

The February Twenty Eighth Incident in Taiwan

Toru Ohashi

Master's Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Department of East Asian Studies

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

In the Graduate College

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Introduction

Taiwan and the Taiwanese were liberated from Japanese colonial rule with the end of World War II in 1945. The Taiwanese were very happy with the restoration to China. Yet, their enthusiasm did not last long. Sixteen months after the restoration, the Taiwanese rose against the new government of Taiwan. The event, called the February Twenty Eighth Incident, started with a confiscation of contraband products. Although it did not start as a political movement, it soon developed into a political struggle. The Taiwanese people had accumulated frustration and longed for political reform. They wished for a change in situation. A question is raised why they turned frustrated to fight against the government that they had enthusiastically welcomed. What happened to Taiwan in the post-World War II period is certainly significant to answer the question. Understanding conditions before the restoration is equally important. Thus, this paper discusses both periods before and after World War II. The focus is on political as well as general conditions of Taiwan and the Taiwanese people, in order to comprehend what led to the Incident. In addition, demands that people made to the government during the uprising are discussed, for they reflect for what the Taiwanese rose.

Another question that should be taken into consideration is why a huge scale uprising occurred in Taiwan and not in the rest of China when the Kuomintang recovered a significant portion of territory from Japan after World War II. For this question, the examination of the general situation of recovered territory of China after World War II and what was typical to Taiwan is important. Focus is put on people's reaction to the arriving Kuomintang officials and to their policies and on similarities and differences

between people's reaction in the mainland recovered territory and their reaction in Taiwan to the newly arrived Kuomintang officials.

Chapter 1 Japanese Colony of Taiwan

Japan's possession of Taiwan was determined based on Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was signed on April 17, 1895, to conclude the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Beginning on May 8, when the treaty went into effect, Taiwan became a Japanese territory.¹ Prior to this, Taiwan was a Chinese territory that had been given a provincial status independent from Fukien in October 1885.² The Treaty of Shimonoseki forced China (the Ch'ing dynasty) to cede Taiwan to Japan as one of the conditions to restore peace. After receiving a treaty draft presented by the Japanese side, the Chinese plenipotentiary Li Hung-chang tried hard in the negotiations with Japanese Ito Hirobumi to reverse the clause concerning the cession of Taiwan, but Li's effort ended fruitlessly. Ito did not compromise at all.³ After all, China lost Taiwan and Chinese on Taiwan lost China. Fate of the residents of Taiwan became dependent on the Japanese authorities instead of the Chinese authorities.

The residents of Taiwan were given the choice to stay on Taiwan or leave Taiwan. In other words, they could choose not to be placed under Japanese rule by leaving Taiwan. Article V of the Treaty of Shimonoseki states as follows:

The inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan, who wish to take up their residence outside the ceded districts, shall be at liberty to sell their real property and retire. For this purpose a period of two years from the date of the exchange of the ratification of the present Act, shall be granted. At the expiration of that

¹ The Treaty of Shimonoseki is quoted in Gaimusho, ed., *Nihon gaiko bunsho* (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengo Kyokai, 1953), vol. 28 pt. 2: 363-380.

² Ito Kiyoshi, *Taiwan: Yonhyaku nen no rekishi to tenbo* (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1993), 60.

³ See Gaimusho, ed., *Nihon gaiko bunsho*, vol. 28 pt. 2: 405-432 for the procedures of negotiations concerning the treaty draft of the Japanese side between Ito Hirobumi and Li Hung-chang at Shimonoseki.

period those of the inhabitants who shall not have left such territories shall at the option of Japan, be deemed to be Japanese subjects.⁴

Because not the entire territory of China was to be occupied by the Japanese, Han Chinese residents of Taiwan could move to another Chinese territory from Taiwan if they did not wish to be ruled by the Japanese. This was technically applied to the Malaya-Polynesian Native Taiwanese, too.⁵ Residents of Taiwan who remained on the island after May 8, 1897, were regarded as Japanese subjects regardless of their ethnicity.

The number of the evacuees from Taiwan was very small. Only 4,500 people left Taiwan in the two-year grace period. Estimating the population of Taiwan to have been three million, only 0.16 percent of Taiwan's residents left Taiwan.⁶ This does not mean that most residents of Taiwan happily chose to be Japanese subjects. The great majority of them had already settled and had been established in Taiwan; for this reason, it was very difficult for them to move to another place by selling properties that they had possessed thanks to their ancestors' effort. Needless to say, the Native Taiwanese were by no means able to leave their homeland of Taiwan for mainland China, a place they knew nothing about. Another factor of their hesitance to leave Taiwan, in addition to their establishment

⁴ The original Japanese-language version of this Article V is quoted on p. 364 of Gaimusho, ed., *Nihon gaiko bunsho* (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengo Kyokai, 1953), vol.28 pt. 2. The Chinese translation is on p. 369. The English translation is on pp. 374-375.

⁵ During his negotiation with Ito Hirobumi on March 24, 1895, at Shimonoseki, Li Hung-chang stated that the Native Taiwanese constituted 60 percent of the total population of Taiwan as opposed to the Han Chinese who composed of 40 percent of Taiwan's population (Gaimusho, ed., vol. 28 pt. 2: 398). This is not accurate, however. The 1905 census conducted by the Government-General of Taiwan (the Japanese colonial government of Taiwan) revealed that the Native Taiwanese constituted only 3.7 percent of Taiwan's population [Ko Shodo, *Taiwan Sotokufu* (Tokyo: Kyoikusha, 1981), 19]. Realistically, it is almost impossible that the population of the peoples who constituted 60 percent of a geographic area declined to only 3.7 percent of the total within 10 years. The Native Taiwanese were by no means the majority of Taiwan's population at that time already.

⁶ Ko Shodo, *Taiwan Sotokufu*, (Tokyo: Kyoikusha, 1981), 55.

in Taiwan, was a risk of migration to a new place where they had no persons to rely on. If they had a stable life in Taiwan and had no guarantee of better life in a new place, they could not dare to abandon a stable life in exchange for a risk. Continuous militant resistance against the Japanese shows Taiwanese reluctance to accept Japanese rule.

The Japanese forces landed at Ao-ti, located southeast of Keelung, on May 29, 1895, and occupied Taipei on June 7.⁷ The northern part of the island fell to the Japanese Army relatively easily. While the Japanese forces scored quick victory in northern Taiwan, their march to the south was not smooth. The southern part of the island had more people to fight against the Japanese.⁸ Endemic diseases of the unfamiliar land also made Japanese conquest of southern Taiwan difficult.

Li Hung-chang warned Ito Hirobumi on May 11 of “the greatly excited and disturbed condition of all classes of people in Formosa which may lead to revolution.”⁹ Li warned Ito of tense Taiwanese also on May 15 and May 26.¹⁰ As Li warned, Taiwanese residents shared intense antipathy against the Japanese. Thus, Japanese conquest and pacification proved very difficult. The conquest took five months. The Japanese casualties for the conquest counted more than 30,000, including 21,748 soldiers who were sent back to Japan for medical treatment because their conditions made it necessary to leave Taiwan for Japan. The total number of the Japanese deaths in action was 164. In addition, 515 members of the Japanese Army were wounded. In comparison, those

⁷ Ito Kiyoshi, 71-73; Tai Kuo-hui, *Taiwan: Ningen, rekishi, shinsho* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), 62-63.

⁸ Ito Kiyoshi, 73-76.

⁹ A telegraph from Li Hung-chang to Ito Hirobumi sent on May 11, 1895. The whole text of the original English-language version of the telegraph is quoted on p. 556 of Gaimusho, ed., *Nihon gaiko bunsho* (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengo Kyokai, 1953), vol.28 pt. 2.

¹⁰ Telegraphs from Li Hung-chang to Ito Hirobumi sent on May 15 and May 26, 1895, quoted also in Gaimusho, ed., vol. 28 pt. 2: 560-562 and 572-573.

Taiwanese who were killed by the Japanese forces counted over 10,000, and those who surrendered numbered more than 8,000 according to an announcement of the Japanese authorities.¹¹ Desperate but fierce fighting of the Taiwanese forces made the Japanese conquest difficult, although the Japanese forces were far more advanced in terms of weapons, organization, number, and training.¹²

The first governor-general of the Japanese colony of Taiwan,¹³ Kabayama Sukenori, sent a telegraph to notify the Army headquarters in Tokyo of the completion of his mission to conquer the Island of Taiwan finally on November 18, 1895. In the message, Kabayama declared the Island of Taiwan was completely pacified, although he recognized possibility of further rebellions.¹⁴ Three months earlier than Kabayama's declaration of the pacification of Taiwan, Ito Hirobumi as the prime minister requested Kabayama for quick occupation of the southern part of the island on July 3.¹⁵ Yet, it was not until November that Kabayama could declare pacification of Taiwan. Kabayama stated that intense heat made quick conquest difficult in his reply to Ito.¹⁶ Taiwan's climate of intense heat certainly played a significant role for the difficulty of Japanese

¹¹ Ino Kanori, *Taiwan bunka shi* (N.p., n.d.; reprint, Tokyo: Toko Shoin, 1965), 3 (ge kan): 980 (page references are to reprint edition).

¹² Ito Kiyoshi, 74-75.

¹³ The Japanese colony of Taiwan included the Island of Taiwan, all the islands that appertained to or belonged to the Island of Taiwan, and the Pescadores (P'eng-hu) Islands, which were located "between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude." This domain was determined in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

¹⁴ A telegraph from Kabayama Sukenori to the Chief of the General Headquarters sent from Taipei on November 18, 1895, quoted in Ito Hirobumi, ed., 29.

¹⁵ A telegraph from Ito Hirobumi to Kabayama Sukenori sent on July 3, 1895, quoted in Ito Hirobumi, ed., 26.

¹⁶ A telegraph from Kabayama Sukenori to Ito Hirobumi sent on July 5, 1895, quoted in Ito Hirobumi, ed., 27.

conquest of Taiwan. Nevertheless, fierce Taiwanese resistance would have been as crucial as climate for the difficulty of quick conquest.

Although Kabayama Sukenori sent a message of Taiwan's pacification to Tokyo in the middle of November, Taiwanese resistance against the Japanese never ceased. The Japanese authorities in Taiwan continued to work for suppression of anti-Japanese forces between 1895 and 1915.¹⁷ Anti-Japanese guerrilla forces of Han Chinese tended to have their bases in mountainous regions. In mountainous regions, Han Chinese residents were relatively new settlers compared to those Han Chinese who had settled on the plains, and they were more cooperative and resolute to protect what they had gained in exchange for various hardships of opening lands that were more difficult to cultivate than plain lands. They also possessed a sense of Chinese nationalism because their family history on Taiwan was not as long as plain settlers. Japanese threat and Chinese nationalism gave rise to their antipathy and resistance against the Japanese.¹⁸

Japanese treatment of resistant Taiwanese was severe. On November 20, 1895, the Taiwan Residents Punishment Act went into effect. The Act was applied to the residents of the Japanese colony of Taiwan. According to the law, those who started a rebellion or killed an official to defy the government were to be executed. An attack to an office or ship of the military was also punishable by death. The death penalty was also to be applied for such crimes as destruction of arsenals, communication means, and transportation systems. If one hindered or disrupted the military, he or she was to be

¹⁷ Between 1895 and 1915, the Japanese governors-general were Kabayama (May 1895-June 1896), Katsura Taro (June 1896-October 1896), Nogi Maresuke (October 1896-February 1898), Kodama Gentaro (February 1898-April 1906), Sakuma Samata (April 1906-May 1915), and Ando Sadami (May 1915-June 1918).

¹⁸ Ito Kiyoshi, 77; Ko, 66-68; Tai, 65-67.

executed as well.¹⁹ There was no mercy on those who were labeled as rebellious in this law. Even if one accidentally killed an official or crushed a military truck, he or she could be sentenced to death if an accident was judged intentional.

On November 5, 1898, furthermore, the government-general of Taiwan²⁰ promulgated the Bandits Punishment Act. Accordingly, people who organized a group of people to achieve certain objectives, whatever they were, through violence or threat were considered bandits and severely punished. Followers were also to be executed if they: burned or destroyed buildings, transportation facilities, communication facilities, and/or forests and fields; or killed, looted, and/or raped people.²¹ Between 1898 and 1902, the number of the executed due to this law counted 2,998.²² Including this figure, Ko Shodo estimates that the Japanese authorities of Taiwan killed about 32,000 Taiwanese in the first eight years of Japanese rule between 1895 and 1902.²³ Estimating the then population of Taiwan at three million, the Japanese forces wiped out more than one percent of the Taiwanese population in the first eight years of their rule.

Huge scale anti-Japanese uprisings were not reported between 1902 and 1905. However, Han Chinese uprisings and Japanese suppression of them re-appeared during the governorship of Sakuma Samata (April 1906-May 1915). Some Han Chinese rose against the Japanese who interfered in Chinese life by confiscating land and other sources of

¹⁹ *Taiwan jumin keibatsu rei*, Articles I, XIII, and XIV.

²⁰ The government-general of Taiwan (*Taiwan Sotokufu*) is the Japanese colonial government of Taiwan. The head of the government-general was the governor-general (*sotoku*). The same terminology for these two was applied to the Japanese colony of Korea.

²¹ *Hito keibatsu rei*, Articles I and II.

²² Ito Kiyoshi, 87; Tai, 69; Yanaihara Tadao, *Jih-pen t'i-kuo chu-i hsia chih T'ai-wan*, trans. Chou Hsien-wen (Chung-ho, Taiwan: P'a-mi-erh Shu-tien, 1985), 159 and 175.

²³ Ko, 86. Ito Kiyoshi also agrees to this estimate of 32,000 Taiwanese killed by the Japanese authorities between 1898 and 1902 (Ito Kiyoshi, 87).

profit. The government-general had thoroughly investigated Taiwan's land between 1898 and 1905 and practiced land nationalization from 1910 to 1914. Forceful land purchase and unfair business deals that Japanese companies imposed on Taiwanese people angered many Taiwanese people. The Pei-p'u Incident of November 1907 in Hsinchu, in which participants stood against an attempt by a Japanese company to monopolize local camphor, was one case. Another case was the Lin-ch'i-p'u Incident of March 1912, when people rose against sale of a land that had no owner to a Japanese company in Nan-t'ao.²⁴

There were also revolutionary activities by Han Chinese trying to expel the Japanese to establish their own rule of Taiwan. One example is the Lo Fu-hsing Incident of 1913. Lo Fu-hsing joined the Revolutionary League (Chung-kuo Ke-ming T'ung-meng Hui) in Southeast Asia while he served as a Chinese school teacher. He returned to Taiwan in 1913 to form a revolution to expel the Japanese from Taiwan. However, the Japanese authorities detected his plan and arrested Lo and his aides before they took action. Lo was executed in March 1914. Another example was the Hsi-lai Hut Incident (Yu Ch'ing-fang Incident) of 1915. The leader of the Hsi-lai Hut Incident was Yu Ch'ing-fang, who was once arrested by the Japanese police for his rebellious attitude toward the Japanese. Yu based his activities to establish the Great Bright Merciful Country (Ta Ming Tz'u-pei Kuo) by driving the Japanese out of Taiwan at the Hsi-lai Hut of Tainan, which was a building of a semi-religious vegetarian organization. After learning that the Japanese authorities had discovered his plan, Yu and his followers retreated to a mountain and started to attack Japanese police stations from there. The police-military joint forces finally suppressed the uprising in severe and cruel manners. More than 1,000 rebels

²⁴ Ito Kiyoshi, 97; Tai, 70-72.

(revolutionaries) were killed in the suppression. One thousand nine hundred fifty-seven persons were arrested and 866 of them were sentenced to death, although 731 of them were later reduced to life imprisonment. Thereafter, militant resistance of the Taiwanese against the Japanese was replaced by political activities.²⁵ The Hsi-lai Hut Incident convinced the Taiwanese people of the difficulty of defeating the Japanese by force. The failure of this revolutionary attempt consequently became a turning point for Taiwanese anti-Japanese movements.

Lin Hsien-t'ang was the forerunner of Taiwanese political movements under Japanese rule not dependent on militant methods. Advised by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in Nara, Japan, in as early as 1907, Lin had decided to take legal political methods to improve the status and conditions of the Taiwanese people at the age of twenty-seven. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao gave Lin the same advice not to rely on violence against the Japanese when Liang visited Taiwan in April 1911. Moreover, Lin was acquainted with a liberal Japanese political figure named Itagaki Taisuke via Itagaki's aides in the government-general of Taiwan. Itagaki visited Taiwan in February 1914 and insisted that the Taiwanese people should not waste their lives on unsuccessful militant resistance against the Japanese. Rather, Itagaki said, the Taiwanese should assimilate into the Japanese as a process of Asian unity against the Westerners. Itagaki's hope for Asian unity derived from his antipathy against the Westerners who encroached into Asian lands. This view of anti-Western Asian unity was not strange in political fields of Japan and other Asian nations. Itagaki's call for Japanese-Taiwanese friendship and equality inspired Lin and many

²⁵ Ito Kiyoshi, 97-98; Lin Heng-tao and Ch'eng Ta-hsueh, ed., *Yu Ch'ing-fang k'ang-jih ke-ming an ch'uen-tang* (Taichung, Taiwan: T'ai-wan-sheng Wen-hsien Wei-yuan-hui, 1974), vol. 1 pt. 1: 1-25.

Taiwanese to organize themselves. Lin had already been convinced that the Taiwanese could not challenge and win over the Japanese military and police forces. Lin rather considered that reduction in sacrifice of lives was more important.²⁶ Lin sought non-militant, political methods to improve the Taiwanese status within the Japanese empire, although he did not intend to assimilate the Taiwanese into the Japanese and thus abandon Chinese heritage. Influence from Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Itagaki Taisuke to Lin Hsien-t'ang on Lin's decision to organize Taiwanese people for political actions in Taiwan was significant. Combining his frustration as a Taiwanese under Japanese colonial rule, knowledge of Japanese might, and advice from Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Itagaki Taisuke to take political actions, Lin Hsien-t'ang resolved to organize a political party in Taiwan. Political activism of the Taiwanese instead of aggressive resistance against the Japanese had now started with a wealthy man from Taichung, Lin Hsien-t'ang, as the starter.

On December 20, 1914, over 500 people participated in the opening ceremony of the first legal political organization in the Japanese colony of Taiwan, the Taiwan Assimilation Society (Taiwan Doka Kai). Several tens of Japanese officials of the colonial government attended the ceremony. Itagaki Taisuke himself was also at the scene.²⁷ Given a chance to make a public speech, Itagaki called for full assimilation of the Taiwanese into the Japanese by promoting Japanese-Taiwanese equality in economic opportunities, legalization of mixed marriage between Japanese and Taiwanese, use of the Japanese language among the Taiwanese, and Japanese migration to Taiwan. Itagaki

²⁶ Chang Cheng-ch'ang, *Lin Hsien-t'ang yu T'ai-wan min-tsu yun-tung* (N.p., n.d.), 42-44 and 79-82; Edward I-te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-1937," *Journal of Asian Studies* 31 (May 1972): 478-479.

²⁷ Chang Cheng-ch'ang, 86-87; Edward I-te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements," 479-480.

maintained his anti-Westerners view. In this regard, Itagaki expected the Taiwanese assimilated into the Japanese to bridge the Japanese and the Chinese as the Japanese partners against the Westerners.²⁸

More than 3,000 people became members of the Assimilation Society. Most of them were learned Taiwanese.²⁹ While Itagaki believed that assimilation of the Taiwanese into the Japanese was the primary goal of the Society, Taiwanese members were not for full assimilation into the Japanese. What was significant for them was improvement of their status and equal treatment with the Japanese. In December 1914, when the Assimilation Society proclaimed its establishment, nineteen years had passed since Japan's possession of Taiwan. During those years, Taiwan had been a mere colony regarded as a land of uncivilized peoples. The Japanese colonizers had never treated the Taiwanese as equals. Those Japanese colonial officials who joined the Assimilation Society did so simply because of the fame of Itagaki Taisuke, one of the key figures for Meiji politics. The Japanese officials had never believed in the validity or possibility of Taiwanese assimilation into the Japanese, the honorable members of the divine imperial land of Japan. They could not love the Taiwanese, who had been strongly anti-Japanese since the very beginning of Japan's colonization, either. Therefore, the Japanese people in the colony of Taiwan believed in the validity of discrimination and mistreatment of the Taiwanese. Discrimination was nothing strange in colonial Taiwan, and many Taiwanese resented it. Yet, the Taiwanese had been convinced that they could not expel the Japanese by force or succeed in militarily to achieve equal treatment. Militant resistance and uprisings had been

²⁸ Ibid., 480.

²⁹ Chang Cheng-ch'ang, 87-88.

suppressed. Those learned Taiwanese who responded to Lin Hsien-t'ang's call chose a legal method in order not to exploit Taiwanese lives for desperate, unsuccessful fight that would merely sacrifice precious lives without positive achievements. For them, a legal political means was the alternative to violence. They had no other choice but to hope for gradual improvement in their status and treatment.

The Japanese colonial government almost succeeded in uprooting militant resistance of the Taiwanese people and made them change their tactics into more peaceful manners in the first twenty years of its colonial rule of Taiwan. The first governor-general Kabayama Sukenori (May 1895-June 1896) relied on military rule of Taiwan. Police officers in Taiwan belonged to the War Department probationally until March 1896. After the separation of the police forces from the Army in March 1896, the number of police officers increased. There were 840 police officers in September 1895, but the number jumped to 1,430 in March 1896 and 3,375 in June 1897.³⁰ The role and status of the police were quickly raised within a few years of the colonization. Further, Nogi Maresuke, the third governor-general (October 1896-February 1898), established the Triple Guard System to clarify job domains of the army and the police. The army was made solely responsible for the mountains and ravines against the bandits. The police were to deal with bandits in the villages. The intervening districts were made to be the domain of the joint forces of the army and the police.³¹

Although the status of the police was raised and the separate job domains for the army and the police were determined, the police continued to suffer from intervention by

³⁰ Yosaburo Takekoshi, *Japanese Rule in Formosa*, trans. George Braithwaite (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), 146.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 145.

the army and the gendarmes.³² The fourth governor-general Kodama Gentaro (February 1898-April 1906) tried to solve this problem by expanding the roles of the police. Kodama determined that the army would take actions only against guerrilla forces whose scale was too large for the police. In other words, the police were determined to solve all violent incidents of the entire colony of Taiwan unless help from the army was found necessary. Kodama, furthermore, involved the police in local affairs such as taxation matters, matters concerning public health, education, and industry. Equally important was the reduction of the number of the gendarmes down to one-tenth of the original number.³³ Thus, police rule had been established replacing military rule by the end of Kodama's governorship. Nevertheless, this change meant little to the Taiwanese, for thorough and brutal suppression continued no matter which institutional forces conducted it. Suppressers and oppressors were still in Japanese uniforms. Japanese forces continued to dominate Taiwanese life; the Taiwanese continued to be under Japanese forces.

Besides the Japanese forces, Taiwanese themselves were involved in a self-policing system and watched themselves under the *ho-ko* ("*pao-chia*" in Mandarin) system, which was adopted in 1898. Ten households made up one *ko* ("*chia*" in Mandarin), and ten *ko* (100 households) made up one *ho* ("*pao*" in Mandarin). *Ko* and *ho* member household heads elected heads of *ko* and *ho*. The heads of the *ho* (of 100 households each) were to be approved by municipal heads. The heads of the *ko* (of 10 households each) were to be

³² Ibid.

³³ Ching-chih Chen, "Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 214-216; Edward I-te Chen, "Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Taiwan: A Comparison of the Systems of Political Control," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 30 (1970): 146-147; Takekoshi, 146 and 148-149. Yosaburo Takekoshi states that there were 3,408 gendarmes in 1897, but their number had been reduced to 231 when he wrote the book.

approved by local police heads. Each of the *ho* and the *ko* was required to investigate member households, to check persons entering and exiting the area of its community, to take precautions against natural disasters and bandits, to protect local forests, to prevent spread of infectious diseases, to correct opium problems, to repair and clean roads and bridges, to punish wrong-doers, and to levy running costs. There was a principle of collective responsibility. If no member of a *ko* reported a crime committed by a member of the same *ko*, all the household heads of the *ko* had to pay fines. One person's failure to abide by a *ho-ko* regulation made other *ko* members share responsibility.³⁴ Combining police forces involved in local administrative matters and the neighborhood watchdog system called the *ho-ko* system, which was supervised by the police, the Japanese colonial government of Taiwan had maintained police rule over the Taiwanese people since 1898. With police rule restricting Taiwanese illegal activities, the Japanese authorities on Taiwan succeeded in suppressing anti-Japanese activities. Taiwanese literati eventually turned toward legal political struggle instead of militant resistance against the Japanese for the purpose of improving their life under Japanese colonial rule. The forerunners of Taiwanese political struggle were the Assimilation Society founded in 1914 and its members including the founder Lin Hsien-t'ang himself.

³⁴ Ching-chih Chen, "The Japanese Adoption of the *Pao-Chia* System in Taiwan, 1895-1945," *Journal of Asian Studies* 34 (February 1975): 397; Taiwan Sotokufu, ed., *Taiwan tochi gaiyo*, (N.p., 1945; reprint, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1973), 83-85 (page references are to reprint edition). The *ho-ko* system continued until June 17, 1945, when the government-general of Taiwan abolished the system "in accordance with the central government's policy to improve treatment of the colonial subjects" (Taiwan Sotokufu, ed., 85). One measure to know effectiveness of the *ho-ko* system is change in the numbers of the cases of collective responsibility. Since 1936 (including that year), no case of collective responsibility for either of the two categories discussed in the text had been reported (Taiwan Sotokufu, ed., 85).

When the Assimilation Society was established, it had forty-four Japanese members.³⁵ An estimated Japanese population on Taiwan in 1913 (one year before the foundation of the Assimilation Society) was 134,000.³⁶ These two figures show that most Japanese in Taiwan ignored the Assimilation Society. Unlike liberal Itagaki Taisuke, they were not interested in Japanese-Taiwanese equality or Taiwanese assimilation into the Japanese. They rather looked down upon the Taiwanese and justified their discrimination against the Taiwanese. Even the Japanese who joined the Assimilation Society did so primarily because of Itagaki's fame rather than because of their sympathy with the Taiwanese, who had been treated as mere colonial subjects unequal to the Japanese. The Assimilation Society, thus, enjoyed little support from the Japanese. The colonial government did not welcome its establishment and activism, either. On January 26, 1915, three days after Governor-General Sakuma Samata prohibited the Society from accepting fees and donations because of the Society's "financial mismanagement," the Society was deprived of its police permit as a legal organization and was forced to dissolve.³⁷ The first legal political organization of the Taiwanese in colonial Taiwan was forced to end its history within only thirty-eight days.

Taiwanese intellectuals continued to take political actions even after the failure of the Assimilation Society. In 1918, a group of Taiwanese students in Tokyo led by Lin Hsien-t'ang and Ts'ai P'ei-huo organized the Enlightenment Society (Keihatsu Kai), which is also referred to as the League to Achieve Repeal of Law No. Sixty-Three

³⁵ Chang Cheng-ch'ang, 87.

³⁶ The Japanese population on Taiwan at the end of 1913 was 133,937 according to Yanaihara Tadao. Yanaihara discusses that the Japanese population on Taiwan increased by 1,527 on average every year between 1913 and 1926 (Yanaihara Tadao, 130).

³⁷ Edward I-te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements," 480-481.

(Rokusan Teppai Kisei Domeikai).³⁸ Law No. 63, which was promulgated in March 1896, endowed the governor-general of Taiwan with an authority to issue legal orders over the Japanese colony of Taiwan.³⁹ Although its effectiveness was limited to three years,⁴⁰ the law was renewed for another three years in 1899⁴¹ and 1902.⁴² In 1905, the law was made effective until the end of the next year of restoration of peace in Taiwan.⁴³ In 1906, Law No. 31, with five-year effectiveness, replaced Law No. 63,⁴⁴ but the governor-general still assumed absolute authority in Taiwan. For Taiwanese activists, Law No. 63 (later Law No. 31 replaced it, but people customarily referred to as Law No. 63) had been the central government's authorization of discrimination against Taiwan and the Taiwanese, for the governor-general's power did not have to be checked by the central government and the governor-general could issue any law and regulation applicable only in Taiwan without consulting the central government of Tokyo. Therefore, Taiwanese activists believed that Law No. 63 had to be repealed to eliminate discrimination between

³⁸ Kaminuma Hachiro, "Nihon tochi ka ni okeru Taiwan ryugakusei: Doka seisaku to ryugakusei mondai no tenbo," *Kokuritsu Kyoiku Kenkyujo kiyō* 94 (n.d.); reprint, *Chugoku kankei ronsetsu shiryō* vol. 20 pt. 4-1 (1978): 237 of the horizontal text section (page references are to reprint edition); O Ikutoku, *Taiwan: Kumonsuru sono rekishi* (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1970), 116; Yanaihara, 176-177. Ts'ai P'ei-huo served as an interpreter between Lin Hsien-t'ang, who did not speak Japanese, and Itagaki Taisuke, who did not speak Chinese, when Itagaki visited Taiwan in 1914. After the Japanese authorities deprived him of a teaching job in Taiwan due to his mediation between Lin and Itagaki, Ts'ai went to Tokyo for study with Lin's patronage. In 1918, Ts'ai was a student at Tokyo High Normal University and introduced some Taiwanese students in Tokyo to Lin.

³⁹ *Taiwan ni shiko subeki horei ni kansuru horitsu* (Law Number Sixty-Three of the Twenty-ninth Year of Meiji), Article I.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Article VI.

⁴¹ *Meiji nijuku nen horitsu dai rokujusan go chu kaisei horitsu* (Law Number Seven of the Thirty-second Year of Meiji).

⁴² *Meiji nijuku nen horitsu dai rokujusan go chu kaisei horitsu* (Law Number Twenty of the Thirty-fifth Year of Meiji).

⁴³ *Meiji nijuku nen horitsu dai rokujusan go no yuko kikan ni kansuru horitsu* (Law Number Forty-Two of the Thirty-eighth Year of Meiji).

⁴⁴ Ito Kiyoshi, 101.

the Japanese and the Taiwanese. In their effort to achieve equality and fairness between the Japanese and the Taiwanese, Law No. 63 was a big obstacle.

The Enlightenment Society, which was a student organization, broke up in 1919 but revived as the New People's Society (Shinmin Kai) in March 1920 with Lin Hsien-t'ang as the president. The New People's Society continued to work for repeal of Law No. 63 and abolition of discrimination between the Japanese and the Taiwanese. The Society started to publish a monthly magazine *Taiwan Seinen* (Taiwanese Youth) as its official bulletin in July 1920.⁴⁵ Both Taiwanese and Japanese intellectuals contributed articles to *Taiwan Seinen* and accused discrimination against the Taiwanese. Although their publication lasted until 1937, the New People's Society was broken up into Lin Hsien-t'ang's group and the anti-Lin Hsien-t'ang group. The anti-Lin group accused Lin's group that Lin and his aides promoted integration of the Taiwanese into the Japanese without respecting Taiwanese distinctiveness from the Japanese. In fact, though, even before the split, the Society had failed to achieve their political objective. That is, their fight against Law No. 31 (replacement of Law 63) ended in failure when the Japanese Diet (parliament or national assembly) simply revised the Law and omitted a clause of validation term in November 1920, but did not repeal the law.⁴⁶ The New People's Society and its members could not influence the Japanese political leaders.

⁴⁵ Articles of *Taiwan Seinen*, which was originally edited by Ts'ai P'ei-huo, were written in both Japanese and Chinese. In April 1922, Lin Ch'eng-lu replaced Ts'ai as the editor, and *Taiwan Seinen* was renamed *Taiwan*. *Taiwan* continued to be published until May 10, 1924. Since April 1923, weekly *Taiwan Minpo* (Taiwan People's Daily) had been published, too. *Taiwan Minpo* developed into daily *Taiwan Shin Minpo* in 1924 and was allowed to be sold in Taiwan in January 1929 (Kaminuma Hachiro, 238; O Iktoku, 117).

⁴⁶ Edward I-te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements," 481-483; Kaminuma, 236-240; O Iktoku, 116-117.

In addition to their fight against Law No. 63 and discrimination against the Taiwanese, the New People's Society promoted a movement for the establishment of a Taiwanese parliament. For them, a Taiwanese parliament was an organ whose members elected by all the residents of Taiwan would inspect and approve the governor-general's policies. The Society's members petitioned to the Japanese Diet for establishment of a Taiwanese parliament fifteen times between 1921 and 1934. The smallest number of signatures on the petitions was seventy one (January 1924) and the largest was 2,684 (1932). Out of four million of the then population of the Taiwanese, two thousand is a very small proportion (0.05%). Moreover, their petitions resulted in nothing other than danger to and suppression of activists. Yet, the movement contributed to a spread of political activism and consciousness of home rule among the elite class of Taiwan, for the signatories of the petitions were in general local leaders.⁴⁷

Another Taiwanese organization was the Taiwan Cultural Association (Taiwan Bunka Kyokai), founded in October 1921 in Taipei by a physician named Chiang Wei-shui. Again, Lin Hsien-t'ang was elected to be president. This organization claimed to be non-political, but its promotion of Taiwanese national consciousness aimed at an eventual achievement of home rule. The Cultural Association looked after summer and night classes of the Chinese language, literature, history, and geography as a way to promote Taiwanese national pride as Chinese. It also assisted activities of the League for Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament (Taiwan Gikai Kisei Domei), which was founded in Tokyo in 1923 and absorbed political activists of the New People's Society, for the League was not permitted to have activity bases in Taiwan. The Cultural Association,

⁴⁷ Edward I-te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements," 483-489; O Ikutoku, 117 and 120.

thus, actually did political activities. Like other preceding Taiwanese organizations, the Cultural Association did not last long. Factionalism between liberals like Ts'ai P'ei-huo and radicals like the communist Lien Wen-ch'ing split the Association in January 1927. Thereafter, radicals controlled the Cultural Association along the leftist line.⁴⁸

After the radicals (leftists) took over the Cultural Association, Chiang Wei-shui and Ts'ai P'ei-huo organized the Taiwan Home Rule Society (Taiwan Jichi Kai), only to be forced to dissolve by the Japanese authorities. In May 1927, they reorganized the Home Rule Society into the Taiwan Popular Party (Taiwan Minshu To) in Taichung. After several refusals and moderate modifications, the Japanese authorities finally permitted the Popular Party's activities in July 1927. The three goals of the Party were democracy, a fair economic system, and elimination of social ills. In September 1927, the Party set up seven offices in Taipei, T'ao-yuan, Hsinchu, Nan-t'ao, Chia-i, Tainan, and Ta-chia. Learning from the failure of the movement to establish a Taiwanese parliament, the Popular Party compromised at establishment of local councils as elected bodies for local autonomy. Members of the councils, according to the Popular Party's petition to Governor-General Kamiyama Mannoshin submitted in April 1928, should be elected by popular vote, not based on ethnic background. The Party also determined that local governments had to follow what was decided by the councils. Factionalism became a serious problem of the Popular Party, too. While Ts'ai P'ei-huo kept circumspect on the labor movement due to danger of calling attention of the police, Chiang Wei-shui actively supported the labor movement to confront with farmers whom their rival Cultural Association had tried to influence. The Popular Party, of which the majority of the

⁴⁸ Edward I-te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements," 489-491; Ko, 137-139.

members belonged to Chiang Wei-shui's faction, helped the unionization and strikes of workers employed by Japanese factories in 1928 and 1929. Together with the Party's new flag that resembled the Kuomintang flag adopted in October 1929, the Popular Party eventually angered the Japanese police. Police suppression started on February 18, 1931, arresting sixteen party members including Chiang Wei-shui.⁴⁹

Before the police suppression, Lin Hsien-t'ang and Ts'ai P'ei-huo seceded from the Popular Party and organized the League for Local Autonomy (Taiwan Chiho Jichi Renmei) in August 1930 in Taichung. The League set up offices in Taichung, Chia-i, Tainan, Lu-kang, Nan-t'un, Yuan-lin, Ts'ao-t'un, Neng-kao, Pingtung, Pei-men, Ch'ing-shui, Wu-ch'i, Taipei, Pei-t'un, and Hai-shan, and hosted meetings to demand home rule. The League also sent petitions for local autonomy to the Japanese Diet, the minister for colonial affairs in Tokyo, and the government-general of Taiwan. Its members at times met with colonial officials to request universal suffrage and election local councils.⁵⁰

Finally, in October 1934, the government-general announced the plan for local elected councils that would be created in the following year. Nevertheless, the plan was not satisfactory for the Taiwanese who had long awaited home rule or at least local autonomy. The councils were to be merely advisory and were subject to be under constant danger of dissolution by speakers, who were municipal heads. Furthermore, people could elect only one half of the council members, and the governor-general would appoint the remaining half of the council members. The colonial government took this

⁴⁹ Edward I-te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements," 491-493; Lin Heng-tao and T'ai-wan-sheng Wen-hsien Wei-yuan-hui, ed., *T'ai-wan shih*, 2d ed. (Taipei: Chung-wen T'u-shu Ku-fen Yu-hsien Kung-ssu, 1979), 688-690.

⁵⁰ Edward I-te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements," 493; Lin Heng-tao and T'ai-wan-sheng Wen-hsien Wei-yuan-hui, ed., 691.

actualization of local autonomy as the reason to enforce the dissolution of the League for Local Autonomy, although local autonomy was merely nominal. The League dissolved in 1937 after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War.⁵¹

In the late 1930's, the rise of militarism in Japan and the wartime structure of the Japanese Empire influenced Taiwanese life to a great extent. Especially after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Taiwanese political activism was silenced almost completely. In 1936, there was a coup d'état attempt in Japan. Radical imperialists in the Army numbering about 1,400 occupied the Diet building from February 26 to March 1 in an effort to realize their own super-nationalist government. Suppression of this coup attempt required help from the Army. Consequently, the Army gained a chance to greatly influence and intervene in politics. The rise of militarism in Japan became decisive.

In Taiwan, Governor-General Kobayashi Seizo (September 1936-November 1940), a retired admiral, made imperialization of the Taiwanese (*kominka*, to make people imperial subjects), industrialization of Taiwan, and construction of the island-wide military structure, be the three principles of his administration.⁵² Taiwanese were involved in Japan's wartime system and total mobilization against China as Sino-Japanese tensions and militarism in Japan dramatically grew in the late 1930's. Japanese effort for imperialization of the Taiwanese accelerated especially after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, although it had started even before the Marco Polo Bridge (Lu-kou Ch'iao) Incident of July 7, 1937. By June 1937, newspapers published in Taiwan had stopped

⁵¹ Edward I-te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements," 493-495; Lin Heng-tao and T'ai-wan-sheng Wen-hsien Wei-yuan-hui, ed., 691-693.

⁵² Ko, 165.

carrying Chinese language articles.⁵³ At the same time, Taiwanese were pressured to abandon their Chinese traditional religious practices. Instead, they were pressured to use the Japanese language for daily life and to bow to Shinto shrines.⁵⁴

On February 11, 1940, the name change policy started. Commemorating the 2,600th year of the imperial history,⁵⁵ the Taiwanese were “allowed” to adopt a Japanese name—both surname and given name. The government-general created Name Change Leagues (Kaiseimei Domeikai) throughout the island and campaigned for name change. However, only one hundred thousand or so Taiwanese out of six million of that time had adopted Japanese names by 1943. In other words, only around 1.7 percent of the Taiwanese adopted Japanese names.⁵⁶ Although Taiwanese families that did not adopt Japanese names were discriminated against in allocation of material supplies and educational opportunities for children,⁵⁷ most Taiwanese rejected Japanese names. Most Taiwanese rejected assimilation into the Japanese.

In April 1941, the Association for Rendering Public Service for the Emperor (Komin Hoko Kai) was established with Governor-General Hasegawa Kiyoshi as the president.⁵⁸ The Association aimed at rise of morale, practice of wartime lifestyle, strengthening of industrious attitudes, accomplishment of civilian defense, and promotion of a vigor and health movement. The Association established branches all over Taiwan and involved both Japanese and Taiwanese (both Han and Native Taiwanese) under a

⁵³ Taiwan Sotokufu, 67.

⁵⁴ Ko, 167.

⁵⁵ The imperial history of Japan (*Koki*) is merely legendary, not scientifically proven.

⁵⁶ See Uesugi Mitsuhiro, “Taiwan ni okeru kominka seisaku no tenkai: Kaiseimei undo o chushin to shite,” *Takachiho ronso* (1987); reprint, *Chugoku kankei ronsetsu shiryō* vol. 29 pt. 4-1 (1987): 143-179 of the vertical text section (page references are to reprint edition).

⁵⁷ Tai, 80.

⁵⁸ Ko, 176.

concept of “one family of Taiwan.” The government-general also created the Women’s Association and the Youth Corps under the Association for Rendering Public Service for the Emperor in order to mobilize even women and youths for total wartime mobilization.⁵⁹

As the war went on, Taiwanese life became more and more difficult both psychologically and materialistically. On September 20, 1938, the government-general established the economic police section in the police bureau and stationed a total of 225 police officers for economic affairs in municipalities. The economic police were reinforced on November 22, 1938, with one superintendent, four inspectors, and twelve assistant inspectors. The economic police supervised prices, distribution of resources, labor, transportation, corporation licenses and structures, trade, electric power regulation, financial regulation, such as budgets and exchange, excessive profits, sale and use of luxurious goods, and allocation of life necessities.⁶⁰ Thereby, economic activities became strictly controlled and restricted by the economic police forces. Up until this time, Taiwanese political activities had been being suppressed. Now Taiwanese were deprived of their basic freedom of economic activity.

⁵⁹ Taiwan Sotokufu, 79-80.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 109-110.

Chapter 2 Postwar Period

Under Japanese colonialism, the Taiwanese people were treated as second-class citizens, or mere colonial subjects. The history of colonial Taiwan was a history of resistance, accommodation, and endurance. When Japan surrendered in August 1945, Taiwanese were freed from the Japanese colonial rule of unfairness and discrimination. They were happy and were eager to establish a new Taiwan by themselves. Yet, their great enthusiasm did not last long after their encounter with the government and people sent to Taiwan by the national government of China. This chapter sketches the historical process of how Taiwanese enthusiasm turned to disappointment and eventually anger in the one and a half years following Taiwan's restoration to China.

The restoration of Taiwan to the Chinese government was recognized at the Cairo Conference on November 1943. This time, international recognition by the Allies concerning Taiwan's restoration to China was made for the first time since Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895. Half a year later, on June 17, 1944, President Chiang Kai-shek set up the Taiwan Investigation Committee within the Construction Bureau in Chungking. The head of the Committee was General Ch'en I. Categories of the Committee's responsibility were collection and edition of information about Taiwan, investigation of Taiwan's current conditions, research of opinions and plans concerning the Taiwan issue, and training of officials to prepare for administration of Taiwan.¹

¹ Cheng Tzu, "Shih-tan chan-hou ch'u-ch'i kuo-fu chih chih-t'ai ts'e-lueh: I yung-jen cheng-ts'e yu sheng-chi wei chung-hsin te t'iao-lun," in *Erh-erh-pa hsueh-shu yen-t'ao-hui lun-wen-chi (1991)*, ed. Ch'en Yen-yu and Hu Hui-ling (Taipei: Erh-erh-pa Min-chien Yen-chiu Hsiao-tsu, 1992), 231-232; Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), 56-57.

Within one and a half years, the Taiwan Investigation Committee edited, translated, and published several tens of books about Taiwan. It also publicized plans for Taiwan's restoration and research outcomes. Examples are the *Outline of the Taiwan Take-over Plan*, which was drafted in October 1944 and was approved by Chiang Kai-shek and officially announced in March 1945; the *Draft of the Taiwan Educational Take-over Plan*, drafted in 1945; and the *Report of the Research of Taiwan's Administrative Districts* (1945). There were other restoration plans besides education, such as police matters, financial affairs, and land policies. By the same token, there was research on other themes than the administrative districts, like land issues. The Taiwan Investigation Committee, in addition to publicizing their investigation outcomes, also trained more than one thousand persons for administration of Taiwan.² Between December 1944 and April 1945, 120 persons were trained for civil administration, education, finance, forestry, commerce, transportation, and judiciary in Chungking. Forty additional persons received training for banking in Chungking. Besides, the Kuomintang authorities provided 932 persons with training in Chungking, Fukien, and other places, to be police workers. Only 140 of the 932 trainees had previous experience of police work for more than a year. Educational background of more than a half, numbering 542, was merely junior high school graduation or its equivalence. More than a half, counting 656, were Fukienese, most of whom spoke the same dialect as the Taiwanese. In addition to police training, the trainees received education of history, geography, and the dialect of Taiwan (Hokkien), and the Japanese language.³

² Cheng Tzu, 233-234.

³ Ch'en Ch'un-ying, "Kuang-fu ch'u-ch'i T'ai-wan ching-cheng te chieh-shou yu ch'ung-chien: I hsing-cheng ch'ang-kuang kung-shu shih-ch'i wei chung-hsin te t'an-t'ao," in *T'ai-wan kuang-fu ch'u-*

The *Outline of the Taiwan Take-over Plan*, one of the Taiwan Investigation Committee's products, described how Taiwan should and would be ruled. It basically designed that Taiwan's restoration to China would be a replacement of Chinese elements in Taiwan for Japanese elements. It determined to apply laws and regulations of the Republic of China to Taiwan, to replace the enemy's measurements with those of the Republic of China, to reorganize the municipal units, and to prohibit use of the Japanese language on official documents, textbooks, and newspapers. Education should aim at raising the Taiwanese national consciousness as Chinese. Schools had to adopt textbooks that the national government authorities edited and approved. The national language (Mandarin) was to be made a requirement for primary and middle schools. Japanese language institutes would be replaced by Chinese language institutes. The *Outline* also determined to discard literary and cinema works that had been produced during the colonial years and slandered China or the Kuomintang or distorted historical facts and views.⁴

On August 14, 1945, the KMT government in Chungking announced that it would appoint General Ch'en I both Governor-General of the Taiwan Provincial Administration and the head of the Taiwan Garrison Command.⁵ An executive order issued on August 29 formalized this appointment.⁶ Ch'en I was given both civil and military authority over postwar Taiwan. Possible reasons for this appointment are his experience as the provincial chair (governor) of Fukien and having visited Taiwan. While he was the chair

ch'i li-shih, ed. Lai Tse-han (Taipei: Chung-yang Yen-chiu-yuan Chung-shan Jen-wen She-hui K'e-hsueh Yen-chiu-so, 1993), 31; Lai, et al., 57.

⁴ Cheng Tzu, 243-245.

⁵ Lai, et al., 57.

⁶ Cheng Tzu, 248.

of Fukien province between 1934 and 1941, he and his aides were considered to be familiar with nature and temperament of Fukienese people, who were of the same geographic origin as the majority of the Han Chinese Taiwanese. In 1935, Ch'en visited Taiwan as a guest of the Japanese authorities on Taiwan for the fortieth anniversary of Japan's possession of Taiwan. Ch'en should have become familiar with the situations of Taiwan at this time. Concerned people in general thought that the appointment of Ch'en to Taiwan's governorship was a reasonable choice,⁷ although residents of Fukien province did not welcome this appointment. Remembering oppressive rule and economic deterioration with food shortage and financial deficit during Ch'en's governorship of Fukien, Fukienese opposed the appointment of Ch'en I to governorship of Taiwan. For many Fukienese, Ch'en I was "a collaborator with the Japanese and a lawless war-lord."⁸

The idea of civil-military joint administration for regained Taiwan was based on a conclusion of the Taiwan Investigation Committee. The Investigation Committee had concluded that Taiwan should be governed differently than other provinces of China due to its peculiar circumstances. Ch'en favored this idea of special treatment for Taiwan, although Taiwanese who had lived on the mainland in general believed that Taiwan should be treated either as a province that was equal to other provinces or as an experimental province that had a provincial constitution.⁹ With regard to civil-military joint rule of Taiwan, Taiwanese in Chungking at that time criticized it for its resemblance to the

⁷ Tai Kuo-hui, *Taiwan: Ningen, rekishi, shinsho* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), 90-91.

⁸ *New York Times*, 22 October 1945.

⁹ Lai, et al., 57.

Japanese colonial government. They warned that it would make Taiwanese think that Taiwan could become a domestic colony.¹⁰

Legal preparation went on meanwhile. On August 31, the *General Outline of the Organization of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office (T'ai-wan-sheng hsing-cheng chang-kuan kung-shu tsu-shih ta-kang)* was issued. The offices of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office (T'ai-wan-sheng hsing-cheng chang-kuan kung-shu) and the Taiwan Garrison Command (T'ai-wan ching-pei tsung-ssu-ling-pu) were established on September 1 in Chungking. On September 20, the *Regulation of the Organization of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Office (T'ai-wan-sheng hsing-cheng chang-kuan kung-shu tsu-shih t'iao-li)* was announced as the replacement of the *General Outline of the Organization of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office*.¹¹

The first group of the KMT officials to Taiwan was the Advance Headquarters (Ch'ien-chin chih-hui-so). It arrived in Taiwan on October 5, 1945. Forty-seven secretaries, specialists, and staff officers organized the Advance Headquarters. The director was Ke Ching-en, the Chief Secretary of the Taiwan Provincial Administration. There were a few Taiwanese officials involved in the Advance Headquarters, but most members were Ch'en I's aides from either Chungking or Fukien.¹² The Advance Headquarters officials started discussion to prepare for transfer of power over Taiwan with Japanese top officials on Taiwan on October 7.¹³

¹⁰ Cheng Tzu, 249.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 248-249.

¹² *Ibid.*, 249.

¹³ *Chung-yang jih-pao* (Chungking), 8 October 1945.

October 16, 1945, marks the arrival of the first group of the KMT military forces in Keelung. A bigger unit of the military, the 70th Division of the Army, arrived in Keelung the next day.¹⁴ Soldiers who had just landed at and started marching in the city of Keelung, however, disappointed Taiwanese people who appeared on the streets to welcome the soldiers of the mother country. Taiwanese people had expected the mainland soldiers to be elegant heroes, but the reality was different. There were soldiers who did not even wear shoes and instead wore grass sandals. Some of them walked barefoot. Unlike the Japanese soldiers, their lines lacked order and were winding. Chinese soldiers whom the Taiwanese saw did not appear able to defeat the Japanese military. Not only did the mainland soldiers disappoint Taiwanese with their poor equipment and clothes, but also they disappointed Taiwanese with their behavior and attitudes toward the Taiwanese. Taiwanese people of Keelung planned a party to welcome the soldiers from the mother country on the evening of October 17, but it was canceled after some soldiers committed several robbery and rape cases on the very first day of their arrival in Taiwan. The soldiers continued to disturb the social order and security of Taiwan by taking merchandise without paying money and robbing innocent passers-by of money by threatening with a gun. They also beat and injured innocent civilians. Those cases caused Taiwanese to think that the mainlanders were merely new conquerors rather than the saviors.¹⁵

The KMT leaders did not consider Taiwan as significant as the other occupied areas like Manchuria, the lower Yangtze valley, and other coastal areas. When on August 21, 1945, the KMT army announced the names of the officers who would be responsible

¹⁴ Ibid., 18 and 21 October 1945; Lai, et al., 62.

¹⁵ Tomizawa Shigeru, *Taiwan shusen hishi: Nihon shokuminchi jidai to sono shuen* (Tokyo: Izumi Shuppan, 1984), 114-118.

to accept surrender of Japanese troops in the occupied areas, only the staff for Taiwan was announced to be assigned at a different occasion.¹⁶ This implies that Taiwan was of second importance for the KMT officials compared to the other areas of China. For this reason, the KMT did not send troops of high quality to Taiwan. Yo Itsushu compares one of the new divisions of the KMT army trained by the Americans and comments, “If this new army were the first-rate army, then the 70th Division dispatched to Taiwan could be said the tenth-rate mixed army.”¹⁷ Low quality of the soldiers dispatched to Taiwan was obvious from their behaviors.

Tomizawa Shigeru quotes words of some Taiwanese about their impression of mainland soldiers as follows:

The scene of that time still now clearly remains in memory. Since expectation was high, a voice trying to shout “long live” stopped at the bottom of the throat as soon as I saw the soldiers’ appearance. Far beyond a shameful feeling, sadness after sadness came up to my mind.¹⁸

The recklessness of the landing soldiers of that time was awful. It [the recklessness] looked like of conquerors instead of saviors from the mother country. Especially because we knew the disciplined manners of the Japanese army, we were disappointed with the actions of that national army.¹⁹

In addition to the 70th Division, which landed on Taiwan from the north, the 62nd Division, which landed at Kaohsiung on November 18,²⁰ also disappointed Taiwanese people. Peng Ming-min writes about this based on his father’s memory as follows:

The ship docked, the gateways were lowered, and off came the troops of China, the victors. The first man to appear was a bedraggled fellow who looked

¹⁶ *Chung-yang jih-pao* (Chungking), 22 August 1945.

¹⁷ Yo Itsushu, *Erh-erh-pa min-pien: T'ai-wan yu Chiang Chieh-shih*, trans. Chang Liang-tse (Taipei: Ch'ien-wei Ch'u-pan-she, 1991), 33.

¹⁸ A Taipei resident named Ch'en, quoted in Tomizawa, 115-116.

¹⁹ A Taipei resident named Sun, quoted in Tomizawa, 118.

²⁰ *New York Times*, 22 November 1945.

and behaved more like a coolie than a soldier, walking off with a carrying pole across his shoulder, from which was suspended his umbrella, sleeping mat, cooking pot, and cup. Others like him followed, some with shoes, some without. Few had guns. With no attempt to maintain order or discipline, they pushed off the ship, glad to be on firm land, but hesitant to face the Japanese lined up and saluting smartly on both sides. My father wondered what the Japanese could possibly think. He had never felt so ashamed in his life. Using a Japanese expression, he said, "If there had been a hole nearby, I would have crawled in!" This victorious Chinese army was made up of country conscripts who showed not the least sign of understanding the welcome arranged for them. They moved into the town, grabbing up what food they wanted and tossing aside things they did not like. There was no acknowledgment by the few Chinese officers accompanying them and no thanks for anyone. Within an hour these troops, spreading through the town, had begun to pick up anything that struck their fancy. As far as they were concerned, the Formosans were a conquered people.²¹

Apparently, behaviors of the KMT soldiers sent to Taiwan immediately after World War II were reckless and sometimes even ruthless. No matter where on Taiwan the soldiers landed and stayed, Taiwanese evaluation of the KMT soldiers was very low.

Although the first impression of mainland Chinese was very bad, an applauding atmosphere to welcome the new government of the mother country and its officials continued to prevail in the province. The new governor of Taiwan, General Ch'en I, arrived in Taiwan on October 24, 1945. His first words to the Taiwanese at the Sung-shan airfield expressed his six creeds regarding administration of Taiwan. He promised not to lie, not to be idle, not to seek unjustifiable gains and profits, to arouse honor with exemplary behavior, to be patriotic, and to be responsible.²² The route connecting the Sung-shan airfield to the Taipei City Hall was filled with hundreds of thousands of people

²¹ Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 51-52.

²² Cheng Tzu, 229-230; Lai, et al., 62-63. Ch'en I spoke Mandarin and had an interpreter translate his words into Hokkien. Ch'en I did not speak Japanese, although the Japanese language was the sole language shared by Ch'en and the majority of the Taiwanese.

enthusiastic to welcome the new governor from the mother country.²³ George Kerr, who shared the same trip from Nanking to Shanghai and from Shanghai to Taipei with Ch'en I and other Chinese officials on the same American airplane remembers Taiwanese enthusiasm to welcome the new governor of Taiwan as follows:

A great parade had been arranged for the Governor-General's reception. Leading Formosan citizens were on hand to greet the General, office workers were lined up with appropriate banners, and hundreds of school children had been turned out to welcome the "liberators." They had been standing many hours in the sun.

When Chen had taken the salute and had been properly greeted by Advance Party [Advance Headquarters], we moved on to the motorcade. General Chen quite properly rode near the head of procession. . . .

General Chen's car moved off, and as it passed along the highway toward the city [of Taipei] the school children and clerks waved their flags and shouted "Banzai!" [meaning, "Long Live"] three times. . . .²⁴

Next day, October 25, 1945, is remembered as the famous Enlightening Restoration (Kuang-fu) procedure. The Japanese power of governing Taiwan was transferred to the Republic of China. Taiwan's fifty-year colonial status under the Japanese authorities came to an end. On October 30, the Japanese troops on Taiwan received orders to surrender their weapons and equipment to the Chinese authorities on Taiwan.²⁵

In this period, the Taiwanese were in general very happy with Japan's surrender and the restoration of Taiwan to China. O Iikutoku enumerates four reasons for their happiness. First of all, the war was over now. Second, colonial rule that made the Japanese the masters and the Taiwanese the colonial subjects came to an end. They were

²³ Tomizawa, 119.

²⁴ George Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 77.

²⁵ Lai, et al., 63.

happy also because the mother country China had defeated Japan and liberated them. Finally, they had a great expectation that the Taiwanese would be able to enjoy equal political rights and privileges within the Chinese political sphere.²⁶ In the joy of liberation from colonial rule, some Taiwanese turned very anti-Japanese and beat Japanese police officers as retaliation against their oppressive attitudes toward the Taiwanese.²⁷ Taiwanese students in Japan, who had been benefited to some extent from Japanese colonial rule as they could receive high education under the Japanese educational system, also shared the Taiwanese joy of liberation from Japanese colonialism. They were eager to reconstruct Taiwan by themselves.²⁸

Nevertheless, as O Ikutoku continues, “[the Taiwanese] could not help sensing anxiety about their future as contacting with strange dress, an unintelligible language, and eccentric actions of the Chinese who had come to Taiwan by junks (these were things that the Taiwanese had not seen for a long time) and as looking at poor appearance and disorderly discipline of the Chinese army that was met at the Keelung quay, ‘not knowing whether to laugh or cry.’”²⁹ Some first impressions of the mainland soldiers shared by Taiwanese people are mentioned above. Although the mainland Chinese soldiers did not come by junks, rather by American ships, their poor appearance was certainly disappointing for the Taiwanese. The then US Assistant Naval Attaché George Kerr sensed in Taiwan that many Taiwanese took more favorable attitudes to the American

²⁶ O Ikutoku, *Taiwan: Kumonsuru sono rekishi* (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1970), 139.

²⁷ Tomizawa, 98-99.

²⁸ See, for example, Peng, 46-47; Tai, 92-94; Yo Iri, *Aru Taiwan chishikijin no higeki: Chugoku to Nihon no hazama de: Yo Seikichi den* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993), 205.

²⁹ O Ikutoku, 139.

servicemen than to mainland Chinese soldiers as a reaction to their disappointment with the mainlanders.³⁰

Besides the first impressions of the Chinese from the mainland, government policies also disappointed and angered many Taiwanese. Most of the KMT officials—both civil and military—had little knowledge and understanding of Taiwan. However, Ch'en I was different. He had visited Taiwan in 1935 to observe an exhibition to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of Japan's possession of Taiwan while he was the provincial chair of Fukien. He was excited by economic development of Taiwan. Therefore, after Taiwan was restored to China, he understood the great potential that Taiwan's agriculture and industry offered the mainlanders as well as the Taiwanese. In order to fully utilize Taiwan's economic potential, Ch'en I had decided to publicize (run by the national or local government) Taiwan's industries. He believed that it would develop the province further by eliminating personal greed.³¹ Soon, though, officials abused this system of publicized industries for their own private profit.

The provincial government confiscated former Japanese property—both private/personal and public/business. The confiscated former Japanese property included personal land and houses, electric power plants, railways, business bases of Japanese financial cliques, and agricultural and forestry lands.³² Between November 1945 and February 1947, the total value of confiscated public properties excluding land was estimated 2,938,500,000 yen (yuan). The total value of confiscated private business property was as high as 7,163,600,000 yen (yuan), and that of confiscated private

³⁰ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 82-85.

³¹ Cheng Tzu, 235-236.

³² Tomizawa, 125.

properties was 888,800,000 yen (yuan). The total value of confiscated Japanese properties, including public and private, was thus about 10,990,900,000 yen (yuan). First, those confiscated properties were nationalized. Then, properties of small scale were sold to the public. But major businesses were publicized under either national, nation-province joint, provincial, or local (county or city) management.³³ The value of the confiscated Japanese property was so high because the colonial government and the Japanese enterprises had dominated Taiwan's economy. For the new provincial government, no matter how the Japanese had acquired such a huge amount of property, the Japanese property was the property of the enemy whom China had defeated and should be confiscated by the government of the winning country.

Regarding the confiscation of Japanese property, many Taiwanese complained that the provincial government had confiscated the Japanese property mostly for its own benefit rather than for sale to the general public. The amount sold to Taiwanese was in fact not a significant proportion of the entire confiscated Japanese property.³⁴ It is partially because of Ch'en I's ideals for nationalization and publicization of industries as mentioned above. Another reason is that each department head dominated confiscated properties of his sphere and was not interested in distribution of confiscated properties to local people. For example, the Department of Mining and Industry dominated properties for sugar, metallurgy, chemicals, textiles, machine fabrication, and electric engineering. The Department of Agriculture and Forestry managed property for lumber, sawmills,

³³ Ito Kiyoshi, *Taiwan: Yonhyakunen no rekishi to tenbo* (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1993), 141; Wakabayashi Masahiro, *Taiwan: Bunretsu kokka to minshuka* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1992), 42-45.

³⁴ Lai, et al., 71.

agriculture, forestry, fishery, and food industries except for sugar. Since each department decided management of confiscated properties according to the will of the top officials especially the department heads, giving priority for sale to relatives and friends of the top officials was possible. As a result, Taiwanese, who in general had no connection to the mainland officials, were tacitly deprived of their chance to benefit from the confiscation of the Japanese property,³⁵ although the Japanese had accumulated properties in exchange for Taiwanese sacrifice.

Moreover, the KMT government from the mainland regarded the Taiwanese as Japanese (i.e., enemy) collaborators or at least people who had been exposed to enemy culture.³⁶ For this reason, the provincial government did not want to allow the Taiwanese to benefit from the confiscated Japanese property. In other words, if the provincial government considered the Taiwanese to have cooperated with the Japanese for industrial build-up of Taiwan, the government should have regarded the Taiwanese to be Japanese collaborators. Therefore, there is no wonder that the government discriminated against the Taiwanese in benefit from the Japanese property. For the government, the Taiwanese had already benefited from the Japanese industrial construction in Taiwan. Thus, in a sense, the Taiwanese were excluded from reconstruction of Taiwan by being deprived of chances for economic participation.

Taiwanese political participation was also limited. At the end of the colonial period, there were 46,955 Taiwanese officials employed by the government-general as

³⁵ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 125-126.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 102-103; Lai, et al., 50; Alan M. Wachman, "Competing Identities in Taiwan," in *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present*, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), 46.

opposed to 37,604 Japanese officials. However, the number of the Taiwanese officials at the end of November 1946 was 39,711. Although at least 37,000 Japanese officials were removed from office, the new provincial government did not employ more Taiwanese to fill vacancies in positions created after the removal of the great majority of the Japanese officials. Furthermore, the great majority of the officials filling the top ranks of the government were mainlanders.³⁷ This was humiliating for Taiwanese who had been very eager to reconstruct Taiwan by themselves. They believed that they were the ones who were qualified for the construction of a new Taiwan. Yet, they were not given sufficient opportunity for that. Although many of the Taiwanese officials remained in office for the new government, they were not promoted to higher ranks replacing the Japanese officials. They continued to be assigned low ranks and menial jobs. Both economically and politically, the Taiwanese continued to be the subjects of outside forces and were not given sufficient chances to participate in the reconstruction of China's Taiwan.

The Taiwanese had been excluded from both political and economic roles of significance in their view. This is not the only thing at which the Taiwanese were angry concerning the new regime. There had been a serious problem with inflation since the restoration. According to one datum, the price level of rice after the first six months from the restoration was five times what it was before.³⁸ Tomizawa Shigeru states that the rice price increased by ten times every week in the end of 1945.³⁹ According to the Bank of Taiwan wholesale commodity indices, the prices of foodstuffs increased by a factor of 6.3

³⁷ Cheng Tzu, 256-259; Lai, et al., 65-66.

³⁸ Hsiao Sheng-t'ieh, "T'ai-wan erh-erh-pa shih-chien te ching-chi yu wen-hua pei-ching: She-hui ch'i-wang li-lun chih ying-yung," in *Erh-erh-pa hsueh-shu yen-t'ao-hui lun-wen-chi (1991)*, ed. Ch'en Yen-yu and Hu Hui-ling (Taipei: Erh-erh-pa Min-chien Yen-chiu Hsiao-tsu, 1992), 90.

³⁹ Tomizawa, 183.

times between November 1945 and January 1947. In the case of clothing, the prices increased by a factor of 4.3 times during the same period of time.⁴⁰ High inflation was a cause of social unease and could trigger massive anti-government demonstrations.

One of the major reasons for inflation was shortage of materials owing to halt in production activities as the industrial bases had been damaged by the Allied air raids and had been confiscated by the provincial government, which lacked skillful engineers and workers.⁴¹ In late 1945, only 156 factories out of 356 built by the Japanese had no or little damage or problem for operation.⁴² Halt in production activities brought scarcity of goods. If productivity declined half due to half-reduction of the number of factories operating properly, supplies of goods should have fallen to a half as well. With material supplies seriously decreased, it was natural that the prices rose dramatically.

Moreover, overpopulation owing to Chinese migrants from the mainland and Taiwanese returning from overseas to Taiwan caused a strain on goods to be distributed and became another factor for inflation. Chinese migrants from the mainland included Fukienese who had great expectation of gaining big profits in a new world where they knew the language (Hokkien) and people who had collaborated with the Japanese during the war. Chinese migrants to Taiwan who had collaborated with the Japanese in Manchuria or Nanking escaped from accusation as traitors, and in Taiwan they behaved as victors deceiving the Taiwanese. As for Taiwanese who had returned to Taiwan after the war, there were anti-Japanese elements who had been in exile outside Taiwan, labor

⁴⁰ Memorandum on the situation in Taiwan, from United States Ambassador to the Republic of China John Leighton Stuart to ROC President Chiang Kai-shek, dated 18 April 1947, quoted in *China White Paper* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967), 2: 924.

⁴¹ Lai, et al., 80.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 81.

conscripts sent by the Japanese authorities to occupied China or occupied Southeast Asia, and Japanese-military soldiers.⁴³ According to a census, 58,706 Taiwanese had returned to Taiwan between the end of the war and March 30, 1946.⁴⁴ There was also a problem with high unemployment rate partially because of the halt in production.⁴⁵ The number of Taiwanese workers engaged in industrial work decreased from 50,000 at the end of World War II down to 5,000 by January 1947 according to an UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) estimate.⁴⁶ Things were getting more and more expensive; more and more people lost their jobs. Social ease naturally decreased day by day.

Halt in production and overpopulation were not the sole factors for scarcity of goods. A significant proportion of both military and non-military food reserves were sent to the mainland.⁴⁷ Part of food supplies were offered to the KMT military in order to help its war against the Communist Party. But there were foodstuffs that officials sold to merchants of the mainland for their own personal profit.⁴⁸ The *Time* magazine reports, "Formosans complained that the Chinese occupation army was looting stocks, letting crops, refineries, railroads and power plants go to rack [and] ruin."⁴⁹ Nonetheless, Ch'en I responded to Taiwanese protests by condemning Taiwanese people who grumbled

⁴³ Tai, 91-92.

⁴⁴ Letter on the "First Convocation of the Taiwanese People's Political Council at Taipei, May 1 to May 15, 1946," from United States Consul at Taipei Ralph J. Blanke to US Ambassador at Nanking John Leighton Stuart, dated 1 November 1946, quoted in Paul Kesaris, ed., *Confidential United States State Department Central Files, Formosa, Internal Affairs, 1945-1949* (Frederick, Md.: University Publication of America, 1985), Reel I.

⁴⁵ Hsiao, 90-91.

⁴⁶ Memorandum from US Ambassador John Leighton Stuart to Chiang Kai-shek, dated 18 April 1947, quoted in *China White Paper*, 2: 924.

⁴⁷ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 107.

⁴⁸ Tomizawa, 128-129.

⁴⁹ "This Is the Shame," *Time*, 10 June 1946, 35.

offering their rice reserves. Ch'en, in addition to condemning the Taiwanese people for scarcity of rice, adopted a rice-collection program throughout the island and placed the Taiwanese under constant fear of confiscation of rice storage by the police and army personnel.⁵⁰

In addition to short supply of goods, increased amounts of circulated currencies also contributed to the super-inflationary situations of postwar Taiwan. George Kerr writes, "I was told by employees of the Bank of Formosa that no one actually had records of the total issue, and there was much extra-legal printing."⁵¹ Kerr also writes, "Commissioner Yen [Chia-kan of the Department of Finance] one day told me that his solution to the nagging problem was simply to 'Print! Print! Print! Print! Print!'"⁵² The total value of bank notes issued by the Bank of Taiwan is estimated 5,330,000,000 yuan by the end of 1946 and 17,133,000,000 yuan by the end of 1947.⁵³ This means that the Bank of Taiwan issued currencies worth as much as 11,803,000,000 yuan in one year of 1947. For reference, the Bank of Taiwan under Japanese rule issued bank notes of 97,721,000 yen in annual average between 1938 and 1944, although the issued amounts were getting bigger in the 1940s.⁵⁴ The provincial government did not change the value of the currencies issued by the Bank of Taiwan after taking over the financial affairs of Taiwan. That is, the value of one yen issued by the Japanese Bank of Taiwan and that of one yuan issued by the Chinese Bank of Taiwan were decided equal at the time of

⁵⁰ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 107-108.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 127.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 125. Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou translated the highest rank for a department (*ch'u-chang*) as a "head of a department," rather than a "commissioner" as is translated by George Kerr.

⁵³ Ito, 147.

⁵⁴ Taiwan Sotokufu, ed., *Taiwan tochi gaiyo* (N.p., 1945; reprint, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1973), 445 (page references are to reprint edition).

Taiwan's restoration to China. Over-printing of currencies by the Bank of Taiwan of the new provincial government was obvious. If the Bank of Taiwan insisted that the price level increased to six times, it could have justified its six-time increase of issue of currencies. But the reality was that the Bank of Taiwan issued bank notes exceeding the rise of the price levels of its own estimate. The Bank of Taiwan's increased issue of currencies as a solution to inflation an improper response. The government had to realize that price increase by a factor of within one year (actually higher than that) was a serious problem and an obstacle for the health of the economy. In order to prevent super-inflation, the government had to keep issue of currencies low, for increased issue of currencies merely accelerates the inflation problem. It is clear that the provincial government lacked qualified financial planners.

Further, there was a problem with endemic diseases. Thanks to improvement in sanitation by the Japanese colonial government, infectious diseases that could cause a huge number of deaths had not posed a serious threat to Taiwanese life since 1920.⁵⁵ However, since the end of World War II, transportation between Taiwan and the mainland became more frequent than before. Transportation from the mainland to Taiwan brought Taiwan endemic diseases from the mainland in addition to people and goods. Poor management of the sanitary system by the provincial government of Taiwan helped diseases spread on Taiwan. Pest came from Foochow to Taiwan in June 1946. Cholera had spread from southern Taiwan and had killed more than three hundred individuals by July 1, 1946. Cholera had further spread to I-lan by July 19 and to Taipei by August 17.

⁵⁵ George H. Kerr, *Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895-1945* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1974), 81-82; Taiwan Sotokufu, ed., 130-131.

In the case of smallpox, it was first detected in Taichung and Kaohsiung on January 9, 1947. By January 16, smallpox had spread to Pingtung and Chia-i.⁵⁶ Taiwanese people, excluded from leadership of political and economic affairs, could not do anything against deterioration of living conditions. Their frustration accelerated as time went on.

There was also a problem with a language barrier between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese. Few Taiwanese possessed native fluency in Mandarin in the first few years after the restoration. A Chinese language that the great majority spoke was Hokkien. Their reading ability of Chinese was not very high due to lack of opportunities for Chinese language education under the Japanese colonialism.⁵⁷ Slogans to promote use of the Chinese language, “Chinese people must speak the Chinese language,” and “Chinese people should not speak the Japanese language,” appeared on newspapers in the first year after the restoration. However, Japanese translations accompanied those slogans so that those who could not read Chinese could also understand the slogans.⁵⁸ The provincial government, aside from promoting the national language of China (Mandarin), prohibited the Japanese language in books and magazines (February 12, 1946), in movies (July 1, 1946), for songs (August 7, 1946), and on newspapers (August 24, 1946).⁵⁹ In schools, mainland Chinese teachers pressured the students not to speak the Japanese language. Originally the Taiwanese were willing and happy to study Mandarin. However, pressure from the top not to speak a bit of Japanese evoked Taiwanese rebellious sentiment to

⁵⁶ Hsiao, 93-94.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 92; Huang Ying-che, “Hsu Shou-ch’ang yu T’ai-wan (1946~48): Chien-lun erh-erh-pa ch’ien-hsi T’ai-wan-sheng hsing-cheng ch’ang-kuan kung-shu te wen-hua cheng-ts’e,” in *Erh-erh-pa hsueh-shu yen-t’ao-hui lun-wen-chi (1991)*, ed. Ch’en Yen-yu and Hu Hui-ling (Taipei: Erh-erh-pa Min-chien Yen-chiu Hsiao-tsu, 1992), 118.

⁵⁸ Tomizawa, 140.

⁵⁹ Hsiao, 92.

speak Japanese words or the local dialect of Taiwan⁶⁰ It was very difficult to change the Taiwanese custom of speaking a language that had many Japanese loan words. Further, communication between Hokkien speakers and Hakka speakers who did not speak Hokkien and between one tribe and another of the Native Taiwanese was held in Japanese. Chances to speak Japanese, either as sentences or words, were everywhere in Taiwan, especially in urban areas. Taiwanese people in general lacked training in reading Chinese, too, because of the Japanese policy of undermining Taiwanese identity as Chinese.⁶¹

When people experience encounter and amalgamation of two different types of system or culture, they tend to show perplexity. Taiwanese members of the Taiwan Investigation Committee understood this and worried about consequences of the encounter between industrial Taiwan and underdeveloped China. A member of the Taiwan Investigation Committee, Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, questioned hasty transformation of Taiwan undertaken by the Kuomintang. Huang Ch'ao-ch'in insisted that current conditions of Taiwan should be preserved for five or six years following the restoration. Another person, Lien Chen-tung pointed out a possible consequence of the Taiwanese encounter with mainland China and the mainlanders. Lien commented that because the Taiwanese had enjoyed social life with cleanness and sincerity, they might prefer the Japanese to disorderly mainland soldiers.⁶² Lien Chen-tung had anticipated the possibility of tension growing between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders after the restoration.

⁶⁰ Jack Belden, *China Shakes the World* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 389.

⁶¹ Robert L. Cheng, "Language Unification in Taiwan: Present and Future," in *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present*, ed. Murray Rubinstein (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), 360-361.

⁶² Ch'en Fang-ming, "Chan-hou ch'u-ch'i T'ai-wan tzu-chih yun-tung yu erh-erh-pa shih-chien," in *Erh-erh-pa hsueh-shu yen-t'ao-hui lun-wen-chi (1991)*, ed. Ch'en Yen-yu and Hu Hui-ling (Taipei: Erh-erh-pa Min-chien Yen-chiu Hsiao-tsu, 1992), 149-150.

What followed the restoration proved to be a realization of what Taiwanese in Chungking at the end of World War II were anxious about. Articles criticizing Governor-General Ch'en I and his government started to appear on newspapers in the fall of 1946.⁶³ There also appeared posters criticizing the mainland Chinese in general on the walls. The posters had dogs to represent Japanese and pigs for mainland Chinese. "The dog can protect the people, but the pig can only eat and sleep."⁶⁴ Tension had grown in Taiwanese society day by day. According to a June 1946 report of the *Time* magazine, "[m]ost foreign observers in Formosa agreed that if a referendum were taken today, Formosans would vote for U.S. rule. Second choice—Japan."⁶⁵ From the end of 1946 to the eve of the February Twenty Eighth Incident, there were chances of a violent uprising everywhere on Taiwan. Ch'en I was one of the few who did not realize the growing possibility of an uprising.⁶⁶

Situations of the areas that had been recovered by the Kuomintang after World War II were similar to those of Taiwan. Beginning from the autumn of 1945, the KMT's take-over (*chieh-shou*) of areas that had been occupied by the Japanese brought people of the recovered areas disillusionment. People were disappointed with slow disarmament of the Japanese soldiers, immoral behaviors of the KMT officials, and inadequate economic policies. Delay of prompt disarmament of the Japanese soldiers was a result of the Civil War. The KMT's primary concern was the Communists, and the Japanese soldiers were

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 152-153.

⁶⁴ Belden, 391.

⁶⁵ "This Is the Shame," *Time*, 10 June 1946, 35.

⁶⁶ Lai, et al., 96-98.

of secondary importance to its top officials.⁶⁷ Immoral behaviors and inadequate economic policies were common features of the KMT officials of that time.⁶⁸

There were protest activities against the KMT in mainland China also. Dissatisfaction with and resentment to the KMT and its officials existed also in mainland China. From the end of November to the end of December 1945, university students of Kunming city, Yunnan province, carried out class boycott. Their rise was to protest the Civil War between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. The students demanded a coalition government of the KMT and the CCP immediately concluding the Civil War.⁶⁹

Another campus movement was the so-called Anti-Hunger Anti-Civil War Movement. This movement started at the end of April 1947, when professors of Shantung University in Tsingtao, Honan University in Kaifeng, and Northeast University in Mukden went on a strike to demand increase in educational funds. In May, students joined the professors for the strike. The strike lasted until the beginning of June. Finally, the KMT government suppressed the movement by arresting students and dismissing professors from the universities.⁷⁰

There were also strikes and demonstrations by workers. Thousands of workers participated in labor movement to protest insufficient salaries in recovered areas. Workers

⁶⁷ Suzanne Pepper, *Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 8-11.

⁶⁸ See, for example, Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 99-142; and Pepper, 20-41.

⁶⁹ Pepper, 42-50.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 58-70.

had suffered from rise in unemployment and prices. Countering labor activism, the KMT government rejected workers' demands and broke up strikes by arresting labor leaders.⁷¹

Obviously, the KMT had many domestic problems in addition to the Communists. Those problems were not unique to Taiwan. The difference between mainland China and Taiwan in terms of people's reaction to the KMT was scale of protest activities. The eventual February Twenty Eighth Incident in Taiwan was much bigger in scale than anti-government activities in mainland China. Mainland Chinese activities did not develop into a province-wide uprising that would require large scale military reinforcements for suppression while the Taiwanese rise immediately developed into an island-wide, almost province-wide, uprising that shook stability of the provincial government of Taiwan. The most significant difference was the fact that the entire population did not unite for protest activities in mainland China whereas the great majority of the Taiwanese population sooner or later participated in the rise.

⁷¹ Ibid., 98-104.

Chapter 3 Incident

The incident started on February 27, 1947. At 11:00 am of that day, the Taipei City Monopoly Bureau was informed that smuggled matches and cigarettes had been carried by a ship that was harbored near Tamsui.¹ When the Monopoly Bureau team of six investigators² and four police officers arrived at where the ship was harbored, however, there were only five boxes of cigarettes out of supposed fifty boxes in total. The staff later learned from another secret report that the rest of the boxes had been carried to T'ien-ma Tea Store on T'ai-p'ing Street of Taipei city (present-day Yen-p'ing North Road) for sale at the tea store. About 7:30 pm, the Monopoly Bureau investigative team went to the tea store, but it found that the dealers of the smuggled merchandise had already escaped. The investigative team after all could not achieve its objective to expose the contraband and to arrest the illegal merchants. The team officials then went out to T'ai-p'ing Street, on which dealers of contraband goods had been known to appear frequently. There the officials discovered a forty-year-old widow selling cigarettes. The officials immediately confiscated the smuggled cigarettes that the widow was selling together with her money. In response, the widow demanded that the officials return her money and the Monopoly Bureau provide legal, taxed cigarettes. She further caught the arm of an official who rejected her demand. The official whose arm was caught by her

¹ Matches and cigarettes were both products that had been monopolized by the Monopoly Bureau. Only the Monopoly Bureau could distribute them to the licensed merchants. If the products bypassed the Monopoly Bureau between a merchant and another merchant and/or between a merchant and a customer without the Bureau's taxation, the products were considered contraband.

² Six investigators of the Monopoly Bureau were Fu Hsueh-t'ung (Cantonese, aged 29), Yeh Te-ken (Fukienese, 32), Sheng T'ien-fu (Chekiangese, 38), Liu Ch'ao-hsiang (Szechwanese, 38), Chung Yen-chou (Kiangsinese, 27), and Chao Tzu-chien (Anhweinese, 30) [Lin Ch'i-hsu, *T'ai-wan ehr-ehr-pa shih-chien tsung-ho yen-chiu* (Kaosiung, Taiwan: Hsin-t'ai Cheng-lun Tsa-chih-she, n.d.), 32].

knocked her down with the butt of his pistol. Then, angered people gathering around the scene cursed the officials and demanded the return to the widow of what had been confiscated. One of the officials, Fu Hsueh-t'ung (a Cantonese), seeing an unfavorable situation surrounded by an angry crowd, took a shot at the crowd in order to escape from the scene. Fu's bullet hit a bystander named Ch'en Wen-hsi (aged twenty), who died on the next day. This angered the people at the scene to the maximum extent. While the officials managed to escape, the crowd rushed into a nearby police station and insisted on arrest and execution of the official who had shot an innocent bystander.³

Two high-ranking officials of the Monopoly Bureau, Li Chiung-chih and Yang Tzu-ts'ai, went to the scene around 9:00 pm. But they immediately retreated to the Taipei Police Bureau as the crowd started to hit their car. Then about six or seven hundred people gathered around the Taipei City Police Bureau and demanded a next-day execution of the guilty official. They were not satisfied with Li and Yang's response that the guilty official would be punished based only on law with appropriate procedures, and some of the crowd shouted a call for a rise of the entire Taiwanese for retaliation.

Another group went to the office of the governmental newspaper, *T'ai-wan Hsin-sheng-pao* (Taiwan New Life Daily), and threatened the publisher Li Wan-chu, demanding that the newspaper would carry an article about the case on the next day or the mob would burn the office building. Li promised that the newspaper would carry an article about the case, although the Propaganda Commission of the provincial government

³ Huang Fu-san, "Erh-erh-pa shih-chien ch'u-li wei-yuan-hui' yu erh-erh-pa shih-chien," in *T'ai-wan kuang-fu ch'u-ch'i li-shih*, ed. Lai Tse-han (Taipei: Chung-yang Yen-chiu-yuan Chung-shan Jen-wen She-hui K'e-hsueh Yen-chiu-so, 1993), 128-129; Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), 102-103; Lin Ch'i-hsu, 32-33.

had ordered him not to report the case. On the next day, the *Hsin-sheng-pao* carried a small article with only 100 characters to report the case. In addition, there were also people who marched inside the city of Taipei beating drums to spread the news of the case for the whole night.⁴

A single case of exposure of contraband tobacco called the attention of a huge number of unrelated people within a few hours. Taiwanese anger against mainland officials had become elevated and serious. The case of the evening of February 27 was not the first occasion that Monopoly Bureau officials committed violence to Taiwanese people. In March 1946, a section chief of the Hsinchu City Monopoly Bureau hurt a person with his pistol shot at the time of an investigation of goods monopolized by the Monopoly Bureau. In December 1946, there was a case of a Keelung Monopoly Bureau official beating a tobacco retailer to death.⁵ For the Taiwanese, Taipei's case of February 27, 1947, was a repeated case of violence committed by mainland government employees against Taiwanese. They could not just endure this time. Within a very short period of time, the issue became city-wide, and island-wide eventually. The Taiwanese had accumulated anger in the one and a half years since restoration to China. Taiwanese anger against the mainland officials soon developed into their antipathy against things Chinese. By the morning of February 28, someone had dropped the Chinese characters for China (Chung-kuo) from the signs of the China Hotel and the Bank of China. A banner with a Japanese-language slogan, "Down with Military Tyranny," had also appeared.⁶ Some

⁴ Huang Fu-san, 130; Lai, et al., 103-105.

⁵ Yo Itsushu, *Taiwan to Sho Kaiseki: Ninihachi minpen o chushin to shite* (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobo, 1970), 75-76.

⁶ Lai, et al., 105.

Taiwanese had started to alienate themselves from Chineseness and leaned toward Japaneseness as an alternative, although they still remembered oppression and mistreatment under Japanese colonial rule.

On the morning of February 28, Taiwanese people again started to gather and beat gongs around T'ai-p'ing Street and shout slogans calling for an uprising of all the Taiwanese and for abolition of the Monopoly Bureau. When a police officer who was the director of that district fired to the sky for the purpose of dispersing the people mobbing around the police station on T'ai-p'ing Street, the mob beat the officer and surged into the police station from windows that they had broken and destroyed interior equipment. The mob ignored an attempt to disperse them by Taipei City Mayor Yu Mi-chien, Taipei City Council Speaker Chou Yen-shou, and Military Police Chief Chang Mu-t'ao. Next the mob raided the Taipei Branch of the Monopoly Bureau and burned furniture, money, matches, cigarettes, and liquor on the street. In this raid, two officials were beaten to death and four others were severely injured. The mob next turned to the headquarters of the Monopoly Bureau. However, the mob could not get into the building because the doors and windows had already been covered with boards.⁷

On the afternoon of February 28, a crowd of four or five hundred people marched on the way to the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office. There were a few guards in front of the Executive Office. As the crowd approached the office, the guards fired at the crowd and killed four people. In the confusion, demonstrators dispersed and took revenge on mainland Chinese on the streets. Taiwanese people started to question passers-by in the Japanese language to identify mainland Chinese and beat and

⁷ Ibid., 105-106.

even killed the mainlanders if identified, shouting “Beat the A-shan!” or “Kill the pigs!” in Hokkien.⁸ Taiwanese also made passers-by who looked like mainlanders sing the Japanese national anthem. The Japanese national anthem was the best tool for Taiwanese to identify mainlanders. Those who came from Fukien could pretend to be Taiwanese by speaking the same dialect as the Taiwanese. Those who had studied in Japan could pretend to be Japanese by speaking fluent Japanese in order to avoid Taiwanese violence on them, for the Taiwanese did not attack the Japanese. Yet, the mainlanders could not sing the Japanese national anthem. Therefore, even those who could pretend to be either Taiwanese or Japanese by speaking Hokkien or Japanese were beaten if they were discovered to be mainlanders because they could not sing the Japanese national anthem.⁹ Concerning Taiwanese violence against mainlanders, Tai Kuo-hui remembers as follows:

I had gone out to scenes several times and had been bewildered at coming across grotesque situations. Pen-sheng-jen [i.e., Taiwanese] shouted a word of abuse, “Chankoro,” which the Japanese had once thrown at the Chinese including the Taiwanese, at Wai-sheng-jen [i.e., mainlanders]. There were even people who brandished a Japanese saber and yelled out Japanese martial songs wearing a headband. I was forced to shudder at seeing this kind of corruption of the human heart. As for making [people] sing “Kimigayo” [Japanese national anthem] for differentiation of Pen-sheng-jen and Wai-sheng-jen and lynching innocent Wai-sheng-jen children [shouting] “Foolish Chankoro,” [how can we condone this] even during a disturbance. . . .¹⁰

About 2:00 pm, a group occupied the radio station in New (Hsin) Park.¹¹

Through radio broadcast from the station that they had occupied, the group called for an

⁸ Ibid., 106. “A-shan” is a contempt word that the Taiwanese use to refer to mainland Chinese living in Taiwan.

⁹ Yo Itsushu, *Taiwan to Sho Kaiseki*, 142.

¹⁰ Tai, 102.

¹¹ The New Park was renamed the February Twenty Eighth Peace Park (*Erh-erh-pa Ho-p'ing Kung-yuan*) on February 28, 1995 [*Shih-chieh Jih-pao* (New York), 28 February 1995].

island-wide rise of the Taiwanese against official corruption in a mixed language of Hokkien and Japanese. They insisted that there was no other way but to fight against official corruption in order to prevent starvation that had resulted from exploitation by corrupt officials.¹² The incident started on February 27 as an exposure of a merchant selling contraband cigarettes. Then, Taiwanese anger was directed toward an official who had killed an innocent civilian. By the afternoon of the next day of an official's shot at an innocent civilian, the incident had developed into a political struggle of unorganized Taiwanese against official corruption of the mainland Chinese government of Taiwan. Putting all the mainlanders into the category of the government side regardless of their occupations, Taiwanese attacked non-official mainland Chinese also.

At 3:00 pm, the Garrison Command proclaimed martial law over Taipei City and dispatched armed police and military forces throughout the city for the purpose of suppression. In many offices, hence, there were clashes between mobs and police and military forces, and some of the mobs were killed. On the other hand, Taiwanese attack to mainlanders and destruction of things continued, although the Taiwanese did not beat the Japanese as is mentioned above. Chinese forces shot Taiwanese with firearms and Taiwanese mobs attacked mainlanders with fists, stones, and sticks.¹³ People became very sensitive to new information and exchanged information with one another on the streets. Some mainland Chinese wore Japanese footwear called *geta* to pretend to be Taiwanese in order to avoid violence from Taiwanese. But the majority of the mainland Chinese hid in

¹² Lai, et al., 106-107; Yo Itsushu, *Taiwan to Sho Kaiseki*, 98-99.

¹³ Hsing-cheng-yuan Yen-chiu Erh-erh-pa Shih-chien Hsiao-tsu, "*Erh-erh-pa shih-chien*" *yen-chiu pao-kao* (Taipei: Shih-pao Wen-hua Ch'u-pan Ch'i-yeh, 1994), 54.

office buildings or homes because the outside was too dangerous for them. In George Kerr's words, "[b]y late afternoon normal activities throughout Taipei were suspended."¹⁴

Also on the afternoon of February 28, Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, the Speaker of the Taiwan Provincial Council, met with K'e Yuan-fen, the Chief of the General Staff of the Taiwan Provincial Garrison Command, and presented K'e with five demands of the Taipei City Council and tobacco sellers' association of Taipei. The five demands were: (1) open execution of officials guilty for the killing of the previous evening, (2) compensation for the families of the victims of the riot, (3) the government's guarantee that similar incidents would not happen again, (4) the Monopoly Bureau's apology, and (5) dismissal of the Monopoly Bureau director. K'e then turned these demands to Ch'en I, but Ch'en merely implied his acceptance of only the second demand (compensation) and rejected the rest. About 7:00 pm, the Speaker of the Taipei City Council (Chou Yen-shou), the Speaker of the Taiwan Provincial Council (Huang Ch'ao-ch'in), the Chief of the General Staff of the Taiwan Provincial Garrison Command (K'e Yuan-fen), and a non-Kuomintang member of the National Assembly (Hsieh O) appealed to the public to calm down through a radio broadcast, announcing martial law proclaimed and an expectation of a severe punishment to guilty officials of the Monopoly Bureau investigative team.¹⁵

As early as February 28, Taipei's influence reached other places of Taiwan, especially places near Taipei. In Pan-ch'iao, Taipei county, beating of mainlanders started already on the morning of February 28. In Keelung, violence against mainlanders began on the evening. In Tamsui, Jui-fang, and Chin-kua-shih, all of which are in Taipei county,

¹⁴ George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 257.

¹⁵ Lai, et al., 108.

dormitories for mainland officials were burned. There was a riot in Ying-ke, too. In T'ao-yuan county, violence against mainlanders started on the evening of February 28. Around 8:00 pm, some people of T'ao-yuan city gathered and denounced the government and officials, although the police dispersed them.¹⁶ The news of Taipei's case also reached central Taiwan on February 28. However, violence did not occur on that day in central Taiwan; some people organized a self-defense team (in Miao-li city) or requested disarmament of the police (in Taichung city).¹⁷

On the morning of March 1, the Taipei City Council convened a meeting of its members, some Provincial Council members, and other organizations. The meeting started at 10:00 am at the Chung-shan Auditorium. The participants resolved to set up a Committee to Investigate a Bloody Case of a Tobacco Seller's Arrest (Ch'i-yen Hsueh-an Tiao-ch'a Wei-yuan-hui). They selected Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, Wang T'ien-teng, Lin Chung, and Chou Yen-shou as their representatives to present the Executive Office with five demands—(1) suspension of martial law, (2) release of the arrested without delay, (3) no shooting by the military, (4) establishment of a committee involving representatives of both the government and the people for the purpose of investigation of the incident, and (5) public announcement by Ch'en I himself. The name of the Committee was changed into the February Twenty Eighth Incident Resolution Committee (Erh-erh-pa Shih-chien Ch'u-li Wei-yuan-hui) after the four committee representatives met Ch'en I.¹⁸

At 5:00 pm, March 1, Ch'en I made another radio broadcast responding to the fifth demand. Ch'en I announced that the detained people would be freed if their family

¹⁶ Hsing-cheng-yuan Yen-chiu Erh-erh-pa Shih-chien Hsiao-tsu, 72-76; Lai, et al., 121-123.

¹⁷ Hsing-cheng-yuan Yen-chiu Erh-erh-pa Shih-chien Hsiao-tsu, 82-83.

¹⁸ Huang Fu-san, 137-138; Lai, et al., 109.

members and neighborhood watchdog association ensured of no further trouble made by him/her. He also stated that the provincial government would pay 200,000 yuan (old Taiwanese dollars) to the families of the killed and 50,000 yuan to the injured. Ch'en added that the judiciary would investigate the case of the February 27 evening and that the government would suspend martial law at 12:00 midnight of March 1-2. He also announced that representatives of the Provincial Council and the Executive Office would meet and discuss solutions to the incident. But Ch'en did not fail to affirm that the government prohibited strikes, demonstrations, and meetings. Martial law was certainly lifted at 8:00 pm of March 1 as Ch'en had declared.¹⁹

People's tensions were not yet soothed, though. Many people of Taipei city continued to protest the authorities with placards reading "Down With Ch'en I's Empire!" "Abolish the Governor-General's Executive Office!" "Don't Compromise, Use Only Armed Struggle!" and "The Taiwanese People Should Immediately Rise Up, Struggle for Their Bread and Fight for Freedom and Democracy!"²⁰

In many places other than Taipei city, situations became worse on March 1. In Pan-ch'iao, a mob surged into the county government office and beat officials. Another group of Pan-ch'iao burned an arsenal, resulting in a loss of about 300 million yuan worth. In Tamsui, a crowd raided the residence of the acting chief of the city police bureau and burned furniture. In T'ao-yuan city, a youth corps group with help of over thirty students from Taipei stripped the railway police of weapons. Also in T'ao-yuan city, people started to beat mainlanders in the afternoon. Groups of people seized arms in other cities of T'ao-

¹⁹ Huang Fu-san, 138; Lai, et al., 110.

²⁰ Ibid., 109.

yuan county. Some Taipei residents went also to Hsinchu city to promote the people's rise, and they also beat mainlanders. In Taichung city, local leaders of Taichung county and Chang-hua county held a meeting on the March 1 morning and resolved to support Taipei residents demands to the government.²¹ Also on March 1, beating of mainlanders began in Chang-hua city.²²

At 2:00 pm of March 2, the Resolution Committee of Taipei met at the Chung-shan Auditorium. The number of the participants was much bigger than the previous day. Chou I-ou (the Head of the Department of Civil Affairs), Hu Fu-hsiang (the Head of the Department of Police), and Jen Hsien-chun (the Head of the Department of Transportation) participated in the meeting as the representatives of the provincial government. Taipei City Mayor Yu Mi-chien was also present at the meeting. During the meeting, Speaker of the Taipei City Council Chou Yen-shou reported that in the morning Ch'en I had agreed with Chou to involve representatives of workers, merchants, students, and an anti-Ch'en I Taiwan Provincial Political Construction Association (T'ai-wan-sheng Cheng-chih Chien-she Hsieh-hui)²³ in the Resolution Committee. In the meeting, the Resolution Committee announced its five subcommittees. The five subcommittees were a liaison committee with Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, an information committee with Wang T'ien-teng, a relief committee with Tu Ts'ung-ming, and investigation committee with Wu Ch'un-lin, and a general affairs committee with P'an Ch'u-yuan. Besides, the Resolution

²¹ Hsing-cheng-yuan Yen-chiu Erh-erh-pa Shih-chien Hsiao-tsu, 73-78 and 84.

²² Lai, et al., 125.

²³ The Taiwan Provincial Political Construction Association was a Taiwanese political group organized by Chiang Wei-ch'uan after Taiwan's restoration to China and had been utilized by the provincial branch of the Kuomintang and the C-C Clique against Ch'en I.

Committee resolved to hold two meetings every day, in the morning and evening, to deal with people's demands.²⁴ The Resolution Committee strengthened its infrastructure.

The Resolution Committee continued to attract more and more people as it held new meetings. Various people from various directions participated in the Committee and its meetings. Involvement of representatives from various directions eventually resulted in factionalism inside the Resolution Committee.²⁵ In fact, opinions were not uniform among the Committee members, and people had already started to form different factions to have separate meetings for their own factions on March 2.²⁶

Ch'en I made another radio announcement at 3:00 pm, March 2. He reaffirmed unconditional release of the arrested and compensation for the deaths and the injured in order to soothe the rioters. Ch'en clarified that no charge would be made against the demonstrators. He further stated that the government would work harder to bring security and harmony to the people and that the Resolution Committee would involve additional persons from various groups. He added that he loved Taiwan and the Taiwanese and wished the people to return to pre-February 27 harmony by cooperation of the government and the people.²⁷ Ch'en I added conciliatory comments little by little as he made new public announcements. However, his understanding of tensions was not sufficient. He was unaware that situations before February 27 were not harmonious. He did not realize that leading Taiwanese people had started to demand political reform. He was only concerned about easy ways to put an end to the ongoing riot. Thus, he made no

²⁴ Lai, et al., 111-112; Hsing-cheng-yuan Yen-chiu Erh-erh-pa Shih-chien Hsiao-tsu, 58-59.

²⁵ Ibid., 61; Huang Fu-san, 138.

²⁶ Ibid., 141; Lai, et al., 111.

²⁷ Huang Fu-san, 142; Lai, et al., 112-113.

announcement promising or even implying political reform, which the majority of the Taiwanese thought necessary but Ch'en thought unnecessary. He did not understand what Taiwanese people were angry about.

On March 2, people of Hsinchu city started to beat mainlanders and burned equipment and clothes of officials' dormitories. In the afternoon, there was a clash between the gendarme and police forces and rioters, resulting in eight deaths and eighteen wounded persons. At night, Hsinchu City Council members and local leaders established the Hsinchu Branch of the February Twenty Eighth Incident Resolution Committee and voted for two demands—punishment for those who had shot at civilians and withdrawal of the military units from the city. Hsinchu Mayor Kuo Hsiao-tsung did not act against the committee,²⁸ just like Ch'en I did not try to dissolve the Resolution Committee in Taipei in the beginning of the uprising. The influence of the incident had spread also to Chia-i by March 2. Beating of mainlanders was observed throughout Chia-i city on March 2 with Mayor Sun Chin-chun and the police forces having escaped from the city.²⁹

In Taichung city, a citizens' mass meeting took place at the Taichung Theater on the morning of March 2. A communist Hsieh Hsueh-hung was named for the leadership of the people. Around 10:00 am, participants of the meeting went outside and demonstrated in the city calling for the people's rise. They rushed into the Taichung branch office of the Monopoly Bureau and forced the acting head of the branch to agree to abolish the monopoly system, to seal the weapons, and to let the people supervise things in the office. Hsieh Hsueh-hung further forced Taichung County Head Liu Ts'un-

²⁸ Hsing-cheng-yuan Yen-chiu Erh-erh-pa Shih-chien Hsiao-tsu, 78-79.

²⁹ Ibid., 105-106.

chung to agree not to shoot anyone and to submit six pistols at Liu's residence to Hsieh. In the afternoon, a Committee to Resolve the Situations of the Taichung Area (*T'ai-chung Ti-ch'u Ch'u-li Wei-yuan-hui*) was formed with local leaders and council members of Taichung city, Taichung county, and Chang-hua city involved. At night, Hsieh Hsueh-hung appealed to the youths to fight against the dictatorial government. In the meantime, the entire city of Taichung was in chaotic situations with violent cases, student protests against the government, self-policing groups of volunteers and gangsters.³⁰

On the other hand, Taipei had regained peace by early morning of March 3. Shops resumed their business, and city busses began their service again.³¹ As it had decided on the previous day, the Resolution Committee held a meeting on the morning (beginning from 10:00 am) of March 3. No government officials attended the meeting, though. Participants of the meeting made three basic decisions. They entrusted Hsu Te-hui with organization of self-defense corps with people from all over the province. They appointed five persons (Lin Tsung-hsien, Lin Shih-tang, Lu Po-hsiung, Lo Shui-yuan, and Li Man-chu) to ask the United States consulate in Taipei to spread news about the incident abroad and to Nanking. They also agreed to hope for no attack on mainland Chinese compatriots.³²

At 11:00 am of March 3, about twenty persons visited the Executive Office as a delegation of the Resolution Committee. They petitioned the provincial government to restrict police power by suspending all armed patrols, the police right to shoot, and the

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 84-87.

³¹ Lai, et al., 113.

³² Hsing-cheng-yuan Yen-chiu Erh-erh-pa Shih-chien Hsiao-tsu, 62. According to George Kerr, the request of the five persons to the United States consulate was rejected as "This is China now" (George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 267).

military police brigade. The government agreed to the first two options, but it refused suspension of the military police brigade. Additionally, the Resolution Committee delegation and government officials agreed to the following seven points. First, the government would withdraw the military troops to their own stations before 6:00 pm, March 3. Second, the civil and military police would maintain local order. Third, transportation would be re-normalized by 6:00 pm, March 3. Fourth, the rice shortage should be solved through redistribution of grain from military reserves. Fifth, Chief of the General Staff K'e Yuan-fen would take responsibility for continued violence after withdrawal of the military forces. Sixth, twenty Resolution Committee representatives would take responsibility for further beating of people and destruction of property after withdrawal of the military forces. Seventh, both the government and the Resolution Committee tried to prevent people from being fooled by rumors. On the evening, K'e Yuan-fen assured the public through radio broadcast that the military troops would be recalled and that civil and military police would maintain peace thereafter. He also appealed to the people for restoration of harmony.³³

On the morning of March 3, Hsieh Hsueh-hung of Taichung reorganized the Committee to Resolve the Situations of the Taichung Area into the Taichung Area Security Committee Headquarters as a base to attack KMT military units in Taichung city and organized the People's Battalion. The People's Battalion attracted people from other towns and captured over 100 rifles with ammunition.³⁴ Hsieh was resolute to fight against the government forces. On the same day, in Chang-hua, people established the Chang-hua

³³ Lai, et al., 114-115.

³⁴ Hsing-cheng-yuan Yen-chiu Erh-erh-pa Shih-chien Hsiao-tsu, 87-88.

City Resolution Committees for the Aftermath in police stations.³⁵ Also on March 3, the Tainan City Council passed demands similar to the Resolution Committee of Taipei—no mobilization of forces other than the military police and political reform of Tainan city.³⁶ In Kaohsiung city, on the other hand, more than one hundred outlaws from Taipei and some students from Tainan instigated the city residents into an uprising.³⁷

At 9:00 am, March 4, Taipei's students who did not want to entrust the Resolution Committee with everything held their own meeting. They made an agreement that students should form a large brigade to keep public order and safety. In other words, they believed that they should have the policing power and ability. On the other hand, at 10:00 am, three Taipei Resolution Committee members (Ch'en Ch'i, Chiang Wei-ch'uan, and Lin Wu-ts'un) and about forty students and popular representatives met with Ch'en I and presented him with their opinions about causes of and possible solutions to the disorderly conditions. The cause, according to them, was failure of economic policies that had led to a high rate of unemployment and insecurity of Taiwanese life. Solutions they proposed were that the Resolution Committee should make reform proposals for Taiwan's politics and that Governor-General Ch'en I should stop his heavy reliance on his subordinates in order to have better comprehension of the people's conditions. Responding to these points, Ch'en shifted responsibility on his subordinates, saying, "My economic and political policies are correct, but I realize that my subordinates do not

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 97.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 110-111.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 115-116.

always clearly understand them.”³⁸ Ch’en I had strong confidence and pride in himself.

He did not admit his failure because of strong self-confidence.

While a group of Taipei students held a separate meeting from the Resolution Committee, the Resolution Committee of Taipei held their regular meetings also on March 4. In the morning meeting, the Committee made eight new resolutions. The eight new resolutions were: (1) prompt resumption of Taipei’s bus service, (2) island-wide prohibition of armed patrols, (3) that Huang Ch’ao-ch’in, Chang Ch’ing-chuan, and Yen Ch’in-hsien would propose to General K’e Yuan-fen that armed forces should withdraw from duty in Taipei, (4) that the military vehicles going to groceries should carry flags and no guns, (5) announcement by the Resolution Committee that it was the people who had occupied the Min-hsiung Broadcast Station, (6) immediate organization of branch committees throughout the province, (7) designation of the Speaker of the Taipei City Council as a provisional chair of the Resolution Committee, and (8) no fliers or posters to be allowed so that information would be conveyed in the same language.³⁹ The Resolution Committee increased their demands day by day as it held new meetings. Ch’en I did not understand people’s anger at his government; the Resolution Committee members did not understand Ch’en I’s pride and temperament.

By March 4, the People's Battalion of Taichung had occupied most of the government offices in Taichung city, such as the Taichung Telecommunication Bureau, the Taichung Branch Office of the Monopoly Bureau, and the Taichung Broadcast Station.⁴⁰ On March 4, beating of mainlanders started in Pingtung, too. The Resolution

³⁸ Lai, et al., 115.

³⁹ Ibid., 115.

⁴⁰ Hsing-cheng-yuan Yen-chiu Erh-erh-pa Shih-chien Hsiao-tsu, 88.

Committees were set up in Pingtung and Keelung also on March 4. The Resolution Committee of Pingtung sent eleven representatives to Mayor Kung Lu-jui to demand disarmament of the army, only to be rejected by the mayor. Then, Pingtungese people occupied the city hall, and the mayor was forced to take refuge in the gendarmes' station.⁴¹

On March 5, traffic returned to the streets, normal business resumed, schools started normal curriculum again, and city bus service was fully restored in Taipei city.⁴² Japanese language signs calling for meetings of former Taiwanese servicemen of the Japanese military started to appear, but attacks to mainlanders had decreased.⁴³ Beginning from 2:00 pm, different groups among the Resolution Committee held separate meetings. Each group met with one another for final reports for the day at 4:40 pm. The meeting yielded suggestions for political reform. The suggestions included employment of a considerable number of Taiwanese for responsible positions in both the government and public enterprises, popular elections of the municipal heads other than the provincial governor, and abolition of the governmental monopoly system and the Trade Bureau.⁴⁴ The Resolution Committee members clearly expressed their strong desire for Taiwanese political and economic participation and leadership.

On the evening of March 5, the Resolution Committee of Taichung city passed its demands—immediate elections for the provincial governor and county and city municipal heads; abolition of the monopoly system; and freedom of speech, thought, publication, assemblies, organization, residence, and personal liberty.⁴⁵ Also on March 5,

⁴¹ Ibid., 128-129.

⁴² Ibid., 65.

⁴³ Lai, et al., 117.

⁴⁴ Hsing-cheng-yuan Yen-chiu Erh-erh-pa Shih-chien Hsiao-tsu, 65; Lai, et al., 117.

⁴⁵ Hsing-cheng-yuan Yen-chiu Erh-erh-pa Shih-chien Hsiao-tsu, 90.

the February Twenty Eighth Incident Resolution Committee was founded in Kaohsiung city. Resolution Committees were set up also in I-lan and Hualien to make demands like the Resolution Committee of Taipei.⁴⁶ There were differences in when people started to organize committees to channel people's demands to the government. However, processes were alike. First, security of a city or town was disturbed with Taiwanese violence against mainlanders, especially officials, and against government offices. Then, council members and/or local leaders took initiative to establish a committee to solve the incident. Committees passed demands for political reform. Overwhelmed by numbers, the police forces of the mainland Chinese did not risk themselves in attempts to suppress the uprising. People naturally became more and more elated and resolute to push their demands on the government.

On the afternoon of March 6, the Resolution Committee of Taipei held another meeting and made crucial resolutions, which the Committee members later publicized. Also on the afternoon of March 6, the Resolution Committee determined people who would take leadership of the Committee for the purpose of strengthening the organization and started to propagandize about the Committee. Publication of the Committee's resolutions was part of its propagandization. The resolutions were the so-called Thirty-two Demands. The Thirty-two Demands were divided into two categories—urgent dispositions and fundamental dispositions. The urgent dispositions were: (1) disarmament of the governmental armed forces and Resolution Committee-gendarmes joint custody of the arms; (2) joint security maintenance by the gendarmes, the unarmed police, and popular organization; (3) no attack on corrupt officials, either mainlanders or Taiwanese,

⁴⁶ Ibid., 141-144.

by the people to be allowed; (4) that the Resolution Committee would accept any suggestion and demand for political reform; (5) that the provincial government should not be allowed to solve the incident with forces by re-mobilizing or asking the central government to mobilize military forces; (6) the government's consultation of the Resolution Committee for its policies; and (7) no accusation of ordinary civilians. The fundamental dispositions fell into two divisions—military and political. Fundamental military dispositions were: (1) no permission of military troops that had not received sufficient education and training for stationing in Taiwan; (2) that the central government could draft Taiwanese for only defense of the province of Taiwan; and (3) absolute opposition to conscription of Taiwanese for any purpose other than Taiwan's defense. Fundamental political dispositions were: (1) enactment of a provincial home rule act as the supreme law of the province in order to realize Sun Yat-sen's ideals; (2) adoption of popular election of county heads and city mayors and re-election of county and city councils before June 1947; (3) that the provincial council had to agree to appointments of the department heads of the provincial government; (4) that more than two-thirds of the department heads had to be those who had lived in Taiwan for more than ten years; (5) appointment of Taiwanese to the heads of the Police Department of the provincial government and local police bureaus of the counties and cities; (6) that more than half of the Adjudication Commission members had to be Taiwanese; (7) that no authorities other than the police could arrest suspects; (8) that the gendarmes could not arrest any suspects other than military personnel; (9) prohibition of political arrest; (10) absolute freedom of unarmed meetings and organizations; (11) absolute freedom of speech, publication, and

strikes, and abolition of the newspaper registration system; (12) immediate repeal of the Ordinance Concerning People's Groups and Organizations (Jen-min T'uan-t'i Tsu-chih T'iao-li); (13) abolition of investigation of popular organizations' candidates; (14) revision of the election law governing popular organizations; (15) adoption of progressive taxation; (16) that all the chiefs of public enterprises have to be Taiwanese; (17) establishment of a popular vote committee for supervision of public enterprises that should entrust the provincial government with disposition of Japanese property, and establishment of committees for management of confiscated factories and mine of which more than a half of the members were Taiwanese; (18) abolition of the Monopoly Bureau, and adoption of rationing of daily necessities; (19) abolition of the Trade Bureau; (20) abolition of the Propaganda Commission; (21) appointment of Taiwanese to all the local chief justices and to all the local chief prosecutors; and (22) that more than a half of the judicial personnel (judges and prosecutors) had to be Taiwanese.⁴⁷

Also on March 6, the Taiwan Provincial Council sent a telegraph to President Chiang Kai-shek. In the telegraph, the Provincial Council criticized official corruption and neglect of Taiwanese talent and opinions by the provincial government of Taiwan as main reasons of the violent disturbances. Thereupon, the Provincial Council urged Chiang Kai-shek to employ Taiwanese people in responsible and respectable positions of political and educational institutions, to abolish the Monopoly Bureau, and to guarantee Taiwanese economic security and freedom of speech, publication, and assembly.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Ibid., 66-69.

⁴⁸ Lai, et al., 118.

Beginning from 8:30 pm, March 6, Ch'en I made another radio announcement. He promised to employ more Taiwanese in the government and to hold elections for the county and city governments on July 1, 1947. He also promised to replace unqualified officials of local administrative units with qualified people chosen by council members or legal popular organizations with the people's consent.⁴⁹ This was the final occasion that Ch'en I showed his conciliatory measures to the public. He eventually became furious at the elated Resolution Committee, which continued to increase its demands.

On the afternoon of March 7, the Resolution Committee of Taipei passed ten more demands additional to the Thirty-two Demands made on the previous day. The ten additional demands were: (1) employment of as many Taiwanese as possible for the provincial military forces; (2) reform of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office by the end of March; (3) establishment of a civil affairs bureau in the Resolution Committee before March 25 and involvement of local representatives in that civil affairs bureau; (4) abolition of unnecessary institutions based on decisions of the Resolution Committee Political Affairs Bureau; (5) requirement of approval by the central government to the Civil Affairs Department of the provincial government about disposition of Japanese property; (6) abolition of the Garrison Command; (7) assurance of rise of economic status and benefit of the Native Taiwanese; (8) enactment of a labor protection law that would went into effect on June 1, 1947; (9) unconditional prompt release of Taiwanese war criminals and suspects for betrayal to China; and (10) shipment

⁴⁹ Ibid., 119-120.

of 150,000 tons of sugar to ask the central government to estimate the value and then to ship it back to Taiwan.⁵⁰

On the evening of March 7, members of the Taipei Resolution Committee general committee visited the Executive Office and presented the Forty-two Demands (the Thirty-two Demands plus the additional ten demands) to Ch'en I. The introductory part of the Forty-two Demands thoroughly criticized the Taiwan provincial government in connection with the causes of the incident. According to it, postwar administration of the provincial government had provided Taiwan and the Taiwanese no freedom of speech or publication, a high unemployment rate, financial difficulty, inflation, closing of factories and mines, and deterioration of rural economic conditions. Soon after he started to read the demands, Ch'en I turned extremely furious and strongly rejected the demands before finishing reading the entire text.⁵¹ In order to soothe the angered people, Ch'en I had continued to express conciliatory measures to the people. He had promised punishment of guilty officials, compensation for the deaths and the wounded, and reform of the government. From Ch'en I's viewpoint, while he had compromised, the Resolution Committee had never compromised. Rather than compromising, the Resolution Committee had added demand after demand. Moreover, the Committee had denied validity and effectiveness of Ch'en I's policies. Ch'en, who replied to the Resolution Committee members on March 4 that his policies were right, could not endure such

⁵⁰ Hsing-cheng-yuan Yen-chiu Erh-erh-pa Shih-chien Hsiao-tsu, 70-71.

⁵¹ Ibid., 71; Li Hsiao-feng, "Erh-erh-pa shih-chien ch'u-li wei-yuan-hui' yu Ch'en I te tui-ts'e," in *Erh-erh-pa hsueh-shu yen-t'ao-hui lun-wen-chi* (1991), ed. Ch'en Yen-yu and Hu Hui-ling (Taipei: Erh-erh-pa Min-chien Yen-chiu Hsiao-tsu, 1992), 182-183.

humiliation. As a result, he took these demands as his excuse to militarily suppress the “rebellious” Resolution Committee and its “rebellious” supporters.

The Resolution Committee announced cancellation of the demands on the next day, although Chairman of the Resolution Committee Information Committee Wang T’ien-teng had publicly announced about the Resolution Committee’s demands to Ch’en I on the evening of March 7. The Resolution Committee stated that the reason for withdrawal of the Forty-two Demands was that defiance to the central government by abolishing the Taiwan Province Garrison Command and disarmament of the national military would not represent popular opinions. Furthermore, the Resolution Committee dispatched Huang Ch’ao-ch’in to the Executive Office to tell Ch’en I of its withdrawal of the Forty-two Demands. However, Ch’en I refused to meet Huang. Ch’en I’s resolute rejection of the Forty-two Demands was obvious and frightened many members of the Resolution Committee.⁵² Finally they learned that they had gone too far.

Late at night, March 8, the first troops from the mainland arrived in Keelung. An army platoon with thirty soldiers and a military police battalion accompanied the censor of Fukien and Taiwan, Yang Liang-kung. They reached Taipei at 2:00 am, March 9. Additional two battalions from Shanghai also arrived in Keelung on March 9. At 6:00 am, martial law was proclaimed again. Chief of the General Staff K’e Yuan-fen broadcast that public meetings and unofficial organizations including the Resolution Committee would no longer be permitted and had to be broken up.⁵³ The government finally started military suppression of the uprising. Suppression necessitated the army not only in Taipei

⁵² Hsing-cheng-yuan Yen-chiu Erh-erh-pa Shih-chien Hsiao-tsu, 71-72; Li Hsiao-feng, 183-185.

⁵³ Lai, et al., 146.

but also in other areas of the island. On March 9 already, K'e Yuan-fen ordered airlift of military reinforcements to Chia-I and truck transportation of reinforcements to Taichung. On March 10, additional troops of two divisions sent from the mainland arrived in Kaohsiung. Some troops were transported to Taipei, some to the south from Kaohsiung, and some to I-lan and Hualien. Military reinforcements continued from March 8 to March 10 throughout the island.⁵⁴

President Chiang Kai-shek publicly spoke of the incident on Taiwan for the first time on March 10. The gist of the speech was as follows. Former Japanese-military soldiers and communists took advantage of the case that the Monopoly Bureau officials beat a tobacco smuggler and instigated the people for their own sake and benefit. The power of the central government was limited over local affairs, so Governor-General Ch'en I would carry out reform of the provincial and local governments of Taiwan and would practice local elections. The central government could not accept the Resolution Committee's demands for abolition of the Taiwan Garrison Command Headquarters and for the military's surrender of weapons. The military forces that had just arrived in Taiwan would restore order and normalcy in Taiwan. People should not be misled by Japanese style deceit.⁵⁵

Also on March 10, Ch'en I made a radio announcement that the military would come to Taiwan to protect the people of Taiwan suppressing only the rebels. Ch'en I also announced six measures to be enforced. First, the personnel of the transportation systems—railways and highways—had to resume their jobs; otherwise, there would be

⁵⁴ Ibid., 146-147.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 147-148.

penalties for refusal to work. Second, businesses had to resume operations with factory workers back to their factories and shop owners reopening their shops. Third, no demonstrations were allowed. Fourth, fund-raising campaigns were prohibited. Fifth, commodity prices had to stay the same. Sixth, severe punishments would be applied to any illegal activity.⁵⁶ With huge scale military power backing him thanks to reinforcements from the mainland, Ch'en I turned from conciliatory attitude to resolute and firm attitude. Ch'en could no longer tolerate rebels who had humiliated him and had endangered his position as a governor of a newly restored province. On March 9 and 11, Ch'en ordered dissolution of the Resolution Committees. By March 13, all the island had fallen under control of the national army.⁵⁷

Suppression of the uprising by the military forces from the mainland had started immediately upon the arrival of the troops in Taiwan on March 8. Mainland soldiers who landed at Keelung on March 8 started shooting their machine-guns at longshoremen without warning. There was indiscriminate shooting in the city of Keelung, too, making a great number of innocent city dwellers victims of sudden attacks,⁵⁸ just like many innocent mainlanders suddenly became targets of Taiwanese attack on February 28 and on. Jack Belden writes:

Throughout March 9 and 10, firing continued both day and night. A clerk of the Taiwan Power Company went out with three thousand yen in his pocket to buy rice, was robbed and then killed. A primary school principal, carrying thirty thousand yen in school fees, was likewise robbed and killed. Taiwanese found out of doors were bayoneted or shot. Meanwhile a search was carried out for middle school students who were arrested, beaten, and also executed.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Ibid., 149-150.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 150-151.

⁵⁸ Yo Itsushu, *Taiwan to Sho Kaiseki*, 130-131.

⁵⁹ Jack Belden, *China Shakes the World* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 393.

The suppression of the uprising was in reality a retaliation by the government of the mainland Chinese against the Taiwanese. Also writes Jack Belden:

On March 11, 12 and 13, the killings became more systematic as soldiers and gendarmes, acting on grudge lists supplied by mainland Chinese, searched out personal enemies, particularly newspapermen, schoolteachers, committeemen and businessmen. Often such men were shot on the spot. Others were taken away and never heard of again. If they could not be found, their families were taken as hostages.⁶⁰

George Kerr presents the similar accounts as follows:

The Government promptly undertook an intensive search for members of the Settlement [Resolution] Committee, and for all editors, lawyers, doctors or businessmen who had taken an active part in preparing the reform program. Some were killed with brutality. Unlike the few local Communists, Formosan leaders had little or no experience in the arts of escape and concealment. Some managed to remain at large briefly, hiding in the outlying villages or skulking in the hills, and a few managed to leave the island. The majority, however, were captured promptly.⁶¹

Kerr continues:

A systematic search was made, based on the Service Corps enlistment rolls. If a student could not be found at once, either a member of his family was seized or a fellow student was taken to serve as hostage or as a substitute in death. Orders were issued requiring that all weapons be turned in, with a deadline for compliance. But simultaneously orders of equal weight were issued which forbade anyone to carry a weapon in the streets. How, then, was a young man in good faith to comply with these contradictory orders? If the house-search revealed a weapon, the entire household might suffer disastrously, and certainly the responsible youth would be shot. But if he were discovered in the streets on his way to turn in the weapons which had been issued to him by the Service Corps, he was equally certain to be liquidated.

After three days of random shooting and bayonetting in the Taipei streets the Government forces began to push out into suburban and rural areas. Machine-gun squads, mounted on trucks, were driven along the highroads for fifteen or twenty miles, shooting at random in village streets in an effort to

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, 297-298.

break any spirit of resistance that might still be present, and to prepare the way for house-to-house search. The manhunt spread through all the hills back of Taipei.

By March 17 the pattern of terror and revenge had emerged very clearly. First to be destroyed were all established critics of the Government. Then in their turn came Settlement [Resolution] Committee members and their principal aides, all youths who had taken part in the interim policing of Taipei, middle school students, middle school teachers, lawyers, economic leaders and members of influential families, and at last, anyone who in the preceding eighteen months had given offenses to a mainland Chinese, causing him to “lose face.” On March 16 it was reported that anyone who spoke English reasonably well, or who had had close foreign connections, was being seized for “examination.”⁶²

The number of the killed during the suppression is not known. There is a great variation for the number of the killed for the suppression—from 1,000 to 100,000.⁶³ For reference, the Japanese authorities killed about 32,000 Taiwanese in the first eight years. The number of the casualties also includes more than 100 mainlanders and Japanese according to one estimate. With a huge scale of casualties from brutal suppression by the KMT forces, the Incident has been a cause of the long-lasting conflict between the Taiwanese and the mainland Chinese living in Taiwan.⁶⁴

⁶² Ibid., 299-300.

⁶³ Lai, et al., 155.

⁶⁴ *Asahi Shinbun* (Tokyo), 1 March 1997.

Conclusion

Taiwanese people had been frustrated under Japanese colonial rule. Resistance had been brutally and thoroughly suppressed from the very beginning of colonial rule. They eventually learned that they could not expel the Japanese from Taiwan. Then they turned to political movements. They established political organizations to fight for elimination of discrimination against the Taiwanese. They acted for equal treatment with the Japanese. Yet, the Japanese authorities never admitted equality between the Japanese and the Taiwanese. After all, political activism was also silenced in the 1930's with the growing tensions with China and the rise of militarism in Japan.

In August 1945, Japan surrendered to the World War II Allies including the Republic of China. The Taiwanese were joyous. They knew that Taiwan would be restored to China, although they shared anxiety for a new future. They believed that they could enjoy the status of first-class citizens. They believed that they would gain equality and fairness in the Chinese province of Taiwan. They were happy to expect to participate in reconstruction of Chinese Taiwan replacing the Japanese with themselves. However, they soon discovered that their status as the second-class citizens or subjects ruled by an outside force had not changed. They eventually accumulated frustration again.

During the period between August 1945 and March 1947, Taiwanese enthusiasm turned to disappointment and anger fairly quickly. Taiwanese antipathy against mainland Chinese grew day by day. They were first disappointed with poorly dressed soldiers from the mother country, many of whom looked to the Taiwanese backward. This

disappointment made the Taiwanese disrespect the mainland Chinese. Taiwanese also shared a feeling of anger at morally corrupt behaviors of both military and civil officials from the mainland. Mainlanders in fact looked down upon Taiwanese, thus many of them were not nice to the Taiwanese. Taiwanese, after all, felt that their status had not improved since the colonial period, for they were mistreated by the Chinese authorities. In addition, mismanagement of economic affairs, social welfare programs, and education disappointed and angered many Taiwanese. Stagnation of economic conditions proved the incompetence of the new officials. Looking at unfavorable conditions of Taiwan, Taiwanese frustration grew dramatically especially because they could not do anything. The new government did not trust and employ many Taiwanese for responsible positions. Taiwanese could not participate in reconstruction of Taiwan. Rather, they had to observe and endure deterioration of various situations in their homeland. They were not given even a chance to satisfy their desire for Taiwan's reconstruction. Behind the February Twenty Eighth Incident lay these background situations. In order to solve the fundamental political problems of restored Taiwan, many Taiwanese rose against the government and tried to achieve their own autonomy so that unfavorable situations could be remedied by themselves. Thus, their demands to the government during the Incident associated with political reform. The Incident eventually developed into a Taiwanese political struggle against the oppressive government continuing from the colonial period.

An immediate outcome of the Incident was a reform of the provincial government. On April 21, 1947, President Chiang Kai-shek told Ch'en I in a wire message that the

central government of the Republic of China had chosen Wei Tao-ming, who had served as Mayor of Nanking, Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan, and Chinese (Republic of China) Ambassador to the United States, as the new governor of Taiwan succeeding to Ch'en I. In the same message, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Ch'en I not to appoint anyone to his government without consulting President Chiang.¹ With Wei Tao-ming starting his first service in Taiwan, the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office was abolished on May 16.² Thereby, Taiwan was in principle given a status of a regular province equal to other provinces of China.

In the long run, ordinary Taiwanese started to lose interest in politics after the Incident. Involvement in politics had come to be considered dangerous. The question of conflicting provincial identities between Taiwanese and mainland Chinese was fixed as natural and usual.³ Taiwanese distrust to the Kuomintang was enhanced. Yo Itsushu describes Taiwanese distrust to the Kuomintang as follows:

After [the] February Twenty Eighth [Incident], Taiwan Islanders became aware of a technique to interpret statements and announcements of the government into opposite meanings. [They] came to realize that there was not a big difference in interpreting generosity to mean manslaughter, honesty [to mean] corruption, freedom [to mean] oppression, democracy [to mean] dictatorship, great publicity and selflessness [to mean] great self and no publicity, under heaven for the public [to mean] under heaven for self, and so on.⁴

¹ Lai, et al., 165.

² Letter on "Political Developments During May 1947," from US Consul at Taipei Ralph J. Blanke to US Ambassador at Nanking John Leighton Stuart, dated 30 May 1947, quoted in Paul Kesaris, ed., *Confidential United States State Department Central Files, Formosa, Internal Affairs, 1945-1949* (Frederick, Md.: University Publication of America, 1985), Reel I; *New York Times*, 17 May 1947.

³ Wakabayashi Masahiro, *Taiwan: Bunretsu kokka to minshuka* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1992), 55-58.

⁴ Yo Itsushu, *Taiwan to Sho Kaiseki: Ninihachi minpen o chushin to shite* (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobo, 1970), 188.

Antipathy against the Kuomintang shared by ordinary Taiwanese should not have been as extreme as Taiwan Independence Movement activists like Yo Itsushu. Nevertheless, Taiwanese distrust and antipathy toward the Kuomintang were much enhanced through the February Twenty Eighth Incident. The question of conflicting identities is understood through Taiwanese distrust and antipathy toward the Kuomintang, for Taiwanese have regarded the mainlanders living in Taiwan as people of the KMT side. That is, for the Taiwanese, the mainlanders and the KMT were--and are--both outsiders.

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