REFUGEE ODYSSEYS:
AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE U.S. AFTER 9-11

by

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SIGNED: Mette Brogden

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This dissertation is dedicated to:

the Somali Bantu community of Tucson, Arizona,
and
all the amazing key informants who resettled in communities across the U.S.
and who told me how it was and is.

Foreword

The dissertation which follows was largely written and edited between January 2013 and July 2015. During this period, the refugee crisis in the world reached a level unseen since World War II, with UNHCR reporting nearly 20 million refugees in the world, and 40 million internally-displaced persons (people who are still living in-country but away from their homes). As I was formatting the work for submission in the fall of 2015, the crisis reached a new phase when hundreds of thousands of refugees from Syria and other countries proximate to Europe began migrating toward Germany through the Balkans and Greece, following German Chancellor Angela Merkel's announcement that Germany would open its borders to refugees. Her announcement led to the prediction that Germany would take in some 800,000 refugees by the end of the year, revised upward from an earlier estimate 450,000.

Merkel was responding to the burgeoning humanitarian crisis: millions of Syrians had fled to bordering countries, putting tremendous pressure on resources and infrastructure. Estimates of 2-4 million Syrian refugees in Turkey circulated. In addition, significant numbers of Africans had been trying that summer to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe, and the coast guards of countries like Italy were rescuing people by the thousands whose boats had capsized or broken apart. Despite the rescue efforts, many perished.

With Merkel's announcement, Syrians and others decided to try to make the sea journey, and journalists began posting photos of impossibly crowded boats, some broken apart and the passengers trying to tread water amid floating bodies of others who could not sustain the effort. The horror of it all culminated in the widely-disseminated picture of a young Syrian toddler's body washed ashore and lying face down on a beach.

That photo galvanized support for resettlement of Syrians among many people of the U.S. and other countries outside of Europe. In the U.S., local resettlement and religiously-affiliated social service agencies—and government officials—received calls from concerned individuals moved by the pictures and stories of the humanitarian crisis and wanting to sponsor Syrians for resettlement in their communities. One agency in northern Wisconsin notified me it had received a call offering land to Syrians for resettlement, reminiscent of the historical practice of homesteading in the U.S. Ordinary Americans were (and still are) offering what they know to be helpful to strangers in profound need from another continent and culture: we are a nation of immigrants with memories of leaving behind everything to come to a new country.

Meanwhile some Europeans were becoming increasingly concerned as refugees flooded into train stations, cut fences to cross borders, and desperately tried to reach their desired destinations in northern Europe. It was beginning to feel like an invasion; reports circulated on the internet and in the press about non-European (especially Muslim) populations who had come in seeking asylum, but remained enclaved and marginalized, and most importantly, *unassimilated.* Their children were born as citizens; some became citizens; and some members of the longstanding, "native" European societies worried that their countries would be transformed into something culturally unrecognizable with all these refugees flooding in, bringing their own religions and cultural practices with them, and (it was assumed) refusing to adhere to the customs of the receiving communities.

Anthropologist Mary Douglas' 1978 monograph, *Purity and Danger*: *An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* seemed a more relevant read than ever. I included her insights in this dissertation in my analysis of the worries and suspicions of both the arriving and receiving communities participating in the U.S. refugee resettlement program after 9-11. As I was researching and writing the dissertation, these worries were mostly discussed privately and rather infrequently among agency boards, volunteers, and others in the U.S. watching the changing refugee populations. Some anti-resettlement internet sites and blogs began popping up; some moments of fear and anger leaked out on rare occasion in meetings about how to serve refugees resettling.

Beginning in 2012, support for humanitarian projects of resettlement began to waver among Americans more publicly, with reports of the increasing flight to the U.S. of children from three Central American countries seeking asylum. Though they numbered around 68,000 in 2014 at the height of this migration (comparable to the crowd in a single NFL football stadium on a Sunday afternoon), some in the U.S. feared being overrun with children who taxpayers would have to support. The Administration responded by (among other things) working with Mexico to prevent the children from reaching the U.S. border where they would have to be taken in. Numbers arriving in the U.S. dropped.

As the Syrian refugee crisis in Europe burgeoned, U.S. President Obama announced in September 2015 that he would add 10,000 to his annual Presidential Determination which sets the ceiling on how many refugees would be admitted to the U.S., increasing the ceiling to 85,000 for FFY2016. He also indicated that he would support an increase to 100,000 admissions in FFY17. The plan for 2016 received support in Congress, and resettlement locales across the U.S. began thinking about how to accommodate the increases.

Then, on the evening of Friday November 13, a series of coordinated terrorist attacks involving suicide bombings and mass shootings were perpetrated in Paris and a northern suburb. The dead numbered 130; with 368 wounded. Initial reports indicated that one of the attackers had a Syrian passport, and with that announcement the worst fears of terrorists entering Europe disguised as refugees seemed to be realized. Later it later turned out that the passport was stolen, and the perpetrators were actually Europeans of Middle Eastern descent who sympathized with ISIS. But the damage was done.

By the following Monday (and before the clarifying information about the passport came to light), the governors of 31 states in the U.S. announced that they would oppose the resettlement of Syrians in their states in the interest of safety. All but one were Republican. Some announced they would block Syrian entry into their states even though the resettlement program is a Federal program. On Thursday of that week, a bill to expand background checks on Iraqi and Syrian refugees hoping to enter the U.S. (H.R. 4038, the American Security Against Foreign Enemies SAFE Act) passed the House just two days after its introduction with a vote of 289-137, with almost all Republicans and 47 Democrats voting in favor. At this writing, the bill has yet to come to vote in the Senate but is scheduled for in the week of January 18, 2016.

The House vote, and the ensuing scramble amongst elected officials across states to find out how resettlement in the U.S. actually occurs (unlike in Europe, refugees undergo two years of background checks after their application to the U.S. program), demonstrated a general lack of understanding about how resettlement has been operating in the U.S. It is actually quite a "safe"

program by all measures, and also well-organized and managed. The Departments of State and Homeland Security have since posted infographics to their websites detailing the 2-year process of security vetting. Some states with governors opposing Syrian resettlement found that Syrians arrived, after all, in the continued tiny numbers that are typical of the U.S. program. In fact, to date since *2011* (a period of four years), only around 2,200 Syrian refugees have arrived in the U.S. The controversy continues to play out as I submit this dissertation to the Graduate College.

Then on December 2, an additional terror event occurred in San Bernadino, California, in which a couple—the husband a U.S.-born citizen of Pakistani descent, and his Pakistani wife originally admitted on a K-1 fiancée visa—opened fire on a holiday gathering where the husband worked with semi-automatic weapons, killing 14 and injuring 22 people. The couple fled, but they were killed in a shootout with law enforcement the same day. Subsequent investigations revealed they had met online and expressed commitment to jihad and martyrdom before meeting in person and marrying. They expressed allegiance to ISIS online prior to the attack. The event stoked more fear of terror and anti-Muslim sentiment in the U.S., but it was clear that the wife's admission on a K-1 visa indicated that the holes in security were not among refugees arriving, but in other legal admissions to the U.S. I expect to see changes instituted for security vetting of those seeking U.S. visas as a result.

* * *

The response of elected officials to recent events is unprecedented in the modern era of resettlement in the U.S. And it may herald that we are entering a new period in the U.S program, fomented and characterized by—for the first time since the Refugee Act of 1980—a lack of bi-partisan support in the U.S. Congress. It remains to be seen whether this, in fact, comes to be a permanent fault line among Americans, pitting those who would continue to welcome refugees and recognize the American legacy as an immigrant nation, against those who would close the borders to refugees of (especially) Islamic beliefs and Middle-Eastern heritage due to fear of terrorism.

Ironically, the protectionist views among some of the American public against Muslims and populations of the Middle East actually replicate conditions prompting the need for protection of refugees: persecution for religion, race, and nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Discrimination against refugees of a specific religious or national background would indicate that the central humanitarian principle to protect those fleeing persecution is being discarded in the U.S.

And that is a sobering thought, one which should give Americans and the greater global community great pause. As refugees arrive to a receiving community who fears them instead of welcoming them, what does that do for ensuring safety and protection? It could lead to just the opposite: more fear and xenophobia as people withdraw into their own identity groups and whisper/ruminate about the "others."

Fundamentally, the problem for arriving populations remains how to establish a new life in a new land, without replicating the factionalist conflicts that originally led them to flee as refugees. The different societal arrangements, policies, and processes of the new country structure new opportunities that help them avoid winding up with a replication. But they need welcoming

relationships with receiving community members who will share their networks and knowledge of local conditions.

The task for receiving communities is how to incorporate the newcomers and benefit from their energy, motivation, and experiences of re-establishment. It is an invigorating energy, as refugees come with ideas that are new, especially for commerce and social interactions. If receiving community members are interested in learning from refugees about the value(s) they bring—and are open to questioning their native assumptions and practices, and are willing to see the possibilities for innovation—then refugees can do what immigrants have always done in the U.S.: they can help revitalize communities.

If receiving community members, however, insist that refugees become *assimilated*—meaning that they give up all sociocultural practices and attitudes they have learned (everything they know to do in the world) and adopt the new culture wholesale—refugees will not be able to bring the new which allows for innovation and revitalization. And they will be lost: unrecognizable to themselves, without anchoring, and of low status.

It is the fundamental paradox of resettlement: refugees have to learn anew, and they also bring the new. Receiving communities have to welcome and include, and embrace the change that is afoot. It is the mutual task of arriving refugees and receiving community members to figure out how to make this an invigoration, rather than a downward spiral of fear, conflict, and various forms of violence. When the relationships between these groups in a third country of resettlement such change from survivor/helper, to fellow citizens and community members, we have embarked on a promising path.

This ethnography of refugee resettlement in the U.S. after 9-11, but before the events of the autumn of 2015, tells of the second era of modern resettlement in the U.S. The first era (post-Vietnam), was characterized by the strong contributions of churches and volunteers working with agencies to resettle refugees in local communities. A second, much more professionalized era appeared underway when events of 9-11initiated suspicions among some Americans that some populations who were being admitted might actually harbor terrorist tendencies.

If we are entering a third era that is characterized by fear of terror and partisan differences in support for resettlement, it may be that a return to a greater engagement of citizen-volunteers and churches in the resettlement and integration of refugees will be needed to resolve the divide. I hope that this ethnography of resettlement between 2001 and 2013 in the U.S.—a mutual story of the desires and experiences of refugees, receiving community members and governments in the U.S.—suggests some paths to a salutogenic future despite the uncertainty and international strife.

Welcoming and including refugees as fellow citizens and community members may be the only path to long-term safety, after all.

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Figures and Tables

List of Acronyms

ACF – Administration for Children and Families: A division within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) which houses the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).

BARA – Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology: Part of the School of Anthropology at The University of Arizona

BIA – Board of Immigration Appeals: The highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration laws. It is also responsible for the recognition of organizations and accreditation of representatives requesting permission to practice before the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. immigration courts, and the BIA.

CBP – Customs and Border Protection: CBP is part of the DHS, and serves as a law enforcement agency tasked with oversight of the U.S. borders. At U.S. ports of entry, CBP reviews documentation of incoming refugees and determines if they are admissible to the United States.

CDC – Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: A division within DHHS tasked with safeguarding the health of the U.S. public.

CO – Cultural Orientation: Orientation classes and workshops given to refugees prior to transfer from overseas, and after arrival in the U.S.

CWS – Church World Service: One of nine national resettlement agencies holding a Cooperative Agreement with the U.S Department of State (DoS) to receive and place refugees in local communities across the U.S. It is a multi-denominational Christian organization.

DHS – Department of Homeland Security: DHS is part of the executive branch of the federal government that ensures that the U.S. is safe and secure. It enforces and administers immigration laws; secures and manages borders; assists in the completion of background checks for refugees who have applied for admission to the U.S.; checks admissibility at the ports of entry into the U.S.; and continue to monitor admissibility after entry.

DHHS- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: DHHS is part of the executive branch of the federal government. It is tasked to enhance and protect the health and well-being of all Americans by providing for effective health and human services and fostering advances in medicine, public health, and social services.

DoS – U.S. Department of State: DoS is part of the executive brand of the federal government. It plays the lead role in developing and implementing the President's foreign policy.

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo: A central African country.

ECBO – Ethnic Community-Based Organization: Also referred to as mutual assistance associations (MAAs)

ECDC – Ethiopian Community Development Council: One of nine national resettlement agencies holding a Cooperative Agreement with the DoS to receive and place refugees in local communities across the U.S. It is a national agency specializing in serving immigrant and refugee communities from Africa.

EMM – Episcopal Migration Ministries: One of nine national resettlement agencies holding a Cooperative Agreement with the DoS to receive and place refugees in local communities across the U.S. It is affiliated with the Episcopal Church.

ESL – English as a Second Language: This acronym is widely used to represent efforts to provide English Language instruction to refugees and other immigrants.

FSU – the Former Soviet Union: Refers to the countries that were in a union with Russia prior to December 26, 1991

FY – the Former Yugoslavia: Refers the communist country comprised of federations (known as Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia) that broke apart during a period of war in the 1990s

HIAS – Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society: One of nine national resettlement agencies holding a Cooperative Agreement with the DoS to receive and place refugees in local communities across the U.S. It is a Jewish organization.

HPRT – Harvard Program in Refugee Trauma: A certificate program of the Harvard School of Medicine

IDPs – Internally-Displaced Persons: People who have fled their homes but remain in-country.

IGOs – International Governmental Organizations: The United Nations is an example of an IGO.

INGOs – International Non-Governmental Organizations: Non-profits operating internationally.

IOM – International Organization for Migration: IOM is an Intergovernmental organization that works closely with governments, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), various international non-government organizations (INGOs), and other partners. IOM provides resettlement services of case processing, health assessments, and pre-departure orientations, and arranges travel to the U.S. for refugees accepted into the U.S. It provides travel loans to refugees transferring into the U.S. from overseas.

IRC – International Rescue Committee: One of nine national resettlement agencies holding a Cooperative Agreement with DoS to receive and place refugees in local communities across the U.S. It has no religious affiliation and also provides many programs for refugees housed in camps overseas while awaiting a durable solution to the issues causing flight from home countries.

IRCO – Immigrant and Refugee Community Organization: A refugee-established multicultural mutual assistance association (MAA) in Portland, OR, one of the most successful and longstanding MAAs in the U.S. established in the modern period of refugee resettlement (est. 1976).

ISED – Institute for Social and Economic Development: A national non-profit which has served as a technical assistance advisor to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). One project was a study of refugee integration in the U.S.

ISIS - Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: Alternatively, Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham. A self-organized movement and militia which is attempting to establish a caliphate in the Middle East and North Africa. It is also known as **ISIL**—Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

LIRS – Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services: One of nine national resettlement agencies holding a Cooperative Agreement with the DoS to receive and place refugees in local communities across the U.S. It is affiliated with Lutheran churches in the U.S.

MAA – Mutual Assistance Association: An organization that provides assistances to (usually) members of an ethnic, religious, or other identity group, usually local in scope.

NGO – Non-governmental Organization: A non-profit organization focused on a public good.

NYC – New York City: The site of the first attacks on 9-11 which saw planes hijacked and flown into buildings to terrorize the U.S.; planes were flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, and both towers collapsed.

NYT – New York Times: The major daily newspaper in the city of New York, internationally known and influential.

ORR - Office of Refugee Resettlement: ORR is an office in the DHHS' ACF. ORR administers benefits programs such as Refugee Cash and Medical Assistance (RCA and RMA, respectively) and social services programs that help refugees, asylees, Cuban/Haitian entrants, Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders, Amerasians, and victims of human trafficking become self-sufficient as quickly as possible after their arrival in the United States. ORR certifies the cases of foreign victims of human trafficking and also assumes custody of unaccompanied alien children who are seeing asylum in the U.S. after they cross a U.S. border.

PRM - Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration: PRM is a Bureau in DoS overseen by the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. PRM works with the United Nations (UN), other international organizations, and non-governmental organizations to provide repatriation, local integration, and resettlement of displaced persons.

PTSD – Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A diagnostic category appearing the American Psychiatric Association's third Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (the DSM-III) starting in 1980.

R&P – Reception and Placement Program: A program operated by the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration through cooperative agreements with the nine national Volags to receive and place refugees with local affiliates or regional offices in local communities across the U.S.

RCA – Refugee Cash Assistance: A cash benefit available to refugees in the first 8 months after arrival, if the refugee is not receiving TANF or Matching Grant assistance.

RCUSA – Refugee Council USA: A coalition of U.S. non-governmental organizations focused on refugee protection that is national and international in scope.

RFP – Request for Proposal: An announcement put out by a funder soliciting proposals for a competitive grant round.

RMA – Refugee Medical Assistance: a Medicaid-insurance available to refugees in the first 8 months after arrival if they do not qualify for state Medicaid programs and are not otherwise insured.

RPC – Refugee Processing Center: The Refugee Processing Center (RPC) is the creator of Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing system (WRAPS), a collaborative computer system built to assist in the processing of refugees to the U.S. WRAPS is used by IOM, PRM, Volags, and various government

entities to process and track the movement of refugees accepted to the U.S. resettlement program from various countries to entry into the U.S. and arrival in a local U.S. community.

RSC – Resettlement Support Center(s): There are six RSCs in the world that are operated by one of five agencies that are funded and managed by PRM. RSCs prepare refugee cases for presentation to DHS.

SCORR – State Coordinators of Refugee Resettlement: A professional organization for State Refugee Coordinators

SIV – Special Immigrant Visa: Visas given for admission to the U.S. to individuals persons who worked with the U.S. Armed Forces or under Chief of Mission authority as a translator or interpreter in Iraq or Afghanistan.

SRC – State Refugee Coordinator: The SRC is the single point of contact for all refugee services within a given state.

SRHC – State Refugee Health Coordinator: Some states have SRHCs who coordinate health screenings and healthcare access for refugees, as well as providing information about disease outbreaks in refugee holding areas overseas that may need attention for refugees arriving from those areas, or special handling by the medical professionals seeing the refugees after arrival.

SSI - Supplemental Security Income: A federal cash benefit for those with the blind, aged, and disabled who are unable to work, to help provide for their basis needs.

TRC – Truth and Reconciliation Commission: The South African commission convened to hear about atrocities during apartheid.

UN – United Nations: An international governmental organization founded in 1945 with (currently 193) member states. The main organs of the UN are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the UN Secretariat.

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: The UN refugee agency governed by the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. Individuals fleeing persecution in their countries of origin register with UNHCR. Then UNHCR collects identifying documents, performs initial assessment, and interviews applicants to confirm refugee status, among other duties. Established on December 14, 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly, UNHCR "…is mandated to lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. It strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another State, with the option to return home voluntarily, integrate locally or to resettle in a third country. It also has a mandate to help stateless people." *(quoted from UNHCR's website).*

USCCB – United States Conference of Catholic Bishops: One of nine national resettlement agencies holding a Cooperative Agreement with the DoS to receive and place refugees in local communities across the U.S. It is affiliated with the Catholic Church.

USCIS – U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is the federal agency that oversees lawful immigration to the United States. It is housed within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Some of the services it provides include citizenship, immigration of family members and employment authorization, among many others.

USCRI – **U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants:** One of nine national resettlement agencies holding a Cooperative Agreement with the DoS to receive and place refugees in local communities across the U.S. It has no religious affiliation.

Volags - is an abbreviation for "Voluntary Agency": Resettlement agencies that have a Cooperative Agreement with DoS to receive and place refugees arriving in the United States. The term is applied to both national agencies and their local affiliates or local offices.

WR – **World Relief:** One of nine national resettlement agencies holding a Cooperative Agreement with DoS to receive and place refugees in local communities across the U.S. It is affiliated with evangelical churches in the U.S.

WRAPS - Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS): WRAPS is an electronic refugee resettlement case management system that links the PRM and its worldwide partners to facilitate the refugee resettlement process. WRAPS contains case information and tracks the processing of refugee applicants as they move through the required administrative steps up to arrival in the U.S.

Abstract

By now scholars, practitioners, government officials and others in the global community have witnessed a number of countries and their populations going through extreme destruction and trying to rebuild in the aftermath. Country case studies are invaluable for their in-depth, continuous look at how a nation-state collective and the individuals who make up that collective recover, regroup, develop, but also remain very harmed for a long time. They must live among and beside their former enemies.

Studies of the resettlement of refugees in a third country offer a different view: there are varied populations arriving with different socio-cultural and economic histories and experiences, and different definitions of a normalcy to which they aspire. They are in a setting that is much different than what characterized their pre-war experiences, and they do not have to rebuild out of ashes in the place that they were born.

Refugees from various countries resettling in a third country have so much in common with each other from the experience of extreme violence and having to resettle in a foreign land that one key informant suggested that we think about a "refugee ethnicity." Though they would not have wished for them, they have gained numerous new identification possibilities not available to those in the country of origin: U.S. citizen, hybrid, diaspora, cosmopolitan global citizen; refugee/former refugee survivors.

But the "fit" of these identities vary, because the receiving society may perceive individuals and families along a continuum of belonging vs. "othering." In the post-9-11 era in the U.S., the "belonging" as a citizen and member of the imagined community of the nation that a refugee or former refugee is able to achieve may be precarious. Will refugees resettling turn out to be vectors of socio-political disease, infecting the new host? Or will they be vectors of development and agents of host revitalization as they realize adversity-activated development in a new environment?

The U.S. "host environment" has changed considerably since the modern era of resettlement began in the 1970s and then passed through the dramatic incidents of 9-11. The "hosts" have now also undergone an experience of extreme political violence. U.S. institutions are responding to the events and subsequent wars, and have themselves been changed as they adjust practices and policies in response to the trauma experienced by the people they are meant to serve.

Much is in play. The times beg for a better understanding of refugees' social experiences of resettlement in a new country, the forms of suffering and marginalization they face, and the healing processes in which they engage. We need a far better understanding of what it takes to assist refugees as they work to re-constitute social networks, recover economically, find opportunity and meaning, pursue goals, and—with receiving communities--express solidarity across social dividing lines.

This dissertation calls out this problematic; and analyzes it at the multi-stakeholder site of refugee resettlement.

Introduction to the Study

On the morning of September 11, 2001 I woke up early and prepared to fly to a national meeting where my colleague and I would help to present the results of a policy-development project for which we had served as neutral facilitators over the course of the previous year. The project had involved over 200 federal and state government officials, environmental NGOs, scientists, and private stakeholders in the U.S. At the time, I was managing the Environmental and Public Policy Conflict Resolution program at The University of Arizona's Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, where I had worked since 1997 while undertaking a doctorate in cultural anthropology.

The alarm-radio was playing and I happened to notice a slightly urgent tone in the announcer's voice that made me wonder what had happened. I turned on the TV in time to see a plane flown into the second tower of the World Trade Center; and shortly thereafter the collapse of both towers. Soon it was announced that all flights had been cancelled and my trip—and the conference—were thus also cancelled.

The events of 9-11 cancelled many plans, individual personal and professional ones, and large systemic ones. Instead, the Bush administration readied us for a war on terror.

My reaction--after seeing the second tower come down, the Pentagon attacked with a third plane, and a fourth plane crashing in Pennsylvania as passengers overtook the hijackers and averted their plans--was to drive to the grocery store and stock up. It was eerily empty: I had made it before the small rush of people who would eventually also come to get supplies that might buttress them against the uncertainty of what was happening. Then I went to the office,

and spent much of the day tearing up and feeling unable to go on with work, as if everything, in an instant, had changed.

It had, in so very many ways. The U.S. invested extensively in going after Bin Laden and then went on to declare war on Iraq and institute massive surveillance systems aimed at thwarting terrorist attacks in the U.S. and internationally. The Bush Administration authorized waterboarding as a means of extracting information from captured individuals who seemed part of the terrorist or counterinsurgency efforts; Guantanamo Bay prison was established to house and interrogate U.S. prisoners of war; pictures posted to the Internet of the humiliation of prisoners held by U.S. forces at Abu Ghraib in Iraq became a flashpoint of furious opposition to U.S. military action, while stories and footage of journalists and humanitarian workers being kidnapped and gruesomely executed by Iraqis or Al Qaeda allies extended public support for the war on terror in the U.S. and Great Britain. Countless thousands were killed in the Iraqi war—some among American troops and for-hire militias, and many, many more Iraqis. American soldiers in the all-volunteer armed services were sent to the war with unarmored vehicles, and those of us watching from the U.S. learned that the Secretary of Defense had told U.S. soldiers in Kuwait that "you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time."[1]

Meanwhile, the funding and concerns about preservation of ecological systems—and many other environmental and social issues—were redirected to assuring safety for Americans and getting retribution for this surprise attack. My career path and focus would change dramatically as funding dried up, and at about the same time as the U.S. readied for war with Iraq in 2003, I began to work in the field of refugee resettlement first as a researcher on a project

[1] Reported on CNN by staff of Wolf Blitzer Reports, December 8, 2004

of the Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology (BARA) at The University of Arizona, then as a volunteer for the first Somali Bantu refugee to arrive in Tucson, and then as the director of a resettlement program at a local social service agency. I am still working in this field as a specialist 12 years later and have now served in national, state, and local capacities, in government, resettlement programs, refugee mutual assistance associations, and as a family ties volunteer for a refugee family; and I am drawing on these years of participant observation and information provided by many key informants to write this dissertation—a vertical ethnography of the U.S. refugee resettlement program—and the last step of a very long post-9-11 journey to finish the requirements of a Ph.D.

If I had been Iraqi, I would have seen my life change dramatically and much more existentially after that day. My country would be attacked by U.S. forces on March 20, 2003 and Saddam Hussein would go into hiding as U.S. forces overran Bagdad in the ensuing weeks. A period of mass looting would ensue in the absence of policing, and the holdings in national cultural centers of the country—the art and history museums, the library, the government buildings, and many centers of commerce—would disappear and their buildings would be dismantled for materials and scrap. The military would be disbanded and, suddenly without work and income, these professional soldiers would re-form themselves into an insurgency with multiple militias and leaders who could access weapons caches hidden throughout Iraq during Saddam Hussein's regime. They would go on to fight U.S. troops and each other in this power vacuum. Some of my family, neighbors, colleagues, and/or friends would be killed by weapons of war wielded by either Americans or Iraqis or both; or kidnapped for ransom and then killed or freed as some groups shifted to criminal pursuits in order to take advantage of new opportunities for income as the legal ones diminished. My economic security would be deeply threatened, my

wealth stolen through the exaction of ransom, or explosion, or outright theft. I would be without electricity and basic supplies for extended periods of time.

And within 5 years, I might be on my way to the U.S. as a refugee or special-visa immigrant, fleeing persecution or violence or retaliation for either being the wrong religious or ethnic identity, or helping the wrong side in the insurgent conflicts, or for assisting the U.S. military. Or if I stayed, I or members of my family might be dead, killed for assisting the U.S. military while awaiting official confirmation needed from the military people I knew that they remembered me and I was employed by them, so that I could get the Special Visa-issuing agency to believe that I had indeed assisted the U.S. military because, apparently the military kept no records of my assistance to them.[2]

If I had been a director or shareholder of Halliburton, I might be anticipating a raise in income. If I were an employee of an international relief organization, I might be positioning myself to go to Afghanistan or Iraq, because I am aware of how opportunities open and close according to disasters in the world. I might start learning Arabic. I might contact my friends in different agencies to see what jobs might be opening. If I were a NYC firefighter, I might be dead within 10 years of disease processes secondary to inhalation of toxic smoke that I had been assured was not a problem or threat to me as I combed through the wreckage. If I lived in Phoenix or countless other cities across the U.S. and wore a hijab or a Sikh turban, I might be attacked; if I were Muslim and had a business, it might be attacked. I might lay low, not go out,

[2] In 2008 the U.S. Congress authorized 25,000 special immigrant visas (SIVs) to be issued to Iraqis who served as interpreters and translators for the U.S. military (endangering themselves); by the end of 2012, 18,000 had not yet been issued and a majority of U.S. troops had left Iraq. See Kirk Johnson's 2014 book documenting his activism to try to get SIVs issued to Iraqis so they could gain safety in the U.S. The program is now (in 2015) functioning well and extended to Afghani interpreters. Johnson's activism was also the subject of a 2012 documentary film by Beth Murphy called "The List." The film was screened in Madison Wisconsin as part of World Refugee Day celebration events in 2014, and it is definitely worth a viewing to understand the difficult experience of civilians who are caught in the middle of a war.

or worry whether people with whom I had routinely interacted the day before might suddenly be a threat to my safety.

If I had been a refugee in an overseas camp or in Germany or Austria or the countries of the former Soviet Union scheduled for transfer to the U.S., my flight would be cancelled and I would wait a few months before the program reopened and I could resume waiting in line again for transit to America. If I worked for a resettlement agency in the U.S., I might be laid off for fear that funding to pay for my work in resettling arriving refugees would be stopped for more than the couple of months that it actually was. I might find another job in another field. Or I might wait, holding on for the inevitable resumption of the task of getting refugees into the U.S. and into homes and jobs so they can start over.

That event on 9-11 brought massive changes to the lives of many people. It is not terribly helpful to compare who had it best or worst. Wrenching change is wrenching for every individual: it changes one's life course, one's memory and perception of meaning, one's opportunities, and one's sense of self and community. However, for people who become refugees, the change is usually rapid, explosive, and it utterly de-centers life as they knew it. And they must pick up and go on in a strange land. To do so, they must become like children and for many, this is as devastating to self-concept over time as the profound humiliations they suffered at the hands of others while they attempted to escape with their lives. They have been reduced to bare life; and now they must build again among strangers. For elderly refugees, there is not really time to rebuild. They are on SSI for the rest of their lives in the U.S. provided they become citizens within seven years after arrival.

In decades previous to 9-11, other events also resulted in such changes to the lives of many people and contributed refugees into the international arena. The 1980s and 1990s saw the

breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; the dissolution of Somalia into warring clans defended by militias; Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Iraq-Iran war; the genocide in Rwanda which helped to destabilize other central African nations and contributed refugees also from Burundi and Congo; the extended warring in Liberia. And in the 1970s and 80s, the Viet Nam war contributed refugees from Cambodia, Viet Nam, and Laos.

REFUGEES IN THE WORLD

Wars and political instability make refugees. Contemporary wars make refugees who cannot return home safely for many years, if at all. And so, the international community of nations must establish a means of handling war-impacted, displaced humanity numbering in the millions: housing, feeding, figuring out how to return them to citizenship, somewhere. If they do not, the instability and chaos will spread. It is a humanitarian mission, and it is a containment/ governance mission, at the same time. *They are inevitably inseparable.*[3]

For a subset of refugees (roughly 1% of refugees in the world) the durable solution is resettlement in a third country, often far from their country or region of origin. They have or will navigate through four kinds of potentially traumatizing experiences:

- violence experienced or witnessed, from which they flee;
- flight, when survival is uncertain and actions must be taken to survive which exceed social boundaries and moral expectations;
- becoming a refugee governed by international actors, a status of liminality and perceived pollution; and
- resettlement in a third country, when one must become as a child in order to learn again how to be a respected adult in a new society.

[3] See Kienzler and Pedersen (2012).

Resettlement in the United States

Beginning in the 1970s and 80s, communities across the United States started welcoming Hmong (over 200,000 since 1975), Vietnamese (approximately 500,000 through the year 2000), and Cambodian refugees (approximately 150,000) from the Viet Nam War era. Churches adopted a family and—supplementing federal benefits programs—provided for much of their material security in the first few years. U.S. communities also began welcoming Cubans and Haitians during this period. In the 1990s, Russian Jews from the former Soviet Union (410,000) were resettled through Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) and local Jewish social service agencies with the assistance of synagogues and Jewish Federations. Refugees from the former Yugoslavia (around 170,000) and smaller numbers of East Africans from Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia also arrived during this time, as did refugees from Iraq (Kurds and Chaldeans) and Iran, and Central Africans fleeing from the Rwandan genocide.

The resettlement of the Lost Boys of Sudan (approximately 4,000) and the Somali Bantu (approximately 13,000) to communities across the U.S. in the period from 1999-2005 heralded a significant change in the program. The Department of State identified and readied populations of much smaller numbers for resettlement to the U.S., and these included Liberians, Congolese, Burundis, Meskhetian Turks, several ethnicities from Burma, ethnic Nepalis evicted from Bhutan after living there for several generations and who were not accepted back as citizens by the government of Nepal (which confined them to refugee camps). And now, Iraqis, Afghanis, more Somalis, Eritreans, and, most recently (and contested by the elected governors of 31 states), some 10,000 Syrians. A highly varied group overall: from Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Caribbean. People who are preliterate; people with professional degrees in medicine, law, or engineering. Receiving agencies and communities have to re-tool, re-tool, and

re-tool again their programs to fit the variety of needs among those arriving from different situations, but with similar experiences of escape from extreme violence and loss. I started researching and working in refugee resettlement in 2003, toward the beginning of this shift and after 9-11, and at the beginning of the Somali Bantu resettlement to the U.S.

I was both fascinated and moved by individual and collective agency in this intense project of resettlement: how embodied people move through time and processes and structures and systems doing their best to realize their interests. As a medical anthropologist and social observer, I think about bodies in landscapes, moving and interacting and allying and competing and cooperating as they act very physically and materially in securing resources and pursuing a wide array of other interests.

Arriving to local communities in the U.S.

Setting up a new apartment for 900 arriving refugees[4] means shopping for, transporting, and unpacking 900 mattress sets, bed frames sets of sheets, pillows and blankets; 900 forks, spoons, knives, plates, cups, drinking glasses; 900 toothbrushes, towels, washcloths; 3600 hangers; a couch, a lamp in each room without overhead lighting, a bathroom mat, a roll of toilet paper roll, bath and laundry soap, writing paper and pencils/pens, a kitchen table and chairs, pots and pans, serving utensils, dish soap, and a twelve-pack of Coke in each refrigerator[5] along with cooking supplies and one week's worth of food—chicken, bread, cooking oil, salt, pepper, rice, bananas, citrus, tomatoes, potatoes, beef, spaghetti, butter, sugar, coffee, tea, tea biscuits, milk, fruit juice, fish, green peppers, onion, garlic, ginger, cinnamon, beans, lentils, cheese, salad

[4] This figure is the approximate number of arrivals to Wisconsin in each of FFYs 2012 and 2013. Arrivals in FFY2015 were close to 1500.

[5] This happened with Africans resettling—I am not sure it still does now—but at that time, African-born case managers explained to me that it symbolized arrival in the U.S. When I go to see former refugees from African, I still get offered a can of soda, though usually now it is either Coke or some variety of orange.

dressing, and ethnic-specific other foodstuffs that Volags[6] install into apartments before refugees arrive. Do this over the course of a year, and you begin to understand the sheer physicality of resettlement and the significant resources needed for welcoming a new family into the U.S. It takes the effort of a lot of people in receiving communities, some paid, some unpaid.

Refugees arrive at airports with children and not infrequently those children throw up in the case manager's car on the way home from the airport. The journey from overseas is tiring and sickening and they've had to either go without food or eat what is offered in flight—most of which they have not eaten before. Parents are embarrassed *and* worried; when they get to their new apartment families have to go through an orientation to using the toilet, refrigerator, stove, door locks, lights, windows, sink, shower, and be shown what supplies are in the house and how to use them before, thankfully, the case manager leaves and they can finally shut the door and get sick in the bathroom, get clean, wash their hands, and go to sleep after assuring that their kids are tucked in. This assumes that the plumbing is in good working order and they use it correctly. Sometimes the parents sleep in the living room on the fold-out sofa since apartments with one less bedroom are cheaper and affordable for the newly arriving; sometimes cockroaches appear; sometimes the sickness goes on all night. But mostly, they are finally able to sleep.[7]

Refugees are survivors, taking their bodies and walking, eating, crying, laughing, struggling their way to establishment of a new life in a strange land. Meanwhile, their case managers from the resettlement agencies are filling out forms, filing receipts, faxing papers to

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[6] The term for refugee resettlement agencies—derived from "Voluntary Agency"—an agency which "volunteers" to receive and place refugees in a local community. It is a bit of a misnomer—they have contracts with the Department of State to complete this work.

[7] This description is from my time doing direct resettlement from 2003-2006. Resettlement agencies are now required to have a hot meal waiting for refugees on arrival and I wondered about this given that they are so exhausted and not feeling well—how does this go? I was able to ask an Iraqi recently about this, who said that arriving refugees frequently do not want to sit down and eat when they are so exhausted. Another from Burma noted that her missed flight resulted in the meal prepared going to waste. I hope this "requirement" is flexibly applied. Just put food in the house, show them how to use the microwave (hopefully, there is one), and let them go to sleep. Or come back with a hot meal the next day.

start benefits flows, recording their mileage in going to the airport/transporting refugees/hauling supplies to prepare the apartment, and turning attention to the myriad other people who need everything, it seems, all the time. They have miles to go before they too can sleep, and then up the next morning, returning to the apartment to gather the family into their cars to start the bureaucratic processes that will govern much of how they start life in the U.S. Stop, record mileage, submit it every two weeks, check to make sure they were reimbursed at the allowable rate. Re-fuel. Re-fuel. Case managers may spend as much as a third of each day in the car.

There is a lot of work for refugees and receiving communities resulting from forced migration and later resettlement. Scary, mundane, boring, silly, maddening, funny, life-affirming work. Bureaucratic, time consuming, forward-looking. For refugees arriving in the U.S., they have a place, now, where they can legally be, and where they have freedom to move around and to make plans. They have opportunities, but the streets are not paved with gold, not by any means. There is relatively more safety; but it is not entirely safe. Indeed it may be getting less safe as the media runs daily stories that stoke terrorism fears and anti-Muslim sentiments in the West, and anti-American sentiments in the Middle East, North and East Africa.

* * *

The dissertation is partly based on my work as an engaged anthropologist, a practitioner constantly questioning, forming little mini-hypotheses about what is and what could be, testing them informally and then constructing something to change practice, hopefully for the better but certainly not always. The method was rather serendipitous, much as practice is in many domains in highly-reorganizing systems. What we see in mass violence episodes internationally are sudden large-scale systemic crashes described in Gunderson and Hollings' 2002 edited volume,

Panarchy, followed by chaotic systemic reorganizations that eventually slow to the incremental changes characterizing more stable periods.

The eruption on May 18, 1980 of the long-dormant Mount St. Helens devastated life in the path of its volcanic flows. But then, after some time, photographers began to publish pictures of green shoots emerging from the cracks of the blackened ground (seeping, leaking out), followed by critters and people testing the new ground. People who remain or return in-country after extreme political violence are left with devastation and the work of recovery, often in as-obliterated landscapes. Refugees who do not return emerge to more-than-bare life when they get to third countries of resettlement and have some sense of safety. It is as life-changing, but takes place within a less devastated physical and social context. The chapters which follow provide fragments and snapshots of what they do in resettlement and recovery.

THE PRESENT STUDY

This dissertation is an ethnography of refugee resettlement in the U.S. after 9-11. Based on years of participant/observation research and conversations with key informants, it examines a nation's admission of peoples who are betwixt and between countries and cultures and who are suffering from both the impacts of extreme violence and a state of liminality. I am a U.S. citizen and an anthropologist who often functions betwixt and between cultures and social groups.

Yin wrote that ethnography (and qualitative research) aspires to an up-close, detailed observation of the natural world, avoiding a prior commitment to any theoretical model (1984:14). Richardson (2000:245) provided five criteria for evaluating the success of ethnography:

- Substantive contribution: does it contribute to our understanding of social life?
- Aesthetic merit: does it succeed aesthetically?

- Reflexivity: how did I come to write this text, and is there adequate self-awareness and self-exposure for readers to make judgments about point of view? (i.e., is this just my opinion, or would others come to the same conclusion?)
- Impact: does it affect the reader, move the reader emotionally and/or intellectually?
- Expresses a reality: does it seem true? Is it a credible account of a cultural, social, individual, or communal sense of the real?

I like these criteria and hope I have written a successful ethnography of the U.S. refugee resettlement program, its policies, and the practices of a significant range of its stakeholders. My purpose has been to understand of the phenomenon—the process—of resettlement from local to national levels of the U.S. resettlement system, each register actually peopled and thereby constituting its own "local." I wanted to capture as rich a picture of resettlement as possible.

As a researcher, I am trying to understand and make sense of practice among both arriving and receiving communities: What do people do, at what levels of the U.S. (nation-state) system? I use a number of theoretical constructs in the ensuing chapters that I have found helpful in trying to understand what I observed in the field. As a "pracademic," I find them "good to think" and also useful in helping other practitioners as well as refugees themselves reflect on their experience in resettlement. I detail these theory tools in Chapters 1 and 4 as well as citing others briefly throughout the rest of the work.

Biehl and McKay (2012) provide three examples of contemporary ethnographic writing in a global context, and examine how the authors responded richly and creatively to the situations they were seeing and in which they were participating. Biehl and McKay suggested that these studies did not simply show examples of situations that could be "named" or "diagnosed" using theory—but instead used theory as a springboard or point of entry into a rich "noticing" of fragments and splinters that reveal motion, trajectory, human sense-making and action at a time of local encounters of the global and vice versa.

Anthropologists situate themselves (and are situated) in the local: a locale peopled, who respond, pour out of, leak out of the structuring frames of governance, war, commercial, and socio-cultural or religious practice. As the authors noted, ethnography can make visible the swerves of local practitioners —citizens, professionals, leaders, bare-life-ascribed clients—to create a different, more positive or desirable trajectory and meaning. My dissertation aspires to this project and the work of engaged anthropology more generally, hopefully self-aware in its socio-political practice.

My background and how I did the research

I started in the field of refugee resettlement while a Ph.D. candidate in Anthropology. My previous careers were: psychotherapist, filmmaker (very brief), facilitator of environmental policy-development processes with many stakeholders often in conflict. My dissertation topic changed from an environmental conflict project with a political ecology focus to looking at the phenomenon of resettlement in the U.S. I just kept getting more and more engaged, and found myself returning to my training as a medical anthropologist. I completed the Harvard Certificate Program in Refugee Trauma (HPRT) in 2008, a move which effectively brought together three aspects of my intellectual and professional training: medical anthropology, refugee work, and therapy. An HPRT faculty member I met (Natale Losi) is a medical anthropologist/psychologist who worked for IOM, and I was very interested in how he brought academic anthropology into his engaged work. All of these experiences surely influenced my perspectives in undertaking this dissertation research.

The various careers have each included a focus on pain and suffering and its relief. I left the profession of psychotherapy after coming to understand that partly, we were medicalizing social and cultural issues. I wondered if there were other ways to address more directly the causes of social suffering: Were there other approaches that might allow people to get more

traction in better (more supportive, less destructive) contexts for making a meaningful and vibrant life for themselves?

I've worked at individual, family, local community, state government, and national levels in the course of my work in refugee resettlement. I have written numerous successful grants to get funding into agencies engaged in resettlement work. Over the past thirteen years I have occupied the following roles and positions in the field of U.S. refugee resettlement, both paid and unpaid. In chronological order, I:

- conducted focus-group research on three sectors within a state's resettlement program as part of a university-based research team;
- served as a family-ties volunteer for the first Somali Bantu refugee to arrive in the city where I was residing;
- directed a local resettlement program in a social service agency;
- mentored three Somali Bantu Mutual Assistance Associations (MAAs);
- created an oral ESL curriculum for pre-literate refugee populations and field tested it with Somali Bantus at their apartment complexes;
- trained trainers in refugee healthy marriage programs across the U.S. as a subcontractor for a national technical assistance project funded by the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement and operated through HIAS, and designed a national evaluation project of these programs;
- served as the State Refugee Coordinator for Wisconsin, a position named in federal legislation as the point of contact between the federal government and local programs, authorized to coordinate all resettlement activities within a state; and
- served as Director of Program Evaluation at Lutheran Immigrant and Refugee Services (LIRS), a national Volag.[8]

At one point or another, within one role or another, I was directly interacting with refugees, receiving communities, and/or resettlement professionals in the following states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, D.C., Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Illinois, Maryland,

[8] My work at LIRS is not part of this dissertation; I moved to LIRS in August 2014. I am now back in Wisconsin, again serving as the State Refugee Coordinator.

Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin. More indirectly, through my participation in SCORR and RCUSA members on phone calls, peer consultations, webinars, workgroups, and national consultations, I am in touch with almost all of the States and national organizations involved in the resettlement of refugees in the U.S., and with staff and/or leadership in the Department of State's PRM; the Office of Refugee Resettlement in the DHHS Administration for Children and Families; and the Washington Office of UNHCR.

I have worked with refugees or former refugees from the following countries of origin and/or ethnicities: Afghanistan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, Cote D'Ivoire, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Hmong/Laos, Iraq, Liberia, Russia (including Mesketian Turks from Russia), Rwanda, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine. My most intense key informants have been refugees/former refugees from the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, East and Central Africa, Hmong/Laos, Cambodia, and Iraq, and it is likely that my study is a distorted to some extent in the direction of these populations and their particularities of culture and resettlement era.

Each of the positions and roles I held gave me different insights into the resettlement experience. I was most often talked to as a person who held a position or role or appointment within the field of resettlement, even though people knew (and know) that I am an anthropologist researching refugee experience and the system. I had first-hand experience of the daily minutiae of activities, interactions, frustrations, and tiny triumphs for everyone engaged in this work—refugees, public and NGO officials, board members, volunteers, school officials. People reflect on what and how they are doing as part of daily life, not just because they are being researched. I got to reflect with them and as one of them in groups. I will discuss as we go what these circumstances enabled me to do as well as how these roles influence my "objectivity," at least as

much as I can see. I'm sure there are blind spots for me, but I am an experienced psychotherapist whose career started with training on transference and counter-transference, and this background has served me in the switch to anthropological reflexivity.

I have had many key informants through the years. Some I have asked to play the role very soon after meeting them, others became key informants over time, and some I checked in with to make sure that what I was thinking and seeing resonated for them ("member checks"). They have talked things over with me to help me do the work of resettlement better, and to contribute to understanding the phenomenon of resettlement so that knowledge is built. I can say things that they are not able to say publicly themselves. For some, it would endanger them or their families politically; for others, it would create social difficulties. So I will not identify them. And I am *so* indebted to them.

The problems investigated

This ethnography details what refugee individuals and populations do to rebuild and reconfigure social life after mass violence, and how they do it in a foreign land—the country of their eventual resettlement. I am taking a systems perspective in this study, so the focus shifts across varied units of analysis: individuals, families, and collectives at different scales. Because we need to consider the variety of influences on resettlement on a different continent, the ethnography documents the vantage points of arriving refugees as well as the citizenry and government officials of the receiving nation-state.

A. A phenomenology of resettlement in the U.S. after 9-11

First and foremost, I undertook to describe the phenomenology of resettlement from the various perspectives. An in-depth, multi-level, multi-stakeholder ethnography of resettlement has

not been done elsewhere—it is a task requiring a significant length of time in the field. And that I have had.

In the beginning I was working closely with refugees coming in from overseas in the first months and years after resettlement. Some staff of resettlement agencies and most in MAAs are refugees who have been here longer, likely are either citizens of the U.S. or close to getting it (three of the staff at the Volag became citizens while I worked as the Volag director; another among staff at the State Refugee Office in Wisconsin). My first focus was on the phenomenology of resettlement from the perspective of refugees who were both employed by resettlement field and/or who were recipients of resettlement services after arriving from overseas. On the receiving-community side, my first focus was on the volunteers, and especially the "professional" volunteers who have been working as volunteers in the field a long time and are very well-known in local communities. Usually (but not always) these are people of means who have taken this project up as an avocation. And I found them in every local community where resettlement takes place.

As I moved to other positions—increasingly administrative—I became much more in touch with the people who were stakeholders from the receiving community: agency directors, local public health departments, government officials at state and national levels, and resettlement professionals in non-profits serving refugees.

I should note that my discussion of the phenomenology of resettlement for arriving refugees is considerable richer about refugees I was encountering in the first years—from 2003-2009. Since moving into more administrative roles, I have had less direct contact with the more recent populations of Iraqi, Burmese, and Bhutanese except as I am meeting their leadership or working with individuals who are staffers in the resettlement field. The policies of resettlement,

though, have changed very little in that time. While the perspectives you will read are largely from the following populations—Jews/Meskhetian Turks/others from the former Soviet Union (FSU), refugees from the former Yugoslavia (FY), Somali, Somali Bantu, Liberian, Eritrean, Sudanese, Cambodian, and Hmong—the processes that they went through are similar to what refugees who come in now also experience because policy remains much the same. I have clearly seen that practice has improved through time as institutional memory and capacity accumulate.

I was meeting people after 9-11. Some who I was meeting from FSY, FY, Cambodia and Laos had come in before 9-11 and were not impacted too greatly by those events insofar as they affected their resettlement experience. But those coming in after 9-11--especially from Muslim groups and/or countries--were clearly impacted by an increasing level of anti-immigrant sentiment and paranoia about terrorist activities. The most recent arrivals from Iraq, Burma, Bhutan, and Somalia were also impacted by the economic downturn in 2008 when jobs became scarce and anti-immigrant was significantly higher as a result. I had not set out to think about this question of the post-9-11 phenomenology of resettlement, but I encountered its impact on resettlement in a number of ways. So it became a focus of analysis for the dissertation. I really did not discuss the question with people directly; I did not really talk to refugees about it since refugee groups who came after 9-11 did not have anything to compare the experience to. The change was discernable primarily among the receiving community members.

From the refugee perspective: What is it like to start over in the U.S. after the extreme experiences of mass violence, flight, encampment, and waiting to see if one's application for resettlement is accepted? How does the experience differ by gender, age, culture, and religion? Individuals have different calculuses due to enabling and constraining factors related to

culturally-mediated expectations about gender and other social roles, and the different resiliencies and judgments associated with age.

From the perspective of receiving communities and governments: We also have to consider what receiving community members think about these foreigners coming in from overseas. What is it like to receive refugees from overseas and take on a "host" role? Or an administrative role in an NGO or government? A regulatory role? A case management and job development role? What about receiving community officials whose institutions and organizations end up working with refugees though they may not have been expecting to serve them? What is it like for landlords and neighbors? There are critical differences based on position and role, and again, demographic differences in who chooses to volunteer or hold other roles. I wanted to capture this experience and what people think they are doing.

Relationships between arriving refugees and receiving community members: In the beginning it is usually a charitable "humanitarian" relationship between victim and rescuer. As time goes on, regularization and the *positioned* everyday work of living has to be understood between arriving and receiving communities if there is to be a basis for relationships beyond the charitable. And getting beyond charitable, I will argue, must occur for effective integration.

I address the phenomenology of resettlement in almost all of the chapters which follow, but provide the most direct focus on this question in Chapter 3.

B. The policies, goals, and structures of resettlement

This study starts with the international process of refugee oversight beginning with flight, and how refugee crises are addressed and governed by IGOs and INGOs. After World War II with the establishment of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), people who have fled their enflamed countries could be given a protected status of

"refugee." The development of international and national law set the policies, structures and goals which greatly influence the experience of refugee life. They also tell us about the attitudes of peoples of the world toward chaos and what will contain it so that the violence and persecution leading to flight does not spill over borders and impact neighboring countries. What structures have been set up by policy, how well do they work, and what outcomes do they seek vs. accomplish? Chapter 2 focuses on international policies related to flight and decisions about resettlement; Chapter 5 explains the policies of the U.S. refugee resettlement program.

C. The stakeholders and players in resettlement, their interests, and how they pursue them

Both arriving and receiving community members have a variety of stakes in refugee resettlement. People are not just experiencing the process; they are actively seeking to influence it with gains in mind, while attempting to minimize risk and trauma. I undertake an analysis of actors at different levels in the system. Americans are interacting with refugees usually as part of institutions, so there is a need to look at the "business of resettlement." Are there unfunded mandates? Perverse incentives? Risks and gains to be made? And if so, what are these? Understanding stakeholders and their interests helps us to analyze agency in the process of resettlement. What are actors and institutions doing and why?

A significant area of exploration is to understand how refugees negotiate retention of their cultural identity and also belong to the new nation. Another is, how do/could U.S. communities embrace difference and benefit from the reinvigorating energy of "others" in an era of increasing fear after 9-11? These questions lead us to the third: how do relationships between the two "sides"—arriving and receiving—develop and change over time? Chapters 5 -7 are devoted to analysis of stakeholders, interests, and agency.

D. What is a resettlement success, what is a failure?

I address this problem because there are so many ideas about it and no true shared definition of success or failure that I have been able to identify. U.S. governmentality as evidenced in policy seems to define it as a refugee who becomes—within the shortest possible time—a self-sufficient, neoliberal citizen who makes no demands on the government, behaves according to the laws of the U.S., and contributes economically through labor or ownership of a profitable business. This viewpoint assumes that refugees coming from sociocentrically-oriented cultures can and want to adapt to the individualistic neoliberal ideal, but they arrive with their own ideas of success in a new land. When I have asked at meetings and speeches for refugees to recall what they had hoped for as they sat on the plane on the way over to the city of their resettlement, they certainly had ideas about what they were after, and fears about how this might fail. These ideas may change as the resettlement trajectory unfolds. But they remain—for individuals and families--a measure or point of comparison with which to assess "success."

Local communities are where success and failure are phenomenologically apparent. There are statistical indicators of employment and non-reliance on government support which can be reported to Congress and the public. They are *noticed* in local communities, where opportunities and barriers--and indeed the character of sociality--are directly experienced. Social roles and economic statuses achieved by refugees are visible; institutional responses are also visible. So it is important to assess social adjustment and achievements as lived out in local communities.

Nevertheless, definitions of success at the individual and family levels, and at the national level, are also critically implicated in the continuation of the U.S. resettlement program, leading to questions of how current policies contribute to successes and failures. But a larger

concern is the recovery from political violence in resettling peoples. And this question of recovery implicates processes of resilience, role change, identity change, senses of belonging, community connections, and recovery of trust in government and in a social contract that is viable for the life of individuals and communities. So in addressing the question of success and failure, we are looking at the hopes and aspirations of refugees resettling, and of the people who are receiving them and attempting to do a humanitarian mission well, and/or figuring out how to effectively integrate them within extant communities. I cover these topics in Chapter 8.

E. How policies contribute to successes and failures

Policies restrict and enable. Policies are set at a variety of levels—they are written into statute, but administrative policy and funding allocations are critical aspects of policy-making, and so I also examine these processes and decisions, and assess the ways in which they contribute to successes and failures in resettlement in Chapters 5 and 8. In Chapter 9—the conclusion, I offer suggestions for improvement.

The purposes of the study

I am positioning this dissertation within and against the emerging literature on forced displacement, repatriation, refugee resettlement, and post-war trauma and recovery in populations and nations impacted by extreme mass violence. I will be drawing from and building on the work of anthropologists who have looked at and critiqued what is happening internationally after 9-11. Two in-depth case studies published as dissertations in 2009 have helped me to think about the points of conceptual entry for this study. Abramowitz investigated what she termed the "interventionscape" of international humanitarian agencies as they focus on suffering and its management in post-war Liberia: the methodologies and their impacts on and appropriation by local populations recovering from years of marauding militias traversing the

country. Locke investigated therapeutic governance in a context of transition to a capitalist economy, focusing on social interaction in post-war, post-international-recovery-effort Sarajevo. He observed the city's inhabitants struggling with anger and frustration, searching for a better sociality, and nostalgically longing for the friendly relations they remembered among intermixed ethnic groups—who were once neighbors in Tito's Yugoslavia.

A. Getting beyond medicalization

Both scholars address the increasing medicalization of trauma and post-war reconstruction in areas devastated by years of atrocious fighting and mass theft. I also take up the issue in Chapter 1. I want to ask after the alternatives to medicalization of war trauma, especially at the community level. Are there other social and economic practices that acknowledge and directly hail the contextual conditions leading to the outbreak of violence, the despoiled sociality during the descent into violence and the stubborn persistence of sickened sociality, societies, political and economic functioning after fighting stops?

Third-country resettlement offers interesting possibilities for studying this question. What is done by, with, and for refugees because they are in a different context of liminality may point us in some new directions of practice and policy. Third-country resettlement offers arriving populations some immediate relief because of the sudden change in context: partly the healthier sociality afforded by conditions of much better safety and the welcoming aspects of a humanitarian effort, [9] and partly the new spaces of agentive action available in a different and very foreign country. Those less traumatized and more entrepreneurial can begin to rebuild very soon after arrival as they embrace new opportunities. But they are addressing war's aftermath

[9] The first people they meet are resettlement agency case managers and volunteers who are interested in helping them and in meeting them, not those with an anti-immigrant viewpoint.

while also navigating a completely new context for which they have not been socialized. And this is fraught with the risk of loss of grounded identity and an inability to find a way home.

B. Extending anthropological work on ritual management of social role change to refugees finding a place in a new land

Studies of ritual mediation of change and indigenous healing come to mind when thinking about resettlement. I extend these analyses to refugees becoming new citizens. It is not that they are assuming a new role in their existing society (as van Gennep and Turner wrote about); they are learning to be someone who goes through a liminal phase toward acceptance by an entirely new society. This study can offer new framings of hybridity and citizenship which get at a silent pain I have observed among many refugees and former refugees: that of the precariousness of their sense of belonging—to the communities and country they left behind, and to what it is possible for them to become in an entirely new society.

And how may they be changing that society? In the van Gannep/Turner explanations of *rites de passage*, ritual specialists guide the way, but they do not themselves change in that process. In the context of accepting foreigners, is the process actually two-way, between arriving refugees and their receiving-community hosts?

C. Elaborating social processes of receiving international migrants into local communities of a nation-state

Both the search for alternatives to medicalization and ideas of ritual/social healing implicate local geographic communities and communities of practice and interest. The actions of local and state populaces, governments, and institutions (both arriving and receiving) in various communities and states have been scantly addressed in the literature. I look at the practices

around pursuit and deployment of social and cultural capital as a means of studying these questions.

Ultimately, we are moving into a time of increasing migration, suddenly forced or impending because of economic pressures or global climate change. What we learn about refugee resettlement can help us think through an increasingly anticipated migratory future in this century.

The study methods

A. Participant Observation

The data for this study come largely from participant observation in the following field contexts:

- refugee services and programs as they are delivered,
- interactions I had in the refugee communities and with families as a volunteer and with other volunteers,
- various institutions involved in resettlement in which I worked or with whom I interacted officially due to my work roles (excluding LIRS), and
- vertical interactions between national and local players implementing the Refugee Act of 1980 and resettling refugees across the U.S.

As part of my various jobs—as a researcher for a short-term BARA project, as a family ties volunteer, a director of a local resettlement program, a national technical assistance provider for an ORR-funded initiative, an ECBO (MAA) organizational mentor, a consultant, a trainer, and a state refugee coordinator (working in state government)—I jotted notes, kept minutes of meetings, created digests of meetings and processes, created powerpoint presentations about resettlement or program practices or policies or direct observations or training information. I worked on service maps; created contract language for program and service providers; wrote program and service guidance based on policy; created plans and myriad other written materials

that required extensive and repeated reviews of federal statute, administrative policy, program and grant requirements, benefits and services eligibility and priorities; and wrote reports of data collected from program providers about employment and healthcare (primarily).

I attended many kinds of meetings, from quarterly and national consultations with ORR and state refugee coordinators, to annual conferences, to planning meetings, to operations-planning meetings, to policy-setting, to community organizing and visioning meetings, to case conferences with a variety of service providers and individual refugees who were experiencing problems, to board meetings of non-profit organizations, to multi-stakeholder national briefings held on quarterly bases, to workgroups developing guidance for implementing new federal policies.

The questions which come up and don't come up, the things that are said and left unsaid, the avoidance of specification where ambiguity is required, the need to accommodate extensive practice and policy variances among states, the constant maneuvering for funding and position among institutions competing for grants---all of these phenomena yield fascinating information about flows and trajectories, swerves in practice and attempts at redefinition to create a different reality and meaning. This is the lived experience of the fieldwork, but I was serving in many roles other than researcher as I did it. I was an actor, as well. I tried to enact change; I influenced what was occurring in front of me. Where I deliberately did this and report on it in my dissertation, I am explicit about it. But the dissertation is not about an assessment of my participation and practice—what did I influence? was that successful or not?—but rather about what I was observing as the reality and attempts of the actors to make changes to it. Refugees have to remake home. Receiving communities have to accommodate newcomers. How they did this is the story. How well these things worked for various families and actors and institutions is

observable, and would happen whether I was watching or not, acting or not. I did experiment with practice as any social actor does, and reflected about the results of these "try it and see" attempts.

Disputes arise between agencies and colleagues, and these can be telling about stakeholder interests. I participated in a number of these as an observer, as a leader, and as an agency representative. Disputes played out by email, in meetings, in trainings, and in multi-stakeholder strategic planning events. I paid close attention to these as both an ethnographer and as an agency official engaged in the dispute. Negotiations tell a great deal about relationships, satisfactions, and interests of various sorts. These events and processes and my notes of these provided the data for much of the chapter on communities receiving refugees, but for obvious reasons I have resisted giving details of the specific agencies involved or their personnel.

In all this time, I kept notes as I went; I did not keep names attached to these notes because the story recalls the speaker easily, to this day. Resettlement is dramatic and multi-sensorial and thus quite easily remembered as storied experiences. As questions arose about what I was seeing, I began asking key informants to help me understand what I was seeing.

B. Key informant interviews and discussions

People with whom I was working—both refugees and colleagues—knew that I was an anthropologist doing my dissertation research on the resettlement of refugees in the U.S. I asked various people if they would be willing to answer questions to help me understand what I was seeing and talk to me about their understandings and thus serve as key informants for this study. Many of the key informants were people with whom I worked in some capacity—colleagues, people I met at meetings and conferences, people working for the same organizations as I was. They were sometimes people who did not work in the resettlement field but were community

members whom I had seen in action over a fairly long period of time (6 years in some cases) and I had come to see them as thoughtful, reflective individuals whose opinions I valued and trusted. Some sought me out after realizing that I would be able to tell their story in some way. I do want to note that a few people refused my request to be key informants and more never responded yes or no to my request at all—and I would hear later through others in their community whom I knew that they were just too afraid to say what had happened to them. The others knew this because they were called by someone I had approached to discuss whether they could take the risk. The latter wanted no details of their life in any way, even disguised, to appear in print. And they also did not want to refuse outright. I did not pursue it when I did not hear back from someone—I did not want them to feel pressured or fearful, and I also did not want to re-traumatize them by asking them to think out loud with me.

Refugees and former refugees are afraid of retaliation against themselves, but even more of retaliation against family who remain in the country of origin. I am very careful in this writing to shield identifying details of key informants. As I said, I did not write these down in notes, either. This may be difficult for the reader to trust because there seems to be so little specification and attribution. Gender, age range, country of origin, and sometimes place or level in the U.S. may be present, but not always if I am concerned that the person could be identified with the comment. I often include information or insights only if I heard them from more than one person, or similar stories from several people. Refugees have many, many experiences in common, and this is true across ethnic groups as well as within ethnic groups. Sometimes I am quoting a key informant and sometimes not. Sometimes I attribute a quote to a key informant and sometimes I do not in the text, depending on the level of specificity of the comment.

Choice of key informants was opportunistic; and I also learned a great deal from discussions with peers at various system levels as I tried to understand what to do in my job, how to understand something I did not understand (which was usually a difficult problem or interaction, or a subtle communication or bureaucrat-speak). Some of them are indistinguishable in their role and contribution from refugee key informants. I called some to clarify very specifically points of policy about which I write.

I am treating all of these people with the same protocols of confidentiality, although I may classify them as an official of this large agency or as part of a group of professionals serving in a specific role (like state refugee coordinators). With some I did "member checks" to assure that I understood something correctly, though I did not ask them specifically to be a "key informant." But I include them within the categories below:

The key informants who are or were refugees included:

- Five Bosnians (three women, two men, all adult in their 30s-50s): they were people with whom I worked in various roles from various cities in the U.S., or their spouses.
- Three Cambodians (one woman, two men), again in the same age range as above, of the same relationships as above.
- Sixteen Somali Bantu (16 men, 6 women), some with whom I worked or consulted, some whom I met when I was first volunteering in this community and I kept in touch. These were of two age grades: 40-60, and early 20s to mid-thirties.
- Three Somalis: all in their thirties. All men. All met through working as colleagues of different agencies.
- Six other Africans from east and central Africa (3 men, 3 women) all in their 30s and 40s, all met as colleagues or trainees (in train-the-trainer settings).
- Iraqis (comparable numbers to those listed above—female and male, in their 20s and 40s). All met as colleagues or at an MAA office.
- Four Hmong, three men, one woman, in their 40s (colleagues or their spouses).
- Five Russians, three women, two men, in their 40s and 50s (colleagues or their spouses).

Some of these individuals are also community leaders. This is the case for MAA management as well as resettlement staff. They are well-positioned to help me understand phenomena because they are brokering between arriving and receiving communities as staff, and/or figuring out how to interface on behalf of an arriving community with receiving community officials. A few of the key informants did not fit into this category (especially but not exclusively among the Somali Bantu informants) but were people who liked to reflect on their experience and the life of the arriving community around them.

I checked back with key informants who spent the most time with me about inclusion of stories that their families and friends would recognize, and let them read the passages. There are also a few instances where anyone who knows me personally in a work setting will also know the key informant, and I explicitly checked the information included to make sure that there would not be a problem for that person if someone could identify them. In no case was I asked to remove or change the passage. What they told me was how much it meant to them to have the story told, because they could not do it directly. The colleague discussants/peer officials of agencies included:

- eight public officials who were state refugee coordinators in various states, staff of federal agencies (PRM and ORR), and
- five individuals from Volag management (national and local).

Of course, these are not the only people with whom I talked or who I quote in the dissertation chapters which follow, but they specifically helped me understand--from their various positions as refugees or receiving community members or colleagues-- questions that I had about what I was observing, the history of actions and issues in communities or countries of origin, and the phenomenology of resettlement. Other people quoted were participating in meetings or events or trainings or discussions of which I was a part, or in opportunistic

conversations following these meetings. Or, as part of trying to work out issues with contracts, funding, reporting, life emergencies (the latter as I volunteered in the Somali Bantu community). And they include people from all refugee populations except Bhutanese/Nepalese (with whom I have had virtually no contact).

C. Review of primary and secondary data, statutes, State letters and ops memos, and other official records

These records were primarily made available on websites of refugee-related agencies: The Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), the Department of Health and Human Service's Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in the Administration for Children and Families (ACF), the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), or in the federal statutes. For these reviews I was looking for specific information for this study, or, to apply policy to solve a case issue for a refugee client or agency. Doing the latter helped me master federal policy and statutes.

Analysis of the data

The data were largely field notes of observations and interviews, and written productions of meetings serving various purposes. I posed the problems/questions after years of participant observation research as a way to organize the huge amount of data collected, and then searched for "cases" and ethnographic information which addressed the questions I was considering. For these analyses I used theoretical constructs which made sense as lenses for understanding what I was seeing—I detail these in Chapters 1 and 4. What I have to say and conclude is both true and open to other interpretation, and therefore I saw my task as presenting as much ethnographic data and examples as possible; and then tell the reader how I analyzed and interpreted them, and my conclusions.

Populations and sites studied

I am using the term "populations" rather loosely here: it refers actually to arriving ethnic groups, receiving community members, as well as individuals who occupy roles in the resettlement field. I provide simply a list of populations and "sites", the latter inclusive of physical location, occupational location, and systemic level.

Table 1: Study populations and sites

Ethnic or country-of-origin populations	Population subgroups	Locales	Communities of Practice
Somali Bantu Somali Sudanese Other East Africans Hmong Iraqi Liberian Central Africans Meskhetian Turks Cambodians Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian Russian/Ukrainian	• Adolescent and young adult refugees • Somali Bantu, Somali, Liberian, Hmong, various Burmese ethnic group leaders • Local resettlement volunteers from receiving communities, both attached to Volags and other contractors, and those who were unattached and formed their own official and unofficial organizations.	Two in Arizona Three in Texas Six in Wisconsin D.C. metro area And (much more briefly) communities in: California Colorado Connecticut Georgia Illinois Kansas Ohio Washington	Torture treatment Conflict resolution MAA leadership and staff Volag leadership and staff Local, state, and federal government officials, including State Refugee Coordinators and officials from ORR and PRM. Local community networks of providers, including Volags, TANF, public health, schools, ESL, and community action agencies. Other state government agency officials

HOW THE DISSERTATION IS ORGANIZED

The dissertation is organized into two parts and a conclusion. The first part centers on the phenomenology and governance of refugee flight and resettlement; the second covers stakeholder interests and practices, U.S. policies, and assessments of success. The conclusion discusses suggestions for policy and future research.

Throughout the dissertation and in most chapters, I tack back and forth between arriving and receiving communities. Often a chapter first gives the experience of the refugees, then the reaction of those encountering refugees. But sometimes this is reversed. Eventually we end up discussing the relationship between arrivers and receivers: this is unavoidable if we are to think about refugees eventually integrating as citizens. It is a key identity step and often difficult for people involved in resettlement to talk about directly because as the rescue and resettlement humanitarian mission unfolds and is achieved, the politeness and customs governing actions between receivers and givers of humanitarian aid yield to problematics of becoming neighbors and employees and business owners and, well, potentially *peers* with equal rights and (potentially) status. Both sides are now givers *and* receivers, rather than exclusively occupying one or the other role.

PART 1: Phenomenology, structure, and governance of refugee crises and resettlement

Chapter 1 looks at harms in war and what governments and populations have done to try to help those in impacted regions recover--what Abramowitz calls "the interventionscape." The chapter stays focused on in-country recovery at a variety of system registers. It problematizes medicalization and social engineering techniques that address post-war suffering but do not address the underlying causes of that suffering.

Chapter 2 turns attention to the refugee experience--those who flee the borders of an inflamed state--and focuses on UNHCR's governance of refugee flows, containment of chaos, and getting to durable solutions for refugees after mass violence ends in countries of origin. For some, the solution is resettlement to a third country, and the U.S. admits the largest number of refugees in its program. The management of the resettlement program from overseas application to acceptance for admission and preparation for transfer to the U.S. is detailed.

Chapter 3 explains the phenomenology of resettling to the U.S., from the decision overseas to do it, to the first months after arrival: it examines the experiences from both sides—arrivers and receivers—and the inevitable first misunderstandings.

PART II: Processes and agency during resettlement and integration

Chapter 4 introduces theoretical frames and tools I use in the rest of the dissertation to analyze the resettlement program; the experience of refugees in navigating the re-establishment of home, identity and community; and, in healing social systems impacted by mass violence, including those of receiving communities after 9-11. I work with ideas about ritually guided change, adversity-activated development, cultural entrapment, social and cultural capital, and recent work on the anthropology of becoming. The chapter finishes with a few case studies of community resilience that offer ideas about resources and practices in recovering from harms of mass violence and other episodes of extreme and traumatic change.

Chapter 5 is about making refugees into citizens and details a neoliberal governmentality, phases of resettlement, and the inexactness of the endgame of resettlement.

Chapter 6 examines interests and actions of stakeholders in receiving communities, looking at volunteers, resettlement-focused agencies, and mainstream institutions who will be interacting with refugee families over time.

Chapter 7 examines arriving refugees' desires and agency. How are they securing resources by building social and cultural capital? How do they negotiate new identities that both preserve and extend their heritage and ancestry, *and* take advantage of new opportunities in a different socio-cultural and economic setting? The chapter concludes with a discussion of the endgame of resettlement from their viewpoint: thickened identity, stable livelihood, belonging, persistence as a people, and social healing.

Chapter 8 defines and assesses success of resettlement in the U.S. after 9-11. I present small case studies of individuals, ethnic groups, and receiving communities to see what contributes to success. We return in this chapter to the concepts of bonding and bridging capital, and decide that defining success differs at various points in time for refugees of different demographic categories, and for communities.

Chapter 9 provides my conclusions about getting beyond medicalization, what we can learn from the resettlement program about social healing, and the contribution of various rituals of welcome, sociality, and identity to attainment of what is still a rather precarious belonging. For policy, I encourage more attention to understanding phasing and development of community; for practice, I encourage more understanding of solidarity: group to group bonding and bridging that allows co-existence and community resilience. And I conclude with suggestions for future research.

* * *

Does the observer affect the phenomenon observed? I think, yes. Even more so when the observer is an engaged anthropologist. Mine is a positioned view, a positioned analysis, even as I have collected the observations and comments and thinking and experiences from many actors variously positioned. I am creating a narrated amalgam of the many threads. It is a transpositional objectivity I am after in this dissertation (Sen, 1993), positional objectivities collected from various vantage points of this contemporary experience of the fact that the world system produces millions of refugees fleeing violence and persecution. It is not complete—it does not capture the entire picture or phenomenon. It is influenced by my life experience and opportunities for engagement. I am trying to make a view from nowhere, and almost

everywhere. I will fall short of this goal, but hope that this dissertation moves us closer to that understanding.

As they think about systems, academics, government officials, and funders tend to think about macro, meso, and local levels. So do I; I've also served in each of these three roles and worked vertically through these levels. But as a researcher and participant observer, I have come to realize that all system levels are local levels in the practice of everyday life: they involve self-interested human beings navigating in a socio-political arena. Sociality exists at all of these levels, and experiences of individuals operating at all of these levels matter.

Probably the most important thing to say at this point is that, because of the length of time in this field and the fact that I held recognized positions, I came to know many people as individuals with stakes and with hopes, at all levels of the program (except elected officials who were making the laws and funding the federal program). This level of access into the operations of many institutions and governments provided a very rich dataset, and offered me the chance for a great appreciation of what is truly involved from many different perspectives, in the resettlement of refugees in the contemporary era. It is a terrible, passionate (ad)venture, for a significant portion of each "category" of people who are engaged in this work.

I hope as I write that this ethnography will help me and my readers to remember this fact: people create and maneuver and operate at every systemic level, which means that the world and its systems are ever becoming. And possibilities for something worse, something different, and something better always lurk and dance enticingly.

For those who have suffered so much, and who shared their experiences with me, I think these possibilities are a kind of hope.

PART I:

FROM FLIGHT TO RESETTLEMENT

PHENOMENOLOGY, STRUCTURE, AND GOVERNANCE OF REFUGEES

Although this dissertation is an ethnography of refugees resettling in the U.S., it begins by looking at people in a region at war: it does not distinguish between those who eventually become refugees and those who remain in-country. They share the experience of descent into mass violence; and they remain in touch with each other after it ends. They have experienced the same harms; they look for answers and healing afterward.

But they have very different contexts in which they rebuild, each of which offers different opportunities and constraints in the aftermath. We start with the common experiences of peoples in war and what has been attempted for recovery in impacted countries. These interventions reveal some interesting lessons and lacunae.

When refugees resettle elsewhere, far from the locales of mass violence, other practices are possible which add to our collective understanding of recovery. Examining governance of refugees through flight, warehousing, and resettlement reveals stakes and principles of international communities in resolving refugee crises and structuring a safe and orderly resettlement in third countries. The experience of resettlement from the decision to go to a distant land through the first months after arrival/reception offers a first look at practices in welcoming and relocation and signals "becomings" that are happening in resettling populaces and receiving communities of the U.S., both of which have been impacted by recent political terrors.

Chapter 1

Harms in war; healing in its aftermath:
A review of literature and international practices

If the struggle of and for life is not contained within one life alone but is distributed across persons, then it is not one life that is precarious but life in a broader sense.

--Hayder Al-Mohammad, 2012

In war, torture, mass political violence, and genocide, people in socio-political collectives suddenly come face to face with death and annihilation. It is like a rapidly moving disease epidemic with a high rate of mortality and close to 100% morbidity. Chaos descends as people try to get out of its path. Who is a pathogen? Who do you trust as not being contagious? Who can you help and not be killed doing so? Who will you help, even if it compromises your own safety? Who do you eject from the village so they will not contaminate you? Who do you kill so they will not kill you? All social, ethical, moral certainties are changed utterly.

Before atrocities and destruction begin, civilians may want something different in their society and government: they may experience deteriorating economies, marginalization, structural violence, social discord, widening gaps between rich and poor, racism, class, gender or religious discrimination, and all manner of other socio-political distress and disadvantage. But would they wish for the systemic implosion with its massive epidemics of disease, destruction and death, where the world and those they know become nearly unrecognizable, and they may have to do things for which they have condemned others in times of peace?

In the period after chaos, when civilians and their governments are catching their collective breath and looking all around them at the destruction, both those who went willingly

into war and those who were caught in its path find that they have been reduced to bare life. They are left with quite another reality from the pre-war conditions: there is ongoing fear of another outbreak of mass violence, and a widespread need for rebuilding but few resources with which to rebuild. All bodies—the biophysical, the social, the economic, and the political—are changed, and "sick." Though the acute illness is passing, it has taken much life both physically and socially. Opportunistic infections and diseases which have set in during the chaos are becoming chronic and highly resistant to treatment.

What may be recovered? What will never be?

This dissertation and indeed my general involvement in the field of refugee resettlement in the U.S. has been a search for practices in domains of social healing after extreme violence. In this chapter I sketch the impacts of political trauma and review the central efforts toward recovery that have gained ascendancy in international practice. Social healing at the level of proximate, directly-experienced sociality (as opposed to the imagined community of the nation) has been the least addressed and theorized, though interest in the social aspects of resettlement is burgeoning. However, "illnesses" and healing practices at this level remain rather unspecified except as subsumed under hybrid labels like "psychosocial."

Professional practitioners in many fields and academic disciplines work on the topic of war recovery, structural violence, peacemaking and peacekeeping, nation-state rebuilding, handling internally-displaced people and repatriation, and other targets of stabilization and recovery, including the resettlement of refugees to third countries. Their efforts insert at multiple registers within the global system.

This chapter takes a structural view, mapping interventions targeted to different systemic registers, using heuristics from the anthropological literature which I have found "good to think,"

and ethnographic data from various conversations with key informants and during in-situ discussions the occurred in the course of living and working in the field of refugee resettlement. In Chapter 4, I will take a more processual view of individuals and identity groups pursuing their interests and desires through time. That chapter summarizes what anthropological and other social science literatures have offered in theoretical framings and case studies of social healing (ritual, liminality, *communitas*, resilience, social and other forms of "capital" and the anthropology of becoming).

Subsequent chapters presenting my research will trace social healing in resettlement from the viewpoint of various actors across systemic scales: refugees, governments and leaders, community organizations. Small, accidentally- and incidentally-observed ethnographic episodes depict and help us map the fields of action and the phenomenology of these experiences; they hint at possibilities and sensibilities for healing social bodies.

INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE BODIES

An early article from the subfield of medical anthropology by Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987) analyzes three "bodies:" phenomenal, social, and political. I have used their heuristic as a tool with the refugee-resettlement community of practice in naming and addressing practice issues. Though they focused on analysis of individual "bodies," their article advocated analysis of bodies at two levels: individual and collective.

In my use of this heuristic, "collective" refers to more than a collection of individual body-selves with some characteristics and identifications in common: a collective is more than a sum of parts. The character of connectedness, interactions, and communications within collectives differs from what happen between two individuals or within a family. "Sociality" and "governmentality" (to be defined) are two constructs that capture important attitudes and aspects

of interactions in a collective. "Culture" by contrast, is like the DNA or software used to enable a collective and its constituent elements to function, to "read" encoded data (messages), and to encode data that can be read by the others.

Individuals may identify with a collective to varying degrees through time, have varying senses of belonging to that collective and varying senses of loyalty or support for the interests of the collective. Lyrics written by Canadian musician Bruce Cockburn at an African nightclub while watching " 'milling humans' shivering energy glow, fusing the spaces between them with bar- throb bass and laughter"[10]—evoke a palpable sense of being part of something greater that oneself. I will define "sociality" in this dissertation as the felt character, emotional tone, flows and workings of that "fused space" in the daily conduct of life of a locale, a region, or of a nation.

Refugees have talked with me about the character of sociality in war and during resettlement over the years: it is a salient aspect of the lived experience of these events and a major contributor to suffering and/or resilience. A key question for field research is, what is the nature or character of sociality in the various contexts of conflict, post-conflict, and resettlement?

The body politic

Scheper-Hughes and Lock identified the body politic as regulating, surveilling, and controlling individuals and populations (societies). At the individual level, they invoked Foucault's notion of biopower—how power is exerted at the site of the body—to discuss ways in which societies "institutionalize means for producing docile bodies and pliant minds in the service of some definition of collective stability, health, and social well-being," thereby controlling populations without the direct exertion of physical force. At the collective level, the

[10] Cockburn, *Last Night of the World*, song released in 1999

body politic refers to the arrangements that societies make for the exertion of power and control, especially who is authorized to exert power directly and who makes policies that exert power and control rather more indirectly. Current indirect practices include counting, measuring, and use of media and political theatre to advance or contest neoliberal responsibilization ideologies (Merry, 2011).

In the modern era, societies increasingly exert this control by vesting power in state apparatuses. Thus the state (with its political subdivisions) is the visible embodiment of the collective body politic. Populations expect government (a term I will use interchangeable with "state" when referring to the governing authority that extends to the borders of a political territory) to assure collective stability, safety and security. Most populations also expect their governments to provide for the common welfare through safety nets and policies--economic, health, and social--that are functional for the many.

The social body

The individual "social body" can be analyzed for its conformance to a (usually gendered) ideal of a given society. It can carry stigma, and is the subject—in ethnomedical healing practices other than biomedicine—of socially-induced/refracted illness causality. The collective "social body"—a society—is what many non-Western ethnomedical or "traditional" practitioners working in small scale societies have conceptualized as the existential ground of health and illness: sickness in an individual body-self is an artifact of sickness in the collective social body.

Less well articulated by traditional healers are the impacts of macro-level processes on sickness occurring in the individual body-self. "Sickness" in macro collectives (*e.g.*, nation-states) has also seemed unamenable to (biomedical) intervention until the emergence of "stress" as a medicalizing concept, capturing the idea of excessive pressures on individuals from

surroundings. Are we too busy? Too bombarded with messages to process? Impacted by war and the absence of safety? Biomedicine treats stress with anti-anxiety, anti-depressant, and anti-hypertensive pharmaceuticals. And while complementary alternative medical (CAM) interventions and treatments did not emerge from within biomedicine and some are grounded in medical models from other large-scale societies (such as ayurvedic and Chinese medicine) they nonetheless treat individual suffering--whether personally, socially, economically, historically, or politically induced. Both pharmaceuticals and CAM are medicalizations of the stressful context, much easier to enact than treatments of large-scale collectives.

Friedman-Peleg and Goodman (2010) described a recent variant of medicalization in their study of Israeli psychiatry "inoculating the social body" by doing preventive PTSD treatment with groups of individuals in an area of the country subject to missile strikes from Gaza. Psychiatrists and scholars are clearly attempting to look at healing of "social bodies" but, in line with difficulties overcoming the split between body and mind, we also have not reached an easy means of describing the interactive individual/collective experience.[11] We look at the site of the individual, and at the site of the social group, but the split is there. The West has generally addressed collectives by hoping that psychological treatments of individuals somehow trickle up. For indigenous healers in many places of the world, their integration is assumed. An individual cannot exist outside of the social group: someone who does is not truly human.

If we want to theorize a collective social body as a site of intervention because it is somehow "sick" or "ill", how do we do it? How do we "heal" the collective social body? Through addressing sociality? Fairness vs. inequity? Demographic dynamics? How do we diagnose a dis-ease of the collective social body? Characterizing and diagnosing the "sociality"

[11] A recent article by Pedersen *et al* (2015) describes the variants of psychosocial interventions-- again, a hybrid term reminiscent of the difficulties of biomedicine in trying to characterize the intersection of "mind" and "body."

of a collective may capture, by proxy, many of the causes of underlying social illness. Analyzing sociality could be similar to analyzing an individual's emotional reaction in situations—the emotional tone and character signals that something is wrong, or right for the organism—wonderful, dangerous, comfortable, depriving, thwarting, *et al*.

The embodied self

The body-self is the sensing, experiencing, thinking, reacting body-mind of an individual human being that the West and biomedicine think of first when talking about a "body." Skin demarcates individual bodies in Western formulations; in others, it may stop at the distance when one cannot be sensed through smell or breath, or at the edge of one's "shivering energy glow." It is thus variably bounded depending on how the encultured society constructs the sensate body and interacts with it in space and time.

Human beings share universal species capacities and characteristics. Across the species *Homo sapiens*, individuals have much in common regardless of culture, even though local culture and history mediate experience. We are born, we die, we breathe, we digest, we eliminate, we mutate, all with basically the same physiological process. We use elaborate language to communicate. We feel pain, we emote. We think. We fight. We freeze or flee. We interact with the environment through our senses. We make meaning. We do not have to be of the same culture to be threatened or killed during mass violence. The "species" is the collective body-self.

BODIES IN MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Harming the body politic

A. The failure of government to protect

Scholars and journalists have compellingly described governments failing to provide for the safety and welfare of citizens or a portion of citizens, or, perpetrating.[12] Refugees from Bosnia and Burma have reported a variety of shocked realizations as their areas descended into war: a Bosnian mentioned that he never believed that the army would break, but it did. A refugee from Burma, speaking to nearly 1000 attendees at the 2011 national consultation of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, gripped the podium in silence for nearly 30 seconds after choking out how he and others were hunted as prey by their own government, trying not to cry. Many in the audience cried *for* him. It is a devastating, disorienting realization to suddenly fully understand that the legitimate exercise of power and governance is so corrupted that the government cannot be trusted and one is fully on one's own for safety.

B. De-powering legitimate governance

Several key informants reported that people use violence to upend existing political and social arrangements in order to gain new spaces of power, advantage, and order. Rarely, however, does it quite turn out the way that populations and their participants imagine as violence takes on a life of its own and destroys at a far wider and deeper level than intended or expected. This observation has also been reported by those who remained in-country (Locke, 2009). Power becomes rogue but leaders remain insulated. As one former refugee noted, "Leaders on both sides know each other but they don't kill each other."

[12] *See* Krog (1999); Nordstrom (1997; 2004), for examples.

C. New spaces of violent agency that go unpunished

Mass violence opens new spaces of agency under conditions of impunity, and some individuals seek all manner of secondary gains including opportunistic score-settling. Refugees told me of seeing people taking personal revenge or settling personal quarrels under cover of war. Corrupt/ criminal elements emerge and prevail. Indeed, one of the first things that may happen as war erupts is that criminals are let out of prison to lead militias. The sociality of violence extends to its aftermath as people remember and react to mass criminal-led violence as well as their witnessing of individual score-settling under its cover.

D. Forced perpetration to implicate the many

Militias force civilians and conscripted soldiers to perpetrate so that everyone is implicated as guilty when the hostilities abate. *Oh it was a crazy time where everyone was out of their minds.* These deliberate tactics cover culpability and make it very difficult to seek justice through court systems. Forced perpetration invokes terrible guilt for those so forced; it makes populations afraid and unable or unwilling to examine guilt.

Refugees told me of seeing militia personnel stuffed with alcohol and drugs so that they would be able to perpetrate rape and other atrocities. In one country as the war progressed, a refugee told of hearing men returning in the early morning to the village and sitting on benches, talking quietly about rapes perpetrated through the night. "The windows are all broken out in the village by now and the dawn is so otherwise silent…their voices carried up through the window opening, and I stayed hidden so they would not know they were being heard. Actually, I really didn't want to hear. [Shaking head]. They said to each other, 'I had to do it. They have to know their place.' They justified actions unthinkable before the outbreak of war as they demeaned the human beings whom they had just so utterly violated while drugged and drunk." Another noted,

"People became animals, just animals. You cannot imagine what you will have to do to stay alive." Another: "you just want to kill everyone so they won't kill you." Another: "we couldn't believe that the rivers could actually run red from all that killing; all the fish died."[13]

E. Populations are forced to rely on strength and protection of an identity group

As violence progresses and perpetrations mount, the population loses trust in a healthy body politic that provides for order and at least some semblance of the common good, including protection. Leaders are seen as criminals. People want government; but they can't trust it in their country of origin. They become disillusioned with international outside governments as well: "We wanted someone to come help us, a stronger government, to protect us." "We couldn't understand how others in the world were not coming to help us—how could they allow us to be wiped out?"[14]

The failure of government fractures the nation-state[15] and can devolve the situation into ethnic, clan-based, sectarian, or nationalist violence as has been observed in Somalia after the fall

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[13] Quotes from key informants (Tucson field notes, 2003-6)

[14] Quotes from key informants and field notes, 2003-6; I heard similar statements from other refugees/former refugees in other states as well.

[15] However precarious the nation-state was. A state sometimes subsumes several nations or clans, making an appellation of "nations-state" more descriptive, perhaps. Here the "nation" is Anderson's imagined community (1983) and refers to the collective social body of a population of bounded identity. "State" refers to the authorization of governing power to the state apparatus by the collective social body or bodies within geographic boundaries or borders. The state is co-terminous with a bounded territory; the nation may not be. Where it is not, there exists more than a single "population" that identifies rather fluidly with others in a collective whole—several social bodies, sometimes rigidly bounded and other times with very porous membrane-shields. A population may be constituted through an ethnicity or clan or tribe; or through religious affiliation (Sunni, Shia), or through a broader religious affiliation (Muslim, Christian, Buddhist). Two recent failed states—Yugoslavia and Somalia—had leaders (Tito and Barre) who tried to deny differences in social bodies that had co-existed in a region, but these came roaring to the fore upon state failure at a time of extreme economic stress. In Yugoslavia, people intermixed and married such that it became difficult to determine who was who, and when war came, one could choose to identify with one nationality or another and in some ways be safer in the moment. Physical differences were not necessarily markers of nationality, despite one refugee receiving a call from another refugee from the former Yugoslavia who sneered at the end of the call, "I can smell a Serb." The recipient's parents were Serbian on one side and Bosniac Muslim on the other. But with ethnic cleansing, "Serbs" living in Croatia who moved to Serbia did not have a place or space there, however much they may have had protection during the conflict in moving to Serbia. Muslim Croatians who moved to Bosnia-Herzgovina still saw themselves as Croats, but were unsafe in Croatia even while identifying with Croatia as a nation-state. Talk about an identity crisis! Iraqi claims of Arab commonality have fallen apart with rising sectarianism. This is single ethnicity at war between itself along a different social fault line. In Somalia, Siad Barre was from a clan and this was not forgotten by the other clans; Somali Bantu apparently constituted as an ethnicity based on race after the state of Somalia failed. Within the Bantu, there are at least three languages and "sub-ethnicities." All this identity constitution is fluid, and becomes much more important in the absence of a workable

of Siad Barre; in the former Yugoslavia after the death of Tito, an economic downturn, and the emergence of political entrepreneurship amongst nationalist elites; in Iraq with the toppling of Saddam Hussein by U.S. forces, to name three cases. If the government will not or cannot protect, then people may feel compelled to rely on the strength and protection of identity groups (Al-Mohammed, 2012) or be completely on their own. This process leads to ethnic/sectarian cleansing in areas that were previously quite integrated or where peoples had evolved relationships of reciprocity and safe passage. It is targeting by identity. Suddenly, you are no longer you: you are an instantiation of a category—Serb or Croat or Bosniac or Sunni or Shi'a. These are *politicized* identities. They bear little resemblance to a previous self-concept or social role. Identity markers which may have been used previously for networking or livelihood purposes suddenly become a source of both safety *and* danger.

F. Mass theft and the shredding of material life

When Saddam Hussein was toppled, thousands of Iraqi government and military personnel were immediately put out of work. Military leaders offered to help stabilize the country and provide order. These offers were refused by Washington decision makers, and the situation quickly devolved into chaos.[16] The very well-reported period of looting of national museums and buildings in Bagdad is still recalled bitterly by many Iraqis—irreplaceable, priceless treasures of a people and a nation were stolen and sold. Billions of dollars of building materials were sent into Iraq and almost nothing has been rebuilt: "There is nothing, nothing" an Iraqi refugee told me incredulously.[17] The supplies have disappeared with nothing to show for all

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governing body that can stitch together the pieces of identification into a whole that works for the parts, providing safety and stability. Boundary maintenance is very problematic but also highly focused on during ethnic cleansing or genocide. Rwandan, Burundi, Balkan, Somali, Iraqi refugees all have told me about the need to switch identities where possible, and the need to be very good at figuring out which identity was acceptable in a given space and time, since it could be deadly to be bad at this.

[16] See Charles H. Ferguson's (2007) documentary film about beginnings of Iraq war, *No End in Sight.*

[17] Key informant, 2013.

that effort and all that investment. The same story recounted in Liberia (Abramowitz, 2009). Theft of property and supplies on an unimaginable scale; the country torn down to bare life.

G. Illicit economies emerge

People do what they can or think that they must do to survive when legitimate means of earning a living disappear. If there are no means of legitimate support, no jobs, no markets, no supplies, a significant number do what is illegal/immoral but perceived as necessary to remain alive. These actions begin to lose their salience as unethical activities, and illicit economies self-organize. Al-Mohammad (2012) documented the emergence of kidnapping and ransoming in Iraq as a new economic activity resulting in mass transfers of wealth through theft; human life is commodified as the economic system degrades into utter corruption and a no rules, open-access regime.[18] If one person doesn't steal it, someone else will, so the incentive is to take before someone else does. There is no question that someone will take it while everything is in chaos. Bribe to survive becomes the norm as the conditions of violence and economic life strip ethics and moral virtue away ("…they became animals, just animals"). Bribes slowly impoverish families; kidnappings steal family wealth much more quickly. There are no rules, and there is no punishment except through retaliation.

Once post-war corruption takes hold it is very difficult to dislodge (Nordstrom, 2004). And it utterly degrades the sociality and resource base of the country. Years later, those who joined to fight for something see nothing, and their country utterly changed for the worse. No advantage, no appreciation for their war efforts. It is *so destroyed*. Refugees from the Balkans have told me about relatives who returned to their homes to find everything stripped out—windows and frames, toilets, sinks, pipes, doors, woodworking, appliance—all gone. All copper

[18] This description invokes a "tragedy of the commons" first described by Hardin in 1968, which was actually about non-regulated access to a resource, called an open-access regime. The commons referred to here is the economic commons which exists when rules regulating economic activity are not in place or are not enforced.

and metals that could be sold for scrap--gone. Only the bare hulk of plastered structure remained, and they had to rebuild from there, with little money to do so. Absolute mass theft. Sometimes other people from other nationality/ethnicities were living in their homes, and they had to get them out through government action. Cases are still being litigated.

Harming the social body

A. Violating culture; destroying social capital

Violence is perpetrated in a way deliberately meant to obliterate social groups and cultural arrangements so that there is little will to continue as an identity group or community. Humiliation of populations is typical. The collective social body is harmed by attacking individuals *en masse* and eliminating their ability to occupy a previously-held social role through death, maiming, or stigma. For example, rape "takes" a life, socially and culturally. It is a strategy to create social death because rape victims are stigmatized in many cultures the same as prostitutes: rape pollutes women and makes them unmarriageable, thus unable to transmit culture to the next generation. It interferes with culturally proscribed reproductive arrangements and disrupts cultural continuity.

Rape has been used as a tool in mass violence in many conflicts across the world. A former refugee narrated that a relative—an army officer—upon seeing someone he knew who was traveling to Srebenica (where 4,000 men and boys would be soon massacred, the women mass-raped and force-marched to the next town) told the person "if you see my mother, kill her" to spare her from what was to come. He knew what was being planned: this was not a spontaneous eruption of mass degradation during war.

When a new refugee population which had been in the Kenyan camps was arriving in the U.S., resettlement agencies were informed by technical assistance providers that the rape

incidence was extremely high in the camps; as many as 60-75% of the women had been raped. Yet no one talked about it or mentioned that it had happened to them. I asked a man from that population several years later if he thought this had happened and he said that he thought so, and so I asked why no one talked about it or told anyone. He responded that a woman would not report it because then, everyone would refer to her forever afterward as "that woman who was raped."[19] The stigma is just too high; it is better to endure in silence, but this silence allows a general condition of impunity to prevail.

B. Targeted disruption of family life

In Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge regime, families were herded out of the cities, then children were separated from parents and sent to labor camps organized by age grade. The regime wanted to completely restructure society so that the state would literally become the family, and government officials the parents. Leaders from urban intelligentsia, owners of businesses, former military or government officials were targeted for the killing fields, and the people starved with no distribution of supplies—they were expected to produce their own food as rural peasantry had done under forced-labor conditions. Without family members, they could not count on anyone else for support. Cambodian leaders in areas of the U.S. with large Cambodian populations report high incidence of alcohol abuse and near-agoraphobic home-boundedness: the people impacted by loss of so many family members have lost ambition and meaning, and just want to be left to drink and live as they will.[20]

C. Sociality becomes angry and amoral

Children grow up without parenting and moral teaching; this too represents the end of culture. A refugee remarked that Somalia now has grown young adults who have seen nothing

[19] Key Informant, Tucson, 2006

[20] Key informant, California 2008.

but war and atrocity as the only social arrangement ordering life: for them, it is normalcy, a normal sociality. Scholars have portrayed post-war in-country sociality as infused with irritability, frustration and sudden bursts of rage, making daily life intense and distressing.[21]

D. Loss of social contract and trust

A deep mistrust results from all these experiences of social harm, at the base of which is the terrible breaking of the social contract of fairness and cooperation, of doing unto others as you would have them do unto you in an iterative situation (where you will continue to share the same lifeworld together after each encounter). Killing and atrocity destroy trust. It is a very long time recovering the ability to trust; it is an even longer time recovering discernment of who can be trusted and under what conditions. Refugees told me of the tremendous existential fear they experienced as they saw the social contract breaking down. Many people were afraid to intervene and averted their eyes from perpetration; later they have survivor's guilt from knowing what was happening and having decided not to intervene out of fear. They may not have survived, had they done so.[22] It is a devastating forced restriction of agency.

During the course of my work in the U.S. refugee resettlement field, I am not aware of explicit attention to social body harms within the policies or funding of resettlement programs except as they are treated individually in clinical settings, or in group therapy (which still is focused on individual improvement, if in a more social setting). And so, in subsequent chapters I will detail some of the ways that these issues are actually being secondarily addressed (*i.e.*, secondary gains).

[21] Silove, Brooks, *et al.* (2009); Locke (2009).

[22] Key informants, Tucson (2005, 2014).

Harming the body-self

A. Depriving people of agency and meaning

Intimidation through torture and the witnessing of atrocity gets people to leave spaces that others want to steal and occupy. Where one does not count as a human being worthy of respect, the degradation leads to extreme state of loss of meaning and for some, a loss of will to survive. Mollica has remarked that there is no deeper harm to a human being than becoming only a prop in someone else's story with no interests or will of one's own.[23]

B. Survival, present-time orientation

Flight and experiencing or witnessing of atrocity reduces sufferers to a present-time survival orientation. Why plan if you might not be alive tomorrow?[24]

C. Physical and psychological sequelae

Body memory carries torture or physical attack long after the actual incidents: they are etched in permanent injury and easily triggered in posture. Men feel shame from their inability to protect and provide for family. Women feel greatly increased ongoing fear; a few resign themselves to a degraded existence after multiple sexual assaults. Already stigmatized, prostitution buys food and pays bills.

* * *

It is actually difficult to isolate impacts to each of the three "bodies" individually. Interventions targeted to different systemic levels reverberate through the other levels; political targeting is arbitrary and capricious as individuals are caught in the way. Nothing personal. It is symbolic, done against you as an instantiated representation of an identity group, not against the

[23] Richard Mollica, lecture during Harvard Program in Refugee Trauma convening in Orvieto, Italy (2007).

[24] Key informant, Arizona (2005).

"you" as a unique sentient being. "You" are wiped out; "you" the person--the phenomenal "you"--are impacted individually, bodily. Just the fact of being suddenly reduced to an identity assignment or a polluted, degraded mixed identity is itself devastating, refugees have told me. Loss of identity, place, and meaning: how permanent or temporary is this condition? How are people reconstructing these systems of such import to social beings? What shrapnel remain in the bodymind?[25]

AFTER MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE

One way to approach thinking about what needs healing after mass violence is to look at what has been harmed and how, and determine its opposite. Loss of identity and reduction of a human being to simply and instantiation of an ethnic category? Thicken identity. Atrocity with impunity? Restore safety and accountability for actions, reinstate definitions of criminal behavior. Change sociality from anger to careful regard and appreciation for what the collective has been through, and what individuals have suffered. Restore meaning and the social contract through altruistic activity.[26] Build social capital: some relationships may be newly enabled by post-war conditions. Enlarge the shadow of a future imbued with hope. Transition illicit economies to licit economies with law enforcement and criminal prosecution going forward in tandem with provision of economic opportunities and development: there is much to rebuild of

[25] Leaning's (2015) keynote address to the international workshop 'Beyond "Trauma": Emergent Agendas in Understanding Mental Health in the Middle East' held in London in 9.27.2014, provides a summary formulation which she summarizes in her subtitle, "The ecology of loss, the prison of isolation, and the role of the outsider." She organizes a discussion of harms into immediate perpetration, immediate harms, and longer-term harms. The author is an expert in public health rights-based responses to humanitarian crises. Silove's ADAPT model (1999, 2013) provides another helpful framing of harms and reparative domains. He postulates that five psychosocial "pillars" of stable society are fundamentally disrupted by mass conflict: safety/security; bonds/networks; justice; roles and identities; and existential meaning. They must be repaired in order to "…[restore] communal mental health and psychosocial recovery." (2013:237). Note the phrase "communal mental health"—which may represent another linguistic framing of what I am referring to as the "health" of a collective social body. What is the "mental" health of a collective? Perhaps it is partially diagnosable from observation of the "sociality" of the collective (as defined earlier in this chapter).

[26] Mollica (2006).

physical infrastructure and this is an opportunity to provide new jobs and economic stimulus/ velocity. A key research question becomes, to what extent and how have some or all of these restorative measures been accomplished in a country system after war? Or with refugees resettling?

Picking up the pieces: The international "interventionscape" after war

Various institutions and actors across the world have intervened to try to address harms after extreme violence. Abramowitz (2009) coined the phrase "the interventionscape" to capture the technologies and practices applied by actors (usually outside INGOs) operating at the different registers of a nation-state and/or international system. By contrast, in my work as a participant observer of refugee resettlement in the U.S., I searched for (and continue to search for) the spaces in which healing, resilience, and adversity-activated development emerge through the agency of many [local] stakeholders operating at various layers of a country system,[27] spaces which I will refer to as "domains of healing."

An "interventionscape" invokes the application of approaches thought to be effective or even efficacious when applied to different system levels or "bodies"—like evidence-based therapies and pharmaceuticals. These approaches emphasize outcome goals by structural position. Abramowitz described these "socio-engineering" approaches (her term) brought into Liberia by INGOs; but she found in practice that local NGO staff (usually trained by the INGOs) actually have to respond much more spontaneously with informal, tactical, and localized interventions. Sometimes such practice is artful, sometimes not very.

I apply the phrase "domains of healing" to such spaces of thinking, acting, testing, adjusting, and improvisation by local practitioners who attend to how other systemic scales or

[27] I include diasporas as part of a country system.

locales might also be impacted by their interventions. Chapter 4 theorizes this type of experimental practice and brings performance and interactivity to the fore.

Those working in the fields of international development, government, and policy are familiar with the ubiquitous layer-cake charts separating individual, community, nation-state, and international "levels" in a global system. They depict a neat linear relation between systemic levels as top-down decisions and bottom-up inventions cross or connect through a meso-level where activities and theories of practice remain rather unspecified (though public). That middle level somehow mediates between top and bottom, using operational expertise to either scale up grassroots initiatives, or, make possible local implementation of macro-level policies, but *how* does it do it, and what else does it do? Though the charts are "good to think," as with the analytical bodies in war, we would have difficulty finding the points of separation between layers of the system depicted in these charts. In fact, actions at any level reverberate through the system: the emergent enabling and constraining properties of a dynamic system in the way that individuals and collectives relate and are able to express agency ought to be studied.

In the context of war sequelae, the meso-level—the social healing level—is the least theorized.[28] In contemporary post-conflict settings, most interventions of outside military and

[28] However, the field of peace-building is well-known among mediation and international conflict resolution professionals and scholars. These methods were started within international faith communities, especially the Mennonites and the Quakers [check this], to create spaces for dialogue between conflicting parties. John Paul Lederach, professor at Eastern Mennonite University, is a well-known practitioner in this field. It was one vector of a three-point convergence from which the field of environmental and public policy conflict resolution emerged in the 1980s and 1990s (the other two were law and psychology). This practice field works through mediation and dialogue circles, was greatly boosted by the Harvard Project on Negotiation whose principals wrote the 1983 book *Getting to Yes* about interest-based bargaining. Multi-stakeholder mediation and neutral discussion facilitation methodologies have been deployed in post-war settings. Practitioner firms without a religious affiliation (but sometimes with principals who came from these religious backgrounds) have been significant actors in some of these processes (Balkans, Northern Ireland, Indonesia and East Timor). They try to find common interests that conflicting parties can work to realize, and they often train in-country local practitioners to use the techniques and theories of practice. This kind of work was what I was doing in the environmental conflict resolution field prior to moving into work with refugees.

The U.S. Institute of Peace is the site of much research and practice-development, and it commissioned projects which deployed these methods in Iraq alongside the U.S. military effort, even at the height of violence during the surge of 2006-8. The most recent efforts in the U.S. have been public dialogue projects to specifically tackle some of the intractable and highly

humanitarian assistance have been targeted to the individual, nation-state, and international levels. As the U.S.-developed diagnostic category of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)[29] became a global discursive formation, humanitarian agencies defined the most prominent need for post-war reconstruction as a therapeutic intervention to address trauma across systems.

Rather than rebuilding physical infrastructure and licit economies, humanitarian agencies—starting with the establishment of several Balkan states spawned out of the 1995 Dayton Accords—became preoccupied with treating PTSD and preventing secondary trauma in future generations such that warring/revenge cycles avoid becoming locked into the populations impacted by the war (Locke, 2009; Abramowitz, 2009). Whole countries, populations, cities, communities have been labeled as traumatized and placed under therapeutic governance.

At approximately the same time (1995), an indigenous version of healing trauma sickness in the national collective emerged with the need to reconstruct the nation-state of South Africa after apartheid.[30] The new South African leadership created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)--led by Catholic Bishop Desmond Tutu--to try to prevent the country from flying apart, and devolving into all-out war. Aimed at the collective social body, it gave amnesty

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contested, ideologically fomented public conflicts (like what to do about illegal immigrants). Most recently I have become aware of a refugee mutual assistance association (Africa House, at IRCO in Portland) working with Portland State University to develop conflict resolution tools for use in the U.S. among factions within populations that have fractured along clan or sectarian lines. Jürgen Habermas is an oft-cited theorist for this set of practitioners, with his ideas about communicative action (1984—English edition). Since my present study is of refugee resettlement in the U.S., and the refugee-resettlement field seems just now touching into the conflict resolution praxis arena, I will leave a more comprehensive examination to another writing project. For the present project, I stay focused therefore on working through a variety of very rich theory streams that anthropologists are finding "good to think." Indeed, those working on community resilience are reporting very interesting community-healing projects that do not mention or work directly on solving conflicts or mediating anything at all. Thus peace-building cannot be completely synonymous with social healing, community-building, or social resilience.

[29] Psychiatrists treating Vietnam War vets in the U.S. after the end of that war advocated for this new diagnostic category which first appeared in the DSM III in 1980. This fact should remind us that mass violence also impacts soldiers, who are human beings even if not civilians. Locke's research (2009) in the former Yugoslavia found high suicide rates among former military personnel after their experience of nothing positive coming from the period of violence and atrocities. Society, the economy, the government, and material well-being were *so* destroyed.

in exchange for truthful testimony about horrors done to people during apartheid. The TRC process acknowledged extreme socio-political suffering and provided a ritual resolution—recording these atrocities in a public record.[31]

The chart which follows depicts the tropes of interventionscape, domains of healing, and bodies—collective and individual. System levels and "bodies" are entered in the boxes to the left of the diagram. The ovals to the right suggest indicators of a desirable recovery or resilience. The center rows identify interventions targeted to various bodies/levels, under which is written "responses" or "responders." Below the chart, I will provide brief descriptions of the responses keyed that have been described to date in the scholarly literature and mass media. "Responders" marks a lack of specificity or institutionalization of practice: few silver bullets or program models seem efficacious and scalable in achieving the resilience goals; these are domains of innovative potential.

[31] I had the good fortune of sponsoring and participating in a workshop by IRCO/Africa House's Djimet Dogo about conflict resolution and traumatic change management in 2013, and he talked about "going into the neutral zone" a liminal period of unguided change where leadership and the populace are experimenting and acting in response to emergent conditions. A best practice at the start of this "neutral-zone" process is the public acknowledgment of and appreciation for the way things were, the fact that things are changing, and what is in fact being or has been lost. This actually describes the TRC process quite well.



Figure 1: Bodies, domains of healing, and the interventionscape in the aftermath of war

Healing the Body-mind: Addressing Individual Trauma in Clinical Settings

Much of our work in the West on "post-trauma" healing occurs in the medical clinic, where patients express the profound distresses of war. Pharmaceuticals, testimonial and other psychotherapies, and psychosocial interventions have been the predominant approaches to treatment. As a diagnostic category first depicted in 1980 in the DSM III,[32] PTSD has been extensively critiqued as a medicalization that (a) simplistically renders massive political trauma as amenable to Western psychiatric technologies, (b) pathologizes and treats memory in individuals, while failing to address the larger collective issues, (c) overshadows other and

[32] The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition

probably more common morbidities in affected populations such as clinical depression and chronic frustration/stress reactions, and misses what populations do and need to do to start rebuilding.[33] Notwithstanding these critiques, PTSD has become the dominant paradigm for post-war experience and is still being highly elaborated as a diagnostic category and a set of disorders.[34]

Clinical treatments of PTSD and other mass violence-induced distresses aim to reduce intrusive memories, nightmares, dissociative episodes, sleeplessness, perseveration of thoughts, and paranoia, all of which are culturally experienced and accompanied by other somatic diseases. Anti-psychotics are prescribed for some patients and have helped;[35] sleep medications also help. Much like what has occurred in the development of a variety of anti-depressant medications now on the market—each a refinement of specificity for alleviating a given configuration of symptoms—new pharmaceuticals are being developed to treat specific aspects of sleep problems, such as calming nightmares.

They do give ease.

Scholarly and practitioner work in this domain of healing continues. Persistent irritability and rageful anger secondary to trauma and human rights violations during episodes of extreme trauma have been identified and relegated to biomedical management through psychiatric intervention (Silove *et al.* 2009; Rees *et al.* 2013) although there is not yet a decided-upon psychiatric label specific to this "disorder." Instead, the experiencing of these episodes has been

[33] Bracken *et al* (1997); Locke (2009); Fassin and Rechtman (2009/2007); Summerfield (1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2012); Young (1995); Kienzler (2008), to name a few.

[34] The number of publications on PTSD is staggering; see for example, Silove *et al* (2014).

[35] Conversation with psychiatrist from the former Yugoslavia at Torture Treatment training, Tucson (2006).

folded into other diagnostic categories, especially explosive anger disorder, in the DSM-V.[36] Some have advocated that a new category of anger disorders be added to the psychiatric nosology. Locke (2009), on the other hand, approached the phenomenon as a type of sociality that emerges in a post-war period characterized by corruption, lack of effective political leadership, and decimated economies.

These dissents among clinicians and medical anthropologists summon to mind debates about medicalization in the anthropological literature.[37] Medicalization is seen both as useful (in that it contains/names chaotic symptoms and provides individual relief from social suffering through medical attention) and as negative (in its mystification of problems that are contextual, structural or cumulative which should be addressed at the collective level). If issues are only addressed individually, the context remains pathogenic and the pathology contagious. For example, Kim Hopper (1982) argued that physicians and other social agents are predisposed to "fail to see the secret indignation of the sick," and noted that "the medical gaze is a controlling gaze, through which active (although furtive) forms of protest are transformed into passive acts of 'breakdown.'"[38]

Following Hopper, we could argue that humanitarian agents using medicalization and therapeutic programs fail to see the indignation of the war-impacted toward the degradation of government and national/regional/local economies, where impunity runs rampant, corruption makes daily living nearly intolerable, and materials and funding for rebuilding are wholly

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[36] The diagnostic category of explosive anger disorder was also first introduced in 1980 in the DSM-III. At that time it was a disorder viewed as an impulse control issue, but in the DSM-V can be applied to individuals who develop the "condition" during or following extreme political violence.

[37] "Medicalization" refers to when non-medical phenomena become "treatable" by biomedicine and (often) turned into disorders. See Conrad and Waggoner (2014) for a historical conceptualization of the term, tracing implications through time, and Behrouzan (2015—both articles) for an interesting take on how medicalization of social memories of the Iran-Iraq war became a resource to re-socialize the war. Veena Das' longstanding consideration of social suffering urges that anthropologists chronicle how life is being remade in the Middle East as a region, asking, "what does it mean to be responsible to the present?" (2015:110). Also Lock (2003) discusses medicalization as a naturalization of social control.

[38] Scheper-Hughes and Lock captured her thoughts in their "Mindful Body" article of 1987.

inadequate or are diverted to private gain. Should the world treat post-war rage as a mental disorder? Or should the world help countries re-build their infrastructure and the capacities of government and licit economies to provide for safety and securing of livelihoods so that people can rebuild their lives instead of remaining locked in degraded conditions? I appreciate the insights of Locke: anger is highly contagious and, unaddressed, pollutes and degrades sociality. Effective economic and political action which addresses bare-life existence could be more effective in moving the populace out of rage distress and into constructive collective action. However, the Western psychiatric clinic does not address collectives with its technologies of healing.[39]

Some clinicians have developed approaches which acknowledge that more than individual psychological disorders must be addressed therapeutically to help reduce suffering in their patients. They are working in the clinical setting, but addressing the impacts of abuses within a country-system. Pioneered in Chile, in clinical testimony or testimony therapy, [40] clinicians applied narrative principles to treatment of human rights abuses in traumatized patients. In this approach, the patient is helped to produce a narrative about what happened to them, and construct a healing trajectory for the future. As the narrative is not uttered into public

[39] There have been a few reported instances of community doctors treating most of the local population with anti-depressants however, while the community was undergoing highly contentious change (one was in New Mexico after a local ordinance was passed requiring everyone to carry guns during a fight over endangered species and ranching practices; another in the Pacific Northwest, again over natural resource conflicts).

Silove *et al* (2014) approach the issue by suggesting the need for prevention of recurrent violence, the alleviation of poverty, and addressing injustices in post-conflict settings. There seems to be a move toward use of "prevention" tropes from the field of public health (health promotion, disease prevention) but the solutions for prevention seem unlikely to emerge from within the clinic. Silove, Brooks, and others who have worked in Timor-Leste document mental illnesses emerging in populations—with a higher prevalence/incidence in women--in post-conflict settings. It is a medicalization of the aftermath of war, essentially. Is it helpful? To the extent that the diagnosis and treatments give ease, yes. To the extent that they are medicalizations of social suffering that should be addressed instead by removing or reducing the causes—the impaired sociality, the economic injustices, the corruption, the impunity and degraded social contract—so that people can be supported in recovery from the harms of war, they mask symptoms of a sick social body. I am skeptical that the treatments of intermittent explosive disorder and PTSD will trickle up to effect healing in the social body.

[40] See Agger (1994); Agger *et al* (2012) for some examples in Denmark, Cambodia, India, Philippines and Sri Lanka. Cienfuegos and Monelli (1983) pioneered the method to help patients cope with the violent perpetrations of Chile's military dictatorship.

interactional spaces, the approach continues to avoid looking at other traumatized "bodies." As such it differs from testimony in tribunals or truth commissions.[41]

"Psychosocial" approaches which become part of clients' treatment plans are an acknowledgment that work must expand into the social milieu even beyond group therapies, but clear technologies still elude the clinical practice beyond a few published examples. Mollica *et al* (2002) for example advocate that patients undertake altruistic activities as these help to restore a sense of value and meaning. These and other writers also recognize spiritual and religious resources as resources for recovery.[42] Still, individual improvement remains the outcome sought; but the possible opening of a new and healthier social space is a realistically and clearly a possible secondary gain from this move.

Healing the Nation-State: Testimony, amnesty, and justice in tribunals and truth commissions

Modern post-war tribunals date to the Nuremburg trials after WWII, and most recently have been convened outside of affected states to litigate war crimes related to ethnic cleansing in the Balkans (at The Hague) and Rwanda (at Arusha). Cambodia convened a tribunal 40 years later in-country, achieving distance through time. Tribunals address justice, attempting to restore or buttress emerging state legitimacy and deter future atrocities by holding high-level perpetrators of mass violence accountable for crimes against citizens. They are as much meant to serve a symbolic purpose—crimes will be punished—but they are a costly and time-consuming and cannot handle the massive numbers of perpetrators in these conflicts.[43]

[41] See Weine (2006) for a book-length exploration of the use of narration in recovery from political violence.

[42] See Khawaja et al (2008); Shoeb et al (2007); Tankink (2007), Mollica (2006); there are many others.

[43] One key informant from the Balkans vehemently expressed the opinion that "the Hague" was actually of very little use to restoration of peace and order in those countries (Tucson, 2009).

Victim testimonies are critical to building a case for guilt, but the focus on legal standards and procedures for establishing truth exposes civilians to re-victimization and re-traumatization during and after their court testimonies. They are subjected to adversarial cross-examination by opposing attorneys as well as the sometimes-insensitive interventions of judges. Victims feel put on trial themselves: their testimonies are attacked, disbelieved, dismembered. Furthermore, in the spaces of impunity that continue to exist in post-war territories, survivors may endanger themselves further by stepping forward to testify. Perpetrators may also become martyrs in ongoing nationalist rivalries: for some Serbians, the trial of Milosevic felt like the Serbian collective itself was unfairly on trial.

Truth commissions address the imagined community of the nation. Events and systemic perturbations that devolved a country into mass violence—a time of madness—have to be read and assessed against the socio-cultural milieu which allowed exclusion of some identity groups from belonging to the nation. Truth commissions attempt to lay groundwork for reconciliation and establishment of an accurate historical record of political violence. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC) elicited searing public testimony from victims and their families, and gave amnesty to perpetrators in exchange for telling the truth about what they did. The process was aimed at beginning healing within the almost-impossible-to-imagine community of the South African nation after apartheid. This commission has been strongly criticized for many reasons: for failing to offer appropriate reparations to victims, failing at true reconciliation, and failing to restore local communities and relations between perpetrator and victim.[44]

[44] See Avruch (2010) for a review and analysis, with Robben's comments (2010); also Cobban (2007).

But these critiques miss the system level targeted for intervention, and fail to acknowledge that *interventions must be keyed to a system level while the architects try also to understand how the intervention may reverberate through other levels.* The TRC could not repair the individual body, though individuals might get some relief through catharsis or through shining a light publicly on the darkness of apartheid and the struggles for its end. It could not repair the political body because amnesty was being offered in exchange for testimony. It could not provide reparations to those harmed: how much would be enough? Instead, it was a symbolic healing of a social kind. It could only set the stage for repair of the nation through ritualized (and thus contained and systematic) truth-telling, and prevent war through a public ceremony of grave attention to what had happened. It allowed perpetrators to escape justice-punishment, but not social scrutiny (see Krog, 1999). It was as messy and impossible to force as any other social process. But it did prevent war; it did establish the historical record. It aired horrific memories; it brought private tortures into the public realm for regard and social acknowledgment of the pain and atrocity. The TRC opened a space for collective self-reflection through public narration.[45]

There have been other truth commissions, none so attended to by international media as the South African one, and none so critical to the prevention of war as the nation was reconstituted. Perhaps a ritual process arising from a specific local context and circumstance loses something in the replication to other places and times: in other words, as it transfigures from an indigenous healing response to an engineered technology. The TRC was led by a

[45] It occurs to me that academic critiques of truth commissions—such as Avruch's discussion of the "one-to-many" problem (2010)—are useful in developing/assessing the theory-of-change, theory-of-practice realm, and this kind of knowledge-building is important for development of praxis. But what real people and leaders do in real time to accomplish a more limited but enormously urgent goal—like what the South African leadership faced—is to construct a platform from which to move a collective out of immediate danger and to build a basis for a different future. Rituals which engage collectives accomplish this immediate task while enabling leadership to help bind the group to the larger tasks of the nation or community. Catherine Bell's *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice* (2009/1992) is a must-read for those seeking to understand practice in collective solidarity/collective repair.

Catholic Bishop—Desmond Tutu—and is reminiscent of the rituals of confession and petition: confess, your sins will be forgiven; ask for your pain to be taken away, and it shall be. Does this model of truth-telling work as well in other settings with other socio-spiritual practices? And without the attention of international media, can these be effective?

Tribunals and truth commissions both address the political body: how power is exerted at the site of the body; how power will be legitimized within the collective; how misuse of power will be punished; and how future violence might be avoided or deterred. Truth commissions begin to address the social body of the nation; however, they do so at a level largely removed from the daily social encounters and interactions of most civilians. And, in focusing the gaze on the past, they do not and probably cannot address social negotiations about future relations.

International aid agency efforts to restore governance and legitimacy of institutions in-country

The international community instituted refugee law and practices (to be detailed in Chapter 2) after WWII to handle populations which had fled mass violence. In the contemporary era, external governments and NGOs collaborate to institute "therapeutic governance" for those remaining in-country as mentioned above.

Some of the most recent U.S. imaginings for engineering social healing were evidenced in a 2013 USAID-posted RFP on Grants.gov (RFA-168-13-000003) to restore social trust among the populace in Bosnia-Herzgovina. The RFP requested proposals for programs based on "evidence-based practices" in combination with "branding," which (to me) indicates another round of top-down problem solving, rather than building on grassroots ideas or addressing underlying economic scarcity and political disorganization in the power vacuum left after the Dayton accords. An example target outcome within the logical framework of the effort was, "BiH Citizens accept alternative political and historical narratives." The developmental

hypothesis was: "if BiH citizens from all parts of the country and from all ethnic backgrounds change their individual attitudes and behavior toward one another, then social trust within communities will increase…" thereby enabling institutional changes that lead to improved social well-being for all citizens of all ethnicities.

Many academics and practitioners have struggled with how to restore social trust. A common approach suggested is "psychosocial" interventions, variously defined. For example, Clancy and Hamber (2008:21) define them as "…those which explicitly recognize the link between social agency and mental health through the utilisation of a medical and/or psychological intervention (or whatever constitutes a therapeutic intervention in a given culture) to promote a social end, and/or a social, cultural, or political intervention that promotes medical and/or psychological well-being."[46]

Anthropologists have traced international efforts at psychosocial interventions in post-war Bosnia and Liberia. In her 2009 dissertation, *Psychosocial Liberia*, Abramowitz defined "psychosocial disorders" as referring to problems resulting from the interaction between self, social conditions, and society. Better understood as "social suffering" in anthropology, it denotes the social enervation resulting from chronic exposure to physical and structural violence (displacement, poverty, injustice, marginalization, threat of retaliation). She also traced the emergence of the idea that, through psychosocial interventions, the rehabilitation of the person is commensurate with the rehabilitation of the state. Psychosocial interventions are "supposed to promote the process of healing from violence by facilitating resumption of normalized everyday life for individuals, families, and communities…" She noted that aid agencies' use of the term "psychosocial" is vague and fluid, enabling play in the framings of problems, interventions, and

[46] Their paper provides an excellent overview of the larger questions of social recovery in post-war societies; *Pedersen et al* (2015) review efforts to find best practices in psychosocial interventions designed to reduce the mental health burdens in war-impacted populations remaining in-country. See also Miller and Rasmussen (2010).

desired outcomes. This vagueness and fluidity can be good and bad—good in that it allows for experimentation, but bad in that it is so non-specific about actual practices that almost anything can be done and be called a psychosocial intervention, and almost any aim can be targeted. She observed that "there is something about the post-war period as a unique moment of cultural formation and cultural questioning in the context of a deeply uncertain state of insecurity and uncertainty. A space opened of awkward global-local dialogue in which wedged open a cultural space for renegotiation of the term 'normal.' All parties involved directed all the power they could muster to impose their vision on the new terms of 'normal' and move toward their own imagined ideal."[47]

A fascinating observation, since resumption of a previous definition of normalized everyday life (if even possible)--when those practices were implicated in the outbreak of war--would be fraught with a risk of relapse into war. And international aid agencies' visions of what needed to be done to address the aftermath differed from what Liberians themselves perceived to be the needs for transformation on the ground. Abramowitz was critical of the Liberian Truth Commission which was encouraging forgiveness and reconciliation while people on the ground wanted to talk about the atrocities they'd seen. They could not relate to the purpose of the Truth Commission. She also discussed the provision of human rights trainings with specific messaging, but locals wanted to know how these were relevant to their local situations of land tenure issues (getting deeds), sexual violence, marriage and child-rearing issues.

Healing at the meso-level: Communities, social roles and identities, and regaining senses of meaning and place

Nordstrom (1997) wrote about how indigenous healers in Mozambique tried to heal social bodies via social role, identity, and repair of stigma after war. Other indigenous

[47] Abramowitz (2009:42)

interventions at the meso-level have included site-specific adaptations of individual or nation-state level interventions, such as the Gacaca courts in Rwanda (which have very mixed reviews) in local communities;[48] or attempts at memorializations in atrocity-impacted locales. Rwanda has several site-specific memorials, much like the concentration camp memorials from WWII. In Croatia and Bosnia-Hergovinia, memorials are appearing, but in some places amidst severe opposition when it is the cleansed population trying to install a memorial in a locale amongst the group which cleansed them out from that space. Some attempts to establish memorials have been blocked.[49]

Mostly, though, it is actors and institutions at this system level which have been identified as responsible for restorative actions, but programs and operations have been little-specified. Very recent work on the social ecology of resilience are starting to elaborate theory and provide case studies which depict domains of healing at this level. I will summarize this work in Chapter 4.

* * *

Post-war environments condition how populaces resiliate. "Environments" include the social environment. Humans are social beings, and therefore a person damaged by targeted aggression designed to stigmatize him or her can harm the collective social body in retaliation or anger about their degraded social identity, despair, and thwarted plans.[50] And so repair or healing is imperative, but it cannot be only the body-self which is auto-healed or addressed by a healer-practitioner. All bodies need spaces and resources for resilience and adversity-activated

[48] Key Informant (2005)
[49] Irwin and Šarić (2010)
[50] Nordstrom (1997).

development through which can emerge new and hopeful approaches of experimentation and creativity in re-establishing collective safety, security, stability, and socio-economic functioning.

In all of these analyses but particularly at the under-theorized meso-level, I am seeking the healing spaces of social negotiation and evolution, where narratives are co-constructed, in spaces of public experiment, and enable meaningful social (re-) connection. Clinical testimony and tribunal/truth commissions provide a useful ritual frame for managing and containing emotion and narrative. They are experimental, liminal spaces, but they are not fully spaces of *communitas* (to be defined in Chapter 4). To the extent that they allow meaningful reflection on past and future identities, and the unspeakable to be spoken (and thus made available to consciousness or the social group), they are likely healing at the systemic register to which they are keyed. How they impact healing at the local meso-level communities, villages, and neighborhoods awaits investigation.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I sketched the impacts of political trauma and reviewed the central efforts toward recovery that have gained ascendancy in international practice. Harms to the various "bodies" in war include degradation of populations, targeted stigmatization of (especially) women through rape so that cultural continuity is disrupted, enabling of personal score-settling under cover of war, distrust in government and governance, forced perpetration to implicate everyone as criminal (and therefore no one can be held accountable), reduction of identity and personhood to an instantiation of a category (a move which removes agency and personal history), populations being forced to rely on ethnic or other identity groups for protection absent effective governance, mass theft, and a complete breakdown of the social contract. Many of

these harms seem unaddressed, or inadequately or only indirectly addressed by interventions devised to date. Approaches in recent decades have included medicalization of psychological and social suffering through therapeutic governance, ritual repair of the nation-state through tribunals and truth commissions, and a placeholder/catch-all category of psychosocial approaches deployed in impacted countries and populations.

I am suggesting—following scholars such as Abramowitz and Locke—that medicalization does not remove the causes of social suffering in war-impacted populations, though some treatments offered in clinical settings do assist with symptom relief. Social recovery needs more study and practice elaboration. A place to start may be to think about how to address each of the harms called out in this chapter. The South African TRC created by leaders prevented war, gave voice to the aggrieved, and established the historical record, but did not address how former enemies might live alongside each other in the new nation. Nor did it address issues in the organization of the economy and distribution of resources. The record of truth commissions elsewhere as importations of a social "technology" awaits more in-depth study; others have not seemed to have the dramatic success of having prevented a nation from devolving into war but may have other achievements the analysis of which have not been well-reported. The verdict on tribunals is still out, but they have been rife with difficulties in establishing guilt and exacting punishment without re-traumatizing those who testify. Where indigenous restorative justice practices have been tried, the distrust and fear attendant to the experience of extreme atrocity at the hands others alongside whom one must now live restricts the sense of justice attained.

The record, overall, is not entirely clear, though it is better than nothing, which would convey total impunity and justice without end. Repairing the social body is very *very* messy, and

not something that can simply be engineered from the top. I hope that this study of resettlement will highlight the means and methods that populations, communities, and societies find to resiliate from mass violence, so that policies and governance can then provide spaces and resources for these practices to emerge and thrive.

Chapter 2

Governing flight:
Refugee crises in the world

Some people have to leave behind everything they thought they knew.

--Bruce Cockburn 1994[51]

Mass violence produces refugees, and in this chapter, I focus on the ways in which leaders and governments across the world have responded to the crises. This chapter will first provide a brief phenomenology of flight before moving to practices of refugee registration and a search for durable solution for those escaping persecution and extreme danger. The chapter concludes with governance of the application for resettlement in the U.S. and preparations for transfer.

THOSE WHO FLEE…

It happens like this:

A truck rolls into town and halts. Ten men standing or sitting on the back flatbed, rifles slung on their back, jump down from the truck and begin throwing rocks through second floor windows. Flames start shooting up in the room and then licking out of the top of opening where the glass has been broken out. Soon the building is engulfed in flames. Time elapsed: about two minutes. Next another building, then another. Cut to a more distant angle, now the frame reveals four, five, six buildings on fire. People on the street are frozen, staring. Camera follows

[51] "Love loves you too" lyrics written 30 May 1992 in Germany, released in 1994, Columbia Records

the men, now back on the truck driving to another spot, repeating same scene. Time elapsed: about 8 minutes.

Viewers of this internet-posted footage follow what the camera follows, and it is not following the people on the street. It is following the actors, as in, people taking aggressive action. The civilians on the street are unarmed and irrelevant, mere life forms of no consequence or purpose. I watched this footage after a long-time key informant—who still searches the internet for images of "the town where I grew up"— sent me the link. I was engrossed with the action, not the civilians. I don't know what they did next or what happened to them.

As a researcher of civilians in war and its aftermath, one would think that I would have gone back to that footage to see what people on the street did next, or wondered who was filming this scene and why. But I didn't—the point of attention for me after viewing that footage was to feel the shock wash over me of seeing that fire and destruction erupt (so quickly!), and then to think about how I would respond to this key informant in talking to her about what I saw and what she wanted me to see.

This key informant was a civilian caught in that war; she has a long-term pattern of suffering that makes her return again and again to the internet to search for images and news of her home town. She was now acting upon me--with me--as a contemporary, doing a social action to help me understand. And she was also suffering now more acutely in this doing. And I needed to respond to that suffering-made-social, now an intersubjective suffering, with me witnessing and experiencing my own bodily sensations. The action to which I attended after watching was in the present, not back then (the start of violence in her hometown). In this act of talking and sharing, she reclaims her importance and identity as an embodied self, a specific and individual human being (not just a social or political body that is the object of the militarized

action of a degraded body politic) and instead of being done to, she acts, she creates the current script and scene. She chooses to share her personal research, re-live the experience, and then to talk about it with me. In some sense, at that point in time, it was important to her that *someone* understand, that *others* understand, how it happens, how shocking it is, and how utterly and instantaneously destructive. Absolute destruction takes a few hours; it takes decades to re-build structures and homes and lives and businesses and communities.

The vignette demonstrates my somatic mode of attention during my extended research. I was not trying to get answers to specific pre-set questions; I had the subjectivity of an engaged researcher in a social process, trying to understand this terrible experience and how people come out of it alive—in spirit, soul, personhood, body. My attention went to the social process in the present; my analysis focused there; my reflexive analysis is focused there. My stance is subjective and intersubjective; I know that there were factual events that happened and that caught people up in them. But the point of power is in the present for her. She and I—*we*—are the subject of these sentences and this interaction in the present is what is significant about this particular dissertation research. I do think that going back and watching the footage again to see what the civilians did is an important question; it is not my question in this dissertation. That question requires a detachment, a disembodied mode of attention. Instead, I participated in and observed the resettlement of refugees in towns and cities across in the U.S.

She became a refugee as militant actions like what were filmed and posted to the internet spread across her country, a country in the process of dissolution. She did not get out of the country immediately; she instead sought refuge with relatives, many of whom would not shelter her beyond a few hours because her parents were of mixed ethnicity and she was in a mixed-

ethnicity marriage in a region being ethnically cleansed. Eventually, someone like a coyote of the Arizona border region helped her out.[52]

She was terribly injured in this horrific conflict, though the injury was and is not physically visible to others. One comes to understand these injuries over time in noticing the way that she reacts in some circumstances which apparently trigger the feeling of un-belonging and dispossession. I have listened to her recount various aspects of the experience for years, and I am still not sure that I could piece together the exact linear sequence of events. She later became much more linear in her narrations than when we first met; for several years, as she talked about the circumstances of flight, I really couldn't follow what was happening when. She constantly shifted registers; events of intense emotionality and threat that occurred continuously over a period of time were recounted without time-sense, or with time and place distortion, in a jumble. I asked her later if she noticed when she shifted registers. She didn't, but speculated that it was an avoidance of some painful material. I don't think so; Uehara (2007) has also reported this pattern of fragmented, non-linear, impossible-to-follow narration given by war-impacted individuals. Perhaps this pattern of utterance reflects the chaotic experience of someone in that situation—what is happening? How can it be made sense of? It doesn't make sense. Who is friend, who is enemy? Who will help? Who will kill? One begins to search for answers through politics, events, groupings, fleeting impressions from today, last month, four months ago, in that village, in this other place. What *was* that meeting really about? My god, a

[52] A "coyote" is a person who gets someone across a border illegally and to a transfer point, for pay. In 2015 as refugees pour into Europe and children and families fleeing gang violence in Central American try to make their way into the U.S. with their "services," I now hear such people referred to as "human traffickers." The term seems to have taken on a politicized character in the current context which confounds this transport activity with notions of illegal enslavement of people for labor or sex. When individuals pay someone to help them transit out, this is of a significantly different character. It is illegal in most cases, but it is not enslavement.

bullet just whizzed past my ear! Crouch and run: humiliation permeates the postures of fleeing human beings targeted as prey.

Sometimes she and others told me of events that were so gruesome as to be unfathomable; they became stuck deeply, persistently, and compulsively in memory. By compulsively, I mean that I couldn't stop thinking about it, the thoughts about it nearly reached the point of intrusiveness. Eventually, I learned to avoid imagining the scene visually or kinesthetically by, instead, attending to the human being talking to me in the present. It prevented much secondary trauma to be able to do that as the listener; it did not perseverate so much when I did that. It took me a long time to develop this practice. It prevents me from numbing myself to this suffering and the unfathomable. I do not want to lose the ability to listen—to perceive directly in the moment, or I would also lose the ability to feel shocked and feel compassion for suffering. It is important, however, to prevent the next step of envisioning it and feeling it bodily, so that more than one sensory mode becomes involved in the memory-making around that exchange. When people who have been through extreme experiences narrate these scenes and memories to another person who was not directly impacted by the violence themselves, they are trying to make sense of the unconscionable. They are sense-making with you; you are witness; you become involved in that story and that journey.[53]

However, when people in flight are actually *in it* rather than recalling it, they numb to get through it. It happens automatically, without thought or plan, as a bodily capacity of flight. Humans go into an altered state of consciousness to be able to act on their own behalf, without attending to context and how dangerous it is. It is acting without thinking at the point of highest danger, so that they can physically execute. It is decontextualized, physical mode, also known as

[53] See Mollica (2006); Herman (1997).

trance or a hypnotic state. It is a direct reactive capacity to the physical task required; unmediated by conscious thought, and it allows a human being to survive. It is de-realization; it is dissociation. It is a survival capacity of the sensate body, a capacity that evolved over millennia and is learned by individuals through the physical activity of daily life, accomplished largely outside of consciousness. It is this practice in motating through the environment that prepares the body for fight or flight. Sports, dance, walking, running, all physical play activities (including virtual internet games that hone fast reflexes) train human beings for such moments of physical reactivity in a time of threatened safety.

During war between these moments of intense danger, fleeing people are trying to make sense of the data coming in so they can add their critical thinking to plan-making. When they run for it, though, they drop back into raw action mode and this is an altered state of consciousness which enables a physical reactivity that is much faster than anything mediated by conscious thought.

A pregnant refugee lay in a Tucson hospital bed with an undiagnosed severe illness; she had the appearance of a skeleton. At this time of extreme health crisis, her husband remembered and spoke about why he loved and cherished her so deeply. He related that when militia came to his village, people began to flee among bullets. He grabbed this woman and fled/carried her out of the path of gunfire. He showed me the motion: it was a hugging, pulling her to his heart, to safety, and not letting go until they were (momentarily) safe. Absent was any commentary about the sense of her weight or his capacity to carry. They later married in the refugee camp (and she recovered from an intestinal parasite and birthed a healthy boy a few months after we spoke).

Who are Refugees?[54]

The Refugee Convention of 1951 defines a refugee as someone who, "…owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."

The most recent statistics I could find as I started writing this chapter in early 2013, (and these were undated but reported on the PRM website) from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated there to be 15.4 million refugees in the world. Refugees International reported that in 2011, there were 15.2 million refugees of which 80% are women and children and, 25.4 million internally displaced people.

It is difficult to get exact figures that are up to date. In March 2013, it is estimated that over 1 million Syrians are now refugees outside of Syria. At the end of January, the estimate was at 700,000 (*New York Times*, January 25, 2013). At the beginning of May, news outlets were reporting 1.5 million Syrians had fled the country to Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. By mid-May Jordan announced it was closing its borders with Syria (they were re-opened not long after). And on the day before World Refugee Day on June 20, 2013, a UNHCR press release announced that the number of refugees in the world had reached its highest point in 25 years.

Current Populations

According to the UNHCR, in 2011 the leading countries of origin for refugees were:

[54] I keep updating this section to try to stay current, but the world refugee crisis has greatly increased as we moved into the autumn of 2015. In December 2015, the figures being reported are 20 million refugees and 40 million IDPs, with many of refugees in transit to Europe or otherwise outside of camps and cities. I made the decision to leave much of what I wrote in 2013 and updated in 2014 in this chapter without revision as it is instructive to see changing crises occurring—rapidly—in the past 2-3 years. The statistics I provide become significantly outdated as soon as I write them in this chaotic period; a reminder of what international governance and humanitarian organizations are fielding as they try to address the crisis.

Table 2: Top 5 countries of refugee origin in 2011

Afghanistan	2.7 million
Iraq	1.4 million
Somalia	1.1 million
Sudan	500,000
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	491,000

In the same year, the largest populations of internally displaced people were estimated to be:

Table 3: Countries with the highest number of IDPs in 2011

Columbia	3.8 – 5.4 million
Sudan/South Sudan	2.2 – 4.8 million
Iraq	2.3 – 2.6 million
DRC	1.7 million
Somalia	1.5 million

In 2013 as I wrote this chapter, Syria was fast overtaking Somalia and Iraq as the leading refugee-making country. Iraqis who were refugees in Syria have had to go back into Iraq; Syrians are escaping into Iraq as well. Syrians were also going to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. And in 2015, they were headed to northern European countries, with some accepted to the U.S. resettlement program and scheduled for transfer to the U.S.

ADDRESSING REFUGEE CRISES

Governments and governance

Most stakeholders—both refugees and observers—in this situation expect some sort of governance. They expect a government, or the U.N., or some outside power to rescue the civilians in the path of violence. In actuality, more than simply being in its path, civilians are being targeted for violence in many refugee-producing conflicts of the contemporary era.

Those who could get out easily did so long before the outbreak of violence, according to one key informant, who believes that the planning of violence is known quite ahead of time by a privileged and/or astute few. Those who were caught in the situation desperately hoped for a

foreign government to come to their rescue and impose safety. I once asked a Sudanese Lost Boy[55] in a 2005 meeting with the director of a national Volag whether he thought that Darfuris and other southern Sudanese should be resettled as refugees, and his response was, "No. A foreign government should come in and establish safety so people can stay." Refugees from Bosnia told me in other discussions that they wanted some outside power to rescue the people who were under siege. Cambodians I talked with said the same thing.

A government has power; a government has responsibility to provide for the safety and welfare of people. People become refugees because of failure of their government and/or persecution by their government, but there has to be some governmental entity managing reception of those fleeing in the global era.[56] Want no government? Or minimal government? Go to the Balkans in 1994. Somalia in the 1990s-2000s. DRC (Congo) now. Where effective, governments keep things organized so that people and enterprises can get traction and build homes and businesses.

Governments can go awry however, as they did in refugee situations where they failed to protect or worse, directly persecuted portions of the population (in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge state psychosis engulfed the entire population). Affected populations lose trust in their governments, *but not in governance per se.*

International governance

The three international documents most important in the addressing of refugee situations are:

[55] I will use this term for Sudanese boys who banded together and walked to refugee camps in Kenya during the civil war in the 1990s after becoming separated from parents (most of whom were killed). They were widely referred to as the "Lost Boys" in media and refugee professional circles, and it is a term specifically applied to this set of refugees who survived this experience. Other refugees from Sudan have also come to the U.S., but the resettlement arrangements for Lost Boys were specific to their circumstance.

[56] Humanitarian NGOs and INGOs are taking on some of this role, but they have no "authority" in the sense that they are not authorized by a recognized, legitimate political authority to do this role except as they receive government and/or international donor funding to do work in this sector. And they do it without oversight of any legitimate political body except as specified in their funding contracts. Their boards of directors generally know the broad outlines of a projects and outcomes reported from the field, but not the details of design or implementation.

- 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
- 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees
- Resolution 2198 (XXI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly

The office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) was established in 1951 by the provisions of first document listed above. UNHCR may assign refugee status to those with a well-founded fear of persecution, and this registration brings people in flight into a lesser state of disorder as they are named, counted, identified, and given a temporary status which indicates who they are and that they have certain protections under international agreements. With refugee status, individuals are guaranteed protection of their basic human rights, and cannot be forced to return to a country where they fear persecution.

A mission statement from the UNHCR website notes, "While UNHCR's primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees, our ultimate goal is to help find durable solutions that will allow them to rebuild their lives in dignity and peace." UNHCR has identified three durable solutions open to refugees where it can assist:

- voluntary repatriation to country of origin, a solution that is of highest preference when conditions are safer
- local integration in the host country to where refugees have fled
- resettlement to a third country in situations where it is impossible for a refugee to return home or remain in the host country

According to the website of the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), the vast majority of refugees are supported in the country to which they have fled (usually a neighboring country) until it is safe to return to their own country. A small number become citizens of that fled-to country. A smaller number (less than 1% of the total number of refugees) are resettled to a third country, and PRM indicates that these

are the refugees who are at the highest risk. Of the less than 1%, half are resettled to the U.S., more than all other third countries of resettlement combined.

UNHCR's website states that "for several million refugees and a greater number of internally displaced people, these [durable] solutions are nowhere in sight. UNHCR has been highlighting these protracted situations in a bid to get movement towards solutions. In many cases, the absence of longer-term solutions aggravates protection problems."

Recent populations resettled to the U.S. illustrate UNHCR's work toward solution in protracted situations: the situation of the Bhutanese (ethnic Nepalis) housed in refugee camps in Nepal since the early 1990s when Bhutan removed them was resolved through the offer of resettlement in the United States, commencing in 2006 and winding down as I write. During this time, over 66,000 refugees from the Nepal camps have arrived in the U.S.

Thailand has been the site of camps for refugees fleeing persecution since the Vietnam War and the reign of Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Camps were established along the Thai border; currently camps are on the west side of Thailand housing refugees from Burma. In early 2013 PRM announced in eight of these camps that refugees living there should make a decision in the coming months as to whether or not to apply for the U.S. resettlement program, as PRM would be closing the program in those locations. 65,000 refugees from Burma who have been living in the Thai camps have been resettled to the U.S. as of the beginning of 2013. Refugees from Burma who moved into Malaysian cities are expected to continue transfer to the U.S. in the foreseeable future, according to PRM officials.

The protracted situation in the Congo is moving toward solution as the U.S. and other nations resettle 50,000 Congolese who have been residing in camps in Uganda, Rwanda,

Burundi, and Tanzania to third countries.[57] This initiative was developed by the U.S. and other nations in collaboration with UNHCR.

A very small number of Syrians were being readied by UNHCR for resettlement (2,000) in third countries by the end of CY13; it was anticipated that most would go to Australia and Canada due to their shorter length of time required to complete applications and screenings. Germany (at the end of 2012) offered to take 5,000 Syrians for temporary resettlement until programs in third countries are started or it becomes safe for repatriation.[58]

GOVERNMENTALITY IN REFUGEE CRISES

In assessing the sociality emerging between those managing crises and those fleeing crises, several "governmentalities" have been observed among writers, and are visible in the management regimes developed for the eventual resettlement of refugees in third countries. The governmentality of the U.S. refugee resettlement program differs from governance approaches for refugees in the resettlement programs in the countries of Europe, in Canada, or Australia.

The term "governmentality" originated with Foucault in the 1979-1980s' period of his lectures and writings, and has been further developed and critiqued among scholars in the ensuing years. Foucault's use of the term referred to the act and methods of governing and keyed off of his stated interest in the "art of governance."

The way I will be using the term synthesizes (a) how people are expected to act in a society and (b) how governance brings that about. Foucault discusses these two aspects in relation to "technologies of power" that shape behavior and give rise to ideas about the normal or

[57] A December 2012 conference call with officials from National Security Council, PRM, and ORR signaled the readying-for-resettlement plans; by 2015, Congolese arrivals were well-underway.

[58] PRM quarterly consultation with states and ORR, July 16, 2013. Obviously, the situation changed radically in August 2015, as reported in the Foreword.

natural ways of doing things. Social institutions within a nation-state/society contribute to governing through use of such technologies to shape behavior and attitudes. Medical anthropologist Jeff Maskovsky (2000) suggested that neoliberal ideologies in the U.S. and elsewhere shape a governmentality that pursues shrinkage of state services, thereby requiring individuals to govern their own access to social services like health care. People should be responsible for themselves; social institutions and policies make this happen through reducing funding, encouraging self-surveillance, and so on.

Eventually, I will also use this term to analyze the leadership actions within ethnic communities being resettled to the U.S. Refugee populations arrive with "remnant" governments—people who were government officials or recognized leaders within clan or tribal systems, or who aspired to enact these roles as the population was decimated and leaders lost. They are a portion of what existed in the country of origin; they help arriving populations in many ways to retain a sense of stability and identity in the resettlement process, and they also act as a conservator of cultural norms. They counterbalance the new and unfamiliar cultural norms of the receiving community which can be viewed as a threat to the existing cultural identity carried in with the arriving group.[59]

Some portion of all stakeholder groups in refugee resettlement—host governments, receiving governments, receiving resettlement communities, and refugees themselves—fear that resettlement will overwhelm their existing arrangements for resource distribution, and they fear "pollution" by damaged "others" as evidenced in the policies, socio-political actions and logistical arrangements that they make. The fears are reflected in the attitudes discernible in each stakeholder group about how refugees should be managed, positioned in the new setting,

[59] See, for example, Devoe (2002).

and perceived by others. Again, I am trying to write these sentences precisely and carefully to signal that the fear goes in both directions: refugees fear that their resource-distribution arrangements and/or their socio-economic and cultural coping mechanisms will be disallowed in the region of resettlement; receiving stakeholders fear that the numbers of refugees resettling and their "other-ness" will overwhelm resources and subvert the existing socio-cultural-economic arrangements. I intend to address the refugee side in Chapter 7.

In this chapter focused on refugees in flight and in warehousing situations, a look at the literature and public pronouncements of neighboring host governments and nations shows that refugees may be seen as intruders, a threat to resources and property, indeed, as "locusts" as one immigrant-American professional told me, because of the resources they need immediately to survive. The threats to resources and potential pollution are at least six-fold:

- the stripping of water, food, and fuel resources and the production of human waste and garbage that overwhelms sanitation systems;
- the influx of foreign aid apparatuses which clog airspaces and require housing and other resources;
- the potential of influx of violence being carried over from the state at war, either as retaliation or attack carried into the camp, or, by combatants infiltrating camps along with those who are refugees actually fleeing persecution, or as people take desperate actions to stay alive;
- the potential deterioration in distribution of resources to an open access regime of resource scavenging which ignores legal and conservation mandates;
- the attraction of extremists looking to opportunistically gain political ground with the spread of chaos; and
- the potential competition for jobs with existing populations.

The threat of destabilization in neighboring countries is very real and discernible in the current Syrian crisis. The host country and/or UNHCR may quickly build camps, as is happening in Jordan. We can use Jordan's experience as a brief case study of humanitarian crises in war:

A report in the *New York Times* published on January 26, 2013 showed photos of the progression of refugees arriving to the Zaatari refugee camp just across the border from southern Syria. The article reported 4,000 Syrians, primarily families led by women, arrived on the 25th of January, with an additional 2,000 arriving overnight.

The camp had opened in July 2012. By September 3, 2012, Jordan had set up 2,400 tents housing Syrian families. On November 15, 2012, there were 5,163 tents; on January 3, 2013, 11,966 tents were in place. The camp housed some 65,000 people as of January 26, 2013. Jordanian authorities noted that 300,000 Syrians had entered the country; elsewhere, 221,000 had registered in Lebanon, 156,000 in Turkey, and 76,000 in Iraq. At the end of March 2013 UNHCR estimated that refugees from Syrian who have fled to neighboring countries number over 1 million, up 300,000 from the end of January as mentioned previously. By 2015, it estimated the number to be 4 million.

At the January 2013 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, King Abdullah issued an urgent call for help, stating "I cannot emphasize enough the challenges that we are all facing, both in Jordan and Lebanon, and it's only going to get worse…what we are asking from the international community is not just to help us with the refugee problems and their challenges as they face this harsh winter, but also stockpiling in Jordan so we can move supplies across the borders to keep people in place."

According to the *New York Times*, Jordan's fears for its own stability had surfaced in the previous week as the country's Prime Minister—Abdullah Ensour—noted that if the Syrian government collapsed, Jordan would not accept more refugees but would use its military to create safe havens inside Syria for those displaced by conflict. By May 2013, Jordan temporarily

closed its borders to Syrian refugees and Zaatari camp numbers had swelled to over 200,000.[60] The fighting had intensified, refugees waited at the border of Syria. Those borders reopened in July 2013.

As of February 25, 2014, 104,883 Syrians were registered as refugees and resident in the Zaatari camp.[61] Overall, UNHCR had registered 2,474,286 Syrian refugees in neighboring countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt) and 46,126 awaited registration. And in Syria itself, those Palestinians who had been living refugee camps for many years faced starvation as supply lines have been severely disrupted due to fighting.

While awaiting a durable solution, refugees reside in camps established by UNHCR or a neighboring host country, or they may go to cities in neighboring countries. Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Malaysia, Germany, Turkey are examples of countries where refugees may register at UNHCR offices in local cities. Many Sudanese went to Cairo; individuals from the former Yugoslavia were able to register in Germany; Rohingya from Burma are in cities in Malaysia. Iraqi refugees registered in Jordan or Syria. A key informant told me that Iraqis could not flee easily because there were no camps set up for Iraqis. They traveled as "regular people" and registered in cities as refugees. If they do not have their own resources to survive, they have to go back to Iraq (2013).

Warehousing: The refugee camp environment

By now well-known refugee camps have been set up in areas of the world proximate to areas of fighting and war: Chad, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi in Africa; Nepal and Thailand in South and Southeast Asia; Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq in the Middle East. Many of these have been in existence for 20-30 years, and they are established in areas away from host-

[60] UNHCR website
[61] *Ibid*.

country cities and populations. They swell in times of exacerbated crises. In Northern Kenya, for example, the Kakuma camp was originally built for 60,000 refugees and at times has ballooned to 300,000 refugees. Camp life in northern Kenya is notoriously unsafe; with attacks in and around the camps as women go for firewood. These camps are in areas of Kenya "where there is nothing: deserts, scorpions, no one wants to live there."[62]

Camp life fosters dependence. Refugees encamped in Kenya, Thailand, Nepal, and probably elsewhere are not allowed to work outside the camp although a few may find jobs with UN or other IGOs or INGOs working in the camps. Humanitarian organizations supply food and other essentials. Refugees to whom I have spoken noted that food is regular, but not enough. The first young woman (age 19) I met from a Kenyan camp arrived in Tucson extremely thin and severely anemic; she talked about not being able to get meat in the camp except very irregularly. In many places, refugees are not allowed to travel outside of camps or are highly regulated in travel outside of camps. Schools, medical treatment, and psychosocial interventions especially for children are set up in the camps, but refugees have reported that schooling that is supposed to be delivered for free is not: teachers from the host countries demand payment from students.[63]

Dependency on aid is the norm for long periods of time; most refugees from the camps with whom I have spoken were not aware of how food gets to them, the processes involved, or who pays for these supplies. This bespeaks a highly present-time, survival orientation with little opportunity for getting experience in planning and implementation beyond self-provisioning based on receiving rationed supplies and foraging in the environment. Somali Bantu refugees resided in camps for 12-15 years before coming to the U.S. Many Congolese refugees who were warehoused in Tanzania *for 30 years* before being resettled to the U.S. grew up in the camps.

[62] Key informant from East Africa, March 2013

[63] Refugee comments during home visits I made as a volunteer; see Jaji (2011).

How they navigate the work of resettlement may be quite different from others who were not encamped for longer periods.

GETTING TO A DURABLE SOLUTION THROUGH RESETTLEMENT TO THE U.S.

Since WWII the U.S. has permanently resettled more refugees than any other country in the world, and continues to admit half of all refugees accepted to third countries for resettlement. According the Refugee Council USA (RCUSA) website, "the U.S. admitted over 250,000 displaced Europeans in the wake of World War II, and the first refugee legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress was the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. This legislation provided for the admission of an additional 400,000 displaced Europeans. Later laws provided for admission of persons fleeing Communist regimes from Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Korea and China, and Cuba. Most of these waves of refugees were assisted by private ethnic and religious organizations in the U.S. which formed the basis for the public/private role of U.S. refugee resettlement today. In 1975 the U.S. resettled hundreds of thousands of Indochinese refugees through an *ad hoc* Refugee Task Force with temporary funding. This experience prompted Congress to pass the Refugee Act of 1980, which incorporated the United Nations definition of 'refugee' and standardized the resettlement services for all refugees admitted to the U.S." Admission of refugees with special humanitarian concerns and family reunification are important emphases of the U.S. resettlement program.

I will revisit provisions of The Refugee Act of 1980 in more detail in Chapter 5. According to RCUSA's website (2013), since 1975, the U.S. has resettled over 3 million refugees, with annual admissions figures ranging from a high of 207,000 in 1980 to a low of 27,110 in 2002 (the year immediately following 9-11). The average number admitted annually

since 1980 is 98,000—and this is a higher figure than any of the annual admissions of refugees since 2001. In FFY2016, it is 85,000, the highest figure I have seen in my years working in the field of U.S. resettlement. The lowest—in 2005 or 2006—was around 57,000.[64]

The U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), created in 1952, follows the 1951 U.N. convention and established the definition of "refugee" in Section 101(a)(42) as:

> (A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership is a particular social group, or political opinion, or
>
> (B) in such circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation (as defined in Section 207 (e) of this Act) may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which such a person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

[Continuing from the INA] "The term "refugee" *does not include* any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."

The Act goes on to say that a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or undergo involuntary sterilization or who has been persecuted for refusing to do so or for resisting other coercive population control programs shall be deemed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion, and therefore would meet the definition of "refugee."

To meet the criteria for resettlement to the U.S., a refugee must (a) be among those determined by the President to be of special humanitarian concern to the U.S.; (b) meet the

[64] Clearly fears of inundation among some of the U.S. public with suggested increases of the presidential ceiling to 100,000 annually are perceptual; they are not based on an actual inability to absorb those numbers of refugees successfully in the U.S. The U.S. has several individual football stadiums with this seating capacity, to give an idea of what the numbers would look like if concentrated in one area. In fact, resettlement is spread across many sites in the U.S.; LIRS has 45 local affiliate sites, for example.

definition of a refugee provided above; (c) not be firmly resettled in any third country, and (d) be otherwise admissible under U.S. law.

Deciding admissions numbers and priorities

Each year, the Executive Branch of the Federal Government is required by law to review the refugee situation and emergency refugee situations, make projections about the extent of possible refugee resettlement in the U.S., and discuss the reasons why the numbers that the President will propose for the coming fiscal year are justifiable on humanitarian grounds or are otherwise in the national interests of the United States.[65] Members of the Administration, including the Departments of Homeland Security, State, and Health and Human Services, and other Cabinet members discuss various implications of the U.S. refugee policy and programs. Their discussions occur alongside a culmination of consultations with a variety of actors, including local and state governments, local and national NGOs and public interest groups who are involved in the ongoing resettlement program. Following discussions with Congress, the President's proposed admission levels, processing priorities, and groups of humanitarian interest are presented to Congress, and they guide the eligibility and admissions processes within the annual ceiling, usually established during the first week of October (the beginning of the federal fiscal year). There are ceilings set per region of the world; with some unallocated slots. In FFY12, some 58,000 refugees arrived in the U.S., well below the Presidential determination for that year due to the backlog of Iraqis awaiting resettlement for reasons discussed below.

In FFY13 through FFY 15, each year the ceiling was set at 70,000. By way of comparison (this a partial list of other countries), in FFY13 Argentina's admission target was 50; Australia's was 12,500; Brazil = 60; Canada = 14,600; Denmark = 516; Germany = 300 (although Germany admits many more refugees more frequently on a temporary basis until they

[65] Information summarized from the USCIS website, 2015.

can be repatriated or moved to a third country); Netherlands = 500; Norway = 1,120; Sweden = 1,900; UK = 750.

Admission targets for UNHCR submissions to the U.S. were 58,000, and for non-UNHCR submissions (in-country Iraqis, Cubans, Former Soviet Union, Iranians being processed through Austria) the figure was 12,000.[66] The regional ceilings for FFY13 were set at:

Table 4: Regional ceilings in the FFY13 Presidential Determination

Region	Projected FY13 UNHCR submissions	Projected FY13 Non-UNHCR submissions
Africa	12,800	0
East Asia	16,800	200
Europe/Central Asia	0	1,000
Americas	200	2,800
Near East/South Asia	25,200	7,000
Allocated from Reserve	3,000	0
Total	58,000	12,000

Figures from UNHCR refugee resettlement handbook, U.S. country chapter p. 1; June 2013.

The priorities for processing refugees into the U.S. for FY13 were as follows (and these usually change very gradually):

A. Priority one (P-1)

Cases identified by UNHCR, U.S. embassies, or specially-trained NGOs include:

- persons facing compelling security concerns in countries of first asylum
- persons in need of legal protection because of the danger of refoulement
- those in danger because of threats of armed attack in area where they are located
- persons who have experienced recent persecution because of political, religious, or human rights activities (prisoners of conscience)
- women-at-risk
- victims of torture or violence, physically or mentally disabled persons

[66] These are admitted under authority of the U.S. President. UNHCR does not have in-country jurisdiction for resettling refugees. Cubans cannot leave easily, nor can some FSU populations. I am unclear about the Iranian-through-Austria program as I have not directly touched this one in my own experiences. Among Iraqis, some of these individuals may not have gotten themselves out of the country but were helpful to ranking U.S. military officials during the war. But also, they include Iraqis who were living in Syria but fled back into Iraq because Syria has become so much more dangerous.

- persons in urgent need of medical treatment not available in first country of asylum
- persons for whom other durable solutions are not feasible and whose status in the place of asylum will not lead to a long-term satisfactory solution.

All must still establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution in the country from which they fled. All nationalities are eligible for processing under Priority One.

B. Priority two (P-2)

These are specific groups of concern identified by the Department of State in consultation with NGOs, UNHCR, Department of Homeland Security, and other area experts.

In-country P-2 programs include:

- **Former Soviet Union:** Jews, Evangelical Christians, and Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox religious activists identified in the Lautenberg Amendment, Public Law No. 101-167, § 559D, 103 Stat. 1261 (1989), as amended, with close family in the U.S.
- **Cuba:** human rights activists, members of persecuted religious minorities, former political prisoners, forced-labor conscripts (1965-68), persons deprived of their professional credentials or subjected to disproportionately harsh treatment resulting from their perceived or actual political or religious beliefs or activities, and persons who have experienced or fear harm because of their family or social relationship to someone who falls under one of the preceding categories.
- **Iraqis and Afghanis associated with the United States:** employees of the U.S. government, a U.S. government-funded contractor or grantee, and U.S. media and NGOs working in Iraq and certain family members of such employees, as well as beneficiaries of approved I-130 (immigrant visa) petitions (this is the special immigrant visa program) are eligible for refugee processing in Iraq. (includes those designations set forth in the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act).

The P-2 program also includes special populations outside of countries of origin:

- **Ethnic minorities and others from Burma in Thai camps**: individuals who have fled from Burma, registered in one of nine refugee camps along Thai/Burma border, and who are identified by UNHCR as in need of resettlement
- **Ethnic minorities from Burma in Malaysia**: recognized by UNHCR as above
- **Bhutanese in Nepal:** those refugees registered by UNHCR in camps in Nepal and identified as in need of resettlement

- **Iranian religious minorities**: these may benefit from a reduced evidentiary standard for establishing a well-founded fear of persecution pursuant to the 2004 enactment of Public Law 108-199
- **Iraqis associated with the United States**: same as in-country P-2 Iraqis
- **Congolese in Rwanda:** those who verifiably resided in Mudende Camp, Rwanda during one or both of the massacres that took place in August and December of 1997

C. Priority Three (P-3)

Nationals from the countries listed below who are spouses, unmarried sons and daughters under 21 years of age, and parents of U.S.-admitted refugees and asylees, even if those admitted are now U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. The countries in 2013 were: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Republic of Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe.[67]

Making and processing applications

Many agencies are involved in the overseas processing of refugees to the U.S. The actual arrivals compared to the presidential ceiling determinations are mediated by processing issues, constraints, and infrastructure. Usually UNHCR refers a refugee applicant to the U.S. for resettlement, and these "cases" (an individual, a couple, a family with many children can all be a "case") are received and processed overseas at a Resettlement Support Center (RSC). PRM funds and manages nine of these around the world. They are usually managed by resettlement agencies or the International Office of Migration; one is operated directly by U.S. government officials. The RSC collects biographical and other data from applications as part of security

[67] Eligible nationalities may change yearly; one can find them for a current fiscal year on the DoS website.

screening. Corroborating documentation is useful; however refugees are often unable to provide these and their testimony—if credible—may be enough to establish eligibility. Then the extensive process of initial background checks begins. USCIS officers review information collected by the RSC and have a face-to-face interview with each applicant, and then a second set of background checks occurs before USCIS decides whether to approve him or her for resettlement.

The following locations have USCIS officers permanently assigned who may adjudicate refugee applications: Rome, Nairobi, Accra, Vienna, Moscow, Athens, Bangkok, New Delhi, Havana, and Mexico City. In locations without a regular USCIS presence, the RSCs work with the U.S. government to schedule visits on a circuit-ride basis. The vast majority of refugee adjudications are done through the circuit-ride visits. Once a case is approved, the RSCs usually make the preparation for transfer by arranging the medical exams.[68]

Though it can vary depending on applicant's location and other circumstances, the average time from UNHCR referral to arrival as a refugee in the U.S. is around two years, as the layers of background checks have increased over time due to security concerns.[69]

[68] For more information, see U.S. country chapter, UNHCR resettlement handbook, available on the UNHCR website 222.unhcr.org); the foregoing information was condensed from this source.

[69] Information in this section was not widely known, and in November 2015, elected officials in states and some in Congress were unsure of the process of background checks as evidenced by the introduction of the SAFE Act legislation in the House. PRM posted a description of the steps of the process of completing background checks on its website, as did USCIS, in November 2015. Amongst the public and some elected officials, the situation of mass refugee migration into Europe in the fall of 2015—which I described in the Foreword—was assumed to be the same as what happens in the U.S.—refugees simply arrive and register somewhere, without background checks, and thus putting the U.S. public at risk of terrorists sneaking in among the refugees arriving. One good outcome from all this controversy is that public officials and the public at large in the U.S. are learning much more about how planned and how careful the process of resettlement in the U.S. is. Historically, refugees going into Germany, for example, did not stay permanently, and did not have the right to work. When refugees come to the U.S., they are admitted with the understanding that the resettlement is permanent. This is a fundamental difference that was perhaps not widely understood.

How Volags take cases for resettlement, and how they decide what community will receive them

Nine national Volags plan and coordinate the reception and placement of newly arriving refugees who will be resettled by their local offices or local affiliate agencies in communities across the U.S.:

- Church World Service (CWS)
- Ethiopian Community Development Council (ECDC)
- Episcopal Migration Ministries (EMM)
- Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS)
- International Rescue Committee (IRC)
- Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (LIRS)
- U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI)
- United States Conference of Catholic Bishops/Migration and Refugee Services (USCCB)
- World Relief (WR)

PRM issues a yearly request for proposals (RFPs) for the Reception and Placement of refugees. PRM updates and refines its requests each year as resettlement practice evolves through time. The RFPs are usually issued in April. National Volags then work with their local affiliates to the national Volags and their local affiliates prepare extensive proposals for PRM concerning their capacity to resettle refugees. The local agencies consult with State Refugee Coordinators (SRCs) and State Refugee Health Coordinators (SRHCs) as part of this process. Then, PRM convenes a panel of reviewers from the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement and among the ranks of the SRCs and SRHCs to review the voluminous data and rank proposals. While PRM accepts proposals are accepted from new agencies wishing to assume the Volag role, in practice it is difficult to get started given the extensive requirements of the Cooperative Agreement with the Department of State.

PRM decides how many refugees are approved for resettlement through a given national Volag by the start of the Federal fiscal year, October 1. The overall percentage-of-the-total allocated to national Volags has changed little from year to year in the time I have been observing U.S. resettlement (since 2003). USCCB has the largest allocation of cases, around 34% of the total.

A moratorium on arrivals begins October 1 until the announcement of the Presidential determination, usually within a week after the start of the fiscal year. The only other stoppage of transfer from overseas (for non-security reasons) occurs in the last two weeks of December.[70] Otherwise, refugees arrive continuously through the year. And local resettlement agencies must be prepared to receive and stabilize them in a new community.

How is that community chosen for a given refugee family?

Once a week (though it can sometimes be twice a week if the number of cases approved for resettlement is high), representatives of the national Volags meet together in Virginia (just outside of D.C.) and allocate cases that have been accepted by PRM for resettlement in the U.S. They download the "caseload" list from PRM on Mondays and prepare the configuration of cases they will request for their allocation that week's meeting; Volag officials review cases based on the capacities of their local affiliates to resettle individuals and families with varied demographic characteristics (ethnicity, language, case size, medical status), and according to the category of the case.

Many cases are classified as "U.S. tie" or "family tie" cases, which means that as part of the application process, the refugee has identified someone in the U.S. whom they know and would like to join. PRM and the Volags make every attempt to meet these requirements because

[70] Security issues will halt or significantly slow transfer, however.

if they do not, their relatives or friends will help new arrivals move so they can be together in the same city. Since the initial placement involves a cash outlay by the Volag (using Reception and Placement funds from PRM) before arrival for rent, deposits, utilities, furniture, *et al*, the better plan is to try to assure that cases go where there is a local tie rather than seeing refugees out-migrate almost immediately and the scarce dollars going to waste.

The number of U.S.-tie cases will help determine where "free" (non-U.S. tie) cases go, since a local Volag may not resettle more than 10% over its approved PRM number for the year without going through a significant number of consultative steps with a variety of government stakeholders. Some local sites are U.S.-tie sites only; there are such substantial communities of a given ethnic/nationality that U.S. tie cases wishing to relocate there take up the full capacity. For example, during the last wave of Hmong resettlement in 2005, over 5,000 Hmong arrived to Wisconsin in a three-month period. Wisconsin was the second largest resettlement site for Hmong in the U.S.,[71] so many newly-arriving families had ties in Wisconsin, and, the communities there were well-prepared with services delivered largely through Hmong mutual assistance associations after the first 90 days.

The vast majority of local resettlement agencies and state program are incented to view the pipeline of arrivals in the long-term, and few agencies will want to be receiving only family ties cases. The reason is that once all of a population is in, the locale will need to suddenly reconfigure services to provide culturally and linguistically-appropriate services to different populations, and, there will be no U.S. ties to that locale to help with the resettlement process. And they will not be receiving more U.S. tie cases. Therefore, the usual local rationale would be

[71] This was an unusually high number of arrivals in a very short period of time to a given locale. By that time Wisconsin was receiving some other ethnicities, but its resettlement program in the first 30 years was designed for the large-scale Hmong resettlement to a number of cities and towns of that state.

to try to resettle a mix of U.S. tie cases and free cases so that the pipeline is never empty of anticipated cases.

Volags may decide that they want to do a special mission for difficult cases. HIAS resettled all Jewish refugees from the former Soviet Union. A local resettlement official told me in 2012 that LIRS determined that their mission included the resettlement of high-needs medical cases (though other Volags also accept high-needs medical cases as these have increased in the past few years). And many have noted (including a PRM official) that USCCB takes whichever cases are left on the table after all the other Volags have selected their cases for that week. USCCB will resettle anyone, with any configuration of issues or difficulties because that is their mission: to assist the poor and vulnerable who appear at their door.

Back at their offices, the national Volags now turn around and approach their local resettlement affiliates or local offices for case assurances. They send demographic, medical, language, and other case information to a local affiliate/office which then decides whether to assure the case for placement through their agency. Local affiliates will assess each case to determine whether they can serve the case in a linguistically and culturally appropriate manner. A local Volag may reject a case if they do not have the language capacity needed by the case. If the case has a specialized medical needs that they are uncertain that they can serve within local health systems, if the case has a high family size which will make it difficult to find affordable housing, if there are no others from their ethnic group or country and none are expected to be coming (so that there is an insufficient community around them to help the transition), a local Volag may choose not to assure the case.

Once a Volag in the U.S. agrees to take a case for resettlement, the location and name of the sponsoring (the local resettlement) agency is forwarded to the originating RSC, which then

works with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to bring the refugee to the resettlement site. The cost of transportation from overseas to the local city is paid by IOM but is actually a loan that refugees have to repay beginning six months after their arrival in the U.S. National Volags collect the repayment.

Refugees who have come to the U.S. in the areas in the U.S. where I have been directly involved with resettlement since 2000 include: Somali Bantu, Somali, Iraqi, Eritrean, Ethiopian, Sudanese, Congolese, Rwandan, Burmese, Bhutanese, Iranian, refugees from the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, Meskhetian Turks, Liberians, Hmong/Laotian, Cambodians, and Afghanis.

On the following page, a chart summarizes the process:

Figure 2: Refugee resettlement: from flight to arrival in the U.S.



CONTAINING EPIDEMICS OF "DIS-EASE"--
PRE-ARRIVAL PREVENTION MEASURES BY RESETTLEMENT AGENTS

Returning to the themes of governance and fear of contamination, the U.S. program puts a variety of structures and screenings in place to prevent problems in the resettlement of incoming refugees—to contain chaos, to structure expectations, to begin to shape behavioral expectations among those who will pass the screening, and to keep out those who are too unknown or potentially too "polluting," too dis-eased, too potentially threatening to the societal collectives of which they will become part.

As Mary Douglas (1978) and other since have thought about it, the idea of pollution emerges from the interest of a group in maintaining its definition of collective stability, health, and social well-being. Governmentality can be observed in this set of ideas. Groups engage, therefore, in all manner of boundary-maintenance activities which assure that these definitions "hold" and are not tipped by difference or innovation into something less "pure" or even unrecognizable. These boundaries are partly maintained through policy carrots and sticks, but mostly by socializing agents. I will discuss these processes in Chapters 5 and 6.

Preventing infection: Security in the resettlement program

Refugee applicants must complete a series of biometric and biographic checks prior to final approval for resettlement in the U.S. Refugees may be excluded from the U.S. resettlement program for criminal activity: crimes of moral turpitude, drug trafficking, multiple criminal convictions, prostitution, aggravated felonies or acts involving persecution or torture. Refugees may also be excluded on security grounds: engagement in espionage or terrorist activities; membership in Communist or other totalitarian parties, Nazi persecution or genocide; or individuals who would present a serious security threat.

Unrelated issues in the U.S. context may create new security fears that impact the resettlement program. Resettlement in the U.S. stopped abruptly with events on 9-11, and did not resume for two and a half months. New security concerns came to the fore; they have not abated in all this time as fears of terrorist infiltration continue. They are founded and feared; should security be breached, the program would be completely threatened. It takes only a single major incident by one individual to bring processing and transfers nearly to a halt as happened to Iraqis awaiting resettlement, after the FBI linked fingerprints found on bomb in Iraq designed to hurt U.S. troops to refugees resettled in Kentucky.[72] The U.S. Departments of State and Homeland Security are extremely cautious and vigilant in trying to assess fraud and/or the potential for a combatant or enemy to slip through screening. Iraqi transfers slowed way down for nearly a year so that these security officials could add additional screening protocols; cases backlogged due to the extra time required for security clearances.[73]

Previous to this episode, Congress had passed legislation that disallowed the admission of any refugee who had given material support to enemies of the U.S. or its allies in any conflict. This law threatened resettlement of those refugees who had been forced into situations of aiding enemy combatants, and it required several years to work through the complications of circumstances that refugee populations find themselves caught in during extreme large-scale episodes of war and/or violence.

It should be noted that refugees have told me about people they know who applied and were denounced as terrorist by others from their country, which was false. Of course there is no way for me to know what the truth is; nonetheless, the extreme and deadly identity and secular conflicts that people are trying to escape may present impossible barriers and situations: having

[72] http://www.npr.org/2011/06/08/137033910/terrorism-case-exposes-gaps-in-refugee-screening

[73] In March 2011, arrivals from Iraq dipped to 111; they slowly increased to 665 in July, went up to 1,020 in August, but then dipped back down and did not reach 1000 until April 2012 (Barbara Day, personal communication, 2015).

to do terrible things to survive (like preemptive killing so one will not be killed), or revenge-taking through preventing others from escaping (denouncing someone as a terrorist), or even of negatively misinterpreting how something happened in highly dangerous circumstances with extremely heightened fearfulness (such as a phone call to a friend telling them of a safe route, which ended up being unsafe and then the friend is killed—so the phone caller is thought by others to have arranged it),[74] makes it highly likely that some who should be eligible are discarded from the program. Very tragic outcomes are unavoidable and extended through time—and for a very long time—once extreme violence is unleashed.

Preventing infection: Health screenings prior to transfer to the U.S.

The Department of State relies on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to provide medical screening guidance for physicians who are examining U.S.-bound refugees. One purpose of the mandatory exam is to identify individuals who are inadmissible to the U.S. due to health-related conditions. The exam is paid for by the U.S. government, and if a refugee must undergo treatment in order to get ready to travel, that cost is also usually paid by the U.S. government. Screening validity is time-limited, between 3 months to one year depending on the location and the TB classification. Refugees are excludable for admission to the U.S. on medical grounds for the following conditions:

- having a communicable disease of public health significance;
- having a physical or mental disorder and behavior associated with the disorder that may pose, or has posed, a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien or other; or
- having been determined to be a drug abuser or addict.

[74] Refugees and former refugees from various continents have described each of these situations to me.

Waivers for the above exclusions are available at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, or when the problem has been successfully treated. As of January 4, 2010, HIV infection is no longer an excludable condition and it is not screened pre-departure.

Pre-departure presumptive treatments may be given. In FY2013, these included treatments for malaria and parasites in some locations. Refugees are not required to receive vaccinations before departure, but the U.S. administers vaccines in camps or processing areas where an outbreak of disease such as measles has occurred. As of June 1, 2013, the U.S. began routinely administering pre-departure vaccinations in Thailand and Nepal, and planned to expand this practice to Malaysia, Kenya and Ethiopia by the end of 2013.[75]

Preventing dis-ease: Cultural orientation overseas

Refugees go through a cultural orientation (CO) shortly before transfer to the United States. CO usually lasts 1-2 days and covers basic information about apartments, laws, benefits, and what to expect in the days after resettlement. It is never enough, and it is not necessarily believed, because refugees hear different things from friends and relatives already in the U.S. or through rumor. The "rumors" when heard by U.S. resettlement professionals often sound like an exaggerated version of actual planned benefits and processes of resettlement. For example, some refugees believe that the Reception and Placement benefit of $1100 per person will be given to them as cash upon arrival. This is not what occurs: resettlement agencies use these funds to purchase food for the week after arrival when refugees are awaiting establishment of FoodShare benefits (previously called food stamps), rent, furnishings, phone service, utility deposits and set up, and other initial expenses of providing a furnished apartment and supplies upon arrival. They get "walk-around" cash usually amounting to less than $100 for incidentals.

[75] UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, United States Country Chapter, p. 7

Anything left over after the resettlement agencies pay for the initial support of the refugees is given as cash to the refugees toward the end of the 30-90 day reception and placement period.[76] Also, resettlement conditions vary across states because the initial cash benefit programs are keyed off of state-determined TANF levels, and these vary widely across states.

Refugees arrive with much higher expectations for benefits (cash and otherwise) than it turns out they will get. They also arrive with ideas about how they will be treated by resettlement agencies and the government. They arrive with ideas about the government as provider; after all, living in resettlement camps for years before arrival sets up an extended experience (and therefore expectation) of simply waiting for food to arrive to deprived population. The fact of being a deprived refugee in itself is "polluting" in the U.S. setting as the American nation has—since the period of welfare reform in the 1990s and the transitions leading up to this—taken a dim view of senses of entitlement.[77] And refugees may feel very entitled for any or all of three reasons:

- They are being accepted as refugees because of their assistance to the U.S. military during war.
- They are so much poorer than Americans whom they perceive as rich.
- A resettlement agency has agreed to bring them to the U.S.

When things go wrong—and something always does in life—a comment heard from some refugees is, "why did you bring me here?" in response to the demand of the case manager

[76] I have heard of local Volags giving the cash at the airport—whatever is left over from the set-up—but I am unsure of how this actually works in practice as my experience was that additional bills are incurred during the first month for which these funds pay.

[77] Some (but not all) in Wisconsin audiences express relief after seeing the slide that I show during a "Refugee 101" presentation which details how brief the period of refugee cash and medical assistance is (8 months) and the fact that refugees have to repay the cost of their transportation into the U.S. They feel refugees should be treated like anyone else. I must say that this is a new attitude from when I first started working on resettlement in 2003; at that time, audiences were incensed that refugees were forced to repay their travel loans so quickly after arrival. The loans can amount to thousands of dollars.

or Volag director that the refugee should himself or herself figure out how to fix it. The level of marginalization and violence to which refugees have been subjected makes their question and exasperation understandable, but does not change the fact that they have to learn to take care of themselves in the U.S.

And so begins both the training of a neoliberal citizen-to-be.

Preventing pollution: Making families socioculturally acceptable

While people are able to practice their own religions in the U.S., they are not able to practice their own ideas about what constitutes a legitimate family. "Families" are legally determined in the U.S. Polygamy is illegal in the U.S. Those applying for admission as refugees that have more than one wife must choose to whom they will remain married and from whom they will divorce. Somali Bantu families had to do this before coming to the U.S. And Somali Bantus complied with the law, while continuing to support their extended families just as they did in Africa. Some key informants found it interesting that many people in the U.S. in effect also practice polygamy, but serially. Or with girlfriends and families on the side.

CONCLUSION

This chapter overviewed how the world seeks to contain and manage the chaos of large numbers of people fleeing war and extreme violence through governance strategies. It presented a very brief phenomenology of victimization, flight, and recovery of agency and sense of self-definition/self-direction, as well as how this process is governed by outside entities. Those managing refugee situations—whether international governmental organizations, neighboring states, states which agree to take in refugees and grant them a more permanent status, or NGOs which exert a sort of therapeutic governance through funding from governments and/or donors—

aim to stabilize conditions through registration that provides individuals and families a temporary status with papers and also locates them in space. They improve safety, provide for basic needs of food and shelter, and as importantly, maintain boundaries and prevent "pollution" of the societies who are receiving refugees from carrying in with them a dangerous variety of dis-eases.

The dangers posed by refugee populations to receiving communities were briefly detailed:

- Security concerns—will combatants, terrorists, perpetrators, those with terrorist or violence sympathies—come in disguised as refugees?
- Health concerns—will populations expose receiving communities to new diseases?
- Cultural concerns—will populations obey laws of the new country? Will they avoid senses of entitlement that are not socially-supported by receiving communities? Will they go to work and support themselves (those who are coming to the U.S.) so that they do not become burdens to taxpayers? Will they have properly constituted families with one father and one mother, or, (ah, er, well) at least one parent?[78]

An emergent fear in receiving societies regarding refugee arrivals—spreading with ideas about PTSD worldwide—has to do with perceptions of contamination in a war-impacted population of two types:

1. A perceived need to recover or reconstruct or create a new social contract among war-impacted populations that prevents new outbreaks of violence (see Locke, 2009). Refugees themselves perceive this need. The "medicalization" answer to date has been to look for psychosocial interventions that would prevent cycles of revenge or retaliation. As one former refugee put it, "There are things that were very hurtful, but we don't want to bring that hurt over here and continue playing it out here. We left that behind. Here, we have to figure out how to be good neighbors."
2. A perception that refugees bring in with them socio-cultural practices which, if replicated in the receiving country, might produce the same conditions that led to war in the first place, *i.e.*, the pollution is not due to trauma and rage secondary to war, but a socio-political model of how to distribute resources which led to war in the first place. *The socio-political model is the potential pollution.*

[78] Things fall apart a bit here as the ideal nuclear family of 1950s America gives way to all manner of families with unmarried parents, single parents, remarried parents, gay parents, extended families living under one roof after 2008.

But careful analysis of pre-war deterioration of (likely economic) conditions would admit more complexity to our understanding of what actually led to war. Socio-cultural models are structural models; conditions are events. Numerous scholars who were writing about the breakup of Yugoslavia were fixated on political opportunism amongst elites (who invoked nationalistic sentiments, social memories, and fears) as the reason for the outbreak of ethnic cleansing. They gave short shrift to the economic downturn that provided the tinder--the susceptibility--to nationalist fear-mongering. The lack of detailed analysis of the economic processes enables the "pollution" to be located in the socio-political structures. In fact, Yugoslavia lost Tito at the time that economic crisis loomed. He had patterned a new logic for the political and social collectives of Yugoslavia during his long tenure that was not based on ethnicity; and the populations had greatly intermixed. Socio-political patterns were in flux during the economic crisis, enabling political entrepreneurism. In some sense it was a perfect storm.

Therefore, the second pollution-fear may be largely a mis-assignment of blame: there are hints within the 2009 dissertation by Locke about the economic downturns; this is certainly part of what happened in Somalia when the state broke up; I do not know about other places as I have not researched this topic. But scratch a conflict, and underneath often there lies an economic downturn or emergency. This is a topic that deserves better research. The second pollution-fear is at least partly a mystification of larger global economic issues which led to the descent into war.

Lastly, potentially a third fear about refugees derives from their continued involvement with family or other networks in the country of origin which is now engulfed in corruption and terrible governance conditions. Europeans note that the arms-dealers and crime syndicates from Bosnia are the most violent "mafias" operating in Europe. Refugees themselves speak fearfully

that someone amongst them might be "XX" mafia. A typical immigrant trajectory sees the emergence of gangs among youth at some point after arrival. Could this allow an invasive pollutant via diaspora?

On the other side, refugees want governance, too. They seek safety. And they have often verbalized the wish that an outside government had intervened. Getting to the U.S., they have governance and much more safety. What they don't anticipate is the very different form of governmentality and sociality to which they will be subjected; and which the conservative leaders among them may view as polluting. Fear of pollution goes both ways. How will arriving populations view sociocultural pressures that they will face in the desire of the U.S. society to make them into governable (and self-governing) citizens? The underlying fear of arriving populations is a completion of annihilation of their societies and cultures that began when they were construed as instantiations of a category. I will have more to say in coming chapters about boundary maintenance and fears of pollution especially with respect to cultural separation vs. integration in resettlement.

AND FINALLY, GETTING ON THE PLANE, IN DEBT

Refugees come to the U.S. by air; their ticket is bought with a loan from IOM which they must repay beginning 6 months after arrival. Their identity documents and proof of admission on refugee status to the U.S. plus medical records are placed in a white plastic bag with the IOM logo prominently displayed on the outside.

Refugees get through connecting airports and onto different flights by carrying this IOM bag. Airline officials are aware of refugees *en route* and help them to get to the next gate by watching for anyone carrying this white IOM-emblazoned plastic bag. Receiving agencies in the

U.S. identify the refugees by their IOM bag; and it becomes a transitional object which refugees keep afterwards as a memento of their journey. When I have asked for a show of hands of how many refugees in a room still have their IOM bags, ALL of them raise their hands. It is almost attains the status of a sacred object—that transitional object that brings them to a new country where they may, if they observe the laws and customs (and adjust status to permanent legal resident), remain permanently according to U.S. law after one year, and if they are of "good moral character" and pass a civics and English examination, become citizens after five years.

Chapter 3

What we talk about when we talk about resettlement in the U.S.: *A Phenomenology*

"…phenomenological approaches have helped anthropologists to reconfigure what it means to be human, to have a body, to suffer and to heal, and to live among others."

Robert Desjarlais and C. Jason Throop, 2011

Refugees are people who have lost everything: their means of livelihood, their homes and properties, as well as many of the people they knew as family, neighbors, or friends. Their life as they knew it before violent upheaval is gone, including a sociality undergirded by a social contract that established moral and ethical behavior in the societies of which they were a part and included at least a modicum of respect for each other's right to live in safety. They know how to be part of that previous society; they do not know and might not have chosen to be part of American society had they not had to flee for their lives. For some, coming to America is a great opportunity; for others it is the best choice from among a few terrible choices.

This chapter presents ethnographic data about the phenomenology of refugee resettlement in the U.S. It begins with stories of experiences which explain the transfer and arrival processes for refugees who have resettled in the U.S. whom I know. Resettling to the U.S. is of course a very embodied experience, and many refugees are coming in with tremendous angst and equally intense desires and hopes. It is a highly social experience as well: we know that human beings function poorly outside of the Social for any extended period of time (by and large); and even those foreign to one's sociocultural background are better than remaining in isolation.

But rarely do refugees arrive without others from their ethnic backgrounds or country of origin: they arrive in close proximity others also resettling—including those from enemy groups

back home. What they experience and how we may be able to understand what they do about it are introduced in this chapter, and will be explored further in the rest of this dissertation.

Finally, refugees arrive to existing local communities of Americans. The latter use cultural information briefs to make preparations for how to serve a new ethnic population long before the first families enter the U.S.[79] The actual culturally-mediated behavior of the populace arriving soon becomes apparent, however, and there is a whole lot of individual variance in its expression. The exhilaration of arriving and welcoming soon settles down to the inevitable misunderstandings and their workings-through. And many funny things happen along the way. As an actor in and an observer of this process, I think that episodes of cultural misfires are so terribly important—remembering and laughing about them later gets us all through the liminal transition.[80]

TOWARD A DIFFERENT LIFE: GETTING ON THE PLANE, LANDING IN A U.S. CITY OR TOWN

Will the U.S. accept me?

Back in refugee camps, refugee applicants anxiously await postings of who is accepted into the U.S. resettlement program and where they are going. It is a time of exhilaration and despair. If a person's name does not appear as accepted, it means they will not go to the U.S. In the camps, rejection can lead to suicidal ideation and/or attempts. I learned about the experience simply through listening to conversations that occurred, usually spontaneously as refugees working in the resettlement process talked about the circumstances of cases they were handling.

[79] For Somali Bantu, receiving communities made preparations for nearly two years before anyone arrived from overseas from this group. ORR and PRM tap private organizations to prepare this information; the Center for Applied Linguistics prepared many cultural briefs of this nature as a long-time, federally funded technical assistance provider for the refugee resettlement agencies in the U.S.

[80] And at the end of 2015, I can only hope that sharing humor remains possible for us even through this time of terrorist actions and fear-mongering.

Or when refugees gathered informally and started reflecting about their experiences. Or as key informants let me explore with them what I was hearing and observing to help make sense of it.

There are many rejections. Nearly 19.5 million[81] refugees are estimated to be encamped or residing temporarily in cities. Of these, during FFY16, 85,000 will come to the U.S., the highest number in several years. Non-acceptance means that PRM officials or the Department of Homeland Security investigators have found a problem with the application. Refugees are not accepted if there is any evidence of fraud, if there are problems with the identity-determination process, if there is any evidence of providing aid or comfort to an enemy of the U.S., or if there is any evidence of past perpetration.

Camp officials hire or designate refugees in the camp as suicide-prevention coaches to support those who have been rejected for resettlement by the U.S. They try to keep hope alive by getting the refugee to look at other options for third-country resettlement.[82]

Refugees who are contemplating application hear all kinds of rumors and ideas about how to increase the chances of acceptance. During the Liberian resettlement, refugees told us they heard that chances for acceptance were better if the men applied separately from the women and children.[83] I do not know if the calculus was getting a toehold with a part of a family and then

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[81] Again, at the end of 2015 the situation of refugees in the world seems more desperate than ever: the counts are inaccurate as Syrians continue to leave that country and people flee in overfilled boats from North African and countries of the Middle East across the Mediterranean to try to reach Europe. Thousands of migrants have been rescued from the sea by the coast guards of countries ringing the Mediterranean. And many have drowned when overfilled boats capsize or break apart in rough seas. The Syrian civil war is in its fourth year and ISIS emerged in Iraq and Syria beginning in June 2014. ISIS has posted photos of beheadings and mass killings to the internet, and is greatly feared but is also attracting fighters to the region from across the world. By May 2015, armed conflicts in Yemen were destabilizing the country; an internet search found the U.N. warning of imminent collapse of water, health and communications infrastructure there; and Saudi Arabian military started bombing Yemen (with which it shares a border). In fact, it is almost surreal to be writing about refugee resettlement in the U.S. dating from 2003-2013; we are facing a tidal wave of violence and people trying to get out of its way as I finish editing in 2015. Former refugees from Iraq who are now U.S. citizens try to travel back to see family (parents are aging and dying); while gone they email me and other American friends and colleagues to tell us they are ok and when they are in various airports going in and out because we are all so worried about their safety and wish that they would not go. But family responsibilities continue. For those working in the refugee field, it is mind-boggling what is happening.

[82] Key Informant, San Antonio (2009).

[83] Tucson, 2005, field notes

bringing the rest in later, or, if the issue of proof of marriage was the reason. Or something else. In Tucson, a skewed demographic pattern resulted: many women and children, few men. And it was pretty disastrous for families arriving without the father. And it also impacted families who arrived intact as they became immersed in addressing the problems of the extended ethnic community.

Self-interested agents trying to resolve their situation have to make decisions and judgments based on imperfect— often *very* imperfect—information. When it happens in chaotic conditions, there is little chance to test information for its veracity, or figure out the potential unintended consequences. People cannot triangulate data or plan. Decisions are based on rumor. And unintended consequences emerge. Many in the resettlement field bemoan refugee warehousing in camps for years. I do too. But, slowing down the process to allow for careful screening and planning is not an entirely bad idea.[84] A resettled refugee's fingerprints found on bomb-making fragments in Iraq greatly slowed the transfer of Iraqis for over a year while U.S. officials added more layers of screening and background checks.

More transparency about applications in the Liberian situation might have prevented all kinds of difficult social adjustment issues faced by fractured families in the U.S. When, how will the husband/father arrive? What if they never do? How will women—who culturally are dependent on men to bring food and livelihood resources to the family—go it alone? Who may they re-couple with?

A few Liberian women resettled through the program I directed, faced with these choices, resorted to illicit means of support. I learned of their deportation for "bad moral character"

[84] I originally wrote this paragraph in 2014; but as I noted earlier, at the end of 2015, the long process of screening and planning completed by the Department of State for refugees –now at two years for Syrians and others—before admission to the U.S. program has been helpful in counteracting some of the fear and misinformation about how refugees come to the U.S. They go through many background checks and a number of face-to-face interviews.

(prostitution) years later. But anthropologists would recognize structural violence at work here. People do what they must to survive, and this was a tragedy. However—and I do not know the facts—it could also have been better to go back, as Liberia was in recovery and at least the women would know more about how to function in their own culture, and, they might have partners to return to.

Yes. Now decide one last time, get tickets, board the plane, enter a new liminal phase

Refugees get loans from IOM for their plane tickets to the U.S. They are notified of travel and must be there to board the aircraft at the appointed time. Meeting their travel schedule may go a little easier for those residing in the camps; where families are spread out in cities, problems can happen.

For one Liberian family, a daughter was with her grandmother in another city when the notification of the flight assignment came. They could not find her by the time of the flight, and faced the terrible decision of whether to leave without her. The Liberian resettlement of 2004 seemed pretty chaotic. President Charles Taylor was removed from power and Liberians started arriving in the U.S. days later. They were the first people I encountered who talked about the war on the way to their apartment from the airport. The family whose daughter could not be found left without her. And it took two years of work on the part of the family, the local resettlement agency, the national Volag, and PRM to get her rejoined with her family in the U.S.

Most populations have a less chaotic flight to the U.S. In Chapter 2 I described the process of getting people/people getting through connecting airports with the white plastic IOM bag. But getting to the right place is only part of the challenge during this "flight." The other part is the descent into a new liminal phase of refugee status: the process of becoming a citizen who belongs to a new nation. It is a precarious belonging, sometimes for years after the

citizenship ceremony, when people gradually enact their new status. Some choose never to complete this phase and they stay as a permanent resident of the U.S.; or they return to the country they fled after many years.[85] Some are deported if they fail the requirements for citizenship. I do not know the statistics about how many choose which options.

Refugees who have recounted the flight experience often laugh in the retelling. They laugh about the food; they laugh and tell hilarious stories about finding bathrooms in airports and navigating them on planes. As I write this I realize I have only talked with adults about the experience. It would be interesting to hear what people who were kids in flight have to say. Adults, for their part, have never mentioned the management of the kids during this transfer to the U.S.—kids are mentioned only as vaguely present in the narratives I have heard.

Based on the few conversations I've had, I surmise that the boarding of the plane is experienced quite differently between encamped refugees and refugees who were living in cities. Camp life puts lives on hold. There is little work (as in "jobs"). But they make friends there, residing among others who are also living in the same circumstances, and with a lot of time on their hands. It is hard to leave them,[86] but no one wants to spend their lives in a refugee camp. In cities, while there may also be restrictions on work, there are interactions with other city residents. With an interactive (urban) social life, choices about how to spend time are greater. There are more choices, it seems, period. People can acquire symbols of progress and incremental freedoms, like cars or houses to rent.

People coming to the U.S. from cities in countries neighboring their homeland narrate a struggle with the decision. Should they really leave their region and "peoples" behind? They know their neighbor populations. They may not know much at all about the receiving population

[85] The literature on returning after being resettled in another country reveals this to be a very mixed experience. Refugees and former refugees who do it find difficulties with belonging upon return, as well. See Ghanem (2003); Zarowsky (2004).
[86] Murray and Zautra (2012).

of Americans. They have heard, they have fears, they've watched movies and TV shows, and they have an impression. Some begin boundary maintenance in advance through the religious beliefs they have grown up with. But they are also interested in possibilities of the new life, because their recent past has been horrific.

Extended families living in cities and not in camps may choose to split up, a wrenching, *wrenching* experience. A refugee from the former Yugoslavia who had fled into Germany was so thrilled to open the door of her tiny apartment one day to see her parents standing there. She had not known what had happened to them. They had risked arrest by coming to see her from another city where they were registered as refugees (movement of refugees between cities was controlled in Germany—it was not allowed). She introduced them to their first grandchild born during flight into Germany.[87] Over time, they decided to apply together for the U.S. resettlement program. All were accepted. And they were scheduled to come to Tucson, Arizona in February.

On Christmas day, this refugee's parents called her from the airport in Berlin. They told her, if you want to see us, we will be in the airport for another three hours. We are going back to Bosnia. She explained, years later, that her parents were going back to claim their pensions. Decisions about resettlement are different depending on age: the resettlement process for older refugees is the most difficult, because they really do not have a chance to build much of a new life in a new country.[88] Pensions in the old country will (they hope) carry them through old age; they don't have to make a complete cultural and linguistic adjustment. They may calculate that

[87] Labor and deliveries do not wait. Water broke on the train, she was transferred to a hospital at the next train stop, and her husband arrested and jailed because he did not have identity or visa papers. I do not know what papers the newborn was given to establish identity. I do not know how the husband and wife were reunited. The right to life of a human being anywhere somehow leaks out and a way is found to resolve this problem. Liminal states are creative states; fraught with danger and stress, but creative nonetheless.

[88] ORR funds programs for older refugees partly for this reason. The program is designed to help elders achieve citizenship, which requires completing a civics interview in English, or, getting a medical waiver to be able to do the interview in their native language—or not at all if they are unable to master the information about American history and government. It also provides opportunities for socialization beyond one's immediate family.

they can't manage the change: the fear of persecution is not as great as the fear of wrenching identity and social status change.

In fact, their decision made practical sense, but it did not make sense to the daughter emotionally. The parents exercised a considered agency, a choice, and reclaimed control their narrative (they are not just a prop in someone else's narrative, as they were during war). For the daughter, it was abandonment in a culture where extended family matters a great deal throughout one's life.

The daughter's calculations led to a different, painful, answer: to continue flight.

Two months later, she corralled her family (now with two young children) to get to the airport, and there as it came time to go through security checks, she and her husband argued about going through with the "flight." She turned around and faced him with the formidable planted-feet wonder-woman stance that a deeply terrified wife does to a husband on occasions of extreme stress and said, "Stay here if you want, but I am going," and she turned and walked down to the gateway without looking back, entered the plane and found her seat. In a little while, husband comes down the aisle with the two kids, and they settle in without talking for a long time.

Perhaps he understood something that she didn't. Refugee women do what they do as mothers and wives wherever they are—they sacrifice themselves for the family. They do not lose that gender-role training, and it precludes, often, the processing of emotional pain for many years. They are just too busy. When the kids leave home in the U.S. for their adult life, it is a disturbing period for refugee women. They finally have to face what has happened to them in becoming new Americans because they are not spending time tending and raising the kids. This is a developmental phase specific to the refugee experience but also shared by many women in

the receiving community: Americans call it the empty-nest syndrome. For refugee men, the shame of the refugee liminal phase—even if they become citizens in a new land—may last a lifetime, and can be a continuous presence, even daily, because the loss of status in the U.S. They were raised to be adult men in their country of origin. How to be an adult man in the U.S. is a long-term learning. It can be littered with failures that intensify shame.

I know this because when I have talked about the different experience of resettlement between men and women and I mention the shame of refugee men in third-country resettlement, the men in the workshops—who are and have been working in the resettlement and integration business for years—nod. It is not a slight, barely-escaped reaction. They nod vigorously. I suspect it is likely the first verbal acknowledgment they may have heard about their silently-borne pain. A speaker/trainer knows when the spaces between the audience and herself are fused in intense focus on the sound of the narration. Through this somatic mode of attention I can sense when I am touching the blanked-out areas of pain in a group.

For me, participant/observation is fully fused at such moments where I am leading and listening at exactly the same time. It is as if it is the group breathing. We inhale and exhale together, without conscious attempt to do so. This is a somatic mode of group attention. One experiences the collective social body in these periods of flow. The nods I see are preceded by a quieting of movement in the bodies of the people in the room as they get fully engaged in the unfolding of the narrative. I feel it, and am aware that my narration slows so that the experience of storying can fully emerge. Narration works through details that evoke emotional experience and memory. People pour their individual histories into the story they are hearing. The vigorous nods are communicative, social, and not really voluntary. They are like the unconscious tensing of muscles that people's bodies do when watching a chase scene together.

I know from fused-space experiences at conferences and workshops that being male and refugee is fraught with shame, and borne quietly.[89] Those who successfully make a go of it and establish businesses, professions, or other occupational markers of achievement, or who manage to find strong spiritual meaning in their flight and resettlement, are able to leave that period of shame behind, or find that through it, they have developed into much more than they thought they could be. Those who don't may suicide years later or disappear into the fog of alcohol and internet surfing.

Arriving in the U.S., boarding the last-leg-of-the-journey aircraft, and landing in the destination city

The flight from Berlin to Chicago is long and everyone is exhausted. They do eat the food offered by the stewardesses. They wonder and wonder and wonder while kids sleep. Many others from their country are also on the plane, and when they disembark in Chicago, someone is waiting to help them through the customs process. After finishing, another person checks itineraries for final destination. Most stay in Chicago. This family is shuttled into gate for the next aircraft destined for Tucson.

They board a plane that has seen better days. It is small, creaky, seats very narrow, upholstery due for refurbishing, a few overhead bins look broken. The couple looks at each other. She wonders if she should have stayed in Berlin. He looks hard and knowingly (as she tells it). But there is no going back now.

[89] Another set of observations supports this conclusion. A former-refugee case manager reported that women talked about their husbands withdrawing and not talking to them after arrival. The women reported feeling abandoned and not knowing what is going on. The strain on marriages was quite high; and women struggled to reconnect with their husbands. I heard many professionals working in the refugee field scoffing at ORR funding of refugee marriage education—as insulting to refugees, based on American models of marriage, *et al*. But, like Liberians repurposing Western psychosocial recovery and therapeutic governance models for their own purposes (see also Abramowitz, 2010), so too this happened with refugee marriage education programs. Refugee couples learned new, strange methods for communication, and they learned how to adapt these into a process of negotiation of their new gender roles and responsibilities, and yes, sociality. Anger and disappointment between them gradually could shift into meeting the challenges of resettlement as team: us against the problems of resettlement and integration (Bellinger, 2013).

In Tucson, almost every refugee arrives at night if they are coming in from Europe, the Middle East, or Africa.[90] They've been mainly awake for 24 hours or more, eating foods not terribly familiar and heated in cockpit-proximate microwaves. Tucson does sparkle prettily at night as you fly into the airport. It spreads across a valley surrounded by four mountain ranges. The heat is not bad in February; it is winter monsoon, cool, and the desert smells of creosote.

The couple de-planes with their kids and is met at the airport by a person from their country. A relief! They can communicate. The case manager drives them long miles to their apartment. They go in; it has one bedroom with a fold-out couch in the living room. There is no food in the house. The overhead cupboards separating the kitchen from the dining area wait for adult heads to bump their corners in the low light of midnight. Cockroaches scatter as the lights go on.

Husband asks how they can get some food. Case manager replies, "If you have money, you can get some food." Husband has some cash; where is the food market? Case manager indicates it is two miles away, and he can go tomorrow. Husband begs for a ride to the market, and she relents. He goes out for the food with her, it is nearly 1 A.M. The next day, another person from their country comes to see them; she works for a local nonprofit. The wife asks about the cockroaches, and is told, "They'll be your pets." A joke, but read through the impaired sociality between former Yugoslavians, it hurts this refugee woman deeply. There is not a friend anywhere, and no one to help her get rid of the cockroaches.

Fifteen years later and after working in the resettlement field herself, this former refugee still cannot forgive the reception. She still talks about it with the tone of disgust and indignation that she must have felt in those first days. She learned later that she was the second family to be

[90] I do not know about Asia as I left the Volag to move to ECBO mentoring before the Burmese and Bhutanese began arriving.

resettled by the newly-opened local office. They had two workers, and the operations were not quite in place.

That is really no excuse. What happens in the beginning is remembered forever.

Refugees—especially free-case refugees[91]—are subject to the luck of the draw. For a refugee, the decisions made 'round the table in D.C. on a weekly basis gain materiality at the airport and even more so when they arrive at their newly-rented apartment. Some agencies are known throughout their national network for the quality of their apartment set-ups, others for good employment and ESL services, still others for doing a good job with advocacy on behalf of refugee families. PRM monitors local sites and the requirements for reception and placement change and improve over time. Refugees, for their part, shop around for services at the best place after arrival for this need, and that. They are scrappy survivors, most of them.

When I started working in resettlement in 2003 (five years after the story narrated above), there was a list of food items that needed to be in the apartment on arrival—staples, drinks, meat, vegetables, fruit, bread or rolls.[92] We always included peanut butter, and refugees thought this food was very peculiar. Hmong refugees recall with great distaste the amount of cheese and dairy in their Wisconsin apartments—they don't eat dairy, and it disgusted them but they did not feel comfortable saying anything. Their volunteers brought round after round of cheese as welcoming-neighbor gestures. Another refugee told of being taken to a volunteer's house for a meal the day after arrival, and she took the first bite and had to suppress her involuntary revulsion. She wanted to spit it out. The food was very cold. A luncheon, it was likely quite a nice plate of food but absolutely unfamiliar to her mouth to eat chilled food.

[91] Refugees with no U.S. ties.

[92] Factory-made bread from U.S. grocery stores is usually a bit of a disappointment to people who are used to baking or frying their own, or getting it from a small local baker.

Ten years later, a case manager is now required to have a hot meal cooked at the apartment and ready to eat when the family arrives there.[93] The agencies work on executing arrival preparations and airport pickup in a team. A food list is tailored to the food preferences of the arriving family. There are required lists for each ethnicity; a week's worth of food staples must be in the apartment when the family arrives.

Most refugees arrived with, at maximum, a small suitcase. With some we did not have to stop at the baggage claim—there was nothing to retrieve. Meskhetian Turks coming from Russia arrived with so much luggage that we took to bringing several vans to pick up a family of six. What *was* in all that luggage? We soon learned it was pots and pans, cooking utensils, and other kitchen paraphernalia. Their cuisine was a source of immense pride, and they would NOT be without the means to cook like that here. With many specialized items for steaming and braising different kinds of foods, huge pots for communal dinners, they would be prepared to eat their way. They had a lot of clothing from home as well. And stuff for "gifting" American officials.[94]

Meskhetian Turks did not reside in camps before arrival. They brought "home" with them, partying and splashing in their apartment-complex pool until the wee hours and landing themselves in trouble with apartment management for violating pool curfew. I found it terribly funny, but our housing coordinator still had to talk to them so they would not get evicted. It stopped for a few days. Though there were many problems of adjustment as with any refugee

[93] A nice gesture, but as I mentioned, the family may appreciate but may not feel like sitting down to eat the hot meal they are very tired from a very long flight, and, many feel ill on arrival. They often just want to go to sleep.

[94] Agencies have strict rules about not accepting even food or a can of coke from refugees, as it takes on the frame of a bribe for some—if not the person offering, for those who are watching. And everyone is watching intently to learn the ways of influence in the U.S. However, refusing what is offered as a welcoming refreshment (bottled water, juice, tea, or soft drink) when entering a refugee home is also shaming to the host. This is a delicate negotiation, to say the least. Eventually, when people settle in and there have been a series of back-and-forth hosting experiences (refugee comes to one's office, is offered coffee or tea; staff person goes to the home, is offered a non-alcoholic beverage from whatever is in the refrigerator or on the stove), the exchange gives way to displays of social acknowledgment and reciprocity. Although some professionals would disagree, I see this as an important developmental step toward refusal of the one-down relationship in a survivor-helper dyad. It is an indicator of a step toward integration, actually.

group, in general they were a pretty joyous and flexible bunch. They quickly learned the advantages of allowing wives to work—it is financial risk management until the family gets into stable occupational niches. They knew how to stand up for themselves. They had amazing wedding celebrations, as do most refugee communities resettling to the U.S. Their familiar cultural sociality leaked out of the new-and-closing-in boundaries of life in America, where the receiving community expects arrivals to become self-sufficient, responsible neoliberal citizens within five years. Weddings enact culture, and re-ground people in spaces and activities where they can still be their best-remembered selves.

Of cockroaches and donations

I had the experience of getting called by the case manager about cockroaches appearing in an apartment we had just furnished for a newly arrived Meskhetian Turk family. I drove there, walked in and was hailed by the wife, who expressed her utter dismay by exaggeratingly shivering with disgust and pointing at a cockroach crawling up the wall. The apartment manager was also there and blamed the couch that had been placed in the apartment by my agency. It was a couch donated a couple of weeks before. The apartment manager said "the cockroaches *poured* out."

I could believe this, actually. Resettlement agencies depended at that time (and probably still do) on donations for some furnishings because the reception and placement allowance was so low.[95] And we got many very nice donations of much higher quality than what one would get if we used budget to buy cheap new couches and chairs. But we also got some that were not, and

[95] When I was resettling refugees between 2003 and 2006, the allowance to the agency for rent, furnishings, utilities, first week's food, clothing, bus passes, and incidentals was $400 per person. Now it is $1100. $900 of this amount must be spent on the family itself with $200 allowed to go into a flexible fund to enable the agency to cover expenses for refugees in difficult circumstances. It was the first such inflation adjustment since the beginning of the program. Agencies always had to add in. Now, most families have some cash outlay to them at the end of the R & P period.

sometimes *why* they were not did not evidence until the furniture was in the apartment. It is an interesting phenomenon, this grass-roots philanthropy: people donate stuff they don't want. Why they don't want them varies greatly, and some of the donors wanted to be thanked profusely for items I would schlep to the trash bin behind our agency because they were not fit to be put in apartments.

Other items needed work—sanding rough edges, fixing handles, but we did not have the capacity to do this work. I hauled them to Goodwill.[96] One man donated a dresser as long as we would also haul away a badly stained mattress, neglecting to tell us of that aspect of his offer until we were already there with an arranged vehicle to pick the item up. Thankfully it fit into the agency dumpster, or we would have paid the landfill fee to get rid of it. Another called and called to have us pick up an "expensive" TV that he had just replaced while remodeling his den. Does it work? we asked. Of course! I got it (very heavy!) from a house two blocks away from where I lived, schlepped it out to my car with no assistance offered from the donor, and put it in a new apartment we were setting up the next day. It did not work and fixing it would cost more than a new TV.

The family hauled it to the dumpster at their complex and waited a long time for another TV to be donated. To this day I am irritated by chirpy internet sites talking about how to get rid of unwanted stuff by calling up social service agencies which are "glad to take it all away for you, for free!" And you get a tax-donation credit for their trouble.

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[96] Some readers will think, wouldn't it be great for a resettlement agency to set up a workshop where refugees could be paid to fix these items. Such ideas seem great, but they take enormous time to get underway, space to rent, tools and supplies to buy, transport from workshop to storage, track to make sure that items are not being stolen or "misplaced." Tracking the donation and keeping the records for audits. Truly, many things could be done with a lot of labor. But in the crisis-chaos of resettlement, with far more to do than can be actually accomplished, schlepping the stuff to Goodwill or the trash bin was mostly the best solution. Honestly, though, I resented it. People's ideas of charity involve a lot of self-interest—get someone to come and remove your trashed items, and feel so good that you are helping those poor refugees. The refugees don't want it, either.

Here is the game: if resettlement staffers balk at the pickup because things are not as described, the would-be donor calls an agency board member to complain about poor treatment. Agencies want cash donors; the cost of getting them is borne by their resettlement program staff. Never turn away anything from a potential cash donor. Smile and thank them. Profusely.

Back at the apartment with cockroaches racing out of the couch, the manager had her maintenance guy come to spray the sinks and places where cockroaches might enter an apartment. The maintenance guy said that the cockroaches come in through the sink drains in the winter, and he sprayed the drain mightily. We looked in cupboards but did not see anything. Several other refugee men living in the complex who were watching the "situation" helped carry the couch out, that night, to the dumpster. I calmly walked around and quashed cockroaches escaping across the ceiling. I suspect the family camped out with another family in their complex that night. We got another couch in the next day; we paid $200 for fumigation before it arrived and while the family was at the agency completing paperwork and getting enrolled in benefits programs. We took them back to another family's apartment to await the time elapse needed to avoid getting fumigated, themselves. The problem did not recur.

I think it was the donated couch. Other apartments in the complex did not have the problem. We fumigated our storage unit for good measure.

We always furnished incoming refugee apartments with a mix of new and used items. We always purchased mattresses new, but they were cheap. I often spent weekends perusing yard sales in Tucson foothills' neighborhoods, looking for high quality furnishings at garage sale prices. There, you could assess what situation they had been housed in. Settling refugees from the airport into cockroach apartments did not happen again on my watch; other issues did and we

sometimes had to swoop in and re-settle the family into a hotel room for the night.[97] By then, I'd heard the arrival tale of my key informant.

Most arrival stories are much better. I always tried to bring flowers from a grocery store I passed on my way to an airport arrival. I could get something for $3 or so, wrapped in colorful tissue paper, flowers plus greens. Fresh flowers seem to be universally understood as an acknowledgement of the person, of their humanity: flowers touch the species' basic appreciation of beauty. Man or woman, it makes no difference. I am a student of ritual: the management of openings, closings, hellos, goodbyes, transitions--handled ritually--both honors and contains the emotion and meaning of the transition.

But I did not know how refugees saw it: they are usually very busy arriving in a new place, attention going every which way…until, one young man—a 22 year old Liberian who had arrived by himself—taught me that it actually mattered. He was coming to a case conference meeting because he had been fired from his first job and was not succeeding in getting another. Our office handled problems by getting the team together with the refugee to figure out what was happening and to make a plan to correct it. I started the meeting and noted that I had met him

[97] Problems with new apartments and newly purchased homes upon taking possession happen, as every renter and new-home buyer knows. No policy can prevent this; so any reader deciding that my cockroach narrative should result in more stringent guidelines by PRM ought to think twice. The vast majority of used items work well for Americans and for refugees. Some do not. Mattresses don't. Stainless steel pans are great. Gently used couches, tables, mirrors, chairs, lamps, *et al* are wonderful and much more stylish and well-built than what might be purchased new on a reception-and-placement budget. Some non-profits, like the Welcome to America Project in Phoenix, do a wonderful job of collecting and screening donated items for refugees. They help resettlement agencies enormously with making an apartment into a welcoming home, and as volunteers themselves, they are positioned to police volunteered donations, thereby avoiding the agency woes with inappropriate donations. Several refugee-receiving cities have this type of organization organized by volunteers. I'm getting convinced that every city should have one.

On the other hand, refugee food storage practices can invite cockroaches to multiply. One apartment complex where numerous refugees from different parts of the world resided became quite infested over time. We worked with the complex manager to plan a complete fumigation day. Our case managers went to explain the process to residents, and emphasized the precautions needed so that the family would not be affected by the insecticide. Fumigation day arrived, and I went to the complex around mid-day to see how it was going. Refugees had brought all their furniture out of the apartments and into the commons areas so as not to have the insecticide land on the couches or mattresses. It seems we had oriented them very well to avoidance of poison; the cockroaches residing in couches and furniture were spared as well. Eventually, they were all "evicted": the apartment complex started to not renew leases and turned the complex into housing for students.

before but I did not know whether he remembered me. (It had been three months). He said, "I remember you. You brought me flowers at the airport."

Don't forget this story: It is about the importance of acknowledgment of a human need for respect and love and understanding of the tragedies we all survive. For refugees, they are so horrific—they need this acknowledgment marked ritually, clearly. Bad experiences happen during resettlement—disappointments, shame episodes, mistakes, loss of income, getting stopped by police, losing a job, getting evicted from an apartment, being arrested for domestic violence, being visited by child welfare for leaving children unattended or leaving marks on them while disciplining them according to one's culturally-accepted practices. But if it starts well, and people are actually welcomed and can feel it through some ritual gesture or respectful experience, they can go back to that moment and remember it to get themselves through the current episode that is not going so well.[98] Refugees remember transitions. They remember arrivals. Human beings remember these moments of intensity marking shifts in experience at a point in time. Done well, they are sustaining. Done poorly, they are bitterly remembered.

Fortunately, corrective experiences can also happen. The couple who nearly split at the airport in Berlin had a visit the next day after arrival from the director of a different resettlement agency who helped the husband get food and toys for the kids. He also handed them a list of volunteers and suggested they call someone. The husband took the list of volunteers, picked a name off the list and called. A man answered. Husband said, "Hallo. I am [gives name]. I need friend." Fortuitously, the American volunteer spoke Serbo-Croatian. He answered in Serbo-Croatian, and relief through a pleasant sociality was on its way. Fifteen years later, they are still friends, and the volunteer recounts movingly how they met with that call from a newly-arrived

[98] As long as repair is also occurring in the present. If constant disrespect or unfair application of laws or discrimination occurs without the agency or receiving community standing beside the refugee, a mood of irritation and anger and regret-for-coming may set in.

refugee, asking for a friend. The refugee family now helps the volunteer couple, who have become frail elderly.

There are two times recognized as periods of suicidal risk amongst refugees: after arrival if there is not enough social support to help get through the initial transition period; and after two years, if adjustment has not gone well, the fight to avoid homelessness is overwhelming, or it is becoming apparent that what they expected to happen is not happening—they are still far away from what they thought they would have achieved by now. A third has recently been recognized in Arizona: men of a certain ethnicity in their fifties, here 15 years or more, whose silently-borne loneliness and lack of access to bars where they can drink and sing their sorrows in the familiar sociality of pre-war times finally weighs too heavily. Seven of them, in two years.

That is an epidemic. And it parallels what is happening back in the land of their birth.

On missed flights and getting refugees to a new home

Airport arrivals are transition points; many things can go awry. Refugees miss connecting flights from Phoenix to Tucson (usually the last flight of the night) because they have to switch terminals, and at night there are few people around to help. If an airline official gets distracted, if the refugee visits the restroom, all manner of small things can go wrong. And airlines usually will not release information to the case managers because of confidentiality and safety protocols. So the case manager may or may not be able to determine whether the refugee was on the flight.

Somehow, amazingly, they get to us despite missed connections. It is the invisible hand of the Social. One refugee was seen wandering around the Phoenix airport by a man who happened to be on his flight from the East coast. That man gestured to see his ticket, the refugee complied, and the man realized that the refugee should have gone on to Tucson. As there were no airport officials to help, the man paid for the shuttle to take the refugee to Tucson—the same

one he was taking. He put the refugee up in his home for the night. And he called me the next morning. He happened to be the head of another social service agency in Tucson, and knew our agency. He brought the refugee to us, and the apartment-orientation process began.

Refugees get pulled from flights if illness sets in during the flight. A refugee coming in from Asia to Wisconsin was taken off a flight in LA and hospitalized/quarantined for measles that broke out during flight. The CDC was notified, the resettlement agency was notified, the local public health department was notified, the refugee eventually got to Milwaukee, and the Volag, ORR, and Medicaid officials in the two states took several months to figure out who would have to pay the bill. Meanwhile the refugee could only trust that it would work out. This is an amazing thing, really, for people who have lost trust. At a certain point, they are forced to relax and be led, to trust the governance system, and to hope it will work out.

It did. Government bureaucrats know that a 10-day hospital stay will not break the budget of a huge program, but only if they fight for every dime and avoid setting new precedents that turn a drip into a leak. Leaks lead to budget deficits, and budget deficits add up to severe corrective policy actions to get macro-level indicators moving in a more desired direction. But it is individuals who are impacted by these corrective actions, in the end, as we are seeing in an era of austerity policies in Europe and to a lesser (but still significant) extent in the U.S. I've learned that there is a reason for bureaucratic wrangling, after all.

The next day, the first week, the first month, the first job, the first layoff, the first, the first, the first….the reality of extended liminality of America as life sets in

On the day after arrival, the Volag case manager goes to the apartment to retrieve the family, and drives them to agency offices to begin the resettlement process. The refugees bring their IOM bags containing documents of status, medical records, and other official records

governing passage to and reception in the U.S. This is the first step of proving who you are and that you have a government-sanctioned right to be here, with eligibility for safety-net programs to which citizens are entitled. It is a step repeated *ad nausea* everywhere one goes as a refugee and former refugee in a third country of resettlement. You have to prove your identity every step of the way. You have to have your identification with you everywhere. And woe ensues if you leave your documents accidentally on the bus or subway. There is no embassy for you to go to for help.[99] I find the procedures around documentation and licensing to be a boring irritation for which I have little patience. For refugees, it is access to life. Refugees experience significant (mostly unspoken) trauma around identity documents—I-94s, green cards, citizenship papers, passports. They are proof of the rights to be here, the right to life, the right to help. Illegal "aliens" in the U.S.—we know from refugee experiences—are constant subjects of this type of trauma: it is the phenomenology of a refugee or immigrant's politicized body.

Refugees and former refugees who are working in the resettlement agencies or ECBOs tend this issue with tremendous care when a refugee has a document problem. For them, it is almost a sacred ritual aimed at relieving existential trauma and fear. I became fascinated watching the way that workers' hands handled the official documentation. Like the measured movements of a priest consecrating bread and wine at a communion altar, carefully placing the body and the blood in sterling and gold plates and chalices, documents get stamped, signed,

[99] In September 2015 USCIS changed the I-94 document delivery system (I-94 documents certify that the refugee entered the U.S. legally, on refugee status. I-94s are now released to the refugee and Volag online once the refugee passes inspection by a Customs and Border Patrol agent at the U.S. [air]ports of entry, rather than having a paper document stamped by the CBP agent at the port of entry. However, the agent does stamp and date refugee travel documents, and some benefits agencies will only accept now BOTH the I-94 and the stamped travel document as proof of eligibility for benefits. Always, a complication. Identity documents remain very important: one can print a new I-94 document, but not ever replace the stamped travel document if it is lost.

witnessed, notaried, recorded, certified, mailed; the refugees nodded to reassuringly when the deed is complete. "And now we wait."[100]

At agency offices on the day after arrival, refugees complete applications for benefits that will sustain them in the coming months. Currently, refugees are federally-eligible for food stamps according to their level of income. In addition, they may receive refugee cash and medical assistance (RCA and RMA, respectively), through eight months after the date of arrival or until they lose eligibility for RCA due to income from employment. RMA eligibility runs the full 8 months, but with the implementation of the Affordable Healthcare Act on January 1, 2014, refugees in states with expanded Medicaid become eligible for medical insurance immediately upon arrival, and RMA is less used now since Medicaid must be accessed first if someone is eligible.

RCA benefits in state-run programs are keyed to the state's TANF payment levels. The level of cash benefits varies tremendously by state. In Arizona, a single individual could get $210 per month when I was directly managing a local resettlement agency. A family of two, $275 per month, and it scaled up accordingly with each additional family member. In Wisconsin, people get $653—if they are deemed employable—regardless of family size. This works pretty well for singles. For families of six, it is not enough to pay rent for very long after the R & P period ends at 90 days. Families with children get the cash benefit through TANF; adults without children under 18 are put onto RCA.

Agencies help refugees strategize their safety-net eligibility period based on the state in which they are operating. States like Arizona with low TANF rates have high allocations of "Matching Grant" slots. Match Grant (MG) is an early employment program funded by the U.S.

[100] Field notes, Tucson (2008)

Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) which provides the following benefits: $200 in cash per adult, $50 per child, per month, for up to 180 days after arrival. Generally, though, the benefit is given in months 2-4 after arrival. Refugees are expected to enter employment by that time. In addition to cash, apartment rent is paid for months 2-4; as are utilities, job tools and clothing, and bus passes.

Refugees have 30 days to choose Matching Grant program over other cash assistance programs. In Tucson, the program was keyed to any employable refugees for as long as we had slots; those who had medical issues were helped to apply for SSI/SSDI. It was not sustainable for a family to go onto RCA or TANF because the benefit level would not even cover half of rent. In Wisconsin, by contrast, many refugees go onto RCA/TANF. The benefit level ($653/month) is high enough to (barely) make rent and families can survive as long as assistance with utilities and food can be garnered from other places. Singles, doubling up in an apartment, can do very well. Matching Grant is a viable option in Wisconsin for families with several children. For example, the benefit level of a single mother with three children is $400 a month, but rent and utilities are paid. With food stamps, the option is very workable. Matching Grant can enable families to build a small amount of savings. RCA/TANF does not, neither in Wisconsin nor in Arizona.

After the excursion to the TANF or Department of Economic Security offices, the family goes back to their new apartment, but demands on time begin quickly. Within ten days, kids must be enrolled in school. Within a month (but not more than three), all family members should go to health screening, especially testing for TB and other communicable diseases. Refugees may refuse screening, but they don't in practice. The case manager completes a "resettlement plan" with the refugee. Enroll kids in school, address employment barriers, find

employment, enroll in ESL, et al. Names and ages in the household are dutifully recorded and each is addressed in the plan.

Within 30 days, refugees should know how to ride the bus and should be doing it. They should be enrolled in ESL if they are not fluent in English on arrival (most aren't, though they may speak some English). They must receive a complete orientation to a list of topics: the necessity of employment; the differences in child rearing and marital relations here (no beatings, and supervision of kids at all times). The need to pay back their IOM loan beginning six months after arrival. How to do it. The transportation system. The job development process. The school requirements. And on. At the resettlement agency I led, the task took nearly four hours, and everyone was exhausted but the requirement could be checked off on the report back to PRM.

Refugees ever afterward complain about the marathon orientation. How could they possibly absorb all that in one sitting? It is overwhelming. Answer: they can't. But it has to be covered for liability's sake. Case managers and volunteers have to re-orient several times on each subject before it is minimally graspable. You gotta start somewhere. Orientations are maps to the territory; they are not the territory.[101]

Refugees also complain that they need time to learn English. This assertion makes sense, doesn't it? But I learned to disagree with it, because ESL programs take up a small part of the day. Many refugees have been sitting around in refugee camps for years with a very leisurely pace, though with a lot of deprivation. Overcoming inertia by having to get out and do something—lots of somethings—helps them to accommodate to the faster pace of life where business is conducted daily. A Somali Bantu refugee leader that I know agrees with my position

[101] PRM now requires more extensive cultural orientations that may last through the 90-day R & P period.

after seeing a family who had moved out of state to be able to learn English for two years before going to work…not making much progress in English, and not making progress in economic stabilization.

My response has been, as a state refugee coordinator, to ask that local Volags in Milwaukee (which has sufficient arrivals to have classes starting frequently) provide combined intensive oral ESL and cultural orientation classes that refugees must attend daily for a couple of hours for 8 weeks, beginning within 10 days after arrival. Get people on their feet and active in getting places on a daily basis: these expectations prepare people to go to work, to get to work on time, and to do it every day. Refugees want to rest after they arrive. But in America, there are only brief rests: 10 days are enough. Then start the demands for daily engagement in the businesses at hand: get an understanding of one's surroundings, and get a strong start in conversing in English. It gets people energized. If they "fire" (meaning, get engaged enough), I am convinced this helps them avoid lapsing into depression and self-medication.

Month two: preparing for job entry is serious business. Refugees may be sanctioned off of benefits for refusing a job offer; for refusing to or avoiding participation in employment and training activities; for non-attendance at required interviews and orientation sessions. They meet with the agency job developer, and—if on TANF—the TANF agency case manager to develop an employment plan.

Plans require assessments. Refugee adults are assessed for marketable skills from previous job experience. "Have you ever worked in a *found*-a-ry?" was my favorite barked-out question by a Tucson job developer. No foundries in Tucson that I knew of, but I suppose the question got at some sort of transferable skill. In Tucson, before the crash of 2008, everyone went to work in the foothills hotels that ring the city: dishwasher, steward, housekeeping,

groundskeeping, silver-polishers. An occasional car wash job or work at a yo-yo factory. Tucson was a good resettlement site because of plentiful hotel jobs and low cost of living. After the crash, though, it was pretty bad for a while because tourists quit vacationing and companies conferenced at hotels in their own cities through the economic uncertainty.

Mass application fill-out sessions followed. Mock interviews. Resumes written for refugees. Hygiene coaching, including how to use deodorant, floss teeth, wash clothes frequently, clean fingernails. Imagine those conversations, especially if someone is violating American expectations that no one should be able to smell you unless you are wearing an expensive cologne. Volunteers take refugees coming in from rural areas to stores for underwear purchases. Refugees cling to volunteers as they step onto the moving stairs of escalators for the first time. Case managers take men and women to thrift stores and charitable "working woman" clothing banks to find suitable interview outfits.

Then, the interview. Job developers accompany refugees, refugees look at the interviewers' faces as coached in advance by staff—if they were to show respect in their own way (never look directly at anyone), they would not be hired. And most get hired; the job developers got very good at figuring out who would hire refugees and what to say to get them hired.

Then, starting the job. Then keeping the job. This has become trickier since I was directing a resettlement program in Tucson. A sea change of how people get hired has occurred since 2008, though there were earlier signs. Temp and staffing agencies now seem to gatekeep the entry to employment, thereby assuming the risk and helping the companies who use them avoid vulnerability to hiring mistakes. Getting onto a permanent job can be much harder now.

What is missing? Job upgrades, getting an occupational identity or industry expertise. Refugees are expected to accomplish this themselves. I do not know of research on this issue; what we do know from a study in Maine is that refugees who make friends with Americans early in their arrival fare better.[102] I worried about the job upgrade issue, but could never get to doing anything about it as a resettlement director—the refugees keep coming, keep changing ethnicities and languages. The community colleges are there for refugees to go to for ESL and then training. But for how many this happens is mostly a mystery to me. Some do it—the ones I have known (Somali Bantus) are young adult men with the support of their fathers or other older adults (but not seniors).

And this is how it starts for refugees in the U.S.

PREPARATIONS AND FIRST ENCOUNTERS

For local receiving communities, preparation for resettlement of an ethnic group also usually begins long before arrival. I have been through two of these directly (Somali Bantu who began arriving in 2003, and Congolese scheduled for 2014) and have heard a lot about another (the Lost Boys of Sudan who came in starting in 1999). I am uncertain about how extensive preparations have been for other recent communities (Burmese, Bhutanese, Iraqis); for Liberians, there were no preparations whatsoever, they just suddenly started coming.

The Lost Boys of Sudan…I was told, were resettled to a few cities across the U.S. All of the Volags in a city had to agree to resettle them in order to become a reception city; many were under 18 and still needed to go to high school. Their story preceded them, and it was truly heart-tugging. Boys whose parents were killed or otherwise separated from them in the intense Sudanese civil war found each other and, banding together, walked out of the country to safety in

[102] Mamgain and Collins (2003).

neighboring East African countries. They had to lead themselves. They lost many in the trek to wild animal attacks. One of the case managers had a picture hanging in her office of the Lost Boys running excitedly into the refugee camp at Kakuma. Eight year olds, ten year olds who had fed themselves through hunting and foraging along the way. I would stare and stare at it when I went to her office. Every time: it was such a dramatic, storied journey.

In Tucson, a "mothers' group" of family-ties volunteers formed who would take care of the boys after they arrived. Tucson did a pretty darn good job with the Lost Boys because of this group of rather opinionated women in their 50s who saw to it that they entered high school, got dental work, and myriad other motherly details. They held group meetings and created events to attend. Many boys (now very tall, not so boyish) eventually went to college; some graduated and then got amazing scholarships for post-baccalaureate degrees. From among them, a homecoming king was crowned at one of the local high schools. A few were lost to PTSD and terrible soul flight. One would disappear for weeks and his volunteer would be searching and worrying the whole time. I don't know what became of him.

A lot of effort, about 40 arrived in Tucson. For their part, the boys also adopted these mothers, it seemed to me as I entered the resettlement field in 2003, most of the way through their transfer into Tucson—few more arrived, and by then, the extended family system of boys and (mostly motherly) volunteers had been set up. The boys (as boys will do) somehow knew how to work their "mothers." And the mothers knew how to mirror and be proud. It was quite a nice fit, actually, even with some family feuds (gotta have a few of those, too).

A number of the now-men are filtering back to South Sudan as that new nation is emerging. Some are establishing schools, some getting married and bringing their wives to the U.S., some undertaking humanitarian missions in South Sudan, some making churches. Some

are running for office—their inherited tribal positions were not lost in the war and family devastation, their people have not forgotten.[103] Sudanese elders in the Kakuma camps had told them not to forget their land and culture as they flew to America and landed in a strange place; and they didn't. The Tucson moms were very happy to learn this new culture from them; and their reach now extends to Sudan as well through their fostered sons.[104] The world goes 'round; I see it as an integration success, this belonging to each other as (fictive) kin with ties of affection, concern, obligation, and really, a sense of responsibility. I observed it both directions.

The process of that resettlement in Tucson evidenced a number of principles for the initiation of making refugees into neoliberal citizens. Refugees have to go to school, be hooked into the paths of achievement in this society and prevented from just settling in to live out life without any responsibilities for management of their own self-sufficiency. The volunteers in Tucson were key players in the process of remaking refugees into citizens. Resettlement agencies set up the structure according to the policies of the U.S. resettlement program; volunteers enact the habitus, along with schools, employers, landlords, neighbors, police. And they have to start by just putting people through experiences and then tweaking the operations as they, themselves, learn on and are impacted by new peoples. *Each side has to put up with the other* as each learns their new role.

In some ways, during the resettlement of the Lost Boys it was a bit easier for their volunteers to enact the socializing role of making new citizens, because of the age (more plasticity) and because of the position (older adolescents, not yet adults). The—how shall I

[103] I first drafted this chapter in 2013, before South Sudan started warring. Lost Boys who went home are now working on staying safe through that violence, too.

[104] What do I mean by "reach"? It is not that the Tucson moms are extending their socializing role to Sudan; they are extending their family and worldliness to include South Sudan and Kenya, into which they are now connected socially. It is really social capital reach I am thinking about here.

say—inexactitudes of the processes are made even clearer in looking at the Somali Bantu resettlement to Tucson, with which I am intimately familiar.

Somali Bantus…began coming at the end of May 2003 to Tucson, and mighty were the preparations long before they started arriving. Pre-literate, marginalized, most without formal education, they had lived in the Juba River valley of Somalia and fled into Kenya as violence and famines swept across their fracturing homelands. In the U.S., locals awaiting their arrival perused pictures of Somali Bantu standing or squatting in doorways of mud-looking huts, carrying firewood in the camps of Kenya—Dadaab, Ifo, and later Kakuma. They looked downtrodden and backward: Poster children of the humanitarian effort about to take place. I participated in a number of meetings between a local Volag and U of A professors and students trying to plan for their arrival. All manner of imaginings occurred to us about what would have to be done to accommodate their enormous barriers and socialize them to life in the U.S. (Tucson had not received any Hmong, a similarly pre-literate group which did arrive in mass numbers to Wisconsin). Two national technical assistance providers funded by ORR—Dan Lehman and Omar Eno (a highly-educated Somali Bantu who had come to North America years before)—worked on educating receiving communities about the group and tried to dispel notions of the extreme backwardness of these rural people (I'll never forget Eno expressing mock shock during our training in Phoenix that the 'pathetically' disadvantaged Bantu "…don't even know how to use a doorknob!!!!").

Shades of Europeans sailing the world in the Age of Exploration, running into small tribes in far flung places and not even sure that they were human (thus began Anthropology).

As it turned out, the Somali Bantu are very much human, and much larger than life depicted in those photos from Kakuma and Dadaab. I happened to see one photograph of a

woman who ended up in Tucson and could barely believe it was the same person, not even a year later. Context is everything, I guess; pictures freeze a physical appearance at a moment in time and in a specific context—no motion, no aura of what their persona might actually be; these are visual documents that Americans cannot read except through the intention and framing of those who circulate the images, and they framing was…primitive.

The Somali Bantu are coming! The Somali Bantu are coming! And all manner of talk-preparation that didn't really accommodate very well the actual reality of those who would soon be among us.

SETTLING IN

Community gardens

Tucsonans planned community gardens in the model that was becoming ubiquitous across the U.S., which turned out to be absolutely baffling to the Somali Bantus who could not figure out the purpose of an agricultural field from which one could not sell the produce at market—gardens are not for socializing in their experience, they are for producing edible products to sell. Furthermore, when an African family moves into a new area and is shown a plot of land for their use, they assume usufruct rights; whereas the homeowner in whose yard they planted assumed social bonding rights. Misunderstandings proliferated. In a meeting I'd convened to try to sort these confusions out, a university-researcher expressed the opinion that they needed to have their hands in the dirt in order to "feel Somali Bantu." An African-born professor from that same academic unit and I looked across the table at each other in dismay as we each tried to figure out how to help explain livelihood strategies to an expert researcher on livelihood strategy. No, he said, they need to make money, and they would not continue to work in that garden if nothing could be sold from it. That was a deal-breaker for the property owner

who had imagined neighbors gathering for garden-fresh salads and iced teas in the hot Tucson summer.

I should note that, I was guilty too. I helped start it with another well-intentioned grad student who knew the property owner and made the introduction, then left to go do her dissertation research. That left the rest of us to muddle through and learn how much out of sync everyone was on the project. The property owner—who was really a generous sort—later was persuaded a bit more to the sales side, but by then the project was pretty much in disarray. Somali Bantus were definitely farmers though…some ended up working at Eurofresh a couple hours' drive away from Tucson, and I heard them discussing the new water-intensive hothouse tomato-growing technology with the interest of true aficionados. However, the means of that production were not owned and they were priced way out of sight for refugees, so they labored at Eurofresh until a job closer to home could be found.

Housing

….was set up the best. My predecessor at the resettlement program I came to run had lived in Africa, and knew the habits of villagers; his staff knew the practicalities of getting apartments for new arrivals, and they found two apartment complexes across a not-exceptionally-busy street from each other into which Somali Bantus were placed. It was surreal, actually, how well this worked at first. One apartment complex was a ring of two-story apartments around a grassy central area with a pool (most Tucson apartment complexes have pools—summers in Tucson are, ah, hot and dry). Village life reborn, but in a much more organized and supplied circumstance. Refugee apartments were small ("junior one-bedrooms" were essentially a studio with a walled-off space for the bed), but this was no problem whatsoever for people who were used to living outdoors for most of their waking hours. They

left their doors open, spilled out into the courtyard, chatted on the grounds where they spread blankets, everyone checking out women's stomachs for signs of the arrival of American babies (eventually the complexes housed several East African ethnicities), swam at the pool. Cooked meat on the grills dotting the grassy commons. Laughed and laughed, kidding each other, slapping each other's thighs and poking and chasing each other when someone got a really good "dig" in about something funny that had happened as a result of cultural misfire.

Such scenes repeated for almost all refugee groups I worked with in Tucson: in the afternoon, after work, the men would gather in the covered parking areas surrounding the complexes and stand in a circle to smoke, and talk, and problem solve, sometimes to laugh at the inevitable mishaps or weirdness of American life, sometimes to stare at the ground, shifting their weight as they stood and quashed out the remaining ember on cigarette butt after cigarette butt or draw imaginary lines with the toes and heels of their sandals while they worked through how to handle a disturbing situation being commonly experienced by their families with an agency or school or an official or a landlord.

Women would pack themselves inside apartments and sit cross-legged on the floor, beading or knitting or shucking corn husks into bowls while they fretted or confronted each other in solving the problems that arose between them. Suddenly a mother would yank open the door race out to scold at a kid outside—I hadn't heard a thing but somehow they knew *everything* that was happening. Often it was not the actual mother of the child getting the scolding—this is communal life, everyone in the village corrects every child in the village. Kids (and sometimes the men) walked freely throughout the complex and got fed in every kitchen. At least at first.

Emergency services

The first American Bantu baby arrived in November, early, and fomented the first ambulance ride of a Somali Bantu person to the hospital. The first responders got their first experience with the mass of kids running around like sports broadcasters announcing their every move, the word then getting passed down the row of buildings to the community members hanging over the rails trying to see what was happening. Bantu men and teens walked around with cell phones constantly at their ears, speaking to unknowns somewhere who would pass the happenings through the rest of the community at lightening-pace. Bantus remaining in Kakuma, Dadaab, Ifo and Somalia probably even knew what was happening in real-time.

By now I was very well known in that community of Bantus and had been called to the "emergency" at the complex. I parked my car and as I opened the door I could hear my name being passed through the passageway into the courtyard and then repeated down the line. When I walked in, everyone was intently watching the open doorway of Zeynab's apartment where the uniformed men stood. "Hi Mette" repeated ten times as I walked down the line; I say "Hi [+ name]" back as I have learned that people want to hear their names said—do I know them, have I remembered their name, and can I say it passably well? Lightly perceptible nods as I pass this latest test of community awareness.

Our case manager handed the situation over to me; she was late for the next appointment and as I recall, she was trying to get ready for a new arrival from overseas. Stretcher arrived and disappeared through the doorway. Soon, out came the gurney with Zeynab strapped on and a ring of men in attendance. Kids watched intensely every muscle and every foot placement and every hand grip of every EMT working to lift the stretcher down the stairs from the second floor to the landing, then walked in droves alongside the men pushing the stretcher to the back of the

ambulance and in. 19 year-old Zeynab, I could see, was in pain *and* hypervigilant, and surveying all the paraphernalia and those EMT guys all at the same time. The baby would be her second.

Now what? The Somali Bantu neighbor who was interpreting…was he supposed to go in the vehicle with her and the EMTs? What of the husband? Volunteers barked orders at each other as they sorted out who should ride with whom, and eventually the husband was put into the front seat of the ambulance, grandmothers shooed the crowd of kids away from the back of the ambulance and made a path for it to leave, and the whole entourage drove the twelve or so blocks to Tucson Medical Center.

The labor and delivery nurses got their first experience with this intensely communal group arriving at the hospital for the birth of the first American-Bantu baby (who are YOU? And WHO are YOU?—good lord, how many aunts and uncles could there possibly be?) and fretted that they had no warning and no medical records; the interpreter did his best (once he was allowed in!) to help explain but the medical models of labor and delivery were so different and the mother-in-labor could not say a lot of what the nurses wanted to know. The baby did arrive, he and the mother survived, and she got a lot of cultural capital from having ridden the ambulance first. I was glad it was for a birth, and not for the strokes and accidents and health emergencies of more grave kinds that were to follow.

And the EMTs? They had new stories to tell their families or friends around dinner tables or after-work bars that night. First refugee encounters are as exciting and fascinating to Americans as first ambulance rides are to Somali Bantus. The experiences stretch everyone, they expand everyone's horizons, *everyone learns.*

Many other systems

ESL acquisition, school enrollments and first months, employment, first encounters with police—turned out in varying degrees of similarity to the gardening project. You just can't plan for this stuff the first time that "others" who are very culturally different come to an American city almost all at once. Or at least we didn't do it so well. Misunderstandings, missteps, lack of experience, theories of practice that did not work but to which we had committed, turned in some cases to blame of Somali Bantus as individuals or as a group for their lack of cooperation or commitment or just plain "bad personalities."

The amazing principal of the first elementary school to enroll Somali Bantu kids discussed the chaos visited upon her school from children who had never been subjected to such regimented days. Recess-ending bells would ring, and Tucson-raised kids would race to the school doors and line up for going inside. Somali Bantu kids, on the other hand, were thrilled—the space freed up and the games/equipment dropped by other kids now got kicked with gleeful abandon everywhere across the gated playground as the Bantus raced after them. Teachers didn't speak Maay Maay and couldn't yell comprehensibly to those kids in that first month of school, so they were left to chase after them and collect them one-by-one. Within a couple of months the principal was suggesting that her school "had enough" U.S. newcomers and the new students should be spread a bit more to other schools. But time went on, and the kids learned how to behave, and that school did a very nice job, as did other elementary schools. Some teachers got very enamored with these newcomers; others tsk-tsked but could do little to change the fact that, yes, Tucson was getting these very culturally-different kids and the schools had to mount a mighty effort in the beginning to socialize them in addition to educating them.

Employers and job developers

I started as a family-ties volunteer with the first Somali Bantu to arrive in Tucson, a 19-year old young woman with anemia and only the white IOM bag and the clothes on her back. She was the first to be hired and the first to be fired. Her job developer was convinced it was "her haughty demeanor," and he came to her apartment to tell her "it is bad" and that she had jeopardized the chances for rest of the Somali Bantus being able to get jobs in Tucson (!). He had managed to get her one more chance with the employer—a foothills hotel where he had gotten her a job in housekeeping. I offered to go shadow her on the job; I discovered deficient training techniques—she had to observe a whole room being made up, and then was expected to do the next room herself. A chaining or scaffolding process whereby she observes, then does, then observes, then does, would have been better. Housekeeping in a hotel is complicated for someone who is unfamiliar with hotels. It also requires the ability to read--which she did not have—the labels of cleaning supplies (which one do you use for what?) and to put the variety of guest brochures into the proper order and places in the room. Finally, I discovered the physicality of making a bed required a health status of someone who was not anemic. I watched her becoming more and more upset as the trainer made disparaging faces and scolded her while the interpreter dutifully interpreted what she was saying. It seemed very demeaning to me.

She lost the job. The job developer told me that it was her uncooperative personality; he was sure that his next Somali Bantu client (another woman with clearly more physical strength) had a much more pleasing personality, and she would be fine.

The second woman also could not do the housekeeping job, it turned out. So she was employed to sit all day and polish silver. This job she could handle. But the first woman was placed at the bottom of the job developer's list of people to be helped to find a job. And her

anxiety grew as the time grew short for matching grant support. Without a job, she would not be able to pay her rent.

That job developer was a former refugee himself. He was really *really* good at the job, but I also found out that refugees employed at resettlement agencies have some authority, and that authority is status, and they want to mark it with the refugees whom they serve. It is not the same sociality, then, as what occurs with American-born staff and volunteers. Another example was the scene at the apartment arrival and day-after for the Balkans couple: a case manager from their own community was not very helpful, a Balkan employee from another agency also made a flippant joke that hurt the wife deeply. I have witnessed this again and again in some ethnic communities, not with all staff, but it is a presence, and it is hard to catch for a manager. My data are from observation mostly as I was functioning as a volunteer, and from key informants talking to me about their experiences.

In any event, I soon got the job of being that job developer's supervisor as I was appointed to direct the resettlement program where he worked. He left for vacation within a couple of weeks of my start, and while he was gone, I negotiated a job for the fired 19-year old at the elementary school as an interpreter when the principal called looking for someone. This refugee had come in speaking almost no English; I had worked with her for four months every day, half-an-hour a day, teaching her English the way that I had been taught to speak Japanese at Indiana University's summer language school which used immersion techniques. She had arrived in the U.S. speaking five languages; when she went to work at the school, her English was not fluent but she had sufficient communicative capacity to be able to help the school, which actually had few options for interpreters from this population in the initial year or two. She learned languages very fast, and English was no exception.

The job developer returned after vacation to find his dictates overruled; he paid me back for the duration of my tenure at that job, which was three years. I did not understand it at the time; but he felt he had lost face, and I had caused it.

I do believe that people in the receiving community have to put a check on each other, and block inappropriate actions that are unthinking or retaliatory. Social dynamics go along everywhere…and refugees—especially men—need to do something to regain status, but that status cannot be regained in a way that hurts others. This man was a physician in his own country; brilliant, and proud. And he did what he had to do to make it in the U.S. financially to support his family, and it was many money-making strategies that were demeaning to someone of his station. His credentials did not transfer easily (if at all) at the time he was arriving in the U.S. In his job when I met him, he was punitive, difficult, imperious, controlling, and very *very* effective at getting people jobs. He reminds me of Doc Martin from the British TV series, actually. And he was my first significant adversarial teacher in the refugee field. I learned about refugee men's shame first from him.

The refugee woman was able to pay her rent and went on to overcome her anemia, marry, have kids, and get stability in her life in America. And that was my goal as her volunteer, and then as her resettlement director. But he taught me that you have to keep your eye on the whole picture; that agency depended on his work, and I needed to learn how to maneuver in that angst-filled, politically charged environment. I was truly awful at this in the beginning. I hope I have learned a few things since then.

Police

Many coming in from other countries—especially in Africa—are terrified of police, who in their country of origin could be violent, corrupt, and arbitrary, and/or come to arrest people for

political persecution. The first encounter with police going to the apartment complex in Tucson was instructive: the men in the community all ran away, and were gone for hours. They apparently trickled back into apartments later under cover of night, when they could figure out what was the cause of the appearance of the police and what it meant for them—the males of their ethnicity.

Over time, the police interacted a number of times with Somali Bantu for issues of child supervision, bike riding in the middle lane of a busy street, domestic violence, and car accidents. I found the police to be very good actually in working with the Bantu on calls, but it was also helpful if someone who could interpret either culturally or linguistically was there to help. Police had learned some things during the resettlement of the Lost Boys, apparently, at the behest of those volunteer "mothers" who paved the way by meeting with police when Lost Boys were being first stopped, and they needed someone to come in and examine what had happened—was it racist? Was it a misunderstood behavior or demeanor? Again, as in the story of the first young woman to get a job and then lose the first job in the community, other individuals of the receiving culture needed to come in and check the situation, and block unthinking, retaliatory, or other inappropriate actions *from either side*. Refugees are vulnerable because they do not have clear lenses (American cultural habitus experience) through which to view the people and situations that present themselves for opportunity or solution. Those Lost Boy "mothers" were so smart, and so well-positioned to take this role.

Their action with the police, and my action with the job developer, are beginning instances of what I will come to identify, in the next chapters, as solidarity, which is one basis of the establishment of belonging for incoming citizens. It is people who will examine, extend, and enforce *socially* the rules of fairness and the social contract of a society to everyone regardless of

identity. And it must go both ways, because receiving community members who go out to be with incoming populations in a very deep way may also need this type of protection and belonging with those arriving ethnic communities. That is the beginning of "integration," as I have come to think about it.

Relations with local law enforcement and the FBI after 9-11

Relations with police and law enforcement more generally, however, are becoming more and more precariously experienced as time goes on in the war on terror. Many refugee families are getting visited by the FBI; so are Volags, so are MAAs, so are state coordinators including myself, as the FBI works to secure the nation and its people from terrorist attacks. They are looking for information and trying to also give people a place to call if something does not seem right. My most recent discussions with refugees about this issue—and these are minimal—tell me that while refugees and especially Iraqi refugees understand why the FBI is doing this and agree with their intense focus and surveillance for the purpose of assuring security (after all, trying to get in a safe place is a primary reason why refugees come to the U.S.), it can also be very disconcerting.

Specific tactics get commented upon as disturbing for refugees. Crossing the line of respect is one yardstick. This is difficult to assess because people have different thresholds and perceptions of this line of respect. My experience with the FBI has been conversational and interesting. I am able to help them understand what resettlement players know about the process of screenings and documents, and what they do at various points in checking those documents, and the processes that are built in for Volags, especially, to report anomalies to the Department of State. I can also serve as their ambassador into communities of resettlement officials and populations. Refugees, however, are being questioned, and I worry that it can feel akin to the

adversarial questioning that witnesses at tribunals experience—where they feel that they, themselves, after going through such terrible atrocities, are the actually the ones on trial.

In this case, as a person betwixt and between who ambassadors across identity groups, my solidarity with the FBI proceeds on the basis of a deep agreement with the need for safety, the exercise of my public responsibility as the state coordinator, my sense of self-preservation as a citizen of the U.S., my sense of responsibility to others of my society (and my society now includes refugees), my deep alliance with the project of building rather than tearing down as a personal value, and my underlying commitment to compassion. Solidarity with refugees proceeds, fundamentally, on the same basis, as refugees have been victims of extreme violence. There is utter agreement here. And on both sides, then, I am also "checking" as described above. The most important approach for addressing inappropriate actions this early in the age of terrorism is, as a researcher, to look at actions as clear-eyed as possible to see what is, what is being accomplished, and unintended occurrences as a result of actions.

My solution as a resettlement practitioner is to think about prevention of violence and vulnerability to terrorist recruitment through social healing, identification with each other, acceptance of each other, and belonging to each other, and arranging spaces in which the variety of cultures and subcultures in our communities can meet and exchange in a health sociality. We need to open spaces for other approaches: respect, belonging, opportunity, and love are also defenses against terror. Teaching people how to express solidarity with each other is another.

This combination of research and practice may be the role of a ritual specialist in these difficult transitions of a nation, with unknown endpoints and uncertain outcomes. But it has to be understood that the ritual specialist is there not because of experience in going through it oneself. Much is experimental. Much can go awry. That ritual specialist is there to mediate

between groups, perceptions, and interests. That ritual specialist is there to figure out ways to create a sense of *communitas,* by opening spaces where it can happen as people meet each other and look beyond the first pass of profiled identity.[105]

On a lighter note, one reaction I am hearing emerging among Iraqis in one city has been that they want to report everything to the FBI and have the FBI handle everything. Something goes wrong? Call the FBI. A former colleague tried to introduce an Iraqi walk-in to a local community-policing official. Promptly nixed. No, I'm calling the FBI if I have a problem.

Probably a more creative solution to profiling. Join 'em, give them lots of business.

PRM and the Department of State

Another aspect of receiving-nation preparation is the way that transfers occur from overseas, and the process I am most familiar with happened with the Somali Bantu. PRM organized this process exceptionally well, and I have heard from one official that this was a very labor-intensive effort. As I understand it, Somali Bantus in the camps self-organized a group of 50 or so to apply together, and these numbered groups were resettled into different locales in the U.S. Practically, this allowed close kin groups to resettle together, since there were no family ties already in the U.S. It required a great deal of coordination. It allowed individuals with very low self-esteem (especially women) to be assisted in the application process as part of the larger group—one woman I knew in particular would have not had the confidence to apply on her own. Her nephew organized the group, and told her to try, he would help her. She was the second Somali Bantu to arrive in Tucson with three children attached to her skirts. I saw her arrive to the apartment parking lot and go into her new home.

[105] I will unpack the concepts of this paragraph in the next chapter.

As I further understand it, locales got several "groups," which ended up mixing things up a bit. Among the Somali Bantus are several subethnicities or clans, speaking different languages, e.g., Maay Maay speakers, KiSegua speakers, Mahatr'i speakers. A "group" consisted of one clan. But there was no attempt made to concentrate single clans in one city. Effectively, this meant that with the distribution of groups across the U.S., Somali Bantus would actually stay distributed in cities across the U.S., and create viable local communities of 500 or so.

Bantus are moving to different locales as time goes on—often through marriage—and the ties across communities are maintained, while safety valves for an individual or family experiencing social difficulty in a given place are also available through move to another city. People will find kin in almost any city where Somali Bantus live. And it allows for choice. Everyone knew their "group number" when they arrived, and could tell me what it was. I haven't checked, but I believe the group numbers have fallen by the wayside as a sense of membership in a locale has taken over. We now typically talk about the Tucson Somali Bantu, the Milwaukee Somali Bantu, the San Antonio Somali Bantu, the Boise Somali Bantu (and there are others). And people locate each other by this designation, not the clan designation. They still know among themselves, but in the bridging world between Bantus and American-born, a common language and identification has developed.

It was smart planning and turned out to be socially viable and effective population management on the part of PRM, but self-organized by Bantus while still in the camps. And that just feels so existentially satisfying to the practitioner side of me.

CONCLUSION

The chapter's narrative recounts some of the major phenomenological aspects of resettlement phenomenology. Some basic themes are:

Refugees have little time to rest upon arrival: there are many things to do, sign up, enroll, learn how to shop for groceries, prepare for employment, get a health screening, go through orientations, learn English, figure out the money system. Then a survival budget.

Choices made by refugees about resettlement vary by gender, age, and likely also socio-economic status in the country of origin. The experience is quite different for men vs. women; young adults vs. seniors; adolescents vs. young children. We actually know very little about younger children's experience of resettlement and what they think or feel about it. Men, especially, experience shame due to loss of full adult status and inability to provide for families. Gender expectations are different in the U.S.; refugee men often feel women are given advantage. Women are busy navigating new gender-role demands while raising dual-culture kids. Elders have little chance to start over and learn an entirely new culture; they face tremendous losses in the U.S., and may choose to stay behind. Skewed demographics in arriving communities are problematic and we need to think more about this.

Rituals of transition that mark thresholds and acknowledge the losses and changes ahead are critical pieces of the welcoming role of receiving communities. Sociality needs to be well-tended in the beginning because a healthy and neighborly sociality can sustain newcomers through very difficult challenges.

Preparations for the arrival of new culture groups miss marks, but people grow and learn from these misfires. If the welcoming has been earnest and sincere and kind, the groundwork of trust and goodwill established in the first weeks will help arriving families and

receiving volunteers and agencies work together solve the inevitable problems that arise.

Refugees need repeated orientations. Orientation, orientation, orientation. It is like learning a new language: we do not expect language learners to absorb and remember every new word after only one hearing, and we should not expect refugees to absorb all the new information in one sitting or the first time. They need a map to the territory, and map reading starts with finding cities, then roads that connect them, then side roads, then streets, then addresses.

Receiving community members need to check each other's practices for the character of sociality, and to prevent counter-productive win-lose interests from seeping in. Refugees cannot read cultural messaging in the beginning very well and they are vulnerable. Volunteers are critical to welcoming.

And nearly everyone will… laugh, get upset, get over it if corrective experiences also occur, and see their horizons and understandings of life stretched immeasurably. This is the magic of meeting the "other" in the process of resettling peoples with well-founded fears of persecution.

PART II:

PROCESSES AND AGENCY DURING RESETTLEMENT AND INTEGRATION

I introduced the phenomenology of refugee flight, chaos and its containment, and resettlement in the previous section. Now we need to think about the work of resettlement and make sense of it, and for that, I turn next to theoretical tools and constructs that can help. Framing is everything, and I do it in chapter 4.

For an ethnography of resettlement, it may seem counterintuitive to start with receiving-community perspectives. But they are what refugees encounter as "structuring" the "context" in which these new arrivals must adjust their practices. So we start here in Chapter 5: it is the receiving society's governmental and governance strategies that prevail…at first. In Chapter 6, I will offer a closer look at stakes and stakeholders in receiving communities. Chapter 7 describes the work of refugees in re-making home in a foreign country while retaining as much of the familiar as possible.

Whose story is it, anyway? I came to see it as our story—the collective story of from both sides. Of course I would see it that way: I am trained as a facilitator of multiple stakes and interests in win-win solutions. Whether and how we get to these wins comes in Chapter 8 on successes of resettlement and integration.

Chapter 4

Framing the work of resettlement: *Healing social bodies after mass violence*

> *Violence creates in people a new kind of historical space, formed when a crack in the "cosmic egg" of ordinary life occurs. All that was fairly mundane and predictable suddenly is thrown into a radically new and different place. Such shifts are historical because they reflect an upheaval in social and political relationships that have major consequences, not only for individuals but for the world itself. These spaces are often created by violence events, sometimes at the individual level, but mostly at the community level. Within these situations, revelations can and do occur as new truths emerge. Perpetrators and those in the media who exploit the horror of violence only focus on the point at which a new reality is cracked open. Unfortunately, they do not stay around to see what unfolds afterwar(d). [parentheses added] …Tragedy and pain cannot be avoided…but they can take on new meaning as they are integrated into a broader healing framework.*
>
> --Richard Mollica, 2006

I often say to colleagues in the resettlement field that anthropology is a theory-rich discipline with great resources for helping us to understand socio-cultural phenomena. When I first mention "theory" to people outside the academy, eyes start to unfocus and glaze over. But when I put constructs and concepts into a chart or illustration, and use the refugee experience as an example to explain the construct (a reversal, I know), people are fascinated. And some have used the tools to think about their own lives and work afterwards, and they come back and tell me the insights they have come to. Or I hear it reflected in discussions among refugee providers.

People working in and/or living through resettlement do want to think about their experiences—in fact they need to do it, to make sense of it and bring their experiences into the social arena for regard, and to regard the experiences of others with similar fates or with whom

they are now sharing in the journey back out to life.[106] One does not want to re-traumatize or make people talk individually or in a group about their experiences. But they do it as they need to. Giving people thinking tools is akin to getting a diagnosis: it brings some order to the chaos of atrocity and actions witnessed and experienced when the life-world was absent a social contract. It helps them put order to the experience of resettlement which—because it is only partially "guided"—can be baffling and anxiety or shame provoking. And they are in charge of it. I just provide the thinking tools and the space to use them if they wish. And they often do, at least that is my experience. Mass violence and atrocity is an interpersonal, social experience regardless of how horrific and how much the survivor was reduced to mere degraded inhuman category; recovery is also a social experience to a significant extent.

In this chapter I review the work of anthropologists and others who have focused more processually on the experience of undergoing difficult or extraordinary change. I have chosen a few I have found useful as I work together with colleagues; others are more recent innovations from scholars and I am trying them out now (as I am writing this dissertation) in working with discussion groups for various projects of refugee integration.

The chapter starts with the insights from ritual guidance of social change that anthropologists began describing years ago, and which invariably make sense to audiences because, we have all—by the time we reach adulthood—experienced rituals associated with change of status. The refugee experience is different than what Victor Turner and Arnold van Gennep were describing; but the process of resettlement shares some features and suggests other possibilities, applications, and outcomes. So we will start there.

[106] Herman (1997); Mollica (2006 and lectures in Orvieto, 2007).

We then move into more uncharted change processes. I will briefly mention some constructs from more recent articles that capture certain types of experiences and possibilities quickly and insightfully (including adversity-activated development and cultural entrapment), and then move to two theory constructs that nearly arrive at the same place, but from very different disciplines. Each offers insights for practice. They are: ideas about pursuit and tending of social and cultural capital (beginning with Bourdieu); and, recent work on the social ecology of resilience at various levels in a system.[107]

Finally, the anthropology of becoming, a recent approach suggested by Biehl and Locke (2012), recommends that researchers look for how people resist hegemonies and maneuver out of closing-in structures that threaten resources and relationships needed to sustain inclusive and diverse ecologies of social life. Following Deleuze, they urge a focus on how desire instigates swerves, leakages, and trajectories out of a degraded, damage present.

LIMINALITY AND *COMMUNITAS*

Ritually-guided change

Anthropological studies of indigenous medical practitioners in African, Asian, and Latin American discuss how social bodies are addressed both symbolically and processually in healing ceremonies and treatments.[108] Individuals become ill because of a problem in the social group: envy, jealously, hoarding or unexplained good fortune may result in (accusations of) sorcery or witchcraft. Practitioners focus on healing the social unit, so that the individual is not made sick by

[107] See volume edited by Ungar (2012).

[108] Carolyn Nordstrom provides a war-specific example of what healers in Mozambique did to address the social in her 1997 book, *A Different Kind of War Story.* As it is so specifically related to political violence and trauma, I recommend it as a must-read. There are many other examples to be found in the literature on ethnomedicine, especially published during the period of the 1980s and 90,s and even a bit later. See Nichter's edited volume for a representative selection (1992).

out-of-whack social relations or environment, and is not, in turn, sickening the community. Ritual treatments involve the extended community in repair and recovery.

Victor Turner's work on the ritual management of change formed the basis for much of the modern study of indigenous healers. Turner studied among the Ndembu in Zambia, and as he searched for ways to understand what he observed, he discovered and applied the ideas of Arnold van Gennep (1909) who had described a three-part pattern, sequence, and form of transitional rites in small societies:

a. **Rites of separation**, in which the initiate must renounce the identity to be left behind and prepare to undergo the journey to a new social identity.

b. **Liminal rites of change**, where the initiate submits to experimentation, acquiring and consolidating new skills and information leading to a breakthrough experience which readies the person to function in the new social role.

c. **Rites of incorporation**, where the person is re-introduced into the social group with a new identity and role. The person has a beginning competency in the role, can function adequately and appropriately in the role, but is not yet an expert.

Turner asserted that this 3-stage management of social identity/role change is visible in all human cultures, e.g., in rituals around weddings, graduations, entering the military, retirement, ordinations, and funerals. The chart below illustrates:



Figure 3: Ritual management of social role transition

The center area depicted above provides the space, time, and conditions for agents to undergo transformation. The limin is a space/place/world of contingency where events, ideas, and reality itself can be carried in different directions.

Ritual masters arrange the space and possibilities for agency. The liminal period begins when the initiates go to a (prepared) place where they are stripped of markers of status by which they were previously identified. Their heads may be shaved, they may be required to don the

same clothing, or assume other signifiers of liminal (and lowly) status.[109] In contrast to normal social hierarchies of non-ritual time and space, Turner called the egalitarian state between initiates during the liminal phase a state of "*communitas*." Initiates are brought low in status and tested with a variety of challenges, and this combination of factors destabilizes their familiar experiential frames and promotes experimentation.

In this space of uncertainty, the answers to the challenges are not available from any pre-defined structure; the initiate has to construct effective responses, relying on himself and/or his co-initiates to improvise as they go. Liminal spaces are spaces of heightened awareness and experiencing: a context of high emotion sets the bodymind on edge. All manner of performative capacities get deployed without conscious effort, and the performer discovers them in the doing, enabling a creative insight and performance "breakthrough" to occur.

A sense of sharing and intimacy typically emerges among the cohort that often develops among people in times of extreme distress. It is an intense sense of communal spirit, a feeling of great social equality, of solidarity, and togetherness.[110] A bonded cohort emerges as its members learn who is able to do what during the time of duress. Individuals contribute to the group's survival in various capacities and trust emerges as they have to rely on each other to survive. As they reach the end of their trial, initiates are re-introduced in "graduation" ceremonies to the home society which has awaited their transformation and re-integration.

Change unguided

Recent scholars have used the work of van Gennep and Turner as a point of departure to look at the extended periods of liminality within contemporary nation-states unguided by ritual

[109] Turner studied the Ndembu in African; Americans are familiar with this phenomenon through their knowledge of what new recruits undergo in military boot camp; or as highly motivated soldiers undergo the training and testing to become Navy SEALS.
[110] Turner (1969).

specialists.[111] Where the wholesale collapse of a social order affects an entire society (such as in war), the future is inherently unknown, and, acting outside the bounds of ethics, morals, or authorized roles, agents put themselves forward to re-orient modes of conduct and thought among the members of a society. Emergent social structures and roles are not envisioned or authorized by the society or group, but instead from what "sticks" in actions and experiments, similar to an epidemic in which the potency and stickiness of a disease agent may be determinative. Sociality deteriorates into disrespect for many things except strength and survival skills. People experience humiliation—rather than humility—and are deeply threatened when there is no one to guide or arrange the conditions of learning and mastery. Negative types of *communitas* can emerge in mass societies dominated by envy, resentment, frustration, and hate. How and why does this happen? In the Balkans it has persisted to the present.[112]

Of course the biggest question is, where extended periods of extreme and violent socio-political episodes have no foregone conclusion, how does the liminal period end? How does routinization of a new socio-political order emerge, and who supports it? For those who remain in-country, it is a formidable challenge in profoundly degraded conditions. This condition has characterized countries emerging from war or other periods of violent change in recent decades.

Partially-guided change

I have used "liminality" as a construct in working with resettlement providers to think about the processes of refugee resettlement. Refugees go into a different limin during resettlement than was originally described by Turner and van Gennep, or more recently by Thomassen: resettlement is partially guided, especially in the beginning, but the end result is not quite known or determinate. The social group that one rejoins is not the social group one left

[111] e.g., Thomassen (2009: 201-21).

[112] Locke (2009); 2014 USAID- Issued RFP.

behind; refugees join the receiving community/nation in an emergent social role, the character and standing of which is rather undescribed beyond "economically and socially self-sufficient" and therefore not quite knowable by anyone—not receiving community members, not arriving leaders. Violence has changed the arriving refugee communities (and refugees individually), and they continue to undergo change as they respond and adapt to a new sociopolitical and geographic context.

Refugees often come from sociocentrically-oriented cultures where social roles, relationships, and their proper enactment are highly valued, in contrast to American society which values self-expression and self-sufficiency. There are differences in the expectations of proper gender role enactment in the U.S. How is one to be a respected adult male? Or adult female? What occupations are available and attainable to refugees in the U.S., and how are the ones that refugees had in their countries of origin valued here? If refugees are coming from an area of subsistence livelihoods such as small farming or herding, or crafting or small market enterprises, many of their skills are not especially transferable in the U.S. economy and wage-labor market. If entering as highly educated with professional degrees earned at universities and training centers abroad, their credentials are also not transferable and refugees have to undergo re-certifications, a lengthy process of getting their credentials accepted as valid, or they must re-train entirely within a U.S. professional program.

In refugee resettlement, "guides" have an incomplete understanding of the role toward which the new "initiates" to U.S. society are headed: there is not a clear picture about what that role is to be. Arrivals will never be native-born Americans; they will be new Americans. In what ways are new Americans, *American,* exactly? Or what how must they change to become *American*? These are not silly questions; these are the very questions which both arriving and

receiving populations ponder on many occasions. They are questions of identity, identification, behavior, sensibilities, values, loyalty. And they are extremely difficult to answer because they address such existential grounds of being…social.

Arriving community leaders vie for leadership, and "guiding" is actually more like leading in a period of uncertainty: provide a vision, look for the best way, help the group survive and advance, provide for the welfare of the group, help the its members cope with extreme changes.

Receiving community professionals and volunteers (and these may also be refugees or former refugees) guide the orientation to the setting and new socio-cultural arrangements, but cannot actually define the new role with specificity except as a rather medicalized assessment of functioning: can they ride the bus? Can they shop, manage money, pay rent, behave properly as tenants, find ways to purchase cars they will need in U.S. society, act within the bounds of family law in the U.S., *etc.*?

Highly competent adults from other cultures must become as children to re-learn how to function competently in the new society; the potential insult is where receiving community members decide that refugees must do this or that according to the receiving community's expectations of what someone should know and by when, as if we are giving them an Apgar test. I view this as a counter-productive medicalization of the refugee odyssey. Refugees are like any other person in the U.S.: they exercise choice; they experience the consequences of their choice. Refugees decide if or when they take the bus. If they do not want to take the bus, they have to figure out another way of getting to the places they need to go.

And they *do* figure out their transportation. They figured out how to get out of a situation of mass violence, how to survive rape and other profound abuse, how to maintain themselves in

refugee camps or reception cities, how to apply for admission to the U.S., how to get themselves through airports and arrive at their U.S. destination. They can figure out how to get themselves around as long as we have shown them how to take the bus and what the routes of travel are. Give them information; let them take it from there.

What I observed is that refugees watch routes and signs as we drive them to their apartments from the airport. They watch intersections, look around, find landmarks, decode how street signs work, all on the way to their new dwelling from the airport. Even at night. They point and inquire, either in English or by pantomime. We respond in English and with gestures. They are survivors.

As I will describe in the next chapter, the policies of resettlement in the U.S. aim to socialize refugees into neoliberal citizens. However, refugee-led mutual assistance associations also may operate and get funded, and they are both a force for advocacy in new surroundings and a conservator of refugee ethnic/religious socio-cultural arrangements and models. This tension results in some level of hybrid citizenship: refugees must adjust to certain new conditions around livelihood strategies, but nonetheless retain some of the social safety-net arrangements of their original societies as well as maintain in significant measure their sociocentric expectations from those societies. But they also have to adjust to new definitions and possibilities for gender roles; this change is fraught with uncertainty and frustration that can lead to episodes of violence in families.

So, neither arriving leaders nor receiving community "guides" can arrange the liminal space to assure that the "initiates" reach the goal, since we are actually rather unsure of what that is, other than, being self-sufficient. Who actually desires that as a social or community role? It actually sounds rather asocial, and not especially community-oriented.

ADVERSITY-ACTIVATED DEVELOPMENT (AAD) AND CULTURAL ENTRAPMENT

Psychiatrist Renos Papadopoulos (2007) and medical anthropologist/psychologist Natale Losi (2007)[113] envision the consequences and implications of mass political violence in terms of harms, resilience or natural sequelae, and positive development. They have explored what is done, what could be done, and what doesn't need to be done because it is "ordinary" human suffering from which people recover without intervention. They suggest that extreme adversity can set off a process of development in a new and (hopefully) healthier direction than what was occurring prior to the descent into violence, calling this phenomenon "adversity-activated development." This construct captures the possibility that some intent of making a situation better by going to war might actually be realized, though likely not in the way originally envisioned by those who initiated violent actions.

Abramowitz' 2009 dissertation about post-war Liberia is a story of medicalization and guided change by international humanitarian aid organizations using social engineering techniques. The INGOs hoped to reintegrate and revitalize the highly fractured Liberian communities through community-based economic and psychosocial programs, political transitions, and reforms in governance and elections. Effectively, this was a managed approach to adversity-activated development, initiated by entities outside of Liberia who imported their developmental approaches. Liberian society did not actually authorize these humanitarian techniques or interventions. And this often appears to world observers to be the situation: no internal entity is able to authorize these imported actions in the socio-political disarray of the aftermath, *but someone has to do something*.

[113] Lecture to participants in Harvard Program on Refugee Trauma, Orvieto, Italy

That assertion may be debatable, but there is a discernable world-wide consensus about it. Unstable states can harm the world system, and the rest of the world will not stand by forever because destabilization takes many forms, including mass refugee flows into other countries. But in the aftermath, outside engineering of healing of various "bodies" can become a contestation between indigenous and imported cultural norms. An important question for future research is to discover the internally initiated, grass-roots forms of adversity-activated development that emerge in the aftermath.[114]

Panter-Brick and Eggerman (2012) interviewed adolescents and their parents at school sites in Afghanistan, and found that it was not just war-related violence that created trauma in the lives of children, but violence at the level of family and community life generated by uncertainty and the daily social and economic pressures faced by Afghanis. War-deaths made sense culturally, even though they are horrific. Instead, the core reasons for psychosocial suffering were structural: overwhelming economic impediments to physical, social, and emotional well-being.

[114] An example from the U.S. described in a training I attended with Djimet Dogo, the director of Africa House at IRCO in Portland, OR. Dogo started a program of dialogue and conflict resolution among competing African MAAs in that city. Dogo, a Chadian, had been trained in conflict resolution techniques while in Africa and Europe, as well as through his collaboration with Portland State University's Conflict Resolution Program faculty. Factionalism among Africans living in Portland had proliferated, with (as I recall) some 40+ African ECBOs vying for resources and power locally, each of them expressing mistrust of the others, and blocking each other from getting traction as sustainably funded organizations. Dogo helped the group leaders to identify their shared experiences and interests as refugees, and to realize that they could not progress as a community if they continued to operate from mistrust and competition.

He used conflict resolution tropes and ideas from many sources about how people facing change go through this transition in an unguided way, and how people can emerge into leadership. In collaboration with Portland State's conflict resolution group, he knitted together a package of thinking tools for these local would-be African leaders which came from many places: simply because an idea or practice tool originates outside of a culture group does not mean there are no aspects that people can (and do) appropriate successfully. Dogo is able to say things as a trainer and mediator and an African who had experienced distrust between clan and ethnic factions, and from his deep knowledge of African cultural models of political power and leadership. He is able to help vying leaders gain insights and skills to collaborate while navigating through the period of unguided change that refugees experience in resettlement.

The key point is that Africans in Portland self-identified the issue of factionalism and mistrust, and developed an amalgam of responses appropriated from a variety of sources that made sense to them. They were able to reduce the dysfunction that prevented everyone from gaining traction that was actually possible in the new setting. Factionalist conflicts were old and imported with them; the new situation of resettlement fomented development of new ways of relating.

Both adults and kids spoke of "broken economy" as the central driver of pain, violence, and misery: "My father's salary is not enough for us, he has *takleef asabi* (affliction of the nerves) and he beats us…if he finds a decent job then maybe he will calm down" (quoting a 16 year-old girl).[115] Afghani cultural values include religious faith, family unity and harmony, obligation of service to family and community, perseverance, good morals, and social respectability or honor. Significantly, interviews revealed huge impediments to achieving the outward manifestations of a culturally-defined honorable life due to economic, social, and political barriers to accessing resources, including deep gender and ethnic inequalities structuring resource provision in Afghanistan.

Noting that "culture [is] an anchor of resilience, but an anvil of pain," Panter-Brick and Eggerman introduced a new construct--"cultural entrapment"-- to depict what people experience when cultural values are unattainable because of structural problems and poor resource environments.[116]

In some sense, this is what refugee men experience and what causes shame when they arrive in the U.S.; it is what many people feel in the aftermath of war when they are unable to enact the cultural values they hold in the attenuated socioeconomic environments of countries after war. There, however, people do share in the experience of the decimated environment and so there is not as much individual shame in that situation—everyone is in the same boat. But in countries of resettlement, refugees are entering into places with intact resource systems and functional socio-cultural environments, and they are starting at the bottom. So shame is a more prominent feature in the first year(s) after resettlement. In each case, hope lies in getting to resources and opportunities that can support rebuilding and a way out of this type of pain. An

[115] Again, this is evidence and an example of the economic issues underlying social suffering.

[116] See also Eggerman and Panter-Brick (2010).

interesting topic area for future research would be to look at the ways that adversity-activated development may transform conditions of cultural entrapment.

SOCIAL AND OTHER FORMS OF CAPITAL

Bourdieu wrote, "Capital is accumulated labor," and noted that people invest in social relations to build social capital.[117] "Social capital" refers to a person's ability to secure resources and benefits by virtue of membership in a group or a social network. Acquisition of social capital can be thought of as the exercise of sociability (social-ability), that is, tending social relations regularly and adeptly for the purpose of creating a network of mutual acquaintance and recognition, and/or of kinship or semi-kinship (in other words, membership in a group).

Social capital is enabled and sustained by social obligations. Individuals can use the social capital of their networks to achieve private objectives; the group or network uses it to enforce a set of norms and behaviors. "Social capital provides group members with the backing of collectively-owned capital, a 'credential' which entitles them to credit, in various senses of the word. The volume of social capital that someone can possess depends on the size of the network of connections he can mobilize, and, the volume of capital (economic, cultural, or social) possessed by each of those to whom the individual is connected. The profits that come from membership in a group form the basis for solidarity…"[118]

Social capital has to be worked at: it must be tended. It involves frequent and persistent efforts of sociability—in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed, implicating expenditure of time and energy.[119]

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[117] In, *The Forms of Capital* (1986).
[118] *Ibid*.
[119] See also Portes (1998)

Putnam (2000)[120] distinguished between bonding and bridging social capital. As applied to refugee resettlement, bonding social capital refers to the social capital one develops through membership and relationship-tending in an ethnic or identity group such as coming from a given country of origin; bridging social capital refers to the establishment of relationships with others across group boundaries, such as what might occur between a refugee and receiving community members. Observations I have made of refugees arriving to locales where others of the same ethnic group or country of origin have resettled suggests that those who do not tend relations within their "bonding" community may be less connected overall especially as the bonded community is cohesive and provides an effective safety net for social belonging and assistance. Gaining a sense of belonging in a foreign land takes time and may feel incomplete for years. I will return to these questions in Chapter 8 in thinking about successes in resettlement.

There are other forms of "capital" that refugees possess or can acquire. "Cultural capital" includes an embodied state of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body that requires time to accumulate and assimilate.[121] Anthropologists strive to acquire cultural capital when they study a long time in a site. Getting educated is a way to acquire cultural capital. Linguistic capital[122] can be parlayed into positions of mediation between cultures, or into employment as interpreters.[123] Information capital enables people to navigate to additional resources, including other forms of capital.[124]

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[120] attributing the idea to Gittell and Vidal (1998)

[121] Another idea put forth by Bourdieu (1996)

[122] Fluency in multiple languages that are in use in a local area.

[123] Many have written about social capital and its importance to well-being. See Lomas (1998); Manderson (2005); McMichael and Manderson (2004); Nee and Sanders (2001); Sandstrom and Dunn (2014); Woolcock (1998)

[124] Lloyd (2015).

CASE STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL, FAMILY, AND COMMUNITY RESILIENCE

The construct of resilience emerged from systems theory and materials science where researchers studied and conceptualized how systems and materials bounce back from perturbations. Psychologists focused on the resilience of individuals growing up in challenging contexts: Bandura's self-efficacy (1977), Antonovsky's sense of coherence (1984, 1987), and ideas about self-esteem more generally were early constructs about resiliency in human beings. Current researchers are rethinking the concept in an ecological frame: "resiliency" is a process conditioned by both individual capacities/tendencies and the community-based sociocultural, economic, political, and natural-system resources accessible to a person under stress. Some are also expanding the concept to refer to collectives as having "traits" and "tendencies" for resiliency—the collective social body's ability to navigate toward or even create resources for responding to stress.[125]

Ungar (2012) suggests that there are two processes of resilience: the capacity of individuals to navigate their way to resources that build and sustain their wellbeing, and their individual and collective capacity to negotiate for resources. Individual agency is expressed in the process of navigation toward resources; but also families, communities, and governments make the resources available.

Bruhn and Wolf's early research of the social ecology of resilience investigated how communities foster resilience (1979; 1993). They investigated life in the town of Roseto, Pennsylvania, where the death rate from heart disease was half of that in U.S. and 1/3 of the rates in two similar towns also made up of European immigrants of similar backgrounds and occupational stresses. They found a difference in deaths from heart disease that could not be

[125] The concept makes the most sense to me as applied to a community of place or practice, or an ethnic community

accounted for by variation in diet, exercise, or family history, leading to the question, what was unique about Roseto?

They discovered a powerfully protective set of social processes and norms that were egalitarian, helpful to the unsuccessful in the town, and which discouraged the wealthy from flaunting their success. In a town of just under 2,000, there were 22 separate civic organizations, many multigenerational homes, a cohesive group of Catholic parishioners, and a general tendency to stop and chat on street or cook for each other in back yards. They concluded that the town had a "collective efficacy that seemed to foster both physical and mental health."

In other words, they were detailing a salutogenic "sociality."

Weine *et al* (2012) studied families of Liberian and Burundian at-risk refugee youth in Chicago and Boston, and found that they used resilience strategies from prior living contexts (in-country, during encampment), and newly-acquired strategies suggested by American friends and volunteers. For example, in camps and countries of origin, people found or built churches and living spaces, and shared parenting responsibilities as was typical of village life. In the U.S., they learned to become more active parents of the children in their own households from American friends who went with them to the school events; they also got financial and in-kind support from volunteers "who were sent by God to help us."

Murray and Zautra (2012) wrote that processes of resilience are adaptive responses to adversity, and include recovery, sustainability, and growth. The concepts are differentially applicable to individuals and communities, suggesting the need for two-level approaches in creation of policy. These authors suggest that the best innovations in policy or programs are those that build collective resilience across domains when benefitting individuals or groups. The

worst programs are those that are applied without a concern for their effects at different levels and with different types of resilience.[126]

Murray and Zautra researched resiliency among the Sudanese in Australia and found that the process of resettlement to a third country involves a significant disruption of the social fabric of life***: refugees had value as persons in their old communities.*** After resettlement, they miss the people they knew in the camps, and wonder when or if they will see them again.

Rebuilding in the country of resettlement is helped by support and encouragement from family and friends, who say, " 'you've got potential'…It makes me feel like I am on track, and I'm doing well. So I'm proud and happy about it."[127] Rebuilding a social network and an identifiable social community is a gradual process. A refugee reported that meeting a few people at church led to interacting with more and more people.

However, experiences of discrimination in daily life challenged the community's sense of perceived acceptance and belonging in Australian life. For example, during a federal election in 2007, the Sudanese community was accused of failure to integrate as cover for halting the Sudanese resettlement program in Australia. One interviewee noted, "…I'm a bit afraid about living in Australia in the future because this thing will grow and grow and grow and grow and Australia will become a racist society toward us…so if there's peace in my country, I will go back instead of adding to the problem." In response, African-Australian "solidarity gatherings" were used to mount a public defense, writing letters, signing petitions, and making joint public statements. The response needed to be community-level, achieving what an individual could not.

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[126] see also Cacioppo, Reis and Zatura (2011).

[127] Quoted from a refugee interview by Murray and Zautra which they included in their article. This story parallels the mirroring process supporting "separation and individuation" in children, in psychological terms. In sociality, it feels like support and appreciation for the value of oneself and one's efforts to re-establish in a very different country. In other words***, social mirroring that one has value as a person.***

Murray and Zautra conclude that there is a critical role for social processes and community development in rebuilding fractured and lost social relationships and structures among arriving refugee communities: supporting refugees in rebuilding their physical (homes, schools), economic (jobs, livelihoods), social (relationships, networks) and moral worlds (justice, rights): "People rebuild their lives through mourning and grieving together, working socializing and struggling together. ***Recovery occurs in social processes***." (emphasis added).

Berliner *et al's* (2012) case study of a small, northern resource-dependent fishing community reports on a community resilience-mobilization program launched in response to high rates of crime, violence, suicide, drug abuse, child neglect that were happening in the context of a deep recession from rapid economic and climate change. A significant social divide existed between long-time residents and relative newcomers who were being displaced from much smaller communities as fisheries declined. A community norm of silence contributed to social isolation and cycles of violence.

When the community experienced a high number of suicides in 2000 among young people, the program designers recognized that the community needed to change from a focus on surviving as a fishing community to building capacity for resilience in context of perpetual change. Individual resilience came to be understood as dependent on social support, especially in times of adversity, and the community needed to revitalize values of mutual respect and support rather than the perpetuation of a social norm of silence about individual and family troubles.

They hypothesized that communities can become more resilient—that is, more supportive of their members and more capable of adapting to change—through a learning process in which communities learn to cope with, adapt to, and shape change by developing the capacities of its

members to self-organize and increase their social connectivity.[128] The program aimed to strengthen community well-being, and revitalize the culture through shared activities, social networks, and options for creativity.[129]

As the program got started, mothers, fathers, and young people began to cooperate to confront problems together. Berliner *et al* asserted that success depended on the active participation of as many members of the community as possible, and resulted less from institutional responses to risk and capacity building, and more from what people could do collectively themselves. "In fact, with a high degree of community involvement, the importance of institutions to a process of community-resilience building remains unclear."

The program included the following components:

- Specific support groups including rehab groups and young people's groups.
- Family competency training.
- Cultural activities: community dinners, sporting events, theatre groups, art classes addressing social issues, small business development and generation of ideas for jobs, community meetings to break the culture of silence, and a summer university with a curriculum of fishing and hunting skills and a staff of seasoned and highly skilled hunters as professors who took 10-12 families to spend 10 days together hunting and fishing in the fiords and mountains surrounding the city.

All of these activities and processes fostered a sense of belonging, and the greater the sense of belonging, the more that people challenged the culture of silence when they were having problems. They also found that it was better to do activities together that required a physical action rather than just talking. "It has more vitality." One father who took his family through the summer university program mentioned that they just had fun together, and as they were doing

[128] See Norris *et al* (2008) who suggested that community resilience is a networked set of adaptive capacities: economic development; information and communication; social capital; and community competence.

[129] Magis (2010) suggested that community members can act collectively and strategically to identify and develop resources, and distribute them equitably.

these things, it was also wonderful to see that other families were facing problems that they working out as well. He came to see working-out-problems as a normal part of life, rather than as evidence of his failure and defects as a parent.

In two years, the program contributed to a 45% decrease in domestic violence and 30% decrease in other kinds of violence. It changed the discourse on parenting, resulted in more sharing of emotions and concerns among community members, and revitalized cultural life in the community (especially engagement in expressive arts and traditional ways of living in the geographic place).

One hypothesis of this dissertation—that the quality of sociality impacts healing—is supported by this case study. The program developers specifically targeted for healing the quality of sociality in this community: the culture of silence, and the divide between disadvantaged newcomers (who came in from surrounding communities seeking work) and those who had been in the community for a long time.[130]

THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF BECOMING

"The anthropology of becoming" is the title of an article published by Biehl and Locke (2012), in which they advocate that anthropologists engage in research modes that capture people and societies *becoming* through a variety of fragmented approaches: opening of spaces, figuring out different trajectories that will help human beings escape out of degraded socialities, structural closures and cultural entrapments which are imposing inhumane constraints on life as people want to live it. Fragments of desire and hope, unguided by ritual specialists, animate change.

[130] The interest in resilience is accelerating, and anthropologists are among those working on the topic. See for example, Panter-Brick (2014); Bonnano *et al* (2015); Lloyd (2015); Southwick *et al* (2014)

They reference the work of Gils Deleuze, who asserted that desire is a driver of human motivation and change, prior to power as constrainer of human opportunities. He urged a mapping of desire and trajectories out of unwanted structural constraints. Deleuze looks at how the social/society "…is constantly escaping in every direction…it flows monetarily. It flows ideologically…so much so that the problem for society is how to stop it from flowing."[131]

Deleuze is interested in the idea of becoming, of emergence: "those individual and collective struggles to come to terms with events and intolerable conditions and to shake loose, to whatever degree possible, from determinants and definitions….In becoming, one can achieve an ultimate existential stage in which life is simply immanent and open to new relations—camaraderie—and trajectories."[132] Biehl and Locke advance the notion that desires expressed for *something different* from the present conditions under which someone or a people are living—and these are usually something(s) specifically *social*—motivate an attempt to break out, leak out of the present conditions to a new trajectory that will overcome the life-stifling sociality of the present.

In his 2009 dissertation about Sarajevo, Locke looked at people, populations, communities, and a nation in the throes of "therapeutic governance" following the war. Post-war Bosnia saw the massive influx of psychosocial and psychiatric programs to help the traumatized Bosnians. Therapeutic diagnoses and language permeated the self-descriptions of Sarajevo by its inhabitants (which was diagnosed by international aid agencies as depressed and suffering from PTSD). Locke asked in his research, what happened to all that therapeutic aid? What is left from it?

[131] Deleuze (2006:280)

[132] As quoted in Biehl and Locke (2012:317).

He found that there are a few native-led NGOs still struggling to do psychosocial programs, however, they are suffering the same problems as the rest of the population. The problems are that *nothing is working economically in the transition to Capitalism*, there is no recovery or rebuilding of working institutions, and instead transactions for anything are made with bribes, extortion and in a context of a Hobbesian social contract. Raw capitalism in the absence of any regulation is proving to be ugly and life-snuffing for the majority of the population.

Many are angry, really angry. It is contagious: the flare of tempers is frequent and irritating in itself, creating edginess and heightened distress. Locke describes a local NGO leader's sublimation of anger into creating what she wants to see, instead. She articulated the psychiatric vision of a city and its inhabitants, but "swerved" out of that trajectory to do activities with her adolescent charges which oppose diagnoses of disease and trauma. She focused on physical action and physical skill building, thereby opening a space for other kinds of actions. People are doing tiny things to go that direction (which do not pay a salary): planting flowers along a sidewalk, taking kids to the mountains to learn snowboarding.

The idea of becoming has some things in common with open-ended liminal situations that characterize unguided change. The discomforts and uncertainties of an open-ended liminality eventually are replaced with a more hopeful possibility that characterizes "becoming" fueled by desire.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I reviewed the work of anthropologists and others who have focused more processually on the experience of undergoing difficult change. As I worked in the field of refugee resettlement and reflected on my engagement, I either accidentally or deliberately

opened numerous small spaces for experimentation in a *communitas* context. I will describe some of these in the next chapters. Professionally, we do little of this in the U.S., especially inasmuch as policy emerging from the body politic constructs the ideal citizen as a neoliberal citizen: independent, individual, self-sufficient, responsible…networked, but not necessarily connected by a supportive sociality or common identification. It is a surveillant and disciplinary governmentality at work, mostly unsupportive in times of need.

Resilience, ritual change, pursuit of social capital, adversity-activated development, desire, becoming—all have a sense of motion. Trajectories. Swerves. While layer-cake charts provide maps between levels and enable analysis of the "rules" of each level, an awareness and tracking of motion, trajectories and swerves captures the agency of individuals and communities as they move through life, recognize opportunities, and sometimes choose to act upon them.

I keep focusing on *healing* social bodies: healing the Social, using the term "healing" rather than simply moving into a study of the exercise of agency and simply focusing on accumulation of new social capital in a new land. We could do that if arriving populations were absent pain. They are not, most of them. If not experienced directly themselves, they are encountering and handling it in others of their ethnicity, and they are resettling alongside their enemies in many cases. I insist on use of the term "healing" in this dissertation so as not to forget the impacts to people of the unraveling of the social contract in a politically-bounded geographic region.

These experiences are carried with them and if not ever acknowledged and processed somehow in social contexts, they lie in wait. I do believe this. People who are working in the field of resettlement also know this and see this. Many are or were refugees, and they have kin who are still in danger or living a degraded nation-state.

"Healing" allows us to remember the insights of symbolic healing and social repair gleaned from the observation of indigenous healers in many parts of the world, in a way that the accumulation of new social capital (with capital being the accumulation of labor) does not. People take and make meaning from their experiences of extreme episodes and events. We need to understand both: action and agency, and, meaning that satisfies existential needs. Pursuit of social capital can lead to both from the work of tending social relations, which may and can result in a sense of belonging and meaning that is more than simply an ongoing set of transactions resulting in access to resources.

Concentrating on the repair, resilience, and development of social "bodies" after the harms of extreme and mass violence involves attending to social roles, social supports and networks, opportunities, and status. We need to understand social actions (sociability) as well as social atmospheres (sociality) which foster or inhibit "success" in resettlement and recovery.

Healing is understood as a term in some sense by all cultures—as dis-ease is a feature of life. Extreme dis-ease fomented by mass violence requires healing. It is psycho-somatic healing that is required for some, and it is also addressing social suffering to try to remove the cause or help refugees to imbue it with meaning that resolves existential pain. It can be endogenous, but the context matters for all but the asocial.

And this implicates policy and practice. Refugees don't just resettle themselves.

* * *

Next up: the work of resettlement

The next three chapters detail the stakeholders and their work in resettlement of refugees. There are two ideologies discernable among resettlement professionals, government officials, volunteers, and arriving leaders about the work of resettlement: one is that intervention is

needed to assist the path to citizenship and self-sufficiency; the other is that refugees can do it on their own—they are smart, capable survivors who escaped the sweep of war and persecution.

These tend to fall out according to whether one is a former refugee or otherwise foreign-born, or not. Those foreign-born usually come out on the side of doing it themselves. Receiving community members tend to want to socialize incoming refugees to the rules and practices of economic and social life in their local communities and the nation more generally. This is a productive tension.

Communities meet and have misunderstandings, and these may increase as time goes on past the initial year of resettlement. The occurrence of *communitas* episodes may help overcome these misunderstandings and work toward forging more meaningful bonds. *May.*[133]

I observed that refugees—especially the farther away they are culturally and educationally from receiving communities—often may not appreciate the interests and activities that Americans must also pursue to stay alive and to thrive in the present economically-challenged situation, especially when these refugees first arrive in the U.S. They are in too much pain, many have been too deprived; many have lost so much that comparatively, they think that their needs should trump those of others. Don't Americans realize what refugees have been through? Refugees often do not understand how life might be difficult for American-born individuals and families, or that the difficulty increased after the economic crisis that began in the fall of 2008. Trying to understand, from the viewpoint of receiving Americans, what their concerns might be seems, well, so unfair. As far as many refugees see it, Americans have everything and every privilege they don't have—material, educational, economic, jobs, political

[133] For a fascinating study of trauma as a "social wound"—the "interstitial tissue of the social" which complicates and adds tension to the relations between refugees and host community members, and between refugees of different identity affiliations, see Dewachi's (2015) case study of a refugee in the Middle East. It is a must-read article for those working on the implications and productivity of victim/survivor identities, the developing relations between arrivals and receiving community members, and on integration in local communities.

power, a place in the community. Often they do not know how Americans got these advantages. In other words, they do not understand *the work of achievement* in the U.S. On the other hand, Americans may understand few of the important values that refugees have in coming from other religions and more sociocentrically-oriented communities or tribes, where the social group is clearly understood as a significant resource. It is a very different organizing principle from the "self-sufficiency" and self-expression emphasis of an individualistic society.

Americans, for their part, may not understand *the work of survival* and *the work of re-establishing oneself and family and ethnic group in a new nation* that refugees must undertake. Many Americans have a media-mediated understanding because of the ubiquity of news and human-interest stories of this problem since the Viet Nam era and that famous footage of the abandonment of the U.S. embassy in Saigon at the end of the Viet Nam war, with American embassy personnel being helicoptered off the U.S. embassy roof while Vietnamese friends and allies reached pleadingly after them in desperation. Images of terrible human suffering and escape and violence have been non-ending, and they are toxic trauma stories, fomenting high arousal and no relief or resolution. Several seconds of footage, three-minute stories, or even one-hour newsmagazines cannot, however, show the lived experience of refugees. [134]

In sum, there are two broad interests at work in the beginning:

- The receiving community manages potential pollution from the chaos of practices which may be tinged with contamination from the asociality of war and the traumatization of individual and collective bodies (what kinds of sicknesses—individual social economic political—are refugees bringing in with them?). And they manage pollution from the arriving communities' sociocultural ideas of the cosmos, economic ideas, social and political arrangements that are very different and often flip sides of the coin to the hegemonies of the receiving nation-state. Many arriving cultures are fall on the more sociocentric side of social organization; this is not the drill for U.S. neoliberal citizenry, which emphasizes individualistic arrangements. In line with this orientation, receiving community members individualistically and

[134] And some have worried about this imagery as a type of violence pornography. Mollica (2006:223) also warns psychiatrists and other healers against fetishizing the trauma story.

capitalistically pursue new social and economic capital in their interactions with new arrivals.

- The arriving community pursues agency in the ways that they see fit, which respect both their full capabilities as adults and their socio-cultural values. These interests are conserving of dignity and respect, and help stabilize the members of these collectives in this time of very rapid change.[135] They are also focused on managing potential pollution from the receiving community, whose socio-cultural arrangements undermine the extant social safety-net practices brought in by the arriving populations: The ways the polygamy has worked in caring for the extended corporate-families; the ways that kinship and clan membership have worked in spreading risk; the ways that someone can make a claim on his/her group in times of stress; the ways that arriving group leaders actually know the stresses of individuals and families and can arrange for assistance without that family losing face: these practices do not conform to neoliberal self-reliance ideas.

Almost all definitely want government to protect and provide for the common welfare. But at the same time as they are managing "pollution" from receiving communities, many are keenly aware of the new opportunities afforded by the U.S. systems of law and economics, and other U.S. cultural forms; and they engage in agentive pursuit as well, just as receiving community members are doing. Refugees told me this: they welcomed new opportunities and even styles. I saw young adult refugee women wearing blue jeans under their traditional clothing, carefully hidden from view and a source of sly delight.

Of course, a mediating dynamic here is the renewing, revitalizing role of immigrant communities in the U.S.—offering variety, variability, alternative practices and models. These contributions and resources are what enable the movement toward transcendence of victim/rescuer, helper/downtrodden relationships which are not sustainable for social, psychological, or political health in the long run, and that interfere with the achievement of full integration of refugees within the nation.

[135] See DeVoe (2002).

And because this is a mediating dynamic, it bears the paradox and promise of refugees resettling in the U.S.: while they are pushed to become neoliberal citizens, they are pulled to retain their identity of origin. This cannot be guided—even though both sides try. No society awaits the reintegration of refugees into a new role. Hybridities are forged which help them to overcome tensions and to heal from war. The task of hybridity is to overcome cultural entrapments via new opportunities. But how does routinization occur? What does it look like? Even as I thought about my role as to continually open new spaces of creativity and agency, I did not have an idea of how these might be routinized.

It requires trust that people will find a way, and that if that way begins to create too much problem for the Social – now dual--others will step in to exert checks on the unthinking or self-destructive.

Refugees are a burden. And a blessing. They can in actuality be both but this happens over time. At a point in time, they may be predominantly one or the other, and receiving communities may come to fixate on one of these as the prevailing view depending on a host of factors—economic downturns being one, neoliberal ideologies being another, the level of terrorist fears currently fomented in the media being a third. The amount of cultural/racial purity of a given community and its tendencies to protect boundaries along those lines might be another. Some communities are just more open than others. I've seen many communities by now, and they exist on a continuum from very open and cosmopolitan to very provincial. And all who see refugees benefit from and are burdened by them. Refugees stretch everyone's experience and assumptions about life.

For refugees, receiving community members are a blessing, and a burden as well. They can be both and it happens over time. At a point in time and in the instantiation of an individual

or local agency, they can be predominantly one or the other, and refugees may come to fixate on one of these as a prevailing view depending also on a host of factors—the level of demands for gratitude, the level of pain and disappointment that one is experiencing after arrival, the intrusiveness of the surveillance one experiences, the absence of true assistance that a community is giving especially in the area of social connection, to name a few. A big one is the level of competition going on between receiving community factions of volunteers who want to "capture" their refugee "community" as their "project."

One highly-educated refugee recently mentioned that all the volunteers hovering around in the background around his/her community [a Burmese ethnic group] are "complicating."[136] In the same meeting, a volunteer stated that arriving community leaders would only be found amongst the young people coming up (ones with whom the volunteer was working), effectively dissing this Yale-educated refugee. The volunteer did not know the background of this refugee and made assumptions; and my swerve practice-wise was to put this refugee on a panel at the next quarterly consultation so that receiving community members can see that, actually, intellectuals are arriving in these so-called high-barrier communities, and sometimes they are more educated than the volunteers who are trying to serve them. And the refugees are also diplomatic, bemused, and smiling through gritted teeth sometimes, too (I am referencing here the observation that sometimes refugees accuse receiving community members of being friendly but not straightforward—refugees mastered this practice long before they arrived, in my observation).

[136] This is the resettlement equivalent of all the aid agencies descending upon a local community that has experienced a disaster overseas, and the local people have their hands full trying to get what they need and managing the chaos of expectations from helpers while recovering from the disaster.

Resettlement of refugees is a multivalent phenomenon. Refugees need to find a way to live in American society; they need the renewing and innovating resources of another society to both get out of their liminal state and to resiliate after mass violence and persecution.

Receiving communities in the U.S. have had a history of reinvigoration from influxes of new socio-cultural forms, businesses, talents, and ideas that have arrived with immigrants. It is no different with refugees--and perhaps even more true of refugees--who can help make real for us the consequences of mass violence and government failures.

Chapter 5

The governing work of resettlement: *shaping refugees into neoliberal citizens*

> *We seem condemned, at least for the immediate future, and perhaps for a good while beyond it, to live at best in what someone, thinking perhaps of Yugoslavian truces, Irish ceasefires, African rescue operations, and Middle eastern negotiations, has called a low-intensity peace—not the sort of environment in which liberalism has normally flourished. But it is the sort of environment in which it will have to operate if it is to persist and have an effect, and to maintain what seems to me its deepest and most central commitment: the moral obligation to hope.*
>
> --Clifford Geertz, 2000

Many people in the U.S. are involved in resettlement of refugees. The longest-running resettlement programs in the U.S. predate the Refugee Act of 1980 and are faith-based (Catholic, Lutheran, Jewish). The International Rescue Committee (IRC) was founded in 1933 and also relies partly on the work of volunteers to assist with the resettlement process. Several federal and state government agencies are involved, as are local private and public institutions, volunteers, neighbors, and community leaders. From faith based and private individuals and groups to government employees, who meets refugees and what do they do with (and to) them?

In the post-9-11 era, ordinary Americans who are assisting refugees arriving from areas of extreme violence may have appreciation for but may also be impacted by these newcomers. Resettlement agencies, receiving community members, and some government officials intimate--and policies of the program reinforce—that refugees must be assisted to behave according to local standards and within the law, must be "caught up" or re-credentialed in educational and

linguistic attainment, and must become self-sufficient as quickly as possible so as not to burden taxpayers. There is something inevitable and inseparable about both the humanitarian and governance functions of resettlement, and it was accentuated by ongoing fears after 9-11.

This chapter revisits the multiple levels of the resettlement system as a means to understand the practices and ways that policies made at the national level circulate through state and local levels. We can then see interests of stakeholders at various system registers across all groups: governments, receiving local communities, and arriving refugees. I will describe the policy and governance structures in the post-arrival period, exploring the actions and responsibilities and interests of the nation-state and those who operate governments at national and state levels. Next we look at the question of phases of resettlement and ask, what is the actual endgame? Until recently, I have found it to be rather poorly defined beyond "self-sufficiency," that is, to socialize refugees into neoliberal citizens, while ideas about the endgame of resettlement among local and national stakeholders vary widely.[137] Chapter 6 will show

[137] Very recently (in the winter of 2015), the White House Task Force on New Americans initiated an immigrant integration study with extensive stakeholder input, issuing a report in April 2015 which discussed how immigrant integration would become part of the federal "DNA," thus assuring a more systematic and careful approach to integrating immigrants and refugees economically and linguistically. As I listened in on many calls, it was apparent that the Administration was trying to build some consensus around an approach to the endgame. It was in a stalemate with Congress about immigration reform (after it has seemed hopeful prior to the 2012 elections) *and* the summer of 2014's significant influx of unaccompanied minors and families crossing the southern U.S. border from Central America and entering ICE and ORR custody (it numbered approximately 68,500 in FY2014, close to the 70,000 Presidential ceiling on refugees officially admitted to the U.S. for the same fiscal year) had deeply politicized immigration issues. The influx of migrants became a serious political issue for the Administration which did not want to be seen incenting migration of "illegal aliens" into the U.S.

The U.S. refugee resettlement program and refugees who *do* have legal status upon arrival in the U.S. got swept into the controversy because many members of the public do not understand the legal status differences, and—as I will explain below—funding was being diverted from refugee programs to handling unaccompanied children, because (by law) ORR must assume legal custody of minors within 72 hours after being picked up by ICE officials. During the summer of 2014, State Refugee Coordinators (SRCs) across the U.S. got many angry calls and emails from members of the public (clearly organized, everyone agreed, and some of which were threatening) insisting that state officials not agree to placement in THEIR state. ACF and ORR told SRCs that funding for the fall was in danger of being cut by nearly half because of the costs of addressing the needs of unaccompanied child minors. Churches, immigrant-rights organizations, and other humanitarian interests were pushing from the other direction and expressing outrage over the treatment of those in flight; a UNHCR official with whom I spoke insisted that by international treaty the U.S. has to accept asylum seekers though he understood the political issues facing the Administration, and that the Administration was truly in a bind. So, much discussion about immigration, immigrant and refugee integration, came flying to the fore from this Central America exodus, and the vulnerability of those in flight increased as pressure was brought to bear on Mexico to prevent migrants from reaching the U.S. border. The administration has now begun processes of interviewing would-be migrants in-country, though the numbers to be admitted fit within existing plans for the

different expectations, stakes, and interests of local stakeholders in receiving communities. In Chapter 7 we return to the expectations, stakes and interests among refugees arriving.

As we progress through these three chapters, the processual and agentive theory constructs of Chapter 4—liminality, ritual, and *communitas* during change; social and cultural capital acquisition, and social healing/resilience—will help us analyze the roles being played (and who is getting what out of these) and the agentive actions taken by various stakeholders in resettlement.

LAWS, STATUTES, AND CODES GOVERNING RESETTLEMENT IN THE U.S.

The U.S. refugee resettlement program is guided by federal statute. The Refugee Act of 1980 established the authorities, programs, funding rules, eligibility for benefits and their levels, and put the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in charge of the administration of these programs. The Act set forth the policy of the U.S. government that all programs focus on getting refugees self-sufficient economically and socially as soon as possible after arrival in the U.S. Funding and programs are frontloaded to the first three years to this end.[138]

Refugees are eligible for most safety-net benefits programs for which U.S. citizens are eligible, according to the same eligibility rules: TANF, FoodShares (food stamps), Medicaid (but not Medicare), SSI (but not social security). These programs have income-ceiling eligibility

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number of refugee admissions from the Caribbean and Latin America, which is 4,000. The Presidential Determination for 2015 specified that individuals from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador—if otherwise qualified—could be admitted as refugees.

Despite these developments, I am keeping this chapter focused on the poorly defined endgame of refugee resettlement I was observing from 2003-2014 because the issues and controversies have not gone away even as stakeholders are thinking much more about what they are trying to do. Interests in one direction or another remain much the same from what I have been able to observe, the current politicization of the issue notwithstanding.

[138] Formula and discretionary grant programs may be accessed by refugees up to five years after arrival and beyond, but refugees who are still within two or three years of initial arrival in the U.S. are prioritized for services. Some programs have longer eligibility periods, such as discretionary TAG and Older Refugee Program; Social Services grant also allows refugees to get assistance with preparation for citizenship beyond the five-year eligibility period for other services.

requirements established in relation to the federal poverty level. Since refugees arrive without an income, they meet income-eligibility requirements for these benefits. TANF is only available, however, to refugee families with children under 18 in the household. And until the Affordable Care Act began on January 1, 2014, Medicaid was also not often available to adults without children under 18 in the household. Therefore, 45CFR§400 Subparts E, G, and J spell out exactly how refugees qualify for federal benefits programs and provide for a cash and medical assistance (CMA) program that assists refugees who are not eligible for TANF program and medical assistance (Medicaid), called Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) and Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA), respectively. These benefits expire at the end of eight months after arrival.

45CFR § 400.140-156 [Subpart I] and 400.310-319 [Subpart L] also provide for formula-funded programs called Social Services and Formula Targeted Assistance Grant (TAG). ORR additionally awards discretionary grants such as Services to Older Refugees, Micro-Enterprise programs for agriculture and home-based child care, and a more general small business development program, Services to Victims of Torture, Ethnic Community Self-Help grants, Individual Development Account (IDA) programs, School Impact grants, and a number of other grants whose purpose is to assist in the provision of enhanced case management and health promotion services, and to address other emergent needs.[139]

The largest of these funded programs (Social Services and the TAG grants) are primarily employment programs that help refugees overcome barriers to employment, and find and keep jobs. They pay mostly for staff time at agencies but can also be used to buy refugees work attire,

[139] Very recently, ORR has started to fold in some discretionary grant programs to the Social Services allocation that States received based on numbers of arrivals in the previous two years. Services to Older Refugees were incorporated for FFY16; School Impact grants will be incorporated in FFY17. These two grants, along with Discretionary Targeted Assistance grant, were only available for States and Wilson Fish programs—Volags and other non-profits were not eligible for these grants. Currently a health promotion grant is also awarded competitively to States and Wilson Fish agencies. Other discretionary grants are offered through competitive award to Volags and other agencies. Ethnic community self-help grants are only available to organizations with 50% or more of the board comprised of refugees and former refugees.

tools, boots, bus passes, and other items that are needed for job entry and retention. Social Services and formula TAG funding (the latter allocated to areas with high concentrations of refugees) can be used to fund barrier-reducing programs such as ESL and vocational ESL, mental and behavioral health services, and short-term work-skills training or on-the-job training. The competitively-awarded Discretionary TAG funding may assist refugees outside of the prioritized three-year-after-arrival period, even beyond the five-year mark.

ADMINISTRATION OF RESETTLEMENT FUNDING AND POLICY

Federal Agencies

A. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM)

The Department of State's PRM executes a cooperative agreement with nine national Volags for the "reception and placement" (R & P) of refugees in local communities across the U.S. by their place-based affiliates or local agencies. A number of requirements of the cooperative agreement were detailed in the Introduction and Chapters 2 and 3 (*e.g.*, the requirements of orientation, what must be put into the apartment, preparing a hot meal for their arrival at the new apartment, funds to be dedicated for the initial support of refugees, *et al*). The period of reception and placement ends after 90 days and also ends the involvement of PRM in the resettlement of refugees (except in instances where the transfer from overseas has gone awry or issues arise with family members of resettled refugees who are still awaiting transfer). At that point, programs administered through the DHHS Administration for Children and Families' Office of Refugee Resettlement (ACF/ORR) take over in providing for refugee resettlement and assistance.

In practice, the 90-day period is used to assure that all services required in the cooperative agreement can be delivered; however most services are required to be delivered

within 30 days of arrival, and most refugees go on to enroll in other programs such as Matching Grant, Social Services, and TAG programs by the 30th day or even sooner.

The R & P money pays for rent and security deposits, sets up utilities, furnishes the apartment, provides for transportation through issuance of bus tickets (in some communities), purchases initial food supplies until FoodShare applications are processed (this takes a week or so) and pays funds left over after these expenses to refugees for walk-around money. This "whatever is left over" is a source of misunderstanding and mistrust for many refugees who have been told about the R & P funding of $1100 per person but did not understand that the money has to be spent first for setting up the apartment, phone, transportation, and initial food expenses.[140]

Several refugees and Americans who have put themselves forward as volunteers or advocates for refugees have called me as the Wisconsin State Refugee Coordinator (SRC) to inquire about Volags possibly taking refugees' money. Most are satisfied with the explanation: they simply need to hear it from someone outside of their resettlement agency to verify that what the agency has told them is actually true. Refugee experiences in many countries of origin have been of graft and corruption by public or NGO officials, or, black-market businesses where they have been cheated or squeezed for bribes.

So they check. In so doing it is the first instance in the U.S. where they exert claim for their human rights: a symbolic act of empowerment in exercising rights under the rule of law.

Glitches may arise. For example, refugees may decide that they want to join a family member or friend in another city, even within a day or two after arrival. These transfers have to

[140] The $1100 figure is what must be spent for direct expenses per person; for a case of a family, it is the number in the family X $1100. Volags receive $800 for administrative and program costs per person, over and above the $1100 to be spent on direct refugee expenses. Local resettlement agencies have a massive amount of work to accomplish with and for refugees starting before they arrive (securing apartment and furnishings, transporting items to apartment, arranging airport pickup, *etc.*); the Cooperative Agreement with PRM specifies in detail everything that must be accomplished.

get worked out between Volags because of the money involved for both the Volags and the refugee. Volags have already expended funds from the R & P budget. It is a management issue and can be difficult to handle. Mostly, though, R & P works very well as PRM has gained experience through the years with planning transfers from overseas to locales in the U.S., and getting good information from refugees in advance of transfer about their preferences for cities of reception based on knowing family or friends who already live there.

PRM's work is not detailed in the Refugee Act of 1980, and though PRM communicates with ORR, the agencies function rather separately. The point of separation is 90 days after arrival. A tie that binds is that both are working with national Volags to do the work of resettlement after arrival in the U.S. A somewhat less salient tie is through the State Refugee Coordinators (SRCs), who provide comments to PRM regarding the yearly proposals from local agencies operation within state borders for numbers and types of refugees they want to resettle.[141] PRM considers this feedback as it makes its decisions about local agency capacities for resettlement. PRM then issues cooperative agreements with national Volags which also spell out the maximum capacity for resettlement at any given locale. Once this number is determined, a local Volag may not exceed its approved number of arrivals by more than 10% without permission of PRM and the State Refugee Coordinator. These sideboards to number of arrivals enable planning across entities collaborating with local Volags in the resettlement of refugees

[141] Comments usually concern local Volag and institutional capacity for the numbers and populations proposed. SRCs have not previously commented—to my knowledge—on what populations are anticipated for resettlement in a way which would exclude populations based on nationality, religion, political views, or membership in a social group—the criteria for admission as refugees fleeing persecution on those grounds. Where a population proposed for resettlement might be an issue is if it is a totally new population to the area and there is no receiving community. I do know of an instance where an elected official requested that a new population not be resettled in a city—because the city had experienced very high numbers of secondary migration of a given nationality. His reasoning was not based on discrimination due to nationality; it was based instead on the experience of high secondary migrant pull factors creating unanticipated secondary arrivals way in excess of planning. With the events of November 2015 where governors of 31 states have indicated they did not wish to resettle Syrians, this discrimination based on nationality would be a new policy if actually implemented and upheld by courts. I am quite sure that there will be legal challenges to any attempt by States to bar Syrians or any refugees based on the very criteria establishing them as eligible refugees in the first place.

coming in from overseas. Landlords, local health departments, local hospitals and other healthcare providers, TANF agencies, SRCs, local school districts, local community action agencies, ESL providers, mental health providers, city and county governments, employment and training agencies, income-maintenance agencies providing Foodshares and medical insurance benefits are among those working on resettlement of refugees in locales across the U.S. Planning has recently been made infinitely more difficult, however, with budget wrangling in Congress, and because ORR as an emergency-administration agency does not have control over expenses that they will be required to pay. I will say more about this below as it is a source of significant stress and angst for government officials charged with stewardship of funds and refugee services.

In sum, PRM's role and activities in resettlement *stateside* include:

- accepting refugees for resettlement in the U.S. (process detailed in chapter 2);
- conducting quarterly placement planning consultations with SRCs and ORR which include information about populations in the pipeline for transfer as well as new resettlement populations being readied for acceptance into the programs;
- assessing capacities of local sites for reception and placement of refugees;
- consulting with SRCs and ORR in review of proposals from Volags for numbers and types of cases to be resettled through their agencies;
- executing cooperative agreements for reception and placement of refugees with funding and benefits attached;
- setting policies and standards about reception and placement responsibilities in local sites;
- monitoring execution of agreements locally, through review of reports on each case, and through local site visits;[142]
- and adjusting policies and requirements in the cooperative agreement that update and "course-correct" in the face of emerging issues.[143]

[142] Sites are visited every few years, and as one local Volag director stated, they are "the mother of all monitoring visits." When an upcoming visit is announced in a local refugee network meeting, it is one instance where local Volag directors commiserate with each other and express extreme sympathy. Cooperative agreements have extensive and detailed requirements for service, and performance is imperfect because people make mistakes and run out of time and money.

[143] For example, there are new requirements for Volags to provide extended cultural orientation with testing of refugees' knowledge acquisition, and Volags are evaluated on the results of this testing. This change has occurred in the past two years and reflects the more general move to focusing on outcomes by federal, state, and philanthropic funders.

The list is undoubtedly quite incomplete, but it gives us a sense of what others outside of PRM and Washington DC more generally can see of its work and therefore are figuring into their thinking about their own work. Each bulleted point glosses the nuanced and detailed work of PRM staff as well as the volume of work and production which goes into each task each year. It is huge, and from everything I have observed, these officials take very seriously their responsibilities of protection of the U.S. from accepting refugees with bad or fraudulent intentions because these stakes are high. And they take very seriously the responsibilities for assuring that the reception and placement of refugees to goes well.

B. Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR)

ORR-funded programs take over quickly to support refugee households on the path to self-sufficiency. Its programs and funding rules are also set forth in 45CFR§400. While some flexibility was built into statute, it is quite prescriptive in structuring the trajectory of resettlement for refugees and how they will be supported in the beginning. Thus ORR officials check practices against statute.

Federal statute grants the Director of ORR some discretionary authority, and s/he exercises it through funding new programs, making decisions about funding, and making changes to policy which are communicated in State Letters (these are available to view on the ORR website). These changes can have very significant impacts to operations down the line (through States and their contractors), as was the case with recent changes to refugee health screening protocols while impending insurance changes loomed with the implementation of the Affordable Care Act on January 1 2014.

ORR grants much of its refugee funding to state governments to administer programs locally and to coordinate programs and services in resettlement locales. Discretionary grants are

awarded competitively and States may compete for some of them. Others are reserved for Volag-only competitions; still others are competitively awarded at the national level for provision of technical assistance. National Volags often win these grants, though not exclusively.

Even though a few funding streams have client eligibility periods that extend to five years, seven years, or even beyond), services purchased and clients prioritized for those services are frontloaded to those within the first year after arrival. This is the period which could be viewed as the most elaborated "interventionscape" by national and state governments, local resettlement agencies that are serving refugees in cities and towns across the U.S., as well as volunteers, and mainstream agencies and institutions.

But is important to next understand what happens after refugees go beyond the initial year or two of resettlement. ORR policy has been to make sure that refugees get "mainstreamed" and are served by social service agencies and safety nets in local communities for disadvantaged families. This policy I would loosely identify as a push towards "integration" into American society via its institutional systems. In practice, it may or may not get carried out effectively for a number of reasons. The Director of ORR from 2009-2015 focused on interfacing with other federal agencies to try to get refugees listed as a target population in other federally-funded programs during his tenure. The initial push I have been able to observe was to get refugees named in requests for funding proposals as an identified target population for proposed programs and services.

Data from my participant observation research (in three of my roles—local Volag director, MAA mentor, and SRC) and remarks of key informants--while not a comprehensive survey--have not shown significant impacts of this effort yet:

- Refugee mutual assistance associations (MAAs) want to compete for these mainstream grants, but they are not reporting success in winning grants. In some instances they have been asked for letters of support or partnerships, but once funding is awarded, their agencies are not tapped for services they could provide in cultural and linguistic interpretation. Effectively, MAAs are asked to volunteer or have been used by mainstream agencies to enhance their grant proposals, but then MAAs find they will not be subcontractors for funding after the award is granted.

- On the other hand, mainstream agencies see additional financial and opportunity costs in serving refugee populations effectively: refugees have socialization and interpretation needs and require significantly more staff time. Agency officials have said to me that they do not see it possible to serve refugees alongside other mainstream populations because they require so much socio-cultural explanation and orientation in addition to the actual service-provision content. They worry about being able to produce the numbers sought by the granting agency for their grants given the significant opportunity costs. I will discuss mainstream agencies' "swerves" around these issues in more detail in the next chapter.

I am unaware of how or if ORR collects data on the impacts of this effort in terms of refugees being served effectively in mainstream programs (this includes both access and impact questions). It would be a good topic for future research.

Some of the most recent efforts from ORR appear to be a series of webinars in which speakers from ORR and XX federal agency discuss mainstream programs that refugees could access. It will take time to see the results of this longer-term strategy. With my practitioner hat on, I am willing to suspend disbelief to see what comes. However, there are also high barriers to getting results with this approach, partly for the same reason listed in the last bullet point above. Others include the following:

- It requires a lot of technical assistance (TA) to assure that refugees can gain access to mainstream services. Much of this TA needs to be provided to Volag and ECBO case managers, and refugees themselves, to help them overcome access barriers. I do not have any sense of how much of this type of TA is currently provided to any of these stakeholders.

- Volags and ECBOs have to actually first *see* the opportunities for refugees and then help refugees to access them, presenting a high transaction cost to these agencies. They may be willing to bear this cost, but in general, they are underfunded and may not have the staff levels to do this work.

One way to handle these issues is by funding refugee MAAs or other refugee-focused CBOs to provide these bridging and support services; and this approach has the added gain of developing more capacity for self-help among MAAs and CBOs. It seems actually a rather simple fix, but is not in the current budget climate.[144]

ORR's budgetary structure: Many are unaware that ORR is responsible for populations other than newly-arriving refugees. Individuals granted asylum are immediately entitled to the same benefits and programs as refugees. ORR certifies foreign-born victims of trafficking, making them also eligible for refugee programs.

ORR must also take custody of the unaccompanied children (referred to as UACs, or Unaccompanied Alien Children) appearing at the southern borders of the U.S. fleeing violent conditions in three Central American countries, and this means provision of food, shelter, and staff to serve them while their cases are under adjudication. These emergencies require funding. The numbers of unaccompanied children have increased from 3,500 a year in 2011 and years previous, to a projected 65,500 for 2014, more than an 1800% increase to be absorbed in ORR's budget. At the end of 2013, ORR projected a budget deficit of $600 million; its existing budget was $900 million.[145] Another enlightening statistic: ORR administered the program of resettlement for up to the ceiling of 70,000 refugees declared by the President and Congress for FY14; but ORR will have actually served an estimated 200,000 *new* clients during that period.

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[144] Too, MAAs and grassroots agencies may have little experience or spotty performance records due to inadequate managerial and administrative capacities.

[145] Congress did significantly increase the budget to ORR to accommodate these projections in January 2014, though the funding was less than $600 million (but greater than what President Obama requested). In June 2014, the funding emergency was back at the forefront, and ORR and ACF officials were again on the phone with Volags and SRCs to tell them of dire funding cuts if Congress did not act. Again, the funding crisis passed when the new Federal fiscal year approached (I was transitioning jobs at the time and was not in the loop as to the actual method of resolution); but the uncertainty was exhausting to (especially) many of the SRCs with whom I was in contact as States tried to plan for the coming contracting year and work with their contractors to help them understand the uncertainty of funding.

Effectively, ORR cannot control its expenditures or demands for funding in emergencies such as the UAC issue. Furthermore, RMA and RCA expenditures are effectively sum-sufficient, meaning that whatever bills are presented for payment will have to be paid. In August of each year, state refugee coordinators (SRCs) send to ORR an estimate of expenditures for the coming year based on historical data, but no one can predict how many adults without children will actually arrive in a given year, and that number was going up during my tenure. RMA expenditures also cannot be fully predicted in advance because healthcare needed by refugees in the first 8 months after arrival are unknowns.[146]

With the exception of funding for services to victims of torture, monies budgeted to ORR for programs and services are discretionary. This means that ORR's budget serves various programmatic and emergency needs but the funds are not segregated. Therefore, funding for accelerating numbers of unaccompanied children showing up at the border to seek asylum has to come out of the funds planned for other programs—and they have been moved over from refugee programs. A solution to this problem would be to segregate funds for various programs, so that if there is an emergency occurring in one target population, it will not require funds be repurposed from a different and unrelated program.

These serious budgeting issues aside, I was told when I first entered the refugee resettlement field that refugee programs had been underfunded by design so that local communities would step up with in-kind donations and volunteering to help welcome and incorporate refugees into their communities. Indeed, the matching grant program for refugees—on which most refugees rely in states with very low TANF benefits—requires a 50% match by

[146] Many though not all states took expanded Medicaid funds from the Federal government under the Affordable Care Act, and since refugees are eligible for Medicaid and RMA only if they are not eligible for Medicaid, some cost savings occurred in the RMA program, a fortuitous co-incidence. If the political maneuverings to gut the Affordable Care Act are successful, however, the problem will return.

the local Volag, 80% of which can be in-kind through volunteer time or donations of material goods, and 20% of which must be cash. Agency Boards and development directors are usually the ones tasked with assuring the cash match.[147]

The budget uncertainties and emergency expenditures make planning at state and local levels extremely difficult, and this is where refugees experience resettlement program quality. ORR officials cannot control the funding as "responsible managers." With a lot of critical responsibilities for very vulnerable populations and subject to underfunding by design, they are between a rock and a hard place. It is very hard to manage risk and reduce vulnerability under these conditions.

In sum, ORR's role and activities in resettlement include the following:

- administering funding for benefits and services according to the Refugee Act of 1980 and ensuing federal statutes;
- operationalizing federal refugee policies;
- managing emerging issues through funding and policy-development (for example, a significantly high suicide rate appearing among refugees from Nepal/Bhutan);
- adjusting policies and practices to improve services as new information about best or promising practices becomes available;
- advocating for refugees *et al* in states and locales, and with other federal agencies;
- developing new programs, issuing RFPs, and awarding grants;
- collecting data on outcomes of funded programs, refugee population trends, and reporting to Congress on a yearly basis;
- providing technical assistance to grantees and information about its programs, partners, policies, grants, and outcomes on its website; and
- monitoring grantees and evaluating programs.

[147] Recently ORR has increased the number of matching grant "slots" (one refugee per slot) by 10,000, effectively paying for it through the anticipated reduction in refugee cash assistance or RCA (refugees get one or the other). The reasons for this move are likely complex, but from my experiences directing a local resettlement program, it puts additional pressure on local resettlement agencies due to the match. Someone asked me, do the agencies raise the match? The answer is that they have to raise it, otherwise, they do not get the federal funds. This program begs for a strong, qualitative study of the costs and benefits to agencies and communities of the requirements to provide this match.

I do not know the answer—I just know the hassle of it from a managerial perspective. What do the requirements for match and volunteerism actually do to help local communities connect with refugees, invest in the program, and take ownership? What does it to for refugees, who are impacted by these "investments" socially and in the way that it identifies them as a survivor in need of humanitarian aid? I *can* say that refugees do tend to like the program because it provides a higher level of financial support in the first months of resettlement (through cash as well as rent and utilities payments). In states with low TANF and RCA it is the only possible way to support refugees after the R & P period and before they are able to enter employment.

The list is undoubtedly quite incomplete, but it gives us a sense of what others outside of ORR and Washington DC more generally can see of its work and therefore are figuring into their thinking about their own work. Each bulleted point glosses the nuanced and detailed work of ORR staff as well as the huge volume of work and production which goes into each task each year. These officials take very seriously the responsibilities of the humanitarian mission of the American people for resettling populations with a well-founded fear of persecution. And they take very seriously the responsibilities for assuring that the resettlement of refugees to goes well: recently, ORR has been instituting performance-improvement plans for low-performing sites, in line with the more general trend at various levels of government in the U.S. toward performance-based contracting.

State governments and Wilson-Fish programs

States administer the bulk of ORR federal funding and programs for refugees. The Refugee Act of 1980 designated that each State in which refugees will be resettled shall appoint a State Refugee Coordinator (SRC) to coordinate all refugee programs and services in the state. I served as the SRC from 2010 to 2014 for the State of Wisconsin. Actual practices across States for re-granting of funds to local provider agencies vary according to State statutes and administrative policies.

Each year, ORR notifies States of the amount of formula funding that they will receive in Social Services and Formula TAG grants, usually in August (before the start of the FFY on October 1). The formula is based on the number of overseas arrivals to the state as well as secondary migrants, asylees, certified victims of trafficking, and Cuban/Haitian entrants who have arrived or been granted status within the previous two years. States may also compete with each other for discretionary grants such as Refugee Health Promotion and Discretionary TAG.

And, States may also compete for other discretionary grants for which a diverse set of non-profits and governments are eligible.

Sometimes a State (meaning, the state government) does not want to participate in the resettlement of refugees or administer its cash and medical benefits. In such cases, Federal statute also provides for the entirely privatized administration of resettlement programs and benefits. Called the Wilson-Fish program, it allows States to divest themselves of administering refugee programs. The program rules enable more flexibility in delivery of benefits and services.

Seventeen states now have Wilson-Fish programs; those which did not occur in the beginning (where a State could actually opt to be a Wilson-Fish program)[148] are able to run more entrepreneurially and with more agility as non-profit organizations. Wilson-Fish programs enable some flexibility in cash benefits, meaning, the payments may not be exactly the same as state TANF.

Another source of flexibility in federal statute allows State programs to be organized as public-private partnerships, again enabling some variation in the issuance of cash benefits so as to incentivize early employment. The Wilson-Fish option allows a different (but still standardized) benefit payment structure from a state's TANF structure, while the public-private partnership option enables provision of an incentive payment for early employment through bonuses. State-run RCA programs follow the state's TANF program benefits structure exactly.

Refugees arriving with children under the age of 18 are eligible for state TANF programs, which lifetime benefits-eligibility limits (in Wisconsin, it is currently 60 months); refugees arriving without minor children get RCA through the 8th month after arrival or until employed, whichever is first.

[148] This is no longer an option and I will not detail the operation of these early holdovers. The State of Colorado operates one of these; it would be a fruitful independent case study. ORR's website has a page devoted to the Wilson-Fish programs.

The number of refugee arrivals to states varies widely. Florida receives Cuban and Haitan entrants (around 15,000 per year; these are not counted among refugee admissions in the presidential ceiling). New Hampshire received 373 in 2014; Arizona received 2,964; Hawaii – 2; Alaska – 141.[149]

Since the numbers vary so greatly, the responsibilities of individual SRCs also vary greatly. And, the coordination of refugee programs in the states varies greatly because state TANF programs and benefit levels vary greatly and the refugee benefits are keyed to TANF programs. State TANF programs are huge compared to refugee programs: in Wisconsin during my tenure as SRC, the yearly TANF budget ranged up to nearly $200 million, as compared to under $6 million for refugee programs. Some states devote some of their TANF funding to refugee-specific programs (Washington does; Wisconsin does not, for example); some states fund some refugee programs from general revenues in addition to granted federal funds (again, Washington does; Wisconsin does not). I am not aware of scholarly or grey literature which examines the function and variance of States' administration and coordination of refugee funding and services, but this would be a good formative research project to undertake so we could get a better handle on what public officials are fielding. State-analyst staff at ORR may actually be among the most informed on this topic, interestingly, since they are working as a team in sending funding to and receiving reports from States. I would caution against this becoming an exercise in comparison of efficacy of state programs and therefore the basis for sending to refugees to some states and not others: PRM *and refugees* need a variety of programs across the U.S. in order for the resettlement effort to be viable. But different funding, economic, and social environments in different states make for differences in resettlement experiences, and refugees

[149] Arrivals figures for all states are available on ORR's website.

make decisions to move between states. So assessing the local environments for adequacy of resources to support refugee resettlement and integration should be a concern and can be assisted with federal policies and funding.

SRCs have a membership organization called SCORR (State Coordinators of Refugee Resettlement) but this organization does not charge membership fees and therefore is run by elected officers (who are SRCs) volunteering to do the work. In my opinion, it is not nearly as effective as it might be if it had full-time dedicated staff to coordinate and advocate for state issues in resettlement. States practices and purviews are so diverse and of such entirely different scales that more targeted attention to variance would help SRCs adopt best practices geared to their own circumstances and scale of operations. SRCs do not really have the time to devote to this data collection, comparison, and analyses.[150]

ORR publishes a yearly report summarizing data on a variety of employment indicators, listed by state. The indicators include information about: job entry rates; average wage (though not keyed to cost of living which of course varies significantly across the U.S.); refugees who have gone off of public benefits or are getting reduced public benefits due to income from employment (a measure of self-sufficiency); those entering jobs with employer-offered health insurance; and retention of employment at 90 days (defined as, working on the 90th day after job entry). It is interesting information in that it can act as a scorecard for state and local managers, but, it does not directly impact decisions about funding or placements from what I have been able to discern. Again, it is critical to the viability and success of the U.S. program that there be a variety of sites across the U.S. receiving refugees, so that no one state is overly impacted and

[150] Some SRCs have recently been partnering with university researchers to secure data (Illinois is one state where this is occurring). I expect this trend to continue.

refugees are not concentrated (and therefore structurally enclaved) in one or two geographic locales.

There have been recent challenges to the resettlement program in a few locales across the U.S. (I am referring to episodes occurring prior to the November 2015 governors' opposition to Syrian resettlement) in which governors or other elected officials want to see a reduction in arrivals to their states. SRCs help to mediate these concerns, and also help local officials understand the practices and promises of refugee resettlement. For example, in one Midwestern state the SRC worked with a mayor of a city which was losing population (and thus losing labor force and tax base) to understand the self-sufficiency policy of resettlement. The mayor turned into a champion of resettlement once he understood that refugees actually contribute to local economies through working and paying taxes, buying houses and paying taxes, opening small businesses and becoming local employers, and spending dollars in the local economy. Some mayors are recognizing that refugees add vibrancy to local communities and do not remain on public cash benefits for very long after arrival, turning into tax contributors within a few years and consumers immediately after arrival. On the other hand, others worry that refugees will become a burden on their fire and police departments, their local schools, and their local health departments. While an SRC I viewed this as a need for more communication and consultation between the Volag and the city government, which the SRC could facilitate if asked. I could name mayors in each category in a variety of states, actually, but in keeping with my policy for this dissertation of maintaining confidentiality of specific actors, I may not. The important point is, not enough data and information are actually circulating in all locales receiving refugees, but

where this information is available and communities are very experienced and have strong communication channels, refugees are seen as assets.[151]

The post-9-11 era coincided with trends toward the professionalization of refugee resettlement. Less participation from churches and volunteers, along with the trend of professionalization, likely reduced the number of receiving community members who actually understand the program and find ways to interact meaningfully with refugees arriving in their locales. However, recent trends toward increasing anti-immigrant sentiment and xenophobia may make it imperative that refugees and receiving community members have ways to interact and find commonalities to counteract tendencies toward marginalization and suspicion. Resettlement agencies may therefore need to revive an emphasis on strategies that encourage the significant participation of local churches and volunteers in welcoming and stabilization or refugees arriving to communities across the U.S.

In mid-size to large resettlement states (and some small states as well), SRCs often convene regular meetings of local refugee-serving networks to coordinate services and work out operational glitches. SRCs are also required by 45CFR§400 to convene quarterly meetings of stakeholders to solicit and exchange information about arrivals and other matters of concern in the resettlement of refugees to the state. They mediate between the interests of Volags--which are motivated to increase numbers since refugees are a revenue stream for them--and the interests

[151] A study conducted in Tennessee of refugee expenses vs. contributions, for example, revealed a net economic gain to communities and the State (Lee, 2013). And on November 27, 2015, *Latin Post* reported that a coalition of mayors of U.S. cities, many from states whose governors went on record opposing the resettlement of Syrians in their states, wrote to Congress urging them to continue support for refugee—including Syrian—resettlement. "The 62 mayors, including one in Puerto Rico, led by Baltimore Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake who serves as president of the USCM, stated, 'Our nation has always been a beacon of hope for those seeking peace and protection from persecution. We urge you to take no action that will jeopardize this rich and proud heritage.' …Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas are among the 31 states that have protested the admission of refugees. However, mayors ranging from Arizona's Phoenix and Tucson, Florida's Tallahassee and Hollywood, Illinois' Chicago, Massachusetts' Boston and Newton, Michigan's Detroit and Grand Rapids to Texas' Austin and Dallas have opposed their respective governors and welcome refugees, particularly from Syria, in their cities."

of other local stakeholders who will be serving refugees in programs or otherwise feel the impacts of refugees resettling.[152]

SRCs are positioned to address concerns and help facilitate better communication and partnerships between agencies. Volags—if funded by SRCs with Social Services or TAG or other kinds of funding—are accountable to SRCs through contract. SRCs field questions from the media and the public and from refugees themselves about the programs, practices, and policies of resettlement, and are positioned to investigate issues or intervene and de-glitch the problems with cases in accessing benefits. They monitor service sectors, emergent issues, program performance, and trends in refugee health, employment, and social self-sufficiency. They can work to prevent crises or change service-delivery models as conditions change. They provide technical assistance to contractors and also search for programs available in other state agencies that can serve refugees.

Finally SRCs track outcomes and monitor agencies, and they track arrivals to their states using data transmitted from PRM on a monthly basis. What they cannot know is how many refugees or former refugees are living in their state at a given time because refugees move around at will, and they do not always access public benefits or check in with a local Volag so that their presence would be picked up by State benefits databases.

Due to the variance in arrivals and funding across states, SRCs can be part time, or full time but the only state employee coordinating refugee programs, or they may be managing a staff team of some size. Many states also have a state refugee health coordinator, a position which

[152] In 2014 PRM began requiring local Volags to do quarterly consultations with stakeholders, and national Volags had to track how their affiliate and local offices were meeting this requirement. It became a source of some contention between Volags and SRCs because it appeared duplicative of meetings and roles. PRM officials did not consult with SRCs prior to instituting its requirement and as I left Wisconsin, various stakeholders were working on resolving the confusion. I am unsure of how practices and accommodations have developed. Having served in both roles (local Volag director and SRC), it seemed to me to be an odd move by PRM as I worked in states with strong SRCs who did quarterly consultations that were quite consultative; perhaps that was not the case everywhere.

emerged over time due to the complexities of providing health screenings and healthcare to refugees after they arrive.

A mediating role between federal programs and local contexts: SRCs are positioned to know a great deal more about what is happening locally than federal officials or national Volags since they are either housed within a state government or working closely with local governments as heads of Wilson-Fish programs. Yet, they are excluded from participation in RCUSA, a national organization whose website describes the organization as a "coalition [which]…serves as the principal consultative forum for the national refugee resettlement and processing agencies as they formulate common positions, conduct their relations with the U.S. government and other partners, and support and enhance refugee service standards." It seems an odd choice that officials who are well-positioned to observe, mediate, and give input from the "field" (local communities and regions) would be excluded. This top-down structure and power arrangement can therefore easily overlook important local data. And this is not an ideal situation in a time where resettlement is becoming controversial. Locals do not want to be ignored or left without means to address their concerns within national fora.

In addition, ORR does not solicit input from SRCs in upstream policy development processes, despite the fact that SRCs know a lot about local conditions that may impact implementation. Their understandings could help federal officials avoid unanticipated problems and foster better-tuned policies to meet the varying conditions across the U.S. resettlement sites. Instead, SRCs are left to respond to requests for comment posted to the Federal Register, which, practically, is often too late to be useful since the framings, decisions, and momentum toward a given policy approach are already established.

As the World Bank discovered over time, top-down policies and program end up with serious deficiencies or unanticipated (negative) outcomes in many development endeavors. I am therefore skeptical that a recent move by ORR to put state analysts in the regional ACF offices will help this gap in information at the federal level; the regional coordinators may serve certain purposes (apparently) for ORR, but it is the SRCs who have the local relationships and the most informed view of what is happening locally. They are responsible for administering most of ORR's funding and contracts with local entities, so they know a great deal about local agency performance and gaps in services, as well as how local systems function formally and informally.

STAKES AND INTERESTS OF GOVERNMENTAL STAKEHOLDERS

Foreign policy interests

A fundamental stake of the United States in refugee resettlement—which many outside the practice field do not realize—is that the refugee resettlement program is a key foreign policy decision that protects U.S. interests internationally. The modern resettlement era began with the resettlement of refugees from the war in Southeast Asia. Hmong refugees allied themselves with the U.S. and South Viet Nam; South Vietnamese who were on the losing side along with the U.S. ended up as boat people and made the news internationally as a human rights emergency directly tied to the war. Cambodians fleeing the Khmer Rouge were encamped in Thailand and found resolution by coming to the U.S.; American operations had contributed to destabilization of their country during the waning years of the Viet Nam war. Many though not all Iraqis who are resettling in the U.S. worked with the U.S. military during the war, allied themselves, provided support services, served as interpreters and translators, or worked on peace initiatives that

opposed those interested in spreading chaos in order. Afghanis are the latest group resettling under these conditions.

If U.S. military efforts need help from local populations to be successful, but then leave people behind to be killed with no assistance from the U.S. after departure, the U.S. military would soon find no friends in places it is trying to operate. Refugee programs are relatively poorly funded by Congress, but they have been funded nonetheless even in times of budget wrangling.[153] Funding cuts have been less than to other programs: not only is it pretty hard to cut an already bare-bones program reliant on contributions of time and resources from local communities, it also suggests that Congress (at least until now) has been well-informed of the foreign policy interests served and the need for the program as a safety valve for allies and supporters of our efforts militarily (who are now refugees). If America's sons and daughters are sent to war overseas, they need the help of locals, and those locals may end up having to flee for their lives because they helped Americans.

Fundamentally, then, the interest of the Department of State and of Congress more generally seems to be that the refugee program be successful and continue, because of the foreign policy stake. *But as importantly, the program provides basic hope to populations fleeing persecution.* It cannot be successful if funding levels are so low that the programs are not viable locally. Local challenges to refugees resettling seem to be at least in part about concerns that there will not be enough resources or that communities will have to foot the bill with already bare-bones resources in this era of austerity and budget cutting. It is also post-9-11, and Americans are wary of terrorist infiltration.[154]

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[153] As noted in the Foreword, this could be changing.

[154] Again, I wrote this chapter prior to the events of the fall of 2015. The wariness went off the charts in December 2015 because of the scale of the refugee crisis in the world, and terrorist events which seem rather designed to increase the chaos and as well to increase divisions between Muslim populations and the West.

Local discussions can be difficult, and opposition can be shrill and sudden. However, helping locales understand that refugees are here legally, subject to the same legal requirements as citizens, and with basically the same level of public benefits—and/but they have to repay their travel loan--has gone a long way in fostering the acceptance of refugees. It has also helped when Volags and other refugee-network actors provide information about why refugees flee and why they cannot return to their country of origin. Agencies do educational events at libraries and elsewhere to accomplish this understanding. For example, in one local Midwest community recently, opposition suddenly surfaced about a new program of resettlement in the community (which had had a history of very successful resettlement of an earlier refugee population). Fortuitously, the local Volag had previously scheduled a panel of recently-arrived refugees to talk at the local library and it was very well attended partly due to the very public discussion of emergent opposition (it was well-covered in the local newspaper and the local mayor was unequivocal in his stance that the community is a welcoming community). A resettlement staff member told me that the library audience seemed a bit tense until the Iraqi panel member talked about his assistance to the U.S. military and this is why he has come in as a refugee. Suddenly it made sense why Iraqis were coming to the U.S.; the community had sent many of its young people to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan. And the perception visibly changed: it was a friend, not a potential enemy, sitting with them in their library.[155]

[155] ORR contracts with the Welcoming America, a national nonprofit, to assist local resettlement networks understand how to target messages about resettlement that resonate with local values, how to work with resettlement champions and those who are uncertain to turn them into champions, and to help communities understand how to be inclusive across a number of sectors.

Interests in effective resettlement because refugees are diasporas, and they tell everyone their experiences in the U.S.

My long-time key informant first clued me into this effect.[156] Refugees phone home. And they send money to relatives who are still residing in camps or countries of origin. If they are having a good experience, it fosters goodwill toward the U.S. and the American people more generally. If they are having a terrible experience and treated poorly, they will not be able to send money home, but they will still phone home. Moreover, refugees very much appreciate the opportunity to exercise their human rights and benefit from the rule of law. Refugees also like and benefit from new cultural models available in American society, such as the idea that you are not stigmatized by the actions of your (often distant) family member in an individualistic society.[157] One refugee told me how much he loved his city (Seattle) because he could walk around in any neighborhood of a different race or ethnicity, or downtown, or in the suburbs, and not worry about being attacked because of his identity. He felt very free, and attributed this to the rule of law. He stated that even though there are people who are racist or otherwise "bad people" he is protected by the rule of law—they cannot attack him because of his identity.[158]

Interests in refugees integrating and belonging to the nation, instead of terrorizing it.

The first that I heard about "integration" as a preoccupation of government officials occurred at a national workshop for refugee-led MAAs that I attended in D.C. in 2007. And interestingly, it was a presentation from a person from the Department of Homeland Security in which he defined "integration" as occurring when arriving refugees essentially come to see their history and destinies and interests as part of the larger history of the U.S., so that they can commit to the nation as citizens, and be interested in the welfare of the nation and all of its

[156] Tucson, 2005

[157] Refugee conversation, Milwaukee, 2013

[158] Refugee conversation, Seattle, 2011

citizens. In other words, they don't remain as outsiders or see themselves as outside of the nation even though living within its borders. The DHS official was quick to distinguish this from "assimilation" in which an immigrant population loses its cultural identity and heritage and blends in to be undistinguishable culturally from other "Americans." The assimilation debate is long-standing as scholars have investigated the accommodations and practices among newcomers to the U.S., while receiving communities have expected them to adjust and conform. I still hear refugee community leaders resisting "assimilation" as a goal. They are worried about what is meant by "integration"—is it a cover for an underlying agenda of assimilation?[159]

There have been numerous attempts to characterize and implement "integration"—the work of resettlement after the first year or two post-arrival—but until recently few of these have gained traction or have been incorporated into policy. And it has not been particularly encouraged through funding focused on integration and the quality of longer-term adjustment.

Definitions and approaches have been proposed in various conference calls, along with indicators from various fronts, but by the beginning of 2014 I had not yet seen these coalescing into policy or funding approaches. More activity was observable in 2014 and 2015, however: a RCUSA workgroup convened to determine indicators of integration during the fall of 2014, and the White House established its Task Force on New Americans at that same time.

These actions are fully nine years out from when ORR formed a workgroup in 2006 focused on researching the important building blocks of integration, coinciding with the Bush administration's creation of the Task Force on New Americans.[160] The Institute for Social and Economic Development (ISED)— a technical assistance provider to ORR—was tasked with

[159] The stakes are high: their culture would cease to exist, then, and the project of annihilation that started with war and persecution would, effectively, be accomplished.

[160] Presidential Executive Order #13404 tasked with strengthening "the efforts of federal, state, and local agencies to help legal immigrants embrace the common core of American civic culture, learn our common language, and become fully Americans." (Brown *et al*, 2007).

staffing, facilitating and managing the development and processes of the Integration Working Group (as it was called) comprised of representatives of SCORR, state foundations, Volag/ MAA representatives, quasi-governmental organizations, and other ORR TA providers. The group was charged with:

- developing a working definition of integration—they said: *Integration is a dynamic, multi-directional process in which newcomers and the receiving communities intentionally work together, based on a shared commitment to tolerance and justice, to create a secure, welcoming, vibrant, and cohesive society*;

- identifying indicators of integration—they identified: *health/well-being; language; economic opportunity; civic values/participation/engagement; education; housing; social connections; and belonging/safety;*

- identifying which services appear to facilitate integration—*ISED later conducted field studies in three local communities in the U.S., and the data showed that ESL acquisition and good volunteer programs were critical factors;*

- offering examples of best practices; and

- making recommendations to ORR about ways to support integration.[161]

A study in Maine had found that those refugees who were well-connected into the receiving community and had numerous contacts with locals found better paying jobs, more stable jobs, and paths toward achievement of an occupational identity or sense of being part of a particular industry—these things are important to achievement of a new social role (Mamgain and Collins, 2003). It is through work that one demonstrations contribution to the economic life of a community and state. So the scholarly literature supports the idea that bridges between receiving and arriving communities are predictive of better integration outcomes.

The definition of integration and the indicators that various stakeholders identified have actually changed very little since that time. The 2015 White House Task Force on New Americans defines integration as comprised of the following:

[161] *Ibid.*

- **Civic integration:** Integration that occurs when all community members belong, are secure in their rights, exercise their liberties, and share ownership in the community and our nation's future.

- **Economic integration:** Integration that occurs when both employers and immigrant workers understand their workplace rights, and workers have the resources to excel, embark on a career pathway, and obtain economic self-sufficiency.

- **Linguistic integration:** Integration that occurs when English learners and Limited English Proficient (LEP) individuals have access to effective English language instruction and related cultural knowledge.[162]

As previously noted, ORR has focused on getting refugees listed as a priority population in the RFPs of other federal agencies. ORR's grant programs target economic integration, and to a lesser extent, linguistic integration (although there is no single grant program aimed solely at provision of ESL instruction). Refugees having the resources to excel and embark on a career pathway have been mainly left to programs outside of ORR, with the exception of micro-enterprise programs, two of which are focused on agriculture and childcare provision.

To date, what has been poorly addressed and understood are two clauses in the civic integration category. There is no coalescence of ideas, policies, or funding around "all community members belong" or how "shar[ing] ownership in the community and our nation's future" might be operationalized. Actually, these clauses contain the crux of the issue that creates difficulties and misunderstandings between receiving and arriving community members, mostly around tendencies to expect vs. resist assimilation, respectively.

This is not to say that awareness of the importance of belonging and ownership as aspects of civic integration has gone unrecognized. An interesting entry in ISED's report of January 2007 reveals an underlying concern among federal and state officials, and the public

[162] Report of the White House Task Force on New Americans, April 14, 2015, available online.

more generally, to prevent the emergence of terrorist activities within populations of refugees resettled to the U.S.:

> "In the years following the terrorist attacks on the U.S., there has been a concern that both the refugees coming into the U.S. and the communities that welcome them should be able to feel safe and secure. Conditions which could contribute to any sense of marginalization should be improved and, where possible, eliminated. So-called "home grown terrorist" incidents in England, France and Spain have alerted us all to the notion that we must do everything possible to ensure that newcomers to the U.S. have every opportunity to become integrated into society in a manner that enriches both the community to which they arrive and the newcomers themselves." (p.1)

It was rather prescient, because within a few months of issuing the report, several young Somali former refugees from the Twin Cities (in Minnesota where the largest population or Somali refugees in the U.S. resides) traveled to Somali presumably to join al-Shabab. Two became suicide bombers. And in April 2013, two young asylee brothers exploded bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three people and injuring over 250 others; then killing a campus security officer in the week that followed. Reports of their marginalization in various ways over time in the U.S. emerged despite widespread fury over their actions.[163]

As of November 2013, Minnesota Public Radio was reporting that at least 23 young Somalis from the Twin Cities area had left for the horn of Africa; and seven more of these were also believed to have been killed there in the fighting. And by 2015, with the rise of ISIS, Somali leaders in the Twin Cities had been working several years to counteract recruitment efforts in their community. Future research on refugee communities' discourses about these events and the actions that they are taking to protect their young people from vulnerability to

[163] See Reitman (2013). The eldest brother who died in a firefight with police and FBI later that week had been prevented from competing in a boxing tournament because he was an immigrant, and he had been assessed as a potential Olympic contender—his radicalization seemed to occur thereafter; and his brother—now tried and sentenced to death—seemed to lose his way when he went to college, a time of transition which is repeatedly cited as a period of serious vulnerability for immigrant and refugee older adolescents and which many have difficulty navigating successfully due to being first-generation college bound and their financial responsibilities to their families.

recruitment is an important topic that may contradict a commonly-heard opinion: that Muslim leaders do not speak out or do anything to oppose terror, and thus are complicit.

A variety of individuals have said to me in conversations that historically, immigrant groups have remained enclaved through the first and second generations (at least), with many in the first generation not needing to learn English but living successfully in the U.S. Therefore, "integration" is not really needed—it will just happen over generations. But I am skeptical that the process of resettlement after 9-11 is just like what happened in immigration waves prior to that watershed event. Fear of the "other" and discrimination has been part of the long-term experience; but the world is much more connected now, with much higher population numbers, more populations migrating, and terror events reported widely. Social media, the rapidity of travel and news "flashes," the ubiquitous toxic trauma stories, the level of factionalist/ethnic conflict in countries contributing refugees, all make for a dynamic system that is not exactly evolving over a generation or two. I am skeptical that the process of immigrant integration will remain the same. And I am unsure about how marginalization and discrimination will impact relations between arriving and receiving communities. Where marginalization and discrimination are severe, reactions to these social phenomena may increase the risk of violence or recruitment to extremist organizations. "Integration" efforts by communities and public officials may be increasingly important as a salutogenic measure for resettlement communities of place. Done well and resulting in an increasing sense of ownership and belonging on the part of newcomers, it is preventative: it fosters safety rather than violence.

* * *

In sum, yes, government officials are greatly interested in integration as it is coming to be defined, and so are incoming refugee groups as long as what is meant is not "assimilation." But,

the term is fraught with the possibility of misunderstanding of intent, and in my observation and conversations with former refugees, not trusted. Perhaps that is why the field continues to try to define and define and define.

I think it will not be "defined" fully—and trusted—until the implementation of those various definitions shows, in practice, what is actually meant by whom. It is a point of dynamic tension, and can also be a point of great creative "swerves" by refugees and stakeholder practitioners. American society *is* imperfect (as any society is); immigrants to the nation have historically been viewed as a source of renewal. This is what I observed that many receiving community members who volunteer or work with refugees are actually seeking; and I find it immensely stimulating, myself, as I watch various individuals and communities express their cultural models through practice and also choose the parts of American culture that are going to work for them in re-establishing their lives.

State and local governments' interests in refugees integrating and belonging

State Refugee Coordinators and local governments have to manage local disputes and marginalized communities, and they also have interests. Healthy communities cost less, meaning reduced demands on taxes and taxpayers. Distressed communities come to local governments to help. Distresses from war interfere with family functioning. ORR has been keenly interested in psychological help for refugees, but I have not observed ORR officials showing much interest in *social* healing, though, inasmuch as civic "integration" of both individuals and ethnic communities continues to be rather unsupported financially. Then again, "social healing" or "social engagement" is emerging as a concept for practice, so my assessment should be not be construed as a critique of ORR, yet. I will be recommending it in the final chapter for a future policy direction.

State and local government officials provide the first interactions with governments that refugees have after arrival in the U.S. State and local government officials therefore are positioned to serve a critical role in recovery and healing of both individual and collective "social and political bodies" of refugee populations. As described in Chapter 1, refugees experienced governments in their countries of origin persecuting or failing to protect them.[164] The refugee groups with whom I worked the most closely in my roles as Volag director and MAA mentor clearly looked to government to provide for their welfare[165] and uphold the rule of law. While an SRC, refugees called our office with some regularity for assistance and clarification of rules and rights. Thus SRCs and other government officials—as they interact with refugees and apply rules/adhere to rule of law—provide a very significant "healing" experience for refugees.

Finally, it is in states and local communities where belonging (or marginalization) and integration are palpably felt. And again, these interests hail their shadow interest: prevention of terrorist actions in a period of constant media reporting about "terror" across the world and the aftermath of 9-11 in the U.S.

In states and local communities of place, innovative potential is great because news of and discourse about terrorism places both arriving and receiving communities in a rather *communitas*-like moment: Arriving refugees want safety and belonging; and receiving communities want the same. If each side can discern that this is a shared goal, and recognize that they are each in their own way in a period of liminal functioning in which they must *depend on each other* for resolving the existential "tests" of this era, it would represent a pretty compelling "swerve" opportunity. As an engaged anthropologist and resettlement practitioner, this

[164] *Cf,* "we were hunted as prey" narrative cited in Chapter 1.

[165] Small "w". I do not mean the pre-TANF U.S. Welfare program which ended in the Clinton administration.

opportunity is what sustains me through all the federal budget crises and public/politicized conflicts around immigration. It is a momentous possibility.

RESETTLEMENT HAS DISCERNABLE PHASES, BUT UNCLEAR OUTCOME TARGETS

Across the various government entities, the endgame of resettlement is not terribly well-defined. Research by Agar and Strang (2008) in Great Britain led them to develop indicators of integration. They included such things as housing, employment, education, language capacity, citizenship, bridging and bonding social capital, exercise and protection of legal rights, and safety, but these are not systematized as indicators of successful resettlement and integration by any U.S. government entity of which I am aware, yet, except for employment. How do we know someone is an integrated, self-sufficient, engaged citizen? How is that actually supposed to look in families living in local communities across the U.S.? As I mentioned previously, a great deal of discourse about integration can be heard amongst refugee providers, but until recently few specifications of indicators. What instead we know is how self-sufficiency is measured (not receiving cash benefits due to employment), and this leads me to assert that what governments are after as the endgame are neoliberal citizens who take care of themselves without government assistance.

The push towards mainstreaming I mentioned as part of federal policies supports this assertion: the government-funded interventionscape for refugees is concentrated in the first 2-3 years after arrival. As well, funding targeted to later periods after arrival are focused on helping refugees gain citizenship, and remediation efforts for those who have not become self-sufficient through employment through assisting them again into survival jobs.

So, the process of resettlement might best be seen in phases. First is "crisis-intervention and stabilization" where people are helped into jobs, schools, homes, healthcare, and English language instruction in the beginning. Governments guide this process through policy; local agencies become the ritual guides. This is the Reception and Placement Period and its requirements have been highly elaborated. They are, by now, ritualized, actually. Then comes the period of longer-term adjustment where more clear trajectories toward achievement of individual and community goals are identified, which I will refer to the consolidation period. It is mediated by local Volags and receiving-community agencies as well as arriving community leaders. Resettlement plans track the developmental tasks of this period to a certain degree, fading away after achievement of employment. ECBOs could and should be playing a role here: they could work on stabilization of the bonding community and support cultural grounding as well as help everyone adapt to the changes required for living in a new society. The final "phase" which I will call "integration" includes the movement into citizenship in a full sense of the term (not just the paper document), at which point the stable sense of being a citizen with defended human rights and full participation in the nation come to the fore. The sense of belonging to and with each other (between arriving and receiving community members) would be an important developmental indicator of integration. Another would be the emergence of reciprocal relationships characterizing the transition from helper/helped to neighbors and friends and colleagues. This is an emerging, poorly elaborated idea, but is on the horizon. I will argue that it is a joint responsibility of both receiving and arriving communities.

The U.S. as a nation has struggled with "integration" inasmuch as groups can be identified racially, ethnically, and/or linguistically and subject to various barriers and boundaries of access. In the case of arriving refugee groups, those similar to the U.S. in cultural habits,

education, occupational experience, urban experience, and race seem to fare somewhat better in achieving the various markers loosely associated with integration. Those who have "high barriers" such as Somali Bantu, some Burmese, Congolese and Burundis coming in from rural areas or long stays in refugee camps fare worse and become a focus for volunteer efforts outside of the Volag system.

The second and third phases of resettlement (consolidation, then integration as citizens) remain relatively unguided in the current era of resettlement characterized by populations arriving in much smaller numbers than was the case in the 1980s-1990s with Hmong, FSU, FY, Vietnamese, and Cambodian populations. The "interventionscape" in the consolidation phase is only partly elaborated (assistance into a survival job and address barriers to self-sufficiency) and has been poorly elaborated for the integration phase. To the extent that this is both true and resistive of "engineered" solutions that are applied as therapeutic governance to refugee populations, it may be to the good. We may do better with practice principles and shared values/interests rather than engineered solutions that fail to improve (as documented in Locke's 2009 study of Sarajevo) or divert the creative energies into suffering management (as documented in Liberia by Abramowitz, 2009) rather than understanding and development of social health.

However, if unguided by ritual specialists in the sense originally identified by van Gennep and Turner, then the goal and endgame of resettlement can be contested, unclear, allowing of more individual agency, but also with more risk of failure either to individuals or collectives (both receiving and arriving collectives). In practice, resettlement in the consolidation phase is not completely unguided, and in the next chapters I will show how.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter on governance within the U.S. refugee resettlement program, I reviewed the policies and procedures of this federal program and identified the key stakeholders and their various roles. Two federal Departments—the Department of State (DoS, which houses PRM) and the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHS, in which ORR is located)—govern different phases of the resettlement process. DoS' PRM admits refugees to the U.S. and works with national resettlement agencies to receive and place refugees arriving from overseas into local communities across the U.S. DHHS/ACF/ORR provides funding to states and nonprofit organizations to support refugees' rapid achievement of self-sufficiency. I noted that given the policy of self-sufficiency and the underfunding of resettlement and integration programs requiring the participation (through volunteering) of local receiving communities, the neoliberal goals for the program seem quite clear. The program defines successful refugees as those who function as neoliberal citizens, self-sufficient, and making few demands on government after the initial months.

The neoliberal goal does not fully coincide with all interests of stakeholders in this program, however. In some sense, the difficulty in describing the emergent goal of "integration" which I detailed reflects a policy lacuna which fails to recognize the various interests beyond the policy mandate of helping refugees to enact an ideal neoliberal citizenship. And as a result, resettlement has some fairly clear phases (crisis intervention/stabilization, consolidation, and steps toward "integration") but the long-term desired outcomes (which in some sense turn out to be based on various interests) are not well-defined and definitely not well-funded. Refugees seek a sense of ownership and belonging in the new nation. Receiving communities want refugees to integrate and belong, as well, instead of terrorizing their new nation. The U.S. would

like to find friendlies internationally where it is militarily engaging, and also recognizes the need for safety valves and hope among populations fleeing persecution. And refugees phone (and send remittances) home. The reputation of the U.S. as a model nation-state in which families can survive and thrive is also at stake.

A governmentality that fosters production of neoliberal, self-sufficient citizens does not really touch the additional interests described, even among governments. It would be interesting to compare U.S. policies to those of other countries doing resettlement which are not quite so focused on neoliberal ideologies and see how "integration" fares in those countries (and this of course assumes that integration is actually a desirable goal).[166]

But policy is not the only factor structuring the experience of refugees and local community members where they are resettling. In the next chapters, I will detail the welcoming work of resettlement in local communities of place, and the home-work of resettlement by refugees who are re-establishing themselves in a foreign country. These chapters move us to the heart of gaining a new sense of identity and belonging that is a central task of resettlement in a third country, and help us realize that it everyone—refugees and receiving community members—who are working on these tasks with each other.

I will argue that they are working on social healing in ways that federal policy does not and perhaps cannot address.

[166] See Valenta and Bunar (2010).

Chapter 6

The Socializing Work of Resettlement:
Stakes, stakeholders and actions of receiving communities

To find common ground is a principal concern in cultural life everywhere in the world.

--Sverker Finnstrom, 2008

In this chapter I am defining "receiving community" members in the same way that the April 2015 White House Task Force report defines them: "The long-time residents of towns or cities into which immigrants settle."

Receiving community members may have worrisome concerns about refugees in the current period of resettlement. Will they take our jobs? Will terrorists sneak in through fraudulent acquisition of refugee status? Will we have to pay for interpreters to deliver services to refugees? Will they fit into our schools? Will they take resources away from our kids? Do they have HIV or TB or Ebola, and do we have to worry about contagion? Will we have to pay public benefits to support them and treat their diseases, and will that leave us enough to take care of our own population? Who is going to pay for their healthcare? Will they get more than we have? Where will they live? Will they bring bedbugs? Will they destroy apartments because they don't know how to keep them clean? Are they clean? Will they control their kids? *HOW* many do they have? Do they have PTSD? Will they be able to support themselves? Am I going to have to pay for them? Won't they cost taxpayers a LOT of money? We can't afford this now. We really don't need any more immigrants right now, although we do like the fact that they are coming legally.

Those who are not particularly enthusiastic about welcoming refugees want to resist taking them in or at least get them socialized as fast as possible so they are less "other." They surveil and maintain boundaries.

Much of the initial interest from volunteers and those looking forward to the arrival of refugees is about the exotic, the new, the different. They want this "other" but may have trouble figuring out how to meet effectively and respectfully in the long run when they are no longer functioning as rescuers or cultural guides.

A long-time key informant remarked recently how interesting it is that so many people from the receiving community want to be around refugees, there seems to be something so energizing about them. The problem is, unless receiving community members can be hired by a resettlement program, how can they interact meaningfully with refugees? Receiving community members may want to befriend refugees but don't know how to do it.

The two well-known ways have been family ties volunteering, and ESL/citizenship instruction. These are of course important. But they are not the only ways to interact. One national Volag—LIRS—has been piloting an employment mentoring program in a couple of local communities, in which business leaders mentor a refugee toward second-tier employment. Early surveys of the business leaders and refugees have shown this to be a rewarding experience. In fact, one local community's businesses are now self-funding the program.[167]

This chapter will detail the work of resettlement by receiving communities. Picking up from the previous chapter and with a nod to Turner's ideas about ritual guidance during liminal phases, in practice, there are many "ritual guides" who put themselves forward in the service of resettling refugees—Volags, schools, volunteers, arriving would-be leaders of ethnic groups,

[167] Personal communication, LIRS employment mentoring project manager, February 2015

churches, health and mental health professionals. But most have not themselves been through the experience of going into a liminal phase and then having to join a new society which, after 9-11, is now rather ambivalent about their joining. So refugees self-define, while socializing agents from the receiving communities work towards their multiple and rather un-agreed upon ideas of the endgame of resettlement. And receiving community members are also pursuing their own interests as part of this humanitarian endeavor; this chapter will examine how.

In essence, *both* refugees and receiving community populations in the U.S. experience adversity-activated development—learning experiences that would not otherwise be available had they not been subject to trauma and adversity. For refugees, it is the condition of having to resettle in a new country; for U.S. community members, it is learning how to recover from the trauma of 9-11 *by welcoming* populations who also experienced the aftermath/after-wrath of the U.S. response. Although this is a ripe moment for intercultural understanding, at the end of 2015 the ascendant "developmental" direction toward xenophobia in the U.S. is worrisome as it seriously impedes *Americans'* recovery.

Instead, it could be a salutogenic moment with global implications. As many receiving communities come to realize in the process of welcoming and resettling refugees, nearly always these encounters over time are enriching, fear reducing, and extraordinarily meaningful. If refugees arrive to a welcoming sociality rather than one characterized by suspicion, receiving communities learn that, we are in this epoch, together, and the power lies in the strength of relationships that can be built and the innovations and safety that are enabled as a result. As we head into 2016, finding ways to enlarge the opportunities for *communitas*-like experiences may need to be a more deliberate activity for those tacking betwixt and between populations in their work.

THE PLAYERS

Volags

Local resettlement agencies are variously related to national Volags. They may be local affiliates of national Volags who are housed within larger social service agencies, such as Catholic Charities or Lutheran Social Service agencies or Jewish Family Services. They may be a local or regional office of a national affiliate, as it the case with the International Rescue Committee resettlement offices (IRC) and some USCRI offices, or they may be stand-alone agencies who become affiliates of Church World Service or World Relief or ECDC or EMM or USCRI. ECDC affiliates are usually ECBOs (ethnic community-based organizations, another term for Mutual Assistance Associations or "MAAs"). There are many configurations. Faith-based local Volags tend to involve church groups or churchgoers in volunteering with various aspects of the resettlement process—either as family ties volunteers or support group folks or self-sufficiency mentors. They are committed to the humanitarian mission, and attract helpers through this shared calling.

But they are first and foremost businesses, some of them quite wealthy or able to marshal resources easily because of their reach into churches or synagogues or internationally-known board members. They have huge social capital, in other words, and can convert it to economic resources when needed or in emergencies. Nonetheless, there are limits to the willingness of these constituencies to contribute resources continually, and these have increased a bit since the early days of modern resettlement in the 1980s. So programs have to be fiscally sound and well-managed.

Volag programs housed outside of large and well-supported institutions may have few financial resources other than what are available through the Department of State's Reception and Placement program or ORR funding streams. They also rely on volunteers to assist. Their

relatively low linking social capital and (usually) poor economic capitalization renders them vulnerable to an organizational crisis if/when resettlement numbers and funding fluctuate significantly.

Regardless of size or situation, resettlement agencies are businesses. They are non-profit businesses, but businesses nonetheless and they need business models to manage a budget and deploy resources on behalf of the mission. "'Non-profit' is just tax status" as one colleague liked to remind me. They are interested in the humanitarian mission, in fact they are passionate about it, but they have to keep in mind the operations of a non-profit business. And the operations of resettlement agencies are complex, diverse, and subject to sudden downturns and work stoppages if refugee transfers stop or slow significantly, as happened after 9-11 and with Iraqis from 2011-2012.

So they do fundraising, and look for donors, and figure out additional revenue streams from grants. They apply over and over for additional grants. But their primary source of income is from resettling refugees arriving from overseas. And so a primary interest of the agency is increasing arrival numbers to a scale which enables efficiencies to be built and where income is sufficient to be viable and stable. They have to have enough staff to carry out the work; desirable efficiencies happen when there is funding sufficient for staff specialization--in case management or job development or housing development or administrative tasks.

It is hard to run a resettlement program with less than 75 arrivals per year. I actually think that 150-200 is a better scale, as it enables specialization of staff. I have seen agencies with 400 arrivals per year which do well as long as management and administration are well-organized. I do not know about the very large agencies resettling 700 per year or more as I have not directly observed these in operation. But that is a lot of housing and a lot of jobs to find for

incoming refugees. I am unsure of how refugees resettled by agencies of that scale of operation fared in the 2008 economic downturn; this would be an interesting research question.

Many resettlement agencies are located in cities where other resettlement agencies are also operating. Frequently they are in competition with each other for volunteers, donors, employers, housing and other local resources. But they also help each other. For example, an agency job developer may find an employer with more openings than he or she has refugees to fill. That job developer scores points with employers if they can fill all slots in one swoop—so, s/he will call the other resettlement agencies to offer the opportunity to their clients as well. In this circumstance, the job developers work as a team to get applications filled out, transport clients, and get the "order filled."

In most states, the local Volag is the primary initial receiving community contact for refugees and not only executes (either with staff or their volunteer group) the work of reception and placement, but continues to help refugees to navigate at least through the first year of adjustment. Staffers are experienced (except if it a new Volag, in which case the national Volag loans its experience to the new agency) and they have encountered and had to work through many issues and difficulties with stabilizing refugees and getting them started toward self-sufficiency. They refer refugees for specialized services and do best when they regularize such partnerships in some way. They interface with nearly all of the local mainstream providers who are encountering refugees at their institutions: schools, health clinics, employers, income maintenance agencies, landlords, libraries, and ESL providers.

The Volags are the ritual guides for both refugees when they first arrive and for receiving community members. Case managers begin to orient refugees the car on the way to their new apartment after airport pickup. When they first encounter resettlement agencies, many receiving

community observers are sure that agencies are "not doing what they are supposed to" in providing cultural orientation.[168] But refugees can only absorb so much. It is like language learning: you have to repeat and repeat and repeat, and the information will be most salient when they are ready for the task to which you are orienting them. Some refugees get it quickly, and some slowly, and for a few it takes years. The problem is that the endgame is unclear: a new role in the new society and local community has to be established, while resettlement agencies mainly have time to focus only on getting through the long list of R & P expectations, getting refugees into their first survival job, and getting reports into the State, the national Volag, and ORR.[169]

Volag employees are a mix of refugee/former refugees and receiving community members who are American-born or naturalized former immigrants. I know one immigrant who is still on permanent resident status after many years, not wanting to fully "convert" to American citizenship, much more Americanized than he realizes. This immigrant has taught me hugely and deeply about the experience of coming into a new country: of wanting to retain cultural identity but also having to learn the new society and how to live in it. He suggested that it is like learning a second language (same metaphor!): you don't have to give up or forget your first language to learn the second one. It makes me think back to my grandmother who immigrated as a teenager; she is long-deceased, and I cannot remember now whether she had an accent. She was just my grandmother. I do recall that when an exchange student from her country came to see her and spoke to her in her native tongue (after she had lived in the U.S. for 60 years), she got really flustered because she could not remember words she wanted to say. My immigrant

[168] I have heard this in so many cities from so many different people that one might safely assume that it is NOT the local resettlement agency misbehaving, in most cases.

[169] Beginning in 2014, however, PRM raised the bar again in practice, requiring extended orientations and testing of refugees' knowledge-acquisition.

friend realized he had trouble with keeping up his native tongue when he returned recently to see his family. His vocabulary had narrowed. My academic vocabulary feels the same when I come back in from the field. But for all of us, get us immersed in the formerly-mastered language and it quickly comes back.

A mix of staff are important—really important—as resources and guides for refugees in a new land, because the endgame has been so loosely defined, and target social roles remain indeterminate. It is a time of great experimentation and challenge for refugees, this liminal period. Those staffers who are refugees or former refugees have recently gone through resettlement themselves and have very specific ideas about how it is best done, but they may miss many things about the society they are living in because they remain within the frame of resettlement. Their ideas may be different from staffers who are American by birth.

America-borns are very adept at systems and rules and expectations of the receiving community, the laws and family life (especially child discipline) that are used and accepted here, and how to navigate through problems with banks and hospitals and school system bureaucracies. They often have farther reach into community resources. But they may not be able to understand the nuances of communication or the metaphors that will work for refugees. They are a source of innovation for refugees, but those staff who were or are refugees are a source of very practical knowledge about the experience of being foreign and how to cope with it, and the experience of atrocity and how to get beyond it.

Staff teams that function well together really leverage each other's work. Staff teams with only refugees and former refugees miss out on some of the socializing nuances that refugees can benefit from in interactions with America-borns. Staff teams with only America-borns may

not be able to see when they are being played by refugees who are used to figuring out how to get what they need.

Oh yes. Refugees are perfectly capable of stretching truths or acting mad or demanding loudly or doing whatever they think it will take to get what they think they need. I've been on the receiving side of this on many occasions as a resettlement director, volunteer, MAA mentor and staff supervisor. Long relationships and consistent predictability based on enactment of clear principles of practice go far in establishing trust. Everyone has to be flexible and realize that not every encounter will be thrilling or fun or new or interesting or productive. It might be stressful and disconcerting and disappointing. But in a community, people are sure to encounter each other again. And those iterations (game theorists like to tell us) are what allow cooperation and trust to persist and grow, the relational foundations critical for socially healthy communities.

Volag staff members—case managers, Matching Grant managers, directors (and this is also true for State Refugee Coordinators)—run programs whose policies clearly state that refugees who refuse employment offers (which means that they will be going off of TANF and RCA benefits due to their income) must be sanctioned. "Sanctioning" means that cash benefits will be fully, partially, or temporarily discontinued unless and until refugees comply with the requirement to accept reasonable offers of legitimate employment. "Reasonable" is defined in statute and concerns the hours and distance from home (and safety), but there are some areas of contestation related to religious and/or cultural prohibitions that may be considered (*e.g.*, a religious prohibition from handling alcohol). I have listened to numerous staffers and even administrators working in local resettlement programs expressing discomfort about and/or resisting the sanctioning of refugees who refuse jobs. They express distaste at forcing refugees into work so quickly, given their traumatic experiences.

But there are many factors to consider. Refugees can be fearful of going off of public cash assistance or other safety-net benefits upon employment. They can count on safety-nets, whereas a job may not be stable. They don't know if they can survive without Foodshares. They are ashamed to take jobs of low status.

The drive to early self-sufficiency in refugee policy does, however, accomplish many secondary gains. It keeps the program at a lower cost; it helps refugees to get going instead of get relaxed and used to leisurely days (not in America!). It helps public officials to defend the program when critics express concern or even outrage at supporting immigrants with tax dollars. Going to work in a survival job—which can be left off of a resume if a cultural mishap happens —can be steadying for people while they get established. It gets them into a routine, out into the workplace and larger world.

Early employment is a goal for a neoliberal governance mentality which insists that people should become self-sufficient as quickly as possible. Sanctioning for avoiding work may seem a distasteful, harsh enforcement of neoliberal ideology, but I came to view sanctioning as assuring that rules are applied as written and thus it builds trust in the rule of law. If most refugees follow the rules, but some don't and then they are not sanctioned, it is not only a violation of rule of law, but it harks back to favoritism which became extreme in refugees' countries of origin, resulting in persecution. It demoralizes the people who follow the rules.

As or more importantly, those who follow the rules and get employed, seemed to do better, go farther, eventually get a better job. Get started. Just get started rebuilding.

On the other hand, resettlement officials—as I stated in an earlier chapter—have to put a check on actors in the system if and when they become abusive or disrespectful in applying

rules. There is no need to make the system a hostile environment in which refugees bump into harsh consequences.

A larger problem is helping refugees into to a career path: resettlement programs are underfunded and I despaired of ever being able to provide services leading to career choices and occupational goals. Some Iraqi refugees seem to figure out how to get new credentials and have the family support to do so, but many other less educated groups truly need some assistance with this issue. Given that two of the clauses of the economic integration definition provided in Chapter 5 ("workers have the resources to excel, embark on a career pathway") suggest that these services are critical for integration, this is a significant gap that needs to be addressed, even if it appears we already have good pathways for advancement through programs at community and technical colleges. We need much more research that tells us the level of demand among refugees for educational certificate/diplomate programs, the record of refugee completions of programs, the successes in finding and entering career paths, and the barriers that refugees find insurmountable in trying to enter programs and/or careers. How, exactly, are they faring at community and technical colleges? What about at universities?

Volunteers

Volunteers are a source of bridging social capital for refugees and also serve as ritual guides in the stabilization process. The resettlement program depends on volunteers, and the most effective resettlement agencies usually have a volunteer program in which volunteers both extend the range of case management and serve as the first American friends. These volunteers undergo background checks and fingerprinting--and in some cases--drug testing, depending on an agency's policies. They ought to: volunteers are working with vulnerable populations who do not have filters for assessing individual American's legitimacy and stability. When the MAA

where I worked instituted a volunteer program with background checks, we discovered child predation and other criminal records among a few applicants who were hoping to volunteer.

A good volunteer program is requires substantial maintenance because volunteers need training and group supervision. Volunteers bring fresh eyes to programs but often do not understand the policy and funding constraints under which agencies work. So they need to have experiences and they need a place to process these experiences until they are competent. The role of a family-ties volunteer has been described as being like the uncle or aunt for a relative moving into the same town. In fact, Volags are often spoken of by some populations of refugees as the family or parent of refugees. Those coming from kinship-focused socio-centric cultures seem to use this metaphor a lot.

Families do set boundaries between members, and volunteers have to learn how to do this for refugees who sometimes arrive with only the clothes on their back. Volunteers have to learn to accept the self-sufficiency policy of the resettlement program. Volunteers who don't are working at cross-purposes with agencies and may actually delay the achievements of refugees toward self-sufficiency because refugees wait for volunteers to do things for them.

One Volag director told me of a church which had been paying rent for a refugee family *for eight years* and finally told the agency that they did not want to volunteer anymore. The director was dumbfounded (a different director than they had started working under). In another city, volunteers were being called in the middle of the night to take refugees to the store, the hospital, the pharmacy. These requests are easily stopped but volunteers may need practical suggestions for things to say or ways to stop unwanted behavior. This is why supportive group supervision of volunteers is a helpful practice.

Agencies which treat volunteers simply as unpaid staff may have difficulty keeping them because they do not understand what motivates people to volunteer. So, who *are* volunteers? Why do they volunteer with refugees? Interestingly, it appears that issues with their own marginalization are what attract many volunteers from the receiving community into spending a lot of time with arriving refugees, especially those refugee populations with high barriers to self-sufficiency—*e.g.*,coming from rural areas with subsistence economies, little or no experience with formal education, preliterate, having an oral culture without a written language.

Many volunteers are people who are themselves looking for respect, status, or belonging: they are aging away from a youth-oriented culture; they are interested in other ways of doing and being; they want to be "of use" and appreciated for it. They have time for adventure. They want to be thanked. Many of these basic decencies are fairly absent in the extended sociality of American urban life, corporate life, and life in the neoliberal mold. Young volunteers are often looking for experiences to put on resumes.

A former volunteer coordinator I know who is also an anthropologist was fascinated at the demographics of most refugee volunteers he knew: women in their 50s or early 60s. They mothered and nurtured Lost Boys in particular and gained a new life project in the doing. They remained in contact long after the Lost Boys became adult men, and served as surrogate parents and kin. They got social and cultural capital from this: from within their own receiving communities who recognized them for charitable work, and from the refugee communities who appreciated the charitable work. And the emotional support. And the financial support in a pinch. And the introductions to the volunteers' mainstream networks.

The volunteer project is a lot about pursuit of social and cultural capital: for refugees more the former, and for volunteers more the latter. Sometimes the lines cross…when refugees

find themselves returning the favor as the volunteer ages, or when they give volunteers introductions overseas in their countries of origin. It can be a very mutually beneficial relationship, and this occurs when volunteers either recognize how much and what they are actually gaining from the relationship and expanded social network of refugees, or, when refugees begin to realize what they are bringing to the relationship and stop asking for charity, but instead look for just an enjoyable friendship. They become neighbors and civic peers who belong to each other and like each other's company. When receiving community volunteers stop socializing refugees to U.S. cultural expectations and allow themselves to get socialized to the refugee's culture, it is a satisfying mutual exchange.

Not all volunteer relationships end up like this. Some are short-term and "professional" in that the purpose is augmentation of resettlement-agency case management. Others simply do not click and the relationship never gets established. Other volunteers want refugees to continue to enact the role of victim or traumatized through time (long after the stabilization period), and refugees eventually figure out how to get away from these volunteers. Refugees know when a relationship is genuine, in my experience, and when it is exploitative—from either side. The latter neither last nor end well (see Erickson, 2012).

Some volunteers self-organize and work outside of resettlement agencies. They learn where refugees live (not hard to do in some communities) and they organize their own "agencies" or print their own business cards and figure out how to gain access to refugees soon after their arrival. They represent another strain of volunteerism.

Refugees are quite vulnerable to friendly people after arrival and may not be able to discern who is actually helpful vs. who may be more exploitative. I have observed many self-appointed volunteers and self-organized volunteer groups over the years. They can be very

helpful and provide a lot of services for refugees, in actuality. But they are also often highly critical of the work of Volags and ECBOs because they will not affiliate with agencies and learn about their practices and accountabilities. It may feed their sense of being important rescuers to see Volags and ECBOs as lacking, because then the volunteer group can fill a need. One such group in Tucson filed a lawsuit against a Volag, which required the Volag to divert attention from the actual work of resettlement. These groups ended up requiring a lot of work of the Volags—not just the one sued—in meetings to try to resolve conflicts. When self-organized volunteers compete with Volags, the latter can end up having to work on managing these competitors without clear standing, instead of serving refugees. It would have been much better to work with the Volag to correct any errors that were actually occurring. Refugees realize people make mistakes, and are often much more forgiving than self-organized volunteers. This observation provides a clue that there are stakes being pursued other than simply helping refugees.

Volags are accountable to the Department of State, ORR, their national agencies, their boards of directors, the State Refugee Coordinator, and any other funders with whom they have contracts. Many are COA-accredited and must undergo re-accreditation every few years.

Self-organized volunteers are accountable to no one.

Sitting in meetings with volunteers who talk about their projects, it is clear that some are proselytizing American social norms and neoliberal citizenship. I have heard volunteers state that they are better role models for refugee kids than the refugee parents, and assert that there is no viable leadership in refugee communities. Some are proselytizing Christianity and not only are looking to "save" refugees but also looking to fulfill their notion of Christian charity and thus acquire spiritual capital.

I have seen them be as factionalist and competitive as refugee communities are, which suggests that the competition for social and cultural capital is quite serious. Some try to make careers of this work and develop livelihood strategies by establishing new NGOs. I find myself hoping, actually, that they get funded so that someone else (the funder) is looking at their work and keeping a check on them. Some make a significant amount of money in the name of refugees and do not share it with refugees in any way. Refugees do their "work," these volunteers get financial and social capital for their agencies. Some do very creative things; but will NOT fit into collaborative networks. Some have been described to me by refugees as "self-righteous."

And some actually *do* accomplish a great deal of work that needs doing. But they add a great deal of noise in the system which officials find themselves having to address, and it diverts officials' attention from work of stabilizing and integrating refugees. But it is all in the mix.

Here is one example that occurred when I was directing a local resettlement program. The director of a self-organized refugee-serving agency (not incorporated—it was impossible to partner with this agency as there was no way to handle money exchanges) came to me to tell me that his/her "case manager" was working with one of our client families to find a junior high school for student to attend. The child had been expelled from the neighborhood school for bringing a knife onto school grounds. The director became solely an advocate and insisted that the student was completely innocent and had brought the knife accidentally. This individual wanted to know what we would do about it and also wanted me to know what her volunteer case manager planned to do. After asking some questions, I indicated that the case could be turned over to us or that her "agency" could continue working with the family, but not both. I explained that the family could not learn how to navigate and get themselves out of situations with schools if they could not understand rules and accept their enforcement, and the student also needed to

apologize to the school and accept responsibility for the error. Otherwise, I could not provide support in this situation as a resettlement official.[170]

It is hard to act outside of victim/rescuer/helper/disadvantaged relationships when a refugee has escaped persecution and horrific experiences. But refugees arriving in local communities have all escaped persecution in very dangerous circumstances. And they have managed to get themselves here by accessing a variety of resources and means along the way.

When volunteers help refugees understand systems, navigate them, and become a reasonable support system (with boundaries like any healthy family), they add much value and gain much in return. But they need to respect refugees as competent survivors, or they risk being counterproductive by sustaining a dependency relationship--a one-up relationship. They also must surely be aware that the refugees may also be exploiting them in return, for this also happens. For example, by getting volunteers to do things for them that end up requiring money to cope with the inevitable "emergencies" that seem to be legitimate, or by feigning ignorance of a rule or expectation as a newcomer and then getting the volunteer to help them out of a negative consequence.

Taken together, the receiving refugee agencies and volunteers are an essential help to refugees, especially in the beginning. Volags have more to do—by design—than what can possibly be done, and refugees have more needs than can possibly be met as they arrive and encounter the various mishaps of life (ordinary human sufferings) as well as the cultural practices mishaps that are bound to occur. Volunteers can contribute by filling in and doing activities that are interesting and fun. Refugees need more than survival jobs; they need

[170] Even though I may not fully agree with the zero-tolerance policies of some schools and think that research has revealed some serious problems with such policies.

welcoming and introductions to local ecologies and geographies. This is a great role for volunteers.

Other refugee-specialist organizations

In addition to Volags, there are organizations which focus on provision of services to refugees, include ESL providers and some mental health providers who specialize in cross-cultural work. Again, these are businesses, some nonprofit, some for-profit. They do what is needed to keep their businesses going and refugees are a source of revenue for them. This fact of people and business "making money off of refugees" is not, in itself, a bad thing. Someone has to offer services; services need to be reviewed and achieve decent outcomes and performances; refugees are vulnerable to scams in the beginning. The system has professionalized as it has become more complex. Churches did much of the work in the post-Vietnam era, but eventually some felt they had done their part and stepped back. Refugee trauma, the need for a good start in difficult political and economic times after 9-11, the uncertainties and politics of resettlement, and the need for social healing and recovery seem too much for volunteers to handle by themselves without any accountability. Communities need coordination and coordinators; volunteers leave unexpectedly because, well, they are volunteering. Paying for organized services is a must.

So other refugee-specialist organizations emerge and begin providing services, and then they have to figure out a business model that works to keep doors open. They depend on grant dollars; refugees cannot afford services in the beginning, and unless the organization is going to confer status that refugees are willing to pay for (like advanced degrees), refugees I have known are loathe to pay for services. It is why the idea of sending money through state refugee

coordinator offices makes sense: oversight and coordination is needed, and so are stable, competent services. The SRC keeps a rudder in the water for the system.

Mainstream community organizations

Other local institutions also provide social, economic, and educational services to community residents. They may or may not be focused on low income individuals and families. As mentioned, ORR policy requires that refugees get "mainstreamed" to social service agencies and safety nets that others in receiving community also access. This policy is loosely identifiable as a push towards "integration" into American society via its institutional systems. In practice, mainstreaming may not get carried out as planned for a number of reasons.

(a) Perverse incentives: Mainstream agencies may decide that refugees cannot effectively be served in the same programs or meetings or groups as American-born clients—due to language or cultural difference—and they set up a parallel set of services specifically for refugees. Doing so positions them to ask for additional funding (mostly from non-ORR sources) in order to serve refugees effectively. Refugees are served but segregated. I observed this practice at a local anti-poverty agency with a budget of over $15 million per year. Long-time refugee clients (refugees here between 10 and 30 years who had not yet gone for citizenship, so were still technically refugees and eligible for refugee-specific services under discretionary TAG funding) still did not speak English, and the agency got funding to be able to serve long-time refugee clients who do not speak English. In other words, the agency should have been addressing the barriers to access effectively by helping clients learn English, but instead got funding to serve refugees in segregated programs.[171]

[171] Field notes, 2012. I do not have data about the actual outcomes of these services.

In the longer term, however, if the funding for specialized refugee services at mainstream agencies stops, it can create a resistance to resettling more refugees who will then be seen as a cost but not a benefit to the community. Elected officials must act with an eye towards the next elections, and not wait to see the longer term benefits of refugees' economic and social contributions, which take time to emerge to visibility.[172]

(b) Unfunded mandates: Agencies who get federal funding have to provide services with interpretation and translation so that refugees can effectively access and understand these services. So, they may outright refuse or discourage refugee clients by being unwelcoming. This happens in private medical clinics who take Medicaid, for example (those operating outside of HMO-type contracts with States). Medicaid does not pay for interpretation services in those circumstances, and the medical clinics have to outlay the cost. Where there are just a few refugees, they may be accepted. But in places where there are streams of refugees, the resistance happens.

This puts refugee provider professionals in a difficult conundrum: do they push the issue? Do they provide the interpretation with their scarce resources? Do they sue the recalcitrant provider? If they do, will resistance to resettlement of refugees in a locale emerge? This is not an infrequent discussion among refugee-serving specialists. They have to mitigate risk while assuring that refugees get decent, interpreted medical or other professional services.

(c) The cost of service provision is higher because of the need for more time to acquire cultural competency (both ways). Agencies refuse or discourage refugee clients from accessing their services because they are high-cost clients: agencies do not have the capacity to serve people who have to be "caught up" linguistically and culturally. By culturally, I mean that

[172] Field notes, same community, 2012

refugees have not been acculturated in an American habitus and will not know many of the subtleties of social expectations, client-expectations, or methods of interfacing professionally. They have not been taught how to be clients of a mainstream agency through years of going through American school systems. And therefore it can take longer to report results—potentially an increasing problem as funders move to performance-based contracting. Job-entry is an exception to this higher cost of service provision: refugees seem to get to work more quickly and retain jobs at a higher rate than other TANF recipients. TANF agencies get support from resettlement agencies that are incentivized to get clients to work as soon as possible; and, refugees have a reputation as good workers once they gain entry into a specific employment sector.

(d) Competition instead of partnership: Mainstream agencies are also businesses. They may be non-profit, but they are businesses nonetheless. As I said, there is nothing wrong with this. However, they do end up getting into competition with refugee-serving agencies, and while some competition is helpful (it subjects businesses to healthy stress), it may also mean that refugees don't get services.

I tried to partner with a mainstream agency in a grant proposal which I would write. The agency would provide its usual educational services; we would provide the client recruitment, the cultural brokering and the translation/interpretation support. We would do all of the administrative and reporting work. Agency officials agreed to the proposal and I started writing the grant. One week before it was due, they emailed me and pulled out, and I learned that they were worried about the costs of delivering services to refugee clients and the possible low outcomes to be reported (issues I mentioned previously). But why did they wait until one week before the grant was due to inform me? I have learned through this and other experiences that

agencies may not want to go for funding, but they do not want anyone else to go for it either. And they prevented me from starting over with a new partner as there was not time to get a different grant written and partnership established.

This happened to me three times, in three different sectors, in two different cities. When the business competition takes over and nonprofits block each other, refugees don't get services. Refugee-serving practitioners need to become very savvy at business and organize accordingly.

(e) And then we get to the "soft" issues: Actually, they are not so soft—subtle, perhaps, but not soft in their impact on social suffering. These include racism and misogyny, perceived racism and misogyny where this may not be the problem, anti-immigrant sentiment leading to unwelcoming behavior and sociality, reverse racism and misogyny on the part of refugee populations, ordinary cultural misunderstandings and miscommunications which are perceived as unwelcoming or bad (aggressive, haughty, unpleasant) personalities/poor social skills; and poor political skills on the part of anyone (from either community). I have seen enough in my work to know that all of these things are present, but they require more systematic participant/ observation research by someone who is not also occupying a position of authority within the social systems being observed. These topics would be exceptionally important for future stand-alone research as they stab into the heart of failures of belonging and acceptance.

And they are the source of trauma re-stimulation for refugees, who were targeted as instantiations of identity groups rather than as unique individuals with agency and desire.[173]

[173] We need to take special note of this pattern of trauma and of misunderstandings between identity groups and communities: traumas inflicted by mass political violence (whether physical or structural) occur because of actions which cross systemic levels to achieve their ends. Collective conflicts are carried out by actions against individuals (all XXXs are cockroaches, you are XXX, therefore I/we will kill you); actions by aberrant individuals may likewise imply a collective culpability that is not there (Muslims hoping that the Boston Bombers were not Muslim because their religion and group identity would be implicated; Iraqi Muslims—when they found out that the brothers alleged to be responsible were Muslim, hoped that they would not be Iraqi). Both of these circumstances are restimulative of trauma for refugee populations and others who have been subjected to mass violence.

Public schools

Refugee kids are put in public schools within 30 days after arrival. Schools worry about test scores, but many teachers are marvelous at helping refugees gain cultural and social capital when teachers are interested (see Hopkins *et al.*, 2013). Schools are places that help kids "thicken identity."[174] I have not worked significantly with schools or school systems (other than to provide general training on refugee resettlement processes) as it is a specialized field, but it is important to mention this extremely important institution in the lives of refugee families.

Usually case managers of Volags interface with schools because they are assisting the kids to enroll. I got involved with a school issue when a parent who I had resettled later came to me when I worked for the MAA. She was Somali Bantu, and trying to navigate a school environment for her teenage son, who was being bullied but teachers were blaming him for the problem. When refugee parents hear that their children are being bullied, it is a highly upsetting issue for them because of having to cross cultural divides while being terribly re-stimulated in the trauma of identity-targeting. These discussions seem to happen most in MAA settings, from my observation. It is not that mainstream kids don't get bullied and experience it as intensely (it is targeting, after all); but refugee parents do not have access to the informal networks and tools that receiving community members have access to in trying to resolve the problem—it is usually happening too early after their arrival (in the first couple of years). This is an area where it might be helpful for receiving community parents to mentor refugee parents. Where a refugee family has a highly involved volunteer, that volunteer can insert themselves into the situation. The Tucson "moms" of the Lost Boys did this quite effectively.

[174] Gain social roles and statuses that are based on something other than ethnicity or being a refugee.

Enrollment in Job Corps has provided a solution for some refugees in some areas of the country with exceptional local programs. Job Corps offers ESL, high school diplomas or GEDs, and vocational training with vocational placement. It serves young adults to the age of 24; in Tucson I observed that it proved to be a highly effective program for adolescent refugees who arrived with no or only rudimentary English language skills. I observed it to be a very safe environment, with incredibly dedicated and skilled teachers.

Ethnic community-based organizations (CBOs)/MAAs

Refugees eventually become receiving community members as well. Refugee-led entities are also businesses, but the role is different: it is advocacy, and ethnic community self-help. I think it is more difficult now for single-ethnicity refugee MAAs and ECBOs to get started and funded because arriving populations are smaller (tens of thousands, spread across U.S. communities, rather than hundreds of thousands). Many recently-developed agencies are multi-ethnic and serve social capital bridging roles. Ethnic groups may establish churches that fall into this role; churches may establish a refugee ministry that serves this role. Volags are often highly competitive with these agencies which they see as competitors for funding.

I was nonplussed when a long-time Volag director asked me just before a meeting started (when I was mentoring three MAA organizations) why anyone would want to fund or provide services through new organizations when there were already long-established, highly competent organizations (like the parent Volag) who were providing services. Apparently the metric was effective administration; it was not coordination and representation of refugees. Refugees told me repeatedly that they needed to have places where they could just be themselves, places with familiar cultural models and norms, where they could speak their own languages freely. It is a home away from home for a collective social body. And refugees need a place where they can

fully relax on occasion, and where they can check their perceptions with people who have been around for awhile and who share their home-cultural lenses.

Refugees and former refugees turn around and become receiving community members to the newly arriving in many ways: as staff of resettlement agencies, as leaders in ethnic communities, as part of a close-knit diaspora. They begin to function as the ritual specialists guiding people through the limin. It may be helpful to think about their roles and in what sense they become effective ritual specialists if we think in terms of the various stages of resettlement.

Who is positioned to do what, when? Both receiving community members and former refugees serve important roles, some overlapping, and some different. Those who work for resettlement agencies serve as cultural brokers but also administer rules and policies of the U.S. refugee resettlement program. Those working outside of Volags or governments—who are longer-term refugees—also serve as cultural brokers, but do more advocacy for their population, more negotiation, and more interpretation of cultural models. They serve sometimes as spokespersons for or experts on refugee populations. They are turned to by dialogue and multi-stakeholder collaboratives to assure that refugee voices get into the discussions, even though they cannot "officially" represent populations. So, ECBOs and MAAs are actually quite critical to the institutional networks involved in refugee work.

I see the best resolution of competition and mistrust when Volags and MAAs find a clear and mostly separate role: they understand who is positioned to do what and they protect their respective institutional survival needs. Honestly, I only saw this in Houston and California. Each side encroaches on the other, but Volags have more power. The competition is unhelpful and the power imbalance can be traumatizing for refugees who have come to the U.S. from situations of marginalization that pushed into severe persecution.

CONCLUSION

I set out in this chapter to detail the work of resettlement by interested stakeholders in local communities in order to figure out what is--and what could or might be available--as social resiliency resources for adversity-activated development. Social capital, social introduction, acquisition of cultural capital…are all made possible by receiving local community members and institutions. It is nonetheless important to analyze the interests of various receiving-community stakeholders because they may pursue interests that actually conflict with the best interests of refugees making a new home in the U.S. Or, funders inadvertently incentivize practices that do not align with policy—such as trying to avoid acquiring refugee clients because they can be high-cost clients.

In this chapter I have also tried to show how, after 9-11, receiving community members are also accessing resiliency resources. Individuals may need a new source of social and political capital because they are aging into a marginalized demographic group. Young volunteers are seeking cultural capital in getting a multicultural experience to put on a resume.

Hence, the potential benefits of the two "sides" interacting with each other are two-way. Once again, I arrive at a point similar to that introduced in the previous chapter: Interactions between arriving and receiving communities may result in a *communitas* experience with new opportunities and invigoration for both sides as long as the relationship evolves to one of reciprocity. I have seen this more at individual practitioner levels, than at the institutional level.

At the institutional level, socialization (as a governmentality process) and socializing (as a social support process) are both at work, but various organizations tip one direction or another.

Both tensions and the opportunity for innovation result. At the institutional level, businesses must be sustained, and this is often a competitive dynamic. Refugees may bring funding (though not a lot). In 2013-2014 when I was watching the ORR budgetary issues, funding was thrown into question. So, perhaps in this era, at the institutional level in local communities, we will see some interesting innovations in business models. That is the promise of adversity-activated development.

Chapter 7

The home-work of resettlement: *Refugee odysseys*

> *To begin with, it is important to remember the obvious fact that becoming a refugee is not a psychological phenomenon per se; rather, it is exclusively a socio-political and legal one, with psychological implications. Ordinary people become refugees because they are forced, directly or indirectly, to abandon their homes as a result of certain political and/or military actions by some groups or the state and then they seek refuge in another geographical region or country. This means that people become refugees as a consequence of a certain set of socio-political circumstances, attempting to begin a new life using legal means in order to be allowed to settle in another location. In trying to complete the move from their home of origin to a new and safer home, the process that leads from dislocation to relocation, refugees have a multitude of needs. These needs are multi-faceted and multi-dimensional…and may cover the entire spectrum of human needs—from the basics of human survival (safety, food and shelter) to the higher ones in Maslow's hierarchy of needs, such as the need for love, belonging, status, self-esteem, and self-actualization.*
>
> ----Renos K Papadopoulos, 2007

A refugee family's decision to go for resettlement in a third country means that their liminal status will be extended and deepened immeasurably. They will leave family and friends, including those they have come to know as part of their temporary community in the camps and with whom they shared a *communitas* experience.[175]

Each will have to learn how to be an adult in a new cultural and physical setting. They will have to become as children again when meeting the receiving community and interacting with its institutions; many will lose the social status they had known. For some, like the Somali Bantu, resettlement may actually present an opportunity to gain status where they were severely

[175] See Murray and Zautra (2012)

marginalized previously.[176] For others it is a shaming loss especially for men because of gender-role expectations in their cultures of origin. It is difficult to start over. It is a bit less difficult if you are starting over with others in your ethnic community or from your country of origin (unless that community is deeply torn apart by ethnic cleansing and everyone is ending up in the same locales in the resettlement country). It is more difficult if the receiving community fears that among your arriving group are terrorists who have not been screened out, or individuals who are susceptible to terrorist recruitment. Many arriving refugees in the post-9-11 era have been Muslim, an identity that is "marked" among many Americans and especially in the media.

Refugees coming to the U.S. after 9-11 have increasingly faced stigma from some Americans with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, additional episodes of terrorist bombings across the world, and the CNN-introduced 24-7 newscasts. What does a television network run in all that time? It runs what Mollica calls "toxic trauma stories…where we see over and over and over images which create high emotional arousal but no solutions."[177] High drama, high trauma, highly arousing, no solutions. U.S. media stories upset many refugees from "dubious" identity-groups (meaning, groups which some in the receiving communities worry harbor or conceal terrorists) because individuals identified as perpetrators are reported as instantiations of an identity category—exactly what happened in identity-based violence that forced refugees to flee in the first place.

Refugees want to resist bringing with them the conditions and conflicts that led to their becoming refugees in the first place. New arrivals seek vastly increased safety and are pleased to see its signs. However, as time progresses, old conflicts re-emerge in the interactions between members of the arriving communities: they seldom arrive without their enemies or rivals from

[176] Somali Bantu male key informant (2006)

[177] Richard Mollica commenting during 2013 conference call hosted by ORR's technical assistance provider for Torture Treatment Programs following the bombings at the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013.

the country of origin. Refugees come from all sides; also among the refugees are those whose marriages or parentage places them on no side. Refugees have to figure out how to co-exist with former enemies as neighbors in the new context, a very important aspect of their liminal phase that is conditioned by the state and federal laws, with great capacity for creative change. This is a strong space of experimentation playing out over a long time after arrival. In the short run, conflicts are kept in check by the rule of law combined with refugees' desire for safety.

The old roles and understandings and marginalization practices are still there, too. People and peoples do not shed their hierarchies and practices in new contexts—they tend to recreate the familiar. At the first ORR national consultation I attended a year after Somali Bantus started to arrive in Tucson, I went to a panel presentation and discussion, and observed a well-dressed Somali woman in an audience sneering[178] that "we know how to deal with the Bantus." Somali Bantus were the first population I worked with when I entered this field, and I "felt" the threat to autonomy that the Bantus sought in their resettlement to the U.S., away from the old hierarchies and marginalizations of Somalia and the Kenyan camps. Bantus knew how to be a marginalized population; they clearly sought a way to be otherwise in the U.S., and there were many interactional mishaps I observed where this tension came to the fore. Certain (largely younger adult) individuals had more difficulty preventing themselves from rather triumphant expressions of glee when they were able to resist being pushed into one-down positions and/or overtly fight back. I saw as many episodes between Somali Bantus and Somalis where genuine affection and solidarity were also apparent, where (I interpreted that) the situation was being read by both as shared experience in coming from the same part of the world and facing the scrutiny of the receiving community.

[178] I thought long and hard about use of this term, but it is the best that I can come up with to describe the knowing, domineering expression of the sentence from an individual who presented as a community leader.

Shifting alliances and identifications are well-known in the anthropological literature. For example, Hannerz (1992) discusses the interplay between the dominant institutions of acculturation, such as schools and media, and the decentering diversity of subcultures organized around ethnicity, communities of place, practice, class, race, gender, and other markers of identity or spatial proximity. Swerves, leakages, possibilities for mapping new trajectories abound. It is a Deleuzian space, truly.

In this chapter I will investigate the pursuit of bonding, bridging, and linking social capital that refugees acquire and tend after their arrival in U.S. communities,[179] as they establish a home in a new land, far from where they were born and the first habitus that forged their early cultural propensities. Resiliency scholars[180] talk about individuals and families navigating toward resources that will help them restore their lives, suggesting that the surrounding community makes those resources available. The resources are material, social, political, spiritual, ecological, and expressive (among others). "Bonding" social capital refers to the relationships one builds and maintains with the people of one's ethnic, national, sectarian, sometimes linguistic (identity) group. "Bridging" capital refers to relationships being built across identity or group lines, as in the relationships between arriving and receiving communities. "Linking" capital refers to the links between bonded-group institutions.[181]

The example I provided on the previous page of what happens between Somalis and Somali Bantus exemplifies the sometimes-changing allegiances to a bonding group that occur for people, depending on what is going on in the context. That space of fluidity, where people leak

[179] And receiving community members are doing this too, in the presence of newcomers, as discussed in the previous chapter.

[180] See collected papers volume edited by Ungar (2012)

[181] Gittell and Vidal (1998) and Woolcock (1998) developed the concepts of bonding, bridging, and linking social capital. Agar and Stang's 2008 study of refugee integration popularized these concepts among refugee resettlement professionals and researchers. Babaei, Haidreza et al, 2012, provide accessible and concise definitions of these terms in their recent study of these forms of capital in empowerment of poor people in Tehran.

out of strict boundaries and include additional "types" within their bonded group, holds potential for social healing. And it is the place where those mediating between very different groups as cultural interpreters-- and who find themselves developing strong ties and experiences with people who are becoming part of this hybrid network--begin to blur the lines and open the possibility of new kinds of belonging.

There is a side to bonding social capital that is quite conservative, as I have mentioned in passing in a number of chapters. It is the boundary maintenance function for the group; the defining of who is appropriate for inclusion in a group and who is not; the defining of what values and mores will be enacted in the social group; and what/who could be so polluting the group identity tips into something unrecognizable, that no one would want to defend. Who and what is in, who and what are out.[182]

Except where I mention stigmatized individuals of arriving ethnicities, I will not have the space in this chapter to address the concerns expressed through boundary maintenance. But let us not forget it: fears of coming into contact with other groups and individuals with "foreign" and polluting ideas remain real, and real and substantial energy goes into protection against "pollution."[183] Both receiving and arriving communities engage in maintenance of group boundaries, values, and standards; both fear pollution.[184] Indeed, ethnic or sectarian cleansing is the extreme variety of this boundary maintenance.

In this chapter I will be telling of many creative acts. Ultimately, this may be why I so love participating and observing the resettlement endeavor—artistry abounds, and so does poignancy. Here is deep potential for new meaning-making.

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[182] See Barth (1969 (1998)) for a seminal discussion of ethnic boundary maintenance.

[183] See Douglas (1978) for a discussion of this type of "pollution."

[184] Arriving communities may also have current ideas about the operation of witchcraft, sorcery or other forms of unseen powers that "Others" can inflict, and so the boundary maintenance can be on levels both seen and unseen (Mimi Nichter, personal communication, 2015).

GETTING ORIENTED: THE INITIAL WORK OF MAKING A HOME

When refugees take their bodies and move across long distances in a few hours by air, they are stepping off the plane in their destination city in a dislocated state. I looked up "dislocated" in Merriam-Webster's dictionary: "to put out of place, esp. to displace (a bone or a joint) from a normal connection…" [like a shoulder].[185] That bodily reference is so apt; and with refugees, it is the entire physical body that is dislocated, and social and political bodies are implicated as well.

Those coming from refugee camps are often dislocated from that set of friends and neighbors with whom they have shared an extended *communitas* state. And this loss can be keenly felt once they get to a third country of resettlement. For a long time. I know about this because of fleeting remarks I have caught in conversations when I ask about friends and especially best friends—and refugees name these friends from the camps, locate them in space (where they live now)…and then abruptly change the subject. There is nothing but sadness to say, and really, I think they just don't want to go there. I had not realized the intrusiveness of this type of question for refugees; I just stopped asking after awhile, and now I only talk about it with refugees if they are bringing it up, not me. It seems I always hear hurt there—my Iraqi colleague mentioned his friend who was rejected from the U.S. resettlement program because someone had whispered to someone that the friend was associated with a terrorist group.

Moreover, while refugees are dislocated from friends and some family, they are also dislocated from a geographic place—where they knew and were culturally, socially, and bodily attached to the plants and animals, the rivers and streams, the quality of the air, the color of the soil, the rock formations and sacred spaces, the mountains, the valleys, the bacteria and disease

[185] Online, Merriam-Webster.com (medical dictionary)

agents. Embedded in these geographic "knowings" is a mastery of what plants and animals are "good to eat" and "good to treat"; which may be dangerously poisonous; which may be used for mat-making. And what they all look like, feel like, sound like, act like, move like. Deeply familiar local geographic ecologies also include the man-made structures—homes, roads, common spaces, gathering places, bars, markets, modes of transportation.

Even in the car riding from the airport to the apartment after arrival in the U.S. destination city, refugee adults are busy getting their physical bearings: eyes and sometimes the entire head whipping around to catch street signs and physical markers of the way. Most are excellent orienteers, I've found, especially the men who sit in the front seat during the drive.

Since refugees invariably arrive by night flights into Tucson, on arrival they are seeing a twinkling city with very sculptural flora growing in the airport parking lot and driveways. Saguaro—tall, sculptural plant-beings with a straight vertical trunk, one or two or three or even more upraised arms, and accordion skins that act like bellows to absorb and store monsoon rains—stand sentinel along the roads and parking lots we pass *en route* to apartments. Ocotillos are prickly stick-bushes that look dead if we are not in monsoon, but come to life during the rains as leafy sticks with flamed flower ends. They look like living torches, and are also a favorite landscaping plant. Prickly pear cacti are a third typical species—oval and heart-shaped pads full of needles, also very sculptural. They add closer-to-the-ground detail. And barrel cactus. Succulents abound in Tucson; add creosote and ironwood, and you get an idea of the diverse Sonoran desert environment.

Many refugees resettling to Tucson from 2003-09 came from equally arid places, but some did not. Nearly all remarked about the physical environment at night as beautiful (except perhaps at the end of June and beginning of July, when everything just looks completely

dehydrated or scorched in the dry heat just before monsoons begin). And they are relieved, I do think so. It is very pretty. Refugees have first impressions, and they are based on how they get greeted at the airport and what they see of the physical environment on their ride to their new apartments and into their new life. Where beauty is available, it is like a breath of fresh air—a comfort, a tiny joy. So decorating apartments for newly arriving refugees…is so important.

Remember this.

With the Somali Bantu migration, I was quickly introduced in the community and began doing a lot of visiting and talking. I met nearly everyone who was placed at the two complexes in that first three months, within a day of their arrival. So I was seeing the very beginning of place-based orienteering of these newcomers.

The Somali Bantus I saw in the first days after arrival looked carefully at all the plants and trees and succulents around them, and remarked that "we had these in Somalia" when they saw something they knew. They did this at the grocery store, too. Of course they did—refugees are trying to feel less dislocated; they look for foods they can comfort themselves with.

Within a week or two after they started arriving, I found myself in an environmental conversation with a group of adults (men and women) sitting in an apartment after a brief English lesson. The interpreter from one of the Volags showed up—I had met him several times as he worked for the same agency as I did as a volunteer—and he always liked to hang around because I was always doing little "things" with people that led to conversations that were fun for him. He was Somali, not Somali Bantu, and he always also provided cultural interpretations in these circumstances.

Somehow the conversation turned to animals and someone asked what animals were they sharing the Tucson environment with. Which set me back: how would I talk about this, exactly?

Eventually we would go to the Desert Museum west of Tucson. This is a typical volunteer move: take them to the zoo (the Desert Museum is a desert "zoo").[186] So I asked them about the animals they knew in Somalia and Kenya, and the conversation started. At some point, one of the women started talking about an animal that would come and "bop" you on your forehead (she gestured, fist to center of forehead). And she told of a couple of instances where this happened to her (each recounted with its forehead gesture, and then gales of laughter all around the circle).

I couldn't quite follow the conversation at first because the interpreter stopped interpreting briefly, then falteringly started again, but it was so disjointed that I could not quite figure out what was going on. So, I would repeat what I thought I heard in English, and ask for confirmation, and then would get told about another episode of "bopping."

Soon the conversation ended because the interpreter just could not get something coherent out, and I resolved to get my Somali Bantu acquaintances outside the city so they could see critters—coyotes, javelina, gila monsters (if we were lucky), quail and quail babies that look like tawny golf balls with legs running around after the mother, hawks, owls, little birds that you can see sticking their beaks out of holes in saguaro cactuses (where they have made nests), pack rats (the bane of Tucson foothills and outskirts dwellers), bats, snakes (including rattlesnakes: 9-1-1 operators in Tucson will deploy the county sheriff office's rattlesnake removal unit). Bobcats, jackrabbits, smaller rabbits, horned toads, cute little zippy desert mice that dart quickly away from cars and people, and hand-sized tarantulas which come out during monsoons. In Tucson, drivers stop for tarantulas crossing the road. Horses. Cattle. Antelope (which crawl

[186] Careful, though: when the Tucson "moms" took the Sudanese Lost Boys to the Tucson Zoo with all manner of exotic animals from other continents including Africa, the experience triggered some pretty severe traumatic memories—as may be recalled, the group lost many of their numbers to wild animal attacks *en route* to the refugee camps of Kenya. The moms cut the outing short.

under fences, not over!). And scorpions (Somali Bantus were familiar with these from the northern Kenya camps).

As I walked with the interpreter out to the parking lot, he told me that the woman was talking about mythical spirit-animals that don't really exist, and editorially explained that Somali Bantu—and especially this woman—were rather "simple," and still believed that mythical beings are real. He smiled (ruefully, it seemed to me).

I saw the same rather nervous, rueful demeanor in a young Somali Bantu leader when, a year or so later, quite a number of refugees came to my house because they needed a place for a traditional treatment (of a spirit-caused illness), and by that time I had gained quite a lot of trust in this community since I saw them nearly every day and they knew I was also an anthropologist unfazed by such phenomena, so they thought it would be safe. This guy came along—I suppose to assure either me or himself that everything would be ok—but he clearly did not want to "go along" with this idea of mythical spirits.

During this event, traditional healers chanted and sang in the center of the group, assisted by drummers. The entire group joined in (adults, kids alike); they were close-packed into the room and actually took on the physical appearance a collective "body." Three or four women got possessed by the spirits, which appear first in a swoon or faint, then emerge in a rather trance-dance-like posture and movement, leaving as the possessed got up and moved a short way into another room and then swooned or fainted again. The young male leader rushed in from the other room to assure me the first time that nothing was wrong: "this happens."

Apparently the spirits accompanied this population to Tucson: there was never a question about this as these traditional healing ceremonies took place and apparently still do, especially

when someone does not respond to biomedical treatments. One of my Bantu friends told me her husband was getting these treatments. "Do they help," I wondered? She said they did.[187]

And that ruefulness? What of that? It was about the perception that modern peoples do not (actually, a better phrase is *should not*) believe in mythical spirits or an enchanted world.

The next time I noticed refugees trying to make ecological connections occurred when I had taken a carload of Somali Bantu women to San Xavier—a Spanish Jesuit-built mission that dates to 1783, located just south of Tucson on the Tohono O'odham San Xavier Indian Reservation. It is a pilgrimage site visited by thousands each year. We had been inside of the larger ornate chapel (which scared them with its statue depicting a deceased priest laid out for people to touch as part of the pilgrimage experience), and we had just driven off of the grounds when one of the women who was pregnant began gesturing frantically to the side of the road. She wanted me to stop the car apparently; it was by some fields that looked a bit agricultural, and

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[187] I wrote in my notes that the spirits are "Jinn"; I was aware of this term for certain kinds of spirits from East African ethnographies written by medical anthropologists, but I do not know if it is the same spirit-population as named in the literature since I did not investigate further. I made a decision not to do this because people could not really talk about it in detail using English and I would have had to use an interpreter. The interpreters would have come from among the non-Bantu Somali population (who might have a similar reaction to what I initially observed and described above) or from the young adult Bantu males who were concerned with being modern and not looked at as backward Africans. I just did not want to put either side in the position of talking about an uncomfortable-for-them subject, though my Bantu women friends would clue me in occasionally. I am recounting this partly to document the transitions people are making in coming to the U.S.: they are trying to socialize into modern roles; they are retaining much of their traditional understandings, especially among the older adults and those who do not learn English to fluency. They really are dual-cultural and having to navigate some pronounced cultural disjunctures. Healing, spirits, and cultural myths they are bringing in with them are one of these areas that require non-judgment on the part of single-culture receiving community members if we are to be trusted. And I am not even touching what newcomers encounter among receiving community myths (think, here, of urban myths in addition to religious ideas and traditions).

I encountered this disjuncture again when holding a relationship skills-training workshop for Congolese who were all, by then, in white collar careers. A part of this training describes processes of emotional arousal and triggering in the brain, a map of the brain is shown to participants at one point. On break for lunch, a man asked me where the witchcraft- and sorcery-producing center was located. I smiled and indicated I did not know and had not thought of this, and it started a conversation about how it has to have a neural/brain process of some sort. So we speculated. It has helped me tremendously in accessing rather submerged cultural models to be known as a person who works with refugee resettlement and integration, and who is also an anthropologist, because people from other parts of the world know that anthropologists will be (a) interested and (b) not shocked to hear of enchantment phenomena. For their part, refugees enjoy having someone with whom to discuss these wonderings who will have fun but also earnestly think with them about such topics. Frankly, I enjoy suspension of disbelief: it takes one into some very new and fascinating experiential and philosophical frames.

I did not think we could do so because we were on the reservation. As it turned out, she had seen a plant that she wanted to get as a food or medicine (not sure which); she was having a lot of sickness with her pregnancy.[188] No one spoke in the car spoke enough English to be able to tell me what she wanted.

As she became more ill she began losing a lot of weight and would not eat. I brought her a McDonald's milkshake which her husband told her (with me there) to try. Though reluctant, she dutifully took a sip, then threw up. Bodies react to foreign foods (especially pregnant bodies). Indeed, many refugee populations begin to experience high blood pressure and develop adult-onset diabetes; many refugee MAAs find they need to undertake diabetes and high blood pressure-prevention campaigns among their populations. The community prepares traditional foods for women who give birth—the foods are brought to the hospital and eaten during the culturally-determined post-natal recovery period.

Except for the R & P grocery list and defined standards for housing structure/furniture, physical and organic environments are not really noticed in policy, funding, or programming. I mention all of this because it is critical to understand that, what refugees do when they come is not all about making social connections for social capital-acquisition reasons: they need to also gather ecological "capital," and they do it. It is placed based, geographical capital.

And this extended relationship with the ecological system in a new place may include ideas about the enchantment of that organic, geomorphic system: a rather different cultural model of how it all works. This would be an interesting research topic. Places are spiritually imbued.[189] All life and places have some sort of spiritual presence. (Even among Americans—

[188] This is the same woman discussed briefly in Chapter 2 who almost died in that pregnancy.

[189] And are repositories of social memory and wisdom. See Basso (1996).

oh yes, it is true!). The field of refugee resettlement is silent about this (and really, how would it be written on a cultural orientation checklist, fit into a logic model or be tracked as a statistic?).

Volunteers--more than anyone else--introduce newcomers to the local ecologies. One volunteer in Wisconsin decided that he would like to take refugees fishing (the town they are in is by a gorgeous lake system) and, with the help of the local Volag director, scheduled an outing for a Sunday afternoon in June. This required the volunteer and his group of hosts to help refugees secure fishing poles and tackle, which involved visiting local sporting goods and tackle shops…which extended participation in the event to shopkeepers and retail sales clerks, and stimulated the economy. A good time was also had by all—outings like this help refugees and receiving community members start to create shared memories.[190]

A Tucson volunteer coordinator partnered with the Sierra Club to do hikes to Mount Lemon—trails which are quite safe, accessible within a few feet of the highway, and provide spectacular views of mountainous areas just outside of Tucson. Refugees from different ethnic groups signed up for these popular outings and went with hike masters; one young adult male refugee (who was recognized in his community as disabled by severe PTSD) reported much improvement in his emotional life after this. In Wisconsin, my Iraqi colleague bought a bike and bikes on nature trails all summer long. He takes his family on outings to farms and natural areas sponsored by neighborhood centers and recreational programs so he can see with what plants and animals and agricultural systems and geomorphological patterns he is living. And it is fun and renewing.

Again, though, receiving community members need to be sensitive to what may emerge for refugees during these experiences. I took a refugee on a hike on a Catalina mountain trail

[190] Recall the Greenland case study cited in Chapter 4 (Berliner *et al*, 2012): "Do stuff together—it has more vitality."

which quickly moves into an area of very diverse cactus species, including pin cushion cactuses and interesting varieties of cactuses that also look rather phallic. I especially love the little pin cushion cactuses, but she experienced revulsion. She wanted to leave: she was getting triggered visually into a PTSD episode, likely a rape victim during war or flight. Never would I have anticipated this, but I do now. I don't avoid hiking with refugees, but I do not draw attention to environmental features unless refugees point or ask. That way they are leading the experience and they can avoid attention to any visual stimuli that may actually be disturbing.[191]

Access to natural areas helps refugees orient to their new environment and make ecological connections. And refugees with animist cultural beliefs may actually be making social acquaintances with other sentient beings who are receiving them in this new place.[192]

A final issue of importance in the acquiring of culturally-imbued geographic capital, is, where do refugees bury the dead in a third country of resettlement? We don't talk about this in the resettlement field; it is not a part of any cooperative agreement that I have seen. I know of three responses to this issue.

First, Somali Bantus worked with their local mosques to handle burial. Families are expected to bury the deceased within 24 hours; the mosque helped. Second, a free-case Russian refugee suicided 3 months after arrival. He was buried in the Pauper's Field, in a small section of a large cemetery, a responsibility of the County. He was the first to arrive of a family which planned to follow. The family did arrive a year later and conducted a second set of gravesite

[191] Country-side photographs from areas of the world visited by extreme violence often show very beautiful scenes—mountains or rivers with diverse, thick foliage. Individual aspects of magnificent natural systems (plant and animal forms, geomorphic forms, sounds in nature) may become imbued with violence: violence can also "sit" in places and attach to parts of those places as triggers for flashbacks and disturbing memories.

[192] This isn't really very farfetched; birds and animals live in neighborhoods; in mine, we acknowledge—and sometimes annoy --each other. I have had numerous experiences over the years with my animal neighbors.

services (the first were conducted by the resettlement agency). Where there is no family, the resettlement agency and volunteers have to step in as fictive kin. And they do.

Third, a Somali refugee population began migrating into Barron County in western Wisconsin in 1999, filling a labor shortage at the Jennie-O Turkey processing plant. Numbering around 200 in 2011, the population ranged as high as 500 or so at one point. I attended a meeting where a cemetery section for Somali burials had been set aside and was being celebrated as an important step toward (and indicator of) community permanence. I do not know if there had been deaths in the Somali community there; if so, I imagine the deceased were previously taken to the Twin Cities area where the largest community of Somalis in the U.S. is located, and from which Somalis had migrated to Barron.

I do not know of any research about the deceased and relationships with deceased among refugees resettled to the U.S., but certainly ethnic communities are navigating this concern with and on behalf of families. It is a significant reason why resettling refugees where there is a greater ethnic community is important (or, as was the case with Somali Bantus and Lost Boys—together with others of their ethnicity). Where there is not a local tie, the resettlement agency steps in, but no one attends to the gravesite subsequently. It was important for the family in the second case to arrive and re-establish the relationship with the deceased.

Refugees take their bodies thousands of miles through space and through time and make a life in a foreign land. Their physical, material, and environmental sensing intelligences are rather unseen by policy-makers and those in think tanks who are structuring life in a third country of resettlement.

But they are there. Oh, very much so.

NAVIGATING TO RESILIENCY RESOURCES THROUGH SOCIAL CONNECTIONS

Beginnings and acquaintances

Refugees with family ties volunteers appear to do better in getting access to resources and networks of their new local communities. I do not know how this operates with church groups; I am familiar with individual volunteers who attach themselves to and are trained by a Volag, and who operate in contact with the case manager assigned to the case in the beginning. They know the Volag staff; they use the staff as a resource; the staff also see volunteers as a resource. The informal discussions with family ties volunteers are invaluable in helping refugees to get to know the community of place. They are the first American friends of refugees.

Refugees I have talked to years after arrival say that they wanted to meet Americans when they first arrived. Interestingly, I never asked why and I still do not know what they would say. Apparently I assumed the answer would be the same as I would give if I were moving to a foreign country: I would want to know what the people are like; especially, are they friendly? When Asarco was trying to recruit refugees as employees for its huge mining operation in a company town hours away from Tucson (and any other refugees), an African refugee only wanted to know, are they friendly? Of course he did. If no one was friendly (and accepting of someone racially and culturally different—which was unsaid), why would one go there?

A Hmong refugee official said in a meeting that when he arrived, he wanted to meet Americans…and this was over 15 years later that he still remembered this. I should have asked, and how did that happen? Because in Milwaukee, what I saw was (former-refugee and refugee) case managers going to the airport. And I was not seeing significant numbers of volunteers from the receiving community when I first arrived in Wisconsin. Refugee agencies control and guide this transition of airport welcome and stabilization in an apartment. If they do not have a robust

volunteer program, refugees may have a harder time connecting with receiving community members who can be effective sources of social capital.

Among the first things that refugees do to get themselves oriented after they have gotten to apartments and slept is learn where the grocery store is, and how they will get there. (The second store of interest is the "Dollar" store—any variety will do). Apartments within walking distance to the store are ideal. When Somali Bantus were arriving in Tucson, their first apartments were within walking distance to a Frye's grocery store, one which catered to the low income families who lived in the area. For the first-comers of new populations arriving to a city, the case manager or volunteer usually drove them there, helped them orient to the various aisles, walked them through the use of the Foodshare card at checkout, and transported them back home, grocery bags in hand. Basic need met.

Another basic need is becoming familiar with the people in one's environment. Research has shown that seeing the same store clerks time after time, knowing who the mailman is, and regularly seeing myriad other casual acquaintances helps people to get established socially—they get familiar; the world is a bit more predictable; they feel more stable.[193] The same with neighbors—regularly encountering neighbors coming and going helps get one's social bearings established. Not everyone is a complete stranger; you learn who seems safe so you can put your guard down.

Two critical pieces for the initial stages of resettlement, then, are proximity to stores—especially grocery—and safe neighborhoods where people are around,[194] even if only walking

[193] See Sandstrom and Dunn (2014), on the power of weak ties/acquaintances.

[194] My initial resettlement experience was with an entirely new population; when there are family ties or a number of people already in place of the ethnicity, the basic neighborhood orientation still occurs, but is a bit less critical unless refugees are housed so distant from others of their ethnicity that they have to have wheeled transportation to reach them. See Agar and Strang (2008): they interviewed refugees in Great Britain who talked about wanting to be in safe neighborhoods because the proximate receiving community/neighbors would be people who are decent role models, not drug addicts or peddlers, not criminally-involved, not dangerous.

back and forth to the parking lot of an apartment complex. Even for people arriving to family and friends, becoming familiar with the faces and habits of long-time residents who are not of one's ethnicity is important: it starts the process toward acquisition of bridging social capital. Meeting the landlord is another; if the landlord is onsite, it's a plus.[195]

Refugees with school-age children have a grounding-and-social-orientation advantage in their encounters with enrolling kids in school and then assuring they get to school each day. Refugees and former refugees find many new acquaintances and some additional first friends through the school environment, because schools offer many ways for people to be involved with kids' education. And they are places of socialization. Open houses, sports matches, and other school events are places of informal encounters that are more than fleeting. Refugees sitting in spectator stands can interact with other parents, stand and cheer with them when the team scores, and otherwise begin to fit in with long-term residents of the place. A foundation for building bridging capital is laid.

Churches and mosques and other religious structures/communities are a third place where refugees make initial social connections. These institutions pay explicit attention to providing a spiritual community, and hold many events where people can socialize. Some who are Christian find a church and enter an existing welcoming community from which they build out.[196] Humanitarian, charitable work is part of the mission in those places, and refugees can count on meeting friendlies right from the first day. And of course, at first and second survival jobs,

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[195] I do have a preference for use of apartment complexes rather than duplexes or free-standing houses (where possible, sometimes a family is so large that the only choice is a house with enough rooms to accommodate them) because neighbors are so close and seen nearly daily. Apartment complexes become like cocoons: and the onsite apartment manager becomes a critical part of the social environment. From what I have seen, they also often become deeply involved with the refugee community: they are the first to know when kids and families are in distress; they orient them to various aspects of managing the physical space, the laundry, the bill paying. If a house or duplex is unavoidable, the case manager or volunteer should as a best practice try to meet the neighbors and bridge the family to their first acquaintance.

[196] Murray and Zautra, 2012.

refugees meet supervisors and fellow employees, and begin to demonstrate what they can contribute economically.

Navigating to resources for resiliency occurs through acquiring social, linguistic, and cultural capital (such as education, professional degrees, or trade apprenticeships and licenses). Local communities can increase these resiliency resources by a variety of means (e.g., pairing refugees with business mentors, completing church congregation and/or ethnic community asset maps which identify the extensive interests and connections of individuals to business and industry; thickening identity of refugees through doing volunteer or civic projects together with receiving community members). Getting a survival job is a first and only a basic beginning.[197]

Stabilizing identity, building status and learning/adopting an acceptable social role: some case examples

During the consolidation and integration phases of the refugee odyssey in the U.S. (approximately years 1-5 after arrival and beyond), refugees have moved far beyond any honeymoon period that they may have experienced in the U.S. upon arrival. Their basic needs are met, usually stably if sparely. They are moving to different apartments, buying houses, or moving into low-income housing and staying there. They are acquainted in the community: some primarily with bonding communities and other refugees; others have ventured farther out into relationships with receiving community members. They venture more deeply into the work of figuring out their place and identity in the social world of this new community in this new country, with its different culture. In this developmental trajectory, there are some identifiable points of vulnerability:

[197] For refugees who are pre-literate and without any formal education, however, that may be where they remain—so helping them into survival jobs like dishwashing and housekeeping works better when there are employee benefits that actually extend social connection, like low hotel rates in other cities where other members of the ethnic group reside. It encourages visiting and attendance at weddings.

- At one year—if refugees have not gotten to a stable job and housing situation after first leases are up, do not yet have a stable basis from which to build, and they can see that others in their bonding community have mastered the stabilization tasks of the first year. This can be a demoralizing state; it can signal problematic adjustment; it can mark a family or an adult as marginal to members of the bonding community, carving a low social status and even a precarious belonging in that community.

- At two years—when refugees feel stable but wonder, is this all there is? Because they have not yet figured out a longer-term identity and social role at a level of status where they are comfortable, and they are unsure of where they will end up. They make less money and work more hours, perhaps, than is comfortably supportive of a family and social life; they miss their old country and friends; progress toward goals they had for themselves coming into the country has not been as far or as fast as they had hoped.

- At five years, which they ready for citizenship and have to pass exams and background criminal record checks (again). Do they feel like an American citizen? Are they connected into mainstream American life to the extent that they want? Do they feel a sense of ownership, or a sense of belonging? What will it mean to take on this new citizen-identity?

I have seen refugees suffering depression at these points. As I mentioned previously, I am also beginning to see another point of vulnerability 11-15 years after arrival, when people who survived back home begin to age and die at high rates (and often at younger ages than expected), and refugees who came in as adults face the developmental phase of middle age and preparing for retirement. Tucson has seen a spate of suicides in 50-something men from Eastern Europe. Refugees with children may do a little better, as long as those children reach adulthood and exceed them as planned (refugees sacrifice for their kids). So there are also points of vulnerability for refugees associated with age and gender. Suicides in Bhutanese refugee populations—especially late adolescents and young adults—have gained attention in the past few years, suggesting a particular point of developmental vulnerability in that population.

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Achievement of a new social role and status that is meaningful in a foreign land varies by demographic category, and also within a demographic cohort. In the case examples which follow, I pay close attention below to what people do to tend bonding (social capital) relationships, and to acquire bridging social capital.

Case example: A Somali Bantu extended family

In Chapter 3, I mentioned that Somali Bantus were required to divorce all but one of their wives before acceptance into the U.S. resettlement program if they were polygamous in Africa. Those ex-wives and children do not go away, however, even though they may be resettled into another city in the U.S. So I noticed a family that arrived to Tucson without the patriarch: A divorced woman, her adult son, his wife, and some other children, and her married daughter with her husband and children. Soon adult young men of the extended family were traveling to Tennessee to Tucson, and from Tucson to Tennessee. Then the patriarch visited Tucson, and not long after, the patriarch arrived in Tucson with his legal wife, additional sons, and their families. His Tucson-resettled son brought him to meet me immediately, and the newcomers "signed up" with the same Volag for case management services.

That energetic and very savvy patriarch quickly secured a job and began planning how to get the extended family well-situated and adjusted. He made sure his sons and his son-in-law were employed and thinking about career paths that were now available with American higher education—through community college, primarily (this is how a number of the entering high school-educated young adults started into the higher education system—as did other refugee groups after arrival). He secured cars for everyone who had not yet gotten one. He fretted about one of his sons who was a bit wild.

The young men in this family had all attended ESL classes in the camps, and they were almost fluent if not fluent on arrival. The patriarch started ESL classes and stopped them as his family responsibilities demanded, but re-started and re-started through the time that I knew him, and made a lot of progress. He attended the classes provided by the State's contractor (the community college adult education ESL school). He was named employee of the month.

He intervened in any family disputes. He maintained close phone contact whenever someone went out of town. The adult sons were all very competent, easy to talk to, liked to discuss the community goings on and what was happening in the world, and often stopped by wherever I was working to help interpret for me, both culturally and linguistically.

The patriarch maintained bonding capital relationships carefully and also took advantage of every training opportunity that would bring him in touch with the receiving community, especially well-placed ones. He attended the first marriage education workshop for Somali Bantu. He did the homework, created a budget, questioned everything, stayed silent about the second family, but also managed that relationship as well. He started citizenship ESL and citizenship civics classes with the wife; completed them, and started the second set of citizenship ESL/civics classes with the second (ex) wife. Serially, they all got citizenship, all within the year following initial eligibility. Both wives worried about their ability to learn the test material and speak in English; he ordered them to do it. They did.

The sons talked to me about growing up in a polygamous family, reporting that they have more than one mother, and a slew of brothers and sisters to help them in a pinch. All have families now; all are doing very well indeed: good second-tier jobs, nice apartments, cars, fluent in English, advancing into career paths, called on frequently by other members of the community, and well-acquainted—and well respected--in the refugee resettlement professional

network (however I don't know how far this extends outward among others of the receiving community).

The patriarch served on the Board of Directors for the Somali Bantu MAA that was formed two years after the population first started arriving. He also helped form it, and fought loudly with patriarchs of the other clans (the three language groups I mentioned in chapter 3) in order to move into position the eventual executive director who was from the patriarch's clan (which outnumbered the two other clans in Tucson). This patriarch could outshout anyone, and stand up to any postural challenge during a heated argument even though he was fairly short in stature. The disparate clans figured out how to prepare young adults for interviews with the organization; and the organization—once funded—had one of the strongest, most ESL-fluent young adult from each clan on staff within a year of start-up (both male and female). The Board also had this representation pattern except that it was predominantly male (women gradually dropped off the Board).

Someone later told me that, had the three clans not reached an agreement about representation, the largest clan would have been able to launch the organization without them. But they had all lived together in the refugee camp; they all knew each other and had watched the young people who would eventually staff and lead the agency grow up, and they figured out how to band together in this new setting. It was the wiser thing to do; their overall numbers were only 500 or so in Tucson. That does not mean, however, that there were not residential areas in Tucson where one or the other predominated. And the divisions were also evident in wedding celebrations.

Once the Somali Bantu MAA started in Tucson, I saw the patriarch quite frequently—a few minutes nearly every day. Bantus often showed up in the morning (around 9am) to conduct

business at the help desk, and the rooms filled with Bantu languages and peoples, including Somalis and a few other refugees from other parts of the world on occasion. In the afternoon, everyone cleared out, but sometimes elders or people with institutional issues would come to discuss them and then hang out in the chairs of the lobby. The patriarch dropped in. A son worked there. His brothers also came by.

The patriarch also attended monthly Board meetings without fail, and frequently stayed afterwards with a few others to discuss what was happening dynamically in the community. For example, the men on the Board stayed late one time to discuss what was going on with gifting and "goldens" in the weddings occurring among Somali Bantu in the U.S. "Goldens" refers to the gold jewelry gifts that husbands were expected to give to the wife as a wedding present. The gifting occurred on the morning of the wedding among the women. And at the wedding, at a certain point the groom sits at a table with his cohort brothers (friends, brothers of his age) while the community is dancing, and various people make their way to the table and drop cash. It sets the new family up. All of this is done very publicly: During the gifting the matriarch or a female elder announces each attendee, who brings forward a gift and bestows it on the wife to be, or her mother. These are not usually gift-wrapped; what the gift is…is also announced.

As weddings became regular events in the community, the demand for goldens of a certain type/style--and the level of gifting expected--skyrocketed as the community acculturated into American style consumption. The men told me that "women control the weddings," but of course that was not entirely true. They also thought that the U.S. favored women over men. So they came together that day—the men in their 40s whose kids were marrying—to talk about how to stop this acceleration of gifting because it threatened everyone's financial security.[198] It was

[198] The shower gifts were typical items for setting up a new apartment or home. In Somali or Kenya, they would likely have been made by hand and there would have been fewer. In the U.S., they were household goods acquired from U.S. stores or

fascinating to watch the ping-pong discussion around the room, including representatives from every clan. Afterward, the patriarch told me in English what they had talked about.

Somehow they managed to put the brakes on, I do think so.

This case illustrates the process of getting socio-economically and politically established in the U.S. used by an extremely competent family executive—there is no other way to describe this patriarch. He ordered, led, envisioned, supervised, disciplined his famil(ies)—who functioned as one family. He was superb at logistics. He forayed out into the Tucson community to find the best places to live, the best cars to buy, the best places to work that were possible for his income and educational level. He maintained high stature and enacted an esteemed social role in the bonding community, respected across the clans for his competency. He impressed his employer; he developed some bridging capital into the receiving community but from what I could see, was among those who stayed more closely involved with the Somali Bantu community as a whole.

His stretch into the receiving community was accomplished largely through his adult sons. He was such a strongly identified patriarch in the bonding community that achievement of social or cultural capital or any new social role within the receiving community at large was not really needed—he had supporters; he helped many others, and his social safety net is assured in that ethnic community.

He was lucky, though, in some ways. Nearly all of his kids were adults by the time they got here, and court-ordered child support was not a risk. In polygamous societies, other forms of social safety nets and social expectations normally provide the support that mothers and children

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ethnic stores and suppliers, along with cash. "Goldens" included necklaces and bracelets. I watched young marriageable women closely tracking the evolution of goldens' style over time. A young husband told me that being able to purchase the "goldens" for a bride signifies financial capacity to provide for a wife and family, much as diamond engagement rings signal degree of wealth that a woman might expect to attain with the marriage.

need. U.S. family law with its court-ordered child support could actually interfere with indigenous arrangements that work quite well, by removing flexibility and maneuverability. When he could not accomplish something for both wives and/or all kids at the same time, he did it serially. And it was fair, every time, from what I could see. [199]

Case example: A Somali Bantu emergent leader

Within 24 hours of his arrival in the U.S., the 20-year-old eventual director of one of the Somali Bantu MAAs I mentored had set up English classes in his apartment. Within a week the network of resettlement professionals and volunteers were saying to each other that "leadership has arrived." It was a truly shallow assessment, there were many other (much more senior) community leaders arriving but we just had no way to identify them. He was an English-fluent individual; he maneuvered Volags into a bidding war for his services in short order, but this was stopped by a savvy Rwandan case manager at the Volag for which I was volunteering.

He was the first Somali Bantu to be promoted to case manager. The first to court and marry in Tucson (he went to Phoenix to find his bride). The first to have a wedding party hosted by an American replete with a wedding cake ceremony. The first to fly to a Washington meeting. The first to get citizenship. He was of the dominant clan in Tucson. He and two others were the first to enroll in the community college as college students. He quickly sized up how to get political power inside of his bonding community and bridging capital into the receiving community, and he did it. The local internist who ended up seeing much of the refugee

[199] I am aware of another situation where the father did not assume responsibility for a child, and had single children serially with several women. The entire community knew exactly what was going on; the first wife got away from him before coming to the U.S.; and remarried in the U.S. to another Bantu man who was very accepting of the child from the first marriage. That child is now close to graduating high school; he is in the gifted/talented program, and I think he will end up in the top 3% of his graduating class. That was one brainy mother, and she navigated to the resources needed to support this child just fine. These solutions are possible in a sociocentric community with strong bonding capital.

community in his clinic referred to him as “the politician.” This physician worked with many interpreters; but could see the glad-handing, confident style of this one. He had linguistic capital. Apparently he had a reputation as a youth in the refugee camps of beating up a lot of other youth. Then he took a job in the camp helping with healthcare service delivery and became a model camp citizen. So he was quite ready when he got here.

He was also a good case manager: he knew about boundaries; he knew about case planning and best practices, and he learned some of this from that Rwandan case manager--probably the best refugee case manager I saw when I was working in a Volag (I saw others, later, as a state refugee coordinator). This guy was the second best (actually, equal to him was a son of the patriarch I described in the first case, above). And then, for a different Volag, another great one from a different clan.

This young refugee came in with leadership designs and he enacted them very quickly. Somali Bantus lived in refugee in camps nearly 13 years before transfer to the U.S. For the ambitious, there was plenty of time to plan. He started his leadership bid there, by organizing one of the numbered groups of his clan to come to the U.S. community where he has resided since. He continued it here by performing the role publically in front of receiving community members, who pitched in to help.

Others in his age cohort have gone farther educationally. They did not have the demands of leadership that he has had; I will be curious to see if he is able to finish his education. But social role? Leader, recognized in both communities. He gets better at it over time.

But he has always been politically adept, one of the best.

Case Example: A Somali Bantu Elder

This man was in his mid-forties I would guess (one never knows for sure—Somali Bantu adults all arrived with January 1 birth days and approximate birth years) when he arrived. He is a religious leader, respected among all clans. He has a reputation for fairness, and for enacting shared religious values. I'm sure he had a job, probably dishwashing at a hotel. But more importantly, everyone in the community went to him for consultation, and he presided over all the weddings in that city. "Presiding" meant negotiating between families (the families are marrying in some sense). He was usually found at home, sometimes at the MAA. He was the President of the MAA Board of Directors; elected by everyone on the Board. He rarely spoke English but probably understood a lot more than was evident in interactions. He did try to talk with me in English when interpreters were not present, and was always able to make himself understood.

I only knew of him because I was so involved with that local community; my guess is that the bridging community would only know of him if they attended Somali Bantu-sponsored events where he would give the prayer and opening remarks. Probably they know him at the local mosque. He worked between cities among Somali Bantu in the state where he was resettled.

This is an example of a person who had a very clear role and high status within the bonding community, and almost none outside of it except as reached through MAA staff. And he had a meaningful, rich, full existence, though not materially. It did not appear to matter—he would be taken care of by the bonding community fully. He did have bridging capital with me, but not because he sought it. He acquired it on behalf of the Somali Bantus, so if we are being precise about classification this would be better characterized as social linking capital.

* * *

Many of the Somali Bantu refugees who arrived in their 30s and 40s deployed similar strategies of sticking primarily to bonding communities. The vignettes I shared above (showing great orienteering and social competence) illustrate what I think leads resettlement professionals who are former immigrants and refugees to think that refugees can just resettle themselves beyond the first few months or the first year. But if refugees want bridging capital—and bridging capital does help people acquire higher levels of (at least material) resources—then some acquisition work has to take place. Resettlement players can help this by getting people acquainted, both in informal and more formal settings. The Somali Bantu adult refugees who favored bonding-capital strategies still met receiving community members as the latter reached out in volunteering or as part of roles associated various social, public school, housing, and economic-support institutions. They met people on jobs, and made friends at work. While I was deeply working in this community, however, I saw few of these friends-from-work attending weddings or other Bantu events.

So, bonding capital is critical to the survival and social adjustment/support of people ages 30 and up, especially among arriving populations who are racially and/or educationally "different." For elders (above 60), it is mandatory. Community members of various age grades interpreted for each other culturally, all the time. They transported each other, they visited in the hospital, they got people married and showered the new American babies. They were rather socially enclaved; but with only 13,000 Somali Bantu who were spread across numerous cities and states, the Bantus needed to make American friends, and families sent their young adults with linguistic capital to do it.

A Somali Bantu leader explained it to me: as a highly marginalized community in Somalia, and then in the camps, coming to America represented very real opportunities for their ethnic group that were not available to them as a population or collective in Africa. So they planned for it, and they invested in their youth in the camps. The adult men took care of each other and their families (for the most part); the adult women also took care of each other, and relied on their adult sons if a husband was missing.

And for the record, *they all sent remittances home*.

They have community safety nets that Americans don't really have, because they have such a strong claim on each other as part of the bonding community. For example, Somali Bantus develop lending (rotating credit) circles so that people can access needed goods more quickly. Here is how it works: everyone contributes monthly to a down-payment pool; the first person uses the entire amount from the first month and buys a vehicle, and then helps transport people participating in the pool. He continues making contributions to the pool once a month, and each month another member of the lending circle buys a vehicle with the pooled money as down payment, until everyone has a car.

The community also does a monthly collection to fund funerals and emergencies: each community member contributes cash on a monthly basis, which is held by a trusted elder. When needed for a community-determined legitimate purpose, a community member can tap this fund.

Such practices are one reason why elders remain very important and of status in the bonding community. It does not always work well (I saw another community with an elder who was pretty difficult for everyone to manage), but in this particular community, it *worked.* We wondered how everyone was getting cars so quickly in the beginning, because they were not arriving with cash.

Navigation to jobs is something that bonding communities also help each other with, and in particular, those young adults who go to work for Volags are especially adept at negotiating openings at new companies for members of an ethnic group and then getting a number of individuals placed at a company. Karen and Chin[200] staff in Milwaukee spoke about this on a panel I helped organized for a workforce development conference: They knew who in their respective communities would be good "scouts" and first-employeds, and they placed them into jobs they found. Or, they had worked at the companies themselves, then suggested their own replacement when they went to work at the Volag, using the same screening sensibilities.

Refugees also get jobs through volunteers, who help refugee populations into a diverse set of workplaces. Volag job developers, in contrast, tend to try to find large employers and then place people over time with that employer, filling vacancies as they occur through workplace attrition, production scale-ups, or seasonal increases in business.

Social capital—bonding and bridging—is critical to refugees in gaining access to diverse employment opportunities.

ADOLESCENCE

Arriving adolescents want to belong but also emancipate. To whom can they belong? One need only look at the teens to see their need for bridging and linking capital, as well as the help of "betwixt and between" operators from both sides of the arriving/receiving community divide.

Somali Bantu teens in Tucson needed the support of their community organization and parents. But they got very little support from the community organization (in the time I was observing this) or parents (who did not attend their soccer games, for example), and they were

[200] These are ethnic groups from Burma/Myanmar

the lowest of the low in the pecking order of ethnicities among students in local high schools. Partly the lack of attention from family and community organization was just due to the reality that adults were themselves so busy getting schooled, taking care of new babies, looking for housing they could afford, and otherwise figuring out how to make ends meet.

I do think that everyone needs mirroring as they explore new roles and try to learn how to get along in a vastly changed context. But especially adolescents need this; in Africa they might already be assuming an adult role after having gone through initiation rites. In the U.S. context, they are not able to go easily into adult roles (especially those who arrive as adolescents and low ESL competency) and they need to have support of parents and community. I did not see that they got much of it except through the wedding rituals where their place in the community was made clear.[201]

I met a 13-year old boy who was very open and friendly when he arrived—the first Somali Bantu adolescent to arrive in Tucson—and of course he clung to the adults in those first weeks before other teens arrived, and also reached out eagerly to volunteers who were beginning to show up at the apartment complexes. Eventually, facing the uncertainties and confusions of adolescence in a rapidly changing socio-cultural environment, this kid got involved in drugs, and I was hearing whispers in the community about him—he stabbed another Somali Bantu kid in the leg, and then helped call the ambulance. A couple of years after arrival, I encountered him in early in the morning at a day-long wedding I was attending. I saw him from across the room, looking gang-dressed. I walked up to him, said hello and how nice it was to see him. I could see him shrinking a bit as I came up to him; but he interacted with me briefly. His eyes and focus

[201] Like many immigrant communities that have come before, Somali Bantus teens formed gangs; got shot, investigated, commented on by the receiving community, and the rest of that general syndrome. While I was observing, their behavior did not cross into the severe criminality of other gangs—immigrant or American-born.

looked to me like he was quite high. Interestingly, I noticed that he sought me out to chat a couple of times through the day.

Later that night, after many comings and goings through the day (on my part), group dancing is in sway and eventually it is the adolescents who are dancing in lines in the flirting, looking-for-mate ritual of this ethnic group. He now looked thoroughly Somali Bantu. Gone were the gang-clothes markers, the look of "high" in the eyes, and instead, a look of "hi" of a familiar Bantu sociality, which I saw in him during the first months after he came to Tucson.

He married later, a well-selected marriage that united two prominent Bantu families; had kids, got out of the gang swerve. The wedding ceremony that day reminded him of how he is valued in a community; how he has value to a wife and children; how he can be a man who is of Somali Bantu origin and culture, living in another land. I've lost touch; last I heard his job situation was a little tenuous as the furniture company where he worked was going out of business. But I think if I inquired now, he would still be doing ok with a decent level of stability. He is embedded in a higher-status social subgroup at the intersection of two families. His status was better in that situation than in the gang milieu or elsewhere in the mainstream community. His father was and is very resilient individual, very focused, a very nice man who set himself and his wife to learning English and passing the citizenship English and civics exams, despite the difficulties of becoming elderly in a new land.

This pulling people back/anchoring them into their community of origin? It has a very strong place for stabilizing the disorientation of resettlement. Many adolescents need it.

Case example: A Sudanese young adult

Somehow, we received an 18-year old Sudanese young man arriving as a single to Tucson. No family, no plans for family to come. He was also not a Lost Boy. He arrived with a high school diploma.

His high expectations for assistance were dashed in fairly short order. Unfortunately, this is almost always the case for refugees because people have to get to work quickly; in Tucson, they can only survive on Matching Grant program (the TANF/RCA rates are very low) and he was put in this program. So he had to get a job or be sanctioned off of it. He failed at the first job (interview?); I do not remember the circumstances, but I convened a case consultation meeting in order to help him get stabilized after this failure. I led the meeting with the matching grant coordinator, the job developer (who was on the kid's case for the failure, suggesting it was due to his arrogant and demanding personality), the case manager, myself, and the young man. Together we figured out some plan that would keep him afloat and in the program.

Within a few weeks, he had managed to navigate toward a school official (an American-born woman in her late 40s or in her 50s) who took him under her wing and tried to get him started doing community radio. That didn't quite work out, but then someone else started trying to help him form a mutual assistance organization. That also did not work out (not enough bonding capital), and yet another receiving community member stepped in to try something else.

In other words, he acquired quite a few (tenuous) fictive kin, somehow, among Americans who could see his struggle and his alone-ness, and who decided to step in. I eventually lost track of him until 2013, when he walked up to where I was sitting in a local bookstore when I was back visiting in Tucson. I looked up and saw this young man with a huge 'fro. He asked me if I remembered him, and as he spoke I did recognize that I knew him but I

could not place him. He reminded me of who he was, and told me he had graduated from college the previous year, and was teaching humanities (!) at a local junior high. He seemed happy and proud. He had little in the way of bonding community after arrival in the U.S., and transitioned to a social support system that was nearly solely comprised of the receiving community.

A case example of cultural entrapment: A Somali Bantu teen

This young man was the second of three kids in a female-headed household. He was 14 when he arrived in Tucson. His family was among the very first to arrive, and I saw him at the apartment complex almost daily. He had a pronounced stutter; he was a rather nervous kid, but very interested and engaged in his surroundings. His brother was two years older; both were enrolled at the same high school. There was also a younger child of grad-school age. The mother was an easy-going woman who laughed a lot, but could discipline those kids in an instant.

This teenager graduated in the upper 15% of his class. Most traces of stutter had disappeared by that time. I had not known about his academic achievement until I attended the graduation and was stunned to see the designating fringed gold rope hanging atop his graduation gown. A Somali Bantu colleague told me "he works really hard."

Well, this kid never quite made it to the community college successfully. His father was long-deceased (while they were in Africa), his older brother married right out of high school and started having kids; he did not have a well-placed uncle in the community and was raised more within the circle of Bantu female-headed households. His closest male kin were others slightly ahead of his age grade; and they were busy trying to get themselves lifted up and hooked in to opportunities themselves.

So I don't know what happened, and by this point I was unable to address every circumstance I saw because I had moved to mentoring the MAA organizations. I kept trying to

bring the situation to the attention of other volunteers I saw, but no one stepped forward, apparently. I watched him descend into an alienated persona replete with street speech and accent, and angry most of the time.

He was quite a talented soccer player. The Somali Bantu soccer club won a lot of tournaments with him on the team. Whenever I saw him I would ask what he was up to and what he wanted to do. For a couple of years he would allow that he wanted to play professional soccer (and someone else confirmed to me that his skill and talent would make him a contender). At one point he found a connection in another state, but when the time came, he could not leave his mother; she needed him and had told him she would be too sad if he left. And I think that was true because the family had lost the father (and others) in Africa.

So he married, as someone fully culturally Bantu. I had left the state by that point and I did not get to attend the wedding. I do not know what has happened to this young man; when I go back to Tucson on brief trips I try to look him up, but have not been able to catch up with him yet. I do want to know what happened: where he works, how he has adjusted since them. It is not the story's end.

But at this point, from what I know, this case illustrates cultural entrapment; and it is not an unusual story for immigrant teens arriving in high school. The jump to college and the next step of education is very precarious when family responsibilities loom…and they do, for many immigrant kids. Those who come in at high school age do not have the time between arrival and when college should be entered for the family to stabilize enough financially. It is even worse for high-school age kids arriving in the U.S. without English skills. As I mentioned elsewhere, Job Corps provides the best solution I have seen.

REFUGEES WITH DISABILITIES

Case Example: A husband and father who arrived with a degenerative physical disability

Every so often while I was directing a local resettlement program I went to set up an apartment because so many families were arriving at once that the setup crews needed help. So I ended up setting up, decorating, and inspecting the apartment for this family.

I had been out to garage sales and found a gorgeously-appointed, used couch; we had tables and chairs and all the other furnishings needed in our storage area. The apartment looked suitably pretty on arrival and the family seemed delighted.

As the husband/father walked down the ramp at the airport, we could see a clear physical disability from the way he was walking. A couple of months of medical evaluations ensued, and medical specialists determined that the disability would only increase as it was a degenerative disorder, and it would eventually involve all limbs. So the wife went to work; he took care of the driving and the children. But he did not relinquish in any way his responsibility as head of household. Before he got a car, while kids were in school and his wife was at work, he figured out how to get around town by bus, and people were always stopping him and giving him things.

Once, we serendipitously ran into him on a downtown street; he was lugging a cloth sack full of shoes that someone had given him after meeting him on the bus. He was lost—he had taken a wrong bus and was unsure of where he was, and had lost a shoe in the process of getting in and out of busses. We helped him to the right bus and off he went. We shook our heads at this strange episode (a bag of shoes! another instance of the invisible hand of the Social).[202]

[202] Cf. the story in Chapter 3 of the refugee who missed his flight to Tucson and was taken home by someone who noticed him wandering around the Phoenix airport. He was a social services agency director in Tucson. He bought the young person a ticket on the shuttle he was going to use, and put him up for the night before delivering him to the resettlement agency in Tucson the next morning.

He also hung around a lot at the MAA office after it opened; once he bought a car, he made himself useful to the community by providing rides to people. And he kept his ear to the ground for opportunities to supply his family—mostly financial assistance of any kind. I found him to be pretty resourceful. Over the four years that I knew him, he took to brushing his hair straight up and could take on a rather menacing appearance if he wanted to, but he was so friendly, with a sunny disposition and good sense of humor, that I never viewed him like that.

One afternoon while I was struggling to de-bug the community computers in the lobby of the MAA, in he walked with an interpreter and a case manager from a mainstream social service agency, who demanded to know why this refugee was being denied utilities assistance from our agency *to which he was entitled*. Our agency had gotten a very small amount of funding to provide assistance with utilities. We reserved the funds to help refugees struggling with overdue bills; and families could apply for a one-time small grant. He had already applied and gotten one of his bills paid.

And now he was back for more. And loud about it. And demanding. And addressing me angrily (through the interpreter), as I was the available staff member in the lobby. The agency case manager happened through just then and I asked about his case and this funding. The case manager brought the file to me, showed me the receipt for the bill we had paid and the case note of the decision process, and it was clear that the man had no further claim to the funds. The case manager motioned me to his office and allowed that he was behaving like what some people typically did in the refugee camp: Demand loudly so that people will tend to you.

I began an extended, interpreted conversation with this man, though he did speak some English. It was agency policy to be totally transparent about all funding coming to the agency. I explained exactly how much funding was received for this purpose; how much that would work

out to if we split it equally among Somali Bantu families (around $17 per family), not to mention other refugees; how much he had gotten because we did an application and qualification process (around $60); and why I could not give him another grant—it would not be fair to others in the community who also were in need. Everyone calmed down through this discussion (calculations and figures seem to have that effect; so does the invocation of the fairness "rule") and I let the interpretation and calculations go on until his face showed understanding.

And then I said, "Mr. XXX, I appreciate that you are here on behalf of your family, and I have known you since day one to be a very responsible husband and father to your children, and I understand that this is why you are here today, because you are trying to provide for them. And I am really impressed with that; you are good husband and father, and a wonderful provider."

Through the interpreter, he replied that he understood what I had told him about why he could not get more money, and that he was already married, but he thought me to be a very nice and desirable woman. We smiled at each other; he got up, nodded, and the entourage left.

This was such a skillful multicultural negotiation, really. And both of us were highly experienced negotiators, as his initial approach and final response told me. In it, he demonstrated his achievement of a certain form of integration, even as he was asking for financial assistance. And that mark of integration is, a transition from being the recipient in a one-down relationship position with a receiving-community "helper" of refugees, to engaging in a reciprocal relationship. We had commented on each other's appropriate enactment of gendered social roles, even though these were conceived a bit differently and communicated in a culture-bound frame on either side. I avoided shaming him (by refusing his request) through my explanation of the program calculations, and my acknowledgement of his responsible enactment of his social role of head of household. He asserted his worth (and indicated he was not shamed) by

complimenting me on my performance reciprocally. It did not end up as a one-up/one-down relationship or transaction; the transaction concluded between two adults communicating across cultures (in culture-bound ways), enabling us to meet again in the future as adults within a local community. I never worried that his physical disability handicapped him from competently enacting his expected family role or adult male social role in his community. These types of interactions were why.

That cross-cultural social capital demonstration—which is what it was—was halfway between bridging and bonding capital. It occurred between two people who had known each other for some time, and had seen each other in a community over that time.

And which community are we talking about? I think it is an emergent, multicultural-yet-bonded community. Or, at least, the proto-type of one. A lot like a small town community.

WOMEN

Refugee women may be somewhat disadvantaged in their navigation toward resiliency resources and acquisition of bridging capital, at least in the beginning. Most arriving refugee communities I have encountered display what Americans view as traditional gender roles: the men tend relations with the world outside the family; the women tend responsibilities inside the home. Women who arrive as the head of household with no spouse seem to navigate more quickly to various resources as they are used to this extra role (the Liberian women described in Chapter 3 were an exception).

Single women arriving without family (or children) coming in with them are sometimes rather suspect in the ethnic community (an example of a stigmatized social body). One case that I know of was actually refused assurance by a local resettlement agency whose case manager of

the same ethnicity said that the individual would be shunned in the community and too difficult to resettle. This was disappointing to me, and frankly, discriminatory. I assume that an agency in another state assured the case, but I had no way of knowing for sure.

There are individuals being resettled from countries without significant resettlement cohorts (like the Sudanese case I mentioned above; Rwandans were another); and they resettle first through developing bridging capital. As time goes on they may figure out how to construct something of multicultural bonding group with other refugees resettling: refugees have all gone through flight and having to relocate to an entirely new and foreign country, which provides a basis for a *communitas* experience to develop among them in the destination city.

LGBT individuals also are shunned; ORR has funded programs that specifically address this topic. From what I observed, these individuals end up relying on bridging social capital for basic social support, and eventually become part of a bonded community of LGBTs.

Women arriving as female heads of households do hold onto their adult and adolescent children pretty tightly, as I have seen across several cases. The ethnic community around them is aware of their circumstances, and the elders and leaders seem to know what they need and can't get for themselves. These women also find ways to be indispensable in the local ethnic (bonding) community.

For example, one individual completely arranged and served the entire seven-course meal at a huge Meskhetian Turk wedding; then taught me how to dance in the lines that women made for that part of the celebration. Women like this are highly ensconced with the adult women of the community; often they are actually leaders among women. I saw women like this across all refugee populations. They have developed executive skills because they needed to. They also

seem to acquire less in-depth bridging social relationships (they don't have time to tend them while assuring their place in the bonding community).

Given the financial pressures and gender-role transitions that occur in the U.S., women often end up going to work outside the home. Tensions come up in marriages, and so does domestic violence (DV). Husbands hitting wives in countries of origin may have been acceptable; they soon find in the U.S. that it can lead to arrest. Interestingly, the first Somali Bantu arrest for DV was a woman who attacked her husband with a knife, finally, in an argument. I happened to be in the apartment to where she returned after release from jail; it was a subdued, rather quiet group of women who sat with her to hear about the experience. She received probation and anger management classes; that marriage eventually ended and I do not know what happened to her in the long run. I knew and liked both of them; the husband was not particularly adept at navigating to useful resources in the U.S., and I suspect it was no different in Africa (in fact someone told me this). Two very frustrated people.

This case reminds me to report that, in my opinion, domestic violence situations in refugee populations are difficult to manage with American models of DV treatment, because ours do not account for the factor of a need to rely on the ethnic community for a long time during the re-establishment of life in a new country, especially refugees like the Somali Bantu, but also others. Spouses want to go home—they do not want to stay separated—not because of any "doormat" syndrome or low self-esteem, but because they do not have enough social support in bridging communities, and they often cannot communicate well enough to understand—let alone go along with—American therapists.[203] There *are* extreme violence episodes and relationships where women (or men) need separation and long-term protection. But in a given

[203] It would be fruitful to look at models for how these situations have been handled by MAAs over time: Hmong MAAs in Wisconsin have done a significant amount of work on developing culturally-appropriate DV treatment and prevention approaches.

episode if police get called, whether the relationship is chronically abusive is not discernable to responding officers, and that arrest can be a difficult thing to manage when it comes time to apply for citizenship—it may prevent acceptance.

REFUGEES WITH HIGHER EDUCATION (INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL) DEGREES

A number of individual refugees arrive with higher education. Some refugees arriving from FSU and FY came in as experienced professionals—doctors, journalists, teachers. They had a lot of difficulty with re-credentialling and often ended up working outside of those professions. Some went into other fields which were as rewarding; others report they sacrificed themselves for their children. There are many stories that deserve a telling.

I am most familiar with Iraqis who have come in with professional degrees or at least bachelor's degrees. Among those I have met, the same situation obtains so far: engineers are no longer working as engineers; doctors have not gotten re-credentialed. This is an issue that needs to be addressed with new policy.

Some Iraqis quickly figure out the fastest way to get a marketable degree, and then get it. In Iraq, many of them worked with Americans, and they use those contacts in the U.S. in the beginning. They have some cultural familiarity coming in (except the everyday, how-do-neighbors-interact-with-each-other variety). Many navigate toward working with refugees who are coming in after: some make this into a longer term career choice; some do this while they figure out what else they might do since there are not many opportunities for advancement in the local Volag system.

Some younger individuals (in their 20s and 30s) mentioned that their parents had chosen their occupation for them when they were back home, and they are actually glad to have the

opportunity now to choose for themselves. But they face, again, what anyone faces who has to work and go to school at the same time: it takes a long time; they cannot devote the attention they would like because they are stretched. I would love to see more outreach from graduate schools to help those interested in advanced degrees.

Of course there is tremendous variance in this population, too. And I am told there are also sectarian tensions emerging because Sunnis and Shias are getting resettled to the same places. I am learning that there are more mixed marriages than one might have thought in this population, but I am hearing about this vaguely, so I cannot comment on how this is playing out in this population.

I have heard statements and learned of episodes where I thought that Iraqi refugees were being assessed as instantiations of a potentially dubious group—they are Muslim; they are from an area of the world where Al Qaeda and ISIS are operating, and maybe they are harboring terrorists. Or even are one [sic]. I am also seeing this attitude toward Somalis (less toward Somali Bantus). So the bridging community relationships are quite important to these refugee families, and among Iraqis, I am seeing definite interest and efforts to build them.

And this observation provides a good segue into the next "work" of resettlement.

IDENTITY THICKENING

"Thickening identity"--a process whereby an individual engages in projects and activities which helps others to understand his/her talents, propensities, personal history, capacities for helping others using specific skills and talents, and trustworthiness[204]--is important to building social capital and social identity. It is much easier to accomplish where the sociality in the

[204] A concept developed by Bartlett (2007) and illustrated by Hopkins *et al* (2013) among Latino newcomer teens in school.

community of place and as captured in mass media within a nation is open, welcoming, friendly, and calm. Identity thickening helps in the acquisition of bridging social capital and in overcoming conflicts and fears that may emerge in living alongside others from the country of origin resettling to the same area.

The first is much easier to accomplish than the second: bridging to long-resident community members (most of who were born in the U.S.) is a matter of getting acquainted through a variety of social and economic activities. Eventually, it provides a foundation for expressions of solidarity across arriving and receiving communities when the collective social body of the receiving community is shaken, as happened with 9-11 and other incidents, or when refugees are targeted or marginalized as polluting "others" in the new country. Getting to know each other when there has not been a direct conflict is much easier then when there is an atmosphere of suspicion.

Bridging to former enemies can be precarious, though refugee factions and their leaders may come to understand that they actually have shared a destiny, and want to prevent bringing the cause of that destiny with them to the country of permanent resettlement. They were fleeing violence and atrocity; they were fleeing the complete breakdown of the social contract. But those conflicts back home between identity groups are still in play—whether in outright war/violence or in great anger and agitation. And they spill here if only because refugees track what is going on back home and have opinions about it, are re-stimulated by it, and unable to process it with each other effectually. Identity thickening also lays a foundation for some improvement of relations among those who were in conflict in the country of origin, so that people become--to each other--more than simply instantiations of the enemy group.[205]

[205] Of course, the garden variety social competition and jealousies still occur, even so. If these get serious, people move from an area, and that is one reason why there needs to be more than just a handful of cities receiving a given ethnic group.

There must be enough opportunities for people to exert their unique visions, skills, propensities and interests both economically and socially in a local place-based community; and, they have to do it in front of each other, publicly. Multicultural refugee networks and Volags and MAAs are important to this process. I am unsure about mosques, but that would be another place where this could happen. When an institution or a group is multicultural, that "group-i-ness" requires that people find areas of commonality. Refugees have gone through very similar experiences of extreme violence and find their stories are uncannily similar. They end up having discussions about the "work" of resettlement in the U.S., and comparing cultural models and customs around a given task or role. They enjoy discovering mythical figures that reappear in different cultures—Santa Claus in the U.S. has gift-giving counterparts in many other countries across the world, for example. These discussions allow deepening nuance in relationships with "others." They acknowledge and accept difference, but also allow people to find what they share as a species (the collective phenomenal body referred to in Chapter 1).

If a conflict from back home spills out into a negative incident in the U.S., it is a resettlement failure of the arriving community. It is not an irreversible failure: it can be revisited in the future, but it can greatly prolong achievement of some rather concrete and agreed-upon desires the collective social body. I have seen factional among the Hmong communities of Wisconsin, among Somali in Phoenix, among Somali Bantu community in San Antonio (the Tucson Bantus avoided this problem through a system of "representation" and possibly because an American was ready to bring resources). Factions block each other from gaining resources and thus power. People in the receiving community *may* be able to help move through these episodes and conflicts with a buffering presence (triangular relationships can do this); this would

be an interesting topic for future research. They can also exacerbate factional conflicts by taking sides (and I have also seen this).

Perhaps as importantly, identity thickening allows refugees to rebuild status, something that has been lost in flight and through the extremely humbling aspects of the refugee experience. And building a status that is based on something other than being a refugee survivor enables more enduring relationships to emerge in communities of place, and helps refugees feel they have established a home, again.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I investigated the pursuit of bonding, bridging, and linking social capital that refugees acquire and tend to as they rebuild life in a new country. Refugees usually arrive with or to ethnic (or other identity) communities in the U.S. The extent to which bonding capital is critical to their adjustment was discussed through the case examples, and it varies with individual and family circumstances. Bridging social capital can help refugees gain access to additional resources not easily available through an enclaved community. Linking social capital—between refugee and receiving community institutions—requires that the arriving community organize itself enough to either form an MAA, or put forward well-accepted leaders who are (informally, but nevertheless somehow) authorized to speak or recognized for their socio-cultural expertise. Some groups are better than others at this; some receiving communities and local resettlement networks are more welcoming of MAA formation. But where MAAs do not form (of some sort, even voluntary), it is hard for a population to get traction socially and

politically.[206] And then ethnic community "voice" reverts to resettlement employees, some of whom would not have been the choice of the ethnic community.

I have not found it to be invariably the case that refugees have to have bonding capital before they can acquire bridging social capital. Only those refugees who fail to develop effective relationships in the ethnic community because of their repeated socially-unacceptable behavior seem to also fail at bridging relationships. I have seen a few of those refugees; they are as marginalized as any community member in any culture with a bad reputation. This is not stigma. Refugees call it "bad character." Across all groups, I have heard this.

This chapter described the many "works" that refugees have to undertake in relocating to another country outside of the region of origin. Acquisition of social and cultural capital is one such work; navigational work is another: orienteering work, acquisition of ecological and geographical capital, and navigating cultural dualities were all introduced as works of resettlement. There are many others that deserve a telling and some of these will be explored in the next chapter.

I realize how much richer the ethnographic data in this and the next chapter are compared with chapters 5 and 6. Perhaps I am a better observer when there is some cultural distance. American culture—even crossing system levels and organizations—is not always "noticeable" to me as ethnographic data because I am of that culture, and participant observation in the culture is taking place is a setting that is more naturalized for me. I hope that some refugees and former refugees who are in the U.S. will become anthropologists with regional specializations in North

[206] I mean this in two ways. Refugee-serving agencies and networks of agencies or communities of practice may want representation in their groups from refugee populations. If there is no MAA, how would these networks or communities of practice identify someone who is well-positioned to know a significant amount about a refugee ethnic community, its social structures and practices, and its politics? And without clear leadership that is supported by and extends out of an MAA, how would a refugee ethnic group concentrate votes or activism to gain the influence with elected officials?

America. Actually, my Iraqi colleague (who became an American citizen while we worked together) told me just after hire that he wrote lots of emails back to his friends and family in Baghdad about the unexpected things his American boss in this American government office does.

I am not sure I should be the example actually: anthropologists can be a bit quirky because they function betwixt and between groups so often. Positioning and idiosyncrasies make for certain biases. I hope I have at least made mine explicit, so the reader can judge the ethnographic material accordingly.

Chapter 8

Successes and failures of refugee resettlement in the U.S. after 9-11

Individuals cannot be understood solely by looking inside their bodies and brains; one must also look inside their communities, their networks, their workplaces, their families and even the trajectories of their lives.
--J Lomas, 1998

Because it can be used to gain access to resources of various kinds, acquisition of social capital offers a productive way of thinking about successful refugee resettlement. But acquiring and tending social capital is not the only task of resettlement, as the case examples of the previous chapter demonstrated.

Refugees who have been through extreme violence and persecution also need to engage in a healing process that entails trust building, identity construction, and meaning making achieved gradually ("a little, a lot, over a long period of time") [207] through interactions with both familiar and unfamiliar groups of people. These important social goals entail cross-cultural communication and examination of assumptions and expectations on the part of both refugees and those receiving and tending to them, both locally and nationally.

Refugees are war-impacted, and in analyzing success of refugee resettlement in the U.S., additional aspects of agency and restoration must be considered. The experience of American populations of the events of 9-11 also beg for such analysis as these processes play out in how Americans consider, welcome, and include refugees from other parts of the world. Again, it is a

[207] Mollica, November 2007 lecture to students of Harvard Program in Refugee Trauma (Orvieto)

two-way process, each community managing its own responses to extreme fear and loss following episodes of violence.

I do not think that there can be resettlement success without social healing. At the most basic level, people have to restore an inclusive, life-affirming social contract. Spaces are needed for addressing the roots of social suffering if peoples are to break out of cycles of revenge, retaliation and toxic sociality. In the first chapter, I called these spaces of creative production "domains of healing," contrasting them to Abramowitz' description of the "interventionscape." The latter addresses the symptoms of violence-induced social suffering through the application of social engineering techniques to various levels of country systems.

Devising spaces where social healing can proceed—and where people do what they need to do to recover from suffering—is also a rather different project than remaking refugees into neoliberal citizens who are self-sufficient and obey the rule of law, as memorialized in the Refugee Act of 1980 and the slew of administrative rules and policies (and funding) which followed. The Act and its ensuing regulations see like a State; they create like a State. They *establish* like a State—setting up the structuring and counting and reporting work of resettlement bureaucracy. But both government officials and refugee service providers are seeing that this is not enough after 9-11: discourses about refugees taking ownership within this new nation and their local communities are coming to the fore, motivated partly by deepening concerns about terrorism.

This chapter assesses the successes and failures of refugee resettlement in the U.S., using two approaches. The first considers success from within the frame of governance: the administration and management of refugees resettling, including the collection of statistics for specific indicators of self-sufficiency. The second considers success from a more

anthropological frame: developmental trajectories out of the harms experienced in episodes of extreme violence, and the sustained actions that people undertake to re-establish life afterwards while relocating in a new country. Each approach finds many successes; and there are some failures; I will provide case examples.

ASSESSING SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN U.S. RESETTLEMENT

As explained in Chapter 5, PRM and ORR administer the federal refugee resettlement programs. These agencies issue grants and contracts to national Volags, States, Wilson-Fish Programs, and a variety of other private (usually non-profit) entities, to deliver services for reception and placement, economic stabilization of refugees, and sociocultural orientation. They issue requests for proposals which usually require submission of program logic models that depict the proposer's programmatic solutions to engineer the *management* of resettlement. Logic models plot linear programmatic enactment through time; the associated "log frames" or SMART objectives facilitate measurement and accountability. They can be useful as long as the operators—in practice—consider themselves to be in an evolving "conversation" between activities and outcomes,[208] and with those whom they are trying to serve. A logic model is disciplining; and it is also a road map. And maps do help.

[208] This is where the logic models enshrines a theory of practice being tested programmatically—and so in evaluation of the project and its outcomes, issues with achieving desired outcomes may be due to incomplete or inaccurate implementation (outputs are not produced), or, in an incorrect theory of practice for the context. If the latter, the theory has to be tweaked or discarded. I think of logic models as establishing program hypotheses: where this is understood between funder and grantee or contractor, the use of logic models offer a helpful discipline for managers and practitioners.



Figure 4: Logic model template

Logic models bring a certain cogent clarity in the logic and expectations of programs and services for target populations, but they do not capture complex practices very well. If the meso- and local levels of systems are simply viewed as there to operationalize policy and goals from the top and communicate up about problems encountered in local outcomes, then logic models are sufficient.

But the process and challenges of refugees resettling anywhere are more accurately depicted as *trajectories of becoming*:[209] Refugees self-determine how they will operate in and respond to various landscapes (physical, social, economic, political) in an ongoing process. And in the process, they change themselves and their environments. No social technology or programmatic application replaces artful practice in establishing homey communities: opening

[209] *Cf.* Biehl and Locke (2010). They suggest that anthropologists look for trajectories that people devise to get themselves out of degraded socialities, structural closures, and cultural entrapments that are blocking them from the lives they desire. It is through desire people struggle to come to terms with events and intolerable conditions, and shake loose from socio-economic and political determinants and definitions that restrict salutogenesis. Desire helps people open to new relations, camaraderie, and trajectories.

spaces for expression of agency and desire is very different from applying social engineering technologies to achieve a pre-determined collective impact.

At macro-levels and in bureaucracies, accomplishments are tracked as statistics. However, in re-establishing a social contract, a life, and a community after atrocity, people and populations are not trying to get needles to move on statistical meters. Though players usually like to know the score (and a logical framework/smart chart enables such tracking), scores do not make meaning or envision a desired future. Scores are better as a tool for:

- advocacy: for funding, for continued support of resettlement, and to explain costs and benefits to taxpayers; and,
- management: to discipline grantees and demand quality performance.

So they are needed.

However, in local communities, given where they *are* after horror and accepting that there is no full restoration or ever completely "getting over it," what arriving and receiving individuals are trying to do is find ways to support phenomenal life so that people can envision and inhabit a future of their choosing. This is the work of resettlement and home-making at the meso/local community level. And myriad individuals and populations desire and find myriad ways of doing it. We need to be able to see *unlike* a State to appreciate this process of becoming. For violence-impacted refugees and American receiving communities after 9-11, success might be conceived as an improving: the sense of health, strength, social support, and meaning that allows people to turn to the future; the capacity to express agency; and the feeling of community well-being.

PROGRAMMATIC SUCCESSES OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE U.S.

U.S. policies and programs are geared toward making neoliberal citizens, as indicated by refugees' achievement of (especially economic) self-sufficiency by entering employment. This "success" target—writ into policy in the Refugee Act of 1980—*is so tracked*. It is tracked in the yearly ORR report to Congress, in monitoring the R & P cooperative agreement, and in new policies and requirements for cultural orientation. With the dissemination of the 2015 report of the White House Task Force on New Americans, I think that we will shortly see even more metrics and more closure of the system toward certain trackable indicators: acquisition of better English fluency, citizenship acquisition, employment advancement, [210] acquisition of financial skills and wealth.[211] And, perhaps some measure of social support or connections, though I have heard very little about how this would be done.

Currently we know the job-entry rate of refugees receiving services in ORR-funded programs, at what average wage, with what benefits, and how many of those who got a job retained employment 90 days later, for a given period of time (in trimester and yearly reports). These figures can be disaggregated by state, by Volag, and by service program, and are collected by ORR. The job-entry rate in Wisconsin while I was there—across Social Services and Targeted Assistance Grant programs—hovered between 50 and 60 percent,[212] with a 90% employment-retention rate. The average wage, as I recall, was around $9.60 or so. The vast majority of those employed entered full time jobs. No one that I know of went homeless.

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[210] The bar for "economic self-sufficiency" is currently set quite low—entering employment, and going off of cash assistance. Given the deep economic bases for social suffering and outbreaks of violence in the experience of many refugees, a better indicator would be progress on a career trajectory. In other words, something beyond a survival job if refugees so desire.

[211] ORR was also preparing to track incidence of suicide in 2014 in response to the pattern emerging in the Bhutanese refugee communities across the U.S.

[212] Wisconsin's statistics were about at the mid-range of resettlement programs among states; variance can occur with economic upturns and downturns, as happened in 2008 and 2009 across the U.S.

On the other hand, I cannot say how refugees progressed in learning English (other than those I taught directly, myself).[213] I did not track employment by ethnic group; but could have. Resettlement offices of governments do not track citizenship applications or how many took the oath of citizenship, nor do Volags. But the Somali Bantu MAA in Tucson definitely tracked this number (citizenship services were funded by the grant) and it was a source of community pride since people in this predominantly pre-literate-at-arrival population had to pass both oral and written tests of English in addition to civics questions.[214]

What we also do not know very well is whether—or when—refugees climb out of their initial life of poverty after arrival (or which refugee populations do so—this may be a more useful question). We do not track nationally whether refugees get second tier employment or into career paths or occupational identities (although the State of Colorado and perhaps other state programs have started to try to discern whether refugees are making progress in these important economic and identity-thickening domains).[215]

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[213] There are standardized tests of English mastery that are accepted in community colleges and by TANF programs. Refugees have difficulty passing the first level, and so appear to be "failing" in English-acquisition. This is nonsense: the standardized tests are not sensitive enough to pick up progress in English, and how well they test communicative capacity is debatable. I think that refugees should be tested and tracked on the material taught in their classes. Classes use different curricula: are they mastering what is taught? I doubt this will be an approach adopted nationally; but states and local programs could do it. Somali Bantus arriving as adults were really demoralized by their apparent inability to learn English. This was a slightly different issue: I took the tack of separating out and teaching first oral skills, then teaching the exact same material in reading and writing, sequentially. I was sure they could learn English—a supermajority came in speaking 3-5 languages. They are an oral culture. And they did learn it.

More recently, I am gratified to see that emphasizing oral skill acquisition is now favored for refugees coming in with low ESL skills, regardless of literacy background in their native language. People want and need to talk to Americans from the beginning. They don't need to read to us in the beginning. (Although they soon need to master safety signs in English for job purposes. And the English on a job application; this written vocabulary can be taught by sight reading). I am hopeful that with the recommendations of the Presidential Task Force and its emphasis on ESL acquisition, new indicators will be determined that can help us "see" progress in English—refugees need these in the beginning to avoid demoralization from their inability to pass standardized tests. This is a basic principle of education: the students' need for ratification of progress and mastery.

[214] A supermajority became citizens in ceremonies attended by many family members. It was a very moving ceremony in Tucson; both those getting citizenship and those in attendance spoke about their feelings and experiences because the presiding judges made the time for this to happen. It provided a first step in voicing ideas as a new citizen, the first ownership of a legal ceremony as a citizen.

[215] By relating this information, I am not advocating for increased surveillance or measurement of refugee achievements; but formative research to tell us about how people are doing would be helpful in making a case for whether and what kinds of

Success is being read at a moment in time. Measures of performance fit a bureaucratic frame; they provide data-informed rationales for continuance of the program when Congress reviews the record. By and large, refugees *are* at least minimally self-sufficient: they work, they get enough income to stay housed and fed; they are viewed as good employees by the business community. Studies show that they contribute economically to the community and create tax revenues in excess of initial costs.[216] And they pay back their travel loans; they do not make claims on the government for services, generally.[217] Yes. They take care of themselves. And yes, this constitutes a success according to the self-sufficiency goal of the U.S. Refugee Resettlement program. Taxpayers are not footing huge bills for refugees.

When the unit of analysis is the individual and family, we see few failures except when criteria are applied at a given point in time, or, when navigation of self-sufficiency "milestones" falters (e.g., moving from crisis intervention/stabilization to the consolidation phase to integration). When the unit of analysis is refugee populations or collectives, the "rate" of success in movement toward self-sufficiency (through employment or business income) is evident in statistics and in events. Populations coming in with higher education and wage labor experience manage to attain a stable self-sufficiency in the first generation, though it may be at a lower socioeconomic status than in the country of origin. If it is a highly intact population coming in with significant numbers, and recognized leaders who are in the lead (as happened with the Hmong), even where pre-literacy and low formal education predominate, the first generation organizes bonding capital to get to stable—if enclaved—self-sufficiency. In the current era of significantly smaller resettling populations, those groups with lower educational

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additional resources might be made available to refugees and receiving communities in fostering economic well-being and pursuing occupational identities.

[216] Lee (2013); Brown *et al* (2007)

[217] Except for low-income housing—I do see Somali Bantus and others getting into and staying in Section 8 and other low-income housing.

and literacy levels and subsistence livelihood backgrounds may see less "success" in attaining self-sufficiency in the first generation. This is the situation of Somali Bantu and possibly of some of the ethnic groups coming from Burma. Formative research as to what emerges over time with these populations could be useful; at present my research shows that the arriving teen and adult generations are more vulnerable to livelihood insufficiency, except where they can gain Section 8 housing which stabilizes them.[218]

SUCCESS IN RE-ESTABLISHING HOME, MEANING, INCLUSION, AND BELONGING

The anthropology of "becoming" invokes ideas about people moving through liminal space and time to assume new social roles/relationships. Part of what has to happen in this limin is that the harms from extreme violence described in Chapter 1—especially at the local and meso levels—have to be addressed in some way, socially.

What I have come to understand from observing and participating over 12 years is that when the limin offers the right contextual resources—providing domains or spaces for healing and recovery and learning, and mastery, and meaning-making, and overcoming cultural entrapments—self-determined, adversity-activated development occurs. Viable refugee MAAs have provided these spaces in some U.S. communities. Some individual challenges can be assisted professionally in some of the domains: both receiving and arriving communities have ritual masters who enact these roles (psychiatrists, teachers, religious leaders, healers). But most solutions are developed by liminals themselves as creative responses to dilemmas, from which

[218] Rent is based on income; it is not simply the lower rent associated with other versions of low-income housing.

they learn what they are capable of in the new space and time context, and from which sudden meaning and insight may spring forth in this space of heightened performativity.[219]

Use of a more processual, change-oriented framework to evaluate successes of resettlement enables us to ask after individuals and their progress, but also to ask whether and how well associated domains of healing are available and resourced for the liminal spaces in which they find themselves. And to ask how much—how frequently, by how many—these domains and resources are accessed by both refugees and receiving communities. And what these offerings have led to through time, with some expectations for how quickly these domains make possibility into effectual healing of social bodies. We may eventually be able to say some things about the performativity successes of refugees and programs, respectively, with regard to:

- the success of his or her *communitas* experience in forging a sense of belonging and what can be offered by a refugee as a value to the [new] community; and,
- the success of the resettlement program itself—how well it conditions, arranges and supplies the spaces for navigating through this neutral zone of self-determination forced by new circumstances.

In the absence of ritual guides who mirror and organize the journey through the limin—it is just too hard to conduct life without any social or environmental markers at all—it is helpful to think about trajectories of becoming that: are restorative after harms; overcome cultural entrapments; create solvable dilemmas and challenges; and unlock resources that enable people to establish home and choose to inhabit roles that will work for them in the new country. I have captured some trajectories out of harm and emerging into the new, and the meso- and local-level social domains where these can take place, in the chart below:

[219] By "heightened performativity" I mean that people are encountering novel situations in which they have to both attend to performing (rather than reacting automatically as they have learned to do in familiar situations), and rely on their instincts and endogenous, embodied capacities to respond. It is a sort of paradox. They find that they can do things that they do not know they can do and that they have not been directly taught to do. It is both highly creative, and fraught with extreme uncertainty at the same time. Indeed, that "fraught"-ness may be what enables the creative performance.

Table 5. Trajectories of becoming in refugee resettlement and integration in the U.S.

Harm from extreme violence	Trajectories of becoming	Associated spaces and domains of healing
Reduced to instantiation of identity category	Thickening identity over time, so that people (and you, yourself) know your history, your talents and propensities, and what your capacities are—i.e., so that what you do, your history, and how you act as a human being among others, *again matters* in the community and society because social relations will be ongoing.	Spaces enabling ongoing social contact over time and which extend outside of bonding communities. Domains include schools, workplaces, spaces and opportunities for leisure activities and interaction within communities of interest. Coffee shops, dance clubs, game rooms, sports teams and tournaments, performance venues.
Persecution, targeting by identity group	Becoming socioculturally adept in public spaces and multicultural settings; finding ways to increase ability to engage in reciprocal relationships with receiving community, rival factions of one's ethnicity or country of origin, other arriving ethnic groups, and former enemies. Finding ways to: express solidarity across identity-groups; contribute to a positive, life-affirming sociality in the new community of place; convene processes and projects in which one can develop understanding of shared interests and goals in creating a livable community environment despite experience with atrocity.	Neighborhoods and public spaces where various identity groups can meet, interact, and exchange views and ideas safely; business relationships and patronage; access to/contribution to media; informal markets, ethnic and multicultural festivals.
Displacement, ethnic cleansing	Find ways to overcome alienation and gain a sense of belonging in a new locale; developing a sense of ownership in and identification with the U.S. as a country and nation; emergent ability to become bi-cultural or to function in two cultures; ability to identify shared interests and common understandings with those of other ethnicities/identities or mixed identities; find ways to stand in solidarity with others across ethnic lines.	Access and contribution to media; access to and contribution in spaces of cultural production (sports, arts, festivals); access to/participation in receiving community festivals; cultural festivals extended to those outside of one's bonding group; idea-exchange meetings and community conversations; MAAs and multicultural exchange settings.
Impunity, loss of social contract, inability to speak up against unfairness, corruption, torture, intimidation, human rights violations	Learn about laws and ordinances of U.S., states, and municipalities and learn how to operate within them (including family law); identify opportunities to exercise human rights and rights of citizenship and to take actions; re-establish a clear sense of what is criminal behavior and the necessity of policing and surveillance; learn how to oppose law-breaking and anti-social activities in one's neighborhood and community of place in order to work toward restoration of social contract; find ways to express reciprocity with neighbors and across ethnic lines.	Rule of law applied fairly; fair law enforcement; understand-your-rights discussions and access to information online and in libraries; places and ways to complain and press one's point of view in conflicts; places to safely explore conflict; MAAs and other places were activism can be pressed.

Disconnection from world outside conflict	Gaining awareness of what else is going on in the world through increasing computer and smart phone literacy and competency	Internet cafes, libraries, training spaces for computers and smart phones.
Impoverishment from mass theft and lack of economic functioning	Initially garnering sufficient income for basic needs. Over time, increasing income for wealth-building, investment in education, and to allow some leisure time to spend with family and friends—above minimum-wage jobs.	Workplaces; small marketplaces; workspaces with equipment/supplies for craft production and markets; small business incubators with access to financing; trade schools, colleges, and universities; places and internet tools for vocational exploration and receipt of mentoring; libraries which allow access to computers and software.
Illicit economies; degraded ability to do occupational role	Pursuit of an occupational path/livelihood strategy or identity of one's choosing; exercising agency; making progress on this path as opportunities for advancement are identifiable	
Mass theft, unsafe conditions, homelessness	Locate and move to safe, secure, stable housing, with adequate space, in good repair, with all needed utilities, and among neighbors who can and will assist in an emergency	Transitional housing options, apartment communities with common spaces, interactive neighborhood life (incl. neighborhood and community centers and neighborhood social events, scavenger hunts, tournaments).
Loss of voice	Learning to communicate, especially orally, in English (in the U.S. setting) in order to speak up about needs and to talk story; undertaking expressive narration and arts which allow the individual to express opinions and share feelings & ideas based on experience, study, and knowledge acquisition.	A variety of places/spaces for learning English; places where refugees can teach others their native languages; ethnic radio programs; community/public access radio and media; speakers bureaus for civic group presentations; places to learn how to present information and talk story to various audiences; expressive arts production studios and places to put work out into the public; libraries, museums; festivals; informal weekday or weekend markets.
Destroyed social networks; social decimation	Connecting socially within and outside of ethnic group to establish and enlarge a social support system that can meet needs and to which one can contribute; finding opportunities for membership in a cohort, developing ways to contribute civically.	Places which make these possibilities available: Schools, workplaces, community centers, religious groups, MAAs, multicultural MAAs, group-based service delivery, volunteer opportunities.
Social stigma, inability to fulfill social role	Enacting with increasing competence a social role that is recognized by various communities in the new setting (parent, spouse, adult of a given gender, age appropriate expectations of children in the new locale; occupation); developing and tending a family life and the ability to be neighborly; achieving human development milestones, such as moving from adolescence to adulthood.	Neighborhoods, family rituals, collegial spaces at work, places for teens and young adults to explore and decide occupational identification; communities of practice; access to training opportunities for work skill acquisition and social life competencies; conflict resolution processes, mental health clinics, civic and volunteer opportunities.

Loss of sense of meaning, will to survive due to deliberate decimation of social body	A sense of meaning emerges as a person moves to a new country and reflects on having survived extreme violence and persecution. Helping others from arriving community to transcend the experience of extreme violence and work toward a sense of deepened meaning about the human condition and shared humanity. Helping those in the receiving community understand what it is to go through a terrible, massively dark time, and emerge again to life.	Opportunities for expression of altruism through religious organizations and civic groups; spaces for cultural production, enactment, and innovation (such as MAAs, festivals, weddings); therapy and group therapy venues; self-organized support groups; doing physical activities with other people such as repair of buildings, vehicles, equipment, infrastructure, roads, parking lots; beautification efforts; public art and collective performances (like community dance, community play events); public library events; religious and spiritual communities and services; establishment of memorials to those lost or left behind; ritual spaces and events which contain and create collective sensibilities; public speaking events/panels/bureaus.

Of course it is a partial list, and as I was creating it, I was thinking about refugee and refugee-community markers of "progress," but not every refugee individual, family, or population has to make progress in every one of these domains or markers to feel successful. Refugees will exert agency, according to their felt needs, cultural values, and goals for themselves.

A trajectories-of-becoming perspective allows us to recognize that successes and failures happen over time, and are not ultimate (except in a suicide or a deportation). People and families and collectives and systems learn and evolve, partly through failures, trial and error. An individual social body success is when a person's identity is thickened beyond race, ethnicity, gender, age, or sect. S/he has an individual history, and this history is known by others and appreciated in its trajectory through time. S/he has a set of interests, talents, and developed honed skills, and personal propensities that have evolved through time in a social milieu, so that others know what s/he is capable of being and contributing in the community or collective. For collective success, we could add an additional set of criteria related to the salutogenic quality of sociality, the restoration of the social contract, the sense of shared interest. And for between-collectives successes, we also need the criteria related to sociality, restored social contract, and shared interest, but we could add mutual understanding and solidarity.

That is how I have come to define success in resettlement of refugees to the U.S. through a long period of participant observation and talking to many stakeholders across all systemic levels.

TRAJECTORIES OF BECOMING: SOME EXAMPLES

The case examples I provided in the previous chapter on the work of resettlement would also be readable as successful "becomings." Here I want to provide a few other examples to show additional aspects of how people are reaching new opportunities and meanings in their resettlement to the U.S.

Case example: meaning-making during resettlement and integration

I met a Somali Bantu man was in his late 20s or early 30s on arrival. He visited around frequently in the Somali Bantu community; he teased others, he enjoyed them, and they enjoyed him from what I observed. I did notice him occasionally sinking into pensive moments, though he was easily roused from this demeanor when conversations resumed in a room. I was never sure what he did to earn a living—I think he remained in a survival job, mostly. Others told me that he was very studious of the Koran, and liked to talk about religious topics. He learned English, though was not quite fluent. But he understood a great deal, and could seemingly communicate nearly anything he wanted to say, including quite complex socio-religious and emotional content.

Once the local Somali Bantu MAA opened, discussions occurred sometimes during which Somali Bantu refugees were working out their complicated relations with Somalis in the U.S. Somalis functioned as interpreters and otherwise interacted with Somali Bantus in these discussions…quite cordially I thought. Ibrahim (not his actual name) did insist, however, on stating clearly how he perceived the marginalization of Somali Bantus in Somalia and in the Kenyan refugee camps. He would correct assertions that there was no difference between Bantus and Somalis, recalling how Somali Bantus were treated in Somalia by the Somali clans.

He was hurt, and though not quite bitter about it, he was adamant and still angry about it. He would not allow it to be brushed over.

He volunteered to help me with my dissertation by doing an in-depth, wide ranging interview as a key informant about life in Somalia and flight. It lasted nearly three hours. He had heard I was looking for people to interview; he wanted me to understand what had happened to them (the Somali Bantu). He narrated his experiences in English; here are a (very) few summarized excerpts:

Ibrahim was the son of a second wife of a Somali Bantu man. He and his mother did not live with his father, and he noted that he didn't know whether the father loved them. He did not think so. He told me of many ways that Somali Bantu were marginalized and subjected to abusive power without participation in Somalia—by being forced into military service, pushed out of queues for resources, not allowed into occupations of choice or venues of decision-making.

At the point at which the situation was becoming very bad in Somalia (before mass flight), people were starving and eating grass and leaves to try to stay alive. He described how skin infections would set in from little cuts people typically get from insect bites or walking in rural landscapes, and explained that as people starved, their bodies had difficulty fighting the infections because they were so malnourished. He showed me multiple scars etched on his calves and shins from that time.

At a certain point he considered whether to flee with others to the camps in Kenya. He went to see his father for advice, but the father was unhelpful. His mother agreed for him to go but did not want to go herself. He decided to go (he would have been between 18 and 20 years

old, I surmise), and described his harrowing experience getting to the camps and gaining admission.

While in the camp, he received word that his mother had died, and he took to his hut and would see no one for three days; he felt so sad, devastated that she died and that he was not with her for her passing. He told me that he loved his mother very much; his friends in the camp were able to give him some comfort and help him begin to recover from the loss. He still thinks of her frequently, and likes the name she gave him—his name. It has a specific religious significance, as do many Somali Bantu names.

I have not done this interview justice here; I don't think that I can, actually, in such a short case vignette. By the end of the interview, we were both exhausted, and he smiled and left as always, tossing the usual "'Bye, Mette" over his shoulder as he walked out. He always rather ceremonially executed greetings and goodbyes *mezzo forte* almost as a brief ode to the other person and an expression of genuine social goodwill.

His was a narrative with immense meaning, highly culturally detailed, and full of angst. Family insufficiency; lack of an adult male role model in his father; loss of the most important relationships of his life; persistence to survive; persistence to tell truth into the world. It demonstrated meaning-making with me; and this was also evident in his study of the Koran.

Not all refugees talk or think like this about what has happened; but more than a few do. Those with severe PTSD—and I have known some sufferers fairly well—live with these memories in the present, nearly (if not) daily. I observe some of them do get better over time with it—though flare-ups may be triggered by current events. Those who get better seem to be those who talk about it and try to make sense/meaning of it over time, both with others and alone with themselves. Those who ruminate but do not bring the thoughts into an arena for social

regard—get lost and have appeared to me as somewhat less functional, teetering more closely to psychosis or angry outbursts.[220] Mass violence is an intensely social harm, its healing needs a social milieu.

As a person with his history, skills, interests, propensities, and reflective thinking ability, I would consider him to be successful in his resettlement trajectory: thickening identity, socially connected, social role as religious scholar within the bonding community, sufficient income, ability to communicate in English and gain voice in a multicultural setting, (he also does have computer competency, which was not a part of this story), he has an apartment, he claimed ownership of this new country through this interview-testimony and in that he sees an escape from persecution and marginalization that is available to him here. Within a couple of years, he married. The last I heard, they had not had children; and she may have been living back with her family, I am not sure. I asked after him and was told that he doesn't seem to do much to make "progress" in his material or occupational life in America. But I see him participating in the community, finding was to speak about his experiences, and still studying the Koran—his passion and through which he derives meaning and spiritual support…and bonding-community status.[221] And his life is still becoming. He grows a sense of meaning through the interactions he has, telling the world of the journey of the Somali Bantu. He did this by offering to be a key informant, knowing that by telling a scholar whom he trusts to write about their journey, he could put this into the Social.

[220] Internet surfing for hours about happenings in the home country—without a place to talk about it with others—functions like toxic trauma stories of which Mollica spoke—high arousal, no resolution.

[221] It is important to take into account the cultural values of arriving communities in interpreting success. Muslims who are knowledgeable in the Koran are highly regarded in their communities

Case study: Bi-cultural navigation

An Iraqi colleague has a wonderfully silly sense of humor; wears his Arab clothing to commemorate World Refugee Day where he leads us in "play." [Muslims don't dance, but they do play—moving in a circle, with specific steps, someone in the lead]. He prays 5 times a day; he fasts for Ramadan--all unobtrusively in the workplace. We admire him for his grace, great goodwill, amazing language and computer skills, and ability to do cultural switching easily.

He gets text messages during staff meetings that he discretely checks. Some report that someone he knows either just escaped the latest sectarian violence or bombing in Baghdad, or, that a friend or cousin was killed in that bombing. I learn about it later, he is stoic through the meeting—one does not know if he is getting a message from his wife about what to pick up on the way home, or about a terrible incident in Baghdad. He mentions later that people are afraid of rising sectarian violence and that war could recur with all this (and now war swells there, again, with the advance of ISIS); I nod, and we go back to work on processing reports or submitting our travel invoices. The mundane life of bureaucracy is co-terminous with the violent ending of life, all wrapped up in that one sentient being standing beside me or trying to stay engaged in the discussion of others around him. Not sure how he does it (he explains that he is Muslim, and Allah wills). It is the continuing habitus in which he operates, split, between two vastly different places on Earth, connected in real-time by optic fibers traversing the geomorphic crust of the planet.

He works on resettlement of refugees to the U.S., into local communities, jobs, homes, healthcare, and social connections. He has become attached to the U.S. community in which he resides. He was deliberate about this, he intended this quite clearly and planned and enacted and situated his family carefully after arrival—in schools, in communities. He is a protector: his

culturally-determined adult male responsibilities are enacted expertly, and these work well also in U.S. culture. He and his family became U.S. citizens five years after arriving, and he has now visited Iraq to see his mother (whose health is failing). While gone he emailed back to us when he went from airport to airport, city to city in Iraq, so we would not wonder about his safety for more than a couple of days. The U.S. is his adopted (adoptive) country now, and we are part of his attachment community. We were immensely relieved on his return. A successful resettlement: he was determined to make it so.

Case example of the importance of social support, and failure of receiving community

A single man arrived in his early 30s as a refugee and soon began working for a local resettlement agency. His siblings and parents remain in in the country of origin. He became a U.S. citizen shortly after hitting the required 5-year mark. He has attempted to advance occupationally but has been unsuccessful due to at least two factors that I have been able to discern:

(1) resettlement programs (even at the state government level) are specialized and there are not a lot of opportunities for advancement, and

(2) there are cultural differences in the way of operating between resettlement agency management (often American-born), and those staff who are from sociocentric cultures. Management has not examined assumptions and expectations of refugees in light of their need for trust-building, social connections, trauma informed care, identity-building (and what that takes), and meaning-making.

Here is his predicament: The salary for case managers at resettlement agencies is low, averaging around $29,000 a year or even a bit less (this works out to around $14 per hour). Salary increases are infrequent (if any), and case managers either try for promotion or look for work elsewhere after some time. Some Americans construe "self-sufficiency" very narrowly, and the agency appears to use this narrow construction, meaning that refugees must learn quickly to rely on themselves—and not the resettlement agency or its volunteers—within a few months

after arrival. Most importantly, they should not try to get assistance from agency staff or volunteers after 5:00 p.m.

For an individual coming from a more communally-oriented culture, that understanding of self-sufficiency does not make any sense: refugees have not grown up in the U.S. and may not have extensive social ties or social capital—linking, bonding, or bridging—in the first few months after arrival, unless there is a large bonding community already present. So this case manager operates responsively with refugees brought in through his resettlement agency, meaning that he helps them over the weekends and works beyond 5:00 pm if necessary.

Within the receiving community, he has shown himself to be quite an astute cultural broker, able to negotiate through crises and conflicts in which refugee families become embroiled. He is notably conscientious in assuring refugees get assistance that they need without shaming them. This "grace" skill is sophisticated and very important for the development of social trust and healing, especially in dealing with men coming from patriarchal cultures.

The man has returned twice to visit family in his country of origin; the first time he was very anxious to get back to the U.S. because of the severe security issues; but on the second visit, he was reluctant to come back because it was so nice to be around his family who appreciated him and were so happy to see him. He realized that he had been very homesick.

So he applied for a job as an interpreter with a security contractor serving the U.S. military back in his country of origin. If he passes the security check and is hired, he can begin at $75,000 a year; this may increase to over $100,000 a year, enabling him to marry. In his current position at his current salary, he does not feel that he can marry.

I asked him what factors made him interested in this job, given that his country of origin is still very unsafe. What does he like about the opportunity? He noted:

1. It is similar to what he did in his country of origin before with the U.S. military as an interpreter. That job offered many opportunities: for promotion; for skills training and professional development; and to learn new things, including computer skills. These are only minimally and infrequently provided by most resettlement agencies which have far too much to do.
2. The U.S. companies are "flexible" and friendly in the workplace.
3. The salary would enable him to marry, and help support his extended family.[222]

Nevertheless, his parents want him to stay in the U.S. and be safe. In the U.S., however, he talks about being very alone. He does not feel acknowledged or appreciated by his employer. It is a combination, then, of being stymied from moving forward on goals, of feeling alone and not able to marry (due to low salary), not being able to learn new things and new skills as part of his job, and not being acknowledged in his workplace for his contributions.

Americans who have not been through the experience of extreme violence and flight to a third country of resettlement, often do not understand the sadness and thwarting that obtains for refugees (and marginalized Americans, actually), and what they may need on the job for a sense of belonging and identification with the business endeavor. Some American employers are interested in employee loyalty, meaning that one does not look for work elsewhere. But the working conditions in some (or even many) resettlement agencies do not provide, essentially, any reason for such loyalty to be given—few advancement opportunities, long waits and hesitations for those few that do exist, very few (if any) skill enhancement or professional development opportunities. Very low salary in cities with a high cost of living.

Therefore, the enticement of a significant salary increase if he will accept a dangerous but familiar environment is strong. Being back among family is another enticement: he has a limited kin group here; he feels unconnected and alone. Feeling unable to advance and in fact,

[222] Themes: cultural expectations about family and the male role; the sociality of the workplace; opportunity for betterment; opportunity for learning new things, economic sufficiency.

thwarted, he concludes that safety is less important than having social support and the ability to pursue hopes and dreams—he has essentially been put into this situation where pursuing safety is at odds with self-actualization and social support. He says, "The XX people are my people, and they are suffering. I want to go home and help, and I am so alone here." And, "it is in [God's] hands."

I view this as a resettlement failure, on the receiving community side. And one that is squarely on the shoulders of American resettlement practitioners, both in governments and non-profits. It could have been possible for this individual to expand his sense of who his "people" are, *if* he would have been able to make a place for himself here where he could advance in his life. He has been performing with great sophistication as a senior case manager, cross-culturally, at an office where two previous senior case managers—both American-born—left, disgruntled with the salary. They had other options; refugees have fewer options.

I assess that resettlement agencies (not only the one in this particular case example) take advantage of this situation of narrow options, and keep salaries low because they can. It is not just in resettlement, it is also social services agencies more generally. At another agency in another state, the justification I heard was, "people don't work here for the money; they work here because they are dedicated." But these jobs are ones in which refugees can make unique and meaningful contributions; and they should not have to sacrifice their family life to do it. It is one of the few places with more professional-level jobs that refugees can get not long after arrival. Taking advantage of refugees in this way is a stain on the resettlement network, which frequently states as a principle of integration that refugees should be able to advance in careers.

If or when he returns to his country of origin, he will have stories to tell about life in America. Some of them will not be pretty stories. They will be stories of thwarting and

loneliness. They will be stories of what anthropologists would term "structural violence" toward refugees with the social skills to function betwixt and between, who are bringing important skills into the U.S. that would utterly revitalize and energize new ways of being and thinking into local communities, and repair divisions between peoples.

We need to recognize the special vulnerability of singles arriving to the U.S., and remember that refugees are not just coming to get a job. They are coming to reach safety, and then to establish a life worth inhabiting.

Why am I so insistent that this is structural violence at work, and so sure that it does not have to be this way? Refugee agencies frequently leave money unspent at the end of their contracts or fiscal year, and the money is returned to the funder, *and* it returns to a general fund which is not reserved necessarily for refugee programs. I have seen this repeatedly, across agencies, across the U.S.

They could give the money to staff as bonuses—this would be permissible. They could give raises. But they don't, because it is "not within our salary structure" *as if no one creates the structure, it just automatically springs forth from a budget.* And that is nonsense. And I hear it repeatedly from a variety of large social service agencies who think they need to keep salaries low to be competitive. Having been a funder, I can assure them that low staff salaries are not a bonus in my assessment of reasonable costs within a budget.

Case Example: Successful population resettlement

In Wisconsin, the first and long-time State Refugee Coordinator's idea was to fund Hmong-led mutual assistance organizations to deliver their own resettlement services nearly exclusively after the Reception and Placement period, and millions of dollars were made available for their work. They delivered employment services as well as community-organized

social services related to health, family strengthening, and other typical adjustment services needed by refugees after arrival to the U.S. There were numerous clans arriving in Wisconsin, and significant numbers of arrivals (it is estimated that 50,000 Hmong resettled in Wisconsin) over several waves of transfers to the U.S. The clans had some clashes and competitions, but as a group they stood together in interactions with receiving community officials and the State.

Their social capital-acquisition strategy with the receiving community focused on linking capital, and they were quite successful in lobbying the state legislature for various funding, services, and benefits. Hmong refugees developed small businesses; teens and young adults availed themselves of education and vocational skills training. There were fears among federal officials in the beginning of whether Hmong could be resettled successfully and survive in U.S. society due to their pre-literacy and subsistence backgrounds, but the population as a whole has done quite well in advancing educationally and in careers, buying property, renting to refugee groups coming in behind, setting up ethnic business associations, and building economic capital. I asked one of the MAA leaders once how so many restaurants survive: he noted that Hmong successively patronize businesses on different days, so that all are supported. This is a communally-oriented culture that has stayed significantly—though not exclusively—enclaved. And they seemed to me—when I arrived in the state in 2010—to be following a historically typical immigrant narrative and developmental trajectory in the U.S. A third generation is now in school, identifying as more on the American side (rather than traditional Hmong), but still bi-cultural.

I am actually unsure whether the model for Hmong resettlement in Wisconsin would work socially or politically after 9-11 with populations arriving from areas where the U.S. has been at war, and arriving in much smaller numbers. The Hmong clearly sided with the U.S. in

the Viet Nam war, and suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks had not become an international preoccupation. The success trajectories of populations resettling after 9-11 needs more study.

Case example: Multicultural, multi-stakeholder, identity/cultural negotiation

This example of an identity-thickening activity in a local refugee provider network is about who constructs identity, who assesses it and how it is perceived, and how these turns of meaning-making and discourse-setting are accepted, resisted *and* pirouetted around. In the process, I do see people claim and feel ownership in their emerging community of place and practice. Struggles around meaning are engaging, and they make shared memories among stakeholders as they work toward mutual understanding.

Recalling discussions in Chapter 7 about modernity and enchantment beliefs, here is another example: African professionals who are now American citizens and working in the refugee milieu tried to prevent Burmese refugees from writing in a cultural brief they were making about themselves that many Burmese are "animists." The brief was to be shared at a Quarterly Consultation. I was following the discussion taking place by email; and ended up asking everyone to stop the email exchange and bring it to the next network meeting. At the meeting, the African leaders noted that ("present company excluded") anthropologists invented the term "animist" originally and applied it to non-Europeans, and it had come to be used disparagingly as something that marked someone as backward.[223]

The refugees from Burma present at the meeting would have none of it; they were talking about their own ethnic groups and were unconcerned as to how they appeared to Americans—"it is what some of us believe." The Africans noted that refugees from Burma had not been in the

[223] Hopefully the reader is stopping a minute to imagine how gingerly—but intensely—this conversation was taking place, given that I was the anthropologist *and* their funder: anthropologists were being somewhat testily blamed for 19th century cultural evolutionism of Sir Edward Tylor.

U.S. long enough to understand the nuance of the issue the Africans were raising (from their experience) about how Americans view animists disparagingly (and would therefore view Burmese who were animist), not realizing that their own statement essentially also disparaged the Burmese as unsophisticated. Again, the Burmese did not care (and effectively refused to be disparaged), and wanted to leave "animists" in their document. An American-born agency leader stepped in to defend his Burmese case manager who had written the description, and suggested that as the author and a Burmese person, he should get to use the words that he wanted to use. And the word "animists" stayed as written.

A multicultural episode, and a tense navigation of the contradictions experienced by bi-cultural individuals. On the American side, one wants to be viewed by other Americans (receiving community members) as fully adult and peer. On the newcomer-to-the-U.S.-and-of-a-different-cultural-upbringing side, one may come to feel caught in the dilemma of being the "Other" who is seen as quaint or exotic. But one wants to be who one is, and the term "animist" was self-applied: even if it *was* developed by an anthropologist, the Burmese appropriated it. Also, being exotic carries some interesting cultural capital that can be converted into economic capital. (Euro-American) receiving community members who operate in the refugee milieu enjoy these differences aesthetically (I think so) and (I suppose) because they offer relief from neoliberal and other cultural hegemonies. And they do not risk being thought of as anything but cultured and urbane when they hold such views. But Euro-Americans operating outside of the refugee milieu (and who may not be especially enamored of immigrants) may not respect "animist" religious ideas and (as the Africans in the meeting feared) would subject those holding such ideas to a general disregard as backward and/or use it as an excuse for Christian

proselytization. Each stance expressed captured someone's experience, so each held a portion of "truth," and of agency exerted.

Topics like these support continuing and productive tensions. I do think so.

* * *

Living together in communities where we see each other, have conflicts and frustrations with each other, have fun together, and know and interact with each other as more than instantiations of an identity category provides a space of great creative possibility during resettlement. It occurs in local communities of place. Many are fun and meaningful; some are harrowing.

Recently I have noticed some interesting responses that some people are beginning to make when a terror incident has happened and—by identity profiling—implicates others of that identity group as a potential threat. And that response is to express solidarity. A recent example from Australia occurred when a non-Muslim woman accompanied a Muslim woman through streets so that the latter would not be harassed after a café shooting incident.[224] Expressions of solidarity have to be done publicly and cross-culturally, which is to do it *socially*. It is to acknowledge what that person or group is experiencing, and to take a stand against that targeting. A response of solidarity is an action/choice to stand beside, to possibly co-experience, and to acknowledge and work to block aggression where that is happening. Or to acknowledge shared or similar feelings about an incident.

Solidarity refuses fear, it provides support and acceptance. Solidarity inserts itself into the precariousness of belonging, and steadies everyone. Solidarity is socially salutogenic. When I see instances of it occurring spontaneously or even with planning, I know I am seeing a resettlement success.

[224] Al Jazeera, December 16, 2004, "Australia stands with its Muslims after siege", by Royce Kurmelovs (reporter)

NATIONAL SPACES OF *COMMUNITAS* HEALING

The arts and humanities are an extremely important domain of social healing. Films, literature, art, theatre, music, poetry *et al* reflect upon, process, and narrate the experiences of what it has meant to be human in that nation at that time and after.[225] They are emergent, not engineered, unofficial, and could be considered a national space of *communitas*-like healing. For both artists and audiences, artistic production and performances occur in as-if play frames. While not fully liminal because the risk is low and people are not highly vulnerable, they are nonetheless important ways that societies discover new insights about themselves and new ways of organizing social life. We are in the infancy of this work with refugees—it is the cutting edge of practice, and it is very disorganized and very unfunded. I would love to see more funding for these activities. They are spaces of experimentation and play, and we need these. Sports are, too.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I applied two different framings of success and failure in the U.S. refugee resettlement program. Both have their uses. The statistical read-in-time frame meets the requirements of funders and provides data for advocacy. This is how States see. Communities and societies see individuals and populations rather differently from what is captured in bureaucratic documentation; they see and experience processes through time which create shared memories and an enlarged sense of community.

An overall project of this dissertation has been to elaborate domains of social healing and to find ways other than medicalization to address social suffering and harms of war by focusing

[225] See Olszewska's (2015) brilliant article on Afghan refugee poets in Iran and the political and transcendental potential of writing poetry.

on meso- and local system phenomena. Some developmental trajectories and associated domains of healing were identified. My conclusions and recommendations are as follows:

First, we need to ask refugees themselves what they hoped for as they sat in their seats in the plane coming over to the U.S. I have asked occasionally and have heard a bit more from refugees as they talked about it spontaneously. What they hoped for is a glaring omission in our collective understanding. While desires change, it would be useful to see how much of what they hoped for actually came to fruition at a point in time distant from arrival—5 years out, 8 years out. It should be done by population, because there will be differences. For example, one Somali Bantu woman remarked that the U.S. is a great country: she has an apartment, and she can get food of any type, at any time. Somali Bantus were a population that survived starvation in Somalia, and hunger in the camps. Other populations are quite disappointed and even bitter in the beginning; we should try to understand how they think about it over time. Often these populations assisted the U.S. military or mission during a war; and they have high expectations for being thanked and taken care of after having to flee for their work on behalf of the U.S. Managing expectations for first jobs is a known practice among job developers; but what about other expectations? How do people modify expectations and desires when the environment is not producing what they expected? And after several years, what do they think both now, and in retrospect?

By the standard of self-sufficiency set in federal refugee policy, the overwhelming majority of individuals and families are "successful," amazingly, given the small amount of resources devoted to refugee resettlement by the government. The incidence of self-sufficiency achieved in a given population as compared to others is not well known, and would be a good topic for future research.

However when we think of resettlement and integration successes along "trajectories-of-becoming," successes have to be read through time, and the selection of which goals should be chosen as for emphasis will be made by refugees themselves based on desire and the circumstances they encounter. Again, my assessment in looking at individuals and families is that there are few failures, but there are some, and these are seen in deportation, anomie, or suicide. Anomie and chronic, poorly managed or treated PTSD leads to poor quality of life. I do see this occasionally.

In looking at the program and system of resettlement, I suggested that one metric to apply is how well the program, policies, and systems (both local and national) arrange the experience of the limin and provide the resources needed for resilience. There are also failures here. A significant one is when resettlement program officials and other professionals fail to examine their assumptions and expectations of individual refugee clients and staff given their profound needs for healing through trust-building, social connections, trauma informed care, identity-building (and what that takes), and meaning-making.

I placed an emphasis on individuals and families in my chart about trajectories of individual becoming, but also described the successful trajectory of a populace (the Hmong) in Wisconsin. And, I described an in-process example of a multicultural network figuring out identity, perception, status, and belonging in an intense discussion about labeling. These point-in-time negotiations when cultural and social positioning are under scrutiny seem critical to understanding the process of co-construction among disparate stakeholders. They reveal how multi-cultural differences are negotiated, bridged, and eventually embraced.

I am suggesting that belonging and inclusion is actually a two-way project if we are to survive as a multi-cultural society after 9-11. I see risk where social enclaving is very high, persistent, and long-term. If arriving refugee populations do not effectively see themselves as neighbors or that there might be a value in interfacing with receiving community members, it lays a fertile ground for suspicion, stereotyping and profiling between arriving and receiving communities. And when suspicion, stereotyping, and profiling predominate, people have a tendency to want to stay among and under the protection of their own identity group, especially where political violence of the type that produces refugees is in the social memory of the group. It exacerbates factionalism. But exactly the opposite is needed to overcome the tensions. And this is where solidarity actions, processes, and principles need to be and are being developed, identified, and tested. This is the space of agentive change emerging among a number thoughtful stakeholders.

The professional field of resettlement work has struggled with a goal of "integration"—defining it, envisioning it, and working toward its achievement among refugees and local communities. Moving toward an understanding of self-determined trajectories which expand social, economic, cultural, and community reach on both sides may help us overcome this problematic. But probably not entirely. So here is how I have come to define it:

Refugee integration entails belonging to a community of place and in a new country, with social identities and roles that move people beyond victim or survivor identities typical of refugee status. They become citizens or permanent residents, with opportunities for economic and social "advancement" (acquisition of wealth, thickened identity), capable of engaging in reciprocal relationships with the long-term residents of their adopted communities. Both arriving and receiving communities have gained enough trust to forge and tend effective bridging

relationships. They learn over time how to be neighbors and friends, and come to enjoy the abundance of difference, even aesthetically but also as resources for innovation and renewal. Shared memories developed over many interactions through time, both enjoyable as well as those addressing problems and conflicts forge commonalities. And people come to understand how each is uniquely positioned and endowed to contribute to the social and economic health and a supportive sociality within that community of place.

And when fear of "others" emerges--whether due to a sense of "polluting" differences or an incident of identity-based conflict or violence—neighbors stand in solidarity with neighbors to oppose identity targeting or marginalization, and to preserve the common good.

Perhaps integration and social healing cannot be engineered, and those who think that refugees can figure out their way after the first year are correct. But much more vibrancy and resource-sharing can be accomplished at the interstices when people have more interactive means to do so.

And these spaces can be offered, and designed, and funded.

Chapter 9

Conclusions:

with research, praxis, and policy recommendations

The social world is accumulated history…

--Pierre Bourdieu, 1986

This dissertation set out the following tasks as part of an overall ethnography of refugee resettlement in the U.S. after 9-11:

- Find ways beyond medicalization as the only response to social suffering, toward addressing its underlying causes in new community and national contexts.

- Elaborate the social processes of receiving international migrants into local communities.

- Extend anthropological work on rituals of change to refugees finding a place and identity in a new country and local community.

In this concluding chapter, I will highlight the key findings for each, and suggest next steps for (especially anthropological) research and practice in refugee resettlement. I will conclude with recommendations for future policy directions.

BEYOND MEDICALIZATION: ADDRESSING THE CAUSES OF SOCIAL SUFFERING

Over the course of this research I have participated in scores of meetings attended by resettlement and healthcare professionals, and observed that treating PTSD and torture sequelae

in clinical settings continues to be the primary response to trauma-symptomatic refugees in the U.S. While group therapy and "psychosocial" approaches (still rather unspecified[226]) are also undertaken, the idea of directly addressing social suffering and its causes are not part of discussions about recovery from social and political harms, which we continue to medicalize through diagnosing PTSD and other forms of mental and emotional distress.

By setting a task of "going beyond medicalization" I do not mean nor would I support discarding medical treatments from among approaches used to address the needs of refugees. Treating PTSD, depression, anxiety, paranoia and psychosis can help to reduce suffering immensely.

Diagnostic labeling and medicines do help some refugees but are often not enough. Over the course of my research and career as an anthropologist working in the field of refugee resettlement, I have documented the resettlement trajectories of a number of refugees who suffer with little relief. They experience frequent episodes of severe emotional distress and perseveration of trauma-related ideation which appears to render some unable to propel themselves forward toward better circumstances and symptom relief. Their symptoms are triggered by toxic trauma stories or thwarting disappointments from which most non-impacted people can rebound. In such cases, clinical/medical treatments help to relieve symptoms such as sleeplessness, enabling sufferers toward better daily coping.

We should also recognize that refugees bring with them indigenous models of illness and health which include methods of social healing. I discovered these practices among the Somali Bantu; numerous Hmong leaders in Wisconsin also mentioned that they are indigenous healers.

[226] See, however, the review by Pedersen *et al* (2015)

They focus on the healing of wounded social bodies and social suffering, assuring the survivors of unspeakable trauma that they have the attention and support of an extended community.

"Social suffering" is not coterminous with PTSD; and may not manifest as psychological disorders of PTSD, depression, anxiety, paranoia, or psychotic episodes. As an engaged anthropologist in the field of resettlement, I have tried to be attentive to social domains of suffering and healing, and how broken economies, identity targeting and marginalization, cultural entrapments, degraded social contracts, and stigma contribute to social suffering. Directly addressing the underlying causes of social suffering means fomenting economic recovery and opportunity, thickening identity, expressing solidarity, finding meaning after extreme violence, and having means to express agency in relocating and rebuilding.

Although in many cases they do not go far enough and their timeline for recovery can be unrealistic,[227] the policies and practices of the U.S. refugee resettlement program and indeed the overall national and state governance and legal systems of the U.S. in some ways *do structure reparative processes* for underlying causes of social suffering, in the following ways:

Through governance and protection of human rights

A. Rule of law

Simply exercising the rule of law restores basic trust that violations of human rights and violent actions will be punished and therefore deterred. Sanctioning refugees who do not follow through with programmatic agreements and conditions of cash assistance—while a source of angst for some resettlement officials—actually serve to restore trust in the reliability of contracts, and this forms a basis for restoration of trust in a social contract. It is dismaying to some observers and to some refugees to think that the period of cash assistance support is so short, and

[227] I am referring here to the short period of financial and medical insurance support as well as frontloading of federal funding for services to the first year or two after arrival.

that cash assistance comes with requirements to move into economic productivity quickly. But there is such a thing as momentum; and getting structure to one's day through going to a job is actually helpful. People walk into society partly through work. And refugees who cannot find jobs also find they have too much time on their hands. Refugees who get started quickly, go farther more quickly—I have seen this time and again. One issue that is troublesome, however, is time for education and recredentialling. This needs a policy solution.

B. The responsiveness and transparency of government officials

Refugees and their volunteers can and do check with government officials about the actions of their resettlement agencies or other local officials. To the extent that resettlement officials such as State Refugee Coordinators or their staff members are responsive on these calls, and transparent about their own practices, trust in governance slowly restores. Refugees want government.

Through healthy economic development and advancement

The emphasis on self-sufficiency through employment has a secondary gain: refugees have a means to licit economic activities. This dissertation mentioned in a variety of places the problem of broken and/or illicit economies and mass theft that refugees face before or during flight. Just getting back to work in a legitimate workplace with a regular income is in itself reparative, and much work among local resettlement agencies focuses on getting refugees to work, anywhere. But the employment incentives of the resettlement program are not reparative, however, if refugees are relegated to survival jobs with poverty-level wages for years and unable to advance their careers. This is a place where formative and statistical research would be helpful as income insufficiency is such a critical part of the underlying cause of social suffering—touching every area of life.

Refugees need to see and have means to advance beyond survival jobs if they so desire. ORR-funded micro-E projects foster small business development among refugees that may take advantage of their existing skills. However, much more study of the factors that foster success for refugees in establishing sustainable small businesses is needed.[228] And refugees need much better services to help them identify and advance in other career paths.

Social health

The social domain is significantly less well understood by receiving communities and among the community of resettlement practitioners more generally, beyond a minimal recognition of their need to acquire social capital. Refugee communities are quite in flux as they arrive. Their numbers have been decimated; their communities have to be reconstituted alongside, often, members of enemy identity groups. Mistrust continues when the latter are resettled in the same place; and often, resettling families straddle these identity groups (in mixed marriages, mixed sect allegiances, or from sect-switching).

When they make it a focus to learn how to become neighbors in a new land, ethnic community-based organizations (MAAs), and sometimes religious communities are well-placed to provide spaces for conflict resolution and development of shared memories that are more positive. Sometimes receiving community members put a check on conflicts between groups. It may be that multi-cultural MAAs have a significant advantage over single ethnicity MAAs: this is an interesting and critical formative research question for the future.

[228] Who, for example, participates successfully and sustainably--men, women, older youth? What are the demographic characteristics of refugees who try first and who succeed over time? The research and evaluation I have seen on micro-E for refugees has focused on best practices in establishing and running small businesses, rather than on the variety of factors contributing to success over time. An analysis of social capital deployment as a variable in small business success would be interesting. And, who benefits from what type of training and capitalization? Many interesting research questions could be posed and would be very helpful in garnering support for small business programs and even providing data supporting loan access for refugees from mainstream lending institutions.

Receiving community members need to and do put a check on each other when receiving community institutions or officials abuse power or do things to keep refugees from emerging out of victim/refugee status as I reported in Chapter 3. It is a critical finding that is also akin to what I identified in Chapter 8 as solidarity practices, where receiving community members stand with refugees (individual or as a group) when the latter are being targeted for discrimination or accusation, especially after terrorist incidents hit the news. But it is also true in addressing xenophobic, anti-immigrant sentiments and discourses. Expression of solidarity between arriving and receiving community members goes far in establishing trust between groups. Even tiny actions that go against recent refugee experiences that caused social suffering are helpful: Proper welcoming, in itself, is socially restorative and much more important than what most resettlement officials realize. A positive, friendly, but earnest sociality—in itself—is restorative.

I cited a quote from a community member in Greenland from the Berliner study in Chapter 4: "Do stuff together—it has more vitality." Arriving communities have wedding and cultural celebrations that provide opportunities for social interactions and tending to bonding social capital. Finding ways that newcomers and receiving community members can have fun together is also helpful. It creates shared memories that are healthy, foster social-ability between groups, and assists refugee to find a place and an identity they desire in the new land. Volunteers from the receiving community are currently creating the greatest spaces of "doing stuff together" to develop bridging capital.

No trust is absolute; but these activities establish the foundation for reciprocity and sense of fairness. When refugees and longer-term residents act reciprocally, they can deepen and change their relationships from survivor/helper (one-down and one-up) to more egalitarian and eventually more satisfying set of relationships as colleagues and neighbors and friends.

In sum, getting beyond medicalization involves social practices that occur outside the clinic to address social suffering: the causes of it, the instances of harm that occur secondary to "others" entering a new area, and the residuals which may trigger trauma memories and symptoms in refugees in the new country of resettlement. Trust, meaning, and honoring what people have been are critical aspects that have to be addressed not only in clinics, but in collectives. Identifying the resources that currently exist, and what others that could be developed to support resilience from social suffering, should be a major concern of researchers, policymakers, and practitioners. There is just too much suffering to handle in clinics; social practices are critical and not well recognized as resources for resilience. But they are highly significant; this dissertation gave numerous examples.

We need more in-depth case studies in local cities and towns where refugees are resettling focusing on how they are rebuilding trust, identity, relationships, social roles and social meaning.

ELABORATE THE SOCIAL PROCESSES OF RECEIVING INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS INTO LOCAL COMMUNITIES

The phenomenology of refugee resettlement in the U.S. has changed since establishment of the Refugee Act of 1980. Resettlement services relied heavily on volunteers and churches in the beginning, but eventually churches tended to move on to other endeavors as they felt they had made a significant contribution in the post-Viet Nam humanitarian mission.[229] HIAS soon stepped in to resettle the large Russian Jewish population in the 1990s, and resettlement services professionalized after 2000 as the expertise of Volag staff and other resettlement officials

[229] Long-time federal and state officials in the resettlement field, along with some local Volag officials, have all mentioned this trend in meetings or personal discussions.

accumulated and church engagement waned. Refugee-organized MAAs took on some of the receiving-community responsibilities, but MAA funding has waxed and waned, and competition between Volags and MAAs is apparent in the locales where I have worked and observed.

Change appears to be accelerating as the number of refugees in the world as of the end of 2015 reached the highest level since WWII. According to UNHCR, 19.5 million refugees are seeking safety outside of their countries, with as many as 60 million people forcibly displaced from their homes overall[230] as conflicts in Africa, Iraq, Syria and Yemen spill refugees into Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and across the Mediterranean to Europe. Among those crossing the Mediterranean, many have lost their lives. Also during the summer of 2015, international media began reporting about thousands of Rohingyas fleeing or being trafficked in boats to Malaysia and other destinations. They are being called a stateless people; this population has been arriving in the U.S. in recent years as part of the refugee flows from Burma/Myanmar.

We have seen a discursive formation around rising anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S. and a (very) few episodes of locales or states pushing back on the resettlement of refugees to their jurisdictions.[231] These events have elicited reactions from receiving community members who want to continue welcoming refugees into the U.S. and their local communities. An Atlanta-based organization called Welcoming America is now an ORR technical assistance provider which offers services to cities and agencies wanting to participate in the resettlement of refugees. Some locales which have lost population and industry are interested in the potential of refugee resettlement to revitalize their communities economically and civically.

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[230] In Turkey alone, as of November 3 2015, UNHCR and the government of Turkey reported in UNHCR's interagency portal that 2,181,293 Syrian refugees were in Turkey. This figure does not include refugees in Turkey who are not from Syria. It is hard to know the exact number of refugees who are in Turkey as of December 1, 2015 since the significant migration into western Europe that began in August 2015 has been very difficult to track as the movement continues.

[231] The events of November 2015 resulting in the governors of 31 U.S. states wanting to deny reception and placement of Syrian refugees in their states is, therefore, a significant new development.

Congress increased the funding to ORR to cope with the acceleration of arrivals of large numbers of unaccompanied migrant children from Central America since 2012, peaking in the summer of 2014. Even so, the high cost of their care has required that some funding planned for refugees to be moved over to cover the costs of the children. Several long-time State Refugee Coordinators in large states of resettlement retired in 2014 and 2015. Two long-time ORR officials also retired during this period, and a new ORR director was appointed in April 2015. The system is changing significantly and is ripe for reorganization with these events.

I am also seeing more scholarly attention focused on refugees concurrently with demands for more data on outcomes and impacts from federal agencies and other funders. Many areas of research and evaluation could be productive, and should encourage anthropological engagement.

Both as a State Refugee Coordinator and as a director of program evaluation at a national Volag, I spent considerable effort in developing data collection systems and protocols to improve validity and reliability of data about refugee self-sufficiency successes. I think we will see much more work on data collection in the future; efforts among national Volags to develop indicators of success abound. Interest is also increasing in literatures evaluating program designs and practices. These trends follow the general practices of creating synthesized medical research and international development databases to address the difficulty of practitioners in keeping up with the huge amount of published research. The IRC, for example, has in the last year created 13 GAP maps, gleaned from a variety of literature syntheses from four core databases[232] in order to try to inform its program designs with the latest research on evidence-based practices.

Acquisition of social capital, emergency and/or creation of *communitas*-like experiences, episodes of solidarity and cultural misfire…were all described in this dissertation as part of the

[232] 3ie, R4D, Cochrane, and Campbell

social process of resettlement. So were boundary maintenance and boundary transcendence activities. Resettlement profoundly intertwines the destinies of both arriving and receiving communities. It cannot be otherwise. So it is important to decide, what do we, collectively, want that destiny to be? One of fear and loathing? Or one of belonging, inclusion, and informed by our most salutogenic social values? This is the question that peoples in resettlement communities are facing as I finish this dissertation.

EXTENDING ANTHROPOLOGICAL WORK ON RITUALS OF CHANGE TO HOW REFUGEES FIND PLACE AND IDENTITY IN A NEW COUNTRY

Chapter 4 reviewed van Gennep and Turner's work on ritual management of the process of social role transitions in small societies. Initiates physically depart from their communities and enter a liminal period and place where they must master a series of problems and performative challenges arranged by expert ritual guides. They must—through actions—discover in themselves the capacities which prepare them to perform the duties of their new role and how they can and must rely on each other to be successful. At the end, when they "graduate," they rejoin the community which joyfully awaits their return.

War, by contrast, is a condition of chaotic change. Life is upended for populations and communities, and there are no ritual specialists who have been through and mastered the process themselves, and are authorized by a society to guide others. People whose societies have been utterly changed by war face chaos and degraded conditions out of which they must rebuild, in a state of an extremely fragile peace characterized by fear of renewed violence. They have to make a new society with their enemies—there is no intact society to re-join. The term "neutral zone" has been applied by some to talk about this condition, where the end-state or end-game of the

liminal phase is not actually known. In-country, the sociality is poisoned, and it makes the neutral zone an immeasurably difficult experience.

Likewise, refugees resettling to the U.S. are not "rejoining" a society which awaits their triumphant return after war—they are going to a new country, and they have to navigate to an identity and social place for themselves in the community. And often, they are resettling alongside those who were identified as enemies in the conflict from which they fled. For (especially) Muslim populations coming to the U.S. after 9-11, they are also joining a society which harbors fears that they are secretly terrorists, even though these refugees are trying to reach safe conditions, themselves.

In Chapter 5 I noted ascendant discourse in the U.S. about "integration" of refugees has not settled into a common understanding among stakeholders (a category which includes refugees) about how refugees are to find a social place and role, or what that might look like, beyond the rudimentary notion of a self-sufficient citizen. I have argued that this neoliberal ideal of "success" is insufficient to help human beings resiliate from experiences of extreme violence because it does not address social suffering and the need for social healing.

Nevertheless, the liminal period of relocation to the U.S. and transition into initial jobs, housing, and transportation, is partially guided by both arriving and receiving community leaders and officials. Guidance to inclusion and belonging within the new community is not yet well-envisioned. Receiving communities know how to welcome and help; but the transition from helper/survivor to more reciprocal relationships in which everyone expresses agency and ownership remains a work-in-progress.

In Chapter 8 I provided the trope of *"trajectories of becoming"* in which there are some typical, desire-driven paths toward certain goals which repair or are restorative for refugees

arriving to a new socio-cultural setting. We might characterize this process as finding a niche in a geographically situated ecology.

Chapters 5 and 6 detailed the resiliency resources currently made available to refugees along the way. Case managers at resettlement agencies help refugees make and execute plans, and monitor their progress toward initial (stabilization and consolidation) goals. Refugee leaders sometimes successfully form mutual assistance associations that act partly as conservator of incoming sociocultural values; partly as a place of linking capital to garner additional resources for refugees for their use in getting re-established. The greater bonding community is critical for anchoring people who are losing their bearings and going down a detrimental or even ruinous path: the importance of familiar life rituals—marriage, baby-welcoming, funerals, New Year celebrations and other cultural holidays—are all helpful in this anchoring, steadying role. Including refugees in receiving-community holidays is also a key strategy for helping refugees feel part of a larger community outside of the local ethnic community.

An important reparative process was suggested in Chapter 7 as *"identity thickening."* When arriving and receiving peoples to engage interactively on projects and works of resettlement, their histories and personal propensities enter the Social; which both helps refugees learn about and find a place in the new society, and helps others understand what these newcomers are capable of and how they can contribute in the civic and economic life of their community. Others can then open or suggest opportunities for refugees to rebuild status. Identity thickening activities and projects help people to find and feel their value in the new setting.

The works of resettlement described in Chapters 6 and 7 are also helpful. Enrolling kids in school and attending their school activities helps provide informal opportunities for learning about the new social environment and cultural expectations/behaviors, as well as a means of

meeting people from the receiving community. The work of developing and tending social capital is critical to gaining a sense of belonging…*to each other*. The more bridging capital, the farther the reach toward resources that can assist this transition through the neutral zone.

Recovering a sense of meaning can proceed in group work to process what happened and talk about desires for future. Meaning making can be done with trusted others; and while individuals have to do a little, a lot, over long time, so do ethnic groups in an area. Like what Abramowitz (2008) described in post-Taylor Liberia, refugee resettlement provides a unique moment of cultural questioning and re-formation in a context of uncertainty, but with safety and more resources to explore possibility. There needs to be a clear understanding of who is positioned to do what between Volags and MAAs. Refugees need places to gather or drop in, where they can be themselves and do familiar activities with others at a leisurely pace; but within frames which can address this moment as a political, social, spiritual, and economic phenomenon—not only a psychological one.

An example of a healing accomplishment is an art museum and memorial in Chicago for victims of the Khmer Rouge genocide at the Cambodian community center. What other places and spaces have refugee diasporas found to remember and honor those lost, and recall the beautiful objects and creative productions of their culture? These are healing spaces of meaning-making, offering places for resolution. Some groups need places for ancestors and spirits who accompanied them to the U.S.; all need places to bury their deceased loved ones in culturally appropriate ways.

Refugee populations are coming in now in fewer numbers than the populations which arrived before 2000, and mutual assistance associations—if they are to be viably funded—need to think about being multicultural. This can make sense for refugees: regardless of where they

have come from, refugees share things in common—the flight, the survival of mass violence episode, the relocation process, and the demands to become economically self-sufficient quickly in the U.S.

Refugees are keen for opportunities to learn about the ecology of their new community of place—they look for species of plants and animals that they knew from back home, and which may be kin to their home species. Natural systems offer restorative and contemplative resources as much as do churches and mosques for many peoples. Establishing newcomer outdoor education programs or partnerships with local programs which currently exist for the public would be welcomed by many refugees.

Finally, there are demographic differences in what refugees do to feel grounded in a new community of place. We need to attend to what is important for men, women, families, children, singles, LGBT individuals, and elders. And, for those of varying religious and educational backgrounds; for those who are coming from oral cultures; and with varying livelihood strategy experiences in coming from rural vs. urban areas.

AT THE INTERSTICES

My research repeatedly touched in the interstices between arriving and receiving communities. Meetings and minglings create additional spaces of desire unfolding, where productive tensions and creative swerves occur. I have seeing these repeatedly; it is the space in which I have observed and participated as an engaged anthropologist for 13 years. Differences bring opportunities into relief; new sociocultural and economic practices provide resources for innovation.

In a sense, Americans' understanding of others' experiences in the world of identity targeting and violence was rather impoverished. 9-11 brought a brief but potent touch of that experience, but the response was to attack back and secure the borders. Getting families fleeing current refugee-producing situations into local U.S. communities enriches the understanding in both directions, of what it means to suffer, what it means to recover, and the implications of wide disparities of economic, social, or political opportunity across the world.

Who is actually transitioning through the neutral zone? In this post-9-11 era, I am arguing that it is all of us, refugees and receiving communities across the U.S., alike.

A PROLEGOMENON FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

How use of research and evaluation data evolves among resettlement professionals and organizations should be of significant interest to anthropological scholars studying the social arrangements and professional cultures of resettlement. Given the increasing pressure of forced migration in the world, resettlement anthropology may well accelerate into a significant subtopic in the discipline. The project of this dissertation—to focus on the Social and the meso-local levels—advances socio-cultural research and contributes knowledge on the works of resettlement. And critique is important during this time of shifting—of refugees fleeing across country borders, and of refugee resettlement practices and policies.

Anthropologists are well-positioned to undertake qualitative research projects that ground statistical data and reveal much more of the actual work of resettlement by both arriving and receiving communities. Ethnographic research is critical for assessing policies that are organizing the contexts and resources of resettlement. Because it captures phenomenology, agency, and motion, ethnographic research can improve an understanding of the restorative

spaces and resources that refugees and receiving communities need and are using now for co-constructing a future together in local communities. And it can reveal and critique the coordinating, communicative spaces among those who are fully engaged in resettlement in institutional and meso-local government contexts.

So as a prolegomenon for future research, I have focused on identifying formative research questions that are well-suited to ethnographic research methods—including participant observation, key informant interviews, and semi-structured interviews.

1. At present, little is known about what refugees want for themselves (beyond safety) as they travel to the U.S.

What are refugees' expectations for resettlement? How do they conceptualize the experience and evaluate their own success(es)? I called this out a research project at the end of chapter 8, and it is so important that it has been selected to lead this section about planning for future research. I have seen and heard quite a lot of rather paternalistic statements about how receiving communities need to help refugees adjust their [unrealistic] expectations. When this pushes into discouraging them from wanting to better themselves through education and switching employment, I would see that as disempowering and therefore problematic. It would be helpful to understand what is actually occurring as refugees try to pursue interests. What do they desire, what are they able to track towards, how are they adjusting expectations, and how empowered do they actually feel? What are the barriers they face at 3 years, at 5 years? We need to know a lot more about this.

There is therefore a need for more longitudinal research projects, which are not always favored given the ubiquitous one- to three-year project cycles. It will require the participation of anthropologists in collaboration with local communities, and commitment of funding from social

science research streams as well as the national and international foundations who want to invest in programs fostering socio-economic salutogenesis and resiliency.

2. Local ideas about how to address harms in war-impacted populations.

How do local receiving populations conceive of refugee trauma and recovery, and what do they do (if anything) beyond medicalization of psychosocial suffering? In communities without torture treatment centers, where are sufferers getting support? How are arriving populations treating it? How are they addressing somatization and understanding what is causing it? And what do they think gives ease to these physio-psychosocial distresses?

3. What local resources are used most by which refugees and refugee populations to advance on which trajectories of becoming?

Developmental evaluations and formative research on how resettlement limins are being supplied with resources locally, and how refugees are accessing these, would be helpful. How are refugees using expressive arts, sports, and play to experiment with and establish the lives they want for themselves in their new communities of place? How do various refugee populations and subpopulations (meaning, of which demographic categories) differentially access various types of resources, and do they differentially choose to emphasize different trajectories of becoming?

4. Research on specific vulnerabilities and trajectory impediments by demographic group

We especially need community case studies that are in-depth and comprehensive about those arriving as 9th graders and above, regarding how they prepare to emancipate, get educated, and follow desires, hopes and dreams. Adolescence and young adulthood should be a research priority: it is a vulnerable time developmentally without the current political and violent

upheavals in several parts of the world, and young people without a lot of worldly judgment—and rather adrift betwixt and between cultures—are vulnerable to extremist recruitment and simplification of dilemmas.

We need more research on men vs. women; on refugee children *en route* to destination countries; and on single adults arriving in the U.S. and the unique issues they face in establishing a home in a new country. We really know so little except anecdotally. We need research on elders and how well they find support in new communities. What improves their quality of life? What are serious vulnerabilities that need attention? And, we need more research on the experiences of refugee children in school systems—what impedes or supports successful academic adjustment and achievement for children of different ages, educational backgrounds (and their parents' backgrounds), and English-language competency?

5. Refugees' engagement with their families and countries of origin

How do newly arrived populations think about continuing conflicts in their countries of origin? What pre-occupies them? What family remains in-country and how are they planned for? Part of the work of resettlement is situating that set of concerns within the demands of relocation and putting down new roots. Nearly all refugees send remittances home, I am told. This is a work of resettlement that I barely touched in this project, but it is an important topic for future research.

6. The practices and roles of refugee mutual assistance associations

Case studies and ethnographies of successful multicultural MAAs which have been able to cooperate across ethnic and continental divides to keeps spaces of social healing and support open for refugees to use would be especially helpful in making policy and funding decisions.

The specific topics to be investigated would include: the leadership and governance structure, what activities go on in the center's offices, how they are funded, and how they are working in the local communities to meet needs through bonding capital and linking capital.

What activities and business models have they found to be popular and viable, and what needs do they position themselves to meet among refugee and receiving community members? For refugees arriving to existing, long-time communities of ex-pats from their country, how does bonding capital work? How do receiving ex-pat ethnic communities provide resources for newly arriving refugees, and what helps them to overcome the inevitable in-group uncertainties of connection and belonging that emerge in tandem with current political events in countries of origin?

7. Episodes of Solidarity

We need a place to collect these stories and a means to develop them into case studies. I see them as that important to effective interstitial functioning. Such examples would enable the resettlement community of practice to figure out ways to increase the expression of solidarity and deepen its significance for building trust between communities.

* * *

I mentioned many more areas of exploration and formative research through the various chapters; the foregoing questions are what I see as first priorities.

PRAXIS RECOMMENDATIONS

Funding for spaces of healing is going to take a significant effort of mobilization and case study documentation. Having watched Harvard's attempts to get global mental health onto the

funding agenda in a significant way—partly through documentation of its psychiatric treatment efforts and research among refugees in Thailand, the U.S., and elsewhere, and partly through development of a community of practice which could advocate (through the HPRT program)—I am presenting these recommendations with slightly less than utter naiveté. And as I am writing, refugees in flight in many parts of the world are careening us toward an urgency for social healing that has not been seen in many years.

The biggest controversy about refugee resettlement praxis in the U.S. has to do with the tension around "integration"--the tension around whether refugees can just do it themselves after the first months to a year, or whether they need the assistance of the receiving community to gain inclusion in civic life. This tension in some way interpolates/relates to the tension between (a) technical solutions applied to problematics--the "interventionscape"--and, (b) domains and spaces of healing which allow expression of agency as refugees pursue ever-evolving goals.

Technical solutions in an interventionscape can be assessed as to their effectiveness in achieving a pre-determined, quantifiable goal. In contrast, the purpose of domains and spaces of social healing is to provide for and enable processes of becoming--self-defined by refugees--which also respect that a social contract has to hold between groups of a country-space. This is a fundamental tension in diverse societies. Social healing domains are a fulcrum of inclusion *and* commitment to a national project, and places where marginalization can be contested within a nation-state.

Refugees have told me that they need to learn how to be neighbors again in a new country. Otherwise, the U.S. and other third countries of resettlement become vulnerable to the very same conditions as what led to refugees becoming refugees in the first place: identity-based conflicts, or more basically, conflicts that are promulgated using identity markers as wedges and

mystifications of an underlying (usually political-economic) game. The stakes are extremely high: those marginalized become targets; people get reduced to instantiations of an identity category and while they play with identities to survive, it deeply, *deeply* harms them in the process.

Still, I do think that there are centers that hold even with "spaces of healing," and these were captured in the "trajectories of becoming" chart in Chapter 8. This problematic is akin to prevention work—the production of social health. There *are* identifiably promising and poor practices, but few are absolute since "health" is a final common pathway, the emergent property of a system made of many interacting parts. Illness may indicate structural malaise, a perturbation, or a system degrading.

Spaces must have resources for becoming. And a question would be: How can funders—who want targeted outcomes that are measureable—help make resources available for such spaces, while remaining satisfied that their funds have been well-spent? They are making investments; but toward what, if we do not have commonly agreed upon outcome targets? I think we could agree on a large-scale goal of social health, by which we mean:

- People have social identity and place in a social world—a role, an identity
- People have ways to identify with the place-based community (diverse, multicultural) and with the project of the U.S. as a nation—which is constantly contested, and therefore constantly productive.
- People have accessible support systems.
- Collectives gain a sense of meaning that requires neither the dehumanization of "others" nor the long-term structural disadvantaging of an identifiable group—be it socioeconomic, racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based.

Funders can invest in interactive projects and spaces of learning where outcomes are expressed creatively and are quantifiable. For example, when it is about the physical

environment, the pre- and post-test would be to draw maps of the territory. The same with the social environment. The same with the economic environment.[233] A quantifiable measure would be the number of additional points of interest on a map, or evidence of expanded "reach" of a territory, or other such indicators of increased mastery of the ecology, depth or breadth of a community of place following episodes of learning and/or social activities. Anthropologists have developed many rapid appraisal/participatory research methods and tools that could be repurposed for this project.

Funders could invest in structures to be built and owned by local communities which enable certain types of activities and events to be held concerned with the welcoming and inclusion of refugees in their local community. The community would work with the funder to design the business model for how the structure would be sustained into the future—how religious groups sustain their buildings are a first place to look for models. Stakeholders would work with an architect to help envision and make the plans for the physical building.

Funders could invest in capitalization of the activities-management of such spaces. Or provide endowments for management of such spaces.

And funders do this now: it is why we have libraries, art museums, theatre districts, music venues, fair grounds. All of these are spaces that can be used by refugees, but the issue is access. These existing spaces are (to various extents) commodified to expert models of arts livelihoods. What refugees and receiving communities *also* need are spaces of collective participation—community dance, community photography, community festival, community

[233] My experience undertaking mapmaking activities in local settings was…fun, and very revealing to participants. The great advantage of doing it in groups is that people also learn how to collect the information held by individuals in the group so that all benefit. Putting individually-held, factual information about local resources or physical characteristics into a group activity is a non-threatening way for even the shyest person to contribute, and people really enjoy gaining new insights from looking at resources from a spatial perspective. This method of discovering and orienting to available resources and gaps spawns creativity in a group about what could be done, and offers grassroots data (rather than opinion and individually-held ideas) that can be used by funders to see where and how to invest in a community of place in projects animated by members of that community.

singing, community contest, community performance, community commemoration, community fairs, community markets. In these spaces, identities thicken, friendships are forged, social bridging and linking capital is acquired, meaning making can occur, shared memories that cross identity groups are produced, projects are hatched, sociality becomes vibrant and life-affirming and appreciate and fun. *These spaces are like the crowdfunding of social vibrancy.*

But they need capitalization, often, and they need coordination. It is a great role for multicultural MAAs who include receiving community members as one part of the "multi." It is also a role for Wilson-Fish programs—the statewide refugee programs operating outside of a state government, but with responsibility for coordination and which receive Social Services funding from ORR as well as other activity-specific funding.

These spaces provide something quite different from charitable delivery of social services. In them, the work of the Social is getting done. It is not professionalized social work, but rather the work of sociality and social-ability. We *do* need social services and social technologies which can be applied to social problematics (but are engineered from without); however, we also need spaces to do (healthy, productive, useful, fun) stuff together which promotes social health as disparate peoples make rewarding, shared memories together in a community of place.

People also need unifying symbols of local social collectives, such as sport teams, cityscapes, signature infrastructure embellishments, public art, architecture, and natural environment incursions into the spaces of human habitation. This is where funders could be very creative, and where people will find ways to meet emerging demands for products and services, thereby stimulating licit economies and interesting livelihood options beyond healthcare, for example. Frankly, I wince every time I hear another championing of Certified Nursing Assistant

(CNA) training program for refugees. Yes, CNA trainings work. No, they are not the only path to employment or even the best path to employment and careers.

There are methods to evaluate projects of "becoming"—developmental evaluation is one approach.[234] I have noticed these approaches emerging as national foundation thinkers have tried to apply complexity theory in their long-term grant initiatives.

In sum, if "domains of healing" is a helpful construct in unleashing more ways of accomplishing the work of resettlement—ways that also directly addresses need for rebuilding of trust, identity, and creating possibilities for meaning-making that overcome the harms of extreme violence—the methods for funding such spaces of social health promotion have been emerging over the course of the past few years.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Future policy directions were recommended in various chapters, and I would summarize them as follows:

1. Instead of trying to get additional funding for services to refugees through federal funding initiatives in the Departments of Agriculture, Education, Housing and Urban Development, and Labor by asking them to specify refugees as a target population in their requests for proposals, it would be preferable to have program funding specific to these topical areas sent into ORR for re-granting to refugee-serving agencies. Or to State Refugee Coordinators (including Wilson-Fish states). I am not convinced that listing refugees as a target population in mainstream granting programs has or will increase services to them, for the reasons I listed in Chapter 6 (high cost of service, taking longer to see results, mainstream programs setting up segregated services anyway, while Volags and MAAs are better positioned in many cases to do them).
2. ORR and PRM should incentivize national Volags to help their local affiliates identify and support opportunities for advancement of staff. Pay decent wages; provide professional development opportunities for skills that can be used both while working in resettlement and for positions outside of resettlement (such as computer skills, project management skills, and so on). Refugees and former refugees move on cyclically after

[234] See, for example, Patton (2010)

populations for which they have language skills have all been transferred into the U.S., and the Volag needs new language skills among staff. This move could be coupled with developing capacity among refugee staff at Volags and MAAs to provide career planning services and programs for refugees. They can teach, and learn by doing.

3. ORR should fund multicultural MAAs, including those which specifically work at the interstices between arriving and receiving communities, in addition to refugee-led organizations. And it should resume yearly competitive grant cycles for this type of funding. Going to every three years for Ethnic Community Self Help Grants may be efficient for ORR but is not responsive enough to changes in local conditions and capacities. And extending the funding period to five years will provide the time needed by more recently formed organizations to diversify their funding sources and solidify their business models so they can sustain themselves after ORR funding runs out.

4. Congress needs to act to segregate funding for programs serving different ORR populations: Funding for UACs should not take away from refugee programs in the middle of planning periods.

5. States and Wilson-Fish programs need more flexibility to use funding as needed to address local emergent issues. Instead of granting funds by category—social services (especially employment), TAG, Services to Older Refugees, Preventive Health—it would be better to do an overall formula allocation to States and then ask the SRC to explain how the various needs originally targeted by these separate grants will be addressed with the formula funds.[235] ORR should also be increasing—not decreasing—funding to States.

6. ORR should establish an office of innovation specifically tasked to address emerging issues of specific populations, as well as issues that have had inadequate attention in the past. These include: the difficult transition to adulthood, and higher education for refugees coming in as teens. The office should operate by first commissioning a literature review and formative research on a problem and how stakeholders have tried to address it, and then fund pilot projects that test and further develop promising practices. Another priority would be development of career-pathways programming specific to refugees. An LIRS-piloted mentoring program pairing community business leaders with refugees has shown promise; it suggests one approach.

7. Funding for small business development among refugees should be increased and prioritized at ORR. Populations arriving from the Middle East have business and trade experience and could help revitalize economies in cities which are looking for new business development. ORR could partner with the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture to develop funds and better technical-assistance provision.

8. PRM's cultural orientation requirements of local Volags during reception and placement as part of their Cooperative Agreements should be adjusted. While I do understand the move toward testing cultural and navigational knowledge acquired by refugees as a result of initial cultural orientations, I am a bit concerned about metrics which resemble Apgar

[235] I was pleased to see ORR adopt this funding approach for Services to Older Refugees in FFY16.

tests administered to refugees at 90 days. Orientations which take place in groups are preferable because they can help refugees make social connections across populations. If the curriculum is highly prescriptive and Volag staff must "get through" a lot of subject matter during orientation meetings, I worry that refugees will not be able to get their felt needs addressed. Orienting people is an art: Refugees need open spaces during trainings to talk about the issues they are encountering, even if these may not coincide with the topic of the day. And refugees need to be able to request topics about which they have great concerns.

Ideas for much more innovative approaches abound. Volunteers could go through the orientation classes with refugees and do conversation-groups-with-coffee or tea later. MAAs could partner with Volags to provide orientations, or, could be taught to do community-based research to discover whether and how refugees are actually mastering and applying CO topics. The community-based research process--in itself—builds social connections and empowers new arrivals. Volunteers could work with MAAs to conduct the research, which ensures that refugees and the research results have the benefit that each "side" offers.

Finally, PRM could work more closely with SRCs and tap them as a resource in assuring that refugees are properly oriented. SRCs are tasked with coordination of services and overseeing the experience of resettlement in a state. SRCs have an interest in good orientation, and could be a conduit for PRM in assuring that good practice principles in orientation are occurring for new arrivals.

9. ORR and PRM should involve SRCs in upstream policy-development discussions. Giving States the opportunity to provide responses to Federal Register postings of impending policy changes as their only input…means that federal agencies do not have the benefit of SRC's intimate knowledge of local conditions, stakeholders, and players. Placing ORR state analysts in regional offices of ACF does not cover this gap in knowledge; SRCs are administering pass-through funding to local Volags and other agencies, have access to state databases and other state-run programs impacting refugees, and understand much more about state and local-level capacities, geographies, and politics.

   Other fields of policy, administration, and practice have learned many participatory methods for involving State officials very productively. The field that I left to enter refugee work—environmental policy and conflict resolution—included many federal (and state) officials who pioneered these methods. They were really forced to learn how to do them: litigation was reinforcing intractable conflicts and making it impossible to manage effectively.

   In the polarizing environment around refugee resettlement in the U.S. that events of November 2015 signaled, the field is ripe with the same conditions, and will need new methods of engaging local stakeholders. It is *not* the time for retrenchment to the federal level, engaging only the national Volags.

10. ORR should extend funding into programming that specifically addresses social healing. Or, it should require attention to social healing as part of requested program designs as it

> formulates RFPs and its guidance to prospective grantees about what activities and designs will be favored in scoring. "Social healing" in this era implicates the relationships established between arriving and receiving communities, and needs to extend beyond one of welcome and assistance. In other words, to assure the social integration of refugees in their new communities that can only be achieved when relationships evolve into ones characterized by mutual reciprocity.

* * *

It is a time of great challenge in addressing refugee flows across the world. I hope that this work has contributed to increasing interest in the phenomenon of refugee resettlement, its management, the work of both arriving and receiving communities, and the healing of traumas from extreme violence. I intended to look from the viewpoints of many actors and system levels, so that this multifaceted, highly complex, and terribly underfunded project can be better understood by stakeholders. I hope I have succeeding in portraying the stories of many people in such a way that their concerns have been heard.

Afterword

What is the difference between praxis, and application of therapeutic or social technologies? I ask myself this and find it hard to articulate. There is something very real and very present about a practitioner that is not available in a technical application. With an application, there is a transaction that must be concluded, so that the box can be checked off.

With a practitioner, it is not about the box.

All of the great practitioners I have seen—and it has not been a lot, but it is not just a handful either—come out of an interaction or event and think about it. They tinker; they constantly experiment and see what doing this will do, and then that. They play. They use themselves as an instrument. They go with what pops into mind to do. They trust it. They are fascinated by the craft of it and they get pleasure in it. They fall in love over and over and over again with the people with whom they are interacting, with the interactions that are beautiful *and* tough. They feel angst deeply, but it does not frighten them off of the practice.

They are not always on, but they realize when a truly great duet or orchestral piece has occurred with those who are playing their own parts. It is the only way I can characterize it. There is a flow. They are not thinking about what to do: it comes to them unbidden, springing forth out of highly embodied memories from deep within the cellular structures of the bodymind.

They commit. They also debrief, but even the quality of the debriefing is different. It isn't about the application; it is about the pieces of each move, as if they are committing the episode to deep structure of body memory which allows ever more nuance to emerge in their future encounters.

Anthropologists study practice all the time. Medical anthropologists have studied great indigenous healers. I do hope that this study stimulates more research on works and practices of

resettlement; and that those who are practicing in this field have many more thinking tools to apply.

The number of refugees in the world as I write this afterward is skyrocketing. It is time to get a strong understanding of praxis, and to develop many more means and deeper understandings of alternatives to the medicalization of social suffering.

Sometimes circumstances tap you on the shoulder and say, *try this way.*

That is what happened to me, when, after 9-11, the funding dried up for environmental conflict resolution and was moved to the war effort. Everything changed when those planes hit the towers for so many people whom I have encountered, for other Americans and those in the Middle East, for refugees who are coming into the country, and for myself.

I started working on rebuilding, outside of academic employment. But I still phoned home, and thankfully, my dissertation chair—Mark Nichter--always answered. And now this liminal period is done for me, and he was the ritual specialist who guided me through it all so I could get to the next role.

I thank him so very much.

To the peoples of the world who welcome refugees to their communities,

and to refugees everywhere:

May you reach safety

May you find belonging

May you walk in beauty

for all the rest of your days on this Earth.

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