

MAPPING MILITIAS:  
STUDYING THE EMERGENCE OF MEXICO'S *AUTODEFENSAS*

By

ELYSE MIREYA FLORES

---

A Thesis Submitted to The Honors College  
In Partial Fulfillment of the Bachelors degree  
With Honors in  
Political Science  
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA  
MAY 2016

Approved by:

---

Dr. Jessica Braithwaite  
Department of Political Science

## **Abstract**

Building on recent studies of civilian militias outside the context of civil war and state guidance, this thesis examines the formation of Mexico's *autodefensas*, self-defense militias which have risen in the wake of drug violence. Classifying militias by traits including use of violence and quasi-governmental activities, this analysis seeks to identify the primary factors that prompt their formation. My method considers over 30 states, collecting information from articles, reports, and national surveys to determine factors such as government attitudes towards militias, civilian attitudes regarding the formation of *autodefensas*, and territorial control.

I assert that several factors provide conditions for *autodefensa* emergence, hypothesizing that *autodefensas* are more likely to form in the absence of a clear authoritative actor. Additionally, militias are more likely to arise when supported by civilians; finally, more *autodefensas* will form if territorial contestation exists, and the groups enjoy a positive relationship with the government. I find that government support is not influential in the formation of *autodefensas*. Contrarily, civilian support and territorial contestation show promise in explaining the formation of *autodefensas*. This paper provides guidance for research regarding civilian use of extralegal security measures, with implications for nations whose governments cannot provide security during violent times.

## **Section 1: Introduction**

As early as the 1970s, the drug cartels have been heavily integrated into Mexican society. For many years, while the Tijuana and Sinaloa Cartels cooperated with Mexico's PRI party, the country was relatively stable. In the late 1980s and 1990s, however, conflict arose between the cartels, the result of more lucrative business and personal grudges. Mexico experienced an uptick in violence due to this shift, but levels of drug-related conflict in that era paled in comparison to the violence of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. President Calderón's use of armed resistance against the drug cartels, a key part of his War on Drugs policy, ignited a decade-long conflict characterized by rampant violence. According to most official estimates, over 60,000 people died as a result of this conflict between the years of 2006 and 2012, with even more in the following years.

Mexico has seen a well-documented surge in violence and insecurity, much of it driven by the changing nature of organized crime. As the Mexican military captures or kills the leaders of the cartels, power struggles ensue. The family-run behemoths of the past splinter into smaller organizations with fewer morals and less to lose. Civilians were continuously drawn into this morass of changing alliances, murdered so that one group can make a point to another.

Until recently, the drug cartels and the Mexican government were the primary actors in the Drug War. However, as the conflict levels rose, and the state failed to address the situation or was unable to combat the cartels effectively, civilians began to seek alternative means of attaining safety. Since late 2010, a new type of actor has emerged: the *autodefensa*. Referred to by many names, the *autodefensas* are groups of civilians who organize with the purpose of protecting their localities from drug violence, through either defensive or offensive means. These militias exhibit a wide range of characteristics, from small groups to organizations of hundreds, unarmed patrols to guards bearing semi-automatic weapons. They differ in their ideologies and relationships with the government, to the extent that official reactions have been mixed.

In 2014, several of these groups joined the Michoacán police to capture one of the most wanted drug lords, "La Tuta" of the Knights Templar. Despite this success, and the historical precedent for civilian armed mobilization, the *autodefensas* have not become a nation-wide phenomenon. This is curious, given that many militias profess that their primary purpose is to protect their territories and families from violence, and much of Mexico is rife with violence.

Like militia activity, violence in Mexico bears many forms: inter-cartel violence, assassinations of government officials, anti-drug operations conducted by the Mexican military, non-combatant murders, and retributory violence aimed at civilians perceived to support rival cartels. While much of this violence is conducted between opposing gangs and cartels, non-combatants are often the targets of murder, rape, and kidnapping. Targeting civilians serves a dual purpose, disrupting the control of rival criminal groups while instilling fear in civilians, particularly those who pay "taxes" to the cartel, or work on its property. Violence aimed at government officials generally has a clearer intent; politicians supporting rival cartels might be candidates for assassination or kidnapping, as well as those who are perceived to be supporting policies that might disrupt the drug trade, such as more stringent security or judicial plans.

Many areas in which the greatest violence occurs- particularly Chihuahua, where Ciudad Juarez, the murder capital of the world for several years, is located- have little to no *autodefensa* activity. The militias seem *not* to be rising in proportion to violence, despite claims that their purpose is to protect their regions from violence, and not necessarily the cartels. This observation led me to consider other factors involved in the decision of the civilians to form a militia, given the

dangers they face in doing so. Previous literature regarding the formation of civilian militias suggests that citizens are more likely to seek alternative means of obtaining security when the state cannot provide protection. The extent to which civilians seek extrajudicial means of security depends greatly on their perceptions of the extent to which they will be impacted by violence or insecurity. The literature review also suggested that militias can more easily arise when they are provided with resources, either by the government or other actors such as the civilians and organized crime factions.

Keeping the above findings in mind, I created three hypotheses in regard to the situation in Mexico. Firstly, *autodefensas* are more likely to arise in the absence of a clear authority figure, a condition that is characterized by territorial contestation between multiple actors. Secondly, I postulated that these groups are likely to be present in greater prevalence if the government also supports them. Finally, I theorized that the *autodefensas* would be more likely to emerge if they had the support of the civilians. Through my project, I aim to explore these relationships, in hope of providing a foundation for future research regarding the formation of civilian militias.

## **Section 2: Literature Review**

This thesis considers existing literature in two areas: the factors that lead to the formation of civilian militias, and civilian perceptions of government efficacy in providing safety, with their impact on the types of security methods sought by civilians. Both areas of study are integral to understanding why militias arise in other countries, and how the interactions between governments, citizens, and third-party actors (in this case, drug cartels) precipitate a climate conducive to militia activity.

To begin, I must first address an important issue for the reader to consider when dealing with militia research: naming conventions. As Mazzei (2009) noted, militias can have a variety of names depending on an author's perception of the groups and their purposes. It is important to recognize, as Arjona and Kalyvas (2005) did, that scholars, citizens, and the media may employ many terms for these groups, including death squads, vigilantes, paramilitary groups (PMGs), and self-defense groups. Moreover, one scholar could employ a certain naming convention – for example, “PMG” – for a group that another author might not categorize as such. Alternatively, two scholars might refer to the same group by different names: Campbell and Brenner (2000) refer to the El Salvadorian groups of the 1980s as “death squads,” while Mazzei (2009) refers to the same groups as “PMGs.” Thus, any researcher studying this field should exercise caution with naming conventions, paying attention to the definitions that the author assigns to each name.

Academic literature on militias tends to emphasize the relationship between militias and the government, with armed groups treated as tools that the state uses when it cannot act directly. The formation of militias is thus seen as being undertaken at least partially on behalf of the government, in response to a threat that the government cannot address, but which is also of interest to the civilians acting as foot-soldiers. Although it was once predominantly accepted that militias were used by failed states, it is now established that even sound governments might use these groups as an alternate means of maintaining order (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2012; Staniland 2015). To this end, many authors have called attention to the use of militias during transitions to democratic forms of government, or during times when civilian demands and international mandates preclude the state from directly engaging with a perceived threat (Carey,

Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015; Campbell and Brenner 2000). Most often, this threat comes in the form of a rival political party or a rebel group, as noted by Mazzei (2009).

Although Mazzei (2009) also emphasizes the connections between government and militia actors, her model provides insight into militia formation in non-civil war situations, which were previously not addressed in detail. The model asserts that paramilitary groups (PMGs) require a trio of factors to form: a “structural shift” that threatens the political and economic status quo, a perception of legitimacy by the powerful actors being displaced that provides them with justification for creating a militia, and an existing network with concurrent goals to use as the base of a militia. This model is most applicable in the context of a strong state and a privileged upper class; Mazzei (2009) sees paramilitary groups as being “the political manifestation of profound uncertainty among a cross-section of a country’s most resourced sectors” (203).

In Mazzei’s (2009) model, PMGs are groups that arise to address a shifting status quo; these groups are created and fed by the government and the elite, working together to eliminate a perceived threat. Mazzei’s (2009) case review of the Columbian AUC is particularly applicable to this project. Although the AUC initially formed through the government, they eventually came to perceive the state’s security provision as insufficient. In highlighting this, Mazzei (2009) recognizes a “security void” that the civilians were compelled to address, signaling that the government’s failure to provide an appropriate level of security was a primary factor in the AUC’s continuation without state aid (91). This suggests that civilian perceptions of safety drive the decision to organize or maintain armed groups, a notion that I explore in the second part of this literature review.

In addition to the perceived lack of safety, the citizens who chose to remain with the AUC saw the Columbian government as unwilling to enact justice against known criminals, indicating that civilian perception of government corruption and inefficacy may also induce the decision to form or maintain a militia. This provides useful groundwork for our discussion, but Mazzei’s model has several limitations in the context of this project. Firstly, it assumes a common intent between the recruits of a militia and privileged actors, which may not exist if the interests of a populace are contrary to that of the state or upper class. Secondly, the model works best in the context of a strong state, and as Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub (2016) noted, Mexico lacks this trait. Finally, Mazzei (2009) assumes that the civilians form militias *after* state actors such as the government or military reach out and reconcile their interests; this does not account for militias that form without state involvement.

As noted above, until recently, few studies considered militias outside the context of civil war, in which the militias were considered to be acting “on behalf of the state” (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 2015). Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger (2015) are among the first to allow that militias, while looking to “acquire [the state’s] loyalty or collaboration” through their actions, are not required to have direct ties to the state (256). This article did not discard the militia’s traditional purpose of advancing the state’s interests against rebel groups; rather, it asserted that militias are most concerned with working against aggressor actors that compromise the safety of an area’s civilians. This new, more expansive definition can be applied to the study of militias outside the context of civil war. In this thesis, the “aggressor” role is assumed by the drug cartels, and the militias are responding to compromised security resulting from drug violence.

Although systematic datasets regarding militias are still limited, important observations have been made in regard to the variation between different types of militias. Most notably, Arjona

and Kalyvas (2005) noted that militias can vary in terms of geographic location, size, and professionalism. This is significant in that it recognizes many types of militias: professionally trained and heavily armed groups such as Columbia's AUC are considered militias, as are groups of farmers armed with kitchen implements. Similarly, groups that act counter to state interests may be militias, just as groups that work in tandem with the official military; this contributes to the broader definition of militias. Perhaps most importantly, Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger (2015) recognized that militias may be created "from above" by state actors, as well as "from below," through grassroots civilian movements. Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger (2015) also asserted that the factor that makes these groups militias is the intent to protect civilians from aggressors; this thesis applies similar logic to its consideration of the various militias in Mexico.

To return to the factors which give rise to militia groups, one of the most relevant recent analyses was conducted by Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub (2016). This group of researchers focused specifically on the *autodefensas* found in Mexico, mapping their activity from the mid-2000s to 2013 while also considering historical militia activity in different Mexican states. They asserted that the factors most important to *autodefensa* formation were "urgent security risks," a historical tradition of militia activity, and "strong community norms against external intrusions" (31). In particular, this study was interested in connecting past experience with mobilization, which grants a cohesive sense of community and an understanding of tactics required to mobilize successfully, with current mobilization patterns. This historical approach indicated that in the Mexican context, these *were* significant variables for militia formation. While the study did not empirically address the current political climate in which the militia groups are operating, it *did* show that community experience with mobilization and distrust of external authorities can play a significant role in a community's decision to form a militia. These findings represent a valuable contribution to literature on militia formation, but research regarding the factors required for a community to independently mobilize is still undergoing development.

One promising theme in recent literature regarding militias is that of perception; as noted above, perceptions of justice and government efficacy might explain the motives behind the formation and continuation of militias. Research in this area tends to focus on perceptions of international actors, or the presence of a perceived confluence of motives between civilian militias and the state. However, several authors have mentioned that civilian perceptions of safety could induce the formation of "grassroots militias" (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 2015; Arjona and Kalyvas 2005; Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub 2016). To that end, this thesis now considers the literature regarding civilian perceptions of safety, focusing particularly on their support for extralegal measures.

Literature on the effects of civilian perceptions suggests that when civilians are concerned for their personal safety, they are more likely to support stringent judicial penalties and tougher crime policies, called "mano dura" policy in Latin America (Chinchilla 2003; Malone 2012; Bergman and Whitehead 2009). This propensity to support more violent measures is evident in actions such as giving government authorities more leeway to pursue criminals, as well as backing the use of the military against aggressor groups, including organized crime. However, when citizens have low confidence in legal authorities, they are more likely to pursue extra-governmental means of obtaining security (Chinchilla 2003). As Chinchilla (2003) asserts, civilians with a low perception of governmental capacity to provide safety seek non-institutional means of security, including armed guards and fences, as well as "citizen's organizations."

The discussion of citizen's organizations is most pertinent to my research; Chinchilla (2003) connects the "high levels of anxiety that people experience in relation to crime" with "an increasing trend toward employing citizens' organizations to address the crime problem." She characterizes these organizations as having "proliferated...with little or no input from government authorities, and [having] taken over functions previously carried out exclusively by government security forces – a situation that has led to involvement in serious abuses" (219). This reference to organizations parallels the description of Mexico's *autodefensas*, and Chinchilla's (2003) work provides a precedent for connecting the rise of militias to civilian uncertainty regarding the provision of their security.

Malone (2012) further discusses the importance of civilian perceptions of security and the impact that those perceptions can have on civilian willingness to pursue nondemocratic or extra-judicial measures. Importantly, the author recognizes that there is a sense of "ambivalence" in Latin America with regard to the *means* of attaining safety; she asserts that civilians would be willing to provide undemocratic powers to government authorities or support extra-legal actors to lessen crime-related violence. Bergman and Whitehead (2009) assert that this willingness is due to a significant crime wave in the wake of democratization, citing increased homicide rates and property crime; they point to public opinion polls which show high rates of police and penal system mistrust. In the vast majority of Latin America countries, over 60% of the population exhibited distrust in these areas. These authors emphasize that "citizens [demand] that governments should fulfill their primary task: the provision of public security" (6).

Malone (2010) recognizes that not all Latin American countries exhibit decreased civilian support for democratic measures in the face of violent crime – for example, in 2004, hundreds of thousands of citizens marched in Mexico City to protest a spate of kidnappings – but the author cites studies that demonstrate a causal relationship between fear of crime and decreased trust and support for democratic avenues. In particular, Malone (2010) refers to Diamond (1999), who asserts that "crime might lead citizens to engage in, or at least support, extreme measures at odds with democratic norms." Vigilante organizations are the first among the nondemocratic measures referenced in connection with this assertion.

In an empirical analysis of Mexican civilian perceptions of crime and institutional efficacy in relation to their support for undemocratic activity, Malone (2010) found that when individuals fear crime in their own neighborhoods, they are less supportive of the rule of law. This indicates that local violence could induce civilians to take up arms for their personal safety, as the threat is near to their communities. Contrarily, the study also found that "when people register concern about crime that seems far removed from their daily lives [such as national drug violence], they are less likely to endorse such extra legal action" (37). In the case of Mexico, this is at least partially the result of a growing concern with corruption of the authorities; citizens are reticent to confer more power to authorities when significant police and military abuse is commonplace (Malone 2013). Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger (2015) also assert that "militias typically emerge not prior to, but during, civil wars, and as a reaction to wartime violence" (762). This parallels the research on civilian responses to decreased security; as Malone (2012) affirms, civilians exhibit an increased propensity to support extralegal justice during times of rising crime and violence.

As the above discussion shows, civilian perceptions of government efficacy in security provision can greatly impact the ways in which citizens of a country address their fears of crime and

violence. If the state is trusted, civilians might push for “tough-on-crime” policies and more state intervention against organized crime. When the government is not trusted to provide security, or when state intervention is perceived to be too risky due to corruption, civilians have a propensity to seek other means of attaining personal safety. This includes armed mobilization. Now that I have established a theoretical basis for understanding the formation of grassroots civilian militias, as well as the impact that civilian perceptions of security can have on their methods of organization, I can turn to my own research regarding Mexico’s *autodefensas*.

### **Section 3: Theory**

Scholarship regarding civilian militias has advanced significantly in the past two decades, such that avenues for civilian mobilization have been explored outside the context of civil war and beyond the traditional notion that the state is the primary initiator for the creation of these armed groups. Now that researchers have acknowledged that civilian militias can rise independently of the government, and even pursue conflicting ends, the study of these groups as grassroots movements is gaining ground. While several factors have been offered as potential explanatory variables in the formation of grassroots militias, this thesis is most interested in exploring the connection between civilian perceptions of safety and their propensity to support extralegal measures such as armed mobilization.

Exploring the impact of civilian perceptions of safety is important to research involving Mexico because of the violence that this country has experienced in the past decade. Mexico has seen a well-documented surge in violence and insecurity since President Calderón began the practice of using armed resistance against the drug cartels in 2006 (Malone 2012; Blanco 2011; Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub 2016). Since 2010, Mexico’s National Victimization and Perception of Public Safety survey (ENVIPE in Spanish) has reported an increase in overall victimization resulting from the ensuing violence. Moreover, civilian perceptions of insecurity have risen in the past five years, from 69.5% to 73.2% of the population reporting that they believed their localities were unsafe as a result of “crime or insecurity.”

Two types of civilian perceptions are important to this thesis: those that involve personal safety, such the ENVIPE measurement above, and those that judge the state’s efficacy in providing security. How civilians react to insecurity depends on the extent to which they trust the state. As demonstrated in the literature review above, when civilians feel unsafe, they show a greater propensity to support less democratic methods of obtaining security (Chinchilla 2003; Diamond 1999; Malone 2012). This includes supporting harsh policies, such as the death penalty, and giving the government more authority to pursue and detain suspected criminals; it indicates a willingness to put public safety over individual rights (Bergman and Whitehead 2009; Chinchilla 2003). This also shows that insecurity can cause citizens to pursue non-democratic avenues.

When civilians do not trust their government, however, they might pursue *extralegal* measures. This assertion has been made by numerous authors, who agree that citizens in this situation might seek private security solutions such as fences and armed guards, or they could create “civilian’s organizations” to protect themselves (Malone 2012; Chinchilla 2003). Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub (2016) found a significant connection between the presence of “urgent security risks,” and civilian militia activity, with the citizens forming their militias in reaction to the presence of local danger. Jentsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger (2015) also support this notion in asserting that grassroots militias form in order to protect civilians from “aggressors.”

This connection between insecurity and extralegal measures in the context of distrust towards the state is especially relevant for Mexico, given the low level of trust that its citizens hold in legal authorities. The ENVIPE survey showed that less than 13% of all crimes were reported to the authorities in each of the years between 2010 and 2014, with only 9.9% of crimes reported at the lowest point in 2013. In each of these years, over 60% of respondents indicated that they did not report crime due to “causes attributable to the authorities,” including distrust and fear of extortion by authorities such as the police. This indicates a significant level of mistrust towards the state, especially the police and military.

In a country where police abuse is commonplace and trust in the government is low, we should not be surprised to see support for armed mobilization in the face of violence. However, before the 2006 policy shift, we did not see significant militia activity in response to drug violence, even during extreme violence such as the conflict between the Gulf Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel, which saw 110 people die in Nuevo Laredo. This situation did not have an absence of violence, nor did it necessarily lack distrust of the government. Rather, we should consider the fact that Mexican citizens were protected from rival cartels by the drug lords in the past, who were powerful enough to credibly claim that they could provide some measure of security (Diaz-Cayeros et.al. 2011).

As noted by Bergman and Whitehead (2009), in the past and in some areas of the country, the drug lords *are* the authority, and they can provide public security where the state cannot. This suggests that the act of creating a civilian militia in the context of the drug war is not just a function of distrust in the state’s ability to provide security. If this was the case, civilians could potentially turn to rival drug cartels for protection. However, there is now a high degree of uncertainty as to who to turn to for security, with the “splintering” of cartels and the intense violence this causes. Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub (2016) offer a potential solution to this conundrum in their assertion that civilian militias stem from a distrust of outsiders. This lays the groundwork for the argument that the militias are not necessarily a function of fear for personal safety and distrust towards the government – gangs and cartels have traditionally been able to step in where the government did not – but more of a lack of trustworthy external actors to turn to for help.

Both the violence of the splintering phenomenon and its impact on civilian willingness to turn to rival cartels are reinforced by Kalvas’ (2006) seminal work, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. The author argues that when there is a high degree of uncertainty in a civil war, actors on both sides engage in indiscriminate violence, inflicting harm on civilians in the struggle for territorial control because they are unable to determine who their enemies are. Kalyvas further shows that civilians will not support either side in a civil war characterized by significant uncertainty as to the outcome; the risk of “defecting” by informing on either side is too great. This parallels the current situation in Mexico, where rival cartels and even government forces such as the Marines engage in indiscriminate violence, unable to identify their enemies. Meanwhile, civilians distrust both the cartels and the government, unwilling to ally with either for fear of retribution. In line with Kalyvas’ assertions, I would expect that civilian distrust and uncertainty as to potential allies in territory contested by the cartels and the government, combined with the high levels of indiscriminate violence, would lead the civilians to take up arms on their own.

This leads me to my hypothesis regarding the type of situation in which we should expect to see civilian militias arise in an area: where there is uncertainty as to the primary authority, along with violence. I would expect *autodefensas* to arise in an area of territorial contestation, a situation in which there is no actor (state or otherwise) with a clear authoritative presence, providing safety or other state goods.

**Hypothesis 1: *Autodefensas* are more likely to arise given territorial contestation.**

My first hypothesis addresses the importance of having a clear authority to provide security in the face of violence. This incorporates recent literature on civilian support for extralegal methods of obtaining safety, as well as how civilian perceptions of the government's efficacy in providing safety can impact the actions that they undertake. This hypothesis does not address the *state's* impact on militia activity, however. As noted in the literature review, this leaves out a potentially integral component in militia creation.

Previous studies have viewed militias solely through their connections with the state; Mazzei's model even included political involvement as one of the prongs in its triad for militia formation. In these past studies, the government was the initiator of militia mobilization, using non-state actors to achieve its ends. Although recent literature has revealed that government support may not be *necessary* for militia creation, we can take away two important lessons from the cases in which the government was involved (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 2015; Arjona and Kalyvas 2005; Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub 2016). When the government facilitated the creation or continuation of civilian militias, it engaged in two important actions: providing resources and information, and supporting militia activity by either endorsing their actions or "looking the other way".

Both of these actions are important to the survival of an actor such as a militia, which disrupts the "monopoly of violence" states are generally presumed to have. In Colombia, Mexico (Chiapas), El Salvador, Sudan, and Iraq, state actors provided militias with resources such as weapons, food, salaries, and clothing (Mazzei 2009; Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015). In the case of Chiapas, the government demonstrated that it could also pass on information regarding potential future targets of militia activity, as well. Both information and resources are integral to the formation of a militia, given that groups such as the AUC are often comprised of men who dedicate much of their time to the militia. Salaries are necessary unless the militia members have other jobs, and many such groups are comprised of poor individuals who cannot afford to buy uniforms or guns. Mazzei (2009) shows the importance of funding and resources in her Colombia case study, wherein the AUC, having been made illegal by laws banning armed mobilization, was forced to turn to the drug cartels for help.

Mazzei's (2009) Chiapas case study is useful in highlighting the importance of having a relationship with the government that enables a militia to operate "under the radar." In 1997, a government-backed paramilitary group called "The Red Mask" attacked Acteal, a small town in Chiapas that supported EZLN activities. Over the course of four hours, 45 civilians were murdered, mostly women and children. A squad of policemen was stationed within walking distance, and the military was warned of the impending attack, but neither took action to prevent

or disrupt the Red Mask's activities. The state also covertly provided training and weaponry to members of this group in preparation for the attack. At the time, the Mexican government refused to acknowledge that the paramilitary groups pursuing the EZLN even existed; this "allowed the groups to operate like ghosts, below the radar of Mexican law" (Mazzei 26). While the Acteal case was eventually taken to court, the state's concentrated efforts to ignore militia activities enabled the Red Mask to act without state intervention. Of course, a group that is officially recognized by the government would similarly benefit from legitimacy.

Staniland (2015) addresses the impact of state support from a different angle, outlining four ways in which a government can deal with militia activity: suppression, containment, collusion, and incorporation. Staniland (2015) argues that states engaging in suppression conduct "large-scale," lethal attempts to destroy an armed group, while containment is a less violent though still repressive reaction to a certain level of politically-charged militia violence deemed gratuitous by the state. If the state perceives that a militia is dangerous to its foundational principals, or poses a potential threat, it will either attempt to eradicate the group, or make it very difficult for militia operations to be conducted. On the other hand, when a state engages in collusion, it may provide the militia with resources, information, training, and protection from state armed forces; this tactic "can be a short-term expedient against a mutual enemy that later breaks down into suppression, a trust-building way station *en route* to incorporation, or a long-term outcome in which the state and a militia develop clear rules of interaction and a strong basis for cooperation" (Staniland 2015, 775). Incorporation involves assimilating a group into the state armed forces. Either "positive" tactic would facilitate militia activity, as opposed to hindering it.

As the above examples show, militias can derive significant benefits from a positive relationship with the state government. Not only can they obtain resources with which to conduct their operations, but they can also act with less concern for state intervention, as their motives are aligned in some fashion. To that end, we can assert that it is easier to form and maintain a militia with government assistance, when financial and logistical concerns are somewhat minimized. From this understanding, I derive the hypothesis below:

**Hypothesis 2: *Autodefensas* are more likely to arise in greater numbers given territorial contestation and a positive relationship with the government.**

Previously, I established that a lack of personal security (or perception thereof) can be a rallying point for militias, as it encourages civilians to seek means of attaining safety. In a situation where the government is unable to protect its citizens, or it is not trusted to support the populace in this manner, there is a "security void" (Mazzei 2009). The literature above shows that civilians are more likely to turn to extralegal measures in such a situation. However, past studies have not addressed the possibility that some civilians within a state or region might support the formation of a militia, while others might not. Such a conflict of perceptions is relevant in areas where the sense of community and commitment to self-defense might not be as strong, including those where community decision-making is not as prevalent, or where there is distrust among neighbors due to unrelated issues such as ethnic conflict. This is an important consideration because, as shown above, militias often require resources, especially when they have just

formed. This is why the AUC in Colombia was forced to contact the drug cartels for help: they needed funding and access to resources such as weapons, food, and shelter.

In a situation where the state does not support armed mobilization, but reaching out to actors such as criminal organizations is not desirable, the burden of supporting a militia would rest on the civilians in an area. This could be problematic for the prospects of militia formation. As Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub (2016) observed, even in the same region, there may be some communities that support the notion of armed mobilization, while others do not. The authors of this article assert that support for these militias is linked to both necessity and trust: civilians are more likely to form militias if the members of a community are significantly affected by violence, and if they have a sufficiently cohesive community culture.

The *Cartel Land* documentary portrayed the application of these stipulations in Michoacán, where the crew filmed the *autodefensas* entering a town and asking for support, only to be told that the town had no need of them. The group was unable to mobilize the citizens, who were unconvinced of the benefits that a militia could provide, and uncertain of the *autodefensas*' motives. This shows that the formation of a militia group (or in this case, an arm of a militia group) may be predicated on civilian support for their cause. We can also refer to examples such as the Michigan militia, which has a small number of supporters but remains largely irrelevant. This group's intent to rebel against the American government was not approved by the citizens in their area, such that their plans to direct violence at police were received with imprisonment.

On the other hand, we can consider the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), an indigenous rights rebel group that achieved significant success in the Chiapas region of Mexico in the 1990s. The EZLN secured popular support on the local, national, and international levels. At the local level, the group began as a Communist organization but later aligned its doctrine and goals with those of the indigenous in the Chiapas region, championing land reform and native rights. This act solidified the support of these groups, such that they were willing to provide foot-soldiers and resources. Similarly, NGOs and Catholic organizations responded to the EZLN's proclaimed goals, providing training, networks, and access to additional resources. Nationally, massive public outcry was expressed when the federal government engaged in vicious military suppression against the EZLN, sending formal and informal armed forces to eradicate the group. This forced the government to withdraw temporarily. By emphasizing the marginalization of Mexico's indigenous and leveraging media attention, the group also caught the attention of the international community, which responded by condemning the federal government crack-down, as well. Although the EZLN has yet to see its demands fully realized, it was able to secure some land rights from the government for the indigenous of Chiapas. The group's popular support has also provided it with a measure of protection, such that it is still in operation to this day.

These examples show the importance of civilian support in the formation and continuation of militias, especially if the groups have goals contrary to the interest of the state. Civilians might provide resources such as funding, food, soldiers, and weaponry; perhaps of equal importance is their ability to deter government actions, as the EZLN case shows. The lack of such support can hinder militia activities. Taken along with research showing that militias require contributors of resources and information, these examples have led me to expect that *autodefensas* will rise

when their cause receives sufficient civilian support. This expectation has led me to formulate the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 3: *Autodefensas* are likely to operate in greater numbers in regions where civilians provide them with higher degrees of support.**

Now that I have outlined my expectations for this dataset and defined my hypotheses, I can turn to my own research, which involved gathering data to evaluate conditions of militia formation in the context of the drug war. I will first describe my research design and the data collection process, after which I will describe my results and offer potential direction for future projects.

## **Section 4: Research Design**

### **Part A: Sources**

As noted in the literature review, there are few datasets available for independent civilian militia research. Although Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe (2013) created a comprehensive database of militia activity from 1981 to 2007, this dataset comprises only pro-government groups. Since I affirm, as Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger (2015) do, that “a recognizable link to the state” is not required for a group to be considered a militia, that dataset was not a directly applicable source for this project. Moreover, this project was focused on the most recent iteration of Mexico’s *autodefensas*, whose catalyst can be traced to Calderón’s 2006 “tough on drugs” policies, but whose primary proliferation occurred in 2012. As of yet, information about these militias has not been gathered in an extensive, systematic manner. Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub (2016) provide the most recent scholarly reference for this topic; however, as I discuss below, my definition for militias is considerably narrower, due to its focus on anti-cartel intent.

Given the above challenges, I devoted the first stage of this thesis project to gathering data on the presence of civilian militias in each Mexican state. This activity was undertaken primarily in the form of online research, with academic articles and government datasets providing supplemental references. Both English and Spanish-language sources were examined to identify and research *autodefensas* on a state-by-state basis. The majority of my sources were news media, including Mexican national newspapers such as *Milenio* and *Proceso*, as well as local media sources that addressed specific states or regions. I chose and analyzed each article, considering the facts provided by the reporter, as well as the comments of Internet users; I gave particular attention to interviews of citizens living in the affected area. I conducted this research with the understanding that the veracity of Mexican media reports varies. Thus, reporter opinions were incorporated into the research, but given less credence than facts that could be substantiated by multiple sources.

In addition to Mexican media sources, my project incorporated American news reports where appropriate, including articles from the *Los Angeles Times* and the *San Antonio Express-News*. I chose to focus on media sources because they offered the timeliest information, compared to annual government surveys and monthly DEA reports. I recognized the potential limitations of this strategy, especially the possibility that bias could impact the information I gathered. To combat this, I cross-checked reports of militia formation and activity across media sources, as well as government data and the Osorio data set, where applicable.

My research also drew on outside sources that were considered less subject to state influence and bias, including *Animal Politico*, a Mexican political reporting site recommended by a DEA agent

and former University alumnus. I also considered articles from the American reporting site *Borderland Beat*, which covers the drug war with analyses of Mexican media reports, as well as first-hand accounts from Mexican civilians. Lastly, *Cartel Land*, a recent documentary that gave on-the-ground insight into the situation in Michoacán, was used to differentiate between the many types of *autodefensas* operating in that particular state, as well as to gauge civilian opinions of the groups.

In order to obtain multiple viewpoints and hard data, this thesis also considered information from the Mexican government, as well as the American government agencies involved in the conflict. Of particular assistance were the U.S. Department of State Travel Warnings, as well as reports from the Drug Enforcement Agency. The DEA drug trafficking organization (DTO) maps, which showed areas of operation for each drug cartel by color, were utilized to determine the extent of territorial contestation between cartels, as well as which actor (government, cartels, civilians, or a combination thereof) had control in each area. The Travel Warnings provided a sense of the danger in each area, indicated by the intensity of restrictions that the American State Department placed on its employees.

The Mexican government source that this research primarily relied upon was the ENVIPE survey, conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI in Spanish). This national survey gauges civilian perceptions of public safety and crime, and is considered one of the least biased official sources to be released by the government. This survey includes statistics for separate states, which are compared to corresponding national figures for each question. Its primary application in the code-sheets was to gauge civilian perceptions of personal safety, as well as to determine whether the government was considered to be an authority in each state.

As I noted in the literature review, one of the primary issues associated with militia research is naming conventions. This was a consideration for the first stage of the project, as there are many terms for the *autodefensas*: AUC, civilian defense militias, vigilantes, etc. After finding groups identified by any variation of militia terminology, it was necessary to do further research in order to determine whether the groups actually fit the definition of *autodefensas* for this project. As I will address below, the most important trait was their stated purpose, which had to express intent to combat or defend against the drug cartels. Without this characteristic, a civilian defense group would not be considered an *autodefensa* for the purposes of this project.

### **Part B: Definitions and Coding Methodology**

As I asserted above, this project applies a broad definition of militias that is similar to that found in Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger (2015). For the purposes of my research, the definition of a “militia” was *not* concerned with a group’s access to weaponry or training, nor did it require connections to the Mexican government, or specific actions such as lynching. As I discuss below, details such as the level of armament, registration with the government, political activity, and the extent to which a group engaged in violence were considered when I designated each group as a particular type of *autodefensa*. Following the precedent set by Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger (2015), however, this paper predicates its overall militia designation on the stated *intent* of the individuals who formed each group.

In this study, *autodefensas* are defined as groups of civilians who work together with the primary purpose of defending their territory and its people against drug violence, with or without assistance from external actors such as the state. As I observed previously, this definition is more

exclusive than that used by Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub (2016). Mexico hosts many types of self-defined “community police” and civilian defense forces, some of which are created to address issues as diverse as indigenous rights, access to natural resources, government funding, and mining encroachment. I chose to focus on a subset of the *autodefensa* phenomenon because I was interested identifying the groups whose formation was directly impacted by drug violence. Therefore, when I refer to *autodefensas* for the remainder of this paper, I am referring to groups whose primary reason for formation was to protect citizens in the area from drug violence.

Many types of qualifying *autodefensas* operate within Mexico, defined by characteristics such as their use of violence, access to weapons, and relationship with the government. Some states host several types of groups, some of which might even be in conflict with each other. For this project, I have broadly categorized groups as “registered” or “non-registered,” based on whether they have been officially recorded by the federal government or their state of operation. Official recognition and activities coordinated with the government are the key factors in this level of classification. Within each registration category, I created several sub-groups, defined by certain characteristics. I will briefly explain all of the group categories below. Readers desiring additional detail on group definitions or the reasoning behind the categorization of groups in a specific state can refer to the appendix, which includes the master code-sheet, as well as the code-sheets for every state.

“Registered” groups, or *Rurales*, were further defined by their relationship with the government. “Government-backed defense forces,” denoted in my code-book with a *G*, have registered their weapons and a list of their members with the state or federal government, but they have not assimilated into the Mexican armed forces or police brigades. On the other hand, “Mexican armed forces factions,” denoted with an *M*, formed as civilian defense forces and chose to merge with local factions of the Mexican authorities. Members of these groups are frequently reported as having taken on the garb and military-grade weaponry of the division that they joined. The “registered” groups were the most infrequently occurring type of *autodefensa*. Only Michoacán and Tlaxcala hosted “registered” groups; Tlaxcala had “government-backed defense forces,” while Michoacán had both “government-backed defense forces” and “Mexican armed forces factions.” The limited occurrence of the “registered” groups restricted their usefulness for my analyses, as I was primarily interested in variations between different types of groups, and these militias display little variation. As such, I included the “registered” groups in only two analyses: a frequency analysis covering all types of groups found across the country, and a comparison of group *types* to government-militia interactions and control.

In addition to the “registered” groups, I identified several types of “unregistered” *autodefensas*, which either declined to register with the government or were not given the opportunity to do so. These groups operate in a manner more akin to vigilantes, as they are not officially aligned with the government, and may pursue activities that are counter to the goals of the state. Within this category, I classified groups by their weaponry, additional stated goals, political rhetoric, use of violence, and relationship with the government. It should be noted that I did not classify the “registered” groups by these characteristics, as their relationships with the government were more salient differentiators.

The mildest category within the “unregistered” designation is the “neighborhood watch,” denoted by a *W*. These groups may be unarmed or lightly armed with machetes and household implements, but generally do not carry firearms. Their primary stated purpose is to maintain order and safety in the community without using extensive violence. These groups serve more of a defensive purpose, and they are not a threat to the state. *Autodefensa* “neighborhood watches” differ from regular ones in that they specifically identify the violence caused by cartels or drug-related organized crime groups as their primary reason for forming. One example of a “neighborhood watch” group can be found in Sonora, where a community has coordinated an organized patrol system. This group is comprised of local civilians who conduct guard shifts with walkie-talkies and cell phones, patrolling the perimeters of their towns to catch and deter criminals.

At the other end of the violence spectrum is the “pseudo-police force,” identified with a *P*. These groups are characterized by their use of considerable violence and extrajudicial activities, which often go beyond conducting citizen’s arrests. “Pseudo-police” act in an authoritative capacity, holding communal trials, committing extrajudicial killings, and physically punishing suspected criminals. Their primary stated purpose is to protect the locals against organized crime, and they may replace government agents in their localities. “Pseudo-police forces” often arise from a need to protect the populace due to a severe lack of state aid, so they tend to be negative towards the government, and more politically charged than any of the other groups. Their final defining trait is the possession of significant firearms, which may have been forcibly removed from the drug cartels. Guerrero has several examples of pseudo-police groups. One group in Ayutla detained at least 54 people purported to be involved in illegal activities. They proceeded to conduct a trial on these individuals before later turning them in to the police. This group had large firearms, and stated that it was primarily interested in protecting the region from drug and police violence.

The final unregistered category is the “anti-drug violence” group, denoted by an *A* in the codebook. Groups in this designation have the stated purpose of preventing or mitigating drug violence, but they are willing to use violent means against cartel members if necessary. This disqualifies them from the “neighborhood watch” designation, which is more passive. “Anti-drug groups” may have access to firearms, but not semi-automatic or automatic weapons used by pseudo-police forces. These groups *could* be a potential threat to the government, but they are less inclined to direct negative commentary toward the state or engage in political action against it. Mexico State has several “anti-drug groups,” which bear nothing larger than a shotgun. These groups have set up roadblocks and checkpoints to search passing vehicles, and one claims to have rescued over 80 potential kidnapping victims. Unlike “pseudo-police forces,” these groups relinquish criminals to the proper state authorities instead of killing them or conducting extrajudicial trials, and they do not push a strong political agenda.

Identifying the *autodefensas* and categorizing them according to their characteristics was one part of the project’s data-gathering phase. During this phase, I also created a code-sheet for each of Mexico’s 31 states, as well as the Federal District (Distrito Federal, or DF, in Spanish). For each code-sheet, I included the following variables: number of *autodefensas* present, type of group(s) present, government rhetoric towards the *autodefensas*, civilian attitudes towards the *autodefensas*, civilian attitudes towards the government, nature of interactions between the *autodefensas* and the government, and a designation of which actor controlled each state. I

discuss each of these variables below; as before, if readers desire additional detail regarding the coding of specific states, the code-sheets are included in the appendix to this paper.

Upon starting each state code-sheet, I determined the number of *autodefensas* present. This was a straightforward variable in definition – simply a gauge of how many qualifying groups operated in each state – but finding an exact number that all sources agreed upon was often difficult. To mitigate this issue, I chose not to search for an exact number, but instead to rank each state on a scale from none to many. As such, an *N* in the code-sheet corresponds to an absence of qualifying groups (“none”), while “few” (*F*) indicates that one to two *autodefensas* were identified. Similarly, “some” (*S*) indicates that three to four groups were present, and “many” (*M*) shows the existence of five or more *autodefensas*. Guanajuato was the only state for which I was unable to assign a figure from this scale; in this case, I acknowledged the presence of *autodefensas* in the state, but did not find sufficient data to support a specific numeric designation.

To determine the appropriate level of the numeric variable for each state, I conducted Internet searches for terms such as “*autodefensa*,” “militia,” “vigilante,” “AUC,” “*policías comunitarias*” and “*grupos de defensa comunitaria*.” Both English and Spanish terms were used in this step, to mitigate the likelihood that I would accidentally overlook a group. These phrases were used in conjunction with each state name for a specified search, such as “*grupos de autodefensa en Chiapas*.” This project focused on groups that formed between 2011 and mid-to-late 2015; earlier articles were not used. As noted above, I also omitted any groups whose description did not include a focus on protecting civilians from drug violence. If a group did not directly name the drug cartels, but referenced kidnappings, extortion, and police collaboration with “organized crime,” this was considered sufficient, as these are the hallmarks of cartel violence. I read and vetted the articles that contained relevant information from these search terms, and cross-referenced them among various sources to attain greater accuracy for my data.

Specific groups were identified according to the names they gave themselves (e.g. Guerrero’s CRAC), or the towns in which they operated, such as Tlalixcoyan. If I found a reference to a militia group that fit this thesis’ definition of an *autodefensa*, I would seek out additional articles and survey data to support this finding. Most often, this involved conducting an additional search such as the one detailed above while incorporating the name of the alleged group or its town of operation. If I only found one reference to a specific group, I did not include it in the dataset. This variable was codified as *number*.

After I determined the number of *autodefensas* operating in a state, I categorized them by their traits for the *type* variable, as I discussed at the beginning of this section. I reviewed the articles from my earlier searches, identifying specific characteristics such as the militia’s use of violence and its relationship with the government. Using the guidelines delineated above, I designated groups as “registered” or “non-registered,” and assigned appropriate sub-designations. If the number of groups in a state was designated as “none,” this category was listed as “not applicable” (*N/A*). In the case of Michoacán, two diametrically dissimilar types of groups had a significant enough presence to require separate code-sheets. I created a code-sheet for Michoacán’s “pseudo-police” and its “Mexican military factions” because the rest of the variables were heavily impacted by the type of group being referenced. For example, state

government rhetoric towards the “pseudo-police” was “hostile,” while its rhetoric towards the “Mexican military factions” was “cautious.”

The *number* and *type* variables were always determined at the beginning of the coding process, as these designations heavily influenced the other variables. The rest of the variables were not coded in a specific, systematic order, as each of the articles I found often provided information relevant to several. For the purposes of continuity, I will now describe the rest of the variables as they appear in the master code-book.

The *rhetoric* variable is a measure of the government’s tone towards the *autodefensas*, derived from officials’ statements regarding such groups. This was meant to catalogue the way in which the state governments publically portrayed *autodefensas* in their own states; if no qualifying groups existed within the state borders, I sought to identify the government’s position towards the civilian defense phenomenon in other parts of the country, especially Michoacán. There were six possible levels for this variable, ranging from “supportive” to “hostile.”

A “supportive” designation, denoted by an *S*, was the most positive level of government rhetoric towards the civilian defense militias. Defining factors for this designation included a public declaration of support by more than one government official, or by a particularly authoritative figure such as the state governor. This level was differentiated from the next lowest by the offer of resources such as food or weaponry. It should be noted that this variable was not identified in practice; in my research, no state government presented rhetoric that qualified for a “supportive” rating. Even in the case of Michoacán, where the federal government arguably made its most significant attempt to incorporate the *autodefensas* into a legal structure, the state government did not offer to fund or provide for the civilian militias.

The next level of the *rhetoric* variable was “positive” (*P*). As I noted previously, the lack of an offer to provide resources differentiated this level from the “supportive” designation. A state qualified for a “positive” rhetoric rating if its government publically welcomed the presence of the *autodefensas* and recognized the potentially positive impact that such groups could have on civilian safety. Oaxaca is a model example of this: the state government declared that the groups which formed to keep civilians safe had a righteous cause, and conferred legitimacy upon them. However, the state did not have the resources to provide anything beyond symbolic support.

The “cautious” (*C*) and “inconsistent” (*I*) levels constituted the middle of the *rhetoric* scale. A state with the “cautious” rating would not have significant official commentary of positive *or* negative character. State officials might assert that they are monitoring groups’ actions and intent, but do not provide a definitive position on the *autodefensas*. Mexico State is the only practical example of this; state officials expressed that the groups’ existence indicated a gap in civilian needs and asserted that they would review the *autodefensas*’ actions. To qualify for “inconsistent” rating, a state government would profess support for the militias at some times, but on other occasions, it would retract those statements, vilify the groups, or engage in attempts to hinder militia activity. This was the case in Veracruz, where the governor denied the existence of a militia in Atzompa, refusing to hear its demands until the citizens blocked major highways and violently reacted to armed disassembly attempts. At this point, he took a conciliatory

approach and offered to fulfill their demands; when this was rebuffed, the state government's rhetoric became negative again.

“Negative” and “hostile” were the lowest levels of the *rhetoric* variable. The “negative” (*N*) level was broader in scope, comprising any state government assertion that the *autodefensas* did not exist, that such groups should not be formed, or that their armed mobilization was unlawful. This could include alleging abuse of power and asserting that the *autodefensas* cannot be trusted because it is impossible to tell who they are or how they are funded. The “hostile” (*H*) rating differs from this level in that the state specifically denounces a group as being comprised of cartel members, such that it presents a threat to civilians. In addition, if a state government threatens to forcibly dismantle a civilian militia, this state automatically qualifies for a “hostile” *rhetoric* rating.

As noted above, a state did *not* necessarily receive an “N/A” designation for the *rhetoric* variable if it was not host to *autodefensas*. If there were no militias, I searched for official statements that addressed *autodefensas* in other states, especially Michoacán, which is widely considered to be a militia hotspot. For example, Nuevo Leon received a “negative” political rhetoric rating because its state government asserted that fighting violence with violence would never work, and that the presence of *autodefensas* indicated a state of anarchy. The government also expressed concern over the sources of financing for Michoacán's *autodefensas*, observing that there have been several cases in which these groups were funded by cartels in exchange for targeting rivals.

The *civauto* variable was a measure of civilians' attitudes towards the *autodefensas*, intended to gauge the level of civilian support for such groups. Unlike the “rhetoric” variable, which used official statements, determining the *civauto* designation was often less straightforward. The most readily available sources for civilian attitudes towards *autodefensas* were interviews conducted by news media. However, there were several states in which civilians were not interviewed about their views on the topic; in this case, I referred to comments on electronic news articles, looking for contributors who professed to be from the state of interest. Since Internet commentary can be of tenuous veracity, I also searched for supporting references by politicians and reporters. I was interested in identifying civilian actions taken for or against the *autodefensas*. If I could not find any of these, I considered assertions made by reporters and officials as to the perceived level of support for such groups. This variable was also measured on a scale from supportive to hostile.

As with the *rhetoric* scale, the most positive level of the *civauto* variable was “supportive,” marked with an *S* in the code-book. Civilians in states that received this designation made many positive statements about the defense militias, listing ways in which their standard of living improved due to the groups' presence. Alternatively, some provided tangible support to the militias in the form of resources or protection from government forces seeking to identify members of the groups or dismantle them. Puebla offers a model example of this: the *autodefensa* of San Gabriel Chilac was funded by citizens who strongly supported its activities, and the state governor admitted that it was hard to dissuade the group due to the level of support it received from civilians in the area.

The primary distinction between the two most positive *civauto* levels is the presence of tangible support. The “positive” *civauto* designation is predicated on ideological or symbolic support

from the civilians, but does not include funding or provision of other resources to the *autodefensas*. A “positive” designation, marked by a *P* in the codebook, was given to states whose civilians voiced support for the rights of others to form such groups, as well as those who stated that this was the best or only means that civilians had to protect themselves, in light of the government’s inability to provide security. Commonly repeated themes include references to legal or constitutional clauses that allow civilians to form armed groups for protection, as well as a general decline in violence or increase in perceptions of safety in the wake of a defense group’s formation.

At the middle of the *civauto* spectrum were the “cautious” and “indifferent/unsure” designations. A “cautious” rating (*C*) identified states whose civilians expressed hesitation towards *autodefensas*, either directly or through opposing opinions. Civilians might agree with the principles on which such groups were founded, including their intent to protect or their lawfulness, but express doubt as to the use of violence to achieve those means. Civilians might also express distrust due to lack of knowledge regarding the groups’ members or methods. The “indifferent” level of the *civauto* variable (*I*) was used for any state without sufficient data on civilian sentiments to categorize it under any other level of this variable. Neither positive nor negative opinions were gleaned from news reports, articles, commentary, or politicians’ comments. As I discuss below, civilians might decline to offer their opinions for many reasons, but the two most prominent possibilities in this context are that the *autodefensas*’ activities seem far removed (as is likely the case in DF), or because civilians are not sure if these groups can be trusted.

A “negative” (*N*) rating for the *civauto* variable is characterized by a lack of redeeming civilian commentary concerning the *autodefensas*. In states with this designation, civilians exhibited fear towards the militias’ intentions or motives, citing their extrajudicial nature, which they referred to as unlawful. Strong support for the rule of law is a potential indicator for this level, as is the civilian assertion that the *autodefensas* should disarm. The most negative level of the *civauto* variable differs in that the civilians both disagree with the groups’ ideological foundations, and also actively seek to disarm the *autodefensas*. They might assert that violence has increased since the groups formed, express suspicion that the *autodefensas* host cartel members, or physically attempt to prevent militia activity. The “hostile” level of this variable was not found in practice.

The *civgov* variable categorized civilian attitudes towards government authorities, determined in a manner similar to civilians’ perceptions regarding *autodefensas*. The “supportive” (*S*) level of this variable denotes that a state’s citizens expressed confidence in the government, indicated by the assertion that the state provides for their needs, particularly in terms of security. Civilians might also state that the government is best able to provide security to its citizens in a just manner, and may engage in public demonstrations of support for the government. This level was not found in practice, although the “positive” (*P*) rating may be emerging in Nuevo Leon. This level is differentiated by a lack of public demonstration or physical intervention on the part of the government. Civilians in a state with this rating strongly support the rule of law. They might not be fully satisfied with the provision of services and safety, but the civilians receive sufficient resources, and they believe that the government should provide such public goods exclusively.

The designation of “bypassing,” denoted by a *B* in the code-book, is given to states whose civilians assert that the government cannot protect them, and who instead seek to provide for themselves. Citizens in these states might ask the government for permission to protect themselves, or they might have come to an agreement in which the authorities “look the other way.” They do not rely upon state or local forces for protection. Oaxaca is a good example of this, as the citizens of this state consistently assert that the government does not have the resources to provide them with services, least of all security. They do not assign blame to the state for its inability to fulfill its mandate, but they have assumed the duties of protection and governance.

As I will discuss below, most states exhibited one of the lowest levels for the *civgov* variable, with “negative” (*N*) being the most common. In a state with a “negative” rating, civilians voiced distrust in the state government, frequently levying accusations of rampant corruption and blatant involvement with organized crime. Civilians in states with this designation often asserted that criminals acted with impunity, that the authorities protected members of organized crime, or that official extortion was common. Another hallmark of this level is a low percentage of crimes being reported, although it is not necessary for a state’s qualification under this rating.

“Hostile” (*H*) was the most negative level of the *civgov* variable, characterized by violent physical confrontations between civilians and government forces. Guerrero is the best example of this, with significant degradation in civilian views of the government. Following the government’s implication in the forced disappearances (and likely murder) of 43 Iguala students in 2014, as well as the frequent abuses of authoritative power, civilians in Guerrero have repeatedly engaged in physical clashes with state government agents. Due to their severe distrust of the authorities, especially the police, the citizens of Guerrero have engaged in physical violence against the government, burning public buildings and forcibly disarming police.

The *interact* variable is an indicator of the nature of interactions between the *autodefensas* and the authorities, through which I sought to gain insight into the relationship between the civilian militias and the government in each state. In determining the level of this variable for each state, I searched for news articles and official accounts of confrontations between state forces and self-defense groups, as well as indications that either party attempted to communicate or collaborate with the other. If a state did not have any *autodefensas*, this variable was coded as “N/A.”

“Integration” (*I*) was the most positive level of the *interact* variable spectrum, an indication that the civilian militias in a state not only registered with the government, but chose to assimilate into an official organization such as the state police or military. Only states whose militias were designated with the *M* “type” could qualify for this rating, as this level of collaboration is the very hallmark of groups that integrated with the Mexican police or armed forces. Only Michoacán had groups that chose to integrate with the state police, donning police uniforms, receiving military-grade weapons, and being publically recognized by the government.

“Partnership” (*P*) was an indication that a state’s *autodefensas* registered with the state or federal government, an action which confers a measure of legitimacy to their activities in the eyes of the authorities. Unlike the Mexican army or police factions, groups that qualified for the “partnership” designation did not fully integrate into the government’s armed forces. However,

in a state which qualified for this designation, civilian defense groups would be more apt to align their actions with the goals of the government, and they would receive their resources from the state.

Like the “bypassing” level in the *civgov* spectrum, “unilateral activity” (*U*) indicated that the *autodefensas* were acting without state involvement. The groups were not officially registered, although they may have appealed to the government for recognition. This rating is defined by the government’s tacit approval towards militia actions, in that authorities “turn a blind eye” to any such activity, or by an official recognition that the government is not able to properly provide for the civilians. Government officials do not deny the existence of the *autodefensas*, and they may acknowledge their presence even if they do not register the groups, as was the case in Oaxaca; the authorities do not attempt to hinder or assist the groups in their activities.

This differs from the “avoidance” designation for this variable (*A*), wherein the state government and the *autodefensas* make a concentrated effort not to engage each other, either physically or rhetorically. If there is any rhetoric on the part of either actor, it is minimal, going no further than acknowledgement of the other’s activities or actions. Mexico State provides a useful example of this rating in practice, as the leader of its civilian militia asserted that the government was aware of the group’s activities, but that the authorities had not taken any actions to stop them. The difference between avoidance and a designation of “no interaction” (*N*) is slim, but important: under a “no interaction” rating, neither party acknowledges the activities of the other. Therefore, neither the *autodefensas* nor the government would reference the other, and the information on the civilian groups would likely come from news media, rather than official statements.

The two negative designations within the *interact* variable were “clashes” (*C*), and “hostilities” (*H*). A state would be coded with the “clashes” designation if the government addressed the activities of the region’s *autodefensas* by requesting that the groups disarm or disband. For this rating, there would be significant ideological disagreement between the state government and the self-defense militias, but not to the extent that prolonged violence occurs. This variable was not identified in practice; as I will discuss below, most states were in the middle of the *interact* spectrum, with governments and militias preferring to ignore each other or act unilaterally.

“Hostilities,” on the other hand, were not absent from the dataset. This level of the *interact* variable indicated a prolonged state of conflict between the *autodefensas* and the government, including both physical and ideological confrontations. Key indicators for this rating included repeated attempts by the government to disband the militias, either by issuing statements regarding the illegality of their actions and demanding that they disarm, or by physically engaging with these groups. Another hallmark of note was either party’s use of “aggressive actions” such as lynching, armed conflict, abduction, roadblocks, and attempted interference in the other group’s activities. Finally, if the government sent members of the armed forces to disband the *autodefensas*, this would also qualify a state for the “hostility” designation.

The final variable for each code-sheet was *control*, an indicator of which actor was the primary authority in a particular state. When determining which actor had control of a state, I considered many indicators of state-cartel conflict, organized crime proliferation, and government efficacy. I searched for indications of cartel brazenness, such as *narco-mantas* addressing the government,

civilian reports of criminal impunity, and highly public clashes between rival organized crime groups. I also considered whether or not the state had conducted armed campaigns to mitigate cartel violence, attempted to purge its police forces and government bodies of officials with ties to organized crime, or placed restrictions on reporting. Other considerations included violence against reporters and government officials, reports of drug violence, civilian perceptions of their personal safety and ability to speak out, and measures of official transparency. The United States Department of State Travel Warnings were also useful for this rating, as they indicated how safe a state was for foreign officials. States were categorized into one of six groupings: “cartels,” “government,” “self-governing citizens,” “cartels vs. government,” “civilians vs. cartels,” or “anarchy.” In the event that I did not have sufficient data, I categorized this variable as “unknown.”

A state was considered to be under “cartel” (*C*) control if there was enough evidence that the drug cartels provided security or public goods to the civilians in lieu of the government. This rating could also be given to a state in which the government clearly acted on behalf of the cartels, giving them protection at the expense of the civilians. Durango is a model example of this, as the state passed laws that greatly restricted reporting on drug violence, and the government refused to provide transparent murder figures and DNA tests to international NGOs. Additionally, when drug violence occurred, the authorities provided little protection to the civilians. A state with this designation would also fail to conduct armed efforts to mitigate cartel violence, and there would be a high incidence of reporter or official assassinations. This designation did not require a single cartel to be in power; Mexico State, for example, was host to four cartels.

If a designation of “government” (*G*) control was given, the state appeared to have a monopoly on authority. In states with this designation, the government would be recognized by the civilians as an authority, such that they would be willing to report crimes to the authorities in a capacity on par with the national average, or better. There would be few incidences of reporter or official assassinations, and any travel warnings issued by the United States government would be mild. For these states, the civilians’ perceptions of insecurity would likely be significantly lower than the national average. It is possible for a state to exhibit the presence of cartels and still have a *G* rating, provided that the above conditions are met.

The “self-governing civilians” (*S*) designation was given to states that had little indication of violent drug cartel activities, where civilians asserted that the state government was unable or unwilling to provide public goods such as security. These states would have very few instances of official or reporter assassinations, and any United States Travel Warnings would be mild. Civilians would provide their own security in the absence of a strong government, and the formation of civilian defense militias might be historically prevalent. In this situation, the government would not have the capability to oppose the civilians, but the drug cartels would not be in clear control. In practice, the only example of this was Oaxaca, where autonomous indigenous communities formed groups without requiring the state government’s consent, and where cartel violence was not a prominent issue.

The dataset revealed that one of the most common conditions was that in which the cartels and the state government were vying for control, labelled as “CVG.” In states with this designation,

the cartels might be attempting to assert their dominance by engaging in turf wars or targeting state officials for assassinations. However, the government would respond by working with SEDENA or another faction of the Mexican armed forces to purge major cities of cartel influence, or to prevent the spread of cartel dominance to other areas. Nuevo Leon is a good example of this, as the state has recently been working with the Mexican Marines to hunt down high-ranking cartel members, and previously conducted an extensive armed operation to flush the cartels out of its capital city, Monterrey.

A situation in which the “CVS” designation would be appropriate is much like that of the “CVG” rating, except that the civilians would be fighting against the cartels instead of the government. In this case, the government would be clearly unable to provide security for its citizens, and would not attempt to engage the drug cartels in armed opposition. The civilians would respond by attempting to provide their own security, arming themselves against the cartels. This rating was included to address the possibility that not found in practice.


The state of “anarchy” was characterized by uncertainty of control, where no single actor was the clear authority within an area. States exhibiting this designation might have significant reports of violent actions on the part of drug cartels, civilians, and government authorities. In some cases, the government might not be viewed as the authority by its civilians, but it might still conduct operations against the drug cartels, such that it would not be a “cartel” designation. There might be high levels of assassinations, significant military operations, and acts of violence by the civilians, such as lynching. This was the case in Veracruz, where the difference between a designation of “cartel control” and “anarchy” was a strong offensive attempt by the state government to purge or attack the cartels, but the civilians were afraid for their safety, such that they were willing to form *autodefensas*.

### **Section 5: Analysis**

After gathering data for each variable and further researching unique situations such as Guerrero and Michoacán to ensure that I understood their conflicts, I analyzed the relationships between different factors across the dataset. To achieve this, I created bi-variate tables depicting the code-sheet results and manually conducted cross-tabulations. As you will see below, the tables address relationships such as those between government reactions to militias and the type of actor in control, types of militias and government reactions to militias, and civilian perceptions of *autodefensas* to the number of militias present in a state. I also combined several of these bi-variate tables together to explore whether relationships existed between sets of three variables, such as *control*, *type*, and *interact*. My hope in doing this was to preliminarily determine if future research might benefit from further exploring these relationships.

The first step in this analysis was to determine the proportion of states coded with each level of the variables outlined above. This provided top-level information such as the frequency of *autodefensa* types across the country, which was one of my first observations from this dataset. I have compiled the frequencies of each militia *type* in the table below to facilitate easy reading, having drawn these data from the code-sheets. This information shows how often each type of *autodefensa* appeared, harnessing data from each of the 31 states, as well as the Federal District.

<b>Registered</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Registered and Non-Registered</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Non-registered</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>None</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>



As the pie chart shows, the vast majority of states were host to non-registered civilian militias. Of these, there was an almost perfect three-way split between “pseudo-police forces,” which were present in eight states, “anti-drug groups,” present in seven states, and “neighborhood watches,” which appeared in seven states as well. These data can be found below in Table 2. The second most common *type* designation was “N/A,” indicating that no *autodefensas* operated in a state; this occurred in 28% of the states. The “registered” designation was the least frequently occurring, only present in two states. This is interesting, considering that these groups received the most significant aid from the government in the form of resources, training, and funding.

Early militia literature would suggest that civilian defense groups *require* government assistance to mobilize. Although government resources are no longer considered mandatory for militia formation and success, Mazzei (2009) and Staniland (2015) have shown that government support can greatly facilitate militia activities. Funding and resources are useful advantages for a militia; approval and limited government opposition even more so. A frequency count can only provide so much information, but it supports assertions by Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub (2016) and Jentsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger (2015) that militias do not require government aid to form, given that the vast majority of *autodefensas* were not affiliated with the government.

As I noted previously, only two states, Michoacán and Tlaxcala, hosted “registered” groups. Michoacán was the primary state in which the federal government instituted its integration plan, publically asking militias to register their weapons and the names of their members. In my research, I found that existing Michoacán groups reacted differently to this request: the tight-knit militias headed by José Mireles, the famous *autodefensa* leader, preferred to remain unregistered, citing concerns of corruption in the state’s forces, and fear as to the potential safety hazards of divulging their membership. These groups, labelled as “pseudo-police,” continue to defy the government by refusing to register. On the other hand, groups that chose to register with the government, one of which was headed by “Papa Smurf,” a former deputy of Mireles’, cited the need for resources and legitimacy as their reasons for allying with the government. These groups successfully contributed to the 2014 capture of the Knights Templar leader, “La Tuta,” but they continually faced the internal threat of absorbing criminals into their midst, as the result of their broad membership.

Another important take-away from the frequency data is the geographic proliferation of “pseudo-police,” in comparison to “neighborhood watch groups” and “anti-drug forces.” Seven states exhibited the presence of the most violent militias, all of which are located on one of the two Mexican coasts. Colima, Jalisco, Michoacán, and Guerrero are all on the Pacific coast, which is home to important trafficking ports such as Manzanillo. Tabasco, Tamaulipas, and Veracruz are located on the Gulf of Mexico coast, to the East. This geographic variation is note-worthy, in that the states which harbor the most violent, heavily-armed, anti-state-government militias are distant from the federal government. This would seem to indicate that violent militias are most likely to form if federal armed forces cannot be called in to quash them. This is misleading, however, as the armed forces have certainly conducted significant operations in many of these states, especially Guerrero. It is possible that these states are the site of significant violence and the lack of a clear authority, a relationship that I will address in the bivariate analysis below.

The geographic proximity of these groups could also be due to a “spillover effect.” During my research on Michoacán and Guerrero, there were repeated assertions by civilians, reporters, and politicians that a successful campaign against organized crime can cause a “cockroach effect” of criminals fleeing to surrounding states. Several states bordering Michoacán, the epicenter of the *autodefensa* activities, set up checkpoints to guard against criminal migration. The proliferation of violent self-defense groups could be a reaction to civilian fear of this phenomenon.

On the other hand, it might represent a domino effect in which civilians seek to replicate the groups that were successful in other states. Since civilians across the dataset referenced the situation in Michoacán, we know that knowledge of the events there is not sequestered, which provides an opportunity for militia proliferation. For example, the *autodefensas* in Puebla asserted that they had seen the success of Michoacán’s militias, and hoped to replicate the groups in their own state. As I will discuss below, this spread of militias could also be linked to levels of insecurity in those geographic regions, as well as the lack of government control.

<b>State</b>	<b>type</b>	<b>state</b>	<b>type</b>
<b>Zacatecas</b>	N/A	<b>Puebla</b>	A
<b>San Luis Potosi</b>	N/A	<b>Oaxaca</b>	A
<b>Queretaro</b>	N/A	<b>Chihuahua</b>	A
<b>Nayarit</b>	N/A	<b>Campeche</b>	A
<b>Nuevo Leon</b>	N/A	<b>Morelos</b>	A
<b>Sinaloa</b>	N/A	<b>Mexico</b>	A
<b>Aguascalientes</b>	N/A	<b>Chiapas</b>	A
<b>Durango</b>	N/A	<b>Guanajuato</b>	A
<b>DF</b>	N/A	<b>Guerrero</b>	P
<b>Baja California Sur</b>	W	<b>Veracruz</b>	P
<b>Hidalgo</b>	W	<b>Tamaulipas</b>	P
<b>Coahuila</b>	W	<b>Jalisco</b>	P
<b>Quintana Roo</b>	W	<b>Tabasco</b>	P
<b>Baja California</b>	W	<b>Colima</b>	P
<b>Yucatan</b>	W	<b>Michoacan</b>	P, G, M
<b>Sonora</b>	W	<b>Tlaxcala</b>	G

Another variable whose frequency provided intriguing results was *civauto*, a measure of civilian attitudes towards the militias. As shown in the table below, the frequencies exhibited significant variation. Out of thirty-two ratings, thirty-one percent were “cautious.” In conjunction with the “indifferent/unsure” variable, over forty-six percent of designations indicated some form of civilian uncertainty towards the *autodefensas*. Contrarily, forty-four percent of the results for this variable were positive, while less than ten percent were negative. These results could suggest further future militia proliferation, as some of the supportive designations came from states that did not have *autodefensas* at the time of this research.

<b>Table 3: Frequency of <i>civauto</i></b>		<b>Table 4: Frequency of <i>control</i></b>	
<b>Positive</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>Cartels</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Indifferent/Unsure</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Government</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Cautious</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>Anarchy</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Negative</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>CVG</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>4</b>
		<b>Self-Governing Civilians</b>	<b>1</b>
		<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>

Frequency of *control* is another important variable to consider, as the top-level statistics gauge the extent to which the government does *not* monopolize power or violence in states across the country. As Table 4 shows, there were only ten instances in which one actor was deemed to have control in a state, and the cartels had control in twice as many states as the governments. A condition of uncertainty as to the primary authority in a state was much more common; between the “CVG,” “uncertain,” and “anarchy” levels, almost seventy percent of Mexico’s states exhibited this condition. This could be dangerous for the rule of law in Mexico; as Malone (2012) and Chinchilla (2003) state, civilians are more likely to turn to extralegal measures when they feel insecure, a condition that could be generated by an uncertain authority and high levels of violence. As I noted previously, civilian perceptions of the government (*civgov*) were also overwhelmingly negative, with 27 out of 32 states exhibiting “negative” or “hostile” ratings; the remainder were “cautious” or “bypassing.”

Of the twenty-three states exhibiting *autodefensa* activity, sixty percent had a rating in the center of the *interact* spectrum, representing “middle-of-the-road,” non-committal activities on the part of the government (“unilateral activity,” “avoidance,” and “no interaction”). The remaining forty percent were divided evenly between “hostilities” and “partnership” or “integration.” This result is logical, in that these reactions would not require the government to expend resources on a foe that does not pose a threat, especially considering the need to address civilian needs and drug cartel violence on a limited state budget. Contrarily, over seventy percent of the results for the *rhetoric* variable indicated that the government was publically addressing the civilian militias in a negative or hostile manner. This shows a clear divide between government rhetoric and action towards the *autodefensas*; this ties in to the notion that the state governments might not view the militias as a sufficient threat to merit action.

The second step in the analysis process was to create tables that presented bi-variate relationships of interest. This enabled me to refer to my code-sheets and determine the potential causes of any recurring correlations. This process amounted to a set of comparative case studies, through which I was able to postulate reasons behind the correlations I found from my code-sheet data.

As per my hypotheses above, I focused on the relationships between the *control*, *number*, *civauto*, *interact*, and *rhetoric* variables.

As I asserted previously, there seems to be a relationship between the types of militias forming and the lack of control within a state, particularly in the case of the “pseudo-police forces.” In all but one case, there was uncertain authority in the states where “pseudo-police forces” formed. As Table 5 shows, four of these states had conditions that were designated as “anarchy,” and two featured a conflict between the cartels and government. This result suggests that the lack of a clear authority in an unsafe situation could be a breeding ground for more aggressive militias.

<b>Neighborhood Watch</b>	Control	<b>Anti-Drug Groups</b>	Control	<b>Pseudo-Police</b>	Control
W - Quintana Roo	Unknown	A - Guanajuato	CVG	P - Veracruz	Anarchy
W - Yucatan	Unknown	A - Puebla	Anarchy	P - Michoacan	Anarchy
W - BCS	Anarchy	A - Morelos	Anarchy	P - Guerrero	Anarchy
W - Hidalgo	Unknown	A - Mexico	Unknown	P - Jalisco	Anarchy
W - Coahuila	Cartels	A - Oaxaca	Self-Governing Citizens	P - Tabasco	Cartels
W - Baja California	Anarchy	A - Chiapas	Anarchy	P - Taumalipas	CVG
W - Sonora	CVG	A - Campeche	Unknown	P - Colima	CVG

Table 5 also shows that most of the states with civilian *autodefensas* reported a level of uncertainty for the *control* variable, with only three exceptions (Coahuila, Oaxaca, and Tabasco). To explore this relationship between lack of authority and *autodefensa* proliferation, I compared the *number of autodefensas* to the *control* variable, seeking to determine the accuracy of my first hypothesis. Hypothesis 1: *autodefensas* are more likely to arise given territorial contestation.

Below in Table 6 is a tabular comparison of the *number* and *control* variables. It is immediately apparent that states exhibiting a condition of “anarchy” are most likely to host greater numbers of *autodefensas*. Fifty-five percent of the states with a number designation of “some” or “many” were coded as being in a state of “anarchy,” while none of the states without *autodefensas* exhibited this rating. Similarly, the “none” designation had the highest occurrence of clear authority figures in an area, with forty-four percent of the states in this column reporting one recognized authority. These results seem to suggest that a significant lack of clear authority, such as that found in a condition of “anarchy,” could provide additional opportunity or motivation for militias to emerge, evident in the higher occurrence of such groups. However, since the data did not provide definitive proof of this, we should consider the effects of other variables in conjunction with the *control* variable.

**Table 6: Comparison of "Control" Variable and Number of *Autodefensas***

<b>None</b>		<b>Few</b>		<b>Some/Many</b>	
Zacatecas	Cartels	Tabasco	Cartels	Tlaxcala	Government
Sinaloa	Cartels	Coahuila	Cartels	Oaxaca	Self-governing civilians
Durango	Cartels	Hidalgo	Unknown	Mexico	Unknown
Aguascalientes	Government	Yucatan	Unknown	Campeche	Unknown
DF	CVG	Sonora	CVG	Quintana Roo	Unknown
Nayarit	CVG	Taumatlipas	CVG	Jalisco	Anarchy
SLP	CVG	Colima	CVG	Baja California	Anarchy
Queretaro	CVG (G)	Chihuahua	CVG	Veracruz	Anarchy
Nuevo Leon	CVG	BCS	Anarchy	Michoacan	Anarchy
		Puebla	Anarchy	Guerrero	Anarchy
		Chiapas	Anarchy	Morelos	Anarchy

To gain additional insight into the conditions that engender civilian militia formation, we must consider the impact of additional actors, such as civilians and state governments. As previously noted, both groups could provide resources and protection to civilian militias, facilitating their activities. Given the generally positive impact that previous researchers have attributed to these external actors, I would expect support from the government or civilians to be correlated with higher incidences of *autodefensa* activity. This leads to my second hypothesis, in which I asserted that territorial contestation and a positive relationship between the self-defense militias and the state government (*interact*) would result in a greater frequency of *autodefensas*. Hypothesis 2: *Autodefensas* are more likely to arise in greater numbers given territorial contestation and a positive relationship with the government.

Table 7 depicts the *autodefensas*' relationship with the state government (*interact*, listed at the top of the table), the *control* variable, and the number of militias, denoted by letter designations to the left of each state. The greatest concentration of the "many" designation occurs at the far right, with four states exhibiting government-militia conflict and a state of "anarchy." As Mazzei (2009) and Chinchilla (2003) suggest, greater numbers of civilian militias during a condition of "anarchy" could be the result of civilians seeking alternate methods of security, when no reliable security providers exist. While it is logical that the "anarchy" condition is affecting the number of militias present, it does not seem as likely that government efforts to shut down civilian self-defense forces would engender *greater* militia proliferation. This is contrary to the lessons of previous literature, which suggest that forming militias is more difficult when the government is engaged in an active suppression campaign, or when there are no alternate sources of support.

With that being said, Guerrero and Michoacán have long histories of civilian mobilization, and both states are currently embroiled in civilian-authority conflicts that could affect government reactions towards extralegal action. This is especially true for Guerrero, where the government was implicated in facilitating the kidnapping of 43 students: citizens have reacted with marches, protests, and demonstrations vilifying the government. As a result, tensions are high between the two groups, and conflict is common. Therefore, a poor relationship between civilians and the government might explain this result, as the civilians do not trust the authorities and they seek alternate means of security that are severely discouraged by the government. I will address this possibility in the final section of this analysis.

**Table 7: Comparison of "Control," "Interact," and "Number"**

<b>Cooperate (P, I)</b>	<b>Control</b>	<b>Ignore (U, A, N)</b>	<b>Control</b>	<b>Conflict (C, H)</b>	<b>Control</b>
M - Michoacan	Anarchy	M - Morelos	Anarchy	M - Veracruz	Anarchy
M - Quintana Roo	Unknown	M - Mexico	Unknown	M - Michoacan	Anarchy
S - Tlaxcala	Government	M - Oaxaca	Self-Governing Citizens	M - Guerrero	Anarchy
F - Yucatan	Unknown	F - Chiapas	Anarchy	M - Jalisco	Anarchy
		F - BCS	Anarchy	F - Puebla	Anarchy
		F - Hidalgo	Unknown		
		F - Coahuila	Cartels		
		F - Sonora	CVG		
		F - Colima	CVG		
		F - Tabasco	Cartels		
		F - Tlaxcala	CVG		
		F - Chihuahua	CVG		
		S - Baja California	Anarchy		
		S - Campeche	Unknown		
		U - Guanajuato	CVG		

Table 8 presents the government's interactions with the *autodefensas*, as compared to the types of militias (denoted by letter designations to the left of each state name) and the *control* variable. As before, the most consistent results are at the right-hand side of the table, where "conflict" converges with "anarchy" and the presence of violent militias. In conjunction with the results of the previous table, this provides one of the most intriguing findings in this paper. The confluence of "anarchy" and negative government reactions is only correlated with more violent, better-armed groups. This result may suggest that civilians who face hostility from the government and cartels alike are more inclined to arm themselves heavily, and to act in place of the state. This begs the question of where the groups in these states obtain their funding and weaponry; rival cartels could be providing resources to these groups. The Wilson Center's Mexico Institute refers to this possibility, stating that "while the groups admit to obtaining weapons including AR-15s and AK-47s from captured Templar stockpiles as well as smuggling them from the United States, some groups have also been accused of receiving aid from the New Generation Cartel of Jalisco, rivals of the Knights Templar" (Horton 2014, 3-4). When the state does not address the militias, results appear mixed. This suggests that other factors might influence the militia type.

**Table 8: Comparison of "Interact," "Control," and Type of *Autodefensas***

Cooperate (P, I)	Control	Ignore (U, A, N)	Control	Conflict (C, H)	Control
G/M - Michoacan	Anarchy	A - Guanajuato	CVG	A - Puebla	Anarchy
G - Tlaxcala	Government	A - Campeche	Unknown	P - Veracruz	Anarchy
W - Quintana Roo	Unknown	A - Morelos	Anarchy	P - Michoacan	Anarchy
W - Yucatan	Unknown	A - Mexico	Unknown	P - Guerrero	Anarchy
		A - Oaxaca	Self-Governing Citizens	P - Jalisco	Anarchy
		A - Chiapas	Anarchy		
		W - BCS	Anarchy		
		W - Hidalgo	Unknown		
		W - Coahuila	Cartels		
		W - Baja California	Anarchy		
		W - Sonora	CVG		
		P - Colima	CVG		
		P - Tabasco	Cartels		
		P - Taumalipas	CVG		

As I discussed in the previous section, one of the primary themes in previous militia literature was the importance of having external actors to provide resources and support. I explored the impact of the state government above, to surprising results. I will now turn to the relationship between civilian support and the incidence of *autodefensas*. As noted previously, I expect there to be more *autodefensas* in conditions where civilian support for their formation exists.

Hypothesis 3: *Autodefensas* are likely to operate in greater numbers in regions where civilians provide them with higher degrees of support.

**Table 9: Comparison of *Autodefensa* Frequency and Civilian Reactions to *Autodefensas***

None		Few		Some/Many	
Nuevo Leon	Negative	Colima	Negative	Quintana Roo	Cautious
Aguascalientes	Negative	Tamaulipas	Cautious	Michoacan	Cautious (Positive)
Zacatecas	Cautious	Sonora	Cautious	Guerrero	Cautious (Supportive)
Sinaloa	Cautious	Tabasco	Cautious	Mexico	Indifferent/Unsure
Durango	Cautious	Guanajuato	Cautious	Jalisco	Indifferent/Unsure
DF	Indifferent/unsure	Chihuahua	Indifferent	Oaxaca	Supportive
Queretaro	Indifferent/unsure	Hidalgo	Supportive	Veracruz	Positive
SLP	Positive	Chiapas	Supportive	Campeche	Positive
Nayarit	Positive	Puebla	Supportive	Tlaxcala	Positive
		BCS	Positive	Morelos	Positive
		Coahuila	Positive		
		Yucatan	Positive		
		Baja California	Positive		

As Table 9 shows, nine states did not have any *autodefensas*. This occurrence of the “none” variable roughly corresponded to civilian perceptions of such groups in the nine aforementioned states. For example, in Nuevo Leon, civilians and politicians alike frequently asserted that they did not support *autodefensas* in other states due to the uncertainty surrounding their formation. Of the states without any qualifying groups, only San Luis Potosi and Nayarit demonstrated civilian support for the creation of self-defense militias. Contrarily, greater frequencies of the

autodefensas were present in states with positive or supportive designations; seven states with “some” or “many” groups featured this trait. This result is significant, as civilian attitudes appear to be an impactful factor at both ends of the spectrum, helping to explain both the lack of militias and their proliferation.

To fully address the relationship between civilian support and the formation of militias, I created a table with the level of civilian support and the types of militias formed. As you can see from the table below, the “neighborhood watch” designation correlated with overwhelmingly positive civilian reactions. This could be due to the involvement of the civilians in the formation of these groups, as they tend to be more localized, reducing uncertainty. The “pseudo-police” tend to be broader in reach, so they might be unfamiliar to the civilians. The positive designations in the pseudo-police column might be due to conditions of significant violence that merit the creation of heavily armed groups. In the case of the neighborhood watch groups, the *civauto-type* relationship might also be indicative of civilian attitudes being impacted by the type of group, as these groups are less threatening by nature.

**Table 10: Comparison of *Autodefensa* Types and Civilian Attitudes Towards *Autodefensas***

<b>Neighborhood Watch</b>		<b>Anti-Drug Groups</b>		<b>Pseudo-Police</b>	
W - Hidalgo	Supportive	A - Puebla	Supportive	P - Veracruz	Positive
W - Yucatan	Positive	A - Oaxaca	Supportive	P - Michoacan	Positive
W - BCS	Positive	A - Chiapas	Supportive	P - Guerrero	Cautious (Supportive)
W - Coahuila	Positive	A - Campeche	Positive	P - Tabasco	Cautious
W - Baja California	Positive	A - Morelos	Positive	P - Taumalipas	Cautious
W - Sonora	Cautious	A - Guanajuato	Cautious	P - Jalisco	Indifferent/Unsure
W - Quintana Roo	Cautious	A - Mexico	Indifferent/Unsure	P - Colima	Negative

Before I conclude this analysis, I would like to briefly address the potential impact of civilian attitudes towards the government on the proliferation of *autodefensas*. As I noted above, the correlation between greater numbers of *autodefensas*, a lack of clear authority, and a conflicting relationship between the government and the militias might be at least partially explained by a negative relationship between the civilians and the governments in general. My dataset does not provide illumination in this matter, as nearly every state exhibited negative civilian attitudes towards the government. Additional nuance regarding the extent of civilian-government conflict would be necessary to recognize this dynamic as the cause of the *conflict-number* result.

I would also like to address an observation that is not immediately visible in the tables, but is evident in supporting data collected for the code-sheets: the identification of specific cartels as targets for the *autodefensas*, a phenomenon that I only identified in one state, but one which holds potentially grave implications. Identification of specific drug cartels as targets could be a sign of rival cartel funding or involvement. Using the Knights Templar as an example, this group began as a “civilian defense force” with the stated intent of driving the Zetas out of the region. Civilians supported them in hopes of being liberated from extortion and violence. The group drove out the Zetas, only to replace them as the dominant cartel in the area. This conversion is of particular concern for Tabasco, as its militia group identified the Zetas as the primary aggressor in the area, and made it clear that they would be the main target for the group’s activities.

**Section 6: Conclusion**

In accordance with recent literature regarding civilian militia formation, my results supported the assertion that militias do *not* require government aid to form, as only two out of thirty-two state

entities exhibited the presence of government-affiliated, “registered” *autodefensas* (Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub 2016; Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 2015). My frequency results also exhibited a significant geographic trend in the types of militias that formed across Mexico, with more violent militias located on the two coasts. It is unlikely that this trend is caused by the states’ distances from the Mexican federal government, as branches of the armed forces often conduct activities in the states that exhibited “pseudo-police forces.” It is more likely that my results are related to high cartel activity in the area, with trafficking and turf war violence leading civilians to arm themselves more heavily in the absence of government security provision.

With that being said, there are a number of factors that could account for the concentration of violent *autodefensas* in the coastal regions, including the “spillover effect” of criminals fleeing areas such as Michoacán and causing civilians in surrounding states to require more offensive methods of dealing with the violence. Similarly, the proliferation of “pseudo-police” might be the result of civilians adopting methods of armed mobilization that seemed effective in other states; anecdotes show that civilians across the country are aware of the situation in these states, especially Michoacán. Additional research into this geographic trend could be promising.

With regard to the conditions necessary for *autodefensa* formation, my results were somewhat surprising. My first hypothesis was supported by the data to an extent, as states with indicators of territorial contestation exhibited higher frequencies of civilian militias. The lack of a single clear authority also appeared to impact the formation of “pseudo-police,” as nearly every incidence of these groups occurred in a state with indicators of territorial contestation. This suggests that territorial contestation could be significant in prompting the formation of civilian militias, due to the lack of a clear authority figure providing security, or due to additional opportunity for militia emergence. This holds true to Malone’s (2012) and Chinchilla’s (2003) assertions that civilians are more likely to seek extralegal measures of security in conditions where they feel unsafe, and the government is unable or untrusted to provide protection.

My third hypothesis was also supported by the data, in that the states without *autodefensas* were almost all characterized by civilian uncertainty towards militias. However, the states with the most militias exhibited higher frequencies of positive civilian attitudes towards the groups. It appears that positive civilian attitudes could contribute to *autodefensa* formation, a finding that aligns with historical examples such as the EZLN’s protection by civilians, and the Michigan militia’s failure due to its inability to rouse civilian support. This is a promising relationship that could merit further study, although we should be careful not to assign a causal association to it based solely on the results of this analysis. The relationship between civilian attitudes and types of *autodefensas* should also be tested further, as my analysis could not determine which variable was the independent variable. It is possible that civilian attitudes were impacted by the type of militia, in that milder groups seemed more trustworthy or were more localized; contrarily, the militias could have formed in accordance with existing civilian perceptions of security needs.

My second hypothesis asserted that *autodefensas* would be more likely to arise under conditions of territorial contestation and a positive relationship between the government and the civilian militias. The data revealed that the greatest militia frequencies were in states with hostile relations between these actors, a result that might be explained by existing turmoil between the civilians and the government. As per Mazzei’s (2009) and Staniland’s (2015) assertions, it seems

unlikely that government attempts to hinder militia activity would engender greater proliferation; however, the hostile environment already existing between the civilians and the government in states such as Guerrero could be prompting the state to react negatively to any type of civilian armed mobilization. Since the civilians distrust the authorities, they may also be seeking methods of attaining safety that do not require reliance on the government.

This would not be surprising, as civilian attitudes towards the government across the country were overwhelmingly negative. However, the *civauto* results revealed that civilian support and hesitation towards the *autodefensas* occurred in roughly equal frequencies, which could indicate that more states might exhibit the formation of militias in the future, given the correct conditions. This is especially salient in light of the fact that there were only ten instances in which one actor was deemed to have control in a state; if the association I observed above is true, the lack of a clear authority figure in the other twenty-two state entities could provide the conditions required for *autodefensa* formation. Despite the overwhelmingly negative official rhetoric, state interactions with the militias were largely passive, possibly due to uncertainty as to whether the militias could pose a threat; this might also provide the opportunity for further proliferation.

This thesis focused on providing an overview of the *autodefensas* that existed in Mexico, the forms they took, the frequencies in which they arose, and their relationships with external actors such as civilians and the government. Like all countries, Mexico harbors a rich political, social, and economic identity that would be impossible to fully engage in a project with such a focus; necessarily, I chose a select few variables to consider and provided additional information as I was able. To that end, I recommend that future researchers build on the data above, conducting additional analyses that systematically account for the impact of factors such as indigenous heritage, state terrain, income, and additional political variables. Some of these factors could impact the government's ability to provide security or address militias perceived as threatening, while others might help explain civilian attitudes and types of militias that form across Mexico.

I would also recommend several areas of further study for researchers interested in the topics of this thesis. Firstly, I would suggest statistically confirming the associations between territorial contestation and militia frequency, as well as civilian support and militia frequency. Both would be exceptionally salient issues for countries whose governments have tenuous control. Future studies might also consider addressing a potential connection between hostile government-militia interactions, types of militias, and territorial contestation, as this could yield policy implications for how governments might consider handling the formation of such groups. Lastly, the geographic trend identified above should be further considered, to better determine the causes of militia proliferation, particularly the spread of violent groups. Any of these areas could provide insight into the phenomenon of the *autodefensas*, as well as the ways in which such militias should be addressed.

## Bibliography

Aguirre-Rodriguez, Marco Antonio. "Si hay autodefensas en Veracruz." [www.agnveracruz.com](http://www.agnveracruz.com). 3 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 15 Jan. 2016.

<http://www.agnveracruz.com.mx/index.php/columnas/misticos-y-terrenales/item/4150-s%C3%AD-hay-autodefensas-en-veracruz-cndh>

Ahmed, Azam and Paulina Villegas. "As frustrations with Mexico's government rise, so do lynchings." 23 Jan. 2016. Web. Accessed 27 Jan. 2016.

[http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/world/americas/as-frustrations-with-mexicos-government-rise-so-do-lynchings.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/world/americas/as-frustrations-with-mexicos-government-rise-so-do-lynchings.html?_r=0)

"Ahora en Sonora irrumpe grupo de autodefensa; lo encabeza un ejidatario llamado Francisco Villa." 5 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 20 Jan. 2016. <http://www.proceso.com.mx/364112/ahora-en-sonora-irrumpe-grupo-de-autodefensa-lo-encabeza-un-ejidatario-llamado-francisco-villa>

Althaus, Dudley. "Nearly 50 bodies recovered from latest Mexico massacre." 13 May, 2012. Web. Accessed 29 Jan. 2016. <http://www.chron.com/news/nation-world/althaus/article/Nearly-50-bodies-recovered-from-latest-Mexico-3555205.php>

Alvarez, Estrella. "Pide Obispo de Queretaro garantizar seguridad de autodefensas." [Milenio.com](http://www.milenio.com). 24 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 13 Jan. 2016. [http://www.milenio.com/estados/Pide-Queretaro-garantizar-seguridad-autodefensas\\_0\\_232777258.html](http://www.milenio.com/estados/Pide-Queretaro-garantizar-seguridad-autodefensas_0_232777258.html)

Angel, Arturo. "EU: Cártel de Jalisco superó a Zetas y Templarios y opera en ocho estados." *Animal Politico*. 11 April 2015. Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2016.

<http://www.animalpolitico.com/2015/04/eu-cartel-de-jalisco-supero-a-zetas-y-templarios-y-opera-en-ocho-estados/>

"Another PRI Federal Deputy Kidnapped, Murdered, and Incinerated." 24 Sept. 2014. Web. Accessed 19 Feb. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/09/another-pri-federal-deputy-kidnapped.html>

"Ante extorsiones surge autodefensa en san luis potosi." [expedientenoticias.com](http://www.expedientenoticias.com). 7 April 2014. Web. Accessed 11 Jan. 2016. <http://www.expedientenoticias.com/ante-extorsiones-surge-autodefensa-en-san-luis-potosi-19792>

"Anuncia Beatriz Zavala creacion de la policia comunitaria." 23 March 2010. Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2016. <http://yucatanahora.com/noticias/anuncia-beatriz-zavala-creacion-policia-comunitaria-2919/>

"Aparecen grupos de autodefensa en Chiapas." 27 Feb. 2013. Web. Accessed 27 Jan. 2016. <http://www.animalpolitico.com/2013/02/aparecen-grupos-de-autodefensa-en-chiapas/>

Arreola, Federico. "Las autodefensas de Nuevo Leon resolvieron el problema cuando EPN ligo a los pinos." [SDPNoticias.com](http://www.sdpnoticias.com). 17 January, 2015. Web. Accessed 16 Dec. 2015.

<http://www.sdpnoticias.com/columnas/2014/01/17/las-autodefensas-de-nuevo-leon-resolvieron-el-problema-cuando-e-pn-llego-a-los-pinos>

“Arrest of Knights Templar cell leader, El Kalimba.” 26 July 2013. Web. Accessed 24 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2013/07/arrest-of-knights-of-templar-celaya.html>

Arista, Sergio Ocampo. “Autodefensas en Guerrero estan ‘un buen plan.’ Hector Astudillo.” 19 Jan 2016. Web. Accessed 29 Jan. 2016. <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2016/01/19/politica/008n1pol>

“Asesinan a lider de autodefensas en Guerrero. 9 Aug. 2015. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://eleconomista.com.mx/seguridad-publica/2015/08/09/asesinan-lider-autodefensas-que-buscaba-normalistas-ayotzinapa>

“At Least 70 Killings of Officials in Jalisco – Deputy Kidnapped/Incinerated Most Likely Mistaken Identity.” 25 Sept. 2014. Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/09/at-least-70-killings-of-officials-in.html>

“Autodefensas en Chihuahua: ¿intención o publicidad?” Nov. 2014. Web. Accessed 24 Jan. 2016. <http://www.cronicadechihuahua.com/Autodefensas-en-Chihuahua,31830.html>

“Autodefensas en Jalisco revelan debilidades en seguridad.” 28 Feb. 2015. Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2016. <http://www.unionjalisco.mx/articulo/2015/02/28/seguridad/guadalajara/autodefensas-en-jalisco-revelan-debilidades-en-seguridad>

“Autodefensas en SLP? No, son solo grupos ‘entrenados y capacitados por el ejercito,’ revela Diputado del PVEM.” sinembargo.mx. 31 March, 2014. Web. Accessed 13 Jan. 2016. <http://www.sinembargo.mx/31-03-2014/948391>

“Autodefensas en SLP surgen por abusos policiacos.” codigosanluis.com. 9 April, 2014. Web. Accessed 11 Jan. 2016. <http://www.codigosanluis.com/portal/content/autodefensas-en-slp-surgen-por-abusos-policiacos>

“Autodefensas podrán pertenecer a dos tipos de cuerpos rurales, ¿cuáles son las diferencias?” *Animal Politico*. 13 May 2014. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://www.animalpolitico.com/2014/05/fuerzas-rurales-y-cuerpos-de-defensa-en-michoacan-cual-es-la-diferencia/>

“Autodefensas se expanden a 10 estados del pais, afirma studio; solo en GRO hay al menos de 20 grupos.” 22 Sept. 2013. Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2016. <http://www.sinembargo.mx/22-09-2013/758584>

“Autodefensas surgen en el Sur.” 16 July 2014. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://expresocampeche.com/notas/estado/2014/07/16/surgen-autodefensas-en-el-sur-de-campeche/>

Ayala, Hector. “Falso que existan autodefensas en Santa Rosa; Segob.” 24 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 12 Jan. 2016. <https://queretaro.quadratin.com.mx/Falso-que-existan-autodefensas-en-Santa-Rosa-Segob/>

Bacchi, Umberto. "Mexico: Army lieutenant and soldiers arrested for Zacatecas executions." 21 July, 2015. Web. Accessed 16 Jan. 2016. <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/mexico-army-lieutenant-soldiers-arrested-zacatecas-executions-1511792>

"Baja California Sur solicita ayuda de EEUU para combatir el crimen." Bcsnoticias.com. 26 Oct. 2015. Web. Accessed 12 Jan. 2016. <http://www.bcsnoticias.mx/baja-california-sur-solicita-ayuda-de-eeuu-para-combatir-el-crimen/>

"Baja California Governor Seeks Help of USA State Dept to Combat Crime." 29 Oct. 2015. Web. Accessed 13 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/10/baja-california-sur-governor-seeks-help.html>

Benabib, Rafael. "En mi opinion: autodefensas en Cuernavaca." 25 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 29 Jan. 2016. <https://www.diariodemorelos.com/blog/en-mi-opini%C3%B3n-autodefensas-en-cuernavaca>

Bergman, Marcelo and Laurence Whitehead, eds. *Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to Democracy in Latin America*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009. Print.

Blanco, Juan Manuel. "Surgen autodefensa contra CFE y pobreza extrema en Chiapas."

Blanco, Luisa, "The Impact of Insecurity on Democracy and Trust in Institutions in Mexico" (2011). Pepperdine University, School of Public Policy Working Papers. Paper 25.

Brooks, Dario Martinez. "La Ciudad de Mexico, un lugar con mas inseguridad para sus habitantes?" 13 Aug. 2015. Web. Accessed 20 Jan. 2016. <http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2015/08/13/la-ciudad-de-mexico-un-lugar-con-mas-inseguridad-para-sus-habitantes>

Calderon, Lucia. "Autodefensas en Tamaulipas." 24 Dec. 2015. Web. Accessed 29 Jan. 2016. <http://expreso.press/2015/12/24/autodefensas-en-tamaulipas/>

*Cartel Land*. Dir. Matthew Hieneman. The Orchard, 2015. Film.

Camacho, Rafael. "Absurdo pensar que haya autodefensas en Santa Rosa Jauregui: Lopez Portillo." Codiceinformativo.com. 24 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 12 Jan. 2016. <https://codiceinformativo.com/2014/01/absurdo-pensar-que-haya-autodefensas-en-santa-rosa-jauregui-lopez-portillo/>

Campbell, Bruce and Arthur D. Brenner, eds. *Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.

Campbell, Monica. "Mexico City is on alert as crime rises." www.pri.org. 28 Oct. 2015. Web. Accessed 17 Jan. 2016. <http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-10-28/mexico-city-alert-crime-rises>

"Campesinos de Guanajuato amenazan con crear autodefensas." 21 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 27 Dec. 2015. <http://www.informador.com.mx/mexico/2014/514253/6/campesinos-de-guanajuato-amenazan-con-crear-autodefensa.htm>

Carey, Sabine C., Michael P. Colaresi, and Neil J. Mitchell. "Governments, Informal Links to Militias, and Accountability." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59.5 (2015): 850-876. Web. Accessed 16 April 2016.

Carey, Sabine C., Neil J. Mitchell, and Will Lowe. "States, the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 50.2 (2012): 249-258. Web. Accessed 20 April 2016.

Carillo, Pablo Cesar. "Guanajuato, altera para los autodefensas." 21 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed Jan 24, 2016. [http://www.milenio.com/firmas/pablo\\_cesar\\_carrillo/Guanajuato-alerta-autodefensas\\_18\\_231156933.html](http://www.milenio.com/firmas/pablo_cesar_carrillo/Guanajuato-alerta-autodefensas_18_231156933.html)

Carillo, Pablo Cesar. "Vamos a permitir autodefensas en Guanajuato?" Dec. 13, 2014. Web. Accessed Dec. 28, 2015. [http://www.milenio.com/firmas/pablo\\_cesar\\_carrillo/Vamos-permitir-autodefensas-Guanajuato\\_18\\_437536294.html](http://www.milenio.com/firmas/pablo_cesar_carrillo/Vamos-permitir-autodefensas-Guanajuato_18_437536294.html)

"Chihuahua attorney general admits 'grave' security problem in Southern Chihuahua." 28 July, 2013. Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2013/07/chihuahua-attorney-general-admits-grave.html>

Chinchilla, Laura. "Experiences with Citizen Participation in Crime Prevention in Central America." *Crime and Violence in Latin America*. Ed. Hugo Fruhling, Joseph S. Tulchin, and Heather A. Golding. Washington, D. C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2003. Pages 205-232. Print.

"CJNG and Los Zetas Clashing for Guanajuato: DEA." 10 Nov. 2015. Web. Accessed 19 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/11/cjng-and-los-zetas-clashing-for.html>

"Coahuila Corruption: Searching for Hundreds of Missing in Allende Massacre." 2 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 2 Feb. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/02/coahuila-operationsearching-for-missing.html>

Cocoran, Patrick. "What Mexico can learn from declining violence in two Border States." 18 Feb. 2016. Web. Accessed 18 Feb. 2016. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/what-mexico-can-learn-from-declining-violence-in-two-border-states>

"Colima: Diary of a Narco State." 2 Dec. 2010. Web. Accessed 21 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2010/12/colima-diary-of-narco-state.html>

Conde, Cecilia. "Baja percepcion de corrupcion en Queretaro; permanece la inseguridad." 2 July, 2015. Web. Accessed 25 Jan. 2016. <http://amqueretaro.com/queretaro/2015/07/02/baja-percepcion-de-corrupcion-en-queretaro-permanece-la-de-inseguridad>

"Consideras que Queretaro es Seguro?" *Alternativo*. 13 Feb, 2015. Youtube. Web. Accessed 13 Jan, 2016. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wIriCVN\\_ShE](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wIriCVN_ShE)

Contreras, Ezequiel Flores. "Enfrentamiento entre autodefensas deja 13 muertos en Guerrero." 6 June 2015. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=406724>

- Contreras, Luis. "Hay autodefensas en 11 municipios del Edomex." Milenio. Milenio.com, 31 January 2014. Web. 20 November, 2015. [http://www.milenio.com/politica/autodefensas-municipios-Edomex\\_0\\_236376933.html](http://www.milenio.com/politica/autodefensas-municipios-Edomex_0_236376933.html)
- Cordero, Deborah. "Autodefensa resguarda Kanasin a falta de seguridad." 20 March, 2013. Web. Accessed 26 Dec. 2015. <http://www.unionyucatan.mx/articulo/2013/03/20/seguridad/merida/autodefensa-resguarda-kanasin-falta-de-seguridad>
- "Crean autodefensas en limites de Sonora y Sinaloa." El Debate Noticias. 2 Feb. 2014. Video. Accessed 20 Jan. 2016. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EZRBABS2lzc>
- "Crean autodefensas en Nayarit; indigenas buscan protegerse de abusos policiacos." 24Horas.mx. 18 Feb, 2015. Web. Accessed 4 Jan, 2016. <http://www.24-horas.mx/crean-autodefensas-en-nayarit-indigenas-buscan-protegerse-de-abusos-policiaos/#>
- Cuevas, Jesus Ramirez. "Policias comunitarios, grupos de autodefensa, y paramilitares." 15 January, 2014. Accessed 6 December, 2015. Web. <http://regeneracion.mx/policias-comunitarios-grupos-de-autodefensa-y-paramilitares/>
- Davila, Patricia. "Tambien en Morelos se gesta la autodefensa." 6 March 2014. Web. Accessed 23 Jan. 2016. <http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=366539>
- Del Carmen Sosa, Luz. "There were 83,000 murders during the last six years." 5 Aug. 2012. Web. Accessed 5 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/08/there-were-83000-murders-during-last.html>
- Delgado, Edwin. "Vigilante groups spring up in Mexico to fight cartels." San Antonio Express News, 10 July, 2014. Web. Accessed 7 December, 2015. <http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local/article/Vigilante-group-fights-cartel-near-the-border-5609648.php>
- Del Pilar Martinez, Maria. "Inseguridad en Nuevo Leon causa fuerte impacto economico." 7 July 2015. Web. Accessed 31 Jan. 2016. <http://eleconomista.com.mx/estados/2015/07/07/inseguridad-nuevo-leon-causa-fuerte-impacto-economico>
- "Descartan Aparición de Autodefensas en Aguascalientes." 10 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 12 Jan. 2016. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pWpprORrA8>
- "Descarta PGJE toque de queda en Los Cabos y La Paz; procurador pide replica modelo de autodefensas." Bcsnoticias.com. 18 Sept. 2014. Web. Accessed 13 Jan. 2016. <http://www.bcsnoticias.mx/descarta-pgje-toque-de-queda-en-los-cabos-y-la-paz-procurador-pide-replicar-modelo-de-autodefensas/>
- "Descarta SGC grupos de autodefensa en San Gabriel Chilac." 22 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2016. <http://municipiospuebla.mx/nota/2014-01-22/tehuac%C3%A1n/descarta-sgg-grupos-de-autodefensa-en-san-gabriel-chilac>

Diamond, Larry. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. Print.

Duarte, Jose Roberto Cisneros. “Los focos rojos que prenden las alarmas de la inseguridad.” 25 Nove. 2015. Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2016.

<http://www.cnnexpansion.com/economia/2015/11/25/los-focos-rojos-que-prenden-las-alarmas-de-la-inseguridad>

“Durango, de los mas corruptos.” 17 June 2014. Web. Accessed 16 Feb. 2016.

<https://www.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/noticia/1006811.durango-de-los-mas-corruptos-encuesta.html>

Durón, Luis. “Autodefensas en Saltillo, a las puertas de la anarquía.” 23 Nov. 2015. Web.

Accessed 5 Jan. 2016. <http://www.zocalo.com.mx/seccion/articulo/autodefensas-en-saltillo-a-las-puertas-de-la-anarquia-1448271574>

“‘El Cochi’ BLO plaza boss arrested.” 15 Dec. 2015. Web. Accessed 27 Jan. 2016.

<http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/12/el-cochi-blo-plaza-boss-of-nuevo-leon.html>

“El gobierno no permitirá resurgimiento de autodefensas en Michoacán: Castillo.” 15 Dec. 2014.

Web. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://www.elsoldenayarit.mx/politica/30860-el-gobierno-no-permitira-resurgimiento-de-autodefensas-en-michoacan-castillo>

“El Peligro de las Autodefensas para Nuevo Leon.” Regiando.com. 14 April, 2015. Web.

Accessed 16 Dec. 2015. <http://www.regiando.com/el-peligro-de-las-autodefensas-para-nuevo-leon/>

Encuesta Nacional de Vicimizacion y percepcion sobre seguridad publica (EVIPE) 2015.

Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia. 30 Sept. 2015. Web. Accessed 30 Mar. 2016.

“En Zacatecas no hay grupos de autodefensa.” Ntrzacatecas.com. 5 Feb., 2014. Web. Accessed 28 Dec. 2015.

“En Zacatecas no hay grupos de autodefensa: autoridades.” 6 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 24 Jan.

2016. <http://www.unotv.com/noticias/estados/centro-norte/En-Zacatecas-no-hay-grupos-de-autodefensa-Autoridades-947764/>

Esteban, Rogelio Agustin. “Surge grupo de autodefensa en Teloloapan, Guerrero.” 11 Jan. 2016.

Web. Accessed 29 Jan. 2016.

[http://www.milenio.com/estados/Surge\\_grupo\\_de\\_autodefensa\\_en\\_Teloloapan-Guerrero\\_0\\_662933953.html](http://www.milenio.com/estados/Surge_grupo_de_autodefensa_en_Teloloapan-Guerrero_0_662933953.html)

“Evaluation of Confidence Testing in Mexico.” 1 June, 2011. Web. Accessed 12 Jan. 2016.

<http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/06/evaluation-of-confidence-testing-in.html>

“Ex-Daughter-In-Law of Vicente Fox Kidnapped.” 1 May 2015. Web. Accessed 25 Jan. 2016.

<http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/05/ex-daughter-in-law-of-vicente-fox.html>

Favela, Fidel. "Evitar que autodefensas y cartels ingresen a Queretaro: Rosendo Anaya." 25 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 13 Jan. 2016. <https://queretaro.quadratin.com.mx/Evitar-que-autodefensas-y-carteles-ingresen-Queretaro-Rosendo-Anaya/>

"Following wave of assassinations in NL, now 21 in 3 days." 22 June, 2015. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/06/following-wave-of-assassinations-in-nl.html>

"Forman nuevas autodefensas, ahora en Estado de Mexico." diariopresente.com. 20 June, 2014. Web. Accessed 20 Jan. 2015. <http://www.diariopresente.com.mx/section/nacional/111565/forman-nuevas-autodefensas-ahora-estado-mexico/>

"Forman policia comunitaria en Yucatan." 25 March, 2013. Web. Accessed 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.24-horas.mx/forman-policia-comunitaria-en-yucatan/>

Fuentes Lopez, Guadalupe. "Violencia y corrupcion, herencia de Jorge Herrera a 8 meses de dejar su gestion en Durango." 1 Nov. 2015. Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2016. <http://www.sinembargo.mx/01-11-2015/1534085>

Gagne, David. "Brote de rivalidades entre autodefensas deja 16 muertos en Guerrero, Mexico." 11 June, 2015. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-del-dia/rivalidades-autodefensas-muertos-guerrero-mexico>

Gamboa, Alejandro. "The Future of Mexico's Self-Defense Groups." 24 April, 2014. Web. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. [http://securityobserver.org/the-future-of-mexicos-self-defense-groups/#\\_edn6](http://securityobserver.org/the-future-of-mexicos-self-defense-groups/#_edn6)

Garcia, Arturo Rodriguez. "200 desaparecidos en el 'muy seguro' Queretaro." 1 Oct. 2014. Web. Accessed 13 Jan. 2016. <http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=383528>

Garcia, Syndy. "Amenanzan con crear autodefensas en Rayones." 24 Nov. 2015. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. [http://www.milenio.com/region/autofedensas\\_rayones-agresiones\\_ex\\_alcalde\\_0\\_634136810.html](http://www.milenio.com/region/autofedensas_rayones-agresiones_ex_alcalde_0_634136810.html)

"GATES tactics called into question: body with message found in Nava, Coahuila." 27 July, 2015. Web. Accessed 1 Feb. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/07/gates-tactics-called-into-question-body.html>

Gaytan, Antonio. "En Durango no hay condiciones para autodefensas." 17 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://www.noticiasggl.com/durango-general/en-durango-no-hay-condiciones-para-autodefensas-jfs/>

Gerardo, Avila. "Hay o no en Zacatecas grupos de autodefensa?" 20 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 25 Jan. 2016. <http://porticoonline.mx/2015/02/06/insisten-ganaderos-de-zacatecas-en-formar-autodefensas-para-combatir-el-abigeato/>

"Gobierno de Tabasco acusa de delincuencia a presunto grupo de autodefensa." CNN Mexico. 18 May 2013. Web. 19 Nov. 2015. <http://expansion.mx/nacional/2013/05/18/gobierno-de-tabasco-acusa-de-delincuencia-a-presunto-grupo-de->

[autodefensa?utm\\_source=feedburner&utm\\_medium=feed&utm\\_campaign=Feed%3A+cnnmexico%2Fnacional+%28Nacional%29&utm\\_content=Google+Feedfetcher](#)

“Golden Triangle in Flames...Again.” 19 Oct. 2014. Web. Accessed 18 Feb. 2016.

<http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/10/golden-triangle-in-flamesagain.html>

Gomez, Eirinet. “Habitantes de Atzompa, Veracruz, se organizan como ‘guardias comunitarias.’” *www.jornada.mx*. 12 Sept. 2015. Web. Accessed 15 Jan. 2016.

<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/ultimas/2015/09/12/crean-guardias-comunitarias-en-soledad-atzompa-veracruz-620.html>

González, Felipe González. “Percepción de inseguridad, temor, e incredulidad/ Desde Aguascalientes.” 21 April, 2014. Web. Accessed 12 Feb. 2016.

<http://www.lja.mx/2014/04/percepcion-de-inseguridad-temor-e-incredulidad-desde-aguascalientes/>

Gonzalez, Jenaro Trujillo. “‘Tienen que saberlo, Queretaro no es seguro’: Martha, la joven que por Segundo ocasion escapo de un rapto.” 28 Sept. 2015. Web. Accessed 13 Jan. 2016.

<http://www.expressmetropolitano.com.mx/2015/09/28/tienen-que-saberlo-queretaro-no-es-seguro-martha-la-joven-que-por-segunda-ocasion-escapo-de-un-rapto/>

Gonzalez, Norma. “Grupos de autodefensa: heroes o villanos?” *www.lja.mx*. 28 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://www.lja.mx/2014/01/grupos-de-autodefensa-heroes-o-villanos/>

Graham, Ronan. “North Mexico: new Civil Police Force to combat organized crime.” 15 Sept. 2011. Web. Accessed 31 Jan. 2016. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/north-mexico-new-civil-police-force-to-combat-organized-crime>

Grillo, Ioan. “Mexico’s cartel-fighting vigilantes get closer to the Texas border.” *Global Post*, 7 July, 2014. Web. Accessed 7 December, 2015.

<http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/mexico/140707/mexican-vigilantes-cartels-texas>

“Grupo se hace llamar ‘de autodefensa’ se atribuye haber ‘pasado por las armas’ a 16 zetas en Tamaulipas.” 5 March 2015. Web. Accessed 29 Jan. 2016. <http://www.sinembargo.mx/05-03-2014/922841>

“Grupos de Autodefensa en Coahuila?” 21 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 2 Feb. 2016.

<https://www.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/noticia/955085.grupos-de-autodefensa-en-coahuila.html>

“Grupo de autodefensa recluta via Facebook.” 13 Sept. 2015. Web. Accessed 23 Jan. 2016.

<http://periodicocorreo.com.mx/grupo-de-autodefensa-recluta-via-facebook/>

“Grupo de autodefensa va contra narcos, plagiarios, violadores, y rateros en Tabasco.” 25 Mar. 2013. Web. Accessed 19 Nov. 2015.

<http://www.proceso.com.mx/337202/grupo-de-autodefensa-va-contra-narcos-plagiarios-violadores-y-rateros-en-tabasco>

“Guanajuato, Colima, Coahuila, y BC caen en el Índice Delictivo: aumenta la inseguridad.” 5 May, 2015. Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2016. <http://www.animalpolitico.com/2015/05/homicidio-doloso-el-crimen-que-mas-afecta-a-los-mexicanos/>

“Guanajuato en foco amarillo por Michoacán, advierte Marquez.” 17 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 24 Jan. 2016.

<http://www.unionguajuato.mx/articulo/2014/01/17/seguridad/irapuato/guanajuato-en-foco-amarillo-por-michoacan-advierete-marquez>

“Guanajuatenses perciben mas inseguridad con EPN.” 9 March, 2015. Web. Accessed 24 Jan. 2016. <http://www.unionguajuato.mx/articulo/2015/09/03/seguridad/guanajuatenses-perciben-mas-inseguridad-con-epn>

“Guerrerenses promueven policia comunitaria en Guanajuato.” 20 May, 2014. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://www.unionguajuato.mx/articulo/2014/05/20/seguridad/guerrerenses-promueven-policia-comunitaria-en-guanajuato>

“Guerrero PAN party chief assassinated.” 29 Sept. 2014. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016.

<http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/09/guerrero-pan-party-chief-assassinated.html>

Gudiño, Alma. “Surge supuesto grupo de autodefensa en Coahuila.” 21 Jan. 2014. Web.

Accessed 1 Feb. 2016. <http://www.imagen.com.mx/surge-supuesto-grupo-autodefensa-coahuila>

Guillén, Alejandra. “Mineras Siembran el Terror en Cuautitlán.” 7 Dept. 2013. Web. Accessed

21 Feb. 2016. <http://www.proceso.com.mx/352141/mineras-siembran-el-terror-en-cuautitlan>

“Gunmen open fire on journalist’s home in Zacatecas.” 6 Oct. 2014. Web. Accessed 22 Jan.

2016. <http://en.rsf.org/mexico-gunmen-open-fire-on-journalist-s-06-10-2014,47062.html>

Guzman, Julio Manuel L. “Detectan autodefensas en tres municipios de Tamaulipas.” 11 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 29 Jan. 2016.

<http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2014/autodefensas-tamaulipas-diputado-carlos-garcia-986852.html>

“Hartos de la violencia, civiles amagan con crear autodefensas en Sinaloa.” 3 Feb. 2014. Web.

Accessed 8 Jan. 2016. <http://www.proceso.com.mx/364003/hartos-de-la-violencia-civiles-amagan-con-crear-autodefensas-en-sinaloa>

Hernandez, Daniel. “The people displaced by the hunt for El Chapo tell of helicopter attacks.” 23

Dec. 2015. Web. Accessed 17 Feb. 2016. <https://news.vice.com/article/the-people-displaced-by-the-hunt-for-el-chapo-tell-of-helicopter-attacks>

Hernandez, Daniel and Rafael Castillo. “Mexico elections update: ‘El Bronco’ rides wave of discontent to big win in Nuevo Leon.” 8 June 2015. Web. Accessed 30 Jan. 2016.

<https://news.vice.com/article/mexico-elections-update-el-bronco-rides-wave-of-discontent-to-big-win-in-nuevo-leon>

Hernandez, Gabriela. “Surgen autodefensas en Puebla; los asesoran grupos de Michoacán.”

Proceso. Proceso.com.mx, 23 January, 2014. Web. 20 November, 2015.

<http://www.proceso.com.mx/363095/surge-autodefensa-en-puebla-los-asesoran-grupos-de-michoacan>

Hernandez, Nephi. “Refuerzan operativo ‘Queretaro Seguro’ tras fuga de ‘El Chapo’ Guzman.” 12 July 2015. Web. Accessed 13 Jan. 2016. <http://www.noticiasmvs.com/#!/noticias/refuerzan-operativo-queretaro-seguro-tras-fuga-de-el-chapo-guzman-802.html>

Hernandez, Rosaura. “Buscan de formar grupos de autodefensa no armados en Morelos.” 13 Sept. 2015. Web. Accessed 23 Jan. 2016. <http://www.oem.com.mx/laprensa/notas/n3948382.htm>

Hernandez, Ruben. “Grupos de autodefensa salen a la luz, el gobierno no ofrece seguridad.” 3 Aug. 2015. Web. Accessed 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.agendatlaxcala.com/2015/index.php?nota=Grupos-de-autodefensa-en-Tlaxcala-salen-a-la-luz,-gobierno-no-ofrece-seguridad->

Hernandez, Silvia. “QRoo Descarta Presencia de Autodefensas.” 6 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2014/en-q-roo-no-hay-autodefensas-secretaria-de-gobierno-985568.html>

“Heroin Surpasses Marijuana in Mexico’s Drug Production.” 27 June 2015. Web. Accessed 18 Feb. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/06/heroin-surpasses-marijuana-in-mexicos.html>

Horton, Gillian. United States. The Wilson Center: Mexico Institute. “Conflict in Michoacan: Vigilante Groups Present Challenges and Opportunities for the Mexican Government.” 2014. Web. Accessed 9 Nov. 2015.

“Hotspots in Guanajuato and Guerrero: 26 killed in 48 hours.” 27 Sept. 2014. Web. Accessed 24 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/09/hotspots-in-guanajuato-and-guerrero-26.html>

Hoyos, Manuel Emilio. “Autodefensas vecinales, policias comunitarias. Solucion?” 11 Feb. 2015. Web. Accessed 23 Jan. 2016. <http://www.sdponoticias.com/columnas/2015/02/11/autodefensas-vecinales-policias-comunitarias-solucion>

Imison, Paul. “How Veracruz became the most dangerous state in Mexico for journalists.” Vice.com. 17 Aug. 2015. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <https://news.vice.com/article/how-veracruz-became-the-most-dangerous-state-in-mexico-for-journalists>

“In Baja California they Protect Criminals.” 23 Nov. 2015. Web. Accessed 15 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/11/in-baja-california-they-protect.html>

“Informe especial sobre los grupos de autodefensa en el estado de michoacan y las violaciones a los derechos humanos relacionadas con el conflicto.” 21 Jan. 2016. Comision Nacional de los Derechos Humanos. Web. Accessed 24 Jan. 2016. [http://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Informes/Especiales/2016\\_IE\\_gruposautodefensa.pdf](http://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Informes/Especiales/2016_IE_gruposautodefensa.pdf)

“In Mexico’s Tlatlaya massacre, soldiers were ordered to ‘take them out.’” Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). 2 July 2015. Accessed 23 Jan. 2016. Web.

[http://www.wola.org/news/in\\_mexico\\_s\\_tlatlaya\\_massacre\\_soldiers\\_were\\_ordered\\_to\\_take\\_the\\_m\\_out\\_0](http://www.wola.org/news/in_mexico_s_tlatlaya_massacre_soldiers_were_ordered_to_take_the_m_out_0)

“Insecurity Affects Tourists in BCS.” 11 April 2015. Web. Accessed 12 Jan. 2016.

<http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/04/insecurity-affects-tourists-in-bcs.html>

“Inseguridad en Durango es culpa de Coahuila: SS.” 15 May, 2015. Web. Accessed 12 Feb.

2016. [http://www.milenio.com/region/Crimen\\_Organizado-Secretaria\\_de\\_Seguridad\\_Durango-Roberto\\_Flores\\_Mier\\_0\\_512348972.html](http://www.milenio.com/region/Crimen_Organizado-Secretaria_de_Seguridad_Durango-Roberto_Flores_Mier_0_512348972.html)

“Intentan detener a vocero de autodefensa de San Gabriel Chilac.” 23 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed

20 Feb. 2016. <http://municipiospuebla.mx/nota/2014-01-23/tehuac%C3%A1n/intentan-detener-vocero-de-autodefensa-de-san-gabriel-chilac>

“It wasn’t one Ferrari; there are six.” 16 June, 2013. Web. Accessed 6 Dec. 2015.

<http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2013/06/it-wasnt-one-ferrari-there-are-six.html>

Jentzsch, Corinna, Stasis N. Kalyvas, and Livia I. Schubiger. “Militias in Civil Wars.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59.5 (2015): 755-769. Web. 13 April 2016.

Juarez, Pedro. “Surgen autodefensas en BCS.” Aug. 13, 2014. Cronica.com.mx. Web. Accessed

12 Jan. 2016. <http://www.cronica.com.mx/notas/2014/850655.html>

Kalyvas, Stathis N. *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Ana M. Arjona. 2005. “Paramilitarism: A Theoretical Perspective.”

“La inseguridad agobia a los duranguenses.” 3 Oct. 2013. Web. Accessed 16 Feb. 2016.

<https://www.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/noticia/919526.la-inseguridad-agobia-a-los-duranguenses.html>

Lakhani, Nina. “Tenancingo: the small town at the heart of Mexico’s dark sex-slave trade.” 4

April 2015. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016.

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/05/tenancingo-mexico-sex-slave-trade-america>

“La Tuta is taking refuge in the state of Colima: Semei Verdia.” 15 Jan. 2015. Web. Accessed 20

Feb. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/01/la-tuta-is-taking-refuge-in-state-of.html>

“Legislature asked to rescind ‘Bullet Act’ after 12-year old boy killed.” 22 July, 2014. Web.

Accessed 4 Mar. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/07/legislature-asked-to-rescind-bullet-act.html>

“Llamada Julio Ceballos a formar autodefensas en San Luis.” Lajornadasanluis.com.mx. 11 Aug.

2015. Web. Accessed 14 Jan 2016. <http://lajornadasanluis.com.mx/politica-y-sociedad/llama-julio-ceballos-a-formar-autodefensas-en-san-luis/>

Lohmuller, Michael. “Mexico Govt contracted businesses linked to Sinaloa Cartel.” 27 July,

2015. Web. Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexico-government-contracted-businesses-linked-to-sinaloa-cartel>

Loyola, Bernardo and Laura Woldenberg. "The Warrior State." 2013. Web. Accessed 29 Jan. 2016. <http://www.vice.com/video/the-warrior-state>

Madrigal, Alejandro. "Arman 'autodefensa' en SLP con machetes y palos." April 7, 2014. Web. Accessed 14 Jan. 2016. [http://www.milenio.com/policia/Arman-autodefensa-SLP-machetes-palos\\_0\\_276572368.html](http://www.milenio.com/policia/Arman-autodefensa-SLP-machetes-palos_0_276572368.html)

Malone, Mary Fran T. "The Verdict is In: The Impact of Crime on Public Trust in Central American Justice Systems." *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 2.3 (2010). 99-128. Web. Accessed 16 April, 2016.

Malone, Mary Fran T. *The Rule of Law in Central America: Citizens' Reactions to Crime and Punishment*. Bloomsbury, 2012. Print.

Malone, Mary Fran T. 2013. "Does Crime Undermine Public Support for Democracy? Findings from the Case of Mexico". *The Latin Americanist* 57(2): 17-44

"Mancera y delegados acuerdan evitar autodefensas en DF." 30 June 2014. Web. Accessed 5 Jan. 2016. <http://noticias.terra.com.mx/mexico/df/mancera-y-delegados-acuerdan-evitar-autodefensas-en-df,03006c5b1fde6410VgnVCM20000099cceb0aRCRD.html>

Martínez, Gabriela. "Se Gestan Grupos de Autodefensa en Baja California." 27 Mar. 2014. Web. Accessed 28 Dec. 2015. [http://www.milenio.com/region/gestan-grupos-defensa-Baja-California\\_0\\_269973109.html](http://www.milenio.com/region/gestan-grupos-defensa-Baja-California_0_269973109.html)

Martínez, Jorge. "Investigan Grupo de Autodefensa en Jalisco." 6 Nov. 2013. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. [http://www.milenio.com/policia/Investigan-grupo-autodefensa-Jalisco\\_0\\_185381733.html](http://www.milenio.com/policia/Investigan-grupo-autodefensa-Jalisco_0_185381733.html)

Martínez, Ulises Zamarroni. "Nahuas de Jalisco buscarán policía comunitaria." 11 Feb. 2013. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/902480.html>

"Mayor acknowledges autodefensas throughout Soledad Atzompa." [www.borderlandbeat.com](http://www.borderlandbeat.com). 5 July 2015. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/07/mayor-acknowledges-autodefensas.html>

Mazzei, Julie. "Death squads or self-defense forces? How paramilitary groups emerge and challenge democracy in Latin America." Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009. Print.

Mendez, Angel. "No hay permiso para que autodefensas michoacanos ingresen a Colima." 9 Jan. 2015. Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2016. <https://www.quadratin.com.mx/regiones/No-hay-permiso-para-que-autodefensas-michoacanos-ingresen-Colima/>

Mentado, Pedro. "Autodefensas, también en la Península de Yucatán." 12 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. <http://www.unioncancun.mx/articulo/2014/02/12/seguridad/autodefensas-tambien-en-la-peninsula-de-yucatan>

“Mexico: A cartel’s rise and inevitable fall.” Stratfor.com. 27 June, 2015. Web. Accessed 14 Jan. 2016. <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico-cartels-rise-and-inevitable-fall>

“Mexico: Alegaciones de desaparicion, tortura, y ejecucion extrajudicial del Sr. Gutierrez Lopez – Temor por Seguridad de Familiares.” Organizacion Mundial Contra la Tortura. 16 Sept. 2015. Web. Accessed 27 Jan. 2016.

Mexican Government. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografía. “Encuesta Nacional de Victimizacion y percepcion sobre seguridad publica (ENVIPE): 2015 principales resultados Durango.” 30 Sept. 2015. Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2016.

“Mexico Govt moves against vigilante leadership in Guerrero.” 18 Sept. 2013. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/mexico-authorities-move-against-vigilante-leaders-in-guerrero>

“Mexican mayor sacrificed herself to save family.” 5 Jan. 2016. Web. Accessed 26 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2016/01/mexican-mayor-sacrificed-herself-to.html>

“Mexican police helped cartel massacre 193 migrants, documents show.” 22 Dec. 2014. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://www.npr.org/2014/12/22/372579429/mexican-police-helped-cartel-massacre-193-migrants-documents-show>

“Mexico’s murdered and missing women.” 17 July, 2015. Web. Accessed 16 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/07/mexicos-missing-and-murdered-woment.html>

“Mexico: surgen grupos de autodefensa tras saeques en Baja California.” www.BBC.com. 19 Sept. 2014. Web. Accessed 28 Dec 2015. [http://www.bbc.com/mundo/ultimas\\_noticias/2014/09/140918\\_ultnot\\_mexico\\_odile\\_az](http://www.bbc.com/mundo/ultimas_noticias/2014/09/140918_ultnot_mexico_odile_az)

“Mexico Travel Warning.” U.S Department of State – Bureau of Consulate Affairs. Updated 19 Jan. 2016. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/mexico-travel-warning.html>

“Mexico’s Veracruz state rolls out new security operation.” www.laht.com. 2011. Web. Accessed 17 Jan. 2016. <http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=490684&CategoryId=14091>

Meyer, Maureen. “Mexico’s Police: Many reforms, little progress.” Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). May 2014. Web. Accessed 29 Jan. 2016. <http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Mexicos%20Police.pdf>

Meza, Silber. “Narcos in Mexico pay their taxes, too.” 1 April 2015. Web. Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/narcos-pay-their-taxes-too>

Miglierini, Julian. “Tamaulipas: ‘failed state’ in Mexico’s war on drugs.” 13 April. 2011. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13061452>

Monroy, David. “Organizacion reporta mas de 400 autodefensas en Morelos.” 29 July 2015. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. [http://www.milenio.com/policia/autodefensas\\_Morelos-comunitarios\\_Morelos-armas\\_defensa\\_Morelos\\_0\\_563343956.html](http://www.milenio.com/policia/autodefensas_Morelos-comunitarios_Morelos-armas_defensa_Morelos_0_563343956.html)

- “Morelos tops list of most violent states.” 11 Feb. 2015. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. [http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/02/morelos-tops-list-of-most-violent\\_11.html](http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/02/morelos-tops-list-of-most-violent_11.html)
- Moreno, Jose Carlos. “Mando Unico of Morelos: Organization that most violates human rights.” 1 Nov. 2015. Web. Accessed 1 Feb. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/11/mando-unico-of-morelos-organization.html>
- Mota Lopez, Dinorath. “Comunidad de Hidalgo arma su grupo de autodefensa.” El Universal. 2 March, 2015. Web. Accessed 6 December, 2015. <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2015/hidalgo-autodefensa-1081252.html>
- Mota Lopez, Dinorath. “Hidalgo Afirma que no permitirá autodefensas.” 9 Aug. 2013. Web. Accessed 6 Dec. 2015. <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2013/autodefensas-hidalgo-olvera-941467.html>
- Mota Lopez, Dinorath. “Surgen ‘vigilantes’ en Hidalgo.” El Universal. 14 March, 2015. Web. Accessed 6 December, 2015. <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2015/surgen-34vigilantes-34-en-hidalgo-1084520.html>
- Muñoz, José Fermin Ruiz Esparza. “Descarta gobierno estatal generación de autodefensas en comunidades de Aguascalientes.” 6 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 12 Feb. 2016. <http://www.lja.mx/2014/02/descarta-gobierno-estatal-generacion-de-autodefensas-en-comunidades-de-aguascalientes/>
- “Murder rate up in Nogales for 2014.” 7 Jan. 2015. Web. Accessed 15 Mar. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/01/murder-rate-up-in-nogales-for-2014.html>
- Murillo, Salvador Arellano. “Presentan Guardia Civil en Nayarit.” 22 June 2015. Web. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. [http://www.milenio.com/policia/guardia\\_civil-modelo\\_policial\\_Nayarit-nueva\\_policia\\_Nayarit\\_0\\_541146153.html](http://www.milenio.com/policia/guardia_civil-modelo_policial_Nayarit-nueva_policia_Nayarit_0_541146153.html)
- Nájar, Alberto and Juan Paullier. “Ecatepec: como es vivir en el peor lugar para ser mujer en todo Mexico.” BBC Mundo. 21 Sept. 2015. Web. Accessed 13 Feb. 2016.
- “Narco banner: Templarios threaten enemies in Puebla.” 5 Aug. 2014. Web. Accessed 4 Mar. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/08/narco-banner-templarios-threaten.html>
- Navarro, Maritza. “Rechazan que en SRJ existan autodefensas.” Web. 25 Jan. 2014. Accessed 23 Dec. 2015. <http://www.eluniversalqueretaro.mx/metropoli/25-01-2014/rechazan-que-en-srj-existan-autodefensas>
- “Nayarit Update.” 17 Jan. 2012. Web. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/01/nayarit-update.html>
- Negrete, Sofia. “Gobernador niega que haya autodefensas en Guanajuato.” 29 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 24 Jan. 2016. [http://www.milenio.com/politica/Gobernador-niega-autodefensas-Guanajuato\\_0\\_235776537.html](http://www.milenio.com/politica/Gobernador-niega-autodefensas-Guanajuato_0_235776537.html)

- “No hay autodefensas en San Luis Potosi: gobierno.” SDP Noticias. 9 April 2014. Web. Accessed 14 Jan. 2016. <http://www.sdpnoticias.com/estados/2014/04/09/no-hay-autodefensas-en-san-luis-potosi-gobierno>
- “No hay autodefensas en Sinaloa, solo son rumores.” Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://www.oem.com.mx/elsoldemazatlan/notas/n3280622.htm>
- Noria, Antonio. “En Zacatecas existen las condiciones para crear autodefensas: El Barzon.” 29 July 2014. Web. Accessed 23 Jan. 2016. <http://elbarzon.mx/2014/07/en-zacatecas-existen-las-condiciones-para-crear-autodefensas-el-barzon/>
- Olmos, Jose Gil. “Nightmare Street: Mexico State.” Proceso via Borderland Beat. 6 Feb. 2013. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2013/02/nightmare-street-state-of-mexico.html>
- “Operation Baja California.” 14 July 2010. Web. Accessed 2 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2010/07/operation-baja-california.html>
- “Organizaciones sociales aseguran que existen autodefensas en Zacatecas.” 20 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 24 Jan. 2016. <http://zacatecashoy.com/noticias/organizaciones-sociales-aseguran-que-existen-autodefensas-en-zacatecas/>
- Osorio, Alberto. “En Jalisco se gestan autodefensas.” Proceso.com. 3 May, 2014. Accessed 7 December, 2015. Web. <http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=371289>
- Osorio, Javier, Livia Schubiger, and Michael Weintraub. “Vigilante Mobilization and Local Order: Evidence from Mexico.” 30 Jan. 2016. Web. Accessed 15 April, 2016.
- Pachico, Elyssa. “Beltran Levya, Zetas battling Sinaloa Cartel in Baja California Sur.”
- Padilla, Liliana and Felipe Larios. “Combaten a criminales ‘autodefensas’...desarmadas.” 3 July 2015. Web. Accessed 20 Jan. 2016. [http://www.milenio.com/policia/Combaten-criminales-autodefensas-desarmadas-Cajeme-Sonora-red-vecinal-inseguridad\\_0\\_476952337.html](http://www.milenio.com/policia/Combaten-criminales-autodefensas-desarmadas-Cajeme-Sonora-red-vecinal-inseguridad_0_476952337.html)
- “Papalota, Tlaxcala: guardias de autodefensa se extienden al centro del pais por la inseguridad y la corrupcion.” 8 Aug. 2013. Web. Accessed 5 Jan. 2016. <http://www.sinembargo.mx/08-08-2013/713263>
- “Part 1: El Mencho replaces La Tuta for control of Michoacán.” 29 March 2015. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/03/el-mencho-replaces-la-tuta-for-control.html>
- “PGR reporta aparacion de autodefensas en Veracruz.” animalpolitico.com. 20 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.animalpolitico.com/2013/02/pgr-reporta-aparicion-de-autodefensa-en-veracruz-gobierno-del-estado-lo-niega/>
- Pigeonutt, Vania. “Reunion de autodefensas deja 16 muertos en Guerrero.” 8 June 2015. Web. Accessed 29 Jan. 2016. <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion-mexico/2015/impreso/reunion-de-autodefensas-deja-16-muertos-en-guerrero-226767.html>

- “Presentation of El Taliban, He had an Alliance with CDG.” 27 Sept. 2012. Web. Accessed 12 Feb. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/09/presentation-of-el-taliban.html>
- “Pena’s security plan starts to take form.” 22 Dec. 2012. Web. Accessed 12. Feb. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/12/penas-security-plan-starts-to-take-form.html>
- “Police intent on extortion and kidnapping.” 19 Jan. 2015. Web. Accessed 14 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/01/police-intent-on-extortion-and.html>
- “Police investigator decapitated in Tabasco.” 6 Jan. 2011. Web. Accessed 5 Dec. 2015. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/01/police-investigator-decapitated-in.html>
- “Queman patrullas e intentan linchar a policias de Canada Morelos en Veracruz.” [www.diariocambio.mx](http://www.diariocambio.mx). 17 June 2015. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://www.diariocambio.com.mx/2015/regiones/los-llanos-y-teziutlan/item/11268-queman-patrullas-e-intentan-linchar-a-policias-de-canada-morelos-en-veracruz-fotos>
- “Que no hay autodefensas en Los Cabos.” [Peninsulardigital.mx](http://peninsulardigital.com). 19 Sept. 2014. Web. Accessed 14 Jan. 2016. <http://peninsulardigital.com/sucesos/que-hay-autodefensas-en-los-cabos/154608>
- Quiles, Alfredo. “Autodefensas en Colima intentan apoderarse de Zapotan.” 12 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 5 Jan. 2016. <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2014/autodefensas-en-colima-intentan-apoderarse-de-zapotan-978963.html>
- Ramsey, Geoffrey. “Inside Mexico’s Golden Triangle.” 31 Aug. 2012. Web. Accessed 18 Feb. 2016. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/inside-the-golden-triangle>
- Retano, Brisa. “Violencia en Sonora provoca que families terminen en albergues.” 8 May, 2015. Web. Accessed 17 Feb. 2016. <http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/violencia-en-sonora-provoca-que-familias-terminen-en-albergues.html>
- Reyes, Eulalio. “Surge grupo de autodefensa en Ozumba, Estado de Mexico.” [elfinanciero.com](http://www.elfinanciero.com). 11 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/politica/surge-grupo-de-autodefensa-en-ozumba-estado-de-mexico.html>
- Reyez, Laura. “Los pobladores de cuatro estados optan por la autodefensa civil.” [CNNMexico](http://mexico.cnn.com). 20 February, 2013. Accessed 5 December, 2015. Web. <http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2013/02/20/los-pobladores-de-cuatro-estados-optan-por-la-autodefensa-civil>
- Riesenfeld, Lauren. “Cuernavaca now Mexico’s ‘most dangerous city.’” [Insightcrime.org](http://www.insightcrime.org). 12 Feb. 2015. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/cuernavaca-now-mexico-most-dangerous-city>
- Rivera, Astrid. 27 Mar. 2014. “Surgen en Sonora autodefensas.” Web. Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2014/impreso/surgen-en-sonora-autodefensas-94295.html>

- Rodriguez, Jose Francisco Gallardo. "Paramilitares." 31 Aug. 2015. Web. Accessed 24 Jan. 2016. <http://www.diariodecolima.com/2015/08/31/paramilitares-2/>
- Rodriguez, Oscar. "Autodefensas de Oaxaca estan vinculados con el crimen organizado: SSP – estatal." 3 April, 2014. Accessed 4 December, 2015. Web. [http://www.milenio.com/estados/autodefensas-Oaxaca-trabajos-seguridad\\_0\\_256174499.html](http://www.milenio.com/estados/autodefensas-Oaxaca-trabajos-seguridad_0_256174499.html)
- Rodriguez, Oscar. "Crean Grupos de Autodefensa en zona triqui, en Oaxaca." Milenio. 2 February, 2015. Accessed 4 December, 2015. Web. [http://www.milenio.com/estados/Crean\\_grupos\\_de\\_autodefensa\\_en\\_zona\\_triqui-en\\_Oaxaca\\_0\\_457154487.html](http://www.milenio.com/estados/Crean_grupos_de_autodefensa_en_zona_triqui-en_Oaxaca_0_457154487.html)
- Rosagel, Shalia. "Autodefensas podrian ser un 'experimento' del gobierno, y semillero de grupos paramilitares: especialistas." 15 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 28 Jan. 2016. <http://www.sinembargo.mx/15-01-2014/873016>
- Ruiz, Eduardo Jose Cabera. "Nuevos grupos de autodefensa... ahora en Yucatan." 20 March, 2013. Web. Accessed 27 Dec. 2015. <http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2013/03/20/889989>
- Ruiz-Palacios, Fanny. 25 Feb. 2014. "Niegan presencia de autodefensas en Magdalena Contreras." Web. Accessed 20 Jan. 2016. <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/ciudad-metropoli/2014/niega-ssp-pdf-presencia-autodefensas-magdalena-contreras-990495.html>
- Salcedo, Jaime. "Tabasco, el primer lugar por robo con violencia." May 19, 2015. Web. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2015/05/19/1024885>
- Samaniego, Raúl Llanos. "En el DF no hay grupos de autodefensa y no vamos a permitir que proliferen: Rodríguez Almeida." 30 June 2014. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/ultimas/2014/06/30/en-el-df-no-hay-grupos-de-autodefensa-y-no-vamos-a-permitir-que-proliferen-ssp-df-4065.html>
- Sanchez, Korina S. "Arranca trabajos grupo de autodefensa en BC." 17 Mar. 2014. Web. Accessed 14 Jan. 2016. [http://www.milenio.com/region/Arranca-trabajos-grupo-autodefensa-BC\\_0\\_263973855.html](http://www.milenio.com/region/Arranca-trabajos-grupo-autodefensa-BC_0_263973855.html)
- Santana, Rosa. "Amenazan con replicar en Campeche grupos de autodefensa, como en Guerrero." 7 Feb. 2013. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://www.proceso.com.mx/332999/amenazan-con-replicar-en-campeche-grupos-de-autodefensa-como-en-guerrero>
- Santiesteban, Julián. "Autodefensa Quintanarroense." 2014. Web. Accessed 10 Jan. 2016. <http://www.periodistasquintanaroo.com/columnistas/autodefensa-quintanarroense/>
- "Se gestan grupos de defense civil en Baja California." March 27, 2014. Milenio.com. Web. Accessed 12 Jan. 2016. [http://www.milenio.com/region/gestan-grupos-defensa-Baja-California\\_0\\_269973109.html](http://www.milenio.com/region/gestan-grupos-defensa-Baja-California_0_269973109.html)

- “Self-defense groups extend to the center of the country due to insecurity and corruption.” 10 Aug. 2013. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2013/08/self-defense-groups-extend-to-center-of.html>
- “The Sinaloa Cartel.” Web. Accessed 18 Feb. 2016. <http://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/sinaloa-cartel-profile>
- “Sinaloa Cartel cleaning plazas in Colima.” 15 Oct. 2015. Web. Accessed 21 Feb. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/10/sinaloa-cartel-cleaning-plazas-in-colima.html>
- “Sinaloa: Mexican Navy helicopter attacked by gunfire.” 26 Dec, 2015. Web. Accessed 27 Jan, 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/12/sinaloa-mexican-navy-helicopter-shot.html>
- “Shootout in Zacatecas signals possible increase in violence.” 17 Dec. 2014. Web. Accessed 12 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/12/shootout-in-zacatecas-possibly-signals.html>
- Solano, Margarita. “Grupos de autodefensas, un virus que se extiende en Mexico.” 28 Sept. 2013. Web. Accessed 18 Feb. 2016. <http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/internacional/noticias/grupos-autodefensas-virus-extiende-mexico>
- “Sontoya, Sonora: Border Violence Erupts as ‘Los Memos’ and ‘Los Salazar’ clash for control.” 13 June, 2015. Web. Accessed 15 Mar. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/06/sonoyta-sonora-border-violence-erupts.html>
- Staniland, Paul. “Militias, Ideology, and the State.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59.5 (2015): 770-793. Web. Accessed 16 April, 2016.
- “Surgen autodefensas en Sonora, su lider es Francisco Villa.” 5 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 20 Jan. 2016. <http://www.sopitas.com/286316-surgen-autodefensas-en-sonora-su-lider-es-francisco-villa/>
- “Surge autodefensas en Tlaxcala.” 22 Feb. 2013. Web. Accessed 24 Jan. 2016. <https://www.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/noticia/842711.surge-autodefensa-en-tlaxcala.html>
- “Supuestos autodefensas intentan linchar a ladrones en Tabasco.” 29 Oct. 2015. Web. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://contextodedurango.com.mx/noticias/2015/10/29/supuestos-autodefensas-intentan-linchar-a-ladrones-en-tabasco/>
- “Surge Grupo de Autodefensa Ciudadana en Frontera Chiapaneca.” 17 Aug. 2014. Web. Accessed 27 Jan. 2016. <http://www.proceso.com.mx/379771>
- “Surgen grupos de autodefensa en Morelos y el Estado de Mexico.” 13 Feb. 2013. Accessed 23 Jan. 2016. <http://www.univision.com/noticias/noticias-de-mexico/surgen-grupos-de-autodefensa-en-morelos-y-el-estado-de-mexico>
- “Surgen grupos de autodefensa en Quintana Roo.” *Periodistasquintanaroo.com*. 1 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 10 Jan. 2016. <http://www.periodistasquintanaroo.com/notas/surgen-grupos-de-autodefensa-en-quintana-roo/>

“Sustiene gobernador: en Colima no hay autodefensas.” 30 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 24 Jan. 2016. <http://gobiernocolima.blogspot.com/2014/01/sostiene-gobernador-en-colima-no-hay.html>

“Tabasco ocupa el primer lugar de inseguridad en sureste del país.” 18 July, 2013. Web. Accessed 17 Dec. 2015. <http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2013/07/18/909532>

“Tamaulipas: the narco counter-attack.” 28 April 2015. Web. Accessed 29 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/04/tamaulipas-narco-counter-attack.html>

“También en Edomex brotan grupos civiles de autodefensa.” Proceso. Proceso.com, 13 February, 2014. Web. 20 November, 2015. <http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=333555>

Tambory, Sam. 7 Oct. 2015. Web. Accessed 10 Feb. 2016. “Rural Chihuahua, Mexico still battle zone for cartels.” <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/murders-drop-rural-chihuahua-still-cartel-battleground>

Thomas, Lupita and Quadratin, Agencia. “Anuncian formación de grupos de autodefensa en Oaxaca.” El Universal. 12 January, 2015. Accessed 4 December, 2015. Web. <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2015/auncian-formacion-de-grupos-de-autodefensa-en-oaxaca-1068152.html>

Tizcareno, Christian Rea. “La violencia y la "fragilidad del Estado" han obligado a diversos grupos de la sociedad mexicana a diseñar sus propios mecanismos de defensa.” 9 Feb. 2014. Web. Accessed 27 Jan. 2016. <http://noticias.terra.com.mx/mexico/autodefensas-una-respuesta-a-la-violencia-en-un-estado-fallido,b248e0e035914410VgnVCM5000009ccceb0aRCRD.html>

Tonantzin, Pedro. “En Morelos ilegales las autodefensas, advierte a Mireles.” 12 May. 2014. Web. Accessed 1 Feb. 2016. <http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2014/05/12/958915>

Torres, Alberto. “El silencio, un manto que envuelve a San Fernando.” 21 March 2012. Web. Accessed 29 Jan. 2016. <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/194129.html>

Torrez, Elda. “Linchan a ladronzuelo y lo iban a quemar vivo en Cardenas.” 15 October 2015. Web. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://www.tabascohoy.com/nota/275055>

Townes, Carimah. “Corruption and a highly militarized police force create a toxic stew in Mexico.” 31 Oct. 2014. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2016. <http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/10/31/3585506/mexico-problems-are-not-going-away-soon/>

Tuckman, Jo. “Mexican vigilantes take on drug cartels – and worry authorities.” 28 Oct. 2013. Web. Accessed 22 Nov. 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/28/mexican-militias-vigilantes-drug-cartels>

United States. Drug Enforcement Agency. *El Mapa de la DEA*. 2015. Web.

United States. Drug Enforcement Agency. March 2015: *New cartel map, including Zeta and CDG cells in Tamaulipas*. 2015. Web.

“The Unnamed of Calderon leave their mark.” 29 Oct. 2012. Web. Accessed 5 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/10/the-unnamed-of-calderon-leave-their-mark.html>

- Valdez, Victor Manuel Sanchez. "La geographia de las autodefensas." 28 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://www.animalpolitico.com/blogeros-causa-en-comun/2014/01/28/la-geografia-de-las-autodefensas/>
- Vega, Mario. "Asegura líder campesino que van en aumento los grupos de autodefensa." 15 April 2015. Web. Accessed 23 Jan. 2016. <http://www.launion.com.mx/morelos/cuautla/noticias/69971-asegura-lider-campesino-que-van-en-aumento-los-grupos-de-autodefensa.html>
- "Veracruz y Campeche tienen autodefensas." elsiglodetorreon.mx. 15 Mar. 2013. Web. Accessed 11 Jan. 2016. <https://www.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/noticia/849668.veracruz-y-campeche-tienen-autodefensas.html>
- "Veracruz: Zetas send warning of pending bloodbath." 29 June, 2013. Web. Accessed 4 Mar. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2013/06/veracruz-zetas-send-warning-of-pending.html>
- "Video: police flee as sicarios carry out execution." Web. Accessed 14 Feb. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2016/02/videopolice-flee-as-sicarios-carry-out.html>
- "Vigilante group pulls out of Mexico Town." Web. Accessed 29 Jan. 2016. <http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=726646&CategoryId=10718>
- Villa, Itzel. "Autodefensas en Veracruz, resultado de la desconfianza en el ejercito." www.elfinanciero.mx. 5 May 2014. Web. Accessed 11 Jan. 2016. <http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/sociedad/autodefensas-en-veracruz-resultado-de-la-desconfianza-en-el-ejercito.html>
- "The voices of the indigenous autodefensa in Santa Maria Ostula." 11 June 2014. Web. Accessed 21 Feb 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/06/the-voices-of-indigenous-autodefensa-in.html>
- Webber, Judy. "A deadly new enemy in Mexico's drugs war." Financial Times. Ft.com. 8 May, 2015. Web. Accessed 4 Jan, 2016. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f5baea0e-f499-11e4-9a58-00144feab7de.html#axzz3wIf8QNQN>
- Webber, Judy. "Third Mexican midterm election candidate murdered." 14 May, 2015. Web. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <https://next.ft.com/content/675b799a-fac0-11e4-9aed-00144feab7de>
- Wilkinson, Tracey. "Mexican authorities arrest a top Zetas cartel leader." 27 Sept. 2012. The Los Angeles Times. Web. Accessed 17 Jan. 2016. <http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/27/world/la-fg-mexico-zetas-20120928>
- Wilkinson, Tracy. "Sinaloa, one of Mexico's most violent states, limits crime coverage." 1 Aug. 2014. Web. Accessed 26 Dec. 2015. <http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-sinaloa-reporters-20140801-story.html>
- Wilkinson, Tracy. "Third priest killed this year in Mexico's Guerrero state." 27 Dec. 2014. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-third-priest-killed-mexico-guerrero-20141227-story.html>

Xochipa, Juana. “Advierte gobernador: Tlaxcala no tolerara autodefensas.” 9 Aug. 2013. Web. Accessed 5 Jan. 2016. <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2013/tlaxcala-gobernador-autodefensas-941485.html>

“Zacatecas violence continues, security forces targeted.” 4 Sept. 2014. Web. Accessed 23 Jan. 2016. <http://www.mexicogulfreporter.com/2014/09/zacatecas-violence-continues-security.html>

“Zacatecas: Zetas exerting power.” 26 July, 2015. Web. Accessed 12 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/07/zacatecas-zetas-exerting-power.html#more>

“Zacatecas: Zetas narcomantas appear in Fresnillo.” 23 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 12 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/01/zacatecaszetas-narcomantas-appear-in.html>

Zamudio, Isabel. “‘Autodefensas’ de Veracruz rechazan entregar las armas.” Milenio.com. 7 July 2015. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. [http://www.milenio.com/policia/Autodefensas-Veracruz-rechazan-entregar-armas-delitos-plagios-extorsiones\\_0\\_556744353.html](http://www.milenio.com/policia/Autodefensas-Veracruz-rechazan-entregar-armas-delitos-plagios-extorsiones_0_556744353.html)

“Zetas: thousands of bones found at Nuevo Leon narco ranch.” 1 Sept. 2015. Web. Accessed 18 Feb. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/09/zetas-thousands-of-bones-found-at-nuevo.html>

“1 year, 133 dead in the war between Los 28, Los Pepillos and Los Montoya.” 14 Aug. 2015. Web. Accessed 13 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/08/1-year-133-dead-in-war-between-los-28.html>

“7 reported killed: blockades and violence in Jalisco amid rumors of possible El Mencho capture.” 1 May 2015. Web. Accessed 19 Feb. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/05/7-reported-killed-blockades-and.html>

“11 Detained in Sontoya, Members of Cartel Los Salazar.” 26 June 2015. Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/06/11-detained-in-sonoyta-members-of.html>

“11 Zetas gunmen arrested in southeast Mexico.” 23 May, 2011. Web. Accessed 6 Dec. 2015. <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2011/05/23/11-zetas-gunmen-arrested-southeast-mexico/>

“16 killed in Mexican resort town during shootout involving vigilante groups.” FoxLatino. 8 June, 2015. Accessed 6 December, 2015. Web. <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2015/06/07/16-killed-in-community-police-shootout-in-mexican-resort/>

“22 policemen linked to Los Zetas are arrested.” 3 Dec. 2011. Web. Accessed 6 Dec. 2015. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/12/22-policemen-linked-to-los-zetas-are.html>

“2015 Mexico Peace Index.” 8 April, 2015. Web. Accessed 25 Jan. 2016. <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/04/2015-mexico-peace-index.html>

## Appendix – State Code Sheets

## Appendix Table of Contents

Master Code Book -----	57-61
Aguascalientes -----	62-63
Baja California -----	64-65
Baja California Sur -----	66-67
Campeche -----	68-69
Coahuila -----	70-71
Colima -----	72-74
Chiapas -----	75-76
Chihuahua -----	77-78
Distrito Federal (DF) -----	79-80
Durango -----	81-82
Guanajuato -----	83-84
Guerrero -----	85-87
Hidalgo -----	88-89
Jalisco -----	90-91
Mexico -----	92-94
Michoacán -----	95-98
Morelos -----	99-101
Nayarit -----	102-103
Nuevo Leon -----	104-106
Oaxaca -----	107-108
Puebla -----	109-111
Queretaro -----	112-113
Quintana Roo -----	114-115
San Luis Potosi -----	116-117
Sinaloa -----	118-119
Sonora -----	120-121
Tabasco -----	122-123

Taumalipas -----	124-126
Tlaxcala -----	127-128
Veracruz -----	129-131
Yucatan -----	132-133
Zacatecas -----	134-135

## Master Code-Book

*state* – name of state

*number* – rough amount of autodefensas in state

- N = none (0)
- F = few (1-2)
- S = some (3-4)
- M = many (5 +)
- U = unknown, but autodefensas exist

*type* – type of autodefensas in state

- N/A = no autodefensas present
- Non-Registered (Autodefensas):
  - W = Neighborhood watch
    - An unregistered civilian group that is lightly armed or not armed at all. Primary stated purpose is to maintain order and safety in the community, generally without the use of violence. Not a threat to the state.
  - A = Anti-drug violence
    - An unregistered group of civilians whose purpose is to prevent or mitigate drug violence, using violent means against cartel members if necessary. Armed, but not with semi-automatic or automatic weapons. Could be a potential threat, but is less inclined to levy negative commentary against the state or engage in political actions against it.
  - P = Pseudo police force
    - An unregistered civilian group that may possess very heavy firepower, as obtained from the drug cartels. Primary stated purpose is to protect the community or locals, but also metes out significant extra-judicial punishments and may take the place of government agents in terms of policing and safety. Sprung from a need to protect the local populace in the lack of government aid, may be hostile or negative towards government actions, using political rhetoric.
- Registered (Rurales):
  - G = Government-backed defense force
    - The group has registered with a list of its weapons and members, but it did not assimilate into any official government group.
  - M = Mexican-army or police factions
    - The group has been assimilated into official arms of the Mexican police or army.

*rhetoric* – tone of government regarding autodefensas

- S = supportive
  - The government publically supports the actions of the autodefensas and provides them with both symbolic and physical support (e.g. weaponry, food, protection).
- P = positive
  - The government voices understanding for the concern of the groups and welcomes their presence as keepers of the peace, but does not move beyond symbolic support.
- C = cautious
  - The government states that it is reviewing the actions and presence of the militia groups, voicing understanding of their concerns. They have not yet reached a consensus on how to approach the groups.
- I = inconsistent
  - The government or officials at times profess support for the *autodefensas* (when politically convenient); at other times, the government vilifies the civilian militias or actively tries to shut them down. Or Federal gov't treats differently from State gov't.
- N = negative
  - The government or government officials accuse the *autodefensas* of being negatively motivated, particularly alleging abuse of power or calling them criminals (on the grounds of bucking the government's orders, not being members of a cartel). Alternatively, they may deny that an alleged self-defense group actually exists. In absence of *autodefensas*, this is the state gov't message about these groups in other states – cautionary.
- H = hostile
  - The government or officials are accusing *autodefensas* of being affiliated with the cartels or involved in murder of civilians; any violent threat of removal also falls under this category.

*civauto* – civilian attitudes towards autodefensas

- S = supportive
  - Civilians cite specific ways in which their living conditions have improved since the *autodefensas* appeared. They may physically protect or hide members of the civilian militias, and they might intervene against the local or federal government on the part of the *autodefensas*.
- P = positive
  - Civilians prefer the condition of having autodefensas in their area to the condition in which they do not exist. While they may not actively state that there has been an improvement in the standard of living because of the autodefensas, they may reference the fact that hitmen or drug cartel

activities are less prevalent. They might also support the notion of self-defense groups from an ideological or legal standpoint. However, they do not physically protect members of the militias that are under attack.

- C = cautious
  - Civilians perceive the *autodefensas* as justice-seeking, but conforming to the general inclination to violence, so they are not sure whether to support the groups. They may alternatively simply distrust the groups, for lack of knowing whom to trust.
- I = indifferent/unsure
  - Civilians have not expressed any positive or negative sentiments towards these groups, for lack of knowing whom to trust or because their presence seems negligible.
- N = negative
  - Civilians may express the belief that the *autodefensas* should disarm; they may also express fear as to the groups' intentions. They view these groups as extrajudicial and therefore potentially dangerous.
- H = hostile
  - Civilians demand that the *autodefensas* disarm, perceive them as working for the drug cartels, or express that conditions have worsened since these groups appeared. They might also actively engage in physical attempts to stop or remove the *autodefensas*.

*civgov* – civilian attitudes towards government authorities

- S = supportive
  - Civilians strongly believe that the government can protect and provide for them, or at least that government officials are the most righteous actors in the area. Citizens may go out of their way to support the authorities with shows of support and solidarity, up to providing physical aid to government actors in need.
- P = positive
  - Civilians have faith in the government and its ability to provide them with protection and services. This support may be manifested through speech and measures of public contentment, but does not extend to political demonstrations or physical intervention on the part of the government.
- B = bypassing
  - Civilians do not believe that the government can protect them, but they are willing to formally ask the government's permission before acting. They may reach an informal understanding with government officials so that they can act unilaterally, with the knowledge that the government will look the other way.
- C = cautious

- Civilians are not certain of the government's motives or alignments; they do not support or denounce anyone in power, for fear of uncertain results. In this situation, the civilians express may fear or refuse to talk to reporters.
- N = negative
  - Civilians do not trust the government to protect or provide for them, even believing many of them to be working for the drug cartels. Protests against the government would fall under this category: there are significant levels of fear and anger towards the government, but this does not escalate beyond very minimal physical manifestations.
- H = hostile
  - Civilians do not trust the government, and believe them to be corrupt (e.g. working for the cartels), to the extent that they openly engage in hostilities that may escalate to physical engagements [fights, brawls, shootings].

*interact* – nature of interactions between autodefensas and government authorities

- N/A = no autodefensas present
- I = Integration
  - The autodefensas have registered and been integrated into an official arm of the Mexican police or the state police.
- P = partnership
  - The autodefensas have registered and attained some level of legitimacy from the government, but they have not been assimilated into an official police group; they are Rurales.
- U = unilateral activity
  - The government may give tacit approval to the actions of the autodefensas and “turn a blind eye.” Alternatively, the groups may simply be acting on their own. There may be an appeal for recognition in the works, but the autodefensas have not yet registered with the government.
- A = avoidance
  - The autodefensas and the authorities are aware of each other's presence in the state but they actively try to avoid engagements with each other. This includes minimal contact physically, but also minimal rhetoric being aimed at the other group.
- N = no interaction
  - Neither the government nor the civilian militia group has had contact with each other, nor is each party acknowledging the other.
- C = clashes
  - The autodefensas refuse to register and hand over their weapons; fights between the two parties are largely the product of the distrust inherent to the refusal to disarm.
- H = hostilities

- The autodefensas refuse to register, and they actively engage in attacks or fights with authorities. Lynching, armed conflict, abduction, roadblocks, and other forms of aggression or attempted interference between the two parties qualify a state for an “H” rating. If the authorities have sent troops to deal with the autodefensas, this also qualifies.

*control* – which type of organization controls state territory?

- C = Cartels
  - The cartels have control over the region, providing the citizens with services and security, although this does not have to be one single cartel with total power. In this circumstance, the government is likely very corrupt, the civilians are terrified of the cartels, and there is little to no opposition from any actor besides rival cartels.
- G = Government
  - The government has control over the region, using its power to keep either the cartels or the militias down, or possibly both. It is possible that militias have not risen in this area because there is no need for them.
- S = Self-governing civilians
  - The citizens have control in the region, and they unilaterally decide to support or form groups regardless of what the state or federal government would have them do. The citizens here are more than capable of defending themselves, as well, and may have had clashes with the government. The civilians are providing their own security, essentially.
- U = unknown
- CVG = Cartels and Government
  - The government, possibly in conjunction with the autodefensas, is going head-to-head with the cartels, on the offensive, and/or is attempting to prevent their spread on the defensive. Security and services might be currently obtained from either entity.
- CVS = Cartels and Citizens
  - The citizens have denounced the government and are aware that they must address their own safety, going so far as to arm themselves heavily. In this case, they may be going on the offensive and attacking the cartels.
- A = Anarchy
  - There is no clear leader in the situation, and there is also extensive violence. Here, there may be multiple cartels fighting for territory, the government might be contending with the cartels, or the militias might be.

## Aguascalientes Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - The Secretary of Government for Aguascalientes denied that there were any autodefensas in the state. In particular, he asserted that Aguascalientes did not have the conditions needed for these groups to form, in terms of its terrain and the government meeting the needs of the citizens. He also suggested that those who claim to be civilian defense groups in the state are likely to be factions of gangs or similar criminal organizations, but he did not make this a blanket statement for all militia groups. There is a distinct fear of criminals leaving other states to come to Aguascalientes in a demonstration of the “cockroach effect,” due to the activity in Michoacán and Guerrero.
- **Number of *autodefensas***
  - **N = none (0)**
  - The New York (Osorio) data set indicates that there were no *autodefensas* in Aguascalientes at the end of 2013. The lack of reports regarding *autodefensas* supports this notion, as the Mexican government did not officially recognize the existence of any civilian militias in Aguascalientes during 2014 or 2015; similarly, *Animal Politico* did not report any *autodefensas*.
- **Civilian attitudes towards *autodefensas***
  - **N = negative**
  - According to several opinion pieces, there seems to be a reticence towards the autodefensas in other areas of the country, largely due to uncertainty regarding their motives, and a fear of what the situation could become. Michoacán is not seen as a particularly good outcome, as it grew far beyond the control of the state or federal governments, and now the officials cannot force the groups to lay down their weapons.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **C = cautious**
  - There were no assertions of serious police corruption, although bribery was referenced several times as an issue. Very little civilian opinion towards the authorities in this state was reported. However, due to the fact that there were no positive comments, either, it is appropriate to label this state as “cautious.” This is supported by the ENVIPE results.
  - According to the ENVIPE survey results for Aguascalientes, 11.1% of all crimes were reported in 2015, just over the national average of 10.7%. The state exhibited significantly lower levels of insecurity than national levels, however; currently, 43.2% of citizens indicated that they felt insecure in their state, as opposed to 73.2% nationally. These results indicate that there is some measure of conflicting civilian opinions towards the authorities: the citizens feel safer in their state, but they still do not demonstrate significantly higher levels of confidence in their crime reporting rates.

- **Type of autodefensas + level of armament**
  - N/A
- **Interactions between *autodefensas* and authorities**
  - N/A
- **Who's in control?**
  - **G = government**
  - The government appears to be in control, with significant ability to provide services, particularly protection; this is predicated partially on the information above that indicates positive civilian perceptions of security. Additionally, Aguascalientes has been one of several states proactively taking steps to mitigate the spread of drug violence, in working with the Mexican armed forces to set up checkpoints and roadblocks during times of significant unrest. This was also the only state to have complied with confidence testing of its employees in 2011, when the federal government requested it. These signs, as well as the information below, suggest that the government at least has the upper hand for control in this region.
  - The only United States travel warning for this area applies to traveling between cities at night, which is relatively mild in comparison to many other states in Mexico. The most recent DEA map shows that Aguascalientes is in the tentative control of the CJNG; however, three other cartels also have cells in the state. Despite this, there is very little media information depicting major cartel violence in Aguascalientes; there have been several small shoot-outs, but these have been focused killings between cartel members. There was little indication that civilian killings go on with impunity.

## Baja California Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **Negative**
  - In the BBC article regarding civilian self-defense against looting after a hurricane, the federal police are quoted as saying that they would restore order “with severity.” This was in response to isolated incidents of shopkeepers guarding their stores against looters with rifles. In other articles, politicians held the view that the civilian militias were extra-judicial, and therefore illegal. There was little commentary otherwise about the prospect of autodefensas, whether in Baja California or elsewhere.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **S = Some (3-4)**
  - A 2014 *Milenio* article asserts that there are 3 to 4 community policing organizations towards the North of the state, formed against police brutality, robbery, violent assaults, and organized crime. Although drug cartels were not explicitly stated here, it seems reasonable to draw such a conclusion based on the reputation of the area and the nature of the police violence, which is commonly connected to cartel power. The fact that these groups are forming in Tijuana also adds to this assumption, as it is a border town (these often see significant drug violence and trafficking). One of these groups is located in the community of Villa del Campo, another in Valle de Las Palmas, and a third in Mexicali (the capital of Baja California).
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **P = positive**
  - Numerous communities in the south of the state have expressed interest towards the activity of *autodefensas* in Michoacán, and have drawn parallels towards their own situation in Baja California, supporting the notion of civilian defense militias in the lack of the government’s ability to provide security.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - A commonly repeated sentiment throughout research for this state was that the citizens did not feel safe, and that the government could not protect or provide for them. Recent incidents with municipal police kidnapping civilians and attempting to extort them has not improved this sentiment.
  - Surprisingly, ENVIPE results show that 15.1% of crimes are reported in Baja California, significantly higher than the 10.7% national average. Public perceptions of insecurity are also much lower than the national average, with only 53.2% of respondents asserting that they felt unsafe as compared to the national average of 73.2%.
- **Type of autodefensas + Level of armament**
  - **W = neighborhood watch**

- The groups are unarmed or armed with implements such as machetes, but they intend to conduct arrests. However, they do not intend to take up arms, as they perceive this as being outside the law.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **N = no interaction**
  - There has been minimal contact between the authorities and the *autodefensas*, although it should be noted that the authorities have admitted their inability to assist the citizens of Baja California.
- **Who's in control?**
  - **A = anarchy**
  - According to the US Travel warning for the state, there are ongoing turf wars between the cartels in this area. The government is clearly corrupt and lacks the resources needed to care for its people, particularly in regard to the police force (it faced a deficit of almost 3000 police in its two largest cities alone). It tries to maintain a semblance of order, but Operation Baja California (with the Mexican military) has not fully mitigated cartel violence in the area. It is also plagued by both municipal police extortion and targeting of women. It is unclear whether the cartels have control here, or the government; it seems certain that the civilians don't have control, but anarchy is an appropriate designation here because there are clear hostilities, but neither side has the upper hand. There is also significant targeting of civilians to suggest the need for this designation.
  - The DEA map shows that Baja California is controlled almost entirely by the Sinaloa Cartel, with a single CJNG cell at the border.

## Baja California Sur Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **I = Inconsistent**
  - Early in 2014, the attorney general of Baja California Sur denied the existence of any *autodefensas* in the state, and asserted that the formation of autodefensas would be impossible in a state that had strong government authority. The politicians claimed that any alleged “*autodefensas*” were in fact groups of civilians who reported crimes to the state government, nothing more. Moreover, they encouraged citizens to report any groups or people who are attempting to conduct extrajudicial activity.
  - In late 2014, one of the leaders of the PGJE asked that the communities replicate the *autodefensa* model of Los Cabos, admitting that the government was stretched in its ability to assist its citizens.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **F = few (1-2)**
  - The only formally confirmed *autodefensa* group in the state was located in Los Cabos. It was recognized by several authorities as existing.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **P = positive**
  - There was little commentary as to the citizens’ thoughts on the *autodefensas*, but most referenced the need for protection and the government’s inability to provide it, suggesting that they preferred having the *autodefensas* instead of being left to fend for themselves.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - The fishermen who formed their own groups to protect their businesses expressed doubt that any level of government would protect them, and thus made the decision to take up arms. The notion that the government cannot provide services and protection is quite common in this state, and showed up repeatedly in Internet commentary.
  - Contrarily, a full 16% of crimes are reported in Baja California Sur, far more than the national average of 10.7%. Public perceptions of insecurity have also been much lower than the national average historically; currently, 61.8% of respondents report feeling unsafe, compared to the national average of 73.2%. This is low, but it does represent an increase in perceived insecurity in the state.
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **W = neighborhood watch**
  - These groups are not making arrests or conducting significant extrajudicial activity; they primarily focus on conducting patrols. Moreover, they are armed only with machetes, sticks, and kitchen tools.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**

- **U = unilateral activity**
- The *autodefensas* have not formally registered with the state government, but there is some approval on the government's part.
- **Who's in control?**
  - **A = anarchy**
  - The drug violence in Baja California Sur significantly increased from 2014 to 2015, with several different cartels vying for power. This state of violence indicates a struggle between multiple cartels, and the fact that the governor has reached out the US for assistance suggests strongly that the government has little control in this situation. It does, however, appear that the state is trying to maintain some semblance of security. For this reason, BCS is not labelled as cartel-controlled. Contrarily, the lack of government resources such as funding and soldiers and its inability to enforce laws such as fishing bans suggest that the government is not strong. This is compounded by the fact that BCS has recently been the site of numerous tourist killings, extortions, and kidnappings.
  - According to the US State Department, "There has been a rise in violent crimes between rival criminal organizations." The organization recommends caution to American citizens.

## Campeche Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - The politicians maintain a very conciliatory tone in regard to the problems faced by their citizens, asserting that their concerns of safety and services are in the process of being addressed. To that end, a common assertion is that the police and other security forces are not properly doing their part to prevent the violence. The authorities discourage the notion of civilian defense groups, on account of their extrajudicial nature, or they ignore the groups that are formed. They also remind the civilians that Che Chu, one of the *autodefensa* leaders in the south of the state, previously committed criminal acts.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **S = Some (3-4)**
  - At least 3 to 4 major groups exist in this state, particularly the south, spanning communities. One of their leaders expressly referenced several drug lords as being a threat to their safety, and a primary reason for their formation.
  - Campesino Front leader Emilia Zapata, Antonio Che Chu were responsible for creating the first group (out of 24 communities in the south of the state), with their start in El Mirador.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **P = positive**
  - The civilians in the areas where the two major groups were operating actually facilitated the creation of these groups through their support; it was a community effort, and they seemed to prefer the condition of autodefensas existing, as opposed to being absent. In particular, the civilians cite fears associated with being at the border of Guatemala (human and drug trafficking chiefly among them), and express conviction that armed mobilization is the appropriate way to respond in light of government inaction. There was no mention of resources being given to these groups, so this cannot be a supportive rating.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - The attitude towards the authorities is that they are not acting quickly enough to address civilians' problems, nor with enough force. The citizens feel unsafe and complaints of poor or missing public services are common in this region of the country. Corruption is also a common complaint levied against the authorities, indicating a lack of trust on the part of the civilians.
  - Contrary to this voiced distrust, Campeche exhibited a higher rate of crime reporting than the national average, with 15.5% of crimes being reported instead of just 10.7%. Similarly, civilian perceptions of insecurity in Campeche have been consistently lower than the nationally reported figures;

in 2015, 53.7% of civilians in Campeche reported feeling unsafe, as compared to 73.2% nationally.

- **Type of autodefensas + Level of armament**
  - **A = anti-drug violence**
  - These groups have arisen on account of both protecting the civilians against illegal logging and combating police corruption. The drug cartels were also explicitly mentioned as a concern and a reason for the groups' formation. The extent of their armament is unknown.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **U = unilateral activity**
  - Several of the civilian groups have requested recognition and training by the Mexican army, but they were unanswered in this. The autodefensas hold a low opinion of the authorities' ability to help the people, especially those who live very close to the Guatemala border.
- **Who's in control?**
  - **U = uncertain**
  - Insecurity and corruption of the government forces were mentioned often, so it seems that the government is not wholly in control of its state; it should be noted that the Yucatan area was not known for violence or insecurity until recently. However, no U.S. Travel Warning is in effect for the state, which would indicate that there is at least some degree of safety, such that embassy employees are not restricted for fear of violence.
  - The DEA drug cartel map showed that Campeche is entirely under the control of the Zeta cartel. Borderland Beat also defined parts of Campeche as "narco-controlled zones." It does not seem that the state government has engaged the cartels in offensive measures, however; for this reason, it would be difficult to assign a CVG rating.

## Coahuila Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - The politicians in Coahuila assert that any extrajudicial activity is in violation of the law, and that the autodefensas in the state are not above the laws. More recently, the common thread was that citizens would accidentally hurt themselves by forming self-defense groups; additionally, groups such as those in Michoacán and Guerrero are vilified for their use of violence. Politicians in Coahuila focused on commending their citizens for not turning to violence.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **F = few (1-2)**
  - At least two autodefensas have identified themselves and been extensively referenced in the media. One of these is located in Saltillo, which cited both high rates of insecurity and organized crime, and numerous instances of theft as being reasons for forming. A second one claims to be operating in the state, but has shown little activity besides announcing its presence on social media.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **P = positive**
  - There is mild support towards autodefensas, particularly those that are more like neighborhood watch groups. Civilians are genuinely concerned with the low levels of security, which have led them to build gated communities and seek additional alternative methods of safety.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - There is extensive discontent with the authorities, particularly due to the lack of security in the state; according to Borderland Beat, Coahuila is considered a “narco news blackout state.” Corruption, bribery, and infiltration of the police by criminal elements are some of the most common accusations, particularly against the state authorities (even the mayor of one city in Coahuila expressed this). Moreover, extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances being conducted by policemen have been reported recently, causing a rise in civilian fear of the police force.
  - Public perceptions of insecurity in Coahuila have consistently been higher than the national average for the past four years. As of 2015, 74.9% of citizens reported that they felt insecure in their state, compared to the national average of 73.2%. Despite this, and the allegations toward the police, 17.2% of all crimes are reported in Coahuila, a surprising number compare to the national average of 10.7%.
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **W = neighborhood watch**
  - No reports have been made of the civilian defense groups being armed; these groups have only conducted patrols of the area, according to the media. No

mention was made of citizen's arrests or offensive actions against the drug cartels.

- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **N = no interaction**
  - The media reports do not reference any interactions between the government and the autodefensas. The state government is not providing assistance or resources to the civilian groups, but it has not actively attempted to hinder their activities, either.
- **Who's in control?**
  - **Cartels**
  - The US Bureau of Diplomatic Security asserted that official travel to Coahuila must be done in armored vehicles, due to the violence in the state (the drug cartels were singled out as a particular threat). This suggests extreme danger and significant cartel activity, as well as government inability to keep foreign officials safe. According to the DEA cartel map, Coahuila is controlled by the Zetas, with two other cartels exhibiting a presence as well.
  - As noted previously, Coahuila is considered a "blackout narco news state," which indicates a high degree of control on the part of the cartels and speaks volumes of the inability of the government to combat their control on such institutions as the news media. This was one of four states that failed to respond to requests to make murder data and other crime statistics public, and Coahuila has repeatedly demonstrated a reticence to provide any information to the federal government or any other organization.

## Colima Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - In early 2014, the governor of Colima asserted that the state did not have the conditions which would cause autodefensas to form. Moreover, he stated that Colima's government would not allow the formation of civilian defense cells such as those found in Michoacán.
  - In early 2015, the AUC of Michoacán requested permission to enter Colima in pursuit of fleeing criminals. The governor denied this request because it was "outside the framework of the law," but did ask that the AUC provide the state government with whatever information they had on the criminals so that the state police could track them down.
  - The government supports the civilians' assessment of the autodefensas possibly being negatively motivated and warns that they could be dangerous; the state does not threaten violence against the groups, but it is wary of the notion that they might harbor cartel members.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **F = Few (1-2)**
  - The presence of one group comprised of at least 80 people was confirmed in 2014, as it publically declared its intention. Its motives and connections were uncertain, and the citizens of the communities it propositioned did not know who the armed men were. This group set up checkpoints near Zapotan and asked the community to provide resources such as food in return for protection, much like the set-up of the groups in Michoacán. An article by *Borderland Beat* featured an interview with one of the Michoacán AUC members, who confirmed that similar *autodefensas* operated in Colima, although they did not have the support of the government.
  - Colima was also one of the states that *Animal Politico* listed as having a "low frequency" of autodefensas in 2014, which substantiates this categorization. An article in *Sin Embargo* asserts that at least one of these groups comprised an indigenous community that was trying to self-police; if this was primarily for protection against cartel violence, it would qualify under the definition of *autodefensas* for this project. Similarly, the Osorio data set attributed a low number of groups to this area in 2013.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **N = Negative**
  - Citizens have expressed fear towards the group's motives, as well as distrust in their claims. The civilians in Colima are concerned with the notion of armed militias, and they are very unsupportive of any program similar to that implemented in Michoacán, largely due to the fact that it is not possible to determine whether armed groups are actually "good," or if they are actually cartel members in disguise.

- Although they have not actively engaged them in a physical confrontation, they asked the armed group to leave their village. The indigenous community in Colima is especially adverse to the idea of community policing, such that they distributed leaflets warning against the dangers of such groups and pointing to Michoacán as a deterring example. Several indigenous groups have gone a step further, suing the federal government for arming autodefensas in neighboring states.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = Negative**
  - The civilians have not engaged in hostilities with the government, but they distrust the state government due to corruption concerns. They have expressed that the government is not doing enough to ensure their safety against cartels, especially those that are fleeing from Michoacán (the Knights Templar). They are also wary of the federal government due to the uncertain outcomes of enfranchising civilian militias.
  - It should be noted that despite the distrust reported in many of the news articles regarding Colima, ENVIPE indicates that 15.3% of crimes are reported in the state, higher than the national average of 10.7%. Perceptions of insecurity were also much lower, at 56.5%, well under the average of 73.2%.
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **Non-Registered (N)**
  - **Pseudo-police (P)**
  - According to news reports, this group was very heavily armed with “high-powered weapons” and expressed the purpose of protecting the community, with extensive political rhetoric against the government.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **N = No interaction**
  - The most recent group is not registered with the government, despite its heavy weaponry. Although it does not appear to have physically engaged with the state government, its rhetoric towards the authorities is very negative.
- **Who’s in Control?**
  - **CVG = Cartels vs. Government**
  - There have been multiple attacks on Colima state governors, and the state is home to a very important trafficking port, both of which have resulted in a high level of cartel influence in Colima. The government has attempted to fight back with the help of federal forces, which is the reason for the CVG designation.
  - According to a 2014 press release from the state government, Colima was working with the national army, navy, and various levels of state police to mitigate the spread of the conflict in Jalisco and Michoacán. They are doing this by tightening checkpoints at the state borders, including rural roads.
  - A 2010 article by Borderland Beat asserted that “organized crime has permeated politics at all levels of the state,” including the police. It also shows

that Colima is home to the strategic port of Manzanillo, through which many traffickers have sought to transport drugs. The state has a history of drug cartel proliferation at all levels of society.

- The U.S. State Department issued a travel warning for Colima, particularly the parts of the state that border Michoacán; this is consistent with the notion that most of Colima's security issues stem from the "cockroach effect" of criminal elements fleeing its neighbors. It also speaks to the significant unrest in both Michoacán and Jalisco. Besides this advisory, the travel warning only discouraged intercity travel at night, which is fairly mild.

According to the most recent DEA map, Colima is primarily controlled by the CJNG, although it also host the Knights Templar. We should also not discount the possibility of violence and cartel members spilling over from both Jalisco and Michoacán, which are hosts to far more unrest, as well as the same two cartels vying for power. In addition, the Sinaloa cartel has released videos and narco-messages claiming that it has arrived in the state to "clean house," which could cause further violence.

## Chiapas Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **C = cautious**
  - The government has provided limited commentary in regard to the autodefensas, although this may result from the fact that there are several types of groups (not all of them eligible for this thesis), and the government is focused more on those. Several public officials asserted that there are other ways to attain safety and public goods; however, none specifically vilified the *autodefensa* groups.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **F (1-2)**
  - The New York dataset indicated that there was significant autodefensa activity in Chiapas from 2012 until the end of 2013. Chiapas was also one of three states (along with Michoacán and Guerrero) that the National Human Rights Commission reported as being a major center of autodefensa activity (the three together hosted 77% of 106 municipalities with autodefensas in 2014). It should be noted, however, that many of these groups are either indigenous rights groups or groups trying to protect their natural resources.
  - Our research uncovered two groups that fit the description of our autodefensas in that they were formed to combat organized crime and drug violence. One was located in Union Juárez, and the other was in Tapachula.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **S = supportive**
  - Chiapas has historically been the site of several uprisings intended to protect and secure the rights of the indigenous communities therein, most notably the EZLN. Although these movements were not directly related to the drug war, they demonstrate a sense of communal thought among the citizens of Chiapas.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **B = bypassing**
  - The civilians in Chiapas have a history of providing for themselves, especially in terms of defense. When a Canadian mining company recently encroached on the land of the Chiapas indigenous in the mountains and at the coast, they created “self-defense” groups to prevent the company from conducting additional operations. This is just one of many examples of the civilians being outspoken and independent about their needs. In a similar but more safety-related case, two men were set on fire in Chiapas in late 2015.
  - The 2015 ENVIPE survey indicated that civilians in Chiapas report 11.2% of all crimes, slightly higher than the national average of 10.7%. Accordingly, the reported perceptions of public security were also much more positive, with only 54.6% of civilians in Chiapas reporting that they felt insecure, compared to the 73.2% national average. This figure indicates that citizens in Chiapas feel safer, but it may have been impacted by the strong sense of community

and protection found in many indigenous communities. This assertion seems to correlate with the crime reporting statistic, which is not much higher than the national average.

- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **Non-Registered**
  - **Anti-Violence (A)**
  - The original purpose of the groups was to maintain the safety of the community, and it appears that they do have access to firearms, along with sticks and machetes.
- **Types of interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **U = unilateral activity**
  - According to our research, the government has not engaged with the autodefensas in Chiapas, nor have the groups attempted to connect with the state for resources or legitimacy.
- **Who's in Control?**
  - **A = anarchy**
  - Chiapas is on the Southern-most border of Mexico, a prime spot for cartels. According to the DEA map, this has resulted in at least 4 cartels vying for territory in the area.
  - Civilians in this state have engaged in significant extra-judicial violence as well, setting fire to two people accused of car theft. Additionally, an activist was kidnapped, tortured (face flayed), and killed just last year. This indicates a lack of respect for rule of law, but also shows that the government may have limited control in the area.
  - The U.S. State Department did not issue a travel warning for Chiapas.

## Chihuahua Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - The secretary general claimed that the formation of *autodefensa* groups would cause disruptions in Chihuahua and be a “setback for safety.” He strongly suggested that citizens use “negotiation and dialogue” as a means of resolving problems instead, and asserted that Chihuahua was not suffering from such a state of “un-governability” as to need *autodefensas*.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **F = few (1-2)**
  - The National Human Rights Commission’s 2014 report included Chihuahua as a state with at least a “low frequency” of autodefensas. There were also at least two reported in a 2013 *Sin Embargo* article; this figure was corroborated by an article in *Jornada*.
  - One group, Barzon, threatened to create a community police force if the state did not provide security and protection for the families of two murdered activists. While this would seem to suggest autodefensa activity, Barzon has a history of feminist and agricultural activism, and the threats may be politically motivated.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **I = indifferent/unsure**
  - Chihuahua does not have an extensive history of militia activity, so the notion of autodefensas is not ingrained into the fabric of civil society. One article cited a sociologist who attributed this lack of history to a dearth of strong leadership for such organizations. This sociologist also asserted that the state has an individualistic (as opposed to communal) society, which makes it harder for such groups to form.
  - Moreover, “many people have friends or relatives in organized crime, which puts them in a vulnerable position and prevents them from forming groups.”
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - The citizens of Chihuahua worked with the state government to combat drug violence in the mid-2000s, according to an InsightCrime.org study. Between 2008 and 2012, according to *Cronica de Chihuahua*, one in five drug-war deaths was a Chihuahua citizen. Conditions are better today, to where this is not the case, although crime is still high.
  - There is a strong sentiment that the government has not fulfilled its duties, in terms of mitigating violence throughout the state, regardless of its successes in urban areas. Additionally, the citizens commonly regard the government (at both state and federal levels) as being infiltrated by criminals.
  - According to the 2015 ENVIPE survey results, 13.1% of crimes are reported in Chihuahua, higher than the national average of 10.7%. On the other hand,

civilian perceptions of insecurity in Chihuahua have historically been higher than the national average, although perceptions of insecurity have declined significantly from 2011, when 89.5% of citizens reported that they did not feel their state was safe. Currently, 73.6% of civilians reported that they felt unsafe, compared to the national average of 73.2%.

- **Type of autodefensas + level of armament**
  - **A = anti-drug violence**
  - The civilian militias are armed, according to a report by El Pais in 2013.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **N = No interaction**
  - I did not find any evidence of tangible interactions between the government and the autodefensas in Chihuahua.
- **Who's in control?**
  - **CVG = Cartels vs. Government**
  - Murders have fallen significantly, especially from their peak in 2010, but also since last year. Although the state, especially Ciudad Juarez, was the site of a major turf battle between two drug cartels, the government attempted to fight back in a manner similar to that evidenced in Nuevo Leon. That is, the state and local governments cooperated with the federal authorities in response to the violence in Chihuahua.
  - The United States urges caution for travel in the state of Chihuahua, especially near Ciudad Juarez and the Sierra Mountains, citing “crime and violence” as “serious problems” in the state. In addition, Chihuahua is one of three states situated in the “Golden Triangle” of drug trafficking, where many of the country’s opium and marijuana crops are grown. This region shows some of the highest rates of consistent violence in Mexico, although much of the criminal violence has shifted from the cities to the rural areas.
  - Although there is undeniably corruption with government officials in this state, it also appears that the authorities are attempting to fight back against the cartels, with at least some measure of success. For this concerted attempt to fight back, CVG is an appropriate designation.

## DF Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - “There are no *autodefensas* in DF, and we will not allow there to be.” This was a very prominent statement in my research, as DF authorities (including the police chief, the mayor, and the secretary of public security) consistently drew a hard line against creating self-defense groups in the district.
  - In addition to this consistent negative messaging, there was also a very public delegation in which 16 leaders of the communities within the Federal District agreed to work together to prevent the need for defense groups, as well as to dismantle the operation of any groups calling themselves *autodefensas*.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **N = none (0)**
  - The New York dataset indicated low levels of autodefensa activity at the end of 2013 in DF. Although there was at least one isolated incident of citizens calling themselves “autodefensas,” it was short-lived, possibly political in scope, and not likely the type being categorized here. The rest of the research showed that there were no other self-defense groups in the Federal District.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **I = Indifferent/Unsure**
  - There was little evidence of how the citizens within the DF felt towards the civilian groups in other states. No interviewees broached the subject, possibly due to a sense of removal from the epicenters of the autodefensa movement. As noted above, the media and government officials also painted the groups in a negative light, which may have contributed to the lack of attention towards the idea of civilian militias.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - *Reforma* reported that 60% of civilians living in DF consider it to be insecure, and less than 40% reported any crime to the police. This is a strong indication that the populace does not trust the authorities to act as they should. The civilians’ fear has increased with the murders of several well-known journalists in a place that was formerly considered to be a safe haven for those running from the cartels. In one area of DF in particular, Itzapalapa, residents hung banners stating that criminals would not be handed over to the police, but rather dealt with by civilians (*New York Times*).
  - For the past five years, DF has consistently reported higher perceptions of public insecurity than the national average in the ENVIPE survey, with 78.5% of the population asserting that they felt their district was insecure in 2015, in comparison to the national average of 73.2%. The ENVIPE survey results for DF showed that 10.7% of all crimes are reported to the police, equivalent to the national average. Both figures from the ENVIPE results provide an

indication of low civilian security perceptions, although not in relation to other Mexican states.

- **Type of autodefensas**
  - N/A
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - N/A
- **Who's in control?**
  - **CVG = Cartels vs. Government**
  - There is a rising level of crime in the capital district, particularly with regard to murders, which are up 15% since 2015 in Mexico City, to high historical levels (numbers in 2015 were up 22% year over year). DF was considered a safe haven, less touched by cartel violence, but it has recently become more dangerous, especially with the murders of high-profile journalists. There is also a greater sense of impunity among the cartels and organized crime gangs, best illustrated by the Iztapalapa incident, wherein the body of a young man was hung from an overpass with a message protesting the government's crackdown on a gang's drug distribution in a nearby prison.
  - The above gang murder directly challenged officials, asserting control in the neighborhood. The mayor of the capital asserted in response that there is no gang presence in the city, although he increased police patrols and highway checkpoints. No State Department advisory is in effect for United States citizens within DF, although there are certain parts of the city which are not recommendable.
  - According to OSAC, "Beheadings, lynching, torture, and other gruesome displays of violence as well as high numbers of forced disappearances have become routine occurrences in various parts of the country, to include in the Mexico City metropolitan area. Numerous journalists and bloggers have been killed over the past few years for reporting on such incidents." Although DF still has lower crime rates than many other states in Mexico, it is doing progressively worse compared to its own past figures (CNNExpansion).
  - This state has multiple cartels and gangs in operation, all of whom are vying for turf and influence (given the city's status as a "hub" of illegal activity). The most recent DEA maps indicate that the CJNG might currently have the upper hand, although there could be up to 5 cartels operating within the DF.
  - The above examples clearly illustrate a conflict between government officials and organized crime, particularly the drug cartels. For these reasons, CVG is an appropriate designation.

## Durango Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - In 2014, the state's Secretary General of Government publically stated that there were no self-defense groups in Durango, asserting that they could only arise in a "failed" state, where the citizens are not provided with proper resources. He said that Durango did not have conditions such as those in Michoacán, and therefore the state could not have autodefensas.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **N = none (0)**
  - The New York dataset indicated low levels of autodefensa activity at the end of 2013, and this was not one of the states in which autodefensas had been officially recognized by 2014. Additionally, Animal Politico confirmed that there were no reports of civilian defense groups by 2014, and no reports of such groups have arisen since.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **C = cautious**
  - There was Internet commentary supporting the idea of forming autodefensas in the face of official failure to assist the citizens of Durango, however there was not enough to be significant. The cautious designation generally applies when the citizens of a state are unsure whether they can trust the defense groups. The citizens might also be labelled as cautious if they appear to agree with the ideological tenets of creating an autodefensas, but disagree with their general inclination towards violence. Since the only discernable comments were relatively positive, cautious is a better designation than indifference for this state.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - According to the 2015 INEGI survey for Durango, the civilians' sense of insecurity decreased significantly over the past year, from 73.5 to 68% of the surveyed population. This speaks positively of government efforts to decrease violence in Durango. However, this same group of respondents also had much less faith in their local and state authorities than in national authorities (39.4% trusted the municipal police, while 87.8% trusted the national Marines). This speaks poorly of civilian perceptions regarding the state and local authorities, but the civilians have not actively engaged in hostilities with the government, so negative is an appropriate designation (as opposed to hostile).
  - Previous INEGI surveys for Durango have revealed that citizens perceive the various levels of government to be corrupt, and that many of the respondents saw insecurity as the most serious problem Durango faced.
- **Type of autodefensas + level of armament**
  - **N/A**

- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - N/A
- **Who's in control?**
  - **C = Cartels**
  - The US State Department's Travel Warning asserts that US officials must keep to a curfew in Durango, and that they can only travel outside the city during the daytime. Restrictions on Embassy employees and officials suggest that the state is not safe, particularly on the highways. The DEA drug maps show that Durango is controlled by the Del Pacifico Cartel, an offshoot of the Sinaloa cartel.
  - Borderland Beat has Durango listed as one of the "Narco news blackout states," which indicates that the cartels have significant power in the state. In addition, Durango is one of three states in the "Golden Triangle" of drug trafficking, where drug-related violence tends to be the highest due to the presence of poppy and marijuana crops. Although the Mexican SEDENA army has come through and destroyed some of these crops repeatedly, the growers only re-plant. Worse yet, they have increased their production of poppy plants for the drug cartels. Additionally, when drug violence has broken out in the past (2014 and before), the authorities provided little to no support to locals, and failed to properly report the actual occurrences of drug violence. Similarly, the authorities in Durango have repeatedly failed to test remains found in clandestine gravesites, owing to the fact that they have neither the ability nor the money to do so. All of these factors indicate that the government has very little authority in its own state, and that the cartels have a run on the power.

## Guanajuato Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - The governor of Guanajuato denied the alleged existence of autodefensas in his state, asserting that the 2014 Facebook page for this supposed group was “nothing.” During early 2014, there were also repeated assertions that the autodefensas should not form in Guanajuato, and that actions were being taken by the state and federal governments to prevent this occurrence.
  - Other officials claimed that there was no need for groups such as those forming in Guerrero at the time.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **U = Unknown**
  - The National Human Rights Commission’s (CNDH) 2014 report included Guanajuato as a state with at least a “low frequency” of autodefensas, although Animal Politico asserts that the government reacted quickly to stem militia activity. The CNDH also reported the presence of armed groups in Guanajuato, although it declined to indicate how many were present, or what types of groups they were. This should be a reliable claim, however, as it is based on field work conducted by the CNDH, and they explicitly did not include indigenous rights groups, focusing on autodefensas such as those that arose in Michoacán.
  - The New York dataset indicated that there were not any autodefensas in operation in Guanajuato at the end of 2013. At the end of 2014, Milenio reported that there was a “self-defense groups” in the state, although it was unarmed, and created primarily to protect the civilians from theft and other smaller criminal offenses. Anti-drug cartel activity was not a stated purpose of this group.
  - NOTE: Members of the AUC in Guerrero reached out in 2014 to bordering municipalities in Guanajuato, offering assistance in forming similar groups.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **C = cautious**
  - The merits of self-defense in the face of government inability were emphasized by civilians in Guanajuato, although concerns arose with regard to the funding and resources of the autodefensas. Ideologically, there was an air of support for self-defense groups, particularly in areas where the state was not able to provide safety and other necessities. When Facebook pages for alleged autodefensas surfaced, there was a significant amount of interest shown by civilians (anywhere from 800 to 55,000 followers). However, there was also a sense of uncertainty as to the legitimacy of self-defense groups, especially those in Guerrero and Michoacan.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **Negative (N)**

- Many farmers in the rural areas of Guanajuato have complained that the state has not addressed their requests for security, particularly against theft, assault, extortion, and kidnapping. When they do attempt to reach out for help, their meetings with officials are cancelled, or they cannot contact the authorities. Additionally, local news sources have reported that “the public perception of insecurity” for this state has increased significantly within the past four years. There is therefore a sense of distrust in the government’s ability to aid its citizens (Informador).
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **A = anti-drug violence**
  - According to the 2016 CNDH report, these were armed militias intending to provide security to the citizens in the area. The closest category that these militias seem to fit would be that of “anti-drug violence,” as they are too heavily armed to be neighborhood watch groups, but not politically active enough to be pseudo-police (they also have not been reported as making arrests or conducting major extra-judicial activities).
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **A = avoidance**
  - This thesis’ research was unable to turn up any direct interactions between the autodefensas and the authorities, although there was negative rhetoric from both sides, and the authorities launched a significant campaign to prevent the spread of autodefensas in Guanajuato.
- **Who’s in Control?**
  - **CVG = Cartels vs. Government**
  - The U.S. state department does not currently have a travel warning in effect for the state of Guanajuato. The state was previously a stronghold for the Templars, as far back as 2013, but the CJNG moved into the territory and sparked violence in 2014, and the Zetas are also vying for the territory. CJNG and the Zetas now control the vast majority of the state, with the Templars and the Gulf Cartel each controlling a single municipality. Moreover, Guanajuato is no stranger to having its policemen caught working with the cartels. This does not appear to be a strong systematic tendency, however, and many of the urban areas have a significant authoritative presence. Additionally, when the possibility of AUC groups arose, the state acted very quickly to rumors and cracked down on security in the area, indicating a strong government presence. Because both the cartels and the government seem to have a strong presence in the area, CVG is a reasonable designation.

## Guerrero Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **H = hostile\***
  - The Guerrero authorities have accused the autodefensas of both abusing their power and being infiltrated by cartel or gang members, which qualifies the political rhetoric for a “hostile” designation. Nieto also went on record to state that regardless of the intent of these groups, their actions will be considered illegal and “something that [his] government will fight against.” “Rubén Figueroa, a Guerrero state deputy who heads the local legislature's security commission is one of the few politicians who openly expresses these fears. ‘I have reliable information that some of these [vigilante] groups have been infiltrated by subversives.’ They are trying to take advantage of the power vacuums that exist in isolated areas.’” (The Guardian)
  - It should be noted, however, that the new governor has “welcomed” a set of defense groups to the North of the state (in 2016), “provided that they are on the side of the townspeople.”
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **M = many [5+]**
  - Civilian defense militias that fit the criteria for this thesis were reported by mainstream media in at least seven towns within Guerrero, staffed by over 2000 people. Animal Politico also reported that Guerrero is one of the three states which together accounted for 77% of the autodefensas found within 106 municipalities in 2014. According to more recent news reports, autodefensas continue to be formed to this day.
  - Some of these groups are under larger parent organizations such as UPOEG, FUSDEG, and CRAC (the last of which is comprised of 13 municipalities, has been in existence since the 1990s, and actively set a precedent for judging and detaining criminals, and which instituted a system for “re-education” of criminals). It should be noted that CRAC differs from the newer groups, in that they work even more closely with the townsfolk, do not cover their faces, and receive their weapons directly from the town. The newer groups are formed from initiatives spearheaded by groups of civilians, which take oaths to protect the townspeople, but supply their own weaponry and try to remain anonymous.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **C = cautious [S = supportive for CRAC]**
  - According to a video by Vice News, there was significant support for the autodefensas and “community police” during the tribunals held in 2014, as shown by almost unanimous hand-raising at the well-attended gathering. The citizens interviewed also voiced thankfulness and support towards the civilian groups. This support is partially predicated on citizens’ understanding of several laws, both state and federal, which can be used to legally justify the

formation of civilian defense groups, provided that the citizens vote for it. The state's strong history of autodefensas – back to at least the 1800s – and their foundation in indigenous values helps to support their operations in Guerrero.

- Although there are many precedents backing up the formation of autodefensas in Guerrero, one of the primary concerns in regard to them is that they lack the training, rules, and direct accountability accorded to groups such as CRAC. Instead of being directly elected by the civilian assemblies, they form on their own and ask for the assemblies' blessings. The fact that a set of rules does not restrict the actions of these groups causes concern, particularly the fear that they “might become paramilitaries for the government,” or worse entities. This is the reason for the “cautious” designation.

- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**

- **H = hostile [B = bypassing (of federal and state gov'n't) for CRAC]**
- The 2014 student abductions occurred in Guerrero, along with the murders of Roman-Catholic priests; elected officials were implicated in the case of the 43 kidnapped students. According to Thinkprogress.org, the mayor of Iguala “ordered the attack,” and fled, while the municipal police directly facilitated the kidnapping through collaboration with gang members, and the governor of Guerrero stepped down in the face of his failure to combat police corruption. Both incidents caused mass outrage and demonstrations, both in Guerrero and throughout the country.
- These were not the first cases to prompt fear or mistrust of the authorities; police forces in Guerrero have a history of using disproportionate force. One example comes from the deployment of over 100 officers to disperse a crowd of unarmed student protestors, some of whom were illegally detained. Even when police are found guilty of collaborating with criminals, justice is rarely forthcoming, and they either serve a pittance or they are not charged with their crimes. Due to such human rights violations, citizens of this state do not feel safe, and they see the government as a collaborator with criminals. In response, they have escalated their engagements with authorities to physical violence, disarming police and burning buildings, among other things.

- **Type of autodefensas**

- **P = pseudo-police force**
- Many of these groups are acting as community police, conducting citizens' arrests. In January of 2013, for example, groups in Ayutla detained at least 54 people that they claimed to be involved in illegal activities. They proceeded to conduct a trial on these individuals, although they were later turned in to the police. The groups in Guerrero are known to have at least some high-powered weapons, and to be primarily interested in protecting their towns against both drug and police violence.
- It should be noted that there have been several clashes between “rival” groups, which follows a pattern established in Michoacan, and could be an indication of infiltration by criminal elements.

- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **H = hostile [U for CRAC]**
  - Guerrero's autodefensas do not trust the state government, to the extent that they view them in a similar light to the cartels and criminal gangs. This perception has led to increasingly tense encounters between the two groups; recently, the autodefensas detained policemen until an agreement with the authorities was reached. Even after the agreement, wherein the government committed to increasing state and federal police presence, the autodefensas maintained control of security inside their towns (the police were deployed to guard checkpoints on the roads).
  - The government has addressed Guerrero's autodefensas with similar hostility, capturing and incarcerating leaders of the groups. ["On 21 August a joint army, navy and state police operation arrested several community police members and put [the leader] Salgado herself into a high security jail hundreds of miles away, accused of kidnapping."] Additionally, they "dispatched federal troops to prevent these groups from moving."
  - It should be noted that in recent years, certain autodefensas such as UPOEG have worked with the authorities instead of against them. This includes signing an agreement to be legally recognized and regulated by "a community security system," in exchange for weapons, training, and other equipment. The division of roads and towns between the autodefensas and authorities continues.
- **Who's in control?**
  - **A = Anarchy**
  - The federal government has deployed "armed forces" (army and navy) to the state, where there are numerous state and local actors in conflict. Besides the federal forces, there are state and local police, some of whom work with crime groups, cartels, civilian defense militias, and criminal gangs. There are at least four cartels operating in Guerrero, possibly five, according to the DEA.
  - There is well-documented police corruption in Guerrero, to the extent that police have consistently worked with drug cartels or gangs (e.g. in the 2014 case of the missing students). There have been regular clashes between police and civilians in this state, indicating a high degree of distrust and anger. This level of infiltration into government speaks to the inability of the state to protect its own people, and the control that the cartels have in this state. Additionally, the cartels are brazen enough to assassinate high-profile members of political parties, indicating that they do not fear accountability from the government.
  - In addition to the aforementioned issues, there have been recent territorial disputes between various autodefensa groups (2015), which might indicate infiltration of criminal elements, and at the very least contributes to the violent climate in the state.

## Hidalgo Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - The rhetoric directed at Hidalgo's groups is negative, as the state governor has asserted that *autodefensas* will not be permitted, and that there are better ways to obtain security and public demands. One mayor is calling these groups "politically-motivated," as well, although this is a minor accusation.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **Few (1-2)**
  - At least one group was confirmed by the media, located in Texhuada; the National Human Rights Commission's 2014 report also included Hidalgo as a state with at least a "low frequency" of autodefensas
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **S = supportive**
  - Although there is no indication that civilians are supplying resources or protecting the *autodefensas* from the government, they publically state that they voted to have community safety groups formed. Community leaders and council members are also supportive of the activity, as are civilians outside the communities where the groups have actually formed. El Universal reports that civilians in 12 additional communities sought to create groups after hearing of the existing *autodefensa*.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **B = bypassing**
  - After not having their concerns addressed, the civilians decided to take matters into their own hands; they believe that the government is not able to protect them, to the extent that it may have abandoned them. Reports do indicate, however, that they are seeking support from the government, if they can obtain it. This is perhaps indicated in the ENVIPE survey results, which show that 17% of crimes are reported in Hidalgo, significantly more than the 10.7% national average.
  - Civilian perceptions of insecurity have also historically been lower than the national average. Currently, 62.1% of respondents assert that they feel insecure, compared to the national average of 73.2%.
- **Type of autodefensa + level of armament**
  - **Non-registered**
  - **W = neighborhood watch**
  - The group is unarmed, with the stated purpose of maintaining order and safety in the community. They formed as a reaction to the high numbers of murders and rapes, as well as general insecurity in the area. Members of the group only bear radios, and focus primarily on conducting patrols, but they have also enforced a nightly curfew. They do state that any criminal they catch will be lynched, although they will be using the authority of the council to place

people under arrest and question them; however, this is more of a community safety organization than an armed group.

- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **U = unilateral activity**
  - The autodefensas have not reached out the state or federal governments for assistance, and the government has not attempted to stop the formation or operation of the civilian defense groups.
- **Who's in control?**
  - **U = unknown**
  - No State Travel Warning is in effect for the US Department of State.
  - Although the civilians have banded together to create defense groups, they are not clearly in control of the area, and the fact that they are not going on the offense would suggest that they do not have the power to do so. That they are taking any action suggests that the cartels or criminals have significant control in the area, but not enough evidence was collected to verify that the cartels had control.

## Jalisco Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - State and federal officials deny that the *autodefensas* exist; they state that there is no way for there to be civilian defense groups in Jalisco, because the authorities have total control on the organized crime issue. They also suggest that some of the groups may be members of the cartels, and assert that anyone caught carrying weapons without a permit will be arrested. The state reiterated several times that no one should be considered above the law, which these groups attempt to be.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **M (5+)**
  - A university professor specializing in the area asserts that as many as 12 municipalities could have *autodefensas*. The media has reported the presence of civilian militia groups, but it is difficult to determine whether they are affiliated with a cartel. It is also possible that they are receiving assistance from across the border in Michoacán, although that has not been confirmed.
  - The National Human Rights Commission's 2014 report included Jalisco as a state with at least a "low frequency" of *autodefensas*. Several towns have reported the creation of *autodefensas*, including Cuautitlán de García Barragán (an indigenous town), El Salto, and Jilotlán de Dolores. In these reports, additional groups have been cited but not named.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **I = indifferent/unsure**
  - It seems plausible that the civilians support the *autodefensas*, at least in theory, because their government cannot protect them. However, they have not explicitly made any statements of support, nor have they provided the groups with any resources thus far. When asked about the *autodefensas*, some civilians support the idea of armed community policing, such as those among the Nahuatl indigenous. However, others express fear towards the anarchy that could potentially be engendered from the situation.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - Judging by the tone of the reporters in the area, most civilians believe that the governments are lying about the crime and proliferation of the *autodefensas*. At the very least, they do not have confidence that the government can protect them. This can be shown in the EVIPE survey results as well: only 9.3% of crimes are reported in Jalisco, compared to the 10.7% national average. This indicates that the authorities are less trusted in Jalisco. Contrarily, Jalisco has shown lower perceptions of insecurity than the national average in all but one of the last three years, with 69.6% of civilians reporting that they felt insecure in 2015, compared to the national average of 73.2%.

- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **Non-registered**
  - **P = pseudo-police**
    - The group may be heavily armed; they have access to guns and possibly grenades, in some cases. All of the aforementioned groups conduct their activities extra-judicially, without turning criminals over to the authorities.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **H = hostilities**
  - The autodefensas have openly attacked members of the government before, claiming that the police are linked to the Knights Templar. They have also previously refused to let community police into their state.
- **Who's in control?**
  - **A = anarchy**
  - Although the civilians have banded together to create defense groups, they are not clearly in control of the area. The state government has repeatedly tried to assert its authority, but given the widespread targeting and assassination of its public officials, it is unlikely that they actually have the control they lay claim to. Even if some of these killings are cases of “mistaken identity,” the fact remains that “a public servant is killed in Jalisco, on average, every eight days” (Borderland Beat). Contrarily, the Jalisco state government has attempted to hold back the influx of criminals and the rising violence by partnering with the Mexican federal government. The effectiveness of this strategy remains to be seen.
  - If anything, the cartels have significant control, as they are enforcing tithes from the civilians, but their control does not seem complete enough to designate them as the main leaders in the region. The US State Department listed Jalisco under a Travel Warning, largely due to the spillover violence from Zacatecas and Michoacán. According to the DEA map, Jalisco is primarily controlled by the CJNG, with cells of three other cartels also operating in the area.

## Mexico State Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **Cautious (C)**
  - The government has stated that it will review and monitor the actions of the militias, but has not publically supported or decried the militia groups. The presence of two groups was acknowledged in 2013.
  - “[The government official] denied that the existence of such groups is a sign of un-governability; rather, he said, “it shows that society has clear needs and that the government must visualize and understand them, particularly to meet them” (Proceso).
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **M = Many (5+)**
  - The National Human Rights Commission’s 2014 report included Mexico State as a state with at least a “low frequency” of autodefensas.
  - According to *Animal Politico*, the state’s Secretary General Efren Rojas Davila “announced that in the municipalities of Amatepec and Tlatlaya, south of the state, community police operate.” The Ministry of Public Security denied this, but the government formally recognized these two groups in 2013. This figure grew significantly in 2014, as officials admitted that there were autodefensas operating in at least eleven towns within the state. Given the dispersion of these groups in the State of Mexico, some of which are over an hour’s drive apart, we would be justified in asserting that at least several additional groups exist.
  - Another group, called the Francisco Villa Campesino Revolutionary Popular Front, also declared its formation in 2013 over concerns of the infiltration of organized crime into civil society. A fourth group identified itself in the town of San José Tlacotitlán in late 2014; according to *El Financiero*, this group was not recognized by the government. “La Presa,” a fifth group which set up cameras and patrols for security purposes, was also declared in Tlalnepantla.
- **Civilian attitudes towards *autodefensas***
  - **I = Indifferent (Indifferent/Unsure)**
  - Official reports and news media did not include explicit civilian perceptions of defense militias that did not come from members of the *autodefensas*. We might say that civilians are supportive of the groups, since their presence has grown. However, since there is no explicit evidence to support that, it would be more conservative to assert that the civilian attitude towards *autodefensas* is indifferent or unsure.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = Negative**
  - Although the civilians have not engaged in hostilities with the government, they highly distrust the government for fear of corruption. Interviewees from

across the spectrum of news sources have asserted that the authorities fail to assist their civilians, and that “there is no security” (BBC Mexico).

- For the past five years, Mexico State has reported higher perceptions of public insecurity than the national average in the ENVIPE survey, with over 90% of the population asserting that they felt their state was insecure in 2015.
- The police are not considered to be authorities in some parts of the state, such as Ecatepec, where police have been known to buy drugs from the cartels and where the dealers can operate with complete impunity. This is also an area where executions and kidnappings are common, and people fear to clean up the sites of killings, due to retaliatory action. According to one interviewee, when the citizens reported crimes, the police told them to “stop complaining” (*Borderland Beat*). The ENVIPE survey results support the evidence that the police are distrusted and ineffectual; only 8.8% of all crimes were reported to the authorities, compared to the 10.7% national average.
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **Anti-Drug Violence (A)**
  - These groups are armed with machetes and smaller firearms such as handguns and shotguns. They are not pushing a political agenda very strongly, nor are they seeking control in the region. They set up roadblocks and checkpoints to search vehicles and “deal with criminals” (Univision).
  - “La Presa” claims to have rescued over 80 potential kidnapping victims, and to have handed 10 criminals over to the state authorities. The stated purpose of these groups is to protect the community against violence from organized crime. They have not registered with the state, but they have not assumed police duties or attempted to conduct extralegal trials.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **A = avoidance**
  - Both sides are aware of each other, but there is a heavy air of caution and the government has yet to engage with the *autodefensas*.
  - “At a press conference, Luis Enrique Granillo, a member of the movement, said that although the authorities know that the organized crime groups have infiltrated various districts, such as Tejupilco, Zacualpan, Almoloya de Alquisiras, Luvianos, Amatepec, and Tlatlaya, they have not done anything to stop them” (Proceso).
- **Who’s in Control?**
  - **C = Cartels**
  - The American State Department issued a travel warning for the State of Mexico “due to high rates of crime and insecurity,” advising caution for American citizens. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security also asserts that rates of violence have risen in this state, but does not explicitly restrict the actions of its employees. BBC Mundo reports that this is the worst state for crimes against women, within which Ecatepec is the absolute lowest.

- According to one of the 2015 DEA drug trafficking maps, Mexico State is host to two factions of La Familia Michoacána (one of which is considered a defector group), as well as the Knights Templar. A more recent map shows that the BLO and the Sinaloa Cartel have also moved in on the area. In 2013, *Borderland Beat* reported that the cartels were active in at least 52 out of 125 municipalities, especially those near Mexico City.
- WOLA asserts that the Mexican military carried out executions against State of Mexico civilians in 2014, re-arranging the scene to make it appear as though they had been attacked. Several low-ranking officers have since been charged with the murders of 22 people, including 12 unarmed civilians.
- Per *Borderland Beat*: “On May 10, 2010, when he was still governor, Pena Nieto stated that Mexico State and the Federal District had become the den of the drug trafficking bosses. According to him, the metropolitan zone was "the great consumer market" that the groups were fighting over.”
- Given the significant reports of crime and impunity in Mexico State, along with the known presence of many drug cartels and the lack of effort to purge them, this state could appropriately be labelled as “cartel-controlled.”

## Michoacán Code – Pseudo-Police

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **H = hostile**
  - Although the government finds it politically advantageous to laud the Rurales, they repeatedly threatened the pseudo-police with violence, asserting that there would be “no forgiveness” for those who did not disarm and incorporate into the government forces.
  - “Cartel Land”
  - The government is reticent to recognize the legitimacy of any organization that does not register with state or federal authorities. Abuse of power is alleged, with regard to the offensive “liberation” of cities.
  - The state government claims that many of the groups are composed of CJNG cartel members, or that they have unknowingly been infiltrated by cartel members.
  - <http://www.sdpnoticias.com/nacional/2015/06/15/ligan-autodefensas-al-cartel-jalisco-nueva-generacion>
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **M (5 +)**
  - *Animal Politico* published a 2015 article which asserts that the groups are present in at least 33 municipalities in the state. Additionally, in 2013, Abundio Marcos Prado, the leader of Purépecha Nation, claimed that there were at least 16 separate groups operating within the state.
  - <http://www.animalpolitico.com/2015/11/la-herencia-del-conflicto-en-michoacan-mas-de-500-desplazados-440-asesinados-524-secuestrados/>
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **C to P**
  - Underpinned by previous experience with the Knights Templar (which claimed to be helping civilians against Los Zetas). Civilians may see the autodefensas as demanding and providing justice, but conforming to the general inclination to kill. They may also simply distrust the groups, for lack of knowing whom to trust.
  - “Both the Knights Templar and the vigilante groups that have risen to oppose them share this [sense of regional] pride, with both sides claiming to represent the interests of the state and its populace.” (Horton)
  - “Against a background of widespread corruption, frustrated community members have embraced the vigilantes in lieu of local government actors who appear unable or unwilling to offer protection. Much of this frustration stems from the Templar’s widespread practice of extortion, which has served as a major catalyst for change and a rallying point for the vigilantes.” (Horton)
  - These groups were met with a variety of different reactions by civilians, from derision in towns which perceived themselves as safe and whose civilians were fearful of reprisal, to praise and excitement in towns whose civilians were searching for a way to fight back. Most poignantly, one of the skeptical

civilians stated, “we just want peace...we don’t care who brings it” (Cartel Land).

- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **C to N (N)**
  - “Cautious to negative” would be an accurate depiction of this region, given that the state has a long and bloody history of political corruption, drug cartel influence on the state governance, recent killings that were carried out with police collaboration, etc. The authorities are prone to changing the official stories, particularly when it looks like innocent victims were killed by state or federal forces, so this is often a source of distrust. Several journal articles also cited the lack of confidence in the authorities.
  - LA Times: <http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-vigilantes-20150113-story.html>
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **P = pseudo-police forces**
  - These groups routinely conduct extra-judicial arrests, abductions, searches, and executions. They are armed with the weapons they took from cartels with whom they clashed.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **H = hostilities**
  - There are autodefensa groups that openly clash with the authorities (those incidents are largely rooted in a refusal to disarm)
- **Who’s in control?**
  - **A = anarchy**
  - The government, militias, and cartels are all vying for the same territory, with mixed levels of success and uncertain outcomes. Although the government and some of the militias have succeeded in capturing major cartel leaders and driving certain cartels out of their territory, many cartel cells still remain. In addition, the autodefensas are being pitted against each other while fighting both the cartels and the federal government. All of the major actors are in conflict in this state, although the civilians try to stay out of these clashes.

## Michoacán Code – Registered (Rurales)

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **I = inconsistent**
  - There is a mixture of cautionary rhetoric and mild support, particularly when the government finds it politically advantageous to laud the autodefensas.
  - <http://www.sdpnoticias.com/nacional/2015/06/15/ligan-autodefensas-al-cartel-jalisco-nueva-generacion>
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **M (5 +)**
  - Existence confirmed
  - *Animal Politico* published a 2015 article which asserts that the groups are present in at least 33 municipalities in the state. Most sources agree on this figure.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **C = cautious**
  - Underpinned by previous experience with the Knights Templar (which claimed to be helping civilians against Los Zetas). Civilians may see the autodefensas as demanding and providing justice, but conforming to the general inclination to kill. They may also simply distrust the groups, for lack of knowing whom to trust.
  - “Both the Knights Templar and the vigilante groups that have risen to oppose them share this [sense of regional] pride, with both sides claiming to represent the interests of the state and its populace.” (Horton)
  - “Against a background of widespread corruption, frustrated community members have embraced the vigilantes in lieu of local government actors who appear unable or unwilling to offer protection. Much of this frustration stems from the Templar’s widespread practice of extortion, which has served as a major catalyst for change and a rallying point for the vigilantes.” (Horton)
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - “Negative” would be an accurate depiction of this region, given that the state has a long and bloody history of political corruption, drug cartel influence on the state governance, recent killings that were carried out with police collaboration, etc. The authorities are prone to changing the official stories, particularly when it looks like innocent victims were killed by state or federal forces, so this is often a source of distrust. Several journal articles also cited the lack of confidence in the authorities.
  - “Recently a meme has been making the rounds on Mexico’s social media, another front in the battle between the Knights Templar and the vigilante groups that oppose them. This particular meme features an irate Batman scolding Robin. “Thank goodness the army has finally arrived in Michoacán!” Robin exclaims. An aggravated Batman lashes out at his naïve young

sidekick. “Quiet you fool, they are only going to help the Templars!””  
(Horton)

- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **Registered**
    - Several groups have indeed assimilated into the Mexican police forces, but the vast majority prefer to register and retain their autonomy.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **P = partnership**
  - The government’s relationship with the Rurales largely involves partnership, as shown in the existence of the Rural Forces and those that integrated into the Mexican military or local police.
  - “The agreement focuses primarily on establishing a formal relationship between the government and selected groups. Its current eight point structure<sup>4</sup> renames the *autodefensas* as “Rural Defense Corps,” obliges their leadership to submit lists of members to the government, and commits the groups to registering any weapons that members already possess. It also dictates that members of the *autodefensas* can form part of the Municipal Police, but does not make this a requirement or provide a mechanism through which this should take place” (Horton).
- **Who’s in control?**
  - **A = anarchy**
  - The government, militias, and cartels are all vying for the same territory, with mixed levels of success and uncertain outcomes. Although the government and some of the militias have succeeded in capturing major cartel leaders and driving certain cartels out of their territory, many cartel cells still remain. In addition, the autodefensas are being pitted against each other while fighting both the cartels and the federal government. All of the major actors are in conflict in this state, although the civilians try to stay out of these clashes.
  - Another major problem in this area is the lack of certainty as to the motives of many autodefensas, which is connected to that of civilian groups becoming infiltrated by criminals and subsequently creating new cartels or gangs. This is especially notable in the case of Los Viagras, which started as a government-backed autodefensa and became a splinter group of the Templars, and later of the CJNG, in the course of a year.

## Morelos Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - The officials' main concern is that people are acting in place of the police, which is a threat to the authority of the state government. According to several sources, the government refuses to "accept and acknowledge" the presence of civilian militias in Morelos, largely because that would require admitting that it cannot protect its people or handle the current levels of violence. In its state. Denial that the groups exist is grounds for a "negative" designation, as per our code sheet.
  - Many of the government officials also asserted that such groups were "illegal" in Morelos.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **M = many (5+)**
  - Milenio reported groups in at least 3 regions of the state by 2015, with over 400 people involved. A local newspaper counted groups in at least seven municipalities within Morelos by 2015.
  - The National Human Rights Commission's 2014 report included Morelos as a state with at least a "low frequency" of autodefensas; Animal Politico backed this claim, and the New York data set indicated that there was a moderate number of autodefensas in Morelos (possibly 4) by the end of 2013.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **P = positive**
  - Farmers, ranchers, and other civilians in rural areas support the notion of forming autodefensas, as they feel that their distance from infrastructure and the government has resulted in the state being unable to provide them with the security they need (La Prensa, Milenio).
  - It should be noted that some support the rights of citizens to defend their own territory and property, or see these groups as the best option left to the citizens, but do not support the use of weaponry. This could fall under the designation of ideological support (positive) or the perception that the groups are justice-seeking but generally inclined to violence (cautious). Given the reactions of Morelos' rural inhabitants, the "positive" designation seems more correct.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - As noted above, the state authorities are seen as unable to provide sufficient safety and security, particularly in the rural areas, and there is a lot of caution towards the state police because they have traditionally succumbed to crime.
  - Reports of police-backed violence, extortion, murder, and kidnappings have been made in Morelos, as well as the allegation of police corruption. In the

words of one journalist, “we are completely unprotected...by all the authorities who are supposed to be ensuring our security.”

- The authorities are perceived to be working hand-in-hand with criminals to help ensure that they do not face punishments for their crimes. This condition has been exacerbated by the introduction of even more corrupt federal police into the state. Only 1% of citizens support the notion of continuing “Mando Unico,” which combines federal and local forces; even many policemen do not approve (e.g. because of quotas being imposed upon them, arbitrary arrests, etc.).
- It should be noted that some citizens do not see the autodefensas as an activity against the state, but rather a necessity to provide what the local and state police cannot.
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **A = anti-drug violence**
  - At least some of these groups are armed with pistols and machetes, although there are clearly instances in which the autodefensas are not armed; neither type is above the use of violence to protect their communities. While the cartels have not been explicitly named in the autodefensas’ statements, the complaints of the civilian leaders are enough to conclude that cartel violence is likely to be a factor: most of the autodefensas give police corruption, insecurity, and “organized crime” or “gang violence” as their reasons for starting the groups. Generally, when both police corruption and violence are occurring in a situation known to be exacerbated by drug turf wars, this is a reasonable conclusion.
  - These groups in Morelos do not have the recognition to be placed in one of the “registered” categories, nor are they in one of the extreme ends of the “non-registered” type of militias.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **N = No interaction**
  - There seems to have been little interaction between the civilian defense groups and the authorities in this state, with the exception of media releases and the noted reluctance of the (state) authorities to recognize the groups. The citizens of several towns did set up roadblocks, but this is not uncommon in rural areas of Mexico, and as long as they do not create major obstructions to traffic, authorities will generally let them be.
- **Who’s in control?**
  - **A = Anarchy**
  - In 2014, Morelos was the state with the highest degree of violence, as well as the highest rate of extortion, a crime often associated with the drug cartels; Cuernavaca was the most violent municipality. Milenio reported that there are 4 major cartels in operation throughout Morelos, as well as over 80 gangs and numerous other criminals. Insight Crime reported that there are now turf wars

between gangs in this state, especially in Cuernavaca, as the major drug cartels have become weaker.

- Morelos is also a very poor state, which could exacerbate the existing social issues and criminal activity. The United States Department of State also issued a travel warning for Morelos, urging American visitors to “exercise caution.” In addition, the recent assassination of a mayor indicates that the state has very little control, and that the criminal elements must be reckoned with; according to family accounts, the mayor “never received protection from the authorities.”

## Nayarit Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - N/A
  - No significant government rhetoric was found in research on Nayarit; the state and local authorities were curiously quiet about the phenomenon occurring elsewhere in the country.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **N = none (0)**
  - In Nayarit, the primary actors who form autodefensas are indigenous groups, who seek not only to advance indigenous rights, but also to address perceived abuses by the police, most of which are not of the ilk that suggest a cartel connection (e.g. racism). There are also groups that are supposedly meant to stop theft in the state, but they do not exhibit enough of the characteristics of fighting organized crime to merit inclusion in this thesis, despite the fact that low levels of autodefensa activity were indicated in the New York dataset at the end of 2013.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **P = positive**
  - Internet commentary supported the idea of bringing *autodefensas* to Nayarit, although it did not indicate that the civilians wanted to form the groups themselves, or that any civilians intended to provide resources to them. This commentary was supportive of the groups' rights to form, and the justice of their cause, but did not go any further than that.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - Internet commentary suggests that the civilians in Nayarit are equally as untrusting of their government as those in other states, an observation which matches the ENVIPE survey results. In the usual fashion, the government is accused of corruption and failing to provide safety to its citizens.
  - The ENVIPE survey results show that 10.6% of crimes are reported in Nayarit, just under the national average of 10.7%. In 2011 and 2012, this state exhibited significantly higher levels of perceived insecurity (79.3% and 72.9% as opposed to 69.5% and 66.6%). This is likely connected to the higher rates of violence seen in that state between 2009 and 2012; Borderland Beat asserts that the number of un-named bodies being dumped by the cartels rose by three times in that period. In recent years, this relationship has reversed, with 55.5% of respondents indicating that they felt unsafe in Nayarit in 2015, as opposed to the national average of 73.2%.
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - N/A
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - N/A

- **Who's in control?**
  - **CVG = Cartels versus Government**
  - According to the DEA map, there are two to four drug cartels present in the state (Sinaloa and CJNG), but the government asserts that they are a minimal threat. Most sources place several cartels in the region, and although the government insists that there are no cartels dominating the region, there appears to be a significant enough presence to merit the above designation. This is especially true when considering the fact that several police officers have been killed by the cartels in Nayarit; Borderland Beat asserts that this may be retaliation for the state's attempt to quash organized crime.
  - The address the fact that there is spillover violence from neighboring states such as Jalisco, the government is attempting to keep its citizens safe by instituting a new "Civil Guard." This group is not to be confused with the autodefensas in this thesis; rather, it is a branch of the police. Nayarit has also previously conducted sweeping operations against the drug cartels, capturing over 100 members of the groups in a year at the program's high point.
  - This designation was also given based on the Travel Warning issued by the U.S. Bureau of Consular Affairs, which lists Nayarit as a state with travel warnings on it. In particular, US citizens are advised against travelling on rural roads or near the borders of the state.

## Nuevo Leon Code

- **Political Rhetoric towards autodefensas**
  - **N = negative**
  - In regard to the autodefensas in Michoacán, the government asserts that fighting violence with violence will never work. They do not trust the autodefensas in that area, highlighting the extreme uncertainty regarding their sources of financing and resources. The government's strongest argument is that there is no way to tell who these groups are receiving money from; there have been several cases of autodefensas in Michoacán being funded by cartels to kill their rivals.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **N = none (0)**
  - Several news media outlets confirmed that there are no self-defense groups which would fit this thesis' definition of autodefensas operating in Nuevo Leon. There was recently a group that threatened to create a similar civilian organization, but they were neither positioning themselves against drug violence, nor do they appear to have actually followed through on that threat.
  - An *SDP Noticias* article referenced "autodefensas" created in the early 2010s but portrayed them as unarmed, politically-active civilians who petitioned for the purging of corruption from the police force. This led to the creation of the Civil Force, a group of new policemen with higher salaries.
  - A sociologist interviewed by *terra.com* asserted that instead of civilian defense groups, Nuevo Leon has "dynamic reporting" groups who take to social media to keep each other informed of danger.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **N = negative**
  - The civilians' opinions towards vigilante groups in other states are negative due to the uncertainty associated with these groups, particularly their extra-judicial punishments. Reporters explicitly ask how the groups obtained their finances and resources, which could have come from the cartels, and asserted that the actions of the civilian groups only "complicated things." In the eyes of the citizens of Nuevo Leon, "the paramilitaries failed."
  - It should be noted that non-violent, less extrajudicial modes of self-defense are met with approval. For example, going through more official channels or forming social media networks to communicate with each other. Again, we have a case of rural versus city considerations.
  - Note of interest: there was an "us versus them" tone in the op. ed. article, which was very interesting. The author referenced the fact that the vigilantes were popping up in rural areas, and commented, "Imagine if these were allowed not only there but here, in the metropolitan area!"
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**

- In regard to the federal government, the citizens of Nuevo Leon believe that Calderon is responsible for creating the war that brought destruction to the state. The perception of Nieto is slightly more positive because he acted quickly to address corruption in the police force, but there is still a strong sense of exasperation with the federal government.
- The ENVIPE survey results show that 11.3% of crimes were reported in the state, slightly more than the 10.7% national average. Similarly, 70.7% of respondents felt that their state was unsafe (lower than the 73% national average). However, only 39.1% reported insecurity in their locality, which is very positive for the purposes of preventing drastic extrajudicial measures (according to Mary Malone).
- The citizens believed that the state government acted correctly in purging the old police forces of individuals accused of extortion and corruption, although this also negatively impacted public opinion of the former police force. In the 2015 Mexico Positive Peace Index, 73% of Nuevo Leon's civilians reported that they felt unsafe; while this is an improvement from 2011, when safety was at an all-time low, it does not reflect well on the citizens' perceptions of the state government and its ability to keep them safe. Moreover, for the first time, an independent candidate won the governorship of Nuevo Leon by a landslide, indicating a strong desire for governmental change.
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - N/A
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - N/A
- **Level of armament**
  - N/A
- **Who's in control?**
  - **CVG = cartels vs government**
  - One of the primary groups in operation in Nuevo Leon is Cartel del Norte (CDN), the Zetas under a new name. According to the DEA maps, the Zetas currently have the upper hand in this state, acting as the primary players in Nuevo Leon. However, it should be noted that the CJNG, Gulf cartel, and Beltran cartel are also operating in much smaller capacities in that state, with the more agile CJNG posing a significant threat. This state has historically been plagued by turf struggles between the Gulf cartel and the Zetas, with drug-related massacres being especially prominent in the early 2010s; the *Houston Chronicle* characterized Monterrey, the capital, as a key location for the warehousing of drugs, so it has strategic importance.
  - There has been a concerted effort on the part of the local, federal, and state governments to fight against the cartels, who also have a significant amount of power. Even as recently as December 2015, Mexican Marines have conducted capture operations in Nuevo Leon; a high-ranking BLO boss was caught. Due to such efforts, we can categorize this state as at least partially controlled by

the government. Here, the “offense” largely consists of altering police forces and policies to minimize cartel control (SDP Noticias).

- The State Department for the United States advised “exercising extreme caution” in this state, particularly in Monterrey.

## Oaxaca Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **P\***
  - One of the four governments to recognize the autodefensas, Oaxaca's mayor originally voiced support for the groups because the state did not have the resources or power to help its citizens. The state therefore understands the concerns of the groups and has enfranchised at least some of them, but it cannot provide more than symbolic public support. It should also be noted that the state greatly discouraged extra-judicial acts and emphasized "keeping the peace."
  - \*Note that this applies to the "legitimate" groups that have registered with the state; there are other groups whose alliance is hazier, as well as certain groups which the government is in conflict with (particularly the triqui), but we focus here on the majority, which is on decent terms with the government.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **M = many (5 +)**
  - At least two were identified based on the 2015 article from *El Universal*, plus another from *Proceso* in January. The *Regeneracion* article named two additional groups, and the CNN article identified Santos Reyes Nopala as another location for civilian militia formation.
  - The National Human Rights Commission's 2014 report included Oaxaca as a state with at least a "low frequency" of autodefensas
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **S = supportive**
  - "...many local residents defend them as the only true security force in regions that are remote and riddled with corruption at the state and municipal government level."
  - Civilians refer to historical precedent and (in many cases) indigenous rights to support the notion of forming self-defense militias. They feel that the state does not have the resources to protect them.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **B = bypassing**
  - The civilians have stated their awareness that the state government does not have the resources to help them. The state's difficult terrain and distance from Mexico City also makes it difficult for the federal government to help its people. Additionally, the history between the civilians and the federal police (as well as the region's strong drive for autonomy) has led to a minimizing of federal involvement.
  - Oaxaca's ENVIPE results show that 10.6% of crimes are reported in the state, just under the national average of 10.7%. The state has historically reported lower levels of insecurity than the rest of the nation; however, perceived

insecurity is rising, such that 77.7% of citizens reported feeling unsafe, as opposed to 73.2% nationally.

- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **Non-Registered**
  - **Anti-Violence (A)**
    - Although it seems unlikely that these groups are a threat to the state, given their willingness to work with the Oaxaca government and their request for legitimacy, they do have as their stated purpose a limit to the violence and crime in the region. Members of the group are characterized as “elected,” so it would seem that they have social pull, and the assertion that they have a commander suggests that they are more organized and militarized than a neighborhood watch group would be. It should be noted that these groups are very lightly armed, with no fire arms reported, only machetes and batons.
- **Types of interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **U = unilateral activity**
  - The autodefensas appealed to the authorities for legitimacy, but have not yet received it; neither has the government actively attempted to stop them, which suggests either a form of tacit approval or the beginning of a partnership.
- **Who’s in Control?**
  - **S = Self-governing Civilians**
  - The US State Department gave a mild Travel Warning for Oaxaca, indicating that travelers should be wary of robbery.
  - Given that the civilians took it upon themselves to form their own defense groups, it would appear that the government does not have significant control. Certainly, Oaxaca is recognized for being one of the poorer states, and it does not have significant resources. Indigenous civilians are especially prone to acting on their own, electing their own councils and creating self-defense groups through community consensus. The cartels are active in the area, with the cells of at least five different groups present, but it is not clear that they have significant control. Taking into account the history of the state and the tendency for the indigenous to be extremely autonomous, it is proper to label the individual communities of civilians as having the control.

## Puebla Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - The government denied the existence of legitimate *autodefensas* in Puebla, and explicitly stated that their presence was unnecessary. The head of the General Secretariat of Government asserted that Puebla did not have the right social conditions for such groups to emerge; to that end, he claimed that there were no *autodefensas* in the state.
  - Puebla authorities stated that they would send in troops to regulate civilian movements and deter organization, an action that presumably stopped short of violence but carries a very negative message.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **Few = few (1-2)**
  - The presence of one group was confirmed in 2014 by *Animal Politico*. In our research, we found a group that declared at least one of its intentions to be the protection of civilians in San Gabriel Chilac from criminal elements, including those that colluded with corrupt police.
  - The National Human Rights Commission's 2014 report included Puebla as a state with at least a "low frequency" of autodefensas.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **S = Supportive**
  - Citizens were among those making announcements for the creation of the group, and media sources indicate that they are actually funding the group, as well. The governor of Puebla admitted that the Common Front for Peaceful Civil Resistance had the support of the citizens, which was making it difficult to dissuade the group from its activities.
  - "Inhabitants of the town of San Gabriel Chilac, to the southeast of the Puebla territory, announced formation of an autodefensa which will be advised and trained by its counterparts from Michoacán and which, moreover, will be funded by the citizens of Pueblo who live abroad" (*Proceso*).
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - "[The citizens] decided to create this group to defend themselves against criminal groups which plague the region in complicity with the municipal and state police authorities" (*Proceso*).
  - "Tired of government corruption and indifference, the mob fashioned its own justice, part of a longstanding problem that Mexican officials say is on the rise" (*New York Times*).
  - Civilians have not intentionally engaged in hostilities with the government, but they distrust Puebla authorities for fear of corruption and ties to criminal organizations. The civilians are more likely to believe that officials are present to harm them than to protect them, especially police. Their primary motivation

for this belief is that police let criminals go, even when their crimes are well-known. There have also been past incidents where civilians were injured during protests, due to the passage of a law that enabled officers to shoot firearms and nonlethal weapons in such situations; this has further degraded civilian-police relationships.

- According to the ENVIPE survey results, Puebla demonstrated lower civilian perceptions of insecurity, with 67.4% of the state population indicating that they felt unsafe in 2015, compared to the national average of 73.2%. While this figure is part of a steady increase in civilian perceptions of insecurity, from 57.1% reporting insecurity in 2012 to the current 67.4% figure, Puebla has consistently reported lower perceptions of insecurity than the national average. Puebla also reported a higher incidence of crime reporting, with 12.3% of crimes being reported instead of 10.7% in 2015.
- **Type of *autodefensas***
  - **Anti-Drug Violence (A)**
  - The Common Front for Peaceful Civil Resistance skirts the line between the NW and A types, as reports do not suggest that it is armed, but it is levying political commentary against the government and conducting anti-state acts such as petitioning to self-govern. Neither of these activities is characteristic of a neighborhood watch group. The group's stated purpose is to protect the community against violence, particularly from organized crime, and it poses enough of a threat to the government that troops are being sent in; for these reasons, it is categorized as an Anti-Drug Violence group.
  - The group's name suggests that they do not possess weapons, but reports regarding the group do not explicitly state one way or the other.
  - "Inhabitants of the town of San Gabriel Chilac, to the southeast of Puebla, announced the formation of an *autodefensa* which will be coached and trained by its counterparts from Michoacán and which will be funded by the citizens of Puebla who live abroad...they decided to create this group to defend themselves against criminal groups which plague the region in complicity with the municipal and state police authorities." (*Proceso*).
- **Interactions between *autodefensas* and authorities**
  - **Hostile (H)**
  - This group is not registered with the government, and its rhetoric towards the authorities is negative. The government stated in its communiqués regarding the group that it would be dispatching soldiers to the town as a response, in order to remove any elements of such a group. In response, the group asserted that it would be collecting signatures to petition the Congress to allow the town to govern itself. This is enough to merit a categorization of hostile.
- **Who's in control?**
  - **A = anarchy**
  - In early 2016, residents of a town in Puebla tied up and burned a pair of brothers alive after breaking into the local police station, on the grounds that

they were outsiders to the town asking suspicious questions. The police were beaten when they tried to stop the mob. Another man was nearly lynched for stealing money. In 2015, several policemen were also beaten, two to death, for the death of a civilian. It does not appear that the citizens expressly seek out police officers to hurt them, but they do not let the authority of the police stop them from acting against perceived criminals.

- CNN Expansion also reports that crime is on the rise in Puebla in all but two categories; rape, homicide, and kidnapping are all above the three-year historical average.
- According to the DEA drug map, Puebla exhibits extensive control by the Zetas, although one cell of the BLO is also present. Although there are now only two major groups operating in Puebla, the state was previous the site of a struggle between cells of these two groups, as well as the Knights Templar. The United States Department of State does not have a travel advisory in effect for Puebla.
- Given the impunity with which the criminals operate, and the apparent inability of the government to address issues such as lynching, we can label this state as lacking a strong government. Not enough cartel information arose to label this state as a cartel-controlled state, so a more proper designation would be a state of anarchy.

## Queretaro Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - The state government largely denies that autodefensas exist. While one official said that residents of Santa Rosa Jauregui were arming themselves against “criminal groups,” the vast majority of the government officials assert that the state does not need them. The Secretary of Government in particular asserted that saying such groups exist is “completely absurd.”
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **N = none (0)**
  - Although a single local deputy said that at least one civilian militia operates in the state, the lack of articles and Internet commentary on the existence of such a group suggests that there are none. There were at least two Facebook pages with groups claiming to be autodefensas in Queretaro, but the veracity of these pages was not ascertainable. Moreover, the pages showed very little activity: only 47 people “joined” one of these online communities, and the group posted very occasionally, mostly links to wanted posters for drug cartel members. The postings for this group ended in 2014. The other group posted similar material with greater political undertones once or twice a year, and their final post also occurred in 2014. It is unlikely that either of these pages are indicative of any autodefensa that would qualify for this thesis.
  - This is consistent with the data from the New York project. No civilian militias were reported in this state at the end of their data set (which overlaps with mine). Similarly, Animal Politico did not report any civilian militias in Queretaro as of mid-2014.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **I = indifferent/unsure**
  - Although there appear to be no autodefensas in Queretaro, the citizens of the state expressed mixed or unsure opinions regarding those in other states. In a positive example, the state’s bishop asked the federal government to guarantee the security of the militias in Michoacán, expressing the opinion that those men only came together to protect themselves and their families. However, there is not a strong positive consensus towards the autodefensas, and citizens have voiced concerns regarding the violence in neighboring Michoacán.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **C = cautious**
  - Queretaro is considered one of the safest states in Mexico, according to several sources (including a Youtube video uploaded by Alternativo), but it seems that the citizens’ sense of security and trust in the government to keep them safe is diminishing. Most of the instances of violence are not connected to the cartels (rather to youth gangs), although the rapes and disappearances might suggest otherwise.

- The civilians have not taken demonstrative actions against the government, nor are there many claims that the state government is working with the cartels. According to a study published by the University of Queretaro (UAQ), the citizens have a less negative perception of the government authorities than they did in previous years (there was an 8% decrease in the number of citizens who would categorize their local police as “very corrupt”). However, crime and a feeling of insecurity remain top concerns. For these reasons, “cautious” is a reasonable label.
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - N/A
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - N/A
- **Who’s in Control?**
  - **CVG = Cartels vs. Government**
  - Given the state’s reputation for safety, it is likely that the government has at least some control, particularly in the areas of policing. Over the past 2 years, the state has also instituted “Safe Queretaro,” an initiative through which three levels of government (state, local, and federal) collaborate to lock down the state’s borders and mitigate the spread of crime and violence. This initiative was enacted in response to the violence in Michoacán, and the possibility that criminals might flee to neighboring areas. In addition, it should be noted that there is no U.S. Travel Warning in effect for Queretaro. Borderland Beat reported that Queretaro is the 3<sup>rd</sup> most peaceful state in Mexico, according to the 2015 Mexico Peace Index.  
Despite the government initiatives, the Knights Templar and the BLO have a strong presence in this state, and the newspaper articles referenced civilian disappearances more from 2013, onward. Additionally, there have been at least three high-profile kidnappings in the state, from a PRI candidate to the former daughter in law of Vicente Fox. This makes it logical to label this state as being caught between the cartels and the government, fighting for control.

## Quintana Roo Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **P = positive**
  - Originally, the state government gave multiple press releases to assert that there were no “Michoacán-style” autodefensas in Quintana Roo. However, several officials recently gave the citizens permission to form neighborhood watches against theft, provided that they work with the authorities instead of acting like state authorities. Towards the end of 2014, these groups were even encouraged; one official offered to register them officially with the state.
- **Number of autodefensas + Confirmation status**
  - **M = Many (5 +)**
  - The figures from the New York dataset suggest that there were autodefensas of some kind towards the end of 2013. However, the groups mentioned in the earlier newspaper articles were specifically focused on preventing theft and giving the community at least a minimum level of security. The cartels did not factor into the decision, at least not explicitly, and there was no mention of strong government corruption (only inaction).
  - Towards the end of 2014, the autodefensas were geared towards protecting the civilians from violence and corruption, fitting the description for our project. One of these is located in Othón P. Blanco, another in Cancun. There are also two located in the city of Chetumal, and additional groups were referenced but not specifically oriented with regard to location.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **C = cautious**
  - The civilians, particularly community leaders, seem to support the notion of acting if the government cannot provide services such as protection, as they have not spoken out otherwise. According to Union Cancun, the groups are “well-regarded.” However, they did not mention taking up arms and thus cannot be said to be explicitly supportive of the “Michoacán-style” autodefensas.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - The newspaper articles strongly asserted that the authorities are either not doing enough to protect their citizens, or that they do not care; they are considered “complacent.” There is a significant level of discontent towards the government, but corruption was not referenced much, if at all.
  - According to the ENVIPE survey results, 12.4% of crimes were reported in Quintana Roo, slightly higher than the national average of 10.7%. Perceptions of insecurity are also significantly lower in this state, although they are not at the lowest in the country: 61% of respondents reported that they felt insecure in Quintana Roo, as compared to 73.2% nation-wide.
- **Type of autodefensas**

- **W = neighborhood watch**
- These groups are lightly armed, and have explicitly been forbidden to act in an extrajudicial manner. Their intent is to keep the civilians safe.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **P = partnership**
  - The authorities are encouraging activity on the part of the autodefensas, and the possibility of enfranchisement as part of the Rural Defense force program is on the table.
- **Who's in control?**
  - **U = unknown**
  - The United States government did not issue a Travel Warning for Quintana Roo. According to the DEA cartel map, Quintana Roo was host to at least four cartels, with the Gulf cartel holding the most significant territory.
  - There is not significant evidence that the cartels are providing services and protection to the citizens, nor are there groups of civilians who unilaterally act in their own best interest, as is the case with Oaxaca. The government might be said to be in control, at least on the surface. In particular, there are not any issues with corruption. However, the government clearly cannot provide services uniformly to all of its people, and is even encouraging neighborhood watches, which suggests minimal control on its part.

## San Luis Potosi Code

- Political Rhetoric
  - **N = Negative**
  - The authorities largely deny the existence of the civilian militias in this state, and their assessment of other states' *autodefensas* is that the militias cannot be trusted due to their extrajudicial nature. Moreover, the official opinion is that militias only arise when the government is insufficient.
  - The former deputy mayor of Tampacan said that there were “self-defense groups” in the state, but that they serve as policing organizations for the rural areas, trained by the Mexican army (they are more like “local authorities”). Other officials reacted to this by asserting that there were no armed groups such as those that fit our definition of *autodefensas*, and that if there were, they would be illegal. It is unclear what the purpose of these groups is.
- Number of autodefensas
  - **N = none (0)**
  - Several articles referenced an indigenous group in Tamasopo armed with rocks, sticks, and machetes, but its primary focus was on police abuse, not organized crime. These two issues are often related, but since the group explicitly stated that it had not formed against organized crime, we can assert that this group does not fit our *autodefensa* profile.
  - Given the lack of certainty as to whether the groups potentially in existence are intended to protect against cartel violence, we can assert that there are no such groups. We should also note that the Osorio dataset also did not show any proliferation of self-defense forces up until 2013.
- Civilian attitudes towards *autodefensas*
  - **P = positive**
  - At the start of the timeline, there was mild support in Internet commentary towards the *autodefensas* elsewhere, mostly predicated on the thought that the Mexican government wasn't doing enough to help its people. Towards 2015, there were more public calls for armed civilian organization and self-protection, indicating support for the formation of such groups.
  - In particular, an ex-policeman named Julio Alonso called for civilians in the metro area to form *autodefensas*, denouncing the government's conciliatory claims that violence in the area was coming from a series of “isolated incidents.” He specified that the goal should not be to bring down the state, but to “defend ourselves as civilians against all types of cartels.” He has received both attention and support from civilians for this assertion.
- Civilian attitude towards authorities
  - **N = negative**
  - Internet commentary indicates significant distrust of the state government, as well as the PRI. Common sentiments include a feeling that the government is failing to prevent crime, including theft and murder, and that the authorities

are corrupt (e.g. referencing the practice of extortion). Julio Alonso, the ex-policeman interviewed by *La Jornada*, asserted that “neither the state nor federal police are interested in prevention [of crime].” The indigenous civilians in particular feel subject to police abuses, such as extortion. According to an interviewee for Milenio, the police “are a factor of uncertainty for the people.”

- According to the 2015 ENVIPE survey, only 6.5% of crimes were reported in San Luis Potosi, far below the national average of 10.7%. This indicates a low degree of trust in the authorities. It should be noted, however, that civilian perceptions of safety were better in San Luis Potosi than they were nationally: only 69.2% of the state’s population reported a perception of insecurity in 2015, compared to the national 73.2% average. Although the state exhibited higher instances of insecurity in the past, it exhibited lower insecurity ratings in 3 of the last 5 years.
- Type of autodefensas
  - N/A
- Interactions between autodefensas and authorities
  - N/A
- Who’s in control?
  - **CVG = Cartels vs. Government**
  - The U.S. State Department issued a travel warning for San Luis Potosi, encouraging Americans to exercise caution in the state, and asserting that American personnel may only travel during the daytime in that area. This suggests that there is a measure of insecurity and possibly corruption, if the federal government prohibits actions such as nighttime travel (as well as patronage of entertainment establishments).
  - The 2015 DEA map shows that the Zetas, the Gulf Cartel, and the CJNG are the primary cartel influences in San Luis Potosi. This could be a point of concern for a potential turf struggle.
  - Although the beginning of our timeline does not show significant cartel vs. government interactions, there certainly seems to be an undertone of the state government attempting to fight corruption within its own ranks. The situation almost appears to be a cartel-controlled situation, although the government is not totally complicit and is attempting to provide services such as protection to its people. The government appears to have enough control to provide basic necessities, such that fewer citizens report insecurity in San Luis Potosi than the national average. Additionally, it has conducted anti-cartel military operations in the past, in conjunction with the federal armed forces (2014 and 2011), succeeding in capturing several cartel leaders. With that being said, it is clear that there is at least some measure of organized crime and cartel-related violence, given the US Travel Warning (usually an indicator of such activity).

## Sinaloa Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = Negative**
  - There was little commentary from the government with regard to the civilian defense groups, but the authorities who spoke up (including the Secretary of Public Safety for Sinaloa) have denounced the idea that self-defense groups exist in Sinaloa as rumors, and claim that the state is “safe.”
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **N = none (0)**
  - It appears that there is one group of “Community Self-Defense Guards” on the border of Sinaloa with Sonora, but they are mostly concerned with obtaining land from the government, which they claim to have lost due to government action, as well as organized crime. They voiced concerns over the presence of criminals on that land, but this seems secondary to the group’s goal to retrieve the lost land; it should be noted that this group is comprised exclusively of Yaqui and Mayo indigenous people. Their explicit purpose is “the restitution of their lands.” For this reason, that group is more properly treated as a political or indigenous rights group.
  - Several different media outlets have confirmed the existence of the “self-defense guards” specifically mentioned above, but many also insist that there are no autodefensas in the region. Given the nature of the Sinaloa/Sonora native group, it is more accurate to state that there are not any autodefensas in Sinaloa.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **C = cautious**
  - Commentary towards the autodefensas was mostly directed at those operating in other states, but there was significant conflict in terms of opinions.
  - Through Internet commentaries, citizens expressed doubt that there could be “peaceful” autodefensas. There was a definitive concern as to the motives of these groups, as well as the potential for them to become corrupt.
  - Despite this, there is a general sentiment that only the citizens can help each other, or themselves. The notion of self-defense groups had just as many supporters as detractors, especially in the face of government corruption and inaction. In this sense, the civilians supported the groups in ideological terms, especially in light of the bad situation in Sinaloa.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = Negative**
  - The citizens of Sinaloa do not feel that the government will protect them, to the extent that they have threatened to create autodefensas for their own safety if the state government continues in its failure to provide security. They allege that their problems (e.g. looting, houses being burned, and other forms of

vandalism) have been reported to the government, but that the authorities have not done anything to help them.

- Additionally, the authorities are seen as corrupt, and citizens have little to no faith that their input matters (in particular, they feel that their votes are useless and that the government is in the thrall of both criminals and foreign powers).
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - N/A
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - N/A
- **Level of armament**
  - N/A
- **Who's in control?**
  - **C = cartels**
  - From the media accounts, the cartels appear to be fighting over territory, while the government is unable to affect much change and the civilians are terrified. According to the DEA, the Beltran and Sinaloa cartels are in control here.
  - In December, a Mexican military helicopter was actually attacked by cartel or organized crime members in retaliation for the seizure and burning of drugs, showing that the groups are brazen in their attacks. The U.S. government strongly advises avoiding the state, with the exception of resort cities.
  - The government has essentially banned full media coverage and investigation into crime, which suggests that the government is under the thumb of the organized crime groups. There have also been reports of Sinaloa state and local police working for the cartels, to the extent that they either participated in crimes (including murders), or turned a blind eye to them.
  - InsightCrime.org confirmed that the Sinaloa cartel has wormed its way deeply into the government of the state, particularly its law enforcement. Sinaloa also has the most businesses linked to the Sinaloa Cartel, some of which have received work contracts from the Mexican federal government. When pressed about the possibility that businesspeople have ties to the cartel, state officials asserted that they did not know.
  - Finally, Sinaloa is one of three states that make up the “Golden Triangle” of drug trafficking, wherein some of the highest degrees of drug-related violence are found because of the region’s production of drug crops such as opium and marijuana.

## Sonora Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - The politicians have suggested that the “self-defense groups” currently in the state are politically motivated or of dubious intent. This is especially true for their claims against Francisco Villa, the leader of the group in Agiabampo, whom officials claim to have been involved in “territorial conflicts” in two states. The implication here is that the *autodefensas* may be connected to unsavory groups, and are thus untrustworthy.
  - The authorities have stated that they “cannot allow people to get together, nor to arm,” especially given the potentially criminal background of one of the leaders. At the mildest, the mayor of Navojoa expressed the importance of dealing with the groups, so as not to encourage the civilians to do more than assemble and demonstrate.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **F = few (1-2)**
  - The Osorio dataset indicated low levels of autodefensa activity at the end of 2013 for Sonora, although this must be taken with caution due to our narrower definition of *autodefensas*.
  - Research for this project has indicated that there are at least two *autodefensa* groups operating in the state of Sonora, both of which are neighborhood watch types. One is located in Cajeme; the other is located in Agiabampo. The second of these (with Francisco Villa) dates back to 2014, and the other one was formed at the start of 2015 as a reaction to increasing violence in the area.
- **Civilian attitudes towards *autodefensas***
  - **C = cautious**
  - There was a significant mixture in the tones of Internet commentary, with some people urging the creation of more autodefensas, and quickly; others stressed the potential dangers, especially the fact that many groups have begun with good intentions and ended as criminals.
  - With regard to the groups that have already formed, since they were created by the people and are comprised of the citizens in the two towns, it would be proper to state that some civilians support the groups, although this may not apply to all citizens within Sonora.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - There is a distinct sense that the government is not doing enough to help its citizens, particularly in the realm of providing safety; when the civilians have reached out for help in the past, it was not given. In some areas of the state, especially towards the border, organized crime violence is so bad that citizens are afraid to speak for fear of reprisal, and many of them are trying to flee

with their families. There is also a strong sense of corruption in the state and local governments.

- There is a significant sense of insecurity in Sonora, but according to ENVIPE, this state reported significantly lower perceptions of insecurity than the national average; only 62.5% of respondents asserted that they felt insecure in their state, compared to the national 73.2%. However, there has been a continuous rise in perceptions of insecurity in Sonora, from just 42.4% in 2012 to 62.5% for 2015. It should also be noted that 16.6% of crimes were reported in this state, significantly more than the 10.7% national average.
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **W = neighborhood watch**
  - These people are unarmed, although they do stand in for the police and claim to have made at least 10 arrests. Their primary focus is on catching criminals, and their methods include using walkie-talkies and patrolling the perimeters of their towns. Drug dealing is very prominent in this area, and has led to several cases of drug-related violence that have threatened the community.
  - It should be noted that at least one group announced that it would contact the groups in Michoacán for assistance and advice.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **N = no interaction**
  - Although the *autodefensas* have reached out to the authorities for recognition and resources, they have not received it. There have been no physical confrontations between the government and the civilian defense groups, nor have there been any treaties or significant attempts at conciliation.
- **Who's in control?**
  - **CVG = Cartels vs. Government**
  - The State Department has issued a travel warning against non-essential travel in Sonora, as well as any travel that involves leaving major roads. In this warning, Sonora is recognized as a key location for trafficking and other illegal activity, as well as a site of local indigenous unrest; extreme caution is advised for this state. This is a significant indication of insecurity.
  - According to the DEA, the state is host to both the Sinaloa and Beltran cartels.
  - The Mexican Federal Police are heavily in operation in Sonora, hunting and detaining drug dealers. However, there have been instances in the past of mass migrations due to violence in the non-urban areas of the state. Additionally, in some towns, government officials are afraid to speak out due to the personal threats they have received from organized crime. This is sufficient evidence to suggest a clash between the government and the cartels.

## Tabasco Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **H (hostile)**
  - Although Tabasco's government admitted that the People United against Crime (PUCD) existed, it denounced the group as members of organized crime, and voiced concerns that they might have ties to another cartel, or possibly receive their funding from such a source.
  - "The group which calls itself the People United against Crime called on governor Arturo Nunez Jimenez to "clean house," in reference to the management positions of the state law enforcement bodies, claiming that they protect criminals and the criminal organization Los Zetas" (*CNN Mexico*).
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **F = Few (1 to 2 )**
  - One civilian defense group was supposedly formed by farmers in Cardenas, but there was not enough evidence to support their activities as being qualified for this thesis' definition of *autodefensas*. The National Human Rights Commission's 2014 report included Tabasco as a state with at least a "low frequency" of autodefensas. In our research, only one group – PUCD – was identifiable as an *autodefensa* that fit the thesis definition.
  - One group in Tabasco self-identified as the "People United against Crime," which actually "killed five suspected drug dealers attributed and warned that it would continue to 'clean up drug traffickers, kidnappers and rapists and thieves' in the state of Tabasco" (*Sin Embargo*).
  - *Sin Embargo* reports that the groups which have arisen in Tabasco are among those which formed "to protect their towns and citizens from the highly organized criminal cartels."
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **C = cautious**
  - With regard towards the more benign autodefensas, people seemed to approve that they thought before killing or resorting to more serious violence (e.g. not lynching the robbers, but instead handing them over to the state police). The citizens are uncertain of the groups' motives, however, which makes them cautious.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **Negative (N)**
  - According to a 2015 article by *Excelsior*, the citizens of Tabasco view the authorities as "useless," and both analysts and civilians believe that 80% of the police are corrupt or linked to organized crime in some way. Corruption and bribery is very high in this state, and the civilians feel that the result is that they cannot rely on government officials to come to their aid. This is evident in the fact that civilians are more likely to attempt extrajudicial justice (e.g. lynching of robbers) than to turn criminals over to the police.

- With that being said, reporting of crime is slightly higher in Tabasco than the national average, as 12.4% of crimes are reported to the authorities (compared to 10.7% nationally). However, civilians in Tabasco reported a much higher perception of insecurity: 88.9% of respondents to the ENVIPE survey asserted that their state was insecure, in contrast to the national average of 73.2%.
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **Non-Registered (N)**
  - **Pseudo-police (P)**
  - PUCD expressed its intent to protect the community and “clean house” in a way that the government has not been able to, levying extensive political rhetoric against the government. Their level of armament is as yet unknown, and they have not registered with the state government. However, they either have the numbers or the weapons to have killed five “suspected drug dealers.”
  - News reports state that the men were armed, but they do not reveal the extent to which they were armed.
  - N. B: PUCD specifically targeted the Zetas as an enemy of the populace, expressing the desire to specifically take them down.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - This group has not physically engaged with the authorities, although they have denounced the government as being heavily corrupt. They particularly accuse the local police of being paid off to provide protection for the Zetas.
  - “The emergence of a group of men, who, hooded and armed, accuse the government of Tabasco of tolerating corruption in the law enforcement through a video on the internet, was denounced by the state government within hours of its appearance” (*CNN Mexico*).
- **Who’s in control?**
  - **C = Cartels**
  - The United States has not issued a travel advisory for Tabasco. According to the DEA maps, this state is primarily controlled by the Zetas, although the Gulf cartel has a small foothold.
  - Transparency International ranked Tabasco as the 5<sup>th</sup> most corrupt state in Mexico, with particular attention to its judicial system, which takes bribes from organized crime. *Borderland Beat* also reported on extensive official corruption and theft, citing the embezzlement of millions from state coffers. Beyond corruption, Tabasco has historically witnessed the killings of nearly 60 police officers, including a police investigator, as well as several military officers and state prosecutors. The murder of authorities indicates brazenness on the part of the cartels; since there have been no major operations to combat this, and since the government appears unable to protect even the authorities, it is safe to infer that the cartels have the upper hand on the government. Since the government is not fighting back, CVG is not an appropriate designation.

## Tamaulipas Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - The mayor of Hidalgo offered public support and justification for the groups' cause, but the federal government was highly displeased, urging the civilian groups to integrate with state forces and become Rurales. The deputy reached out to the federal government, asking it to address the groups so as to prevent their spread into other regions of the state. Given the greater incidence of negativity than support, it is more appropriate to label the rhetoric as negative.
  - It should be noted that the mayor and the federal officials have mentioned the possibility that these groups received their arms from the Gulf Cartel, for the purpose of defeating the rival Zetas. The city has also not provided the groups with any weaponry, but it appears that they are considering the opportunity to register any weapons that the groups currently have, as a form of legitimacy.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **Few (2)**
  - The San Antonio Express News article asserted that one group was already in existence in the town of Hidalgo, and another was forming as of 2014. The older group is called the Pedro Mendez Column, and the newer group is called the Alberto Carrera Torres Brigade.
  - The media, the local government, and the militias themselves have confirmed their existence. The Mexican federal government also recognized Tamaulipas as one of 13 states with autodefensas in 2014, according to Animal Politico.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **C = cautious**
  - The civilians may support the motives of the militias, as well as their desire for justice, but they are unsure of the militias' integrity, and unsupportive of their use of extrajudicial actions. The notion of having one group be "judge, jury, and executioner" is unsettling to many of the civilians in Tamaulipas.
  - The defense groups here are very secretive for fear of reprisal from cartels. Their identities are not known, nor are members of these groups "elected" by any form of citizens' tribunal. Due to the uncertainty associated with these groups, the civilians have asserted that the government should do a better job of "policing" Tamaulipas' autodefensas.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - There have been civilian protests for better security and less corruption in Tamaulipas, with citizens demanding protection from the state and federal governments. In the 2011 massacre, state and local police were implicated in the violence, inciting severe distrust on the part of the civilians. Moreover, the citizens felt that they were "being left to fend for themselves." There was such fear between 2010 and 2011 that 10,000 citizens left the state, although many

returned in the aftermath. Most civilians are terrified by the extreme violence perpetrated throughout the state, but they claim that some of the police are victims of the cartel war as often as they are accomplices. Regardless, there is a strong sense that the state is unable to provide the security citizens need.

- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **P = pseudo-police force**
  - With its agenda of keeping civilians safe from the cartel violence pervading the state and its lack of politically charged rhetoric, Tamaulipas' civilian defense groups toe the line between anti-drug activities and pseudo-policing. The Pedro Column, at least, states that it “supports” the federal army and marines, although it does assert that some policemen are accomplices to the cartels. These groups carry rifles at the very least, and likely have access to more potent weaponry, as well.
  - Given that they mete out extra-judicial punishments such as execution of cartel members, the most appropriate designation for the groups in Tamaulipas is that of pseudo-police forces. News reports state that the groups are armed, but they do not say how heavily armed the autodefensas are.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **U = unilateral activity**
  - Although several members of the local government provided symbolic public support for the militias, there is no evidence that the authorities enabled them to register. No reports of the autodefensas working with the government, or contrarily, actively opposing the government with anything more violent than roadblocks, have emerged. It is possible that the militias are receiving guns from the Gulf Cartel, the Zetas' enemies, but there is no indication that any governmental entities are actively trying to curb their activities or investigate their funding and armament. For their part, the autodefensas have not applied to become legitimized, nor have they sought any agreements with authorities. The groups appear to be acting independently of each other.
- **Who's in control?**
  - **CVG = cartels vs. government**
  - The U.S. Department of State has issued a strong warning against traveling in Tamaulipas, stating that “throughout the state violent crime...poses significant safety risk.” Moreover, it warns that “violent crimes between rival criminal elements and/or the Mexican military can occur in all parts of the region and at any time of day.” These two statements indicate that Tamaulipas is highly unsafe, and implies that the government does not have the ability to provide security. According to the most recent open-source DEA maps available, there were two major cartels vying for territory in Tamaulipas, the Gulf cartel and La Familia. The state now appears to be almost completely under the control of the Gulf cartel, with the Zetas maintaining a small foothold.
  - The government does not have the resources or strength to protect its people, and the Zetas had such a strong presence in the area that until recently, people

were too scared to take any actions against them. For example, in 2010 and 2011, there were two Zeta-backed massacres in Tamaulipas, the first of which involved the deaths of over 70 migrant workers from South America, who refused to work for the cartel. The police chief charged with investigating the incident was also detained and killed by the cartel. The second massacre was focused on Mexican nationals, who were abducted on their way into the state. Both incidents clearly show that the state authorities are not in control, as they cannot prevent such attacks on their citizens, nor safeguard members of their own ranks. Even now, the autodefensas hide their faces, and are aware of the risk that they could be violently murdered as an example to others.

- While facing corruption within its own ranks, including several former state governors, the government has made a significant attempt to “go on the offensive” against the cartels, establishing a military base in San Fernando and actively attempting to conduct missions against the criminal groups. Borderland Beat reports that the actions against the cartels were met with harsh reprisal in 2015; in April, the government raised the threat level to “red.” There were blockades, gunfights in the streets of major cities, and deaths on all sides. The presence of significant offensive activity against the cartels provides the basis for labeling Tamaulipas as a “CVG” situation.

## Tlaxcala Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **I = Inconsistent**
  - When autodefensas first began appearing in 2013 and armed groups claimed to be civilian defense groups, regardless of their true intent, the governor of Tlaxcala asserted that there would be “zero tolerance” for any groups calling themselves autodefensas, even if they were supported by the citizens. This is indicative of the attitude that the authorities of Tlaxcala have towards the civilian groups, although they may be referring towards those which are not registered with SEDENA.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **S = Some (3-4)**
  - The National Human Rights Commission’s 2014 report included Tlaxcala as a state with at least a “low frequency” of autodefensas, and at least one pseudo-autodefensa was in operation in 2013, with another registered previously in 2012. The 2015 appearance of autodefensas which were originally linked to teacher’s rights protests was not the first. In 2015, 183 individuals were registered with SEDENA in Tlaxcala.
  - It should also be noted that there are other types of “self-defense” groups in Tlaxcala, fighting for particular rights for groups such as taxi drivers, but that these would not qualify under the definition of this thesis.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **P = positive**
  - Civilians have provided symbolic and verbal support to the autodefensas, particularly against state authorities that seek to disband them. There is a sense of “taking matters into their own hands,” as they perceive the government to be insufficient in meeting their needs and demands.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - The citizens of Tlaxcala assert that the state government is not helping them, particularly in regard to their safety, as well as the provision of jobs and other resources, and they claim that they are disillusioned with the politicians in office. Here, corruption is common in government agents working in the state, particularly in regard to turning a blind eye to blatant criminal activities such as sex trafficking.
  - The ENVIPE survey results reveal that 14.2% of crimes are reported to the authorities, which is significantly higher than the national average of 10.7%. Accordingly, only 59.2% of civilian respondents in Tlaxcala reported a feeling of insecurity, compared to the 73.2% national figure.
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **G = government-backed defense groups**

- These groups have been armed legally: they received arms registered with SEDENA, the Secretary of National Defense. However, they do not appear to have assimilated into an arm of either the federal or state militaries. They also are not tied to a *state* authoritative group; rather, their backing comes from the federal government. This has been substantiated by several sources.
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **P = partnership**
  - Although there may be additional autodefensas that are not Rurales, the primary type in Tlaxcala appears to be government-backed forces. This indicates that the groups are in a partnership with the federal government, although they clash ideologically with the state government. They have attained some level of legitimacy, and their activities have been officially sanctioned.
- **Who's in control?**
  - **G = Government**
  - Although this has been coded as a case of governmental control, many of the individuals in Tlaxcala's government are corrupt or crooked. The presence of cartels is not strong enough in this state to justify claiming that the cartel is in power or vying for power; however, it should be noted that the government may not be "good," nor acting in the best interest of the people. They **do** hold the power in this state, however. It should be noted that Tlaxcala was one of four states with a bad reputation for poor transparency and refusing to divulge murder information, or appropriate crime rates.
  - There is no State Department advisory warning in effect for Tlaxcala. In 2015, this was one of the top 5 most peaceful states in Mexico, although that could be the result of either government or cartel control. The Beltran cartel had a foothold in Tlaxcala in 2014, but DEA sources indicate that there is currently "no presence" of drug cartels in this state (or at least, not a significant enough presence that they would be considered to have control). It should be noted, however, that Tlaxcala has previously had a reputation for corruption and misinformation. Moreover, the state is a major hub for criminal activities such as sex trafficking, which the state government has repeatedly and systematically allowed.

## Veracruz Code

- Political Rhetoric
  - **I = Inconsistent**
  - Throughout most of 2013 and 2014, many state officials claimed that there were no self-defense groups in the state. However, in 2015, the government attempted to conciliate the Atzompa group, which had set up road blocks and violently responded to corrupt police actions. State governor Duarte offered to grant their requests for public works assistance and military training in exchange for the dissolution of the *autodefensas* in Atzompa. His proposal, which included actions that the group had requested from the state a year before, was refused.
  - Official reactions to the *autodefensas* was mixed in 2013; some officials claimed that self-defense groups existed in Veracruz's rural areas, the result of poor security. The mayor of Tlalixcoyan stated that his town's group was not acting inappropriately, and characterized it as a support mechanism. Other officials, especially the governor, denounced this claim on the basis that the state was safe enough, asserting that the government protected its citizens. By 2014, the government was forced to acknowledge their existence.
  - Note that the above code applies to the state and federal governments, not to the local authorities (e.g. the mayor who supported the Atzompa movement).
- Number of autodefensas
  - **M = Many (5+)**
  - At least 3 autodefensas were reported in Veracruz by 2013 (*Animal Politico*); their existence was confirmed by the National Human Rights Commission. One of these groups is said to be located at the Tamaulipas border, while the other two are in Ciudad Mendoza and Acultzingo, which is very close to the Puebla border.
  - The fourth group, located in Tlalixcoyan, "operate[d] in coordination with the authorities" in 2013, giving them information and handing over any criminals it caught. A fifth group, Guardia Civil Huasteca, was formed in 2012 to "dissuade" crime in their region (*El Siglo de Torreon*).
  - In 2014, another group in Soledad Atzompa actively became engaged in discussions with the state government (Milenio.com). This group has over 400 people and 40 communities involved. It managed to both detain state agents and create roadblocks on the border of Puebla. It should be noted that the mayor backed this group, and helped organize it.
- Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas
  - **P = positive**
  - In the rural areas, there is a strong sense that autodefensas have historically been a means of protection, to the extent that the right to create such a group is referenced in the Mexican constitution, as well as those of some states. Indigenous groups are also afforded this ability, according to *La Jornada*.

- When the state cannot provide security, the citizens are allowed to provide it themselves. These groups are seen as part of a tradition that is acceptable to participate in for protection. While it was emphasized that there is a difference between the legal “community police” and unilateral autodefensas, those fighting to protect their communities are considered just (LJA).
- Civilian attitude towards authorities
  - **N = negative**
  - The civilians levy significant accusations of corruption and police brutality (e.g. robberies, extortion, and kidnapping) against the municipal authorities. Police extortion is commonplace in Veracruz, and the state’s culture of impunity has been acknowledged by the President of Mexico.
  - There have also been demonstrations (e.g. marches) against public corruption and the government’s failure to provide safety, particularly for journalists. Several high-profile journalists and political activists were recently murdered by cartel members, causing fear and anger among the people. Some civilians are afraid to say anything negative, however, for fear of retaliation. For the past four years, Veracruz has reported higher perceptions of public insecurity than the national average in the ENVIPE survey, with over 80% of the population asserting that they felt their state was insecure in 2015.
- Type of autodefensas + Level of armament
  - **P = pseudo police force**
  - One of the primary concerns voiced by the autodefensas in this region is safety, particularly against police abuses and kidnappings (both of which are often highly tied to drug cartel actions). These groups do have guns, although it unclear how heavily they are armed.
  - In Atzompa, the mayor asserted that the autodefensas were originally formed by civilians “after they were victims of organized crime” (Borderland Beat). Murders and forced disappearances, the hallmark of the cartels, were among the crimes committed against Atzompa. The group asked the federal armed forces to set up camps on the border of the municipality, and to train 50 of their youths in combat, but both requests were denied. As a result, the group publically spoke out against the government. Although *Jornada* asserts that Atzompa’s group had only sticks and machetes, several sources have indicated that the civilians had access to rifles and handguns.
  - As noted below, the group in Atzompa has conducted citizen’s arrests of municipal policemen and nearly lynched three men who tried to extort a group of farmers in 2014. This incident only ended when additional authorities became involved, at which point the group proceeded to burn the patrol vehicles of the men they had detained.
- Interactions between *autodefensas* and authorities
  - **H = hostile**
  - It has been reported that the state government “supported the groups to ensure the peace,” but did not subject them to the same rules as everyone else.

- After realizing that the Atzompa group was obstructing highway traffic and detaining police, the government reached out to offer integration and training, which the *autodefensas* refused. This was the same group that captured and threatened to lynch state policemen on account of their attempted extortion; they also abducted 15 members of the state's Ministry of Public Security. These actions qualify for a hostile rating (Milenio.com).
- Who's in Control?
  - **A = Anarchy**
  - According to several news sources, Veracruz is considered by the federal government to be one of the most dangerous states, particularly for journalists. At least 14 journalists were killed between 2010 and 2015, according to Vice News. This indicates a high degree of violence and a lack of control on the part of the state government. Moreover, LAHT explicitly identified this state as the scene of a turf war between cartels, the results of which have been extensive violence and many murders. People have expressed a reticence to say anything critical, for fear of retaliation against their families.
  - There have been three military operations targeting organized crime in the last two years, indicating that the state is attempting to regain control (with the help of the federal army). The state government is fighting back with significant support and at least some success. However, this progress has been hindered by the fact that the governor, Javier Duarte, has repeatedly and publically been accused of ties to the Zetas, along with many of his fellow politicians and the state police, so this state is labelled "Anarchy" (Vice news). The cartels have significant control in the state's government and legal authorities, although there are turf wars and the government and people are trying to fight back.

## Yucatan Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **P = positive**
  - In Kanasin, the local government's Public Safety Department refused to recognize the groups at first. However, it later admitted that it did not have the funds to address the problems in Kanasin, and sent in additional police to help mitigate the insecurity. Several political candidates had done something similar in years past, by publically supporting the community police, framing it as a solution to more localized issues that the state cannot readily solve due to its limited resources.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **F = Few (1-2)**
  - At least one group is cited as being active in the municipality of Kanasin, with the possibility of additional groups operating in the same area. Only one was specifically identified, however.
  - The figures from the New York study clash with this finding, as they indicate fairly high levels of *autodefensa* activity. However, research showed that there may have been additional group activity before 2010, which may be where the New York results came from.
- **Civilian attitudes towards *autodefensas***
  - **P = positive**
  - Residents of areas such as Kanasin "opted for" *autodefensas* over state police protection, and none of the research showed that the civilians had a negative perception of the groups, particularly given the historical precedent for civilian militias in the Yucatan region. It would thus be reasonable to assert that there is support for the civilian groups.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - Civilians feel that the government is not helping them, as they have reached out for assistance against insecurity in the state, to no response. Corruption is as an issue, indicating that the citizens do not trust their local police; this is supported to an extent by the ENVIPE results, which showed that only 9.6% of all crimes are reported in the state, as opposed to 10.7% nationally. Another grievance in this state and in the Yucatan region more generally is the lack of services provided by the local government, one of which is security.
  - Despite the negative commentary towards the Yucatan state government, it appears that civilians feel relatively safe: only 33.8% of respondents reported feeling insecure, as compared with the national average of 73.2%.
- **Type of autodefensas**
  - **W = neighborhood watch**
  - These groups are very lightly armed: they primarily carry sticks, lamps, machetes, and kitchen-style implements, although at least one photo shows a

handgun. It should be noted that these groups are actually making arrests and acting on the part of the authorities.

- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - **P = partnership**
  - As indicated above, the government resisted recognizing the autodefensas at first. However, within a week, it sent a detail of 50 policemen to help mitigate civilian feelings of insecurity and unrest.
- **Who's in control?**
  - **U = Unknown**
  - There is a definite lack of resources on the part of the state government, to the extent that it is unable to properly address the concerns of its civilians. While it does not appear that the cartels are providing protection or services to the citizens, the Sinaloa Cartel has a clear hold on the region. Meanwhile, the civilians are acting on their own, but not to a great enough extent that they are challenging the government.
  - Yucatan is one of the most peaceful states in the country, and it is considered to have the lowest rate of violence. This statistic has been repeated by many sources, official and otherwise, and is supported by the U.S. State Department, which does not have a travel advisory on Yucatan.
  - The DEA cartel map indicates that the entire state is under the influence of the Sinaloa Cartel, although the neighboring states of Quintana Roo and Campeche are host to the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas, among others. The entire region tends towards less violence than the rest of Mexico as a whole.

## Zacatecas Code

- **Political Rhetoric**
  - **N = negative**
  - Most of the primary governing figures publically and strongly deny the existence of autodefensa groups in Zacatecas, and they discourage the formation of any such groups.
  - One public figure insists on their existence, but her position as a member of an opposing party would at least somewhat discredit her claims. Additionally, she only insinuated that the groups were forming in the rural areas to protect themselves from organized crime, not necessarily drug cartels.
- **Number of autodefensas**
  - **N = none (0)**
  - Two leaders of social organizations (e.g. teacher or worker unions) have claimed that there are self-defense groups in at least 18 towns within the state, but there were no outside substantiating reports to back this; therefore, we must label this state as not having autodefensas. Another factor in this label is the fact that no such groups have been mentioned since around 2014, which would suggest that they are either under the radar (if they exist), or they were not in operation in this state. The only consistent and credible references to autodefensas in this state were those against cattle rustling, which do not qualify for this thesis.
  - Social media have referenced the existence of autodefensas in Zacatecas, the truth of which the authorities have vehemently denied. There were also mentions of “self-defense groups” meant to prevent cattle rustling, but these groups would not qualify under this thesis’ definition of autodefensas.
  - At least one public figure claimed that there were autodefensas in Zacatecas, but she did not provide solid numbers or substantiating evidence.
- **Civilian attitudes towards autodefensas**
  - **C = cautious**
  - One opinion piece asserted that while the self-defense groups are addressing issues of insecurity, they have the potential to be very dangerous. There is no way to tell how these groups were funded, or what their impact on society will be. It appears that in Zacatecas, Michoacán is seen as a cautionary tale, largely predicated on the fact that there is so much anarchy as a result of the militias’ activities in that state. When there were mentions of creating similar entities, the citizens emphasized that they would prefer to be unarmed and to work within the law, which the groups in Michoacán do not do.
- **Civilian attitude towards authorities**
  - **N = negative**
  - Repression by the authorities is a concern for citizens of Zacatecas, as is police corruption and violence. The common issues of security, nonresponsive state governments (e.g. to requests for help against cattle rustling), and poor

public infrastructure have been mentioned, indicating that the citizens are not confident in the state's ability to take care of their needs. There were no reports of violence between the civilians and the authorities, however; distrust and disillusionment seem to be the extent of the civilians' feelings towards the authorities.

- **Type of autodefensas + Level of armament**
  - N/A
  - Not applicable to this state
- **Interactions between autodefensas and authorities**
  - N/A
  - Not applicable to this state
- **Who's in control?**
  - **C = cartels**
  - Borderland Beat reported extrajudicial killings being committed by "federal forces" in 2015, indicating a lack of adherence to the law and showing weak government control. Zacatecas appears to be the site of a major turf war, between the Zetas, the Gulf Cartel, and CDN, as well as CJNG. Numerous civilian executions, "narco messages," kidnapping, and decapitations have been reported, indicating that the state is not able to protect its citizens. The U.S. State Department has also issued a travel warning for Zacatecas, with the assertion that "the security situation is unstable" in this state. There are also curfews imposed in this state for U.S. Embassy employees and officials.
  - It appears that the state is trying to fight back against the cartels, but that they are being overwhelmed. For this reason, and because the police are getting involved in killing civilians (in connection to the cartels), it is reasonable to label this as a case of cartel control.