A CASE STUDY OF REVOLUTION:
ZANZIBAR AND TANGANYIKA
COMPARED

by

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STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

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Date
PREFACE

Interest in this study began with a revolution. In 1964 Zanzibar experienced a revolution which completely changed her social, economic, and political systems. My personal interest in that revolution began late in 1964. It was at that time that I was fortunate enough to become a part of an experiment. Ever since President John F. Kennedy established the Peace Corps in 1961, I was attracted to the idea and quickly resolved to join that organization as soon as possible. This resolution became a reality in the Fall of 1964 when I was offered and accepted an assignment to Tanganyika. By the time I entered training at Syracuse University, Tanganyika federated with the island state of Zanzibar and became Tanzania. From the day Dr. Fred Burke first lectured us on the politics of Tanzania, I was determined to pursue the study of that area further.

The debts incurred in writing this paper are many. One of the largest debts I owe is to Dr. Henry C. Kenski. This thesis became a reality through the inspiration, encouragement, and innumerable suggestions offered by Dr. Kenski. Many thanks are also due to Dr. Michael P. Sullivan and Dr. Edward J. Williams whose suggestions and insights
were invaluable to the final form of this paper. I wish, as well, to acknowledge the many grammatical suggestions Mr. C. Leroy Mobley made on this essay. Last, but by no means least, I owe a debt any married man invariably incurs. Without the patient understanding and cheerful encouragement of my wife, Karen, the completion of this essay is doubtful. Additionally, she spent many hours translating my indecipherable handwriting into type. However, while much of this paper's strengths are directly connected to the contributions of these outstanding friends, the weaknesses are mine and mine alone.
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ABSTRACT

The following essay is a study of revolution. The Zanzibar Revolution is studied within the framework of Chalmers Johnson's paradigm, multiple dysfunctions plus an intransigent elite plus an accelerator equals a revolution.

Economical failure, inequitable landownership, and racial animosity are three of the most commonly cited causes of the revolution. These three factors are examined as possible dysfunctional elements within the Zanzibar society. In addition, once a probable dysfunction is identified in Zanzibar, that same factor is examined in a parallel study of a healthy society. Tanganyika is used for this comparative analysis because of its many similarities and close proximity to Zanzibar.

Johnson's thesis also requires an intransigent elite for the culmination of a revolution. The leadership of both Zanzibar and Tanganyika are examined for their sensitivity, approachability, and respectability within their respective countries.

The final ingredient for a revolution is an accelerator, something which ignites the revolution. Three
possible accelerators are identified and examined in Zanzibar; these are a communist-lead conspiracy, the emergence of a great leader, and the influence of the Africanization of the African continent. Again, these same factors are examined in Tanganyika.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Both democracy and oligarchy are based on a sort of justice; but they both fall short of absolute justice. This is the reason why either side turns to sedition if it does not enjoy the share of constitutional rights which accords with the conception of justice it happens to entertain.

Students have puzzled the causes of revolution since at least Aristotle. In the past, however, these studies have been philosophical judgments on the causes of revolutions. It has only been in relatively recent times that attempts have been made to develop analytical models within which revolutions can be studied.

The following study is an attempt to close that much neglected gap which exists between theory and reality. Only too often are theories found which have never been applied to the concrete world of facts; just as histories are often found with no real purpose beyond the recording of man's past. Certainly the value of both of these scholarly endeavors are not questioned. The suggestion

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is merely that these two lines of scholarship might be made more meaningful through an application of history to theory. The success with which the following study bridges this gap can only be answered by the reader and how well it encourages further research along this same line of investigation.

Chalmers Johnson provides us with our model. It is within this analytical scheme of revolution that we propose to study a revolution. Flexibility, adaptability, and universality within a definite structural guideline are features seemingly offered by Johnson's paradigm. While he identifies a distinct pattern through which revolutions can be studied, he offers no sine qua non. His dysfunctional political system is any political system which experiences basic disruptive activity. In theory, the nature of the political system is irrelevant. For these reasons, Johnson's model seems ideal for a study on revolution in Africa.

It might be prudent, however, at this point to define revolution. Revolution, suggests Johnson, is 2 change effected by the use of violence, in government, and/or regime, and/or community. When Johnson uses the word

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violence in his definition, he means physical violence. Community is the social system or, in the words of Johnson, it is "the consciousness of human solidarity that overlays a society technically defined--i.e., people united by the division of labor--and by which men actually perceive their social life."\(^3\) The regime, in Johnson's terms, is the structure within a community which determines the basic organization through which the "fundamental rules of the game" operate, i.e., it is the political system. The government, on the other hand, is the political and administrative institutions which control the decision-making functions, i.e., the decision-makers and their individual institutions.

A word of caution, however, must be given when considering a revolutionary change which is the result of a violent attack on the government. Johnson does not include the classical coup d'état in this definition of revolution. A violent attack upon the government of a functional system... is not an instance of revolutionary change.\(^4\) Such is the coup d'état. It is merely a changing

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 28.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 50.
of leadership, functioning within the same government, regime, and community. And, since the coup d'etat is not the result of a dysfunctional system, it does not fit within Johnson's definition of revolution.

A revolution was next needed for this study. After conducting a preliminary study of the Zanzibar revolution, it was found to be an ideal subject for a case study. There had, indeed, been a systemic change affected by the use of violence, in government, and/or regime, and/or community. In fact, as a result of the revolution, the entire complexion of the islands changed from an Arab dominated society to an African controlled society. The change affected not only the political system but even the economics, landownership, and property of the islands.

However, a study of just the revolution seemed rather tenuous. What was needed was some way in which the findings could be compared. The second area of

5 Whenever "revolution" is used in this paper, the above definition of revolution will be assumed unless otherwise noted. Also, see Chapter 4, herein, for Johnson's definition of a dysfunctional system.

6 Ibid., pp. 3-31.
Tanzania was Tanganyika. The mainland country was not only geographically close to Zanzibar (it is separated by a mere 27 miles of water), but it too had experienced violence early in 1964. Unlike Zanzibar, however, Tanganyika's government was never in real danger. The government remained intact and viable during the entire disturbance. Therefore, as a form of control, the question was asked: if the factors which this study suggested were contributing factors to Zanzibar's revolution, were they also present in Tanganyika? An affirmative answer would place this assumption in grave doubt. A negative answer would tend to support, but not prove, the assumption. For instance, if Zanzibar's economics were in a state of crisis immediately preceding the revolution, this might be considered a major cause of the revolution. However, if during this same time Tanganyika was experiencing an economical crisis, then such a conclusion would be untenable. On the other hand, if Tanganyika's economics were healthy at this time, a conclusion of economic cause and effect would be supported. It should, however, be noted that even with this collaborating evidence the conclusion is not final. Such a final conclusion can only be made when the motives of the major actors of a revolution are positively stated by those actors prior to the revolution. Such statements of motivation made after the revolution
might possibly be rationalizations. Unfortunately, such a priori statements are rare, and the Zanzibar revolution is not an exception.

This paper is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 1 is this introduction. Chapters 2 and 3 are brief historical statements which are provided for background and perspective. It is the opinion of this writer that it is impossible for a society to act outside of its history. In order to understand the importance and significance of a current event, the history of the country under study must be known and understood. The historical statements made in this thesis are presented to give the reader an overview of the histories of Zanzibar and Tanganyika. Such a presentation is additionally important when the countries studied are considered. Until recently Africa has not received a great deal of attention by American scholars and journals. Except at universities which have an African studies program, university libraries normally have very small African sections. A quick look at the professional journals, excepting recent issues, will also verify the dearth of research on Africa by American scholars.

Chapter 4 is a descriptive chapter. Since Johnson's model of revolution is the scheme selected for this study,
a summation of his paradigm is presented. In short, Johnson suggests that when a society experiences multiple dysfunctions and has an intransigent elite a revolution is pending. An accelerator is the final ingredient needed to bring about that revolution.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 apply Johnson's model to the Zanzibar revolution. Three of the most commonly cited reasons for the Zanzibar revolution are racial tensions, inequitable land distribution, and economical failure. The fifth chapter considers these underlying societal patterns as possible systemic dysfunctions.

The leadership of Zanzibar prior to 1964 is examined and compared with the leadership of Tanganyika in the sixth chapter. The condition or degree of elite intransigence is the primary question examined. The seventh chapter attempts to identify the coup de grace of the Zanzibar revolution. Communist influence, the great leader thesis, and the influence of Africanization are three possible accelerators considered in this chapter. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the conclusions made throughout the body of the study.

Immediately following the study of a proposed causal factor of the revolution in Zanzibar, a parallel study is made on Tanganyika.
CHAPTER 2

ZANZIBAR

It is not certain when the first African groups arrived in Zanzibar, but there is abundant evidence that Africans have lived on the islands since prehistoric times. These groups arrived on the islands at different times and at different places, thus developing several autonomous communities. It was only in recent times that these various village units united to form larger political groups.

Sometime during the ninth and tenth centuries, Persians arrived in East Africa. It is thought that a significant number of these Persians chose to settle in the Zanzibar islands. They soon, however, disappeared as

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1 This brief historical statement is in no way intended to be an orthodox historical essay. Its purpose is to develop an historical background only, placing historically induced situations relevant to the contemporary political scene in proper perspective. Books consulted for this statement are: Kenneth Ingham, A History of East Africa (London: Longman's, Green and Co., 1962) and W. H. Ingrams, Zanzibar, Its History and Its People (London: H. F. & G. Witherby, 1931).
as a distinct group and through assimilation and intermarriage merged with African groups.

Soon after, or simultaneously with, this Persian-African merger two of the three major tribes of the Zanzibar island began to form. One group, the Hadimu, today occupies all but the northernmost tip of Zanzibar island. The second group, the Tumbatu, lives in the north of Zanzibar island, on the small island of Tumbatu, and in the southeast corner of Pemba island. The third recognized major indigenous African group, the Pemba, occupies the rest of Pemba island. They never did achieve even the loose tribal unity the Hadimu or, to a lesser degree, the Tumbatu achieved—a point which will become important later in this essay.

The Arabs first came to the islands about the same time as the Persians. They, however, chose only

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2 The Persian impact was great and responsible for many of the characteristics of the indigenous African people of the islands. Their Islamic faith and customs stem from this influence. The term "Shirazi", used by a vast majority of Zanzibar's indigenous African population, is also of Persian origin. It refers to the Persian principality from which most of the early Persians came.

3 See Appendix A: Maps, Figure 1.
to trade, but not settle in Zanzibar at this time. Those Arabs who did settle in East Africa chose the mainland, particularly Mombasa. They soon gained control over East African trade and many of its tribes. However, Arab domination of the mainland was interrupted in the early sixteenth century by the Portuguese. Although the Portuguese dominated this part of Africa for two centuries, they had virtually no lasting influence on Zanzibar, and very little on East Africa as a whole. The Portuguese interest in East Africa was only that of exploitation and profit. They made no effort to regroup the Africans religiously, politically, or geographically; and they seldom traveled to the interior. They remained autonomous overlords of the area. The Arabs regained control over East Africa in 1699 when they succeeded in recapturing the important seaport of Mombasa.

It was not until the 1830's that Zanzibar became important to the Arabs. Four factors were responsible for Zanzibar's importance to the Arabs. First, due to the Sultan of Omani's initial inability to gain control of Mombasa from the Masrui Arabs, a separationist clan, the Omani capital was established in Zanzibar. Second, the increasing importance of the slave and ivory trade made Zanzibar, directly opposite the major route into the African interior, an ideal market place. Third, Zanzibar had a
fine natural harbor and some significant natural resources—timber, water, and coconuts, to mention a few. Fourth, and finally, the resident Arabs were basically loyal to the Sultan.

In the 1830's Zanzibar became an imperial, independent Arab state, ruled by the Sultan of Zanzibar. This independent rule lasted for sixty years, when Great Britain, extending her own empire in East Africa, made Zanzibar her Protectorate. Even then, however, the Sultan remained the nominal ruler and the Arabs remained the major political force of the British.

Before sketching the political growth of Zanzibar from the British Protectorate to independence, it should be noted that two other significant immigrant groups are present in Zanzibar.

First, there is a large number of Indians and other Asians. While they never become politically important, they quickly gained economic control of Zanzibar. Indians began trading in the East African area about the same time the Arabs began their immigration. Eventually several Indian families settled in the islands. These Indians (referred to in East Africa as Asians), however, remained aloof and maintained a commercial orientation. Gradually
the Arabs lost their economic self-sufficiency and became the landed aristocracy, dependent upon the financial and business skills of these Asian traders.

A distinction also exists between those Africans who consider themselves the indigenous inhabitants of Zanzibar and those of more recent mainland origin. The indigenous inhabitants, the Hadimu, the Tumbatu, and the Pemba, prefer the term "Shirazi" when referring to their group, while the latter group refers to themselves as "African".

The "African" population is basically composed of Bantus from Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda, Nyassaland (Malawi), Mozambique, and the Eastern Congo. These people arrived in the islands as the descendants of slaves brought from the mainland to work in the growing clove industry or as modern voluntary migrant workers.

In the late 1800's two European forces became interested in political control of East Africa. As British and German interest in the area intensified, Arab control of the area decreased. Finally, in 1890 Zanzibar fell under the control of the British as one of her Protectorates. Once Britain gained control of the islands, her power over Zanzibar remained virtually intact until independence.
The Zanzibar type of protectorate status has been called a "dual mandate" and involves two governments sharing sovereignty over a single people. Theoretically, the British were to have complete control only in the area of foreign relations. The Sultan and his Arab government were to have the dominate power over Zanzibar's internal affairs, subject only to British advice. In fact, however, by the beginning of World War II, British control over Zanzibar was complete.

The introduction and creation of a constitutional monarchy with parliamentary democratic institutions were the ultimate objective of British policy in Zanzibar. Britain's view that Zanzibar was an Arab state can clearly be shown in her implementation of this constitutional goal. From 1914, when the first council (the Protectorate Council) was created to reflect local opinion, until 1957, when the first popular election was held to choose members of the legislative council (legco), only a handful of Africans ever served in these appointive positions. The first African appointment was in 1946.

With the July, 1957 election, the Africans held more legislative seats than the Arabs. However, the Arabs managed to unite with a number of Arab-oriented Africans and received the keys of independent government from
Great Britain on December 10, 1963. One month later, January 12, 1964, this Arab-led government suffered a violent end.

**Violence in Zanzibar**

Saturday night, January 11, 1964, Zanzibar town was filled with large numbers of festive Africans. Sponsored by the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), the fete was used by insurgent Africans as cover for their attack on the month-old independent government of Zanzibar. Led by the flamboyant, self-proclaimed "Field Marshall" John Okello, the attack began at 3 a.m., Sunday morning, January 12, 1964.

The insurgent forces quickly gained control of the town's two police armories, Ziwani police and prison.

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4 In order to avoid confusion we will use the term **Zanzibar town** when writing about the capital city, **Zanzibar island** when writing about that single island, and **Zanzibar** when writing about the entire island group.

headquarters, and the radio station—which became the base of operations for the rebels. Once these objectives were won, the fight for governmental control was virtually over. Only help from Great Britain or the mainland could have saved the Sultan's government after that time. That help was not forthcoming.

With the insurgents essentially in control of the island's entire arsenal, the collapse of the government was complete within eighteen hours. By this time all organized resistance had been overcome. Malindi police station, the last point of defense for the government, was in the hands of Okello's forces and the Sultan was in full flight aboard his yacht.

One of the most bizarre facts of the revolt was that it was over before the government knew who was behind the revolt. In fact, Keith Kyle reports:

Assuming the Afro-Shirazis were the victors the police commissioner went through his list of telephone numbers of leading members of the party and began ringing them up to find someone to whom to surrender himself and the Ministers. No one replied. The opposition leaders were either not at home or...had been warned off using the phone. The Prime Minister was also trying to call up his parliamentary opponents...but with a similar lack of effect.  

6

"How it Happened", op. cit., p. 203.
This attempt to surrender was just nine hours after the first attacks. Even when the government realized that it was over, they could not find anyone to whom they could surrender.

In the following days, a Revolutionary Council was established by John Okello, with Abeid Karume as President. It contained members of the Afro-Shirazi Party, Umma, and the trade unions. With Zanzibar town in the firm control of the insurgents, rural Zanzibar offered little resistance. What did follow, however, was mass violence in which Arabs were the major victims. Even though Zanzibar constitutionally united with Tanganyika on April 26, 1964, a union subsequently called Tanzania, Zanzibar remained essentially independent.

**Historical Conclusion**

Zanzibar's historical setting tends to offer several conclusions which are important to our study. First, demographic patterns reveal that the least organized,

7 For a list of members see Appendix C.

8 While there has been no census taken since 1964, the number of Arabs left in Zanzibar is thought to be small. Many of those Arabs who did not lose their lives, fled the islands during these violent days.
least unified tribe occupied Pemba island, while the most
organized, most unified tribe lived in Zanzibar island.
This suggests that Pemba island Africans were more receptive
to outside forces than were Zanzibar island Africans.
It's axiomatic that groups of people who have no strong
social patterns of their own are more susceptible to outside
influence than are groups of people who have a strong
identification.

Second, when Persian and African groups merged
into one group, the resulting group absorbed many of the
cultural and social characteristics of the Persians.
Many of these characteristics were common among the Arab
groups in the Middle East. Hence, when the Omani Arabs
gained political dominance in East Africa, and eventually
settled in Zanzibar, they shared many common cultural
and social characteristics with the islands' indigenous
groups. For example, Islam is the dominant religion of
the Middle East. When the Persians migrated to Zanzibar
and merged with the local Africans, Islam became the
prevailing religion. Therefore, when the Arabs finally
arrived on the islands, this common religion, which they
shared with the Sharazi, offered an important bond of
acceptance. Similarities, such as Islamic beliefs, acted
as a bonding agent between the migrant and indigenous groups.
Third, through a unique system of government, the British politically controlled Zanzibar. The Sultan of Zanzibar remained the visible symbol of power, with real power resting in the hands of the British. Thus, when the British decided to politically withdraw from the islands, they had little difficulty in deciding who would become their political heirs. Consistent with their past policies, they turned the government over to the Arab oligarchy, not the African majority.

In summation, history suggests that the Arab dominance over the African Shirazi was easily created and maintained. This political control was undoubtly more complete and acceptable on Pemba island where the tribes were weak and disunified. But even in the stronger tribal areas of the Hadimu, common bonds drew Arabs and Africans together.

Nevertheless, just thirty-three days after the British formally quit Zanzibar, a revolution erupted. While much of Zanzibar’s history indicates a good chance for continuing success of Arab domination in Zanzibar, history also provides us with a clue from which we can begin our study. History points to Zanzibar island as the most likely area for an African-Arab schism. Perhaps a
comparison between conditions on Pemba island and conditions on Zanzibar island before the revolution will be revealing. But first, a look at Tanganyika’s history is necessary.
CHAPTER 3

TANGANYIKA

Tanganyika today has approximately 120 distinct tribes. Most of these tribes are composed of Bantu people. Available evidence and tribal tradition caused speculation that these people arrived in two different waves. The first group apparently entered Tanganyika from west of Lake Victoria and occupied much of eastern, northern, and central Tanganyika. A second group came from the east, crossing or by-passing Lake Tanganyika. These people settled in the western and southern regions of Tanganyika. This distinction is of possible importance in that the first group developed chiefdoms, whereas many tribes in the second group did not.

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1 This historical statement, like the one on Zanzibar, above, is provided for historical background only. Books consulted for this statement are: Allison B. Herrick, Sidney A. Harrison, Howard J. John, Susan MacKnight, and Barbara Skopa, Area Handbook for Tanzania, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968); and Ingham, op. cit.

2 The Bantu people are so classified because of their linguistic similarities. This type of language is distinguished by the division of nouns into classes and by the use of similar prefixes for these nouns and their adjectives. The Bantu is not a racially pure group but a group which had varying degrees of Negro and Hamitic characteristics.
In addition to the Bantu tribes, there are a small number of Nilo-Hamitic and Hamitic tribes. The former is best represented by the famous Masai tribe, while the latter is represented by the Iraq tribe. These two groups are relatively small in number and are presently of little political importance.

The first non-African people to settle in the area now called Tanganyika appear to have been Arabic and to have arrived late in the twelfth century. Many of these Arab people mixed with the local Zinj (black) people. The result of this miscegenation is the Swahili people.

The Arabs seemed little interested in the settlement of the interior. They were content to retain political control only over their coastal and off-shore island settlements. They were, however, extremely interested in the ivory and slaves which came from the inland regions.

3 There are no pure Negro tribes in Tanganyika.

4 There is evidence that Persian, Greek, Roman, and Indian traders traveled on the coast of Tanganyika (or Zinj as it was then called), but the Arabs were the first to establish any significant settlements. Early Persian settlers seem to have concentrated their settlements on the off-shore island, including Zanzibar and Pemba.
In order to participate in this lucrative trade, the Arabs developed a trade language and a business arrangement with the more adventurous and aggressive tribes of the interior. This trade language, called Swahili, was a hybrid language developed by the Arabs from Bantu linguistic patterns. It was introduced by the Arabs as they made their contact with the interior African tribes. It soon became the lingua franca throughout East Africa, used intertribally as well as interracially.

Since the Arabs did not develop any significant settlements or even travel in the interior during these early centuries, it was necessary to rely on Africans to bring the ivory and slaves to the coast. These Africans, particularly members of the Wanyamwezi tribe, soon established a busy trade route through the east-west center of modern Tanganyika. The slave routes were later used by Arab traders and European explorers to enter the interior. Even today the major roads and railroads follow these routes.

The Arabs captured very few of their own slaves or ivory tusks. They, instead, developed a nefarious commerce with the interior tribes. Since elephants were abundant, tribes had little trouble supplying the Arabs.

Today, Swahili and English are the national and official languages of Tanzania.
with these tusks. However, slaves were a slightly different matter. Tribe was pitted against tribe as they raided each others' camps for slaves to offer the Arab traders. This practice kept the many tribes divided and weak, a fact which plays an important part in today's intertribal relations, as we will see later in this paper.

Arab supremacy suffered a severe blow in 1498 when Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope. By 1515 the Portuguese were in firm control of East Africa. Although the Portuguese maintained military and economic control over East Africa for approximately two hundred and eighty-five years, their influence was slight and of little importance. By 1800 the Arabs had succeeded in dislodging the Portuguese and regaining control over the East African coast.

Arab activity in Tanganyika reached a new high in early 1830's when the capital of the Omani Empire was established in Zanzibar. Not only did this move bring a large number of Arabs into East Africa in general and Tanganyika specifically, but it also brought a renewed interest in slaves and trade in the interior. By 1850 a few brave Arabs began to penetrate the interior with their own caravans. Soon Arabs were found living in trade centers along the caravan route. They did not, however, settle these interior villages in large numbers, nor did
they attempt to control or participate in local tribal politics.

The Asians (Indians, Goans, and Pakistanis) arrived in East Africa about the same time as the Arabs. However, unlike the Arabs, the Asians never became involved in the politics of Tanganyika. They retained a very heterogeneous community, split religiously, socially, and nationally. In addition, they strictly limited their involvement to trade and commerce and returned to the India subcontinent with their profits.

The second European invasion of Tanganyika began in the mid-1800's. Two distinct groups became active on the mainland of East Africa; missionary-explorers and profit-seeking traders.

The activity of these two groups in Tanganyika became politically important for at least three reasons. First, the explorers and missionaries gave European nations "exploration" claims when "the scramble for Africa" took place in the eighteen hundreds. Second, they led to the final eclipse of Arab sovereignty in Tanganyika. Third, they, particularly the English missionaries, substantially "westernized" the future African leaders.

After a series of intricate political maneuvers by a handful of German "empire-builders", the Germans gained the upper hand in Tanganyika. Through treaties drafted
in 1886 and 1890, Germany gained complete control over what is now Tanganyika, (together with Ruanda and Urundi) then called Deutsche Ostafrika (German East Africa).

In the thirty odd years that Germany administered Deutsche Ostafrika, they made several valuable contributions which helped to shape the present political and social nature of independent Tanganyika. They systematically explored and mapped the interior and they made contact with every major tribe. Even though the German rule was harsh and often cruel, they were responsible for a social identification among the Africans outside of their immediate tribe. This came about through two phases. First, the Germans imposed direct rule. Through the use of Arab and Swahili akidas (local administrators), the paramountcy of local chiefs was undermined. As these akidas became accepted, they became aware of forces outside of their own tribal unit. They, for instance, saw that wazungu (Europeans) held power over a number of tribes. They also became aware that there were much greater differences between them and the "outsiders" (akidas and Germans) than there were between tribes.

Finally, as this outside force became more demanding and more imposing, tribe segments (i.e., villages) and whole tribes began to resist the German rule. This rebellion soon culminated in intertribal action. The
largest of these was the famous Maji-Maji rebellion. While the Germans successfully quieted this rebellion, awareness of an identification outside of tribal units was created. In addition, the Germans and their akidas had successfully destroyed many of the traditional chiefdoms.

The Germans were responsible for many improvements in Tanganyika, but development in two areas stand out: the economy and communications. It was the Germans who introduced the growing of sisal which was to become the chief export of Tanganyika. They also introduced coffee, tea, cotton, rubber, and cinchona. It was also the Germans who constructed the two major railway lines, one between Tanga and Moshi and the other between Dar es Salaam and Kigoma. In addition, roads, bridges, ports and docks, telegraph, and telephones were installed throughout the country. For the first time, permanent contact was established between the interior and the outside world.

As a result of World War I, Deutsche Ostafrika disappeared and Tanganyika emerged. By January, 1919,

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6 The Maji-Maji uprising began in 1905 and was not completely quieted until 1907. At its zenith, most of southeast Deutsche Ostafrika was affected. Judith Listowel claims, "One hundred and twenty thousand men, women, and children died either fighting, by execution or from famine" as a result of the Maji-Maji uprising, The Making of Tanganyika (New York: Longon House and Maxwell, 1965), p. 43.
British military forces had expelled the Germans from Tanganyika. In 1922 Great Britain received legal control over Tanganyika through a mandate delivered by the League of Nations. Tanganyika was categorized as a B mandate by this newly formed international organization. As described by Article 22 of the Covenant, a B mandate was one which had not attained sufficient development to become independent, but had to be administered by some mandatory for the material, social, and moral welfare of the inhabitants.

The League of Nation's role and power were extremely limited. The permanent Mandate Commission (staffed basically by colonial powers) issued questionnaires, made general observations from the results of these questionnaires, and received petitions from the people of the territory via the administrating power. There were no provisions made for visits by members of the League. In other words, the power rested entirely upon the good will of the administrating power and their receptivity to League opinion.

When, in 1946, the United Nations was created by the demise of the League of Nations, Tanganyika became a

7 Belgium forces had gained control over the northwest corner of Deutsche Ostafrika which subsequently became Ruanda-Urundi.
trust territory. Trusteeship differed from the old mandate system in two important ways: in the explicit obligation placed upon the administrating power to prepare the trust territory for independence and in the steps afforded the United Nations to ensure that such preparations were in fact being made. The questionnaires were much more concerned with political and constitutional matters, were periodically sent to examine the trust territory, and petitions could be directly submitted to the United Nations Secretariat. However, the good will of the administrating territory was still required for an effective territorial program and eventual independence.

One of the first political changes the British implemented was in the method of governing the territory. As we noted above, the Germans had created a system of direct rule thorough a use of akidas. The British, on the other hand, developed a system of indirect rule of local native administration. Under this system, the local governing body was composed of the local traditional authority. In the well developed tribal areas, these traditional chiefs were relatively easy to find. However, on the coast and in these areas where the local chiefs and authority figures were executed by the Germans during the several revolts (particularly the Maji-Maji affair), it was necessary to arbitrarily select the local leaders; no pretense in the
use of democratic methods was made in most of these selections. Ultimate control of these local governments was, however, kept in the hands of the British.

Under this system of government, local councils were provided to aid the local administrator (chief). While it was planned that these councils would ultimately expand to include inter-tribal membership, indirect rule did foster tribalism. The local administration, as we have noted, was given to traditional tribal leaders. Hence, indirect rule diminished much of the inter-tribal identity which had been established under the Germans.

The British also created a Legislative Council to aid the Governor in handling the functions of the central government. The council consisted of fourteen official members and up to ten unofficial members. The unofficial members were theoretically chosen by the Governor without regard to race or interest. The first Council had only seven unofficial members (five Europeans and two Asians), but its membership was later expanded to ten members (seven Europeans and three Asians). This was to remain the composition of the Legislative Council throughout Tanganyika's mandate years.

In 1945 the first Africans were selected to serve as unofficial members of the Legislative Council. Thereafter, government at the national level was one of
relatively peaceful political development. In 1960 Africans gained a majority of the elected seats on the Legislative Council. In 1961, full internal self-government was granted and in December, 1961, Tanganyika became an independent state. The only "threat" to the government (the ruling party in Tanganyika) came just seven days after the "Zanzibar Revolution" when the Tanganyikan army staged a mutiny.

Violence in Tanganyika

Late on Sunday night, January 19, 1964, troops of the First Battalion of the Tanganyika Rifles staged a mutiny.8 The mutiny began at Colito Barracks (the First Battalion's military camp) when the African members of the Battalion seized control of the camp and arrested their British officers, and NCO's. After confining these British officers to one of the base's buildings, the mutineers left the base for Dar es Salaam, eight miles away.

The mutinous soldiers were obviously well briefed in their deployment. They quickly took control of several

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key points: the radio and police stations, the airports, the State House, and the home and office of President Nyerere. They also established road blocks at the major traffic arteries leading to the central city. In short, they quickly gained effective control of the capital.

This initial action was not only handled quickly and effectively, but it was also done quietly and bloodlessly. The only shooting which took place during this initial seizure of power occurred in Oyster Bay, a suburb in which the European officers and their families were living. However, no one was killed or injured.

The first objective of the mutineers was to present their demands to President Nyerere. They did not, however, find him at his home or office. Nor were they able to find the Vice President, Rashidi Kawawa.

The dissident soldiers had better luck when they approached Job Lusinde, Minister of Home Affairs, and Oscar Kambona, Minister of Defense and External Affairs. Mr. Kambona

9 It was later discovered that the President made a strategic withdrawal to "an undisclosed place of personal safety."
soon became the official spokesman for the government during these early stages of the mutiny. Mr. Kambona accompanied the spokesman of the mutinous troops back to Colito Barracks. There he received their demands.

There were two demands. First, the mutineers demanded the immediate removal of all European officers and a complete "Africanization" of the army. Second, they demanded an increase of more than double their existing pay rate—for example, approximately $37 a month for private. Mr. Kambona advised the spokesman of the rebellious group that he was unable to accept their demands because only the President had the authority to approve such changes.

The bulk of the 700 rebellious troops had remained in Dar es Salaam. It was in the city that the first bloodshed occurred.

10 Oscar Kambona was later praised by both Nyerere and Minister of Local Government, Austin Shaba.

11 The demand of Africanization was effectively implemented, however, when the European soldiers and their families were expelled by the mutineers. They also announced that Lieutenant Elisha Kavana was selected as their "Commander".

12 Full strength of the First Battalion was 1000. However, the mutineers subsequently reported that approximately 700 were involved with mutiny.
As news of the mutiny spread through the city on the morning of January 20, many civilians took to the streets. As they approached the Asian section of town, riots and looting broke out. Several people were killed, many were injured, and several shops were destroyed. By hospital reports and official accounts, fourteen people died (of whom two were African soldiers), twenty were seriously injured, and one hundred received slight injuries.

Throughout the day, rumors quickly spread through the city, e.g., President Nyerere was held captive by the rebels and a military junta had replaced the government. Later in the day Mr. Kambona reacted to these rumors. He appealed to the people to remain calm. He further advised that President Nyerere was well and still in firm control of the government.

With the aid of the mutinous army, the looting and rioting was soon halted. That evening saw Dar es Salaam retire in an uneasy calm. The mutinous First Battalion soldiers were still in their battle gear.

The next day, January 21, the Second Battalion, stationed approximately 450 miles inland at Tabora, mutinied.

13

The Tanganyika Rifles consisted of the First Battalion at Dar es Salaam, the Second Battalion at Tabora, and company elements at Nachingwea in Southern Tanganyika. The Nachingwea troops never became directly involved in the mutiny.
Again, the major communications and security posts were quickly seized and the troops gained control over Tabora. Their demands were the same as those presented by the First Battalion: better pay and complete "Africanization". They likewise exiled their British officers and appointed an African commander, Captain M.F.H. Sasakidya.

The Tabora mutiny also touched off a number of riots and looting. It was quickly brought under control, however, and only one man, an Arab, was killed.

Later that day, President Nyerere emerged from his "place of personal safety" to broadcast a short speech in Swahili. He advised the people that there had occurred a slight crisis with the military forces. He concluded his brief message with an appeal for the people to end the "disgrace" and to remain calm.

On January 25, President Nyerere announced that since the army had failed to obey "the laws and orders of the people", they were no longer a lawfully constituted army, but a danger to the whole nation. Therefore, he concluded, all troops would be disarmed and all "ringleaders" would be severely punished.

In order to implement this decision, he requested British troops. Six hundred troops were airlifted from a nearby carrier to Colito Barracks. In the ensuing battle three Africans were killed, an estimated thirty soldiers
fled, and the remainder were disarmed and arrested. By noon of that day the capital was firmly controlled by the British commandos. Meanwhile, British paratroops dropped on the two inland camps: one unit to relieve the soldiers at Nachingwea and one unit to disarm the mutinous soldiers of the Second Battalion at Tabora. There were no deaths reported in either of these actions.

In the aftermath of the mutiny, several arrests including army personnel, minor government officials, and labor leaders were made. All privates were discharged and returned to their tribal villages and a new army was organized from the TANU (Tanganyika Africa National Union) Youth League (TYL). The mutiny was, however, substantially over when the British commandos disarmed the mutinous army at the request of President Nyerere.

**Historical Conclusion**

The preceding history of Tanganyika offers us several clues which are useful to our investigation. When the present people of Tanganyika first entered East Africa, they came not as one or two large, well organized tribes, but as several small, loosely constructed tribes. This was to play a very important part in the modern development of Tanganyika. Since the number of tribes within Tanganyika were small and numerous, no one tribe had gained
political dominance. In addition, the larger tribes were internally too disunited to ever make a consolidated bid for political power.

Ironically, slavery also contributed to the stability of Tanganyika. As the slave trade spread throughout East Africa, tribal units were in continual flux as their people were either scattered, enslaved, or killed. Because of their initial organizational weakness, these tribes were never able to coalesce into tribes strong enough to withstand these raids. Even those tribes, particularly the Nyamwezi, which raided and enslaved the less fortunate Africans, were not to emerge as dominate powers in contemporary Tanganyikan history. For instance, the Nyamwezi, while being the second largest tribe in Tanganyika, is small relative to the total population of Tanganyika (approximately 3.5 per cent of the population in 1957), lives in one of the lesser developed areas of Tanganyika, has a loose tribal organization, and nationally has no more political power than any other tribe in the country. Hence, as nationalism spread intertribally throughout the artificial boundries of Tanganyika, the counterpoise of tribal allegiance was not strong enough to counteract a nationalistic movement.

Swahili also became an important contributor to the modern unification of Tanganyika. As the language
spread across East Africa, intertribal communications came a bond that drew these tribes into a "Swahili Community".\textsuperscript{14}

The harsh German rule of Tanganyika (German East Africa) also contributed to its post-independent stability. As German domination became ever more repressive, African resistance began to organize intertribally. Several times violence erupted which pitted Africans against Germans. Since these rebellions were often intertribal involvements, the foundation of intertribal cooperation was established; a necessary ingredient for building a modern nation.

While the British system of indirect rule re-established political power centered around tribal identity, it also offered Africans an opportunity to participate in modern governmental structures. As representation and participation in the government were extended to native Africans, invaluable training was gained by the eventual leaders and bureaucrats of independent Tanganyika. Without this experience, political stability in Tanganyika would have been doubtful.

Finally, Tanganyika's trusteeship status contributed to the newly independent country's stability. Because British control over Tanganyika was never absolute, nor

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{14}
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A Swahili community is loosely defined as that group of Africans who have broadened their involvement and activities beyond their traditional tribal units. Primary allegiance, of course, may still remain with the tribe.
perpetual, European immigration into the country was never large. Tanganyika's trusteeship status also tempered Britain's rule of the country. The British Colonial Office was ever sensitive to the United Nation's opinion on the trust territory.

With this historical perspective we are better prepared to compare Zanzibar with Tanganyika. We have some historical insights as to the origins of Tanganyika's apparent stability. However, it must be kept in mind that we are not studying Tanganyika, per se. Tanganyika is used as a comparative control. That is, when an apparent dysfunction is examined in Zanzibar, a parallel study is conducted on Tanganyika. We can better assess the importance of the dysfunction by asking the question, "Does the condition leading to the proposed dysfunction in Zanzibar also exist in Tanganyika?" Again, if a dysfunction is found in Zanzibar but not in Tanganyika, strength has been added to the importance of that dysfunction. At least, the dysfunction existed in an unstable society but not in a stable society.

With the histories of Zanzibar and Tanganyika placed in proper perspective, we now need to examine the model within which this study is placed. The next chapter is devoted to this task.
CHAPTER 4

A HYPOTHESIS

In analyzing the Zanzibar revolution, Chalmers Johnson provides us with our model. He suggests that "multiple dysfunction plus elite intransigence plus X (accelerator) equals revolution."  

The sociologist, Talcott Parsons, posits Johnson, provides us with an excellent paradigm from which to base a study of revolution. Granting that structural-functional analysis represents the social system of a state in a condition of equilibrium; it does not follow ipso facto that the model is useless for measuring change. Equilibrium is a concept, not a real condition. It is a reference point from which a student can measure change. When the equilibrium of a state is interrupted, it becomes an unbalanced system, or a changing system. To understand change, Johnson reasons, is to understand what disrupts the equilibrium of the system.


2. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
"Society", continues Johnson, "can best be understood as a functionally integrated system." When one component of the system fails to function in a way necessary for maintaining the equilibrium, then that affected subunit of the system moves out of equilibrium. If that sub-system does not receive proper corrective action necessary to bring it back into equilibrium, the entire system will become unbalanced. Dysfunction, defines Johnson, is that condition in the system which causes that system to fall out of equilibrium.

Dysfunction, then, is a potential force found in any functionally integrated system. Pressures, which Johnson calls sources of dysfunction, acting upon the system compel the actors within the system to redefine their present, or future, actions differently that they did under equilibrium conditions. They act in ways which will relieve the conditions of dysfunction. In the terms of Johnson, they implement social change; of which, revolution is but one form.

But, Johnson asks, what characterizes revolution from other forms of social change? In answer he identifies

3
Ibid., p. 5.
two distinguishable features. First, revolution is a violent response taken when peaceful change has failed. Second, one single dysfunction is not ordinarily sufficient to cause a system to collapse. As these dysfunctions increase in number and intensity, the danger of a revolution becomes more acute. Johnson calls these conditions **multiple dysfunctions**.

Multiple dysfunctions, then equal the precondition of revolution. They are conditions which interrupts the equilibrium of a system.

Couple these multiple dysfunctions with an intransigent elite and the climate for a revolution intensifies even further. An adaptable elite will regard the dysfunctions of a society with caution and attempt to relieve those dysfunctions as expediently as possible. They know to do otherwise is to prompt the possibility of a revolution. If indeed the elite is adaptable, simple change will occur, dysfunction will be relieved, and revolution will be avoided. Revolution presupposes two counter-acting forces, one which represents the status quo and one which represents change. As dysfunctional conditions arise in the system, the status quo elite either fails to act at all, or fails to act thoroughly enough, or fails to act quickly enough to avoid conditions of revolution. The elite, in other words, is intransigent.
and revolution is the only action the potential revolutionaries think available to relieve the existing dysfunctions.

The final act necessary to trigger the revolution is an accelerator, Johnson suggests. An accelerator is the *coup de grâce* to a system. The conservative system is violently rejected when an accelerator is introduced which focuses upon and unites the existing societal dysfunctions. This accelerator can take on many different forms. Some of the examples suggested by Johnson are: a defeat in war, the rise of a prophet, or the growth and activities of a revolutionary party. For this study three commonly expressed accelerators will be examined. These are the Africanization thesis, the communist inspired thesis, and the prophet thesis.⁴

In the following study, the preconditions (multiple dysfunctions), the ruling elite, and possible accelerators of Zanzibar will be examined. These same factors will then be examined in Tanganyika. By comparing these two countries in this manner, it is hoped that some tentative conclusions can be made as to why one country witnessed

⁴ See Chapter 7.
a revolution, while its neighbor state remained stable and viable during an army mutiny.

Three preconditions of the Zanzibar revolution are commonly identified. These are: (1) a severe recession was straining Zanzibar's economy; (2) the Africans (mainland and Shirazi) perceived an inequity in landownership; and (3) social tensions were brought to a breaking point by independence and election failures. These three proposed preconditions will empirically be tested below for their validity.

In addition, these same conditions for Tanganyika will be examined. It is not implied that these are the only conditions which lead to revolution. Conditions can be held in common by several countries or they can be unique in each country. There may be conditions of dysfunction in Tanganyika which will not be present in Zanzibar. However, by contrasting the same conditions in both countries, we can make some tentative conclusions as to the validity of these "dysfunctions". That is, if these factors were indeed centrifugal forces in Zanzibar, were they also centrifugal forces in Tanganyika? Or, were they neutral or centripetal forces in Tanganyika? The purpose of this initial comparison, then, is to lend strength to, or suggest weaknesses in, the dysfunctional thesis.
It should be noted, however, that this part of the analysis is in no way conclusive. It's perfectly reasonable to find that the same societal dysfunctions exist in two countries, according to Johnson, yet find that a revolution occurs in one country but not in the other. For a revolution to erupt, Johnson's theory requires the other two conditions— an intransigent elite and an accelerator. However, when we examine Zanzibar in light of these two factors, they will also be compared to Tanganyika. Then, and only then, can we suggest some final conclusions to our study.
CHAPTER 5

PRECONDITIONS TO REVOLUTION

The Economy

James C. Davies suggests that economics are the stuff from which revolutions are made. More exactly, the economic condition of a country is an excellent and accurate indicator of revolutionary attitude. Revolution occurs when the gap between what people want and what they get becomes too great for the people to tolerate.\(^1\)

His hypothesis rests on the assumption that there is a positive relation between a reduction in the economic growth of a country and change by revolution. He does not mean to imply that a decline in economic expectations is the only systemic dysfunction necessary for a revolution, but that it is a necessary factor—at least, it is an accurate indicator of pending revolution.

If economics are an underlying factor leading to revolution, then a study of the economic conditions of Zanzibar and Tanganyika during the same span will be revealing.

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Many students of the Zanzibar revolution posit that economic plight was a significant factor in creating an atmosphere of revolution on Zanzibar. On the other hand, Tanganyika witnessed only a minor army strike. The following analysis, then, will examine some empirical indicators to discern the difference between the economies of these two countries, if there were any. Such a contrast will give us some basis from which to comment on the merit of Davies' hypothesis.

Unfortunately, research has only been able to discover partial figures on the gross domestic product figures (G. D. P.) for Zanzibar. It is, therefore, necessary to use total value of exports to establish a complete growth index for the economy. Since cloves and coconuts are the chief exports of Zanzibar, it is suggested that the total value of exports is as accurate an indicator of economic growth as is available. The importance of cloves to the Zanzibar economy is obvious when it is realized that this

For example: John Hatch writes, "The depression in the cloves market, which accounts for 85 percent of Zanzibar exports, the growth of unemployment in the town and of squatting in the rural areas, and the absence of economic development, have all combined to exacerbate longstanding social cum-radical tension." "Zanzibar, Behind the Revolt", New Statesman, LXVII (January 17, 1964), p. 68.
spice accounts for 72 percent of the export income and 25 percent of the G.N.P. during the period 1957 to 1961.  

The researcher is much more fortunate with Tanganyika. Not only do we have available the export figures, but also the G.D.P. figures available for several decades. Therefore, both the G.D.P. and the export figures will be given. The G.D.P. figures will be used to establish, or dispute, the validity of using the export figures to determine an economic growth index. The export figures will be used to contrast the economic growth of Tanganyika with that of Zanzibar. It would seem hazardous at best to compare the two countries on the basis of a different set of figures.

Using the export figures of Tanganyika is as sound as using those same kind of figures for Zanzibar. The chief exports of Tanganyika are sisal, coffee, and cotton. These crops accounted for 59.7 percent of the export income and the export income accounted for 26.1 percent of the G.D.P. during the period 1954-62.

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Davies' hypothesis requires more than just plotting the economic growth rate. The growth in economy must also affect the potential revolutionaries. In the words of Davies, "It is when the chains have been loosened somewhat, so that they can be cast off without a high probability of losing life, that people are put in a condition of proto-rebelliousness." 5

Ideally we should have some dependent economic indicator to suggest how well a growth in economy is reaching the ordinary citizen. Per capita figures on the number of radios, automobiles, telephones, bicycles, the number of children in school and the amount of income taxes paid would ordinarily be good indicators of economic distribution. Unfortunately, the number of children in school are the only complete figures available for both Zanzibar and Tanganyika, and these figures are of questionable value. In Zanzibar and Tanganyika, as well as East Africa, education is very heavily subsidized by the government. In fact, if a child is accepted in a school (entrance is based on a competitive examination) and he can prove that he hasn't the money to attend, the government will pay his fees, board, and room.

5 Davies, op. cit., p. 7.
For these reasons, attendance figures do not necessarily reflect the distribution of economy. They do, however, reflect the amount of services provided by the government. To show that a drop in the economy has caused a decrease in governmental services would lend strength to the Davies argument, that a significant drop in the economy creates a systemic dysfunction.

Upon reflection and in view of the circumstances, our inability to find complete G.D.P. figures for Zanzibar might not be as disappointing as we had originally thought. The G.D.P. for any given year really has very little to say about the distribution of that income. To divide that figure by the number of people in the country can be extremely misleading. For example, the minute country of Kuwait had a per capita income of $3,300 in 1963, the highest in the world. But even to a casual observer, it quickly became apparent that this wealth is centered in the hands of just a few people.

While the export figures must be used with caution, they are the most useful figures available. As noted above, cloves are the major export. They are the bulwark of the

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Zanzibar economy, employing more people outside of subsistence farming than any other activity. Granting that most of the income from clove exports goes to the plantation owner, some of that income must also go to the employee in the form of wages or services. We suggest, then, that a recession in the clove industry, i.e., exports, affects the wages or services of the laborer. In fact, since Zanzibar is virtually a one cash crop country, a decline in the clove market affects the entire country.

Leaving aside the question of whether or not a recession is a necessary dysfunction to revolution, we will examine the Zanzibar economy to see if there was, indeed, an economic dysfunction.

Using export figures, we hypothesize that for an economic dysfunction in the society (Zanzibar) to exist, the economic growth line (total value of exports) must show a significant drop within the last two years preceding the revolution. The time lag between the economic recession and the revolution is necessary for the recession to be felt by society. The recession must have had time to make an impact on the mind of people.

We will also examine enrollment to see if there was a corresponding decline (assuming an economic decline) in governmental service. If our findings are positive,
the economic thesis will be strengthened; if they are negative, the thesis will be weakened but not disproved. In fact, it will only indicate that regardless of economic set-backs, education remained a high priority to the Zanzibar government.

Table 1 shows total export values and attendance in public schools in Zanzibar from 1957-63. Zanzibar's export income declined 17.9 percent and 8.3 percent in 1958 and 1959, respectively. The next year showed a temporary and partial recovery, only to drop in 1961 to its lowest level in the seven year period studied. It did not make a significant recovery until 1963, the year immediately preceding the revolution. Such a recovery came too late to have been felt by the citizenry before the revolution. As one student of Zanzibar writes, "Financial difficulties severely impaired the political viability of the ZNP/ZPPP regime. The economic crisis in Zanzibar was so great that no government could easily have found a feasible solution, but the ZNP/ZPPP Government sought to meet the crisis by reducing social services. It closed schools, fired teachers, reduced hospital facilities and cut back welfare programs."

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TABLE 1

Total Export and School Enrollment Figures
For Zanzibar, 1957-63

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Exports a</th>
<th>Total School Enrollment a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£ millions</td>
<td>£ thousands</td>
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<td></td>
<td>change</td>
<td>change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
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<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>18.9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
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<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Every year from 1957 to 1963 experienced an increase in student enrollment. However, the increases in student enrollment in 1960 and 1963 were the smallest increases over the seven year period. If we compare these two decelerated years to the export income figures for those same years, we might, at first, be surprised. Both 1960 and 1963 witnessed the highest increases in export income.
The aforementioned time lag offers the answer. The sale of exports declined in 1958 and 1959; cut backs in the expending school system were made in 1960. Again, there was a severe slump in export sales in 1961, with only a slight (2.7 percent) recovery in 1962. In the following year, 1963, school enrollment was expanded only 2.1 percent. It took two poor years in general economy before it affected decrease in government services (education).

Our analysis reveals a definite economic slump preceding the revolution. This economic recession caused a reduction in government services the year immediately preceding the revolution. Hence, the recession was significant enough to suggest that an economic dysfunction did indeed exist in Zanzibar at the time of the revolution.

We will now turn to the economy of Tanganyika during this same period of time. Again, we suggest that for an economic dysfunction to exist, the economic growth line (total value of exports) much show a significant decline at least two years prior to the mutiny. As a kind of check, we will also trace an economic growth rate based upon the gross domestic product (G.D.P.). It is hoped that by comparing these two economic growth indicators, we will be able to make some tentative remarks as to the validity of each.
The school attendance figures will also be examined. They will be compared to the economic indicators (export and G.D.P. figures) to establish any similarities which might exist between the two different kinds of indicators. Tanganyikan export values, gross domestic products figures and school attendance figures from 1957 to 1963 are given below on Table 2.

**TABLE 2**

Total Export, G.D.P., and School Enrollment Figures for Tanganyika, 1957-63

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Exports</th>
<th>Gross Domestic Product</th>
<th>Total School Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>162.4</td>
<td>384.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>167.1</td>
<td>397.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>177.1</td>
<td>407.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>186.2</td>
<td>465.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>188.7</td>
<td>493.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>208.6</td>
<td>532.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>232.3</td>
<td>609.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*aFrom Gilbert L. Rutman, The Economy of Tanganyika (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 43-44, 72, 146.*

*bFrom Britannica: Book of the Year, 1955-62.*

Contrary to Zanzibar, Tanganyika experienced an increase in export sales for all but one year, 1961, during the seven years studied, 1957-63. While the loss of export income was considerable in 1961 (11.1 percent less than the previous year), a partial recovery of the lost export income was made the next year. By 1963, export sales made a healthy 19.5 percent gain, reaching the highest figure attained from the sales of exports during the seven years studied.

Generalizing on this data, Tanganyika's economy was rapidly improving. Only during one year, 1961, was this economic growth interrupted. Certainly, this temporary economic setback could not throw an otherwise stable society into disequilibrium.

The gross domestic product (G. D. P.) figures showed substantially the same trend. From 1958 to 1960, the G. D. P. increased 2.8 percent, 5.6 percent, and 4.9 percent, respectively. This rapid rate of economic growth slowed to a 0.8 percent increase in 1961, the same year export sales declined 11.1 percent. The final two years of our study (1962 and 1963) experienced a resumption on Tanganyika's rapid economic growth. This East African country was once again showing a very substantial gain in its economy.
This comparison adds strength to our original hypothesis that export figures in Zanzibar and Tanganyika are indeed good indicators of economic growth.

Given this encouraging view of the Tanganyikan economy, it was of little surprise that the school enrollment figures showed a fairly constant increase during the entire seven year period. After a 12.4 percent increase in 1960, the school enrollment only increased 6.6 percent and 6.5 percent the following two years. But even with this decelerated rate, the increase in school enrollment was substantial. By 1963, school enrollment was increasing at a rate of 12.6 percent.

From our data, we can see that the economy of Tanganyika and Zanzibar were directly opposite excepting 1963. From 1957 until 1962, Zanzibar was in a fairly significant economic recession; during these same years, Tanganyika's economy was generally improving. While both countries attached prime importance on educational expansion, only Zanzibar had to reduce its expansion rate to any noticeable degree. In general, Zanzibar's society was experiencing an economic dysfunction when the revolution occurred, while Tanganyika's society was economically healthy.
Landownership

It is suggested that unrest in Zanzibar was directly related to, but not necessarily proportional to, the perceptions Africans had as to the inequities between African and Arab landownership, especially in terms of quality. The more intensely Africans believed their land inferior to Arab land, the more restless they were—thus, the more inclined they were to violent opposition.

While perceptions are difficult to get at without survey data, general patterns of landownership are known. Therefore, by comparing these patterns of landownership with the areas where strong Arab opposition and violence were found, it is suggested that the above hypothesis can be partially tested. First, we will examine these patterns of landownership. Second, we will analyze pre-revolution patterns of Arab opposition in terms of anti-Arab Association, including political parties. Third, we will make a similar examination of patterns of violence. And, finally, we will compare this data with our hypothesis.

---

Zanzibar consists of two major islands, Zanzibar and Pemba. Excellent soil is found on both islands, but they differ widely in their distribution. On Pemba the arable soil is partially ubiquitous with only a few remote areas of poor land. Zanzibar, on the other hand, has good soil only in the western portion of the island. A high ridge separates good, arable land on the west from poor, rocky land on the east.  

Because of this difference between the islands, settlement patterns were widely different. On Pemba island the Arab settlers spread all over the island, freely mingling with the Africans. On Zanzibar island the Arab settlers settled on the western side of the island. Thus, the Arabs settled on the fertile land of Zanzibar, while the Shirazis occupied the rocky side of the island.

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9 See Appendix A: Maps, Figure 2 for arable-nonarable land patterns.

10 There is serious debate over the question of how heavily settled this side of the island was before the Arabs arrived. John Middleton argues that it was virtually unoccupied and covered with a dense forest, Land Tenure in Zanzibar (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961), pp. 10-13; while Sir John Gray argues that the Arabs dispossessed a large number of Shirazis when they settled this area, History of Zanzibar from the Middle Ages to 1856 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 167-9.
Perhaps the best way to discover the difference between Zanzibar island and Pemba island, in terms of African-Arab landownership, is to examine clove plantation ownership on the two islands. These figures are available for 1923 and are shown below in Table 3.

**TABLE 3**

Clove Plantations in the Protectorate, 1923

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>Owners</th>
<th>Plantations</th>
<th>Trees</th>
<th>Trees/Plant</th>
<th>Trees/Owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zanzibar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>1,869</td>
<td>735,554</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>4,340</td>
<td>7,070</td>
<td>236,753</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>2,973</td>
<td>6,819</td>
<td>883,750</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>8,710</td>
<td>15,117</td>
<td>896,439</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1948 figures showing ethnic landownership by size of clove plantations are also very revealing. Remembering that the Pemba people live basically on Pemba island and that the Hadimu people live basically on Zanzibar island, these figures are even more significant. Table 4 shows these figures.
TABLE 4

Land Ownership by Size of Clove Plantation, 1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plantations</th>
<th>Hadimu</th>
<th>Tumbatu</th>
<th>Pemba</th>
<th>Arab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Large</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>1,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>3,715</td>
<td>1,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Small</td>
<td>2,330</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>1,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>41,425</td>
<td>43,965</td>
<td>57,585</td>
<td>44,605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Lofchie, Zanzibar, p. 248.

From this data it is apparent that there was a sharper distinction between Arab and African landownership on Zanzibar island than there was on Pemba island. Referring to Table 3 we find that on Zanzibar island Arabs owned approximately 3.5 times more clove trees than did Africans, while on Pemba island both groups owned nearly the same number of trees. Also, Table 4 shows that African plantations were significantly smaller on Zanzibar island than those on Pemba island. Thus, if our hypothesis is correct, African-Arab friction should be distinctly greater on Zanzibar island than it is on Pemba island.

In tracing African hostility towards the Arabs of the islands, we will look at the growth of anti-Arab organizations and election patterns. Then, we will trace the patterns of violence in Zanzibar since World War I.
The African Association was the first African organization formed in contemporary (post-World War I) Zanzibar. It was founded in 1934 by a group of mainland Africans. Five years later, the Shirazi Association was established. Neither of these organizations were originally political, but they were, instead, "incipient trade unions and grew up largely in response to the activities of the Arab Association." Their primary purpose was to protect the rights of African squatters and laborers, and, on Pemba island, of Shirazi clove growers. In fact, the only political mobilization among the Africans before 1950 was against the commercial Asian community, and this was in cooperation with the Arabs during the depression in the late 1930's.


In the early 1950's the African Association and its semi-official youth league, Young African Union (YAU), covertly began to participate in Zanzibar politics. Through the effective leadership of a small group of African civil servants (the only educated group of Africans in Zanzibar), African grievances were voiced in their newspaper, Afrika Kwetu (Our Africa). Their orientation was reform and their target was the inequitable social and political structure of Zanzibar. At first, they attacked the entire pattern of human and race relations in Zanzibar, but later began to question the very presence of British— and Arab—colonialism. There was, however, a developing cooperation between the top leadership of this African group and the Arab Association. All of this was curtailed when the government enforced a regulation which prohibited civil servants from engaging in political organizations and activities. This effectively destroyed the leadership of the African Association, and YAU, and, incidentally, brought to an end any possibility of joint African-Arab cooperation.

13 The following account of the growth of early African political participation is taken from Michael Lofchie's excellent book, Zanzibar, pp. 151-30 and a less detailed account by John Middleton and Jane Campbell, op. cit., pp. 43-55.
The leadership of the African Association fell into the hands of Abeid Karume, a former African seaman. The direction of political involvement by Africans also underwent a transition. The African Association changed from a position of attacking the unfair distribution of political influence, wealth, and social services to a position of defending the status quo. Shaaban Sudi Mponda, the first mainland African nominated to Legco, articulates the reasoning behind this defensive shift when he voiced his opinion about the proposed 1957 election which was based on a common role:

I beg to state plainly before this Council that we Africans do not welcome this election with open hearts... This (type of election) is applicable only to that country where the citizens have the same opportunities in the management of the activities of their government. Here,...we the Africans are backward people due to our lack of educational facilities; we therefore do not have those said opportunities...Owing to my people's ignorance of election, I suggest that they should be given enough time to learn.  

The African Association, then, favored a policy of delaying Zanzibar independence until such a time that Africans attained educational parity with the Arabs and Asians. It believed that if independence was granted while

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Zanzibar was still in the hands of the Arabs, African control of the government and its society would be lost forever.

The important point for our immediate thesis is that it was the African Association, which found its basic strength on Zanzibar island, that led the anti-Arab movement. In fact, in 1956 when a merger was proposed between the African Association and the Shirazi Association, the Shirazi leaders were deeply divided. The leaders of the Zanzibar Shirazi Association, Ameri Tajo and Thabit Kombo, were in favor of such a merger, but Mohammed Shamte and Ali Sharif, leaders of the Pemba Shirazi Association, were against the merger. Indeed, several months before the 1957 elections, Shamte and Sharif unsuccessfully attempted to create a new political party. They both eventually ran as independents.

In sum, the anti-Arab Association found strength only on Zanzibar island. Any attempts to expand such organizations to Pemba met immediate opposition from the Pemba Shirazis.

Four elections were held in Zanzibar before independence in 1963. We now propose to look at the results of these elections to see if our landownership hypothesis holds up under analysis.

In the 1957 election, two parties and several independent candidates were contesting six legislative seats.
The Afro-Shirazi Union (ASU), discussed above, was composed of mostly Africans on Zanzibar island. The second party, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), was basically an Arab-Asian party.

The ZNP was formed out of the Arab Association in December, 1955. Although the ZNP claimed to be non-racial, it could not "escape the fact that many of its leaders (were) Arabs, that it (was) supported by the members of the Arab Community, and that it was formed out of the Arab Association."\(^{15}\)

The election was held on July 22, 1957. The results are shown on Table 5. From these results, we can see that the ASU was soundly defeated in the one race they entered on Pemba island—they received only 657 votes out of a total of 7,225 or 9.9 percent of the total. While the ZNP also lost both races on Pemba island, the two winners were pro-Arab Shirazi leaders, Shamte and Sharif, who refused to join with the ASU.

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\(^{15}\) Campbell, op. cit., p. 76.
# TABLE 5

1957 Election Results, Zanzibar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Affil.</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zanzibar South</td>
<td>Ameri Tajo</td>
<td>ASU</td>
<td>ASU</td>
<td>5,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amour Zahor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Said</td>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>1,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanzibar North</td>
<td>Daud Mahmoud</td>
<td>ASU</td>
<td>ASU</td>
<td>3,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haji Mohammed</td>
<td>Indep.</td>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>3,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemba South</td>
<td>Mohammed shamte</td>
<td>Indep.</td>
<td>Shirazi Assoc.</td>
<td>5,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hamadi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rashid Ali El-Khafiy</td>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>1,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdullah Seuleiman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ali Busaidy</td>
<td>Indep.</td>
<td>Indep.</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemba North</td>
<td>Ali Sharif Mussa</td>
<td>Indep.</td>
<td>Shirazi Assoc.</td>
<td>3,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rashid Hamadi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Athumani Shaaban Sudi</td>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>3,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mponda</td>
<td>ASU</td>
<td>African Assoc.</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone Town</td>
<td>Sher Mohammed Chowdhary</td>
<td>Indep.</td>
<td>Muslim Assoc.</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rutti A. Bulsara</td>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anverali Hassan Virji</td>
<td>Indep.</td>
<td>ASU</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdul Qadir Mukri</td>
<td>Indep.</td>
<td>Indep.</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngambo</td>
<td>Abeid Amani Karume</td>
<td>ASU</td>
<td>ASU</td>
<td>3,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ali Muhsein Barwani</td>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ibuni Saleshe</td>
<td>Indep.</td>
<td>Comorian Assoc.</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35,361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Lofchie, Zanzibar, p. 176.
On Zanzibar island we see quite a different voting pattern. Since we are looking at voting results in terms of landownership patterns, the rural constituencies, Zanzibar South and Zanzibar North, are the only ones in which we are interested at this time. Zanzibar island's voting is directly opposite Pemba island's voting pattern. The ASU won both rural elections with a total vote of 9,067 (64.9%), while the ZNP only gained 4,900 votes in rural Zanzibar (35.1%).

The 1957 election result shows that the ASU strength was significant on Zanzibar Island while it was slight on Pemba island.

The second election by common roll vote was held in January, 1961. During the interim period there were several significant and relevant political happenings. After the election both Shamte and Sharif joined the ASU to form the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). This, however was an uneasy alliance. Late in 1959 Shamte and Sharif quit the alliance and helped Ameri Tajo form a third party, the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP).

The ZPPP purported to be a multi-racial party but was organized and led by Shirazis. It was also immediately given the full support of the Pemba Shirazi Association, who had continually refused to merge with the ASP.
After a six month delay, the election was held in January, 1961. Table 6 shows the result. Looking first at the Pemba island results, we find that the ASP won two seats, the ZNP won four seats, and the ZPPP won three seats. After the election, the three ZPPP members split; two ZPPP members, Shamte and Bakari Mohammed, chose to cooperate with the ZNP, while the other ZPPP member, Ali Sharif, joined forces with the ASP. Thus, the total ASP strength on Pemba island was three Legco members, while the total ZNP strength on the island was six Legco members—a 2 to 1 ratio in favor of the ZNP.

We find a similar picture when comparing voting strength. The ASP received a combined voting strength of 9,203 (23%) votes; 17,169 (43%) voters cast their ballots for the ZNP; and, 13,595 (34%) voted for the ZPPP.

The January, 1961 election shows a voting pattern on Pemba island similar to that shown in the July, 1957 election. While the ASP increased its Pemba island strength in 1961 (from 9.9% to 23%), Pemba island was still a weak area for the ASP.
TABLE 6
January, 1961 Election Results, Zanzibar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>ASP</th>
<th>ZNP</th>
<th>ZPPP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stone Town North</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone Town South</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darajani</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1,765</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raha Leo</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>4,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jangombe</td>
<td>3,023</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td>2,614</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mkokotoni</td>
<td>3,723</td>
<td>1,209</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaani</td>
<td>4,052</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangapwani</td>
<td>1,831</td>
<td>2,049</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koani</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chwaka</td>
<td>3,023</td>
<td>1,091</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>4,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuoni</td>
<td>2,064</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makunduchi</td>
<td>2,315</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td>4,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konde</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>2,383</td>
<td>1,779</td>
<td>4,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wete</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>3,441</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pandani</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1,796</td>
<td>2,473</td>
<td>4,337</td>
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<td>Piki</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>2,494</td>
<td>4,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ziwani</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>2,913</td>
<td>1,684</td>
<td>5,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chake Chake</td>
<td>1,538</td>
<td>1,537</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>3,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chonga</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td>3,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kengeja</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td>2,676</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>5,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mikoani</td>
<td>2,599</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>5,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>36,699</td>
<td>32,724</td>
<td>15,541</td>
<td>84,963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Arab opposition was still centered on Zanzibar island. Again, we look only at the rural constituencies—Northern, Mkokotoni, Mangapwani, Chaani, Koani, Chwaka, Fuoni, and Makunduchi. The ASP lost only two out of the eight rural elections and both of these were in the northwest plantation region. In rural Zanzibar island, 19,853 or 61.7% voters polled their votes for the ASP; 10,569 or 32.9%
voters chose the ZNP; and only 1,760 (6.4%) voters voted for the ZPPP. Again, we see a strong anti-Arab vote in rural Zanzibar.

Perhaps the most fascinating occurrence of this election was its outcome. The ASP won a total of ten seats, the ZNP won a total of nine seats, and the ZPPP won a total of three seats. As we have mentioned, two of the ZPPP representatives supported the ASP. This meant that there was an eleven to eleven split and neither camp was able to form a parliamentary majority. This necessitated a new election, called for in June, and an additional constituency was formed in order to avoid the possibility of another deadlock. Interestingly, the additional constituency was created in southern Pemba island.

During this interim the ZNP and the ZPPP agreed to form an election coalition in which both parties would share power. In essence, these two parties agreed not to oppose each other in the same constituency. In this way, whichever party challenged the ASP in a particular constituency, they would not split anti-ASP votes.

Table 7 gives the June, 1961 election results.
### TABLE 7

June, 1961 Election Results, Zanzibar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>ASP</th>
<th>ZNP</th>
<th>ZPPP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zanzibar Island</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone Town North</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone Town South</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>362</td>
<td></td>
<td>984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darajani</td>
<td>1,493</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raha Leo</td>
<td>3,301</td>
<td>363</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jangombe</td>
<td>3,162</td>
<td>273</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>1,841</td>
<td>2,792</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mkokotoni</td>
<td>3,915</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangapwani</td>
<td>1,922</td>
<td>2,174</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaani</td>
<td>4,318</td>
<td>965</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koani</td>
<td>1,325</td>
<td>740</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chwaka</td>
<td>3,219</td>
<td>1,368</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuoni</td>
<td>2,373</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makunduchi</td>
<td>2,448</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,852</td>
<td>4,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemba Island</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konde</td>
<td>1,074</td>
<td>3,576</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wete</td>
<td>1,334</td>
<td>2,257</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandani</td>
<td>2,355</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,273</td>
<td>4,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piki</td>
<td>1,543</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,995</td>
<td>4,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ziwani</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>4,336</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chake Chake</td>
<td>1,761</td>
<td>2,374</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chonga</td>
<td>886</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,894</td>
<td>3,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtambile</td>
<td>1,552</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,402</td>
<td>3,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kengeja</td>
<td>1,479</td>
<td>2,590</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mkano</td>
<td>2,602</td>
<td>1,533</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45,172</td>
<td>31,631</td>
<td>12,411</td>
<td>89,264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While there was some shifting within the Pemba island constituencies, the ASP again won three seats, and the ZNP picked up an extra seat giving them a total of five seats. The ASP received 15,741 (36.7%) votes, while the ZNP received 10,559 (24.5%) votes. While the ASP gained a substantial number of votes on Pemba island, the pro-Arab coalition remained in political control of the island.
In rural Zanzibar island the results of the two elections (January and June, 1961) changed surprisingly little. The ASP received 21,361 (62.6%) votes, the ZNP received 10,892 (31.9%) votes and the ZPPP received 1,352 (5.5%) votes. Again, Zanzibar was the bastion of the anti-Arab vote.

The fourth and final popular election before the revolution was in July, 1963. The political parties had remained the same with the ZNP/ZPPP coalition still in effect. Over half of the total population turned out to vote in this final election. Table 8 gives the results.

The biggest change that took place in this new election occurred on Pemba island. Again the ASP received its weaker support on Pemba island. But the differentiation was substantially less. Out of a total of 76,268 votes, the ASP received 33,853 (44.4%) votes—7.7% more votes than they received in June, 1961. The ZNP and ZPPP received 21,378 (28%) and 21,037 (27.6%) votes, respectively. Little changed, however, in the number of seats each party gained. Again, the ASP won two seats, while the ZNP won six seats and the ZPPP won six seats.

Results on Zanzibar island remained virtually the same. The ASP polled 35,096 (62.5%) votes for eight legislative seats, and the ZPPP polled 4,356 (7.6%) votes, losing both rural Zanzibar seats they contested.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>ASP</th>
<th>ZNP</th>
<th>ZPPP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zanzibar Island</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forodhani</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>2,403</td>
<td>2,578</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shangani</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>2,391</td>
<td>2,787</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mlandege</td>
<td>2,736</td>
<td>3,135</td>
<td>5,871</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikwajuni</td>
<td>4,062</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>5,265</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwembeladu</td>
<td>5,066</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>5,875</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwahani</td>
<td>5,701</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>5,917</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nungwi</td>
<td>2,615</td>
<td>3,198</td>
<td>5,813</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumbatu</td>
<td>2,310</td>
<td>3,667</td>
<td>5,977</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donge</td>
<td>4,564</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>5,109</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaani</td>
<td>3,908</td>
<td>1,147</td>
<td>5,055</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangapwani</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>3,290</td>
<td>5,188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibojie</td>
<td>2,958</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>3,576</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dole</td>
<td>2,965</td>
<td>1,513</td>
<td>4,483</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chwaka</td>
<td>3,795</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>4,515</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuoni</td>
<td>3,534</td>
<td>1,923</td>
<td>5,462</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jozani</td>
<td>3,818</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>5,449</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makunduchi</td>
<td>2,741</td>
<td>2,725</td>
<td>5,466</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemba Island</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konde</td>
<td>1,585</td>
<td>3,565</td>
<td>5,150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumbe</td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>2,971</td>
<td>4,781</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wingwi</td>
<td>4,390</td>
<td>1,705</td>
<td>6,095</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wete</td>
<td>2,719</td>
<td>3,140</td>
<td>5,859</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piki</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>2,756</td>
<td>5,319</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenge juu</td>
<td>2,042</td>
<td>3,531</td>
<td>5,573</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ziwani</td>
<td>1,793</td>
<td>3,038</td>
<td>4,831</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ole</td>
<td>1,634</td>
<td>3,897</td>
<td>5,531</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chake Chake</td>
<td>2,347</td>
<td>2,627</td>
<td>4,974</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pujini</td>
<td>2,746</td>
<td>2,930</td>
<td>5,676</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chambara</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>3,469</td>
<td>5,038</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kengeja</td>
<td>2,573</td>
<td>3,506</td>
<td>6,079</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtambale</td>
<td>1,913</td>
<td>3,572</td>
<td>5,485</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mkoani</td>
<td>4,169</td>
<td>1,605</td>
<td>5,774</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37,085</td>
<td>47,950</td>
<td>25,609</td>
<td>160,644</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For the fourth election in a row, rural Zanzibar island voted the heaviest anti-Arab vote. While the landownership
pattern remained constant, anti-Arab sentiment gained acceptance on Pemba island. The intervening variable which caused this shift in sentiment will be considered below.

First we will turn to the pattern of violence in Zanzibar to see if the pattern shown in our anti-Arab associations and votes is supported.

Zanzibar has been fortunate in its lack of violence. Since 1920 there have been only six reported cases of violence involving death up to and including the January 12, 1964 revolution, excluding individual violence, e.g., murder and suicide. Table 9 lists these incidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incident Description</th>
<th>No. of Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>intra-Arab feud</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Arab riot opposing quality control on cloves and copra export</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>African vs. British riot over cattle innoculations</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Assassination of Sultan Mugheiry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Election riots</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td>3,000 (30-13,635)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first four incidents listed in Table 9 were either intra-Arab or anti-British conflicts and do not directly concern us here. The first African-Arab incident involving a loss of life occurred in 1961.

Following the June 1, 1961 elections, a violent clash occurred between ASP and ZNP supporters. These disturbances began in Zanzibar town and spread to the rural areas of Zanzibar island. Sixty-eight people were killed in this riot—sixty-four of whom were Arabs. All of these deaths occurred on Zanzibar island with most of them in the plantation area.

The second anti-Arab revolt was the most significant; the January 12, 1964 revolution. As we noted above, the revolution began in Zanzibar town. While death reports are conflicting, three factors are constant in all reports. First, the major victims were Arabs. Second, most of these deaths occurred on Zanzibar island. And, third, the death toll was high. Three thousand deaths is the most commonly cited figure.

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16 Lofchie, *Zanzibar*, p. 204.

Our pattern once again remains constant. In both significant anti-Arab conflicts, the violence began on Zanzibar island and was largely confined to the southern island.

We have found that our data supports our landownership hypothesis. First, Zanzibar island had the greater difference in Arab and African landownership. Second, the first and strongest anti-Arab organizations were on Zanzibar island. Third, the strongest anti-Arab votes (for the ASP) were cast on Zanzibar island. And, finally, Zanzibar island was the scene of the most violent anti-Arab demonstrations and carried the brunt of the revolution as well.

We will now examine Tanganyika's land distribution pattern. In particular, we will identify those areas which have the greatest percentage of alienated land. We will then trace the various political organizations, the patterns of voter response, and the kinds and location of violence in Tanganyika. This data on Tanganyika will finally be compared with our findings on Zanzibar to establish what, if any, correlation exists between the two.

As Rutman observes, "The major portion of the African peasant's labor is allocated to squeezing out a subsistence level of living." Rutman, op. cit., p. 76.
mashamba (small farms) because of lack of capital, little knowledge of contemporary agricultural techniques, and primordial customs and tribal laws which value tradition.

Besides subsistence, Tanganyika's agricultural output is produced for the international market. Sisal, cotton, and coffee are the leading exports. In 1963 these three crops were responsible for 59.3 percent of Tanganyika's export income (sisal exports account for 33.7 percent), or, they represented 17.7 percent of the G.D.P. for that year.¹⁹ Sisal is mainly an estate crop, while coffee and cotton are basically grown on small peasant farms. In other words, most sisal is grown on alienated land by non-Africans, while coffee and cotton are mostly grown on small African farms.²⁰

The amount of land alienated in 1960 was 2,14 million acres, or .93 percent of Tanganyika's total area (see Table 10 for a breakdown of this alienated land by province). This is approximately 12 percent as much as the amount of land cultivated by Africans. Using 1957 population figures, this means that 122,900 non-Africans alienated 2,140,000 acres of Tanganyika, while 3,662,700 Africans only cultivated

¹⁹ Herrick et al., op. cit., pp. 274-349.

²⁰ "Alienated land" refers to that land which was considered the domain of an indigenous tribe but which had been leased, sold, or granted to private individuals. This includes private associations, such as, corporations.
### TABLE 10

Alienated-African Cultivated Land
Distribution by Province, 1960, Tanganyika

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total area</th>
<th>% land alienated</th>
<th>cultivated By Africans (est.)</th>
<th>cultivated By Africans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Lake and West Lake</td>
<td>21.18</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>24.30</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanga</td>
<td>22.53</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>3.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Highlands</td>
<td>8.96</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>7.13</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>23.67</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>50.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>22.53</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>213.33</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>13.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 11

African and non-African Population by Province, 1957, Tanganyika

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Non-African</th>
<th>% Non-African of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Lake and West Lake</td>
<td>772,48</td>
<td>759,0</td>
<td>13,4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>2246.2</td>
<td>2223.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanga</td>
<td>887.0</td>
<td>879.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Highlands</td>
<td>683.3</td>
<td>671.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>1030.3</td>
<td>1023.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>1062.6</td>
<td>1052.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>955.9</td>
<td>946.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8735.6</td>
<td>8662.7</td>
<td>122.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1IBRD, p. 462.

2Excludes Dar es Salaam; total population 128,742; African population, 93,363; non-African population, 35,379.
18,530,000 acres (see Table 11). Ergo, non-Africans controlled approximately 15.9 acres per capita and Africans cultivated slightly more than 2.1 acres per capita.

Three provinces stand out in the percentage of land alienated column: Tanga (7.13%), Northern (1.94%), and Eastern (1.33%). As Herrick notes, Sisal plantations "are found mainly around Tanga and Morogoro, but some small growers are south and east of Lake Victoria." 21 Thus, the large land alienation in Tanga Province and Eastern Province (Morogoro) are due to sisal plantations. 22 The vast majority of the alienated land in Northern Province is north of Mt. Meru and west of Mt. Kilimanjaro. The land is mostly used for small coffee estates and, as Rutman observes, these estates "are not concentrated in one area but are scattered among the small peasant farms of this region." 23

Population figures show a similar demographic distribution. Tanga Province has the largest percentage of non-Africans (outside of Dar es Salaam), where they consist

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21 Herrick, et al., op. cit., p. 239.
22 For the location of the provinces, see Appendix A: Maps & Figure 4.
23 Rutman, op. cit., p. 36.
of 2.5 percent of the total population. Northern Province and Eastern Province are the only other provinces which have non-African populations of over one percent of their total.

From the alienated land distribution and non-African population figures, three provinces are significant: Tanga, Northern, and Eastern. If this Tanganyikan landownership study is to support the Zanzibar thesis, African hostility towards non-Africans, should center in these provinces.

The Tanganyika African Civil Servants Association was the first voluntary association founded and controlled by Africans. This association was founded in Tanga in 1924. However, it was not formed as a protest group but, instead, acted as a pressure group representing the interests of African government employees.

During the interwar period, two Dar es Salaam based voluntary associations were also formed. The Tanganyika African Welfare and Commercial Association (TAWCA) was formed in the mid-1930's. In the beginning it was considered by the British to be more political than the Tanganyika African Association (TAA). Sir Harold MacMichael, British Governor

24 See p. 57, herein.

of Tanganyika from 1934 to 1933, was quoted as saying that
TAWCA members were "semi-literate, politically minded,
mission trained youth..." While there were unsuccessful
attempts to merge the TAWCA with the TAA, the association
never succeeded in emerging as a major political organization.

The TAA, with its less colorful beginning, has quite
a different history. Considered non-political, or apolitical,
when it first organized sometime between 1927 and 1929, it
was to emerge in 1954 as Tanganyika's major party, renamed
TANU. Sir Donald Cameron, British Governor of Tanganyika
from 1925 to 1931, is reported to have described TAA as
"a social rather than a political organization" made up of
"some of the better educated natives who are employed in
Government service or engaged in business and trade in
Dar es Salaam." 

It was after World War I that TAA became increasingly
political. It began to canvass the rural areas for support.
Its complexion, indeed, looked more and more like a national
movement. This rural expansion was implemented through
TAA's acceptance by the tribal unions.

26 Ibid., p. 23. (Citing the archives of the former
Tanganyika Territorial Secretary as S.M.P. 22444, pp. 69-70.)
27 Ibid., (Citing Cameron to Colonial Office, August 22,
1930, S. M. P. 19325, p. 15.)
The TAA gained considerable rural support from its opposition to British agricultural policies. This opposition also attracted many of the tribal unions to the side of the TAA. In fact, in some cases the tribal unions emerged as the local TAA branch. For example, after a TAA branch in Moshi challenged and lost to the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens' Union (KCCU) in an election to select a paramount Chagga chief, the branch was absorbed into the KCCU, which in turn became the official branch of the TAA.

The British began a policy of enforcing agricultural change about 1946. They were attempting to establish anti-erosion measures, cattleculling, disease prevention and inspection of crops. As the British attempted to enforce these agricultural changes, they met resentment and resistance. This opposition is dramatically exemplified by the celebrated

Meru Land Case.

The Meru Land Case began in 1951 when the British attempted to release Meru land for non-African use. The Meru Citizens' Union, led by Kirilo Japhet (Ajo), met this land alienation plan head on. Japhet eventually carried

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his fight to the floor of the United Nations. The TAA gained political advantage of the situation when they sent Japhet on a national tour. He later became the first TANU chairman of the Northern Province.

Thus, the TAA influence in the rural area continued to grow as they became the champion of the African farmer. As Lionel Cliffe observes:

In most areas, even if the rural peasantry was not part of the formal membership, the (Tanganyika African) Association's officials represented them in the sense that they received and took up complaints...

Along with this insertion into rural Tanganyika, TAA's membership began to increase significantly. In 1940 Lord Hailey reported that TAA only had about 100 members and two branches; the second branch, outside of the original branch in Dar es Salaam, was in Dodoma, Central Province. By 1947, however, Lord Hailey noted that the TAA had branches in a considerable number of places in the Lake, Northern,

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29 The Meru Land Case is at least partially responsible for the rebuke delivered to the British by a United Nations Visiting Mission in 1954.

30 Bienen, op. cit., p. 27. (Citing Lionel Cliffe, "Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika During the Colonial Period," Paper presented to the EAISR Conference, Makerere College, Kampala, December, 1963, p. 6.)

31 Ibid. (Citing Lord Haildy, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1940), p. 23.)
Eastern and Tanga Provinces. Four years later, 1951, the United Nations Visiting Mission found TAA branches in virtually every sizable town they visited. In 1957 Julius Nyerere reorganized the TAA and renamed it TANU.

After the TANU constitution was formally adopted on July 7, 1954 (Saba Saba) the new party continued to follow the majority of TAA's policies. As Ingham observes, initially TANU was primarily "an African nationalist movement and inevitably, in its public utterance, adopted an extreme tone so as to capture popular support. Nevertheless, as the party grew in strength, Nyerere's leadership enabled it to adopt a much more friendly attitude towards the idea of cooperation with other races."

This shift from the extreme, issue-oriented positions was a carefully executed move by Nyerere. While TANU did continue to oppose the alienation of land to any non-African and tried to act as the rural farmers voice of discontentment to colonial policies, their single aim was Uhuru (Freedom).

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33 Ingham, op. cit., p. 422.


35 Ingham, loc. cit.
As Nyerere explained his pre-independence policy after Uhuru had been achieved:

All we were saying... was "Let us unite and once we have achieved Uhuru the rest will take care of itself."... We deliberately refused to answer questions as to what we would do after Uhuru because the moment we had started to do that we would have got our forces divided about future plans and that would have been wrong. 36

Besides, as Herrick reports, "After 1954 the loss of land by Africans decreased, and by 1960 the government was granting long-term occupancy rights to non-Africans only in special cases... (In fact,) in 1960... the land given back to Africans was greater than that which was allotted to non-Africans that year." 37

In order to challenge the dominant position held by CANU, the United Tanganyika Party (UTP) was formed in 1956. It was sponsored by the colonial administration as an option to the all-African TANU. Whereas TANU membership was open only to Africans, UTP was open to all races. It was not until two years after independence that TANU became a multiracial party.

The UTP was more than a multiracial party. It was the unofficial, political arm of the colonial government.


While it opposed racial discrimination, it supported separate racial communities each with their own legislative representative. They believed that this could best be implemented by forming a second legislative chamber "which would be a consultative body including outstanding people of all races." 38

The UTP so closely parroted the government's official line that it went so far as to declare "that until independence the final responsibility for Tanganyika rested with the British government, and not with the United Nations." 39 They also wanted a franchise which would prevent the domination by one racial group over the others.

The government decided to hold elections for the Legislative Council in 1953 and 1959. Ten constituencies were developed, five of which were to hold their elections in September, 1953, and five of which were to hold their elections in February, 1959. Each constituency was to elect three members of parliament: one African, one Asian, and one European. In order to validate the ballot, the elector had to vote for all three seats.


39 Hughes, op. cit., p. 63.
The UTP, of course, endorsed this electoral policy. TANU, on the other hand, rejected the compulsory casting of three votes by each elector. They supported, instead, universal sufferage and racial parity on the Legislative Council.

In 1953, Nyerere decided that TANU should accept the compulsory tripartite voting system rather than boycott the election. Sensing a strong opposition to this endorsement, Zubari Mtemvu chose to leave TANU and form a more racialist group. Named the African National Congress (ANC), the party demanded an acceleration of the "Africanization" of the civil service and citizenship rights for Africans only.

While TANU was an "African-only" party, it gave their endorsement to those Asians and Europeans who were most sympathetic to their cause. They instructed their members to vote for these endorsed candidates or, if there was no endorsed candidate, to vote for the non-UTP contender.

The first round of elections was held on September 3, 1953, in Tanga, Western, Northern, Southern Highlands, and Eastern Provinces (this last excluded the Dar es Salaam district). 22,769 ballots were counted in this phase of the election. 40

40 This and the following election figures are taken from Bienen, op. cit., pp. 51-52; J. Clagett Taylor, The Political Development of Tanganyika (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1963), pp. 127-4; and, The Times (London), September 13, 1953, p. 5.
TANU and TANU-supported candidates won all twelve contested elections with an overall 67 percent of the vote. Graham Lewis, Eastern Province, was the only non-TANU supported candidate to win election and he was one of the three unopposed candidates.

Julius Nyerere won his election against G. P. Kunambi with more than three times as many votes as his opponent, 2,628 to 802. The ANC entered only one candidate in this phase of the election. Zubari Mtemvu, ANC's president, ran against John Keto, TANU, and P. C. Mntambo, UTP. The results were Keto 3,455 votes, Mntambo, 1,854, and Mtemvu, 53. The president of the UTP, Ivor Bayldon, was his party's candidate in the Southern Highlands Province. Running against Lady Chesham, a TANU-supported candidate, Bayldon was soundly defeated 2,962 to 954.

The first phase of the election effectively demonstrated the dominate position TANU held with the electorate. The UTP was damaged beyond repair. At the end of December, Sheikh Hussein Juma resigned his chairmanship of the UTP. At this same time the colonial administration admitted the end of the UTP when they acknowledged that the party had "ceased to function as an effective political organization."41

41 Taylor, op. cit., p. 174. (Citing from Colonial Office Report, 1958, p. 35.)
The second half of the election was set for February 9, 1959. A total of 30,791 voters registered for this part of the election. Again, there were fifteen seats available in five constituencies: three seats each in Dar es Salaam, Southern Province, South-East Lake constituency, Central Province, and West Lake Province. However, neither the UTP nor the ANC chose to run a candidate in any of these political races. All five African aspirants, TANU nominees, were unopposed. D. F. Heath was the only European TANU-sponsored candidate opposed. He was opposed in Dar es Salaam by the incumbent, Tom Tyrell, who ran as an independent after resigning from UTP after the September election. His resignation, however, did him little good as he was defeated by Heath 4,367 votes to 1,436. Two TANU-sponsored Asian candidates were also opposed. K. L. Jhaveri, a lawyer, backed by TANU defeated G. M. Daya, an independent, for the Asian seat in Southern Province. The TANU-sponsored candidate had little trouble winning his race.

The election had demonstrated that TANU was equally strong in all ten constituencies, including Northern, Tanga, and Eastern Provinces. The electorate seemed to prefer the middle-road, Uhuru-oriented approach of TANU to the more conservative political platform of the UTP or the more
radically-oriented position of the ANC. While the 1958-59 election shows little more than a clear preference for TANU, Tanga Province offers room for speculation. It is the only constituency in which ANC attempted to challenge TANU. While this challenge was disastrous, it is suggested that the more racially oriented ANC supporter thought that the Tanga Province was their best area to challenge TANU. In other words, they considered the province with the highest land alienation as the most inclined towards their position.

Political events moved quickly in Tanganyika after the 1958-59 election. It was less than two years later that new elections were called. Whereas the 1958-59 election was designed to make the Legislative Council more representative, the 1960 election was called in order to prepare Tanganyika for "responsible government".

With a greatly increased number of registered voters (885,000), the election took place on August 30, 1960. Seventy-one representative seats were open for election. Fifty of these seats were open to any member of the community: African, Asian, European, or Arab. In addition, twenty-one seats were reserved for eleven Asians (which includes Arabs) and ten Europeans. These elections were to be held in fifty

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42 Bienen, op. cit., p.55.
district sized constituencies. Unlike the 1958-59 election, the voter did not have to vote for a candidate of each race in this new election, but needed only to vote for candidate(s) of his choice.

When nominations closed on July 18, only thirteen seats were contested. Thirty-nine Africans, eleven Asians, and eight Europeans were declared elected on July 29, by virtue of "no contest".

As The Times pointed out, this was "the first time in the Commonwealth that a general election had been won before the voters had gone to the polls."43

Since there was no voting in uncontested elections, only 121,445 of the 885,000 registered voters cast their ballots on August 30.44 Of these, TANU candidates won 100,581 votes (82.8 percent); the ANC received 337 votes (0.3 percent); and independent candidates received 20,527 votes (16.9 percent).

The ANC was the only "organized opposition" TANU faced in the election. It had announced earlier that they would contest only three seats.45 They polled but 337

44 Bienen, op. cit., pp. 55-6.
votes out of the 16,001 votes balloted in the three elections. Zuberi Mtemvu once again forfeited his deposit, as did the other two ANC candidates.

The rest of the opposition TANU faced in the election came from independents. All three of the European challengers for the reserved seats, including Ivor Bayldon, the former UTP leader, lost their bids for election to TANU-supported candidates. A fourth European, R. Donaldson, filed for the Tanga open seat and lost to his TANU African opponent. In fact, all four European challengers lost their deposits.46

The only seat TANU lost was to an African independent, Mr. E. Sarwatt. Sarwatt had been the choice of the Mbulu branch of the TANU but was rejected by the TANU National Headquarters. With his rejection, Sarwatt and several of his followers left the party to challenge the National Headquarters' choice. Sarwatt's victory can be directly contributed to his popularity in the district. Not only was he a local resident, but he was the son of a prominent chief of the largest tribe in the area. Even so, his victory was close; he defeated his opponent by a narrow margin of 240 votes in a poll of over 15,000.47 The only other

46 Hughes, op. cit., pp. 78-80.

47 Lowenkopf, op. cit., p. 246.
significant challenge TANU had was in Lukugu, Southern Highlands Province, where the TANU candidate won, but with fewer votes than the combined total of his opponents. 48

The pattern that was evident in the 1958-59 election, once again appeared in 1960. TANU completely dominated the election. The ANC showed almost no election support. Even in the district in which Mtemvu ran, a district located in the province with the largest percentage of alienated land, Tanga Province, ANC was thoroughly repudiated. Independent candidates fared little better than the ANC candidates. Even with the seat TANU lost, they lost it to a former TANU member who later rejoined the party. 49

The only other national election to occur before the army strike was the presidential race of 1962. After Tanganyika received independence on December 9, 1961, the TANU government decided to replace the office of prime minister with an elected president. The election was set for November 1, 1962, one month before Jamhuri (the day Tanganyika became a republic).

Even after the demoralizing defeats the ANC suffered in the 1958-59 and 1960 election, they nominated their

48 Bienen, op. cit., p. 246.

49 Ibid., p. 56.
leader, the indefatigable Zubari Mtemvu, as Nyerere's presidential opponent. By the end of 1960, the ANC had nine organized branches, while TANU was reported to have had 498 organized branches.\footnote{50}

Over ten percent of the people in Tanganyika cast their votes for the president of their new country. Nyerere defeated Mtemvu 1,127,978 votes to 21,276.\footnote{51} The ANC only received 1.9 percent of the vote in their final election.\footnote{52} Again, the most striking feature of the election was the inability of the "opposition" to challenge Julius Nyerere and his TANU organization.

Two parties swiftly formed and disappeared in 1962. Under the leadership of C.K. Tumbo, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) was formed in opposition to TANU's racial policies. They, like the ANC, wanted a more rapid Africanization policy and a limited citizenship, i.e., citizenship for Africans only. A second party, the People's Convention...
Convention Party (PCP), was formed in Mwanza in opposition to "government land bills which set conditions for continued rights of occupancy." Neither party, however, received much support and they quickly disappeared. Neither party ever ran a candidate in a national election.

Following the Presidential election of 1962, Tanganyika became a de facto one-party state. Nyerere began an extensive and serious campaign to implement a de jure one-party state when he published *Democracy and the Party System*. In this essay Nyerere argues that since Tanganyikans agree on the fundamental issues of government, a one-party system is more democratic than a two-party system. For if the differences between the parties are not fundamental, then "the politics of a country governed by a two-party system are not, and cannot be, national politics; they are the politics of groups whose difference, more often than not, are of small concern to the majority of people". Ergo, Tanganyika should legally become a one-party state so that factionalism can be discharged from Tanganyikan politics and "any member of the Movement... would be free to stand as a candidate if he so wishes."

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53 Ibid., p. 58.
55 Ibid., p. 7.
56 Ibid., p. 25.
Early in 1964 Nyerere appointed a Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One-Party State. In 1965 the findings and recommendations of the Commission were used to draft a new constitution. The Interim Constitution of Tanganyika of 1965 proclaimed that “There should be one political Party in Tanzania”.57

Tanganyika’s post World War I history has been even more tranquil than Zanzibar’s. From 1920 until 1964 Tanganyika experienced only five reported incidents of violence, excluding violence against individuals or inter-tribal clashes. Neither of these latter two forms of violence are of any import to the scope of this paper. The relevant incidents are listed below in Table 12.

TABLE 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>incidents and location</th>
<th>no. of deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>labor strike riot, Tanga</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>dock worker’s strike and riot, Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Mau-Mau raid, Moshi</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Riot in protest to introduction of new land cultivation methods, Matombo</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Army strike, Dar es Salaam and Tabora</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reference: The Times Index (London), 1939-64.

The first two incidents of violence which resulted in death came from labor disputes. The government only became involved as the agent responsible for social order, not as the initial target of the protest. The third incident listed in Table 12 is an overflow from the internal disorder of a neighboring state. This is the period of time during which the infamous Mau-Mau rebellion of Kenya was at its height.\footnote{The interesting question of classifying and typing this extensive violence is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this essay.} As a result of pressure from the Kenyan police and army, a number of Kikuyu refugees fled across the border into Tanganyika's Northern Province. The only death reported in The Times (London), as the result of a Mau-Mau attack, took place just north of Moshi, Northern Province.\footnote{The Times (London), December 28, 1953, p. 6.} A family of four non-Mau-Mau Kikuyu were killed by the Mau-Mau terrorists.

In 1955 a crowd of approximately 4,000 African farmers rioted at the village of Matombo in the Morogoro district.\footnote{The Times (London), July 16, 1955, p. 6.} They were protesting the attempt of the central government to introduce new innovative land cultivating...
methods. The local farmers resented the insensitivity shown by the central government towards their traditional agricultural methods and rioted in protest. One rioter was shot to death and one policeman was seriously injured during the riot.

The final outbreak of violence shown during the period of the survey was the Army strike. As we have noted, seventeen people were killed in Dar es Salaam and one man was killed in Tabora.

In studying Table 12, we notice that in three of the five incidents, including the army strike, violence was the extension of a labor dispute. They took place in the area which supported these strikers. One incident was the only conflict which involved agriculture and it was not a protest over the ownership of land, but a protest over the violation of tradition.

Violence in Tanganyika, unlike that in Zanzibar, had no discernible correlation with landownership patterns. It is once again obvious that the foreign, i.e., non-African, ownership of land played but a small part in the overall politics of Tanganyika. Even though the Meru land case

\[ \text{61 See Chapter 3, above.} \]
gained international attention, landownership problems never again approached the position necessary to be considered a systemic dysfunction. In sum, Zanzibar's landownership patterns prior to the revolution were responsible for a serious internal societal dysfunction, while landownership patterns in Tanganyika prior to the army strike were inconsequential to that internal disturbance.

**Racial Tension**

A third often mentioned condition which is used to explain why a revolution occurred in Zanzibar is racial tension. John Hatch observes that "the composition of the population brings together Arabs, Indians and Africans. Ever since slave-trading days Africans have felt hostility towards Arabs...". The riots of June, 1961 in which 68 political rivals were killed, although occasioned by political rivalry, revealed how easily racial antagonisms can be roused.  

We suggest that Arab dominance in Zanzibar caused an irrepressible racial dichotomy. This dichotomy was intensified by repeated African failure through the constitutional system to achieve political equity. This frustration was strongest in Zanzibar town and Zanzibar town.

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island where the Arabs and Africans were located in physically separate areas. On the other hand, the Africans seemed most satisfied on Pemba island where African and Arab farms were interspersed.

In 1958 the official census recorded a total population of 299,200 people, of whom 165,300 lived on Zanzibar island and 133,900 lived on Pemba island.63 Unfortunately, the 1958 population figures cannot be used for this study. The principal difficulty of the 1958 figures is that these figures do not differentiate between two of the major ethnic groups of the islands—the Arabs and the Africans. For this reason, the 1948 census will be used. However, despite the increase in total population, the distribution "would appear to have altered very little in the period between the two census".64 The 1948 census figures are listed below in Table 13.

63 Middleton, op. cit., p. 6.

64 Ibid., p. 7.
### TABLE 13

**Distribution of Population by Ethnic Community in 1948, Zanzibar**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Zanzibar No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Island Pemba Island No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Zanzibar Protectorate No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>118,652</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>81,208</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>199,860</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>13,977</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>30,208</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>44,560</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>13,107</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>2,104</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>15,211</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comorian</td>
<td>2,764</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3,267</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goan</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td>681</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>296</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td>287</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>149,575</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td><strong>114,587</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td><strong>264,162</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From these census figures a great difference can be seen between the number of Africans to Arabs on Zanzibar island and the number of Africans to Arabs on Pemba island. On the former island there are more than eight times as many Africans as there are Arabs. On the latter island there are less than three times as many Africans as there are Arabs.

If we look at figures that tell us where these ethnic groups live on the two islands, we gain even a clearer picture of the demographic differences between the two islands. The 1948 figures are given in Table 14.
TABLE 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban-Rural Population Distribution, Zanzibar *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zanzibar Island</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pemba Island</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Urban areas on Zanzibar island include Zanzibar town and its virtual suburbs of Bububu, Kimara, Mbweni, and Mombasa. On Pemba island urban areas include Wete, Chake Chake, and Mkoani.

Again, the figures show a substantial difference between the two islands. On Zanzibar island over half of the Arabs live in or near Zanzibar town, while most of the Africans live in the rural areas of the island. These figures support a conclusion made earlier in this essay, that the Arabs and Africans on Pemba island were much less geographically separated than they were on Zanzibar island.

With these demographic figures in mind, let us now turn to our ethnic distribution map. On Pemba island

65 See Appendix A: Maps, Figure 1.
rural Arabs lived throughout the island, while on Zanzibar island rural Arabs centered in the rich plantation belt on the central west side of the island. Again, Africans lived throughout Pemba island, while they were concentrated in the less productive areas of Zanzibar island.

Even Zanzibar town showed this separation characteristic of Zanzibar island. Again turning to Appendix A: Maps, Figure 1, we see that the Arabs (and Asians) basically lived in the northwest corner of the town, commonly called Stone Town, while the Africans lived in the northeast and southern sections of the town, commonly called the Ngambo (African section).

We have suggested that racial tensions and African animosity towards Arabs were, in part, the results of a failure to gain control of the government through constitutional means. Such animosity was particularly noticeable in those areas where the Africans and the Arabs were physically separated. We will now examine the election results to test this hypothesis.

Since we have already compared Zanzibar island with Pemba island voting patterns, we will confine our examination to Zanzibar island: the island with the stronger anti-Arab sentiment. In short, did the African constituencies register the strongest anti-Arab (ASP) vote?
In 1957 Zanzibar South showed a stronger ASU vote than did Zanzibar North, the ASU received 76.1% in the former as compared to 53.4% in the latter. This, of course, corresponds to our expectations since Zanzibar North included most of the plantation area. Zanzibar town also ran true to form. Ngambo registered a strong ASP vote (77.4%), while Stone Town registered a weak ASP vote (27%). The surprising fact is that the ASP candidate received 27% of the vote in Stone Town, but considering he was not formally affiliated with the ASP, it becomes more understandable.

The January, 1961 results show substantially the same results as the 1957 results. In rural Zanzibar island, only the Northern constituency fails to comply with our pattern. Two conditions might explain the ZNP victory in the Northern constituency. First, this part of Zanzibar island is the closest constituency to Pemba island. Thus, Pemba island politics might influence voters in this area.

Second, the major tribe in this area of Zanzibar island is the Tumbatu. As we mentioned in the introduction, Tumbatu tribal identification had not developed to the point it had with the Hadimu. Hence, the Tumbatu were more apt to identify with the Arabs. This matter of weak tribal identification and the Arab-Pemba tribe cooperation is also
important on Pemba island. Also, the Tumbatu tribe extended over both the north tip of Zanzibar island and the southeast tip of Pemba island. This geographical overlapping of the Tumbatu might help explain why Pemba island politics possibly affected the politics in the Northern constituency.

The ZNP victory is expected in Mangapwani district. It is in the heart of the plantation sector. We also find both constituencies in Stone Town delivering a weak ASP vote. Darajani gave a slight majority to the ZNP and occupied the fringe area between Stone Town and Ngambo and populated mostly by Comorians. The rest of Zanzibar town delivered its expected heavy ASP vote.

The June, 1961 election was a carbon copy of the January, 1961 election on Zanzibar island. The only constituency to change its votes even five percent was in Makunduchi where the ZNP candidate withdrew and his votes apparently went to the ZPPP candidate. The ASP candidate still won by a comfortable majority.

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66 See Appendix A: Maps, Figure 1.

67 The Comorians are an immigrant group from a French island, Comores Island, just south of Zanzibar. Because of their French mannerisms they are a distinct people, aligned closer with the Arabs than with the Africans. They, like the Asians, were traders and businessmen.
Again, the 1963 election gives us the very same pattern. We also find that the two constituencies carved out of the northern constituency of 1961 gave a majority vote for the ZNP. We find nothing in these results to cause us to revise our suggested explanation for this "inconsistency" to our pattern.

When the election riots of 1961 erupted, they began in Ngambo where the inequities between Arabs and Africans could most easily be seen—Stone Town in contrast to Ngambo. Okello also enlisted the majority of his forces from those areas outside of the plantation area. As he states, "... we did not have members or soldiers in Mangapwani, Tumbatu, Bumbwani, and Nungwi which were all Arab strongholds". The data above, then, tends to support our hypothesis on racial tension.

In line with our study on racial tensions in Zanzibar, we will now look at Tanganyika's racial relationships. We will once again trace population figures for their demographic distribution. These will be compared to the voting patterns in order to suggest what affect, if any, racial proportionment had on the election results. These findings, of course, will be compared to our findings on Zanzibar.

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68 Okello, op. cit., p. 130-31.
Since the British accepted the responsibility of Tanganyika's administration, Africans have always had some involvement in the country's government. Limited as this involvement was, first through "local native administration" and later through political appointments to the Legislative Council, the British governors realized that Africans would eventually have a dominant if not predominant role in Tanganyika's government. Furthermore, Africans began forming voluntary associations as early as 1924.

As we have seen the TAA formed sometime between 1927 and 1929. It began and ended as an African organization. When TANU was formed out of the TAA in 1954, it became an "African-only" party. Nyerere, however, held a sincere belief in eventually creating a non-racial party. As early as 1957 he suggested to the United Nations Trusteeship Council that TANU would shortly be open to all races. Due to strong opposition within TANU, it was not until 1965 that all citizens without regard for race or occupation could join TANU. The National Executive Committee (NEC) of TANU opened membership to Asians and Europeans in 1963.

69 Ingram, op. cit., p. 297.
70 Hughes, op. cit., p. 66.
The following year, civil servants, military members and policemen were allowed to join the party.  

The first party formed to challenge Nyerere's racial approach was the United Tanganyika Party (UTP). As we have seen, it was formed with the encouragement of the colonial administration. Its main purpose, other than as an opposition party to TANU, was to challenge the "African-only" membership rule of TANU.

Founded in 1956, the UTP made its first electoral challenge to TANU in 1958-59. The failure of the UTP to influence the voter with its multi-racial policy is evident in the September, 1958 phase of the election. It failed to elect even one member to the parliament.

From Table 11 we can see that Tanga Province had the largest percentage of non-African residents (2.5 percent). However, even in this province, the UTP had little support. In the African contest, Keto, TANU's candidate, received 3,455 votes (64.4 percent of the total vote) to 1,854 votes (34.5 percent) for Mntambo, UTP's candidate. The

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71 Bienen, op. cit., p. 243.

72 Herein, p. 78.

73 Taylor, op. cit., p. 173.
European race was just as conclusive as the African race in this province. Donaldson, a TANU-supported candidate, defeated Lead 3,439 votes to 1,567.\textsuperscript{74}

The failure of the UTP to mobilize an anti-TANU party can also be shown from its membership figures. Approximately 7,000 voters had joined UTP by mid-1957. Of this "total membership, 4,600 were Africans. Only 500 of an estimated 4,000 eligible Europeans and 1,800 of an estimated 30,000 Asians had joined".\textsuperscript{75}

TANU was also challenged because of its policy of progressively opening memberships to all races. While the ANC and the PDC both advocated a party membership closed to non-Africans and citizenship rights to Africans only, the ANC was the only one of the two parties to seek support for this policy line at the polls. While the ANC only contested one seat in the 1953-59 election, its defeat.

\textsuperscript{74} The Times (London), September 13, 1958, p. 5.

was conclusive. The ANC's president, Mtemvu, ran against Keto (TANU) and Mntambo (UTP) in Tanga Province. He only received 53 votes (1 percent). 76

The ANC returned to the polls in 1960. Attempting to find further support for their racial policy, they challenged TANU in three contests. Out of the 16,001 votes cast in the three elections, the ANC only received 337 votes, or 2.1 percent of the vote. 77 Zuberi Mtemvu lost another election deposit in his bid for office.

The ANC made its final appeal to the voters in 1962. In an election for the newly formed position of president, Mtemvu made a personal challenge to Nyerere. Nyerere's belief in racial equality was well known. Mtemvu was equally outspoken on his "African-only" position. The election result was clear. The electorate chose Nyerere with an overwhelming majority; Nyerere received 1,127,978 votes while his staunch opponent only received 21,276 votes. 78 The ANC's inability to receive support

76 Taylor, loc. cit.

77 Lowenkopf, op. cit., p. 247.

78 Bienen, op. cit., p. 57.
for their "Tanganyika for Africans only" policy seems undeniable in light of our election findings. Even in the province with the largest percentage of non-Africans, Tanga Province, neither the multi-racial UTP nor the racial ANC were able to challenge the "middle road" approach of TANU.

Credit for the harmonious development of racial understanding in African governed Tanganyika goes to Nyerere. It has been through his sensitive and tactful leadership that understanding has been relatively successful. Nyerere's commitment to eventual racial anonymity goes back to at least 1952. While he was a graduate student at Edinburgh University, Nyerere wrote a paper on the race problem in East Africa. In this paper he observed that it was stupid to quarrel over matters of race. Not only was such a quarrel stupid, it was a potentially tragic argument. He concluded, "If we all make up our minds to love like 'ordinary sort of fellows' and not to think that we were specially designed by the Creator to be masters and others specially designed to be hewers of wood and drawers of water we will make East Africa a very happy country for everybody". 30

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80  
Ibid., p. 29.
When Nyerere returned to Tanganyika and began his active participation in the country's newly emerging African politics, racial anonymity became one of his most important and recurring themes. Immediately following his election to the Legislative Council, he voiced his objections to the use of either multi-racial policies or non-racial policies. He pointed out that since Great Britain, the United States of America, and India were all nations of multi-racial populations but did not refer to their policies as multi-racial policies, it would be somewhat sinister and misleading to do so in Tanganyika. Furthermore, the use of non-racial policies are equally objectionable on the grounds that race is still emphasized. What Nyerere advocated was an eventual policy in which race was ignored and the individual citizen was stressed.

The individual is the keystone to Nyerere's philosophy. It is the quality of the citizen which is important to Nyerere, not his racial membership. In this same sense, Nyerere stresses the right of the individual, not tribal or community rights.

His philosophy may have seemed in contradiction to the new African government's policy of giving priority to Tanganyikan citizens of African descent in appointments

81 Ibid., p. 63-65.
and promotions in the civil service. It was, indeed, a contradiction, but one recognized and corrected by the nation's first president in early 1964. In a policy circular to all Ministers and public bodies in Tanganyika and also released for publication, Nyerere wrote:

> It is natural that we should distinguish between those who are, and those who are not, citizens of our country. But it would be quite wrong for us to continue to discriminate between Tanganyika citizens on any grounds other than those of character, and ability to do specific tasks...
>
> The distinction between citizens of African descent and citizens of non-African descent must now be ended.\(^8\)

> Nyerere's long-standing and consistent belief in racial anonymity did much to reduce racial fears in Tanganyika. His philosophy allowed Tanganyika to develop one of the most harmonious interracial understandings in Africa.

> In accord with our findings on Zanzibar's economic status and landownership, the two differed substantially in their interracial equilibrium. Whereas a clear dichotomy existed between Arabs and Africans in Zanzibar, interracial understanding was emerging in Tanganyika. On the one hand, the acceptance of TANU's policy of progressive integration was accepted equally well all over the nation, even in those areas with a higher non-African population. On the other

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\(^8\) Ibid., p. 259.
hand, Zanzibar's politics showed a deep chasm running along racial lines. Hence, a racial dysfunction existed in Zanzibar while racial understanding and cooperation were developing in Tanganyika.
CHAPTER 6

AN INTRANSIGENT ELITE

The second component required by Johnson's model is an intransigent elite. As he succinctly writes, "It takes two to make a revolution, and one of these two is always the status quo elite." 1 In addition, the elite must be intransigent or simple change will occur as they are confronted and threatened by these disruptive dysfunctions. If an elite hopes to escape a revolution, concessions must not only be made but such concessions must be made before revolutionary change becomes the accepted mode of change by the dissident force.

Arabs have been the dominate force on Zanzibar since the 1830's when Seyyid Said Sultan (Al-Busaidi) chose Zanzibar as the capital for the Omani Empire in East Africa. Even after the islands fell under the control of Great Britain, the Arabs held the preferred economic, political, and social positions. Economically, the Arabs owned most of the government seats under the British supervision.

Socially, the Arabs represented the aristocracy of Zanzibar and had a much higher standard of living than did the Africans. The capital, Zanzibar town, especially symbolized Arab superiority with the physical separation of Stone Town and Ngambo. Above all the Sultan was always a visible symbol of Arab authority in Zanzibar.

From 1957, when the first popular election was held, until 1963, when Zanzibar became an independent nation, the Arabs were able to retain political control. Although the ASU won three Legco seats (one-half of the elected seats) in the 1957 election, the Arabs remained in firm control of the native representation to the Council. Only six of twelve unofficial seats to Legco were open for popular election. The other six were appointive, chosen by the Sultan, on the advice of the British Resident. Sheikh Ali Muhsin Barwani, for example, was appointed to one of these six seats. He was the top leader of the ZNP and was soundly defeated by Sheikh Abeid Karume in the Ngambo constituency, 3,323 votes to 913.

The January, 1961 election resulted in the tie with each party receiving eleven legislative seats. However, when an additional constituency was added for the "run-off" election six months later, it was created in Pemba island, the strong hold for ZNP/ ZPPP coalition. The ZNP/ZPPP...
coalition won this additional seat and won a parliamentary majority even though they received a minority popular vote—ASP had 45,172 (50.6%) votes and the ZNP/ZPPP coalition had 44,172 (49.4%) votes.

The 1963 election was a repeat of the June, 1961 election. Out of 31 constituencies, the ASP won 13 Legco seats, while the ZNP/ZPPP coalition won 18 seats. The Arab forces had a firm legislative majority. This legislative majority was attained despite a clear defeat in popular votes. The ASP won 87,035 (54.2%) votes while the ZNP/ZPPP coalition won only 73,559 (45.8%) votes. This election was especially important in that the winner (the ZNP/ZPPP coalition) was to receive independence from Great Britain.

Immediately following the election of 1963, the ZNP/ZPPP clearly showed their resolution to retain political control over the islands. As Lofchie explains:

The ASP's massive popular following led to considerable speculation that a three-party "national" government would be formed. In the despair of defeat many top ASP leaders viewed this as a more fruitful course of action than simply to form a parliamentary opposition. An ASP delegation began to negotiate with the ZNP/ZPPP over a possible three-way distribution of ministerial portfolios. The ZNP/ZPPP leaders, however, proved extremely reluctant to allow the ASP to help form a Government. They argued that they had offered the ASP an opportunity to form an all-party coalition at the 1962 London Constitutional conference, but had been turned down.2

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During the months prior to the revolution, the ZNP/ZPPP coalition began a series of moves to insure their social control. (They passed or initiated legislation which would effectively curtail opposition groups.) For example, they outlawed a leftist organization (Babu's Umma Party) which had splintered from the ZNP; they imposed restrictions on the press; and, they began staffing many of the politically strategic sectors of the bureaucracy with Arabs known to support the ZNP. Arab intransigence was a fact of political life in Zanzibar immediately before the revolution.

Tanganyika is a study of the opposite kind of leadership. While it is a fact that TANU became the only legal party in Tanganyika by 1967, it did so with a clear mandate of the people. The presidential election of 1962 was a manifestation of this mandate. TANU's candidate, Julius Nyerere, received more than 93 percent of the vote. The inability of opposition parties to challenge TANU shows another example of the overwhelming support TANU received (and, from all indications, continues to receive) from politicized Tanganyikans. Not one candidate supported by an opposition party ever gained election. The only defeat TANU ever suffered at the polls was inflicted by an independent.

\[3\]
Ibid., p. 265.
and this independent was a former TANU member who rejoined the party shortly after his victory.

Three factors contributed to the peaceful transfer of Tanganyika from British to African control. First, Great Britain became the administrating power of Tanganyika. Second, Tanganyika became a trust territory of the United Nations. Third, Tanganyika was fortunate in its choice of a national leader. While there were other factors responsible for this peaceful transition of Tanganyika, these three were of prime significance.

The fact that Great Britain became the administrating power of Tanganyika is a salient constituent to the East African country’s tranquil beginnings as an independent nation. Through the British system of indirect rule, Africans gained experience and confidence in participating in a contemporary governmental system. By 1924 there were enough Africans in the civil service to form a voluntary association, the Tanganyika African Civil Service Association. It was from this corps of African civil servants that many of the leaders of TANU and independent Tanganyika

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4 This does not mean to imply that indirect rule was faultless. As A.J. Hughes points out, Cameron apparently, did not foresee that indirect rule would also act against his ultimate goal of Africans ruling Tanganyika. For instance, indirect rule fostered tribalism and, by itself, failed “to train people in Western skills and to provide a proper place for those who did achieve such skills...” Hughes, _op. cit._, p. 47.
were recruited. As Bienen observed, "TANU appealed to clerks and other lower-level officials in the colonial administration."

The British were also sensitive enough to recognize and accept the African drive towards independence. While at first they attempted to stem, or at least retard, this African independence movement, British administrators accepted the facts and made the transition as smoothly and as harmoniously as possible.

Tanganyika's position as a United Nations' trust territory also facilitated her peaceful movement from a dependent to an independent state. While Great Britain was administratively in control of Tanganyika, she also accepted the international status of Tanganyika: first through the mandate system of the League of Nations and later through the trusteeship system of the United Nations. As we have already noted, any power either international organization had over the mandated or trust territory, depended upon the sensitivity and receptivity of the administrating nation to the opinions, suggestions, and resolutions of the international organization and their members. Fortunately for Tanganyika, Great Britain was among the most receptive to the international attitudes manifested through the voice of these two organizations.

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5 Bienen, op. cit., p. 46.
One of the most comprehensive case studies on the influence which international trusteeship status had on a trust territory was written on Tanganyika. As a revised addition of his doctoral dissertation, B.T.G. Chidzero published *Tanganyika and International Trusteeship.* As a result of his examination, he concluded that Tanganyika's status as an international trustee territory influenced her political development in at least four important ways: (1) the maintenance of the status of the territory; (2) the pattern and rate of the territory's political progress; (3) the response to the problems of multiracialism; and (4) the question of landownership and land alienation.

Because of the status of a trust territory and Great Britain's recognition and acceptance of this position, any change in Tanganyika's international status was a remote possibility. For instance, Chidzero wrote, "In the immediate post-war period, when there were local pressures and widespread support in Britain in favour of creating federations in Central and East Africa, Tanganyika's international position...rendered it legally impossible to include her".

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7 Ibid., pp. 248-56.

8 Ibid., p. 249.
When Tanganyika became a trust territory of the United Nations, a difference of opinion developed between the United Nations Trusteeship Council and the Administrating Authority. Whereas Great Britain continued to support a policy of gradual political development and qualified franchise for the people, the United Nations urged a policy of speedy development and universal suffrage. This difference between the Administrating Authority and the United Nations not only offered worldwide publicity to the question, but it increased the activity, self-confidence, and determination of the African leaders.

Tanganyika's membership in the trusteeship system also aided her racial confluence. Following World War II, when eventual independence of Tanganyika became not only a goal but a coming reality, concern for non-Africans became an important factor in British policies. While the United Nations also recognized the insecure position non-Africans would face after independence, they differed substantially from the British in how non-African protection could be achieved. Where the British favored a policy of balanced representation of each racial community, the Trusteeship Council stressed an equality of individual rights. As we have seen, the British view prevailed in the 1953-59 election, only to yield to the United Nations' position in the 1960 election.
The final significant influence that trusteeship status had on the political development of Tanganyika revolved around the question of land. Because of the international nature of Tanganyika, non-African emigration was somewhat retarded. There just wasn't the same psychological security that an emigrant experienced when he migrated to a Crown colony or a protectorate. In addition, the British were restrained, psychologically, if not physically, from granting land rights in perpetuity or establishing large, clearly defined non-African areas.

Chidzero sums the influence of the Tanganyika's international status in these words:

Whatever may have been and may be the motives and convictions of individual members of the Trusteeship Council in their criticisms of Britain, the net result is that international trusteeship had generally rendered British rule less a matter of expediency and more a matter of principle and moral obligation, less a function of settler pressure and more a matter geared to the terms of international obligations.

As a system of rights and duties, of legal and moral obligations, of international accountability and international supervision, international trusteeship can justly be said to have procured a greater sense of security for the indigenous peoples of Tanganyika. It had contributed to the development of a system of government increasingly becoming divested of the rationalizations of qualitative democracy which in other instances have shown themselves to be but devices to perpetuate sectional interests and entrench indefinitely privileged minority positions. Finally, it has contributed most positively to both the land policy of the Territory and to the rejection of any European-dominated political federation in East Africa.9

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9 Ibid., pp. 255-6.
Whenever the politics of Tanganyika are mentioned, it is impossible to ignore Julius K. Nyerere. If any one force can be identified as the force of nationalism, that force is Julius K. Nyerere, respectfully called Mwalimu (Teacher) or Baba ya Taifa (father of the nation). People of all tribes throughout Tanganyika speak reverently and in a certain amount of awe when mentioning the President. Political leaders almost singularly emulate Nyerere in dress and speech. As Herrick states, "He is a symbol of unity, and as such, seems capable of explaining to the people the problems of development".\(^{10}\) Nyerere and Tanganyika are, in fact, often thought of synonymously.

It is undeniable that much of the ease with which Tanganyika went from a British trust territory to an independent nation was due to Nyerere's leadership. As

\(^{10}\) Herrick, et. al., op. cit., pp. 264-5.

\(^{11}\) It is prudent, however, at this point to heed the warning of Bienen when he admonished, "People have written about Tanganyika and about TANU as if the ideas associated with one man--Julius Nyerere--were the belief system of a whole society. There has been a narrower, but equally mistaken tendency to equate the ideology of TANU with Nyerere's ideas. However, it would not be entirely accurate to assume that all published statements about the past, present, and future of Tanganyika were the work of Nyerere alone". Bienen, op. cit., p. 205.
pointed out above, it was Nyerere's patient and skillful leadership that was responsible for keeping racial problems in Tanganyika to a minimum.\footnote{12}

Another incident which exemplifies Nyerere's tactful leadership occurred in 1953.\footnote{13} The British colonial government proposed a common voters' roll; election based on a compulsory tripartite ballot; that is, each voter was required to cast a vote for each of the three racially designated seats available in their respective constituencies. TANU had initially rejected this proposed election because of the compulsory tripartite balloting procedure. Claiming that this balloting procedure was impractical, TANU threatened to boycott the election unless the British colonial government granted immediate universal suffrage parity in the Legislative Council between Africans and all other races, and independence within four years: seven years early than the date stated in the demands.

When, in July, 1953, Sir Richard Turnbull succeeded Sir Edward Twining as Governor, it was Nyerere who immediately began to develop a rapport with the new governor. When

\footnote{12} Herein, Chap. 5.

\footnote{13} Hughes, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 65.
Turnbull addressed the Legislative Council for the first time on October 14, 1953, he declared that when self-government was attained, both the legislature and the government were likely to be predominantly African. \(^{14}\)

Nyerere responded:

We have always waited for a Governor of this country even to indicate that it was the government's policy that, when self-government is eventually achieved in this country, the Africans will have a predominant say in the affairs of the country. Now the Africans have this assurance, I am confident that it is going to be the endeavour of the Africans, if the non-Africans have any fears left, to remove those fears and remove them soon. \(^{15}\)

In order to put the importance of this speech in context, it should be remembered that Nyerere expressed these comments just two years after the Mau-Mau violence had ended in Kenya. The ability of African and European living together in harmony was seriously questioned by East Africans of all races immediately following these anxious years.

Nyerere was ideally suited for his role of guiding Tanganyika to independence. He was a well educated man, among the first Tanganyikan Africans to receive a college education. He started his college education at Makerere College in Kampala, Uganda and later traveled to Great

\(^{14}\)Ibid., p. 69.

\(^{15}\)Ibid.
Britain where he took an M.A. at Edinburgh University. Nyerere then returned to Tanganyika and taught at St. Francis Pugu school situated twelve miles outside of Dar es Salaam and at a secondary school located near Tabora. He joined the TAA while at Tabora and was soon fully involved in politics.

Nyerere's tribal lineage also aided his political position as Baba Ya Taifa. He is the son of a chief of the small Zanaki tribe which inhabits land located on the northeast Tanganyikan shore of Lake Victoria. Since Mwalimu (an affectionate title commonly used for Nyerere which means The Teacher) is a member of a small tribe, he avoids the common African problem of belonging to a rival tribe of the other large tribes in the country. It thus becomes much easier to appeal to the whole country as their national leader, not as a tribal leader who has somehow gained paramountcy.

In writing about Tanganyika's advances towards independence, Hughes somewhat admiringly sums up Nyerere's qualities in these words:

His integrity, his intellect, his organizing talents and his ability to translate his idealism into popular practical terms... played an important part in this advance.

For a location of tribes in Tanganyika see Appendix A: Maps, Figure 5.
He was all the more acceptable because he came from a small tribe.¹⁷

In our examination of pre-1964 Zanzibar and Tanganyika we found a near perfect contrast of an intransigent vs. a sensitive elite. In Zanzibar the governmental leadership attempted to fortify their position through political manipulation and physical repression. In Tanganyika, on the other hand, the political leaders implemented change slowly and carefully, with a continual awareness as to the sensitivity of the people. Once again, Zanzibar fulfilled one of Johnson's conditions necessary for a revolution, while Tanganyika avoided developing an intransigent elite.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 71.
CHAPTER 7

THE ACCELERATOR

The final condition needed to incite a revolution is an accelerator. Accelerators, Johnson explains, "are particularly intense sources of dysfunction that make their effects felt suddenly and powerfully, and that typically constitute the final aggregate in a growing burden of dysfunctional conditions". An accelerator, then is a catalyst which causes existent dysfunctions to surface. These dysfunctions, in turn, cause the oppressed to mobilize into a violent reaction—a reaction called revolution. We will consider three possible accelerators to the Zanzibar revolution.

The Communists

Communism, posits one group of Zanzibar "experts", was the accelerator which brought about the Zanzibar revolution. For instance, Pieter Lessing writes, "It (the

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What was the basis for this conclusion? Aidan Crawley sums it up in two sentences. He writes, "In fact, Hanga and Babu, who were the two leaders of rival Communist factions, knew exactly what they were going to do two years before they did it (initiate a revolution), and planned it steadily. Hanga in particular was open in talking to one about what their intentions were." Thus, two political leaders of Zanzibar were singled out as "fellow travelers" and the importers of the Zanzibar revolution—Abdul Bahman Mohammed (Babu) and Abdulla Hanga. Unfortunately for the proponents of this thesis, the evidence is contrary to the Communist conspiracy thesis.

First, neither "Babu" nor Hanga participated in the revolution. Late in 1963 the Umma Party had been banned and Babu left the island ahead of an arrest warrant issued by the ZNP. But, speculate some of our Communist theorists, Babu could have slipped back to Zanzibar before

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3Crawley, op. cit., p. 97.

4Kyle, "Gideon's Voices", op. cit., p. 175.
the revolution. However, Babu did not leave Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika. As Kyle reports, "He (Babu) spent the whole of Saturday evening there (in Dar es Salaam) drinking with a well-known American journalist".5

And where was Hanga? Again, Kyle reports, "A few hours after the revolution had started Kassim Hanga slipped quietly out of Zanzibar by canoe and made for the mainland. Why? One can only guess. (His own answer now to this question is that he was 'on a mission'.) The likelihood is that he was just as much in the dark as the other politicians: this was not his revolution".6 Nor has John Okello accorded either of these men an active roll in the revolution.

Some claims have been made that Okello was a Cuban trained revolutionary. Again, the evidence is contrary to the suggestion. In Okello's own words:

I am no one's agent and I believe this matters, both for those who claim to explain the Zanzibar Revolution and for the leaders of East Africa, who know its causes... As I have written in this book, the Revolution in Zanzibar which I led was not 'approved from above' or supported from outside, but it may have foiled those who were planning such revolutions with leaders they knew and could control.7

5"How it Happened", op. cit., p. 203.
6Ibid.
7Okello, op. cit., p. 25.
According to Okello's own account, he had never been outside of East Africa.

Okello had little contact with communism. While he was vaguely aware of Castro and his Cuban revolution, he cited Gideon as his chief source of inspiration and was much more prone to biblical expression than he was to communist doctrine. For instance, when he was about two years old, he had been baptised with the Christian name of Gideon.\(^8\)

Also, before he launched the revolutionary attack he had given his men ten commandments; their biblical style was obvious.\(^9\)

Finally, the "Communist inspired revolution" theorists cited Zanzibar's immediate and close association with the "Eastern Block" as proof of pre-revolution ties between the Communists and the revolutionaries. What they apparently fail to consider is that it was these nations, along with the East African nations, which were the first to recognize The People's Republic of Zanzibar. The East African nations had recognized the new regime within three days after the revolution. The Communist nations of Cuba, the U.S.S.R., East Germany, and the People's Republic of

\(^8\)Ibid., p. 35.
\(^9\)Ibid., pp. 124-5.
of China had recognized the revolutionary government of Zanzibar before the end of January, while Great Britain, and the U.S. did not recognize the regime until February 24, one month after the Communist nations. In fact, Communist China pledged an aid grant of $518,000 to Zanzibar on February 21. Is it little wonder that Zanzibar seemed to draw closer to the Communists?

But, to repeat, the revolution was not a creation of the Communists. As Humphry Berkeley, MP (Great Britain) writes:

It now seems clear that the January revolt owed nothing to Communist inspiration nor to the activities of President Karume and Abdulrahman Mohammed Babu, the principal contestants for power at the present time. Both were apparently engaged in separate and distinct plots of their own, and both found themselves the unexpected beneficiaries of the surprisingly successful military plans of "Field-Marshall" John Okello.10

"The Prophet Gideon" and Africanized Africa

Two other factors present in Zanzibar just before the revolution make more sense as accelerators. First, there was a dedicated prophet of revolution called John "Gideon" Okello. Second, there was a movement throughout Africa for an independent, Africanized Africa.

We are not suggesting that without Okello there would not have been a revolution. In fact, there is evidence that there was at least one, and perhaps two, other revolution plots present in Zanzibar. As one "eye-witness" reporter suggests:

There were two revolutionary plots in Zanzibar, not one. Once this central fact is grasped, some of the apparent contradictions in the evidence sort themselves out, though it must be confessed that many loose ends remain. The first plot was planned by the Afro-Shirazi Party, almost certainly with the knowledge and approval of the leading politicians on the mainland. It relied to some extent on outside help and it seems likely that if it had succeeded Kassim Hanga rather than Abeid Karume would have been chosen as the Republican leader.

The second plot was Okello's. Nonetheless, without Okello, the revolution that took place would not have occurred.

Admitting that Okello was primarily responsible for the planning and initiating of the Zanzibar revolution of January 12, 1964, two questions remain. First, what is responsible for Okello's attitude towards the Arabs? Second, why was he able to find a receptive audience?

In answer to the first question, we look once again to Okello's autobiography. While he lived in Nairobi, Kenya during 1954-55, he came into contact with members of the Land Freedom Army and the Nairobi African District

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11 Kyle, "Gideon's Voices", op. cit., p. 175.
It was during this time that Okello learned "what the Kenya Africans themselves were thinking about the present and future state of their country. I am indebted to this party (the Nairobi African District Congress) for much of my early education in political organization which I put to good use later when teaching the masses of Zanzibar".\(^1\)\(^2\) It is obvious that Kenyan movements advocating African independence for Kenya made a profound impact on Okello.

It is suggested that African nationalism during the early 1960's in East Africa acted as a catalyst not only on Okello but on his followers. In fact, it is responsible for the "atmosphere of revolution" which had permeated the African society of Zanzibar. It is responsible for the coming together of all the grievances, overt and latent, Africans held against the Arabs.

On December 9, 1961 Tanganyika was granted independence under the African leadership of Julius K. Nyerere and the TANU (Tanganyika African National Union); on October 9, 1962 Uganda achieved independence under the African leadership of Dr. Milton Obote and the UPC (Uganda People's Congress); and on December 12, 1963 Kenya achieved independence under the African leadership Jomo Kenyatta and the KANU (Kenya African National Union). In the meantime, \(^1\)\(^2\)Okello, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
Zanzibar was given its independence on December 10, 1963 under the Arab leadership of Sultan Seyyid Jamshid bin Abdullah and Mohammed Shamte and his ZNP.

We must also remember that there was a sizable number of mainland Africans living in Zanzibar at this time—in 1948 there were 51,380 (21% of the population) people counted as mainland Africans. It seems reasonable to suspect that the "Africanization" of their homelands influenced their attitude towards the "Arabization" of Zanzibar—an attitude of frustration and resentment. Remember also that it was these mainland Africans who made up the bulk of Okello's hard core revolutionaries.

A "great man" historian might cite Okello as the sole major cause for the Zanzibar revolution. However, at least three factors place this interpretation in doubt.

First, Zanzibar was ready for a revolution. The election riot of 1961 is ample proof that the African population of Zanzibar island was dissatisfied with Arab rule of the islands. (Those who would dismiss these riots as mere political friction, overlook the fact that political parties on Zanzibar were reflections of ethnic differences.) The militant and inflammatory action of Babu's Umma party, which led to its banning, is partial evidence of a militant reaction to Arab rule growing on Zanzibar island—a reaction which was quite separate from Okello's agitations.
Even the ZNP/ZPPP government was aware of underlying disenchantment with their government. For instance, a law which was passed to control "subversive" societies read, in part, "The Minister can...by order declare to be unlawful any society which in his opinion is being used for any purpose prejudicial to or incompatible with the maintenance of peace, order and good government". This is not a law representative of a secure government.

Second, when Okello began to enlist his revolutionary army, he encountered little difficulty. In fact, he quickly enlisted the aid and support of several key officials of the youth wing of the ASP, the ASYL, several former police officers, and members of African based unions. It is clear that they joined Okello not because of his charisma, but because they were ready for an opportunity to attack the Arab oligarchy.

If Okello had been the charismatic force behind the Zanzibar revolution, his popularity would certainly have sustained him in power longer than a month. Within one month after the revolution Okello was disposed of as a significant leader in Zanzibar. In fact, by the end of February he had been banned from the islands. This doesn't seem to be the fate one would expect for a "great man" of a revolution.

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13 Lofchie, *Zanzibar*, p. 266.
Third, as we have already noted, there was at least one other revolutionary plot present in Zanzibar in early 1964. In fact, one political correspondent, Keith Kyle, believes that a plot led by Kassim Hanga, planned with the cooperation of outside help, and known to Tanganyika leaders, was planned for January 19, one week after Okello's revolution.14

In sum, the sudden movement on the mainland towards independence and Africanization caused the multiple dysfunctions present in Zanzibar society to coalesce and culminate into a revolution. Okello began his preparations for a revolution because of his nationalistic temperament. He found a receptive following because the multiple dysfunctions examined above were present.

Tanganyika

While our examination of Tanganyika failed to reveal either significant multiple dysfunctions or an intransigent elite, it might be useful to examine briefly communism, leadership, and Africanization as possible accelerators. Such an examination will necessarily be brief and comparative. Tanganyika did not give any significant dysfunctions or an intransigent elite. Therefore, by definition, an accelerator of revolution was not present in this mainland African nation.

In 1964 Tanganyika had little involvement with the Communist, in fact, over eighty-three percent of her imports and eighty-six percent of her exports came from or went to Commonwealth nations or their allies.\textsuperscript{15} Tanganyikan leaders were educated by European teachers. Nyerere, for example, received his higher education at Makerere University College in Uganda and at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland. While Nyerere is leading his country towards a democratic socialism, it is distinctly an African version of socialism.\textsuperscript{16} In sum, Nyerere’s political orientation is neither “pro-West” nor “pro-East”, but pro-Africa, generally and pro-Tanganyika, specifically.

As we have pointed out repeatedly, Nyerere is the outstanding leader of Tanganyika. His leadership has never been directly challenged and even during the Army strike of 1964, his position was never questioned by the Army. There is, of yet, no single leader in Tanganyika who can even approach Nyerere’s popularity. The only other national leader who came close to attaining Nyerere’s stature was Oscar Kambona, who lost favor with Nyerere and was removed from political power. Even Mr. Kambona, however, was never a serious threat to Nyerere.

\textsuperscript{15} Herrick, et al., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 355.

In sum, Tanganyika had little contact with communist nations, the country's undisputed leader was President, and Africanization was a reality.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

In our study, we have attempted a case study on revolution. We centered our discussion on the question: what factors were present in Zanzibar which led to a revolution? A second associated question asked was: how did Zanzibar's conditions correspond to those same conditions in Tanganyika? In order to answer these two questions, both Zanzibar and Tanganyika were examined in light of Johnson’s casual paradigm of revolution: multiple dysfunctions plus intransigent elite plus accelerator equal revolution.

Economics are the stuff from which revolutions are made, posits James C. Davies. Indeed, many students of Zanzibar suggest that the failing conditions of Zanzibar’s economy led to the revolution. Without attempting to resolve the causa sine qua non question of this hypothesis, Zanzibar’s economic growthline was compared to the raise in the expectations of the people. This expectation growth was established through the rate of increase in governmental services. We found that there was, indeed, a severe recession
in Zanzibar's economy several years prior to the revolution. This recession caused the growth rate of government services to be significantly reduced. Since this decelerated rate by which government services were expanded was substantially less than that rate which the people had come to expect, we concluded that there was a widening gap between the actual growth rate and the expectations of the people. In short, the economy of Zanzibar was in a dysfunctional state.

When we examined the economy of Tanganyika, we found a considerably different picture. While Tanganyika did experience an occasional economic slump, it was neither of the same intensity nor of the same duration. Thus, where the economy of Zanzibar was appreciable depressed, the economy of Tanganyika was generally sound.

Another popularly suggested cause of the Zanzibar revolution was inequitable landownership. By comparing the racial distribution of landownership with the patterns of elections returns, violence, and anti-Arab organizations, we found that those areas with the most obvious inequities in landownership corresponded affirmatively with those areas which demonstrated the most anti-Arab sentiments.
A similar examination of Tanganyika revealed a clear lack of a racially oriented landownership pattern. Nor was there a discernible pattern of violence. These findings led us to conclude that while inequitable landownership created a societal dysfunction in Zanzibar, no such condition existed in Tanganyika.

Perhaps the most commonly cited cause of the Zanzibar revolution was racial animosity. While racism was closely tied to landownership and economical distribution in the islands, it was nevertheless distinctive. By tracing the racial distribution of Zanzibar and contrasting these demographic patterns to the area in which racial organizations and racially-based political contests were strongest, we found a positive comparison between areas of distinct racial dichotomies and areas of strong racial tensions. From these findings it seemed undeniable that strong racial tensions did exist in Zanzibar immediately before the revolution.

Again, Tanganyika showed a study in contrast. First, Tanganyika had no areas of strong racial division. Second, there was no clear relationship between areas having large non-African populations and areas having strong racial tensions. In fact, the Tanganyikan leaders were able to keep racial tensions and hostilities to a minimum.
Tanganyika and Zanzibar also demonstrated two radically different kinds of leadership. Where Tanganyika’s leaders were cautious, sensitive, and flexible, Zanzibar’s leaders were often impulsive, callous, and tenacious. In short, Zanzibar had an intransigent elite while Tanganyika had an approachable elite.

The final requirement needed for a revolution, according to Johnson’s hypothesis, was an accelerator, a coup de grace. Two factors present in Zanzibar made revolution inevitable. First, there was a group of Africans in Zanzibar who were able to attract a following and who had decided that violence offered them their only hope for an African controlled government. The most important of these leaders for the actual revolution was John Okello. Second, the Zanzibar revolution was the climax of an Africanization movement which had entered African politics in Zanzibar. This movement which had been generated and focused by similar Africanization and independence movements on the African continent since World War II. Particularly influential was the African-led independence of Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya.

Since Tanganyika’s society was a functional, stable system, there was no accelerator present in that nation.

We have attempted to apply Johnson’s model of revolution to the Zanzibar revolution and the Tanganyika army
strike. From the above analysis, a comment or two on the usefulness of Johnson's model are in order.

Johnson's model of revolution proves to be extremely useful in the case of Zanzibar. When this examination of Zanzibar is coupled with a similar study of Tanganyika, the model proves to be even more beneficial. It provided the student with a framework within which he can control his comparison. For instance, by using Johnson's intransigent elite factor, we were able to study the leadership of both countries without loosing sight of the overall focus of the study. That is, we were able to study the leadership of both countries without loosing sight of the overall focus of the study. That is, we were able to place our examination of each country's leadership on a flexible-inflexible, sensitive-insensitive continuum and still place this continuum within the boundaries of the complete equation: multiple dysfunctions plus intransigent elite plus accelerator equal revolution.

Johnson's equation of revolution also has the advantage of accommodating the particularities of the society under study. It can be applied to a country whose economy is just developing as well as to a country whose economy is complex and sophisticated. It can be used to examine
capitalistic and socialistic countries equally well. In other words, the examination focuses on the particular dysfunctions, or potential dysfunctions, of the system chosen for examination, not on the system itself. The questions asked are: what conditions exist within the state which can lead to a revolution? Have these conditions reached the critical level of dysfunction? And, are these conditions coupled with an intransigent elite? If so, a revolution is pending and only needs a catalyst (the accelerator) to ignite the revolution.

Finally, Johnson has not established a sine qua non for revolution. He allows for the peculiarities which make up each society. This feature becomes increasingly important when the student attempts to study non-Western countries, such as Africa and Asia, particularly the latter as the former has been significantly influenced by the Western nations.

Perhaps the greatest limitation Johnson's model has is one which any study of society suffers. It presupposes access to information. Unfortunately, the world is full of closed societies and we, as students, can only do our best with the information at hand. We will have to depend upon our knowledge and "sensitive judgement" to determine which information is valuable and trustworthy, discounting the rest.
Figure 1. Ethnic Groups, Zanzibar
Figure 2. Land Arability, Zanzibar
Figure 3. Principal Towns, Zanzibar
Figure 4. Tanganyika Provinces at Independence
Figure 5. Tanganyika Tribes and Their Location
Figure 6. Major Tanganyikan Towns
APPENDIX B:

THE "OFFICIAL" VERSION OF THE ZANZIBAR REVOLUTION
The "Official" version of the Zanzibar Revolution,
as reported in The Nationalist, Dar es Salaam,12th January, 1965.

Here for the first time is the authoritative story of the Zanzibar Revolution of January 12, 1964.

It is based on the personal experiences and records of men who were prepared to risk everything to make the rising a success. The account tells the circumstances which led to the rising. It reveals the force of popular support behind the Afro-Shirazi organisers of the revolt. This article answers many of the questions which have been asked about the Revolution:

Who were the leaders?
What was the "Committee of Fourteen"?
Where did the arms come from?
Who planned the Rising?

Although all of the men who have provided information have wished to remain anonymous, in the same spirit as they continue their work of nationbuilding, all of them are equally emphatic that the main driving force, and inspiration behind the organization of the Revolution of the People of Zanzibar was the leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party and First Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume.

The story of the Zanzibar Revolution of January 12th, 1964 is the answer of the people of the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba to the intrigues and plots of the Sultan and his political henchmen to prevent a popular democratic regime coming to power when Zanzibar cut free of British colonial domination on December 10, 1963.

The revolution was led and organized by the Afro-Shirazi Party under the direct guidance and inspiration of Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume, President of the People's Republic of Tanzania.

President Karume, it can now be disclosed, actively directed the secret "Committee of Fourteen" charged with preparing the revolt against the Sultan.

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1John Okello, op. cit., pp. 209-222.
When the moment for the rising came on the night of January 11, 1964, Abeid Karume was at the central control point of the revolution at the Raha Leo radio headquarters. It was not until it had become clear that the Revolution had succeeded that the President left secretly the following morning by canoe, personally to inform President Julius Nyerere and the Secretary General of TANU, Oscar Kambona, of what had happened. For had not TANU helped and supported the Afro-Shirazi Party since its inception?

As soon as his mission was completed, President Karume returned to Zanzibar by a canoe-type Mashua, accompanied by Kassim Hanga, Prime Minister-to-be, and Abdulrahman Babu, leader of the Umma Party, designated External Affairs Minister of the People's Republic. They arrived back in Zanzibar on Monday, January 14, during the People's victory, and immediately proceeded to establish the administrative and executive authority of the new regime.

Even before President Karume left for Dar es Salaam, telegrams had been despatched from the revolutionary headquarters at Raha-leo to twenty-three countries seeking recognition and support. The telegrams, signed by Karume as President, and Hanga as Prime Minister designate, informed these countries in round terms that Zanzibar has carried out an armed revolution and established a Republican government under Abeid Karume, President, and Kassim Hanga, Prime Minister.

The response to the cables came within a matter of days from Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, the People's Republic of China, Ghana, Yugoslavia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR.

The People's Republic of Zanzibar discovered early how to identify and rely on its friends.

The Revolution against the Sultan became inevitable when Jamshid's ministers, Muhammed Shamte and Aly Muhsin openly tried to establish an iron dictatorship in Zanzibar designed to destroy all forms of political association, trade union organization, and promote permanent inter-racial conflict.

The Shamte-Aly Muhsin government had been put into power on a minority vote at the elections held the previous June. These elections had been deliberately rigged by the British colonial regime to prevent any chance of the national liberation movement, led by the Afro-Shirazi Party, winning a majority of seats. Even the decision of the Umma Party, led by Sheikh Babu, not to contest any seats but to support the possible for the Afro-Shirazi Party, made little difference
to the number of seats it was possible for the Afro-Shirazi Party to obtain, although they obtained an overall majority of votes.

When the final results of the elections were known it was shown that the Afro-Shirazi Party had a majority of 15,000 votes over the combined votes of the pro-Sultan Zanzibar Nationalist Party, and the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party.

The trickery of the elections was illustrated by one example from Pemba where the Afro-Shirazi Party obtained only two seats, although it had 32,000 votes. The pro-Sultan Zanzibar Nationalist Party, and the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party had twelve seats although they registered an aggregate of only 10,000 more votes in those constituencies.

As soon as the elections were over it became clear that the reactionary government intended to operate a policy of repression against the active nationalist freedom fighters. At the same time they combined this with a deliberate attempt to split the leaders of the party away from the masses.

Even before the final Independence Conference in London in September, the Sultan's Ministers sought to organise a conspiracy in August to divide the leadership of the Afro-Shirazi Party and to discredit the Umma leaders, whose loyalty to their united election pact with the Afro-Shirazi Party had been proved during the elections.

The British Governor, Sir George Mooring, was deeply implicated in the August Plot. He followed up the efforts to divide the nationalist leaders by refusing to grant passports to Babu and his colleagues to attend the Independence Conference. They only managed to get to London by secretly leaving Zanzibar by mashua, and obtaining travel documents from the friendly and sympathetic Tanganyika Government.

Every attempt by Muhammed Shamte and Aly Muhsein to break the unity of the People's Liberation movement failed. A policy of open intimidation, repression and arrests began.

By that time the "Committee of Fourteen" had already begun to prepare the most effective answer to the Shamte terror policy.

No one remembers the precise date on which the Committee of Fourteen first came together. All that responsible leaders of the Afro-Shirazi Party can say is: "After the elections we all knew we should have to take protective measures, and we knew we could rely on the support of the masses for whatever steps were taken.

The Committee of Fourteen were charged personally by President Karume to make the necessary dispositions to meet any situation which might arise.
Their terms of reference were (1) to formulate the strategy and tactics of an operation to enable the people to take-over, at an appropriate time after independence; (2) to prepare an effective plan of attack to ensure that, if it came to an uprising, there would be sufficient arms available to ensure success; (3) to arrange transport, liaison, communications and reserves.

All the members of the Committee of Fourteen were active militants of the Afro-Shirazi Party and the trade union movement. Most of them were young, dynamic and determined. There was a leavening of middle-aged and even elderly men among the Committee.

The nucleus of "The Fourteen" consisted of Sefu Bakarin now President of the National Youth League, Yusuf Himid, now commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army, Said Abdulla Natepe was Vice-Chairman. Other members included Ramadhan Haji, Said Bavuai, Said wa Shota, Mohammed Abdullah, Phili Khamis, Hamisi Darwesh, Khamis Hemed, Hafiz Sulieman, Hamid Amir.

All these were men with extensive grass-roots connections among the members and supporters of the Afro-Shirazi, the Umma parties, and the masses.

Each of them had special qualifications and contacts of their own. They all knew that once the work of the Committee had started, they were on their own. They were individually and personally responsible to the President. They knew that when the time came the success or failure of the rising would be determined entirely by the amount of support and assistance they had from their people.

For the Committee of Fourteen, there was never any question having arms, equipment or ammunition from outside sources. They would not have wasted time collecting spears, clubs, pangas, and farm equipment if they had reserves of guns and arms from outside.

The transport arrangements were elaborate and highly efficient. It was largely due to the success with which lorries and buses were available on the decisive night that the operation went so smoothly.

A great deal of help with transport came from African sympathisers in the civil service administration. There is one newly painted blue Peugeot estate car, now to be seen in the streets of Zanzibar, which did yeoman service carrying members of the Committee of Fourteen or coordinating between different centres. It belongs to a former senior civil servant of the Shamte government. It has only just been put back on the streets after being completely overhauled and repainted in honour of its service as the "Old Faithful" of the revolutionary transport organization.
Again it was President Karume who finally decided the date and timing of the Rising. Up to the actual moment for action, there had inevitably been some hesitation and reluctance on the part of a group of politically responsible individuals to reach the point of no return. There was always the chance that some less drastic solution might turn up.

At one stage it was seriously considered that in view of the police swoops and arrests of suspected militants immediately before the independence celebrations on December 10, that the best time to strike would be the day following these celebrations.

Postponement was followed by a spate of rumors. On the one hand everyone was convinced that a rising was in the wind. The Shamte government showed its hand more definitely on January 6th, 1964. The order was issued banning the Umma Party and confiscating its goods and property.

After this, the Committee of Fourteen could wait only at its peril.

It was known that an order had been issued for the arrest of Babu, the leader of the Umma Party. It also became known that the Shamte government was issuing ultimatums to every known opponent.

In fact, when the revolutionaries captured Ziwani Police Station on Sunday, January 12, they found a list of 120 members of the Afro-Shirazi Party, and trade unionists, who were due to be arrested and confined at the Sultan's security headquarters.

Karume set the date: The night of January 11 and 12. Long before the uprising started the atmosphere in Zanzibar was tense and expectant.

There had already been earlier rumors that something was to happen.

We deliberately exploited the tactics of calling wolf, wolf, said one of the Committee of Fourteen. We knew we had to keep them on their toes.

The police were subjected to a continuous war of nerves. They were obviously jumpy.

On the morning of January 11 the Shamte government showed its nervousness by ordering road blocks to be established controlling the flow of traffic in and out of town. They were particularly concerned with the roads leading to town from the shambas. The airport road was also strictly controlled.

The European police chiefs were active. They tried hard to find ways of establishing contact with individuals
they suspected might be able to act as channels of communication in event of an emergency.

Mr. Henry Hawker, the "all-purpose" expatriate who had been a senior official at Treasury was particularly active. At one time he even tried to appoint himself secretary to the new Prime Minister after the revolt had succeeded. His efforts proved abortive.

On the night of Saturday, January 11, the police were, in fact given a stand-to warning to expect attacks. They waited expectantly but everything seemed quiet. They decided it was a false alarm. After all, there was little sign of political activity. Only a dance at the Welfare Hall attached to Raha Leo.

The dance was a blind. While the dancers certainly enjoyed themselves, President Karume, Abdul Aziz Twala, now Finance Minister, Zanzibar, Aboud Jumbe, Minister of State, Zanzibar and Daud Muhammed M. P. were laughing and joking with ears straining, waiting for the sound of action. They did not have to wait long.

Sometime after two o'clock in the morning the noise of gunfire broke through the sound of the dance-band.

The leaders knew what it meant. So did most of the others. There had been sufficient rumours circulating for the people to respond when the moment came.

Karume, Jumbe, Twala and Muhammed followed swiftly behind the guide who led them into the radio centre. They took possession of Raha Leo. It was as simple as that.

Outside the dance hall, some cars and buses arrived as if by magic. Within moments they were packed like sardines with people coming from every direction.

An unexpected night service of buses and lorries was doing the same in many other key centres of Afro-Shirazi support. They brought the people bang into the revolution.

The priority objectives of the rising had been carefully selected. They were thoroughly known to the leaders of the attacking groups.

Three key police stations had to be taken quickly to ensure success. They were the arsenals of the Shamte government. The Committee of Fourteen had obtained detailed plans of the inside of each of the police posts. They knew exactly how many men were on duty, how to find the arms and ammunition.

The three police stations were Mtoni, Ziwani, the security headquarters, and Malindi.

Within a matter of hours, the Revolutionaries had complete control of both Mtoni and Ziwani.

The Malindi police station was to prove the most difficult.

Before the morning light had settled, the revolutionaries
had obtained sufficient arms, and transport to be able to complete the rest of the essentials. They sent a squad to the Airport, with instructions to hold all planes, and prevent anyone landing or leaving. They sent further details to take the cable office, electricity and water supplies and the telephone exchange.

The operation in Zanzibar town went so smoothly that everything seemed to be over before it had begun, said one of the members of the Revolutionary Council. In fact, the popularity of the rising was so great it was hardly possible to move in the streets for people shouting, that everything is over and surrenders had been made.

In fact, the involvement of the ordinary folk of the town in the revolution had complicating and confusing effects of which the Shamte government, and some British police reserves took advantage.

It enabled them to obtain breathing space, while everyone was congratulating themselves. The relief came too soon.

Although it seemed that Malindi was in the hands of revolutionaries, the police were able to open fire. This caused more unnecessary casualties than at any other time during the rising.

They also succeeded, during the foray, in capturing Sefu Bakari, one of the key members of "The Fourteen". Although Bakari was known as an Afro-Shirazi supporter he was not identifiable as one of the leaders.

The Prime Minister, Shamte, and Aly Muhsin, saw an opportunity to use Bakari as a negotiator. They sent him up to the radio headquarters with a letter, offering to negotiate a settlement and establish a national government, if Karume would do a deal.

The move was too late and too futile. By this time they had lost. The Sultan, as it is well known, had fled. As soon as the revolutionaries came knocking at his door in the early morning, he took to his yacht with a number of British civil servants and members of his staff. Mr. Merwyn Smitherman, one of the British legal prosecutors, had been so convinced of what would be his fate, as soon as he heard the sound of gunfire, he and the Attorney General, Jack Rumbold, had dashed down to the beach and swum out to a Greek schooner, which took them aboard.

The Sultan had vainly tried to obtain outside help from Britain and the western powers to help put down the revolution.

Shamte and Aly Muhsin had been asking Britain and other western governments to intervene to prevent a rising, but had been unable to convince them to take it seriously.
The present Zanzibar administration had both the cables, and the answers.

By the evening of Sunday, January 12, the Malindi police station had surrendered. Some Ministers had already been captured. Others were to surrender the following day.

Up at Raha-leo, Aboud Jumbe and Twala were holding the fort, while President Karume left for his quick visit to Dar es Salaam. On the ground floor of the radio station they had set up a casualty station. There was a dispensary rigged up in one of the larger rooms.

Upstairs, the revolutionaries had full control of the radio—and made the most of it.

The revolution was completed and consolidated within a matter of days.

It had been a complete revolution of the people. The masses had come out of their homes, and had come from their shambas, into the streets actively to shape the course of the revolution.

The streets had been thronged with people. They had taken their destiny into their own hands. They had thrown out the Sultan, rejected the tempo-rising mercenary politicians picked and trained by the former colonial regime to keep them in captivity.

They chose and followed the men they trusted to lead them to a new life, and to shape the pattern of a new socialist society.

On January 21 President Karume wound up the first phase of Zanzibar's people's revolution. He formally inaugurated the Revolutionary Council of thirty members, whose job has been to take it from there. Among those thirty, continually on the alert and determined to remain the people's watchdogs, are the nucleus of "The Fourteen". They had written a page of Zanzibar's history that will never be forgotten.
APPENDIX C:

ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

1. President Abeid Karume.
2. Vice-President Abdulla Kassim Hanga.
11. The Commissioner of Police—Mr. Edington Kisassi.
12. Field Marshal John Okello.
15. Hon. Ramadhan Haji.
27. Hon. Muhammed Mfaume Qmar.
30. Hon. Daud Mahmoud.
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