

THE EFFECTS OF CLIENT NONCOMPLIANCE ON COOPERATION AND FOREIGN POLICY
DECISION-MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS

by

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Abstract

The foreign policy decisions of small, weak states often go overlooked in the international system. Most understandings of small states emphasize their limited foreign policy choices under the influence of larger, global powers. Yet, there are numerous examples of small states selecting their own foreign policies unencumbered by the international system. This study seeks out those examples and argues that weak states often have the freedom to form their own policies and positions uninfluenced by global powers. To explain the foreign policy decision-making process of small, weak states and explore the relationship between small and large powers, this paper asks when and how do small, weak client states choose to not comply with the demands of large patron states in patron-client relationships? The use of the patron-client framework is a valuable tool for analyzing the foreign policy selection process of small and large states interacting in dyadic relationships. To answer the question, the study examines three separate cases involving patron-client relationships. In each case, the United States serves as the patron state while El Salvador, Pakistan, and Thailand represent the separate client states. The case studies examine moments of client-driven noncompliance to reveal how small states form foreign policy decisions. Ultimately, small states not only wield significant control of their own foreign policy decisions, choosing not to comply with the demands of a stronger patron state, but they also form policy based off diverse considerations—including domestic factors, self-interest, and capacity to comply. Findings suggest that clients in international patron-client relationship have more influence over stronger states than current theories would suggest.

Section 1: INTRODUCTION

In the global system, vast uncertainties, global crises, and concerns about uncommitted, self-interested allies significantly weaken international cooperation. Yet, states with substantially different foreign policy perspectives and agendas have found ways to cooperate in mutually beneficial relationships. Even states with asymmetric capabilities and differing levels of state power enter cooperative relationships with one another. To explain the phenomenon, scholars have sought to establish frameworks to outline how such international cooperation in an anarchic system operates (see Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Fearon, 1998; Keohane, 1986b; Oye, 1986; Parkhe, 1993).

While the common and current frameworks of cooperation are important to understanding international cooperation, the system-level approaches commonly utilized by international cooperation theorists often fail to clearly explain how smaller, weaker states exert their influence in international cooperation or even if they can. Cooperation theory and neorealist perspectives too narrowly define weaker, small states by their vulnerability or dependence on larger states in the international system. Such theories fall short in explaining the very real variation in foreign policies of weak states and the reasons why weak states will enter asymmetric cooperative relationships with larger states. Cooperative theories and neorealist perspectives on asymmetric relations as is do not account for the variation in foreign policy decisions weak states make based on their own unique resources and cooperative opportunities.

Conventional wisdom in international relations theory has long suggested that the states that hold power and resources wield influence. Barnett and Duvall (2005, pp. 49-52) call this “compulsory power.” States with power can change the behavior of smaller states. Yet, real world examples suggest that this is not always true; small states do avoid obeying the demands of stronger states. How and why would small states not comply with demands of more powerful states? Rothstein (1968, p. 20) notably suggested that small states have obtained their own interests when “other factors outweighed their material interests.” While insightful as a counterargument to the view of powerful states controlling international cooperation, the answers are likely much more complex.

I argue that smaller, weaker states in asymmetric relationships actually do have significant control over their foreign policy decisions and will exhibit noncompliant behavior in cooperative relationships for numerous reasons. To demonstrate this, I utilize a particular and a seldom-used framework—the international patron-client framework (Carney, 1989; Shoemaker and Spanier, 1984)—to explain how weaker, smaller states form foreign policy decisions in asymmetric relationships. By analyzing specific points of small state noncooperation within a bilateral relationship, which I refer to as client noncompliance, I demonstrate how small states form their own foreign policy decisions, even when they are involved in a close, cooperative relationship with a stronger state. Findings on noncompliance suggest that weak states in asymmetric, cooperative relationships can form foreign policy decisions outside of the interests of larger states. Weak states will frequently form foreign policies out of their own self-interest, in reference to their own capability to cooperate, and in response to internal domestic pressures. The conclusions suggest that in patron-client relationships, weaker states are at times unencumbered by the potential threats posed by larger state powers, and in turn, weak states can guarantee continued cooperation from the stronger state while securing the benefits of cooperation for themselves by leveraging their own unique capabilities and resources.

Secondarily, the implementation of the international patron-client framework here backs the framework as a viable alternative framework for examining asymmetric cooperation. I demonstrate its strength as a useful analytic device for understanding cooperation within asymmetric bilateral

relationships while also suggesting further research needed to refine and improve the understanding of the concept in the conclusion.

The international patron-client framework is a unique and underutilized way to analyze international cooperation arrangements, because it subverts expectations regarding weak state dependence and vulnerability in relation to the more powerful patron. The relationship by nature is mutually beneficial to patron and client state alike. The mutually beneficial aspect of cooperation and reciprocity in the patron-client framework creates a certain level of parity in an asymmetric relationship, a phenomenon that dependence theory cannot explain and can be useful for helping understand how a state with substantially less power can avoid compliance in cooperative arrangements with a greater state power.

The first section of this paper will synthesize the current understandings about weak state foreign policy and cooperation. The discussion will then move to examining the international patron-client framework and origins of noncompliance in the international system. Covering such topics will not only justify that weak state foreign policy decisions in particular scenarios need further examination, but a review of the research will also demonstrate that the foreign policy choices of weak client states in patron-client relationships are possibly vaster than current cooperation theories suggest and warrant further testing. The first section will also lay out hypotheses related to client noncompliance, cover how international relations theorists usually test for compliance, and assert that case studies are better suited for examining moments of noncompliance.

The second section of this paper will focus on three select case studies. The case studies selected meet the established criteria of international patron-client relationships and incorporate significant moments of noncompliance; significant moments of noncompliance are referred to as noncompliance critical junctures in this paper. The beginning of each case study will focus on the formation of the patron-client relationship and cooperation before the arrival of the critical junctures. The sections following will focus on state behaviors during critical junctures and will demonstrate how and when clients choose noncompliant behavior along with examining the response of the patron state. The case studies will conclude by looking at the state of cooperation between patron and client after numerous noncompliant critical junctures.

Lastly, the final sections will focus on the findings and the implications. Information from the case studies will be examined in juxtaposition with the initial hypotheses regarding client state noncompliance and follow-on cooperation. The closing conclusion suggests further questions and notes about the use of the international patron-client framework and the future of weak state noncompliance research.

Section 2: WEAK STATE COOPERATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Small, weak states occupy a unique position in the international system. Many argue that their lack of resources and power make them more vulnerable to domestic and international pressures than their larger, stronger neighbors. Small states may also value their own resources differently than large states and view their role in the international system distinctly different from global powers. While their select attributes lend themselves for potentially interesting analyses, attempts to elucidate on how small states form foreign policies and seek cooperation in light of their unique place in the international system has never been the focus of international relations studies, and those focused on the topic remain divided on how to exactly study the foreign policies of small states.

Perspectives that argue that small, weak states form foreign policy decisions primarily based off pressure from the international system argue that small states focus predominately on their own survival. Under this paradigm, small states lack the great influence and power of international powers

to effect the system as a whole. Therefore, their foreign policy decisions must reflect and protect against the influences of the international system, causing weak states to worry less about domestic influences on policymaking. Waltz (1979) simultaneously accepted and refuted this idea. He argued that small states are dependent on structural constraints. As a result, small states need to be more observant to structural constraints when constructing foreign policy given the smaller margin for error in small state foreign policy making given their position of minimal power (pp. 184-5). Yet, Waltz (1979, pp. 72-3) also remarked that small states care less about the international system since the capabilities of small states mean they are unlikely to have an effect on the system as a whole. Therefore, without pressure from the international system, small state foreign policies are more likely to reflect domestic influences.

Either way, much of the thinking on small state foreign policy in relation to the international system has focused on power and capabilities of the state. Morgenthau (1972, pp. 123-30) postulated that "a Great Power is a state which is able to have its will against a small state [...] which in turn is not able to have its will against a Great Power." The international system approach to small state foreign policy renders small states vulnerable to the wills and interests of much stronger and larger states. The focus on capabilities would likely lead one to be flippant about the ability for small states to form their own foreign policies.

Not all accept the traditional view that great powers have unparalleled control over the decisions of small states in the international system. Fox (2006) rejected the notion that weak states are merely pawns in the international system. Instead, by examining the success of several small states' refusal of participating in the Second World War, Fox (2006) demonstrated that weak states could rebuke the influence of larger states by making their own choices, even though those choices may be limited. The weak states that sought to remain neutral during the war did so by convincing the great powers that coercive pressure against them would inevitably offset any gains they may seek (Fox, 2006, p. 45). Understanding how weak states could possibly reject coercive power requires a reframing of the understanding of power. Typically, global powers measure their power in relation to military strength. However, both great and small states alike have various other ways to exert influence by utilizing various economic, ideological, and diplomatic methods (Fox, 2006, p. 40). Therefore, small states can use their influence across multiple methods to deprive global powers of valued goods.

Comparative foreign policy has frequently asserted that certain traits ultimately effect a state's foreign policy decisions. Rosenau (1968) laid out a fundamental framework for comparative foreign policy approaches. Rosenau (1968) emphasized the importance of explanatory factors at different levels of the state, highlighting the effects of domestic, social, individual, and system pressures on policy formation. In the end, the different factors have a varying effect on the formulation of policy based on the type of state under examination. Hey (2003, p. 9) asserted small states have their own unique factor influencing policy formation that sets them apart from other states. In rejection of assumptions about external powers controlling small state foreign policy, Elman (1995, p. 211) found that small states are also surprisingly vulnerable to domestic variables. The possibility of domestic variables influencing small state foreign policy further refutes the neorealist assumptions on foreign policy creation and cooperation.

I do not mean to infer that client states as defined in the parameters of this paper necessarily equate to the working definition of small states. After all, the very definition of a small state has been fluid within the limited field of small state research. Definitions include practical details about "geographical size, population size, and a country's degree of influence in international affairs" (Hey, 2003, p. 3). However, a lack of a cohesive definition does not invalidate small state theories and their

utility in discussing them here. Instead, what matters in this case is what small state theories can reveal about foreign policy formation of states with various levels of global power and capability. Research on small states, with its focus on the unique foreign policy decisions of weaker states, can help form assumptions about the factors behind client-based noncompliance in cooperative asymmetric dyads, such as those events found in patron-client relationships. The definition of small state used in this research equates to the definition of a client state in the patron-client relationship. The definition of a small state used here follows more closely to Rothstein's (1968, p. 29) concept of small states being differentiated by their inability to maintain their own security through their own capabilities, and they therefore rely fundamentally on the support of other states. Small states therefore require an expanded explanation of cooperation beyond the limits of neorealist theories involving a framework that permits inclusion of numerous potential explanatory factors.

Section 3: COMPETING FRAMEWORKS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Cooperation between states involves shifting independent—or at times dependent—decisions by state actors. To understand how states form their decisions, scholars have often relied on various frameworks and models to explain cooperative or non-cooperative behavior. Many of these theories and frameworks reflect the neorealist and liberal perspectives on cooperation from which they originate.

Structural realist or neorealist theories, focused on an international system driven by mistrust between actors and states driven by self-help, explain weak state foreign policy predominately in relation to the interests of more powerful states. Much of the common thinking has treated small, weak state foreign policy as a uniform part of the system, driven by the decisions of more powerful states (Vital, 1967; Keohane, 1969; Jervis, 1978, pp. 172-3). As a result, cooperation between states and the foreign policy is highly unlikely in the neorealist perspective, especially given the neorealist assumption that states predominately focus on their own survival. States operating under this view are more concerned about their own relative gains compared to other states. As Waltz (1979, p. 105) put it, “When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not ‘Will both of us gain?’ but ‘Who will gain more?’ [...] Even the prospect of absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use increased capabilities.” Therefore, strong states have very little incentive to help weak states.

Scholars that believe that cooperation almost solely concerns an actor's self-interest have at times relied on the prisoner's dilemma as a model to explain cooperation. The prisoner's dilemma is less a tool for understanding a cooperative arrangement than understanding when states may seek or avoid cooperation and where the potential for cooperation is enhanced and decreased based on the varying levels of coordination and collaboration between states (Snidal, 1985). While insightful, prisoner dilemmas rarely go beyond relative gain explanations for cooperation and do not distinguish between differentiating factors effecting small and large states. Instead, cooperation exists as a possibility, not a certainty.

Tit-for-tat strategies typically play a large part in the success of cooperation in prisoner dilemmas. Axelrod (1984) found that tit-for-tat strategies within prisoner dilemmas can lead to cooperation as the actors involved would begin to follow tit-for-tat behavior. Therefore, cooperation is met with further cooperation in prisoner dilemmas, creating a positive cycle of cooperative behavior. The opposite however is also true. Coercive action also tends to lead to coercive responses (Jervis, 1976). This leads to a negative tit-for-tat cycle. The negative cycles correspond to negative perceptions of trust, which are only intensified as the negative cycle continues (Dohemen et al., 2008).

Liberal approaches to international cooperation have challenged these assumptions. Cooperation is no longer about guaranteeing a state's own survival under a liberal framework. The rise of international institutions, such as the United Nations and the European Union, demonstrate that international cooperation comprised of mutual gains is not impossible. Scholars challenging neorealist perspectives have instead focused on multifactorial explanations, contemplating the effects of influences such as common interests and norms on cooperation. Research on gains and cooperation has transitioned to a conversation about under what specific conditions are gains important and when is cooperation more or less likely. For example, Lipson (1984) highlighted that relative gains are usually more of a concern under security matters than economic; Snidal (1991) proposed that there is a difference between immediate gains and long-term gains; and Mastanduno (1991) found that while gains are important in the initial consideration of policy, they are often not present in policy outcomes. The diverse findings on the subject of gains contest the basic understandings of cooperation in an anarchic world. Therefore, multifactorial explanations of international cooperation, with their unique considerations about the individual state's position within the international system, are better suited for explaining occurrences of cooperation between strong and weak states.

Researchers have also used less system-level focused approaches to understanding cooperation. More particularized frameworks focusing on specific variables within cooperative arrangements can more precisely describe the conditions of cooperation, often leading to better explanations of the motives behind cooperation and effects of those actions on the framework itself. These frameworks, while substantially narrower in scope, allow for more real-world policy relevant applications. The principal-agent framework for example has been used for an extensive period to explain state participation and cooperation in the EU. Here, the principal enters into a contractual arrangement with the agent in order for the agent to carry out tasks on the principal's behalf. In principal-agent models, systemic issues such as shirking and slippage hinder cooperation (Kassim & Menon, 2003). The framework has usually been used to explain states' involvement with international institutions and in its current form does not extensively focus on the capability differences between small and large states.

Frameworks relating to specific regime-types and power levels, such as cooperation under empire, provide insights into how cooperation works when specific conditions related to the state are set. When an empire—a state that has hegemonic power over the system—controls cooperation, cooperation operates in a hub-and-spoke fashion. Empires reinforce their dominance over weak states by integrating their peripheral states economically, culturally, and militarily into the central state (Barkey, 2008). Yet, empire may not be as useful today in explaining weak state cooperation. As Nye (2002) pointed out, it would be in error to apply the hub-and-spoke concept to today's global network. While the empire framework is an interesting way to envision how large states interact with small states, the hub-and-spoke approach negates the factors related to the smaller states. Therefore, the patron-client framework is the most appropriate approach to explain cooperation between a large and small state.

The patron-client relationship framework has seldom been used as lens with which to examine international relations. The study of patron-client relations has instead been used mostly in other fields of research, such as anthropology and comparative politics. Only during the Cold War did researchers like Shoemaker and Spanier (1984) and Carney (1989) attempt to apply the concept to international relationships. For their part, Shoemaker and Spanier (1984) used an international patron-client perspective to dissect and explain interstate relations, structuring the relationship between a strong patron and weak client around the asymmetric military capacity between states. Their use of the framework helped form useful conclusions about security cooperation between strong and weak states,

noting that the cooperative nature between a strong patron and weak client could raise the perception of security for both countries and reinforce compliance and solidarity (Shoemaker and Spanier, 1984, p. 14).

Carney (1989) employed an international patron-client perspective differently and sought to expand the concept as a theoretical framework. In particular, he used the patron-client framework to challenge the shortcomings of dependency theory, a theory popular during the Cold War to explain the nature of Cold War relations. To do so, Carney (1989) created what is likely the most synthesized definition of international patron-client relationships to date. By borrowing definitions and concepts of patron-client relationships from comparative politics research at the subnational level and broader anthropology, he established four select criteria that defined international patron-client relationships and its related mechanisms (Carney, 1989, pp. 43-51).

While Carney's efforts created a clear framework for understanding how strong and weak states cooperate and interact, there have been few attempts to employ the international patron-client framework to explain post-Cold War state behavior. Understanding how researchers have conceptualized and utilized the concept in a post-Cold War environment is important to understanding the possible flexibility and relevance of the concept. More recently, Ciorciari (2015) used the international patron-client framework to explain China and Cambodia's relationship. Ciorciari (2015) moved beyond the Cold War tendency to apply the framework to analyze solely the security aspect of bilateral relationships. Instead, he used the patron-client perspective to explain why weak states within China's sphere of influence were unwilling to enter into "highly subordinate patron-client pacts" (Ciorciari, 2015, p. 267). Ciorciari (2015) suggested that a Chinese framework for patron-client relations emphasizes a less intrusive patron state at the cost of a less rewarding relationship overall for both sides (Ciorciari, 2015, p. 267).

Veenendaal (2016) attempted to reassert the relevance of the international patron-client framework to modern day analysis of international relations. He argued that the framework is well suited to explain the formation of small state foreign policy since the framework includes elements of exchange between asymmetric partners, something dependency and neo-realist perspectives fail to achieve (Veenendaal, 2016, p. 14). While more recent uses of the international patron-client model demonstrate the model's current relevance, the use of the international patron-client framework is still severely limited. Many of the important hypotheses suggested by Carney (1989, pp. 52-3) regarding the mechanisms of international patron-client relationships are relatively untested; are economic, military, and cultural linkages in international patron-client relationships good predictors of client behavior? Will compliant behavior increase based on the client's need for the exchanged benefit provided by the patron? While these questions are not the sole purpose of this paper, they will help form hypotheses and questions about the roots of weak state noncompliance and foreign policy formation. They will feed the larger question of the research here; how and why would small states not comply with demands of more powerful states? The use of the patron-client framework can provide useful insight to the interplay of numerous variables between strong and weak states.

Section 4: THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS

Carney's (1989) framework for international patron-client relationships remains the closest to a standard definition of international patron-client relationships. In his definition, unlike interstate relationships based on pure dependency, a patron-client framework encompasses numerous elements outside of socio-economic factors in a dyadic exchange. Elements such as cultural, ideological, diplomatic, and military factors shape the nature of the relationship between a powerful and weak state and help form a unique, mutual affinity between actors that is not present in purely dependent

relationships (Carney, 1989, p. 43). In particular, Carney's (1989) international relations patron-client framework focuses on four criteria synthesized from the understanding of patron-client relationships in other major research fields outside of international relations theory, predominately drawing from established anthropology and comparative politics research.

Asymmetry

The first criterion to Carney's (1989) international patron-client framework is a natural asymmetry within the dyadic relationship. The asymmetry specifically refers to the differences in the capabilities of the states within the relationship, with the patron owning more military power, economic resources, or other assets that contribute to a patron's international dominance compared to the weaker client state. The asymmetric nature of patron-client relationships imitates the asymmetric nature of dyadic relationships found in dependency theories. Dependency theorists also attest that state relations often exist in an asymmetric dyad based on power (Galtung, 1971; Caporaso, 1978). Under dependency theories, larger, more-advanced and industrialized states hold greater access to more resources than smaller and often less-developed states. Thus, more advanced states wield significant influence over lesser states.

Dependency theory and an international patron-client approach to asymmetry differ though on how asymmetry operates. Power asymmetry in dependency theory portrays the foreign decisions of weak states as limited. Since smaller states are dependent on large powers for numerous economic reasons, their decision making power may be more limited (Hirschman, 1945). Under dependency theory, powerful first world countries use the asymmetry to drive political and economic interactions, using its political and economic capabilities to dominate its exchanges with weaker states. While the international patron-client framework concurs with dependency theories that patrons can use their immense influence to control aspects of the dyadic relationship, the international patron-client relationship framework does not emphasize the destabilizing effect of the unidirectional flow of influence from powerful state to weaker state created in asymmetric dyads. Instead, the power disparity in patron-client relationships maintains stability within the relationship by allowing the patron to control the resources that can be exchanged with the client for loyalty. The emphasis in international patron-client relations is not on the exchange from client to patron, but on the two-way exchange between patron and client. This makes the dyad valued on both sides. In an asymmetric security exchange for example, a patron with sizeable military capabilities could guarantee security or boost military status for the client state. In exchange, the client provides what it can, such as loyalty, aligning with security interests, or cooperating on the patron's security priorities. However, the dyad is still asymmetric and research has suggested that the patron still controls how the relationship operates. Since the patron controls most of the capability in the dyad, the principal security transfer in this case still maintains a unidirectional flow (Shoemaker & Spanier, 1984, p. 13).

Reciprocity

The second characteristic of Carney's (1989) framework is reciprocity. As alluded to above, though an international patron-client relationship is asymmetric in nature, it centers on an exchange between the more powerful patron and the weaker client state. The foundation of the interaction in the relationship is on the provision of exchanged goods defined by both sides of the relationship as mutually valued (Carney, 1989, p. 45). The goods exchanged vary based on the relationship. Shoemaker and Spanier (1984) focused on a security exchange between the patron and the client; a weak client, incapable of ensuring its own defense, receives security from a militarily strong patron

state. In return, the client state provides valuable support to patron, often in terms of solidarity with the patron's foreign interests and within foreign competition.

Keohane (1986) also acknowledged reciprocity's ability to be an effective mechanism for interstate cooperation and stratified reciprocity across several different forms and definitions. In particular, he has made important distinctions between specific reciprocity and diffuse reciprocity. Specific reciprocity focuses on clearly defined exchanges with no sense of obligation between actors. In comparison, diffuse reciprocity is the opposite. It involves less defined exchanges that carry a sense of obligation between states (Keohane, 1986, p.4). The difference between the two is important since diffuse reciprocity requires a greater sense of obligation between the actors and possibly allows for less tolerance of noncompliance in comparison to specific reciprocity. Yet, the two different types are interlinked. Keohane (1986) suggested that actors had to build a sense of obligation through numerous exchanges; "repayment of political and economic debts in a strictly bilateral context may increase confidence, enabling actors to take a broader view of their common interests," (Keohane, 1986, p. 25) creating room for specific reciprocity to lead to diffuse reciprocity. As a neoliberalist, Keohane (1986) recognized that limited cooperation does exist in the international system. His views on reciprocity still view the exchange of goods and cooperation based on the basic principles of international anarchy, self-help, and sovereignty.

Other interpretations of cooperation discard the assumptions made about reciprocity under anarchy. Constructivists would argue that the introduction of norms and internationally shared ideas could create the basis for reciprocal exchange of goods and cooperation supplanting self-interest. Created norms would help shape what is appropriate and inappropriate in international behavior (March & Olsen, 1989). There are several examples of norms setting the terms of international cooperation. Examples include norms defining what is acceptable behavior in regard to the slave trade (Nadelmann, 1990), international environmental regulations (Mol, 2002), and treatment of soldiers in wartime (Finnemore, 1996). Yet, norms are unlikely to control all decision-making for states and even less so on the specific interests typically involved in patron-client relationships. Patron and clients enter reciprocity for the unique goods the other state can provide. Norms are often internationally shared making them intrinsically less valuable and unique.

Carney's (1989) international framework for patron-client relationships also noted that since there is natural asymmetry intrinsic to the relationship, reciprocity does not rely on a zero-sum exchange between the two states. Instead, both sides clearly have something the other one desires. Clients typically strive for tangible goods from reciprocity. As noted earlier, the material support from the patron can enhance the client's relationship with its public through the distribution of the benefits from the exchange (Carney, 1989, p. 48). The client can also use the reciprocal exchange to gain international status by associating with the patron and use material benefits to fend off international economic risks (Carney, 1989, p. 48). The patron's goals are typically ideologically based. Therefore, they seek partial influence or control of a client in order for the client to help the patron achieve its strategic or ideological goals (Shoemaker & Spanier, 1984, pp. 17-8).

The natural material imbalance of the exchange does not impede cooperation. Instead, when actors are not equal in terms of capabilities and cannot exchange goods of equal value, reciprocity refers to an exchange of mutually valued goods (Keohane, 1986, p. 6). The interpretation of value is determined by the individual state receiving the exchanged good. Parity of resources may actually undermine reciprocal cooperation. An examination of reciprocity in comparative politics at the subnational level notes that patron and client relationships are more stable the more materially imbalanced the parties are. When parties are equal and have access to similar resources, they no longer need the benefits provided through reciprocity (Lemarchand & Legg, 1972, p. 152). Imbalance also

provides the client leverage. The more the patron relies on the strategic advantage gained from the client, the more the patron values the relationship (Shoemaker & Spanier, 1984, p. 13). “In this way the client can gain a certain degree of leverage with the patron and some measure of tolerance of occasional noncompliant behavior” (Carney, 1989, p. 46). Understanding reciprocity is important to understanding weak state foreign policy expression and noncompliance. The exchange of mutually valued goods provides weak states more foreign policy options than a system dominated by a global hierarchy and top-down enforcement would suggest.

Affectivity

The third important aspect to patron-client relationships is affectivity. Many international relations theorists assert that in asymmetric relationships, more powerful states rely on coercive threats to enforce compliance (see Organski, 1958; Mearsheimer, 1983; Cable, 1994). Under a patron-client framework however, powerful patron states do not primarily rely on coercive measures to enforce client compliance. Instead, affectivity between states supersedes coercion as the primary mechanism of enforcing compliance. Clients follow a patron because they have built loyalty to the patron (Lemarchand & Legg, 1972, p. 152). Numerous linkages across various cultural, economic, military, or political elements to the relationship reinforce the affectual bonds between actors. Carney (1989, p. 52) hypothesized that linkages would be useful predictors of a client’s potential behavior. The more established links the states form within the dyad, the more likely compliance is. This hypothesis however has not been put to a rigorous test. The examination of relevant case studies here will reveal initial answers on Carney’s assertion.

The strength of linkages shows that affectivity between patron and client is not automatic or natural. Instead, the levels of affectivity between states can be an indication of the type of cooperative arrangement states will enter. Think of cooperation existing on a spectrum with no cooperation on one end, cooperative relationships reliant on instrumental exchanges somewhere in the middle, and patron-client relationships with primarily affection-based compliance on the other end. This spectrum reflects the level of trust intrinsic to the relationship, with affection-based compliance signaling the greatest amount of trust in a relationship.

It often takes time for a patron and client to build a meaningful partnership that permits affectivity to work. In an examination of the patron-client relationship between China and Cambodia, affectivity has been something formed after numerous exchanges, not organic to the relationship. Cambodia in the 1980s often blamed China for many political and economic issues and had minimal cooperative arrangements with China. Only in the 1990s, when China saw a political opening as Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) rise to power did the two states reengage each other in an instrumental partnership, focusing on economic and military stimulus from China to Cambodia (Ciorciari, 2015, p. 251). While the relationship was initially mired by suspicion, over time China has become Cambodia’s largest economic and military supporter. The relationship is now more similar to a patron-client relationship. The two countries have created social linkages that have bonded the states together. Both have shared experiences of imperialism and have held a like-mindedness on nonintervention that has formed a normative foundation to their relationship (Richardson, 2010). Cambodia’s ethnic Chinese population is also well integrated, and the CPP enjoy government support and backing that shields them from domestic and foreign critics (Ciorciari, 2015, p. 252). Trust has reinforced affection-based cooperation.

Compliance

Lastly, patron-client relationships require compliance. Compliance is the overall driver of the relationship and ensures asymmetric cooperation works. When both sides comply with the terms set in the reciprocal exchange, both sides receive mutual benefits. Affectivity in the relationship only strengthens compliance, reducing both sides' concerns about betrayal and reducing the need to use coercive methods to gain compliance. Compliance is not automatic however. External and internal factors will strain patron and client compliance alike. While both sides have a stake in the other side complying, the patron because of its superior capabilities has more tools at its disposal to ensure that the client does comply. It can use military, economic, and diplomatic pressure to coerce client compliance (Carney, 1989, p. 47). Carney (1989) noted that patron states are unlikely to tolerate constant client noncompliance since clients in the reciprocal exchange provide highly valued strategic support. Yet, if the issue is less important to the patron, the patron is more willing to overlook episodes of client noncompliance (Carney, 1989, p. 45).

Adding to another layer of complexity to compliance is the voluntary nature of patron-client relationships. Since the primary mode of inducing compliance in patron and client relationships is the nature of reciprocity and affectivity, the client has the unparalleled ability to depart voluntarily from the relationship and choose not to comply with cooperation when it sees fit, though possibly with consequences. As Carney (1989) noted, "patron-client relationships may simply die a natural death or may end amidst conflict or dashed expectations" (p. 45). "A natural death" however is likely an oversimplification of how cooperation ends and noncompliance issues develop in patron-client relationships. Noncompliance is an act of foreign policy interest and an individual strategic choice of the state in patron-client relationships.

Patron-client relationships therefore effectively end when the criteria of the relationship are no longer met; in particular, when affection-based compliance and reciprocity disappear. Without affection-based compliance and reciprocity there is little distinguishing the relationship from other dependency relationships. Again, consider the patron-client relationship as existing on a spectrum. Since affectivity is the most unique aspect of the patron-client cooperative relationship, when affectivity no longer works and trust is lost, it is natural for states to resort to specific reciprocity to build trust, shifting away from the diffuse reciprocity that is common in patron-client relationships. If specific reciprocity disappears, reciprocity disappears with it, stifling cooperation.

It remains unclear within the international patron-client framework what level of noncompliance either the patron or client would tolerate or how client states come to the strategic choice to not comply with the reciprocal exchange. Though levels of affectivity, the value of the reciprocal exchange, and the patron's willingness to use coercion may affect the level of noncompliance that occurs, these factors have rarely been tested in context of an international patron-client relationship; individuals have only theorized their effects. Since these factors vary greatly from dyad to dyad, the levels of tolerance towards noncompliance will also likely vary. These preliminary identified factors about how noncompliance works in patron-client dyads will feed the following hypotheses about weak state foreign policy formation and help answer why and how do small states choose not to comply with the demands of more powerful states.

Section 5: THE STUDY OF NONCOMPLIANCE

Since research remains limited on compliance and noncompliance mechanisms within international patron-client relationships, external ideas about interstate compliance and noncompliance must be considered in order to create a holistic understanding of when and how weak client states may choose to express noncompliant state behavior.

Self-interested explanations

Neo-realist perspectives on noncompliance and the breakdown of cooperation explain weak state noncompliance in terms of self-interest. Neorealist perspectives view cooperation in an anarchic world as inherently tenuous, using prisoner dilemma games to explain how states pursue their self-interest and overcome collective action problems under cooperation. States are mainly concerned about their own power in relation to other states. Therefore, the main obstacles to international cooperation in an anarchic world are state concerns about relative gains and the other states cheating for their own benefit and gain (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 12). Glaser (1994) found that realists' negative view of cooperation however is typically overstated, arguing that cooperation under structural realist perspectives can actually help achieve mutual security goals through cooperation.

Cooperation is less about affectivity under realist/neorealist paradigms and more about the benefits of cooperation. Under the realist perspective, states act in their own self-interest when they act in a rational manner seeking their own survival. In the anarchic system, this usually refers to a state's capability compared to other states. Self-interested state actors therefore refer to states pursuing an increase in their material capabilities and own security. While states are acting within their own self-interest when they attempt to gather an abundance of resources or increase capabilities, they are also acting in a self-interested manner when they move to protect their current capabilities. Acquiring new weapons or sources of income can be as much as a self-interested act as a state protecting its current capabilities from foreign influence or acquisition. Under realist assumptions then, states are likely to leverage noncompliance to increase the benefits from cooperative arrangements; states can use noncompliance to signal the desire to renegotiate the terms of reciprocity or possibly attract newer partners to provide increased benefits.

The concept of affectivity in patron-client relationships conflicts with realist perspectives about the anarchic world and self-interested states. The very nature of international patron-client relationships is based on a deep-rooted trust and the exchange of mutually valued goods, two concepts in direct conflict with realism. However, since little is understood about international patron-client relationships, it would be rash to dismiss the self-interested motives of small states. One would expect self-interested explanations for client-based noncompliance under an international patron-client framework would occur when client states no longer value the reciprocal exchange nor have high levels of affectivity for the patron. The relationship ends because of no affectivity existing or reciprocity occurring between the patron and client. Clients may use noncompliance here to signal other partners to receive higher valued goods or renegotiate the terms of the current relationship before it ends.

Noncompliance is not only a result of self-interested considerations; it is also a useful foreign policy tool to further self-interests. In cooperative arrangements, weak states might use noncompliance to signal current disapproval of another state's actions. Many scholars have framed this form of weak state noncompliance as a form of soft balancing (see Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005; Yesiltas, 2009). Soft balancing is predominately found in asymmetric relationships and is used when states disagree about the terms of cooperation or face pressure from major powers. In these scenarios, strong states with their superior resources are in a better position to enforce compliance or outlast weak states in a disagreement until a weak state acquiesces to the strong state's demands. Such a dilemma forces weak states to surrender their autonomy and accept the conditions set by the strong state. The weak state lacks the capability through its military capabilities to hard balance within the asymmetric relationship.

As an alternative response, weaker states in the post-Cold War era have utilized international institutions to build coalitions and employ diplomatic bargaining to contain the influence of greater powers (Paul, 2005, p.58). During U.S. President George W. Bush's administration, foreign powers such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia used its diplomatic capacity to block the U.S. request to base ground troops in those countries to support the Iraq War as a form of soft balancing (Pape, 2005, p. 39). Turkey and Saudi Arabia's moves hampered the U.S. war strategy and was an effective way for Turkey and Saudi Arabia to express its disapproval for the United States' unilateral military approach. Soft balancing is a response to aggressive action by another state. Client states could expect to use soft balancing when the reciprocal benefits of cooperation are no longer appear mutual and seemingly favor the strong state. In this scenario, expect client states to attempt to block patron moves on an international platform and call into question the legitimacy of the patron's demands in a move to garner international support. The obvious risk is the client's soft-balancing antagonizing the patron while simultaneously destabilizing the affectivity and reciprocity of the relationship, resulting in the likely use of coercive methods against the client by the patron.

Kelley (2005) also identified that weak states will attempt to avoid perceptions of vulnerability label by using soft balancing to gain future status. Kelley (2005) framed weak state soft balancing as a form of "strategic non-cooperation" (p. 154). Through strategic non-cooperation, weak states will purposefully turn away from cooperation when they feel cooperation is no longer mutually beneficial and may even reject possible immediate gains (Kelley, 2005, p. 154). The intent of soft balancing under this scenario is not to signal the desire for an instant adjustment to the terms of reciprocity. Instead, weak states are making a stance showing resolve and expressing their sovereignty over their own foreign policy. The intent is for a weak state to be able to better negotiate the terms of cooperation in the future and create a more equitable relationship (Kelley, 2005, pp. 167-8).

Based off the discussion about self-interest—which here refers to a state seeking to acquire greater capabilities or protect its current capabilities from foreign threats—there are two distinct hypotheses about how and when client states will demonstrate noncompliant behavior in relation to its own self-interest:

H1: *Self-interest—If the client state does not see the value of the reciprocal exchange as equal and no longer has high levels of affectivity for the patron, client states out of self-interest will resort to noncompliance. Noncompliance in this scenario is designed to renegotiate the terms of the reciprocity or attract new patrons to increase or protect a state's capabilities.*

H2: *Self-interest—If client states no longer view the value of the reciprocal exchange as equal between patron and client yet there remains high levels of affectivity, client states will utilize soft balancing techniques as a form of noncompliance to renegotiate the terms of reciprocity. Noncompliance in this scenario is designed to renegotiate the terms of the reciprocity or attract new patrons to increase or protect a state's capabilities.*

Domestic considerations

While realism rejects the influence of domestic level factors, doing so is inappropriate at this stage based on the current understanding of small state foreign policy decision making. Numerous authors have contended that domestic level factors and institutions partially impact small state foreign policy decisions (see Elman, 1995; Hey, 1996; McCraw, 1994). Elman (1995, pp. 216-7) found that while international forces can influence domestic institutions, there is no guarantee they always will. Instead, a two level perspective is more appropriate. As an example of a two-level effect, McCraw (1994) noted that New Zealand's foreign policy behavior altered under differing political parties.

However, differences in political parties only changed some aspects of New Zealand's foreign policy. While not changing some of the state's stance on foreign policy issues, the alteration of domestic political control influenced the emphasis of multilateralism, degree of focus on economic issues, and overall emphasis on international relations.

Domestic level changes can also greatly alter how patron and clients view the potential of cooperation with one another, shifting perceptions of affectivity between them. Without domestic support, a patron may have a harder time convincing a client to follow the patron's interests. As an example, Crawford (1996) examined the newly united German government's decision to unilaterally recognize Croatia in the early 1990s. Most European nations had publically opposed the move. The European nations condemned the move by the new German government, labelling it as a violation of international cooperation (Crawford, 1996, p. 483). The unilateral violation by Germany however did not originate from international pressure. Instead, it stemmed from Germany's democratic institutions where the norm of self-determination had flourished. Weak European norms on cooperation could not overcome the domestic pressure that resulted in Germany's unilateral decision (Crawford, 1996). Noncompliance in these cases will especially be strong in democratic client states where elites are accountable to the public and cooperation challenges emerging domestic norms or beliefs. Patron states will likely use their close affectivity to the client to influence domestic emerging norms before abandoning the relationship.

By factoring in the potential effect of domestic level factors, a hypothesis about client noncompliance driven by domestic levels pressure can be shaped. I hypothesize this form of noncompliance will be extra prevalent when patron states lack access to creating domestic linkages:

H3: Domestic considerations— If client states are accountable to domestic institutions and domestic norms are at odds with the patron's interests, then the client will resort to noncompliance.

Ambiguity, capacity, and temporal explanations

There may also be other non-system related explanations for noncompliance. Chayes & Chayes (1993) examined compliance within regulatory agreements, looking at state relationships where a treaty was at the center of a relationship and where the agreement clearly outlines the terms for compliance. Chayes & Chayes (1993, p. 187) noted that realist explanations do not suffice in explaining all cases of noncompliance. Instead, they suggested three separate circumstances outside of the realist perspective to why states may fail to comply with agreements. The first circumstance was ambiguity. Arrangements such as treaties do not always make the terms of compliance clear, with differing levels of specificity from arrangement to arrangement. Such ambiguity in the terms of the agreement can lead to multiple interpretations (Chayes & Chayes, pp. 189-90). When there are multiple interpretations, cooperative behavior by one state may be seen as uncooperative by another. Therefore, states must decide what is and is not a violation of the agreement when the terms for cooperation are not clear.

International patron-client relationships naturally contain significant opportunities for ambiguity. Since international patron-client relationships rely on strong and continuous levels of affectivity and reciprocity, patrons and clients do not typically have to delineate the terms and conditions of the exchange. They may be broadly defined in a treaty or aid agreement, but no outside mechanisms should have to enforce compliance since compliance comes willingly and the exchange is mutually valued. Noncompliance in general is therefore difficult to detect when it does occur, and the patron and client states must constantly reevaluate and terms of cooperation within the dyad to respond to noncompliance. Evaluation of the cooperative arrangement is normal. Both bargaining over new

benefits and the renegotiation of the standing cooperative agreements are inherent problems to international cooperation. Renegotiation in particular includes threats of noncooperation in order to adjust the terms of cooperation (Fearon, 1998, p. 275). Since patron-client relationships favor reciprocal arrangements built through close bonds that usually exist outside of formal regulatory agreements, it is likely that noncompliance issues will coincide with significant renegotiation between patrons and clients. Ambiguity-based noncompliance is likely when the patron and client lack a strong outlet for expressing their interests and intent. Ambiguity is measured when there is a differentiation in the interpretation of the reciprocal exchange. The client may state it is acting in the patron's interests, claiming its interests are one thing, while the patron claims its interests are actually something different. A great deal of knowledge on background information is needed to confirm the ambiguity is real and not a false claim by one of the parties.

Compliance may also fail in response to capacity issues (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, p. 193). States do not live in isolation. Often states, especially weak states, cannot maintain the required conditions established at the onset of cooperation. For example, the Soviet Union in the 1980s was technically able to meet the destruction standards for nuclear weapons eventually set in the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). However, the collapse of the Soviet Union complicated the guarantor's ability to fulfill the agreement when it was eventually enacted. After the collapse, Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, had to guarantee that Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—states that maintained some nuclear capability after the collapse of the Soviet Union—also disarmed their nuclear capacity as set out in the Lisbon Protocol (Wolf, 2003). The new states had to agree to disarm before the ratification of START could happen. However, the former Soviet states lacked the technical expertise to disarm their nuclear weapons themselves. The new states would have to send them back to Russia to ensure compliance (Campbell et al., 1991, pp. 25, 108; Wolf, 2003). Since the new states lacked the capacity to destroy the materials themselves, the nuclear weapons became a bargaining chip for the small states hindering Russia's ability to ratify the START agreement. It was not until the U.S. and Russia provided external security guarantees and financial assistance to Kazakhstan and Ukraine did the states send the nuclear materials to Russia for destruction (Wolf, 2003). The Soviet Union may have had the capacity to meet the destruction requirements set forth in START before dissolution, but a much more divided and weakened Russia in the early 1990s lacked the capacity to enforce the standards needed to ratify the agreement, slowing cooperation. In this case, cooperative states overcame noncompliance by creating new agreements across multiple states, including former Soviet satellite states, to overcome capacity related noncompliance issues. It is worth observing that the United States even helped ensure compliance with the Lisbon Protocol, demonstrating a committed effort to the strategic benefits of potential cooperation even in the face of noncompliance. Capacity-based noncompliance is likely in patron-client relationships immediately after any significant regime changes or small state involvement in a large conflict.

Lastly, there is a temporal element to noncompliance (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, pp. 194-7). In regulatory treaties that require agreeing states to enforce large social or economic reforms, compliance is often slow to start. To bring themselves into compliance, states need to make internal or external adaptations that take a varying amount of time to enforce. While states therefore are noncompliant after the cooperative agreement takes effect, states that show a willingness to comply will take steps to overcome the initial issues of agreement enforcement. In regulatory cooperative agreements, the initial treaty is usually only the first in several other agreements. States create other regulatory instruments to make an agreement work (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, p. 195). The Lisbon Protocol is an example of how a follow on agreement creates other instruments to make compliance work.

Noncompliant states may take advantage of the temporal element however. In these cases, noncompliance is more likely about self-interest than it is about a temporal element to enforcement. States will argue that they need time to enforce the standards set in the treaty without making any substantial changes to overcome noncompliance while one-sidedly benefiting from the agreement. This has been common in human rights agreements where the costs of noncompliance have been minimal and the tools for monitoring and enforcement are relatively weak (Bayefsky, 2001). Instead, with a lack of strong states seeking enforcement, states unwilling to comply can ratify human rights treaties as a sign of goodwill and continue committing human rights violations (Goldsmith & Posner, 2005). False claims about temporal reasons for noncompliance in international patron-client relationships are unlikely however. Since the value of the exchange is highly and mutually valued, patron states will likely invest in close monitoring of compliance, and therefore will take action to work with the client state to overcome temporal issues related to noncompliance if such instances arise.

Based off the discussion of non-system related noncompliance issues, three hypotheses can be formed:

- H4: *Ambiguity—If the terms of reciprocity are ambiguous then the client will resort to noncompliance. The patron will tolerate moderate levels of noncompliance to ensure cooperation succeeds.*
- H5: *Capacity—If the client state does not have the capacity to comply then the client will resort to noncompliance. The patron will tolerate moderate levels of noncompliance to ensure cooperation succeeds.*
- H6: *Temporal—If the client cannot comply to the immediate terms of the agreement then the client will resort to noncompliance. The patron will tolerate moderate levels of noncompliance to ensure cooperation succeeds.*

Section 6: MEASURING NONCOMPLIANCE

To test the hypotheses listed in the previous section, I will examine several case studies in favor of a quantitative analysis of weak state UN voting records—the common method for measuring international compliance and noncompliance. Scholars have often used UN voting records to examine a weaker state's dependency and compliance to a stronger state's interest (see Moon, 1983; Richardson, 1976; Wang, 1999; Wittkopf, 1973). The advantage of examining voting records of certain states is that it is a measurable form of foreign policy expression. It is easier to determine a state's foreign policy position based off its voting behavior and to account for any significant shifts in a state's foreign policy by noting alterations in voting behavior. UN voting records are ideal for cross-sectional and longitudinal studies and are sometimes the only public way a small state expresses its foreign policy on the international stage with the public announcement of a state's position on issues in the UN (Moon, 1985, pp. 299-300).

There are several reasons however, why the examination of UN voting would not be an effective way to test the noncompliance hypotheses listed here. The first problem is the shortcomings of UN voting as a methodology to examine a state's intent. While UN voting records are a sound way to examine state foreign policy positions, it is an inferior instrument to explain the motives behind voting records. Moon (1985) in particular noted that compliance is often just a consensus among elite groups, and it is a challenge to determine when a state is acting within its own interests or following the interests of an external state. UN voting cannot distinguish between compliance and consensus. Since UN voting cannot make this important distinction, such a methodology is of little use in the

examination of the hypotheses listed where explanatory factors are quintessential. To detect noncompliance, it is necessary to detect when a state was agreeing with the conditions set by cooperation and when the situation altered; UN voting alone cannot provide such compulsory information.

The second problem of UN voting record analysis as a methodology is the method's shallow approach to confirming compliance or noncompliance. Analysis of voting records cannot distinguish between when a state action is cooperative and when it is considered a form of defection. Actual global events and factors tend to be more nebulous in the real world than they are in controlled simulations (Oye, 1986). As a result, the interpretations of the meaning behind state action are left to the judgement of the decision-makers who rely on assumptions, beliefs, and experiences to make their judgments (Niv-Solomon, 2017, p. 5). While UN voting provides statistical information that can provide important insights, it is not the perfect mechanism for gaining insights on the motivations behind state behavior. Voting records do little more than show a causal relationship between how states vote without interpreting what those votes mean in relation to one another.

UN voting records can be a perspicacious starting point for examining noncompliance issues between a patron and client, but a quantitative approach cannot facilitate explanations about the complex multi-level factors and variables that have been hypothesized about here. A qualitative case study approach has numerous advantages then. Case studies by design help explain complex phenomena in social sciences and international relations (Bennett & Elman, 2006; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). As Kacowicz (2004, pp. 119-120) succinctly laid out that the advantages of case studies include:

“(1) operationalization of qualitative variables, attaining high levels of conceptual validity; (2) identification of new variables or hypotheses, and the test and refinement of existing ones; (3) potential examination of causal mechanisms within individual cases, including unveiling causal processes in non-events; (4) constructing historical and detailed explanations of particular cases, through an in-depth intensive examination; and (5) analysis of complex causal relations through contingent generalizations and typological theories, in instances of equifinality and path dependency.”

The advantages listed make case studies best suited for examining patron-client relationships. Since the concept of international patron-client relationships is underdeveloped along with proper procedures on how to measure them, the methodology chosen should help unveil new hypotheses and variables in relation to how international patron-client relationships operate. With international patron-client relationships being a preliminary theoretical framework, there is an inherent risk of becoming too fixated on the explanatory power of a limited number of analyzed variables. A broader case study permits analysis and detection of more variables. Secondly, as acknowledged by Kacowicz (2004, pp. 119-20), when it is possible to reach an end state through numerous means, case studies permit comparison of complex casual relations to explain the path to the end state. The hypotheses above suggest there are multiple variables at domestic and international levels that can eventually cause noncompliance in patron-client dyads; the methodology selected must be able to account for the numerous interactions on numerous levels.

In the following sections, I present three separate case studies—patron-client relations between the U.S.-El Salvador, the U.S.-Pakistan, and the U.S.-Thailand. Each case study has been selected based on several criteria to allow for valuable comparisons between the independent variables derived

from the mechanisms of the international patron-client framework and the dependent variable of noncompliance as a foreign policy selection of the weak state. Since international patron-client relationships vary in terms of power, affectivity, and values of reciprocal exchange, I have chosen to set the patron state as a control. By guaranteeing the U.S. is the patron state in all cases, patron behavior will ideally become more defined and consistent, decreasing the number of possible, variable explanations related to client state noncompliance.

Each case study will be examined in a three-part approach. The first part will focus on the nature of the international patron-client relationship. The preliminary analysis will focus on what makes the relationship a patron-client relationship by highlighting the development of affectivity, the terms of reciprocity, and the asymmetry between states. Compliance will be examined in all three phases as a consistent part of the relationship. Examinations of affectivity will include analysis of social, military, economic, and cultural linkages between states. An analysis of reciprocity in each case will focus on how the reciprocal exchange and cooperation has developed and what each state desires from the exchange.

The second part of the case study analysis will focus on the moments of client state noncompliance within patron-client dyads, which I refer to as noncompliance critical junctures. Moments of noncompliance framed here are loosely similar in terms of utility to Niv-Soloman's (2017) concept of critical junctures in international reciprocal relations. Niv-Soloman (2017) borrowed the concept of critical junctures from comparative politics to highlight the key decisions points that actors faced in reciprocal exchanges. Critical junctures are crises points where actors in a dyad face import decisions that limit the options available to them moving forward (Niv-Soloman, 2017, pp. 9-11). The processes after critical junctures are path-dependent, implying fewer options for international actors within cooperation. In reciprocal relationships, after critical junctures, dyads must determine to enter negative tit-for-tat cycles, continue a positive tit-for-tat cycle, or do nothing to the established exchange (Niv-Soloman, 2017, p. 9).

Patron-client relationships face similar situations when the relationship faces noncompliance critical junctures; patrons and clients can choose to increase cooperation, reduce cooperation, or continue cooperation as normal within the relationship. To detect critical junctures and distinguish them from normal decision points, Niv-Soloman (2017, p. 12) suggested using counterfactual analysis and identifying generative cleavages between dyad members. Noncompliance critical junctures have a broader definition within this paper. Noncompliance critical junctures in patron-client relationships incorporate and examine definitive moments of noncompliance in patron-client relationships. These critical junctures are unique for they are acknowledged by the patron as noncompliant behavior and require action or inaction on the part of the patron or client in response. They also feed into the future decision-making cycle of the patron-client relationship and typically have an effect on one of the main variables of the relationship. One cannot identify noncompliance decision points as noncompliance critical junctures in the moment, for the available choices to the states and significance of the event only develop after the critical juncture. Therefore, it is useful to examine historical and less current patron-client relationships.

Lastly, the case study will examine the relationships between patron-and client post-critical junctures, examining the subset of hypotheses and their relation to continued cooperation and compliance. By comparing critical junctures separately to cooperation post-critical junctures, the analysis can avoid solely focusing on noncompliance events that ends cooperation, which is important considering it is far easier to detect relationship-ending noncompliance compared to noncompliance leaving little impact on the relationship. The same variables of patron-client relationships—*affectivity,*

reciprocity, and asymmetry—will be examined post-critical juncture to assist in explaining how noncompliance has occurred and its overall effect on the relationship.

Section 7: CASE STUDY: U.S.-EL SALVADOR

The nature of the patron-client relationship

The United States and El Salvador's initial forays into cooperation at the beginning of the 21st century were characterized by one off exchanges, lacking the deeper bonds characteristic of patron-client relations. The first move between the two countries to a more substantial relationship linked El Salvador's political elite and the U.S.'s economic prosperity in the late 1930s and early 1940s. With a global economic system facing collapse, the U.S. sought to improve trade internationally. The strategy included improving its economic ties with El Salvador through trade deals. At the time, Hernández Martínez was the dictator of El Salvador, vehemently opposed by the U.S. While Martínez was aware that the trade deal would favor the U.S. economically, he knew that agreeing to work with the U.S. would quell political opposition within El Salvador and prevent the U.S. from interfering in domestic politics. To garner favor and guarantee internal political security, he signed a trade agreement with the U.S. in 1937 (Leonard, 1991, p. 107). The reciprocal trade deal reflected specific reciprocity more than it did diffuse reciprocity, which is expected for states with minimal trust between them. The deal did however increase the affectivity between the U.S. and the Martínez regime. The deal secured Martínez's political safety. After declaring he would remain as president in 1939, the U.S. did not issue any condemnation of the dictatorship, a significant policy change to decades prior (Leonard, 1991, p.107).

Even after the trade deal, the relationship between the two countries lacked the affection-based component of patron-client relationships. Instead, the relationship remained focused on instrumental reciprocal exchanges. This was for several reasons. First, the U.S. at the time did not have any major strategic objectives that required El Salvador. El Salvador did not have the unique component to establish mutually valued reciprocity between the states. To the U.S., it could interchange its relationship with El Salvador with numerous other Central American countries.

The second issue was the turbulent nature of El Salvador's politics which made it difficult for the U.S. to create the needed bonds to build affectivity. The military removed Martínez from power in 1944 after he had overstepped his authority domestically by trying to prolong his status as president. In the decades following, numerous coups and power struggles became commonplace with the military on several occasions using its authority to step in to remove unfavorable leaders. Internally, El Salvador was fractured among class divides and differing ideologies. A rich land owning population formed a powerful oligarchy in the state. The military played to the oligarchy by exaggerating security threats and protecting the interests of the oligarchy. In exchange, the oligarchy gave passive consent to the military to control governing (Binford, 2016, p. 34-7). There were the also poorer, leftist groups with communist beliefs. The military ensured that these parties stayed out of Salvadoran politics, frequently using violent suppressive tactics.

U.S. interest in El Salvador increased in 1961 however when U.S. President Kennedy proposed the Alliance for Progress initiative throughout Central America. El Salvador finally had something unique to offer the U.S. in a potential reciprocal exchange. The U.S. in recent years had become concerned about the growing influence of communism in Latin American countries, and the U.S. had very little to show for it. In an attempt to garner goodwill among Latin American countries and prevent communistic expansion, the U.S. used the Alliance for Progress to funnel aid to

socioeconomic programs in Latin American countries in hopes for creating environments free of communist interest (Quint, 1963). This became the basis for the reciprocal exchange between the U.S. and El Salvador for decades after the policy initiative; the U.S. would provide aid to El Salvador's government in exchange for efforts to isolate communistic influence in the region.

While the asymmetric and reciprocal elements of the patron-client relationship were in play, the U.S. and El Salvador still lacked bonds of affectivity. After the implementation of the Alliance for Progress, the U.S. and El Salvador began to slowly establish close relations along two fronts. The first was the linkage between the U.S. and El Salvador's central-left party, the Christian Democrats. To the U.S., by 1979 the Christian Democrats were the only viable political option in El Salvador. The party was the closest to matching the U.S. beliefs and closest supporter of its international interests. Supporting rightist parties would only exacerbate violence against the left in El Salvador, and leaning too far left would bring communists into a position of power. The best opportunity came in 1979 when a reformist, government junta formed with members from the Christian Democrats. The promise of reforms attracted further U.S. support, with the U.S. directly backing some Christian Democratic members. The U.S. also had recently come off a failed policy initiative in Nicaragua, increasing El Salvador's strategic value and influence in the region in the U.S. perspective.

To the Christian Democrats, the U.S. provided an indispensable safety net. El Salvador by the time 1979 came along had reignited a civil war between leftist guerillas and the government. The rightists, who were radical in their own way, also attempted to stage a coup against the Christian Democrat-led civil-military junta in February and May of 1980. The government at the time lacked any significant domestic support. Without the U.S. backing of the government, the installed centrist civilian-led junta would have disappeared. (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 46). The centrist party became indebted to the U.S. and its support. No treaty or signed agreement mandated the U.S. to back up the centrist government. Instead, the U.S. rendered support because the two entities shared mutual interests, and both states held the key to the success of the other state's interests. The U.S. support of the besieged government during the coup attempts solidified the affection-based cooperation between the Salvadoran centrist government and the U.S.

The second avenue of influence was through the Salvadoran military. Though the political leaders changed frequently throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the military was a constant, always attached to the state's oligarchy. The U.S. up until 1979 had kept the military at arm's length. It had cut military aid to El Salvador in order to avoid potentially encouraging human rights abuses in the 1970s. However, that year the U.S. experienced a shift in interests and policies, permitting affectivity to flourish between the Salvadoran military and the U.S. Failed policies against communist expansion in Nicaragua and growing tensions in El Salvador made the U.S. shift its focus back on military containment of Soviet influence. By October 1980, while full military aid funding from the U.S. had not returned to the Salvadoran military, the U.S. did begin to send equipment such as six helicopters at no cost. Though the shipment came with human rights demands, the Salvadoran military mostly ignored them and provided a weak code of conduct change in response (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 45). The U.S. still provided the equipment.

Though the freeing of previously withheld military aid cemented affectivity between the military and the U.S. in 1980, the U.S. had been creating significant bonds with the military for years. The U.S. created pro-American enclaves within the military by providing the military significant aid and directly training the armed forces. The U.S. successfully trained 1,971 Salvadoran officers

Table 1: The international patron-client relationship between the U.S. and El Salvador 1980

<u>Asymmetry</u>		
	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>El Salvador</u>
GDP ¹	\$7.95 trillion	\$19.9 billion
Defense Spending ²	\$397.5 billion	\$339 million
% of GDP on defense	5.0%	1.7% ⁴
CINC value ³	.1331146 (2 nd of 156 countries)	.0004871 (98 th of 156 countries)
<u>Reciprocity</u>		
Reciprocal arrangement	- U.S. provides economic and military aid to El Salvador in exchange for preventing communist interference in Latin American and El Salvadoran commitment to economic, political, and human rights reform - No formal reciprocal arrangement outside 1981 aid certification process	
<u>Affectivity</u>		
Initial signals of trust and affection	- U.S. support to Christian Democrats without any formal agreement in place - U.S. provision of helicopters at no cost to Salvadoran military - Continued close relations between Christian Democrats and U.S. and Salvadoran military and U.S.	
<u>Compliance</u>		
Acts signifying compliance at outset of relationship	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>El Salvador</u>
	- 1961 Alliance of Progress: U.S. aid to Latin America to build programs to limit communist influence - U.S. military and economic aid in 1979 to support newly formed junta government U.S. provision of military trainers and advisors	- Support U.S. interests on limiting communist/leftist influence in El Salvador - Centrist party's attempts at economic agrarian reform - Centrist support for democratic reforms

between 1950 and 1979 (Binford, 2016, p. 47). At the start of the civil war in 1980, the U.S. chose to infuse more money in the military and direct teaching and training on U.S. strategy and tactics. Salvadoran military viewed the cooperation as favorable (Needler, 1991).

For the first time after several decades, the U.S. and El Salvador had effectively entered into a patron-client relationship. El Salvador shared the interests and goals of its patron—the rejection of communist influence within El Salvador—while affection-based bonds had also been established

¹ Calculated based off the “% of GDP spend on defense” in conjunction with “defense spending” in 2015 U.S. dollars to ensure consistency in dollar amounts across tables.

² Information is taken from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2017) SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. All values are set to 2015 U.S. dollars.

³ The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) is a statistical value created by Singer et al. (1972). These tables use the National Material Capabilities version 5.0 dataset accessed from <http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities>. The value represents a calculation of a state’s overall national power by factoring in six different components—total population of country ratio (TPR), urban populations of country ratio (UPR), iron and steel production of country ratio (ISPR), primary energy consumption ratio (ECR), military expenditure ratio (MER), and military personnel ratio (MER). The data—while not fully inclusive of the complete capabilities effecting a state’s national power and dependent on the quality and quantity of data available—still provide useful insights to comparisons of power based on the calculated values. Values are derived from the following equation: $CINC = ([TPR+UPR+ISPR+ECR+MER+MPR] / 6)$.

⁴ SIPRI estimate

between the U.S. and Salvadoran government and military. Financial aid began to flow again from patron to client and El Salvador occupied a more important role in Central America to prevent communist intrusion. The mutually valued reciprocal exchange was set. While the patron-client relationship had worked before the beginning of the civil war in El Salvador, a shift in U.S. demands in 1981 and El Salvador's internal dynamics tested El Salvador's ability to comply between 1981 and 1984.

Noncompliance Critical Junctures

The main period of the noncompliance critical junctures in El Salvador occurred between the years 1981 to 1984. It is when the rightist parties took control of the main body of government, Constituent Assembly, and initiated the most noncompliant policies.

The United States maintained significant influence over El Salvador's political apparatus and the country elite in the early 1980s. Up until this time, the U.S. had mostly responded to signals of noncompliance from El Salvador with leveled threats to the reciprocal exchange. The U.S. however redefined the nature of reciprocity in 1981. The Reagan administration and the U.S. State Department had signaled that it had been willing to provide El Salvador an increased aid package to ensure that the civil war raging in El Salvador did not lead to a communist success. The foreign aid package to El Salvador saw the administration make the largest request for any country in the hemisphere, requesting \$91.2 million in economic aid, \$25 million for military assistance, and \$1 million for International Military Education & Training (IMET) (Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1982, 1981, p.68). John Bushnell noted the sizable request, remarking that El Salvador had "been the most affected by outside interference, it has our largest proposed program" (Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1982, 1981 p. 71).

The U.S. effectively increased its demands, forcing El Salvador to weigh the value of reciprocity and its ability to comply. The violence in El Salvador however made the U.S. Congress wary on providing such a substantial aid increase, worrying that the money would go to the far right's violent campaign against the guerillas and raise further human rights concerns. Therefore, Congress signaled a change in U.S. interests in El Salvador. U.S. foreign policy would no longer be solely concerned about the repulsion of the communist threat, but the U.S. would link support directly to progress on human rights and economic reform. The amendment to aid, originally prohibited further military assistance to El Salvador unless the U.S. President certified that El Salvador was not committing violations of human rights; achieving control over its armed forces; implementing economic and political reforms to include land reform; committing to hold free elections at an early date; and demonstrating a willingness to cooperate with the opposition (Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1982, 1981). Senate approved of the certification requirements on May 1981, at the behest of the Reagan administration (Goshko, 1981, p. A1D, A19). By the following fall, U.S. Congress and Senate passed into law that the U.S. President had to certify every six that El Salvador met political and economic reforms along with human rights conditions for El Salvador to receive U.S. aid. The U.S. government's sudden intolerance for potential human rights violations and insistence on economic and political reform was likely rooted in the U.S.'s own history. Senator Charles Percy remarked on passing the certification requirement; "this nation doesn't want another Vietnam" (Rogers, 1981, p. 12).

The Salvadoran government quickly provided the U.S. verbal reassurance that the El Salvador would strive to meet the standards laid out by the aid certification law. However, while President José Napoleón Duarte, leader of the Christian Democrats, attempted to align the objectives of El Salvador and the U.S., he also tried to shield against them, signaling possibly unsuitable domestic conditions. In a letter to the U.S. Senate, he wrote:

“The objectives which I have cited are embodied in the set of conditions included in S. 1196 [certification requirements] which the Senate will soon be considering. The rationale reflected in the conditions coincides with my own stated objectives but the Government and the people of El Salvador would consider legislative conditions unwarranted. I hope that the Senate will recognize the conditions as an unacceptable imposition on a government friendly to the United States and fully committed to fulfill its pledge” (127 Cong. Rec. 21670, 1981).

This is the first indication by El Salvador that it did not have the capacity to comply with the increased demands of reciprocity. Internally, the Salvadoran government in 1981 not only faced an insurrection from leftist rebels but also a growing pressure from the extreme right. Salvadoran conservatives, comprised of members of the Salvadoran oligarchy, fed up with the direction of the government formed a new political party called Alianza Republicana Nacionalista de El Salvador, (Nationalist Republican Alliance of El Salvador, or ARENA) led by ex-Major Roberto D’Aubuisson,. The new party maintained close links to the death squads that had been foundation of El Salvador’s human rights abuses since the 1970s (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 157).

A portion of the U.S.’s foreign policy in El Salvador relied on the Salvadoran elections in 1982 to be openly democratic elections and provide a legitimate source of governance. To the Reagan administration, the open elections would also help fend off congressional critics to Reagan’s political and security plans for El Salvador while also justifying the large increase in aid (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 157). The elected government would also have to work closely with the U.S. to ensure compliance with all the objectives established in the aid certification requirement. However, the political landscape was not conducive for the U.S.’s objectives, nor was the election completely representative. For one, the members of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), the center-leftist party, refused to participate in the election. Without the FDR’s participation, it was unlikely that violence would cease between the rebels and the government, undermining the U.S.’s goal for future stability. There was also a substantial fear in the U.S. and among the Christian Democrats that if the ARENA members and the Nationalist Republicans took power, violence would intensify against the Christian Democrats and far left rebels, depressing progress on human rights objectives.

Fears about violence from the right were not unfounded. Mario Redailli – the number two of the Nationalist Republican Alliance, the political coalition of the far right – remarked in the view of the coalition the Christian Democrats and the Communists were the same. A presidency under José Napoleón Duarte would only allow three options, “to become slaves of the Communists, to fight or to leave the country [...] [the Nationalist Republican Alliance] the will not let this country fall into Communist hands.” (Bonner, 1982, p. A2).

The ARENA party had made surprising gains in the lead up to the election in 1982. A combination of voters being potentially afraid of reprisals for not voting for the far right and the Christian Democrats having their influence eroded after defections to the left while also being the

party in power during a period of violence and economic downturn had given ARENA and D'Aubuisson a surprising amount of momentum (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 158). The U.S. began to worry that the election would not go their way. U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton remarked in February 1982 at a meeting with Salvadoran leaders that that the rise of D'Aubuisson was the main worry. D'Aubuisson's ARENA party did not try to placate to the U.S.'s humanitarian concerns at this time, warning that if elected ARENA would free the army on the rebels even at the consequence of civilian casualties (Hoges, 1982a).

Christian Democrats during the election were much friendlier to the U.S. agenda. Outside of Duarte's previous message of support to the U.S. Congress, Duarte also reaffirmed during the campaign the Christian Democrats' resolve to reaching a peaceful conclusion to the conflict, reducing violence, and continuation of political and economic reforms (Dickey, 1982; Hoagland, 1982). The American public had also become publically concerned about the numerous deaths of church members as a part of the violence in the nation, including the deaths of four American churchwomen in El Salvador in 1980. Running up to the election, Duarte reiterated his conviction in bringing the killers to justice to placate the U.S. (Torgerson, 1981). To the U.S., the choice of preferred candidate was clear. As a flex of patronal influence, the U.S. sought to ensure the election did favor its foreign policy objectives in El Salvador. During the course of the election, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spent over \$2 million in support of Christian Democrats and Duarte (129 Cong. Rec. 21218, 1983; Preston, 1984; Taubman, 1984).

The Christian Democrats did win a plurality of votes in the election. The U.S. praised the electoral process, with President Reagan sending a letter remarking that, "the Salvadoran people have clearly repudiated violence and voiced their commitment to a democratic future" (Hoges, 1982b). However, the true problem to future compliance had been the strong showing from the rightist parties. While Christian Democrats won a plurality of the votes, in the assembly, a coalition of rightist parties held the most seats, putting the rightist government in power (Meislin, 1982b).

The U.S. moved quickly to react and ensure that the exchange of aid for policy compliance was still in place. The U.S. had two policy objectives in response to the emergence of a rightist assembly. The first was to keep D'Aubuisson out of the presidency, an act of true patronal influence. The second was to ensure reforms passed (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 163). In previous instances, the U.S. typically made threats about withholding aid. The Carter administration had withheld military aid when the violence and death squads had been rampant. The U.S. was not afraid to use it as an effective strategy here. However, the Salvadoran right stood defiantly in face of American threats of coercive action. D'Aubuisson went as far as to directly challenge the U.S.'s threats to limit aid by stating, "The United States has never cut off aid anywhere for very long or even entirely [...] Reagan will never let the communists win here. It's just a complete bluff" (Omang, 1982b). The defiance from the right was a harbinger to come.

While noncompliant behavior began to emanate from the right, the U.S. still maintained significant influence outside of El Salvador's political sphere. Mainly, the U.S.'s use of aid manipulation still resonated significantly with the military, who had become heavily dependent on the aid to fight leftist rebels. The U.S. sent a letter from Secretary of State Alexander Haig to Salvadoran military commanders reminding them that aid was directly linked to the progress of U.S. objectives (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 164). The message to the military was if there was continued disagreement over who should be president and if the new government was not acceptable to the U.S., aid would be cut

off immediately. The military responded by summoning political leaders to the military headquarters and proceeded to give them approved names for the presidency. The military heavily instructed the politicians to select Alvaro Magaña for president, rejecting a right wing candidate, and forcing the right wing to accept a consolation prize of D'Aubuisson leading as the head of the new constituent assembly (Omang, 1982a). Magaña had not been the preferred president for the U.S. Yet, Magaña was more favorable than a D'Aubuisson presidency. Coercion still appeared to be an effective tool among affection-based patron-client connections.

Noncompliance Critical Juncture – Land Reform

The first noncompliance critical juncture between the new government under Magaña and the U.S. arrived after the elections. The noncompliance issue centered on land reform. This was an important moment in noncompliance because it not only demonstrated the client's ability to leverage its capacity issues to justify noncompliance, but it also demonstrated that an unfriendly domestic political group with no bonds of affectivity will act in a self-interested manner. The juncture also forced the U.S. to make a decision on enforcing compliance or not, possibly altering how serious El Salvador would take its threats in the future. The U.S. had been pushing land reform in El Salvador and other Latin American countries since the late 1970s as a way to undercut the strength of communist and leftist ideologies (Harris and Espinosa, 1981).

The original land reform project initiated in 1980 under the Duarte government called for a three-phase plan. Phase one called on expropriation of estates larger than 500 hectares, representing 15 percent of El Salvador's land across 263 estates. Phase two would expropriate mainly coffee estates that were between 150 and 500 hectares. These lands were the basis of the oligarchy's economic power. The last phase was the Land to the Tiller (LTTT) program. The LTTT program effectively converted renters land into ownership, fully compensating owners of the expropriated land (Harris and Espinosa, 1981, pp. 302-4). Phase three had been a U.S. backed idea, also known as Decree 207. The motive for enacting Decree 207 was more about political gain than economic reform. By having the landless peasants becoming landowners, the government could build a strong base for political support (Bonner, p.198). However, the original implementation of the land reform program also coincided with the implementation of martial law. Rural workers became afraid not of leftist guerillas; instead, they feared the dispossession of land from peasant groups to the pro-junta groups (Harris and Espinosa, 1981, p. 305). Land reform therefore was not popular on either side. The right with the close ties to land owning oligarchy found land reform unwarranted. The left and peasant class on the other hand had feared the violence associated with land reform. However, the U.S. saw land reform as a critical part of economic reform and keeping communism out of El Salvador.

Land reform did not really go beyond phase one after its activation in 1980. In 1982, since the U.S. linked land reform to aid certification, the U.S. pushed the new Salvadoran government to make progress to reignite land reform. In order to avoid the perception of complete disobedience, rightist parties during the election refrained from stating they would gut land reform progress and pledged not to reverse phase one. However, ARENA went as far to state that it did oppose phase two and three of the project (Meislin, 1982a). After the election, the rightist parties now in power assumed a stronger anti-land reform position. In its first act of noncompliance, the assembly under the heavy influence of the ARENA party and D'Aubuisson rejected the implementation of phase three and Decree 207 by voting a hold on the LTTT program for an entire crop cycle in May 1982. Magaña attempted to do

damage control and limit the suspension of Decree 207 by limiting the suspension to only cotton and sugar producing lands. The assembly however expanded it to include cattle and grain producing lands; the expansion ended up almost covering all farms (Associated Press, 1982). ARENA affectively did not comply with U.S. demands and played to its own interests, preservation of the oligarchy.

The U.S. reaction was instantaneous. After the vote by the assembly, U.S. Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Charles Percy, noted that not a single cent of funds would go to the El Salvador if the nation suspended the land distribution program. The Reagan administration though assumed a more cautious position to foreign aid cuts, noting in a letter to the Senate that it would be dangerous to cut off security and military aid (Weinraub, 1982). In response to the threat of aid being cutoff, the Constituent Assembly attempted to reassure that the key provisions of land reform would be carried out despite the vote (Gwerzman, 1982). The move did not placate U.S. concerns. The U.S. pressured Magaña to attempt to reverse the assembly's decision by veto. However, his efforts fell short, with Magaña upholding the law and merely seeking clarification on peasants' rights to own land ("Salvador's President," 1982).

D'Aubuisson publically justified the rejection to U.S. interests by citing domestic economic concerns while simultaneously attempted to pacify international anxieties. On May 20th, D'Aubuisson noted that the suspension of Decree 207 would not withdraw any land that had been given away and that any prior claims would stand. Land reform in the view of the right was economically crippling. The right claimed that reform would prevent landowners from renting land in fear of losing it to renters under Decree 207 in the future (Bearak, 1982). There is an alternative explanation to D'Aubuisson's and the rightist parties' rejection of Decree 207 – they had the most to lose. ARENA was founded on strong anticommunist ideals by uniting a myriad of factions including oligarchs, conservative professionals, and military hardliners (Barry, 1991, p. 150). In order to establish a cohesive party, D'Aubuisson used ultranationalist and anticommunist rhetoric (Wade, 2016, p. 29). Since a large portion of ARENA's base had come from the wealthy landowning oligarchy, it was in the rightist parties' own interest in their political survival to end land reform. The oligarchy had long feared land reform as not only a threat to the elite's own economic well-being but also as a catalyst for communistic sentiment. When U.S. President John F. Kennedy recommended agrarian reform for El Salvador, the oligarchy responded by labeling Kennedy a communist (Booth et al., 2014, p. 140).

The U.S.'s influence and threats to reciprocity remained strongest in areas where its affectivity was strongest. Similar to its post-election reaction, the U.S. went to the Salvadoran military to ensure compliance with its foreign policy objectives. Threats of suspending aid had a greater effect on the military than it did on El Salvador's political apparatus. In response to the Constituent Assembly's noncompliance, the U.S. Congress decided to freeze \$135 million that the Reagan administration had planned to send to El Salvador later in the summer of 1982. The move forced the military to react. To give the illusion of forward progress, the Salvadoran military began to relocate peasants back on to land from which they had been illegally removed after the assembly put Decree 207 in a hold status (Torgerson, 1982). The rightist government however still held significant influence. Public attempts to kill land reform were not likely to succeed and hurt chances of receiving U.S. ARENA therefore put into place a plan to scuttle land reform more surreptitiously by controlling agrarian agencies and slowing down implementation of reform to a standstill through administrative roadblocks (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 170).

Noncompliance Critical Juncture – Human Rights

The second noncompliance critical juncture involved the continued demands by the U.S. for El Salvador to improve its performance on human rights. This critical juncture reaffirmed El Salvador's self-interested motives under a domestic party that had little to no ties to the patron. It also demonstrated though that if the client assesses the value of reciprocity correctly, it could avoid compliance with few ramifications if the patron values the reciprocal exchange more than the client does. After the election in 1982, the rightist government and military demonstrated a minimal desire to improve on its human rights record, a key element to the certification of aid outlined by the U.S. The human rights numbers had only been marginally better than the numbers reported in 1981; according to the Reagan administration's certification report of 1982, in the first five months of 1982, there had been 1,573 political related murders, down from 2,962 in the first five months of 1981 (Presidential Certification on El Salvador, 1982, pp. 470-7). The Salvadoran military had never really taken the U.S.'s interests on human rights seriously, mainly because history had shown they did not have to.

In the late 1970s, U.S. President Carter had made human rights a centerpiece to his Central American policy. However, in El Salvador, the looming threat of a leftist rebellion always trumped human rights concerns under the Reagan administration. That meant the U.S. wanted to keep the Salvadoran military strong in the face of numerous threats. The Salvadoran military's violence had a polarizing affect that only made the U.S.'s decision between security and human rights harder. Official violence from the right increased participation in the leftist groups while also escalating the level of violence in general (LeoGrande, 2008, p. 40). Carter administration officials had pushed the military to cease human rights abuses, linking aid to progress but usually yielding pressure at the most minimal signs of compliance by the client. When the U.S. had begun to provide the Salvadoran military support, it had offered the Salvadoran government several helicopters free as long it made guarantees to reduce the death squads and violence. The U.S. quickly climbed down from the requirement, providing El Salvador the helicopters in exchange for a limited, new code of conduct for the military (Department of State, 1980a; Department of State, 1980b). Even though U.S. President Carter did suspend aid after the violence killed four American churchwomen in 1980, the incoming Reagan administration relieved the pressure on human rights compliance for the Salvadoran military and extreme right.

The Reagan administration had been critical on U.S. President Carter's human rights agenda in Central America leading up to the election. The Reagan administration viewed the Soviet threat in South America as pervasive. To isolate it, the administration would minimize concerns about human rights (LeoGrande, 1980, p. 55). With the signals from the Reagan administration, it is not surprising then that the rightists and military reacted quickly to the easing of human rights related sanctions and fully reigniting their campaign of violence. Death squad death tolls began to rise after Reagan's election (Riding, 1980). While U.S. Congress began to worry about the uptick in violence, the Reagan administration furthered military support by deciding to send military advisers and increasing military and economic aid in 1981. There were few consequences at first to blanket noncompliance on human rights issues under the Reagan administration for El Salvador. Instead, the Reagan administration increased aid. In the early 1980s, the habitual pattern of the U.S. threatening cutting off military and economic aid followed by inevitable support or increases effected how El Salvador treated its patron's rhetoric. Military leaders especially had developed the perspective that the U.S. saw the outcome in El Salvador as essential to its interests, permitting them to ignore the human rights concerns of the Carter

administration (Stanley, 2006, p. 102). With dwindling affinity caused by the increase in demands, the military was also losing incentive to comply from the U.S.

The U.S.'s timidity on pressuring its client on human rights issues partially emanated from El Salvador's ability to portray itself as a besieged ally holding together a fractious state and the U.S. administration's reinforcement of the perspective. Once again, El Salvador justified noncompliance as a symptom of capacity issues. In particular, when pressed, the right responded by pointing out that El Salvador was caught in a violent struggle. By October 1982, the right began to wage a more vicious campaign against center and left leaning parties interested in negotiations with the rebels. The U.S. encouraged the process by pushing Magaña to work towards negotiations. D'Aubuisson however rejected the call to bring the left into the political fold (Associated Press, 1982b).

Instead, the right increased the violence, using death squads to target individuals that may facilitate peace with the rebels and even kidnapping seventeen labor leaders. The U.S. voiced its displeasure publically (Meislin, 1982c). In a speech to the Salvadoran oligarchy, U.S. Ambassador Hinton attempted to bolster Defense Minister José Guillermo García, the principal ally of the U.S., against violence led by D'Aubuisson. Ambassador Hinton concluded in the end that if El Salvador did not make progress on human rights or on persecuting the killers of U.S. citizens swept up in the violence, aid would end regardless of U.S. concerns about communism. The rightists cried foul (LeoGrande, 1998, pp. 178-80). Juxtaposing Ambassador Hinton's statement against the civil war, the Chamber of Commerce of El Salvador took out a full ad declaring that the speech was "a slap in the wounded and bloodied face of our country" (Cody, 1982). Showing that rhetoric was not in harmony with action, the Reagan administration quickly rolled back the statement and censored Hinton.

The increase in human rights abuses and stagnation on land reform had not halted aid certification. Instead, the Reagan administration seemed to fear state collapse most of all. A trip to El Salvador by Jeane Kirkpatrick raised the alarm in 1983. Kirkpatrick assessed the state was almost breaking apart and that the solution was an increase in military aid (Goshko and Oberdorfer, 1983). When asking Congress for an increase in military aid to El Salvador for 1983, even if with minimal to no progress on human rights and land reform, the administration linked support for the Salvadoran military to state stability. Congressman Clarence Long had been opposed to military aid expansion but after visiting El Salvador noted a complete cutoff of aid would not result in a leftist guerilla victory but instead would lead to a right-wing military coup and prolonged violence (Tolchin, 1983).

Aid allotments through the 1980s reveal the little effect noncompliance on human rights and land reform issues did to the client receiving the benefits of reciprocity. Instead, aid from U.S. to El Salvador increased across all forms – economic, military and nonconcessional – from 1979 to 1985. In constant dollars, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) recorded U.S. aid to El Salvador increasing from \$31,288,947 in 1979 to \$147,198,780 in 1980, marking the beginning of the civil conflict. In the span of 1981 to 1987, aid increased from \$262,229,452 to \$853,774,326. During the main period of the critical junctures, 1981 to 1984, aid increased from \$392,308,324 in 1982 to \$506,540,588 in 1983. Aid retracted minimally to \$430,303,832 in 1984 (USAID, 2017).

By 1984, the patron-client relationship was barely functioning. While El Salvador was still interested in upholding the U.S.'s main interests—keeping communist influence out—its disinterest in the U.S.' other objectives demonstrated that affectivity was almost nonexistent under the rightist government. The increases in aid while ignoring rampant noncompliance to certification requirements supported the thinking of the rightist parties in El Salvador. "Ronald Reagan was as fervent an anti-

Communist as [the right] [...] The handwringing about rights emanating from the embassy was the work of the Communists in the State Department, or it was just public relations designed to pacify American Congress. In either event, it was not anything the right needed to take seriously” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 230). This situation also shows how when the client no longer values what the patron is providing, they will take risks and act in a self-interested manner to secure what they want.

The Post-Noncompliance Critical Juncture Period in El Salvador

The Reagan administration provided significant aid through the rest of the civil war. It also continued to wrestle between supporting the Christian Democrats and working with the rightist government to stave off guerilla advances. The reintroduction of domestic partner bound by some ties of affectivity changed the perception of the patron-client relationship for the U.S. The main change after the noncompliance critical junctures was the election of Duarte as El Salvador’s president in 1984. In reality, while the victory provided a moment of elation for the U.S., little about the relationship had changed, even though the U.S. perceived it had. In preparation for the foreign aid budget for FY 1985, U.S. Congress abolished the certification requirement for military aid (130 Cong. Rec. S12829, 1984).

While the U.S. may have believed that the rise of Duarte bought them political favor in El Salvador, the political situation had not changed much. Rightist parties still controlled the Constituent Assembly and under a month after Duarte’s election, fully repealed Decree 207. There was minimal reaction from the U.S. Congress. Reform no longer was tied to aid (LeMoyné, 1984). The U.S. instead seemed satisfied by the Duarte administration’s compliance on human rights issues in conjunction with continued commitment to fighting off the guerillas. While land reform died quietly, there was headway made on the death squads and human rights spearheaded by Duarte who had promised the U.S. action he would finally take action against human rights abusers. For example, a long pending and delayed prosecution of several Salvadoran National Guardsmen for killing four U.S. churchwomen finally occurred on May 23, 1984. The number of deaths related to death squads had also slowly declined from 12,000 in 1981 to 1,500 in 1985 (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 275). While Duarte takes partial credit for these, the civil war had also slowed down slightly in those years.

Surprisingly, the client in this case found a way to turn a patron-client relationship that would naturally favor the more powerful patron, in to one predominately controlled by the client. The reason the client was able to use capacity issues and pursue policies of its own interests was because of the imbalance in value of the reciprocal exchange. The rightist parties knew the U.S. had valued its cooperation on anti-communist issues more than its secondary objectives. By ignoring those objectives and serving its own interests, El Salvador was still able to receive large sums of economic and military aid. While it is difficult to determine where the patron-client relationship would have ended up after 1984 if all factors remained constant, the relationship began a slow decline as the threat of global communism faded. The U.S. would continue to provide aid to El Salvador throughout the 1980s, but the value of the reciprocal exchange would dwindle for the U.S. By the end of the decade, the U.S. would not need El Salvador to be a bastion against communism in the region.

Section 8: CASE STUDY: U.S.-PAKISTAN

The nature of the patron-client relationship

The United States and Pakistan have had an on and off cooperative relationship centered on international security issues since the creation of the Pakistani state. Similar to many of the bilateral cooperative relationships the U.S. has entered, cooperation between the two states has centered on the U.S. providing financial aid in return for Pakistan's support on U.S. security priorities. U.S. aid has gone to bolstering Pakistan's military and security apparatus, which for the U.S. has directly served U.S. security interests in Afghanistan and global counterterrorism initiatives. For Pakistan, the aid serves a separate purpose, enhancing Pakistan's security posture against its primary regional security concern—India. At times, the priorities of the U.S. and Pakistan have aligned making cooperation relatively easy and straightforward. However, this has not always been the case with disagreements on priorities making cooperation naturally challenging in a post-9/11 era. The U.S. as a patron has maintained client cooperation over the years by building strong ties between the military and building influence among the ruling party. Yet over the history of bilateral relations, the U.S. has not invested as a patron in establishing linkages outside of the ruling military and political entities. The Pakistani public, Islamist parties, and elements of the Pakistani security apparatus, including Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), remain distrustful of U.S. intentions. As the noncompliance critical junctures will show, the lack of strategic depth has inevitably weakened client compliance.

The early forms of reciprocity and affectivity in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship originate from the bilateral security relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. during the Soviet-Afghan war in 1979. The war lasted nearly a decade with Afghanistan mujahedeen insurgents fighting off Soviet Union forces who had backed the Soviet friendly government in Afghanistan. Pakistan, always concerned that India was playing a role in Afghanistan, worried that it would be stuck between an unfriendly Soviet regime in the west and a hostile India in the east (Coll, 2004, p. 62). For the U.S., Pakistan was a crucial ally in preventing communist victory in Afghanistan. In 1982 memos to then U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the State Department noted the importance of Pakistan as a cooperative ally, remarking, "We must remember that without [Pakistani President] Zia's support, the Afghan resistance, key to making the Soviet pay a heavy price for their Afghan adventure, is effectively dead" (as cited in Coll, 2004, p. 62). Pakistan's strategic value to the U.S. has always come from its ability to influence key transnational issues in the region. The U.S. did not greatly alter its assessment of Pakistan's strategic value in regards to its influence in Afghanistan between 1979 and post-9/11, giving it significant influence in the future reciprocal exchanges.

During this time, the U.S. and Pakistan shared a mutual influence on limiting the Soviet power in Afghanistan. However, cooperation did not extensively go beyond instrumental cooperation on security related concerns. The exchange was straightforward. The U.S. aid was for supplying arms to mujahedeen through Pakistan, not for broader economic or security related matters. In return, Pakistan supplied arms to the mujahedeen. Pakistan and the U.S. did cooperate on other minor security related matters, but on broader issues, without cooperation in the Soviet-Afghan War, the two states would normally have remained in a contentious relationship. Pakistan during this time was under military rule, led by Pakistani President General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Military rule would normally have gone against larger U.S. interests in democracy promotion. Pakistan also continued to further its nuclear program secretly. Normally, such an issue would have been a major security concern to the

U.S. Without the Soviet-Afghan War, the two allies had minimal mutually shared interests or bonds to cooperation. Speaking to the lack of depth in the cooperative relationship, “If the Afghan issue is resolved, the US would need a new excuse to keep Zia in power” (Ali, 1987, p. 589).

While the Pakistani government and the U.S. shared a mutual interest in Afghanistan, the bonds of affectivity created were incredibly shallow. Most cooperative action with Pakistan involved the U.S. and Pakistani President General Zia-ul-Haq. The civil society did not view the U.S. as a positive patron. Numerous events had revealed that many Pakistanis maintained an anti-American stance, highlighted by Islamist students burning down the U.S. embassy in Islamabad in 1979. President Zia leveraged the anti-American sentiment within Pakistani culture, citing it as evidence to why the U.S. needed a military strongman like him in control of Pakistan and that only he could help the Americans fight Soviet influence (Haqqani, 2013, pp. 243-4). Though the U.S. aid packages helped General Zia maintain his status as Pakistan’s leader, he showed little signs of loyalty to the U.S. in return. “Zia knew he would need American help, and he milked Washington for all he could [...] Yet as he loaded up his shopping cart, Zia kept his cool and his distance” (Coll, 2004, p. 64).

The U.S. aid package in 1981 provided Pakistan \$3.2 billion over a five-year plan, as Pakistan became the main supplier of arms to the Afghan mujahedeen (Kronstadt, 2009, p. 32). While the aid agreement bolstered U.S.-Pakistani security objectives, it did little to improve public perception of the relationship on both sides. The relationship took a downturn when the U.S. shifted its attention to Pakistan’s nuclear program. The Pressler Agreement, passed in 1985, limited U.S. aid to non-nuclear states including Pakistan by directly linking the provision of aid to certifying that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. The amendment had a significant effect on the limited forms of reciprocal cooperation that did exist. No longer was influence over regional security interests as important. Nuclear security took frontstage. The sanctions imposed meant the U.S. provided \$452 million in development aid in 1989 to Pakistan, and by 1998, the U.S. cut aid down to one percent of that amount (Zaidi, 2011, p. 105).

Pakistan did not halt its pursuit of nuclear material during this time even in the face of U.S. threats regarding the cessation of aid for several reasons. For one, Pakistan believed the pursuit of a nuclear weapon gave them something that the U.S. could not—firm and lasting security against India. The covert nuclear program, initiated under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s, altered Pakistan’s self-identity. Bhutto in particular believed that obtaining a nuclear weapon could affectively balance power with India and reduce the military’s influence internally (Cohen, 2004, p. 80). Secondly, Pakistan had diversified bilateral relations even when the U.S. and Pakistan had closely cooperated in the 1980s. In response to the deterioration of relations between the U.S. and Pakistan in the 1990s, Pakistan leaned heavier on its bilateral cooperation with China. During this period, Pakistan increased its supply of arms and civil nuclear cooperation. China to this day has continued its support even during renewal of U.S.-Pakistani relations.

Examining the history of cooperation before the emergence of a patron-client relationship after 9/11 between the U.S. and Pakistan is useful to help structure the natural shortcomings of cooperation between the two states. History shows that there has been a lack of cultural, domestic, and military connections between the states and contention surrounding common divergent interest. The nonexistent cooperative relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan quickly shifted however after al-Qaeda conducted terrorist attacks against the U.S. on September 11, 2001. The U.S.’s concern about Pakistan’s nuclear program faded to the back of its international priorities, as it had in the 1980s,

replaced by the concerns about international terrorism. In response to the events, U.S. President Bush launched a war focused on counterterrorism in Afghanistan, attempting to remove the influence of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Pakistan's support and influence in the situation would become once again irreplaceable considering the Taliban was an evolution from the Pakistani backed mujahedeen fighters from the 1980s.

The U.S. under President George W. Bush moved immediately to frame the conditions of reciprocity post-9/11. To allure Pakistan into a cooperative arrangement again, President Bush's administration sought to reestablish important linkages within the ruling military party while also reestablishing new guidelines for reciprocity. The U.S. knew it needed Pakistan if it was to be successful in Afghanistan. To ensure its success, the U.S. submitted a list of seven security related demands to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. The list stated that Pakistan must stop al-Qaeda at its border while cutting all logistical support to Usama bin Laden; provide total overflight and landing rights to the U.S.; access to Pakistani naval and air bases and borders; cooperation on intelligence and immigration information; call for Pakistan to condemn terrorist attacks; halt fighters and fuel from Pakistan to the Taliban; and demand for Pakistan to cut ties with Taliban if the U.S. discovered that the Taliban harbored Usama bin Laden (Woodward, 2002, pp. 58-9). The U.S. told President Musharraf that the terms were nonnegotiable; President Musharraf accepted all seven of the demands. While the agreement did include stipulations for aid, the agreement did not codify these terms. Therefore, the agreement represented a mix of specific and diffuse reciprocity. In a sense, the U.S.'s demands were very clear in the beginning, with the promise of aid in return. Yet, the U.S. did not outline its intent if Pakistan did not uphold the listed terms.

In exchange for accepting the conditions outlined, President Musharraf received a great deal of financial support from the U.S. In a meeting with President Bush shortly after the attacks, President Musharraf set his own terms of cooperation. The Bush administration upfront offered Pakistan \$1 billion in aid. However, President Musharraf claimed that it was not enough, countering that in order for Pakistan to trust the U.S. again after being abandoned after the Soviet-Afghan war, the U.S. would need to provide Pakistan F-16s and avoid pressuring President Musharraf on domestic political activity or democratization. The U.S. did not agree to the F-16s at the time, but President Bush did agree to not pushing democratization or criticizing President Musharraf's way of governing (Rashid, 2008, p. 86). President Musharraf's ability to counter the U.S. offer of assistance demonstrated the increased value the U.S. placed on Pakistan's ability to influence U.S. security concerns. President Musharraf's reference to the exchange of aid in order to signal trust also interlinks the affectivity and reciprocity for Musharraf; the one fed the other.

Affectivity in the U.S. and Pakistani patron-client relationship centered on the development of friendly relations between the Bush administration and President Musharraf himself. President Musharraf, who had risen to power in a military coup, through his quick acceptance to the U.S.'s terms of cooperation created a strong bond of affectivity between him and the U.S. president. Shortly after the attacks, Musharraf went on air to publically support the U.S. Not only did he affirm commitment to the demands laid out by the U.S., he alluded to a complete policy shift on Pakistani supported militants in the Indian border region by stating that "no organisations will be able to carry out terrorism on the pretext of Kashmir" ("Musharraf speech," 2002). The move itself was more in step with American policy on the issue than one of typical Pakistani interests. Musharraf went on to demonstrate his allegiance to his new potential patron and its interests by remarking, "we have been

taking measures against terrorism from the beginning, not because of any outside pressure. We were already carrying out these measures when a terrorist attack was carried out in America on 11 September. After 11 September we joined the international coalition against terrorism and I am delighted that the majority of Pakistani people supported this decision” (“Musharraf speech,” 2002). Musharraf’s overtures distinguish the patron-client relationship after 9/11 from the cooperative arrangement between U.S. and Pakistan in the 1980s. Musharraf, unlike Zia, quickly placated and adapted to the interests of the U.S., not always out of coercion but out of strategic choice and affectivity.

Though Musharraf initially signaled a shift on Pakistani support of militants, the militant issue has been a perpetual component of Pakistan’s security interests in relation to India. Pakistani-based militants were a nonpriority issue to the U.S. immediately after 9/11, but the issue would eventually severally damage the patron-client relationship. Pakistan had a long history with the Pakistan-based militant groups. Not only had Pakistan held a close relationship with the Taliban since Soviet-Afghan war, they had also sponsored numerous other proxy groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, to fight Indian expansion in the Kashmir region. ISI in particular kept close ties to these groups. A sudden pivot in policy to America had certain Pakistani factions worried that Pakistan would have to cut ties completely with these groups. President Musharraf himself had historically been a strong supporter of supporting proxy groups, seeing it as providing strategic depth (Hussain, 2010, p. 60). Because of this even, during the noncompliance critical junctures as the U.S. pushed Pakistan for Pakistani military action in its own regions, Pakistan would show a reluctance to launch major military operations within places like the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), a large tribal region in Pakistan that had been a breeding ground for Taliban influence.

However, in the beginning, the U.S. was not concerned about Pakistani-based militants. It wanted to go after al-Qaeda. Therefore, Musharraf’s speech received a warm welcome. Adding to the Bush administration’s eagerness to work closely with Musharraf was the perception of Musharraf in relation to the capacity of the Pakistani state. To the Bush administration, there was a deep concern that President Musharraf was solely responsible for keeping the Pakistani state together as a whole. The Bush administration had feared that the chaos in Afghanistan would bleed over into Pakistan, a nuclear state. “Everyone understood that President Musharraf was the crucial barrier between stability and a worst-case scenario” (Woodward, 2002, p. 82). As it will be shown, since the principal link of the patron-client relationship was between the U.S. and President Musharraf himself, with the U.S.’s relational trust placed almost solely in President Musharraf, President Musharraf and his military regime ended up having a great deal of clout as a client.

Initial cooperation between patron and client worked effectively for a significant period. While Pakistan was slow to launch large military operations against insurgent groups following the terrorist attacks, the steps Pakistan did take seemed to have satisfied the U.S.’s demands. A number of other counterterrorism operations in the initial years after September 11, 2001 made it clear that Pakistan as a client was willing to go after major al-Qaeda operatives at the request of the U.S. Pakistan targeted and arrested numerous al-Qaeda members including several in the first few years. Pakistan arrested pivotal al-Qaeda members Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in March 2002 and September 2002 respectively. In 2003, Pakistan helped the U.S. capture the mastermind behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (Kronstadt, 2004).

The terrorist arrests were a huge win for the U.S. Back in Pakistan however, the capture served two purposes. For one, it satisfied the U.S.'s demand for counterterrorism support, fulfilling Pakistan's role in the reciprocal exchange. Secondly, the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in particular gave President Musharraf space on not supporting the U.S. on a vote authorizing military action in Iraq. The Pakistani public greatly opposed supporting the war (McCarthy, 2003). The military regularly had found themselves delicately balancing public interests and U.S. interests. Ignoring one in favor of the other would likely have resulted in Musharraf's usurpation. In other productive signs of compliance, Pakistan also immediately gave the U.S. access to numerous operational bases within Pakistan. This included intermediate staging areas to allow support in Baluchistan Province for counterterrorism operations within Afghanistan. The U.S. had access to bases in Jacobabad, Pasni, Dalbandin, and Shamsi, with the latter two bases being used for Predator strike operations (Williams, 2013, p. 33).

Compliance only brought further windfall for Pakistan. As a sign of deepening affectivity and trust, additional aid packages appeared to reflect a change from specific reciprocity to diffuse. In February 2002 after another sit down between President Musharraf and President Bush, the U.S. pledged more aid, cancelling \$1 billion of Pakistan's \$2.8 billion debt and rescheduling the remainder. Aid packages began to focus on bolstering the client broadly with no formal stipulations directly attached and not only for use to serve the U.S.'s security interests. In this short time, Pakistan had already received \$600 million in emergency aid and \$500 million for logistical support to the U.S. forces in the area (Rashid, 2008, pp. 148-9). President Musharraf took the massive support the U.S. had provided and attempted to turn it into political legitimacy at home. Pakistan's elections that spring did lead to a sweeping victory for President Musharraf. However, it was plagued by domestic and international accusations of mass corruption (Rashid, 2008, p. 151). The elections resulted in a more divided government with President Musharraf and the army on one side, and the growing fundamentalist parties and opposition on the other. The U.S. heeding President Musharraf's demands did not intervene in the domestic situation or push heavily for democratization. Satisfied by the counterterrorism progress so far and President Musharraf's word of internal stability, the Bush administration announced a five-year \$3.2 billion aid package in 2003. Half that money would go to the military (Rashid, 2008, p. 160).

Pakistan and the U.S. through strong bonds of affectivity between state leaders and military support had built a patron-client relationship continually reinforced by a growing diffuse reciprocity. However, challenges to compliance and cooperation lingered in the back as Pakistan and the U.S. grappled with the same and similar issues that had stalled cooperation in the 1980s. While cooperation would not disappear across all U.S. interests, Pakistan's strategy of minimal level of compliance became increasingly intolerable after 2004. Over the next six years or so, the U.S. would continue to allow certain levels of Pakistani noncompliance in order to guarantee it would fulfill its major security priorities.

Noncompliance Critical Junctures

The noncompliance critical junctures in the Pakistan and U.S. case study involve three main events. The first is Pakistan's reluctance to pursue a growing militancy issue within its own territory. The second involves Pakistan's nuclear instability and rogue nuclear program. Lastly, noncompliance focuses on the removal of President Musharraf from power and growing domestic rejection of U.S. influence.

Table 2: The international patron-client relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan in 2001

<u>Asymmetry</u>		
	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Pakistan</u>
GDP ⁵	\$14.2 trillion	\$136.7 billion
Defense Spending	\$418 billion	\$5.6 billion
% of GDP on defense	2.9%	4.1%
CINC value	.1414571 (2 nd of 192 countries)	.0132578 (18 th of 192 countries)
<u>Reciprocity</u>		
Reciprocal arrangement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - U.S. provides economic and military aid to Pakistan in exchange for cooperation on counterterrorism objectives; aid and relationship enhances power of Pakistani government - No formal reciprocal arrangement outside U.S. initial demands from Pakistan immediately after 9/11 	
<u>Affectivity</u>		
Initial signals of trust and affection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - U.S. large, preliminary aid offer and continued increases - President Musharraf's speech in 2002 verbalizing reversal of support for militant groups - Pakistani pursuit of al-Qaeda targets - Continued close relations between President Bush and President Musharraf with constant, public proclamations of support - U.S. agreement to not pressure Musharraf on democratic reforms 	
<u>Compliance</u>		
Acts signifying compliance at outset of relationship	<u>U.S.</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cancellation and rescheduling of Pakistani debt - Increased economic aid and military aid 	<u>Pakistan</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Capture of major al-Qaeda members including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed - Opening of bases for U.S. military support

Noncompliance Critical Juncture – Militancy in FATA

The first critical juncture dealt with Pakistan's noncompliant behavior in response to the U.S.'s concerns on increasing militancy in the FATA. The U.S. began to push Pakistan harder on containing Taliban's influence within the Pakistani border provinces when it became increasingly apparent that the Taliban and al-Qaeda were indeed growing and seeking sanctuary within Pakistan (Gall, 2003). During this time, there existed more than fifteen al-Qaeda camps, protected by the sympathetic tribesmen in the region. In early 2004 even, senior al-Qaeda members partook in a terror summit to discuss future terrorism against the U.S. and Great Britain (Hussain, 2010, p. 65). Coupled with the increase of Taliban attacks on U.S. forces in 2003, the U.S. needed Pakistan to act against extremist friendly territories.

The U.S. was exasperated by Pakistan's inaction and as a result shifted to coercive threats to guarantee compliance. The U.S. Secretary of State gave President Musharraf an ultimatum in spring 2004, telling the Pakistani military that if they did not take military action against al-Qaeda camps in South Waziristan, the U.S. would (Rashid, 2008, p. 270). By 2004, President Musharraf was more willing to comply with the U.S. demand for action in the tribal areas only because the militants it had supported for years began to turn against the government. Militants in the FATA did not approve of

⁵ See table 1 for the discussion on the use of SIPRI data and CINC value for measuring power asymmetry.

Pakistan's cooperation with the U.S. and attempted to assassinate President Musharraf on several occasions around 2004. It is difficult to determine then that when the Pakistani military did carry out an assault in South Waziristan in the spring of 2004 to quell areas of growing extremist influence, did it do it out of self-interest or in response to growing coercive threats from the U.S.? The answer, while not completely discernable at this time, is likely a mixture of both. It took three years after the U.S. and Pakistan entered a patron-client relationship for Pakistan to take action in FATA. In Musharraf's likely perspective, both the threats posed by the militants and the U.S. could damage his position.

Pakistan's first military action in FATA was not a success. The battle of Wana did not go smoothly, with the military suffering hundreds of casualties. While Pakistan conducting military operations was a step forward, the execution worried the U.S. In the U.S. perspective, the operation's failure originated from obstructive Pakistani institutions. There appeared to be little coordination between the Pakistani military and ISI. The U.S. had suspicions that the lack of coordination was not a mistake. Instead, the U.S. believed ISI purposefully undermined cooperation to the benefit of the extremist groups in the tribal areas (Rashid, 2008, p. 271). The U.S. did not have a significant way to increase the capacity of these institutions yet and could do little to improve military operations. Many of them harbored misgivings about U.S. cooperation since the end of the Soviet-Afghan War.

Up until this point, affectivity was strongest between the U.S. and President Musharraf and his military allies. Aid and reciprocity created the linkages between these entities, but verbal commitments and Pakistani action through diffuse reciprocal exchanges reinforced it. The U.S. had given significant leeway to President Musharraf during this period, setting loose terms on continued aid outside of the original, broad demands. However, the botched operation weakened trust and affectivity. Adding to the U.S.'s disappointment, the Pakistani military sought a military truce with militants in FATA. The truce, according to the Pakistanis, served to lure the tribesmen away from al-Qaeda. However, the Bush administration voiced concern over the deal, stating such moves only gave militants time to regroup (Hussain, 2010, p. 72).

President Musharraf explained the military failure differently than the U.S. The Pakistanis argued that the failure stemmed partially from a capability issue. Pakistan needed more and better weapons to soundly defeat the militants. The claim by the Pakistanis played to the perspective a dwindling state capacity to contain the threat in the FATA. While the failure weakened the perspective of compliance, it likely bolstered the U.S.'s dependency on President Musharraf, who remained the barrier from chaos erupting in Pakistan. In order to compensate for Pakistan's failures, the U.S. began to play a more direct role in the suppressing extremists in FATA. Between 2004 and 2007, frustrated by Pakistan's selective nature in pursuing extremist militants in the region, the U.S. conducted more than a hundred missile strikes against select militants in the North and South Waziristan. While Pakistan condemned the actions publically, behind the scenes the government condoned the strikes (Constable, 2001, p. 190). President Musharraf admitted to providing the U.S. approval on several occasions to conduct drone strikes (Robertson and Botelho, 2013). Reports indicate that approval for the strikes lasted from 2004 to 2008 (Coll, 2014; Haider, 2013).

The second significant change was Pakistan's willingness to put its own security objectives first. Pakistani military operations only flamed extremism in FATA and a total military conflict would likely—and did—increase militancy against President Musharraf's regime. The numerous peace deals the Pakistani military made with extremist militants between 2004 and 2006 did not satisfy the interests of the U.S. They satisfied Pakistan's interests. The legitimacy of the arrangements were also

questionable as President Musharraf's appointed general to handle the peace deals, General Orakzai, was ill equipped to reign Taliban influence in FATA. General Orakzai had extremist sympathies for the Taliban in the FATA. To him, "the Taliban were just Pashtun nationalists opposed to foreign occupying armies but with no connections to al-Qaeda" (Rashid, 2008, pp. 276-7).

Pakistan's noncompliance in the Wana operation was not an isolated event. After 2004, the U.S. would constantly push Pakistan to take action in the region as the U.S. realized that the Taliban had regrouped in Pakistan's borders. The noncompliance demonstrated in the 2004 operation did highlight two things in particular though in relation to Pakistan's noncompliant behavior. For one, Pakistan's self-interest in its own security interests, in this case not upsetting the connections with militant groups in FATA, will at least at times require the U.S. to threaten coercive action to gain compliance. Secondly, Pakistan might not have the military capacity to handle the domestic insurgent threat, as Musharraf purported. If Pakistan could not fulfill the U.S. demands, the U.S. would need to figure out a way to contain the threat. While there are indications that the two states worked together in strike targeting, the previous counterterrorism successes, such as the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, became an increasingly distant memory. Pakistan demonstrated it could comply when it involved capturing foreign militants like al-Qaeda members, but it would remain reluctant and difficult when asked to handle militant groups that it had supported for years, such as the Taliban, even at the growing demand of the U.S.

President Musharraf was able to placate U.S. concerns on the deals. In 2006, President Musharraf and President Bush met. President Musharraf insisted that peace deals were the best option to deal with the Taliban. Even in the face of increasing violence against U.S. troops in Afghanistan from militants originally located in the FATA, President Bush reaffirmed his trust in President Musharraf. His only warning to President Musharraf: "you know we are watching this very carefully, obviously" ("US 'watching'", 2006). Reciprocity had not fully stopped because of noncompliance in the FATA. The U.S. still provided aid. Pakistan still complied, even if not fully, with U.S. demands for action. Trust however was faltering.

Noncompliance Critical Juncture – Nuclear Insecurity

The second critical juncture involved Pakistan's nuclear program. Pakistan once again found its own security interests at odds with those of the U.S. Would it sacrifice the reputability of its nuclear program under U.S. pressure or act in a self-interested manner and save it in the short term? Further explaining the weakening trust between the U.S. and Pakistan while also stroking the U.S.'s fears regarding a destabilized Pakistan were the unsettling revelations surrounding Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and Pakistan's nuclear program around 2003. In 2003, Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's network of nuclear proliferators were caught smuggling centrifuge parts on a cargo ship to deliver to Libya. The reaction of the U.S. was one of displeasure. The cessation of cooperation during the 1990s had stemmed from concerns over Pakistan's nuclear program. With evidence of Khan's misdoings, the CIA provided proof to President Musharraf of the nuclear proliferation network providing material to Libya, North Korea, Iran, and an undisclosed country. They demanded President Musharraf to shut down the network (Rashid, 2008, pp. 287-8).

Instead of complying immediately, President Musharraf wavered. Khan had been a hero to the Pakistani people for his role as a major contributor to Pakistan's nuclear program. President Musharraf rightfully worried over potential domestic fallout if he labeled Khan as a traitor of the state. Eventually

forced by Libya's declaration it was ceasing pursuing nuclear equipment, President Musharraf finally placed Khan under arrest and forced him publically to admit to furthering global nuclear instability. President Bush lauded the news publically. "Khan has confessed his crimes, and his top associates are out of business. The government of Pakistan is interrogating the network's members, learning critical details that will help them prevent it from ever operating again" (Bush, 2004). The reality however was greyer. Even though Musharraf called for Khan's arrest, he sought to pacify the domestic pressures by mostly cutting the U.S. out from involvement from questioning Khan and merely placing Khan under house arrest. President Musharraf would eventually pardon him and in 2009; A.Q. Khan would walk free (Warrick, 2009).

President Musharraf's dilemma regarding A.Q. Khan echoes the dilemma Pakistan faced on working with the U.S. on counterterrorism; neither form of cooperation had a large amount of public support in Pakistan nor did they serve Pakistan's historical interests. The interests of the public and the U.S. never aligned, and there were minimal efforts at the domestic level and by the U.S. to align them. Instead, the U.S. concentrated on providing military and economic aid along with debt relief to bolster Musharraf's military regime and support its interests solely through the military government. While President Musharraf did repeatedly express loyalty to its patron between 2001 and 2007, the public's interests and its own interests always pulled Pakistan in another direction. Pakistan in these critical junctures always complied with the demands of the U.S., but they always complied at the minimal amount acceptable.

This strategy is best described as one of minimal compliance. The minimal compliance approach taken by Pakistan in regards to the conflicting interests of the patron and its own ensured that the client state derived the benefits from reciprocity while only expending a minimal amount of goods. ISI maintained this perspective in regards to the utility of Pakistani militants against India. In ISI's perspective, they could play a duel game with the U.S. By providing initial compliance with U.S. demands post-9/11, it could renege on those exact demands down the road, especially the demands requiring a break with Pakistani sponsored militant groups (Rashid, 2008, pp. 32-3).

Pakistan's minimal compliance strategy worked for several years. While the U.S. continued to demand Pakistan to take action against the growing insurgency in FATA, it never attempted to put aid at true risk. Instead, the U.S. continued to expand aid packages to the Pakistani government. Aid to Pakistan in 2003 to 2006 increased from \$563 million to \$888 million (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2017), even during numerous Pakistani military failures against the growing insurgency in FATA and a shocking blow to nuclear insecurity. Pakistan also began to receive long sought after military equipment from the U.S. While the Pakistanis cited military challenges in fighting the insurgents to justify the need for more military equipment, Pakistan used the aid to fund its own interests. "Although foreign military financing is often justified to Congress as playing a critical role in the war on terrorism, in reality the weapons systems are often prestige items to help Pakistan in the event of war with India" (Cohen & Chollet, 2007, p. 13).

Noncompliance Critical Juncture – Political instability

The third critical juncture came at the election in 2007. The U.S.'s unwillingness to cut aid and use coercion to correct noncompliant behavior was directly linked to its close bond to President Musharraf's regime and the perceptions and realities of Pakistan's internal stability. On one hand, the U.S. continued to believe President Musharraf was the best person to act on the patron's interests.

Even after President Musharraf lost the public elections in 2008, the Bush administration pushed hard for President Musharraf to be involved in the Pakistani government to some capacity. Though a push for President Musharraf's involvement in a new government was seen as meddling in free and fair elections, the U.S. believed that supporting President Musharraf was quintessential to maintaining Pakistani military support (Rohde, 2008). On the other hand, the U.S. feared a destabilized state and assumed aid cuts would place state security at risk. Cutting aid in the U.S. perspective would strengthen the Taliban and effectively eliminate the U.S.'s ability to conduct sanctioned drone strikes in Pakistan. Secondly, it also put Pakistan's nuclear weapons at risk. The Pakistani government and military knew these fears and exploited them.

The patron-client relationship took a hit in 2008 as President Musharraf was unseated as Pakistan's president as a result of democratically held elections. The U.S. pushed to keep the military coup leader in some control and form a coalition government. However, the efforts failed and domestic opinion of the U.S. worsened. Without its main client actor, President Musharraf, the U.S. lost significant faith in its client to fulfill its security objectives and primary interests. The U.S. had used President Musharraf as its main link to the military and state. Now, the U.S. lacked any significant link to the public. The minimal affectivity and trust that bound the patron and client was gone with Musharraf. The patron-client relationship was suddenly over.

While some form of cooperation continued between the U.S. and Pakistan after President Musharraf lost the public vote, President Musharraf's removal from power effectively ended the patron-client period of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Many authors will point to the U.S.'s and Pakistan's continued efforts to cooperate after the regime change as a sign that both states still held on to some semblance of a cooperative relationship. The U.S. made massive efforts to get Pakistan to comply with its security interests, including diversifying aid to include more of Pakistan's domestic institutions. Yet, trust between the patron and client effectively disappeared between Pakistan and the U.S. with President Musharraf gone. The U.S. no longer trusted the Pakistan to uphold its security obligations coupled with the client beginning to place its own security interests ahead of its former patrons. What emerged after 2008 was a retreat in relationship status where instrumental exchanges became the status quo.

The Post-Noncompliance Critical Juncture Period in Pakistan

Inability to guarantee compliance on U.S. security interests in FATA resulted in increased unilateral action by the U.S. The U.S.'s military drone strike program saw significant increases after President Musharraf stepped down. According to the New American Foundation, the number of drone strikes from 2007 to 2008 covering the year of President Musharraf's transition increased from four strikes to 36. Strikes continued to increase in 2009, growing to 54 strikes and reaching their peak in 2010 at 122 strikes (Bergen et al., 2017). Even though newly elected President Obama attempted to build new, lasting connections with the Pakistani government, the U.S. no longer trusted Pakistan to effectively handle the troubling insurgency in the FATA, which the U.S. viewed as a thorn in its side for its efforts in Afghanistan. Even at the behest of Pakistani officials to share intelligence on high value targets in Pakistan in 2007 and 2008, the U.S. refused, not trusting Pakistan's ability to safeguard the information (Perlez, 2008). At the time, Presidential candidate Obama made it clear that Americans would take action unilaterally on important targets if Pakistan did not; "if [Americans] had

actionable intelligence against high-value al-Qaeda targets and the Pakistani government was unwilling to go after those targets, then we should" (Logan, 2008).

Pakistan's operational approval of drone strikes mattered less and less. Tired with the flow of insurgents into Afghanistan, President Bush effectively ended the U.S. policy of seeking permission from Pakistani generals in 2008 to conduct strikes (Coll, 2014). The Pakistani military, once secretly supportive to U.S. drone strikes, also became more hostile publically and intolerant of U.S. unilateral action all together. After the Pakistanis arrested CIA contractor Raymond Davis in the streets of Lahore for killing two armed men on January 27, 2011, the ISI, once covertly complacent of drone strikes in the FATA, removed its approval completely. Sanger (2013, p. 90) noted, "Suddenly Pakistanis were insisting on renegotiating their fundamental understandings with Washington [...] The ISI also demanded a list of every American intelligence official in the country and an end to drone strikes. Yes, they said, back when Musharraf was running the country, Washington and Islamabad had a secret agreement to allow drone strikes. But that was before production was ramped up and the number of drones mushroomed, and with them the anger of the Pakistani populace."

At the same time, the U.S. also exacerbated the tensions in the relationship by establishing closer ties with India. After the militant organization Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) conducted violent, coordinated shootings within India in 2008, relationships between Pakistan and India returned to the brink. At the onset, Pakistan denied that the terrorists were even possibly from Pakistan. Pakistan's rigid position on LeT's role in the attack further muddled the U.S.'s trust in Pakistan to challenge militants (Rashid, 2012, pp. 57-8). Soon after, President Obama appointed Afghanistan-Pakistan Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke to negotiate peace with India and Pakistan in relation to the situation in Afghanistan. India vehemently refused, declaring to the U.S. it would not couple itself with Pakistan in any Afghanistan-Pakistan solution. The U.S. backed down after India's protestations. Pakistan, the military in particular, viewed the new Obama administration as "weak, vacillating, and untrustworthy" (Rashid, 2012, p. 58). To Pakistanis, the U.S. would alter its interests in the face of India pressure. Pakistan's ally now seemed to be unwilling to challenge its enemy.

Though the provision of U.S. aid in the reciprocal exchange had guaranteed compliance in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, it no longer had much effect on inducing reciprocity. President Obama even retooled aid in an attempt to build support for the U.S. among Pakistan's domestic populations. When U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke visited Pakistan in 2009, the Pakistanis said directly they had no civil sector improvements to show for all the U.S. aid provided to that point. The U.S. tried to compensate for the domestic level shortcomings by securing the Kerry-Lugar bill. The bill would provide Pakistan's civilian sector \$1.5 billion a year for five years (Rashid, 2012, p. 33). This was the U.S.'s first major attempt to target aid post-9/11 at domestic level institutions. Between 2001 and 2010, the U.S. had provided Pakistan \$20.5 billion in aid. Most it went to aiding Pakistan army operations along its Afghan border, while the rest went to budgetary and economic support (Rashid, 2012, pp. 32-3). Yet, the Pakistani military protested the Kerry-Lugar bill, refusing to support stipulations on aid, including the requirements to certify civilian control over Pakistan's military. As Rakisits (2009) framed it, "The Pakistani top brass has seen this all before, and has not forgotten America's many broken promises over the past 50 years. Accordingly, they will keep their options—including backchannels with the Taliban and other fellow travellers [sic]—open, knowing that at the end of the day, the Americans have few alternatives available to them."

A factor of the patron-client relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan is Pakistan to draw support from other regional powers. In particular, Pakistan could replace many of the goods the U.S. supplies through reciprocity through agreements with China. Similar to when the U.S. cut ties with Pakistan after the Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan and China enhanced their economic and military ties during the decline in U.S.-Pakistani relations after President Musharraf left office. Pakistan has commonly portrayed China as an “all-weather” friend, always supportive of its regional ally. After the raid to kill Usama bin Laden, China staunchly supported Pakistan’s claims it had no idea Usama bin Laden had been hiding in the region (Jiang, 2011). China has also spent a great deal of money investing in Pakistan, agreeing to spend \$46 billion in Pakistan on numerous projects. Pakistan has also become the largest receiver of Chinese weaponry (Manuel, 2016). The rekindled relations between China and Pakistan have helped counterattack the gap in close relations between the U.S. and Pakistan. While China and Pakistan are unlikely to enter a patron-client status anytime soon given China’s reliance on economic trade with India, the close relations have helped minimize the influential power of American aid and coercive action. With its ability to draw support from other countries, Pakistan has little interest in supplanting its own security issues to the interests of the U.S.

While many would point to the U.S. raid into Pakistani territory to kill Usama bin Laden in 2011 as the turning point in U.S.-Pakistani relations, the incident was merely a reflection of the trajectory of bilateral cooperation. The operation to kill bin Laden carried many of the traits of the tit-for-tat strategies and the instrumental cooperative arrangement the states had entered by that time. Most prominent was the distrust the U.S. had for Pakistan. Faced with the growing intelligence reality that Usama bin Laden had indeed been living in Pakistan for numerous years, the Obama administration had to decide if it would share the information with Pakistan or secretly violate the state’s sovereignty. The Obama administration briefly considered the idea, dismissing it almost immediately (Sanger, 2013, p. 89).

The bilateral relationship has remained relatively cool since the raid on Usama bin Laden’s compound in 2011. Cooperation has remained relatively low and neither side has made any grand gestures to signal a desire to reenter a patron-client relationship. The mechanisms for reciprocity no longer seem to be functioning. In 2015, the U.S. announced that no aid had been provided to Pakistan since 2013 (Iqbal, 2015). Pakistan has effectively counted the absence of U.S. support by attracting other international partners, mainly China.

Section 9: CASE STUDY: U.S.-THAILAND

The nature of the patron-client relationship

Cooperation between the U.S. and Thailand began after World War II had thrust Thailand onto the international stage. The Second World War had exposed Thailand to an uncertain security environment as Southeast Asian states attempted to shed western colonial influence. As an economically and military weak state, Thailand recognized that without some sort of international recognition, it was unlikely that it could guarantee its own sovereignty nor could it ensure its own security from influence of outsiders (Chinwanno, 2004, p. 191). The changing global landscape during this period and the emergence of the Cold War also meant that states faced the polarizing choice between supporting communism or supporting the West. The choice affected the foreign policy decision-making of countries throughout Southeast Asia. To cope with the new reality quickly and

build influence beyond its own borders, Thailand pursued a strategy that established regional security through leveraging outside powers (Unger, 1995, pp. 234-5). In particular, Thailand had sought U.S. support in fighting communist influence within its own borders and regionally.

By 1950, the United States and Thailand effectively entered the early stages of a patron-client dynamic. Mutually shared interests made the development of affection-based cooperation relatively simple. Since the U.S. had been vehemently supportive of Thailand's pursuit of joining the United Nations and supportive amongst several other foreign policy positions, Thai leaders viewed the U.S. as a dependable friend and potential cooperative ally by the early 1950s. The two states also naturally shared a mutual security interest. Thai leader Field Marshall Phibun Songkram, who had overthrown the elected Thai government in 1947, was a staunch anti-communist. The emergence of the communist-based People's Republic of China in 1949 threatened to expand communism further into Southeast Asia. Thailand feared that the rise of communist China encouraged the creation of an alternative Thai government (Chinwanno, 2004, p. 193). The U.S. shared Thailand's concerns.

Since both states appeared eager to move into a cooperative relationship, Thailand and the U.S. moved through instrumental cooperation quickly. Thailand began to shift from regional ally to client when it chose to back Bao Dai as the legitimate ruler of Vietnam's new government in 1950. France, Britain, and the United States had all publically recognized the new government while the Soviet Union and China remained opposed to Bao Dai as Vietnam's leader. Phibun's decision to back Bao Dai while other regional actors remained silent affirmed Thailand's desire to court the U.S. by signaling Thailand had chosen to side with the West under the new Cold War system. The decision to back Bao Dai was intensely debated among the Thai government with many arguing that Thailand should assume a neutral stand. However, the military and Phibun were eager to show their commitment to the U.S. as a reliable anticommunist partner and were firm in eventually securing government commitment to recognize Bao Dai's government. While the move did not accompany any significant anticommunism action on Thailand's behalf, it effectively closed the door on the East and bound Thailand to the West (Fineman, 1997, pp. 111-4). Thailand had picked a side in the Cold War without any significant guarantees of benefits. While the allures of the benefits from potential future reciprocal exchanges had partially motivated Thailand to support Bao Dai, Thailand's growing anticommunist policy highlighted the underpinnings of potential affectivity between the U.S. and Thailand and Thailand's willingness to show its loyalty to the U.S. by signaling its commitment to its interests.

The U.S. moved quickly to reciprocate Thailand's gesture. The aid package initially sent by the U.S. established the basic conditions of reciprocity for future exchanges between the patron and client. Aid did not reflect an instrumental transaction or specific reciprocity. Instead, U.S. aid affirmed the U.S.'s commitment to the Thailand as a client with few stipulations or requirements attached, reflecting a diffuse reciprocity approach. The initial U.S. aid package targeted several sectors, making American influence felt across political, military, and economic linkages. While military aid was almost a guarantee given Thailand's recent outspoken commitment to U.S. security interests, in spring of 1950 Phibun approached the U.S. requesting economic aid also. Phibun played up the risk communism posed to domestic elements in Thailand, arguing that U.S. economic aid would protect Thailand from regional communist forces. The U.S. likely realized that economic aid protecting domestic economic institutions had the side effect of strengthening Phibun's government (Randolph, 1986, p. 14). Nonetheless, the U.S. provided \$8 million in 1950 for economic and technical assistance

through the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) (“US aid,” p. 49). The Mutual Security Agency (MSA) replaced the ECA in 1951 serving a similar function, and the U.S. allotted an additional \$7 million in aid (Randolph, 1986, pp. 14-5).

While the terms of reciprocity had been established, Thailand moved to reinforce the growing bonds of affectivity between the it and the U.S. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 had two effects on the new patron-client relationship. For one, it deepened the commitment and value of the reciprocal exchange. Secondly, it built trust and loyalty between countries, especially between the U.S. and Phibun’s regime. Thailand was eager to assist the U.S. in Korea as cooperation had already been providing benefits for Phibun domestically. “Having benefited handsomely from this one initiative [Phibun’s previous request for aid], Phibun could not help but jump at the chance to further please the Americans—and complete his postwar foreign-policy revolution—when war came to Korea in June” (Fineman, 1997, pp. 115-6). Phibun took numerous proactive steps to support the Korean War effort in hopes of increasing reciprocity. Even before the U.N. had requested additional troop support, Phibun and the military offered to send troops to Korea, even among public protestation. Korea would also send 40,000 metric tons of rice for Korea relief and supported important U.S. actions in the U.N. regarding Korea issues (Fineman, 1997, p. 116; Randolph, 1986, p. 13). As a sign of goodwill and appreciation, the U.S. quickly met Thai officials to release more aid, allocating additional military aid and arms for Thailand’s security support and additional aid for developmental purposes (Fineman, 1997, p. 118; “U.S. aid”, 1951, p. 49; “Thailand to Get,” 1950). In exchange for increased aid, Thailand showed it was willing to play an active role beyond its own borders. By this time, the U.S. and Thailand had entered a patron-client relationship.

While cooperation flourished, the benefits of reciprocity had several domestic ramifications for Thailand—mainly increasing repression. Phibun, encouraged by the U.S. aid commitment to Thailand, began to wield greater authoritative influence at home. The arms deals and quick turnaround of aid packages had secured Phibun a significant amount of influence among the Thai military. The arm shipments had convinced Phibun that the U.S. was committed to Thailand, and he could increase repression against leftist elements with few risks to U.S. aid (Fineman, 1997, p. 122). Thailand took extreme steps in shutting down pro-communist messages. In the summer of 1950, Phibun’s government announced it would prosecute any journalist that seemed to encourage unrest through communistic ideas. Thailand also banned all negative press that could damage foreign relations (“Reuang Ham Sang” and “Reuang Ham Khosana,” as cited in Fineman, 1997, p. 122). The U.S. did not intervene to stop Phibun’s increasingly repressive tactics.

Though U.S. aid provided Thailand economic and political support, aid predominately reinforced the bonds between the U.S., Thai regime, and Thai military. The public and parts of the government were the least allied to the U.S. patron. While domestic entities did not necessarily block security actions that appeared to serve U.S. interests, there was regularly a public debate surrounding whether Thailand’s foreign policy should or should not serve U.S. interests. With the increased amounts of aid and international support, Phibun affectively suppressed a great deal of this dissent. The U.S.’s control and influence over the military apparatus remained much stronger than the domestic civilian sectors. Because of the military aid and arms transfers, the military had become exceptionally willing to serve U.S. interests in return for aid. As a result, the U.S. became increasingly dependent on the Thai military regime to achieve its interests. “The American position in Thailand depended on military control of the budgetary process, security programs, and foreign policy. After

1950, therefore, advancing authoritarianism and expanding American influence marched in lock step” (Fineman, 1997, p. 125).

The U.S. expanded Thailand’s role as client in 1954 and made Thailand the foundation of its security policy in Southeast Asia. Concerned that communists had been gaining influence in Vietnam in the aftermath of the Geneva Accords that year, the U.S. established policy stating Thailand was to become the principal guarantor of U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. A National Security Council policy statement outlined three ways to accomplish its Thailand policy: provide military assistance to increase the strength of Thailand’s forces in order to help control local subversion and to improve identification of instances of overt aggression, provide economic assistance to maintain and strength the non-communist regime, and concentrate efforts on developing Thailand as a support of U.S. objectives in the area and as the focal point of U.S. covert and psychological operations in Southeast Asia (United States, 1971). The policy articulated that the U.S. was to use its linkages with the military and the regime to stabilize any public descent.

In response to expanding its demands on security cooperation, the U.S. sought to increase and rebalance the aid package to ensure the military regime remained friendly to U.S. interests and that there were enough resources to meet its growing security demands. The aid package shifted away from economic support to defense and security funding. In 1954, the amount provided for technical cooperation funds were halved in 1951 to \$4.6 million while defense support aid added an addition \$27.9 million (Randolph, 1986, p. 22). The U.S. also funded numerous military infrastructure programs and provided aid to building the Thai National Police. Aid to the national police helped shape an entity to influence the public and provided the CIA influence over police activities through the Sea Supply Corporation cover (Randolph, 1986, p. 23-4).

The value of reciprocity was increasing. Thailand showed no concerns about what its patron had been asking though. During this period, Thailand provided unconditional support on almost all U.S. requests. Some larger moments of cooperation included Thailand supporting the U.S.’s wish for Thailand to enter an appeal to the U.N. in 1953 to condemn Vietnam’s incursion into Laos; France ultimately blocked the appeal. The U.S. responded with public praise for Thailand’s initiative and released military supplies to the Thai military. The U.S. also demand that the Thai military and government support U.S. psychological operations in Thailand in an attempt to create an anticommunist movement within the country. Phibun agreed to the creation of a U.S.-Thai psychological warfare committee and several other initiatives focused on U.S. anticommunist propaganda. While the U.S. targeted propaganda at first at the peasantry, they eventually targeted the bureaucracy, introducing anticommunism programs at all levels of government (Fineman, 1984, p. 180). Thailand’s willingness to accept U.S. demands was not merely out of Thai interest in U.S. aid. Thailand firmly believed the U.S. would sponsor its new regional role as bastion against communism.

In 1954, Thailand achieved its foreign policy goal of finding a protectionist security sponsor. The U.S. and Thailand entered into the Manila Pact, establishing the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), a defense alliance comprised of numerous Southeast Asia allies

Table 3: The international patron-client relationship between the U.S. and Thailand in 1954

<u>Asymmetry</u>		
	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Thailand</u>
GDP ⁶	\$3.37 trillion	\$13.7 billion (1957) ⁷
Defense Spending	\$377.4 billion	\$495 million (1957)
% of GDP on defense	11.2%	3.6% (1957)
CINC value	.2809401 (1 st of 82 countries)	.0028946 (38 th of 82 countries)
<u>Reciprocity</u>		
Reciprocal arrangement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - U.S. provides security and aid to Thailand to protect from encroaching communist threat while increasing regional status in exchange for supporting U.S. regional anti-communist objectives - Part of the expectations of the security relationship built into the Manila Pact/SEATO relationship 	
<u>Affectivity</u>		
Initial signals of trust and affection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - U.S. support of Thailand joining the U.N. - Thailand's commitment to Korean conflict - Thailand's support of the U.S. position in Vietnam - Mutual agreement to the Manila Pact 	
<u>Compliance</u>		
Acts signifying compliance at outset of relationship	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Thailand</u>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - U.S. noninterference in Phibun's authoritative moves against domestic pro-communist messages - Provision of economic aid when asked in conjunction with military aid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support for U.S. interests in Korea and Vietnam - Opening of domestic institutions to U.S. influence

to combat unwanted international intervention. Thailand showed no hesitation entering into the treaty with the U.S. (Darling, 1965, p. 127). Thailand's entrance into the arrangement created firm security obligations as an ally to the U.S. and solidified the U.S. as a committed patron against communist intervention in Thailand.

Noncompliance Critical Junctures

The U.S.-Thailand patron-client relationship faced several significant critical junctures between 1955 and 1957. The critical junctures were driven by noncompliant action on both sides, and the decisions made by the patron and client in response to noncompliance events determined the stability and trajectory of the patron-client relationship. Unlike the other case studies examined, the first critical juncture occurred after the patron violated the terms of reciprocity.

⁶ See table 1 for the discussion on the use of SIPRI data and CINC value for measuring power asymmetry.

⁷ 1957 represents the earliest date of SIPRI data available for Thailand. However, since 1957 is an active period for U.S.-Thailand patron-client relations, the data is still relevant and represents an imbalance in power between the two states. The U.S. data and CINC data still represents 1954 information to properly provide a picture of capabilities at the formation of the relationship.

Noncompliance Critical Juncture—U.S. security support

Laos had always had an influential role in Thailand's regional security policy. Not only did Thailand and Laos share geographic borders and ethnic populations, but Laos also acted as a buffer between Thailand and Vietnam. Therefore, Thailand implemented a foreign policy in 1954 that attempted to maintain that buffer against communist influence. In conjunction with the Sea Supply Corporation, the Thai government formed a defensive strategy that would block the potential advancement of communist forces in Laos from crossing into Thailand (Randolph, 1986, p. 33). Thailand had hoped that SEATO would play into the state's border security interests. In the Thai perspective, that act of joining SEATO was meant to fill this policy interest for Thailand.

Thailand was disappointed then when the U.S., along with the rest of the SEATO members, decided in mid-1955 not to intervene in Lao's civil war (Randolph, 1986, p. 33). The civil war put the threat of communist forces at Thailand's borders. Phibun warned in February 1955 that 20,000 communist Chinese soldiers had amassed in the southern border ready to invade through Laos. The move not only stoked the security threat Thailand faced but also emphasized Thailand's perception of the threat: "If we [SEATO] do not do anything about it [...] communism will take over Thailand and dominate Southeast Asia" ("Reports 20,000," 1955).

Around this time, the U.S. also provided mixed messages to Thailand on its commitment to an anti-communism policy in the region. In 1955, there was a brief thawing of Cold War tensions within the Soviet Union and China, with both countries asserting a less forceful global stance. The U.S. took advantage of this moment opening informal talks with China to discuss repartitions and other matter. Thailand, in response, began to open up avenues for neutralists who were more sympathetic to communist influence. The move directly went against previous U.S. and Thai efforts to subvert any leftist opinions or movements regionally and within Thailand. In no means did the U.S. nor Thailand instantly assume a pro-communist position or solid relations with communist countries. Instead, the moves on both sides demonstrated a significant shift in regional policy. As this brief period in 1955 demonstrated, mutually valued reciprocity was not only about the aid the U.S. could provide Thailand; it was also about the security guarantees and promised from the U.S. to Thailand. Discouraged by the U.S.'s unwillingness to commit to growing communist threats in Laos and the U.S. minimal rapprochement of communist actors, Thailand began to loosen its anti-communist posture. Thailand had answered noncompliance with noncompliance, and as a result of this critical juncture brought neutralist influence back into Thai politics.

Noncompliance Critical Juncture—Thailand's domestic pressures

The second critical juncture focuses on Thailand's noncompliance on anticommunist objectives and the resulting regime instability. Noncompliance within this critical juncture is a direct result of the first critical juncture. Thailand opening a domestic space for neutralists created an environment for them to grow and apply pressure domestically. Noncompliance here highlighted the capacity weaknesses of the Thai regime in face of domestic pressures and schisms.

Thailand's noncompliance on anticommunist objectives served two purposes, both grounded in Thailand's self-interest. On one hand, Phibun did not want to be the largest anti-communist state in the region in case the United States and China developed stable diplomatic relations. By slightly opening diplomatic relations with China themselves, Thailand could lessen the likelihood of a forceful Chinese intervention (Fineman, 1997, p. 212). The alternative reason appeared to concern domestic control.

General Phao Sriyanond—the leader of Thailand’s national police, which had seen its influence grow under U.S. aid—indicated that he, was plotting to overthrow Phibun. Phibun therefore made the calculated decision to preserve his own power by democratizing certain institutions in hopes of drawing on public support in response to the threat posed by Phao’s national police (Fineman, 1997, p. 210-1).

The developing political conflict undermined the patron-client relationship in two ways. One, it weakened the linkages the U.S. had established within Thailand. The U.S. had spent the last five years cultivating close relationships with the Phibun regime, the military under Sarit Thanarat, and the national police under Phao. When Phao and Phibun began to compete for control of Thailand, Phibun began to doubt the U.S. commitment to his regime. He believed based off the CIA’s close links to the national police that the U.S. would back Phao if it came to it. The U.S. even had to confirm verbally to Phibun that they had no intent to overthrow his government and replace him with Phao (Fineman, 1997, p. 213). The lack of trust emerging between the U.S. and Phibun made affection-based compliance all of a sudden a greater challenge. Secondly, Phibun was distancing himself publically from the U.S. alliance. The repressive tactics used to enable Phibun against the public years prior and the military’s political control became equated with U.S. involvement. By reinstating the freedom to publically criticize foreign relations, Phibun weakened the public opinion of the U.S. in Thailand by giving the neutralists a platform and voice. The move would damage his own relations with the U.S.

In the previous critical juncture, Thailand had reacted to patron noncompliance with client noncompliance. Now Thailand faced challenges to internal stability, damaging its resolve to cooperate with U.S. demands and interests. The U.S. therefore faced multiple choices on how to react at this critical juncture and to Thailand’s noncompliant behavior. The U.S. could ignore Thailand’s embracing of neutralists and uphold its end of mutual reciprocity, providing the benefits, aid, and support Thailand had expected by this point. Alternatively, the U.S. could reject the acceptability of noncompliant behavior and Phibun’s democratizing efforts by using coercive methods to further strengthen Phibun or bring favorable regime change. Lastly, the U.S. could boost aid and increase its value to Thailand in a move to hopefully build trust. The U.S. could mix the listed options, presenting a variety of carrots and sticks in the face of noncompliance.

The U.S., unlike Thailand, appeared to reject the notion of entering into a noncompliance cycle at the outset of this critical juncture. Instead, the U.S. increased the normal benefits normally associated with reciprocity. Though Thailand had moved closer to China and antagonized its relations with the U.S., Thailand had not abandoned American interests completely. Instead, Thailand made significant efforts to keep the U.S. on its side behind the scenes. Lobbyists in the summer of 1955 concentrated their efforts on justifying their strategic position in the region, the best state to further U.S. interests and build a strong coalition. Thailand therefore requested \$50 to \$60 million to distribute to Laos, Cambodia, Burma, and Vietnam (“Thailand Cabinet,” 1955, as cited in Fineman, 1997, p. 214). The U.S., unexpectedly given President Eisenhower’s cap on foreign assistance, approved a supplemental package to Thailand and Taiwan that July for \$12.2 million. The amount was under Thailand’s request, but it was indicative of the U.S.’s value in the patron-client relationship given the strict budget for international aid.

The U.S. decision to answer noncompliance with increased aid did not stop Thailand’s noncompliant behavior in regards to relations with China and curbing growing anti-American sentiment. Instead, Phibun made the decision to democratize in conjunction with the 1957 parliament

elections. In order to secure his win over Phao, Phibun moved to court the neutralist voters needed to win by distancing himself from the U.S. To do so, he made a number of positive moves towards China including stating he would recognize China if it joined the U.N., proposed reducing the alien registration fee for the Chinese, and proposed allowing Chinese secondary schools (Fineman, 1987, p. 222). This culminated with both Phao and Phibun attempting to court neutralist favor by secretly discussing the normalization of relations with China in November 1955 (Fineman, 1987, p. 224).

In regards to China, Thailand played a double game with the Americans. In order to give the appearance of remaining compliant on the issue and in order to maintain some amount of U.S. trust, both Phao and Phibun made overt statements and actions to placate the concerns of the U.S. In a statement regarding the normalization of relations with China, Phibun remarked that, “There is no way [...] to establish friendly relations or an understanding with communist countries [...] when Communists intend to take over the world?” (Fineman, 1997, p. 225). Yet, both Phibun and Phao continued backdoor meetings and deals with Chinese representatives. In 1956, the U.S. forwardly expressed its displeasure when the Phibun government announced its intent to lift trade sanctions on China for some items. Thailand pivoted the issue to internal pressures to allow trade and communist subversion. Phibun remarked in a meeting with the U.S. in March 1956 that it was the communists attempting to infiltrate Thailand economically, pivoting the issue to internal threats (Alden, 1956). This strategy is very similar to the minimal compliance approach adopted by Pakistani President Musharraf.

Noncompliance Critical Juncture—Thailand’s regime change

The third major noncompliance critical juncture of this period arrived in 1957. Both Phao and Phibun—while both damaging in the past year to U.S. interests, both remained aligned with the patron privately—faced increased pressure from Field Marshall Sarit for control of Thailand. Sarit had embraced the anti-American stance presented by neutralists. Not only did Sarit publically attack the U.S. involvement in Thailand to neutralist delight, he also undermined the institutions the U.S. had established to strengthen Thailand’s fight against communists, including the CIA’s involvement at Sea Supply. His anti-Americanism won him support in the growing view that Phibun and Phao were puppets of the U.S. Sarit becoming Thailand’s next leader was all of a sudden a real possibility.

The potential of increased noncompliance and a complete deterioration of the U.S.-Thailand patron-client relationships was possible under a potential Sarit government. The U.S. had to choose to build a positive relationship with Sarit or try to minimize his influence with Thailand. The U.S. maintained a relatively passive position against Sarit, partially fearing that any overt move to minimize his influence would backfire and weaken Phao and Phibun. In a message to Bangkok Embassy, Secretary of State Dulles noted that Phibun remained the primary choice as Thailand’s leader but “in the likelihood of an army coup, to maintain good relations with Sarit” (United States Department of State, 1957). The U.S. did not make any significant moves to block Sarit’s rise to power or change the conditions of the patron-client relationship.

By September 1957, Sarit’s coup was complete. The U.S. had lost significant support in the friendly regime and the patron-client relationship delved into uncertainty. The leftists and neutralists appeared to have gained the most influence resulting from the events between 1954 and 1957 and the trust between the U.S. and Thailand had eroded. At the onset, Sarit’s government appeared to be the

end of patron-client relationships. U.S. Ambassador Bishop noted that Sarit's successful takeover would require "major adjustments" to the relationship.

The Post-Noncompliance Critical Juncture Period in Thailand

The breakdown of the patron-client relationship never came as the pre-coup period predicted. To ensure Thailand remained in the U.S.'s sphere of influence, after Sarit took over the government, the U.S. made its first serious threat to aid to Thailand. Forced into the unknown and pressed by growing anti-American sentiment, the U.S. made serious threats against the new Thai regime stating that the U.S. was ready to directly intervene and eliminate leftist and neutralist influence unless the growing opposition was quelled (Fineman, 1997, p. 246).

Surprisingly however, Sarit was eager to become a reliable partner to the U.S. By 1958, Sarit had reaffirmed Thailand's commitment to SEATO and to the interests of the U.S., halted accommodations with China, and eliminated public opposition to the U.S. and Sarit's regime. There are several explanations for the immediate shift in position by Sarit. For one, China had resumed a more aggressive regional posture. China had recently invaded Tibet—increasing the amount of anti-Thai language coming from its neighbor—and increased material support to Vietnam (Randolph, 1986, p. 35). The communist threat became more prevalent than it had for several years increasing the value of the exchange.

The other explanation for Sarit's pivot towards warmer relations with the U.S. was his desire to consolidate power and the irreplaceable value of the reciprocal arrangement. Sarit discovered quickly that the free press that he used to criticize the U.S. would also be critical of his government. Just like years prior, the aid and military support could go a long way in allowing the political leader of Thailand to suppress any domestic grumblings. Sarit therefore moved quickly to pacify the concerns of the U.S. from the beginning. Sarit both notified the U.S. of the coup before it happened and continued to emphasize throughout the process his commitment to cooperating diplomatically. His clampdown on the neutralists and leftists went beyond that of Phibun and Phao and had the effect of quickly rebuilding trust with the U.S. (Fineman, 1997, p. 255).

Unlike Pakistan and El Salvador, regime change did not necessarily mean the end or deterioration of patron-client relations. While the period between 1955 and 1957 had marked a high level of client noncompliance, both countries maintained a beneficial patron-client relationship after 1957 and under Sarit Thanarat. The relationship had survived because the countries viewed the value of the reciprocal exchange as irreplaceable. To the U.S.'s benefit, at each critical juncture it did not choose sides or abandon the relationship completely. Even when it became clear that Sarit was going to stage a coup, the U.S. did not attempt to alienate the future leader.

For the U.S., rejecting Thailand as a cooperative partner was not a viable option in 1957. While the U.S. had been fostering other influential relationships in Southeast Asia, no other potential client wielded the same influence regionally as Thailand had. Starting a relationship with another regional country would guarantee to be costly and unpredictable. That is likely why the decrease in compliance between 1955 and 1957 never brought upon reciprocated noncompliance on behalf of the patron. While the U.S. desired complete compliance on its security objectives in the region, abandoning the relationship or further destabilizing the domestic situation through coercive methods to gain compliance would have likely regressed the relationship to an instrumental-based cooperation relationship. For both Thailand and the U.S., in the end, the value of reciprocity was just too big.

Section 10: ANALYSIS

The three cases studies examined reveal a number of interesting consistencies and thought-provoking questions regarding how and when client states choose to demonstrate noncompliant behavior in a patron-client relationship. The examination of separate critical junctures within each case also provides insights to the patron's reaction into cases of noncompliance, especially in a U.S. foreign policy perspective throughout this study.

H1: Self-interest—If the client state does not see the value of the reciprocal exchange as equal and no longer has high levels of affectivity for the patron, client states out of self-interest will resort to noncompliance. Noncompliance in this scenario is designed to renegotiate the terms of the reciprocity or attract new patrons.

Self-interested noncompliance was a strong motivator for noncompliance in all three case studies for slightly varying reasons. In the case for Pakistan and Thailand, as clients, complying with U.S. interests meant surrendering the perception of sovereignty over one's own security. In Pakistan, U.S. applied pressure on Musharraf's regime to lead attacks against militants within the FATA region. The increase in demands by the patron went against Pakistan's own security interests. In the FATA, Pakistan had an interest in maintaining the important security relationship between it and the militants in that region, which had been a cornerstone to Pakistan's security paradigm. Pakistan moved to a self-interested posture when the U.S. showed no signs of helping it leverage its position against India. The U.S. instead cultivated closer ties to India while trying to keep Pakistan as a client. Instead of concerning itself with the priority of Pakistan's security interests, the U.S. incorrectly assumed that military aid and regime support would be enough to keep Pakistan compliant on U.S. interests. In Pakistan's perspective, the U.S. also continued to rework the terms of reciprocity and asked Pakistan to do exceedingly more to go against its own interests. These meant actions such as challenging militants in FATA and weakening its own nuclear program. While the U.S. increased aid to compensate for these initiatives, the U.S. did not provide aid that supported Pakistan's own security interests, often ignoring or delaying requests for things such as advanced weapons or actually contributing directly to Pakistan's interests.

Pakistan also did not maintain high levels of affectivity with its patron for long after the patron-client relationship formed in late 2001, and any form of affectivity between patron and client was enacted solely through the linkage between Musharraf and the U.S. Without the overriding sense of affectivity across multiple linkages and sectors, such as the lack of a meaningful and trustworthy relationship with the military and intelligence services, Pakistan found it easy to supplant the security interests of the U.S. for its own. In this sense, compliance became a realist calculation on gains in the end. The benefits gained from reciprocity were not worth sacrificing Pakistan's own security interests and capabilities. Working with the U.S. meant Pakistan would have to assist in degrading the capabilities of militants in Pakistan, which Pakistan relied on to fight India, and Pakistan would have to accept India's burgeoning relationship with the U.S. Having viable alternative partners also made the end of the patron-client relation easier for Pakistan. In particular, courting China to invest in Pakistan's economy and military as the patron-client relationship has dwindled has prevented Pakistan from becoming solely dependent on the U.S. Pakistan ultimately chose to follow its own interests.

While the U.S. continuously increased the monetary benefits to Pakistan, Pakistan was able to play a double game with the patron. Though the military capabilities and economic incentives helped Musharraf build his legitimacy as leader, they did little to help Pakistan's actual security objectives. Pakistan wanted leverage against India. Pakistan under Musharraf chose then instead to seek a dual

level approach to cooperation. Musharraf chose a minimum compliance strategy to keep U.S. aid flowing while also seeking to guarantee Pakistan's survival by maintaining and protecting its own capabilities. Not pressuring militants and signing peace treaties with them meant that Pakistan could possibly maintain positive relations with anti-India groups. Pakistan's calculus here mostly followed the realist ideas on relative gains; states will pursue strategies to maximize their power relative to other states around them (Mearsheimer, 2001). In Pakistan's calculation, the patron-client did not fully support its interests in India and even worked against them. Noncompliance could correct that.

While Pakistan viewed their compliance strategy of minimal compliance as enough to sustain the benefits of reciprocity, it was not enough to sustain affectivity. As noted earlier, tit-for-tat cycles can improve cooperation. They can also degrade it. Negative cycles correspond to negative perceptions of trust, which are only intensified as the negative cycle continues (Dohemen et al., 2008). As the militant problem did not go away in FATA, the U.S. took a stronger stance in the region, encroaching on Pakistan's sovereignty over its own security. The action was met with the retraction of secret consent of the behavior. After, the negative cycle continued and degraded trust with it. By the time the U.S. found Usama bin Laden in Pakistan, the U.S. did not trust Pakistan enough to share the information.

Dismissing the security interests of the client state also led to client noncompliance within the patron-client relationship in Thailand. The U.S.'s refusal to take SEATO action in Laos ignored the communist threat that Laos posed to Thailand. In the Thai perspective, no action meant that communist forces could invade Thailand if communist influence grew. The U.S.'s minor reconciliation with the Chinese in 1955 also put Thailand in a bind regarding its own security. Maintaining a staunch anti-Communist stance without U.S. would put Thailand at risk if the U.S. and China opened friendly relations. Though the U.S. and China did not reestablish such relations during that time, the sudden possibility meant that Thailand for security purposes had to curry favor with China.

Similar to the case in Pakistan, self-interested noncompliance in Thailand was not about the acquisition of resources or enhancing its capabilities. Self-interested noncompliance meant protecting itself from potential global pressures and future threats. The U.S. reengaging the Soviet Union and China even in limited discussions potentially left Thailand as the largest anti-communist state in the region. With even the possibility of not having U.S. backing, Thailand had to protect itself from potential future aggression. This falls in line with Walt's (1987, p.114) view of weak states in the anarchic world. Weak states are more likely to bandwagon or align with stronger states in the fear of experiencing the consequences of not supporting a stronger state. They cannot balance against such a threat because of its weak power status.

Unlike the U.S.-Pakistan case however, the U.S.-Thailand patron-client relationship survived noncompliance. In the Thailand example, the value of the reciprocal exchange and the level of affectivity never disappeared. The high levels of both kept the relationship intact. Even though the domestic instability created a great amount of anti-American rhetoric, the U.S. never wavered on its commitment to Phibun, Phai, or Sarit. Even when Sarit took over power, the U.S. did not isolate him completely and worked to build affectivity between the U.S. and the new Thai government. Partial credit may be because the U.S. stopped a potential negative tit-for-tat cycle. By tolerating the temporary level of noncompliance, the U.S. could successfully reengage Thailand later on the same compliance issues but with trust and affectivity still maintained, not degraded by a negative cycle of tit-for-tat behavior.

The value of the reciprocal exchange also seemed to sustain the relationship. The best evidence of this is Sarit's immediate and quick change from anti-American rhetoric to leader of an anti-communism agenda. For Thailand, U.S. aid meant regime stability. No other nation could provide that. For the U.S., Thailand was the only regional actor the U.S. could rely on for blocking communist expansion. Periods of client noncompliance were therefore tolerable.

The El Salvador case did not lend itself to self-interested explanations for noncompliance. Mainly, the U.S. and El Salvador shared a primary mutual interest throughout the relationship. Both sides, even during noncompliance critical junctures, were both dedicated to rejecting the influence of the left. It was the value the U.S. placed on that mutual interest that would permit El Salvador to not comply with other U.S. interests for domestic and capacity purposes.

The cases involving self-interested noncompliance also elucidate a common tactic that clients used to pursue their own interests while also complying with the patron, the minimal compliance approach. In all three cases studies, the client states employed minimal compliance in some fashion. In El Salvador, the government partially enforced land reform, though the initiatives were hollow and would never be followed through. In Pakistan, the military took a selective approach to targeting militants. In the beginning of the relationship, it could capture al-Qaeda members to satisfy the patron while ignoring demands to capture certain militants. In Thailand, all parties soothed the U.S. concerns that no one was trying form a closer relationship to China, when in reality Phao and Phibun had meetings with the Chinese about opening relations. The purpose of minimal compliance seems straightforward. Appease the patron in order to gain the most from reciprocity.

Lastly, in relation to the U.S. approach to reciprocity in the self-interested cases, blanket monetary aid does not appear to be the most consistent approach to ensuring reciprocity works in every example. If patrons seek to build long-term relationships based on affectivity, they should consider providing something that reinforces both.

H2: Self-interest—If client states no longer view the value of the reciprocal exchange as equal between patron and client yet there remains high levels of affectivity, client states will utilize soft balancing techniques as a form of noncompliance to renegotiate the terms of reciprocity.

There were no significant cases of soft balancing techniques within the case studies examined. While no significant conclusions can or should be made from the absence of useful data, questions for research should be posed. A basic question should be can soft balancing techniques even occur under the patron-client framework or is there something about the unique nature of patron-client framework that prevents the phenomena? Alternatively, further research should examine the different types of soft balancing in comparison to the patron-client framework. Should noncompliance by the client state actually be considered a form of soft balancing in itself?

H3: Domestic considerations— If client states are accountable to domestic institutions or populations and domestic norms are at odds with the patron's interests, then the client will resort to noncompliance.

The third hypothesis was the strongest indicator for client driven noncompliant behavior across all cases. Noncompliance driven by the interests of domestic populations was present in all of the cases selected. It is worth noting though the conclusions drawn from these case studies in relation to the

hypothesis are narrower than it may first appear, predominately because of the cases selected. In each of the patron-client cases examined, the strongest links of affectivity between the U.S. and the client focused on support to a political party or regime. In each case, the U.S. spent little time or effort in creating bonds of affection between the patron and domestic institutions. The patron in these cases propped up a political regime with minimal domestic input and no significant influence over domestic institutions. It is also important to clarify at this point the difference of noncompliance based behavior based off self-interested justification and domestic considerations. Self-interested noncompliance related to the client's own security among the international system through either the collection or protection of its capabilities or status. Domestic considerations measured the influence that subnational elements had on altering the compliance behavior of the client states, typically unconcerned about the state's status among the international system. However, it is possible for these two elements to overlap.

In the case of El Salvador, democratic elections significantly backfired on the patron. The U.S. had built meaningful ties among the elite, the military, and Christian Democrats, but it could not translate its influence into domestic support for moderates. As a result, the far right took power. ARENA and other rightist parties successfully passed complying on a number of important issues to the patron, such as human rights and agrarian reform. The political shift eroded trust between the U.S. and the ruling political party. The U.S. aid certification process also moved the relationship into instrumental exchanges. However, El Salvador remained noncompliant on several key issues for several years and still received increases in aid. The main explanation for continued aid has to do with capacity, which will be discussed later. The rise of unfriendly domestic institutions however ensured noncompliance on several issues.

By linking itself to one political party, by lacking linkages across varied domestic groups, and by not enacting significant aid restrictions, the U.S. ultimately prevented itself from curbing any anti-U.S. rhetoric or noncompliant policies. D'Aubisson was able to publically protest against numerous U.S. policies as president of the Constituent Assembly. Undermining the U.S. was the perspective and narrative that anything the Christian Democrats, one could link to the outside influence of the U.S. More importantly, the domestic opposition—D'Aubisson in this case—correctly calculated the value of the reciprocal relationship to the U.S. D'Aubisson knew the U.S. would not significantly alter the benefits provided through reciprocity as long as the government helped quell the leftist movement in the country.

The domestic institutions also shifted President Musharraf's calculus in Pakistan. Domestic sentiment and a growing sense of anti-Americanism fueled Musharraf's minimal compliance strategy. Pakistan often delayed action on various U.S. demands because domestic institutions would not approve such behavior. Musharraf did little however to quell concerns domestically about its patron. Instead, Musharraf played to the domestic institutions in order to remain in power by furthering conspiracy theories and lies about the U.S. foreign policy intent.

Similar to the case in El Salvador, the U.S. was not equipped to refute any of the domestic institutions or groups that opposed its interests or policies. The U.S. had created a strong link with Musharraf, but a great deal of the Pakistani population had felt jaded about the U.S.'s previous cooperative relationship with Pakistan during the 1980s. The abandonment by the U.S. of the cooperative relationship as a result of Pakistan's nuclear program made members of the military and ISI distrustful of the patron's commitment. Without significant influence domestically beyond

Musharraf, the U.S. could not find a political replacement for Musharraf in 2008 that carried the same bonds of affectivity.

In Thailand, U.S. patronage became a liability for all potential leaders of the government. This is mostly because during the early years of cooperation, U.S. patronage previously resulted in the suppression of domestic institutions. The U.S. incorrectly assumed though that Thailand could control domestic institutions through repressive action. Therefore, when Phibun gave back the tiniest amount of freedom to domestic institutions, their reaction was strongly negative towards U.S. policies, partially blaming the U.S. for the suppressive tactics of the regime. In all the cases examined, domestic institutions were always successful at removing a patron friendly regime as necessary. The reason for client noncompliance then is grounded in the regime's desire to hold power and appease the domestic institutions. It is also a result of waves of domestic institutions with anti-patron sentiment rising to power after the patron's interests clash with the clients.

Each of these cases reveals two important things. One is consistent with the findings regarding self-interest. First, the U.S. is often unwilling to use the full weight of its status as power patron to force a client to comply, even in the face of noncompliance. This is especially true when factoring in domestic considerations, given that domestic opposition groups exploit any potential sign of U.S. involvement to weak the position of the patron's interests or boost their own status. The U.S.'s unwillingness to coerce also emphasizes the value the patron places in mutually beneficial reciprocity.

Secondly, the findings in regards to domestic level noncompliance heavily suggest that most small states factor in two level games when forming foreign policy decisions in patron-client relationships. Untangling how and when domestic level factors influence foreign policy making however is beyond the findings here. A theory such as Putnam's (1988) concept of two-level games provides potential insights to how the two elements interact. The two-level game approach has the advantage over state-centric approaches by "recognizing the inevitability of domestic conflict about what the 'national interest' requires" (Putnam, 1988, p. 460). The theory is also useful for creating the distinctions between voluntary and involuntary defection from international agreements, explaining how institutional agreements abroad can weaken politicians at home, and what are the potential reverberations of international developments at home (Putnam, 1988, p. 460); all important for possibly explaining the phenomena of domestic influence on noncompliance.

H4: Ambiguity—If the terms of reciprocity are ambiguous then the client will resort to noncompliance. The patron will tolerate moderate levels of noncompliance to ensure cooperation succeeds.

There were no significant instances of ambiguity-based noncompliance in the cases examined. The primary way to detect for such instances in this study was through clearly made statements from the patron or client articulating that there existed an ambiguous portion or disconnect about the terms of the cooperative agreement made by the patron or client. No such instances were detected during the noncompliance critical junctures. Like capacity-based noncompliance, it is worth examining ambiguity in the future to see if clients will use ambiguity as a cover to justify noncompliant behavior.

H5: Capacity—If the client state does not have the capacity to comply then the client will resort to noncompliance. The patron will tolerate moderate levels of noncompliance to ensure cooperation succeeds.

Capacity justifications for noncompliance were in every case. Not only was it common in each case, clients had a tendency to greatly exaggerate the lack of state capacity to comply with U.S. interests. Similar to explaining noncompliance resulting from domestic pressures, the clients evaluated are very similar in the sense that each experienced a significant domestic upheaval during the critical junctures. Therefore, it is likely too broad to say that clients will always manipulate their capacity to comply to permit a tolerable level of noncompliance. Instead, it may be more appropriate to argue that clients whose legitimacy comes from the patron will use explanations about capacity to avoid complying with some of the patron's interests.

At times, capacity is an actual issue and not a deception by the client. It also appears to be a legitimate calculation in the patron's determination of the acceptable level of noncompliance. In the case of Pakistan, the U.S. gave President Musharraf significant leeway on how the U.S. interests were executed or even if Pakistan demonstrated compliant behavior. To the Bush administration there was little other choice, though the political change in 2008 suggested otherwise. The removal of Musharraf posed an even greater threat in the U.S. perspective than no Musharraf. Pakistan had proven in 2003 to have an incredibly unstable nuclear program and the rising militant activity in FATA only made Pakistan more unstable. The risk of militants getting their hands on a nuclear weapon was too high without Musharraf in place.

The calculus had been the same for Reagan in El Salvador. While human rights and agrarian reform were important to the United States, the Reagan administration emphasized that El Salvador was fighting a significant conflict against leftist forces in their own country. Reagan, more than Congress, viewed achieving the primary goal more important than the total goals.

Lastly, many of the clients leveraged the perception of capacity issues and the provision of minimal amount of compliance possible to avoid contentious policies while still receiving the full benefits of reciprocity. El Salvador, Pakistan, and Thailand all did it to a varying degree of success. El Salvador used excuses about economic capacity to mask that it had given up on agrarian reform, placating the U.S. with verbal commitments and legislative acts that went nowhere. Thailand made statements to its U.S. patron that it would never approach a permanent relationship with China citing certain doom for the state. Yet, secretly both sides continued to meet. Phibun hid behind the free press launching critiques of American programs; he argued he could not reign them in. Pakistan, possibly the greatest offender of leveraging minimal compliance and projecting capacity issues, constantly used both strategies with the U.S. Pakistan would be highly selective in targeting terrorists, usually ensuring its preferred groups remained untouched while exaggerating the stability of the state.

H6: Temporal—If the client cannot comply to the immediate terms of the agreement then the client will resort to noncompliance. The patron will tolerate moderate levels of noncompliance to ensure cooperation succeeds.

Temporal justifications for noncompliant behavior were harder to detect. Mainly, no distinct conclusion could be made because of the temporal justification was present but not necessarily the prominent reason for noncompliance in several examples. At times, it was closely related to capacity-related justifications for noncompliance. For example, the El Salvadoran government said after the election of 1982 that it lacked the capacity to implement land reform, saying it would take a significant amount of time. In this case, noncompliance was mainly a capacity issue with a temporal justification. Detecting temporal noncompliance is likely better suited for examination of formal treaties.

Finally, there is a distinct interplay between all these factors. While the international system can exert immense pressure on the choices of weak, client states, client states appear to form their own policies in patron-client relationships based off self-interested preservation in the global system, domestic pressures and changes, and their overall capacity to comply. None of this would likely be possible however without a stronger, patron refusing to use its coercive capabilities.

One of the most interesting occurrences in each case study was the patron state's minimal coercive responses to client noncompliance. In each case, the patron either maintained or increased the aid throughout the noncompliance critical junctures. This likely has to do with the value of reciprocity to the patron. The patron generally refused to use coercive measures that would potentially risk the nature of the relationship. These findings suggest that even if there is a significant gap in capability between patron and client, with the value of the exchange equal or favoring the client, a client can gain leverage over a larger, stronger patron. As Fox (2006) noted, small states have various ways to exert influence by utilizing various economic, ideological, and diplomatic methods, freeing them from the pressures of a sole power.

Section 11: CONCLUSION

This study was designed to determine how and when weak states choose to form noncompliant behavior in cooperative arrangements. Through the implementation of the patron-client framework and the examination of several case studies, findings suggested that clients are not only capable of forming their own foreign policies free of the coercive influence of larger powers, but they also form foreign policies for a variety of reasons. Client states resort to noncompliant behavior in order to preserve their own self-interests in relation to their own security, react to domestic level changes, and because of the lack of capacity to comply. Surprisingly enough, in patron-client relationships, clients will demonstrate noncompliant behavior with few immediate, negative consequences. While the long-term health of the patron-client relationship is not guaranteed because of continued noncompliance, results indicate that clients hold a significant amount of ability to not comply with the patron's demands.

It is important to note that explanations of noncompliance cannot and should not be divided into singular explanatory categories. Instead, why and how client states express noncompliant behavior happens for a multitude of reasons at once. Self-interested compliance may serve international policy concerns while also feeding into the demands and desires of domestic institutions, or clients may use capacity-based noncompliance explanations to hide self-interested noncompliance. Based off the complex case examinations within this study, it would be imprudent to argue that client states will always not comply for one particular reason over another.

While the main intent of this paper was not to examine the role of linkages or evaluate the utility of the patron-client framework, doing both can contribute to the discussion of the role of patron-client relations in international relations theory. In U.S. led patron-client relationships in particular, it appears linkages bypass domestic institutions and typically are made with state militaries or parties in power. The critical junctures in these cases have highlighted the weakness in having minimal linkages with domestic entities. Mainly, once a regime or party collapses, the U.S. as a patron is left with few affection-based connections to the client. Without affectivity, cooperation automatically takes a step back, usually shifting the relationship to instrumental cooperation.

The utilization of the patron-client framework should not stop here. The framework as a tool is an effective way to not only explain bilateral relationships, but it is an effective tool to explain individual state behavior. The patron-client framework can provide useful insights on small state behavior, offering a way to conduct analysis on behaviors that are usually overlooked and oversimplified. Yet, it is a niche framework. The conditions laid out here and by Carney (1989) are specific and the measurement of affectivity as it stands is relatively subjective. If reciprocity and affectivity are indeed the aspects that make patron-client relationships unique, then as variables they should be more narrowly defined. Keohane (1986b) does a good job laying out some useful distinctions regarding the different forms of reciprocity, but what does reciprocity specifically look like under a patron-client relationship? What does specific forms of reciprocity such as “mutually valued reciprocity look like?”

It may also be useful to continue to define levels of patrons and clients. Distinguishing patron and clients by their larger position in the international system may reveal interesting conclusions. For example, do states involved in international institutions interact differently with a patron than clients that are more globally isolated?

Furthermore, while the cases examined here only represent three patron-client relationships over the span of 50 years, the cases should raise some initial questions in regards to U.S. foreign policy. For one, does the U.S.’s hesitation to cut aid and support undermine its ability to correct noncompliant behavior of a client state? In none of these noncompliance cases did the U.S. make a serious cut to aid. Instead, it increased the benefits of reciprocity for the client while receiving less in return. It is worth examining if the U.S. does possibly regain leverage with a client if it partially limits reciprocal aid. The results of the case studies also demonstrate that patron states likely need to attune themselves to the unique interests of the client states. If the patron is unable to alter the interests of the client state, the separate interests will always compete with the priorities of the patron. A way to guarantee that clients become more receptive to U.S. interests is by expanding linkages. The U.S. and other patrons could likely increase the receptivity of its interests if they built strong trust networks at every level—domestic, military, political, social, etc.

Lastly, the results of this paper go a long way to argue that small and weak states can hold significant influence over stronger, global states. Small states are not always intimidated by the global system and will often pursue foreign policies that suit their own interests, even if it means the end of a beneficial cooperative arrangement. Yet, small states hold unique capabilities and control assets that are highly valued by international actors. This control permits small states to gain significant leverage over stronger states. The small state’s foreign policy decisions and ultimate decision to cooperate is also influenced by a variety of factors as shown here. This research contributes to the concept that global powers do not decide the foreign policy orientation of small states. Instead, small states form foreign policies and enter cooperative arrangements after considering a myriad of complex factors, such as domestic considerations, capacity, and their own interests.

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