

THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE:

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEW

by

Barbara Dianna Reed Hartmann

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the

COMMITTEE ON LINGUISTICS (GRADUATE)

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1 9 8 0

Copyright 1980 Barbara Dianna Reed Hartmann

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

I hereby recommend that this dissertation prepared under my direction
by Barbara Dianna Reed Hartmann

entitled Therapeutic Discourse: A Phenomenological View

be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy.

Leticia R. Van Matre
Dissertation Director

December 4, 1979
Date

As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have
read this dissertation and agree that it may be presented for final
defense.

Adrian T. Bennett

12/10/79
Date

Paul R. Turner

12/7/79
Date

Richard Coan

12/6/79
Date

Christie Tang

12/11/79
Date

Date

Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent on the
candidate's adequate performance and defense thereof at the final oral
examination.

STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder.

SIGNED:

Barbara Diane Red Hartmann

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	v
1. THE PROBLEM	1
Issues of Meaning and Psychotherapy	4
Psychotherapy: Social Context	10
Problematics of Social Meaning--	
Historical Focus	15
Rationalist-Empiricist Notions	16
Social Constructionist Notions	23
Statement of the Problem	27
Social Understanding and Linguistic	
Discourse Analysis	27
Direction and Focus for the Inquiry	29
2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE	34
Semantics and Pragmatics	35
Linguistic Semantics: Clarification	
of the Paradigm	35
Clues Toward a Paradigm	49
A Note on Inference in Human	
Discourse	71
Discourse: Type B Meaning, Understanding,	
and Interpretation	78
Structural Linguistic Analysis and	
Psychotherapy Talk	93
A Note on Structural Approaches	
to Human Interactions	96
Pittenger, Hockett, and Danehy	98
Labov and Fanshel	116
Non-structural Approaches to Human	
Behavior	126
Gumperz and an Interactional Model	127
Bennett and Thematic Progression	131
Erickson and Rhythmic Patterning	132
3. THE METHOD	136
A Note on Circularity of Method	142
The Concept of Truth in Human	
Discourse	143

TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued.

	Page
The Circular Method	152
Procedures	157
4. THE ANALYSIS	174
An Interpretation of the Interactional Situation	178
The Interaction	182
The Moods	183
Mood 1. Challenge and Duel	185
Mood 2. Instruction	190
Mood 3. Joking	192
Mood 4. Bewilderment	195
The Unfolding: More Selections from the Text of Moods and Transitions	202
Example IV-5	202
Evidence in Support of an Interpretation of the Interactional Situation	220
"Oh Woe Is Me I Can't Get Out and They Can"	221
Issues of Psychotherapy for A and T	246
Family Resemblances: Implications for Psychotherapy	251
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS	254
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	267

ABSTRACT

The central investigative question addressed by this study is: How might linguistic discourse analysis expand current notions of meaning in the interpretation of texts in order to develop a method of practical analysis of the data of client-therapist communication activity in psychotherapy interaction? To develop an inquiry which will serve as a basis for answering this question, a review of relevant theories of meaning as well as a review of some research in discourse analysis of psychotherapy interaction has been included. Additionally, some basic matters relating to the nature of psychotherapy and to its critical import for both client and therapist are discussed. The hypothesis of the study is that the creation of a deep mutual understanding in therapy interaction is hindered when the participants are in conflict as to what the interaction is to achieve.

Two diverging directions in the study of meaning in human experience have developed. One of these lines of thinking views meaning as a static entity separable from social context, despite the conceptual presence of social context in the ordinary language and linguistic pragmatic versions of this orientation. Advocates of this perception

of meaning include proponents of cognitive, behavioral and functional approaches to meaning.

The second movement has attempted to direct the study of meaning to account for meaning within specific social situations and interactional activity. The underlying assumption is that meaning in human experience is jointly produced by participants in an historical fashion, context being created by the participants within the interaction itself. It is to this second direction that this study adheres.

Issues of linguistic discourse analysis are currently interpreted and described through various structural methodologies. This study proposes, following the influence of interactional theorists in sociolinguistics, that the relationship between observed structural regularities and the actual understanding participants experience is not the close correspondence to the various constructional units which structural analyses report. Rather, human discourse, to be adequately described, insofar as such may be possible, requires a more flexible and sensitive method than has been offered through structural approaches.

This study examines the texts of four audiorecorded psychotherapy interactions of one client, A, and the therapist, T, who is the author of this research. The method of analysis is a non-structural description of the texts which

focuses upon the interaction of A and T. The method, a hermeneutic approach, begins with an interpretation of what is going on between the participants. The interpretation is then substantiated on the basis of the observable characteristics of the interaction which allow the interpretation.

Recognizing that all understandable talk is modulated then any talk which unfolds as meaningful will have a distinctive prosody as a constitutive characteristic. Through a notational system which segments the text in a manner analogous to its syntax, the prosody is analyzed as intrinsically relational to all other aspects of the discourse.

There is explication of how the prosody of the talk frames its content serving to create the meaning of the interaction. In this way the method is empirically verified.

Hermeneutic analysis, a phenomenological approach is offered as logically prior to any structural analysis where the intention is to understand the meaning of the discourse. This method proves to be an empirical and practical way for linguistics discourse analysis to characterize how language and meaning are constitutive of the way in which psychotherapy interaction is assembled and interpreted.

CHAPTER 1

THE PROBLEM

This chapter introduces the central investigative problem for the study. The problem, meaning in human experience, is examined first in terms of some matters of psychotherapy. These matters serve to provide the reader with an orientation to the author's approach to this face-to-face event. Following this, an historical overview of the problematics of social meaning in terms of some relevant scholarship is provided. Two variant orientations towards the study of meaning have developed and for purposes of discussion here, are identified as the Type A and Type B approaches.

The major question to be addressed along with certain other questions concerning the interpretive process posed by this study suggest that linguistics, if it is to remain a social science, must move to develop a way to characterize how language and meaning are constitutive of the way in which social interaction is assembled and interpreted.

Finally, the hypothesis of the study is given: that the creation of a deep mutual understanding in therapy interaction is hindered when the participants are in

conflict as to what the interaction is to achieve. This becomes especially apparent when the conflict is not brought to the level of explicit attention in the situation.

The divergent art and science of human discourse analysis conjointly depend for adequacy upon the achievement of a fundamental notion as to the nature of meaning in human behavior generally. This dependence is necessarily the case because human beings have created cultures which are sets of subtly learned constraints on what constitutes the public reality. These constraints are guides to how to perform and how to interpret what people are doing through which an understanding of themselves as individuals and the world in which they find themselves can be achieved. In other words, the background of culture makes possible the complex of negotiated meanings.

For the discourse analyst, who is striving to describe and understand the dynamics of human expression, with a primary view towards illuminating how man, the speaker, interprets his own meanings while interpreting the meanings of others in the acts of creating discourse, two notions are fundamental:

1. One lives in a world of people and things and relationships, as part of complexes of group and social phenomena: How may this experience be described as coming to have meaning?

2. One feels certain ways, some aspects of which are potentially expressible in visible behavior characterized by modifiers such as happy, depressed, hopeful, angry, curious, anguished, confused, or so on: How may this experience be described as coming to have meaning?

The core from which this discussion of these two kinds of experience arises takes as primitive that meaning in interaction is central to the study of human social conduct. In other words, meaning, being both public and private, visible and invisible, is created through participation in human discourse. The nature of such participation, the particular meaning achieved, emerges as different for each participant in the interaction; that is, each person constructs his own reality through the background of culture. Rooted in this notion is that meaning is accomplished, negotiated, unfolding in an historical fashion out of interaction. That is to say that a study of human discourse might consist of a description of one's interpretations of oneself and of the other, as an historical act of unfolding simultaneous self-interpretation and other-interpretation by virtue of a relationship creating a social context. One's social reality, then, originates from this interactive accomplishment of meaning.

With reference to the first notion mentioned above, meaning is one's self-interpretation of social experience. With reference to the second notion, the specific nature of one's social participation and self-other interpretation, meaning is what is accomplished as one interprets his place in ongoing interaction. In what manner does he construct his experience?

In these questions concerning human discourse, the linguist-analyst's interests coalesce with those found within the concerns of the "helping" professions, especially psychiatry and psychotherapy.

Issues of Meaning and Psychotherapy

Psychotherapy is an occurrence of face-to-face interaction (talk) where, no matter what additional trappings of the "modality" or "technique" are being "used" in the session, the talk, that is, the discourse is the treatment.

Within the context of a relationship formed specifically for purposes of "helping", where the behavior communicates about itself and its history, in order to understand what goes on in achievement of a therapeutic goal, it remains critical to note that both client and therapist understand the meaning of the interaction. They always take the discourse to have a meaning. Therapists and clients usually and routinely make judgments about whether "anything has gone on", or whether "anything has been achieved" in the

therapy. In order to make such judgments as to whether anything has gone on or whether anything has been achieved, one has to know what counts as something that can go on or what counts as something that can be achieved in the particular interaction.

For purposes of definition in this study, psychotherapy, in any of its variations, is a socially agreed upon, naturally occurring context, historically available and specifically intended to provide a situation where people gather to focus directly upon themselves as human beings within their worlds of experience. In their interaction, client and therapist face the ongoing paradox of the human's social experience being always a part of and yet apart from others. This is a point of fundamental importance in therapy in that it is literally impossible for one person to give another insight: each person is simultaneously dependent and autonomous in creating his own experience.

Frequently, therapy dialogue leads to the understanding that at least one of the person's experience of self and world is intolerable. This sometimes calls forth nearly heroic acts of self-other support within such experience of pain and dread. Therapist and client repeatedly undergo rather rough confrontation with self-crippling ways of being which collide uncomfortably with the person's freedom to choose a lifestyle.

In one's action of continuing to choose being-present to the public and to one self over against a potential choice of total withdrawal from social participation, the particular therapy dialogue becomes an exigent convergence of each person's total historical experience of self-other and self-self relationship(s) in terms of what each's experience has come to mean.

Psychotherapy is discourse about social action which is both theoretically and ethically problematic and most often not clearly defined. An example of such opacity is found in therapeutic discourse where suicide is the topic. Here, although the event is meaningful to some extent as an aspect of formal shared cultural knowledge, in any specific discourse the meaning of the event remains frustratingly elusive and ambiguous.

In contemporary psychotherapy systems, there exists an adversary position to client-suicide which asserts that something must be drastically wrong for a person to commit himself to a suicide action or threat of action. The overwhelming problem, though, for the therapist, using the specialized and more focused area of cultural knowledge (his training in the voluminous literature pertaining to the topic), is to come to some conclusion as to what the real meaning of suicide is for the client. And, for the client, the problem is to arrive at some conclusion about what

suicide will come to mean in terms of his own particular history. In other words, during the process of accomplishing the meaning of the interaction, despite the fact that the therapist comes biased to the interaction by virtue of the injunction of prevention, and an armory of facts about who has committed suicide in the past and who might be most prone to perform such an action, and for what reasons, and in what manner, client and therapist have to work out the meaning of suicide.

The therapist does not "do" anything to the client in order for the meaning of the interaction to emerge. That is, the therapist does not "treat" the client through applying "therapeutic talk" to the problem in order to render a successful outcome. Both participants mutually work towards the meaning of the interaction: the therapist and the client create the meaning of suicide in that specific discourse.

The glaring absence of adequate models for close textual analysis of actual discourse presents a formidable barrier to learning how to talk about interaction per se, how to talk about the ways social action is managed. This is an embarrassingly prominent void in the literature of psychiatry and psychotherapy. In lieu of showing exactly what goes on in a therapy interaction, in terms of how the therapist and client arrive at their interpretations, one finds simple case histories of patients, described in terms

of a presenting symptomology which is then treated by some method, the outcome of which is either remission or non-remission of the symptoms. Then follows a rationale for the treatment in terms of its success or failure and some further discussion. These case histories are context-free structural stereotypes or typifications of particular pathologies imposing an order for a set of interrogative procedures for collecting information which can lead to a diagnosis.

The process of accurate diagnosis is presented as a logical step-by-step procedure continually ruling out some possibilities while ruling in others. This presents the process as a coherent transfer of findings from a client to a case history heavily dependent upon client memory for past events. Yet often there is client confusion concerning these past experiences.

In texts giving case histories, this question of confusion is not taken into account, nor does one find an elaboration of therapist activity working upon this confusion. Diagnosis escapes its definition: a series of invisible hypotheses finding confirmation or lack thereof through interpretations arising out of the interaction of the participants. Rather, the typical procedure is explained as relating the symptoms to some reality of pathology, the therapist acting as a connector between the a priori entities, pathology and cure. The discourse, the socially

organized features and management of the interaction, and the participants' understanding as to what has gone on, is taken for granted. The whole issue of how meaning comes to exist for the participants is evaded. What is provided instead is a higher level abstract recipe of sorts for how the diagnosis will be made, the therapy proceed, and the desired outcome attained. Problems of knowing what exactly is communicated and how diagnosis relates to ongoing communication, to "symptoms", and to outcome reports, and the relationships of these variables is not generally discussed or known.

The problematic nature of the meaning(s) of social action(s) for the members of society-at-large, some of whom are theoreticians who observe, describe, and interpret human experience, and secondarily, the intimacy and the depths of what the experience which inheres in the possibilities of psychotherapy interaction can come to mean both serve as more than adequate rationales for therapists and discourse analysts to develop a way to show how meaning is created in discourse, particularly, psychotherapy discourse.

Where all of the foregoing discussion ultimately leads is to the conclusion that, given the nuclear position meaning holds in personal and cultural experience, linguistic discourse analysis ideally ought to develop a theory and method of text analysis which will in a practical and

practicable way answer the question "What allows the client and therapist to understand their interaction?" and will begin to get closer to answering "What allows persons to arrive at their particular interpretations of the world?". This in effect would amount to describing aspects of the act of meaning creation itself.

Psychotherapy: Social Context

The purpose of this section is to focus first upon some of the features of the general framework provided by the social institution called psychotherapy, and second to delineate certain specific features of therapy interaction.

As an academic discipline, psychotherapy is continually in ferment--new theories emerging, old systems changing and moving to the background.

The term itself appears in the lexicon as derived from Greek *psychē*: the organ of thought and judgment; and *therapeia*: treatment. The definition for an occurrence of psychotherapy depends upon the particular source offering such definition. Variation in descriptions exists over such continua as, for example, the view of the nature of man: How it is that people find themselves in painful life situations? What is the nature of the discomfort? What is involved in stopping the discomfort? Is stopping the discomfort desirable? and others. The central and crucial

core of each of these theories is its delineation of what would in fact be an ideal person, which characteristics and traits one would expect to find in its version of an "optimal personality" (Coan, 1974; 1977) and what questions might be involved in this as a possible attainment for any particular individual.

The theory acts to provide both constraints upon possible interpretations of one's experience and a way of looking at human beings generally, and as such is a framework for the interaction. Through its point of view, its way of making sense of specific life happenings, that is, explaining what the nature of human experience is and what, in the particular life situation at hand, could be going wrong, one can interpret his experiences using perhaps as a grid the terms and constructs of the theory.

Another part of the framework is that the organizational arrangements within which psychotherapy usually takes place consist(s) of such accoutrements as a designated place, an office or room, in most instances a prearranged and scheduled time for both beginning and ending, the possibility of a fee assessment upon the client and other such arrangements for the actual occurrence. These features along with those of certification of practitioners, accreditations of the facility, and others, serve to validate psychotherapy as a socially approved occasion.

In the framework is the process of interaction management. Participants each have certain rights, obligations, assumptions, and expectations concerning the interaction. These may be mutually agreed upon but may or may not be made explicit. Persons come into the situation and begin sharing in the constructing of the discourse world through various modes of interaction over the duration of the interaction.

Psychotherapy is a particular occurrence of the face-to-face situation. While there is simply a co-location of two people in space and time in bodily presence to each other, there is concern with at least two ways of being in contact with the other. One way is simply being aware of the presence of the other with a mutual awareness of the other. Another is the way of being together which is characterized by mutual close attentiveness and awareness of the other, with persons interacting, perhaps sharing experiences. This second way of being with the other is for Schutz (1967) the "we-relation" participants being "con-sociates" in contrast to the former way of being, a "they-relation" of mere "contemporaries".

Schutz questions how it is possible to experience the other (if at all). Primarily, experiencing the other is not a case of having the other's own experiences, and is not the literal living through of what the other is

living through. The experiencings of the other are his (not mine) and my experiencings of his experiences are mine: interpretations I have arrived at. The other is experienced by me as having his own experiences. I experience him as experiencing me; but none of my experience of him is the same as my having his experiences. Essentially, no two persons can have the same experiences: each has his own self and historicity.

Conversation with the other involves mutual engagement in ongoing activity. The other says something; I respond. If the other feels I have not understood the sense of his talk, he may work out the meaning in some additional way. Words are heard; physical movement occurs; meaning is jointly created in the mutuality of the experience.

While involved in the conversation presently, participants hold on to current meanings while having awareness of past meanings which relate to the current activity. Awareness of the other flows, taking shape moment by moment and relates to all non-present and past interpretations. One's experience is an interconnection of meanings; and one's experience of being together with the other is a living together in intersubjective time: "we grow old together" (Schutz, 1967, p. 103).

In the psychotherapy relationship, the goal is presumably but not necessarily the same for both participants.

This sameness inheres in looking at the occasion as an opportunity to focus upon one's experience and understanding as a person. How this focus works and this understanding is accomplished lies in the way each is present in the situation; and how each participant orients himself there: the roles.

The therapist in some measure orients himself as would the host of a social event: extending the invitation to come to a certain place at a certain time for a certain purpose. This face-to-face occasion is the opportunity to focus directly upon the client's experience, who, as the invited, finds himself and his experience as the center of attention. What emerges then from the interaction is the jointly produced meaning of the event of psychotherapy, the interpretations of the participants.

A final consideration in this section relates to the nature of the psychotherapy interaction. To get at these interpretations it becomes necessary to focus on such issues as how each arrives at his interpretations; that is, what in the actual discourse allows one to reach the particular conclusions, both the observable communication behavior and the cultural knowledge and experience, expectations and assumptions used. In particular: (1) what can be said about the assumptions, expectations and values which are the background for the discourse? (2) what do the participants expect to get out of the interaction? (3) what is

actually accomplished in the discourse? (4) how is this accomplishment achieved?

While this study cannot provide conclusive answers to these questions, it will, through looking at specific instances of interaction, suggest a productive direction for linguistic science to understand human language as "Lebensformen" (Wittgenstein, 1953), as discourse, and for participants and analyst to understand meaning in human discourse.

Problematics of Social Meaning--Historical Focus

The history of the problem of meaning in language and human discourse in twentieth century scholarship includes significant work from a variety of disciplines among which are anthropology, philosophy, psychology, sociology, and linguistics. This widespread interest in the topic demonstrates the importance which has been accorded the issues of meaning. But, because numerous scholars from so many differing fields have deliberated upon these questions, there results considerable confusion as to what is meant by the term "meaning" itself.

This section will review some of the major trends comprising the literature of the discussions of meaning in order to clarify and begin to delimit the scope of the question to be developed here which arises from the problem of meaning in psychotherapy conversations. The purpose is not

to provide a comprehensive survey of all the contributions to the study of meaning in this century, but rather to introduce some basic issues relating to meaning, and how these are developed and treated within particular approaches.

Generally, during this century discussions of meaning have divided into two directions. One of these deals with meaning in terms which remove it from any specific contexts of social interaction. The concern is to study meaning as an entity separable from and independent of the intentions, motives, goals, or purposes of the individuals in specific situations. This tradition in meaning research will be referred to as Type A Meaning.

A second movement has proposed a direction for characterizing the development of moment-by-moment negotiated meaning in specific social situations involving--at least ultimately--actual persons in real ongoing, interactional events. Meaning in this school of thought will be referred to as Type B Meaning.

Rationalist-Empiricist Notions

The first approach involves philosophical semantics out of which develop the issues of Ideal Language Philosophy which concentrate upon clarifying the descriptive language for "pure" science. Interest is in formal logic and its applicability to language, where, in order for a speaker to

make sense, he must be able to specify the way in which what he says can be empirically verified. It must be possible to specify what observations would show truth or falsity of the proposition. There is concern with characterizing the scientific descriptions of reality. Propositions and the underlying logical methods of this approach have been used in linguistics in areas such as componential analysis.

Philosophers contributing to this realm of semantics have been Tarski, Schlick, Carnap, Wittgenstein (early period), Russell, Whitehead, Frege, and others; while linguists Chomsky, Jakobson, Hjelmslev, Katz and others represent varying frameworks for these notions. Among the most prominent anthropological research arising out of this Type A notion of meaning is that of Boas, Kluckhohn, and Benedict as well as in cognitive anthropology, the work of Lounsbury and Goodenough. Underlying all these writings is the notion of a natural science model for performing research.

Also arising out of philosophical semantics is a bi-directional approach involving both Type A and Type B concepts, the Ordinary Language Philosophy. Concern lies in specifying the practical logic assumed to lie underneath the use of what is referred to as "speech acts" or "ordinary language" (which is not the same as language in conversation and never was intended to be thus establishing a Type A

tone). Work such as Searle's (1969) focuses on philosophical issues pertaining to the way people make statements, ask questions, make requests, and what, as Austin (1962) suggested, has to "be in the air" or assumed, to use and distinguish these entities. Also, scholars such as Grice (1971) stress the notion of intentionality: that meaning in language involves speakers' intentions. This work has attempted to outline the logical system underlying the possibility of being able to figure out what a speaker's intentions might be. Certain general rules operate which act as logical underpinnings in order for smooth interaction to occur. The rules are not investigated in terms of actual conversations but rather are offered as something people in dialogue assume and operate on in order to converse. Austinian plain-clothes philosophy, with its low profile techniques, offers a gently persuasive line that meaning is a practical matter of getting things done via words. A difference between the Ordinary approach and the Ideal Language one revolves around the issue of audience participation: one cannot sensibly make requests, promises, apologies, or bets if there is no one to ask, promise or apologize to, or bet with. However, one can always speak the truth even in the absence of a listener.

The critical difference between these two orientations centers upon the Ordinary Language Philosopher's ability to show that it is possible, to a certain extent, to

talk about people's intentions. Within an Ordinary Language view, meaning is a social event. In this recognition, Austin's work as well as that of Searle and others moves in principle towards the perspectives of the Type B theorists, but not totally in method. In contrast to the Ordinary Approach, philosophers advocating an Ideal Language directionality for research in semantics concern themselves with matching propositions with states of affairs in the world. This latter interest is, in both principle and method, of Type A orientation.

For Ideal Language, meaning is identified in factual statements. If a statement can be verified as true or false it is meaningful. For Ordinary Language meaning inheres in performing a linguistic act felicitously, that is, conventionally.

Both of these approaches identify meaning in meeting certain conditions. The conditions are "scientific" in Ideal Language and social in Ordinary Language. Therefore, a statement like "It's snowing in Hell" is meaningless in the Ideal approach but at least potentially meaningful in Ordinary.

This division between Ideal and Ordinary Language views in the philosophy of semantics is not at all clear-cut despite the fact that their subject matter is confined to specific nonduplicating issues. For example, in

scientific language a proposition to be good must, besides reflecting some state of affairs in the world, also be relevant, should not say more or less than needs to be said, should follow the manner of the particular science, and so on.

Insofar as the division of meaning into Type A and Type B approaches hinges upon the particular theory's ability to get at interactional meaning, Austin's work shows elements of both approaches. His expert analysis of typical instances of language use parallels the work of Type B theorists such as Schutz (1967) in looking for underlying rules and conditions for performing certain kinds of social acts. And, Austin's method is not quite that of natural science. It is to some extent observational and abstracting, turning upon his own introspection. He ties talk to activity suggesting that in certain instances the utterance constitutes the act. In saying "I apologize" the act is accomplished given the appropriate conditions for apology to occur. However, within the speech act orientation of Searle and others, utterances are viewed as independent wholes which is a Type A notion. In contrast, a Type B view of a particular utterance would construe the piece of talk to be a strategy interrelated and interpreted within the larger task of managing discourse.

Semantics in linguistics is concerned with that aspect of the language which is referred to by such questions as "What does one say about a linguistic expression in order to specify its meaning?" Techniques, limited in scope of Type A orientation, have been developed to look at the different sets of words used by languages to identify the features of a particular area of experience (semantic field), as well as to study all the various relationships of meaning which exist between words in a particular language (structural semantics). Applications of these latter techniques deal with problems such as analyzing words which have more than one meaning, defining idioms, stating how much detail to allow into the definition of a word, and the relationship of styles to usage to the meanings of words. Also, dictionary writing and thesaurus compiling are among the peripheral interests in linguistic semantics.

Of prime concern for the linguist in semantics is the problem of how the semantic system hypothesized for a language is organized, and what model might most usefully be constructed in order to facilitate analysis.

Approaches to this primary problem have tended to develop in contrasting Type A formats comprising theories focusing on a limited domain of the issues of meaning such as Katz, Palmer, Chomsky, Chafe, and other theories attempting to account for the whole domain of meaning in language such as Bloomfield, Hockett, and others. There has been a

continuous tension between the confined-domain and the broad-domain theories, as well as tension within each domain throughout the recent history of linguistics. Generally, meaning in the confined approaches has been described as a context-free and static property of utterances, the meaning of which can be fully specified by a native speaker of a language on an intuitive basis. The broad theories, in accounting for how sounds are transformed into meaning, argue that meaning is directly translatable into the linguistic code with its phonological, morphological, and syntactic structures.

Issues of pragmatics are important for developing a theory and method of discourse analysis which can look at meaning as negotiated by participants in specific interactions. Pragmatics as a discipline involves specification of: (1) the relationship of signs to users, and (2) conditions of appropriateness for the use of a sentence. Some representative pragmatic issues in language are what kinds of judgments a person makes to know how or if someone is being polite, if an interaction is beneficial, as well as what in the language might differ for women speakers as opposed to men speakers.

Linguistics pragmatics is exemplified by the work of Fillmore who began by looking for an alternative to the transformational-generative approach to linguistics. He

accomplished this by developing a set of concepts which identify the types of judgments which human beings are capable of making about the events going on around them-- who did something? To whom did it happen? What got changed? and so on. Out of this direction in semantic theory, Fillmore moves to other topics such as descriptions of word meanings and the interpretation of sentences. Most recently he presents an extremely broad goal of developing a uniform conceptual framework for discussing this whole range of meaning, also including the interpretation of texts, and the cognitive processes of expression and comprehension.

Fillmore's work, although Type A in nature by virtue of the abstract semantic construct of frames through which people relate their knowledge of the world to what goes on in interaction and meaning is conveyed as information, also bears similarity to Type B concerns. This similarity involves Fillmore's (1977) proposal for a unified theory of discourse. It is in the application of interpretive frames to ongoing interaction, that is, discourse, where one's intention is to describe what is accomplished, that the theory proves problematic. This problem will be reviewed in Chapter 2.

Social Constructionist Notions

The second major direction in discussing meaning involves taking as its data specific situations--actual

persons in ongoing interactional events. Issues deal with what people do in communicating when they interact. Looking at this kind of meaning is important in order to look at language and social life as interdependent. This amounts to saying that language cannot be studied without reference to a theory of social life, and conversely, that it is not possible to study social life without reference to language. Any issue of human communication demands concern with both.

Work in this interpretational approach to questions of meanings draws from the writings of Vico, Herder, Husserl, Heidegger, (later) Wittgenstein, all of whom view the individual human being as capable of realizing his own truth in his own unfolding life process. Truth for these philosophers is not a collection of verifiable descriptions or an accumulated body of data and generalizations based on such, where facts and their descriptions are independent of the individual person's experience--especially that of the scientific researcher. Meaning cannot be taken up in a mood of pure abstraction but must be considered in the specific instance of a context.

In this tradition, research from anthropology such as the Hymes and Fraake studies in ethnography of communication focus on the social rules operating in particular contexts and on what people must know to be communicatively competent in their particular cultures. Erickson looks at

the relationships of social identity and cultural communicational style as he attempts to offer a theory of interactional dynamics in particular social settings.

Ethnomethodology is the format for dealing with the situational knowledge that people have concerning their daily life. Work in this field goes beyond that already developed in pragmatics, especially speech act theory, showing that in order to find out what participants in interaction are doing, the researcher also must become concerned with their practical everyday knowledge of their world. Writers such as Cicourel, Garfinkel, Sacks, and Schegloff form the early core of this newly defined style of studying meaning.

In sociolinguistics, especially in the studies of Gumperz, Cook-Gumperz, and Bennett, focus is upon looking at language as the means for conveying information, intentions and so on. Meaning is described as a dynamic and flexible interpenetrating part of a negotiated context. And for each occasion the particular meaning of an event is created by the participants. Meaning is bound up with language use and is not totally arbitrary. The basic question in this area of linguistics is the possibility of doing linguistic analysis, relating it to the meaning of each situation. This question proves difficult when one considers that the way language is used in a situation provides the

basis for interpreting the specific intentions and meanings of participants. Meaning is jointly produced by the participants, and always inheres in all the various "levels" of discourse simultaneously. Emphasis is on providing an empirical base for the study of jointly produced meaning with frameworks for looking at prosodic patterning, content, rhythm and so on. Within the variety of tasks involved in ordinary talk such as topic selection, development of topic within certain ranges, interactional occurrences such as joking, questioning, discussing and so on, one finds participants managing the discourse. The way in which this management is accomplished will be part of the participants' understanding of the meaning of the communication. Meaning, then, involves many more facets than reference to the world. Among its interests will be attitudes, beliefs, assumptions, feelings, and others, all of which interpenetrate in a current and unique flexible context for each participant. The problem of meaning for the analyst who wishes to deal with actual face-to-face talk is to be able to describe it without "idealizing" the data. The goal is to provide an analysis which preserves the integrity of the text and illuminates the structure of the text in its own terms.

Statement of the Problem

Social Understanding and Linguistic Discourse Analysis

The question to be addressed in this investigation is specifically: How might linguistic discourse analysis expand current notions of meaning in the interpretation of texts in order to develop a method of practical analysis of the data of client-therapist communication activity in psychotherapy interactions? Answering this question will hold strong implications toward a theory of human discourse.

To begin an inquiry toward forming the basis for this study of psychotherapy talk, the investigation will be concerned with other questions in the interpretive process: (1) What specific meanings are created by persons in therapy interaction? (2) How are these meanings brought into being by the interactants? (3) What in fact would constitute valid answers to these questions? (4) Are certain kinds of answers more valuable here than others? (5) In order to learn about these interactions, what is the necessary kind of analysis?

The central investigative question is a critical one for linguistics in its concern with human language and discourse in view of the realization that the understanding of face-to-face interaction is central to the conceptualization and study of human social conduct. To focus even more intently on the importance of being able to talk about

situational meaning, linguistics, if it is to remain a social science, must move to develop a way to characterize how language and meaning are constitutive of the way in which everyday social interaction is assembled and interpreted.

Other significant reasons for developing a practical analysis for the interpretation of texts are first, that outside of a theoretical direction set by the Type B approaches to understanding meaning, there exist only the very beginnings of a sensitive, appropriate, and empirical methodology for discourse analysis. Second, the potential for application of results of this kind of research in discourse analysis calls to the fore numerous possibilities within the human services or "helping" professions along with possibilities such as developing a concrete and empirically valid method of training student therapists, counselors, or interviewers among others. In this era of mass interest in human relations training and awareness of the importance of effective communication, applications of findings may be only limited by one's creativity and adaptive skill in developing educational formats. Last, and most importantly for psychotherapy, application of findings may serve to illuminate the nature of the talk, which is the treatment.

Direction and Focus for the Inquiry

The purpose of this investigation is to offer a direction of thought for developing a practical analysis of human discourse in the context of psychotherapy conversations.

The specific objectives of this study are:

1. To direct attention to specific issues which are crucial to the particular segments of discourse for those who participate in it.
2. To make explicit whatever interpretations arise from the discourse.
3. To explain how the conclusions are arrived at, which in effect explains how the particular interpretations are created.
4. To demonstrate how the interpretation of the discourse is the meaning of the discourse.
5. To describe the therapy talk in terms of what the client and therapist are each trying to accomplish in the interaction.
6. To identify the kind of understanding achieved by the participants.
7. To identify what problems may exist in the discourse and the implications for these in view of the purpose of psychotherapy.

To begin at this point to focus this discussion upon real issues of psychotherapy dialogue, an actual example from a session follows. This Example I will serve as a departure point for the elaboration of what kind of objectives would most readily serve to assist in answering the core question posed here.

1. A: What I-h' . . . okay now what I hear on the other hand is if you turn me inside out [] then it w' then I would be the opposite [] from what I am . . . Let me
2. T: well
3. A: let me elucidate
4. T: if . . . if wait a min' just just repeat now til I get that . . . if . . . if you turn inside out then you would be the opposite Is that what you said
5. A: kinda
6. T: okay [go ahead
7. A: [uh [] Anyone who says to me "A" you do a good this uh . . . I don't know wh' you or somebody had said something onetime hey you're really coming along it's really you know good to see you doing this and that . . .

8. T: I hope I never said that
9. A: [2] N'I don't think you [ever did
10. T: [(laugh) cut out
my tongue
11. A: God I hope not . . . cut your heart out laugh
12. T: [laugh... ()]

At the point of the above example, the session has been in progress for forty-five minutes. Prior topics have included A's explanation for his experienced social isolation, some discussion of his past and current relationship with his parents, his employment status in view of his having been recently hospitalized, and some remarks on recent participation in a group therapy exercise. Several minutes before the excerpted dialogue happens, A reports that he feels a basic problem has been his relationship with his father. T strongly confronts A's rationale. A counters with supporting evidence for his assertion. T picks up her confrontation. (Turn is abbreviated to Tn.)

At Tn 1, A is paraphrasing T's point. In Tn 2, T begins speaking. With Tn 3, A overlaps her talk. T responds by an attempt to clarify A's statement in Tn 4. A responds that T partially understands (Tn 5). T agrees to A's request to give more information in Tn 6. In Tn 7, A elaborates his position. T responds. With Tn 9, A

retorts. In Tn 10, T overlaps A's talk with laughter. With Tn 11, A responds to T's earlier remarks. In Tn 12 and Tn 13 both persons are laughing.

This general interpretation constitutes the meaning of the talk for the analyst and is the basis for further interpretation. In this excerpt, the dialogue simply happens. Somewhere in Tn 9 and/or Tn 10 a joke begins and concludes in Tn 12, whereupon A returns to his point begun in Tn 7. The way this discourse relates to what precedes it and what follows it allows the conclusion that the talk constitutes a joke which means it is not to be taken literally. Some other knowledge involved in understanding Tn 9 through Tn 12 as the process of joking bears upon the particular history of the interactants, as well as what one believes to be an occasion of joking in a psychotherapy interaction. This example will be discussed further within its larger occurring dialogue in Chapter 4, Example IV-5, Tn 61 through Tn 72.

Given the text and the objectives, the investigation will center around the question: "What is it about this particular discourse that allows one to interpret it in this way?" The interpretations are what come into the foreground of attention and are set forth as assertions arising out of the data.

Without arguing the case here, it is hypothesized that the creation of a deep mutual understanding in therapy interaction is hindered when the participants are in conflict as to what the interaction is to achieve, particularly when this conflict is not brought to the level of explicit attention in the situation.

To get at the issues involving what, if any, problems exist in the discourse as psychotherapy, the question arises: "What in the discourse allows one to interpret it as unsatisfactory as a therapeutic interaction?" To direct the investigation to be able to answer this question, other subsidiary questions will engender a focus: (1) What is the nature of the conflict between the participants? (2) How does one know that there is a conflict of a particular kind? The most valuable answers to these questions would be those interpretations which not only would account for most of the data but would also best further our understanding of ourselves as human beings and of our social world.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

With an intention to elaborate on the rationale for dividing the field of the study of meaning into Type A and Type B approaches, specific theories of meaning are selected and described. Some relevant scholarship devoted to Type A meaning within linguistic semantics and pragmatics and exemplary structuralist-functionalist work such as Structural Sociology and Symbolic Interactionism, Ethnography of Communication, and Functionalism is reviewed. The Type B characteristics of each theory which remain important contributions to the study of discourse as well as any barriers of Type A format to such study are noted.

Following this a discussion of some theoretical issues of inference raises important considerations as to its nature in human discourse.

The full Type B orientation introduces the conception of meaning as a social accomplishment, uniquely related to interactional events, and never fully achieved. In this view, context is socially constructed, a negotiated framework within which participants interpret particular utterances.

The second part of this chapter focuses closely upon two Type A structural approaches to conversational analysis. These studies concern psychotherapy interaction and serve as representative of past work in linguistics in describing the structure of therapy using structural methods of linguistic analysis.

Finally, some research of the Type B theorists who propose an interactional model for the study of sociolinguistics is discussed. Their findings and suggestions for further research provide the tradition within which this study of psychotherapy interaction resides.

Semantics and Pragmatics

Linguistic Semantics:
Clarification of the Paradigm

For purposes here, meaning refers to linguistic semantics and pragmatics with their traditional concerns of propositional content, reference, predication, synonymy and homonymy, polysemy and antonymy. Also, meaning refers to the context, and the particular uses or occurrences of the language entities, or in other words, concern with issues of meaning and usage (following Wittgenstein's example in Philosophical Investigations, 1953). Meaning also refers to communication:

The very word 'communicate' means 'share', and inasmuch as you and I are communicating at this moment, we are one. Not so much a union as a unity.

Inasmuch as we agree, we say that we are of one mind, or again, that we understand one another. This one another is the unity. A group of people, a society, a culture, I would define as 'people in communication'. They may be thought of as 'sharing rules' of language, custom or habit; but who wrote these rules? These have evolved out of those people themselves...the unity... what we share, we can not have as our own possession, and no single person in this world has ever been born and bred in utter isolation (Cherry, 1978, p. 4).

Meaning is concerned with instances of miscommunication, that is of something going wrong with the process itself. Lyons (1968) makes the point that in most semantic theories it is assumed that for understanding to occur, the same content must be transferred from one mind to another. What the sender communicates is put into the signal by the sender's selection among possible alternatives, and the information derived from the signal by the receiver (being thought of as the receiver's selection from the same set of alternatives) is identical. There are also other considerations such as a distinction between the actual and the intended receiver of a signal in view of adjustments made by a sender, and secondly, a designation of a successful communication as one in which the receiver not only receives the signal along with knowing that it was intended for him but also recognizes the sender's intention for the communication to which the receiver responds (Lyons, 1977a, p. 34). When this does not occur, there is an instance of

failure, which as Lyons and others indicate, is considerably more available to empirical testing than instances of communicative success. Occurrences during talk of such utterances, as "What are you saying?" "Get to the point", "I don't follow you", "I don't get the idea" mark instances of potential communication failure and serve to reorient, if you will, the participants to successful communication.

Additionally, meaning here refers to interactional or experienced meaning which includes the linguistic semantic and pragmatic issues enumerated above, but also relates to the totality of human discourse, that is human experience in all its potentiality.

Linguists are well aware of the complexity involved in semantics and semantic analysis. In Language, Bloomfield (1935) devotes two full chapters to the topic of meaning, thus demonstrating a keen interest in the challenge of incorporating it into linguistic description (see discussion below). He additionally refers to semantic issues throughout his consideration of diachronic concerns. This emphasis on meaning in language was not present in later structuralist work such as Harris (1951), and Chomsky (1957), who, although innovative in approaching linguistic description, retained the historical independence of form and meaning. However, later versions of transformational-generative theory do not attempt to provide systematic incorporation

of meaning into linguistic description in their acceptance of meaning as one factor in evaluating the adequacy of a grammar. How semantics and syntax are related has been an issue widely debated, causing radical expansion in the empirical domain of linguistics, some writers concluding that linguistics as a science cannot profitably expand until its domain comes to include everything about human beings that is in some way connected to the acquisition and use of language (Yngve, 1969).

This is not to intimate that the no-man's-land state of affairs has been a comfortable retreat. From the time of the pre-Socratics, language and meaning has interested philosophers. However, it occupied a peripheral attraction at most. In the nineteenth century, fluctuation occurred in synchrony with insights that philosophical problems could be clarified through restatement in a linguistic mode (Davis, 1976), leading John Stuart Mill to proclaim that the most elementary part of logic was understanding the grammatical structure of a sentence (Cormier et al., 1970).

The opening of the branch of semantics in linguistics came primarily in the study of lexical meanings, and also in some measure in the psycholinguistics of Wundt. Von Humboldt had asked questions concerning language's place in culture and society (Blumenthal, 1970). Any of the early work looking at the cognitive processes involved

in the linguistic forms was but a token of the increasing interest in organizing investigations of forms and combinations of forms, which in the United States, at least, seemed a matter of scientific ethics. The study of semantics as a respectable enterprise stopped short of any involvement in systematic semantic description of a natural language.

Lehrer (1974) describes semantics as a "vast field, touching on most aspects of the structure and function of language as well as problems in psychology, philosophy, and anthropology", and suggests delimiting the scope of study to small areas of the field which can be adequately described and eventually placed along with other such endeavors forming a "coherent theory of human behavior". This approach to the challenge of semantics lends optimistic underpinnings to research endeavors, whereas Palmer (1976) begins his Semantics with a lament: "Unfortunately, 'meaning' covers a variety of aspects of language, and there is no very general agreement either about what meaning is or about the way in which it should be described". His conclusion remains that semantics is not and probably cannot ever be a single, well-defined, and well-integrated discipline. Instead, he suggests, there needs to be a set of studies of meaning relating to the variant aspects of "experience". Semantics relates to the whole of human experience and as such is not analogous to phonology or grammar as a course of study.

Type A--Confined Focus. In contrast to this "traditional trepidation" of scholars in semantics (Caton, 1971), Katz and Fodor (1963), in the enthusiasm of the early currents of transformational-generative theory, aim high to capture semantics. Katz' Semantic Theory (1972) promises to achieve three distinct goals:

Semantics is the study of linguistic meaning. It is concerned with what sentences and other linguistic objects express, not with the arrangement of their syntactic parts or with their pronunciation. Nearly everyone agrees on this. It is also generally agreed that the basic question of semantics is 'What is meaning?'

With the intention of first, answering this question, as well as second deriving a clear conception of the empirical constraints on semantic representations--that is, to specify the structure these representations must have to make predictions about the semantic properties of sentences--Katz then, third, proposes to determine the "boundary between semantics and other areas of linguistic communication...". Katz ends the explication by reminding readers that to work properly, his theory of meaning of sentences depends on an "idealization that allows us to focus exclusively on linguistic meaning by abstracting away every aspect of language use that does not reflect grammatical competence" (p. 443).

Another approach to studying semantics also calling for its containment to the narrow confines of linguistics, is that of Leech (1974), who stresses the impracticality

of semantics involving the study of meaning in the wider sense of "all that is communicated by language". His fear is that using such a broad range of material as its subject matter will lead semantics into collapse under a burden of describing "all that may be the object of human knowledge and belief". Instead, Leech divides the domain seven ways, and chooses one, conceptual meaning (denotative), which he views as appropriate for study, that is, analogous to syntax and phonology. In stating that meaning ought to be studied as a linguistic phenomenon in its own right, he argues that involvement with other sciences and disciplines outside of linguistics constitutes a weakness in studying meaning.

With Chomskyan theory of the early 1960's, semantics was envisioned as a system which operated on an input of syntactic deep structures which were independently generated (Katz and Fodor, 1963). Eventually, others in the ranks adopted an opposing view that separate syntactic structures were not required, in that all that was necessary as input were deeply abstract representations of sentence meanings (McCawley, 1968; Ross, 1970). The rules of the grammar would supply the appropriate sentence structures, derived independently, with appropriate interpretations. These semantic primitives had to be abstract enough to allow for uniform treatment of some classes of words

which varied in meaning but behaved identically to a given level in the derivation. Semantic concepts equivalent to syntactic ones were borne in such formats as variables for predicates and arguments and in constants for connectives.

This machinery eventually required a language of precision, "logical forms", to account for all correct inferences in natural language and for no incorrect ones. That the logical forms looked like the logic of calculus proved to be a persuasion for narrowing the aim of transformational-generative descriptive semantics to being the science of deduction of all inferences relevant to analytic truth (Kempson, 1977).

Semantics proved a problem-child to linguistics from the very beginning of its modern period. The seventeenth century Port Royal Grammar had separated the provinces of grammar into the study of the forms, and the study of the meaning of the forms. Chomsky christens the former as the birthright of scientific linguistics. The latter, undesignated by Port Royal, and unclaimed officially by any discipline, hangs around as a burdensome aside, the subject of ongoing debate as to where it belongs.

Lyons (1968) suspects that the rationale for linguists' avoidance of semantics is their confusion and doubt as to whether meaning can be studied "objectively" and rigorously as have been grammar and phonology, not a lack

of interest in the topic. He notes linguists' propensity for seeking interface with other disciplines interested in the challenge of the problem of meaning. In this way, Lyons compassionately excuses linguists for their truancy in the matter, voicing rather softly misgivings about the viability of a model theory of semantics, himself calling it unnecessarily complex (Lyons, 1977a). His excusings are well-taken in that neither of his two volumes in semantics deals with the topic of metaphor, an understandably frightening topic for descriptive semantics or of synonymy, not so understandably avoided. By pardoning the linguist, he exempts himself.

These theorists have adequately touched on the issues related to the complexities of the study of meaning (Steinberg and Jacobovits, 1971) and each in response carves out a restricted domain for close deliberation. From their considerations of how best to handle the particular focus arise several theories of meaning in language, where meaning is produced by rules operating on linguistic material within an unchanging context (Chafe, 1970; Chomsky, 1965; Katz, 1972). Language in this view is a set of algorithmic functions, and meaning is a set of semantic primitives triggered by the operation of rules. The semantic theorist is to explicate these rules.

Type A--Broad Focus. This method of researching semantics, that is, of carving out small areas of the issues of meaning and semantics has not been the only style of research in this field. Scholars such as Bloomfield and others discussed below responded to the enormity of the questions of meaning and semantics by attempting to handle the field in its entirety in their approach.

Meaning as a theory has presented some elusiveness in its precise definition in behaviorist semantics, whose assumptions include: (1) a distrust of introspection and mentalistic concepts as valid scientific data; the equating for all essential purposes of human and animal behavior principles; (2) minimizing the role of innate drives while maximizing the role of learning so as to increase the importance of environment over heredity; (3) a pervading deterministic explanation for all behavior, leading to the belief that only one method, the experimental method, can properly and objectively deal with the real world. It follows, then, that the natural scientist becomes philosopher, in that, within that scientific methodology and objective truth inheres an implicit and in principle complete epistemology as well as a philosophy of reality which rules out spontaneous everyday experience as a way of bringing one into contact with the objective world. The spontaneous and ordinary is replaced by a system of scientific experiences. The problem

with this point of view quite simply is its presupposition that the analyst and the outcome analysis of the data will tell people what they are doing--as if people don't already know. This deficiency indicts each of the behaviorist approaches to meaning, necessarily limiting their usefulness in describing what is going on within human discourse.

Behaviorism generally subscribed to these given assumptions in order to adequately describe the human organism. Behavior is the responses the organism makes to stimuli in its environment. A behavior pattern is a learned chain of responses. Language is a behavior pattern created from a building up of causal relationships between stimuli and responses together with the associative bonds between words which govern the transitions from one word to the next and those to follow. The strength of the bond is a function of the amount of practice of the items along with reinforcement of these associations.

Meaning in the behavioral framework of Hockett's (1958, p. 139) is "associative ties between those morphemes and morpheme-combinations and things and situations, or types of things and situations in the world around us. These semantic ties are more or less the same for all the speakers of a language". He accounts for the individual variability in language as simply a matter of "antecedents" and "consequences" where such elements vary by speaker. Language is a set of acquired habits. A speech act, an

utterance, is not a habit, but an historical event which is controlled by habit. Habit is not directly observable but is inferred from historical events which are directly observable. An approach such as this supposes unchanging and fixed correlations between stimulus and response, which fails in view of the fact that even in very highly conventionalized instances of talk, interpretation is necessarily tied to the specific situation. For example, in telephone talk, the intonation pattern of the answerer's "hello" will be interpreted along such lines as the historical aspects relating both participants, current situational aspects, orientation to each other, and the like. A theory such as Hockett's cannot account for these factors and others. As will be argued specifically below, the Pittenger, Hockett, and Danehy (1960) attempt to provide a complete description of participants' verbal and nonverbal behaviors and to relate these behaviors to interpretations of the intentions of participants is not successful. Inferring for them is the same for both the user of a language as well as the analyst; the inference project becomes overwhelming.

Bloomfield (1935, p. 23) had characterized the enormity of achieving an adequate account of meaning for linguistics in warning that meaning would remain the weak point in language study until a complete and scientific description of objects, states, and situations for which

words operate as substitutes could be advanced, where meanings are assumed to be recorded by an operation analogous to phonetics thus positing a specific connection between the terms of the theory (phonemes) and the data as recorded (phonetic properties). The phoneme, significant but per se meaningless, combines to make morphemes, that is, the minimal unit of meaning. Other categories of elements, order, form class, sub class, selection, phonetic modifiers (alternation) and modulation (pitch and stress contours) combine in various ways to create meaningful constructions. The relationships of these levels, rule-governed, definable in terms of level in the linguistic system, established the task then, as an exact specification of each occurrence of linguistic activity, which more than accentuates the total massivity of the project. Bloomfield's (1935) often-cited description of the speech event involving "Jack and Jill and the apple", a reliably secure example, still was fraught with the obvious difficulties of having to decide which "practical behavior(s)" relate(s) directly to the speech event and which are incidental to it. (And this is only one event between two speakers!) If a theory such as this is to be proposed as accounting for human interaction, it requires that there be fixed characteristics of each situation in which the particular speech event occurs, and that there must be fixed characteristics of each and all responses

to the particular speech event. These fixed aspects of the situations of occurrence will act then as cues assigning meaning to the speech event or response event (Alston, 1964).

The analyst must observe the linguistic behavior, then observe the "practical" nonlinguistic behavior, then associate these two entities by a casual relationship. The meaning of the utterance, then, consists of the important things with which the utterance is connected, namely, the practical behaviors.

In summary, Bloomfield's approach appears to be one which will take into account all aspects of the communicative event. He discounts all features of the event except those directly involved in the language code, the social fact or object independent of any speaker or situation. This code is analyzed, categorized, and described as an idealized system extracted out of a particular social event or context. Focus is held to the linguistic pattern itself, language being a set of arbitrary signs for conveying information from one to another. Any other factors in the linguistic occurrence are irrelevant. With his insistence on studying the form of the speech act as the carryall of the message, or simply the linguistic facts as abstract elements combined by rules using a natural science model, Bloomfield by necessity could not account for any of the aspects of the communicative event such as intentions, or

goals of the participants, and what actually happens in the situation within and around talk.

Clues Toward a Paradigm

Concerns of pragmatics have moved linguistics closer to being able to talk about issues of human discourse. Scholars in this area, for example, Robin Lakoff in her early work (1971, 1972, 1973) clearly argues that the syntax of the transformational-generative model of grammar required pragmatics and semantics to begin to account for linguistic events; that is, she and others have demonstrated the presence of semantic and pragmatic elements not accountable for within a narrowly confined model of language.

There has also been other significant work completed which looks at language and its place in social settings. However, theorists in pragmatics still need to look at how language is used in discourse to create social action. This creation of interaction is especially important in psychotherapy insofar as the definition of what psychotherapy actually is becomes created in the interaction itself. In order to make sense out of a psychotherapy session one needs to be able to understand how the participants go about creating the situation in terms of their orientations to themselves and to the other. One needs to understand the relationship being created.

In order to accomplish this goal, it is necessary to develop the kind of analysis which allows the researcher to get close to the interaction itself. Although pragmatics has moved closer to social situations than the strict Type A theorists, there are some features of current work in this field which prevent it from becoming sufficiently involved with the data of actual discourse to describe how language serves to create social action.

Most of the research completed within the pragmatic concerns of speech acts deals with invented sentences and highly conventionalized behaviors of educated speakers in socially homogeneous settings and as such cannot be simply and directly transferable to the issues of conversational analysis. In other words, the work in pragmatics which is considered here, as well as that in ethnography of communication mainly looks at very formal and highly structured speech and behavioral events, and provides analyses and descriptions of the rules of these events.

Work in the functional considerations of language, with static notions of context as a unit to be added to other particles to produce the total meaning--an additive approach--works well with isolated texts, as does the pragmatic approach. Although these ways of dealing with meaning in human language introduce a differing conceptual framework within which the discourse analyst needs to look at conversational interaction than strict Type A theorists

suggest, they cannot totally provide such a basis. The veins of research to be discussed: pragmatics, structural sociology, ethnography of communication, and functionalism do not claim, no do they possess the tools, to look at meaning in a moment-by-moment manner.

Fillmore--Meaning, Frame, Interpretation. Study in linguistic pragmatics, well represented by Fillmore (1973, 1976, 1977) views meaning as having something to do with the behavior of persons, with how this behavior relates to situations, with what people have to know to act appropriately in situations, and what happens in discourse generally. He argues for the necessity of pragmatic concerns in being able to get at what is going on in discourse. "It is by means of establishing the pragmatic conditions for the sentence that we can discover its interpretation possibilities" (1974, p. V-3). He argues further that discourse will be structured syntactically and semantically in ways which are only explainable in terms of pragmatics. Although he proposes that

the most straightforward principles of pragmatics or contextualization are to be found in the nature of conversational language, the language of people who are looking at each other or who are otherwise sharing some current experience in which the hearer processes instantaneously what the speaker says (1974, p. V-8)

he stays within the limitations of traditional linguistics in its attempt to show meaning as a fixed, context-free

relationship between symbol and referent. This approach, elaborating for example what it is that speakers have to know about a context in order to appropriately use the sentence "May we come in?" (1973) posits a fixed meaning, attached to context for sure, but associated as a set of relations predetermined and given, operating independently of the situation. The meaning is a product of rules relating the linguistic elements to this static context. The main problem for this kind of approach to meaning is the same as has been a barrier in all of the approaches discussed so far--that somehow the notion of meaning being a set of fixed relations, independent of the interaction and its situation, precludes the researcher from being able to adequately describe the dynamic, historically unfolding character of discourse where such a view seems to be a necessity for interpreting discourse (Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz, 1976). As will be discussed below, for purposes of developing a practical analysis of psychotherapy interaction, it is argued that treating discourse as a set or even a matrix of sentences is too limiting.

Fillmore is interested in the notions of conditions of appropriateness, which is conceptually similar to the notion of grammaticality. He confines his explications to the kinds of relations which rarely get violated, and to conditions which participants must follow to be speaking English. Although his analyses won't enable one to be

able to talk about participants' intentions and meanings in discourse, Fillmore offers an excellent description of those aspects of linguistic events which are fixed. His work provides an elaboration of framework of concern for considering how social knowledge is related to meaning and interpretation.

In demarcating the various steps in the comprehension process, Fillmore offers an anecdote out of a magazine article focusing on one sentence of it in order to ask certain questions about text interpretation. The Pete Rose anecdote involves the professional baseball player's speech to an audience where Rose's four year-old son was in attendance.

...While Rose was speaking, unknown to him; the child moved up to the speaker's table and stood next to him. Rose told a joke, there was laughter, and after the laughter there was a moment of silence. Here, now is the sentence...At precisely that moment a small but amplified voice notified the entire room in the most lucid of idioms, of a common childhood emergency (1977, p. 72).

Fillmore identifies the pragmatic knowledge of the scene: the child's voice, the presence of a microphone, and so on to elaborate how much the reader knows about the scene from the sentence in context above. This exercise, Fillmore offers to demonstrate some features of the puzzle of the text's being easy to understand, but the process of how this understanding is achieved is most complex. He

offers an exercise of four underlying questions which analysts may ask in order to understand how they understand a text.

1. What did he say?
2. What was he talking about?
3. Why did he bother to say it?
4. Why did he say it in the way that he did?

Fillmore's approach to meaning arises as a representational theory where linguistic events "key" or "activate" cognitive frames. To use this kind of a theory in discourse analysis one needs to work out first the problem of how to get from language as representation to language as doing something interactionally.

Fillmore's work shows the analyst how to develop constructs by means of which participants match their knowledge of the world, which is a set of categories, with what goes on in interaction. These descriptions can then be applied to explain behavior in new situations. His work shows clearly the boundedness of interpretation to context. However, a difficult problem arises when applying this work to everyday interaction in that frequently there are varying interpretations of what was "going on" during the "same" linguistic event. Participants' descriptions of events often do not reflect the close agreement as to "what happened" or "what was intended" that is assumed that a piece

of interaction produced in a certain contextual setting would have when examined by this kind of theory. Although Fillmore's approach can define meaning in terms of speaker's intentions and show that judgments of intention are based on more than surface features or referential aspects of talk, other constructs are necessary to account for issues like variations in interpretation and how people go about creating conversational interaction. These four guideposts suggest concentration upon first the message, the only question of interest in traditional linguistics. The other three questions move the analyst into the world of discourse, involving speech act theory, intentionality, historical concerns, relationships of this specific discourse to the world of discourse. Fillmore follows with an "informal analysis of the interpretation" of the segment, which remains such in that Fillmore does not discuss the larger questions raised by his four guides for reference. Instead, Fillmore inserts text interpretation as proper study in linguistics in terms of the relationship of the message to the real world of communication acts, historical scenes, memories, or activities, and ongoing experience, all of which serve as the strategies employed for

...constructing, from the pieces of a text, from our knowledge of the world, and from our estimates of the author's or speaker's purpose, some single coherent view of what is going on, some possibly complex but unified scene or story or world that we would recognize has been matched to this particular text (1977, p. 81).

In commenting upon Fillmore's work, it is immediately apparent how tightly the symbolic logic approach underlying the frame semantics keeps this author from being able to talk about moment-by-moment meaning as a dynamic unfolding. To view accomplished meaning as a series of "scenarios" or "scripts" is to add unilinear movement to the frames in the same way as one adds more box cars onto a train or more scenes into a comic strip. The problem here is that meaning is seen as static, as given within one scene. The linear movement does not effectively dissolve the static context-free meaning bind, in that each scene is discrete, clicked off from some combination of real world knowledge, automatically applicable and shared by interactants, but ignoring the actual dependence upon the situation for its meaning, as well as the characteristics talk has beyond being referential: reflexivity and indexicality, which is how the talk creates the world for the understanding to arise. Each attempt, no matter how sophisticated, to translate meaning in discourse into a system of formal logic fails for at least these two latter reasons. Without a concept of "occasionality" or situatedness, which is a dynamically flexible and interpenetrant context, much of the data of discourse remains uninterpretable. Artificial intelligence as a model for discourse fails for these reasons to be an adequate basis for building a theory and method of discourse.

Fillmore's work in calling for a unified theory of discourse, seems to be moving into the necessary territory for discussing the Type B meaning. The movement of the frames and a conception of dynamics in general seems to be necessary to begin to get at "occasionality". The idea of movement, of interpenetration of behavior in context, has been of historical concern in Tagmemic Theory, which pointed out the Bloomfieldian extraction of form of the code at the expense of looking at the function of the code. That these two factors, form and function, intersect in social behavior is an underlying conceptual frame for hierarchical studies of human behavior (Schefflen, 1972, 1974; Pike, 1967).

Pike explains that:

Meaning occurs only as a function of a total behavioral event in a total social matrix. The sharp-cut segmentation of meanings or partial meanings out of this total structure is therefore in principle impossible. There are no sharp boundaries to the meanings of these parts. Meanings fuse and flow into one another...they overlap and occur simultaneously and interpenetrate (1967, p. 89).

Here, an attempt to relate these various "levels" of language into the totality of human behavior provides the model for a hierarchical approach to the study of the problem of meaning in human interaction. What this work shows is that the discourse analyst needs a way to talk about how peoples' intentions are constructed in discourse.

Interactants don't just convey information in a referential sense but work in additional ways as they mutually create their experience.

Goffman--Structural Sociology. Goffman (1967) addresses the social construction of interaction in terms of "face-work". "Face" is one's social image which is achieved by personal activity. This activity, the "line" is the means whereby one's situational orientation is expressed. The interaction of "face" and "line" create the pattern of activity called "face work" which consists of the repertoire of face-saving processes. These processes are of a social ritual order wherein the self which is an image pieced together from the expressive implications of the full flow of events in an undertaking ...and as a kind of player in a ritual game who copes honorably or dishonorably, diplomatically or undiplomatically, with the judgmental contingencies of the situation...Once the two roles of the self have been separated, one can look to the ritual code implicit in face work to learn how the two roles are related (1967, pp. 31-32).

In this manner, Goffman has attempted to uncover the practices, conventions and rules that make up a person's framework of interpretation. These factors are important in this investigation of psychotherapy interaction in that they comprise the tacit knowledge which grounds the ongoing process of understanding. Also because of the current concern psychotherapy talk, the analyst needs to note especially what might be relevant for individual cases.

Goffman points out that in spoken interaction, "The human tendency to use signs and symbols means that evidence of social worth and of mutual evaluations will be conveyed by very minor things..." (p. 33). These include changes in tone of voice, eye contact or movement and other strategies. The situation of interaction itself is organized through the system of social practices where "The conventions regarding the structure of occasions of talk represent an effective solution to the problem of organizing a flow of spoken messages" (p. 36).

Goffman's insights show that the understandings people have of ongoing interaction (e.g., "face" and other meanings too) are arrived at from the symbolic quality of the complex of verbal and nonverbal behaviors whose meaning, "significance", is determinable through reference to the implicit framework of conventions, practices, and "rules" of face-to-face interaction.

However, there seems to be a rather "loose fit" between this framework and the specific acts people perform. This state of affairs shows how there is always room for interpretation of the meaning of each encounter. Therefore, knowing the observable behaviors and the conventions or practices will not tell all there is to know about how interactants determine meaning. There is an aura of

ambiguity around every piece of interactional activity such that specific interpretations cannot be predicted with certainty in each case a priori.

Goffman's work, in the structural normative sociological tradition, views social experience in the Durkheimian sense, as does Blumer, and also reflects a positivistic pragmatism and character of influence. In this work in social theory there seems to remain an open issue that perhaps there is some "real self" hidden and unknown to the person himself or to others. This "real self" is the theoretical result of the givenness and lack of freedom in human experience within this method's view of society's relationship to individual persons.

Goffman consistently fails to look at whether or not people actually do have available alternative courses of action along with the ones chosen. He assumes there is a legitimate way of comportment, and then there are ways people get around the social law. These second choices are facts people need to hide about themselves. There seems an experience of negativity about being a person in a society; one finds himself controlled and often a victim of it (1961, 1963, 1969, 1971). If Goffman's ideas reflected more closely how people actually behave and choose to act, one would expect to encounter more of a similarity among persons in the same society and not the wide variation in persons and their behavior which seems the usual

finding. Throughout the progression of his works, Goffman, complete with the trappings of a phenomenologist, actually creates a series of structural studies leading to increasing involvement in the microstructures of interaction, as for example his discussions of syntax in Relations in Public (1971) and Frame Analysis as "the principles of organization which govern events--at least social ones--and our subjective involvement in them" (1974, p. 10).

Symbolic Interactionism is chosen for review here as another strong representative of normative structural sociological approaches to social meaning. These approaches whether transactional, functional, or interactional apply their various methodologies (e.g., survey, field observation and others) to describe social interaction in terms of three independent elements: actor, situation and rule. Theory in the normative tradition generally explains social experience as: (1) actors know certain rules; (2) actors apply rules in social situations. These rules, independent of the particular actors and the particular situations, include motives, intentions, and expectations.

Although the discourse analyst needs a way to deal with peoples' motives and intentions and expectations, the theoretical orientation of normative structural sociology proves problematic for such a purpose. The formal logic model upon which these approaches is based views social

action as series of activities wherein actors simply match rules to situations. This matching activity takes place automatically and consistently. In this way, the meaning of the situation is determined.

Blumer--Symbolic Interactionism. Blumer (1967, 1969) builds his "Symbolic Interactionism" upon the philosophy of George Herbert Mead, an American pragmatist and social psychologist. Mead believes that a man's self is not present at birth but develops through the individual's relations with others and to social processes as a whole. The self can have itself (in self-consciousness) as an object, but the object-self is experienced indirectly, as the individual takes on the attitudes of others toward himself within a social environment or context of experience and behavior in which both he and others are involved. The internal structure of the self mirrors the relationship between society and the individual, the self, based upon a socio-behavioristic principle.

What Blumer contributes to Mead's philosophic treatment of human group life as the beginning point of the emergence of consciousness--the mind, a world of objects, human beings as organisms possessing selves; and human conduct in the form of constructed acts--is a model of how all of these are related. This perspective is developed by three premises:

1. Human beings act toward things on the basis of what meaning the things hold for them.
2. The meaning of the things is derived from the interaction one has with one's feelings.
3. These meanings are mediated through an interpretive process employed by the person in dealing with the things encountered.

The meanings that things have for human beings are central in their own right. Meaning arises out of interaction processes between persons. The meaning of a thing for a person grows out of the ways in which other persons act toward the person in regards to the thing. Meanings, then, are social products. And meaning is derived from a process of interpretation. There are two steps to the process:

(1) The person indicates to himself the things to which he is acting, pointing out to himself the things that have meaning. This activity is an internalized social process. The actor interacts with himself. (2) Following this process of self-interaction, interpretation occurs. The person handles the meanings, that is, he selects, suspends, checks, regroups and transforms the meanings in terms of the current situation in which he is placed and the direction of his action. This process of interpretation is not a simple application of meaning but is construed as formative processes, in which meanings are used and revised as

instruments for the guidance and formation of action. Meanings play their parts in activity through the process of self interacting with self.

Symbolic interactionism develops a notion of "root images" which are its elements. Taken together, these form the basic format for viewing human society and social conduct. Generally this framework identifies meanings as derived from society but as necessarily private and discrete. Sharing of meaning is essentially equivalent to saying that once an actor has identified a meaning, the work is done; the meaning is accomplished. The actors learn meanings from society; meanings are rules in the sense of social facts; and actors follow these rules in social situations.

This position does not escape the criticism applied by Garfinkel (1967) or Cicourel (1964) to other normative theories. Symbolic interactionism falls into the theories which describe social activity as a complex of actors entering situations, defining them, recognizing applicable rules, and acting accordingly. Actors match the situation's meaning to some automatic self-activity..

Although Blumer attempts to avoid the pitfalls of viewing meaning as being either intrinsic in the object itself or a psychic accretion brought by the person to the thing, he does not avoid the trap of describing meaning as

a given, automatically applicable social fact. The person acting in the situation in relation to others is directly and indirectly compelled to behave as others expect.

What is emphasized is that people enter social situations knowing what they can say in such a situation and how it should be said. Meaning resides in each speaker, is gathered from the social bank, is exchanged and adjusted. There is no provision for an unexpected experience--everything having been accounted for in the past (Brudner, 1977).

That the categorical type meaning of the symbolic interactionists can not be demonstrated as having a relationship to actual behavior by its statistical measures is Garfinkel's (1972) criticism of normative approaches. He argues for the thesis concerning "The Relevance of Common Understandings to the Fact that Models of Man in Society Portray Him as a Judgmental Dope" (p. 23-29). Garfinkel shows how social background knowledge is continually revealed in the interaction itself and that common understandings (despite applicable norms) between interactants create their social world of their experience. Social activity is cooperatively created rather than given.

Garfinkel shows how everyday life including highly formalized rule systems such as legal or medical or others all involve the actors interpreting the code by virtue of situational considerations. Actors continually work out

the code which itself is necessarily incomplete regardless of its sophistication and specification.

For example, in the situation of psychiatric diagnosis the actors are the client and the therapist. The psychopathology terms are the rules. The incompleteness of the rules lies in the fact that the system does not characterize how it is to be understood and used nor its situational meaning. To understand the diagnostic process one must have a means for looking at the participants' interpretations of these rules as constitutive of the diagnostic situation.

Hymes--Ethnography of Communication. So far, some research relating to the issues of meaning in language has been reviewed along with some comment as to how these approaches may or may not shed light on meaning experienced by participants. What remains noteworthy about the approaches to meaning discussed is that they show only how information is conveyed in a referential sense; that is, they recognize only this aspect of the meaningful use of language and that people use language in various ways. Beyond the views considered though, the analyst needs to be concerned with constructs such as Hymes' (1971) communicative competence, which is the speaker's ability to produce appropriate utterances. The rationale underlying ethnography of communication is that traditional grammatical

analyses do not deal with the actual usage patterns of speakers, the ways speakers express their meaning. Issues of grammaticality become relevant within particular situational contexts. Hymes gives four criteria as a basis for determining communicative competence: Systematic potential, whether and to what extent something is not yet realized; appropriateness, whether and to what extent something is in some context suitable, effective, or the like; occurrence, whether and to what extent something is done; and feasibility, whether and to what extent something is possible. Any discourse may be described according to these parameters of speaking. Any description of speaking, then, will provide data along the following interrelated dimensions (1974):

1. Linguistic resources available to the speaker--how many styles he can choose from.
2. Supra-sentential structuring--how many variantly structured linguistic events are recognized.
3. Rules of interpretation by which the set of linguistic elements comes to have communicational value.
4. The norms which govern different types of interaction.

Hymes recognizes that the ethnographer is part of the scene observed. He looks at language as a tool; it is used for various purposes. Hymes demonstrates the analyst's need to become concerned with the intentions of the participants. Focus can be on those of either the speaker or listener although it may be the case that neither listener nor analyst can achieve certainty in interpretations of the particular intentions of speech acts.

Ethnographic focus has arisen from a structuralist-functional philosopher's view of social acts leading to the view that speaking activity is some sort of formal and discrete system composed of building block elements, which can then be analyzed by virtue of their intrarelationship within the system and the concurrent interrelationship with static cultural variables. In this manner, the typifications produced are to explain individual behavior. The assumption underlying the typification approach is similar to that underlying the frame approach. Both identify cultural knowledge as a bounded context and both of the approaches fail to be able to apply these typifications or frames to ordinary everyday interaction, mainly because of the relative inflexibility of the ceremonies, routines, or events of the typification or frame, and the nearly total flexibility of the everyday interaction.

Firth--Functionalism. The outright assertion the learning languages is primarily a matter of learning how

to communicate, particular linguistic structures being the means of doing so, is the theme uniting the points of view that language-using as communication ought to be a central concern in linguistics.

Functional concerns of establishing a formal framework within which to interrelate the linguistic form, semantic interpretation, and the pragmatic elements as a way of understanding communication was the directive of J. R. Firth more than forty years ago (1964). He suggests that linguists look at conversation for the key to understanding how the language is and works. The main concern of linguistics should be that of making statements about the meaning of utterances, only part of which lies in the contrasts of phonology and syntax. His claim that language is the fundamental way of behaving and of influencing others calls for considerations of context in all linguistic analyses.

In Speech, Firth develops the basis for his version of characterizing meaning as use:

If we regard language as "communicative"...a piece of speech...is a pattern of group behavior in which two or more persons participate by means of common verbalizations of common situational context, and of experiential contexts of the participants. It is a pattern without clearly defined boundaries. And, consequently it is difficult to isolate and describe individual speech behavior, if there could be such a thing...A speaking man is a corporate man, associated through the present with man of all time ...The problem of linguistics of the future will be the experimental study of the social functioning of speech (1964, p. 173).

Firth's behaviorism differs markedly from Bloomfield's in that the latter's hypothesis that meaning is a physical process of associative conditioning is directly challenged by Firth and the London School. Firth recognizes different kinds of contexts in linguistic activity whereby meaning is realized. The different contexts are associated with different levels of analysis. Firth does not view these levels as hierarchical in a part-whole sense, all contribute equally to meaning. For example, on the phonological level, the functions of sounds are obvious in how they occur and how they contrast with other potential choices; the distributional potential in lexical choice and the paradigmatic relationships contribute to recognition of the meaning. In the situational level, in conversational setting, participants, topic, and other idiosyncracies are characterized as the extra-linguistic factors of the meaning. The total linguistic meaning is the sum of all these aspects of the event, "the patterned processes ...in which language behavior...[is] dynamic and creative ...meaning is just as much a property of the people, their 'sets', their specific behavior, the things and events of the situation as of the noises made" (1964, p. 111). Despite his involving meaning as embedded in the context and not something apart from the linguistic forms, Firth

describes what amounts to a static model of combinatorial dynamism. Meaning is the totality of the sum of the arrangement.

For purposes of developing a theory of discourse for psychotherapy interaction, the functionalist perspective with its additive approach and its notion of the givenness of shape of social experience does not provide the kind of model necessary to account for the uniqueness of an interactional event where context, flexible and "occasional" is accomplished.

A Note on Inference in Human Discourse

At this place in the discussion it is necessary to look closely at acts of inference and to distinguish various types of inference. This discussion holds importance for questions of human discourse in order to be able to analyze how meaning happens during everyday interactions. Formal types of inference such as deductive or explicit characteristically differ from conversational inference which Polanyi (1969) accurately characterizes as a "dwelling in subsidiary awareness", that is, an act of tacit inference.

Tacit inference is not simply an unconscious version of explicit inference. For example, once one has solved a visual puzzle, one cannot return to a state of total ignorance of its solution. The controversy of how this subsidiary

awareness works dates back to 1867 and Helmholtz' interpretation of the perception of visual images as "unconscious inference" as an equivalent converse of explicit inference, where his peer psychologists even then rejected his conclusions on the basis that optical illusions remain intact and are not destroyed by demonstrating their falsity. The knowledge of the solution does not necessarily guarantee the solution for all times. This contrasts with explicit inference, logical inference which necessarily depends upon the truth value of its supporting evidence. Optical illusions can be altered by moving focus to a new center, such as, in the instance described by Polanyi, where the image experienced from two pictures being viewed through a stereoscope becomes destroyed if both pictures are focused upon separately. The point is, tacit inference is affected by breaking-up and rediscovery whereas deductive, explicit inference is not vulnerable to this kind of focal movement. Cognitive content in logical inference is independent of any sensory quality, and as such, it does not vary among its knowers as a Pythagorean theorem remains identical for each mathematician.

Discourse analysis calls for looking at meaning as Polanyi and Prosch (1975) define it: whatever is in our focal awareness, whatever is primary recipient of attention, an apprehension of the clarity, and the definiteness

of some aspects of one's experience. However, this focal awareness is possible because of our subsidiary awareness, that is, the background of our attention. Focal awareness, what one attends to, evolves in subtle ways out of our background and thus is always closely related, hence the possibility of making explicit some aspects of what lies in the background of our attention, allowing us to reveal how it is that our interpretation has come to be. Polanyi and Prosch describe this relationship:

...the presence of two different kinds of awareness ...When I use a hammer to drive a nail, I attend to both but quite differently. I watch the effects of my strokes on the nail as I wield the hammer. I do not feel that its handle has struck my palm but that its head has struck the nail. In another sense, of course, I am highly alert to the feelings in my palm and fingers holding the hammer. They guide my handling of it effectively, and the degree of attention that I give to the nail is given to these feelings to the same extent, but in a different way. The difference may be stated by saying that these feelings are not watched in themselves but that I watch something else by keeping aware of them. I know the feelings in the palm of my hand by relying on them for attending to the hammer hitting the nail. I may say that I have a subsidiary awareness of the feelings in my hand which is merged into my focal awareness of my driving the nail (1974, p. 33).

Discourse analysis is the process of allowing this subsidiary awareness, this background of experience, to appear in its relation to what is focal. In practice this amounts to making static some aspects of the talk, reflecting upon it, making explicit an interpretation of the experience.

One involves himself in uncovering what is necessarily hidden and invisible, recognizing that one necessarily cannot ever attain total clarity. In ongoing interpretations, the total meaning is not immediately given. One uncovers meaning layer by layer with repeated interactions with the whole, moving to a deeper and fuller appreciation of the total experience. Interpretation is thus circular--open-ended and uncompletable. Man interacts with the other creating meaning in his life. Man and other are universally interdependent and co-defining (Fischer, 1970). Man, then is self-interpretation, creator of his own experience (Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz, 1976; Laing, 1961, 1966; and Frank, 1961).

The role of tacit inference in communication activity has been discussed by Cicourel (1978) in terms of his interactional model of the study of language and society. This work is clearly applicable to the study of discourse showing that shared-background higher predicates enable communication to proceed. The important point of this paper for the study of how linguistic analysis needs to view discourse in relationship to other problems in the field, is its conception of the relation of autonomous syntax to interactive processes. Cicourel's suggestion is that autonomous syntax, in its original conception of being detached from other levels in language (Saussurean) a la the structuralists and Chomskyans cannot be a relevant notion in discourse

theory. Rather, autonomous syntax plays a role in conversation in terms of its being a description of the rules or conventions, in the speech act sense, which people follow to be speaking a particular language. Thus, autonomous syntax is part of the higher predication activity, part of the tacit knowledge people share which provides for their being able to communicate in the first place.

Cicourel shows that syntax as autonomous is not directly correlative to the meaning of the discourse, the assumption of Stylistics, where attempts are made to describe speakers' intentions on the basis of the syntax of the utterance.

Some notions out of semiotics, especially Peirce's concept of abductive inference have been applied to interaction by Cicourel (1978). Abductive inference in logic refers to the conditions where a major premise is clear and evident, but the minor is so obscure as to require further proof. This kind of inference is defined by Peirce as reasoning which moves from consequent to antecedent.

Peirce's argument is that the sole function of thought is the production of belief which essentially in turn consists of a habit of action. The vagueness or obscurity in the minor premise relates to the inability to explicitly state of what the habit of action consists. Peirce's line of thinking is concretized by the example of

a lemon and how one might act towards it. To call something a lemon is to say that it is a food, its pulp is nourishing; its juice is sour, and it would occupy such and such an amount of space if put into a bag. There are other potential statements to be made such as saying that if an object of a certain weight is placed on top of it, it will be crushed. All of these factors are related to how one will act towards a lemon. To say that a lemon is sour is to possess certain habits towards it. The confusion arises when it comes to spelling out the exact nature of these habits; how one develops them; how tenacious they may be; and so on. This is where abductive inference becomes the tool for clearing up the problem. It defines truth as that which a community of investigators would agree upon in the long run. The truth is that which is most fit to believe. In effect, having obscurity as part of inference rules out in principle Cartesian methods and goals which demand that the certainty be ultimate and its base intuitive. Confusion has no place in Cartesian epistemology.

Cicourel contextualizes how this notion of abduction works in interactive processes. Abductive inference is the process through which the

observation of acts in the testing hypothesis is embedded in the particular circumstances that exist at the time of observation...lead(ing) to the recognition or creation of facts that contextualize the inferential step of making guesses about what is happening under the condition of hypothesis testing" (1978, B-28).

Abductive inference contrasts with inductive or deductive as being the basis upon which one would establish the tacit knowledge participants have of the aspects of social interaction in natural settings, which allows them to move beyond the information given of past and present to create the situation and its future possibilities. Cicourel refers to higher level predication, which is the salient cognitive-socio-cultural principles underlying the speaker's ability to produce acceptable discourse. For success, one must be able to negotiate among variable conditions of comprehension and the variety of possible interpretation over the course of an exchange.

Complex memory structures and other cognitive capacity underlie one's ability to produce both higher and lower predication, the "Internal schemator, or frames, or scripts must be linked with the external realization we call syntactic, phonological, turn-taking and textual representations" (1978, p. B-33). The process of coding exchanges for their functional meanings in the context leads to the understanding of the interactions of the "various modalities in social exchanges and their role in providing...information not clearly marked by formal aspects of speech" (1978, B-26). The functional units wherein cultural knowledge converges is the higher level or meta-predicates, the invisible component, and the lower level predicate, the visible.

Cicourel describes texts according to his purpose of advancing the study of language and society by giving close attention to linguistic and cognitive theories in the hopes of avoiding "data-driven or...hypothesis-driven explanations of sentential or sequential aspects of language use" (1978, p. B-47). The difficulty with Cicourel's paper is its failure to include an explanation of how he himself arrived at his interpretations of the segments of discourse presented. This lack is very often present in the literature of discourse theory.

Discourse: Type B Meaning,
Understanding, and Interpretation

How meaning is created by participants and the issues of interpretation by participants, as well as by the analyst, is the concern of this study. Interactional meaning refers to the orientations of participants in an interaction. These orientations are mutually shared and agreed upon, and come to life, that is, unfold in an historical fashion. Meaning in this sense is not the correspondence theory of signs positing ideas existing in one's head, objects existing in the world, and signs appearing to connect these two in a stable relation. That is, meaning here is not a kind of entity providing that every "meaningful" linguistic unit stands for something. Meaning here is not a set of features common to all the situations in which a given expression is uttered in a given sense; it is not dispositions to respond

in a particular way. However, meaning here does have something to do with expressing and communicating, something to do with reference to the world, and something to do with units of language through usage by people interacting. Meanings here are situationally determined, context itself being part of the created meaning.

The participants' interaction structures the meaning, that is, meaning is created during the course of interacting (Bennett and Reed-Hartmann, 1979; Bennett, 1978b,c). Meaning is socially achieved.

To begin looking at meaning in these terms, it becomes apparent how it is that the approaches to meaning which have been discussed so far have not yielded adequate tools to describe the participants' construction of meaning in social interaction. Interactionally achieved meaning has recently attracted attention in linguistics as theorists attempt to analyze "the everyday situation in which two or more people address each other for a period of time, communicating something about themselves and their experience in the process...[for the analyst] an extremely complex activity" (Labov and Fanshel, 1977, p. 1). Labov and Fanshel continue to note that although much work has been done with the data of psychiatric interviews, the research itself seldom focuses on the speech acts and the particular occurrences of discourse in these interviews. They conclude

that although researchers have considered such issues as, for example, the abstract processes of cathexis, transference, resistance, and others, along with some superficialities of the non-verbal communication, "very few authors have addressed the question of what is actually done in the therapeutic interview...they do not examine what the patient actually says" (1977, p. 3) at the place of interest in the dialogue. To begin to get at what is taking place, how such resistance or transference, or whatever, is being accomplished in the interview, "we necessarily dealt with what speakers were doing to each other, that is, with their interaction" (p. 3). Labov and Fanshel call for an interdisciplinary approach to discourse analysis for linguistics insofar as what a person says at any given moment relates to his whole life history and the practices of his particular speech community, as well as to other operating principles determined by the specific character of the social situation which itself requires definition.

Since understanding meaning in human discourse is the focus of the particularly troublesome problem being presented here, looking in detail at more relevant work which has been accomplished within the Type B approaches to meaning will begin to illuminate the complexity of and the difficulties of adequately describing the effortless and everyday occurrence of creating and understanding

meaning in social interaction. The focal issues are what it is that participants in interaction know about the interaction and how people use this knowledge to make sense of their communicative behavior. To deal with these issues, the analyst needs to be able to look at interpretations of interactions in terms of not only the lexical and grammatical construction of participant utterances, which act as constraints upon possible interpretations, but also upon the active interpretations of participants. This latter aspect is of prime concern for discourse analysis.

Philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1976) describes meaning in this interactional sense as "occasional". It is not like an attribute or property of an object, a fixed entity or element. Meaning is always the present experience, arising in interpretation. It flows from a context and one's social experience, and has various modes of communication. Meaning is not a wholly predetermined set of rules applicable to particular communicative behaviors.

Gadamer explains:

By occasionality I mean dependency on the situation in which an expression is used. ...such dependency on the situation is not itself situational, like the so-called occasional expressions (for instance, 'here' or 'this') that obviously possess no fixed content in their semantical character...such relativity to situation and opportunity constitutes the very essence of speaking...for no statement has an unambiguous meaning based on its linguistic and logical construction as such, but on the contrary, each is motivated. A question is behind each statement that first gives it its meaning (1976, pp. 88-89).

He then continues to show that language is the way we live out our social lives. We not only live in language; language lives in us. Occasionality is not the case where interaction is highly conventional, that is, predetermined with already given meanings. The relation of occasionality and conventionality is inverse: as one approaches conventionality, meaning becomes increasingly independent of the specific situation or context. As an interaction departs from conventionality, that is, as it begins to depend on the participants' acts for its meaning, it becomes increasingly "occasional" or uniquely related to the ongoing interactional events. It becomes opaque and in its opacity has an inexactness and a need for refinement that of necessity inheres in linguistic expression and human discourse.

Meaning is a mutual achievement by the interactants, who orient themselves in a particular situation. As Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz (1976) demonstrate, meaning in conversation is jointly produced and develops out of the interaction. Their concern is with understanding, that is, the meaning of the situation for the participants as a situated or context-bound process of interpretation, by means of which participants in a conversation assess each other's intentions and on which they base their responses (Gumperz, 1977). Viewing conversation as rhythmic, cooperative activity involving commitment to both speaking and listening,

Gumperz and Cook-Gumperz and others regard speakers and listeners as constantly monitoring the talk (Cherry, 1978; Erickson, 1975; Scheflen, 1972; Kendon, Harris, and Key, 1975).

The essential point here is that context is created in the interaction through linguistic means. That is, a framework of interpretation is set up through speech by means of which specific utterances are made intelligible. Context is a dynamic influence on the form and content of the message as well as its interpretation. That is, the context is not merely a backdrop of setting, topic, and socioeconomic characteristics of participants but rather a socially dynamic construction affecting the information communicated and perceived by the participants. Contextual information does not stand outside the linguistic aspects of the interaction. It is actively involved in the achieved interpretation. The assumption that context is a cluster of background social information which, when known, elucidates the talk, and that this extralinguistic material is outside the linguistic process, cannot hold up in looking at conversation, as Cook-Gumperz, Gumperz and others notably demonstrate (Bennett and Reed-Hartmann, 1979; Bennett, 1978b; Cicourel, 1974, Garfinkel, 1967, 1972; and Sacks, 1972). By relating participants' perceptive processes to their explication of the occurrences of interaction, Gumperz (1977) and others show how to get at some

of the issues relevant to the present study. It becomes important to look at context from not only the scene of the activity with its particular historicity and shared perception, but also from the participants' individual perceptions of the context, all of which is part of the communicative activity at the given time.

Looking at meaning as interactionally achieved at a given point in time, but never quite fully achieved, is an important consideration for serious study of meaning in human discourse. This importance lies in coming to grips with the problem of being able to determine what the meaning of a text actually is. At the juncture of arriving at some interpretation of a given text, structuralist or functionalist approaches to meaning, the Type A, can then rest with their findings. Those approaches revolving within the conceptualizations of Type B, must propose their interpretations as tentative. That any aspect of or all interpretations made at a given occurrence may be changed later on in time, thus changing the meaning of the event for the participants, is shown by Sacks (1973), where the meaning of a pun became different subsequent to a later message. Sacks characterizes the historical unfolding and ongoing creating of meaning which is the activity of discourse by showing that, one's ability to continue to interpret the pun depends upon one's awareness of earlier

activity and the ability to work on the past material, in a present context. This "open-endedness" of meaning (Garfinkel, 1967) accounts for a usual experience: that the meaning of what is currently happening, is always subject to change depending upon one's future orientation and experience. This quality of human experience is especially relevant in this study of psychotherapy interaction. As will be argued below, psychotherapy is a specific occasion for looking at one's interpretations of experience and of understanding them in the light of the totality of one's life. There exists no pre-given or established end-point to these interpretations until one decides to close himself off from new understandings of the experience, all endpoints being in effect interpretive, situational, or practical.

Garfinkel continues to investigate situational experience and offers two other characteristics of this kind of meaning: that it is "indexical", referring to the fact that part of the meaning inheres in the situation, and as such it is relevant for the participants. In defining this quality of "indexicality" in talk, he cites Husserl who:

...spoke of expressions whose sense cannot be decided by an auditor without his necessarily knowing or assuming something about the biography and purposes of the user of the expression, the circumstances of the utterance, the previous course of the conversation, or the particular relationship of actual or potential interaction

that exists between the expressor and the auditor (1967, p. 4).

Additionally, talk is "reflexive" in its usual presence in social interaction and its ability to fold back over itself. That is, the presence of talk carries a significance through which participants create their experience. The talk, besides conveying meaning, also creates the context for itself. Mehan and Wood (1975) illustrate "reflexivity" through using an analysis of greetings:

To say "hello" both creates and sustains a world in which persons acknowledge that 1. they sometimes can see one another; 2. a world in which it is possible for persons to signal to each other, and 3. expect to be signalled back to, by 4. some others but not all of them. This is a partial and only illustrative list of some of the things a greeting accomplishes...a greeting creates room for itself (p. 13).

When such a greeting works, that is, when the other replies as expected, the talk, itself "reflexivity", occurs unnoticeably. Should the other reject the overture, one does not immediately deny the reality of the act of greeting. Instead one creates the meaning of the event, being quite aware that something has gone wrong. Reflexivity of talk itself creates the context where in this instance, occasions of greetings can be either accepted or rejected. In either event, greetings become reaffirmed as a social reality.