JOHN F. LACEY: A STUDY IN ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS

by

Sister Mary Annette Gallagher

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1970
I hereby recommend that this dissertation prepared under my direction by SISTER MARY ANNETTE GALLAGHER entitled JOHN F. LACEY: A STUDY IN ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement of the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

Dissertation Director

After inspection of the final copy of the dissertation, the following members of the Final Examination Committee concur in its approval and recommend its acceptance:

*This approval and acceptance is contingent on the candidate's adequate performance and defense of this dissertation at the final oral examination. The inclusion of this sheet bound into the library copy of the dissertation is evidence of satisfactory performance at the final examination.
STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

SIGNED: [Signature]
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Although it is impossible to list all who have contributed to the preparation of this dissertation, some persons must be singled out for their assistance. The entire staff of the Iowa Historical Library at Des Moines served me with courtesy and professional competency during my lengthy period of research. Sister Bernadine Pieper, president of the Sisters of the Humility of Mary; Sister Mary Helen Rappenecker, president of Marycrest College; and the faculty and staff of Marycrest have encouraged, supported, and financed my graduate study. The writer gratefully acknowledges the assistance given by Dr. John V. Mering, Dr. Jack D. Marietta, Dr. Harwood Hinton, and Dr. Gail Bernstein who read the manuscript and offered suggestions for improvement of style or content. To Dr. Russel E. Ewing, formerly chairman of the history department, I am indebted not only for his reading of the study but also for his understanding and encouragement throughout the doctoral program. Finally, I owe very much to Dr. Herman E. Bateman for his sound direction and unfailing encouragement over the many months of research.
and writing. Without his support and patience, I feel certain the study would not have been completed.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................ vi
ABSTRACT .................................................................. vii

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................. 1
II. LACEY OFF-STAGE ............................................. 9
III. LACEY AND THE MAZE OF IOWA POLITICS ................. 22
IV. BUILDING POLITICAL EXPERIENCE ............................ 46
V. LACEY, CITIZEN OF THE NATION ............................... 75
VI. LACEY IN THE LAST DAYS OF PEACE ......................... 112
VII. CONTEST FOR PARTY CONTROL: LACEY'S ROLE IN 1901 . 142
VIII. LACEY'S STRUGGLE WITH THE NEW ORDER: ROUND ONE . 163
IX. STANDPATTER FROM STANDPATVILLE ....................... 196
X. RENEWED CONTEST FOR PARTY CONTROL ................... 225
XI. RESPITE AND REFORM .......................................... 262
XII. CONFRONTATION AND DEFEAT ............................... 289
XIII. POLITICAL INTERLUDE ....................................... 351
XIV. DOUBLE DEFEAT ................................................ 404
XV. THE LAST ATTEMPTS .......................................... 466
XVI. CONCLUSION .................................................... 502
LIST OF REFERENCES .............................................. 509
## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Congressional Districts of Iowa: 1888-1912</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

The Progressive movement which swept the nation in the early years of the twentieth century had a definite and varying impact on state and local government. Iowa was one of the Midwest states which underwent a pronounced struggle for political reform. Traditionally Republican since the Civil War, the state in 1900 was under the leadership of the congressional delegation comprising thirteen conservative Republicans led by the astute William B. Allison, a member of the Senate's Big Four.

The political ambition of Albert B. Cummins contributed to dissension within the state's Republican party. After two rebuffs to his aspirations for the United States Senate, Cummins succeeded in winning Iowa's governorship in 1901 and in holding that office for a record seven years. By 1903, Iowa Republicans comprised two opposing groups styled Progressives and Standpatters.

One member of the Standpat faction was John Fletcher Lacey who served as Iowa's Sixth District Congressman from 1889 to 1907 except for one term. Lacey built a political base of farmers, minorities, and small business men. Since the Burlington railroad ran through his district, Lacey generally cooperated politically with Joseph W. Blythe, the
Burlington's counsel and a man of great political strength in Iowa.

Lacey buttressed his political strength with support from railroad interests and with a consistent defense of a high protective tariff. These two factors necessarily marked him as a foe of Iowa Progressivism and as antagonist of the reforming governor, A. B. Cummins, who called for railroad regulation and endorsed a downward revision of the tariff.

Upon Senator Allison's death in 1908, Lacey represented the Standpatters in their last attempt to curb Governor Cummins' ambitions to succeed to the Senate. Under the state's newly enacted primary law, Cummins won a decisive victory over Lacey and was subsequently appointed to the United States Senate by the Iowa legislature.

Lacey's defeat demonstrated the inadequacy of his political base for the twentieth century and the realignment of political power in Iowa from a conservatively oriented congressional delegation to one dominated by Progressive Republicans.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written about the Progressive era as a period of national reform. This was a period which vitally affected the political image of both major parties and prompted legislation to cure economic, social, and political ills. Little attention, however, has been given to the intra-party struggles between conservatives and progressives on state and local levels. In Iowa, particularly, the Progressive movement was marked by a division within the Republican party, a division which centered around the political ambitions of Albert B. Cummins, who served as governor from 1901 to 1908. Representative of the anti-Cummins faction in state politics was John Fletcher Lacey, United States Representative from the Sixth District from 1889 to 1907 except for one term. Lacey's career clearly revealed the nature of organization politics within Iowa's Republican party during the rise of the Progressive movement.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, great problems of social and economic distress altered the political history of the nation. Although the country remained at
peace until the close of the century, this was a period of pronounced conflict. Battles raged over the problems of trusts, cheap money, tariff, and railroad abuses, and various reform-minded organizations emerged to seek redress from such ills.¹ The Granger movement appeared first, focusing attention on the abuses which railroads inflicted on farmers. Next was the Greenback party with its demand for cheap money, and by the last decade of the century a reform movement called Populism swept the West and the South. In 1892, the Populists, under the legal title, the People’s party, fielded a national ticket with Iowan James B. Weaver as presidential candidate. Considering this ferment, the last decade of the nineteenth century was certainly not the "Gay Nineties." For multitudes of Americans, life was anything but gay; all segments of American society suffered economic distress. Depression destroyed farm prosperity, slowed the growth of industry, and marked an end to railroad expansion.²

The twentieth century witnessed the rise of still another reform movement—Progressivism, as it was called. The Progressive movement was not a continuation or further development of nineteenth century reform. As Eric Goldman

²Ibid.
has said, the Progressive movement was "not the Populist buggy rolled out for a new century."³

Progressive reform was often local in character because, according to Robert Wiebe, reformers turned to "the cities and states where problems were more tangible and amenable to analysis."⁴ Later, of course, reforms assumed a national character with integrated planning, but even then state reforms continued to be of great importance. Indeed, Henry S. Commager and Richard B. Morris have declared that while some issues were contested on the national plane, more were probably handled on the state and local level. They contend that "at no time in our history have local and state politics been more significant or contributed more to the working out of ultimate solutions to major problems."⁵


⁵Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion, p. x.
Iowa was one of several states where the effort for reform had a definite impact on the politics of the state. Almost a one-party state from the birth of the Republican party in 1854, Iowa gave that party's presidential candidate its electoral votes from 1856 through 1908. Only twice in that period did a Democrat win the gubernatorial race; this was in 1889 and 1891. Furthermore, Iowans elected no Democrat to the United States Senate between 1854 and 1912, the closing date for this study. Thus, contemporaries often assumed that in most areas in Iowa nomination on the Republican party ticket was tantamount to election.6

In Iowa Congressional Districts such as the Sixth, however, the political position of the Republican nominee was often precarious, either because of aggressive Democratic and third party minorities or factionalism within the Republican party. This factionalism, initially rooted in personalities rather than issues, developed as a result of A. B. Cummins' desire for a seat in the United States Senate, and it increased when Cummins and his followers embraced the Progressive reform movement.7


7Ibid., Introduction, p. 9. Thomas R. Ross, Jonathan Prentiss Dolliver: A Study in Political Integrity and Independence (Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1956), p. 141, documents this schism of personalities as beginning in the 1897 gubernatorial struggle between A. B. Funk and
At the turn of the century, a conservative Republican congressional delegation headed by the astute political veteran William B. Allison, dominated Iowa politics. One member of this group was John Fletcher Lacey, who for sixteen years, 1889-1907, served as a United States Congressman, winning eight of ten consecutive contests.

Although he never achieved the stature of Allison, Jonathan P. Dolliver, or Cummins, Lacey left a distinguished political record, and his influence continued even after he left public office. As Edward Younger has said in his biography of one of Lacey's Iowa contemporaries, "the concentrated work of such secondary figures accounts for much of the general competence and historical achievement of . . . this era." 8

Lacey's role in Iowa politics had a twofold importance. First, he consistently opposed Cummins, and in that opposition so fully represented the Standpat faction of his party that he was called "the perfect opponent" of A. B. Cummins. 9 In fact, in 1903, Lacey proudly proclaimed Leslie M. Shaw. This was four years before the popular terms, "Standpat" and "Progressive" were used to denote factions. For location of the Sixth District, see map, Figure 1.


Figure 1. Congressional Districts of Iowa: 1888-1912.
himself the "Standpatter from Standpatville," and again in 1908, while attempting a political come-back, he accepted the Standpat nomination in a last attempt to bar Cummins from the United States Senate.

John Lacey also was important in Iowa politics because he represented the "doubtful" Sixth District. By the 1880's Greenbackism and Populism had made inroads in the district, and Democrats, seeking alliance with these interests, increased their political strength by running as fusion candidates representing third party views. Furthermore, the Sixth District was predominantly Protestant with an ethnic background that endorsed prohibition.\(^{10}\) Combining the dissident elements in the district, James B. Weaver during the mid 1880's acquired a stronghold on the Congressional seat, converting the Sixth into one of the few areas in Iowa where Republican dominance was not assured. In 1888 Lacey rescued the district from Weaver's hold and converted it from an uncertain to a safely Republican area.

Other studies have been made of Iowa history during Lacey's time, but none of them presents a total picture of Iowa politics. Hopefully, this study of the life and career of John Fletcher Lacey will shed light on the totality of Iowa's political history. Some attention will be given to

\(^{10}\) See Chap. III of this study.
Lacey's earlier work, but the principal focus will be on his career from 1901 to 1910. His career reflected the problems and nature of organization politics in Iowa during those years, and illustrated that political techniques valid for a particular era must adjust to changing times.
CHAPTER II

LACEY OFF-STAGE

John F. Lacey entered political life endowed with personal qualities that were both assets and liabilities. From the paternal and maternal sides of his family he inherited strong political beliefs which formed a part of his life creed. Reared in near poverty, Lacey early learned the necessity of hard work and self-education, two characteristics which remained with him during his public life. But devotion to duty as he saw it and respect for the self-made man contained a weakness, and in time, Lacey developed a genial obstinacy and inflexibility which made it difficult for him to adapt his political views to the changing social and economic conditions of the twentieth century.

The Lacey family settled first in Virginia, then moved to Delaware, having received land grants there in 1703. Later, they migrated to Ohio. The family of John Lacey's mother, Eleanor Patten, also moved to Ohio early in the nineteenth century, leaving Georgia because of their opposition to slavery. Strict Quakers, the Pattens

---

1Lacey's paternal great-grandfather fought for the colonies in the Revolutionary War.
disinherited Eleanor when she married John Mills Lacey, a Methodist. John and Eleanor returned to Virginia, and, on May 30, 1841, John Fletcher Lacey was born in a one-room log cabin near New Martinsville.

Lacey soon moved his wife and growing family into a modest farm home, and in 1853 moved to Wheeling. Life was simple and happily shared with five children, three brothers and two sisters, until the younger girl's death. Religion was an integral part of the Lacey family life, and their home often offered hospitality to an itinerant Methodist minister, James J. Dolliver, whose son, Johathan P. Dolliver, later became Congressman and Senator from Iowa and was a long-time political associate of J. F. Lacey.

To escape the ever-recurring floods of the Ohio River, the Lacey family journeyed west to Iowa in 1855. Transporting...

---

2 Autobiography, pp. 1-6. Great-grandfather Spencer Lacey filed manumission papers freeing his slaves about the same time the Pattens demonstrated their opposition to slavery by leaving Georgia. See also Genealogy papers in unclassified Lacey Papers, Census and Archives Department, Historical Building, Des Moines, Iowa. Lacey's father left the Democratic party to become a Whig and still later, a Republican. John Lacey undoubtedly received his middle name, Fletcher, from his father's favorite uncle by that name.

3 Isaac, the oldest brother, was a bricklayer and farmer like his father. James was closest to John, and a special bond joined these two brothers until James's death. Will, five years John's junior, became his law partner for more than forty years. Mary, the remaining girl, moved to Missouri after her marriage. See Autobiography, pp. 8-17, 24, 69.
their meager belongings and a wagon and team by boat down the Ohio, they entered Iowa through the city of Keokuk. Because there were no railroads in the area at the time, they traveled to Oskaloosa in Mahaska County by wagon.

Oskaloosa would be the home of John F. Lacey for the remainder of his life. As a boy, he helped on the farm and learned to lay bricks, his father's trade. Despite intermittent formal schooling, Lacey's strong interest in education led him, for a time, to a teaching position and eventually to a lifetime of learning through reading and travel.4

Lacey early developed an interest in law, but the outbreak of the Civil War interrupted his study. Soon after hearing of the attack on Fort Sumter, he enlisted in Company H, Third Iowa Infantry. After a few weeks of drill practice, he left for war on his twentieth birthday in 1861. In the same unit were his brother James and William E. Shepherd, later to be his first law partner. Company H engaged in hard-fought campaigns, and in Lacey's own words, the company "was literally fought out of existence."

While James contracted tuberculosis which ended his service, John fell ill with malaria. Since he could not keep

pace with retreating comrades, his illness contributed to his capture by the Confederates at the battle of Blue Mills, Missouri. Paroled on November 7, 1861, and under oath not to take up arms against the Confederacy unless he were exchanged as a prisoner, John returned home.⁵

Immediately, Lacey resumed his reading of the law until news of a prisoner exchange interrupted his study a second time. Re-enlisting in July, 1862, this time in Company D, Thirty-third Iowa Infantry, he rose quickly to the rank of first lieutenant, then to captain, and was named regimental assistant adjutant-general. Later, he was brevetted major for his role in storming Fort Blakely, opposite Mobile, Alabama.⁶

After Richmond fell in 1865, Lacey was one of the 40,000 soldiers ordered to the Rio Grande in protest of French activities in Mexico. While he was in Texas, all officers holding presidential commissions became eligible for mustering out. Lacey, who had been ill that summer with a variant of yellow fever called "breakbone fever," asked to be discharged.⁷

⁵Autobiography, pp. 21-30. It was this parole that accounted for Lacey's being home when his brother James died, February, 1862.

⁶Ibid., pp. 55-61. Stiles, Recollections and Sketches, p. 154, called Lacey a "great soldier," noting that Lacey's treatment of his own role is too modest. Lacey was only twenty-three when named adjutant-general.

⁷Autobiography, p. 63. This was July, 1865.
Arriving home, Lacey returned to his interest in the law. Since he had read law books each evening during the last days of the war, Lacey soon took his bar examination in Fairfield. Admitted to the bar on September 16, 1865, he opened his law office in Oskaloosa two days later. The following day, after a three-year engagement, he married Martha Newell.  

Lacey was a successful lawyer. He knew, however, that his legal preparation left much to be desired, so he began and maintained a life of study. Until entering politics he claimed he worked from twelve to sixteen hours a day at his profession, while simultaneously reading in geology, astronomy, history, and literature. Moreover, Lacey considered his work with experienced trial lawyers to be excellent schooling in his profession, and later wrote that there was scarcely any kind of civil or criminal case that he had not tried. In every case it was his custom "to go to the bottom of it." If it involved an arm injury, he studied the "anatomy of the arm as carefully as any surgeon." Such

---

8Ibid., p. 63. Oskaloosa Daily Herald (Oskaloosa, Iowa), Nov. 24, 1903, reprint of the Fairfield Ledger gives Sept. 12 as the date for the bar examination. Of the four children born to the John Laceys, a son, Raymond Fletcher, and a daughter, Marion, called Dumpsie, died of diphtheria within the same month in 1880. A daughter, Eleanor, married James Brewster and gave Lacey his only grandchild, Doris Brewster Hatch, who currently resides in California. The remaining daughter, Berenice, married Carroll E. Sawyer of Oskaloosa. See Autobiography, pp. 4, 7-8, 63-69.
discipline was a pleasure for he "loved to work, to study every question that might arise in the progress of each case."  

Lacey could easily have become a railroad attorney and garnered a lucrative income. The compilation of his two volumes, entitled *Railway Digest*, made him an expert in railroad legislation. Printed respectively in 1875 and 1884, these books included cases from Great Britain, Canada, and Australia, and comprised all the English language cases involving railway law. Lacey, however, believed that general practice made the best lawyer, and endorsed it for its security as well as for its challenge and variety. He knew that after long years of service to a single railroad corporation, his employer could terminate his services overnight. Although not a specialist in veterans legislation, Lacey also became involved in pension cases for veterans and their widows. Always zealous in matters pertaining to the support of his family, Lacey, with the aid of his brother-partner, maintained his law practice during his entire

---


10 *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67. Although Lacey believed he never received adequate royalties for his books on railway law, he did recognize that they brought him railway clients who paid "very satisfactory fees."

11 *Lacey Papers*, Vol. 2, contains letters about his early pension cases. Nearly every volume of his political papers contains similar letters attesting to his work for veterans.
congressional career, a fact which aided his transition to private life in later years.

Lacey's efforts to reinstate three Annapolis cadets dismissed for hazing illustrated his tenacious character and his zeal in behalf of clients. In his endeavor to win the case, he left no stone unturned, including an intensive study of the history of hazing, letters to appropriate officials, the introduction of special legislation; and when all else failed, he requested presidential intervention from Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt failed to act, however, and Lacey lost his case.  

Another suit, detailed in the *Annals of Iowa* as "illustrative of the type of litigation" in which Lacey reveled, involved the contract labor law of 1885. In this case he defended David S. Morrison of Grinnell, Iowa, who owned a firm that manufactured women's kid gloves. Morrison was on trial for violating the law because he paid the transportation costs from Austria for two skilled leather cutters. Reasoning that the kid glove industry was not well enough known in 1900, the time of Morrison's arrest, to be

---

12 Daily Capital (Des Moines, Iowa), Dec. 19, 1904. Letters of William H. Brownson, Superintendent of United States Naval Academy, Jan. 18, 30, Feb. 5, 8, 20, 1904, to Lacey; letter of Samuel C. Lemley, Judge Advocate General of the Department of the Navy, Feb. 23, 1904, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253. The brief to President Roosevelt dealt with only one of the cadets, John H. Lofland, relative to one of Lacey's Civil War officers.
considered an "established industry" under the law, Lacey successfully argued that the case did not come within the scope of the law.\textsuperscript{13}

In 1913 Lacey's distinguished legal career was recognized when he was elected president of the Iowa Bar Association. He never enjoyed the office, however, for he died on September 29, 1913.\textsuperscript{14}

John Lacey's military and legal careers illustrated two traits of his character: devotion to duty as he saw it and thoroughness in his work. Lacey considered hard work a virtue in its own right, and at the age of nineteen characterized "contentment" in a young man as "laziness." Such a man "may have no enemies," he observed but "he seldom deserves friends." Discontentment was a blessing because the exertion used "to better natural circumstances . . . enlarges the mind, increases the desires, and, of course, ends in greater dissatisfaction, and renewed labor."\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13}Judge Smith McPherson of the United States District Court for southern Iowa ruled that though the cost of the boat tickets was advanced by Morrison, the Austrians were not brought to the United States "under contract." Annals of Iowa, XII (Oct., 1915); 179-193. Oskaloosa Daily Herald Nov. 20, 1901. Iowa State Register (Des Moines), Dec. 4, 1901.


Although in his speaking engagements to college students in Iowa Lacey emphasized the importance of continued self-education, he failed to live up to his dictum in at least one area of his own life. His speeches often contained references to literature, Scripture, and various fields of science, but they demonstrated no familiarity with the political theorists of his day such as Henry George, Henry Demarest Lloyd, or Edward Bellamy.  

Lacey was not a gifted writer. Nevertheless, his contributions made an impact on his contemporaries. He was an amateur poet and also did some writing in the area of history which merited publication in Iowa journals. While his centennial address on the Louisiana Purchase, requested for distribution among Iowa's teachers by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, contained pompous, chauvinistic oratory, it drew no such criticism in a day accustomed to such oratorical addresses. More closely related,

16 Penn Day, pamphlet, Oct. 14, 1909, Lacey Papers, Vol. 268. Drake University Commencement Address, June 15, 1899, unclassified Lacey Papers. These two addresses illustrate Lacey's habit of borrowing heavily from earlier prepared talks as well as his failure to practice the advice of continued self-study which his addresses held out to students. Although ten years apart in delivery, they contain almost identical expressions of ideas. See Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume for excerpts of many of Lacey's speeches.

17 For Lacey's article on General Samuel A. Rice, see Annals of Iowa, II (Apr., 1895), 32-44. For his article on General Frederick Steele, see Annals of Iowa, III (Apr.-July, 1898), 424-438. See also letter of R. C. Barrett,
however, to his profession were his Third Iowa Digest, a volume on Iowa law published in 1870, and his two Railway Digests. 18

Travel was still another means Lacey used to continue his education, as well as to gain recreation. 19 Visiting every state in the Union, the territories of Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona, and Alaska as well as Puerto Rico, he also toured Europe twice. Moreover, he made extensive journeys through Cuba and Mexico. 20

In his private life, Lacey revealed certain traits which demonstrated his ability to act independently of those around him. Although born of Methodist parents, Lacey as an adult joined the Episcopal church. 21 Presumably, he became

Apr. 13, 1903, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253. For a copy of his best known poem "Alaska," see reprint in Register and Leader (Des Moines, Iowa), Mar. 22, 1908, see Lacey Papers, Vol. 267, 268, for other examples of his creative writing.

18 For a list of other Lacey publications, see Annals of Iowa, XII (July, 1915), 134.

19 As Lacey prospered, he traveled four weeks annually.

20 This writer is indebted to Doris Brewster Hatch for the European travel letter-books obtained Jan. 22, 1969. They are now on file in the State Historical Library, Des Moines, Iowa. The writer is also indebted for access to Lacey's New Mexico travelogue to Mrs. Roy E. Ott in an interview Dec. 16, 1968. See also address of James A. Devitt before the Iowa State Bar Association, June 25, 1914, in Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, p. 9.

an Episcopalian by conviction or taste, because, living in an area of Iowa where Methodism prevailed, the political advantage lay in remaining a Methodist. Lacey's social life centered around family dinner parties at which he enjoyed good wine, although he did not publicize his taste in politically dry Iowa. He dressed impeccably in the fashion of the day, usually attired in a "tightly buttoned Prince Albert coat of dark material." A mustache and goatee, always carefully trimmed, further enhanced his formal appearance.

Lacey entered politics with many assets that sustained him in his long public career, but some of them eventually became political liabilities. As a man of humble origin who had risen in society, Lacey displayed a certain rigidity and formality. He believed that knowledge of the past and its social forms was something to be acquired and preserved and that new ideas should be viewed with a certain disdain or distrust.

---

22 Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. II, pp. 3-4.

23 Semira Phillips, Mahaska County: A Story of the Early Years 1843-1900 (Oskaloosa: Herald Print, 1900), pp. 287-290. Autobiography, p. 121. Interviews with Mrs. Roy E. Ott, Dec. 16, 17, 1968. When family disputes arose, Lacey was expected to assume the role of mediator. See letters of Isaac Lacey, Mar. 8, 1868, and of Will Lacey, May 20, 1868, as well as other family letters to John Lacey in Lacey Papers, Vol. 268.

24 Stiles, Recollections and Sketches, p. 160.
While Lacey was an intelligent man, neither his speeches nor his letters, which often displayed dry humor, indicated he was gifted with extraordinary intellect. Furthermore, his lack of a formal academic training was a handicap. Lacey viewed education as a lifelong process, but he was never able to demonstrate an imaginative approach to the political events of his time or to relate them into a meaningful trend necessary to give direction to his own actions. Consequently, John Lacey never seemed to grasp the real strength of the Progressive surge in Iowa.

Closely related to his inability to view the present in the perspective of the future was Lacey's certitude of being right. He was aware of the handicaps of the past, and found it difficult to risk the certainty of proved experience for the uncertainty of change. Once espousing an idea, he rooted it in conviction and maintained it as long as possible, apparently considering compromise tantamount to disloyalty or violation of principle.

While Lacey at one time knew the needs of his rural constituents and pleased many contemporaries with his views, the voters of Iowa eventually outgrew him, a fact illustrated in his tenacious endorsement of protectionism long after Iowans favored revisionism. A single-minded perseverance, rigidity, and relative lack of sophistication in his
political technique ultimately left Lacey out of step with twentieth century economic and political progress.\textsuperscript{25}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{25}These examples of strength converted to political liabilities will be illustrated throughout Chaps. 6-15 of this study.
CHAPTER III

LACEY AND THE MAZE OF IOWA POLITICS

The late nineteenth century was a time of significant change for the people of Iowa. New ideas about cheap money, tariff revision, and railroad dominance arose. In Iowa politics there was a growing importance of prohibition and increasing attention paid to such minority or special interest groups as veterans, immigrants, and Negroes. Reaction in Iowa to these changes was apparent in the stands by both Democratic and Republican parties. The tariff and railroad issues, particularly, became major political questions within the Republican party. This was the maze of politics John Lacey faced when he decided to run for public office.

With the rise of industrialism, Iowa farmers gradually found earning a livelihood more complex. They became businessmen with long term investments in land and machinery, and were caught in the intricacies of international trade. In the foreign market, Iowa producers competed with the farmers of the world; in the domestic market, they were forced to pay high prices for goods protected from competition by the tariff. In addition, they faced a monetary squeeze caused by a contraction of currency and its
concentration in Eastern houses of finance. As a result, Iowans joined other Westerners in demanding some form of cheap money. Railroads were a third irritant to Iowa farmers. They were dependent on these corporations for marketing, and increasingly found themselves at their mercy in the rates charged. Although Iowa businessmen did not necessarily share the farmers' views on tariff and prices, they did join in opposing railroad abuses.¹

Thus, three issues—tariff, money, and railroads—became important factors in Iowa politics. Russell B. Nye aptly summarized that "the triple alliance of railroads, banks and tariff-protected industries" dominated the economy of the Midwest.² These factors, however, did not always have equal significance nor the same duration. The transportation issue yielded to the crisis of money in 1896, then was revived later. The tariff, either as a legitimate economic issue or as a highly effective political one, was never allowed to die. It incurred debate in every national election in Iowa during Lacey's career.


The money problem was pushed as an issue in Iowa by third parties during the last half of the nineteenth century. The Greenback party was one of the earliest. Although losing national stature in the 1880's, the Greenbackers remained active in various localities. One such area was the Sixth Congressional District of Iowa. This was due in part to its peculiar composition and in some measure to the oratorical skill of its Congressman, J. B. Weaver, who had successively abandoned membership in the Republican and Democratic parties in order to espouse Greenbackism and cheap money. In 1888 when John F. Lacey entered his first national political contest, he leaned on Greenback support to win.3

The money question then shifted from redemption of paper notes to the problem of silver, with the People's party espousing the coinage of silver as a reform issue. Like the Greenbackers, this party also maintained a degree of vigor in Iowa's Sixth District after its decline in many other sections of the West.4

---


4 See Chapter IV of this study for a treatment of Sixth District races in Iowa in 1890 and 1896. See also Herman C. Nixon, "The Populist Movement in Iowa," Iowa Journal of History and Politics, XXIV (Jan., 1926), 3-108. This article
The third party influences were accentuated by fusion candidate activity. In Iowa this fusion traditionally meant collaboration with the Democratic party. After the census of 1880, the Republicans, hoping to gerrymander the problem out of existence, re-drew congressional districts. They attempted to form eleven districts patterned to reduce the strength of the Democratic and Greenback opposition, particularly in eastern and southern Iowa. The Sixth District emerged with a ragged outline which encompassed seven counties. The district lost Marion and Appanoose Counties, but Poweshiek was added to the remaining ones of Davis, Jasper, Keokuk, Mahaska, Monroe, and Wapello.

Subsequent election results, however, indicated that the gerrymander of 1880 did not solve the problem. The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Congressional Districts were captured by the Democrats in 1884, and the next year, fusionist candidates for local and state offices again carried the Sixth and five other districts. With the danger continuing, the Republican-dominated legislature arbitrarily re-districted again in 1886, attempting to insure a Republican majority in eight of the eleven congressional

also contains material on the significance of prohibition and J. W. Blythe in Iowa politics. The People's party was popularly known as the Populist party.

5See the map, Figure 1.
districts. The second gerrymander, however, did not change matters in the Sixth District. It was against this background of political uncertainty that Lacey's ensuing contests in the Sixth District would be waged. Despite generous aid from other sources, Lacey deserved much credit for keeping the district "safe" for the Republican party in all but two of his ten races.6

A second political issue in Iowa concerned railroad abuses. After the successful bridging of the Mississippi River in the mid-1850's, railway expansion in Iowa was rapid. By 1880 Iowa ranked fifth in the Union in rail mileage, with ninety-six of its ninety-nine counties having rail service. Ten years later it was the fourth state in railway mileage, although tenth in population.7 Out of a maze of tracks, four major systems emerged to dominate the economic history of the state: the Burlington, the Northwestern, the Rock Island, and the Milwaukee.8


7Harlan, History of Iowa, II, 112. Iowa State Register, Nov. 27, 1900. Iowa followed the national pattern of decline in rail construction after 1900. Statistics from Railway Age reprinted in Des Moines Daily Capital, Jan. 2, 1905, show Iowa's construction in 1904 to be but 34.97 miles of track.

8Harlan, History of Iowa, I, 282-288.
Of these four railroads, the Burlington line was the most significant in Lacey's career. The Burlington began as the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad, but was usually referred to as the "Q"; by 1904 it had double tracks of standard gauge across southern Iowa. In the Sixth District, the Burlington became the dominant economic and political influence.9

George Mowry has said that "the dominant voice" in Iowa politics during the 1890's belonged to the railroads which fanned out from Chicago.10 In Iowa, railroad influence fanned out from Cedar Rapids and Burlington, and the voices were those of Judge Nathaniel Mead Hubbard until his death in 1902, and Joseph W. Blythe who died seven years later. Hubbard was the attorney of the Northwestern, and Blythe was the General Counsel for the Burlington. Together their railroads touched two-thirds of Iowa's counties.11 Cyrenus Cole, a prominent Iowa newspaper editor and the author of several colorful books on Iowa history, wrote that "it was often said that it made no difference who was governor de jure, since Judge Hubbard was

---


10 Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 73.

always governor *de facto*.* Blythe was ranked second in political repute, Cole said, adding that *"the firm name of Hubbard and Blythe"* was often applied to them.\textsuperscript{12}

Joseph W. Blythe's father and grandfather were Presbyterian ministers, who enjoyed tracing their ministerial ancestry back to the distinguished Jonathan Edwards. Joseph Blythe, however, preferred law to the ministry as an avenue to influence and power. His education reportedly was better than that of most Iowa college presidents in his day. Blythe began work for the Burlington in 1876 and was named General Counsel in 1901.\textsuperscript{13}

Had he wished, Blythe easily could have won public office. He declined a seat in the United States Senate proffered him by Governor Leslie M. Shaw in 1900, and in 1904, Blythe described himself as *"too busy"* to accept the Republican National Committee Chairmanship.\textsuperscript{14} Although Blythe held no public office, he *"probably exercised more political control than any other man in the state,"* according

\textsuperscript{12}Cyrenus Cole, *I Remember, I Remember* (Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1936), pp. 178-180. Although Cole stated that Hubbard outranked Blythe, it was evident that he considered Blythe the greater of the two men.


\textsuperscript{14}Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 6, 1906, reprinted sketches of Shaw's speech at Indianola, Iowa, in the 1906 campaign in which Shaw made reference to his offer to Blythe in 1900. Daily Capital, Feb. 28, 1904.
to E. H. Stiles, an Iowa historian. Stiles quoted Blythe's friends who, without the concurrence of others, attributed Blythe's political preeminence to his "truthfulness, common sense and wide knowledge of human nature." Other friendly sources saw Blythe's political strength as rooted in his "genial, intellectual, humble, and mild" character. Not all critics thought so highly of Blythe. The Des Moines Daily Capital urged "this Diaz of the Reservation to be merciful and generous." This paper claimed that Blythe had more strength than that wielded by James S. Clarkson, the distinguished editor of the Iowa State Register, and that Blythe's railroad ties made him suspect of subservience to corporate interests.

15 Stiles, Recollections and Sketches, p. 313.


17 The "Reservation" was the name applied to southern Iowa where the "Q" dominated economically and politically.

18 Daily Capital, July 30, 1900. Under the editorship of Lafayette Young, this paper was generally considered the organ for the anti-Cummins faction of the Republican party after 1901. An early admirer of Cummins, Young became a severe critic. With the death of Senator W. B. Allison in 1908, the Capital moved back to a pro-Cummins position. The other leading Des Moines daily paper of the time was the Iowa State Register. A consistent supporter of the Republican party, its owners were dubbed the "Regency" under its distinguished editor, James S. (Ret.) Clarkson. It was sold by the Clarkson brothers in 1902 to George Roberts, the owner of the Messenger (Fort Dodge, Iowa), who merged it with the Des Moines Leader. Roberts, in turn, sold the Register and Leader to Gardner Cowles and Harvey Ingham. Usually pro-Cummins, the
Blythe and Hubbard exercised political power through the normal channels of Republican party organization. In Iowa this organization included a state central committee and the ninety-nine county committees. At an intermediate level, the counties were grouped into judicial and congressional districts with their respective committees. Each county organization was further subdivided into townships, wards, and precincts. Nominations were made by the caucus-convention system at county, district, and state level. Thus, whoever controlled the caucuses at the precinct level was in a favorable position to control the county, district, and state conventions. For this reason Blythe, Hubbard, and most professional politicians preferred the convention method over the direct primary. With the selection of astute precinct committee men, they could extend their control to the selection of United States Senators and delegates to national conventions.\textsuperscript{19}

Although they were efficient and sometimes ruthless manipulators of the political process in Iowa, the railroad attorneys received no direct pecuniary advantage from their political activities. Those who opposed Blythe and Hubbard

in state politics agreed these men were respected businessmen, good family men, and admirable citizens of their communities. Such a portrayal as honest men by their opponents enhanced their influence in Iowa.20

The third major factor in Iowa politics during Lacey's day was the tariff. It was an enduring issue that distinguished Democrats from Republicans. Republicans endorsed a protective tariff as best for the American economy; the Democrats espoused a lower tariff for revenue and were dubbed "free traders" by their opponents. In 1901, however, the tariff became an issue within the Iowa Republican party following A. B. Cummins' election as governor. Cummins championed tariff reform, and linked high tariff not only to the "interests" which controlled Republican politics in the state but also the growth of monopolies in American economic life. Some Republican leaders modified their tariff stand to meet Cummins' view. George E. Roberts devised the "Iowa Idea," which endorsed a reduction when the tariff was serving as a shelter to monopoly. A similar view was held by fellow Iowan John A. Kasson, a diplomat who negotiated several reciprocal trade treaties in the McKinley administration. He, too, became convinced that tariff revision must be downward.21


21As a matter of fact, it is reasonably clear that Cummins took his tariff views from Roberts' "Iowa
Lacey, like many other Republicans, remained wedded to high protection, although the tariff sentiment among Iowa farmers was not always in accord with his views. Lacey believed that protection and prosperity were inseparable. The correctness of this principle was evident in history which showed that panics followed tariff reductions. He received campaign support from three groups with highly protectionist views: the Home Market Club of Boston; the American Protective Tariff League; and the American Iron and Steel Association.  

During his congressional career, Lacey did not alter basically his tariff position, nor did he change his rationale for that position. Failing to keep pace with the advancing economic thought, he relied on old explanations and reasoning. Clay's American System accurately summarized Lacey's tariff views, and remained valid in the twentieth century. His thoughts on the tariff never changed.  

---


22Wiebe, Business Men and Reform, pp. 55-61.

The tariff was an issue Lacey repeatedly used in political contests in the Sixth District. As his district lay entirely within the railroad "Reservation," Lacey after 1894 increasingly allied himself with the railroad interests which Cummins claimed controlled Republican politics in the state. His tariff stand was both a conviction and a convenience. In defending protection Lacey took a position contrasting to that of Cummins, and preserved himself from the political alienation and oblivion which would have followed any attempt to leave the "Reservation."

Although the triumvirate of money, railroads, and tariff were the major issues in Iowa politics, there also were lesser influences. For example, the votes of minorities—Negroes and immigrants—were important. During the last half of the nineteenth century, conditions in Europe caused a great influx of foreign-born persons into America. In the 1890's, the "new immigration" of southern and eastern Europe surpassed the "old immigration" from northwest Europe, and by 1900, foreign-born persons and their American-born children comprised 34 per cent of the national census. In Iowa that same year the foreign-born population was 13.7 per cent.24

Iowa proved attractive to the "older" immigrants, particularly the Irish, Scandinavians, and Germans. The

---

Irish tended to settle in the cities of the east-west border counties, while the other two groups settled in northern Iowa, with pockets of Germans in both western and eastern counties.\(^{25}\)

Iowa politicians catered to the votes of the immigrants and first-generation Americans by distributing campaign literature in native languages and seeking speakers of the same nationality to address local groups. An Iowa citizen from the Dutch settlement of Pella asked Lacey in 1900 to have "a Hollander come here from Michigan" to explain the Boer war to the citizens of that town. Politicians interpreted the conferring of an honorary degree upon J. W. Blythe by a Swedish college in Kansas as having considerable effect on Scandinavian voting patterns in Iowa in 1901. Furthermore, the Scandinavian vote of northern Iowa was a factor considered in the selection of the candidate to oppose Cummins in the special Senate primary in 1908.\(^{26}\)

\(^{25}\) For a brief but clear account of the areas of foreign settlement in Iowa, see Margaret L. Posten, *This is the Place--Iowa* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1965), pp. 260-270. See also Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics, pp. 9-12. For German strength in Scott County, see Adolph Petersen, "The German Impress," in History of Davenport and Scott County, Iowa, ed. by Harry E. Downer (Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1910), I, 813-839. For German influence in western Iowa, see John J. Louis, "Shelby County, A Sociological Study," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, II (Apr., 1904), 218-230.

In Iowa politics, the Negro vote was less significant than the votes of immigrants and their American-born descendants. In 1900 only .6 per cent of Iowans were black. Lacey's district, however, did not conform to the state average because coal mining was an important industry there, attracting nearly one-fourth of the Negroes of the state.27 In 1900, Lacey's district claimed a total black population of 3,416 which was concentrated at the two mining centers of Muchakinock and Buxton.28

In addition to seeking votes from the black miners of Iowa, Lacey sought the support of the national figure, Booker T. Washington. As a Congressman, Lacey pledged time to push a bill concerning the sale of Tuskegee Institute's public land, and won the Negro educator's good will.29

The veterans of the Civil War constituted another potent factor in Iowa politics. They adhered predominantly


to Republican party principles, and their influence was powerful. Banded into the Grand Army of the Republic, they numbered at the height of their influence in 1890 about 20,000 men. With annual deaths of five hundred members, the Grand Army of Iowa numbered just over 10,000 in 1906, when Lacey made his last race for the House.30

In common with other Congressmen, Lacey devoted much time and energy to the desires of this special interest group. He introduced numerous bills to secure or enlarge pensions for individuals. During Grover Cleveland's second term, he opposed with great energy the Democratic administration's drastic cut in pension rolls, humorously asserting that the reduction in pensions by Secretary of the Interior Hoke Smith, a Georgian, more nearly resembled "Georgia marching through the boys in blue," than the boys in blue marching through Georgia.31


Lacey also appeared before veterans groups to maintain favor with the GAR. He received special recognition in 1894, when he was chosen as the principal speaker for the ceremony transferring Iowa's regimental battle flags of the Civil War to the state capitol for permanent display. Later, in 1903, he was selected to address a state-wide assembly of veterans in Des Moines. A lifelong association with veterans and sixteen years of congressional activity in their behalf led Lacey to rely heavily on the soldier vote.

Iowa was no exception to the rule that patronage is a perennial factor in politics. One facet of the patronage problem was the contest waged by the state's political leaders over appointments to the lucrative positions of state binder and printer. The recipients of these offices were without political power, but their appointments reflected the strength and numbers of their political benefactors, in that day always referred to as "friends." While


33 Saturday Globe (Oskaloosa, Iowa), Oct. 19, 1901; Daily Capital, Aug. 25, 1903. Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, pp. 232-245, 270. Lacey maintained his contacts with veterans after his retirement from political life. In 1912 he was the principal speaker commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the battle of Shiloh. The surviving members of Crocker's Iowa Brigade were in his audience. See Iowa Journal of History and Politics, X (Apr., 1912), 304.

34 See Chapter XIV of this study.
A. B. Cummins was governor, contests among rival candidates for these offices developed into power struggles between the two major factions of Iowa's Republicans. 35

Post office patronage engaged much of Lacey's time and was more directly related to his political fortunes than the binder-printer contests. A postmaster was expected to be active in local politics, and his appointment had an influence in determining the relative strength of the Republican factions of the area. One postmaster wrote to Lacey about his willingness to step out of office "provided friends of ours get the balance of my term." 36

The post office patronage often was intimately related to holding the support of small newspapers. A loyal editor usually expected a postmastership; in return he was to use the combination of offices to support his benefactor. In election years, the candidate or party headquarters mailed campaign material on a weekly basis. It was understood that

35 For the 1906 struggle over the application of the biennial election law to the offices of binder and printer, see Daily Capital, Jan. 18, 1906; Register and Leader, Jan. 17, 1906. As early as 1869 Lacey was asked to support two contestants for the state printer job. See letter of Frank M. Mills of Iowa State Register, Nov. 1, 1869, to Lacey and letter of Charles Beardsley of Burlington Hawk-eye, Dec. 14, 1869, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 246.

the recipient editor was to print it as "news"; therefore, it amounted to free political advertising. Another service expected of the editor-postmaster was the mailing, free of charge, of political literature to all names on his post office patron list and to all his newspaper subscribers. In some areas, railroads also expected free political advertisements and editorial support for candidates representing their interests.

Several postmaster-editor appointments generated ill-will for Lacey. For example, in his home city of Oskaloosa, C. V. Hoffman, editor of the Oskaloosa Herald, enjoyed Lacey's post office patronage for over a decade. This obvious favoritism was used against Lacey in the Senate primary of 1908, when Robert Kissick, a disappointed seeker of the Oskaloosa postmastership, circulated a vitriolic tract charging that Lacey stayed in office by subsidizing at least two papers in Mahaska County.37

37Letter of Robert Kissick, Oct. 30, 1908, to all veterans in Iowa, Lacey Papers, Vol. 259. Prior to Hoffman's editorship was that of Colonel Albert W. Swalm who controlled the Oskaloosa Daily Herald from 1881 to 1896. Under Swalm, who also served as postmaster, the Herald virtually was a "personal organ" of Lacey's. It faithfully reported every political activity and speech, and ran "fillers" in slack political times, printed Lacey's trial balloons as anonymous ideas much as news leaks are used today. See Oskaloosa Daily Herald, July 11, 1900, and Annals of Iowa, XIII (Jan., 1923), 545-546. Another example may be found in the Grinnell post office appointment in 1906. See letter of W. G. Ray, Jan. 12, 1906, to Lacey; letter of C. L. Roberts, Aug. 20, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 256.
Prohibition was another issue that greatly influenced Iowa politics. Throughout the state, the prohibition question stirred religious and ethnic sensitivities as well as political division. A study of voting patterns in Iowa by Kirk Boyd showed that increasing attention was paid to this issue after 1885. In that year a lieutenant governor campaigned and won on the slogan: "A school house on every hill and no saloon in the valley." In 1886, when the Iowa legislature enacted the Clark prohibitory law, Iowans immediately set out to evade it. Drugstores sold liquor as medicine, and "wets" picked up liquor by paying freight charges on cases shipped to fictitious persons. Attempts to enforce the law met with passive resistance or violence. As Boyd aptly phrased it, "the drys had their law and the wets had their liquor."38

The question of prohibition reflected cultural diversity in Iowa. One group of citizens embodying Puritan Sabbatarianism proscribed drinking; another group advocated greater freedom in social activities and viewed Sunday as a day of relaxation. The first group generally included native Americans of English and Scottish ancestry together

with Scandinavian immigrants, while the second group comprised Irish and Germans who held a more liberal attitude toward liquor. As a rule, the immigrants, who often were unskilled laborers, regarded the saloon as a "Poor Man's Club" which offered everything from free newspapers and lunch to job placement and a sense of belonging.

Religion also became involved in the prohibition issue. Generally, the Methodist, Presbyterian, and evangelical Protestant churches were "drys," while the Lutherans, Episcopalians, and Roman Catholics were usually "wets."39 The eastern and western border counties, where Catholic Germans and Irish were congregated in cities, were always "wet," and the interior counties, rural, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant, were "dry."40

By 1889, prohibition in Iowa had become identified with the Republican party. Some Republicans, having regarded it as a millstone about their necks. Dry Republicans tended to vote the Prohibition party ticket when they felt

39 James H. Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement 1900-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 2-40, 82-100. Iowa State Register, Dec. 18, 19, 29, 1900, Jan. 10, 1901. Iowa State Register, Jan. 10, 1901, reported on the flurry among Protestant ministers of Des Moines over a bill in Congress which barred army canteens from selling liquor. Construing the opposition of some Catholics to the bill as a "Catholic attack" upon it, the ministers deluged Iowa Congressmen with telegrams in support of the bill.

their interests were not being served by Republican candidates. Since the Democratic party had no strong bloc of dry voters to bolt, the desertion of dry Republicans was always to its advantage. This situation contributed to the Democratic capture of the governorship in 1889 and 1891; Governor Horace Boies's second victory carried with it the entire state ticket and a majority in the state senate. This Democratic victory convinced many Republicans that a change in their party stand on the liquor question was necessary.

The Iowa Republican party platform in 1893 straddled the issue after the temporary State Convention chairman made an impassioned plea that "prohibition not be made the test of Republicanism." With this modification, the "drys" returned to their party, and the Republicans swept the state elections that year. The next move was enactment of the mulct (fine or penalty) law in 1894, which resulted in the anomalous situation which permitted saloons to operate after they paid a state mulct fee. As such, it was one form of local option. To those who opposed the law, it amounted to a pardon for breaking the law with the fine paid in advance.

---

41 There was no relationship between the position of the political party and the individual candidate's views on the liquor problem. Some Republicans voted dry and drank wet; some Democrats voted wet and were personal abstainers.

Others considered the mulct law unfair and prejudiced in favor of out-of-state breweries because it legalized the sale of liquor in Iowa but made it impossible for Iowa brewers to manufacture alcoholic beverages. In spite of its apparent contradictions, prohibition as modified by the provisions of the mulct law remained the traditional party stand of the Republicans during Lacey's career in Congress.

Another aspect of the liquor question concerned "original package saloons." They arose following an 1890 ruling of the United States Supreme Court which stated that liquor could be shipped into dry states and sold in the "original package," unless Congress specifically authorized state laws prohibiting such action. Iowa passed a law in 1886 forbidding such traffic, but it was overturned by the Court's decision in 1890 as interference with the federal control of interstate commerce. There was immediate response to counteract the high Court's ruling. Iowa Senator James P. Wilson introduced a bill by which Congress conceded the right of each state to deal with imported liquor in the same manner as with that manufactured within the state. Although the Wilson bill passed both houses of Congress...
Congress with little opposition and received the President's signature, liquor continued to enter Iowa illegally.44

Regarding the prohibition issue, Lacey's stand demonstrated the dichotomy of personal and public views which many politicians held. At eighteen he confided to his diary that "sobriety is the vinegar . . . of life." Until his year of teaching ended, however, he regretted that he "must be an old man, sober, poking, and dull."45 In 1893, as a seasoned politician, Lacey observed that "all parties struggle for the floating vote," but he condemned the Democratic party platform as one "set up" by "bar handles."46 When Lacey was asked publicly to spell out his personal stand on the liquor question and related legislation, he practiced the politician's art of evasion. He neither condemned nor condoned the use of alcohol, and he never commented on his personal habits. Politically, he took the sure road of standing by party policy on this sensitive and complex issue.

The economic and social changes in Iowa in the late nineteenth century produced significant effects in state politics that endured into the twentieth century. Politicians

---


45 Diary, p. 24, Lacey Papers, Vol. 271.

46 Manuscript notes, 1893, unclassified Lacey Papers.
rode to victory or defeat because of their stands on cheap money, tariff, and the railroads. Special attention was given to courting the minority votes of Negroes and immigrants and the special interest blocs of veterans and prohibitionists. In the nineteenth century, these issues served to point up the differences in the two major parties, but in the twentieth century, the problems of tariff and railroads proved of far greater significance within the Republican party. It was in this political maze that John Lacey moved in his first bid for national office.
CHAPTER IV

BUILDING POLITICAL EXPERIENCE

As a young lawyer with a growing family, Lacey at first rejected the uncertainties of national politics and concentrated on the social and economic security to be gained as an attorney. This decision came after one term in the Iowa legislature and limited service in municipal government. However, political events in the Sixth District soon altered Lacey's judgment, and he entered his first contest for national office in 1888. Winning a seat in the House of Representatives and subsequent re-election, Lacey by 1900 had established himself in Iowa politics as a determined Republican party leader. He also had learned the advantages, if not the necessity, of cooperation with J. W. Blythe, the railroad spokesman of the anti-Cummins wing of the Republican party. During these years, Lacey learned to practice politics successfully, but when factionalism, stemming from the ambition of A. B. Cummins, rent the Republican party in the early 1900's, he found his influence and support crippled and he suffered defeat at the polls.

At the behest of some fellow veterans, Lacey entered politics for the first time in 1869 when he sought
the Republican nomination for a seat in the lower house of the Iowa legislature. Elected that fall by a large majority, he served only one term. He resolved then not to enter another race for "personal political preferment" because, as he wrote, "I did not care to have my personal business broken into by the uncertainties and labor of a personal political contest."¹

Lacey's first and brief involvement in Iowa politics later proved advantageous. It provided him with the opportunity in 1870 to support William B. Allison at the outset of Allison's interest in the United States Senate. Allison would be the dean of Iowa politicians during Lacey's entire congressional career. At this time, Allison represented the Third District and aspired to become the state's junior senator. Lacey was a member of the Iowa Assembly that year, and cast his vote in Allison's behalf. This began a political association that lasted all through Allison's life.

Allison lost the senatorial race, but won in 1872—and every election thereafter until his death in 1908. Allison became one of the Senate's "Big Four," and Leland Sage, his biographer, asserted that he controlled "not one seat but two" from Iowa during his entire Senate career. When Iowa's senior Senator, Samuel J. Kirkwood, vacated his

seat in 1882, it went to Allison's friend, James F. Wilson, for two terms and then to John H. Gear, father-in-law of J. W. Blythe. With Gear's death in 1900, J. P. Dolliver was named junior Senator over A. B. Cummins. The defeated Cummins then sought the governorship of Iowa as a route to political power, and in doing so set the stage for the Republican factional struggle in Iowa. Since one aspect of Republican factionalism was Cummins' attempt as governor to wrest leadership of state politics from the Congressional delegation, Lacey's long-standing friendship with the astute and powerful Allison served the Sixth District Congressman well in his own role in the anti-Cummins faction of the party.²

After completing his term in the State legislature, Lacey announced that he planned to leave politics, and later claimed he had rejected "many suggestions of nomination . . . especially for Congress." However, Lacey did serve one term as city alderman and one as city solicitor in his home town of Oskaloosa. In 1872, he was a candidate for circuit judge nomination, although he later recorded that he "did not actively seek the position and fortunately was not nominated."³ Actually, he withdrew when guarded replies


³Autobiography, pp. 67-70.
to his requests for support convinced him of the strength of his opposition. For the next fifteen years Lacey devoted his time to his law practice.

In time, events in the Sixth District drew him again into politics. The dominant political figure in the district was James B. Weaver, who had been defeated in 1876 in his first bid to represent the Sixth District. Two years later he was swept into office by Democratic-Greenback fusion votes. In 1880, the Greenback party tendered him the nomination for the Presidency, and he accepted it. Weaver lost a bid for Congress in 1882 to Republican M. E. Cutts, but won in 1884 as a fusion candidate, defeating Frank T. Campbell, former Republican lieutenant governor of Iowa. Two years later, as a fusionist once more, Weaver won over Republican John A. Donnell, United States District Attorney for southern Iowa.

By 1888 Iowa Republicans were alarmed about the Sixth District. Their only victory in twelve years had been in 1882, a year when there was no fusion. The search began for a party candidate to challenge Weaver's supremacy. Since two counties in the district, Jasper and Wapello, had furnished unsuccessful candidates against Weaver, Republicans

---

4Letter of G. G. Bennett, Apr. 10, 1872, to Lacey; letter of G. K. Hart, June 15, 1872, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 246. This volume contains other pertinent letters from all over the Sixth District.
sought someone from another county to avoid the tarnish of defeat. Lacey's residence in Mahaska County and his willingness to run promptly singled him out as a likely candidate. The Oskaloosa Herald declared that in 1888 Lacey "was nominated almost without his knowledge."^5

The Herald oversimplified his entrance into national politics. As early as January, 1888, the Ottumwa postmaster discouraged Lacey from congressional candidacy, saying that Weaver's strength and the "awful burden of the tariff" would bring defeat. In April, James S. Clarkson, distinguished editor of the Iowa State Register, tempted Lacey to run, promising Democratic support through the former owner of the Oskaloosa Times, R. R. Harbour. By May, Mahaska County Republicans were openly supporting Lacey for the nomination. The mining center of Muchakinock hosted a Republican meeting in July which instructed four delegates to the district convention, two of whom were Negroes, to vote for Lacey. At Given, another mining area, the four black delegates chosen were in a position under unit rule voting procedures to swing the three white votes away from Lacey. He was urged

---

^5Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Mar. 19, 1900. Clipping from Democrat (Ottumwa, Iowa), n.d., 1888, in Lacey Scrapbook, Lacey Papers, Vol. 270. Autobiography, pp. 71-75. Frank Campbell and E. H. Stiles, a candidate in a special election following the death of Cutts in 1883, were the unsuccessful candidates from Jasper and Wapello Counties, respectively.
to "work hard" to convert at least one of the Negroes to his candidacy.6

When the district convention met in Ottumwa in August, Lacey received three times as many votes on a trial ballot as his combined opposition. J. C. Blanchard from Mahaska County, John Moore from Poweshiek, and R. E. Tilton from Wapello County received token support, but Lacey was clearly the choice. Consequently, on the first formal ballot the delegates unanimously nominated him. Lacey's career in national politics was launched.7

The ensuing campaign against Weaver—Lacey called him "the old stager"—was vigorous and devoted to the basic issues in Iowa politics. Lacey's position on the money question was no doubt calculated to win support of the strong Greenback element; he expressed disapproval of the withdrawal of Greenbacks from circulation.8 As for the trusts,


Lacey would "throttle them, compel them to submit to requirements of common people," and not allow them to "dictate terms and values to the bones and sinew of our country the producer." This was a sound position to assume to win the rural vote. Lacey was wary of the prohibition issue. Discussion of a constitutional amendment to forbid the transportation and sale of liquor was widespread because "original package" saloons were flourishing in Iowa at the time. He avoided impaling himself on the horns of this dilemma by pointing up the inconsistency of his opponent's position. He said that Weaver, an ardent prohibitionist, charged that the Republican party was the "party of free whiskey," but in Congress he had voted for the Mills bill, which repealed taxes on stills and retail liquor dealers.10

Another campaign issue concerned railroad influence. In 1888 Lacey had no connection with the "railroad machine." With railroads claiming that their interests were best served by the Democratic party, the Republicans

9 *Journal* (Newton, Iowa), Sept. 12, 1888.

faced a problem. The State Chairman informed Senator Allison that Judge Hubbard, the Northwestern attorney, strongly opposed Republican candidates for the state Railroad Commission, and warned that he would "turn over the entire railroad vote" to the Democrats in Iowa if such election occurred. Lacey experienced firsthand the results of Hubbard's threat. A former Lacey supporter from Jasper County, Frank Campbell, who was also a Railroad Commissioner seeking re-election on the Republican ticket, reportedly promised support to Weaver rather than face his own defeat by antagonizing the railroads.

Lacey recognized the significance of minority bloc votes, and attempted to win the Negro vote away from Weaver. A Negro friend agreed to stump the district "for free" even though he had been offered money to campaign for the Democrats. Lacey also requested Iowa's junior Senator, James F. Wilson, to mail copies of his speeches concerning Negroes to black voters in the Sixth District. Wilson arranged for this distribution and offered to speak in the coal mining areas where the Negro population was concentrated. The owner of the Oskaloosa Herald and a long-standing personal

---


and political friend of Lacey's, Colonel Albert W. Swalm, was of considerable aid in winning GAR votes for Lacey, making special efforts to swing Lacey's Civil War outfit, the Thirty-third Iowa Infantry, behind him.\(^\text{13}\)

The tariff overshadowed all other issues in the Lacey-Weaver contest. This was partly due to the importance of the tariff in the Presidential campaign that year.\(^\text{14}\) Lacey read everything in the *Congressional Record* about the Mills bill, and journeyed to Missouri to visit a factory which he said was "practically created by a protective tariff." He imported Irish speakers to "talk tariff" to fellow Irishmen, and Senator Wilson sent Lacey tariff literature in German. In an attempt to dissociate the tariff from industry and to link it with benefits to farmers and laborers, Lacey inaugurated research on wage levels throughout the world. His campaign stationery was a constant reminder of the tariff issue with its heading: "Harrison, Morton, Lacey, and Protection."\(^\text{15}\)


National protectionist organizations were very active in Iowa. Of the 1,101,887 tariff tracts—elaborate arguments defending protection "fortified by . . . reliable statistics," distributed by the American Iron and Steel Association—about 94,000 were used in Iowa. In August an additional 11,500 pieces of literature were sent to the Sixth and Eighth Districts, together with a campaign contribution of $2,000. The American Protective Tariff League also offered free literature for use in these Iowa districts, and the League Secretary unabashedly asked Allison "to advise us if we can availably interfere."  

---


Lacey assumed most of the burden for speeches, because he had little success in his requests to the State Central Committee for outside speakers. Reprimanded for his apparent naivety, he was told that "big speakers don't come for the asking," but were saved for doubtful states. For example, James G. Blaine, whom Lacey wanted, was to go to Indiana. Lacey kept in frequent contact with Senator Allison by letter, and eventually the State Central Committee arranged for him to have two speaking engagements in the Sixth District. An Ottumwa rally in Lacey's behalf drew 20,000 people, outnumbering Weaver's rally there "three to one." This success especially heartened Lacey because it reflected his own strength as a candidate.

The greatest risk of Lacey's campaign ultimately became his greatest asset. Contrary to the advise of his political friends, who feared to pit a first term candidate against a seasoned orator, Lacey challenged Weaver to a series of joint discussions in the seven county seats of the district. Weaver accepted, and the toss of a coin awarded


20 Letter of Lacey, Oct. 17, 1888, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 263. There were marching bands and some 4,000 torch bearers in parade, all standard campaign procedures of the time. See Newton Journal, Oct. 24, 1888.
Lacey the advantage of opening and closing four of the seven meetings. The challenger prepared seriously for his encounters with the veteran orator by attending several of Weaver's rallies, observing the style, content, and audience response to his talks. 21

Nevertheless, in the debate in his home town of Oskaloosa, Lacey narrowly escaped embarrassment and defeat. When Weaver pointed out the slight wage differential between textile industry employees of England and the United States, Lacey was momentarily at a loss to defend his argument for a protective tariff. But a foreigner in the audience rescued Lacey from his predicament by pointing out that Weaver made no distinction between skilled English workers and unskilled United States textile workers, and added that it was the tariff which secured the higher wage for the unskilled laborer. 22 Apparent defeat was turned into a victory.

Another unplanned incident in the debates turned the advantage to Lacey. In the presidential campaign of 1888, the British Minister to the United States advised an English immigrant to vote for Grover Cleveland because he was considered friendlier to British interests than Benjamin Harrison. This news, reaching the press the day


before the Lacey-Weaver meeting at Newton in Jasper County, enabled Lacey to identify the tariff view of his opponent with that of the British manufacturing interests. During Weaver's rebuttal of this charge, two small birds fluttered in front of him. The noted orator paused and, with dramatic flourish, interjected, "Behold, even the birds of the air are bringing happy omens of our victory." Instantly Lacey seized the opportunity to destroy Weaver's eloquence. Jumping to his feet, he shouted, "Beware, General, of the birds. They are English sparrows." Laughter destroyed the effect Weaver intended.  

After a hard-fought campaign, Lacey won the election by a slight margin. He received 18,009 votes to 17,181 for Weaver. While he was undoubtedly helped by the popularity of the Republican presidential ticket in Iowa, Lacey's own endless work and the abundant use of literature contributed much to winning the Sixth District for the Republicans. Lacey himself attributed his victory in large part to his success in the debates with Weaver.  

Triumph over "Wily Weaver" earned Lacey the gratitude of Republicans of all ranks. President-elect Benjamin Harrison wrote to offer congratulations. Allison sent his  

---

23 Autobiography, pp. 80-81.  

24 Iowa Official Register, 1891-1894 (Des Moines: State Printer, 1894). Weaver carried Davis and Wapello Counties by fair margins, but took Keokuk by two votes only. Lacey won in the remaining four counties. Autobiography, p. 78.
personal good wishes; James F. Wilson wrote that many Senators were wanting to "meet the man who downed Weaver." J. P. Dolliver, himself a victor in the Tenth District Congressional race, told Lacey that "every Republican in the state was grateful." Iowa's Governor William Larrabee termed it a "splendid victory." James Clarkson, Vice Chairman of the Republican National Committee, called it "the hardest fight ever fought in any district in Iowa," and advised Lacey that "victory ... has given you national reputation."25

The freshman Congressman from Iowa soon became known in Washington as an unflagging worker in the Fifty-first Congress. His labor on a fact-finding committee which investigated a disputed seat from Arkansas exhibited his passion for thorough study.

Lacey introduced two bills against special interests which, although neither passed the House, won him admiration in his rural district as one "not lining up on the side of rich corporations." He believed that long-term patent rights, such as those held by the barbed wire trust and the Bell Telephone Company, lessened competition and thereby injured

25Letter of Benjamin Harrison, Nov. 30, 1888, to Lacey; letter of Allison, Nov. 10, 1888, to Lacey; letter of James F. Wilson, Nov. 12, 1888, to Lacey; letter of J. P. Dolliver, Nov. 10, 1888, to Lacey; letter of Governor Larrabee, Nov. 9, 1888, to Lacey; Letter of James S. Clarkson, Nov. 15, 1888, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 247. This volume also contains numerous letters from other Republicans across the state.
the public. Consequently, one of his bills authorized Congress to buy, after a suitable length of time, the patent rights of such offending companies. A second bill, dubbed his "anti-trust bill," provided for fines or imprisonment when persons, partnerships, or corporations with residence in different states entered into combination "for the purpose of putting up prices or reducing the quantity of any product" on the market. These bills, although never enacted into law, were important indicators of Lacey's political views on economic matters at the outset of his national career.  

In 1890 Lacey's popularity in the Sixth District was still strong, and the party nomination went to him without effort. Deemed a sure winner again after his defeat of the great Weaver, some Democrats hesitated to oppose Lacey. Finally, Frederick E. White, a Keokuk County farmer, agreed to be the Democratic candidate.

Although White was tagged "Iowa's Sockless Jerry" by the Oskaloosa Herald, the campaign proved the epithet false.  

26 Clippings from the Richland Clarion, Dec. 19, 1889, and Journal (Centerville, Iowa), n.d., 1890, in Lacey Scrapbook, No. 1165, relate the Arkansas election dispute. For copies of the two special interests bills, introduced Dec. 18, 1889, see Lacey Papers, Vol. 268, and clippings from Herald (Grinnell, Iowa), Dec. 31, 1889, and the New Sharon Star, Jan. 8, 1890, in Lacey Scrapbook, No. 1165.  

27 Jerry Simpson was a radical Populist in Kansas known as "Sockless Jerry."
Clever enough to convert his weaknesses to strength, White admitted he was an unpolished farmer, and then questioned how a lawyer's office could offer superior training for a candidate to represent a constituency of farmers and laborers. With clear, concise speeches, White made cutting indictments of Lacey's record in Congress, and attacked his vote for the McKinley bill as well as his entire tariff theory. The Democratic candidate decried Lacey's "home market" idea in which the Congressman claimed that protection sustained farm prices by sheltering them from competition with foreign farm goods. White pointed out to farm audiences that agricultural production in America exceeded consumption, and the resulting surplus kept farm prices down regardless of the tariff. This economic fact necessitated foreign markets for farm products, yet the high tariff worked to decrease their availability. White denied Lacey's claim that history linked panics with low tariff.28

The tariff was an excellent weapon for White because the desire in the Midwest for tariff revision was growing stronger.29 Early in 1890 a constituent warned Lacey of the change in sentiment, adding that the next Congress "will have a majority of Democrats in the lower house and probably

28Speech at Oskaloosa, Sept. 2, 1890, and at Monroe, Sept. 11, 1890, in unclassified Lacey Papers.

29Accounts of the period do not explain the factors accounting for change. To fully understand the tariff question in Midwest politics would require a study of its own.
Cleveland will resume office in 1893" if the Republican Fifty-first Congress failed to act satisfactorily on the tariff.30 Lacey, however, had spurned this sound advice and had voted for the McKinley bill, which passed in the closing days of the Congress. In doing so, he provided White a most effective weapon.

Cheap money was another issue that White exploited successfully. Lacey apparently modified his views on the money question during his first term in Congress. When he introduced a bill in 1889 requiring issuance of greenbacks to replace national bank notes withdrawn from circulation, a Democratic newspaper in his district predicted that Lacey might be a better Greenbacker than Weaver.31 But when this bill died in Committee and Lacey failed to attempt its rescue, some of his constituents interpreted his action as "politics."32 They were convinced of the soundness of their charge when, in 1890, Lacey voted against the free coinage of silver. White quickly attacked Lacey's silver stand, and

30 Letter of Joseph H. Blair, Mar. 19, 1890, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 248. This does not mean the opponents of the McKinley bill did not believe in high protection. Not even the Republican National Platform of 1896 endorsed the McKinley tariff.

31 Clipping of Oskaloosa Times, Dec. 27, 1889, in Lacey Scrapbook, No. 1165.

32 Clipping of Banner (Colfax, Iowa), n.d., 1890, in Lacey Scrapbook, No. 1165.
using exaggeration with good effect, informed the voters of the Sixth District that the only "ten men in the state ... opposed to the free coinage of silver ..." were the Republican Congressmen.  

Lacey's friends endeavored to persuade him that the district wanted cheap money. Urging him to support the "free silver" bill, Albert Swalm advised that the people wanted free silver as soon as they could obtain it. Lacey, however, had voted against the free coinage bill and supported a compromise which permitted demonetization of silver under stipulated conditions. This vote led the Democratic Ottumwa Sun to oppose his re-election and to predict his defeat by one thousand votes. White made political capital out of Lacey's position on silver. He carefully explained to the Sixth District farmers that the compromise law, which Lacey had supported, made silver certificates exchanged for bullion "legal tender for all obligations, public and private except where otherwise stipulated." Farm creditors could thus demand mortgage payment in gold. This threat, however remote as a reality, was effective campaign propaganda among the local farmers.

33White's speech at Monroe, Iowa, Sept. 11, 1890, in unclassified Lacey Papers, Census and Archives Department, Historical Building, Des Moines, Iowa.

34Emphasis is mine. Ibid. See also letter of A. W. Swalm, June 20, 1890, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 248, and clipping of Ottumwa Sun (Ottumwa, Iowa), n.d., 1890, in Lacey Scrapbook, No. 1165.
Prohibition was a third issue in the campaign of 1890. White chided Lacey for opposing the "original package" legislation in the House. This was unfair criticism. Lacey had voted against the first bill because of his preference for the Senate version, but he did support the final amended form of the liquor control law. To avoid dissatisfaction among both "wets" and "drys" over his vote for the "original package" law, Lacey endeavored to tie his support of the bill to states rights. A Democratic newspaper in Oskaloosa, the Times, publicized the sudden conversion of a "long-time anti-prohibitionist" to the doctrine of states rights. Because this paper desired Lacey's re-election, it contented itself with reproving him for his political caution and acknowledged his right "to go to bed with Prohibitionists."

Although Republicans acknowledged that tariff and prohibition were troublesome issues for their candidates, they predicted victory in the Sixth District and throughout the state. The Republicans, however, could not withstand the nation's Democratic sweep. Lacey lost to White by a small margin, and the Democrats captured six of the eleven


36Clipping of Oskaloosa Times, June 13, 1890, in Lacey Scrapbook, No. 1165.
Iowa seats in the House. This victory, coupled with the previous year's election of Democrat Horace Boies as governor, was of such magnitude that it marked a new low in Republican strength in Iowa. Lacey singled out two causes for the rejection of his party as well as his own defeat. He believed that Republicans were overconfident of victory, and that the newly enacted McKinley tariff was not in force long enough to prove its merits before the election.

In 1892 the Sixth District campaign proved to be almost a re-match of that of 1890. While the candidates and the issues were the same, the vital difference was that White was the incumbent in the second encounter. It was his turn to be on the defensive, a position no doubt influencing his rejection of Lacey's challenge to debates.

In 1892, the Sixth District again went for Lacey. His vote was 17,747 to White's 16,572, a victory all the more surprising in view of the Democratic party's success in

---

37 Iowa Official Register, 1891-1894 lists 16,572 votes for Lacey and 17,092 for White.

38 Sage, Allison, p. 244, writes that Republican strength in Iowa in 1890 was at its "lowest point in party history between 1854 and 1932."

39 Autobiography, p. 81.

40 Lacey's Address at Leighton, Oct. 5, 1891, and White's Address at Ottumwa, Nov. 5, 1892, in unclassified Lacey Papers, Census and Archives Department, Historical Building, Des Moines, Iowa. Letter of H. L. Waterman, Sixth District Republican Committee Chairman, Aug. 29, 1892, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 249. Autobiography, p. 82.
the presidential contest. This was the first of seven consecutive victories for Lacey and, thus, a significant step in the conversion of the Sixth to a safe Republican district.

From 1892 to the end of the century, Lacey strengthened his political hold on his district. The contest of 1894 was a three-way race with the Democrats running W. H. Taylor, and the populists supporting Reverend Allen Clark. Lacey referred to this contest, with his plurality of 7,000 votes and a majority of 700, as his only "easy race." During the campaign he used to advantage his traditional arguments in defense of protection and bimetallism.

In 1894, Lacey involved himself not only in a campaign for re-election to the House, but briefly in the contest over the choice of a United States senator from Iowa that year. Lacey's role in the Senate campaign was limited, but it was important because it manifested his desire to

---

41 *Iowa Official Register, 1891-1894.*

42 Lacey's nomination was never challenged, although for a short time J. R. Gorrell of Jasper County thought of entering his candidacy. Letter of H. E. Hunter, June 20, 1894, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 249.

43 Autobiography, p. 83. *Iowa Official Register, 1895.*

44 Speech at Grinnell, July 18, 1894, in unclassified Lacey Papers, Census and Archives Department, Historical Building, Des Moines, Iowa. This same address urged the champions of "unlimited coinage" to consider the effects of their views since increased silver production had lowered the bullion value of silver to 47 per cent of its coinage value.
rise politically. It also was influential in determining the position Lacey would assume when Iowa Republicans later split over the political ambitions of Albert B. Cummins.

Lacey hoped to win the Senate seat of his friend James F. Wilson, but competition for the office was keen. John H. Gear, William P. Hepburn, George D. Perkins, John Y. Stone, and Albert B. Cummins were other Republican aspirants for the seat. First news of Lacey's interest appeared in 1893 in an Eastern newspaper which tactfully claimed that friends had put Lacey's name forward after his candidacy had been discussed for more than a year. The public announcement was made at an auspicious time—just after state elections in Iowa had returned gubernatorial leadership to the Republicans. Lacey's supporters helpfully linked him to Senator Allison and claimed that he would be a strong colleague of the senior Senator.45

To test the strength of his candidacy, Lacey privately sought support from state Republican leaders. Their response undoubtedly dissipated his hope for any serious role in the Senate contest. George D. Perkins, editor of the Sioux City Journal, reminded Lacey that he, too, was a candidate for

45Clipping of Tribune (New York, New York), Nov. 24, 1893, in unclassified Lacey Papers, Census and Archives Department, Historical Building, Des Moines, Iowa. A clipping of What Cheer Chronicle (What Cheer, Iowa), n.d., is identical to that of the Tribune article except that it does not have the Washington dateline.
the office. James E. Blythe, Chairman of the State Central Committee and brother of Joseph W. Blythe, replied that he liked Lacey personally, but he was committed to John H. Gear, his brother's father-in-law. James S. Clarkson, former editor of the *Iowa State Register*, claimed neutrality in the selection of a Senate candidate. His references to Cummins as a friend and fellow citizen of Des Moines, plainly indicated his prejudice in Cummins' behalf. Nate Kendall, who was from Lacey's district, and a member of the Iowa legislature, regretted that he could not offer support because he had endorsed Gear before he knew of Lacey's candidacy. Tenth District Congressman J. P. Dolliver indicated that he would be "friendly in words and actions" to Lacey when the senatorial question arose in Iowa's Congressional delegation.46

Dolliver's response was vague and meaningless, but it was the nearest approach to "support" which Lacey received. Just who were Lacey's "Friends" that allegedly pushed his candidacy was not revealed. Some Iowa papers gave his plans for the Senate favorable publicity: the Des Moines *Daily Capital*, Cedar Rapids *Republican*, Marshalltown *Times-Republican*, Grinnell *Herald*, Ottumwa *Courier*,

46 Letter of George D. Perkins, ed., *Journal* (Sioux City, Iowa), Nov. 20, 1893, to Lacey; letter of J. E. Blythe, Nov. 25, 1893, to Lacey; letter of J. S. Clarkson, Nov. 20, 1893, to Lacey; letter of Nate Kendall, Nov. 24, 1893, to Lacey; letter of J. P. Dolliver, n.d., to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 249. Kendall was Speaker of the Iowa House at one time and was elected Sixth District Congressman in 1908.
Bloomfield Republican, and the Oskaloosa Herald; but with the exception of the first three, they were all Sixth District papers. In view of such limited support, the strength of Lacey's candidacy was questionable. In fact, the favorable article in the New York Tribune of November, 1893, which was attributed to Lacey's friends, may have been a calculated leak or "trial balloon" to gauge public reactions.

Voting in the Iowa legislature confirmed Lacey's lack of support and proved he never had a chance to succeed to Wilson's seat in the Senate. On the three ballots taken, Iowa legislators gave Lacey the lowest number of votes among the five men seeking the position. John H. Gear led all the candidates, and was elected on the third ballot.

In his bid for the Senate Lacey was regarded as an anti-machine candidate, according to Ralph Mills Sayre's study of the Progressive movement in Iowa. Dan E. Clark reached a similar conclusion in his analysis of senatorial elections in Iowa. Clark declared that Lacey was the "candidate of the opposition to the Republican central committee

47 Clipping of the papers cited in unclassified Lacey Papers.


and the so-called ring" which had managed the state campaign of 1892. Lacey's opponents went so far as to attempt to intimidate one of his supporters, William M. McFarland, the incumbent candidate for Secretary of State in Iowa. McFarland was threatened with defeat for re-election unless he ceased his opposition to Gear's candidacy for the Senate. 50

Lacey's defeat for senatorial office in 1894 was not a total loss. It taught him a lesson about organization politics in Iowa, namely, the necessity of support by the railroad machine. Increasingly after 1894, Lacey allied himself with the railroad politicians, especially J. W. Blythe of the Burlington. Although defeated for the Senate, Lacey was easily returned to Congress in the three-cornered race in the Sixth District in 1894.

In 1896, he was again the unanimous choice of his party's convention. His opponent, Fred White, in a third bid to unseat Lacey, campaigned as a fusionist candidate. The principal issue in the Sixth District was the question of cheap money. Lacey, both in and out of Congress, dwelt on the evils of cheap money, reminding laborers and veterans that fifty-three cent dollars would cut their incomes in half. A depreciated currency amounted to "commercial

50 Dan Elbert Clark, *History of Senatorial Elections in Iowa* (Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1912), pp. 229-234. Clark mentioned that Lafe Young, Albert Swalm, Ben McCoy, and William McFarland met in Des Moines the last week of November, 1893, to support Lacey's candidacy for the
blood poison" for a nation, he declared. He made great use of a sound-money tract entitled *Coin at School in Finance*, written by George E. Roberts, who later was Director of the United States Mint in Washington, in an effort to counter the widespread distribution of *Coin's Financial School*, a free-silver tract.51

The tariff also received attention. Lamenting the Democrats' repeal of the McKinley Act, Lacey referred to the Wilson bill as a tariff "for deficit only" and the "crime of 1893." Prosperity and protection were inseparably linked in Lacey's campaign speeches.52 Lacey's friends feared the election outcome because of White's fusionist opposition, but the McKinley landslide swept into office Lacey and ten other incumbent Republican Congressmen of Iowa.53

---

51 Lacey speech at Ottumwa District Convention, 1896, in unclassified Lacey Papers. See also, in the same place, clippings from *Ottumwa Courier*, Aug. 5, 1896; *Herald* (Newton, Iowa), Sept. 4, 1896; *Oskaloosa Times*, Sept. 8, 1896, and campaign notes of Lacey. Speech in House of Representatives on "wages and the Silver Standard," Feb. 11, 1890, in Lacey pamphlets, Iowa Collection, Historical Library, Des Moines, Iowa. Letter of George E. Roberts, July 1, 1896, to Lacey; letter of A. W. Swalm, Aug. 13, 1896, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 249. Roberts, the editor of *Messenger* (Fort Dodge, Iowa), won national repute for his sound money tract.

52 Lacey campaign speeches in unclassified Lacey Papers, Census and Archives Department, Historical Building, Des Moines, Iowa.

53 *Iowa Official Register*, 1897. Lacey's margin of victory was nearly 1,200 votes.
In 1898 the Democrats, in their plan to defeat Lacey, reverted to General J. B. Weaver. Weaver's supporters depicted Lacey as inconsistent on the money question, and charged that he had changed from a cheap money advocacy at the start of his political career to a "defense of the rich." Newspapers unfairly charged that Lacey rejected all forms of money but gold. Actually, he rejected silver monometallism, but endorsed bimetallism with all forms of money maintained at a parity with gold. The money issue hurt Lacey's campaign, and he refused an offer of district-wide distribution of free circulars which called for his re-election as a sound-money man.

Lacey labored hard to offset the strength which Weaver enjoyed. To secure the support of the district's Negro minority, Lacey called on Booker T. Washington, who responded with an article in Lacey's behalf for the Iowa State Bystander, leading Negro newspaper in Des Moines. Washington also appeared in the mining community of

54Clippings of Iowa State Democrat (Newton, Iowa), Oct. 20, 1898; Albia Union (Albia, Iowa), Oct. 1898, and Bloomfield Farmer (Bloomfield, Iowa), Oct., 1898, in unclassified Lacey Papers. These three papers were especially barbed in their criticism of Lacey. See also, in the same place, Weaver's speech at Ottumwa, Sept. 26, 1898, and clipping of Signal (Grinnell, Iowa), Oct. 6, 1898. Weaver challenged Lacey's votes for the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and against a proposed income tax bill.

55Letters of H. H. Hanna, Chairman of the Executive Committee of Indianapolis Monetary Convention, Aug. 24, Sept. 8, 29, 1898, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 250.
Muchakinock to give the first political speech of his life, after having assured Lacey that he wanted to serve him in any way possible "in connection with the colored population in Iowa."56

Lacey also profited from President McKinley's visit to Iowa. McKinley journeyed through southern Iowa enroute to Omaha after having been advised by Eighth District Congressman W. P. Hepburn, who like Lacey was under "Reservation" influence, that there was more political advantage in a presidential trip through the Sixth and Eighth Districts than through Des Moines.57

In the second Lacey-Weaver contest, Lacey was again the victor, winning some 1,500 votes more than his adversary. J. A. T. Hull, Congressman from the Seventh District, which included Cummins' hometown of Des Moines, reflected the feeling of many Republicans when he reported to Lacey that the "whole country is rejoicing over the fact that you have . . . finished Weaver."58

56 Letter of Booker T. Washington, Jan. 11, 1898, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 250. Washington's letter is apparently misdated because it is in reference to the campaign of 1898.


58 Letter of J. A. T. Hull, Nov. 15, 1898, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 250. Iowa Official Register, 1899 listed the returns as 19,738 votes for Lacey and 18,267 for Weaver.
Lacey's fourth consecutive victory added to his growing reputation in the Republican party. By actively supporting Iowa's D. B. Henderson in his successful candidacy for Speaker of the House, Lacey heightened his political stature still more. His early and effective campaign in Henderson's behalf won Lacey not only the new Speaker's gratitude but that of Senator Allison as well. By 1900 Lacey had a formidable record in politics. With initial experience in state and municipal government, he had gone forward to win five of six contests for a House seat. On two occasions he had defeated an opponent who was powerful enough to have twice merited presidential nomination. In addition to building a strong public image, Lacey had developed friendly relations with Republican leaders in Iowa and established a reputation for "hard work" in Congress. The dawn of a new century would present him with new experiences and challenges.

---

59 Letter of Joe R. Lane, Second District Congressman, April 22, 1899, to Lacey; letters of D. B. Henderson, April 20, 25, 28, May 20, 24, 1899, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 250. Henderson was from the Third District as was Allison.

60 Weaver was the presidential candidate for the Populists in 1892 as well as for the Greenback party in 1880.
CHAPTER V

LACEY, CITIZEN OF THE NATION

John Lacey demonstrated different capacities as a political leader in Iowa and as a Congressman in Washington. On the state level, he allied himself with the railroad interests and became mindful of the prejudices and demands of his constituents. On the national level, in matters unrelated to Iowa, he pursued areas of special interest which reflected both conviction and vision. Although Lacey never identified himself with the Progressive movement, he pioneered in legislative areas later identified as Progressive. His national career demonstrated an abiding interest in conservation problems, particularly those associated with wildlife, forests, and parks. An enduring humanitarian concern also characterized Lacey's national political activity. Although his leadership in the areas of human rights and natural resource conservation involved no political risk in Iowa, neither did it win him political advantage in the state. Colleagues in the Congress, however, appreciated Lacey's national interests and accorded him greater respect than did many citizens of Iowa.
Lacey was a pioneer in the field of conservation.\(^1\) In fact, he has been called the "Father of American Conservation."\(^2\) One of Lacey's contemporaries recognized him as "one of the first to lift up his voice in Congress and ask for a stay of the hand of the destroyer."\(^3\) William T. Hornaday, director of the New York Zoological Park, lobbied vigorously for many of Lacey's bills and claimed that the Iowan was the first American Congressman "to become an avowed champion of wild life."\(^4\)

Membership on the House Public Lands Committee and twelve years service as its chairman provided Lacey a forum for his conservation interest and opinions.\(^5\) The Iowa Congressman began his work as a champion of bird wild life.

---


\(^3\)Tacitus Hussey, "The Old-time Trapper," Annals of Iowa, IX (Jan., 1910), 310.


Although he labored for eight years before achieving the passage of a conservation measure, Lacey regarded this sustained effort worthwhile and believed that the Lacey Bird and Game Act of 1900 was one of the most useful bills of his Congressional career. This law received national attention as a new departure in a field in which the federal government had not previously claimed any right to legislate. To assure the constitutionality of his so-called "bird bill," Lacey based it on the interstate commerce clause of the constitution.

Lacey's bird bill was introduced in the Congress during January, 1900. Later known as the Lacey Act, the bill authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to forbid the importation of unwanted foreign birds and animals and to work for the propagation of game, song, and insect-eating wild birds in the United States. It also aimed at eliminating the interstate shipment of illegally killed game. Such shipments violated game laws in some states; in others

---


7 For references to Lacey's earlier attempts to secure passage of the bird bill, see letter of Madison Grant, secretary of New York Zoological Society, Dec. 23, 1898, to Lacey; letter of W. T. Hornaday, director of New York Zoological Park and vice president of League of American Sportsmen, Jan. 25, 1899, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 250. Hornaday was born in Knoxville, Iowa, and attended one year of college in Oskaloosa before enrolling in the State Agriculture College at Ames, Iowa.
the laws were evaded by applying the "original package" principle long associated with liquor traffic, to the interstate shipment of wild game. To correct such abuse, the Lacey bill incorporated the principle of the Wilson Bill of 1890 so that game shipped into a state was subject to that state's laws as though the game had been killed in the state. To avoid a charge of invasion of states rights by the federal government, the bill applied only to those states which had game laws.

Support for the "bird bill" was nation-wide with many individuals and associations cooperating with Lacey to secure its passage. James Wilson, Secretary of Agriculture and a fellow Iowan, offered suggestions to avoid Congressional pitfalls. T. S. Palmer, Assistant Chief of Biological Survey in the Department of Agriculture, urged the nation's ornithologists to lend their support. Moreover, the New York Zoological Society, along with fish and game associations from Montana, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia, organized to apply pressure on Congressmen in behalf of the bill. These organizations secured personal interviews with members of Congress, distributed thousands of pieces of

---

8 See Chap. III of this study for explanation of the "original package" principle and the Willson Bill designed to curb its use.

literature, and contacted fish and game associations from other states for cooperation in lobbying for the bill.\(^{10}\)

One group which gave outstanding support to Lacey's bill was the League of American Sportsmen. George Shields and William T. Hornaday, League president and vice-president, respectively, were ardent and effective lobbyists. They wrote every member of the House, and planned a comparable assault on the Senate once the bill reached that body. Furthermore, they devoted a meeting of the League to honoring some fifty prominent scientists and bird lovers, and invited Lacey to be the principal speaker.\(^{11}\) When the bill seemed stalled in the House, Shields offered to lobby personally in Washington, and sought Lacey's permission to distribute circulars to all League members urging them to bombard their Congressmen in behalf of the bill. Shields also requested Speaker D. B. Henderson to give the bill prompt action on the House floor.\(^{12}\)

\(^{10}\)Letter of James Wilson, Jan. 15, 1900, to Lacey; letter of T. S. Palmer, Jan. 20, 1900, to Lacey; letters of M. G. Sellers, Mar. 16, Apr. 18, 1900, to Lacey; form letter from New York Zoological Park officers, Mar. 17, 1900; letters of Frank Curtis, Jan. 29, Feb. 2, 1900, to Lacey; night letter of M. J. Elrod, Apr. 7, 1900, to Speaker of the House, D. B. Henderson all in Lacey Papers, Vol. 251.

\(^{11}\)Letter of G. O. Shields, Mar. 12, 1900, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251. Lacey's speech before meeting of League of American Sportsmen, Feb. 14, 1900, in unclassified Lacey Papers. An excerpt of the speech may be found in Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, pp. 160-165.

\(^{12}\)Letters of G. O. Shields, Apr. 14, 17, 18, 1900, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251. Henderson was from Iowa and a political friend of Lacey's.
Opportune circumstances contributed to the final passage of the Lacey Act. For example, the Millinery Merchants' Association, composed of manufacturers of women's hats, changed its mind about the bill. Initially opposed to the bill because it outlawed the slaughter of many birds providing decorative feathers, it withdrew its opposition when Lacey accepted an amendment permitting them to use plumage from barnyard fowl.\(^\text{13}\)

A second act of good fortune occurred on the day Lacey delivered a long defense of his bill in the House. The two most consistent critics of the bill, Joseph Cannon of Illinois and Sereno Payne of New York, were silent that day. Cannon was absent from the chamber; Payne temporarily was replacing Henderson as Speaker, and did not engage in the debate.\(^\text{14}\)

Lacey devoted most of his speech to the section of the bill prohibiting interstate commerce in birds and game killed in violation of state laws. While claiming authority for the federal government to prevent the illegal shipment

\(^{13}\)Clipping of Herald (New York, New York), n.d., in Shields's letter, Mar. 12, 1900, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251. Clipping of Millinery Trade Review, May, 1900, in unclassified Lacey Papers. This article described Lacey's bill as stronger than a New York State law passed under Governor Theodore Roosevelt because, while the latter bill protected "certain wild birds," it did not aim a severe blow at the feather trade as did Lacey's bill.

\(^{14}\)Pammell, Lacey Memorial Volume, pp. 144-145; Oskaloosa Daily Herald, May 1, 1900.
of such commerce across state lines, he was careful not to antagonize states rights advocates. He clearly pointed out that under his bill the authority of the national government began where state authority ended, i.e., when the illegally killed game was ready to be shipped outside the state. Game wardens, Lacey insisted, had long wanted such a law to aid in their enforcement of state game laws.\(^{15}\)

At the close of Lacey's defense, a vote was taken, and the measure passed its first hurdle.\(^{16}\) The struggle in the Senate was much briefer than that in the House; by May 25 the Lacey Act had the approval of the Senators, the signature of the President, and was the law of the land.\(^{17}\) Lacey's success capped eight years of hard work.

The new law caused varied reactions across the nation. Press comments ranged from highly laudatory remarks to omission of credit to Lacey for sponsoring the bill.\(^{18}\)

\(^{15}\) Lacey speech on House floor, Apr. 30, 1900, in unclassified Lacey Papers. The bill provided a maximum fine of $200 for each violation of the law. Consignees and carriers knowing of the violation were subject to the fine as well as the shipper.

\(^{16}\) Oskaloosa Daily Herald, May 1, 11, 1900. Ottumwa Courier, May 2, 1900. The Sioux City Journal, May 2, 1900, reported that the bill passed with but twenty-six opposing votes.

\(^{17}\) Lacey's article in Transcript (Boston, Massachusetts), as found in Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, p. 169.

\(^{18}\) Iowa State Register, July 18, 1900, gave Lacey much credit. Leader (Des Moines, Iowa), July 2, 1900, explained the bill but gave its sponsor no recognition. Wallaces' Farmer (Des Moines, Iowa), June 1, 1900, defended the need of
League of American Sportsmen expressed gratitude by soliciting donations from its members for a memorial gold watch for Lacey.\footnote{Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Oct. 17, 23, 1900.} Enforcement of the Lacey Act in several large cities resulted in seizures of illegally shipped birds, such as quail and doves; as many as 20,000 were netted in a single raid. The Milliners Association agreed to impose a five hundred-dollar fine on any member who used decorative feathers in violation of Lacey's law.\footnote{Nonpareil (Council Bluffs, Iowa), Nov. 8, 1900. Iowa State Register, June 3, 1900. Daily Capital, June 6, 1900. Lacey article in World Review as found in Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, p. 173.}

In keeping with the positive aspects of the bill, thousands of game birds were brought into the United States for propagation purposes.\footnote{Letter of Jasper Y. Brinton, solicitor for Game Commissioners of Pennsylvania, Nov. 6, 1903, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 254. Letter of John L. Hill, member of New York State Game Association, Feb. 7, 1905, to George C. Hazleton, Lacey Papers, Vol. 254. Reprint of Register and Leader in Oskaloosa Daily Herald, July 30, 1904.} The Lacey Act was only a modest beginning in conservation. Lacey himself spoke of a state governor, whom
he left unnamed, who scoffed that "Congress could do better than discuss the raising of goslings!"  

Not content with one law for preservation of birds, Lacey became a champion for the protection of migratory birds and the establishment of game preserves. His interest in legislation prohibiting the shooting of birds in migration was generally ahead of that of his contemporaries. Cautioned that a federal migratory bird law would be unconstitutional, Lacey replied:

Where all the states are more or less concerned in a law for the protection of all, and where mere local law is unavailing, our federal system ought to give protection. It is true that this power, if it exists, has not been exercised heretofore, but from time to time as our growing needs have demanded it, latent federal jurisdiction has been asserted and sustained by the courts.

Lacey's efforts to achieve migratory bird legislation ended in failure, but after leaving national office, he continued his interest in the subject and lived to see the enactment of a law such as he desired.

Lacey's labors to secure game preserves on federal land extended over a decade. Although he met consistent

---

22 Lacey article in World Review as found in Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, p. 172.

23 Letter of Lacey, Dec. 11, 1905, to J. W. Wadsworth, chairman of House Agriculture Committee, Lacey Papers, Vol. 254. The proposed bill, limited in scope in that it forbade only the shooting of migratory birds in their northward spring migration, was enclosed in the letter. A letter from David C. Beaman, Feb. 16, 1905, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 254, warned Lacey of relying on the interstate commerce clause.
opposition in his endeavors, he finally achieved greater success in this field than in the area of migratory bird legislation. As early as 1894, Lacey had successfully sponsored a law which established Yellowstone Park as a breeding ground for wild game, but progress in additional legislation was slow after that date. Thus, the Iowan decided to stir the public to become interested in game preserves. He wrote articles, gave addresses, and mailed out innumerable letters toward this end.²⁴ In 1906, he proposed a letter campaign to Speaker Joseph Cannon in behalf of a bill authorizing the President to establish game preserves in national forests.²⁵ While no such general bill for the establishment of game preserves became law before he left Congress, Lacey did secure the passage of bills for the establishment of game preserves in specific localities.²⁶


Though its application was particular in scope and place, Lacey took special pride in his Alaska Game Law, because the need for game preservation in that remote area was great. Lacey became disturbed over the slaughter of Alaskan deer, the principal food of the natives, for hides. Indeed, William T. Hornaday compared the useless killing of Alaskan game to that which occurred earlier on the western plains of the United States. Recognition of this senseless destruction and the meagre attention paid to game laws by the territorial code of Alaska prompted Lacey to introduce the bill. Support for the Alaskan game bill was widespread, and Lacey had the rare privilege of seeing the House pass his measure without one dissenting vote. Receiving prompt Senate approval, the bill became a law in the surprisingly short span of four months. With the passage of the Alaska Game Law in 1902, the Des Moines Daily News acknowledged Lacey's


28 See letters of Madison Grant, Feb. 1, 26, 1902, to Lacey; letter of C. Hart Merriam, Chief Biological Survey, Department of Agriculture, Feb. 13, 1902, to Lacey; letter of G. O. Shields, Feb. 24, 1902, to Lacey; letter of A. M. Barker, president, Santa Clara County, California, Fish and Game Protective Association, Apr. 14, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 252. For other letters concerning the Alaska Game law, see those of W. T. Hornaday, June 16, 1902, to Lacey, of Madison Grant, June 17, 1902, to Lacey, and Lacey's letter, July 9, 1902, to George E. Roberts, Lacey Papers, Vol. 252. See also, Register and Leader, July 18, 1902.
growing reputation as a conservationist. It editorialized that House members now assumed that any move in behalf of conservation would be inaugurated by the Iowa Congressman.29

Simultaneously with his interest in a game law for Alaska, Lacey turned his attention to the preservation of the American buffalo, a species which by the turn of the century was in danger of extinction.30 By July, 1902, he had wrested a $15,000 appropriation from Congress to be used in fencing a supervised breeding ground for buffalo within Yellowstone park. Agriculture Secretary Wilson, popularly known as "Tama Jim," later confided to Lacey that he knew "of no man in public life who is doing so much towards the protection of wild creatures as you are." Being an Iowa man, Wilson continued, "I am all the more proud of it."31 By 1906, Lacey had succeeded in the establishment

29 Reprint of Daily News (Des Moines, Iowa) in Saturday Globe (Oskaloosa, Iowa), Apr. 19, 1902.


of a second buffalo breeding ground in Oklahoma's Wichita Forest Reserve. 32

Forest preservation was still another area of conservation in which Lacey manifested early concern. In 1891, he participated in the drafting of a Public Lands Committee bill which he rightly characterized as "a first step towards a national system of forest reserves." 33 It was under this statute, enacted in 1891, that Presidents were authorized to establish reserves by executive order. Several years before Theodore Roosevelt's name became associated with conservation, Lacey's interest in and knowledge of forest conservation was widely known.

In 1896, Lacey delivered the principal address before a joint meeting of the American Forestry Association and the National Geographic Society. In this address he expressed enthusiasm for conservation and called for action in the area of forest preservation. He enumerated the wanton waste of forests in the Eastern United States as well as in Italy, France, and other European countries, and waged government


33Lacey address, "Homesteads in Forest Reserves," in Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, p. 99.
action to end the "sin of destruction" in forests in the West. Considerable forest areas, he said, must be maintained in order to preserve the climate, soil, and wild life of the country. Declaring that private owners could not perform "the duty of forestry in America . . . only the government lives long enough to plant trees extensively," he placed the burden of conservation on government rather than individuals. 

In conclusion, Lacey suggested that forest control be transferred from the Interior Department to the Department of Agriculture.

Lacey introduced a bill requiring this transfer of authority and offered a twofold defense of the projected legislation. Most of the trained, scientific foresters in the United States were in the Agriculture Department, Lacey claimed, and he added that those in the Interior Department were, by job definition, hired to survey and dispose of public lands rather than to conserve and care for them. In a second defense of his bill, Lacey portrayed the Interior Department as overworked and burdened with responsibility for everything not assigned to other departments. Since his bill sought to reduce the authority of the Interior Department, 

34 For a full copy of the address given Jan. 27, 1896, see unclassified Lacey Papers. For excerpts, see Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, pp. 69-77.
Lacey used flattery to make the reduction palatable to the Secretary of the Interior.  

The second part of Lacey's transfer bill provided for the establishment of game preserves. This provision was a modification of his earlier stand on expansion of the role of the federal government under the interstate commerce clause. As drafted, this section of the forest bill required the President to obtain consent from state governors before establishing game reserves on federal forests within their states. In this deference to state wishes, Lacey retreated from his earlier position wherein he had advocated an expanded role of the federal government in conservation. However, he denied any retreat and insisted that his bill took no power from the national government while making a concession to the states. Although permission from the states was not necessary for action, it was "prudent" to receive such consent. On the basis of this distinction Lacey asserted: "I have never been a States' Rights man, but I

have nevertheless always had the highest regard for the rights of the States."  

Lacey's closely reasoned defense of his forest transfer bill, together with the endorsement of the Interior Secretary and President Roosevelt, were not adequate to overcome opposition. The transfer of forest control to the Agriculture Department had to await action by a later Congress.  

Along with his concern for birds and forests, Lacey also was interested in national parks. A visit to Mt. Hood, which he could not see because of smoke from forest fires, convinced Lacey that the scenic wonders of America required governmental action for preservation. On one occasion, Lacey stated with unwitting foresight that "as our country grows, breathing places in the large cities become a matter of necessity rather than a pleasure." The Iowan's efforts for park legislation centered on three bills. One concerned the Petrified Forest of Arizona, a second sought to preserve


37Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, p. 100.  

38See the Minutes of Executive Committee of Boone and Crockett Club, Oct. 27, 1913, Lacey Papers, Vol. 267.  


the Cliff Dwellers area of New Mexico, and the third aimed at the preservation of American antiquities. The last bill resulted from Lacey's failure to gain acceptance of the first two.

During the spring of 1900, Lacey succeeded in maneuvering his Petrified Forest Park bill through the House only to see it fail in the Senate. He tried again in the 57th and 58th Congresses, but again found the upper House unresponsive. As a result, the park bill never became a law.\textsuperscript{41} In 1901, the Public Lands Committee favorably reported a bill for the creation of the Cliff Dwellers National Park in New Mexico.\textsuperscript{42} However, the House rejected the bill. He did not give up, however, and to amass first-hand data for a proposed new bill, visited the Cliff Dwellers site southwest of Santa Fe in the summer of 1902.\textsuperscript{43}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{footnotes}

\textsuperscript{42}Interior Secretary Hitchcock had designated the area, "Pajarito National Park," but Lacey changed the name because he believed it would be mispronounced by most Americans and that its meaning of "little bird" was not related directly to the object of the bill which was to preserve the remains of the Cliff Dwellers. See Public Lands Committee Report, Jan. 23, 1901, in Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, p. 233.

\textsuperscript{43}Oskaloosa Daily Herald, July 8, 1902. For Lacey's speech on the Pajarito, see Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, pp. 210-219. For a personal account of his trip, see travel letters to his family in possession of Mrs. Roy Ott, Oskaloosa, Iowa.
\end{footnotes}
\end{footnotesize}
Two significant achievements resulted from this trip to New Mexico. One was the introduction and passage of Lacey's bill for the Preservation of American Antiquities. Victory was in large part due to the cooperation of W. J. McGee, chief anthropologist in the Exhibits Division of the St. Louis Exposition of 1904. McGee promised to secure endorsement of Lacey's bill from scientific institutions, museums, and universities with departmental studies in archaeology or anthropology. Lacey's first attempt to pass an Antiquities bill failed, but by 1905, when he tried again, McGee had secured the support of the American Archaeological Institute, the American Anthropological Association, and the Association for the Advancement of Science. With the approval and support from such respected national

44 Letters of W. J. McGee, Apr. 8, 9, 1904, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253, in which he asked Lacey to send copies of the bill to six prominent museum directors and archaeologists, e.g., Franz Boas. According to Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920, Harvard Historical Monographs, Vol. XL (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 102-103, McGee, born in Dubuque County, Iowa, in 1853, was the first and chief conservation theorist of his day; a self-made scientist who went to Washington in 1885, he helped organize the National Geographical Society and the Geological Society of America. He was president of the National Geographic Society in 1904-1905, and of the American Anthropological Society in 1911. For years he edited the journals of the two organizations he helped found. Hays terms McGee the "idea man" for Roosevelt, Pinchot, and Interior Secretary Garfield.

45 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 24, 1905. Letters of W. J. McGee, Jan. 18, 24, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers,
organizations, Lacey's bill passed both Houses of Congress and received presidential approval.\textsuperscript{46}

There was a second, although indirect, effect of Lacey's trip to the Southwest. The passage of his Antiquities bill, in turn, contributed to the formation of the School of American Archaeology. Auxiliary to the American Archaeological Institute with schools in Rome, Athens, and Jerusalem, the School of American Archaeology maintained summer institutes in Santa Fe; and during the winter, it explored Mexican and Central American ruins.\textsuperscript{47} The preservation of the Arizona Petrified Forest and the area of the Cliff Dwellers in New Mexico was achieved by 1906. Under the American Antiquities bill, these two areas, together with a part of the Olympic Mountains in Washington State and

\begin{verbatim}


\textsuperscript{47}Lacey attended the 1911 session of the summer school held in Rito de los Frijoles, New Mexico. See his address, "The Pajarito," n.d., in Pammel, \textit{Lacey Memorial Volume}, pp. 210-219. Professor Edgar L. Hewitt of the University of New Mexico served as Director of the School of American Archaeology. In 1917, the school was reorganized into the School of American Research.
\end{verbatim}
over two hundred other places of ethnological interest were designated "national monuments" and preserved to the public.48

Because of his growing reputation, Lacey received numerous invitations to address conservationist groups. In 1902 he delivered the principal address before the Boone and Crockett Club at its New York meeting; the assembly attracted most of the eminent zoologists and museum men of the nation as well as President Roosevelt.49 In a second appearance before the American Forestry Congress, some nine years after his initial address to that body, Lacey pleaded for support of his forest transfer bill which was before the Congress at that time. He told the American foresters that some 63,000,000 acres of forest had been set aside in reserves during the first fourteen years of his service on the Public Lands Committee.50 Shortly after his address to the Forestry Congress, Lacey had an opportunity to present his views on forest conservation to an Iowa audience when he was selected the principal guest speaker by the state's Federation of Women's Clubs.51

49 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Feb. 8, 1902.
51 Lacey address, May, 1905, in Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, pp. 78-88. The Chicago Tribune, June 18, 1905, carried an article by Lacey on forest conservation. Save
Lacey's interest and work in conservation continued after his retirement from Congress in 1907. Although recognized as knowledgeable in several areas of conservation by his colleagues in the field, he failed to receive an invitation from the President to attend the White House Conference on Conservation in 1908. In hindsight, Roosevelt's failure to invite Lacey is difficult to understand, particularly when such men as James J. Hill, John Mitchell, Andrew Carnegie, and W. J. Bryan merited invitations.  

Lacey, however, was indirectly involved in the work of the Conference. One outgrowth of the White House meeting was the establishment of the National Conservation Commission, which sought the cooperation and aid of other interested groups, including the League of American Sportsmen. The League formed a Committee on Conservation and promptly named Lacey to its membership; thus, he was in a position to cooperate officially with the work of the National Conservation Commission.

The retired Congressman viewed his appointment to the League's committee as an opportunity to complete his unfinished Congressional work in conservation. He urged the

for one new paragraph it was a total borrowing of his address before the Federation of Women's Clubs which, in turn, was borrowed from Lacey's 1896 address to the joint meeting of the American Forestry Association and the National Geographic Society.

Committee's chairman to formulate an agenda calling for organized efforts to obtain legislation in two areas in which Lacey had unsuccessfully sponsored bills, namely, the establishment of a game preserve in every national forest reserve and the enactment of a migratory bird law. Approved by other members of the League's committee, Lacey's suggestions were placed on the agenda for cooperation with the National Conservation Commission.53

In 1910, when the Weeks bill on migratory birds came before Congress, Lacey personally supported it and praised its goals in an article in Field and Stream.54 The bill failed, nonetheless, necessitating another attempt for migratory bird legislation. In 1913, when the McLean bill came before Congress, G. O. Shields asked Lacey to intercede with T. S. Palmer of the Agriculture Department to reclassify prairie chickens as migratory birds so that the proposed law would cover them. Lacey agreed with Shields and W. T. Hornaday that prairie chickens were indeed migratory, and the Iowan's letter to Palmer cited evidence from the Midwest to


54Letter of Lacey, Dec. 3, 1910, to John W. Weeks, in Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, pp. 185-186. See also in the same volume, Lacey's article from Field and Stream, pp. 178-180.
prove the birds' migratory nature. The McLean bill also failed to win approval in Congress, but later in the year still another migratory bird bill was introduced. When it became law, Lacey's long-standing efforts toward such legislation were realized. Additional recognition came to the Iowa conservationist in 1913 when the Secretary of Agriculture named Lacey to the National Commission for the Protection of Migratory Birds. The Commission in turn elected Lacey secretary and declared that he was "the one best man" in the country for the position.

Lacey's role as a supporter of conservation spanned the years from the early 1890's to his death in 1913. This represented nearly a quarter century of service to the nation from which he gained little political return. Conservation was a labor of concern and devotion for Lacey. While he worked steadily to educate the public on the need for conservation, federal authority gradually moved in areas too complex for states to handle effectively. Lacey's accomplishments were services to the nation, and not merely to Iowa. His state had no great forests to reserve or


56 The migratory bird bill was finally passed as the Weeks-McLean law. See Pammel, *Lacey Memorial Volume*, p. 41.

public lands to convert to national parks. L. H. Pammel, president of the Iowa Park Association, underscored the unselfishness of Lacey's conservation work when he wrote that "the great cause, protection of the forests, game, and the preservation of antiquities had little of interest to the average citizen of Iowa, but to the nation as a whole, in particular to generations yet to come, it will mean much."58 One of the best appraisals of Lacey as a conservationist was by the editor of the Cedar Rapids Republican who very plainly wrote that Lacey's work was "not showy but will last long after him."59

Lacey's service on the Public Lands Committee also involved him in areas closely allied with conservation, particularly the areas of irrigation and disposal of public lands. Lacey believed that the more public land occupied by settlers the stronger America would be. In this context he consistently declared that all public land, excluding national parks, should eventually pass into private ownership.60

58 L. H. Pammel, "Major John F. Lacey and the Conservation of our Natural Resources," in Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, p. 36.

59 Reprint of Republican (Cedar Rapids, Iowa), in Oskaloosa Daily Herald, July 2, 1902. The editor was correct, and Lacey's memory in Iowa is perpetuated today by the Lacey-Keosauqua State Park.

At the end of the nineteenth century much of the remaining public land required irrigation to be productive enough to attract settlers. Irrigation projects were delayed, however, by the question raised over federal and state government jurisdiction and responsibility in funding the projects. On the assumption that irrigation was a right and duty of the states, the Carey Act provided that public land be given the states in return for their establishing irrigation systems. The *Iowa State Register* endorsed the philosophy underlying the Carey Act when, in 1900, the paper editorialized against the goals of a National Irrigation Congress meeting in Chicago. Rejecting the concept of the use of federal funds for western irrigation projects, the editor repudiated the plans of the Chicago meeting.61

Lacey's views on the government's role in irrigation were in marked contrast to those of the Register's editor. He endorsed the concept of an expanded role of the federal government in irrigation as he had done in forest and wild game conservation. This recognition of the need for federal legislation was evident in his advice to Iowa's Governor L. M. Shaw that "the great difficulty about the states handling this question is that it often occurs that the water is in one state and the land in another. An

61*Iowa State Register*, Nov. 10, 1900.
interstate problem of this character can only be successfully worked out through some national agency."62

Having enunciated this forward-looking principle, however, Lacey weakened its application. His moderation was consistent with the cautious, prudent approach demonstrated by his work in the conservation field. Although Lacey championed the use of federal funds for irrigation, such funds should not be appropriated, he declared, until all arable land with adequate rainfall had been settled. Even when this condition had been met, Lacey believed that federal tax money should not be used beyond experimental projects for irrigation until experimentation proved the justification of such an outlay of federal funds. The fact that the Carey Act was not being used by the states, made him even more cautious in endorsing a large-scale irrigation program. Expressing his convictions on the use of federal money to Governor L. M. Shaw, Lacey declared that "until some such an experimental scheme shall be tested out by national aid I think or cannot say with any assurance of being right that it would be advisable for the government to adopt a general policy of national irrigation."63

63 Ibid.
Lacey's views on irrigation conflicted with those held by President Roosevelt. The President's message to Congress in December, 1901, called for a national system of irrigation at once, and the Senate responded with a bill authorizing a federal irrigation fund from the sale of public lands. Lacey countered this bill by one of his own, calling simply for a federal experimental project in irrigation. The House Committee on Irrigation, however, preferred the Senate bill embodying Roosevelt's views, and Lacey abandoned his own bill and supported the Senate bill.

Perhaps the timing of the irrigation debate diminished Lacey's opposition to the Senate bill. The House discussion on federal funds for irrigation occurred at the same time that Lacey was seeking approval of his bill transferring control of the forests to the Agriculture Department. Since Lacey considered trees the protectors of streams, which, in turn, were the sources of water for irrigation, he gave the forest bill priority. His over-simplified view of the relationship of forests to water led him to an inconsistent position concerning irrigation. In yielding to the Senate plan for a national irrigation program, Lacey told his House colleagues that "it makes no difference whether the future irrigation shall be controlled by private parties, or by the states, or by the United States--

whichever course is taken, it is essential that the sources of the streams should be preserved." This statement reflected a view quite different from that which he expressed to Iowa's Governor in 1901.

Railroad pressure may have induced Lacey to abandon his efforts for irrigation experimentation and to support the Senate irrigation bill. Earlier, however, he apparently resisted such influence. Officials of the Union Pacific Railroad offered to pay his expenses to Omaha so that they might confer with him on irrigation matters before the opening session of Congress in January, 1902. Lacey never revealed whether he accepted the offer, but if he did journey to Omaha, he did not yield to the railroad's views on the necessity of federal irrigation for the development of the West. Early in the 1902 session of the Congress, he introduced his bill calling for federal experimental projects in irrigation.

The Rock Island company also tried to influence Lacey. A spokesman for that road informed Lacey of the

65 Lacey speech on House floor, June 9, 1902, in Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, p. 104. Lacey's maneuver did not work out and the forest transfer bill failed to pass the House as was noted above.

Rock Island's preference for Roosevelt's general irrigation plan over Lacey's limited bill. The company vice president pointedly remarked that "the commercial, manufacturing and transportation interests of the region which you represent in Congress would all be vastly benefited by the adoption of the policy embodied in the Senate Irrigation Bill!" Openly revealing his company's self-interest in westward expansion, the Rock Island official declared that "as a representative of a Railway System whose lines extend in the direction of and into the arid regions, I am confident that much of the future growth of the entire country depends upon the carrying out of this policy." Later, the same Rock Island official urged Lacey to support the amended version of the Senate irrigation bill and to withdraw his own bill for experimentation projects. He also warned that efforts toward another bill in the House would kill the entire irrigation project for that session of the Congress.

Lacey apparently adopted the position advocated by some of the western railroads, for he eventually cast his vote for the amended Senate irrigation bill, which essentially

---


68 Ibid.

69 Letter of Robert Mather, June 7, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 252.
embodied President Roosevelt's views on irrigation, and the bill passed the House. In June of 1902, the Newlands Reclamation Act, which provided for the first federal system of irrigation projects, became law.70

Lacey also was concerned about conserving human resources and promoted measures favoring those groups who wielded little political power. One of his first acts upon assuming the chairmanship of the Public Lands Committee in the 54th Congress was to endorse a bill providing free land for Oklahoma homesteaders who were too poor to pay the minimum fee assessed. Subsequently, his committee favorably reported the bill to the House, and eventually, the "free home" bill became a law.71

Lacey also sponsored a bill to protect mine workers. Passed during his first term in the House in 1890 the Mine Safety Bill was referred to by Lacey as his "favorite bill." It called for mine inspectors, double mine shafts, and safety latches on all hoist devices. The bill specified the minimum amount of fresh air needed in proportion to the number of

---

70 Reprint of Albia Union in Oskaloosa Daily Herald, July 31, 1902, presented Lacey as a champion of the Newlands Act and implied that it was the work of Lacey's Committee on Public Lands.

miners and prohibited any child under twelve years of age from working underground. Lacey's bill also authorized injunctions against mine owners who failed to comply with its provisions. The bill covered only those mines within the territories where the federal government clearly had jurisdiction, and thus it avoided conflict with the mining officials in his Iowa district. Furthermore, at the time he introduced the bill, the interstate commerce law was but three years old and its elasticity was yet to be determined.

Lacey's fondness for the mine bill may have stemmed from the unusual circumstances accompanying its passage. The measure came before the Senate on the closing day of the last session of the 51st Congress. Since Lacey had lost his bid for re-election in 1890, the mine safety bill had to pass Senate hurdles that day or wait for some future sponsor in the Congress. At the last minute Lacey personally entreated John Sherman to withdraw his opposition, and the bill passed one hour before adjournment. President Harrison signed it into law, but there was no time to appropriate money for its enforcement. However, before the next Congress assembled, a mine explosion in Indian Territory took the lives of sixty-seven men. This disaster led the new Congress to

---

72 For a copy of the bill, see Lacey Papers, Vol. 268. It was specifically aimed at the Indian Territory mines, said to be more unsafe than most.
allocate funds for the immediate operation of the safety law. 73

Although the mine safety bill did not apply to mines of the Sixth District in Iowa, Lacey may have reaped some indirect political advantage from his labors. About a decade later, Lacey wrote that "though many of the miners of Iowa have always /had/ a strong tendency to populism and visionary monetary schemes, yet they have treated me with kind consideration because of this bill." 74

Encouraged by Lacey's law, mine officials were soon urging him to amend and strengthen his safety bill. Both John Mitchell, national president of the United Mine Workers (UMW), and John P. Reese, president of UMW Local #13 in the Sixth District offered suggestions for improving the bill. 75

Another mine explosion in 1902, this time in his own district, spurred Lacey into action. Some twenty men were killed when a dust explosion followed a series of blasting shots within a mine. 76 After this disaster, Lacey promoted a move to

73Autobiography, pp. 111-114.

74Ibid., p. 114.


76Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Jan. 24, 1902.
fulfill the demand made by the National Miners Convention, namely, that law compel mining companies to employ "shot-firers." Within a month he maneuvered another safety bill through the House which embodied most of the requests made by UMW president Mitchell. This second measure increased the minimum fresh air volume needed for each miner and added a provision for ventilation which would force air to every work area in a mine. In addition, it made the employment of trained shot-firers mandatory and provided that shots, fired daily when a mine was in operation, were not to be detonated when any miner was underground.

Lacey's bill journeyed slowly through the Senate because some Senators objected, especially to the clause on shot-firing. However, he received support from the lobbying of Mitchell and local mine union officials who applied pressure on hesitant Senators. Mitchell singled out Montana's Senator William A. Clark, a millionaire pioneer in

Shot-firers were the men who set the dynamite charge for blasting the coal loose. Mitchell told Lacey that more miners were killed in Indian Territory than anywhere else, and that most of the deaths were due to explosions following the fire blasts. See letter of John Mitchell, Jan. 26, 1902, to Lacey, and letter of John Reese, Jan. 25, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 252.

Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Feb. 10, 1902. The bill did not quite meet Mitchell's standard of air volume, but no amount of air would have been of much value without the shot-firers provision.
copper mining. In Iowa mining interests offered no opposition to the safety bill. Although Lacey's opponent in the 1902 race charged that he purposely limited the bill to avoid conflict within the district, the real reason for limitation probably lay with the accepted interpretation of the interstate commerce powers of the federal government.79 As in 1890, when Lacey wrote his first mine safety bill and again in 1900, when he carefully drafted the "bird bill" to avoid violating states rights, so in 1902, Lacey shunned constitutional pitfalls for his bill. Ultimately, the second mine bill passed, leading the Register and Leader to editorialize that "every recent law enacted by Congress to promote the welfare of miners has been introduced and urged . . . by Lacey."80

The Iowa Congressman continued his interest in mine safety and even toyed with the idea of a bill to give Cabinet status to a Department of Mines. John Mitchell, however, discouraged him from further action toward this end. He personally believed that a bill for the creation of a Bureau of Mines would more nearly succeed than one creating a department in the Cabinet. Thus Lacey introduced a bill to create a Bureau of Mines within the Interior Department, and

79 Letters of John Mitchell, Mar. 1, 22, 28, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251. See also Chap. VIII of this study for 1902 election campaign.

80 Register and Leader, Oct. 13, 1902.
Mitchell enlisted the support of labor organizations throughout the country. Furthermore, the UMW president also publicized Lacey's bill before the International Convention of United Mine Workers early in 1906.\textsuperscript{81} The bill failed, however, and the Bureau of Mines did not become a reality until four years later.

Another area of concern for Lacey was the plight of the American Indian. Sixteen years of membership on the House Indian Affairs Committee and a firsthand tour of the Indian agencies of the Southwest during the summer of 1900 provided him with some knowledge of Indian problems and needs.\textsuperscript{82} Because he believed that education was imperative for the Indians, Lacey opposed all attempts to cut appropriations for Indian schools. He preferred small local schools to centralized boarding institutions for Indian children, pleading that children who returned home each

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{81}Letters of John Mitchell, Dec. 7, 16, 1905, to Lacey, and letter of Lacey, Dec. 9, 1905 to Mitchell, Lacey Papers, Vol. 254. Mitchell's judgment was borne out in an editorial in the \textit{Register and Leader}, Dec. 19, 1905, which reported little sentiment for a Department of Mines but predicted success for Lacey's Bureau of Mines bill. However, a Bureau of Mines was not established until 1910.

\textsuperscript{82}In fairness it must be noted that Lacey also used the trip to further the interests of some clients with mineral claims. See Letter of N. A. Jones, Indian Commissioner, July 2, 1900, to all Indian Agents informing them of Lacey's visit, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251. This volume contains numerous exchanges between Lacey, the Indian Office, and agents in the field.
\end{quote}
evening would contribute to the adult education of their parents. Lacey also viewed intermarriage between Indians and whites as desirable, and opposed the pattern of segregation the government had imposed on Indian society.\(^3\)

When Indian Commissioner F. E. Leupp contemplated withdrawing the government from the care of Indian trust funds, he solicited Lacey's cooperation. Leupp asked Lacey to give his attention and the "weight of your name and influence in the House" to a bill providing for the phased distribution of tribal funds to the individual Indian. As a result, he would be "like the Caucasian, the Negro . . . and all the rest—a separate man, standing on his own feet and not a pauper or a mere undivided portion of a lump."\(^4\) Within a week, Lacey drafted a bill which won support from President Roosevelt, Treasury Department officials, and Leupp.\(^5\)

Lacey's bill on the distribution of Indian tribal funds passed the House in 1905, but met delay in the Senate until early in 1907. Although the final version contained amendments offensive to some Indians and also to the Board of Indian Commissioners, Leupp had to accept the offending

---

\(^3\)Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Mar. 5, 1903.


clauses or lose the entire bill. To ameliorate the situation, he requested Lacey to draft another bill giving the United States Court of Claims equity jurisdiction over cases arising from the undesirable amendments of the original bill. Lacey again agreed to cooperate.\footnote{Letter of M. E. Gates of Board of Indian Commissioners, Feb. 19, 1907, to Lacey; letter of S. M. Brosius, Agent of Indian Rights Association, Feb. 25, 1907, to Lacey; letters of F. E. Leupp, Feb. 23, 26, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. See also letter of F. E. Leupp, May 10, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 255, in which Leupp spoke of both Lacey and him accepting a "half-loaf" in the bill. One offensive amendment permitted the sale of white pine on Indian lands for $10 per acre when the Indians and government officials judged them to be worth $100 per acre.}

In several areas of national legislation, Lacey had pursued his own vision, and left a respectable record of accomplishments. Lacey also strove to enlarge the meaning and use of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. This endeavor, together with his solicitude for miners and Indians and his early interest in conservation, marked him as a man of vision and concern. As Lacey soon learned, however, he enjoyed far more esteem among national political leaders than he did among party leaders and citizens of his own state.
CHAPTER VI

LACEY IN THE LAST DAYS OF PEACE

The year 1900 marked a watershed in Iowa politics. Judging from the previous decade, Republican leaders might well have expected 1900 to have been a politically calm and stable year. The Republican party appeared in a secure position. Lacey's status within the party was strong, and his name already had been mentioned for three national offices: The Vice Presidency, the Senate, and, of course, the Congress. However, mounting railroad influence and the threat posed by the ambitious A. B. Cummins, who sought Republican leadership, would bring change and dissension into state politics.

In 1900 all eleven of Iowa's Representatives and both Senators were Republicans, and D. B. Henderson, who was from the Third District, was Speaker of the House. The governorship had been in Republican hands since the close of Horace Boies's term in January, 1894. The Republican state platform reflected the party's national platform which championed the winning issues of protective tariff and the gold standard.¹

¹Iowa Official Register, 1901 (Des Moines: State Printer, 1901).
Some men who looked beyond these external signs of party success detected omens of party strife. Railroad influence during the governorship of Republican Governor Leslie M. Shaw, who began his first term in 1898, had grown continually. The Des Moines Leader charged that the Republican party was in danger of domination by at least two railroads, declaring that "a political machine is being fashioned superior to the one of the Regency. The impression grows that Iowa's political capital oscillates between a couple of railroad offices." The Leader also accused the state Railroad Commission of failing to fulfill its responsibility to regulate the roads, and charged that the Governor and other state officers comprising the Executive Council more adequately represented railroad interests than the people's interests. Alvin C. Hobart, a candidate for Secretary of State, an office represented on the Executive Council, announced his plans to seek the position upon receiving support from Judge Hubbard and J. W. Blythe. Furthermore,

2While William Larabee was governor from 1886 to 1890, the railroads declined in power.

3Leader, July 29, 1900. The term "Regency" refers to the political influence of the editors of the Iowa State Register and other Allison supporters.

E. E. Hart, Iowa's new national committeeman for the Republican party, was the candidate of Blythe and his father-in-law, Senator Gear.5

Railroad influence was also involved in the appointment of a federal judge in southern Iowa. Blythe conferred with the Iowa Congressional delegation concerning his choices for the new judge, namely, W. I. Smith of Council Bluffs or James A. Davis of Keokuk. The delegation was divided. Lacey favored William McNett from Ottumwa in the Sixth District, and Hepburn supported H. M. Towner as a satisfactory way of removing a potential political rival from the Eighth Congressional District. While it appeared that the Iowa delegation rebuffed Blythe, compromise saved him from outright defeat. Congressman Smith McPherson received the federal judgeship in southern Iowa, but Blythe's candidate for the appointment, W. I. Smith, was later elected to replace McPherson from the Ninth District, which was in the Reservation.6

These examples of railroad influence in state politics, however, paled in comparison to the role of the


railroads in Iowa's Senate race of 1900. The contest of 1894 was renewed, with A. B. Cummins attempting a second time to challenge the incumbent, John H. Gear. Although the war veterans urged Lacey in 1899 to run for the Senate, he refused to oppose Gear. Experiences in his first contest with Gear taught him the meaning of cooperation in organization politics, and he remained an avowed supporter of the old man for a second Senate term. Lacey tactfully explained that he and Gear had many mutual friends, and his opposing Gear would result in a party division within the state.\(^7\) Lacey added, however, that the time was ripe for the election of a soldier-senator in the event of Gear's death.\(^8\)

When Governor Shaw also refused to run against Gear, Cummins' followers declared that the absence of competition

\(^7\) Gear was J. W. Blythe's father-in-law. See six letters from John Gear, from May through September, 1899, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 250, in which Lacey's support is made clear. Letter from J. F. Lacey, n.d., but answer to one from Gen. Robert St. George Dyrenforth, Commander-in-chief of the National Command, Union Veterans Union, Apr. 1, 1899; letters from Peter Kiene, veteran from Dubuque, Mar. 23, 31, 1899, to Lacey, and Lacey's response to them, n.d., in Lacey Papers, Vol. 250. Letter of Major General L. M. Langstaff of Union Veterans Union of Iowa, Mar. 27, 1899, to Lacey and letter of Lacey, Apr. 3, 1899, to Langstaff, Lacey Papers, Vol. 250.

amounted to a scheme to insure Gear's re-election. The Cummins wing of the party repeatedly spoke of "machine control." 9

Cummins' campaign for the Senate nomination was intense but short-lived; his withdrawal from the race cleared the path for Gear's re-election. Cummins recognized that he lacked legislative support when his candidate for Speaker of the Iowa House, W. L. Eaton, lost to Gear's candidate, D. H. Bowen. Cummins withdrew and Gear's nomination by acclamation followed; the veteran Republican easily defeated his Democratic opponent, Fred E. White. Friends of Cummins termed the outcome of the Senate race "a victory for Blythe and the C. B. and Q." 10 Apparent victory, however, proved only an armistice in the fight for the Senate. Senator Gear died on July 14, and Iowa politics assumed an air of crisis. Once more the question of senatorial succession plagued party leaders. 11


10Daily Iowa Capital, Jan. 5, 8, 1900. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Jan. 3, 8, 9, 1900, which predicted Gear's victory. The pro-Cummins Leader, Jan. 6, 9, 1900, reported that the "Q" area was nearly unanimous for Gear. For a thorough analysis of the Gear-Cummins struggle, see Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. VIII, pp. 15-60. See also Sage, Allison, pp. 275-277.

11Daily Iowa Capital, July 14, 1900. Iowa State Register, July 15, 1900.
Lacey lost no time in entering the Senate race. Informed by his brother Will of Gear's death, Lacey responded, "I will be an active candidate for the Gear candidacy and hope my interests may be protected in my absence." Writing from an Indian reservation near Flagstaff, Arizona, he instructed his brother to notify C. V. Hoffman and other supporters, and added that, "my candidacy should be announced so that it may not be overlooked." 12

After instructing Will on immediate steps to be taken, Lacey advised Governor Shaw that he was a candidate. Shaw replied that he was not personally committed to any candidate. "The situation as you know," he informed Lacey, "is somewhat complicated and I dare not at this time make any promises." 13 This was an obvious understatement because Shaw desired the Senate position himself. He did not think it proper, however, to resign in order that the Lieutenant Governor might appoint him to Gear's unexpired term. 14

Senator Gear's death left the railroad machine in momentary confusion; leaders of this group initiated plans


14Daily Iowa Capital, July 14, 1900. Iowa State Register, July 15, 1900.
to select a new candidate. J. E. Blythe, brother of the Reservation's boss, arranged a Chicago conference to discuss the political crisis in Iowa. Governor Shaw was invited, and J. W. Blythe, while informing Allison of the conference, urged the senior Senator to attend. "I hope you can meet us," Blythe wrote, "for I think the situation critical. The papers announce Dolliver and it seems to be taken for granted that Hepburn and Lacey will certainly be candidates."15 Shaw's hopes for the railroad machine's endorsement of his candidacy appeared groundless. Blythe told Allison that he interpreted the editorial advice of the pro-Cummins Des Moines Daily Capital to mean that Governor Shaw should stay out of the Senate contest.16

Lacey was not the Burlington's choice to succeed Gear. In a letter to Allison, Blythe confirmed that Lacey's chances for the Senate were slim, and confided, "I understand that Major Lacey thinks that his claims have not been given sufficient consideration, but I hope he will change


16Ibid. Lafe Young, editor of the Daily Iowa Capital, had written that Shaw should name the best man. Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. VIII, pp. 67-70, treats a series of conferences between Blythe, Allison, Shaw and others. At one conference, Shaw proffered the Senate seat to Blythe who declined.
his mind when he has looked the field over." The general absence of communication between Lacey and Blythe about the Senate controversy underscored the railroad machine's desire for some other candidate. Furthermore, Blythe's brother, who was politically powerful in his own right, considered Lacey "too unpopular" to win.

Prominent anti-railroad newspapers revealed hostility to the machine's role in the Senate contest. Three Des Moines dailies, the Leader, the Capital, and the Iowa State Register endorsed A. B. Cummins. Much of their speculation on the endorsement of candidates by the railroad machine only added to the public's confusion. The Capital announced that J. W. Blythe and Judge Hubbard planned to give George D. Perkins, of the Sioux City Journal, the short term appointment and Governor Shaw the full term by election.


18 Ross, Dolliver, p. 162. After the important Chicago conference, J. E. Blythe wrote to Shaw that Hepburn was "too old, Lacey too unpopular, Perkins too weak . . ." and that left Hull and Dolliver. Since J. A. T. Hull was from Cummins' district, J. E. Blythe considered Dolliver the stronger candidate.

19 Leader, July 18, 19, 1900. Daily Iowa Capital, July 16, Aug. 18, 1900. Iowa State Register, Aug. 5, 1900.

20 Daily Iowa Capital, July 16, 1900. The prestige of a short Senate term would aid Perkins to regain his lost seat from the Eleventh Congressional District it was claimed. Blythe's letter to Allison, July 20, 1900, Allison Papers, Vol. 76, demonstrates the incorrectness of the analysis by Lafe Young.
The Leader interpreted the scheme somewhat differently, placing Perkins in the Governor's chair and elevating Shaw to the six-year Senate term. Some two weeks later the Leader portrayed Lacey as "the hand-picked candidate" of J. W. Blythe, and charged that Lacey used his headquarters at the Republican State Convention to further his candidacy. Lacey favored the Governor's appointing a new Senator until the regular meeting of the state legislature; this view together with Shaw's visit to Lacey's convention headquarters confirmed the Leader's judgment that a Lacey-Blythe link existed. As events were to prove, both the Capital and the Leader were wrong in their analysis. The Leader was more nearly correct when it offered still a third interpretation some two weeks later. Switching to a new position, it editorialized that "all the senatorial kittens" had been drowned but J. P. Dolliver and A. B. Cummins. As events were to prove, the Leader was substantially correct in its last analysis of the Iowa political crisis.

The only newspapers enthusiastic for Lacey's candidacy were of limited circulation, many of them loyal Sixth District organs. The Iowa City Republican inquired whether or not Lacey could be spared from his district. The Clear Lake Mirror endorsed Lacey as a man who "has

21 Leader, July 17, 1900.
22 Ibid., Aug. 1, 3, 1900.
23 Ibid., Aug. 14, 1900.
earned promotion," and then proceeded to damn him with faint praise. Lacey was not as "strong as some men, does not acquit himself so well in the oratorical dress parade, but there is no discount on his ability." The loyal Grinnell Herald declared that no one could fill Gear's place with more honor.

The New Sharon Star endorsed Lacey by asserting that men from northern Iowa should not represent southern Iowa in the Senate. Furthermore, Dolliver from Fort Dodge should not be appointed because such a move would complicate Governor Shaw's own desires to reach the Senate. Both men were from the same congressional district. As no one expected Cummins to receive Gear's seat, the editor concluded that by this process of elimination only Lacey was left. The editor of the Hedrick Herald testified to Lacey's interest in Senate membership by announcing that it was known that he "has looked forward to being a candidate should a vacancy occur." The Herald endorsed Lacey as a keen political

---

24 Clipping from Mirror (Clear Lake, Iowa), n.d., 1900, in unclassified Lacey Papers, Census and Archives Department, Historical Building, Des Moines, Iowa. Republican (Iowa City, Iowa), July 25, 1900.


26 Clipping of Hedrick Herald (Hedrick, Iowa), n.d., in unclassified Lacey Papers, Census and Archives Department, Historical Building, Des Moines, Iowa.
observer and a gentleman who had built a national reputation through his own efforts.

Few colleagues reacted to Lacey's candidacy, and those who did took different stands. A Dubuque war veteran, L. M. Langstaff, who had urged Lacey to oppose Gear for reelection, placed himself at Lacey's command. Langstaff was well aware that Iowa had never had a soldier-senator, and to him Lacey was the logical candidate to end that omission.27 Another supporter with similar thoughts urged Governor Shaw to appoint Lacey because he was "undoubtedly the choice of the ex-Union soldiers."28 At least one railroad official, in this instance from outside the Reservation, recommended that Shaw appoint Lacey but he did so only at Lacey's request.29 In other solicitations for support, Lacey met rebuff. Some colleagues preferred neutrality in the Senate race, and some straightforwardly rejected Lacey in order to support Cummins.30

27Letter of Major General L. M. Langstaff, Commander of Union Veterans Union of Iowa, July 14, 1900, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251.

28Letter of W. H. Redman, Aug. 15, 1900, to L. M. Shaw, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251. A subsequent letter from Redman to Lacey on Aug. 17, 1900, denoted a less pure motive on Redman's part. Lacey's promotion would have facilitated the nomination of Redman's friend, Capt. J. W. Carr, as Sixth District Congressman.


30Letter of John Hughes, Iowa Assembly member, Aug. 7, 1900, to Lacey; letter of T. J. Fletcher, Aug. 9, 1900, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251.
A state constitutional question further complicated the difficulties in choosing Gear's successor. The state legislature had passed the Titus Amendment to the Iowa Constitution. This provided for biennial elections and in effect eliminated annual contests which resulted from the alternation of state and national elections in Iowa. If the amendment were ratified, the governor and the state legislators would remain in office through 1902. If the amendment were not approved, a new legislature would select the man for Gear's six-year term, and Governor Shaw would be out of office and available as a Senate candidate. As it was, the voters of Iowa approved the Titus amendment, and Governor Shaw and the legislators moved to select Gear's successor.31

Speculation over the choice of Gear's short-term successor ended when Shaw announced in late August that he had selected Congressman J. P. Dolliver.32 Ross, the biographer of Dolliver, claimed that the new appointee won machine support because he was the strongest candidate to stop Cummins' drive to reach the Senate. The Governor in

31Daily Iowa Capital, July 14, 1900. Leader, July 17, Sept. 1, 1900. Iowa State Register, Oct. 7, 14, 1900, opposed the Titus Amendment as did the Dubuque-Telegraph (Dubuque, Iowa). They were said to be the only two papers in opposition. See the Daily News, Sept. 13, 1900, for the charge against the two newspapers. See Chapter X of this study for subsequent development of the Titus Amendment.

32Iowa State Register, Aug. 23, 1900. Daily Iowa Capital, Aug. 22, 1900.
forswearing his own senatorial aspirations found consolation, Ross added, in James E. Blythe's intimation that the Iowa Congressional delegation would work to secure a Cabinet appointment for Shaw.  

Lacey mailed the customary congratulatory letter to Dolliver at once, and the victor replied with a message calculated to assuage Lacey's disappointment in not receiving Shaw's favor. Dolliver assured Lacey that he had informed the Governor that he would have heartily supported Lacey's appointment and added that "for a long time I thought the governor was looking in your direction." Although the Iowa State Register hinted that Lacey might oppose Dolliver for the full Senate term in 1901, the charge was never substantiated. Lacey was astute enough to realize that he lacked broad support and that he was not the choice of the railroad bosses or the party leaders in the state. Until

---

33 This did occur and Shaw became Treasury Secretary under President Roosevelt. Ross, Dolliver, pp. 163-165. Some Republicans objected to Dolliver's appointment as part of a bargain to have the Tenth District name the Governor's friend, Judge J. P. Conner to Congress. Conner was elected to replace Dolliver. Iowa State Register, Dec. 5, 1900. Leader, Sept. 26, 1900. Sioux City Tribune, Sept. 27, 1900. Iowa Official Register, 1901.

34 Letter of J. P. Dolliver, Aug. 27, 1900, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251.

35 Iowa State Register, Dec. 5, 1900. Lacey's correspondence offers no evidence to suggest he thought of contesting for the Senate seat in 1901.
Allison's death, Lacey manifested no further aspirations for the Senate.

In the interlude between the two phases of the senatorial contest, Iowa politicians concerned themselves with the possible selection of a native son for second place on the national ticket. Lafe Young, Capital editor, initiated a publicity campaign for Lacey for vice president in 1900. Other newspapers of various factional affiliation offered a number of reasons for supporting Lacey. The Ottumwa Courier called him the "right man for the place." Echoing the same theme, the Des Moines Leader declared Lacey exceptionally well-informed, and claimed that he was "probably next to Allison from Iowa in being at home no matter what the discussion." The editor of that newspaper pointed to Lacey's advantages as a veteran and to his experience as a presiding officer in Speaker Henderson's absence from the House. Lacey's hometown paper, the Oskaloosa Daily Herald, reprinted the Leader's editorial because the editor believed he could not improve upon this endorsement.

---

36 Daily Iowa Capital, May 23, 1900.
37 Ottumwa Courier, May 23, 1900. On May 25, the Courier declared that Young's boom made it look as if Lacey were the only available man.
38 Leader, May 23, 1900.
39 Ibid.
40 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, May 23, 1900. The Oskaloosa Saturday Globe, June 2, 1900, reprinted a complimentary article from the Nevada Republican (Nevada, Iowa).
Few friends, however, gave Lacey support for the second place on the national ticket. One who did encourage him was Major S. H. M. Byers, a fellow Oskaloosan and GAR member.41 Another colleague wrote more realistically by pointing to the danger of political extinction if Lacey were named to the vice presidency. "Now it may be that you want to retire from political life," he warned Lacey. "If so, accept the vice presidency. But if you prefer to remain in politics refuse it," admonished Lacey's friend. He advised the Congressman to wait for a Senate opening if he desired political advancement.42

The possibility of an Iowan for vice president became entangled with the issue of the House Speakership, an office held at that time by Iowa's D. B. Henderson. Since it was unlikely that both bodies in the Congress would be presided over by men from the same state, some political analysts viewed the offer of the vice presidency to Iowa as a scheme to oust Henderson and make Illinois' Joseph Cannon the Speaker.43

The problem of the Speakership was taken up by the Iowa press in June with the initiation of a Dolliver-for-


42Letter of Jed Lake, May 24, 1900, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251. Senator Gear was not yet dead at the time of Lake's advice.

43Ross, Dolliver, pp. 158-162, 323.
vice-president boom. Neither the Des Moines Capital nor the Leader believed Henderson's chances for re-election as Speaker were endangered by the selection of an Iowan for vice president. The Capital claimed that Henderson supported J. P. Dolliver for the second place on the ticket, something the Speaker would not do if it threatened his position.44 Ross, Dolliver's biographer, claimed that the vice presidential movement in Dolliver's behalf had nothing to do with questioning the leadership of Speaker Henderson and asserted that Dolliver had not only the support of Henderson but that of Allison also.45

After a visit to Washington, H. O. Weaver, the Iowa State Republican Chairman, assessed the relationship of the Speaker and vice presidential choices differently, concluding that Speaker Henderson would be affected adversely by the nomination of an Iowan to the vice presidency. Weaver's conversations in the nation's capital convinced him that the New York delegation would select the vice presidential

44Daily Iowa Capital, May 23, June 4, 6, 9, 1900. The Leader switched support from Lacey to Dolliver without explanation on June 9, 1900.

45Ross also stated that Cummins advocated Dolliver to eliminate him as a future Senate rival, and the Blythe-Hubbard machine espoused Dolliver as a method of opening a Senate position for Governor Shaw. Gear was seventy-five years old when re-elected, and there was some expectation that he might not live to complete his term. See Ross, Dolliver, pp. 158-160 and Sage, Allison, p. 277.
candidate; and in the event that the national convention failed to ratify New York's choice, the position would move westward to Shaw, Dolliver, and Lacey in that order. These Iowa men, Weaver added, would likely win support from some states which wanted to secure an opening for the Speakership.46

The Iowa State Register reflected views similar to those of Weaver when it editorialized against Dolliver or any other Iowan for vice president as "an attempt . . . to get Henderson out of the Speakership."47 Later the paper broadened the base of its argument. The editor declared that the vice presidential nominee should strengthen the party ticket; and since he believed Iowa was "safe" for the Republican party, he concluded that it was not necessary to reward Allison, Dolliver, Shaw, or Lacey in this fashion.48

46Daily Iowa Capital, May 31, 1900.

47Iowa State Register, June 2, 1900.

48Ibid., June 14, 16, 1900. The Sioux City Tribune, a Democratic paper, failed to assess the Register's judgment as altruistic. It labeled the Des Moines paper's opposition to Dolliver as part of a Gear-Shaw scheme to have Allison named to the second place on the ticket, thus clearing the way for Shaw's elevation to the Senate. This seemed to presume that Allison would have accepted, a proposition hardly likely when the Senator had earlier refused Cabinet offers from Garfield, Harrison, and McKinley because he preferred the Senate. Sage, Allison, p. 278, stated that Allison supported Dolliver.
Lacey probably never took his candidacy for vice president seriously. In fact, early in the Republican National Convention in June of 1900, he predicted that Iowa's chances for the national ticket rested solely with Dolliver. Lacey predicted that the position would go to Dolliver or to John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy from Massachusetts, and that Mark Hanna would make the choice. As the national convention progressed, events proved Lacey's judgment erroneous on both counts. Dolliver's name was never presented to the assembled Republicans. Lafe Young, who was prepared to place the Iowan's name in nomination, altered his speech to nominate Theodore Roosevelt, the choice of Boss Thomas C. Platt of New York.

Lacey's role in the Sixth District congressional race in 1900 absorbed most of his time and concern, and, needless to say, the outcome of the election was far more significant to him than the momentary skirmish over the vice presidency. Several problems confronted Lacey in his bid for re-election to Congress that year. Opposition candidates arose to contest his nomination by the Republican party. One such candidate, H. L. Waterman of Ottumwa,

49 Leader, June 19, 1900. Daily Iowa Capital, June 20, 1900.

received the support of Wapello County because Wapello Republicans accused Lacey of neglecting them in the distribution of patronage. Political rebellion also occurred in Poweshiek County when Captain J. W. Carr entered the race. Carr represented the Cummins faction in the county, and opposed Lacey because of his tie to the railroad interests which earlier had supported Gear and quashed Cummins' hopes for political advancement.

The action of Nate Kendall, a man of great self-esteem and an Iowa legislator from Albia in the Sixth District, was another source of irritation to Lacey. Kendall supported Waterman until the latter withdrew. Furthermore, Kendall tried to embarrass Lacey over his vote in Congress for the Puerto Rican tariff bill. Taking advantage of Iowans' dislike for the Puerto Rican bill, Kendall persuaded the Iowa legislature to pass a resolution opposing a tax on products entering the United States from that island.

---


53 Reprint of *Times-Republican* in Oskaloosa *Saturday Globe*, Apr. 21, 1900.
Kendall's tactic may have profited Lacey more than it hurt him because the powerful *Iowa State Register* ridiculed the Puerto Rican resolution. The paper denounced it as a thinly disguised attempt to help Waterman's candidacy, and questioned the value of the Assembly's action, saying that it took but one hour to decide an issue which the House of Representatives had studied and debated for three months.54

Lacey encountered additional criticism because many newspaper publishers owed their appointment as postmasters to him. Postmaster-journalists in Oskaloosa, Sigourney, Bloomfield, Ottumwa, and other Sixth District towns expressed their elation over H. L. Waterman's withdrawal of his bid for nomination. The Ottumwa *Saturday Herald* accused the editor of the *Ottumwa Courier*, who was also the city's postmaster, of wiring support to Lacey within five minutes of Waterman's withdrawal.55

The threat of opposition to Lacey by an Albia editor, J. R. Norman of the *Southern Iowa Educator*, illustrated the lingering problem of fusionism in the Sixth District. Norman informed the Republican National Committee of

54*Iowa State Register*, Mar. 24, 25, 1900. Will Lacey reassured his brother that the tariff bill had little impact in Mahaska County. Letter of W. R. Lacey, Apr. 23, 1900, to J. F. Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251.

plans to elect a fusionist candidate rather than Lacey, but indicated that the editorial support of his paper for the incumbent could be purchased. "If you wish that I assist you in this campaign kindly place me on your liberal pension list and send me the first installment by return mail," he advised the Committee. The editor's challenge to "pay me or perish" was significant because Norman was Sixth District Chairman of the Peoples party and a delegate to its National Convention.56

Alienated Silver Republicans accentuated the problem of fusionism in 1900. A strong element of Iowa Republicans who favored silver rejected the party's platform, which endorsed the gold standard and defined prosperity as the key campaign issue. These dissident Republicans from Iowa and other states met in their own convention and espoused the Democratic national ticket of Bryan and Adlai Stevenson.57 Since the Sixth District had long been harassed by cheap money views and the entrenchment of both Greenback and Populist theories, this split among Republicans over the silver question was a real threat to Lacey.

56Letter of J. R. Norman, May 7, 1900, to Republican National Committee and clipping from Southern Iowa Educator (Albia, Iowa), May 2, 1900, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251. Norman was from Nate Kendall's hometown.

57Leader, April 14, July 5, 7, 16, 1900. The Leader claimed Iowa had 40,000 Silver Republicans and that nearly every county in the state was represented in their National Convention.
Lacey's supporters claimed they were never worried by the opposition to their candidate, and their confidence proved to be justified. By July, Lacey had the support of six of the seven counties in the district. Carr captured only Poweshiek County and it was no surprise at the District Convention when Carr rose to place Lacey's name in nomination. For the seventh consecutive time, Lacey received his party's nomination for Congress by acclamation.58

The Democrats selected Judge A. C. Steck from Ottumwa to oppose Lacey and prepared to base their campaign on imperialism with silver as an ancillary issue. They would have done well to ignore the latter problem because in adopting it the Democrats placed Steck, a Gold Democrat, in a precarious position for the campaign.59

Lacey waged a vigorous campaign and denounced the Democrats as "Fourth of Juliiars." Much of his campaign rhetoric emphasized the difference between the actions of Democrats and the principles set forth in their National Convention of July, 1900. Pointing up the inconsistency of Bryan, who voted for the Spanish-American war treaty and then cried "imperialism," Lacey defended the policy of the

58Oskaloosa Daily Herald, July 3, 11, 1900.

59Ibid., July 31, Aug. 1, 8, 22, 1900. Ottumwa Courier, July 31, 1900. The Sioux City Tribune, July 4-11, 1900, gave a good account of the Democratic National Convention and platform. See also Iowa State Register, Aug. 7, 1900.
Republicans as an "expansion of sovereignty" consistent with American history. He charged the Democrats with hypocrisy in opposing trusts because they had refused to cooperate in securing a constitutional amendment for trust regulation. Lacey would not accept the Democratic charge that the tariff was the "mother of trusts." He pointed out that Standard Oil was the greatest of all trusts but that petroleum was on the free list. Then in a display of sarcasm and wit, Lacey referred to the New York ice trust and told his audiences that "ice is not on the dutiable list, but the New York Democrats have found themselves able to organize a trust big enough to put their whole party in cold storage." Lacey endorsed protectionism completely and claimed that the nation's balance of trade from 1897 to 1900 was nearly triple the amount of the preceding century. Lacey's defense of the tariff was hailed as irrefutable by his Republican friends. He used excerpts from Democratic sources on the depression years of 1893-1897, and

60 Lacey's Nomination Speech, 1900, in unclassified Lacey Papers. Lacey speech before the State Epworth League in Leader, Aug. 1, 1900. The Iowa State Register, June 6, 1900, also charged deceit to Democrats over the Constitutional amendment. They were really opposed to its vagueness which Democrats believed permitted the inclusion of labor unions as illegal restraints of trade. They did support the Republicans' Littlefield Bill which exempted labor unions from the provisions. See Newton Herald, Sept. 28, 1900.
from the same sources garnered extracts on the nation's prosperity after the passage of the Dingley Act.61

Although prohibition was not a major issue in 1900, party spokesmen reminded Republicans from southern Iowa that the Prohibition party drew strength from disgruntled Republicans to the distinct benefit of the Democrats. Temperance Republicans were cautioned not to cast their votes as if there were but the one issue of prohibition at stake. The Burlington Hawk-eye advised that "expansion, currency, and tariff questions are in the forefront . . . so this is not a good year for thinking men to waste votes on prohibition candidates."62

The campaign reflected a rising concern over minority bloc support, especially the votes of Germans and Roman Catholics. Some Germans who voted Republican in 1896 now opposed the party ticket on the issue of imperialism. Colonel Joseph Eiboeck, editor of the Staats-Anzeiger, the leading German weekly in Des Moines, threw his support to Bryan and declared that his own sentiments reflected the

61Iowa State Register, June 8, 1900. Lacey's speech for Republican Congressional candidate, J. N. Rumple, in the normally Democratic Second District of eastern Iowa, on Sept. 17, 1900, is a good example of Lacey's witty treatment of the issues of silver and imperialism and the discrepancy between Democratic words and deeds on these two issues. See Lacey's speech in unclassified Lacey Papers.

62Hawk-eye, July 3, 1900.
views of most German-Americans. Republican concern over the German vote increased when the Democrats named Eiboeck an elector-at-large to their National Convention for the purpose of "holding the Dutch [Germans] for the Democratic party's congressional ticket." Democratic officials planned to weld together the support of Silver and Gold Democrats and the Populists, particularly in the Sixth and Eighth districts of Lacey and W. P. Hepburn.63

Republicans feared the loss of Catholic votes because of the settlements concerning church property in territories lost by Spain in the Spanish-American war. Party officials also envisioned the alienation of many Catholic Republicans when a statement was circulated that Archbishop John Ireland, the spirited church leader from Minneapolis, intended to vote for Bryan.64 Although this rumor was false, the Oskaloosa Daily Herald made a definite attempt to hold Catholic voters for Lacey. It featured articles on Rome's approval of the church-state policies in Cuba and the Philippines and publicized Ireland's endorsement of McKinley as the best way to continue the nation's prosperity and solve the problems


64Newton Herald, Sept. 28, 1900.
emanating from the recent war. On election eve, Lacey's hometown paper pleaded with Catholics to read the paper's articles about Pope Leo and other prominent churchmen before casting their votes.  

Lacey and Sixth District Republicans courted the Negro vote also. George H. Woodson, a black attorney from Muchakinock, was named alternate delegate to the Republican National Convention. The Oskaloosa Herald printed Woodson's open letter urging all Negroes in the Sixth District to vote the Republican ticket. The black man, he said, had no trouble deciding which was paramount among the issues, which were "imperialism, militarism, trusts, free silver, and the degradation of the Negro race." Delegations from Oskaloosa, Ottumwa, Albia, and Muchakinock represented the Sixth District at a state-wide pre-election rally of black Republicans in Des Moines.  

False charges were hurled at Lacey in the campaign, but his supporters converted them into assets. Lacey's alleged opposition to rural free delivery prompted the news release that he was at work on a state-wide RFD plan, and had secured two new routes out of Oskaloosa with rural delivery

66Ibid., May 21, Oct. 12, 1900.
67Iowa State Register, Nov. 1, 1900.
for some 2,000 people commencing near election day. The 
Oskaloosa Herald took the charge that Lacey enriched himself 
with a veteran's pension and explained that he was the local 
man who made good but whose only connection with pensions was 
his unselfish efforts to secure them for others. Rej ectlng 
these accusations as false rumors, the respected Iowa State 
Register attributed them to the fact that opponents could find "nothing that was both wrong and true in Lacey's life."

During the last days of the campaign, reports of a 
Democratic "still-hunt" (secret or undercover campaign 
tactics), created feverish activity in the Sixth District. 
Although J. W. Blythe assured Lacey he would win, the 
Burlington's attorney was sufficiently concerned to suggest 
a conference to discuss ways he might be of service. Allison volunteered his services for "another speech or two" in Lacey's favor. Governor Shaw urged voters to support 
Lacey, and Senator Dolliver spoke twice in his behalf.

68 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Mar. 31, Apr. 6, Oct. 15, 


70 Iowa State Register, Nov. 3, 1900.

71 Letter of J. W. Blythe, Sept. 9, 1900, to Lacey, 
Lacey Papers, Vol. 251.

72 Letter of W. B. Allison, Nov., n.d., 1900, to 
Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251.

Lacey was fortunate in receiving the aid of the three top party leaders in the state as well as that of Iowa’s most powerful political boss, J. W. Blythe. The support of these men helped compensate for the denial of Lacey’s request for out-of-state party leaders to help in the district. For the last two months of the campaign, he increased his efforts, speaking every day and occasionally several times daily. He closed his campaign with addresses at three different halls in Oskaloosa on election eve.

Organization and effort paid off handsomely. Lacey’s margin of victory was twice the size of any of his previous triumphs, while Judge Steck lost his home county of Wapello and carried only Davis. All Republican congressmen in the state won as part of the great tidal wave giving McKinley a majority of 100,000 votes in Iowa. In the face of such a general victory for Republicans, State Chairman Weaver singled out the Sixth District winner for special congratulations because the Democrats had marked Lacey as a special target for defeat.

74 Letter of H. O. Weaver, State Chairman, Sept. 19, 1900, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251.

75 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Sept.–Oct., 1900, issues listed his itinerary. See also the Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 6, 1900, and Iowa State Register, Oct. 20, Nov. 5, 1900.

76 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 7, 9, 10, 1900. Iowa State Register, Nov. 7, 8, 1900. Autobiography, p. 124. Iowa Official Register, 1901, listed 22,956 votes for Lacey and 19,812 for Steck with Lacey’s majority 3,144.

77 J. N. Rumple, Second District victor for Congress, also received special congratulations.
The superb efforts by Chairman Weaver effectively supplemented the campaign work of Lacey and other party candidates. Weaver arranged thousands of speeches and distributed free materials conveying Republican views to hundreds of newspapers in every school district of Iowa.\textsuperscript{78} Another factor in achieving victory for Iowa Republicans may be found in a letter directed to Senator Allison. The correspondent informed the Senator that "the R. R. boys I consider did nobly by the Republican ticket."\textsuperscript{79} Allison's informant underscored the verity of his judgment when he told the Senator that he had gathered his election evidence while doing "company work \textit{in the Midwest} for the Republican National Committee."\textsuperscript{80}

As 1900 drew to a close, Iowa witnessed a deceptive political serenity. Dolliver was with Allison in the Senate and the Republicans had won in all eleven Congressional districts. Passage of the biennial election law meant that L. M. Shaw would occupy the Governor's chair an extra year, and above all, it meant that Cummins' political machine was

\textsuperscript{78}Leader, Nov. 8, 1900. \textit{Gate City}, Nov. 8, 1900. \textit{Ottumwa Courier}, Nov. 13, 1900.

\textsuperscript{79}Letter of Fred L. Barnett, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, Nov. 8, 1900, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 76.

\textsuperscript{80}Ibid.
silenced until 1902. This tranquility ended when the Burlington Hawk-eye predicted that the courts would invalidate the Titus Amendment to Iowa's constitution. As Iowans anticipated the possible return to annual elections in 1901, chaos replaced the calm of the century year.  

---

81 Reprint of Hawk-eye in Daily Iowa Capital, Dec. 4, 1900. Harlan, History of Iowa, Vol. II, p. 222. The Titus Amendment was invalidated on the technicality that the wording differed in its recording in the Senate and House Journals.
CHAPTER VII

CONTEST FOR PARTY CONTROL: LACEY'S ROLE IN 1901

The judicial ruling invalidating the Titus amendment to the Iowa constitution, which substituted biennial for annual elections, initiated a contest for control within the Republican party in the state which divided the party into two camps by the close of 1901. This intra-party struggle for power endured during the seven years A. B. Cummins occupied the Governor's chair. At the very outset of the contest for party control by Cummins and his followers, Lacey allied himself with the anti-Cummins leadership of the Republican party. In obedience to political convention, however, Lacey supported Cummins for the governorship after he won the party's nomination to that position.

The Titus amendment began its progression through the courts in January, 1901. Within a month the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court, and the amendment was struck from the state constitution. At once state candidates scrambled to begin nomination proceedings.1

Speculation about possible candidates for governor assumed more than usual importance to Republican leaders in 1901. Judge Hubbard's stated preference for George D. Perkins, former Eleventh District Congressman and editor of the Sioux City Journal, confirmed a rumor that the railroad machine was not supporting Governor Shaw for a third term. In what was undoubtedly a play for time, Blythe indicated he would not support any particular candidate.\(^2\)

Within a week of the Supreme Court ruling, George Perkins was in the race for gubernatorial nomination. Among the other aspirants were A. B. Cummins, State Senator W. F. Harriman, and Railroad Commissioner Colonel Frank Palmer. Endorsing Cummins at once, the Daily Capital suggested that everyone but Perkins and Cummins might as well "take down their signs."\(^3\)

Blythe was still to be reckoned with, however. In spite of assurances that he would support any "honest candidate," he searched for a man who could counter the strength Cummins was developing as a candidate. For a time, Blythe centered his attention on Dallas County's E. H. Conger, the popular United States Minister to China.\(^4\)

---


\(^3\)Daily Capital, Feb. 4, 9, 1901. Iowa State Register, Feb. 9, 10, 1901. Daily Capital, Feb. 19, 1901.

\(^4\)Conger's fame was greatly enhanced the previous summer by the report that he and his entire family had
Rumors soon appeared in the press that Conger would return home to seek the governorship. The Capital declared that he was being "used," and that he was too far away to grasp the intricacies of Iowa politics. Conger was being suggested as a harmony candidate, but in reality it was hoped that he would defeat Cummins. Even Conger's willingness to be a candidate was in dispute. Congressman J. A. T. Hull wired Conger in Peking for a statement about his plans, and on January 29, received the answer that he "would accept but would not fight for the nomination." Before Hull revealed his communication with the minister, both Perkins and Cummins announced their plans to seek the Republican gubernatorial nomination. Following the publication of Conger's telegram to Hull, Cummins sent his own inquiry to the minister in Peking, and Conger answered that he definitely was not a candidate for the governorship. The two Conger messages been killed in the Boxer Rebellion. The sanctifying effect of this political martyrdom did not diminish when Conger was later found to be unharmed. See Oskaloosa Daily Herald July 18, 1900. Blythe borrowed from the Chinese revolt the Boxer epithet which he applied to Cummins' followers.

5 Daily Capital, Feb. 19, 20, 1901.

6 Leader, May 3, 1901. Iowa State Register, Feb. 12, 1901.

7 Daily Capital, Feb. 25, 1901. Iowa State Register, Feb. 24, 1901.
evoked much public discussion; and when Hull perceived that anti-Cummins forces were not rallying to support Conger, the Congressman minimized his role in the gubernatorial contest.  

Blythe, disgusted by Hull's withdrawal, continued to press for Conger's candidacy. Although a Chicago meeting of Allison, Dolliver, Blythe, and Cummins' supporter Colonel D. W. French was described as pure coincidence, plainly Blythe had called the conference. The Chicago conferees decided to persuade Conger, then enroute to Washington to report on the Boxer Rebellion, to accept the gubernatorial candidacy. They also selected Lacey to court the diplomat in behalf of the anti-Cummins leaders of the party.

Blythe requested Lacey to welcome Conger upon his arrival in San Francisco. Flatteringly, he wrote Lacey: "I see it advertised that Captain Hull is to meet Conger in San Francisco . . . but I have said nothing, except to Allison and Dolliver about the possibility of your going. I have not mentioned it to Hubbard or anybody else." Blythe added that he thought "it ought not to be mentioned." The railroad boss was careful to let Lacey know that both Senators approved of

8 Rather than risk his own re-election from the Fifth District, Cummins political home, Hull announced plans to be out of the country most of the summer. See Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. IX, p. 19. Iowa State Register, Mar. 17, 1901.

9 Leader, Apr. 3, 1901.
his trip to the west coast. In addition, Blythe invited Lacey to a meeting, so that they could discuss Allison's view of the whole gubernatorial situation.\(^\text{10}\)

Two days later Blythe assured Lacey that Hull would not be going to San Francisco, and extended another invitation to a Chicago conference, which D. B. Henderson also would attend.\(^\text{11}\) However, Blythe's ego-building tactics were of no avail, for Lacey pleaded that Conger's arrival was not a free date for him.

Even after repeated requests, Lacey remained firm in his decision not to involve himself in Blythe's plans for Conger, and he did not go to San Francisco.\(^\text{12}\) Undoubtedly, Conger's conduct on arrival from China confirmed Lacey's view that his judgment was correct. When questioned on his two different responses about the gubernatorial race, Conger simply repeated that he was not a candidate but would accept the nomination if chosen. After enumerating several men who would make good governors, Conger unpardonably singled out

\(^\text{10}\)Letter of J. W. Blythe, Apr. 3, 1901, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251.


\(^\text{12}\)Letter of J. W. Blythe, Apr. 8, 1901, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251. Daily Capital, Mar. 8, 1901. At Blythe's request, Speaker Henderson also appealed to Lacey to support Conger but adeptly kept his own political fences mended. He asked Lacey, in the event that Conger's candidacy did not materialize, to think well of State Senator
Cummins for praise, and added that he knew of "no one who would make a better executive officer."\textsuperscript{13} In spite of Conger's passivity, newspapers friendly to Cummins publicized charges about the minister's "machine candidacy." When George D. Perkins, for the sake of party harmony, withdrew in favor of Conger, the pro-Cummins press interpreted the withdrawal as a machine plan to clear the field for Conger.\textsuperscript{14} The \textit{Leader} abandoned Conger when the hesitant candidate was escorted into Iowa by the Omaha attorney for the Union Pacific Railroad. Because the scheme to make Conger governor happened to correspond with stories that he was being replaced as Minister to China, the \textit{Leader} accused the pro-Conger \textit{Iowa State Register} of plotting to ruin the minister's diplomatic career.\textsuperscript{15}

Harriman, a candidate from Henderson's congressional district. Henderson described Harriman as an able man who had no "element of the traitor" in him, i.e., Harriman was not a Cummins follower. See Letter of D. B. Henderson, Apr. 28, 1901, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251.

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Daily Capital}, Apr. 26, 1901. \textit{Leader}, Apr. 27, 1901. Both papers were pro-Cummins and interpreted Conger's statement to mean that he knew his candidacy was being used against Cummins. On the other hand, it may have meant that Conger was uninformed of the growing split within the party.


\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Leader}, Feb. 8, May 9, 10, 12, 1901. \textit{Iowa State Register}, May 5, 7, 1901.
Cummins also emphasized machine endorsement of his leading opponent. In his address to the Polk County Republican Convention, Cummins declared that he was not a candidate because Blythe or Hubbard wanted him to be. On the contrary, they had notified him to retire from politics or "be pounded into the earth." He had refused to be intimidated or dominated. Cummins' audience roared approval and empowered him to choose all sixty-four delegates to the State Convention. His attack on the railroad men evoked an editorial from the Burlington Hawk-eye which scored Cummins' implication that anyone not supporting him was selling himself to Hubbard and Blythe. Since the Hawk-eye faithfully reflected Blythe's wishes and consistently praised Conger's candidacy, the paper's attack upon Cummins bore little weight.

The Register's continued support of Conger helped perpetuate the charge of railroad machine backing. While the newspaper insisted it was not anti-Cummins, adding it had endorsed him for senator in 1900, the Baxter New Era labeled the Register an "anything to beat Cummins organ." The Baxter editor denounced the Register's harmony plea, saying it was more calculated to give railroads special privileges in tax

16 Iowa State Register, May 5, 7, 1901.

17 Hawk-eye, May 7, 1901. See also Apr., May, June, July, Aug., 1901, issues on this topic.
rates. These charges of "railroad privilege" arose just at the time when the roads were merging into the Northern Securities Company. Moreover, the Cummins press continued to label Conger the "machine candidate," charging that Blythe and Hubbard wanted a Governor who would control the state's Executive Council for them and follow their advice on taxation. This charge seemed plausible because at the time half the members of the Governor's Council favored raising railroad tax rates.

The Oskaloosa Herald attempted to defend Conger from these accusations by attacking Cummins. It reminded the editors of the Des Moines Leader and Daily Capital that of all the gubernatorial candidates Cummins was the only railroad attorney, and added that "railroads don't pay attorneys

---

18 Iowa State Register, May 18, 19, 1901. Reprint of Baxter New Era (Baxter, Iowa), in Iowa State Register, May 18, 1901. The New Era charged that railroads were paying a tax rate of 12-1/2 per cent on assessed valuations while farmers paid 25 per cent.

19 Daily Capital, June 17, 1901. Leader, Apr. 6, 12, May 9, 21, 1901. Iowa State Register, Apr. 21, 1901, supported the rail merger. See also Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. IX, pp. 30-32. J. J. Hill's statement that the Burlington would no longer be involved in politics was scorned by anti-railroad spokesmen.

for being anti." The Oskaloosa editor implied further that Cummins might be a better Democrat than Republican since he was endorsed by the *Times*, the only Democratic paper in Mahaksa County.\(^21\)

In another attempt to keep Conger's candidacy alive, the *Iowa State Register* portrayed him as the choice of the old soldiers of Iowa. Five of the preceding eleven Iowa governors had been soldiers, and the *Register* described 1901 as the year to balance out the record with a six-six tie. The newspaper even suggested that the selection of a soldier-governor was the best way to insure that Allison's successor in the Senate would be a Grand Army man.\(^22\)

In spite of all the efforts to rally anti-Cummins strength behind him, Conger's candidacy did not materialize. The Polk County Convention, which Cummins easily carried, showed Conger's weakness as a candidate in his home district. Blythe confided to Lacey his disappointment over this outcome and over Conger's attitude in general.\(^23\)

Conger's candidacy ended abruptly when he decided to return to China after completing his Washington mission.

\(^{21}\)Oskaloosa *Daily Herald*, May 3, 11, 21, 22, 1901.

\(^{22}\) *Iowa State Register*, May 21, 30, June 4, 8, 19, 1901. The *Register* labeled D. B. Henderson as their GAR choice for Allison's seat. This indicated that the editor must have considered Allison's health too poor to enable the senior Senator to seek re-election in 1902.

\(^{23}\)Letter of J. W. Blythe, June 1, 1901, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251.
Controversy surrounded his departure, as it had his projected entry into Iowa politics. Both the Capital and Leader, pro-Cummins papers, printed an alleged statement by the minister that he had been misinformed about the state of Iowa politics or he never would have allowed his name to be used. The Register in challenging the authenticity of the account found support in a counter statement by Mrs. Conger, who denied that her husband had been interviewed. Finally, the Capital's editor, Lafe Young, admitted faking an interview with Conger as a scheme of some Cummins' managers while their candidate was out of the city.24

In any event, the Republicans now groomed another man to oppose Cummins. Lacey suggested to Blythe that James H. Trewin, a member of the Iowa legislature from Allamakee County, be put forward. Blythe agreed and replied that "the best thing to do is to look to Trewin as the rallying point."25 Apparently unaware of Lacey's suggestion, Trewin, in a letter which was a polite and direct plea for support, recounted old acts of friendship and his great personal esteem for Lacey. "We believe the tide has turned," Trewin wrote, "and that if


25 Letter of J. W. Blythe, June 1, 1901, to Lacey in answer to one from Lacey, May 31, 1901, Lacey Papers, Vol. 251.
those opposed to Cummins are to win, they need to take up my candidacy and push it actively."26

The pro-Cummins press treated Trewin's candidacy as it had that of Conger. They attacked Trewin as a "friend and subservient supporter of the political railroads," who journeyed to Chicago for consultation with railroad officials before announcing his candidacy. The Leader declared that Conger's candidacy gave the impression of division within the railroad machine, while Trewin was its true choice all the time.27

Lacey's alliance with the anti-Cummins wing of the Republican party and his disapproval of Cummins' candidacy placed him in direct opposition to Cummins supporters. They increased their activities in the Sixth District to the extent that J. W. Blythe worried about their influence on the State Convention as well as on Lacey's own political future. Blythe informed Lacey, who was still in Washington at the end of May, of "great activity of the Cummins people in your district, especially in Mahaska County, where I am told Mr. Cummins has been in person." Reminding Lacey of Cummins' "oft repeated boast" that his strength in the Sixth District was greater than Lacey's, Blythe concluded his letter with the


27Leader, June 1, 11, 1901.
warning that "it goes without saying that to carry Mahaska County would be a great, perhaps decisive, victory for the Boxers."²⁸ James Wilson, a member of the Iowa legislature living in Lacey's district, also warned Lacey that Cummins' supporters in the Sixth District desired to be delegates to the State Convention. Moreover, Wilson lamented that "every Cummins delegate from the Sixth is a direct slap at Major Lacey and a boost for Captain Carr."²⁹

George D. Perkins, who had been an opposition candidate to Cummins until his withdrawal in favor of Conger, defended Lacey against the onslaught of the Cummins faction. Not only did Lacey have the right to express his preference for the party's gubernatorial nomination, he said, but Lacey had a long-standing habit of having done so. Furthermore, Perkins reminded Cummins and his followers that Lacey had held the Sixth District for the party when no other man could.³⁰

Other papers besides Perkins' Sioux City Journal defended Lacey's right to political preference. For instance, the Oskaloosa Herald sought to allay fears of Cummins'
followers by reminding them that Lacey had never failed to support the party nominee. Even bolder was the Grinnell Herald. Decrying the organs of the "new machine," i.e., Cummins followers, the newspaper called on Lacey and all other good Republicans to continue to exercise political preferences.  

Cummins' threat, however, of controlling Sixth District delegates to the State Convention did not develop. At the state-wide Republican assembly in August, Cummins lost the vote to name his man from the Sixth District to the Credentials Committee; and, after that defeat, he allowed the other committeemen from Lacey's district to go by default. Observers were surprised because the Cummins forces thought the Sixth was their district when the State Convention opened in Cedar Rapids.

On the eve of the Convention, Lacey's name emerged momentarily as a possible candidate against Cummins. As early as April and May, some small Republican papers in southern Iowa had attempted to promote Lacey's candidacy as a possible solution to the party wrangle over Cummins and

---

31Oskaloosa Daily Herald, reprint in Leader, June 11, 1901. Grinnell Herald reprint in Iowa State Register, June 20, 1901.

32Daily Capital, Aug. 7, 1901.
This plan failed to win general support, however, and nothing more was heard of the idea until the opening of the State Convention.

Just prior to the opening of the assembly, the Blythe brothers, Judge Hubbard, the avowed candidates other than Cummins, and a few other men met in conference to attempt to agree on a compromise candidate. Not a single candidate was willing to withdraw from the race, however, and the hopes of Cummins' followers rose. The conference produced one tangible result in forming a steering committee to direct opposition to Cummins' nomination. Approaching Lacey near midnight on the eve of the Convention, this committee offered him party support for the governorship if he could hold the Sixth District delegates. Rumor enlarged this account to the effect that Lacey without success had sought support from Jasper and Poweshiek County delegates. R. W. Clayton, Sixth District representative on the Republican State Central Committee, confirmed that the steering committee wanted Lacey on the ticket, but denied rumors that Lacey sought delegate strength. As it turned out, the possibility of Lacey's

---

33Oskaloosa Saturday Globe, Apr. 20, 1901. Reprints of Audubon Republican (Audubon, Iowa), and Anita Republican (Anita, Iowa), in Oskaloosa Daily Herald, May 2, 1901.

34Leader, Aug. 6, 1901.

35Oskaloosa Saturday Globe, Aug. 10, 17, 1901. Leader, Aug. 7, 8, 9, 1901, circulated the story of Lacey's rebuff in search for delegates.
candidacy was short-lived. The Montezuma Republican claimed that Lacey's friends withdrew his name from the contest when he indicated to them that activities in his behalf were contrary to his wishes.36

Cummins easily won the Republican gubernatorial nomination; and John Herriot, an advocate of reform in railroad assessment who was not identified with either the Blythe or Cummins factions of the party, was given second place on the state ticket.37 Although many Republicans were not enthusiastic, they closed ranks, and a unified party faced the Democratic opposition. Issuing a statement of support for the Republican nominees, Blythe called on his friends to "have a warm feeling towards Mr. Cummins." Speaker Henderson campaigned in behalf of the ticket as did Senator Dolliver, who had maintained a silent neutrality during the contest for nomination. Lacey actively campaigned for the party and at times appeared on the same platform with Cummins.38 Portraying Lacey's support of the ticket a

36Reprint of Montezuma Republican (Montezuma, Iowa), in Iowa State Register, Aug. 16, 1901. This paper theorized that the delegate-seeking story was written in the Des Moines office of the Leader, a pro-Cummins paper.

37For a detailed account of pre-convention and convention delegate strength, see Batemen, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. IX, pp. 37-52.

facades, a Democratic paper in Chicago reported that he failed to applaud Cummins at a speech in Oskaloosa. The paper also claimed that Lacey privately requested Sixth District postmasters not to contribute to the campaign funds of the State Central Committee. However, Lafe Young of the Capital, a Cummins supporter and a man with some experience in news fabrication, discredited these charges.39

During the campaign the problems of railroads, tariff, and prohibition emerged as the important issues. Cummins' followers viewed the railroad problem as a long-range one. Cummins, however, did not demonstrate vigorous anti-railroad sentiment in his campaign. Furthermore, the roads wooed Democratic candidates with free passes and letters so that Democratic votes could be relied upon in the legislature when rate assessments were discussed.40

The tariff plank in the state Republican platform related tangentially to trusts and was consequently dubbed the "shelter to monopoly clause." The plank was the work of George E. Roberts of the Fort Dodge Messenger.41 In his


41The State Convention approved Roberts' plank before Cummins saw it, but the candidate added his approval. See Harlan, History of Iowa, II, 218. The term "Iowa Idea" which
speeches in behalf of the Republican state ticket, Lacey attempted to dissociate tariff and the trusts, but avoided denouncing tariff revision. While emphasizing the party's commitment to protection, he diplomatically indicated that the party's position did not promise permanence of schedules. Nevertheless, he contended revision should be undertaken only for the gravest of reasons, reiterating that protection aided American farmers because prosperous labor provided a domestic market for agricultural products. 42

In speaking of the railroad issue, Lacey admitted the inequality of railroad tax assessments, but was careful not to antagonize the roads. He warned that the popular demand for reform in railroad taxation could result in a reverse inequality which would impose greater tax burdens on railroads than on other taxpayers of the state. Further, he explained, a major difficulty in making fair rail assessments lay in the fact that railroads had different values in different states; meaning that gross or net earnings in

Later was used to designate the tariff plank of 1901 was coined by Walter Wellman of the Chicago Record Herald on Sept. 5, 1902, and was first printed in the Sept. 6 issue of the paper. See George E. Roberts, "The Origin and History of the Iowa Idea," Iowa Journal of History and Politics, II (Jan., 1904), 69-82.

42 Lacey Address at Republican State Convention, Aug. 7, 1901, and Lacey's speech at Pella, Iowa, Aug. 9, 1901, in unclassified Lacey Papers. Newton Journal, Aug. 21, 1901.
any one state were not a fair test of assessment for the roads. 43

The prohibition problem was a formidable one in Cummins' campaign, the question having been revived in Iowa politics by Carrie Nation's visit to Des Moines early in 1901. Taking a moderate stand on the liquor question, as he had on railroad reform, Cummins endorsed the mulct law as it was then functioning, a stand which pleased neither of the extremist wings on the prohibition issue. "Wets" criticized Cummins' decision as one calculated to hold prohibitionist votes in his party, but at the same time prohibitionists were not satisfied. When the Iowa Prohibition party met in State Convention, the spirit of the meeting was characterized as strongly anti-Cummins, for it was "the impression that he is against prohibition legislation." 44

The Iowa State Register and the German language weekly, the Staatz-Anzeiger, exchanged a series of editorials

43 Lacey's speech at Pella, Iowa, Aug. 9, 1901, in unclassified Lacey Papers. See also Lacey's speech at Boone in the Leader, Oct. 31, 1901, for added defense of the railroads. For a survey of the major issues in the Iowa campaign of 1901, see Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. IX, pp. 57-67.

on the mulct law. While the Register defended it as "moral suasion and all the law that can be enforced," Colonel Eiboeck, editor of the German paper, argued consistently for less liquor legislation. With unanswerable logic, Eiboeck castigated the mulct law as a fraud on the people designed

for the sole purpose of holding the liberal as well as the radical prohibition votes to the Republican party, saying to the Germans, you can have your beer, and to the Irish and the Swedes you can have your whiskey, and to the prohibitionists here we have given you a law by which you can close up the saloons and prevent brewing in the state.45

Eiboeck further attacked what he considered basic unfairness in the law's provision, pointing out that in towns of 5,000 or more, signatures of one-half of the people were adequate to petition for the sale of liquor, but in smaller towns consent petitions had to carry signatures of 65 per cent of the population. While commending the Democrats for not supporting the law, Eiboeck chided the Republicans for defending the mulct measure. The Republicans, he said, considered the brewing and sale of liquor a crime but had legalized the crime by payment of a mulct fee.46

The complexity of the liquor question in Iowa was evident in the divergent sources of Cummins' support. Eiboeck,

45Iowa Staats-Anzeiger, Oct. 24, 1901. See also the Oct. 10, 17, 1901, issues of the paper. Iowa State Register, Oct. 18, Nov. 19, 1901, and the editorials of both papers during Oct., Nov., Dec., 1901. For an explanation of the mulct law, see Chap. III of this study.

considered by prohibitionists a "rampant and radical advocate of free whiskey and no Sabbath," urged all Democrats to vote for Cummins despite his defense of the mulct law. On the other hand, H. H. Abrams, Superintendent of the Anti-saloon League, announced he was for Cummins because "temperate men have no other choice."\(^47\)

Cummins easily defeated the Ottumwa Democrat Thomas J. Phillips for governor. The victor was aware, however, that numerous Republicans viewed him with misgivings. Replying to Lacey's congratulatory telegram, Cummins described his election as an expression of confidence in the party rather than as a personal victory, and he voiced the hope that "those to whom the Republicans of the state naturally look for guidance will give me their confidence."\(^48\) With Cummins' victory, the old structure of party leadership could no longer function unchallenged. Although the terms did not come into use until some two years later, the election of 1901 marked a definite division of the Republican party into Standpat and Progressive factions.\(^49\)


Despite the triumph of Cummins and the threat to the Congressional delegation's continued leadership of state politics, Lacey remained confident. Ever faithful to him, the Oskaloosa Herald declared that Lacey's extensive work in behalf of the state ticket had earned for him "the logical role of succeeding himself in 1902." Lacey also had the privilege of placing the name of his good friend, D. B. Henderson, in nomination for a second term as Speaker of the House. After Henderson's unanimous election, Lacey helped escort the Iowan to his chair.50

CHAPTER VIII

LACEY'S STRUGGLE WITH THE NEW ORDER: ROUND ONE

After Cummins' victory and the defeat of the Blythe machine in the gubernatorial contest of 1901, the two factions of Iowa's Republican party moved to consolidate power. To that end, both groups sought identification with the vigorous new President, Theodore Roosevelt. In part, the results of the state's Congressional races of 1902 manifested the extent to which each faction won that identification. Another aspect of the power struggle, and one somewhat allied to the contest for presidential approval, centered on the adoption of a tariff plank by Iowa Republicans. Lacey, in a bid for re-election, proved to be a staunch opponent of Cummins' tariff views. Although he lost the battle over the party's tariff position at the state convention in 1902, Lacey easily won renomination and re-election to Congress.

As 1902 opened, the anti-Cummins wing of the party had the advantage in gaining an identification with Roosevelt's administration. Late in 1901, Governor Shaw had announced his acceptance of President Roosevelt's cabinet offer, an appointment hardly calculated to bolster Cummins'
claim of the President's favor. Shaw's elevation meant that
Iowa's Old Guard Republicans had two representatives in
Roosevelt's Cabinet.\footnote{Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Dec. 24, 26, 27, 1901. Iowa in 1902 had reached unusual heights in political importance. Shaw and "Tama Jim" Wilson were in the Cabinet. Henderson was Speaker of the House; George E. Roberts was Director of the Mint; E. H. Conger was Minister to China; A. B. Swalm was United States Consul at Montevideo, Uruguay. In addition, all eleven Congressmen and both Senators were Republicans, and it was this Congressional delegation which exercised power in Iowa political leadership. See the Iowa Official Register, 1903.} Having finished his term as
governor on January 16, 1902, Shaw assumed his duties as
Secretary of the Treasury.\footnote{Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Jan. 16, 1902.}

From the first, Cummins exhibited caution in his
leadership—although a prominent historian of Midwestern
Progressivism, Russell Nye, claims that Cummins turned his
guns on railroads, the tariff, and corporations.\footnote{Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics, pp. 210-212.} The
record would show, however, that more often than not the
guns were loaded with blanks, not bullets.\footnote{Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. X, pp. 26-38, opposes Nye's views.}

Cummins waged no aggressive war on railroad privi­
ileges. Of the two bills concerning railroads passed in the
early months of his administration, he vetoed one and
approved the other. The Molsberry bill, which received the
Governor's veto, would have removed limitations on debts of railroad corporations formed under Iowa law. Opponents of the roads claimed the bill was in the interest of the Hill-Morgan merger of the Great Northern, Northern Pacific, and Burlington railroad lines.\(^5\) Believing the bill to be unconstitutional because its provisions did not apply to intra-state railroads, Cummins refused to sign the bill into law.\(^6\)

Three of Des Moines' four daily papers defended the veto. The Leader praised Cummins for not allowing J. W. Blythe's journey to Des Moines to deter him. Citing W. W. Baldwin of the Burlington as the bill's chief lobbyist, the Daily News rejoiced that the veto added Iowa to the list of states refusing privileges to railroads. The Capital denied that Cummins' veto was revenge for Blythe's opposition in previous political contests.\(^7\) However, the Iowa State Register, standing apart from the other three papers, upheld the Molsberry bill.\(^8\)

Almost at once, the Iowa senate began work on a revised bill framed to correct the Governor's objections. Meanwhile another railroad proposal passed the legislature.

\(^5\)Nye, *Midwestern Progressive Politics*, p. 211.

\(^6\)Daily Capital, Mar. 29, 1902.


\(^8\)Iowa State Register, Mar. 22, 1902.
This measure, the Hubbard bill, vaguely authorized any Iowa railroad corporation owning or operating a road in the state to expand into other states, and gave the right to exercise in such states all the powers conferred on the railroad by its Iowa articles of incorporation. Supporters of the Hubbard bill claimed that it was akin to a "full faith and credit" law in reverse because it extended to Iowa corporations in other states the same privileges which corporations from those states enjoyed in Iowa. Opponents of the bill, however, saw it as an attempt to facilitate mergers among railroads. The opposition succeeded in adding an amendment which forbade the extension of Iowa railroads to parallel or compete with out-of-state roads and limited the expansion of Iowa roads only to the acquisition of connecting railroads.

The Hubbard bill ultimately passed both houses of the Iowa legislature and went to the Governor who signed it into law. Because the revised Molsberry bill, killed in committee, never reached the floor of the legislature a second time, Cummins' record on legislation extending privileges to Iowa's railroads was one for and one against.9

A bill to increase railway taxation rates provided further evidence of the Governor's failure to use live ammunition against the roads. This bill proposed a new tax base for railroads, and used the value of stocks and bonds rather

---

9Ibid., Apr. 4-12, 1902. Leader, Apr. 4, 9, 11, 13, 1902.
than gross earnings of the companies. Some of Cummins' supporters in the legislature helped defeat it, when a committee of the lower house voted to delay the measure indefinitely. ¹⁰

Nevertheless, the question of increased rail taxation continued to be a live issue. The Burlington, opposed to taxation on the market values of its stocks and bonds, conducted its own study on the market value of farm lands and their corresponding rate of assessment. ¹¹ A great number of railroad attorneys and tax experts descended upon the July meeting of the Governor's Executive Council to protest unfair railroad assessments as compared to those on farm lands. ¹² In compromise, the Executive Council decided to raise railroad taxes $4,000,000 over those of 1901, but opponents of the roads still criticized the amount as too conservative. ¹³

The record of Governor Cummins' first year in office did not reveal severe anti-railroad policies. While some

¹⁰Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Mar. 12, 1902. Iowa State Register, Mar. 29, 1902. Leader, Mar. 28, 1902.

¹¹Oskaloosa Daily Herald, July 2, 1902.

¹²Register and Leader, July 16, 1902. The paper assumed its new name July 1 after George E. Roberts merged the Iowa State Register and the Leader.

¹³It was, however, the largest single yearly advance since Governor Larrabee's action in 1887. Register and Leader, Aug. 2, 1902. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Aug. 1, 1902.
regulatory measures passed, they do not sustain Nye's claim that the new Governor waged war on Iowa's railroads.\textsuperscript{14}

Although the question of railroad influence remained an aspect of the contest for party control after Cummins' victory, the tariff was an equally important issue in Iowa politics. The "shelter to monopoly" clause in the platform of 1901, which had occasioned little debate in the elections of that fall, increased in significance early in 1902. The Governor won his tariff battle in the State Convention of 1902, but he lost the war when President Roosevelt refused to champion national tariff revision.

Two days after Cummins took office, the \textit{Capital} editorialized, "let us have peace on the tariff."\textsuperscript{15} The cry went unheeded, and growing disagreement over the relationship of tariff to trusts accentuated tariff differences within the party. Furthermore, Cummins' Minneapolis speech in April stressed divergent party views on the tariff, and furnished his opponents political ammunition for years to come. In his address, Cummins had expressed his belief that "the consumer has a better right to competition than

\textsuperscript{14}Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. X, pp. 26-38, claims that an anti-pass bill failed when Cummins did not champion it in the state legislature.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Daily Capital}, Jan. 18, 1902. The \textit{Capital}, a supporter of Cummins in the 1901 campaign, reverted to a more conservative position in Iowa politics.
the producer has to protection." The Capital rejected the Governor's obvious tying of tariff to trust growth. While the editor endorsed regulation of trusts, he warned against their destruction, and thus implied that trust demolition was Cummins' goal. The Iowa State Register defended Cummins' statement as consistent with party views, and asked why the Governor should be condemned for standing on the state platform. Also championing Cummins' views, the Daily News went so far as to suggest defeating some Iowa Congressmen, or even the whole party in Iowa, in order to bring tariff legislation into line with the popular view.\footnote{\textit{Daily News}, April 2, 1902.}

With the approach of the Republican State Convention in 1902 tariff debate in Iowa centered on the formulation of a tariff plank for the party platform. For a time the Register called for the elimination of the "shelter plank" of 1901, but endorsed revision of some tariff rates, lest the Republican party lose control of Congress. Soon after the purchase of the newspaper by George E. Roberts, author of the 1901 plan, the Register reversed its policy and called for reinsertion of the shelter plank, saying that Governor Cummins wanted it. Roberts made it quite clear \footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, Leader, May 2, 1902. \textit{Iowa State Register}, May 21, 1902. \textit{Daily Capital}, Mar. and Apr. issues, May 1, 1902.}
that, while Cummins desired the re-statement of the previous year's tariff plank in the new platform, he in no way favored general tariff revision. The Capital opposed the Governor's wishes, and called for deletion of the shelter clause, declaring it had been a source of misunderstanding within the party. Observing that tariff tinkering was dangerous to prosperity, the newspaper separated the issues of tariff and trusts. The editor widened the party breach when he editorialized that the state platform should be made to harmonize with the national one, and thus implied that Cummins wanted a thorough tariff revision while the Roosevelt administration did not. In ascribing almost opposite interpretations to the Governor's tariff views, the two Des Moines dailies contributed greatly to the confusion over the tariff among Iowa Republicans in 1902.

Lacey was drawn into this tariff controversy. Shortly after Roberts purchased the Iowa State Register and the Des Moines Leader, he corresponded with Lacey concerning the platform for 1902. Roberts made no overt attempt to change Lacey's tariff views, but the implications of his letter to the Congressman were evident. Tactful in his approach, he began by assuring Lacey that both he and the

18 Iowa State Register, June 5, 27, 1902.
19 Daily Capital, July 2, 19, 23, Aug. 19, 1902.
new Register and Leader were friendly to the Congressman and endorsed his continued tenure in office. Then, quickly, he moved to the real reason for his letter when he told Lacey that

We may not always agree . . . but we must . . . get together on general policies. I hope we will have no trouble in the state convention. The Governor has concluded that he will be satisfied to repeat the language of last year's platform upon the tariff, and I presume I will not be expected to go back on my own platform. I think it reasonable ground to get together on.20

In reply, Lacey, in four pages of pleasantries and five more of postscript marked "private," poured out his views on the tariff, and spelled out his condition for "getting together" as Roberts had asked. He complimented Roberts for his wording of the 1901 platform, then deftly advised him how to change it. The wording, Lacey claimed, allowed tariff reformers to represent the tariff plank as the admission of Iowa Republicans that tariff was "the Mother of Trusts." In an obvious allusion to Cummins and his followers, he went on to say that the 1901 plank could not bear many of the interpretations of it made "by our enemies and some of our friends." He added: "I . . . hope you have no pride of authorship as to this particular composition for I think you have written better platforms and can do so again." Repeating his conviction that the tariff

---

did not create trusts, and then, subtly equating free trade with rate revision, Lacey stated that the only way trusts would be killed by free trade was for them to go down in the general business wreckage sure to follow the adoption of a free trade policy. Although he said that tariff schedules were not sacred, Lacey ascribed to them something of the permanency of stone tablets. Business cessation, he warned, would invariably follow any "monkeying with the tariff." His final admonition to Roberts indicated that Lacey interpreted the tariff question as an issue larger than state politics. In conclusion, Lacey stated that "tariff doctrines were not so important when we had nothing but state offices to elect, but with eleven congressmen on the ticket our expression on this subject assumes a great national importance."21 Taken as a whole, Lacey's reply to Roberts reflected his inflexible views on the tariff. It also was a clear warning that Roberts and other Republicans with similar views should not expect docility from Lacey when his congressional office was at stake.

Although Roberts had asked Lacey to de-escalate the tariff issue, the tone of his second letter to the Congressman was anything but conciliatory. He bluntly advised Lacey that

the latter's call for a rewording of the platform would deepen party divisions. "Between the Governor's desire to have his Minneapolis speech vindicated," Roberts wrote, "and an opposing effort to modify this trust resolution, we will come into sharp conflict . . . along the line of our factional division." He commented that "we don't want a permanent Cummins party and anti-Cummins party in this state." The resolution did not imply, Roberts pointed out, that trusts could not exist independently of the tariff, as Lacey inferred, but merely stated that Republicans would not tolerate the abuse of the tariff when companies used it to shelter monopolies. Further, Roberts warned Lacey that should the shelter clause be deleted from the platform the very discussion over its deletion would serve to make tariff the issue of the campaign.\(^{22}\)

Press comments on the forthcoming Republican State Convention reflected the covert Lacey-Roberts duel. The \textit{Capital} echoed Lacey's views and called for a rewording of the disputed shelter plank.\(^ {23}\) Faithfully echoing Roberts' viewpoint, the \textit{Register and Leader} called for harmony.\(^ {24}\)

\(^{22}\) Letter of George E. Roberts, July 12, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 252.


\(^{24}\) \textit{Register and Leader}, July 17, 29, 1902.
The *Daily News* forthrightly asked why the Republican party should defer to the Blythe faction defeated in 1901. Unwittingly answering Lacey's admonition to Roberts, the *News* editor wrote: "It does not matter what Iowa Congressmen think on tariff and reciprocity for the people don't take orders from them—but the other way round." There should be no regression from the platform of 1901.25

When the Republicans met in State Convention in Des Moines, the Cummins-Roberts view on the tariff plank prevailed. Although the delegates affirmed the party's historic policy of protection, they also endorsed the concept of regulation "to protect people and society from the abuses of corporate wealth," and favored "any modification of the tariff schedules that may be required to prevent their affording shelter to monopoly." The platform also indicated that the principle of reciprocity was the natural complement of protection.26


26*Daily Capital*, July 30, 1902. See *Iowa Official Register*, 1903, for copy of the platform. Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. X, p. 47, suggests that Cummins' platform victory was a major triumph over Congressional delegation leadership of Iowa politics. See *Sage, Allison*, pp. 284-285, for similar interpretation. The *Daily Capital*, July 31, 1902, considered the platform a concession to the "personal pique" of both Cummins and Roberts who would have considered a change as personal rebukes.
Roberts’ views on the tariff dominated the state platform, but he was in error in believing that retaining the shelter clause would reduce the divisiveness of the tariff as a party issue. The press continued to keep the tariff question alive, and a surprise and startling announcement by Speaker Henderson thrust it into the limelight. Henderson dramatically withdrew from the Third District Congressional race after having received his eleventh consecutive nomination in July, offering for a reason the difference in tariff views between himself and some other party leaders in Iowa. In his withdrawal statement, Henderson equated revision with free trade, and stated that while he opposed trusts, he did not believe that free trade in whole or in part was the answer to trust regulation. Such a remedy for control of American trusts, the Speaker added, would create a market for foreign trusts by killing all domestic industry.27

Although President Roosevelt, the Chairman of the Republican National Central Committee, and a number of Iowa’s leading Republicans appealed to Henderson to reconsider his decision, he remained firm in his intention to withdraw from the race. Henderson met the request of these men with the brief comment, "Let the new light shine." The Speaker

---

reiterated that his quarrel was with some Iowa leaders of the party and that he was in complete agreement with Roosevelt's recent Ohio speech on the tariff. In identifying the anti-Cummins wing of the party with the President's tariff views, he thus implied that the Governor's followers were somehow out of step with the national administration. 28

Henderson's announcement was particularly ill-timed for the Republican party. He made it while Roosevelt, Allison, and a coterie of other prominent senators were in conference at Oyster Bay discussing the tariff as it would affect a presidential tour of the West. In speculating about the real motivation of the Speaker's withdrawal from politics, two Des Moines papers hinted that Henderson's statement may have been deliberately timed to show his displeasure at not having received an invitation to the Oyster Bay conference. 29 The New York Sun reported that Henderson feared a conspiracy among Iowa Congressmen to depose him as Speaker. Henderson's unfounded apprehension perhaps fed upon the rumors that the National Federation of Millers had organized against his re-election to Congress. 30 Also, 28


30 Reprint of Sun (New York, New York), in Register and Leader, Sept. 20, 1902. The Harter bill in behalf of
Henderson may have interpreted the support of some Republicans in the nomination of his opponent, Horace Boies, former Democratic Governor of Iowa, as the initial step to unseat him in 1904.\footnote{This seems untrue because Henderson could have stayed in the race and refused to be a candidate in 1904. It also leaves unexplained the July to September delay in the withdrawal. See letter of J. A. T. Hull, Sept. 19, 1902, to Lacey and letter of D. G. Winchell, Sept. 19, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 252. See also \textit{Daily Capital}, Sept. 17, 18, 1902.}

The \textit{Capital}’s editor, Lafe Young, wrote that the whole Henderson fiasco stemmed from local politics in Waterloo. Henderson’s Prohibitionist party opponent was from that city, and he falsely accused the Speaker of authorizing a restaurant manager to sell liquor in the House restaurant. The other charge emanating from Waterloo, namely that Henderson was a “personal and political friend of the liquor interests,” was more difficult to counter. The Speaker’s use of alcohol, sometimes to the point of immoderation, was well known.\footnote{\textit{Daily Capital}, Sept. 18, 1902. \textit{Register and Leader}, Sept. 13, 1902. Reprint of Chicago \textit{Record-Herald} in Oskaloosa \textit{Saturday Globe}, Sept. 20, 1902. A postoffice fight in Waterloo was also said to have embarrassed Henderson there.}

\textit{millers}’ interests was designed to eliminate rate discrimination against American flour unloaded in London. Julian W. Richards, Henderson’s secretary, placed the blame for delay on the bill’s sponsors. Its very late arrival on the floor of the House caused it to be held for action in the next session of Congress. See the \textit{Register and Leader}, July 8, 15, 23, 25, 26, 1902.
Speaker Henderson's withdrawal from the Congressional race was of special concern to Lacey, for their pleasant personal relationship had extended from the years they both served in the Union army. In 1889, Lacey was among the tireless workers to secure the Speaker's chair for Henderson, and again in 1901, Lacey actively sought the Speaker's re-election to that position. Lacey's friendly support often earned him the privilege of presiding in the House when Henderson was absent. Indeed, the Oskaloosa Herald boasted that Lacey was probably in the Chair more often than any one save the Speaker. That paper feared that Lacey's role in House leadership would decrease without Henderson as Speaker, and particularly so if the rumor proved true that Joseph Cannon would be the next leader of the House.

Of more immediate concern to Lacey, however, was the effect of Henderson's withdrawal on his own bid for re-election. J. A. T. Hull wrote at once to express his concern that the decision would "hurt the sixth district

---

33 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Feb. 20, 1902. Lacey bore his own expenses in the campaign to make Henderson Speaker. See letter of D. B. Henderson, June 12, 1899, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 250. Five other letters from Henderson to Lacey about the Speaker's race are also in Vol. 250.

34 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 16, 21, 1902. The Herald believed that Hepburn would be favored for presiding officer in the Speaker's absence should Joseph Cannon be elected to House leadership. The Register and Leader, Oct. 26, 1902, reported its belief that Lacey would continue to act as presiding officer much of the time.
and one or two others" more than the rest. A Sixth Dis-
trict Republican holding a party post in Washington in-
quired of Lacey about effects in the District of what he
termed "Henderson's fluke." Holding identical tariff
views, both Lacey and the Speaker opposed the shelter plank.
When Henderson cited tariff differences within the party as
his sole reason for quitting the race, his statement also
served to accentuate the divergent tariff views of Lacey
and Governor Cummins. Lacey's friends thus feared the re-
results in the Sixth District, should attention focus upon the
tariff as a factional issue in the campaign.

Lacey denied that Henderson's decision would have
adverse effects on his own race, and boldly defended the
Speaker's tariff views as no more out of line with party
creed than his own. Both men were outside the party, Lacey
added, if one accepted the Democratic interpretation of the
Republican platform; but both he and the Speaker were in
harmony with the Republican interpretation of it. Although
Lacey meant to minimize his differences with the Cummins
wing of the Party, his remarks reflected only a superficial
harmony. Lacey declared that if the Republican party did

---


36 Letter of D. G. Winchell, Sixth District Repre-
sentative on the Executive Committee of the Iowa Republican
Association in Washington, Sept. 19, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey
Papers, Vol. 252.
not "stick by its guns" it would not matter whether Republic-licans were elected anywhere. To Lacey, the "guns," of course, meant the doctrine of protection. In his attack on free trade, he added that "I am not one of those who believe that it is better for the country to be destroyed by the enemies than by its friends." In effect, Lacey ascribed a Democratic interpretation of the Republican platform to the Cummins wing of his party, at the same time insisting that all Republicans agreed on the meaning of the tariff plank.

In Lacey's assessment of Henderson's withdrawal, he assigned more weight to personal reasons than to the tariff. Lacey believed that the Speaker was too honest to run after having been, as Lacey phrased it, "goaded to an unbearable position." On another occasion Lacey declared that "Colonel Henderson's patience has been sorely tried by his personal afflictions. We should consider these things in criticizing the man." Lacey believed, too, that his friend had grown too sensitive, and that he had come to expect exemption from petty attacks of partisan politics because he was a foreign-born citizen who had risen to such a high post as party leader. Furthermore, Lacey reasoned, Henderson's obvious

---


38 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Sept. 18, 24, 1902.
displeasure at adverse criticism only furnished more material for petty partisan criticism.\(^{39}\)

As the surprise over Henderson's announcement gave way to acceptance, politicians tended to assign it little political significance beyond the Third District. There, the Republicans selected B. P. Birdsall as the new nominee for Congress. Lacey helped campaign for the new candidate, who was handicapped by the lateness of his entry into the race. Using a positive approach, Lacey insisted that he would not discuss Henderson's retirement. His loyalty to the Speaker was evident when he recommended Birdsall to the voters as one who "will not lower the standard of an Allison and Henderson."\(^{40}\)

After the Henderson publicity, the tariff issue continued to be the subject of many campaign speeches in Iowa in the fall of 1902. The surprising feature, however, was that

---

\(^{39}\) Reprint of Cedar Rapids Republican in Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 25, 1902. Lacey's interpretation was similar to that of Walter Wellman writing in the Chicago Record-Herald. Wellman believed that tariff was a pretext and that Henderson's "morbid fear" of having his private life exposed was his reason for withdrawal. Wellman testified that the Speaker's friends denied any dishonesty in his past although they admitted he was boisterous and indiscreet at times. He quoted one Senator as saying Henderson endured "a hell of pain" after the loss of his leg in the Civil War. Reprint of the Chicago Record-Herald in Oskaloosa Saturday Globe, Sept. 20, 1902.

harmony, not dissension, characterized the efforts of the campaigners. The press quoted the hitherto inflexible Lacey as saying, "The platform was good enough for us last year. It is good enough now." Many speakers placed emphasis on protection as a Republican party principle. While there was disagreement as to whether or not the time was ripe for change, all believed that the Republican party must secure tariff revision. Governor Cummins contributed to the harmony efforts also; in a speech before Chicago's Marquette Club, he explained his views of the "Iowa Idea," a term used to denote the shelter plank concept. The Governor projected his tariff beliefs as "sound Republicanism" when he made it clear that the shelter clause of the platform did not mean Iowa Republicans were opposed to tariff on goods made by trusts. What he opposed, Cummins emphasized, was a protective tariff on goods manufactured by monopoly-trusts, adding that "protection is the essential principle of republicanism, but competition is the eternal law of industrial life. We should, and will, enforce both."^42


^42 Register and Leader, Oct. 10, 24, 29, 1902. Daily Capital, Oct. 13, 14, 1902. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Oct. 10, 1902. The word, monopoly, was a key one. Using it to qualify his war on trusts, Cummins could claim that his tariff views were sound protection doctrine. His opponents, by deleting the word, said Cummins advocated basic Democratic doctrine in his call for revision to curb trusts.
The campaign in the Sixth District proved relatively smooth for Lacey, despite his open opposition to Cummins' tariff views. Although the Cummins faction threatened to unseat Lacey because of his opposition to Cummins' nomination in 1901 and his half-hearted support in the gubernatorial campaign, the threat did not materialize. Lacey's supporters anticipated opposition for a while from Nate Kendall, J. W. Carr, H. L. Waterman, George Seevers, and Fred L. Maytag. The first three men had been previous opponents of Lacey, while Seevers and Maytag, both Cummins' supporters, were newcomers to the opposition. When Kendall withdrew from the contest for nomination, and Seevers and Maytag failed to win district-wide support, Lacey's opposition dissipated. He was nominated by acclamation for the eighth time at the District Convention in Newton.\textsuperscript{43}

Lacey's Democratic opponent was John P. Reese, an official in a local United Mine Workers organization. Nominated as a free silver candidate in harmony with the party's national platform, Reese inherited the distinct

disadvantage of having the Democratic State Convention reject the free silver plank of the national platform. 44

Reese was clever enough, however, to concentrate upon the tariff issue in the Sixth District race. While he admitted that it might be too strong an indictment to say Lacey favored protection that sheltered monopoly, Reese, by implication, linked the Congressman to that position when he reminded his audiences that both Lacey and Henderson had opposed the shelter plank. Reese implied, too, that Lacey was less honest than Henderson because the Speaker had at least conscientiously stepped down when he realized his district favored tariff revision. In still another charge that Lacey was out of step with Sixth District tariff views, Reese suggested that many Republicans would find their tariff beliefs better represented by him than by the nominee of their own party. The Democratic candidate portrayed Lacey as the friend of trusts and the well-to-do. While labeling Lacey a man who had done nothing for farmers and miners of the district, Reese called on disgruntled Republicans to help him "nail the political hide of Lacey on the wall of his $60,000 hotel." 45

44 Newton Herald, Aug. 1, 1902. Register and Leader, Sept. 4, 11, 1902.

45 Speech of J. P. Reese at Fremont, Iowa, Oct. 7, 1902, in unclassified Lacey Papers. Reese's thirty-nine page speech indicated his lack of education and his youthful age of 26. The reference to the remodeled Lacey Hotel in
During the campaign, Lacey altered slightly his public utterances on revision without basically changing his position on the tariff. On at least two occasions he publicly endorsed rate reduction on items which the United States could not produce. He insisted, however, that this was sound Republicanism, claiming that such reduction had been approved by the framers of the Dingley law. Tariff rates under this law had been pushed to artificial heights with a view to reducing them in reciprocity treaties. 46

In general, Lacey defended his protectionist views by describing the growth of coal and oil trusts, hoping to prove that trusts thrived under free trade as well as under tariff protection. Since both coal and oil were on the free list, their control by trusts proved the falsity of the Democratic charge that tariff was the mother of trusts. To defend further his tariff position, Lacey strove to identify himself with Roosevelt's views on tariff and trusts. Consequently, he arranged for a presidential trip through the Sixth District as part of Roosevelt's projected Western tour. Unfortunately, however, the plans had to be cancelled.

Oskaloosa failed to mention it was jointly owned by Lacey and his brother, W. R. Lacey.

46 Lacey's speech at Red Oak, Iowa, Oct. 1, 1902, in unclassified Lacey Papers. Lacey's speech at Bethel, Iowa, in Daily News, Sept. 27, 1902.
when a recurring knee injury compelled the President to submit to surgery. 47

Because the Democratic candidate was identified with organized labor, much of the Sixth District contest centered on both candidates' concern for labor interests. Reese, the recently resigned president of a UMW local, attempted to discredit his opponent's accomplishments. The Democrat expressed his readiness to retire if he could not do more "in one minute in my sleep for the Mine Workers of the Sixth District" than Lacey had done in all his years of service. Reese went on to point out that Lacey's bill on mine safety was restricted to Territories "where there were no corporations from his district to fight him." 48 Answering the charge, Lacey replied that the miners knew, even if Reese did not, that his bill was limited in jurisdiction because the Territories were "the only part of the country where Congress has the authority to regulate . . . the operation of the mines." 49 Furthermore, Lacey produced a telegram


expressing UMW national president John Mitchell's gratitude for Lacey's success in amending his original mine safety bill to make Territorial mines safe.50

Lacey had won additional publicity among Sixth District miners and a resolution of thanks from Ottumwa's UMW Local No. 152 for his role in winning a presidential pardon for Wapello County miner John Haddow. At the request of Lacey and a few other Congressmen, Roosevelt pardoned Haddow, previously sentenced to six months in prison under injunction proceedings and ordered to cease union organization among West Virginia miners.51 Reese further attempted to deflect credit from Lacey by demanding that the Congressman go on the floor of the House and secure an anti-injunction law. The Newton Journal quickly pointed out that Lacey had already voted for an anti-injunction bill, and that the Grosvenor bill, which Lacey's vote had helped through the House, was pending in the Senate.52

Lacey's position relative to the anthracite coal strike in Pennsylvania in 1902 was not recorded. His opponent's views on the prolonged strike, however, offered


51Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Apr. 28, May 8, June 12, July 28, 1902.

52Newton Journal, Aug. 6, 1902.
Lacey no embarrassment, nor did they serve to help Reese politically. The former mine official opposed a sympathy strike among Iowa miners because he did not believe contracts with Iowa mining companies should be broken. In appraising the strength of Reese as a candidate, the Marshall-town Times-Republican predicted that he would not win enough miners' votes to offset Lacey's support among farmers and business men.

As the Pennsylvania coal strike lingered into autumn, concern grew over its political effects in the Sixth District. Iowa miners blamed the Republican national administration for failure to end the strike. On the other hand, the party suffered because some of the biggest Republican contributors were unhappy with Roosevelt's position on the labor dispute. Consequently, fund raising for Republican candidates was difficult. Lacey suffered also from the last minute efforts of Albia newspaperman J. R. Norman to throw miners' votes.

53 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, June 20, July 25, 1902.

54 Reprint of Times-Republican in Oskaloosa Daily Herald, July 23, 1902. See also letter of Ellsworth Rominger, Chairman, Sixth District Congressional Committee, Sept. 20, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 252.

votes to Reese. In a release to the Des Moines Daily News, carefully timed to prevent Lacey from answering, Norman charged that Lacey imported Leslie M. Shaw to "drown out Reese in Albia," but that Reese's rally in that coal mining center outdrew Shaw's crowd. Norman's article further charged that there were "no takers" among the miners, when three Sixth District mines posted notices that any miner planning to vote for Lacey would be paid five dollars.56

Lacey campaigned vigorously in spite of his obvious advantages over the youthful Reese, even requesting Mark Hanna's aid through the Republican Speakers Bureau. The Bureau, however, denied his request on the theory that Ohio needed Hanna more than Iowa did.57 To strengthen support in Wapello County, where Republicans persistently accused Lacey of lack of patronage, he attempted to secure the transfer of the Fourth District's Internal Revenue office to Ottumwa. Treasury Secretary Shaw, however, denied Lacey's request with a good-natured explanation of his understanding why Lacey desired the change.58

56 Daily News, Nov. 4, 1902.

57 Letter of Mark Hanna, Sept. 11, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 252.

Minorities in the Sixth District received the customary attention from Lacey. A black attorney, George Woodson, presided over the Mahaska County Convention. To win the votes of another special interest group, special pleas went out for support from German, Welsh, and Swedish voters in the district. In response to the plea, The Drych, a Welsh paper among Sixth District miners, supported Lacey.

Supporters portrayed Lacey as the friend of the old soldiers. Some GAR men exceeded political prudence, however, and called for a meeting "in uniform" to be held just one hour before Lacey's scheduled talk in Grinnell. This too obvious attempt to swell the speaker's audience and identify the GAR with Lacey angered some veterans.

Election returns on November 5 reflected a sizeable victory for Lacey, and a near sweep of the state for the Republican party. Democrats carried only the Second District

---

59 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, May 21, 23, 1902.


which normally went to their party. With farmers and miners remaining loyal to Lacey, he won by a larger margin than in 1898, another non-presidential election year.\textsuperscript{62}

Congratulations poured in to Lacey from party leaders across the nation. Governor Cummins, who had spoken once in Lacey's behalf, graciously attributed victory to Lacey's own efficient way of reaching people.\textsuperscript{63} In expressing gratitude that Lacey won without sacrificing his manhood, Speaker Henderson's letter reflected his unabated bitterness toward Cummins.\textsuperscript{64} Leslie M. Shaw modestly admitted that he was uncertain of his contribution to Lacey's campaign, but immodestly added that he "would have broken a blood vessel to

\textsuperscript{62}Returns in 1898 were a better basis for comparison than the election of 1900 when Republican candidates were aided by the Presidential ticket. The Iowa Official Directory, 1911-1912, listed 18,828 votes for Lacey to 17,015 for Reese. See also Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 5, 6, 1902. Lacey won at least eight votes by paying to have voters transported to the polls. See letter of A. L. Love, Ottumwa Ironworks laborer, Nov. 5, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 252, wherein Love asked Lacey to reimburse him for transportation of five men from Evens to vote in Ottumwa. Love indicated that Lacey had already cared for the cost of transporting three Oskaloosa men to vote in Ottumwa. Of Lacey's ten campaigns for Congress, this was the only evidence found that Lacey engaged in such tactics.

\textsuperscript{63}Letter of A. B. Cummins, Nov. 6, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 252. Register and Leader, Nov. 9, 1902, remarked that Lacey's letter of thanks to the Governor was especially cordial.

\textsuperscript{64}Letter of D. B. Henderson, Nov. 7, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 252.
have saved Lacey." Sereno Payne, chairman of the powerful House Committee on Ways and Means and one of Lacey's political friends who had participated in the Sixth District campaign, sent a dual purpose note: while it offered congratulations, it also requested Lacey's support because Payne was an aspirant for the Speaker's chair relinquished by Henderson. Joseph Cannon from Illinois also used his letter to bid for Lacey's support for the Speakership. "My judgment and desire tell me that I ought to be Speaker of the next House," Cannon boldly declared.

Soon after the close of the fall campaign, members of the Iowa Congressional delegation caucused in Des Moines over the choice of Henderson's successor. Both Hull and Hepburn favored Representative Joseph W. Babcock from Wisconsin, and Hepburn confided to Lacey that he hoped the party could do better than choose Cannon. Henderson, however, had endorsed the Illinois Republican, and the press predicted that he would receive the support of the Western states in Congress. When the Iowa Congressmen met in the

65 Letter of L. M. Shaw, Nov. 8, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 252.


68 Letter of W. P. Hepburn, Nov. 7, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 252. Register and Leader, Nov. 11, 12,
state's capital, Cannon received unanimous support as Iowa's choice for Henderson's successor. Lacey released a statement to the press indicating that he had been in communication with Cannon over the Speakership, but denied that Henderson had used his influence in behalf of any one candidate.69 Joseph Cannon was ultimately the choice of the House for Speaker; and it must have been consoling to Henderson to have a man of his own tariff views selected as his successor.

At the close of 1902, the political atmosphere in Iowa was heavy with talk of the tariff. A consistent commentary from the Capital and Register and Leader, kept the issue alive, respectively interpreting the President's December message to the Congress as anti-revisionist and revisionist.70 With Governor Cummins' speech before the

69Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 17, 1902. Register and Leader, Nov. 19, 1902. Lacey along with six other Congressmen left their votes but did not stay for the caucus. Lacey, who was to have chaired the caucus in Hepburn's absence, turned the meeting over to Thomas Hedge, Congressman from the First District which encompassed Blythe's home town.

National Reciprocity League in December, the tariff achieved full circle in Iowa politics. Cummins insisted that protection and reciprocity were not contradictory ideas, and he castigated those who endorsed the idea of "stand pat and let well enough alone." Calling for the reduction of some rates without reciprocal action by other nations, Cummins termed "idle talk" the discussion of reciprocity without the intention of conceding something to American trading partners.  

Seven years passed, however, before the Governor and the Register and Leader witnessed the fulfillment of their wishes for revision. No change in the tariff occurred until 1909 when Roosevelt turned the White House over to Taft.

Although Cummins occupied the Governor's chair in 1902, the year closed with the anti-Cummins faction of the party still dominant in Iowa. Moreover, that group had succeeded in the struggle to win identification with President Roosevelt's views on tariff and trusts.  

---

71 Register and Leader, Dec. 11, 21, 22, 23, 1902. Cummins' speech was in direct opposition to Lacey's campaign explanation of the relationship of reciprocity to the Dingley act. The Register and Leader had also editorialized earlier that the Republican party could not "stand pat" through 1904 and called for immediate action on the tariff. See the Register and Leader, Nov. 14, 1902.

72 See Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. X, pp. 66-68, 75, for the view that Cummins' Detroit speech before the Reciprocity League marked a shift in his attack in the tariff war from the "shelter to monopoly" clause to the reciprocity principle.
Lacey, it was a good year. Although he lost the contest over the state tariff plank, his tariff views seemed vindicated. Furthermore, threat of Cummins supporters to retaliate for Lacey's opposition in 1901 did not materialize. Lacey won his sixth consecutive victory and his seventh term in the House.
CHAPTER IX

STANDPATTER FROM STANDPATVILLE

Iowa Republicans regarded 1903 a critical year. As the contests for Congress had occurred the preceding year, the only campaign to be waged was for the governorship. Many Republicans feared that Governor Cummins would attempt to use this opportunity to strengthen his position within the party and gain a controlling influence over the state delegation to the 1904 National Convention. To thwart that strategy, Iowa's Old Guard Republican leaders devised a plan for harmony which would permit the re-election of Cummins but keep party control in their hands. Congressman Lacey resisted the shift to the harmony idea, and publicly identified himself as a defender of traditional Republican policies.

Cummins' Democratic opponent in 1903 was J. B. Sullivan, a free silver man. Sullivan was flexible enough to compromise when the Democratic State Convention rejected the silver plank in an effort to rid the party of any remaining identification with Bryan.¹ The major development

¹Register and Leader, Jan. 24, 25, 1903.
during the gubernatorial campaign, however, was the sharp factionalism among Iowa Republicans, with the tariff as the apparent source of division. While the Old Guard insisted on protectionism, Cummins endorsed revision and reciprocity.

Lacey launched an attack on Cummins and his followers early in the year. As the principal speaker in February at the Boies Penrose Republican Club in Philadelphia, he defended the policy of protectionism. This thoroughly Republican concept of the tariff, Lacey argued, was irreconcilable with Cummins' Iowa Idea. At the beginning of United States history, the tariff issue had appeared in the very first Congress, when its second bill established a tariff for protection. Lacey buttressed his argument by turning to the Bible. Quoting St. Paul's first epistle to Timothy, "but if any man provide not for his own and specially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel," he all but excommunicated progressive Republicans from the party.2

In an allusion to Iowa politics, Lacey informed his audience that he was more concerned about the confused thinking in his own party than the threat of a Democratic victory in 1904. "The doctrine of protection cannot be overthrown by its open foes," he declared, and predicted that "its chief danger will come from those who pose as its friends."

---

2Daily Capital, Feb. 10, 1903.
Making his charge against the Cummins faction even more explicit, Lacey decried the attempt of some Republicans to make protection a local issue. The Republican Party, he said, "is the one party which looks after the prosperity of the whole country, north, south, east, and west," and added, "we do not need any Pennsylvania idea, New York idea, Kansas idea, or Iowa idea." What the party should and must stand for was "the national republican idea which will be content with nothing less than the protection and successful operation of all of the industries of the country." The national republican idea "is good enough for me," he concluded.

Although well received by Pennsylvania Republicans, Lacey's speech failed to make a deep impact. This was due in part to an adroit move by Cummins. Speaking in Omaha some two weeks prior to Lacey's address, Cummins indicated a slight change in his posture on the tariff and expressed some willingness to minimize party differences. Attempting to smother the opposition to his Iowa Idea, the Governor defended the doctrine of protection and explained that the tariff views of Iowa Republicans were no different from Republicans elsewhere. Cummins reaffirmed his opposition

---

3 Ibid. Register and Leader, Feb. 11, 1903. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Feb. 12, 1903. Lacey viewed the tariff as a national issue of benefit to labor, farmers, and industry in order to render protectionism acceptable to his Sixth District rural constituents.
to "standing pat," but he was careful not to make a request for immediate tariff revision.4

The Governor's next move was a shrewdly ambivalent speech in March before the Polk County Republican Convention. As the Register and Leader described the address, it could be taken as "a gesture of harmony or as a guantlet of controversy." Cummins extended the olive branch, explaining that while he favored revision, reciprocity, and the shelter plank of 1901 he was "not wedded to any particular form of expression" of those ideas. His ensuing remarks, however, amounted to a withdrawal of the peace offering. Cummins declared that the 1900 platform clause providing for reciprocity on noncompetitive goods must be strengthened to include competitive items. Furthermore, the Governor attributed the Senate's failure in ratifying reciprocal trade treaties to an "insane fear" of altering tariff schedules. He then repeated his much publicized Minneapolis phrase that "the consumer is better entitled to competition than the producer is to protection." Finally, the Governor let

4Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Feb. 11, 1903. Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. XI, pp. 5-8, states that President Roosevelt used personal influence about this time to dissuade Dolliver, Roberts, and A. B. Funk, a close friend of Cummins', from their insistence on immediate tariff reform. The date of Cummins' speech was Jan. 29 and that of Lacey's was Feb. 7, 1903.
it be known that he planned to work toward incorporating his ideas in the national platform of 1904. 5

Cummins’ reference to the national platform and indications in the press of his availability as a vice presidential candidate in 1904 intensified apprehension among Iowa’s conservative Republican leaders. They feared Cummins might try to write the state platform as a bid for the national office. They worried, too, that if Cummins dominated the State Convention and controlled the Iowa delegation to the Republican National Convention the following year, he would have gone far in taking party leadership in the state away from the congressional delegation. 6 Somehow, the Governor had to be stopped.

Devising a plan to check Cummins, conservative Republicans called on Allison to fashion a compromise platform before the State Convention opened. They assumed that both factions would accept this strategy. Conservatives viewed the senior Senator as one of their own, and, at the same time, they felt he was too highly regarded in the state

5 Register and Leader, Mar. 15, 1903. Daily Capital, Mar. 14, 16, 1903. The Capital accused the Cummins faction of using the Iowa Idea for political advantage in the public mind because, the editor pointed out, the great railroad corporations were not too disturbed by Cummins’ anti-monopoly talk.

to be attacked directly by the Cummins faction. Acting anonymously and apparently without orders from Old Guard leaders, Lacey contributed much to the publicity of Allison's role as mediator. At Lacey's suggestion, the Oskaloosa Daily Herald printed a short article on its editorial page purporting to be the Herald's X-ray machine picturing the Republican State Convention proceedings. The picture showed a Jasper County delegate suggesting that Allison be named chairman of the Resolutions Committee with "authority to draft a platform on which all Iowa Republicans can get together." The motion carried unanimously, of course, in the X-ray picture. Several Republican papers across the state endorsed the idea of an Allison platform as an effective method of harmonizing the Iowa Idea with the national Republican platform's clause on the tariff.

Allison agreed to play the role of pacifier. He expressed his belief that the State Convention would "adopt

---


8The Oskaloosa Daily Herald was so pleased with press response to its claimed parentage of the idea for an Allison platform that it reprinted many supporting editorials. See reprints of Daily Capital, Register and Leader, Cedar Rapids Republican, Sioux City Journal, Times-Republican, Davenport Republican, Gate City, Ottumwa Courier, Denison Review, and Hawk-eye in Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Apr. 17, 1903.
a broad gauge platform that will favor changing the tariff to meet changed conditions." After that nod to revisionism, the Senator reassured the protectionists that "if a high rate was necessary for protection of an industry it should go up" until there was no longer a need for such a high rate. He both defended protection and praised reciprocity, although he admitted that reciprocal tariff rates would have to come through legislation rather than treaties.9

President Roosevelt's projected western tour caused the Iowa Republicans to unite. Planning to journey through Iowa in early April, the President wanted his tariff statements to be accepted by all Republicans in the state.10 A hint of Roosevelt's stand on the tariff appeared in the speeches of several national Republican leaders, all of which indicated the President planned no immediate tariff change. Roosevelt himself delivered the death blow to revision in his Minneapolis address. He silenced those who linked the tariff to trusts when he declared that "you can put an end to the prosperity of the trust by putting an end to the prosperity of the nation, but such a price seems high."11

9 Register and Leader, Mar. 31, 1903.

10 Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. XI, pp. 14-16.

11 Daily Capital, Apr. 4, 6, 1903. The Capital referred to speeches by Allison, Leslie M. Shaw, and Elihu Root.
Whether Cummins was influenced by the clamor for an Allison compromise platform or by Roosevelt's tariff views, he nevertheless moved at this time to seek out J. W. Blythe for conferences on Iowa politics. After several informal meetings, the two men in early April met with Allison in Chicago. Harmony in Iowa was, of course, the goal of the meeting. Not only had Blythe suggested Allison's presence, but he had carefully fortified himself by ascertaining Roosevelt's tariff views before going to Chicago.12

Soon after the Chicago conference, Lacey received letters from both Allison and Blythe. Blythe, who was designedly casual about the meeting, wrote that "since Allison was in town . . . we finally all three got together

12Letter of J. W. Blythe, Apr. 6, 1903, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253. The Chicago conference took place before Roosevelt's Minneapolis address. See Sage, Allison, p. 289, who says the object of the Chicago conference was the political advantage of both sides, not a good tariff plank.

In a far out defense of Lacey's tariff views, the Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Apr. 15, 1903, interpreted the judgment of a United States Circuit Court of Appeals on the Northern Securities Company as a contributing factor in Iowa's Republican harmony. The Court ruled the company in violation of anti-trust laws, and since a railroad trust obviously was unrelated to tariff, said the editor, this judgment dissociated tariff from trusts and proved there was no need for a "shelter to monopoly" clause in the Republican platform. The Iowa Idea, continued the editor, was an attempt by Cummins to build a state platform on national issues in order to embarrass Congressmen who were in agreement with the national administration's tariff views. Thus, the Herald, while drawing unwarranted conclusions on the Northern Securities judgment, did testify to the power struggle between the Governor and Congressmen of Iowa.
to talk things over." The Burlington's counsel made it appear that he had inquired into Roosevelt's tariff position primarily for Cummins' conversion, but he enumerated them for Lacey's benefit as well. Blythe's letter contained four Presidential suggestions for harmony: (1) separate treatment of tariff and trusts; (2) development of a tariff plank along historical lines with silence on the application of the reciprocity clause to competitive or noncompetitive products; (3) conservative treatment of the trust problem in harmony with Roosevelt's speeches on the topic; and (4) avoidance of factionalism both as to party nominations and issues.

Blythe added that to stay within these Presidential guidelines and arrive at a compromise platform for Iowa, Allison had suggested the use of a section from the 1896 state platform. Both he and the Senator agreed that the old tariff plank stating that "tariff schedules shall be just, fair, and impartial, equally opposed to foreign control and domestic monopoly, to sectional discrimination and individual favoritism" in no way contributed to the "shelter to monopoly" idea. The tone of Blythe's letter indicated that he expected opposition from Lacey. To counter it, Blythe suggested Lacey meet with him and Allison. Frank discussion was desirable "among those who are likely to have a controlling voice."

Blythe concluded by cautioning Lacey to secrecy, adding that it was especially desirable "that no report should get out
that anybody is trying to influence the action of the Convention in this matter."\(^{13}\) This letter, as a part of Blythe's strategy for harmony, seemed designed to muffle Lacey as the Chicago conference had presumably muffled Cummins.

Allison's letter to Lacey, written a day later, exhibited the same strategy, and he too invited Lacey to Dubuque to talk things over. The Senator endeavored to secure Lacey's cooperation by identifying his views with those of Allison. "As a result of frank talk" in Chicago, Allison said, "I am satisfied that so far as we are concerned (when I say we, I mean you and I, and others who think as we do) there will be no serious trouble with those who act more directly with Governor Cummins."\(^{14}\)

Blythe courted Lacey with still another letter in which he enclosed a clipping from the Burlington *Hawk-eye*, a paper friendly to Blythe's views. Portrayed as an interview of the railroad politician, the article was really a Blythe-directed production informing Iowa Republicans that the formula for party harmony was a platform written by Allison and based on President Roosevelt's directives. In the interview, Blythe attributed the idea of an Allison platform to "the earlier suggestion of Cummins and the

\(^{13}\)Letter of J. W. Blythe, Apr. 6, 1903, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253.

Register and Leader." To complete his message, he informed his interviewer that President Roosevelt while on his Western tour, offered sufficient material from which to construct a platform.\(^{15}\) The article closed with a tribute to Cummins' "hard work" in behalf of harmony.\(^{16}\) With such obvious sub-titles as "Suggestions of Harmony" and "All Iowa Republicans can Unite Upon the Policies outlined in President Roosevelt's Speeches with Senator Allison as Referee," the message of the interview seemed doubly clear. Perhaps with tongue-in-cheek, Blythe told Lacey that he hoped the article would "commend itself . . . as sufficiently guarded and conservative."\(^{17}\)

Before Lacey received this second letter from Blythe, he had replied to the first one. He straightforwardly challenged the judgment of both Allison and Blythe in employing the 1896 tariff plank. Advising Blythe that it would be a mistake to single out the earlier platform phrase about

\(^{15}\)Roosevelt's Minneapolis address on Apr. 4 separated tariff from trusts and declared tariff no "shelter" to trusts. See Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Apr. 6, 1903.


\(^{17}\)Letter of J. W. Blythe, Apr. 7, 1903, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253. Actually Blythe wrote three letters to Lacey on Apr. 7, but only this one is meaningful. See also Register and Leader, Apr. 8, 1903. Daily Capital, Apr. 8, 1903. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Apr. 15, 1903.
"domestic monopoly," Lacey warned that if the clause were inserted in the 1903 platform "it would be used as the basis for more Democratic speeches from Republican candidates."

Continuing in an anti-Cummins vein, Lacey wrote that "we know how eagerly some people [the governor] had been crossed out[7] will catch at any phrase that will enable them to win Democratic applause." He reminded Blythe that the shelter plank of 1901 caused no trouble until "it was used as a text at Minneapolis [by Cummins] and carried away beyond any thing that its authors thought it stood for." Lacey feared that the "domestic monopoly" clause, if incorporated, would be used for the same purpose in 1903. Except for this tariff extract, Lacey agreed with the rest of the harmony plan. He could not resist openly identifying himself as the initial promoter of the Allison platform through his anonymous article in the Oskaloosa Herald.18

In spite of Lacey's strong disagreement, the strategy of Allison, Blythe, and Cummins prevailed. The Governor publicly promoted the harmony efforts without, of course, revealing the existence of the prearranged agreement. Cummins stated that his tariff views were substantially in accord with those of Allison and Dolliver, and without

18 Letter of J. F. Lacey, Apr. 7, 1903, to J. W. Blythe, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253. Lacey must have been specially irritated at Blythe's letter of Apr. 7 which ascribed the Allison platform idea to "Cummins and the Register and Leader."
specifying names, added that he believed his views agreed with a majority of the House members from Iowa. Admitting that he had talked to party leaders normally unfriendly to him, the Governor reported entire concurrence in the desire to draft a platform acceptable to all Republicans. With a nod to Allison as peacemaker, he expressed hope that the new platform would be drafted "by some eminent leader of the party in Iowa who commands the absolute confidence of every republican in the land." Dubuque became the Mecca for tariff-minded Republicans. George Roberts, George D. Perkins, Lacey, and others traveled to Allison's home to advise the platform architect. Lacey particularly wanted a direct platform statement that there would be no tariff revision until after the next Presidential election. Persuaded by Allison and Perkins that this objective would be achieved without the irritant of a direct statement, Lacey abandoned his recommendation. George Roberts was more successful than Lacey

19Cummins correctly interpreted Allison's views not as an abandonment of reciprocity, but as a shift from treaties to legislation to secure it.

20Register and Leader, Apr. 5, 1903. Ross, Dolliver, pp. 184-190, treats of the harmony platform and states that Dolliver yielded his position on revision at the "personal request" of Roosevelt who feared a major fight might result in his loss of Iowa in 1904.

21Letter of W. B. Allison, Apr. 16, 1903, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, Box 9, File 34. The calendared notation on this letter completely misinterprets it. The notation has
in having his recommendations accepted. At Roberts' suggestion, Allison expanded the reciprocity clause to define reciprocal trade as trade between nations that was mutually advantageous. Allison reported to Cummins that things were well under way for amity and peace, and described Roberts' suggestions as "valuable additions" to the platform. What they really did, of course, was give emphasis to the Governor's views on reciprocity as opposed to those of Lacey and other Old Guard Republicans of the state.

President Roosevelt's swing through Iowa coincided perfectly with harmony efforts among the Republicans. Fulfilling a promise made to Lacey in 1902 when a Presidential trip had to be cancelled, Roosevelt made it a point to visit the Sixth District. Although the Congressman did not face the voters in 1903, he gathered as much political capital as he could from the President's abundant praise. Giving the dedication address for Oskaloosa's new YMCA building, Roosevelt told the estimated crowd of over 25,000 that he was present at Lacey's request, somehow creating the

Allison telling Cummins of his conference with Perkins and Lacey in which they decided there should be no revision until after the 1904 election, while the letter really makes it very clear that at the Chicago conference Cummins agreed to no tariff revision until that date. Relative to Lacey's request for a direct statement in the platform delaying revision, Allison wrote Cummins that "whilst we all agreed about it, it was thought unwise, as we thought in Chicago, to make any statement about it."

22 Ibid.
impression that the President did Lacey's will. Roosevelt identified Lacey as a man "who has the interests of the whole country at heart," and upon whom he called for advice on matters which were important to the nation. Giving Lacey a valuable quotation to use in 1904, Roosevelt congratulated the Sixth District for having such a man to represent them.23

The smoothly unfolding harmony plan by state Republican leaders encountered some opposition from influential newspapers. Capital editor Lafe Young, who opposed Cummins' tariff views, exploded when the Register and Leader editorialized that the Iowa Idea would be in the 1903 platform regardless of its language. Interpreting the statement as a capitulation to Cummins and Roberts, Young called for an open endorsement rather than a disguise of the Iowa Idea, bluntly adding that he considered principle more important than two men.24

The press comments so annoyed Lacey that he inquired of Allison about them. Replying that he was equally annoyed,

23Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Apr. 29, 1903. Register and Leader, Apr. 29, 1903. Daily Capital, June 2, 1903. Lacey rode with Roosevelt from Oskaloosa to Ottumwa where the President made an additional brief platform appearance.

24Daily Capital, May 14, 26, 1903. Register and Leader, May 1-14, 1903. Lafe Young accused the Sioux City Tribune's Jud Welliver of sending pro-Cummins material to Iowa papers, to the Post-Dispatch (St. Louis, Missouri), and to a number of papers in Eastern United States.
the Senator agreed that "persistent falsehoods were being circulated" despite his care to say nothing about the platform. Allison hinted that the leaks might have come from Roberts, but added that he did not know if Roberts had seen a copy of the tentative platform declarations. Allison observed "that somebody has been misrepresenting all that has been done to the newspapers." To reassure Lacey, he affirmed that the Iowa Idea would not be in the final declaration, even in changed verbal clothing. As another proof that party leaders controlled Cummins, Senator Allison recounted how he and Perkins dissuaded the Governor from insisting on including a provision that government must work to preserve competition and prevent monopoly.25

Further attempting to win Lacey's acquiescence to the agreement thus far accomplished, Allison recounted the growing approval of the preliminary platform draft. Such men as Mark Hanna, Cummins, Perkins, Birdsall, Blythe, and W. R. Boyd of the Cedar Rapids Republican all liked what they read, Allison told Lacey. Without going into detail, he characterized the first clause as "a strong vindication of the tariff policy of the party," and the second one as a vaguely worded endorsement of lower or higher rates as needed for industrial growth. Allison admitted the second

25Letter of W. B. Allison, May 16, 1903, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253. This clause wanted by Cummins expressed the controversial idea of his Minneapolis speech about consumers' right to protection.
clause did not please everyone, including himself, but recom-
mended it for the restraints it placed on Cummins. "Whatever
the Governor may say, and he is bound to say that this is
satisfactory to him," Allison confided to Lacey, "we know if
he had his own way that he would make a different decla-
ration." The Senator further explained that the platform
endorsement of reciprocity was quite general with no specific
directions to the Congress. In a final assurance, Allison
indicated that the plank on trusts would not cause trouble
because "all [i.e. Cummins] recognized . . . that we are not
to deal with this subject until after 1904."26

Still another rumor, indirectly related to the con-
tent of the platform, disquieted Lacey. He wanted to know
whether or not a deal had been made during Roosevelt's Iowa
tour promising Cummins the vice presidency in return for
approval of the Iowa platform draft. Not only had Allison
not seen the President during his Iowa travels, the Senator
replied, but the tentative platform proposals had not been
drafted at that time. Reiterating his earlier explanation
to Lacey for rejecting his request that the platform include
a clause delaying revision until after the 1904 elections,
Allison denied the need of such a statement. Cummins had
"many times publicly and openly" committed himself to that

26Ibid.
policy, he wrote. Allison responded patiently and fully to Lacey's inquiries in order to mollify his opposition at the forthcoming State Convention.

Allison's attempts to convert Lacey to the compromise view, however, met with little success. Lacey seized his first opportunity to demonstrate publicly his intransigence when he spoke before Des Moines' Grant Club, the leading Republican club in Iowa. Because earlier speakers had devoted themselves to the values of the Iowa Idea, Lacey was invited to deliver "something of the old time political religion in so far as the tariff is concerned." Lacey began his address with a reference to the spirit of Henry Clay. After this indirect endorsement of the current compromise efforts, he launched into a direct defense of protectionism. He emphasized the validity of Clay's earlier assurance that a protective tariff would "increase production, reduce the price, and improve... the article," and declared that Clay's speeches of 1832 were still "good living arguments." In reality, the whole address was nothing more than a survey of tariff history, delivered with evangelical zeal, and designed to "prove" that prosperity and high tariff were inseparable, as were

27Ibid.

depression and low tariff. Lacey closed with a blow at Cummins, without mentioning his name. The Congressman expressed his "utter dissent" from the latest Republican suggestion to make the extension of reciprocity to competitive goods "an article of party faith."29

Lacey's unwillingness to accept the party call for harmony received even greater publicity when Lafe Young published the entire speech under the heading, "Lacey Opposes the Tariff Revision Policy." Overlooking much of what Lacey said, the Register and Leader declared that Congress should set aside the whole problem of the tariff because the election of Roosevelt and a Republican majority in the Congress merited prime consideration from all Republicans.30

This view, of course, was an idea central to the harmony plan worked out by Iowa Republican leaders.

Senator Allison, still uncertain of what Lacey's position would be at the State Convention, wrote a reserved letter to him after the Grant Club speech. Revealing more courtesy that agreement, he courted Lacey with a bit of flattery. He expressed regret that he had not seen Lacey to discuss convention plans with him, adding that he

29Oskaloosa Daily Herald, May 20, 1903. Letter of W. P. Hepburn, May 25, 1903, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253, expressed Hepburn's endorsement of "everything" Lacey said. The Grant Club speech was on May 19.

desired to have him serve on the Resolutions Committee.

"Whatever we do there ought to be a real compromise of conflicting views," Allison explained, "so that we would present a harmonious platform acceptable, or practically so, to all." In order to be available for consultation, Allison asked Lacey to arrive in Des Moines a day before the State Convention opened.31

The Senator's hope that Lacey would serve on the Resolutions Committee failed to materialize, and part of the responsibility lay with Lacey himself. When Lacey's candidacy for the position became known, Cummins' supporters in the Sixth District selected Captain Carr to oppose him. Lacey withdrew his candidacy at once, citing as his reason the public knowledge that Cummins requested Carr to enter the contest. Anti-Cummins men of the Sixth District did not give in so readily, and rallied behind H. W. Robinson of Jasper County. Because the party caucus selected Robinson over Carr by a forty-vote margin, Lacey, had he chosen to keep his name in the race, no doubt could have defeated Carr also. Some Republicans interpreted Lacey's withdrawal as deference to harmony; Lacey, however, did not generally defer to the Governor's wishes over those of Allison. However, his decision probably was calculated to escape last

minute identification with the Allison platform. Both Allison and Blythe had consistently overlooked his pre-convention suggestions.\textsuperscript{32}

Still another contest concerning Sixth District membership on the State Central Committee ended in victory for the anti-Cummins faction. The former district representative on the Central Committee, R. W. Clayton, was an Old Guard Republican who accepted a Washington position from Treasury Secretary Shaw. The contest over Clayton's successor worried Lacey because it not only represented a test of Cummins' strength in Lacey's district, but it also was vital to the struggle for factional control of the entire State Central Committee. Early in the spring, Blythe alerted Lacey to the problem and suggested W. W. Epps from Ottumwa, and recommended further that Lacey support him since Epps's victory in Mahaska County was essential to district election.\textsuperscript{33} Former Republican State Chairman H. O. Weaver corresponded with Lacey in a similar vein, reminding him that the Old Guard candidate for Seventh District representative on the State Central Committee had

\textsuperscript{32}Ottumwa Courier, July 1, 1903. Letter of A. W. Lee, publisher of Courier, July 2, 1903, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253, in which Lee told Lacey that his action on the Resolutions Committee matter had won him compliments from a number of prominent party men.

\textsuperscript{33}Letters of J. W. Blythe, Mar. 28, Apr. 6, 1903, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253.
withdrawn from the race. Weaver's successor was also a Cummins man, and consequently Weaver felt obliged to caution Lacey about the significance of the Sixth District contest. "I take it you are aware of the peculiar situation of the committee," Weaver tactfully advised Lacey.  

The Sixth District Congressman accepted the advice of both Blythe and Weaver and secretly worked for the election of Epps over J. C. Harrold, Mahaska County delegate and Cummins' friend. At the State Convention, Epps won the coveted seat on the State Central Committee with the aid of Lacey's vote. Harrold, who had always supported Lacey for Congress, reacted in surprise and anger that the Congressman would, as he put it, "stoop to defeat me in my own county."  

In spite of such stooping, victory was sweet to Lacey because Cummins' drive for power was thwarted in the Sixth District, and in a great measure in the state at large.  

Although Nate Kendall, a Cummins supporter, served as permanent chairman, the State Convention was controlled by the Old Guard. When J. W. Blythe emerged as chairman of the

---

35 Letter of J. G. Harrold, June 4, 1903, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, Box 10, File 37.  
36 Blythe told Lacey that "it was very gratifying that you were able to give Epps your vote." Letter of J. W. Blythe, May 23, 1903, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253.
Resolutions Committee, the elimination of the "shelter to monopoly" clause from the platform surprised no one. Blythe's Committee inserted the 1896 tariff plank, declaring that rates should be "fair and impartial, equally opposed to foreign control and domestic monopoly, to sectional discrimination and individual favoritism and must from time to time change to meet varying conditions." In a vaguely worded statement, the platform also endorsed reciprocity as the natural complement of protection.37 Publicly placing their seal of approval on the new platform, Cummins, Allison, and Dolliver warmly endorsed the work of the Resolutions Committee which reflected the secret preconvention negotiations of Blythe, Allison and Cummins.38

Because all his previous recommendations to Allison received a negative response, Lacey found little in the platform over which to rejoice. In an address to the State Convention delegates, he good-naturedly declared his opposition. Although the Oskaloosa Herald termed it a "harmony speech," it more nearly resembled a declaration of continued war on the tariff issue. Lacey blessed Allison as a "peacemaker," and then turned to a more direct allusion to the party fight. "I am glad to be able to get on one corner of the

37Oskaloosa Daily Herald, July 1, 1903. Daily Capital, July 1, 1903.

38Register and Leader, July 2, 1903. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, July 2, 1903. Daily Capital, July 1, 2, 1903.
platform," Lacey quipped, while standing on the extreme edge of the wooden structure. "Like my friend Robert G. Cousins," he continued, "I am a Standpatter from Standpattville." Bluntly, Lacey sketched out his future position by informing his audience that he was "not there to apologize for the Dingley tariff but to promise that none of its material benefits to this country shall be disturbed by my vote." This speech brought Lacey much publicity as an uncompromising protectionist, and it also publicly identified him as a determined member of the anti-Cummins faction of the party.

Both party factions claimed vindication of their views in the new platform. Lafe Young of the Capital rejoiced that the party war was over, claiming that the state platform now harmonized with the Republican national platform. This judgment was naive, however, because Cummins, from the outset of the struggle, indicated that he was not

39Oskaloosa Daily Herald, July 2, 1903. Cousins' speech, even more spirited than Lacey's, was said to have made him "the patron saint of standpatters in Iowa." See Jacob A. Swisher, Robert Gordon Cousins (Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1938), p. 53.

40It was reported that he received a letter addressed simply to The Standpatter from Standpatville. Reprint of Hawk-eye in Oskaloosa Daily Herald, July 10, 1903. Letter of B. F. Keables, July 2, 1903, to Lacey and letter of William McFarlane, July 6, 1903, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253.

41Daily Capital, July 1, 2, 1903.
wedded to any set of words to express the ideas he wanted in the platform. Progressive Republicans called victory theirs because, while they lost the "shelter plank," they obtained a commitment to revision, an endorsement of reciprocity, and a definite party stand on domestic monopoly. Standpatters, on the other hand, declared themselves the winner because they succeeded in separating the tariff from trusts, and averted a detailed statement on both revision and reciprocity. A more accurate assessment of the Iowa Republican platform came from the St. Paul Dispatch, which portrayed the document as "a masterpiece designed to say nothing while seeming to say everything." If the platform were not such a masterpiece, reasoned the editor of the Minnesota paper, it could not have won approval from both Cummins and Lacey.42

Even more perturbing to the Standpatters than the Progressive Republicans' claim to victory, was the common rumor portraying Cummins as the primary author of the platform, an impression conveyed, moreover, in the Governor's own correspondence. Lacey bitterly complained to Allison about this perversion of the truth, but the veteran Senator did not allow this usurpation of his work and talent to disquiet him. "Yes, I supposed I had something to do with the platform," he replied to Lacey, "but it seems not." There

---

42Reprint of Dispatch (St. Paul, Minnesota), in Register and Leader, July 5, 1903. See also Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. XI, pp. 30-32.
were too many men, Allison continued, who knew "what was done and how it was done to have any great mistake made. I thought I would let the matter go for the present, but perhaps jot down a few things that I know about for the future," Allison concluded.43

As at the State Convention, the Republican party maintained apparent unity throughout the gubernatorial campaign. Cummins concentrated on the theme of reciprocity, and in a definite attempt to dissociate himself from the Democrats' tariff views, he declared it inconsistent with the Democratic party's free trade principle. Endeavoring to minimize Republican differences, Cummins more directly identified his views with protection and reminded his audience that he opposed hasty change or encompassing tariff reform. He divorced trusts from the tariff, calling trusts part of an "economic revolution," and asked for their control through cooperative state and national government action.44

Outwardly, Lacey and Congressman Cousins kept the campaign truce, but they were under suspicion by Cummins' friends. Cousins, who often delivered campaign addresses without mentioning the Governor's name, provoked ill will among Progressive Republicans by his speech in Lacey's


44 Register and Leader, Sept. 21, 27, Oct. 11, 1903.
home town. Because Cousins spoke at Lacey's invitation and because parts of the address employed phrases from Lacey's speech the preceding day, Cummins' followers concluded that Lacey had coached the speaker. In reporting to the Governor, George ¥. Seevers, who briefly sought the Republican nomination to Lacey's seat in 1902, complained in words that did nothing to assuage the personal antipathy developing between Cummins and Lacey. Seevers termed the talk a "sarcastic abuse of those who, in any measure, favored revision," and added that Cummins' friends considered it a "personal assault" on him. Quoting the Sixth District Congressman as saying to a friend, "Wasn't that speech good and a chilly blast for Cummins," Seevers described Lacey as "rushing forward to congratulate Cousins." With the exception of Major Lacey, Seevers informed the Governor, the speech was not well received. While disclaiming that the Governor suffered any damage from the address, Seevers, nevertheless, urged Cummins to deliver a major campaign speech in Lacey's home town of Oskaloosa.45

Lacey's campaign speeches for Cummins, because they consistently defended the values of protection, were special

45Letter of George W. Seevers, Oct. 16, 1903, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, Box 11, File 42. Seevers also told the Governor that Cousins avoided "with studied purpose" the use of his name or reference to his administration. See also Register and Leader, Sept. 21, 1903.
irritants to Cummins' followers. The Congressman spoke
often both within and outside his district, and his tariff
views achieved wide dissemination. The American Economist,
an organ of arch-protective tariff views, characterized one
of Lacey's addresses as a "fine old-fashioned, straight-
away republican speech" which "clearly demonstrated the
invariable value of the protective policy."

In spite of the uneasy intraparty peace unity pre-
vailed, and the Republicans won a clear victory. Cummins
swept the state with approximately 60,000 votes, and carried
Lacey's county. Only Davis County in the Sixth District
went to the Democrats. Progressive Republicans claimed
victory in the Iowa House and elected Cummins' supporter,
George W. Clarke, as Speaker.

As Governor Cummins prepared to begin his second
term, it appeared that neither he nor the Standpatters gained

\[46\] Letter of A. F. Dawson, Chairman Republican
Speakers' Bureau, Oct. 30, 1903, to Lacey, Lacey Papers,
Vol. 253.

\[47\] Reprint of American Economist in Oskaloosa Daily
Herald, Oct. 26, 1903.

\[48\] Oskaloosa Daily Herald, May 29, 1903. Register and
Leader, Nov. 4, 1903. Daily Capital, Nov. 4, 5, 1903. The
Iowa Official Register, 1904. See also Bateman, unpublished
manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. XII, pp. 1-5.

Cummins could also claim a personal political victory
in a business transaction made about election time. George
Roberts sold the Register and Leader to Gardner Cowles of
Algona who proved to be pro-Cummins in his views. For
further explanation of this newspaper sale, see Sage,
Allison, p. 291, and Bateman, unpublished manuscript on
total victory in 1903. Renominated without opposition and elected with the support of the whole party, the Governor had modified his tariff views and sought rapprochement with the Standpat faction. He had shifted from defense of the Iowa Idea to that of effective reciprocity as his theme for winning political leadership. Standpatters, on the other hand, had achieved the deletion of the hated "shelter to monopoly" platform clause, and promised nothing specific in their concessions to revision or reciprocity. In controlling the State Convention and the party's State Central Committee, Standpatters had effectively thwarted Cummins' initial designs for leadership in the 1904 National Convention. Although he paid lip service to party unity in 1903, Lacey remained the "Standpatter from Standpatville."
CHAPTER X

RENEWED CONTEST FOR PARTY CONTROL

Although Governor Cummins during his second term enjoyed increased strength in the lower house of the Iowa legislature, he did not strive for progressive reforms. Party harmony, so painstakingly built in 1903, proved fragile, and within weeks after his re-election factional warfare erupted. It was precipitated by Cummins' attempt to: dominate the Iowa delegation to the Republican National Convention in 1904 and to legitimize his views by securing Roosevelt's approval.1 The Governor also intervened in the Congressional contests that year, aiming much of his harassment at John Lacey.

Iowa's lawmakers made some initial attempts in 1904 to secure state reforms, but they did not achieve impressive results. While refusing to enact a general railroad reform measure which endorsed a two-cents per mile passenger fare, nullified rebates, and outlawed railroad passes, the legislature did force the railroads to continue the issuance of

---

1Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. XII, pp. 1-6. Daily Capital, Jan. 18, 1904. Iowa had twenty-two delegates selected two from each district, and four chosen at-large by the State Convention.

225
passes to farmers and livestock producers traveling with their animals.\(^2\) Supporters of a state primary law fared somewhat better. Failing to win a state-wide primary, they were able to obtain a law establishing primaries in counties with population of 80,000. But only Polk County had that many people.\(^3\)

The final approval in 1904 of the Titus amendment to the state constitution also brought an element of reform to Iowa politics. Having passed legislative hurdles several years earlier, only to be invalidated by Iowa's highest court, the amendment, or biennial election law as it was often called, journeyed a second time through the legislature.\(^4\) Opponents of the amendment failed to stop the measure in the legislature, and turned to kill it in the popular referendum necessary for ratification.

---

\(^2\)W. L. Bowers, "The Fruits of Iowa Progressivism, 1900-1915," The Iowa Journal of History and Politics, LVII (Jan., 1959), 41. Bowers stated that four anti-pass bills were introduced in 1904 but none passed. See also the Daily News, May 22, 1904, and the Register and Leader, Feb. 11, Apr. 20, May 2, Dec. 14, 1904. Railroads had eliminated the passes voluntarily, but since they adopted a slower time schedule for the stock trains and failed to lower the freight charges on stock cars, the farmers and stockmen demanded reinstatement of the passes. See Wallaces' Farmer, Nov. 30, 1904, for further treatment of delay of stock trains.

\(^3\)Register and Leader, Dec. 14, 1903, Jan. 13, Mar. 29, 30, 1904. Harlan, History of Iowa, II, 227. Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. XII, pp. 8-10. The limited primary bill was sponsored by Emory English, a Cummins supporter.

\(^4\)See Chaps. VI and VII of this study for the background of the Titus amendment. The provision eliminated
Opposition to the election law, however, proved too disparate to be effective. Both Blythe and Lacey disapproved of the Titus amendment, believing that the treatment of national and state issues in the same election year would submerge one or the other. Railroad interests also sought to defeat the amendment as an effective means of thwarting Cummins' bid for party control. No Iowa governor had ever sought the office for three terms; therefore, if the biennial law extending state office terms by one year met defeat, railroad men reasoned, Cummins would lose his office by the close of 1905 rather than in 1906. Within the Republican party, the opposition crossed factional lines, and while some anti-Cummins men favored the amendment, some of the Governor's supporters opposed it. The Democratic party took no official stand on the biennial law, but the 1903 Democratic gubernatorial candidate, J. B. Sullivan, had disapproved of it. In the face of, and perhaps because of, such varied opposition, the Titus amendment was approved at the polls in November. Consequently, there would be no elections in 1905 or thereafter in odd-numbered years.

1905 elections by extending the terms of most state offices by one year.

With the Titus amendment struggle won to his favor, Cummins sought the leadership of the Iowa delegation to the National convention and a seat on the Resolutions Committee. Through such a channel, he hoped to imbed his tariff views in the Republican national platform. To defeat the Governor, J. W. Blythe announced his interest in the same position. Since the faction winning the most convention delegates would prevail, and because twenty-two of the twenty-six state delegates represented district choices, lines for the party struggle formed around Congressional district contests. The Cummins faction, of course, hoped to carry enough Congressional seats, as well as convention delegates, to destroy the hold over Iowa state politics enjoyed by the conservative Republican Congressional delegation.

The fragile harmony of 1903 ended when the Governor in his inaugural threw down the gauntlet to the Standpatters. With the tariff his central theme, Cummins called for reciprocity on competitive products, and seeking to win American farmers more markets, endorsed the reduction of rates assessed against West European goods. Such new European markets for farm products, he reasoned, would

opposed the Titus amendment; typical were the Newton Herald, Oct. 23, 1904, and the Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Dec. 5, 1904.

6Districts 2, 4, 7, 10, and 11 were claimed by Cummins and 1, 3, 5, and 8 by Blythe in early January. The Sixth and Ninth Districts were claimed by both sides. See Register and Leader, Jan. 14, 1904, and Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Jan. 19, 1904.
compensate for any decline of domestic markets resulting from the admission of Canadian farm goods. Thus, in one speech, Cummins resurrected the issues of revision and reciprocity, believed by the Standpatters to be dead.

Reacting vehemently to the inaugural address, the Standpat press accused Cummins of deserting the farmers, of interjecting national issues into state affairs, of embarrassing the candidacy of Roosevelt by giving Easterners the impression that all Iowa Republicans favored revision, of impeding the re-election of Iowa's Republican Congressmen, and lastly, of violating his harmony pledge of 1903. The Governor, charged the Standpatters, had planted the Iowa Idea more strongly than ever in state politics.

While the inaugural address warned Standpatters of an impending party fight, the charges leveled against the Governor by several state Republican papers signalled that the battle would be intense. The Standpatters, following the

7Daily Capital, Jan. 14, 15, 1904. The remaining January editorials strongly disagreed with Cummins' views.

8The Oskaloosa Daily Herald surveyed prominent newspapers, and, of course, found a near unanimity of opinion against the Governor's inaugural and in favor of leaving the tariff alone. See reprints of Daily Capital, Register and Leader, Cedar Rapids Republican, Gate City, Globe Gazette (Mason City, Iowa), Republican (Iowa City, Iowa), Nonpareil, Ottumwa Courier, and Hawk-eye in Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Jan. 19, 1904. The Daily Capital, Feb. 2, 1904, listed reprints from twenty Iowa Republican papers and from the Evening Post (Chicago, Illinois), to prove that Cummins abandoned his harmony pledge made in 1903 when Allison persuaded the Governor to accept Roosevelt's views that tariff revision be delayed till after the 1904 elections.
strategy used in 1903, began their offensive by offering a compromise which gave the Governor a position of honor and prominence, but which, in fact, actually sought to restrain him in his scheme to win party control. In return for his being elected one of the delegates-at-large and allowed to lead the Iowa delegation to the National Convention, the plan called for Cummins to support Standpatter Robert Cousins as temporary chairman of the convention and E. E. Hart for re-election to the Republican National Committee. Moreover, since both Blythe and Cummins wished to serve on the Resolutions Committee, the compromise provided that neither would serve but that the position would be awarded to Allison or some such "safe" person. The Governor, who now could afford to be more adamant than when he faced re-election in 1903, refused to compromise.

With Cummins' rejection of the Standpat plan, the skirmish for factional power and control began. Both Republican camps claimed superior strength in the Sixth District; hence, the selection of the two regular district delegates to the National Convention ranked in party significance with the choice of the four at-large delegates. Immediately, rumors circulated about the choices for the positions, with Allison

---

9Cousins, known for his oratorical skill, gave the keynote address according to Sage, Allison, p. 292. Other sources list Elihu Root and Joseph Cannon as temporary and permanent chairman, respectively. See Ross, Dolliver, p. 190, and Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 175.
Cummins, Blythe, Shaw, Perkins, Cousins, Lacey, Young, and Roberts favored for delegates-at-large. George Seevers of Oskaloosa and Fred Maytag of Newton appeared to be Sixth District choices for the Cummins' faction; while John T. Brooks of Hedrick, J. C. Mabry of Albia, and Frank Simmons of Ottumwa were Standpatter possibilities. The contest for control of the Sixth District soon began in earnest.

Aware of the imminence and intensity of the fight in his district, Ellsworth Rominger, a long-standing friend from Davis County and chairman of the Sixth District Committee, advised Lacey, who was in Washington, that judging from Cummins' inaugural "there is little doubt that war is to be declared in the Sixth District." The word from Des Moines was "to get the Sixth District solid for the delegates to the national convention, then notify Mr. Lacey that he will not be renominated." He explained to Lacey why he was encountering such opposition, saying "you have stood out against Mr. Cummins as one of the 'original standpatters.'" Rominger was not without hope, however, and he advised Lacey that the Wapello County Standpatters believed that four of the seven counties in the district could be made safe with hard work. After suggesting state senators John T. Brooks and H. L. Waterman as the best combination to defeat the

10 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Jan. 19, 26, 27, 1904.
Seeverson–Haytag ticket, Rominger urged Lacey to begin immediately a letter campaign in their behalf.\footnote{Letter of Ellsworth Rominger, Jan. 16, 1904, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253. Letter of D. D. Moore, Feb. 11, 1904, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253, also warned Lacey of plans in Keokuk County to oppose his renomination.}

In a speech from the House floor directed to the farmers of his district, Lacey defended his tariff position and answered Cummins' attack against him. He declared that the Republican party favored reciprocity if it brought reciprocal advantages, but he affirmed that no advantage could be obtained from Canada, whose products competed with the farmers of the Midwest. He cited McKinley's definition of reciprocity as "sensible trade arrangements which will not interrupt our home production," and quoted Roosevelt's statement that reciprocity should be "the handmaiden of our protection," and "not the sexton of our industries." Lacey added the testimony of Agriculture Secretary James Wilson to the weight of his argument, quoting Wilson's statement that "reciprocity may be either the auxiliary or the assassin of protectionism." Lacey closed by identifying his views with the last Republican national platform, and by quoting that the party favored reciprocity when "so directed as to open our markets in favorable terms for what we do not ourselves
produce in return for free foreign markets.\(^1\)\(^2\) With this massive array of documentation supporting his own position, Lacey attempted to demonstrate that Cummins' views on the subject were not consistent with those of the party. But he never mentioned the Governor's name.

Lacey's address offered the farmers economic reasons for opposing the entry of Canadian farm goods. Citing the unfavorable trade balance for Americans during the nineteenth century period of reciprocity with Canada, Lacey assumed the same deficit would occur again, and added that farmers could not be expected to be enthusiastic about an agreement transferring their accustomed prosperity to the Canadians. In simple language he told Midwest farmers that it was unfair to them to give Canada some 80,000,000 customers in return for 5,500,000 to the United States. Not only would American farmers lose their protected domestic market, Lacey explained, but the group gaining the most from reciprocity would be farm implement manufacturers of the East, a group Lacey implied was already profiting sufficiently from purchases of Midwest farmers.\(^1\)\(^3\)

The Oskaloosa Daily Herald reported that Iowa politicians generally took Lacey's address as an answer to

\(^1\)\(^2\)Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Jan. 27, 1904.

\(^1\)\(^3\)Ibid. Lacey referred to reciprocity with Canada from 1855-1866.
Cummins' inaugural. Identifying the Standpatter's tariff views with those of President Roosevelt, the Herald added that Lacey's remarks were "conceded to represent the administration's views," and said that the speech would circulate in pamphlet form together with Roosevelt's 1903 Minneapolis speech. Although Lacey's address was politically sound, it lacked correct logic: it violated his own axiom that tariff must always be considered in terms of national interests rather than from the viewpoint of local or special interests. Clearly, Lacey spoke with Iowa and the November elections in mind.

In declaring Cummins' tariff views inconsistent with Republican doctrine, Lacey also adopted the tactic of attempting to discredit the Governor by identifying him with Democratic tariff doctrine. The Standpat press underscored Lacey's action toward this end. In the Capital, Lafe Young called attention to the similarity of Cummins' views and those of Iowa's Democratic Congressman from the Second District, Martin Wade. When Wade rebutted Lacey's tariff address, the Capital used his remarks to emphasize that the tariff creeds of Wade and Governor Cummins coincided. Similarly, the paper published Missouri Democratic Congressman Champ Clark's statement commenting on Cummins' misfortune in having to lead a protection-minded state delegation to the

14Tbid.
National Convention. In the same vein, the Burlington Hawk-eye printed an interview with Blythe in which he impugned the Governor. Publicly questioning the legitimacy of Cummins' Republicanism, Blythe declared that the Governor's tariff views were at variance with those of Roosevelt and accepted Republican policy.15

While Standpatters considered themselves the only Iowa Republicans in step with the national party, Cummins pursued his own method of identifying with the national administration. At the Governor's request, Roosevelt invited him to the White House. Subsequent to this meeting, Cummins had indicated that he and the President were in general agreement on tariff and reciprocity policies; after the conference he admitted that neither he nor Roosevelt specifically brought up the issues. Furthermore, Cummins urged that all District and State Convention delegates select men pledged to Roosevelt and the Iowa Idea to represent them at the National Convention. Unwilling to divide the party's national delegates along factional lines and expressing confidence in the strength of his followers, the Governor indicated he preferred to abide by majority rule in the selection of delegates.16


16Register and Leader, Jan. 22, 23, 27, 1904.
Standpatters, annoyed by Cummins' confidence and by his implication that they were out of harmony with Roosevelt's tariff convictions, arranged their own interview with the President. Allison, Blythe, and Lacey called on Roosevelt to enlighten him about the realities of Iowa politics. Lacey, who had his own reasons for identifying with the President since he faced re-election, informed Roosevelt that Iowa Republicans opposed reciprocity and were sound on the tariff, regardless of what the President had heard from other sources. Speaking carefully and without directly contradicting Cummins' statements about his White House visit, the President, nonetheless, reassured the Standpatters that he still stood on his Minneapolis speech of April, 1903.

Believing that the interview confirmed the harmony of Standpat views with those of the administration, Standpatters left the interview as jubilant as had Cummins. Lacey, upon his return to the House, moved to incorporate the President's year-old speech into the Congressional Record.17

At this same White House meeting for Standpat leaders, Lacey asked Roosevelt to clarify his position on another

---

aspect of Iowa politics which, according to Standpatters, Cummins had distorted. The Governor, in his earlier interview, had told the President that Iowa railroad interests opposed the selection of pro-Roosevelt delegates to the National Convention. Then in his statements to newsmen Cummins alleged that the President sanctioned opposition to the railroads' delegate plan. Offering Standpatters a completely different version of Cummins' meeting, the President declared that on the issue of delegate selection he had informed Cummins that he "considered it wise not to do anything to precipitate a conflict and that he considered all Iowa Republicans his friends." To further reassure Lacey and his Standpat associates, Roosevelt added that he had no doubt of support from Iowa regardless of delegates chosen for the National Convention.18

Taking this presidential cue for harmony and strengthened by the assurance that Roosevelt was squarely in the Standpat tariff camp, Blythe assured the press that National Convention delegates from Iowa would support the President and attributed any discord in Iowa politics to the Governor. Standpatters, Blythe added, would continue their overtures for harmony in spite of former Progressive rebuffs. As one step toward factional peace, the railroad politician

suggested that Allison, Dolliver, and Cummins be named the Iowa delegates-at-large. In a statement displaying self-abnegation, Blythe revealed how honored he would be if selected as the party's fourth delegate, adding moreover, that he "would not be in the way if somebody else could better serve party harmony." Plans to select Iowa's two Senators as delegates gained support when George Perkins, following his own interview with Roosevelt, announced that the President favored the choice of Allison and Dolliver because each man had previously served as national delegate but once.

Cummins did not retreat, however, in the face of Standpat pressure. At a Lincoln's Day memorial address in Minneapolis, he reiterated his demand for tariff revision and for reciprocity on competitive products. With changed times, the Governor declared, the Republican party would die under the slogan "Let Well Enough Alone." Clarifying his position so that opponents could no longer confuse his reciprocity views with free trade, Cummins denied that he ever advocated free trade with Canada. The Governor reminded his audience that half the nation's imports were on

---

19Register and Leader, Jan. 28, 1904. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Jan. 28, 1904, headed its article: "Blythe willing to sacrifice self for good of party."

20Register and Leader, Feb. 3, 1904. Allison had not served as delegate since 1880.
the free list, but that protectionists quickly labeled as "free trade" any suggestion to increase the free list by even one item.21

Angered by Cummins' expressions, Standpatters challenged the persistent rumors that the Governor wrote the 1903 state platform and, hence, that it accurately reflected his tariff views. The Capital's Lafe Young and two Standpatters from the Cedar Rapids Republican, W. R. Boyd and Cyrenus Cole, began editorial attacks on the platform because its wording lent itself to misinterpretation by the Cummins camp.22

Obviously, since Allison was the real author of the 1903 state platform, Standpatter criticism of the document caused him some discomfort. In order to defend the senior Senator and to rectify confusion about the platform, as well as to present his own views to advantage, Lacey wrote an editorial in which he urged the Standpatters "to let up on the platform and to attack its misconstruction instead." Lacey suggested to Blythe that if the Burlington Hawk-eye published it, other papers would reprint, assuring it wide circulation. In endorsing the idea of a new party

21 Ibid., Feb. 14, 1904.

22 See the February and March, 1904, issues of Daily Capital and Cedar Rapids Republican.
declaration for 1904, Lacey told Blythe that "we should stand pat on principles not upon phrases."23

Lacey's article began as a straightforward account of Allison's authorship of the 1903 Republican state platform, but went on to claim that the Governor's "ill-timed and worse tempered" inaugural had all but eliminated his chances to control the Iowa delegation to the 1904 National Convention. Declaring that not even Allison asked for reaffirmation of the previous year's planks, Lacey called for a new state platform that was broad enough for all true Republicans to stand on at least until the National Convention. With due concern for his own political future as well as Roosevelt's, Lacey concluded with a reminder that "this is the National Republican Year."24

The editorial, although entitled "Harmony," hardly contributed to healing party wounds, and, fortunately for Standpatters, it was not carried by the Iowa press. It was significant, however, because it showed Lacey's growing


24Lacey's editorial, "1903-Harmony-1904," in Lacey Papers, Vol. 253. Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. XII, pp. 27-29, states that Allison, Perkins, and Dolliver wanted reaffirmation of the 1903 tariff plank while Blythe and Lacey rejected the identical words without repudiating the plank. Lafe Young also opposed reaffirmation. Thus, Bateman states that when Allison observed the division of the Standpatters on this point, he yielded on the reaffirmation principle.
antagonism toward Cummins and was an earnest attempt to identify Senator Allison with Standpat Republicans.

Lacey also failed in another attempt to promote his faction's interests. He called on Roosevelt to lobby for Blythe, because after weeks of rumor that Blythe would succeed Mark Hanna as Republican National Chairman, the White House had not announced the appointment. Assuring the President that Blythe was not seeking the position, Lacey, in an obvious understatement of Blythe's abilities, recommended him for the national chairmanship as a man with "tact, force and skill in handling men." Blythe's appointment, he reasoned, would further identify the President with the anti-Cummins wing of the party in Iowa and amount to a major blow to the Governor's strategy to gain control of the state's party machinery. Lacey's scheme collapsed, however, because Blythe, to use his own words, "was too busy" to accept the position. 25

Twice rebuffed in his endeavors to impugn Cummins' Republicanism, Lacey found new hope when Jonathan P. Dolliver publicly identified himself with Standpat tariff views. Breaking his silence in mid-April, Iowa's junior Senator delivered from the Senate floor what Lafe Young termed "a

---

25Register and Leader, Feb. 25, 26, May 3, 1904. This paper endorsed Blythe for National Chairman. See also Oskaloosa Daily Herald, May 3, 1904, and Chap. III of this study.
splendid defense" of the Dingley law. Since Lacey had earlier interpreted Dolliver's silence on the tariff as loyalty to George Roberts, also from the Tenth District and the author of the Iowa Idea, rather than agreement with Cummins', Dolliver's Senate speech justified the confidence Lacey had placed in him. The Congressman undoubtedly found additional satisfaction in Lafe Young's statement that had Dolliver been as vocal in 1902, when Lacey strongly dissented from the party's tariff plank, the "Iowa Idea would never have gotten beyond the Savery house club-room . . . and Henderson would yet be in the Congress."27

While the tariff contest among Iowa Republicans developed to Lacey's satisfaction, other elements of discord in the Sixth District remained a source of concern. Lacey benefited when Fred Maytag, ignored by his home county of Jasper, withdrew his candidacy as a pro-Cummins National Convention delegate. Although they carried Jasper, the Standpatters lost Poweshiek County. Blythe plainly worried about the over-all district results. Appraising the situation realistically, he warned Lacey that "while of course we do not need the vote [of Poweshiek] in order to maintain the organization, yet if the Sixth District is to be classed


27Daily Capital, Apr. 22, 1904.
as sound, we cannot afford to let many more counties weaken."\textsuperscript{28}

Weakness in Lacey's organization manifested itself again when Keokuk County passed over Standpatter John T. Brooks in favor of George Seevers.\textsuperscript{29} Furthermore, it looked as if the pro-Cummins Seevers would carry Mahaska, Lacey's as well as Seever's home county. According to the Standpatters, the Progressive followers of Cummins resorted to subterfuge in order to win Mahaska, placing the word "Stand-pat" at the head of the ballots used in caucus voting. Thus, without realizing it, many voters chose a Cummins man. When Seevers added Mahaska to his earlier victories in the Poweshiek and Keokuk County conventions, he needed only Monroe County to carry the district for Cummins in the fight for National Convention delegates. Fortunately for the Standpatters, Lacey's organization held firm, and John DeMuth, Monroe County native, defeated Seevers.\textsuperscript{30}

Ultimately, the Standpatters controlled the Sixth District Convention and selected H. L. Waterman, from Wapello County, and DeMuth as National Convention delegates.\textsuperscript{31}


\textsuperscript{29}Brooks was from Keokuk County.

\textsuperscript{30}Register and Leader, May 11, 1904.

\textsuperscript{31}Seevers won but twenty votes and G. F. Harlan of Keokuk County, who replaced Maytag as a candidate for
Lacey valued DeMuth's victory because it represented an effective rebuke to Nate Kendall, also from Monroe, who openly supported the Seever-Maytag candidacies for national delegates. Not only did Monroe County make possible Lacey's victory in the district, but the County Convention delegates pledged support to him in a very warm and complimentary statement.32

In other District Conventions across the state, Standpatters emerged victorious, and when Republicans gathered in Des Moines for their State Convention, the Standpat faction was in control. Speaking before the Polk County Republican Club on convention eve, Treasury Secretary Shaw delighted fellow Standpatters when he referred to Canadian reciprocity as "unmitigated rot."33

Carrying out Blythe's recommendation on selecting delegates-at-large, the State Convention named Allison, Blythe, Cummins, and Dolliver. For the state platform, the convention adopted planks clearly in opposition to Cummins' views, although they neither affirmed nor repudiated the Progressive Republicans, garnered but twelve. Daily Capital, May 16, 1904. Register and Leader, May 17, 19, 1904. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, May 16, 18, 1904.

32Daily Capital, May 16, 1904.

33Register and Leader, May 18, 1904. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, May 18, 1904. Lacey addressed the club as Hull's substitute but confined his remarks to a criticism of Alton B. Parker and Democrats in general.
1903 platform. Declaring in favor of protection and the American home market and endorsing reciprocity on non-competitive products only, the platform linked prosperity to the Dingley law and denounced the Kasson reciprocal trade treaties for their inclusion of competitive goods.34

Indeed, proceedings at the State Convention were so harmonious that some Des Moines newspapers questioned the authenticity of the pre-convention party battles. The Daily News observed that convention speakers were all Standpatters: Allison, Dolliver, Shaw, Lacey, Cousins, and Hepburn.

Delegates cheered Cummins loudly, the News reported, when, in an obvious reference to Lacey’s position on the edge of the platform in 1903, the Governor announced that he stood firmly on the platform adopted. This atmosphere of tranquility led the News to ask if the party battle was "real or sham."35 While implying that the tariff issue in Iowa was the creation of politicians, the Capital's editorials, nonetheless, reflected a jubilant attitude that the convention was a victory for Standpatters.36


35Daily News, May 16, 17, 18, 19, 1904.

36Daily Capital, May 18, 19, 1904. The Register and Leader, May 19, 1904, accepted the Convention's outcome with little protest. It contented itself with pointing out that
Sham or real, the tariff battle resumed in June at the Republican National Convention in Chicago, and at the Convention’s close, both Iowa factions claimed victory. A Cummins’ supporter from Oskaloosa hailed the national platform as a “virtual acceptance of the Iowa Idea” and indicated that he too viewed the party’s tariff battle as a sham. Standpatters were really "engaged in a conspiracy . . . to destroy A. B. Cummins" rather than the tariff views of the Governor, the Oskaloosan wrote, or Blythe, Lacey, and other Standpat leaders could not have acquiesced in the national tariff plank.37 Choosing also to view the Chicago tariff plank as ratifying Cummins’ views, the Register and Leader declared that although it endorsed protectionism it left the door open to revision "when conditions change," and approved reciprocity "without injury to American agriculture and industry." Because the national platform went beyond the Iowa platform in that it recognized the desirability of revision and eliminated the clause limiting reciprocity to non-competitive items, the Register and Leader interpreted the Chicago tariff plank as a national endorsement of the Iowa Idea.”38

the platform rejected the Cuban reciprocity treaty, endorsed by Roosevelt and voted for by both Iowa Senators, and questioning if the platform did not even reject the reciprocity phrase of the Dingley law itself.

37Letter of J. B. Bolton, June 22, 1904, to A. B. Cummins, Cummins Papers, Box 14, File 54.

38Register and Leader, June 22, 23, 25, 1904.
Taking an opposite view, the *Daily Capital* spoke for the Standpat faction and hailed the national platform as "a triumph for old-time principles." While quoting the Chicago *Tribune* to the effect that the tariff and reciprocity planks were more Standpat than those of 1896, the *Capital* pointed out that the platform did not even suggest the existence of the "changed conditions" necessary for revision. Furthermore, the editor added, it was a near impossibility to find a tariff schedule that could be changed without some "injury to American agriculture, labor or industry."

Regardless of the interpretation of the national tariff plank, Cummins lost his bid for a controlling influence over the Iowa delegation to the National Convention. Although the Governor wanted to lead the delegation, Allison served as chairman of the Iowa caucus. Blythe represented Iowa on the Committee on Resolutions, a position which Cummins also desired, and also served on the Sub-committee on Resolutions, the group in direct charge of platform construction. Thus, the Standpatter achieved an even more influential position. Finally, Standpatter E. E. Hart won re-election as Iowa's representative on the Republican National Committee. Although Lacey was not directly involved in the National Convention, he indirectly contributed

39 *Daily Capital*, June 20, 23, 1904.

to Standpat victory there. By controlling his own district, he increased Standpat strength in the State Convention, a prerequisite to control on the national level. Furthermore, he worked with Standpat leaders to discredit Cummins' identification with national party views.

Iowa Republicans customarily held two state conventions. One was primarily for nomination purposes, with the second one for adoption of a state platform. In the interim month between the National Convention and Iowa's second State Convention in July, Governor Cummins outwardly displayed a desire for harmony while, at the same time, claiming vindication of his tariff views in Chicago. Continued Standpat misinterpretation of his pronouncements about the tariff, however, irritated the Governor, and finally, on the eve of the second State Convention, he gave vent to his emotions.

In an address before the Polk County Republican Club, where some two months earlier at the time of the first State Convention Secretary Shaw had castigated Cummins' idea on Canadian reciprocity as "unmitigated rot," the Governor vehemently denounced opponents of the Iowa Idea as "unmitigated liars." Any Democrat or Republican who said "the Iowa Idea is a proposition to abolish all protective duties upon products of the so-called trusts, who says that it is a proposition for free trade with Canada, or with any other country . . . who says it is democratic as found in the democratic platform, is an unmitigated liar," Cummins cried.
Regaining his control, he apologized to the audience for the use of such strong words. He had intended to say, Cummins explained, that "such a critic of the Iowa Idea if intelligent, was malignant; if ignorant, a fool." Either way, Blythe, Lacey, Shaw, and other Standpatters were either liars, fools, or malignant persons.

Cummins' wrath was understandable, however, because even his explanation that Standpatters misinterpreted his words was in turn distorted in the Standpat press. The Capital quoted from Cummins' 1902 Minneapolis speech, his Marquette Club address of the same year, and his inaugural address of 1904 to prove that the Governor advocated the removal of duties on trust-made goods. Lafe Young, however, ignored a significant distinction in Cummins' terms. All of Cummins' statements, quoted by Young, referred to duties on monopoly-trust products, yet Young used them to support his own contention that the Governor opposed a tariff on products of all trusts. 42

In another manifestation of the confusion of tariff terms, the Oskaloosa Daily Herald interpreted Congressman Hepburn's speech before the second State Convention as

41 Register and Leader, July 20, 1904. Daily Capital, July 20, 1904.
42 Daily Capital, July 20, 1904.
"leaving little of the Iowa Idea remaining."\textsuperscript{43} Actually, Hepburn’s keynote address attempted to minimize party dissension, and it succeeded to a considerable degree. In a later speech to the assembled delegates, Cummins referred to Hepburn and declared that "I do not know at the moment whether he is an Iowa Idea man or I am a Standpatter," adding that he agreed with every line of Hepburn’s address. Iowa Idea supporters, Cummins explained, had never proposed reduction below the point of reasonable competition; actually they agreed with Hepburn that every product be produced "with that protection that will enable us to take and hold our markets."\textsuperscript{44} Thus, Cummins again challenged the myth that he advocated free trade or unreasonable reciprocity.

With a National and two State Conventions out of the way, Lacey turned to the fall Congressional contests. Before devoting attention to his re-election, he quickly disposed of false rumors about his political future. Dismissing as "a surprise" the rumors that he should be the Standpat candidate for governor, Lacey went on to explain that the

\textsuperscript{43}Oskaloosa Daily Herald, July 20, 1904. Part of the confusion in this instance may have been due to a slight discrepancy between the delivery of the speech and the prepared text given to newsmen. In speaking, Hepburn made no reference to reciprocity on non-competitive goods only, and later said he was unaware of any deviation from his prepared text.

\textsuperscript{44}Register and Leader, July 20, 21, 1904. The Register and Leader labeled the second Republican State Convention a "Big Love Feast."
gubernatorial election was at least two years away if the Titus amendment met voter approval in November.\textsuperscript{45} Equally realistic when a political friend suggested that he consider the post of Interior Secretary in 1905, Lacey pointed out that since there were already two Iowans in the Cabinet, there could hardly be three.\textsuperscript{46}

Because of Lacey's victory in the Sixth District contest for convention delegates, no Republican challenged his candidacy. Nominated by acclamation at the District Convention in Ottumwa, Lacey accepted the party's trust in a speech best described as a ringing defense of protectionism. Quoting from the party's 1860 platform of Abraham Lincoln's day, Lacey pronounced it "good enough for 1904!"\textsuperscript{47}

The Democrats, as they had in 1902, again had difficulty finding a candidate to oppose Lacey. J. P. Reese, the mine union official, refused a second race. Rumor suggested that the Democrats would name a Cummins'...

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Oskaloosa Daily Herald}, May 24, 26, 1904. The \textit{Herald}, after Lacey's light dismissal of the rumor, decided that it would rather have him available for United States Senator or the Vice Presidency.

\textsuperscript{46}\textit{Letter of D. T. Flynn, former Territorial Delegate to Congress from Oklahoma, Aug. 18, 1904, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253}. Flynn said he intended to tell Roosevelt that Lacey was the best qualified man for the post in spite of Lacey's dismissal of the idea. Treasury Secretary Shaw and Agriculture Secretary Wilson were from Iowa.

\textsuperscript{47}\textit{Oskaloosa Daily Herald}, June 15, 1904.
Republican, T. D. Foster of the Morrell Meat Packing Company, but Foster refused to cooperate. Finally, the Democrats nominated S. A. Brewster, publisher of the Ottumwa Evening Democrat.

The Republican campaign seemed to be off to a good start when Lacey accepted Brewster's challenge to joint debates in the seven county seat towns of the Sixth District. However, this arrangement became a fiasco when the Republican District Committee overruled Lacey's decision. Since the Committee chairman previously approved Lacey's judgment, the decision to cancel the debates represented a surrender to the will of W. W. Epps, Frank Simmons, and A. W. Lee, editor of the Ottumwa Courier, all Wapello County Republicans who feared, for reasons not altogether clear, the debates would jeopardize some county tickets.

---


Although district chairman Ellsworth Rominger assured Lacey that the odium resulting from the cancellation of debates would fall on the District Committee, not on the Congressman, the results belied his prediction. Lacey drew adverse criticism when he yielded to the Committee's judgment. Brewster complained that Lacey's initial acceptance gave the incumbent an advantage. Furthermore, the press interpreted the episode to the political benefit of the candidate of its choice. Except for the unfortunate publicity about the cancelled debates, Lacey's campaign progressed reasonably well.

Minority bloc voters received the usual attention. At the Negro community of Buxton, Lacey delivered an Emancipation Day anniversary address which statistically documented the progress of blacks since the Civil War, and portrayed the Republican party as the Negroes' benefactor. Moreover, Lacey worried for a time about a split in the black vote of the district due to the formation of the National Liberty party. The threat failed to materialize, however, when George E. Taylor, Sixth District Negro organizer of the party said to be an aspirant for Lacey's Congressional seat, neglected to file on time not only his

own nomination papers but also the name of his party. The National Liberty party, therefore, never appeared on the ballot. While the percentage of Sixth District Negro voters was negligible when compared with that of white voters, the attention which Lacey always paid to the black minority demonstrated his zeal for thoroughness and his attention to detail.

Lacey encountered some trouble from veterans opposing a pension bill currently before the Congress. Rejecting their demands that every old soldier over sixty-five be paid $12 a month, Lacey explained that such a bill would consume half the government's total revenue. He defended the pending bill as a fair compromise between the veterans' demands and the current practice which paid veterans $12 monthly at age seventy-five. Refusal to give old soldiers more money involved a certain political risk, and Lacey in an obvious attempt to win approval informed his old soldier friends that he devoted two half-days weekly to pension legislation and had already personally processed more than 8,000 cases.52


52 Letter of J. W. Carr, June 29, 1904, to Lacey and letter of Lacey, July 1, 1904, to J. W. Carr, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253. Since Carr was a Cummins' follower from Poweshiek County and former contestant for Republican nomination to Lacey's Congressional seat, Lacey's forthright opposition
Lacey received more than usual campaign help from the party. Charles W. Fairbanks, Indiana Senator and vice presidential candidate, spoke on four different occasions in the Sixth District. Congressman Cousins' speech in Lacey's behalf proved to be a record success, and Senator Dolliver joined Lacey in a political rally in Oskaloosa. When Governor Cummins traveled to Oskaloosa to speak in Lacey's behalf, however, the Congressman deliberately absented himself from the city.

Lacey's departure appeared strange to many observers. Although a certain feeling of antipathy existed between the two men, Lacey demonstrated poor political judgment in parading his feelings publicly—at the very moment he was Cummins' debtor for the generous political favor. The

to the veterans' demands required a degree of political for-
titude. See also Chap. III of this study for more on Lacey's work for veterans. The pending pension bill paid $12 monthly to veterans at age seventy.

53Letter of J. A. Tawney, Chairman Speakers Bureau, Republican National Committee, Sept. 30, 1904, to Lacey; letter of Thomas A. Berkebile, Cedar Rapids attorney, Sept. 27, 1904, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253. Register and Leader, Nov. 1, 1904. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 1, 4, 1904. Cheap money advocates presented less of a problem than usual in the Sixth District when Silver Republicans, who left in 1900, returned to the fold and endorsed Roosevelt for Pres-


54Register and Leader, Oct. 27, 1904. According to the Register and Leader, Cummins' Oskaloosa rally, which many Polk County Republicans planned to attend, was "ex-

pected to be the biggest . . . of the District."
Daily News publicized the whole painful episode, declaring that "Lacey sulked in Des Moines" while the Oskaloosans "cheered the Iowa Idea."  

Attempting to rectify his error, Lacey offered an indirect apology to the Governor. Without expressing regret for his action, he voiced his trust that Cummins felt no personal discourtesy in Lacey's absence. Endeavoring to clothe his action in party zeal, Lacey explained that he concurred in the request of one of his political agents to spend the day in Colfax, a hitherto neglected part of the Sixth District. The Congressman ended his restrained letter with a remark that the people "were much pleased" with Cummins' address. Cummins responded with equal restraint and brevity. The whole incident demonstrated the level of personal animosity between Lacey and Cummins, a separation further intensified, of course, by factional differences.

In Poweshiek County, Lacey encountered still another political controversy. The trouble concerned the appointment


56Since the agent was E. H. Hunter, Blythe's Des Moines lieutenant, his judgment should not have been expected to impress Cummins.

57Letter of J. F. Lacey, Nov. 4, 1904, to A. B. Cummins, Cummins Papers, Box 15, File 59.

of a receiver to a defunct national bank in Grinnell—an unimportant position unduly magnified by factional controversy. When Treasury Secretary Shaw appointed a Stand-pat leader from Iowa City, Cummings men in Poweshiek objected strenuously. Since Lacey had earlier publicly recommended a Cummins' supporter for the receivership, Progressive Republicans accused the Congressman of speaking one way for political advantage while secretly urging the appointment of a Standpatter. During Shaw's visit to Grinnell, he publicly admitted that he was responsible for the bank appointment. Because Shaw's trip to Iowa came after election day, however, the Grinnell bank incident handicapped Lacey's campaign.59

Most of Lacey's campaign speeches dealt with the tariff, a logical choice in view of Cummins' inaugural address and the platform struggles at both State and National Conventions. The Congressman, however, displayed no new ideas or attitudes. As in the past, he endorsed protection as the best way to insure American business a domestic market and thereby bring prosperity to farmers and laborers. Lacey's reasoning received influential support from fellow Oskaloosan A. W. Swalm. Because Swalm was United States

Consul at Southampton, England, a nation with free trade experience, Lacey hoped his views would carry more than usual weight with Sixth District voters.

Lacey's Democratic challenger, Brewster, countered with an appeal to Progressive Republicans in the Sixth District, claiming that his tariff views were closer to those of Governor Cummins than were those of his Republican opponent. For Lacey, the "Iowa Idea" was really the "Cummins Idea," and, hence, Lacey had no use for it, the Democrat charged in an attempt to emphasize the personal antagonism between the Congressman and the Governor.60

Democrats failed to offset the coattail advantages Republican candidates enjoyed in a presidential election year, and the Republican party swept the nation. In Iowa the Republicans won all eleven Congressional seats. Lacey, losing only Davis County in his entire district, earned a majority twice the size of any earlier one, while the press reported Lacey's victory margin showed the greatest gain of any Iowa Congressman.61


61 Daily Capital, Nov. 9, 1904. Register and Leader, Nov. 9, 1904. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 9, 10, 29, 1904. The Iowa Official Directory 1911-1912 listed Lacey's vote as 23,213 to Brewster's 13,840 for a plurality of 9,373 and a majority of 6,708. While Lacey lost Davis County, Roosevelt carried it marking the first Republican victory in a major office there since the Civil War, it was reported. Lacey
When the election was over, Republican revisionists no longer felt bound by the ill-kept moratorium of 1903 in which they had agreed to postpone tariff revision until after the 1904 campaign. Governor Cummins promptly announced his belief that the Republican party must "stand pat on unchanging principles" but move on "as they were applied to changing conditions." Reports circulated that even Standpatter J. A. T. Hull, Congressman from Cummins' home city of Des Moines, suggested that Roosevelt could with propriety call a special session of the Congress solely for revision purposes. Concurring in Hull's judgment, the Governor reported after a trip to Washington that tariff was the topic of conversation in the nation's capital, and added that some of the leading eastern Republican papers had joined the call for revision.

Amid this renewed talk of tariff change, Lacey announced from Washington that he was "standing pat," adding that not only was he opposed to revision but also to

never carried Davis County in his ten races for the House. Allison's former secretary, A. F. Dawson, defeated Democrat M. J. Wade in the Second District.

62 Register and Leader, Nov. 10, 1904.

63 Ibid., Nov. 19, 1904.

64 The Governor named only the New York Tribune, however, but indicated that the New York Sun was about to endorse revision. Three Chicago papers, the Tribune, Record-Herald, and Chronicle, advocated tariff reform. See Daily News, Nov. 25, 1904.
a special session of the Congress being called for such purpose.65 Undoubtedly, the Congressman experienced a sense of triumph when, some two days later, President Roosevelt in addressing the Congress omitted reference to tariff reform other than to call for changed rates with the Philippines. Roosevelt's message made it quite clear that there would be no special session of Congress in the spring of 1905, nor did he promise revisionists any hope for later action.66

By the close of 1904, Iowa Standpatters had again emerged victorious in a factional contest. They not only held a majority on the State Central Committee, but they returned a Standpatter to the Republican National Committee. Defeating Cummins' attempt to lead the Iowa delegation to the Republican National Convention, Standpatters went on to claim vindication of their tariff views in the national platform and later

---

65Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Dec. 5, 1904. Register and Leader, Dec. 8, 1904. These two papers presented a majority of the Iowa delegation as moderate revisionists, but opposed to a special session of the Congress to achieve tariff reform.

66Daily Capital, Dec. 6, 1904. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era 1910-1917 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 3, states that Roosevelt rarely attempted to dislodge the conservative Republican Congressmen, but succeeded in humoring insurgent Republicans while working closely with the Old Guard. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics, p. 231, states that Midwestern progressives were "badly disappointed" in Roosevelt until after 1904. Sage, Allison, p. 296, agrees with Nye. For the interpretation that Roosevelt yielded on the tariff in order to win support for railroad reform legislation, see Blum, The Republican Roosevelt, pp. 73-105.
by identification with those of Roosevelt. Cummins, too, affirmed the soundness of his tariff views. Thus, both Republican factions attested to the ambiguity of the tariff as a political issue. Standpatter Lacey had his own reasons for rejoicing as 1904 ended. He had triumphed over Cummins' attempt to unseat him, and in so doing publicly snubbed the Governor without political harm to himself. Furthermore, Lacey found particular comfort in presidential companionship in "standing pat" on the tariff.

---

CHAPTER XI

RESPITE AND REFORM

The defeat of the Iowa Progressives in 1904 was caused largely by Cummins' hammering one issue, the tariff. When Roosevelt failed to press for revision, Cummins' supporters were left with a lost cause. Near the end of 1904, leaders of the Progressives assembled in Des Moines to devise a broadly based strategy for the future.\(^1\) Because approval of the Titus amendment precluded Iowa elections in 1905, the time seemed especially propitious for enactment of reform measures. Freed from immediate concern about the ballot box, the Progressives pushed for pure food and drug laws, the direction election of Senators, a primary election law, and the regulation of railroads.\(^2\) Congressman Lacey assumed varying positions on these reform issues both before the Iowa legislature and in Congress.

\(^1\)In this study the term, Progressives, will be used to distinguish Cummins' followers from the Standpatters. Since the Progressive party was not organized until 1912, it should be noted Iowa Progressives constituted one faction of Republicans.

\(^2\)Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. XIV, pp. 1-2, Chap. XIII, pp. 10-11. Bateman states that it is at this time, when the Cummins faction opted for reform, that the Governor's followers may be called Progressives.
When the Iowa legislators convened in January, 1906, they resumed consideration of a state primary law, a goal toward which they had worked with limited success in 1904.\(^3\) Progressives, encouraged by a rumored endorsement of the primary concept by Des Moines' leading Standpat paper looked to Democratic support for needed votes to achieve their goal.\(^4\) Upon the completion of its organizational work, the legislature took up a new primary bill introduced by state Senator J. J. Crossley, whose bill in 1904 met defeat.\(^5\)

\(^3\)Due to the Titus amendment, the 1906 body's membership was the same as that two years earlier. The legislators, beneficiaries of an extra year in office themselves, voted not to extend the Titus amendment to the offices of state printer and binder. Progressives won the battle to replace Standpatter Bernard Murphy and Howard Tedford with Emory English and E. D. Chassell, respectively, printer and binder. See the Register and Leader, Jan. 11, 18, 1906, and the Hawk-eye, Jan. 12, 18, 1906. Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. XIV, p. 36 indicates that Cummins was angry with the Senate defeat of railroad reform in 1905 and that this spurred his interest in a primary law "governing among other things the choice of Senator." See also the Register and Leader, Mar. 8, 1905, in which Cummins called for a primary law to make Senators more responsive to popular will.

\(^4\)Reprints from Benton County Times (Benton, Iowa), the Newton Herald, and the Chronicle (Des Moines, Iowa), in Register and Leader, Dec. 19, 1905. The Daily Capital, Dec. 15, 19, 1905, and Jan. 4, 1906, saw direct primaries as an inevitable requirement as Iowa's population grew. While recognizing their value in the elimination of dark horse candidates, the Capital's standpattism showed in its observation that in close districts, like the Sixth, the competition of several candidates might result in the nomination of a weak candidate who would then lose the election to the Democrats. Above all, Lafe Young warned that such a primary law should not be passed in order to allow Democrats to elect Governor Cummins to the United States Senate.

\(^5\)Register and Leader, Jan. 9, 1906.
The Crossley bill immediately encountered stiff
opposition from Standpatters. Claiming that many areas had
abolished the primary system after trying it, the Burlington
Hawk-eye insisted that such electoral reform had "little
tangible bearing on either the material or moral welfare of
the community." Former Governor Shaw, in a tongue-in-cheek
pose, expressed his opposition to a primary bill, saying
"it would give the railroads a chance to control Iowa
politics." While declaring railroad domination of either
past or present state politics "a myth," Shaw implied that
Progressives were forcing the roads into Iowa politics be-
cause primary election costs would be prohibitive for can-
didates unless supported by three or four railroads.7

Lacey had expressed his convictions about the
primary idea long before the introduction of the Crossley
bill. Using the example of southern primaries to ridicule
reform in the north, Lacey pointed out that a "Tillman-rulled
South Carolina or a Jeff Davis-rulled Arkansas, both of which
have primaries . . . [were hardly] calculated to create
enthusiasm for the primary in Iowa."8 In a long letter to

6Hawk-eye, Jan. 10, 1906.

7Daily Capital, Feb. 14, 1906. That railroad spokes-
man Shaw opposed reform on the theory that it would enable
railroads to control state politics was more than Wallace's
Farmer could tolerate. That farm paper endorsed the primary
law as a needed reform to keep voteless corporations from
controlling the suffrage of the state. See Wallace's Farmer,
Mar. 9, 1906.

8Daily Capital, Sept. 25, 1905.
Crossley, Lacey grounded his opposition to a primary in Sixth District experiences of primary laws. Citing the Poweshieek County law, he claimed that primary elections there gave undue weight to cities over farm areas. Likewise, Jasper County primaries led to an uneven distribution of nominations, while Mahaska and Monroe Counties both abandoned their primaries. In the light of these events, Lacey suggested to Crossley that if a primary law were enacted it would be better to give it a voluntary base with county option rather than make it universal for the state. Lacey condemned the primary for increasing party factionalism, and praised the convention system for its ability to bring out a new man who could often heal party dissension. Finally, in addressing himself to the Governor's motive for primary elections, Lacey bitterly noted that "I can understand why Governor Cummins may want to organize a system by which the Democrats may aid him in controlling our primaries."  

Seeking a compromise position, Emory English introduced a bill combining the values of a primary election and the convention system. In his measure, convention delegates would be chosen by the primary method rather than by caucus. After studying the bill Lacey again cited farmers' habits in his opposition. Since farmers voted well at general

---

elections but not so well at primaries, he argued, the convention system, with delegate strength based on the party vote at general elections, offered farmers a more equitable representation in choosing party candidates.  

J. W. Blythe also opposed primary elections, and turned his attention directly to securing votes to kill the bill rather than to detailed explanations of his opposition. Explaining to Allison that state Senator George W. Dunham from near Dubuque voted for the primary bill in 1904, Blythe requested Allison to "advise" Dunham to reverse his vote.  

While Progressives were claiming that the Standpat opposition took its cue from the railroad machine, the involvement of the railroads in the struggle for primary legislation eventually broke into the open on the floor of the Iowa legislature. Responding to Governor Cummins' charge in a Fairfield speech that the railroad lobby was working to kill the Crossley bill, Standpatter Shirley Gillilland from Mills County introduced a Senate resolution calling on Cummins to be more specific in his charges. Gillilland demanded that the Governor furnish the names of


11 Letter of J. W. Blythe, Jan. 4, 30, 1906, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 355. The second letter indicated that the primary bill could be killed with proper strategy.
people both offering and receiving money, together with the amounts exchanged, to substantiate the charge that legislators were bribed to oppose a primary law.

In an attempt to discredit the Gillilland resolution, a Mitchell County senator introduced a letter, reportedly written by one of Blythe's agents, although the Senator would not reveal the correspondent's name, which supplied evidence on railroad lobbying against the primary bill. The letter, whose author the Register and Leader identified as W. D. Eaton of the Burlington's legal department, referred to the Crossley bill as "absurd and ridiculous" and quoted Gillilland as being opposed to it.12

While the Standpatters could not prevent the publication of the so-called Eaton letter, neither could the Progressives prevent the Gillilland resolution from passing both houses of the legislature. Cummins, out of town at the time, reported himself in favor of the resolution and offered to respond to it upon returning to Des Moines. Approximately a month after the dramatic floor fight in Iowa's Senate, the Governor submitted his mild reply, naming no legislators and denying ever having said that the lawmakers received bribes to oppose the Crossley bill.

12Register and Leader, Feb. 23, 1906. The editor offered an unusual summary of the whole fracas when he wrote that "a more sensational situation has not been experienced nor enjoyed in Iowa legislative history."
However, he reiterated his charge that the railroad lobby worked against the primary bill.\textsuperscript{13}

In spite of the Progressive attempt to win support for the Crossley bill by discrediting its opposition, the primary bill failed. Standpatters, who interpreted the bill's amendment permitting voters to switch party registration on election day as a Progressive tactic to woo Democratic votes for Cummins, rejoiced when a number of Democrats joined with them to defeat the bill.\textsuperscript{14}

To win the support of the legislators who disliked the Crossley bill but said they favored a primary law, J. C. Flenniken introduced a new bill in Iowa's lower House. Hopeful that a more limited bill might find success, he narrowed his measure to cover only the offices of governor, treasurer, auditor, secretary of state, and board of railroad commissioners. Furthermore, the bill was not to become operative until after the 1906 elections.\textsuperscript{15} The Flenniken bill, however, still offended Standpatters because it too allowed voters to switch their party registration on primary election day.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13}Register and Leader, Mar. 14, 22, 1906.
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., Feb. 23, Mar. 10, 1906.
\textsuperscript{16}Messenger, Mar. 16, 1906.
While legislators debated the Flenniken measure, Crossley introduced still another bill, broader than Flenniken's but narrower than his original proposal. This bill covered township, county, and congressional district offices but omitted state and city ones. To allay Standpat fears of Democrats voting in Republican primaries, Crossley provided that the minimum time for changing party registration would be sixty days prior to a primary. One loophole remained, however, in the bill's provision that voters who wished to change party affiliation on election day and who were challenged at the polls could do so upon taking an oath that they acted in good faith. Still another clause, designed to weaken party machine control of caucuses and therefore conventions, provided that delegates to county and district conventions as well as members of the parties' county central committees be elected at the primary.\(^\text{17}\)

All attempts at compromise failed, however, and the legislature adjourned without adopting a primary law. Placing the blame on the Republican party, the Fort Dodge Messenger claimed that factional antagonism within the legislature "embarrassed and confused all attempts at legislation. The legislators had scrutinized every bill for its bearing on state politics rather than on its own merits.\(^\text{18}\)


\(^\text{18}\)\textit{Ibid.}, Mar. 16, 1906. The editor correctly predicted the failure of all primary bill attempts and accused
Simultaneously with their attempt to enact a state primary law, Iowa Progressives moved to make the election of United States Senators a direct responsibility of the people rather than of state legislatures. Cummins and his followers hoped to arouse adequate state interest and action on this issue by calling for a national constitutional convention to draft an amendment on senatorial elections. Iowa Standpatters vehemently opposed Cummins' proposal for a meeting in Iowa to initiate national convention plans. They lost, however, after what one editor termed a "brilliant fight." When Cummins extended an invitation to all state Governors to meet in Des Moines, the press reported that thirty states responded favorably and would be represented—the magic number needed to issue a call for a constitutional convention.

When the governors convened in December, however, Progressives acknowledged that attendance was considerably

Cummins of campaigning for a third term on the primary law, adding that without factionalism the differences in bills could have been adjusted and a primary law passed.

19 Register and Leader, Feb. 24, 1906.

20 Ibid., Feb. 24, Dec. 2, 7, 1906. Iowa Progressives were particularly anxious for action because five of the fifteen states then enjoying state laws for the direct election of Senators were neighbors of Iowa. They were: Nebraska, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, and South Dakota.
less than anticipated. Cummins' followers reaped political satisfaction, nonetheless, in the governors' endorsement of direct election of United States Senators and their call for a constitutional convention to draft an amendment toward such a political reform.21

Although Iowa Progressives achieved little success in their first two endeavors for electoral reform, they were more successful in their campaign to lessen railroad influence in Iowa politics. The legislature enacted an anti-pass bill, effective July 1, 1906, which greatly restricted the distribution of railroad passes. Public officeholders or candidates for such offices, convention delegates, political party committee members and employees, and jurors in state or federal courts were no longer eligible for free rail transportation.22

In compliance with the new law, Lacey returned passes that summer at the request of three railroads: the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul; the Chicago and North-western; and the Chicago Great Western. Although Lacey

---


22Register and Leader, Mar. 10, 31, 1906. Harlan, History of Iowa, II, 227. See also Bowers, "The Fruits of Iowa Progressivism, 1900-1915," Iowa Journal of History and Politics, LVII (Jan., 1959), 41-42. Bowers states that Iowa Progressives were not satisfied with the 1906 law and passed another in 1907 which "broke the back of the pass system" in the state by enumerating eligible recipients and then extracting from them an annual sworn statement on eligibility.
undoubtedly enjoyed a pass from the Burlington, as lesser party officials did, there was no record concerning the receipt or the return of a Burlington pass.\(^{23}\)

Successful in some areas of state reform, Iowa's Progressives turned their attention to national reform legislation. This concern manifested itself in the need for railroad control and pure food and drug laws. Although Iowa passed a pure food law in February, 1906, Iowans demanded a federal law.\(^{24}\) Some merchants believed the state law worked to their disadvantage because out-of-state agents flooded Iowa with impure products, while still others complained they were deprived of needed products by what they termed "the too scrupulous inspection" of out-of-state goods.\(^{25}\)

\(^{23}\)See Lacey Papers, Vol. 255. See also the *Messenger*, July 3, 1906. According to Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. XIV, p. 27, the Governor of Iowa voluntarily turned in sixteen railroad passes on Feb. 1, 1905.

When M. L. Temple, author of the Temple amendment to Iowa's constitution, opposed the legislature's anti-pass bill he identified himself as a pass-holding attorney of the Burlington railroad but argued that the "Q" did not own him.


Lacey had a long-standing interest in pure food and drug legislation, and he responded favorably to the demands of his constituents for federal regulation. He not only agreed on the need for federal action, but pointed to the commerce clause of the Constitution as a clear source of authority for federal control over food and drug ingredients. Clearly and succinctly, he explained his position for *Events* magazine in a national symposium on pure food legislation. Of necessity, Lacey wrote, the question of pure food was a national problem, saying that theoretically, state regulatory legislation was sufficient, but in practice, states were incapable of protecting themselves from impure food and drugs. Referring to his own earlier success in stopping interstate traffic in illegally killed birds and game, Lacey declared that "the Constitutional power to regulate commerce is a most sweeping and effective engine."

omitted from labels and still be in compliance with the law. He wrote that "the alcoholic content need not be given unless it is more than prescribed by the U. S. Pharmacopeia or the National Formulary . . . and the quantity of opium or morphine need not be stated unless it contains more than two grains of opium or one-half grain of morphine to a fluid ounce, or if a solid preparation, to an avoirdupois ounce."
Continuing in the same vein, the Congressman wrote that "under this power interstate commerce can be used to protect the people against adulteration. The wise exercise of that power can injure no one." 27

A variant of the pure food question arose in the demand for a special meat inspection law. The existence of a large meat packing plant in the Sixth District prompted Lacey to seek information on the problem of inspection. 28 Moreover, public reaction, both domestic and foreign, to muckraking reports of Chicago stockyard conditions focused attention on the need for federal inspection. Stockyard owners reacted defensively to the adverse publicity. They feared such publicity would increase the consumption of Australian and South American meat imports and perhaps even give rise to a foreign boycott of American meats. To explain their position, they flooded every part of Iowa with telegrams concerning their plight, and requested all recipients and their friends "to wire all Congressmen and Senators you can reach . . . urging an announcement by the Secretary of Agriculture and Bureau of Animal Industry," testifying


28 The Morrell Meat Packing Company of Ottumwa is still the city's chief industry today. However, it plans to move its operations sometime in 1970.
to the thoroughness of present government inspection of both domestic and foreign meat.\textsuperscript{29}

An old friend of Lacey's, A. W. Swalm, who was then Consul General at Southampton, England, advised him of the reality, in England at least, of declining American meat imports since the muckrakers report on Chicago stockyards. In the first half of 1906, shipments were down 33 per cent from the preceding year. Swalm warned Lacey that imports would drop even more because of the unsavory picture of American meat processing presented by English papers in at least a thousand columns daily. The Consul's letter made it clear that the "only thing that will save our American meat trade in England will be the institution of an inspection that will inspect."\textsuperscript{30}

Convinced of the need for effective federal inspection, Lacey was careful to seek advice on the meat inspection bill before the Congress from T. D. Foster, a director of the Morrell Meat Packing firm with headquarters in Ottumwa. Foster replied, after studying a copy of the law provided by Lacey, that he favored the plan because a much closer inspection by the government was essential to curb abuses of

\textsuperscript{29}Telegram from Union Stockyards, Chicago, June 5, 1906, to First National Bank of Marshalltown, Lacey Papers, Vol. 256. Pencilled in red ink at the top was the notation, "More than one hundred of these telegrams were received at Marshalltown alone."

\textsuperscript{30}Letter of A. W. Swalm, June 2, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 256.
some packers and insure pure food. Informing Lacey of the practice by some packers of bleaching and deodorizing grease from condemned animals and then adding it to their packaged lard for human consumption, Foster called for strengthening the law's provision forbidding condemned animals to be used for grease. Foster regarded two provisions of the bill as too rigid and of no appreciable benefit to the consumer. The clause requiring canned meat to be dated, he pointed out, would result in the public's purchase of meat with recent dates only, although meat would remain good for years if it were in good condition at time of canning. As for the bill's provision barring borax as an additive to fresh meat, Foster defended the moderate use of borax as more healthful than the high amount of salt otherwise used as a preservative. He explained that borax was essential to Iowa packers' fair competition in European meat markets since two notable competitors, Denmark and Ireland, were close enough to provide fresh meat, and Canada, another huge rival, used borax legally. Foster's final statement on the use of borax must surely have given Lacey pause. Warning Lacey that his tariff position was no longer acceptable to the business interests he sought to protect, Foster declared that France, Germany, and Austria excluded American meat with borax not because of danger from its use but rather "as a way of retaliating
against McKinley tariff.\textsuperscript{31} During the summer of 1906, Congress met the American public's demand and enacted legislation to regulate meat, food, and drug sales.\textsuperscript{32} Lacey, following the sentiment in his district, voted affirmatively.

Although Iowa Progressives promoted reform in a number of areas, they reserved their major interest for federal railroad reform legislation. Because Roosevelt committed himself to this issue also, Cummins' supporters knew they would not be left on a political limb as they had been

\textsuperscript{31}Letter of T. D. Foster of Morrell Meat Packing Company, June 20, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 255. Foster was referring to the Dingley act passed in McKinley's administration. Other Iowans seconded Foster's views on the careless use of diseased animals and suggested that the federal government slaughter all such animals at the owner's expense. See also letter of W. G. Ray, June 16, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 256. Ray forwarded a letter which Senator Dolliver received demanding "a rigid meat inspection law."

\textsuperscript{32}Daily Capital, June 30, 1906. Register and Leader, June 29, 30, 1906. Harlan, History of Iowa, II, 229. See also Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism, pp. 98, 103, who says that it was the drop in European imports of American meat, not domestic reformers, that caused passage of the meat inspection bill. He quotes Upton Sinclair as saying that meat inspection was passed at the request of the packers and that business opposition to it was not \textit{per se}, but over who should pay for inspection and whether or not canned meat should be dated. Enforcement of the federal regulatory laws remained a problem, however, and the Daily Capital, Nov. 29, 1907, reported that half the meat sold in Des Moines was uninspected because local agents for packers bought up such meat and sold it to butchers at reduced prices. Lafe Young reminded his readers, in words that are still used today, to "ask to see the purple label of the United States Government inspector."
Progressives held another advantage in the railroad issue, in that it would place Standpatters on the defensive, since their acknowledged leader, Blythe, would undoubtedly oppose curbs to railroads.

In selecting the railroad issue, Iowa Progressives profited additionally from the position taken by the state’s popular ex-governor, William Larrabee. Speaking to the Interstate Commerce Law Convention in the fall of 1904, Larrabee had called for an effective strengthening of the Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.). While he termed the abusive pass system "plain bribery" by the railroads, he informed his audience that the American people paid three times more in freight rates annually than they paid in taxes. Larrabee urged his listeners to lobby for the reform measure then before the Congress, the Quarles-Cooper bill.

Speaking in a similar vein before the Mississippi River Improvement Association in November, 1904, Governor Cummins declared that since competition no longer insured fairness of treatment, federal action was needed to prevent discriminatory railroad rates between areas and individuals. As one means to this end, Cummins asked that the federal

33 Republican Larrabee served from 1886-1890.

34 Register and Leader, Nov. 16, 23, 1904. The Quarles-Cooper bill gave the I.C.C. authority to determine rates which would remain effective until overturned by a court.
government be authorized "to supervise, revise, and re-
create" interstate rates established by the railroads.\textsuperscript{35}

In late 1904 and early 1905, three bills came before
the Congress, each designed to accomplish in varying de-
grees what the two Iowa governors demanded in rail reform.
In addition to the Quarles-Cooper bill, they included the
Esch-Townsend bill and the Hepburn bill. Members of the
Iowa Congressional delegation who expressed opinions on
railroad regulation displayed a variety of views on the
amount of government control needed, but all endorsed some
type of limitation. While Congressman Hull favored giving
the I.C.C. increased power, he disapproved the right of the
Commission to fix rates arbitrarily.\textsuperscript{36} Hepburn, Chairman
of the House Interstate Commerce Committee, opposed the
Quarles-Cooper measure and introduced the bill bearing his
name.\textsuperscript{37} Senator Dolliver pleaded for immediate reform in
rates; Allison also endorsed reform but indicated it would

\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Register and Leader}, Nov. 16, 1904. In a highly
political Christmas letter to the farmers of Iowa, Cummins
encouraged them to consider the problem of railroad rate
reform, laws relative to a direct primary and the more
direct selection of United States Senators while reassuring
the farmers that he never advocated free trade with their
Canadian rivals. See \textit{Register and Leader}, Dec. 23, 1904.

\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Daily Capital}, Nov. 16, 1904.

\textsuperscript{37}\textit{Register and Leader}, Dec. 11, 1904.
not be achieved in the current session of Congress. Although both Senators agreed on rate-making power for the I.C.C., Allison appended the stipulation that the roads should have the right to court appeal before the rates became operative. Congressmen Lacey, who at this time did not publicize his views on reform legislation, was nevertheless frequently reminded by correspondence of the mounting public opinion in his district against rail abuses.

As opinion, favoring some form of railroad control, crystallized both in and out of Congress, J. W. Blythe journeyed to Washington to work for what he termed "a reasonable settlement." While the Burlington's counsel was lobbying in Washington, Hepburn, from Iowa's Eighth District, introduced the first of two rate control bills to bear his name. This measure authorized the I.C.C. to set maximum

---

38 Ibid., Dec. 25, 1904.

39 Letter of H. L. Spencer, Dec. 20, 1904, to Lacey; letter of J. B. Bolton, Dec. 21, 1904, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253. Letter of Sam Baldauf, Jan. 2, 1905, to Lacey; letter of Samuel Mahon, Jan. 12, 1905, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 254. The letters of these men testified to the prevalence of pooling among Iowa railroads and the resultant rate discrimination in long and short hauls. Bolton spoke of coal, which cost the operators eighty cents at Sixth District mines, being charged $1.16 in freight rates if shipped to Council Bluffs but some thirty cents less if shipped over the river to Omaha, Nebraska.

It is known too that at a late December conference in Allison's office, the Iowa Congressional delegation agreed to act as a unit in seeking rate legislation. See Register and Leader, Dec. 25, 1904.

40 Register and Leader, Jan. 4, 6, 14, 1905.
rates and created a special Commerce Court to hear railroad appeals on the Commission's actions.\(^4\) Labeling the special appeals court a duplication of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Register and Leader opposed Hepburn's bill.\(^5\) The Iowa Manufacturers' Association also disapproved it, and Cummins, speaking before that body, added his disapproval of Hepburn's proposal. Without mentioning Blythe's name, the Governor linked him to the bill and scorned him as a man "in whose hands the Republican party of Iowa has been placed," and who was clearly attempting to thwart the will of Iowans for rail reform.\(^6\)

Soon after the introduction of the Hepburn bill, Lacey mailed copies of it and the Esch-Townsend proposal to Sixth District constituents to determine their views on pending rail reform. The Congressman received in return a variety of responses with widely differing suggestions. A common opinion emerged, however, in that nearly all of Lacey's respondents expressed a dislike for the Hepburn bill.

Undoubtedly, George W. Seevers, the General Solicitor for the Iowa Central Railroad, faced a difficult decision

\(^4\)Ibid., Jan. 21, 23, 1905.

\(^5\)Ibid., Jan. 23, 26, 27, 1905.

when Lacey sought his opinion. Seevers, a Cummins' supporter, could afford neither to offend his railroad employers nor oppose Cummins' position demanding rail reform. While declining to express his observations on the bills until he had time to study them more, Seevers' letter, amounting to a defense of the position of railroads, betrayed dissatisfaction with both measures. Noting that small carriers were at a disadvantage to large ones who could afford to risk violation of the Elkins act by granting rebates, Seevers defended pooling as the only method small railroads had to maintain fair rates. Since Seevers viewed the need for rail reform to be one of maintaining fair rates, rather than determining such rates, he cautioned Lacey against any hasty legislation in the Congress.44

Another of Lacey's respondents, H. L. Spencer, the vice president of a wholesale grocer firm, agreeing with Seevers' caution against undue haste, recommended that railroad legislation be carried over to the next term of Congress. This Oskaloosa grocer, however, differed from Seevers' views on pooling, and, as he had done in an earlier letter to Lacey, denounced the practice among Iowa's railroads. Without going into detail, the Oskaloosaan expressed himself

as strongly opposed to the "unnecessarily complicated Hepburn bill."^45

The most helpful reply which Lacey received concerning the pending legislation, came from T. D. Foster, the Morrell Meat Packing Company official who earlier expressed such strong views on the meat inspection law. Confirming Seevers' observations on the violation of the Elkins act by large carriers, Foster added that eighteen years of experience under the Interstate Commerce law confirmed railroads in their belief that the risk of conviction before the I.C.C. was nil. He condemned the Esch-Townsend proposal for not removing the premium placed on "lying, deception, and dishonesty" practiced under the original 1887 law. Because railroads used private cars as one method of circumventing the rate and rebate laws, Foster advised Lacey that private car lines should be subject to the same regulation as railroads. Since the Morrell Company owned and used some two hundred private cars, Foster certainly strove to be objective in his judgment. He closed his remarkably straightforward letter with a plea for government inspection of railroad

^45 Letter of H. L. Spencer, Jan. 26, 1905, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 254. See also his earlier letter of Dec. 20, 1904, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 253. Another opponent of the Hepburn bill was L. F. Parker, Professor Emeritus of Grinnell's Iowa College. In his letter of Feb. 3, 1905, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 254, Parker told Lacey that many Republicans were threatening to vote for Hepburn's Democratic opponent in 1906 and in a reference to general party-switching warned that "some Republicans... in Congress do not appreciate this fact as they ought."
books, adding that an investigation of them "would reveal a state of lawlessness that would astonish the country."  

When Hepburn's bill met defeat at the hands of House committee members, attention was turned to the Esch-Townsend measure, and both Hepburn's and Lacey's votes helped it pass the House in February, 1905. Speaking from the House floor on the merits of the bill, Lacey called for a strengthening of the I.C.C.'s power to set rates. Without this power, he argued, the I.C.C. would be nothing more than a rate review board. In 1904 some five hundred new rate schedules had come before it daily. Later he defended the reform measure as a return to the practices of the I.C.C. during the first decade of its existence when it was presumed the Commission had authority to set rates after they had been declared unreasonable. "If the Commission ever had the power, or assumed to have, and it worked well, that is only an additional reason why we should give it now," Lacey reasoned.

---


47Briggs, Hepburn, pp. 253-254. Briggs stated that the Hepburn bill was killed in committee by the double barreled opposition of those who wanted no rate reform and those who wanted more.

48Register and Leader, Feb. 10, 1905. Lacey claimed he preferred enforcement of the new law by the Justice Department because the I.C.C. was already back-loged with 160,000 rate cases.

The Iowan's defense of the Esch-Townsend bill received praise from the Register and Leader. Declaring its agreement with him that "rate-making" was the nub of the reform controversy, the paper described Lacey as "squarely behind legislation for rate control." Although the Sixth District Congressman took no position against pooling or rebates, two abuses about which his constituents felt strongly, the Register's endorsement identified Lacey with the reformers.

Dubbed an administration measure, the Esch-Townsend bill, which provided that the I.C.C. could declare a rate unjust and name a substitute rate effective within thirty days, died from Senate delay. Thus, House action for reform began anew. In late January, 1906, Hepburn introduced a second bill which, without amendment, received House approval on February 8 with but seven dissenting votes. Specifically

50Register and Leader, Feb. 27, 1905.

51Harlan, History of Iowa, II, 230. Ross, Dollier, p. 197. Carriers did have the right of court appeal under the law.

52Register and Leader, Jan. 11, 26, 28, 1906. Ottumwa Courier, May 26, 1906. Hepburn succeeded in establishing himself in the Roosevelt reform camp after Wallace's Farmer assailed his first bill. When the editor challenged Hepburn to meet him in debate in Adams County in the Congressman's Eighth District and where farmers were reported to have burned him in effigy, the encounter completely vindicated Hepburn. The Congressman read a letter of endorsement from Roosevelt and Attorney General Moody and the Farmers Institute at Corning, Iowa, applauded Hepburn. See the Register and Leader, Feb. 25, 1905, and reprint of the Washington Post in Register and Leader, Mar. 2, 1905. See also Briggs, Hepburn, pp. 253-254, 262,267.
the bill placed private car lines and terminal facilities
under the authority of the I.C.C.; outlawed free passes, un-
reasonable rates, and rate discrimination; required a thirty-
day notice for rate changes; and, more importantly, empowered
the I.C.C. to establish maximum railroad rates effective
until modified by later act of the Commission or by a court.
Furthermore, the act authorized the government to prescribe
and publicize bookkeeping methods for the railroads.53

Dolliver, credited as one of the bill's chief
sponsors in the Senate, worked closely with Allison to
maneuver the reform measure to a successful passage. Senate
opposition, led by the conservative Republican Senator Nelson
Aldrich, centered around the extent of appellate power to be
given to courts in reviewing the work of the I.C.C. After a
series of amendments, the bill passed the Senate with but
three dissenting votes on May 18, 1906.54

53Ross, Dolliver, p. 204.

54Daily Capital, May 16, 19, 1906. Ross, Dolliver,
pp. 210-213, credits Dolliver with helping Allison draft the
amendments, but earlier on p. 202 states that the "real
author of the Hepburn bill was Dolliver." Sage, Allison,
p. 299, credits the second Hepburn bill to Roosevelt and says
it may properly be called "Roosevelt's bill." On pp. 300-305,
Sage treats of Allison's role in the amendments and describes
the maneuvers of Senator Nelson Aldrich to defeat the bill.
See also Blum, The Republican Roosevelt, pp. 95-105, who says
the Allison amendment granted review rights to United States
circuit courts but left the definition of scope of review to the
courts.

The bill became law June 29, 1906. See Ross,
Dolliver, p. 212. See also Wiebe, Business Men and Reform:
A Study of the Progressive Movement, pp. 51-56, for details
on final passage of the Hepburn act.
Although the *Register and Leader* had for a time identified the anti-revisionists among Iowa's Congressmen as also opposed to railroad reform, the fact remained that Iowa Standpatters supported the movement for reform legislation. In particular, Lacey cast his vote affirmatively for both the Esch-Townsend bill and the second Hepburn bill. Sensitive to increased demands for bringing railroads under control, and as John Blum says in *The Republican Roosevelt*, "recognizing in the President a safe sponsor for reform" Lacey and other Iowa Standpatters supported the demand of Progressives for railroad control.

Although Iowa Progressives failed to achieve a state primary law or the direct election of senators in 1905 and

---


56 Allison's Papers, Vol. 258, contain copies of resolutions drawn up by the Iowa Farmers Cooperative Society at Postville, Iowa, Feb. 13, 1906, in which the farmers pledge they "will neither campaign nor vote for any public official who is not squarely behind Roosevelt's railroad reform program and who will not also publicly pledge that he will not accept a pass for himself or family while he is in office." Although there were no copies of the resolutions in Lacey's papers, they were to have been sent to all Iowa Congressional members, to Iowa newspapers, and to all county chairmen of both political parties. See also Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt*, p. 92.

Blythe found portions of the Hepburn bill too stringent to suit the wishes of railroads. See his letter, Apr. 6, 1906, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 255.
1906, they were able to secure a state pure food law and an anti-pass bill. On the national level they further achieved their goals in federal legislation for meat inspection and the enactment of pure food and drug laws. Their biggest breakthrough, however, was the passage of the first comprehensive piece of railroad regulatory legislation since the original Interstate Commerce law. For Iowa Progressives, the years 1905-1906 were characterized by political respite and reform. For Standpatter Lacey, who opposed the state primary law lest it upset the "Reservation" control of the Republican party's state machinery, and who supported effective railroad legislation in the nation's capital contrary to the wishes of "Reservation" boss Blythe, this period demonstrated his ability to react adroitly to the intricacies of organization politics in Iowa. Despite his actions, however, increased Progressive strength within Iowa and across the nation portended that troubled years lay ahead.
Chapter XII

Confrontation and Defeat

Iowans in 1906 witnessed one of the most bitter political battles in the state’s history.¹ For the first time, voters elected state and national candidates in the same year. Furthermore, since the Cummins wing of the Republican party encountered defeat in 1904, Progressives were especially determined to wrest party control from the Standpat Congressional leaders of the party. To that end they sought to re-elect a governor from their faction and to defeat Standpat Congressional candidates, including Lacey. Standpatters were equally determined to win back the governorship and re-elect their men to Congress. While Progressives hoped to campaign on the need for political and social reform legislation with an emphasis on regulation of railroads, the Blythe-led Standpat faction elected to make the tariff the central issue of the campaign. Under the growing strength of Progressives, the

¹E. W. Harrington, "A Survey of the Political Ideas of Albert Baird Cummins," Iowa Journal of History and Politics, XXXIX (Oct., 1941), 350, stated that the 1906 campaign had few parallels in the history of Iowa or any state for its bitterness and activity.
machine strategy of Blythe collapsed. Cummins won an unprecedented third term as Governor, and the veteran Lacey went down to defeat.

Iowa Progressives warned the Congressmen that there would be a major political struggle in 1906 almost as soon as 1904 election results were known. Continuing these barbed threats, Cummins in 1905 called for a "cleaning out" of the Iowa delegation. The tariff, he said, could not be altered until the Standpatters were defeated. When Cummins spoke in mid-August before the National Reciprocity Congress in Chicago, Iowans interpreted his address as laying the foundation for 1906. The Register and Leader hailed the Governor's speech as "brilliant" and added that he had "declared war on Standpatters and sent a winged shaft at Secretary Shaw," who openly opposed reciprocity. Two months later, speaking before the Polk County Republican Club, Cummins brought the "war" closer to home. Differentiating among Standpatters, he labeled some "sincere"

---

2 Daily Capital, Dec. 17, 19, 1904.


4 Register and Leader, Aug. 17, 1905. The Aug. 24, 1905 issue of the Register and Leader claimed that every political move until 1908 in Iowa would be analyzed with the two opposing tariff views in mind.

5 Register and Leader, Aug. 18, 1905. Shaw was rumored to be a presidential aspirant for 1908.
men whom he could trust, while others were followers of Blythe.6

On another front, the Iowa Progressives warred against Standpatter in the selection of a Republican gubernatorial candidate. For most of Cummins' second term, his supporters looked upon former Congressman George D. Perkins of Sioux City as an acceptable candidate for 1906. During the closing months of 1905, however, as the press speculated about a third term for Cummins, Progressives attempted to link Perkins with the Blythe machine.7 In reality, however, Standpatters were reluctant to support Perkins for the party's nomination, and Blythe called for a conference in early January, 1906, to discuss factional strategy.8 Among those Standpatters whom the press listed as under consideration for candidacy were: Major S. W. Rathbun, Lafe Young, James H. Trewin, B. F. Carroll, and Lacey. An Ottumwa newspaper man wrote optimistically to Lacey that corridor talk at the conference indicated many of the men present considered Lacey "just the man to

6Ibid. For Cummins' speech on the tariff before the Polk County Republican Club, Sept. 17, 1905, see Cummins Papers, File 115.


8Register and Leader, Jan. 10, 1906.
nominate for Governor. "9 Acknowledging that "a more consistent and able Standpatter does not live," the Register and Leader confirmed that Lacey had supporters at the meeting.

The conference overlooked Lacey, however, and the Register attributed this decision to the judgment of the railroad magnates that Lacey would have little strength in any of Cummins' territory.10 By a process of elimination, the Standpatters agreed to support Perkins because he was the strongest available man.11 By February, Progressives withdrew their allegiance to the Sioux City man and Cummins publicly announced his candidacy for a third term. Since Perkins had revealed his intention to seek the party nomination some three weeks earlier, the factional dimension of the gubernatorial struggle became apparent at once.12

Forgetting their earlier support for the former Congressman, Progressives now attempted to discredit Perkins


10Register and Leader, Jan. 14, 1906.

11Ibid. Standpatters believed they could control the First, Fifth, Eighth, and most of the Sixth and Ninth Districts; they welcomed Perkins' strength in the Tenth and Eleventh Districts. No other candidate among the Standpatters seemed willing to oppose Cummins.

12Register and Leader, Jan. 23, Feb. 11, 1906.
as Blythe's candidate. When George Roberts, who agreed with
Cummins' views but who did not consider Cummins the sole
leader of good government in Iowa, endorsed Perkins, the
Register and Leader declared that "this is not a contest
over the governorship of Iowa. . . . This is a contest for
the control of the political future of Iowa."\(^{13}\)

Perkins, who keenly felt the disadvantage of being
identified as the railroad candidate, complained to Allison
and suggested that the Congressional delegation publicly
support his candidacy.\(^{14}\) Equally distressed by what he
called the "miserable falsehoods and half-truths" of the
Progressives' speeches, Blythe feared their consequences on
Congressional races as well as on Perkins' future. Con-
sequently, he asked Allison to have Hepburn, Cousins, Lacey,
Birdsall, and Smith return to their districts to answer
Cummins' charges that Standpatters were out of harmony with
Roosevelt's plans.\(^{15}\) Later Blythe quietly withdrew from
any prominent role in the Perkins campaign in order to
combat allegations that the Sioux City editor was under

\(^{13}\)\textit{Messenger}, Mar. 6, 1906. \textit{Register and Leader},

\(^{14}\)Letter of George D. Perkins, Jan. 28, 1906, to

\(^{15}\)Letter of J. W. Blythe, Feb. 23, 1906, to Allison,
railroad influence. Iowa's Congressmen, however, resisted the pressure to take Perkins' side at that time. Some Standpatters accused them of giving tacit approval to the man who sought to encompass their defeat.

Believing, for reasons not too discernible, that early conventions worked to the advantage of their candidate, Cummins forces planned such meetings in as many counties as possible. In several areas open conflict between the two factions occurred. For instance, in Dubuque County, conflict revolved around candidates for the state treasurer's office with Fred Kretschmer of Dubuque as Cummins' choice, and W. S. Morrow from Union County representing the Standpatters. Since this factional struggle occurred in Allison's home county, Progressives assumed he was involved and attempted to link Lacey with the controversy. Kretschmer, having ignored Allison's warning against an alliance with Cummins, set the early date of May 10 for the County Convention. The Progressives won control of it, and he emerged

16Letter of J. W. Blythe, Apr. 7, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 255. This may also have been an indication of Blythe's lack of confidence in Perkins as a candidate. In his Feb. 23, 1906, letter to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 355, Blythe asked the Senator to request Perkins to speak in the Eleventh District since Blythe had not seen him nor communicated with him in a long time.

with the coveted nomination. To strengthen his candidacy, Progressives allowed Kretschmer to name all Dubuque County delegates to the State Convention. Countering Progressive advances, Allison's supporters conferred both in Dubuque and Chicago and persuaded Kretschmer to name a majority of the State Convention delegates pledged to Perkins, and then to withdraw his own candidacy in favor of Morrow. Kretschmer assigned nearly all twenty-eight delegates to Perkins, and then announced his withdrawal "in the interests of Senator Allison."

Quick to see the railroad machine at work, the press labeled the affair a withdrawal "in the interests of Kretschmer and Perkins." Rumors flew that Kretschmer had been promised a federal position. Allison intervened in

---


19Letter of Jacob Rich, May 20, 1906, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 359. Register and Leader, May 25, 26, 27, 1906. Although the Register and Leader, May 27, 1906, named J. F. Lacey as the man who assured E. H. Hunter, Allison's intermediary with Kretschmer, that Allison approved the plan, there is nothing in Lacey's correspondence to indicate his involvement. It is more than possible that he was confused with Judge Lacy, political supporter of Allison from Dubuque who was among the initial planners of the "stop-Kretschmer" movement. See Rich's letters to Allison, May 20, 29, 1906, Allison Papers, Vol. 359.

the Dubuque County contest with the proposal that the county delegation be divided evenly between Cummins and Perkins. To minimize the factional issue and to rescue the Senator's name from any taint of wrongdoing, his supporters issued a statement that Allison had not made "a deal" and knew nothing about the patronage plum supposedly promised as reward to Kretschmer.21

Warfare also broke out in Des Moines County, home of the Burlington boss, when Blythe attempted to dominate the convention. Shunting aside the usual provision for a secret ballot, he demanded that votes be given orally to the tellers. The result was a walkout by Cummins' men after the convention named two sets of delegates, one with instructions for Perkins and one for Cummins.22 Blythe forces were further alarmed when Cummins made his first personal incursion into the "Reservation" heartland, giving six

21 Letter of Henry Rickel, May 29, 1906, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 359. Daily News, May 25, 26, 1906. The case lost some of its political flare when J. D. McCullock, the Iowa College student who had sworn he saw Hunter's letter to Kretschmer with one of three federal job offers, altered his statement to read, not that he saw the letter, but was "informed of its contents." See Register and Leader, June 1, 2, 1906. For later developments of the Kretschmer affair and Allison's role in it, see Chap. XIII of this study.

22 Register and Leader, May 12, 13, 14, 17, 20, 22, 1906.
hours of speeches. Never before had the Governor waged a factional assault in Blythe's home territory. After Cummins called a special strategy meeting for "war" on all the counties of Lacey's district, Wapello County's convention, like the one in Burlington, ended with two sets of State Convention delegates being selected.

As the county conventions met across the state, their proceedings confirmed Blythe's gloomy outlook conveyed to Allison in April. Cautioning Allison about Dolliver's optimistic prognosis about northern Iowa, Blythe reported that the Fourth District would be for Cummins, that with the exception of three or four counties, the Tenth District was hopeless for the Standpatters, and that even the Eleventh, Perkins' home district, was doubtful. Moreover, Blythe prepared Allison for trouble at the State Convention, telling the Senator that confusion and friction would ensue "because of the lack of consultation and cooperation—in other words the machine is not working."

Realistically, the railroad politician wrote that he was

23Sioux City Tribune, May 15, 1906, said Cummins' visit to Burlington "doubled the consternation" of the railroad forces there. It was the first such excursion for the Governor into Blythe's home territory.

24Ottumwa Courier, Mar. 8, May 12, 16, 21, 1906. The Wapello County struggle will receive more attention later in this chapter.
"prepared for anything in the way of faulty preparation" at the State Convention.\(^{25}\)

As the date for the Convention drew nearer, both factions claimed victory, at the same time displaying frantic activity which betrayed doubt. The Sioux City Tribune, a rival to Perkins' Journal, interpreted the selection of one of Blythe's agents, E. H. Hunter, as Perkins' manager an act of last resort, and headlined that Blythe and Perkins were in despair even though Hunter was using railroad money in a desperate attempt to defeat Cummins. The Register and Leader printed a map showing the Governor victorious everywhere "but those counties in which the Burlington railroad is dominant."\(^{26}\) Reporting a directly opposite view, the Capital claimed that Perkins' attack against state extravagance, tariff revision, and the unprecedented third term was making great headway; and the Nonpareil rejoiced that state-wide reports showed a Standpatter victory at the State Convention.\(^{27}\)


\(^{26}\)Sioux City Tribune, May 31, 1906. Register and Leader, June 19, 1906. Daily News, June 1, 29, 1906, repeated the Tribune's bribery charge. The Daily News, June 21, 1906, printed a cartoon showing a large dog lying on a map of southern Iowa; the dog's head was in Burlington and its tail in Sioux City, Perkins' home.

During June, two blunders in Perkins' campaign revealed the despair in the Standpat camp. Treasury Secretary Shaw returned for his second speaking tour within a month, only to have his zeal lead him into a tactical error. Endeavoring to identify Perkins with the President, Shaw advised the secretary of Davenport's Lincoln Club that he had "canceled engagements and was coming after conferring with the President." When local Republicans wired the White House asking if Shaw's statement meant Roosevelt was taking sides in Iowa politics, Presidential Secretary William Loeb replied that the President had no favorites and would not interfere in factional contests. Loeb's message revealed that Shaw's conference with Roosevelt really amounted only to letting him know where the Secretary could be reached if needed, a customary routine for all Cabinet officers leaving town.28 Another blunder followed when Hunter's assistant in Des Moines, Charles W. Johnston, attempted to press Iowa's Congressmen into an active anti-Cummins role. Demanding their help in controlling the State Convention, Johnston threatened that those who refused would be treated as political foes; but the Congressmen refused to be intimidated.29


29Register and Leader, June 26, 28, 1906.
In counties where Cummins prevailed, Perkins' managers often claimed victory by resorting to the creation of false contests in the choice of delegates. The managers named a slate of Perkins' delegates hopefully anticipating that in the ensuing contest over validity, the Credentials Committee would seat Perkins' men and exclude Cummins' delegates. To forestall what would otherwise be a chaotic State Convention and to achieve the greatest possible advantage for their candidate, Standpatters met in late June to discuss possible resolution of the problem of contested delegations. These conferrees, who included Lacey and Cousins according to one account, decided to seek help from outside Iowa to settle the dispute. Standpatters suggested that the Republican National Committee divide contested delegations including the fake contests and that both candidates agree to accept that body's ruling.  

When Cummins rejected the Standpat offer to divide the contested delegates, Standpat managers made one last attempt to save the Convention for Perkins. Approaching the Republican State Central Committee, they asked that body to formulate a temporary roll call of the Convention.

---

before the assembly convened. The Committee, however, refused to do this, seemingly making a floor fight unavoidable.\textsuperscript{31}

In the days immediately preceding the Convention, Standpatters found themselves in a political quandary. Some wished to fight out the issue of contested delegations at the risk of splitting the party, but Blythe and a majority of the Congressional delegation favored compromise with a view to salvaging as many remaining benefits as possible.\textsuperscript{32}

If compromise could win the election of Colonel D. J. Palmer to the State Railroad Commission and that of W. S. Morrow to the Treasurer's office, and hence to membership on the Governor's Executive Council, not all would be lost for the Standpatters. Needless to say, Congressmen viewed their own re-election as another compromise benefit. Blythe especially wanted to avoid a floor fight because, having in mind the expiration of Dolliver's Senate term in 1907 and that of Allison in 1908, the Standpat leader believed a harmonious convention would contribute to Standpat control of the state legislature to be elected. Furthermore, Blythe hoped that with compromise, Cummins might be persuaded to select Standpatter L. D. Raymond over Warren Garst

\textsuperscript{31}Sioux City Tribune, July 6, 26, 1906. Daily Capital, July 28, 1906.

\textsuperscript{32}E. H. Hunter and Charles Johnston together with Perkins and Lafe Young were said to favor a fight.
as his running mate, thus assuring Standpatters one more vote on the Executive Council. Raymond's choice as Lieutenant Governor would also mean that, in the event of a Senate vacancy, Cummins would not be appointed to that body.33

With this mood for moderation prevailing, it was not too difficult for Dolliver to suggest to fellow members of the Congressional delegation present at the preconvention meeting that the delegate claims of fake contests be eliminated and that the delegations honestly contested be settled by the party's Credential Committee, as was usually done.34 This decision, of course, insured the nomination of Cummins; and the Convention, moreover, selected Progressive Warren Garst as the party's candidate for second place on the ticket.

Knowing that their surrender on the delegate fight meant victory for Cummins, Standpatters somehow still hoped to win the struggle over the party's state platform. After


34 Lacey was among those present who agreed to Dolliver's plan. Sioux City Tribune, Aug. 1, 1906, also said that 180 of the contested delegates were awarded to Cummins and but 88 to Perkins. See also Nonpareil, Aug. 1, 1906, and Register and Leader, Aug. 1, 1906. The Register and Leader, Aug. 2, 1906, reported that harmony prevailed because Cummins controlled the Credentials Committee by a 6-5 vote. See also reprint of the Washington Post in Register and Leader, Aug. 6, 1906, for the role of Dolliver in the solution.
the adoption of the tariff plank, the focal point of factional controversy, Progressives again claimed to have defeated Standpat views, only to be met with the countercharge that the platform vindicated the doctrine of protectionism. Since the platform did not call for reciprocity on competitive products, nor for immediate revision of the Dingley act but only for revision "as it is needed," Standpatters rejoiced. Cummins' followers, on the other hand, found vindication of the Iowa Idea in the platform clause which endorsed "wise and unselfish tariff laws . . . equally opposed to foreign control and domestic monopoly." Similarly, Progressives hailed the concept of reasonable and timely tariff changes as endorsement of their revisionist views.

A more accurate appraisal of the platform struggle appeared in the Democratic Oskaloosa Times, whose editor wrote that Standpatters "lost their nerve" when the Congressmen chose to harmonize rather than face "the prospect of sending a lot of Democratic Congressmen to Washington this fall." The platform, the editor said, was nothing more


36Sioux City Tribune, Aug. 2, 1906. By Aug. 8, 1906, the Daily Capital acknowledged that the tariff plank really expressed the Iowa Idea. The Register and Leader, Aug. 2, 1906, hedged in assigning victory; it preferred to say that the "Progressive convention adopted a platform written by a committee with Standpatters in the majority."
than a "meaningless conglomeration intended to catch Stand-
pat votes," and, consequently, it was "interpreted in a
different manner on every corner."37

The tariff continued to be a central issue in the
1906 Iowa election. Lafe Young, however, may have over-
estimated its significance when he dubbed the fall campaign
the "irrepressible conflict."38 Although both factions
devoted much of their campaign oratory to the tariff, Stand-
patters benefited from Roosevelt's apparent decision, sup-
ported by Republicans in Congress, to postpone revision an
additional two years or until after the 1908 Presidential
election.39

37Oskaloosa Times, Aug. 4, 1906. The Evening Post
(New York, New York), Aug. 7, 1906, completely missed the
significance of the Iowa power struggle. It declared the
divergence of the nominee from the platform as equivalent to
the lamb and the lion lying down together and it wondered
aloud "what the long and envenomed quarrel had been all about."

38Daily Capital, Aug. 7, 21, 1906. Young referred to
the anti-Shaw hisses at the State Convention as anti-tariff
hisses, indicative of the wide party differences that would
have to "be fought out" in some manner.
The Register and Leader, Aug. 16, Sept. 29, Oct. 3,
1906, attempted to project the prohibition issue into the cam-
paign when it claimed that Claude Porter, who neither smoked
nor drank, was named by the Democrats with a view to winning
prohibition Republican votes. The Daily Capital, Aug. 8,
1906, declared the Republican platform "notable for its en-
tire lack of reference to the liquor issue." Cedar Rapids
Republican, Aug. 9, 1906, claimed the Democrats in their State
Convention, Aug. 7, 1906, recognized also that the liquor ques-
tion was dead in Iowa. Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A.
B. Cummins, Chap. XV, p. 79, stated that prohibitionists were
active, but the issue did not become critical in the campaign.

39Daily Capital, Aug. 7, 21, 1906. Register and
The state campaign got under way with the election of Frank Woods, a pro-Cummins man, as chairman of the Republican State Central Committee.\textsuperscript{40} Bitterness intensified at once, and the factions accused each other of bolting the ticket and soliciting Democratic support for certain Republican candidates. Cummins' supporters accused Standpatters of using railroad money to support Claude R. Porter, the Democrat, over Cummins.\textsuperscript{41} For a time, rumors circulated that Standpatters were out to "dump Dolliver" for re-election to the Senate because he had been too pro-Cummins at the State Convention.\textsuperscript{42} Still another facet of the bitter in-fighting reflected the understanding of each group that in 1906 Cummins was less of a gubernatorial candidate than a senatorial one.\textsuperscript{43} Both factions, therefore, campaigned with 1908 in mind.

\textsuperscript{40}Ottumwa Courier, Aug. 14, 1906.

\textsuperscript{41}Register and Leader, Aug. 15, Nov. 6, 1906. Democrat and Leader, Sept. 11, 1906. Sioux City Tribune, Sept. 25, 26, Nov. 3, 5, 1906. Gate City, Sept. 27, 1906, indicated that Democratic support of Cummins in the river counties of eastern Iowa would more than offset his losses in the interior of the state. Letter of W. H. Asbury, Ottumwa realtor, Sept. 27, 1906, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 88.

\textsuperscript{42}Register and Leader, Aug. 15, Sept. 2, 1906. Letter from W. H. Asbury, Sept. 27, 1906, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 88. See also Ross, Dolliver, p. 223.

\textsuperscript{43}Register and Leader, Aug. 29, Sept. 2, 1906. Democrat and Leader, Oct. 28, 1906. See also Shaw's speech at Indianola, Iowa, in Daily Capital, Oct. 30, 1906, which attempted to downplay the role of Blythe in Iowa politics. Shaw indicated Blythe would be holding Dolliver's seat in
Lacey's Sixth District, marked for capture by the Progressives, illustrated well the bitterness of the state campaign. The struggle began there at least a year before Cummins announced his decision to seek a third term. The first phase of the contest revolved around discrediting Lacey for re-nomination and re-election. Later, when the Governor decided to oppose Perkins for the gubernatorial nomination, the Sixth District battle broadened to include the fight for State Convention delegates.

Responding to a survey of Congressional tariff views, Lacey set the pace for his campaign within a few months of his re-election in 1904. He reiterated his consistent anti-revision position and offered the same explanation for his views, saying that farmers would suffer from a deviation from protectionism while Eastern manufacturers would profit.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{44}Register and Leader, Jan. 10, 12, 13, 1905. Daily Capital, Jan. 16, 1905. Oskaooosa Daily Herald, Jan. 20, 1905. Part of this tariff discussion related to the duty on hides and its effect on shoe prices and would recur at the end of 1905. See the Saturday Review (Ottumwa, Iowa), Dec. 23, 1905, in unclassified Lacey Papers. See also form letters on the tariff dated Dec., 1905, in Lacey Papers, Vol. 254. Some were anonymous; some had names of shoe companies; all urged people to write their Congressman protesting the tariff on hides.
Although Lacey insisted that legislative priorities in the Sixth District concerned railroad reform, nearly all of his speeches through 1905 and the campaign of 1906 concerned the tariff.\textsuperscript{45} However, Lacey did speak on the floor of Congress in behalf of railroad reform legislation, and undoubtedly hoped that the railroad issue would lose some of its significance with the passage of the Hepburn act in June, 1906.\textsuperscript{46}

Although Lacey interpreted the absence of tariff references in the letters from his constituents as proof of their satisfaction with protectionism, he received fair warning to the contrary from other quarters. The \textit{Register and Leader} cautioned that Standpatters who defied the public demand for revision would have a reckoning in 1906.\textsuperscript{47} Cummins declared that the political air in the House was stifling to revisionists and suggested that some Congressman should be retired "to breathe the pure air of the country."\textsuperscript{48} Planning specifically for Lacey's retirement, Cummins'

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45}Register and Leader, Jan. 10, 1905. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Aug. 28, 1905. Daily Capital, Jan. 21, 1905. See below in this chapter.
\item \textsuperscript{46}See Chap. XI of this study.
\item \textsuperscript{47}Reprint of Argus (Elkader, Iowa), in Register and Leader, Jan. 29, 1905.
\item \textsuperscript{48}Washington Post reprint in Register and Leader, Apr. 9, 1905.
\end{itemize}
followers in the Sixth District initiated programs to educate farmers to revisionist views. Farmers Institutes, devoted to the advancement of farmers' causes, provided the Progressives a channel for reaching rural audiences.\textsuperscript{49}

When the program for the March, 1905, meeting of the Wapello County Farmers Institute featured both Cummins and Henry Wallace, editor of the journal \textit{Wallaces' Farmer}, Blythe grew concerned. Alerting Lacey, who was in Washington at the time, to Cummins' personal invasion of the Sixth District, Blythe interpreted the Governor's action as an early attempt to win Democratic support for Progressives' control of Republican caucuses.\textsuperscript{50}

Three months later, Lacey received still another warning that all was not well in his district. Speaking in Jasper County before some ten thousand people, Thomas Bray, Grinnell attorney and pro-Cummins chairman of Poweshiek County central committee, delivered a blistering attack on the "system." Including the railroads and the American Protective Tariff League within the "system" Bray then identified

\textsuperscript{49}The meeting at Corning, Iowa, in which Hepburn successfully defended his rate bill was sponsored by the Farmers Institute. See Chap. XI of this study.

\textsuperscript{50}Letter of John O'Keefe, Mar. 2, 1905, to J. W. Blythe; letter of J. W. Blythe, Mar. 3, 1905, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 254. See also the \textit{Register and Leader}, Aug. 20, 1905, which spoke of a farmers movement in the Sixth District to control politics there.
Lacey with the object of his attack. Without using Lacey's name, he attributed the Congressman's nomination to the railroads, and his election to the Tariff League which provided money for votes and free "canned" articles and editorials for the press. In gratitude for this double-headed support, Lacey interfered in state politics to help determine who would be the governor, secretary of state, auditor, and railroad commissioners. Bray then outlined what he termed the "efficient machinery" used for control of state politics, citing as most beneficial the combination patronage-press system whereby local editors received postmaster appointments in return for their newspaper support of a candidate. The work of loyal editors coupled with that of key county officials, he continued, secured the election of state legislators hand-picked by the railroad boss, J. W. Blythe. Reminding his audience that the legislators named the United States Senators from Iowa, Bray completed the cycle of control in state politics, deftly identifying Lacey with the need for reform in all areas from the tariff, to railroads, to primary elections, to the direct election of Senators.51

Lacey fought back in an address before the Davis County Convention. He defended the convention system as preferable to the primary for its utility in healing factional

51 *Register and Leader*, Aug. 19, 1905.
differences and securing a better distribution of party nominees, and endorsed, without risk, the existing railroad legislation as beneficial to both the roads and the public.\textsuperscript{52} However, Lacey devoted most of his speech to a defense of the tariff. In comparing the nation's imports in 1905 with those of 1894, the Congressman concluded that "evidently the much abused Dingley schedules are not destroying the imports of this country." He labeled reciprocity a Democratic idea, and equated Cummins' tariff views with the Democratic party. Recalling the Governor's address before the Chicago Reciprocity Convention, Lacey reminded his audience that the organization selected Democratic ex-Senator Harris from Kansas as its advisor.\textsuperscript{53}

The pro-Cummins Register and Leader defended the Governor and attacked Lacey's speech. In another clear warning, of prophetic value as it turned out, the editor commented that "Major Lacey may assume the roll of King Canute and attempt to sweep back the ocean with a broom. But he will learn the old lesson, for public opinion is an ocean whose tides are more restless than any known to any coast."\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52}Iowa had no state elections in 1905 due to the Titus Amendment; Davis County in the Sixth District, however, had a legislative vacancy to fill and so a County Convention was held.

\textsuperscript{53}Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Sept. 23, 1905. Register and Leader, Sept. 24, 1905.

\textsuperscript{54}Register and Leader, Sept. 25, 1905. The Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Sept. 29, Oct. 2, 3, 1905, carried reprints of
Robert Kissick, Civil War veteran from Oskaloosa, inquired about Lacey's tariff views on steel products, pointing out that United States Steel was charging more for steel at home than abroad. Skirting the issue, Lacey admitted steel products schedules should be reduced in the next tariff revision, but added that abolition of all duties on such products would damage small companies in competition with United States Steel. In an attempt to tie his tariff views to those of President Roosevelt, Lacey paraphrased the President's 1903 Minneapolis address that tariff change should come "only when necessity to do so is sufficient to justify the injury done to business that always goes along with tariff revision." Reverting to his favorite tactic of comparing the Dingley tariff with Democratic tariff legislation, Lacey caustically concluded that "I am not impressed with the logic of the suggestion that now inasmuch as times have improved we should repeal the law which brought the improvement."
Progressives used an invitation to speak before the Sixth District Meat Producers as another opportunity to educate farmers to new tariff views. Speaking in Grinnell before livestock farmers, Thomas Bray again attacked Lacey and presented his concept of reciprocal trade. The only remedy for "robbery" of meat producers, he declared, was railroad rate control and the extension of foreign trade in livestock products, hinting as he spoke that such trade expansion would come from "the growing and universal demand for reciprocity." Overlooking the controversy on federal meat inspection raging at the time, Bray explained to the farmers that the decline in European imports of American meat was a retaliation for a tariff wall which excluded Europeans from American markets. In a sweeping generalization that reciprocity received support from "every American statesman whose love of country is greater than love of loot" and condemnation from "every corporate tool who ever occupied a seat in Congress," Bray called Lacey a "mis-representative" who was a friend of corporations but not farmers. While he acknowledged Lacey's ability and his influence in Washington, Bray declared it was better to have an empty seat than to have such ability and influence misdirected. Bray urged his audience to dispense with the services of the Sixth District Congressman "for the reason that he is opposed to reciprocity and never misses an opportunity to air his hostility to this measure." Although Lacey represented an agricultural
district, Bray further charged he did nothing to alleviate farmers' hardships because the Congressman was under railroad domination in the district.\(^5^7\)

Iowa Progressives achieved a degree of success in altering the tariff views of local farmers by the close of 1905. When the Farmers Institutes met in state assembly, farm producers unanimously adopted a resolution which endorsed reciprocity consistent with the provision of the Dingley act. That law permitted the government a percentage margin of existing rates for the negotiation of reciprocal treaties, but also proved itself ineffective because of difficulty in securing treaty approval in the Senate. Iowa's farmers, therefore, challenged Congressmen to be realistic in their approach to reciprocity. Calling attention to the defeat of reciprocal trade treaties negotiated by fellow Iowan John A. Kasson during McKinley's administration, the farmers asked that reciprocity be accomplished by a simple majority vote in both houses of Congress.\(^5^8\)

---

\(^{57}\)Ottumwa Saturday Review, Dec. 23, 1905, in unclassified Lacey Papers. Bray had a reputation for fiery talk. See letter of James T. Powell of Ottumwa Courier, Dec. 23, 1905, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 254, in which Powell wrote: 'I enclose a paper in which you will notice Tom Bray (who is peculiarly and appropriately named) has a speech. . . .'

\(^{58}\)Register and Leader, Dec. 14, 15, 1905. The editor assailed the inconsistency of Hepburn, Hull, Cousins, and Lacey in not giving the reciprocity clause of the Dingley act a fair trial since they voted for the law.
While Progressives in 1908 gradually undermined Lacey's tariff defenses among Sixth District farmers, the following year witnessed an intensification of the battle for control of the district. Proceeding blindly with the same tariff defense he had employed over the years, Lacey selected two effective podiums from which to propagate his protectionist doctrine. Accepting an invitation to speak before the Home Market Club in Boston, he projected his views from both the viewpoint of Iowa and Congress. Protection, Lacey argued, allowed home markets rather than foreign ones to determine the price of farm goods, and he concluded that the best market was the one nearest home. In language addressed to the farmers of his district, Lacey attacked the idealist who in spurning the good of the present for something new "would not stand pat in a clover field." Regarding the demand of some Eastern manufacturers for free hides, Lacey explained that such free trade would benefit only the manufacturers to the exclusion of farmers and the general public. "The Iowa farmer has stood and still stands by the protective system," he concluded, "and has the right to share in its benefits."59

59Lacey's speech before Boston Home Market Club, Feb. 8, 1906, in unclassified Lacey Papers. A second manuscript of a Philadelphia speech is almost identical. See letter of Albert Clarke, secretary of Home Market Club, Jan. 29, 1906, to Lacey, in which Clarke asked Lacey to expose the "fallacy of free hides."
Despite the fact that Lacey ruled out the possibility of solving the farm problem without high protection and ignored the obvious signs of growing rural discontent in his district, copies of his Boston talk received wide circulation in southern Iowa. Blythe requested 5,000 reprints for use in the First District and suggested they be sent throughout the state. Although the railroad attorney preferred to make tariff rather than railroad reform the central issue of the 1906 campaign, he refused to be personally involved with the distribution of Lacey's speech, lest such action give weight to the Progressives charge of railroad boss politics.

In addition to the Home Market Club, Lacey used Congress as a podium from which to reach his Iowa constituents. After the delivery of a typically standpat tariff speech in early March, however, some Eastern newspapers offered scathng criticism of Lacey. While admitting that Lacey's arguments were good "twenty years ago" and before foreign nations were so involved in garnering a share of world trade for themselves, the editor of the Washington Times questioned if "such ossified . . . convictions" would contribute to the


The American Protective Tariff League responded favorably to Lacey's request to mail copies of his Home Market speech to people whose names he furnished. See letter of W. F. Wakeman, secretary, the American Protective Tariff League, June 22, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 256.
Congressman's "reputation for political wisdom or business sagacity." Repudiating Lacey's position that the United States should not alter trade relations with Germany because British trade was more important, the editor declared with a touch of sarcasm that "the argument would have some force if anybody proposed to injure the trade with Britain . . . but nobody does." For the Congressman of a meat-producing Iowa constituency to declare against any concession to preserve or improve trade with Germany, he continued, took "positive courage—or, perhaps, obvious blindness." Writing in a similar vein, the editor of the New York _Sun_ acknowledged Lacey's privilege of viewing the Dingley tariff as "the unchangeable . . . word of wisdom" and chief cause of prosperity, but qualified his statement with the telling phrase, "if his district will believe him."62

The Standpat press of southern Iowa publicized Lacey's remarks widely as offering "sound philosophy" on the tariff. The _Oskaloosa Daily Herald_, referring to the address as one of the ablest tariff speeches of the day, announced that it would be published in pamphlet form by the American


62 _New York Sun_, Mar. 9, 1906, in unclassified Lacey Papers.
Protective Tariff League. The address received further distribution when an Eastern magazine, *My Business Friend*, printed the speech in full together with Lacey's picture.

Lacey somehow interpreted the rather wide circulation of both his Home Market speech and his address in Congress as tantamount to general belief in his views, and ignored the warning signals emitted from the Sixth District relative to tariff dissatisfaction. Addressing the Davis County Convention in 1906, Lacey summarized the glories of prosperity and intoned, "we stand again on the solid rock of protection."

Although he seemed blind to the possible results of his inflexible tariff views, Lacey reacted quickly to the Progressives' threat to capture the Sixth District's convention delegates and to prevent his renomination to Congress. Cummins' followers, meeting early in March, mapped a comprehensive outline for victory in that district. Believing that Davis, Keokuk, and Poweshiek Counties were anti-Lacey and that Jasper and Wapello were open to Progressive conversion, the Governor's supporters sought to weaken Lacey's position still

---


65 *Oskaloosa Daily Herald*, Sept. 8, 1906. A later campaign speech in Ottumwa amounted to a historical recital of the glory of the Republican party due to national prosperity resultant from the party's high tariff policy. See *Ottumwa Courier*, Oct. 23, 1906.
further. To do that, while at the same time strengthening support for Progressive candidates for the state legislature and for delegates to the State Convention, Progressive leaders planned to offer a number of congressional candidates throughout the District. 66

Implementation of the plan first called for persuading B. F. Carroll, state auditor from Davis County, to announce himself as a Progressive candidate for Congress and then have Wapello County Progressives endorse Carroll. Such an accomplishment, James F. Powell of the Ottumwa Courier told Lacey, would "in a way tie both of these counties to the tail of the Cummins kite." 67 Carroll refused to be a candidate, however, and talk then turned to Fred Maytag of Newton in Jasper County and S. H. Harper, Wapello County state senator from Ottumwa. 68

From old-time Standpatters, Lacey received full, although sometimes conflicting, reports of district affairs.


68 Register and Leader, Mar. 9, 1906.
and Cummins' strategy. Among his most zealous informers were three aspirants for Lacey's good will who ultimately hoped for appointment to a federal patronage post in the Sixth District. Sensing the urgency of the situation particularly from the details of a letter from Frank Clark, one of the patronage hopefuls, Lacey requested an appraisal from Blythe. The forthcoming analysis was anything but reassuring. According to Blythe, Wapello and Keokuk Counties were "improving," Jasper was in "bad shape," Poweshiek needed "careful looking after," and Davis County needed "help."

Sobering news from another source reached Lacey in Washington about the same time that Blythe's letter arrived. Ellsworth Rominger, chairman of the Sixth District Congressional Committee, advised Lacey that with Cummins' strength over Perkins in Mahaska County the situation was "alarming." Although he assured Lacey of re-nomination by acclamation, he nonetheless warned him that Mahaska County's delegation would undoubtedly be divided at the District

---


Convention. Rominger advised Lacey to return home in time for the Convention, which was to convene in Oskaloosa on May 23.71

Lacey reacted at once to the situation in Mahaska, and his anxiety concerning Cummins' strength was evident in letters to his brother Will. Since the Mahaska County chairman was a Cummins' follower, Lacey entrusted Will with the responsibility of quietly surveying the county and reporting back to Washington. Acknowledging to Will that he would "certainly like to see Mahaska line up solid" for Perkins in order to offset the closeness of votes in other parts of the district, Lacey urged an intensive campaign by Standpatters in all precincts.72 The situation in Mahaska would turn out satisfactorily, he believed, if the organization succeeded in getting "the country vote" to the caucuses. Specifically, Lacey advised his brother that "I think the rural telephones could be used to advantage the evening before."73

71 Letters of Ellsworth Rominger, Apr. 25, 27, 1906, to Lacey; letter of F. W. Simmons, Apr. 26, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 256. Simmons, from Ottumwa, wrote in the same vein as Rominger.


73 Letters of J. F. Lacey, May 5, 9, 1906, to W. R. Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 255. See also letter of L. C. Blanchard, Oskaloosa Standpat attorney, May 10, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 255, in which Blanchard told Lacey that Cummins might carry Mahaska because Standpat interests there had not been looked after.
The fight for control of Wapello County was equally severe, and the County Convention met under almost chaotic conditions. When supporters of Perkins and Cummins tried to unseat delegates claimed by their respective opponents, J. W. Blythe reportedly offered to divide the delegation. This suggestion pleased neither faction, however, and rival delegations were chosen.74

At the Congressional Convention in Oskaloosa on May 23, Lacey received the nomination without opposition. Trouble ensued, however, when Wapello County's pro-Cummins delegates walked out after the Credentials Committee seated the Perkins delegates. Since both sets of delegates supported Lacey's nomination, the walk-out was more significant as a forecast of troubled times at the State Convention. Except for this display of Progressive strength, the Congressional Convention was a complete Standpat victory. Lacey's acceptance speech was a eulogy of the Grand Old Party, and he asserted that the protective tariff had been part of America since the second bill of the first American Congress. All the resolutions represented Standpat views, with one opposing tariff revision, another endorsing the Iowa delegation in Congress, and still a third supporting

Leslie M. Shaw for President in 1908.\(^{75}\) As a final blow to the Progressives, Standpatters regained every position on the new District Congressional Committee.\(^{76}\)

Although the Sixth District supported Lacey for the tenth consecutive time, it was still uncertain how many of its State Convention delegates would be for Perkins. In writing about his concern for Poweshiek County, Blythe complained to Lacey of the indifference manifested by most Congressmen "with two or three exceptions," of which certainly Lacey was one; he singled out Dolliver for his "utter want of influence" on the campaign.\(^{77}\) Jasper County was still another source of concern for the Standpatters, and District Chairman Rominger urged Will Lacey to get some men to go there to offset the work of Fred Maytag, who was

---


\(^{76}\) *Newton Journal*, May 30, 1906. Rominger from Davis County was re-elected; the others were: C. V. Hoffman from Mahaska, W. G. Ray from Poweshiek, Frank Clark from Wapello, M. D. Riddle from Jasper, W. H. Young from Keokuk, and G. C. McCormick from Monroe.

reportedly using money effectively in Cummins' behalf. The rural vote was necessary to save the county for the Stand-patters, Rominger wrote. If the county's delegates did not support Perkins, the Progressives would control the District's caucus at the State Convention.78

As the fight for Jasper escalated, confusion about the battle increased also. While his brother pondered Rominger's pessimistic note, John Lacey received optimistic information from Milt McCord, his appointee to the Newton postmastership. McCord reported Jasper "well organized against Cummins" and safe for Perkins if the Democrats could be kept from voting.79 The Progressives replied to the charge hurled at Maytag and claimed that E. H. Hunter, the railroad lobbyist, was using "a barrel full of railroad money" to undermine Cummins' strength. Taking advantage of Maytag's support for Lacey in the Congressional race while minimizing the fact that he did not endorse Perkins for governor, Stand-patters tried to undercut Maytag's influence for Cummins by smothering him with praise and identifying him with the

78Letter of Ellsworth Rominger, Chairman Sixth District Congressional Committee, June 4, 1906, to W. R. Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 256. Jasper County resorted to a primary to demonstrate Cummins strength.

Standpat faction. Although the Register and Leader reported that Cummins carried Jasper County by carrying Newton, the County Convention resulted in rival delegations for the two gubernatorial candidates after a chaotic evening similar to the events in Wapello County. As a result, the struggle in Jasper remained unsettled until the opening of the State Convention. At that time Perkins won the contested delegations from both Jasper and Wapello Counties, but the victory was a hollow one. As already indicated, the abandonment of the fake contests by the Standpatters resulted in the nomination of Cummins for an unprecedented third term for governor.

With Cummins and Lacey nominated, the factional struggle in the Sixth District assumed new dimensions. Although prior to the State Convention outcome, an Iowa reporter labeled Lacey "as the most bitter anti-Cummins man" among the Congressional delegation who would rather forfeit

---


81 Register and Leader, June 9, 1906. For a vivid account of the tactics used to control caucuses and for a description of the struggle in both Jasper and Poweshiek Counties in 1906, see Thomas Bray's original manuscript, "Iowa's Rebirth of Freedom," pp. 42-51, in State Historical Library, Des Moines, Iowa. Bray wrote his account in 1952; it is possible that his memory after 46 years may be inexact and that his original pro-Cummins position may have led him to excessive defense of the Progressives.

his seat than go to Washington as a Cummins pawn, Lacey's activities in the fall campaign do not bear out the statement. Lacey campaigned actively against his Democratic opponent, Dan Hamilton, and he called on his audiences to support Cummins and the whole Republican ticket.

Before he left Washington, Lacey visited Roosevelt to solicit his assistance and to explain the dangers of the Iowa campaign resulting from "the unexampled bitterness of the factional strife for . . . Governor." At that meeting, the President indicated he would provide Lacey with a letter of commendation for use in his campaign. After Lacey returned to Iowa, he reminded the President about the promised letter. Addressing his request to William Loeb, Roosevelt's secretary, he explained his need for identification with the President. The gubernatorial contest was so severe, Lacey wrote, that threats of scratched tickets were increasing. For the first time in Iowa, removal of the circle from the ballot made straight ticket voting impossible. Because the people believed in Roosevelt and because the Iowans who were fighting the Congressional delegation posed as supporters of the President, there was latent danger to Roosevelt in the Iowa contest. If Cummins succeeded in alienating the people from some Republican
candidates for Congress, Lacey maintained, the President would lack the support of a Republican House for the last half of his term.⁸⁴ Although this reasoning ascribed too great a weight to Iowans in terms of a Republican majority in the House, it strongly underscored Lacey's determination to win re-election as well as the disposition to blame Cummins should he be defeated.

Roosevelt's letter arrived promptly after Lacey's request to Loeb. Worded to appear as a spontaneous gesture, the President made it clear that he was identifying with a group of wild life enthusiasts who wished to honor Lacey. "It has been my privilege," Roosevelt continued, "to be closely associated with you and to watch the many different ways in which, without any hope or expectation of personal reward, you have rendered efficient public service." The letter closed with an expression of "cordial thanks" and an extension of presidential good wishes.⁸⁵


⁸⁵ Letter of Theodore Roosevelt, July 16, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 256. See also Pammel, ed., Lacey Memorial Volume, p. 183, which reprints the letter but makes no mention that Lacey asked for it as campaign material.
Roosevelt's bland statements, used widely in Lacey's campaign, in no way identified the Congressman with the President on the key issues in Iowa politics—tariff revision, railroad regulation, and the drive for a primary law. More of an endorsement of Lacey's character than his political views, this letter of detached praise allowed the President to escape from the political dilemma of openly identifying with either Iowa faction.

Lacey reaped greater political advantage from a letter written by Roosevelt to Indiana Congressman James E. Watson. In commenting about the tariff the President seemed to agree with Iowa Standpatters in declaring that he stood "unequivocally for a protective tariff" and endorsed revision only when it would do more harm than good. The President attributed the "phenomenal prosperity" of the nation to protection, and repeated his belief that the question of tariff was unrelated to the trust problem.86 Such views, of course, expressed well Lacey's position in the Iowa tariff struggle.

86 Letter of President Roosevelt, Aug. 18, 1906, to James E. Watson, Lacey Papers, Vol. 256. Earlier in a letter of J. H. Trewin, Delaware County Standpatter, July 16, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 256, Trewin warned Lacey of the importance of the tariff issue in the Iowa contest. Trewin wrote that he hoped the Iowa enemies of protection would not defeat Lacey for the Iowa political struggle was "brought on solely by the personal ambitions of one man."
Because the Jasper County Convention resulted in the selection of rival delegations to the State Convention, both Standpatters and Progressives filed tickets for the election. Standpat Chairman J. W. Hunter advised Lacey to stay out of the county until just before election day to avoid harm from the factional fight. Later, the campaign became more heated when Hunter's Democratic father-in-law, J. R. Gorrell, charged that Progressive Fred Maytag failed to deliver his promised three hundred votes for the Democratic ticket in return for Democratic support to Maytag. Democrats countered by labeling the whole thing a plot by Blythe to discredit Maytag and hinted that Hunter was a prospect for a federal patronage appointment in Lacey's district. Editorializing on the Jasper County situation, the Register and Leader referred to the patronage post as "bolters bait," labeled Ed Hunter, Blythe's Des Moines agent, as the "baiter," and then asked, "what further evidence does

---

87 Newton Journal, Aug. 29, Sept. 12, 1906. Register and Leader, Sept. 8, 1906, questioned what the trouble was since both tickets named Maytag for state senator and John Offil for state representative and the county offices differed only in two names. The Newton Journal, Sept. 5, 1906, indicated that Democrats were "gleeful," and that C. F. Rinehart had returned to edit the Newton Herald in the hope of pulling a Democratic victory out of the Republican turmoil. Letter of J. W. Hunter, not to be confused with E. H. Hunter of Des Moines, Oct. 7, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 255. See also the Register and Leader, Oct. 9, 1906.

anybody want that the railroads have taken off their coats and are in this fight to defeat Governor Cummins. Thus, the turn of events in Jasper County not only linked Lacey to an anti-Cummins position but also emphasized his relationship with Blythe and the railroads.

Aware that the pre-convention discord in Wapello County as well as the bitterness in Jasper handicapped his campaign, Lacey waged an aggressive fight. He termed the contest of 1906 the preliminary battle for the great senatorial struggle of 1908 and called for a united party stand in support of the whole Republican ticket. In order to map effective campaign strategy and to benefit as much as possible from the support of the press in his district, Lacey chaired a conference which met September 10 in Oskaloosa. Newspaper editors, county chairmen, and members of the Congressional District Committee attended, as well as Progressive state chairman, Frank Woods. Apparently, Lacey

---

89Register and Leader, Nov. 3, 1906. Newton Journal, Oct. 24, 1906. Although the Newton Journal claimed to be for Lacey, it grew more reserved and selective in its comments as Jasper County's campaign fight unfolded.


hoped to bargain for his own support in the Cummins press by demonstrating that his campaign was not meant to exclude the Governor or other Progressive candidates.

The Jasper County fight, however, spilled over into Lacey's press relationships there. The Standpatter was so upset with noncooperation of the Baxter New Era that he complained to Chairman Woods. In his reply, Woods indicated that the situation was partly the fault of the Standpatters in Jasper County. "Perhaps you can do something with these parties to get them to line up for Governor Cummins," he straightforwardly advised Lacey.92

Notwithstanding the opposition of Nate Kendall and the reluctance of Joseph Cannon himself, Lacey persisted in his plans to have the Speaker of the House campaign for him in Wapello County. Both Kendall and Cannon feared that the latter carried an anti-labor reputation because of some differences with Samuel Gompers. Lacey, however, risked any adverse reaction from labor and insisted that the people of Ottumwa wanted to hear the Speaker.93 When Lacey requested Dolliver's assistance, the junior Senator did not refuse but


neither did he respond enthusiastically; he simply asked
Lacey to channel his request through the Speakers Bureau. Agriculture Secretary Wilson returned to Iowa and addressed
the farmers of Lacey's district, while still another Cabinet
member spoke in Oskaloosa. In placing Lacey among the ten
Congressmen with the most influence in Washington, Treasury
Secretary Shaw decried the efforts of Republicans to retire
their own best leaders across the nation while at the same
time claiming to be Roosevelt supporters.

Although Progressives linked Lacey to the railroad
machine, he received no direct help from Blythe. During the
campaign, the Burlington's counsel wrote to Lacey inviting
him to Burlington for a strategy conference because, for
reasons obvious to Standpatters, he could not go to
Oskaloosa. Perhaps for the same obvious reasons, Lacey
believed he could not risk a journey to Burlington; but what-
ever the cause, Lacey replied that he was too busy to deviate
from his schedule. On paper, at least, Lacey cleared him-
self from the charge of taking orders from Blythe.


The question of the federal patronage post in the Sixth District also played an important role in Lacey's campaign for re-election. The Sixth District long had had the privilege of naming the United States Marshal for southern Iowa as its portion of the federal patronage which was divided among Iowa's eleven Congressional Districts. Although the term of the incumbent marshal, George M. Christian from Grinnell, continued until July, 1906, the appointment of his successor was in the forefront of political talk during 1905. Several factors combined to magnify the importance of selecting the next marshal, the most important of which was Christian's long tenure. Since he had received the post in 1898 and had been favored by Lacey for the appointment as early as 1889, many Republicans wanted a change.97 A second factor in the choice of a successor was the demand of Wapello County Republicans that Lacey end what they termed inattention to their interests. Third, the patronage appointment grew still more complex when factional cleavage was injected into the choice of a marshal.

Early in 1905, Christian faced two challengers in Calvin Manning from Ottumwa and C. M. Hinsdale from Newton. Another Wapello County man, I. H. Hammond, sought the deputy marshal post, thus complicating somewhat Manning's plans, since it was doubtful that two appointments would go to the same county. Manning bombarded Lacey with evidence of his support for the position, including letters of recommendation from Ottumwa newspapermen, the endorsement of the local Irish-American Club, lists of reference names, and many of his own letters in which he claimed to be the strongest district candidate save in Jasper and Poweshiek Counties, which he conceded to Hinsdale. With equally impressive recommendations, "Charlie" Hinsdale offered Manning real competition. Such long-standing Standpat friends of Lacey's as Milt Mc Cord, Newton postmaster; Julian Richards, Speaker Henderson's former secretary; and Colonel D. J. Palmer of the State Railroad Commission, all supported Hinsdale.


Furthermore, he received approbation from Fred Maytag, a Cummins supporter.  

Christian had considerable support for reappointment as marshal. The president of the Ottumwa Saturday Herald, a Standpat lawyer-friend of Lacey's from Oskaloosa, and a two-term Standpat mayor of Lacey's home town all favored another term for Christian, as did the Iowa solicitor for the Milwaukee railroad.  

Christian, however, was his own best supporter. He offered to confer in Washington when the Iowa delegation met, reminded Lacey that he would be of more election campaign value than a new marshal, and promised to do his share financially in both the Sixth District and State Central Committee funds.  

---


While I. H. Hammond wished to be deputy marshal, his activities displayed greater political sensitivity than did those of the three contestants for the marshalship. Assuring Lacey that he was "standing pat," Hammond explained that he had confined his political activities to Wapello County because "our troubles will be sufficiently numerous the coming year election year without additions."\(^{103}\)

Although the Register and Leader claimed that Lacey "would practically name the Marshal," no name had been selected by the close of 1905.\(^{104}\) According to one Ottumwa paper, the delay was just another attempt to deprive Wapello County of any patronage. Linking the appointment to Lacey's re-election, the editor asked why Wapello Republicans should vote for an old Oskaloosa gentleman who apparently did not know the city of Ottumwa existed.\(^{105}\) Lest the marshalship seriously encumber the 1906 campaign, both District Chairman Rominger and James T. Powell of the Ottumwa Courier urged Lacey to settle the appointment soon.\(^{106}\)


\(^{104}\)Register and Leader, Dec. 10, 1905. It correctly predicted that M. L. Temple would succeed Lewis Miles of Eighth District as United States District Attorney.

\(^{105}\)Ottumwa Saturday Review, Dec. 23, 1905, in unclassified Lacey Papers. The editor claimed Manning would not get the marshalship because he was "damned by faint praise."

Lacey chose not to act, however, and restiveness among Republicans in the Sixth District continued. Hammond, applicant for the deputy marshalship, made it quite clear to Lacey that since two men could not be chosen from Wapello County, he as County Chairman should be the one selected.\(^{107}\)

In the end, however, it was probably Blythe's disapproval which cost Calvin Manning the appointment to the marshal's position. The Burlington counsel considered Manning a Cummins man who switched allegiance to serve his own political needs; Blythe hinted that Lacey should name a dark horse to avoid incurring repercussion from the supporters of the three strong contenders.\(^{108}\)

Without offering an explanation, Blythe later changed his mind about this appointment. While he still did not want Manning, and condemned Christian for his inability "to deliver anything," he indicated that Hinsdale might be

\(^{107}\)Letters of I. H. Hammond, Jan. 1, 1906, to Lacey; other Hammond letters of Jan. 10, Nov. 29, 1906, in Lacey Papers, Vol. 255. See other 1906 letters endorsing Hammond in Lacey Papers, Vol. 255, including one with signatures of 19 of 28 members of Wapello County Republican Central Committee.

acceptable "now that he has not been drinking lately." Still a few months later, the railroad politician switched back to the idea of a dark horse candidate naming Ottumwan Frank Clark as a possibility. Reminding Lacey that he could not find a candidate neutral in the factional contest, Blythe closed his letter with a bit of advice. "My own notion," he told Lacey, "is that your reputation and life work have been so identified with the protective tariff that the only course open to you is to recognize your identity with the old-line Republicans and to do everything you can to promote and strengthen their cause."

When June arrived and Lacey still had not settled on a candidate for the marshalship, both Blythe and Frank Simmons, an Ottumwa Standpatter, counseled him to delay action until after the elections. In indicating to Lacey that the First District "war" was fierce, and that conditions in other districts were equally precarious for Standpat victory, Blythe implied that he preferred to avoid any

---

109Letter of Blythe, Apr. 14, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 255. See Lacey Papers, Vols. 255 and 256, for other letters relative to Hinsdale's appointment, including four from Hinsdale.

trouble that might throw the Sixth District to the Progressives. 111

While Blythe counseled delay, M. L. Temple, candidate for United States District Attorney from the Eighth District, urged Lacey to have the Iowa Congressional delegation fill all patronage posts before the election and preferably before the State Convention. Temple claimed that Cummins so disliked him personally that the Governor threatened to carry the matter to the President should Temple be nominated for the post. If the Progressives carried the State Convention and Cummins were elected a third time, Temple feared the Governor would be in a strong position to exercise an influence on federal patronage. 112 Temple, however, lost his case; the appointments waited until after the fall elections.


Fearing that another term for First District Congressman, Thomas Hedge, would give Cummins control in the District, Blythe eased him out of re-nomination, asked Allison for an appointive job for him, and steered the party nomination to C. A. Kennedy. See letter of J. W. Blythe, Feb. 23, 1906, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 355, and Sioux City Tribune, June 7, 1906. Progressive strength was great enough to merit formation of Progressive Republican Club in Burlington. See Register and Leader, Apr. 17, 1906.

Although the voters returned Cummins to the state house in 1906, he won by a smaller margin than in 1903. Considering the organized opposition against the Governor, however, his friends considered his victory a great one. Progressives charged the Standpatters with duplicity, of talking harmony to Cummins men and telling fellow Standpatters to vote for Claude Porter, the Democrat. Since a considerable number of Democrats voted for Cummins, and yet his margin of victory declined, the Progressive charge of Standpat defections was difficult to disprove.\(^{113}\)

Although Progressives rejoiced in Cummins' victory, Lacey lost by a substantial margin to Democrat Dan Hamilton. Repudiated by the voters of his own county, a humiliation intensified by the fact that Cummins carried Mahaska, Lacey won in only Monroe and Poweshiek, two out of the seven counties in the district. Moreover, Lacey was the only Republican Congressman to lose in Iowa.\(^{114}\)


\(^{114}\) Letter of Lacey, Nov. 13, 1906, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 253. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 7, 8, 10, 1906. Daily Capital, Nov. 7, 1906. The Iowa Official Register, 1907, listed 18,987 votes for Hamilton to 16,713 for Lacey, making Hamilton's plurality 2,274 and his majority 1,331. See Lacey Papers, Vol. 255, for letters to Lacey with expressions of regret over his loss from Congressmen Cousins, Hubbard, Birdsall, Senator Allison and Mrs. J. P. Dolliver. See also letter of Congressman W. I. Smith, Nov. 8, 1906, to
Numerous causes contributed to Lacey's defeat. These included the long, involved federal patronage struggle, the freedom to vote a split ticket, the factional discord particularly in Jasper and Wapello Counties, Lacey's reluctance to accept revisionist tariff views, and his inflexibility toward Cummins and Progressives. Certainly party factionalism also was an important factor. Generally, each faction blamed the other for Lacey's loss.

Lafe Young declared that it had been apparent for months that Progressives marked Lacey for defeat, and he challenged them to explain how they were supporting the President by sending him a Democrat in Lacey's place. Supporting Young's charge of vote trading against Lacey in Jasper and Wapello Counties, the Keokuk Gate City alleged also that Lacey votes openly traded for support to State Senator Fred Maytag led to the Congressman's defeat in Jasper County. The Gate City declared Lacey the "victim of Governor Cummins' inordinate ambition to become United States Senator."

Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 256, who wrote in a prophetic vein that "never did we need William B. Allison so much, as nothing but his recovery can save us from an immediate conflict more threatening than that through which we have just passed."

Although Cummins carried Mahaska County, he did not carry the Sixth District.

In turn, the Progressives blamed Standpatters for Lacey's defeat. Labeling Lacey and all Standpatters as men "out of touch with the trend of the times," the Progressives cited a nation-wide defeat of conservative Republicans, enumerating Minnesota's McCleary, Indiana's Watson, and Wisconsin's Babcock as examples. Iowa Progressives claimed that Standpat threats against Cummins resulted in retaliation against Lacey. Furthermore, Cummins' followers cited as intolerable Lacey's half-hearted support for the Governor especially when Progressive thought was so strong in the Sixth District.\textsuperscript{116}

\begin{flushleft}
formation of the Republican party there were Democrats in the Jasper County Court House. \textit{Register and Leader}, Nov. 8, 1906, took a neutral stand and expressed regret at Lacey's defeat calling him "one of the most efficient men Iowa has sent to Congress," adding that he had done more "work of more general value" than had had recognition, and that other members of the Congressional delegation could have been spared more readily.

\textit{Register and Leader}, Nov. 12, 1906. Letter of John C. Foster, Nov. 9, 1906, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 90. Letter of news correspondent, W. A. Little, Nov. 21, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 255, adds testimony to Progressive strength in the Sixth District and claims that the District Convention's endorsement of Shaw for 1908 was a major mistake.

The \textit{Hawk-eye}, Nov. 20, 1906, denied any Standpat guilt and claimed Lacey's defeat the result of "a purely personal factional fight against Lacey in behalf of Cummins." James A. Rice, in letter of Nov. 28, 1906, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 358, claimed that Lacey lost votes of Progressives because of alleged opposition to Cummins and of Standpatters because he supported the whole ticket.
\end{flushleft}
Because Lacey for so many years projected an inflexible anti-revisionist position on the tariff, that issue may have constituted an important factor in his defeat. When the Reciprocal Tariff League mailed out a post-election analysis of the defeat of several Standpatters, it attributed Lacey's tariff stand as a cause for his loss. Sharing the League's view, Wallaces' Farmer editorialized that farmers would no longer allow protective tariff to destroy their international markets.117 Rejecting the analysis of the Tariff League, on the other hand, the Burlington Hawk-eye categorically denied that tariff had anything to do with Lacey's defeat, insisting instead that district voters opposed him solely because he was not for Cummins.118

Although admitting that the distribution of Reciprocal Tariff League circulars during the campaign cost him some votes, Lacey would not concede that the tariff issue defeated him. He pointed out that not even the League in its analysis of election returns claimed that he was wholly defeated on the tariff. Corroborating Lacey's assessment of the role of tariff in the campaign, the chairman of the

117Circular of Reciprocal Tariff League and letter of Allison, Nov. 18, 1906, to Lacey, Allison Papers, Vol. 358. Allison asked Lacey to make an analysis of the complex Sixth District situation before the tariff circular received wide publicity claiming Lacey was defeated on the tariff issue chiefly. Wallaces' Farmer, Nov. 16, 1906.

118Hawk-eye, Nov. 20, 1906.
Reciprocal Tariff League acknowledged that widespread distribution of Lacey's Standpat tariff speech in Congress hurt him, but added that "other issues entered into the fight" in the Sixth District. Lacey placed almost as much stress on a last minute circular from Samuel Gompers distributed to the miners on election eve. He had not been aware of its distribution before election day and had no opportunity to make a rebuttal. In analyzing causes for his loss, Lacey rated vote trading highest, and declared that one Democrat at Newton claimed to have traded his vote fifty times for Hamilton. Certainly, it was ironic that Lacey's anti-revisionist views may have helped defeat him at the time that the popular Roosevelt committed the nation to a Standpat tariff position. While his December message to the Congress called for continued railroad reforms, it omitted

119 Letter of Alvin H. Sanders, Chairman American Reciprocal Tariff League, Nov. 8, 1906, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 89. Sanders added that "the one member of Congress that I did go out after personally . . . was McCleary . . ." of Minnesota.

120 Letter of Lacey, Nov. 21, 1906, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 358. There is no copy of the Gompers circular nor any other reference to it in Lacey's correspondence. In Lacey Papers, Vol. 267, see explanatory document, probably in answer to Allison's request for an election analysis, entitled "The Result in the Sixth District and Iowa Compared," which gives the history of close races in Sixth District and points out that Lacey's large majority in 1904, a Presidential election year, was not a fair comparison to 1906. The report also pointed out that Cummins' vote in the District declined by some 6,000 votes from 1903.
reference to the tariff; the omission meant there would be no tariff revision until after the 1908 elections.121

Perhaps the best single, although certainly incomplete, analysis of Lacey's defeat came from the editor of the Brooklyn Chronicle. He distinguished between proximate causes, such as vote trading, and the ultimate cause of Lacey's loss. While he cited factionalism, Hamilton's strength as a candidate, patronage problems in postmasters and other federal offices, and Lacey's long tenure in office, as contributing factors, the editor declared that the real cause of Lacey's defeat was the feeling, even in Standpat circles, that Lacey "was a reactionary and out of all sympathy with reform measures of the present." Describing Lacey's speeches as "old fashioned" ones which conveyed the impression there were things the Congressman feared to discuss, the Chronicle editor concluded that while to some extent Lacey was the victim of political misunderstanding, he was to a larger extent "the victim of his own failure to grasp the meaning of the popular political upheavals of the past few years.122 In short, the editor depicted Lacey as a man out of step with his time. Hard work, tenacity, devotion to duty, loyalty to a cause—all those qualities


122 Reprint of Brooklyn Chronicle in Register and Leader, Dec. 10, 1906.
which helped Lacey climb the political ladder—also contribu-
ted to the rigidity, the inflexibility, the certainty
of being right which stood in Lacey's way and prevented him
from adapting his political views to the needs of the time.

Certainly, defeat was difficult for Lacey, but he
accepted it manfully. When William Reece, clerk of the
Public Lands Committee, drafted a flammable statement about
Cummins as "chief of the wrecking crew," Lacey advised him
not to publish it. Approached to become a part of the
Standpat-Democrat coalition against the re-election of
Dolliver, Lacey refused to cooperate. Although the ex-
chairman of the Democratic Central Committee advised him
that a number of Democrats were willing to elect Lacey to
Dolliver's Senate seat in return for Standpat promises to
elect a Democrat speaker of the Iowa house, Lacey remained
loyal to Dolliver, tempting thought it might have been to
punish the junior Senator for his pro-Cummins sentiment and
particularly for his campaign coolness toward Lacey. "Whilst
I sincerely thank you for your friendly expressions and sug-
gestion, I would not be willing to enter upon the plan
suggested," he replied.

123 Letters of William Reece, Nov. 9, 11, 1906, to
Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 256. Reece's manuscript may be
found in Lacey Papers, Vol. 256.

124 Letter of Lacey, Dec. 28, 1906, to G. A. Huffman,
Lacey Papers, Vol. 255. Although Mrs. Dolliver expressed
regrets at Lacey's defeat, his papers contain no letter from
Senator Dolliver. Dolliver was re-elected on Jan. 22, 1907,
Amidst wild speculation that Lacey would be the recipient of some federal appointive office such as Secretary of the Interior or Commissioner of the General Land Office, the lame duck legislator announced in a press interview his disdain for being thought of as "a political pauper" and indicated he planned to return to private law practice. Lacey claimed that he had no desire to be Land Office Commissioner, but added that he would have enjoyed serving as Interior Secretary. As for his political future, Lacey expressed uncertainty about running for Congress in 1906, but assured his interviewer that he hoped "to take some little part in Iowa politics from this time on." Giving this statement some direction, he admitted that he felt attracted to his friends' suggestion to run for the Senate when Allison retired. With an air of confidence, Lacey

---

went on to declare that Iowa would surely have a primary law when the Senate question arose, but that he "could defeat Cummins in a primary."\textsuperscript{126}

When Lacey returned to his desk, the federal patronage problem, shelved during the latter part of the campaign, assumed new dimensions. Rumors that the marshal patronage would be shifted out of the Sixth District, since it was to be represented by a Democrat, coincided with other rumors that Congressman Albert F. Dawson, whose Second District felt under-represented in patronage distribution, sought to name the new marshal. Playing on Lacey's desires for the Senate, Christian urged his own reappointment as the best man to help Lacey in a state-wide Senate race.\textsuperscript{127}

Christian's concern for his own future was well founded. Not only did Frank Clark promise effective work when Lacey "would be ready to carry out his [Senate] plans," but he informed the Congressman of a scheme to transfer the marshalship to Hepburn's Eighth District as an effective block


\textsuperscript{127}Letter of George Christian, Nov. 22, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 255. Christian had one notion of his ability; Blythe, as seen above, had an opposing view of his ability to deliver help. See also Register and Leader, Dec. 8, 1906.
to M. L. Temple's desire to be named United States District Attorney.128 Apparently, the Progressives planned something of this nature because State Chairman Woods communicated with Iowa's Senators about naming W. W. Epps from Ottumwa as district attorney. Such an eventuality would not only stop Temple, but would ultimately mean the transfer of the marshal patronage to another district. Woods testified to the transfer of power within the Republican party, advising the Senators that "the Republican party in this state is confronted with a new condition which must be met fairly." To do so, Woods continued, required the disposition of federal appointments in such a way "that will best promote party unity now and in the future."129


129 Letter of F. P. Woods, State Chairman Republican Central Committee, Nov. 25, 1906, to J. P. Dolliver, Lacey Papers, Vol. 256. Woods, who was pro-Cummins, indicated he sent a copy of his letter to Senator Allison and one to Lacey. Letter of W. W. Epps, Nov. 29, 1906, to Theodore Roosevelt and to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 255, offered conclusive evidence on plans to exchange the patronage posts of the Sixth and Eighth Districts. In a second letter of Dec. 1, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 255, Epps supported his claim to appointment as compensation for his defeat in the Wapello County Attorney race which Epps attributed to Stand-pat revenge for his support of the whole ticket. A still later letter of Dec. 5, 1906, enclosed letters of endorsement from members of the Third, Fifth, and Seventh District members of the State Central Committee testifying on what Epps's candidacy could do for party harmony.
Responding with concern for immediate action before the State Central Committee made recommendations embarrassing the Congressional delegation, Allison urged Lacey to "use his own judgment over the marshalship." At the same time, however, he added that he had been requested to use his influence for Clark. Although Allison counseled action, Lacey chose to delay a decision until the Senator returned to Washington in 1907. Actually, the decision was not forthcoming until after the expiration of Lacey's term; in a highly unusual move, however, he participated in the party caucus which upheld his choice for the marshalship.132

With the close of the Fifty-ninth Congress, Lacey quietly called at the White House to bid farewell to


131Letter of W. B. Allison, Dec. 13, 1906, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 255. Although Allison expressed regret at the decision to delay, his letter also exuded pleasure at this deference shown him.

While the Sixth District patronage revolved so much around men from Ottumwa and occasioned hundreds of letters in intra-party correspondence, the Ottumwa press paid little attention to the issue. The Ottumwa Courier, Jan. 19, 1906, carried a general article explaining how the Iowa delegation awarded patronage but nothing specific on the nominees for marshal or the 1905 negotiations over the post. The Register and Leader, Dec. 10, 1906, editorialized that the Iowa appointments under consideration paid no heed to the lesson of Lacey's defeat.

132See Chap. XIII of this study.
President Roosevelt. After sixteen years of service to his country, years marked by consistent service to what he considered sound Republicanism, Lacey finally had lost in his repeated battles with the Progressive Republican faction in Iowa politics. Although he had to acknowledge his own defeat in the very election which returned Cummins to an unprecedented third term, Lacey refused to interpret the election results as indicating the direction Iowa politics would take in the future. Since he refused to acknowledge the evident strength of Progressivism and entertained an active role for himself in shaping the future of Republicanism in Iowa, Lacey returned to Oskaloosa in defeat but not in despair.
Lacey did not retire from politics as a consequence of his defeat in 1906. Allison and Blythe still looked to him as party spokesman in the Sixth District; indeed, Blythe urged upon Lacey a larger role in state political leadership. The veteran Republican expressed his desire to work in Iowa politics, but for the most part, he contented himself with the distribution of patronage and rounds of speechmaking. Lacey anticipated seeking a Senate seat when Allison was no longer a candidate, but the senior Senator’s announcement that he would seek another term in 1908 momentarily ruled out these aspirations. He participated in Allison’s primary campaign, supporting the Standpat organization, still refusing to believe that Progressivism was the wave of the future. The old political order in Iowa was making its last stand. Allison was old and ill, and Blythe believed that he could best serve Standpat Republicans by an inactive role which would reduce the Progressive charge of railroad bossism in the Republican party. But Lacey refused to lead, preferring instead to defer to the judgments of Allison and Blythe. The situation was a portent of the future of Iowa politics.
In 1907, the two-year battle over federal patronage in Iowa resumed with greater intensity than ever. Cummins' victory, Progressives believed, entitled them to a share of patronage which would reflect their growing strength. According to the Capital, the patronage question involved more than a contest over factional strength in Iowa; the opposition to the candidates under consideration by Iowa Congressmen was evidence that "the cards were being shuffled" for the "great prize of United States senatorship." While the Register and Leader assailed both men seeking the posts of United States District Attorney for northern and southern Iowa as unwise choices, it particularly opposed M. L. Temple, Eighth District candidate from southern Iowa. Claiming that Temple belonged to the Burlington "Reservation" as much as the engine smokestacks, the Register added that if Blythe were to be district attorney in fact, he should be in name also.

When Lacey's choice of Frank D. Clark for the marshalship position for southern Iowa became public, the factional aspects of the contest exploded. Calvin Manning, an earlier follower of Cummins and the most vocal of the

1 Reprint of Washington Times in Register and Leader, Feb. 8, 1907, which said Progressives threatened to take the issue to the White House.

2 Daily Capital, Jan. 12, 14, 1907.

3 Register and Leader, Jan. 9, 12, 24, 1907.
three major aspirants for the marshalship, vehemently protested. Manning related the appointment to the power struggle in Iowa politics and thereby confirmed Blythe's judgment that he had deserted the Progressives and become a Standpatter only to qualify for the position.\(^4\) Implying that Lacey was unaware of the Progressive strength, Manning angrily warned him that "if you should recommend Clark it will be serving notice that the fight is on . . ." because "the party that is making the laws in Des Moines will not stand being ignored."\(^5\)

The *Register and Leader* regarded the selection of Clark as part of Lacey's political plans and interpreted the choice of an Ottumwa man as a means to secure future political strength for Lacey from Wapello County. However, rumors out of Washington that Lacey hoped to run for the House again did not coincide with the Congressman's own pronouncements that, save for the Senate, he had not determined on his political future.\(^6\)

\(^4\)See Chap. XII of this study.

\(^5\)Letter of Calvin Manning, Feb. 1, 1907, to Lacey: see also letters of other candidates, George Christian, Feb. 15, 1907, to Lacey and C. M. Hinsdale, Feb. 15, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers. Vol. 257. *Register and Leader*, Feb. 5, 1907, printed a rumor that Lacey himself would make a good district attorney along with Lacey's denial that he did not want and would not accept the post if he could have it, because he considered it dishonorable to accept.

\(^6\)Register and Leader, Feb. 15, 1907.
When the Iowa Congressional delegation finally acted on the patronage appointments on March 5, 1907, the day after Congress adjourned, Lacey and the Standpatters emerged victorious over the Cummins faction. Although actually out of office, Lacey not only attended the caucus and voted, but his choice of Clark for the marshalship was upheld. Since J. A. T. Hull could not be present for the meeting, he left his proxy with Lacey, thus doubling his voice in the patronage distribution. Temple received the district attorneyship for southern Iowa in spite of the Register's charge that he was the most anti-Cummins person of the entire slate of federal officers in Iowa.7

Using the patronage episode to tie the Congressional delegation to Blythe, the Register and Leader suggested inspection of the hole through which this "political fox" was supposed to have disappeared from politics. Without Blythe's support, the editor declared, "it is inconceivable . . . that Major Lacey should have been given such unusual recognition, and that at the expense of Mr. [Albert] Dawson who was

7Ibid., Jan. 24, Mar. 4, 5, 7, 8, 1907. Temple himself believed Cummins opposed him. See Chap. XII of this study.

In northern Iowa's patronage, Progressives fared a little better. M. J. Tobin was defeated as candidate for United States District Attorney; however, the Progressive nominee, D. C. Chase, was passed over also. A compromise was reached after 119 ballots in the person of Fred F. Faville of Storm Lake, a Cummins supporter. Tobin received the post of internal revenue collector of northern Iowa. The marshalship
supposed to have the backing of Senator Allison. Since Lacey in defeat proved more powerful than Dawson who was trying to hold a doubtful district for the Republicans, Blythe's influence had to be the determining factor, according to the Register.\(^8\)

The Register and Leader's editorial onslaught echoed Manning's predictions of continued factional war in southern Iowa. Warning all those who thought reaction in Iowa was dead, the paper urged the Progressives to look to 1908, adding that "there is a movement on foot of much wider significance than merely getting a marshalship located."\(^9\)

went to Ed Knott, the incumbent and a Standpatter. See Daily Capital, Jan. 12, Mar. 6, 1907. Register and Leader, Mar. 7, 1907, reported that Haugen and Birdssall opposed Tobin.

\(^8\)Register and Leader, Mar. 8, 1907. Dawson, Allison's former secretary, represented the Second Congressional District.

\(^9\)Register and Leader, Mar. 8, 1907. Allison's letter of Mar. 8, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, suggested that Lacey, to soothe feelings, should accept Dawson's suggestion to allow the Second District Congressman to name the Deputy United States Marshal. Second District, which often went Democratic, was at the same time the only district in southern Iowa without any federal patronage to win and hold votes. Ultimately the deputy post went to Howard Hedrick of the Sixth District. See Iowa Official Register, 1907.

\(^10\)Register and Leader, Mar. 8, 1907. This paper began its own war on Hull, a candidate for re-election in 1908. See the Register and Leader, Mar. 24, 1907, and Hull's letter of Apr. 18, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257.
The analysis of the Register was correct. Standpatters hoped to maintain their organization in the Sixth District, assuming that Democratic victory was a temporary deviation from Republican ascendancy in the district. Although Lacey no longer held any office, Standpat leaders considered him their spokesman in district affairs. Consequently, his advice and support carried considerable weight in the assignment of patronage plums throughout the district.

As in the past, much of this patronage revolved around the appointment of editors of small newspapers to local postmaster positions. One aspirant, who wrote to Lacey "because I understand your recommendation is just the same in the district as when you were in Congress," reminded the former congressman that his appointment would "strengthen the party in its fight for true republicanism." Another contest developed over the Colfax postmastership, reflecting anew the fierce Jasper County struggle of 1906 which contributed to Lacey's defeat. While Lacey received conflicting reports as to the type of Republicanism practiced by W. W. Hawk, who aspired to succeed Standpatter H. W. Robinson as

11Letter of P. T. Grimes of Davis County Republican, Oct. 31, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. See also letter of Frank C. Traverse, Dec. 3, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, in which he asked to be retained as the Bloomfield postmaster. Lacey, however, recommended Grimes. See his letter of Nov. 17, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257.
postmaster of Colfax, he opted for Hawk as a fellow Standpatter and recommended him to both Iowa senators.\(^{12}\)

In addition to Jasper County, Wapello Republicans continued to face a factional power contest over the distribution of patronage. A portion of the struggle concerned the appointment of an Ottumwa postmaster; Lacey conferred with Allison over the complex situation resulting from the need to choose from a number of applicants.\(^ {13}\) Although Fred Wilson, the incumbent, received Standpat support for another term, R. H. Moore of the Ottumwa \textit{Saturday Herald}, and also an aspirant for the appointment, threatened to boycott both Allison and Lacey in future elections should Wilson be


Postmasterships at Cedar Falls and What Cheer, Iowa, are other examples of patronage fights in which Lacey's influence was sought. See letter of George A. Poff, publisher of What Cheer Chronicle, Jan. 29, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 250; letter of A. L. Sebille, ed., Cedar Falls \textit{Gazette}, June 17, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. Sebille felt he was opposed as a candidate by the Progressives for his paper's stand in the 1906 race; Poff was threatened by removal after one term because he was not a Progressive, he claimed.

\(^{13}\)Letters of Lacey to W. B. Allison, Sept. 6, Nov. 5, 1907; letters of W. B. Allison, Sept, Nov. 6, 12, Dec. 26, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. See also \textit{Daily Capital}, Nov. 8, 1907.
While Moore denounced Wilson, he was equally vehement against still another postmaster candidate, Frank Nimocks, calling him a Cummins' man. An Ottumwa attorney, however, endorsed Nimocks as a man who having "experienced a change of heart, a true conversion . . . was [then] supporting the G. O. M." Moreover, both Senator Dolliver and J. W. Blythe supported Nimocks for the appointment. By

14 Letter of R. H. Moore, Dec. 18, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. Moore told Lacey he would "be dead beyond resurrection" in Wapello county. Moore wrote again on Dec. 19, 1907, to apologize for the harsh things said in his earlier letter and to reiterate that he could do more for Allison and Lacey than any other candidate for the postmastership.

15 Letter of R. H. Moore, Dec. 18, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. This is a second letter dated Dec. 18. See also letter of H. C. Nosler, July 1, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 260, who concurred that Nimocks was a Progressive. Letters of J. G. Hutchison, June 10, July 15, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 259, opposed Nimocks and called him a "habitual drunkard." Daily Capital, Nov. 8, 1907, editorialized that Cummins' recent trip to Washington was either to secure a Cabinet post for himself or the Ottumwa postmastership for a friend.

16 G. O. M. referred to Allison, the Grand Old Man, and thus Nimocks was said to be supporting him over Cummins in the Senatorial primary. See letter of William McNett, Feb. 27, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers. Vol. 260.

17 Letter of Blythe to Lacey, Dec. 26, 1907, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, in which Blythe considered Nimocks the "most useful" candidate for the future. Letter of T. R. Bickley, June 24, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, which said that Dolliver supported Nimocks.
the summer of 1908, S. L. Hauck, Burlington railroad medical examiner, also entered the field as a candidate. 18

Despite continuing pressure through the fall of 1908 from Moore and other Standpatters, Lacey declined to recommend any one to the Iowa Congressional delegation. 19 By that time, his energies were fully devoted to winning the second Senate primary. His role in patronage, moreover, declined when the victory of Progressive Nate Kendall over Congressman Dan Hamilton returned the Sixth District to the Republicans, and when Lacey himself lost to Cummins the bitter Senate primary election. 20

A second and more important aspect of the patronage problem in Wapello County centered on the demand for a division of the Federal District Court in Ottumwa. Desire for an


20 Letter of E. H. Thomas, Nov. 7, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261. Thomas complained that having won elective offices with Standpat support, the Progressives wanted the postoffices and other jobs too.
additional court reached back to 1901, but nothing had been done because of the powerful opposition of such men as Blythe and Federal Judge Smith McPherson of Iowa's southern judicial district. Both believed there were already too many divisions of the federal court in terms of efficiency or the business needs of southern Iowa, and that some areas did not provide enough business to meet the expenses of the court. By 1902, however, Lacey yielded to the pleas of Sixth District residents that theirs was the only district in southern Iowa without a place to hold federal court; he introduced a bill to provide for a federal court building in Ottumwa. The availability of a piece of land adjacent to the post office and the concurrent need for expansion of post office facilities resulted in Ottumwans requesting Lacey to work for the acquisition of the land on its own merits, although they ultimately hoped to construct a building to house both a court and a new post office addition.


22 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Jan. 25, 1902. Herald listed Des Moines, Keokuk, Council Bluffs, and Creston as the four places for District Court meetings in southern Iowa. Sixth District people took their federal court cases to Keokuk.

23 Letter of A. W. Buchanan, member of Iowa's Twenty-ninth General Assembly and from Ottumwa, Jan. 8, 1902, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 252. See also the Ottumwa Courier editorial in letter of A. W. Lee, Feb. 15, 1902, to Lacey,
Lacey urged his constituents to solicit the support of attorneys throughout the district, but the plans for expansion of federal patronage in Ottumwa moved slowly. Finally, in 1906, he obtained an appropriation of $35,000 for the enlargement of the post office building, but delay followed when he lost his Congressional race that fall.

Early in 1907, Lacey witnessed the House's passage of his bill naming Ottumwa as a sixth location for the United States District Court in southern Iowa. After leaving office, Lacey remained determined to secure a court. He advised the Ottumwa postmaster that it might be wise to delay using the appropriation for expansion of the post office until such time as one building could be constructed to house both federal services. Wilson, the postmaster, agreed to

Lacey Papers, Vol. 252, which called for the purchase of the land without reference to the federal court project.

24 Oskaaloosa Daily Herald, Jan. 22, 1903. Register and Leader, Jan. 11, 1905. Davenport by 1905 had become the fifth location in southern Iowa to hold federal court sessions.


26 Letter of Frank Simmons, Jan. 19, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, referred to Dolliver's support of the bill in the Senate. Letter of Judge Smith McPherson, Jan. 31, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, again expressed opposition to the need of another court location. His letter contradicted the statement in the Register and Leader, Jan. 11, 1907, which spoke of such heavy business in the Southern Judicial District of Iowa that judges from the Northern District had to be brought in to aid McPherson.
to wait. Working through Senator Allison, Lacey finally achieved success both for his court bill and for an increased amount of money for the Ottumwa building.

While Sixth District patronage problems kept Lacey in the public eye, he also became involved in a round of speeches both within and outside the district. Delivering talks before business men, religious groups, as well as farmers and veterans, Lacey kept his image and name before the voters.

Although he could have gained political exposure by taking an active part in the state's legislative struggle for additional Progressive reforms, he generally did not intervene. Legislation in 1907 produced what William L. Bowers termed "a bumper crop . . . for Iowa Progressivism." Laws

---

27 Letter of Fred Wilson, Apr. 21, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257.

28 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, June 8, Oct. 22, 1907. The court convened Oct. 21, 1907, nearly seven years after Lacey's initial endeavor. One can only speculate on the election returns of 1906 if this long sought political plum had been delivered one year earlier.

29 Lacey's Memorial Day speech at Rock Island, Illinois, 1907; speech before Bankers Convention at Clinton, Iowa, June 18, 1907; speech before Ottumwa Bar Association on "the persistent influence of John Marshall," Oct. 21, 1907, which was included almost verbatim in a 1909 speech on Marshall and R. B. Taney before Mahaska County Bar Association; speech before DAR meeting in Des Moines, Mar. 9, 1908; speech on Alaska before the Church Fellowship Club of Ottumwa, Aug. 5, 1908; speech to veterans at Cedar Rapids, June 9, 1908; speech before Farmers' Institute in Oskaloosa, n.d., 1908, in unclassified Lacey Papers. See also Daily Capital, July 4, 1907.
included both freight and passenger rate regulation for the state's railroads, a more inclusive anti-pass bill which barred all passes except for families of employees, and a state-wide primary law including the choice of United States senators. State Senator W. G. Jones requested Lacey to use his influence against the primary bill, but although he joined Jones in disapproving of the clause making a plurality vote adequate to win nomination, Lacey apparently did nothing openly to oppose the bill.  


A two-cents per mile passenger fare with a minimum fare of ten cents became law; the anti-pass bill denied passes to doctors and attorneys. The I.C.C. agreed to hold hearings in Des Moines on charges of unfair railroad freight rates. See Daily Capital, Dec. 11, 20, 1907, and Jan. 1, 1908.

31 Letter of W. G. Jones, state senator from Fourteenth Senate District which included Mahaska County, Mar. 12, 1907, to J. F. Lacey and W. R. Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. Daily Capital, Mar. 14, 1907, endorsed a primary law if Republicans only were allowed to vote in Republican primaries, and if party registration were not permitted on election day. Letter of Lacey, Oct. 17, 1907, to Blythe, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, in which Lacey referred to the "thirty-five per cent joker" in the primary law and scorned the concept of 35% of the people controlling the other 65% in the name of reform. Lacey did not express himself on the current efforts to reform city government in the establishment of the Des Moines Plan, adopted by plebiscite in June, 1907. See Daily Capital, June 4, 5, 1907, which endorsed the reform and Register and Leader, Feb. 7, Mar. 22, 27, and June 14, 21, 1907, which also endorsed the reform and blamed saloon men and gamblers who feared a business administration of the city for attempting to defeat the law.
The tariff was a more comfortable device for Lacey to use in keeping his name alive. Assuming that Roosevelt's delay of revision identified the Standpatters' position with Roosevelt's, Lacey took obvious delight in embarrassing the "tariff rippers" who "seven years ago were demanding revision to prevent impending disaster," but now had conceded there would be no tariff changes until after the 1908 elections.\(^32\) Lacey maintained his protectionist view in this first year out of office, but he slightly modified his tariff position. While insisting that business, working men, and farmers opposed any change, he admitted that the tariff would undergo some modification with the next administration.\(^33\)

His greatest shift on the tariff concerned the concept of a dual tariff. While some men talked of a maximum-minimum tariff, which provided a high protection level consistent with the reciprocity clause of the Dingley act, Lacey preferred the opposite concept, that of a minimum-maximum charge. A minimum tariff, he argued, should be adequately protective to preserve wages and the American standard of living. This much of his thesis was his old argument that protection

---

\(^32\)Oskaloosa Daily Herald, May 27, 1907.

\(^33\)Register and Leader, May 10, 1907. Robert H. Wiebe, Business Men and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement, p. 90, states that the American Reciprocity Tariff League represented the Midwestern agricultural interests and gave $3,000 for lobbying for tariff revision after the Panic of 1907.
benefited all segments of the American economy. He viewed a maximum tariff as a second safeguard for domestic markets. When a nation raised rates against American goods, the President could retaliate by raising duties within the maximum schedules in order to insure fairness to Americans.\footnote{Lacey's manuscript on "The Dual Tariff," n.d., 1907, in unclassified Lacey Papers. The Dingley bill was framed with high enough rates to provide for reduction in reciprocity treaties. Lacey believed his proposal offered an advantage to those countries which had no reciprocal products with which to negotiate a reduction from the maximum rates.}

Supporting Lacey's creed that farmers benefited from protection, the \textit{Daily Capital} editorialized that it was a poor time to talk "tariff ripping," because protectionism was never before so strong among the farmers of Iowa. No one should gamble with farm prosperity, the editor declared, without first asking farmers their views on protection.\footnote{\textit{Daily Capital}, Sept. 12, 23, 1907.}

Although at first Lacey assumed that the Panic of 1907 would not affect Midwest prosperity, and both leading Des Moines dailies supported the same view, he and the papers later acknowledged that the Eastern panic produced a money shortage in Iowa.\footnote{\textit{Register and Leader}, Mar. 16, 1907, portrayed the concept of an "eastern" panic in a cartoon which showed a farmer plowing contentedly while a Wall Street fight ensued on the road nearby. \textit{Daily Capital}, Mar. 14, 1907. Des Moines banks with money tied up in eastern banks issued, by the fall of 1907, clearing house certificates with the value of money to circulate until the banks' resources in the east were freed. See \textit{Daily Capital}, Oct. 28, 30, 1907, and \textit{Register and Leader}, Sept. 13, 1907.}

When he spoke out, his remarks reflected...
a relatively unsophisticated philosophy of money and banking. With a certain temerity, he told the bankers of seven Iowa counties gathered in Oskaloosa that he opposed their plan for the issuance of asset currency. Terming their desire for a flexible, elastic currency "fascinating but not practicable," Lacey preferred the current system, which, while not elastic, did convey confidence and security. Safety was the foundation of confidence in money and, therefore, more important than elasticity. Unfortunately, Lacey could not envision a plan that encompassed both qualities.37

When L. M. Shaw and George Roberts, two men respected for their knowledge of finance, both called for emergency asset currency, Lacey boldly took issue with them. In an article written for The Midwestern Banker, he declared again that asset currency would undermine confidence in the whole structure of finance, and the panic would grow worse. To allow all national banks to issue emergency money, Lacey wrote, was "to invite reckless inflation."38

37Lacey’s speech at Oskaloosa, May 2, 1907, in unclassified Lacey Papers. Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism, p. 153, states that by 1907 virtually all the nation’s bankers wanted federal monetary reform legislation. See letter from Wells S. Short, president of Orange City, Iowa, state bank, Nov. 2, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, in which Short agreed with Lacey that there was no need for more currency.

38Letter of Clement Chase, ed., The Midwestern Banker, Nov. 11, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. Letter of Lacey, Nov. 13, 1907, to Clement Chase, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. See also Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 12,
The slogan, "let well enough alone," which Lacey used so often in his tariff speeches, also expressed his views on monetary reform during the panic. While the nation's conservatives generally recognized the need for monetary change, Lacey's determination to "stand pat" on the currency question further confirmed his image as a man unable to grow or to adapt to the country's changing needs. Neither did Lacey make any attempt to explain the breakdown in his decades-old thesis that a high protective tariff and prosperity were inseparable.  

Although upon his return to Iowa in the spring of 1907, he indicated that he hoped to "take some little part in Iowa politics," Lacey refused a role of active leadership even when Blythe urged him to assume such a position. Having disregarded the advice of a fellow Standpatter early in 1907 to

1907. Lacey tolerated what he put forth as L. M. Shaw's plan for more currency. While Roberts advocated issuance of asset currency by all national banks, Lacey interpreted Shaw as endorsing the issuance of such money by a few clearing houses only, with the money not circulating generally. Actually Shaw's speech before New Haven, Connecticut's Chamber of Commerce in Nov., 1907, indicated he and Roberts were in basic agreement on national banks issuing bank notes up to 50% of their capital. Shaw served as Treasury Secretary in Roosevelt's Cabinet and George Roberts was Director of the United States Mint.  

In Lacey's letter of Nov. 13, 1907, to Clement Chase, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, he chose to attribute the panic of 1907 solely to a want of confidence in corporate integrity which, in turn, led to a contraction of credit and demands for business liquidation.
announce candidacy for the governorship of Iowa, Lacey received additional support for such an announcement from Blythe. Alerting him to rumors that Beryl F. Carroll from Davis County sought endorsement throughout the Sixth District in order to close out the possibility of Lacey's candidacy, Blythe opened the door to Lacey for state leadership in the Standpat wing of the party. Sauvely appealing to Lacey's ego, Blythe wrote:

You know that for a good many years I have thought that you ought to take the leadership in Iowa politics, especially on the tariff issue, and that to do this you ought to be identified with statewide politics more than you have been. To be a candidate for governor I believe would give a great opportunity to vitalize the tariff issue in the next campaign and find out whether the sentiment of the Republican party is not now the same as it was in 1904, when your activity and courage contributed so much to bringing about satisfactory results.

Blythe requested Lacey's reaction to the gubernatorial suggestion, indicating that his decisions on First District politics depended upon Lacey's judgment in the matter.

When Lacey demurred from fighting for the top state position, Blythe employed powerful weaponry to move him to

---

[^40]: Letter of D. M. Anderson, Jan. 6, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, who asked Lacey to edge out Frank Carroll.

[^41]: Letter of J. W. Blythe, June 14, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257.

[^42]: Ibid.
positive action. Reminding Lacey that the sweep of Progressivism in the Sixth District would make it very difficult for him or any Standpatter to win the Congressional seat, he stated that the governorship would involve "your chances for the succession to ... Allison whenever that shall happen."\(^43\)

This was indeed a heady offer, and Blythe continued to paint a picture of the ease of a gubernatorial race. The tariff, he said, was bound to be an issue; also, state and federal issues could be so bound together that "it will be but one contest."\(^44\)

Whether or not Lacey chose to make the race for the governorship, Blythe urged him to exercise party leadership in Iowa politics. The railroad leader indicated the near impossibility of any prominent role in organization for himself because of Progressive charges about his interference in Republican politics. Consequently, he asked Lacey and other interested Standpatters to meet and "tell the rest of us what you want us to do."\(^45\) Blythe thus reasoned that because he could not lead, and because Allison was not keeping his friends informed, somebody had to assume Standpat leadership.\(^46\)


\(^{44}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{45}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{46}\) *Ibid.*
Lacey reacted in a somewhat different way; he attempted to persuade Allison to announce his plans for re-election so that state politics would have some sense of direction. But Allison was slow to make a public announcement in mid-1907, adding that he thought "it was generally understood" that he would be a candidate in 1908. This hesitancy distressed Blythe even more, and he advised Lacey that the Standpat people "may lose interest" in Allison. Continuing in the same tone, Blythe wrote that the press looked for a cue to follow concerning the Senator's plans, but if "the people who are interested do not think it is time, those of us who are not so much interested can afford to wait." 48

Finally, in late August, Allison announced his candidacy through an interview with the Associated Press. 49

47 Letter of Allison, June 24, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257.

48 Letter of Blythe, June 28, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257.

49 Sage, Allison, p. 314, states that Congressman B. P. Birdsall from Third District urged Allison as early as Apr., 1907, to announce his plans. E. E. Hart, Iowa's National Committeeman, did also. Letter of Allison, Aug. 29, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, in which Allison asked Lacey for advice on organization and suggested the District structure as the wisest plan. Allison announced his plans just a few days before the letter. In a letter of Sept. 5, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, Allison thanked Lacey for his offer of help in the Senate primary.
Significantly, Lacey's thoughts reverted to the gubernatorial race very soon after Allison's decision became known. When he sought the advice of Allison, however, Lacey received no encouragement to pursue any office. As for the governorship, Allison pleaded that he was in no position to advise him about it. The Senator agreed, however, with Blythe's judgment that Lacey had very little chance of returning to Congress from the Sixth District.50

Prior to this, the possibility of Lacey heading the state ticket had remained a private question among Standpat leaders. In September, however, the Register and Leader gave wide publicity to such an idea when it reprinted an article from the Nevada Representative which called Lacey "the fittest candidate" for the governorship that Republicans could nominate.51 Immediately, Nate Kendall offered "earnest and enthusiastic support" to Lacey, an offer no doubt made easier because Kendall hoped to have Lacey's support in his own bid to win the Sixth District Congressional nomination as a Progressive Republican.52


51Reprint of Nevada Representative (Nevada, Iowa), in Register and Leader, Sept. 16, 1907.

52Letter of N. E. Kendall, Sept. 17, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. See also letter of I. H. Hammond, July 22, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, in which Hammond told Lacey that Fred Maytag would not oppose Kendall for Congress because the Progressives had decided "not to handicap Nathan."
No Lacey bandwagon developed, however, and some ten
days later in a press interview with the Washington Post,
Lacey failed to mention anything about the governor's race.
He again underscored his real political ambition to run for
the Senate. Reiterating that he would not be a senatorial
candidate while Allison was one, he added with a note to the
future that he "wouldn't mind having a round or two with
Governor Cummins." In a press interview in the spring of
1907, Lacey had left his political future in the House unde-
termined, but this time he ruled out another attempt to win
back his seat. Thus, he made it clear that except for a
possible Senate race, he had no further political ambitions.

Although talk of Lacey-for-governor dropped out of
the news, Lacey's activities in Iowa politics increased.
Allison communicated with him about his own campaign, admit-
ting that he did not feel well enough to commence a state-
wide canvas. Since the Senator projected a District
organization with local work carried out on a county basis
as one method of reducing his own efforts, he seemed to be

53Register and Leader, Sept. 26, 1907. Oskaloosa
Daily Herald, Sept. 26, 1907. The September interview on the
senatorship squared with Lacey's earlier rejection of an en-
dorsement for that post by the League of American Sportsmen.
See letter of G. O. Shields, May 10, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey
Papers, Vol. 257.

In September's interview Lacey voiced his opinion on
the 1908 Presidential race; indicating his own preference for
Joseph Cannon, he spoke of Shaw's strength in Iowa, and also
Taft's because of his favor with Roosevelt. A month later,
while he still favored Cannon, Lacey expressed his view that
Iowans preferred either Taft or New York's Governor Hughes.
See the Register and Leader, Oct. 25, 1907.
soliciting Lacey's aid in the impending Allison-Cummins struggle.\textsuperscript{54}

Once Lacey had decided against the race for Governor, he turned his attention to the problem of Standpat organization in that contest. He now attempted to carry out Blythe's admonition to get together with other Standpatters and "tell the rest of us what you want us to do." Conferring with Hepburn over the best plan to follow, the two agreed to unify Standpat support behind one candidate. There was no agreement, however, on how to settle on the right man. Hepburn asked Lacey to arrange a quiet Standpat conference to discuss unity, but Lacey was reluctant to initiate such a call. He suggested instead a Dubuque meeting of Allison's "friends" in order to lessen the Progressives' cry that Standpatters were "pounding Cummins."\textsuperscript{55}

Following his custom, Lacey looked to Burlington for advice. He asked Blythe for his views on who should call the conference and the date and place for holding it.\textsuperscript{56} Before

\textsuperscript{54}Letter of W. B. Allison, Oct. 19, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257.

\textsuperscript{55}Letter of Lacey, Oct. 17, 1907, to Blythe, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. On the back of the letter is written a variety of names and a few dates which no doubt represent some of the fruits of the Lacey-Hepburn discussion as to the "who, where, and when" of a meeting.

\textsuperscript{56}Letter of Lacey, Oct. 17, 1907, to Blythe, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257.
the railroad attorney could answer, however, Lacey attended another conference with Hepburn and also Colonel D. J. Palmer. It is possible that these men offered new insights into the wisdom of a Dubuque meeting. At any rate, Lacey developed such doubts over the idea that he hurriedly sent off a second letter to Blythe. Abandoning the idea of a small, secret conference, Lacey suggested that "there is always merit in a proposition involving openness and boldness," and proposed a meeting, in Des Moines, of some 500 to 600 loyal Republicans from across the state. Lacey expressed hope that such a conference might attract young men to the "real Republicans" and stop the bandwagon attraction of young people to the Progressive camp. Leaving the decision on size of conference to Blythe, he passed along Hepburn's suggestion that should a small group meeting be decided upon, it would be best to hold it before the Iowa Congressmen returned to Washington for the December opening of Congress.57

Blythe flatly opposed a secret conference and replied to Lacey before receiving the second letter. He said that the Standpatters' selection of a compromise gubernatorial candidate in 1906 had been a cause for their defeat, and called for an open conference and an open fight. All "protestionists of the old school . . . opposed to reciprocity as a panacea

---

for trade evils" should be invited, he stated. Although such a meeting would declare its support for Allison, the primary interest of the assembly would be the tariff. As in 1906, Blythe preferred to make the tariff question, rather than railroad legislation, the issue of the campaign. He warned against establishing an organization around Senator Allison. "That becomes too personal, and besides that it is too precarious in view of all the circumstances," he wrote. As a prelude to the large meeting, Blythe suggested a small planning conference, because he believed that with astute organization the Republicans would sweep the state as they had in 1904. The large conference should be chaired, he said, by "an old-line Republican," but "no one associated with the railroads." It would be appropriate for Lacey, Hepburn, George D. Perkins, or a number of other Standpat editors such as Lafe Young or J. L. Waite of the Burlington Hawk-eye to call the meeting.  

8Letter of Blythe, Oct. 19, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. Blythe's letter hinted that the time was at hand for some type of tariff revision; the meeting he said would "be in the interest not of the tariff as it is without any change in . . . schedules, but . . . as it is with such revision . . . as experience has shown to be needed and as could be made without a preponderance of loss."

9Letter of Blythe, Oct. 19, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. Letter of Blythe, Oct. 21, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers Vol. 257, which was in answer to Lacey's second letter stated that he was in full agreement with "what you say now."
Other Iowa Standpatters agreed with Blythe. Hepburn suggested that the preliminary conference be held in Chicago and urged speedy action. Such action was necessary to counteract the efficient organization of the other camp "all done on the state's pay-roll."60 Allison joined those who approved of openness, because, as he said, "with the vigilance of the opposition a meeting at any point would be fully known as well as its proceedings."61 Agreeing with Hepburn on a small Chicago meeting, he further suggested Des Moines as the site for the large conference. Without mentioning his health, Allison indirectly alluded to it when he indicated his dependence on his friends for managing such meetings.

Despite Hepburn's call for speed, Standpat plans moved forward slowly. Since no meeting had been called during the month after Blythe had suggested everything from issues to organizers of such a meeting, the railroad leader spoke out again for "bold and aggressive movement." Blythe felt particularly frustrated. He could not lead, Allison

60 Letter of W. P. Hepburn, Oct. 21, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. Letters of J. W. Blythe Oct. 30, Nov. 1, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, in which he said J. H. Trewin approved of a meeting but that M. L. Temple and Frank Simmons did not. See also letter of J. E. Blythe, Nov. 6, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257, in which he also expressed approval of conference.

61 Letter of W. B. Allison, Nov. 12, 1907 to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257.
was too ill to help, and no one else seemed willing to assert bold leadership.62

Eventually, the first step in an open fight against Cummins came from Senator Dolliver, whom Lacey apparently had not consulted about the 1908 campaign. Delivering a strongly pro-Allison speech at Council Bluffs, Dolliver charged that Cummins broke his word given in 1906 that he would not oppose Allison for the Senate.63 The junior Senator followed his address with a letter to Lacey in which he requested advice on a campaign manager, adding that "it is now necessary for somebody to take charge of Senator Allison's interests in Iowa and open a headquarters where the troops can report for duty."64

62Letter of J. W. Blythe, Nov. 17, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. He testified to his withdrawal from leadership when he told Lacey that he could not enlighten him on a forthcoming Council Bluffs meeting for Allison because he had "heard nothing of it."

63Ross, Dolliver, pp. 225-230, treats of Cummins' promise to Dolliver in 1906 campaign that the Governor would not oppose Allison's renomination. By May, 1907, Cummins was in the Senate race and projecting the idea that Allison was being used to defeat him. Dolliver denied this charge of Cummins', and in Council Bluffs, accused the Governor of breaking his word. This speech of Dolliver's led to the injection of the so-called Torbert letter into the 1908 campaign. See below for more on this issue.

The open fight in the Iowa gubernatorial contest could not begin until Standpatters agreed on a candidate. Although Lacey put forward Gilbert Haugen, Fourth District Congressman, Blythe disapproved of him. "The situation in Iowa is not at all as it is in Minnesota with respect to the strength of the Scandinavian vote," Blythe declared, implying that Haugen's popularity among Fourth District Scandinavians would not hold up across the state. 65 Another Lacey favorite, D. J. Palmer, disqualified himself because he believed his membership on the State Railroad Commission would label him a Blythe agent and give Cummins an issue. Unwilling to accept Palmer's judgment, Lacey wrote to Blythe for additional endorsement of Palmer's candidacy only to find Blythe did not want Palmer either. 66

Toward the end of 1907, there again was talk about the possibility of Lacey as a gubernatorial candidate. Palmer urged him to run because he possessed so many assets needed for the time. "You can get the soldiers' vote . . . and I think you can again bring the Sixth District back home . . . You will get all the support from the railroads that I could and maybe more," Palmer declared. Referring to Lacey's years


of experience in speech-making, the railroad commissioner told him that concerning the issue of Progressivism "you can meet Garst . . . on the stump much better than I." 67 These were sound reasons to choose Lacey, and others besides Palmer endorsed them. 68 Lacey, however, chose not to be a gubernatorial candidate. Although the reasons were known only to himself, Lacey probably was aware of Allison's frail health, and wished to be available for a possible Senate opening.

Early in 1908, Standpatters had not yet agreed upon a man for the gubernatorial nomination, and it appeared the selection would go by default to B. F. Carroll. Warren Garst was being promised Progressive support in the primary. Without offering any explanation for his statement, Blythe remarked that of the two candidates he preferred Garst, "though of course I shall go with our friends." 69

67 Letter of D. J. Palmer, Dec. 21, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. Lieutenant Governor Warren Garst was expected to be the Progressive candidate for nomination for Governor.

68 See letter of Charles J. Wilson, Washington, Iowa, attorney, Dec. 31, 1907, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 257. See also the Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Dec. 28, 1907, which reported on the "Lacey for Governor" toast at the Mahaska County Bar Association meeting. See also letter of J. W. Blythe, Jan. 7, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258.

Election year began with several ominous signs for the conservative Republicans of Iowa. In a Presidential address to the Congress in January, Roosevelt excoriated railroads and corporate wealth.\textsuperscript{70} Within the following week, Standpatters Robert Cousins of the Fifth District and B. F. Birdsall of the Third announced they would not seek re-election to Congress.\textsuperscript{71} While praising their decision, the \textit{Register and Leader} declared its opposition to Hepburn's renomination from the Eighth District and indicated that in light of Roosevelt's address, Iowans should have no doubts on selection of a senator, a governor, and national convention delegates.\textsuperscript{72} Very shortly a fissure appeared in the solidarity of Allison's support among the Congressional delegation; Congressman E. H. Hubbard from the Eleventh District in northwest Iowa announced that he would support Cummins in the Senate primary.\textsuperscript{73}

Hubbard's endorsement came at a time when the Governor was fighting for his right to be a senatorial candidate, a result of the widely discussed Governor's letter to

\textsuperscript{70}\textit{Register and Leader}, Feb. 1, 1908.


\textsuperscript{72}\textit{Register and Leader}, Feb. 2, 7, 8, 1908.

\textsuperscript{73}\textit{Ibid.}, Feb. 12, 1908.
W. H. Torbert in 1906 and of Senator Dolliver's Council Bluffs speech late in 1907. Generally, Dolliver, Torbert, and Standpatters took the view that in order to win votes for a third term as governor in 1906, Cummins had promised not to oppose Allison for the Senate. Cummins, unable to deny his earlier statement to Torbert, claimed that it would be absurd to hold him bound for the rest of Allison's life. Taking the offensive, he implied that Allison's candidacy was not freely made, that he sought the office again as an unknowing tool in the Standpatter's plan to defeat Cummins. He never expected to oppose Allison, Cummins stated, because he always supposed the Senator would carry out his own promise to get out of the race before he was physically impaired. Allison's managers believed that Cummins' shift

_74_ Ostensibly to win support for a third term as Governor in April, 1906, Cummins wrote to his friend W. H. Torbert of Dubuque, that he did not intend to oppose Allison for the Senate. By 1907, however, Cummins had announced his candidacy for the Senate and the Torbert letter was used as evidence in the charge that the Governor had broken his word. See Chap. XII of this study and Ross, Dolliver, pp. 221, 225.

_75_Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Dec. 14, 16, 1907. Register and Leader, Dec. 16, 1907. Daily Capital, Dec. 14, 18, 19, 1907. B. F. Birdsall lent further support to the Capital's interpretation. Reportedly, he sent a signed statement to Allison's managers that Cummins personally told him in 1906 that he would not oppose Allison for re-election, and that it was that promise that enabled Birdsall to vote for Cummins at the 1906 State Convention. See the Daily Capital, Feb. 14, 1908. See also letter of Peter Kiene, Feb. 12, 1908, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 372, in which Kiene spoke of Birdsall's statement.
was an important issue in winning votes, and they printed a portion of the "Torbert letter" on the back of the Senator's campaign stationery.76

The Allison camp luckily escaped the revelation of their own campaign liabilities. Fred Kretschmer, the controversial candidate for state treasurer who, in return for promised compensation, had withdrawn to cooperate with Standpatters in reducing Cummins' strength in 1906, believed himself betrayed. Consequently, he threatened to publicize all communications concerning the episode so that Iowans would know Allison's role in it. Peter Kiene, one of the Senator's Dubuque friends, persuaded Kretschmer to remain quiet, but the possibility of divulgence led Allison, in a carefully worded letter to Kiene, to deny responsibility for, while not denying knowledge of, the Kretschmer affair.77

Although Lacey did not accept a leadership position in state politics, he chaired the Committee on Resolutions at the State Convention. Moreover, he assumed an unofficial

76 See Lacey Papers, Vol. 260, for copies of the campaign stationery. The Standpat version of the Torbert letter is reflected in Cyrenus Cole, Iowa through the Years (Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1940), p. 436.

77 Letter of Peter Kiene, Jan. 22, 1908, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 372. Allison, in a letter of Feb. 2, 1908, to Kiene, Allison Papers, Vol. 372, denied Kretschmer's statement that he had called on Allison in Dubuque and that the Senator had admitted to full knowledge of the affair through Major Lacey and Secretary Shaw.
role, particularly in Sixth District affairs, for Allison. Subsequent to his correspondence with Blythe and Hepburn in the fall of 1907 concerning a state conference of Allison Republicans, Lacey and some one hundred others met in Des Moines in mid-February to launch the campaign. There, Lacey introduced a resolution of endorsement of Allison and eulogized him as a man whom the nation loved and reverenced to a degree "unequalled by any other."78

At Allison's request, Lacey tried to keep him informed of progress in the district campaign. One letter in particular accused the Governor of using hypocritical tactics. While Cummins adopted an anti-railroad position, he used canvassers connected with the legal department of the Iowa Central Railroad, Lacey charged. In addition, Cummins hired Standpatters to circulate materials for him. Furthermore, Lacey wrote Allison, the Governor was attempting to win both sides of the prohibition vote working the "side doors" of the saloons himself while sending his attorney general to work the Anti-saloon League by speaking before Ministerial Associations.79

78 Register and Leader, Feb. 14, 1908. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Feb. 14, 1908, doubled the number in attendance to 200 and said Frank Jackson and George E. Perkins also spoke. Although some opposed, this group also passed a resolution of endorsement for Taft for President. See above in this Chap. for reference to earlier 1907 meetings on Allison's candidacy.

79 Letter of J. F. Lacey, Feb. 23, 1908, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 372. W. H. Byers was the state attorney general.
Although the senatorial nominee would be selected by the primary election, Standpatters and Progressives hoped to use the Senate contest as a rallying force in winning a majority of delegates to the State Convention. Such control would give the winner influence over the platform and serve as a public witness to the relative strength of the two Republican factions in the state. Consequently, both Standpatters and Progressives worked to elect convention delegates pledged to vote for their senatorial candidate. Since both Iowa factions supported Taft for the presidential nomination, the delegate struggle concerned only state politics.

When Nate Kendall planned to divide Monroe County delegates between Allison and Cummins, Lacey reported to Allison that he persuaded Kendall to abandon such a scheme. Kendall, who was Sixth District candidate for Congress, undoubtedly wished to reap personal benefit from supporting both senatorial candidates. In all probability, Lacey took too much credit in dissuading Kendall; J. C. Mabry, Albia attorney, had already warned Kendall that such a plan would cost him votes. Moreover, rumors of a Standpat boycott both in the primary and in November, should Kendall insist on delegate division, undoubtedly helped bring the congressional candidate into line.  

As the county conventions convened throughout the Sixth District, Lacey predicted jubilantly to the Senator that all seven counties would support him. Standpatters ruled in Jasper County, a victory which was sweet revenge for 1906. Having quashed Kendall's compromise plan, Allison carried Monroe County with slightly more than a two to one margin. Likewise, Keokuk County went to Allison by the same margin. In the Mahaska convention, Lacey personally read the resolution of Allison's endorsement which, he said, passed with but four or five dissenting votes. Lacey reported Poweshiek as the one doubtful county, and as events unfolded, it gave Allison half the delegation.  

Letters of Lacey, Mar. 1, two on Mar. 3, Mar. 7, 1908, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 372. Register and Leader, Mar. 11, 1908. A letter of Grinnell attorney, Will C. Rayburn, Mar. 7, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261, explained that Poweshiek County's vote for the District Convention went seven to six in favor of Cummins due to the political naivete of Professor Macy of Grinnell College. Macy, selected as a candidate for National Convention delegate, was empowered to name his own delegation to the District Convention, and he unwittingly named a majority of Cummins delegates. See the letter of W. G. Ray, Apr. 11, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261.

The Sixth District's record of victory was accentuated when compared with Des Moines County in the First District. There Blythe lost control of five of seven city wards in Burlington to W. W. Copeland, leader of the Progressives. Blythe's first slip from control was underscored when his borther-in-law, Horace S. Rand, was defeated as delegate to the District Convention by his own ward, the third ward in Burlington. Finally, two County Conventions were held in Burlington, one by each faction. See the Register and Leader, Mar. 6, 7, 8, 1908.
Lacey did not bother to inform Allison of the battle to win the Negro vote in Mahaska in order to carry the county. Alerted some weeks before the County Convention that a majority of the blacks in the mining towns were for Cummins and that Allison needed their votes, Standpat leaders promised the blacks an alternate delegate to the National Convention as a reward for delivering the vote to Allison. Lest the bargain be overlooked in the flush of victory, Standpatters requested Lacey's influence with his "friends" to see that the promise would be carried out. 82

As the primary date neared, the Iowa State Bystander, a Negro newspaper of Des Moines, editorially endorsed Cummins over Allison, as a younger, better educated, reform-minded man. The paper embraced the entire Progressive state ticket and specifically in Lacey's district Nate Kendall for Congress over Ellsworth Rominger. The Bystander quoted an Oskaloosa Negro attorney and strong Cummins supporter, George H. Woodson, as saying that the Progressives would sweep the state in the primary. Simultaneously, the Ottumwa Courier printed an article on Allison's endorsement.

82Letter of A. H. Anderson of Albia Union, Feb. 25, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258. Letter of J. C. Mabry, Mar. 8, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 260. A black, J. R. Spears, was ultimately named alternate delegate. Later, as the primary date approached, Standpat candidate for the gubernatorial nomination, B. F. Carroll, in a letter May 30, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258, asked Lacey to go to Buxton and hold the "colored boys in line," explaining that Garst had gone there to campaign for himself and for Cummins.
by the Negro president of Howard University calling Allison a "champion" of the Negroes and the last "surviving member of Abraham Lincoln's Congress."\(^{83}\)

When the State Convention assembled in Des Moines on March 18, 1908, a majority of delegates were Allison supporters, but Cummins' showing was at least respectable. Delegates from forty-nine counties represented Allison's strength, and those from thirty-seven counties supported Cummins. The two candidates shared support of the delegates from the remaining thirteen counties. While Allison's strength lay in the southern, eastern, and western part of the state, with the exception of the extreme northwest, the Governor's support centered in the northern and central counties of Iowa.\(^{84}\) A little later, the Senate primary would reflect a similar pattern of vote distribution.

As chairman of the State Convention's Resolutions Committee, Lacey worked to further the goals of the Standpat faction. Although the primary election had not yet been held, one resolution called for the re-election of Allison. Later Lacey reported to the Senator that he felt joyous upon reading the endorsement to the Convention, but he said nothing about the reaction of Cummins delegates.\(^{85}\)

\(^{83}\)Iowa State Bystander (Des Moines, Iowa), May 29, 1908; Ottumwa Courier, May 29, 1908.

\(^{84}\)Daily Capital, Mar. 19, 1908.

As usual in Republican state conventions in Iowa the tariff provoked much argument. In this particular convention the struggle was almost as pronounced between Allison's supporters as it was between factions. The disagreement, moreover, illustrated quite well the resistance of J. T. Adams, Allison's official campaign manager, to the Standpatters' efforts to identify Allison as part of their factional war against Cummins. Adams preferred to portray Allison in his usual stance of being above either faction.

It was Adams' plan to adopt a tariff plank acceptable to the Progressives in order to win Progressive votes for Allison that might otherwise go to the Governor. "Of course, we had a regular knock down and drag-out fight with the 'Standpatters' for thirty-six hours before we could line them up on the tariff question," Adams wrote Allison, "but we finally succeeded and there is no issue left for the Governor except his personal ambition to succeed you in the United States Senate." Without adverting to the fight, Lacey reported to the Senator in similar language, noting that nothing was left as an issue save Allison's personality as compared to Cummins'. The convention thus overrode

---


87 Letter of Lacey, Mar. 19, 1908, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 372. Allison wrote his personal thanks to Lacey for his work in the Sixth District and at the Des Moines
Blythe's earlier warning to Lacey that the tariff should be the issue, because to build a campaign around the person of Allison was too precarious.88

Insisting that the tariff plank reinforced Taft's sweep of Iowa delegates to the National Convention, and that it endorsed the tariff clause adopted by Republicans in Taft's home state of Ohio, the Burlington Hawk-eye praised the Iowa platform as thoroughly Standpat in its wording. However, not even Lacey as Resolutions chairman claimed a platform victory for his factions's traditional views.89

The Iowa plank endorsed protection and acknowledged, as did the Ohio one, that duties were to be adopted that would "equal the difference between the cost of production at home and abroad, together with a reasonable profit, to the end that without excessive duties American manufacturers, farmers, producers, and wage earners may have adequate protection."90

State Convention. See letters of Allison, Mar. 9, 23, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258. Daily Capital, Mar. 19, 1908, praised Lacey for his work as Resolutions chairman and floor leader representing the majority at the State Convention.

88Blythe's fears were realized, of course, when Allison died soon after the primary.


90Register and Leader, Mar. 19, 1908.
Nevertheless, the platform called for revision with a special session of the Congress requested by the new President.

Seizing the initiative, the Register and Leader claimed the platform was really a triumph for Cummins, and heaped scorn on Lacey to accentuate its point. Not only was Taft the most consistent revisionist of Roosevelt's administration, wrote the Register's editor, but the Ohio tariff platform was even more radical than the Iowa Idea. While it was conceivable to the Register's editor that George D. Perkins and Lafe Young might relinquish their tariff position, he added that "we thought the hills would sooner fly from their firm base than Major Lacey read that Ohio plank for endorsement." Although Standpatters controlled the State Convention, Progressives really won the battle. "Victories are won in all sorts of ways," and, the editor continued, "the triumph of the Iowa Idea is a unique triumph. Major Lacey, sponsor for the Iowa Idea! Major Lacey, progressive! Major Lacey, tariff reformer!"

Lacey's about-face on the tariff did not go unnoticed in the East. Editorializing that the tariff plank took the Iowa Standpatters in a body over to the views of

91 Ibid., Mar. 20, 1908.

92 Ibid., Mar. 23, 1908. Register and Leader, Apr. 6, 1908, credits Lafe Young of the Capital with winning Lacey and the Standpatters to Taft and the Ohio tariff plank.
their adversaries, the New York *Globe* wrote that "not the least amusing feature of the situation was the fact that . . . [the one] who read the revision plank was former Congressman Lacey," whose habit of longstanding was to begin his speeches with the statement, "I am a Standpatter from Standpatville." The *Globe* concluded that Standpat surrender on the tariff was a confession that anti-revisionism was no longer politically safe in Iowa.93

Whether or not the *Register and Leader* was immediately aware of leadership differences within Allison's camp, that paper continued to denounce Lacey. Underscoring Adams' desire not to have Allison identified as a Standpat candidate, the editor implied that Lacey was a millstone around the Senator's neck. Allison had nothing to gain from Standpattism, and Lacey's attempt to use the Senator was "embarrassing" to Allison, for what Lacey wanted was a Standpat victory that would remove the bad taste of the Ohio tariff plank from his mouth. Lacey had always had a narrow idea of the Republican party, declared the *Register*, and it compared his views of Republicanism to a sectarian's view of heaven—room for

---

93 Reprint of *Globe* (New York, New York) in *Register and Leader*, Mar. 23, 1908. The *American Economist*, organ of the American Protective Tariff League, offered a different explanation, and claimed, without supporting evidence, that a majority of the Republicans were maneuvered into a corner and made to take tariff revision and Taft as "the only way to prevent Cummins from going to the United States Senate in Allison's place." See reprint of the *American Economist* in *Register and Leader*, Mar. 30, 31, 1908.
only those of his creed. Furthermore, the Register warned, Lacey's loss in 1906 and his defeat on the tariff plank at the recent State Convention placed him on the "rebound" and stricter in the faith than ever.\textsuperscript{94}

Later, the Register and Leader and the Marshalltown Times-Republican printed rumors that Standpatters considered Adams a Progressive and were attempting to fire him as Allison's manager. The Times-Republican claimed that Adams supposedly refused to allow Lacey to speak for Allison and failed to invite him to a campaign strategy conference.\textsuperscript{95}

These rumors were exaggerated; there was a time, however, when Adams was not eager to have staunch Standpatters on the speaker's trail for the Senator.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{94}Register and Leader, Apr. 22, 1908.

\textsuperscript{95}Ibid., Apr. 23, 27, 1908. Times-Republican Apr. 23, 1908, clipping in unclassified Lacey Papers.

Adams called a Des Moines conference to plan strategy against Cummins at which Lacey, Lafe Young, and former governor Frank D. Jackson were present. Progressives believed it to be a meeting to determine a speaking campaign by Dolliver and Lacey in Allison's behalf. See Ross, Dolliver, p. 229, who states that Allison needed the help of Dolliver to win for the "battered Blythe forces" of Hepburn, Lacey, and Adams were not adequate. Thus Ross ignored Adams' whole strategy to keep Allison from identification with Standpatters.

\textsuperscript{96}See the Register and Leader, Apr. 19, 1908, and Daily News, Apr. 18, 1908, both of which spoke of Lacey at the conference and also as a speaker selected for the Allison campaign along with Dolliver, James G. Berryhill and others. See also letters of J. T. Adams, Apr. 30, May 1, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258, wherein Adams wrote of Lacey's speaking engagements for Allison in
Although Adams wrote to Lacey that he hoped "he was enjoying the free publicity in the Register and Leader" which claimed the two were having a "knock-down and drag-out fight" on campaign questions, the question was not solely one of adverse publicity. A month earlier, in reporting to Allison on preconvention work in the Sixth District, Adams advised the Senator that District Chairman O. L. Campbell, assisted by Frank Nimocks and supervised by F. M. Simmons, who was "one of the best organizers in the state," was lining up the district solidly for Allison. Lacey's name or work was not even mentioned. Allison, however, had earlier requested and received a survey of district results from Lacey; thus, he advised Adams to express appreciation to Lacey for his work and reimburse him for personal expenditures.

The Sixth and Eleventh Districts. See also letter of D. C. Shull, Eleventh District Allison chairman, May 4, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261, in which Shull invited Lacey to speak. See also letter of Lacey, May 13, 1908, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 372. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, May 13, 1908, reported on a speech by Lacey at Stuart, Iowa, for Allison.


Now that the dissension in the Allison camp became public through the Register's editorials, Adams attempted to minimize the trouble. He told both Allison and Lacey that there was no problem except in the minds of Charles Hellen and Julian Richards and "that class of politicians, who have not been taken care of in the usual way and who think we should adopt their policy of campaign, which would bring about . . . defeat at the Primary." Later, he advised the Senator of the glowing progress reports about the campaign which he received from Blythe, Lacey, and Frank Simmons. The Register and Leader conceded that Adams and the Standpatters had patched up a truce, but added that the "entente cordiale" was tenuous.


101 Letter of J. T. Adams, Apr. 29, 1908, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 368. Daily News, Apr. 18, 1908, in a news article, reported on Progressive strength in southern Iowa to the extent that Progressive newspapers were being founded because space could not even be bought in local papers to present facts to the people.

102 Register and Leader, May 2, 5, 1908, reported a mix-up in dispatches sent out by Julian Richards, the Chicago Tribune representative in Des Moines. Items intended for Standpat editors were inadvertently mailed to the Progressive papers of Iowa.
Unity prevailed over dissension in Allison's camp, however, and fortunately so, because Cummins' supporters waged a vigorous battle. Choosing Burlington as the site for a blistering attack on the railroad domination of Iowa politics, Smith W. Brookhart, a Progressive later to be a senator from Iowa, linked Allison to Blythe's machine by charging that Allison gave information received from Roosevelt to Blythe. In turn, Brookhart declared, the railroad leader used the data to organize Iowa politics against the President's policies. Another Progressive assailed Allison's role in the Credit Mobilier scandal, and although generally the Senator escaped guilt in the affair, his biographer, Sage, indicated he "got off more lightly than he deserved." When GAR commanders across the state received Allison circulars, Progressives charged the Senator's

---


104 Sage, Allison, pp. 125-126, states that Allison's long association with Grenville Dodge made him no innocent in this area. William M. Reece, former clerk of Lacey's Public Lands Committee, in a May 8, 1908, letter to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261, reported on Progressive Tom Cheshire's attack on Allison. Reece reported that the Congressional Globe of the day did not mention Allison in conjunction with Credit Mobilier and that James Ford Rhodes in his History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 (London: Macmillan Company, 1906), VII, complimented Allison for being one of the men who returned stock to Oakes Ames.
headquarters with attempting to use the veterans organization for political purposes.  

Allison's health emerged as an issue in May. While his supporters claimed that he was in robust health and working every day, Progressives predicted the Senator would die before completing his term in 1909. Controversy centered around a publicity photograph of Allison distributed by his managers; Progressives charged that it was touched up to make him appear younger, while Allison's supporters countercharged that Progressives doctored it so that the Senator appeared weak and older than he was. Indignant at the press charges, Lacey termed them a poor attempt to earn "political capital." Lashing back at Lacey, the Sioux City Tribune declared that men like Lacey were "more likely indignant at being caught," because he, more than most Allison men, should have known how old and weak the Senator was. Lacey, the editor added, "was the first man to announce that he would be a candidate for Senator at the time it was

105 Sioux City Tribune, May 15, 1908.

106 Democrat and Leader, May 21, 1908. Sioux City Tribune, May 26, 1908; Sioux City Journal, May 27, 29, 1908. Letter of Les McNeeley, Allison's secretary, May 21, 1908, to J. T. Adams and Adams letter, May 23, 1908, to McNeeley, Allison Papers, Vol. 368. McNeeley answered a triple inquiry from Julian Richards that Allison's picture was taken in Feb., 1907, not on the seventy-ninth birthday anniversary of Allison, but he did not say if this was the picture being circulated.

107 Sioux City Journal, May 27, 1908.
thought Allison would not live through the campaign. While the Tribune approached the truth, it exaggerated somewhat; Lacey never spoke of his own Senate candidacy without making it clear he would never challenge Allison. Progressives finally emerged victorious in the newspaper war, however, asking that the issue be settled by the Senator's personal visit to Iowa so that the people could determine the state of his health. This, of course, was a risk Allison's supporters could not take.

Near the close of the primary campaign, Lacey devoted much time to northwest Iowa, an area in which the state convention had revealed Allison's weakness. While the Capital reported him so effective in the Eleventh Congressional District that the word went out to Cummins to cancel his other plans and move into the district, the Sioux City Tribune reported Lacey's successes as highly exaggerated, adding that his talks were so greatly abusive of Cummins that they actually won Allison supporters to the Governor. Confident of victory, however, Lacey reported that not only

108 Sioux City Tribune, May 27, 1908.

109 Ibid., May 29, June 1, 1908. Earlier, Peter Kiene in a letter, Mar. 21, 1908, to Allison, Allison Papers, Vol. 372, tried to forestall trouble over Allison's health. He told Allison he hoped he would soon have occasion to speak on the Senate floor to confirm the report that Allison was practically entirely well.

were Perkins supporters of 1906 in Allison’s camp but also many of Cummins’ 1906 followers.¹¹¹

Elsewhere, Lacey attacked the character of Cummins, and declared he had "no moral right to run." Making the most of the Torbert letter, Lacey urged the Governor to publish it to clear up doubts over its contents. He rejected Cummins’ claim that his "enemies" attacked his honor in being a candidate, and pointed out that both Torbert and Congressman Birdsall were his friends.¹¹² Moreover, Lacey singled out Cummins’ failure to attend the White House Conference on conservation; the Standpat press picked up the charge and reported that of the two governors missing the conference, one was "chasing votes."¹¹³ Again, the Cummins’

¹¹¹Sioux City Journal, May 27, 1908. Lacey predicted a 25,000 vote margin for Allison. He also implied that Perkins men felt Cummins won the 1906 gubernatorial nomination because he manipulated the credentials committee and edged out Perkins. Daily News, Apr. 18, 1908, quoted Lacey as saying that every one in southern Iowa was for Allison and asked, "Are they?" See also Register and Leader, Apr. 19, 1908.

¹¹²Lacey’s speech at Keosauqua, Iowa, May 20, 1908, Lacey Papers, Vol. 264. Lacey referred also to Birdsall’s statement that Cummins promised him in 1906 not to oppose Allison. Lacey might well also have included the 1906 Christmas greetings from Cummins to Allison by way of Dolliver in which the same promise was conveyed. See Ross, Dolliver, pp. 225, 229.

press snapped back at Lacey by linking Allison with many who "have been tried in office and found wanting," and thus were entitled to write "ex" before their name.\textsuperscript{114} As for Lacey's attack on the Governor's right to run, the Sioux City\textit{Tribune} scornfully declared that "when cast offs like Lacey prate about the Governor's morality . . . they simply advertise the poverty of their cause."\textsuperscript{115}

Dolliver, too, grew more vehement in his addresses for Allison as the primary drew nearer. Denouncing the Governor's attacks on Iowa's Congressmen, which made them appear anti-Roosevelt, Dolliver reminded his audiences that there was a time when Cummins was not a reform advocate. As for the Governor's appearance before the Senate committee on interstate commerce, Dolliver charged that he made a "consummate ass" of himself.\textsuperscript{116}

The acrimonious campaign closed with the first state-wide primary in June. Although Allison won, his margin of victory was only about half that of Carroll's victory over

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114}\textit{Sioux City Tribune}, May 21, 1908. \textit{Daily News}, May 20, 26, 1908, identified the fight in Iowa as being made by the same men who were in the pay of the railroads in 1906.
\item \textsuperscript{115}\textit{Sioux City Tribune}, May 23, 1908.
\item \textsuperscript{116}Dolliver's manuscript, May 26, 1908, in unclassified Lacey Papers.
\end{itemize}
Garst in the gubernatorial contest; moreover, Allison won by less than half the margin predicted by Lacey.\(^{117}\) The Standpat press attributed Allison's smaller vote total to the fact that thousands of Democrats voted for Cummins in the Republican primary.\(^{118}\) Designating the primary a fraud designed by the Governor's followers, the Staats-Anzeiger, Des Moines' German language weekly, called for repeal of the primary law.\(^{119}\)

Allison carried the Sixth District with a margin of 2,000 votes which, like the state total, was about half what Lacey had hoped for. Since the Senator carried every county in the district but Poweshiek, however, and lost that by only 300 votes, Lacey rejoiced in the outcome of his work.\(^{120}\) Viewing the victory as the culmination of seven

\(^{117}\)Register and Leader, June 4, 1908, reported that Allison's margin was about 10,000 votes while B. F. Carroll won over Garst in the gubernatorial contest by about 20,000 votes. See Register and Leader, June 6, 1908, for a statewide vote by districts. See also Daily Capital, June 3, 4, 1908.

\(^{118}\)Daily Capital, June 3, 4, 1908. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, June 4, 5, 1908.

\(^{119}\)Iowa Staats-Anzeiger, June 19, 1908.

\(^{120}\)Oskaloosa Daily Herald, June 5, 1908. Standpatters defeated W. W. Epps, Progressive candidate for Sixth District representative to the State Central Committee. In a letter of R. H. Spence, June 25, 1908, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 103, Cummins was told that "Lacey and his gang" defeated Epps "because he, in good faith, supported you at the polls two years ago." This is only part of the reason and not adequate in itself, for Lacey also supported the Governor in
years work to defeat Cummins and the Progressives, Milt McCord jubilantly wrote to Lacey that "their machine was knocked all to pieces." In spite of Brookhart's prognosis that half the counties of the First District were a "stand off" or for Cummins, Allison carried the district. A Burlington Progressive reported to Cummins that the election there left no choice but "to lick the hand of Blythe" or vote Democratic.

Progressives assessed the prohibition issue as an important cause of Cummins' defeat. John Hamilton, former editor of the Des Moines Daily News and a man who neither smoked nor drank, participated in the Republican gubernatorial

1906. Compare Epps's role in the patronage fight of the Sixth District in 1907 when Epps followed the Cummins' line of opposition to Temple for the district attorneyship. See Chap. XII of this study. Allison carried Polk County despite Lafe Young's report that 1,500 Democrats in Des Moines intended to vote for Cummins in the Primary. Letter of Lafe Young, Apr. 15, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261.

Letter of Milt McCord, June 6, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 260. McCord must have been very pleased with his victory in Jasper County in 1908 after the 1906 battle there. Realistically, McCord referred to the necessity of watching the Dolliver boom for the Vice Presidency, and intimated that he would not harmonize again should the Cummins star rise, but would let Progressives go to the Democrats before he would compromise himself to hold them in the Republican party.

contest along with Carroll and Garst. According to Cummins' supporters, Hamilton's candidacy, since his views were acceptable to the "drys" and Cummins' were not, gained at least 10,000 votes for Allison when that many third party Prohibitionists voted the Republican ticket. Progressives also cited the crusade against Scott County saloons launched by State Attorney General Webb Byers which lost some votes for Cummins and failed to gain prohibition votes for him.123 Crediting the Methodist church with partial responsibility for the Governor's defeat, the editor of the Odebolt Chronicle claimed that nearly every Methodist minister in the Eleventh District distributed letters to parishioners asking for support to Allison.124 Although the liquor question undoubtedly cost Cummins some votes, it was more likely Allison's reputation in the state which defeated the Governor. Most Iowans believed the venerable elder statesman should have a place in the Senate so long as he desired it.125


124Letter of W. E. Hamilton, June 8, 1908, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 103. Hamilton, whose Odebolt Chronicle was a long-time supporter of Cummins, failed to mention that Cummins carried the Eleventh District.

125The results of the second Senate primary bear this out. See Chap. XIV of this study.
After he returned to private life, Lacey appeared torn between a wish to keep politically alive by maintaining his position in Standpat circles and a reluctance to accept responsibility for effective Standpat leadership. While desiring an all-out war on Progressive strength in Iowa, and knowing that he had the support of Blythe, Lacey refused to bid for the gubernatorial nomination. Standpatters, without real leadership, faced insuperable odds in 1908. While they claimed Allison's defeat of Cummins as a victory for themselves, their triumph proved to be illusory. To win support for Allison, Standpatters abandoned their traditional position on the tariff, an act which brought considerable political hazing to Lacey. Furthermore, in a very short time, the death of Allison and the perplexities of the Presidential contest snatched victory from the Standpatters and forced them to renew the fight against Cummins.126

126Although by this time Lacey had come to favor Taft for President in 1908, Blythe could not agree and offered strong objections against him. Taft was, Blythe said, "an avowed tariff-ripper," a man with the "big-head," and "so Rooseveltian in his ideas on wealth that he can't be trusted." Taft was also too imperialistic-minded to suit Blythe, and the railroad leader predicted that "if Taft is nominated, he won't win for he can't consolidate the Negro vote, labor vote, nor keep Republicans in line by appeal to protection." See Blythe's letter, Jan. 7, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258.
CHAPTER XIV

DOUBLE DEFEAT

Contests for the Senate were the key to political developments in Iowa during 1908, and their results marked a watershed in the state's political history. Although Standpatters could not regard Allison's senatorial victory in the June primary as a vindication of their views, they rejoiced in Cummins' defeat and the consequent blow to Progressives. This sense of triumph quickly dissipated, however, when, some two weeks later, the problems of nominating a vice presidential candidate at the Republican National Convention placed them in an untenable and ridiculous position from which they could not escape with dignity or political advantage. This was followed by Allison's death a few weeks after the convention which precipitated another battle with Cummins over the Senate vacancy. In this last confrontation, Lacey played a prominent role, largely because no one else would undertake a seemingly futile contest. Lacey thus became the forlorn symbol of the last Standpat battle in Iowa. His optimism and courage remained evident, but strangely he seemed unaware that most of the conservatives had recognized a power shift in Iowa politics and trimmed their sails accordingly.
At the Republican National Convention of 1908, Lafe Young chaired the Iowa delegation in which Standpatters controlled the majority. Lacey, however, represented Iowa on the Resolutions Committee, and although he did not serve on the subcommittee which drafted the platform, the tariff views finally expressed therein were partially compatible with his own. The initial tariff plank proposed, dubbed the Ohio plank because it represented the views of Taft and the convention in his home state, implied that the tariff contributed to monopoly if the rates were higher than the difference in cost of production at home and abroad. Lacey and his Standpat friends hoped to modify the plank's wording. They wanted to amend the provision to read that the tariff would "at least" be as high as the difference in cost of production. By implication, therefore, it might go higher. The Register and Leader pointed out that the Standpat plan meant the emasculation of the harmony plank of Iowa's State Convention.

---

1. Osvaldo Daily Herald, Mar. 12, 1908. Letter of Elmer Dover, secretary of Republican National Committee, Apr. 6, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258. Lacey and Milt McCord were Sixth District delegates. Professor Jessee Macy of Grinnell was an alternate, and true to the Standpat promise to name a black man as alternate, J. R. Spears from Buxton also served.

2. Register and Leader, June 15, 17, 1908. The Register and Leader, June 5, 1908, stated that Standpatters were behind protectionist John Dalzell of Pennsylvania as Chairman of Committee on Resolutions.
and indicated that the two words, "at least," should be deleted.³

Ultimately, both sides claimed victory, for while the detested words, "at least," were omitted, the platform left open the possibility of a higher tariff. Although it called for revision by a special session of Congress, the ambiguous plank read that "in all tariff legislation the true principle of protection is best maintained by the imposition of such duties as will equalize the cost of production at home and abroad, together with a reasonable profit to American industries."⁴ The platform went on to endorse a minimum-maximum tariff schedule, an idea which Lacey had expounded in 1906.⁵

While the tariff issue was important, Iowa leaders regarded selection of the vice presidential candidate a more significant controversy. Taft's evident preference for Dolliver as a running mate created consternation among Iowa Standpat delegates who believed this choice would open the

³Reprint of Washington Post in Register and Leader, June 12, 1908. See also Register and Leader, June 15, 1908.

⁴Register and Leader, June 19, 1908.

⁵Ibid. See also Lacey's views on a minimum-maximum tariff in Chap. XIII of this study. The minimum tariff was to represent the normal measure of protection at home; the maximum was to be available to meet discrimination by foreign countries against American goods.
doors of the Senate to Cummins.\textsuperscript{6} None of the Iowa delegation, however, wanted to go on record as opposing an Iowan for such a high honor. Nevertheless, reports indicated that Blythe, Young, George Roberts, and Lacey, along with Allison, were quietly working against Dolliver; the senior Senator allegedly urged Dolliver to issue a statement declining interest in a national candidacy. In the attempt to divorce their opposition from state politics, Standpatters claimed their opposition rested solely with the talents of Dolliver, talents too great to be shelved in the vice presidency, they said.\textsuperscript{6}

Meanwhile, Dolliver authorized George D. Perkins and Lafe Young to withdraw his name at the discretion of the delegation. He felt "there are considerations also of a political character local to our state, it seems to me, which are also peremptory in indicating my duty."\textsuperscript{7} E. E. Hart, Iowa's National Committeeman, warned Taft that Dolliver's choice would mean "practically anarchy" in Iowa and almost certainly the choice of a Democratic state legislature. Concurring in that assessment, Lacey underscored Hart's contention that such deep dissension among Iowa Republicans

\textsuperscript{6}Register and Leader, June 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 1908.

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid. June 15, 1908. Cartoons in the Register and Leader, June 9, 16, 1908, linked Lacey to the anti-Dolliver group although Dolliver's biographer, Ross, pp. 233-235, makes no mention of Lacey in the Standpatters' opposition.

\textsuperscript{8}Democrat and Leader, June 16, 1908. Register and Leader, June 16, 1908.
would give the Democrats a majority in the state legislature and ultimately mean the state's two Republican senators would be replaced by Democrats. 9

When Idaho's William Borah launched a boom for Cummins for the vice presidency, some Standpatters viewed it as a solution to the Iowa controversy. Among the hold-outs against Cummins, however, were Lacey, Young, and Perkins. The Register and Leader fumed at their action, asserted they were servants of Blythe, and reported that fifty Des Moines business men wired Lacey protesting his part in blocking an Iowan from the ticket. 10 Finally, Young capitulated, but indicated that he would not place Cummins' name in nomination. Perkins and Lacey remained obdurate, and the Register quoted Lacey as declaring he would "never stand for Cummins." 11

9Register and Leader, June 16, 1908. In a similar interpretation, Judson Welliver's report from the Chicago National Convention claimed that if Dolliver were blocked, Progressives in Iowa would consider it a deliberate attempt to keep Cummins from the Senate and would retaliate by voting for a Democratic state legislature in November and thus also defeat the re-election of Allison. See Daily Capital, June 13, 1908, wherein Lafe Young discounted Welliver's report.

10Democrat and Leader, June 16, 1908. Daily Capital, June 17, 1908. See the Daily Capital, June 27, 1908, for a page of excerpts from Iowa papers on the Dolliver-Cummins candidacy. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, June 17, 1908. Register and Leader, June 17, 1908, reported also that Roosevelt favored Cummins for the ticket.

11Register and Leader, June 18, 1908.
Lacey yielded, however, when it became safe to do so. Having been assured by Hepburn that Cummins' chances were nil because a bloc of Eastern states wanted New York's James Sherman, Lacey agreed to go along with the Iowa delegations' support of Cummins.12

Following Sherman's nomination, Progressives vented their wrath at what they considered unfair tactics to slight Cummins. Ora Williams, an ardent admirer, released a vehement protest to the press. Lacey, Young, and Perkins were not only "Cummins haters" who operated on the "deadly poison of personal prejudice," they were, in Williams' language, "political iscariots," and, in a mixed metaphor, "a sacred trio" who could not be silenced even after their attempts to turn the state Democratic in 1906. Williams also saw the "fine hand" of the American Protective Tariff League at work in the convention, because Sherman, a high tariff advocate and friend of Speaker Cannon, helped control the House through his membership on the Committee on Rules. Concluding his diatribe, Williams claimed that Sherman's choice meant the trusts would support Taft's campaign.13

12Ibid., June 19, 1908. Sherman emerged the winner. See Register and Leader, June 20, 1908.

13Daily News, June 19, 21, 1908. In a letter from Harry Hull, June 20, 1908, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 103, Hull told the Governor that Taft had chosen Cummins, but the orders never got delivered to the delegates and that Hitchcock stood to lose the National Chairmanship because of this. Hull jubilantly concluded that at least the episode showed where Progressives stood with the Administration.
In milder language, the Register and Leader declared Iowa to have been "cheated by the Standpatters." The Capital offered a different explanation of the convention proceedings; it claimed that Lacey and the last hold-outs reluctantly yielded to Cummins, but that the choice of a New York man became a necessity for Taft's nomination when the anti-Taft forces decided to claim the vice presidency.\(^{14}\)

The Standpat plan to reject Dolliver, as well as Cummins, for a place on the national ticket may have resembled base ingratitude for all that Dolliver had done for Allison in the Senate primary, but the defeat of Dolliver did not evoke the same cry against the Standpatters. Dolliver had announced before the convention that he did not want the vice presidency, and furthermore, his official biographer adds, Dolliver did all he could to prevent being chosen because he desired rest rather than the rigors of a national campaign in 1908.\(^{15}\) Moreover, Standpatters had indicated

\(^{14}\)Register and Leader, June 20, 1908. Daily Capital, June 22, 1908. See also letter of Lafe Young, June 26, 1908, to Dr. James A. Cochrane of Cincinnati, Iowa, Cummins Papers, File 103, in which he stated the same thesis of eastern domination. This interpretation was disputed by the Register and Leader, June 24, 1908, which quoted Horace Rand, Blythe's brother-in-law, as saying Taft and Roosevelt sent telegrams to the Iowa delegates urging Dolliver or if not he, then Cummins.

\(^{15}\)Ross, Dolliver, pp. 231-235.
that Dolliver's political future would be better served if he retained his powerful voice in the Senate.

While Cummins lost the battle in Chicago, the victors there would eventually lose the war. Progressives in Iowa would not soon forget the Standpat double-edged attack on the Governor. Within the next two months, they found themselves with a third opportunity to advance their leader.

Very soon after the close of the National Convention, Iowa Republicans assembled in Waterloo for the second State Convention to formally ratify the state platform. J. C. Welliver reported that the real issue of the meeting was the action of Lacey, Young, and Perkins in Chicago. Noting that several counties passed condemnatory resolutions against the trio, Welliver added, in a play on words, that the second State Convention might well prove to be the "Waterloo" of the three men. As Welliver predicted, Progressives gained control of the Waterloo gathering, and the state platform was a Progressive triumph. Cummins' followers gained a majority of the State Central Committee and named C. F. Franke of the Third District of the state, chairman.

16 See letter of P. I. Appleman, June 22, 1908, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 103, for a particularly harsh attack on Perkins, Lacey, and Young.


18 Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Chap. XVIII, pp. 14-16, describes the Progressive control of the second State Convention as an accident. Since the primary
Looking toward the fall campaign, the Republican party attempted to close ranks and present a united front after the convention adjourned. Both the Register and Leader and the Daily Capital preached the "harmony" theme. This unity was necessary to attain the party’s goal of winning 100,000 Iowa votes for Taft. Lacey paid lip service to harmony by declaring that Iowa Republicans had risen above factionalism and were "marching to the national music." He betrayed his feelings, however, when he added that the party in Iowa "was not a one man party" but a party of real men.

On August 4, Republican plans were suddenly cast awry when Iowa newspapers flashed the news of Senator Allison's death. Cummins' hopes soared again, and Standpatters, who twice that summer successfully defeated the Governor's plans had selected party candidates, the platform was the convention's sole work. Thus little attention was paid the selection of delegates and only about two-thirds of those elected bothered to attend. See also the Daily Capital, June 24, 25, 1908, and the Democrat and Leader, June 24, 1908.

19 Register and Leader, June 27, 1908. Daily Capital, June 25, 1908.

20 Letter of E. P. Adler, secretary of the Republican State Central Committee, July 27, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258. This letter went out to party leaders over the state.

21 Letter of Lacey, n.d., Lacey Papers, Vol. 267. From its context, the letter had to be written sometime between the June primary and the death of Allison in August. Though Adler's name does not appear on it, the document is undoubtedly a reply to his letter of July 27, 1908.
for political advancement, recognized the inevitability of a new battle.22

Both Republican camps were uncertain as to the best method of handling the new crisis in Iowa politics. Some Republicans believed Cummins should logically succeed to the Senate because except for the personal following the aged Senator had he would have won the June primary. Other party members intimated that Lacey, Young, and Perkins got what they deserved, and that the three could now expiate the past by supporting Cummins.23 Some friends urged the Governor to call an extra session of the legislature for the purpose of amending the primary law to care for the extraordinary situation.24 Still another suggestion came from Dan Turner, later to be governor of Iowa. He believed that a conference of all Republicans, attended by Standpatters who were

22Register and Leader, Aug. 4, 1908. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Aug. 4, 1908. Hawk-eye, Aug. 5, 1908, reported Cummins' announcement that he would appoint a successor for the short term and be a candidate for the long term. The editor reported as "rumor" the possibility that the Governor would resign at once and let Garst name him for Allison's unfinished term also. Daily Capital, Aug. 6, 1908, carried Cummins' denial that he had announced his candidacy on the day of Allison's death.

23Register and Leader, Aug. 6, 1908. Daily News, Aug. 6, 1908, stated that if the Standpatters had not blocked Cummins for the vice presidency, the way to the Senate would now have been open for one of them.

24Letter of W. S. Weston, district court reporter at Webster City, Iowa, Aug. 8, 1908, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 104.
"larger than faction" would "shame the ultra-radicals (Young, Lacy, Perkins etc.) into passive acquiescence."  

Following Turner's advice, and at Cummins' behest, the State Chairman sent out notice of a Republican meeting in Des Moines. The letter also conveyed the news that former Second District Congressman, Joe R. Lane, who had headed the Allison Club earlier, announced his support for Cummins.  

Meanwhile, the Standpat camp members busied themselves with plans. There was some speculation on the senatorial candidacies of Gilbert Haugen, Walter I. Smith, B. F. Carroll, who had won the recent gubernatorial primary, and Lacey, whom J. A. T. Hull described as having the potential to develop into "a strong and logical candidate." Julian Richards suggested that Standpatters hold their own

---

25Letter of Dan Turner, Corning, Iowa, Aug. 6, 1908, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 104.


27Register and Leader, Aug. 7, 15, 1908. Reprint of Albia Union in Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Aug. 15, 1908. Public Opinion (Decorah, Iowa), Aug. 19, 1908. Daily News, Aug. 15, 1908, reported Haugen as the candidate agreed upon after a conference of Standpatters in Charles City on Aug. 11, 1908. However, a check of the Intelligencer (Charles City, Iowa), Aug. 12, 1908, revealed no mention of a conference there. The Charles City editor had been for Allison but switched to Cummins at this time.
Letter of W. F. Lake, Aug. 7, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 260. A subsequent letter, Aug. 19, 1908, from Lake, editor of Arlington News indicated his paper was the only Standpat paper in Fayette County.
meeting just prior to the all-Republican conference called by Chairman Franke. 28

With rumors flying that both factions planned to collaborate with the Democrats to cut down their opponents, and with fears intensifying that such action might even defeat Taft in Iowa, Republicans gathered for their state-wide conference on August 25. 29 That same day Cummins issued a summons for a special meeting of the legislature to amend the primary law. 30 Thus, by personally determining the means the party would take to name Allison's successor, the Governor really undermined the work of the Republicans assembled for that purpose.


29 Letter of Loren Burnham, Aug. 5, 1908, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 104, in which Burnham urged Cummins to make a deal with Democratic candidates for the state legislature. Letter of A. J. Gillespie, Aug. 12, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 259, in which Gillespie urged that the "Standpat element should combine with the Democrats, for if they don't, Cummins will." Letter of L. M. Shaw, Aug. 16, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261, in which Shaw wrote confidentially to Lacey that he believed if Standpatters were told the truth that their votes would send either Claude Porter, the Democrat, or Cummins to the Senate their ballots for the state legislators would reveal a preference for Porter. Daily News, Aug. 15, 1908.

Some papers asked that nothing be done about the Senate question until after the fall elections so as to avoid a deleterious effect. See Daily Capital, Aug. 10, 1908. See also reprints of Fort Dodge Messenger, Gate City, Republican (Harlan, Iowa) in Register and Leader, Aug. 17, 1908.

Lacey did not allow the futility of the Des Moines conference to pass without comment. He had responded to an invitation to attend, he said, but all he could do was "register the decree" pronounced. Angered at the attack on Cummins, several people in the audience hissed Lacey's remarks and told him to "get off the platform." When he referred to the fact that the Governor had won by a narrower margin in 1906 than in 1903, many in the audience let Lacey know they held him partly responsible. Because Lacey had not abandoned politics, it was hardly prudent to have alienated so many Republicans.

When the state legislature convened in response to Cummins' call, the factional tempo increased. Progressives hoped to amend the primary so as to nominate a long-term successor to Allison, but they were divided over the projected plan to name Cummins to serve out the remaining "short term" of Allison's. Countering the latter scheme, Standpatters warned they would boycott the party caucus which was to consider Cummins' short-term candidacy. Under the pretext that the people should have a voice in determining Allison's immediate successor as well as his long-range one, Standpatters pledged to return to Des Moines at their own expense.

\[31\text{Daily News, Aug. 26, 1908. Tribune (Des Moines, Iowa), Aug. 28, 1908.}\]
and ratify the people's choice in the special primary.32
Ultimately, the Standpatters won the legislative battle; the legislature adjourned until November 24 after Cummins failed, both in the caucus and in the legislature, to receive the needed votes for immediate appointment to the Senate.33

Before adjournment, however, the legislature revised the state primary law. Worded to apply only to Senate vacancies occurring more than thirty days before elections, the amendment provided that the special primary ballot be kept separate from the general ballot and that it be obtained by written request. Voters, challenged for party affiliation, had to swear they intended to support the Republican nominees generally, and that they had not participated in another party's primary in 1908.34 Obviously, this reflected each

32Daily Capital, Sept. 3, 4, 5, 8, 1908. Register and Leader, Sept. 4, 5, 1908. Daily News, Sept. 4, 1908, referred to this Standpat action as the declaration of the "war of 1908." Letter of Ottumwan, G. C. Jammy, Sept. 8, 1908, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 108, urged Cummins to fight for his rights and reminded him that at the National Convention he was "knocked down and trampled under foot by a certain few, including that miserable rule or ruin man, John F. Lacey. . . ."

33Daily News, Sept. 8, 10, 1908. Hawk-eye, Sept. 5, 11, 1908. Register and Leader, Sept. 9, 10, 11, 1908. Daily Capital, Sept. 8, 1908. Lacey received some votes at this caucus but never more than three.

34For a copy of the amended primary law, see Lacey Folder, File 2, Iowa Biography and Clippings in State Historical Library, Des Moines, Iowa. See also the Register and Leader, Sept. 5, 10, 1908, for explanation of the law.
factions' fear that the other would seek Democratic collaboration.

It remained for the Standpatters to select a man to represent their cause in the special primary election. Stand-pat state legislators took the first step toward that end before leaving Des Moines when they determined to hold a large conference of "Allison Republicans" on September 15 to choose a man to oppose Cummins. By extending invitations to all who had supported Senator Allison in June, Standpatters hoped to win his followers and avoid waging the new contest on a purely factional basis.

Speculating on the outcome of the special meeting, the press listed a number of possible candidates: Lacey, W. I. Smith, former Governor Frank D. Jackson, "Tama Jim" Wilson, Leslie M. Shaw, J. A. T. Hull, George D. Perkins, Lafe Young, J. H. Trewin, Gilbert Haugen. Smith, Haugen, and Wilson withdrew from the contest, and Jackson's chances appeared to be slim when Standpatters recalled his midnight entry into Council Bluffs in an attempt to forestall Kelly's army of men (sympathetic with Coxey's Army) marching through Iowa in 1894.

---

35See Lacey Papers, Vol. 261, for copy of the form letter invitation which was to be returned to I. M. Treynor.

36Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Sept. 11, 14, 1908. Register and Leader, Sept. 11, 15, 1908.

37Letter of Almor Stern, member of Standpat committee listed on the form letter, Sept. 12, 1908, to I. M. Treynor, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261. For other letters opposing Jackson,
Although the Daily News listed Lacey as the strongest candidate remaining because he would attract the old soldiers' votes in addition to Standpat support, the conference members first turned to a dark horse candidate, E. E. Clark. Their hopes collapsed, however, when Clark, chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, informed the group that he pledged his support to Cummins soon after Allison's death.

Finally, the conference rallied around Lacey, and he received 69 votes on the first informal ballot and 113 on the first formal ballot. The Des Moines Tribune hailed his selection "a last choice," labeled him a "lamb" on a "sacrificial altar," and noted that the two senatorial contestants were "bitter enemies." Other unfavorable press comments see Lacey Papers, Vols. 258, 259, 260. The railroads provided a special train for Jackson's trip to Council Bluffs. Letter of W. I. Smith, Aug. 27, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261, in which Smith explained his withdrawal because he was convinced that neither he nor Lacey could be elected but that Haugen could because he could probably transfer the Scandinavian vote of the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Districts from Cummins to himself. See also Tribune (Sioux City), Sept. 15, 1908.


40 E. E. Clark jumped only from forty-seven to forty-eight votes. See Register and Leader, Sept. 16, 1908.

41 Des Moines Tribune, Sept. 17, 1908.
labeled Lacey the "high priest of the Hanna school of Republicanism" and "the fittest representative possible . . . of the narrow warped views of three hundred 'odd' conferees" in Des Moines. 42

The reaction of fellow Standpatters was consistent with the Tribune's analysis that Lacey was not chosen because he was popular but because Standpatters conceded Cummins' victory. Lacey's correspondence indicated that, prior to the Standpat conference, only one person wrote to offer support for his nomination. On the other hand, many people advised the chairman of the conference that Lacey was not an acceptable candidate, describing him as too conservative, too bitterly identified with the factional fight, and as a loser in 1906. 43


Some of the Governor's friends were jubilant over the selection of Lacey whom they considered a weak candidate, easy to defeat. One sarcastically referred to his candidacy as "leaving nothing to be desired." See letter of E. D. Chassell, state binder, Sept. 17, 1908, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 111. See also Cummins Papers, File 108, for more such letters. On the other hand, a leading Burlington Progressive interpreted the choice of Lacey as an indication that Standpatters planned to bolt the ticket because, he said, the Standpatters knew Lacey was "very unpopular." See letter of W. W. Copeland, Sept. 15, 1908, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 108. Copeland apparently did not take seriously the Standpat promise to support the whole Republican ticket.

43 Letter of W. D. Johnson, Webster, Iowa, Sept. 12, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 259, who endorsed Lacey. See opposing letters in Lacey Papers, Vols. 259 and 260, including letters from U. S. Judge Smith McPherson and Lacey's fellow Oskaloosan, J. C. Mabry. Mabry felt no one engaged in the first bitter Senate primary should be chosen.
Even the Standpat press was lukewarm in its response to Lacey's candidacy. Of the more prominent of these papers, only the Burlington Hawk-eye registered enthusiasm in his choice. Referring to the Standpat conference as "the most enthusiastic political convention ever held in the state," the Hawk-eye declared Lacey the "strongest and most representative person of the old line Republicans," and a man who, while a Standpatter, was at the same time in tune with the national platform and in favor of the proposed tariff revision. Attempting to make Lacey's selection appear impressive, the Oskaloosa Daily Herald cited his commanding lead over E. E. Clark, and indicated that he was the choice of men representing every county in the state. Yet Lafe Young's Capital restrained its comments, and merely cited Lacey as honest, hardworking, and a clean campaigner. A number of newspapers which had supported Allison now switched to Cummins. Although they acted before Lacey's nomination, and thus did

---

44 Hawk-eye, Sept. 16, 1908.

45 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Sept. 16, 1908. Surprisingly, not even Lacey's hometown paper portrayed an air of enthusiasm at first. The Sept. 17, 1908, issue reprinted the praise of the Hawk-eye, Sept. 16, 1908. Cedar Rapids Republican, Sept. 16, 1908, reported Lacey as the selection of the "love feast" meeting in Des Moines. The Gate City, Sept. 17, 1908, believed that Lacey's choice created enthusiasm and that his election would end factionalism in Iowa. The Nonpareil, Sept. 16, 17, 1908, claimed that no one could doubt Lacey's fitness for the office.

46 Daily Capital, Sept. 16, 1908.
not reflect personal opposition to him, their action proved to be symptomatic of the campaign.  

The Register and Leader designated Lacey the "logical candidate" for Allison's place on the ticket and "fully deserving of the leadership he has been called on to assume." While he was the "Republican antipodes from Cummins," Lacey was a "man of ability, of rigid convictions . . . . tireless energy and of the faith of the martyrs." Whether or not one accepted Lacey's views, the editor concluded he was a man of character whom the state would honor. Mistaking this appraisal as an endorsement, Lacey later earned critical scorn from the paper.

At long last, Lacey had his chance to "take on" Cummins, as he had expressed it twice before when speaking

---

47 The Ottumwa Courier crossed over to Cummins. The Register and Leader, Sept. 13, 1908, reported that the Lee syndicate of papers in Davenport and Muscatine would join the Courier in support of Cummins. The West Liberty Index (West Liberty, Iowa), the Charles City Intelligencer, and the Herald (Clinton, Iowa), were other papers mentioned by the Register and Leader. The Citizen (Iowa City, Iowa) and the Register (Marion, Iowa), also switched to the Governor, but the Marion Register switched back to Lacey after D. J. Palmer asked Lacey to send an old soldier to bring the editor, Major S. W. Rathbun, into line. See letter of D. J. Palmer, Sept. 22, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers. Vol. 260, and letters of S. W. Rathbun, Oct. 6, 22, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers. Vol. 261.

See the document in Lacey Papers, Vol. 276, which gives Cummins' campaign quotes from fifteen papers. This list also shows that Henry Wallace and ex-Governor William Larrabee supported Cummins in addition to Congressman Joe Lane's support of him.

48 Register and Leader, Sept. 16, 1908.
of his political future. Lacey's acceptance speech contained more optimism about his candidacy than the Standpat press reflected. Alluding to the shortness of the campaign, since elections were but six weeks away, Lacey called for the support of everyone at the conference. Posing as the loyal Republican, he selected for his campaign slogan, the words, "Let no harm come to the Republican party." Frank Jackson's eulogy following Lacey's selection, wherein he described Lacey as the representative of 13 per cent of Iowa's population who fought in the Civil War but never had a member in the Senate, provided the "soldier-senator" slogan in Lacey's campaign.

Almost at once, many of Lacey's political friends and associates offered advice, support, and encouragement. Some of the soundest counsel came from Blythe, who had refrained from participating in the conference selecting Lacey, for obvious reasons, as he told Lacey. Most of Blythe's suggestions concerned the need of keeping the candidate in the public view, and he more than once reminded Lacey that many people, especially northern Iowans, did not know Lacey as they knew Cummins. To win the non-Standpat element of Allison's support would take an aggressive campaign waged

---


50Hawk-eye, Sept. 16, 1908. For copies of the soldier-senator campaign literature, see Lacey Papers, Vol. 258.
outside the press, Blythe said. He concurred in Lacey's judgment to have headquarters in Oskaloosa.51

Another letter which constituted a compendium of all the counsel sent Lacey, came from a party official already selected as a Taft elector and, therefore, barred from publicly supporting Lacey. This correspondent urged Lacey to assert that his previous House experience would give him a higher rank in the Senate than Cummins could have. He should talk about the national platform including the tariff day and night, to define "Standpatter" to mean the national platform, to support Nate Kendall's candidacy for Congress, to use the magic name of Roosevelt often, to solicit support from every sportsmen's paper, to organize every GAR post, to

51Letters of Blythe, Sept. 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258. In Lacey Papers, Vol. 267, there is a thirteen-page typed summary of Lacey's life covering his work on tariff, conservation, mining laws, pensions, railroad legislation, etc. It appears to be the type of document Blythe asked be compiled for publicity purposes in northern Iowa especially.

Julian Richards, C. W. Johnston, and A. U. Quint approximated leading positions in the campaign but Lacey would have to be called his own manager. See letters in Lacey Papers, Vols. 260, 261. For other letters of advice from Lacey's friends including Judge Smith McPherson and U. S. Marshal Frank Clark, see Lacey Papers, Vols. 258, 259, 260, 261.

J. P. Dolliver, in a letter, n.d., 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258, explained to Lacey that he was not at home when the Des Moines conference of Allison Republicans assembled but that he was happy with the results of the conference. Ross, Dolliver, p. 236, says that Dolliver stayed clear of a choice for Allison's successor and made it clear that he was "willing to forgive and forget" so far as Cummins was concerned.
answer correspondence promptly, to send materials to unfriendly papers as well as supporting ones, and lastly, to keep the Allison literary bureau functioning in order to publicize himself in northern Iowa especially.  

Congressman W. I. Smith suggested that Lacey send a letter, without using the words "Progressive" or "Standpatter," to each of the 200,000 Republicans on Allison's mailing lists. A. U. Quint of Lacey's Des Moines office, highlighted the need for poll watcher's in every precinct to challenge Democrats who attempted to vote in the Republican primary. Although this was sound advice, Lacey's supporters failed miserably in providing challengers at the polls.

Candidates and press alike feared that a factional fight over the Senate seat would harm the entire Republican ticket. Reflecting this fear, the party's Congressional Committee expressed its hope that neither senatorial

52Letter of Marsh W. Baily, Sept. 18, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258. Similarly, B. C. Ellsworth, editor, Kanawha Record (Kanawha, Iowa), in a letter Oct. 5, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 259, told Lacey to use Lafe Young's definition of a Standpatter, i.e., one who "stands for everything that a Progressive stands for and in addition thereto is an orthodox defender of the protective tariff."

53Letter of W. I. Smith, Sept. 23, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261. Lacey Papers, Vols. 265, 266, are mostly long lists of county and precinct chairmen, names and addresses of voters, and pages from Allison's campaign lists.

candidate would establish formal headquarters and that both
would campaign for the whole ticket. 55 Actually, at an
Oskaloosa meeting in September, representatives of both
senatorial candidates pledged support for the entire party
ticket. 56 The Capital's editor, a long-time Standpat ally
of Lacey's, in a move which other editors soon adopted in-
dicated his paper would remain neutral because he believed a
factional fight in the press would hurt the Standpat cause
more than help it. 57

Obviously, Lacey was at a distinct disadvantage if he
had to wage a six-weeks' campaign without ever mentioning the
Senate question and with doubtful support from the press.

55Letter of Nate Kendall, Sept. 21, 1908, to Lacey,
Lacey Papers, Vol. 259. Kendall's worry may have stemmed
from a rumor circulating to the effect that Lacey was going
to turn votes away from Kendall unless the latter urged
active support of Lacey for the Senate. See letter of J. P.
Early, Sept. 24, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 259.
When Lacey publicly endorsed Kendall, he was overjoyed. "I
am under the most imperative obligation to you for allowing
it to be understood that you favor my election," he wrote
Lacey. See letter of Kendall, Oct. 3, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey
Papers, Vol. 259.

56Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Sept. 18, 1908. Ottumwa

57Letter of Lafe Young, Sept. 18, 1908, to Lacey,
Lacey Papers, Vol. 261. Young's decision raised Standpat
fears that the newspapers might be forming a combination
and all say nothing on the senatorial question. In that
event, Lacey was urged to use the mails. See letter of
D. J. Palmer, Iowa Railroad Commissioner, Sept. 17, 1908,
to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 260.
The Governor had just fought a hard battle with Allison and, in addition, had public exposure from his three terms in the state house. Furthermore, Standpat candidates for the state legislature could help Lacey very little, because as office seekers themselves, all they could do was promise to support the winner of the primary. Lest he harm his own chance of re-election, Hepburn refused to campaign for Lacey. Advising Lacey that he did not think it possible for him to win, Leslie M. Shaw declined Lacey's invitation to speak in his behalf. The only way to defeat Cummins, Shaw declared, was to elect a Democratic state legislature.

The reluctance of many Standpatters to participate in Lacey's campaign underscored the fact that Lacey did not really have an organization to support him. While many friends offered advice, and associates contributed aid which sometimes proved to be of negative value, the truth remained that Lacey suffered from the lack of a tightly knit organization or a campaign manager other than himself. Moreover, he unwisely attempted to rely on his traditional coalition of

58 Letter of W. P. Hepburn, Oct. 10, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 259. In the end, Hepburn was defeated.

farmers, veterans, and laborers in the defense of protection as a base for political support.

Although the Daily Capital and the Register and Leader maintained neutrality in the Senate race, some papers across the state were more partisan. Julian Richards informed Lacey that he sent releases to 110 papers and was adding to his list almost every day.\(^\text{60}\) To offset this publicity, however, some pro-Cummins papers were very strongly anti-Lacey.

Angered by the Burlington Hawk-eye's citation of Lacey as

\[\text{Letter of J. W. Richards, Sept. 29, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261. Richards and C. W. Johnston had established Lacey headquarters for a literary bureau in the Fleming Building in Des Moines. For an account of the mailing of hundreds of thousands of pieces of literature, see Richards' letters to Lacey through October, 1908, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261. As a consequence of this activity, the Telegraph-Herald (Dubuque, Iowa), Oct. 9, 1908, reported that Cummins was forced to open headquarters. The Dubuque paper claimed that Lacey's Des Moines office planned to send a million pieces of literature over Iowa. See the Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Sept. 28, 1908, for reprints of editorials by a number of Iowa papers on Lacey's candidacy. The Daily Herald, Sept. 19, 1908, printed the old 1903 statement of endorsement by Roosevelt; it ran the article without a date, however, thus giving the impression that the President had recently visited Iowa. The editor of the Enterprise (Coon Rapids, Iowa), picked up the article for a reprint. Both editors had to eat "political crow" when Cummins' friend, "Billy" Hamilton of the Odebolt Chronicle pointed out that Roosevelt had not been in Iowa for five years. See letter of S. D. Henry, ed., Coon Rapids Enterprise, Oct. 10, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 259.

Letter of J. C. Mabry, Sept. 28, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 260, reported that all but one or two newspapers in Monroe County, Kendall's home county, were in favor of Lacey.

The National Tribune (Washington, D. C.) endorsed Lacey. See clipping, n.d., 1908, in unclassified Lacey Papers.\]
"the Republican nominee for the Senate" which gave the impression he was Democrat Claude Porter's sole opponent, and also by the circulation of an anti-Cummins pamphlet believed to have originated in Blythe's office, some newspapers unleashed an attack on Lacey. He was not "the" nominee, declared the Daily News; rather, Lacey was the choice of but 150 of the state's 300,000 Republicans, and the 150 were men devoted to corporation interests. Also rejecting "the assumption that 150 Standpatters are the Republican party of Iowa," the Sioux City Tribune went on to question the source of Lacey's campaign funds, adding that anyone could "guess with accuracy" where the money came from.

Handicapped by his relations with the press, Lacey suffered from a series of blunders made by his supporters. Republicans in Woodbury County, in an ostensible attempt to stay out of the factional fight, discouraged both Cummins and Lacey from making speeches. Yet the press agent of the

---


62 Daily News, Oct. 1, 6, 1908. The News was especially angry at the prospects of Julian Richards' plan to send out 100,000 pictures of Lacey with the title "the Republican candidate" for Senator.

63 Sioux City Tribune, Oct. 9, 14, 1908.
County Central Committee used his office to mail out Lacey's literature until discovery terminated his activities.  

That incident was hardly over when Lacey came under fire for the alleged circulation of a "yellow sheet" on the high cost of Cummins' administration as Governor. Charging Lacey with having broken the campaign truce agreed to, the Sioux City Tribune described him as "Cannon, plus malice, minus ability." Both Lacey and his key campaign workers disclaimed authorship of the circular, and indicated they did not know its source. Although the Daily News charged that the yellow sheet was circulated over the entire state to injure Cummins, an investigation indicated that its distribution occurred only in Dallas County and western Polk, and that the circular was the work of a few loyal but indiscreet Lacey followers in Dallas County. Rejecting this explanation, the Daily News castigated Lacey as a suave "pink tea

---


65Register and Leader, Oct. 21, 1908. Sioux City Tribune, Sept. 17, Oct. 23, 1908. See the Cedar Rapids Republican, Oct. 22, 1908, for a defense of Lacey in the controversy.

66Register and Leader, Oct. 23, 1908. Daily News, Oct. 24, 1908. Letter of A. U. Quint, Oct. 21, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261. Although Quint said he enclosed a copy of the circular for Lacey, there is none in Lacey's file of papers. Quint sarcastically told Lacey that one of the two copies he had seen was at the Register's office and thus amounted to the "great circulation coming into their hands," which the editors had written of.
politician," adding that apparently "pink tea politics" had replaced the "knock-down, drag-out variety."67

Although Lacey knew nothing about the yellow circular, his followers made no attempt to deny still another accusation of questionable campaign tactics. Charging that the state's railroads were out to defeat Cummins, the Des Moines Tribune revealed that Lacey's campaign materials were being mailed to railroad station agents. Furthermore, declared the Daily News, Lacey's headquarters enclosed literature with railroad materials, and thus the railroads paid the postage. Although a bag full of such double purpose mail had been found only on the Milwaukee road, the News reported that the scheme involved all the major rail lines in Iowa.68 The controversy provided the Cummins' people with tangible proof that the railroads preferred Lacey.

Meanwhile, political literature praising Lacey arrived all over the state but bore no postmarks. Although printed at


For flyer on "How to Vote for Lacey," see Lacey Papers, Vol. 261. This was a copy of the primary law with an appeal to vote for Lacey, and was part of the materials found in the railroad mail.
various places, the Sioux City Tribune declared that the materials came "from J. W. Blythe and the railroad pool." Citing the literature as proof that the railroad interests considered it more important to hold the Senate than to elect Taft, the Tribune editor went on to say that the hiring of Julian Richards was still another indication that the railroads "don't care for appearances but are desperate enough to employ any agency." Singling out Blythe as the "special agent of all the special interests" who dispersed the "corruption funds" through his organization, the Tribune editor called for him to be driven from power. Without mentioning Lacey's name, the Tribune effectively linked him to the railroads by asking whether "Cummins or Blythe" should be the victor.

---

69 Sioux City Tribune, Oct. 30, 1908.

70 Ibid., Nov. 2, 1908. It is difficult to assess the amount of financial help Lacey received in his campaign. Evidence of outside aid is indirectly portrayed by Lacey's account of his expenses. He listed total costs at $1,561.69, yet many times that amount was needed for postage alone to cover the vast "personal mail" aspects of Lacey's campaign. See letter of Lacey, Nov. 6, 1908, to Iowa Secretary of State, Lacey Papers, Vol. 260. For numerous letters of A. U. Quint to Lacey concerning campaign bills, see Lacey Papers, Vol. 261.

71 Sioux City Tribune, Nov. 2, 1908. The Tribune, Sept. 18, 19, 22, 1908, had earlier accepted Hearst's charges that the letters of Standard Oil's J. D. Archbold to Senator Foraker, linked Foraker to corporation rule. The Tribune editor then associated the Foraker case with Iowa politics by charging that such corporation rule was exemplified by the Blythe-led railroad machine.
While sustaining heavy fire about his relationship with railroads, Lacey fell victim to a spurious appeal made to farmers in his behalf. A. U. Quint mailed letters to Grundy County farmers using stationery with the letterhead, "The American Farm Magazine" of Chicago and Des Moines. When approached, Quint admitted no such magazine existed as yet, but added that the first issue should appear in mid-December. Cummins' men were upset because the letter indicated Lacey was the choice "of a statewide conference of Republicans" as a candidate for the Republican Senate primary. Although careful not to identify Lacey as "the" Republican candidate, it gave the impression that he was the statewide choice of all Republicans, and urged farmers to attend Lacey's meeting in Grundy County.

On the afternoon before the primary election, the Des Moines Daily News attributed one more political trick

---

72 Actually, Quint's statement that the Panic of 1907 held up publication of his farm journal may have been correct. All his correspondence to Lacey in the 1908 campaign was written on the same letterhead stationery. There may have been some political advantage for Lacey, however, when the stationery was used in the political mailings to farmers. See Daily News, Oct. 29, 1908.

73 Daily News, Oct. 29, 1908. Sioux City Tribune, Oct. 29, 30, 1908, attempted again to link Lacey with railroads. It charged Quint's letter was a plot to deceive farmers, win their votes, and then the railroads could say there was no need for further regulation because farmers chose railroad candidates and thus were happy with the treatment of the roads.
to Lacey's supporters. It published a letter, with the impersonal signature of the "Iowa Bryan Club," which purported to offer an exchange of twenty votes for Bryan and Cummins in each precinct. According to the News, the Cummins headquarters attributed the letter to Richards' and Johnston's Des Moines office, and considered it an attempt to prejudice Republicans against Cummins by portraying him as a Democratic tool. Additional credence in that interpretation grew when the president of the Des Moines Bryan Club revealed there was no Iowa club for Bryan and branded the letter "a disreputable trick."  

While these unfortunate and embarrassing campaign incidents weakened his candidacy, Lacey attempted to win support from a broad base ranging from sportsmen to laborers. Withdrawing from an engagement to speak before the national meeting of the League of American Sportsmen because he was pressed for time, Lacey allowed G. O. Shields to solicit support for him from General Grenville Dodge, of Civil War fame and later a railroad promoter from Iowa, and from "Ret" Clarkson, former editor of the Register and Leader who was currently serving as Surveyor of the Port of New York. Neither man agreed to help, however, and Clarkson implied he favored Cummins. Attempting to help in another way,  

74Daily News, Nov. 3, 1908.  
75Letter of Lacey, Sept. 19, 1908, to G. O. Shields; letters of Shields, Sept. 23, Oct. 3, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey
Shields mailed letters to Iowans announcing the Sportsmen's League's support of Lacey, and in the November issue of Shield's Magazine, called on all Iowa sportsmen to vote for Lacey.76

Lacey's interest in conservation received some attention from a Progressive paper, but the editor turned the issue to the Governor's advantage. Mockingly anticipating any campaign literature on Lacey's work in conservation, the Marshalltown Times-Republican reviewed his interests and accomplishments, adding that much of the work prompted amusement because Lacey was in advance of his times. Admitting that both parties' national platforms and the recent White House Conference on Conservation called for reforms which once won scorn for Lacey, the Marshalltown editor called on Lacey, who now was a convert to tariff revisionism, to sympathize with Cummins who, also in advance of his times,

Papers, Vol. 261. See also letter of J. Frank Blagburn, Sept. 28, 1908, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 108, in which Blagburn quotes Clarkson as saying that the legislature's refusal to name the Governor to the Senate would result in a greater primary victory for him. Shields, however, had told Lacey that he could rely on Clarkson's support although Clarkson, as a federal office holder, would not tell Shields directly.

preached revisionism when it was not politically popular to do so.\textsuperscript{77}

In speaking on the tariff issue, Lacey attempted to identify with Taft and revisionism by reminding his audiences that he reported Iowa's tariff plank at the state convention, and that he also served on the national convention's platform committee. Because the Dingley act was twelve years old, Lacey explained, undoubtedly some of its schedules were irrelevant. While thus endorsing tariff change, Lacey none-the-less made it clear that his basic protectionist views would never allow revisionism to get out of control. Canadian farm goods would never be permitted to enter duty free, he told his farm audiences, and to assure that American farmers and laborers should be protected, revision must be accomplished along "protective lines."\textsuperscript{78}

Referring to the apparent consensus on the tariff reached by the senatorial candidates, the Dubuque \textit{Telegraph-Herald} placed the tariff issue of Iowa politics in candid

\textsuperscript{77}Reprint of Times-Republican in Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Sept. 22, 1908.

perspective. The Iowa Idea was not the rock on which the factions of the Republican party split, declared the editor. "But it served as a rock," he said, "and on one side of it stood all those Republicans who wanted to 'stand in' with the railroads," while on the other side stood those opposed to corporate domination in Iowa.\(^7\) Without mentioning Lacey's name, this editorial minimized the significance of his changed tariff views and linked him to Blythe.

Publicly charged as the tool of corporation interests, Lacey appeared wary of seeking labor's support. At the Republican National Convention, he had voted against the so-called anti-injunction plank which, although calling for the diminished preservation of "the powers of the courts to enforce their process to the end that justice may be done at all times to all parties," also warned against "sundry issuance of injunctions without proper consideration."\(^8\) During the fall campaign when questioned on his injunction views, Lacey's advisors urged him to delay answering; to trim, and stand behind the party majority which accepted


\(^8\)\textit{Sioux City Journal}, June 16, 1908. \textit{Daily Capital}, June 18, 1908, labeled it pro-injunction. At first the \textit{Register and Leader}, June 19, 1908, defended it as anti-injunction, but by June 22 referred to reactionary twigs having been grafted on to the plank.
the plank. Although warned by Johnston that the injunction issue was "hot iron—the business men on the one side and the labor unions on the other," Lacey responded to labor's inquiries without delay. Without referring to his convention vote, he indicated that the party plank was a "wise proposition" due to the "abuse of the injunction in some cases" and that, if elected, he would support the proposition.  

Lacey particularly sought the support of one segment of labor in the state, the miners. During 1908, he had successfully defended the UMW of Iowa, preventing the government from collecting $16,000 in taxes on the miners' benevolent fund. One local UMW president gratefully assured Lacey that miners knew their friends and would have "no lapse of memory in November." Summarizing his Congressional labors for miners in a form letter and linking his name to John


82 Letter of Lacey, Oct. 21, 1908, to G. A. Irving, Lacey Papers, Vol. 260. Lacey penciled on the back of a similar inquiry that the plank met his approval. See Lacey Papers, Vol. 259.

Mitchell, Lacey distributed the document to miners and editors.\textsuperscript{84}

The Iowa Federation of Labor, however, endorsed Cummins, and the state president urged members to vote for Cummins and Bryan. Noting that the Federation's president was the alter ego of the state Labor Commissioner, who was a Cummins' appointee, Standpatters interpreted the Federation's endorsement of Cummins as a call to Democrats to participate in the Republican primary.\textsuperscript{85}

On election eve, both candidates had an opportunity to make a final plea to labor at a Des Moines rally of the Labor Republican Organization. Dissension arose in Lacey's camp, however, on the value of the big rally. Johnston and Richards believed Lacey should use his speech commitment elsewhere as an alibi to avoid the meeting which they considered a Cummins' scheme. A. U. Quint, on the other hand, urged Lacey to attend, claiming that a majority of the scheduled speakers were Standpatters and the rally chairman supported Lacey. Somewhat impatient with Quint's insistence and his efforts to rearrange Lacey's schedule to free him for the evening of the rally, Lacey upbraided Quint and, siding

\textsuperscript{84}Letter of Lacey, Oct. 15, 1908, Lacey Papers, Vol. 260.

with Johnston and Richards, chose not to attend the rally. Many supporters wondered why Lacey avoided the labor meeting. He may have been disturbed by the recent endorsement of Cummins by the Iowa Federation of Labor; he may have wished to avoid a confrontation on his national convention vote against the anti-injunction plank; and he may have recalled the Gompers circular of 1906 which Lacey considered instrumental in defeating him then.

The contest for the Negro vote which began during Allison's candidacy continued during Lacey's battle with Cummins. When Lacey requested a commendatory letter from Booker T. Washington, the latter replied with a certain political skill that he would be happy to comply if someone would inquire of him about Lacey's aid to Tuskegee Institute. Such a letter went out at once, but Washington

---


Lacey's decision not to participate left B. F. Carroll, J. A. T. Hull, and an old soldier, George Dobson, to carry the burden against Cummins.

had not yet answered at the end of October. Washington's endorsement, had it come, probably would not have been of great value in 1908. By that date, many blacks already considered Washington too conservative on Negro rights.

The Iowa Bystander, the oldest Negro newspaper in the state, linked Lacey with the railroads and with Cummins' defeat for the vice presidential nomination, but the editor, styled a "rampant Cummins man" by Richards, did not openly support the Governor. When the Bystander asked a $25 fee to print Lacey's photo with some biographical information, Richards declined, preferring, he said, to pay the Buxton Gazette which would have more influence on Sixth District Negroes.

Lacey's friends made strenuous efforts to win GAR votes for him by forming veterans' clubs to develop the "soldier-senator" theme, discreet campaigning at the Iowa Soldiers Home, and the clarification of false rumors that Lacey opposed lowering the pension age from seventy-five to

---


89 Emma Lou Thornbrough, "The Brownsville Episode and the Negro Vote," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XIV (December, 1957), 461-463. Washington's silence on Roosevelt's punitive action against the black soldiers further alienated him as an effective black leader, according to Thornbrough.

to sixty-five. Knowing that many veterans read the National Tribune, Peter Kiene, Allison's friend from Dubuque, urged the Tribune's editor to endorse Lacey. When the paper did, Quint mailed 4,500 copies to Iowa's old soldiers. 91

Such strenuous efforts to win the GAR vote elicited criticism from some of Cummins' supporters. If being a soldier was the sole criterion for claiming veterans' votes, the Sioux City Tribune claimed that GAR men should vote for the Democratic candidate for governor, Fred White, because White was a veteran and B. F. Carroll was not. 92 In a letter to Iowa veterans, mailed too late to enable Lacey to


92 Unidentified clipping, n.d., 1908, in unclassified Lacey Papers. Reprint of Sioux City Tribune in Dubuque Telegraph-Herald, Oct. 19, 1908. See also the Sioux City Tribune, Oct. 29, 31, 1908. The Charles City Intelligencer was severely critical of the attempt to turn the non-partisan GAR into a Lacey organization. See letter of L. H. Henry, Charles City postmaster and editor Floyd County Advocate (Charles City, Iowa), and the Herald (Charles City, Iowa), Nov. 3, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 259.
reply, Robert Kissick, fellow veteran and fellow Oskaloosan, assailed Lacey's record as a politician. Citing his unfair treatment of veterans without giving supportive data, and his "subsidy" of at least two Mahaska County newspapers, in order to stay in power, Kissick called for Lacey's defeat.93

As the prohibition issue surfaced in the first Senate primary, so it did in the second race also. Reminding Cummins that "the whole temperance element . . . in the Republican party, and with it the religious element, was lined up for Allison . . . to make sure of beating you," J. J. Hamilton, a dry who lost the party's nomination for governor, urged Cummins to let the people of Iowa see that he was independent of and not fearful of antagonizing the liquor interests.94

Lacey could not exploit the temperance issue because he, like Cummins, was vulnerable. When assailed about the bar in the Lacey Hotel in Oskaloosa, Lacey hid behind the mulct law which legalized the sale of liquor, and pointed out that the hotel's lease to an operator removed him from any

93Letter of Robert Kissick, Oct. 30, 1908, to Iowa's veterans, Lacey Papers, Vol. 259. Letter of Will Lacey, Nov. 1, 1908, to L. L. Couse, Decorah veteran, Lacey Papers, Vol. 264. Will Lacey's letter was a hotly worded attack on the character of Kissick which also said local GAR men were trying to bring libel charges against Kissick.

94Letter of John J. Hamilton, Sept. 10, 1908, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 108. The letter was marked "confidential."
right to interfere. Inquirers wanted to know Lacey's stand on the Hepburn-Dolliver bill and the Littlefield bill, both designed to give states control over the interstate shipment of liquor within their borders. Since the Wilson original-package bill, enacted in the late nineteenth century to accomplish this end, had been nearly nullified by a court decision, prohibitionists were demanding new legislation. Repeatedly, Lacey replied to the inquiries that he knew nothing about the Littlefield bill because it was introduced after he left Congress but that he had supported the Hepburn-Dolliver bill in 1907. To buttress his neutral stand and offend neither side of the liquor issue, Lacey added that he construed the Iowans' bill as an attempt to "protect state laws against interstate commerce."

Lacey's friendship with Joseph Cannon, who opposed the Littlefield bill, earned him some opposition from the Temperance Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church. In organized opposition to Cannon's re-election, the society recommended that every Republican candidate for Congress be interviewed on his support for Cannon and the response be


published in hometown papers of the candidate. Claiming that a vote for Lacey meant support for Speaker Cannon, a Mount Vernon, Iowa, paper urged all of the city's Methodists to reflect on Cannon's strength when deciding how to vote in the senatorial primary. When answering the inquiry of a Methodist minister which also related Cannon's views to Lacey's political future, Lacey's reply approached sarcasm more closely than any other letter in his political correspondence. Demonstrating definite resentment at the Mount Vernon paper's attempted injection of the Speakership into the senatorial race, Lacey wrote that "perhaps the editor feels the Speaker will preside over the Senate."

97 Nonpareil, Oct. 9, 1908. Letters of G. C. Core, Oct. 29, 31, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258. Cummins had gone on record as opposing the Littlefield bill, the Hepburn-Dolliver bill, or any bill which would prohibit a state from sending liquor into another state that was under a prohibitory law.

98 See clipping of Record (Mount Vernon, Iowa) in unclassified Lacey Papers. See also the letter of J. F. Black, pastor of Methodist Episcopal Church at Grundy Center, Oct. 17, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258.

The Standpat press, particularly the Burlington *Hawk-eye*, attempted to remove Republican candidates from the horns of the prohibition dilemma by declaring that the liquor question in Iowa was no longer a partisan issue. Claiming that both parties contained prohibitionists, liquor manufacturers, liquor license and anti-license citizens, and people of all shades of belief, the *Hawk-eye* editor pleaded with voters to consider candidates from many points of view. Those who insisted upon making the prohibition question "the chief issue" should "vote the Prohibition national and state tickets," the editor advised.\(^{100}\)

In planning the campaign in northern Iowa, Lacey and his supporters were caught between two harsh realities. Since Lacey was not well known in the northern part of the state, he needed as many speeches as possible there. Yet it was hostile territory generally, and Standpatters had to consider effects of their intrusion on county and state tickets.\(^{101}\) Determining that a large rally in Mason City would be most advantageous to Lacey, his managers hoped to cooperate with a local Progressive candidate in staging a general Republican rally. It


turned out to be solely a Lacey meeting, however, because the Cerro Gordo county chairman, an ardent Progressive, claimed he was unable to provide a speaker to appear with Lacey.102

Lacey's Mason City rally chairman planned an impressive program. With excellent publicity from handbills and newspaper accounts of the meeting, the chairman arranged to announce the rally on the screen of the local movie house. He rented a theater, engaged a band and a male quartet, and while waiting for the rally crowd to gather, played phonograph records of several of Taft's short campaign speeches in order to identify Lacey with the national ticket. Careful to use all assets, the rally chairman engaged an old soldier to preside over the entire meeting and secured fifty more to escort Lacey to the stage. Lacey responded well to the elaborate planning which preceded him. Holding his audience for ninety minutes, he campaigned for the entire Republican ticket and never once mentioned his own candidacy.103

---

102Letters of A. U. Quint, Oct. 14, 15, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261. Quint used E. V. Franke, Lacey's supporter and brother of Progressive State Chairman, C. F. Franke, to go over the head of County Chairman Ira W. Jones and arrange a Mason City meeting for Lacey.

103Letter of E. V. Franke, Oct. 20, 1908, to A. U. Quint, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261. Quint later refused to pay the expenses for this meeting, calling it a "general Republican rally," and referred Franke to the hostile County Chairman for the $78 bill. See Quint's letter, Oct. 30,
Another rally in Fort Dodge gave Lacey needed publicity in northern Iowa. Intending to stage a large meeting and to transport miners from a nearby town, Lacey's planners found that they could not use the Fort Dodge armory for the meeting. The denial of facilities, however, was short-lived; authorities explained that there was no attempt to shut out Lacey, that a regimental band scheduled to drill at the armory would move its practice to another night. While the rally occurred as planned, the misunderstanding over the armory gave Lacey added publicity.\(^{104}\)

Apparently satisfied with results of his strenuous efforts in northern Iowa, Lacey wrote to his brother Will, two weeks before the election, expressing his belief that he was winning back votes which Allison had lost to Cummins in the first senatorial primary. Lacey added that the Mitchell County chairman admitted that Lacey's rally in Osage was the

---

104Hawk-eye, Oct. 21, 1908. Letters of E. F. Cooke, Oct. 17, 23, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258. The miners were to come from Lehigh. Register and Leader, Oct. 23, 1908. Sioux City Tribune, Oct. 23, 1908. The Tribune charged that the denial story was publicized to win political sympathy for Lacey.

E. F. Cooke, who arranged the meeting, warned Lacey against a factional speech. See his letter, Oct. 26, 1908, to A. U. Quint, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258.
best political meeting in the county in ten years. Confidently, Lacey told his brother, "whether I win or not I will make a good race, and it looks as if I will win."105 With even greater detail, Lacey reported to George D. Perkins that he was having good meetings in "the enemy's territory," and that mail from across the state confirmed his belief that all of Allison's vote would be his plus some defections from Cummins' side. "The crux of the situation," Lacey deduced, "is in 106,000 votes not cast in June."106 Lacey advised Perkins of his belief that he would gain votes from this source.

The Sioux City Tribune viewed Lacey's northern Iowa campaign differently. As a result of an interview with Lacey, a Tribune correspondent portrayed Lacey as reminiscing with another lawyer over the days "when they jointly defended corporations." When asked about source materials for so many

105Letter of J. F. Lacey, Oct. 20, 1908, to Will Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 239. Lacey reported to his brother that in June, Cummins had carried Mitchell County over Allison with 1167 votes to 428.

106Lacey had the votes all tabulated. Of the fifty-six counties carried by Allison, only 40 per cent of the Republicans had voted; of the forty-three counties for Cummins, 74 per cent of Republicans had voted. See letter of Lacey, Oct., n.d., 1908, to George D. Perkins, Perkins Papers, P. 4194, 1907-1908. Sage, Allison, pp. 329-330, stated that Allison's strength lay in the southern half of the state, where in June he had lost but six counties while carrying but fifteen in the northern half of Iowa. Sage lists the influence of four railroads in southern Iowa as partial explanation for Allison's strength there. These figures on Allison's record in June should have told Lacey something of the odds against him in northern Iowa.
campaign speeches, the Tribune quoted Lacey as replying that "I say the same things as years ago but I have several new jokes." The interviewer insisted that he found Lacey literature including a copy of the "Yellow Circular," which had caused trouble in the Des Moines area, in the railroad car when Lacey departed from the interview. Not content with this damaging account, the Tribune correspondent went on to say that Lacey's belief in "old time politics" was "evident also from his dress not to mention his conversation." In describing Lacey as wearing "a pair of custom made boots and a very neat but old-fashioned frock coat," the journalist cleverly identified Lacey as a man of the past whose ideas were as outmoded as his clothes.

To the Tribune's devastating article, George Perkins' Journal replied with a calm endorsement of Lacey as a "close friend of Allison's . . . a splendid soldier . . . a hard-working Republican . . . with . . . the power of self-subordination." With obvious reference to the Governor's sense of self-advancement, Perkins' paper implied that factionalism in Iowa would disappear with Cummins' departure from the political scene.

107 Sioux City Tribune, Oct. 26, 1908.

108 Ibid.

While Lacey gave great campaign emphasis to northern Iowa, some of his advisors entertained misgivings on the outcome in the southern part of the state. A. U. Quint and Julian Richards interpreted the abstention of many voters in the Allison primary differently from Lacey. They believed the poor turnout to be an indication of the inefficiency of Allison's organization in southern Iowa. To them, it was alarming that the June senatorial vote south of the Rock Island railroad was 72,000 less than the Republican vote of the area in 1906, a non-presidential election year.\(^{110}\) Standpatters feared that even Des Moines County, Blythe's home territory, was doubtful, because it was "too quiet for Lacey's good." While Standpatters believed Lacey would carry his own district, they hoped for a comfortable margin of 5,000 to 6,000 votes.\(^{111}\)

Consequently, Quint importuned Will Lacey to get out the stay-at-home-in-June vote for his brother. Precinct and poll workers were needed more than speakers, Quint emphasized; moreover, he suggested a personal friend of Lacey's be

---

\(^{110}\) Letter of A. U. Quint, Oct. 26, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261. The area referred to as south of the Rock Island lines comprises the three southernmost tiers of counties in Iowa.

\(^{111}\) Letter of J. A. Devitt, Oct. 28, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258. See the letter of P. F. Crispin of Lacey, Iowa, Sept. 17, 1908, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 108, in which Crispin, a farmer, told Cummins he would carry Madison township in Mahaska County because the farmers there "do not want John Lacey for Senator." He gave no reason.
stationed in each precinct of the district on election day to remind Standpat voters to ask for the special Senate ballot. Over and above his attention to the Sixth District, Quint and his associates in the Des Moines office, telephoned supporters in every southern Iowa county urging them to get out all the voters for election day.112

Almost simultaneously with Quint's organized drive in southern Iowa, the Register and Leader abandoned its neutral position on the primary and adopted a strongly anti-Lacey position. Editor Harvey Ingham took Lacey to task for lifting the paper's earlier editorial content out of context and using it on campaign literature in a way that made it appear the Register and Leader endorsed him. Bluntly, Ingham wrote that "the paper does not endorse" Lacey because "the Major has been out of step with the political march in Iowa for the past seven years." Furthermore, Ingham dissociated Lacey from either Iowa's or Roosevelt's reform programs and linked him with Cannonism.113 Both the Sioux City Tribune and the Des Moines Daily News reiterated the Register's charges, and the News also specifically linked Lacey to the railroad interests of Iowa when it related him


113Register and Leader, Oct. 29, 1908.
to "the same crowd that fifteen years ago fought against Cummins in the Gear-Cummins fight for the Senate."\textsuperscript{114}

When C. W. Johnston of Lacey's Des Moines headquarters replied to the \textit{Register and Leader}'s charge that Lacey opposed Roosevelt's program, the paper refused to print the article. Not to be outdone, Johnston submitted it as a paid political advertisement. Comprising two-thirds of a page and flanked by two-column pictures of Lacey in 1864 as a soldier and in 1908, the advertisement, no doubt, drew more attention than if Ingham had printed it in an obscure manner. Johnston's letter not only contained Roosevelt's endorsement of Lacey in 1903 and again in 1906, but it used quotations from Cummins' speeches on the tariff to make the Governor appear to be a free trader.\textsuperscript{115} Such difficulty with the powerful \textit{Register and Leader} so near to election's eve was unfortunate to say the least.


\textsuperscript{115}\textit{Register and Leader}, Oct. 30, Nov. 1, 1908. For other reprints of Johnston's letter, see \textit{Hawk-eye}, Oct. 30, 1908, and the \textit{Nonpareil}, Oct. 30, 1908. The \textit{Hawk-eye}, asked its readers to choose between the veracity of Harvey Ingham and President Roosevelt in deciding whether Lacey was a supporter of Roosevelt's policies and further declared that the \textit{Register and Leader} had broken the truce which was to have characterized the campaign. See the \textit{Hawk-eye}, Oct. 31, Nov. 3, 1908.
Election results proved that Quint's fears about the voters who abstained in June were well-founded. While Taft carried Iowa with a margin of 70,000 votes, Lacey lost his bid for the Senate by 40,000. Moreover, Cummins' greatest gains over his June primary vote were in the counties formerly carried by Allison. Lacey, thus, not only failed to win the vote of the June abstainers, but he failed to hold Allison's vote in the earlier primary.

In assessing the causes for Lacey's defeat, both the press and Lacey's headquarters turned their attention to the effects of Democratic participation in the Republican primary. Reports from around the state generally indicated that Lacey's poll workers failed to prevent Democrats from voting. In Polk County, Standpatters prepared themselves with precinct lists of Democrats who had earlier signed nomination papers for candidates so that requests for the Senate ballot could be checked against the lists. Ideally sound, the plan collapsed because no one heeded it; casual observers reported

116 Register and Leader, Nov. 4, 1908. Daily Capital, Nov. 4, 1908. Democrat and Leader, Nov. 5, 1908. Daily Capital, Nov. 23, 1908, listed 42,647 votes as Cummins majority over Lacey. See also Cole, History of the People of Iowa, p. 524.

Returns showed that the state Republican ticket was victorious save for W. P. Hepburn of the Eighth Congressional District who lost to the Democrat, William D. Jamieson.

The Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 4, 5, 1908, acknowledged that Lacey's loss was principally in the southern counties where Allison's vote declined from 20 to 25 per cent. The Nonpareil, Nov. 4, 1908, reported that Cummins carried Pottawattamie County after having lost it in June.
no attempt to stop anyone from voting. As the Des Moines Tribune, a Democratic paper, stated, the "Lacey men lost out in securing judges who were 'right' . . . while the opposition cared for this with a scientific nicety."\textsuperscript{117} Attributing Lacey's defeat "undoubtedly . . . to the large Democratic vote," the Oskaloosa Daily Herald claimed that 4,000 Democrats voted in Polk County alone.\textsuperscript{118}

On election day, the Daily Capital reported that perjury charges would be filed against some Polk County Democrats who swore to their right to vote in the Republican primary. The next day, however, Lafe Young switched his editorial line, declared Cummins the rightful nominee and asked all loyal Republicans to support him. While Young acknowledged that many Democrats voted for Cummins, he also claimed that the Governor would have carried the state without counting Democratic votes.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{117}Des Moines Tribune, Nov. 3, 1908. This paper was owned at one time by G. F. Rinehart, former owner of the Newton Herald. The Tribune reported that Cummins men in Polk County outnumbered Lacey workers at the polls by five to one. Daily Capital, Nov. 3, 1908. Hawk-eye, Nov. 4, 5, 1908.

\textsuperscript{118}Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 4, 5, 1908.

\textsuperscript{119}Daily Capital, Nov. 4, 1908. There was no lament over Lacey's loss by Lafe Young. Ottumwa Courier, Nov. 4, 5, 6, 1908, was restrained in comment while it had endorsed Cummins. The Fort Dodge Messenger made no comment between Nov. 6 and 13 when it reprinted a Daily Capital editorial which wished luck to Cummins. The Gate City in its Nov., 1908, issues called attention to the defeat of Lacey, but the issues following the election made no further reference either to his loss or Cummins' victory.
For a time, Lacey and his campaign workers tended to assign great weight to the Democratic intrusion into the primary as the reason for Lacey's defeat. Quint, obviously disappointed in the outcome, noted that Cummins gained in votes by about "25 per cent in practically every county in the state," and concluded there must have been state-wide Democratic votes for Cummins as he had observed in Polk County. Citing the failure of the Register and Leader and other papers to print the total vote for each senatorial candidate, while printing only the margin of the victor in each county, Quint declared such press omission to be tantamount to admission of Cummins' victory with the aid of Democratic votes. If Democrats controlled the Republican primary, Quint added, the legislature could not morally follow the results as a directive in the Senate appointment.

120 For reports to Lacey on this, see Lacey Papers, Vols. 185, 258, 259, 260, 261.


122 Ibid., Nov. 6, 7, 1908. Letter of William M. Reece, Nov. 12, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261, in which Reece also encouraged Lacey to take his case to the Legislature in order to prevent the election of Cummins even though Lacey himself could not be chosen. Reece reported that from 400 to 600 Democrats voted in the city of Ottumwa. George D. Perkins, in a letter, Nov. 10, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 260, acknowledged that the request for the primary ballot did not serve the purpose intended but said nothing about challenging returns.
Lacey suggested that a study be made on the relationship of fraudulent votes to election outcome. If results showed a possibility of Lacey's victory should the Democratic votes not be counted, Lacey planned to request the Governor and the state legislators to launch their own investigation before filling the Senate vacancy. Lacey recognized the difficulty of proving fraud especially in areas where his and Cummins' votes combined were smaller than Taft's totals. Quint, however, worked out a precarious formula to measure Democratic votes in areas where the combined senatorial vote exceeded the presidential vote. Claiming that 20 per cent was a safe estimate of people who voted for Taft but failed to vote in the primary, Quint concluded, without proof or much logic, that in areas where the Senate candidates tallied more than Taft's total, at least 20 per cent of Cummins' votes were Democratic ones. Johnston rejoiced in the prospects of a state-wide investigation, precinct by precinct, and concurred in Quint's judgment that the legislature was morally bound to ignore the primary.


125 Letter of C. W. Johnston, Nov. 9, 1908, to Lacey in reply to Lacey's letter of Nov. 7, 1908, Lacey Papers, Vol. 259.
Julian Richards responded in the same vein as Quint and Johnston. Advising Lacey that he had found enough discrepancy in votes to warrant an investigation, he suggested that the state legislature be made to review all aspects of the primary, even should the study not reveal adequate fraud to overturn Cummins.\textsuperscript{126} As the days passed, however, Johnston grew more discouraged about an attempt to prove fraud, admitting realistically that it was next to impossible to prove conclusively the number of Democratic votes cast.\textsuperscript{127}

Lacey, who shared Johnston's doubts and discouragement, advised all three of his Des Moines office workers of the futility of attempting to challenge the primary returns. Since the legislature was scheduled to both meet and adjourn on November 24 to name the new senator, Lacey pointed out that the legislators would have but one day to consider the results of an election study. A speedy review of the study would no doubt result in his challenge being overruled, Lacey added, and furthermore, such a result would only injure him more in the public's eye. Realistically, he advised his co-workers that "the majority against me while undoubtedly

\textsuperscript{126}Letter of Julian W. Richards, Nov. 9, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 261.

\textsuperscript{127}Letter of C. W. Johnston, Nov. 13, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 259.
fraudulent, is so heavy that I would find myself subject to
criticism for kicking against the inevitable." 128

Reluctantly acquiescing in Lacey's judgment not to
challenge the primary returns, Johnston replied to Lacey's
letter that "we note what you say and possibly you are
right." 129 Quint, who still believed Democrats determined
the outcome of the Republican primary, also agreed to
abandon a fight. 130 With Lacey's concurrence, the two men,
however, proceeded with their plan to publish the results of

128 Letter of Lacey, Nov. 18, 1908, to "Dear Friend"
and penciled on it were the words, "C. W. Johnston et al.",
Lacey Papers, Vol. 260. A summary of Lacey's election study
may be found in Lacey Papers, Vol. 260. Individual letters
from across Iowa in response to his inquiry on voting returns
may be found in Lacey Papers, Vols. 258, 259, 260, 261, 264,
266.

Lacey summarized the results of his study to his
workers in Des Moines. Excluding Polk County, there were 435
precincts in 77 counties in which the combined Senate vote
exceeded Taft's by a total of 4,220 excessive votes, Lacey
wrote. He translated these figures to mean ten Democratic
votes per precinct for Cummins. Then in questionable logic,
Lacey reasoned that "the same percentage would hold good in
all the other precincts, although not susceptible to the same
demonstration owing to the deficit of Republican votes."
Proceeding on the assumption of ten Democratic votes per pre-
cinct, Lacey argued that since there were 2,400 precincts ex-
clusive of Polk County, it would mean 24,000 Democrats voted
for Cummins. Adding that figure to the round number of 4,000
Democrats said to have voted in the Polk County primary,
Lacey arrived at the grand total of 28,000 fraudulent Dem-
ocratic votes cast for Cummins. Obviously, since Cummins
would still have won with a substantial majority without
those votes, Lacey knew his case was lost.

129 Letter of C. W. Johnston, Nov. 19, 1908, to Lacey,
Lacey Papers, Vol. 259.

130 Letter of A. U. Quint, Nov. 21, 1908, to Lacey,
Lacey Papers, Vol. 261.
their study, hoping to demonstrate the inability of the primary law to achieve party goals for which it was designed. While emphasizing that Lacey would take no legal action over the contest, the press release called on the state legislature to devise some method to protect a political party from outside interference in its primary elections.\textsuperscript{131}

Since Lacey proved to his own satisfaction that Cummins would have won without Democratic support, other factors in Lacey's loss must be investigated. Two very pro-Cummins papers claimed that Iowa Republicans evened the score for Lacey's role in the national convention which helped keep Iowa off the national ticket.\textsuperscript{132} A paper in Allison's hometown charged that the press reacted against Lacey's campaign workers' attempt to "fix the papers" with money by planning large-scale political advertisements in the papers at the last minute.\textsuperscript{133} The Des Moines \textit{Tribune} reported two factors

\textsuperscript{131}Register and Leader, Nov. 21, 1908.

\textsuperscript{132}Daily News, Nov. 4, 5, 1908. Sioux City Tribune, Nov. 4, 1908. These two papers were so partisan that their statements on Lacey's loss lacked good taste. The Tribune, Nov. 5, 1908, declared that the fact that Lacey was a poor loser could be "overlooked in the general rejoicing that he lost." The News, Nov. 4, 1908, reprinted his slogan of "Let No Harm Come to the Republican Party," and added, "Well, Major, it didn't."

\textsuperscript{133}Dubuque Telegraph-Herald, Nov. 3, 1908, stated that the Des Moines Daily News would not even sell Lacey's headquarters advertising space.
at work, claiming that Lacey lost the labor vote, and that Cummins would have won in June had it not been sentiment that elected Allison.134

Still other causes contributed to Lacey's defeat. The shortness of the campaign and the lack of organization, especially on election day, hurt Lacey's chances; poll workers were woefully insufficient in number.135 It was essential to have political stature in northern Iowa to carry a state-wide election, and Lacey was little known in that generally anti-Standpat area. Moreover, Allison's death ended his long years of control of the Third District for conservative Republicans. Furthermore, Lacey's image in northern Iowa failed to overcome the stigma of living within the "Reservation." Still another reason for Lacey's defeat in southern as well as northern Iowa lay in his own rejection by Sixth District voters in 1906; that loss enabled his senatorial opponents to label him a loser.

When compared to the more youthful Cummins, Lacey's age worked against him. As one GAR man summed it up, "the

134Des Moines Tribune, Nov. 5, 1908.

fact is, I suppose, we have lived too long. We are in the way of more ambitious people." Then too, Lacey's reliance on the soldier-senator theme, so ably depicted on his campaign literature, tended to identify him with the old soldiers, but, as a Cedar Rapids editor stated, "not with the young, that generation that believes in present duties and in present men." Expressing this same idea, a concept traditionally followed in politics, the Register and Leader succinctly observed that "these are new times and new men must come out."

The Capital had already suggested the conflict over age and times when it editorialized on the day of Allison's death that he was "the last connecting link between the old and the new in American politics." Allison, as a keen interpreter of the public will, determined what public opinion wanted and then secured it, the editor claimed. In

---


137 Cedar Rapids Republican, Nov. 6, 1908. Peter Kiene, in a letter Nov. 17, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 259, told Lacey that his and Colonel Hepburn's defeat together with Hull's narrow victory were signs that "the rising generation of the Republican party in Iowa . . . take but little interest and care nothing for the veterans of the Civil War."

138 Register and Leader, Nov. 5, 1908.

139 Daily Capital, Aug. 4, 1908.
that way, Allison had maintained public confidence, although at times it appeared as if he were on both sides of public questions. Lacey lacked the pliability to change with the times, and he could not adequately replace Allison as the "link" between the old and the new in politics. Basically, Lacey's views were still nineteenth-century oriented in a twentieth-century world.

Blythe suggested to Lacey that "we need not look for causes of Cummins' victory; there were a great many things combining to make it happen as it did." Lacey's nephew, a rising Republican party worker in Oklahoma, confided to his uncle that "I could not see under the circumstances how you could succeed." Actually, with six weeks to counteract Cummins' fourteen-year struggle for the Senate, Lacey never had a chance.

Lacey suffered a double defeat in his own loss in the Senate primary and in Cummins' victory. As a Standpatter, he had repeatedly participated in his faction's contests with Cummins and the Progressives for political leadership and power in Iowa; now he had failed in the last battle against Cummins, a battle he had anticipated over-confidently.

140Wallaces' Farmer, August 21, 1908.


Lacey's loss comprised a second defeat for him, because by it he terminated his political career. Having indicated the Senate was his sole remaining political ambition, and with Dolliver and Cummins safely ensconced in new terms, Lacey knew he would be unable to try a second time.\textsuperscript{143}

There was little comfort for Lacey in a year that marked Allison's death and Cummins' victory. The veteran Standpat Congressman W. P. Hepburn had lost to his Democratic opponent, William D. Jamieson; and six of the remaining Republican Congressmen from Iowa had subscribed to Progressive tenets. When the new Congress assembled, the Progressive majority in the Iowa delegation would be strengthened even more by the addition of Senator Dolliver to their ranks. Assuredly, the traditional pattern of Iowa politics had come to an end.

Lacey's candidacy, however, had made it easier for Iowa Standpatters to vote the Republican ticket rather than to bolt or abstain. Thus, party unity remained intact. Republican candidates had generally won in state and local elections: Governor-elect Carroll presided over a Republican state legislature. Taft carried Iowa handsomely,

\textsuperscript{143}Dolliver was re-elected in 1907; the Iowa legislature assembled on Nov. 24, and following the primary returns, named Cummins to both Allison's short and long terms. Garst, loser in the Republican gubernatorial primary in 1908, assumed the Governor's chair for the duration of Cummins' term.
too. In short, the political anarchy which Standpatters feared would accompany Cummins' political advancement did not materialize.\textsuperscript{144}

---

\textsuperscript{144}Letter of John L. Bleakly, Ida Grove, Iowa, Nov. 5, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258. Letter of Thomas R. Beman, Attorney of Oklahoma law department of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific railway, Nov. 8, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258. See the letter of Nate Kendall, July 11, 1908, to Cummins, Cummins Papers, File 103, in which Kendall treats of the worry of Standpat bolting. Letter of D. M. Anderson, state court judge of Second Judicial District, Centerville, Nov. 10, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 258, which stated Lacey's candidacy "undoubtedly elected Kendall," as Sixth District Congressman. Letter of S. D. Henry, editor, Enterprise (Coon Rapids, Iowa), Nov. 9, 1908, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 259, claimed that without Lacey's campaign slogan, about no harm to the Republican party, many Republicans would have bolted the party ticket.

The strength of Iowa's Republican party was borne out by the Nov. 12 sale of the Des Moines Tribune by G. F. Rinehart to Gardner Cowles of the Register and Leader, effective Dec. 1, 1908. Rinehart said the election returns determined there was no future for a Democratic paper in Des Moines. The Tribune was to be published as an evening paper with the Register and Leader remaining as the morning one.
CHAPTER XV

THE LAST ATTEMPTS

Cummins' victory in 1908 marked the end of Standpat strength in Iowa, and terminated Lacey's aspirations for political office. The veteran politician, however, remained interested in political affairs. During the State Convention fight of 1910, Lacey spoke out on the patronage issue and demonstrated his inability to comprehend the changing nature of Iowa politics. In this struggle, he supported President Taft, who involved himself in the state patronage contest but ignored the rising strength of Progressivism in Iowa—an act which contributed to his alienation from the Progressives in Congress. In 1912, Lacey watched with regret the continued dissension within the Republican party, and the formation of the Progressive party. The pressures of public life behind him, he spent his remaining days practicing law in his home town.

In the months following Iowa's second Senate primary during November, 1908, Lacey devoted some time to furthering bills in Congress which dealt with his lifelong interest
in nature and wild life. He visited Washington to urge the passage of a bill to create a game reserve in the Mount Olympus National Forest, and at least one member of the Department of Agriculture believed that Lacey turned the tide in favor of the measure.

Through his membership on a conservation committee sponsored by the League of American Sportsmen and formed at the request of the National Conservation Commission, Lacey promoted bills which were pending at the time he left Congress. When the chairman of the League's committee sought the members' advice on cooperation with the National Commission, Lacey offered a two-point agenda. He suggested efforts toward a game preserve in every national forest reserve and a law to preserve migratory water fowl.

Lacey was elected president of the Phil Kearney post of the GAR at Oskaloosa for the term beginning Jan. 5, 1909, and when the commanding colonel of the 33rd Iowa Regiment died, Lacey was chosen for the honor to lead the regiment at its annual reunion in 1909. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Dec. 2, 1908, Sept. 10, 1909.

See letter of T. S. Palmer of United States Department of Agriculture, Apr. 3, 1909, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 262. Palmer stated that the bill had languished for years. His letter also indicated that the Department had fifty-one bird reserves and that for the first time, the 1910 Agriculture Department budget contained appropriations for protection of birds on federal forest reserves.

The National Conservation Commission was an outgrowth of the White House Conference on Conservation in 1908. See clipping of the Evening Mail (New York, New York), Aug. 23, 1909, in unclassified Lacey Papers.
during spring migrations. Although pleased with Lacey's practical suggestions for action, George Shields, president of the Sportsmen's League suggested that the agenda be broadened to include all types of migratory birds. Lacey quickly adopted Shields's recommendation.

When John Weeks sponsored a migratory bird protection bill in 1910, he solicited Lacey's support. The bill, however, failed to pass and Weeks renewed his efforts two years later. When this new migratory bird bill was under consideration in 1912, a controversy arose over whether or not prairie chickens were migratory. In this dispute, Lacey

---

4 Letter of William B. Mershon, Chairman of League of American Sportsmen's Conservation Committee, Nov. 30, 1909, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 262. Letter of Lacey, Dec. 30, 1909, to W. B. Mershon, Lacey Papers, Vol. 262. Lacey also pressed Mershon to put game preserves on the existing national forest reserves in order to take advantage of competent game wardens. The former Congressman was well aware of appointments made to such posts for political patronage rather than for competency, he said.


At about this same time, the original Lacey Bird act received recommendations for further strengthening from the Congressional Committee on the Revision of Laws. See letter of Lacey, Feb. 28, 1910, to G. O. Shields, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263.

6 See the letter of Lacey, Mar. 30, 1910, to W. B. Mershon, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263.

sided in the affirmative with George Shields and William T. Hornaday, over the negative judgment of T. S. Palmer of the Agriculture Department. When the migratory bird bill finally became a law in 1913, it provided for an Advisory Board on Migratory Birds, and Lacey agreed to serve on the fifteen-member board. Since the group's purpose was to educate the public about the new regulations, and the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture sought potential members who "knew what they were talking about," Lacey's membership testified to his standing among conservation leaders.

Overlooked by Roosevelt in 1908 for participation in the White House Conference on Conservation, Lacey received an invitation to the second National Conservation Congress. Lacey declined to participate, however, when rumors developed that the meeting would be converted to an "insurgent Republican" conclave.

Lacey also urged support of an amendment to a pending tariff bill which prohibited importation of certain birds and

---


9Letter of P. T. Galloway, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, June 21, 1913, to Lacey; letter of Lacey, June 23, 1913, to Galloway, Lacey Papers, Vol. 264. The federal migratory bird law of 1913 was the Weeks-McLean law.

plumage from foreign countries. While milliners raged against the provision, Lacey worked for it and the amendment passed. He refused, however, to contact Senator Cummins in behalf of the bill, noting realistically that his relationship with the Senator was such that it would do no good to write him. 11 Although five years had passed since the bitter struggle of 1908, personal relations between the two men apparently remained strained.

Lacey was not bashful in assessing his own role in conservation. Perhaps he felt it necessary, considering the controversy involving Taft's conservation officials, to defend his views for liberal terms in opening Alaskan coal lands. Whatever the cause, he wrote to a Seattle judge that "you will remember that I was the original conservationist in Congress, introducing and securing the enactment of the first bills along that line. A good many conservation measures—all of them I believe to be useful—are to my credit on the statute books."12


12 Letter of Lacey, Dec. 4, 1911, to the Honorable Charles D. Fullen of Seattle, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263. For some light on the dispute over withdrawal of Alaskan coal lands, see the Register and Leader, Nov. 7, 1910. This
Although conservation was a consuming interest, Lacey could not keep himself free of the tariff controversy that arose during Taft's administration. When the Payne-Aldrich bill, introduced in the special session of the Sixty-first Congress in the spring of 1909, encountered opposition from Progressives and from what he termed "insurgent newspapers," Lacey prepared for a fight. He advised President Taft that, should he speak in Iowa, he should not mince words on the tariff. Although both Iowa Senators voted against the tariff bill and four Iowans in the House opposed it, the Payne-Aldrich bill became a law.

Defending the bill as a "Republican tariff," Lacey considered the Progressives' disapproval of it one of its paper's article on Ballinger's views on the Alaska coal lands agreed with Lacey's belief that natural resources must be conserved for man's use, not preserved from his use.

Letter of Lacey, Apr. 28, 1909, to President W. H. Taft, Lacey Papers, Vol. 262. Progressives in the Congress, as Joseph L. Bristow of Kansas, Robert La Follette of Wisconsin, Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana, and Moses Clapp of Minnesota, joined in the efforts of Senators Cummins and Dolliver to defeat the Payne-Aldrich bill.

E. H. Hubbard, Gilbert Haugen, Nate Kendall, and Frank Woods opposed it. See the Register and Leader, July 24, 29, Aug. 1, 6, 1909. For reasons as to why Dolliver joined the Progressive camp, see Ross, Dolliver, pp. 243, 281-284. See also Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Epilogue, p. 1.

Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics, p. 249, cites the organized opposition of the Progressives to the Payne-Aldrich tariff as ultimately opposition to "Aldrichism." The party steam roller went over them, however, and only a few Republicans, all from Midwestern states, according to Nye, voted against the bill.
best recommendations. Striking particularly at Iowa's Progressives in the Congress, he declared that "I have no sympathy with their proposition, that the protective tariff is of no value to Iowa." Still clinging to his traditional views, Lacey added that he could never understand how farmers could doubt protection's value to them.  

Reacting to Lacey's criticism, Sixth District Congressman Nate Kendall, who had voted against the Payne bill, defended his vote in such a way as to make it appear that he preferred the Dingley act to the new tariff proposal. Endeavoring to please both Standpatters and Progressives, he explained that the Payne-Aldrich bill discriminated against Iowa's interests with its provision for free hides and lower rates on coal and meat, while at the same time it preserved practically prohibitive rates on shoes, harness, and other manufactured goods. Pointlessly needling his critic, Kendall added that he had "dissented from the Iowa platform of 1908 presented to the State Convention by Major Lacey." Firing back a response, Lacey chided Kendall for implying that the State Convention and the Payne-Aldrich bill were too revisionist for him. After six or seven years of Kendall's


self-description as a revisionist, it was a trifle late for
the Congressman to proclaim himself a Standpatter who had
been forced by a Progressive like Lacey to accept a revision
platform.17

The Lacey-Kendall feud continued unabated when
Kendall removed, on grounds of incompetency, Charles V.
Hoffman as postmaster in Oskaloosa. Since the postmaster,
Lacey's appointee and friend, had but thirty days left in his
term, and Kendall named George C. True, a Cummins man, to
supplant Hoffman, it seemed apparent that Kendall acted from
political motives.18 Although Lacey complained to Postmaster
General F. H. Hitchcock about True's appointment, noting that
True was such a newcomer to Oskaloosa that he lacked voting
residency requirements, the new appointee retained his
position.19

17 Letter of Lacey, Sept. 4, 1909, to Nate Kendall,
Lacey Papers, Vol. 262. Frank Simmons in a letter, Sept. 5,
1909, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 262, spoke of the desire
"to clean out Kendall."

About a month later, Kendall in a letter, Oct. 16,
1909, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 262, offered Lacey sup­
port for nomination as Commissioner of Pensions if the O ska­
loosa Daily Herald dispatch of his selection by Taft were true.

18 See letter and telegram of E. T. Bushnell, Acting
First Assistant Postmaster of the United States, Oct. 23,
1909, to W. R. Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 262. Letter of

19 Letter of Lacey, Nov. 30, 1909, to F. H. Hitchcock,
Lacey Papers, Vol. 262. Letter of Lacey, Nov. 13, 1909, to
Milt McCord, Lacey Papers, Vol. 262, in which Lacey stated
that Hoffman wrote over 900 letters for Kendall in the cam­
paign of 1908 and that Kendall would not come to Lacey's law
office when in Oskaloosa to discuss Hoffman's removal.
Unfortunately, one of Lacey's friends leaked a rumor to the press that Lacey hoped to oppose Kendall's renomination. Consequently, the breach between the two men widened, even though Lacey entertained no notion of actively entering the Sixth District race. Picking up the false rumor, the Register and Leader used it to publicize another Standpat plan against Kendall. Standpatters, the editor claimed, planned to nominate Kendall and then defeat him by voting Democratic in the general election.20

Meanwhile, through the autumn of 1909, Taft displayed a vacillation which eventually brought him into real disfavor with the Progressive faction of his party.21 In Iowa, protracted disputes over postmasterships, similar to the Oskaloosa problem, typified Taft's political irresolution.22


22See Lacey Papers, Vols. 262, 263, for letters to Lacey about similar postmaster troubles in Hedrick, Kanawaha, Coon Rapids, Charles City, and other Iowa towns where the Progressives were attempting to gain control of patronage and discredit Taft. Standpatter incumbents asked Lacey to write both Taft and Hitchcock in their behalf. Lacey was also accused of interfering in the Sioux City postmastership, but denied the charge and also the general accusation that he was a "referee in Iowa appointments" in his letter, July 23, 1910, to Craig L. Wright, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263.
While he at first tended to overlook Progressive candidates for patronage positions, Taft eventually yielded to Progressive strength in Iowa, demonstrated by the primary returns. Before the culmination of the Hoffman-True struggle, patronage difficulties arose in Newton where Kendall had nominated Progressive George Clark as successor to Standpat Postmaster Milt McCord. McCord complained to Lacey about the choice of his successor and requested Lacey to call on both Taft and the Postmaster General upon his next visit to Washington. Standpatters interpreted the move as the first act of open revolt threatened by Jasper County Progressives following Taft's Winona, Minnesota, speech.23 Lacey suggested that McCord induce Jasper County committeemen to sign a petition protesting Clark's nomination to be mailed to Taft; at the same time, Lacey personally wrote to the President in behalf of McCord, his long-time political ally and friend.24

Relating the outcome of the post office struggles to the continuing contest for factional control in Iowa, McCord indicated that it was not too early to start fighting for


control of the State Convention, advising Lacey on New Year's day that Standpatters adopt Cannon's plan to "fight insurgents like you fight Bryanism." Former Sixth District Chairman Ellsworth Rominger expressed a similar Standpat line in recommending Kendall's elimination. Claiming that Kendall was so incompetent that Taft relied on others in naming Sixth District post office assignments, Rominger informed Lacey that Davis County Republicans favored letting Kendall "spend his money and be nominated," and then "clean him out at the polls," by voting Democratic.

Taft notified Lacey that he planned to follow Kendall's recommendation and appoint True to the Oskaloosa postmastership because Kendall, while an insurgent, supported Taft in Congress. At once Lacey fired back a blunt warning to the President. Not only would it be difficult to carry the Sixth District for Taft when "enemies get the rewards," he

25Letter of Milt McCord, Jan. 1, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263. In line with this a Newton attorney suggested that Kendall be named Sixth District party nominee and "face the show against a Democrat." See letter of Henry Silwold, Jan. 18, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers. Vol. 263.

Congressional candidates did not want cleavage lines drawn within the party for they needed both Taft and insurgent votes to win election. But stalwart leaders as Frank Jackson, Lafe Young, C. W. Johnston, Colonel David J. Palmer, Frank Simmons, Bernard Murphy, and Dave Brant thought a fight should be made to control the State Convention. See letter of E. C. Haynes of Centerville, Feb. 8, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 262.

wrote, but he advised the President that a Tenth District newspaper, reflecting that District's strong boom for Dolliver-for-President, editorialized that Taft could not carry one county in the district even "if his opponent were a yellow dog." 27

Although they had not promised to support all Republican candidates on local tickets, Iowa Standpatters had agreed to endorse Taft's administration. Consequently, the President's seeming failure to demonstrate by his appointments that he grasped the realities of Iowa politics angered the Standpatters. 28 Shortly after the primary election returns were in, Taft named two Sixth District postmasters, one in Keokuk County and the other at Newton in factionally torn Jasper County. While Standpatters claimed to have kept both counties safe for the President, he appointed two Progressives to the positions. James A. Devitt, Sixth District Standpat member of the State Central Committee, complained to Lacey, who was in Washington working in behalf of the re-appointment of Newton's postmaster, Milt McCord, that the appointees had led the fight in their respective counties

---

27 Letter of President Taft, Feb. 9, 1910, to Lacey and of Lacey to Taft, Feb. 12, 1910, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263.

28 Letter of Frank D. Jackson, President of Taft-Republican clubs of Iowa, Apr. 11, 1910, to Lacey; letter of Jackson, June 21, 1910, to all Standpat delegates, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263.
against Taft. Devitt wrote that "this is a damn poor reward for the President's friends."

Undoubtedly, the post office appointments distressed Lacey very much. Dubbed by the Des Moines News "Iowa's Standpat agent" to Taft, Lacey had not only spent weeks in Washington advising on the Iowa patronage problems, but he had personally notified the President that George Clark's appointment was tantamount to reward for disloyalty because the nominee had opposed Lacey's re-election in 1906. While Lacey and his Standpat friends considered Taft's acceptance of Progressive nominees a Presidential betrayal of Standpat support, it was the Standpatters who exhibited an unrealistic position. They were unable to recognize that although they carried particular counties for Taft, the President, in view of growing Progressive strength throughout the state, had to reconcile himself with new political realities in Iowa.

In the midst of the appointment dispute, Iowans were surprised to hear that the two controversial names of Clark and Foster for the Sixth District postmasterships had been

29 Letter of James A. Devitt, June 13, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 262. George Clark was the nominee for the Newton post office, and John C. Foster for the Hedrick position in Keokuk County.

recalled from the Senate. John Foster, the nominee from Keokuk County, reacted at once. Angrily, he offered one hundred dollars for any proof that he had supported Dan Hamilton over Lacey in 1906, as alleged in the press. Actually, Lacey had not made this charge of disloyalty against Foster but against George Clark, the Newton nominee. As for the withdrawal of Clark's name, McCord did not interpret it as reassurance for his own chances at reappointment; instead, he questioned the possibility of Taft's reversing himself a second time in favor of Clark.

While Taft continued to hold the nominations open, two separate charges of political irregularity in Jasper County arose to complicate the already complex picture. McCord suggested that many pro-Clark telegrams sent to Kendall were forged, and claimed that he could prove some were. Furthermore, someone reported to the President that ballots for Governor Carroll and for State Convention delegates favoring Taft's views were stolen at Newton, with


32Letter of John C. Foster, July 5, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 262.

33Letter of Milt McCord, June 20, 30, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263.

34Ibid.
George Clark suspected of involvement in the irregular transactions.\textsuperscript{35}

Mistakenly assuming that this information on the missing ballots came from Lacey and thus confirming some truth in the rumor that Lacey was the Taft agent for Iowa, the President requested more information on the Jasper County charges. After assuring Taft that he was not the informant because his interview with the President had followed the withdrawal of Clark's name, Lacey suggested that Hepburn or Frank Jackson might have been the Presidential informer. As it turned out, Congressman Hull proved to be the source of the adverse information on Clark.\textsuperscript{36} At the height of the Jasper County controversy, the Des Moines Daily News and the Newton Record claimed that Taft notified Kendall to clear the Newton post office appointment with Lacey.\textsuperscript{37} Kendall refused, however, and ultimately Taft completed a double somersault and resubmitted Clark's name to the Senate where it received approval.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{35}Letter of President Taft, June 27, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263.


\textsuperscript{38}Letter of Milt McCord, Sept. 19, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263. McCord asked Lacey if they were to
Meanwhile, the struggle to control the State Convention continued. Although Governor Carroll hoped to head the state ticket again, a group of Republicans calling themselves "The Progressive Republican Committee" met and endorsed Warren Garst for the governorship as a man who would be on the right side "in the fight of Iowaism v. Cannonism and Aldrichism."39 Progressives gained additional strength when Senator Dolliver openly joined their ranks. Angrily, Lacey lashed out at what he called "Dolliver's desertion," and charged that the Senator acted because it was "safest" for him to join the dissenters rather than fight them. As an insurgent, Dolliver fit his own earlier description of a Populist, i.e., "a coupon on the Democratic through ticket—worthless if detached."40 At another time, Lacey remarked that when he heard Dolliver "denying Republicanism and preaching the Iowa Idea," he listened "to hear the cock crow."41

turn the county over to "the skunks" i.e., the Progressives without a fight. Taft acted after the Progressives carried the State Convention.


40Letter of Lacey, Apr. 9, 1910, to Colonel Albert Clarke of Boston, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263.

41Notes from Lacey speech, n.d., 1910, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263. Ross, Dolliver, pp. 181-184, treats of the struggle for factional control of the Iowa convention in 1910. He says that local and some eastern Standpatters offered Ret Clarkson a half million dollars to return and establish a
Apparently forgetting his own endorsement in 1908 by the League of American Sportsmen, Lacey vehemently attacked an official of the Iowa State Fish and Game Protective Association for using letterhead stationery to solicit votes for Garst. Indicating that he would not vote for Garst for "dog pelt er," Lacey declared that if Garst received the nomination he would "not only vote against him but actively oppose him at the polls." Upset because he believed that the Iowa sportsmen's organization, of which he was a member, should not be used to advance a man politically, Lacey advised the club's official that he spoke for all the club members in the Oskaloosa area regardless of their political affiliation. Lacey felt so strongly on the issue that he not only openly advocated bolting the ticket but closed his letter with a crudity unmarked in any of his other correspondence.\(^2\)

With the advent of the State Convention, a leading Sixth District Standpatter advised Lacey to return from Washington to lead the Mahaska delegation in the convention

\(^2\)Letters of Lacey to Harry Barmeier, May 7, 12, 1910. Lacey told Barmeier that "... I think you have made an ass of yourself, with a big A." See also letters of Lacey to Harvey Ingham, Lafe Young, and Governor Carroll, May 7, 1910, all in Lacey Papers, Vol. 263.
Standpatters looked to Lacey as a leader in the state-wide struggle. He found the work satisfying, believing that he thereby contributed more to the Republican party than if he were seeking office. Now that Allison and J. W. Blythe were both dead, Lacey exuded a greater self-confidence and a rougher fighting spirit than before.

The opposition also considered Lacey a rugged fighter and Robert J. Fleming, Chairman of the Progressive Republican Committee, singled him out for special attack. Not only did Fleming link Lacey to Cannonism, but he held him responsible for the Newton and Hedrick postmaster fiascoes in Jasper and Keokuk Counties. In a scathing criticism of Lacey, the Progressive chairman displayed deep bitterness, declaring that "permanent harmony can never result from surrendering a well earned majority in the State Convention to please a few

---


44 Letter of Lacey, Apr. 9, 1910, to Colonel Albert Clarke of Boston, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263.

45 See Chap. III of this study on Blythe's death and Chap. XIV for Allison's. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, July 14, 1910, referred to Hepburn, George D. Perkins, and Lacey, leaders respectively of Page, Woodbury, and Mahaska Counties, as the "triumvirate of republican Romans." A Ding cartoon in the Register and Leader, July 31, 1910, showed the three above men with Jackson, Hull, and Lafe Young labeled "Indians on the Reservation" carrying tomahawks and eyeing the fair child of Progressivism in Iowa.
toothless political wolves of the Lacey stripe, who have worn their fangs down to their ulcerated gums by a lifetime of gnawing at the public crib."\(^{46}\) Calling on all Progressives to fight fairly, Fleming urged them not to submit to having their "political throats cut" by Standpatters who now called for harmony, although they would have bolted for the Democrat, Claude Porter, had Carroll lost the gubernatorial nomination to Progressive Garst. Carefully distinguishing among the Standpatters, Fleming called on Progressives to support the state ticket because, he stated, Carroll and other Standpatters on it were not a part of the "Lacey-Taft outrages."\(^{47}\)

Just prior to the opening of the State Convention, in early August, ex-governor Frank Jackson, who was president of Iowa's Taft Clubs, called a meeting of the chairmen of all county delegations for Taft.\(^{48}\) Lacey's speech sounded the keynote of the meeting which endorsed Carroll, Taft, and the Payne-Aldrich tariff. Urging all regular Republicans to


\(^{47}\)Ibid.

\(^{48}\)Letter of Frank Jackson, President of Taft-Republican clubs of Iowa, July 19, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263.
fight to the end, Lacey reminded all to "go down carrying the flag of true Republicanism," should the Progressive steam roller pass over them. "We must remember two things," Lacey declared, "first, that it is necessary that Iowa go Republican and second, and most important, it is necessary that the Republican party go Republican." 49

The State Convention convened the following day. With Senator Cummins presiding as temporary chairman, his old opponents revealed little zeal for harmony. When Cummins paused in his address to wait for applause after citing the Progressivism of all Republican Presidents from Lincoln to Roosevelt, the Standpatters interjected cries of "Taft, Taft," for some ten minutes. Reportedly, Lacey began the outburst when he jumped into the aisle shouting, "Why

49 Daily Capital, Aug. 2, 1910. Register and Leader, Aug. 3, 1910. The "regular" Republicans were politically embarrassed just prior to the State Convention by the indictment of Governor Carroll on a libel charge against John Cownie, Progressive member of the State Board of Control which exercised jurisdiction over Iowa's state institutions other than the universities. The twofold charge against Cownie stated that he sold diseased cattle out-of-state and accused him of misconduct while on a state visit to the Girls School at Mitchellville, Iowa. An October trial acquitted Carroll of the libel charge when it was shown that he sought to protect Cownie's good name and that Cownie had published the charges about himself in a letter to state senator, Fred Maytag, in order to discredit the Governor's chance of re-election. See the Register and Leader, July 21, Oct. 1, 1910. Iowa City Republican, July 21, Aug. 3, 1910. Daily Capital, Sept. 21, 22, 24, 26, 30, 1910. Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Sept. 30, 1910. Letter of Lacey, July 30, 1910, to W. G. Ray of the Grinnell Herald, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263, in which Lacey pointed out that the grand jury which indicted Carroll failed to consider that Cownie admitted to Maytag that he had sold diseased Iowa cattle in Omaha.
not Taft too?" When the Standpat Republicans would not stop chanting, Progressive delegates from the Fourth and Tenth Districts began yelling, "Shut up!" Still other delegates from the Seventh District, Cummins' home area, hissed the name of Taft and those supporters calling out in his behalf.

After quiet returned to the hall, the Progressives were in complete control. Dolliver served as permanent chairman over the Standpatters' choice of J. C. Mabry of the Sixth District, and the Progressives carried a majority of the Resolutions Committee. Although regular Republicans represented five districts on the State Central Committee, the insurgents controlled that body.

Under the leadership particularly of Lacey and Hepburn, the Standpatters, now self-styled the "regular" Republicans, fought the insurgents at every step. At one time, Lacey boldly challenged a ruling by Dolliver concerning

---


the platform. Lacey had introduced a resolution calling for separate votes on platform planks which had not met unanimous approval of the Resolutions Committee, but Dolliver ruled him out of order. When put to a voice vote, the delegates defeated Lacey's challenge and upheld Dolliver's ruling.54 A dissenting minority, however, hissed Chairman Dolliver's decision.55 Following Lacey's pre-Convention advice to the Standpatters to go down with "colors flying," some Standpatters even voted against the plank endorsing Governor Carroll rather than go on record as favoring the party's platform.56 Rejecting the Payne-Aldrich tariff as a satisfactory fulfillment of the party's promises on tariff revision, the platform endorsed Taft's "efforts" rather than Taft himself.57

54Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Aug. 5, 1910, gives a full account of Lacey's role and especially his challenge of Dolliver. The Herald condemned Dolliver for his ruling, and reminded him that at the 1908 National Convention, Chairman Lodge permitted separate votes on disputed resolutions. See also the Register and Leader, Aug. 4, 1910. Letter of J. L. Waite, editor, Hawk-eye, Aug. 4, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263. Reprint of Daily Capital in Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Aug. 12, 1910, speaks of the Progressives' efforts to have Lacey "put out" of the Convention.

55Cole, A History of the People of Iowa, p. 526.

56Register and Leader, Aug. 4, 1910.

57Ibid., Daily Capital, Aug. 4, 1910.
Iowa's revolt against the President was symptomatic of the national revolt against him, a feeling so pronounced that some Eastern papers predicted that without abatement of the anti-Taft sentiment, Roosevelt would again be a Presidential candidate in 1912.\textsuperscript{58} No doubt existed that in 1910 Iowa Republicanism was split wide open.\textsuperscript{59} Cummins' men, in control, opposed the Taft wing of the party; Taft's supporters, on the other hand, felt no obligation to support men they did not consider Republicans.\textsuperscript{60}


\textsuperscript{59}Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt 1900-1912, p. 225, stated that the Republican party had split before Roosevelt left office in 1909. His unsatisfied demands during his last two years in office were said to have given the Progressives a platform and to have created a situation which spelled trouble for Taft. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era 1910-1917, pp. 4-5, stated that Taft's decision to root out insurgent candidates in the Middle West in 1910 was his last step from "Progressivism to conservatism." Link said, however, that in spite of ruthless use of patronage, money, and the best orators the rank and file of the Midwesterners refused to reject their local leaders. This spelled the doom of Taft and ultimately of the Republican party in 1912. Link claimed that already by 1910, there was considerable talk of a third party should Taft be renominated.

\textsuperscript{60}Register and Leader, Sept. 30, 1910, distinguished between eastern and western Progressives with defense of the primary election bill their one common factor, because Iowa Progressives in the name of Roosevelt rejected Taft and his tariff while New York Progressives in the name of Roosevelt endorsed Taft and all his works. The Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Sept. 30, 1910, interpreted the Progressives' action differently and defined insurgency as a "local issue chiefly important as a method of getting office."
While the Oskaloosa Herald eulogized Lacey for his valiant fight at the State Convention for the "Carroll-Young-Lacey-Rominger Republicanism of Iowa" against the "Cummins-Dolliver" variety, it was very evident that Progressivism was the wave of the future in Iowa.\(^6\) Reflecting its editorial assertion that Progressivism was the portent of Iowa Republicanism, the Register and Leader printed a cartoon in which a farmer used a cornstalk pencil to write "Progressive" in the air.\(^6\)2

Although the cartoon graphically demonstrated that Iowa's farmers had abandoned Standpat doctrines, the Register and Leader predicted that the tariff would be the election issue following the fight of the State Convention.\(^6\)3 Rumors flew too, that Standpatters would "knife the Progressive candidates pretty freely." Some Standpatters even decided to contribute campaign funds directly to favored candidates rather than to channel them through the State Central Committee. Democrats, reportedly, were especially hopeful in four of the districts.\(^6\)4

\(^{6\text{1}}\)Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Aug. 16, 1910.

\(^{6\text{2}}\)Register and Leader, Aug. 4, 1910.

\(^{6\text{3}}\)Ibid., Aug. 7, 1910.

\(^{6\text{4}}\)Ibid. Democrats hoped to capture the First, Second, Sixth, and Eighth Districts. Letter of C. W. Moore of Storm Lake, Aug. 6, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263. See the Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Aug. 9, 1910, for reprints from Iowa newspapers on the State Convention. See also letters of S. D. Henry, editor, Enterprise (Coon Rapids, Iowa), Aug. 8, 15, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 262.
Suddenly, as two years earlier, the death of an Iowa Senator interrupted the state campaign. On October 15, Dolliver died unexpectedly while being examined by his physician. When the method of choosing a successor became a question, the Democrats offered two suggestions. They recommended an informal primary to be ratified by the state legislature, or, as in 1908, a special primary at the general elections. The Republican State Chairman rejected both suggestions, however, and contented himself with urging all Republicans to vote in the fall elections so that the state legislature would be Republican and thereby guarantee election of a new Republican Senator.65

As for Dolliver's successor, a few Republicans believed it should be Lacey. Milt McCord, who refused to work for the ticket in Jasper County because Taft had in the end named George Clark to the Newton postmastership, offered to campaign for Lacey should he choose to make the race. To McCord, Lacey was just the person to "succeed a man who failed to treat... Lacey" respectfully, at the last State

65*Register and Leader*, Oct. 16, 1910. *Daily Capital*, Oct. 17, 21, 24, 1910. Form letter of C. F. Franke, n.d., 1910, Lacey Papers, Vol. 262. The amended primary law of 1908 provided for special Senate primaries when necessitated more than thirty days before the general election date. From Dolliver's death to the fall election, it was approximately three weeks.
The Iowa City Republican declared that Lacey was the "most available" person.

Within a month of the Senator's death, however, Governor Carroll named Lafe Young to fill the vacancy until the new state legislature met the following spring. Lacey believed his record in the 1908 primary entitled him to the Senate seat, but he publicly rejoiced with Young in his new honor. With a real sensitivity to Lacey's claim to the

66 Letter of Milt McCord, Oct. 20, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263. This was exaggeration born of defeat, for an unfavorable ruling from the chair hardly equated to disrespect.

67 Letter of Ira J. Adler, Iowa City attorney, Oct. 22, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 262. Adler narrowly claimed that Dolliver was hurt politically by his support of Cummins and that the anxiety over this broke his health.

68 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 12, 1910. Lafe Young held the post but a short time, for William S. Kenyon was named by the Iowa legislature in Apr. 1911, to supersede Young in Dolliver's seat until March, 1913. See the Iowa Official Register, 1911-12. See also Cole, A History of the People of Iowa, p. 529, which stated that factionalism in the Iowa legislature prevented Young from election in his own right and permitted the election of William S. Kenyon, a Fort Dodge attorney of the Illinois Central Railroad and a conservative Republican with Progressive tendencies. See also Bateman, unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, Epilogue, pp. 2-4, on the election of Kenyon.

In 1912 Lafe Young contested Kenyon's right to a new six-year term on the Senate. While abstaining from using the Daily Capital in his own behalf, he did, with Lacey's urging, initiate a letter campaign which included requests for support from all of Iowa's "old soldiers." See letter of Lacey, Jan. 15, 1912, to Lafe Young; letters of Young, Jan. 16, Mar. 4, 18, May 11, 1912, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 264.
office and for his feelings in being passed over, Young replied that Lacey's congratulatory message "was the one particular telegram that I was anxious to receive, and I appreciate it."  

Although Dolliver's death deprived Iowa Republicans of a powerful campaign voice, the state did not follow the national trend in the election. While the House of Representatives went Democratic for the first time since 1892, Iowa maintained its long years of Republican dominance and yielded only one district, the often-Democratic Second, to Irvin Pepper from Muscatine. Kendall won re-election over Dan Hamilton in the Sixth District.  

Final tallies of the gubernatorial race gave Carroll a victory over Claude Porter, the Democrat, with 20,000 votes to spare.

---

69 Letter of Lafe Young, Nov. 20, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263. Letter of A. U. Quint, Dec. 3, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263, in which Quint agreed that Lacey had received a majority of Republican votes, i.e., not insurgents, in the 1908 primary.


71 Oskaloosa Daily Herald, Nov. 9, 11, 16, 1910. The Herald explained Iowa's favorable returns as the result of Republicans having supported the whole Republican ticket as did Mahaska County which gave both Governor Carroll and Congressman Kendall a victory. See also Cole, A History of the People of Iowa, p. 529, which stated that politicians in Iowa could not account for Carroll's re-election in 1910.
After the 1910 elections, Iowa's chairman for Taft determined to keep up his organization on a quiet but efficient basis for use in 1912. But Lacey had cooled in his devotion to the President by the close of 1910, and declined to go along. There was no chance of a successful Taft organization in Iowa, Lacey declared, so long as the President continued to seek advice from LaFollette, Cummins, and the Kansas Progressive Joseph L. Bristow, and appointed men like Clark, Foster, and True to postmasterships. Taft's actions indicated that "he doesn't see any difference between his friends and his enemies." While Lacey admitted that he liked Taft personally and would have enjoyed supporting him in 1912 had the President's actions indicated he wanted assistance, Lacey realistically concluded that he could not help him under the circumstances. If things did not change, Lacey added that he might have to choose "Sherman or some other good man before 1912."73

Amidst some talk in Iowa of naming Cummins a favorite son candidate for President in 1912, Lacey offered Taft what

72Letters of Frank D. Jackson, president Taft-Republican clubs of Iowa, Nov. 25, Dec. 15, 1910, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263.

73Letter of Lacey, Dec. 8, 1910, to Frank D. Jackson, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263. "Jim" Sherman was Vice President and long-time conservative associate of Lacey in the House of Representatives.

The President realized he had engaged himself in a hard fight. His suit against the United States Steel Corporation further alienated Roosevelt followers and also businessmen. See letter of Lafe Young, Oct. 28, 1911, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263.
amounted to a "last chance" to prove himself. Though an intermediary, he urged the President to renominate at once the present federal office holders, even though Iowa's Congressmen preferred to wait until after the 1912 primaries revealed the direction of state politics. Immediate action by the President would strengthen his support among Standpat or the self-styled regular Republicans in Iowa, Lacey reasoned, while it would leave no ground for complaint by the Congressmen who had willingly passed up their chance to submit names for the offices. Such a proposal for Presidential intervention was impossible to carry out as Lacey should have known if he had recalled his own patronage problems during his last term in the House.

In the interim between the campaigns of 1910 and 1912, Iowa's Progressivesturned their attention to the popular political reforms of the day. Lacey, of course, opposed all such suggestions for change. When the demand for a new state primary law emerged, he disapproved of it because he considered it a step "toward direct Presidential


75 Letter of Lacey, Dec. 11, 1911, to United States Senator Murray Crane, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263. That same day Lacey wrote a letter to W. P. Hepburn to inquire if, as well as Crane, should talk to Taft. Hepburn declined to interfere and told Lacey that Carroll and Lafe Young were Taft "stars" in Iowa. See letter of Lacey, Dec. 11, 1911, to Hepburn and letter of Hepburn, Dec. 18, 1911, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263.
elections." A primary applied to a national contest, he declared, would mean Democrats would participate in Republican primaries, and such fraud in some states could not be offset by honest election returns in others.76

When Lafe Young joined Cummins and the Register and Leader in recognizing the value of a state primary, Lacey dissented. A primary with precautionary provisions to avoid the voter's crossing party lines, Young reasoned, would be especially useful in large urban centers. Rebutting that argument, Lacey reminded Young of the fraudulent Democratic votes in Des Moines during the 1908 primary and added that primaries allowed cities to overpower the rural vote. This ultimately could mean a Democratic state legislature. Since Young was a candidate for the Senate in 1912, Lacey clearly implied that he should uphold the position of his Standpat friends. He was weary, Lacey advised, of being asked by his associates, "What is . . . the matter with Lafe Young?"77

Still later, when an effort was made in 1913 to extend the Iowa primary to state judiciary elections, Lacey opposed such action as "the last straw." Still exuding strong

76 Letter of Lacey, Sept. 30, 1911, to Lafe Young, Lacey Papers, Vol. 263. Apparently, Lacey was not bothered by Republicans voting in Democratic primaries.

personal antipathy for Cummins some five years after his personal confrontation in the Senate primary, Lacey linked his dislike of a primary to Cummins' victory over him. The primary law worked so well in winning votes "for one man" in 1908, Lacey charged, that Mahaska County Democrats used the primary election in 1912 to win control of the county. Participating in the Republican primary, Democrats helped select weak Republican candidates and then defeated them in the November elections. Lacey firmly believed that opening the judiciary to such a similar election practice would result in the same "political wreck." Thus, Lacey's opposition to the primary never wavered, nor did he alter to any degree his basic reasons for disapproving it.

When the Progressives endorsed the popular demands for the initiative, referendum, and recall, Lacey dismissed them as "support for something new in order to be Progressive." Sarcastically, he declared that such practices were hardly new because they dated from the Roman Republic, where it was a common occurrence to bribe voters as had been done in recent Midwestern primaries. Consistent with his opposition to a judicial primary, Lacey termed judicial recall a "heresy." 79


Lacey, seemingly unable to grasp the depth of Progressive strength in Iowa and in the nation in 1912, considered it a desirable goal to overthrow the whole movement at the earliest possible date.\textsuperscript{80} He was unwilling to seek Standpat support for the gubernatorial nomination in 1912, saying that Cummins would work to secure votes for the Democratic nominee should Lacey represent the Republicans. He lamented that George W. Clarke was "Cummins' choice" for the party's nominee.\textsuperscript{81}

While Lacey did not participate to any great extent in the Republican party's presidential struggle in 1912, he privately supported Taft over Roosevelt. In a personally executed cartoon, Lacey pictured a large rabbit labeled "nomination" running quickly away from Roosevelt, while the latter followed with outstretched arms in hot pursuit of the rabbit. The caption read: "I will accept the nomination

\textsuperscript{80}Letter of Lacey, Mar. 29, 1912, to C. H. Van Law, Progressive candidate for nomination for Lieutenant Governor of Iowa on Republican ticket, Lacey Papers, Vol. 264. Van Law had read law under Lacey when preparing for admission to the bar. See also Van Law's letter, Mar. 1, 1912, to George D. Perkins, Perkins Papers, P. 4194, 1912.

\textsuperscript{81}Letter of Lacey, Feb. 8, 1912, to Colonel D. J. Palmer, Iowa Railroad Commissioner, Lacey Papers, Vol. 264. George W. Clarke was the Progressive Lieutenant Governor of Iowa from 1909. He won the party nomination for Governor and the election in 1912. Clarke, not to be confused with the candidate for Newton's postmaster, was from Dallas County. See Iowa Official Register, 1909-1910, 1911-1912.
if tendered."\(^{82}\) At the Republican State Convention, which, contrary to the Progressive trend in Iowa politics and for reasons difficult to assess, was a victory for Taft forces, the Sixth District carried solidly for the President.\(^{83}\)

Meanwhile, Nate Kendall, who had received renomination at the Sixth District Congressional Convention, decided, as D. B. Henderson did in 1902, to withdraw from the race. According to Lacey, Kendall must have "considered the race hopeless in the present condition of the party" in Iowa.\(^ {84}\) Sixth District Republicans faced a problem in finding another candidate, because any Republican would face a difficult race. Moreover, the party had to agree upon the manner of selecting the candidate.\(^ {85}\)

Since the primary law did not cover such circumstances, Lacey suggested a special party convention to choose a nominee.

\(^ {82}\)Letter of Lacey, Mar. 20, 1912, to George D. Perkins, editor, Sioux City Journal, Perkins Papers, P. 4194, 1912.

\(^ {83}\)Clipping from Cedar Rapids Republican, Apr. 25, 1912, unclassified Lacey Papers. See also Harlan, History of Iowa, II, 256-258. Taft won sixteen delegates to the National Convention, while Cummins won ten. One possible explanation is that Progressive Republicans hesitated to deny renomination to an incumbent President.

\(^ {84}\)Letter of Lacey, Aug. 9, 1912, to C. W. Ramseyer, Davis County attorney, Lacey Papers, Vol. 264. The party split and the "Bull Moosers" formation of the Progressive party had occurred before Kendall's withdrawal.

\(^ {85}\)Ibid. Letter of C. W. Ramseyer, Aug. 8, 1912, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 264.
Offering Ellsworth Rominger his endorsement for the position, Lacey indicated that the Standpatters would have a better chance of winning if the "Bull Moosers" would enter a candidate. Such a person, Lacey believed, would attract disgruntled Republican voters who would otherwise support the Democratic Congressional candidate, Sant Kirkpatrick. When someone suggested that Lacey enter the contest, he demurred on the grounds that he had done his share of work. But he again demonstrated his inability to come to grips with the political realities of the day, when he added that "I believe, however, that I could be elected if the Bull Moosers put up a candidate." While attributing a three-cornered race to his defeat in 1890 and to the traditionally close vote in the Sixth District Congressional races, Lacey in 1912 inconsistently endorsed such a partition of votes.

The District Convention reconvened and selected Milt McCord, the long-time Newton postmaster and Standpat leader in Jasper County to replace Kendall. Aware of the difficulty ahead of him, McCord's perception of it deepened as the days

86 Letter of Lacey, Aug. 9, 1912, to C. W. Ramseyer, Lacey Papers, Vol. 264. Letter of Lacey, Aug. 12, 1912, to Ellsworth Rominger, Lacey Papers, Vol. 264. This was Lacey's first use of the term "Bull Moosers."

When McCord lost to Kirkpatrick, he expressed no surprise nor embitterment. Rather he indicated satisfaction with having carried Newton and Jasper County after his many years of political embroilment in city and county affairs. He was sorry, of course, that the district returned to the Democrats.

While George Clarke, a Cummins' Republican, carried the gubernatorial vote in Iowa, many Republicans voted for John L. Stevens, who headed the state ticket for the newly formed Progressive party. Thus Clarke's margin of victory was considerably narrower than usual for the Republican candidate.

Compared to his role in the 1910 State Convention struggle, Lacey played a relatively inactive role in the Taft-Roosevelt struggle in 1912. In Lacey's own words, he "took a great deal of comfort . . . in being busy at my profession rather than involved in the brutal struggle precipitated by

---

88 Letters of Milt McCord, Sept. 8, Oct. 19, 1912, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 264. McCord complained that Mahaska County was not moving, and that without Lacey's and James Devitt's work it would fall to the Democrats.

89 Letter of Milt McCord, Nov. 18, 1912, to Lacey, Lacey Papers, Vol. 264. McCord, in opposition to Lacey's earlier views, admitted that his defeat was no surprise to him for a three-cornered fight in a district which usually carried or lost by a slim majority had not looked promising.

90 See the Iowa Official Register, 1912-1913. William L. Harding was Lieutenant Governor.
Colonel Roosevelt."^91 No longer able to accept Roosevelt's ideas or to respect Taft as the trusted leader of "regular" Republicans, Lacey withdrew from political activity. Although Taft carried Iowa at the Republican State Convention, he trailed both Woodrow Wilson and Roosevelt in the general election. Lacey's last hope to curb Progressivism went down to defeat in the election of Clarke, a Progressive Republican although not the candidate of the Progressive party, to Iowa's Governorship and in the selection of a United States President who was not only a Progressive but a Democrat.

Lacey devoted the remaining months of his life to his law practice. With a long career marked by hard work, whether in law or politics, it seemed appropriate that he should have spent the last hours of his life at work in his law office. For a man who was devoted to his family, it was equally appropriate that he should die at home. Struck by a heart attack, he was dead within moments of entering his home after walking from his office on September 29, 1913.^92

---

^91 Letter of Lacey, Dec. 21, 1912, to Senator Curtis of Kansas, Lacey Papers, Vol. 264. Lacey had accepted Curtis' invitation to speak in Topeka, Jan. 1913, on "straight-out" Republicanism.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCLUSION

John Fletcher Lacey's public life roughly corresponded with the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century. During that time, the Republican party dominated Iowa politics except for rare Democratic victories.¹ The Republicans regained their hegemony in 1892, by capturing ten of the eleven House seats. The party's congressional victory in Iowa that year was all the more significant because the nation selected the Democrat, Grover Cleveland, for the White House.

Iowa Republicans built a power base by welding together farmers, laborers, and small business men in the defense of high protection and by eliminating prohibition from the party's creed. Added strength came from the support of the state's railroad machine. Republican party leaders and candidates looked especially to two men. N. M. Hubbard of Cedar Rapids and J. W. Blythe of Burlington, for direction. These skilled politicians, while never holding office

¹Iowans elected a Democratic governor in 1889 and 1891. In 1890 Democrats won a majority in the Congressional delegation.
themselves, exercised vast power in Iowa politics during their lifetime.

Republican power in Iowa, however, began to shift in 1901, and by 1908 a new direction was accomplished. In 1901, the Republican state platform introduced a tariff concept which called for revision whenever the tariff served as a "shelter to monopoly." The politically ambitious Albert Cummins endorsed the new tariff concept termed the "Iowa Idea," and although having suffered two defeats for the Senate, won the governorship of Iowa.

In his precedent-shattering three terms as governor, Cummins fought continually to win control of party leadership in Iowa away from a conservative-minded Congressional delegation headed by the astute Senator W. B. Allison, one of the Senate's Big Four. Gradually, Iowa Republicans divided into two factions, those who looked to Cummins for leadership, and those who still looked to Allison and also Blythe, counsel for the Burlington railroad.

During the long years of controversy between the two Republican groups, the tariff issue divided the party; and the concepts of protection and free trade were interpreted and used to meet the needs of both factions. By 1903, Iowa Republicans styled themselves either Standpatters or Progressives, and both groups claimed to be the only authentic type of Republicans represented by Theodore Roosevelt. When the President refused to become embroiled in the tariff
controversy, Standpatters in Iowa claimed victory. Cummins' followers then turned to the issue of Progressive reform legislation, accused Standpatters of being subservient to the state's railroad machine, and linked them to the political domination of America by the trusts.

Lacey was typical of this anti-Cummins or Standpat brand of Republicanism. Reared on a farm and self-educated for the most part, he twice enlisted in the Civil War. With an enviable war record, he returned to Oskaloosa to practice law in that community. Eventually drawn into politics by the Republicans' plan to rescue the Sixth Iowa District from the clutches of James B. Weaver, the triple-coated politician who had gone from Republicanism to Greenbackism and who would in 1892 be the Populist candidate for President, Lacey entered his first race for national office in 1888. He won ten consecutive party nominations and safely carried his district every election except for 1890 and 1906. In 1908, in the face of Progressive triumph, he unsuccessfully challenged Cummins for the Republican nomination to the Senate. Lacey could not prevent Progressive control of Iowa's state convention in 1910.

Politically, Lacey accepted what Richard Hofstadter terms the "agrarian myth," believing that farm prosperity was essential to national prosperity.² He did not fit

²Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, pp. 24-59.
Hofstadter's thesis, however, when he claimed that a highly protective tariff was necessary to insure continued national growth. Declaring often that America's consumers would make America's producers prosperous if only farmers and laborers had money to buy, Lacey adopted a cyclical view of the tariff which left business, labor, and farm prosperity dependent on each other. Protection from foreign competition insured national markets for both farm and industry and thereby resulted in national prosperity, Lacey expounded, in a simplistic theory closely analogous to Henry Clay's American System of the early nineteenth century.

Because his Congressional district fell within the area of southern Iowa dominated by the Burlington railroad, Lacey deferred to the political judgment of J. W. Blythe. He also cultivated the friendship of Allison. Therefore, Lacey's political base was typical of the Republican party in Iowa before the 1901 platform adoption.

While Lacey worked with Allison and Blythe to perpetuate what Standpatters considered to be true Republicanism, he grew consistently more critical of Progressive views. Furthermore, the personal antipathy existing between Lacey and Cummins accentuated the political differences between the two men. After 1901, Lacey attempted to destroy Cummins' brand of Republicanism by cooperating in the Standpat plan to portray the Governor as a free trader and one who was out of step with the sound party creed of national Republicanism.
Party government was one of Lacey's firmest political beliefs, and he considered Cummins' and fellow Progressives' endeavors to fight for the primary and other reforms as definite attempts to undermine party structure. Simultaneously, he resisted the Progressives' efforts to relate tariff to the problem of trusts in America.

Maintaining the rigidity of his opposition to tariff revision and to other Progressive demands for change as long as he could, Lacey, by 1906, found it politically expedient to endorse the cry for railroad reform; and, by 1908, he was forced to espouse the need for tariff revision. The twin pillars of Lacey's support, high protection and the railroad machine, were swept away by the rising tide of Progressivism. By 1910, Lacey could no longer accept Theodore Roosevelt's ideas, and two years later the Iowan lapsed into political passivity. Although Lacey considered Taft a conservative and worked, without success, to carry Iowa for his views in the party battle of 1910, Lacey believed by 1912 that the President had accepted Progressive ideology. It was Taft's great misfortune that the Progressives felt equally betrayed by Presidential actions.

While Iowans rightly identified Lacey with railroads and with hopelessly old-fashioned views, they failed to give him credit for the pioneering side of his legislative work. As one of the nation's foremost leaders in the field of
conservation, he left a formidable record. Devoted to the preservation of birds, wild game, forests, and scenic wonders, his efforts resulted in significant legislation in each of those areas. Iowans, belatedly grateful for his endeavors, attached his name to the Lacey-Keosauqua state park.\(^3\)

Despite his success in conservation leadership, Lacey was best remembered for the defeat of his political views. He was typical of the Iowa Republicans who held nineteenth century views as a dike against the reforms of the twentieth. The death of Allison and Blythe, however, and Cummins' advancement to the United States Senate, completed the restructuring of Iowa's Republican party leadership and marked Progressive triumph over Standpat principles.

While Lacey's long and stormy career earned him a reputation for rigidity and obstinacy as well as blindness to the growing unpopularity of vested interests, even his foes conceded his abilities. Honesty, dedication, devotion to principle, and constant hard work were qualities which both friend and foe recognized and respected.

Although Lacey was not one of the great political leaders in Iowa's history, he contributed importantly to the

\(^3\)Cole, I Remember, I Remember, p. 330. See also memorial article by William T. Hornaday in Lacey Papers, Vol. 267, in which Hornaday wrote that "Lacey was the first member of Congress who made the cause of the wild birds and beasts particularly his own."
mosaic of Iowa's complex politics. At the time of Lacey's death, the editor of a paper bitterly opposed to the Congressman's struggle against Progressivism, offered a fair assessment of Lacey's role in Iowa's political history when he wrote:

Politically . . . Lacey found his later years unprofitable. He was one of those who, having lived under the conditions of an earlier time, refuse to change. A born conservative in all things he was strictly a conservative in politics. . . .

Major Lacey was never a great man. He knew that and once spoke of it to the editor who writes this article. He never did great things in statesmanship or advanced startling theories of government, but he was a worker and a useful man wherever his activities led him. That is the word which describes the man best, "useful."4

4Clipping from the Times-Republican in the Iowa Pamphlet Collection, State Historical Library, Des Moines, Iowa. See the same collection for clippings from over fifteen other Iowa papers whose eulogies at the time of Lacey's death reflected their interpretation of Lacey's worth. See also Pammel, Lacey Memorial Volume, pp. 3-50, 52-67.
LIST OF REFERENCES

Manuscript Collections


Cummins, Albert B. Papers. Des Moines, Iowa: Iowa Historical Library.


________. Diary. Des Moines, Iowa: Iowa Historical Library.

________. Papers. Des Moines, Iowa: Iowa Historical Library.

________. Scrapbook for Campaign of 1888. Des Moines, Iowa: Iowa Historical Library.

________. Scrapbook No. 1165. Des Moines, Iowa: Iowa Historical Library.

Perkins, George D. Papers. Des Moines, Iowa: Iowa Historical Library.

Weaver, James B. Papers. Des Moines, Iowa: Iowa Historical Library.

Official Records


United States Congress. Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st sess., 1901.
Unpublished Sources

Bateman, Herman E. Unpublished manuscript on A. B. Cummins, University of Arizona, n.d. (Typewritten.)


Interview


Miscellaneous


Journal Articles

Annals of Iowa, II (Apr., 1895), 32-44.


Annals of Iowa, XII (July, 1915), 134.


Annals of Iowa, XIII (Jan., 1923), 545-546.

Annals of Iowa, XVI (Jan., 1929), 550.


Books

Alden, B. D. **Prohibition Handbook for Iowa.** Mt. Vernon: Mt. Vernon Hawk-eye Publisher, 1901.


Briggs, John E. **William Peters Hepburn.** Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1919.


- James Harlan. **Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1913.**

Clark, Dan Elbert. **History of Senatorial Elections in Iowa.** Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1912.


- I Remember, I Remember. Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1936.


Faulkes, F. W. **Iowa's White Elephant.** Cedar Rapids: Gazette Company, 1893.


Lees, James H. History of Coal Mining in Iowa: With Coal Statistics. N.D., N.P.


Posten, Margaret L. This Is the Place—Iowa. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1965.


Swisher, James A. The Iowa Department of the Grand Army of the Republic. Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1936.


Newspapers

The following newspapers may be found in the Iowa Historical Library, Des Moines, Iowa:

Burlington Hawk-eye (Iowa), 1888-1890, 1900-1910.
Council Bluffs Nonpareil (Iowa), 1900-1910.
Des Moines Daily Capital (Iowa), 1901-1913.
Des Moines Daily Iowa Capital, 1888-1901.
Des Moines Daily News (Iowa), 1900-1910.
Des Moines Iowa Staats-Anzeiger, 1900-1908.
Des Moines Iowa State Bystander, 1900-1908.
Des Moines Iowa State Register, 1888-1902.
Des Moines Leader (Iowa), 1888-1890, 1900-1902.
Des Moines Register and Leader (Iowa), 1902-1913.
Des Moines Tribune (Iowa), 1907-1910.
Des Moines Wallaces' Farmer (Iowa), 1904-1908.
Keokuk Gate City (Iowa), 1900-1910.
Newton Herald (Iowa), 1888-1910.
Oskaloosa Daily Herald (Iowa), 1888-1913.
Oskaloosa Saturday Globe (Iowa), 1900-1910.
Ottumwa Courier (Iowa), 1900-1910.
Sioux City Journal (Iowa), 1900-1910.
Sioux City Tribune (Iowa), 1900-1910.

Newspapers--Clippings and Reprints

The following clippings and reprints may be found in the Iowa Historical Library, Des Moines, Iowa:

Albia Southern Iowa Educator.
Albia Union (Iowa).
Anita Republican (Iowa).
Audubon Republican (Iowa).
Baxter New Era (Iowa).
Bloomfield Farmer (Iowa).
Brooklyn Chronicle (Iowa).
Cedar Falls Record (Iowa).
Cedar Rapids Gazette (Iowa).
Cedar Rapids Republican (Iowa).
Centerville Journal (Iowa).
Charles City Intelligencer (Iowa).
Chicago Chronicle (Illinois).
Chicago Evening Post (Illinois).
Chicago Record-Herald (Illinois).
Chicago Tribune (Illinois).
Clear Lake Mirror (Iowa).
Colfax Banner (Iowa).
Colfax Clipper (Iowa).
Davenport Democrat and Leader (Iowa).
Davenport Republican (Iowa).
Decorah Public Opinion (Iowa).
Denison Review (Iowa).
Des Moines Chronicle (Iowa).
Dubuque Telegraph (Iowa).
Dubuque Telegraph-Herald (Iowa).
Dubuque Times-Journal (Iowa).
Elkader Argus (Iowa).
Fairfield Ledger (Iowa).
Fort Dodge Messenger (Iowa).
Grinnell Herald (Iowa).
Grinnell Signal (Iowa).
Harlan Republican (Iowa).
Hedrick Herald (Iowa).
Iowa City Republican (Iowa).
Kanawha Record (Iowa).
London Chronicle (England).
Marshalltown Times-Republican (Iowa).
Mason City Globe-Gazette (Iowa).
Monroe Mirror (Iowa).
Montezuma Republican (Iowa).
Mount Vernon Record (Iowa).
Nevada Representative (Iowa).
Nevada Republican (Iowa).
New Sharon Star (Iowa).
Newton Daily News (Iowa).
Newton Iowa State Democrat.
Newton Record (Iowa).
New York Evening Mail (New York).
New York Evening Post (New York).
New York Sun (New York).
Odebolt Chronicle (Iowa).
Oskaloosa Times (Iowa).
Ottumwa Democrat (Iowa).
Ottumwa Saturday Herald (Iowa).
Ottumwa Saturday Review (Iowa).
Ottumwa Sun (Iowa).
Ottumwa World (Iowa).
Richland Clarion (Iowa).
Rockwell City Advocate (Iowa).
St. Paul Dispatch (Minnesota).
Vinton Benton County Times (Iowa).
Washington Press (Iowa).
Washington National Tribune (D. C.).
Washington Post (D. C.).
Washington Times (D. C.).
West Liberty Index (Iowa).
What Cheer Chronicle (Iowa).

Magazines--Clippings and Reprints

The following clippings and reprints may be found in the Iowa Historical Library, Des Moines, Iowa:

American Economist, The.
Events.
Millinery Trade Review.
Shields' Magazine.