

HONESTY ATTRIBUTIONS AND DECEPTION DETECTION ACCURACY
OF FRIENDS AND STRANGERS IN THE ROLES
OF OBSERVER AND PARTICIPANT

by

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A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA


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
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
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My heart felt gratitude is extended to my thesis advisor, David B. Buller, whose guidance made this research effort a very challenging and very rewarding experience. Thanks so much, Dave. To my committee members, Michael and Judee Burgoon, thank you for your advice and support and words of encouragement. The opportunity to work with the people in this department has been, without doubt, the most rewarding experience in my life and I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the support I received from my fellow graduate students--thanks everyone!

I know how much this means to my parents, John and Mary. So I'll just say thanks for hanging in there all these many years.

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ABSTRACT

The effects of perspective (participant vs. observer) and relational familiarity (friend vs. stranger) on honesty attributions and deception detection accuracy were tested by having subjects interact with truthful and deceptive conversational partners. The propositions that participants and friends would exhibit a truth-bias and 1) attribute more honesty to sources and 2) be less accurate in detecting deception were not confirmed. Likewise, exploratory analysis failed to reveal a significant interaction between perspective and familiarity. Regression analysis of intimacy ratings on honesty attributions offer support for the assumption that familiarity, in terms of perceived intimacy with a source, is a significant predictor of a truth-bias.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The majority of research in deceptive communication has been directed toward deception detection, i.e., identifying the behaviors which differentiate deceivers from truth-tellers and signal that deception is occurring. One underlying assumption has guided many of these efforts: deceivers betray themselves through a variety of verbal and nonverbal indicators of deception (Ekman & Friesen, 1969, 1974; Kraut, 1978; Hocking, Bauchner, Kaminiski, & Miller, 1979; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981; Buller & Aune, 1987). Until recently, many, if not most, research efforts have focused on deception detection by observers of interactions rather than the detection accuracy of participants engaged in those interactions. Also, these studies typically have relied on the perceptions of subjects who are unacquainted, rather than on perceptions by partners who have established relationships with the deceiver. Because a great deal of evidence indicates that one's perspective has a significant influence on the causal attributions made of others' behaviors, in particular, affecting or creating a truth-bias, it is imperative that communication scholars investigate more closely the attributional differences created by adopting roles such as observer, participant, stranger, and friend.

Participants and Observers

Interest in the different attributional processes of participants and observers can be traced to Fritz Heider's (1948, 1958) work on social perception. Heider, along with others, was concerned with people's perceptions of causality, i.e., individual's thoughts about why things happen the way they do and what causes things to happen. At the heart of the question of why people behave the way they do are people's perception of the locus of causality.

Evidence regarding the assessment of causal responsibility in social situations suggests that an individual's perspective has significant consequences for the attributions made about another's behavior. For example, Jones and Nisbett (1972) found that the dissimilar perspectives of participants (or actors) and observers affects the kinds of attributions they make. Essentially, Jones and Nisbett (1972) proposed that participants in interpersonal interactions respond more to situational cues when assigning causes for their own behavior whereas observers of behavior focus more on the dispositional qualities of the actor when making causal attributions. Nisbett, Capputo, Legant, & Marecek (1973) suggest that these divergent attributional assessments result from differences in perspective of participants and observers. Participants, by virtue of their active role in an

interaction, have access to relevant sources of information not available to an observer (Nisbett, Capputo, Legant, & Marecek, 1973; Jones & Harris, 1967; McArthur, 1972; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1972). Beside monitoring their interaction partner's behavior, participants also attend to contextual cues affecting the moment-to-moment exchange process. Observers, on the other hand, are not as constrained by situational influences and are free to attend almost exclusively to the actions of the person being observed.

It must be acknowledged that the initial studies of the differing attributional processes of observers and participants focused on the attributions of subjects acting in the role of both observer and participant. For example, Storms (1973) had subjects interact with others while researchers simultaneously videotaped the interactions. After measuring subjects' self-attributions immediately after their interaction, subjects viewed a videotape of the same interaction and their self-attributions were measured again. Results indicated that after subjects' visual perspectives were manipulated and their role as participant was changed to observer, they tended to change the attributions they made regarding their own behavior. When placed in the position of explaining their own behavior, subjects acting as participants were more likely to explain

their behavior based on situational factors. Conversely, when those same subjects were in the position of observing their own behavior on videotape, they tended to change their initial attributions of their behavior by expressing more dispositional explanations.

Because the changes in attributions appear to be related to a change in perspective, recent studies have extended the implications of these earlier experiments to studies in which different subjects act as observer or participant (Buller, Strzyzewski, & Hunsaker, 1991; Burgoon & Newton, 1989; Street, Mulac, & Wiemann, 1988). Results from these studies indicate that the same influences on the attribution process hold for subjects serving as either participants or observers--observers tend to interpret others' behaviors in terms of the dispositional qualities of the targets while participants rely more on situational explanations. For example, Street et al. (1988) found that participants' evaluations of conversational partners were qualitatively different from evaluations by observers of those conversations. They suggest that these differences can be attributed to differences in role, perspective, and available information experienced by participants and observers. Further, Burgoon and Newton (1991), in a study of relational message interpretation, found that participants were more favorable in their evaluations of

conversants than were observers. They speculate that participants, by virtue of access to environmental and relational information, are "awash in a stream of subtle and visceral nonverbal cues that the observer, standing on the banks, as it were, cannot detect" (Burgoon & Newton, 1991, p.25). Taken together, results from these studies provide strong evidence that adopting the role of active participant in an interaction creates a more positive evaluation of a source than generated through observation. These differing role characteristics appear to be associated with the amount and quality of environmental and relational information available to participants and observers, with participants having access to a wider range of more subtle cues which help create a more situational frame of reference when evaluating others' behavior.

Deception Detection

As mentioned, the majority of studies of deception detection have relied on the detection skills of observers of deception. Typically, subjects have been directed to make honesty judgments of others' communications by watching videotaped or filmed interactions (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1969, 1974), listening to audiotapes of interactions or reading transcripts of interactions in which deception occurs (e.g., Maier, & Thurber, 1968).

The differences between observer and participant attributions outlined above raises several questions about the external validity of deception studies emphasizing observers' reactions (Buller, Strzyzewski, & Hunsaker, 1991). First, the concept of "interaction" clearly implies that interpersonal behavior is mutually experienced by two or more interactants and that the outcome of an interaction results from the behaviors of all involved. To more fully understand deception, one must be cognizant of the full range of influences which are inherent to active engagement in interpersonal interaction. Second, the circumstances in which an individual will find himself/herself strictly in the role of an observer are relatively rare. As Buller, Strzyzewski and Hunsaker (1991) suggest, other than as mass media consumers or as jurors, most people are more likely exposed to deception in face-to face situations typical of day-to-day interactions. Third, over-reliance on the dispositional attributions made by observers may lead to overestimating the detection skills of participants who are more likely to account for a deceiver's behavior by looking to situational cues than to deceptive intent (Buller, Strzyzewski, & Hunsaker, 1991).

Recently, communication scholars interested in the deception phenomenon have begun to investigate more fully the behaviors and perceptions of individuals who are

actively engaged as participants in deceptive communication (Buller, Comstock, Aune, & Strzyzewski, 1989; Buller, Strzyzewski, & Comstock, 1991; Buller, Strzyzewski, & Hunsaker, 1991; McCornack & Levine, 1990). Results from these studies suggest that interaction participants exhibit what McCornack and Parks (1986) have called a "truth-bias", i.e., a predisposition for receivers to assume that their interaction partners will provide truthful information. Evidence indicates that this bias may be much more pronounced for participants than observers.

Buller, Strzyzewski, and Hunsaker (1991) speculated that the truth-bias may be stronger in participants than in observers because conversational participants have a wide variety of interactional responsibilities that may distract them from attending to behaviors which indicate deception is taking place. These responsibilities demand cognitive "energy" to manage the interaction from moment-to-moment. Turn-taking, encoding responses, and behaving appropriately all require effort which might otherwise be directed to more careful monitoring of a partner's behavior. In addition, the truth-bias mirrors one of the general maxims of conversation. Grice (1975) contends that the maxim of quality (i.e., truthfulness) is basic and necessary for meaningful interaction to take place. Others suggest it is fundamental and instrumental to all conversations (Kraut &

Higgins, 1984; Clark & Clark, 1975). This assumption of truth allows conversational participants to "go beyond what is literally said to infer an indirect meaning that the speaker intended the listener to infer" (Kraut & Higgins, 1984, p. 91).

H1: Conversational participants attribute more honesty to their conversational partners than observers of those conversations.

Buller, Strzyzewski and Hunsaker (1991) also suggested that the truth-bias may function as a cognitive heuristic, or short-cut, which frees participants to attend to conversational management tasks on a moment-to-moment basis. Rather than devote cognitive energy to processing cues of possible deception, participants assume truthfulness unless clear and unambiguous signals suggest otherwise. Observers, on the other hand, gain less from use of this cognitive heuristic. Freed from interaction responsibilities, observers gain less advantage by assuming anything about an actor's behavior. Therefore, due to their lack of active involvement in an interaction, observers may be less dependent on the truth-bias and may focus more on an actor's behavior, behavior which will indicate when deception is occurring. Observers, therefore, should be more accurate at detecting deception when it occurs, despite attributing generally less honesty.

H2: Observers of conversations detect deception more accurately than participants in conversations.

This hypothesis will be tested in two ways. The first test will be on an accuracy score created by calculating the proportion of participant and observer responses which correctly identify the source's responses as either "true" or "false." The hypothesis predicts that observers will score higher on this measure than participants.

The second test will examine ratings of honesty at the end of the interaction. It is anticipated that the truth bias will hold for participants regardless of the source's honesty. Observers, however, should display a weaker truth bias and more sensitivity to deception. Thus, the hypothesis predicts an interaction (likely ordinal) between role and honesty condition such that ratings of honesty at the end of the interaction will be lower for observers who judge deceivers than observers who judge truth-tellers.

Relational Familiarity

Another salient influence on the attribution process also related to the truth-bias is relational familiarity. It is intuitively appealing to assume that as a relationship develops, individuals will exhibit increased confidence and accuracy in decoding messages from each other (Knapp, 1979; Brandt, Miller, & Hocking, 1980b). It stands to reason that as a "history" of interactions develops, relevant

information regarding another's attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors will provide interactants with a baseline from which accurate attributions for another's actions will emerge. If this assumption holds, it seems safe to conclude that familiarity with a communicator would be a distinct advantage in deception detection.

Initial research on familiarity with interaction behavior offers some support for this supposition. A number of studies manipulated familiarity by first exposing subjects to communicators engaged in truthful dialogue prior to them witnessing them deceiving (Miller, Bauchner, Hocking, Fontes, Kaminski & Brandt, 1981; Brandt, Miller & Hocking, 1980a; Brandt, Miller & Hocking, 1980b; Brandt, Miller & Hocking, 1982). Using this type of manipulation, Comadena (1982) obtained results which indicate that intimates (i.e., married couples) were better deception detectors than either friends or strangers.

A major criticism of these studies revolves around the operationalization of familiarity which was used. These studies operationalized familiarity as simple exposure to a few baseline truthful dialogues of a subject rather than as a measure of familiarity obtained through voluntary involvement with another based on mutual interests and attraction. The fundamental problem with this conceptualization of familiarity is that it fails to account

for salient relational variables, such as affective interdependence and relational history, that could have a far greater influence on detection accuracy than mere exposure to baseline behavior.

Evidence from a number of more recent deception studies indicate that relational familiarity does not improve detection accuracy. In fact, it appears that relational development may be one of the biggest impediments to accurate deception detection. Evidence continues to mount that as relational familiarity increases, deception detection accuracy decreases (Stiff, Kim, & Ramesh, 1988; McCornack & Parks, 1986; Buller, 1987).

A number of justifications can be forwarded to explain this. First, as a relationship develops, individuals will exhibit a more pronounced truth-bias. This increasing predisposition to assume the truth reflects positive affective expectations held for relational partners. Second, when deception is viewed as an interactive process, deceivers familiar with the target will have prior knowledge which may provide information which aids them in constructing deceptive messages. Essentially, the deception may be tailor made for the target. Finally, relational involvement may cause individuals to overlook deception to avoid the potentially unpleasant consequences of confronting a friend about being dishonest.

Thus, it is reasonable to anticipate significant differences in the deception detection skills of strangers and friends as well as the attributions of honesty which they make. Based upon a review of recent deception detection studies, the following hypothesis is tendered.

H3: Friends attribute more to honesty to sources than do strangers.

As mentioned, the truth-bias appears to operate on at least two levels. First, by virtue of their active role in interaction, participants are predisposed to assume truthful communication from their interaction partners. Second, due to the effects of relational familiarity, interactants with a relational history will also attribute truthfulness to sources with whom they are familiar. At this point it is unclear if these role-specific sources of the truth-bias have an additive or non-additive effect. In other words, if an individual is both an observer and familiar (in a relational sense) with a deceptive source, will the effects of the truth-bias be greater than its effect in either of those conditions alone? Or, is there an absolute limit for the assumption of truth beyond which any additional source of truth-bias is superfluous? To more fully understand the effects of the truth-bias, the interaction between perspective and relational familiarity will be examined to

see whether the two truth-biases are additive or non-additive.

CHAPTER 2

METHODS

Overview

In this experiment, friends and strangers in the role of either participant or observer evaluated a source who either lied or told the truth during a five-minute interview conducted by the participant. In each interview, a conversational participant interviewed a source about her/his responses on a personality scale while an observer looked on unobtrusively through a two-way mirror. Participants, observers, and sources were matched on relational familiarity, i.e., all were either strangers or friends. Half the sources were instructed to deceive about their responses on the personality scale. After the interaction, participants and observers completed posttests measuring honesty attributions of the source and made honesty judgments about each item discussed during the interview.

Respondents

Respondents (N=204) were undergraduate students, recruited in groups of three, from communication classes at a large southwestern university. They were given extra credit in their classes for participation. Half of the subjects were recruited individually to form stranger triads. The remaining subjects were asked to recruit two

non-romantic friends to participate with them in the experiment. To qualify for participation as friends, subjects in this condition had to meet several criteria which differentiate friends from strangers. These criteria included level of involvement, amount of reciprocal self-disclosure, affection, frequency of interaction, and spontaneity--attributes one would expect to be evident in friendships. The data for this study came from one hundred thirty-six respondents assigned to the role of either participant (n=68) or observer (n=68).

Pretests

Subjects assigned to the participant and observer roles completed a five-item version of Wheelless and Grotz' (1975) Trust Scale (Appendix A)--a generalized measure of trust of others modified to measure general trust of either friends or strangers. Reliability of this scale was high (Cronbach's alpha =.92). In an effort to further confirm that friends recruited for the experiment met the criteria for greater familiarity than strangers, friends completed an eight-item version of Fischer's (1981) Intimacy Scale (Appendix B), as well as the Trust Scale. Alpha reliability (.61) was moderately high. The Spearman-Brown Prophecy Formula was applied to yield an effective reliability (.93) for the eight-item version, equating it with Fischer's original forty-two item scale. Further, friends were asked

to choose which of eight descriptors best described their relationship with the EE (Stranger, Acquaintance, Friend, Best Friend, Lover, Spouse, Relative, Boyfriend/Girlfriend) (Appendix B).

Sources (i.e., interviewees) completed a sixteen-item version of Crowne and Marlowe's (1964) Social Desirability Scale (Appendix C) modified to obtain true-false answers. Their responses on this scale provided material for the experimental interaction.

Procedure

Upon arrival at the communication laboratory, subjects were assigned to the role of interviewer (ER), interviewee (EE) or observer (OB). Further, the EE was assigned to the truth or deception condition. All subjects were told that the purpose of this experiment was to examine how friends and strangers communicate with one another in an interview setting.

The EE was separated from the ER and OB and instructed to complete the Social Desirability Scale. Just prior to the interaction, EEs were recruited to act as confederates in the experiment. In the truth condition, EEs were told to be completely forthcoming with their responses to ERs' questions in the upcoming interview, i.e., to tell the truth. In the deception condition, EEs were instructed to lie about their responses on the Social Desirability Scale,

after responding truthfully about their responses to the first two questions. From question three on, if they responded "true" to a scale item, the EEs were instructed to tell the ERs that they answered "false" and if they responded "false", they were to say they said "true." If asked by the ERs to provide an explanation or elaboration on a response, the EEs were instructed to generate false explanations in the deception condition. To assure that the EEs followed instructions and responded in accordance with the manipulation, the experimenter monitored the EEs' responses to verify that they responded either truthfully or deceptively to scale items as instructed.

While the EE was in another room filling out the pretests, the ER and OB completed the Trust Scale and, in the case of friends, Fisher's Intimacy Scale. The ER and OB received the same instructions on how to conduct the interview. The ER and OB were then told which roles they would fulfill and provided with a blank copy of the Social Desirability Scale. The ER was told to ask the EE for her/his response to each of the scale items. After hearing the EE's response, ERs were instructed to follow up by asking for more information from the EE about the response given. Specifically, they were told to ask "why" the EE responded the way she/he did to the item and to continue discussing the EE's response until they understand it.

Neither the ER nor the OB were informed that deception had been manipulated. The experimenter then took the OB behind a two-way mirror and told the OB to simply observe the interview. Next, the experimenter took the ER into the room where the EE was waiting, briefly repeated the directions, signaled an assistant to begin videotaping the interaction, and asked the ER to begin the interview.

After 5 minutes, the researcher returned and stopped the interview. The EE was separated from the ER and posttest measures were completed by the ER and OB.

Posttests

Participants and observers completed a shortened version of Burgoon and Hale's (1987) Relational Communication Scale (RCS) following the interaction. To assess the honesty attributions participants and observers made about sources, five additional items were embedded in the RCS; "She/he gave answers which were believable", "She/he did not tell the truth all the time", "She/he was very open and forthcoming", "She/he was honest with the interviewer/with me", "She/he was not sincere when answering questions", (See Appendixes D & E). These five measures were combined to yield an overall Honesty Attribution Scale ($r=.83$). After completing the RCS, participants and observers were informed that the source had been instructed to either tell the truth or lie. A final measure asked

observers and participants whether or not the source lied or told the truth on each of the items discussed in the interview (Appendixes F & G). An Honesty Bias measure was created by calculating the proportion of "truthful" judgments made by participants and observers. Finally, a deception detection Accuracy Score was calculated as the proportion of "correct" judgments about the truthfulness of the source's responses.

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

Manipulation Checks

Relational trust. A one-way ANOVA was performed on the pretest trust scale to confirm that friends and strangers differed significantly on their trust of the interviewee and level of relational development. As anticipated, friends ($M=20.03$, $SD=4.75$) were trusted more than strangers ($M=9.37$, $SD=4.30$), $F(1,134)=187.14$, $p < .05$.

Intimacy Scale. Subjects in the friend condition met the criteria for intimacy. Overall mean for the 7-point Likert-type scale was above the mid-point ($M=5.00$, $SD=.61$)

Deception. Comparison of the actual true-false responses during the interviews with EEs' pretest responses indicated that the deception manipulation was successful. Of 34 interviews in the truth condition, 19 EEs (55.9%) followed instructions completely, i.e., they responded honestly on all questions. The remaining 15 EEs (44.1%) made the appropriate response on 102 of 129 responses (79%). In the lie condition, 28 EEs (82%) responded as instructed, telling the truth on the first two questions and lying about the rest of their responses. The remaining 6 EEs responded appropriately on 31 of 52 responses (60%) they were instructed to lie about, after responding honestly to the first two questions.

Hypothesis One

Hypothesis one predicted that conversational participants would attribute more honesty to their conversational partners than would observers of those conversations. The main effect of perspective, tested in a 2 (participant vs. observer) X 2 (friend vs. stranger) X 2 (truth vs. lie) ANOVA on Honesty Attribution, was not significant, but did suggest a trend $F(1,128)=3.41$, $p > .06$, $\eta^2 = .03$ (Observer $M=5.19$; Participant $M=5.59$). Likewise, the main effect of perspective on Honesty Bias (proportion of responses which participants and observers judged to be honest) was tested in a similar 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA. Contrary to predictions, participants ($M=.65$) did not differ significantly from observers ($M=.67$) on Honesty Bias, $F(1,128)=.56$, $p > .05$, $\eta^2 = .00$.

Hypothesis Two

Hypothesis two predicted that observers of conversations would detect deception more accurately than participants in those conversations. This hypothesis was first tested by a 2 (participant vs. observer) X 2 (friend vs. stranger) X 2 (truth vs. lie) ANOVA on Accuracy Score. This accuracy score was created by transforming Honesty Bias scores, taking into account the deception condition. Therefore, for this test, the main effect for perspective tested the prediction in hypothesis two. Contrary to

predictions, the main effect for perspective (observers $M=.48$, participants $M=.49$) was not significant, $F(1,129)=.50$, $p > .05$, $\eta^2=.00$. Detection accuracy was also tested in a 2 (participant vs. observer) X 2 (truth vs. lie) X 2 (friend vs. stranger) ANOVA on Honesty Attribution. In this case, the interaction between perspective and relational familiarity tested the hypothesis and revealed a trend for the interaction between perspective (observers $M=5.52$, participants $M=5.85$) and relational familiarity (strangers $M=5.26$, friends $M=5.51$), $F(1,128)=3.41$, $p < .06$, $\eta^2=.03$.

Hypothesis Three

Hypothesis three predicted that friends would attribute more honesty to sources than strangers. This hypothesis was tested by the main effect of relational familiarity (friend vs. stranger) in the 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVAs on Honesty Attribution Scale and Honesty Bias Score. Hypothesis three was not confirmed. Contrary to predictions, friends ($M=5.51$) did not differ significantly from strangers ($M=5.26$) in Honesty Attribution $F(1,128)=1.30$, $p > .05$, $\eta^2=.01$. Likewise, friends ($M=.69$) did not differ significantly from strangers ($M=.63$) on Honesty Bias, $F(1,128)=.56$, $p > .05$, $\eta^2=.00$.

Exploratory Analyses

General detection accuracy. The main effect for honesty condition was significant on Honesty Attribution,

$F=7.67$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2=.06$ (Truth $M=5.69$; Lie $M=5.09$) and on Honesty Bias, $F(1,128)=23.00$, $\eta^2=.15$, $p < .05$ (Truth $M=.75$; Lie $M=.58$). ERs and OBs in the truth condition rated sources significantly more honest than did ERs and OBs in the lie condition, demonstrating some sensitivity to deception.

Additivity of truth-biases. To explore the additive or non-additive effects of the truth biases, the interaction between perspective and relational familiarity was examined on Honesty Attribution and Honesty Bias. There was a trend toward a significant interaction between perspective and relational familiarity on Honesty Attribution, $F(1,128)=3.41$, $p < .06$, $\eta^2=.03$. The mean Honesty Attribution scores for friends in both the participant and observer conditions are identical (Table 1), suggesting that the truth-bias exists for friends regardless of perspective. Strangers, though, may possess a truth-bias when acting as a participant. Thus, the truth-biases may not be additive. If a truth-bias emerges due to either conversational participation or relational familiarity, the addition of the other factor may not reverse the truth-bias. The interaction between perspective and relational familiarity on Honesty Bias was not significant, $F(1,128)=1.48$, $p > .05$, $\eta^2=.00$.

Table 1
Mean Honesty Attributions for the Interaction Between
 Perspective and Relational Familiarity

<u>Perspective</u>	<u>Honesty Attributions</u>	
	Stranger	Friend
Participant	5.66	5.51
Observer	4.86	5.51

Alternative Analyses: Trust and Intimacy Evaluations

This experiment failed to obtain the truth-biases which had emerged in previous studies, particularly the truth-bias due to relational familiarity. This suggested that perhaps the operationalization of relational familiarity (i.e., the dichotomous classification of strangers vs. friends) did not capture the relational and affective differences that create the truth-bias. The lack of sizeable differences between strangers and friends on Trust and Intimacy Rating indicate support for this interpretation. Hence, analyses were performed on the entire sample, substituting the continuous Trust Rating for the stranger-friend dichotomy. In addition, analyses were conducted on friends only, employing the continuous Intimacy Rating in place of the stranger-friend dichotomy. In these analyses, multiple regressions were performed on the Honesty Attribution and the Honesty Bias scores, with perspective and deception condition dummy coded. Main effects were entered first in these analyses,

followed by the two-way interactions, and finally the three-way interaction. After performing the initial analysis, predictors with F -values less than 1.00 were pooled in the error term and a reduced model was calculated. High and Low categories were created for the Trust Rating and the Intimacy Rating using a median-split to examine significant effects from the regression analyses. On Trust Rating, scores greater than 14.00 were pooled into the High Trust category and scores less than or equal to 14.00 defined the Low Trust category. On Intimacy Rating, scores greater than 5.00 were included in the High Intimacy category and scores equal to or less than 5.00 were placed in the Low Intimacy category.

Honesty attributions and the trust rating. The fully-saturated multiple regression performed on Honesty Attribution employing the Trust Rating indicated that honesty condition was the only variable with an F -value greater than 1.00, $F(1,128)=1.21$, $p > .05$ (Table 2). Results from the reduced model indicate that the honesty condition was a significant predictor of Honesty Attributions, $F(1,128)=7.31$, $p < .05$ (Table 2). All interviewers considered deceivers less honest than truth-tellers ($b = -.60$).

Table 2
Predictors of Honesty Attributions with Trust Rating

	<u>Initial Model</u>				<u>Reduced Model</u>			
	<u>b</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>p</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>p</u>
Perspective	-.03	-.01	.00	>.05				
Honesty Condition	-.84	-.32	1.21	>.05	-.60	-.29	7.31	<.05
Trust	-.05	-.05	.08	>.05				
Honesty Condition by Perspective	-.20	-.07	.04	>.05				
Trust by Perspective	-.01	-.14	.23	>.05				
Trust by Honesty Condition	.10	.14	.21	>.05				

Honesty bias and the trust rating. The multiple regression on Honesty Bias identified Trust Rating, $F(1,128)=1.26$, $p >.05$, and the interaction between Trust Rating and honesty condition, $F(1,128)=1.93$, $p >.05$, as two variables with F-values greater than 1.00. The reduced model revealed that the interaction between Trust Rating and honesty condition was the only significant variable predicting Honesty Bias, $F(1,128)=24.35$, $p <.05$ (see Table 3). Subjects in both the high trust ($M=.75$) and low trust ($M=.74$) categories exhibit similar high honesty judgments when interacting with truth-tellers.

Table 3
Predictors of Honesty Bias with Trust Rating

	<u>Initial Model</u>				<u>Reduced Model</u>			
	<u>B</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>p</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>p</u>
Perspective	.10	.24	.82	>.05				
Honesty Condition	-.02	-.05	.03	>.05				
Trust	.03	.18	1.26	>.05	.02	.12	1.83	>.05
Honesty Condition by Perspective	-.05	-.10	.09	>.05				
Trust by Perspective	-.03	-.24	.75	>.05				
Trust by Honesty Condition	-.05	-.40	1.93	>.05	-.05	-.43	24.35	<.05
Trust by Honesty Condition by Perspective	.02	.11	.11	>.05				
			$F(7,127)=3.65, p < .05$ adjusted $R^2=.12$				$F(2,132)=12.47, p < .05$ adjusted $R^2=.05$	

However, in the lie condition, high trust subjects ($M=.61$) attributed more honesty to sources than did low trust subjects ($M=.55$), suggesting that lower levels of trust attenuate the effects of the truth-bias associated with relational familiarity when individuals experience deceptive communication. Stated differently, as relational trust increases, individuals presuppose honesty from their conversational partners when those partners dissemble (Table 4).

Table 4
Mean Honesty Bias Scores for the Interaction Between
 Trust Rating and Honesty Condition

<u>Honesty Condition</u>	<u>Mean Honesty Bias Scores</u>	
	High Trust	Low Trust
Truth	.75	.74
Deception	.61	.55

Honesty attributions and the intimacy rating. As with Trust Rating, the Intimacy Rating was substituted for relational familiarity to tap the affective, relational forces presumed to create the truth-bias. A multiple regression performed on Honesty Attribution revealed that the main effect of Intimacy Rating and the interaction between Intimacy Rating and honesty condition both obtained F-values of greater than 1.00 (Table 5).

Table 5
Predictors of Honesty Attributions with Intimacy Rating

	B	<u>Initial Model</u>			<u>Reduced Model</u>			
		Beta	F	p	B	Beta	F	p
Perspective	.68	.24	.06	>.05				
Honesty Condition	2.13	.82	.54	>.05				
Intimacy	.77	.53	2.95	>.05	.58	.39	11.72	<.05
Honesty Condition by Perspective	-.94	-.31	.06	>.05				

Table 5 cont.
Predictors of Honesty Attributions with Intimacy Rating

	<u>Initial Model</u>				<u>Reduced Model</u>			
	<u>B</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>p</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>p</u>
Intimacy by Perspective	-.05	-.10	.01	>.05				
Intimacy by Honesty Condition	-.59	-1.21	1.10	>.05	-.28	-.44	14.79	<.05
Intimacy by Honesty Condition by Perspective	.10	.18	.02	>.05				
	<u>F(7,60)=2.89, p <.05</u> adjusted <u>R</u> ² =.16				<u>F(2,65)=9.93, p <.05</u> adjusted <u>R</u> ² =.21			

Results of the reduced model indicated that Intimacy Rating was a significant predictor of Honesty Attribution, $F(1,64)=11.72, p <.05.$, as was the interaction between Intimacy Rating and honesty condition, $F(1,64)=14.79, p <.05.$ The truth-bias due to intimacy level emerged in this analysis ($b=.58$): As intimacy increased, honesty attributions increased. However, as intimacy increases, subjects may be more sensitive to deception even though the truth-bias persists. Honesty attributions scores of high intimacy respondents decreased more when deception occurred (Truth $M=6.51$; Deception $M=5.41$) than did those by low intimacy respondents (Truth $M=5.60$; Deception $M=4.65$) (Table 6).

Table 6
Mean Honesty Attributions for the Interaction Between
 Intimacy Rating and Honesty Condition

<u>Honesty Condition</u>	<u>Mean Honesty Attributions</u>	
	High Intimacy	Low Intimacy
Truth	6.51	5.60
Deception	5.41	4.65

Honesty bias and the intimacy rating. A multiple regression performed on Honesty Bias with Intimacy Rating identified two variables, perspective and the interaction between Intimacy and perspective, with F -values greater than 1.00. The regression performed on the reduced model did not obtain significance on the main effect of perspective, $F(1,64)=3.90$, $p > .05$, or the interaction between Intimacy and perspective, $F(1,64)=2.91$, $p > .05$.

Table 7
Predictors of Honesty Bias with Intimacy Rating

	<u>B</u>	<u>Initial Model</u>			<u>B</u>	<u>Reduced Model</u>		
		<u>Beta</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>p</u>		<u>Beta</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>p</u>
Perspective	.56	1.27	1.45	>.05	.38	.85	3.90	>.05
Honesty Condition	.08	.04	.00	>.05				
Intimacy	.06	.24	.56	>.05				
Honesty Condition by Perspective	-.06	-.12	.00	>.05				

Table 7 cont.
Predictors of Honesty Bias with Intimacy Rating

	<u>Initial Model</u>				<u>Reduced Model</u>			
	<u>B</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>p</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>p</u>
Intimacy by Honesty Condition	-.03	-.34	.08	>.05				
Intimacy by Perspective	-.10	-1.16	1.14	>.05	-.06	-.74	2.91	>.05
Intimacy by Honesty Condition	-.03	-.34	.08	>.05				
Honesty Condition by Perspective	.01	.14	.01	>.05				
	$F(7,60)=1.46, p >.05$ adjusted $R^2=.05$				$F(7,60)=2.17, p >.05$ adjusted $R^2=.03$			

CHAPTER 4

Discussion

Given the number of deception studies preceding this one which employed similar manipulations, the most startling and, perhaps, most interesting aspect of this experiment was the failure to obtain significant differences in the honesty attribution scores and honesty bias scores of subjects in the roles of observers and participants and friends and strangers. With this in mind, the following discussion will address this failure from several different perspectives. Data will be interpreted under the assumption that no methodological biases affected the results. This part of the discussion will concentrate on the implications for deception research. Next, alternative analyses performed on the Trust and Intimacy Scales will be discussed. The experimental manipulations also will be examined with the aim of identifying methodological characteristics that may explain the lack of significant findings. Finally, suggestions for future research efforts directed toward unraveling the deception puzzle will be forwarded.

Hypothesis One

The first hypothesis posited that conversational participants will attribute more honesty to conversational partners than observers of those partners. The lack of differences in the attributions of honesty which

participants and observers made about sources in this study suggests that observers of, for lack of a better word, "live" interactions were affected by forces which had little influence on observers in previous studies employing qualitatively different manipulations.

It appears that the definition of "observer" may need to be expanded and refined to include the perceptions of individuals observing interactions unfolding in close proximity and in real-time. Previous studies have focused exclusively on the perceptions of observers viewing videotapes, listening to audiotapes or reading transcripts of interactions in which deception occurred. Observers have viewed, heard or read transcripts of interactions from which they are clearly distanced in terms of time and space. The basic premise of these inquiries has been that under these circumstances, observers are more critical in their evaluations of sources due to a lack situational cues and relational influences. Therefore, observers are less likely to be effected by a truth-bias associated with active participation in an interpersonal interaction. For example, unfettered by conversational maintenance responsibilities and contextual influences, observers of videotaped interactions in Buller, Strzyzewski and Hunsaker's (1991) study rated communication sources less favorably, in terms of honesty attributions, than did subjects actively engaged

in those conversations. It appears that in under these circumstances, observers experience a significant psychological distancing from sources which reduces affective and/or cognitive interdependence, an interdependence experienced by individuals actively engaged in conversation.

This study attempted to extend previous participant-observer manipulations by evaluating the attributions of observers unobtrusively scrutinizing conversations transpiring in real-time, separated from the interaction by a two-way mirror. Hypothesis one was predicated on the proposition that under these circumstances observers' attributions would mirror those from previous investigations, i.e., they would be less likely to assume that sources were being honest. That prediction did not hold in this study. The attributions made by observers using this real-time manipulation were very similar to those made by participants. These results suggest that propinquity and real-time observation combine in such a way as to (1) attenuate the psychological forces which influence observers separated in time and space from the interactions that they observe and (2) to create a shared reality such that observers in real-time and close proximity assign the same subjective, idiosyncratic meaning to the interaction as participants.

In future deception experiments, researchers must be very clear when specifying the circumstances under which their observers' perceptions may be generalized to the larger population of observers. For example, findings from this study suggest that a juror's attributions about the honesty of a witness made through observation in a courtroom will be qualitatively different from the evaluations of an observer who views a videotape of that witness's testimony. The juror's attributions may be reflected in a more positive evaluation of the source in terms of attributions honesty--attributions which, depending upon the circumstances, may have serious consequences for the defendant. Conversely, observers of mediated communication, as might be the case in observing politicians engaged in televised debates, may be more sensitive to deceptive messages and less likely to accept duplicitous pronouncements from those politicians than observers attending a political speech.

Hypothesis Two

The second hypothesis predicted that observers would be more accurate than participants at detecting deception when it occurred. No evidence for this prediction was obtained in terms of accuracy of detecting deception, with observers (.48) and participants (.49) yielding almost identical accuracy scores. Instead, as in many previous deception studies, all observers failed to obtain accuracy scores much

greater than 50 percent, with scores typically ranging from 40 to 60 percent. However, results from the alternative regression analyses indicated that when accuracy is considered as a reflection of Honesty Attribution scores, there is a trend such that observers attributed less honesty to sources than participants, especially in the lie condition. This suggests that observers are less constrained by a truth-bias and anticipate that sources, regardless of relational history, will be less honest in their communication. It must be noted, however, that effect sizes for these observed differences were relatively small. This point will be addressed in later discussion.

Hypothesis Three

Hypothesis three predicted that friends will attribute more honesty to sources than strangers. Failure to obtain differences in Honesty Attribution and Honesty Bias scores for friends and strangers was one of the more perplexing aspects of this study. Several previous deception studies that used similar manipulations detected a pronounced truth-bias among friends. In the present study subjects in the stranger category made consistently high attributions of honesty about sources, very similar to the attributions made by friends. It appears that the truth-bias may be a powerful cognitive heuristic which influences individual's expectations about a source's honesty, regardless of

relational familiarity. Because the truth-bias functions as a cognitive heuristic, it likely develops as other cognitive "short-cuts" do--through personal experience. While the truth-bias may function to free individuals to attend to more pressing, moment-to-moment conversational responsibilities, it also may function in a manner similar to an availability heuristic. For most people under most circumstances, an assumption of honesty is the correct assumption. Therefore, without a clear indication that deception is occurring or is likely to occur, individuals will not consider that deception has transpired because in most circumstances it has not. That is, honesty is the most "available" frame of reference when considering another's motives and intentions for interacting.

Exploratory Analyses: Additive/Non-additive Effects

The exploratory analyses performed to test the additive or non-additive effects of the truth-biases failed to obtain significant results for the interaction between perspective and relational familiarity on Honesty Bias. However, a trend was revealed for the interaction of perspective and relational familiarity on Honesty Attribution. A comparison of the mean Honesty Attribution scores for the interaction between perspective and relational familiarity (Table 1) reveals that friends in the roles of observer and participant made identical

attributions, suggesting that the truth-bias created by relational familiarity is especially influential, regardless of a person's perspective on an interaction. A higher honesty rating, though was provided by strangers in the participant condition, providing evidence that active participation in an interaction is sufficient to produce a truth-bias. There may be a limit to the truth-bias, such that once it occurs, either due to participation or to relational familiarity, the addition of other situational factors that also produce a truth-bias has no impact on attributions.

The effect sizes that emerged in this experiment limit any conclusion about truth-biases, including the preceding one. Overall, most of the effects reported in this experiment were small ($\eta^2 = .03$) and failed to achieve traditional significance levels. However, the effect sizes were identical to Buller, Strzyzewski, & Hunsaker's (1991) recent study comparing participants and observers, suggesting that the present study may have been underpowered. Buller, Strzyzewski and Hunsaker argued that these effect sizes do, in fact, represent meaningful differences corresponding to a binomial difference of .42 versus .52 for an effect size of .03 (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984). Moreover it is premature to conclude that participant-observer effects are meaningless and hence

abandon the study of participant-observer differences, given that a number of different factors may exacerbate differences due to perspective. For example, suspicion of a source's veracity may improve observers' accuracy than participants' in that suspicious observers' can devote full attention to a closer monitoring of behaviors--behaviors which may betray deception when it occurs, whereas participants are constrained by their conversational responsibilities.

Alternative Analyses

The alternative analyses performed to tap the relational and affective differences presumed to create the truth-bias offer some limited support for the assumption that relational factors may affect the strength of that bias. Comparison of high and low categories of the Trust and Intimacy Ratings revealed that differences in trust and intimacy translate into differences in Honesty Attribution and Honesty Bias scores, especially when looking at intimacy main effects and the interaction between trust and honesty condition. It seems fair to suggest that subjects in the high trust category were represent friends while those in the low trust category are equivalent to strangers.

Trust. The significant interaction between trust and honesty condition on Honesty Bias offers support for the supposition that as trust levels increase as friendships

develop with their accompanying increased trust, people will exhibit a more pronounced truth-bias. It also appears that as trust levels increase, individuals become less sensitive to deception from sources, and this decreased sensitivity is related to higher levels of relational familiarity. Given these results, it is reasonable to conclude that relational familiarity, as measured by level of trust, translates into an increase in a truth-bias.

Intimacy rating. Although only subjects in the friend condition completed the Intimacy Rating, results from the alternative regression analyses revealed that intimacy level is a significant predictor of truth-bias. As intimacy increases, friends exhibit a concomitant increase in perceptions of a source's honesty. Additionally, the significant interaction between intimacy and Honesty Attribution suggests that higher levels of intimacy are associated with a greater sensitivity to deception. More intimate friends' Honesty Attribution scores decreased more dramatically than did less intimate friends' when judging a liar. It seems to be the case that while increases in intimacy translate into a pronounced truth-bias intimacy can increase sensitivity to deception, supporting Miller et al.'s (1981) contention that an increase in familiarity leads to more detection accuracy.

One additional, and somewhat troublesome, set of results regarding Honesty Bias and Intimacy Rating must be addressed. A trend toward a significant main effect for Perspective on Honesty Bias scores was in the opposite direction from expectations. That is, friends ($M=.72$) who were observers rated sources' responses as being more honest than did participants ($M=.66$). Therefore the interpretation offered is strictly speculative. Given this caveat, it appears that participant friends, due to their active role, may have had access to subtle variations in sources' behaviors which affected their perceptions of sources' veracity. Observers, on the other hand, may have been sufficiently distanced from the interaction to miss these subtle cues and therefore relied on more global evaluations of sources when making judgments about their truthfulness.

Methodological Considerations

By design, this experiment attempted to test two propositions. First, conversational participants differ from observers of conversations in the assumptions of honesty they hold for sources. Second, friends and strangers also differ significantly in and also in their attributions of honesty. Because this investigation failed to detect such differences, when previous investigations had, the methodology is called into question. Careful consideration

of the methodology reveals a number of design issues that may account for the results obtained.

Participant/observer manipulation. As alluded to in the discussion of the first hypothesis, observers of interactions unfolding in close proximity to the observer and in real-time may be more similar to actual conversational participants than observers who viewed videotapes, listened to audiotapes or read transcripts of deceptive communication in the majority of previous studies. Although not, strictly speaking, a methodological problem, these similarities strongly suggest that observing "live" interactions may create a cognitive and/or affective constancy with sources that obviates the psychological distancing effects of observing "from afar." In fact, in this study subjects assigned to the observer role interacted, albeit briefly, with participants and sources before each session began. Whether the mutual experience of acting as experimental subjects was sufficient to establish some degree of relational fealty is unclear. However, it appears to be the case that observers in this investigation exhibited qualitative similarities with active participants.

Relational familiarity. Identifying methodological bias in the manipulation of relational familiarity is somewhat more problematic. However, several factors may

have led to the unintended creation of what were essentially two groups of acquaintances.

The friends may not have all been highly intimate and interdependent. First, friends were required to have known each other for a minimum of only three months, a period insufficient to establish interpersonal interdependence. Second, by recruiting subjects from summer school, students may have limited to bringing acquaintances who were available during that time. Third, all the friends were recruited from one class. This class is traditionally very difficult, and consequently, all of the students desired extra-credit. Perhaps some (if not most) of the students, in their ambition to receive the extra points, felt compelled to bring with them two others who did not actually meet the requirements for participation in terms of self-disclosure, frequency of interaction, and the like. Fourth, although trust differed between friends and strangers, the standard deviation on the Trust Scale was large for both friends ($SD=4.75$) and strangers ($SD=4.30$), indicating a great deal of variance within these categories. The wide latitude of variability may signal overlap between friends and strangers and account for significant differences between friends and strangers were lacking.

Similarly, the strangers may not have been, and in fact, were not all strangers. Again, it was nearly

impossible to create 68 triads of strangers recruiting subjects from a handful of undergraduate summer school classes. At a minimum, subjects were aware that fellow subjects in the stranger condition were all summer school communication students. Although subjects were randomly assigned to the stranger condition from different classes, it seems more than reasonable to assume that many of them had at least some knowledge of their fellow "strangers." As students they shared an institutional and departmental interdependence which would have potentially affected their perceptions of each other. These perceptions could have translated into more favorable attributions about one another than the attributions they would have made about real strangers about whom they had no working knowledge. Further, the pretest questionnaires which they completed tapped their perceptions of strangers in general, not their perceptions about the specific strangers.

One conclusion is that the strangers in this experiment were more like acquaintances, as the friends may have been. Thus, the friend/stranger dichotomy necessary to test for differences based on relational familiarity may have been weakened, leading to comparisons of somewhat analogous groups.

Summary

Although this experiment failed to obtain empirical support for the hypotheses forwarded, alternative analyses did reveal some limited support for the proposition that relational familiarity, in terms of intimacy and trust, is positively associated with a truth-bias. That is, as levels of trust and intimacy rise, individuals will exhibit an increased propensity to assume that relational partners are providing straightforward and honest information. There was also some suggestion that truth biases are nonadditive. If it is evoked by relational familiarity, perspective does not alter it or vice versa.

Appendix A

On the scale that follows, please indicate your reactions to strangers in general. Please circle the number which best characterizes strangers. Please complete all scales.

1. Trustful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Trustful
2. Safe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dangerous
3. Respectful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disrespectful
4. Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dishonest
5. Reliable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unreliable

Appendix B
Pretest #1

1. How long have you known _____? _____
2. On average, how many times a week do you interact with _____? _____

On the scale that follows, please indicate your reactions to _____. Please circle the number which best characterizes _____. Please complete all scales.

3. Trustful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Distrustful
4. Safe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dangerous
5. Respectful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disrespectful
6. Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dishonest
7. Reliable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unreliable

8. From the following list, please circle the word which best describes your relationship with _____.

Stranger Acquaintance Friend Best Friend

Lover Spouse Relative Boyfriend/Girlfriend

On the scale that follows, please indicate your perceptions of _____. Circle the number which best characterizes _____. Please complete all scale items.

- | | Strongly
Disagree | | | | | | Strongly
Agree |
|--|----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------|
| 9. She/he talks in ways which makes it difficult for me to understand. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 10. I have to say and ask things two or three times before she/he will answer. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 11. It's easy to let her/him know about what I like and don't like. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 12. I get to explain my side when she/he and I start to disagree or argue. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

Appendix B cont.

13. She/he confides in me more than she/he confides in anyone else. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. She/he tells me things about her/himself which she/he is not likely to tell other people. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. She/he does not always talk about herself/himself to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. Her/his conversations with me last the least time when she/he is discussing herself/himself. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Appendix C
Social Desirability Scale

Listed below are a number of statements concerning attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally. Please circle your response.

1. T F Before voting, I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates.
2. T F I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.
3. T F It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.
4. T F I have never intensely disliked anyone.
5. T F On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life.
6. T F I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.
7. T F There have been times when I have taken advantage of someone.
8. T F I'm always willing to admit when I make a mistake.
9. T F I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud-mouthed, obnoxious people.
10. T F If I could get into a movie without paying for it and be sure I was not seen, I would probably do it.
11. T F No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.
12. T F I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.
13. T F There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.
14. T F I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
15. T F I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved.

Appendix D
Interviewer Posttest

Please read the following statements and indicate whether you agree or disagree with it. Circle the number which best represents your perceptions of the person you interviewed.

- | | | Strongly
Disagree | | | | | | Strongly
Agree |
|--|---|----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------|
| 1. She/he was frustrated with me. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| 2. She/he wanted to dominate the interaction. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| 3. She/he wanted me to trust her/him. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| 4. She/he emphasized disagreement between us. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| 5. She/he gave answers which where believable. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| 6. She/he tried to control the the interaction. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| 7. She/he did not tell the truth all the time. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| 8. She/he expressed anger toward me. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| 9. She/he attempted to persuade me. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| 10. She/he was very open and forthcoming. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| 11. She/he was comfortable interacting with me. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| 12. She/he behaved unusually because she/he was in the experiment. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| 13. She/he was competitive with me. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| 14. She/he was honest with me. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |

Appendix D cont.

- | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15. She/he was unresponsive. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 16. She/he was willing to listen to me. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 17. She/he communicated aggressiveness. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 18. She/he felt very relaxed talking to me. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 19. She/he was not sincere when answering questions. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 20. She/he seemed to care if I liked her/him. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

Appendix E
Observer Posttest

Please read the following statements and indicate whether you agree or disagree with it. Circle the number which best represents your perceptions of the person being interviewed.

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree
1. She/he was frustrated with the interviewer.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. She/he wanted to dominate the interaction.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. She/he wanted the interviewer to trust her/him.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. She/he emphasized disagreement between herself/himself and the interviewer.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. She/he gave answers which were believable.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. She/he tried to control the interaction.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. She/he did not tell the truth all the time.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. She/he expressed anger toward the interviewer.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. She/he attempted to persuade the interviewer.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. She/he was very open and forthcoming.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. She/he was comfortable interacting with the interviewer.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. She/he behaved unusually because she/he was in the experiment.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. She/he was competitive with the interviewer.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix E cont.

- | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 14. She/he was honest with the interviewer. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 15. She/he was unresponsive. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 16. She/he was willing to listen to the interviewer. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 17. She/he communicated aggressiveness. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 18. She/he felt very relaxed talking to the interviewer. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 19. She/he was not sincere when answering questions. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 20. She/he seemed to care if the interviewer liked her/him. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

Appendix F
Final Posttest (Observer)

In the preceding interview, the person being interviewed (_____) was instructed to either tell the truth or lie. Specifically, she/he was instructed to either be completely honest when responding to questions or to lie when responding to some of the questions. For each item discussed, circle "T" if you believe he/she answered honestly to a question about her/his responses to the item or circle "F" if you believe he/she was lying when responding to a question. Please circle your choice for each item discussed in the interview.

1. T F Before voting, I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates.
2. T F I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.
3. T F It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.
4. T F I have never intensely disliked anyone.
5. T F On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life.
6. T F I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.
7. T F There have been times when I have taken advantage of someone.
8. T F I'm always willing to admit when I make a mistake.
9. T F I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud-mouthed, obnoxious people.
10. T F If I could get into a movie without paying for it and be sure I was not seen, I would probably do it.
11. T F No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.
12. T F I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.

Appendix F cont.

13. T F There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.
14. T F I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
15. T F I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved.
16. T F I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.

Appendix G

Final Posttest (Participant)

In the preceding interview, the person you interviewed (_____) was instructed to either tell the truth or lie. Specifically, she/he was instructed to either be completely honest when responding to your questions or to lie when responding to some of the questions. For each item discussed, circle "T" if you believe he/she answered honestly to a question about her/his responses to the item or circle "F" if you believe he/she was lying when responding to a question. Please circle your choice for each item discussed in the interview.

1. T F Before voting, I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates.
2. T F I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.
3. T F It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.
4. T F I have never intensely disliked anyone.
5. T F On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life.
6. T F I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.
7. T F There have been times when I have taken advantage of someone.
8. T F I'm always willing to admit when I make a mistake.
9. T F I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud-mouthed, obnoxious people.
10. T F If I could get into a movie without paying for it and be sure I was not seen, I would probably do it.
11. T F No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.
12. T F I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.

Appendix G cont.

13. T F There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.
14. T F I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
15. T F I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved.
16. T F I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.

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