

INTERGENERATIONAL CO-RESIDENCE AND GENDER
ATTITUDES IN EAST ASIA

by

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Abstract

Gender equality had long been discussed and studied. Besides education and the influence from society, the family is the closest and most important place in which people form and change their views and values about the gender issue. Are old values more likely to be passed on in families in which several generations live together? We found interesting results here.

East Asia has a relatively high level of economic growth; however, the gender equality status is still not satisfying. China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan share highly similar cultural backgrounds. Additionally, they all underwent rapid development after World War II. Most importantly, they share a tradition of several generations living together. By studying the impact of co-residence on gender attitudes in families in those four societies, the impact of co-residence is carefully examined.

1. Introduction

Unlike most western countries, Asian countries have the tradition of several generations living together (Martin, 1990). This living pattern is deeply rooted in farming culture. It has long been viewed as an efficient way to cut down on family expenses and time spent on housework.

Typically, the males in the family are responsible for earning money and the females are responsible for the housework. Additionally, sons are expected to achieve career goals and bring future benefits to the family; thus, generally, a greater share of family resources is devoted to their education and related consumption. Daughters are viewed as attached members who will get married and leave; thus, they receive fewer family resources. Apart from the gender gap in the family, there is the issue of status in the family. Older generations generally function as the head of the family and have higher discursive power and decision-making authority. As a special legacy of Confucianism, intergenerational co-residence is valued highly in traditional culture.

With the modernization of society, East Asian society and its family forms changed greatly.

More large families live separately in different communities, as young people tend to move out and search for career opportunities and then decide to live far away from their family. Apart from population migration, the development of communities has led to less need to share a large house; due to increased income, instead of searching for shelter, people care more about the quality of living. The traditional large family is gradually breaking apart. However, this has occurred mostly in urban areas, where people's lives are not dependent on farming.

The gender gap is a serious issue in East Asia. The development of society brings more education and working opportunities to women. These opportunities are sufficiently attractive to

women. However, on the other hand, women are still facing pressure from their families and society to be a traditionally good daughter, good wife, and good mother. Due to the pressure from society and family, many women sacrifice their chance to succeed in a career and stay in a lower position to meet expectations.

For example, in China, working mothers are really common as a result of the 1960s' Cultural Revolution. However, the traditional culture still exists. Even though women are allowed to have their own career, they are still asked to sacrifice it for the benefit of their family. In other words, being a good mother and a good wife is much more highly valued than having a successful career.

Taiwan is facing a similar problem. Taiwan shares almost the same cultural backgrounds with China and has an even more conservative opinion regarding family roles. As more and more women seek to pursue a career in the outside world, the conflicts between traditional culture and modern society have become more intense. One of the outcomes of this is the inequality they are facing in the job market. Women earn less than their male co-workers for the same work and feel pressure for not taking care of their families as they used to.

For Japan, things are slightly different. Although the gender gap exists, too, pressure is more likely to come from society, not the family. As Japanese laws effectively protect the rights of housewives, women do not commonly consider themselves inferior in terms of family status. Since the society is designed based on traditional roles, women who enjoy their career rarely have the opportunity to obtain a higher position at work. In particular, when women get married, they often only take part-time or non-regular jobs when their household is not earning enough (Brinton, 2001).

Confucianism is deeply rooted in South Korean society, too. Men generally have a higher status at home compared with women.

While most of the literature study the cause of intergenerational co-residence, the issue we are exploring here is whether the continuing existence of intergenerational co-residence affects the persistence of old ideas and values, especially gender attitudes. The traditional ideals of Confucianism include many rules regarding family members. Under these complicated rules, every member is viewed as a productive unit of the family instead of an independent person. Additionally, the status and responsibility of every family member are fixed. Women have long been placed at the bottom of the power pyramid. If the family is following the strict attitudes of Confucianism, there will be limited resources for daughters and limited or no working opportunities for wives. If intergenerational co-residence has a significant effect on the passing on of values and ideas, it will be a factor that slows down the process of gender equality; therefore, we may need to determine some different approaches to deal with it.

2. Relevant Literature

2.1. Confucian Heritage and Family Roles in East Asia

The Confucian culture has long ruled East Asia. It has had a deep and long-lasting cultural effect on family and gender roles. It worked quite well in history to help keep society under the control of feudal rule. Under the influence of Confucianism, every family in society functions as an economic and social unit. In this unit, family members have different and unchanging duties (Lee Kwang-Kyu, 1989).

The basic idea about the family in Confucianism is that the differences of family status should be clear and settled. A person is considered only as part of a social unit (Hofstede et al., 1988).

Males and elders should be respected and are placed in a higher position. Decisions from them should be followed without question. Additionally, commonly, women are viewed as property and attachments to the family. At the same time, men are viewed as achieving the real success in the family.

On this basis, family members are deeply bonded. Housework and family expenses are shared.

The family has a huge influence on one's life choices, such as education, work, and even marriage. Through the combination of closely bound relations and solid gender status and roles in the family, biased gender attitudes are rooted deeply in East Asia.

In modern society, these traditional types of families are slowly changing and evolving. There are several reasons for this. As East Asia has developed rapidly, the family size has become smaller over time. The shrinking of the family size has resulted from rural migration to cities. As the younger generation is moving to urban areas to search for education and work opportunities, new families are being formed there. The impact of western culture has also brought new attitudes to East Asian families. The tendencies of individualism and the smaller family unit have

weakened traditional Confucian ideals, and family members have more opportunities to make life decisions based on their own ideas and life goals instead of accomplishing long-term family goals.

At the same time, some Confucian ideas are still maintained by others. Gender attitudes are one example. When women are offered the chance to accept a higher level of education and exposed much more to the real world than before, they are still required to remain in their old position.


Women are still required to deal with housework and are not encouraged to enter the job market.

The four societies in East Asia have been found to have different levels of acceptance of Confucianism. The degree to which Confucian values affect intergenerational co-residence was strongest for Taiwan and the weakest in South Korea (Yasuda et al., 2011). Japan also had a weak influence from Confucianism, but it also epitomizes the clash between traditionalism and modernism occurring in many developing nations of Asia (Takagi et al. 2006).

2.2. Famille Patriarcale as Defined by Frédéric Le Play

Formal spatiotemporal analysis of family types began with Frédéric Le Play's large-scale empirical studies in the mid-nineteenth century (Le Play 1855). There are three kinds of families in his theory. The first is the joint family. In the joint family, older generations live with or live close to all of their sons after they reach adulthood and are married. A similar type of family is the stem family, in which members of the older generation choose one of their sons to live with them and eventually inherit all their property. The third type is the nuclear family, which refers to families who break apart and found new, smaller ones.

2.3 Gender Gap Differences among These Societies



China, Japan, and South Korea were ranked 91st, 101st, and 115th, respectively, in the Gender Gap Index 2015 developed by the World Economic Forum. The index was measured by four indicators—education, economy, politics, and health—on a scale of 0–1, where 0=inequality and 1=equality. As shown by the graph, these three societies differ from each other greatly in political empowerment and economic participation. However, they have similar scores in health and education. In traditional Confucian thought, politics is the realm of men. Therefore, it is not surprising that all three societies had lower gender equality in politics than average than all 142 countries. China had a higher level of equality in economic participation and political empowerment and a relatively low level of equality in health and survival. This could be due to the son preference in China. Son preference not only leads to an unbalanced sex ratio, but girls

are less likely to be taken care of or treated with care when they experience health problems (Ashford, 2012). South Korea had relatively low equality in economic participation and political empowerment. At the same time, Japan had a relatively high level of education and health equality.

2.4. Intergenerational Co-residence in East Asia

Research has shown that in developed Asian societies, the rate of co-residence is decreasing (De Vos, 1990). When a society develops, instead of counting on other family members, people tend to depend on social policy and systems to obtain resources for living. Additionally, other studies have found that intergenerational co-residence is relatively high when the older generation owns large property (Martin, 1989). These results indicate that co-residence is highly related with the approach to resources; when a family can provide better resources, people tend to co-reside.

3. Research Hypothesis

Family is the place where a child first develops values, morals, and ethics. In this case, there might be a connection between intergenerational co-residence and gender attitudes. Most families in East Asia with three or more generations have one or more senior members who were born immediately after World War II and before the wildly rapid development that brought western and new values to society. Whether these senior people are still leading the family or not, they influence and share their old-fashioned values and ideas with their children and grandchildren. At the same time, migrated families with only parents and children might be exposed more to modern and western ideas and are thus less likely hang on to old values. Modernization not only leads to exposure to western culture, but also less demand for manual labor. This greatly improved opportunities for women to be as competitive as men in the job market. However, women in East Asia still have a lower labor force participation rate. This is due to gender attitudes from Confucianism, which remains mainstream in society. Thus, one important problem emerges. How can we change people's minds and shrink the gender gap? If co-residence does make a difference, there needs to be a different approach to applying gender equality programs to different families.

In this study, the idea that co-resident families tend to have more conservative gender attitudes will be tested. We want to prove not only that there are differences in attitudes between co-resident and non-co-resident families, but also that co-residence is related to this difference. Additionally, difference analyses will be performed in younger generations, as they are the future of society and also will be more affected by their families. Then, we will consider what has reduced the co-residence rate in developed societies. In East Asia, the traditional family system is that the oldest son remains living with their parents, and

after they pass away, he inherits everything, which is a kind of stem family situation. The rural-urban migration that occurred after the development after World War II created more nuclear families in urban areas. In contrast to older generations, young people in this generation migrate to developed urban areas and search for work and other opportunities and thus marry later. Therefore, the newly formed nuclear families are small ones, with fewer children and distance relationships with their parents. Additionally, due to the massive rural-urban migration of the young population, family networks among rural elderly parents are more dispersed than those of urban elderly parents (Park et al. 1999).

4. Data and Empirical Strategy

4.1. Data

Data were taken from the East Asian Social Survey that was conducted from June to December 2006. The survey provided detailed and identical questionnaires to adult representative respondents from four societies. All the data were collected through face-to-face structured interviews. There were 3,208 valid samples in China, 2,130 in Japan, 1,605 in Korea, and 2,102 in Taiwan, and the response rates were 38.5%, 59.8%, 65.7%, and 42.0%, respectively. There were 330 variables for personal and family members' status, relationships, and attitudes toward life and family (East Asian Social Survey Data Archive, 2008; JGSS Research Center, 2009).

4.1.1. Measuring Gender Attitudes

To understand how intergenerational co-residence impacts people's attitudes towards family issues, 30 variables were analyzed. They can be divided into three categories: financial support, life satisfaction, and gender attitudes. All the attitude variables are ordinal variables, with 1 for strongly agree to 5 or 7 for strongly disagree. In particular, eight gender attitude variables were chosen to perform the regression. All these attitudes were traditional ones, which means that if a respondent had a higher value in response to attitude, the respondent held a more equal attitude towards gender issues. In further regression analysis, responses that went against the traditional values were coded 1, while others were coded 0. Details for these variables are included in the

appendix.

4.1.2 Measuring Intergeneration Co-residence

The potential explanatory variables can be categorized into personal variables and relative/household variables. The most interesting variable of the study is the co-residence dummy. Furthermore, here, the definition of intergenerational co-residence is two married or formerly married family members from different generations living together. Married siblings living together are not included here, for the attitudes involved here are basically passed on from older generations to new ones. Additionally, never-married adult children are included only when they are living with both their parents and grandparents. In East Asia, especially in China, this happens often due to high house prices. In this case, adults commonly cannot afford the rent or price of apartments, so they decide to live with their parents to save money. Other personal explanatory variables include age, gender, marital status, education, health condition, employment status, and if the respondent is the first child of the family.


Family variables include household income percentage scale, worst health condition of R's relatives, highest education level of R's parents, and R's parents' marital status.

A community size variable is included, too. All the explanatory variables are ordinal variables except age. Statistics about these variables are included in the appendix (Tables 1 to 4).

4.2. Empirical Strategy

4.2.1 Variable Emerge Strategy

The most important variable in the research is the dummy variable for intergenerational co-residence. The flow chart below shows how the variable was generated. 1 represents co-residence, and 0 is non-co-residence.



Other variables were generated according to the definition.

4.2.2 Gender Attitudes Difference Test

Gender attitudes differences were tested both between different residence situations and different genders. Additionally, to understand whether the younger generations are affected differently by co-residence, the test was applied again to all respondents younger than 30. The reason for paying special attention to this age group is that their attitudes are more likely to be affected by their parents and other family members, while older people are more likely to have developed their opinions largely from their own experience. At the same time, in general, younger

generations are more likely to be exposed to new ideas and values. It will be interesting to determine whether co-residence affects the process of accepting western and newer ideas.

4.2.3 Co-residence and Gender Attitudes Impact Analysis

To explore the potential correlations of gender attitudes with a focus on international co-residence, we applied the ordinal logistic model to analyze the impact of intergenerational co-residence. The model is shown below. There are two groups of explanatory variables here. The first group is about the respondent, and the other group is about R's other family members and family features.

$$\text{Gender Attitudes} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Co-residence} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{First child} + \beta_3 \cdot \text{Household Income} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{Income} \\ + \beta_5 \cdot \text{Health} + \beta_6 \cdot \text{Household Health} + \beta_7 \cdot \text{Education level} + \beta_8 \cdot \text{Parents' Education Level} + \beta_9 \cdot \text{Gender} \\ + \beta_{10} \cdot \text{Age} + \beta_{11} \cdot \text{Marital Status} + \beta_{12} \cdot \text{Parents' Marital Status} + \beta_{13} \cdot \text{Employment} + \beta_{14} \cdot \text{Community Size}$$

The eight dependent gender attitude variables are all five-point or seven-point Likert scale variables. The ordinal logistic model would provide the most relevant results for these variables as the respondents generally had two attitudes towards the gender issue: agree or disagree. The difference between strongly agree and fairly agree was not great. Therefore, the dependent variables were simplified into dummy variables. For each of these eight gender attitudes, 1 represents disagree and implies an equal attitude towards the gender issue, while 0 represents a neutral and supportive attitude and implies conservative ideas.

The regression was applied to each society separately as household income and community size are measured differently due to the different features of each society.

5. Results

5.1. Differences in Test Findings

In general, the results from the T-test showed clear attitude differences between co-resident respondents and other respondents (Appendix Table 7). Significant attitude differences between genders were observed, too (Appendix Table 8). For respondents younger than 30, the mean value differences were larger. Considering the much smaller sample size, most of the differences are significant. We found different results when the tests were applied to each society separately. Note that South Korea's results are less significant as it had a relatively smaller sample size.

Firstly, from the results of difference tests between co-resident and non-co-resident respondents, we can see that almost all the attitudes are significantly different between these two groups. Since on the 1–7 scale 4 stands for neither agree nor disagree, all the responses larger than 4 are considered to be against the idea listed, while value equal to or less than 3 are considered to support the idea. From the results for all societies and all ages of respondents, we observe that respondents generally agreed with the traditional ideas, while they did not have much preference for children's gender and did not agree with laying off women during a recession. Regarding each society's result, China had six out of eight significant differences, while Japan and Taiwan had significant differences for all attitudes and the differences were all positive, indicating that co-resident respondents tend to support these ideas. Of these three results, Japan had the highest value, which means the respondents from Japan generally had more equal ideas about gender issues. Although only one attitude had a significantly different result in Korea, we can still

compare the mean values of the responses. As a result, Korea had lower values for these attitudes; thus, respondents from Korea tend to agree with the traditional values.

Let us move to the right side of the table and assess the situation for respondents younger than 30.

Generally, younger respondents are more likely to be against these ideas. In the table for all societies, five out of seven attitudes still showed significantly different results. Most of these five attitudes showed larger differences in mean values between the two groups, indicating that children who grow up in co-resident households are more likely to hold on to traditional values.

As can be seen from the table, while more young respondents from non-co-resident families have begun to be against the ideas that “It is important for the wife to help the husband’s career,” “It is the husband’s job to earn money, and the wife’s job to care for the home,” and “A married woman should help her husband’s family first,” young co-resident respondents still tend to support them. The results from China, Japan, and Taiwan follow the same pattern.

While co-resident and non-co-resident families showed significant attitude differences, male and female respondents also showed significantly different attitudes. Generally, male respondents were more supportive of these ideas than females. The patterns are the same in younger generations, but younger respondents showed less agreement with these attitudes. Importantly, younger respondents from Japan did not show significant attitude differences between the two genders, and both genders tended to have equal attitudes.

5.2. Regression Analysis Findings on Gender Attitudes

In last section, we found out that co-resident and non-co-resident respondents hold different opinions towards the gender issue. In this section, we try to determine whether co-residence has an impact on attitudes. Estimators and log likelihood are listed separately from Tables 9 to 12 in

the appendix. Additionally, the marginal effects are shown separately from Tables 13 to 16. As seen from the likelihood ratio test results, almost all the models fit well except “The authority of the father should be respected.” This variable might be more related to culture and not the other features.

For China, there were two significant results. People from co-resident families were 4.48% more likely to not have a son preference and 3.26% more likely to agree with the idea that the husband should be older than the wife. The reason for the former result might be that a larger family size reduces the anxiety of “continuing the family line.” The latter result is not surprising and supports the idea that co-residence makes people more likely to have traditional attitudes. In Japan, four attitudes showed significant results. When respondents were co-residents with their families, they were 9.74% more likely to prefer a son as a child, 5.53% more likely to believe that “one must have at least one son,” 6.73% more likely to believe that “The husband’s job is to earn money, and the wife’s job is to care for the home,” and 7.47% more likely to believe that “It is OK for women to be laid off during a recession.”

The first two attitudes are actually related, and they showed that co-resident families have stronger son preference in Japan. Additionally, the other two results showed that traditional gender roles are more accepted in co-resident families. The results for Korea do not agree with the hypothesis. Leaving aside the statement “The authority of the father should be respected” as the model does not fit well, respondents from co-resident families were 11.8% less likely to believe “It is important for the wife to help the husband’s career” and 9.08% less likely to believe “The husband’s job is to earn money, and the wife’s job is to care for the home.” Employment for Korea is not shown here as the estimators are too small or the variable is not related. Taiwan had similar results with Japan. When the respondents were co-residents with

other family members, they were 7.70% more likely to believe that “One must have at least one son,” 5.84% more likely to believe “The husband’s job is to earn money, and the wife’s job is to care for the home,” and 5.52% more likely to believe “It is OK for women to be laid off during a recession.”

Regarding other marginal effects, we can see that female and younger respondents were more likely to have more equal gender attitudes. Higher education level also contributed to higher acceptance of new ideas. By comparing the four sets of results, we can find that China’s results are less significant, although it has a larger sample size. This might be due to the huge developing inequality and cultural diversity in China. Japan and Taiwan had similar results, while Japan generally had larger-sized marginal effects of co-residence. Korea did not have significant results and even had opposite marginal effects to the others. There might be other reasons for this aside from small sample size.

6. Concluding Remarks

6.1. Major Findings

In the first step of analysis, the most important finding is that respondents from intergenerational co-resident families have different beliefs from those from non-co-resident families. Additionally, it is noteworthy that significance still exists in respondents younger than 30 years old, which indicates a high possibility that co-residence helps pass on traditional attitudes from generation to generation. The results would be more convincing if there was panel data with which we could examine the effects of co-residence across years. According to the results of difference tests conducted between genders and other significant marginal effects in the regression, we found that there are other more significant factors that affect people's attitudes. Compared with these results, the marginal effects of co-residence are sometimes not very significant.

The four societies we discussed here showed really different results. China had the largest sample size, but its results were not significant in the regression. Unlike the other East Asian societies in this study, China has huge developing inequality issues; additionally, the cultures are from different areas. Even if two respondents are from similarly sized communities and have relatively similar levels of income and education, they could be affected by different cultures in different regions. Therefore, it is hard to observe differences. Japan and Taiwan showed highly similar results in difference tests and regressions. This might be because they are both island countries and Taiwan was once colonized by Japan and formed some modern cultural ideas under the Japanese influence. The significant attitudes involved here are related to the preference for a son and traditional roles of the husband and wife in the family. One possible explanation for this is that as the co-residence rate declined greatly, those who continued to co-reside with family would have family properties and care about the survival of the family line. We had opposite and

mostly insignificant results from the regression for South Korea. There are two possible explanations for this. One is that the sample size is too small for analysis, and the other is that people are not satisfied with co-residence life there; thus co-residence makes them support opposite ideas.

6.2. Future Work

In this paper, the impact of co-residence on gender attitudes was tested. However, how precisely the impact occurs was not studied as the data we had was not panel data. The impact of co-residence can be more carefully tested if we can analyze the change of people's ideas and how it took place.

Although eight gender attitudes were tested here, including attitudes towards family roles, child gender preference, and the female employment issue, other aspects of the gender issue are not included. If we can find data to fully analyze other gender-related attitudes, the conclusions we draw can be more convincing.

7. Appendix

Table 1. Variable Description

Variables	Notations
Household Characteristics	
Intergenerational Co-resident with family or not	0= non-co-resident 1=co-resident
Is R the First Child in family or not	0=No 1= yes
R's health	1-5: good-bad
Relatives worst health	1-5: good-bad
R's Degree	0-5: low-high
Highest Degree of R's Parents	0-5: low-high
Gender	0=Female 1=male
Age	
Married or Once Married	0=No 1= yes
Parents' divorced or separated?	0=Divorced or separated 1=Other
Employment	0=Not employed 1=Employed
Gender Attitudes	
Prefer son as child	0-1: Agree-Disagree
Husband should be older than wife	1-7: Agree-Disagree
Important for wife to help husbands career	1-7: Agree-Disagree
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	1-7: Agree-Disagree
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	1-7: Agree-Disagree
Authority of father should be respected	1-7: Agree-Disagree
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	1-7: Agree-Disagree
Married woman should help husband's family first	1-7: Agree-Disagree

Table 2. Basic Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Household Characteristics					
Intergenerational Co-resident with family or not	9045	0.214	0.410	0	1
Is R the First Child in family or not	9045	0.316	0.465	0	1
R's health	9035	2.317	1.038	1	5
Relatives worst health	8365	2.997	1.144	1	5
R's Degree	9029	2.766	1.440	0	5
Highest Degree of R's Parents	7425	1.845	1.480	0	5
Gender	9045	0.463	0.499	0	1
Age	9045	45.494	16.023	17	92
Married or Once Married	9045	0.811	0.391	0	1
Parents' divorced or separated?	9045	0.984	0.127	0	1
Employment	9045	0.761	0.427	0	1
Gender Attitudes					
Prefer son as child	9031	0.731	0.443	0	1
Husband should be older than wife	9029	3.531	1.288	1	7
Important for wife to help husbands career	9025	3.527	1.460	1	7
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	9031	3.662	1.562	1	7
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	9025	4.923	1.492	1	7
Authority of father should be respected	9024	2.707	1.276	1	7
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	9024	3.584	1.617	1	7
Married woman should help husband's family first	9023	3.786	1.358	1	7

Table 3. Basic Statistics in China

Variable	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Household Characteristics					
Intergenerational Co-resident with family or not	3208	0.186	0.389	0	1
Is R the First Child in family or not	3208	0.332	0.471	0	1
Household Income percentage in the sample	2891	50.017	28.854	0	100
R's income compared with the household	2732	44.992	29.857	0	100
R's health	3205	2.193	0.989	1	5
Relatives worst health	3069	2.69	1.093	1	5
R's Degree	3207	2.203	1.253	0	5
Highest Degree of R's Parents	2163	1.328	1.158	0	5
Gender	3208	0.453	0.498	0	1
Age	3208	42.163	13.409	17	69
Married or Once Married	3208	0.867	0.339	0	1
Parents' divorced or separated?	3208	0.996	0.064	0	1
Employment	3208	0.884	0.32	0	1
Community Size	3208	4.3	2.278	1	7
Gender Attitudes					
Prefer son as child	3208	0.746	0.435	0	1
Husband should be older than wife	3208	3.428	1.104	1	7
Important for wife to help husbands career	3208	3.317	1.211	1	7
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	3208	3.499	1.358	1	7
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	3208	4.669	1.409	1	7
Authority of father should be respected	3208	2.598	1.111	1	7
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	3208	3.713	1.543	1	7
Married woman should help husband's family first	3208	3.707	1.25	1	7

Table 4. Basic Statistics in Japan

Variable	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Household Characteristics					
Intergenerational Co-resident with family or not	2130	0.261	0.439	0	1
Is R the First Child in family or not	2130	0.35	0.477	0	1
Household Income percentage in the sample	1461	50.034	28.74	1	100
R's income compared with the household	1432	66.377	31.847	5	100
R's health	2123	2.504	0.948	1	5
Relatives worst health	1897	3.172	1.066	1	5
R's Degree	2119	3.157	1.255	1	5
Highest Degree of R's Parents	1684	2.651	1.416	1	5
Gender	2130	0.453	0.498	0	1
Age	2130	52.733	16.712	20	89
Married or Once Married	2130	0.847	0.36	0	1
Parents' divorced or separated?	2130	0.975	0.156	0	1
Employment	2130	0.712	0.453	0	1
Community Size	2130	2.443	0.945	1	4
Gender Attitudes					
Prefer son as child	2121	0.767	0.423	0	1
Husband should be older than wife	2118	4.047	1.041	1	7
Important for wife to help husbands career	2117	3.858	1.228	1	7
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	2121	3.843	1.308	1	7
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	2122	4.763	1.341	1	7
Authority of father should be respected	2116	3.31	1.151	1	7
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	2115	3.519	1.327	1	7
Married woman should help husband's family first	2117	3.974	1.101	1	7

Table 5. Basic Statistics in Korea

Variable	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Household Characteristics					
Intergenerational Co-resident with family or not	1605	0.096	0.295	0	1
Is R the First Child in family or not	1605	0.292	0.455	0	1
Household Income percentage in the sample	1554	50.032	28.838	0	100
R's income compared with the household	911	63.377	33.208	0	188
R's health	1605	2.463	1.171	1	5
Relatives worst health	1466	3.441	1.148	1	5
R's Degree	1604	3.342	1.424	0	5
Highest Degree of R's Parents	1508	2.06	1.583	0	5
Gender	1605	0.445	0.497	0	1
Age	1605	43.242	15.542	18	92
Married or Once Married	1605	0.765	0.424	0	1
Parents' divorced or separated?	1605	0.986	0.116	0	1
Employment	1605	0.607	0.489	0	1
Community Size	1605	1.567	0.624	1	4
Gender Attitudes					
Prefer son as child	1601	0.58	0.494	0	1
Husband should be older than wife	1601	3.512	1.471	1	7
Important for wife to help husbands career	1599	3.619	1.738	1	7
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	1600	3.948	1.778	1	7
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	1598	5.168	1.587	1	7
Authority of father should be respected	1600	2.361	1.325	1	7
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	1599	3.308	1.736	1	7
Married woman should help husband's family first	1600	3.863	1.586	1	7

Table 6. Basic Statistics in Taiwan

Variable	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Household Characteristics					
Intergenerational Co-resident with family or not	2102	0.3	0.458	0	1
Is R the First Child in family or not	2102	0.276	0.447	0	1
Household Income percentage in the sample	1891	50.026	28.798	0	100
R's income compared with the household	1867	39.898	35.539	0	275
R's health	2102	2.206	1.05	1	5
Relatives worst health	1933	2.975	1.151	1	5
R's Degree	2099	2.793	1.577	0	5
Highest Degree of R's Parents	2070	1.572	1.442	0	5
Gender	2102	0.502	0.5	0	1
Age	2102	44.963	17	19	92
Married or Once Married	2102	0.724	0.447	0	1
Parents' divorced or separated?	2102	0.971	0.168	0	1
Employment	2102	0.739	0.439	0	1
Community Size	2102	2.067	0.966	1	4
Gender Attitudes					
Prefer son as child	2101	0.788	0.409	0	1
Husband should be older than wife	2102	3.184	1.457	1	7
Important for wife to help husbands career	2101	3.442	1.705	1	7
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	2102	3.513	1.84	1	7
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	2097	5.284	1.582	1	7
Authority of father should be respected	2100	2.529	1.393	1	7
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	2102	3.662	1.853	1	7
Married woman should help husband's family first	2098	3.658	1.528	1	7

Table 7. Difference Tests of Gender Attitudes Between Co-resident and Non-co-resident Respondents

Gender Attitudes	Respondents of All Age			Respondents Younger Than 30		
	MEAN CO=0	MEAN CO=1	Difference	MEAN CO=0	MEAN CO=1	Difference
All						
Prefer son as child	0.734	0.719	0.015	0.760	0.747	0.013
Husband should be older than wife	3.558	3.435	0.123 ***	3.722	3.561	0.162 **
Important for wife to help husbands career	3.573	3.357	0.216 ***	4.083	3.652	0.431 ***
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	3.728	3.423	0.305 ***	4.276	3.828	0.448 ***
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	4.960	4.786	0.174 ***	5.289	5.304	-0.016
Authority of father should be respected	2.726	2.637	0.089 ***	2.821	2.743	0.077
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	3.637	3.391	0.246 ***	3.975	3.784	0.191 *
Married woman should help SPs family first	3.837	3.598	0.239 ***	4.240	3.916	0.325 ***
China						
Prefer son as child	0.755	0.706	0.049 **	0.792	0.752	0.040
Husband should be older than wife	3.438	3.388	0.050	3.433	3.264	0.170
Important for wife to help husbands career	3.344	3.200	0.145 ***	3.549	3.147	0.402 ***
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	3.519	3.411	0.108 *	3.772	3.512	0.260 *
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	4.691	4.572	0.119 *	4.830	4.744	0.086
Authority of father should be respected	2.603	2.574	0.030	2.648	2.512	0.136
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	3.753	3.537	0.217 ***	4.012	3.892	0.120
Married woman should help husband's family first	3.724	3.631	0.093 *	3.916	3.527	0.389 ***
Japan						
Prefer son as child	0.779	0.732	0.047 **	0.760	0.774	-0.013
Husband should be older than wife	4.082	3.945	0.137 ***	4.372	4.189	0.183
Important for wife to help husbands career	3.911	3.708	0.203 ***	4.267	3.906	0.361 **
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	3.877	3.746	0.132 **	4.387	4.019	0.369 **
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	4.821	4.600	0.221 ***	5.199	5.434	-0.235
Authority of father should be respected	3.361	3.166	0.195 ***	3.728	3.642	0.086
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	3.591	3.315	0.276 ***	4.000	3.472	0.528 **
Married woman should help husband's family first	4.038	3.792	0.246 ***	4.545	4.094	0.450 ***
Korea						
Prefer son as child	0.584	0.539	0.045	0.646	0.611	0.035
Husband should be older than wife	3.5259	3.3766	0.1493	4.026	4.278	-0.252
Important for wife to help husbands career	3.6342	3.4706	0.1636	4.567	4.722	-0.156
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	3.9668	3.7662	0.2006	4.887	4.833	0.054
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	5.1702	5.1503	0.0199	5.639	5.500	0.139
Authority of father should be respected	2.367	2.3072	0.0598	2.702	2.556	0.147
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	3.3301	3.1039	0.2262	3.759	4.000	-0.241
Married woman should help husband's family first	3.8893	3.6104	0.2789 **	4.486	4.833	-0.348
Taiwan						
Prefer son as child	0.798	0.764	0.034 *	0.806	0.750	0.056
Husband should be older than wife	3.241	3.051	0.191 ***	3.593	3.479	0.114
Important for wife to help husbands career	3.557	3.171	0.386 ***	4.371	3.990	0.381 *
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	3.704	3.070	0.634 ***	4.447	3.958	0.489 **
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	5.378	5.064	0.315 ***	5.703	5.948	-0.245
Authority of father should be respected	2.621	2.315	0.305 ***	2.754	2.594	0.160
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	3.780	3.388	0.391 ***	4.089	3.771	0.318
Married woman should help husband's family first	3.771	3.395	0.376 ***	4.368	4.167	0.202

Note: * = 10% significance; ** = 5% significance, *** = 1% significance

Table 8. Difference Tests of Gender Attitudes Between Female and Male Respondents

Gender Attitudes	Respondents of All Age				Respondents Younger Than 30			
	Mean Female	Mean Male	Difference		Mean Female	Mean Male	Difference	
All								
Prefer son as child	0.770	0.686	0.085	***	0.794	0.720	0.075	***
Husband should be older than wife	3.483	3.587	-0.104	***	3.551	3.847	-0.295	***
Important for wife to help husbands career	3.525	3.529	-0.004		4.097	3.929	0.168	**
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	3.749	3.562	0.188	***	4.412	3.990	0.421	***
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	5.038	4.789	0.249	***	5.565	5.008	0.558	***
Authority of father should be respected	2.740	2.669	0.070	***	2.858	2.757	0.101	*
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	3.752	3.390	0.362	***	4.193	3.688	0.505	***
Married woman should help husband's family first	3.860	3.700	0.160	***	4.398	3.973	0.425	***
China								
Prefer son as child	0.763	0.726	0.038	**	0.801	0.767	0.034	
Husband should be older than wife	3.396	3.467	-0.071	*	3.312	3.507	-0.195	**
Important for wife to help husbands career	3.367	3.257	0.110	**	3.606	3.332	0.274	***
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	3.506	3.490	0.015		3.857	3.577	0.280	***
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	4.814	4.495	0.320	***	5.092	4.499	0.594	***
Authority of father should be respected	2.616	2.576	0.041		2.624	2.624	0.000	
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	3.774	3.640	0.135	**	4.097	3.869	0.228	*
Married woman should help husband's family first	3.785	3.612	0.173	***	4.028	3.641	0.387	***
Japan								
Prefer son as child	0.859	0.654	0.205	***	0.821	0.686	0.136	**
Husband should be older than wife	4.087	3.998	0.089	**	4.331	4.333	-0.002	
Important for wife to help husbands career	3.824	3.900	-0.075		4.086	4.324	-0.238	
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	3.966	3.695	0.271	***	4.324	4.286	0.038	
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	4.868	4.638	0.230	***	5.511	4.905	0.606	***
Authority of father should be respected	3.438	3.155	0.283	***	3.698	3.724	-0.026	
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	3.731	3.264	0.467	***	3.928	3.829	0.100	
Married woman should help husband's family first	4.015	3.926	0.089	*	4.460	4.429	0.032	
Korea								
Prefer son as child	0.611	0.541	0.070	***	0.702	0.583	0.119	**
Husband should be older than wife	3.449	3.589	-0.140	*	3.979	4.103	-0.124	
Important for wife to help husbands career	3.594	3.649	-0.055		4.730	4.406	0.325	**
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	4.066	3.799	0.268	***	5.191	4.554	0.636	***
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	5.248	5.069	0.180	**	5.958	5.280	0.678	***
Authority of father should be respected	2.294	2.445	-0.151	**	2.778	2.606	0.172	
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	3.500	3.069	0.431	***	4.229	3.280	0.949	***
Married woman should help husband's family first	3.934	3.774	0.159	**	4.799	4.183	0.616	***
Taiwan								
Prefer son as child	0.819	0.757	0.061	***	0.844	0.759	0.085	**
Husband should be older than wife	2.990	3.377	-0.388	***	3.125	3.917	-0.792	***
Important for wife to help husbands career	3.397	3.486	-0.090		4.424	4.203	0.221	
Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	3.649	3.379	0.269	***	4.777	4.031	0.746	***
OK for women to be laid-off during recession	5.425	5.144	0.281	***	6.094	5.483	0.611	***
Authority of father should be respected	2.551	2.507	0.044		2.813	2.655	0.157	
Filial piety: One must have at least one son	3.950	3.376	0.574	***	4.496	3.669	0.827	***
Married woman should help husband's family first	3.753	3.565	0.188	***	4.665	4.072	0.593	***

Note: *= 10% significance; ** = 5% significance, *** = 1% significance

Table 9. Estimators on Gender Attitudes in China

	Prefer son as child	Husband should be older than wife	Important for wife to help husbands career	Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	OK for women to be laid-off during recession	Authority of father should be respected	Filial piety: One must have at least one son	Married woman should help husband's family first
Co-residence	-0.2536* (0.1438)	-0.3149 (0.1956)	0.0329 (0.1704)	0.0977 (0.1489)	0.0102 (0.1266)	0.1048 (0.26)	0.0905 (0.1416)	-0.1525 (0.152)
Household Income	-0.00498** (0.00238)	-0.00184 (0.00312)	-0.00139 (0.00279)	-0.00233 (0.00248)	0.00125 (0.00211)	-0.000438 (0.00441)	0.00173 (0.00233)	-0.00493** (0.00245)
R's health	0.0669 (0.0697)	-0.3209*** (0.103)	0.0292 (0.0799)	0.0291 (0.0718)	-0.0991 (0.0618)	-0.00216 (0.1326)	-0.036 (0.0685)	0.0619 (0.0702)
R's Degree	-0.2909*** (0.0647)	0.086 (0.0806)	0.3606*** (0.0702)	0.3105*** (0.0634)	0.1884*** (0.0554)	-0.0954 (0.1182)	0.2428*** (0.0597)	0.0641 (0.0626)
Gender	0.5123*** (0.1272)	-0.1379 (0.1591)	-0.7302*** (0.1399)	-0.3146** (0.1236)	-0.5103*** (0.1079)	0.2037 (0.2293)	-0.4324*** (0.1167)	-0.411*** (0.124)
Age	-0.0154** (0.00663)	-0.0175** (0.00892)	0.00889 (0.00768)	-0.0067 (0.00694)	0.00419 (0.00582)	0.00545 (0.0122)	-0.0041 (0.00645)	0.00211 (0.00674)
Married or Once Married	0.654*** (0.2167)	0.7814*** (0.272)	-0.4561** (0.2131)	-0.0984 (0.1925)	0.0417 (0.1741)	-0.1255 (0.3634)	-0.1592 (0.1826)	-0.0915 (0.1955)
Employment	-0.1441 (0.2033)	0.3452 (0.2887)	0.0331 (0.2324)	-0.1653 (0.2075)	-0.0424 (0.1808)	-0.4213 (0.3419)	-0.127 (0.1947)	-0.1202 (0.2021)
Community Size	0.0859*** (0.0316)	0.1026** (0.0411)	0.02 (0.0356)	0.0533* (0.032)	-0.00614 (0.0274)	0.0399 (0.0583)	-0.0881*** (0.0297)	0.014 (0.0315)
First Child	0.205* (0.1201)	-0.2166 (0.1595)	-0.0525 (0.1375)	-0.0138 (0.1228)	-0.0998 (0.1057)	-0.1634 (0.2279)	0.1223 (0.1145)	-0.0815 (0.1222)
R's income compared with the household	-0.000332 (0.00222)	-0.000149 (0.0029)	0.00113 (0.00247)	0.00449** (0.00221)	-0.00177 (0.00191)	0.00151 (0.00401)	0.001 (0.00208)	0.00006 (0.00222)
Relatives worst health	-0.0441 (0.0562)	-0.0352 (0.072)	0.00475 (0.0646)	0.0646 (0.0574)	0.0796 (0.0494)	-0.0978 (0.1053)	0.0107 (0.0541)	0.0456 (0.057)
Highest Degree of R's Parents	-0.1686*** (0.0639)	0.1597** (0.0747)	-0.0165 (0.0667)	0.106* (0.0594)	0.0899* (0.0536)	0.0924 (0.1107)	0.1274** (0.0562)	0.1218** (0.0591)
Parents' Divorced or Separated	-0.2841 (1.1607)	-0.7243 (1.1483)	-1.005 (0.9739)	-2.1468* (1.143)	-12.8647 (327)	12.1298 (765.4)	-1.8195 (1.1583)	-0.5217 (0.9537)
Observations Used	1,793	1,793	1,793	1,793	1,793	1,793	1,793	1,793
Likelihood Ratio	97.511***	48.328***	72.087***	73.725***	61.765***	7.165	112.570***	37.396***

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 10. Estimators on Gender Attitudes in Japan

	Prefer son as child	Husband should be older than wife	Important for wife to help husbands career	Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	OK for women to be laid-off during recession	Authority of father should be respected	Filial piety: One must have at least one son	Married woman should help husband's family first
Co-residence	-0.554*** (0.1855)	-0.1993 (0.2251)	-0.1274 (0.1871)	-0.3987** (0.1941)	-0.3203** (0.1605)	-0.3114 (0.2699)	-0.4669* (0.2393)	-0.1421 (0.2058)
Household Income	-0.000717 (0.00315)	-0.0025 (0.00365)	-0.00732** (0.00308)	-0.00597* (0.00311)	-0.00427 (0.00268)	-0.00559 (0.00425)	-0.00635* (0.00366)	-0.00598* (0.00335)
R's health	0.1753** (0.0855)	0.00628 (0.0959)	0.00358 (0.0817)	-0.0229 (0.0826)	-0.0204 (0.0717)	0.1568 (0.1109)	0.00221 (0.0975)	0.1138 (0.0882)
R's Degree	-0.0144 (0.0725)	0.2273** (0.091)	0.2464*** (0.0766)	0.2191*** (0.0776)	0.1095* (0.0637)	0.0855 (0.1067)	0.3081*** (0.0948)	0.131 (0.0834)
Gender	-0.835*** (0.2161)	-0.4753** (0.2323)	-0.7966*** (0.199)	-1.2873*** (0.203)	-0.8205*** (0.1814)	-0.5607** (0.266)	-0.9059*** (0.2435)	-0.7045*** (0.2121)
Age	-0.020*** (0.00609)	-0.0319*** (0.00708)	-0.0171*** (0.00588)	-0.0201*** (0.00596)	-0.0156*** (0.00513)	-0.0254*** (0.00834)	-0.0156** (0.00693)	-0.0307*** (0.00647)
Married or Once Married	0.5802** (0.2646)	0.5717** (0.2916)	0.2095 (0.2488)	0.2701 (0.2525)	0.3101 (0.2284)	-0.0122 (0.3177)	0.7508** (0.3205)	0.3302 (0.2589)
Employment	0.1284 (0.2564)	0.1598 (0.2685)	0.09 (0.2273)	0.31 (0.2271)	-0.1281 (0.1969)	-0.1597 (0.2918)	-0.2421 (0.2492)	0.038 (0.2397)
Community Size	0.0856 (0.0804)	-0.0397 (0.0903)	0.0396 (0.0769)	0.2312*** (0.0785)	-0.0843 (0.0676)	-0.0223 (0.1047)	-0.0942 (0.0906)	-0.238*** (0.0832)
First Child	-0.0987 (0.1614)	-0.0862 (0.1777)	-0.2157 (0.1534)	0.0244 (0.1529)	0.1547 (0.1354)	0.0855 (0.2034)	0.1022 (0.1771)	-0.00881 (0.1619)
R's income compared with the household	-0.0076** (0.00381)	0.00416 (0.00405)	0.0103*** (0.00348)	0.0123*** (0.00351)	0.00763** (0.00314)	0.00229 (0.00455)	0.00253 (0.00401)	0.00624* (0.00368)
Relatives worst health	0.0742 (0.0736)	0.1354 (0.0866)	0.0958 (0.0728)	0.0586 (0.0736)	0.1061* (0.0634)	0.2646** (0.1038)	-0.0577 (0.0866)	0.0491 (0.0793)
Highest Degree of R's Parents	-0.0295 (0.0607)	0.00842 (0.0671)	0.0895 (0.057)	0.1108* (0.0579)	0.0827 (0.051)	0.0985 (0.078)	0.0433 (0.0672)	0.09 (0.0615)
Parents' Divorced or Separated	-0.412 (0.5792)	0.2363 (0.5682)	0.0548 (0.4733)	0.9724* (0.5845)	-0.1566 (0.4391)	-0.2649 (0.5356)	-0.2863 (0.5332)	-0.2067 (0.4588)
Observations Used	1067	1068	1065	1066	1067	1067	1067	1067
Likelihood Ratio	86.951***	51.538***	71.984***	114.388***	75.706***	42.986***	68.593***	77.458***

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11. Estimators on Gender Attitudes in Korea

	Prefer son as child	Husband should be older than wife	Important for wife to help husbands career	Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	OK for women to be laid-off during recession	Authority of father should be respected	Filial piety: One must have at least one son	Married woman should help husband's family first
Co-residence	-0.2123 (0.2432)	0.2286 (0.2852)	0.5739** (0.2576)	0.4161* (0.2509)	-0.0709 (0.2657)	0.8352*** (0.3191)	0.0439 (0.2753)	-0.0499 (0.2618)
Household Income	-0.00432 (0.00348)	-0.0052 (0.00431)	-0.0123*** (0.00378)	-0.0126*** (0.00359)	0.00211 (0.00381)	0.00398 (0.00543)	-0.00427 (0.00394)	-0.0122*** (0.00373)
R's health	0.00134 (0.0782)	-0.1919* (0.098)	0.0574 (0.083)	0.0588 (0.0797)	-0.0198 (0.0847)	0.2533** (0.1186)	0.0287 (0.0879)	0.034 (0.0824)
R's Degree	0.0788 (0.0835)	0.0195 (0.1036)	0.3929*** (0.0921)	0.2156** (0.0864)	0.0222 (0.0904)	0.0474 (0.1319)	0.1376 (0.097)	0.0512 (0.0888)
Gender	-0.5542*** (0.1858)	-0.2077 (0.2194)	-0.59*** (0.1927)	-0.9648*** (0.1879)	-0.5236** (0.2069)	-0.1527 (0.2833)	-0.9928*** (0.2023)	-1.2631*** (0.1907)
Age	-0.018* (0.00946)	-0.0118 (0.012)	-0.0137 (0.0108)	-0.0119 (0.01)	-0.0247** (0.0101)	-0.0012 (0.015)	-0.0194* (0.0115)	-0.0279*** (0.0106)
Married or Once Married	-0.1504 (0.2368)	-0.0434 (0.2734)	-0.563** (0.2393)	-0.7088*** (0.236)	-0.2309 (0.2689)	-0.2215 (0.3598)	0.1598 (0.255)	0.3635 (0.2398)
Employment								
Community Size	-0.0234 (0.1222)	0.1788 (0.1488)	0.2415* (0.1333)	0.1099 (0.1263)	-0.113 (0.1327)	0.2048 (0.1857)	0.00043 (0.1398)	-0.00487 (0.1296)
First Child	-0.0486 (0.1698)	0.1966 (0.1988)	0.1568 (0.1755)	0.0282 (0.1711)	0.3466* (0.1921)	-0.3357 (0.2801)	-0.3961** (0.1926)	-0.1202 (0.1759)
R's income compared with the household	0.00188 (0.00293)	0.00165 (0.00362)	0.00652** (0.00318)	0.00697** (0.00301)	-0.0018 (0.00325)	0.00023 (0.00447)	0.00269 (0.00328)	0.00974*** (0.00311)
Relatives worst health	-0.00683 (0.0714)	0.1024 (0.088)	-0.0864 (0.0768)	-0.0174 (0.0735)	0.019 (0.0779)	0.0434 (0.1168)	0.1021 (0.0825)	-0.104 (0.0755)
Highest Degree of R's Parents	0.0673 (0.0596)	0.0178 (0.071)	0.0627 (0.0603)	0.0196 (0.0593)	-0.0344 (0.0644)	-0.0222 (0.0942)	0.1443** (0.0641)	0.00404 (0.0605)
Parents' Divorced or Separated	-1.0181 (0.7812)	0.0449 (0.6748)	-0.3987 (0.585)	-0.0142 (0.582)	0.2214 (0.6807)	0.529 (1.0689)	0.0868 (0.6203)	-0.8844 (0.584)
Observations Used	825	826	826	826	826	824	825	825
Likelihood Ratio	49.366***	15.534	130.104***	109.008***	38.990***	18.341	70.233***	85.615***

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 12. Estimators on Gender Attitudes in Taiwan

	Prefer son as child	Husband should be older than wife	Important for wife to help husbands career	Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	OK for women to be laid-off during recession	Authority of father should be respected	Filial piety: One must have at least one son	Married woman should help husband's family first
Co-residence	-0.2044 (0.1385)	-0.1803 (0.1602)	-0.028 (0.1353)	-0.3041** (0.134)	-0.3326** (0.1375)	-0.219 (0.1874)	-0.3669*** (0.1275)	-0.0593 (0.1331)
Household Income	-0.00213 (0.00254)	-0.00175 (0.00282)	-0.00433* (0.00241)	-0.00379 (0.0024)	-0.00478* (0.00253)	0.0014 (0.00326)	-0.00229 (0.00229)	-0.006** (0.0024)
R's health	0.0989 (0.0662)	0.0513 (0.0723)	0.00428 (0.0628)	-0.0219 (0.0624)	-0.0908 (0.0635)	0.0762 (0.0823)	0.00588 (0.0585)	0.0772 (0.0618)
R's Degree	-0.0982* (0.0567)	-0.0297 (0.0632)	0.3598*** (0.0535)	0.4974*** (0.0537)	0.2099*** (0.0569)	0.3812*** (0.0716)	0.2591*** (0.0505)	0.17*** (0.0528)
Gender	-0.386*** (0.1285)	0.4411*** (0.1411)	-0.2227* (0.1159)	-0.8068*** (0.1179)	-0.4529*** (0.1312)	-0.3019** (0.1534)	-0.8779*** (0.1116)	-0.7252*** (0.116)
Age	-0.00606 (0.00587)	-0.0137** (0.00675)	-0.0116** (0.0058)	-0.0165*** (0.00576)	-0.0257*** (0.00585)	0.00963 (0.00754)	-0.0129** (0.00543)	-0.0303*** (0.00592)
Married or Once Married	-0.1176 (0.1969)	0.2705 (0.2128)	-0.2873* (0.1704)	-0.1269 (0.1743)	0.3977* (0.2056)	-0.0985 (0.2213)	0.4863*** (0.1658)	0.1843 (0.1712)
Employment	0.1635 (0.1801)	-0.1672 (0.1982)	0.0774 (0.1751)	0.2013 (0.173)	0.1517 (0.1777)	0.4055 (0.2524)	-0.134 (0.1622)	0.0637 (0.1712)
Community Size	-0.0707 (0.0649)	0.00234 (0.0723)	-0.0976 (0.0612)	-0.00013 (0.061)	0.0216 (0.0652)	0.0431 (0.0812)	0.034 (0.0578)	-0.1013* (0.0609)
First Child	-0.0432 (0.1358)	-0.1069 (0.1499)	0.0443 (0.1231)	0.1652 (0.124)	-0.2046 (0.1378)	-0.2056 (0.1687)	-0.1642 (0.1198)	0.0316 (0.123)
R's income compared with the household	0.00219 (0.00216)	-0.00388 (0.00252)	0.00006 (0.00208)	-0.00228 (0.00207)	0.0001 (0.00208)	0.00441* (0.00261)	0.00459** (0.00195)	-0.00149 (0.00212)
Relatives worst health	-0.0324 (0.0552)	-0.0124 (0.0617)	-0.0231 (0.0521)	0.0845 (0.052)	0.0588 (0.0556)	0.03 (0.0691)	0.00303 (0.049)	-0.0305 (0.0517)
Highest Degree of R's Parents	0.0363 (0.0536)	0.0876 (0.0567)	0.0636 (0.0466)	0.0488 (0.0475)	0.0989* (0.0584)	0.024 (0.0608)	0.0375 (0.0459)	0.1641*** (0.0467)
Parents' Divorced or Separated	-0.1358 (0.381)	-0.2871 (0.347)	-0.6946** (0.298)	0.0235 (0.3068)	0.1643 (0.3738)	-0.7936** (0.3427)	-0.228 (0.2983)	-0.6388** (0.301)
Observations Used	1,713	1,714	1,714	1,714	1,713	1,714	1,714	1,713
Likelihood Ratio	24.225**	25.665**	241.753***	390.531**	182.754***	73.923***	169.64***	267.211***

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 13. Marginal Effects on Gender Attitudes in China

	Prefer son as child	Husband should be older than wife	Important for wife to help husbands career	Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	OK for women to be laid-off during recession	Authority of father should be respected	Filial piety: One must have at least one son	Married woman should help husband's family first
Co-residence	0.0448* (-0.0244)	-0.0326* (-0.0189)	0.00471 (-0.0246)	0.0176 (-0.0271)	0.00243 (-0.0303)	0.00576 (-0.0147)	0.0183 (-0.0289)	-0.0269 (-0.0262)
Household Income	0.000910** (-0.000433)	-0.000203 (-0.000346)	-0.000197 (-0.000398)	-0.000414 (-0.00044)	0.000298 (-0.000504)	-0.0000234 (-0.000236)	0.000347 (-0.000468)	-0.000889** (-0.000441)
R's health	-0.0122 (-0.0127)	-0.0356*** (-0.0114)	0.00415 (-0.0114)	0.00516 (-0.0127)	-0.0237 (-0.0148)	-0.000116 (-0.00709)	-0.00722 (-0.0137)	0.0112 (-0.0127)
R's Degree	0.0532*** (-0.0116)	0.00952 (-0.00893)	0.0514*** (-0.00986)	0.0550*** (-0.011)	0.0451*** (-0.0131)	-0.0051 (-0.00633)	0.0487*** (-0.0118)	0.0116 (-0.0113)
Gender	-0.0937*** (-0.023)	-0.0153 (-0.0176)	-0.104*** (-0.0197)	-0.0558** (-0.0218)	-0.122*** (-0.0252)	0.0109 (-0.0123)	-0.0868*** (-0.0231)	-0.0742*** (-0.0222)
Age	0.00281** (-0.00121)	-0.00194** (-0.000989)	0.00127 (-0.00109)	-0.00119 (-0.00123)	0.001 (-0.00139)	0.000291 (-0.000653)	-0.000822 (-0.00129)	0.000381 (-0.00122)
Married or Once Married	-0.120*** (-0.0394)	0.0866*** (-0.0302)	-0.0650** (-0.0303)	-0.0174 (-0.0341)	0.00998 (-0.0416)	-0.0067 (-0.0194)	-0.0319 (-0.0366)	-0.0165 (-0.0353)
Employment	0.0263 (-0.0372)	0.0382 (-0.032)	0.00472 (-0.0331)	-0.0293 (-0.0368)	-0.0101 (-0.0433)	-0.0225 (-0.0183)	-0.0255 (-0.0391)	-0.0217 (-0.0365)
Community Size	-0.0157*** (-0.00574)	0.0114** (-0.00456)	0.00285 (-0.00507)	0.00945* (-0.00566)	-0.00147 (-0.00656)	0.00213 (-0.00312)	-0.0177*** (-0.00591)	0.00252 (-0.00568)
First Child	-0.0375* (-0.0219)	-0.024 (-0.0177)	-0.00748 (-0.0196)	-0.00244 (-0.0218)	-0.0239 (-0.0253)	-0.00873 (-0.0122)	0.0245 (-0.0229)	-0.0147 (-0.022)
R's income compared with the household	0.0000607 (-0.000406)	-0.0000165 (-0.00032)	0.000162 (-0.00035)	0.00079** (-0.0004)	-0.00042 (-0.0004)	0.0000807 (-0.0002)	0.000201 (-0.0004)	0.0000102 (-0.0004)
Relatives worst health	0.00806 (-0.0103)	-0.0039 (-0.00798)	0.000677 (-0.0092)	0.0115 (-0.0102)	0.0191 (-0.0118)	-0.00522 (-0.00564)	0.00216 (-0.0109)	0.00824 (-0.0103)
Highest Degree of R's Parents'	0.0308*** (-0.0116)	0.0177** (-0.00828)	-0.00235 (-0.00949)	0.0188* (-0.0105)	0.0215* (-0.0128)	0.00494 (-0.00593)	0.0256** (-0.0112)	0.0220** (-0.0106)
Divorced or Separated	0.052 (-0.212)	-0.0802 (-0.127)	-0.143 (-0.139)	-0.381* (-0.202)	-3.399 (-152.8)	0.642 (-38.53)	-0.365 (-0.232)	-0.0941 (-0.172)
Observations Used	1,793	1,793	1,793	1,793	1,793	1,793	1,793	1793
Likelihood Ratio	97.511***	48.328***	72.087***	73.725***	61.765***	7.165	112.570***	37.396***

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 14. Marginal Effects on Gender Attitudes in Japan

	Prefer son as child	Husband should be older than wife	Important for wife to help husbands career	Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	OK for women to be laid-off during recession	Authority of father should be respected	Filial piety: One must have at least one son	Married woman should help husband's family first
Co-residence	-0.0974*** (-0.0342)	-0.0252 (-0.0274)	-0.0227 (-0.0328)	-0.0673** (-0.031)	-0.0747** (-0.0375)	-0.0283 (-0.0229)	-0.0553** (-0.0258)	-0.0217 (-0.0307)
Household Income	-0.000118 (-0.000518)	-0.000329 (-0.000478)	-0.00132** (-0.000551)	-0.00105* (-0.000546)	-0.000988 (-0.000619)	-0.000543 (-0.000413)	-0.000818* (-0.000471)	-0.000930* (-0.00052)
R's health	0.0288** (-0.014)	0.000822 (-0.0126)	0.000646 (-0.0148)	-0.00403 (-0.0146)	-0.00473 (-0.0166)	0.0152 (-0.0108)	0.000285 (-0.0126)	0.0177 (-0.0137)
R's Degree	-0.00236 (-0.0119)	0.0298** (-0.0119)	0.0445*** (-0.0137)	0.0386*** (-0.0135)	0.0253* (-0.0147)	0.00831 (-0.0104)	0.0397*** (-0.0121)	0.0204 (-0.0129)
Gender	-0.137*** (-0.0348)	-0.0623** (-0.0304)	-0.144*** (-0.0351)	-0.227*** (-0.0335)	-0.190*** (-0.0405)	-0.0545** (-0.0259)	-0.117*** (-0.0311)	-0.110*** (-0.0326)
Age	-0.0032*** (-0.000985)	-0.0042*** (-0.000918)	-0.0030*** (-0.00105)	-0.0035*** (-0.00104)	-0.0036*** (-0.00117)	-0.0025*** (-0.000815)	-0.00201** (-0.00089)	-0.00478*** (-0.000983)
Married or Once Married	0.0952** (-0.0432)	0.0750** (-0.0381)	0.0378 (-0.0449)	0.0476 (-0.0445)	0.0718 (-0.0527)	-0.00118 (-0.0309)	0.0967** (-0.0411)	0.0514 (-0.0402)
Employment	0.0211 (-0.0421)	0.021 (-0.0352)	0.0163 (-0.041)	0.0547 (-0.0399)	-0.0296 (-0.0456)	-0.0155 (-0.0283)	-0.0312 (-0.0321)	0.00591 (-0.0373)
Community Size	0.0141 (-0.0132)	-0.00521 (-0.0118)	0.00715 (-0.0139)	0.0408*** (-0.0137)	-0.0195 (-0.0156)	-0.00216 (-0.0102)	-0.0121 (-0.0117)	-0.0370*** (-0.0128)
First Child	-0.0162 (-0.0265)	-0.0113 (-0.0233)	-0.039 (-0.0276)	0.0043 (-0.027)	0.0358 (-0.0313)	0.0083 (-0.0198)	0.0132 (-0.0228)	-0.00137 (-0.0252)
R's income compared with the household	-0.00124** (-0.000623)	0.000545 (-0.000531)	0.00186*** (-0.00062)	0.00218*** (-0.000608)	0.00177** (-0.000718)	0.000223 (-0.000442)	0.000326 (-0.000516)	0.000971* (-0.00057)
Relatives worst health	0.0122 (-0.0121)	0.0178 (-0.0113)	0.0173 (-0.0131)	0.0103 (-0.013)	0.0246* (-0.0146)	0.0257** (-0.0101)	-0.00744 (-0.0112)	0.00764 (-0.0123)
Highest Degree of R's Parents	-0.00484 (-0.00997)	0.0011 (-0.0088)	0.0162 (-0.0103)	0.0195* (-0.0102)	0.0191 (-0.0118)	0.00957 (-0.00758)	0.00557 (-0.00866)	0.014 (-0.00954)
Parents' Divorced or Separated	-0.0676 (-0.095)	0.031 (-0.0745)	0.0099 (-0.0855)	0.172* (-0.103)	-0.0363 (-0.102)	-0.0257 (-0.052)	-0.0369 (-0.0687)	-0.0322 (-0.0714)
Observations Used	1,067	1,068	1,065	1,066	1,067	1,067	1,067	1,067
Likelihood Ratio	97.511***	48.328***	72.087***	73.725***	61.765***	7.165	112.570***	37.396***

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 15. Marginal Effects on Gender Attitudes in Korea

	Prefer son as child	Husband should be older than wife	Important for wife to help husbands career	Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	OK for women to be laid-off during recession	Authority of father should be respected	Filial piety: One must have at least one son	Married woman should help husband's family first
Co-residence	-0.0483 (-0.056)	0.0366 (-0.0479)	0.118** (-0.0535)	0.0908* (-0.0545)	-0.0134 (-0.0509)	0.0958** (-0.0448)	0.00794 (-0.0501)	-0.0103 (-0.0538)
Household Income	-0.000967 (-0.000775)	-0.000789 (-0.000653)	-0.0025*** (-0.000741)	-0.0027*** (-0.000756)	0.000396 (-0.000713)	0.000358 (-0.000489)	-0.000767 (-0.000705)	-0.00253*** (-0.000758)
R's health	0.000299 (-0.0175)	-0.0291** (-0.0148)	0.0115 (-0.0166)	0.0127 (-0.0172)	-0.00371 (-0.0159)	0.0228** (-0.0107)	0.00515 (-0.0158)	0.00706 (-0.0171)
R's Degree	0.0176 (-0.0186)	0.00297 (-0.0157)	0.0788*** (-0.0178)	0.0467** (-0.0185)	0.00416 (-0.0169)	0.00427 (-0.0119)	0.0247 (-0.0174)	0.0106 (-0.0184)
Gender	-0.124*** (-0.0408)	-0.0315 (-0.0333)	-0.118*** (-0.0378)	-0.209*** (-0.0383)	-0.0981** (-0.0383)	-0.0137 (-0.0255)	-0.178*** (-0.0346)	-0.262*** (-0.0356)
Age	-0.00404* (-0.0021)	-0.00179 (-0.00183)	-0.00275 (-0.00216)	-0.00259 (-0.00217)	-0.00464** (-0.00186)	-0.000108 (-0.00135)	-0.00348* (-0.00206)	-0.00579*** (-0.00217)
Married or Once Married	-0.0337 (-0.053)	-0.00659 (-0.0415)	-0.113** (-0.0473)	-0.154*** (-0.0501)	-0.0433 (-0.0504)	-0.0199 (-0.0324)	0.0287 (-0.0458)	0.0755 (-0.0496)
Employment								
Community Size	-0.00524 (-0.0273)	0.0271 (-0.0226)	0.0484* (-0.0266)	0.0238 (-0.0273)	-0.0212 (-0.0248)	0.0184 (-0.0167)	0.0000766 (-0.0251)	-0.00101 (-0.0269)
First Child	-0.0109 (-0.038)	0.0298 (-0.0302)	0.0315 (-0.0351)	0.00612 (-0.0371)	0.0650* (-0.0358)	-0.0302 (-0.0253)	-0.0712** (-0.0343)	-0.025 (-0.0365)
R's income compared with the household	0.000421 (-0.000654)	0.00025 (-0.000549)	0.00131** (-0.000633)	0.00151** (-0.000646)	-0.000336 (-0.000608)	0.0000207 (-0.000402)	0.000484 (-0.000589)	0.00202*** (-0.000633)
Relatives worst health	-0.00153 (-0.016)	0.0155 (-0.0133)	-0.0173 (-0.0154)	-0.00376 (-0.0159)	0.00357 (-0.0146)	0.0039 (-0.0105)	0.0183 (-0.0148)	-0.0216 (-0.0156)
Highest Degree of R's Parents'	0.0151 (-0.0133)	0.0027 (-0.0108)	0.0126 (-0.0121)	0.00424 (-0.0129)	-0.00646 (-0.0121)	-0.002 (-0.00848)	0.0259** (-0.0114)	0.000839 (-0.0126)
Divorced or Separated	-0.228 (-0.174)	0.00682 (-0.102)	-0.08 (-0.117)	-0.00308 (-0.126)	0.0415 (-0.128)	0.0476 (-0.0963)	0.0156 (-0.111)	-0.184 (-0.121)
Observations Used	825	826	826	826	826	824	825	825
Likelihood Ratio	49.366***	15.534	130.104***	109.008***	38.990***	18.341	70.233***	85.615***

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 16. Marginal Effects on Gender Attitudes In Taiwan

	Prefer son as child	Husband should be older than wife	Important for wife to help husbands career	Husband job to earn money wife job to care home	OK for women to be laid-off during recession	Authority of father should be respected	Filial piety: One must have at least one son	Married woman should help husband's family first
Co-residence	-0.0343 (-0.0238)	-0.0238 (-0.0206)	-0.00537 (-0.0259)	-0.0584** (-0.0257)	-0.0552** (-0.0235)	-0.0231 (-0.019)	-0.0770*** (-0.0262)	-0.0115 (-0.0258)
Household Income	-0.000348 (-0.000416)	-0.000237 (-0.000381)	-0.000831* (-0.000461)	-0.000726 (-0.000458)	-0.000766* (-0.000405)	0.000153 (-0.000356)	-0.000486 (-0.000487)	-0.00117** (-0.000464)
R's health	0.0162 (-0.0108)	0.00694 (-0.00978)	0.000821 (-0.0121)	-0.0042 (-0.012)	-0.0146 (-0.0102)	0.00832 (-0.00899)	0.00125 (-0.0124)	0.015 (-0.012)
R's Degree	-0.0161* (-0.00926)	-0.00402 (-0.00855)	0.0691*** (-0.00981)	0.0953*** (-0.00934)	0.0336*** (-0.00901)	0.0417*** (-0.00782)	0.0551*** (-0.0104)	0.0331*** (-0.0102)
Gender	-0.0632*** (-0.0209)	0.0597*** (-0.019)	-0.0428* (-0.0222)	-0.155*** (-0.0215)	-0.0725*** (-0.0208)	-0.0330** (-0.0167)	-0.187*** (-0.0221)	-0.141*** (-0.0216)
Age	-0.000992 (-0.00096)	-0.00185** (-0.000913)	-0.00223** (-0.00111)	-0.0032*** (-0.0011)	-0.0041*** (-0.000918)	0.00105 (-0.000823)	-0.00274** (-0.00115)	-0.00590*** (-0.00113)
Married or Once Married	-0.0192 (-0.0322)	0.0366 (-0.0288)	-0.0552* (-0.0326)	-0.0243 (-0.0334)	0.0637* (-0.0328)	-0.0108 (-0.0242)	0.103*** (-0.0349)	0.0359 (-0.0333)
Employment	0.0268 (-0.0295)	-0.0226 (-0.0268)	0.0149 (-0.0336)	0.0386 (-0.0331)	0.0243 (-0.0284)	0.0443 (-0.0276)	-0.0285 (-0.0345)	0.0124 (-0.0333)
Community Size	-0.0116 (-0.0106)	0.000316 (-0.00979)	-0.0187 (-0.0117)	-0.000025 (-0.0117)	0.00347 (-0.0104)	0.00471 (-0.00888)	0.00722 (-0.0123)	-0.0197* (-0.0118)
First Child	-0.00706 (-0.0222)	-0.0145 (-0.0203)	0.00851 (-0.0236)	0.0317 (-0.0237)	-0.0328 (-0.022)	-0.0225 (-0.0184)	-0.0349 (-0.0254)	0.00615 (-0.0239)
R's income compared with the household	0.000359 (-0.000353)	-0.000525 (-0.000341)	0.0000109 (-0.000399)	-0.000436 (-0.000396)	0.0000167 (-0.000333)	0.000482* (-0.000285)	0.000975** (-0.000413)	-0.00029 (-0.000413)
Relatives worst health	-0.0053 (-0.00904)	-0.00167 (-0.00836)	-0.00445 (-0.01)	0.0162 (-0.00994)	0.00941 (-0.0089)	0.00328 (-0.00756)	0.000643 (-0.0104)	-0.00593 (-0.0101)
Highest Degree of R's Parents'	0.00593 (-0.00877)	0.0119 (-0.00767)	0.0122 (-0.00892)	0.00936 (-0.0091)	0.0158* (-0.00933)	0.00263 (-0.00664)	0.00797 (-0.00974)	0.0319*** (-0.00895)
Divorced or Separated	-0.0222 (-0.0623)	-0.0389 (-0.0469)	-0.133** (-0.0569)	0.0045 (-0.0588)	0.0263 (-0.0599)	-0.0867** (-0.0374)	-0.0485 (-0.0634)	-0.124** (-0.0583)
Observations Used	1,713	1,714	1,714	1,714	1,713	1,714	1,714	1,713
Likelihood Ratio	24.225**	25.665**	241.753***	390.531**	182.754***	73.923***	169.64***	267.211***

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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