RESIDENT PARTICIPATION
IN THE
TUCSON MODEL CITIES PROGRAM

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STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

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Resident participation in one Model Cities program is the central concern of this paper. Preceding analysis of the specific case, however, a frame of reference is established in broadly sketched discussions of Model Cities legislation and of federally sponsored citizen participation.

These overviews are followed by a narrowing of focus to several characteristics of the Model Cities program in Tucson. Hypotheses are presented relating the program's structure and philosophy to the nature of resident participation in the program.

It is predicted that the city dominated organizational structure and the moderate philosophy of the local program will generate a form of participation which is mild and noncontroversial in nature. Specifically it is predicted that local participants will be few in number, moderate in their views regarding the role of participation, and somewhat constrained in their behavior as participants.

The evidence presented largely supports the image of noncontroversial participation. It is concluded,
however, that a broadened study would be necessary to establish a causal link between this type of participation and program structure and philosophy.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study is an attempt to learn something about the background characteristics, attitudes, and activities of resident participants in the Tucson Model Cities program. The author's hope originally was to generalize from these findings and to infer a relationship between the moderate language and mild intent of the Demonstration Cities Act of 1966\(^1\) and the breadth and character of citizen participation in Model Cities programs.

It was assumed that the citizen participation engendered by the Act would be mild in character; that is that participation would be low, that the roles allotted to participants would not be influential and that goals and philosophies would be moderate. The wide variance among communities in the character of participation, and particularly the unexpected early militance of residents in some programs, would suggest that such a generalization cannot be made. Apparently neither the language of the enabling legislation nor federal administrative policy determine local form.

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1. Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, Statutes at Large, Vol. LXXX, 1255 [1966].
Although broad speculation along these lines cannot emerge from the Tucson case, the Tucson Model Cities program does serve as an instructive model. Perhaps not a typical Model City, Tucson is in some ways a "model" Model City. Tucson's program is highly regarded by federal administrators. This regard is evident in frequent references by the Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] officials to the high quality of the local program\(^2\) and in the fact that Tucson was one of the few cities asked to apply for a Planned Variations award.\(^3\)

Two characteristics of the local program - its clear cut structure, which allows a great deal of resident participation while lodging final authority in the Mayor and Council, and its emphasis on a "competent program"\(^4\)-undoubtedly appeal greatly to federal officials. These characteristics well represent the original intent of the legislation and are expected to have a significant influence on the character of citizen participation in the local program.

\(^2\) See, for example, the Arizona Daily Star, June 18, 1971.

\(^3\) Planned Variations was a scheme to experiment with Nixon administration concepts in communities with particularly successful Model Cities programs. These awards have not been made.

\(^4\) Ralph Kramer suggests this terminology in Participation of the Poor [Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc, 1969], p. 203. See Chapter 4 of this paper for a fuller discussion of the term.
The structure specifies active Mayoral authority at its apex. It provides for only one staff; this staff is lodged in city hall and its services are shared by city hall and resident participant organizations. The philosophy which is generally held within the structure is a predictable, non-controversial one, stressing coordination and planning within existing frameworks.

**Hypotheses**

It is hypothesized that a citizen participation component which is limited in number of participants, moderate in philosophy, and directed from outside will exist within this structure. This paper will undertake to see if such is indeed the character of citizen participation in the Tucson Model Cities program.

Specifically it is proposed that mayoral control of the program will reduce the power stakes of participation and thus reduce interest. Similarly an ideology which stresses planning and coordination rather than organizing residents for social action may reduce the immediate benefits to be gleaned from participation.

Consequently it is predicted that the number of residents participating in the program will be small. Moreover, the number of residents selecting representatives to decision-making councils will be limited. It is hypothesized, furthermore, that the residents who are elected to policy-making roles will not form the aggressive,
upwardly mobile group which has emerged in the War on Poverty programs but will be more representative of the people served. Finally, the expectations which delegates have concerning their roles in the Model Cities program are expected to be moderate.

The independence of resident attitudes and activities, as well as the breadth and stance of participation, is supposed to be restricted in the local program. Resident attitudes are posited to be more similar to the attitudes of "establishment" participants than would be the case in programs where structure and ideology were more resident oriented. A particular structural element, the staff which serves both residents and the Mayor and Council, is expected to constrain resident activities.

Unfortunately, the relationships just identified will not be proved or disproved in this paper. While the nature of citizen participation may be established here, no lines of causality can be imputed from an isolated case. The purpose of this paper is to suggest hypotheses which may be tested in other case studies and to provide in-depth information about relevant variables as they exist in one city at one point in time. Before attempting to achieve this purpose it might be well to discuss the data which will be employed.
Data

The data on which this descriptive analysis is based were obtained in several ways. Much of the basic information was gathered from a series of formal and informal interviews with participants involved at various levels of the Model Cities process: residents, resident-aides, professional staff members, and one member of the city council. Similarly a good deal was learned from a series of meetings attended by the author in the winter and early spring of 1970-71, the period which this research covers.

More concrete data were obtained from the minutes available for the Model Neighborhood Council and the Unit organizations. The minutes studied spanned a period from the original meetings to the spring of 1971. The file of minutes for the Model Neighborhood Council was almost complete. Unit minutes, on the other hand, were available only for occasional meetings in the early period. Thus figures on attendance by Unit are drawn from a small and recent sample.

The single most important, and most disappointing, source of "hard" data was a questionnaire conducted in February and March of 1971 of various groups of participants in the Model Cities process. The Mayor and Council, the City Development Agency staff, agency representatives to the Study Group Council, and residents participating on
the Model Neighborhood Council were surveyed. It was hoped that from these questionnaires would come [1] some socio-economic and attitudinal characteristics of residents which could serve as a basis for an analysis of their representational characteristics, and [2] some similarities and dissimilarities in notions held by various groups as to what citizen participation should be and should accomplish.

Unfortunately the return rate, while it varied considerably among groups, was generally low. In addition, questionnaires returned by residents were in many cases incomplete, further reducing the sample size. Table 1 shows the numbers of participants in each category responding.

Table 1
Questionnaire Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaires</th>
<th>Mailed</th>
<th>Returned</th>
<th>Percent Returned</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aides</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Neighborhood Council</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegates</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternates</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Group Council</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor and Council</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The staff return rate yields an acceptable sample. Statistics drawn from other groups, particularly the resident group, cannot be considered reliable. Nonetheless,
because the data seem too interesting to ignore, a portion of the following analysis will be based on the questionnaire. It should be remembered by the reader that this information is more suggestive than authoritative.
CHAPTER 2

THE DEMONSTRATION CITIES AND
METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1966

Several forces combined in 1965 to make the concepts underlying the Demonstration Cities Act attractive to those concerned with urban problems. One was a dissatisfaction with the physical emphasis of urban renewal. Increasingly critics were decrying urban renewal as a program which attacked patches of blight simply by moving the poor to new slums. 1 Another factor which enhanced the idea of the Model Cities program, as the product of the Demonstration Cities Act came to be known, was a cluster of reactions to the War on Poverty. 2 These were responses to both omissions and commissions of the poverty program.

Although the notion of planning was originally part of the Economic Opportunity concept, most local poverty agencies were "defining their roles as those of advocacy, confrontation, and delivery of services rather


than of community-wide planning and coordination. Many critics felt that the problems of the poor had not yet been met with a comprehensive, planned attack.

Another promise which the Office of Economic Opportunity [OEO] had extended and then in practice withdrawn was decentralization. Many believed that a need existed for a program in which communities were granted wide discretion in designing programs to assist the poor. Furthermore, a feeling existed that while citizen participation was useful in establishing the priorities of the poor and in gaining their support for services, the controversy and conflict aroused by OEO's philosophy of participation were too costly. That is, the Model Cities program could be considered a new attempt at Community Action.

A third factor giving rise to the Demonstration Cities Act was a growing awareness that the burgeoning grant-in-aid system was moving from inefficiency to unmanageability. The President's Task Force on Model Cities described the frustration arising from the use of 400 federal grant-in-aid programs in their evaluation of the Model Cities Program:

Every dollar of [grant-in-aid money] has a thousand strings attached...Cities...find themselves able to get federal money that they can spend only

for things that are relatively low in priority... and at the same time unable to get money for things they consider most urgent. Everyone knows of instances in which a city has done things with federal money it has not done with its own... because otherwise the federal money would be lost.4

In 1965 a high level study group, headed by Robert C. Wood and including "an extraordinarily powerful blend of academic minds, labor and civic leaders and top businessmen,"5 proposed the idea of a demonstration program to attack urban blight to President Lyndon B. Johnson. The program was suggested after an attempt to transfer the Community Action Program to the new department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] had failed. It was to provide the core concern for HUD. The initial plan was that a small number of cities would be awarded funds to make a concerted attack on the whole complex of problems of the urban poor. Their efforts then would be used as models in later federal and local planning.

On January 25, 1966, legislation "authorizing assistance to cities... to show how complex and intertwined


urban problems can be effectively attacked" was requested in President Johnson's budget message. The following day a special message was sent to Congress to elaborate on the requested legislation. In this message a major effort was proposed to "focus all the techniques and talents within our society on the crisis of the American city." Cities were to design their own programs and compete for funding on the basis of comprehensive plans submitted to a central agency. The program includes attacks on physical, social, and economic blight. "For the first time, social and construction agencies would be joined in a massive, common effort, responsive to common local authorities."

On February 21, 1966 hearings began on the president's proposal in the House Banking and Currency Committee. The program was presented by Robert Weaver, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, as one possessing strenuous eligibility requirements and allowing


7. Congressional Quarterly, XXIV, No. 5 [1966], 344.

8. Fourteen guidelines for planning are suggested, among them: requirements that the plans as implemented must eliminate blight in entire neighborhoods; must have a significant impact on the development of the city; must use every available social program; must develop private initiative and widespread citizen participation. Funding of 2.3 billion dollars to be spent over six years was requested. Ibid., p. 328.

9. Ibid., p. 345.
a good deal of local autonomy. According to a later New York Times report the bill almost foundered in this first try.10

The selectivity of the program was one of the obstacles to its passage, as no mayor or congressman could be confident that his city or district would be awarded a grant. In addition, according to the New York Times report, the inexperience of HUD officials and the initial ambivalence of interest groups clouded the future of the President's grand proposal. In the end, however, stiff presidential pressure prevailed and the committee ordered the bill reported out several months later with only minor changes.

On August 9, 1966 the Senate Banking and Currency Committee reported its version of the bill, and on August 19 the Senate approved a severely reduced, although conceptually similar, program. The House readily accepted the reduced version of the President's proposal and on October 29, 1966 a Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act was passed by Congress. Although cut in time-span and in funding,11 the bill was essentially that proposed by President Johnson.

10. Semple, "Signing of Model Cities Bill."

11. The Act authorized $924 million to be spent over three years, as well as $250 million in additional urban renewal funds to be earmarked for Model Cities. The original request had been for $2.3 billion to be spread over six years.
The purpose of the Demonstration Cities Act is:

...to provide additional financial and technical assistance to enable cities of all sizes to plan, develop and carry out locally prepared and scheduled comprehensive city demonstration programs containing new and imaginative proposals...to revitalize blighted areas; to expand housing, job and income opportunities...; to improve educational programs...; to combat disease; to reduce the incidence of crime...and generally to improve living conditions.12

A limited number of cities were originally meant to have an opportunity to take on this sizeable challenge. Several requirements for eligibility are listed in the Act. Chief among them is that eligible cities must have programs of "sufficient magnitude to make a substantial impact on physical and social problems".13 And, as in the Johnson message, "widespread citizen participation" is required.14 Federal guidelines issued by HUD also suggest that innovation and imagination are to be rewarded.15

As their tools in the battle against blight, the cities are to make use of existing federal and local programs. On the local level "the fullest utilization

13. Ibid., Sec. 105.
14. Ibid., Sec. 103a.
possible will be made of private initiative and enterprise.\textsuperscript{16} On the federal level the Secretary shall "insure maximum coordination of Federal assistance...(as well as) prompt response to local initiative and maximum flexibility in programming."\textsuperscript{17}

Cities awarded planning grants are to receive up to 80 percent of the costs of preparing a comprehensive five year plan. Cities whose plans are accepted, moreover, will receive block grants allocated according to a fixed need formula. These funds may be used in two ways, both calculated to enable cities to fill in the interstices of the fragmental grant-in-aid system. First, the funds may be used to cover 80 percent of the cost of programs administered by either public or private agencies and not eligible for existing federal grants. Secondly, they may be used to cover up to 80 percent of the local contribution required by federal grant-in-aid programs, thus making use of available funds not currently drawn to the community. In both instances it was intended that supplemental funds should provide seed money to induce public and private agencies to participate in the attempt to erase urban blight, and to tailor their own programs to the plans of Model Cities agencies.

\textsuperscript{16} Demonstration Cities Act, Sec. 103a.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
Local City Demonstration Agencies [as the local administrative bodies are to be called] are to allot these funds to programs designed to meet "the basic problems of human and physical deterioration"\textsuperscript{18} in a limited, predesignated geographic area referred to in this paper as the Model Neighborhood. This area is to be small enough to allow the production of demonstrable effects, and large enough to be a workable laboratory. This area is to be a "hardcore slum."\textsuperscript{19}

The City Demonstration Agency [CDA], designated to implement the Model Cities program, is required: [1] to be closely related to the government decision-making machinery; [2] to provide a meaningful role in policy making to the residents of the Model Neighborhood; [3] to be structured so as to overcome the fragmentation of efforts; and [4] to be capable of mobilizing local resources.\textsuperscript{20} It was made clear in 1967 that CDA's were to be clearly accountable to local government.

The citizen participation structure favored by HUD was not spelled out originally. However, after receiving many applications for planning grants a policy statement

\textsuperscript{18}. Improving the Quality, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{19}. Ibid., p. 5.

\textsuperscript{20}. Ibid., p. 17.
was circulated stating that "widespread citizen participation" entailed "the constructive involvement of citizens of the Model Neighborhood...in the planning and carrying out of the program." Furthermore, certain safeguards for citizen influence must be provided in setting up organizational machinery. The citizen participation structure, the policy statement continued, must have:

- clear, direct access to the decision-making process of the CDA...sufficient information...so it can initiate proposals and react knowledgably...
- [and must have]...the technical capacity for making knowledgable decisions. 22

It was further stated in the program guide issued in late 1967 that a formal structure of citizen participation must exist and that "the leadership of that structure must consist of persons whom neighborhood residents accept as representing their own interests." 23

The Demonstration Cities Act, in summary, is intended to launch a major, concerted, coordinated effort to combat the physical and social deterioration of America's cities. The hope is to demonstrate that urban problems are not insoluble. The emphasis of the act is not only on planning and coordination, but more importantly, on joining


22. Ibid., p. 2.

23. Improving the Quality, p. 21.
residents with public and private agencies in a harmonious effort to address urban problems. The resources needed for this effort are to be coordinated from above by the Secretary of HUD, and from below by the authority of the local government. Decentralization of program planning and scheduling is to be strictly observed. The pitfalls of conflict and confrontation, of insufficient local authority, and of over-direction from the federal administrator are to be avoided.

One year after the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act was passed, planning grants were awarded to 63 of the 193 cities applying. Twelve more awards were soon to follow and in 1968 a second round of applications brought the total number of cities awarded planning grants to 150. It was not until early 1969 however, more than two years from the passage of the Act, that the first plans were approved, and not until July 1969, several months into the Nixon administration, that the first block grants were awarded to 35 cities.

According to a *New York Times* report of December 1969, a survey of 16 cities awarded grants revealed little progress in planning at that time. Delays were being caused by disputes over control.\(^{22}\) James Sundquist cited, as well, the obstacles raised by an excess of democracy and by

conflicts between residents and professionals. Nevertheless, according to Sundquist, at the end of 1969 the "range of participation was impressive" and the plans that had been approved represented a "remarkable achievement in coordination."

After careful examination of individual plans by the Secretary of HUD, two presidential task force reports, and much grumbling by presidential aides over Johnson's expansive rhetoric ["the whole undertaking...oozed over-promise"], the program seemed, in late 1969, to have gained a new if temporary hold on life. A rumored diversion of Model Cities funds had been fought back by a vigorous coalition of Mayors, new coordinating efforts were being made by the President's Council on Urban Affairs, and experiments in decentralization and expansion were being designed.

Task force reports favorable to the Model Cities concept, if not to its current operation, and HUD's interest in preserving its key program led to HUD's billing of Model

24. Ibid., p. 102.
26. Ibid., p. 1474.
Cities as a key to the "New Federalism." The program, HUD argued, could give the Nixon Administration the opportunity to experiment with decentralization in decision-making, block grants, and more flexible coordination. Citizen participation, highly regarded by HUD staff during the Johnson administration, was downplayed by an emphasis on the distinction between citizen control and citizen participation. Appropriate revisions were requested in many plans.

Despite HUD's optimism and the temporary victories gained for Model Cities, President Nixon failed to commit his energies to the program. In early 1971 with the

27. The "New Federalism" would decentralize governmental functions by giving over responsibility to state and local governments. Eventually categorical grants from the federal government would be replaced by revenue-sharing schemes in which local governments would gain the initiative and authority which they lose in a centralized system. See Banfield, Toward a New Federalism for a discussion of the need for decentralization.


29. According to Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Model Cities, Robert H. Baida, the Nixon Administration "inherited a philosophy in many areas of the country dedicated toward extensive citizen control... The Model Cities program is not to be controlled by citizen groups. Control and responsibility rest with the local government." Baida is quoted in Lilley, ibid., p. 1470.

planned variations experiments announced, but still not implemented, the President requested a revenue sharing system to replace several categorical grants. If Congress approved this plan, Model Cities could disappear as a budget item in 1972. Nevertheless, it is thought by many involved with the program that Model Cities will survive and that some of the 117 operating Model Cities programs will, under different names, continue as tools in the effort to revitalize the cities.

CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

The Demonstration Cities Act of 1965 declared that there should be "widespread participation" of residents in the local Model Cities programs. The equivalent clause in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was even more sweeping and vague for it stipulated "maximum feasible participation of the poor."¹

What "maximum feasible participation" was understood to mean to the originators of the language, to those who supported and opposed the bill, to those who administered the act in Washington and in countless communities, to the Mayors, and to the poor has been discussed at length.²

Certainly the phrase meant numerous, often incompatible,


things to many people. Even among the most ardent supporters of citizen participation there is little consensus on what participation of the poor should accomplish, how it should be effected, and where it should be used.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan described the long process by which the community action concept made its way into law and finally into hundreds of communities. He maintained that by the time the community action idea emerged as implemented policy it represented a cluster of notions held by the assortment of men involved in its formulation, legitimation and implementation. The various, often incompatible, perceptions of community action implied very different roles for citizen participants.

One early and respected notion held that community action and citizen participation should simply give the poor the opportunity to strive toward middle-class goals in socially approved ways. Another, a Peace Corps analogy, saw the poor as an underdeveloped people who would, through community action, be educated and activated by idealistic outsiders. Thus, the poor could eventually become capable of a responsible role in determining their futures.

A third conception of community action and of the Community Action Program, maintained by the Bureau of the Budget, stressed their potential as planning and

coordinating devices. It gave the poor no explicit role in community action, however.

The men drafting the poverty bill for the most part envisaged the Community Action Program as a catchall for sponsoring programs that communities might wish to initiate. According to Moynihan the term "maximum feasible participation of the poor" was inserted by this group simply to insure that the Southern Negro would participate in program benefits. It is this notion which Congress seems to have accepted.

A final notion was held by the group that Sargent Shriver assembled to plan the implementation of the bill. This group included many forceful advocates of community action. The group conceived of the Community Action Program and of "maximum feasible participation" as the means to mobilize the poor to press their own demands for change. In the hands of these men the notion of participation was radicalized.

Richard Blumenthal speaks more specifically of differences among those who held the latter notion - that community action, through "maximum feasible participation" of the poor, was to be a means to achieve social power. Even among this group there was dispute over whether the effort to give power to the poor should aim at molding a
coalition between progressive elements of the establishment and the poor, or at creating conflict which could enhance the power potential of the poor but threaten any carefully created coalition.\(^4\)

Accompanying this disagreement were differences over the potential role of the poor within the traditional, bureaucratic, decision-making structures. The "coalitionists" believed that jobs and skills learned within the local bureaucracy were essential to social power. A more radical faction thought that local bureaucracies would not only coopt the poor, but never permit them to gain influence.\(^5\) And, while the more moderate group emphasized planning by coalitions including the poor, the second insisted that planning had little place in community action. For the latter group "[p]lanning would place a premium on systems analysis that the poor were not equipped to understand or criticize effectively."\(^6\)

The differences concerning the role of the poor among those who designed, enacted, and administered community action at the federal level were repeated at the local level. The conceptions of "maximum feasible participation" embraced at the operating level have been described and categorized by many writers.

\(^4\) Blumenthal, "The Bureaucracy", p. 141.

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 142.

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 140.
Kenneth Clark in *A Relevant War on Poverty* suggests four concepts of community action by which programs may be classified. The conceptions posit the respective goals of community action as [1] provision of services, [2] provision of opportunity, [3] community organization, and [4] social action. Clark suggests that the goals may be placed on a continuum ranging from the traditional to the "radical". Although Clark does not categorize specifically the notions of participation accompanying these conceptions, he does make clear that the roles and objectives of citizen participation vary greatly along the spectrum.

Paul Kramer's study on participation of the poor in several Bay Area communities speaks of four goals of citizen participation *per se*. The goals are congruent with Clark's four modes of community action. Kramer's goals are: [1] to give feedback on programs and promote utilization of services, [2] to provide job experience within the community action bureaucracy, [3] to insure participation by the poor in decision-making as members of the governing boards of community action and other social service agencies, and [4] to institute a redistribution of power to generate change.


The typologies discussed by Clark and Kramer, and those put forward by other students of citizen participation, suggest a continuum of citizen influence. Each of the successive program orientations on the spectrum implies a role for the poor which is broader, more influential, and more threatening to established bases of power. The continuum might be sketched as follows:

Legend: Potential for resident influence /###/ Potential for resident autonomy /***/ Potential for conflict

Orientation: Service Opportunity Community Development Social Action

Conservative Radical

Figure 1. A Theoretical Continuum Depicting the Relationship of Program Orientation to Citizen Participation

On the lower end of the spectrum is the traditional view of a community action program which delivers more and better services to the poor. It utilizes citizen participants largely to establish definitions of problems, and to increase feedback on the services provided. The poor are viewed as clients or consumers of services, and their ideas are tapped through surveys or weak advisory boards. This point on the spectrum provides citizen participants the least amount of impact.

The second perspective, which is oriented toward giving the poor job experience and opportunities for advancement in staff positions, is farther along the continuum. This emphasis on opportunity is espoused by those who believe that the poor are potentially competent. However, without skills and experience in planning, negotiating and administering — and without a decent income — indigenous leaders are unlikely to wield much influence on the social service "establishment." This conception places emphasis on putting the poor into jobs with various community action projects. Residents are not assured a voice in policy-making, but are likely to have more influence than under the previous traditional view.

In contrast, self-help, or community development, stresses the need for organizing the poor so they may begin to solve their own problems. Self-help groups are likely
to be formed in the neighborhood. Leaders who emerge may be given fairly responsible roles in planning larger projects. This perspective assumes [1] that the poor are capable of evaluating their own situation, [2] that organization will give the poor an opportunity to attack their problems as a group, and [3] that an even more capable citizenry will emerge from each problem-solving effort. Thus neighborhood participants are likely to be given more responsibility in policy making than in the service-oriented program. For instance, they may serve on governing boards as well as advisory bodies.

A still different philosophy holds roughly that before the poor can have any significant impact on their own situation they must obtain the power to change existing institutions. Power is aggregated by organizing for social action. Pressing for action in an organized way [1] gives participants a new sense of their own power potential, and [2] forces the "establishment" to recognize that the poor as a group are a new force with which they must deal.

A social action approach is likely to be conflict engendering both because of the organizing power of controversial issues, and because the avenue to recognition is often through strong protest. In addition, social action proponents often hold the notion that existing institutions are "bad" and for effective social action to occur institutions must be altered drastically.
In this conception the role of the poor includes control of certain autonomous bases of power, such as neighborhood organizations or Community Action Agencies. Resident participants are unlikely to have as much influence within established institutions as on the third level, but will have a great deal of autonomy.

These four perspectives are not incompatible. They represent ideal types. Despite differences in underlying philosophy there is overlap along the spectrum. And, different viewpoints coexist in some programs. In such cases one perspective usually dominates, while those farthest from it in philosophy are ignored. The traditional social service focus is unlikely to coexist, for example, with a social action emphasis. The opportunity viewpoint, on the other hand, may well coexist with either social service or self-help orientations.

It is a popular belief, based largely on the outcry from city halls, that the fourth conception of participation - organizing for social action - prevailed in most Community Action Programs. Most studies suggest, however, that this is not the case. Resident participation in Community Action Programs has often been limited and ineffectual.  

11. See, for example, Kramer, Participation of the Poor; Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," and Clark and Hopkins, A Relevant War on Poverty.
In fact, Community Action Programs have served more often to improve service delivery than to organize the poor.\textsuperscript{12}

Howard Hallman's statement on community action, in effect, is repeated over and over in the literature. He states that, with a few exceptions, community action programs did not have a "predominant commitment to the strategies of giving power to the poor, of deliberate confrontation, of purposefully created conflict."\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, Saul Alinsky, foremost proponent of power for the poor, found community action programs to fall so short of his notions of social action that he called them "political pornography."\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, the impression of a level of conflict which threatened to bring down city hall prevailed. Consequently, the Demonstration Cities Act of 1966 reduced the role of citizen participation both by the use of more cautious language describing citizen participation, and by providing explicitly for mayoral control.


\textsuperscript{13} Hallman, "The Community Action Program," p. 289.

Despite the language of moderation in the Demonstration Cities Act, the character of citizen participation in Model Cities has been as varied as in the War on Poverty. In some cities the OEO experience activated some citizens' groups to attempt to take over City Demonstration Agencies. In a few cities de facto control or at least veto power over the CDA was achieved. Early in the program the staff in Washington favored a strong resident voice, and emphasis at one time was placed on delivering effective technical assistance and perhaps separate staff to resident organizations.

As in the case of the War on Poverty, however, it appears that resident influence has often been described too enthusiastically. Sherry Arnstein, who worked in the Model Cities Administration at HUD, devised a typology of citizen participation. Her evaluation was that delegated power, the highest level of resident power possible given legal constraints, had been reached in seven cities by mid-1969.

15. See Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," and Mogolof, "Coalition to Adversary."

16. Altshuler suggested that in favoring local programs which provide a large role for residents "federal bureaucrats may well have gone beyond congressional intent..." He adds that "what is more important is that they have remained within congress' zone of indifference." Altshuler, Community Control, p. 188.

17. Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation." The steps in Arnstein's ladder are: manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power, and citizen control.
Nevertheless, in the vast majority of cities studied, citizen participation's high water mark came only to the level of "placation."\(^\text{18}\)

In the Model Cities Program, as well as in the War on Poverty, variations in citizen influence must be explained by local conditions. This paper will examine a proximate basis for the type of citizen participation which exists in Tucson's Model Cities program. This proximate basis is the structural design of the local Model Cities organization.

\(^{18}\) It was at about the time of the Arnstein article that the Nixon administration began to dampen expectations concerning the future role of citizen participation in the Model Cities program. \textit{New York Times}, July 13, 1969 and December 15, 1969.
CHAPTER 4

THE MODEL CITIES PROGRAM IN TUCSON

The Development of the Program

In Tucson, progress toward a Model Cities program was initiated in the city government. The Department of Community Development took the first steps toward preparation of an application for a planning grant in the winter of 1967.

In the following months an ambitious series of interviews was held with people who might have some knowledge of the problems of Tucson's poor, and of the tools existing to alleviate these problems. Some of those interviewed - members of the Area Councils of Tucson's Committee for Economic Opportunity [TCEO], and members of several youth organizations - were residents of the future Model Neighborhood.

Study groups directed by agency heads and comprising agency employees and residents were formed to explore specific problem areas. Several meetings were held with the memberships of TCEO area councils, three neighborhood centers, and two youth associations. Data were obtained from Census publications and a survey of 420 residents taken as part of a Community Renewal Program.
Information on problems and priorities in the proposed Model Neighborhood area were derived from these sources. The weight of resident suggestions is difficult to assess, but certainly the ideas of resident leaders were solicited at this time. And the application, while not resident produced, was a local product prepared without the aid of outside consultants.

Proposed boundaries for the Model Neighborhood were drawn by the Department of Community Development on the basis of prevailing conditions, size and population that were considered manageable, estimates of available resources to deal effectively with problems, interest and commitment of...other units of local government...and neighborhood organizations. 1

The director of the City Demonstration Agency staff insists that these decisions were made on a purely technical basis and accomplished simply by overlaying topographical maps of demographic conditions and choosing the neediest area. 2

The Application for a Model Cities Planning Grant was compiled and written by the Department of Community Development

1. City of Tucson, Department of Community Development, Application for a Model Cities Planning Grant [Tucson, April, 1968], p. 15.

2. Subjective factors probably entered the decision as well. This notion is corroborated by the subsequent inclusion of a sixth Unit. The area, which was annexed only after considerable political maneuvering, was clearly as worthy as the original Model Neighborhood but had nevertheless been excluded from it.
Development. In April of 1968 the document was submitted to HUD for consideration in the second round of applications. A five month waiting period, labeled by a HUD sponsored report as the period of "muted expectations"\(^3\) then ensued.

In September 1968 the application for a planning grant was approved by the Model Cities Administration. An Interim Advisory Committee, comprising residents from the few neighborhood organizations in the Model Cities area and "a strong agency base", was appointed by the Mayor and Council.

During the next few months the Interim Advisory Committee established job criteria for key City Demonstration Agency staff and interviewed applicants from the three top staff positions. In February 1969 Cressworth Lander, formerly Deputy Director of the Pima and Santa Cruz County Committee For Economic Opportunity,\(^4\) was appointed staff director.

The first order of business of the new CDA, during April, May and June of 1969, was establishing a citizen participation structure. By this time HUD policy on citizen participation structure. By this time HUD policy on citizen participation structure. By this time HUD policy on citizen participation structure. By this time HUD policy on

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4. Prior to being Deputy Director of the local OEO program, Lander was State Director of Technical Assistance for Community Action Programs.
participation had been clearly defined. This policy called for a well defined, semi-independent resident structure headed by neighborhood leaders. A structure along these lines was proposed by the CDA and staff and, in late April, was approved by both the Interim Advisory Committee and the three Area Councils. Some objections were raised in Area Council meetings, but they were countered by the suggestion that changes could be made later.

Evidently the struggle for control which Marshall Kaplan et al. found common in the early days of Model Cities, particularly where residents have been previously organized by local Community Action Programs, did not occur in Tucson. For one thing the local Community Action structure was closely involved with, and seemed to concur in plans for a Model Cities citizen participation structure. As noted, their Area Councils endorsed this structure.

Another, more basic factor, was the ingenuity exhibited in designing the structure. From the beginning it was emphasized that the Mayor and Council were to have in fact all control invested in them legally by the Demonstration Cities Act. To highlight and facilitate this

5. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "CDA Letter Number 3."

6. See Minutes included in the City of Tucson, Department of Community Development, Division of Model Cities, "Submission of Required Documents...in order to Execute a Planning Grant" sent to the Regional Administrator of the Department of Housing and Urban Development on April 25, 1969.
control the Mayor and Council designated the City Demonstration Agency [CDA]. Thus, it was immediately apparent that final authority lay with the city. It was also implied, however, that political sanctions could be applied to the CDA. Control of policy bodies advising the CDA, moreover, was given administratively to the residents. According to the staff director, the resident majorities on the policy boards removed all incentive for protest.\(^7\)

In early June, Fred Acosta, Deputy Director in charge of citizen participation, joined the staff on a full-time basis and immediately engaged in the hectic organization of the five neighborhood units included originally in the Model Neighborhood. In mid-June an open workshop was held by the Tucson Committee for Economic Opportunity [TCEO].\(^8\) According to Acosta three of the units emerged easily from this workshop while the other two required more organizational effort.\(^9\) In June 1969 the first meeting of

\(^7\) It seems to the author that the impossibility of gaining control of the CDA was probably another dampening factor.

\(^8\) The involvement of Community Action Agencies in the organization of Model Cities programs does not appear to have been uncommon. It was probably hoped that local OEO influence over Model Cities Agencies and citizen participation structures could best be achieved in this way. See Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, p. 90 for mention of the influence of OEO experience on Model Cities. See also p. 128 for a discussion of hostility in some cities. Similar animosities have existed in Tucson.

\(^9\) There is some dispute over whether all the units did not emerge from the area councils. In any case it is evident that TCEO citizen organizations laid a firm foundation for resident participation in the Model Cities program.
the Model Neighborhood Council, the chief policy-making body of Model Neighborhood residents, was held, and formal citizen participation in the Tucson Model Cities program began.

The Model Cities Structure in Tucson

Originally HUD was silent on the form which Model Cities organization should take. Accordingly, these structures took many outlines in the plans submitted. James Sundquist, who studied sixteen Model City programs during their planning period, provides an excellent discussion of organizational structures and their implications.10

Organizational Forms

According to Sundquist the form adopted often reflected the cities' experiences with the Economic Opportunity Act. In cities where community action agencies espoused a confrontational philosophy, Model Neighborhood residents held out for a bicameral structure in which residents had an independent organization participating in planning and program evaluation, parallel to and on equal footing with organizations comprising public and private officials.11 In some of these cities residents managed to

10. Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, pp. 86-103.

11. The CDA was an administrative organization directed by some combination of representatives of these groups.
take de facto control of the CDA. In other cities unicameral organizations developed wherein neighborhood residents and agency representatives were involved in a single planning process. Figure 2 presents the major types of organizational form identified by Sundquist.

Sundquist contends that the November 1967 HUD policy statement implicitly prohibited the unicameral form. And it is widely held that HUD staff, strongly infused at this time with OEO blood, in general preferred a powerful resident position.

While the Johnson administration opposed the unicameral planning process, approval of resident domination of the CDA - the most extreme bicameral position - was rejected by HUD's Secretary Romney. And, according to Sundquist, a resident dominated CDA can only be unsatisfactory. Placing final authority in city hall, he maintains, is essential to accomplish the comprehensive planning and coordination which a successful program must achieve.


15. See Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, p. 90; Lille, "Uncertain Future," and Altshuler, Community Control, p. 188.

16. See this study, Chapter 2.
1. **UNICAMERAL**

   ![Diagram of Unicameral Identification Task Forces Including Residents]

2. **BICAMERAL - Unified**

   ![Diagram of Bicameral Unified Identification Task Forces Using CDA Staff]

3. **BICAMERAL - City Hall Oriented**

   ![Diagram of Bicameral City Hall Oriented Negotiation or Confrontation Staff]

4. **BICAMERAL - Neighborhood Oriented**

   ![Diagram of Bicameral Neighborhood Oriented Negotiation Confrontation Staff]

5. **RESIDENT CONTROL**

   ![Diagram of Resident Control Negotiation Confrontation Staff]

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**KEY**

- CH: City Hall
- CDA: City Demonstration Agency
- NRO: Neighborhood Resident Organization

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Figure 2. Model Cities Organizational Schemes (From James Sundquist, *Making Federalism Work*, p. 96).
Thus lines [1] and [5] on Figure 2 represent unlikely forms for Model Cities' structures to take. Tucson's organizational form lies between lines [2] and [3] and is, when measured in terms of formal resident influence, one of the most moderate options available. In one sense the Tucson CDA is city hall oriented [line 3] since the CDA is the Mayor and Council. The fact that CDA staff, in most instances, act for the CDA does not alter this orientation. Nevertheless, the independent staff resources for residents, and the adversary relationship between residents and CDA, indicated on line [3] do not exist locally. In this sense the Tucson case approaches the unified bicameral form [line 2]. There seems to exist in Tucson a consensual structure in which CDA staff manages to identify both with city hall and with neighborhood residents, but in which city hall clearly retains control.

Tucson's Organizational Structure

In Tucson the Mayor and Council are at the apex of the Model Cities organization [see Figure 3]. The Mayor and Council are not only final arbiters but also active participants in the planning and evaluation process. Obviously many decisions which would ordinarily lie with the CDA in Tucson are delegated to staff. Nevertheless, the fact that this staff is a department of the city directly beneath the Mayor and Council and not a semi-autonomous
Figure 3. Model Cities Organization in Tucson
public agency, as is true in most cities, suggests the importance of equating the CDA with the Mayor and Council. This arrangement is also important in a symbolic sense in that it makes abundantly clear to all participants that the Mayor and Council are in command. Although intervention or veto by this group on a "hot" issue might well cause shock waves, their position above all policy boards is universally recognized and generally respected.\footnote{Actually, for the most part, joint recommendations of the advisory bodies below the CDA are accepted by the current Mayor and Council.}

Directly beneath the CDA is the Policy Board. This small, resident-dominated group receives proposals from agency and resident councils and has authority to accept or reject them. Whereas approved proposals are routed to the Mayor and Council, recommendations for change are sent back to the councils. The resident portion of the Policy Board includes several of the more powerful residents [Unit chairmen], and thus transmits a significant resident voice. One member of the City Council sits on the Board, and the Board meets occasionally with the entire Mayor and Council.

Under the Policy Board, sharing the services of CDA staff with the Mayor and Council, are the primary agency and resident structures. These units are joined theoretically by a Conference Committee which is nominally dominated by residents but which has never been convened. The
Conference Committee is designed to settle differences which arise between the resident and agency councils. Heretofore, such differences have been settled by joint sessions of the agency and resident councils.

The Model Neighborhood Council [MNC] is the central organization in the resident decision-making structure. It is composed of five delegates from each of six geographical units into which the Model Neighborhood is divided. The details of MNC delegate selection are specified in Unit by-laws, but in all cases delegates are directly elected at open meetings. The MNC receives all information compiled by CDA staff. Its stated functions are to initiate planning and evaluation and to review outputs in these areas before transmittal to the Policy Board.

Planning is carried out at the Task Force level. Task Forces are structured around problem areas. Their membership is divided equally between resident and agency representatives. Membership, at least as an alternate, must be open to any resident wishing to participate. A staff specialist is appointed by the staff director to serve the needs of [and, in fact direct] each Task Force. Task Forces are the basic planning units in the Tucson process. Their efforts are overseen by resident and agency councils.

The agency side of the Model Cities organization is served by the Study Group Council. This Council is a 30
member board of 24 representatives of public and private agencies involved in the Model Neighborhood and six residents, one from each unit. While the resident organization recommends priorities based on neighborhood preferences, the Study Group Council presents priorities based on agency fiscal and administrative capabilities. The Study Group Council, like the Model Neighborhood Council, must approve all recommendations before they go to the policy board.18

The Tucson organizational structure is bicameral but has a unified staff. The structure is clearly under the auspices of city hall but includes resident supremacy on advisory boards. This structure should be, and heretofore has been, stable. Only the sharing of staff by residents, agency representatives, and the Mayor and Council, by Sundquist's criteria, would compromise its durability.

Model Cities Staff

According to Sundquist an independent staff for residents is a "natural" element in a stable organizational structure. The differences in priorities and attitudes of poor residents and middle-class professionals should make the sharing of staff by residents, agency representatives, and city hall untenable. In many cities residents have their own staff which gives them technical assistance in

18. Most of this information is taken from the City of Tucson, Department of Community Development, Model Cities Division, Model Cities Program: Comprehensive Development Plan [Tucson, 1970], pp. 9-11.
complicated budgeting and planning matters, and which often engages in advocacy planning. Altshuler, for one, cites a "growing trend in response to demands for dollar grants to [resident] boards for the hiring and firing of staff and professional consultants." Clearly a separate staff would give residents more independence and expertise.

A resident structure with a small, independent staff was mentioned in Tucson's application for a planning grant but later dropped. Something like a separate staff and access to independent consultants was tried in a Training and Technical Assistance program funded by OEO but this too was dropped. Instead, over the first two years of Model Cities operations in Tucson, a "branch" staff serving resident needs evolved. This staff was recognized officially as the "Citizen Participation Component" in the fall of 1970, and is now housed in the Model Neighborhood.

During the research period the sub-staff was resident oriented in both perspective and contact. When


20. At the time of this research the staff consisted of a Neighborhood Coordinator [who was also the Deputy Director of the CDA staff], an administrative assistant, six Unit and seven Task Force aides, and secretarial assistants.

21. Since that time the Neighborhood Coordinator and his assistant have been moved to city hall and replaced by men whose sympathies are not known. It is probably significant that the new coordinator is an "Anglo" and a minister at a suburban church and has not worked with the residents before.
differences arose between staff and residents, the Citizen Participation Component largely championed the resident viewpoint. An effort, moreover, was made to provide technical assistance to residents. Nevertheless, the group is under the direction of the CDA staff director and of the Mayor and Council, and in some degree is constrained not to give advice which would run counter to the wishes of city hall. It is clearly not the function of the Citizen Participation Component to engage in any resident directed "advocacy planning"; rather the sub-staff appears to exist chiefly to encourage and direct resident activity.

Residents do not lack representation. A serious effort is made to include Model Neighborhood residents on the staff, and this policy evidently existed even before HUD spelled out its requirements on the subject.\(^{22}\) According to the November 1970-January 1971 quarterly progress report, 22 of 52 CDA staff members were Model Neighborhood residents. None of the 22 held higher echelon positions, but some training was being accomplished.\(^{23}\) Civil service regulations and educational requirements, however, are


\(^{23}\) Most of the residents are employed as Unit or Task Force aides, or as interviewers.
likely to keep most of these people from moving very high into the staff structure.\textsuperscript{24}

The sharing of staff by the CDA and resident organizations is seen by the staff as an integral element of the consensual, programmatic Model Cities process. A resident organization working independently of city government, drawing up, with the aid of its staff, proposals for presentation to the Mayor and Council, and fighting to have these proposals accepted, would be dysfunctional.

The reaction of the residents interviewed to a shared staff was again almost universally favorable. This response came despite recent friction between residents and staff specialists.\textsuperscript{25} Several residents also mentioned that direction of the planning process by some higher authority was essential to achieve a workable program.

\textbf{The "Competent Program" Philosophy of the Local Model Cities Program}

Ralph Kramer has suggested that Community Action programs stress either the "competent program" or "competent

\textsuperscript{24} In the spring of 1971 residents were also given some voice in the hiring of CDA staff members. Civil service regulations, however, restrict this role in most cases. And, in instances where staff members are hired under contract, rather than through competitive civil service examinations, and in which the resident Screening Committee should play a major role in the selection process, it is not clear how influential residents have been in the final choosing.

\textsuperscript{25} See Chapter 4.
community" philosophy. That is, they may emphasize on the one hand the coordination and delivery of services, and on the other the organization of residents to press for services. That an emphasis on the "competent program" exists here seems evident in staff statements. The local program is often compared by staff members to the local poverty program. The latter was not so pragmatic in outlook, preferring to emphasize confrontation and to operate outside the governmental system. Several staff members pointed out that this orientation resulted in low local funding for the program.

Great stress is placed on the relative success of the Model Cities program in providing services. When it was suggested that some Model Cities programs have the social action-oriented philosophy of citizen participation often associated with OEO, the staff director pointed out that programs with stronger, more independent resident participation didn't work. When questioned about flaws in participation, the Neighborhood Coordinator, a man most enthusiastic about citizen participation, countered that the program is not perfect but it works.

26. See Kramer, Participation of the Poor, p. 203.


28. Fred Acosta, Neighborhood Coordinator and Deputy Director of the Department of Model Cities, Interview held in Tucson, March 10, 1971.
A neglect of the "competent community" philosophy may be reflected in conceptions of the goals of citizen participation. The goals are perceived by the preponderance of the staff [and residents] as improving the program and promoting its use, rather than organizing and educating residents.\textsuperscript{29}

It is maintained by the local staff that the moderate local philosophy is the Model Cities philosophy. Such a philosophy is in accord with the intent of the Act and with the Nixon-HUD ideology. Nonetheless, that the "competent program" orientation is not predetermined is made clear by experiences in other cities.

Summary

The Tucson Model Cities process is clearly oriented toward producing a workable, noncontroversial and, most importantly, well funded operation. The Department of Model Cities staff Director has declared that a working program could not be achieved without CDA and staff direction of the Model Cities process and that citizen participation must operate within an integrated system. Furthermore, the Department maintains that "clear and direct access to decision-making", which citizen participation guarantees to residents, cannot be assured except through

\textsuperscript{29} See Chapter 6.
an integrated structure headed by the Mayor and Council with staff serving as a bridge between the Mayor and Council and residents.

This integrated structure and the competent program orientation which the structure facilitates may have a significant influence on citizen participation in Tucson's Model Cities program. It is expected that the character and independence of resident activity are greatly influenced by the organizational structure and the prevailing philosophy of the program.
CHAPTER 5

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN TUCSON

The characteristics of participation to be analyzed in this chapter are: [1] the breadth of participation, [2] the representativeness of participants, and [3] the "stance" of participants. These concepts, defined subsequently, are analyzed with the aid of survey findings and Model Cities' records.

The Breadth of Participation

The characteristic of participation currently most easily measured is referred to here as "breadth". Breadth of participation is measured at two points by counting the people who become involved in the activities of the resident participation structure. One measurement point is at the level where participation should be most widespread - at the Unit or neighborhood level - whereas the other point refers to the leadership level.\(^1\)

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1. In one case it is asked how many residents participate in the open, well-advertised Unit meetings. In the other, it is asked how many residents are visibly influential at the policy-making level.
Citizen participation in Tucson's Model Cities program is expected to be limited. Participation in governmental affairs is not generally widespread even among the middle class. Therefore, the probability of the poor becoming widely involved is unlikely. Obstacles to the effective organization of the poor include: the characteristics of the poor [apathy, alienation, lack of resources and experience in organized groups]; the nature of the organizers [their sponsorship, their ideologies, their ability or inability to win trust], and the kind of outcomes involved [the possibility of gaining power, and the type and immediacy of expected outcomes].

The typical Model Neighborhood resident is poor and obstacles stemming from the characteristics of the poor are likely to exist. While the organizers in this case have been, for the most part, indigenous and presumably able to inspire trust, their ideologies, like those of

2. For instance, a Survey Research Center study has shown that only 23.7 percent of a sample representative of the general population had ever done anything to influence a governmental decision. Cited in Robert Carr, Marver Bernstein, Walter Murphy and Michael Danielson [eds.] Essentials of American Democracy [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971].

their sponsoring organization, have been traditional if ranked on the aforementioned spectrum.4

The outcomes of participation may be influenced by local organizational structure and philosophy. In Tucson the structure is such that even when residents acquire access to decision-makers, the probability of their aggregating power to induce change is low. And, a program stressing the "competent program" is likely to emphasize planning at the expense of immediate results. As Altshuler suggests, "the sense of participation varies with the immediacy of linkage between activity and decision."5 For all of these reasons local participation is expected to be low.

The actual number of citizens involved in the Tucson Model Cities program is quite small. Participation rates are especially low at the Unit or "grass roots" level. Records of attendance at Unit meetings have been irregularly maintained, but those available from October 1970

4. Of six aide-respondents, three felt the primary purpose of citizen participation was to elicit definitions of needs to the staff. Another two thought it was educative and one thought it was to organize residents for action. It is assumed that ideologies which stress the role of the resident as clients of service agencies will be less likely to stir interest in citizen participation than those which emphasize the role of residents as potential agents of social action.

5. Altshuler, Community Control, p. 126.
to March 1971 reveal an average attendance of 47. The average Unit population is 4000, and Unit meetings are open and well-advertised.

Participation in the Model Cities program varies significantly among neighborhoods. The smallest of the six Units, for instance, has an average attendance of 73, whereas the largest averages a scant 27. A great deal of this difference was attributed by those interviewed to the personality and efforts of aides charged with organizing the two Units. Remaining variance is believed a function of differences in the characteristics of the Units.

Not only is participation low at the Unit level, but the number of participants actively involved in the policy-making process in the Model Neighborhood Council is small. Attendance at Task Force and Council meetings - drawn from a large group of delegates and alternates and rewarded by stipend - is good. But, the number of people actively participating in open meetings is low.

6. This figure was obtained simply by averaging the number of people signing attendance sheets at Unit meetings for which records were kept. The average for each Unit was calculated for the period from October 1970 through March 1971. The means were then averaged. Since the attendance records include guests as well as residents the figure is a generous estimate of resident turnout.

7. Information on Unit characteristics was not available at the time that the study was made.

8. Attendance records show that quorums are always achieved at MNC meetings. Task Forces have mixed success in drawing attendance. The active Task Forces generally draw at least one delegate per Unit.
A count of "movers" mentioned in the minutes of the Model Neighborhood Council from its inception to early 1971 revealed only seven highly active participants. Three of these - the most "militant" members of the original Council - dropped out by the summer of 1970, leaving only four movers, all Unit chairmen.  

The limited involvement of most resident participants can be attributed, in part, to their lack of organizational sophistication. Most residents are unaccustomed to participating in large groups. This disinclination to participate actively may also be related to the feeling expressed by residents of not knowing enough. Clearly, no matter how diligent staff efforts might be, the complexities of planning are such that many novices feel inadequate.  

The imbalance in participation also may result from an imbalance of power between Unit chairmen and their delegations. For the most part the same Unit chairmen have headed their delegations since the early days of the program.  

9. Movers are defined as those who were mentioned more than twice, excluding mention for the seconding of a motion.  

10. This seems to have begun to change since the research period. Although Unit chairmen still dominate, active participation has increased.  

11. Although delegates may go to aides for explanation of the agenda, and although information packets are distributed before meetings, the most frequent comment on the returned resident questionnaires was that residents needed more information.
They are granted, moreover, substantial influence by the structure of the organization.

Unit chairmen rotate as Model Neighborhood Council chairman and possess authority over programs conducted by Unit councils. Most chairmen have served regularly on the agenda-setting executive committee. More importantly they often serve on the committee which screens applicants for all Model Cities jobs. In addition, because they are Unit spokesmen with relative permanence in office, they are called upon repeatedly by the staff for input.

Over the two years of the program's life, Unit chairmen have become an "establishment". Given the non-aggressive style of their delegations [see this chapter], and the information gap between chairmen and other residents, it is hardly surprising that Unit chairmen dominance on the floor is unchallenged.

It is difficult to say how many residents of the Model Neighborhood have participated in the Model Cities program since its inception. Clearly there is a loyal group which has turned out for meeting after meeting from the organizational through the operational stages of the program. The number of people attending the grassroots meetings, however, is small. Moreover, the number of residents taking an overt leadership role in the process during the research period was very limited. A handful of leaders
appears to voice resident sentiment to other participants in the process.

The Representativeness of Participants

OEO program experience demonstrates that the representatives of the poor are often not representative of the poor. They are not the "hard core" poor at whom the program is aimed, but rather better educated, upwardly-mobile individuals often highly involved in ethnic affairs.\(^\text{12}\)

Representativeness, like breadth is a characteristic of participation. Paul Peterson extends the notion of representativeness in moving beyond the social characteristics of the representative. In a study of three Community Action programs he identified four types of representation: descriptive, formal, substantive and interest.\(^\text{13}\) Both descriptive and formal representation will be considered in this study.\(^\text{14}\)

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14. Substantive and interest representation are not discussed because the data necessary to describe them have not been collected. However, some notion of the impact of representatives and of their orientation may be inferred from later sections.
In most OEO programs, what Peterson calls descriptive representation—the relationship between the social and economic characteristics of the represented and the representative—has been low. Upwardly mobile, previously-organized, ethnic leaders have used Community Action Programs to gain power and/or a voice in community affairs. Their interest, however, would likely dwindle with the nature of the stakes.

In Tucson, a city hall dominated organizational structure, and a prevailing philosophy which stresses consensus and cooperation within the existing system, is likely to make these stakes low. The amount of influence which can be aggregated and applied by residents through the Model Cities program may be too small to attract aggressive leadership. Thus the organizational structure of the program and its concomitant philosophy indicate that its participants will not be the aggressive, successful, upwardly mobile "cream" which has emerged in some Community Action Programs. Rather, they will be descriptively representative.

While participants may be descriptively representative, it cannot be presumed that they will be particularly representative formally. The degree of formal representation is assessed in noting the method of selection of the representatives. The more directly and widely chosen the more formally representative. Some degree of

formal representation results in the Tucson program from the direct election of delegates. However, the evidence on breadth of participation suggests that few people turn out for elections.

Data to support the hypothesis that Tucson's Model Cities program maximizes descriptive representation and minimizes formal representation is drawn from a survey conducted among resident delegates to the Model Neighborhood Council, and from records of election turnout. Unfortunately the rate of return on the questionnaire was low and the records on election turnout were poor. In addition, current data describing residents of the Model Neighborhood are not extensive.

Although relevant data are sketchy, the evidence suggests that representatives in the Tucson program are not as representative descriptively as hypothesized. The leaders of the Model Neighborhood Council in particular appear to match Kramer's description of the well-educated, upwardly mobile, ethnically-concerned leaders in Bay area poverty groups. 16

The educational level of MNC delegates responding to the questionnaire was somewhat higher than all residents in the Model Neighborhood in 1960. Only 32 percent of

16. Some of this difference may be a result of returnee bias. However, some undoubtedly reflects a higher educational achievement among delegates.
those completing the questionnaire did not graduate from high school, whereas 55.3 percent of the 1960 population did not complete the eighth grade.

The income level of representatives appeared to be lower than that of residents in general. Sixty percent of those completing the questionnaire reported incomes below $4000, while 36.9 percent of the area's residents had incomes below $3000 in 1960.\footnote{Since the poverty line, as defined by OEO, has moved from $3000 to almost $4000 in this decade, the figures can probably be compared.} On the other hand, 25 percent of the delegates had incomes over $7000.

An ethnic comparison between this study's crude estimates and 1960 Census figures shows that blacks are slightly over-represented in the Council at the expense of Mexican-Americans. Approximately 58 percent of the representatives to the Model Neighborhood Council had Spanish surnames in the spring of 1971, and some 28 percent were nonwhite. However, the 1960 census reports 74 percent of the residents as having a Spanish surname, and but 17 percent as black.

Other socio-economic characteristics reveal that fifty-five percent of the representatives are women; a surprising 36 percent of the delegates are over 55,\footnote{The high proportion of older delegates may explain the surprising combination of high education and low income.} and one half of those responding to the relevant question belong to...
organizations outside the Model Cities structure but only a few of these belong to organizations which are ethnically oriented.¹⁹

A vague picture of descriptive representation emerges from the figures. Representatives seem to rank higher in education than their constituents, but not in income. Moreover, they do not appear to be ethnically oriented in organizational affiliation. Their ages would exclude many of them from the upwardly mobile group.

The established leaders — Unit chairmen — on the other hand definitely appear more successful than the typical resident. Additionally, four of the six chairmen seem strongly conscious of ethnicity and all but one had organizational affiliations before joining Model Cities. While delegates in general are largely representative except in education, the leaders are less descriptively representative than hypothesized.

The degree of formal representation is more easily measured than that of descriptive representation. Although Peterson claims elected representatives are more formally representative than appointed representatives,²⁰ variations

¹⁹. Only fourteen of the respondents replied to the question on organizational affiliation. [It is likely that most of those who did not complete the question are not organizationally affiliated]. Of the fourteen who responded eight said they were affiliated. Of these three listed organizations which are ethnically oriented.

may exist within classifications. And in the Tucson Model Cities program the active electorate is quite small.

According to the Model Cities newspaper, at least one election was postponed for lack of adequate participation [40-50 persons should be present the paper declared], and the average attendance at elective meetings for which reports were found was approximately 35. Thus less than one percent of Model Neighborhood residents typically participate in the election of delegates. In contrast, in the early stages of the Model Cities program, turnouts in most cities averaged 7 to 11 percent and four ranged from 24 to 40 percent.\(^{21}\)

The Stance of Resident Participants

A more interesting aspect of the character of citizen participation than the numbers of people involved is the attitudes of these people toward their roles as citizen participants. How do resident representatives view the Model Cities program and particularly their role in it? What do they believe to be the objectives of a citizen participation program? How do they regard the independence

\(^{21}\) Altshuler, Community Control, p. 139. It is also noted that in the Community Action Program's first year turnouts of 2 and 3 percent were common. Moynihan similarly reports turnouts ranging from .7 percent to 5 percent in major cities. The bases for these figures are unknown. Tucson's average turnout is estimated at less than one percent of the population or almost 2 percent of the population over 18. It is certainly comparable to, and perhaps slightly less than turnout in the poverty program.
of their own organizations and conflict within existing institutions? All of these attitudes toward citizen participation can be considered together and referred to as stance.

In the earlier discussion of conceptions of citizen participation a rough spectrum was suggested along which degrees of "militance" could be measured. Four notions of the role and purpose of citizen participation were defined in terms of program orientation: provision of services, opportunity, community development, and social action. Each point along the continuum embodies greater degrees of power to the poor, combined with a more probable threat to the established process. The "militant" or social action stance, therefore, not only would delegate substantial power to the residents, but would view the manifestations of conflict and controversy as inevitable.

In Tucson where structural arrangements clearly delimit resident influence, and where programmatic emphasis is on producing a workable, funded operation within existing systems rather than on challenging established patterns, it is hypothesized that the stance of the resident, in terms of the above spectrum, is non-militant. In other words resident participants will define their roles and objectives more in terms of a traditional, service-oriented

22. See Chapter 3.
conception of citizen participation than in terms of a social-action frame.

One question asked of residents concerned their views of the citizen participation component of Model Cities. In specifying what they believed to be the most important objectives of citizen participation residents answered as indicated in Table 2.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizen Participation Objectives</th>
<th>First Priority</th>
<th>Second Priority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition of needs, building trust</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building skills</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting political awareness, leadership</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing for action</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number responding</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. What do you feel are the goals of the Citizen Participation component of the Model Cities program. [a] to organize citizens so they can take their needs to City Hall and can effectively press City Hall to respond to them; [b] to familiarize citizens with Agencies which affect their lives and to give them skill and confidence in working with these Agencies; [c] to build political awareness in the Model Neighborhood so that the residents will participate more knowledgeably; [d] to get residents' definitions of the needs of the Model Neighborhood; [e] to build trust among the residents and to promote the use of programs offered, and [f] to identify and develop local leadership.

24. In most cases the number of residents answering a particular question is less than the number responding to the questionnaire. In many cases this is because choices were marked but not ranked and thus could not be used. In other cases certain questions were simply not answered.
Table 2 contains a continuum moving from a traditional, service orientation to a militant, social-action orientation. Resident participants, it is apparent, define objectives more in terms of provision of services [and in the case of second priority, in terms of opportunity], than in terms of social action.

The same sort of spectrum might be set against the residents' views of their tasks in Model Cities processes. The least militant view sees the resident role in terms of the on-going planning process, while more militant views would emphasize the use of residents in staffing and organizing. In answering a question concerning their role, 53 percent of the residents said their most important role was to participate in planning, while 20 percent said it was to organize residents to press for action [see Table 3]. In answering another question [Table 4], 50 percent suggested that their role in planning was to get resident ideas to staff specialists, while only 25 percent thought residents should present their own plans. Thus most resident participants see their role as one of a client providing information to professional planners.

Interestingly, 36 percent of respondents - including some who gave participation in planning first priority - gave organizing for action as a second choice. This group

25. Whether this spectrum was assumed by respondents when they answered the question is, of course, open to question.
### Table 3

**Resident Tasks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resident Tasks</th>
<th>First Priority</th>
<th>Second Priority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participating in planning and evaluation</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing for action</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with agencies</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participating in hiring</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing for self-help</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number responding</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4

**Resident Role in Planning**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The residents' part in the planning process is:</th>
<th>First Priority</th>
<th>Second Priority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bringing ideas about neighborhood needs to the staff</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing up plans and designing programs using staff as consultants</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submitting projects for agency and staff consideration</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperating with agencies and staff in planning</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number responding</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
when added to the 20 percent who gave first priority to action would indicate that there is a sizeable group among residents who would organize around some sort of social-action issue.

A fourth question asked residents whether their role in the Model Cities program should remain the same, be made larger, or be made more paramount [see Table 5]. Only 9 percent said that it should remain the same while 65 percent supported a larger role and 26 percent sought resident control. The original proposition attributing a rather moderate position on social power to residents may be upheld by the fact that the great majority of them do not ask for control; nevertheless, the significant minority who do make the evidence less clear.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Resident Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resident Participants Should Have:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A smaller role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A larger role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete and final say</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number responding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 reveals information on the residents' view of conflict. As suggested earlier, a social-action orientation welcomes conflict, while traditional philosophies more often reject it. In this study 58 percent of the
resident respondents thought that conflict was undesirable while 23 percent thought it unimportant and only 19 percent considered it useful. [In contrast, among the more sophisticated staff 67 percent thought conflict was useful.]

Table 6
Conflict Between Residents and City Hall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Is:</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undesirable</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undesirable but not too important</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither desirable or undesirable</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number responding</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The questionnaire returns support the notion that resident participants do not aspire to a dominant, or a conflict-producing role; more often they see themselves as client-consultants. On the other hand, a significant number [approximately 20 percent] of resident respondents feel, despite structural arrangements and prevailing programmatic emphasis, that they should have a more dominant, action-oriented role.

One area of interest in investigating resident philosophy is the respondent's feeling of impact. While not directly related to "militance", the participant's confidence in his personal impact is an essential part of his stance. A participant who is confident that his views can be made effective is much more likely to be active and even
combative than one who is not so assured. In this study, 46 percent of the respondents felt they had made some impact on programs while 50 percent did not know. Only 33 percent felt that the impact they had was as great as they hoped.

Table 7
Perception of Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you feel you have had an impact on the program?</th>
<th>Has the impact been as large as you had hoped?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>Don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 24</td>
<td>Number 24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of the limited number of questionnaires returned and the possibility that responses were interpreted differently by the author and the respondents, the "stance" of resident participants should be examined from another perspective. Some evidence concerning the attitudes of participants, therefore, has been drawn from the records of the Model Neighborhood Council.

Evidence on "stance" may be inferred from the list of notable dropouts. Of seven individuals labeled earlier as "movers", three were regarded as "radicals". Two of the three were on the original Policy Board, and all three virtually have dropped out of the Model Cities process.

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26. See the continuum drawn in Chapter 3.
The Neighborhood Coordinator has suggested that these three were not only suspicious of the "system", but the staff. One of them, described by the Coordinator as an "idealist", warned that "the system will buy you."\textsuperscript{27} The other two actually used a Training and Technical Assistance [T and TA] grant, extended by OEO, to try to establish a confrontation model. This model, and its proponents, apparently were rejected by the Model Neighborhood Council in their vote not to accept a new T and TA grant. The two "movers" drifted away soon afterward, and with them, apparently, the confrontation philosophy.

The confrontation model experience marked one of the two more lively periods in resident activity. The only other issue generating as much interest, during the same time, was a freeway issue.\textsuperscript{28} Stirred, it would appear, by radicals and the T and TA funded newspaper, a substantial number of Model Neighborhood residents turned out to protest a planned freeway cutting through the area. On the residents' insistence an objection to the freeway plan was

\textsuperscript{27} Fred Acosta, Interview held in Tucson, March 10, 1971.

\textsuperscript{28} Another potentially heated issue concerning a golf course in the Model Neighborhood arose within the larger community later that year. It was carefully circumnavigated by the Model Cities organization.
included [under the heading "resident perceptions"] in the Comprehensive Demonstration Plan.

During the period in which these two issues crystallized the proper methods and goals of citizen participation were unsettled. Over the spring and summer of 1970, however, a prevailing philosophy apparently solidified. This philosophy embraced more the moderate, programmatic "encounter" model than the militant "confrontation" model.\textsuperscript{29}

Mixed evidence on the "stance" of citizen participants is found in resident attitudes toward staff directions. The residents interviewed [with one notable exception] agreed that staff direction was essential to the success of the program. On the other hand, several of the residents insisted that the program is "the resident's program". Some animosity against staff specialists flared in one or two Model Neighborhood Council meetings attended by the author. Similarly, a staff workshop which resident leaders attended, was reported to have turned into a rather acrimonious session at which resident complaints against staff were aired.\textsuperscript{30}

Some conflict exists although its significance is obscured by the fact that to some extent ranks are closed in the presence of outsiders. The resentment seems largely

\textsuperscript{29} This distinction was suggested by Fred Acosta, Neighborhood Coordinator, suggesting "encounter" connoted a much less aggressive stance than "confrontation". Interview March 10, 1971, Tucson.

\textsuperscript{30} The Neighborhood Coordinator also has reported resentment from the residents toward the attitudes of specialists.
directed at what is perceived as a patronizing attitude of certain planning specialists. The type of resident mistrust which Sundquist and Kramer found common may have surfaced here. On the other hand, neither the Director who supports the notion that citizen participation must be staff directed – nor the Neighborhood Coordinator are resented.

Summary

Participation in the Tucson Model Cities program is limited. Although the average Unit population is 4000, only about forty-five people turn out for a normal Unit meeting. The typical representative to the Model Neighborhood Council is chosen by about one percent of the residents. Moreover, the number of representatives actively participating at higher levels of organization comprise a handful of men and women largely dissimilar from the average Model Neighborhood resident. While all of this may be lamentable, none is too surprising in the light of earlier experience in the war on poverty.

The stance of resident participants is a moderate one. Generally they neither share a "militant" view of


32. It is surmised that this is largely because of their ability to avoid giving the impression that as professionals they are different from, or superior to, the residents.
citizen participation, nor have great confidence in their efficacy. Nevertheless, residents have the kind of respect for themselves and their position which impels them to resent openly overt patronization. In addition, a small number of them perceive social action as important.
CHAPTER 6
THE INDEPENDENCE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE TUCSON MODEL CITIES PROGRAM

It is difficult to assess the amount of independence achieved by resident organizations. This paper cannot provide a definitive assessment of their independence. It will examine, however, some evidence relevant to the question.

It is hypothesized that an organizational structure wherein the Mayor and Council are the City Demonstration Agency and where the only staff available to residents is attached to the Mayor and Council should produce dependent participants. That is, the activities and decisions of resident organizations will be influenced, if not controlled, by people outside these organizations.

Outside direction of citizen participation is not essential to the structure set forth. Even when the Mayor and Council make final decisions, residents not only can differ with them but protest loudly. However, it is more probable that the underlying philosophy of such a structure - the emphasis on working within the system, on the importance of reaching agreement, on the desirability of a highly funded, smoothly-working program - will make such disagreement unlikely.
Two kinds of evidence pertaining to two possible aspects of independence will be considered. One of these aspects is the independence of, or incongruence of resident attitudes. The other concerns the existence of constraints upon resident activities.

Congruence in attitudes among resident and other participants, in itself, does not indicate that control of, or significant influence upon, residents exists. On the one hand, an evident similarity in attitudes may be imposed by those who direct the residents. On the other hand, residents may simply agree with "establishment" participants.

In the latter case, to impute outside direction in instances where residents behave in accordance with the wishes of others, would be false. Therefore, a second aspect of independence must be discussed. This aspect is the existence of constraints on resident activities. Is the behavior of resident organizations limited or directed by other participants in the program? A discussion of this question will follow a consideration of attitudes.

**Congruence of Attitudes**

Before proceeding with the analysis of the presence or absence of attitudinal congruence among participants in the Tucson Model Cities program, degrees of
non-attitudinal difference should be noted. Table 8 provides two background characteristics of program participants.

Table 8

Selected Characteristics of Residents and Other Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Agency Employee</th>
<th>Professional Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model neighborhood resident in the past</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model neighborhood resident now</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 12 years</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College graduate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Table 8 it is obvious that there are at least two non-attitudinal differences between resident and "establishment" participants. Very few professionals have lived in the Model Neighborhood and educational differences are large. Table 9 indicates that at least one general attitudinal difference exists as well. 1 Residents are significantly more likely to feel alienated from the political

1. The alienation scale is based on a series of questions probing the respondent's perception, his relations to governmental processes and institutions. The group efficacy scale is based on a question inquiring into the ways in which the respondent feels that groups can influence policy decisions.
system than other participants. Furthermore, some evidence of resentment toward professional staff members has been suggested, and a similar distrust of the Mayor and Council is indicated in questionnaire response.

Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Agency Employees</th>
<th>Professional Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-alienation</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group efficacy</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In *Making Federalism Work*, Sundquist argues that differences in the attitudes and priorities of residents and other participants arise from the types of differences suggested in Table 2. He suggests that "Model Neighborhood Organizations are bound to bring to the surface the abeyant antagonism between slum dwellers and the power structure." Indeed, it seems apparent that some attitudinal differences and antagonisms will arise from the social, economic and cultural gaps separating participants.

Although attitudinal differences would thus appear to be natural, theoretical notions suggest the possibility of congruence. These notions, however, are based on the

2. On the other hand, they score almost identically with other groups on a scale measuring belief in group efficacy. This is probably an indication of their faith in Model Cities.

assumption of some influence from outside the naturally variant group.

Co-optation, for instance, might minimize differences in attitude between resident and non-resident. Residents views may change as they are incorporated into, and attempt to solidify positions within, the power structure. This change is more likely to occur in a program in which the relevant power structure has a moderate or conservative outlook. Similarly, congruities in attitude might exist because the prevailing philosophy welcomes and makes comfortable a certain type of participant.

Both co-optation and pre-selection, if they exist, can act as limitations on the independence of resident activity. No imputation of control or non-control of activity, however, will be drawn from the presence or absence of attitude congruence.4

The attitudes of residents participating on the Model Neighborhood Council have been discussed and found to be moderate when placed on a "militance" continuum.5 Tables 10-14 indicate that resident views are similar to

4. The best evidence of control would lie in observations of the application of influence. The author has not been in a position to observe directly such applications but will discuss the possibility of their existence in the next section.

5. See Chapter 5.
Table 10

Goals of Citizen Participation\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Residents(^b)</th>
<th>Staff(^c)</th>
<th>Study Group Council(^d)</th>
<th>Mayor/Council(^e)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To define needs for the staff</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To increase political awareness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To organize residents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve resident skills</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To build trust</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{x^2 f}\) 4.4 5.2 2.6

Number responding 19 15 12 4

\(^a\)Building leadership has been dropped as less than 4 percent chose this option. This omission has been made to enhance the validity of the chi-square statistic by removing empty cells.

\(^b\)One resident supplied his own answer.

\(^c\)Two staff members supplied their own answer.

\(^d\)Three SGC members supplied their own answer.

\(^e\)One Council member supplied his own answer.

\(^f\)The chi-square statistic at the foot of the column is an indication of the significance if the difference between the group represented in that column and the residents. The chi-square which indicates significance at the 5 percent level for this table is 9.49.

The validity of the chi-square is questionable because of the small number of respondents in many cells. Dixon and Massey suggest that for the statistic to be meaningful, expected frequencies must be greater than zero, and at least 20 percent of the actual frequencies must be greater than 5. The latter requirement does not exist uniformly in this study because of small sample size. Where possible tables have been collapsed to increase cell frequency. However, most tables are deficient and the statistic must be regarded, at best, a rough approximation. Wilfrid Dixon and Frank Massey, Jr., Introduction to Statistical Analysis, 3rd ed., [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969], p. 238.
those of "establishment" participants. In only one case did the chi-square reveal a meaningful difference between resident and non-resident views on the objectives and tasks of citizen participation.

It is apparent that the distributions in Table 10 are generally similar. Most respondents thought that the definition of needs was the most important goal of citizen participation, although substantial minorities of staff and agency representatives saw increasing political awareness as an objective. Interestingly, residents rejected this idea, perhaps because of a lack of faith in the political system.

Tables 11-13 pertain to the nature, size and eventual role of residents in policy-making. A majority of respondents in all groups thought the role of the resident organizations was to participate in planning, rather than to organize residents.

Responses concerning the post-Model Cities role of residents in local policy-making, on the other hand, were more varied. There is some difference, although again it is not significant, in perceptions of eventual role. Agency representatives and Councilmen, it can be seen, were not enthusiastic about residents serving on governing boards, and thought residents could better participate in decision-making in other ways. The CDA professional staff, on the other hand, largely agreed with residents.
Table 11
Role of Resident Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Staff (Prof.)</th>
<th>Agency Reps.</th>
<th>Mayor/Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participate in planning</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in hiring</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organize Residents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Evaluation and Working with Agencies have been dropped in calculating $X^2$ as less than 4 percent selected these.

*b* The $X^2$ which is significant at the 5 percent level for two degrees of freedom is 5.99.

Table 12
Eventual Role of Residents in Local Policy-Making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eventual Role</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Staff (Prof.)</th>
<th>Agency Reps.</th>
<th>Mayor/Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To serve on governing</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To react as clients</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To participate as</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pressure groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To advise as employees</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Advisory Boards has been dropped in calculating $X^2$ as only 5 percent chose this answer.

*b* Three residents supplied their own answers.

*c* The $X^2$ which is significant at the 5 percent level for three degrees of freedom is 7.81.

Table 13
Size of Resident Role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role should be</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Staff (Prof.)</th>
<th>Agency Reps.</th>
<th>Mayor/Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larger</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Smaller was dropped as none selected this response.

*b* One of each group supplied his own answer.

*c* The $X^2$ which is significant at the 5 percent level for two degrees of freedom is 5.99.
The tables also reveal that many respondents thought the resident role in the Model Cities program should be larger. The Study Group Council, however, deviated significantly from residents on the size of role; several members thought it should remain the same and none believed it should be dominant.

Only residents demonstrated a substantial proportion [26 percent] in favor of giving residents final authority. The fact that this 26 percent existed—although the differences in distribution are not significant—is interesting in itself. It was hypothesized that the view of citizen participation which this choice represents would be discouraged by the organizational structure of the local program. 6

Also interesting is the fact that most "establishment" participants thought conflict useful, while residents felt it undesirable [again, however, the differences are not great]. Earlier it was suggested that approval of conflict would accompany a "militant" view of citizen participation, and that this view was most likely to be held by residents. Table 14 reveals the opposite. That is, more residents feel conflict undesirable than useful, whereas over 50 percent of the professional staff regard conflict as functional. Responses to other questions, however, do not suggest that "establishment" participants are "militant".

Instead it would seem that they are simply articulating the social science position which nowadays stresses the positive aspects of conflict.

Table 14
Perceptions of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict is</th>
<th>Residents (Prof.)</th>
<th>Agency Reps.</th>
<th>Mayor/ Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Useful</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undesirable</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square(^a)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)The \(X^2\) which is significant at the 5 percent level for two degrees of freedom is 5.99.

Some comparisons of attitudes are available only for pairs of participant types. These involve perceptions held by various groups of one another's abilities and sympathies. Table 15 presents the findings. The table reveals that, except for some resident suspicion of the Mayor and Council, the various participant groups seem quite satisfied with one another.\(^7\)

Non-resident and resident attitudes, as expected, are quite moderate. Moreover, there are no large differences in viewpoints among groups. Little emphasis is placed on the importance of organizing residents for action, whereas the contribution of ideas to the planning process is viewed as the major avenue for resident impact. Most Model City participants thought the resident role should be larger.

\(^7\) See Chapter 5.
Table 15
Participant Attitudes Toward One Another

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Staff (Prof.)</th>
<th>Agency Reps.</th>
<th>Mayor/Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff Support of Citizen Participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exists</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not exist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number responding</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Representatives are:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely helpful</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helpful</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than helpful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number responding</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident Impact on Agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number responding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor/Council are Sympathetic to Participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number responding</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Participation has Helped the City</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number responding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
but not dominant. Many staff members as well as residents felt that citizens would be competent to serve on agency governing boards in a few years. Advisory boards, which often denote tokenism, were solidly rejected as points for resident influence. These findings clearly demonstrate that the attitudes of resident and "establishment" participants toward citizen participation are similar and moderate.

Some Speculations on the Application of Influence

When participating groups within an organization share the same kinds of attitudes, the application of influence upon one another becomes increasingly less necessary. However, when dissenting resident participants - those who stress organizing for action and who believe residents should have program control - have some influence, they must be prodded occasionally. Also the normal differences of opinion, despite overall agreement, may make necessary some direction if resident decisions are to be satisfactory.

In the Tucson Model Cities program several groups are in a position to apply influence over resident participation. These include agency representatives, the Mayor and Council, and the CDA staff. Any one of the three might, on occasion, wish to influence the decisions of resident organizations.

Agency Representatives

In the present organizational structure agency representatives are not in a position to exert much influence
on resident behavior and decisions. For one, the central deliberating bodies of the two groups [e.g., the Study Group Council and the Model Neighborhood Council] meet separately on most occasions leaving little opportunity for the patronization and professional domination which might be expected in face-to-face encounters. For another, residents have numerical majorities both in the Conference Committee, if disagreement should be taken there for settlement, and in joint sessions.

Most importantly agency representatives do not appear greatly interested in acting on policy within the organization. In Tucson's current implementation phase, agencies, of necessity, must be involved in the Model Cities process. Nevertheless, although agency representatives may work closely with CDA staff, they do not appear too eager to impose their will at the level of resident participation. Nor do they appear to be particularly enthusiastic about participation on the Study Group Council.

8. Task Forces, on the other hand, are combined groups and it is true that agency ideas may prevail here. However, the Model Neighborhood Council must accept these ideas.


10. At the one joint meeting of residents and agency representatives which the author attended, the residents were quite aggressive and clearly dominated the proceedings. It was reported to the author by a CDA staff member, and by a resident present at the meeting, that agency representatives usually let the residents "have their way".
The Mayor and Council

The relationship between the Mayor and Council and residents is more complicated. There is no question as to superiority, for all legal authority rests with the Mayor and Council. Nevertheless, what Melvin Mogolof calls the "adversary relationship", in which residents and city hall each have the right to block one another, could exist. Roland Warren also has suggested that this veto power, and the ability of residents to extract concessions from city hall in response to hard pressed demands, are important indications of citizen independence.\(^{12}\)

As we have seen earlier, local resident participants are not inclined to make this type of demand.\(^{13}\) Their stance, their agreement with other participants, and the consensual nature of the program all run counter to such an approach. Residents are clearly not given veto power except through their participation in public elections. Nonetheless, neither have the Mayor and Council pressed major

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13. See Chapter 5.
demands on the residents. They do occasionally reject resident requests largely on the ground of fiscal necessity.\textsuperscript{14}

The general receptivity of the Mayor and Council to resident views may be attributed to a kind of "ideological majority" on the Council.\textsuperscript{15} And, when measured against costs, the benefits accruing to the city from the program are such that an "ideological majority" is well justified.\textsuperscript{16}

The "ideological majority" supports most programs coming to it through the Model Cities planning process. The benefits derived from these programs may account for the infrequent overt pressure applied by the Council to the resident organizations. Another reason for this state of affairs is that the Mayor and Council, like agency representatives, are not totally involved in the Model Cities process.

\textsuperscript{14} Policy Board minutes reveal no hard fought public battles on controversial issues, nor do minutes of the joint meetings of the Policy Board and the Mayor and Council. One controversial issue was pressed before the Policy Board was implemented. That issue seems to have faded temporarily rather than ending in a decision.

\textsuperscript{15} This term was suggested by Ruben Mendez, administrative assistant to the Neighborhood Coordinator. It indicates simply that a majority of the Council, at present, supports the local Model Cities concept.

\textsuperscript{16} The cost to the city of the Model Cities program is marginal. The total local contribution in fiscal 1970 was $564,000 of which $483,000 was in kind. Local matching funds equaled 18% of the Model Cities grant, while federal matching funds were 315%. Thus, the city draws, at very little cost, $12,968,000 which may be used to assuage the discontent of a potentially troublesome portion of the population. City of Tucson, Department of Community Development, Model Cities Division, Reallocation and Reprogramming: Submission Number 1 [Tucson, February, 1971], p. 34.
The program is but one of their many concerns and their contact with residents has been minimal. Moreover, the Mayor and Council are unlikely to have the time or the information necessary to attempt to exert much influence on resident behavior. Therefore, the application of influence, if there by any, must be exercised by the CDA staff.

The CDA Staff

The CDA staff first organized the residents and, in doing so, brought to prominence many resident leaders. CDA staff trains the resident and provides him the technical skill necessary to participate in planning and evaluation. Furthermore, CDA staff direct the meetings of the Task Forces, advising them on budget necessities, feasibility, and the intricacies of comprehensive planning, all of which turn Task Force recommendations into workable programs. The staff in many instances acts as a communications link between the residents and the Mayor and Council. Only the staff is cognizant of the legal restrictions, budget requirements, agency attitudes, and the myriad other details which must be understood before a plan can be drawn up and implemented.

The Model Cities emphasis on planning clearly gives the staff many special resources. Technical skills and programming expertise are at a premium. Residents, without good technical assistance, are unable to participate
except by recommending priorities. Potential participants, more interested in action than an abstract planning process, often drift away leaving decisions to a smaller group.

From these observations it is clear that the staff is in a position to exert considerable influence on the decision-making activities and outputs of the resident planning process. However, the potential for staff influence on outputs from the Model Cities decision-making structure does not indicate in itself a restriction of the independence of resident organizations. A discussion of potential influence does suggest, however, at least three ways in which restrictions might be imposed.

The most important restriction would be through the limiting of technical information available to residents. Unless such information is objective, exhaustive, available on request, and comprehensible to the layman, resident organizations cannot participate with complete independence in the planning process.

Another way in which the independence of resident organizations may be affected is by giving the staff the role of communications link between residents and other participants. The local staff, for instance, to a much greater

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degree than other participants, perceive conflict between residents and the Mayor and Council [see Table 16]. Moreover, a solid majority of the staff feels that in cases of conflict it is their duty to effect a compromise. Under such circumstances, the moderation of resident views likely to be effected in the transmission process could easily constrict resident expression.

Table 16

Perceptions of Resident-City Hall Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict:</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Staff (Prof.)</th>
<th>Mayor/Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exists</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not exist</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third constriction of resident independence might be associated with an emphasis on efficiency and speed in the planning process. Nondirected, democratic procedures are not amenable to such efficiency and, therefore, could be compromised.

This study will not examine each of these avenues for potential influence, but instead explores some readily observable evidence relevant to the discussion.

Staff attitudes expressed in the questionnaire, while not favoring the "militant stance", did respect and support the citizen participation structure. For instance, 75 percent of the staff members thought citizens should have a larger role in planning and evaluation [see Table 13].
Moreover, 82 percent of the staff believed that their fellow staff members fully supported citizen participation [see Table 15]. Nevertheless, the general feeling that all must cooperate for the good of the program, that some staff direction of effort is essential for competent planning submissions, and that publicity and internal wrangling are to be avoided tends to counter these expressions.

Resident independence of central staff direction is suggested by the ability of residents to obtain training and technical assistance from sources other than CDA staff. Apparently, funding to engage a separate planning staff is not available to residents of the local Model Neighborhood. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, a Training and Technical Assistance [T and TA] Program, funded by OEO, was dropped after being evaluated critically by a University of Arizona sociologist. Residents were left, therefore, with little independent, resident-directed, technical assistance.

The minutes of Model Neighborhood Council meetings also reveal evidence about resident independence.

19. Roland Warren suggests that one indication of the growth of resident strength is "the amount of funding available to various Model Neighborhood boards to engage planning staff". Warren, "Model Cities First Round," p. 247.

20. The evaluation team was headed by Gary Buck. Evaluation was made in May 1970. It is difficult to determine whether the militant philosophy underlying the grant, or the poor administration of it by a succession of directors, was the more important factor in its cancellation.
Initially these meetings were quite openly directed by the staff. In a short time, however, residents took charge of the meetings, calling on staff to give reports, and occasionally treating them with hostility. The Neighborhood Coordinator and the CDA Director were invited to sit with the Council and act as advisors, or arbitrators. Moreover, the Neighborhood Coordinator and his assistant seemed to have a large role in setting the agenda for meetings. Nevertheless, by the spring of 1971, residents were ostensibly in control of their meetings.

Model Neighborhood Council meetings did not provide a forum for program initiation. Not only was time wasted debating the nature of parliamentary procedures, but residents concerned themselves largely with hiring and payment, relationships with other groups, and increasingly with program review.

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21. Clearly this was a necessity in an organization pulled together from the outside, and directed toward goals which few within the organization understood.

22. Only the staff director and the citizen participation component of the staff were immune to this hostility in the spring of 1971.

23. For instance, the minutes of the second half of 1970 revealed that 18 percent of the items mentioned concerned hiring and payment, 18 percent program review, and 20 percent relations with agencies. Other matters of concern were dispersed. Although coding was not done for the spring of 1971, the program review function was clearly growing in emphasis.
The program review function of the Model Neighborhood Council has been labelled by some, including a former director of the OEO T and TA grant, as little more than rubber stamping. He and others spoke of proposals held back until the day of the meeting at which they were to be considered, and of "deals" made between staff and resident leaders.

This study's charge that meetings were dominated by a handful of residents, with others in attendance exhibiting little knowledge of the matters under discussion, has been challenged with the counter-statement that democracy is seldom built on full knowledge. During the research period resident sophistication did grow and broaden perceptibly. A few young, potential leaders began to speak out. Reportedly, the "second year action plan" met with several challenges. Unfortunately the challenges came too late to be analyzed.

The author attended a series of meetings held to determine how surplus funds from the first action year were to be reallocated. These meetings were dominated by two men, both of whom appeared to understand the intricacies of the programs submitted, while it was moot how much other participants understood.

24. Fred Acosta, March 10, 1971 interview.
25. Challenges recorded in minutes of the Model Neighborhood Council concerned resident participation in budgeting, staff participation in resident decision-making, and various program changes.
At the first Model Neighborhood Council meeting considering these proposals, voting to establish priorities was done by secret ballot. Decisions at the second meeting, held jointly with the Study Group Council, were made openly. Some complicated maneuvering was clearly present here, the object of which seemed to be to gain acceptance for two capital grants.\textsuperscript{26} The grant proposals, which appeared to some to fall within the city's sphere of responsibility, had received a mixed reception in earlier meetings. The staff director clearly supported the outcome of this maneuvering, while the sponsorship of the maneuver was unclear.

These few examples leave unanswered several questions. Obviously they emphasize the need to examine transactions other than public meetings if one is to explain the behavior which occurs there. Information on lobbying and negotiating which transpires out of the public eye is essential to the perception, understanding, and tracing of influence.

One overt incident which did reveal an area of staff influence concerned the Model Cities newspaper, \textit{Changing Tucson}. This paper was established under the auspices of the OEO T and TA grant. Its sponsors claimed that it was founded because "[t]he people have been

\textsuperscript{26} These grants comprised almost half the monies to be expended.
promised a voice in planning any decisions made about the Model Cities area. This paper is dedicated to making damn sure that promise is kept."27 Subsequently, several letters critical of the existing form of citizen participation were published, as were articles criticizing public and private agencies.

When the T and TA grant expired the newspaper came under the influence of the Citizen Participation Component. It was relabelled a newsletter and functioned to provide information on Model Cities programs. Strict editorial supervision was technically required. However, the young editor, who believed controversy stimulated interest in Model Cities, was retained.

The censorship regulations were ignored for the first few months, but the new policy on content was maintained. In February 1971, however, a story was printed highly critical of an experimental education program [not Model Cities sponsored]. Immediately the editor was fired and letters of apology sent to the city and the school system. An elaborate editorial review policy was established calling not only for approval by a resident committee, but by two staff members. The Director maintained that the editor was "playing games" which

jeopardized the cooperation of the school district and that such foolhardy behavior could not be tolerated.²⁸ In this one case, at least, independent expression was sacrificed to the "competent program".

Summary

The hypothesis was made in Chapter 1 that the organizational structure of the Model Cities program, and in particular the shared staff, would constrain the attitudes and behavior of resident organizations. No causality has been established in this chapter, nor indeed has constraint been proven.

It was indicated in the first section of this chapter that resident attitudes toward citizen participation are quite similar to those of the professional staff, agency representatives, and the Mayor and Council. Because of the cultural, economic, and social differences separating residents from the other groups, these congruities are surprising. The best explanation for them may be influence applied by "establishment" participants upon resident organizations through cooptation and pre-selection of participants.

Less can be said concerning the conjecture that resident activities would be actively constrained the non-resident participants. Clearly the group most able to apply influence is the professional staff. The evidence presented concerning staff direction of citizen participants is both sketchy and equivocal.

Clearly resident organizations do not have the autonomy Sundquist claims necessary for a durable program. Many channels for staff influence exist, and this influence has been exerted at least once. Apparently there is widespread agreement that a good program cannot be produced without staff direction over the activities of outputs of resident participation in the planning process – and that such a program is the ultimate goal. Resident attitudes are amenable to some staff direction, although specific staff members are openly resented. Finally the evidence strongly suggests that in order to understand the complicated and subtle patterns of influence the researcher must go beyond the public situations surveyed here.
CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It was suggested in Chapter 1 that the organizational structure and the "competent program" philosophy of the Tucson Model Cities program would affect the character of citizen participation in the program. Specifically, participation would be limited, moderate in stance, and dependent. Causality, such as is suggested here, could not be established without careful comparative study. Nevertheless it would be interesting to review the structural characteristics of the program in the light of the aforementioned hypothesis. Subsequently the findings on the characteristics of citizen participation will be reviewed.

The organizational structure of the local program is interesting in that the resident is given nominally a great deal of access to Model Cities decisions, while at the same time the authoritative role of the mayor is extraordinarily apparent. In Tucson,

1. While legal resident control is impossible in many cities, de facto resident control over the CDA does exist in cities such as Oakland and Cambridge.
although residents may aspire to more influence, the program clearly leaves little room for the militant. Thus, the organizational structure influences both the type of people who participate and their attitudes and objectives.

The location of the CDA within city hall strongly affects program orientation. A city hall-based CDA results in an emphasis on the "competent program" rather than on the "competent community".\(^\text{2}\) City hall is unlikely to foster a program stressing the value of outspoken dissent and the ability of the poor to effect change through social action. A constraint on the potential independence and aggressiveness of resident organizations is likely to result from this program emphasis.

The sharing of staff within a city-hall oriented structure may also have a moderating effect on resident demands as they are articulated within the decision-making machinery. A fulltime professional staff which acts as a fulcrum within a complex decision-making structure is likely to gain a great deal of influence over participants simply by virtue of its comprehensive view and total involvement.\(^\text{3}\)

\(^\text{2}\) See this paper, Chapter 4.

\(^\text{3}\) This was suggested in a telephone conversation with Councilman Robert Royal, May 2, 1971.
The lines of influence which are suggested by the author to flow from structure to citizen participation are plausible. Certainly local arrangements would be antithetical to the vociferous, strongly influential form of citizen participation which exists in some cities. What do the findings suggest about the character of citizen participation in Tucson?

Chapter 5 revealed that relatively few residents participate in the program. Especially minimal is participation in the selection of representatives to decision-making councils. Leadership on these councils is confined to a small group. Moreover, while delegates to the Council are fairly representative, their leaders are not. Finally, the views of delegates to the Model Neighborhood Council concerning citizen participation are moderate.

In Chapter 6 is was found that resident attitudes concerning their roles in the program were similar to those of nonresident participants. This congruity in attitude was surprising unless explained by "establishment" influence on resident attitudes. Some possible lines of "establishment" influence on resident activities were also discussed in Chapter 6. No findings on restriction of action were presented however.

In summary, the Tucson citizen participation program, while healthy in some respects, is limited and
noncontroversial in character. This, of course, has been widely true within Community Action Programs despite a philosophical stance allowing for a militant, social-action philosophy. Nonetheless it is likely that local structure and philosophy in the Model Cities program have made this moderation inevitable.

A moderate form of citizen participation, while obviously a disappointment to those who hoped that participation would give the poor social power in a lopsided pluralistic structure, is not a failure. Clearly some leadership has been developed in Tucson. Those few who participate, particularly those who participate actively, learn a great deal about the workings of the established political and bureaucratic systems. A few of them learn to move easily, if somewhat conspicuously within these systems. A new arena of influence is opened for potential minority leaders who in the past had little opportunity for entry into the political system.

If the emerging leaders are not representative of the poor, they are at least more representative than the middle-class Anglos they join in policy-making arenas. And it is not unimportant that some of the views of the residents have been communicated to city hall and that a network of programs is being implemented in accordance with these views.
The character of citizen participation in Tucson may change. Citizen participation in Tucson and other cities may well expand if the resources to be gleaned from participation increase. The author indicated earlier that local power stakes were somewhat limited by structure and that action was slow to emerge from planning. As programs are fully implemented and hiring is accelerated even more, it is possible that, despite the conservative structure, leadership in the Model Cities program will become a more valuable prize.

On the other hand, uncertainty concerning the program's future and particularly pessimism about its funding may mitigate the growth in interest. The events of the next few months in Tucson and Washington will be critical in determining the ultimate character of citizen participation in Tucson's Model Cities program.

The findings derived from this case study of the Tucson Model Cities program are equivocal. Moreover, the limits of time and the too often constrictive nature of the research design have produced lacunae in both the depth and extensiveness of the study. Many points too briefly explored in this study demand more thorough analysis. In particular further research might best be directed at the constraints on resident independence

4. See Chapter 5.

5. This may in fact be happening as full operation gets underway.
imposed by bureaucratic participants. In order to ascertain that such constraints exist, a study carefully tracing applications of influence on particular issues would be useful.

Much greater use should be made of systematic, in-depth interviews. A sufficient supply of manpower [or time] should produce valuable information. Moreover, any further surveys conducted in the Model Neighborhood should be administered door to door, and supplemented by an interview. The skepticism and survey-weariness of the residents makes it particularly important that those conducting the survey appear sympathetic. Furthermore, it is essential that the questionnaire be carefully pretested. Comments made to the author by residents indicated that these measures could greatly increase the validity of survey findings.

The most useful outcome of the case study often awaits its comparison with similar case studies. A great deal more could be stated about the characteristics of the Tucson Model Cities program if comparable features in other programs were known. Therefore, further research along these lines in other cities would be useful.
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