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SIGNED: 

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It may be that a sign of effective education is the changing of the meaning of the subject matter in the mind of the student. If this is true, then many of my teachers have been effective, as I have never come to a settled conception of politics. I do not wish to try to name all of those teachers here; but one teacher in particular has raised questions that have forced me to abandon the psuedo-science fad of contemporary political science, and have helped me to continuously more meaningful levels of understanding. His guidance in the writing of this dissertation has been typical of his guidance in all teaching situations: critical, insightful, and helpful, but never intolerant or overbearing. The conclusions of this dissertation are my own, but the argument would have been much weaker without his help before and during its preparation. I am especially appreciative to have been taught by Phillip C. Chapman.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
	ABSTRACT	vi
I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	THE MEANING OF LOSS OF COMMUNITY	11
	The Ideal Types--Community and Society	14
	The Loss of Shared Norms and Values	20
	The Loss of Common Sense of Identity	34
III.	THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY AND THE LOSS OF COMMUNITY	43
IV.	POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES	73
	LIST OF REFERENCES	84

ABSTRACT

Those social scientists and social commentators who have possessed the apparently rare ability to stand back from modern society and see it, not as an unrelated series of meaningless events, but as a coherent inter-related process of change, have tended to see this change in a negative light. They have argued that alienation and loss of community are the consequences of modernization.

Aristotle argued that community was the essential basis of politics. I believe that the major political theorists of the modern period have been groping to conceptualize the political consequences of the loss of community. But it has been certain sociologists and social psychologists who have carried on that tradition since the beginning of the Twentieth Century.

I have drawn from two of those theories what I think are the most useful ideas available to conceptualize the theory. The concept which Eric Fromm calls individuation most clearly explains what happens to the individual as community is lost. This is the process by which individuals exchange a sense of identity with others for a sense of self-identity.

Emile Durkheim has shown effectively how, at the level of social organization, there is an association between the weakening of common values and the increase of the division of labor.

In this dissertation I have described the loss of community in terms of the above two theories, and I have attempted to explain it by drawing together and adding to the explanation of Fromm and Durkheim. My argument is that modern social organization replaces community gradually as population density pressures men to break with the past and a growing economic surplus makes that break possible.

There are many political consequences of these changes. If the ancient idea that politics is inseparably connected with community is true, then the loss of community must be the greatest political event of our time. I have concentrated on the idea of freedom and the loss of community, because I believe that this idea focuses our attention on the most urgent consequences of the change. Robert Nisbet and Eric Fromm argued that totalitarianism might be the political order of the future, if the "quest for community" is not satisfied in some other way. I disagree, but I think that as men free themselves from the restraints of community, they may be subjecting themselves to a political life equally restraining, if not as unpleasant, as totalitarianism. That is the "unfreedom" of impotence. And this "unfreedom" is, I believe, a potential source of great accidental injustice from the political system.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The following passage opens a well known work on community: "One may paraphrase the famous words of Karl Marx and say that a specter is haunting the modern mind, the specter of insecurity."[1] The author, Robert A. Nisbet, goes on to argue that alienation and cultural disintegration are distinguishing characteristics of our times. The existence of this crisis of community is a common theme in modern social literature.

Nisbett claims that most modern philosophies of history represent history as a process of decay. He cites Toynbee's A Study of History as an example. He points to the works of Niebuhr, Bernanos, Berdyaev, Sorokin, Dewey, Ortega y Gasset, and Fromm as examples of social comment on this situation.[2]

Novelists, poets, and playwrights have also explored this theme. Nisbett mentions Proust, Mann, Joyce, Kafka, and Eliot among them. This contrasts with the optimism of social commentary and the literary theme of escape from the ties of culture that predominated during the previous

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1. Robert Nisbet, Community and Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 1.

2. Ibid., p. 8. Not all of the writers listed here are pessimistic as Nisbet seems to imply, but they do concentrate on the problem of loss of community and alienation.

century. In the 19th Century the intellectual was an optimist; in the 20th he is a pessimist.

The social sciences tell us that modern man is alienated and lonely. Yankeetown is disintegrating, urban man exists in a lonely crowd and the modern worker is ". . . forced back upon himself, with no immediate or real social duties. . . ."[3] Modern man seeks an "escape from freedom."

Nisbet attributes the isolation of modern man to the decline of community. This has occurred for several reasons. The values that a group passes on to its new members, and that hold the group together, remain constant only so long as those values are related to the total pattern of social institutions in which the individual participates.[4] Families, churches, local groupings, guilds, classes, etc., (the traditional communities) are more and more separated from the economic and political functions that they once had. The entire social order was once a unity and participation in each of these communities was the means of participation in the whole. The immediate needs of the individual were met through such participation and the obligations associated with them seemed natural and relevant. We still expect some of these groups to perform the function of socialization of people but (for reasons that will become clear) they are no longer institutionally relevant. Therefore they do not have the capacity to evoke the loyalty that is needed to perform the socialization function.

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3. Elton Mayo, The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization (The Harvard University Press, 1945), p. 7, as cited in Nisbett, op. cit., p. 15.

4. Nisbet, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

Another important aspect of modern life is the bureaucratic nation state. Nisbet believes that the nation state has systematically taken over more of the functions which traditionally were performed by communities in order to unify populations. But the state has rarely been able to provide man with the sense of community that he needs and seeks.[5]

There is one value that seems to be accepted by most modern men: that is that every man is entitled to his own values. Even though men still strive to find some basis upon which to build a verifiable value system, the consequences of Hume's discovery that we cannot prove assertions of value are more evident to more and more people. So long as a man's life was lived out in a stable community where he was relatively certain about very fundamental assumptions, these assumptions constituted a stable world view and seemed secure; from them other values could be derived. In fact, in many cases basic values are not even articulated or made conscious until they are questioned. But in the modern world where men are exposed to a variety of cultures and where the world is in a dizzying state of flux the status of metaphysical and moral principles becomes more and more dubious. When all men believe in God no one thinks very much about it. But when some men argue that there is no God men become conscious of the question of God; those who believe in God must then find reasons for believing. When social values and meaning are changing and new values exist side by side with old values then men feel compelled to try to explain values. Thus much of

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5. Peter Berger, An Invitation to Sociology (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1963), Chapter 2.

modern social and ethical science is made possible by the relativity of values.

Modern sociology as a separate field of knowledge came into existence in France and Germany near the end of the 19th Century. In France the Revolution in 1789 began a process of dissolution of traditional culture that was a very dramatic period in history. During the 19th Century it was more and more apparent in France that culture was not an immutable reality. Peter Berger argues that it was these circumstances that made the occurrence of the Durkheimian school of sociology in France a natural event at the time. Berger also argues that in Germany at about the same time historians were gathering immense catalogues of data about a variety of historical events including the revolution that was taking place in France. From this material came an awareness of the relativity of values.[6] Berger argues that German "historicism" was an attempt to deal with the problem of value relativity. This historical awareness of relativity was enhanced by the rapid social change that occurred in Germany with the industrial revolution. Tonnies' attempt to describe the traditional culture which he saw existing beside the emerging modern culture and the sociology of Max Weber which followed are in part a result of German historicism. These two schools (German and French sociology) became the theoretical sources of modern sociology.

There is a common theme in these two schools which is still the basis of significant features of every modern sociological theory,

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6. This point was, of course, made by Nietzsche in The Use and Abuse of History, trans. Adrian Collins (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1969).

although the substance of the theme now fades into the background at times. That theme, which is expressed in Tonnies' Community and Society and in Durkheim's The Division of Labor in Society, is the demise of community as the basic form of social organization, a demise that is closely associated with industrialization and modernization.

The ideas that will be discussed in this dissertation have roots in much of the political philosophy of the 18th and 19th Centuries. The liberals proposed that human society exists by the rational choice of men. Social contract theory and the doctrine of natural rights idealized individualism and rationalism and tended to deprecate traditional morality. Adam Smith introduced an interesting twist to this general trend in philosophy by pointing out that, even though individualistic competition benefits society, the behavior involved is the exact opposite of moral goodness so far as the entrepreneur who competes is concerned. As Joseph Cropsey points out, the fact that the father of capitalist theory saw clearly the distinction between "morality," or commitment to one's fellows, and the rational competitive ethic that made capitalism a dynamic moral force casts a " . . . strange light. . . on Marx's theory that capitalism contains the seed of its own negation."[7]

In arguments against the liberals Burke pointed out that man is by nature a part of society; that his happiness is dependent upon the security that society provides; and that the stability of society and the security of its members depends upon the sense of identity with the

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7. Joseph Cropsey, "Adam Smith," in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, History of Political Philosophy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 570.

past which traditional values and institutions ensure. The point being made here is that the distinctions between rationality and tradition, between mere convention and convention based on a sense of common identity and an emotional attachment to a set of values; and the distinction between the solidarity of the division of labor and the solidarity of community grew in the consciousness of social and political philosophers over a long period of time.

Some philosophers, like Burke, did not believe that the rational, economic motives and the modern philosophies attributed to men are sufficient to hold society together. Hegel shared this skepticism and his distinction between civil society and the state clearly influenced modern sociology through Tonnies, whom we will examine in some detail in Chapter Two. It is no accident that social commentary turned away from a focus on the political and religious aspects of society in the period of Enlightenment. This shift of focus reflected changes in the nature of society; we shall attempt to show that those changes are what is meant by the phrase "loss of community."

De Toqueville saw the political nature of these changes in what he described as the "progressive development" of society toward a condition of "social equality," a condition which he thought led inevitably to democratic regimes. "Effort to halt democracy appears as a fight against God himself."[8] De Toqueville perceived another possibility that will appear in some of the materials that we will review in more detail: equality naturally leads to democracy, but that democracy can

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8. Democracy In America (New York: Mentor Books, 1956), p. 6.

be perverted into tyranny. Individualism and materialism, as distinguished from authority and morality, are the chief values of modern society. But in a society where every man is for himself no man has any power. While equality and freedom seem to be values that go together, if equality is threatened men may sacrifice freedom in order to achieve and maintain equality. De Toqueville sees the solution to this problem in exactly the same terms that Nisbet does: freedom of association is fundamental to maintenance of freedom in modern egalitarian society. Through associations men can combine their efforts to overcome their individual impotence.

It is ironic to note that the liberal philosophy of the 19th Century is an attempt to justify the escape of modern man from the conditions of community while the characteristic literature of the 20th Century expresses a desire to return to community. When modern men became sufficiently individuated (to use Fromm's terms) to realize that community was not an inevitable aspect of existence they sought to escape from it. But when individualism began to be realized in full they sought to escape from that.

It is not the purpose of this dissertation to review in detail the development of these ideas. Nisbet has done that with some of the important philosophers of the Enlightenment. Any history of political thought will provide this review. They are mentioned here briefly to call attention to the fact that the ideas did not originate full blown in the theories that we will examine and to demonstrate that the social changes which are described here were in progress long before the 20th

Century and were recognized by astute observers of society during that earlier period of time.

However, no theory provided an adequate explanation of these changes as a total phenomenon. De Toqueville was the first to attempt this:

> The whole of this book has been written under the impulse of a kind of religious dread inspired by contemplation of this irresistable revolution advancing century by century over every obstacle. . . . God does not himself need to speak for us to find sure signs of his will. . . . I know, without special revelation, that the stars follow orbits in space traced by his finger. . . . (The) discovery (of this change) in itself gives this process the sacred character of divine will.[9]

We will look, however, at some more profane attempts to explain the change. I am convinced that the thread of continuity in the history of political thought in the modern period can best be understood from the point of view of the problem of the decline of community. But there is a far more important reason for examining the problem. An understanding of this social change is the key to explaining most of the continuing political problems of our time and especially the problems of political development.

This essay can be divided into four logical parts, which are not, however, necessarily separated from each other physically in the essay. First, I have attempted to conceptualize the loss of community by showing that several seemingly different authors were really looking at the same phenomenon in different ways. Each of their different conceptualizations gives certain insights that are an integral part of the conception that I offer. Second, as each of the different conceptions

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9. <u>Ibid.,</u> p. 6.

attributes the social changes that are the loss of community to basic changes in the conditions of people's lives, my conceptualization is inextricably associated with an explanation as to why the change is occurring. This explanation incorporates the factors used by all of the theorists examined except that of Nisbett. But even in the process of refuting Nisbett's explanation we learn something about the nature of the phenomenon.

It is not the purpose of this essay to report or criticize the authors examined. At one point I started with a very vague and superficial idea of what community means. It was in trying to understand these works that I developed a conception of community, and I can think of no better way to explicate that understanding than to retrace the steps by which I came to understand. I am not, therefore, so much concerned with their accuracy as historians or logicians as I am with communicating the understanding to which they led me.

Third, in the process of trying to understand what has happened to community, I have come to believe that this phenomenon is the common link that connects economic development and social modernization with the various changes which political scientists call political development. Community is at the heart of the idea of politics in the tradition of western political thought. The alleged loss of community must be of great political consequence. The real intent of the essay is to try to understand the political condition of modern society. The fourth element, then, is a statement of some of my own values about these conditions. I do not apologize for inserting my own values, vague and incomplete though they may seem, because I believe we all

have, not just a privilege, but an obligation to try to make life better. In fact, the very essence of the loss of community (with emphasis on what is lost) is the loss of shared values. I believe it is important to try to prevent that loss from proceeding further.

CHAPTER II

THE MEANING OF LOSS OF COMMUNITY

The problem raised in Chapter I can appear to be deceptively simple. Medieval and primitive men were (and are) members of communities which deprived them of freedom on the one hand and provided them with security on the other. By this we mean that there were shared and unquestioned values which defined a man's place in the world and gave meaning to his life, while at the same time limiting his freedom to choose goals and seek individual happiness. But, modern men are constrained by society and there was freedom of choice in medieval society. Some men did change social status in the Middle Ages and not all modern men are able to choose their occupation and status. If the quest for security is as urgent as Fromm and Nisbett think, why are middle class youth of today so taken up by what seems to be a "quest" for freedom? Burning draft cards and seeking to "do your own thing" do not appear to be actions of insecure people; on the contrary, this movement seems in some ways to be very much in the spirit of 19th Century liberalism. What long haired, bearded eighteen year old would not agree with J. S. Mill, that

> With regard to the merely contingent . . . . injury which a person causes to society by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to

> any assignable individual except himself, the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear for the sake of the greater good of human freedom.[1]

As we examine the problem in the context of actual social and political situations two things are apparent. First, the individuation of modern man is far from a completed social process--modern man is more individuated than medieval man or primitive man.[2] Second, the term community (as well as the notion of loss of community) refers to very complex social phenomena. In the abstract the concept makes sense; it is clear that the pattern of responses of men to the groups to which they belong and to the structure of those groups has changed; that change can sensibly be called loss of community. But the word community refers, in a vague way, to phenomena that are very difficult to describe.

The "specter of insecurity" mentioned in the opening paragraph of this essay is linked by many writers to the general alienation that is said to characterize the present time. Seeman distinguishes between work alienation, a feeling of powerlessness, alienations based on ethnic status differences (or resulting from prejudices) and loss of community. Seeman suggests that:

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1. John Stewart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Currin V. Shields (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1956), p. 100.

2. We tend to talk about the phenomenon of the loss of community as though it is a comparison of 20th Century men with men from past generations. It makes equal sense to compare 20th Century western man with traditional cultures that exist today. See, for example, Colin Turnbull, The Lonely African, (New York: Clarion Books, 1962). We choose here, for the moment at least, to think of the loss of community as social change and to emphasize the transition from medieval Europe to modern western culture.

> Community means either (a) a common _fate,_ determined by objective interdependence and interaction, often (but not necessarily) territorially delimited (e.g., the ghetto community or the university community); (b) a common _identity,_ determined by personal sentiments of belonging and attachment--what we usually mean when we speak of the "sense" of community (again, by no means necessarily tied to a locality, but also to family, neighborhood, or work colleagues where located); or (c) common _aims_ determined by agreement in value--that is, a community more or less in the sense of shared norms and values.
>
> It is the latter two that commentators chiefly worry about--on the one hand the sense of loneliness and rootlessness in urbanized society, and on the other hand the danger that with the loss of traditional values we "can no longer achieve the consensus needed for collective life." These concerns are about the alienations I have elsewhere called "social isolation" and "cultural estrangement".[3]

In this chapter we will review some attempts to describe this condition of modern man. We will see, first, a psychological typology developed by Ferdinand Tönnies which corresponds to the nation of community _(Gemeinschaft)_ and to what we might call non-community _(Gesellschaft)_ social organization. Second, we will look at a change that Emile Durkheim saw as a continuing change (upon which all significant social change was based) through history from primitive to modern society. Durkheim discovered two kinds of social relationships existing side by side; one can be said to correspond to Tonnies' _Gemeinschaft_ and the other to his _Gesellschaft._ The progressive shift in predominance from the former to the latter is the very foundation of social

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3. Melvin Seeman, "The Urban Alienations: Some Dubious Thesis from Marx to Marcuse," _Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,_ 1971, V. 19, No. 2, p. 140. Emphasis and parentheses in original. The quote in the next to last sentence was from: S. Keller, _The Urban Neighborhood_ (New York: Random House, 1968). For the discussion of social isolation and cultural estrangement mentioned in the last sentence see "Alienation and Estrangement" in Campbell and Converse, eds., _The Human Meaning of Social Change,_ (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation), 1972.

change. Tönnies asserts that his purpose is to study "relationships of mutual affirmation."[4] Durkheim wants to explain sources of cohesion or social solidarity. Thus both address the same question.

The Ideal Types--Community and Society

Tönnies' theory begins (logically) with a simple conception of human psychology; there is in each person an individual will and a social or collective will. The individual will is what we normally conceive as will--the desire to act in certain ways and the ability to choose how one will act. The social will consists of the norms and values that each person has learned. The individual will may be divided into natural will, which expresses a desire to act to carry out drives or satisfy needs of the body, and rational will, which strives to regulate and direct the body. Natural will is emotion and rational will is rational calculation of means-ends relationships. All persons are motivated by both types of will, but as a person matures the rational will comes to be more dominant. Some individuals come to be more conditioned by rational will than others. "The businessman, scientist, person of authority, and the upper classes are relatively more conditioned by rational will than the peasant, the artist and the common people."[5]

Some associations exist because men are born into social life and are committed by the natural will to associate. It is in this sense that men are naturally social. These associations may be said to exist

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4. Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society, ed. Charles P. Loomis (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), p. 33.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

because of the natural will. They are called Gemeinschaft or community and may be divided into three types. Kinship communities are based on blood relationships; neighborhood communities are based on living in the same place and the consequent frequent interaction; friendship communities, Gemeinschaft of mind, are based on frequent contact between people with common values such as religious groups or occupational associations. Members of Gemeinschaft "love each other, or adjust themselves to each other." They understand each other (meaning that they are emotionally committed to each other) and they "dwell together" and "organize their common life."[6]

The group will, or social will of Gemeinschaft is typically custom and tradition. It is ". . . kept as sacred inheritance of the ancestors."[7] Tönnies says that the "will of the Gemeinschaft in its most elementary forms" is "understanding and concord" which "are one and the same thing."[8] Apparently understanding means consensus or sympathy.[9] One can sensibly read into Tönnies' discussion at this point the idea that the group will of Gemeinschaft is a set of unselfconsciously accepted values which are not agreed to because to agree to them would be to consciously question them. However, the discussion is difficult to follow and this may be attributing more to Tönnies than he tried to say.

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6. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

7. Ibid., p. 76.

8. Ibid., p. 48.

9. Ibid., p. 47.

But there is another kind of association that exists because men make a rational decision to associate for some common purpose. This kind of association is called Gesellschaft or society. The group will or social will of Gesellschaft consists of the shared conventions that are associated with the rational will. There is a need for some objective value when people engage in acts of exchange; Gesellschaft exists to regulate exchange.

Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft consist of the shared values that are passed to the individual by his group; again, Tönnies calls this set of values the group will because it corresponds, or we might better say, is a consequence of, the wills of individuals. He says of Gemeinschaft:

> For besides the inherited forces and instincts, the influence of a community as an educating and guiding will is the most important factor determining the condition and formation of every individual habit and disposition. Especially is the family spirit (Familiengeist) important, but also is every Geist which is similar to it and has the same effects.[10]

The individual brings to the group certain predispositions that influence the nature of group life; but the group also determines, through imposing its Geist (culture), the nature of the individual.

> The whole, in its various transitory manifestations may, therefore, appear to be their [the individual units of the organic whole--in this case the group] product, although it is conceived as a lasting material or metaphysical existence, i.e., as the unity of these permanent relations [between the parts]. In this [latter] sense, the whole creates these elementary organisms [the individual members of the group, in this case]; they are, so to speak, accidental and capable of being destroyed [without destroying the whole].[11]

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10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 171. Tönnies is actually speaking of the human body here, but he then argues that each person relates to his Gemeinschaft as the cells of the body relate to the person.

This relationship between the whole and its parts is characteristic of organic wholes. In this sense Gemeinschaft is organic. Gemeinschaft is a product of natural will. Its most basic form is the relationship between a mother and child. It is characterized by the sentiment of liking. This occurs between mother and child because they need each other and they bring satisfaction to each other. But all family relationships are Gemeinschaft relations; husband and wife based in the beginning on the need to procreate; brothers and sisters based on common experiences and continued association; father and child based again on mutual needs (although this relationship is less urgent than in the case of mother and child) and on the father's sense of the child as the continuation of the father in time. In non-modern communities the sibling type relations are extended to cousins and uncles and aunts.

Gemeinschaft can also be based on living in a common locality (Gemeinschaft of place) and on sharing a common point of view (Gemeinschaft of mind). The former would be exemplified by a village or neighborhood; the latter by common working place or common church association.

Gesellschaft is based on the utility of other persons as opposed to sentiments that identify one with others. Action in Gesellschaft is motivated by exchange. Each party feels he must gain from each interaction. Therefore there is no common thing existing between parties; there is no sense of shared identity. The need to create a common thing or common basis for acting, leads to creation by legal or social fiction of common identity. Because this common basis of relationship is created rationally by man out of existing social ideas (rather than existing automatically due to natural forces), Tönnies calls the organization a

mechanical one. Gesellschaft exists to regulate exchange: there is a need for some objective judgment of value during the time of the interaction. This judgment is provided through the Gesellschaft. Since the creation of relationships and rules to order the relationships is by deliberate, rational choices, the Gesellschaft can be said to result from the rational will.

Tönnies describes the rules or norms which regulate interaction in Gesellschaft as mere convention. Tradition and custom, which are the norms of Gemeinschaft, can be called convention, but they are more than convention. (They are, in other words, convention based on practice and respect for or identity with the past). But in Gesellschaft the norms are followed because they are agreed upon; they are not sacred (as traditional mores are) but are generally accepted ("kept for general use").[12]

Typical Gesellschaften would be a city, a nation-state, a "Republic of Scholars," or a corporation.

Tönnies' purpose was to explain the very different modes of cooperation which he had experienced as the son of a peasant in an industrializing community and as the brother of a merchant who had frequent contact with English merchants: the world of tradition and the world of rational profit making.

He first tried to find a psychological basis for this explanation and in doing so he produced something remarkably like Freudian theory. There is the system of non-rational impulses--the natural will; the system that regulates those impulses to deal with the external

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12. Ibid., pp. 75-76.

realities of experience--the rational will; and the aspect of the mind that is learned from social interaction--the group will. (The two theories are not identical, especially with regard to the ego, but the similarity is striking). Tonnies concludes that there are two kinds of human group; one comes into existence, as Hobbes asserted, because the rational will chooses its existence; and the other exists because of the natural social instincts of men. The one is more stable and emotionally rich, characterized by giving; the other is competitive and is characterized by greed and self-seeking. Tonnies denies this, and perhaps we feel it because of our own values, but one cannot help but feel that Tonnies much preferred Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft.

Before turning our attention to Durkheim, it should be noted that what Tonnies has consciously tried to do in this work is to show that both the liberal and the conservative interpretation of the origins of society are partially correct. There are social relations that are held together primarily because men will them to exist (by social contract) and there are those that are held together because of the sympathetic and moral nature of man. In fact, he tells us, there are elements of both in all associations, but by using the two conceptions as ideal types we can see that the one (organic) prevails in traditional associations, but that the other (purposive) is becoming more predominant in modern business, urban life and in the modern state. Durkheim's position is not to reconcile the two positions (conservatism and liberalism) but to show that the liberals are all wrong in the idea of the social contract. This fact may explain why, despite the fact that he never mentioned Tönnies' work in the Division of Labor in Society, he deliberately chose to use the words organic and mechanical in the opposite

way from the way that Tönnies used them.[13] Durkheim wanted to show that the liberal view was wrong in that soliderity is not a matter of rational choice, but a consequence of social conditions which individual men do not have the opportunity to either choose or reject.

The Loss of Shared Norms and Values

Durkheim's conceptualization of community can best be understood in the context of his theory of social change. He set out to determine the function of the division of labor as it related to the nature of men's sense of social obligation or social solidarity. Durkheim points out that in theories of ethics there are two bases of attraction between people: one type of theory says that people who have similar interests are drawn together; the other that people are drawn together because they are different in certain complimentary ways. The moral function of the division of labor is that it creates this latter kind of solidarity. Just as the difference between sexes is the quality which forms the basis of marriage, the differences between economic functions bring people together in order to better accomplish desired ends. Human history consists of the constantly increasing complexity of the division of labor beginning with the sexual differences and progressing first to more complex differences of function between men and women and then differences within larger social organizations. The study of the division of labor begins as an attempt to test the hypothesis that the function of division of labor is to bring about solidarity or cohesion in society.

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13. Ibid., p. 277, see note 27.

Methodologically, Durkheim argues that solidarity can be studied at either a psychological level or at a sociological level. The tendency in the past has been to focus on the psychological bases of solidarity. Durkheim argues that this is not solidarity. It is the thing which makes solidarity possible. To properly understand solidarity we must understand the sociological nature of solidarity; we must study solidarity as a "social fact."[14] In other words, psychology can only explain necessary causes; it is through sociology that we can find sufficient causes of social phenomena.

We cannot see or directly experience the social phenomena of solidarity because it is an "internal fact." Therefore we must choose some result of solidarity to use as an index to measure it by. The index chosen by Durkheim is law. This choice is not an arbitrary one. Solidarity leads to interaction and interaction must be regulated; it is regulated by custom which is formalized into law when the pattern of interaction is regularized.[15] It is true that law is an imperfect

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14. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 67. This paragraph in The Division of Labor is important to a proper understanding of Durkheim's work. The key concept, the collective conscience, can be understood as a metaphysical reality existing in the atmosphere like a magnetic field. (See Ibid., pp. 79-80). If Durkheim's references to the collective conscience are read with this paragraph in mind it is clear that he means culture. Although he does not explain it by the mechanism of socialization, he wants to clearly impress on us that social facts are derived from social experience. Like Tonnies, he wants to deny the liberal conception of society as a sum of the characteristics which individuals bring to their social experience. The individual is potential to be many things. His culture and his social experience determine which of those things he will become. Thus society determines the individual and not vice versa.

15. Ibid., pp. 64-65.

indicator of custom. But like all the indicators used in science, it is seen as the best we can get, and it is adequate for purposes of generalization.[16]

The first step in the study is to classify forms of solidarity through noting the forms of law. Law consists of "rules of sanctioned conduct." A common and useful way to classify law is to distinguish types of sanction. There are two kinds: punitive or "repressive sanctions" and "restitutive sanctions." The former are crimes, punishable by fines, imprisonment or physical harm; the latter are found in civil and public law and the sanctions consist of restoring that which has been damaged.[17]

The essential characteristic of criminal law is that it consists of specified punishments or sanctions for acts which are defined as evil by the common conscience. In other words, criminal law prohibits acts which everyone who has been properly socialized would disapprove.[18] This is in contrast with civil law, which, when written, consists primarily of a statement of obligation and secondarily of a statement of the associated sanctions. Sometimes civil law sanctions are not even listed. However, criminal law consists primarily of statements of sanctions or penalties. Often the rule is not stated except in the form of the expression of the sanction because it is assumed that the rule or obligation is universally recognized.[19]

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16. _Ibid.,_ pp. 64-66.

17. _Ibid.,_ pp. 68-69.

18. _Ibid.,_ p. 73.

19. _Ibid.,_ pp. 74-75.

Criminal laws, then, are an expression of those common values in a culture that are most intense and can be precisely defined. Punishment is an act that expresses the emotion of horror that comes from observing violation of the common conscience or of specific learned values. It further functions to defend and reassert the value that has been violated. Evidence of the emotional (and non-rational) source of criminal punishment is to be found most clearly in the fact that in less modern societies punishment is applied indiscriminately to lower animals, inanimate objects and (in the case of human culprits) often to the family or other persons associated with the culprit, who may not themselves be culpable.[20] In modern society the application of modern rational values (whose source will be made apparent below) have altered the use of the punishment but the source is still an emotional reaction to the violation of sacred norms. This is not to say that punishment does not serve any purpose.

> It is very possible that, in itself, it consists of a mechanical and aimless reaction, in an emotional and irrational movement, in an unintelligent need to destroy, but, in fact, what it tends to destroy was a menace to us. It consists, then, in a veritable act of defense, although an instinctive and unreflective one.[21]

The vengeful nature of punishment of crime in modern law is seen in the gradation of punishment; we do not determine the severity of the punishment by the likelihood that the criminal will repeat his act, as we should if the purpose of the punishment is to insure he

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20. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

won't commit the crime again. The severity of the punishment is determined by the degree of intensity with which the violated norm is held. Thus the focus is not on the future propensity to act but on the act actually performed in the past. Furthermore, criminal punishment is always accompanied by social disgrace, regardless of the fact that the criminal may have repented of his crime.[22] We may convince ourselves of the continuing validity of Durkheim's argument that criminal punishment is not restitutive in purpose today by noting that criminal punishment often includes permanent loss of rights of citizenship.

Criminal law, then, is a manifestation of a form of solidarity that is mechanical in that its source is not rational but a mechanical response based on emotion. It consists of the "social cohesion whose cause lies in a certain conformity of all particular consciences to a common type which is none other than the psychic type of society."[23] That is to say, mechanical solidarity consists of the tendency of each member of a culture to identify with other people who share the same culture: it is based on the sameness of citizens. Personality consists of aspects which are personal and individualized and aspects which are shared. The shared aspects help to bind society together. Criminal law exists to provide punishments for those who do not conform in at least a minimal way with the shared values of a community.

Civil law, on the other hand, is not punitive. The intent of the law is to restore a pre-ordained order to relations when that order

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22. _Ibid._, pp. 88-89.

23. _Ibid._, p. 105.

has been deviated from. One who loses a civil case is not disgraced.[24] The agencies which apply civil law tend to become specialized into such agencies as divorce courts, administrative agencies, etc.

It might appear that civil law has to do only with private relations between individuals, but such is not the case. There is not a social interest in particular decisions, but there is a definite interest in the general principles which are used to determine which party prevails. Thus the social interest is not one of an impartial arbiter. Civil law regulates relationships between individuals when transactions between those individuals have implications for persons who are not parties to the transaction. The transactions themselves are not socially important but society "must feel the repercussion."[25] The concern, then, is not with the repugnance of the acts themselves, but a purely rational concern for protection. It does not look back at the act performed but ahead to the state of relations in the future. Persons who are found to violate civil law are not punished in the sense that vengence is taken against them, but are rather required to restore a damaged condition to its previous state as nearly as possible.

The sociological difference between civil and criminal law can be seen when we realize that we have no particular emotional commitment to particular rules of civil law. We can imagine changes being made without any deep sense of repugnance. But to change the rules of crime would usually be offensive to our conscience. On the other hand, restitutive law is social in nature. The purpose of a restitutive decision

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24. <u>Ibid.,</u> p. 111.

25. <u>Ibid.,</u> p. 115.

is not to be found only in the interest of the parties in the decision. This social interest is more than just impartial arbitration; there are times when decisions do not maximize justice to either party, because the social interest is different from the interests of either party. Durkheim seems to identify two different social interests, although he implies that they are the same. The general idea is that the interaction between the parties is regulated because it has "repercussions" for parties other than the "special parties in society" who are bound by the regulation.[26] However, he also implies that in some cases, notably regarding business contracts, the social interest is simply that there be a standard order to the relations: that is to say, that the social interest is not in the consequences of contracts generally, but in the existence of a standardized definition of contractual relations and obligations. Predictability alone is the social interest.[27]

Organic solidarity has two aspects which are manifested in two kinds of law.[28] On the one hand, there is a kind of negative law, relating directly or indirectly to the relations of people to things. The effect of this kind of law is negative; it defines the limits beyond which people may not interfere with each other. When such interference takes place then restitution must be made.[29]

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26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 114.

28. Ibid., p. 115.

29. Ibid., p. 119.

But, on the other hand, there is a positive organic solidarity which is manifested in the form of a positive restitutive law.[30] Perhaps the clearest example of this type of law is domestic law.[31] This type of law relates to a positive kind of solidarity: it is the solidarity of cooperation on the basis of differences. It defines, for example, the obligation of husband, wife, children, etc., to the family unit. It regulates relations growing out of the division of labor. Hence it expresses the solidarity of the division of labor, of specialization of function: contracts between employers and workers or carrier and shipper; the role of counsel, judges and jurors in the courts; the functions of various administrative officers in government; the authority of the legislative, executive and judiciary; and so on. Once again, when the partner to the mutual cooperation fails to carry out his share of the endeavor, restitution must be made.[32]

Specialized tasks are not governed by the common conscience because they imply the ability of one person to do something which others cannot do; knowledge which others do not share, and cannot, therefore, govern. Both positive and negative restitutive law are based on a recognition of differences rather than a sense of sameness. Criminal law is based on the common conscience: that which all share and "all can represent it in one and the same manner." Furthermore, restitutive

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30. _Ibid._, p. 122.

31. _Ibid._, pp. 122-123.

32. _Ibid._, pp. 123-126.

law is not based on "very active sentiments, nor even very often (on) any type of emotional state."[33]

The view of the Enlightenment was that negative solidarity was the beginning of society and the essential form of solidarity. Durkheim, like Tonnies, denies this. Justice, which is the basis of negative solidarity, is the "simple respect for the rights of another . . . purely negative virtue." But solidarity based on justice presumes the existence of charity, or a positive commitment on the part of each member to other members of society. The assumption of the mainstream of the Enlightenment was that men are willing to submit to justice because it alleviates conflict; but Durkheim argues that men do not necessarily place that high a value on peace. They desire peace with fellow members of society precisely because there is another form of solidarity already existing. Thus positive solidarity, either based on the common conscience or on interdependence, is the real foundation of society.[34]

Organic solidarity (based on the division of labor) and mechanical solidarity (based on sameness or common conscience) are both as old as society. The family is founded on the difference between the sexes but every primitive social grouping is characterized by predominance of mechanical solidarity. Thus they always exist side by side and there are "marginal regions where different characters are found at the same time."[35] There are, for example, cases of restitutive law in which there are elements of punishment and social ostracism indicating that

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33. _Ibid._, pp. 127-128.

34. _Ibid._, pp. 120-121.

35. _Ibid._, p. 112.

that deviations do offend the common conscience. But the tendency of history is toward an ever greater division of labor and as a consequence an ever greater preponderance of organic solidarity over mechanical solidarity. This is evidenced by the fact that in the total volume of legal rules which govern society, the proportion of restitutive rules is continually increasing.

Both Tonnies and Durkheim ask: Why do men cooperate? Tonnies says that there are two psychological motives for cooperation: men naturally (instinctively) like each other and men rationally realize that cooperation can be beneficial. Thus the Enlightenment theory of cooperation is only half right, according to Tönnies. Durkheim disagrees with Tonnies in that he thinks the Enlightenment is about nine-tenths wrong. While there is a kind of negative solidarity that corresponds to social contract theory, its existence can only be explained if we assume that man is social and the basic form of solidarity of _Gesellschaft_ is as natural as the emotional solidarity of _Gemeinschaft_. _Gesellschaft_ (or Durkheim's organic solidarity) exists, not just because men choose to organize, but because the species is naturally served by the fact that there are differences between individuals. Tonnies is wrong in putting the husband-wife relationship in _Gemeinschaft_--it has its origin in difference, as do most family relationships. In fact, it does not make sense to classify groups as one type or the other. The classification must be made in terms of the predominance of one kind of relationship or the other.

Durkheim further differs with Tönnies as to why mechanical solidarity (using Durkheim's label, now) exists. It is not simply an

instinct to understand, and therefore like, those with whom we associate. Durkheim did not point out (although he might have) that people in groups that are primarily of the <u>Gemeinschaft</u> sort do not always like each other. However, they do identify with each other. People are often heard to comment about the propensity of some groups of people to fight with each other in internal relations and then make great sacrifices for each other when external threat occurs. Durkheim argues that this sense of identification is based on the sharing of a common conscience. It is the identification of each member with every other member because all have the same values and have been socialized together.

We can agree with Tönnies that to the degree that any association of people is held together by this sense of common values and common identity, it tends not to be predominated by reason. But, for the most part, the division of labor progresses for the purpose of advancing production and is associated with reason and calculation. Reason has to do with manipulation, not only of things, but also of people including the self. It is natural, therefore, that the division of labor and the consequent progress of reason (as well as organic solidarity) tends to drive men apart in the sense that they become more competitive and come to treat each other more as separate objects and less as a common identity. The three definitions of community suggested above (see page 13) are not three associated states of being. The existence of an awareness of objective interdependence leads men to view each other as objects to be used, and therefore to be more willing to reject the sense of common identity and to be less conscious of common

aims. We say, then, that loss of community refers to the loss of the latter two as the first increases.

Tönnies used words like belief, habit, feeling, shame, tradition, soft and warm to describe the Geist of Gemeinschaft. He uses words like intellect, disbelief, manhood, tool, and hard to describe the Geist of Gesellschaft. In talking about the group will of Gemeinschaft he speaks of family, Volkstum (or people in the sense of a people separate from mankind generally), sharing and calling. The group will of Gesellschaft is characterized by terms like state, civilization, wealth and business.[36] These words are not intended to describe the behavior patterns, but rather the kinds of things that are valued. They describe the feeling of or the spirit of "mutual affirmation." In Gesellschaft friendship may develop, but that friendship is a private thing between the friends. It is not a matter of social judgment. In a Gesellschaft men may believe, but it is not belief that is valued so much as intelligent questioning. By the same token, in Gemeinschaft unbelief occurs but it is regarded as a threat to the pattern of mutual affirmation.

The question we have asked is: What does it mean to speak of loss of community? Our answer is, it means loss of a sense of common identity and loss of a deep, intense sense of agreement in value or on common aims. But this happens at the same time, and in fact, in response to a growing objective interdependence. Thus we choose to restrict the meaning of community to the former two conditions.

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36. Tönnies, op. cit., p. 268.

Nisbet points out that this condition is not a loss of social organization. Modern society is extensively organized. Large complex organizations provide a great variety of services including welfare, education, and security from business losses. All of these provide a great deal of material security. The loss of community consists of the reduction in importance of the primary, personal relationships of society--the relationships that "mediate directly between man and his larger world of economic, moral, political and religious values." These primary relationships "have become functionally irrelevant to our state and economy and meaningless to the moral aspirations of individuals." The very pervasiveness of large bureaucratic organizations destroys the meaning of primary groups, because men seek the status that primary groups traditionally provide in the larger organization.[37]

A sense of personal significance can be found in a variety of ways. We may list three: (1) through contributing to some socially significant cause, like building a great cathedral or participating in the crusades; (2) through being loved and needed in a primary group; or (3) through striving for success in an organization like those that characterize professional, political, and business life in modern society. But for the most part, it is only the third that works very well for most people in modern society.

However, as Nisbet points out, there is a lack of security in this kind of success; security which is provided in traditional social life by the fact that status is given moral meaning by primary

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37. Nisbet, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

relationships.[38] That is to say that moral security is derived from community. Without deeply felt "common aims determined by agreement in value" personal success seems empty because it is not reinforced by a shared sense of worth among persons who are significant to the successful one. Further, the latter kind of personal significance is not available to the great majority of modern men.

Nisbet suggests, as a first level of explanation of this loss of community, that "the functional and psychological significance" of traditional communities has declined.[39] These primary groups have been the source of the sense of identification between men; In Tönnies' terms, relations of mutual affirmation based on a spirit of liking. From these relationships grow affection, and friendship as well as prestige or recognition.

Why, then have primary groups lost these functions? Nisbet's first answer is that they no longer have institutional meaning to their members.[40] In traditional societies an individual was part of a larger political, religious, and especially, economic order through participation in primary groups. Primary groups performed the charitable functions which provided economic security. Today participation in economic life and to a large extent political life is separate from participation in significant permanent primary groups.

Charity has been changed into welfare, which is largely a function of large governmental bureaucracies in which the welfare recipient

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38. *Ibid.*, pp. 67-70.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

is not a member. Governmental bureaucracies also perform such varied functions as protection of consumers, maintenance of discipline (crime prevention), and creation of enthusiasm for the political order. In the medieval guild if a man lost his shop and inventory by a tragedy, such as fire, the members of the guild would gather around him and replace his losses through their labor and from their own resources. The modern small businessman would undoubtedly recover most of his losses from insurance and perhaps government aid. These losses are, in fact, covered by the insurance and tax payments of thousands of other persons like himself. But he does not know them, nor does he feel any sense of association with them.

To say that this change is due to the progress of the division of labor and the growing irrelevance of primary groups is to explain the phenomenon by saying it occurred. The decline of importance of the common conscience and the dwindling of the functions of primary groups are the social manifestations of the psychological conditions that we have called loss of community: in Seeman's terms, loss of a deep sense of agreement in values and loss of sense of common identity. For the explanation we must delve deeper into the meaning of the phenomenon and the nature of social change itself. Before we do that it will be useful to explore further the consequences of altering primary group functions.

The Loss of Common Sense of Identity

We have said that loss of community is the loss of a common set of values and common sense of identity. _Gemeinschaft_ is a system of primary groups. _Gesellschaft_ is an organization in which primary groups are incidental if they exist at all. We will explore the important

relationship between primary groups and the condition we call community when we examine Nisbett's analysis further. But before doing that it will be helpful to understand more precisely what is meant by a "common sense of identity." Eric Fromm has provided a useful explanation of that aspect of the loss of community.

Fromm's theoretical position is that social change is a dynamic relationship between the natural needs of men and the social conditions in which men exist.

> Man is not only made by history--history is made by man. The solution of this seeming contradiction constitutes the field of social psychology. Its task is to show not only how passions, desires, anxieties change and develop as a _result_ of the social process, but also how man's energies thus shaped into specific forms in their turn become _productive forces, molding the social process._ Thus, for instance, the craving for fame and success and the drive to work are forces without which modern capitalism could not have developed; without these and a number of other human forces man would have lacked the impetus to act according to the social and economic requirements of the modern commercial and industrial system.[41]

The combination of Natural needs plus the conditions in which men seek to satisfy those needs creates derived needs.

> They are flexible in the sense that individuals, particularly in their childhood, develop the one or other need according to the whole mode of life they find themselves in. None of these needs is fixed and rigid as if it were an innate part of human nature which develops and has to be satisfied under all circumstances.[42]

These needs may change as the conditions of existence change, but certain conditions are universal because they result from the fact that men

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41. Eric Fromm, _Escape From Freedom_, (New York: Avon Books, 1941), p. 36.

42. _Ibid._, pp. 31-32.

live in society. These conditions give rise to needs that are universal, even though they are not genetically inherited.

One such derived need (which is universal because it results from universal conditions) is the need to avoid moral aloneness. This need is partly a consequence of the capacity of the human personality for consciousness. Speaking of man, Fromm says that:

> . . . by being aware of himself as distinct from nature and other people, by being aware--even very dimly--of death, sickness, aging, he necessarily feels his insignificance and smallness in comparison with the universe and all others who are not "he." Unless he belonged somewhere, unless his life had some meaning and direction, he would feel like a particle of dust and be overcome by his individual insignificance. He would not be able to relate himself to any system which would give meaning and direction to his life, he would be filled with doubt, and this doubt eventually would paralyze his ability to act--that is, to live.[43]

Even a hermit, who is alone physically, must retain a sense of moral relationship to other men or to gods.

Fromm also suggests that there is a derived need for freedom. In order to better understand why this is so, it is necessary to review some aspects of Freudian theory. Freud described a personality process which has been called identification, by which individuals become aware of themselves as separate from objects outside themselves. Identification is a process in which the mind learns the difference between things that satisfy the instincts, or basic needs, and mental images of those things. As this awareness gradually develops the individual becomes aware of what Freud calls "subjective reality," which is the reality of the mind, and "objective reality," which is the reality of things outside the mind. Identification occurs as a result of the

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43. Ibid., p. 36.

adjustments that are made in the mind as mental images are altered to conform more exactly to reality. This must occur in order for the individual to cope effectively with his environment. These adjustments are made when frustration occurs due to the fact that some objects do not satisfy particular needs. It is this process which brings into existence what Freud called the ego. Ego (as used here) is the label for those mental processes which have to do with relating to real events outside the self. It is these processes that develop into the ability to use logic and rationality (means-end thinking).[44]

Fromm discusses one important identification which all persons make. This is the identification of significant other persons, beginning with the mother. Fromm calls this "individuation"--the development of awareness by an individual that he is a different entity from the people around him. Everyone is individuated to some extent. It is the extent of individuation that is characteristic of the loss of community. The process of education "entails a number of prohibitions, which change the role of the mother into that of a person with different aims which conflict with the child's wishes, and often into that of a hostile and dangerous person." Fromm adds that "instinctual frustration <u>per se</u> does not arouse hostility. It is the thwarting of expansiveness, the breaking of the child's attempt to assert himself--in short, the atmosphere of suppression--which create in the child the feeling of powerlessness and the hostility springing from it." This process, however, takes years, and since the child, in the meantime, is not fully aware of his separateness, Fromm says "submission (by a non-individuated

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44. Calvin S. Hall, <u>A Primer of Freudian Psychology,</u> (New York: The New American Library, 1954), pp. 41-46.

child) has a different quality from the kind of submission that exists once two individuals have become really separate."[45]

In order to understand the nature of this latter kind of submission, we must recall the need to avoid moral isolation. Self-consciousness results in greater awareness of the self and consequently of things other than the self; individuation is the process by which awareness comes into existence. But it will be recalled that awareness includes awareness of the fragility and tenuousness of life itself, which may be overcome by the belief that one's life, short and weak though it may be, is significant to other men; that life has moral meaning. Thus the greater the degree of individuation the greater the need to avoid moral isolation.

> . . . one side of the growing process of individuation is the growth of self-strength. The limits of the growth of individuation and the self are set, partly by individual conditions, but essentially by social conditions. For although the differences between individuals in this respect appear to be great, every society is characterized by a certain level of individuation beyond which the normal individual cannot go.
>
> The other aspect of the process of individuation is <u>growing aloneness.</u> The primary ties offer security and basic unity with the world outside of oneself. To the extent to which the child emerges from that world it becomes aware of being alone, of being an entity separate from all others. This separation from a world, which in comparison with one's own individual existence is overwhelmingly strong and powerful, and often threatening and dangerous, creates a feeling of powerlessness and anxiety. As long as one was an integral part of that world, unaware of the possibilities and responsibilities of individual action, one did not need to be afraid of it. When one has become an individual, one stands alone and faces the world in all its perilous and overpowering aspects.[46]

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45. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 41-42.

46. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 44-45.

Since the personality does not always (or even usually) mature in its moral aspects at the same rate as individuation occurs, there are pressures to reverse the process in order to escape a sense of moral isolation and to return to the unconscious security of non-awareness. This is expressed through attempts to re-submit the self to authority--first the authority of parents but later other authority figures. The reason Fromm says that submission before individuation is different from submission after individuation is that the latter submission involves a denial of the freedom or self-assertion that led to individuation.

Further, it cannot work. Since the self-awareness has already occurred, the "basic contradiction between the authority and the child (or adult) who submits to it is never eliminated. . . . (This) submission increases the child's insecurity and at the same time creates hostility and rebelliousness."[47]

Society limits the extent to which the process of individuation can occur. Through primary group relationships a man learns to recognize himself and others. He only becomes self-conscious to the extent that his culture provides him with the means to do so. However, it is these same cultural ties that provide meaning for his life and give him the security he needs to cope with the awareness that he does have, by providing moral meaning for death and defining purposes for life. To the extent that a given culture allows freedom <u>to</u> express the self it also provides freedom "<u>from</u> a world which gave security and reassurance."

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47. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 50-51.

The extent to which one can achieve this freedom depends upon the nature of the particular culture in which one lives.[48]

Individuation occurs because of frustration when other people prevent the individual from following the urges of the instincts. This frustration gives rise to a derived need to be free from restrictions that are imposed from without: to be free to "satisfy the emotionally conditioned drives." But at the same time, the self awareness that is created by the process gives rise to a need to "avoid isolation and moral aloneness."[49]

Individuation is not a loss of a sense of identity with the community; it is a gaining of a sense of separation from community, or from primary groups. By the same token, the loss of common norms and values is not primarily a rejection of recognized standards of conduct; it is primarily a growing consciousness of the standards which govern conduct, and a consequent loss of the "commoness" of the "common conscience." The loss of community is not a result of a growth of consciousness. It _is_ a growth of consciousness.

From Durkheim we have learned that human society has been in a continuing evolution from one which was primarily held together by a deep, sense of intense agreement on the true norms that should govern the everyday actions of men (the common conscience), to one which is held together by the interdependence of the division of labor. We will examine Fromm's assertion that from generation to generation men in society have gradually gained a greater awareness of their separateness

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48. _Ibid.,_ p. 37.

49. _Ibid.,_ p. 46.

from each other, a loss of sense of common identity, through the process of individuation. Tönnies says that the spirit of Gesellschaft is characteristic of older people, men, and educated people; the spirit of Gemeinshaft is characteristic of youth, women and uneducated people.[50] The process of individuation is a continuation of a process which occurs in all men--the process by which the ego develops. The continual individuation of men is equivalent to the development of rationality among men.

The consequences of these changes is to isolate people from each other. This does not mean that the quantity of interpersonal contacts decreases. It does mean that those contacts come to have a very different quality. People are instruments to each other. Competition is a part of every relationship. Therefore we must be constantly on guard, lest our competitors find our inner weaknesses and use them against us. Since there are no "true" norms to define who I am, I must depend on the definition provided by my peers. But if my peers have this power over me then I must guard my relationship with them so as to assure that their judgment is positive. When I must open myself to others, I go to a professional counselor who is not a friend for help.

Ultimately all power to judge rests on me, and consequently all responsibility for judgment. I judge the correctness of my own actions and the actions of those around me. I decide what my career will be, who I will marry, and on and on. Even when I seek guidance in these matters, the ultimate authority to make correct decisions rests with me.

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50. Tönnies, op. cit., p. 269.

My only source of security is to make these judgments in conformity with public opinion.

In traditional society this was <u>less</u> true. The existence of moral truths and ascribed statutes insured the ability of men to know who they were, what they should do and how they could achieve significance. There were people who had authority in the primary groups to interpret the rules when interpretations were needed. Primary groups also provided opportunities for open, uninhibited personal relations. Thus primary groups, while they were a source of authority which limited freedom, were a source of security and emotional warmth. For the individual modernization of society means increased freedom, but it also means increased responsibility, increased isolation.

CHAPTER III

THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY AND THE CONDITIONS OF LOSS OF COMMUNITY

In the preceding chapters we have concentrated on the meaning of the phrase "loss of community." In this chapter we will try to clarify relationship between the loss of community and the organization of society, and the conditions under which it has occurred. During the entire pre-modern period of human history the basic structure of all known societies has been one of inter-related primary groups. In modern industrial society primary groups have come to have a very different meaning. We will continue our explication of Fromm's analysis of European history to try to see what the differences are. We will then look at Nisbett's very different analysis. Along with this look at the structure of society, we will try to understand what elements in the development of society might explain why community is being lost. Both Gerhard Lenski and Durkheim see these changes as part of a continuing process that has been underway since the primitive stages of human society. From a comparison of these various theories of change and loss of community we will attempt to select those concepts that can be logically related to form a coherent theory that explains the loss of community.

We are talking about social change, which is to say that we are talking about history. For obvious reasons each of the theorists we are looking at had in mind particular historical events. It would be difficult to explain their theories out of the context of their discussion of those events. However, our concern is not with the accuracy of the details of their histories; it is the usefulness of their explanations of the loss of community to which we wish to address ourselves. If we can discover in their work the elements of a coherent theory, then that theory can be tested against the historical events of the past, present and future.

Fromm looks at two periods in European history, the Italian Renaissance and the Reformation. His argument is that the internal structure of the economic communities, which made up an integral part of the overall economic structure of Europe, changed. Because of these changes the communities themselves ceased to provide the security which they had once provided to their members; and as time went by they withered away entirely so that a whole new economic structure came into existence. New structure did not evolve new communities. On the contrary, the changes themselves resulted in new opportunities for individuation among men.

Fromm says that during the Renaissance period commercial activities, the political fragmentation of Italy, and the importation of skills and industry from the orient into Italy resulted in the growth of a new class of very rich people. The aristocracy and rich middle class people were brought into social contact by the lure of wealth so that "Feudal class stratification became less important. . . . Birth

and origin were of less importance than wealth. . . . The result of this progressive destruction of the medieval social structure was the emergence of the individual in the modern sense."[1] Political policies as well as a growing distinction within the middle class between rich and poor resulted in the reduction of large numbers of people to an urban poor working class.

> The masses who did not share the wealth and power of the ruling group had lost the security of their former status and had become a shapeless mass, to be flattered or to be threatened--but always to be manipulated and exploited by those in power. A new despotism arose side by side with the new individualism. Freedom and tyranny, individuality and disorder, were inextricably interwoven.[2]

This class was no longer protected from exploitation by traditional communities.

However, Fromm thinks the really significant beginnings of the loss of community and individuation of modern man came in northern Europe, where a larger number of people were individuated more gradually. By the 14th Century, according to Fromm, guilds had begun to be differentiated internally between members who had more capital and those who had less.

> Already in the Fourteenth Century--or even earlier--an increasing differentiation within the guilds had started and it continued in spite of all efforts to stop it. Some guild members had more capital than others and employed five or six journeymen instead of one or two. Soon some guilds admitted only persons with a certain amount of capital. Others became powerful monopolies trying to take every advantage from their monopolistic position and to exploit the customer as much as they could. On the other hand, many guild members became impoverished and had to try to earn some money outside of

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1. Fromm, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

2. Ibid., p. 63.

> their traditional occupation; often they became small traders on the side. Many of them had lost their economic independence and security while they desperately clung to the traditional ideal of economic independence.
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> In connection with this development of the guild system, the situation of the journeymen degenerated from bad to worse.[3]

As the number of journeymen per master increased, and as capital became a requisite to guild membership, the position of the journeymen was reduced to that of permanent wage labor. "But as the number of journeymen under one master increased, more capital was needed to become a master and the more the guilds assumed a monopolistic and exclusive character, the less were the opportunities of journeymen."[4]

As trade increased persons engaged in commerce were able to ignore traditional restrictions also. Fromm says that by the 15th Century there were big commercial companies which had become monopolies.

> While medieval commerce had been mainly a petty intertown business, national and international commerce grew rapidly in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Although historians disagree as to just when the big commercial companies started to develop, they do agree that in the fifteenth century they became more and more powerful and developed into monopolies, which by their superior capital strength threatened the small businessman as well as the consumer.[5]

In industry capital became an important source of new differentiation.

> One remarkable example is the mining industry. Originally the share of each member of a mining guild was in proportion to the amount of work he did. But by the fifteenth century, in many instances, the shares belonged to capitalists who did

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3. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

> not work themselves, and increasingly the work was done by workers who were paid wages and had no share in the enterprise. The same capitalistic development occurred in other industries too. . . .[6]

Fromm identifies signs of changed attitudes toward time. There were writings about the value of time, pressures to reduce the number of holidays and resentment grew among the middle class toward the clergy who lived by begging, because the beggars were unproductive. There was an increase in concern for material wealth and a corresponding tendency to place moral value on efficiency.[7]

> One outstanding consequence of the economic changes we have been describing affected everyone. The medieval social system was destroyed and with it the stability and relative security it had offered the individual. Now with the beginning of capitalism all classes of society started to move. There ceased to be a fixed place in the economic order which could be considered a natural, and unquestionable one. The individual was left alone; everything depended on his own effort, not on the security of his traditional status.[8]

Fromm says that one result of these changes was that the larger market was less manageable and less predictable than the local markets that typified medieval society. It seemed to be an impersonal, alien force which arbitrarily affected the lives of the capitalist middle class.

> The mechanism of the new market seemed to resemble the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, which taught that the individual must make every effort to be good, but that even before his birth it had been decided whether or not he is to be saved.[9]

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6. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 76 - 77.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

Thus the new religion seemed natural; it reflected the life experience of the people. It ". . . gave expression to a new feeling of freedom and independence as well as to the feeling of powerlessness and anxiety by which their members were pervaded."[10]

The new versions of the Christian religion offered another element that was a very real part of the emerging social order: they were highly individualistic.[11] Each man faced God alone; not as a member of a small community of believers, and without the mediating authority of the priesthood. The Prostestant worshiper faced a diety who was beyond his ability to comprehend and he faced that diety alone. Modern man faces a world of impersonal forces and he too faces them alone. We may suggest that a very significant aspect of the aloneness of the believer was the absence of the priesthood; every man must make his own decisions about what to believe and how to act. Thus men sought to escape from their insecurity through a total and unquestioning submission to God. "By not only accepting his own insignificance but by humiliating himself to the utmost, by giving up every vestige of individual will, by renouncing and denouncing his individual strength, the individual could hope to be acceptable to God."[12] The Calvinist emphasis on predestination also led to great emphasis on activity: work for work's sake.

> A man who expects to receive within a few hours the doctor's diagnosis of his illness--which may be fatal--quite naturally is in a state of anxiety. . . . Most frequently his

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10. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

> anxiety, if it does not paralyze him will drive him to some sort of more or less frantic activity. . . . The activity is not meant to create a desired end but serves to indicate whether or not something will occur. . . . This mechanism is a well known feature of compulsive neurotics.[13]

In short, Fromm explains the loneliness and isolation of men in modern society by saying it was caused by the restructuring of society due to changing economic conditions. This restructuring began as a restructuring of certain communities themselves. But eventually those communities became irrelevant and disappeared. Even the church was affected because the traditional Catholic religion was replaced with religions that not only reflected the new social structure, but actually accentuated its effects. We may add to this, from Nisbett's analysis, that even the family lost part of its relevance to the larger social order, because, with the rise of larger workshops and factories, families no longer functioned as the basic economic unit in many segments of production.

Fromm's analysis is very precise with respect to the changes that occurred regarding the condition of individual men; but it is quite vague with respect to why it happened. He says that the increased importance of capital led to a differentiation between those who had more capital and those who had less. But he does not explain why this did not occur earlier in time, for example. Presumably there were rich artisans in the Middle Ages. Why did they conform to the rules of traditional society (the common conscience)? Perhaps Fromm means to say that the surplus (the supply of capital) increased and that given this increased availability of capital rich men used it to break the bonds

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13. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 111.

of community. However, this would imply that it was not the norms of the communities that restricted freedom in earlier periods, but the lack of resources. This is clearly not the position that he took earlier in the argument when he discussed the emergence of the individual from the bonds of community.

Further, if the increased surplus in the case of Italy is due to the location of Italy, why did it occur at this particular time? In short, Fromm's explanation as to why the loss of community process began to occur is incomplete.

Nisbet's argument is not only contrary to Fromm's, it is contrary to the traditional approach to the relationship between socio-economic change and political change since Marx. Nisbett argues that it was not capitalism that brought on the loss of community. It was the rise of the nation state.

In Nisbet's words, we are concerned with the ". . . increasing separation of traditional groups from the crucial ends and decisions in economic and political affairs."[14] This is one way of defining the loss of community; it is this "institutional irrelevance" of primary groups to these important affairs of life that results in the loss of common sense of identity among members of the groups, and a loss of commitment to common goals.

Nisbet argued:

> . . . that the single most decisive influence upon Western social organization has been the rise and development of the centralized territorial state. . . . The conflict between the central power of the political state and the whole set of

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14. Nisbet, op. cit., p. 55.

> functions and authorities contained in Church, family, guild, and local community has been . . . the main source of those dislocations of social structure and uprootings of status which lie behind the problem of community in our age.[15]

Nisbet points out that the beginning of the modern state was the organized relationship between a military leader and his army.

> But to the military function is added, in time, other functions of a legal, judicial, economic, and even religious nature. . . . This expansion of functions of military lords and the extension of these functions from his army to those who live in the territories he and his predecessors conquered took place gradually over a long period of time.[16]

This process occurred because those who hold power in the state felt a need to destroy allegiances among their subjects which could be a source of loyalty strong enough to induce people to make sacrifices in causes which oppose the power of the state. The real conflict in modern political history has not been, as is so often stated, between state and individual, but between state and social group. It has been the privileges of nobility, of Catholics, of Protestants, of citizens of cities, which have been a cause for opposition to the state. "From this conflict have arisen most of the relocations of authority and function which have formed the contexts of decline of medieval communalism and the emergence of both individual and central political power."[17]

In accomplishing the goal of destroying the hold of traditional communities on the loyalty of people, the military rulers first, and more complex political organizations later, established a claim to loyalty as a relationship between the regime and the subject. But to

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15. Ibid., p. 98.

16. Ibid., p. 101.

17. Ibid., p. 109.

secure that loyalty the regime assumes important functions which had previously been performed by persons in roles related to the structure of communities--priests, guild masters, or the lords of the manor, for example. As time goes by this vertical "relation of power between king and subject . . . becomes a kind of <u>horizontal</u> relationship among individuals, with power made immanent in the Nation, with rights and duties made dependent upon the Nation." The sense of identity becomes an identity, not as a member of a community, but as a member of a nation. "It is an increasingly popular and ever more cohesive <u>mass</u> relationship."[18] Thus what began as a power relationship based on military force becomes an authority relationship based on national identity. But in the process men's primary group relations (their sense of community) are weakened because the primary groups are deprived of functional relevance to their lives.

The result is a new kind of community--the political community.

> Fundamental to the political community is the belief that the normal plurality of authorities and functions in society must be supplanted by a unity of authority and function arising from the monistic State. The power of the state must become the context of the realization of all man's aspirations, even as the Church formed this context in the Middle Ages. There is, second, the view of people, not as diversified members of social groups and cultural associations, but as an aggregate of atomized particles needing the absolute state for protection and security.[19]

The state is absolute. "It claims all power to make war, to make peace, to conscript life, to tax, to establish and dis-establish property, to define crime, to punish disobedience, to control education, to supervise

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18. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 102.

19. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 156.

the family, to regulate personal habits and to censor opinions."[20] It goes without saying that this monistic authority can be exercised either by a dictatorship or a representative government selected by a majority of the mass of members.

A major impetus behind the growth in acceptance of this idea has been the

> . . . visible emancipation, by the state and its law, of innumerable individuals from the often oppressive structures of guild, monastary, class and village community. . . . Between the state and the individual there arose a genuine affinity that was not obscured by later, often intense, conflicts between the public law and asserted private rights.[21]

The struggle for individual rights and freedom has been more a struggle against the oppression of communities than a struggle against the state; and the transfer of loyalty from community to state has frequently been a vehicle for carrying out that struggle. By simply replacing medieval tradition with modern law the modern state has done much to enlarge the freedom of individuals. The danger, as Nisbet sees it, is that the state may become the oppressor, if men do not maintain some sense of community other than the state.

While Nisbet's argument makes a good deal of sense, two objections can be raised. Nisbet implies that the military organization that became the state suddenly came into existence at the beginning of the modern period. But there were military organizations before this period. Why were the kings able at this particular time in history to successfully extend their military influence? And how were they suddenly able to achieve adequate power to enforce their new authority

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20. _Ibid.,_ p. 102.

21. _Ibid.,_ p. 107.

over the traditional structures? The answers would seem to be found, in part, in the events noted by Fromm. The geographic barriers between peoples were reduced by increased trade and better roads. Those who had already obtained control of the newly important capital needed extended areas of order so that markets could be enlarged. In other words, the beginning of the breakdown of the communal structure was necessary before the military-political state could come into existence to hasten it. Tonnies has very succinctly described the process as I understand it:

> The main features of this process can be described in the following way. The anonymous mass of the people is the original and dominating power which creates the houses, the villages, and the towns of the country. From it, too, spring the powerful and self-determined individuals of many different kinds: princes, feudal lords, knights, as well as priests, artists, scholars. As long as their economic condition is determined by the people as a whole, all their social control is conditioned by the will and power of the people. Their union on a national scale, which alone could make them dominant as a group, is dependent on economic conditions. And their real and essential control is economic control, which before them and with them and partly against them the merchants attain by harnessing the labor force of the nation. Such economic control is achieved in many forms, the highest of which is planned capitalist production or large-scale industry. It is through the merchants that the technical conditions for the national union of independent individuals and for capitalistic production are created. This merchant class is by nature, and mostly also by origin, international as well as national and urban, i.e., it belongs to _Gesselschaft,_ not _Gemeinschaft._ Later all social groups and dignitaries and, at least in tendency, the whole people acquire the characteristics of the _Gesellschaft_.[22]

It should be clear by now that the condition implicit in the theories of both Fromm and Nisbett is the existence of an increased economic surplus which enabled the wealthy guild members, some traders,

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22. Tönnies, _op. cit.,_ p. 225.

and some guilds, acting more and more like capitalist corporations, to alter their relationship with society. It was not so much that they chose to revolutionize the social structure; their new wealth changed their status vis a vis their fellows so that the structure was changed. By the same token, the newly powerful rulers did not consciously choose to alter the communal order; they continued to do what kings had done throughout the Middle Ages--they tried to expand their influence by extending their control over more land. Medieval society was a war of all war-lords against all war-lords. Aggressive, expansive wars were a way of life. When means were available to some kings by virtue of the new surplus they naturally used them to achieve what they had always been trying to achieve. When military power had been expanded and was threatened by Church, guild, or village authority it was not a revolutionary motive that induced them to use their new power to extend the security of their positions. Yet the consequence of the combination of these changes over time was an irreversible revolution.

It will be useful, for the sake of the argument to be made later in this chapter, to digress at this point. Gerhard Lenski has offered a theory of social change which explains the social stratification of societies as a function of the economic surplus.[23] The changes in social structure identified by Fromm and Nisbett are clearly explained as a function of an increased surplus that was generated in Europe at the end of the Middle Ages. We examine Lenski's discussion because it is more general in that it applies to the entire process of

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23. Gerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

economic and political change from primitive society to modern industrial society.

Lenski classifies communities into five categories based on technology. In addition there are a number of hybrid types and three special types that are different from the others because of the manner in which they take advantage of a unique environment.[24] For our purposes we can concern ourselves mainly with the five primary types. However, it will be helpful to briefly look at one of the special types.

The least advanced communities are hunting and gathering communities where tools are "invariably made of . . . materials taken directly from nature," and members "live close to the subsistence level for much of the year."[25] Everyone spends most of his time trying to obtain food, and leadership roles are very simple and require little time and effort. There is almost no surplus and goods are distributed almost entirely on the basis of need, and almost equally among members. Lenski found that headmen in these communities have very little influence and some bands do not have a headman. Where the surplus is greater, due to the favorableness of the environment, headmen tend to be more influential, even extending their influence to several tribes in some instances. Bases for selection of persons to occupy this position are supernatural skills, skill in hunting, strength, or age. There are "no hereditary roles which accrue to the incumbant regardless of

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24. *Ibid.,* p. 92.

25. *Ibid.,* pp. 96-97.

ability."[26] In most instances the headman has no power at all; his role is limited to making suggestions which may or may not be followed. Shamans are sometimes more influential than headmen because they can call upon supernatural power to support their demands. In short, "in primitive hunting and gathering societies, power, privilege, and prestige are largely a function of personal skills and ability."[27] In some instances, some of the trappings of tradition are found, notably a presumption in favor of giving office to heirs.

The second type of community is the simple horticultural community, where the digging stick is used to facilitate gardening as the basic source of sustenance, but without the support of terracing, irrigation, fertilization, or metallurgy.[28] Horticulture usually produces a surplus and the communities tend to be larger than hunting and gathering communities. It is not unusual for several villages to be associated together in a larger community with a single political organization.

The existence of surplus provides some leisure time which results in production of non-essential goods, elaborated ceremonial activities, warfare, and increased community specialization and internal division of labor.

Political specialities are found, with the chief, at least, devoting full-time to political duties, and in some communities he is assisted by a staff of sub-chiefs. Sometimes religious or magical authority results in more influence than political authority. In other

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26. Ibid., p. 109.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 118.

instances it is a support to political authority, as when the chief assumes priestly functions.

Some political offices are based on demonstration of ability in war. This is not usually the highest office, although in some instances it is. In most cases, the chieftanship is hereditary, but is usually subject to a considerable amount of instability, and may be transfered from its legitimate heir if he does not display certain personal qualities.[29]

There is a clear concept of office and obligation to obey; it is clear that there are authority relationships in simple horicultural communities. The most stable norms upon which authority may be based are expectations with regard to magical or religious powers.[30]

Often the political hierarchy is more complicated and involves more people. This occurs, again, where there is more surplus if the chief has greater say in the distribution of surplus. He can then withdraw some of the surplus to support full-time specialists to act under his direction, and he can bestow favors with greater freedom. Offices become a possession to be sought, and the chief's ability to bestow them reinforces the system.

Advanced horticultural communities, the third type, also depend on gardening as their basic mode of production. However, they differ in the use of the hoe as a tool of cultivation, and they may use one or more of the techniques (excluded by definition) from simple horticultural communities: terracing, irrigation, fertilization, metallurgy.

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29. Ibid., pp. 131-132.

30. Ibid.

Communities are much larger, numbering in the millions in America and some approaching one million inhabitants in Africa.[31] This is true primarily because in advanced horticultural communities ambitious political leaders are able to build empires. Fairly large urban areas are made possible by a degree of division of labor, and these become the bases of fairly complicated political organizations with large numbers of people being supported from the surplus of the community. They function entirely in political capacities, as tax collectors and in other administrative functions, judicial officers, police, and ministers of the king. Armies are large and specialized and warfare is used to facilitate slavery, a common institution in these communities. Because they are part of the structure of authority for the entire kingdom, local headmen are much more authoritarian in their relationship to their communities than are those of more primitive communities.

However, in many communities the structure is much more like that of more primitive communities. Charismatic breakthroughs are fairly frequent occurrences. Classes are based on kinship groups and the technological limitations on the size of any one effective empire (due to lack of transportation facilities and advanced trade systems) leaves the likelihood of neighboring or fringe kinship groups who are fairly independent. This makes it difficult to prevent revisions of the class system under the charismatic leadership of an ambitious leader of a rival clan. While hereditary titles are common, the system never gets so rigid that the monarch does not have some leeway to appoint many people to offices. Further, the kingship is rarely

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31. Ibid., p. 146.

completely hereditary. There is usually some provision for choice of a successor by someone other than the king himself and consequently some emphasis on personal qualifications in the assumption of authority, if not in the exercise of authority.

Lenski identifies two types of organization in advanced African horticultural communities. One was very much like the simple horticultural communities. The other was more complex with definite indications of patrimonial authority. The more primitive types clearly predominated where the environment was less conducive to production of larger surplus.[32]

Agrarian communities are the fourth type. These are distinguished by many differences from the more primitive types. It would appear that the most fundamental of these are the use of the plow, the use of animals to pull the plow and higher development of metallurgy which makes it possible to make iron plowshares.[33] As a consequence of the leisure time made available by the surplus of production which results from these advancements, and the consequent greater degree of internal division of labor, agrarian communities achieve tremendous advances in technology and production over more primitive types. Among these an important advance is the use of the wheel to facilitate transportation. These changes are related to the rise of large urban areas in all agrarian communities.

Another difference which is important for our purposes is the difference in territory and population which can be brought under the

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32. <u>Ibid.,</u> p. 156.

33. <u>Ibid.,</u> p. 190.

domination of one political elite. This is made possible by the ability of armies to use the superior technology of the productive system. Armed internal struggles and external wars are a characteristic condition in agrarian states.

Residents of the urban areas dominate the political, economic, religious, and cultural systems. Wealth, political power and military power are based in the cities.[34] There is a small elite class who benefit most from the surplus, while the peasant class, the largest, often exists near the subsistence level.

Lenski says:

> To fully understand how . . . vast accumulation of wealth came into existence, one must take into account the _proprietary theory of the state_ which dominated the thinking of most men of power in virtually all agrarian societies. According to this theory, the state is a piece of property which its owner may use, within broad and somewhat ill defined limits, for his personal advantage. Also, like most other forms of property, it can usually be transmitted to one's heirs. This concept of the state has been well described by Max Weber in his classic analysis of traditional authority.[35]

As the agrarian productive system progressed in Western society most communities turned to trading as the basis of their economics. These are the maritime communities of antiquity and the mercantile communities of the late Middle Ages up to the beginnings of the industrial age. In these communities the merchant class obtained a monopoly of the exchange functions which helped to facilitate an increase in the available surplus. They were the ones who began to rationalize the economic order. In some instances they formed mutually beneficial

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34. _Ibid._, p. 200.

35. _Ibid._, p. 214.

coalitions with certain members of the political elite and in other instances they replaced the old political elite.

The most advanced type of productive technology is the modern industrial society. While there are many unique characteristics of this type of technology, perhaps the most characteristic is the use of fuels to drive machines.[36] The optimum size of communities is increased immeasurably over more primitive types and the population concentration shifts from rural areas to urban areas. Community specialization and division of labor is multiplied many times.

Political organization, like all other kinds of organization, is much more complex and the technological limitations on the size of community that can be governed in one political structure are apparently eliminated.

Apparently the surplus is distributed much more broadly. Lenski argues that when the surplus becomes as large as it is in industrial communities, it is no longer profitable for the privileged class to withhold as large a portion as they do in other types. The surplus is so plentiful that overall their wealth is increased, in the short run, at least, by increases in production which can be obtained by sharing.[37] This fact, coupled with several technological and demographic changes from agrarian communities, makes this advance the first one since the very most primitive type in which increased production results in less rather than more separation of classes.

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36. Ibid., p. 298.

37. Ibid., p. 314.

Lenski argues that as the size of the surplus available increases, the nature of the stratification changes. In very primitive communities where the surplus is small or nonexistent there is very little, if any, difference between classes because, first, survival necessitates fairly equal distribution; and second, because there are few assets which are durable so that they can be counted as wealth. As the surplus increases, a system of distribution of that surplus develops, based on power. This system differentiates a privileged class from less privileged classes. The greater the surplus the greater the distance between the privileged class and the non-privileged classes. Since the political sector tends to play a major part in the distributive system (by definition), it is associated with the privileged class. However, in the most productive stages of agrarian production and with the development of industrial technology the surplus gets so large that those who benefit from the surplus become more and more numerous. (Examples are the merchants in the Middle Ages and industrial workers in very recent times). So long as the entire surplus is taken by a small privileged class, the political system is oppressive to the non-privileged. But when the surplus gets so large that it begins to filter down to larger numbers of people, and larger numbers of people are freed from the necessities of production for survival, leisure time spreads through the population and the political system begins to respond to the demands of greater numbers. Thus, a kind of cycle has occurred in human history--from a very egalitarian, participatory political and social system to a highly oppressive one and back to a more egalitarian participatory one. We will have more to say about this in the next chapter.

Lenski has demonstrated that increases in surplus result in shifts in the class structure and related changes in the political order. Since he did compare several different societies in different parts of the world and at different times, and since the social structure and political order were similar in situations where the surplus was similar (even though the societies were separated in time and space) his is a convincing case. At this point in the discussion we only wish to note that the size of the surplus is likely to be a major factor in the process of social change, and that it probably has a significant effect on the social and political structure of society. We have followed Lenski's argument in some detail (even though he did not discuss the loss of community <u>per se</u>) for this reason; but also because we will come back to Lenski later in this chapter.

Fromm's discussion led us to conclude that it was the increased surplus that enabled, indeed forced, some guild members and certain other persons to break out of the communal restrictions of medieval society and become a new upper class. We should note that in the long run the entire economic basis of the older aristocracy disappeared. Land was simply not as important as capital as modern industry developed. Nisbett's discussion has led us to conclude that this same surplus was used by certain members of the political elite to also break the restrictions of communal society and bring into existence the nation state. This latter argument was made also by Lenski, although without reference to community.

We should return, at this time, to the main line of the discussion by looking at another explanation as to why the loss of community

occurred. The distinction made by Durkheim between the segmental type of society and society based on the division of labor has already been discussed. Briefly, the segmental type is so-called because its structure consists of separate, self-sufficient communities: segments which can continue to exist and function without serious disruption when any one segment or community is removed. A very primitive hunting and gathering society with one or more clans, each performing the same good gathering activities would be the typical segmental society. There are varying degrees of advancement of the division of labor, each of which is a step away from the segmental type and toward modern industrial society in which men are interdependent and highly specialized. As the society becomes more interdependent the common conscience is less encompassing in its effect on people's lives.

The question which we now wish to address to Durkheim is, why does all this happen? Durkheim vigorously asserts that the division of labor is not a causal factor: rather it is the consequence of the reduction of importance of the common conscience and the underlying causes of the "effacement of the segmental type."[38]

This occurs under conditions of increased social interaction, or moral density. "The progressive condensation of societies in historical development is produced in three principle ways: (1) population density increases; (2) associated with this, cities are built; and (3) technical means of communication are improved."[39] The division of labor can enhance the volume of interaction by enhancing the building of cities and

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38. Durkheim, op. cit., p. 256.

39. Ibid., pp. 257-261.

the means of communication. But the division of labor <u>cannot</u> occur without increased interaction or "increased moral density." Therefore the "vision of labor remains the derived fact."[40]

> We can then formulate the following proposition: The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the volume and density of societies, and, if it progresses in a continuous manner in the course of social development, it is because societies become regularly denser and generally more voluminous. . . . not that the growth and condensation of societies <u>permit,</u> but that they <u>necessitate</u> a greater division of labor.[41]

Durkheim says that this occurs for exactly the same reason that natural selection leads to specialization among biological species.

> Darwin justly observed that the struggle between two organisms is as active as they are analogous. Having the same needs and pursuing the same objects, they are in rivalry everywhere. As long as they have more resources than they need, they can still live side by side, but if their number increases to such proportions that all appetites can no longer be sufficiently satisfied, war breaks out, and it is as violent as this insufficiency is more marked; that is to say, as the number in the struggle increase. . . . (If) they do not feed in the same manner, and do not lead the same kind of life, they do not disturb each other.
>
> Men submit to the same law. In the same city, different occupations can co-exist without being obliged mutually to destroy one another, for they pursue different objects. The soldier seeks military glory, the priest moral authority, the statesman power, the business man riches, the scholar scientific renown. Each of them can attain his end without preventing the others from attaining theirs.[42]

Two creatures, whether they are men or other animals are in competition with each other when they both acquire the necessities of life in the same way from the same source. But if they pursue different objects to survive they can co-exist in the same spot. The young

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40. <u>Ibid.,</u> p. 260.

41. <u>Ibid.,</u> p. 262.

42. <u>Ibid.,</u> pp. 266-267.

man who lives on a farm can take his father's place or go get new land. But if population concentration reaches a certain point so that all land is in use he must seek some other occupation in order to survive. The search for new riches leads to new occupations. However, the division of labor is not the only solution to the problem of overpopulation.

> It must not be forgotten that specialization is not the only possible solution to the struggle for existence. There are also emigration, colonization, resignation to a precarious, disputed existence, and finally, the total elimination of the weakest by suicide or some other means.[43]

The division of labor can only occur if the effects of the common conscience are weakened.

> We have just shown that the advances of the division of labor are due to the stronger pressure exercised by social units upon one another which obliges them to develop in increasingly divergent directions. But this pressure is at each moment neutralized by a contrary pressure that the common conscience exercises on each particular conscience. Whereas one impels us to become a distinct personality, the other, on the contrary, demands our resemblance to everybody else. Whereas the first had us following our personal bent, the second holds us back and prevents us from deviating from the collective type.[44]

Fortunately (or unfortunately, depending upon one's point of view) increased concentration of population also weakens the common conscience. This happens for three reasons. First, the values and meanings in the common conscience in earlier stages of society define the specific, concrete environment of the community members. Their experiences are nearly the same.

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43. *Ibid.*, p. 286.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 283.

> But it (the common conscience) changes its nature as societies become more voluminous. Because these societies are spread over a vaster surface, the common conscience is itself obliged to rise above all local diversities, to dominate more space, and consequently to become more abstract. For not many general things can be common to all these diverse environments. It is no longer such an animal, but such a species; not this source, but such sources; not this forest, but forest *in abstracto.*[45]

Since the common conscience must define general categories of action, as well as things, individuals must make choices as to what specific acts fit the general categories.

> In lower societies, the very external form of conduct is predetermined even to the details. The way in which man must eat, dress in every situation, the gestures he must make, the formulae he must pronounce, are precisely fixed. On the contrary, the further one strays from the point of departure, the more moral and juridical prescriptions lose their sharpness and precision. They rule only the most general forms of conduct, and rule them in a very general manner, saying what must be done, not how it must be done. . . . But the more general the common conscience becomes, the greater place it leaves to individual variations.[46]

And, we might add, abstraction of the common conscience not only leaves greater room for individual variation; the values that make up the common conscience become more conscious and therefore more subject to question. It is these changes, Durkheim believes, that lead to more rational (means-ends) patterns of thought as society develops.

A second cause of the weakening of the common conscience is "the greater mobility of social units" and the greater interaction between people of different cultures. The common conscience is strengthened by the fact that it is shared by past generations, as well as

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45. *Ibid.*, p. 287.

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 289-290.

present members of society. Old people pass traditional values on through the various socialization processes. Old people are a "living expression" of the common conscience. But when people begin to move about in a mixture of cultures, then young men seeking employment are often taken away from the influence of tradition at the very time when they are most susceptible.

> . . . it is the reverse [of the effects of tradition] that is produced when man, while emerging from adolescence, is transplanted into a new environment. To be sure, he finds there men older than himself as well, but they are not the same as those he obeyed in his infancy. The respect he has for them is then less, and by nature more conventional, for it corresponds to no reality, present or past. He does not depend upon and never has depended upon them; he can then respect them only by analogy.[47]

Finally, the common conscience is weakened because "in so far as society is extended and concentrated, it envelopes the individual less, and consequently, cannot as well restrain the divergent tendencies coming up." People are freer to move about and associate with other people who have divergent cultural backgrounds. There is less intimacy among associates, and therefore less willingness to sanction deviations from minor rules of behavior.[48]

We have reduced three explanations to two. One says that an increase in surplus made it possible for people (who according to Fromm naturally strive after greater freedom) to break out of medieval community and in the process begin to destroy those communities. Durkheim

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47. Ibid., pp. 293-294. Turnbull, op. cit., contains case studies which seem to verify this point.

48. Ibid., p. 297. Notice that a natural inclincation to be free from the restrictions of the common conscience (see discussion from Fromm above) is implicit in this entire discussion of the weakening of the common conscience.

has argued that population density, in a process of natural selection and adaptation leads to both the weakening of deeply held common values (one aspect of loss of community) and an increase in the division of labor. Our next attempt will be to prove that both are correct.

Durkheim's single causal analysis makes a good deal of sense when we look at Europe; but in India, for example, and in other parts of the world today, we see extreme concentrations of population while traditional culture does not seem to be eroded. Further, in some of these countries the state is actively and consciously trying to bring about the revolution of society to which we have seen that the state unintentionally contributed in Europe. If concentration of population automatically results in a breakdown of the common conscience and increased division of labor, why did the change not occur in India? The answer is obvious. There was no place for those young men about whom Durkheim talks to go--no other niches for them to fill. The theory of natural selection assumes that a niche is available and the creature with a new adaptive structure fits that niche. Among animals there are many more non-adaptive mutations of structure than adaptive ones. For evolution to occur there must be some cooperation from the environment. In Europe there were environmental and technological conditions which made it possible for the division of labor to progress. Added population resulted in increased production above the survival needs of the population: there were technological means available to take advantage of an environment of relative material abundance; the population increased so that there was labor available to use the technology. Consequently there was a shift in the balance between mechanical and

organic solidarity associated with the increased division of labor in society. The importance of Durkheim's theory, and one of the reasons we introduced Lenski at great length, is that both men were thinking not of one specific period of change, but of the whole history of changes that occurred from primitive culture to modern culture. The process of loss of community is identical with the process of increased rationality of men and it has been going on since the beginning of the species.

In summary, if we use the categories of social action suggested by Parsons and Shils, we can re-state the above discussion in a simple theoretical framework. The categories of that framework are: (1) psychologically based motives and energy, (2) norms and values (or what we may call learned values), and (3) the situation in which action occurs.[49]

When there is tension due to incongruence between the perception of the situation and learned values then either the values and norms must change or the situation must be redefined or changed. Social change may occur when the latter alternative fails to reduce the tension. In the case we are discussing, increasing population creates tension due to the lack of occupational opportunities. If there is a surplus available so that new occupational niches can be successful then the old patterns of economic action will be abandoned by some members of the population and the result will be increased division of labor. In the case of modernizing societies of today, the tension may

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49. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (Editors), Toward a General Theory of Action (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 53.

be generated by the policies of governments dominated by persons who have already been separated to some extent from tradition.

One point must be made in conclusion: These changes undoubtedly feed on each other. Increased surplus and technology make possible extension of the average life expectancy. Population increases aid the increase of the surplus and increasing surplus makes possible technological advances. Thus the relationship does not seem to be one of cause pushing effect, but rather a circular, spiraling relationship.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

In this chapter we will explore some of the consequences of loss of community for the political life of modern men. There is a very large body of literature that is labeled political development literature. The thing we call political development consists of a set of sociological consequences of loss of community. But most of the so-called developing nations are dictatorships. Fromm and Nisbett argued that insecurity due to loss of community may lead to dictatorship. The curious point of this argument is that the process which increases freedom may lead men to "escape from freedom."

I will try to show that this argument is not valid when compared with history, but that in another sense it is true that the individual freedom of modern social life leads to the absence of freedom in politics. One way to distinguish alternative meanings of freedom is to contrast freedom in the sense of capacity for choice with freedom in the sense of capacity to control events. A man may be free to choose what he will do in the abstract, but his environment may prevent him from doing what he chooses. Freedom from the constraints of community means freedom in the former sense. But the result of the rational, mass society organized on the basis of interdependence is that men work in and make collective decisions through social structures that determine their lives more effectively than any totalitarian dictator or any traditional culture.

The loss of community occurs: (1) as traditional cultural prescriptions for action are made less precise, so that people can make more choices regarding the conduct of their own lives; and (2) as the increase of the division of labor makes possible a social system that is based on interdependence between an ever-increasing population. The diversity of action patterns, the decrease of continuous stable face to face relationships, and the increase in the habit of relating on the basis of mutual utility (instrumental as opposed to affective ties) all contribute to the growth of awareness of the separateness of the self from others. As the productive and political organizations of society become larger (as the complexity of the division of labor increases), primary groups are less important to the immediate economic and political problems of life (for example, as factories replace artisan family organization in production). All of these factors favor increased individual self-awareness and decreased individual identity with primary groups.

Thus freedom, in the sense of individual choice and self-expression, increases. But insecurity also occurs because one feels responsible for his own suffering, and because he has less assurance as to the correctness or wrongness of his choices. He is morally isolated. He doubts the value of his suffering and is not sure of the meaning of his life.

Generally, all aspects of life, including politics, are secularized and dealt with on a rational basis. All collective tasks are organized rationally and bureaucracy is a result. Thus in politics

the rational, secular, bureaucratic state is the natural form of political organization.

The loss of community is at the center of the continuing political problems of our time. There are no traditional countries today, only traditional communities within countries. This mixture of cultures creates tensions which are similar to, but perhaps more disruptive than, the problems of those areas that passed through these changes at an earlier time. In addition, the existence of highly individuated and economically successful societies in contact with these mixed cultures further complicates the situation.

But perhaps the most fundamental political fact of our time is the fact that all nations are developing nations--all are underdeveloped--in the sense that the social changes (and consequently the political changes) associated with the loss of community are going on at a very rapid pace in North America and Europe, as well as in Africa and Latin America.

As we think about the consequences of these facts for political freedom, two basic ideas need to be kept clearly in mind. First, the traditional ideas of authority, justice, obligation, participation and membership are based on the assumption that politics occur in communities. Second, if my explanation of the loss of community is correct, it is not conceivable that the conditions of community could be re-established by a simple re-structuring of society.[1] The problem is that community is not a rational commitment to other people. It is not love

1. It is conceivable that a radical re-structuring could re-establish community after a period of several generations, but only if significant sacrifices are made in the economic standard of living. None of this seems very practical to me.

or morality. It is a lack of awareness of separation from others and a lack of capacity to make choices. Awareness can be created; lack of awareness cannot.

Further, it is not clear to me that it is desirable to re-establish community. The total identification between members of communities has frequently been the cause of violence and atrocities committed against persons who are members of other communities.

Nisbet expresses concern that totalitarianism is a consequence of the loss of community. "When the masses, in considerable number, already exist, as a consequence of historical forces, half the work of the totalitarian leader has been done for him. . . ."[2] Fromm believes that only by imbueing ". . . people with a faith that is the strongest the human mind is capable of, the faith in life and in truth, and in freedom as the active and spontaneous realization of the individual self . . ."[3] can we avoid totalitarianism.

But all evidence is that totalitarianism occurs in the transition from traditional society, and not in fully individuated societies. Nisbett himself says, "But when the masses do not already exist in great numbers and where, through the accident of quick seizure of power, the totalitarian mentality comes into ascendency, then it becomes necessary to create the masses."[4] He implies that these are exceptional circumstances, but the fact is that all known totalitarian systems have come into existence in exactly this way.

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2. Nisbet, op. cit., p. 199.

3. Fromm, op. cit., p. 303.

4. Nisbet, op. cit., p. 201.

Nisbet says that " . . . there are two central elements of totalitarianism: the first is the existence of the masses; the second is the ideology . . . of the political community."[5] But we may note two empirical indications that this is not a typical political structure for modern society. One is the so-called "decline of ideology" in Europe.[6] Another is the apparent conflict in the Soviet Union between the technocrats (the most individuated class presumably) and the party ideologies.[7] Dictatorship is effective when traditional conceptions of authority exist, and it can become totalitarian when it can incorporate modern technology and rational organization to support it. But it is unstable at best among individuated men because it denies freedom of choice and rational decision-making. Totalitarian systems depend on the technologists who have minds that are trained away from the unthinking acceptance of authority that is necessary for effective totalitarian control.

Despite the fact that freedom, in the sense that people can (and must) make choices regarding everyday conduct, is very great in modern society, men are not really free. They are not free because they lack power over the social environment, and this is particularly true with respect to politics. I may choose to vote for any candidate, but my

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5. Ibid., p. 198.

6. See, for example, Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of West European Party Systems: in Gary C. Byrn and Kenneth S. Pedersen (eds.), Politics in West European Democracies, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), p. 151, ff.

7. See, for example, Ernest Kux, "Technicians of Power Versus Managers of Technique," in Sydney A. Ploss, The Soviet Political Process, (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn and Co., 1971).

vote has such an infinitesimally small effect that for all practical purposes it is of no effect at all. This powerlessness of individuals is due to the size and impersonalness of the organizations through which we act. In primary groups, when collective decisions are made, some individuals prevail and determine what will be done, and the individual effort of each participant in the process has some effect on the outcome. But in modern organizations persons sense the fact that whether or not they, as individuals, participate makes no difference in the outcome.

In politics each person has two possible kinds of interests. One is an interest in the substance of public policy. The other is an interest in his own relationship to the organization. In traditional communities the former was either "right" or "wrong," depending on whether or not it conformed to the shared norms of the community. In modern politics society accepts the legitimacy of using one's private interest to determine one's substantive preferences. In this situation policy outcomes are a consequence of the working out of interests, and the most salient interests are the interests of individuals in their relationship to the organization: the interests of politicians in staying in office; the interest of bureaucrats in enlarging their jurisdiction; the interest of college professors in maintaining tenure. These are the kinds of interests which are sufficiently common and permanent to provide continuity in the collective processes. The "public interest," the opinions of the masses, are manipulated by massive propaganda to serve the common organizational interests of segments of the elite.

All of this can occur because the society is structured on the basis of interdependence, and because it is so extensive; because there are no common values, and therefore no common interests (only the accidental coincidence of private interests); because individuals measure their own value, not by contributions to the public good, but by success in competition for personal status.

The result of this process is that it very seldom occurs that any individual has any real control over the substantive outcome of the policy processes. The masses feel that a few politicians make the decisions without regard to "the interest of the common man." Political executives feel manipulated by civil servants. Technical advisors feel that their advice is ignored by policy makers. Legislators feel that their power has been usurped by executives. In short, no one is responsible for the outcome, because it is, in a very real sense, the product of a variety of forces beyond the control of any one person. The only persons who have any sense of control are those few people who find themselves in a position to manipulate their own relationship to the organization by taking advantage of the ebb and flow of these tides of interest: the political opportunists.

One consequence of this is that public policy generally protects the masses--the political class use their influence to insure that the distribution of material goods is never too disadvantageous to them. Overall, it is probably true that in these societies more people benefit from the distributive processes of society than in any other. But the policies are not primarily a result of a common moral commitment; they are a result of the manipulation of mass interests by ambitious politicians and bureaucrats.

On the other hand, injustices frequently occur for the same reasons, sometimes on an incredible scale. The political executive of a super military power is advised by military bureaucrats to use strong military force against a small under-equipped guerilla army. Intelligence bureaucrats and international relations bureaucrats advise against this action because of the danger of precipitating war with another large power, and because of the probable disapproval of allies. The political advisors warn that either course of action will result in a negative mass reaction and advise actions to maintain the status quo long enough to develop another option. The political executive chooses a course of policy that all technical advisors say will not work. As this policy begins to fail, another unacceptable policy is devised. In the meantime thousands of human lives are lost and damaged by a policy that is not really acceptable to anyone, but that is vigorously sold to the masses by an expensive and dishonest public relations campaign. Thus, terrible death and destruction is not a consequence of evil design, but of the lack of commitment to justice and the accidental working out of political forces beyond the control of anyone.

Two things must be made clear. First, I do not propose an adverse comparison of the present with the past. When mankind was divided into communities men were unjust to each other because they did not recognize the common humanity that exists among all men. Aristocrats treated peasants like alien beasts (and probably *vice versa* when the opportunity presented itself). Tribes of primitive people who live virtually identical lives within a few miles of each other engage in ceremonies of eating each other's flesh. From the early modern period

to the present, nationalism, political ideology and religion sometimes divide groups of men from each other and the very sense of identification within a group becomes the basis for incredible brutality to humans who are not identified with the group.

Second, among those who recognize the failure of modern men to develop a sense of justice, it is too easy to fail to see that many of the most individuated of modern men do have an intense sense of justice and an apparently intense sense of identity with other humans. In fact it seems to me that most of those who write about the subject have found, not just a set of values, but a <u>common</u> set of values. The sacrifices and struggles of some white men for the welfare of non-white men, the struggle of some men of the middle and upper income classes for the welfare of the poor cannot be attributed entirely to self-interest. Although I do not believe that it was the major fuel, certainly the sense of justice shared by many of the participants was one circumstance that supported the anti-war movement. And it was probably the circumstance that gave the movement the limited effectiveness that it had.

The problem, then, is not the absence of just men. It is a system in which personal interest is given equal legitimacy with justice, and is therefore as likely to prevail as justice, and it is a system in which the complexity of the decision-making process results in decisions which are not really chosen by any one person. As John Scharr has said, "All bureaucrats are innocent."[8]

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8. "Legitimacy in the Modern State," in Philip Green and Sanford Levinson (eds.), <u>Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science</u>, (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 307.

The problem is not only the lack of a common sense of justice; perhaps more important is the lack of genuine authority of public officials over the masses. In the above example an executive in a traditional society might have chosen to make a just decision. He would not have felt constrained by the possibility of a negative mass reaction. In modern society no one is free and no one is responsible.

If the analysis in Chapters II and III is correct, then it does not make sense to argue for the reestablishment of a sense of community. If the traditional values of justice and authority depend upon the existence of community, then they cannot be reestablished without reversing those trends that have been in motion throughout all of what we know of human history. But justice and authority and most of the other moral ideas that we have associated with politics depend upon the existence of a community.

The difficulties lie in the predominance of private interest over common values as motivators of action, and in the need in modern society for every man to feel a sense of identity with all other men.

But there is evidence that men want values which will give meaning to life. I cannot suggest where those values can be found, but I do think that the greatest possibility lies in social science and education. We should abandon the search for a value-free social science and devote our efforts to discovering those universal tendencies in human behavior that can serve as the basis for a common morality. We should recognize that the fact that given values are not "provable" by science or logic does not constitute grounds for rejecting them. The validity of values should be judged on the same grounds that physicists

judge their theories: on grounds of how useful they are to those who use them.

In education we should systematically devote ourselves to teaching people to understand the nature of their own experiences, rather than teaching the irrelevancies that make up the bulk of social science education today. In short, we should reject both the pseudo science of the behavioralists and the romanticism of the new left and accept the insecurity of our present condition. Rather than seeking to escape from responsibility by ignoring our difficulties or by seeking false security in vague schemes to reestablish the values of the past, we should re-examine what we do know and recognize what we do not know about our present condition and about human behavior, and try to find a new set of values that can be meaningful to men in an industrial society.

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