THE DEFENSE OF PIMERÍA ALTA, 1690-1800: A STUDY
IN SPANISH-APACHE MILITARY RELATIONS

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PREFACE

In this account of Spanish-Apache relations during the years 1690 to 1810, I have stressed the military aspects of the problem. Certainly there is no intention to downgrade the importance of the many other factors relevant to this problem on the frontier. In an attempt to limit the scope of so complex a topic, only limited reference has been made to religious, cultural and political factors which certainly had a great bearing on events on the frontier. Despite these and other omissions, I hope the picture presented is accurate and coherent. Special thanks are due to Dr. Russell C. Ewing for his patient guidance through several versions of this thesis. I would also like to thank the staff of the Manuscript Division of the Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society.
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ABSTRACT

Contact with the Apache Indian on the Sonoran frontier in the last half of the seventeenth century presented the Spaniards with a perplexing problem to which successful experience with Indians to the south apparently did not apply. The Apaches' hostility and exclusiveness prevented the regular clergy from executing a policy of peaceful penetration and subjugation. With the clergy unable to function, in this instance, the Spaniards were forced to turn to other resources.

Father Eusebio Kino initiated the policy of using the friendly sedentary tribes of the frontier as a means of keeping the Apache Indians from invading Sonora. The attempt to place the major share of defense on these tribes failed. Several of them, especially the Opata, were extremely useful in the role of auxiliaries, but the main defense of the area had to be borne by Spanish arms.

Successful defense of the frontier necessitated a uniform policy executed under unified control.
The Spaniards, however, did not begin to articulate a policy until the time of José de Galvez' visita. Nearly two decades of groping toward unified command and policy followed. Much of the time went into acquiring knowledge of the Apache. In the mid-1780's experienced commanders such as Neve, Ugarte y Loyola, and Nava carried out a coherent policy toward a satisfactory, if temporary, conclusion.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Hernan Cortes' conquest of Mexico launched Spain into a period of conquest on the mainland of the New World. From the central valley of Mexico, Spaniards moved with ease in all directions until much of North America was under their domination. The Spaniards often met resistance, but few of the Indian tribes were capable of prolonged opposition to the conquest. In these early days, Spanish policy and power were so dexterously applied that the subjugation of the more civilized tribes was accomplished often without recourse to force.

The use of Jesuits for peaceful conquest was a cardinal point in the advance northward along the Pacific slope. The Jesuits expended much time and effort in moving to new valleys and new tribes. From their efforts the Spaniards learned much about the people they were to encounter and could take steps to overcome peacefully opposition beforehand.

It is unnecessary to dwell long on so well-known a policy in this study. It worked well because of many factors: the high caliber of personnel in both the church
and the military, the vigor of the participants, and the fervor with which they carried out projects. Of particular importance, however, was the fact that these tribes were sedentary and dependent on agriculture. Communication among them was well developed, and conquest of one tribe gave the Spaniards much information on adjacent groups to the north, making their subjugation easier. It was in this manner that Father Eusebio Kino introduced Spanish influence into Pimería Alta in 1687.

In spite of the successes of Kino and others, attempts to move the frontier northward from the region called Pimería Alta consistently failed. Again, several factors were involved, but one of the basic reasons was the encounter with the nomadic, barbarous Apache tribe with whom the traditional policies failed. The link in the communications chain was interrupted by the Apache nation. The Spanish reacted unimaginatively. Little attempt was made to study and understand the Apaches even for the purpose of subduing them. Although the Spaniards did not normally resort to force in expanding the frontiers, in this instance they did adopt military measures. As a consequence, Spanish-Apache relations, during most of the period under study (1688-1810), revolved around tactical warfare.
It was not until the 1770's that the Spaniards began to gain a significant insight into the nature of the Apache and shape a comprehensive policy in accordance with the Indian's unique strengths and weaknesses. Notable improvements in Spanish relations with the Apaches followed, and by 1810 a tenuous peace was established. It is useless to speculate on what might have evolved. The Spaniards had not yet achieved complete pacification of the Apaches when, as happened often on the frontier, events far away changed the history of the Sonora frontier.
CHAPTER II

THE APACHE AS A WARRIOR

The Apache Indians did not interpose themselves between the Pima and Pueblo Indians until late in the seventeenth century. Working on anthropological evidence, Henry F. Dobyns cites the existence of regular trade between the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and the Pima Indians of Pimería Alta. Such trade would have been impossible if a disruptive force such as the Apaches had been present in appreciable numbers.¹ Historical evidence tends to support that contention. Francisco Coronado, in his report of the expedition of 1540-1542, stated that the territory between the Pima villages and the New Mexico pueblos was unpopulated at that time. When Coronado did mention the Apache Indians, he referred to them as "Querechos," who were probably ancestors of the Jicarilla and Mescalero groups. At least as early as 1525, the Querechos lived in what is now eastern New

¹ Henry F. Dobyns, "Tubac Through Four Centuries" (MS in four volumes, The University of Arizona Anthropology Library, 1959), Vol. II, pp. 170-171.
Mexico and west Texas. From this home ground, they raided as far as the area just south of Santa Fe.²

Apparently the term "Apache" was common among the Spaniards by the time of Juan de Oñate in 1598. The name probably came from the Zuñi word for enemy which they applied to a band of Indians who had occupied one of their towns. The Spaniards soon applied the term "Apache" to the many related groups on the fringes of New Mexico.³

The Querechos, or Apaches, were an Athapascan group which had migrated southward from the central Great Plains about the fourteenth century. The migration was still under way when the Spaniards arrived in northern Sonora, although by then most of the sub-groups had appropriated certain areas and considered them as their own.⁴ Pushing the Apaches southward were the Comanches, an Indian tribe which in turn was under pressure from


⁴. Ibid., p. 327.
the Sioux to the north. Through intermittent pressure during the Spanish period, the Comanches continued to drive the Apache nation before them. 5

The Apaches probably moved from the plains into what is today southwestern New Mexico and southeastern Arizona after 1542. Dobyns concluded that the move took place between 1680 and 1692, when the Spaniards' temporary loss of New Mexico made it possible. Trade between the Pueblo and Pima Indians ceased before the year 1700. Repeated attempts by the Pimas to reach New Mexico from Pimería Alta failed thereafter because of opposition from the Apaches. 6

The Apache's influence in northern Sonora thus predated the arrival of the Spaniards by only a few years. Before the natives of the region could formulate their response to increasing Apache pressure in the northeast, an intruder from the south arrived and sought to impose his will on both Indian parties. From Father Eusebio Kino's time (Kino died in 1711), the Spaniards enlisted the aid of the Indians of Pimería Alta—especially the Sobaipuri of the San Pedro Valley—as a buffer against the Apaches. Father Kino disrupted the

5. Spicer, p. 320.
peace between the Sobaipuri and the Apaches. Subsequently, however, the Spaniards would or could not support their allies against the Apache Indians. Under continuous Apache attack, the Sobaipuri culture slowly gave way and eventually crumbled. The vengeful Apaches broke through into Sonora to become a problem which plagued the Spaniards for a century. \(^7\)

That branch of the Apache nation which harassed Sonora was a segment of the tribe living west of the Rio Grande. Numerous subdivisions constituted this segment of Apaches, two of the most rapacious being the Gila and Mimbreno. In designating all of the Apache groups operating west of the Rio Grande, the term "Gila Apaches" was often used. \(^8\) Estimates of their total population during the period 1690-1810 are in close agreement. Visitador Pedro de Rivera, in 1728, placed the number of Apaches residing on the fringe of Pimería Alta at about

\(^7\) Charles C. DiPeso, et al., The Sobaipuri Indians of the Upper San Pedro River Valley, Southeastern Arizona (Dragoon, Arizona: The Amerind Foundation, Inc., 1953), No. 6, p. 32.

5,000 persons.\(^9\) Father Johan Neuntuig in his *Rudo Ensayo* computed the Apache population in his day (1764) at over 1,000 families.\(^{10}\) Edward Spicer placed the Apache population in this area at about 7,000 in the 1840's.\(^{11}\) It would seem that reasonable limits could be set at 5,000 to 7,000 during the eighteenth century, assuming that a nomadic group would maintain a fairly stable population under stable conditions.

Apache culture was markedly distinct from that of the sedentary tribes with whom the Spaniards were accustomed to dealing. It was unique in many ways. The savage, nomadic Apaches lived by hunting and minimal farming. The tribe was composed of many independent bands. Each group was normally identified by the name of the mountain which it inhabited, or occasionally by the name of its chief. Esch family (in a broad definition of the word) formed a *rancheria*, usually in the


11. Spicer, p. 244.
mountains which secured its independence by providing a high degree of natural protection.\textsuperscript{12}

Residence in mountain strongholds did not hinder the mobility of the Apache Indians. Rather, mobility was a way of life for the entire tribe. Even the most populous ranchería could proceed with such rapidity either afoot or on horseback as to lose all pursuers within a few hours. Camp could be disbanded in an instant; if horses were available, they were quickly loaded with the children and the few family belongings. The women walked, carrying their infants. Warriors, mounted on their best horses, provided escort. All moved with celerity and good order to another hide-out, which would provide safety.\textsuperscript{13}

Mobility came naturally to the male Apache because hunting was his main occupation. Hugo de O'Connor declared that the Apache spent most of his time in Spanish territory with no other purpose than to rob

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
and pillage.\textsuperscript{14} Spicer asserted that contact with the Spaniard was a major element in revolutionizing the Apache's culture when he "chose warfare as a way of life."\textsuperscript{15}

One point should be made perfectly clear: Despite all the death and destruction that he left in his wake, the Apache warrior was primarily interested in loot.\textsuperscript{16} This is quite evident in his hit-and-run raiding tactics. He was, in fact, a parasite and was conscious enough of this fact to have no wish to destroy his host. It was on this fact that Bernardo de Gálvez, on his accession as Viceroy of Mexico, would hinge his entire program for subduing the Apache in his "Instructions" of 1785.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{itemize}
    \item[15.] Spicer, p. 243.
    \item[17.] Below, pp. 146-148.
\end{itemize}
The hit-and-run tactics of the Apaches led the Spaniard to conclude that the Apache lacked courage. Ordinarily, if the Apache met a little resistance, he would retreat. In his raids he preferred to rely on treachery, improvised attack, and well concealed ambuscades. He always sought to attack with surprise and sure advantage, and almost never in open warfare or when defeat was possible. To him, an offer of peace meant the enemy was weak. Despite this, the Apache warrior exhibited great courage when attacked by his enemies. He would resist, even if surprised and without means of defense until exhausted or dead.

The traditional Apache weapons were the lance and the bow and arrow. The lance was normally grasped with both hands for an overhead thrust, making it a more effective weapon when the bearer was afoot rather than on horseback. As to the bow and arrow, Father Ignaz Pfefferkorn noted that "the Apache are incomparable archers and seldom miss." The first arrows shot from

18. José de Ortega, Historia de Nayarit, Sonora, Sinaloa y ambas Californias (Mexico: E. Abadián, 1887), p. 536; O'Conor, p. 79.

19. Cortes, pp. 50a-50b.

a bow were capable of penetrating both a shield and a jacket. Loosening bowstrings reduced the power of the following shots, but this could be readily corrected.  

Soon after contact with the Spaniards, the Apache began to acquire firearms by trade from French Louisiana. The Indians quickly saw the advantages of firearms and readily learned to use them effectively. There were disadvantages, of course. An Indian could shoot eight or ten arrows before a musket could be fired and reloaded. For this reason, Bernardo de Gálvez later proposed that the Spaniards supply the Apache with "trade" muskets. In time, he hoped, they would lose their proficiency with the bow and arrow and become totally dependent on the Spaniards for firearms and repairs.

Armed with either bow and arrows or musket, the individual warrior was a formidable enemy. With the initiative on his side, he would select situations which would maximize his strengths and minimize his weaknesses.


Throughout most of this period, it was the Apache
who carried the war to the Spaniard through raids.
Generally, a raid would require the cooperation of
several rancherías. The headmen of these rancherías—
sometimes a hereditary leader, often an ambitious, able
warrior—would gather to discuss a proposal for a raid.
If the proposal was accepted by enough groups, over-all
leadership was then bestowed by common consent on the
bravest warrior; but the position carried little authority
for the others were free to do as they pleased at any
time.\(^{23}\) Having agreed to raid, they selected some
natural fortress in which the families were left under
limited guard, and the warriors then departed.\(^{24}\)

The Apaches usually entered Sonora at night in
the first phase of a new moon. They employed various
subterfuges in order to escape detection. These con-
sisted of breaking up into small parties, walking, and
deliberately selecting as their route rough terrain or
mountain passes.\(^{25}\)

\(^{23}\) Cortes, pp. 42b-43a.
\(^{24}\) Ibid., p. 48b.
\(^{25}\) Zuñiga, p. 13; Donald Rowland, "The Sonora
Frontier of New Spain, 1735-45," New Spain the the Anglo-
American West, ed. George P. Hammond (Lancaster, Pa.:
The Apaches favored several trails. The north-south orientation of mountain chains and river valleys made many paths available. Basic also to much of the raiding strategy was the nearness of the Sierra Madre Oriental which separated the presidios of Janos and Fronteras. Raids originating north of the Gila could go south on San Simon Creek, through the Sierra of San Bernardino, through Mababi or Magallanes Pass, and along the western slope of the Sierra Madre until deep in Spanish territory. Raiding parties originating farther east could cross through several passes, including the Carretas Ridge and the Caguiona Mountains.

Farther west, raiders followed Arivaipa Creek to the San Pedro River, southward to the vicinity of modern Bisbee and entered Sonora at that point. The trail


branched in three directions: (1) southwest to the mining and ranching region of Magdalena, (2) south toward Arizpe and Pitic, and (3) southeast to the mines and ranches of the Nacozari area. In addition to these routes, Nicolas de Lafora added three passes between Terrenate and Tubac and Consumidero Pass (between the Rincon and Santa Rita Mountains) ten leagues northeast of Tubac as access routes often used by the enemy.

The mechanics of the actual raid were often improvised after the band arrived at its destination undetected. The group usually divided into small parties, most of which spread out in search of horses, mules, or cattle, while a few contingents prepared ambuscades along the chosen path of retreat. The small groups executed quick assaults and fled with or without their booty to reunite with the others.

Retreat was usually at such a rapid pace that the Apaches were out of reach before pursuit was organized. Even then, they resorted to stratagems. These included

30. Cortes, pp. 49a-50b.
leaving a rear guard, taking only the best horses and killing all other livestock, fleeing into the mountains, and frequent, successive traps sprung on inferior numbers of pursuers in the narrow defiles of mountain passes.³² When the expedition returned to its stronghold, the booty was divided. Open dissension was settled by the law of the strongest. Then each chief led his group back to his favorite mountain and security.³³

The actual number involved in a raid varied according to circumstances. In the 1730's, bands numbering up to 300 warriors were reported.³⁴ Such large groups must have been rare; the average raiding party was probably composed of a much smaller group. Despite the sporadic raids, there were periods of relative peace when the Apache launched only an occasional sortie or shifted his attention to another region. The presidial captains were under orders for most of this period to grant peace to all Indians who met a few minimum requirements; therefore, local truces were often in effect. One aspect of Apache society which plagued

³². Cortes, pp. 49a-b.
³³. Ibid., pp. 49b-50a.
³⁴. Neuntuig, p. 89.
their civilized enemies until they learned to exploit it was the absence of a central authority with whom to conclude a lasting peace. Each ranchería was fully independent of all others. Thus, peace had to be arranged with each ranchería separately, and to secure treaties with all simultaneously was virtually impossible.35

CHAPTER III

PRESIDIAL PROBLEMS: TRADITION-BOUND
AND INADEQUATE RESPONSE

The defense of the Sonoran frontier presented problems to an imperial Spanish government which found itself seriously over-extended. The most acceptable solution would be one in which Spain's contribution would be marginal or nil. The scheme decided upon was to hold the frontier in Pimería Alta by proxy, with indigenous, sedentary Indian tribes providing the manpower to keep out or suppress all enemies. According to this plan, the main burden would fall on the Pima and Opata Indian tribes of northeastern Sonora. The strategy dated back to the time of Father Eusebio Kino, and in the early days seems to have had limited success. As late as 1835, Ignacio Zuniga, with some exaggeration, credited the Opata and Pima Indians with the containment of the Apache, presenting them as brave warriors in a campaign and faithful despite the difficulties of such extraordinary warfare.1

Of the two nations, the Opata had a better reputation as warriors, and the Spaniards turned to them as a source of auxiliaries. In the 1770's, when the Spaniards established three standing companies of Indians in Sonora, two of them were Opata and one Pima. Companies of Opata Indians were based at Bacchachi and Bavispe; a Pima company was established at San Rafael de Buenavista (between Tubac and Terrenate). Although officered by Spaniards, each company had its Indian military leader.\(^2\)

The Opata reputation as dependable allies tends to overshadow the fact that the most warlike of the settled tribes of Sonora was the branch of the Pima tribe called Sobaipuris, "born and reared on the border of the Apaches."\(^3\) It was this group in the San Pedro River valley which actually blocked the Apaches from much of the interior for they were astride one of the major trails into Sonora. It was the abandonment by these people of this valley on two occasions, the last permanent, that opened a wide avenue into Sonora. The


\(^3\) Neuntuig, p. 79.
first evacuation took place in 1698 and ended in 1704 or 1705. A new settlement was established at Quiburi which survived until 1762. Renewed Apache pressure forced its abandonment and the Sobaipuris moved into Pima settlements in the Santa Cruz Valley to the west, again opening the way for the Apache.4

The Opata and Pima often fought well, as, for example, at Cuchuta in 1694, where the former especially showed great fighting ability. This and other reasons led the Spaniards to accept the Opata wholeheartedly. One of these reasons was the low opinion of the Pima shared by the Spaniards and the Opata, who regarded them as savages endangering expansion of the frontier. They felt the Pimas would be better used as forced labor in the mines and on the ranches.5 As Hubert Howe Bancroft points out, Father Kino was apparently the only one unwilling to believe that the Pimas were involved in the troubles of the late 1680's.6 The Pima Revolt of 1695,


directed at first against Opata overseers at Tubutama, re-enforced mistrust of the Pima, and the Spaniards never had full confidence in the tribe thereafter.  

Of the three Indian groups on which Spain depended, one would be defeated and disappear as a separate entity; one was under continuous suspicion, justly or unjustly; and the third, the Opata, was unable to hold the frontier by itself. The problem fell into Spanish hands—reluctant hands—whose main concerns were elsewhere. For the better part of the period under study, Spain made only a minimal effort on the northern frontier, but her hand was constantly being forced until a serious effort was unavoidable.  

Spain's attempt to conduct the war against the Apaches by proxy suffered a serious setback shortly after it began. In 1680, the revolt of the Pueblo Indians had forced the Spaniards to retreat to El Paso. Then, in 1684, the Conchos, Janos, and Sumas in the area between El Paso and Casas Grandes revolted. The Sumas and Conchos seized Casas Grandes, and, more important to Sonora, forced the abandonment of Carretas, a Suma

7. Ibid., pp. 261-262; Spicer, pp. 126-127.

settlement in the pass of the same name leading into Sonora. The major part of the revolt was put down and
the presidio of Janos established in 1685; but Janos, Sumas, Jacomes and their newly allied Apaches were
pushing the war westward. By 1700, the enemy was described by the term "Apache," indicating that the
others had either been killed off or absorbed by the Apaches. 9

The Apache and their allies probably began the war in Sonora in 1686 with a raid against the mining
town of San Juan del Rio and the mission village of Teras. Then, in 1688, a band of Jacomes, Sumas, and
Janos Indians attacked the Opata ranchería of Santa Rosa, forcing its residents to flee to the area where the
presidio of Fronteras was later located. Raids increased in intensity and frequency for a decade as Teras and
other settlements, both Spanish and Indian, were abandoned. 10

The people of Sonora petitioned Mexico City for relief from imminent disaster and the Viceroy responded
by authorizing formation of the company Volante de

9. Spicer, pp. 232-233. On a previous page Spicer notes that the Janos and Jacomes were perhaps also Athapascans.

10. Ibid., pp. 233-234.
Sonora (literally, "Flying Company of Sonora") with a strength of twenty-five men. Fifteen men from the presidio of Sinaloa provided the core for the company, stationed at Teuricatz during its first two years. The Company was then ordered to the spring of Corodehuachi where it was established as the Presidio of Santa Rosa de Corodehuachi, or, as it was more commonly referred to, Fronteras. A pattern for Spanish action in Sonora had been set. (See sketch map inside back cover.)

On March 29, 1692, the strength of the presidio was increased to fifty men and General Domingo Jironza Petriz Cruzate, former Governor of New Mexico, became its commander, superseding temporary commander Francisco Ramirez de Salazar. Jironza adopted a policy of offensive warfare and, in cooperation with the presidio of Janos, carried the war to the enemy with great energy in the following years.

Fronteras, in theory, was solely responsible for the defense of Sonora until 1742. Its over-all record during this early period seems to be good, although later it was subjected to much criticism. Teodoro de


Croix later stated that it was useless until 1728.\textsuperscript{13}
Throughout its existence, however, cooperation with neighboring Janos in Chihuahua was close. Besides geographical proximity, the two presidios faced the same Mimbres and Gila Apache bands, and thus found joint campaigns into the Sierras de Gílas profitable. Important, also, was the fact that they were on opposite sides of the northern end of the Sierra Madre Occidental, one of the few places where this barrier could be crossed the year round. Control of the area in between would also block major Apache plunder routes into Sonora and Nueva Viscaya.\textsuperscript{14} In this respect, the evacuation of Carretas, noted earlier, hindered the effectiveness of both presidios.

\textsuperscript{13} Bancroft, North Mexican States, p. 272; Teodoro de Croix, Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontiers of New Spain, trans. and ed. Alfred Barnaby Thomas (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941), pp. 197-198. Juan Bautista de Ansa, Sr. came into command at Fronteras circa 1728; while at the time the statement was made; his son of the same name was one of Croix's most trusted lieutenants. It was, nevertheless, due recognition of the father's proven ability.

\textsuperscript{14} Carlos Espinosa de los Monteros, Esposicion que sobre las Provincias de Sonora y Sinaloa Escribio su Diputado Carlos Espinosa de los Monteros (Mexico: M. Ontiveros, 1823), p. 3; Bancroft, North Mexican States, pp. 271-272.
Instances of cooperation in the defense of the frontier were quite common, for Spain was aware that the northern frontier was an interrelated problem very early in the eighteenth century. For one, the Apache was not limited to Sonora but ranged over most of the length of the frontier. The common problems of settling such a wide area led to the same conclusion as did climate and geography. Again, Brigadier Pedro de Rivera's inspection of 1724-1728 substantiated this view. Later reports and proposals merely reiterated this theme. But it was not until the 1760's that this fundamental assumption influenced policy. Until then, the frontier was handled in a haphazard manner, action being taken only in response to crises which were often magnified by strident appeals from inhabitants of the area.¹⁵

Perhaps nothing illustrates this situation of stimulus-response better than the creation of the presidio defensive system in Sonora over the years. The presidio originally had been introduced into New Spain to protect routes used by the silver pack-trains between the north central mining areas and Mexico City. As originally conceived, presidios were not pioneering institutions,

¹⁵. Chapman, p. 80.
but with time their mission enlarged to include the protection of "outposts of civilization and to escort the pack-trains which supplied their vital needs." They were to be located in strategic locations as bases for presidial companies which could contain and punish the Indians and insure the security of towns populated by Spaniards and mestizos in addition to protecting the missions.  

The presidios cost the royal treasury considerable expense, but they remained material symbols of royal policy. Thus, normally one could be established only after approval by a junta de guerra y hacienda in Mexico City. The fully completed structure, in its typical form, was quadrangular with salients in each corner. It had ample room to accommodate all personnel and their families, a chapel for religious services, an animal compound, and storerooms for food and war materials.

17. Almada, p. 628.
These structures were built along the inside of the main walls, with an open square, or plaza de armas, in the middle. Later needs for expansion could be met by simply extending the lines of two parallel walls and enclosing additional area. The chief building materials were adobe and timber. Actual cost to the Crown varied tremendously with circumstance, and it was not unusual for officers and soldiers to "voluntarily" subscribe to a large part of the cost from their pay. Yearly salaries (which covered most costs of maintenance under the Spanish system) were changed only little and averaged somewhat over 20,000 pesos for most of the period.

Theoretically, each presidio should be self-sufficient in procuring food and other necessities from the immediate vicinity. It should be located in an area where harvests could be gathered to meet the demands of the troops (often by the soldiers themselves). Agriculture and cattle raising by settlers were to be encouraged so that the troops could be released for


combat. To this end, most presidios were located in areas already populated by Spaniards and mestizos or friendly Indians.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, the presidio was supposed to become a focal point of colonization and a commercial center. Settlers were to be encouraged to move in and take possession of the land. In theory, the successful presidio was one which did away with the reason for its existence, a point which may have made some captains wary of success.\textsuperscript{23}

That this colonization did not take place as effectively as necessary was largely the fault of the presidial captains directly, and of Spain's governmental system indirectly. The captain purchased his office at a high price, and down to 1772 expected a return on his investment through his monopoly on commerce with the presidial soldiers. It was to his advantage to discourage competitors, and most officers successfully kept

\textsuperscript{22} Croix, p. 188.

\textsuperscript{23} Reglamento, p. 14; Carta del B.\textsuperscript{or} Pedro Gavriel de Aragón al S.\textsuperscript{or} Gov.\textsuperscript{or} y Cap.\textsuperscript{n} gral (Juan de Piñeda), Real de los Alamos, Septiembre 6 de 1765 (in the files of the Arizona Pioneer Historical Society, Bancroft Library microfilm files, MC-6, Vol. XVII, Item No. 21, p. 130a). Citations from this file will hereafter be abbreviated to APHS, giving proper volume, item, and page numbers, in order.
them away. Extensive private commerce could not be established; therefore, settlers tended to stay away.\textsuperscript{24}

This situation was detrimental to the presidio's effectiveness in several ways. Obviously, self-sufficiency suffered, with little more than the troop as a work force. A civil militia would be difficult to recruit and here Zuñiga made the point that vecinos are truly a passive militia simply by being there. An unmeasurable but perhaps more serious effect was the weakening of the soldier's morale.\textsuperscript{25}

Attempts to settle people around the presidios continued with little success throughout the period. Land with few encumbrances was offered under the \textit{Reglamento} of 1772.\textsuperscript{26} Earlier, in 1750, a proposal to settle friendly Indians in the vicinity to work as auxiliaries and scouts foundered when few could be found. Instead, Indians convicted of crimes would be sent to Fronteras.\textsuperscript{27}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{24} O'Conor, p. 24.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Zuñiga, p. 30.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} \textit{Reglamento}, p. 14.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} "Carta del Licenciado José Rafael Rodriguez Gallardo Don Diego Ortiz Parilla, Governador y Capitan Gral Interino de estas Provincias, Matape, 15 Marzo 1750," in APHS, Vol. XVI, No. 26, pp. 376a-382b.
\end{itemize}
That the company needed relief was undeniable, and many of its time-consuming duties could be traced to the lack of settlers. Father Ignacio Lizasoin noted what he considered a typical disposition of company personnel:

The presidial company comprises fifty men, of whom it is necessary to detail eight or ten to guard the horse-herd, and another ten at least for the presidio. Of the rest, it is proper to consider some ill, ignoring other ordinary reasons why the whole company would not be present in the presidio. In this case, when the captain wishes to aid settlements under attack, he dispatches a corporal with the small number of men that circumstances permit . . . .28

The above comment presupposed a company at full strength, which many were not.29 In addition, other normal duties such as the practice of assigning two soldiers to a mission, escort duty for supply trains to and from the interior, messengers, orderlies, and growing of crops depleted the company's fighting strength. Ironically enough, the Apache's love of horseflesh helped him cripple his opponent; the number of troops assigned to guard remounts went up with increasing Apache incursions.


29. Croix, p. 188.
If the presidio were to serve the purpose of helping to colonize its vicinity, the key was the establishment of commerce and this meant channeling the soldier's pay into the civilian economy.\textsuperscript{30} That was not permitted. The system actually in force until reforms were begun in the last quarter of the century was best described as payment-in-kind, and was a variation of the latter-day company store system:

Necessities are provided by the respective captains in kind, without finding example of a single peso being paid in money, and it is for this lack of coin circulation that no settlements nor commerce of any considerable size is found on the frontier, for it is natural that the captains, with the motive of increasing their profits, impede with grave penalties, entrance into their presidios of merchants and others whom they believe might reduce their profits.\textsuperscript{31}

The resulting effect of this situation on troop morale was obvious. The Márques de Rubí, in his inspection of presidios, found that payment-in-kind rather than specie was the single most important source of dissatisfaction among the troops.\textsuperscript{32} Specie payments four times a year had been in force in the eighteenth century.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} Zúñiga, p. 22.
\item \textsuperscript{31} O'Conor, p. 74. Author's trans.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Moorhead, p. 33.
\end{itemize}
century. By the 1700's, however, goods-payment was authorized in the regulations. Brigadier Pedro de Rivera had attempted some reforms during his inspection tour of 1724-1728; but his reforms, incorporated largely into the *Reglamento* of 1729, amounted to a sanctioning of the system while attempting to curb excesses.

In defense of the captains, it should be pointed out that many were the victims of circumstance. Most had bought their office--Pfefferkorn states that the price in his day was 12,000 to 14,000 pesos in cash. Both the king and captain knew it was profits and not position nor salary that led to this outlay of money. A second reason was the isolation of the presidios. Using the land route, *recuas* would take a year to complete a round trip.


34. Moorhead, pp. 32-33.


to Mexico City; and if the climate was too wet or too dry, more time was required. Obviously, losses would accumulate and drive costs upward. But even with prices set by the King through regulations, the captain received about a fifty percent profit on all items bought for his soldiers, minus freightage and some other small costs. Furthermore, local procurement offered more opportunities for profit. Captains, then, were often more concerned with growing rich than with duties of office. It was only natural that they would prefer peace and inactivity to the harsh task of bringing savages under control. O'Conor would charge in 1774 that captains had in the past refused action with the enemy, realizing that if a soldier died, he would lose some of his profits, and so the troop was never ordered out of the presidio to stop enemy raids.

38. Pfefferkorn, pp. 292-293.
40. O'Conor, p. 74.
It was evident that troop morale was low. Inspector after inspector during the century noted that the pay and supply system was a major reason. Rivera had been but the first.\textsuperscript{41} Croix complained over fifty years later that he had to employ two pickets of dragoons only around Arispe to free them of debt.\textsuperscript{42} The fact that both complaints were echoed by Zuniga in 1835 illustrates that a completely satisfactory solution was never found.\textsuperscript{43}

Hope had been high that the reforms introduced by the Reglamento of 1772 would produce an acceptable solution. The very first paragraph ordered captains out of the supply business and subsequent paragraphs established as havilitado, or paymaster-supply clerk, one of the company elected to a three-year term by a committee composed of all company officers, the chaplain and one enlisted man selected by the company in the absence of all officers.\textsuperscript{44}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{41}] Moorhead, pp. 32-33.
\item[\textsuperscript{42}] Croix, p. 154.
\item[\textsuperscript{43}] Zuniga, pp. 34-35.
\item[\textsuperscript{44}] Reglamento, pp. 1-2. Paymaster is at best an adequate translation by Moorhead.
\end{itemize}
The new system was to eliminate profit and the accompanying problem of soldiers' debts from the supply operation. The paymaster was to sell at no more than cost plus a two percent mark-up under penalty of loss of office and possible imprisonment. Competition was introduced by ordering captains to give merchants free access to the presidial soldiers, who could then buy from whom they pleased.

The new system was an improvement, but it had at least one great defect. In curbing excess profits, only a small margin had been left the paymaster. Much now depended on the ability and experience of those elected to the post. Bankruptcy was now a serious threat which occurred frequently due to the high cost of supplies, losses during transportation, dishonesty or incompetence. Troops were often well supplied with unwanted items and short of food, clothing and munitions. The new system, in short, did little to improve morale but was apparently the best acceptable. An attempt by Cavallero de Croix in 1781 to utilize private contractors failed and the old system was again in force.

45. Ibid., p. 20.
46. Ibid., p. 9.
47. Moorhead, pp. 31-34.
48. Ibid., p. 35.
The inability of Spain to solve the pay-supply system satisfactorily thus had the effect of hindering the presidio's effectiveness by inhibiting colonization and weakening the morale of the soldier.

The fighting qualities and effectiveness of the presidial soldier would vary widely, of course, depending on circumstance. Generalizing on the evidence presented in later pages, it would seem that through the first eight decades little was expected and little was achieved. But the potential was there and, when higher standards were enforced after a period of experimentation, both officers and men responded in such a way that by the end of the period of colonization, the frontier presidials were well led and capable fighters.49

The officer corps was a critical factor which had to improve before higher standards could be applied to the enlisted men. The officers of the frontier army were either Spaniards or Creoles, who, down to the 1770's, generally purchased their office, as noted above.50 The reforms of the 1770's and 1780's tended more and more to make promotion a matter of ability following the

49. See below, pp. 141-143.

implementation of the Reglamento of 1772. A system of recommendation by the immediate superior to the next higher officer in filling a vacancy served to thwart favoritism and office-selling. The same system was in effect in selecting a chaplain to serve the presidio.  

Selection of noncommissioned officers varied little during the period. Corporals and drummers were named by the captain as authorized in the Recopilacion. Sergeants nominally had to be selected by the next higher authority not only because of the importance of the position but also because they were potential officer material. For instance, a report on Captain Allande's company at Tucson during Croix's time showed that both Alferez Diego de Oya and Lieutenant Miguel de Urrea had come up from the ranks.

The soldiers themselves were a varied lot. Pfefferkorn stated that "resistance to fatigue and expert

51. Reglamento, p. 11.
52. Recopilacion, p. 598. The law dated back to 1629.
horsemanship are the two qualities which cause Spaniards born and raised in Sonora to be considered the most able for Sonora military service, and hence no others are accepted as soldiers."\textsuperscript{54} It is very doubtful that such an exclusive policy was ever in force on the frontier, especially when New Spain made use of mixed breeds, especially mulattos in the interior. For instance, Pedro de Lbaquera, a former Lieutenant-Governor of Nueva Galicia, wrote in 1760 or 1761 that most of his soldiers were mulattos.\textsuperscript{55} The problem seems to be simply one of broad definitions and exaggeration. Thus, Allande's Tucson Company of 1779 listed two sergeants of European birth (one Roman and one "European"), five Spanish corporals, one coyote corporal, twenty-nine Spanish, sixteen coyote, three mestizo, two mulatto, and two Opata soldiers. These last two were not auxiliaries, being listed with the group headed Cuera.\textsuperscript{56}

The matter of payment was alluded to in discussing supply, to which it was inextricably connected. Soldiers were on a salary schedule which changed often.

\textsuperscript{54} Pfefferkorn, p. 290.
\textsuperscript{55} Chapman, pp. 65-66.
\textsuperscript{56} Croix to Gálvez, pp. 2-3.
during the 120 years under study. Moreover, differences were evident during given time periods as when Pedro de Rivera, during his tour, established a system which deliberately discriminated on the basis of distance of a given presidio from Mexico City. Thus, until 1772, salaries ranged from 380 to 420 pesos a year. From this amount, the soldier had to provide for himself, his family, and also buy and maintain all his service equipment.57

The Reglamento of 1772 instituted several reforms. As noted above, one was the paymaster system which was designed to save the soldier a large sum of money. As a corollary, yearly salary was reduced to a standard 290 pesos, with the important provision that two reales were to be paid daily to corporals and enlisted men for living expenses. The rest would be held in a fund for future distribution, for replacement of horses lost, unusable, or declared unserviceable by the inspector, and for charges for clothing, arms, and equipment.58

Paternalistic Spain also decreed forced saving; twenty to twenty-five pesos were held back yearly until a fund of 100 pesos was established by each soldier. It

57. Moorhead, pp. 31-33; Pfefferkorn, p. 291.
58. Reglamento, pp. 5, 8.
was to be made clear to the soldier that the objective was to provide the family with funds if he were killed or to be returned to him upon retirement because of old age, disability, or end of service.\(^9\)

The soldier could supplement his income in two ways: One was to engage in agriculture. A second was a provision calling for distribution of all booty taken from the enemy such as horses, mules, cattle, food, and other effects only among the soldiers, Indian scouts, and auxiliaries involved in an action as a reward for their work.\(^0\)

Additional income was welcome, for the soldier normally began his career by going into debt to the government for the equipment he was issued. Repayment was made over a period of time through deductions from his pay. Uniforms and equipment varied in type and quality in the early days. The Reglamento of 1772 established the standard for uniforms and equipment which O'Conor, Croix, and their successors sought to enforce with some success thereafter.\(^1\) Except for standardization of items, however, the Reglamento simply confirmed

\(^{59}\) Ibid., p. 8.
\(^{60}\) Ibid., p. 13.
\(^{61}\) Ibid., pp. 6-7.
the equipment then in use. The presidial soldier was provided with a standard cavalry sword, lance, musket, and two pistols. 62

Protection of the soldier in combat was provided by two articles of military equipment: The first was an adarga, or shield of three or four layers of raw ox hide approximately twenty inches in height and twenty-four inches in width, designed in a convex form to deflect arrows from either side. During active combat, the shield was attached to the left arm by two loops. 63 The second protective device was a cuera, or deerskin jacket (which gave the presidial soldier his common name of Soldaro de Cuera). The cuera was always worn on the field or during guard duty. The jacket, six to eight layers thick, was knee-length and cut like a coat but without sleeves. Such armor was normally excellent protection, but Spanish losses show that arrows could still penetrate the armor with deadly results. 64

The Sonoran soldier was an expert in the use of the lance, but the weapon had limited advantage in the

62. Ibid., p. 7.
63. Pfefferkorn, p. 291.
64. Ibid., pp. 155-156. See footnote.
type of warfare favored by the Apaches. Despite inadequacies, the soldier regarded the musket as his chief weapon. In the hands of a well-trained soldier, it could be an effective weapon, capable of hitting a target sixty or seventy paces away. Its greater range compensated, in part, for its slow rate of fire as compared to the rapid fire of the arrow from the bow. Properly trained units staggered their musket firings to maintain a steady barrage of the enemy. However, as late as 1799, the inability of the average soldier to hit his target was a subject of concern to commentators.  

Throughout most of the period, the Sonoran presidial soldier was seriously deficient in training because the new recruit was assigned to service immediately without preparation. "If he but knows how to sit firmly in the saddle (things which the Sonorans are, in general, well able to do) he is a finished soldier," commented Father Pfefferkorn as he recited the story of a soldier loading the ball before the powder into his musket.

65. Ibid., p. 291.
Pfefferkorn was unfriendly toward the military but the Cavallero de Croix echoed similar views in 1780 when he accused most of his presidial troops of being "ignorant of the use of these arms."\textsuperscript{68}

Part of the problem was the soldiers' dislike of training, which they considered a useless waste of time.\textsuperscript{69} Fundamentally, however, the ineffectiveness of the soldiers stemmed from a lack of leadership. Nicolas de Lafora placed the blame on "the extreme ignorance and gross inexperience of the captains," and felt that the proper solution was to find officers who would train and discipline the men, and thus win their respect.\textsuperscript{70}

The Reglamento of 1772 had tried to correct one phase of training deficiency by providing each soldier with three pounds of powder for practice each year and three more for each new recruit, but few units apparently took advantage of it.\textsuperscript{71} Allande's Tucson unit, inspected by Assistant Inspector Don Roque de Medine for Croix in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{68} Ibid., p. 291; Croix, p. 152.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Cortes, p. 7b.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Lafora, pp. 277-278.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Reglamento, p. 10. The Spaniards by this time used ready-made paper cartridges.
\end{itemize}
March, 1779, was competent in the use of weapons; but when Medina recommended practice afoot and on horseback with both musket and pistols, Croix added a marginal no tiene resolucion (there is no solution) to the report.\textsuperscript{72}

In spite of derogatory attacks by Fathers Neuntuig and Pfefferkorn on their valor and effectiveness,\textsuperscript{73} it would seem that the frontier soldier was basically sound—a man of good stature, healthy, courageous, dependable, and fully capable of doing his duty if given the leadership and training.\textsuperscript{74} Hugo O'Conor had such boundless faith in their potential that he issued standing instructions to attack immediately any Apache force encountered that did not out-number the Cueros by odds of more than four to one.\textsuperscript{75} There was some weeding out to be done among both officers and men; the slow but continuous

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{72} Croix to Galvez, pp. 3-6.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Neuntuig, p. 151; Pfefferkorn, pp. 150-151.
\item \textsuperscript{74} O'Conor, p. 66; Croix to Galvez, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{75} O'Conor, p. 88.
\end{itemize}
process began with the Márques de Rubí's inspections and was carried to completion by the various commanders of the interior provinces. By the turn of the century, the frontier soldier had attained a high degree of proficiency in the art of war.76

One other item briefly touched on before is of particular importance. In order to achieve maximum mobility, all presidial troops on the Sonoran frontier were mounted. To maximize mobility, each soldier had to purchase several horses (first from the captain and later from the paymaster) as a single horse of standard quality was clearly incapable of performing adequately. At first, six horses were required of each soldier.77 Later, the Reglamento of 1772 raised this requirement to seven horses and one mule. A fifty-man company thus required 350 horses and fifty mules. Each member of the garrison had to maintain one horse immediately available day and night so that the company could respond quickly to any emergency. Presumably, by the turn of the century, the state of readiness was such that a detachment of thirty to forty men, with supplies for almost a month, could be placed in the field in an hour or hour and a half.78

76. Cortes, pp. 7a-b; Escudero, p. 76.
77. Pfefferkorn, pp. 291-292.
In reality, the large horse herd thus accumulated actually robbed the company of the mobility it was intended to provide. First, a large number of soldiers were detached to guard the horse herd from Apache raids. Second, the commanding officer usually required each soldier to take a given number of remounts on each campaign. The ramifications of the problem were innumerable; even common sense was ignored, for example, when unserviceable horses were accepted for delivery from the interior. 79

Other problems concerning the horses abounded: The one horse on stand-by was supposed to be fed on grains, but lack of a local supply meant that the Spaniards normally depended on grazing their horses. Thus, the horses lacked stamina, and a heavily equipped soldier could easily wear out several mounts in a single expedition. Then, too, winter campaigns, when the Apaches were at a disadvantage, were even rougher on the mounts. The natural result was reluctance of the soldiers to purchase additional horses. 80 Teodoro de Croix, as late


as 1780 was faced with the problem of remounts and came up with a curious solution:

I have sometimes refused orders for the purchase of remounts, considering this a useless expenditure because the duty of guarding the horse herd with horses and without supplies can not be rendered. The risk that the horses will be carried off by the enemies is increased. In this case the obligations of the companies will be enlarged. 81

The Spaniard faced an enemy who was cunning, tough, and mobile. The Apache could live off the country or live under severe hardships for long periods and still be a formidable warrior. For the defending Spaniard, the problem seemed almost insoluble. Food, equipment, war supplies totaling about 350 pounds, in addition to five or six remounts accompanied him on campaigns, obviating the mobility necessary to succeed against the highly mobile Apaches. If the horses gave out or the expedition's supplies became exhausted, the unit had to return immediately to its base. 82

At least one person thought that infantry would be more mobile and better equipped than cavalry for the task of pursuing Apaches. There would be no horse herd to watch (or raise dust); moreover, horsemen could not pursue the enemy into the rough terrain he used as a

82. Lafora, p. 278; Pfefferkorn, p. 209.
retreat. The cavalryman, distracted by the shield, reins, and horse's movement, lost most of his shots. The infantry rifle, on the other hand, had a greater range than the carbine; the bayonet replaced the lance; and with a cuera for protection against arrows, the infantryman could enter terrain inaccessible to cavalry.\textsuperscript{83}

Infantrymen would perhaps be ideal for closing and destroying, but this ignored the main tactical problem, namely to find and confront the enemy. This problem brought up the basic questions as to the quality of the cavalry and the proper location and purpose of the presidios, questions which Spain did not wish to acknowledge and which she avoided with some success until the 1760's when the European manipulations won for her Louisiana, with the English as neighbors and the prospect of a future war threatening. Until then, policy for defense of the northwest frontier focused on specific reactions to isolated events. The presidio "system" grew in response to specific, immediate problems in localized areas.

Through most of the period under study, the presidio, itself, was a defensive stronghold from which

\textsuperscript{83} "Descripción sucinta . . . ," pp. 215b-216a.
cavalry could range to keep the Apaches out of Spanish territory. Invaders would be intercepted at a line or detected after they crossed, and expelled before they could inflict damage. This "watch all along the line of the frontier" as Father Neuntuig saw it would provide a warning to the true defense, the Indian villages (and Spanish settlements), while the troops would relentlessly harass any band crossing the border.\textsuperscript{84}

This concept suffered from at least two deficiencies, either of which could be fatal. In the first place, tactical mobility lay not with the Spaniard but with the Apache, who could undoubtedly outdistance any warning of their approach. Second, the manpower to guard such a line was simply not available. Sonora was underpopulated, and even the relative safety of the presidios failed to attract many settlers. The presidio needed more missions and pueblos to be fully effective.\textsuperscript{85} As Zuniga pointed out, the converse was also true: Missions and pueblos needed an effective presidio to exist on the frontier. Zuniga carried his thesis further by concluding that it was the ineffectiveness of the presidio that led to the lack of population.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{84} Neuntuig, pp. 150-151.
\textsuperscript{85} Zuniga, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., pp. 21-22.
That the Spanish government had earlier partially endorsed this conclusion was shown by the requirement of the *Reglamento* of 1772 instructing settlers already at the sites of four Sonora presidios who were to be moved to remain there; others, both Spanish and Opata, were moved in and given free land and houses. The only requirement was the obligation to defend their district and aid troop detachments. The success of such colonization schemes has already been discussed.

The Spaniards could adopt and attempt to execute an offensive policy, but many of the problems cited above hindered them. In addition, Spain would have to commit greater resources of manpower and wealth to secure her frontiers; however, she considered these requirements excessive for an isolated frontier. Spain's policy at that time, in fact, was the direct opposite of this. She was draining wealth from the colonies to subsidize her ambitious plans in Europe.

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CHAPTER IV

NEGLECT AND OPTIMISM, 1690-1740

It is significant that Spain depended for half a century on a military force of only fifty men to guard the Sonoran frontier. The presidio of Santa Rosa de Corodeguachi protected Pimería Alta and Sonora from 1690 until 1741. It could count on Janos for cooperation in fighting off the Apaches. The presidio of Sinaloa, on the other hand, located far to the south, could provide limited aid, and then only in emergencies due to the extent of its responsibilities. With a limited military establishment, Spanish control of Sonora was tenuous. More military strength was required.¹

Unfortunately, the government accomplished little on this frontier in any field. Even the missions were neglected. Between 1711 and 1730, no new missions were established in Pimería Alta, although two new priests were assigned to the area, one in 1720 and the other in 1722.²

¹. Rowland, pp. 148-149.
². Spicer, pp. 128-129; Bancroft, North Mexican States, p. 507.
In the military field, the viceroy ordered Captain Gregorio Alvarez Tunon y Quiros, in 1724, to adopt a purely defensive policy against the Apaches and to cease all entradas. This decision presumably enabled Tunon to deal with Indian raids more effectively, but it was also motivated by a need to watch the Indians of the interior, especially the Seri and the Pima. The troop at Fronteras was inadequate in numbers and in morale, and could not perform all of its duties competently. The Apache took advantage of the order of 1724 to open a new raiding corridor into the Sonora valley. Forays by raiding Apaches penetrated the area south of Arizpe and near Sahuaripa on the Yaqui River.

In addition to the extended area of responsibility, the beleaguered garrison at Fronteras suffered from continuous corrupt leadership. Both General Jacinto Saldaña (who succeeded Jironza in 1701) and his successor and nephew, Captain Tuñon, who served until circa 1726, were men of questionable ability and doubtful reputation. Saldaña had been accused of gaining his post through unworthy means. According to reports, Tuñon spent some

nine years away from Fronteras engaging in various private ventures. He always drew full pay for fifty soldiers, although the company seldom attained full strength in personnel.⁵

Fronteras was not alone in these problems. On the contrary, the presidio seems to have been quite typical of the times. The Marques of Casa Fuerte, Viceroy of New Spain, recognized the alarming deterioration in the defensive posture of the frontier and communicated his uneasiness to the King. He recommended that all frontier presidios be placed under regulations common to the entire defense system, and warned that inevitable disintegration would ensue unless action were taken. The Marques reported that relief became more necessary every day to curtail deterioration and prevent total ruin which threatened them. In reply, the King authorized a complete inspection of the frontier defense system by a competent person selected by the Viceroy.⁶

The Viceroy chose General Don Pedro de Rivera, who spent almost four years in a survey which culminated in:

⁵. Bancroft, North Mexican States, p. 516.

in the Reglamento of 1729. Don Pedro's trip began in Mexico City on November 21, 1724. After having traveled more than 3,000 leagues, he returned to the capital on June 21, 1728. Although Rivera's inspection had been initiated by fear that the frontier defenses were about to collapse, the scope of his mission was broadened and directed toward a different objective. His instructions specifically emphasized the need for economy, and Rivera was empowered to decide whether services being rendered by each presidio were commensurate with the cost.\(^7\) More specifically, Article 16 raised the possibility of abolishing some presidios.\(^8\)

Cost was the yardstick which Rivera applied wherever possible. He was instructed to investigate the goods-payment system, and terminate profiteering by captains by establishing fair prices for commodities deemed necessary by him for the successful operation of a presidio. Articles 8 and 9 of Rivera's instructions specified certain abuses practiced by some of the captains as the collection of wages for nonexisting personnel and the use of soldiers as personal laborers.

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 29.

\(^8\) Ibid., p. 34.
These objectives seemed to indicate that Rivera endeavored to spend the Crown's money wisely.9

The other sixteen articles empowered Rivera to look into areas other than those involving money. He had been delegated tremendous powers by his instructions. The Viceroy authorized him to suspend any captain, subject to viceregal review, and to appoint a temporary successor. Rivera held each captain responsible for the condition of his presidio. Indicative of the general assessment of the situation, only four captains of the twenty-three presidios inspected met his standards.

His discretion in utilizing his powers was well illustrated by his inspection of the neighboring presidios of Janos and Fronteras. The captain at Janos was one of the few that pleased the inspector.10 Rivera conducted his visita at Janos in October of 1726 and completed his inspection in the brief span of ten days because of the excellent state of the presidio and its fifty men. Here, as at the other presidios, he reduced the annual salary of the soldier; however, because of

9. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

10. Ibid., p. 89.
the distance to Mexico City, the reduction for Janos and Fronteras was fifty instead of the standard 100 pesos.\textsuperscript{11}

In contrast to the estimation of the status of Janos, the situation at Fronteras left much to be desired. The presidio was in a deplorable state. Rivera thought that immediate correction was necessary. The soldiers lacked leadership, equipment, and martial knowledge. Raids on the presidio itself were not unknown, and the rest of the province was defenseless. The captain who had been in charge for eighteen years was relieved immediately of his command. This captain was undoubtedly Tunón, who resided some thirty leagues to the south.\textsuperscript{12} Don Juan Bautista de Ansa was appointed as his successor, which elevated him from a subordinate position at Janos. Ansa emerged as an energetic commander who utilized the fifty-man troop effectively against the Apaches until his death at their hands in 1737.\textsuperscript{13} Ansa and his men

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 116.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Pedro de Rivera, "Informe del Sr. Brigadier Visitador Gral. al Señor Virrey del Estado de las Missiones de la Compañía en las Provincias de Sinaloa y Sonora," Janos, February 14, 1727, APHS, Vol. XVI, Item 21, p. 317a; Murphy, p. 117.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Rowland, pp. 157-158. Chapman (p. 29) gives the year of 1739 as that in which Ansa died.
\end{itemize}
also helped put down Pima Bajo (1726) and Seri uprisings in the south.\textsuperscript{14}

Renewed activity at Fronteras justified the unpleasant and difficult decision Rivera had made. He intended to reduce the complement of soldiers at both Janos and Fronteras by five men each; however, upon his return to Mexico City in 1728, he realized this would be an error and both presidios were allowed to retain their fifty-man companies.\textsuperscript{15}

This was not the hardest decision Rivera had to make, however. He was well aware that his proposals would constitute the basis for regulations governing the military establishment on the frontier. He, therefore, made a series of far reaching recommendations, most of which were incorporated in the \textit{Reglamento} of 1729. Of particular importance was the discontinuance of the practice of paying all personnel except the captain the same wage. The new scale gave a lieutenant thirty pesos, an \textit{alferez}, twenty, and a sergeant fifteen pesos above the regular soldier's yearly wage.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp. 152-153.
\textsuperscript{15} Murphy, p. 168.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 161.
Other points in the Reglamento dealt with the method of selecting officials, the enlistment of soldiers, and the imposition of heavy penalties for the most minor infraction of regulations. Also included was a requirement that the captain reside at the presidio. Officers were prohibited from employing soldiers for personal use or as couriers. The manner in which presidios assisted each other was clarified, as well as the relation of the missionary or chaplain to the captain. It defined the classes of people entitled to escorts. A section was devoted to methods of conducting campaigns. Included also were regulations governing contacts with the barbarians. An attempt was made to cover all aspects of presidial life and activity.

Not prominently featured in the Reglamento but implied by much in it was another most important result. Rivera had reduced expenses for the Crown in two ways: (1) by eliminating as many presidial soldiers as he thought consistent with safety, and (2) by the reduction in wages. True, his attack on profiteering and other abuses by captains profited the enlisted man and perhaps justified the lowering of wages. But lost somewhere along

17. Escudero, p. 62.
the way was the reason an inspection had been called for by the Viceroy—the inability of a small military force to defend such a long frontier. Increased efficiency and a new policy were expected to correct the deficiency.

The new policy contemplated peace with the Apaches. Following the King's orders and Viceroy Casafuerte's regulations, the Spanish military attempted to convince the Apaches that peace was desirable and to their advantage. At Fronteras, Captain Juan Bautista de Ansa made peace overtures to the Apaches in October, 1733. The attempt failed. About eighty individuals of all ages came into the presidio. In spite of gifts of food, clothing, and a cornfield, they soon left on a pretended visit to their old homes, stealing some horses on the way. At Janos, Captain Antonio Becerra had suffered similar experiences the previous year. The peace policy, although always a royal objective, was quietly abandoned as Apaches returned to their mountains and the Spaniards redoubled their vigilance on the frontier.


Fronteras guarded a frontier of some 300 leagues in extent, but Ansa, at full strength, had only fifty men. It is not at all strange then that his voice joined those of Juan Mateo Manje and other Sonorans in petitioning Governor Huidobro, in 1734, to save the area from destruction by establishing a new presidio at Terrenate. Similar appeals for help had led the Viceroy to ask for the inspection conducted by Rivera. The leaders hoped that if Governor Huidobro was won over, action would follow.20

Manuel Bernal Huidobro had become the first governor of the new province of Sonora and Sinaloa, with the capital at San Miguel de Horcasitas, in 1734. His experience in the area was extensive, and undoubtedly he must have had some idea that he faced a deteriorating situation. Huidobro had been active in Sonora during 1725-1726, putting down the Pima Bajo revolt with troops from Sinaloa. He also had received aid from Fronteras during the Seri uprising of 1729, a gesture of help made possible only because the Apaches were quiet at the time. Huidobro apparently agreed with the petitioners regarding

20. Ibid., p. 149.
the seriousness of the situation for he sent an expediente to Mexico City requesting additional troops, but nothing came of it immediately, and affairs continued to deteriorate.21

The decline was definitely under way by 1737.22 In that year, Pimas from the Tecoripa area revolted and fled to the Cerro Prieto. Ansa had moved quickly with troops and auxiliaries from Fronteras and forced the Pimas back to their pueblos.23 Within three years after the Pima uprising, the security of the interior was shattered again as Indians in Sonora, Ostimuri, Alamos, and Fuerte rose up against the Spaniards in a rebellion which lasted several decades. It was reinforced by the uprising of the Pimas and two Seri villages in 1751. Not until the time of José de Gálvez's visita in 1766 was the interior of Sonora at peace.24


22. For different reasons, both Ortega (p. 545) and Priestley (p. 269) agree on 1737.


Undoubtedly the revolts of 1740 were serious enough to justify strong action in themselves, but at least two other factors contributed to the Spanish reaction. First was the foreign interest in the New World. The Russians landed in North America at 55° North in 1741 and threatened to move south, while the English were trying to reach the Pacific by a northern strait. Second, the government was anxious to protect the miners drawn into the area by silver strikes such as that at Arizonac. The Viceroy now authorized two new presidios for Sonora and the shifting of the company of Sinaloa north to Buenavista. Newly appointed Governor Don Agustín Vildosola founded the presidio of San Pedro de la Conquista at El Pitic in 1742, and charged it with the responsibility of watching the Yaquis, Seris, Pimas, and Tepocas. Pitic also served as his official residence. In the north, the presidio of San Felipe de Gracia Real at Terrenate was established to protect Pimería Alta from the Apaches. Coincident with the erection of these two new presidios, the Apaches apparently had turned their attention to the area east of the Sierra Madre.

27. Priestley, p. 269.
Terrenate stimulated considerable interest in the northern frontier. It generated new momentum for a northward advance and revived Kino's old project of settlements along the natural boundaries of Pimería Alta—the Gila River. The Council of the Indies had considered the matter in relation to the Californias as early as 1703.28 Jesuit efforts, in particular, increased greatly after a royal decree in 1741. To this order was entrusted the conversion of the Moqui to the Society. Inability to effect contact with the Moqui culminated in the transfer of the spiritual care of those Indians to the Franciscans four years later; but the Black Robes, as some called the Jesuits, still maintained an interest in the north.29

Nor were the Jesuits the only ones involved. A royal cedula of 1744 expressed interest in the establishment of missions in (Baja) California and on the Colorado and Gila rivers. Many sought to implement and widen the scope of the project. One such enthusiast, with service in Sonora to his credit, was Captain Don Gabriel de Prudhom Butron y Muxica, who urged the creation of a


29. Ibid., p. 29; pp. 33-34.
presidio manned by 100 cavalry. In his opinion, such a
presidio would promote the propagation of the faith, open
the way to Moqui conversion, counteract the long range
hopes of foreign nations to reach the South Seas by the
Colorado River, and secure other advantages. Nothing
came of his proposal.30

More consideration was given Fernando Sanchez
Salvador, Captain of Cuirassiers in Sonora and Sinaloa,
when he revived Butron's proposal in 1751 with memorials
to the King and Viceroy. One memorial proposed action
which would obstruct the expansion of the French to the
Pacific.31 Sanchez envisaged four companies of fifty
men each. The governor, functioning as one of the four
captains, was to be delegated the authority to requisi-
tion and mobilize the resources of New Mexico, Nueva
Viscaya, and Sonora in carrying out the conquest.32

32. Fernando Sanchez Salvador, "Copia de la
consulta que hace a S. M. d D. n Fernando Sanchez Salvador,
Alcalde de la Santa Hermandad, Capitan de Cavallos
Corasas de las Proas de Sinaloa y Sonora, Costas de el
mar de el sur y fronteras de la Gentilidad," Mexico,
The Council of the Indies gave this weak version of the later interior provinces serious consideration, but tabled it.\textsuperscript{33}

Failure to act on these and other proposals dampened spirits and soon the optimism evaporated. The Spanish government's actions during this period were intended to be defensive in nature, without thought of expansion. Terrenate, Fronteras, Janos, Buenavista, and Pitic were outposts designed to hold Sonora for Spain, not to provide a base for further conquest.

\textsuperscript{33} Chapman, pp. 41-42.
CHAPTER V

SPAIN LOSES AN OPPORTUNITY
TO ESTABLISH A FIRM HOLD ON SONORA

Under the circumstances existing in the first half of the 1740's, Spanish control of Sonora seemed assured. Military power on the frontier had tripled. Terrenate, Fronteras, and Janos, at full strength, could muster a total of 150 cavalry. Each of those presidios was located in a settled area on the perimeter of the Spanish frontier. In the interior were Buenavista and Pitic, capable of providing support in an emergency. Even with the exclusion of Janos' fifty men, Sonora, in 1745, could count 183 soldiers in her territory compared to the fifty of 1740.\(^1\) With the Apache conducting only occasional raids, the one serious difficulty which still remained was in the interior where a few Pima-Seri rebels evaded attempts to bring them under control.\(^2\)

The quietude was almost fatal. The authorities in Mexico City, always ready to economize wherever

\(^1\) Chapman, p. 29.
\(^2\) See above, p. 61.
possible, felt that the tranquility in Sonora made a large military force there superfluous. Accordingly, the Viceroy, in 1744, ordered Governor Agustín Vildosola to close down the two new presidios of Pitic and Terrenate. The two presidios, contended the Viceroy, were unnecessary and should be abolished in response to economic restrictions imposed by Spain. Vildosola's vigorous protests proved effective and the order was soon rescinded.3

In retrospect, it would seem that the early 1740's were Spain's great chance to secure its hold on Pimería Alta and Sonora at small cost. The government in Mexico City had taken strong steps in this direction and was interested in doing more. But it failed to establish a stable, settled population which would ensure success. Sonora's mining operations, so important to Spain, and to which the government assigned priority, continually overshadowed ranching and farming. One source complained that not a single locality could claim the ten families necessary for a población under the Laws of the Indies. Reales (mining towns) such as the original capital, San

Juan Bautista, survived only as long as the mines in the vicinity produced suitable ores.\(^4\)

Nor were the presidios able to attract settlers with any more success. Visitador General José Rafael Rodriguez Gallardo brought about a desired concentration of population only by removing the entire population of Real of San Juan Bautista to the site of the new presidio of San Miguel de Horcasitas.\(^5\) Visitador Rodriguez Gallardo formulated two other plans to handle the population problem. One was to re-settle Yaquis and Mayos on the frontier. But, Bancroft points out, the padres would not allow the good Indians to go and each troublesome Indian would require a soldier to watch him. The Visitador also instructed incoming Governor Diego Ortiz Parilla to send persons without passports and those lacking visible means of support as well as vagabonds to the frontier presidios. Little success was noted.\(^6\)


\(^5\) Ibid., pp. 377b-378a.

\(^6\) Bancroft, North Mexican States, pp. 531-533.
Terrenate had the most serious population problem. Its vicinity was generally unpopulated. Only the mission of Santa Maria Suamca, four leagues to the west, was doing well, although under frequent Apache attack. The situation in the area was so serious that the Visitador probably ordered Terrenate (renamed San Felipe de Jesus Guevavi) transferred to the vicinity of Guevavi on the Santa Cruz River. The garrison did not remain in that area long.

The temporary transfer of Terrenate was an attempt to deal with renewed Apache raiding. The Apaches were favoring the west and central plunder trails at that time. About 1748, the Apache initiated frequent raids around Nacozari. Fronteras, in the path of an Apache invasion route, responded feebly to the renewed depredations. In an isolated area and poorly situated in the shadow of a nearby hill, much fault could be found with the simple structure that served as a fort, including

crumbling adobe. Besides the garrison of fifty cavalry, some five vecinos had taken up residence at the presidio.  

East of Fronteras, however, the countryside appeared more prosperous, especially in the vicinity of Janos. The presidio there was well located on a broad plain with good soil. The structure was well built and quite ample for the needs of the personnel. The fort had four towers for observation and defense, and a plaza de armas. Although this fort was also under Apache attack, the capellan (military chaplain) of the fort administered to 100 families who had settled and remained in the valley despite the Apache threat.  

Spain had sought to provide the other presidios with a population base such as Janos possessed. Lacking a Spanish population, the mission Indians might have served Spain's purpose. Confidence in the Pima and Opata Indian allies received a serious setback when rumor reached Rodriguez Gallardo in 1748 that Caballo, chief of the Sobaipuri, had entered an alliance with the Apaches. The captains of Fronteras and Terrenate, ready

10. Ibid., pp. 369-370.
to move out on an Apache campaign, were quickly rerouted down the San Pedro River to investigate the story, which proved untrue. But some damage had been done. Furthermore, the captains reported trouble enlisting Pima auxiliaries for the planned campaign.¹²

The campaign for which these presidios had been preparing was the second such effort. The first joint campaign, involving six presidios of Nueva Viscaya, New Mexico, and Sonora, had been executed in 1747. According to the Viceroy's orders, each presidio was to contribute at least thirty soldiers, accompanied by militia and Indians. The New Mexico contingent was unable to participate because of an Indian revolt. Troops of the other five presidios joined together and invaded Apache country with little success. At the same time, some Apaches took advantage of the absence of troops to invade the province of Sonora.¹³

The second joint expedition alluded to above was arranged for November-December, 1748, in the hope that winter would favor the Spaniards. The troops and militia

¹². Rodríguez Gallardo, p. 389b.
were joined by 200 Opopa and 300 Pima Indians. Misfortune came in the form of a rapidly melting snowfall which erased hopes for easy tracking. The only action was an attack on a ranchería where ten Apache were captured and a few killed. Some indirect benefits did accrue from these two expeditions when some Apache Indians sought to settle near Janos and a ranchería moved in next to Fronteras.14

Meanwhile, two events occurred in 1748 which threw much of the province into turmoil. First, in the interior, the Seris warned their missionaries to leave and then arose in a revolt destined to plague southern Sonora for two decades. The Seri base at Cerro Prieto, south of modern Hermosillo, was inaccessible to Spanish arms, and it would be to this area that unrepentant Pimas of the revolt of 1751 would move in 1756.15 Second, it was in the same year of 1748, according to later testimony by Hugo de O'Conor and Cavallero de Croix, that the Apache began to inundate the area. Their main efforts were in Nueva Viscaya, but Sonora, too, felt the pressure.16

The Pima Rebellion of 1751 should be viewed within the framework of these circumstances. It confirmed the fears of those who had never quite trusted their erstwhile allies. The revolt was suppressed by Governor Ortiz Parilla in the following year; however, due to the unsatisfactory conclusion of the rebellion, Sonora failed to regain its prosperity, and the downward spiral was accelerated by the bitter controversy between Parilla and the Jesuits. Jesuit influence over the mission Indians, one of the few stabilizing factors in Sonora, declined from this point onward.\footnote{17} The missions had not recovered from the shock by the time of the expulsion in 1767. Inasmuch as the Franciscan effort was never adequate, the missions continued to decline thereafter.\footnote{18}

If the missionaries faced a period of slow deterioration, the Spanish military responded to the Pima revolt with unaccustomed vigor. Two new presidios were added to the four already in existence—Terrenate, Fronteras, Horcasitas (formerly Pitic), and Baroyeca.\footnote{19} A junta de guerra y real hacienda met in Mexico City in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{17}{Chapman, pp. 45-46.}
  \item \footnote{18}{Spicer, p. 132.}
  \item \footnote{19}{Ewing, p. 237.}
\end{itemize}
January, 1752, to consider the pacification of unruly Indians in all of Sonora. Thoughts of expansion and the elimination of costly presidios, so recently entertained, now vanished. Instead, Viceroy Revilla-Gigedo issued a decree on January 31, 1752, authorizing Governor Ortiz Parilla to raise fifty soldados de cuera and to select the site for a new presidio.20 The thirty-man flying company of Baroyeca, still without a permanent base, was also moved.

The two moves which followed indicated the leaders of Sonora recognized the direction from where the major threat might come. First, the flying company moved to Santa Ana, and a detachment was ordered to Altar. The last-named location was selected as the site of a presidio, and Captain Bernardo de Urrea established it with a fifty-man complement by 1755. Altar was the western anchor of Spanish military strength. Somewhat isolated and apparently wasteful, it was still strategically placed on the flank of the Pima, faced the Papago, and, hopefully, would be capable of aiding against the Seri to the south.21 It could also aid in defense against the Apache Indians.

20. Ibid., pp. 241-245.
The principal purpose of the second presidio was defense against the Apache. By April 22, 1952, Lieutenant Francisco Xavier de Escalante, a thirty-one-year veteran of the frontier, and Ensign Joseph Moraga reported to Governor Parilla that the site of Tubac was preferable to all others, intercepting as it did an important avenue for Apache raiders into Sonora. A sixty-man company was recommended, with thirty men to be stationed at the enclosed structure at Tubac and thirty at Tupo, to the west.22

Tubac as a Spanish settlement dated to the late 1730's when a mission farm under the supervision of a number of Spaniards who had brought their families was established.23 In 1750, however, only the overseer's family resided there.24 By 1753, San Ignacio de Tubac was operational, with a fifty-man company. Croix stated that its transfer to either Tres Alamos or Optuavo on the San Pedro River was agreed upon later, but the move was never carried out.25 Chapman claimed that Tubac

could become a future steppingstone to the Gila and Colorado Rivers. Its main purpose, however, was undoubtedly to deny to the enemy the terrain between it and Terrenate.

The establishment of Altar and Tubac revived the question of the location of the other presidios, but only that of Terrenate was seriously considered. No new move was instituted, however. The Guevavi site selected by Rodriguez Gallardo proved unsatisfactory. In 1751, the Marques de Altimira relocated the presidio to the Canada de San Mateo. Another move was out of the question, so Terrenate remained at its central position in the defense of Sonora.

The two new presidios and the return of Terrenate to its old location established the defensive system in Sonora in its basic form by 1753. A presidial line to confront the Apache extended from west to east as follows: Altar, Tubac, Terrante, Fronteras, and Janos. These five presidios comprised the defense of Sonora.

27. Croix, p. 200; Bancroft, North Mexican States, p. 535.
until the end of the century. Changes would be ordered in such matters as sites, troop strength, objective, and even their need questioned; but the fundamental line would survive.

The quantitative improvements, however, were not matched by qualitative improvement. Authorized troop strength of fifty men to each presidio (except for Altar, with thirty men until 1757) gave the line 230 men to meet the Apache threat. But the soldiers were obviously of low caliber. Occasional "visitas" such as those of Rivera or Gallardo were followed by excellent recommendations; but since the recommendations were not implemented, the frontier soon lapsed back to its old ways.29

Much of the criticism raised earlier still applied, but more important was the lack of over-all coordination. Croix complained later that what he found was a cordon of unconnected posts.30 Each captain was still too independent of control by the governor or by anyone else. Cooperative ventures such as that involving 110 soldiers from Janos, Fronteras, and

29. Pfefferkorn's prejudiced but still noteworthy comments (pp. 289-295) are of this period.
Terrenate with 200 Indians in November, 1757 were the exception rather than the rule.\footnote{31}

More frequent improvised and secret incursions by presidial troops were recommended by Rodriguez Gallardo to Ortiz Parilla in preference to the well-equipped and well-planned campaigns mentioned above, which were "not only costlier, but also delay matters for a long time, giving the enemy (more time) to learn our movements and fool us, which results in greater insolence in the Indians and in lower reputation and credit to the royal arms." Long campaigns, he continued, were in vain; after a few days the enemy was aware of the Spaniards and fled to safety.\footnote{32}

Time enough would be lost in reaching the enemy. In fact, even a short campaign was so arduous that a single horse would not stand up under the strain. Because of the distance to Apachería from the presidios, 

32. Rodriguez Gallardo, p. 383a.}
and due to the dispersion of the Apache over wide areas with no fixed residences, each soldier should have been equipped with from four to six horses on those campaigns. Expeditions, said Rodriguez Gallardo, should number at least sixty to seventy men, and hopefully between eighty and 100 men, for at least fifteen men were needed to care for the horses whether the horse herd was small or large. Gallardo also pointed out that civilians could not be counted on to augment expeditions; they were too few and too ill-prepared. It had been a common practice to have them replace soldiers at the presidio.33 Thus, despite all efforts, including the addition of two presidios, little or no improvement had been made in solving the basic problems.

In actuality, the situation was getting worse. The aforementioned break between the Pima Indian and the Spaniard was of grave consequence. Dobyns maintained that the Apache threat became serious only after the Pima revolt in 1751. That revolt created a power vacuum when the Spaniards retreated a full 100 miles southward to the Sonora valley.34

33. Ibid., pp. 383a-384b.
Actually, a void had been noticeable since at least 1748 in much of the North, with Apaches reported lurking in the high ground. The Spaniards lost their offensive momentum, conducting only one or two campaigns a year into Apache country during the 1750's and 1760's. In writing of the period between 1751 and 1767, Bancroft went even further and gave full credit to "the hostility between Pimas and Apaches" for allowing the Spaniards to hold on to anything outside the presidios.

Ortega described the situation in this manner:

Of the presidios that have been placed on the frontier to contain so many hostilities, there is no doubt that they are useful and even necessary; for without them the damage of their [the Apaches'] fury would be greater than their insolence. It is also true that several times they [presidials] have given terrible blows and enough prudence to their audacity. Nevertheless, they cannot do that which is required to harness barbarity. Now because of the suspicious threats which cannot be understood, because of the rapidity with which the Apache retreats losing all pursuit; and because of the excessive distances, which the soldiers can not cover quickly. In these reasons, those who suffer the damage are not interested, attributing all blame for their dangers on the presidios, believing the soldiers to possess little

35. Villasenor, p. 393.
37. Ibid., p. 560.
courage, and even considering the captains to be cowards. Those complaints are not new: from the time of Father Kino...38

From the time of Father Kino conditions on the frontier seemed to worsen. The raids were more frequent; in the past, the enemy had entered through one or two avenues; now he entered anywhere he wished. If, in the past, their forays were confined to the frontier, now they penetrated the center and heart of the province. If, in the past, the Apaches were few and cowardly, now they came in hundreds and raided in insolence.39 In the 1760's, Apache, Pima, and Seri Indian raids led to the abandonment of missions, pueblos, mines, and ranches which resulted in the inevitable decrease in the population.40 Lafora recorded that by the time of the Rubi inspection, the Gila Apache had already raided in the vicinity of San Miguel de Horcasitas.41

Another view of the situation was presented by Father Lizasoin, writing in 1763. He stated that Apache

39. Ibid., p. 545.
40. Bancroft, North Mexican States, pp. 564-565.
41. Lafora, p. 151.
raids were not as numerous as those of the Seri and Pima but were more disastrous because of the large numbers involved.  

42 Because of the huge numbers, he asserted, the presidial troops could do little more than go to the settlers' aid after the enemy's assaults.  

43 At the same time, both Pfefferkorn and Neuntuig recorded growing pressure by the Apache in Sonora.  

44 The reason for increased Apache raiding into Sonora was the pressure of the Comanches again driving the Apaches into Spanish territory. This renewed pressure was quite evident all along the frontier by 1763.  

45 In Pimería Alta, the onslaught was felt most severely by the Sobaipuri of the San Pedro valley. The previous year, they had begun to flee the valley in large numbers. The Sobaipuri population in the valley soon dwindled to a handful.  

42 Lizasoin, p. 197b.  
43 Ibid., p. 203b.  
44 Pfefferkorn, p. 43; Neuntuig, p. 27.  
45 Thomas, p. viii.  
46 DiPeso, pp. 40-41.
The Spanish authorities disapproved of Sobaipuri's evacuation, but took no concrete steps to stop it. In a letter to Lieutenant Colonel Don Juan de Piñeda in March of 1764, Father Manuel de Aguirre decried the abandonment of the valley as opening the door into Pimería Alta and Sonora. It would have been a greater service to Spain, wrote the priest, to have supported the Sobaipuri there, even if it meant moving a presidio, either Tubac or Terrenate, into the valley. Even now, he urged that the valley be re-populated.⁴⁷ Later, Terrenate was moved into the San Pedro valley; but without the Sobaipuri and under intense Apache attack, it was withdrawn.⁴⁸

Visitador José de Gálvez arrived in the area to find Sonora and Sinaloa almost destroyed by the barbarous assaults of the ferocious Apache, and of the Seri, Pima, and Sibubapa rebels.⁴⁹

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⁴⁸. See below, p. 111.

In October, 1765, Lieutenant Colonel Don Juan de Piñeda, Governor of the province (1763-1771), held a meeting with his presidio captains in which it was decided to take the war to the Apache. The plan called for each of the three northeastern Sonora presidios to alternate in a monthly invasion of Apache territory.50

Typically, Captain Juan Bautista de Ansa, III carried out the first campaign in February-March of 1766 with mixed success. Forty captives were taken and in accordance with custom were distributed among the soldiers. This success was counterbalanced by events back in the Santa Cruz valley where Apaches took advantage of the troop's absence to raid Bac and steal 300 head of cattle.51

The matter faltered and then failed when the order for action was received in Fronteras. The experiences of the captain epitomized the weakness inherent in the presidio system. Testifying to his desire to


chastise the Apaches, Captain Gabriel de Vildosola protested to Governor Piñeda that sickness and widely scattered duties had so reduced his available force that he could not sally forth against the Apache. Nevertheless, he had been ready to leave when Piñeda had ordered the raid suspended and twenty soldiers under a lieutenant had been sent to the south. Within a few days, Vildosola continued his lament; he, too, had been called southward. In his absence the Apache had taken the presidio's herd, killing five soldiers. Replacements sent for the horses had not been trained nor acclimitized; therefore, Fronteras could make no major effort. 52

The Apache Indians pressed their raids into Sonora relentlessly. During the years 1763 to 1776, Sonora suffered heavily at their hands. The situation was aggravated by a few small rebellions within the province itself. 53

This was the state of affairs that existed at the time the two representatives of the Spanish crown approached the Sonoran frontier for the purpose of

52. Vildosola to Piñeda, June 8, 1764, pp. 148a-b.

reorganizing the presidial defense system. Spain's involvement with problems in other areas was responsible for their presence. In 1762, Spain acquired Louisiana from France, thus ending the threat to Spanish lands from that nation. Shortly thereafter, both acknowledged defeat at the hands of Great Britain, but all sides understood that the peace was simply a truce. As part of the preparation for renewal of hostilities, Spain sent Visitador General José de Gálvez and the Marqués de Rubí to the New World to revise the viceroyalty of New Spain, including the frontier defenses.
The condition of the province of Sonora called for reform; but when it came, it was because of conditions having little to do with the situation in Sonora. To prepare for renewed warfare with Great Britain following defeat in the Seven Years' War, Spain's energetic Charles III instituted a thorough administrative, economic and military reform of his kingdom. In the colonies, the main purpose was an increase of royal revenues by (1) reducing corruption among the tax collectors by strict enforcement of tax laws, (2) revival of the mining industry, and (3) increasing trade between Spain and her colonies.¹

As noted earlier, two representatives were charged with the reformation of conditions in the frontier provinces. By far the most powerful of the two representatives was Visitador José de Gálvez. Gálvez was a confident of the king, and was granted

¹ Haskell, p. 33.
broad powers to deal with conditions in New Spain. The major work of reform devolved upon him. Of more immediate concern, however, was the work of the Marques de Rubí. Investigation of the military problems of the frontier was placed in his hands. The Marques spent almost two years in his investigation of the frontier presidial system beginning in March, 1766, and his report formed the basis for the far reaching Reglamento of 1772.2

Rubí's tour took him to every presidio of the frontier. His conclusions were based on personal observation and investigation. The guiding principle incorporated into his plans for the presidial system was "to concentrate effort upon the defense of what he considered the real possessions of New Spain." To do this, it was necessary to locate the fortifications near enough to support one another and to prevent hostile Indians from breaking through the intervening spaces. Therefore, Rubí proposed a line of fifteen presidios for the frontier, each forty leagues distant from the next, stretching from the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of California.3

2. Lafora, pp. 15-16.
Acceptance of Rubí's proposal would mean wholesale removal of presidios. Rubí noted that within the forty league limitation, he would recommend change of a presidio's location only if the new position could materially aid the line by blocking mountain passes favored by the Indians. In practice this still meant that of all the presidios involved in the defense of Pimería Alta and Sonora against the Apache, only Janos with its excellent location on a broad plain should not be moved.4

Although Fronteras would be moved closer, Rubí was still concerned as to the ability of Fronteras and Janos to deny the intervening rugged terrain to the Apache Indians. Rubí, therefore, reported on the desirability of an intermediate post between the two presidios, closer to Fronteras, but to be manned by forces from both.5

Previous inspectors had recommended reforms for the frontier presidios only to see their plans fail due to lack of continuity. Enforcement of the inspector's plan was placed in the hands of the same

4. Haskell, p. 41.
persons responsible for past deficiencies. Those with an interest in maintaining the status quo could effectively block all reform. Rubí decided the solution must be continuous inspection. He recommended that three comandantes de compañía, or field commanders, be appointed and each assigned an area of the frontier, with one for Sonora. The commanders were to act as inspectors who would conduct a general review of their presidios once a year and submit a written report.6

The commanders would also work to eliminate two long-standing Spanish weaknesses: the lack of training at all levels and coordination during battle. Standards for individual and company training on the frontier varied according to the skills and dedication of the company officers. Rubí wished to bring pressure to bear on this group, described by Lafora as being so ignorant and inexperienced as to be unable to instruct the troops. Under existing conditions, Lafora contended, combat usually degenerated into individual contests in which the Apaches' superiority in numbers, skill as archers, and agility gave them a definite advantage.

6. Haskell, p. 42.
Conditions were such that many soldiers did not even know how to fire a musket.\textsuperscript{7}

Inasmuch as execution of the Regulation of 1772 would fall on the first Inspector Commandant, Don Hugo de O'Conor, other proposals made by Rubí, including recommendations for realignment of presidios, will be discussed in the section dealing with O'Conor and his execution of the Regulations.

Rubí performed his job well, and most of his recommendations, with some modification by José de Gálvez, were incorporated into the Regulation. The Márques had provided plans for what he considered to be an adequate defense of New Spain's northern frontier, organizing a line of presidios which should be able to contain the enemy and prevent major penetrations. While accomplishing this, he did not forget that his was a twofold mission; he estimated that his reforms would save the royal treasury 79,928 pesos a year.\textsuperscript{8} Understandably, José de Gálvez gave firm approval to Rubí's plans, expecting great success from the concept of a unified command and equidistant presidial installations.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{7} Lafora, pp. 277-278.
\textsuperscript{8} Haskell, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{9} José de Gálvez, p. 151.
For his part, José de Gálvez had some projects in mind for the interior provinces. One was the establishment of frontier towns in Sonora and Nueva Viscaya, with some 40,000 settlers to be recruited in Mexico City. It was a defensive measure, tying in well with Rubí's work, and directed toward the elimination of Apache raids. The settlers would organize into self-sufficient militia. More than with Rubí, expenses were a factor in Gálvez' plans. If successful, some presidios would be unnecessary, and their elimination would ease the strain on the royal treasury. The press of other business and the mental breakdown suffered by Gálvez, however, led to the abandonment of this project which could have aided defense of the frontier tremendously.

Meanwhile, Gálvez and Viceroy Márques de Croix conceived a plan to establish a commandancy-general for all of the northern provinces from the peninsula of California to the Gulf of Mexico, and submitted it to the King of Spain, Charles III. By order of August 10, 1769, he approved the plan, but execution was held in

The King was apparently not prepared at this time to establish what was actually a viceroy for the interior provinces. Instead, the Regulation of 1772 created for the area the post of inspector-commandant, who would be directly under the viceroy of New Spain until such time as the King established a commandancy-general. The inspector-commandant's main duty was to enforce the Regulation. He was granted broad powers, and the aid of two chief assistants.\footnote{12}

In general, the Regulation which the inspector-commandant was authorized to enforce was composed of two main divisions: the establishment of the inspector-commandancy as the agent for reform on the frontier, and a listing of the reforms to be instituted in the presidial system which were based largely on Rubí's recommendations.

The tenor of the provisions dealing with the Apache Indians was harsh. Spain abandoned the idea that its Indian enemies were candidates for pacification and conversion, and now favored all-out offensive warfare.

\footnote{11. José de Gálvez, p. 150.}
\footnote{12. Reglamento, p. 15.}
According to the Reglamento, "the first order of business should be with the Indians [who are] known enemies, to maintain a lively and incessant warfare, and whenever possible, attack them in their own rancherias and lands." ¹³

A more emphatic indication of the King's thoughts was the deliberate removal of the Apache Indians from coverage under the old Law of the Indies which required Spaniards to seek peaceful solutions to Indian problems. ¹⁴ Nicolas de Lafora had foreshadowed this change when he urged adoption of a policy of extermination. Lafora had recommended continual offensive warfare by small groups, a policy he contended would lead to total destruction of the Apaches, as they would be unable to rob and could not subsist without raiding. Spanish raids would result in the capture of Apache women and children, which would also cut down the enemy's numbers. The policy of eradication represented a complete reversal of official Spanish Indian policy, but its acceptance by the court was widely hailed on the frontier. ¹⁵

¹³. Ibid., p. 12.
¹⁵. Lafora, pp. 279-280.
For the commanders on the frontier, the policy of extermination meant an end to the monumental problem of discriminating between peaceful and warlike Apache groups. The Regulation specifically forbade the inspector commandant or the presidio captains to grant peace to the Apaches. They could arrange only a temporary cessation of hostilities until the next higher official was contacted. In effect, only the Viceroy might approve peace, and he was bound to insist on an immediate end to hostilities during the negotiations, and, if possible, the return of Spanish and Indian ally prisoners.\(^{16}\) Despite the aggressiveness of the new policy, concessions to moderation were made, as in a provision for proper treatment of prisoners.\(^{17}\)

Faithful execution of the provisions of the Regulation's first section were directly related to improvement in the quality of the presidial soldiers. Various provisions were incorporated into the Regulations to ensure betterment of the troops. Most important was the task given the Viceroy of removing and replacing immediately all officers not meeting the

\(^{16}\) Reglamento, p. 13.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 12.
high standards of their post. Thereafter, the inspector commandant was responsible for filling vacancies with the Viceroy's approval. Concentration of the power of appointment in the hands of the inspector commandant would give him, supposedly, more power over the officer corps and eliminate some abuses associated with the old system.

Also worthy of note were two paragraphs (numbers 5 and 6) which made it clear that hereafter frontier troops were considered a part of the regular army, entitled to all rights, honors, and privileges of regulars, and expected to observe the general ordinances punctually or incur the resulting penalties. The much abused plea of ignorance was no longer acceptable as a defense. The Viceroy was ordered to provide each officer with a copy of the pertinent articles and make one book readily available in each presidio from which passages would be read on a weekly basis to the troops.

The first section of the Regulations of 1772 dealt with the personnel of the frontier presidial system, covering everything from uniforms to tactics.

18. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
19. Ibid., p. 4.
Its second section detailed the establishment of the inspector commandant of the new line of presidios in accordance with the Marques de Rubí's report and the map prepared by Don Nicolas de Lafora. In September, 1772, Don Hugo de O'Connor was promoted to colonel, and appointed the first inspector commandant of the Interior Provinces. O'Connor was to serve during the four years, 1772-1776, at this post. He immediately launched into an arduous schedule of activity that eventually ruined his health.

O'Connor first tended to that part of his domain east of the Sierra Madre Occidental. There, characteristically, he gained time to move and build presidios by personally leading an invasion into Apache country. O'Connor failed to deal the enemy a serious blow in this three-company expedition, launched from presidio Junta de los Rios in November, 1773, but won the respite his troops needed to relocate the presidios. Although not specifically mentioned, he undoubtedly hoped that his personal example would set a standard of behavior for the troops.

20. Ibid., p. 21.


It would take more than personal leadership, obviously, to effect reform in Sonora. Saddled as he was with full responsibility for both establishment of the presidial line and reorganization of the presidial companies, O'Conor required a long lull in the fighting. During much of 1773, the province of Sonora did enjoy a form of peace. It had been a rough winter as the Apache Indians came down from the mountains seeking a warmer climate. Both Terrenate and Tubac lost their horse herds to the daring raiders; but with spring, peace came to Sonora. Bobb would have us believe that Hugo de O'Connor's early reforms among Sonora's soldiery were paying off, mentioning especially Governor Mateo Sastre's success against the Tiburon and Seri.23 It is difficult to accept this conclusion, however, for O'Connor had had little time to accomplish anything substantial. Moreover, Apache attacks resumed their frequency and ferocity a short time later. Probably Thomas is right in his assertion that the Apaches had turned their attention to the east.24

O'Connor did not visit Sonora personally until 1774. Much of his work in this province was accomplished

23. Bobb, p. 140.
by subordinates. He had ordered two inspections of the Sonoran presidios for that year: one by Adjutant Inspector Don Antonio Bonilla and another by the new governor, Francisco Crespo (1774-1777). Of the two, Bonilla was by far the more important as it fell to him to establish the Sonoran part of the line by seeking out the sites which would be utilized. Bonilla presented his recommendations to O'Conor, and the latter incorporated them into his plans with little change.25

The work of Don Antonio Bonilla contributed to the reorganization of Sonora's presidial defense. Bonilla finished his inspection and selection of sites by August of 1774. In his report, he tried to make his recommendations conform to the royal order of 1772 which embodied the Marques de Rubí's proposals. He felt that Rubí's line of 1767 would have been adequate with the addition of one presidio if Juan Bautista de Anza had not discovered a land route to California in the meantime. That event required a complete re-evaluation. Bonilla thus submitted not one but two proposals to O'Conor: one in accordance to the regulations, and one encompassing his own solution to the new situation.26

Bonilla's own proposals are especially interesting as a radical approach to the problems of northern Sonora. Bonilla wanted a new presidio at the junction of the San Pedro and Gila rivers, for he had concluded that the true Apache frontier was the San Pedro valley. Establishment of the new presidio would be accompanied by a shift of Tubac to El Quiburi, Terrenate to the San Pedro valley, and Fronteras to San Bernardino. The proposal violated the regulations which recommended forty-league spacing, for the new presidio would be only twenty-six leagues north of Tubac (Quiburi); Tubac only twenty-two from Terrenate; and from Terrenate to the new location of Fronteras another thirty-one leagues.²⁷

Bonilla wanted to make the front line impregnable by placing four presidios within seventy-nine leagues of each other and moving the whole line forward to the very edge of Apache territory. It would have been difficult for the Apache to cross such a tightly-knit line. Other advantages were obvious. While the proposal did increase exposure to the enemy, it would result in a better defensive patrol system (instituted by O'Conor). By eliminating the march to and from the land of the enemy, the cavalry would gain tremendous mobility. Bonilla

realized that increased isolation from the settlements would be a danger. He, therefore, proposed a second defensive line, made up of settlers at the established presidio sites, which would serve to secure the interior if properly organized according to his proposals. It should be noted that Bonilla found the province enjoying peace during his inspection tour. Only the Seri and Pima Indians in the south, and the Apache Indians in the north, threatened trouble. At any rate, Bonilla's personal views were to be ignored in most instances because O'Conor found the second proposal more acceptable.

Although O'Conor considered the second set of recommendations more acceptable because they conformed more closely to the regulations, even this plan contained variances from Rubí's work. At this point, it would be helpful to discuss the various recommendations and actions taken on a presidial basis, beginning with Altar and moving east.

**Altar:** According to Rubí, it was necessary to move Altar closer to the Gulf of California in order to cut off the Papago and Piato from the Seri. Altar was


29. Ibid., p. 168.
free of Apache hostilities. Lafora reported the company at full strength of fifty-one soldiers and also the presence of some 125 families in the vicinity.

Bonilla's personal view was that it was unnecessary to move the presidio; however, in accordance with the Regulations, he selected a site in the valley of Escomac between Caborca and Bisanig. Here, the forty-league limitation had the disadvantage of forcing the movement of Tubac westward, away from the Apache, thus leaving its neighboring missions and settlements open to Apache attack and placing it in rough, impassible terrain. As a result of these disadvantages, Altar was left alone.

Tubac: San Ignacio de Tubac, a league north of Tumacacori mission, had been founded in 1752 after the Pima revolt. By the mid-1760's, it could boast of 421 gente de razon, if the forty-nine soldiers under Captain Ansa were included. Lafora further informs us that

30. Lafora, p. 150; Croix, p. 167.
31. Lafora, p. 132.
32. Croix, p. 169.
33. Ibid., pp. 170-171.
34. Bancroft, North Mexican States, p. 563n.
two of its four cannon were completely useless due to neglect.35 With Altar at Escomač, Tubac would have to shift westward; accordingly, Bonilla had selected the valley of El Arivac, forty-one leagues from Altar (Escomač).36 The move would probably result in the abandonment of most of the Santa Cruz valley. Moreover, while the Arivac valley was ample and offered good pastures, it was swampy and unhealthy. Still the Regulations required it and Bonilla recommended the move.37 O'Connor found this unacceptable and would make his own drastic changes.

Terrenate: The presidio of many names and locations was located, at the time of Bonilla's inspection, only two leagues from its proposed location at Las Nutrias. The new location was reported as fertile but lacked wood. The minor relocation would cost some 4,000 pesos. The move would place the 300 inhabitants closer to the area on the San Pedro River where some of them had been farming for some time.38 No site seemed completely satisfactory and the presidio was moved several times within a few years.

35. Lafora, p. 127.
37. Ibid., pp. 171-172.
38. Ibid., p. 172.
Fronteras: Rubí had recommended relocation in the valley of San Bernardino, thirty-four leagues to the northeast of its old location. Here Bonilla reversed his normal procedure and recommended that the presidio remain in place for an indefinite period while the settlement grew strong. 39

Janos: No proposals were made to move it.

Acceptance of Bonilla's recommendations would mean new sites for three of the five presidios which defended Sonora's northern frontier. There was yet the possibility that Colonel Crespo, Governor of Sonora, might recommend further changes. The Governor conducted his inspection in late 1774, but aside from recommending the junction of the San Pedro and Gila rivers as the northern-most point of Spanish concern, his report was not of immediate pertinence. 40 Thus, Hugo de O'Connor would make his decisions on the basis of Bonilla's work and his own observations.

It has been noted that 1773 was relatively quiet in Sonora. 41 When O'Connor entered the province in

39. Ibid., p. 169.
40. Ibid., pp. 174-175.
41. See above, p. 98.
mid-1774, tranquility still prevailed. O'Conor immediately sought to take advantage of this and seized the offensive. Together with Governor Crespo, he made a sortie into Apache country; but the Noticias for that year record that it brought no better results than any other as the enemy retreated into rougher, more distant terrain.\footnote{42}

On his return, O'Conor turned his attention to the relocation of the presidios. He conducted a personal reconnaissance and then returned to Janos, where he wrote to Viceroy Bucareli, giving his recommendation on the Sonoran phase of the line. The recommendation was a compromise of the works of Rubí, Bonilla, and O'Conor himself.\footnote{43}

O'Conor asked viceregal approval of a presidial system for Sonora which he felt fitted the state of the province at the time. Specifically, he had to take into account Ansá's California exploration and the continuing peace in the interior. His recommendations represented a move away from Rubí's linear concept:

1. Altar was left at the same site.

\footnote{42. Noticias, 1734-77, p. 160a.}
\footnote{43. Croix, pp. 178-179.}
2. Tubac was to be shifted northward to the Indian village of Tucson, widening the gap between it and the adjacent presidios.

3. Terrenate was to occupy the selected site at the abandoned pueblo of Santa Cruz. (This is an error on the part of O'Conor; he seems to be telescoping events. See below, p. 111)

4. Fronteras was to move to the valley of San Bernardino.

5. In the south, San Miguel de Horcasitas and San Carlos de Buenavista would be abandoned. 44

On October 18, 1775, the Viceroy approved O'Conor's proposals except action on the two southern presidios which he suspended pending the outcome of Ansa's second California expedition. 45

The new realignment obviously did not follow Rubi's proposal. The crux of his recommendation was the forty-league interval between presidios. For Sonora, this would have meant the wholesale relocation of presidios. As executed by O'Conor, however, the only radical change in location was the movement of Tubac

44. O'Conor, pp. 64-65; Croix, pp. 147-148.

45. Croix, p. 183.
and Fronteras to the north. Ansa's successful mission to Monterrey made the move necessary. The Tucson location was the closest to the Gila River under Spanish control; and the gathering there of Pima, Sobaipuri, and some Papago Indians provided a friendly population near the presidio site. It was a step toward acceptance of the Gila River as the northern frontier (again ignoring Rubí), for plans were afoot to move Horcasitas and Buenavista to the Gila and Colorado rivers.46

It was a cautious step and fell far short of the grandiose plans of Father Francisco Garces, who, with Ansa, was chiefly responsible for the change. Garces had long been advocating a bold move to the Gila River based on fortification of the San Pedro valley, much as Bonilla later proposed. Garces, however, also advocated communications with New Mexico as a means of handling the Apache Indians. To the west, a presidio on the

46. O'Conor, pp. 70-71
Colorado would open the Yuma area to missions and secure the way to California.\(^47\)

While Ansa led his colonization expedition to establish San Francisco, Garces tried to reach New Mexico from the junction of the Colorado and Gila rivers. The more direct Gila River route to New Mexico drew others; later, Zúñiga attributed this as one of the main reasons for the advance to the River.\(^48\) In 1780, for example, Juan Bautista de Ansa, then Governor of New Mexico, would try to reach Sonora through this area.\(^49\) In 1788, Zúñiga and Echeagaray tried again from Sonora.\(^50\)

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\(^{47}\) Francisco Garces, "Diario y derrotero que siguió el M. R. P. Fr. Francisco Garces en su viaje hecho desde Octubre de 1775 hasta 17 de Septiembre de 1776, al Rio Colorado para reconocer las naciones que habitan sus margines, y a los pueblos del Moqui del Nuevo Mexico," Bancroft Library microfilm, No. 118 in The University of Arizona Library, n.p., n.d.

\(^{48}\) Zúñiga, p. 61.

\(^{49}\) Thomas, pp. 190-191.

Garces' hopes for the Yuma area received more official interest. For a time, it seemed that his hopes for a presidio and settlement in the area would be fulfilled. By the time the movement was executed, over-all command had fallen on Teodoro de Croix, who tended to ignore the Californias and the Colorado-Gila colonies. Croix moved too late to establish the colonies, and then failed to make them strong enough. The result was a disaster. 51

The Yuma massacre of 1781 ended the life of Father Garces. It did not end the discussion of moves to the north; proposals to reopen the California route were heard as late as 1801. 52 Nothing of importance came of these proposals. Tucson, established as a presidio on December 10, 1775, 53 was to be the northernmost point of Spanish control in Sonora. The massacre ended the presidio's duty of guarding the route to California and left it with no clear-cut mission. Tucson was not situated in a location which would enable it to make an equal contribution with other presidios against the Apache enemy, but it was never moved.

52. Ibid., p. 432.
Carl Sauer, in an article written in 1935 about a Spanish expedition into the Apache country, described the location of Tucson as follows:

It was off-side with regard to the main Apache country, the western-most Apache band, the Tonto, being less troublesome than the others. Tucson also was further from the centers of Indian and Spanish population which, in such cases, supplied part of the necessary forces. Its most important disadvantage, however, was apparently its inferiority in pasturage.54

Insofar as Sonora was concerned, then, the net results of attempts to expand her frontier northward was to disrupt the Márques de Rubí's plan and introduce radical realignment in her frontier defensive system. The main load thus fell on Terrenate, Fronteras, and Janos, already heavily taxed in moving and adapting to O'Conor's new standards. Janos was the least affected, for its location was entirely satisfactory and its standards already high. O'Conor did order Fronteras moved, and this took place during the summer of 1776, bringing it more in line with the two flanking presidios.55


55. Chapman, p. 305.
Terrenate's actual location during this period cannot be determined exactly. The major movements can be outlined, however. O'Connor ordered the presidio moved to the Las Nutrias location late in 1775.\textsuperscript{56} In the following year, while the company was already at work at the new site, O'Connor underwent a change of mind and ordered the unit north along the San Pedro to a new site called Santa Cruz, one league south of Quiburi.\textsuperscript{57} The stay here was apparently of very short duration.

Archeological findings of Dr. Charles DiPeso of the Amerind Foundation give definite evidence that the site of Santa Ana del Quiburi, twenty-five leagues from Old Terrenate and forty-one from San Bernardino, was taken over by the company at this time.\textsuperscript{58}

It seems certain that the company was stationed at Quiburi for a number of years. At both locations, the presidio came under heavy Apache attack, with very heavy losses. On July 7, 1776, for instance, while based at Santa Cruz, the company was attacked by the enemy and suffered a disaster as Captain Tovar and

\textsuperscript{56} Almada, p. 728.
\textsuperscript{57} Croix, p. 183; Sauer, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{58} DiPeso, pp. 42-43.
twenty-five others were killed. Only nine members of the patrol escaped. The beleaguered company held on in the San Pedro valley until ordered to move again. By 1780, Croix speaks of the company as being at Las Nutrias again, being sheltered in temporary quarters there.

Having settled the problem of presidio location to his satisfaction, O'Conor turned his attention to the next logical step: how to best utilize the line to keep the Apaches out. His solution was to institute a bi-weekly patrol system between the presidios. Beginning with Altar, each presidio sent a detachment over a predetermined easterly route which would cover various likely Apache hide-outs on the way to the next presidio and return by the same route. For example, the instructions for San Agustin del Tucson were as follows:

The one [detachment] from this presidio on leaving shall cut by San Xavier del Bac to the Ojito de Agua [probably near Pantano] keeping to their right the large mountain of Santa Rita and on the left those of Santa Catalina, continuing their march along the margin of the San Pedro River, site of Tres Alamos, to the presidio of Santa Cruz, from which they shall turn back over their own trail to their own presidio.

60. Croix, p. 150.
61. O'Conor, pp. 81-82.
62. Ibid., pp. 82-83.
63. Ibid. Author's translation.
O'Conor sternly forbade variation from the route unless fresh tracks were found. These were to be followed, and if the enemy were found and did not number over 100 men (a detachment usually numbered one-fourth that many), the Spaniards were to attack immediately unless surprise at dawn were possible. Larger bodies of the enemy were to be kept under surveillance until aid could arrive.  

O'Conor recognized the training aspects of this duty and again he refused to leave matters to chance. In order that all officers might benefit from the experience, he decreed that patrol duty would alternate between captain, lieutenant, and alferez (standard bearer) so that each would be out fifteen days with his detachment. A new patrol would leave within twenty-four hours after the old one returned to the presidio. As a further check, each officer would keep a detailed diary of his excursion which would be sent to O'Conor by the captain later. 

O'Conor's first concern was defense. He had expended a major part of his resources in providing for


the safety of the interior. But he did not care to ignore offensive warfare, the objective of which, as he pointed out, was peace. Since the major concern was the welfare and conversion of Indian gentiles (even now), and tranquility for the frontier, O'Conor endeavored to maintain the most appropriate measures to achieve such useful and pious objectives: vigor and flexibility in war and good faith and suavity in the treatment of peaceful Apaches and of prisoners.66

Having delivered himself of such lofty aims, O'Conor formulated a plan to carry warfare to the enemy. Ten detachments varying from 105 to 385 men, composed of settlers and auxiliaries in addition to the presidials, would carry the war to the Apache throughout the northern frontier.67 For Sonora, this meant participation in large-scale, well-coordinated campaigns involving troops from Sonora, Nueva Viscaya, and New Mexico. Inasmuch as the priority of the Elizondo campaign against Seri and Pima rebels during 1767-1771 had forced the northern presidios into defensive postures and little had been attempted since, O'Conor was also attempting to overcome the inertia of a decade.68

66. Ibid., p. 92.
67. Ibid., pp. 92-93.
The first of these concerted attacks on the Apache Indians was executed under O'Connor's direction during September-November, 1775, and dealt the Indians a severe blow. While Ugarte y Loyola with Rio Grande troops drove the Apaches westward, New Mexico units were to block escape to the north, then Sonoran forces and a group under O'Connor would strike, encircling the Apache. Despite failure of New Mexico units to do their part, the Spaniards succeeded in killing 138 warriors, capturing 104, and recovering 1,966 animals in the campaign.\(^69\) After a long period in which little had been done to harass the enemy, O'Connor had begun to instill in the troops a spirit of aggressiveness.

To further induce his troops to take the offensive and to take advantage of Apache weakness, O'Connor also recommended warfare during the winter months, especially against the western Apache, who usually were driven down to a lower elevation from the Chiricahua, Gila, and Mimbres ranges by the cold in search of food.\(^70\) In the more open valleys, the Spaniards should achieve more success in finding and destroying the enemy. O'Connor

\(^{69}\) Bobb, p. 142; Thomas pp. 10-11.

\(^{70}\) O'Connor, p. 101.
is silent on the effect this might have on his forces, but it is consistent with his continuous efforts to force them to greater exertions. Nor is it clear that the Spaniards were more successful in locating the Apache in winter.

Finding the enemy was a problem at any time of the year. To correct it, the Regulations of 1772 inaugurated a new policy by authorizing ten Indian scouts for each presidial company. Scouts were armed with a pistol, shield, and lance, in addition to their bow and arrows. Each scout received one real daily for expenses, with another held back to cover costs, as with the soldiers.\textsuperscript{71} The regulations made it clear that although it was in Nueva Viscaya, the presidio of Janos would use Opatas as scouts, just like the four Sonoran presidios. O'Conor gave the same wholehearted support to this measure as he gave to all of his work.\textsuperscript{72}

In truth, his exertions in meeting the demands of his position were such that by 1776, O'Conor's health was much impaired. He petitioned the Crown for an appointment to a less arduous post. In recognition of

\textsuperscript{71} Reglamento, pp. 7-8.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. 23; O'Conor, pp. 103-104.
his services to the King, he was appointed Governor of Guatemala. 73

O'Connor thus retired as the first and only inspector commandant of the Interior Provinces. José de Gálvez, after a decade of pleading, finally won the King over to completion of the reorganization he had begun during his tour as Visitor General. A Commandancy General of the Interior Provinces was established the year O'Connor retired. His successor would have powers far beyond those available to O'Connor.

O'Connor had accomplished much despite the limitations of his position. He had established the line of presidios in the east, quite in accordance with the Márques de Rubí's recommendations and had realigned the western end of the line. It has also been said of him that he succeeded in driving the Apache Indians back. 74 Viceroy Bucareli definitely considered him a success in his post. The Viceroy's instructions to O'Connor's successor dealt extensively and kindly with O'Connor's work. Conditions on the frontier, he stated, were definitely improved, with the presidios now manned by

73. Bobb, p. 143.

74. Ibid.
better, more disciplined soldiers. Raids also were fewer and resulted in less damage.\textsuperscript{75}

Such a view of conditions on the frontier was quite uncommon. Replacement of O'Connor had hardly been announced when more normal views were vocalized. Anguished cries for immediate succor from impending disaster began to reach Mexico City. Surprisingly enough, and embarrassing to the Viceroy and Hugh de O'Connor, these calls for help from the frontier were being considerably amplified by O'Connor's successor, Don Teodoro de Croix, as he proceeded northward to assume his new command.

\textsuperscript{75} Croix, p. 22.
José de Gálvez had long sought to improve the administration of the frontier provinces by establishing in the area a person with the authority to make and enforce decisions. It was not until Gálvez reached his pinnacle of power a decade after his inspection of New Spain that he convinced the King of the practicality of his plans. On August 22, 1776, King Charles III issued a royal order creating the post of commandancy general of the Interior Provinces. The commandancy general was to have under his command the provinces of Texas, Coahuila, Nueva Viscaya, Sonora and Sinaloa, and the Californias. To administer this huge area, the commandant was given great authority and was theoretically directly responsible to the King. The person appointed to the position would have tremendous powers over both civil and military affairs. The King, in effect, made the commandant general a peer of the Viceroy of Mexico. There were ambiguities in the royal
order which made the commandant general dependent to
some extent on the Viceroy. Nevertheless, the new
position was of great importance and desired by many.¹

The winner of this political plum was Teodoro de
Croix, better known as Cavallero de Croix. He was a
nephew of the Márques de Croix, who had cooperated so
well with Visitador José de Gálvez. El Cavallero had
served his uncle in various capacities in New Spain. At
the time of his appointment as head of the Interior
Provinces, he had attained the rank of general in the
Spanish army. El Cavallero de Croix arrived in New
Spain in December, 1776. He immediately busied himself
in the capital, familiarizing himself with the provinces
by studying reports and planning for assumption of his
heavy duties. He left for the interior in August of
1777 and immediately began a tour of inspection.²

Before Croix left Mexico City, Viceroy Bucareli
had assured him that the situation in the north had
improved greatly in the past few years. Croix traveled
no further than Querétaro before he began to receive
reports to the contrary. For example, his aide, José

¹ Bancroft, North Mexican States, pp. 670-671.
² Ibid., p. 671.
Rubio sent Croix a pessimistic report on the frontier. Croix's new military commander in Sonora, Juan Bautista de Ansa, had only bad news to report. Other sources in that province contended that the Seri, Pima, Papago, Tiburon, and Gila Apache Indians planned to overrun the province at the same time.³ Croix, in a gloomy dispatch, reported to José de Galvez that disaster loomed in the background.⁴

Of all these enemies, Croix was most concerned with the Apache Indians. After two years of calm, these Indians were renewing their attacks on Sonora with increasing frequency. Actually the new Apache onslaught was relatively easy to explain. The nations of the north, especially the Comanche, were again moving southward, forcing the Apache before them into Spanish territory. This led to more Apache raids as they were driven from their old hunting grounds. It also presented the threat of a new enemy on the Spanish frontier; but later, the pressure subsided and the Apache continued to serve as a buffer between Spaniard and Comanche along most of the frontier.

³. Bobb, pp. 149-150.
⁴. Croix, p. 22.
⁵. Ibid., p. 15.
During this period, pressure continued on the Apache Indians. By the year 1776, it appeared that what had been a difficult but tolerable situation had become a grave matter. The gravity of the situation was signified by Apache assaults on two towns in the month of November. In that month, forty Apache raiders attacked Magdalena successfully and conducted a systematic sacking of the town. A few days later apparently the same group fell on Saric, killing eleven persons, wounding four, and capturing a woman. Pursuit from Tubac failed to catch the raiders.6

Such was the situation as reported to Croix as he entered the Interior Provinces. Croix must have been overwhelmed by what he found. So disturbing were these catastrophes that Croix felt free to ignore instructions to visit the Californias as soon as possible and secure their communications with Sonora. Croix stayed in the east; he actually never visited Alta California, and did not move into Sonora until 1779, three years after his arrival in New Spain.7


Once in Sonora, Croix found much to criticize. Covering the whole military situation in a blanket statement, he "found in the province the same enemies that in all times have devastated it and I found no line of presidios or troops to defend it." To improve the situation, Croix would have to move the presidios into a line which permitted reciprocal defense. The troops, too, would require much of his time and effort as all the companies must be thoroughly revamped. His men, Croix stated, were without clothes, arms, discipline, or pay, and thus almost ineffective. Ansa had informed him already that the Sonoran companies were in similar circumstances. In view of his pessimistic assessment, Croix came to the conclusion that O'Conor had "erred" in reporting the condition of the frontier to Bucareli.

If the situation were as desperate as it appeared to be, the commandant general had no choice but to appeal for massive assistance. The first appeal to the Viceroy was sent shortly after Croix arrived in

the provinces. As a minimum request, Croix asked that 2,000 men then on duty along the 700 league frontier be reinforced by an equal number. He further requested that the company of fusiliers at Guadalajara be ordered immediately to Sonora. On his own initiative, he arranged that each Sonoran presidio add twenty militia-men to its roster.  

The request for help went directly to the Viceroy, who answered on his own authority. Bucareli, aware of the developing threats to Spanish interest in Europe and concerned about additional expenditures because of the Crown's instructions to conserve funds, refused Croix's request. The Viceroy pointed out that he did not have enough soldiers for New Spain; Croix's request would cost 600,000 pesos in salaries alone. Moreover, it appeared that war with Great Britain was imminent. Croix's response was a request for 1,000 soldiers, which Bucareli also refused. A third appeal for 1,000 soldiers was sent to Mexico City in November, 1777. Bucareli replied by ordering the fusilier company to Sonora and offering help in raising a flying company.

12. Ibid., pp. 150-151.
Croix's appeals for help had netted him some fifty soldiers, earmarked for his military commander in Sonora.\textsuperscript{13}

The military commander to profit by the assignment of additional personnel was Juan Bautista de Ansa, III, son of the captain of Fronteras, recently appointed to office of lieutenant colonel. Ansa, III had been in Mexico City with the newly appointed Governor Intendent Don Pedro Corvalan when Croix had arrived in New Spain. Ansa was the King's choice to succeed resigning Governor Mendiñueta of New Mexico. Nevertheless, Croix proceeded to appoint Ansa to be his military commander in Sonora\textsuperscript{14}

The choice was quite natural. Ansa was a proven veteran of the frontier and member of a well-known Sonoran family. He knew conditions on the frontier and had ideas on the means to remedy them. The new commander originally was expected to be satisfied with the number of troops available to him in Sonora, and to improve their quality through training and inspection. If necessary, an increase in militia was possible. As

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., pp. 151-152.

\textsuperscript{14} Croix, p. 21.
to location of presidios, Croix gave Ansa a free hand to leave them or move them as he saw fit.\textsuperscript{15}

As noted above, Ansa had requested more soldiers from Croix, and eventually the company of fusiliers was dispatched to Sonora. Efforts to increase military manpower from Sonoran resources were also instituted. No increase in militia as authorized by Croix was carried out, however. Instead, in 1778, a second standard-bearer, a sergeant, and sixteen soldiers were authorized for each presidial troop.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, Croix allowed him sixty-five Opata warriors in their own company. From Nueva Viscaya came more aid in the form of the third company of the flying corps of Nueva Viscaya with a strength of sixty-two men. Thus, by the end of his stay in Sonora, Ansa had 502 men under his command as compared with 368 on his assumption of command. He assigned 396 of these to the Apache frontier to be utilized in his plan to renew the monthly campaigns. He was forced to assign the remaining 106 to the interior where renewed troubles called for his personal attention.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 137.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 139.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Ibid., pp. 134-145.
\end{itemize}
Despite the pressing problems with the Apache Indians in the north, Ansa was forced to deal first with the Seri rebellion of 1777 in the interior of the province. The Seris were a threat in themselves, but Ansa also feared that if not immediately suppressed, other Indians would join the uprising. He won his greatest success as military commander in putting down the rebellion. He turned then to the Apache problem in the north but found he did not have time to undertake it as he had received orders to go to New Mexico.\textsuperscript{18}

Ansa's commission as Governor of New Mexico cut short his career in Sonora to little more than a year. Croix's problem now was to find a worthy successor. In March, 1778, amid praise from Croix and others, Ansa turned his command over to Don Pedro de Tueros, his ranking presidial captain, and left for New Mexico.\textsuperscript{19} Tueros, unfortunately, proved unable to improve the condition of his troops despite his efforts to be an able and energetic commander. He, too, was unable to establish priorities for the detachment of units. Like Ansa, he complained of the uselessness of the presidios.

\textsuperscript{18} Chapman, p. 392.

\textsuperscript{19} Croix, pp. 141-142.
but did little to improve them. Tueros seemed aware of his deficiencies as an area commander and intimated them to Croix.  

When Croix heard Tueros confess his feeling of inadequacy, he appointed Don Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola as commander in Sonora. Ugarte y Loyola arrived at the new capital of the Interior Provinces on November 13th of the same year. Croix had determined to settle the problem of Sonora's presidios, but, still weak from a recent illness, he decided to forego a personal reconnaissance. Instead, Ugarte y Loyola was ordered to undertake the assignment, assisted by Engineer Don Geronimo de la Rocha. Ugarte y Loyola could call also on the aid of captains Don Jose de Vildolola and Don Pedro de Allende for any assistance required to complete his report.  

Ugarte y Loyola's report was thorough, and included: (1) plans and sketches by Rocha, (2) a report on distances, topography and availability of water during the year.  

20. Ibid., p. 144.  
21. Ibid., pp. 144-145.  
22. Ibid., p. 147.  
23. Ibid., p. 150.
the year, (3) details on the San Pedro River, (4) number and names of fords on rivers, (5) resources of the lands near water, (6) whether cultivation was possible in an area, (7) recommendations on a line of presidios, and (8) opinions on a presidio requested by the Opata Indians expressed by Ugarte y Loyola.24

Brigadier Ugarte y Loyola left Arizpe on April 15, 1780, and concluded his inspection on July 16, 1780.25 For Altar, Horcasitas and Buenavista (the presidio located in the southern area of Sonora), he recommended in his report that they remain where they were until the transplantation of the Seri Indians freed Sonora from this menace.26 Tucson, although it served only the missions near it, was necessary if the line were to be extended to the Colorado River and California.27 The company of Santa Cruz was now back in temporary quarters at Las Nutrias, where they were ordered to erect a permanent presidio. On the mesa of Buenavista on the

24. Ibid., pp. 149-150.
25. Ibid., pp. 150-151.
27. Ibid., pp. 185-186.
Santa Cruz River, Ugarte y Loyola recommended a presidio should be established, noting that it would be thirty-five leagues from Altar, twenty-six from Tucson, and twenty-five from Terrenate at Las Nutrias.²⁸

In his report, Ugarte y Loyola expressed a belief that presidios on the (middle) San Pedro River would not be advantageous: (1) the most favorable sites could not support both a presidio and a large settlement; (2) distances between presidios would be overly great; (3) presidios would be unable to support one another or the pueblos in an invasion; (4) each would require a large garrison to be effective.²⁹

Engineer Rocha was essentially in agreement with Ugarte y Loyola's recommendations. Rocha, however, considered the site of Fronteras as unsatisfactory and wanted it moved one league south to Badeguachic. He also made clear his objection to any attempt to move the presidios forward. This would increase the area to be protected; the circumference of the line would be increased (Ugarte y Loyola had, in effect, recommended a distance of about twenty-five leagues between presidios);

and the supply problem would divert more troops from the field. He was of the opinion that the location of presidios toward the frontier and away from settlements was responsible for the freedom with which the Indians invaded the province.\(^{30}\)

In reaching his decisions on location of the presidios, the commandant general was strongly influenced by the reports of Ugarte y Loyola and Rocha. He agreed with them that O'Conor had selected unfavorable sites for several of the presidios.\(^{31}\)

Once again the commanding officer of the Sonoran frontier ordered a realignment of the presidial line.

Altar: Altar was left in place, losing only seven men to the forthcoming Colorado River settlements.\(^{32}\)

Tucson: Isolated Tucson had two advantages which highly commended it to Croix. First, under its commander, Captain Don Pedro de Allende, both its company and the attached flying troop had achieved a high state of training in the arts of the soldier.\(^{33}\) Second, it was the natural jumping off point for the advance to the

\(^{30}\) Ibid., pp. 187-189.
\(^{31}\) Thomas, p. 41.
\(^{32}\) Croix, p. 197.
\(^{33}\) Croix to Galvez, p. 2.
Colorado. Croix, following Ugarte y Loyola and Rocha, likewise eliminated the San Pedro valley as a possible presidio site. Croix also saw that a presidio on the Gila River would not aid in the defense of Sonora to any appreciable extent, and would place a drain on limited resources. Tucson was therefore left alone.  

**Gila-Colorado Settlements:** As noted previously, it was Croix who decided on two colonies as military settlements instead of a presidio on the Colorado River crossing. Each colony was to have eleven soldiers and a complement of settlers. The colonies were founded in 1780 and crushed in the Yuma uprising of July, 1781. The uprising effectively ended hope for a move to the Gila and Colorado rivers.  

**Terrenate:** Croix had ordered the transfer of Santa Cruz de Quiburi (Terrenate) to its encampment at Las Nutrias in 1780. The decision was based on the inability of the company to sustain constant Apache attacks which had resulted in the loss of a large number

34. See above, pp. 106-107.
of lives. Spanish losses at Quiburi were two captains and eighty men killed.

**Fronteras:** The retreat from O'Conor's advanced positions for the presidios continued at Fronteras. The presidio had been moved northeasterly by O'Conor to bring it closer to Apache country and within forty leagues of Janos to the east. Croix decided, however, that communication with Janos from San Bernardino, so necessary to block entrance of Apaches into either Sonora or Nueva Viscaya was now broken. Although re-enforced with a flying company, the presidio was ineffective. Croix ordered a return to Fronteras. The cost of transfer was about 10,000 pesos, but Captain Don José de Vildosola contributed 8,000 and company officers and soldiers voluntarily supplied the rest.

**Buenavista:** Nothing constructive would occur in reference to an intermediate presidio between Tucson and Terrenate until after Ugarte y Loyola became commandant.

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37. DiPeso, p. 44.
38. Croix, p. 204.
39. Ibid., p. 146.
40. Ibid., p. 200.
general and employed Yaqui auxiliaries in the con-
struction of the presidio at Santa Maria Suanca during
1786.\textsuperscript{41}

**Bavispe:** Croix had also planned a presidio at
Bavispe to be manned by Spanish-led Opata Indians, but
execution of the plan was delayed by lack of supplies.
The garrison had been selected and Croix hoped that a
good crop would permit its establishment by 1781. This
project was completed by Croix's successor.\textsuperscript{42}

El Cavallero de Croix left much unfinished, but
he had faced an imposing array of problems. On the
assumption of command, he had sought to implement a
many-faceted, coordinated defense of his whole domain,
including the relocation of some presidios, building
up the militia as a second line of defense based on
the towns, carrying the war to Apachería, and securing
the Comanches as allies.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{41} "Las Tropas de Indios flecheros en Nueva
Espana en 1792," Boletin del Archivo General de la
Nacion, ed. Gustavo A. Salas, Vol. IX, No. 4 (1938),
p. 737.

\textsuperscript{42} Croix, p. 166.

\textsuperscript{43} Thomas, p. ix.
Difficulties plagued him in his attempts to implement these policies. They were, in fact, much the same problems that had plagued his predecessor. Croix had actually started anew, for much of his time was spent changing what O’Conor had done in the relocation of presidios and establishing a secondary line manned by settlers. To Thomas, this was the main reason why Croix never was able to develop fully his offensive strategy which was the second step of his plan. Also important was the war between Spain and England, which resulted in an order to keep expenses at a minimum on the frontier.

Croix had sought to launch monthly offensive campaigns in 1778 before the outbreak of war with little success. In May of that year, Tueros had ordered Allende of Tucson to conduct the first raid, a limited effort along the frontier. The captain from Tucson, with seventy-nine presidials, some militia, and Opata and Pima Indian auxiliaries, had encountered no enemy. Next, Captain Luis del Castillo of the flying company from Fronteras tried his luck during July and succeeded

44. Ibid., p. 42.
45. Croix, p. 79.
only in recapturing five horses, three donkeys, and three head of cattle. The operations were then dis-
continued as Tueros found it impossible to raise troops; numerous duty detachments, reviews by Adjutant Inspector Don Roque de Medina, escorts for supplies and horse herds, and countless other needs apparently took all his men.\textsuperscript{46}

Croix was more successful in putting fighting men into the field with his policy of forming alliances with the Indians of the north. Croix's policy of recruiting Indians to fight Indians was so successful that at one point, the Spaniards succeeded in turning the Lipan Apaches against the other Apache groups. The Comanches, traditional enemy of the Apaches, were the mainstay of the policy. The only problem here was that success by the Indians of the north would force the Apaches right into Spanish territory.\textsuperscript{47}

If the Comanches in their "no quarter" drive forced the Apaches to war more on the Spaniards, Croix could expect a bloodier struggle. In the contest that followed, neither side had much regard for the niceties of civilized life. But the Spanish King's concern for

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 143.

\textsuperscript{47} Hodge, p. 327; see above p. 121-122.
the soul of the heathens severely handicapped Croix's forces. A royal decree of February 20, 1779, reversed the "no peace" section of the Regulations of 1772. The commandant general was instructed to conquer by kindness, good treatment and benevolence wherever possible, avoiding war. Croix accordingly concluded peace with all Indian enemies except the Gila Apaches.48

Croix had always doubted that peace with the Apaches was possible. The Indians consistently refused to give hostages or return captured prisoners and animals. They refused to live by agreements and used settlements near presidios merely as havens from which to raid other places.49 It is impossible to judge how much the new policy crippled Spanish defense. It could not be considered successful. By 1780, Apache raids into Sonora were being conducted with impunity. Croix, who had hoped that his presence and example might bring success, confessed that he had done no better than Ansa or Tueros.50

Croix had adequate reason to feel disheartened by lack of improvement in conditions in Sonora. He had

49. Thomas, p. 16.
little to show for four years as commandant general. But Croix had moved with some energy and skill to find a solution for his provinces. He consoled himself with the thought that he had done the groundwork for future victory. Much of his work required time to reach fruition. Moreover, he had been forced by necessity often to take action where the results were questionable. And he still maintained that the offensive was the only way to halt the Indians. Croix, in short, had been overwhelmed by the immediacy and vastness of the problems of the Interior Provinces, as his predecessors had been.51

Shortly after his arrival in the Interior Provinces, Croix decided that the commandancy general was still too large an area for one man to govern. His first impulse was to revive the office of inspector commandant. Later he changed his mind, for in the mid-1778s he recommended to Don José de Galvez that the commandancy general be divided in two. Croix proposed to retain Nueva Viscaya, Sonora, and the Californias. Bernardo de Galvez would take the east, including Nuevo Leon and Santander. José de Galvez refused to accept this plan. Instead, in 1782, Felipe Neve, Governor of

51. Ibid., pp. 228-229.
the Californias, was appointed as inspector commandant under Croix.52

The appointment of the able Neve as Croix's second in command may have been a matter of foresight on the part of the Spanish government. By 1783, Croix, a favorite of the powerful José de Galvez, had put in seven years in a most difficult assignment. In that year, the King relieved Croix and rewarded him with an appointment as Viceroy of Peru.53

Croix's appointment as Viceroy was very much a promotion and indicated that the Crown appreciated the services rendered. If one wanted to be harsh, much the same thing could be said of Croix that he had said of O'Conor: he left behind the same enemies that had always devastated Sonora and his line of presidios and his troops were hardly in better shape than he had found them. It is difficult, of course, to assess such thing as troop morale or the comparable effectiveness of competing presidio sites. To Croix's credit there was the increase in troop strength, not just for Sonora but along the entire frontier. He had also established a government

52. Bancroft, North Mexican States, pp. 672-673.
53. Ibid., p. 673.
for the interior provinces. But while it is still
difficult to find any over-all improvement, is it un-
doubtedly unjust to go so far as Chapman does and call
Croix an incompetent. 54

CHAPTER VIII

TOWARD SUCCESSFUL POLICIES

Whatever the relative merits of the plans and actions of Hugo de O'Conor and Teodoro de Croix, they had given the frontier the simple but essential elements for Spanish success—the constant supervision necessary to improve the individual presidial soldier and the coordination of diverse elements of border defense to form a cohesive whole. The labors of a dozen years, even when at cross-purposes, had led to a net gain. Much as Croix had predicted, his successor began to reap the harvest. Although Felipe de Neve served a little over a year, before his death in 1784 he was Croix's successor in more than just appointment. He represented a new factor of continuity. Experienced in the frontier and having worked a year under Croix, the transition was devoid of the rancor, criticism, and mania for change which had characterized the accession of Croix.¹

¹. Chapman, p. 414; Bancroft, North Mexican States, p. 673; see above, pp. 123 and following.
Neve could and did move immediately, seeking to expel the Apaches from the Sierras near the Sonoran boundary. If successful, this would reduce materially the danger to the province and also concentrate the Apaches in a smaller area where later attacks would be more effective. Neve conducted a five-division invasion of Gila and Chiricahua Apache country which featured night marches, hidden daytime encampments, strategical and tactical ambuscades, and a constant attempt to achieve surprise. Neve was pleased with the results. He lost one soldier and yet killed sixty-eight Apaches, taking eleven captive. In addition, he returned with much booty. Perhaps of even more importance, the Spaniards had carried the war deep into enemy country with success and morale was high.²

Neve seems to have been more effective than he realized. The pressure on the Apache had been so great the Gila group called on the Navajo Indians for help. The commandant general countered with a demonstration of the new Spanish unity of command. An order was issued by Governor Ansa to remind the Navajo of the treaty recently negotiated in New Mexico in an

² Thomas, pp. 42-45.
attempt to force a break between the allies. By June of 1785, Ansa had achieved the desired separation. The Apaches were forced to face the Spaniards by themselves.³

The prospect of facing a suddenly vigorous Spanish offensive was apparently not pleasing to many Apaches. When Neve, implementing the King's order to use peaceful means in conquering the Apache menace, offered peace terms to the Indians, several groups accepted. The Spaniards established peace with over fifty rancherías from Janos to Tucson. The terms provided for a complete break between these rancherías and those still at war. Some of the "peaceful" Apaches apparently began to aid the Spaniards against those still at war.⁴

Success in recruiting a few Apache Indians as allies was surpassed by work done with the settled, allied Indians. Neve now brought to fruition Croix's plan for shifting some of the burdens of the war back to the Opata and Pima Indians. The drought of 1780 had forced Croix to abandon plans to activate an Opata

³. Ibid., pp. 45-46.
company and establish a presidio at Bavispe. Neve now moved to establish this Opata company on a regular footing. The exact date when the presidio was established is difficult to determine inasmuch as the company had actually been organized by the Indians in 1780 and maintained an unofficial existence.  

Such enthusiasm was matched elsewhere and the Spaniards proceeded to form two more Indian companies. At Bacoachi, another Opata company of eighty-five warriors was created in 1784, with some Spaniards serving as officers.  

In response to a series of petitions by residents at Tubac for protection, a company of Pima Indians was sent there, probably before 1784. The two Opata companies were considered worthy of the highest praise. The members were described as loyal, obedient, untiring, and extremely agile and fast in moving over rough terrain or occupying high ground. The Pima company, soon to be moved to San Rafael de Buenavista between Tubac and Terrenate, did not fare so well.

6. Ibid.
8. Cortes, pp. 8a-8b.
well, having a reputation for fleeing from strong resistance. Later, Spanish soldiers would be added to the Buenavista garrison. The net effect of the three Indian companies was to free more Spanish soldiers for Neve's ambitious plans.

Neve was not able to execute his plans, however, for he died in November of 1784. Don José Rengel, an experienced subordinate, held command temporarily while a replacement for Neve was selected. After a few months, Don Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola, Croix's old lieutenant and subsequently commissioned Brigadier General and Governor of Puebla, was given an ad interim appointment as commandant general. Ugarte y Loyola served several years before receiving a regular commission which would expire in 1790.

In 1785, the same year that Ugarte y Loyola returned to Arizpe, Bernardo de Galvez became Viceroy of New Spain. Because of Galvez's presumed personal knowledge of the frontier, the Interior provinces were placed under his jurisdiction, although with ill-defined authority. This nebulous question of viceregal

9. Ibid., p. 9b.
authority would continue until 1793 when the interior provinces again were freed from viceregal supervision.\textsuperscript{11}

Upon accession to office, Gálvez inaugurated changes not only in the provinces' relationship to Mexico City but changes in the internal structure as well. In 1785, the Interior Provinces were divided into three administrative areas under the commandant general. Reorganizations were ordered frequently thereafter until 1804 (effected in 1812 and in effect until the Spaniards were ousted). But throughout the rest of the period under consideration, the chief executive for Sonora was either Ugarte y Loyola or his successor, Brigadier General Pedro de Nava; as a result, for a period of over fifteen years Sonora experienced stability of administration.\textsuperscript{12}

Stability for the province was also provided by Mexico City. Bernardo de Gálvez served as viceroy until his death in late 1786. But on August 26, 1786, he issued a new set of instructions to Commandant General Ugarte y Loyola in which he took infinite pains to detail a policy for the frontier which would long

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{12} Chapman, p. 246.
outlive his term of office. Reduced to its simplest form, Gálvez could be said to have instituted a "carrot-and-stick" policy. Many points in the policy show that the Spaniard had finally learned something about the Apaches. For one, incessant war was to be conducted against all warring tribes with the objective of forcing them to peace. Once concluded, a peace treaty was to be faithfully observed by both sides, although minor infractions could be overlooked by the Spaniards. But the Apache's good faith was not to be accepted. Bribery in the form of gifts would be used to keep him at peace. Gálvez also ordered that trade should be made so favorable to the Apache Indian as to make him dependent on the Spaniard. Gálvez went so far as to order gifts of cheap guns and powder and liberal quantities of liquor to create this dependency.\textsuperscript{13}

Gálvez's approach is well illustrated by his policy on firearms. The Spanish government had tried in vain to prevent firearms from reaching the Indians. But the English, Americans, and French supplied Indians with "trade guns" and exchanges had brought them into the hands of even the westernmost tribes.\textsuperscript{14} Gálvez wished

\begin{itemize}
\item[13.] Ibid., pp. 174-175.
\item[14.] Cortes, p. 47a.
\end{itemize}
to channel this trade through Spanish hands. The most important reason was that the inferior guns used in the trade would bring the Indians to depend on the Spaniards for repairs, powder, and replacements. This would give the Spaniards some control over their use, and thus develop greater dependency of the Indian on the Spaniard.\textsuperscript{15}

There was more to the policy than creation of dependency of the Indians. It would be the Spanish policy to turn tribe against tribe with the purpose of exterminating them, especially the Apache.\textsuperscript{16} Gálvez justified such a policy by simply pointing to the past record. The 734 men maintained at a yearly expenditure of 283,900 pesos in 1729 had increased to about 4,000 men at a cost of over 1,000,000 pesos yearly. Despite the increases, Gálvez could not say that the situation had improved.\textsuperscript{17}

The situation, however, had improved. For one thing, with Ugarte y Loyola as commandant general, wasted motion in reorganization was precluded. Wholesale

\textsuperscript{15} Bernardo de Gálvez, p. 108. His successors were not as venturesome and cancelled the plan.

\textsuperscript{16} Bancroft, \textit{Arizona}, p. 267.

\textsuperscript{17} Bernardo de Gálvez, p. 97.
shifting of presidios was unlikely. He had selected the sites for most of them personally and had aided Croix in carrying out the changes. The line of presidios which he inherited was west to east: Altar, Tucson, Buenavista, Terrenate, and Fronteras. It is true that Neve had made one change, moving Terrenate from Las Nutrias to the valley of Santa María in the hope of obtaining more defensive reciprocity and combining operations more effectively, but the change was minor.

With the presidio defense established, attention turned to offensive operations. Gálvez's instructions insisted that Ugarte y Loyola give command of field detachments to officers of outstanding valor, experience, and knowledge. But contrary to O'Conor's policy, and again indicative of improved conditions, once selected to lead, an officer was given a free hand over the conduct of the expedition. A rigid program of reconnaissance, the instructions pointed out, merely allowed the Apaches to slip by without trouble or to ambush the Spaniards with overwhelming numbers. Hereafter, a premium was placed on individual initiative.

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18. Espinosa, p. 22.
19. Zuñiga, p. 12; Escudero, p. 75.
Thomas credits Teodoro de Croix with finding the successful solution to the Indian problem of the frontier during his service from 1777 to 1783.\textsuperscript{22} His contribution was respectable; but if anyone were to be credited with solving the Apache problem, it would seem that Conde de Gálvez should receive the credit. During his short term as viceroy, he initiated a policy which, with little modification, brought success to the Spaniards in the 1790's.\textsuperscript{23}

The Gálvez policy of 1786 was carried out much as he dictated until the end of Spanish rule over Mexico. Ugarte y Loyola and Pedro de Nava both kept pressure continuously on the warring Apaches. Those who sought peace were settled near presidios, receiving gifts of many kinds. Bancroft mentions a cost of from $18,000 to $30,000 per year for this purpose, an obviously inexpensive way of pacifying so many Apaches.\textsuperscript{24}

Obviously the symbiotic relationship had not been changed. The host had simply learned how to support the parasite more efficiently. In point of fact,

\textsuperscript{22} Thomas, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{23} Bancroft, \textit{North Mexican States}, p. 683; Cortes, p. 102.

\textsuperscript{24} Chapman, pp. 424-425; Bancroft, \textit{North Mexican States}, p. 715, footnote.
the Spaniards were now exploiting the Apaches' weaknesses, particularly one characteristic which had proved so frustrating in the past. This was the lack of sovereign government among the Apache Indians. Spaniards had come to see, cynically as advocated by Bernardo de Gálvez or sympathetically as advocated by José Cortes, that the Apaches were human and discriminations could and should be made among them. 25

The views of Gálvez have been dealt with above. The memoria by Cortes is not typical, but it is indicative of the change which had taken place: a Spaniard could sympathize with the Apaches. Cortes concluded that because of the Apache Indian's nature, he would have to be heavily subsidized with goods by the Spaniards. It was true that some bands would come in and later flee, but investigation of the causes without prejudice would reveal that the actions were justified. The Spaniards would have to win the Apaches' trust. 26

Moreover, ten to fifteen years of peace would be necessary to assure that the Apaches would forego their old ways. It probably would not be until the next generation that any of the men would turn to the

25. See above, pp. 145-148, Gálvez; Cortes, pp. 9b-10a.
26. Ibid., 9b-10b.
peaceful pursuit of agriculture. \(^{27}\) Again, Cortes cannot be considered a typical Spaniard, but his writings indicate that the Spaniards had abandoned thinking of the enemy in terms of a stereotype.

The idea of discriminating among Apache bands began to pay dividends almost as soon as it was adopted. For example, in October and November of 1788, Captain Echeagaray was engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to find a route from Tucson to New Mexico by the Gila River. The expedition captured two groups of Apaches; of these, fifty-five volunteered for service as scouts. Echeagaray, who apparently already had a few Apache scouts, accepted and granted them favorable terms. \(^{28}\) On his return Echeagaray reported killing fifty-four of the enemy, twenty-five of whom were probably warriors, taking 125 prisoners, recovering sixty-one horses and "acquiring" fifty-five Apache scouts. The horse count had been lowered by the captain's reward of some horses to the Apaches. He was reprimanded by Governor Ansa for granting such favorable terms to his "prisoners," but Ugarte y Loyola fully backed his captain on the

\(^{27}\) Ibid., p. 13a.

\(^{28}\) Hammond, pp. 43-44.
matter. Echeagaray's success could be traced directly to his acquired scouts.29

By 1799, Cortes records, Apache scouts were a fixture on expeditions, with the detachment commander having only to announce his need at a nearby rancheria in order to have his pick of warriors willing to serve and fight like lions against their own people.30

By this time, Apache rancherias were very common along all the frontier presidios. Beginning in 1796, according to Espinosa's report, large numbers of Apaches had concluded treaties and settled down near the presidios. Occasional defections occurred, but shortly after the turn of the century the word bronco (wild one) was being used to describe those who refused to come in.31

With most of the Apaches at peace, the alert presidial companies with their Indian allies were able to defend Sonora against the infrequent incursions by hostile bands from the north.32 Internal problems also proved tractable. The Pima-Papago revolt of 1796 was

29. Ibid., p. 46.
30. Cortes, pp. 11a-12a.
easily handled by the Spanish military.\textsuperscript{33} The presidial troops continued to improve and reached a high point of proficiency by 1810. Throughout the period, the Regulations of 1772 continued to govern their lives; and, in fact, were continued in force by Mexico after independence. A large part of the Spanish success was due to their efforts in making war unprofitable to the Apaches. Galvez's policy had succeeded because it was multi-faceted, and because it was executed by highly efficient soldiers.\textsuperscript{34}

Spicer, in describing Spanish-Apache relations at the turn of the century, is also paying the military a compliment when he describes the success of Gálvez' policy:

By 1800 raiding had almost stopped. A symbiotic relationship between Spaniards and Apaches slowly developed, with considerable disorganization among those Apaches of the southern part of the region who became involved. How many began to live in this manner is not recorded but it is clear that the bulk of the Apaches were ceasing their raids on Sonora communities and a degree of peace had been achieved. Pacification by dependency might have been permanently successful if the Mexican War of Independence had not changed the situation.\textsuperscript{35}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[33] Espinosa, p. 21.
\item[34] Ibid., p. 22.
\item[35] Spicer, p. 240.
\end{footnotes}
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