Love of Humanity in Shaftesbury's *Moralists*

Michael B. Gill

1. Introduction

Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, was an intensely aspirational thinker. He expected great things of human beings, hoping to inspire them not only to do right by everyone but also to feel love for all. But Shaftesbury was also a keen observer of human folly. In the conduct of most people he saw much that fell far short of his ideal.

How did Shaftesbury's aspirational tendencies consort with his awareness of human shortcomings? Shaftesbury's meta-ethics — his view of the origins of morality's content and motivational force — brings that question into sharp focus. The answer to that question is less clear. That might have been by design. The work in which Shaftesbury addresses the issue most conspicuously is his epistolary dialogue *The Moralists*, whose shifting scenes, multiple characters, and interrupted conversations provide plenty of places for a philosophical position to hide.[1]

In this paper I'll examine the views on virtue's content and motivation presented in Shaftesbury's *The Moralists*.[2] Shaftesbury's positions on the content of virtue and on moral

---

[1] For discussion of the form of *The Moralists* see Prince, *Philosophical Dialogue in the British Enlightenment: Theology, Aesthetics and the Novel*, 47-73; Hoover, '"Voices and Accents": Enthusiastic Characterization in Shaftesbury's *The Moralists*', 72-96; and Jaffro, 'Shaftesbury on the "Natural Secretion" and Philosophical Personae', 349-359.

[2] This paper will focus mainly on *The Moralists* and other parts of *Characteristics*. I will say little about things Shaftesbury wrote but chose not to include in *Characteristics*. For

motivation are well-known, but here I will try to show between those two positions there is a surprising, less-noticed tension.

2. Shaftesbury on moral motivation and the content of morality

One of the central questions in modern moral philosophy was whether morality originates in reason or sentiment. Samuel Clarke and Immanuel Kant gave clearly rationalist answers to the question. Francis Hutcheson and David Hume gave clearly sentimentalist answers.

Shaftesbury has often been taken to be the forebear of Hutcheson and Hume. In fact Shaftesbury's view straddles the rationalist-sentimentalist divide (see Gill, *The British Moralists on Human Nature*, 100-132). He believes that morality has an '*eternal*' and 'immutable' content that is independent of human reactions; in this he agrees with the rationalists (C 2.36).[3] But he also believes that human conduct is based in 'Affection', and that it is 'by Affection merely that a Creature is esteem'd good or ill' (C 2.12; see also C 2.22 and 2.45); in this he agrees with the sentimentalists.[4]

---

discussion of the picture of Shaftesbury's moral views that emerges from some of his unpublished writings see: Maurer and Jaffro, 'Reading Shaftesbury's *Pathologia*'; Klein, *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness*; and Müller, 'Dwell with honesty & beauty & order'. For discussion of the relationship between Shaftesbury's published and unpublished writings see Jaffro, 'Shaftesbury on the "Natural Secretion" and Philosophical Personae'.

[3] Cooper, Anthony Ashley, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, volume 2 of page 36 of original pagination. All references to *Characteristics* will be in this form.

[4] For discussion of Shaftesbury's sentimentalist view of motivation see Terence Irwin, *The*

So Shaftesbury is a rationalist about the content of morality and a sentimentalist about human motivation. It's a risky mix. For it opens up the possibility of humans' being sentimentally incapable of acting in the way that virtue requires — of morality's being a check that reason writes but affection is unable to cash. Unlike views on which moral content and motivation have a single origin, the Shaftesburean mix raises the specter of a mismatch between what virtue demands and what we're able to do.

Shaftesbury himself was keenly aware of this worry. His concern centered on the impartiality and affectivity of virtue.

To be virtuous, according to Shaftesbury, is to 'love the Publick, to study universal Good, and to promote the Interest of the whole World, as far as lies within our power' (C 1.37). Shaftesburean virtue consists of impartial care for the 'publick Interest' (C 2.31), of an 'equal, just and universal Friendship' with all humankind (C 2.137). Given the affective origin of motivation and merit, it follows then that the morally righteous are those who are sentimentally disposed to benefit humanity as a whole. As Shaftesbury puts it, '[T]o deserve the name of *good* or *virtuous* a Creature must have all his Inclinations and Affections, his Dispositions of Mind and Temper, sutable, and agreeing with the Good of his *Kind*... To stand thus well affected, and to have one's Affections *right* and *intire,* not only in respect of one's self, but of Society and the Publick: This is *Rectitude, Integrity,* or Virtue' (C 2.77).[5] In addition to the affective element, Shaftesburean virtue requires the reflective capacity to conceive of the good of one's species, and for this idea of the good of one's species to be

Development of Ethics, 353-71 and Joseph Filonowicz, *Fellow-Feeling and the Moral Life*, 48-55.

[5] See also C 2.110-13, where Shaftesbury contrasts '*intire Affection*', or concern for all of humanity, with 'narrow or *partial* Affection'.

part of one's motivational etiology. It's this reflective capacity — necessary for the ability to act from conscious concern for one's species — that distinguishes mere goodness from virtue. A creature can be good even if it has no awareness of the good of its kind. A spider or a tiger that is affectively constituted to behave in ways that best promote spiders or tigers in general will be good even though it lacks the reflective capacity for the idea of its species to figure in its motivational etiology. But the moral goal to which humans beings should aspire — 'that which is call'd Virtue or Merit' (C 2.28) — does require an awareness of the good of the human species. '[I]n this Case alone it is we call any Creature *worthy* or *virtuous*', Shaftesbury writes, 'when it can have the Notion of a publick Interest' (C 2.31) For humans to be virtuous they must act from a '*proportionable Affection of a rational Creature towards the moral Objects of Right and Wrong*' (C 2.40). They must act from a conscious concern for humanity as a whole, from universal love.

Who, though, can bring themselves to feel universal love?[6] How many of us are capable of acting out of affection for all of humanity? Philocles, narrator of *The Moralists*, initially maintains that he, for one, cannot. According to Philocles at the beginning of the narrative of the *The Moralists*, the goal of impartial virtue is for partially affected people such as himself '*a Chimera*' (C 2.239). Philocles' first thought is that the Shaftesburean mix makes the accomplishment of virtue impossible. But then Philocles visits his friend Theocles.

---

[6] Shaftesbury would not have denied that benevolence toward a subset of humanity (such as one's friends and family, and even one's self) can be virtuous. But he believes that the height of virtue is universal benevolence (C 2.137). And he also believes that partial benevolence — what he calls '*close Sympathy* and *conspiring Virtue*' or our '*cantonizing*' tendency — often leads to the greatest conflicts and worst destruction (C 1.112-3).

They walk the fields for two days, and they talk (and talk and talk). Eventually Philocles sees the light. Theocles convinces him that a mismatch between the content of morality and human motivation is not inevitable. Virtue is a realistic aspiration. Universal love can be achieved.

How does Theocles make his case? That's what we'll look at now. We'll see that although Philocles is satisfied by what Theocles says, it's far from obvious that we should be.

3. *The Moralists* and universal love: Philocles' problem

The action of *The Moralists* commences in a 'pompous *rural Scene*' by '*Morning-light*'. Philocles meets up with Theocles, who is 'roving in the Fields' of his seaside estate, which is capacious enough to include a 'Mountain', an 'antient Wood; a 'River', and a 'well-inhabited Plain' (C 2.222-3). Philocles and Theocles discuss poetry and pleasure and happiness, and eventually land on the topic of the highest good. Theocles contends that the highest good is a life consisting of 'one continu'd Friendship' with all of humanity (C 2.239). Philocles doesn't deny that turning 'all [one's] Life' in an 'intire Act' of friendship is the essence of virtue. But he doubts such a thing is within his reach. He raises two obstacles to the development of universal love.

The first obstacle is that many members of the human species are too corrupt and stupid for him to bring himself to love. '[W]iser Heads' may think universal love is 'heroick', says Philocles. 'But for my part, I see so very little Worth in *Mankind*, and have so indifferent an Opinion of *the Publick*, that I can propose little Satisfaction to my-self in loving *either*' (C 2.240).

Philocles is not the only character to voice this view. Palemon, to whom Philocles is relating the story of *The Moralists*, has the same '*Man-hater*' (C 2.197) tendencies. The first

words we hear out of Palemon's mouth are: 'O wretched State of Mankind!—Hapless Nature, thus to have err'd in thy chief Workmanship!' (C 2.192). Palemon goes on to say that he wishes he could love humanity, but — 'O what Treacherys! what Disorders! And how corrupt is all!' — their conduct repels him (C 2.198). People who in public appear as friends craftily plot each other's ruin less than an hour later. Many would gladly sacrifice the 'the State it-self' to satisfy their own ambitions (C 2.198). In company there is 'much Folly and Perverseness … and strange Appetites' (C 2.201). 'Licentiousness', 'Villanys and Corruptions' are everywhere (C 2.195, 2.204).

Nor was *The Moralists* the first work in which Shaftesbury expressed such misanthropy. In his *Inquiry concerning Virtue*, Shaftesbury extolled the moral accomplishments humans and humans alone can achieve. '[T]he highest Improvements of Temper are made in Human Kind', he wrote (C 2.96). But he also contended that humans are guilty of the 'greatest Corruptions and Degeneracys' in all of creation (C 2.96). Only humans exhibit cruelty and 'perverse Inclinations' (C 2.82). 'In the other Species of Creature around us, there is found generally an exact Proportionableness, Constancy and Regularity in all their Passions and Affections… Whilst Man … is often found to live in less conformity with Nature… So that 'tis hard to find in any Region a human society which has *human* Laws. No wonder if in such Societys 'tis so hard to find a Man who lives NATURALLY, and as a Man' (C 2.96-7). No creatures other than humans have been designed to achieve virtue. We alone have the capacity to reach so high. But no creatures other than humans violate their nature so grievously. We alone sink so low.

Theocles does not dispute these judgments of pervasive 'human Frailty' (C 2.241). What he does instead is seek to persuade Philocles that he can relish loving people even while recognizing their faults. Towards that end, Theocles has Philocles attend to his

friendships. If a friend does something for Philocles, Philocles will want to show gratitude. But suppose Philocles discovers in his friend 'several Failings' (C 2.241). 'Does this', Theocles asks, 'exclude *the Gratitude*?' 'Not in the least', Philocles replies. His gratitude toward a friend will not be at all deterred by his awareness of his friend's faults. Theocles points out that the same is true of Philocles' '*Bounty'*. Philocles delights in benefiting his friends not because they are '*deserving*' of it but just because they are his friends. Indeed, the delight he takes in benefiting a friend is if anything enhanced by his awareness that he is not doing it because his friend's moral character compels it of him. But if Philocles finds it so easy to show gratitude and bounty towards his friends even while acknowledging their faults, why think the imperfections of people in general are an insuperable obstacle to loving them as well? From Theocles to Philocles: '[C]onsider then what it was you said, when you objected against the Love of *Mankind* because of human Frailty; and seem'd to scorn the *Publick*, because of its Misfortunes. See if this Sentiment be consistent with that Humanity [i.e., the kindness toward friends] which elsewhere you own and practice' (C 2.241). Philocles knows his friends are far from perfect, but he still delights in showing them kindness. So why shouldn't he also delight in kindness to the entirety of human beings despite their 'Faults or Blemishes'? Theocles also points out that Philocles takes pleasure in being able to 'help, assist [and] relieve' 'Strangers' in need even if he has no reason for thinking they are morally exemplary. But since Philocles relishes the 'Compassion' and 'Kindness' he shows to 'Chance-Creatures', he should also be able to enjoy showing compassion and kindness toward the public. The moral shortcomings of an individual recipient don't subvert Philocles' gratitude and bounty in particular cases. So the moral shortcomings of the species should be no bar to his compassion toward human beings in general.

Philocles still has doubts. He doesn't deny that the virtue consists of 'universal friendship'. And he acknowledges that he can love particular imperfect people. The worry he now raises is that he's psychologically incapable of caring about something as large and abstract as humanity as a whole. 'I told Theocles, going along', he says, 'that I fear'd I shou'd never make a good *Friend* or *Lover* after his way. As for a plain natural Love of *one single* Person in either Sex, I cou'd compass it, I thought, well enough; but this *complex universal* sort was beyond my reach. I cou'd love the Individual, but not the Species. This was too mysterious; too metaphysical an Object for me' (C 2.243).[7] Loving a single person is one thing. Loving people in general is something else entirely.

Expansive abstractness is Philoles' second obstacle to loving humanity as a whole. Philocles was not the only one impressed by it. So was David Hume.

According to Hume, we care about individuals because of certain qualities they possess, such as being beautiful, kind, amusing, or from our hometown. We can also be induced to take an interest in any particular person who is 'brought near to us' or whose plight is 'represented in lively colours'. But the welfare of humanity as a whole does not engage our emotional machinery. The bare quality of being human does not engender our love. Hume writes, 'There is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such … no proof of such an universal affection to mankind' (Hume, *A Treatise of*

[7] Shaftesbury also discusses the difficulty of loving something as abstract as humanity as a whole in *Sensus Communis*, where he says that 'Universal Good, or the Interest of *the World in general*, is a kind of remote philosophical Object. That *greater Community* falls not easily under the Eye' (C 1.111). See Chavez, 'Philosophy and Politeness in Shaftesbury's *Characteristics*', 61.

Human Nature 3.2.1.12, 309). Our sentiments are literally partial, ineluctably 'confined to a few persons'. While we can love almost any part of humanity, we cannot, Hume thinks, love humanity as a whole.

Theocles thinks we can. In response to Philocles' Hume-like worry, Theocles exclaims in characteristically high-blown fashion, 'O Philocles! how little do you know the Extent and Power of *Good-nature*, and to what an heroick pitch a Soul may rise, which knows the thorow Force of it; and distributing it rightly, frames in it-self an equal, just, and universal Friendship!' (C 2.242). And just at this point, when Philocles is primed to hear Theocles' secret to virtue, Shaftesbury withholds. He does not allow Theocles to give his answer. He conjures an interruption. 'Just as [Theocles] had ended these Words', Philocles explains, 'a Servant came to us in the Field, to give notice of some Company, who were come to dine with us, and waited our coming in. So we walk'd home-wards' (C 2.242-3). Philocles and Theocles then trudge back to the house from the 'Fields' in which they had been 'roving'.

But we are not left completely hanging. As they follow the servant home, Theocles gives a preview, a teaser, of his answer. Philocles thinks humanity as a whole is too abstract an object for him to love, that his affections can get a grip only on something more definite. In the past, however, Philocles has loved some with whom he has had no physical interaction. Theocles gives two examples of this kind of phenomenon: '*the People of old* ROME' and Palemon, whom Philocles grew to love entirely through correspondence (C 2.244). In each case, Philocles formed an appropriate mental image of the object of his affection, a lovable picture that he called to mind when he thought of the Romans or Palemon. Philocles concedes these two examples. But what picture could function as a mental stand-in for humanity as a whole and elicit his love? How can he 'raise any such

Image, or Specter, as may represent this odd Being you wou'd have me love'? (C 2.244). What 'Figure' could he 'stamp upon [his] Mind' that would both represent humankind and be thoroughly lovable (C 2.244)? That's the challenge. And Theocles 'accept[s] the Terms'. He vows to reveal to Philocles the image that will turn him into 'that *Lover* I cou'd wish' (C 2.245). But not just yet. The rest of the day they will spend with 'Friends' at the 'Table' and speak of matters more suitable to 'Company' (C 2.245). The ultimate answer will be given — the image revealed, the challenge met — 'To-morrow, when the eastern Sun (as the Poets describe) with his first Beams adorns the Front of yonder Hill' (C 2.245).

There the conversation breaks off — for ninety-four pages. In the interval, we follow Philocles and Theocles through an afternoon, evening, and night of conversation with company. They discuss with their visitors the benefits of temperance, the deficiencies of Deism, the inherent sociability of humans. They affirm the coincidence of virtue and happiness. They debate the relationship between religious belief and moral action.[8]

Eventually they all retire to their 'repose'. Getting into bed, Philocles is in a twitter. 'For now (Palemon!)', he writes to his pen-pal, 'that Morning was approaching, for which I so much long'd' (C 2.338-39). Despite his excitement, Philocles falls asleep easily enough.

He's woken at daybreak by the sounds of guests' departing. He rises quickly and races up the hill to catch Theocles, who has begun his morning walk. After some jocular banter about the jealousy of '*Silvan* Nymphs', Theocles launches into his promised presentation.

[8] Most important for what is to come the next morning is Theocles' evening speech on the existence of God (C 2.282-95).

4. *The Moralists* and universal love: Theocles' solution

Theocles begins with an examination of an oak tree. An oak tree, Theocles and Philocles unquestioningly assume, remains a single thing throughout its life. It has an identity. That identity cannot consist of the tree's outward form, for other things — such as 'a Figure of Wax … cast in the exact Shape and Colours of this Tree' — could have the same outward form and yet not be an oak tree (C 2.348). Nor can it consist of the physical stuff of which the oak tree is made, as the tree will remain '*One and the same*; even when by Vegetation and change of Substance, not one Particle in it remains *the same*' (C 2.349). What the tree's identity must consist of, rather, is the 'Concurrence' of all its individual pieces '*in one common End*', the enduring organizational principle of which its different elements partake, the '*Sympathizing of* [its] *Parts*' (C 2.348).

The same reasoning, Theocles argues, applies to the identity of a person. A person is a single thing, retaining an identity throughout the years. But that identity cannot consist of physical matter, as every particle of a person changes over time. The '*Stuff* … of which we are compos'd', says Theocles, 'wears out in seven, or, at the longest, in twice seven Years, [as] the meanest Anatomist can tell us. Now where, I beseech you, will that same *One* be found at last, supposing it to lie in the *Stuff* it-self, or any part of it? For when that is wholly spent, and not one Particle of it left, we are *Our-selves* still as much as before' (C 2.350). Nor can a person's identity be based on any idea or emotion, as all of a person's ideas and emotions change as well. There's no single mental item that has the constant existence that would be needed to fund a person's identity. So since a person remains '*one and the* same, when neither *one* Atom of Body, *one* Passion, nor *one* Thought remains the same', his identity must be based on 'a Sympathy of Parts' (C 2.351). His identity must consist of an overall

organization, of a 'simple Principle' of which all the person's different aspects partake (C 2.352).

Theocles next sets out to show that the natural world as a whole is just as organized as a tree, and considerably more organized than most people. If Theocles can convince Philocles of that — if he can establish that there is '*a uniting Principle* in Nature' that brings all its aspects into '*Harmony* and *Order*' — then Philocles will have to embrace the idea that nature has an identity that is as robust as that of an oak tree, a '*Self*' that is no less real (even more real, actually) than Philocles' own (C 2.357-8).[9]

---

[9] Hume was dismissive of the *The Moralists*' claims about identity, writing 'If the reader is desirous to see how a great genius may be influenc'd by these seemingly trivial principles of the imagination … let him read my Lord *Shaftesbury's* reasonings concerning the uniting principle of the universe, and the identity of plants and animals [in] his *Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody*' (Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 1.4.6.6). It seems, however, that Hume did learn from Theocles' views on identity. For Hume's own view, like Theocles', relies on the idea that there is no single 'constant and invariable' mental item that can fund personal identity: compare T 1.4.6.2 and C 2.350-51. Of course Hume and Theocles draw opposite conclusions, with Theocles moving from the premise that there is no constant and invariable mental item to the conclusion that personal identity must consist of something other than a mental item, and Hume moving to the conclusion that there is no personal identity.

For recent discussion of Shaftesbury's views of identity in general and personal identity in particular, see Winkler, '"All is Revolution in Us": Personal Identity in Shaftesbury and Hume' and Jaffro, 'Shaftesbury on Human Frailty and the Will'. Winkler

The case Theocles makes for the identity of nature is observational. When we examine carefully, he contends, we will see that '[a]ll things in this World are *united*' in 'one common Stock' (C 2.287). Everything is 'fitted and join'd' together, each contributing to the 'Order, Union, and Coherence of *the Whole*' (C 2.287). Examples abound. Theocles points to the 'mutual Dependency' found at both the micro and macro levels of plant and animal biology (C 2.287). He explains the coordinating purposes of light, wind, water, fire, the harmonious movement of planets, stars, sun, moon (C 2.287-88 and C 2.369-73). He takes us on a tour of the continents. At the Poles we learn the environmental benefits of extreme cold and snow (C 2.383-84). In India we witness the symbiosis between 'land-creatures' and the Indus River (C 2.385). We come to understand the usefulness to myriad species of the flooding of the Nile, of the topology of the Himalayas, of the 'gums and balsams' of Australia (C 2.386-89).

---

raises the reasonable worry that Shaftesbury attributes identity in a much more profligate manner than would those who have been concerned with 'the classical philosophical problem of personal identity, a problem about the conditions for a thing's persistence over time' (Winkler 12). Jaffro attempts to assuage this worry by distinguishing 'between a normative sense of 'being oneself' or 'remaining the same person', and the metaphysical sense, that is, personal identity' (Jaffro, 'Shaftesbury on Human Frailty and the Will', 158). I think Jaffro's distinction is a promising way of viewing passages on identity from Shaftesbury's *Soliloquy*. But given how Theocles' argument moves seamlessly from the identity of an oak tree to what seems to be the moral identity of a person to the identity of all of nature, I wonder whether Jaffro's distinction applies easily to *The Moralists*.

The word 'ecosystem' hadn't been coined yet, but I think Shaftesbury would have pounced on it if he'd heard it. For what he wants Theocles to do is persuade Philocles that all of nature's seemingly disparate parts form a tightly coherent interdependent whole, that the entire natural world is one 'System' (C 2.285-86; see Gatti, 'Stoic Influences on Shaftesbury's Theory of Beauty', 68-69).

But Theocles has to do more than persuade Philocles that there is a systematic unity to nature. He also has to produce a symbol of nature's unity, a mentally manageable object that represents the natural world and elicits Philocles's love. The object that fills that bill is the 'natural Genius', or as Shaftesbury also calls it, the '*sovereign* Genius', the 'Great Genius', the '*Universal Genius*', the '*Genius of the World*' (C 2.245, 343, 347, 352, 393, 400, 401, 410).

'Genius' meant a lot of things in Shaftesbury's day, some of them unfamiliar to twenty-first century ears. How are we to understand *The Moralists*' uses of the word?

One of the meanings of 'genius' current at the time was the 'characteristic disposition' of an entity, its 'distinctive character' or 'inherent constitution' (*Oxford English Dictionary*; see McMahon, *Divine Fury: A History of Genius*, 20 and 22-3). This meaning did not carry with it the twenty-first century notion of exalted intellect or creativity, nor was it applied primarily to human beings. A nation, a disease, a natural object: each could have its own genius, its own distinctive constitution. This is the meaning that explains Philocles' discussion of 'the Genius of our Age' at the beginning of *The Moralists*, as there he is describing the distinctive intellectual tendencies of his society, what we might call the period's zeitgeist (C 2.189; see also 2.183; compare 2.136). Similarly, when Philocles speaks of 'your Genius' to Palemon and Theocles (C 2.194, 2.393; see also C 2.181), he is referring to his companions' characteristic dispositions, to their 'natural aptitudes' and 'inclinations' (*OED*). This use of the word does not have invariably positive connotations. Indeed, in the

passages at the beginning of *The Moralists*, Philocles is expressing contempt for the 'reigning Genius of *Gallantry* and *Pleasure'* (C 2.183). To say that something has a genius in this sense is simply to attribute to it a single unifying character, a defining, constitutive commonality, for good or ill.

I just said that when Philocles speaks of 'your Genius' to his companions, he is referring to their distinctive characteristics. But Shaftesbury also had in mind an older, pagan sense of a person's genius, which is 'the tutelary god or attendant spirit allotted to every person at his birth, to govern his fortunes and determine his character' (*OED*).[10]

Another of Philocles' applications of 'genius' to a person is noteworthy because of how it points forward rather than back: when Philocles calls Theocles 'that *Heroick* Genius, the Companion and Guide of my first Thoughts in these profounder Subjects' (C 2.223). Here Theocles doesn't *have* a genius; he *is* the genius. Philocles' point is partly that Theocles is a kind of "*Guardian-Angel*" for him. But Philocles also seems to mean that Theocles is a person with extraordinary abilities, someone who possesses 'intellectual power of an exalted type' (*OED*). And this is the kind of usage twenty-first century readers are most familiar with.[11] There are earlier examples of 'genius' being used in this way, but there aren't that

---

[10] Shaftesbury uses this sense of genius in *Soliloquy* (C 1.168), and refers to it in his Index as 'Genius, or *Guardian-Angel*'. For discussion of Shaftesbury's uses of genius in *Soliloquy*, see McMahon, 19 and 22-3. Shaftesbury also uses this sense of 'genius' in a 1706 letter to Pierre Coste, (Shaftesbury, *The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury*, 357).

[11] On the transition from a 'genius' being something a person *has* to being something a person *is*, see McMahon, 70-72.

many of them and they're not that much earlier. Shaftesbury probably had as much to do with the turning the word into what it means for us today as anyone writing in English.

'Genius' could also mean in Shaftesbury's time the 'quasi-mythologic personification of something immaterial (e.g., of a virtue, a custom, and institution), especially as portrayed in painting or sculpture. Hence, a person or thing fit to be taken as an embodied type of some abstract idea' (*OED*). The examples of usage the *OED* gives for this definition are a person who is taken to be 'the very genius of famine', and a 'lizard' that is taken to be 'the very genius of desolate stillness'. This definition explains Theocles' use of the word when he speaks of Philocles' love for the ancient Romans 'under the Representation of a beautiful Youth call'd *the* Genius *of the People*. For I remember, that viewing once some Pieces of Antiquity, where the People were thus represented, you allow'd 'em to be no disagreeable Object' (C 2.244; see McMahon, 28 and 254). A 'genius' in this sense is a symbolic physical object, a material thing used to represent an abstract entity.

Theocles and Philocles also frequently speak of the '*the Genius of the Place*' (C 2.245, 2.343, 2.349, 2.351, 2.393). This is an English rendering of 'genius loci', which is 'the presiding deity or spirit' or 'tutelary and controlling spirit … connected with a place' (*OED*). At times Theocles uses the term in that ancient sense, referring to spiritual beings, or genii, who look after certain areas (C 2.343, 2.349). Theocles might really have believed that such genii — '*Nymphs*' and '*Hamadryads*' — exist. Perhaps, though, we should take Theocles and Philocles' uses of 'genius loci' to be elaborate personifications, vivid metaphors for the 'body of associations connected with or inspirations that may be derived from' a place (*OED*). If we take 'genius loci' in this second way, then when Theocles and Philocles speak of the 'genius of the place', their meaning will be similar to what you and I might mean if we spoke

of the 'spirit of a place', a phrase that refers to an area's atmosphere or vibe while still carrying with it the echo of a resident spiritual being.

These multiple implications — unifying character, extraordinary individual, personification of an abstract idea, animating spirit — all inhabit Shaftesbury's 'natural Genius'. By showing that all things cohere in a systematic whole, Theocles establishes that the world has one unifying character or organizing principle. By identifying that organizing principle with a personal spirit animating all of nature, Theocles provides an object onto which Philocles' affections can latch.[12] 'I cou'd love nothing of which I had not some sensible material Image', says Philocles the first day (C 2.243). Then Theocles shows him that the myriad of sensibles all around him bespeak a single individual. The more Philocles learns of nature's unity, the more beauty he sees in it. The more beauty he sees in nature, the greater grows his love for the mind of which all of nature is an expression. Theocles'

[12] The notion of a genius as a person is also important for addressing another aspect of Philocles' challenge to Theocles. Philocles says, '[W]ere it possible for me to stamp upon my Mind such a Figure as you speak of … it might probably have its effect; and I might become perhaps *a Lover* after your way: But more especially, if you cou'd so order it, as to make things reciprocal between us, and bring me to fansy of this Genius, that it cou'd be "sensible of my Love, and capable of *a Return*"' (C 2.244). Philocles is saying that the objection of his benevolence should be a mind — a sensible thing that can love him back. Mere impersonal or mindless systematicity does not fulfill that desideratum. At the same time, Theocles and Philocles both believe that the existence of systematicity clearly implies the existence of mind (C 2.164, 2.226).

'sovereign Genius' is both all of nature and a personal God[13] — something as large as the world, as tangible as an oak, and as beautiful as a desert sunset.[14]

On the first day, Philocles had challenged Theocles to prove that what virtue requires him to love 'is an *Object* capable and worthy of *real Enjoyment*' (C 2.400). At the conclusion of his apotheosis of nature on the second day Theocles revisits the challenge. 'And thus we are return'd again to the Subject of our Yesterday's Morning-Conversation. Whether I have made good my Promise to you … I know not. But so, doubtless, I shou'd have done with good success, had I been able in my poetick Extasys, or by any other Efforts, to have led you into some deep View of *Nature*, and the *Sovereign* Genius' (C 2.399-400). To which Philocles responds: 'O Theocles! … well do I remember now the Terms in which you engag'd me, that Morning … You have indeed made good your part of the Condition, and may now claim me for *a Proselyte*' (C 2.400). Or as Philocles also puts it: 'Tis true, said I, (Theocles!) I own it. Your *Genius*, the *Genius* of the Place, and the Great Genius have at last prevail'd. I shall no longer resist the Passion growing in me for things of a *natural* kind' (C 2.393).

[13] In his Index to *Characteristics*, Shaftesbury refers to this use of 'genius' under the heading of 'Genius *of the World*… *See* Deity.'

[14] For explication of this idea in Shaftesbury see: Darwall, *The British Moralists and the Internal Ought,* 188); Axelsson 'Shaftesbury on the Natural Affections and Taste', 37; and Müller 'Hobbes, Locke and the Consequences: Shaftesbury's Moral Sense and Political Agitation in Early Eighteenth-Century England', 322.

So Theocles succeeds. With his sovereign genius, he has produced an image that represents the entire natural world and onto which Philocles' sentiments of love can latch. The second obstacle to virtue has been overcome.

Or has it? There seems to be a huge problem. Theocles has perpetrated a bait and switch.

5. *The Moralists* and universal love: problems with the solution

Recall the set up. Philocles and Theocles agreed that to be virtuous is to love humanity as a whole. Philocles doubted he could love humanity as whole because [1] so many people are so stupid and corrupt, and [2] humanity as a whole is an object too large and abstract for him to love. The first day of their conversation, Theocles addressed [1]. Before he could get to [2], their conversation was interrupted. When they resumed the next morning, Theocles showed Philocles how he could love the natural world. But this looks to be a non-sequitur. Loving the natural world is not the same thing as loving humanity. If Shaftesbury hadn't placed after the first-day discussion an eventful ninety-four page digression — if instead of spinning out an afternoon, evening, and night of colorful social interaction he'd moved directly from the question of how to love humanity to the answer of how to love nature — Theocles' change of subject would have been obvious.

There is a moment at the end of the first day's conversation that foreshadows the change of subject. In response to Philocles' claim that he can love only a few individuals and not humanity as a whole, Theocles points out that Philocles has shown himself capable of loving the entire civilization of ancient Roman. 'Methinks', Theocles then says, 'you might have the same Indulgence for *Nature or Mankind*, as for the People of Old Rome (C 2.244; italics added). 'Indeed', replies Philocles, 'were it possible for me to stamp upon my Mind

such a Figure as you speak of, whether it stood for *Mankind or Nature*, it might probably have its effect' (C 2.244; italics added). But the addition of '*or Nature*' comes from out of the blue. What Theocles and Philocles had been talking about is how virtue requires the love of humanity. Why think that proving that one can love nature overcomes an obstacle to virtue so defined?[15]

Late on the second day Theocles does draw a connection between love for humans and love for the creator of the universe (C 2. 404-29). When you find a work of art beautiful, he explains, your admiration attaches to the artist who created it. Similarly, therefore, when you experience love for the moral beauty of a human, your love should rise up to the creative Divine Mind to whom the human owes his existence. One might envision this line of thought leading to an exhortation to see in every person the image of God. But Theocles doesn't guide us back down from love of the creator to love of every human. His speech is all about the ascent, about moving from a particularly beautiful human to admiration for the creator, not about the descent back down from creator to every human.

Another way one could imagine trying to bridge love of nature and love of humanity is to subsume the latter under the former. This approach would have us view our own

[15] Maurer and Jaffro point out that having 'the public good' as the goal of one's conduct may conflict with 'stricter versions of Stoicism' that Shaftesbury otherwise endorsed ('Reading Shaftesbury's *Pathologia*: An Illustration and Defence of the Stoic Account of the Emotions', 215-16). Perhaps we can see Theocles' shift from Day One of *The Moralists* to Day Two as reflecting the tension between Shaftesbury's commitments to less strict and more strict versions of Stoicism.

species as part of the natural world. It would urge us to see in human phenomena the same beautiful unity that inspires our love of forest and desert, ocean and sky.

One might have thought that Shaftesbury's capacious notion of the natural would lead in exactly that direction: away from a sharp division between the human and the non-human, and towards an encompassing of all within Nature. Shaftesbury has much to say about plants and animals, but at least as often as not he uses 'nature' or 'natural' when discussing human beings. What he is chiefly concerned with in those discussions, moreover, are the natural *internal* aspects of humans — not their physical features but their motives, dispositions, psychologies, spirits.[16] We can certainly find in Shaftesbury's Christian predecessors and Enlightenment successors the idea that there is some fundamental difference between the physical world and the human mind. But Shaftesbury seems to be a holistic naturalist.[17]

In Shaftesbury's texts, however, there are also vehement expressions of a sharp *difference* between human activity and every (other) feature of the natural world. Humans have a nature, and Shaftesbury certainly believes that everything that follows nature is

[16] Places where Shaftesbury discusses the naturalness of internal aspects of humans include: 1.71, 1.83, 1.88, 1.90, 1.92, 1.104, 1.108-118, 1.189, 1.280, 1.348, 2.14-15, 2.22-27, 2.40-45, 2.87, 3.29, 3.33, 3.69, 3.143-5, 3.158, 3.162.

[17] I wish to acknowledge an anonymous BHJP referee for urging on me the importance of the points in this paragraph.

good.[18] But Shaftesbury also believes that humans and humans alone can violate (their) nature. As we have seen, in the *Inquiry* he contends that humans differ from everything else in creation in that they alone act contrary to nature (C 2.96-7). And in *The Moralists* itself Theocles and Philocles vociferously reject the assimilation of the human to the natural.

The Moralists is replete with statements contrasting the glorious perfection of nature with the despicable activity of humans. Its encomia to nature are spiked with misanthropy. During the evening discussion Theocles says, 'All we can see either of the Heavens or Earth, demonstrates Order and Perfection… All is delightful, amiable, rejoicing, except with relation to *Man* only, and his Circumstances, which seem unequal. Here the Calamity and Ill arises; and hence the Ruin of this goodly Frame. All perishes on this account; and the whole Order of the Universe, elsewhere so firm, intire, and immoveable, is here o'erthrown' (C 2.291). Philocles echoes the lamentable difference between nature and humanity. 'I shall no longer resist the Passion growing in me', he says on the second day, 'for Things of a *natural* kind; where neither *Art*, nor the *Conceit* or *Caprice* of Man has spoil'd their *genuine Order*, by breaking in upon that *primitive State*' (C 2.393). Or as Philocles puts it when comparing natural phenomena with human lives: 'The *one* is regular, steddy, permanent; the *other* are irregular, variable, inconstant. In one there are the Marks of Wisdom and Determination; in the other, of Whimsy and Conceit: In one there appears Judgment; in the other, Fancy only: In one, Will; in the other, Caprice: In one, Truth, Certainty, Knowledg; in the other, Error,

---

[18] Places where Shaftesbury expresses the idea that following nature is good include: 1.110-111, 1.114, 1.121, 1.135, 1.142, 1.280, 1.339, 2.30, 2.71, 2.80-81, 3.30, 3.33, 3.35-36, 3.107, 3.137, 3.216-8.

Folly, and Madness' (C 2.337). Palemon expresses the same, talking 'with much Satisfaction of natural Things, and of all Orders of Beautys, Man only excepted' (C 2.196).

Even in the midst of apotheoses of nature, Shaftesbury cannot resist inserting criticism of humanity. He thus has Theocles not only extol the wonders of the minerals underground but also excoriate humans for trying to extract them (C 2.376-77; 2.392). He contemns human religion for breeding 'mutual Hatred' and inevitably leading people to 'profane one to another, war fiercer, and in Religion's Cause forget Humanity: whilst savage *Zeal*, with meek and pious Semblance, works dreadful Massacre; and for Heaven's sake (horrid Pretence!) makes desolate the Earth' (C 2.388). Politics is simply beneath contempt: on our tour of the continents' natural beauty we skip Europe altogether because 'it wou'd be hard to see it in any view, without meeting still that *politick* Face of Affairs, which wou'd too much disturb us in our *philosophical* Flights' (C 2.392).[19]

---

[19] Shaftesbury's theodicy is relevant here. Müller has argued that Shaftesbury aimed in *The Moralists* to show that natural evil does not actually exist, that all aspects of the natural world are in fact good ('"Dwell with honesty & beauty & order": The Paradox of Theodicy in Shaftesbury's Thought', 209-10 and 225). But what is so striking is that Theocles tries to convince Philocles of these things only as they concern the non-human parts of the natural world, and not as they concern humankind. He tries to show that all natural things are perfect and harmonious, whatever their initial appearances. But he doesn't try to show that humanity partakes of that perfection and harmony. The point can be put in terms of aesthetic reactions. Müller maintains that the cornerstone of Shaftesbury's theodicy is the experience of the beauty of creation (221-224 and 230). I agree. Theocles does his best to bring Philocles to an aesthetic appreciation of all natural objects (C 2.388-89; 401). But

Some contemporary environmental philosophers believe there is a special, inestimable value to 'wildness' — to those parts of nature wholly untouched by human influence (see Hettinger and Throop, 'Refocusing Ecocentricism', 3-21). Shaftesbury's *Moralists* should be counted an ancestor of such views. While Theocles is a 'bitter Enemy' of the human activities of politics, religion, and mining, he finds always that 'Wildness pleases' (C 2.388).[20]

Theocles' account of the sovereign genius may succeed in showing Philocles that it's possible for him to love an object as 'mysterious' and 'metaphysical' as nature as a whole. But inextricably linked to Theocles' glorification of nature is his damning of humanity. And it was humanity — which the second day conversation of *The Moralists* so often sets *against* (the rest of) nature — that Theocles was supposed to show Philocles he could love. The sovereign genius of nature thus seems not to be a suitable "Image, or Specter" to "represent this odd Being [i.e., humanity as a whole] you wou'd have me love' (C 2.224).

Now there is another well-known solution to the problem of bad human behavior, and that's to hold that what appear to us to be evils are actually for the best when viewed from the fullest perspective. Things that seem to us to make the world worse in truth make the world better, 'notwithstanding the *Appearances*' (2.364). As Theocles explains, '[*I*]*n an*

Theocles never suggests that humanity is beautiful. Quite the contrary; see C 2.112, 2.291, 2.392-4. Theocles advances a cosmodicy, but he doesn't advance an anthropodicy.

[20] For elucidating discussion of Shaftesbury's love of non-human nature and its influences, see Gatti, 'The Aesthetic Mind: Stoic Influences on Shaftesbury's Theory of Beauty'; Liu, 'The Surprising Passion for Wild Nature: the True Innovation of Shaftesbury's Aesthetics'; and Fleming, 'The Third Earl of Shaftesbury: Practical Gardener and Husbandman'.

infinity of Things, mutually relative, a Mind which sees not infinitely, can see nothing fully; and must therefore frequently see that as imperfect which in it-self is really perfect' (2.363). Note, however, that Theocles makes these claims in the context of discussing 'Disasters and Calamitys which Nature has entail'd on Mankind', not when discussing the conduct of humans that Palemon and the early Philocles found so appalling (C 2.361). The logic of this theodicy might imply that even apparently bad human behavior really is for the best. But the two main characters of *The Moralists* don't draw this out.[21] If it's an implication, that's all it is. It's not an explicit, heart-felt part of *The Moralists* — as the misanthropy is.

[21] Using the design argument as a solution to the problem of evil is a logically possible route for Shaftesbury, but it seems to me that it's not something we find any significant development of in *The Moralists*. An anonymous referee for BJHP has suggested that it was just because of these limitations of the design argument — that it did not apply convincingly to human activity — that Shaftesbury's initiated an inquiry into the aesthetics of the beautiful. It might not be possible to provide a proof of the goodness of humanity that convinces in the same way as math or logic. Nor would a purely subjective liking be a sufficient basis for the steady, settled love for humanity that virtue requires. But if the focus of virtuous concern is an object of beauty — which for Shaftesbury involves both the rational and the sentimental (or, perhaps, transcends the distinction between the two) — then the problem raised by Philocles may be solved. On this reading, Shaftesbury's moral sense embodies an appreciation of beauty that transforms a philosophical limitation of the design argument as the basis for ethics into a new principle bridging reason and sentiment. My main reservation about applying this reading to the *Moralists*, as I explain in footnote 19,

Philocles has no complaints. He believes that Theocles has proved everything that needs proving. If he's the victim of a bait and switch — promised that he would be shown how to love humanity but in the end inspired to love non-human nature — he's blissfully unaware of it.

What about Shaftesbury himself? Was he aware of the incongruity between Theocles' first-day promise and second-day delivery? Did he deliberately shift from love 'of the species' (which is what Theocles says he will establish at the beginning of the conversation), to love of 'mankind or nature' (which is what Theocles says he will establish in the middle of the conversation), to love of 'wildness' (which is what Theocles establishes at the end of the conversation)?[22] I honestly don't know. Perhaps Shaftesbury was as carried away by Theocles' apotheosis of nature as Philocles, and thus failed to notice that he had drifted from his original goal. But another possibility is that Shaftesbury knew he was changing the subject, intentionally — if subtly, surreptitiously — contrasting the religious high of natural communion with the daily disappointment of dealings with men. Such a performance would be consonant with the ambivalent attitude toward humanity that seemed to be a deep feature of Shaftesbury's own character. As a number of commentators have explained, he was a person drawn in both philanthropic and misanthropic directions,

---

is that not even Theocles seems to be able to see beauty throughout the realm of all human activity; see C 2.112, 2.291, 2.392-4.

[22] For discussion of whether Shaftesbury intended for *The Moralists* to reach a single firm conclusion or to end in something more like aporia, see: Prince, *Philosophical Dialogue in the British Enlightenment: Theology, Aesthetics and the Novel*, 47-54) and Hoover, '"Voices and Accents": Enthusiastic Characterization in Shaftesbury's *The Moralists*'.

alternating between periods of great public engagement and reclusive isolation.[23] Some years, he would be as actively involved in human affairs as one can imagine, throwing himself into national politics and taking a hands-on approach to the running of his estate. Other years, he would retreat to a foreign country, shutting down his household, avoiding politics, refusing visitors. Perhaps we should not be surprised that Theocles affirms the moral requirement of loving humanity but is at his best when he has left company behind for the '*Solitude*' of the 'open Scene of Nature' (C 2.343).

The Moralists ends abruptly. After achieving the enthusiastic heights while roving in the fields, Theocles and Philocles just stop. Says Philocles, 'By this time we found our-selves insensibly got home. Our *Philosophy* ended, and we return'd to the common Affairs of Life' (C 2.443). The conversation of the first day might have led us to believe that the inspiration achieved in nature would be transposed to society. But this ending, along with *The Moralists*' entwining of natural glorification and human contempt, gives us reason to doubt.

6. Conclusion

Shaftesbury thought the rational structure of morality implies that the height of virtue is beneficent conduct toward all of humanity. Shaftesbury also thought that human conduct

[23] In 'Shaftesbury's Philosophical Poetics', Müller notes how *The Moralists* "reflects [a] seesawing between philosophical reflection and public calling' (256). In 'Reading Shaftesbury's Private Writings', Lori Branch discusses the tension between Shaftesbury's desire to be 'a lover of men' while remaining 'immune to the slings of commerce with them' (265). See also Bullard, 'Review of *Askemata*', 532-34 and Chavez, 'Philosophy and Politeness in Shaftesbury's *Characteristics*', 51-68.

originates in affection. The two main characters in *The Moralists* share both this rationalist view of the content of morality and this sentimentalist view of human motivation. As a result of this combination of a rational apprehension of the content of morality and a sentimentalist position on human motivation, the characters in *The Moralists* come to the conclusion that that the height of virtue is love for all. But one of the characters raises a problem: Philocles worries that he cannot bring oneself to love all of humanity, and thus that he will invariably lack the affective motive the rational content of morality requires.

We can imagine a conceptual solution to Philocles' problem, one that tries to discover non-affective grounds for impartial moral motivation or that tries to show that the content of morality is such that less expansive affection is enough for full virtue. But *The Moralists'* other main character, Theocles, takes the more ambitious, psychological approach: he tries to convince Philocles that it is possible to develop love for humanity as a whole, embracing both the rationalist view of morality's content and the sentimentalist view of human motivation.

Philocles accepts Theocles' solution. We have seen reason to doubt whether we should. But that Theocles may advance, and Philocles accept, an unsatisfactory response to the seeming mismatch between rational moral content and affective moral motivation is not necessarily a criticism of Shaftesbury himself. Shaftesbury may have intended careful readers to appreciate a recalcitrant difficulty in moral views based on both affective love and rational impartiality.

The aspiration to universal love expressed in *The Moralists* would have both ardent defenders and critics in the years after Shaftesbury wrote. Directly in Shaftesbury's wake, Francis Hutcheson tried to defend universal love by instructing his readers to pursue a kind of cognitive behavioral therapy that would break the mental associations that cause us to

favor a part of humanity at the expense of the species as a whole. Mill folded the aspiration to universal love into his utilitarianism, advocating for educational reform that would lead people, from youth onward, to identify their personal good with the happiness of all, imparting to the utility principle the status of religious truth. On the other side, rationalists such as Balguy and egoists such as Mandeville argued that human psychology was manifestly incapable of producing stable universal love; the kind of motivation morality requires, such critics argued, must come from a source other than love for others. The remarkable thing about Shaftesbury on the aspiration to universal love — as on many other topics — is that he was both a gimlet-eyed critic and a passionate champion.

Bibliography

1. Axelsson, Karl. 'Shaftesbury on the Natural Affections and Taste'. In *New Ages, New Opinions: Shaftesbury in his World and Today,* edited by Patrick Müller, 27-44. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014.
2. Branch, Lori. 'Reading Shaftesbury's Private Writings'. In *New Ages, New Opinions: Shaftesbury in his World and Today,* edited by Patrick Müller, 261-76. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014.
3. Bullard, Paddy. 'Review of *Askemata*'. *Review of English Studies* 64 (2013): 532-34.
4. Chavez, Joseph. 'Philosophy and Politeness in Shaftesbury's *Characteristics*'. In *Theory and Practice in the Eighteenth Century: Writing Between Philosophy and Literature*, edited by Alexander John Dick and Christina Lupton, 51-68. London and Brookfield, VT: Pickering & Chatto, 2008.
5. Cooper, Anthony Ashley, the third Earl of Shaftesbury. *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001. I will refer to this work as 'C', followed by volume number and page number of original pagination. This text of Shaftesbury's *Characteristics*, with the original pagination, can be found online at: http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1851.
6. Cooper, Anthony Ashley, the third Earl of Shaftesbury. *The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury,* edited by Benjamin Rand. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. and New York: the Macmillan Co., 1900.
7. Darwall, Stephen. *The British Moralists and the Internal Ought.* Cambridge University Press, 1995.

8. Filonowicz, Joseph. *Fellow-Feeling and the Moral Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
9. Fleming, Suzannah. 'The Third Earl of Shaftesbury: Practical Gardener and Husbandman'. In *New Ages, New Opinions: Shaftesbury in his World and Today,* edited by Patrick Müller, 93-114. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014.
10. Gatti, Andrea. 'The Aesthetic Mind: Stoic Influences on Shaftesbury's Theory of Beauty'. In *New Ages, New Opinions: Shaftesbury in his World and Today,* edited by Patrick Müller, 61-76. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014.
11. Gill, Michael B. *The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
12. Hettinger, Ned and Throop, Bill. 'Refocusing Ecocentricism'. *Environment Ethics* 21(1999): 3-21.
13. Hoover, Shayda. '"Voices and Accents": Enthusiastic Characterization in Shaftesbury's *The Moralists*'. *Eighteenth Century Life* 37 (2013): 72-96.
14. Hume, David. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
15. Irwin, Terence. *The Development of Ethics, volume* 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
16. Jaffro, Laurent. 'Shaftesbury on the "Natural Secretion" and Philosophical Personae'. *Intellectual History Review* 18 (2008): 349-359.
17. Jaffro, Laurent. 'Shaftesbury on Human Frailty and the Will'. In *New Ages, New Opinions: Shaftesbury in his World and Today,* edited Patrick Müller, 153-166. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014.

18. Klein, Lawrence E. *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century England.* Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

19. Liu, Yu. 'The Surprising Passion for Wild Nature: the True Innovation of Shaftesbury's Aesthetics'. In *New Ages, New Opinions: Shaftesbury in his World and Today,* edited by Patrick Müller, 77-92. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014.

20. Maurer, Christian and Jaffro, Laurent. 'Reading Shaftesbury's *Pathologia*: An Illustration and Defence of the Stoic Account of the Emotions', *History of European Ideas* 39 (2013) 207-220.

21. McMahon, Darrin M. *Divine Fury: A History of Genius*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

22. Müller, Patrick. '"Dwell with honesty & beauty & order": the Paradox of Theodicy in Shaftesbury's Thought', *Aufklärung* 22 (2010), 201-31.

23. Müller, Patrick. 'Hobbes, Locke and the Consequences: Shaftesbury's Moral Sense and Political Agitation in Early Eighteenth-Century England'. *Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies* 37 (2014): 315-330.

24. Müller, Patrick. 'Shaftesbury's Philosophical Poetics'. In *New Ages, New Opinions: Shaftesbury in his World and Today,* edited Patrick Müller, 239-260. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014.

25. Prince, Michael. *Philosophical Dialogue in the British Enlightenment: Theology, Aesthetics and the Novel.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

26. Winkler, Kenneth P. '"All is Revolution in Us": Personal Identity in Shaftesbury and Hume'. *Hume Studies* 26 (2000), 3-40.