THE CLIFTON-MORENCI STRIKE
OF 1915 - 1916

by
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PREFACE

The first two decades of the twentieth century were years of upheaval on the domestic scene in the United States. Organized labor was struggling for rights and recognition; industrial giants were battling to maintain their positions of superiority. Businessmen had financial power and usually governmental support to protect their interests; workers had only the "walkout." The result was often a long and bitter strike with its attendant violence, bloodshed, and property destruction.

While Arizona experienced a contemporary union development, it was characterized by a notable absence of such clashes, in contrast to most Western mining camps. The pacific nature of strikes in its mining districts was credited to several factors. Most of the workers were inarticulate Mexicans, easy to lead but difficult to organize, and hence company unions dominated. The inert condition of the working force discouraged any concentrated efforts by national organizations to unionize the miners. By the time such attempts were begun, both sides had been able to profit from the mistakes made during earlier strikes in other areas. Moreover, union officials found in Arizona a government sympathetic to their desires.

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The Clifton-Morenci strike of 1915-16, the first major labor difficulty in Arizona, demonstrated that long strikes involving thousands of men need not be violent. Both the miners and the managers showed enlightened restraint in the use of their "weapons." The governor employed troops to insure against the disrupting influence of strikebreakers. In short, the actions and attitudes of almost everyone involved showed a remarkable determination not to repeat the errors of the past. By so doing, they set a commendable example for the peaceful settlement of future disputes between labor and management.

The research for this study was done chiefly in the Western Collection of the University of Arizona Library and at the Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society. In writing of this "sorry scheme of things entire," the author is indebted to Professor John Alexander Carroll. Without his help and inspiration, this thesis may not have been completed in its present form. Finally, the author wishes to thank his parents whose patience and payments made this possible.
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ABSTRACT

On September 11, 1915 almost five hundred workers walked off the job in the Clifton-Morenci mining district of southwestern Arizona. Organized by the Western Federation of Miners, the men were protesting low wages and oppressive company policies. The managers of the three companies—the Detroit Mining Company, The Arizona Copper Company, and the Shannon Copper Company—refused to have anything to do with the Federation. Governor George W. P. Hunt went to Clifton to see if he could help effect a settlement. In a speech to the workers, he promised to treat both sides as equals. Two days later the managers, fearing violence, left the district and went to El Paso.

With the three chief officials absent in Texas, the situation became complicated. Governor Hunt ordered National Guard troops to Clifton to insure against the importation of strikebreakers. The companies set up a refugee camp at Duncan for men who felt compelled to leave the strike zone. The following January an agreement was reached whereby the men returned to work with a pay increase, while the rest of the issues were worked out. The miners returned to their jobs on January 26, 1916 and a contract was signed on March 29 of that year.
The peaceful settlement of this strike was in contrast with the violence, bloodshed, and property destruction which characterized labor difficulties in other mining districts of the West.
CHAPTER I

THE CAUSES OF THE STRIKE

It was almost eleven o'clock on Saturday night, September 11, 1915. Soon their replacements would come and the tired miners would be finished for another turn. Sunday would mean Church and rest for some of the men, just rest for others. Eight hours earlier, when they entered the musty shafts of the Detroit Copper Company Mine, the district was alive with rumors and with speculation of a strike, but the men soon forgot such talk as they went about their arduous and monotonous tasks. Suddenly they heard shouts, "Get out!" "We're on strike!" Most of the workers, electrified by the noise, left their tools and mules, rushed through the adits into the crisp night air, and joined the howling mob outside. Pickets were thrown up around the mine entrances, smelters, and concentrators, while bands of men fanned out through the tunnels, ejecting reluctant

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1. Walter Douglas, managing editor of the Phelps Dodge Co. which owned the Detroit Copper Co., issued a statement after visiting the district. In it he reported that the strikers refused to allow the mules of any of the companies to be fed or hoisted to the surface until persuaded by the sheriff to allow the animals to be taken out of the mines. (Tucson) Arizona Daily Star, September 29, 1915.
workers. The workmen loitered around for a while, but gradually the crowd dissipated as small groups, discussing the day's events and anticipating tomorrow, drifted off toward their shanties and sleep.

The next morning, union organizers ordered employees of the Arizona Copper Company and the Shannon Copper Company to cease work, and at two o'clock that same day, the smelters of the two companies were shut down. Tap matter was left in the furnaces and the charges in the converters were not blown. Almost five thousand workers were idle. Power for lighting purposes and the daily train were the only signs of industrial life in the entire district. The power plant was seized by strikers and shut down for three nights. Service was restored after the sheriff persuaded the miners to surrender the property and convinced company

2. Bisbee Daily Review, October 24, 1915, p. 5. No physical forces was exerted in getting the men to leave, but intimidation was used to the maximum. (Clifton) Copper Era, September 17, 1915.


4. The estimate of the number of men varied from 4,000 to "over 5,000." According to the (Miami) Daily Silver Belt, September 24, 1915, 4800 were out of work. Their breakdown showed 2500 employed by the Arizona Copper Mining Co., 1500 by Detroit Copper Co., and 800 by the Shannon Copper Co.
officials to reopen them under the protection of his
office. The train to Clifton and Morenci was not inter-
fered with because, as one striker put it, "That's our bean
wagon."

The Clifton-Morenci copper mining district, located
in Greenlee County in southeastern Arizona near the New
Mexico border, was an isolated community in 1915. Clifton,

5. The power plant of the Detroit Co., which served
Morenci, was shut down about seven o'clock Sunday evening.
Operations at the Arizona Co. power plant, which serviced
Clifton, were halted early Tuesday morning. After hurried
conferences with the Arizona Corporation Commission, which
regulated public utilities, the managers of the three mines,
and the sheriff, electrical service was restored Wednesday
morning under the protection of the sheriff's office. Cop-
per Era, September 17, 1915. Sheriff James G. Cash inter-
preted this to mean he should run the plants. The companies
continued to collect the bills and paid the men for a while.
As non-union or non-sympathetic workers left the district
in the course of the strike, Cash hired strikers and ex-
panded the size of the crews. In late November, the com-
panies refused to pay the men and they walked off the job
plunging the district into darkness for one night. The
sheriff protested to the Corporation Commission which sided
with the mine managers and demanded that Cash explain why
he was running the power plants without their knowledge.
Company officials agreed to pay the men, but gave Cash a
voucher bearing the endorsement "paid under protest." Fear-
ing that he might be held liable, the sheriff refused to
pass the payments on to the men. Copper Era, November 26,
1915. Since this was illegal, finally, on December 22, Cash
arranged with the union leaders to let the companies resume
operations, and the matter died.


7. Clifton was named for Henry Clifton, a gold
prospector who came into the area in 1864. James H.
McClintock, Arizona, the Youngest State (Chicago: S.J.
Clarke Publishing Co., 1916), II, p. 421. Morenci was
with its numerous suburbs, had about ten thousand residents, and was the county seat. Strung out for two or three miles on both sides of the San Francisco River Canyon, the town was a hodgepodge of streets and buildings erected wherever there was room to build. Seven miles up Chase Creek and Morenci Canyon, a road "as wide and as smooth as a boulevard" led to Morenci, with a population of about eight thousand. In that distance, the altitude rose from 3,466 feet to 5,000 feet. Metcalf, a community of one thousand inhabitants, was seven miles up Chase Creek from Clifton. To enter the district, a visitor could take either the road from Duncan or Solomonville, or travel by rail from Lordsburg, New Mexico, to Guthrie, and then ride the narrow gauge Arizona and New Mexico Railroad to the area.


8. The erosive action of the San Francisco River and Chase Creek, which flows into it near the center of town, have crested a canyon about a thousand feet deep. This gave the illusion that Clifton was situated in a tumble of mountains, but actually it sits on a great plain that slopes to the Blue Mountains. The San Francisco flows into the Gila about five miles southwest of Clifton. James Monroe Patton, "The History of Clifton" (Unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Arizona, 1945), p. 5.

In the first two decades of the twentieth century, three copper companies maintained an industrial "barony" in the district. The Arizona Copper Company, a Scottish corporation, dominated Clifton, while the Detroit Copper Mining Company, owned by the Phelps Dodge Company, held sway in Morenci. The Shannon Copper Company, owned largely by Boston financiers, and the smallest member of the three, had Metcalf for its "sphere of influence." More than just employers, they controlled almost every aspect of the workers' lives. Merchandise was brought into the district on the railroad owned by the Arizona company, and sold in company stores--the Arizona Copper Company Store Department in Clifton, or the Phelps Dodge Mercantile Store in Morenci.

10. The Arizona Copper Company Ltd. was hastily organized and incorporated in Edinburgh, Scotland on March 9, 1883, in order to buy the Longfellow Mining Co. Robert Metcalf, for whom Metcalf was named, staked the original claims to the Longfellow property and sold them to Charles and Henry Lesinsky in 1872. The Lesinskys in turn sold them to Frank L. Underwood in September, 1882, for one million five hundred thousand dollars. He sold the property to the Scotch interests six months later for two million dollars. T.H. Weed, "The Arizona Copper Company," The Mines Handbook and Copper Handbook 1916, p. 168.

The Detroit Copper Mining Company was founded in 1872 in Detroit, with E.B. Ward the principle stockholder. William Church, founder of Morenci, bought Ward's controlling interests in 1880 and began to develop the claims. In need of financial assistance, Church approached the Phelps Dodge Company. Although their principal business was exporting cotton to England, and importing tin and other metals to the U.S., they advanced him the money. In the spring of 1897, Phelps Dodge Co. purchased the Detroit Company. Robert Glass Cleland, History of Phelps Dodge, 1834-1950 (New York:
Men lived in either company owned houses, or ones built on company property. These homes were lighted by company power plants, and furnished water from company reservoirs. Long before Arizona adopted prohibition in 1914, saloons were forbidden in Morenci, where one could purchase beer and light wine by the pint at the company store, but only at certain times.

These subsidiary enterprises of the mining corporations were a special source of irritation for the workers. Men resented those endeavors even when they operated at a reasonable basis of profit or when these provided things better than the men could furnish themselves. In spite of


12. Charles F. Willis, Director of the Arizona State Bureau of Mines, observed four major problems causing an upswing in the number of strikes in Arizona after the start of World War I: (1) too much leisure time to become dissatisfied with one's way of life; (2) bigness of business, hence lack of loyalties; (3) resentment of company profits, especially in camps where many foreigners were employed and disparities of wealth were more acute; (4) resentment toward non-production company owned enterprises. "Some Observations on Arizona Strikes," *Engineering and Mining Journal*, October 13, 1917, p. 642. Hereafter cited *E&MJ*.

the existence of some private businesses in the area, most of the workers apparently bought at the mercantile department either at the "urging" of the company or because credit was easy to obtain there. Moreover, independent merchants existed at the pleasure of the town owners, so they didn't dare undersell the company stores. Workers claimed that store managers were instructed to make from fifty to two hundred percent profit on commodities. In September, 1915 sugar sold for ten cents a pound in hundred pound lots; flour cost $1.50 for twenty-six pounds; pink beans were ten cents a pound; a lead pencil was fifteen cents; a shave cost a quarter; and a shoe shine was fifteen cents, not including tip. Prices for staple items

14. Over eighty percent of the workers were constantly in debt to the companies through a system of enforced trading at the company stores. New York Call, November 7, 1915. (Taken from Governor Hunt's Scrapbooks, Vol. 19, p. 126. Hereafter cited GHS, Vol. (page.) R.L. Byrd, who reported he worked for the Arizona Copper Co. two years prior to the strike said the company owned stores were the only ones readily available to the average citizen. El Paso Herald, October 12, 1915. (GHS, Vol. 18, p. 43.)

15. Walter Doudra, El Paso Herald, n.d. (GHS, Vol. 18, n.p.). Doudra claimed small merchants had to be very careful not to offend the companies. (Doudra owned a small claim in the district). If one considers that the railroad which brought supplies to Clifton was company owned, one can see their plight. Moreover, few people would complain about being "forced" to make a bigger profit. It is interesting to note that most of these merchants sided with the miners. A few backed the strikers to the point of bankruptcy. (Phoenix) Arizona Republican, November 1, 1915.


17. Ibid.
averaged twenty-five percent higher than at Phoenix, and more than at Springerville, Arizona, where goods were freighted eighty-five miles by wagon.

If a determined miner hated the company store enough, he might patronize an independent merchant, even though he might not save any money doing it. With other services, it was a different story. The companies had a monopoly on water, whether liquid or solid. The rates for water caused considerable consternation among the workers. Each man paid a fixed amount, deducted from his salary. In the spring of 1915, the Corporation Commission conducted an investigation and ordered changes in the operations of the water companies. Prior to June 1, each single man paid $1.25 per month, the head of a family or household two dollars. Thereafter, bachelors were charged one dollar per month, and the rates for married men were reduced to $1.60.


20. Arizona Copper Company Payroll Records, 1914-1916, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library. Union officials claimed the rates paid were higher than this, but a check of payroll records shows these to be the correct figures. After the strike, the company discontinued deducting water fees from the payroll.
In spite of the decrease, the miners nevertheless continued to complain that the rates were too high. Ice cooled men's attitude toward the companies as much as it did their food. At the same time that workers were paying a dollar a hundred pounds in Clifton, ice shipped on contract from Bisbee to Fort Huachuca sold at twenty-five cents a hundred. While these items were not a major complaint, they added to the miners' animosity toward their employers.

The company hospital was a principal grievance of the men and one upon which they would vent some of their most vociferous complaints. The Arizona company operated a hospital under the name Clifton Benevolent Society. Before the enactment of the Arizona Workingman's Compensation Law in 1912, the society was also an insurance company. The men paid a dollar a month hospital dues plus fifty cents for the insurance. When the Compensation Law became effective, the hospital directors raised the fees. The men then paid the same amount, $1.50 for single, $2.00 for a married man and his family. What galled the miners was the additional fee for the use of the facilities. Any member of

21. Copper Era, December 3, 1915. The managers' answers to the water question were couched in vague terms and limited mainly to an objection that the money for water was not paid to the companies but to water plants. They always neglected the ice question.

22. Arizona Republican, October 9, 1915. These rates were the ones given by the hospital directors. They
a worker's family confined to the hospital had to pay a dollar a day for board; the men themselves had to pay this amount for certain illnesses, while for injuries and other sicknesses they got free care but half pay. This service, they maintained, was another profitable venture for the companies in which they had no voice. Actually, the miners were to have elected representation on the directorate, but from the beginning few took any interest in it, and the hospital directors filled the vacancies on their own.

Lack of interest in such affairs was not surprising in view of the peculiar make up of the labor force in the district. When the camp first opened in the '80's, Mexicans

are at variance with a statement by Walter Douglas, who said single men were paid a dollar a month and married men $1.50. Arizona Daily Star, September 29, 1915.


24. The directors claimed they received about $4500 a month in dues alone, but that the hospital lost $3-400 in 1914. Arizona Republican, October 9, 1915. Byrd claimed the fees withheld to have been $2500 to $3000 a month, to pay the expenses of a hospital with less then fifteen patients a month, two physicians, two nurses, and a cook. He was obviously talking about the Detroit Co. Hospital in Morenci. The objections in the strike were mainly against the Clifton Hospital.

25. Arizona Republican, October 9, 1915. The workers were probably unaware that they even had a right to a voice on the hospital board until union organizers called it to their attention.
were the only workers obtainable. This cheaper class of labor was sought thereafter because of the character of ore, its formation, and the higher cost of extracting and treating it. In later years, the operators hired hundreds of Yaqui Indians, who sought the mines of Arizona rather than take their chances with either of the warring factions in their native Mexico. Americans, constituting about thirty percent of the employees, held most of the occupations of skill and subordinate positions of trust.

The Mexicans being inarticulate and their oppressors indifferent, they suffered silently the dishonest and often brutal yoke of many of these lesser officials. Lacking any effective organization or machinery for reaching the bosses, workers who protested usually found themselves discharged; and discharge meant banishment from the district. The companies would have nothing to do with such a worker. Many workers complained among themselves of being compelled by


27. B. F. Fly, Newspaper article (GHS, Vol. 18, p. 6).


29. Feature Article by Ernest Douglas, Arizona Republican, November 1, 1915.
petty foremen to buy chances on worthless, or nearly worthless, items, but what they particularly resented was the bribery required by minor officials to get or keep a job. Shift bosses collected from five to fifteen dollars a month for such services. Many foremen "double shot the turn," that is, they built shacks with the money thus obtained and rented them to the miners for ten dollars a month.

Such bribes came out of an already meager salary, the lowest of any Arizona mining camp. A sliding scale, based on the selling price of copper, determined wage rates. The price quotation used to set the rates appeared in the weekly *Engineering and Mining Journal*. The major mining camps in the state had a minimum scale of $3.50 per turn for miners, with the rate automatically rising as copper prices rose as the price of copper advanced.


31. Ibid.


33. The price of copper for the previous month determined rates for pay from the fifteenth of one month to the fifteenth of the next. Thus, if January's price averaged fourteen cents, pay from February 15 to March 15 was based on that price. *Copper Era*, February 5, 1915. Wages rose as the price of copper advanced.
went up. In the Clifton-Morenci district, Mexican miners received $2.39 for a seven and a half hour turn; American miners were paid $2.89. At the time the strike was called, muckers were earning $1.92 per shift. Although quoted as shift pay, wages were actually figured on an hourly basis. When Arizona adopted the eight hour law in 1903, the managers utilized this new system in order to avoid paying the men for the time it took them to get from the cellar of the shaft to the working level and back again.

The policy of cheap wages for cheap labor netted the companies handsome dividends during this period. The mining profits, combined with big "turn shooting" ventures like the mercantile departments, meant huge profits for the stockholders in New York, Boston, and Edinburgh. In 1912 Phelps

34. For example, the Copper Queen managers in Bisbee announced the following rates in January, 1915:

- Present rate $3.50/turn
- 13-14¢ copper 3.65
- 14-15¢ copper 3.75
- over 15¢ copper 3.90

These rates are for miners, all other rates in proportion. E&MJ, February 5, 1915, p. 300.

35. There was much dispute about what wages were actually paid. The managers claimed one rate, the miners claimed another. The rate quoted here was from W. Douglas' statement November 11, 1915, dated New York. Douglas quoted $2.36 and $2.86, but actual company records show $2.89 to be correct figure.


Dodge earned twenty-three percent on its capital of forty-five million dollars and its principal property, the Detroit company paid a dividend of 146 percent on a capitalization of one million dollars that year. In 1913 Shannon Copper, reputed to be the weakest financially of the three companies, paid better than $1.50 per share, the stock listing at around 6½ points. Events in Europe soon caused a temporary halt in such earnings, then an unprecedented rise in returns. The lowly miner in an isolated camp in southwestern Arizona knew little of the happenings across the ocean, but he felt the results in his pocketbook.

At the outbreak of hostilities in August, 1914, all shipments of copper to Europe ceased. The metal was listed as absolute contraband, and, as such, could be seized and confiscated under traditional international law by any of the belligerents. This was a serious blow to the copper companies in the United States, which exported sixty-five

38. (Iowa) Des Moines News, January 10, 1916 (GHS, Vol. 19, p. 47). As to the "safety" of mining investments, the following government figures, released in 1916, are worth noting. They showed that 36% of legitimate mining investments failed, against 54% in commercial lines, while the following returns on capital invested were earned: Railroads, 3%; National Banks, 6½%; Insurance, 11%; Lumbering, 14%; Manufacturing, 14%; Mining 182%. Arizona Daily Star, January 29, 1916.

percent of their annual production to Europe. Arizona, which produced over one-third of the nation's output of the metal, felt the effects of the ban immediately. With the sudden drop in both demand and price, directors throughout the country took immediate steps to curtail operations.

In the Clifton-Morenci district, J. W. Bennie, general manager of the Shannon Company, closed operations entirely, while A. T. Thomson, general manager of Detroit Copper, and Norman Carmichael, general manager of Arizona Copper, cut wages ten percent across the board, and discontinued some facilities. This action sent a laborer's pay per shift to $1.60, while a miner earned $2.44. The managers also reduced the number of hours each man worked in order to employ as many as possible while the hard times lasted. Preference was given married employees wherever possible. In October the mercantile departments of the two companies announced a "profit sharing plan," by which

40. Ibid., August 7, 1914.


42. Arizona Payroll Records, 1914.

43. Statement by A. T. Thomson, Arizona Daily Star, October 12, 1915. Thomson was general manager of the Detroit Co. at this time.
employees received a five percent rebate on purchases for the duration of the copper depression.

Five months after the outbreak of war, Great Britain agreed to give United States ships comparative freedom from interference on the seas, and the situation in the copper industry improved rapidly. By January 23, 1915, the price of copper had risen to fourteen cents a pound. On February 5 the mine managers announced a pay raise, based on a new sliding scale, with top pay when copper sold at fifteen cents and over. At the same time, Mr. Bennie of


45. At the height of the depression, it had dipped to about eleven cents. Fourteen cent copper was supposed to be the minimum price at which stockholders received a reasonable return on their investment. E&MJ, March 20, 1915, p. 546.

46. Copper Era, February 5, 1915. The managers' statement listed the scale, and called it a raise. They claimed the "15¢ and over" rate corresponded to when copper sold at 17¢, but the article failed to list the rates. This lack of published rates lends some credence to the complaint of some miners during the strike, that often the same job paid different rates. A more plausible explanation for any lack of uniformity in rates seems to be the amount of the "kick-back" to the foreman. Some workers claimed the "raise" was not that at all. They maintained that they got a ten percent advance in salary, thus cheating them out of one-half per cent. For example: Wages August 1914 50¢/hour, minus 10% during the depression, or 45¢/hour; then 10% raise, or 49½¢/hour. Arizona Republican, October 4, 1915. A check of company records shows that a laborer's wage rose from $1.60 to $1.64 per shift; a miner's pay went from $2.44 to $2.51. Additional raises from this scale pushed a miner's wage to $2.00 for the two week pay period ending July 30, and laborers' to $2.96. Arizona Copper Company Payroll Records.
Shannon announced the resumption of operations. On February 20 the mercantile departments declared an end to "profit sharing." The district, it appeared, had returned to normal.

As the price of copper continued to rise, the managers hoped to balance out the depressed period with extra profits. The workers, lacking organization, had no effective way to get a substantial pay raise to balance their losses, unless the managers granted a pay hike. Milton McLean, Bennie, and Carmichael interpreted their employees' silence as satisfaction. While in unionized camps, such as at Bisbee and Miami, pay scales went up with the price of copper, the Clifton-Morenci wage standard lagged. At Miami, pay scales called for a twelve cent hike as copper advanced a cent per pound; in the District raises averaged only eight cents a pound. Years of petty abuses and misunderstanding, culminating in scanty salaries during prosperous periods, made the miners susceptible to union agitation.

The few feeble attempts at organizing in the past had been miserable failures because the men lacked the


49. Arizona Copper Company Payroll Records.
experience in successful negotiating and the financial independence to endure a long strike. Realizing these facts, a group of workers asked an organizer from the Western Federation of Miners to come to the district. It was ironic that the Western Federation was invited there. They had been a leading advocate of the so-called eighty percent law, which would have allowed Arizona companies to employ no more than twenty percent aliens.


51. The Western Federation of Miners was organized in Butte, Montana, in 1813, and affiliated with the American Federation of Labor almost immediately. It separated from the Federation in 1897, and after a period of independent existence, broken by alliances with the Western Labor Union in 1898, and with the I.W.W. in 1905, rejoined the AF of L in 1911. Before the birth of the I.W.W., the W.F. of M figured in some of the most dramatic and bloody strikes in the history of the American labor movement. Among the more noted names in the WF of M history are Coeur d'Alene, Cripple Creek, Leadville, and Telluride. The organization changed its name in June, 1916, to the International Union of Mine Mill and Smelter Workers. Vernon H. Jensen, *Heritage of Conflict* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950) and Paul F. Brissenden, *The I.W.W.* (New York: Columbia University, 1920).


53. This law was an initiative measure on the 1914 ballot. It carried the state 25,017 to 14,323. Greenlee County approved it 1,210 to 640. The mining companies of Clifton-Morenci employed almost the converse of the law. In December, 1915, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, Guy E. Miller, a member of the executive board of the Federation, entered the district early in August, with an assistant, "a half breed Mexican named Tribolet." In spite of the many grievances, the first attempts of the union organizers were characterized by a notable lack of success. Many of the men distrusted Miller and Tribolet; most workers feared reprisals from the companies.

At first, small groups of men held clandestine meetings at Newtown, a Morenci "suburb" outside of the mining district proper where most of the Mexican miners lived. The organizers took advantage of Spanish American societies. They promised to extend the benefits of these groups by securing better wages and working conditions. As union strength grew, the agitators came out into the open. At a meeting in Morenci, men shouted to Miller, "We

54. Guy Miller had risen in the ranks of the WF of M, through his activities in Colorado, where some of the most turbulent labor relations in the U.S. took place. He was president of the local union at Telluride, Colo., during the "labor wars" of 1904. Miller had a keen intellect, and was a leader in the fight against radical unionism. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict, pp. 141 and 340.

55. Copper Era, August 20, 1915.

56. (Globe) Arizona Record, September 4, 1915.

57. Tucson Citizen, October 15, 1915. The Spanish American societies provided sick and burial benefits to its members.
can't understand you, speak in Spanish." He withdrew, and
as Charpentier began to speak, he was greeted with cries
of otro toro, and "Speak English, we can't understand you."
Two men, reported to be company "spotters," tried to break
up a later meeting. They were severely manhandled and told
to leave the district. Sheriff James G. Cash, who had
worked for the Arizona Copper Company prior to his election
in 1914, warned the union men that he would permit no vio-
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lence. At the same time he served notice on the non-
union men that any interference on their part with anyone's
right to free speech and meetings would also be prohibited.

Company officials quickly learned of the presence
of labor agitators in the area. At first they attempted to
discredit the Western Federation. From Jose Tibbets, a
miner in Ray, where the Federation had attempted to organize
a union in July after a strike had begun, they got the fol-
lowing telegram and distributed it as a circular:

Federation has no union here; only a few boys
belonging to Miami local. These boys are

58. Copper Era, August 20, 1915. Otro toro means
"more bull" figuratively. Charpentier was another organizer.

59. James G. Cash had been employed by the Arizona
Copper Co. for six years. During the strike, the workers
heartily approved his actions. The voters, apparently, did
not; he was defeated in the 1916 election. Copper Era, May
8, 1914, November 6, 1914, and November 10, 1916.

60. Arizona Record, September 5, 1915.
disgusted with the way they have been treated and are going to quit the union and demand their money back. Do not pay any attention to Tribolet; he is no good and deceived us all. As soon as he gets you in trouble he will leave and probably take your money same as he did here.61

Union membership continued to grow. On August 16 it was fed by a salary cut resulting from a decline in the price of copper during the previous month. On August 18 the managers requested a conference with their Latin-American employees. When Miller showed up, they refused to meet. Then, certain employees began circulating a petition announcing their satisfaction with conditions and requesting that the camp not be unionized. When all these measures failed, the managers began discharging employees who had joined the union or who refused to sign the petition.

61. Copper Era, August 27, 1915. Tibbets was described as a former Morenci resident, who was well known there.

62. The average monthly price of copper in June was 19.477; July, 18.796; August, 16.941. E&MJ. The salary cut dropped a laborer's pay from $2.00 to $1.92 per shift; a miner's salary fell from $2.96 to $2.89. Arizona Copper Company Records.

63. Arizona Republican, September 17, 1915.


65. Speech by Miller, Copper Era, October 1, 1915. The re-hiring of all employees discharged from September 1 to September 11 was a major consideration in the eventual settlement of the strike.
On September 6 Miller held a meeting in Library plaza at Clifton, and outlined his plans. These included the presentation of demands to the managers, time for consideration of the requests, and, if this failed, a strike. In case a walk out was deemed necessary, he advised the men to stock up on provisions, adding that if they ran out before the strike ended, the union would "perhaps" come to the rescue. When more workers were discharged for union activity, the leaders changed their plans and decided to act swiftly.

On Saturday morning, September 11, the three mine managers each received letters requesting that they hold a conference with a committee of their employees and that Guy Miller be admitted to the conference. Milton McLean was in his office at the time. He replied that he would meet a committee of employees at any time, but that he would have nothing to do with Guy Miller or the Western Federation of Miners. J. W. Bennie wired a similar answer the next morning from California. Norman Carmichael, also out of town, concurred with the other managers when he was contacted. After receiving the reply from McLean, the

66. Copper Era, September 10, 1915. As it turned out, the Western Federation did not authorize the strike, largely because they lacked the funds to support it.

union committee met and decided to call a strike against
the Detroit company that night, and to hold off action
against the other two companies, pending answers from
their managers. At a hurried conference, men made plans
for a strike that had been coming for years. Miller had
been in the district only a month when he called the strike.
Like the assassin at Sarajevo, he was not the cause of the
events that followed; he merely touched the match.
CHAPTER II

EARLY ATTEMPTS AT SETTLEMENT

At the time the strike was called, the Western Federation of Miners was in bad shape. It had never recovered from a long and costly strike in Michigan in 1913 and 1914. Heavy unemployment during the 1914 depression had cut membership rolls and weakened the influence of the union. Adding to its difficulties, Butte Miners Union, its main financial source, was in revolt against the central committee. The miners in the Clifton-Morenci district were unaware that the organizers had ordered the walk out with only the slimmest hope of more than token monetary support from the Federation. Nevertheless, by the time the strike began, nearly all the workers, heeding the advice of Guy Miller, had exhausted their credit for provisions at the company stores. Such supplies would last only a short time. The men would have to make other arrangements for necessities, give up the strike, or force an early settlement with the companies.

2. (Clifton) Copper Era, September 17, 1915.
Because of the sanguine reputation of the Western Federation from other strikes, and the desire of preventing any strong union development, the managers of the companies had attempted to avert the establishment of such organization in the district. So confident that their efforts were succeeding, two of the managers were out of town when the strike was called; the walk out caught them totally unprepared. Their problem suddenly became one of elimination rather than prevention. They could not let the men feel that their organized effort had won them any advantage. This was especially true of the Detroit Copper Company. Phelps Dodge operated larger properties elsewhere, and it was important that the tactics of its Morenci employees be discredited lest they be adopted at other mines. The managers took the position that the question of wages and other "minor grievances" had been interjected for popular effect. The central issue, they maintained, was whether "outside agitators" would dominate or whether it would be an open camp.

On September 17 the three managers reiterated their stand against the Federation and their willingness to meet


their employees directly. In a statement issued that day, they laid down certain preliminaries to any conference. They insisted that committees selected to meet with them be chosen "at such time, place, and in such manner that all our former employees, whether union or non-union, may have participated in that selection" so they would know the group fairly represented all the workmen and was not sent as delegates of the Western Federation. After representatives were thus chosen, the managers were to be given time to confirm that their instructions were carried out. Further, the workmen were required to pass "appropriate resolutions" or "duly authorize" the committees not to demand recognition of the Western Federation of Miners either then or at any time, and to state their desire and agreement to return to work provided that any existing difficulties be adjusted. When the men complied with these conditions, the statement concluded, it would be a "pleasure to meet with the proposed committee for the purpose of discussion."

The next day, while the companies were formally turning their property over to Sheriff Cash for protection, the men began taking the prescribed steps for a conference.

6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
which they hoped would lead to the resumption of operations at those properties. That afternoon the employees of the Arizona Copper Company met at the Princess Theatre in Clifton and named a committee to represent them in negotiations. Delegates from the Detroit and Shannon Copper Companies were chosen at Morenci the following Wednesday morning. All of the men selected belonged to the union and were employees of the companies. At none of these gatherings were any resolutions or instructions given to the delegates. After the meeting at Morenci, Guy Miller addressed the crowd on the plaza. In his speech, he emphasized that he never demanded anything of the managers. The word "demand," he said, did not belong to labor disputes because such disputes should be worked out by reason. Knowing that the Federation would not be able to support the strike, the organizer told the men that he was willing to waive recognition "at this time," in order that


9. (Phoenix) Arizona Republican, September 23, 1915. No officials of the Western Federation, however, were named.
industrial harmony might be quickly restored to the com-
10
munity. At Clifton later that day, he explained to the
workers gathered in library plaza that recognition would
require a long struggle and he could not ask the men to
pay such a price just then. He concluded that he hoped
"relations between employer and employee will be such
that the managers will have no objection to my interven-
11
tion when I may come again."

When the managers were given the list of delegates,
they asked if the workers had complied with the other pro-
visions. Since the men had not passed any resolutions or
given their representatives any instructions, the managers
still refused to meet the men. On Thursday, September 23,
Charles H. Moyer, president of the Western Federation, and
Walter Douglas, general manager of Phelps-Dodge, both ar-
12
rived in the district. Douglas immediately went into

11. Ibid.
12. Charles H. Moyer had become president of the
Western Federation in 1903 and served as its head until he
was forced to resign in 1926. In those twenty-three years,
he had seen the Federation gradually decline. One by one
locals deserted the organization, which, incidently, changed
its name to the International Union of Mine Mill and Smelter
Workers at its 1916 convention. Much of the blame for the
disintegration was laid at Moyer's door. He was accused by
the membership of lacking drive and relying too much on the
advice of a handful of confidents. In his desire to expand
the size of the union, he often took on more than he could
conference with the managers, while Moyer conferred with the strike leaders. The following day the strikers in Morenci passed a resolution waiving recognition of the Federation and declaring their willingness to return to work "upon the adjustment of differences." That night the workers in Clifton adopted the statement and the following morning employees at Metcalf ratified the declaration. Confidently predicting that the strike would be over in forty-eight hours, Moyer listed three points which the workers would demand, a higher wage scale, reinstatement of men unjustly discharged since September 1, and assurances of no discrimination against the strike leaders. At eight o'clock, the managers announced their willingness to meet the committee the following morning.

An air of optimism pervaded Clifton Sunday morning. Somberly dressed Mexican women talked anxiously among themselves as they filed into church. While devout señoritas prayed for an end to the strike, fidgety youngsters 

successfully handle at one time, as the strike in Clifton would show. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict.

13. Resolution of the strikers, ratified by the workers at Clifton and Morenci on September 24, and at Metcalf on September 25, 1915. Arizona Republican, September 26, 1915.

14. (Miami) Daily Silver Belt, September 25, 1915. Unlike Miller, Moyer saw nothing wrong with the word "demand."
whispered and giggled. Mothers alternated between fervent petitions to Our Lady of Guadalupe and stern reprimands to their impish off-spring. Outside, men began congregating in small groups in the plaza, on the courthouse lawn, and in front of the offices of the Arizona Copper Company. They scrutinized each of the company officials as he entered the general office building. Each became the topic of conversation until he was replaced by the next arrival. A few minutes before eleven, the representatives of the strikers walked through the picket line and went into the building. For three hours, the workers waited and watched. Shortly after two, the sober-faced strike committee reappeared, made a terse announcement that the managers would have a statement at four o'clock, and left for the union headquarters in Newtown. The men knew that the conference had been a failure; nevertheless, they waited for the official word.

The statement from the companies confirmed the suspicions of the strikers; the tone of the reply disheartened them. The managers contended that "agitators" of the Western Federation entered the district, persuaded their former employees that the "past pleasant relations and present rate of wages should be radically changed," and
called the strike without any presentation of grievances.\textsuperscript{15}

In spite of the fact that large numbers of workers were willing to return to work, Bennie, McLean and Carmichael felt that any attempt to recommence work would be to invite violence and intimidation. They were prepared to shut down indefinitely and arrogantly asserted:

\begin{quote}
When it shall appear that conditions in this section warrant it and the companies are satisfied that the general sentiment of the community and their former employees is unanimously in favor of a resumption of operations on a basis of wages and conditions which have prevailed heretofore in this district, the companies reserve to themselves the right to decide as to whether or not they will again start up their plants.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

Although their main objection, union recognition, had been waived by the strikers, company officials were concerned about the continued presence of organizers of the Federation in the district. They apparently felt that the labor leaders would complicate the settlement of the "minor" issues, especially the wage question. The managers maintained that the Shannon and Detroit companies, which employed half of the workers in the area, could not continue to operate with any substantial increase in wages.

\textsuperscript{15} Managers' statement, September 26, 1915. Taken from "Clifton-Morenci Strike, 1915-1916," a collection of letters, statements, and articles on the strike. Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
They held the demand for a $3.50 per day minimum for all underground miners was impossible with thirteen cent copper, the base from which the wage scale ascended. E. W. Lewis, an attorney and spokesman for the Shannon company, said that a wage increase, even if possible, would not benefit present employees, but would cause a substitution of the Mexicans by the more efficient white miners. Arizona Copper Company, on the other hand, had both high and low grade ore, and could operate for a while on their high grade, but the workers' request would shorten the life of that property fifty percent. The editor of the Copper Era, the weekly newspaper of Clifton, argued that any settlement would have to depend on these facts.

The average striker did not understand statistical explanations of what the companies could or could not afford any more than he understood the dispute over union recognition. He wanted higher pay, and he believed that the strike would get it for him. Almost daily, Miller, Moyer,

17. Arizona Republican, September 27, 1915. Yearly averages on copper prices had not been under thirteen cents since 1911. Even in the depression year 1914, the metal averaged 13.602 cents a pound. E&MJ, January 23, 1915, p. 201. On September 23, 1915, copper was quoted at 17.90 cents per pound.


19. Ibid.

and local leaders addressed the strikers, instilling enthusiasm, squelching rumors, and promulgating "official" policy. The mass meetings were held alternately at Clifton and Morenci. Workers in both communities got their exercise; the men marched to the gathering and back again in parade formation. With the exception of picket duty, these gatherings constituted the only activity of the rank and file workers. With their provisions exhausted, the conference a failure, and the strike in its third week, the miners hopefully looked for something to break the deadlock.

As soon as he learned the manager's reply, Sheriff Cash sent the governor a telegram informing him that the conference had been a hopeless failure, and urging him to come to Clifton to help effect a settlement. Although he had been urged by both the managers and the miners to come to the district, the governor replied that there was little that he could do "as the situation now stands." Nevertheless, he would come and add his "voice and counsel to efforts toward peace" if another conference could be


arranged. Without waiting for an answer, Governor G. W. P. Hunt and his Adjutant General left Phoenix by train for the strike area.

At the time, George Wiley Paul Hunt was fifty-five years old. He was born on November 1, 1859, at Huntsville, Missouri, a town founded by his grandfather. Though he prided himself on the social status of his ancestors, Hunt grew up in poverty, his family having been impoverished by the Civil War. When he was eighteen, he ran away from home and gradually made his way to Blackhawk, Colorado, where he worked for six months in a boarding house kitchen. In the spring of 1879, he set out for Santa Fe to work on the railroad. When this venture failed he journeyed to El Paso, then to Lordsburg, and finally to Shakespeare, New Mexico, where he found work in a mine. The mine soon played out, and he found himself back working in a boarding house. On July 4, 1881, Hunt and two companions left to find gold in Arizona. On Columbus Day he "packed a burro" into Globe, where he spent the next two and a half years as a waiter at

23. Ibid.

the Old Pascoe Restaurant. He reportedly became a member of the Waiters' Union, and took an active part in union affairs. In 1884, he got a job as a "mucker" at the Old Dominion Mine. When the mine closed in 1886, the future governor went to San Francisco to work. In 1890 he returned to Globe and became a "delivery boy" for the Old Dominion Mercantile Company. Ten years later he was the president of the firm.

While he was establishing himself as a successful businessman, Hunt became active in politics. He lost his first bid for elective office, Gila County recorder. Two years later, in 1892, he was chosen a representative to the territorial legislature where he spent four years in the lower house and four years in the Council, before temporarily retiring from politics in 1900. Four years later he was elected to a seat on the Council, and served in the final three sessions of the Territorial Legislature. The Democrats, with control of the Council in 1904 and


28. The Council, or upper house, consisted of one member from each county.
1908, chose Hunt as president. At its last session, Hunt and the other legislators shied away from progressive measures lest they delay statehood. When President Taft signed the Enabling Act, union leaders, hoping to influence the convention in the interests of the working man, at first attempted to organize a Labor party. As a third party, the labor group did not appear able to elect enough delegates to control the convention. Largely through intervention by Hunt, leaders of the two parties reached an agreement whereby the Labor party withdrew from politics and supported the Democratic party, which incorporated labor planks into its platform. The convention was called to order on October 19, 1910. With forty-one Democrats to eleven Republicans, and Hunt as president, the convention proceeded to adopt a liberal constitution. The following fall, G. W. P. Hunt was elected the first governor of the state.

Hunt's motto, "Remember your friends, and forget


31. Ibid., p. 33.
your enemies," dictated the course of his political actions. Labor, an important cog in the so-called "Hunt machine," benefited from its association with the "globo-lar governor from Globe." Having worked the mines himself, Hunt knew the needs and wants of the worker; a successful businessman, he was sympathetic to the problems of the entrepreneur. He distrusted the "extremists" on either side, and attempted to steer a middle course, his sympathy at all times with the "underdog." A master politician, he captured the favor of the common people through his humble origin's identification with an audience, by accentuating the "interests" conflict to his benefit, and with bombastic problems and promises. Although Hunt had an abruptness of

32. Lockwood, p. 208.
33. Ibid., p. 201.
34. MacFarlane, p. 21.
36. The "interests" were the big corporations, such as the copper companies and the railroads. When Hunt was elected, the corporations reportedly sent a representative to him as a gesture of friendship. "What can we do, governor, to help make your administration a success?" beamed the visitor. "You might begin by paying your share of the taxes," suggested the governor dryly. Then he appointed a commission to reassess the tax role, tacking almost all additional levies on the corporations. MacFarlane, p. 23.
expression, and was not a particularly companionable man, he acquired a devoted following which never wavered in their support of both him and his deeds. He was almost constantly under attack from the press, yet his policies apparently pleased the "dodgasted persnicketiness" of the voters. He was returned to office time and again.

The governor arrived by train in Clifton Tuesday morning, September 18. He exchanged pleasantries with residents as he made his way to the Reardon Hotel, where he set up headquarters. The first delegation to call was the mine managers. Hunt told them that he was there to learn the facts and "call white white and black black." After he heard their side of the strike, the governor proposed an arbitration committee to be composed of the three managers, a representative of the workers from each company, and one disinterested person appointed by himself. The managers balked at this idea and reiterated their insistence that any settlement must be preceded by the elimination of the Federation from the district and a period in which they

38. Pattee, p. 47.
40. Hunt was governor for seven terms. In later terms his enemies referred to him as "George V, George VI, etc." Lockwood, p. 194.
41. Copper Era, October 1, 1915.
could observe the spirit of the men. When the managers asked Hunt to dine with them that evening, he declined, abruptly telling them that he came to end the strike, not to eat. After the union organizers came and exchanged their views with the governor, Hunt invited the workers to present their grievances personally. With a court reporter named Shortridge transcribing the testimony, Hunt spent the rest of the day listening to complaints—some real, some imaginary—from a steady stream of strikers, anxious to unload their problems on a sympathetic ear.

The hearings continued Wednesday in Morenci. As the men continued to come, the chief executive said that he did not know when he would return to Phoenix and that he might make Clifton the capitol until the labor problem was cleared up. Later in the day Guy Miller announced that a "monster mass meeting" would be held Thursday at five o'clock in Library Plaza in Clifton and that Governor Hunt would address the crowd.

42. *Arizona Republican*, October 2, 1915.

43. Hunt Diary, September 28, 1915. The Hunt Diaries are at the Arizona State University Library, Tempe.

44. Hunt reported that he interviewed "fully six hundred men" during his comparatively brief stay in the district. *Arizona Republican*, October 2, 1915.

45. *Copper Era*, October 1, 1915.
The Plaza in Clifton started to hum with activity shortly after noon, as workers from Morenci and Metcalf began pouring into town. Ushers from the strikers' committee took up positions to channel the crowd into an orderly assemblage. A Mexican orchestra provided entertainment, while chairs were hurriedly secured for an unexpectedly large number of female spectators. By four o'clock, over a thousand persons were milling about, seeking the best spot to watch the proceedings. Surrounding telegraph poles afforded points of vantage as did a box car standing on a nearby siding. Many of the men wore home-made badges, "Hurrah for Governor Hunt." At five o'clock, a big auto truck, decorated with the national colors, was driven slowly through the crowd to the center of the plaza. Over three thousand businessmen, clerks, women, deputy sheriffs, and strikers had filled the square by the time organizer Miller climbed onto the truck and opened the meeting by calling for a voice vote and show of hands of those who wanted to hear Hunt. An auto was sent for the governor, while Miller continued to speak. When the guest speaker, escorted by ushers, began making his way through the crowd to the platform, the speaker cut short his remarks and said to Hunt, "Governor, you are wanted over here, right over here."

46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
Hunt climbed onto the platform. A reporter and court stenographer Shortridge were seated on the front end of the truck to take down the speech. I. Guiterrez de Lara, a Federation organizer from Los Angeles, stood next to the governor ready to translate his remarks for the Mexicans in the audience. As he started to speak, shouts of "Hurrah for Governor Hunt," and three cheers were given. In his introductory comments, Hunt praised "your good sheriff Cash," and said how proud he was to have been elevated to his position by people who can "go ahead and demand what they think are their just rights in an orderly and law-abiding manner." Emphasizing his remarks by pounding his fists, he continued:

For the past few days I have been interviewing the boys . . . . I find conditions existing here that require adjustment. I feel that the men who have charge of these great works will be amenable to reason, and I believe they will meet you on common ground. When I come back to this community and have to bring troops, the principle officers of the companies will be no different from the poorest Mexican they control. I hope all of you realize that I am going to have order if I have to call every troop we have in Arizona. I do not want to come to this

48. De Lara, a Socialist, was said to have been private secretary to Pancho Villa at one time. Ibid. He reportedly quit the Madero army after the battle of Casas Grandes because "he could not stand to see his brothers killed." Paper unknown (GHS, Vol. 18, p. 45).

district except to bear the olive branch of peace, but if war comes, you will have to abide by war. There never was a condition but that it couldn't be improved, and I feel that employers and employees can get together, and if they cannot get together peacefully, they will have to get together some other way, because I am going to see you people get together some way, if I have to put every one of you in the bull pen.  

The rotund governor's harangue obviously pleased the crowd; they frequently interrupted it with applause and shouts of bien dicho. He rambled on for half an hour, repetitiously praising their efforts to improve their conditions, but warning them to maintain order, and finally concluded that "the time has come when the men and women who toil in this district should have justice, and that is all the governor of this state asks for."

When the applause for Hunt died down, Miller rose and pledged to go to the "bull pen" if necessary to get what the workers deserved. Then Wiley E. Jones, Attorney-General of Arizona, spoke. He reminisced about having come into the district twenty-three years earlier, and by hard work raising himself to his present position. Jones

50. Ibid. The "bull pen" reference was to stockade enclosures which were first used in a strike in the Couer d'Alenes in 1892. Union men and sympathizers were rounded up and held in these pending trial.

51. "Well said." Copper Era, October 1, 1915.

concluded that "God Almighty is on the side of the working-man in this controversy." G. A. Franz of the Becker-Franz Mercantile Company in Clifton told the strikers that he was with them as long as he had a dollar in his pocket. Franz advised the men "not to starve working, but if necessary starve fighting." By the time the final speaker, a Mexican, finished speaking, darkness had fallen, and the crowd had largely dispersed. Governor Hunt travelled by auto to Lordsburg, where he caught the train for Phoenix.

Hunt had given a fine, if somewhat partisan, performance in the district. The strikers were pleased with their governor and his speech. Others were not as enthusiastic. The editor of the Arizona Daily Star called his utterances a serious mistake. Pointing out that the speech was before people who understood little or no English and "translated very likely in a crude manner," the Star editor felt that Hunt's remarks were "doubtless" taken to mean that whatever happened he would protect them. I. W. Spear,

53. Arizona Republican, October 1, 1915. God and Wiley Jones may have been on the side of the workers in the district at this time, but two weeks later, before the Supreme Court, only God was. Jones went to Washington shortly after this speech to argue the validity of the so-called eighty percent law (see Chapter I, footnote 53). Jones cited the Clifton strike as an example of the need for such a law, as the strike demonstrated the need for closer exercise of the police powers of the state. Arizona Daily Star, October 16, 1915.

54. Copper Era, October 1, 1915.

editor of the Arizona Republican, said the governor should realize that he represented neither side and that his job was to preserve law and order, not to encourage agitation. The editor of Dunbar's Weekly, on the other hand, found the lamentations of the "copper press" toward Hunt "amusing." Governor Hunt's encouragement to the strikers, he said, consisted of a pledge that everyone would be treated equal. Most disturbed by the governor's oration were the mine managers, who accused him of making "inflammatory speeches" that encouraged the strikers and made the Western Federation bolder.

On Saturday morning, October 2, about two thousand persons gathered in front of the union hall. Headed by a drum corps, the strikers and some of their children marched down Chase Creek to the center of Clifton. Some of the men carried signs, "Mine Managers too Proud to Confer,"

56. Arizona Republican, October 5, 1915.

57. Dunbar's Weekly, n.d. (GHS, Vol. 18, p. 50). The copper press were those papers that always sided with the copper companies. Some of the papers were owned by copper companies.

58. Ibid.

59. Tucson Citizen, October 9, 1915.

60. Copper Era, October 8, 1915 estimated that there were 1500 marchers. Arizona Republican, October 3, 1915, put the figure at 2000. The Daily Silver Belt, October 2, 1915, said there were 2500 in the parade.
"Carmichael, Bennie and McLean Want us to Starve," and "We Will Fight Before We Will Starve." Several of the children had a banner, "Are you going to Let Us Starve, too?"
The parade halted at the General Offices of the Arizona Copper Company, where the managers were meeting with their attorneys. Some of the men were cheering for the union, while others were shouting, *Vejo le Garantes*, and shaking their fists. A mechanic named Dawson, who had refused to joint the union, came down the road and was surrounded by the strikers. When the men began to manhandle him, Sheriff Cash, who was watching the demonstration, intervened and took the mechanic to the Courthouse for safety. The parade formed again and marched down East Side to the home of Norman Carmichael, who had returned from the meeting in Clifton. The men shouted for him and Bennie to come out and lead the parade. Unsuccessful, the strikers walked back to Hill's Addition and then to Shannon Hill on the way back to the union hall, where they disbanded shortly after one o'clock.

When the 3:45 passenger train pulled into Clifton,

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63. "Down with the managers." *Phoenix Gazette*, October 3, 1915 (GHS, Vol. 18, p. 57.)

64. Ibid.

65. Hill's addition and Shannon Hill were suburbs of Clifton.
Engineer Tom Simpson and Fireman Pike Penn were ordered to turn it around and prepare to return to Lordsburg. They uncoupled the engine and backed it down to the bridge in Hill's Addition, where they were to pick up the mine managers and the company's attorney, Ernest W. Lewis. The four men arrived by auto shortly after four o'clock and immediately climbed on the back of the light engine. Enjoying the novelty of the situation, the managers waved good-by to the pickets as they passed the smelter. At Guthrie, they picked up a coach for the remainder of the trip. As soon as the strikers learned that the managers had gone, they attempted, through the sheriff's office to bring them back. Roman Armijo appeared before Justice J. A. McWilliams and swore a complaint:

Normal Carmichael, J.W. Bennie and Milton McLean are accused of the crime of riot committed as follows: The said Carmichael, Bennie, and McLean, on or about the second day of October, 1915, in Greenlee county, Arizona, willfully, knowingly, unlawfully, maliciously, forcibly, and feloniously did then and there in a riotous, tumultuous and violent manner, assemble themselves together and then and there in a riotous, tumultuous and violent manner, having then and there the present ability so to do, unlawfully attempt to and did then and there with force and violence, disturb the public peace.67


Specifically, Armijo alleged that the managers had incited a riot by leaving. When McWilliams issued the warrant for their arrest, Sheriff Cash tried to have them stopped at Duncan, but the engine shot through the station. After he notified one of his deputies, Joe Larrieu, who was in Lordsburg, to have the managers arrested as fugitives from justice, Cash and M. A. Franz took off by auto for the New Mexico town.

When Cash and Franz got to Lordsburg about one in the morning, Larrieu was waiting with the mine managers. A justice of the Peace named Marsailles immediately heard the fugitive from justice charge, in the lobby of the Vendome Hotel. Attorney Lewis pleaded that the managers left because of a rumor that the strikers were planning to seize them and force a contract, and that Cash was going to put them in jail for their own protection. Marsailles dismissed the case for lack of evidence. Cash tried to talk the managers into returning to Clifton; they refused and proceeded to El Paso, where they set up headquarters in the


69. *Copper Era*, October 8, 1915. Marsailles had no jurisdiction in the disturbing the peace charge, but he ruled that they were not fugitives from justice by leaving as they did.

70. *Arizona Republican*, October 4, 1915.
Paso del Norte Hotel. Later in the day the managers declared that they left because of the "incidents of the day and the temper of the strikers." They felt that their presence was a "constant and increasing source of irritation," which would have led to "bloodshed within twenty-four hours."

With the managers gone from the district, the possibility of a quick settlement became remote. Until their departure, relief to the strikers had been carried out on a temporary basis and in the most expedient manner. Provisions that the miners had hoarded were supplemented with whatever local assistance was obtainable. Some money was collected from the union initiation fee, which was raised from two to five dollars on October 5. Miners were required to join to be eligible for relief; many businessmen felt "compelled" to have their names on the list. At first families were given provisions at cost, while single men were fed at boarding houses set up in the three towns. Since there was no strike fund and few men had any savings, they soon became dependent upon the voluntary assistance of sympathetic labor unions and individuals. Cattlemen in the district donated forty "beeves" to be slaughtered two

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., October 13, 1915.
daily; a local bakery contributed fifty loaves of bread a day. On October 7, fifty thousand pounds of flour and forty thousand pounds of beans arrived by rail in the district. Obtained on credit, the provisions were turned over to the executive committee for distribution to the needy.

The number of persons dependent on relief increased rapidly as the strike wore on into the second month. On October 8 the relief committee reported feeding 224 families and thirty-three single men. By October 16 the figures had risen to 2300 families and 180 bachelors. Central relief stations were set up in each of the three towns to distribute the supplies. Every day, long lines of strikers waited outside these depots where the basic essentials--flour, beans, coffee, salt, lard, and whatever meat that was available--were doled out to the men according to need. The station at Morenci distributed two tons of flour, one ton of beans, 400 pounds of coffee, 600 pounds of lard, and 300 pounds of salt on a typical day. At Metcalf, the men were given one ton of flour, a thousand pounds of beans, 600 pounds of lard, and one hundred pounds of salt, while the Clifton depot meted out 780 pounds of

73. Ibid., October 6, 1915.
74. Ibid., October 9, 1915.
75. Ibid., October 17, 1915. Many of the single men were still able to pay their own way.
flour, 400 pounds of beans, 150 pounds of lard, and fifty pounds of salt per day. In Clifton, the "Union Restaurant," located opposite the relief depot, occasionally offered music for the bachelor's dining pleasure. The men enjoyed a meal to the strains of "Aloha" and "La Paloma," or watched the married men jauntily bearing sacks of flour and parcels of beans from the relief station to the "syncopated rhythm of a Charlie Chaplin walk." Other necessities were provided as required. Medical care was available at all times; shoes and clothing for the children were distributed whenever such contributions were received.

The workers received assistance from many sources, including the companies. When the managers turned the company property over to the sheriff for protection, he hired strikers for guards. They were paid by the companies and turned over part of their earnings to the relief committee. Various unions rendered whatever assistance they could afford. At the convention of the Arizona State Federation of Labor in October, members were asked to help the

76. Daily Silver Belt, October 19, 1915.
77. Arizona Republican, October 23, 1915.
78. Walter Douglas letter to the editor, The New Republic, March 18, 1916, p. 186. One worker was run out of town in late December when he refused to give fifteen percent of his wages to the union. Ibid., January 1, 1916.
miners. John T. Walker, president of the Illinois Federation of Labor, speaking in Clifton, pledged financial aid from his organization. Both the United Mine Workers and the American Federation of Labor solicited voluntary contributions from their affiliates. The executive board of the Western Federation somewhat reluctantly voted a thousand dollars to the strikers in November, and encouraged local organizations to help as much as possible. The workers were told that the Federation had levied an assessment of fifty cents per man and one day's wages per month on its members but this turned out to be false. The bulk of aid came from the Globe-Miami mining district. The men there went all out to help their brothers in Clifton-Morenci. The workers subscribed to a fund of two dollars a month per man; several merchants promised half a day's profit per month. The Ladies Aid to the Strikers sponsored the

79. Ibid., November 5, 1915.

80. Shortly after he arrived in the district, Moyer sent wires to the members of the executive board of the Federation asking them whether an assessment should be levied on the membership. Since the board could not agree, Moyer called a meeting in Denver to discuss the propositions. The board members refused to allow an assessment, but voted a thousand dollar donation and sent out an appeal for voluntary contributions. Official Proceedings. Twenty-Second Annual Convention, Western Federation of Miners, Great Falls, Montana, 1916, p. 15.


82. Daily Silver Belt, October 22, 1915.
usual benefit dances, dinners, clothing drives, and carnivals. A jeweler sold guesses for ten cents apiece on the number of seeds in a pumpkin in his window. A ruby souvenir ring was the prize. Lester Doane, President of the Arizona State Federation of Labor, conducted a cake contest which netted the strike fund $1500, and Mrs. Nellie Jones a one hundred and twenty-five pound cake. Sandow, "the strongest man in the world," gave an exhibition in Miami. Lifting 700 pounds with one hand, and breaking chains by expanding his chest, he performed before a packed house and contributed sixty percent of the proceeds to the Greenlee county miners. By work and play, the people of Globe-Miami raised over $15,000, three-fourths of the total collected in the state.

Voluntary assistance provided an adequate, but somewhat unstable, source of support. In mid-October, the leaders of the strike began to agitate for a $150,000 county bond issue to feed the strikers. Since the mining companies paid ninety-one percent of the taxes, the organizers looked on this as a way of forcing the companies to feed their

83. Ibid.
84. Ibid., January 27, 1916.
85. Ibid., November 6, 1915.
86. Ibid., January 26, 1916.
former employees and of hastening the end of the strike. Because of legal complications, the leaders abandoned the plan. The idea came to the strikers from Governor Hunt who had announced early in the strike that if the people were starving, he would declare martial law and direct the Greenlee county board of supervisors to feed them. On October 1 the governor decided that he would feed them at the expense of the state if they needed food. By October 22 Hunt doubted that he could render financial assistance to the strikers because the legislature would have to make such appropriations "unless in the event of people starving to death." Delegates to the State Federation of Labor convention urged the governor to take over the mines under the provisions of the industrial pursuits act. E. W. Lewis quickly countered that Hunt would be personally liable

87. Several lawyers advised the miners that a bond issue for such a purpose would be illegal. More important was the question of who would buy the bonds. *Douglas Daily International*, October 15, 1915.


90. *Arizona Republican*, October 27, 1915. By this time, troops had been sent to the district at a cost of $1,000 per day. To feed the strikers and their families, even at a cost of twenty-five cents per head, would have cost an additional $3,750 per day. *(Phoenix) Arizona Gazette*, October 26, 1915 (GHS, Vol. 18, p. 30).

for any damages or injury. Hunt said the state had the right to operate the mines but that he did not plan to do it. Lacking any legal means to help, the governor lent his voice to the call for aid in a proclamation:

Appealing to the people of Arizona for generous co-operation in relief of suffering families in the Clifton-Morenci mining district:

This is the season of harvest, that especial time of the year when toll is taken of Nature's bounteous usufruct: when industries are measured in terms of their products; when Labor takes accounting of that which it produces; and when prosperity is carefully gauged in its relation to human endeavor. It is well if, at this period of the year, when the day of Thanksgiving approaches, they who have plenty may freely celebrate their good fortune with the comforting assurance that the grim spectre of woeful want is not abroad anywhere in the land. For the observance of feast-days when the hungry go unfed, the homeless go unsheltered and the sorrowing go uncomforted must cavour sharply of sacrilege, and ever be tinctured with sadness.

In the Clifton-Morenci Mining District . . . , there exists deplorably a condition whereby nearly five thousand workingmen are deprived of employment, and where consequently hundreds of families with their slender savings exhausted are entering upon the rigorous winter season without any dependable supply of the necessities of life. Words cannot express or pictures portray the extreme suffering that even now is baring its cruel visage to the worthy people of this striken district.

Pursuant, therefore, to the plain dictates of humanity, I . . . do herin proclaim the serious need of food, fuel, and clothing in the Clifton-Morenci district, and do earnestly appeal to the

92. Ibid., October 8, 1915.

93. Actually Hunt could not invoke the act because the legislature had made no provisions for putting it into effect. Tucson Citizen, October 8, 1915.
generous people of this state for such contributions of money and supplies as will alleviate suffering and afford means of simple sustenance for penniless families in this time of industrial trouble. All civic and benevolent organizations are especially urged to organize and conduct movements for the gathering and shipment of supplies to the Workmen's Relief Committee, care of the Sheriff of Greenlee County . . . to the end that, through ministrations unto those who are afflicted, the spirit of mercy and brotherly love may be exemplified in our citizenship.94

CHAPTER III

SCABS, SCARES, AND SOLDIERS

When the managers left, the district was virtually under the control of the miners. After seeing their passengers safely to Lordsburg, Pike Penn and Tom Simpson turned their light engine around and returned to Clifton. Since they operated under orders of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the two men saw nothing wrong in taking the mine managers from the district. The strikers felt otherwise, they thought that Bennie, McLean, and Carmichael were permanently abandoning their properties and they were highly excited and embittered. As Penn and Simpson were walking home from the depot, they were "set on" in a dark spot by a mob with sticks and clubs. About eleven o'clock on the evening of October 3 a gang of almost two hundred men with clubs and "missiles" showed up at Penn's house and advised him and Simpson to leave the district.


2. (Clifton) Copper Era, October 8, 1915. Penn and Simpson related their experiences to a reporter at Duncan.

3. Ibid.
Four deputy sheriffs guarded the house for the rest of the night. Early Sunday morning, the two railroad employees left in an automobile for Duncan, "disregarding the speed limits." Later that day, Morgan Merrill, an expressman, was "run out" of Clifton because he was a friend of Penn and Simpson.

During the course of the strike, especially in the first month, many persons either felt it advisable to leave the district, or were advised to do so. Most of the foremen, shift bosses, and lesser officials of the companies found the first two weeks an excellent time to "take a vacation." Moreover, many persons who opposed the union or in some other way were inimical to the strikers voluntarily left for a healthier climate. The leaders attempted to get every worker in the district to join the union or leave. Most men complied with the request; those who did not were asked to come to union headquarters, where they were given twenty-four hours to obey. Those who agreed to leave were given passes worded such as, "Favor de no molestas el Senor Grencacieo Santa Cruz guen saidra en 48

4. (Phoenix) Arizona Republican, October 5, 1915. The two men went to the Duncan camp (see page ). Penn suffered a similar fate there. He was run out of Duncan for trying to organize one hundred cowboys to "clean out" Clifton. Ibid., October 8, 1915.

5. Copper Era, October 8, 1915.

horas." A similar pass, signed by Deputy Sheriff Alex Arnett gave Nicholas Tardano twenty-four hours to leave. Reluctant workers, intimidated with threats of violence, usually slipped out of town during the night, although a few waited until mobs visited them. None of these men suffered broken bones, but a few were considerably "roughed up." Most of the hold-outs spent at least one night in jail under the protective custody of the sheriff before they could be safely transported out of the district.

Sheriff Cash, with a force of about fifty deputies, feared that strict enforcement of the law would incense the four thousand striking workers and lead to bloodshed. Lacking enough men to control the strikers should they become unruly, he adopted a policy designed to prevent violence by eliminating sources of irritation. Most of the deputies he appointed to protect the property of the companies were strikers, or at least sympathetic to them. Moreover, he kept a close watch on potential troublemakers, advised many

7. "Please do not interfere with Grenecacio Santa Cruz, who will leave in 48 hours." Tucson Citizen, October 12, 1915.

8. (Tucson) Arizona Daily Star, October 19, 1915. The Star carried a picture of this pass.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., October 12, 1915. Letter to Dr. H.A. Shell of Tucson from an anonymous friend in the district. The anonymous friend claimed that 40 of the men hired as deputies were strikers paid by the companies.
of them to leave, and, as a last resort, put them in the courthouse to protect them from harm. Pedro Michelena, a former Clifton resident, returned and began stirring up the Mexicans against the union. When a mob surrounded Michelena, Cash took him to jail and searched him. Finding letters from company representatives offering to pay his expenses, the sheriff told him to leave town. Joe Ritz, a leader of the sanitary gang of the Arizona Copper Company, was allowed to continue work after the strike began because of the nature of his job. One evening some forty men called him from his home, accused him of deriding the union, and "beat him up." He escaped and hid under a nearby building. When he returned to his house, deputy sheriffs took him to jail for the night and put him on the train the next morning for Duncan.

Shortly after the strike began, officials of the companies established a refugee camp near Duncan, thirty-five miles south of Clifton. The first emigrants from the district had nowhere to go. Large numbers of them came to Duncan, where they rented whatever space was available. Some men sought employment in other mining areas; others

went to El Paso looking for work. Most of these early refu-
gees were the lesser officials and skilled Anglo-Americans, 
men necessary for the resumption of operations once the 
strike was over. The companies, therefore, set up a tent 
city for "relieving the embarrassment and distress" of the 
workers. Any former employee of the companies was wel-
come to come to the camp where he was provided with free 
board, bed and blanket. Company officials who were given 
leaves of absence at half-pay were invited to the camp but 
were expected to pay for their provisions. Other residents 
of the district who felt compelled to leave received free 
ground for a tent.

Frank McLean, brother of the general manager of the 
Detroit Copper Company, was put in charge of the tent city. 
"Mayor" McLean, as he liked to be called, had the difficult 
task of providing the necessities of life for the citizens 
of the "newest and fastest growing town in Arizona." Since 
most of the people had made hasty exits from the district, 
few came with anything but the clothes on their backs. 
McLean set up committees and work gangs to handle the various 
municipal functions, to provide relief, and to keep the men 

busy. The building crew erected tents for families—each with pine floors and electric lights—along carefully laid out streets. Two bunk houses were constructed for single men. Families cooked in their tents; the bachelors ate at an old farmhouse which had been remodeled into a mess hall with a capacity of two hundred. Single men were given credit certificates for small necessities at Duncan stores; married men got additional vouchers for food. The "sanitary squad" was charged with the disposal of garbage and keeping the streets of the town clean.

In November, "Mayor" McLean conducted a contest to name the town. He offered a ten dollar prize and announced that he would be the only judge because, as he put it, "What's the use of being mayor of a town if you can't choose the name by which it is to be known to the historians of future generations?" One man suggested "Siesta" because all the men did was sleep. As the number of residents increased, the amount of work required of each person decreased. When the men finished their daily tasks, they either went hunting or back to bed. The principal event


19. Ibid., November 2, 1915. McLean never announced a new name, and the place was called the Duncan refugee camp for the duration of the strike.

20. Ibid.
of the day was the arrival of the morning train from Clifton. A few took advantage of the reading and writing tent, where a good supply of paper, pens, and stamped envelopes was available for the refugees to write back to their friends in the strike zone of the "joys of life in Duncan."

The miners in Clifton and Morenci had other ideas about the Duncan colony. They believed that it was a camp for strike-breakers, and that as soon as there were enough men there the managers would bring them into the district and resume operations. The strikers contended that previous employment was not a prerequisite for enjoyment of the privileges of the encampment. Further, they insisted that men were being brought there to supplement the working force in order to gain sufficient numbers to break the strike. Officials of the companies repeatedly denied any intention of using strike-breakers; they claimed to refuse admission to anyone not known to them. Charles W. Harris, adjutant-general of the Arizona National Guard, sent an officer in the guise of a workman to the camp to investigate. He reported that he was admitted to the camp


22. Charles Wilfred Harris was born in Garrett, Indiana on March 9, 1879. He entered the army as a private in 1898. In 1903, he joined the Arizona National Guard, also as a private. He was appointed adjutant general on July 3, 1912, and served in that capacity until
after being advised "to remember that he had worked for the
companies." Once inside, he said that he talked to many
men who had come from other areas and that all the men ex­
pected to go to work as soon as there were enough men to
enter the district. The spy that Harris sent was some­
what over-zealous. After the strike was settled, Governor
Hunt admitted that his adjutant-general had been deceived.
The men imported from other areas, he said, were actually
workers who had left the district early in the strike to
seek employment elsewhere, and finding none, went to Duncan
for free food and lodging. Such an interpretation, how­
ever, did not allay the fears of the workers in the strike
zone. They were sure that the companies would import
"scabs" to end the walk-out.

Throughout the strike Governor Hunt was convinced
that the mine managers would attempt to use strike-breakers,
and he was determined that they should not succeed. He did

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June 3, 1919, and again from July 1, 1923 until January 6,
1929. He died in Los Angeles on August 4, 1949. General
Order 16, August 5, 1949. Death Notices of Adjutant Generals,
National Guard of Arizona File, APHS.

24. Ibid.
changed his original charge, saying that the Duncan officials
accepted the word of the men that they had previously worked
for the company. Copper Era, December 3, 1915. As to the
men re-entering the district and returning to work, this was
probably the same type of speculation that the men in the
district were engaging in about their return.
not believe that a large body of men would initiate and
dure the hardships of a strike unless they were convinced
that they had just grievances. Workers, he said, were en-
titled to a fair consideration and adjustment of legitimate
complaints, and they could not get this if "scabs" were
permitted to take their jobs. He felt that a large strike
in a mining or manufacturing community created an unusual
condition—one that could not always be controlled either
by "technical interpretations of law" or by individual
claims by the strike-breaker to his constitutional right
to work wherever he pleased. Hunt pointed out that, as
industrial strife in Colorado in 1913 and 1914 had demon-
strated, the importation of armed thugs and strike-
breakers was an open invitation to bloodshed and violence
and wholesale destruction of property. In such cases,
Hunt thought every citizen's constitutional right of pro-
tection was more important than "theoretical contentions
for individual liberties."

Governor Hunt was in daily contact with Sheriff

to editor.

to editor. As far as statute law was concerned, a strike-
breaker had the same right to work as a striker had to
stop working.

28. Ibid.
Cash from the beginning of the strike. On October 2 Hunt announced that he would send troops if the strike was not settled in one week, and called on National Guard units in Phoenix, Tempe, Mesa, Tucson, and Yuma to be ready for action. When he learned that Bennie, McLean and Car- michael had left the district, the governor put an initial detachment of forty-eight men on alert, and wired Governor McDonald of New Mexico for permission to ship troops through Lordsburg. Hunt was irritated because the managers fled from the state "in a manner so melodramatic, so true to the techniques of the movies as to suggest quite forcefully . . . that the theatrical effect was, after all, the ob-
ject of the exodus." He contended that they wanted to give the public the impression that the strikers were lawless and desperate, thereby creating a situation favorable to the importation of armed guards and strike-breakers under military protection. The next day, when he learned

29. Outfits at Douglas, Ray, and Morenci were not asked because they were mining camps. Arizona Republican, October 3, 1915.


31. New Republic, January 22, 1915, p. 304. Both federal and state troops had been used in the past to help break strikes. Because of Hunt's attitude toward labor, and his statements during the first three weeks of the strike, the managers could not have expected him to use state troops to protect strike-breakers. Both Hunt and
from Cash that the managers would not return to Clifton, Hunt ordered the alerted contingent, under the command of Major H. H. Donkersley of Yuma to proceed to the district.

When the guardsmen arrived in Clifton on Monday morning, October 4, to set up camp on the courthouse lawn, the strikers welcomed them. The next afternoon the men from Morenci marched to the encampment to greet "Governor Hunt's troops." Donkersley said that the militia was sent to insure that the companies would not "prevail on the President" to send in federal soldiers, whom the strikers feared would be a prelude to strike-breakers. The militia-men were available to be used in the district at the discretion of Sheriff Cash for "any unforeseen emergency that might arise." Since there were no riots and the troops

the union leaders feared that if federal troops were stationed in the district, the managers, in spite of statements to the contrary, would attempt to use strike-breakers and violence would result.

32. Adjutant General Harris, on the way to Florida with the state rifle team, was called back to Phoenix. Arizona Republican, October 3, 1915.

33. Ibid., October 6, 1915.

34. Ibid., October 5, 1915. It seems a bit strange that since both Hunt and President Wilson were Democrats, the governor did not contact Wilson to inform him of the situation, and request that he send no troops.

were not even being used for guard duty, the major saw no need for additional soldiers. The next day he and Cash went to the state capitol to confer with the governor. On October 7 another one hundred men were ordered to the district, including forty-seven Apache Indians of Company F of Phoenix. Two days later, forty men from Flagstaff left for Clifton. Harris explained that the additional troops were sent to convince the managers that it was safe to return. The new guardsmen encamped a half mile south of Clifton in an abandoned cemetery to guard the main road to the district.

When the second contingent of troops got to their campsite, they found a cemetery on a rocky hillside overlooking the road. The coffins had been removed several years earlier, leaving a pock-marked pasture of partially filled graves. The men cleared about three acres, levelled the ground, and set up their tents in neat rows, not unlike the interment plots they replaced. Several of the graves were re-dug and served as latrines. Down the hill, a tent with a slanting board floor and shower baths above was erected. Since the men in Clifton used the showers in the county jail, all the guardsmen were in a "constant state of next-to-godliness." Local YMCA leaders opened a tent

36. Arizona Republican, October 8, 1915.
37. Ibid., October 22, 1915.
and supplied writing tablets, newspapers, chocolates, and other refreshments to help the men pass their leisure time. Captain Holyworth, a company commander and former school teacher, conducted night classes for the three high school militiamen from Tucson. Eight university men had to keep up with their studies on their own. The troops spent each day practicing military tactics, performing menial tasks, and polishing their Springfields, which were loaded and ready for use at a moment's notice.

The presence of troops in the district was a cause for curiosity rather than concern on the part of the strikers. The miners continued their activities under the watchful eyes of Sheriff Cash, the union leaders, and now the military. Fortunately, saloons had been closed since January 1, when Arizona adopted prohibition. The taverns on Chase Creek in Clifton had been among the wildest in the state. The elimination of liquor had removed a potential problem that could have caused serious incidents had it been allowed to inflame the passions of four thousand workers.

38. In the 1914 elections, prohibition, an initiative measure, carried the state 25,887 to 22,743. In that total, 1018 Greenlee County residents approved the measure, while 1031 citizens were against it. Report of the Secretary of State of Arizona, January 2, 1915. General Election Returns, p. 15.

Cash eased the men along, interfering only when trouble appeared imminent. The leaders were anxious to avoid any incidents, especially ones that would discredit the union or cause the militia to be used. They were particularly worried that the Mexicans or "less intelligent whites" would disregard their commands. In their speeches, the organizers were careful to avoid inflammatory remarks.

In one harangue, Tribolet became violent against the companies and capital in general, and obeyed a "polite request" to leave the camp. On October 6 the local union officials issued instructions that in the future, any member who committed a misdemeanor or in any way brought "reflections of wrong doing" on the union would be brought before them "to answer in full" for such actions.

The issuance of these instructions was prompted by a series of acts which threatened to disrupt the amicable relations between Cash and the union. On October 3, Jose Padilla, postmaster of Steeple Rock, New Mexico, went to Clifton to see a doctor. Mistaken for a strike-breaker,

40. Tucson Citizen, October 5, 1915.

41. Ibid. Tribolet had been one of the first organizers to come into the camp.

42. "Intimidation, fighting with non-union men, destruction of property, and misuses of legal rights" were classified as such actions. Article by R.L. Byrd, El Paso Herald, October 12, 1915. (GHS, Vol. 18, p. 43).
he was attacked by a mob of three hundred men and severely beaten. The sheriff took him to the hospital, where he remained for four days with two broken ribs. That night, fifty men entered the Arizona Copper Company electric plant, overpowered the engineer, and switched off the power. Under the cover of darkness, another group broke the windows in the company drug store and the general office building. The next day, a "monster parade" was held in Clifton with two bands and about three thousand marchers.

That evening, the water main between Morenci and Newtown was dynamited by unknown persons. Early on October 5 someone opened the gates of the reservoir at the Arizona


44. Company officials said the drug store incident was an obvious attempt to intimidate store employees to join the union. They said that if the union persisted, they would close the stores. Arizona Republican, October 5, 1915. The store at Metcalf was closed for one day, but re-opened under the sheriff's protection. The companies shut down their offices, boarded the windows, and gave the clerks leaves of absence at half pay. Tucson Citizen, October 5, 1915.

45. Copper Era, October 8, 1915.

46. The strikers disavowed any connection with the incident and called it "part of a plot to starve them." They repaired the line. Tucson Citizen, October 5, 1915.
company concentrator, emptying the huge water store-
47
house. In the afternoon, several hundred Mexicans stormed
through Morenci demanding union cards of everyone. On
October 11 the business men of Morenci requested that some
of the militia be sent there. Deputy Sheriff Larrieu,
fearing that such a move might arouse the anger of the
Mexicans, advised against it since he felt troops were not
needed at that time.

Although kept in a constant state of readiness, the
troops had nothing to do but the dull daily duties of en-
campment. To pass some of their off-duty hours, the Apaches
of Company F competed with Clifton High School in football
on October 16. The Indians, most of them only two years out
of high school, won 27-6. The victory was credited to the
size of the guardsmen, but "the speed of the young ones
49
cought up toward the end of the game." The following
Wednesday morning, the National Guard had a field meet
against the high school. While the troops were running

47. The object of this incident was said to be to
prevent the preservation of expensive belting on the vanner
tables, which had to be watered daily or they would rot. Arizona Republican, October 6, 1915.

48. Arizona Republican, October 12, 1915. Sheriff
Cash was in El Paso at the time, trying to arrange a con-
ference between the managers and the strikers.

49. Ibid., October 17, 1915.
foot races and playing baseball, four hundred strikers were
demonstrating outside the Reardon Hotel, where James Casey
and M. "Biddy" Doyle were staying. The two men had come
to town to secure affidavits about conditions there; the
strikers heard that they were passing out train tickets to
Duncan and sounding out the men on returning to work. Casey
and Doyle went back to Duncan on the evening train. That
afternoon, the strikers held another parade in Clifton.
Over two thousand workers marched to Frank Salami's
bakery, where the bands played the funeral dirge, then down
to the courthouse to serenade Sheriff Cash, and on to the
militia campsite south of town. There the musicians enter­
tained the troops with patriotic airs, and ended with a
salute to the flag.

The camaraderie between the troops and the towns­
people during the week did little to combat a growing dis­
satisfaction on the part of the guardsmen. On October 18

was a lawyer with the firm of Ellinwood and Ross of Bisbee,
general counsel for the companies. Doyle, the "chief of
police" at the Duncan camp, accompanied Casey for personal
protection. Copper Era, October 22, 1915.

51. Arizona Republican, October 21, 1915. Salarni
was one of the principal leaders in the 1903 strike in the
district. He spent three years in the "pen" as the result.
At the start of the 1915 strike, he made speeches against
the Western Federation, blaming them for his imprisonment.
Arizona Republican, October 9, 1915.
notices were posted that after thirty days continuous service, the rates of pay would be the same as like grades in the regular army. Privates would then make seventeen dollars a month, instead of a dollar-fifty per day. The next day, State Auditor J. C. Callaghan said that he had not decided whether there were funds to pay the men, or if they would have to be issued certificates as in the case of the guardsmen who went to the annual encampment and the bandsmen who went to the San Diego and San Francisco expositions. In June, a special session of the legislature had passed the general appropriations bill with a provision that if the governor vetoed any items in the bill, such veto would not revive the statutory appropriation for such items, and banned the auditor from drawing on any fund unless authorized by the legislature. Hunt vetoed numerous

52. Military Code of Arizona, July 15, 1912, Section 59, p. 20. (General Orders #11.) Frank Alkire Collection, Arizona National Guard Box, APHS. The Code provided pay of $1.50 per day for privates and musicians; $1.75 for corporals; $2.50 daily for the rest of the non-commissioned staff, until thirty days active service, when regular army pay would be in effect.

53. Arizona Daily Star, August 26, 1915. Warrants were issued because they were thought to be more satisfactory than the mere promise of the state to pay its guardsmen.

54. The legislature was attempting to repeal statutory appropriations and substitute lower ones. Morris Goldwater of Maricopa county introduced the repealing clauses. The general school fund, for example, had a $500,000 statute appropriation. The legislators sought to cut this to $100,000 annually. Arizona Daily Star, May 20, June 10, 1915.
items and the repealing clauses in the bill. Since there was a question whether the governor could veto the repealing clauses, or if the legislature even had the right to pass such provisions, Callaghan was advised to pay no money out under any sections in question until the court passed on the bill. Because of this legal squabble, the guardsmen had not yet received any money for the certificates issued at summer camp. On October 21 the troops on duty in Clifton learned that they would get more of these warrants, until the Arizona Supreme Court ruled on the tangle between the governor and the legislators.

Governor Hunt had been under criticism from the editors of almost every newspaper in the state for the problems arising out of the controversy over the appropriations bill, and his stand on capital punishment and penal reform. The use of troops in the strike zone added to his

55. The National Guard, likewise, had its appropriation cut, tying up its funds, and this was the reason the men got warrants for summer camp. The Guard units did not meet for three weeks after encampment because of the appropriation problem. Arizona Daily Star, August 26, September 14, 1915.

56. In the case of the Clifton strike, the Military Code provided that whenever the Guard was called out, the money to pay them was to come out of "any funds in the State Treasury, not otherwise appropriated." Military Code, Section 68, pp. 22-23. For this reason, the men were given warrants again. Since the Supreme Court was not scheduled to meet until December 9, the men would have to wait at least six weeks before a ruling would be handed down.
difficulties with the press. C. H. Akers of the *Arizona Gazette* said Hunt and the Federation leaders were trying to get control of the state, and called the governor's actions "the worst sort of politics." The editor of the *Tucson Citizen* attacked the governor for his poor economy in sending only part of the Guard to the area in order to keep the cost down. He said it would have been better to send no troops at all than a "wholly inadequate force." I. W. Spear of the *Arizona Republican* condemned the continued presence of troops in Clifton as a waste of state money since there were no disorders and they did nothing to prevent the deportation of men. The editor of the *El Paso Herald* called Hunt's actions, "Arizona's Shame." He said that Arizona was still passing through a period of "radicalism and bold experimentation in governmental practices" to which the rest of the country could either assume an attitude of "amused tolerance" or take a genuine interest in the "efforts of the new state to find itself." An

57. (Phoenix) *Arizona Gazette*, October 14, 1915, (GHS, Vol. 18.) Hunt noted at the bottom of the editorial, "Comment unnecessary."


60. *El Paso Herald*, n.d. (GHS, Vol. 18, p. 52.) Hunt wrote on the edge of this, "Arizona's shame from the El Paso Herald, all tarred with the same stick. A paper that is owned by the same interest that owns the *Star*, *Bisbee Review*, *Douglas International*, *Gazette*, *Copper Era*. 
editorial in the *Arizona Daily Star* quoted from the *Pueblo Tribune* which advised Hunt to study recent Colorado history. Warning the governor that the Western Federation was a criminal organization, the writer said that Hunt was "playing with fire" by encouraging the union instead of insisting that all citizens recognize the law.

On October 22 a movement for the recall of Governor Hunt was started at Mesa. A petition, drawn up for

61. *Arizona Daily Star*, October 20, 1915. Colorado experienced some of the bloodiest strikes in labor history as the result of the importation of strikebreakers, so perhaps Hunt had studied his history.

62. This was said to be the first time in the history of the country that an effort was made to recall the chief executive of a state. It is interesting to note that the "very people who had made the air vocal with dire predictions of the disaster impending over Arizona if the Constitution carrying the recall feature should be adopted were the first to invoke it." J. H. Upton, "Current Topics," *Port Oxford Tribune*, February 23, 1916, (*GHS*, Vol. 18, p. 28.)

This was not the first time that there was talk of recalling Hunt, but the first time talk was translated into action. During the special session of the legislature that passed the appropriations bill, conservative Democrats considered recalling the "extravagant Hunt" or face the prospects of dwindling political fortunes in the next election. *Copper Era*, June 11, 1915. In July, there was talk of recall over the governor's stand on capital punishment. *Copper Era*, July 30, 1915. C.H. Akers wrote an editorial, "State's Salvation Lies in the Recall," in the *Gazette* on October 3. *Arizona Gazette*, October 3, 1915. (*GHS*, Vol. 18, p. 57.) Democrats began to worry that the little popularity Hunt gained among the twelve percent mining population for his actions in the strike was more than offset by losses among other citizens for the same actions. *Arizona Republican*, October 22, 1915.
presentation to the Arizona Secretary of State, Sidney Osborne, claimed that Hunt was incompetent to perform his duties or conserve the peace and dignity of Arizona, charged him with wanton and reckless extravagance, and accused him of setting himself above the law. It contended that he had "deliberately attempted to foment and encourage class hatreds and divisions," and that, by a "program of un-concealed and deliberate catering to the most radical elements," he had "created a condition approaching anarchy in certain sections of the state." On October 26 the Mesa Commercial Club passed a resolution to work for the recall. C. H. Akers said the petitions would be wired by the Associated Press all over the state, giving great publicity to the Mesa movement. About sixty-five members walked out following the presentation of the petition. When the club met on October 28, a heated debate developed over the recall action. Hunt supporters claimed the petition was outside the by-laws of the organization which forbade action on political or partisan questions. Advocates

63. The petition would have required 13,739 signatures or twenty-five percent of the total vote cast for governor in the 1914 election. After the last petition was filed, the governor would have had five days to resign if he so desired, and if not, an election would be held sixty days thereafter. If no-one was nominated on the recall petition, the office would become vacant and the Secretary of State would become governor. Arizona Daily Star, October 24, 1915.
of the move claimed the recall was for the betterment of Mesa. By a fourteen vote margin, the club rescinded its action.

The three leaders of the recall movement were Akers, O. S. Stapley, and R. F. Johnson. They had organized the campaign in Phoenix, but moved the drive to Mesa for political reasons. Hunt described Stapley as "a humble lackey of certain interests in the Senate," and called Johnson a "disappointed office-seeker seeking revenge." Akers, who in the speech at Mesa had called Hunt dishonest, was characterized by the governor as a "despicable turncoat and timeserver, the abject tool of a few corporate interests." In questioning his honesty, Hunt said Akers had lied, "just as his wretched excuse for a newspaper" had

64. The leaders wanted the movement to spring up outside the capitol and not in a mining camp, in order to disassociate it as much as possible from the mining interests and broaden the base of support by making it appear a "grass roots" movement. Arizona Republican, October 28, 1915.

65. Stapley was a Democratic state senator from Mesa, but opposed Hunt on almost every proposal in the Senate. Johnson, a rancher from the Mesa area, wanted to be Superintendent of the State Industrial School but was turned down because of "disqualifications." Arizona Republican, October 28, 1915.
done for a long time. The governor said the recall move-
ment was a "political sortie" to discredit his efforts to
have a federal investigation made of the Clifton situation.
Calling the charges "glittering generalities," he warned
the men at the head of the affair that he was going to make
public some "important documents" that he thought would
make "interesting reading."

Hunt had obtained several telegrams which proved
that some newspapers in the state were being paid to print
advertising as news, a violation of Postal Regulations.
On October 15 the managers at El Paso made public thirty-
five affidavits from men who had left the district either
by orders of the union or because of fear of violence. The
same day, Ned Crieghton, owner of the Arizona News Service,
sent telegrams to newspaper editors throughout the state,
offering to pay them to publish a full page, including cuts
of strike scenes and the affidavits, on "truth about the
Clifton-Morenci strike conditions." The copy was not to

66. Akers had been a Republican, but supported
Hunt through the 1914 election. Tucson Citizen, October 29,
1915. In the Mesa speech, Akers said he supported Hunt as
governor and "did so when I felt that he was honest but I
cannot do so now." Arizona Republican, October 28, 1915.

67. Arizona Republican, October 26, 1915.

68. U.S. Postal Laws and Regulations, Section 443
forbade such practices.
be "labeled advertisement or marked in any way to indicate same as paid matter, as written copy will clearly state part taken by the Western Federation of Miners in trouble and object of publishing is to make clear why companies in the district refused to deal with the Western Federation." The editor of the Santa Cruz Patagonian was offered $10.50 to run the story. Hunt threatened to expose the sham and have the violators prosecuted. The newspapers that favored turning Hunt out of office had all run the story, and the recall matter died.

69. "Clifton-Morenci Strike, 1915-16." Typescript of letters and statements by various officials during the strike. Special Collection, University of Arizona. The miners had often objected to newspaper reports of the lawlessness and violence in the district. The El Paso Morning Times was boycotted for several days in October for printing a report that the National Guard unit at Morenci had been run out of the district. In November, the Times was made a public bonfire for reporting that the men were willing to go back to work on the old wage scale. EAMJ, Vol. 100, November 13, 1915, p. 819. The editor of the Copper Era condemned articles and wild rumors that had "grown in exaggeration and number" in newspapers without accredited representatives in Clifton. Copper Era, October 8, 1915.


71. On March 10, 1916, Creighton pleaded guilty in Federal Court to a charge of securing the publication of advertisement without having it marked as such, in connection with this case. Arizona Republican, March 11, 1916. The newspaper publishers were not prosecuted.

The stubborn Hunt was not intimidated by the recall movement. Two days after the Mesa movement began, perhaps partially to spite his critics, the governor ordered an additional one hundred troops to Clifton. At the same time, he released the students and a few businessmen from active duty. While the troops were on their way, a committee, composed of W. T. Witt, chairman of the Greenlee County Board of Supervisors; B. F. Billingsley, a prominent merchant; and B. R. Lanneau, Cashier of the Bank of Duncan, addressed a strikers' rally and assured the men that there were no strike-breakers at the Duncan camp, nor would they be tolerated. Sheriff Cash and Major Donkersley confirmed this report for the men. Most people expected the new arrivals to be sent directly to Morenci. Instead, they were temporarily split between the two existing camps. On October 29, at four o'clock in the morning, one hundred men, under the command of Major E. P. Grinstead, marched the seven miles to Morenci and set up camp without incident.

73. On October 20, a rumor that a hundred refugees were coming to Clifton sent a thousand strikers to the Arizona Copper Company smelter one mile south of Clifton to prevent their entry. No strike-breaking force appeared. Arizona Republican, October 20, 1915. It was hoped that this meeting would allay such fears in the district. Copper Era, October 29, 1915.

With approximately one-third of the National Guard in the district, the strike was costing the state a thousand dollars a day. With the exception of a spectacular fire that did $150,000 damage to the Arizona Copper Company concentrator, the activities in the district were almost routine--constant rumors, a daily parade, and an occasional deportation. By November 8 Governor Hunt was convinced that local authorities could handle the situation in the district. Lacking funds to pay the men or justification for keeping them, Hunt released two hundred and fifty guardsmen from active duty. Four days later, he withdrew the Indians of Company F, leaving only a token force of sixty men in Clifton.

When the militiamen left Clifton, there was widespread talk among the dissatisfied men that they would not come out again if called for strike duty because they had

75. Arizona Gazette, October 26, 1915. (GHS, Vol. 18, p. 30.)

76. The cause of the concentrator blaze was never determined. Some people thought the strikers started the fire. Company officials refused to accuse anyone outright. The strikers blamed the fire on defective wiring, and were quick to point out that it was a striker who sounded the alarm and formed a bucket brigade to help put out the blaze. Several strikers were injured. Dick Walsh fell twenty-five feet off the roof and was taken to the Gem billiard parlor for an examination. Later, at the hospital, he was treated for two fractured ribs. Copper Era, November 5, 1915.
been compelled to serve without pay. This meant that if serious trouble developed in the district, federal troops would probably have to be sent there, because the few remaining forces would be inadequate to handle any major difficulty. The union leaders, especially concerned that federal intervention be prevented, doubled their efforts at keeping the men in line, and dispelling any stories about disorder in the district. The mine managers were confident that the steady flow of from twenty to fifty "refugees" daily into Duncan meant that the "backbone of the strike would soon be broken." They wanted to do nothing, therefore, that would disrupt the bloodless nature of the strike. The troops, it would appear, were accomplishing more by their absence than they had by their presence.

77. Douglas Daily International, November 30, 1915. When the case over the appropriations bill was settled on December 23, the men finally got paid.

78. Arizona Daily Star, November 4, 1915. The number of refugees had fallen off for a while in late October, when the strikers attempted to keep the men in the district. The number of men leaving picked up again when the troops left, and the strike leaders were anxious to avoid adverse publicity by preventing them from going.

79. The sixty guardsmen left in the district were maintained at a cost of only one hundred dollars a day. Copper Era, January 7, 1916. The total cost of sending troops to the district was almost $35,000. The appropriations controversy caused problems of supply for a few days in December before the Supreme Court ruled on the case. The company stores refused to extend any more credit to the troops in the district until the old bills were paid. The Phelps-Dodge store had $5,300 worth of script waiting the end of the litigation. Douglas Daily International, December 22, 1915.
CHAPTER IV

NEGOTIATIONS

While the two sides continued to eye one another with suspicion, go-betweens were busy trying to get the managers and the miners together. On Tuesday, October 5 Homan C. Myles, the British Consul at El Paso, requested that J. W. Bennie, a British subject, be given safe conduct to Phoenix to confer with Governor Hunt. Bennie was concerned that he might be arrested on the inciting to riot charge if he returned to Arizona. The governor replied that as long as Bennie violated no law, he would be welcome, and granted him an interview on Thursday morning. That same day Hunt sent a letter to the mine managers asking them to meet with the strikers. He told the three men that he could see no justification for their refusal to hold a conference, especially since the workers had agreed to renounce the Western Federation. He called the other conditions—-influence of the Federation dissipated

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1. On October 7 the Greenlee county attorney appeared before Judge McWilliams and asked that the complaint against the managers be dismissed. The request was granted. (Clifton) Copper Era, October 8, 1915.
and favorable conditions for the resumption of operations—"a state of mind over which there was no control." Bennie came as far as Lordsburg, where he conferred with company representatives, but he refused to cross the state line.

When Hunt learned that Bennie was not coming, he ordered more troops into the strike zone. Sheriff Cash, Major Donkersley, and adjutant general Harris, who were in Phoenix conferring on the situation, accompanied the first contingent of these militiamen as far as Lordsburg. Donkersley took the men the rest of the way; Cash and Harris went to El Paso with a letter for the managers from the governor. In the letter, Hunt told the three men that his purpose in writing was to advise them of new conditions in the district. He said that he had "positive assurances" that the seven Western Federation organizers in Clifton "will have voluntarily withdrawn themselves . . . by the time this communication shall have been delivered into your


4. The editor of the Tucson Citizen cited this as an example of Hunt's "economy." He said that for eight cents, the governor could have mailed the letter, and for ten cents more could have had it registered. Tucson Citizen, October 12, 1915.
Furthermore, with the National Guard in the district, the managers could return home safely and settle the dispute. The sheriff and the adjutant general arrived in the pass city Friday morning, October 8. Harris told a reporter he was there on a pleasure trip and winked. E. E. Ellinwood, attorney for the managers, said the two men were passing through on the way to Clifton. Cash and Harris then went into a long conference with McLean. That afternoon, they discussed arrangements for negotiations with all three managers. Bearing a reply for the governor, the two men returned to Clifton the next morning.

By the time Cash and Harris got to the strike zone, union leaders had already begun making arrangements to send a delegation to Texas. Cash had wired his under sheriff Henry Hill from El Paso that the managers would meet with their former employees. Hill notified the presidents of


6. Ibid.

7. Paper unknown (GHS, Vol. 18, p. 45.)

8. The reply to the governor accused him of making "inflammatory speeches" and "openly encouraging affiliation with the Western Federation." The managers went on to say that they were willing to enter any arrangement for resumption of operations when the "atmosphere is entirely clarified of the dominating influence of the Western Federation under whatever name, title, or disguise it may take." Tucson Citizen, October 9, 1915.
the three locals, Juan Guerra of Clifton, Abram Rico of Morenci, and Carlos Carbajal of Metcalf, to choose a committee to represent them. Many of the men were opposed to leaving the district for a conference because they felt that this would put them at a disadvantage. Others argued that if they refused, they would lose sympathy and support in the state. At a mass meeting on Saturday, October 9, Cash told the workers the conditions of the conference as transmitted to the governor. At the same time, he announced the names of the seven men selected to go to El Paso. At first, the sheriff named only six miners: Frank T. Tarble, Frank Hocker, and Dick Walsh, representing the workers of the Arizona Copper Company; Amos C. Beam and Noverto Gonzales from the Shannon Company; and Abram Rico for the Detroit Company employees. The Mexicans from Clifton, however, insisted that Guerra be named to the committee, and he was made a delegate-at-large. Cash wired the managers the names of the men who were being sent. Norman Carmichael sent a telegram stating that the names submitted were unsatisfactory. Cash did not reveal the contents of this wire to the strikers. Instead, he called the managers, explained that the situation in the district was grave, and persuaded


10. Ibid.
them to let the delegates come to El Paso. The group, accompanied by Harris and Cash, left Sunday morning.

While the delegation was on its way to El Paso, Bennie, McLean, and Carmichael changed their minds. When the seven men got to the Paso del Norte Hotel, the managers refused to meet with them, claiming that two of the men were officials of the Western Federation, and that one was a discharged employee. The managers handed Harris a memorandum which stated that they would meet a committee of five men selected by them from a list of names previously submitted to discuss "such grievances as the committee may submit." The delegation was to have no officials or prominent agitators of the Federation in it, and two members were to be Mexicans. The rejected representatives returned to Clifton that same afternoon.

The men in the strike zone were disappointed by the failure of the abortive mission, but they agreed to make the new concessions mainly because Governor Hunt urged them to do so. On October 13 fifteen men were selected and

the list of names sent to El Paso. The next day the managers announced that they had chosen J. S. Hughes, Theodore Hollingsworth, Henry Daly, Rufino Garcia, and Adolfo Palacio to meet with them. The companies consented to pay the expenses of the men. This new delegation was instructed by the union leaders to concede all points except a pay raise, a minimum wage, the right to affiliate with the Western Federation, and a guarantee against discharge for strike activity. Any agreement by the delegation was to be subject to ratification by the workers. The five men, accompanied by Cash and Harris, left by train for Texas early Friday morning, and arrived in El Paso that evening.

Saturday the two sides held a brief organizational meeting. Harris asked to be admitted to the session as a representative of Governor Hunt but he was barred by the managers; attorneys for the companies also withdrew. Henry Daly, chairman of the delegation declared that the men had agreed to waive formal recognition of the Western Federation and presented a proposed wage scale which the managers said they would study. Monday morning the men discussed the reinstatement of workers discharged between September 1 and 11.

15. The men were requesting the right to affiliate with the Western Federation but were not demanding recognition as a basis for negotiations. *Tucson Citizen*, October 15, 1915.
The managers said they would practice no discrimination against union men, but reserved the right to fire persons "perniciously" active in agitation among the miners. At the conclusion of the confab, the managers asked the employees to change their demands on several points. Tuesday the miners offered a plan to return to work under a new wage scale and arbitrate the rest of the issues. They suggested binding arbitration with two workers, two managers, and one representative from the Department of Labor deciding the cases. The managers rejected this idea. The discussions continued for the rest of the week. When the executive committee in the district learned that the managers would answer the employees' proposals on Saturday, they announced that they would issue no more instructions to the delegates in Texas. They decided to let the El Paso committeemen use their own discretion in offering a "rock bottom" proposition to the managers' reply.

The week long conference came to an end on Saturday afternoon, when the managers handed the strikers' committee

16. A dispute arose over several discharged employees. The managers called them agitators; the strikers said they were organizers. Arizona Republican, October 19, 1915.

17. Ibid., October 23, 1915.
a written statement. In it, the three company leaders claimed that the Western Federation was influencing the miners' delegation in all its work. The managers once again stated their position--the Federation had to be eliminated in both body and spirit from the district, and the men return to work before they would discuss any question or grievance. The strikers called the conference a "farcical affair." They claimed that the companies had prolonged the meetings by "managerial pretense and deception" in an attempt to starve them into submission.

The workers said that the Federation organizers had left the district but were continuing to aid the union there in such functions as relief solicitation because the local organization would be "helpless" without outside assistance.

The local union organization began to suffer internal dissension almost as soon as the Federation advisors left the district. Many of the white workers had never

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20. Ibid. On October 22, the strikers learned that the office help of the Shannon company was taken off the payroll the day before the conference ended. This was taken as a sign by the miners that the mission to El Paso had not been expected to be a success by the managers. Arizona Republican, October 23, 1915.

been very enthusiastic about the strike. On October 23 the executive committee issued orders that every picket party must include at least two or three Anglos. That morning, the Mexicans at Metcalf had announced that they were going to try to get the whites to participate in their next parade. In the afternoon, Juan Guerra, president of the Clifton local, and Ricardo Rodriguez, secretary, resigned to avoid being recalled. Guerra was accused of "treachery" for saying that he absolutely controlled the Mexican strikers and could send them back to work at any time and under any conditions suitable to himself. Rodriguez suffered guilt by association. The two men were put in jail for their own protection and remained there for the duration of the strike. A week later, Frank Tarble and George


23. The reporter for the Republican speculated that the effort was "not likely to be a success." **Arizona Republican**, October 24, 1915.

24. Both Guerra and Rodriguez were among the most trusted Mexicans at the beginning of the strike. Manuel J. Lucero replaced Guerra. *Ibid.* The week before, Frank McKeough resigned from the executive committee after being criticized by the strikers for giving the press the names of the men going to El Paso. **Bisbee Daily Review**, October 16, 1915.


26. They were let out once, but returned the next day after strikers beat them up. The miners did not want the two men to leave the district because of the information they knew. Neither Guerra nor Rodriguez dared go to Duncan because of the many enemies they had there. **Copper Era**, October 29, 1915.
McKenzie, leaders in the Morenci local, were arrested for disturbing the peace. They had entered a meeting of ten men appointed to audit the union books and tried to confiscate the ledgers. These defections caused a temporary loss of confidence by the strikers in their leadership.

The Guerra incident occurred at an unfortunate time—the day the El Paso conference ended. On October 25 Sheriff Cash offered a new plan to end the impasse between the strikers and the managers. The proposal called for the men to return to work immediately and have all the issues settled by an arbitration board. In Clifton, only twenty-six men voted against the proposition; at Metcalf and Morenci, when union leaders tried to explain it, the Mexicans booed and jeered. They accused their leaders of being Guerra backers and rejected the deal. Although the miners had decided before this affair that any hope for a settlement lay in a federal investigation of their grievances, distrust of their leaders seemed to have solidified that feeling.

On October 9 Governor Hunt requested that Secretary

27. Arizona Republican, October 31, 1915.
28. Ibid., October 25, 1915.
29. Ibid., October 27, 1915.
of Labor William B. Wilson ordered an investigation of the strike. Wilson subsequently appointed Joseph S. Myers, a federal conciliator, to go to Arizona and look over the situation. When Myers arrived in Phoenix, the first mission was on its way to El Paso. He announced that the labor department would not intrude in the strike zone or enter into the negotiations unless "all other means of breaking a deadlock have failed." The workmen in the district, meanwhile, began agitating for the Secretary of Labor to order an investigation, while the executive committee began collecting evidence to present should such an inquiry be held. When the El Paso conference failed, Myers tendered the managers the services of the labor department in helping adjust the difficulties. On October 26, after all attempts at settlement had apparently been exhausted, Wilson wired Hunt that he had asked Myers and Hywell Davies, another conciliator, to make a "thorough examination of conditions existing in the mining industry of Arizona."

31. Myers, the first commissioner of the Texas State Department of Labor which he had helped organize, had a long career in industrial relations. *Douglas Daily International*, October 31, 1915.


33. William B. Wilson wire to Governor Hunt. *Arizona Republican*, October 27, 1915. Hywell Davies was from Lexington, Kentucky, and was a former president of the Kentucky Coal Operators Association. This was his
conciliators spent the next month collecting data in Phoenix, various mining camps, and El Paso, before going to Clifton.

While Myers and Davies quietly went about their work, the business men of the district, suffering from the depression resulting from the strike, became more vociferous in calling for an end to the deadlock. In early October, the merchants had sent John Christy, state representative from Greenlee county, to attempt a settlement. He was well received by the managers in El Paso, but when he appeared before the Arizona State Federation of Labor convention at Tucson, he nearly started a riot by calling the strikers "barbarians" and Hunt a "wooden indian." By the time he got to Phoenix, he was useless as a mediator. Governor Hunt granted him a brief interview that ended with Hunt abruptly telling him that if he were not governor, he would "take him out in the grounds and beat the stuffing out of him." Like the strikers, the businessmen now put their hopes in a federal investigation or another conference, while their trade continued to drop.

By the first of November the financial slump had third appointment in sixteen months as a labor arbitrator. He had acted in both the Colorado and Ohio coal strikes. Copper Era, November 12, 1915.

34. Christy addressed the convention hoping to get them to intervene and put pressure on the Western Federation to end the walkout. Tucson Citizen, October 7, 1915.

35. El Paso Herald, October 9, 1915 (GHS, Vol. 18, p. 46.)
affected almost every business in the community. The loss of the mining companies' monthly payroll of $450,000 had drained the district of its monetary blood. Grocery and drug store sales were only a trickle of their former volume; clothing store owners reported almost no customers. Mexican widows who had done washing or housework when the mines were operating were forced to get relief from the strike committee. Most of the movie houses managed to stay open, but the "for hire" auto service closed down. About the only businesses that were prospering were the library and the pool halls.

On November 19 about one hundred Greenlee county businessmen met at the Clifton town hall to discuss the strike situation and to see if some steps could be taken by them to help end the stalemate. They appointed a mediation committee to sound out both sides and report back in one week. Meanwhile, Myers and Davies arrived in the district and began taking testimony from the strikers behind closed doors at the courthouse. When the merchants

37. Arizona Republican, October 25, 1915.
38. The "for hire" auto rental was a favorite pastime of the Mexican workers, who liked to rent a big car and take it for drives through the countryside. Arizona Republican, October 24, 1915.
39. Approximately one hundred twenty persons testified in Clifton. Each told his story, then the statement was summarized, read to the witness and signed. Copper Era, December 3, 1915.
gathered the following Thursday, the mediation commission told the men that they had received favorable replies from the managers and the miners. Since some of the members felt that such a board might impede the work of the labor department, the group decided to "maintain their organization and resume negotiations as soon as possible after the report of the U.S. representatives."

Four days after Myers and Davies got to Clifton, and ten weeks after the strike began, the first fatality occurred, ending the bloodless character of the walkout. Casimiro Martinez returned from Duncan for some of his personal effects. He was confronted at the train depot by pickets who ordered him to go to union headquarters. He refused and made his way to a house on Burro Alley, followed by a crowd. When Lusano Ramirez tried to take him from the house, Martinez shot him. Five days later, Andreas Telles Gondera, a clerk at the Phelps Dodge Mercantile Store, was accosted on his way to work by twenty men. They pinned a sign, "esciror" (scab) on him and paraded him from Morenci to Clifton. After beating him up, they marched him out of town and ordered him not to return. While this was happening, L. J. Owens, manager of

40. Ibid., November 26, 1915.

41. Ibid.
the store, called the sheriff's office to protest. He was told that there were no deputies available. Later in the day, the Phelps Dodge employees wired Governor Hunt that they were not being given adequate protection. Hunt replied that Cash and the National Guard were doing their utmost for the citizens, and that any deficiencies in security were due to the failure of the county board of supervisors to provide enough deputies.

Prompted by the Gondera deportation, one hundred businessmen met at the school house in south Clifton on Friday night, December 10. They formed the Clifton Citizen's League, "a species of a vigilance committee," for mutual protection against riots and disorders and to safeguard lives and property. The group drew up a resolution to be presented to the town council asking that all members be made deputy marshals. In addition, they reactivated the mediation board to try to get the managers and miners together. On Monday, the council recognized the League and made all its members deputies subject to the call of the town marshal. Friday the county board of supervisors

42. Ibid., December 10, 1915.
43. Ibid.
45. About two hundred citizens were finally sworn in on December 30 and 31. Copper Era, December 31, 1915. They never performed any duties because by that time the strike was almost over and they were no disorders.
recognized the organization, and approved a request by them for eight more regular deputies for Sheriff Cash. The following week the mediation board sponsored a series of discussions in Morenci between union leaders and company spokesmen. The first two meetings were described as friendly, but the Western Federation proved to be the "stumbling block" to any agreement. A third conference, scheduled for December 17, was called off when the company representatives failed to appear.

As the end of the year approached, the outlook for a peaceful end to the walkout appeared grim. For almost two months, the two sides had not even met and there seemed to be no prospect for an amicable settlement in the near future. Events in December made it appear to the workers that the strike might be broken. Twice in December miners had "held up" trains coming to Clifton and searched them for strikebreakers. Since both trains carried mail, such acts were federal offenses. After the threat of an investigation by postal officials and possible federal intervention, the strikers stopped this activity. A more

46. Ibid., December 17, 1915.

47. The "hold ups" were staged three miles south of Clifton with about two hundred and fifty miners taking part each time. Arizona Republican, December 11, 1915.

serious threat of outside interference occurred on December 18, when attorneys for the Detroit Copper Company filed a petition in the federal court at Tucson praying an injunction restraining the unions from interference with assessment work on the company's unpatented claims. The company had one hundred and forty plots which they had to have surveyed annually in order to retain possession of them. At first Sheriff Cash had assured Frank McLean that the work could be done, but when the superintendent showed up to make the arrangements, Cash told him he feared that violence would result if the work was attempted. Judge W. H. Sawtelle ordered twenty-one union leaders to appear at a hearing on December 24 to show cause why the assessment work should not be done.

The leaders of the strike saw the assessment work as a pretense by the managers to have federal troops brought

49. Under federal law, these unpatented claims were held by private persons or corporations on the condition that one hundred dollars worth of work be done annually per claim. A writer in the Engineering and Mining Journal pointed out that this method of spending one hundred dollars per claim on assessments (as was brought out at the hearing) seemed to be a "proposal to cheat Uncle Sam." E&MJ, Vol. 101, No. 4, January 22, 1916, p. 194.
into the district. At the hearing, attorneys for the union argued that the company could not appeal to a court until actually prevented from doing the work. Moreover, they contended that the plaintiffs could not lose title to the claims if prevented by force from making the assessment. Company lawyers countered that their client had a right to have the assessment work done irrespective of the strike, and that court action did not have to wait for an overt act. Sheriff Cash testified that there were reliable contractors in the community willing to do the work, but he refused to name any. If the companies were allowed to import assessors, Cash admitted that he would be unable to prevent violence. On cross examination, the sheriff revealed that Captain Hall of the National Guard was drilling

50. E.H. Peplow in his History of Arizona claimed that the strikers were holding out to prevent this work from being done to force a settlement on the managers. Edward H. Peplow, Jr., History of Arizona (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Co., Inc., 1958), Vol. II, p. 57. I could find no evidence to substantiate this. On the contrary, the workers were trying to prevent the work to avoid having a settlement forced on them.


52. Ibid.

53. Ibid. G.A. Franz, a prominent Clifton merchant, said he would take the contract if he were not leaving for St. Louis the next day. Another merchant, Dell M. Potter, offered to do the work on twenty-three claims for one hundred and fifty dollars each, with fifty dollars per claim going to the strikers' food fund. Tucson Citizen, December 24, 1915.
some of the strikers as a "pastime," but pointed out that they did not have guns. Judge Sawtelle, nevertheless, sided with the company, and granted a temporary injunction. The strike issue, he said, did not really enter into the merits of the case. U. S. Marshal Joseph Dillon and fifty deputies were ordered to go to Morenci the next day and see that the court order was carried out.

While Judge Sawtelle was hearing final arguments in Tucson, the people in the district were holding a giant Christmas party. Because of their financial situation, the strikers decided to have a municipal tree and community gathering. A special fund was set up to see that all the children were remembered. A huge tree from the Blue Mountains was set up in the plaza at Clifton. A Mexican orchestra and local talent provided the entertainment. The Christmas spirit provided a temporary truce between the district and the Duncan camp. The refugees extended an invitation to the public to come to their town for the holiday. On Christmas eve, a grand ball was given. The next morning contests and games were held for the young; that afternoon a ball game pitted a Mexican nine against a team of Americans. A big dinner was served from

two to six, and candy and presents were distributed to the children. Several hundred strikers and their families took advantage of the free train ride to Duncan; a few decided to stay and enjoy the hospitality permanently.

The day after Christmas, Dillon and his deputies arrived in Morenci and covered the district with notices of the injunction in English and Spanish. On Christmas day, the Detroit officials had offered the strikers an opportunity as individuals to work the claims at five dollars a day, but only fourteen men applied. The following Monday, two hundred and thirty-six Duncanites were brought to Morenci. The next day two hundred and fifty more arrived without incident. Dillon searched the men for weapons and gave them back when they returned to the refugee camp. Union officials were extremely careful to avoid any trouble lest they be cited for contempt or cause the entry of federal troops to enforce the court order. The federal deputies kept a close watch on the

56. Copper Era, December 24, 1915.

57. The men were reportedly pressured by the Western Federation not to accept. Arizona Republican, December 28, 1915.

58. Sheriff Cash reported a search of the men revealed forty-six six-shooters, one Winchester rifle, and twelve dirks. Arizona Republican, January 1, 1916. Marshal Dillon denied that Cash ever searched the men, nor would he have had any right to do so. Dillon searched the men and took whatever weapons he found. Arizona Daily Star, January 13, 1916.
assessors. One man tried to make an anti-union speech and 59 Dillon quickly put him in jail. The work lasted two weeks. On January 7 two hundred and fifty men returned to Duncan; the rest left the next day. The night before they left the strikers held an appreciation demonstration for the federal officers. A Mexican band serenaded the men and several union leaders gave speeches of "thanks and praise to Dillon and the deputies."

While the assessment work was progressing in Morenci, events elsewhere were paving the way for a settlement. The strike was proving costly for both sides. The price of copper had risen from 17.375 cents per pound the day the strike was called to 22.50 cents on December 31. While other mining areas were enjoying this prosperity, the Clifton-Morenci camp stood idle. Over a million and a half dollars in wages alone had been lost by the miners. On December 22 the federal investigators had concluded their hearings and had gone to El Paso to submit a proposition to the managers. From there Myers and Davies went to


60. Ibid., January 14, 1916. Officials at the Duncan camp reported that one hundred more men returned to Duncan than left.


Washington to confer with Secretary Wilson and then to New York to talk to the directors of Phelps Dodge. In the final issue of the Copper Era for 1915, the Arizona Company Department Store, somewhat cynically perhaps, ran a half page ad wishing all its customers "a Year of Continued Prosperity and Success."

On New Year's Day the managers submitted a proposition through Henry Hill and Reese R. Webster of the Citizen's Mediation Committee. They offered to advance the wage scale to twenty cent copper and resume operations at once, if the workers surrendered their charters with the Western Federation. The next day the men agreed to give up affiliation with the Federation, but rejected the proposal because the wage increase was too small. The Anglos accepted it almost to a man, but the Mexicans refused it almost unanimously. On Sunday, January 3 Doctor A. V. Dye, representing the managers, addressed the workers at Morenci and asked them to end their alignment with the Western Federation. Tuesday he spoke to the

63. Ibid.
64. The increase would have amounted to about five percent, while copper prices had risen fifteen percent (17.502 to 20.133). Arizona Republican, January 2, 1916. The wage scale would have paid miners $2.89, while at Miami the scale was $4.40. (Miami) Daily Silver Belt, January 10, 1916.
66. Dye, a Clifton resident, had been American Consul at Nogales, Sonora at one time. Daily Silver Belt, January 7, 1916.
miners in Clifton. No conclusive action was taken at either meeting, but the executive committee told Dye to ask the managers to hold the offer open for one week. Meanwhile, Hill and Webster returned to El Paso and got the managers to agree to advance the wage scale to include up to twenty-four cent copper if the other conditions were met.

The two citizen mediators returned to the district on January 9, and the next day explained the proposition to mass meetings of the workers. On Tuesday, January 11, four months after the strike began, the miners formally renounced the Western Federation. About one thousand men attended the ceremony in Library plaza. The executive committee handed the charters and seals of the three locals to a delegation of citizens, who in turn gave them to Sheriff Cash. The strikers then threw away their union

67. Copper Era, January 7, 1916. The executive board said they wanted a week to eliminate the Federation in a bona fide manner and select a committee to go to El Paso. The managers rejected a delegation coming to Texas. Arizona Republican, January 7, 1916.

68. The January 8 proposal called for the men to renounce the Western Federation and return to work immediately on the new wage scale, advanced to meet the increased price of copper. No men were to be fired except those guilty of acts of violence, and only a total of ten men from the three companies could be discharged for this reason. Finally, after normal resumption of operations, the managers would meet their workers. Arizona Republican, January 15, 1916.

69. Wednesday morning Cash wrapped the papers and seals securely and sent them to the secretary of the
cards and swore allegiance to the Arizona State Federation of Labor. Finally, John L. Donnelly, vice-president of the state federation, addressed the crowd. He told the men that they should be proud of their fight for the right to organize and that he was happy to represent them. The strikers, he said, had complied with the demands of the companies, and the next move was up to the managers.

Bennie, McLean, and Carmichael remained silent in El Paso, while spokesmen and mediators maintained a dialogue between the two sides. Myers and Davies, back from the East, conferred with Governor Hunt in Phoenix, and then went to the pass city. There they reviewed the proposed settlement with the managers and Hill and Webster. Meanwhile, on January 17 the miners voted to return to work for fifteen days provided that a conference be held during

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70. The three locals were temporarily admitted to the Arizona State Federation, pending the approval of the American Federation of Labor. The idea of having the A.S.F.L. represent the strikers in negotiations with the managers was worked out in a conference between Donnelly and Dye. Daily Silver Belt, January 7, 1916.

71. Donnelly had worked for the Arizona Copper Company on the conveyors at the turn of the century. Later he moved to Miami where he rose rapidly in the union organization. He was elected president of the A.S.F.L. in 1916. Copper Era, January 14, 1916.

72. Ibid.
that period. In addition, they stipulated that no employee who refused to join the union or went to Duncan be employed before the expiration of that date. When the managers refused to accept this condition, the miners agreed to a gradual importation of refugees at the discretion of Cash, Hill, and Webster. On January 21 the federal mediators went over the plan with the managers and then left for Clifton to recommend its adoption by the strikers.

On Sunday, January 23 a mass meeting was held at the Princess Theater in Clifton to discuss the managers' offer. John Donnelly told the men that he would not advise them one way or the other, but if it were up to him, he would not accept the settlement. Hywell Davies reminded the miners of the impartial nature of the Department of Labor. Then he reviewed the financial condition of the strikers and told the workers that they could expect little or no more help from other union organizations. Finally he explained the terms of the "Hill-Webster proposition,"

73. There were over thirteen hundred men in the Duncan camp by that time. Arizona Republican, January 18, 1916.


75. Ibid. Help had not come as it should have because the men in the district had never supported organized labor in any other section. Daily Silver Belt, January 26, 1916.
as the January 8 proposal of the managers was called, and recommended that the men compromise and take the deal as the best they could get. A vote to return to work was defeated by twenty-eight votes. The next morning the men at Metcalf unanimously approved resumption of operations; that afternoon the Morenci miners approved the proposal. The Clifton workers voted again that evening and the strike ended.

76. The proposition had been changed slightly and now called for a conference within thirty days. Arizona Republican, January 24, 1916.

77. It was said that the men wanted more time to study the proposition and let the Morenci and Metcalf miners pass on it first. Copper Era, January 28, 1916 and Arizona Republican, January 24, 1916.
CHAPTER V

THE RESULTS OF THE STRIKE

On Wednesday morning, January 26 the whistles blew in the Clifton-Morenci district for the first time in four and a half months. The shrill sound summoned only a small number of workers, but the noise was a cause for general rejoicing. About two hundred men held an impromptu celebration in Morenci when the call for work was heard. The managers had returned earlier to supervise the start-up; the mules and horses were expected from Safford on Thursday. The workers who made a preliminary inspection of the mines found most levels dry and ready for ore to be shovelled into the chutes; only a few areas were flooded. The first refugees from Duncan began arriving on the afternoon train. Merchants kept the wires hot all day ordering supplies, as the district once again took on the spectacle of activity and industry.

1. The mules and horses had been shipped to Safford shortly after the strike began. E&MJ, Vol. 101, No. 6, p. 318.

2. The refugees had written Governor Hunt asking for protection when they returned. Hunt replied that it was up to the Greenlee county authorities to provide such security. (Clifton) Copper Era, January 21, 1916. With minor exceptions, work resumed without friction. Ibid., February 4, 1916.
By the end of the week, two thousand men were back on the payroll, and it was "confidently predicted" that within thirty days all the workers would be reinstated. Monday the last of the National Guard forces left Clifton and by Friday the number of employees went above three thousand. Wednesday there was a brief strike at Metcalf over the hiring of Duncan men, but the matter was quickly adjusted. Myers and Davies, who were ordered to stay in the state for six months to assist in the final settlement and keep in touch with the situation, met with the managers twice during the week to discuss plans for the conference with the workers. John Donnelly remained to aid the miners in their negotiations and to help effect an orderly resumption of operations.

The transition from idleness to industry was accomplished with little difficulty; few exceptions marred the conversion. On February 11 the employees of the Detroit Copper Company walked out when a mine foreman hired a new man before all the old employees were working. Donnelly advised the men to return to work pending an investigation, and warned the minor officials to live up to the spirit of the agreement like the managers were doing. Bennie shut

down the Shannon company concentrator and leacher for "re-
pairs" when he heard of a threatened walkout. The inter-
ruption lasted three days. The editor of the Copper Era
admonished the workers for boycotting various institutions
and individuals. He reminded the men that their statement
at the conclusion of the strike called for the spirit of
the Brotherhood of Man in the community. In spite of
these problems, the district was almost back to normal by
February 17, when the managers and the union began to work
on the final agreement.

At the first conference, seventeen representatives
of the miners, the three managers, the two federal inves-
tigators, and A. T. Thomson met in the office of the Arizona
Copper Company. For the next five weeks, similar discus-
sions were held. On February 25 the men announced agree-
ment on a new wage scale effective March 1. By the terms
of the arrangement, the employees got raises of five to

8. Thomson was assistant manager of Phelps Dodge.
The representatives of the employees included: Theodore
Hollingsworth (chairman), C.S. Edmondson (secretary), Dick
Walsh, Rudolfo Palacios, Charles Duval, Encaracion Lucero,
Francisco Maese, Pedro Mireulo, Lido Domínguez, Noberto
Gonzalez, Hilario Penas, Frank J. Starr, Fred W. Harris,
Jose Bernal, Sam Bridges, Ignacio Aja, and Camuto Vargas.
Ibid., February 18, 1916.
fifteen percent depending on the job. A minimum wage of two dollars per shift was established, and the sliding scale, depending on the price of copper, was formally adopted. At the same time discrimination in salary between Mexicans and Anglos was ended. After another month of negotiations, the final pact was worked out. It banned the Western Federation from the district, provided discharge for shift bosses and foremen who accepted or demanded gratuities from any worker as the price of employment, set up committees and procedures for grievances, and affirmed the employee's

9. The sliding scale provided advances or declines in wages whenever the price per pound of copper changed. Under this arrangement, wages were determined by the average price for the previous month as quoted in the *Engineering and Mining Journal*. From a base of thirteen cent or below, the wage scale went up as the price rose. The percentage increase in wages was added to the minimum salary, and the pay rose proportionally from this. *Ibid.*, February 25, 1916.

How this set up affected the pay of workers can be seen from the following examples: Nat Espinoza, a laborer, earned $1.92 per day when the strike was called. For the first pay period after the strike, he made $2.12 (this was based on 20¢ copper, December's average). In February, he got $2.52 per shift (based on 24¢ copper, January's average). With the wage hike under the terms of the final settlement, and the raise in copper prices to 26¢, his pay was $3.08 in March.

Miguel Alarcon, a miner, earned $2.89 per day when the strike was called. For the first pay period in 1916, he made $3.08. In February he got $3.53 per shift. His pay after the agreement was $4.01 per day. *Arizona Copper Company Payroll Records, 1915-1916.*
right to buy wherever he chose. On March 29 the three managers signed the contract for their companies; Theodore Hollingsworth and C. S. Edmondson endorsed it for the union.

The workers were satisfied with their new contract; they were getting the highest wages ever paid in the district. Considering that copper prices had soared to an all time peak, however, the pay hike was not really a tremendous victory for the men. The salary increases, while substantial, were much less than the workers had requested and practically nil compared to inflated copper prices. The average monthly price of the metal had risen fifty-six percent from August 1915 to February 1916. The pay raise represented a mere thirty-nine percent increase for miners

10. While banning the Western Federation, the agreement affirmed the right of affiliation with any other union. On the grievance matter, a committee was set up to investigate individual complaints and try to iron them out with shift bosses or foremen before appealing to the managers. Anyone agitating a strike or quitting work before a final decision was handed down was subject to discharge. For complaints affecting the whole district, a joint grievance committee of twelve was set up. Copper Era, March 31, 1916.

11. The men had asked for a minimum wage of $2.50 per day for surface laborers, and three dollars for underground work. Wages of all other occupations were to rise from this base, and all wages were to be advanced as copper prices increased. E&MJ, Vol. 100, No. 15, October 9, 1915, p. 606.
and sixty percent for laborers. Donnelly said that winning the right to organize was the "Big Thing," but this was small consolation since the union conformed almost completely to the terms laid down by the managers.

By their persistence, Bennie, McLean, and Carmichael had succeeded in preventing the establishment of the Western Federation in the district. On the other hand, they had their properties closed down for five months at a time when copper was selling at the highest prices in eight years. The strike was especially detrimental to the profits of the companies in 1915 because copper prices were low during the first part of the year. The rapid rise in the

12. Copper averaged 16.941 cents per pound in August, 1915, the period from which the last pay before the strike was figured. The average price in February 1916, which determined the March rates, was 26.440 cents a pound. This was an increase of 9.499 cents. E&MJ, August 1915 to March 1916.

The wage of a miner in this same period went from $2.89 per day in September to $4.01 in March, or a $1.12 increase. A laborer's pay rose from $1.92 to $3.08, an increase of $1.16 in the same period. Arizona Copper Company Records.


14. Copper sold for 12.75 cents a pound on January 2, 1915, and 22.50 cents on December 31. Shannon company, whose only enterprise was its mine claims in the district, and hence the only one whose profits would accurately reflect conditions in Clifton-Morenci, reported net profits in 1915 of $209,678. E&MJ, Vol. 102, No. 4, July 22, 1916, p. 185. For the first six months in 1916, the company showed a net profit of $434,220. E&MJ, Vol. 102, No. 14, September 30, 1916, p. 578.
price of the metal as the year ended benefited the companies in wage negotiations by allowing the managers to grant a small increase in pay which appeared to the workers as a substantial salary hike because of the sliding scale. Fortunately for the managers, the price of copper remained high throughout 1916. By the end of the year, copper prices had risen to 33.50 cents a pound. Laborers were then earning $3.91 per shift, more than double what they made when the strike began.

Wages consequently ceased to be a major cause of labor difficulties for the rest of the year. Other problems, however, came to the fore to plague peaceful relations between the managers and the miners. In eighteen months following the settlement, the workers staged seventeen strikes in various departments of the three companies. In addition, superintendents and other officials complained that they were constantly occupied with investigations and grievance meetings. Any attempt to fire a man was a cause for trouble. The miners also found fault with company hiring practices. They maintained that the company surgeons placed "too much diagnostic importance on the celebrations of strong union tendencies" in pre-employment 15 physicals. On another occasion, they protested when the

Detroit Copper Company refused to give the union ground in Morenci for a union hall. But the biggest problem was efficiency. Norman Carmichael complained that production fell from 2.60 tons a man per shift in 1915 to 2.22 tons in 1916. At the same time the average wage per shift had gone from $2.34 to $3.72. The union organization which the managers had permitted proved stronger than they had anticipated.

In February the executive committee of the Arizona State Federation of Labor granted a charter to the miners of the district. The union set up the Clifton District Labor Council and began a drive to organize all the crafts in the area. One month later they had a membership of over four thousand workers enrolled, and reported nine thousand dollars in the bank. Moreover, the miners voluntarily assessed themselves a day's pay for the next six

16. Ibid.


19. The leaders reported that in addition to miners, they had organized bookkeepers, stenographers, and accountants. Daily Silver Belt, March 8, 1916.
months to pay back obligations from the strike. The men were taking their union commitments seriously. In six months they had passed from no organization at all into a formidable group conscious of the power of collective action.

The persons responsible for unionism in the district had left before they could reap the benefits of their efforts. In July the Western Federation of Miners held their annual convention at Great Falls, Montana. For several months prior to the meeting, a running battle had been waged over the actions of Federation officials in the Clifton strike. At the time the organization withdrew from the district, the strike committee had expressed their appreciation to Charles H. Moyer that "you have done all in your power to save us." After the walkout was settled, the leaders of the strike had second thoughts. As part of a "new blood" movement in the Federation, George Powell, president of the Miami Miners' Union, was trying to unseat

20. Ibid. The final report of the executive strike committee showed total receipts of $24,174.13 and disbursements of $23,926.00. They reported at least $25,000 in unpaid bills. Copper Era, February 4, 1916.

Moyer as head of the union. This group attempted to make capital of Moyer's actions in Clifton. They accused him of repudiating the miners, and they enlisted the aid of the strike committee in discrediting his activities. In the election, Moyer beat Powell by a three to two margin.

Of more concern and interest to the people of Clifton and Morenci were the state and county elections of 1916. On March 30 Governor Hunt announced that he would be a candidate for a third term. He claimed that human liberties were the issue in the campaign because "popular government in Arizona is in danger of being dethroned and supplanted by a hierarchy of special interests." Labor organizations immediately came to his support and formed Hunt Clubs throughout the state. These organizations, composed mostly of wage earners, were reciprocating Hunt for the cooperation he had given the labor movement in his first two terms. The Arizona State Federation of Labor closed its annual convention with a unanimous vote endorsing the governor's re-election.

23. Ibid., pp. 373-375.
25. Ibid.
Organized labor's support of Hunt was a major issue in the campaign. The editor of the Arizona Daily Star saw a Hunt victory as a threat to the future prosperity of the state. With its large undeveloped resources, Arizona needed capital, and "Hunt's socialism," the editor lamented, "is a danger that makes even northern Mexico a more attractive place to invest." Spears of the Republican said the Hunt campaign was based on the idea of aligning class against class. He supported Thomas E. Campbell, the Republican candidate, who the editor thought would be "fair to all." Hunt countered the press criticism by a personal tour of the state to tell the people "things the copper subsidized press won't tell you." The two candidates traveled the state until election eve.

30. Arizona Republican, August 25, 1916. When he spoke in Clifton, he was greeted with several banners including one, "Hunt is the Juarez and Hidalgo of the Mexicans of Arizona." Ibid., September 5, 1916.
The people went to the polls on November 6. When the official results were tabulated, they showed that Campbell had won by a slim thirty votes out of fifty-eight thousand ballots cast. At the urging of friends, Hunt demanded a recount. He contended that he "was loathe to have this done, but there had been so much skulduggery in the campaign that I finally consented." The problem centered around ticket splitting. In Maricopa county, a large number of persons marked their ballots straight Democratic and then placed an "X" before Campbell's name. These ballots were counted for Campbell. In Gila and Greenlee counties, many people voted straight Democratic except for sheriff. In these cases, the ballots were thrown out. While legal action was being initiated, Campbell demanded and got a certificate of election from the secretary of state.


32. "Autobiography of G.W.P. Hunt," Typescript on microfilm, Arizona State Library and Archives, Phoenix, p. 166. The first part of Hunt's story was published in the Arizona Historical Review (see Chapter II, f.n. 24). The rest of the autobiography is on microfilm and its use is "restricted." This author was allowed a superficial examination of the film.

33. Copper Era, December 15, 1916. Sheriff Cash was defeated by A.H. Slaughter 908 to 889, after the
On January 1, 1917 Campbell went to the capitol building to be inaugurated. When he got to the door, deputy sheriffs from Maricopa county barred the entrance and told the governor-elect that the capitol was closed because it was a holiday. On January 29 Campbell became de facto governor, after the superior court declared him the winner. Hunt appealed to the state supreme court. The justices heard the case in October and, on December 22 handed down a ruling which declared him the winner. Hunt said he "felt sorry for Campbell." Nevertheless, on December 25, 1917 Campbell vacated his office to Hunt.

Contested ballots had been added in. Cash protested on the grounds that he should get all the votes marked straight Democratic in spite of the marking for Slaughter. Ibid., December 22, 1916. Ironically, if a uniform standard was set up to judge the ballots, Hunt could not lose. If all the contested sheriff and governor ballots were thrown out, he would win and if they were all added in he would win. In all the cases, the Democrats should have gotten the votes where straight Democrat was marked even if people marked names in the Republican column, according to Section 2979 Revised Statutes. Ibid., December 15, 1916.


36. Campbell served almost a full year as de facto governor, without pay. The salary went to Hunt. Campbell ran for the governorship again in 1918, won, and was re-elected in 1920. The 1922 race saw Campbell versus Hunt, back on the stump after a four year retirement. Once again Hunt beat Campbell.
In a sense the inauguration in Phoenix on Christmas morning, 1917, was the last act of the Clifton-Morenci strike. For even though it took place almost two years after the settlement, the strike had almost as great an influence on Hunt as Hunt had on the strike. A hunt of a different nature also had a lingering effect. E. W. Kewaugh of the forester's office at Albuquerque reported that hunting trips by strikers had greatly depleted the game supply in the nearby national forests. Men from the district alone had bagged four hundred and seventy-five deer. The farmers of Greenlee county happily reported that the miners had killed all the rabbits in the area.

In a more serious vein, the strike had been one of the most remarkable that had occurred in any mining region in the country. It was notable for its order and for the absence of bloodshed or property destruction. According to Myers and Davies, it was "conducted on a different plane to any Western strike of similar magnitude and duration." Many persons and groups either took credit or were praised

38. Ibid.
for their actions. Temperance societies pointed to the peaceful nature of events in the district as an example of the benefits of prohibition. They claimed that the Mexican children were better fed and clothed during the strike than when their fathers were working and Arizona had the open saloon. Socialists said the strike demonstrated the validity of their doctrines by showing the control three men had over the lives of five thousand miners and their families. The miners believed that Governor Hunt and Sheriff Cash deserved credit for the pacific nature of the strike because of their refusal to allow the importation of scabs. The managers contended that this was undeserved praise since the companies had no intention of introducing strikebreakers.

No one faction or person deserved credit for either the peaceful nature of the strike or the final settlement of it. Both sides hurled charges at each other, but both sides showed restraint when it came to action. The strike began peacefully and the miners and the managers wanted to keep it that way. By the time negotiations reached an impasse, Governor Hunt had moved to prevent the managers from

41. Tucson Citizen, October 15, 1915.
42. Arizona Republican, October 23, 1915.
breaking the strike. At the same time, the Department of Labor had entered the situation and given the miners hope that they would get a fair hearing of their grievances. Meanwhile the rise in copper prices and the loss of wages made a settlement desirable for both sides. The youngest state had given a commendable representation of itself in its first major labor difficulty.
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