeting with King George and his Ministers (the King's visit to Paris, April, 1914) to mention to them

(26) B. P., X, ii, No. 536.

(27) Ibid., No. 537, minutes.
confidentially that a closer agreement between Russia and Great Britain would be welcomed in France also as a happy event which is equally desirable for all three partners in the existing Triple Entente." Isvolsky's reply showed that the French had agreed to do so: that to them, it was obvious that the agreements between France and Britain and France and Russia should be harmonised, but that the Russo-British agreement should take the form of a naval convention, and possibly technical discussions between all three naval staffs. (28) Paleologue spoke to Buchanan in the same vein. Sazonov said, "England had made an agreement with Japan directed against Russia; therefore, why not an alliance with Russia against German aggression; ... if we wish to maintain peace, we must proclaim to the world the solidarity of the Triple Entente." (29)

De Fleuriau told the British foreign office that Sazonov had suggested to Doumergue that he speak to Grey regarding the enlargement of the scope of the Anglo-Russian entente. Grey was suspicious of the French, whom he thought could have originated the idea. (30) But the fact that the Russians were asking for more than the French had received from England puzzled him. (31)

(28) Stieve, op. cit., p. 196.

(29) B. D., X, ii, No. 538.

(30) Supra, at the time of the Franco-Russian naval negotiations in 1912, Cambon had said that France desired that England be included.

(31) B. D., X, ii, No. 539, minutes.
At Paris, Grey, in due course, discussed this matter with Doumercq. He agreed that Russia should first be informed as to the details of the Anglo-French naval plans in order that the Russians would understand exactly how things stood and what they could do. Then the matter would be reduced to conversations between the Russian and British naval staffs. According to the report from Isvolsky to Sazonov, Grey personally was in favor of an agreement with Russia, like the one between England and France, and he hoped to be able to bring Asquith and other members of the cabinet to his view. Only a naval convention would be possible with Russia, however, because the British land forces were already distributed under the French agreement and furthermore, any cooperation with Russian land forces was obviously out of the question. Isvolsky remarked that Doumercq and Gambon had been astonished at Grey's willingness to agree with Russia and to make such concrete suggestions as to carrying out the idea.

It is rather clear, however, that Grey had become impressed by the rapidly growing military strength of Russia. Buchanan's reports for a period of three months had consistently repeated that Russia was not only growing strong, but that she was determined on a definite and virile foreign policy. It was well known that Russian finances

(32) B. D., X, 11, No. 541.
(33) Stieve, op. cit., p. 198.
under the administration of Kokovstov were in good condition; also that this minister had been rather successful in negotiations with the Duma with regard to obtaining the necessary credits for warlike preparations and especially for building up the Russian Baltic fleet.\(^{(34)}\) Nicolson and Crowe were both of the opinion that England would necessarily accede to Russian overtures in the near future, and while Grey wished to delay it as long as possible, he apparently changed his mind when he went to Paris, where, as he wrote to Bertie, "I found everyone conversant with politics; both those in office and such men as MM. Clemenceau and Delcasse were immensely impressed by the growing strength of Russia and her tremendous resources and potential wealth and power."\(^{(35)}\)

About a month after his return from Paris, Grey conferred with both Cambon and Benckendorff. Copies of the Grey-Cambon letters were given to the Russian ambassador,\(^{(36)}\) and conversations were arranged in London between a Russian naval attaché\(^{(37)}\) and the British admiralty.

\(^{(34)}\) See D. D. E., 3rd series, III, No. 117, in which Kokovtsov, as early as June, 1912, had spoken of the great efforts he was making along this line, and especially in regard to credits for a Baltic fleet, and added, "Aurions-nous les yeux fixés de ce côté (Baltic) si l'on pouvait songer chez nous à un changement de politique?"

\(^{(35)}\) B. D., X, 11, No. 541.

\(^{(36)}\) Isvolsky had already forwarded copies of these letters to the Russian foreign office\(^{(Stieve, op. cit., p. 198)}\).

\(^{(37)}\) Grey did not want a Russian staff officer to be seen going in and out of the naval office\(^{(38)}\).
Grey suggested that conversations between the three naval staffs be conducted in Paris because they would be better able to coordinate the British plans with those already made between France and Russia pursuant to their alliance. (38)

Sazonov was well pleased with the British response to Russian overtures. He believed it to be important in general political considerations because it was a step toward bringing England into closer relations with the Franco-Russian alliance. And while Anglo-Russian naval plans were not completed (39) prior to the outbreak of the war, the British were never fully aware, apparently, that Russia was more concerned with the Straits than with the Baltic. Sazonov ordered that no political discussions concerning the Straits be included in the tripartite conversations at Paris as to naval plans in the Mediterranean. (40)

Grey, however, perhaps suspected that something of that nature was in the wind. In the instructions to Mallet at Constantinople on June 25, 1914, Grey said that the position of His Majesty's Government in regard to the Straits was the same as it was in 1908. (41)

Throughout the series of negotiations with regard to naval matters, from the time that Italian action had changed the balance of power in the Mediterranean, the British government had been concerned with seeking by

non-political agreement a distribution of naval forces in order to keep naval estimates at a minimum. In doing this, they were forced into closer relations politically and strategically with France. Russia's increasing power, and her Baltic fleet building program, moved England one step, big or little, in the direction of a political understanding with her. It is not quite accurate to say that the Anglo-Russian naval negotiations came to nothing or that Grey entered upon the negotiations because he did not want to be impolite to Russia. In view of Russia's growing power, her insistence upon a closer understanding among the entente powers, and the greater diplomatic cooperation between France and Russia, England was being, after the beginning of 1914, drawn inexorably into a warlike orbit. Grey could not, or did not, do anything to stop it. It would have taken a very strong man indeed to have cut through, casting aside all the reasons why the entente should be kept together, and directly made terms with Germany. Nicolson spoke of loss of prestige in such an event, but loss of prestige would also follow failure to give forceful effect to the growing closeness of the entente. Moreover, an agreement with Germany would have meant higher naval estimates in order to make the Mediterranean secure for Great Britain. Probably no cabinet could have withstood the pressure of asking for them without being able to give German antagonism as the reason.
Chapter Seven

THE "SINGLE-MINDED AMERICAN" IN PERSIA

Although Persia had been generally the most impor-
problem which the Anglo-Russian accord of August 31, 1907,
purported to settle, England and Russia continued to be
frequently at odds as to Persian policy. It is usually
concluded that England permitted Russia to "steam-roller"
the northern and wealthiest section of Persia because a
really stern attitude would have broken the entente. As a
result, Russia would have inclined toward Germany, and this
was an inclination which Grey had every reason to avoid.(1)
This view, borne out by certain authorities(2), can be temp­
ered by other material as well as by certain general consid­
erations.

Although the forceful tactics of the Russians with re-
gard to Persia cannot perhaps be justified, in a measure,
at least, they can be explained. England knew, and was fre­
quently reminded by the Russians, that the latter could not
compete successfully in commerce with the more advanced
western powers. Consequently, in order to acquire markets
for industrial products, the Russians sought to gain polit­
ical or semi-political control over new and adjacent terri­
tories where they could shut out competition. The greater

(1) Fay, op. cit., I, 221-22.

(2) Sources cited by Fay are W. Morgan Shuster, The Strang­
ing of Persia (New York, 1912), passim; Siebert-Schreiner,
 op. cit., pp. 49-141.
political control made up for the deficient industrial and commercial ability. Persia was an example of this policy at work. Moreover, Persia, in Russian eyes, was no more important as a state than the series of tribes throughout Central Asia which had already succumbed to the much greater Russian ruler, the tsar.

The Russian politico-commercial policy in Persia was not without its advantages to England because it is obvious that the shutting out of all trade also shut out German trade. German trade in Persia competed so successfully with that of England that the British began seriously to speak of subsidizing the British in southern Persia. The British did not object to Russia's influence in the appointment of Persian governors to administer the northern provinces in accordance with Russian policy, because the English employed the same methods in southern Persia. But the Russians openly directed the governors through their consuls. The British objections seemed to be made against appearances rather than practices.

It was in the matter of appearances that the anti-Russian, pro-Indian groups in England, headed by Curzon, and aided by the Germanophils, were able frequently to challenge the government's Persian policy. At the height of the Shuster controversy in Persia, even the French were considerably worried that the Germanophils in England

(3) B. D., X, 11, No. 510.
(4) Ibid., No. 552.
would, by the use of the Persian problem to illustrate the undesirable features of a friendly policy toward Russia and the entente, promote an Anglo-German rapprochement. (5)

Two additional phases of the Persian question deserve mention. At all times, the general Turkish problem had more or less affected the situation in Persia because the commercial and political rivalry of the powers in Turkey easily carried across disputed boundaries into zoned Persia. In the minds of the men at the British foreign office, there was no question but that the Germans for a long time had been showing themselves generally unfriendly to Persia and to the Anglo-Russian control of it; that for years they had continually urged the Turks forward at strategic points on the Turkic-Persian frontier and had aided and abetted them in carrying on revolutionary intrigues at Tabriz. (6)

The second phase concerns the prolonged problem of the Bagdad railway as it was involved in the Persian problem. After Sazonov at Potsdam (November 4-5, 1910), had agreed not to oppose the Bagdad railway (7), a new problem arose as to the proposed trans-Persian railway which was to be connected up to the Bagdad line, and which the Russians desired to be routed through Tehran. Grey did not object to the project, provided that the British could have ex-

(5) D. D. F., 3rd series, II, No. 5.
(6) B. D., X, 1, No. 640, minutes.
(7) Ibid., No. 611; supra, chapter 3, passim.
clusive control of the railway as it passed through their Persian zone, and provided that their interests in the neutral zone were at least equal to any other power. The British felt that any railway to India which connected with the Bagdad railway would seriously threaten Indian security unless they could dominate the road for a considerable distance before it approached Indian frontiers. Otherwise, a hostile Turkish force could be concentrated and moved dangerously close to India almost before the movements would be known outside the Turkish empire. (8)

On the other hand, British oil interests were finding the neutral zone to have excellent prospects for oil reserves; therefore, London was becoming very jealous of any power's future influence there.

Into this general situation, already complicated enough to annoy the British foreign office no end, came the "single-minded American" (as Grey called him), W. Morgan Shuster. The newcomer desired nothing more than to put Persia in a good financial condition without involving himself in politics. (9)

Shuster's appointment was a compromise, but it

(8) B. D., IX, No. 83; B. D., X, 1, No. 640, minutes, 648. The French did not like the Potsdam agreement either. Cambon told Goschen that while officially he said that nothing which occurred at Potsdam or afterwards could disturb the relations between France and Russia, added, "Voulez-vous que je vous dise mon opinion? Eh bien! c'est que l'Alliance Franco-Russe est f__" (Sic.)

(9) B. D., X, 1, No. 804, enclosure, Shuster's letter to Barclay at Tehran.
reflected the need for a thorough re-organization of Persian finance from top to bottom. The events which led up to his appointment began toward the latter part of 1910, when the British acceded to Persia's request for a loan to permit the Persian government to establish order and assert its authority. In a proposal which the Russian government accepted, an Anglo-Russian loan was to be given to Persia upon the following conditions: that the expenditure of the loan be approved by both the English and Russian legations; that Persia appoint seven French officials in the ministry of finance and be given executive powers; that enough police with foreign instructors be provided to protect the trade routes; that Persia grant no railway concessions without first offering options to England and Russia; that a concession be granted forthwith for the navigation of Lake Urumia to the Tabriz Road Company (Russian); and that repayment of the advance be the first charge against a subsequent loan, if such a loan were facilitated by the British and Russian governments. (10)

Persia refused to take the loan on those conditions. When the Germans heard about it, they stated categorically that in view of the German commercial interests in Persia, German claims should be paid out of the loan, and, furthermore, Persia should employ subjects of other powers besides Englishmen and Russians (i.e., the police to protect trade routes). Austria and Italy also made representations to

Great Britain and Russia which caused the former to accuse Germany of sponsoring a joint attack with her two satellites. Germany naturally denied any part in such a sponsorship but insisted upon equal rights for Germans in Persia. Finally, however, Germany agreed to forbid Germans to accept concessions in Persia without the approval of both the British and the Russians, on the condition that the terms of the loan to Persia would not baldly say so, to which the others assented. (11)

The next question arose as to the nationality of the financial advisers. England desired appointments from small European powers; this was satisfactory to Russia. Persia wanted to appoint Americans, to which Russia at first agreed but later opposed because Germany would insist upon having an adviser. Germany said that the United States was a great power and the fact that she was a non-European power made no difference. England then said if Germany had an adviser, England and Russia would also have them. (12)

The impasse was finally overcome by Germany's assenting to an American without insisting upon a German's being appointed in a similar capacity. Shuster was appointed February 14, 1911. His title was Treasurer-General of the Persian Empire; he had other American assistants, who, with Shuster, were all to be under the direction of the Persian minister of finance for a term of three years. (13)

(11) R. R., X, 1, pp. 743 ff. (12) Ibid., Nos. 743 to 766, inc. (13) Ibid., No. 771; Grey's minute: "If he is a good man this step may really improve the chance of getting Persia on her feet, but I do not envy him his job."
Shuster apparently knew little and cared nothing about the maze of political and commercial currents which criss-crossed at the Persian capital. He set about determinedly to straighten out Persian finances, and in order to be successful, felt that he should be in a position to control all officials in Persia who handled government money. One Mornard, a Belgian in charge of collecting Persian custom dues in the northern, or Russian zone, had always conducted his office in accordance with Russian wishes. Shuster ordered that Mornard's checks were not to be honored in any Persian bank without his approval. Then, through his control of the Medjliss, enacted a law providing for the appointment of an assistant to Shuster who was to organize a treasury gendarmerie for all of Persia. At about the same time, the ex-shah of Persia, it was rumored, was on his way through Russian territory to make an attempt to regain his throne. According to Barclay's reports from Tehran, the Russian circles there could scarcely conceal their elation. Shuster's determined disregard of Russian susceptibilities were advanced as reasons for the Russian government not to oppose the shah's restoration. Buchanan reported from St. Petersburg, however, that the ex-shah had been through southern Russia on a false passport and that the Russian government had nothing to do with his attempt to return. In fact, some days later, the Russian proposed a joint note with

(14) B. P., X, i, Nos. 778; 783.
(15) Ibid., Nos. 786; 788.
England to notify the ex-shah that under no circumstances was he to return to Persia. (16)

Shuster then announced the appointment of Major Stokes of the Indian army (Sazonov disliked Anglo-Indian officers) to be his assistant in charge of the treasury gendarmerie. While it seemed to be generally assumed that the gendarmerie were to help put down disorders and to repel the ex-shah, the real purpose, officially, was to assist in the collection of revenue. (17) Russia immediately asked the British government to intimate to the Persian government that the appointment was undesirable. Grey told Benckendorff that while he could not object to the appointment, Stokes would have to resign from the British army if he accepted it. He telegraphed to Barclay, however, that Persia should not employ Stokes in the Russian zone, and if she persisted, England, on the basis of the 1907 agreement, would recognize Russia's right to occupy northern Persia; that Shuster was to appoint officials from minor powers; and that he was to stop appointing British people for posts in northern Persia. (18) Grey then delayed Stokes appointment by refusing him his release from the Indian army. In consequence, Russia was somewhat mollified. (19)

(16) B. P., X. 1, Nos. 789; 790.
(17) Ibid., Nos. 803; 778.
(18) Ibid., Nos. 791; 800; 802; 825.
(19) Ibid., No. 823. Grey wrote to Bryce that he did not know Stokes was anti-Russian but four months previously Grey had minced "If Major Stokes is appointed he must be cautioned to suppress all anti-Russian feelings (Ibid., Nos. 778; 863.)"
In spite of Grey's warnings, Shuster appointed an Englishman as treasury agent at Tabriz, which was in the Russian zone and the center of much Russian commercial activity. The new treasury agent seized some property which was mortgaged to the Russian bank and leased to a Russian subject, and replaced Persian Cossacks (officered by Russians) with Shuster's treasury gendarmerie as guards. (20)

Grey realized the gravity of this move. Mallet said that it was essential to get rid of Shuster because he failed completely to realize that Persia was under Anglo-Russian protection. (21) Grey telegraphed instructions to Barclay to tell Shuster not to appoint Englishmen in northern Persia; to be as conciliatory as possible to the Russian legation at Tehran; and "...tell him so he will understand that the Russian Government could employ means which he would be unable to withstand and which would gravely hamper him in the execution of his duties(!) and to stop provoking the Russians in northern Persia." (22)

Shuster had carried his methods too far. The Russians gave Persia an ultimatum. They demanded a withdrawal of Shuster's police from the property in question. Included in their demand was an apology for an incident in which the Russians alleged that the treasury gendarmerie had threatened with aimed rifles two officials of the Russian consulate-general and the consulate building itself. The Persian minister of foreign affairs promised reparation if a joint enquiry showed the story of the Russians to be true; but
the Russians demanded that the apology be made before the enquiry. The demands were refused by Persia as inconsistent though "...dignified and temperate in tone...." with Persia's dignity and with Russo-Persian friendly relations. There were new demands from Russia and new requests for an enquiry from Persia. Shuster's next step was to send a circular to the Russian subjects in Persia requiring them either to furnish him directly with full particulars of leases held by them, or to forfeit all recognition of their rights by the Persian government. From England, Grey let it be known at St. Petersburg that while he did not suggest Shuster's dismissal, he would not object to Russia's demanding it. At Grey's insistence, Persia then agreed to meet the Russian demands. Shuster, in defence, circulated through Persia a letter which justified his action. Again more stringent demands came from Russia, requiring that Shuster and the English treasury agent at Tabriz be dismissed; that the Persian government promise not to offer any posts to foreigners without the consent of the Russian and British legations; and that reimbursement be made for the military expedition. (23)

Up to this time; Grey did everything he could to cooperate with Russia; but Buchanan made a serious mistake in St. Petersburg. Sazonov was in Paris at the time; which left Neratov in charge of the Russian foreign office. Not

(23) B. B., X, i, Nos. 834; 838; 839; 840; 842; 843; 851; 868; Buchanan, op. cit., I, 100ff.
too successful in his conversations with Neratov, Buchanan talked with Kokovstov regarding Russia's demands in Persia. Kokovstov gave him assurances that as soon as Persia complied with Russian demands, the troops would be withdrawn and the matter closed. Buchanan, and the British foreign office too, failed to realize (or did not want to) that Kokovstov had no authority to speak on foreign affairs, that ministry in Russia being completely separate from the rest of the government and responsible only to the tsar. (24)

The misunderstanding came at an inopportune time because with the despatch of troops to Kasvin, the British public and the anti-Russians began to criticize the policy of the government. The situation in England was not eased by the fact that the Russian government seemed to say one thing (Kokovstov) and do another (Neratov). Grey told Benckendorff that if Russia pressed things too hard in Persia, it would be necessary for him to enter in discussions as to how seriously the principles of the Anglo-Russian entente had been impaired. Benckendorff immediately telegraphed to St. Petersburg: "If an end comes to our (Anglo-Russian) common action in Persia this will inevitably mean the end

(24) B. D., X, 1, No. 381; Buchanan, op. cit., I, p. 102. For an excellent discussion of this independence of the Russian foreign minister from the rest of the Cabinet, see H. H. Fisher, Ed., Out of My Past: The Memoirs of Count Kokovstov (Stanford University, 1935), passim. There seems to be no explanation as to why Kokovstov did not tell Buchanan that he had no authority to speak; apparently he assumed that Buchanan knew it. Neither Buchanan nor the British government appeared to realize it. In a Bluebook published on the Persian question the next year (1912), the British government included Buchanan's conversations with Kokovstov. Sazonov told Buchanan that they should not have been printed
of the Entente."(25) Cambon's despatch of the same day, December 2, 1911, related that everyone was annoyed at Russia's acting without Great Britain; that the Jews, the conservatives, and the advanced liberals, all against the accord with Russia, made a large portion of a public ready to burst into flame. Grey told him that although Shuster should disappear and although his peopling the Russian zones with British functionaries was inadmissible, yet the effect of the threat to advance on Tehran, and of the 48 hour ultimatum was so serious that he feared for the entente. Benckendorff told Cambon the same thing.(26)

Sazonov, in Paris at the time, assured de Selves of the great price he put on British friendship(27), and on the same day(December 7), Isvolsky telegraphed from Paris to Neratov,"Don't endanger Entente with England.... I think Great Britain will go a very long way with us, but it is dangerous to stretch the bow too tight."(28)

In London, the anti-Russian movement was gaining ground. Gurzon spoke at a banquet of the Persian Society, eulogizing the Persians, and later, he attacked Grey's

and very carefully explained why. It is apparent that Buchanan still did not know where he was wrong when he wrote his book(Buchanan, op. cit., I, 102). At the time, Buchanan concluded that Kokovtsov was not well informed on foreign policy(B. D. X, 1, Nos. 381-383, inc.).

(25) Ibid., No. 874; Stieve, op. cit., p. 49.
(27) Ibid., No. 314.
policy in the house of lords. Nicolson was greatly disturbed because even the members of Grey’s own party began adverse criticism; Nicolson wrote privately to Buchanan that too great a strain on the Anglo-Russian understanding would lead to a complete revision of England’s whole international policy. Buchanan read the letter to Neratov to show him "...what so true a friend of Russia as Sir A. Nicolson had written to me privately." (29) This, together with Sazonov’s return to Russia, the modifications of the Russian demands of Persia, and England’s persuasion of Persia to accept them, eased the situation. (30)

Persia was still in a state of unrest, however, and an outbreak in the north seemed to give credence to the Russian view that the troops at Kasvin could not be withdrawn until order was restored. Although Grey felt that the outbreak at Tabriz justified Russian occupation of parts of Persia, he knew that even the people who desired to be on good terms with Russia shrank from being committed to a cooperation that could imply responsibility for Russian action. The foreign office was somewhat relieved by the tsar’s assurances to Buchanan on his return to St. Petersburg. (31) He told Buchanan that he gave his word that

(29) B. D., X, 1, Nos. 898; 901.
(30) D. D. F., 3rd series, I, 363; Buchanan, op. cit., I, 100f.
(31) The tsar had been at Livadia at the time of the greatest strain; as the French said, "The Russian Government is scattered; one cannot find where it is." (D. D. F., 3rd series, I, No. 272.)
Russia would annex no Persian territory. (32)

But Shuster was still annoying. He left Tehran on January 11, 1912, and went to England. There he was used by enemies of the Russian entente to protest Grey's policy. The Persian Committee headed by a member of parliament, and made up of anti-Russians, pacifists and Moslem defenders, gave Shuster a banquet. But he would not say anything more against Russia than he had already stated to the press, and even his listeners, said Gambon, told him that they expected a more open account of Russian intrigues in the book which he intended to publish upon his return to America. (33) While the British were apparently disappointed in Shuster; as Gambon put it, "...he appeared presumptuous and little instructed", (34) Russian public opinion was kept aroused by stories of mutilations on the Russian killed and of tortures applied to the Russian wounded in the fighting around Tabriz. Sazonov was thus confronted with a problem of popular demand, (35) and told Louis at St. Petersburg that the campaign against Anglo-Russian policy in England came from the Germans, and therefore was not of purely English origin. The French view, however, coincided with the English in that Sazonov should have realized the susceptibilities of the English to Russia's tactics in Persia and if he would

(32) B. D., X, 1, No. 915.
(33) D. D. F., 3rd series, I, No. 616.
(34) Ibid., No. 619.
(35) B. D., X, 1, No. 915.
use more tact, he would not only help Grey, but would also destroy one of the best weapons of the promoters of an Anglo-German rapprochement. (36)

The moderating French influence began to have its effect. The English and Russian ministers at Tehran, toward the end of February, sent a note to Persia, inviting her to conform to the Anglo-Russian accord. Along the same lines suggested by Grey, a Persian gendarmerie was organized and an attempt made to establish better relations. (37) Russia, however, continued to impose her will on northern Persia, and to govern it as a Russian province. (38) But it was not until the beginning of 1914 that the whole Persian as well as Middle Asian question was openly discussed between England and Russia.

The Russian drive toward a strong foreign policy was accompanied by suggestions for new alignments as to Anglo-Russian influence in Mongolia, Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia. (39) In northern Persia, Russia was converting Persian governors into Russian officials; land was being acquired and given to Russian subjects; and Persians were becoming Russian protected subjects. In the south, Great Britain was also having governors appointed who were friendly, and through a mining concession, was extending British interests.

(36) D. P. E., 3rd series, II, No. 5.
(37) Ibid., No. 62; E. P., X, 1, No. 912.
(38) E. P., X, 11, No. 552.
(39) Ibid., No. 534, Ed. note, (3).
into the neutral zone in pursuit of oil. The British had much competition commercially from the Germans in the neighborhood of the Persian Gulf. Nicolson complained that they had practically succeeded in capturing the whole of the trade on the Karun. (40)

Both the tsar and Bazonov were in favor of partitioning the neutral zone, but Grey was decidedly against it. In a memorandum to Benckendorff on June 10, 1914, Grey stated that the agreement of 1907 was a division of Persia into strategic and not political or administrative zones, and while the Persian governor-general at Tabriz, under the protection of a Russian military force, recognized no authority at all from the central Persian government, England was not concerned about it. But Russian influence of the same character was not to be extended into the neutral zone, and the British government would have need to secure their important and strategic interests in both the neutral and southern zones and in the Persian Gulf. (41)

Since the British had never obtained the consent of the amir of Afghanistan to the agreement of 1907, Grey did not think there would be much point in discussing new questions. He felt too that the Russians had grounds for complaints over the treatment received at the hands of the amir. Tibet offered little difference of opinion, and the Mongolian question, while outside of the 1907 agreement would not prevent the

(40) B. P., X, 11, Nos. 510; 552.
(41) Ibid., Nos. 547; 553.
British from considering some concessions to Russia in that area. Grey, however, was puzzled as to what he could offer Russia. An agreement on the trans-Persian railway to India would have been a substantial quid pro quo provided that it would be passed by the committee of defence and agreed to by the Indian government. He was extremely doubtful that this could be done. (42)

While these discussions were taking place, the British government purchased Anglo-Persian Oil Company shares against which the Russian press angrily protested. This step showed conclusively that the British intended to exploit to the fullest extent the oil reserves in Persia, and Grey reiterated his statement made to Sazonov at Balmoral in 1912, that if necessary, British officers would be used in the gendarmerie in southern Persia. (43) Apparently this forceful stand momentarily checked the Russians in their desire to discuss a partition of Persia.

However, on July 14, Sazonov suggested discussions pointing to a triple guarantee by Japan, Russia, and England, of all their possessions throughout Asia. This appealed to Nicolson because Russia exhibited the desire entirely to remove England's fear of any aggression toward India. The war intervened, and the Russian government's far-reaching plans for an entire continent came to nothing. (44)

(42) B. D., X, ii, No. 535.
(43) Ibid., Nos. 555; 558, Ed. note; 561.
(44) Ibid., appendix I, p. 821.
As the Anglo-Russian negotiations began in 1907, so they ended in 1914, with discussions of distant frontiers. The Persian question occupied the British government, not out of any consideration for Persia, but for its importance to the empire and India. England stood by while Russia made herself secure in northern Persia primarily because the British interests did not lie in the Russian zone. The conclusion cannot be escaped, however, that Russian dominance in the northern section harmonized with the English desire to see Germany shut out of all Persia. British interests in Persia's oil were becoming important to England. As a consequence, the Russian policy in northern Persia coincided with Grey's determination to strengthen the south and to aid British enterprise there, which was seriously threatened by Germany's commercial gains.

It is interesting to note that the British policy toward Russia during this period was concerned with the shutting of successive doors to possible Russian expansion. Beginning in the Far East in 1902, with the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the British policy gradually barred the inroads of the Russians back across Asia. By the Angle-Russian agreement of 1907, Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia, from east to west, were in that order closed to further Russian advances. The problem of Turkey remained. During the annexation crisis and after, the British fostered an alliance between Turkey, Bulgaria and Russia. This failed
to materialize, putting Grey in the awkward position of trying to reconcile the Russian anti-Turkish with the British pro-Turkish interests. With the cooperation of Kiderlen-Waechter until the end of 1912, and with the cooperation of the French in 1913, he succeeded. The use of a strong Russian policy in 1914, however, pulled England into a war-like Franco-Russian orbit from which there was no escape.

Intentionally or not, the fact remains that England was slowly moving to surround Central Europe with French and Russian armies. From the beginning of 1912, this movement was supplemented by naval conversations. Throughout the period, London slowly arose to be the diplomatic center of Europe, reaching its zenith with the ambassadors' conference. After that time, Russia began a more independent policy. Secure in her growing strength, she demanded more insistently closer cooperation from Great Britain. Grey read the reports of Russia's improvements, and not the least important were the plans for a strong Baltic fleet; he was deeply impressed by the fact that the French politicians with whom he talked in Paris, in April, 1914, confirmed his own information. He had tried to hold back, to delay committing England, even morally, to closer relations with Russia, as his minutes show; but the pressure was too great. He was losing his grip on the entente. His decision to enter into naval conversations with Russia in the summer
of 1914, was symbolic of this fact. The tsar's government had achieved its goal.(45) Britain had secured the support of the Russian armies, but she had tied her fleet to an aggressive Russian policy.

Why did Great Britain commit herself? Nicolson answered this by saying that it was "...cheapest, safest, and simplest." Alliances, agreements and moral commitments seemed an easier method than the old policy of splendid isolation. An alliance with Japan guarded British interests in the Far East. An agreement with Russia made the approaches to India safe. A naval agreement with France in order to guard Malta and Gibraltar was cheaper than the raising of naval estimates in parliament. Acceding to Russia's demands for naval conversations was simpler than the re-arrangement of the whole British policy. It was "cheapest, safest, and simplest", for England, as the Russian soldiers said in the trenches, "to fight with the last drop of blood in our bodies."

(45) Sazonov, before the special conference of Russian political and military leaders, stated: "In reality, a Russian initiative supported only by France would not appear particularly dangerous to Germany....A struggle, on the other hand, in which Great Britain participated might be disastrous to Germany...."(Stieve, op. cit., p. 225).
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

I. DOCUMENTS

A. Issued Officially

FRANCE. Ministère des affaires étrangères, Commission de Publication des Documents relatifs aux Origines de la Guerre de 1914, Documents diplomatique français, (1871-1914), 3 Series. Paris, 1931-.


B. Issued Unofficially


II. MEMOIRS AND BIOGRAPHIES


SECONDARY SOURCES

I. BOOKS


ALEXINSKY, GREGOR. Modern Russia. (Tr. by B. Hiall from the Russian). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913.


II. NEWSPAPERS


The Times, 1912-1914. London.

III. ARTICLES IN PERIODICALS

A. Signed Articles


B. Author Unknown and Editorials

"Anglo-Russian Convention", The Outlook, vol. 87, p. 234, (October 5, 1907).


"Great Britain, Russia, and Japan", Quarterly Review, vol. 203, p. 599, (October, 1905).

"Russia Courting the Allies", The Literary Digest, vol. 46, p. 171, (January, 1913).


