

# CHICANOLOGY: A POSTMODERN ANALYSIS OF MESHICANO DISCOURSE

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Why, indeed, will the people never know what they must know in order to live, to survive? Why the fear to extend the knowledge that shall free us? Poets like Sánchez were probably banished from Plato's republic for asking this kind of question. Today, however, the status of knowledge (what is truth? how do we know?) is considered a crucial issue in academic circles. For example, Mario Barrera states:

. . . the politics of the Chicano community can be expected to revolve around both class and colonial divisions in a complex manner whose outlines we can only *dimly perceive* in the current period of confusion and redefinition.<sup>2</sup> (my emphasis)

More recently, in a review of the models used to study Mexican political behavior, Juan Gómez-Quiñones decries the dominant liberal-conservative pluralistic myths which "often are not only ahistorical but factually erroneous." He is also critical of the reactions against this analysis by some social scientists who

(in) their haste to replace the dominant liberal interpretation with a more profound one, . . . proved to be too facile in suggesting an

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“internal colony model,” a discrimination related to economic structures and later suggesting consciousness and language as explanatory factors.<sup>3</sup>

But this quest for “knowledge that shall free us,” for adequate analytical models, is not characteristic only of Chicano Studies or Chicano reality. In effect,

(it) seems increasingly probable that Western culture is in the middle of a fundamental transformation: a “shape of life” is growing old. In retrospect, this transformation may be as radical (but as gradual) as the shift from a medieval to a modern society. Accordingly, this moment in the history of the West is pervaded by profound yet little-comprehended change, and uncertainty, and ambivalence.<sup>4</sup>

It is precisely, this shift from an industrial to a post-industrial society, this radical transformation of the global economy, of the way we produce knowledge, and thus culture itself, which is termed “postmodernism.”

Clearly, postmodernism includes a variety of transformations that involve everyday practices, economic organization, the grounding of science, aesthetics, ethics and philosophy. But even in the face of a multitude of positions regarding postmodernism, it is generally agreed that its most characteristic thesis addresses the relationship between power and knowledge.<sup>5</sup>

In this vein, I contend that the difficulties we—Meshicano<sup>6</sup> poets, scholars, working men and women—encounter are based precisely on the intertwinement and symbiotic power/knowledge relations specific to the Meshicano. First, Michel Foucault’s discussion of two predominant theories of power will be re-produced, along with his tentative hypotheses, suggestions and methodological guidelines for a different, perhaps more adequate, analysis of power.<sup>7</sup> On this basis, the power/knowledge relations manifested by and within Meshicano discourse in general and Chicano Studies in particular will be discussed. Finally, after mapping the geography of this discourse, the techniques and mechanisms through which it is robbed of its power will be described. May the following words serve, if for nothing else, as “*una lágrima que rompe el silencio en el ceno del cocodrilo.*”

There are two prominent systems for approaching the analysis of power. Both share a common point of what may be called an economism

in the theory of power.<sup>8</sup> In the juridical-liberal conception, power is taken to be a right that one is able to possess like a commodity. It can be transferred or alienated, either wholly or partly, through a legal act or some act that establishes a right, such as a contract. Power is what every individual holds, and whose partial or total cession enables political power or sovereignty to be established. This theoretical construction is based on the idea that the constitution of political power obeys a model of a legal transaction involving a contractual type of exchange. The other view, the general Marxist conception, sees power in terms of the role it plays in the simultaneous maintenance of the relation of production and class domination, which the development and specific forms of production have rendered possible. In this view, the historical justification of political power is to be found in the economy. Several questions need to be asked regarding these analyses of power. Concerning the juridical-liberal: Is power modeled upon the commodity? Is it possessed, acquired, ceded through a force or contract that one alienates or recovers, that circulates or voids on this or that level? With respect to the Marxist conception: Is power always in a subordinate position? Is its end purpose to serve the economy? Is it destined to realize, consolidate, maintain and reproduce the relations appropriate to the economy and essential to its functioning?

Even if we allow that it is the case that the relations of power remain profoundly enmeshed in economic relations, what means are available to us today if we want a non-economic analysis of power? We can begin with the assertion that power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but exercised, and only exists in action. Second, power is not primarily the maintenance and reproduction of economic relations. Above all it is a relation of force. The questions to be posed then would be these: If power is exercised, what sort of exercise does it involve? What is its mechanism? The immediate answer of many contemporary analysts is that power is repressive. It represses nature, the instinct, the social class, the individual. So, should not the analysis of power be the analysis of the mechanisms of repression? Another answer may be that if power is the way in which relations of force are put into effect and given concrete expression, it should be analyzed in terms of struggle, conflict and war.

In these terms let us compare these major analyses of power. In the first place there is the old system found in the philosophies of the eighteenth century. This (juridical-liberal) approach is based on the

idea of power as an original right that is given up in the establishment of sovereignty, and the social contract as broker of political power. A power so constituted risks becoming oppression whenever it goes beyond the contract. Thus, we have contract-power, with oppression as its limit, or the transgression of this limit. On the Marxist side, we have an approach that analyzes political power in accordance with war-repression. In this view, repression no longer occupies the place of oppression in relation to the contract. It is not a violation of the contract but the mere effect and continuation of a relation of domination. Repression is none other than the play of a continuous relationship of force—warfare under the illusion of peace.

This notion of repression, however, seems inadequate for capturing precisely the productive aspects of power. In defining the effects of power with a law that says “no,” power is taken above all as carrying the force of prohibition. If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but say no, would anyone be brought to obey it? What makes power accepted is simply that it does not only weigh on us as a force that says “no,” but that it traverses and produces things. Power induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse.<sup>9</sup> There is, however, a historical reason for the acceptance of the analysis of power in terms of repression—as the mere limitation of liberty.

The monarchies that appeared during the Middle Ages brought a measure of order and peace to the mass of warring forces that preceded them by a system of delimited territory and hierarchical authority. That authority was embodied in the sovereign and his/her law. From the Middle Ages on, the exercise of power has always been formulated in terms of law. Of course, there are times such as in seventeenth-century England or in late eighteenth-century France when monarchical authority was identified with arbitrary rule. Despite attempts to free law from monarchical rule and politics from juridical concerns, the representation of power is still caught up in this system. Whatever criticism the eighteenth-century jurists made of monarchy in the name of the law, they never questioned the principle that power must be formulated in terms of law and exercised within the law—a principle that was established with the monarchy. The nineteenth century saw a more radical critique of political institutions. In this view real power operated outside the role of law. The legal system itself was a form of violence, a weapon to be used to reinforce political and economic inequalities. However, even this critique was based on the postulate that power

should be exercised according to a fundamental right. Despite the differences of intent from one period to another, the representation of power has remained affected by the model of monarchy. In political thought and analysis the King has not yet been decapitated. Hence the importance still given, in the theory of power, to the problems of right and violence, law and illegality, will and liberty and, above all, the state and sovereignty (even if sovereignty is no longer embodied in the person of the sovereign, but in a collective being).<sup>10</sup>

What of the role of the state? To pose the problem presented by the analysis of power in terms of the state requires posing it in terms of a sovereign and sovereignty. That is, in terms of the law. If one describes all phenomena of power as dependent on the state machinery, this means grasping them as repressive (i.e., the Army as a power of death, law enforcement and justice systems as punitive instruments). This is, of course, not to say that the state is not important. Rather, that relations of power (and the analysis that must be made of them) necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state. This is so for two reasons: first, the State, for all the might of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and second, it can only operate based on other already existing relations.<sup>11</sup> For example, after reviewing several theories on the State and the terms of their applicability to the Meshicano experience, Barrera states:

The Marxist structuralist perspective appears superior in that it better accounts for the imperfect control of the state by the dominant class. This is because this control is primarily exercised indirectly through the structure of the state rather than through direct control.<sup>12</sup>

He expresses his frustration (perhaps unwittingly) at the inadequacy of the existing analyses:

. . . the most satisfactory formulation *maybe* one that sees the most particular interests of capitalists satisfied through the interest group process and through placement of their own members in state positions, while the general interests of the capitalists as a class are attended to through the mechanisms stressed by structuralists.<sup>13</sup> (my emphasis)

Difficulties in the analysis of power arise precisely because, from medieval times onward, the essential role of Right has been to fix the legitimacy of power. In essence, the function of the discourses and

techniques of Right has been to erase the domination intrinsic to power and to present power under two different aspects: as the legitimate right of the sovereign, and as the legal obligation to obey it.<sup>14</sup> Thus, power becomes codified in terms of the Law.

Under these circumstances, one must escape from the limited field of juridical sovereignty and base the analysis of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination. Domination is not meant here as the way in which power is exercised by one individual or group over another, but the manifold forms of domination exercised within society.

It is necessary to show how Right is the instrument of domination. More importantly, there is a need to show the extent to which, and the forms in which, Right defines relations that are not relations of sovereignty but of domination. How was power transformed during the last three hundred years? How did it become less visible and codified in terms of the Law.<sup>15</sup> A map to guide us through this transformation is provided in Chart 1.

The top of Chart 1 illustrates that power under feudalism was dependent upon the earth and its products. It extracted wealth and commodities from human bodies, was distributed with absolute power and absolute expenditure, was exercised through periodic levies and legal obligations, and was centered on the sovereign. Power under capitalism, however is dependent on human bodies and what they do (bio-power).<sup>16</sup> It extracts from them time and labor. Its distribution is according to a new economy of power: minimum expenditure, maximum return. It is exercised through continuous surveillance, and is centered on Collective Sovereignty or Public Law. This new type of power, which can no longer be formulated in terms of sovereignty, is one of the great inventions of bourgeois society. It has been a fundamental instrument in the constitution of industrial capitalism. This non-sovereign power is disciplinary power. Yet, the theory of sovereignty has continued to exist as an ideology of Right. It has also provided the organizing principle of the legal codes that Europe acquired with the nineteenth century Napoleonic Code.<sup>17</sup>

**CHART 1**

<b>Nature of Power In</b>	<b>Feudalism</b>	<b>Capitalism</b>
Dependent upon	Earth and its products	Human bodies and what they do
Extract from human bodies	Wealth and commodities	Time and labor
Distribution of power	Absolute power Absolute expenditure	New economy of power: Minimum expenditure, Maximum return
Exercised through	Periodic levies and legal obligation	Continuous surveillance
Centered on	The sovereign	Collective sovereignty
	Rules of Law • • • • •	• Public Right
	•	•
	•	•
	•	•
	•	
	•	Human Sciences: Power linked to Scientific Knowledge
	•	
	Rules of Norm • • • • •	• • • • • Disciplinary mechanisms

Despite differences between Feudalism and Capitalism, power is conceived in terms of sovereignty. This serves to conceal the increasing invasion of procedures of normalization into the domain of Law.

The lower part of Chart 1 addresses the question of why the theory of sovereignty has persisted as an organizing principle of all major legal codes. There are two discernable reasons. As noted before, it has been a permanent instrument of criticism of the monarchy. At the same time, however, the theory of sovereignty, and the organization of a legal code

have allowed a system of Law to be superimposed upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal them. It hides the elements of domination inherent in its techniques. Paradoxically, it guarantees to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the State, the exercise of individual rights. Modern society, then, has been characterized, from the nineteenth century to our own day, by (1) the social body and the delegative status of each citizen that articulate an organization (discourse, legislation) based on public right, and (2) a closely linked grid of disciplinary coercions whose purpose is to assure the cohesion of this same social body. These two limits define the area in which power is exercised. Now, in reference to the disciplines, such as the human sciences, it is clear they are concerned with scientific discourse. As such, they do not have anything in common with the discourse of law, rule or sovereign will. When disciplines speak of a rule, they do not intend this as a juridical rule derived from sovereignty but as a natural law, a norm. Thus, the code they come to define is not that of Law, but of normalization.

The human sciences are disciplines, which produce knowledge regarding human behavior. Ostensibly, this is done from a scientific, non-ideological perspective. While it is more or less accepted that the social or human sciences have advanced from increasingly scientific techniques, it is more likely that it is the juxtaposition of the right of sovereignty and a polymorphous disciplinary mechanism that makes them possible. Thus, it can be said that the procedures of normalization increasingly engage in the colonization of those of Law.<sup>18</sup> Disciplines, as bodies of knowledge, truth and power, tend to increase the productivity of the human body (in economic terms of utility) and diminish these same forces (in political terms of obedience). They dissociate power from the human body. On one side discipline forms it into an "aptitude," a "capacity," which it seeks to increase. On the other side, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection.<sup>19</sup> This is precisely what Paulo Freire calls education for domination.<sup>20</sup> If economic exploitation separates the force and the product of labor, disciplinary coercion establishes in the individual the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination. To be sure, legal and normative standards have intersected in a variety of ways, some positive, others negative. The problem, of course, is not the human sciences or other disciplines per se, but the insidious ways in which



power establishes particular relationships with knowledge.<sup>21</sup>

Disciplinary normalization, then, seems to be coming into increasing conflict with the juridical systems of sovereignty. The critical problem is that against the transgression of disciplinary mechanisms, against the ascent of a power tied to scientific knowledge, we find that there is no solid recourse available to us today, except that which lies in the return to a theory of Right organized around sovereignty. This is the predicament in which we find ourselves.

In short, modern society is characterized by manifold relations of power that permeate and constitute it. These relations cannot themselves be established, consolidated or implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and sanctioning of discourses. Power never ceases its interrogation, inquisition or registration of truth. It institutionalizes, professionalizes and rewards its pursuit. As a material entity, discourse is subjected to a political economy of truth, so that finally we must produce truth as we must produce wealth. Indeed, we must produce truth to produce wealth in the first place. We are also subjected to truth in the sense that it is truth that makes the laws, that produces the true discourse which, at least partially, decides the effects of power. In the end, we are judged, condemned, classified and destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourses that are the bearers of the specific effects of power.<sup>22</sup>

This particular idea of the relationship between power and knowledge leads to the following methodological guidelines:

- 1.) Where there is power there is resistance. Thus, the focus is not on the regulated and legitimate forms of power in their central location or on the general mechanisms through which they operate. The focus is on power at its extremities, in its more regional and local forms and institutions. Of main concern is the point where power surmounts the rules of Right that delimit it, invests itself in institutions, becomes embodied in techniques and equips itself with instruments and eventually even violent means of material intervention. One should try to locate power at the extreme points of its exercise, where it is less legal in character.
- 2.) The analysis of power should not concern itself with power at the level of conscious intention or decision. It should avoid questions such as "who has power and what has she or he in

mind?" or "what is the aim of someone that has power?" It is instead a matter of studying power at the point where its intention, if it has one, is completely invested in real and effective practices. The analysis is on the everyday life, on how things work at the level of on-going subjugation, those continuous processes that target the labor of our human bodies, dictate our behaviors, and even attempt to govern our gestures.

- 3.) Power is not to be taken as a phenomenon of one individual's domination over others or that of one group or class over others. What should always be kept in mind is that power is not that which makes the difference between those who exclusively have it and retain it, and those who do not have it and submit to it. It is not something that is acquired, seized or shared. Power must be analyzed as something that circulates, as a process, as a continuous chain, a *rhizome*. It is never localized here and there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations.
- 4.) Power comes from below. The important point is not to attempt some kind of deduction of power starting at the top and aimed at the discovery of the extent to which it moves down to and permeates the base. Instead, one must conduct an ascending analysis of power, starting from its micro-mechanisms and then noting how these have been colonized, invested, transformed and extended. Anything can be deduced from the general phenomenon of the domination of the bourgeois class. What needs to be examined is quite different. One must suppose that the manifold relationships of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery of production, in families, groups, and institutions, are the basis for wide-ranging effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole. These then form a general line of force that traverses the local oppositions and links them together. Major dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations.
- 5.) Relations of power are not in some kind of superstructural relationship with other types of relationships such as economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations, etc. Power relations are the immediate effects of the divisions, inequalities and disequilibriums that occur in said relations and conversely they are the internal conditions of these differentiations. They

are not ideological constructs with a role of prohibition or accompaniment; they have a directly productive role whenever they come into play.<sup>23</sup>

We have come full circle in the examination of the juridical-liberal and the Marxist theories of power and their limitations. We discussed the historical reasons for their common grounding in the analysis of power in terms of repression/sovereignty and presented an analysis that reverses the trajectory followed by these two theories. The methodological guidelines lead us to the discovery of an exercise of power that simultaneously increases the forces of domination, and improves the force and efficacy of its techniques of domination. This is made possible by the appearance of mechanisms of discipline concealed under a theory of Right. These mechanisms of power refer to disciplinary discourses, such as the human sciences, which behind a constant pursuit of scientific truth, mask their inherent domination and begin to invade the domain of the Law. In the final analysis, knowledge is not so much true or false as legitimate or illegitimate for a particular set of power relations. And now to explore the relevance of this analysis of power to Meshicano discourse.

### *Meshicano Discourse and the Analysis of Power*

In the previous section we referred to power in terms of a political economy of truth. This economy can be characterized by five important traits: Truth is centered on scientific discourse and the institutions that produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political manipulation (for economic production and political power); it is the object of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through systems of education and information); it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic systems (university, media, military, literary). Lastly, it is the issue of political debate and social confrontation (ideological struggle).<sup>24</sup> Now we need to ask the following questions: In specific discourses, such as Meshicano discourse, what are the most immediate, the most local power relations at work? How did they make possible this type of discourse? Conversely, how is this discourse used to support power relations? How is the action of these power relations modified by their very exercise? Finally, how are such power relations linked to one

another according to the logic of a great strategy?

A clue to the direction that must be followed is provided by two studies based on the analysis of discourse. In *The Invention of Africa*, V.Y. Mudimbe is "directly concerned with the processes of transformation of types of knowledge."

The fact of the matter is that, until now, Western interpreters and African analysts have been using categories and conceptual systems that depend on a Western epistemological order. Even in the most explicit "Afrocentric" descriptions, models of analysis explicitly or implicitly, knowingly or unknowingly, refer to the same order. . . . What does this mean for the field of African studies? To what extent can their perspectives modify the fact of a silent dependence on a Western *episteme*?<sup>25</sup>

Edward W. Said is more explicit in his analysis of scholarly studies that deal with the Orient:

Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient . . . My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. Moreover, so authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I believe no one writing, thinking or acting on the Orient could do so without taking into account the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism. In brief, because of Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or action. This is not to say that Orientalism unilaterally determines what can be said about the Orient, but that it is the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that peculiar entity "the Orient" is in question.<sup>26</sup>

What Mudimbe and Said are stating here are counter-hegemonic positions against a dominant body of knowledge: the discourse of the West. We might say there is a Chicano Studies discourse that plays a

similar role with respect to the power relations between Anglos and Chicanos. What is that Anglo body of knowledge that "invents" Chicanos, the counterpart to Orientalism?

To be sure, there are stereotyped images of the Meshicano present almost everywhere. Carlos E. Cortés, for example, has conceptualized the Societal Curriculum: "that massive, ongoing informal curriculum of family, peer groups, neighborhoods, mass media, and other socializing factors which 'educate' us throughout our entire lives."<sup>27</sup> Much longer than one lifetime, however, there is also a "historical curriculum" known as the "Black Legend," a collection of anti-Spanish, anti-Catholic statements, that can be traced to the sixteenth century!<sup>28</sup> More recently, in the early twentieth century, we find an academic discipline, sociology, which played a similar role. It, too, defined Chicanos in terms of a traditional culture, as people who were not free subjects of thought or action.<sup>29</sup> Similarly, Américo Paredes in his search for the folklore of the Anglo Texan finds what he calls "the Texas Legend," which he attempts to categorize as either folklore, fact or "something else."<sup>30</sup> Echoing the "Black Legend" discourse that has functioned since the sixteenth century, the Texas Legend basically states that "the Mexican is cruel by nature . . . cowardly and treacherous . . . as degenerate a specimen of humanity as found anywhere . . . he descends from the Spaniards, a second-rate type of European, and from the equally substandard Indian of México . . . and the Mexican has always recognized the Texan as his superior."<sup>31</sup> Paredes is puzzled that this legend is not found in the cowboy ballads, the play-party songs, or the folktales of the people of Texas. Paredes concludes this legend is pseudo-folklore which, disguised as fact, still plays a major role in Texas (we might say Meshicano) history. Implicit in this conclusion is the relation of the legend to two sources of power where it appears; that is "the written works of the literary" (where the power of knowledge is exercised) and "among a class of rootless adventurers who have used the legend for their own purposes (where raw, physical power is exercised)." This illustrates the contention that power is tolerable only on the condition that it masks a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to conceal itself. Stereotypes, academic disciplines, and legends or pseudo-folklore disguised as fact, however, do not quite fit the role of a "corporate institution that manages or produces Chicanos politically, sociologically and imaginatively" that Said finds in Orientalism. Yet, we know such discourse exists as a hegemonic power because we live with

it, struggle against it, analyze it, and write about it. How can a discourse like that have so much influence on our everyday life and remain unnamed? This is no mystery; it illustrates the power relations between Chicanos and Anglos. For example, the subject of this discourse, the Meshicano, is identified as "a forgotten people," "a minority nobody knows," and "the invisible minority." Or, once "discovered" or "awakened" Chicanos are defined as Hispanics, Latinos, Mexican Americans, Spanish Americans, and so many other names that no single definition is possible. This highly diffused discourse that appears as stereotypes, social science, legends, or pseudo-folklore disguised as fact is, in effect, a politicized science of Chicanos. This *logos* gives statements about Chicanos the status of truth, thus it is a *Chicanology* that serves as a fundamental tool of domination. Paraphrasing Said, we can say that Chicanology is the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on any occasion when that peculiar entity "the Meshicano," is in question. No one writing, thinking or acting on the Meshicano can do so without taking into account the limitations on thought and action imposed by Chicanology.

It is precisely the expression of power intrinsic to Chicanology that engenders a Meshicano discourse, understood poetically as "that which we must know in order to survive." More specifically a knowledge that in the politics of truth of Anglo America is never allowed the status of truth. Without the status of truth, Meshicano discourse cannot invest its statements on institutions and their practices. It is a subjugated, oppositional knowledge. Such knowledge is defined as the historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal system. It is the whole body of knowledge that has been disqualified as inadequate or insufficiently elaborated. It is popular knowledge, though not common sense. It is a particular, local, regional knowledge, a heterogeneous knowledge incapable of unanimity that owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it.<sup>32</sup> Consequently, subjugated and oppositional knowledges are concerned with a historical knowledge of struggles. Whether it is in specialized areas of erudition (such as doctoral dissertations) or in the disqualified popular knowledge (such as *corridos*, rap songs, and jokes) we find the memory of hostile encounters. Films like *Seguín*, *The Ballad of Gregorio Cortez*, and *Zoot Suit* are examples of these memories. In the context of availability to the dominant culture, these are, even up to this day, confined to the margins of knowledge.

(And they were intended for the general public!)

Within the power relations between Chicano as a discourse of dominance and Meshicano discourse as a subjugated (and thus oppositional) knowledge we can see the conditions for the appearance of Chicano Studies as we commonly understand the term. Chicano Studies is a specific form of struggle, a particular practice within Meshicano discourse that stands in a counterhegemonic position to Chicano. In effect, the claim that Chicano Studies is an academic discipline (that it is based on a logical, empirical structure and that therefore its propositions are the outcomes of verifiable procedures) is the attempt to invest it with the effects of power that have been attributed to science since Medieval times.<sup>33</sup> The important point is that this is not a battle “on behalf” of truth but a struggle “about the status of truth” and the economic and political role it plays. Until this is clearly understood, there is the possibility that Chicano Studies may be appropriated by Chicano.

We have defined Chicano as an elusive yet systematic hegemonic discourse that expresses and actualizes Anglo domination over Chicanos, and Meshicano discourse as a diffuse, subjugated, oppositional knowledge resulting from the struggle against Anglo power. Chicano Studies has been defined as a specific discursive practice within Meshicano discourse that attempts to acquire power by claiming academic and scientific validity. Several questions remain, however, regarding the scope and configuration of Meshicano discourse and the procedures by which it is controlled.

### *The Geography of Meshicano Discourse*

A map of the power/knowledge relations that define the Meshicano people since the United States invaded northern México (or since Columbus tripped over this continent) needs to be drawn. Because of space limitations, however, here it is only possible to trace the key statements of this discourse. Now, according to the guidelines that have been established above, power must be analyzed as something that circulates, as a process, as a continuous chain, and Meshicano discourse as an oppositional knowledge, which owes its power precisely to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything that surrounds it. To adhere to these points, then, it is necessary to refer to rhizomes.<sup>34</sup>

(Any) point of a rhizome can be connected to any other, and must be. . . . Semiotic chains of every nature are connected to very diverse modes of coding (biological, political, economic, etc.).

.....

It is not a question of this or that place on earth, or of a given moment in history, still less of this or that category of thought. It is a question of a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing, and of a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again.

.....

(The) rhizome pertains to a map that must be produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of flight.

On this basis, a specific event is here presented as an entryway into the geography of Meshicano discourse. It is one that exhibits a very particular kind of semiotic chain. On April 13, 1972, Ricardo Chávez Ortiz, a Mexican national, hijacked a Frontier Airlines 737 Jet from Albuquerque, New Mexico, with an unloaded gun. The hijacker ordered the plane flown to Los Angeles, California. According to the *Los Angeles Times*, his request was not for money or to be flown somewhere, or to release prisoners. He requested "live broadcast time in which to voice the frustrations of a man who feared the world would not listen to his problems, and those of his people, under any other circumstances."<sup>35</sup>

Thus, in terms of the analysis here discussed, this event shows power at its extremes. It involves an illegal act, the threat of violence and, potentially, an international incident. It also involves issues that were being discussed at the academic level. Ironically, while Chicano faculty and students were trying *to prove the truth* of their statements, Chávez Ortiz appropriated the means *to give the status of truth* to his statements.

Addressing himself to Anglo Americans, Chávez Ortiz made the following statements:

I have felt an obligation to do this bad deed but not only for the situation of my family but . . . it is much more delicate and dangerous for the new generation than you can imagine . . . I (told) myself: ask for what you need and make them realize that we are also the children of god . . . I wanted to attract the attention of everyone in this nation and to say to everyone once and for all, what type of



human beings we are . . . What I need to say to you and that you need to pay very close attention to (is that) on the path we are following, there are going to come very disastrous and terrible days . . . All you do is let the days go by and maybe tomorrow, maybe the next day, there will be a chance, there will be a new governor or a new president, yakkity, yakkity. . . .

Don't always think about your good clothes and having enough to eat and your good friends . . . The Americans (Anglos) go and send rockets to the moon. Yes, go ahead and do whatever you want to do while we become rebellious . . .

All I want is for Mexicans to know that this is Mexican land and always will be . . . This land that we are working on was a divine gift . . . I would not admit to any son of a bitch that my nation is for sale or in servitude . . .

I was held in captivity for two years and all I had was the right to search through garbage cans for something to eat. I also worked for two years without being paid one single cent . . . Where was justice at this time? Where were the authorities? I have a great fear of going out into the street because I am afraid that at any moment a policeman will take his pistol and shoot me.<sup>36</sup>

Thus, in thirty-five minutes of air time, bought with the violation of a federal law, Chávez Ortiz revealed to the world the harshness that surrounds Meshicano discourse. His statements include the following key points: (1) an assertion of the basic humanity of the Meshicano with reference to god, (2) Anglo indifference to social justice and emphasis on materialistic values, (3) empty political promises, (4) the land grab, (5) Meshicano nationalism, (6) the imposition of a colonial labor system, and (7) police brutality. This collection of observations and accusations, however, is not only the "frustrations of a man" or an example of individual alienation. It is that and much more. Leaving aside the question of how "aware" he was of the significance of his act, what he said is equivalent to a microcosm of Meshicano discourse. It is a holographic fragment of the Meshicano experience, a rhizome.

The critical relationship to the geography of Meshicano discourse is that these statements represent a specific articulation, of the "governing" statements that emerge, to some extent, in every event in Meshicano history. These are: (1) racial theories, (2) the land grab, (3) the establishment of a colonial labor system, (4) the system of justice, (5) nationalism, (6) education, (7) internal divisions, and (8) the right of self

preservation. In other words, specific arrangements or assemblages of these statements give Meshicano discourse a sort of regularity that has been in operation since the United States invaded Northern México, now known as the Southwest. A regularity that can also be seen in rhizome terms, as “a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing, and of a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again.”

At any rate, this discursive regularity appears at different times, and in different circumstances. Thus, one could take a journey tracing these metamorphoses from, say, the guerrilla tactics of Juan N. Cortina or *Las Gorras Blancas*, the social banditry of Tiburcio Vásquez or Joaquín Murrieta, the increasing sophistication in organizing from the *mutualistas*, the *Magonistas*, and other union efforts to the G.I. Forum, L.U.L.A.C. (League of United Latin American Citizens), the Viva Kennedy Clubs and *La Raza Unida* Party. The journey would take us to different levels of the Power/Knowledge relationship, with the emergence of particular discourses: the Chicano Student Movement, the Chicano Artistic Renaissance, and the Chicano Studies programs/curriculum. Today we witness the appearance of a new object of political, economic and epistemological attention: the Hispanic. Despite the variation, that is, no matter the level of specificity of the statements, they constitute a Meshicano discursive regularity because of the implicit or explicit threat, or actual practice of violence.

### *Procedures for the Control of Chicano Discourse*

There is, however, another aspect to the statements made by Chávez Ortiz that go beyond the geography of Meshicano discourse and point to the specific procedures by which it is dominated.

I could very easily force this plane to go to Mexico and I could have demanded three or four million dollars . . . and I assure you that I would have been able to avoid capture there . . . I am a pretty smart person. And I know how to use my intelligence so I can get along well with my family.

You are the ones that make the laws and elect the governments. Well what are you doing, what kind of governments are you electing? What kind of society are you making? I want . . . a clean society not a filthy traitorous society like the one we are presently

living in . . . If that is what the laws are like, then the laws are for the protection of the capitalists, or, in other words, to protect the government.

There is a Mrs. Bañuelos (U.S. Treasurer 1971 to 1974) . . . She has trampled on a lot of people and because of this she is a son of a bitch<sup>37</sup> . . . only very capable people and good hearted with good intentions . . . have the right to obtain positions like these. . . .

The children that I have . . . attended school for many years and they know absolutely nothing.<sup>38</sup>

These statements refer to points of struggle between Chicano and Meshicano discourse: (1) the question of intelligence, (2) the ambiguous nature of the law as applied to Chicanos, (3) the status given to speakers of Meshicano discourse and (4) educational institutions and processes. These points will be used to illustrate some of the techniques, mechanisms and procedures for the control of discourse. Through these, Chicano selects, organizes, and redistributes Meshicano discourse in order to deflect its power, to neutralize its impact on public policy.<sup>39</sup> However, let us first finish the story of the hijacking. The event ended with the conviction of Chávez Ortiz on charges of air piracy. He was given a life sentence and released in 1978. To the chagrin of his supporters, his only logical defense was based on "diminished capacity," not being "mentally competent and criminally responsible."<sup>40</sup> This may seem ironic. However, from a Chicano perspective, this is a technique to invalidate this tactical (as opposed to strategic)<sup>41</sup> articulation of Meshicano issues.

The procedures for the control of Meshicano discourse are illustrated by the following examples that include the points raised by Chávez Ortiz and others taken from Meshicano history.

### *Prohibition*

This is perhaps the most obvious procedure and many examples of it are found in Meshicano history. There was the prohibition to speak Spanish under penalty of bodily punishment or suspension from school (some people swear it still happens). In the late nineteenth century the singing of *corridos* about Meshicano *bandidos* was illegal, and early in this century the practice of red-baiting inhibited Mexicans and Chicanos from speaking up for better wages and working conditions. This led to

the demise of unions such as the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union (CAWIU) and organizations like the *Congreso de Habla Española* during the 1930s. Certainly Ricardo Flores Magón experienced the effects of prohibition around the turn of the century. He was incarcerated nine times for speaking or writing radical political doctrines.

### *Reason vs. Insanity*

There is a more subtle technique of intervention in the control of discourse that is based on the contrast between Reason (usually on the side of the dominant power) and Insanity (usually on the side of those who are subjugated). Thus, Ricardo Chávez Ortiz had to plead insanity for hijacking a plane in order to protest the oppression of the Mexicano in the United States. Furthermore, Meshicanos have not only been overrepresented in mentally retarded classes, but their cultural characteristics have been categorized as deviant. A revealing example of this practice is the statement made by the Texas historian Walter Prescott Webb about the *Plan de San Diego* of 1915. He does not believe that Mexicans wrote the plan because "the disturbances had behind them a purpose, an intelligence greater than that of the bandit leader or of his ignorant followers." Instead, he attributes it to an ambitious Texan or Germans. While it is not clear who the author of this plan was, it is known that Aniceto Pizáña and Luis de la Rosa, Mexicans native to Texas, led military actions at that time.<sup>42</sup> Similarly, Commodore John D. Sloat, who took over Monterey Port in 1846, could not understand why Chicanos were planning to rise against him.

Truly this procedure is more that of insane people than of persons in their right minds, because if they had common sense they would understand that I am too strong to allow myself to be forced to give up what I have acquired.<sup>43</sup>

At a different level, in American fiction, there are many Mexican characters who suddenly and inexplicably, go temporarily crazy. One thinks for example of Spanish Johnny in Willa Cather's *The Song of the Lark*, and Danny in John Steinback's *Tortilla Flat*.<sup>44</sup> It is in this context that we can appreciate the force behind Chávez Ortiz's insistence on his intelligence.

### *Validity*

An even more insidious technique to deny the validity of what is said is the assignment of the status of truth to certain events or statements. In other words, the regime of truth appropriates the right to decide the distinction between true and false statements, the correct method to acquire knowledge and who is qualified to speak the truth.<sup>45</sup> This is, as noted before, not a matter of what is true, but of what can be made to appear as true. To find examples of this technique, one need only open any Chicano history book: the violation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the blurring of what is justice and injustice in the second half of the nineteenth century, the exclusion of Chicanos from labor unions and schools, the manipulation of immigration laws, deportations, the zoot-suit riots, and charges of "reverse discrimination." From the perspective of Meshicano discourse and Chicano Studies, every one of these instances represents a struggle to establish what actually happened as opposed to what has been given the status of truth.

### *Academic Control of Discourse*

Even in academic disciplines we find procedures of control in the production of truth.<sup>46</sup> Disciplines allow us to build a discourse, but only within a narrow framework. They are defined by groups of objects of study, methods, a body of propositions considered to be true (the literature), and the interplay of rules, definitions, techniques and tools. In order to speak the truth within a discipline, one must obey the rules of some discursive policy that takes the form of a permanent reactivation of a set of rules. It is precisely the resistance to these rules and regulations that gives rise to a Chicano Studies discipline. The first generation of Chicanos who entered academia found that history, political science, sociology and other academic disciplines were somehow detrimental to their search for knowledge about their own culture. Through the establishment of Chicano Studies, these scholars hoped to validate their discourse. But this validation was thwarted by restrictions in terms of material support. Meshicano professors were denied tenure, Chicano Studies courses were not required for graduation, programs were funded with "soft" monies, editors and publishers would not publish articles or books by Chicanos, and many that were published, soon were out of print. There are, of course, exceptions.

The rule is, however, that the knowledge provided by hundreds of dissertations, studies and research projects did not have the effect on institutional practices that they might have if the authors had been speaking from positions within the dominant culture.

### *Status of Chicano Intellectuals*

There are various methods to limit the number of people who are given the charge of speaking the truth. One of these methods is the establishment of the status of the speaking individual through (1) the criteria of competence; (2) systems of differentiation and relation with other individuals or groups with the same status; (3) the function of this status in relation to society in general and the Meshicano community in particular; (4) the institutional sites that lend legitimacy to their statements; and (5) the various positions occupied by the speaking individual in information networks. This allocation of individuals is determined by a "politics of truth"—a Chicanology. Thus we find ourselves in a very uncomfortable position when we realize that our demand for more Meshicanos in positions of authority has not been realized in terms of the acquisition of power. Rodolfo Acuña refers to this development as the rise of the Meshicano bureaucrats, power brokers who function as agents of social control.<sup>47</sup> This is precisely what Chávez Ortiz denounced in very harsh terms in his reference to Mrs. Bañuelos. To be sure, this is not a matter of labeling successful individuals as "*vendidos*" (sellouts), but a description of the workings of power that go beyond intentionality (or why we never know what we need to know). In effect, this situation may be getting worse:

Relative gains are visible in the modest improvements for the middle class—for the most part, college educated professionals and small business persons—and the increment in wealth for the wealthy entrepreneurs. . . . However, because of political self-protection, the advantaged move in step with the reigning conservatism and the distance that separates them from the working poor of their own community potentially could increase.<sup>48</sup>

### *Fellowships of Discourse*

More restricted than academic disciplines is the control of discourse by what may be called fellowships of discourse. Their function is to

preserve, reproduce or circulate discourse according to strict regulations and within a closed community. For example, the Anglo Texans in 1832 and 1835, borrowing a technique from their revolutionary forefathers, formed municipal committees for safety and correspondence. These committees, which brought citizens together outside of legal channels, became an important vehicle for bringing on the declaration of independence of Texas.<sup>49</sup> Meshicano organizations such as *mutualistas* and groups such as the *Penitentes*<sup>50</sup> also fall into this category. Meshicano youth in the barrios have their own fellowship of discourse which is restricted by the discourse of *caló*. More commonplace are technical, scientific, medical, economic, teaching discourses and others that follow different schemes of exclusivity and disclosure.

### *Doctrine*

At first sight, doctrine (religious, political, philosophical) would seem to be the reverse of a fellowship of discourse, for among the latter, the number of speakers is, if not fixed, at least limited. It is among this number that discourse is allowed to circulate and be transmitted. Doctrine, on the other hand, tends towards diffusion. It is the holding in common of a discourse on which individuals, as many as possible, can define their reciprocal allegiance. In appearance, the only requisite is the recognition of the same truths and the acceptance of a rule of conformity with these truths. If it were a question of just that, doctrines would be barely different from scientific or academic disciplines. The control of discourse would bear only on the form or content of what was said. Doctrines, however, involve both the speaker and the spoken. Doctrines involve the statements of speakers in the sense that they are, permanently, the instruments and the manifestations of an adherence to a class, a social or racial status, a nationality, a struggle, a revolt. In short, doctrine links people to a certain type of statement while barring them from all others. It brings about a dual subjection, that of speaking individuals to discourse and that of discourse to the group of individual speakers. The restriction imposed by doctrine is illustrated by José Antonio Villareal R., author of *Pocho*. Referring to the effects of the "doctrine" of the Chicano Movement on Chicano literature, he states:

What resulted then is that an unwritten set of standards began to take form. Codes for Chicano literature were explicit. First and foremost

was the fact that we could never criticize ourselves as long as we followed this developing pattern.<sup>51</sup>

### *Education*

On a much broader scale there is education as the social appropriation of discourse. Education is the instrument whereby every individual can gain access to any kind of discourse. We well know that in its distribution, in what it permits and in what it prevents, it follows the well-trodden battle lines of social conflict. Every educational system is a political means of maintaining, or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and powers that it carries with it. Of course, these forms of control of discourse—the status given to individual speakers, fellowships of discourse, doctrinal groups and social appropriations—are linked together, constituting a corporation that distributes speakers among the different types of discourse. What is an educational system after all, but the allocation of discourse to specific individual speakers, the constitution of a diffused doctrinal group, a distribution and appropriation of discourse with all its pedagogical powers? Thus, the control of Meshicano discourse, the reason that “the people do not know what it is that they must know in order to survive” is to be found in the educational process. This is why Chávez Ortiz’s children and the vast majority of Meshicano children “have attended school for many years and they know absolutely nothing.”

Education as a mechanism for the control of Meshicano discourse combines all the procedures discussed above. It manifests itself in the curricula of all grades, and is, in effect, an extension of the Societal Curriculum discussed by Carlos E. Cortís. This is because “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.”<sup>52</sup> If power is to be studied at the extreme points of its exercise, where it is less legal in character, one must look at the very battle line where hegemonic and counter-hegemonic practices meet face to face with very tragic results: school failure among Meshicano children, for instance. Such failure leads to other battle fronts such as youth gangs in the barrios and high arrest and incarceration rates for these youths. With reference to bio-power,<sup>53</sup> what we have here is, in effect, a body count of the struggle between Chicanology and Meshicano discourse. Here, too, power is effective to



the extent that it is invisible. Thus the difficulty in finding solutions to the problem of school failure: is it culture, language, a cast-like status, or "dramaturgical communicative competence?"<sup>54</sup>

If we define the property of discourse as the ability to invest discourse into institutional practices (public policy), then what we have just considered are the techniques, procedures and mechanisms by which that corporation of truth called ChicanoLOGY appropriates, organizes, rearranges and distributes Meshicano discourse to deflect its impact on these institutional practices. We can now answer Ricardo Sánchez's question. The people do not know what it is they must know because their discourse and its inherent power is either forbidden outright, considered insane or irrational, declared a falsehood, or restricted by academic disciplines, and the educational process, in general.

To reiterate the thrust of these discussions, what is being proposed here is an analysis of discourse that includes both erudite knowledge and local memories. This will establish a historical knowledge of struggles and make use of this knowledge tactically today. Discursive analysis is not a return to a more careful or exact form of science; though it does not call for a lyrical knowledge or the right of ignorance. Such analysis seriously considers the claims of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledge against the claims of a unitary body of theory that filters and orders them in the name of true knowledge and a politicized idea of science. The focus of this analysis, then, is on the insurrection of knowledges that are opposed primarily to the effects of centralizing powers linked to scientific discourse.<sup>55</sup> Further study along these lines would address, *for a specific historical event*: (1) the goals and objectives of Meshicano discourse; (2) the status given to the speakers of such discourse; (3) the operational conceptual scheme; (4) the institutionalization of these three aspects; and (5) the ultimate effects of this particular discourse on the actual physical body of the people (biopower).

It is critical to make one very important clarification. The struggle between ChicanoLOGY and Meshicano discourse has been presented in terms of a dialectical relationship for the sake of simplicity. It is not, however, as if all Meshicanos speak from within Meshicano discourse, and all Anglos speak from within ChicanoLOGY. As already noted, power functions in terms of manifold relationships that are determined by specific conditions. Thus, depending on the particular struggle under investigation, we may find Chicanos making statements dictated by

Chicanology and, conversely, Anglos obeying the rules of Meshicano discourse. Any ethnic group found in the United States can speak either discourse (from within their own discourses, their own power/knowledge relations). It is precisely the purpose of discursive analysis to reveal the specific, ever-shifting micro-physics of power and its micro-mechanisms. In passing, it should be noted that this is particularly important when culture is conceptualized as a platonic entity: "It's a (brown, black, red, yellow) thing. You wouldn't understand." Often multicultural relations are perceived as being above not only race and class but most critically, above relations of power.

In conclusion, the essential political problem for the intellectual is not to criticize the ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or to ensure that his own scientific practice is accompanied by a correct ideology. Rather, it is a matter of ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth. The problem is not changing people's consciousness—or what's in their heads—but the political, economic institutional regime of the production of truth. It is not a matter of emancipating the truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony within which it operates at the present time. The political question is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology. It is truth itself.<sup>56</sup>

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Ricardo Sánchez, *Hechizospells* (Los Angeles: Chicano Studies Center Publications, 1976), p. 91. Incidentally, I believe Ricardo Sánchez meant "seno," and not "ceno."

<sup>2</sup> Mario Barrera, *Race and Class in the Southwest* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), p. 219.

<sup>3</sup> Juan Gómez-Quiñones, *Chicano Politics: Reality and Promise, 1940-1990* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990), p. 19. It should be noted that, besides misspelling my last name, this author erroneously refers to my work as belonging to the language critical-theory of the Frankfurt School which he considers "socially abstract or potentially one more manipulation to further veiled interests, or at worse an argument for no politics." (p. 221-222). Clearly, though, he is against any analysis of discourse. The correct analysis, he claims, involves "(real) politics (involving)

conscious individuals acting rationally . . ." p. 30. This is, however, not the proper place for a critique of his assumption that the self is a coherent, stable individual engaged in an "objective" world through a transparent representational language.

<sup>4</sup> Jane Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory," *Signs* 12, 4. (1987): 621. Quoted in Mustafa U. Kiziltan, William J. Bain and Anita Canizares M. "Post Modern Conditions: Rethinking Public Education," *Educational Theory* (Summer 1990, Vol 40. No. 3), p. 352. For a thorough, concrete analysis of postmodern transformations, look at the working papers produced by *The Post-Industrial Future Project: A Canadian Exploration of the Implications of Profound Societal Change*, Ruben Nelson, Director, (Canmore, A.B. Canada: Square One Management, 1989). For a brief discussion of the various definitions of postmodernism, see Stanley Aranowitz and Henry Giroux, *Postmodern Education*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991. pp. 60-67.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* p. 353.

<sup>6</sup> The term "Meshicano" is here used to address three concerns. One is to emphasize the symbiotic relationship between power and language (i.e. discourse). Nearly five centuries ago Cristóbal Colón appropriated the power to define, and thus dominate, what he had encountered: the native peoples became Indians, and later, Americans. Another exercise of the power to define took place at the beginning of the Chicano movement when the term "Chicano" was used as an abbreviated form for "Mexicans north of the Río Bravo, and 'Chicanismo' meant a politically charged Mexicanidad (*sic.*)." But, as Juan Gómez-Quiñones astutely observes "with hindsight, one can ask whether "Chicanismo" . . . was one more effort to subsume Mexican identity with all its implications." (cf. *infra*, *Chicano Politics*, p. 104). There is also the question of etymology. The letter "x" in México originally had a "sh" sound and it was changed by the Spaniards into a "j" sound (h in English). If we want to come close to the original Náhuatl word, we would say that some Meshicanos live in Meshico and others live in the United States. Then, in the 1960s some of the latter dropped the "Me-" prefix and simply called themselves "Chicanos." None of these concerns, however, are intended as an argument for what is the "correct" name. Such decisions are made within the context of a political economy of discourse, not by individuals. Thus, Gutierrez Tibón has found seventy versions of the word "México," yet he considers chicano a "*corrupción pachuca de mexicano*" in *Historia del nombre y de la fundación de México*, Segunda edición, (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1983), p. 420. At any rate, it is revealing of the unfortunate state of affairs, that the term with more currency today is "Hispanic."

<sup>7</sup> I use the word "*re-produced*" because at various points in this article I use Foucault's own words which I have "poached" from different texts. This was done for various reasons. One is the difficulty in paraphrasing him. Another is to avoid a cumbersome fragmentation of the text by frequent quoting and interpolation of my own remarks. Most importantly, as Michel de Certeau points out in *The Practice of Everyday Life*, reading is "poaching": "The reader takes neither the position of the author nor an author's position. He invents in texts something different from what they 'intended.'"

He detaches them from their (lost or accessory origin). He combines their fragments and creates something un-known in the space organized by their capacity for allowing an indefinite plurality of meanings." (tr. Steven F. Rendall, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 169. I have, however, taken care to note the sources of the various fragments when these deviate from the main discussion which can be found in Michel Foucault's "Two Lectures," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, Colin Gordon, editor (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pp. 78-108. For an intimate discussion of Foucault's writings see Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988. For an informative discussion of his work, a complete bibliography and biography and his last interview (five months before he died), see James Bernauer and David Rasmussen's, *The Final Foucault* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988).

<sup>8</sup> Foucault, "Two Lectures," *Power/Knowledge*, p. 88.

<sup>9</sup> Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, Colin Gordon, editor (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 119.

<sup>10</sup> Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, Volume I, tr. Robert Hurley, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 89.

<sup>11</sup> Foucault, "Truth and Power," *Power/Knowledge*, p. 122.

<sup>12</sup> Barrera, *Race and Class in the Southwest*, p. 172

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Foucault, "Two Lectures," *Power/Knowledge*, p. 95.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 92-93. This transformation was the object of Foucault's *oeuvre*. Some examples are *Madness and Civilization*, tr. Richard Howard (New York: Pantheon, 1965); *The Order of Things*, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1970); *The Birth of the Clinic*, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1973); *Discipline and Punish*, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*, tr. Robert Hurley, (New York: Pantheon, 1978). For a complete bibliography see James Bernauer and Thomas Keenan, "The Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984" in James Bernauer and David Rasmussen's, *The Final Foucault* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988) pp.119-159.

<sup>16</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, p. 140-141.

<sup>17</sup> Foucault, "Two Lectures," *Power/Knowledge*, p. 105.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.106-107.

<sup>19</sup> Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, p. 141.

<sup>20</sup> Ira Shor and Paulo Freire, *A Pedagogy for Liberation: Dialogues on Transforming Education* (New York: Bergin & Garvey, 1987), pp. 12-13. See also Henry A Giroux,

*Teachers as Intellectuals: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of Learning* (Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey, 1988), pp. 114-116.

- <sup>21</sup> There are many observations of the relationship between social science and disciplinary mechanisms. One very specific example is Alexander Liazos, "The Poverty of the Sociology of Deviance: Nuts, Sluts, and 'Preverts,'" in Stuart H. Traub and Craig B. Little, *Theories of Deviance*, Third Edition, Itasca: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1985. More extensive and recent examples are: James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989 and Renato Rosaldo, *Truth and Culture: The Remaking of Social Analysis*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1989. The most specific discussion of this topic, however, is Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
- <sup>22</sup> Foucault, "Two Lectures," *Power/Knowledge*, p. 93-94.
- <sup>23</sup> These methodological guidelines have been compiled from two sources: "Two Lectures," *Power/Knowledge*, pp. 96-102 and *The History of Sexuality*, pp. 94-95.
- <sup>24</sup> Foucault, "Truth and Power," *Power/Knowledge*, p.131.
- <sup>25</sup> V.Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. x.
- <sup>26</sup> Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 3.
- <sup>27</sup> Carlos E. Cortés, "The Societal Curriculum and the School Curriculum," *Educational Leadership*, XXXVI, 7 (April, 1979), pp. 475-479. More recently he has extended this conception in "The Education of Language Minority Students: A Contextual Interaction Model," in *Beyond Language: Social and Cultural Factors in Schooling Language Minority Students* (Los Angeles: Evaluation, Dissemination and Assessment Center, California State University, Los Angeles, 1986), pp. 3-33.
- <sup>28</sup> Raymund Paredes, "The Origins of Anti-Mexican Sentiment in the United States," *New Directions in Chicano Scholarship*, Ricardo Romo and Raymund Paredes, editors (San Diego: University of California, 1978), 139-165.
- <sup>29</sup> Octavio Romano-V. developed a critique of this view through his journal *El Grito*. See for example "The Anthropology and Sociology of the Mexican American: The Distortion of Mexican American History," *El Grito* Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall, 1968).
- <sup>30</sup> Américo Paredes, *With his Pistol in his Hand*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), p. 18.
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p.16.
- <sup>32</sup> Foucault, "Two Lectures," *Power/Knowledge*, p. 81.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

- <sup>34</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in "Introduction: Rhizome," *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 7-21 passim.
- <sup>35</sup> This is a paraphrase of the event as described in the *Los Angeles Times*, July 6, 1972.
- <sup>36</sup> David F. Gómez, *Somos Chicanos: Strangers in Our Own Land* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 177-187, passim.
- <sup>37</sup> "(Nominated) by President Richard Nixon and subsequently confirmed by the Senate as Treasurer of the United States. During the Senate investigation into her qualifications, it was discovered she was hiring "illegal aliens" from Mexico . . . In the barrio it is common knowledge that she has made her fortune in the Mexican food business exploiting cheap labor from Mexico." *Ibid.* p. 183.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 177-187 passim.
- <sup>39</sup> Michel Foucault, "The Discourse on Language," *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), pp. 215-237. This appendix contains a discussion of the various forms of exclusion of discourse.
- <sup>40</sup> Gómez, *Somos Chicanos*, p. 186.
- <sup>41</sup> For the meaning of "tactic" as an act of resistance against a "strategic" force, see Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. xvii-xx.
- <sup>42</sup> Juan Gómez-Quiñones., "Plan de San Diego Revisited," *Aztlan* (Spring, 1970), pp. 124-132.
- <sup>43</sup> David J. Weber, *Foreigners in Their Native Land* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973), pp. 129-130.
- <sup>44</sup> Paredes, "The Origins of Anti-Mexican Sentiment," p. 165.
- <sup>45</sup> Foucault, *Archaeology*, pp. 217-220.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 222-224.
- <sup>47</sup> Rodolfo Acuña, *Occupied America: A History of Chicanos*, Third edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), pp. 377-386.
- <sup>48</sup> Juan Gómez-Quiñones, *Chicano Politics: Reality and Promise, 1940-1990*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990), p. 195.
- <sup>49</sup> Weber, *Foreigners in Their Native Land*, p. 105.
- <sup>50</sup> Robert J. Rosenbaum, *Mexicano Resistance in the Southwest* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 145-146.

- <sup>51</sup> Antonio Villareal R. "Chicano Literature: Art and Politics from the Perspective of The Artist," in *The Identification and Analysis of Chicano Literature*, Francisco Jimenez, Editor, (New York: Bilingual Press, 1979), p. 163.
- <sup>52</sup> Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 27.
- <sup>53</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, p. 140.
- <sup>54</sup> See John Ogbu and Maria Eugenia Matute-Bianchi, "Understanding Sociocultural Factors: Knowledge, Identity, and School Adjustment," in *Beyond Language: Social and Cultural Factors in Schooling Language Minority Students* (Los Angeles: Evaluation, Dissemination and Assessment Center, California State University, Los Angeles 1986). A critique and attempt to improve this assessment is provided by Douglas E. Foley, "Reconsidering Anthropological Explanations of Ethnic School Failure," *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, Volume 22, 1991. The latter publication includes a critical commentary of both perspectives by Henry T. Trueba.
- <sup>55</sup> Foucault, "Two Lectures," *Power/Knowledge*, p. 83.
- <sup>56</sup> Foucault, "Truth and Power," *Power/Knowledge*, p. 133.

