

THE SAN CARLOS APACHE POLICE

(By JOHN P. CLUM, Copyright 1930.)

Referring to my official proposal in 1877, to assume responsibility for the conduct and control of all Apaches in Arizona, provided I was furnished with two companies of special Apache Police, and that then the troops might be removed from the territory, it seems desirable that some additional facts should be presented in support of my assertion that this proposal was not only sane and feasible, but that it offered the only sensible, practical and effective solution of the Apache problem at that time.

If this proposition had been accepted it was my purpose to assign the command of one of these special companies to Captain Beauford, who was then serving as chief of police at San Carlos, and to tender the command of the other special company to Al Sieber, the well known scout and guide then in the employ of the military. The removal of the troops would have released Sieber and there is no doubt that I could have secured his services. No better men ever commanded Indian police or scouts than Beauford and Sieber. They were energetic, courageous, just and sympathetic. These qualities won for them the confidence and esteem of the Indians and the citizens alike. Of course, each of these two special companies would be equipped with a suitable pack train for use on extended scouting trips. With my Special Apache Police Force thus organized I would have established a mutual confidence at the very onset of this important undertaking that would have marked a definite and gratifying advance toward the goal of success with our first official stride.

General August V. Kautz, commanding the Department of Arizona, submitted an elaborate annual report under date of Prescott, Arizona, August 15, 1877, which was prodigal in its hostile references to me and to my job, but inasmuch as we are presenting the events of the period as they were officially recorded at the time we may be pardoned for quoting several paragraphs from this report of General Kautz. It begins thus:

“The Apache is a savage of the lowest type. He held high carnival in this land until my predecessor availed himself of his savage nature in order to control him. He used Apache against Apache. He can be bought for a small figure to kill his father or his mother or any of his relations, and there is no difficulty in enlisting allies in one band to fight another.

“This is the principal means by which peace is preserved in the territory at the present time. No agent would remain at the San Carlos Reservation without troops if the Indians were all harmonious among themselves.”

Although unfriendly to me, it may be noted that General Kautz asserts that the use of “Apache against Apache” is **“the principal means by which peace is preserved in the territory at the present time”**. No more cordial endorsement of my plan could be desired. Although there had been no troops on the reservation for nearly two years, a general condition of peace prevailed throughout the territory, and the San Carlos Apache Police Force represented “the principal means” by which this peace was preserved.

Furthermore, my plan insisted upon justice for, and sympathy with the Apache, and denied that he was “a savage of the lowest type”. In passing it should be stated that no one harboring the violent prejudices against the general character of the Apaches as officially expressed by General Kautz, ever should have been permitted any voice in their management or control. General Chaffee declared that the Apache Police were alert, trustworthy and obedient, and that it is **only in the discharge of their duties under orders** that “they know neither family nor friend”. No higher commendation can be given a guardian of the peace. General Chaffee lived among the Apaches and wrote his endorsement while he was acting agent at San Carlos. General Kautz recorded his prejudices at department headquarters.

General Kautz’s assertion that “no agent would remain at the San Carlos Reservation without troops if the Indians were all harmonious among themselves” is another **long distance** bit of fiction and absolutely absurd. In my annual report for 1875, referring to the development of the agency police force, I said: “On July 31, after the removal of the White Mountain Indians, I increased the number to twenty-five. **They were carefully chosen from the various tribes and bands**, armed with needle-guns and fixed ammunition, and placed under the command of Mr. Clay Beauford”. It is obvious that the San Carlos Apache Police Force never would have achieved its splendid record for efficiency and dependability if its members had been **on fighting terms among themselves**. It was because each tribe and band desired to express its appreciation of, and **loyalty to our near-self-government plan**, and to share in the honor and emoluments of the service, that **they sought representation on the reservation police force**, and this situation made the selection of the several members of this force a matter of diplomatic importance.

If the conditions suggested by General Kautz had actually prevailed; if a fierce and deadly enmity had existed among tribes of savages "of the lowest type", THEN **no agent would have been able to "remain at San Carlos without troops"**. When Indian Inspector Daniels returned from the reservation to Tucson late in 1874, he told of "Agent Clum and his 'happy family' at San Carlos". In the summer of 1875 Mr. Davis and Mr. Gaby, removed with their families from Colorado Springs, Colo., to San Carlos. Mr. Davis was employed as head farmer, and Mr. Gaby as carpenter. Mr. Davis brought with him his wife and youngest daughter, a bright, attractive girl about fifteen years of age, and Mr. Gaby was accompanied by his wife. I had been acquainted with Mr. Davis' family for several years, and, assuredly, would not have consented to the bringing of Mrs. Davis and daughter and Mrs. Gaby to San Carlos if I had felt there was any danger of violence from the several bands of Apaches then on the reservation. Mr. Davis and Mr. Gaby remained with their families at San Carlos for nearly a year, and then left—**not from fear of the Apaches**—but because they desired to locate in California.

I was married in Ohio on November 9, 1876, and arrived at San Carlos with my bride the last week in December, 1876. This young bride was a lady who had known something of the better home life and better social conditions of such communities as Cincinnati and Columbus, Ohio, and Washington, D. C., and she had lived in the latter city several years immediately preceding our marriage. I purchased a suitable conveyance at San Francisco, which was shipped on the steamer with us to San Diego, where I acquired four horses. We **drove** through to San Carlos—"camping out" most of the way. Assuredly we were in the "Apache country" during the 200-mile drive from Tucson to San Carlos. I knew there were 4500 "wild" Apaches at large upon the reservation with no restraint except that exerted by the San Carlos Apache police, as all troops had been removed from San Carlos more than a year previous. And yet, without hesitation, or fear of harm, or thought of an escort, this young city-bred girl and I proceeded with our four-horse outfit over the regular stage road to Cienega, San Pedro and Point-of-Mountain, and thence via Sulphur Springs Valley and along the Gila River to San Carlos. I admit that I carried a six-shooter, but it is obvious that I was not anticipating an attack by marauding hostile Apaches. **For several weeks this young bride was the only white woman on the reservation with those 4500 unrestrained Apaches—but not a single soldier.**

In February, 1877, when I took the company of 60 Apaches to Tucson for enrollment as Territorial Militia, my wife remained at the agency during my absence of eight or ten days—unalarmed. In the latter part of March, 1877, when I was arranging for my trip into New Mexico on the trail of Geronimo and his band of renegades, I took my wife to Tucson where she remained during my absence—anxious, but composed—as the guest of Mrs. C. H. Lord. And this same young bride had expected to resume her residence at San Carlos immediately upon my return from New Mexico, and would have done so had I not retired from my position as agent—not from any apprehensions as to the Apaches—but because of the disastrous consequences certain to follow the proposed deadly mixture of civil-military rule on the reservation.

Dr. Chapin, the agency physician, brought his bride to San Carlos in February, 1877, and they remained there until some time after the end of my administration. These simple facts speak volumes in denial of the assumption that in that period San Carlos was an unsafe place of residence—even for ladies. Mrs. Chapin is now living in Washington, D. C., where she has resided for many years. Mrs. Davis and her daughter, Mrs. Gaby, Mrs. Chapin and my wife were the only white women who came upon the reservation during my entire administration.

Another thing. In July, 1876, I arranged to take a group of twenty Apaches on a trip to "the states," the details of which may appear later. This group included representatives from the several identical tribes, or bands, which, a year later, were declared by General Kautz to be **inharmonious, hostile and antagonistic among themselves**. Tah-zay, the older of the sons of Cochise, and Cullah were Chiricahuas. Diablo was chief of the Coyotereros. Captain Jim, of the agency police, Es-kim-in-zin and Casadora represented the Pinalis and Arivaipas, and Sagully was chief of the Yumas. Es-kim-in-zin, Casadora, Sagully and Captain Jim took their wives with them, and Diablo was brave enough to take with him his little son—a sturdy kid six or seven years of age.

This group was absent from the reservation about three months. We were about a month driving from San Carlos to the railroad depot at El Moro, Colorado. Our visit in "the states" occupied about a month, and another month was consumed in the return trip to the reservation. Everyone knows that a long trail trip is one of the very best means for determining whether the members of any group are **inharmonious, hostile**

and antagonistic. The dramatic stampede along the trails to the Klondike left a tragic record of **much wrangling** among parties of friends—and even between brothers of the pale-face race. Occasionally the feud became so bitter that when the parties finally separated they **even sawed their boat in two.**

When our group arrived in Saint Louis we forthwith organized ourselves into a **Wild West Show.** Without hesitation or delay we appeared in first class theaters in Saint Louis and Cincinnati. **At each entertainment we shot and cut and killed each other** (on the stage). We gave a good show. It was a **thriller, all right.** But when we found we were going on the rocks, financially, we quit the show business and went to Washington (where Tah-zay died), and to the Centennial Exposition at Philadelphia,—and then returned to Arizona.

We saw many things and did many things, but in all the vicissitudes of that memorable trip **there was no wrangling among the members of our group.** In fact, I have always regarded it as most remarkable that we were able to make that long, tedious trek by team; to take those Indians so far from their homeland to meet conditions new and strange to them, **without developing a single instance that would indicate that any members of the group were inharmonious, hostile or antagonistic among themselves.**

A little later in this same report General Kautz, inadvertently, gave generous commendation to my administration and to the efficiency of the San Carlos Apache Police in enforcing order and discipline among the 5000 Indians on the reservation when he wrote: “With the exception of some depredations in the extreme southeastern portion of the territory, **peace has prevailed in this department, and the country has advanced materially in its mining, agricultural and stock-raising interests.** The population has received a considerable increase in the past year by immigration.”

Particular attention is invited to **the quality of the peace** which then prevailed in Arizona. The term did not mean a mere cessation of hostilities, **but it represented a condition of confidence and security** that encouraged immigration and enabled the citizens to go about their business in the wide open spaces unhindered and unafraid, with the result that **the chief industries of the country “advanced materially”.**

In this connection it will be of interest to read the following editorial comment published in the Arizona Citizen on April 15, 1876, to wit:

“The outbreak of the Chiricahua Apaches is a serious blow to Southwestern Arizona. We had enjoyed peace so long the people were off their guard and were scattered over the country in small parties, prospecting, stock-raising and farming, and in many instances were poorly armed.”

This editorial refers to the outbreak of April 6, led by Pi-on-se-nay, who was arrested on June 9 by the San Carlos Apache Police at the time of the removal of the Chiricahuas to San Carlos. It is a simple statement of facts. The Chiricahuas had not indulged in hostilities in American territory since the treaty made with Cochise by General Howard in 1872. The troops had been removed from San Carlos and the agency police were maintaining order and discipline on that reservation. The people “had enjoyed peace so long” they were “off their guard”. They were going about their business of prospecting, stockraising and farming, giving little heed to the matter of arms. The “peace” the people were enjoying meant “**a condition of confidence and security**”.

On the same date (April 15, 1876,) the Citizen published the following item:

“Agent John P. Clum, who has lately been in town on a short visit, rode out on Wednesday afternoon to go to San Carlos, traveling by way of the trail. He didn't go there from any fear of trouble with his Indians, as whatever might happen he had perfect reliance in Mr. Sweeney, whom he had left in charge. But he wished to be on hand in event of the least possible emergency, and if allowed he would like to lead a few hundred of his tried and trusted Indians against the Chiricahua fiends. The public opinion seems to be that if Agent Clum were just permitted to take 200 of the San Carlos Apaches, and furnished with their small needs, they would in a short time effectually clean the Chiricahua dish and leave nothing but the bones—with the aid of the coyotes.”

This is probably the first editorial comment suggesting that the jurisdiction of the San Carlos Apache Police under my direction **be extended to include all Apaches within the Territory of Arizona.**

The following are additional excerpts from General Kautz's report:

“He (the agent) has been particularly careful to avoid anything that seemed like dependence on the military service.

“He (the agent) recently made public a telegram to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, offering, if his salary would be increased and two companies of Indian Police given him, to be responsible for the conduct of the Indians, and the troops in Arizona could be withdrawn from the territory.

The reason why I avoided “dependence on the military service” in Arizona was because that service was unfriendly—was hostile toward me and my administration. General Kautz devoted pages of his report to the presentation of his reasons why the military should have absolute control of all the Apaches, both on and off the reservation. He regarded the Apache as “a savage of the lowest type”, and he had difficulty in finding words and phrases that would adequately express his estimate of the depravity of the agent.

Fortunately, within the limits of the reservation I had no need to place any “dependence on the military service”. When I was ordered to remove the Chiricahua Indians from Apache Pass to San Carlos I took with me a company of fifty-four special Apache Police, and, therefore, personally, I was relieved of the necessity of placing any “dependence on the military service”. But I felt that some troops should be sent to positions in the field where they would be conveniently available in an emergency for the protection of citizens and the punishment of hostiles. In these circumstances I asked General Kautz, officially, **how many troops** he could send to the vicinity of the Chiricahua reservation. In reply the general informed me, officially, that he could not send any troops to cooperate with me in the proposed removal of the Chiricahuas. He persisted in his refusal until ordered to cooperate. In his report the general comments on this incident as follows:

“He (Governor Safford) was mainly instrumental in securing the order for the removal of the Chiricahua Indians last year. The heaviest portion of the expense of this removal fell upon the War Department, which was not consulted in regard to it. I have heretofore given my opinion against concentrating large numbers of hostile and antagonistic Indians on one reservation. I was not disposed, therefore, to aid in a movement the consequences of which could not be foreseen, without the instructions of the War Department in the matter. I had the impression also that there was an ulterior motive in bringing about this removal.”

General Kautz has supplied a concise and forceful illustration of some of the reasons why I avoided “dependence on the

military service" in his department, and why I was willing to assume full responsibility for the conduct and control of all Apaches in Arizona, provided I was given a free hand with an extended Apache Police Force.

In connection with my narrative of the removal of the Chiricahuas, and the comments of General Kautz on the same subject, it will be entertaining to read General Carter's reminiscences of this campaign as recorded by him in his "Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee," to wit:

"In the spring of 1876 conditions had become so bad along the Mexican border of Arizona and New Mexico, owing to the proximity of the Warm Springs and Chiricahua Apache reservations, that a removal of the Indians to San Carlos was determined upon. The troops of the regiment were promptly put on the march for the rendezvous in southeastern Arizona.

"Upon arrival of all the troops several expeditions were organized. Captain Chaffee's troop accompanied the squadron sent into the San Simon Valley, on the eastern side of the Chiricahua Reservation, and when it reached Horse Shoe Canyon, on the east side of the Chiricahua Mountains, the trail of a large part of the tribe was found leading toward Mexico. The trail was followed, but the Indians had already crossed the line."

"The Chiricahuas consisted of four bands, that of Natchez (Nah-chee), son of the famous Cochise, the other three under Ju (Hoo,) Geronimo and Nolgee. Of the four, that of Natchez was the only one which moved to the San Carlos Reservation; the others escaped into Sonora, and from the inaccessible fastnesses of the Sierra Madre Mountains began a series of raids which lasted ten years and involved the loss of hundreds of lives. Upon the completion of the movement of Natchez' band the several expeditions were abandoned."

General Carter recalls that in the spring of 1876 conditions were so bad along the Mexican border that a removal of the Chiricahua Indians to San Carlos was determined upon; that the troops were promptly put on the march; that upon their arrival in Southeastern Arizona "several expeditions were organized" (the purposes of which are not stated); that the squadron to which Captain Chaffee's troop was attached followed an Indian trail from Horse Shoe Canyon to the Mexican line (about

25 or 30 miles) and observed that the band led by Geronimo, Ju (Hoo) and Nolgee had escaped into Mexico, and that as soon as the Chiricahuas under Nah-chie left for San Carlos "the several expeditions were abandoned" (but no reason is given for this summary action).

From this record the reader is compelled to the conclusion that the only active service performed by the regiment in this campaign was the march of Captain Chaffee's squadron on the Indian trail from Horse Shoe Canyon to the Mexican line—**and this was true.** However, having ignored the actual circumstances that had brought the Sixth Cavalry into Southeastern Arizona at this time, General Carter found it necessary to substitute some excuse for the movement, and so he mingled a bit of fog with the facts by his reference to several mysterious "expeditions" which were so blythely "organized" and so unceremoniously "abandoned."

The fact that depredations had been committed in Southeastern Arizona, and that the Indians who fled into Mexico were known to be of a renegade character who had been raiding in Mexico and along the border for years, demanded that this area should be patiently and persistently patrolled by the troops as a protection to citizens against these maurauders. **But this was not done.** Not only were the mythical "expeditions" summarily **abandoned**, but, likewise, the exposed areas were left unguarded and the troops ordered back to their several posts.

Complete details of the removal of the Chiricahuas were published in the Review for July, 1928, in connection with the story of Geronimo. From a brief review of the facts as presented by General Kautz, General Carter and myself, we shall find that General Kautz was **strongly opposed to the removal.** He also feared "an ulterior motive". The troops of the regiment were **not** "promptly put on the march". Not a soldier was moved until positive orders to that effect had been received from the War Department. When General Kautz arrived in Tucson he sent his adjutant, Colonel Martin, to me for **suggestions as to the placing of the troops in the field**, thus shifting all responsibility to the Secretary of War and myself. I escorted the colonel of the regiment through Apache Pass with my special company of San Carlos Apache Police. A detachment of this police force arrested the murderer Pi-on-se-nay on June 9, and at the same time discovered that Geronimo had abandoned his camp and fled toward Mexico. I immediately

furnished this information to General Kautz at Fort Bowie, and asked that troops be sent in pursuit of the fleeing Indians. General Kautz ordered the squadron under the command of Major Morrow, which had been stationed in the San Simon Valley, to take up the trail of Geronimo and his band. Major Morrow followed the trail to the Mexican line, but inasmuch as Geronimo had moved a day in advance of the troops, and the distance to the Mexican line was only about 25 or 30 miles, Major Morrow's command **did not see any Indians**. The Chiricahuas formerly under Cochise, then under his sons Tah-zay and Nah-chee, were removed to the San Carlos Reservation **entirely under my direction, and were escorted only by the special company of fifty-four San Carlos Apache Police** that had accompanied me to Apache Pass. The murderer, Pi-on-se-nay, was conveyed by Sergeant Tau-el-cly-ee of the Apache Police and myself from Apache Pass to Point-of-Mountain stage station, where the dangerous prisoner was delivered into the custody of two deputies sheriff of Pima County.

It was upon my request that the troops were ordered to positions in the field **where they would be available in an emergency**. The only "emergency" that developed calling for active service by the troops was the flight of Geronimo and his band to Mexico, and the squadron to which Captain Chaffee's troop was attached "reached Horse Shoe Canyon" and "found" the trail "leading toward Mexico" **several hours—probably a full day—after that trail had been discovered by the San Carlos Apache Police and this information had been conveyed through me and General Kautz to the commander of said squadron.**

It will be of special interest to present here the exact facts as they were recorded at the time and place in the following letter from me to General Kautz.


(Note. This letter was published in full in the Arizona Citizen on July 29, 1876. See copy of said paper on file in the Library of Congress.)

"Office of U. S. Indian Agent,
Chiricahua Agency, June 9, 1876.

General August V. Kautz.
Commanding Department of Arizona,
Fort Bowie, Arizona.

Sir:

"I have the honor to inform you that yesterday about noon, three principal men of the Southern Chiricahua Apache Indians came in and had a talk with me regarding their removal to the



APACHE OLD-TIMERS at FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA.

From left to right: Dekly, 23 years, 3 months service; Charles Bones, 26 years, 6 months; Chow Big, 29 years, 11 months; Eskiphygojo, 26 years, 5 months; Thomas Sye, 24 years, 1 month. (The faces and records of these veteran scouts do not indicate that the Apache is a savage of the lowest type). Photograph by Captain Hawley, December, 1928.

San Carlos Reservation. After I had explained to them the nature of my orders and the conditions of the transfer, they all consented to go, but asked for twelve days to bring in their families. I considered four days ample time for them to gather such of their people as might be scattered about the reservation, and accordingly gave them a pass for four days to bring in their respective bands. They were named E-ron-e-mo, Hoo and Nolgee, respectively.

“This morning I learned that Pi-on-se-nay, the murderer of Messrs Rogers and Spence, was camping within ten miles of the agency. I accordingly sent out a detachment of Indian police to bring in the outlaw and such others as might be in his camp. This party have just returned, bringing with them Pi-on-se-nay and thirty-eight others, mostly women and children.

“My Indians inform me that they found the camp where Hoo, E-ron-e-mo and Nolgee had their families while they were in to talk with me yesterday; that the camp had been deserted some time yesterday evening; that camp-kettles, axes, hatchets, cowhides, corn, dead dogs, horses, etc., were strewn about the camp, and a large trail leads from the camp in the direction of the Sonora line.

“From this it is evident that the Indians above named do not intend to return to the agency, and that they desired a pass for twelve days, not to bring in their people, but to enable them to place their families beyond the reach of the troops. The killing of their dogs that they might not be betrayed by their bark, and the fact that they left such camp equipage as was unnecessary or cumbersome, and killed their old horses and threw away corn and other provisions,—all indicate their intention to make a secret and hasty move into Sonora.

“I, therefore, respectfully request that you pursue them at once with troops, and if possible overtake and punish them. The limits of the reservation, or the pass given to Hoo, shall not in any manner interfere with your movement.

“It is my opinion that all friendly Indians are within ten miles of the agency, hence, should you desire to scout the reservation outside of those limits you may issue such orders at once.

“I further wish to inform you that after June 13 I shall leave the reservation entirely under your supervision, and such

Indians as remain on the reservation after that date are to be considered hostile, and you are respectfully requested to treat them as such.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) JOHN P. CLUM,

U. S. Indian Agent."

Here we have the major facts concisely and officially set forth. The only service performed by the troops was the march along the Indian trail from Horse Shoe Canyon to the Mexican line. The only force exerted by the Apache police was in connection with the arrest and careful guarding of the murderer Pi-on-se-nay.

It is obvious, therefore, that if my proposed plan had been in operation at that time the removal of the Chiricahuas would have been accomplished effectively with the San Carlos Apache Police Force, and the military would not have been disturbed. General Kautz would not have been compelled to cooperate against his will and his conscience, and General Carter would have been relieved of the necessity of organizing and abandoning "several" imaginary "expeditions". The whole situation would have been immensely simplified, and if the Apache Police had been impressed with the fact that they were responsible for the conduct of all Apaches in Arizona, it is more than probable that their careful observation of everything occurring on the reservation would have enabled them to pick up the trail from Horse Shoe Canyon to the Mexican line in time to have captured a goodly number of Geronimo's followers.

Very recently my attention was drawn to the following comments published in the Arizona Citizen on July 8, 1876, to wit:

"If Agent Clum had more arms and a little more cash to pay Indian scouts, he could safely engage to guarantee no trouble from any and all straggling Indians off reservations, and to fully take care of those on them. No officer that ever handled Indians in Arizona begins to equal him in managing them."

This item is of peculiar interest for the reason that it establishes the fact that the proposition to extend the jurisdiction and services of the San Carlos Apache Police to include all Apaches in Arizona was being favorably discussed in 1876, just before and immediately following the removal of the Chiricahuas. In fact, the proposition met with the most cordial

popular endorsement until my telegram of June 7, 1877, included the suggestion that the troops might be removed. That suggestion precipitated a near-panic in Arizona business circles. The Apaches might be controlled without the troops, but the plump military contracts were vital to the business interests of the territory. My proposal might mean the true solution of the Apache problem and the actual and permanent development and prosperity of the territory, but the military contracts meant much real money—immediately available. **The military contracts won.**

If I had omitted reference to the removal of the troops I would have received substantial support from my many friends, but my plan made the withdrawal of the troops inevitable in order to avoid that deadly mixture of joint civil and military authority and responsibility, the anticipation of which was even then driving me from my position at San Carlos.

I am tempted to indulge in just one more quotation from the report of General Kautz for 1877. It is this:

“Whatever credit, if any, is due the management of the San Carlos Indians, it cannot justly be awarded the late agent, as he was habitually absent from the agency during the past year. There have been employed at the agency several men of great personal influence among the Indians, who have had far more to do with their control than the agent.”

This paragraph was intended as a **deadly slam**, but I choose to accept it as a **very high compliment**. An essential qualification of a successful executive is the ability to select an efficient cabinet, and I imagine that **even in the army** it often happens that the general who plans and directs a great battle **does not do all of the fighting himself**. It is true that there were “employed at the agency several men of great personal influence among the Indians”. These men had been **selected and appointed by me for the reason that they seemed well qualified to perform the respective duties assigned them in line with the plan of my administration**, and these same men soon gained that “great personal influence among the Indians” because their actions were just and their manner sympathetic and they displayed a keen interest in the welfare and progress of the Indians. I had employed these men because I believed their conduct would win the confidence of the Indians. My policy was to advance the Apaches gradually to a condition of self-support and self-control through friendly advice and sympathetic en-

couragement and expressions of confidence in their willingness to cooperate.

In the development of this policy I was very much in need of the services of such men as Sweeney, Beauford, Hoag, Pangborn, Ming and others, among whom special mention must be made of that fine Mexican character and faithful interpreter—Marijildo Grijalba. And I admit that I was hoping to secure the services of at least one other man, of “great personal influence among the Indians”—and that man was Al Sieber. Mr. Sweeney and Captain Beauford occupied the positions of greatest responsibility and most vital importance and I did not fail to acknowledge their faithful, efficient and loyal services in my annual reports and in the columns of the territorial press.

It was inevitable that insubordinate manifestations and occasional desperate characters would develop at intervals among a population of 5,000, or more, Indians **that could be controlled only by the strong arm of force**—and that force was willingly and promptly and effectively exerted through the medium of the San Carlos Apache Police Force.

There was peace on the San Carlos Reservation because the great mass of the Apaches living thereon knew what was being done and realized that everything was intended for their best interests. They were very anxious that those conditions should continue, and therefore they were eager to cooperate in suppressing every act of insubordination and in apprehending every criminal within the limits of the reservation.

As a matter of fact, **we had actually established a system of self-government. The Apaches were enforcing discipline and order within the limits of their reservation.** There were only about a dozen pale-face employes at the agency, and it is obvious that these could have been **swept away in an instant** if that great body of Apaches had been hostile. But each day these Indians were realizing more fully the benefits of the conditions they were enjoying. **I had delivered them from the persistent aggression and oppression and depression of the military menace by causing all troops to be removed from the reservation.** Instead of being threatened and harassed they were being consulted and encouraged and assisted. **They were invited to sit in the councils of their government, and impressed with their personal responsibility in the matter of the proper functioning of that government to the end that order might be maintained and peace perpetuated.** The sincere and persistent efforts to carry out this policy of common sense and common decency in

the management of the affairs of the Apaches was daily being more fully comprehended by them, and it was this fact—and this fact alone—that gave to me and to several of my employes “great personal influence among the Indians,” and made San Carlos as safe a place of residence for ourselves and our families as could be found anywhere in Arizona.

It is true that I was absent from San Carlos while directing the removal of the Chiricahuas in the summer of 1876, and again in the spring of 1877 while leading the campaign into New Mexico which resulted in the capture of Geronimo and the removal of the Warm Springs Apaches—and that’s that. Also, I had submitted my resignation before I left with the group of Apaches for a trip to “the states.” Anyhow, I knew that the Apaches on the reservation had already arrived at a condition of very-near-self-government; that there were “employed at the agency several men of great personal influence among the Indians” who would faithfully carry on my **common sense policy**; that there were **no troops stationed there to create a disturbance**, and therefore I did not hesitate to leave the affairs of the reservation in charge of my loyal employes. And events proved that my judgment in this matter was not faulty.

In fearful contrast with my policy of mutual confidence and peace and progress, the military mind believed that these “wild Indians” could be **held in check** only by a display of troops in their midst in sufficient force to fill their savage souls with “awe”, and to impress upon their untutored minds the futility of opposing the armed forces of the United States. And the sad record tells us that upon my retirement from the service my common sense policy was **gradually consigned to the scrap heap**, and it was not so long thereafter until the military idea prevailed and the military arm was set in motion and the Indians were duly “awed” and the **SEVEN YEARS OF PEACE WAS BROKEN** and the welfare and progress of the Apaches were “held in check” for a quarter of a century.

As heretofore stated, the San Carlos Apache Police Force was established in August, 1874, with the installation of its original **BIG FOUR** members, and the United States Indian Police Force was organized under the provisions of the Act of Congress approved May 27, 1878. Within four years this national Indian police system had been put in operation at 40 of the larger agencies, with a grand total of 848 members. Five years still later, Commissioner of Indian Affairs J. D. C. Atkins, in his annual report dated Washington, D. C., September 21,

1887, in commenting upon the efficient services of this Indian police force, as a whole, submitted the following unqualified commendation:

“Experience has demonstrated that the Indian Police Force will compare favorably as to fidelity, courage, loyalty and honor with any similar body, even though composed of men who boast of a higher civilization. During the year there have been a few discharges on account of neglect of duty, but it is a fact worthy of note that **dismissals for cowardice are almost unknown**, the Indian policemen being willing to face any danger, and, as has been the case several times during the past year, **to sacrifice life itself in obeying orders and faithfully discharging duty.**”

There is no doubt that the records at the forty, or more, agencies throughout the United States where the Indian police system was in operation, fully justified the splendid tribute paid to the force by Commissioner Atkins, and **we are sure that no unit was more deserving of this high commendation than that which served at the San Carlos Agency.**

The decision of my own department to re-introduce a mixed civil-military administration at San Carlos drove me from the reservation in 1877, and the same deadly mixture finally succeeded in driving the Chiricahuas from the reservation on September 30, 1881, as we may read in a later chapter.

Captain Adna R. Chaffee was acting agent at San Carlos from July 19, 1879, until June 1, 1880. The troops were recalled for police duty within the reservation in August, 1881, and Captain Emmet Crawford was placed in charge of the San Carlos Agency Police on July 24, 1883. This last action was taken under the agreement arrived at on July 7, 1883, at Washington, D. C., between the Interior Department and the War Department, by which General Crook was entrusted with the entire police control of all Indians within the San Carlos Reservation. This was the inauguration of a military regime at San Carlos which became supreme when Captain F. E. Pierce assumed charge of that agency on September 1, 1885. This absolute military administration was continuous until February 5, 1901, in the meantime six army officers succeeded Captain Pierce as acting agent.

In June, 1890, Special Agent Stephen Whited of the Census Bureau, visited San Carlos for the purpose of obtaining certain data covering general conditions among the Indians on that

reservation to be included in the official report of the Eleventh Census. Among other things, Agent Whited found that on June 1, 1890, **there were five companies of troops and sixty Indian scouts stationed at San Carlos**; four companies of troops stationed at Fort Apache, and two companies of troops stationed at Fort Thomas. This means that there were **nine companies of troops stationed within the reservation, and two companies stationed about five miles east of the eastern line of the reservation.**

A strange but most interesting array of facts are presented by the official record. From 1875 until 1881 **there were no troops on the San Carlos Reservation, and during my administration the agency police force never exceeded twenty-five members.** In 1879, when Captain Chaffee was the acting agent at San Carlos, he reported that the agency police force then consisted of "one lieutenant, seven sergeants and thirty-one privates". But in 1890, fifteen years after Lieutenant Carter led the two troops of the Sixth Cavalry away from San Carloe and abandoned that military camp, the military administration deemed it necessary to **have five companies of troops and sixty Indian scouts stationed at the agency.**

And the record presents the further astounding fact that this extraordinary and extravagant military regime was permitted to continue eleven years longer—until February 5, 1901. In 1877 a plan of administration promising the true solution of the Apache problem, and which meant peace for all and the progress and uplift of the Indians, was pitted against a sordid lust for plump military contracts—and **"the military contracts won."** It is obvious that for twenty-four years—nearly a full quarter of a century thereafter, the same sordid lust after plump military contracts prevailed over a just and honorable consideration for the true interests and progress of the Apaches.

With this record fresh in our minds we shall read with peculiar interest an excerpt from the report of Special Agent Whited, published on page 154 of the Census Bureau's report on "Indians Taxed and Indians Not Taxed" in 1890, to wit:

"As to army control, I venture the suggestion that 200 mounted Indian scouts, officered by efficient white men, would preserve order among the Apache tribe much better and vastly cheaper than the garrisons that are maintained there at this time. If they are to remain, however, I would move them just outside the reservation. On the other hand, the present garrisons are great consumers of food and produce, and the camps

furnish a ready market for many things produced by the Indians, but I believe the day is past when a large force of soldiers should be maintained on reservations."

When the San Carlos Reservation passed under military rule the famous San Carlos Apache Police Force was practically merged with the military scouts. And we shall not forget that the Apache military scouts—enrolled from the same heroic tribes—have left a record that is quite as loyal, efficient and honorable as that of the San Carlos Apache Police. When General Crook led his campaign into Mexico in 1883 the most important unit of his force consisted of 193 Apache scouts under the command of Captain Emmet Crawford. When Geronimo and Nah-chee led their followers from the reservation again in May, 1885, we learn that a telegram from Washington under date of June 9 "authorized the enlistment of **200 additional Indian Scouts**". Between 300 and 400 Indian scouts participated in this campaign against Geronimo.

Surgeon (later General) Leonard Wood, who accompanied Captain Lawton's command in this campaign, has left the following sincere testimonial to the willing and effective services and tireless devotion to duty of the Apache scouts:

"The Indian scouts were very efficient and hard workers and constantly in the advance; always willing and ready, and physically equal to the hostiles. The greatest good feeling existed between the scouts and the soldiers, and I can say from my own experience, that they are obedient and kind to their officers."

During the campaign against Victorio in New Mexico an application for permission to enlist scouts had been disapproved, whereupon Colonel Hatch, commanding the troops in the field, sent the following telegram to Department Headquarters under date of Fort Craig, New Mexico, May 26, 1880:

"Refusal to allow Indian scouts will postpone settling Indian troubles. Experience certainly advises obtaining them in some manner. Troops cannot find Apaches in the mountains without incurring great risk and exposure. To be successful they must be pursued in the Indian way, keeping the troops off the trail, and Indians are best adapted for this service."

Singly and in groups the Apache scouts have performed a service that cannot be overestimated. Always they were in the advance of every column to follow the trails and to give timely warning that would save the white troopers from the perils of

ambush. Too little has been said in praise of their fidelity and tireless devotion to duty. Right now the War Department is doing a fine thing in connection with the sole surviving regular army unit made up of Indians. The conditions out of which the enrollment of Indian Scouts grew have disappeared, and their military importance in an era of tanks and bombing airplanes and high power artillery barrages has dwindled to a mere shadow, but for sentimental reasons; because of the invaluable services rendered by the Indian scouts in the winning of the West; because this conquest has depended so much on their loyalty and tireless devotion to duty, this last detachment of veteran Apache Scouts are retained in the service of Uncle Sam and are stationed at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and were, until recently, under the command of Captain Donald C. Hawley, Tenth Cavalry, U. S. A.

During the closing weeks of 1928 Captain Hawley, with marked courtesy, furnished me with two photographs of members of this detachment and some exceedingly interesting information regarding their status, employment, etc. Captain Hawley stated that at that time (Dec. 1928) the detachment consisted of 1 sergeant, 2 corporals and 16 privates. These scouts are enlisted exactly like any other soldier, for a term of three years, with the privilege of re-enlisting on completion of each enlistment. The plan of the War Department is to permit these scouts to continue in the service until each shall have a full term of 30 years to his credit, when each will be retired with the rank and pay of a sergeant. This, of course, means that all who complete thirty years of service will be carried on the army payroll as long as they live. It also means that this sole surviving unit of Indian scouts will be gradually reduced in numbers and will completely "fade out" when its last member is placed on the retired list.

The following exact details are quoted from Captain Hawley's statement: "Sergeant Chow Big, a veteran of the Geronimo campaign, several minor Indian campaigns, and the Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916, will retire on completion of 30 years service in January, 1929. Eskipygojo, Tom Sye, Charles Bones and Deklay are all veterans of the Indian Wars and the Punitive Expedition; they have around 27 years service in, and will retire about 1931. Of course they will retire as sergeants. **Those are the only real old-timers;** several others have 15 to 20 years service and were with the Punitive Expedition. There are only two or three young ones, one of whom is the son of a scout who retired a couple of years ago.

“The scouts draw the same pay and have exactly the same privileges and rights as any soldier, with two exceptions; first, they are required to provide their own mounts and horse equipment, and receive forty cents a day for doing so, in addition to which the government furnishes forage for the horse. Second, they are allowed to live with their families in a tepee (wicki-up) village near the post and to draw the value of their rations, amounting to about \$17 per month, in cash.

“They are not armed except in time of war—or when on maneuvers, and do not drill or do any guard duty. They are employed at the present time in various capacities about the post; one as assistant to the carpenter; one as assistant to the plumber; three running the post ice plant; two running the saw in the wood yard; two patrolling the reservation for stray cattle and horses—and similar jobs.

“Their health is good, and they seem happy and contented, except that some of the younger ones think they should have houses to live in instead of the tepees (wicki-ups). I am planning to get them out from time to time for some real scouting work—to keep them in practice; and if the Tenth Cavalry goes to Texas next spring, as seems probable, I hope to take a part of them along. However, I am afraid they will not be as valuable in maneuvers as in actual war.”

I have been deeply impressed with the kindly mental attitude evinced by Captain Hawley toward these veteran Apache scouts. His genuine interest and sympathetic enthusiasm in his command are refreshing and inspiring, and I am sure that if he could have joined me during my administration at San Carlos, and we had been allowed to direct the destinies of the Apaches since that time through the medium of the Apache Police—then I would have the pleasure of writing a very different story.

The members of the famous San Carlos Apache Police Force have been less fortunate than the military scouts in the matter of obtaining any substantial or definite recognition of their long years of efficient service. The civil system under which they were employed did not provide either pensions or retirement with pay. An ungrateful public and a soulless government have never done anything to recognize or reward the distinguished services of even the most deserving members of that splendid organization. Some, in ill health and poverty, have appealed in vain for a pittance that might in some degree alleviate their distress and sufferings. All were glad to have the protection their services afforded when they were young

and strong and faithful guardians of the peace, but when they grow old and decrepit they were easily and quite completely forgotten. Some day a noble saga will be written that will honor and perpetuate the memory of their sterling qualities and worthy deeds. But it is now forever too late to minister to their temporal needs. Wearied with the strife and sorrows of their unequal struggle under adverse conditions imposed upon them by their pale-faced brothers(?) they have gradually resigned themselves to their inevitable fate. One by one they have unresistingly responded to the call of the Grim Reaper, and very soon the last of those fine old guards will follow along the well-worn trail that leads all mortals

“To the kingdom of Ponemah,
To the land of the Hereafter.”

SUPPLEMENT

Al Sieber is the man I had in mind to assist me in directing the activities of the San Carlos Apache Police in 1877, if the Indian Bureau had extended my authority and jurisdiction as suggested in my telegram of June 7 to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

My personal acquaintance with Sieber was limited, but his personality and reputation convinced me that he would make an ideal leader of Indian Police, and his subsequent record proves that my judgment was not faulty in this matter. He rendered many years of invaluable service as a civil employe of the “military arm” in connection with the Apaches. His final employment was at San Carlos, where he was discharged and ordered to leave the reservation because of his expressed sympathy with the Apaches who were being oppressed and maltreated by the unjust and tyrannical military authorities then in charge of the reservation.

Some time previous, while in line of duty, Sieber was shot in the ankle. The wound never healed and resulted in a serious disability. None will ever know how keenly Sieber felt the injustice he and the Apaches suffered at the hands of the military, but as there seemed to be no one to whom he might appeal for redress he was compelled to submit to the cruel order which ruthlessly separated him from the honorable position he had ably filled for so many years.

And thus it happened that the old scout gathered up his few personal effects, bid his Apache friends good-bye, and, with a heavy heart, hobbled his way thirty miles over the trail to Globe. There he faced the perplexing problem of making a new start in life. His long service as a scout, his age and his shattered ankle seriously handicapped his chances for success in the industrial world. But Sieber always had a brave heart. For several years he did odd jobs about the mining camp, or went on prospecting trips whenever he could obtain a **grub-stake**. Finally he was employed under the Roosevelt Reclamation Project in the construction of a wagon road from the Roosevelt Dam to Payson. Immediately he organized a small group of Apaches to assist him with this work.

And now we approach the last act in the sorry drama, and which afforded this veteran of many thrilling adventures a final opportunity to display the genuine nobility of his character. One day he and his little band of Indians were endeavoring to remove an immense boulder from the right-of-way of the new road. The earth was being removed from the lower side of the boulder, when, suddenly the great rock started to roll into the excavation. Sieber realized the danger instantly—and his first thoughts were for the safety of his Apache helpers. He shouted a warning and assisted them to escape—refusing to seek safety for himself until the last of the Apaches were beyond danger. Then it was too late. His maimed ankle responded too slowly, and the worn and crippled body of the faithful, unselfish old scout was caught and crushed beneath the massive rock. Thus was the valiant soul of Al Sieber set free. He died for his friends. None can do more.

Associates of Sieber, mechanics employed at the dam—laborers like himself—hewed a neat monument of stone to which was nailed a bronze tablet reciting some details of the tragic death of their departed friend. This monument was placed on the spot where Sieber's wearied life was crushed out—and there it is standing today.

Sieber's mangled remains were buried in the cemetery at Globe, and his grave is marked by a rough granite boulder, appropriately inscribed, which was authorized and paid for by a special act of the Legislature of Arizona.

These two monuments memorialize the life story of a man who was truly great. The hero they recall was not one of those who possessed great riches, or high position with vast authority and power. Often a single monument is erected to a man of that

class. Sieber has two monuments, and yet he was a plain man who held an humble and subordinate position during the years he was rendering invaluable service. His discharge from that service had implied humiliation and disgrace. His last years were spent in a broken-hearted struggle against the unkindly Fates—and then, in a twinkle, his life was snapped out.

A lone, obscure, weary, crippled old man had been accidentally killed while working with some Indians in the midst of the rugged waste places of the Tonto Basin. Why should mechanics employed on the Roosevelt Dam carve a monument to mark the spot where he met the Grim Reaper—unflinching and unafraid? Why did the Legislature of Arizona by special act provide a monument to mark the grave of this man who, in his declining years, had been permitted to feel the stings of poverty, obscurity and neglect? Al Sieber's reward was posthumous. His true worth was not recognized until he had crossed the Great Divide, and we may not doubt that the proud saga of his brave and unselfish deeds will continue to be sung long after his two granite monuments have crumbled into dust.

I am greatly pleased to know that a biography of Al Sieber is now in course of preparation by Dan R. Williamson, the esteemed State Historian of Arizona, who was a former intimate friend of the deceased, and who is well qualified and equipped to give the grand old scout that honorable and enduring place in the official archives of the State of Arizona to which his character and achievements so justly entitle him.