

STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE

by

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DEDICATION

To Ava Jeanne with all my love.

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ABSTRACT

Political resistance is manifested in a variety of ways, including violent and nonviolent methods. Though violence and nonviolence are often treated as analytically distinct phenomena, this dissertation argues that there is value in understanding how the methods are related, and how underlying factors lead to the use of one over the other. There are many resistance groups which use a combination of both violent and nonviolent tactics, and only by examining these methods in conjunction with one another can we more fully understand their use.

To understand the efficacy of jointly examining violent and nonviolent tactics, this dissertation addresses the topic from three primary perspectives. The introductory chapter offers the primary questions and puzzles this dissertation will explore. Following that, chapter two, is the first primary perspective to be addressed: the individual level. The arguments in chapter two revolve around personal networks, and the characteristics of those networks that impact views on the use of nonviolence by violent groups. Chapter three takes a state and environmental perspective, and identifies factors unique to the state and their impact on the likelihood of violence and nonviolence. Chapter four examines organizations as the unit of analysis, and inter-organizational characteristics are assessed for their impact on the use of nonviolence by violent groups. The concluding chapter brings together the insights gained from the empirical chapters, and offers suggestions for future efforts. Overall, I find that violent and nonviolent tactics share underlying correlates that impact their use, and that their joint examination offers insights on group behavior otherwise unavailable. A unified approach to the range of conflict methods offers new insight and understanding to conflict and conflict processes.

CHAPTER 1

VIOLENCE AND NONVIOLENCE: AN INTRODUCTION

Conflict has been a relative constant in the city of Gao, in northern Mali, since the civil war began in 2012. Though French and United Nations troops now occupy the city, the threat of violence is still real. On a Friday in late January, 2015, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) dispatched two suicide bombers to the city in search of targets: the UN mission (MINUSMA) being a top choice. Upon finding no viable targets, the bombers left, saving their attack for another day. The next day – Saturday – MUJAO again targeted MINUSMA troops; this time with an improvised explosive device (IED) placed at the edge of the city square (the IED malfunctioned, no one was hurt). Several days later – on Tuesday – a large protest formed outside of the UN headquarters in Gao. The gathering, which included elements of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), was protesting a potential truce being negotiated between the UN and MUJAO (among other rebel groups) just to the north of the city. The protest grew out of control, and the UN troops reacted by shooting and killing four protesters.

This anecdote illustrates the complexity and multi-faceted nature of the conflict. The city of Gao was initially taken over by the MNLA and Ansar Dine, only later to be taken by MUJAO, and then taken by French and UN troops. Further, the city experienced a range of activities, including: suicide, grenade, and IED attacks; as well as protests, demonstrations, and vigilantism. The complexity of any given conflict – the manner and methods through which a conflict manifests – is often missed by conflict

studies. Terrorism, civil protests, civil wars – though each a focus in their own right – a larger effort to understand the links and common drivers across the methods is rare.

The Malian Civil War presents a case not easily discussed purely in terms of terrorism, civil protest, or civil war. Terrorism has occurred – the bombings of marketplaces or town squares. Civil protests have taken place across the country – in fact it was a large protest that helped precipitate the change of power between the MNLA and MUJAO. And civil war – illustrated by gun battles and mortar attacks – has been active since the conflict began in 2012. Add to these factors the civilian pushback and efforts for vigilante justice, and this case highlights the complexity of conflict. Only through considering the range of conflict tactics used can we gain a fuller understanding of conflict dynamics and outcomes.

1.1 Questions about Strategic Complexity

This project begins with the basic assumption that violence and nonviolence are related tactics. Though often treated discretely, violence and nonviolence are simply two general categories of tactics available to resistance groups fighting the government. How are violence and nonviolence related? Under what conditions are violent or nonviolent tactics preferable? What causes a group, such as MUJAO, to use both violence and nonviolence? Can a broader understanding of the factors that impact a group's tactics be gained through the examination of local dynamics, inter-group interactions, and state and environmental conditions?

The case of northern Mali is rich, though the use of violence and nonviolence throughout the course of a conflict has many examples in recent history. The African

National Congress (ANC) used both terrorism and civil protests, and was engaged in a civil war against the South African government during the struggle to end apartheid. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) simultaneously used violence and nonviolence throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) used both violence and nonviolence in the West Bank and Lebanon – though not always the same tactic in both locations at the same time. The Maoist Party in Nepal strategically switched between violence and nonviolence to gain concessions from the state. Other groups – Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), M-19 – have all variously utilized violent and nonviolent tactics. Even among lesser-known groups there has been the dual-use of violent and nonviolent tactics: the Malawi Congress Party, the Ivorian Popular Front, and the Kenya African National Union are just a few examples. Though barriers may exist to using both violence and nonviolence, by treating violent and nonviolent tactics as discrete and unrelated phenomena we artificially censor our arguments, theoretical insights, and our broader understanding of resistance movements.

Only through a holistic approach to the study of conflict can we better understand the manner in which various forms of resistance occur. How are individuals' views on violence and nonviolence affected when they experience both? Under what conditions are resistance groups most likely to use violence or nonviolence? Does the use of violent and nonviolent tactics spread between resistance groups? Understanding the answers to these questions are important for at least two reasons. First, current literature fails in large part to consider violent and nonviolent tactics as related efforts. Evidence suggests that there are many groups which use both violent and nonviolent tactics – thus, only

through examining the range of tactics available to groups can we hope to understand the factors that lead to tactical variations. Second, understanding the conditions under which a group utilizes violent or nonviolent tactics has important policy implications; with a better understanding of what leads to nonviolence, policy responses can more effectively limit violence.

1.2 Defining Violence and Nonviolence

Before we begin examining the use of violence and nonviolence, it is necessary to explicate what is meant by both of the terms. Nonviolence as a tactic not refers to passivity or pacifism (the moral or philosophical position), but rather the active use of nonviolent tactics in an attempt to achieve some political objective. Nonviolent resistance is defined as “the application of unarmed civil power using nonviolent methods such as protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, without using or threatening physical harm against the opponent” (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013, 271). Nonviolence comes in three primary forms: symbolic protests (vigils, marches), noncooperation (boycotts, labor strikes), and nonviolent intervention (nonviolent occupations or blockades) (Sharp 1989). Each of these forms in various combinations have been argued to be an effective form of resistance. The effectiveness of nonviolent resistance comes at its most basic from the implicit obedience that states rely on from their population - widespread noncompliance removes this obedience, ultimately contributing to the tactic being effective to some extent (Zunes 1999).

Violence is contrary to nonviolence, and may be exhibited in different forms such as with terrorism or guerrilla warfare. Regardless of the form, violence is evinced by

people being killed or injured, or property being destroyed. Civil and interstate wars are often defined by the *level* of violence; a war is said to exist when violence surpasses a particular threshold. Thus, violence in the context of this dissertation can take several forms; though whether the incident in question is “terrorism” or an “insurgency” or occurs in the context of a civil war does not matter – what matters is that the incidents in question exhibit violence. Taken together, we can then classify the efforts of groups as either nonviolent or violent, depending on the circumstances and method of the incident.

1.3 Rational or Predetermined? Impacts on Behavior

The actors examined here are assumed to be acting rationally, based on the circumstances and contexts in which they operate. This assumption is commonly made when discussing the relevant parties in terrorism, civil war, or civil protest movements. However, a primary criticism of this assumption deals with the extent to which groups can truly be rational, as opposed to the actions of the group being determined largely by (1) the conditions which impact the group, or (2) the actions of the opposition (such as the government). Most likely, group behavior is determined by a combination of rationality and circumstance that lead to tactics chosen, strategies followed, and the broader outcomes of conflict.

Through much of this dissertation, the tactical variation of groups will be treated as a choice. However, it is a choice that is affected by the conditions in which the group finds itself. A goal of this dissertation is to explore the conditions which impact actors’ rationality; what is it about local conditions, state and environmental factors, or the influence of other organizations, which lead groups to *choose* a particular course of

action? Different circumstances and conditions in the environment will affect the decisions a group makes. To understand a groups' calculus, we must examine the range of conditions that influence behavior.

The assumption of rational behavior have long been the norm in studies on both violence and nonviolence. Terrorism is often treated as a rational action to achieve a particular goal (Crenshaw 1981; Lake 2002; Pape 2003; Pape 2005; Neumann and Smith 2005; Kydd and Walter 2006; Carson, LaFree, and Dugan 2012; Forest 2012), in anticipation of a governments' response (Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Bueno de Mesquita 2008), or to adapt to their environment (Drake 1998; Abdulkadirov 2010; Brandt and Sandler 2010; Santifort, Sandler, and Brandt 2012). Nonviolent actors are also treated as rational, though not as explicitly as are violent actors. Nonviolence, as previously mentioned, refers to the purposeful and tactical use of nonviolence in order to achieve some objective. Nonviolent action must be rational if it is used as a tactic. Ackerman and Rodal write that "Civil resistance is not about melting hearts but about developing power, and about the artful adaptation of strategy to the complex linkages with other forms and dimensions of power (2008, 119)." In other words, the use of nonviolence is very much a rational tactic aimed at achieving a particular political goal.

1.4 Role of the Government

Regardless of the tactic used, a resistance group is always struggling against some other party – most often the government. The government acts as the protagonist in any conflict, and in turn plays a pivotal role in the story. However, modeling the side of the

government is a constant challenge, and often is relinquished to a minor role or afterthought. To the extent possible, this dissertation will avoid that.

The government's role is not left aside intentionally, but rather by necessity. Whereas data on the actions of resistance groups is not great, it is superb relative to data on actions of the government. Governments are purposively guarded; troop movements are hidden, strategies vague, and tactics secret. Thus, it is typically not possible to fully account for government actions as they are relevant to resistance groups. And though there may be few instances where such analysis is possible, no such data exists when trying to conduct large-N analyses. Where applicable the government will be accounted for theoretically; and in the third chapter, we can approximate government actions through the use of data on particular characteristics of the government and economy.

1.5 What's Next?

This dissertation will cover a great deal of territory, both figuratively and geographically. Identifiable violent and nonviolent groups active in Africa over a twenty year period serve as the basis for the data which encompasses terrorism, insurgent and rebel violence in civil wars, nonviolent campaigns, and an on-the-ground survey conducted in a conflict zone. Furthermore, I will attempt to reconcile a great many studies and articles to formulate a broader theoretical understanding of why groups use violence and nonviolence. The primary puzzle driving this research has already been raised – what impacts a groups' use of violence, nonviolence, or both? To accomplish these efforts, several broad perspectives are examined. The first looks at the individual level to understand how personal relationships affect opinions on violence and

nonviolence. The second looks at state and environmental factors that condition the behavior of groups. The third, and last, perspective examines the impact of organizations on other groups – how do inter-organizational interactions and awareness influence the use of particular tactics?

Chapter two takes the first perspective; I examine how individual ego networks affect opinions on violence and nonviolence. I utilize data collected from a survey I designed and helped implement in the rural villages surrounding Gao in northern Mali. The conflict in northern Mali began most recently in 2012, and since that time, has included both violent and nonviolent conflict. Using the rich data collected in the survey, I examine how structural differences in ego networks impact views on nonviolence. I find that weak ties in an ego network are positively associated with support for nonviolence. Moreover, I find that positive perceptions of MUJAO, widely considered a terrorist group, are associated with the use of nonviolence. The relationship between MUJAO and nonviolence highlights the need for contextualized studies of conflict, and demonstrates the complexities related to the joint use of violent and nonviolent tactics.

The second perspective, looking at state and environmental factors, is addressed in chapter three. Multiple variables that are commonly used in conflict studies are identified and analyzed. These key variables were examined for their impact on the likelihood of violence and nonviolence. Some factors align with expectations, such as state repression positively affecting the likelihood of violence. Others demonstrate no significant effect, such as the number of groups in the environment, which itself is interesting given the extensive literature on the topic. Though these variables have been previously included in numerous studies, it is necessary to examine them in light of both

violent *and* nonviolent tactics – not just one or the other. Studies that address only terrorism, for example, are censored and in turn find biased effects of the identified variables. Only by examining these variables with violent and nonviolent tactics can we more fully understand their impact on the range of resistance tactics.

The fourth chapter takes the inter-organizational perspective, and examines the influence that organizations have on one another. Organizational neighbors are identified based on proximate activities. These organizational neighbors are those groups most likely to influence one another. The prevalence of nonviolence in the organization field is identified and used to explain the adoption of nonviolence by the focal group. Ultimately I find that the use of nonviolent tactics does spread through organizational fields, however this is only the case where groups are operating in highly uncertain environments.

Taken together, this dissertation demonstrates that violent and nonviolent tactics are related. It suggests that scholars must do more to understand violence and nonviolence as a range of tactics available to a resistance group. By treating a group as only violent or nonviolent limits the broader understanding and insights we can draw. Many groups have utilized both violence and nonviolence in an effort to achieve their goals; better understanding the factors that lead to one general method of resistance over the other is important, as it provides the potential for significant theoretical advances in conflict studies. Better understanding when particular methods are used is also important for the policy world; if we can identify the conditions that encourage a violent group to adopt nonviolent tactics, real and positive outcomes can be created. By approaching violence and nonviolence together, this dissertation is intended to move the discussion of

conflict forward in a meaningful way. There is certainly more to do, but demonstrated here is that violence and nonviolence are related, and there is value in understanding their connections.

CHAPTER 2

EGO NETWORKS AND THE SUPPORT FOR NONVIOLENCE: LOOKING AT NORTHERN MALI¹

In 2012, conflict broke out in Northern Mali. Several groups quickly achieved their goal and took over the entire northern portion of the country, and declared it a sovereign state called Azawad. Nearly a year later, French forces launched Operation *Serval* to root out the rebel groups, and quickly recaptured the main cities. Gao, the largest city in northern Mali, was initially captured by the primary separatist group the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), but later taken by the Islamist group the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), only to be taken months later by the French. Through this experience, the residents of Gao experienced all manner of violence; ranging from IED attacks, to the amputation of thieves' hands in the city square, to drawn-out gun battles. However, in addition to violence, residents of Gao also experienced nonviolence, including frequent protests both during and after the civil war. Nonviolent demonstrations included MUJAO fighters and Gao residents protesting the MNLA, Gao residents protesting MUJAO, and area militias and residents protesting the French and United Nations presence.

The range of violent and nonviolent activities in northern Mali makes the area an excellent case to examine factors that influence individuals' opinions on violence and nonviolence. Due to the diversity of tactics, the frequency with which they occurred, and

¹ The analysis, conclusions, and views presented and expressed in this chapter belong solely to the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of AECOM International Development or USAID-OTI, the organizations that organized the survey used in this chapter.

the span of time over which the conflict was fought, most individuals in the area had experiences related to the civil war. How does the experience with conflict impact an individual's opinion on violence and nonviolence? Does the support for violence or nonviolence follow particular characteristics and relationship patterns of the individual?

It was in the post-conflict setting of northern Mali that I assisted USAID in surveying roughly 2,500 residents of the villages surrounding Gao – an area called Gounzoureye Commune – in early 2015. This survey was designed to learn about residents' opinions and thoughts on topics ranging from women's rights to security concerns. A key portion of the survey also examined the social network topography of Gounzoureye – notably how individuals interact, where they interact, and their opinions of other villages.

The goal of this chapter is to use the rich data collected in the survey to assess the impact that networks have on an individual's opinion of nonviolence. In particular, the approach used here is to look at egocentric networks. Ego networks focus on specific actors – called *egos* – and their connection to other actors – called *alters*. Ego networks are important because they identify the sources of influence most likely to impact an individual's opinions, beliefs, attitudes, and actions. By examining the ego-alter relationships, in conjunction with attributes and characteristics of the ego network, we can empirically examine the relationship between ego networks and opinions on nonviolence.

This chapter is significant for at least two reasons. First, this chapter provides a case rich in context and data that enables a better understanding of local conflict processes. Studies of violence and nonviolence are often reliant on broad approaches to

conflicts or cross-national data, which is problematic as broad approaches risk losing local contexts which affect the conflict's initial stages, course, and outcome. Second, the methodological approach and data examined provide a unique illumination of the efficacy of analyzing egocentric networks in conflict settings, and identifying the networks' impacts on conflict evolution.

It is not enough to simply consider the question of violence and nonviolence from the level of the individual, the group, or the state. Only by examining violence and nonviolence from each of these perspectives can this project culminate in a fuller understanding of the connected logics of violent and nonviolent resistance. This chapter, with its focus on personal egocentric networks, begins the empirical analyses as it lays the groundwork for subsequent chapters. By first gaining an understanding of how violence and nonviolence works at the local level, subsequent chapters are better situated. Chapter Three follows on this as it investigates state and environmental impacts on tactical choices, and Chapter Four explores how proximal resistance groups affect one another's resistance strategies.

The question addressed in this chapter is how do egocentric networks impact the ego's opinion of nonviolence? I argue that individuals who are embedded in a village, and who have only strong, familial relationships, will be the least likely to support nonviolence. In contrast, those individuals whose networks span villages and involve a wider range of relationships will be more likely to support nonviolence. The greater support for nonviolence is due to the presence of weaker ties in the ego networks, which provide the egos with access to new information. Instances of violence have been the norm in northern Mali since the outbreak of war in March 2012. Hence, I expect the

atypical behavior, found in the use and support of nonviolence, to follow from the new information provided by the weak ties.

Access to new information, the information that comes from outside of an individual's *effective* network, is key to the spreading of ideas and innovations (Granovetter 1973; Granovetter 1983). John Stuart Mill wrote that:

“it is hardly possibly to overrate the value...of placing human beings in contact with persons dissimilar to themselves, and with modes of thought and action unlike those with which they are familiar...Such communication has always been, and is peculiarly in the present age, one of the primary sources of progress (Cited in Burt 2004, 350).”

Through these survey data, I will demonstrate that ego networks composed of weak relationships indicating a greater availability of new information will lead to a greater support for the use of nonviolence.

This chapter will proceed by examining the literature on social network analysis. In particular, the scholarship on ego networks, weak ties, and the spread of information is relied upon to support arguments central to this chapter. Following this overview, a brief outline of the Malian civil war provides the necessary context in which this survey was administered. This outline is followed by a presentation of my primary arguments and theories, the chapter concluding with statistical analyses and discussion of results.

2.1 Literature Review: Ego Networks and Structural Holes

My arguments are based on concepts core to the field of social network analysis. My arguments necessarily rest on several core concepts. The first such concept is the ego network, and the enormous influence an ego network can have on a wide range of an individual's behaviors and beliefs. Likewise, a second set of interrelated concepts,

including social capital, structural holes, and strong and weak ties, are foundational. These developed concepts will constitute the necessary base for the analysis that follows.

Ego networks are networks consisting of a single actor, the ego, and the actors to which the ego is connected, the alters. Moreover, relationships that exist between the alters are often included (Everett and Borgatti 2005)². Thus, ego networks have two levels: the first is the ego level “constituted by the ego’s characteristics and overall network features;” and second, the ego-alter level “constituted by the characteristics of each alter and ego-alter ties (Carrasco et al. 2008, 965).”

Ego networks have long been used to study a range of phenomena, in part due to ego networks’ simplicity. Information on ego networks can be collected in surveys, as was done for this project, and only requires the participation of the individual respondent to gather data on the whole ego network. Gathering information on ego networks contrasts with gathering whole or partial networks, for which it is difficult to gather data. Despite their simplicity, ego networks can provide us a great deal of information about what impacts an “ego’s attitudes, norms, values, goals and perceptions of the world (Freeman 1982, 291).”

One reason why understanding ego networks are important is that these networks are likely to directly impact the behavior and beliefs of individuals. The people with whom an individual acts are those most capable of influencing thoughts and opinions, affecting behavior, and spreading ideas. Matters ranging from the level of an individual’s happiness (Fowler and Christakis 2008) to the individuals’ decision to join a terrorist group (Post, Sprinzak, and Denny 2003) have been demonstrated to be directly impacted

² To be discussed later, the data on relationships between alters are unavailable for this paper.

by ego networks. The manner in which this influence is exercised is through various forms of “social capital” such as social organization, expectations, trust, or information (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993). An ego that is in a strong position in the network is likely to have greater levels of social capital, and in turn be in an advantageous position:

“The advantage is conceptualized using structure as a proxy for information...based on two facts... (1) People cluster into groups as a result of interaction opportunities... [and] (2) [c]ommunication is more frequent and influential within than between groups such that people in the same group develop similar views of the history...(Burt 2011).”

The ego can utilize its relationships to gain information on topics the ego might otherwise not have the capacity to monitor. Coleman argues that information acquisition is costly; at a minimum it requires attention “which is always in scarce supply (1988, 104).” In effect then, each member of the ego network can specialize in a particular area – if one alter follows foreign events, and one alter follows domestic events, the ego can rely on those alters to convey that information, without the ego itself expending energy.

Another important aspect of social capital is that it can impact the behavior of the ego through social norms, which may inhibit or encourage particular behaviors (Freeman 1982; Coleman 1988). These norms are conditioned onto the ego by their interactions with the alters. This need not be overt coercive mechanisms, but rather simply expectations and examples realized through the alters. The mechanism that encourages particular behavior may even indirectly affect the ego, such as in cases where actors are responding to similar conditions or circumstances (Marsden and Friedkin 1993). Thus, to relate social norms to the context in Gounzoureye Commune, an effective – but not official – ban on smoking, or the generally accepted secondary role played by women in the community, will lead and condition individuals’ beliefs and behaviors.

The importance of social norms relates closely to the idea that cultural forces can impact social organization and outcome. The previous examples of social norms may be considered “strong culture,” culture can also be “weak” and still impact social outcomes (Schultz and Breiger 2010). Weak culture is often banal, reflected in small talk, and captured in the “pure sociability” of interaction (2010, 622).

Another important form of social capital, and one that may have tremendous impact on an ego, is strong and weak ties, and the related idea of structural holes. Strong and weak ties refer to the type and intensity of the relationship between actors; in this case between the ego and its alters. Granovetter writes that “the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie (1973, 1361).” Strong ties may typically exist between family members or close friends: that is, between those with whom the ego shares the strongest connection. Weak ties are those connections with which the ego does not share a close relationship, for instance an acquaintance or a work colleague.

Stemming from the concept of strong and weak ties is the “strength of weak ties” argument made by Granovetter (1973; 1983). The alters to whom the ego is closest – the strong ties – are likely to have similar information and knowledge; best friends are self-selected. In turn, the knowledge and information is redundant, and does not provide the ego with an advantage. Weak ties, however, may offer the ego access to new information and ideas. A weak tie to another actor is likely to span social groups, thereby offering new knowledge. Access to new information and ideas is why there is “strength” in weak ties – weak ties can prove very advantageous for the ego. Granovetter writes:

“...individuals with few weak ties will be deprived of information from distant parts of the social system and will be confined to the provincial news and views of their close friends. This deprivation will not only insulate them from the latest ideas and fashions...such individuals may be difficult to organize or integrate into political movements of any kind, since membership in movements or goal-oriented organizations typically results from being recruited by friends (1983, 202).”

The logic behind the strength of weak ties relates closely to the conceptualization of structural holes. A structural hole is “a relationship of nonredundancy between two contacts...two contacts provide network benefits that are in some degree additive rather than overlapping (Burt 1992, 18).” In other words, if the ego has a relationship with Alter 1 and Alter 2, yet the alters have no relationships with one another, then there exists a structural hole between Alter 1 and Alter 2. In this example, the ego acts as a broker between Alter 1 and Alter 2. The reason this relates closely with the concept of strong and weak ties is that there is unlikely to be a structural hole between an ego’s strong ties. If ego has a strong tie with Alter 1, and ego has a strong tie with Alter 2, then there is the tendency for Alter 1 and Alter 2 to form a relationship. The lack of a relationship between Alter 1 and Alter 2 would be a “forbidden triad,” identified as such due to the expectation for Alter 1 and Alter 2 to form a tie given their strong ties with ego (Granovetter 1973).

Structural holes are themselves a form of social capital, as actors that span structural hole have brokerage opportunities. By bridging structural holes the ego is able to affect the information flow between the actors adjoining the hole boundary (Burt 1992; Burt 2001; Burt 2004). The control of information that comes with brokering information flows is in line with the Cook and Emerson’s (1978) examination of power inherent in certain structural conditions – by occupying a position in the network that

allows the spanning of discrete sources of information, the actor has some level of power. As will be argued later, egos that occupy brokerage positions will be more likely to support nonviolence, as they will have more exposure to new ideas.

2.2 Overview of the 2012 Mali Conflict

Before discussing the theoretical arguments of this chapter, it is necessary to provide an overview of the context in which the arguments are situated. The March 2012 erupted when Tuareg rebels attacked towns in northern Mali. In the ensuing days, a lack of leadership and support for the military led to a coup d'état which deposed President Amadou Toumani Touré. The disorder caused by the coup – including the disintegration of the army – allowed the rebels a strategic opportunity to seize large portions of northern Mali (Themner and Wallensteen 2013), including the largest cities of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu. Several days after takeover of Timbuktu on April 1, 2012, a rebel spokesperson announced:

“Mali is an anarchic state. Therefore we have gathered a national liberation movement to put in an army capable of securing our land and an executive office capable of forming democratic institutions. We declare the independence of Azawad from this day on (France24 2012).”

The “national liberation movement” alluded to in the announcement is the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, or the MNLA. The MNLA, a Tuareg separatist group, was formed in October 2011 (Livermore 2013), shortly before conflict broke out. The independent state of Azawad had been a sought after goal by the Tuaregs for many decades (Francis 2013; Saraceno 2014). Tuareg resistance against the Malian government in Bamako had previously resulted in uprisings in 1962, 1990, and 2007 (Keita 1998; Francis 2013; Livermore 2013). These uprisings are often attributed to the

Tuaregs' lack of economic opportunity and their marginalization by the central government (Livermore 2013).

Though the MNLA was successful in creating an independent Azawad, they were not alone in their achievement. Two other groups – Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad (MUJAO) – were fighting alongside the MNLA against the Malian government. Neither Ansar Dine nor MUJAO were separatist as was the MNLA, rather they were Islamist, seeking to establish an area in which they could impose their extremist interpretation of Islam (Themner and Wallensteen 2013). Both Ansar Dine and MUJAO were associated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); however neither group had expressly extra-regional objectives. In fact, MUJAO actually splintered from AQIM in 2011 (“Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)” 2015) and has defined itself “explicitly in terms of a regional (rather than globalized) agenda (Dowd and Raleigh 2013).”

Unfortunately for the MNLA, and their realization of an independent Azawad, the Islamist groups soon turned against them. Rather expediently, the MNLA was pushed from all major cities in the north. The MNLA actually requested international assistance to push the Islamist groups back (Livermore 2013). By the beginning of January 2013, most of the cities in northern Mali were controlled by either Ansar Dine or MUJAO, with the MNLA limited only to the periphery.

On January 20, 2013, nearly one year after hostilities began, the French, in collaboration with the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), launched operation *SERVAL* to reclaim northern Mali. The MNLA, still seeking to regain some control, offered to fight alongside the French against the Islamist groups

(Livermore 2013). Less than three weeks later, the last rebel stronghold of Kidal had been retaken by the French. Shortly thereafter, in April of 2013, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established to support stabilization and security efforts (Saraceno 2014).

In the time since MINUSMA began its mission, there has continued to be sporadic fighting. It is in this context of continued violence that USAID (among multiple other aid organizations) tried to foster reconciliation and rehabilitation. By way of example, in the one month period in which the survey used in this paper was administered, there were at least several IED and grenade attacks in Gao, mortar attacks in Kidal, and shootings in the areas outside of Timbuktu.

Part of what explains why the conflict broke out when it did was the ousting of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. It has been widely reported that many Tuareg fought in Libya, and returned to Mali towing with them all manner of weapons (Themner and Wallensteen 2013). This added instability to an already precarious situation where there was a minimal level of “economic development, limited presence of administrative structures and a general resentment against the central government (Themner and Wallensteen 2013, 6).”

This brief outline of the conflict cannot do full justice to the complexities and historical precedents that make 2012 Mali Civil War such a difficult situation. One of the most relevant dynamics is the tension between the long-held secular, separatist goals of the Tuaregs, juxtaposed with the desire to establish a safe-haven of Muslim extremism by MUJAO and Ansar Dine. This tension helps explain the incompatibility between the MNLA and Ansar Dine and MUJAO. The Tuareg have long been secular; however,

when the primary trade routes through the Saharan Desert were taken over by AQIM³ beginning years prior to the 2012 conflict, the Tuaregs were forced to interact with the Islamists to earn a living (Livermore 2013). Thus, the Tuareg entered into a relationship with the Islamists not necessarily due to common goals, but rather due to a common means of achieving their own goals – fighting the Malian government. As long as both the Tuareg and the Islamists sought to wrestle control of northern Mali from the government in Bamako, both parties found common ground. Once that control was achieved, however, the MNLA and the Islamists were at odds with one another.

2.3 Theoretical Arguments

In this section, I outline the two primary arguments to be explored and tested. These two arguments are related, yet distinct. A first argument is that a greater frequency of weak ties in an ego network will lead to greater support for nonviolence. A second argument is that the greater the number of alters in the ego network – conditioned by the composition of those alters – will lead to a greater support for nonviolence. A potential source of insight is the conflict contagion literature: how conflicts spread, particularly between states (Starr and Most 1983; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Braithwaite 2010; Maves and Braithwaite 2013). However, the focus of this chapter is not on conflict per se; rather, this chapter is focused on how ideas spread through ego networks. Conflict contagion literature will be important in Chapter Four, as I examine the contagion of tactics between groups.

³ AQIM morphed out of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 2006 in Algeria.

2.3.1 Weak Ties

Weak ties have been consistently demonstrated to affect an ego due to the new information brought with such a relationship. In effect, weak ties in an ego networks provide the opportunity for non-redundant information. In an ego network where all actors are closely connected and occupy the same social space, the information each actor has will be highly redundant with the other actors in the same ego network. The weak ties then provide the ego access to actors that come from other social spaces, and in turn provide the opportunity for non-redundant information. Access to this non-redundant information, and the ego's position in the network as a broker of that information, has been shown to help the ego get a job (Granovetter 1973), get a promotion (Burt 1992), or even increase its creativity (Burt 2004; Perry-Smith 2006). Weak ties have also been shown to affect an ego's adherence to social norms. Bott (1957) found that in familial ego networks where there were patterns of dense interaction, suggesting strong ties, social conformity and adherence to norms were prevalent. However, conformity to social norms was less likely where the networks were loosely connected, which suggests a greater presence of weak ties.

Given these contentions, the potential role that weak ties can have in the villages of Gounzoureye Commune cannot be overstated. Life in northern Mali – and in particular the rural areas outside of the cities – is extremely traditional and conservative (Pezard and Shurkin 2015). Much of an individual's focus is on that individual's family, community, or tribe, and in turn that individual may have very little interaction outside of that setting. Further dampening the spread of new ideas is the restricting role of religious conservatism and cultural practices. Complicating the spread of new ideas is the general

lack of resources often taken for granted, such as electricity, cell phone coverage, or internet access. For example, more than 95% of respondents who were surveyed indicated their primary source of news was the radio. And these respondents only drew information from eight stations: and in fact the stations were located in the neighboring commune (Cramer 2015).

In the context of conflict and extremism in northern Mali, the balance of strong and weak ties in an ego network is also likely to have a large impact on an ego's views of violence and nonviolence. Weak ties provide ideas and knowledge to the ego that the ego might otherwise not encounter in the setting of limited information and close-knit families and communities. The weak ties may introduce the ego to new ideas, knowledge, or beliefs that were previously unavailable. It is for this reason that we should expect to see greater support for nonviolence associated with a greater number of weak ties in the ego network.

Nonviolence, though not entirely foreign, runs contrary to much of the experience in northern Mali for many years. For at least the past 15 years, Mali has experienced varying waves of violence (Batten-Carew and Dowd 2015). In particular, since the beginning of the conflict in 2012, areas in northern Mali have been plagued with sporadic violence, with the peak of violence coming the month of January 2013 when there were 284 fatalities. Given IED attacks, bandits along the highways, suicide bombings, and battles between groups, a manifestation of nonviolence is surprising. Nonviolence is not a completely alien experience in northern Mali; however it is not exactly commonplace either. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (2015), riots and protests comprise roughly three percent of the conflict events since 2009, and most of

those events occurred around Bamako – hundreds of miles from Gao. Due to nonviolence rarely being experienced in the Gao area, knowledge and opinions of nonviolence from friends and other contacts can be expected to be a key conduit for the spread of information. In effect, a larger presence of weak ties in an ego network provides a greater *opportunity* for knowledge of and support for nonviolence. This is not to suggest individuals in close-knit personal networks and limited social circles are more likely to support violence; rather they will simply be less aware of nonviolence and have fewer individuals to draw ideas from who have experienced nonviolence.

One might wonder why in an area such as Gounzoureye, where family and community are so central to an individual's daily life, weak ties would be expected to impact an ego's opinion on a topic. Why would an individual discuss something as potentially volatile as violence and nonviolence with those who are not most important in that individual's life? One scholar found that "close to half of the core discussion network consists of alters whom respondents do not consider personally important (Small 2013)." In other words, intimate or important conversations are not necessarily reserved for those individuals most important to an ego. Further, an ego may be constrained by social norms in dense family and community networks in discussing novel ideas such as nonviolence. These realities lead me to contend that the presence of weak ties is positively associated with support for nonviolence.⁴

Hypothesis 1: Support for nonviolence will increase as the number of weak ties in an ego network increases.

⁴ The presence of weak ties in an ego network may also logically impact the *change* of tactics within the violent and nonviolent categories. Exposure to different tactics in a network may precede their adoption by the ego. The data in this chapter look only at individuals' levels of support for nonviolence, and not the use of particular tactics by groups. This idea is more directly addressed in Chapter Four, where group-to-group impacts are explored.

2.3.2 Ego Network Size

The number of alters in an ego network directly affects the extent of opportunity the ego may have for new information. The size of the ego network serves to proxy the possible amount of knowledge the ego has available from which to draw. The greater the number of individuals in the ego network, the greater availability of information and knowledge for the ego to extract (Odella 2006). This logic follows the arguments made relative to weak ties: the greater the number of individuals in an ego network, the more likely there will be weak ties which will have novel information (though the information brought by strong ties is likely to be redundant, it is possible that the information be novel). The concept of social norms and their impact on the ego illustrates this point well. The greater the extent that everyone is connected to one another in an ego network, the greater the pressure to conform to social norms and maintain societal expectations. If an ego had only a few relationships, however, those pressures would be lessened, thereby allowing the ego greater freedom in behavioral decisions (but, there would also be less social support) (Bott 1957; Freeman 1982).

The presence of more alters in an ego network leads to more opportunities for new ideas, then a greater number of alters in an ego network should associate with a greater support for nonviolence. However, this effect should be mitigated by the number of family members in the ego network. As mentioned in the previous section, family and community life are central in Gounzoureye Commune. In turn, many individuals' entire ego networks are comprised of family members. An ego network that includes only family members should be expected not to expand information, but rather to restrict knowledge and information because it indicates the ego has limited exposure. Given this,


I expect there to be an interactive effect between ego network size and the extent of family members in the ego network.

Hypothesis 2: Support for nonviolence will increase as the size of an ego network increases. However, this effect is conditional on ego network composition; as the number of family members in the ego network increases, support for nonviolence will decrease.

2.4 Overview of the Survey

The data used in this project were collected in a survey conducted in February 2015. AECOM International Development – Mali, a large humanitarian organization, is the implementing partner of USAID-Office of Transition Initiatives in Mali. AECOM conducted the survey with the goal of examining the social networks and opinions of individuals in Gounzoureye Commune, Gao Cercle, Mali. In particular, AECOM was interested in topics such as women’s rights, security, religious conservatism, and how social interactions affected opinions on these topics. I was tasked with designing and assisting with the implementation of the survey, conducted by a local firm.

Gounzoureye Commune has a population of 51,249 over thirteen villages. The largest village is Tacharane, with a population of 10,533, and the smallest village is Kosseye, with a population of 1,046. Overall, 2,581 surveys were completed, providing us an overall confidence level of 95% and a margin of error of 1.88. Figure 1 shows the location of the thirteen villages (Cramer 2015).

Figure 1:⁵

⁵ The dots in Figure 1 indicate the location of survey respondents. These location data were used to identify the thirteen village boundaries shown as shaded areas. Gao, the largest city in the region, is shown

Further illustrating the realities of Gounzoureye Commune, access to the villages to conduct the survey was problematic. The report analyzing the survey illuminates some of the problems:

“Conversations with village “facilitators” and the village chiefs were necessary for the survey team to gain access to the towns. Further, participation of the village inhabitants had to be condoned by the village chief... (Cramer 2015, 6)”

These problems were exacerbated by the challenge of physically accessing the villages; not all villages were connected by road. A neighborhood in Gorom Gorom was on an island situated in the middle of the Niger River, accessible only by boat. Table 1 describes the villages (Cramer 2015):

Table 1:

Villages of Gounzoureye Commune

Population Total: 51,249

Number of Villages: 13

Village	Population	% of Population	Surveys Completed
Arhabou	2,723	5.31	215
Bagoundje 1	3,560	6.95	238
Bagoundje 2	4,159	8.12	160
Gorom Gorom	3,629	7.08	167
Kaji	9,198	17.95	428
Koima	3,500	6.83	162
Kosseye	1,046	2.04	49
Lobou	2,652	5.17	119
Sadou	3,131	6.11	143
Sidibe	2,968	5.79	109
Tacharane	10,533	20.55	482
Thirissoro	2,645	5.16	133
Wabaria	1,505	2.94	176

near the center of the figure. The Niger River is shown as the dark gray band running in a mostly north-south direction.

Further challenges included language barriers (the survey was written in English, translated to French, and then translated to Songhai), and widespread illiteracy.

Ultimately the decision was made that surveys be conducted on smart-phones; the enumerator would read each question to the respondent to avoid illiteracy constraints, and enter that individual's response on the phone. Other factors that even in Western settings are concerns were overt problems in Mali; special efforts were made to ensure common gender and language between the enumerator and respondent.

Aside from practical concerns, there were also theoretical concerns. Defining network boundaries is often complicated, and this was particularly so in choosing a method to approach surveying the thirteen rural villages of Gounzoureye Commune. The approach taken was to present survey respondents with a name generator (Burt 1984), where respondents were asked to identify other individuals to whom they were "closest" over the "last four months." There is a great deal of literature examining different name generating techniques, such as limiting the number of recalled individuals or having the recall unlimited.⁶

A concern in survey research is respondent burden (i.e. how much effort is required to participate in the survey) (Golinelli et al. 2010). For example, by limiting the time span within which to recall alters (in this case, the prompt was over the "last four months") we can mitigate respondent burden. With regard to the number of alters to recall, asking respondents to list as many acquaintances as possible is very taxing, whereas asking for your "five closest contacts" is much more manageable. In a valuable paper, Merluzzi and Burt (2013) conduct analyses to identify the "cost effective number

⁶ For a detailed review, see Marsden (1990) or Marsden (2005)

of sociometric choices to record.” They find that five names provide the best balance; additional names may garner new information, but 60-70% of that will be redundant.

However, Merluzzi and Burt also note an important caveat – “[a]sking for a sixth or seventh name may be prudent in contexts where the researcher suspects network effects may be harder to disentangle from other effects.” Disentangling confounding effects was expected to affect the name generators for this survey; the rural areas outside of Gao are paternalistic, with family and community playing a large, if not overriding role, in daily life. By asking for up to seven names, the goal is to move past the strong ties (it is expected those will be named first) and to begin learning information on the weaker connections an ego has.

Furthermore, the maximum of seven names was chosen, as opposed to an open, unlimited recall, due to the subsequent burden of identifying alter attributes and alter-alter relationships. For each alter, attributes such as relationship type, relationship duration, alter location, and interaction frequency. Then, questions were asked about the relationships between the alters.⁷ For instance, respondents were asked, “are any of the alters strangers?” And, “are any of the alters especially close to one another?” Anything beyond seven alters would have not been feasible⁸ to conduct on such a large scale in this setting.

⁷ The data on relationships between the alters were collected, however, reliability concerns have precluded the data’s inclusion in this analysis. For example, when asked “do you feel equally close to all of these people?” more than 97% of respondents indicated “yes.” The biased distribution suggests either that the respondent or enumerator did not understand the question, or that responses were systematically entered incorrectly.

⁸ The program allowed adaptive questioning, though the inclusion of additional alters increased the number of questions exponentially. Questions were only populated for the number of alters provided by the respondent, and only if the respondent indicated that “yes” some alters were strangers or “yes” some alters were especially close to one another. It was decided that the burden of gathering information on more than seven alters per ego network outweighed the potential gains.

2.5 Data and Methodology

For the more than 2,500 surveys collected, nearly 300 variables were recorded. Many of the variables were network related, looking at ego networks, but also looking at family, friendship, and acquaintance networks. The data relevant to this project are limited to those collected on the ego networks, for which there are useable data from 2,413 of the surveys.

The dependent variable used in this study asked “Would you be more likely to support an armed group if they begin to use non-violent actions such as protests?” The possible responses were either “yes” or “no.” This question, which was asked immediately following the questions about perceptions of the various armed groups, was intended to gauge the respondent’s support for these armed groups shifting towards nonviolent tactics. On average, 56 percent of respondents indicated “yes.” There was significant variation between the villages, with respondents in Kaji answering “yes” 68 percent of the time, whereas respondents in Gorom Gorom responded “yes” only 32.7 percent of the time.

The key independent variables relate to the two hypotheses. The first hypothesis looks at the impact of weak ties on the ego in the ego network. In order to address this, two variables are used to assess the strength of the ties in the ego network. The first, *Different Village*, reflects the proportion of alters in an ego network that come from a different village than where the ego resides. As previously noted, family and community life are central in Gounzoureye, and in turn, most connections are to other individuals in the same village as the ego. Thus, the presence of alters who reside outside of the village

should serve to approximate a weak relationship. In turn, we should expect to see that as the proportion of relationships outside of the village increases, support for nonviolence will also increase.

The second independent variable relating to weak ties measures the average *relationship duration* of the ego. Possible values range from 1 to 3; 1 indicates the ego knew the alter less than one year; 2 indicates the ego knew the alter one to three years, and 3 indicates the ego knew the alter more than three years. The maximum relationship duration of three or more years was chosen as that would indicate the ego knew the alter *prior* to the conflict breaking out in March 2012. The longer the duration of the relationship, the stronger that relationship is. Since we are looking for evidence of weak ties impacting support for nonviolence, we should see that as *relationship duration* increases – indicating the relationship becomes stronger – the support for nonviolence will decrease.

The second hypothesis argues that as the size of the ego network increases, so too will support for nonviolence. However, if that increase in ego network size corresponds with an increase of family members in the ego network, then the support for nonviolence will decrease.

In order to measure this, two variables and their interaction are used. The first variable, *family*, is a dummy variable indicating that more than half of the ego network is comprised of family members (e.g. spouse, parent, sibling). The second variable *ego size*, is the count of alters in the ego network. The interaction term, *family X ego size*, will capture the effect of an increasing ego size, when that ego network is mostly or entirely comprised of family members.

Several control variables are also included, the most important of which is the *Perception of MUJAO*. *Perception of MUJAO* ranges from 1 indicating “unfavorably” to 5 indicating “favorably.” MUJAO is the group that had the greatest impact and interaction with Gao and Gounzoureye Commune. Although the MNLA initially took the area over, they were quickly forced out of Gao by MUJAO. MUJAO then ruled over the area until the French removed them in Operation SERVAL. Further, MUJAO recruited extensively from the local population. In turn, I would expect that as an ego’s perception of MUJAO becomes more favorable, support for nonviolence will decrease.

The other control variables are demographic, capturing information about the ego. *Married* is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the respondent is married and 0 if the respondent is not married. *Education* indicates the respondents’ education level with values ranging from 0 indicating “none” to 5 which indicates “college.” The average value of 1.22 indicates most respondents completed education at a local madrassa, but did not complete primary school. *Sex* indicates if the respondent is a female (value of 1) or if the respondent is male (value of 0). Lastly, the *age* variable indicates the respondents’ age, ranging from 19 to 95.

Given that the dependent variable is a binary “yes” or “no,” a logistic regression is used to model the primary arguments made in this paper. To better account for unmeasured factors that may be driving respondents’ opinions on nonviolence, dummy variables for thirteen villages of Gounzoureye Commune are also included. Gorom Gorom, which has the lowest levels of support for nonviolence, is omitted such that the effects of all other villages are relative to Gorom Gorom.

2.6 Findings

To test the hypotheses argued in this paper, a logistic regression model is used. Using this method allows us to appropriately model our dependent variable, *support for nonviolence*, which ranges 0, indicating “no,” and 1, indicating “yes.” For the hypotheses to be supported we must see two primary things. First, we want to see that weak ties positively impact support for nonviolence. As the proportion of alters in the ego network that reside in different villages increases, we should see a positive impact on the support for nonviolence. Also, as the duration of average relationships in the ego network increases, indicating stronger ties, we should see a negative impact on support for nonviolence. Second, we should see a positive impact as the size of the ego network increases, but for that effect to be mitigated by an ego network comprised mostly of family; this will be reflected in the interaction term. The results of the regression are shown in Table 2; coefficients are reported as odds ratios. As can be seen in Table 2, the results are mixed.

Table 2:

Support for Nonviolence in Gounzoureye Commune	
Outside Village	1.56** (.23)
Relationship Duration	0.33*** (.09)
Family	0.93 (.20)
Ego Size	.86*** (.04)
Family X Ego Size	1.18** (.06)
Perception of MUJAO	1.33*** (.05)
Married	.72* (.12)
Education	1.02 (.07)
Sex	1.01 (.09)
Age	1.01* (.003)
Village Fixed Effects	Yes
Observations	2329
Standard Errors in Parentheses	
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$	

Strong support is found for the first hypothesis, which argues that an increase in the number of weak ties in an ego network will lead to increased support for nonviolence. *Outside Village* measures the extent to which an ego network is comprised of alters from the same or different village than the ego. Thus, as the variable *Outside Village* increases, there will be a greater proportion of alters from villages other than that of the ego. The resultant odds ratio of 1.56 indicates that as the proportion of alters moves from

0 (indicating all alters are in the same village) to 1 (indicating all alters are from a different village), the likelihood of supporting nonviolence increases by 56%. This increase is reflected in Figure 2, which shows that as the proportion of relationships an ego has with alters outside of his/her village increases, so too will the probability of support for nonviolence. As the variable *Relationship Duration* – which measures the average duration of relationships in an ego network – increases, the duration of the average relationships also increases. To find support for hypothesis one – that weak ties lead to more support for nonviolence – we should see that as *Relationship Duration* increases support for nonviolence decreases. This is exactly what is found. The reported value of .33 indicates that for every one-unit increase in *Relationship Duration*, the odds of supporting nonviolence decrease by 67%. In Figure 3, the predicted probability of supporting nonviolence for varying values of *Relationship Duration* is shown; all other variables were held at their means. Both the positive impact of *Outside Village*, and the negative impact of *Relationship Duration*, strongly support hypothesis one.

Figure 2:







Figure 3:



The second hypothesis argued that as ego network size increases, support for nonviolence will also increase. However, this was conditioned on the presence of family members in the ego network. As can be seen in Table 2, the opposite effect is found. The variable *Family* effectively measures the impact of an ego network where there are no family members, and that result is not significant. However, *Ego Size* is significant, and has a negative effect on the dependent variable. *Ego Size* is effectively measuring an ego network where *Family* is equal to zero. For each one-unit increase in *Ego Size*, support for nonviolence decreases by about 14%. The interaction variable, *Family X Ego Size*, shows a significant and positive effect. This reflects that where the ego's family comprises at least half of their ego network, for every one-unit increase in ego network size, there is an 18% increase in the likelihood of supporting nonviolence. Although the net effect of *Family X Ego Size* is positive, the marginal effects of *Family* on *Ego Size*, however small, are negative, indicating a gradual decrease of *Family*'s effect on *Ego Size* as *Ego Size* increases. The marginal effects of *Family* on *Ego Size* are shown in Figure 4. Overall, the results run contrary to the expectation of hypothesis two; that ego network size is positively associated with nonviolence, although as the number of family in an ego network increases, support for nonviolence will decrease

Figure 4:

Among the most intriguing results is the positive and significant impact that *Perceptions of MUJAO* has on the support for nonviolence. The results indicate that for every one-unit increase in *Perceptions of MUJAO*, support for nonviolence increases by 33%. Figure 5 reflects this outcome: as favorability perceptions of MUJAO increase, so too will the probability of supporting nonviolence. The reason this unexpected finding is intriguing is that nearly all references to MUJAO include MUJAO's affiliation with Al Qaeda, its barbarity, and its penchant for doling out biblical forms of punishment. How, then, is a group so mired in violence associated with a positive effect on nonviolence?

Figure 5:

Evidence suggests that there is a discrepancy between the Western and official accounts of MUJAO, as opposed to those of the local population. The local population did not view MUJAO as an invader; rather, MUJAO was largely viewed as a stabilizing force. Doctor Abdul Aziz Maiga, the surgeon at the hospital in Gao, commented:

“Us in Gao, we think that the MUJAO are ten thousand times better than the MNLA because when the MNLA were here they were stealing a lot. They robbed the hospital. They robbed people’s cars. They have raped our women. But with MUJAO we did not see any of this. If someone steals from you, you can see the MUJAO and they will help you (Transcribed from Roussinos 2013).”

The MNLA controlled Gao from the start of the conflict in March 2012 through the end of July, when MUJAO took over the city. Lebovich (2013) writes that “The MNLA was no more popular, and in many areas more hated than the jihadist groups.” When MUJAO

came to town, they cracked down on all behavior they deemed contrary to Islamic law, including the limiting of dance and music, the destruction of drugs⁹, and the practice of cutting off the hands of those suspected of stealing (Roussinos 2013). MUJAO may also be viewed more favorably than the MNLA due to other practices in the area (Pezard and Shurkin 2015). MUJAO recruited extensively from the area outside of Gao, including many from the Songhai and Puel communities. Further, MUJAO tailored its message in Gao specifically for the local population, which is largely Songhai. They were “defending the local population in Gao...against the mostly Tuareg MNLA. MUJAO statements and videos appeals to Songhai symbols, and sometimes referenced conceptions among some sedentary communities of Tuareg as racist” (Lebovich 2013).

In the survey, we asked respondents to indicate their perception of MUJAO and the MNLA¹⁰ ranging from a score a 1 (unfavorably) to 5 (favorably). Both MUJAO and the MNLA are viewed generally unfavorably, but MNLA is view significantly more unfavorably than MUJAO (1.41 versus 1.83).

One might inquire as to why a group that imposed such strict practices on the city would be viewed favorably at all? In general, the residents of Gounzoureye Commune are quite socially and religiously conservative. For example, when asked if “it is acceptable for Muslims to smoke,” less than 5% of respondents said “agree,” and *none of the more than 2,500 respondents* said that they “strongly agree.” More than 95% of respondents agreed that “a wife must always obey her husband,” and 93% of respondents disagreed that “a son and daughter should have equal inheritance rights (Cramer 2015).”

⁹ This is somewhat ironic, as MUJAO’s primary business venture in the region was drug trafficking (Lacher 2012).

¹⁰ We also asked the perceptions of Ansar Dine, and the “militias,” which is the general term used to describe those fighting against the Islamists.

In other words, many of the practices put in place by MUJAO did not outright clash with the customs already in place in Gao, and in turn there was not much of a cultural shock.

Conversations with the program manager for a humanitarian organization in Gao echo the sentiment argued above. MUJAO was not a symbol of violence for many people in the Gao area. They were not viewed as operating as aggressively as the MLNA, and were not corruptible. MUJAO also solved many land issues that had remained unresolved in the inefficient Malian justice system. MUJAO provided law and order, something that had been previously lacking, even under Malian authorities prior to the outbreak of the conflict.

Given all of this, although it was unexpected, the fact that favorable perceptions of MUJAO are associated with higher opinions of nonviolence may only indicate that people are seeking stability, or a change towards peace. MUJAO offered stability, and although they limited expression, they also limited the threat of violence for the population.

“...there is no contradiction in favoring non-violence and MUJAO; MUJAO is not a violent actor in [the populations’] minds (Confidential, personal communication, July 9, 2015).”

The control variables included in the model also present some interesting effects. *Married* has a significant and negative impact on support for nonviolence, indicating that if an individual is married, that individual’s support for nonviolence will be lessened by roughly 28%. Such lessening of support for nonviolence may be due to married individuals having less social mobility; unmarried individuals may have more freedom to interact outside of the family or community than their married counterparts. *Age* is also significant though the impact is relatively minimal. A one-year increase in *Age*

corresponds with a .1% increase in support for nonviolence. In other words, for every decade a person ages, their support for nonviolence increases by approximately 1%.

Neither *Education* nor *Sex* had a significant impact on support levels. That the variable *Education* is not significant is perplexing, as one might expect support for nonviolence to increase with increased education levels. The expectation of increased education associating with increased support for nonviolence may be without merit, or it may be that the bias toward low levels of education in the data is suppressing the result.

Moreover, the lack of significant results for the *Sex* variable is also interesting, given the realities of the conflict. During the conducting of the survey the implementing firm's manager reported that in some villages it was difficult to find male respondents, because "all the men have left to fight." Thus, the conflict experience was likely different for males and females, which may reasonably lead to different levels of support for nonviolence.

Village fixed effects were included in the model, though their impacts were not reported due to space considerations. The omitted village was Gorom Gorom, which as previously noted, had the lowest levels of support for nonviolence. It is unsurprising, then, that some villages were significantly more likely to support nonviolence than Gorom Gorom. Residents from Kaji were 5.3 times as likely to support nonviolence. Residents of Wabaria – Gounzoureye's capital city – were 3.8 times likely as Gorom Gorom to support nonviolence. In fact, the only village *not to* have significantly greater levels of support for nonviolence than Gorom Gorom was Kosseye, though this may be attributable to the relatively few surveys successfully completed in Kosseye.

Overall, the results are mixed. I find strong and consistent evidence that weak ties lead to greater support for nonviolence. However, I find that an increase in ego network size – when the ego network is primarily comprised of family members – has a significant and positive impact on support for nonviolence. This is contrary to the direction argued in hypothesis two. Lastly, the fact that positive perceptions of MUJAO correspond with support for nonviolence was unexpected, but is explainable given the local perceptions of the group.

2.7 Conclusions

The arguments and findings presented in this chapter show how individuals can be affected in their preference for nonviolence. Even in a context of considerable conflict over time, there are identifiable factors that positively impact an individual's preference for nonviolence. The results also point to a more general problem in the literature on conflict studies. The fact that support for nonviolence is positively associated with perceptions of MUJAO indicate that the situation is complex and requires a local understanding. However, discussions of Mali are “emblematic of the de-contextualized approach analysts, politicians, and policy makers have taken in assessing violence in Africa” (Dowd and Raleigh 2013, 499). The situation in northern Mali is often exaggerated as an organized push by Al Qaeda and its affiliates to unite rebel groups under the guise of a monolithic jihad. For example, Lacher (2012) writes “fears [that Al Qaeda is expanding their influence] appear to have been vindicated by the recent takeover of northern Mali by AQIM and organizations closely associated with it.” However, this argument is ill-considered. AQIM did not take over northern Mali with

other organizations (for instance, the MNLA or MUJAO); rather, the MNLA and MUJAO had local grievances and took over northern Mali, and some of their dialogue was supplanted by AQIM's jihadist verbiage.

Predictably, this study has indicated that the presence of weak ties in egocentric networks lead to greater levels of support for nonviolence. Unexpectedly, it was found that greater levels of support for nonviolence are associated with positive perceptions of MUJAO. The challenge of capturing survey data in a conflict area may lead to some shortcomings in this study. The complexity in coding relationships can confound our ability to understand how the ego networks are impacting egos' opinions. Furthermore, given this study is context specific, it must cope with generalizability limitations. The chapters that follow, with the level of analysis expanding, will demonstrate how this local context can relate to a larger understanding of violence and nonviolence.

CHAPTER 3

STATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ON THE USE OF VIOLENCE AND NONVIOLENCE

The literature on violence and nonviolence has examined a wide range of factors thought to impact resistance groups. It is important to situate these factors within the context of this dissertation, such that the conclusions we draw will rely on the full breadth of relevant information. The majority of the factors identified in the literature on violence and nonviolence can be broadly grouped into two categories. The first category includes state and environmental factors, such characteristics include the form of government, economic conditions, political events, or even the geography of the state. The second category includes group-level variables factors, such as a group's ideology, age, or size. This chapter examines the first category, state and environmental factors, due to the relative dearth of information on group-level factors of resistance groups.

In the realm of violent and nonviolent scholarship, violence dominates. As such, many of the factors identified here will exist only in the literature on violent groups. However, these factors are relevant to nonviolent groups, given the relationship between violent and nonviolent tactics. Studies of violence or nonviolence are all addressing, in a general way, the manner in which a groups' resistance is waged. For example, a study that addresses an increase in terrorism is self-censoring arguments by addressing only terrorism; more generally, terrorism is just one tactic a group may use in resistance against the state.

Thus, by stepping back and seeing the conditions under which violence or nonviolence is more likely to occur, we can be better informed about what factors affect

their use. To do this, eleven variables are identified as being commonly included in the literature related to violence and nonviolence. Through the use of data that incorporates both violent and nonviolent incidents, we can identify the impact of the eleven factors on the likelihood of a particular tactic; which factors lead to more violence, and which lead to more nonviolence.

This chapter complements and provides the foundation for the other chapters in this dissertation. The second chapter, “Ego Networks and Support for Nonviolence: Looking at Northern Mali,” examined individual-level factors that impacted support levels for nonviolence. We found that the structure of an individual’s network – in particular the extent to which an individual has weak ties in their ego networks – impact views on nonviolence. Importantly we also found that perceptions of MUJAO were positively associated with support for nonviolence – this is due to the local perception of MUJAO as a stabilizing force. These individual factors highlight the need for a contextualized approach to conflict studies – by simply taking wide-ranging variables and applying them to multiple conflicts, we potentially draw incorrect conclusions about any one conflict. This chapter moves from the individual level to the state and environmental level to examine factors that may broadly impact a group’s use of violence and nonviolence. These factors are important as they affect the environment in which a groups’ resistance takes place. This is an important evolution as it provides a fuller understanding of how groups use violence and nonviolence. Chapter four examines organizations in relation to one another; we find that groups’ tactics are affected by other groups to which they are proximate.

This chapter will proceed by highlighting the literature which argues for and against various state and environmental factors thought to affect group behavior. This is followed by theoretical development and the expected effects of the factors on violent and nonviolent tactics. The methodological section will empirically test the primary variables identified to assess the effect on the likelihood of violence and nonviolence. A discussion of the results and how the variables fit with the larger project will conclude this chapter.

3.1 How Do State and Environment Factors Affect Groups?

Many factors have been argued to impact violent and nonviolent groups. Most of the factors are theorized with regard to violent groups, but that has more to do with the prevalence of violent literature and the availability of data on violent incidents, than about an inapplicability of the factors to groups which use nonviolence. Rather, the literature on nonviolence tends to be more limited, restricted to recent years, and tends to focus on the success or failure of large campaigns, as opposed to variation in operations or the impact of particular variables. However, even with the prevalence of violent literature, that does not mean that these variables are irrelevant or not-significant for nonviolence as well. I argue the factors identified are as applicable to nonviolent groups as they are to violent groups. Factors that affect the use of violence by groups, must also affect the use of nonviolence by groups, as violence and nonviolence simply describe tactical options – either of which may be used by a resistance group. Thus, a variable that impacts violence is also likely to have an impact on nonviolence, and vice versa.

In the following pages I outline four general categories of state and environmental factors that impact group outcomes. The categories outlined are: economic and demographic, government form and behavior, conflict and competition in the environment, and geography.

3.1.1 Demographic and Economic

Demographic and economic factors address arguments which rely on characteristics such as a population size or gross domestic product. Population is often treated as a control variable in conflict studies, much because there is not a direct causal link between population size and a particular outcome. Rather, population may serve to approximate factors such as the pool of resources from which a group may be able to draw. A larger population may mean the possibility of more recruits, skilled workers, money, and it makes it easier for the violent group to blend in (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2012). Raleigh and Hegre (2009) find that conflict is most likely where populations are the most concentrated. Population size is also significant for nonviolent resistances, as a larger population suggests a greater pool of potential protesters and supporters (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). Thus, population in and of itself means little; it is the prospect of increased resources that population size represents that is significant. However, population may also indicate just the opposite – that a larger population serves to approximate the size of the economy, and in turn the resources available to the state to combat the resistance groups (Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer 2010; Young and Dugan 2014).

A state's gross domestic product (GDP), or also the state's GDP per capita, is often theorized to have an impact similar to that of population size. GDP per capita represents a state's level of development; the lower the level of development, the more likely a rebel group will be able to carry out incidents (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hultquist 2013; Jones and Johnston 2013; Meierrieks and Gries 2013). A larger GDP per capita may lead to greater resources or more skilled recruits for the group (Benemelech and Shughart 2010); or a larger GDP per capita may mean that more resources are available to the state. Moreover, a larger GDP per capita may indicate a greater amount of resources for citizens, thereby making the citizens less amenable to the resistance groups (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2012).

3.1.2 Government Form and Behavior

This category identifies factors related to the government or to the government's behavior. Such factors include the form of government (e.g. democracy or autocracy), government actions such as repression, the government's capacity, or the presence of elections. Each of these factors has, for different reasons, been argued to affect the behavior of groups.

The form of political system in a country will play a strong role in the outcomes and form of conflict in a country. Democracy provides groups with particular political goals a viable channel through which they may realize their objectives (Tilly 1978; Eisinger 1973). Meyer writes "the key recognition in the political opportunity perspective is that activists' prospects for advancing particular claims, mobilizing support, and affecting influence are context dependent (2004, 126)." Thus, depending on

the political environment in which a group operates, their strategy and options will vary (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). Saxton and Benson (2006) find that democracies do have higher levels of nonviolent conflict, but that democracies do not have higher levels of violent conflict. This is in part attributable to democracies being less likely to enter a “cycle of violence” where repression and violence cycles create an escalation dilemma.

For some of the same reasons that democracy may make protests and nonviolence more likely, democracy has also been argued to make violence and terrorism more likely (Crenshaw 1981). Fewer restrictions on liberties such as the freedom of movement or communication may allow for more planning by terrorist groups. Further, democracy may also lead to increased levels of terrorism because democratic states are more susceptible to public opinion and the will of the people: characteristics terrorism is likely to affect. Cunningham (2013) finds that factors such as exclusion from the political process actually increase both nonviolence *and* civil war violence when compared to the use of conventional politics. Overall then, there are contrasting expectations for the effect of democracy on violence and nonviolence.

State repression is also thought to affect group behavior, though the expectations are inconsistent (Shellman, Levey, and Young 2013). Lichbach (1987) finds that increasing repression will limit nonviolent resistance but encourage violent resistance. Rasler (1996) and Opp and Ruehl (1990) find that repression will lead to increased protest activity. Moore (1998) concludes that state repression can shape group behavior, but not eliminate it. Contrast this with Saxton and Benson (2006) who find that repression will positively impact rebellion – both of the violent and nonviolent variety. Regan and Norton (2005) find that repression encourages violence but discourages

nonviolence. Asal et al (2013) find evidence that state repression will decrease the likelihood of a group using nonviolent methods, but will lead to an increase in the use of violence by these organizations.

An interesting approach to the relationship between repression and the use of violence or nonviolence comes from Cunningham and Beaulieu (2010), when they argue that groups look to previous state responses to violence in choosing their own tactics. In situations where the state responded to violence with consistent repression, the group may switch to nonviolent tactics. However, where the state was inconsistent in its application of repression, the group would continue using violence. A related argument is that groups may *want* the state to repress the population in response to some tactic of resistance. Given the often covert nature of these organizations, it can be difficult for the state to respond directly to the perpetrators; instead, the state is often forced into widespread repression of a particular area or ethnic group. This repression, which impacts all individuals in the area or ethnic group (not only those involved with the resistance group), may then increase support for the resistance group by the population as the population sees the state as a repressive force. This argument has been made a number of times (Crenshaw 1981; Kydd and Walter 2006; Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009), and though not directly testable in this project, offers an interesting alternative argument regarding state repression. Worth noting, it is important to consider the political form of a state and repression independently from one another in and theory and testing, as democratic states can repress, and autocratic states can allow freedoms. Even in democratic states where nonviolence is common or encouraged, the occurrence of state repression is likely to completely change the dynamics of political resistance

(Tilly 1978; Gurr and Moore 1997; Regan and Norton 2005; Davenport 2007; Asal et al. 2013; Saxton and Benson 2006).

The strength or capacity of the government is another factor argued to impact group behavior. If a government is strong, then “it is able to police its citizens, provide basic services, and otherwise take the wind out of an insurgent’s sails – not to mention employ thousands or even millions of police and soldiers to actively hunt down insurgents (Byman 2013, 355).” This idea is similar to that put forth by Gaibullov and Sandler (2012) when they argue that a higher GDP per capita allows the government more resources to combat the resistance groups.

The occurrence of elections have also been argued to bring about violence (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000; Ellman and Wantchekon 2000). As an election nears, violence will increase (Newman 2013). This is similar to a spoiler argument, where groups excluded from or in opposition to certain political outcomes carry out violent attacks in an effort to “spoil” the process (Kydd and Walter 2006; Braithwaite, Foster, and Sobek 2010; Bloom 2004; Chenoweth, Miller, and McClellan 2009; Stedman 1997; Robbins, Hunter, and Murray 2013).

3.1.3 Conflict and Competition in the Environment

Conflict and competition in the environment captures factors that deal with civil wars and the extent to which groups are competing with one another. Civil war itself poses a problem in this application, as much of the data on “terrorism” are actually violent incidents attributable to group behavior in civil wars. Thus, although civil wars are argued to bring with them more violence, the fact that violence is *required* for a civil

war poses tautological problems. Eight of the ten most active groups (by number of events) in START's *Global Terrorism Database* are also primary combatants in UCDP-PRIO's *civil war* data. This indicates that terrorism and civil war should be considered together, though such efforts are relatively rare (Findley and Young 2012a; Fortna 2015; Kalyvas 2004; Kalyvas 2006; Sambanis 2008) when compared to the vast literature that treats civil war and terrorism independently. In either case, it is expected – in part by definition – that the presence of a civil war will be associated with higher levels of violence than nonviolence. Findley and Young (2012a) find that terrorism is most prevalent during a civil war, somewhat frequent following a civil war, and is the least prevalent prior to a civil war; though their conclusions are perhaps unsurprising given the overlap of groups that use “terrorism” and groups that simply engaging in “violence” in a civil war.

A factor attributable to competition in the environment is the number of groups active in a state. As there are more resistance groups active, it has been argued that these groups will increase their violence in order to differentiate themselves from one another. This differentiation may provide them more public support, which is a finite and sought after resource. Bloom argues that the number of groups matter in the context of suicide terrorism, and asserts that the competition for support provides “incentives...to jump on the ‘suicide bandwagon’ and ramp up the violence in order to distinguish themselves from other organizations (2005, 94). Kydd and Walter (2006) also argue that outbidding is a strategy used by terrorist groups, however their argument applies to all varieties of terrorism, not only suicide terrorism. Despite these expectations, Findley and Young (2012b) find little support for an outbidding strategy in their large cross-national study;

instead they conclude that the number of groups in a state has no impact on either terrorism in general or suicide terrorism in particular.

We might also expect a ‘reverse outbidding’ strategy, where in an environment of many violent groups, a group might switch to using nonviolence as a means to differentiate themselves (Dudouet 2013). This logic is similar to that presented by Cunningham and Stanton (2009) in which they argued there may be a decrease in terrorism as groups vie to become a legitimate representative of the people. The underlying logic is the same for an outbidding strategy – a group tries to differentiate itself from the others – but in this case the differentiation comes from the use of nonviolence as opposed to the use of more frequent or lethal violence.

3.1.4 Geography

Following the example of numerous other studies (Blomberg, Gaibullov, and Sandler 2011; Fearon and Laitin 2003), geographic factors are considered here as variables that may affect group behavior. The percentage of the country in a tropical area, which approximates the extent of jungle, is included as it is argued that jungles provide resistance groups more opportunities to hide and retreat, thereby enabling them to persist, plan, and attack (DeRouen and Sobek 2004). Mountainous terrain, included for similar reasons, suggests that a group may be able to retreat to the mountains, where the government would find it difficult to pursue (Young and Dugan 2014; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gaibullov and Sandler 2012; Abadie 2006). However, Buhaug and Lujala (2005) conducted a study with subnational data (which allows for greater accuracy on

geographic factors) and “found that conflict zones are actually less forested and less mountainous than their host country average... (Nemeth, Mauslein, and Craig 2014).”

The size of a country may also impact violence, either because it provides resistance groups more opportunity to retreat, or because it provides the state more area from which to extract wealth. Studies that include land size (Abadie 2006; Lee 2013) do not develop theoretical arguments. An additional factor identified as impacting group behavior is the extent to which a country is landlocked. A country that is landlocked does not provide a group as much opportunity to retreat, and makes it more difficult to move weapons and personnel into and out of the country (Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer 2010; Gaibullov and Sandler 2012). Abadie (2006) includes landlocked in their model, but argues that it is relevant because the extent to which a country is landlocked will affect the national income, and in turn the state’s ability to combat internal threats.

Often, these variables are examined in the context of group survival or longevity; the ability for a group to retreat to safer quarters suggests that the group will survive for a greater length of time. However, these variables are often not significant or have little impact (Blomberg, Gaibullov, and Sandler 2011; Young and Dugan 2014; Gaibullov and Sandler 2012). Nemeth et al (2014) find that mountainous terrain is significant in determining the location of conflict hotspots, but only in democracies.

3.2 How Do These Factors Apply to Both Violence and Nonviolence?

How do the factors identified impact the likelihood of violence or nonviolence? Much of the literature has only addressed one or the other of these outcomes, as opposed to considering both violent and nonviolent outcomes in conjunction with one another. In

turn, there are not clear theoretical expectations for each variable. The expectations that are identifiable are outlined below, and initial conjecture is offered for those variables with theoretical ambiguity.

3.2.1 Expectations of Demographic and Economic Factors

The primary demographic and economic factors identified in the literature include a state's population size and some measure of development, which often is captured using gross domestic product (GDP) or GDP per capita. Population size has been argued to correlate with an increase in violence (Gaibullov and Sandler 2012; Raleigh and Hegre 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003), to correlate with nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth, Ulfelder, and Lewis 2012; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013), and to correlate with less violence, due to the greater state resources associated with a larger population (Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer 2010; Young and Dugan 2014). Population seems to impact violence and nonviolence in similar ways. A larger population is likely to provide more recruits and resources for both violent and nonviolent groups. Moreover, if a larger population does indeed provide the state with more resources, then the state should be more capable with a larger population to combat both violent and nonviolent uprisings. Chenoweth and Lewis arrive to a similar conclusion, when they write "Perhaps most striking is that violent and nonviolent campaigns share only one determinant in common: population size" (2013, 420). Given all of this, we should expect population to have little to no significant impact in determining the likelihood of violence or nonviolence.

Hypothesis 1: Population size will have no impact on likelihood of violent or nonviolent incidents.

The level of development also presents contradictory expectations in terms of whether resistance groups are benefitted or restricted with increased development. A larger GDP per capita may lead to greater resources (such as skilled recruits or donations) (Benemelech and Shughart 2010), or a larger GDP per capita may make the state more resilient (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and more able to fight the resistance groups (Gaibullov and Sandler 2012). The idea that a higher GDP per capita leads to greater resources for the group is somewhat thin, considering that really GDP per capita is conceptualized as a broad measure of the potential pool of possible resources from which the group can draw. I suspect the more meaningful conceptualization would use GDP per capita as a measure of development or general quality of life for citizens of the state. In turn, this level of development is also measuring the basic level of costs to an individual should they decide to combat the state. Where costs to the individual are lower (i.e. where development is low), violence would be more likely. However, where there are high levels of development, we should expect that resistance efforts fall more within the realm of acceptability; such as is the case with nonviolence. If there is political resistance in states with higher levels of development, nonviolence will be more likely due to the relative lower costs of nonviolence than violence for the individual.

Hypothesis 2: Increased levels of development will lead to a greater likelihood of nonviolence than violence.

3.2.2 Expectations of Government Form and Behavioral Factors

The primary factors identified in the literature relating to the government include the level of democracy, state repression, state capacity, and the occurrence of elections. Democratic political systems allow groups with grievances a venue or channel through

which they may express and potentially achieve their goals (Tilly 1978; Eisinger 1973). However, the additional freedoms associated with democracy, such as the freedom of movement or the open means of communication may also enable violence (Crenshaw 1981). Further, because public opinion influences democracies, a campaign of violence may be able to effect change or cause a particular outcome. This same logic applies to the expected increase of violence around elections. Violence increases around elections – basic feature of democracies – because it may impact the way people vote (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000; Newman 2013). These efforts at “spoiling” the elections have been shown to have a significant impact on peace processes and election outcomes (Kydd and Walter 2006; Bloom 2004; Robbins, Hunter, and Murray 2013).

For these reasons, we should expect that the likelihood of violent incidents over nonviolent incidents will increase the more democratic a state is, and will increase with the occurrence of elections. Democracies provide channels through which certain objectives may be achieved through conventional political methods – thus, there should not be a prevalence of nonviolent incidents. Elections will cause a similar outcome; the act of voting in an election is already a civil, nonviolent method of exercising change. In turn, nonviolent incidents such as mass protests should be less likely to occur. Violence, however, can have a large impact on the outcome of elections, and will likely increase around elections as a result.

Hypothesis 3: Increased levels of democracy will lead to a greater likelihood of violence than nonviolence.

Hypothesis 4: The occurrence of elections will lead to a greater likelihood of violence than nonviolence.

Repression is also thought to affect group behavior, though the manner through which this influence occurs is unclear. Repression may increase protest activity (Rasler 1996; Opp and Ruehl 1990), increase both violent and nonviolent activity (Saxton and Benson 2006), or increase only violent activity (Regan and Norton 2005; Asal et al. 2013). Given the contradictory expectations of how state repression impacts group behavior, we should expect that repression has no impact on the likelihood of violent over nonviolent activities.

Hypothesis 5: State repression will have no impact on likelihood of violent or nonviolent incidents.

State capacity is also expected to affect group behavior, as the stronger the government is, the better able they will be to combat resistance groups. Byman (2013) argues that if a government is strong, then it will be able to better police and provide security and opportunities for its citizens; both of which counteract violent groups. Violent groups will have a difficult time operating in a high-security environment, and if citizens are provided a safe environment with opportunities, then they will be less likely to lend support to violent groups. For these reasons, we should expect that as state capacity increases, nonviolence will be more likely than violence.

Hypothesis 6: Increased state capacity will lead to a greater likelihood of nonviolence than violence.

3.2.3 Expectations of Conflict and Competition Factors

Two primary factors were discussed in the conflict and competition category: civil war and the number of competing groups. As mentioned previously, to include a variable for civil wars in this chapter would present tautological problems. In order for

there to be a “civil war”, there must have been at least 25 battle-related deaths (N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). Thus, there is a built-in bias towards violence in the data. While nonviolence can and does occur in the context of civil wars, the inclusion of a civil war variable would be misleading.¹¹

The second factor was the number of resistance groups operating in a given environment. Groups may behave differently if they are competing with other groups for resources and support. Like many of the factors identified here, there are conflicting expectations for how the number of groups affects group behavior. The most common expectation is that as the number of groups in a particular area increases, groups will increase their use of violence in an effort to ‘outbid’ their competitors and draw support from the population (Kydd and Walter 2006; Bloom 2005). However, Findley and Young (2012b) found no evidence of outbidding behavior. An opposing argument suggests that as the number of groups increase, nonviolence will increase due to groups differentiating themselves from the other groups (Dudouet 2013; D. Cunningham and Stanton 2009). In consideration of Findley and Young’s (2012b) findings and the equally plausible argument that groups may shift to nonviolence in the face of an increasing number of actors, we should expect that nonviolence will increase relative to violence as the number of groups in a state increases.

Hypothesis 7: As the number of groups operating a state in a given year increases, nonviolence will increase relative to violence.

¹¹ To explore this further, a model was run with a dichotomous variable indicating a civil war in a given country-year. Unsurprisingly, there was a significant and positive effect on the likelihood of violence; an impact that was many magnitudes greater than any other variable in the model. This reaffirmed concerns of bias toward violence. Notably, all other outcomes in the model held in terms of both association and level of significance.

3.2.4 Expectations of Geographic Factors

Geographic factors do not typically have a great deal of theoretical development associated with them; rather they are conditions in a country that may give an advantage to the resistance group or state. Mountainous terrain provides violent groups terrain in which they can better hide and defend themselves against the government (Young and Dugan 2014; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Abadie 2006). For example, the Houthis, in Yemen, have long benefitted from mountainous terrain. Though they have since become active over much of the country, they have for many years been thriving and active in the mountainous region of Sa'ada. A country that is landlocked makes it more difficult for a group to move weapons and personnel and to wage an effective campaign against the state. A country that is tropical, which suggests jungle coverage, provides violent groups areas to hide out and defend themselves (much like mountainous terrain). Lastly, the size of a country may impact group behavior, though the reason why is somewhat underdeveloped. On the one hand, a larger country may provide rebel groups more opportunities to hide and retreat. On the other hand, a larger country may mean greater resources for the state to combat resistance groups.

Mountainous terrain and tropical forest coverage should lead to a greater likelihood of violence over nonviolence, because it provides violent groups with areas from which to attack and where to retreat; moreover, nonviolent groups will derive no benefit from mountainous terrain or forest coverage. Violent groups rely on the ability to move resources and weaponry; if a country is landlocked, moving supplies is more challenging, making violent campaigns more difficult to carry out. This increased difficulty will to relatively more nonviolence. Lastly, the size of the country is likely to

have no measurable impact on either the likelihood of violence or nonviolence, as there is no theoretical reason either such behavior should become prevalent with an increase in geographic area.

Hypothesis 8: As the percentage of mountainous terrain in a country increases, the likelihood of violence over nonviolence will increase.

Hypothesis 9: As the percentage of tropical forest coverage in a country increases, the likelihood of violence over nonviolence will increase.

Hypothesis 10: The extent to which a country is landlocked will not have a significant impact on the likelihood of either nonviolence or violence.

Hypothesis 11: The geographic size of a country will not have a significant impact on the likelihood of either nonviolence or violence.

3.3 Data and Methodology

The goal of this chapter is exploratory – what is the impact of the range of factors identified on the occurrence of violence or nonviolence? The variables identified have been tested a number of times, but only ever with violent *or* nonviolent data – not with data that includes both violent *and* nonviolent incidents. By combining the data to include the range of resistance methods, we can more fully understand the variables' impact.

The data used to model the impact of the factors outlined above, on both violence and nonviolence simultaneously, is based in large part on two datasets: the Global Terrorism Database (START 2012) and the Social Conflict in Africa Database (Salehyan et al. 2012). Both of these datasets have data at the incident level; as opposed to larger war or campaign level data used elsewhere (N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) includes all manner of violence – not just terrorism. In turn, we can capture violence more appropriately considered as

guerrilla or insurgent activities. The Social Conflict and Africa Database includes data on both violent and nonviolent incidents. The data range from 1990 to 2011¹².

After combining and cleaning the data, we are left with a dataset of 4,774 unique incidents – both violent and nonviolent – perpetrated by 218 unique groups. The inclusion of the eleven independent variables central to this chapter led to a decrease in the number of observations on which the model is estimated; ultimately the model is estimated on 3,664 observations. The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of violence – the variable equals 1 if the incident was violent and a 0 if the incident was nonviolent. Violent incidents dominate the data, though nonviolent incidents still account for some 17 percent of the observations.¹³ In order to test the hypotheses laid out in this chapter, a logistic regression¹⁴ is used, and coefficients reported as odds-ratios. Given the dependent variable indicates violence or nonviolence, and the type of model chosen, interpretation is straightforward. A significant coefficient greater than or equal to 1 indicates the independent variable makes violence more likely than nonviolence; a significant coefficient less than 1 indicates the independent variable makes nonviolence more likely than violence.

There are eleven independent variables, each corresponding with a particular hypothesis previously outlined. The *Population* variable measures the natural log of a country's population size in a given year. The *GDP/Capita* variable measures the gross domestic product per capita for a country in a given year. Both *Population* and

¹² The year 1993 is excluded due to issues with the Global Terrorism Database's data.

¹³ Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013) discuss some of the primary issues in observing and recording incidents of nonviolence, some of which likely contribute to the relative dearth of nonviolent incidents accounted for here.

¹⁴ Standard errors are clustered on the country, to account for any unaccounted for country effects.

GDP/Capita are taken from the World Bank's open database ("World Bank Open Data" 2015).

As the *Democracy* variable increases, it indicates that the country is becoming more democratic. The data¹⁵ used to measure this comes from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011). *Elections* is based on the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy dataset (NELDA) created by Hyde and Marinov (2012). The variable counts the number of presidential and legislative elections that take place in a given country-year. *Repression* is measured by finding the average value of negative Goldstein-scale incidents (King and Lowe 2003) of within-country interactions recorded in the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) dataset (Virtual Research Associates 2012). The value was then multiplied by -1 such that an increase in the value of the variable indicates an increase in state repression. *Capacity* is taken from the Relative Political Capacity Dataset (Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. 2012), and measures the ability to extract resources from society.

The only independent variable included from the conflict and competition category is the number of groups in a given state. *Number of Groups* is the count of groups active in a state in a given country-year. A group was counted if they perpetrated at least 1 violent or nonviolent incident. The variable ranges from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 11 groups active in a country-year.

¹⁵ I also explored including a squared-variable for both democracy and repression to address potential curvilinear relationships. The polity-squared variable was significant, though the effect on the dependent variable was exceedingly negligible. The repression-squared variable had no significant impact on the dependent variable. All other variables maintain the same relationships and levels of significance, with either the inclusion or exclusion of the squared terms.

There are four independent variables which account for geographic factors. The four variables were taken from the Country Geography Data housed at Portland State University (“Country Geographic Data,” n.d.). *Mountainous* measures the average elevation of a country. Although a country could technically have a very high average elevation and no mountains, this variable serves as a good (and commonly used) approximate. *Tropical* measures the percentage of the country that falls within a tropical zone, which corresponds with the percentage of the country expected to have forest coverage. *Landlocked* measures the mean distance to a coast for each country – the greater the mean distance to the coast, the greater the extent to which a country is landlocked. Lastly, *Land Size* is the geographic size of a country, measured in square kilometers.

The last variable included in the model is the *Proportion of Nonviolence/Violence*, which measures the proportion of nonviolent to violent events, across all groups in a given year. *Proportion of Nonviolence/Violence* is included in order to account for potential trends in the data. For example, if over the twenty-year time-frame of the data, nonviolence became more commonly used than violence, it may bias the results. Thus, including *Proportion of Nonviolence/Violence* accounts will account for such potential trends.

3.4 Findings

The findings from the logistic regression model are shown in Table 3.

Table 3:


Factors Impacting the Likelihood of Resistance Groups
Using Violent Tactics

Population	1.05 (.299)
GDP/Capita	0.99** (.000)
Democracy	1.04 (.058)
Elections	0.73** (.096)
Repression	2.02*** (.475)
Capacity	0.47 (.259)
Number of Groups	0.76 (.149)
Mountainous	1.001 (.000)
Tropical	1.32 (1.098)
Landlocked	0.99 (.002)
Land Size	1.00** (.000)
Proportion of Nonviolence/Violence	0.005*** (.006)
Constant	2.17 (10.72)
Observations	3664
Standard Errors in Parentheses	
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$	

The results shown in Table 3 reflect mixed support for the expectations outlined in the hypotheses. The two hypotheses regarding economic and demographic factors are

supported with our model. Population size did not have a significant impact on either violence or nonviolence, confirming expectations. This non-finding of significance likely reflects the confounding effects of a large population. Population can both enable resistance groups by providing more resources, and also provide more resources for the state, making the state's response potentially more effective.


Our measure for a state's development, GDP/Capita, also confirms expectations. The coefficient returned, 0.99, indicates that nonviolence is more likely to occur than is violence, as a state's GDP/Capita increases. Though the effect is small, this finding lends some support to the argument that with greater levels of development, nonviolence is more likely than violence due to the greater associated costs for the individual to become involved with violent campaigns. The predicted probability of violence over nonviolence, as predicted by GDP/Capita, is graphed in Figure 6, and shows a precipitous drop in the likelihood of violence relative to nonviolence as GDP/Capita increases.

Figure 6:

The findings for the hypotheses related to government form and behavior are somewhat mixed. The level of democracy does not have a significant impact on the likelihood of violence or nonviolence, contrary to the expectations of Hypothesis 3. The presence of elections actually makes nonviolence more likely than violence, which was unexpected (hypothesis 4). The argument that groups may use violence to spoil elections is not supported here. While spoiling has been demonstrated to have an impact in some cases, the spoiling arguments are typically illustrated with case studies, and never with data that incorporated both violence and nonviolence. Based on the evidence presented here, nonviolence is actually 27 percent more likely to occur in an election year than is violence. The variable measuring elections ranges from 0 to 3, which means that in some

cases, nonviolence was 81 percent more likely than violence (in states where there were three elections in a year).

The results for the repression variable indicate that as state repression increases, violence is significantly more likely to occur than nonviolence. The expectation of hypothesis 5 was that repression would not have a significant effect, given the contradictory arguments and findings of previous literature. The significant results indicating violence is more likely to occur than nonviolence supports previous arguments made by Regan and Norton (2005) and Asal et al. (2013), and is contradictory to those made by Opp and Ruehl (1990) and Rasler (1996). The predicted probability of the repression variable is shown in Figure 7, and demonstrates that as repression increases, so too will the likelihood of violence over nonviolence. Further, it shows that the greatest change in likelihood of violence over nonviolence happens at low levels of repression; as repression reaches high levels, there is less of an impact.

Figure 7:

Hypothesis 6, which stated that nonviolence should increase as state capacity increases, is not supported by the results shown in Table 1. State capacity does not have a significant impact on the likelihood of violence relative to nonviolence. The variable reflecting the number of groups is also not significant – suggesting that the number of groups in an area has no effect on the likelihood of violence relative to nonviolence. The only geographic variable shown to have a significant impact on the likelihood of violence relative to nonviolence is the size of the country. *Land Size* has a positive and significant impact on the dependent variable, though the magnitude of effect is quite small (coefficient is 1.0000001).

The last variable included in the model is the *Proportion of Nonviolence/Violence*, which measures the proportion of nonviolence relative to violence, occurring in a given

year. This variable allows us to account for global trends that may contribute to the use of violence or nonviolence in a given year. The positive and significant effect of *Proportion of Nonviolence/Violence* suggests that over time, there has been a small trend towards the use of nonviolence.

3.5 Conclusions

The results show mixed support the hypotheses argued in this chapter. By identifying primary factors that are commonly used in the literature on violence and nonviolence, we were able to assess their relative impacts on the likelihood of each tactic. The results show that by considering only violence or only nonviolence, our understanding of resistance groups may be quite distorted. However, by including both violent and nonviolent tactics in the study, we identify how the identified variables impact their likelihood of occurring. In many ways, this chapter demonstrated that factors often thought to impact violence and nonviolence have no discernable impact on the likelihood of one or the other when the data includes both violence and nonviolence. These findings provide some clarity on otherwise contradictory or unclear arguments. Further, the findings also provide some unexpected results, such as elections being associated with more nonviolence than violence.

Two of the factors identified (GDP/Capita and elections) had significant and positive impacts on the likelihood of nonviolence relative to violence, whereas two factors (repression and land size) had significant and positive impacts on the likelihood of violence relative to nonviolence. That state repression was positive and significant

provides clarity on a factor that previously had many contradictory arguments in the literature.

The results presented in this chapter, which used a full dataset of both violent and nonviolent incidents, provided a unique and more thorough means of examining the impacts of the identified factors. These factors help to situate the other chapters of this dissertation, in that they allow for a more complete understanding of the various impacts on violence and nonviolence. In chapter two, we looked at how individual-level factors affected opinions on nonviolence. In this chapter, we gained an understanding of how state and environmental level factors influence violence and nonviolence. In chapter four, the perspective will change again, and examine how groups are impacted in their use of violence and nonviolence by other, proximate groups.

CHAPTER 4

THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONS ON VIOLENT AND NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

The African National Congress (ANC) waged a lengthy campaign against the South African government while utilizing both violent and nonviolent tactics in an effort to achieve their goals. The ANC ultimately found success as the apartheid system was dismantled, and the group took control of the government. Did the successes of the ANC motivate other resistance groups to adopt similar tactics and strategies? Organizations such as the ANC are likely to serve as successful examples to other organizations struggling to achieve their own objectives. Though the ANC is a remarkable example, less notable groups also illustrate the potential of various violent and nonviolent tactics.

Resistance groups will look to their contemporaries for examples of what tactics have been more or less effective in opposing the state. Though each circumstance and environment is unique, it is expected that groups engaged in a resistance against the state will seek out strategies and tactics previously used by other, similar groups. This expectation leads to the primary question of this chapter: to what extent do organizations adopt the tactics of other, proximate, organizations?

This chapter will look at groupings of organizations over time in an effort to explain the spread of tactical variation: in particular, the spread of nonviolent tactics to violent organizations. Although violence may also spread to nonviolent organizations, the diffusion of violence will be much less likely to occur than the diffusion of nonviolence due to the adoption of violence having a greater associated cost. The approach of this chapter was inspired by the study of networks, and how particular

variables such as a disease or knowledge spread through network relationships. Though networks are not used in this chapter, the looser conception of organizational fields provides an analogous idea and identifies organizational neighbors as the potential recipients and drivers of diffusion. The goal of this chapter is to identify the extent to which a group *changes* its tactics. In order to explore this change, potential illustrative groups (which serve as references of behavior) must be identified.

The utility of jointly examining violent and nonviolent tactics was demonstrated in the previous chapters. In this chapter, I take the examination further by approaching violent and nonviolent tactics from an inter-organizational level. Having already looked at the individual level in chapter two, and the state and environmental level in chapter three, this chapter seeks to identify the effect organizations have on other organizations' use of violence and nonviolence.

This chapter will proceed by examining literature that lays the foundation for understanding the diffusion of tactics through organizations. Several fields are relevant here, including organizational learning, organizational fields, and the literature on conflict and policy diffusion. Following review of the literature, I present the arguments and expectations of this chapter. The data and methods used will be presented, followed by a discussion of the findings. The concluding section will offer an overview of the contributions and insights of this chapter, as well as situate these findings within the larger dissertation.

4.1 Literature Review: Group Learning and Diffusion

Two general fields of literature inform the arguments of this chapter; the literature on organizations and organizational learning, and the literature on diffusion. The concepts and arguments drawn from these fields are often approached separately; however, I argue that the underlying logics are similar and relatable. One such similarity is the role of agency in organizational learning and diffusion. Agency suggests an “active” role in the spread of ideas, processes, or outcomes; this contrasts with the more “passive” spread of effects found in some contagion literature. Though contagion arguments may offer insights from which we can borrow ideas, it is the underlying logic of organizational learning and agency that is most relevant to the arguments of this chapter.

Organizational learning is “the development of new knowledge or insights that have the potential to influence behavior” (Slater and Narver 1995, 63). Though this definition was conceived in reference to legal organizations, it is equally relevant to groups opposing the state. Organizational learning has been used to mean multiple things over the years, but in this application, organizational learning refers to the adoption of resistance tactics by groups. This adoption, which signifies learning, may be evinced either by predominantly violent groups using nonviolent tactics, or by predominantly nonviolent groups using violent tactics.

But when can we expect to see organizations adopting a new tactic? To help understand when organizations adopt new tactics, we can look to the concept of an organizational learning curve. Learning curves help understand how tactics might be adopted over time. As the cumulative output of a good – in this case a tactic of resistance

– is increased, the cost of that good is decreased (Argote 1999). As a particular tactic is increasingly used, the relative costs associated with using that tactic will decrease. Cost of use helps to explain why the adoption of tactic unique to an area is rare. In areas that exhibit high levels of violence, the additional use of violence has a low relative cost. However, the introduction of nonviolent tactics into a violence-prone area will have higher relative costs. Likewise, violent tactics will have a greater associated cost in predominantly nonviolent areas. Relative costs are related to the concept of thresholds; Granovetter (1978) argues that as the number of adopters of a particular innovation increases, other organizations will meet their ‘threshold’ and then themselves adopt the new innovation. Each organization has a different threshold – the point at which it chooses to adopt the innovation.

This contrasts with Levitt’s and March’s (1988) argument that organizational learning is more of an unintentional phenomenon, which is similar to the “passive” contagion arguments found in some diffusion literature. According to Levitt and March, learning occurs when incremental changes become internalized by an organization, as opposed to some rational decision to change practices. However, the logic of incremental change being internalized is not as applicable to resistance groups as to legal organizations: the change of tactics identified in this chapter is not incremental. The shift of tactics from violent to nonviolent, or nonviolent to violent, are significant changes and suggests rational and “active” decisions.

The concepts found in the organizational learning literature are similar to those in the diffusion literature. As previously noted, diffusion literature approaches learning with an agential perspective – organizations will actively learn – as opposed to a

perspective looking at innovation as an unintentional, contagious effect. Rogers (2003) argues that diffusion is a process by which “(1) an *innovation* (2) is *communicated* through certain *channels* (3) *over time* (4) among members of a *social system*” (2003, 11). Rogers’ approach to diffusion suggests that innovations are actively communicated between organizations (within a particular social system).

These four conditions are present in this chapter’s examination of the spread of violent and nonviolent tactics. The *innovation* is the tactic – violent or nonviolent. If a group is predominantly violent, then the potential innovation is nonviolence. If a group is predominantly nonviolent, then the potential innovation is violence. The *communication channels* are the direct and indirect means of spreading the tactic. Roberts writes that “mass media channels are usually the most rapid and efficient means of informing and audience of potential adopters about the existence of an innovation – that is, to create awareness-knowledge (2003, 18). I expect the mass media also serves as the most common avenue of information spread in this context of violent and nonviolent tactics. Though, direct contacts (e.g. personal relationships, group alliances, social media) are also likely to spread information. The third condition of Roberts’ approach – that the process occurs *over time* – is accounted for by the inclusion of more than two decades of data. By modeling the use of violent and nonviolent tactics over time, we can see how the prevalence of violence and nonviolence spreads. Lastly, the *social system* is the organizational field to which the group is party. Organizational fields represent the contemporary organizations to which or from which new tactics may spread.

The literature on diffusion processes has consistently demonstrated that effects (e.g. conflict, democracy) spread to neighboring states. These findings are important for

at least two reasons. First, the evidence shows that processes do in fact spread to other areas. Conflict spreads to neighboring states (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; K. S. Gleditsch 2007; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Braithwaite 2010; Maves and Braithwaite 2013) due to geographic proximity but also due to “ethnic affinities, security ties, and political relationships (Kathman 2010, 991).” Policy effects, such as democracy, may also spread to neighboring states (Brinks and Coppedge 2006). Brinks and Coppedge go further to argue that “purely domestic actors can be influenced by events in neighboring countries” (2006, 467). Even organizations in conflict with the government – and that have purely local intentions – can be influenced by organizations in other states and with wholly different objectives. Innovations of tactics have also been demonstrated to spread by diffusion. Horowitz (2010) finds that suicide bombing – an innovation for many terrorist groups over the years – is spread via direct and indirect relationships between groups.

The last concept that we must rely on is the concept of organizational fields. Organizational fields are akin to actors in a network; organizational fields are a community of organizations that provide similar services or products, and are subject to similar pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Additionally, organizational fields can be extended to include the network and configuration of relations, and the interaction of multiple, overlapping networks (Powell et al. 2005). Organizational fields are important because as the organizational field defines the set of actors which may serve as behavioral references for other organizations. Thus, the organizational field is the “social system” from which actors can learn. A particular organization will look to reference

organizations – identified by joint inclusion in an organizations field – for information and examples of tactical behavior.

4.2 Theoretical Arguments

In this section, I outline the two primary arguments to be explored and tested. First, groups will increasingly adopt a new tactic as the use of that tactic increases by other groups in the organizational field. Second, environmental uncertainty will affect the rate of adoption of new resistance tactics. As environmental uncertainty increases, the adoption rate of new tactics will increase.

4.2.1 Adopting Innovations

Tactical innovations will be diffused through members of the same social system. Similar to what Rogers (2003) argued, organizational fields serve as the roster of similar groups from which learning may derive. Organizational fields serve to delineate the bounds of rationality; bounded rationality affects actors and how the actors learn (Weyland 2005a; Weyland 2005b; Weyland 2007). Effectively, the pool from which the groups draw reference is limited to the other actors in their organizational field.

Pressure to adopt a new tactic will emerge from one of two areas – technical considerations or political calculations – both of which are relevant to violent and nonviolent groups. Technical considerations refer to what a group is capable of given characteristics such as expertise and resources. A violent group which loses a bomb-maker or lacks the necessary funds may be obligated to consider nonviolent options, if those prove to be more readily available or more feasible to carry-out. Likewise, a

nonviolent group which has the requisite resources to utilize violent tactics may consider them if the group expects the use of violence to move them toward their objectives.

Political calculations, the second area about which Weyland writes, are the demands and expectations made by constituents and stakeholders of the group. The demands and expectations are likely to involve legitimacy concerns or expectations of their supporting populace.

As further evidence of organizational fields impacting the adoption of innovations, Horowitz (2010) finds that *indirect* relationships are sufficient for the spread of new tactics. Indirect connections are precisely the type of relationship to be expected between groups sharing an organizational field. Organizational fields are operationalized in this chapter as groups proximate to one another – this operationalization neither assumes nor requires direct connections to be evident. However, congruent with Horowitz' findings, direct connections are not necessary for an innovation to spread. For example, the group Hamas in Israel was inspired to use suicide bombings by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (2010, 37).

Given that indirect connections – such as those found between groups in an organizational field – will be sufficient for diffusion processes and organizational learning, the next question is what will be transmitted? Both violent and nonviolent tactics can be diffused through organizational fields; however nonviolent tactics will be more likely to spread for several reasons. Nonviolent tactics are preferred to violent tactics for at least two reasons (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). First, nonviolent tactics are met with greater legitimacy than are violent tactics. Second, it is more challenging for the state security apparatus to respond to nonviolent tactics than it is violent tactics.

Nonviolent tactics are also likely to have a lower associated cost than are violent tactics (Kurzman 1996; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Violent tactics come at a high costs; likely requiring weapons, training, and detailed planning – all while at risk of discovery, imprisonment, or death. The high costs of violent tactics contrast with nonviolent tactics; although nonviolent tactics may still require extensive planning and materiel, the associated risks of capture and death are significantly lower. Braithwaite, Kucik, and Maves (2014) note violent groups may “...require participants to be screened, to have high levels of training, to be removed from their daily lives, and to engage in higher risk activities,” however the use of nonviolent tactics may mean that participants are “...able to return to their workplace or home in between activities and do not necessarily need to be pre-screened or trained in order to take part.” Moreover, nonviolent tactics are less risky to plan and carry-out for both participants and the group.

The impact that costs have on the adoption of violent and nonviolent tactics relates closely to the threshold arguments made by Granovetter (1978). Threshold levels for the adoption of a new tactic are situation-specific: the levels vary by group, environment, and circumstance. Due to the relatively low cost associated with nonviolent tactics, the threshold for adoption is lower, compared to the high-costs and high threshold level for adoption of violent tactics. If the threshold for adoption of nonviolent tactics is relatively low, then even minimal levels of nonviolence in an organizational field may surpass the adoption threshold for a group, leading to a greater rate of adoption.

Due to nonviolent tactics having greater legitimacy, posing a greater challenge to the state security apparatus, and a lower relative cost to utilize when compared to violent tactics, we should expect that nonviolent tactics will be adopted at greater rates than

violent tactics. The greater rate of adoption will be particularly evident and organizational fields that exhibit high levels of nonviolence.

Hypothesis 1: Organizations that are wholly or partially nonviolent will increase their use of nonviolent tactics as the use of nonviolent tactics by other organizations in the organizational field increases.

4.2.2 The Impacts of Environmental Uncertainty

Thus far, I have argued groups will actively learn from other groups in their organizational fields. This mechanism, drawing from organizational learning and diffusion literature, suggests that groups will choose nonviolent tactics because they are more effective and more economically efficient than are violent tactics. However, we know there are many violent groups actively fighting the state, which suggests there are other factors, in addition to a preference for nonviolent tactics, affecting group behavior.

That there are so many violent groups actively fighting the state can be explained, in part, by neoinstitutionalist theory. Neoinstitutionalism suggests that organizations homogenize their behavior over time; organizations will move toward using *only* violent or *only* nonviolent tactics. Nonviolent groups will increasingly use nonviolence, and will not explore violent options. It is argued that organizational fields may display considerable diversity at the initial stages of their life cycles, however, through the establishment and structuration of the fields, and through the repeated interaction and reproduction of relationships, homogenization will occur (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Powell et al. 2005).

Groups that utilize primarily violent tactics should behave similarly to other violent groups (although not necessarily at the same point in time). The same is true with nonviolent groups - groups that utilize nonviolent tactics should behave like other

nonviolent groups. The expectation of homogenization in neoinstitutionalist theory is due to isomorphic pressures. Isomorphism refers to a "constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions" (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 149). Isomorphism has been theorized to occur for a number of reasons: first, differentiation in the environment needs to be met with similar patterns of differentiation within the organization (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967); second, competitive pressures in an industry lead to selecting out non-optimal organizational forms and behaviors (Hannan and Freeman 1977); and third, pressures in an organizational field (governmental, cultural, professional) placed on an organization lead to organizational conformity (J. Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).¹⁶

There are three primary mechanisms of isomorphism, each of which suggests that violent and nonviolent groups do not mix tactical behaviors. Coercive isomorphism refers to "formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 150)." Laws, regulations, standard operating procedures, but also subtle influences such as cultural and community, all contribute to the homogenization of organizations through coercive isomorphic pressures.

Mimetic isomorphism refers to the imitation of other organizations in uncertain environments. "When organizational technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 151)." In

¹⁶ See Carolan (2008) for an overview of theoretical approaches to isomorphism.

conditions of high environmental uncertainty, where the relationship between an organizations' means and ends is poorly understood, there are pressures to emulate the structures and innovations of other organizations expected to be met with higher levels of legitimacy. This is true even in situations where there is a lack of an empirical link between those structures and innovations, and the outputs to which they are related (Ashworth, Boyne, and Delbridge 2009). Uncertainty can be defined as the inability of an organization's leader to "accurately assess the external environment of the organization or the future changes that might occur in the environment" (Dickson and Weaver 1997, 405). Organizations strive to minimize or eliminate uncertainty, because "certainty renders existence meaningful and confers confidence in how to behave and what to expect from the physical environment" (Hogg and Terry 2000, 133).

Lastly, normative isomorphism results primarily from professionalization, which is interpreted "as the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work... (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 152)." These normative pressures are due to the common education, training, and certifications processes of professionals by accredited professional bodies (Ashworth, Boyne, and Delbridge 2009).

The three forms of isomorphism – coercive, mimetic, and normative – all work to condition and form organizations into similar patterns of structure and behavior. Coercive isomorphism refers to the informal expectations of how the group should look and act by the population and other groups (e.g. what should a violent group “look” like?). Mimetic isomorphism is expected in conditions of high environmental uncertainty – which is nearly an always pervasive condition faced by groups opposing the

government – especially violent groups. Normative isomorphism may not be an obvious application to the sort of groups in this study, however, there are numerous cases of shared training camps and contacts which are used to educate, indoctrinate, and expand the skill sets of actors; these things are analogous to the professional associations and training programs of legal organizations.

The expectation set out by neoinstitutionalism run contrary to the arguments made that organizations are rational and will actively adopt new tactics – in particular nonviolent tactics. Under what conditions, then, will organizations “actively” adopt new tactics, and under what conditions will organizations have less agency, and be affected by isomorphic pressures? Neoinstitutionalism suggests that a condition likely to affect organizational behavior is environmental uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty can range from low to high levels, and will impact the bounds of rationality, and the decision making calculus, of the group. A state’s capacity is likely to be positively associated with environmental uncertainty; as state capacity increases, the state will be more effective at policing and counter violence, thereby raising the uncertainty associated with the use of violence. As previously noted, in conditions of high environmental uncertainty, there are pressures on organizations to emulate the structures and innovations of other organizations that have previously been met with higher levels of legitimacy or success. Thus, organizations operating in high uncertainty environments (indicated by a state’s capacity and the state’s ability to police violence) will be more likely to adopt nonviolent tactics. Organizations will respond to the greater levels of state capacity by adopting nonviolent tactics; this is due to nonviolent tactics carrying greater perceived

legitimacy and success¹⁷, but also due to state being more effective at countering violence. Likewise, organizations' use of tactics will not be significantly impacted in states with low capacity (i.e. low uncertainty).

Hypothesis 2a: Groups operating in low uncertainty environments will not be significantly affected by the extent of the use of nonviolence in their organizational field.

Hypothesis 2b: Groups operating in high uncertainty environments will be more likely to adopt nonviolent tactics as the proportion of nonviolence in their organizational field increases.

4.3 Data and Methodology

Shared organizational fields are sufficient for groups to learn from and be aware of one another. The indirect and proximate relationships formed between groups sharing an organizational field falls short of the direct and purposeful connections used network studies. However, the connections resulting from organizational fields should be to realize any of the learning effects theorized in this chapter. Moreover, these connections between groups can be modeled with great variation; whereas information on group alliance networks is often sparse and relies significantly on the assumption of continued relationships, no such assumptions need to be made here.

The organizational fields created to model these relationships are based on data originally taken from two datasets: the Global Terrorism Database (START 2012) and the Social Conflict in Africa Database (Salehyan et al. 2012). Both of these datasets have data at the incident level. The range of data used for this study is limited to Africa, from

¹⁷ Success is not empirically measured in this chapter; rather, the adoption of a new tactics serves as an indicator of that tactic's perceived success.

1990 to 2011. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) includes data not only on "terrorism", but also violence more generally, including some incidents more appropriately coded as guerrilla or insurgent activities. The Social Conflict in Africa Database includes data on both violent and nonviolent incidents.

After significantly cleaning the data¹⁸, a dataset of 4,774 unique incidents (both violent and nonviolent) was developed. The newly developed data included information on 218 uniquely identified groups. All incidents were coded as either violent or nonviolent. Further, a coding scheme to identify the targets of each incident was established and applied to all data. With the creation of this incident-level data, shared organizational fields were identified.

The creation of group-year relationships, as determined by shared organization field membership, resulted in 924 connections over the data's time span. The connections were created using a minimally defined organizational space. In order for there to be a connection between groups, two criteria needed to be met: first, there must be geographic proximity - a group needed to be present in the same or contiguous country; and second, groups' activity must be temporally proximate. Temporal proximity was established as a weighted relationship - connections were created when activity occurred within three, six, twelve, and eighteen months of activity of another group. The resultant relationships then reflected organizational fields defined by both geographic and

¹⁸ Cleaning the data involved numerous steps. First, countries and years covered were aligned. Second, group identification and assignment was done – SCAD had 2,932 unique names, GTD had 540. Every named actor in both dataset was searched for to identify named groups. In SCAD, out of the 2,932 unique names, there were 174 named groups identified by 318 different actor descriptors. In GTD, out of the 540 unique names, there were 133 identifiable groups named with 145 different actor descriptors. Subsequently, years were constrained to 1990-1992, & 1994-2011. Lastly, groups with less than 1 incident and active only 1 year were excluded. Ultimately, these steps left me with a combined 218 groups and 4,774 observations across both datasets. These data were then used to create the networks of groups, which resulted in 924 observations.

temporal proximity. With these relationships identified, variables related to group connections can be created, and those variables can be used to understand the diffusion of violent and nonviolent tactics between organizations.

The dependent variable measures the proportion of nonviolent tactics used by a group in a given year. This variable can range from 0, indicating the group is entirely violent, to 1, indicating the group is entirely nonviolent. Perhaps unsurprisingly, most groups do not use a combination of violent and nonviolent strategies - however, there is a sizeable minority which does use both violent and nonviolent tactics. Sixty percent of the groups in the study are entirely violent. Almost thirty-three percent of groups are entirely nonviolent. Thus, roughly seven percent of the groups in the study use a combination of both violent and nonviolent tactics.

The key independent variable, *Proportion of Nonviolence*, relates to the levels of nonviolence among the connections shared by the group. Recall, the connections a group has are to the other groups in the organizational field. In order to measure this, a variable which measures the proportion of nonviolence among organizational field partners was created. Roughly forty-three percent of the organizational fields measured were wholly violent, whereas nineteen percent were wholly nonviolent. We should expect that as the proportion of the organizational field which utilizes nonviolent tactics increases, that the group in question should increase their use of nonviolent tactics.

Also important is the measure used to account for levels of uncertainty in the environment. This is accomplished by utilizing the measure of relative political extraction, from the Relative Political Capacity Dataset (Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. 2012). Relative political extraction accounts for the capacity and efficiency of the

government at mobilizing the state toward advancing public goals. Political capacity serves to approximate the levels of uncertainty in the environment. *State Capacity* is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when a states' raw political capacity value is greater than or equal to the 75th percentile of all political capacity values in the data, and equal to zero otherwise. States with high levels of capacity are more likely to have effective governing mechanisms and means of countering violence. The more effective the state is at countering violence, the more likely violent groups will shift to nonviolent tactics in an effort to emulate resistance organizations perceived as more legitimate or successful. In order to empirically test this, an interaction term is used in estimation of the model. *Proportion of Nonviolence* and *State Capacity* are interacted (reflected in the variable *Nonviolence X State Capacity*) to examine how different levels of capacity affect the adoption of nonviolent tactics.

Several variables are included to account for additional factors that may cause intervening or mitigating effects. The *Groups in Field* variable is a count of the number of organizations in the organizational field; it is plausible that a larger organizational field will affect the behavior of the focal group differently than a smaller field. A larger field may lead to more examples of change, or a larger field may make the behavior of any one group less impactful.

Variables are included to account for the various types of groups; however, rather than utilizing invariable and often ambiguous labels such as "ethno-nationalist" or "religious" - group type is measured by focusing on which sort of targets the group targeted. In other words, although a group may claim to be leftist or nationalist, by accounting for group types through the actions of the groups, we can avoid

misinformation. Group type is measured with three variables, each of which is a proportional measure of the share of group incidents: *Target Civilians* indicates when the focus of an incident is civilian; *Target Government* indicates when the focus of an incident is the government; and *Target Security* indicates when the focus of an incident is security forces.

The dichotomous variable *Wholly Nonviolent* is also included, and indicates whether or not a group used entirely nonviolent tactics in that year. This is important because we want to examine when a group adopts nonviolent tactics; if a group is wholly nonviolent, it cannot become any *more* nonviolent. Moreover, the inclusion of *Wholly Nonviolent* allows the realization of the effect of nonviolent neighbors only on those groups which use violent tactics in their repertoire.

Additional variables which were identified in chapter three are also included. *GDP/Capita* measures the gross domestic product per capita of a country in a given year (“World Bank Open Data” 2015). *Democracy* measures the extent to which a country is embodies democratic characteristics (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011). *Elections* counts the number of presidential and legislative elections in a given country-year (Hyde and Marinov 2012). The *Repression* variable measures the average value of negative Goldstein-scale incidents (King and Lowe 2003) of within-country interactions in the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) dataset (Virtual Research Associates 2012). The value is then multiplied by -1 such that increasing values correspond with greater levels of repression. Two geographic variables which had a significant impact in chapter three’s analysis are included, *Tropical* and *Land Size* (“Country Geographic Data,” n.d.).

4.4 Findings

The two primary questions to be addressed in the model are 1) does the proportion of nonviolence in an organizational field positively impact a group's use of nonviolence, and 2) the extent to which the adoption of nonviolent tactics are affected by environmental uncertainty. To address these questions, a multi-level mixed effects model is used. To account for behaviors that may be unique to a group or country, groups are nested within countries in the data. Moreover, year fixed-effects are used to accommodate potential unspecified trends in Africa at-large. For example, a general move towards nonviolence, or periods of regional instability which may breed more violence, are accounted for by year fixed-effects.


Table 4:

Table 1: The Adoption of Nonviolent Tactics

Proportion of Nonviolence	0.041*** (.007)
Political Capacity	-0.053*** (.009)
Nonviolence X Political Capacity	-0.043** (.017)
Groups in Field	0.001 (.001)
Target Civilians	-0.214*** (.012)
Target Government	-0.046*** (.011)
Target Security	-0.204*** (.014)
Wholly Nonviolent	0.834*** (.008)
GDP/Capita	6.98E-07 (3.17E-06)
Democracy	0.005*** (.001)
Elections	0.017*** (.003)
Repression	-0.005 (.004)
Tropical	0.034** (.012)
Land Size	-1.49E-08*** (3.78E-09)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
Random-Effects Parameter	
Country	0.001
Observations	2287
Standard Errors in Parentheses	
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$	

The results of the model are indicated in Table 4. *Proportion of Nonviolence*, given that there is an interaction term in the model, reflects the impact of nonviolence in an organizational field when state capacity is *low*. *Nonviolence X State Capacity* reflects the impact of the proportion of nonviolence in an organizational field when state capacity is *high*. The results paint a complex picture, which only partially supports the arguments made in this chapter. The *Proportion of Nonviolence* is significant and positive, which indicates that as the proportion of nonviolence in an organizational field increases, a group will increasingly use nonviolence itself. However, this is only the case in instances of low state capacity. This runs contrary to the expectations of hypotheses 2a and 2b; that adoption of nonviolent tactics will occur in *high* capacity states, due to the increased uncertainty in those areas. Figure 9 shows the differential effect of *Proportion of Nonviolence* on a group's use of nonviolence – for low and high levels of uncertainty.

Figure 8:



As can be seen in the graph, the effect of *Proportion of Nonviolence* in low capacity environments is much greater than the effect in high capacity areas. That being said, *Proportion of Nonviolence* still has a positive effect in high capacity areas; that effect is just lessened. Although somewhat contrary to the expectations – that we would see a positive effect of *Proportion of Nonviolence* only in high capacity areas – the results may be explained in part by the operating environment. It was argued that environmental uncertainty is high where state capacity is also high. However, it may be the case that in cases of high state capacity, groups can be more confident in the response of the state, which in some ways would make their environment more certain. Moreover, where there is low state capacity, there may be more competing groups, and less predictable governmental responses, thereby increasing uncertainty. If groups are more

likely to adopt nonviolence where uncertainty is high, then the results suggest that high uncertainty corresponds with low capacity

The other variables included in the model's estimation present interesting findings. The number of groups in an organizational field do not significantly impact the adoption of nonviolence. The three variables accounting for the type of group – *Target Civilians*, *Target Government*, and *Target Security* – indicate that groups which target civilians and security are significantly more likely to be using violence. *Targeting Government* also slightly favors the use of violence over nonviolence, but not at nearly the same magnitude. The significant and positive effect of *Wholly Nonviolent* was expected, as that variable serves to account for groups which use *only* nonviolence

The variables identified in chapter three also reflect interesting findings. *Democracy* and *Elections* both have a positive and significant effect on the use of nonviolent tactics. The positive impact of *Democracy* contrasts with the finding in chapter three, which suggests that democracies are associated with a greater likelihood of violent tactics than nonviolent tactics. This is likely due to the inclusion of organizational fields and their impact on tactics in this chapter. The effect of *Elections* is congruent with the effect found in the previous chapter; the presence of elections is positively associated with the use of nonviolent tactics. The two included geographic variables¹⁹, *Tropical* and *Land Size*, pose contradictory findings. *Tropical* has a slight but significant impact on nonviolence, which contrasts with the finding of non-significance in Chapter Three. This is likely due to the different statistical model and the manner in

¹⁹ The two variables excluded from analysis in this chapter that were included in the previous chapter are the extent of mountainous terrain and the extent to which a country is landlocked. These two variables were excluded here due to modeling issues.

which country effects are accounted. *Land Size* has a significant and negative effect on nonviolence, which is congruent with the findings of Chapter Three.

Overall, the results provide partial support for the arguments posed in this chapter. The use of nonviolent tactics will increase as the proportion of nonviolent tactics used in an organizational field increases. This positive effect, however, is greatest in areas of low state capacity, which contradicts the expectations of hypotheses 2a and 2b. These results may, however, be explained by state capacity affecting uncertainty in unexpected ways.

4.5 Conclusions

The arguments and findings presented in this chapter show that organizations can have an indirect impact the behavior of other organizations. While this is expectation is commonly accepted in traditional organizational studies, the extension of this logic to resistance groups is less common. Although there have been inter-organizational studies examining diffusion, such studies typically look only at violence, and rely on explicit relationships between the organizations. The approach utilized here removes the burden of explicit connections between groups, and demonstrates that even with indirect relationships based on proximity, tactics can and do diffuse between groups. When groups in organizational fields use nonviolence in high capacity, other proximate groups increase their use nonviolence. Moreover, this effect is demonstrated for *violent* groups – the results shown indicate that violent groups are adopting nonviolent tactics. This shows that there is indeed tactical diffusion between groups.

The impact on the adoption of nonviolence due to a shared organizational field was small, though this was expected. The relationships examined here were all indirect, which suggests there may have been no explicit or formal interaction between the groups. Instead, this chapter showed that by simply being proximate to other groups was sufficient for the diffusion of tactics between groups. Furthermore, a group's legacy may serve to mitigate any drastic changes in the use of violent or nonviolent tactics. Group legacy refers to the actions, statements, beliefs, and prior interactions that have come to embody the group. This is akin to organizational memory, which is described as the knowledge "codified or recorded in information systems, operation procedures, white papers, mission statements, organizational stories, or routines (Slater and Narver 1995)." This legacy will likely prevent a group from dramatically changing their tactics, and instead lead to the incremental increase of nonviolence. The constraining effect of legacy may explain the small impact of the use of nonviolence in the organizational field. The effect of legacy also serves to reify the significance of finding that violent organizations will increase their use of nonviolence based on the use of nonviolence by contemporary groups; a violent group's legacy makes the shift to nonviolent tactics a significant finding.

This chapter has found that the use of nonviolent tactics by proximate groups positively impacts the focal group's use of nonviolence. This effect occurs in low capacity states. Moreover, this effect is demonstrated to be significant among violent groups. The inclusion of organizational fields, although foundational for the approach used in this chapter, also poses measurement challenges for other factors of interest. Looking forward, the other factors included in the model need to better align with

organizational fields' boundaries, as opposed to state boundaries. Though complicated in execution, there may be methods to weight the variables according to the variables' values in contiguous states. Furthermore, the identification and inclusion of prominent groups may add robustness to this study. Whereas groups are most likely to learn from organizations to which they are proximate, a prominent and successful example (such as the ANC in South Africa) may serve as an example for all groups, not only those which share an organizational field with the ANC. Lastly, the inclusion of direct connections – in addition to the proximate relationships identified in this chapter – will serve to strengthen the results reflected here. At present time, direct connections pose two problems: first, existing data on direct connections lack the variability sought to model tactical changes; and second, many of the organizations identified in this dissertation – particularly the nonviolent organizations – lack any information on organizational relationships.

This chapter, in combination with the chapters two and three, has demonstrated the efficacy of considering violent and nonviolent tactics in conjunction with one another. Many groups utilize both violent and nonviolent tactics; and the proportion of violent and nonviolent tactics used are constantly changing over time. Chapter two showed that individual ego networks affect opinions on violence and nonviolence. Furthermore, groups which are considered violent (e.g. MUJAO) may be associated with nonviolence and security by local populations. This apparent irony begs that studies of violent groups do more to incorporate the context in which the groups are operating; as the local context is likely to greatly affect the group's behavior. Chapter three identified multiple factors which are typically included in studies of violent and nonviolent groups. It was

demonstrated that, when considered together, some variables positively impact the use of violence, whereas others impact the use of nonviolence. In this chapter, we addressed the impact that other groups may have on the use of violence and nonviolence. We found that increases of nonviolence in an organizational field positively affect the use of nonviolence by the groups. These chapters, addressing nonviolence and violence from an individual level, a state and environmental level, and an inter-organizational level, demonstrate the connections and value of treating violent and nonviolent tactics as part of one, connected logic.

CHAPTER 5

MOVING FORWARD WITH VIOLENCE AND NONVIOLENCE

This dissertation began with several simple questions – how are violence and nonviolence related? Under what conditions are violent or nonviolent tactics preferable? And what causes a predominantly violent group to begin using nonviolence?

Chapter two begins answering these questions by examining the use of nonviolence in an otherwise very violent area. Northern Mali has been engaged in civil war since 2012, yet throughout the conflict, there have been instances of nonviolence. A wide range of actors – including the rebel group MUJAO – have used nonviolent tactics at different times during the conflict. In fact it was a protest, comprised of MUJAO fighters and residents of Gao, that helped precipitate the change in power from the MNLA to MUJAO. However MUJAO also used all manner of violence, and are perhaps best known for their biblical forms of punishment carried out in the city square.

The premise of chapter two was to explore the factors that impact individuals' support levels for the use of nonviolence. What are the conditions that affect support levels for nonviolence, in an environment otherwise plagued with violence? I argued – and found – that the more connected individuals are to others outside of their immediate family and village settings, the more supportive that individual is of nonviolence. Increased support is due to the presence of weak ties in individuals' ego networks; weak ties provide the individual with access to information that can be scarce or non-existent in close-knit family or village settings. Villages in the area around Gao are very rural, traditional, and conservative. Living in this setting can retard information flows and

access to new ideas. The limited access to new ideas is exactly why weak ties are so important – weak ties serve as the link to new information.

A second primary expectation of chapter two was that perceptions of MUJAO would be negatively associated with support for nonviolence. It was expected that with MUJAO's proclivity for punishment, their relatively radical views of Islam, and their widespread use of violence, that support for nonviolence and perceptions of MUJAO would be inversely related. However, the exact opposite was found. As favorable perceptions of MUJAO increased, so too did support levels for nonviolence. How can MUJAO – widely considered a terrorist organization – be associated with support for nonviolence? In chapter two I argued that this paradoxical finding is explained by the largely positive role MUJAO played in the local residents' lives. MUJAO brought a measure of basic security to the residents of Gao; something that was lacking while the MNLA was in control. MUJAO also presented itself in Gao as defending the largely Songhai population against the mostly Tuareg MNLA. Moreover, the harsh rules enforced under MUJAO's rule were in many ways already congruent with the traditional and conservative practices in the Gao area, such as those regarding women's rights or the acceptability of smoking.

The findings in chapter two begin to shed light on the complex relationship between violence and nonviolence. In violent areas, support for nonviolence may not simply be a function of an individuals' desire to see less violence; rather, support for nonviolence is contingent on an individuals' social relationships. The option for and efficacy of nonviolent tactics may be an alien concept in many settings; however, the more connected individuals are to those outside of their immediate family or village

settings, the more that individuals are exposed to new ideas and information. Moreover, conflict is more complex than support for nonviolent tactics simply running contrary to support for violent groups. Chapter two demonstrated that individuals may simultaneously support nonviolence *and* support largely violent groups. This paradox can be explained by the localized benefits provided by the groups. Both of these primary conclusions begin to highlight the complex relationships between violence and nonviolence, and the need for contextualized approaches to the study of conflict.

Chapter three continues exploring violence and nonviolence by examining the conditions under which violence and nonviolence become more likely. Across the range of studies on violent and nonviolent conflict, there are multiple variables that are commonly thought to affect conflict-related outcomes. Though each of the variables identified have been previously studied, they have not been examined with data that include the range of violent and nonviolent incidents. To appropriately address this, data were collated and created that included violent and nonviolent incidents throughout Africa, over a twenty-year period. Four general categories of variables were identified in the literature: demographic and economic; government form and behavior; conflict and competition in the environment; and geography. The variables identified were then examined for their impact on the likelihood of a resistance incident being violent or nonviolent.

The first category, demographic and economic, included two factors: population size and GDP per capita of the state. Though population size had no significant impact, GDP per capita did significantly increase the likelihood of nonviolence. The second category, government form and behavior, included several variables: democracy,

elections, repression, and state capacity. Elections made nonviolence significantly more likely, whereas state repression made violence significantly more likely. State capacity and democracy did not have a significant impact on the likelihood of violence or nonviolence. The number of groups active in an area was the only variable to comprise the third category, conflict and competition in the environment, and was found to not have a significant impact on the likelihood of violent versus nonviolent incidents. The last category, geography, included four variables that have been argued to affect conflict and conflict outcomes: mountainous terrain, tropical terrain, the extent to which a state is landlocked, and the geographic size of the country. The only geographic variable to have a significant impact was the geographic size of a country, which had a slight positive impact on the likelihood of violence over nonviolence.

Though many of the variables identified were significant in the model, two variables stood out as particularly interesting: state repression and the number of groups. The state repression variable indicated that as the level of state repression in a country increases, the likelihood of violence over nonviolence increases. The reason this is interesting is that there have been conflicting conclusions about the effect of state repression on group behavior and conflict outcomes. The results shown in chapter three indicate that, in consideration of all the other variables identified, state repression will increase the use of violence when compared to nonviolence. The second variable of interest is the affect that the number of groups have on a conflict. The model found *no significant effect* on the likelihood of violence or nonviolence. Although the expectation was that nonviolence and the number of groups would be positively associated – the lack of any finding – including that contrary to expectations, is intriguing. There have been

numerous arguments put forth that the number of groups should lead to more violence (outbidding) or to more nonviolence (reverse outbidding). Thus, to find *no effect* on the likelihood of violence relative to nonviolence is calls for further exploration of the effect of groups in the environment.

Although the identified variables have been previously examined, the reexamination conducted in chapter three provided new insights on the relationship of violence and nonviolence that were otherwise unavailable. The demonstrated relationships were somewhat consistent with the hypothesized effects, and more generally point to the need for better theoretical development and testing in the literature which relies on these factors. Moreover, the results from the variables measuring state repression and the number of groups provided clarity on previously contradictory and unclear arguments. Furthermore, reconsidering the variables made it possible to assess their impact on violent and nonviolent tactics simultaneously. By studying either violent tactics *or* nonviolent tactics, the variables' effects are censored and, in turn, the conclusions drawn may be limited. Only with data that includes both violent *and* nonviolent tactics can we assess the variables' relative impacts. Aside from better understanding how the variables affect violence and nonviolence, the examination also helps to situate the dissertation more generally. Whereas chapter two explored individual level factors and their influence on support for nonviolence within the context of northern Mali; chapter three looked more broadly at conditions of the environment in which groups operate to understand effects on violent and nonviolent tactics. By understanding these broader conditions, we can have more confidence in the generalizability of the conclusions and findings of the dissertation.

Chapter four, the final empirical chapter, examines how groups' use of violence and nonviolence influences other, proximate, groups. Resistance groups can be expected to look to their counterparts for examples of tactics and state reactions to those tactics. In turn, organizational neighbors act as sources of tactical innovations and behaviors. Chapter four identifies organizational fields for every group; the organizational field represents the population of organizations to which a group may look for guidance or examples. By identifying other members of an organizational field, we can assess their impact on a group's behavior.

Both violent and nonviolent tactics can be spread through organizational fields; however, the expectation in chapter four was that nonviolence would be more likely to spread than would violence. Nonviolent tactics are often viewed with more legitimacy than are violent tactics; and the costs (or potential costs) to use nonviolence are lower than those of violent tactics. The extent to which nonviolent tactics spread, however, is conditioned on the levels of uncertainty in the environment. Environmental uncertainty affects organizations' behaviors; in this context, high levels of uncertainty will lead groups to emulate the structures of other groups in their organizational field.

Environmental uncertainty is measured by the level of state capacity, which represents the state's ability to combat the resistance group.

To examine the affect that organizational fields have on a group's use of nonviolence, the dependent variable measures the proportion of violence and nonviolence used by a particular group. The primary independent variable is a similar index, but it measures the proportion of violence and nonviolence used by organizations party to the

organizational field. The primary expectation – that nonviolent tactics spread through organizational fields – is supported by the results of the hierarchical model

In chapter two an individual, contextualized approach was used. Chapter three then approached violence and nonviolence from a state and environmental perspective, identifying general variables commonly argued to impact conflict and conflict behaviors. Chapter four examined the relationship between violence and nonviolence by looking at inter-organizational effects. The impact that organizations have on one another provides additional context to the puzzles posed here. More than simply looking at individual conflicts or wide-reaching state variables (without consideration for the particulars of groups within), inter-organizational impacts provide further context of groups' operating environments. Resistance groups do not operate in a vacuum; rather the groups are comprised of and rely on locals, are constrained by the environment in which they operate, and must contend with and interact with other groups in their organizational neighborhood. All of these sources of influence impact a groups' use of violent and nonviolent tactics.

5.1 Future Directions

With the relatively little research that has been done jointly examining violence and nonviolence, there are many opportunities for future studies. The efforts contained herein are significant, but represent only a portion of the necessary research directions. There are numerous directions future work may take; of which several immediately come to mind.

My first step will be to conduct a second-round of the survey (which provided the data used in chapter two) in northern Mali. Among the goals of the survey was to analyze how social networks and opinions on key topics have changed over time. The first survey round, which was completed in February 2015, provides only a single point in time. With a second survey round, we can identify how social interactions and opinions have changed. I expect AECOM will conduct the survey by the end of 2015. While much of the survey will consist of the same questions previously used – thereby allowing an analysis of change – there is the opportunity for additional questions. In particular, I expect to ask questions that may further enlighten some of the findings of this dissertation. For example, rather than simply asking about perceptions of MUJAO, I will include questions that better take account of the “positive” side of MUJAO. The provision of security or social services, for example, is something that a question can address, and that may go far in explaining the positive association between MUJAO and nonviolence. Moreover, a primary effort of the second round will be to collect viable data on alter-to-alter relationships in the ego networks, relationships that were left out of the analysis in chapter two due to reliability concerns.

A second step will be to improve the data used for chapters three and four. In particular, more exhaustively including nonviolent incidents will likely improve the data, and may in turn, impact the conclusions drawn. Better accounting for nonviolent incidents is, however, a significant challenge. Fortunately, data which accounts for nonviolence is continually improving its reporting of events. More generally, I would like to expand the data used here beyond Africa; most probably to include Europe.

Europe will provide a rich and varied source of tactics, and it is likely that violent and nonviolent incidents are reported in Europe more reliably than in other regions.

Continuing with data expansion, the collection of group-level data would be very important. Group-level factors were largely unaccounted for in this dissertation, and likely have a large impact on groups' behaviors. Many violent groups have group level information already available, though such information is exceedingly rare for nonviolent groups. Many nonviolent groups are small and exist for only a short amount of time, and in turn the minimal footprint of many nonviolent groups limits the amount of information available on them. The last data related effort I am interested in pursuing is the inclusion of direct relationship information between the resistance groups. Again, such efforts have been made for exclusively violent groups (e.g. alliance relationships), however nonviolent groups lack this level of detail. Direct relationships would greatly improve the arguments and potential findings of chapter four, which looks only at indirect relationships. All of the suggestions to improve the data would also create opportunities for more advanced modeling techniques. More advanced social network analysis is one immediate application, particularly if alter-to-alter relationships are available. A separate promising avenue of approach would be to include hierarchical models in the examination. Given the different perspectives that each chapter of the dissertation addressed, hierarchical modeling may likely improve analytical rigor.

A note mentioned in the introduction was the role of the government in affecting group behavior. Although some data included served to approximate government actions, more directly addressing government behavior would greatly improve the strength of the findings of this dissertation. Unfortunately, government actions are often

purposely secretive, and in turn are hard to account for. Though the data may not be perfect, any effort at approximating government behavior beyond including state-level variables would be an important improvement.

Lastly, there is a plethora of previous studies which have looked exclusively at terrorism, civil war, or nonviolence; I suspect there would be a great deal of factors and underlying mechanisms that can be borrowed from one application and applied to another. Exploiting the rich and varied previous exercises on the range of violent and nonviolent tactics should be a relatively straightforward and promising venture; particularly if the data can be expanded in the ways suggested.

Violent and nonviolent tactics are related methods that resistance groups use in their strategies against the state. Resistance groups adjust their behavior based on a number of factors – ranging from the local populations on which the group relies to the behavior of other proximate groups – in an effort to achieve their goals. Better understanding the factors that affect the use of particular tactics can provide insights on how to positively impact conflict behaviors and outcomes. Identifying the conditions or circumstances that lead to nonviolence over violence, for example, provide useful policy insights. In conclusion, understanding violence and nonviolence as related conflict processes provides scholars and policy-makers alike a rich and rewarding area for future endeavors.

APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

In Table 5 are the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the logistic regression in chapter two.

Table 5:

Descriptive Statistics for Model in Chapter Two

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Support for Nonviolence	2,367	0.565	0.496	0	1
Outside Village	2,413	0.191	0.313	0	1
Relationship Duration	2,403	2.959	0.194	1	3
Family	2,409	0.660	0.474	0	1
Ego Size	2,413	3.487	1.704	1	7
Family X Ego Size	2,409	2.285	2.118	0	7
Perception of MUJAO	2,412	1.844	1.195	1	5
Married	2,412	0.914	0.281	0	1
Education	2,387	1.212	0.667	0	5
Sex	2,413	0.536	0.499	0	1
Age	2,413	41.310	13.640	19	95

In Table 6 are the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the logistic regression in chapter three.

Table 6:

Descriptive Statistics for Model in Chapter Three

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Violent Incident	4,728	0.853	0.354	0.00	1
Population	4,774	16.800	1.050	13.73	18.93
GDP/Capita	4,305	1428.197	1368.274	65.47	14827.85
Democracy	3,959	-0.606	5.309	-10	9
Elections	4,774	0.358	0.710	0	3
Repression	4,684	3.489	1.248	0.97	6.36
Capacity	4,747	1.097	0.402	0.20	2.22
Number of Groups	4,774	2.911	2.036	1	11
Mountainous	4,515	710.125	381.645	34.47	2160.854
Tropical	4,774	0.670	0.409	0	1
Landlocked	4,515	539.390	306.229	93.35	1319.58
Land Size	4,774	1138560	780957	10013.55	2507269
Proportion of NV/V	4,774	.183	.115	.055	.521

In Table 7 are the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the cross-section time-series regression in chapter four.

Table 7:

Descriptive Statistics for Model in Chapter Four

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Prop. of Nonviolence by Group	3,768	0.263	0.429	0	1
Prop. of Nonviolence by Org. Field	3,768	0.300	0.374	0	1
State Capacity	5,415	0.471	0.499	0	1
Nonviolence X State Capacity	3,768	0.100	0.256	0	1
Groups in Field	3,768	2.610	2.496	1	17
Target Civilians	2,835	0.341	0.379	0	1
Target Government	2,835	0.643	0.413	0	1
Target Security	2,835	0.191	0.299	0	1
Wholly Nonviolent	3,768	0.237	0.425	0	1
GDP/Capita	4,942	1,397.27	1,433.17	64.810	14,827.85
Democracy	2,324	-1.525	5.356	-9	9
Elections	2,913	0.360	0.713	0	3
Repression	4,803	3.470	1.246	0.969	6.357
Tropical	4,913	0.675	0.408	0	1
Land Size	4,913	1,129,308	778,562.80	10,013.55	2,507,269

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