Mexican Americans in the 1990s: Politics, Policies, and Perceptions
Perspectives in Mexican American Studies is an ongoing series devoted to Chicano/a research. Focusing on Mexican Americans as a national group, Perspectives features articles and essays that cover research from the pre-Colombian era to the present. All selections published in Perspectives are refereed.

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INTRODUCTION

This edition of Perspectives in Mexican American Studies focuses on identity, culture, and politics. Although these themes are identified separately in this introduction, their discussion in the selections that make up this issue of Perspectives are by no means always separate and distinct. Often, they are discussed concomitantly because they overlap or are inextricably linked.

Two major foci of the Chicana/o Movement in the 1960s and 1970s were culture and identity. El Movimiento was, of course, highly political as well. One of the critical elements for Chicanas/os was the development of a unique identity that would articulate the goals and aspirations of the movement, and challenge the prevailing assimilationist ideology. In “Constructing the Chicano Movement: Synthesis of a Militant Ethos,” Ignacio García describes the stages it went through as people within the Movement worked toward their goals. The ethos and these stages, which embodied specific characteristics, propelled the movement and fundamentally changed the way Mexican Americans perceived themselves. In reviewing the historiography of the Chicana/o Movement, García challenges some of the prevailing interpretations, and calls upon researchers and scholars to study El Movimiento as a social process, rather than a series of events.

Educational reform, especially at the college and university level, was also at the heart of the Chicano Movement. As a result of student and community activism, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a burgeoning number of programs and centers. A failing economy, the prolonged recession it triggered, and a growing conservative backlash in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in many programs being scaled back or eliminated. This threat to the hard-won gains made by Chicanas/os resulted in renewed efforts to reconstitute departments and programs on campuses. In “Chicano Movement Chicano Studies: Social Science and Self-Conscious Ideology,” Raoul Contreras surveys the events that took place at UCLA in 1993, when students and their supporters demanded the establishment of a Chicano Studies department. The central focus of his essay is a theoretical analysis of the exogenous and ideological forces that propelled supporters and opponents involved in the controversy.

Armando Navarro traces developments and changes in the Chicano Movement between 1975 and 1996 in “The Post Mortem Politics of the Chicano Movement: 1975-1996.” In the process he delineates the forces that have eroded the militancy and altered the focus of the Movement. In the first phase, which he terms the “Viva Yo” stage, the movement became moribund because of the growth of neo-conservatism, the decline of the civil rights struggle, the power struggles and divisions extant within
the movement itself, and because of the external forces that had propelled and united it in the 1960s were no longer present. The result was the emergence of a generation of leaders who were more moderate to conservative in their outlook and politics. Increasingly this return to mainstream assimilationist goals among the Viva Yo generation was, in part, reflected in their growing acceptance of the term “Hispanic” to identify themselves. The need to assuage different constituencies in order to be elected led them to turn more to ballot box politics rather than protest and confrontation. In a related vein, this group was not immune to the nativism and racism that characterized the 1980s and 1990s. This resulted in a turn on their part to the second phase, which Navarro terms the “politics of scapegoating.” In this stage, Hispanics blamed the problems of their group and of the United States on immigrants. The consequences and impact of this second stage on the movement are further delineated in his essay. Navarro concludes by suggesting strategies for building a new movement.

Immigration re-emerged in the 1980s and 1990s as a major issue that created problems and challenges for Chicana/o and Hispanic elected officials. The dilemmas they faced in addressing the needs of differing constituencies, and the impact that controversial issues have on their politics and actions are delineated in the essay, “Divided We Stand, United We Fall: Latinos and Immigration Policy,” by David M. Hernández. The debate, strategies, and policies of the immigration question have plagued the efforts of Latinos and Latinas to respond to the anti-immigrant attitudes and legislation that have emerged in the past few years. But as Hernández points out, the attacks emanating from the anti-immigrant forces have not always proved divisive for Latinas/os. For example, the controversial Proposition 187 galvanized political activism among them. He argues that much of the resurgent Latina/o political activism has been built on the Latino pro-immigrant’s infrastructure that emerged to counter the activities of the anti-immigrant forces. Nonetheless, the widespread immigrant bashing has blurred the lines between legal and undocumented immigration. This has seriously divided Latinos themselves, hindering political efforts. Hernández’s essay analyzes the effects of this contradictory, divisive, and perilous dilemma.

Too often, the debate over immigration becomes mired in rhetoric, losing sight of the human dimension. Critics of immigration rely on heavy handed and inaccurate stereotypes to bolster their arguments and campaigns. A major outcome of the immigrant bashing has been the tendency to dehumanize the immigrants themselves. This often creates an environment that is intolerant to their presence, and indifferent to their human and civil rights. Such was the case in Arizona in 1976, when three undocumented immigrants were captured and brutalized by a local rancher and his sons. The events leading up to their capture and torture, and the indictments and trial that followed are described by Christine Marín in “They Sought Work and Found Hell:
The Hanigan Case of Arizona." In relating the events Marín also presents the dilem-
mas and problems that the case created for Hispanic politicians, and how it polarized
the community. In essence, the trial focused national and international attention on
the situation along the border, and profoundly affected the politicians and civil rights
organizations that the trial touched. This case study ably demonstrates the dilemmas
and consequences that the issue of immigration imposes on organizations and politi-
cians that Hernández and Navarro allude to in their essays.

the theoretical and scholarly debate over culture and identity in New Mexico. The
main issue in this controversy is whether the identity and culture of New Mexicans is
unique and distinct when compared to other Hispanics in the Southwest. One school
of thought holds that social, geographic, and historic elements created a uniquely
Mexican American culture in northern New Mexico. Opponents of this argue that
this leads to misleading stereotypes and incorrect assumptions about the identity and
make up of Mexican Americans. At issue in this debate is the question of ethnic iden-
tity, the purposes it serves, and the forces and ideas that help shape and define it. After
outlining the main currents of this debate, Gonzales offers an analysis and critique of
each of the major viewpoints. Given the complex and dynamic nature of this question,
Gonzales believes the discussion should be placed within a broader social, political,
and historical context.

In “Power, Borders, and Identity Formation: Understanding the World of Chi-
cana/o Students” Marc Pizarro reviews the literature on identity, and proposes meth-
ods and frameworks that will further understanding of the forces that shape identity
among Mexican Americans. Just as in the incident involving the Hanigans, where
power, ethnicity, and intolerance played major roles in the events and actions that
transpired on that hot August day along the U.S.-Mexican border, so do these ele-
ments factor into the experiences that profoundly influenced the identity of the stu-
dents interviewed by Pizarro. For those students, racial confrontations and discrimina-
tion played important roles in the formation of their identity. He concludes that eth-
nicity and the power relationships that these students experienced were at the core of
how they perceived and identified themselves.

In his essay on film, Mario Barrera looks at another powerful force affecting the
Film Analysis,” he discusses the key differences between film makers and film analysts
in how they gauge a movie’s impact. According to Barrera, film makers focus on how
effective they were in reaching the audience, while academic analysts examine the po-
litical and ideological elements of a film. This often results in completely differing
perspectives and interpretations about the film itself. It is therefore important for film
scholars to understand the perspective of the film maker, the core myths and story paradigms that are common to many feature films, and the constraints that film makers operate under. To Barrera, American feature films are basically mythic in nature. The use of these popular myths, which are rooted in the Western cultural tradition, are intended to appeal to the values of the audience. Thus, in addition to ideological analyses, academics must add considerations about the mythic and dramatic dimensions to their appraisals and discussions of feature films. In discussing La Bamba, Born in East L.A., and El Norte in this context, Barrera speaks to the issues of politics, identity, and transculturation in each of the main characters in these films.

"Chicanos in the Northwestern and Midwestern United States: A History of Cultural and Political Commonality," by Daniel Estrada and Richard Santillán, is a broad survey about the organizing efforts of Mexican Americans in these two regions. Their essay begins by providing a brief overview of the arrival of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the Midwest and Pacific Northwest before the Great Depression. They then discuss how the depression of the 1930s, the Second World War, and the Chicano Movement that followed exercised a profound influence on the communities that developed in these regions. The remainder of the essay describes the plethora of organizations that have emerged there to deal with the diverse and vexing issues that affect people of Mexican descent. It is evident that these organizations have served the community in a variety of ways, thus dispelling the notion that Mexican Americans have been passive in dealing with their own needs. Central to these organizing efforts has been the goal to forge and reinforce a positive identity among Mexican Americans and other Hispanics. Another important element in describing the history and political behavior extant in these communities has been the central role played by women. The authors conclude their study by calling for more research on political organizing and activism in the Midwest and Pacific Northwest.

Our thanks to the authors for their thoughtful and provocative essays. Their work and patience made this volume possible. Our gratitude also to Professor Adela de la Torre, director of the Mexican American Studies & Research Center, and to Holly M. Smith, dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences at the University of Arizona, for their continued support of this publication.

Juan R. García & Thomas Gelsinon, Co-Editors
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August 1997
CONSTRUCTING THE CHICANO MOVEMENT: SYNTHESIS OF A MILITANT ETHOS

Ignacio M. García

Recent attacks on immigrants and on Affirmative Action, coupled with the mean-spirited political climate in the U.S. Congress, have brought a revival of Chicano activism on college campuses and in scholarly conferences. With it has come a revival of the rhetoric of the Chicano Movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Young activists have declared the interred movement alive and refer to their activism as movimiento-inspired. This is not new as the movement continues to dwarf all other post-1970s activism within the Mexican American community. Try as they may, Chicano political pundits have yet to successfully label the activism of the post-movement era in any lasting manner. So every new social crisis in the barrio brings out those who claim to be movement activists, even though some of them are not old enough to remember the 1970s.

This should tell us that the movement continues to have ideological and emotional attraction for Chicanos today. The attraction is partly romantic, much like that which the 1960s has on young white activists of today. But another, more important reason is that the movement represented a fundamental shift in the way Mexican Americans saw themselves. During the period in which the movement played itself out, Chicanos developed new ideas, refined cultural characteristics, and adopted new ways to accommodate to American society. New leaders arose, and old ones revamped much of their thinking. As such, it became the basis for modern Chicano activism. This being the case, it is natural that activists today seek to emulate, or at least build on that which came from the movement.

Interestingly, we have never fully understood the Chicano Movement, and much of the scholarship ignores or downplays its real significance by emphasizing its failures. The majority of the narratives and analyses of the movement have failed to provide a framework or theoretical model that would test the varied interpretations of this social upheaval. Most are written from a regional
perspective, or influenced by the author's ideological attachment or detachment from particular movimiento organizations. Most who have written about the movement have been Marxist scholars who, for the most part, find fault with the nationalist tendencies of the activism, and its failure to promote a true class-struggle agenda. Except for Armando Navarro's recent work, most nationalist interpretations of the movement promote activism rather than explain it. This should in no way imply that the works have all been lacking in scholarship quality or insight. Rather it signifies that the study of the Chicano Movement is still young. Its legacies are yet to be completely determined. Because of this, there is much popular interpretation of what the movement did or did not do. And like Che Guevara, the movement is used to legitimize a number of political crusades that are not only contradictory to each other but contradict even the spirit of the movement itself.

My interest in this essay is to promote a different framework for the study of the Chicano Movement. I seek to move beyond the narratives of "participation" and from the Marxist and neo-nationalist interpretations of the past. Rather than look at the "story" of the movement, I look at the "process" of what has come to be known as Chicanismo. This study of process looks at the development of ideas, strategies, tactics, and rationalizations that the Chicano community used to respond to external and internal challenges. Or what Armando Navarro calls "exogenous and endogenous antagonisms." In this case, the process led to the formation of a Chicano ethos that the Mexican American community used in the 1960s and 1970s to combat racism, discrimination, poverty, and segregation, and to define itself politically and historically. This ethos synthesized at least partially the problems of the Mexican American community in terms that most Mexican Americans could understand. It "spoke" their language, a language buttressed by years of discrimination, violence, and neglect by the American mainstream. The ethos also promoted new solutions to powerlessness and poverty that went further than those of most other non-violent Chicano resistance movements of the past.

Spurred by this ethos, the movement caused a fundamental shift in the way many Mexican Americans perceived themselves within American society. New activists arose who renewed the debate and discussion on being a Mexican in American society. This debate, and the subsequent change in attitude that it engendered, led to a number of new artistic and intellectual currents within the
Mexican American community. Artists gave rise to a form of art that extolled the virtues of the *la raza* and of the Mexican indigenous past; writers and poets wrote a literature inclusive of the community’s culture; and scholars and grassroots intellectuals gave rise to a scholarship that promoted a new historical construct that freed Mexican Americans from self-victimization, and shifted the blame for their powerlessness to Anglo American society. All of these actions were motivated by a politics of self-identity and communal empowerment that sought to transcend the class and social barriers that kept Mexican Americans locked in poverty, and political powerlessness. A political “consciousness” of being a *mexicano* in the United States became the impetus for this social upheaval.

I posit that during the early 1960s and through the late 1970s the Chicano community’s activists, reformers, and intellectuals went through several stages in their philosophical evolution, and during that process the Chicano Movement arose and played itself out. These stages, which I will explain later, were: 1) a rejection of the liberal agenda; 2) a reinterpretation of history; 3) a reaffirmation of race and class; and 4) the creation of an oppositional polity. The stages proved to be uneven, and at times unfocused and contradictory. Nevertheless they generated a multiplicity of ideas in the Mexican American community. The process helped coalesce numerous philosophical and historical currents within the community. The unification of these thoughts caused Mexican Americans to see themselves as a community with a glorious past and a bright future. It also provided a base for a cultural-political movement that transformed the Chicano landscape. That movement, I repeat, played itself out in phases, rather than through actions or events. Thus, the Chicano Movement should be studied as a *social process* rather than a series of events stimulated by organizations or individuals. I do not downplay the effects that these had on the barrios of the United States, but I try to put them within the context of a larger social catharsis.

A historical definition of the Chicano Movement, and a review of what scholars have said about this social process are imperative before I set forth the steps of this process. The Chicano Movement may be defined as a social movement that erupted in the 1960s to protest the circumstances in which the Mexican American community found itself. Breaking with the legalistic and moralistic strategies of the Mexican American Generation, new activists promoted
mass mobilization against American institutions. This emotional, but predominantly non-violent, reform movement included several concerns of great importance to a diverse community. Among these were the fear of cultural genocide, the lack of economic and social mobility, rampant discrimination, and inadequate educational opportunity and access. The movement did not have an exclusively political-electoral character, as Chicanos fought racism and neglect in education, housing, employment, and in the realm of culture and identity. Calls for self-determination and identity became an important element of the movement. For many activists, the Mexican American community had reached a juncture in its historical odyssey that required a social and political outburst to make significant changes in the barrios.

Rodolfo Acuña describes the movement as a renewal of the ongoing struggle of Chicanos to liberate themselves from racism and exploitation. His analysis, once couched in the theory of internal colonialism, presents the Chicano Movement not as something new or particularly different from the struggles of the past, with the exception that it was more national in scope and waged predominantly in urban areas, notwithstanding the farm workers' union in California and the land grant battles in rural New Mexico. Though he later abandoned his internal colony model, Acuña continued to center his argument of Chicano oppression on the military conquest of the Southwest by U.S. forces and its colonizing effects. Even as new immigrants came into this country, they fell into the segmented circumstances created by conquest and colonization. In Acuña's view, the 1960s were dominated by a search for causes, often leading to a fanatical zeal for what was “Chicano.” Mexican American nationalism became a “natural response to 120 years of political, economic, and cultural suppression.”

Mario Barrera similarly argues that the Chicano Movement “drew on the heritage of Chicano political activism,” but “added distinctive new elements, such as the heavy involvement of youth and the emphasis on academic programs.” Barrera posits that Chicano youth perceived a political vacuum in traditional community politics as represented by Mexican American political groups and other middle-class organizations. These organizations were still preaching the moderate liberal agenda, while African Americans were taking to the streets and white youths were closing down universities. Chicano students, says Barrera, became “hypersensitive” to the conditions of the barrio and saw
themselves as the only ones bold enough to agitate for changes. In a way, the more Americanized students were confronting a cultural and generational gap that made them see their elders as being too passive at a time of heightened activism. Barrera argues that external conditions served as the major catalysts for the movement. The Kennedy election, the civil rights movement, the War on Poverty, Vietnam, and the Free Speech Movement were all stimulants to Chicano student activism. Once stimulated, the community activists developed an ideological agenda that combined "communitarian and egalitarian goals . . . and what may be seen as an almost nostalgic vision of community."14

Juan Gómez-Quiñones calls the Chicano Movement the liberal phase of Chicano political history, and the twelve years between 1966-1978 were a "junction between self-determination or integration."15 Chicano reformers were disillusioned with the uneven progress in the areas of civil rights and economic betterment. The Black civil rights and the white anti-war movements, argued Gómez-Quiñones, made the liberal agenda seem even more inadequate as Chicanos saw dissatisfaction within those groups they perceived as having more influence on mainstream society. The Cuban Revolution, and the African wars for independence as well as the Mexican student movement also galvanized "consciousness" among Chicanos. This consciousness was later given direction by the "Farm Workers Union, the Alianza, the Crusade for Justice, student organizations, and . . . La Raza Unida."16 The working class was key in this action and women were the organizational backbone of the movement. This movement, writes Gómez-Quiñones came to concentrate on the "questions of alienation, ethnicity, identity, class, gender, and chauvinism." It became a struggle for self-identification and a search for a legitimate past.17

Carlos Muñoz, the first major figure in the movement to write about it in an autobiographical style, agrees on the question of identity. Muñoz describes the movement as a social phenomenon placed in the "context of the politics of identity." For him, as with Gómez-Quiñones, students were the backbone of the drive for social change among Chicanos. Unlike Acuña, Muñoz does not see the movement as simply another phase of the Chicano struggle for liberation. In fact, the Chicano student movement signalled a departure from the struggles of the past because of its youthful nature, its ideological tendencies, and its search for identity.18 Working-class youths, many already at the universities, saw two major challenges confronting them. One was the atrocious con-
ditions of the barrios, and the other was their isolation from the historical and cultural process. These were young people who decided to embark on a journey to recapture their culture, history, and primarily their identity as Chicanos.¹⁹

Like Barrera, Muñoz sees external factors as being important in the politicalization of this generation of young people. These students were moved by events taking place around them. They confronted an unjust war in which Chicanos were dying at a high rate; they were seeing the Johnson liberal years giving way to the Nixon Administration; they were constantly being reminded of white middle-class discontent and Black anger. More important, they were beginning to see their elders radicalizing their politics.²⁰

While these Chicano scholars and others have provided an intellectual foundation for studying the Chicano Movement, their works can inadvertently depict Chicanos as no more than ideological emulators or political copycats who have waited for outside stimulants in order to rise from their slumber. This defeats the purpose of studying the movement and continues to perpetuate the notion that Chicanos have done little that is original, consequently little can be learned of social movements by studying them. This is a false analysis. This is based on a limited historical understanding. While outside stimulants were important, particularly in the latter stages of the movement, they were not the original catalysts. Three major events in Chicano history had occurred by the time the Black Power and anti-war movements had gathered steam. The Alianza Federal de Pueblos Libres was founded in 1962; Crystal City had exploded with its first Chicano revolt in 1963; and César Chávez had called his first strike in 1965. All these events occurred before the rise of the Black Power Movement in 1965-66, and the strong surge of the anti-war campaign from 1966 onward.

The Chicano Movement also was not simply a search for identity, nor an outburst of collective anxiety spurred by outside antagonisms. It was a full-fledged transformation in the way Mexican Americans thought, played politics, and promoted their culture. Chicanos embarked on a struggle to make fundamental political changes, and in the process they redefined their position in American society. No more were they to be an invisible minority without history or without a voice. Mexican Americans would no more be known only for their patriotism in time of war, and their work ethic during the harvest time.
To understand this change, one has to analyze the steps taken by significant sectors within the Mexican American community to develop a political consciousness, or ethos, that defined them as a distinct sector in American society. More focused than just a communal philosophy, a political ethos is the manner by which a community rationalizes and justifies its political participation in society. The development of that ethos required intellectuals, politicians, activists, and other influential individuals within la comunidad to assess their historical importance; recognize or decide on their class status or statuses; promote their cultural roots; and organize a political agenda. This process was neither uniform nor ideologically consistent throughout all the sectors which embarked on this philosophical odyssey. In fact, its diversity and often contradictory nature maintained this activity as an ethos rather than a political ideology.

During the movement, activists chose to identify certain symbols, events, rhetoric, and forms of resistance, and make them part of a pool of consciousness that gave meaning to the term Chicano, and the philosophy that came to be known as Chicanismo. By popularizing these elements through rhetoric and debate, Chicano activists developed a cultural-political taxonomy that explained their activism. This taxonomy differed from those of the past which were either pro-America or pro-Mexico. This new political identification was pro-barrio, and incorporated Americanism with the barrio's Mexicanism. For Mexican Americans, the negative aspects of the American experience, combined with the historical nostalgia for Mexico, created a cultural ambience that gave rise to Chicanismo. None of the works cited succeed in explaining this militant ethos. In fact, several of the authors completely ignore the existence of a political reservoir of ideas and strategies that go beyond promoting cultural pride or political separatism. The movement was driven by profound political and cultural precepts on being Chicano. To this day, no workable synthesis has been provided for looking at the development of a militant ethos in the Mexican American community.

In the first phase of the movement, Mexican American intellectuals, politicians, students, and others came to believe that the liberal agenda, which had been seen as the solution to the community's problems, was simply morally corrupt and a failure. This liberal agenda centered on an active government that would provide economic development, protect civil rights, and guarantee
cultural pluralism. It was an approach that required faith in the established institutions, and patience in the face of slow change. It was a steady approach of government action, judicial litigation, and Anglo American leadership. It also required that Mexican Americans wait for the "real" civil rights problems—those of Black Americans—to be solved before the focus shifted to them. Carlos Guerra, a Chicano activist and writer, succinctly described the dilemma when he said that Chicanos were not white enough to be accepted and not Black enough for the civil rights movement.²³

Time and time again, Mexican Americans had attempted to reach out to the mainstream by developing patriotic organizations, serving in the armed forces in large numbers, adopting American ideals and de-emphasizing their national origins. Yet, they remained outside the mainstream, and saw the economic and social gap widening between them and other Americans. Mexican American activists of the G.I. Generation were frustrated over the lack of progress on civil rights by the beginning of the 1960s. Court litigation, creation of patriotic organizations, and the support of liberal candidates had only a limited effect on the large number of Mexicans and Mexican Americans who continued to struggle with poverty and discrimination. Anglo American politicians and reformers did not seem interested in the dilemma. Most seemed only interested in enhancing their coalitions by adding Mexican American voters to their ranks. Wrote Hector P. García of the American G.I. Forum to a friend, "I don't think that we can expect anything from the Anglo politicians... They want us to help them, but they don't want to give us a break. What... can we do?"²⁴

The liberal agenda de-Mexicanized Chicanos but failed to Americanize them as a group, allowing them into the mainstream as individuals, not as a community. Even this entrance had its limited benefits as Americans of Mexican descent continued to be targets of racism and cultural insensitivity. Mexican Americans were allowed into the American mainstream to the degree that they rejected their "Mexicanness" or diluted their historical experience. A false historical experience became the "Spanish" missions, the fiestas, the Mexican participants in the battle of the Alamo, and the "Frito Bandito."

Chicano activists, ignored by the civil rights movement and other liberal crusades, lost faith in American society. They soon rejected the notion of a classless America, and questioned the historical continuity with American society that some of its elders argued existed.²⁵ They no longer saw the value of
patriotism, or of liberal leaders. In their eyes, American institutions such as government, schools, churches, and social agencies, had failed. American institutions, as far as activists were concerned, were inherently racist. In the passion of the movement, many activists even lost faith in a pluralistic society, believing that pluralism often meant diluting their cultural and philosophical ideas in order to belong to the whole, which remained dominated by those who believed in capitalistic exploitation of the poor, regarded African Americans as the only oppressed minority, and who had no historical understanding of or interest in the Mexican American experience.

The rejection of the liberal agenda led to a search for new solutions. These new solutions were oriented inward, and sought solutions born of experience, and based on cultural and philosophical tendencies native to the community. New leaders arose who were part of the community, and the organizations they founded shunned assimilation, and sought legitimacy not from the integrationist middle class but from the nationalistic working class. These organizations accentuated their ethnic culture for organizing purposes, and tended to be wary of liberal condescension. In rejecting the liberal agenda, Chicano activists sought to destroy the sense of inadequacy that many Mexican Americans felt in their relationship with mainstream society. Organizations such as the Crusade for Justice in Colorado, La Raza Unida Party in Texas, the Alianza Federal de Pueblos Libres in New Mexico and numerous others, competed with the League of United Latin American Citizens, the American G.I. Forum, and the Political Association of Spanish-speaking Organizations and other integrationist organizations as the activist entities of the Mexican American community. Other organizations such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project (SVREP) and the Mexican American Democrats (MAD) which staked out a ground between the two political philosophies also arose during this time.

In the second phase, Mexican American activists saw a need to reinterpret the past. They understood that the treatment of Mexican Americans was partly the result of the distorted view of them perpetuated by historians, social scientists, journalists, and the media in general. While Mexican American middle-class reformers had taken on many of the stereotypes, few of them had ever attempted a fundamental reinterpretation of the history of Mexican Americans. They had been content with emphasizing inclusion, and telling “their”
side of American history. Chicano activists believed, however, that for the barrios to develop the type of self-esteem and pride necessary for political action, Mexican Americans had to see themselves in a new light.

Chicano activists knew that Mexican Americans could overcome their powerlessness only if they could see themselves as a historical people with heroes, legends, triumphs, and legacies. Chicano historians discovered old heroes, and reinterpreted old events through a new nationalist framework that made Mexican Americans active participants in history. This reinterpretation led Mexican Americans to discard the stereotypes of the lazy, passive, mañana-oriented mexicano, and replace it with the proud, historically-rich Chicano/a, who was ready to fight for his or her community.27 Said Chicana activist and writer, Enriqueta Longeaux y Vásquez, “The raza wants [our] history back . . . our cities . . . mountains and rivers were explored and settled by Indians and Spaniards, not pilgrims and wagon masters. The first cattle raisers, cowboys and farmers were raza. We weren’t waiting here to be saved by the great white fathers.”28

Chicano scholars, writers, dramatists, poets, and activists found new protagonists in the forgotten history. They discovered revolutionists, journalists, lawyers, union organizers, and others who had fought against an overwhelming Anglo American onslaught.29 Their history often worked backwards chronologically. They posited that Chicanos were a strong and courageous people who had survived conquest, colonization, and racial brutality. Working back from that premise meant finding the “facts” to support the thesis. This new interpretation of history allowed Chicanos to become the evaluators and legitimizers of their history. And it provided them the opportunity to manipulate their historical significance and importance. Historical interpretation would be one of the most significant by-products of the movement, and would lead to the rise of Chicano studies as an academic discipline. This discipline had a political purpose and was nurtured under the watchful eyes of movement activists. Said an editorial in El Grito: “The responsibility . . . of those in Chicano programs is great, for should the end product be disfigured in any way, they will have turned victory into defeat, self-expression into self-denial, a dream into a nightmare, and a promise into . . . purposeless nothings.”30

The third phase led Chicano activists, intellectuals, and artists to affirm a rediscovered pride in their racial and class status, in their sense of peoplehood.
They emphasized their indigenous past, and glorified the ancient civilizations of Mexico and South America. *Indigenismo* became an important part of the new Chicano genealogy.31 “I am the eagle and serpent of Aztec civilization,” declared Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzales in 1969.32 While Chicanos would never successfully build alliances with the American Indian Movement, they nevertheless saw AIM’s struggle as part of theirs.33 The search for the “Indian” past led many Chicanos to study Mexican history. They soon found that much of the work on Mexico’s Indians, written by Anglo American scholars, depicted the Aztecs and Mayans as bloodthirsty, warlike, and repressive of their people.34 Many Chicanos began to look elsewhere for information. They read books by Mexican scholars, and sought original manuscripts by Mexican Indians. Some simply reconstructed writings by mainstream authors, gleaning every bit of information that contradicted the authors themselves. This search often led to the creation of a mythical past in which Native Americans were “devoid of aggression, warfare . . . perfidy, treason, intoxication, adultery, etc.”35 The search for this past also took them to José Vasconcelos’s ideas on the *raza cósmica*. This concept of a new race of mixed blood and origin, which would overshadow intellectually and spiritually other races, captivated Chicano activists. To them, Chicanos were the *raza cósmica*.

By accentuating their class status, Chicano activists and their adherents were able to legitimize, and at times romanticize, the lives of those who lived in the barrio. Mexican Americans, particularly the youth, were not embarrassed by the music they heard, the food they ate, the *curanderas* who cured their illnesses, or the home-grown philosophies shared across countless kitchen tables.36 This affirmation of race and class brought about a sense of solidarity with Third World movements for liberation, and united Chicanos with a worldwide revolution against oppression. It also spurred a renaissance of Chicano literature, theater, and art. Artists and writers now took the barrio as the setting for their work, and the working people or their indigenous ancestors as the protagonists. The attempt by earlier artists to integrate their works into the American mainstream ceased among many of the new and some of the old artists of the barrio. The search began for a “uniquely” Chicano literature, theater, and art. “*Ser Chicano es vivir como humano* (to be Chicano is to live like a human),” declared the *pinto* poet Ricardo Sánchez.37

In the final phase, Chicano activists engaged in oppositional politics. Un-
able to develop a national ideology, they developed platforms, manifestos, and tactics that best represented an oppositional strategy to the American mainstream. Rather than make things bearable for Mexican Americans, Chicano activists sought to empower their community to free it from Anglo American politicians, nativist educational curriculums, and cultural stereotypes. By engaging in oppositional politics, Chicano activists could emphasize the "Mexicanness" of the community and steer it away from integration into American society. To this end, they created their own political party, developed nationalist and quasi-socialist platforms, and manipulated local government agencies to be pro-Chicano and anti-Anglo. Chicano activists sought to question the "goodness" of American society, and undo the effects of years of segregation, discrimination, poverty, and political powerlessness. Without a national political party, or nationally-distributed journal or newspaper, Chicanismo often developed a regional context and regional priorities.

These politics of Aztlán developed within a framework depicting Mexican Americans as a historically and culturally-rich community seeking to liberate itself from, rather than accommodate to, Anglo American racism. Individuals became committed to the Chicano Movement through indoctrination, but also from the experience of being political. Commitment came when Chicanos in California stood between hostile law enforcement agents and striking farm workers, or when they walked the streets for Chicano candidates. In Tucson, Chicanos became committed when they camped out on the barrio grounds that were to become a golf course for Anglo Americans, and challenged the police to remove them. In Crystal City, Texas, and Albuquerque, New Mexico, Chicanos committed themselves through school boycotts, and the building of the La Raza Unida Party. From each struggle came anecdotes, songs, poems, political slogans, and heroes. These were the essence of political culture. Interpreted by Chicano activists within the context of their local struggles, they formed part of a larger political ethos.

The four phases, while at times sequentially inconsistent, provided an aperture for different sectors within the Mexican American community to enter the philosophical discourse on being Chicano. Intellectuals debated, politicians campaigned, artists drew, corridistas sang, and escritores wrote. For women, the movement provided an opportunity for them to regain their historical role as strugglers on behalf of the barrio and la familia. Even as Chicanos attempted
to develop a cultural nationalist philosophy, Chicanas challenged traditional Mexican orthodoxy. Rejection of the liberal agenda meant that new ground rules had to be established. The fact that women were among the first in nearly every Chicano organization of the period, meant that the Chicano Movement would be the most inclusive of all the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, allowing—at times only grudgingly—women to serve in most levels except the very top.

The reinterpretation of history provided Chicanas an opportunity to discover their Aztec goddesses, their union organizers, their radical journalists, their soldaderas, and their historical importance. In a history of struggle against oppression, Chicanas fought against the greatest odds, and most remained faithful to their ideals. The cultural renaissance which made the third phase possible depended heavily on women writers and poets. Said one Chicana activist in 1969, “When we talk about equality, we better talk about total equality.”

Women such as Inez Tovar, Evangelina Vigil, Carmen Tafolla, Denise Chávez and others wrote against simply reaffirming traditional gender roles within the Chicano family. Other Chicanas took positions of leadership, walked the picket lines, got arrested, and ran as candidates on independent Chicano slates. They also fought to bridge the gap between the public life of activism, and the private life of the family. Chicana activists came to view the oppression of women in the barrio as three-fold. Declared the Colorado Raza Unida Party platform, “For our women . . . there exists a triple exploitation . . . they are exploited as women, as people of la raza, and they suffer from . . . poverty.”

This meant that Chicana activists had to enlarge the political agenda from one concerned with race and national origins, to one that included gender and familial roles. They created a political paradigm that made the discussion of Chicana issues a permanent part—theoretically, if not always in practice—of the polemics of the struggle for self-determination.

In the politics of opposition, Chicanas were to play their biggest part. From the lettuce fields of southern California and the urban jungles of Colorado, to the political offices of La Raza Unida Party in Texas, Chicanas remained a political presence throughout the movimiento period. They could point to Dolores Huerta, Virginia Múzquiz, Luz Bazán Gutiérrez, Rosie Castro, Lupe Castillo, Enriqueta Longeaux y Vásquez, and other women who succeeded in assuming a political role. Unfortunately for Chicana activists, their inability to gain con-
trol of their communities limited the opportunity to put into practice their own version of women’s liberation. Crystal City proved one of the few laboratories for the new strategies. In the political and electoral arena, a number of women there were able to blossom and become an integral part of the power elite.\textsuperscript{45} They headed the major organizations, were elected to city and county offices, and participated in most of the La Raza Unida Party activities.

But since even in Cristal the party never succeed in gaining significant economic patronage, women did not reach economic parity with men. Also, most of the bureaucratic and educational jobs went to men from outside the community who had the education and training needed to run the “revolution”. It is possible that Chicana integration would have occurred if the party had been able to control the town’s economic sector. This conjecture is not an attempt to deny the dynamics of male/female relations. There were still significant conflicts between the women and the men in the party. Women’s “female” roles were still restricted by the community’s social mores. But the women leaders, with elected office, and large numbers of women supporters were negotiating with strength. In Cristal, Chicanas had learned to play political hardball and win. While far from being a feminist social movement, the Chicano Movement did prove to be fertile ground for the development of women leaders, and Chicana feminist ideology.

Throughout the different sectors of the Mexican American community, the movement aroused a new sense of militancy based on a historically-rich legacy of resistance, and cultural affirmation. There was considerable romanticizing of the past, and the reinterpretation of events was often as skewed as the one it replaced. But even this ritualization of the Chicano experience proved to be positive in that it made many Mexican Americans proud of themselves, and motivated many of them to seek a change in the status quo. Even those moderate organizations and leaders who resisted the movement’s radicalism, changed their own perceptions of their place in American society.\textsuperscript{46} The new ethos took hold on the newer Mexican American elites, and among many working-class Chicanos.

This ethos, I argue, is irreversible for the foreseeable future. While some of the militancy is lost, and nationalism is subsumed by practical politics, the militant ethos remains even during this period of “Hispanic” politics. Mexican American politicians still reject the old traditional liberal approach to civil
rights and upward mobility, which disdained race-specific strategies, and de-
manded assimilation. They see history in much the same way Chicano activist historians taught it, and they have become ethnic politicians, accentuating the racial and cultural differences with the mainstream. Finally, they still prac-
tice a politics of opposition, though they do this within the context of coalition politics. That is, they continue to promote issues, and carry out strategies unique to their community, and then find alliances which allow them to promote these issues. Hispanics, while often less than militant in their pursuit of change, no longer see themselves as just Americans. Rather, they are an ethnic group that has a historical notion of itself, and whose importance lies within its uniqueness. In this sense, like the Mexican American Generation of the 1930s, '40s and '50s, and the Chicano Movement Generation of the 1960s and '70s, the Hispanic Generation has its own ethos and generational thought.

By using the four-phase framework in studying the movement, we can rec-
ognize it as more than a passing phase in Mexican American history. We then understand it as a critical period in developing political strategies for the Mexi-
can American community in the latter part of the twentieth century. It also distinguishes the movement from other movements that have occurred among the Mexican-origin population. In this manner, the four-phase model is a con-
tribution to the study of the movement, and it can be tested at the national, regional, and local levels. It helps to better identify the changes that took place within the Mexican American community than the previous narratives or analy-
ses. This framework also captures the grassroot, democratic tendencies of the movement by showing how a new dialogue occurs that includes voices from a number of sectors within the community that had not fully participated be-
fore. This approach also does not relegate the movement to the political graveyard as an unfocused, passionate social catharsis that arose, played itself out, and left things worse than they were. This is the kind of conclusion that is often made in some of the previous works, which start out praising the ideals of the movement, criticize its ideological foundations, and bemoan its stepchild, the Hispanic Generation.

We can, through this synthesis, see the movement as a process by which the Mexican American community develops a construct to debate its place in Ameri-
can history and society. Mexican Americans no longer react to the problems confronting them as would immigrants, nor as an ethnic group that is slowly
fading into assimilation. Mexican Americans confront the challenges of a society that remains conscious of race through ethnic group solidarity, and through strategies that guarantee their survival as a distinct yet very American community. They reject traditional liberal pressures to assimilate, and they continue to search for a political agenda that opposes the country's new nativism. More importantly, the community has come to depend on native sons and daughters for its leadership. Many would argue against my interpretation of the legacy of Chicanismo on Hispanic politicians. And while tempted to agree with their analysis on the failure of this generation, I am reminded that each generation seeks a counter-identity that distinguishes it from those of the past. Hispanics are no different. But for those who reject the politics of this generation, the Chicano Movement will continue to be the crucial juncture in twentieth-century Mexican American history. Understanding the Chicano Movement then remains important for those seeking to be different and for those who hope to duplicate the social activism of that most tumultuous period.

NOTES


2 See Armando Navarro, *Mexican American Youth Organization* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1995). Navarro is a long time activist, but he is also a very good scholar who has blended both aspects of his intellectual thought to provide this work.

3 This should not imply that I believe there are too many personal accounts of the movement. On the contrary, there should be more, but we cannot depend on them to provide the intellectual framework for understanding the movement in a scholarly manner.

4 See Armando Navarro, *Mexican American Youth Organization*, 1-8. This the latest attempt to provide a framework for studying the Chicano Movement. It is also one of the better works on the Chicano Movement. Unfortunately, it was not available when I began my study of the movement.


6 I say "partially" because the ideology-building never quite reached a mature level. That is, Chicanismo did not produce an abundance of written material and many of the ideas were not tested over a long period of time.

7 The best two works describing Chicano resistance to Anglo American domination are Rodolfo Acuña's *Occupied America: The Chicano Struggle for Liberation* (San Francisco:

For a discussion of the Mexican American Generation's strategy, see Mario T. García's *Mexican Americans* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); also, Guadalupe San Miguel, "Let All of Them Take Heed" (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1987; and Juan Gómez-Quíñones, *Chicano Politics*.

Carlos Muñoz argues in his book that the Chicano Movement was a struggle over identity; see *Youth, Identity, Power*, 8-12. Gómez-Quíñones calls it the "politics of identity" in *Chicano Politics*, 102-105.

The internal colony model posited that Mexican Americans were a conquered people subjected to conditions of a colonial society: discrimination, dual-wage system, co-optation of its elites, and ruthless violence. For a more in-depth explanation of the internal colony model, see Mario Barrera, Carlos Muñoz, and Charles Ornelas, "The Barrio as Internal Colony," in *Urban Affairs Annual Review* ed. Harlan H. Hahn, 6 (1972); also, Tomás Almaguer, "Toward the Study of Chicano Colonialism," in *Aztlán* 2, 1, (Spring 1977): 7-20.


Much literature was written during the movement years on the meaning of being Chicano/a. Even the origins of the word "Chicano" were debated and discussed continually. See Bob Morales, "Chicano: Word Symbol of Confusion or Cohesion?" *Coraje* 1, no. 2 (April 1969): 8, personal collection of Salomón Baldenegro.

By liberal agenda I mean the traditional manner by which immigrants and minorities were supposed to integrate into the American mainstream. This would include education, good citizenship, patriotism, alliances with liberal groups, faith in government action, and especially patience. It also meant waiting for the problems of Black Americans to be solved.

This was a statement credited to Guerra and repeated often in the early years of the Chicano Movement.
See Hector P. García, Corpus Christi, Texas, to Manuel Avila, Jr., Caracas, Venezuela, 22 July 1961, García Papers in Special Collections at Texas A&M University in Corpus Christi, Texas.


One who did was Carlos E. Castañeda who wrote what historian Mario T. García calls a “complementary” history of the Mexican American. This history attempted to underscore the similarities between Mexican and American history. It also sought to dispel stereotypes that Anglo Americans had about Mexican Americans. For a further explanation of Castañeda’s work, see Mario T. García, “In Search of History: Carlos E. Castañeda and the Mexican American Generation,” 1-20.


See Romano’s “The Historical and Intellectual Presence of Mexican Americans,” for a discussion on *indígenismo*.


Reies López Tijerina was one of the first Chicano activists to make overtures to Native American activists. He also called himself an Indo-Hispano. See Tony Castro, *Chicano Power: The Emergence of Mexican America* (New York: Saturday Review Press/E.P. Dutton, 1974), 126.


Chicano scholars and organic intellectuals continually promoted the superiority of the barrio over the “sterile” Anglo neighborhood. See Armando Rendon’s *Chicano Manifesto: The History and Aspirations of the Second Largest Minority in America* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), for an all out cultural attack on American “debauchery.”


Aztlán was the name of the legendary home of the Aztecs. Chicanos adopted that name to refer to the Southwest, and their political utopia. See Chávez’s *The Lost Land*, for a discussion on the concept of Aztlán; also, see “El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán,” in *Aztlán: An Anthology of Mexican American Literature*, Luis Valdez and Stan Steiner, eds.


By sequentially inconsistent, I mean that these phases did not neatly follow each other. Rather, each phase built on the preceding one, and played itself out throughout the process of the movement.


I would qualify this statement by saying that those who know the history have learned it at the university from Chicano historians.


These sectors would be the youth and the women. While active within the different oppositional movements of the past, they had not developed the organizational structures similar to those that arose during the movement. See Juan Gómez-Quiñones, *Mexican Students Por La Raza* (Austin: Relámpago Press, 1978) for a discussion of the involvement of youth; and, Martha P. Cotera, *The Chicana Feminist* (Austin: Information Systems Development, 1977) for a discussion of the role of women.

Acuña, Gómez-Quiñones, and Muñoz have presented this kind of argument. In fairness to them, this is a common view among former activists, and among Chicano scholars in general.
CHICANO MOVEMENT CHICANO STUDIES: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SELF-CONSCIOUS IDEOLOGY

Raoul Contreras

Introduction

In the Spring of 1993, the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) made a dramatic concession to the demands of a 1960s-like protest by a coalition of Chicano/a students, faculty, and community activists. Forced to negotiate with this coalition, administration officials agreed to upgrade the “program” in Chicano Studies on that campus to “departmental” status.¹ This event was a significant chapter in a political movement for Chicano Studies that is now more than 25 years old.²

The focus of this article will be an examination of the events at UCLA in terms of their historical and social theoretical relationship to Chicano Movement politics. More specifically, it will examine how the events at UCLA reasserted Chicano Studies’ central defining character as a social science and a “self-conscious ideology” of the Chicano Movement.³

The intent is to use this analysis to illuminate how the political events at UCLA reconfirmed that “self-conscious” social identification as an ideology is itself a central component of Chicano Studies. It will be argued that this is because a central ideological component of traditional social science, in opposition to which Chicano Studies emerged historically, is its own social identification, its own social identity, as a “non-ideology.” That is, traditional social science is allegedly based in universalistic and disinterested academic values and traditions of the European Enlightenment.

This argument will be made through social theory based on the concept of ideology, the historical perspective of world systems theory, and the idea of Chicano Studies articulated during the Chicano Movement in journals such as El Grito and Aztlán, and in El Plan de Santa Bárbara. It will develop through five parts. First, there is a brief description of key political events at UCLA in 1993. Second, a theoretical view of ideology is elaborated. Third, the role of ideology in the political events at UCLA is examined. This will be done through an analysis of the idea of “legitimate social science” that was used to oppose Chicano
Studies on academic grounds. Fourth, a historical analysis unveils the ideology of "legitimate non-ideological social science," and finally, this article's idea of Chicano Studies is elaborated from analysis of early Chicano Movement writings.

UCLA, 1993

In early June 1993 administrative representatives of UCLA made a dramatic capitulation to student demands for a Chicano Studies Department. The significance of winning departmental status for Chicano Studies at UCLA was twofold. First, the university formally committed itself to providing academic resources that were commensurate with such status. This included hiring six new full-time faculty to be the teaching core for the new "Center for interdisciplinary Instruction in Chicana and Chicano Studies." More importantly, by gaining departmental status the Chicano community at UCLA formally won the right to a "self-determination" concerning the development of Chicano Studies on that campus.

The immediate catalyst for a sudden turnabout by the UCLA administration was a hunger strike by Chicano/a activists. Shortly before this action, UCLA Chancellor Charles Young, in a publicly aggressive fashion, had re-asserted the university position of adamant and categorical opposition to upgrading the campus' Chicano Studies inter-departmental program to departmental status.

However, the willingness of the hunger strikers to hold out to the end gained national media coverage, and it provided the student-led movement at UCLA with a moral highground over its administrative adversaries. Further, the confrontational time frame imposed by the hunger strike tactic worked to the advantage of the Chicano Studies activists. It served to intensify and expand the political support of the Chicano community in Los Angeles and surrounding areas, and also drew some influential Chicano, other racial minority, and Anglo politicians into the coalition. According to university officials, this coalition of support that mobilized behind the hunger strike became a "gun to its head" and forced an accommodation to student demands.

It would be a mistake, however, to view the Spring 1993 events at UCLA in terms of the single dramatic moment implied by the administration's image of conceding to a "gun to its head." Actually, as noted above, UCLA administration officials conceded to a student-led movement for Chicano Studies then
more than 20 years old on that campus. Even in a historically limited and nar-
rowly immediate sense the hunger strike's impact developed from its coalescing
and giving focus to a year-long organizing effort by various student groupings
(Chicano/a, other racial minority, and multi-racial student groups).

For example, in May 1993, in an act that may have had even more bearing
on the course of events than the hunger strike, Chicano/a students led a multi-
racial mass student occupation and shutdown of the main administrative office
building. This led to an assault by riot police, called for by UCLA's vice-chancel-
lor, and mass arrests of students. In turn, this led to intensified organizing, ral-
lies, and demonstrations which eventually led to the hunger strike. Further,
these student actions were concurrent with a publicly circulated and widely pub-
licized curriculum/organizational plan for a Chicano Studies Department that
was developed by Chicano/a faculty at UCLA to challenge and contest the
chancellor's opposition.

The focus of this article, however, is not on those specific events, but on the
politics of which they were an expression. Historically, these politics have char-
acterized both the political process of forming Chicano Studies and Chicano
Studies itself. More precisely, the intent of this analysis of events at UCLA is to
posit and to elaborate upon a central component of the ideology of those politics.
The argument is that "self-conscious" social identification, a social identity,
as an ideology of the Chicano Movement is itself a central ideological compo-
nent of Chicano Studies. The meaning and significance of this assertion pre-
sumes a theoretical view about ideology, and an analysis of ideology's practical
role in the political events at UCLA.

What is Ideology?
In terms of its varied and even contradictory modes of utilization, arguably, there
is no more problematic a concept in social science than that of "ideology." Thus,
elaborating upon the specific ideology characterizing the politics of Chica-
no Studies presupposes a theoretical statement about what the concept will refer
to in this article. Terry Eagleton's theoretical and historical analysis of the con-
cept generates two points that will be used in this article to explain the political
role of ideology.

First, he generalizes that ideology makes reference to the relationship between
a system of beliefs and the way power is exercised in society. That is, ideology
refers to how a system of ideas, like Chicano Studies, can serve to legitimize specific interests, and a specific political agenda for pursuing those interests, within a field of competing interests and political agendas. In terms of this first point, a system of ideas is ideological if it serves to legitimize a specific interest and political agenda by providing intellectual explanation and moral justification for that interest and agenda.

Essentially, Eagleton’s analysis suggests that a system of ideas, like Chicano Studies, is ideological if it serves to circumscribe a relatively specific political direction, orientation, and method. This would be accomplished by the way the system of ideas explains and morally justifies interests that underlie social action that aims either to preserve and maintain, or to erode and reformulate, the way that power is exercised within a given social order.12

Martin Seliger developed a working definition for this first point about the political role of ideology and how it will be used in this article.

... (Ideology is) sets of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends and means of organized social action, and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot, or rebuild a given social order.13

Eagleton’s second point in defining the political role of ideology makes reference to the constitution, or formation, of a specific social identity. He derives this idea about the relationship between ideology and social identity from the influential theoretical work of Louis Althusser.14 For Althusser, ideology represented conceptually the “lived relations” by which a person’s connection to society was expressed and produced. He used ideology to explain how a person is connected to social reality through one’s affective relations with the world. Those affective relations, according to Althusser, were not necessarily self-conscious.

Althusser theorizes that a person experiences social reality through “lived” affective relations to it. Ideologically-speaking, one becomes bound up in that social reality when those experiences cause an individual to invest part of her or his identity, a crucial part of what it is to be oneself, into those lived affective relations to social life.15 Essentially, Althusser was theorizing that it was through one’s affective identification with a particular set of beliefs, meanings, values, ideas, or symbols that one’s lived relation to social life, one’s social identity, was expressed and produced.
In terms of this second point, a system of ideas, like Chicano Studies, can be ideological if that system of ideas becomes an object of individuals' affective identification. As such, the system of ideas serves as a nexus, or a meeting point, for those various individuals' affective relations to social life and becomes, like the hub linking the spokes of a wheel, a basis of common social identity among them.

Eagleton provided a working definition for this second point that explains the present article's idea about the political role of ideology.

... ideology is no mere set of abstract doctrines but the stuff which makes us uniquely what we are, constitutive of our very identities ... It appears often enough as a ragbag of impersonal, subjectless tags and adages; yet these shop-soiled platitudes are deeply enough entwined with the roots of personal identity to impel us from time to time to murder or martyrdom.16

Theoretically, the image of ideology generated by these two points is a combined intellectual/moral perspective toward the exercise of power in society, and a social identity that lives that perspective in its political life. Theoretically, then, the argument is that Chicano Studies is a social science, and it is a socially based idea(s) about the exercise of power in society. Importantly, this social base, the social identity of ideology, is constituted through its lived affective identification with the system of ideas manifested by Chicano Studies.

Chicano Studies and Legitimate Social Science
A first step in assessing the role of ideology in the political events at UCLA is analytically distinguishing the ideology from the politics in that situation. In this analysis politics will be used to refer to the conflict manifested by the "power processes" through which social order is sustained or challenged. Ideology will be used to analytically denote how these power processes generate, and are generated by, conflict within the field of signification (beliefs, meanings, values, ideas, and symbols).17

For example, in the events at UCLA, on the side of the Chicano Studies coalition, there were power processes such as the student occupation of the administrative building and the Chicana/o faculty's calculated publicized exposure of their plan expressing need for a Chicano Studies Department. On the UCLA administrative side, there were power processes like the chancellor's public pronouncement and institutional directive against a department, and the order to
forcibly remove students occupying administrative buildings.

Ideologically, these processes that characterized the Spring 1993 events at UCLA (re)generated, and were (re)generated by, conflict about the meaning or idea of social science. These conflicting ideas served to explain and to justify, and thereby to legitimize, the political power processes of the student-led movement for Chicano Studies on the one side; and the political actions manifesting the chancellor-led university opposition to Chicano Studies, on the other.

It must be emphasized that this conflict of ideas was not a theoretical one in relation to a practical reality of the political power processes. Actually, in a logical sense, the conflict in ideas about social science at UCLA was constitutive of those political power processes. This is the significance of the second theoretical point about ideology elaborated above.

This is to say that the political power processes on both sides at UCLA, but especially those of the Chicano Studies coalition, presumed the social construction of a relatively unified social force, moving in a relatively unified direction, and working through a relatively unified method of political activity. This social force emerged from what was otherwise, in terms of their motivation and orientation, a relatively heterogeneous assortment of individuals and groups. This socially constructed unity, presumed by the power processes at UCLA, was at its origin the social identity generated by those individuals' and groups' affective, though not necessarily self-conscious, identification with a Chicano Studies idea of social science. This identification provided the intellectual explanation and moral justification for their political commitments.

To fully grasp this sense of ideology as a specific socially constructed identity, it is necessary to guard against an overly rationalistic understanding of the role of ideology in the political events at UCLA. That is, the relatively unified social force manifested by the Chicano Studies coalition was related to the rationality of the idea of social science that was the object of the coalition's affective identification. However, it was the socially constructed identity, and not some commonly agreed upon rationality to the Chicano Studies idea of social science, that was the principled base for a shared discourse within the heterogeneously oriented and motivated Chicano Studies coalition. As suggested by a developed body of literature on theory of ideology, it was the social identity realized through ideology that was the base for a common discourse within the coalition for reaching political resolutions (compromises) to political problems (disunity and social
A Political Assault On Academic Values?
A brief analysis of UCLA History Professor Robert Dallek's Op-Ed piece in the June 9, 1993, *Los Angeles Times*, "A Political Assault on Academic Values," will draw out the conflict in ideas about social science manifested by the political events at UCLA that Spring. The premise is that Dallek's article was a representative popular or common sense expression of the idea of social science that served intellectually to explain and morally to justify the university's political opposition and resistance to Chicano Studies.

Sarcastically nominating the Chicano protest for that year's political correctness award, Professor Dallek summarized a litany of dangers, real and potential, to the university and its mission, that were allegedly manifested by the administration's "forced give in" to protesters' demands. For example, the agreements that ended the Spring 1993 political conflict at UCLA called for student participation in faculty hiring. This student participation, Dallek warned, would be a "sure fire prescription" for undermining UCLA's commitment to upholding "serious academic standards." The entire process by which Chicanos/as won their department was "a throwback," continued Dallek, to a time when people more intent on "advancing an agenda" than serving legitimate academic ends tried to impose their political ideas on the country's universities. The result, asserted Dallek, will diminish UCLA's integrity and further contribute to a "disuniting of America."

Addressing the specific issue of the Spring events at UCLA, Dallek argued that university departments were not created "to satisfy political demands." They were organized around disciplines that rested on knowledge and understanding developed over a long period of time. Significantly, he was here not only castigating the political means, he was questioning the legitimacy of the political goal as well, as he inferred that Chicano Studies "lacks the body of critical scholarship essential to an academic discipline."

Truly galling to an indignant Dallek was the tendency of student protesters to describe as racism the opposition to Chicano Studies departmental status by faculty members like himself. In fact, Dallek inferred, it was the political movement for Chicano Studies that was (presumably reverse) racist as he pointed out that "the answer to racism, ethnic bias, and gender discrimination is not a like
response.” Do not the proponents of Chicano Studies know, chided a contemptuous Dallek, that the 19th century Irish immigrants, even though they were a despised minority, did not seek consolation in Irish studies.21

Residually, Dallek’s opposition to Chicano Studies was also an outline for an idea about “legitimate social science”. The way that opposition to Chicano Studies departmental status was intellectually explained implied the dominant university image of social science. It implied an idea of social science in which serious academic standards and legitimate academic ends are such because they are free and unrelated to political agendas and political ideas. “Legitimate social science” is departments and disciplines that organize distinct bodies of knowledge that have been developed over long periods of time; certainly they are not, like Chicano Studies, the satisfaction of political demands. Most importantly, the dominant university conception of social science is a place logically and morally removed from problems of race.

Central to my argument is that the idea of “legitimate social science” implied by Dallek’s opposition to Chicano Studies is a different conflicting ideology of social science. In other words, “legitimate social science” is an intellectual explanation and moral justification for maintaining and preserving the social and political order of society. From this perspective, it is opposed to Chicano Studies because Chicano Studies is a challenge to that order. This conflict of ideologies is obscured, however, because the central, and the centralizing, idea in the system of ideas represented by “legitimate social science” is one that self-consciously posits a social identity as a “non-ideology.”

The History of Legitimate Social Science
The argument for this proposition is broadly historical, and it is made through the framework of Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory.22 While others, working from different perspectives and orientations, have made similar arguments about the ideology of social science, Wallerstein’s work has the virtue of historically linking the conflict between the ideology of social science and the ideology of Chicano Studies.23

In an insightful analysis of the French Revolution Wallerstein argued that it catalyzed a fundamental transformation of the capitalist world economy as a world system.24 The French Revolution, he argued, was the first truly anti-systemic uprising of the modern world where the masses seemed to seriously
contemplate state power. In Wallerstein's argument the world bourgeoisie, as a response to the French Revolution, accepted the idea of "normality of change" as the best way of containing the social forces underlying anti-systemic rebellion. In his argument this acceptance of the idea of normality of change by the world's ruling classes ushered in three sets of cultural institutions—Ideology, social science, and (anti-systemic) Social Movements—that have formed a central part of the culture of the capitalist world system ever since.25

Ideology, Wallerstein pointed out, was a worldview, a weltanschauung, or, figuratively, a common set of eyeglasses through which people interpreted their world. However, ideology was also a significantly specific case within this genre of worldview. In all times and places, Wallerstein argued, people had always constructed reality through one or more, historically manufactured, worldviews. The French Revolution, however, ushered in a particular brand of weltanschauung.

It is one that has been consciously and collectively formulated with conscious political objectives. Using this definition of ideology, it follows that this particular brand of "weltanschauung" could be constructed only in a situation in which public discourse accepted the normality of change. One needs to formulate an ideology consciously only if one believes that change is normal and that therefore it is useful to formulate conscious middle run political objectives.26

In particular, three such ideologies developed during the 19th century—Conservatism, Liberalism, and Marxism. They were different political agendas about what normal change was and how it should be brought about. However, as Wallerstein pointed out, the cultural institutionalization of political agendas was historically related to that of social science. This was because the political agendas represented by the ideologies of Liberalism, Marxism, and Conservatism were concrete proposals requiring concrete knowledge of current realities. Without knowledge of how the world worked, it was difficult to concretely propose how to make it work better.

Further, as Wallerstein emphasized in this analysis of the historical significance of the French Revolution, just as ideology was more than mere weltanschauung, social science was more than another period or category of the social thought or social philosophy which preceded it, and that we have labeled under titles like "the Greeks" or the "Renaissance." In the 19th century it involved the empirical study of the world with the intent of understanding normal change and thereby affecting it. As such, social science was not the product of
solitary thinkers but that of a collective body of persons working within specific structures to achieve specific ends.

Social science was institutionalized, principally, within Europe's traditional university structure. The universities, which at the end of the 18th century were virtually moribund, were largely organized in the traditional four faculties of theology, philosophy, law, and medicine. However,

In the course of the nineteenth century, there occurred a significant creation of new chairs, largely with the faculty of philosophy, to a lesser extent within the faculty of law. These chairs had new names and some of them became the forerunners of what today we call "departments." 27

By the end of the 19th century these new chairs had stabilized into the primary "disciplines" defining the university's departmental structure of social science—politics, economics, sociology, anthropology, and history. Wallerstein's analysis reveals that the origin of this present-day core of social science disciplines and departments, dubbed "academically legitimate" by Dallek, was rooted in the political victory of the dominant political agenda that emerged out of the French Revolution. That is, the origin of our present-day disciplinary intellectual division of labor and its departmental organizational structure manifested the political triumph of liberal ideology as the then, and now, reigning ideology of the capitalist world economy.

If we ask ourselves not merely why the medieval university's faculty of philosophy became differentiated into the multiple "disciplines" we know today, but why this differentiation took the exact form it took, we can see that its ultimate form reflected the reigning ideology of the nineteenth-century world system, classical liberalism in its British variant. 28

The substance of Wallerstein's argument is to show a common origin for common fundamental premises that explain the form and content of both liberal ideology (and its political agenda) and social science. In terms of the 20th century ideological conflict between "legitimate social science" and Chicano Studies there were three significant ways in which liberal ideology was inscribed in the form and content of social science.

First, it was the liberal worldview that explained an intellectual division of social science as logically distinct bodies and types of knowledge. That is, it was a fundamental premise of the liberal political agenda that the great achievement of the modern world was the proper separation of the three spheres of human
activity: the public sphere of the exercise of power, the semi-public sphere of production, and the private sphere of everyday life. This liberal view of the world, argues Wallerstein, was the origin of the threefold division of knowledge—the political, the economic, and the socio-cultural—fundamental to contemporary social science epistemology and the organizational development of semi-autonomous departments of political science, economics, and sociology.29 Especially significant in terms of this ideologically induced internal division of social science was the explicit epistemological demarcation between historical knowledge (and the humanities generally) and social scientific knowledge of the present.

Second, the specific form and content of the internal disciplinary and departmental demarcations of social science were inscribed with a liberal ideological premise of a cultural (and thus racial) supremacy of European Civilization.30 This liberal premise of cultural supremacy will provide intellectual explanation and moral justification for 19th century European colonialist expansionism and racial domination.

Third, it was a liberal ideological premise of a universal bourgeois human nature that was the basis for assuming that there were universal laws of social reality that could be discovered by social science. This will account for an epistemology that emphasized study of objective, empirical, and individually discreet "facts," and a methodological organizing principle for social science based in the idea of objectivity.31 It will be upon this liberal idea that social science will construct its social identity as a “non-ideology.”

In making this argument about the common premises of liberal ideology and social science, Wallerstein pointed out that it was a way of circumscribing the study of social change in such a way that it would serve as an explanation and justification for the politically triumphant liberal social and political order.32 This was the basis for the third and final aspect of Wallerstein's thesis about the historical significance of the French Revolution. That is, the third cultural institution spawned by this world systemic event was the transformation of “rebellion and opposition” into anti-systemic “social movements.”

... Once again, rebellion and opposition were not new. They had long been a part of the historical scene, as had been both “weltanschauung” and social thought. But just as “weltanschauung” now became ideologies and social thought became social science, so did rebellions and opposition become anti-systemic
movements. These movements were the third and last of the institutional innovations of the post-1788 world system, an innovation that really emerges only after the world revolution of 1848. . . .

There were, to be sure, two great forms of such anti-systemic movements, one for each main theme of the "French revolutionary turmoil" as it was expressed throughout the world system. There were movements organized around the "people" as working class or classes, . . . and there were movements organized around the "people" as volk, as nation, as speakers of a common language, what came to be known as the nationalist movements.33

What essentially differentiated the anti-systemic social movements after 1848 from prior rebellions and opposition was that the latter were spontaneous, short-lived, and largely uncoordinated beyond the local level. The post-French Revolution social movements, Wallerstein argued, were organizations and eventually organizations with bureaucracies.34

It was in this sense that the relationship of social movements to social science historically developed. While social science became an instrument for realizing the agenda of politically triumphant liberalism, those who sought to go beyond the limits of normal change ideologically framed by social science turned to the social movements. The anti-systemic social movements, unlike pre-French Revolution rebellions, planned the politics of social transformation. Like the liberal ideology of social science they expressed political agendas for ushering in normal change in a time frame that went beyond the short run.

In sum, Wallerstein's historical analysis of social science unveils an ideological and political origin for our present-day academically legitimate disciplines and departments. It also argues that there has been a historical conflict between social science and the ideas and plans for social change that have been manifested by oppositional social movements like the Chicano Movement.

This historical conflict has been only indirectly related to norms of academic legitimacy. Rather, at the core of the conflict have been opposing political agendas for realizing normal change. From this perspective, Wallerstein's historical analysis reveals the ideological deception of Dallek in counterposing the political movement for Chicano Studies against a presumably "non-political" dominant conception of social science.

On a more specific level, Wallerstein argues that social science's disciplinary division of intellectual labor was inscribed with an ideology and a political agenda that was masked by the universalistic premise of its liberal values and by its departmental structure. Moreover, it is a historical and macro-level explanation of
a racist orientation to the liberal ideology and disciplinary/departmental organization of the dominant conception of social science.\textsuperscript{35}

**The Racial Ideology of Social Science on the Mexican American**

The absence of any substantive challenge to the liberal premises of 19th century social science served as confirmation for the assumed universalism that cloaked its ideological orientation and political agenda.\textsuperscript{36} This absence of substantive academic rivalry was parallel and related to the absence of any substantive rival or challenge to the political dominance of Western Civilization and its liberal ideology over the global framework of the capitalist world economy. Despite the shocks of the First World War, the Russian Revolution, and the rise of fascism, this ideological hegemony of liberalism within the capitalist world economy, and within social science, remained essentially intact through the first half of the 20th century.

In this historical and world systemic perspective, the ideological and political-economic context for the origin of Chicano Studies was the anti-colonialism and worldwide social turbulence after World War II that reached its peak at the end of the 1960s. George Katsiaficas has elaborated upon the worldwide nature of these social and political developments in his global analysis of 1968.\textsuperscript{37}

Wallerstein has emphasized the impact of these developments, that he refers to as the “Revolution of 1968,” on the intellectual life of the university.

As a revolutionary moment, 1968 has passed, and passed definitively. But so did 1848 as a revolutionary moment. However, 1968, like 1848 before it, has left enormous legacies. Among them is its impact on the universities and the world of intellectual discourse. What 1968 did was to break the total control over the world university system by the heirs of nineteenth-century thought and restore the university to its role as an arena of intellectual debate.\textsuperscript{38}

In terms of the disciplinary division of intellectual labor, the fracturing of liberalism's ideological hegemony over social science had specific manifestations.

The result has been disorder. Rehashed versions of early nineteenth-century conservatism have rushed to fill the breach. While noisy and aggressive, thus far they have been weak on intellectual substance, gaining credit primarily out of the discredit of the liberal-Marxist arena of consensus. On the other hand, new subject matters have appeared in the universities which derive directly from the 1968 world revolution: in particular, women's studies, and multiple versions of what generically might be called “ethnic” studies.\textsuperscript{39}
The first formally academic Chicano Studies expression of this revolt against liberalism's ideological hegemony over social science was a journal that began publishing out of the university of California at Berkeley in 1967, *El Grito*. The early *El Grito* (1967-1972) was characterized by its polemical intellectual war against Social Science on the Mexican American. The idea of a Chicano social science emerged from opposition to traditional social science on the Mexican American.

During this period the editorial stance of *El Grito* was closely identified with the writing of the journal's editor and founder, Octavio I. Romano-V. An anthropologist at the Berkeley campus of the University of California, Romano wrote a series of articles that began as a critique of Social Science on the Mexican American as ideology.

In those articles Romano argued that Social Science on the Mexican American was based in a set of beliefs, ideas, and values that framed and circumscribed a discourse that served to explain and morally to justify, and thereby to legitimize, a historical and continuing subjugation of Mexicans in American society. Central to the theoretical framework of Romano's critique was the separation of Chicano history from contemporary or social scientific studies of the Chicano. That is, Romano argued that the ideological role of Social Science on the Mexican American presumed a marginalization of the Chicano historical experience of resistance to racial/cultural exploitation and oppression.

Significantly, in the concluding article of that series, however, Romano expanded the target of his ideological criticism to social science as an institution. What he argued was that the ideological orientation of Social Science on the Mexican American was rooted in the idea of objectivity. Methodologically, Romano's argument went, the idea of objectivity was the intellectual linchpin for the social science born of the European Enlightenment. Summarizing domestic and international critics of this idea, Romano asserted that objectivity was a fallacy. Anticipating Wallerstein's historical and world systemic analysis, Romano argued that it was through social science's intellectual foundation in the idea of objectivity that its racist ideological role in relation to Mexican Americans was expressed.

*Chicana Movement Idea of Chicano Studies*
Romano's critique and rejection of objectivity, and thereby of the entire con-
struct of liberal intellectual premises that it methodologically grounded, implied the need for a new Social Science on the Mexican American. In place of the fallacy of objectivity, Romano posited the notion of a “Chicano Self-Image” as a central value for this new social science.

In relation to the problem of articulating an ideological framework for Chicano Studies, Romano never “self-consciously” identified as an ideology the work that culminated in the notion of a Chicano self-image. However, the Chicano self-image was an idea that presumed an organic linkage between a new Chicano social science and the Chicano Movement. Romano’s critique of Social Science on the Mexican American essentially attributed an epistemological status to the political movement of Chicanos.

Most importantly, the focus of Romano’s ideological critique of social science was the racism that was the “reality” veiled by the fallacy of objectivity. Thus, while never identified as an ideology, the value of a Chicano self-image was specifically a response to the ideological role of objectivity in veiling a racist, racial, and cultural dimension to the social relations of social science. As such, the Chicano self-image, asserted Romano, would be a case of the “studied studying the studiers.”

This situation is unique in the annals of American social science. It is unique because a population heretofore studied is now studying the studiers. The final outcome of this venture is yet to be revealed. Nevertheless, it promises to introduce perspectives that are unique in social science, perspectives which have their origin within a previously studied population (Mexican-Americans) whose objectifications in the past have not been an accepted, explicit, and integral part of traditional social science thought. As such, these perspectives will introduce a self-image into the arena of rational thought. If this self-image is rejected by non-Chicano social scientists, then, in effect, they will have rejected summarily the rationality of the Chicano.

The Limits of Romano’s Critique
The course and development of Romano’s critique, in rejecting the methodological principle of objectivity, implied a re-conceptualization of social science. In so doing, Romano made a specific contribution to the theoretical elaboration of an ideology of Chicano Studies that can be generalized in terms of two points.

First, it was through its intellectual foundation in the ideas and values of the European Enlightenment that the ideology of Social Science on the Mexican American was expressed. In other words, in Romano’s argument, the problem
was not deviation from the intellectual premises, norms, and methodology defining academically "legitimate social science." The problem was not deviation from objective study of the Mexican American. Rather, the racist ideological orientation of Social Science on the Mexican American was rooted in the intellectual, normative, and methodological orientation of Enlightenment social science itself. Thus, it was Romano who first asserted the claim of UCLA students in 1993 that the intellectual basis of the university's opposition to Chicano Studies was racist.

Second, in the development of Romano's argument the ideological role of Enlightenment social science necessarily rested on a distortion of Chicano history. Reciprocally, he argued that the new Chicano social science would presume the recovery of authentic Chicano history. Thus, Romano was arguing for a relationship between Chicano history and Chicano social science that implied transcending "legitimate social science's" disciplinary and departmental borders between those fields.

However, in terms of articulating an ideological framework for Chicano Studies, the notion of a Chicano self-image was fundamentally limited in a theoretical sense. As far as it was developed by Romano, it was a response to how the racial ideology of social science was expressed through a set of historically specific social relations of social science. One could say that it was specifically a response to the historical social relations between an Anglo studier and a Mexican American studied from the period of Manifest Destiny, in Romano's words, to the historical point of his critique.

In terms of articulating an ideological framework for Chicano Studies this implied that the Chicano self-image could be taken as equivalent to a Mexican American "studied" becoming a Mexican American "studier." The problem with this limited notion of a Chicano self-image was that it implied conceptualizing ideology in terms of homogeneous racial and cultural forms of thought, and Chicano Studies in terms of the perspective of an ideologically homogeneous Chicano culture and community. This will be an image of Chicano Studies that both proponents and opponents will debate.

Theoretically, the broad parameters of this problem can be understood in terms of the work of Antonio Gramsci, who theorized on the relationship between ideology and community and culture. Gramsci argued that the consciousness of subordinate groups is typically fragmented and uneven. Underlying
this fragmentation and unevenness, he wrote, was a basic conflict between different conceptions of the world. This basic conflict manifested the subordinate group's internalization of the official notions of the dominant group, on the one hand; and the subordinate group's practical experience, on the other.57

In Gramsci's analysis, this ideological conflict internal to subordinate groups was historically based. On the one hand, there was an emergent world view that a subordinate group displays in those historical periods when it acts as an "organic totality." In the Chicano historical experience this would correspond to the Chicano Movement.58 On the other hand, there is the group's submission in more normal times to the ideas of those who govern it.

In terms of this Gramscian framework, the limitation of Romano's notion of a Chicano Self-image was its inadequate ideological distinction between the Chicano Movement and the Chicano culture or community to which it was organically related. That is, Romano never explicitly, self-consciously, identified his own critique of social science on the Mexican American as an ideology. Thus, he never developed what the Chicano self-image represented ideologically within Chicano culture and community. This absence of self-conscious identity as an ideology was the basis for the Chicano self-image's suggestion, on the plane of social theory, of an ideologically homogeneous Chicano culture and community. In terms of the above Gramscian framework, Romano's notion failed to explicitly identify Chicano Studies, ideologically, as the "self-image" of the Chicano Movement within an ideologically heterogeneous Chicano culture and community.

The Ideology of Chicano Studies

The concept of Chicano Studies that Romano's critique was striving toward was made in Aztlán—A Journal of Chicano Studies.59 While historically following El Grito, Aztlán was the first official (university-sponsored and supported) scholarly journal devoted to Chicano issues. Published by Aztlán Publications, an arm of the then UCLA Mexican American Cultural Center, later re-named the UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center, the inaugural issue of Aztlán appeared in the Spring of 1970.

In relation to the above summarized inadequacy of Romano's Chicano self-image, the idea of Chicano Studies that emerged in Aztlán distinguished itself on both a theoretical plane of analysis and in terms of its ideological social identity.
On the theoretical plane, underlying Aztlán's analysis of Social Science on the Mexican American, was a perspective that all social science was ideological and political in its constitution. Second, there was explicit recognition of an ideologically heterogeneous Chicano culture and community.

Ideologically, the idea of Chicano Studies found in the early publishing period of Aztlán was also distinguished by two related points. First, there was an explicit, self-conscious, identification of Chicano Studies as the perspective of the Chicano Movement. Second, there was an equally explicit identification of Chicano Studies as an anti-colonialist social science. Articles by Raymond Rocco and Carlos Muñoz, Jr., in the second issue of Aztlán serve as exemplars of the social theoretical orientation and ideological social identity of Chicano Studies found in the early period of this journal.

In terms of the theoretical limitation of Romano's Chicano self-image, Rocco presented an argument for an idea of social science as an ideological and political enterprise. In “The Chicano in The Social Sciences: Traditional Concepts, Myths and Images” he argued that critiques of Social Science on the Mexican American, like that of Romano, presumed a critical perspective toward what Rocco referred to as the “normative context of social science.” The argument was that the dominant perspectives of Social science did not acknowledge their own normative context. Methodologically organized in terms of an overarching idea of objectivity, social science did not acknowledge that “data, concepts, and facts” do not present themselves as such, “objectively.” Rather, they were developed by the researcher and thus introduced a normative context in which the selected data, concepts, and facts exist.

Utilizing the then contemporary work of political scientists such as William E. Connolly, Grant McConnell, and Harry Kariel, Rocco asserted that Social science was “at root a normative enterprise” and an integral part of society's social and political order. The work of social scientists would alter “the perspectives, the context, the alternatives” that would be relied upon to solve social conflict. In this sense social science was, by the nature of its social activity, ideological and worked to the benefit of certain sectors of society and to the disadvantage of other sectors.

The point of this argument was that because the dominant perspectives of social science did not acknowledge their normative context they were “restricting and inhibiting” in terms of the normative contexts of the research they generated.
In other words, because social science did not acknowledge its own normative context, it inhibited the recognition of other normative contexts, like that represented by Romano’s critique, as legitimate aspects of social science.

As long as social science failed to acknowledge its own normative context, and used this as a pretext to close itself to other normative contexts, Rocco’s argument continued, social science would continue to be limited to an unacknowledged normative context of what he variously referred to as the “dominant culture,” the “dominant sector,” and the “power structure” of society.66 Thus, consistent with Romano’s critique of objectivity, Rocco had argued that the ideology of Social Science on the Mexican American was integral to a more inclusive ideology and social identity of social science as a non-ideological endeavor.

Rocco’s analysis of social science, however, was not confined by the potential limitations of Romano’s idea of social science as a self-image. In Rocco’s analysis it was social science’s normative stance toward the social and political order of society that explained its exclusion of the emerging Chicano Studies perspective. As such, Rocco’s piece was theoretically anticipating the 1993 events at UCLA. His analysis was an argument that the conflict between Chicano Studies and “legitimate social science” was only indirectly related to norms defining academic legitimacy and more firmly grounded in conflicting ideological stances toward the social and political order of society.

In relation to the ideological social identity of Chicano Studies, Rocco’s argument in “Myths and Images” was also a development in terms of the ideological homogeneity that was suggested by Romano. In Romano’s argument the ideology of social science had been manifested by the historical exclusion of a Chicano self-image from “the arena of rational thought.” Rocco argued, on the other hand, that social science had been closed to normative stances that challenged and contested the social and political order of society. In this specific case, social science was closed to Chicano Studies because it was closed to the ideology and politics of the Chicano Movement.67 By framing the ideology of the Chicano Movement off limits, Social Science on the Mexican American was ideologically circumscribing the study of problems (politics) in the Chicano community to a liberal question of how much or how little the Mexican American was assimilated.68

Theoretically, the significance of Rocco’s identification of Chicano Studies with the ideology of the Chicano Movement was that it implied an analytical
centrality for the recognition of an ideologically heterogeneous Chicano culture and community. In other words, the social identification of Chicano Studies with the ideology of the Chicano Movement presumed social theory in which all Mexican Americans were not Chicano (Movement).

... One of the characteristics of the ideology of the "Chicano Movement" is the attempt to distinguish those of Mexican ancestry who are committed to the preservation of Mexican culture from those who are not. The term "Chicano" is used in a positive way to characterize the first category while a variety of epithets designate the latter category. Thus for the active core, "Mexican American" has definite, negative ideological connotations.69

"A Chicano Perspective"
Complementing Rocco's social identification of Chicano Studies with the ideology and politics of the Chicano Movement were two articles by Carlos Muñoz Jr., in the same issue of Aztlán.70 In this work Muñoz was asserting that Chicano Studies was an anti-colonialist social science. In terms of this anti-colonialist social identity, the central point of "Toward A Chicano Perspective of Political Analysis" was its assertion of a racial and cultural identity for the Chicano community. The premise of Muñoz's argument was that an integral component of the ideology of social science was the relative insignificance of the Chicano in the study of racial problems in the U.S. 71 At the heart of this relative unimportance was social science's marginalization of the racial aspect of the Chicano community's history and culture.

Muñoz argued that the thrust of the dominant perspectives was to view the Mexican American as an "unassimilated caucasian." The principle reason for this lack of understanding was that it was predicated on Anglo cultural values and norms. Values and norms, Muñoz argued, that were historically based in 19th century colonialist race relations of manifest destiny.72

This theoretical de-racialization of Chicanos served an ideological role. It framed the intellectual understanding of problems in the Chicano community in terms of a de-racialized dynamic of ethnic assimilation. It thus served to obscure the scope and historical basis of racism in American society. Essentially, Muñoz's argument went, the problems of the Chicano community could hardly be rooted in racism, if Chicanos were not a (non-White) race.

In opposition to this de-racialization of the Mexican American by the dominant perspectives of social science, Muñoz asserted that the Chicano community
and culture was racially mestizo.

Social scientists have failed to acknowledge the rich Indian Mestizo heritage and non-white "blood mixture" which have shaped the distinct cultural patterns and genetic characteristics of the Chicano. Mestizo has been a term alien to the vocabulary of social science. Even more importantly, assimilation has not been the prime goal of most Chicanos. This can be supported by witnessing the fact that a solid, if not the most solid, cornerstone of the ever growing Chicano movement is "cultural nationalism."

Thus, Muñoz's assertion of a mestizo racial identity, on the level of social theory, also supported Rocco's central argument. The theoretical de-racialization of the Mexican American by social science served a role of ideologically framing, and thus limiting, solutions to community problems to a liberal politics of assimilation. In this sense Muñoz, like Rocco, was arguing that the academic conflict between social science and Chicano Studies was rooted in Chicano Studies' ideological identification with a Chicano Movement that was challenging the reigning order of society. And, like the UCLA students in 1993, Muñoz was arguing the centrality of race in this ideological conflict between Chicano Studies and social science.

Ideologically, however, Muñoz's piece also expressed an important development of Rocco's social identification of Chicano Studies with the Chicano Movement. This was because the theoretical framework for Muñoz's assertion of a mestizo racial identity was based on the idea that the Chicano community was an "internal colony." This was the significance of "On the Nature and Cause of Tension in the Chicano Community: A Critical Analysis" in the same issue of Aztlan.

As social theory, the internal colony model explained the conditions in the Chicano community in terms of a colonialist historical experience. In this paradigm the mestizo identity was historically forged by the intersection of Euro-American colonialist exploitation and cultural oppression, and the historical Chicano resistance to that exploitation and oppression. The idea of Chicano Studies posed by Muñoz's internal colonial framework was one that would respond to the Chicano inequality generated by this history of exploitation and cultural oppression.

Muñoz's internal colonial framework also placed Chicano Studies into Wallerstein's World Revolution of 1968. That is, Wallerstein argues that ethnic
studies, as social science, was a direct derivative of "1968." Ideologically, this was because the central thrust of this world revolution was an anti-colonialist one. Thus, in Muñoz's work, the social identification of Chicano Studies with the Chicano Movement is also ideologically anti-colonialist.

The idea of Chicano Studies found in the early issues of El Grito and Aztlán was a response to the ideological role of social science on The Mexican American. It exposed social science as an intellectual explanation and moral justification of Euro-American colonialist exploitation and cultural oppression of Chicanos. Reciprocally, Chicano Studies, as posited by these journals, was an explanation and justification for a Chicano Movement that was contesting the relations of power inscribed in the economic, political, and cultural institutions in America. In this sense, however, the idea of Chicano Studies in those journals was more than a new social science of the Mexican American. It was a self-conscious anti-colonialist Chicano Movement ideology as well.

Summary and Conclusion
The events at UCLA in the Spring of 1993 reasserted the central defining character of Chicano Studies as both a social science and a self-conscious ideology of the Chicano Movement. At the moment of its political constitution in 1968, Chicano Studies was both a noble and a novel idea about social science: noble because it was an idea about knowledge linked to anti-colonialist social justice and human liberation; novel because in contrast to the social science in opposition to which it historically emerged, Chicano Studies was self-consciously ideological.

This Chicano Movement idea of Chicano Studies was constructed in this article through the work of Romano, Rocco, and Muñoz. It was, however, a notion of Chicano Studies that was articulated most systematically by El Plan de Santa Barbara. El Plan was the published proceedings of a 1969 conference of Chicano/a educational professionals and students intent on developing a master plan for Chicano higher education. Substantively, it was an expression of ideology by a body "representative of the activist social base of the political movement for Chicano Studies." The political events at UCLA in 1993 suggest that this movement born in the social and political upheaval of 1968, and the idea of Chicano Studies upon which this movement was socially constructed, continues to be a necessary condition for the institutionalization of Chicano Studies as
El Plan is noted because the 1993 student movement at UCLA did not display overtly an understanding of the intellectual role of Romano, Rocco, and Muñoz in the ideological constitution of the struggle that those students were then leading. However, they did recognize *El Plan De Santa Barbara*, symbolically, as a representation of their political quest. It is in this sense that the idea of Chicano Studies posited by this paper is argued to have been the ideological base of the political movement that won departmental status for Chicano Studies at UCLA.

The argument is that a necessary element in the construction of the social identity, the political movement, that generates the power to institutionalize Chicano Studies, is the idea of being an anti-colonialist Chicano Movement ideology. However, the review of the theory of ideology, Wallerstein's historical perspective on social science, and the analysis of the early *El Grito* and *Aztlán* also suggest that in order to be a challenge to the social and political order, Chicano Studies must be *self-consciously* ideological. In other words, a social science legitimization of Chicano Movement politics must at the same time be a legitimization of the role of social science as oppositional ideology.

Central to the system of ideas through which traditional social science legitimized *its ideological role* was the idea that "legitimate social science" is non-ideological. Wallerstein's historical perspective and the critical analyses of Social Science on the Mexican American in the early *El Grito* and *Aztlán* suggest that this capacity to be an ideology, through the idea of being a non-ideology, resides in its status as institutionalized social science.

For institutionalized social science the element of self-consciousness becomes relatively superfluous to the political processes of legitimizing its ideological role. This is because the legitimacy of institutionalized social science is self-evident and a given in its status as institutionalized social science. In other words, "legitimate social science" does not have to self-consciously reproduce legitimacy for its ideological role because its legitimacy is reproduced by the very organization, structure, and operation of institutionalized social science.

As an oppositional ideology, however, Chicano Studies must be self-conscious about legitimizing its role. This is because the intellectual reasonableness or practicality and moral justification of challenging the social and political order of society is not self-evident or a given. It is not self-evident or a given, even and
most importantly to most of those who because of race, class, gender, and cultural aspects of their identity could affectively identify with the anti-colonialism of the Chicano Movement. This social identity, the constitution of the power for the processes of legitimization, must be self-consciously constructed.

This article's analysis of the 1993 political events at UCLA argues that those involved in the protest were reasserting Chicano Studies' central defining character as a social science and a self-conscious ideology. It is an argument that those political events indicated, once again, that a necessary element in the construction of the social identity, the political movement, that generates the power to institutionalize Chicano Studies as social science is a self-conscious idea of being an anti-colonialist Chicano Movement ideology.

NOTES

Citations are abbreviated. Complete publication data is included in the bibliography.

1 Significantly, the UCLA Chicano Studies “coalition” drew support and participation from other racial minority students and organizations, progressive “Anglo” students and organizations, and multiracial support from individuals, organizations, and politicians from Los Angeles and other Southern California communities.

2 On the historical struggle for Chicano academic programs in California see Acuña (1981); Contreras (1993); Gómez-Quiñones (1974, 1978); Muñoz (1981, 1984, 1989); and Padilla (1974). See the Op-Ed page of the Los Angeles Times, June 9, 1993, for opposing interpretations of the Spring 1993 events at UCLA. One article is by Robert Dallek, a Professor of History at UCLA, and is titled, “A Political Assault on Academic Values.” The second article is by Rubén Martínez, a Los Angeles community activist/writer, and is titled, “The Emergence of LA’s True Identity.”

3 This proposition about Chicano Studies’ “central defining character” is the basic conclusion of my dissertation. (Contreras 1993)

4 The “agreements” that were signed by UCLA administration officials and settled the Spring 1993 conflict are titled, “Framework for a Center for Interdisciplinary Instruction in Chicana and Chicano Studies.” Copies are filed in the UCLA Chicano Studies Library.

5 A Chicano “self-determination” was central to the goals of the political movement that founded Chicano Studies. See the works cited in footnote #2 in this regard. Previously, I addressed the relationship, organizational and ideological, between the idea of self-determination and departmental status in terms of the political structure of the University. (Contreras 1993: 322-338)

6 The status of the Chicano Studies program at UCLA had been under formal university review for over a year. The conclusion of this review, which was overdue, was expected to express the
administration's response to calls to upgrade the program to departmental status. On April 28, 1993, a press release was issued by Chancellor Young stating that on the basis of this review Chicano Studies would continue to be structured as an as an inter-departmental program. The press release was a public rejection of departmental status. The timing of the press release angered Chicano Studies activists. It came on the day that most Chicano Studies activists at UCLA were attending, or observing, the funeral of César Chávez. A copy of the press release is on file at the UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center Library.

This is the way that UCLA history professor Robert Dallek, in the above mentioned article in the Los Angeles Times, described the administration's view of the hunger strike.

A "Proposal For The Creation of A Chicana and Chicano Studies Department" was developed by the "core teaching faculty" of the UCLA Chicano Studies program. A copy of the proposal, dated January 25, 1993, is on file at the Chicano Studies Research Center Library at UCLA.

Contreras 1993: 3.


Eagleton 1991: 5-20

Ibid., pp. 45-61.

Martin Seliger 1976: 11.


Althusser 1971: 173-174


The substantive content of these conflicting ideas about social science will be developed through the rest of this article. However, it is pointed out now that the events at UCLA manifested a re-play of a historical conflict. In the historical struggle to institutionalize Chicano Studies, the first systematic academic expression of this conflict in ideas about social science was made through a series of articles by Octavio I. Romano. (Romano 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970) Romano's contribution to the ideology of Chicano Studies is examined later in this article. For more detailed analysis of Romano's role in the development of Chicano Studies see Contreras (1993), Olguin (1991), and Garcia (1992).

One reason for the developed discussion about "ideology" in this article is that the logic, sense, and significance of the central argument assumes a clear and distinct separation from a highly distorting "bias" that dominates both popular and academic understanding of the concept. In terms of the distinction between "theory" and "practice," that is so central to all social (and especially political) analysis, the distorting bias in both popular and academic thinking about ideology is to put it into the realm of "theory." The logic, sense, and significance of my argument assumes an understanding of ideology as a "meeting-point" of theory and practice. This is the image I attempt to convey with the word "constitutive." Politics, the political actions of political life, is constituted by power processes and ideology.

As exemplars for this literature on theory of ideology I would cite Manning and Robinson (1985), Eagleton (1991), Meszaros (1989), Geuss (1981), Gouldner (1976), and Therborn (1980). Collectively, this theoretical work itself represents an ideological spectrum that incor-
porates liberal, Marxist, Neo-Marxist, and Critical Theory on ideology. In addition, their writing shows that the above argument about the role of ideology in political life can also be found in the work of some conservatives, some neo-conservatives, and some postmodernists. Previously, I made an analytical summary of this “theory of ideology.” (Contreras 1993: 66-88)

This analogy between “Irish Studies” and Chicano Studies is an expression of the “immigrant analogy.” Roughly, this is the idea that the problems of late 20th century racial minorities in the U.S. are analogous to the problems (and their solution) of 19th and early 20th Century white ethnic immigrants. Over a generation ago, Robert Blauner argued that the “immigrant analogy” was a bedrock principle for an American “social science on race” that served a role of intellectually obscuring the colonialist historical basis for racial oppression in America (Blauner 1972). It is both amazing and characteristic of the ideological power of Dallek’s idea of social science that the hackneyed “immigrant analogy,” that was “academically” and “social scientifically” de-bunked 20 years ago by Blauner and others can be successfully utilized today without even bothering to camouflage it or dress it up in 1990’s clothing. “Successfully utilized” in that no doubt it continues to mobilize/organize support for Dallek’s and the university’s opposition to Chicano Studies by ideologically framing a space where such opposition is intellectually reasonable and morally just, and most importantly, “not racist.”

Wallerstein is the Distinguished Professor of Sociology and the Director of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations, at the State University of New York, Binghamton. Some of the more significant work through which he has elaborated upon the world systems perspective include: The Modern World System (Three Volumes; 1974, 1980, 1989), Capitalist World Economy (1979), and Historical Capitalism (1983).

Some other scholars whose work makes a point of emphasizing the linkage between the political triumph of liberalism and the emergence, form, and content of 19th century social Science include Raymond Williams (1977), Alvin Gouldner (1976), Istvan Meszaros (1989), David Theo Goldberg (1993), and Eagleton (1991). Also relevant is Ronald Takaki’s insightful analysis of the racial nature of the liberal ideas underlying the 19th Century development of economic and political institutions in the United States. Central to Takaki’s analysis is the
relationship between these liberal ideas and the racialization of concepts of “progress” and “civilization” in American culture. (Takaki 1979) Reginald Horsman discusses some of the more overt racist expressions of 19th Century liberal social science in the U.S. (Horsman 1981) In particular, he explains how social science provided intellectual explanation and moral justification for racialized notions of progress and civilization and the realization of these notions of progress and civilization through racial domination of Native Americans, African Americans, and Mexicans.

In this regard, Robert Blauner’s work has a specific political significance in relation to Chicano Studies. (Blauner 1972) A sociologist at UC Berkeley, Blauner was a “mentor” for some young academics who played important roles in the political movement for Chicano Studies. He was also an intellectual influence on many more. In his academic work Blauner argued that American social science (on race) was based in 19th Century Eurocentric premises. In his analysis these premises served the ideological role of obscuring U.S. colonialism as the historical basis for contemporary racial oppression in America.

In a different but conceptually related vein, Georg Lukács in History and Class Consciousness also linked “bourgeois ideology” and the ideology of social science. (Lukács 1971) Lukács argued that the intellectual division of social science into “disciplines,” that had come to be viewed as logically distinct categories of knowledge, served the purpose of veiling the ideology of social science. His argument was that “ideology” was a category of knowledge that can be fully grasped or apprehended only at the level of the “totality” of social science. The “reification” of the intellectual division of labor into apparently logically distinct categories of political science, economics, sociology, history, . . . served the purpose of fragmenting and obscuring the “totality,” and thus the ideology, of social science. (Lukács 1971: 28) Lukács’ argument is consistent with Wallerstein’s historical analysis that liberal ideology is inscribed in the intellectual disciplinary division of labor and departmental structure of social science. It is also a theoretical base upon which I build my own argument that the “organizational structure” of the University, in particular its “departmental” structure of social science, is itself an ideological form of organization. (Contreras 1993: 331-338)

Wallerstein comments on one such academic challenge. In late 19th Century Germany a field developed called Staatswissenschaft. According to Wallerstein it represented a basic challenge to the tri-modal differentiation of the economic, the political, and the social, as well as the binary distinction between the universal present and the historical past.

The story of the institutional elimination of Staatswissenschaft, accomplished more or less by the 1920’s, has never really been told (Wallerstein 1991: 97).


Ibid.

In his study of the Chicano Movement Carlos Muñoz identified El Grito: A Journal of Contemporary Mexican-American Thought as the “first Mexican American scholarly journal to appear in the United States.” (Muñoz 1989: 63) The designation as “first” academic expression of Chicano Studies is qualified by recognition of the historical role of important individual intellectual precursors such as George I. Sanchez, Carlos E. Castañeda, Américo Paredes, Julian Samora, and Ernesto Galarza. (Muñoz 1989: 128-129) These scholars, it could be argued, were “doing” Chicano Studies as early as the 1930s.

Contreras 1993: 155-204.

Romano 1968.
Romano 1970.
Romano 1970: 11-12.
Romano 1970: 12.
Contreras 1993: 232.
Romano 1970: 12.
Contreras 1993: 204.

David Theo Goldberg's recent work on racist culture analyzes the racial basis of Enlightenment social science in terms of its intellectual, normative, and methodological premises (Goldberg 1993: 14-40).

Romano 1968.

This image of Chicano Studies will be probed in an opportunistic fashion by those opposed to Chicano Studies in misleading debates about "insiders and outsiders." (Gómez-Quiñones 1971: 32; Mirande 1985) The substantive content of those arguments was to reduce the ideological critique of Social Science on the Mexican American to a narrow question of whether only Chicanos can do Chicano Studies. The validity of the debate rested on a premise that Chicano Studies was the perspective of an ideologically homogenous culture or community. (Contreras 1993: 292)

Antonio Gramsci 1971.
Ibid., 348.

The original journal title was *Aztlan—Chicano Journal of the Social Sciences and The Arts.*
Contreras 1993: 369-380.
Rocco 1970: 89.

Rocco 1970: 94.
Rocco 1970: 90.
Rocco 1970: 93.
Rocco 1970: 90.
Rocco 1970: 76.
Muñoz 1970a; 1970b.

This article was actually a short summary of a paper delivered by Muñoz at an academic symposium on the urban crisis earlier in the year. As such, this short piece, in itself, provided little theoretical explanation of internal colonialism. However, my concern in this article is the ideological role of internal colonial theory (Contreras 1993: 268-284). Ideologically, as an object of affective social identification, Muñoz's summary served as a representative of more developed theoretical elaborations of Chicano internal colonialism. For example, see Almaguer (1971); Barrera, Muñoz Jr., and Ornelas (1972); Blauner (1969, 1972), and Flores (1973).

Contreras 1993: 325-331.


Contreras 1993: 319.

The Chicano/a student movement of the California university and state college systems has consistently recognized, over the last two decades, *El Plan de Santa Barbara* as its idea of Chicano Studies. Organizationally, this has been mainly, but not solely, because of the students of El Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán (MEChA). This is because MEChA's origin, ideological and organizational, is also based in *El Plan de Santa Barbara* and the conference that produced the document. (Contreras 1993: 60-65; Muñoz 1989: 78-84)

Contreras 1993: 331-339.

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THE POST MORTEM POLITICS OF THE
CHICANO MOVEMENT: 1975-1996

Armando Navarro

The politics of protest (1966-1974) produced unprecedented social change in the United States. During this era Chicano activists repudiated the politics of accommodation and opted for the politics of militant protest. It was the extraordinary activism under the rubric of the Chicano Movement that altered Chicano politics. The "new Chicano politic" was impelled by Chicanismo. Pride in the Mexicano culture, language, and heritage replaced the emphasis on assimilation. This renaissance stimulated both old and new organizations and leaders into energizing the Chicano Movement. This generation was relentless and resolute in its pursuit to extricate Mexicanos from the shackles of poverty, marginalization, and powerlessness.

By 1975, however, a new form of Chicano politics determined the Mexicano/Latino political, cultural, ideological, and organizational caste in the United States. During the next twenty-one years (1975-1996) the Mexicano/Latino community was characterized by two political phases: that of the "Viva Yo" generation (1975-1989); and that of "scapegoating" (1990-1996). These phases were preceded by the politics of resistance (1848-1915), accommodation (1916-1945), social action (1945-1965), and protest (1966-1974).

This article is a continuation of "The Evolution of Chicano Politics," which I wrote in the early 1970s. It examines each of the above-mentioned phases by utilizing a theoretical framework on political movements. In addition, it provides a political, historiographical, and theoretical analysis of how Chicano politics was characterized between 1975 and 1996.

The Moribund Chicano Movement

The Chicano Movement became moribund by 1974. In my book, Mexican American Youth Organization: Avant-Garde of the Chicano Movement in Texas, I maintain that the movement was a product of heightened levels of frustration and discontent caused by the unfulfilled expectations of Mexicanos. Moreover, with the nation in a state of turmoil in the 1960s and early 1970s, the Chicano
Movement was caused by the manifold contradictions produced by clashing antagonisms.³

Social movements are not launched in isolation. Certain conditions and ingredients must be present for movements to emerge, and they can only develop in social systems subject to disfunctionality and disequilibrium. Chalmers Johnson writes, “Since an equilibrium system is not a changing system, a changing system is one that is out of balance.” Antagonisms are what produce the imbalance or dysfunctions within the social system. They come in distinct forms: historical events, enactment of laws, increasing repression, and emergence of charismatic leaders, to name a few. Thus, social movements never develop in social systems that are in balance.⁴

Endogenous and exogenous antagonisms give rise to a social movement. Individually or in combination they produce the requisite pressure, conflict, and discontent within the system. If left unmet, the system faces the possibility of disfunctionality. Antagonisms can act as either “accelerators” or “precipitants” that give rise to the conditions that create, impel, and organize a social movement.⁵ They help create the climate that is necessary for a social movement to emerge. Seldom, if ever, does a single antagonism generate enough discontent to create a social movement. Only when several antagonisms feed off one another do they dialectically foster the chronic discontent that nourishes a movement.

The following are the salient endogenous and exogenous antagonisms that gave rise to the Chicano Movement.⁶

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exogenous</th>
<th>Endogenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights Movement</td>
<td>History of Chicano resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Left</td>
<td>Demographic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-war Movement</td>
<td>Changing socioeconomic Profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Power Movement</td>
<td>Tijerina and the Alianza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign movements</td>
<td>Chávez and the UFW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The War on Poverty</td>
<td>Gonzales and the Crusade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As historical forces, these antagonisms developed an interdependency on one another, and in some cases one antagonism generated another. Because of their inherent contradictions, the exogenous antagonisms influenced the en-
dogenous and vice versa. These antagonisms were actuated by the dialectical process that existed within the epoch of protest (1955-1974), which in turn generated changes in political ideas and strategies. One such example was the Brown vs. Board of Education Supreme Court decision of 1954, which contributed significantly to the increase in activism during the Civil Rights Movement. Consequently, the Civil Rights Movement gave impetus to the emergence of the New Left. As the war in Vietnam escalated, the New Left became instrumental in the development of the Vietnam Antiwar Movement. These antagonisms subsequently gave rise to the Black Power Movement. Thus, each antagonism in the epoch of protest had a thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, with each successive antagonism constituting a higher form of radicalism.

By 1975 many of the above antagonisms, especially the exogenous, were history. While some movements continued beyond 1975, the reality was that the unprecedented epoch of protest had come to an end. The Civil Rights Movement reached its apogee in 1965 with the passage of the Voting Rights Act. By the 1970s, only vestiges of it remained, e.g., Jessie Jackson’s Operation Push. The New Left, absorbed by the Antiwar Movement, all but disappeared. With the United States military involvement in Vietnam ending in 1973, the Antiwar Movement also subsided. With the decline of these movements, the Black Power Movement also disappeared. It fell victim to internal power struggles, ideological cleavages, subversion, infiltration, and repression by law enforcement agencies. By the mid-1970s, few foreign movements existed that captured the imagination and interest of activists in the United States. The War on Poverty programs, by this time, had been substantially curtailed by the Nixon and Ford administrations. However, of all these antagonisms, it was the end of the Vietnam War that contributed most to the decline of the epoch of protest. These movements also became casualties of the emerging neo-conservative trend that generated, in 1968, the election of Republican Richard Nixon to the presidency. Without the dynamism, mobilization, and activism of the other exogenous movements, the Chicano Movement by 1975 succumbed as well.

Moreover, endogenously, Chicanos were not able to thwart the emerging neo-conservatism, largely because of the internal contradictions that plagued the movement. Although some Mexicanos continued to practice protest politics, the overall movement had become debilitated by the pervasiveness of in-
ternal power struggles, ideological cleavages, growing apathy and complacency, and a shift to electoral accommodationist politics. Although the Mexicano/Latino population was increasing steadily and becoming more middle class, those leaders who acted as agents in the radicalization of the Chicano Movement were in a state of decline by 1975. Such endogenous antagonisms, like Tijerina, Chávez, Gonzales, and Gutiérrez and their organizations were at the incipient stage of their decline. Historian Juan Gómez-Quiñones alludes to the growing apathy, “The intensity of the decade had exhausted some activists, and some activism itself had become a consciously delimited activity.”

Thus, the political climate favored the emergence of a new Chicano politic.

A Theoretical Framework on Political Movements

The study of political movements suggests that there are several variables or “ingredients” endemic and requisite to any viable movement. They are: political climate, leadership, ideology, organization, strategy and tactics, and a power capability. If any one of these variables is missing, the probability of a struggle for change becoming a political movement is not likely. No political movement can emerge without a propitious climate. Political movements are dialectical products of society’s political and material conditions. The literature on social movements suggests that reformist and revolutionary movements originate from discontent and are nurtured by adversity and conflict. People do not form change-oriented movements when they are content—a sense of restlessness and unmet expectations must exist for a movement to take form.

A climate of change must be accompanied by leadership, because no movement can be formed or exist without it. Leaders are the pilots, navigators, architects of ideas, conductors, and mechanics of a movement. Organization is the infrastructure for people’s participation in a movement. It is the people’s countervailing weapon against the system’s superstructure. No political movement can expect to prevail without an ideology. Ideology is what defines a movement’s beliefs, direction, and justification of actions. Strategy and tactics provide a general course of action, and the methods by which to realize its ideology. For a political movement to achieve a level of viability it must have the capacity to use and exercise power. Thus, all of these variables, coupled with adequate financial and human resources are what give a movement power capability.

Political Climate: A Growing Conservatism

During the 1970s the nation's political climate shifted from one of turmoil, militancy, and radicalism to one that was conservative, ballot box, and accommodationist-oriented. The epoch of protest was characterized by a political climate and culture that sought reformation or transformation of the United States' political and economic systems. Nurtured by the 1964 Goldwater for President campaign and the Nixon/Ford Presidential administrations (1968-1976), electoral politics shifted from the left to the right of center. The subsequent Democratic (1976-1980) and Republican (1980-1992) administrations were not interested in expanding civil rights, promoting social justice, or ending poverty. In particular, the priorities of the Reagan and Bush administrations were to unfetter the federal government and economy from what they called the long arm of "big government." They also focused their policy efforts on further enriching corporations and expanding the nation's military.

"Big government" and its adherence to Keynesian economics came under severe attack, especially during the Reagan administration. His zealous support for supply-side "voodoo" economics promoted the virtues of tax-cuts for the rich, and a reduction in government expenditures for the poor. Republicans promoted laissez-faire capitalism and "anti-welfare state" deregulation. Reaganomics adhered to a political creed that emphasized life, liberty, and the pursuit of property (wealth). Individualism pervaded the nation's political climate and culture. The emphasis was on the accumulation of wealth by the rich at the expense of the middle class, the poor, and minorities.

The Mexicano was not exempt from this dramatic change in the nation's political climate. As many non-Mexicanos began identifying themselves as being more moderate or conservative, so did many Mexicanos. It was during these years that approximately thirty-five percent of "Hispanics" left the Democratic Party and became Republicans. This change in Mexicano political culture reflected the nation's change in attitudes, beliefs, and values. During the years of the Chicano Movement, the activist stressed "community," we, and "Raza primero." By the late 1970s, and especially in the 1980s, their emphasis shifted to the "I." The Mexicano/Latino community was surrounded by neo-conservatism that preached self-interest at the expense of community self-determination. Their greed was induced by an insatiable appetite for wealth.
Chicano scholars such as Rodolfo Acuña, Carlos Muñoz, Matt Meier, Feliciano Ribera, and Juan Gómez-Quiñones acknowledged the Mexicano/Latino's growing tendencies towards conservativism. This trend continued despite the problems that were developing as a result of conservative policies. This dramatic attitudinal shift in the Chicano ethos was reflective of the "Viva Yo" generation.

**Leadership: From Activist to Politician**

The years of the Viva Yo generation were afflicted by a leadership vacuum. The movement era produced a plethora of leaders such as Reies López Tijerina, César Chávez, Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales, and Jóse Angel Gutiérrez. Yet the leadership capability of these individuals declined dramatically by the late 1970s. Their decline contributed to the emergence of the Viva Yo politic. During the eighties, Chávez was the only movement leader who was still organizing. There were a few others, like myself, who sought to organize using a myriad of issues. But no one emerged at a level of national prominence. Leadership was essentially local and regional. The neophyte activists were protective of their turf. This kept any one leader from emerging beyond their own neighborhood, community, or region. The parochialism that historically has plagued Chicano politics continued to exacerbate leadership formation at state and national levels.

During the 1980s, leadership shifted from the barrio activists to the politicians of the system. This conversion process was in great part stimulated by the dramatic demographic growth of Mexicanos and Latinos during the 1970s and 1980s. Mexicanos in 1970 numbered some seven million. By 1980 the figure increased to nearly nine million. By 1983 the Latino population as a whole increased to 16.9 million, an increase due primarily to immigration and high birth rates. The dramatic swell in numbers coupled with the Viva Yo mind-set, helped to increase the number of Mexicano and other Latinos elected to public office. Significant growth in Latino political representation occurred at the state level. The chart on the following page illustrates the growth in Latino representation in legislatures in the five Southwestern states between 1950-1983:
In 1974, Mexicano political representation became more evident with the elections of two Mexicano governors Jerry Apodaca of New Mexico, and Raúl Castro of Arizona. In 1982, liberal Democrat, Tony Anaya, was elected governor of New Mexico. At the federal level, Mexicanos began to make significant gains by being appointed to high administrative positions. In 1976, Jimmy Carter received 81 percent of the Mexicano vote. He reciprocated by appointing more Mexicanos to these positions than previous administrations. He appointed some 200, including: Dr. Julian Nava, Ambassador to Mexico; Raúl Castro, Ambassador to Argentina; Mari-Luci Jaramillo, Ambassador to Honduras; and Dr. Ralph Guzman to the State Department. Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, appointed a lesser number. One such appointment was Dr. Lauro Cavazos as Secretary of Education in 1988. Mexicanos had seven representatives in Congress in 1988. Three were from California; three from Texas; and one from New Mexico.

At the local level, Mexicanos made impressive gains exemplified by the election of Henry Cisneros to the San Antonio, Texas, city council in 1975, and as mayor in 1981. Federico Peña was elected mayor of Denver in 1982. As mayors they represented what historian Acuña describes as belonging to the “age of brokers.” Owing to a growing population, and voter registration drives organized by Willie Velasquez from the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project (SVREP), scores of Mexicanos in the eighties were elected to city councils and school boards. In Los Angeles, Richard Alatorre and Gloria Molina were elected to the city council. From Los Angeles to San Antonio to Chicago, Mexicano political activism manifested itself through the ballot box.

### Latinos Elected to State Legislatures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arizona</th>
<th>California</th>
<th>Colorado</th>
<th>New Mexico</th>
<th>Texas</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chicano Movement’s call for “Chicano Power” in the early 1970s changed in the eighties to “Hispanic Empowerment.”

**Ideology: The Maintenance of Liberal Capitalism**

As the nation’s political climate and leadership became more conservative, people became more committed to maintaining the liberal-capitalist system. This also applied to many Mexicanos. The days when the Chicano activist promulgated the virtues of cultural nationalism, Chicano power, Aztlán and Viva la Raza were, for the most part, gone. During the movement years, some activists unequivocally rebuked the exploitative nature of the capitalist system. Some used socialism and Marxism as their model. By the 1980s, Chicano politics had come full-circle. It once again embraced the virtues of the “free enterprise system.” This conservative trend was also visible in universities. Increasingly, Chicano Studies programs were directed toward “mainstreaming.” This preference was evident at the conferences that were organized, in the research that was conducted by Mexicano scholars, the growing conservatism among Chicano student organizations, and their growing detachment from the community. Mexicanos in substantial numbers once again set their sites on assimilating into what they believed was mainstream U.S. society.

This mind-set or political culture eventually led some Mexicanos to identify as Hispanic. Ironically, this was not a designation given as a result of philosophical contemplation, but rather because the federal government needed a simplified way for identifying “brown folks.” In 1978, the Office of Management and Budget decided to use the term Hispanic to identify “persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central and South American... culture or origin, regardless of race.” Roberto M. De Anda writes, “For Mexican Americans it meant subsuming their Chicano ideology for the label ‘Hispanic,’ which gained its importance and strength from being a national rather than original descriptive term.” Quiñones states, “It quickly became the preferred term by bureaucrats, academics, businesses, and media.” Few cared that Hispanic connoted more of a cultural lineage to Spain rather than Mexico. The term Hispanic negates the “mestizo” and indigenous aspects of the Mexicano’s experience. Thus, during the “Viva Yo” generation or “decade of the Hispanic,” as was promulgated by Corporate America, Latinos increasingly bought into “Hispanicization.”
**Organization: Decline of Protest Groups**

While the era of the Chicano Movement witnessed a proliferation of new activist organizations that dominated Chicano politics, the “Viva Yo” generation witnessed their dramatic decline, and by the 1980s their demise. Chicano protest-oriented organizations became casualties of internal power struggles, devastating ideological schisms, and a vanishing community support base. By 1975, the Alianza Federal de Mercedes, and Brown Berets, among others, subsided. The Chicano student movement like its parent, the Chicano Movement also declined. By 1980 the Raza Unida Party (RUP), for all intents and purposes, had become defunct in most areas of Aztlán due to a combination of factors, e.g. power struggles, ideological cleavage, etc. During these years the Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán (MEChA) was embroiled in conflicts. On many campuses it resembled a fraternity rather than an activist protest group. By the late 1970s other organizations, such as the Centro de Acción Social Autónoma-Hermandad General de Trabajadores (CASA-HGT), and the August 29th Movement, had also disappeared.

Gonzales’ Crusade for Justice faded in the early 1980s after many years under a state of siege by law enforcement agencies. The only major movement organization to survive the contagious decline was Chávez’s United Farm Workers Union (UFW). After losing numerous contracts, however, it was relegated to a defensive posture.

This is not to say that Mexicano organizational activism was dead during those years. In 1974 the activist-oriented Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS) was formed. One year later the United Neighborhood Organization (UNO) was organized in Los Angeles. In 1978, as a result of “El Plan de San Bernardino,” El Congreso para Pueblos Unidos sought to revitalize the Chicano Movement. In California, during a struggle in 1981 for fair redistricting, Mexicanos formed Californios for Fair Representation (CFR). There were other coalitions that were formed, such as Operation Corporate Responsibility. The gravity of the crisis encouraged the formation of organizing and policy institutes such as the Institute for Social Justice, formed in 1983, and the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute, formed in 1985. In 1985 the Institute of Social Justice ventured into the arena of foreign affairs by organizing a peace delegation to Mexico, Central America, and Cuba. In 1988, it organized Impacto 2000, a Southwest coalition, that held meetings with Mexico’s leading presidential candidates. These organizations sought to create change in a conserva-
tive political climate that did not welcome change. The few protest organizations that did surface proved to be transitory or always in a defensive posture.

This period witnessed the re-emergence of the older organizations and the formation of new ones. Traditional organizations such as the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the G.I. Forum, and the Mexican-American Political Association (MAPA) took on prominent organizational leadership roles as advocates of Hispanic interests. Several other moderate and accommodationist organizations were formed: the Southwest Council of La Raza, which was renamed in 1972 the National Council of La Raza (NCLR); the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), formed in 1968; the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project (SVREP) in 1974; and the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO), in 1975. With an emphasis on Reaganomics and the virtues of the private sector, Mexicanos Chambers of Commerce became Hispanic Chambers promulgating individual economic empowerment. Some Chambers became vehicles for Republican activism.

Scores of Mexicano men's and women's professional, educational, social service, and economic development organizations populated the "Viva Yo" generation landscape. During the 1980s, there was no lack of Hispanic organizations. Sometimes Mexicanos had too many organizations struggling and competing for rapidly vanishing private and public sector funds. Divisions between organizations consequently became commonplace. Numerous attempts were made to coalesce, solidify, and strengthen organizational networking capabilities. All ended in failure.

**Strategies and Tactics: The Primacy of Ballot Box Politics**

The conservatism of the "Viva Yo" generation was reflected in the strategies it employed. As previously discussed, Mexicanos, from 1975 to 1988, employed the ballot box to achieve political empowerment. During these years organizations such as SVREP, NALEO, MALDEF, MAPA, and Mexican American Democrats (MAD) in Texas, sought the further integration of the Mexicano into the political system. Their *modus operandi* were conventional methods such as voter registration, voter education, and get-out-the-vote drives. During the eighties and early nineties, major efforts were conducted to register Latino voters. In California, for example, Hispanic (Latino) voter registration increased:

Across the nation Latino registration increased by 27 percent. Organiza-
tions such as MAPA, CPU, and MAD endorsed candidates. These entities, along with NCLR, LULAC, the G.I. Forum, and MALDEF functioned as pressure groups confronting social and policy issues. Their emphasis was on lobbying, press conferences, letter writing and petition campaigns, negotia-
tions, telephone calls, and conferences. Their pressure tactics were designed not to polarize or appear militant or radical. MALDEF and SVREP relied on litigation and research reports to advocate for the interests of the Mexicano. One example of this was the Plyler vs. Doe decision in 1982, through which MALDEF succeeded in defending the right of undocumented children to a public education. In 1987 MALDEF scored another legal victory with the Gomez vs. City of Watsonville decision that allowed local governments to redist-

Despite the popularity of ballot box politics, some Mexicano organizations continued to use protest as their tactic. Organizations such as the UFW, RUP, MEChA, Committee on Chicano Rights (San Diego), CPU, CFR, Hermandad Mejicana, and the Mothers of East Los Angeles relied on marches, sit-ins, demonstration vigils, and hunger strikes to confront the issues adversely impacting the Mexicano/Latino community. These groups continued to rely on protest as a tactic because some vestiges of the Chicano Movement continued to influence the Mexicano's political culture. Issues impacting the barrios of Aztlán—immigration, affirmative action, police brutality, job and education discrimination—created conditions auspicious for the use of unconventional protest methods. However, the further Mexicano/Latinos moved into the eight-
ies, the less they were willing to use protest to resolve crisis situations.

Power Capability: Absence of a Mass Movement

During the "Viva Yo" years, no movements of the stature of the epoch of pro-
test surfaced. The political chemistry needed to form mass movements was absent. The various exogenous and endogenous antagonisms of this epoch never became acute enough to foster relative deprivation or intolerable discon-
tent and frustration. No polarizing issue such as the Vietnam War confronted the nation. Mexicanos experienced a definite absence of power capability. At
no time during these years did those in power respect either the Mexicano or Latino. Regardless of their growing numbers, Mexicanos lacked a "fear factor." They did not demonstrate power. Mexicano leaders and organizations were too weak to challenge the deteriorating political, economic, and social conditions. There was no Mexicano leader with the stature of a Jessie Jackson. Their organizations did not have the resources or clout to mobilize their constituency. Without a clear ideology, Mexicanos fell prey to the contradictions of the liberal-capitalist system. Although some protest activity did occur, the prevailing modus operandi was based on the ballot box and conventional pressure politics. Consequently, without a power capability, Mexicanos entered the 1990s with a ranking of "no respect" from the power brokers. Mexicanos suffered from what this author describes as the "Rodney Dangerfield Syndrome" of no power, no influence—meaning "no respect" politics.

The Politics of Scapegoating (1990-1996)

Political Climate: Nativism and Ethnocentrism
During the 1990s the nation's political climate remained conservative. With the election of George Bush to the presidency in 1988, Reaganomics continued to be the nation's doctrine. However, it was softened under the facade of being a "kinder, gentler," program. The electorate began moving toward a more moderate conservatism. This became apparent with the election of Democrat Bill Clinton, and the election of a Democratic Congress in 1992. Even when Republicans took control of the Congress in 1994 and pushed for their "Contract With America," Clinton, in "Machiavellian" manner, shifted the politics of his administration to a more right of center position. This, despite the fact that Latinos were instrumental in electing him to office. He seemed to be trying to out Republican the Republicans, especially when it came to issues such as immigration, affirmative action, welfare reform, civil rights, and English Only initiatives. Unfortunately, these were issues afflicting the nation's barrios. As the nation prepared for the 1996 presidential elections the political climate became even more hostile toward Latinos, especially Mexican immigrants.

This hostility manifested itself through a resurgence of nativism. The nativism crusade targeted both documented and undocumented immigrants, and used them as the scapegoats for the country's ills. This racist crusade was
predicated on political xenophobia that was being promoted by both Republicans and Democrats alike. Prominent politicians, such as California Governor Pete Wilson, and Democratic U.S. Senators Diane Feinstein and Barbara Boxer, among others, acted as catalysts in fostering a political climate that nurtured "immigrant bashing." The Clinton administration added to the problem by ordering the implementation of "Operation Gatekeeper," which enhanced the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border. These actions added to what could be characterized as a "state of siege" for Mexicanos in California.57

The hostility and intolerance became evident with the passage of anti-immigrant legislation. The most blatant initiative was Proposition 187 in California in 1994. Governor Wilson and other politicians effectively used the issue for their re-election and election bids. With California in a state of economic crisis, they pandered to the fears and frustrations of the electorate. Even though countless studies repudiated their attacks, they continued to blame immigrants for taking jobs away from domestic workers, and burdening taxpayers. Proposition 187 sought to deny children of undocumented parents the right to an education, which was unconstitutional since it violated the spirit of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision Plyler vs. Doe (1982). Furthermore, it denied health and social services to the undocumented. Despite the illegality of the initiative, it passed with fifty-eight percent of the vote.58 MALDEF and other legal organizations subsequently challenged its constitutionality. In 1996 it was tied-up in the federal courts. With the passage of 187, the politics of scapegoating picked up momentum through the promotion of similar initiatives and legislation in other states, and at the federal level.

In 1996 the Clinton administration, supported by the Republican-controlled Congress, passed restrictionist immigration legislation, e.g., the Anti-Terrorism Bill and National Interest Act of 1996, which called for measures designed to curb the immigrant "exodus" from Mexico.59 In addition, that year Clinton joined Republicans in supporting the passage of welfare reform legislation that denied documented immigrants access to public health care benefits.60 The nativist's attacks went beyond immigration. Affirmative Action, welfare reform, dismantling of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and other liberal reforms also became targets. Their attack, however, honed in on affirmative action. In 1996 anti-affirmative action forces succeeded in getting the Californian Civil Rights Initiative (Proposition 209) on the ballot. This mea-
sured sought to prohibit state and local-funded programs from giving preference on the basis of race, gender, and ethnicity. Not waiting for its passage, in 1995, Governor Pete Wilson and the University of California Board of Regents, succeeded in laying the groundwork for the dismantling of the University of California's affirmative action programs. By 1996 similar movements to curtail or end affirmative action were picking up momentum in more than a dozen other states. That year in Texas, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the University of Texas' affirmative action program unconstitutional, a ruling the university later appealed to the Supreme Court.

The mean-spirited political climate of the nation was exacerbated by increased poverty and social problems. The poverty rate for Latino children grew from 36.2 percent in 1989 to 41.5 percent in 1994. The overall poverty rate increased to 30.7 in 1994. A plethora of problems permeated the nation's Mexicano barrios. Unemployment, crime, gang violence, drug and alcohol abuse, scarcity of affordable housing, lack of adequate health care, were among the many serious conditions afflicting this community.

Three other major issues fueled the politics of scapegoating: the "browning of America" or changing demographics; the nation's shift from a war economy to a peace economy; and the inherent contradictions of the economic system. The 1990 Census concluded that the Latino population had dramatically increased. In California the Latino population increased 69.2 percent, which amounted to some 7.7 million. Demographers predicted that Latinos in California could reach majority status by 2020. Nationally, by 1995, the Latino population was 27 million, and expected to increase to 31 million by the year 2000. By 2006, if not sooner, Latinos will become the largest minority group in the nation. In 1990, the cover of Time Magazine read "America's Changing Colors." One of a series of articles in that edition concluded "That in the 21st century—and that's not far off—racial and ethnic groups in the U.S. will outnumber whites for the first time. The 'browning of America' will alter everything in society, from politics and education to industry, values and culture." This is expected to occur by no later than 2056.

This dramatic demographic transformation triggered and energized nativism. Fearing Mexicanos would over-populate Aztlán, some nativists were driven by an irredentist belief in the inevitably of a "Mexicano Quebec." Witnessing the substantial increase in Mexicanos being elected to public office, they
feared that they were losing political and economic control. They feared the change in the region’s culture and language, and the Mexicano’s affinity to Mexico.

This nation’s economic problems, coupled with a worldwide economic crisis, contributed to the politics of scapegoating. Two inter-related factors escalated the crisis. First, the end of the Cold War meant the nation moved from a wartime to a peacetime economy. This transition was plagued with problems. The paradox was that while the United States’ military budgets continued to be exorbitant, corporations were reacting to this transition by down-sizing, decreasing worker’s wages and benefits, conducting corporate mergers, and emphasizing automation. The result of these actions was the layoff of thousands of blue and white collar workers. In the wake of defense industry cut backs, Northrop Corporation, for example, laid off tens of thousands of workers in California. Nonetheless, in 1994, the earnings of its Chairman and CEO rose to 1.6 million, up from 1.1 million the year before. The CEO’s salary, compared to that of the average U.S. worker, increased, from a ratio of 41 to one in 1975, to more than 225 to one in 1996.

Secondly, the apparent triumph of capitalism over communism ushered in what President Bush described as the “New World Order,” the unleashing of monopoly capitalism. Throughout the world, governments faced enormous pressures due to increased global competition for profit and markets. United States-based multi-national corporations responded to the competition by exporting thousands of jobs to Second and Third World countries. The passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) created a fire storm of debate with unions and activists alleging that it would create a loss of jobs for U.S. workers. This transfer of jobs fostered the further concentration of wealth among the few. Between 1975 and 1992 the share of the total wealth held by the richest one percent of families nearly doubled. Household income in the United States had been flat since the late 1970s, and workers’ real weekly wages dropped almost 20 percent during this same period. The net effect was that the rich grew richer and the poor became poorer, with the middle class fast joining the ranks of the poor. This precarious situation stimulated a growing discontent and insecurity among the nation's middle class and poor, which served to fan the fires of nativism. The end result was that many U.S. workers took out their frustration and anger on immigrants. Some maintained that the
immigrant was the culprit behind the nation's economic crises.\textsuperscript{72}

\textbf{Leadership: The Reign of the Politician}

During the scapegoating era the Latino community, in general, continued to be plagued by a chronic lack of leadership, especially at the national level. None of the contemporary organizational or political leaders commanded the following, prominence, and respect as did the leadership of the movement era—Reies López Tijerina, César Chávez, Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzales, and José Angel Gutiérrez.\textsuperscript{73} In 1993, this crisis was deepened by the death of UFW leader César Chávez. Arturo Rodriguez, Chávez’s son-in-law took over the UFW’s leadership. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Latino politician replaced the Latino activist. The following chart illustrates the level of Latino representation in five western states from 1990 to 1994:

\begin{table}[h]
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\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
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Arizona & 11 & 11 & 10 & 6 \\
California & 7 & 12 & 14 & 14 \\
Colorado & 10 & 8 & 7 & 6 \\
New Mexico & 40 & 45 & 42 & 41 \\
Texas & 25 & 32 & 33 & 35 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Latinos Elected to State Legislatures}
\end{table}

The above figures indicate that by 1996, there were decreases in representation in the states of Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico; California maintained its number, and only state of Texas increased significantly.

At the national level, in 1991, overall Latino representation totaled 4,202 elected officials—approximately 0.7 percent of the nation’s elected officials. By 1994, the figure increased dramatically to 5,466 with the majority coming from the Southwest.\textsuperscript{74} But by 1996, this trend changed. NALEO reported that the overall levels of Latino representation decreased in all the Southwestern states. The following chart further illustrates this decline:
Latinos Elected to Local, State & National Offices

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<tr>
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<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1996</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>299</td>
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<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>693</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>166</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>618</td>
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<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2030</td>
<td>1689</td>
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The principal reasons for this drop include: a trend toward racially polarized voting; political alienation; apathy; a large documented and undocumented Latino immigrant population; a young, largely apolitical, population; and a lack of political leadership, organizational infrastructure, and physical and monetary resources. The impact of these deficiencies varied from state to state. In California, for example, where the immigrant bashing was so intense, State Senator Art Torres' lost his bid for secretary of state. However, in Texas, Dan Morales was elected state attorney general. Here, the possible explanation might be that Torres ran on a more liberal, anti-Proposition 187 platform, whereas, Morales ran on a more moderate ticket and did not have an anti-undocumented initiative to contend with.

The 1996 presidential elections produced yet another change in the number of California Latinos elected to state and congressional offices. Proposition 209, the California "Civil Rights Initiative," which sought the dismantling of affirmative action programs, was the driving force behind the increase in Latino voter turnout. This participation contributed to the election of three new assembly persons, giving Latinos 14 of the 80 seats. The Latino vote also helped Democrats regain control of the assembly. According to Frank del Olmo, "That in turn, led to the party's leadership selection of the first Latino, Cruz Bustamante, to hold the post of assembly speaker, the second most powerful job in state government." Equally significant was the election of Rod Pacheco, who became the first Latino to run on a Republican ticket and win an assembly seat.

The trend to attain Latino empowerment also carried over into congressional races. By 1996 Latino congressional representation increased to 18. In
California, for example, Latino congressional representation increased from four to five—a result of an astonishing upset. Lorretta Sanchez, by a mere 984 votes, managed to win over "the rabidly right wing" Republican, Robert K. Dornan. Her victory was in great part the result of the changing demographics of Orange County. What had once been the bastion of "lily whiteness" had fast become the stronghold of the people of the sun, "brown folks."

In Texas, Latinos experienced the same positive outcomes; in 1996 there were five Latino congressmen from that state. During the 1990s Texas witnessed two interesting campaigns for the U.S. Senate. José Angel Gutiérrez, former national chairman of the Raza Unida Party, ran unsuccessfully as a Democrat in 1993. In 1996, after months of campaigning throughout the state in his little pickup truck, and winning the Democratic nomination, Victor Morales lost to Republican incumbent Phil Graham. Although he received forty-four percent of the vote, his populist campaign strategy lacked the support of the Democratic leadership and the money that could have assured him a victory.

Immigrant bashing stimulated the resurgence of activist leadership. However, it did not have the same support that existed during the movement era. This deficiency left activists ineffective in dealing with issues such as immigration, affirmative action, and the dismantling of Chicano studies programs. Unfortunately, their posture also caused them to be transitory. One such case occurred in 1994, when thousands of mostly high school students initiated school walkouts in protest to Proposition 187. But when the initiative passed with a 59 to 41 percentage margin, the student leadership disappeared, and so did the protests. The barrios confronted the same problem—an activist leadership that was transitory and sometimes non-existent. Power struggles, differences over strategy, tactics, and ideology hampered empowerment efforts. It was apparent that the activists of the nineties had failed to learn from the shortcomings of the their predecessors of the Chicano Movement era. Thus, in 1996 came to a close, the leadership crisis had deepened.

**Ideology: The Pursuit of Laissez-Faire Economics**

Latinos have yet to develop their own ideological vision. They continue their fidelity to the liberal capitalist system, with Latino politicians serving as the "gate keepers" of the status quo. According to David E. Hayes-Bautista and Gregory Rodríguez, "The number of Latino elected officials in California rose
to nearly 800, almost twice what it was a decade earlier.” They further state: “But success in creating Latino political fiefdoms has not translated into a consistent and coherent agenda on how to promote Latino interests or how to better govern the state.” Very few Latino politicians produced policy alternatives that changed dramatically the social order. Instead, many were merely purveyors of “Viva Yo” politics, and its cardinal principle of “What’s in it for me?” Consequently, increased Latino representation, as of 1996, had yet to make a major policy difference in improving the quality of life for Mexicanos.

With few exceptions, this characteristic also applies to the intellectual, professional, business, and to some students, and activists as well. During the nineties, many Mexicanos continued to adhere to the “Viva Yo” mind-set. Many were more concerned with promoting their own mobility and mainstreaming. Very few were willing to work in the trenches of the barrios. Like most politicians, they too were more concerned with defending the interests of the “I” versus the “we.” Strong vestiges of the “Viva Yo” generation mind-set continued to impede social change. However, by 1993 the nativist’s attacks once again inspired the use of such terms as Aztlán, Chicano self-determination, and cultural nationalism among the few activists. As was the case during the era of the Chicano Movement, the 1990s saw an increase among those who were hypercritical of liberal capitalism. This stimulated discussion on the need for ideological alternatives, primarily among intellectuals and community activists. In spite of this, Chicano politics during the scapegoating era still has no vision of its own. It continued to be reactive rather than proactive in confronting the problems of the barrios.

**Organization: The Preeminence of Traditional Organizations**

Organizationally, traditional groups remained relatively weak and oriented toward maintaining the status quo. They were plagued by decreasing membership. An inherent problem was that these organizations had aging memberships that are not being replaced or augmented. In addition, none were financially self-sufficient. Their dependency on external funding sources prevented many from taking on controversial issues, fearing the loss of financial support. Moreover, few organizations conducted grass roots organizing. None of the traditional organizations could mobilize large numbers of people in either the electoral or protest arenas. Too many of their members had become “confer-
ence and cocktail activists.\textsuperscript{84}

The nativist attacks did, however, stimulate a semblance of an organizational renaissance among activist groups. The renaissance was a product of two stimuli: the severity of the nativist attacks, and the possible loss of funding. In some cases, the driving force behind organizational activism was the fact that survival depended on it. Most of these organizations were not committed to grass roots organizational development, but rather on the formation of coalitions. The 1990s were replete with coalitions that had virtually no structure, no mass base, or financial resources to speak of. Therefore, like the leadership of the 1990s, they to were transitory. One coalition that was able to show longevity was \textit{Cordinadora 96}. However, this was due in great part to the organizational leadership efforts of One Stop Immigration out of Los Angeles, which had some staff and resources to support it. Some of the activist organizations which had their roots in the Chicano Movement era such as the Brown Berets, MEChA, the National Chicano Moratorium Committee, Unión del Barrio, appeared to be going through a process of revitalization.\textsuperscript{85} These groups organized a variety of protest activities focusing on such issues as immigration and affirmative action. But, by and large, Chicano organizations in 1996 were still weak, and continued to be victimized by the stultifying Rodney Dangerfield Syndrome.

\textbf{Strategy and Tactics: The Resurgence of Protest}

Strategically and tactically, Mexicano leaders and organizations continued to adhere to a bifurcated approach of ballot box and protest politics. In the electoral arena, great gains were made in increasing Latino political representation and voter turnout.\textsuperscript{86} This was attributed to the dramatic increase in the number of Latinos registered to vote, the increase in citizenship, and the hostile political climate. Through the efforts of numerous organizations, SVREP, MAPA, LULAC, and others, including both the Democratic and Republican parties, the number of Latinos registered to vote increased. In California, for example, Latinos in 1990 made up seven percent of the state electorate. By 1994 that figure increased to eleven percent. Nationally, in 1996 there were some 6.6 million Latino voters, including 2 million in California, 1.6 million in Texas, 566,000 in Florida, and 539,000 in New York—states that have significant numbers of electoral votes.\textsuperscript{87} In the area of naturalization the same occurred. In droves, across Aztlán resident immigrants became U.S. citizens.
In Los Angeles County alone, in 1995, as many as 2,500 people a day applied for citizenship. By 1996 over 300,000 Latinos became naturalized. For Latinos, in particular, the immigrant bashing and attacks on affirmative action, animated their desire to become citizens of this country and to vote.

The Latino turnout for the 1996 presidential elections was impressive—the highest ever, according to the Southwest Voter Research Institute. Sixty-five percent of those registered to vote cast their ballots, surpassing the 1994 record of 56 percent. Issues such as Proposition 187, Proposition 209, and welfare reform, induced Latino voters to defeat Republican candidates. Exit polls showed that President Clinton received 75 percent of the Latino vote, whereas Dole only received twenty-one percent. Journalist Lou Canon concluded, “The Latino giant sleeps no more.”

During the politics of scapegoating, Latinos also opted for the use of protest as a strategy. While some protest activity occurred during the first few years of the nineties, it was not until 1994, with the emergence of Proposition 187 in California, that major nativist crusades spurred the forces of protest among Latinos into greater action. Marches, pickets, sit-ins, hunger strikes, and press conferences were organized in response to pressing issues. In 1994, a coalition of immigrant groups led by One Stop Immigration, held the largest march in the history of Latinos in Los Angeles. It drew more than 70,000 people. The march had a chain-reaction effect. It inspired numerous high school walkouts. The students proudly waved Mexican flags in recognition of their Mejicanismo. This, however, in the eyes of some, was a strategic error. Latino politicians claimed that this expression of cultural nationalism further polarized the Anglo vote to the extent that Proposition 187 passed.

Furthermore, numerous conferences and meetings were held for the purpose of fostering a unified political response to the nativist attacks. For example, in 1994 and in 1995 summit conferences were organized by the Ernesto Galarza Public Policy Institute at the University of California, Riverside. The events produced “El Plan de Riverside.” The plan called for a massive electoral and direct action mobilization for the upcoming presidential elections. In 1996, the National Republican Convention held in San Diego witnessed a series of protests conducted by various Mexicano activist coalitions and groups, such as Impacto 2000, Unión del Barrio, National Chicano Moratorium Committee, MEChA, and the Coalition for Social & Economic Justice. For ex-
ample, Impacto 2000, a coalition of Latino leaders and groups, organized the “Justice & Freedom” Rally and March along the U.S.-Mexico border protesting the racist politics of the Republican Party. An anti-Proposition 209 march from Sacramento to San Diego was organized by the Coalition for Social & Economic Justice. Some traditional organizations, such as MAPA, and the Chicano Federation of San Diego, also participated in the protest activities. In 1996, Cordinadora 96 once again promoted the mobilization of the Latino community against proposed nativist legislation by calling for a march on Washington, D.C., on October 12, El Día de la Raza. Organizers of the event predicted that over 100,000 Latinos would be in attendance. They were perplexed and troubled when only 30,000 showed up. Unfortunately, Washington, D.C., was not the mecca of Latino presence as was Los Angeles in 1994 when over 70,000 attended the protest. The passage of Proposition 209 incited student protests and arrests on the campuses of the University of California at Berkeley, Santa Cruz, Los Angeles, and Riverside. Civil rights organizations were successful in securing a restraining order from U.S. District Judge Thelton Henderson, which temporarily put a halt to the implementation of the proposition.

By the end of 1996, Mexicanos continued to be strategically and tactically reactive rather than proactive. Even though Mexicanos voted in greater numbers than ever before in California in the presidential elections in November—a result of nativist propositions 187 and 209—little systematic organizing was being done at the local, state, and national levels. The barrios were once again in the grip of alienation, apathy, and complacency.

**Power Capability: An Illusive Reality**

The Latino community in 1996 was still under what some Latino activists describe as a “state of siege,” meaning that Latinos were still being victimized by the nativist’s intolerance and oppressive means. In spite of the situation being propitious for the building of a new movement, the Latino community had yet to develop the power capability to carry out such an undertaking. This was because Latinos still lacked leadership, did not have ideological alternatives, had powerless organizations, had yet to develop a concerted plan of action, and lacked the independent financial resources to sustain a new movement. Not a semblance of a resurrected Chicano Movement existed, and no new movement appeared to be in the making.
The Building of a New Movement
As the 20th Century draws to a close, Mexicanos and Latinos in general find themselves at a critical juncture. The present crisis stems from the inherent contradictions of the liberal capitalist system. The dominant dialectical forces or antagonisms impelling it are two: first, the nation's inability to produce the requisite number of well-paying jobs needed to support its changing population; and second, its refusal to plan for the continuing demographic "browning of the nation," which is transforming the current minority people of color into the new majority. This crisis threatens to take the politics of scapegoating to a higher level, further polarizing the country. Indicators such as the passage of Propositions 187 and 209 coupled with the Clinton administration's swing to a right of center posture, suggest that the politics of scapegoating continue to exacerbate ethnic, racial, and class antagonisms. If unresolved or unmitigated, this acute polarization could, in the 21st Century, foster the balkanization of the United States.

The implications of the crisis could be devastating for Latinos. The current trend of scapegoat politics could move Latinos toward a de facto apartheid status. One can deduce that the nativist attacks are conspiratorial in nature, designed to keep Latinos, especially Mexicanos, subordinate, uneducated, and impoverished in order to feed the liberal-capitalist machinery's appetite for cheap labor. The crisis is further exacerbating other problems plaguing the barrios. With the barrios becoming powder kegs of discontent and alienation, the political climate is, and will become, more propitious for the building of a new movement.

Thus, if Latinos are to be successful in overcoming the crisis and its potential for fostering a racial and ethnic balkanization of the nation, they must close ranks and build a "New Movement." The building of this movement must begin with the adherence to the "three Rs." This means that Latinos must recommit, re-organize, and re-mobilize. They must dedicate their energies to building movement that is oriented toward empowerment and change. The leadership of this movement must be adroit at manipulating public discourse about the worsening conditions in the barrios' and the political climate that causes it. Concomitantly, the movement's leadership must have a powerful "new vision," one that calls for the reformation of the existing liberal capitalist system into one that is social democratic. Activist and traditional organizations
alike must embrace the new vision. The leadership must move with resolution to strengthen their member and constituency bases. The movement must have armies with troops and not just generals. Strategically and tactically, the leadership must manifest a direct action and ballot box "mobilization capability." In addition, it is imperative that coalitions be built with other ethnic/racial groups who share comparable agendas. For Latinos to achieve a power-capability, independent financial resources must be found and developed. Latinos cannot achieve a power-capability if all the aforementioned ingredients are not present.

Thus, the question is: Will Mexicano politics in the 21st century be propelled by the power of a new movement, or will it continue to be rudderless and chaotic as it is now?

NOTES

1 The usage of "Chicano" will be utilized essentially when making reference to the protest politics of the Chicano Movement. Otherwise, in examining the Chicano political years of 1975-1996, "Mexicano" will be used synonymously with "Chicano." In addition, Latino will be used when broadening the analysis to include other populations from Latin America who reside in the United States.


4 Ibid.


6 Navarro, Mexican American Youth Organization, 7.

7 Ibid., 8.


10 For a critique of the War on Poverty programs, see Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding (New York: The Free Press, 1969).


*Ibid.* See them all for a historiography of the Chicano Movement era.


Ibid.


Acuña, *Occupied America*, 419.
Ibid.


33 Acuña, *Occupied America*, 413-454.


Ibid.


40 Gómez- Quiñones, *Chicano Politics*, 185.


42 Gómez- Quiñones, *Chicano Politics*, 150-152.


51 Navarro, "The History of Latino Political Participation."

Ibid.


53 Ibid.


57 *Los Angeles Times*, September 24, 1996.
The Press Enterprise, May 12, 1996; and Los Angeles Times, August 23, 1996.
The Desert Sun, August 23, 1996.
Riverside Press Enterprise, August 12, 1996.
Los Angeles Times, January 22, 1996.
Riverside Press Enterprise, March 31, 1996
Hispanic Link Weekly Report, October 16, 1995, Volume 13, Number 41.
The Yuma Daily Sun, February 18, 1996.
See Armando Navarro, The Politics of Community Control.
Los Angeles Times, November 10, 1996.
Los Angeles Times, November 17, 1996.
La Opinion, November 21, 1996.
Los Angeles Times, November 17, 1996.
The Daily Cougar, April 8, 1996.
Los Angeles Times, November 11, 1996.
Ibid.
Los Angeles Times, February 11, 1996.
Los Angeles Times, November 19, 1996.
Southwest Voter Research Notes, Winter 95, Volume IX, No. 1.
Los Angeles Times, October 23, 1996.

Los Angeles Times, November 10, 1996.

The Press Enterprise, November 16, 1996.

Los Angeles Times, October 16, 1994


The 'Justice & Freedom' March and Rally was held on August 10, 1996. It was organized under my leadership. Some 400 hundred Mexicanos participated in the high visibility protest events.

Los Angeles Times, October 21, 1996.


The Press Enterprise, November 28, 1996.

This analysis is being developed as part of my forthcoming book What Is To Be Done: The Building of a New Movement.
On the final day of its session, the 101st Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1990, greatly expanding the numbers of potential immigrants to the United States in the most sweeping legislation in 25 years. In what appeared to be a moment of confidence, National Council of La Raza president Raul Yzaguirre stated, “This legislation represents a new era in the immigration policy debate. The votes . . . in both the House and Senate have shattered the myth that Congress is unwilling to adopt [a] fair, human immigration policy.”

By many accounts in Washington, D.C., the outlook for immigrants, refugees and their families was very positive. However, within a few years of the 1990 legislation, the immigration picture changed dramatically as more restrictionist, or “anti-immigrant,” legislation won greater success, and anti-immigrant sentiment fueled a broad pattern of backlash ranging from ambivalence to fear and hysteria. By 1994, Yzaguirre’s “new era” was further swept away with the Republican Congressional takeover and the collapse of the Mexican peso. Many Latinos were served a wake up call in 1994 when California voters approved Proposition 187, the punitive “people’s” initiative that seeks to deny undocumented immigrants the most basic human rights. The proposition and its supporters also seek to create a web of detection within the community, and to stigmatize immigrants as a population.

These negative events, however, were also a catalyst for political action in the Latino community at all levels. They opened the door to sophisticated coalition politics, and led to widespread protest in regions throughout the U.S. The surge in activism, building on the existing Latino pro-immigrant rights infrastructure, would shape the oppositional debate and guide the community under several organizational and strategic flags to challenge the anti-immigrant hysteria plaguing the United States.
Congressional Hispanic Caucus

The caucus is united in its opposition against anything giving the perception of immigrant bashing. For us it is singling out a special group. —Rep. José E. Serrano (D-NY)

Hispanics in the House of Representatives are just one of the many voices addressing immigration. They are in closest proximity to the creation of legislative immigration policy, and have grappled with immigration issues since before the formation of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus in 1976. In the 1970s and 1980s, Latino Representatives, with critical support from the “Latino Lobby,” that is, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), and the United Farm Workers (UFW), blocked the passage of what became, in 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) for over ten years. In the early 1990s, the immigration debate has had its ebbs and flows before Congress. As a central issue, it lullled after the passage of the Immigration Act of 1990. Consequently, with both success and failure, Latinos in Congress primarily fought rules, provisions, and amendments attached to larger pieces of legislation which attempted to deny rights to immigrants. As the National Journal reports, “the Hispanic Caucus has successfully fought several skirmishes in the House against measures caucus members say are unfair to the children of undocumented aliens.” In other areas, however, such as health care and welfare reform, Latino members of Congress unsuccessfully battled the sentiment of Congress as well as the White House. In response to such recent legislation, Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL) says, “It’s simply targeting people because of their political vulnerability.”

Under these hostile conditions in Washington, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus has resorted to “damage control” maneuvers, indicating a growing tendency to sacrifice the rights of undocumented immigrants in order to protect those of immigrants recognized as legal. While outspoken on the positive contributions of legal immigrants and often “troubled” by the tone of the debate in the House, the CHC’s voting record, nonetheless, displays ambivalence over the issue. For instance, Latinos in Congress vote almost unanimously in favor of increased Border Patrol budgets and stricter enforcement, despite widespread complaints in the Latino community about Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) abuses. Increased enforcement at the border is framed as an effort to halt crime, a maneuver rich in political currency for the CHC. According to the *CQ Weekly Report*, “Tightening the border has become an automatic cause for most politicians—either as [a] prelude to cutbacks in legal immigration or as an attempt to forestall them.” The CHC has given uneven support Haitian immigrants as well.

In 1996, Latino lawmakers have been faced with major immigration legislation aimed at cracking down on illegal immigrants, and reversing the direction of the Immigration Act of 1990 by limiting legal immigration. Recent welfare reform legislation has also aggressively targeted all immigrants. The *National Journal* reports that “the immigration debate is likely to throw the Hispanic Caucus into a more brutal political melee that it has ever faced before.” As Rep. Bill Richardson (D-NM) states, “We’re literally under attack every week with some kind of anti-immigration amendment.” To their credit, the caucus published a report in 1994 entitled *Fact and Fiction: Immigrants in the U.S.* in order to “meaningfully contribute to the current debate on immigration policy.” Latino lawmakers have also loudly contested the proposed national verification system to curtail hiring undocumented workers, which, like employer sanctions, creates an incentive for employers to distrust people of color, and discriminate against anyone who appears “foreign.”

**Community-Based Responses**

At first they asked us if we would support the immigration laws. We said we are not responsible for enforcing the immigration laws. We are strong enough that [we made them] take that out of the contract. —Carlos Marentes, *Unión de Trabajadores Aricolas Fronterizos*

The steady stream of immigrants since the late 19th century has continued to revitalize the Latino community, increasing the population, reinforcing the Spanish language, maintaining cultural traditions and keeping the issues, needs and obstacles of immigrants at the center of the Latino agenda. Latinos have always drawn from communal resources to receive, integrate, and empower arriving immigrants, from 19th century *mutualistas* to the current proliferation of Latino-sponsored naturalization campaigns. In the 1990s, Latinos and Latino community-based organizations have responded assertively to legislative
policy as well as non-legislative policy, which broadly defined, includes such impacts as private labor practices, border enforcement, and widespread anti-immigrant sentiment. As such, the Latino community-based response occurs in several sectors, and its battles in the 1990s are salient examples of the heterogeneity of Latino communities, and their potential for political change.

If there is one lens from which to analyze the Latino community's effectiveness in engaging immigration policy, it is heterogeneity. Ethnically, racially, socio-economically, by gender and sexuality, by ideology, by political access, and by individual standards such as personality, fear, and concern, the Latino community is diverse, so diverse, that the term "community" itself bears an inclusive definition, evading assumptions that Latinos are a monolithic bloc. According to writer Marta Lopez-Garza, "Geographical dispersion and varying degrees of assimilation have also prompted the diverse political consciousness within the Latino community, which has created difficulties for political organizers." Yet in the face of the anti-immigrant backlash this decade, Latino community-based organizations have utilized the rich potential of Latino diversity and transgressed the tensions and political fragmentations that surround difference.

Since few Latino community leaders are invited to Washington to engage the machinery that creates immigration legislation, the community's most direct influence in legislation is at the ballot box. As such, Latino organizations have widened the two avenues toward this form of political voice—voter registration and naturalization assistance. Many Latino organizations are now conducting voter registration drives in their communities, and, since many Latinos are non-citizen immigrants and cannot vote, a variety of Latino organizations like the National Association for Latino Elected Officials (NALEO), Hermandad Mexicana Nacional, the Community Association of Progressive Dominicans in New York City, and the Latino Forum are aggressively stressing naturalization to politically empower immigrants. For example, at a May 1994 pro-immigrant demonstration in Los Angeles, Dolores Huerta of the United Farm Workers stated, "We must become citizens and vote so that our voices can be heard." According to Harry Pachón of the Tomás Rivera Center, an average Latino immigrant waits 13 to 15 years before seeking naturalization, and in California, "1 out of 2 Latino adults . . . is not a U.S. citizen." With the immigrants who qualified for amnesty under IRCA now becoming eligible for citizenship,
Latinos are demanding changes in the system, recommending an increase in the number of examiners, simplified forms, and alternative options for satisfying the civics and language exams.

Other efforts to counter legislative policies have again come from the traditional "Latino Lobby"—the UFW, NCLR, MALDEF, and LULAC—who work at the local, state and federal levels. Most notably, MALDEF successfully challenged the implementation of Proposition 187 through federal and state litigation which has resulted in the proposition being declared unconstitutional. The Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF) has also pressed Congress and the White House on legislation affecting immigrants.

With the advent of Proposition 187 and other regressive proposals, Latino community-based organizations and leaders have utilized these conservative gestures to organize and politicize various sectors of the community. Journalist Michael Novick writes, "Many of these efforts demonstrate a new level of unity among U.S.-born Mexican Americans, naturalized citizens, refugees, legal resident aliens and the undocumented, regardless of their national origin." While Proposition 187 catalyzed the community to produce a critical mass of new activists, coalitions and programs, the recent mobilization has also revealed both the strengths and weaknesses in the infrastructure of Latino pro-immigrant resistance. For example, according to María Jiménez, a Latina activist with the American Friends Service Committee, "Currently we don't have a strong Latino voice and coordinated strategy at the national level, especially one that is articulating a coherent policy on immigration. And this includes the Hispanic Caucus, which is sometimes divided." Juan José Gutiérrez of One Stop Immigration, however, counters notions of a Latino leadership void, stating, "We do have leaders of tremendous stature—they're just not recognized by the media." Community-based organizations are thus "filling the vacuum that presently exists within the Latino leadership institutions." According to Rubén Solis of the Southwest Network for Economic and Environmental Justice, former leaders such as MALDEF and NCLR have lost their community base of support, both for supporting the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and for failing to work equally with other Chicano groups during the anti-Proposition 187 campaign. The multiplicity of local leaders and varying objectives, then, demonstrates the urgency for Latino individuals and organizations to propel their pro-immigrant agendas into the debate, and provides ample
justification for a new era of coalition politics formed around the pro-immigrant rights movement.

Clear examples of collaborative resistance are the well-coordinated public demonstrations held nationwide in 1994. These events were multi-ethnic, multi-generational occasions and according to the Los Angeles Times, “Proposition 187 is one of the rare issues on which many of the teenage opponents seem to be in sync with their parents. Parents have actually joined in some of the marches, while others have encouraged their children to participate.”¹⁹ Student marches and demonstrations, which mirrored the “blow-outs” by Chicana/o students in 1968, occurred frequently in the weeks prior to the California elections in 1994. As one immigrant student protester astutely stated, “I’ve got a lot of friends who will have to quit school if Proposition 187 passes because they’re illegal. Plus classes will be smaller and some teachers will get fired. I want people to know that students disagree with this.”²⁰ Some students acquired pride and awareness in their own and other cultures because of the demonstrations. One student, Stephanie Bernal, stated, “It feels great right now just to be doing something about it. When we get together to talk about it, we speak Spanish and just feel good about being Mexican.”²¹

Throughout the 1990s, many Latino organizations and individuals have resisted the anti-immigrant backlash in areas outside of national legislation. These include border militarization, labor policies, and cutbacks in housing and public transportation. Service organizations are faced with the task of improving and formalizing their new advocacy and community empowerment duties, while still maintaining a continuous level of services. As Rubén Solis said, “The fight against 187, and the issues of migration, are presenting themselves as facilitating tools for other issues that have always existed but have historically received little attention.”²²

One of the most drastic impacts of the new hostile immigration policy occurs at the U.S.-Mexico border. Unexplained deaths, unlawful deportations, denial of civil rights, illegal searches and arrests, physical and mental abuse, and the Border Patrol’s perception of undocumented and documented immigrants and U.S. Latinos as criminals occur frequently. In response, several organizations and coalitions monitor the border area, provide various services to immigrants, and consistently stress the importance of this pattern of incidents and the urgent need for political action. Guadalupe Castillo of the La Mesilla Orga-
nizing Project states, "Real human rights violations occur at the border day in and day out. . . . They are all connected to militarization at the border. . . . It is not a new phenomenon. When you invade a country, and you conquer people, you militarize, and maintain a certain level of militarization." Therefore, the increased law enforcement presence creates what María Jiménez calls a "deconstitutionalized" zone, where the Border Patrol and local police have fewer limits on the exercise of authority than in non-Mexican-border areas. This is a drastic difference from the Canadian border, and a clear inconsistency with NAFTA's goals toward the creation of an equal trading partnership with Mexico and Canada.

Employment, for almost all Latino immigrants, whether they immigrate to the U.S. for family reunification, to escape political and economic persecution, or as part of a rite of migratory culture, is a necessity. Latino immigrants continue to form the backbone of industrial labor and the labor movement. Immigrant labor organizing therefore serves a critical role in combatting exploitation, INS abuses, and the economic stratification of the immigrant community. As unions benefit from the increased enrollments of immigrant workers, these workers benefit from the existing structures' resources. Unions thus enlist the support of workers who are indispensable to local economies, and who historically have been used to drive down wages and as strikebreakers. And where immigrants are not accepted into the mainstream labor movement, they have organized among themselves, promoting successful strikes and protests. Humberto Camacho, a representative of the United Electrical Workers Union, states that hardball tactics are common in immigrant-dependent industries. He writes, "Just because we speak a different language, come from another country, [and] have darker skin, doesn't mean we don't have rights or that we'll accept exploitation in silence."24

Groups like Mujeres Unidas y Activas, a San Francisco Bay Area Latina immigrant group, engage in non-legislative immigration policy by educating and preparing immigrant women and refugees for adaptation to U.S. society, while focusing on community involvement and social, civic, and political impact.25 Founded in 1990, Mujeres' 200-plus members sponsor leadership training, community organizing projects, citizenship teatros, "Know Your Rights" workshops, parent groups, and health and English classes.

Another sector of Latino resistance is in the arts. Author and poet Rubén
Martínez, for example, responds to the “evil of Proposition 187” as a journalist, writing articles in papers nationwide, and also as a creative artist. Martínez recently joined forces with performance artist and “Border Brujo” Guillermo Gómez-Peña on a poetry-performance-lecture series to “personally settle the score with Pete Wilson.” The 1990s version of immigration hysteria has led to a contemporary surge in artistic oppositional forms. These alternative responses to immigration policy are deliberately coded with themes and satire specific to the U.S. Latino experience to enlighten and empower Latinos, reflecting back to the artistic traditions of the Chicano Movement. Says artist and immigration satirist Lalo López, “We want people to think critically. . . . You make your enemy appear cartoonish, and it gives you a sense of empowerment.”

According to Ed Morales of The Village Voice, the September 16, 1994, “Hispanics for Wilson” (HFW) hoax garnered national recognition. Conceived and enacted by POCHO Magazine publishers Esteban Zul and Lalo López, the HFW hoax satirically defended immigrants and pendejo-ized Pete Wilson, and immigrant-fearing Anglos. López states, “I was sick of hearing about how so many Latinos are for 187. We thought, let’s spoof it by creating this rabid self-deportationist movement of people so fervently for Wilson that they were willing to repatriate to Mexico.” The press release snow-balled into a spot on a nationally televised Telemundo talk show which included pro-immigrant activist Juan José Gutiérrez. The humor treaded thin ice as Gutiérrez and other panelists took López and his HFW colleagues seriously. Morales writes that this act of pochismo “moves political activism into a new frontier, with a full dose of mediated irony.”

Collaboration and Fissure

While stressing links to other communities, organizers leave no doubt that this is foremost a Latino movement—one designed to embrace both new immigrants and multi-generational U.S. residents, the undocumented and those with legal status. The many attacks on illegal immigrants, they say, are to be viewed as assaults on all people of Latin American ancestry. —Los Angeles Times, June 4, 1994

The Latino response to U.S. immigration policy clearly challenges perceptions that the Latino political imagination is lethargic or homogeneous. The Latino
voice is a confluence of voices, covering a broad organizational and political horizon, from the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, to national and regional Latino civil rights and service organizations, to local immigrant self-help groups. As such, this varying awareness and level of experience with legislative and non-legislative immigration policy translates to a complex Latino response to the immigration debate, consisting of various, and sometimes contradictory, strategies toward equal access, fairness, and political empowerment. Given the different agendas, constituencies, ideologies, organizational structures, and political constraints of the Latino actors, coalition politics and collaborative strategies appear to be the model of organization that can sustain, at least temporarily, multiple and parallel fronts of resistance. In this sense, the strategy for Latinos replicates the tactics of the 1970s and 1980s. According to Juan Gómez-Quiñones, “To achieve equity, a necessary condition is the continuing development of both single-membership advocacy and confrontational groups as well as strong ‘operational unity’ coalitions, which can be vehicles for the national community on specific issues.”29 In the 1990s, we have witnessed numerous examples of simultaneous, collaborative and individual efforts within the Latino community. Yet Latinos have also experienced the limits to coalitions and collaboration. In other words, coalitions break down, especially as the multiplicity of Latino differences buoys its way to the forefront of policy debate and enactment. Besides existing political contradictions, macro forces like the economy and international stability, and shifts in political vision can affect the trajectory of Latino politics. As such, in the 1990s, Latino coalitions have focused on both coming together quickly when common ground can be found, and on maintaining individual agendas when unity does not exist.

For instance, the watershed marches and protests in 1994 exemplify the multiplicity of cultures and leadership within the pro-immigrant rights community. In May and October 1994, thousands of Latinos marched through downtown Los Angeles in “tightly organized counterattacks” against the anti-immigrant sentiment in California and the nation. The Los Angeles Times reported that the October 16 march consisted of 70,000 persons, making it “the largest protest gathering here [in Los Angeles] in decades, surpassing Vietnam War era demonstrations” including the National Chicano War Moratorium in 1970.30 The Times further reported that “behind the demonstration was a newly formed statewide coalition and a corp of young Latino leaders—typically im-
migrants or the working-class offspring of immigrant parents. The presence of Mexican, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan flags as well as representation from South America and the Caribbean were testament to both the impact of immigration policy and the response from the Latino community.

Conferences that bring together different circles of actors in the immigration debate provide another example of collaboration between and among Latinos. In April 1994, a National Association for Chicana and Chicano Studies (NACCS) Foco Conference sponsored a symposium entitled "Immigration: a Call to Action" which brought together community activists, Chicano academics, and border city officials. Teresa Córdova, Chicana scholar and NACCS member, stated, "Part of what we want to do here today is talk about the way in which those of us based in institutions of higher education can become players and contribute to the community efforts around immigrant rights." Similar conferences have taken place throughout the country. The focus of these dialogues has been to convene grassroots activists, immigration lawyers, academics, and public officials to inform each other and develop strategies to politicize the community and oppose restrictive immigration policy.

Within the matrix of Latino responses to immigration policy, there have been several areas where Latino elites in Congress, and community-based organizations intersect in their efforts and strategies. These include opposition to Proposition 187, increased voter registration, naturalization campaigns, and opposition to blatant political opportunism in the anti-immigration hysteria. In 1993, Frank Acosta of the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA) wrote, "Perhaps the concerted legislative attack... is merely cynical political posturing. After all, several of the 21 anti-immigrant bills these lawmakers have introduced... would almost certainly be judged unconstitutional if enacted. Yet considerable public resources have been expended on promoting them anyway." Pete Wilson, for example, used the political currency of the immigration debate and Proposition 187 to support his re-election. The acts of sponsoring anti-immigrant legislation or suing the federal government on behalf of the state amount to state-funded campaign advertisements.

Unfortunately, political opportunism has led to the diminution and separation of documented and undocumented immigrants' rights, which has been corroborated by the Congressional Hispanic Caucus and certain Latino nonprofits. Border militarization is a case in point. While both Latino lawmak-
ers as well as the NCLR have stressed the need to review the INS for its continuing abuses of authority, both groups have also supported increases in Border Patrol programs and numbers of officers. The CHC has unanimously supported such increases and NCLR has stated that “the Latino community has a very strong interest . . . in immigration control. That is controlling the border at the border.” NCLR president Raul Yzaguirre has also ambiguously and uncritically stated, “We are encouraged by recent evidence which shows that efforts to control the border are beginning to take effect, and we encourage the INS to implement its ‘Operation Gatekeeper’ effort in San Diego and ‘Operation Hold the Line’ in El Paso in a way which provides an effective deterrent without violating human rights.” These kinds of statements, despite their wobbly disclaimers, are a sign of a dangerous division of the fates of documented and undocumented immigrants, and a shallow understanding of the global economy and the often mixed status of many Latino families and communities. They set a potentially irreversible precedent for delineating between who is “entitled” to services and human respect and who is not. Unfortunately, this attitude echoes the rationale of President Clinton, that “We must say no to illegal immigration so we can say yes to legal immigration.” These dubious views are indicative of the false remedies and short-sighted interpretation within the immigration debate. In the effort to protect documented immigrants, politicians and some community organizers are, perhaps unknowingly, codifying the system of legitimacy that, along with our national compassion, stretches only to our geographic borders, preventing us as a nation from understanding the globalization of our economy and society. This attitude is in opposition to the many cross-border organizers and border residents who view themselves as part of a process of globalization. As Rufino Domínguez of the indigenous organization, Frente Indígena Oaxacaño Binacional, states, “What we are experiencing in California is part of a global political crisis.” Even former Border Patrol chief, Silvestre Reyes, who instituted Operation Blockade in El Paso, says “it is foolish not to view ourselves as part of the global economy.”

As we navigate through the 1990s, the coalitions and community mobilization set into motion by the emergence of Proposition 187, as well as the long-standing Latino infrastructure of pro-immigrant rights groups, must confront the extremely restrictive legislation moving through Congress, and its unpredictable support from the White House. The administrative policies out-
side the scope of legislation and the negative sentiment that plague the community warrant maintaining the pro-immigrant struggle in simultaneous arenas. However, as Hispanic Link reporter Margarita Contín writes, “Surging white voter backlash against both immigrants and Hispanics is likely to present elected Latino leaders with immense problems in their home states as well as in the nation's capital. . . . Latino legislators will have their hands so full it’s unlikely they’ll be able to push for new reform in matters of special concern to Latino communities.”

It must be acknowledged, then, that the anti-immigrant backlash is partially fueled by increased conservatism at the national level. Some Latino organizations have targeted the Republican majority in an effort to counter restrictionist policies. For instance, the National Chicano Moratorium Committee recently held a march and protest in opposition to the 1996 Republican National Convention in San Diego.

Additionally, many Latino community activists are concerned with their role in the fight against anti-immigrant backlash. Already politicized, many Latinos are drawing connections between the pro-immigrant rights struggle, and their efforts against other forms of discrimination. According to journalist Mariana Mora, activists are “concerned that if the fight against anti-immigrant backlash is primarily manifested through the court system, it will disempower grassroots Latino community struggles.” In light of this concern, community activists are imprinting their agendas upon the immigration debate and demanding media attention. One Stop Immigration has asserted its own immigrant rights campaign entitled “Proposition One,” a “non-electoral petition [that] calls for a new legalization of immigrants who have arrived . . . since the cut-off period . . . in the earlier amnesty, and agitates for citizenship for those who are already legal residents,” and Juan José Gutiérrez coordinated the Latino March on Washington, D.C., in October 1996.

Finally, the Latino community must continue to acknowledge the presence of racism that is often at the core of anti-immigrant hysteria. Restrictionist and punitive legislation signify a misguided fear that Latinos and Asians are changing the racial and cultural composition of the U.S., thus reinforcing a culture of fear. The appropriate response to that fear is yes, Latinos and Asians are transforming U.S. society. These “new immigrants” are part of worldwide system of economic and societal globalization, and are answering U.S. demands for labor. An immigration policy that is a reaction founded in fear and racism will
prevent the possibility of a sound and equitable national adjustment to global change. There is a direct line between such restrictive legislation and racist hate crimes and hate speech. The lack of parity in the policing of our national borders with Mexico and Canada is another indication of the racist trajectory of U.S. immigration policy. This policy of military enforcement intensifies harassment of Latinos, vigilantism along the border, and anti-Latino sentiment throughout the United States. As Roberto Maestas, executive director of El Centro de la Raza in Seattle said in 1995, “America is a ticking time bomb. It must confront its racism, or pay a price.”

While apprehension toward the so-called immigration “crisis” is often couched in economic reasoning, the findings from a recent Chicano/Latino Policy Project report also suggests that social beliefs are pervasive forces in the U.S. imagination. The report states, “While improving national economic conditions may reduce anti-immigration sentiment, cultural and ideological factors, as well as beliefs concerning the impact of immigration are likely to drive opinion regarding immigration policy for the foreseeable future.” This implies that there is a firm hierarchical structure in the U.S. that determines who is legitimate and who is not, and who has the right to social mobility. Immigration and race thus enter that hierarchical equation as critical variables. The stark differences between European and Latin American immigrant experiences, and the unequal access to social mobility afforded these two groups, are functioning examples of the race-based immigrant hierarchy we call U.S. immigration policy. And even though Latino community-based organizations and lawmakers have provided an excellent and spirited defense of immigrants in many areas, Latinos have yet to promote a national pro-active immigration policy, or set national precedents with incremental legislative movidas needed to induce change. In fact, many Latinos in Congress and in community organizations have used the notoriety of illegal immigration as a point of compromise to ensure the protection of legal immigrants’ rights, providing “damage control” to restrictionist immigration policy, but unfortunately contributing to the delegitimization of portions of the Latino community. Sadly, this is the essence of “divide and conquer” strategy.
NOTES

Source Note: This essay is part of a larger project that examines the often unheard Latino voice on U.S. immigration policy. By examining the heterogeneity in the Latino response found in newspapers, alternative presses and organizational newsletters, the project answers the contemporary silence by illuminating Latino voices, who because of their intimacy with the immigration phenomenon, are critical players in the immigration debate. The essay utilizes the immigration terminology found in the source material, that is, "legal" and "illegal" and "documented" and "undocumented" immigration. Keep in mind that these terms are dubious, and imply a system of legitimacy that divides society and reinforces U.S. social hierarchies.

6 See note 4 above, pp.1069-1070.
7 See note 3 above, p. 782.
8 Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


[PochNostra@aol.com]. "The Poets of the Last Days: Gómez-Peña and Martínez on the Continental Crisis," in CHICLE, [CHICLE@unmva.unm.edu], October 28, 1995.


Ibid.


See note 17 above, p. 11.

See note 14 above, p. 12.

See note 16 above.

THEY SOUGHT WORK
AND FOUND HELL:
THE HANIGAN CASE OF ARIZONA

Christine Marín

Introduction

The kidnapping, beating, torture, and robbery of three undocumented Mexican nationals who crossed the border at Douglas, Arizona, illegally in the summer of 1976 became a civil rights issue in Arizona. Charges of kidnapping, assault, and robbery were brought against three Americans, George Hanigan and his sons, Patrick and Thomas. The Hanigans were members of a prominent and pioneer ranch family in southern Arizona. They were acquitted in a 1977 trial which lasted 23 days.

The setting for the Hanigan trial was Cochise County, an area in southern Arizona where American property owners felt threatened by undocumented Mexican nationals, whom residents blamed for a series of unsolved burglaries and robberies along the border. No Mexican Americans served on the Cochise County jury that acquitted the Hanigans, although they comprised the majority of the population of the border community of Douglas.

The intent of this essay is to assess the Hanigan case as a means of interpreting various themes. The main theme is the treatment of three Mexican nationals in Douglas, Arizona, who crossed the U.S.-Mexico international border illegally to seek agricultural work in 1976. Another theme is the Hanigan trial. It received considerable attention not only from Mexican Americans and Anglo Americans, but also from political and church leaders, all of whom were angered over the mistreatment of Mexican citizens who looked to the United States for economic opportunities. Another related theme discussed in this essay is border economics along that part of the border where Douglas co-exists, side-by-side with its Mexican counterpart, Agua Prieta, located in the state of Sonora. During the course of the Hanigan trial, a boycott on businesses in Arizona border towns was called by anti-Hanigan forces in an effort to urge the business communities to call for a federal investigation of the torture case.
This essay analyzes the boycott in order to assess its effectiveness. Finally, the work of the National Coalition on the Hanigan Case, an alliance of national Hispanic and civil rights organizations, is explained. This group attempted to draw attention to the treatment of Mexican workers who crossed the U.S.-Mexico border illegally to seek agricultural work.

No attempt is made here to provide solutions to past or current border problems which center on the entry of undocumented Mexican nationals into the United States. That is a theme that requires extensive study and research, and which is beyond the scope of this essay. The author makes no suggestions on how to improve relations between the United States and Mexico which may have been damaged as the result of alleged crimes committed along the border in 1976, and does not attempt to determine whether the Hanigans were indeed guilty or innocent of kidnapping, assault, and robbery in this so-called “Hanigan case.” The Cochise County jury has already determined that. However, this essay examines the reasons why some Arizonans became angry over the results of the Hanigan trial, and why they sought to call attention to the mistreatment of Mexican citizens in Douglas, Arizona, in 1976 and 1977.

There are some problems, however in writing about the Hanigan case. For example, one cannot build on previous research about the Hanigan incident because little has been written on this topic. Another problem relates to official court transcripts prepared in the trial. During the course of research, the Clerk of Superior Court for Cochise County was unable to locate courtroom transcripts in the Cochise County archives. Because the Hanigans were acquitted of all charges in the 1977 state trial, the county was not required to maintain official transcripts. Also, the clerk is prohibited from preparing copies of the court transcripts, even if they are located after a 20-year period. To obtain court transcripts, one must contact the court reporters who prepared the original transcripts of the trial. Patricia Vigil and Deann Kleck, the two court reporters who prepared the transcripts during September 1977, no longer work at the Cochise County Courthouse, and no longer live in Cochise County. Portions of the transcripts, however, were obtained by the National Coalition on the Hanigan Case during the trial. I have used portions of the transcripts to recreate the events surrounding the torture incident and the trial. I have also used other secondary sources, such as newspapers, to provide some insight into the events surrounding the case.
The Setting: The International Border

Douglas, Arizona, is located along the southeastern boundary of the state adjacent to Agua Prieta in Sonora, Mexico. Situated on U.S. Route 80 and Route 666, Douglas is about 70 miles southeast of Tucson. The town was named for copper baron and entrepreneur James D. Douglas, who came westward in the 1870s to develop mining interests in southern Arizona. By 1900, James Douglas had firmly established the Phelps Dodge Copper company and other mining interests in and near Douglas.

The town's location made it a desirable copper mining and railroad center. For example, by railroad distance, Douglas was 217 miles west of El Paso, 124 miles east of Tucson, and 624 miles east of Los Angeles. Railroad passengers from Chicago could travel to Douglas on the Golden State Limited train within two days in the early 1900s. By 1914, the Nacozari Railroad, just across the border in Mexico, and owned by Phelps Dodge, was used to ship cattle and copper from Mexico to the United States. As a trade center, Douglas quickly became an important gateway for the two countries.

The history of Douglas reflects its economic importance to its sister city, Agua Prieta, located adjacent to Douglas along the international boundary. Agua Prieta covers an area of about four square miles and constitutes the government headquarters for the Agua Prieta Municipio founded in 1916. Mexican government troops battled it out in Agua Prieta with revolutionaries—Captain "Red" Lopez in 1911 and Pancho Villa in 1915. Pancho Villa even made threats against the town of Douglas before retreating. An international airport—part of the runway was in the United States and part in Mexico—opened in Agua Prieta in 1928. Today, Agua Prieta is bounded on the east by the state of Chihuahua, on the south by Bavispe, Nacozari and Fronteras, and on the west by Naco and Bacoachi, Sonora.

The Phelps Dodge copper smelter in Douglas remains a viable source of employment, but the sister cities have diversified their economy. American companies operate manufacturing plants in Agua Prieta under the "twin plant" concept, using Mexico's inexpensive labor to assemble American products. The first maquila industries were established in Agua Prieta in 1968. By 1977, manufacturing accounted for "nearly 30 percent of Douglas area employment . . . Next to Phelps Dodge, the garment industry was the largest manufacturing employer in Douglas." Wholesale and retail trade are also of great significance.
to the Douglas area because of its international border crossing. A large percentage of sales were to Mexican citizens, who preferred shopping in Douglas. In 1976, about 45 percent of all retail sales in Douglas were made to these Mexican citizens.9

It can be assumed that Douglas was a common entry point for undocumented Mexican workers who crossed the border illegally to seek work in the United States. Residents in the Douglas area, however, blamed undocumented Mexicans for a constant burglary problem. The sheriff's department reported that it answered 122 burglary calls in an eight-month period in 1976. It also reported that approximately $135,000 in merchandise was burglarized from Douglas-area homes.10 Local law-enforcement officials also felt that the burglaries were the result of Douglas' proximity to the international border. One spokesman for the sheriff's department estimated 85 to 90 percent of the break-ins outside the city limits were traceable to Mexico. "I don't know how many times we've tracked them to the border fence,"11 said the deputy. Sheriff Jim Wilson agreed: "Most of our problems have come from Mexico."12 U.S. Border Patrol Supervisor Drexel Atkinson maintained that the burglaries were committed by undocumented Mexicans because "every illegal alien [was] a potential burglar."13 The Border Patrol apprehended almost 5,000 of these so-called "potential burglar[s]" in the Douglas area in 1975-76. According to statistics from the Douglas Border Patrol Station, 4,908 illegal aliens were seized in the Douglas area between June 30, 1975 and June 30, 1976.

Atkinson was not able to provide any proof that all of the burglaries in the Douglas area were committed by undocumented Mexican nationals. However, Edward T. Blankenship, a U.S. Border Patrol agent in Douglas, said that "no figures [were] available on the number of aliens who burglarize Douglas homes, although street talk [said] there [were] a great number of alien-committed burglaries."14 When Manuel García Loya, Bernabe Herrera Mata, and Eleazar Rueles Zavala entered Douglas illegally, they were on their way to seek work in the United States. They didn't come to the United States to steal.

The Mexican Nationals

On August 17, 1976, García Loya, Herrera Mata, and Ruelas Zavala met at the home of Ramón Soto in Agua Prieta, which has approximately 45,000 inhabitants. Although lacking formal immigration papers or documents, they made
plans to seek agricultural work at the Bar V Bar farm in Elfrida, Arizona, located in the nearby Sulphur Springs Valley near Douglas. The men were not unfamiliar with the possibilities of being caught entering the United States without formal immigration papers. They had been apprehended at various times on “farm sweeps” in the Douglas area by the U.S. Border Patrol, only to be returned to Agua Prieta and released to Mexican authorities on each occasion.

García Loya was born in 1950 in the capital of Chihuahua, Mexico, where his father worked as a construction worker. As the eldest of ten children, García Loya had many family responsibilities. As a youth, he helped his father in construction work, and often worked for his brother-in-law as a construction helper. He wanted to come to the United States to seek work, and to earn money so that he could help support his family. He and his father agreed that he should go to Agua Prieta, where his friend, Antonio Hernández, owned a salvage yard, and where he could find work. Hernández felt “almost like a father” to García Loya, and allowed him to live in his home and work for him. Soon, García Loya was sending money home to his family in Chihuahua. In July 1976, he found work at an apple orchard owned by H. Barry Rose in the Sulphur Springs Valley, near Willcox and Douglas. He worked there for ten days before the U.S. Border Patrol picked him up for illegal entry into the United States, and returned him to Agua Prieta. Rose had frequently hired Mexican nationals to work for him because he “relied heavily on unskilled workers who didn’t speak English,” and felt “such workers were vital to [his] orchard.”

Bernabe Herrera Mata, age 22, hardly knew García Loya and Ruelas Zavala when he met with them at Ramón Soto’s home in Agua Prieta. He was not a stranger to U.S. Border Patrol officers, however. Prior to August 17, 1976, he had been apprehended as many as four times by the INS. Herrera Mata came from an impoverished family of agricultural laborers, and had fewer than three years of schooling in Mexico. His reason for crossing the border was solely an economic one. He knew that he could find agricultural work across the border because he had worked in the Douglas area in 1975.

Eleazar Ruelas Zavala, age 26, travelled from Chihuahua with intentions of working in the United States because he could not find work in Mexico. On three separate occasions, he had been apprehended by the U.S. Border Patrol
near Douglas. When he met with García Loya and Herrera Mata in Agua Prieta to plan their journey northward, he knew where they could find agricultural work: at the Bar V Bar farm in Elfrida, Arizona. Both Herrera Mata and Rueles Zavala had worked in Elfrida, about 25 miles from Douglas, for American farmers Ben Ratliff and Wally Householder during the summer months of June and July and "up until August 4, 1976." Householder had promised Herrera Mata "more work for him and others if he wanted to return." And that was the reason for his desire to return to Elfrida when he met with García Loya and Rueles Zavala on August 17, 1976. Another factor in Herrera Mata's decision to return to Elfrida was the $99 back pay owed to him by Ben Ratliff for work he had completed earlier in the summer. The men agreed they would cross the border together and go to Elfrida and the Bar V Bar farm for agricultural work. They had every reason to believe they would find work there.

The Torture

Early the next morning, August 18, García Loya and Herrera Mata met as arranged at the Soto home in Agua Prieta. Ruelas Zavala hadn't arrived yet. The two men decided they needed some provisions to take with them on their journey. They walked to a grocery store nearby and purchased a loaf of bread, bologna, cheese, and bananas, and returned to the Soto home to meet with Ruelas Zavala, who was now at the Soto home. Before departing, they filled a plastic gallon container with water to take with them.

The men walked along a road which paralleled railroad tracks running close to the border, and kept within view of a landmark on the American side, approximately one mile west of Douglas. It was the Phelps Dodge copper smelter. The men walked along the fence which separated the countries for a distance of perhaps two miles. At this point, they squeezed through the barbed wire and continued their journey westward toward Elfrida. As they walked through the desert in the searing August heat, the men realized that their water container was nearly empty. They saw a windmill nearby and decided to walk towards it.

The windmill was situated on the homesteaded ranch of George Hanigan, age 67, and his two sons, Patrick, age 23, and Thomas, age 19, and his wife, Mildred. George Hanigan was a former Cochise County Republican Party Chairman and was involved in the selection of judges and prosecutors for the
county. He and his wife and their sons ran a cattle operation on the family-owned ranch. They also owned the corporation, "Dairy Queen of Southern Arizona," valued at over $260,000. They also owned all the Dairy Queen franchises in Arizona outside of Maricopa County. Thomas and Patrick each owned 500 shares in the franchise. The estate of the Hanigan family was estimated to be worth $7 million. The three Mexican nationals were on their 1,000-acre ranch to look for water for their gallon container.

Before reaching the open water reservoir at the base of the windmill, the Mexicans noticed a man some distance away working on a tractor in a field near a house. A yellow pickup truck with a white camper shell was parked near the tractor. After refilling their water container at the windmill, the trio continued their journey to Elfrida. U.S. Highway 80 was in front of them. They would have to cross it to get to Elfrida. Running parallel to Highway 80 was Gasline Road, a dirt road bordered by a barbed wire fence. As the trio prepared to jump the fence, they heard a vehicle coming down from Gasline Road.

Afraid the vehicle might be a Border Patrol truck, the trio jumped back from the fence and hid in some tall grass as the vehicle passed by. It was the yellow pickup with a white camper shell driven by the same man they had seen working on the tractor. The truck came to a stop and backed up. Thomas Hanigan jumped the fence to the side on which the trio were hiding, and looked for them. When he spotted them he shouted in Spanish, "Hey, 'wets,' where are you going? What are you doing?" The trio, who spoke no English, answered, "We are going to work in Elfrida." Thomas Hanigan responded, "All right, fucking wetbacks, get up. You're not going anywhere. All you fucking wets come to the United States to rob, and then you return to Mexico." The trio repeatedly denied the accusations. Ruelas Zavala said, "No, we are going to work, we are not going to cause harm." García Loya added, "We are only looking for work, because there is no work in Mexico." Thomas Hanigan snapped back, "There is a lot of work in Mexico." Noticing the trio's paper bags, Hanigan asked, "What's in the bags?" The trio answered, "Food and clothes." They showed him the contents, and he said, "O.K." With his pistol aimed at them, Hanigan told the Mexicans, "Take your things and jump into the truck." He opened the door of the camper, waved the trio inside, and then locked the door behind them. They assumed he was a Border Patrol agent or that he would turn them over to one. Thomas Hanigan, however, transported
the men to the Hanigans’ home.

He parked the truck toward the rear of the house, got out, went inside the house, and left the Mexicans locked inside the camper. Hanigan returned, let the trio out of the camper and sat them down under a shaded area by the side of the house, standing guard over them with his pistol. Approximately fifteen minutes later, his father, George Hanigan, arrived. George stepped from his blue pickup truck with a shotgun in his hand. He approached his son, Thomas, stared at the Mexicans sitting near the porch of his home, and asked, “Wetbacks?” Thomas answered, “Yes.”

Soon, another pickup truck arrived. It was pulling a light colored trailer behind it with a cow inside. Patrick Hanigan, Thomas’ brother, got out. He wore a handgun tucked into his waistband. He walked over to his father and brother, and said in Spanish, “Ah, wetbacks!” Patrick looked at the Mexicans, looked at García Loya and drew his handgun at him and said, “I know you. You stole three rifles and a pistol from me.” García Loya answered, “No, that’s not true; I’ve never been here before.” Patrick then said, “I know you by the shoes you’re wearing.” García Loya replied, “They were given to me by Antonio Hernández Armenta of Agua Prieta.” Patrick said, “You’re lying. You all come here to rob; all Mexicans are thieves.” García Loya said, “You’re crazy, I’ve never been here before.” Patrick shouted back, “Shut up!” Patrick also noticed the bags the trio had been carrying and wanted to know what was inside. He and his father, George, opened them, finding used clothing and food.

Patrick went to his pickup truck and retrieved several pieces of rope; he threw the rope into Thomas’ truck. The Hanigans ordered the Mexicans into the yellow truck’s camper, and locked them inside. Patrick and Thomas got inside the truck, and the Mexicans were driven towards Highway 80. George Hanigan followed them in his blue pickup truck; he had his shotgun with him. The Hanigans traveled west on Highway 80 and headed down a country road, stopping at a fence with a wire gate. Patrick Hanigan got out of the truck and opened the fence, got back inside the truck, and both Hanigan vehicles proceeded west over some rough desert terrain. The Mexicans were still on Hanigan property.

The vehicles came to a stop between the windmill and an arroyo. The Hanigans got out of their trucks still carrying their firearms. They unlocked the camper and ordered García Loya to get out. Patrick and Thomas grabbed him,
and tied his hands behind his back with rope. Patrick and Thomas told him to lie on the ground. When García Loya refused, they knocked him down, injuring his shoulder and the side of his face in the fall. While on the ground, he was hog tied; a rope was fastened around his feet and connected to his bound hands.

Herrera Mata was the next one to be ordered from the camper. His hands were tied behind his back as he put up a struggle, and he too was flung to the ground. Like García Loya, his hands were tied to his feet. He was left sprawled on the ground with his companion. Next to be ordered out of the camper was Rueles Zavala. He offered no resistance, but his hands were tied behind his back anyway. He was then forced to the ground and hog-tied. All three victims were now on the ground, bound, and totally helpless. Although Patrick and Thomas forced the trio to the ground and bound them, it was their father, George, who gave the orders and told his sons what to do.

Patrick and Thomas used hunting knives and sheared clumps of hair from their heads and cut the clothing off the three Mexicans, and left them naked. As they ripped their clothing, however, they found one dollar in Herrera Mata’s trousers; thirty dollars inside García Loya’s pants and seven dollars in one of his socks. Putting the money into his own pocket, Patrick asked García Loya why he had money. He explained that it was his pay for work he had performed in Agua Prieta, and that he hoped to buy food with it. The Hanigans said that if they had so much money, they did not need to come to the United States in search of work.

Thomas Hanigan built a fire with dry mesquite wood, which was abundant in that desert area, and he and Patrick threw the Mexicans’ clothing into it. Their shoes and food were tossed into the flames. The Mexicans pleaded with the Hanigans to leave them alone, promising never again to cross their land. The Hanigans told them not to act like “cry babies,” and that they would indeed never return to their land because, “You are going to die first.” The Hanigans threatened to cut their throats and they held pistols to their heads. Putting his finger on the trigger as though he were about to pull it, one of the Hanigans said, “You are going to die in just a moment—you will never return to your fucking Mexico!”

George Hanigan asked if they were thirsty, and they answered yes. He poured water over them from the same gallon container the Mexicans had refilled at the Hanigan’s windmill; and he kicked and rolled them over in the hot desert
ground with his boots so that mud would stick to their bodies. George took a
knife and threatened to castrate the Mexicans. He grabbed the genitals of Herrera
Mata and ran the blade of his knife over and around them, coming close enough
to the skin to cause some cuts and inflict pain and discomfort. The Hanigans
grabbed the Mexicans by their ropes and dragged them close to the intense heat
of the fire. Thomas Hanigan took a red hot metal rod from the fire and passed
it close over the faces and bodies and genitals of the Mexicans. He then rubbed
the hot rod along the soles of the feet of Ruelas Zavala, causing painful and
extensive burns. Ruelas Zavala was still tied when Thomas Hanigan placed a
rope around his neck. He was dragged to a nearby ravine and hanged from a
tree. He escaped strangulation by supporting the weight of his body against the
ravine wall. As he hung from the tree, he heard the ranchers say to Herrera
Mata, “Let’s see how good you are at running.”36 The Hanigans cut him free
from his ropes and then told him to run away. Herrera Mata ran towards a
ravine. He heard loud pistol shots and shotgun bursts behind him. As he ran,
he was shot in the back and sprayed with forty-seven shotgun birdshot pel-
lets.37 Meanwhile, the Hanigans returned to the ravine where Ruelas Zavala
was still struggling with the rope around his neck to keep from strangling him-
self to death. He was cut down from the tree and ordered to run away. While
running through the desert and away from the Hanigans, Ruelas Zavala tripped
and fell. The fall saved his life. Had he not tripped, the shotgun pellets fired
from George Hanigan’s shotgun would have hit him in the face and head.38

The Hanigans turned their attention to García Loya, who was still bound
and left on the ground near the fire set earlier. The Hanigans tied a rope around
his neck and dragged him through the desert. They hit him with the butt of a
shotgun. And they cut him loose and ordered him to run away. As García Loya
ran towards the Mexican border, the Hanigans shot him in the back with one
hundred twenty-five shotgun pellets.39 He eventually reached the border and
was treated for his wounds at the Civil Hospital in Agua Prieta, where he was
re-united with Herrera Mata and Ruelas Zavala, who were being treated for
their wounds. Physicians there reported the assaults committed against the trio
to the Mexican police, who notified local Mexican officials about the torture of
the three men.

The torture incidents drew immediate international attention from various
Mexican officials. Raul Aveleyra, Mexican consul in Douglas, Arizona, was out-
raged over the mistreatment of the Mexican citizens. He filed an official complaint about the incident with the Cochise County Sheriff’s office, and called for the quick punishment of the Hanigans. A Mexican Foreign Ministry statement called the incident a “brutal aggression against Mexican citizens.” Interior Minister Mario Moya Palencia charged the United States with “flagrant violation of the human rights of [Mexican citizens],” and accused the United States of “racial sadism.” Foreign Affairs Undersecretary José S. Gallastegui lodged a formal protest against the United States for the violation of the human rights of the three Mexicans. The President of the Mexican Supreme Court and the Mexican Ambassador to the United States also registered their outrage and indignation over the beatings.

Arizona governor Raul Castro characterized the incident as an “inhuman situation [and] a return to the days of slavery.” However, Castro cautioned Mexican and American residents in the state and along the border area to “keep emotions clean and don’t pre-judge [the situation]. This [incident] should not be a disrupting factor between Mexico and the United States, between Agua Prieta and Douglas.” Castro’s concerns over the damage the incident could cause to further weaken U.S. and Mexican diplomatic relations had some merit. Herrera Mata, García Loya, and Ruelas Zavala were typical members of a migratory farmworker group which illegally entered the United States seeking employment. In 1976, for example, 875,915 Mexican undocumented workers were apprehended in the United States. At least 72 percent of these workers were either employed at or seeking agricultural employment in the United States. In 1973, it was also estimated that between 1.5 and 10 million undocumented workers held jobs in the United States, which exerted an extraordinary impact on the commerce between the two countries. The torture of the three Mexican nationals was bound to have some impact on diplomatic relations between Arizona and Mexico. The problem of illegal immigration was already straining border relations in the Douglas-Agua Prieta area. An unsolved rash of burglaries and a growing rate of drug sales and arrests in the Douglas area were already being blamed on “illegal aliens.” Arizona’s Attorney General, Bruce Babbitt, added his expression of disbelief over the torture incident, and pledged that “justice [would] be done in prosecuting those responsible for the brutalities.” However, both Castro and Babbitt maintained a low profile and left local officials to deal with the matter. Neither Castro nor Babbitt took
an official role in the investigation of the incident, nor did they interfere in any way with Douglas law enforcement officials who interviewed the Hanigans, and the Mexican nationals.

**Pre-Trial Proceedings**

On August 27, the Hanigans were charged and indicted by a Cochise County grand jury on 14 counts in the kidnapping, assault, and robbery of the three Mexican nationals on August 18. Superior Court Judge Anthony T. Deddens, a long-time friend of George Hanigan, refused to issue arrest warrants for the Hanigans, and issued a summons instead, which ordered them to appear in Superior Court on September 7, where they were fingerprinted, photographed and released on their own recognizance. Citing his long acquaintance with George Hanigan as a conflict of interest on his part, Deddens stepped down as the judge at the arraignment. He asked Wes Polley, attorney for the Hanigans, and the Cochise County Attorney’s office to each submit a list of five acceptable judges who could take over the case, and act as presiding judge in the trial. Pima County Superior Court Judge J. Richard Hannah was selected. At their October 7 arraignment, the Hanigans pleaded not guilty to all charges. Trial was set for December 7, 1976, and Hannah allowed the Hanigans to remain free on their own recognizance.

Indictment against the Hanigans was quashed due to procedural improprieties during the grand jury session. Hanigan attorney Wes Polley successfully argued for and won numerous court delays. He argued that the prosecution’s interpreter who translated the testimony of the three Mexican nationals was not court appointed as required by law, but was named by a jury foreman. He argued that a dialogue was permitted between the victims and certain bilingual jurors that was not fully translated for benefit of monolingual jurors, but only summarized. At issue was the lack of a complete and accurate verbatim transcript of the questions and answers of the grand jury prior to the actual trial. The selection of another grand jury also caused delays because Polley questioned the qualifications of prospective grand jury members.

The Hanigans were arraigned for the second time in Superior Court on January 7, 1977. They pleaded not guilty to each of the 14 counts in the indictment. Judge Hannah released them on their own recognizance and set the trial date for March 29, 1977. But the unexpected death of George
Hanigan on March 22 had an impact upon the court's proceedings again. The autopsy performed on George Hanigan showed that he died of a heart attack. Judge Richard Hannah postponed the trial of Thomas and Patrick Hanigan until April 26.55

Pre-trial motions by Hanigan attorney Polley, however, caused the trial date of the Hanigan brothers to be postponed or reset by Judge Hannah for as many as six different times.56 Finally, the trial began on September 16, 1977, at least one year after the kidnapping, assault, and robbery of Manuel García Loya, Bernabe Herrera Mata, and Eleazar Ruelas Zavala.

The Trial

Jury selection was a surprisingly brief action. The defense eliminated the list of Mexican Americans considered for the jury, while the prosecution eliminated all the Anglo-American ranchers and cattlemen from consideration. What remained was characterized as a jury of data-processors from Ft. Huachuca, the Army military post just a few miles away, and bored housewives. Many members of the jury, however, lived in Sierra Vista, the community just outside the military base. The majority came from outside the Bisbee-Douglas area along the Mexican border, the area troubled by burglaries and bad feelings against undocumented Mexicans.

Eight women and four men made up the jury. The jury foreman was William K. Lawraven, Jr. Defense lawyer Alan Polley's mother was one of his business associates. No Mexican Americans served on the jury, although they formed the majority of the county's population.57 And none of the jurors were from the Douglas or Elfrida communities.

The Hanigan brothers were represented by the father and son attorney team of Wesley and Alan Polley. The elder Polley was a family friend of the Hanigans. The prosecutors in the case were Deputy Maricopa County Attorney Lawrence Turoff and Deputy Cochise County Attorney Patrick Elliston. Judge J. Richard Hannah instructed the jury that it was to deliver either a verdict of innocent, or guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The judge fixed in the jury's mind the concept of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which was meant to establish and support a guilty verdict. He outlined the precise definitions of the crimes with which the Hanigans were charged: kidnapping, assault with a deadly weapon, and armed robbery.58
García Loya spoke through an interpreter during the first day of testimony in the trial. He testified that George Hanigan threatened to castrate him with a knife after he and Herrera Mata and Ruelas Zavala were taken to a field and tied up, with their hands and feet bound together. His testimony was time-consuming and slow because of the many pauses for interpretation from English to Spanish, and then from Spanish to English. Loya also identified photographs of his wounds taken during his stay in the Civil Hospital in Agua Prieta, and of the Hanigan ranch and pickup trucks of the Hanigan men.

The next day’s testimony was also that of García Loya. Alan Polley learned that García Loya and his companions hired a Douglas law firm to represent them in a damage suit against the Hanigan family, hoping to gain a financial settlement. Polley tried to show the jury that the Mexican nationals had a financial interest in the Hanigan case. He succeeded in portraying the trio as greedy Mexican aliens trying to squeeze money out of Americans.

When Herrera Mata related his story of the torture incident on the Hanigan ranch, Alan Polley was able to prove inconsistencies in Herrera Mata’s trial statements and those given to the Cochise County grand jury that indicted the Hanigans. A damaging point in the testimony concerned Mexican consul Ramón Aveleyra. Herrera Mata admitted that he and his two companions had been coached daily by Aveleyra on what to say in the courtroom. Herrera Mata admitted the discussions with the consul violated those instructions on witness conduct made by Judge Hannah. Before the trial started, the judge told witnesses they could not discuss their testimonies with each other or with others.

Throughout the 23-day trial the defense argued that the testimony given by the Mexican nationals was inconsistent with those statements given during the initial investigation, at the pretrial hearing, and in the courtroom. Testimony regarding the clothes George Hanigan wore, the identification of a handgun used in the torture, and the time of day the assault occurred was indeed varied. Other inconsistencies centered around whether or not George Hanigan wore a baseball cap; if he had a moustache, or if he was clean-shaven; whether he actually threatened the castration of the two. Other discrepancies in the stories of the Mexican nationals centered on whether Patrick Hanigan was even on the Hanigan ranch at the time of the attack. Witnesses claimed he was elsewhere.

Alan Polley consistently characterized the three Mexican nationals as bur-
glars who crossed the international border illegally in order to rob border-area homes. Polley suggested to the jury that the Hanigans believed the three Mexican nationals were on their ranch because they wanted to steal from them. Thus, the Hanigans were justified in treating the Mexicans as they did. Prosecutor Lawrence Turoff said the Hanigans tortured the Mexican nationals because they wanted to make an “example” of them, to teach them a “lesson.” Turoff said the Hanigans unjustly reacted to border burglaries blamed on Mexicans by classifying all Mexicans as “thieves.” Defense lawyer Alan Polley told the jury that the three Mexican nationals had made up the torture story to cover up the wounds they probably received in the commission of crimes. Polley echoed the sentiments made earlier by Douglas Border Patrol Supervisor Drexel Atkinson, who actually believed that all “illegal aliens” were potential burglars.

Assuming that García Loya, Herrera Mata, and Ruelas Zavala were not agricultural workers but indeed burglars, the issue of the Hanigans’ guilt for torture was still before the jury. It was clear that the three Mexican nationals were not committing an act of thievery when they were caught by Thomas Hanigan on the family ranch on August 18, 1976. The Hanigans, however, kidnapped, assaulted, and robbed the trio merely because they suspected them of being burglars. They tortured the trio because they suspected them of theft. Indeed, a violent act based upon suspicion was unjustly committed. And the jury never considered whether García Loya, Herrera Mata, and Ruelas Zavala deserved the treatment they received.

On October 7, 1977, a year after the torture of the three Mexican nationals had occurred, Thomas and Patrick Hanigan were found innocent on all counts of the kidnapping, assault, and robbery of the trio.

**Reaction to the Verdict**

Acquittal of the Hanigan brothers prompted an angry response from the Mexican consul in Douglas, Raul Aveleyra. “They just opened the hunting season for every illegal Mexican who comes into the United States,” he said. In complete disbelief, he further commented: “It’s incredible . . . It’s an insult to the justice system of the United States.” Prosecutor Patrick Elliston was astounded about the verdict. He believed that the torture story itself should have convicted the Hanigan brothers. He also maintained that Cochise County con-
sisted of two mentalities: one wanting to release the Hanigans, and the other convinced they were right for what they did to the three Mexican nationals. Defense Attorney Alan Polley said that he felt the jury made the correct decision in the case. He also felt that the Hanigans were acquitted because the Mexican nationals lied about the torture incident, and the defense had proved they lied. The torture did not occur; it was fabricated.

The Rev. Ronald P. Gagnon of Douglas, a Roman Catholic priest, said: “I think there is a general feeling that the Mexican nationals probably had burglary in mind. There’s no question that they were tortured. It boils down to people taking justice into their own hands.” The Catholic Church also released an official statement from Rev. Thomas P. Cahalane, Priest Senate President of the Diocese of Tucson: “Given the total story and circumstances of what happened in Cochise County in this particular travesty of justice, the Pledge of Allegiance should be rewritten to read ‘Liberty and justice for some.’”

**Federal Probe Sought**

Some individuals in southern Arizona were bitterly disappointed over the outcome of the trial and sought to attract national attention to the case. They wanted the U.S. Justice Department to investigate the treatment of undocumented Mexican laborers in Cochise County and along the international border. Many also believed that racism against Mexican citizens was prevalent in the Douglas-Agua Prieta area. They called for an FBI investigation to determine if federal laws were violated by the Hanigans. Their view was that if the trespassers on the Hanigan ranch had been Anglo-American migrant farmworkers, the Hanigans would not have committed the acts they committed against García Loya, Herrera Mata, and Ruelas Zavala.

Among those calling for a federal investigation were The Most Rev. James S. Rausch, Catholic Bishop of Phoenix; Margo Cowan, Director of the Manzo Area Council in Tucson, a group that helped undocumented Mexicans legalize their status in the United States; and Douglas City Councilman, Francisco Barraza, a self-styled leader in the Douglas Mexican-American community. Barraza claimed that the Mexican American community there was concerned about possible criminality involving Mexicans run over by railroad trains or shot at by local ranchers, a frequent occurrence along the border, he felt. Cowan led a petition drive calling for a federal investigation of the torture incident and
collected over 200 signatures, which were part of a civil rights complaint she had filed in the U.S. Justice Department office in Tucson.

The petition drive was a successful one. Assistant U.S. Attorney A. Bates Butler III indicated that he intended to ask for a federal probe of the torture incident. However, before any probe would occur, the FBI investigation had to determine whether any provisions of U.S. civil rights laws applied to undocumented Mexican nationals and the Hanigan case. For federal law to be applicable to the case, it would have to be shown that García Loya, Herrera Mata, and Ruelas Zavala were prevented from any activity, such as seeking work, or working at a job, that fell under the protection of civil rights laws.68

John Conroy, deputy chief of the criminal section of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, reported to Cowan and Barraza that federal action against the Hanigans was unlikely because there was yet no jurisdiction to prosecute at the federal level.69

The Economic Boycott
In an effort to call attention to the Hanigan acquittal, Cowan and Barraza organized a peaceful demonstration and rally along the Douglas-Agua Prieta border. Newspaper accounts estimated the number of participants to be anywhere from 500 to 1,500, and noted that the group included both American and Mexican protesters. The October 16, 1977, demonstration coincided with a boycott called on businesses in Arizona border towns, such as Douglas, Nogales, Naco, Sasabe, and Yuma. Boycott organizers, Cowan and Barraza, believed that such a move would encourage border businessmen to join in the demands for a federal investigation of the Hanigan case.70

Cowan and Barraza initiated an advertising campaign for a boycott of border shops in Agua Prieta. Antonio Palomares, editor and publisher of La Verdad de Agua Prieta, supported the business boycott and printed an advertisement in his newspaper that urged Mexicans not to shop in American border towns until justice was done in the Hanigan case.71 Cowan and Barraza reprinted the advertisements on posters which were distributed throughout Agua Prieta.

The border boycott was a failure. The controversial nature of the Hanigan case created a mixed bag of opinions about the boycott among Americans and Mexicans. For example, furniture store owner, Miguel Padres, of Cananea, Sonora, felt that the Hanigans were able to pay their way to freedom: "... the
United States is supposed to be a leader in human rights, but if you have enough money, you can get around human rights... I wouldn’t say there is any strong sentiment against Americans here.”72 Lionel Valenzuela, owner of the Papagayo Club in Naco, noted: “As far as I can see, there’s no change in my business.”73 Jim Sill, owner of a popular western wear shop in Bisbee, Arizona, said that his Mexican customers from Cananea and Nacozari “[didn’t] seem afraid to come up [from Mexico] here. None of them [have] mentioned the Hanigan case to me.”74

Francisco Barraza admitted that the economic boycott along the border was also unpopular: “If the boycott is successful, it will not only hurt the businessmen, but the employees also and will affect the local sales tax. This is not a good thing. It’s a very drastic measure, but the issue is bigger than business and economics. Justice is not an economic issue,” he said.75

Indeed it wasn’t. The boycott was called off by Cowan and Barraza nine days after it began. It had no effect on business in Douglas or Agua Prieta, nor in any other border towns. Douglas City Attorney Ramón Alvarez indicated that the Douglas Associated Merchants (DAM) and other city officials felt the boycott was unfair to the city, and refused to acknowledge both the boycott and the call for a re-investigation of the Hanigan case.

The boycott was further marred by disagreements between Cowan and Barraza over boycott strategy and its effects on the Douglas community and residents. Barraza was afraid that if the economic boycott was successful, his community would suffer financial hardships. Mexican-Americans and Anglo-Americans in his community were angered over what they felt was his misuse of public office. They felt that, as a city councilman, he should have been more concerned about the effects of the boycott on the entire town, and that he should not have organized the boycott at all. Barraza said that the decision to initiate the boycott was not his decision, that it was made by “outsiders.”76

Cowan, on the other hand, argued that it was Barraza who called for the economic boycott. After all, he was from the community, he knew the people along the border area there, and he was bilingual. She was from Tucson. Cowan also felt that the decision to call the boycott was simply a tactic used to create both attention and controversy in an attempt to convince federal authorities to look into the matter. For her, the issue of concern was the violence of the attack on the Mexican nationals. Such violence was merely a reflection of the type of
violence which commonly occurred against undocumented Mexicans along the border by Anglo-American ranchers and employers, and which remained unnoticed: “These three young men [García Loya; Herrera Mata; and Ruelas Zavala] represent sons, brothers, and fathers of everybody. In that perspective, we can’t walk away [from the incident].”77 Barraza, on the other hand, shirked away from his part in the border boycott because he wanted to retain his seat on the Douglas City Council, where he had a modicum of importance. He also wanted to appease both Anglo-Americans and Mexican-American supporters in his community. “I wasn’t entirely with [the boycott] and was generally opposed to it,” he said.78 While Barraza believed in the idea of federal intervention in the Hanigan case, he only went along with the economic boycott “to retain credibility to try and stop it after its first day.”79 The Douglas City Council agreed to take no action against Barraza for his involvement in the boycott. Cowan, on the other hand, continued efforts to bring the torture case to the attention of the federal government by working with a national coalition.

The National Coalition on the Hanigan Case

On November 16, 1977, the group calling itself the National Coalition on the Hanigan Case was formed. It had its roots in Douglas. Its brainchild was Antonio D. Bustamante, a Douglas native and a magna cum laude graduate of Stanford University, who was a senior law school student at Antioch Law School in Washington, D.C.80 Bustamante was a National Board Representative for La Raza Legal Alliance, and an active member of his college’s La Raza National Law Students Association, as well as a leader in the National Committee of Concern. He spearheaded a massive and successful letter-writing campaign to state and federal officials asking them to study the Hanigan case for possible violation of the civil rights of the three Mexican nationals.

The coalition was composed of national Mexican-American groups and civil rights organizations such as the National Council of La Raza (NCLR); the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC); the National Association of Farmworker Organizations (NAFO); the American G.I. Forum; the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF); Catholics for Christian Political Action (CCPA); and La Raza National Bar Association (LRNBA).81

The Antioch School of Law, with headquarters in Washington, D.C., ac-
cepted the Hanigan Coalition as clients and agreed to represent the coalition legally in the matter of persuading the Justice Department to re-investigate the case and to consider new grounds for the federal indictments of the Hanigan brothers. Professor Burton D. Wechsler served as legal counsel for the coalition.

On November 18, 1977, coalition representatives met with John E. Huerta, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to discuss the intervention of the Justice Department in the Hanigan matter. Huerta agreed to consider the coalition's request for a federal investigation of the torture incident. He met with members of the coalition again on April 8, 1978, to continue discussion on the federal merits of re-opening the case. But at this particular meeting, Huerta was non-committal in his actions and recommendations to the Justice Department. The coalition came away from the meeting unimpressed with Huerta and his lack of commitment to pursue a civil rights matter.

MALDEF joined the Antioch School of Law as co-counsel on April 5, 1978, in order to strengthen support for the Coalition's efforts to pressure the federal government to re-open the Hanigan case. The coalition was on the move now. Letters from union leaders, national politicians, state representatives, governmental agencies, and civil rights groups poured into the office of the Justice Department. Telephone calls were made to Arizona politicians, urging them to press the federal government to reinvestigate the case. The coalition's efforts paid off. Finally, on June 21, 1979, the federal government agreed to investigate. The Justice Department had determined that there was federal jurisdiction to proceed with a grand jury probe of circumstances surrounding the kidnapping, assault, and robbery of Manuel García Loya, Bernabe Herrera Mata, and Eleazar Ruelas Zavala. The coalition had succeeded in calling attention to the violation of the civil rights of undocumented Mexican nationals who sought work in the United States, and encountered violence and abuse. The Hanigan brothers now faced a federal trial and were accused of interfering with interstate commerce by kidnapping, torturing, and robbing three Mexican nationals on August 18, 1976. On July 29, 1980, a federal judge declared a mistrial. The federal jurors were deadlocked in an 8-to-4 split in favor of conviction. On January 20, 1981, a third civil rights trial of the Hanigan brothers began in Phoenix. On February 24, 1981, Thomas Hanigan was acquitted. His
brother, Patrick, was found guilty of violating federal laws governing interstate commerce. U.S. District Judge Richard Bilby gave Patrick Hanigan a three-year prison sentence, which was later appealed six times. Finally, after appeals were exhausted, Patrick Hanigan reported to the Swift Trail Prison Camp at Safford, Arizona on May 27, 1983, almost six years after the torture of three undocumented Mexican nationals on the Hanigan ranch.84

Conclusion
What happened on the Hanigan ranch outside Douglas, Arizona, on a hot summer afternoon in 1976 polarized the residents of Cochise County. It brought national and international attention to the question of whether the civil rights of Mexican nationals, who illegally crossed the border to look for agricultural work, were violated when they were kidnapped, tortured, assaulted, and robbed by American ranchers. The Hanigans became both judge and jury when they decided that the Mexicans were on their ranch with robbery on their minds. Some residents in Cochise County believed the Mexicans deserved the violence they encountered simply because they were violators of American laws and therefore were undeserving of any protection of their rights. When the Hanigans were indicted for their crimes, some Americans were appalled at the idea that Mexican nationals could bring charges against Americans who were merely protecting their property and standing up for their rights. The American ranchers were found innocent in a state trial that civil rights groups considered to be a mockery of American justice because no Mexican Americans served on the grand jury. Were it not for the demand for social justice in a case which had grown to international proportions, the acquittals of the Hanigans would have passed into obscurity. The Hanigan trial is important because it served as a rallying cry for civil rights advocates. Anglo Americans and Mexican-Americans saw impoverished and uneducated Mexicans seeking work in a land of opportunity, but finding violence and mistreatment instead. The severity of the mistreatment which the Mexican nationals endured created sympathy for them. The American ranchers, on the other hand, had supporters who saw them as folk heroes. The Hanigan trial also brought attention to a more serious consideration which was not taken into account by the jury. And it is this: the American ranchers suspected the undocumented Mexican nationals of being burglars. The Mexicans were tortured simply because they were suspected of
being burglars and suspects of a crime which did not occur. A violent act based upon a suspicion was unjustly committed. The Mexicans did not deserve the treatment they received at the hands of the Hanigans.

NOTES

1. The term "Mexican American" refers to persons living in the United States who are of Mexican origin or whose parents or ancestors came to the United States from Mexico or whose antecedents resided in those parts of the southwestern United States that were once part of Mexico.


3. A municipio is the smallest Mexican governmental unit and has its own elected officials. It functions much in the same way a county in the United States would function. The municipio of Agua Prieta is situated in the northeast corner of the State of Sonora.


9. Ibid., 21.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


*Idem*, "First Alien Ends Hanigan Testimony."


*Idib.,* 1.


The expression "wets" refers to the term, "wetbacks." Both terms are considered to be pejorative and refer to a person's unauthorized presence in the United States. In their Dictionary of Mexican American History, published by Greenwood Press in 1981, Matt Meier and Feliciano Rivera note that the "Mexican terms 'espalda mojada' (literally, wet back) and 'mojado' (wet one) refer to the fact that one way of crossing the border between Mexico and the United States is by swimming or wading the Rio Grande."

"Declaratory Judgement, Mandamus."


_Ibid._

_Ibid.,_ 7.


_idem, “Governor, Mexico React to Torture,”_ 1.

_Ibid._

_Ibid._


_idem, “Governor, Mexico React to Torture,”_ 1.

_Ibid._


_Hearings On Illegal Aliens Before Sub-Committee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, Pt. 2 at 528, (1971)._ 

_Articles in The Daily Dispatch, published in Douglas, began to appear on September 11, 1976 blaming virtually all border area burglaries on Mexican nationals, thus attempting to justify the tortures committed by the Hanigans by portraying the three Mexican nationals and all undocumented Mexicans as “thieves” who deserved to be dealt with harshly and “taught a lesson”; idem, “Area Residents Give Reaction On Torture Case,” 1; “No. 1 Border Problem,”_ _The Daily Dispatch_, 31 August 1976.

_idem, Report To The United States Commission On Civil Rights Regarding the Torturing of Mexicans: the Hanigan Case_, 9.


*Idem*, “Hanigan Trial Uproar Bares the Soul of Cochise County,” 1.


idem, Report to the United States Commission on Civil Rights Regarding the Torture of Mexicans, 28.

idem, “Probe Sought On Illegal Alien Mistreatment.”


The advertisement read: “Boycoteo. ¡Mexicanos Unirense! No Compren En Los Pueblos Fronterizos En EEUU Hasta Que Haiga Justicia En El Caso Hanigan. ¡Defenden Su Raza, No Compren! Habra Lineas De Piquete Cada Sabado En Las Garritas Hasta Que Haiga Cargos Federales En Contra De Los Hanigans. ¡No Descansaremos Hasta Que Haiga Justicia!” (Boycott. Mexicans Unite! Don’t Shop In Border Towns Along the United States Until There’s Justice In The Hanigan Case. Defend Your People, Don’t Shop! There Will Be Picket Lines Every Saturday Along Border Stations Until There Are Federal Charges Against The Hanigans. We Will Not Rest Until There Is Justice”).


idem, “Ads Encourage Mexicans To Boycott Border Towns.”


Antonio Bustamante was a former Douglas High School student body president and a classmate of Patrick Hanigan. He had worked as a community organizer in his hometown before he attended law school in Washington, DC. He followed the Hanigan case very closely. His family sent him newspaper articles from The Daily Dispatch about the trial. He and his boyhood friend, Jose Bracamonte, a student at Notre Dame University School of Law, and Chairperson of La Raza Legal Alliance, helped to rally other law school students to find ways to get the Hanigan case re-visited by federal investigators. Bustamante organized a national committee and talked seven of his law school professors at Antioch Law School into getting involved in researching the Hanigan case. Bustamante was outraged over the injustice of the Hanigan verdict and felt compelled to get involved. He and
Bracamonte were familiar with the exploitation and mistreatment of undocumented Mexicans along the border because they had "grown up with it." José Bracamonte, interview by Christine Marín, 23 February 1993, Phoenix, Arizona.

Other groups in the Hanigan Coalition were the Georgetown University Centro de Inmigración; National Congress of Hispanic American Citizens (El Congreso); National IMAGE, Inc.; Third World Law Student Collective; Cochise County Committee For Justice In The Hanigan Case; the MANZO Area Council; and the Arizona Mexican American Political Conference. José Bracamonte, interview by Christine Marín, 23 February 1993, Phoenix, Arizona.


idem, José Bracamonte, interview.
For decades observers of ethnicity in New Mexico have been encountering the phenomenon that Nancie Gonzalez called the "New Mexico legend." At the heart of the New Mexico legend is the contention that, through the centuries, New Mexico has remained isolated from the rest of the world and, as a result, the cultural heritage associated with the native Spanish-surnamed people there is "distinctive," representing a legacy that is not Mexican in origin or nature. The list of scholars and other writers who have commented on this proposition is now quite long. The Spanish Heritage—the claim that the native Hispanic legacy in New Mexico is essentially 'Spanish' or 'Spanish colonial'—is but one among several Hispano distinctiveness versions. It is, however, one that makes quite provocative racial, cultural, and historical claims for Nuevo mexicanos. As a result, the overall history of published commentary on the subject of Hispano identity is marked by some radically dissonant conclusions.

Compare, for example, the following views from the past. In his 1943 community study, anthropologist Olen Leonard comments on New Mexico's famed historical isolation and states that the resulting uniqueness provided for "... the maintenance of old Spanish culture in the area to such an extent that an Andalusian of 18th Century Spain would probably feel at home in a village such as El Cerrito today." Some years later, sociologist Armando Valdez chastised the whole suggestion of a Spanish culture in the Southwest, calling it a high-brow affectation commonly held by middle-class Mexican Americans in the Southwest. "Therefore," Valdez says, "to designate the Spanish-surnamed, Spanish-speaking population of New Mexico as Spanish American is not only grossly contradictory to historical fact but it is a vacuous ethnic taxonomy."

As polarized as they appear, these pronouncements complement one another like adjoining pieces of a jig saw puzzle. In his naive fantasy, Leonard disregards fundamentally different societal contexts in situations existing centuries apart. Valdez, for his part, falls back on the smug, rather easy assault on...
the bourgeois ethnic. Together, the two attitudes demonstrate the power of New Mexico's ethnic dynamics, which have often ensnared observers within their own fields of ideological contestation. From this perspective, Leonard and Valdez form a classic rhetorical couplet within the greater, socially rooted, and highly ramified processes of ethnic identity in the Southwest.

Another, more recent, set of observations on ethnicity in New Mexico refer directly to each other. Geographer Richard Nostrand unwittingly sparked what is known as the "Hispano Homeland Debate" in his 1980 article, which used census data to chart the residence patterns of New Mexico Hispanos for the year 1900. Nostrand graced his otherwise useful figures and maps with the classic statement that Hispanos "are culturally distinctive among persons of Spanish-Indian or Mexican descent"; moreover, that in their areas of major concentration, "Mexican Americans and Indians were too few to have diluted their [Hispano] culture." The cultural interpretation in Nostrand's piece drew two relatively quick critical responses, one from Niles Hansen and another from J. M. Blaut and Antonio Ríos-Bustamante, both of which argued that Hispanos in New Mexico are just as Mexican in cultural content and in their major ethnic identity as Mexican Americans elsewhere in the Southwest. Nostrand proffered a reply to Hansen, after which support for his position came in from Marc Simmons and Angelico Chavez. Rounding out the initial phase of debate then were D. W. Meinig and Thomas Hall both of whom observed simply on the difficulties of analysis being raised on both sides of the debate.

Unlike the off-hand remarks of Leonard and Valdez, Nostrand and his critics argue by resort to historical fact, cultural interpretation, census data, and social conceptualization. Yet many of their observations seem like dressed up representations of social rhetorics. As such, Hall and Meinig are entirely correct in observing respectively that in the whole exchange, "several levels of controversy are conflated," and that "matters of ethnic self-identity are notoriously complex, elusive, subject to change historically and cannot be resolved by the kinds of evidence offered in this case."

Sylvia Rodríguez has since made the one notable advance in relation to the debate. Rodríguez, an anthropologist with extensive field experience, transcends, through analytical clarity, the limited terms of the original debate. Lamenting the lack of ethnic theory in the debate, she introduces some key theoretical points of departure, and demonstrates the critical role empirical knowl-
edge must begin to play before the complexities of culture and identity in New Mexico can be fully appreciated.

Rodríguez registers the crucial distinction between the "etic" perspective of the observer and the "emic" perspectives of the actors in actual life. Rather than insist on the truth or insidiousness of the distinctiveness claim, the need is to recognize the 'reactive' nature of ethnic identity, usually in response to emergent conditions of ethnic contention over resources. In New Mexico the chief objects of ethnic contention have been land and water. Ethnic identities, including that of Hispano distinctiveness and homeland, are constantly being "constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed" to meet emergent contingencies of ethnic competition. A primordial right-or-wrong categorization may blind one to this important point. The root of ethnic difference does not lie in a contrast of culture traits. Rather, ethnic boundaries are sustained "to structure group relations and to organize differential access to and control over critical resources, particularly in situations of competition." Ethnic boundaries are both situational (subject to adaptation in everyday life) and structural (resulting in relatively patterned behavior).

As Rodríguez states, "... while the cultural repertoires (not to mention genetic makeup) of Indian, Hispano, and Anglo populations have undergone radical and continuous transformation during the past four hundred years, the boundaries between them persist and today seem to be maintained and protected with increasing self-consciousness if not intensity." One way the boundaries have been reproduced is by reference to the "homeland" concept. The exact meaning of "the homeland," however, is determined, according to Rodríguez, primarily on the local level. Utilizing ethnographic materials, Rodríguez examines the threat to traditional Hispano irrigation methods that resort tourism has posed in the last fifteen years in Taos County. She describes an Hispano homeland identity based in the village locales that are under this economic siege actually intermeshing with a "Chicano" form of ethnopolitical identity. She interprets this pattern with reference to large-scale effects of economic development in creating localized forms of ethnopolitical identity. This identity pattern is then contrasted with the strictly mexicano form of ethnopolitical identity adopted by another group of Hispano activists in their land grant struggle in neighboring Rio Arriba County.

Rodríguez provides valuable correctives for the study of ethnic culture and
identity in the Southwest by revealing in particular the over simplicity of imposing one’s etic categorization upon communities of people who have their own reasons for identifying themselves as they do, and who display variable cultural patterns through time and across space. Still, it should be recognized that Rodríguez’s contribution marks a beginning; numerous issues of historical and theoretical importance remain to be addressed. While Rodríguez sharpens our sensitivity to variations in localized settings within the greater Northern New Mexico cultural region, there is still, for example, the level of “New Mexico” as a geopolitical unit to consider as well. This is because some important aspects of the Hispano Homeland concept refer to New Mexico itself, and because Hispanics have competed for political resources at the state level.

Other key issues that require attention include: ethnic nomenclature and identity; Hispano and mexicano relations; the meaning of regional difference; the importance of political competition in the historical process by which the claim of Hispano distinctiveness came about; and the role of the Hispano middle class in the shaping of ethnic identity in New Mexico. To open up these matters, the discussion shall proceed to unpack the original Hispano Homeland Debate, looking specifically for the conceptual conflations that appear in the arguments of the participants.

Derivations of the Hispano Nomenclature

Nostrand writes in his first Homeland article that “Mexican Americans and Indians were differentiated from Hispanos because they did not share the latter’s culture...” Leaving aside how Nostrand might define “culture,” this appears to agree with the view that Hispanics and Mexicans belong to virtually different ethnic groups. Already in his reply to Hansen however, Nostrand starts to leave this absolutist notion of Hispano distinctiveness by addressing the question of when a “Spanish consciousness” took root in New Mexico. At this point, as Rodríguez suggests, an important distinction should be understood between the (etic) realm of objective classification and the people’s own (emic) ethnic identification. As Nostrand says, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, native New Mexicans referred to themselves as “Mexicans,” not “Spanish” and that “Spanish” really began to flourish in the 1920s. As he comes to say, “Hispanos are not more ‘Spanish’ than anyone else, but relative to the larger minority they are distinctively ‘Spanish’ in a cultural sense.”
In his reply to Blaut and Ríos-Bustamante, Nostrand itemizes and accounts for at least nine elements which he says are associated with Hispanos and not Mexican Americans. The listing is presented as if to stand for a holistic or primordial culture, yet Nostrand compromises his position further when he says that they represent only "subtle" differences from Mexican culture. Nevertheless, he clearly concedes a shared categorical membership among Mexican Americans and Hispanos, even though his sense of the latter's distinctiveness is not backed by an adequate comparison with Mexican culture. Also in his reply, Nostrand holds his ground concerning "distinctiveness," referring to archaic residues and indigenous cultural forms, but he then violates his own distinction made a few paragraphs before when he says that what is also included here is the fact that Hispanos reject "that which is Mexican."17

In response to these conflations, it can be emphasized that when Hispanos reject "that which is Mexican," the act does not manifest traditional Hispanic culture, whatever that may be; rather, it expresses self-conscious identification. While a particular ethnic nomenclature can become culturally ingrained, the salient point about the construction of identification is that its communication depends on a kind of calculated manipulation of symbols that often has tenuous ties to the people's everyday lives. In the artifice of identification, there is no reason to expect an exact correspondence to the content of a greater cultural foundation. And yet, while he barely avoids the trap, Nostrand comes close to the many scholarly writings that make or accept the claim of true Hispano distinctiveness. This claim is based primarily on the Hispano ideological disassociation from a Mexican national type.

The objections raised by Hansen, and Blaut/Ríos-Bustamante represent the standard mode of explaining away the claim of Hispano or Spanish distinctiveness in New Mexico. Concerning stereotypes of the Feminist Movement, Ferree and Hess say that "Many long-accepted assumptions can be shown to rest on superficial impressions repeated so often that they become a kind of 'truth'."18 The same can be said of certain aspects of the polemical attack on Hispano and/or 'Spanish' identification in the Southwest.

A major tactic of the "standard reaction" is to point out contradictions in Hispano claims. Hansen first takes issue with Nostrand's use of the term "Hispano." Blaut and Ríos-Bustamante agree with Hansen that "Hispano" is a generic referent among all Spanish-speaking groups; therefore, they conclude,
Nostrand's application is "unique." Blaut and Ríos-Bustamante accuse Nostrand of ignorance concerning things Latino. On the question of objective distinctiveness, Hansen also conflates the question of traditional culture and that of identification by claiming that "there is little in the appearance and origins of Hispanos that makes them really different from other Mexican Americans." Moreover, he trots out Arthur Campa's well-known observation that while New Mexicans may call themselves "Spanish" in English, on the other hand, they call themselves *mexicano* when stating what they are in Spanish. Hansen cites Campa's own conflated interpretation that in English, the word "Mexican" represents a national designation to Hispanos, but a term of racist denigration to Anglos, while in Spanish, the word "mexicano" expresses a cultural category to the Spanish-surnamed because, quoting Campa, "both groups have comparable folk heritages, with similar folk songs, folk tales, and customs".

What is sorely missing amid this speculatory discussion is a solid grounding in the intricacies of Spanish American identification as it actually occurred in New Mexico. In point of fact, and contrary to Blaut/Ríos-Bustamante, the word "Hispano" was indeed appropriated by New Mexicans beginning in the 1890s precisely to designate a regional heritage, and it was done originally in Spanish. This becomes apparent in any reading of the historical archives and records of the time. Moreover, some of the Hispano identity formulations of that era, roughly 1890-1930—not simply the 1920s as Nostrand states—displayed an awareness of the issues raised by Hansen, Blaut/Ríos-Bustamante, and even Campa. A prime example is the essay entitled "Hispano-Americanos, o simplemente Americanos," by one L. E. Bernal, which appeared in Santa Fe's *El Nuevo Mexicano*, May 6, 1920. "Durante los últimos años," Bernal wrote,

> ha habido un aumento notable de actividad en los asuntos de esta nuestra patria por el elemento Hispano Americano. Y el término ‘Hispano Americano’ en este artículo, deberá de usarse como aplicado, no al elemento de habla española de Florida o Georgia o Louisiana o de alguna otra de las grandes ciudades como Nueva York o Chicago, sino a lo de Texas, Arizona, California y especialmente Nuevo México y Colorado."

As is evident, Bernal's definition of "Hispano" stresses a three-pronged reality—being at once 'Latino,' indigenous to the region, and citizen of the U.S. The comprehensiveness in Bernal's construction is illustrated best by quoting at length:
Es cierto que casi todos los países al sur de los Estados Unidos son llamados “Hispano América” y sus habitantes “Hispano Americanos.” Y esto ha guiado a una gran confusión en la mente de aquellos que no saben las diferentes conexiones en las cuales esos nombres se usan. Sin embargo, ha guiado a una confusión mayor en el uso del otro nombre, esto es “mexicano.” Este nombre conforme se aplica a los poseedores del primer idioma europeo de los Estados del Sudoeste, ha causado que se escriban libros por las plumas de los escritores mal informados, en los cuales ellos tratan del pueblo mexicano como de un pueblo extranjero con costumbres extranjeras y conexiones extranjeras. En sus mentes la palabra “mexicano” tiene una relación inevitable con México, lo cual es un error. Es solamente aquellos que han vivido por muchos años en alguno de los estados del Sudoeste y que han tomado suficiente interés para investigar un poquito acerca de los primero pobladores en nuestro Sudoeste hispano, son los únicos que pueden distinguir entre las diferencias en aplicación de la palabra “mexicano” entre los hijos nativos de los Estados Unidos y los de México. El mismo nombre de por sí es algo así como un problema, no en sus efectos sobre los que lo llevan, sino en cuanto a la actitud de los que no conocen su significado local. Es probablemente innecesario decir que se puede cambiar, y... sin ninguna perdida... ni en prestigio ni en el efecto moral de los interesados. 

What is crucial here is that the author, while emphasizing “Hispano,” is not denying “mexicano” in its common everyday usage. He is arguing (in opposition to Campa’s assumption) that “mexicano,” as a folk term applied to the long-time natives of the Southwest, means something different from Mexican national identity or common cultural continuity.

In the paragraph that follows, Bernal interprets the past in terms of a colonial society that was established in the Southwest, and which developed on its own terms apart from Spain itself, and outside the bounds of Mexican history proper. Thus,

Ni el nombre ‘español’ ni el de ‘mexicano’ se pueden aplicar a los constituyentes de habla española. Otro nombre o nombres deben procurarse o buscarse... El nombre más apropiado, aunque no deja de tener escollos a causa de la America Espanola, es el de “Hispano Americano.”

Bernal is clearly taking into account the difference between Mexico and the United States, and the distinctiveness of Nuevo Mexicano society to derive a regionally specific definition of Hispano. This meaning should be kept in mind when referring to the historical association between Nuevo Mexicanos and ‘Hispano’. The matter of regional effects is taken up again below.

In short, Bernal’s piece shatters Nostrand’s assumption that the distinctiveness argument as formulated by Nuevo Mexicanos reduces itself only to being
“distinctively ‘Spanish’ in a cultural sense.” Moreover, assuming that it is possible to objectively designate a general or folk culture, the fact is that the entire process of how and when the New Mexico legend and the homeland concept came about, is still poorly understood, Nostrand’s critics included.

Hispanos and Mexicanos
Notwithstanding the validity of mexicano as a cultural designation, what Campa’s classic formulation sidesteps is the degree to which American-born, American-socialized Mexicans have usually felt a significant measure of distinction between themselves and mexicanos from Mexico. At times this is expressed as a rejection and a prejudice, but not always and not necessarily, as Bernal’s essay proves. In other contexts, it may reflect real culture difference in terms, for example, of the important matter of Spanish-language proficiency and dialect. In fact, third generation Mexican Americans and their descendants, who form the largest Mexican American sub-group, tend to be different, those native to the United States being in some way or other also “U.S. American.”

Nor should the basic fact of citizenship be underestimated as a criterion by which Mexican nationals and Mexican Americans perceive difference among themselves, even as they may logically deduce a shared membership in the same broad social category. If these points hold across the Southwest, then Hispano dissociation from a national Mexican prototype appears less an example of false consciousness and more like the elevation of a point of difference to the level of ideological cleavage. The question for research then becomes: Under what conditions will this cleavage open up?

Blaut and Ríos-Bustamante effectively counter Nostrand’s inferring of cultural relations between Mexican Americans and Hispanos based on demographics. The value of Nostrand’s demographic study lies in illustrating the low level of migration from Mexico into New Mexico and in specifying the areas of relative Hispanic concentration in 1900. However, Nostrand is not justified in concluding that the New Mexico-born children of Mexican-born parents did not “assimilate” with Hispanos. To the contrary, there is every reason to believe that they would necessarily have had to do so, especially as one moved north into the core Hispano counties. Blaut and Ríos-Bustamante appear to question, without justification, the fact that, until fairly recently, Mexicans arriving from Mexico into northern New Mexico had little choice but to adjust, if per-
haps not “assimilate,” into long-standing Hispano communities. That they also augmented Hispano culture with their own cultural input must also be recognized. 

In the standard reaction to the Hispano Heritage tradition, Blaut and Ríos-Bustamante call Nostrand’s work ideology. The first charge in this vein is that Nostrand is simply propogating a myth of Spanish purity in New Mexico which Hispanic elites invented for their own purposes. But the sum of Nostrand’s writing in the Homeland Debate can be seen to fall more accurately within a tradition of scholarship that seeks to give the distinctiveness thesis an empirical test. In fact, Nostrand’s piece is actually a replication (albeit uncited) of a little-known work by Wolf and Craig, who conducted the same demographic exercise for New Mexico using data from the 1960 census, and who found Nostrand’s identical pattern concerning native-born and Mexican-born Spanish-surnamed people in the same northern and southern counties. On the assumption that national nativity is socially and culturally consequential, they therefore conclude that time of settlement is one of the dimensions by which the two Spanish-speaking “communities” could be differentiated.

Such study then is a response to the fact that “distinctiveness,” as generally propagated in New Mexico, comes to form an empirical issue. Within the perspectives of demography and other fields, the thesis is allowed a measure of plausibility without necessarily tying it into the more manifest ideological expressions of the New Mexico legend. Thus, mindful of the uses to which the distinctiveness notion is often put, Wolf and Craig say: “To note and confirm that there are two or more subcultures among the Spanish-speaking residents of New Mexico is not to endorse class snobbery or claims for intraethnic superiority. Nonetheless, in practice, the distinction between Hispano and Mexican is frequently intended to denote social class.” Wolf and Craig also state that the significance of these two communities should not be exaggerated. Rather than cultural difference, Wolf and Craig see an important political distinction, that is, the sense in which the older community has had the time to “hone” political astuteness in New Mexico, while the newer arriving mexicanos could not be expected to “achieve comparable skills until the third or fourth generations in this country if their rate of political acculturation is comparable to that of other immigrant groups.”

The basic but key conclusion from these kinds of studies is that there are
both native and immigrant experiences among the Spanish speaking in New Mexico, the latter having been more prevalent historically. The interesting question is how the two experiences have interrelated and interlaced in real life. Others prefer to examine whether or not the distinctiveness thesis, whether ideologically or objectively derived, has any validity. This is simply an empirical question that is available for research consideration, and not ideological per se.

Blaut and Ríos-Bustamante charge Nostrand with what they call the "Traditional Anglo-American Scholar's View of Latinos in the United States." Nostrand allegedly contributes to the racist diminishment of the role that Mexicans have played in the Southwest by distorting Mexican American history, and ignoring Mexican ethnic organizing, thus denying it legitimacy. The charges refer to writings not directly related to the Homeland Debate. They may or may not have justification. I would only point out that Blaut and Ríos-Bustamante's response conforms point for point to another standard critical response, this time to Anglo social science research. Octavio Romano initiated the Mexican American's confrontation with the biases of American scholarship in 1968. His tenor and specific arguments find periodic echo in various Chicano writings. If mainstream scholarship on the Latino experience represents a strain of ideology in American letters, Blaut and Ríos-Bustamante represent its vigilant and predictable counter-ideology, which may partially explain their imprecise reading of Nostrand's Homeland writing.

The Importance of Regional Effects
If Nostrand starts with an absolute conception of Hispano distinctiveness and then loosens it in the face of Hansen's objection, Blaut and Ríos-Bustamante hold to an understanding of "Mexican" so monolithic that it would obliterate the importance of regional distinctiveness altogether. The Chicano Reaction thus has its own way of regarding the Spanish Heritage as constructed, without acknowledging the specific historical construction that went into the rise of 'Mexican' as a social rubric in the first place.

Anderson et al. note the paradox of the aboriginal heritage mystique (indígenismo) in the national ideologies of Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay. "When we note that the apostles of Indigenismo have been white or mestizo intellectuals, and not the Indians themselves," they write, "we
are perhaps very close to the heart of the paradox." And more specifically,

The advocates of Indigenismo in post-1910 Mexico were almost entirely members of the dominant Hispanicized community, although some were of mestizo racial background. . . . What was at issue, of course, was not so much Indigenismo as Mexicanism. For the nationalized elites of Mexico, long departed from Indian culture themselves, this was a search for the distinctive roots of national identity; it was a search for the Mexican Volk.28

The unquestioned manner in which the category "Mexican" is applied by critics of the Spanish Heritage is a measure of national hegemony, the dominant identities associated with established state-societies largely succeeding in getting themselves taken for granted. The standard critique tends to consider Mexican culture and society as strong monoliths having few valid definitional features. But it is more accurate to conceive them as fragmented, having many elements that are loosely bound and sometimes contradictory.

Blaut and Ríos-Bustamante deny that New Mexico experienced any particular isolation after its initial Hispanic settlement, a prime example being the covered wagon trade that existed throughout subsequent generations. And yet, they do acknowledge "the old regional cultures" of California and Texas which were "buried" under a "generalized modern Mexican culture."29 They don't, however, entertain the possibility that New Mexico's "old" regional culture may not have been so fully buried. This would raise the possibility that the vestiges of this old culture—the land grants and the classic lay brotherhood, Los Hermanos de Nuestro Padre Jesús Nazareno (popularly known as los penitentes) being two prominent examples—may indeed be significant for defining a distinct culture and sense of group membership.

The conflation being made in the Homeland Debate concerns levels of analysis in relation to ethnic categories. Social categories are aggregates of people sharing a common characteristic. As such, all categories—ethnic ones most assuredly—are internally complex. Their members differentiate among themselves for many important reasons, for example, in their memberships in still other categories. This is the routine sociological analysis that has been applied to Mexican Americans, who are, perhaps, the most complex, diverse and internally differentiated of all major ethnic groups in the U.S. Regional dispersal is one of several major causes of Mexican American diversity.30 Indeed, regional concentration is an important differentiating factor among Mexicans in Mexico.31
**Distinctiveness, Protest and the Hispano Elite**

Hansen also raises the oft-repeated point that the claim of cultural distinctiveness in New Mexico is a cover for denying that Hispanics are a conquered and socially subordinated minority group, a charge that Hall rightly disputes based on the constructionist definition of ethnic identity. Until recently, skeptical observers were virtually unanimous in equating Spanish American identity with Anglo-American values, integrationist goals, assimilationist policies and similar orientations that can be considered conservative for their ‘other-directedness.’

The accusation gains greater charge when it is associated with the Hispano “elite” class. In this regard, the tendency is to attribute a stereotyped self-centered and essentially psychological construction to the way that the Hispano middle class has expressed Hispano distinctiveness. Rodríguez herself inserts this mode in her otherwise valuable contribution, citing those who have held that the “Spanish American” myth was “originally perpetuated by the Mexican (and mestizo) or Mexican American elite and middle classes as a self-protective strategy against the progressive institutionalization of Anglo American racism”; that this strategy “simultaneously served their own class interests and reflected Spanish racism against Indians . . . [which is] reminiscent of a similar pattern still observable in other isolated parts of Latin America . . .”; and further, that this genteel Spanish fantasy was “fostered by proponents of statehood who wanted to ‘bleach’ the native population and thereby assuage anti-Mexican anxieties in Congress . . .”32

As Hansen demonstrates in his contribution to the debate, this element of the common critique tends to conflate the level of logic, which postulates that since Hispanics consider their blood-line European, they must be identifying with Anglos, on one hand, and, on the other, the question of whether or not this logic has always applied in all situations of ethnic affirmation and activity in New Mexico.

Research published since the onset of the Hispano Homeland Debate suggests the facility of assuming that Hispano distinctiveness in the hands of the middle class was at all times a psychological salve against racism, that it was always a way of appeasing Anglos for sociopolitical rewards, or that is was only a way of isolating middle-class interests from the interests of working-class Nuevo Mexicanos. It is clearer now that a politically active underpinning to Hispano was indeed more important than was the conservative or accomadationist ver-
sion precisely during the statehood period. While conservative interpretations of Hispano identity have always been present, there was also a "progressive," (i.e. a competitive and protest motivated) part played by that identity, which formed part of a homeland arsenal applied in direct action confrontations with Anglo racism and social domination. This action occurred most prominently within the conventional political system just as Hispano political power was declining under the onslaught of Anglo American immigration and economic development.33

To the extent that it was an "elite" that propelled a competitive Hispano identity at this time, it is vitally important to identify the type of elite that was involved in this, and all other cases of middle-class political involvement in given historical eras. In this particular case, it is clear that it was a political group (clearly not an economic or business one) which struggled for inclusion in the state's public institutions on behalf of all Hispanics in the state, and which resulted in educational and citizenship rights for "Spanish Americans" being specifically incorporated into the state constitution.34

The point is that understanding the political motivations of Spanish American expression may be no easy task whether one would wish it ill or well. But there is no reason why a Europeanist form of identification should necessarily mean a desire for social association with the dominant group or with the history of American Manifest Destiny. This is an entirely historico-empirical question. And just as Rodríguez demonstrates that homeland identity is constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed on the basis of competition affecting Hispanics at the grassroots level, so must we be willing to accept that the Hispano ideology has also undergone its variable construction through time. Moreover, middle-class constructions of protest identity were also important, for in addition to land and water issues, the question of Hispano participation in the political system has also been a classic bone of ethnic contention through the history of New Mexico as a U.S.-owned entity.

The theoretical shortcoming here involves an adequate approach to the middle-class sectors of the greater Mexican American population. A starting point was suggested long ago by W.E.B. DuBois, who referred to the "peculiar situation" of the Black middle class, its suspension, that is, between the dominant white leaders of the community and the socially subordinated Black mass. As Leo Kuper later argued, the term "bourgeoisie," while perhaps suggesting a
"verbal fantasy" in view of its Marxist derivation, was nevertheless appropriate to the upper echelons of an otherwise stratified social grouping. With E. Franklin Frazier's 1957 work, *Black Bourgeoisie*, much progressive scholarship tended to inveigh against middle-class racial ethnics as pretentious, confused in their group loyalties, and accepted by neither the racist white society nor working-class Blacks. More recent work has argued for the necessity of seeing a much more complex reality in which some bourgeois elements of an ethnic subaltern are capable of progressive thought and action under the right conditions. A great deal depends on the political and economic aspects of national and regional contexts as well as developments within the working classes. Examining the ideological and cultural characteristics of the Black middle class from 1960 to 1990, for example, Banner-Halley recognizes this group's own sources of social indignation over systemic social inequality. Banner-Halley characterizes the relationship between the Black middle class and the Black mass as an "integrative cultural diversity" signifying a complex and evolutionary response and action to oppression. Torres and Amado have taken initial steps toward such an approach in their work on middle-class Mexican Americans in Arizona. The same approach needs to be taken with regard to the Hispano middle and professional class in New Mexico. In given situations, the Hispano elite will act the part of the bourgeois in its tendency to over-identify with the American middle-class, but under certain conditions will presume to take a certain lead in what is considered equality and justice for its people in a racist society.

In this regard, while it may stretch the imagination of those who constantly attack the notion of a Hispano heritage as only conservative political values and assimilationist ethnic policies, research is showing that, at least for the period between 1890 and the mid-1930s, Hispano identity was indeed applied for competitive purposes by an Hispano political elite. There is, for example, the case of a mobilized Hispano community that, in 1933, protested the exclusionist practices of the University of New Mexico. What is becoming clearer is that the Spanish Heritage took a predominantly conservative turn under conditions of the New Deal and World War II, when new political goals beyond those associated with statehood, were set in New Mexico.

Finally, what has to be recognized is the fact that, since the New Mexico legend was formed and disseminated after the turn of the century by an elite
corps of culture makers, including the well-known folklorist and scholar Aurelio Espinosa, the Hispano nomenclature was installed as a generic ethnic terminology which has been adopted by working-class Hispanos as well. What exactly the meaning of the term “Hispano” or “Spanish” is for this subcategory is still in need of systematic investigation. Preliminary work in an urban setting seems to indicate that working-class Hispanos do not use it as an elaborated ideological way of characterizing their cultural heritage, but rather as a term of casual or customary reference in order to distinguish themselves broadly from people from Mexico and other ethnic groups. In this case, it could well have a logical validity given the older Hispano communities in New Mexico.

Conclusion

This essay has sought to clear away empirical and theoretical ground regarding issues of ethnicity in New Mexico and the Southwest. What has been lacking in the whole range of commentary on this topic is precise knowledge concerning the exact history of Hispano identity in New Mexico, including the uses to which it has been put during different periods, the variations in its symbolic content, and the original reasons for its prevalence in this region. Without a perspective derived from such knowledge, too much of the debate will remain mired in useless argumentation revolving around the question of the truth or falsity of the Spanish and Homeland claims in New Mexico. In addition, more theoretical work is needed to give the data a sophisticated interpretation, with reference, for example, to the ethnic bourgeois elements and the evolution of ethnic nomenclatures.

Several points are established in this article: first, there are several “Hispano distinctiveness” versions, not all of them reducible to “Spanish American” identity; second, Hispano identity itself has had a varied and complex history of meaning and significance in New Mexico, only part of which has been alluded to here; third, in terms of “New Mexico” generally, the political system has been a major arena for ethnic competition and a source of ethnopolitical identity; and fourth, regional identity forms a key differentiating factor among Mexican Americans throughout the Southwest and an important context for the relations between Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans. Finally, much work remains to be done before we fully understand the role of the Hispano middle class in the formation of ethnicity and identity in New Mexico.
Other primary research is beginning to present a historical analysis of Hispano identification in New Mexico as it relates to political ethnicity. In its sum total, ethnic identity has been vital to the greater New Mexico story and for this reason deserves the respect of a serious interpretive reading. In Max Weber’s method of verstehen, it is important to discover “... what makes [a person] do this at precisely this moment and in these circumstances.”

Thus, for example, there was a sociohistorical and cultural context which served as an important backdrop to Bernal’s essay and which must be discerned if the identity patterns of his generation are to be completely comprehended. Hispanos in New Mexico belong to the greater Mexican American category certainly, but this realization should not bring us to the point of implied or actual conflict with those whom we wish to understand in historical perspective.

But verstehen does not entail automatic or total acceptance of the native’s point of view. Nor does it mean that the researcher must pretend to a scientistic ideology of objectivity in which the actual world is kept at a sterile distance. What it permits, rather, is entrance into historical situations, enabling us to see the conditions which may constrain people from effective social action, or free them for creative struggle.

NOTES
8 Marc Simmons, “Rejoinder.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 74, 1


10 Ibid., p. 171.


12 Ibid., p. 97.

13 Ibid., p. 98.

14 Ibid., pp. 106-110.


17 Ibid.


20 Translation: “In the past few years, there has been a notable activity in the affairs of our country by the Hispanic American element. And the term, 'Hispano Americano' in this case should be applied, not to Spanish speaking people in Florida or Georgia or Louisiana or any of the other big cities like New York or Chicago, but rather to Texas, Arizona, California and especially New Mexico and Colorado.”

21 Translation: “It is certain that almost all of the countries south of the United States are called ‘Hispanic America’ and their citizens “Hispanic Americans.” And this has led to a great confusion in the minds of those who do not know the different connections in which these terms are used. Moreover, a major confusion arises in the use of another term, this being “mexicano.” This name [which] is properly applied to the speakers of the first European language in the southwestern states, has caused malinformed writers of books to treat the mexicano community like it was a foreign country with foreign customs and foreign relations. In their minds, the word “mexicano” means an inevitable relation to Mexico, which is an error. Only those who have lived many years in the Southwest and who have taken enough interest to investigate some into the first settlers of the Hispanic Southwest that can distinguish between the different meanings of the word “mexicano” among the descendants of natives in the United States and of those in Mexico. The same name in itself is something of a problem, not in its effects on those who use it, but in terms of the attitude of those who do not recognize its local significance. It is probably unnecessary to say that it can change and without any loss whatever in prestige nor the morality of those to whom it refers.”

22 Translation: “Neither the term ‘Spanish’ nor ‘mexicano’ is applicable to the Spanish speakers. Other names should be sought out . . . The most appropriate name, while it is not necessary linked to Spanish America, is ‘Hispano Americano.’”


Blaut and Rios-Bustamante, “Commentary,” on their citing the old Spanish culture.


The struggle for definition has not only defined the Chicana/o experience itself, but research on Chicana/o populations as well. The term “Chicano” emerged from the social upheaval of 1960s America as a symbol of the efforts of Mexican-descent peoples in the United States to define themselves. The reality lived by the Chicanas/os of the 1960s was that they were neither “American” nor “Mexican,” neither white nor black, and often, simply invisible. Through the development of a discourse that addressed the marginalization of Chicanas/os (occurring via external and inaccurate definitions of the group) the Chicana/o experience itself became better understood in all its intricacies.

This discourse led to an increasing awareness of the importance of identity in understanding the Chicana/o experience and the need to deconstruct identity and its centrality to both Chicana/o failure and success. Unfortunately, however, attempts at this deconstruction have continually suffered from an inability to incorporate the complexities of Chicana/o identity that became blatantly apparent in the wars waged over self-definition (as seen, for example in the arguments over the proper ethnic label to identify Mexican-descent individuals living in the United States). Contemporary research into Chicana/o identity has been severely limited by its own, often unacknowledged, struggle with defining that which it has analyzed. While researchers have recently placed increasing emphasis on the importance of social and ethnic identity in understanding the position and future of Chicanas/os (as well as other “minorities”), the fact remains that just as the complexities and realities of life on the margin have made uniform self-definition for Chicanas/os all but impossible, these same complexities have confined the world of identity explored in research to narrow corners of the Chicana/o experience. Chicana/o identity research has thus over-emphasized analyses of identity grounded in self-chosen ethnic la-

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bels, ethnic values, and/or ethnic practices; none of which address the depth of Chicana/o identity.

After looking at the obstacles confronting researchers, this paper attempts to move towards deeper levels of understanding Chicana/o identity through qualitative analyses of identity formations among Chicana/o high school and college students. The students’ own discussions of their experiences reveal the complexity of identity, the themes that remain constant across individual experience, and the way in which power is central to Chicana/o identity formation.

Contemporary Research on Chicana/o Identity Formation
The two main arenas in which Chicana/o identity has been best explored are social psychology and post-colonial social theory. The work in each area has made fundamental contributions to our understanding of the Chicana/o experience and identity. At the same time, however, each has also been constrained by specific limitations.

Post-colonial theorists have pushed the discourse on identity forward by suggesting that ethnic/racial, gender, sexual and class identities are neither static nor firm; rather, they are continuously intersecting and evolving as a function of various social forces. A number of writers have effectively demonstrated the most current manifestations of the fluid identities which constitute our perceptions of self and others. The theorists who have specifically looked at Chicana identity have: exposed the interwoven nature of sexual, gender, racial, and religious identities, articulated the contradictory and shifting nature of this identity as influenced by the inherent borders integral to the Chicana experience, and suggested that by acknowledging the power of “Xicana” identity as an evolving and syncretic embodiment of (in particular) spiritual and sexual identities we can move towards recreating identity and transforming Chicana experiences through imagination.

While these are powerful progressions in our understanding of the Chicana/o experience, the core of this discourse exists on a theoretical plane which is inapplicable to our understanding of the daily manifestations of these social creations. Thus, while some of the most poignant revelations within the discourse on post-colonial identity have advanced contemporary thought and understanding of the social phenomena at play in constructing the “Chicana/o,” they have not suggested, in any thorough fashion, how we might dissect these
forces to understand their local essence and, most importantly, use that understanding to assist Chicana/o communities.

At the same time that these theories have evolved, a number of more applied analyses of ethnic identity (using Social Identity Theory and other social psychological frameworks, for example) have sought quantification of the links between specific aspects of identities and other individual characteristics as a means of discovering the connection between ethnic identity and behavior. While this work has suggested important considerations for educators, by pointing out the potential links between cultural ties and effective negotiation of the school culture, it is often accompanied by tendencies to oversimplify the construct of identity into labels and categories that betray the progress made in the Chicana theory just mentioned. Oftentimes, this work attempts to find meaning and interpret individuals' lives through statistically significant relationships between variables that do not allow the researcher or the reader to discover the essence, the evolution, and the impact of identity formation on Chicanas/os.

Carlos Arce initiated critique of this work 15 years ago, as he explained that:

Virtually all studies of Chicano identity have been too exclusively focused on the ethnic aspects, without adequately examining an individual's private definition and categorization of his or her total social identity. If such a distinction were adopted, it would be possible to assess the importance of ethnic identity in the broader framework of a multidimensional social identity. For Chicanos, ethnic identity is not simple or unidimensional. It potentially operates on multiple levels (on a private to public continuum), each of which has several components that may be ethnic in general character.

Unfortunately, much of this critique is still valid with regard to the most contemporary social psychological research on identity. Virtually all of the empirical research on Chicana/o identity bases analyses on statistical relationships between quantified variables that relate to small facets of ethnic identity. For example, Hurtado, Gurin and Peng make important innovations by considering socio-historical contexts and macro-social forces in understanding ethnic identity, but they base their findings on links between individuals' self-chosen labels, cultural loyalty measures, and background factors. Similarly, Bernal and Martinelli edited an important work on Mexican American ethnic identity that, while providing some important insights into identity through interdisciplinary works, did not address the social processes involved in multi-level identity formation (and instead looked at relationships like the connection between
perceptions of the out-group and self-perceptions, and between demographic characteristics, self-chosen labels and gender).\(^7\)

Earlier, Rodriguez and Gurin engaged in a project that further highlighted the methodological obstacles confronting identity research. As they pointed out, their analysis of the links between ethnic identity, inter-group interaction and political consciousness is limited by their use of labels as ethnic identity indicators and by their inability to assess inter-ethnic interaction beyond its frequency (thus not considering "context, type, or quality of contact").\(^8\) These are limitations faced in other research such as García's early work on Chicana/o ethnic identity and its connection to political consciousness, and more recent work by Hurtado and Hurtado, Gonzalez, and Vega, considering the relationships between ethnic identity and academic performance among Latinas/os.\(^9\)

Just as important, this research overlooks the contributions of Chicana post-colonial theory as it does not integrate analyses that consider the intersection of different facets of Chicana/o social identity. By focusing exclusively on ethnic identity, this research is unable to understand the whole of social identity and the way in which other facets of these identities interact with and possibly reinforce ethnic identity.\(^10\)

Nevertheless, this research has been crucial to the emerging construct of identity in that it has moved toward increasingly complex models of explaining Chicana/o identity.\(^11\) In so doing, it has pushed researchers to try to understand how ethnic identity is created and connected to individuals' daily lives and behaviors. Unfortunately, the methodological approaches undertaken in this research have not matched the complexity of these models and have even skirted around the models themselves because of the difficulty of quantitatively analyzing processes of identity formation. Still, these efforts suggest the possibility of conducting research through which identity can be more fully understood with regard to its influences, formative processes, and multiple manifestations.

Gurin, Hurtado and Peng, for example, address the limitations of research that analyzes identity and its potential influences by using ethnic labels and correlational data, and they also discuss the potential intersection of different identities and the importance of developing methods that are more responsive to the nuances of individuals' actual lives and the influences on them.\(^12\) Phinney also mentions the importance of analyzing context in future identity research.
to understand the linkages between ethnic identity and gender, familial characteristics, socioeconomic status, and the ethnic diversity in the community. In addition, Saenz and Aguirre discuss situationally shifting identities influenced by context and inter-ethnic interaction. Knight et al. provide perhaps the most comprehensive example of the contributions of previous identity research in this area. While acknowledging the difficulties and shortcomings of this research, proposing a social cognitive model of ethnic identity development, and suggesting further exploration and testing of the model, they explain the progress they have made in their work:

This model suggests that the social ecology [of students’ lives] is causally linked to the content that is socialized by familial and nonfamilial agents. The socialization content is, in turn, causally linked to the nature of children’s social and personal identities, including ethnic identity, and the acceptance of ethnic values that guide behavior. The model also suggests that children’s cognitive development and socialization practices through which the socialization content is transmitted are causally linked to the timing of the development of their ethnic identity and its respective behaviors.

They go on to add, however, that

It is apparent that although there has been considerable research on Mexican American-Anglo American differences and recent research on the Mexican American family, there has been little research bearing directly upon many of the most important features of the model. (emphasis added)

Overall, as this final statement highlights, while work in Chicana post-colonial theory and Chicana/o social identity theory has made critical progress in the thinking surrounding identity, both areas have made fundamental sacrifices in the means by which they attempt to explain the social phenomena at work in the formation of identities among Chicana/o communities. In short, although there are insights into a number of potential relationships between identity, background factors and behaviors, there is still no clear understanding of what constitutes Chicana/o identity and the means by which Chicana/o identities are formed.

**Qualitatively Operationalizing Chicana/o Identity**

Before turning to the deconstruction of Chicana/o identity, clear definitions of the terms employed in the analyses are required. First of all, Chicana/o refers to females and males of Mexican descent living in the United States. Chicana/o
identity refers to the social identity that Chicanas/os establish for themselves. This social identity is simply how given individuals define themselves in their own social world, specifically with regard to social groups in which individuals place themselves (and with which they interact), along with the conscious significance they place on these groups and interactions. Thus, Chicana/o identity theoretically includes the identity of all Chicanas/os, including those who define themselves as upper-middle class or as homosexuals, for example, and those who do not consciously ethnically identify. It also includes Chicanas/os who define themselves as Catholic, Mexicano and working class simultaneously, as another example. This investigation, therefore, considers the self-perceptions of all types and categories of Chicanas/os so as to understand the full complexity of Chicana/o identity formations.

The definition of Chicana/o identity used in this project began with the development of a general framework of Chicana/o identity that attempted to incorporate all the potential arenas of Chicana/o identity formations identified in the literature, and in interviews with the participants. It was determined that family identity is important, but that it is a precursor to social identity, and that school identity is also important (with regard to outcomes), but that this is heavily influenced by familial and social identities in general. Thus, the construct of Chicana/o identity included the potentially significant realms of: class, community, gender, race/ethnicity, sexuality, and religion/spirituality (along with family and school). Additionally, participants included other realms of identity formation when relevant. In short, the construct of Chicana/o identity, as operationalized in this paper, encompasses those social realms in which Chicanas/os have the potential for significant interactions with others. The specific means of operationalizing identity departed from those employed in quantitative analyses which define the terms that determine the nature of an individual’s ethnic identity. Instead, the students were asked about the social issues that were important to them to discover the role of different arenas of identity within their overall social identities, and, more importantly, they were asked to explain who they are in their own minds and which identities were most pertinent in their lives. The rationale underlying this approach was the need for researchers to understand how individuals define their own identities and why, so as to avoid defining students’ identities through measures that are unable to grasp the value, meaning, and influences behind an individual’s response to specific
statements related to identity. In the project, Chicana/o students at a major university, a community college and a high school in metropolitan Los Angeles completed surveys and participated in interviews. Through open- and closed-ended questions, the students identified their self-constructed identities and the forces at work in their development.

As mentioned, students' identities were understood through their responses to the social issues they deemed important (such as racism, sexism, and community issues) as well as who they said they were in their social worlds. These issues were covered repeatedly in each of the research tools through multiple questions (asking students, for example, to identify the most important issues in their social lives from a list as well as simply asking students to define themselves in their social world). Students spent thirty to forty-five minutes completing surveys and those interviewed spent one to one and one-half hours discussing these issues, while some also participated in a second interview of similar length. The interviewees were also challenged with regard to the strength of their beliefs through discussions of opposing views. Each individual student's responses were then analyzed to determine the nature of their identities and the influences on them. Afterward, each student's experiences were incorporated into an all-encompassing model. The analyses in this paper are based on data collected through surveys with over 150 Chicana/o students, as well as interviews with 13 students.

**The Sample**

Students volunteered to participate in the study after the author made presentations explaining the project in their classes (during the winter of 1996). The total sample surveyed included 158 Mexican descent students (37 from a four-year university, 37 from a community college, 32 high school seniors, and 52 high school freshmen).

The four year university is a major research institution and, at the time of the study, 13.01 percent of the student population was Chicana/o, while 58.8 percent was white. At the university, the author recruited participants through the Chicana/o Studies classes being offered, attending all of the larger classes in Chicana/o Studies (10 in all), but also sought participants in three non-Chicana/o Studies classes which had significant numbers of Chicana/o students. These classes were an education course and a sociology course, both of which
dealt with minority issues, and a Spanish class for native speakers. The Chicanac/o Studies classes were about 90 percent Chicana/o, while the non-Chicana/o Studies courses averaged about 30 percent. Later discussions with participants indicated that the students in Chicana/o Studies courses included Chicana/o Studies majors, students interested in Chicana/o issues, as well as students who were uninterested in Chicana/o Studies but needed to fulfill a diversity requirement. The participants in non-Chicana/o Studies classes similarly indicated that they enrolled in these classes for diverse reasons.

The community college is at the edge of a large Chicana/o barrio and, at the time of the study, 59.6 percent of the student population was Chicana/o (another 16 percent were non-Chicana/o Latinas/os), while three percent were white. At the community college, the author also recruited students through six Chicana/o Studies classes as well as through three non-Chicana/o Studies history classes. Chicana/o Studies classes were about 99 percent Latina/o, and history classes were about 95 percent Latina/o. Discussions with participants indicated that the students also held a wide variety of interests and reasons for being in the classes from which they were recruited. Few students in Chicana/o Studies courses, however, had an interest in pursuing this as a major field of study and most were interested in training for a specific career in business.

The high school is in the middle of a Chicana/o barrio (the same one served by the community college) and, at the time of the study, 99.1 percent of the student population was “Hispanic.” At the high school, the author recruited 9th and 12th graders through mandatory English classes (5 classes for each grade level). The response-rates of these two groups were impacted by the fact that the freshmen were all given class time and credit for completing the survey, while none of the seniors were formally given class time to do the survey, and only two of the classes were offered any type of credit.

All 13 interviewees volunteered to participate in the interviews after completing the surveys. Four individuals from each site were randomly selected from subgroups of the sample. A male and a female student who were recruited through Chicana/o Studies classes, as well as a male and a female who were recruited through non-Chicana/o Studies classes were selected from the college and university samples respectively (one additional university student was also interviewed). At the high school, a male and a female in the ninth and also in the twelfth grade were selected. The interview sample was crucial because the
interview data were exceptionally detailed and rich and serve as the heart of the project.

Clearly, a number of issues affected the sample obtained at each site. In terms of general demographics, it seems that the sample is fairly representative of the larger Chicana/o population as most of the students are working class (75 percent are working class while another 16 percent are middle class; the remaining participants were unable to provide this information) with limited education (63 percent and 66 percent of fathers and mothers did not attain the equivalent of a high school education while 18 percent and 19 percent respectively went only as far as a high school diploma). Additionally, most of the participants are second generation (63 percent), with a significant first-generation immigrant population 24 percent and a smaller third generation group (13 percent). Gender distribution in the sample reflected that in the classes sampled (there tended to be slightly higher numbers of females in these classes, and 60 percent of the participants were female). The sample is limited by the fact that it only includes students, that it is more likely to include better performing students (since those poor performing students who actually attend class are less likely to complete a written survey, regardless of whether or not they get credit for it), and that it is more likely to include students who feel they need to be heard or have an issue that they want to talk about. Additionally, in the community college sample and, in particular, the university sample, the students are likely to have some interest in Chicana/o issues due to the use of Chicana/o Studies classes for recruitment into the study.

While we can assume some possible effects of these factors on the results of the study, the data obtained and the lack of any relationships between the findings and certain unique characteristics of subgroups of the sample provide no conclusive evidence of this impact. In fact, the subsequent analyses discuss the entire sample as a whole (rather than each site individually) because the trends in the data are constant within and across each sample (while the main distinction is simply the degree of feedback provided, as university students provide the most detailed responses and high school students the least). In short, it appears that the processes of identity formation are constant across the subgroups of the sample, particularly given the breadth of the model employed in understanding these processes (which accommodates the multiple variations in the students' experiences).
The discussion now turns to: 1) the importance students placed on each of the potential realms of identity formation, 2) the influences on these varying emphases, as well as, 3) the overall model of identity formation suggested by the research and the implications for both understanding Chicana/o identity formation and its possible transformation.

Los Angeles Chicana/o Students Identity Formations
As mentioned earlier, two important facets of Chicana/o students' social identities are school-based identities and familial-based identities. These are key aspects of how they see themselves in their social world, although not the most central. That is, for most students the familial identity is a grounding force in their life, and they find solace and release in their familial roles, while school is seen as important as a means towards change and improving their condition in life. Still, the most common way Chicana/o students define themselves in their social world is through the other arenas of identity, and it is the identities that emerge in these other areas that both shape school identities and are guided by familial identities. What follows is a brief glimpse at each of the areas of potential identity formation for Chicana/o students, followed by a more in-depth model explaining the forces at work in students' lives that lead them to place importance on specific areas of identity over others.

Spiritual/Religious Identities
Despite the importance placed on religion in "traditional" research on Mexicana/o and Chicana/o populations, the students themselves did not emphasize religion or religious issues in their lives. While many practice religion regularly, few saw this as a central component of their identities (only half of the university students, 26 percent of the college students and six percent of both high school freshmen and seniors discussed the importance of a religious issue). Rather, religion is viewed as an assumed part of who they are and it is given little thought or emphasis in daily life beyond its ritual, often unconscious aspects. Interestingly, the most common discussions about religion in the surveys (reflected most often in university students' responses) emphasized the fact that students were questioning their religion (usually Catholicism) and had problems with the teachings and/or practices of the church. Some students, in fact, had stopped practicing altogether, while others had looked to
their indigenous roots for a new spiritual grounding. Regardless, in almost every case, religion was not a core facet of how students defined themselves and the identities they had developed over the course of their lives.

Community Identities
Community played a similar role in identity formation, although it was given slightly greater significance. While many students (about 30 percent at each site) felt that the issues of their communities were of importance to them (particularly those related to gang violence and drug-dealing), the fact remained that these issues were not central to their identity formations nor were they major influences on their social worlds. Students were concerned about younger siblings and their safety, but also felt that there is little they can do about these concerns beyond simply keeping themselves and their families safe. Other students had strong bonds to their communities and took pride in them, but for the most part these feelings were secondary to other aspects of their identities. The few students whose communities played a fundamental role in the formation of their identities were those with strong affiliations to gangs. Gang affiliations are often based on physical location, and thus, location/community is critical to their social identities as gang members. Still, for the vast majority of the students, social identity was influenced little by the communities in which they lived.

Sexuality-Based Identities
Sexuality is another of the less significant realms of identity formation for the majority of Chicana/o students. Most did not give any thought to the role of sexuality in their daily experiences and this assumed aspect of their lives played no role in their identity formations. A small number of students (five percent and eight percent in the community college and university respectively), however, placed a great deal of significance on the role of sexuality in their identity formations. The Chicanas/os who discussed the centrality of sexuality in their identities are gay and lesbian students and they explained that this is the core, and often the only pertinent aspect, of their social identities. Who they are is defined almost entirely by their sexuality and, for many, by the fact that their experience as homosexuals is heavily determined by the covert and overt discrimination they experience from both Chicanas/os and mainstream society.
Gender Identities
Gender was similarly manifested in the identity formations of Chicanas/os, although it was of much greater significance in the overall identity formations of the students (27 percent of high school freshmen, 44 percent of high school seniors, 62 percent of community college students and 75 percent of university students referred to the importance of gender issues to them). In the responses of both males and females, gender was cited as an important issue. While a smaller number of males mentioned gender issues, those who did, discussed the fact that they are burdened with more severe stereotypes as minority males (by store owners and the police, for example) and with greater expectations with regard to providing for their families. Males did not deem these as central arenas of their identities, but rather simply as issues they had faced. Like the males, the Chicanas often linked the salience of gender in their identity formations to their experiences as racial/ethnic minorities. A number of the Chicanas more deeply emphasized the role of gender and gender biases within the Chicana/o community. Interestingly, however, these experiences were deemed to be normal aspects of the Chicana experience, and even as unchangeable by many. Similar to other students' discussions of gang violence, these women saw gender and gender bias as something they observed and even experienced, but something that they, in turn, did not make a central emphasis in their lives or a key facet of their identity. This was both because of the perceived, unchangeable nature of gender bias that seemed to underlie their feelings, as well as the fact that, for many, this gender bias was entrenched in racial issues that were more central to their identity formations.

Class Identities
Class was one of the least significant aspects of identity for Chicana/o students. Like community, the students (three-fourths of whom are working class) acknowledged that class issues were a reality in their experiences, but these were never central to how they defined themselves nor to the issues they felt were most pertinent in their lives. Thus, the students mentioned economic hardships faced by their families, but each of the class-based issues they raised were seen as the product of specific circumstances which they and their families would change through continued effort. Most of the students who focused on class issues in any significant way, however, did so by integrating issues of race
into these discussions. That is, they discussed the class position and economic hardships faced by Chicanas/os as a function of their race. In these cases, the economic issues discussed were important to the students and part of how they defined themselves, but it was the racial aspect of their identity that they were emphasizing. Eight percent of community college, and 14 percent of university students, however, had more developed class identities, grounded in an awareness of economic inequality in society.

Racial/Ethnic Identities
It is racial or ethnic identity that is the core of the students’ identities (the distinctions between ethnic and racial identity will be covered in the next section). When students discussed the issues that are important to them, roughly 70 percent refer to racism. When they talked about the most severe difficulties they have faced, 12 percent of freshmen, 35 percent of seniors, 49 percent of community college students, and 73 percent of university students refer to race issues. When they simply explained who they are in their own minds, race and ethnicity were most often at the center of their discussions. Students talked primarily about the significance of racial discrimination and differential treatment on the basis of race. These are issues and experiences that are not only important to them, but central to how they define themselves. This became clear when students were asked simply what they are—17 percent of freshmen, 31 percent of seniors, 36 percent of community college students and 54 percent of university students answered with a racial or ethnic descriptor. The significance of these figures is even greater when we consider the number of students who did not provide responses indicative of social identities but rather focused on personal characteristics (65 percent of freshmen, 31 percent of seniors, 27 percent of community college students, and 14 percent of university students). Given the critique of previous identity research mentioned earlier, it is also important to make reference to the students’ self-chosen ethnic labels. The most striking findings with regard to these labels were that many students used multiple labels throughout their discussions; suggesting that there is a significant degree of variation in the use of labels even for individuals. Most importantly, of course, is the simple fact that their social identities are most frequently grounded in their racial/ethnic experiences and identities.

In short, Chicana/o students revealed critical patterns both in the arenas of
identity formation that were important to their social sense of self and in the intersections between these different areas. While the students are all touched in some way by each of the areas of identity formation addressed here, many of these issues are not crucial to how they view themselves in their social world. Each of these issues and areas of identity formation is, therefore, part of their lives, but most are not critical to students' social identities, while some are only important as they are interpreted through the lens of another facet of identity (this is a key theme that will be addressed in the following section). Overall, the survey data suggest that it is racial/ethnic identity that is the pivotal arena of Chicana/o students' social identities.

Racialization, Intersection, and Identity

The reality of Chicana/o students' identity formations, is far more complex than the previous, brief explanations portray. Many of the students, for example, blended the discussions of the different aspects of their social identities. Most commonly, Chicana students discussed gender issues when asked about race/ethnic issues and vice versa. To a lesser extent, Chicanas/os integrated their discussions of their racial and class-based experiences and identities. It is in the interview data, that the nuances of identity, its formation, and its most significant influences are all revealed.

First of all, as in the surveys, the interviews revealed that race is by far the most dominant facet of students' identities. Nine of the thirteen students interviewed brought up race as a central part of their development. A few students provided examples of this as they responded to a question asking which of a number of issues is important to who they are:

[Race is] really the basis of who I am. Like, I mean class will always change. You can get poor . . . you can always change everything, to a certain degree, but your ethnicity is who you really are. It's not something that's instilled in you . . . You're basically born into it.

I have to say race, ethnicity and culture. And the reason why my race is very important to me, [is because it's] my roots, where I come from . . . With culture, it all stems from heritage for me. Things that my ancestors went through . . . I believe that my culture is being targeted in [an] immigrant bashing type of way.

. . . [Race] it's always been very important . . . See, I grew up in [the barrio]. And we went to . . . elementary school [there], me and my brother. And then, when it was time to go to junior high in the late seventies, it's gangs
and so it's crazy. So my brother and I, we went out to school in the [white area]. They had better schools. So we got bussed. We always had pride in being Mexicanos, but I think it was more emphasized when we went out there, where me and my brother were [two] of the few Mexicanos who were in the honors classes, who played sports, and were good at it. It was kind of like we were representing Mexicanos. So it became a little more important. . . . we always took pride in it.

While the students interpreted race/ethnicity in many different ways, it was clearly the dominant theme in their discussions and usually with reference to the sociopolitical position of Chicanas/os (based in the larger context of racial discrimination). As the first student explained, race/ethnicity is something that Chicanas/os can neither avoid nor change.

In addition, five of the 13 students interviewed felt that their socioeconomic status was a key part of their development and who they are (four of whom felt it was central), but three of these students viewed class as part of their ethnic or racial experience. One student provided a good example as she discussed experiences and issues that dealt with class, but also integrated race issues into this discussion:

[Class] was the big problem for me as I was growing up, class. Because I've always been discriminated [against]. We grew up in a upper-middle class environment and we were the only minorities, my sister and I, growing up with most of the student population [in] elementary school being Anglo. . . . And growing up I always felt like an outcast. They would say like racial remarks like "wetback" and [another Chicana's] name was Rosa so they used to call her "Rosarita Beans." Things like that, so class was a big problem for me because even when I went to my girlfriends' house, they lived in these big houses up in the hills where[as] we lived in a small little underdeveloped, I guess, impoverished house where my mom kind of always made us feel embarrassed for living there. She never liked us bringing friends over . . . So class in that sense like, that was a big problem for me growing up.

Another student provided a more detailed example of how Chicanas/os link race and class:

I mean race, race was important. Races fighting against other races and being put down . . . Yeah. . . . and the different levels of society. You've got your upper class, middle class and lower class. Most of the lower class is two races, Mexican and Black. Middle class, you've got your Orientals, some Whites, some Mexicans and stuff. . . . And your upper class: all the white collar society. All your executives [are] mostly Anglo. . . .

MP: . . . when did it become an issue for you?
When I started working, I was working in a bank and I'd see the separation. I'd see supervisors, the majority of supervisors were all white, you know they were the decision makers. They handled your money, they handled your paycheck... it was hard for someone of a different race to climb that ladder. You saw more white people getting promoted, more white people getting the job spots and all that. That's when I started seeing that this ain't right.

As these examples show, while students brought up other realms of potential identity formation that are involved in their development, many are embedded within the construct of (if not confused with) race itself in their discussions. Class, for example, is most often either consciously or subconsciously deemed as something that is a part of or defined by being Chicana/o (as seen in the two excerpts above). With regard to their total identities, race/ethnicity was the most important realm in which students defined themselves.

Later, when asked whether the different realms of identity were linked (in their lives), students explained how race encompassed many of the different realms of identity formation. One student provided a good example of how the different facets of identity are linked when asked if the issues he had been discussing were connected or distinct.

I'd say distinct in their definition but connected in their function... Well, I can give you a definition of each one of these issues, like what it means to me, like separately. But, if I discuss gender, sexuality is going to come up, class is going to come up, spirituality and religion is going to come up, community is going to come up, race and ethnicity is going to come up. I can't talk about one without the other, they're all connected in the way they operate, in the way they affect me.

In fact, seven students felt like all of the different realms of identity formation were related and mentioned this within their discussion of specific issues. More specifically, race was seen by many as encompassing: class, religion, family, community, and gender. Similarly, when students were asked about the importance and impact of specific aspects of their racial/ethnic experience, they also lumped these issues into their larger racial experience so that issues like language background, immigrant status, and skin-color were not central to identity formation beyond the fact that they were used by non-Chicanas/os as criteria for determining their racial status and were all, therefore, related to racial discrimination.

Two students did a good job of explaining what they and their peers meant when they linked the different realms of identity. As one student said, the
family incorporates a number of different areas of students’ identity development. She referred specifically to religion, sexuality, gender and class within the cultural aspects of family life and identity formation. Another student was more specific as he explained that there are different categories within the linkages of these different identity themes. He linked gender, race, and sexuality as related identity themes in their connections to discrimination, while then linking community, class, religion and race (again) as a more general area of identity development.

... they’re all connected ... I think I would view like community, class, race and like religious spirituality more in one sense. Gender, sexuality and then race would be kind of more in terms of discrimination that’s going on out there. ... I would say like gender, sexuality and race in terms of discrimination; others ... community, class, race and spirituality are more separate.

This student cut to the heart of the distinctions within students’ identity development, suggesting that their racial/ethnic experiences can be perceived in two ways: as political in response to discrimination (racial identity), and (although he does not emphasize the other aspect) as cultural (ethnic identity). The political facet of this identity is linked to discrimination and, therefore, to gender as well as sexuality (depending on the individual), while the cultural aspects are linked to family, community/class, and religion. Still, there is no black-and-white categorization of these different areas, as specific experiences shape individuals in different ways. Class, for example, is typically incorporated within students’ interpretations of their experiences as Chicanas/os, but it is linked more to the cultural aspects of these experiences rather than as a political, discrimination-based area. This is simply because most students do not have a class consciousness. One student, however, clearly interpreted class as a political issue and his configuration of identity linkages is quite different. Similarly, gender can be seen both as cultural and as political, depending on the individual. In fact, only a few students felt gender and gender discrimination were crucial issues which they had to deal with, while most saw gender and differential treatment of males and females as something that is embedded in local, familial histories and not addressable. This is not to suggest that gender is never a crucial arena of identity formation for Chicanas/os. Rather, as the next section explains, gender becomes central in Chicanas’ identities when power is asserted across gender lines in ways that parallel or exceed the exertion of racial
power. It is critical to acknowledge that the unique gender dynamics within the Chicana/o community (e.g., the often-discussed role of machismo) are not central to how most students define themselves because of the fact that other facets of identity formation are dominant.

The most important finding overall then is simply that there are two distinct realms of identity formation within the Chicana/o student population, the political and the cultural. Not all students have both, but the distinction clearly exists. Furthermore, as students describe themselves and their identities, they reveal that their ethnic-cultural identity is that part of their experience as Chicanas/os that is local and embedded in the lives of all Chicanas/os. In many ways, it is an assumed facet of identity because most believe these are internal, intrinsic and universal Chicana/o experiences and characteristics. It is the racial-political identity that is, therefore, the most dominant in Chicanas/os perceptions of self. Their sense of self evolves from experiences with, and observations of discrimination in their communities and schools. It is also reinforced through the life experiences of their families and their own experiences with racial confrontation.

**Power and Identity Formation**

Despite the prevalence of a central racial identity among Chicana/o students, there are some whose social identities are not grounded in their race or ethnicity. It is in looking at these students—comparing the whole of their experiences to those of the others—that we can begin to understand the forces at work in Chicana/o identity formation. First, by returning to the students whose social identities were most firmly grounded in race, we can understand the means by which their identities are shaped.

As might be expected, those students with strong racial identities are deeply influenced by their social contexts. There are two primary means of influence: interracial interactions (in heterogeneous contexts or in homogeneous contexts with authority figures of a different race) and parental influence. In each instance where Chicana/o students developed a strong racial identity, they experienced interactions with members of another race where it was made obvious that they were in a position of inferior status and power. Additionally, some of these students had a parent who helped them negotiate these experiences and reinforced the importance of race through positive messages. The role of con-
text in identity formation, therefore, is based primarily on that to which a Chi-
cana/o student is exposed. Background characteristics like immigrant status
and socioeconomic status influence identity formation, but mainly as they im-
impact the individual's interracial interactions and the importance parents place
on education and race, for example.

There are a number of instances when the students talked specifically about
the racial confrontations critical to the process of identity formation. One
student discussed the significance of race on two separate occasions:

And we had a substitute one day [in sixth grade] and everybody, the whole
class was messing around, it was [a] ruckus. And the teacher came up to me
and she said, "If you don't like it you can go back where you came from."
And then she told that to my friend and we were the only two Mexicans in
the class and I think there was one black guy. . . . And so that was the theme
of the day, like every time everybody else messed up it was "Shut up, shut
up!" but when we messed up it was "Go back to Mexico!" And so we already
knew by sixth grade I guess we were already socialized like not to make a big
deal out of it. . . . And in junior high like it was more evident. You know like,
if you ditched, they had to call the cops. But if like a white kid ditched, they
would just send X teacher to go get him. So like that was different. I was
costantly like suspended, expelled.

Another student's experiences (as she worried over getting into college) re-
fect a somewhat less-direct, racialized incident whose connotations, however,
are quite clear:

. . . I was still worried about whether or not I was going to [get into the
university]. I mean I graduated with like a three-nine [3.9 GPA]. But I was
still really worried. . . . probably because I had a counselor who I despised in
high school. I told her I wanted to go to [the university] and she saw my
grades and she said, "You know I don't think you're going to get into [the
university]" and she said, "But you might, because you are a minority, so you
might get in." And, I thought, I know it plays a big part, but it still really
upset me that she said that. . . . I had good grades and she was just like, "I
don't know if you'll get in, but you might because you're Mexican."

Some students also described how the messages conveyed by family members
were important to their dealing with these issues and their identity formation
itself. For example, one student provided the following explanation when she
was asked where her pride, which she mentioned earlier, came from:

. . . My uncle because he was like another father. He was the kind that'd
listen to you, and like you could say whatever you wanted to him and he
would help you out, just tell you, "You're Mexican and you have to be proud
of it 'cause that's who you are." My grandpa too, he sat me and my nina down to talk about where we come from so that later on it won't be a question to us. . . .

Finally, other students describe powerful racial confrontations outside of the school that are critical to their evolving views of themselves:

But a lot of the cops, they treat me bad. . . . me and my friend, we were in my car and they stopped us. I turned off the car and he told me to turn down the radio, and I turned it down, and for no reason he took out a gun and put it on my head. And both of 'em [the police] were white. And my friend had a beanie with the Mexican eagle on the front. He took off his beanie, he threw it on the floor and stepped on it. And he pulled me out of the car and then he put my hands on my back, he took out that little black [rubber stick]. . . . And he smacked me in the head with it and he told me that we were in [a white neighborhood], and . . . what were we doing over there, that we belong in [the barrio]. That over here that it's pure white people . . . and that us wetbacks should go back over there. . . . And, but there's nothing I could do about it. It's just hate, that's why. . . . my dad too, they treat him bad. Because they arrested my dad because supposedly he was hitting my mom, but it was just a neighbor calling because they were arguing. And they were two white cops too and they tied my dad from the hands and feet and they dragged him all the way to the cop car.

These explanations provide clear evidence of the racial confrontations and issues that lead to strong racial identities among Chicana/o students while they also help us better understand the identity formations of the other Chicana/o students.

One of the students' who did not have a racialized identity had a sense of social self that was firmly grounded in his sexuality. The importance of sexuality in his identity construction evolved from the fact that he was gay. Being gay had a significant impact on him in that he was forced to confront this difference in various arenas of his life. It is interesting that this student also attended high school with a predominantly white student body, and that both of his parents had strong Chicana/o identities as embodied through their beliefs and jobs (both of these factors contribute to strong ethnic identity formation in other Chicana/o students). As he explains, however, an overriding factor in his experience is the fact that he shared the socioeconomic background of the upper-middle class students in the private school he attended. This was important because he felt he had a great deal in common with his fellow classmates, and that he could identify with them (which was not the case with other
Chicanas/os who went to school with a majority of whites from a significantly higher class background). Furthermore, this student never encountered racial bias or discrimination from his teachers or peers. In fact, it is only with regard to his sexuality that he ever faced any form of bias or discrimination, and it is in these contexts that he was made aware of his lower status and lack of power as a result of being gay.

Similarly, one of the other students whose social identity was not grounded in her ethnicity also lived and went to school with a majority of white students who shared her same class background. She too felt a common bond with her classmates and the core of her identity was actually based in aspirations for upward mobility. Both descriptions suggest that in those cases where Chicana/o students attend school and reside in neighborhoods where they are one of only a few Chicanas/os (or other minorities) and where they share the class backgrounds of their peers, they may not have experiences with discrimination and bias that force them into positions where they must acknowledge the lack of power they have.

Two other students grew up and attended schools in predominantly Chicana/o contexts but did not develop central racial identities. As they explain, neither experienced nor witnessed any form of racial discrimination. The first student discussed the fact that he has led a fairly sheltered life in which most of his time is spent in a tight circle of family members, and it is they whom he interacts with almost exclusively. The second student, although she has not faced racial discrimination, has been made aware of gender bias through observations within her family and of her mother's struggles. These are issues that are clear in her world and she has felt the constraints of gender bias in her own life and the lack of power she is granted as a female.

In looking at the lives of all thirteen Chicana/o students, who represent a variety of different experiences in and out of school, we can see that power is central to their identity formations. Students' encounters with power are best understood in those arenas of their social world in which they have little or no power. This does not mean that other areas are non-existent, but simply that these are less important facets of their identities. In fact, virtually all arenas of potential identity formation impact most students. The fact that some students are considered the norm in a specific social realm (e.g., with regard to gender or sexuality) makes these issues unconscious, sublimated aspects of who
they are. These are not fundamental means by which they identify themselves simply because it is around social difference that these individuals define who they are and are outwardly defined by others; particularly when this difference is coupled with some form of subjugation.

One student provides a good example of the role of power in defining his experience as a racial minority:

...when I went to high school, like that’s where everybody goes, the raza, the black, brown, everybody. So then I started seeing my Chicano friends and started hanging out with them and that was probably one of the first times I really thought about race because I noticed the difference. Because when I hung out with white dudes, like X white boy was “big nose,” you know, you joke around. This white boy was “big butt”... and I was always “beaner.” Like that was the joke. . . . it was like good-hearted so I thought, but then I thought about it and thought, “No, that’s bullshit, that’s fucking racist.” And so then I just told all my white friends “Shine you” and started hanging with the Mexicans again. And they always said, “Oh, look he changed he became a gang member,” you know that’s what the white dudes would say. And like to me, I was kind of like reacting against the way they treated me. And I was hanging with the Mexicans and we were a smaller number so, you know, you have to defend yourself some way, so we were numbers. You know, white boys got... the [new] Jeeps and the [new] Honda Accords and stuff and they were so cool you know. And the only thing we had was power. We were like, you don’t walk by the tree. White boys walk by the tree, you get fucked up.

This student helps us understand not only the means by which power is used to define Chicana/o social identity (externally), but the way in which some Chicanas/os react to their lack of sanctioned, institutional power by taking physical power over their immediate surroundings. As one student excerpt detailed earlier, race is a facet of identity that cannot be changed. It cannot be avoided because difference is not only obvious, but it is reinforced through power and concretized borders that separate whites and Chicanas/os, males and females, and hetero- and homosexuals.

In essence, these students expose the reality of border identities. While the physical border between the United States and Mexico marks a clear distinction between power and subordination, the Chicana/o experience is almost always blatantly stamped by symbolic borders conveying the same message. Just as Mexican residents (especially those who live near the border) are made well-aware of the line in the sand that marks the fundamental distinctions in power held between the United States and Mexico, there are lines drawn that
distinguish Chicanas/os from other "Americans" with regard to power along race, class, gender and other lines. Chicanas/os are continually reminded of the borders that separate them from the dominant society as the power held by whites, males, and heterosexual society demarcates difference and, in turn, defines their social selves. Just as the U.S./Mexican border may soon be marked by an "impenetrable" wall designed to ensure that Mexicans cannot cross that boundary, Chicanas/os are socialized to understand that they cannot cross the social borders that mark their identities in this country.

While most Chicanas/os develop racial identities fairly early on in their lives as a function of their exposure to racial difference, bias, and/or discrimination, it is through experience and an evolving familiarity with the invisible, but blatant, borders of power dominating their existence that their racialized identities are cast and hardened. This is reflected in the more well-developed racial identities of the university students who have had greater and more intense experiences fighting to maintain a positive sense of self—through daily life in a predominantly white institution that discourages difference—given the side of the power border to which they have been relegated. The dominance of these racial borders is further evidenced by the fact that in those arenas where the borders of power are less evident or less emphasized, such as class, community, and religion, the possibility for concretized social identities (grounded in these areas) is minimal. Still, as some students reveal, there are other borders differentiating power with regard to gender and sexuality (for example) that are more dominant in certain individuals, and which correspondingly become central arenas in which identities are formed. Chicana/o students' identities are, therefore, most often racialized and always grounded in power inequalities and the borders that signify them.

Conclusion
The experiences of Los Angeles Chicana/o students in 1996 help us understand the complexities of Chicana/o identity and the means by which power and its borders govern the formation of their social selves. This analysis provides insights into the evolution of Chicana/o identity, as we understand the separation of cultural/ethnic and political/racial identity formations. As the data indicate, Chicana/o students are engaged in a number of different social realms that are affected by an equally diverse number of social characteristics.
While issues like class, community, religion, and culture are important parts of students' lives, it is those areas of their world in which social difference is made quite apparent to them that their identities become crystallized—by virtue of their lack of power along a given axis as evidenced through interactions often grounded in discrimination. For the majority of Chicana/o students, the fact that they are made well aware of their lack of power becomes critical to their understanding of their place in the world. This is the means by which they then define their own identities.

These findings are crucial to the future of identity research because they expose the need for advancing complexity in the means by which we study identity and—as Chicanas/os of the 1960s demonstrated in their effort to define themselves—the critical contributions Chicanas/os can make to our understanding of identity when they are included more intimately in the research process.

The most pivotal contribution of this research will be in applying this new understanding to the larger Chicana/o experience and making connections between identities and the success and failure of Chicana/o students. Preliminary analyses suggest that there are critical connections between academic success among Chicanas/os and the influences of parents on developing strong, educationally grounded racial identities. These findings suggest the urgency of continuing our explorations of identity with other Chicana/o communities; considering the connections between identity formation and the overall experiences and outcomes of Chicanas/os. Future analyses may lead us towards interventions that can reshape identities and empower Chicanas/os. It will require a continued dedication to innovative, qualitative explorations of identity to pursue these leads and uncover findings that are not simply rich, but also laced with transformative possibilities.

NOTES

1 At the time, “Chicano” was used. In this paper I refer to “Chicanas/os” to signify that I am consciously discussing both females and males of Mexican descent who are living in the United States.


Knight *et al.*, 1993, 229.


This term has been used in a variety of ways both in research and in the popular media, but for the entirety of this work I will use this simple definition. I do not include generational status as part of the criteria for inclusion in this group because many of the first-generation participants immigrated at a very young age and have been socialized as Chicanas/os. Additionally, whenever Chicana is used it is in reference to females of Mexican descent living in the United States.
Employment is another potentially crucial realm of identity formation, but since the sample in this research consists of students, this was not a primary focus. Still, students were able to bring up the role of their jobs and employment in their identity formations when relevant.

As mentioned, the distinctions between first generation immigrants and second generation Chicanas/os were often blurred. For example, some of the first generation immigrants came to the United States at such a young age that they have no memories of Mexico, while the families of second generation Chicanas/os immigrated to the United States a very short time before their births. Almost none of the participants in this study are recent immigrants.

This general description is based on the survey data collected, while the more detailed analyses in the following section are based on both the preliminary and follow-up interviews.


This example also illustrates the intricacies involved in the formation of gang identities as this student was involved in gangs during his high school years. While these identities are fairly uncommon for the vast majority of Chicana/o youth, those who form identities around location and gangs are responding to unique experiences with, and manifestations of power in their daily lives.
It is only in recent years that Latinos in the United States have been able to make feature films. The first such film to be generally recognized was Luis Valdez's *Zoot Suit*, released in 1981, although there are some earlier, rarely seen low-budget Latino features. By the mid-1990s, however, there is a sufficient body of work that a number of university courses are now devoted to the subject, and there is a steadily growing body of critical literature. The purpose of this article is to point out some of the limitations of this literature, and to suggest certain directions for expanding its boundaries.

It is my contention that a great deal gets routinely left out of Latino film analysis because many analysts fail to appreciate the basic nature of the American feature film, of which Latino features are a sub-category. The questions that are asked of such films are often relatively unproductive, while more promising areas of inquiry are slighted. In order to lay some groundwork for my critique, I will start with an analysis of the nature of American features.

The following comments are couched in general terms. While I recognize that there are inevitable exceptions to these generalities, I believe that my characterization of American features corresponds to the vast majority of films which get to the point of theatrical distribution.

*The Nature of Feature Films*

A feature film can be characterized as a narrative, or fiction film, greater than one hour in length. One of the first things that an academic discovers when he or she spends time with working filmmakers is that their discourse is strikingly different from that of scholarly film analysts. In particular, I want to call attention to the importance that filmmakers attach to the notion of whether a particular film element “works.” Whether one is dealing with rewriting a script, directing an actor in a scene, or discussing the cutting of a sequence in the editing room, the same questions or statements are heard over and over: “Will this work?” “I don’t think this is working.” “This will never work.” While no
one stops to define the meaning of "working," there seems to be a general understanding among filmmakers as to what is meant by the term.¹

I would say that when a filmmaker used the term "to work," he/she is referring to whether that particular scene will evoke the desired response in the intended audience. The "desired response" I would further divide into two interrelated aspects: a) will it hold their interest?, and b) will it create the intended emotional reaction?

By examining the centrality of this concept of "working" for filmmakers, we can begin to appreciate one of the key differences between them and most academic film analysts. Feature filmmakers (and the better documentary filmmakers) are oriented toward film as drama, and at the core of drama is emotional response. Academics, on the other hand, address film primarily through a cognitive or intellectual lens, for reasons discussed in Graeme Turner's Film as Social Practice.² This is not to say that feature filmmakers are not concerned with conveying ideas of an intellectual nature. Indeed many are. However, most feature filmmakers are keenly aware that if their film does not "work" emotionally, neither will it "work" at any other level.

It is also important to note that this comment is intended to refer primarily to American features, and that there are differences in national film cultures and in the ways that features are financed in different countries. However, the overwhelming dominance of American features in the international market speaks to the effectiveness of American film techniques in reaching general audiences across cultural boundaries, and that effectiveness can not be explained away as merely a reflection of larger budgets. Indeed, the size of American film budgets is to a considerable degree a reflection of the historically greater success of American films in reaching large audiences.

The second distinguishing characteristic of the American feature film, I would argue, is that it is mythic in nature. My discussion of myth here generally follows along the lines laid down by Joseph Campbell in a number of works,³ although others have developed similar concepts. A "myth" in this sense is a story, cast in metaphorical terms, which is intended to state a moral position concerning a universal aspect of human existence. While Claude Levi-Strauss ⁴ and others have described myths as performing multiple functions in society, I wish to focus here on the moral aspect, which I believe is the most central. In this sense, then, myths provide the moral compasses that allow individuals in
society to negotiate all of the truly universal aspects of human existence: birth, coming of age, sexuality, reproduction, aging, the loss of loved ones, coming to terms with one's own death, finding the courage to cope with fundamental life challenges, defining one's core meaning in life, and so on.5

The idea that American feature films are mythic in nature has gained increasing recognition among working filmmakers in recent times. Indeed, one of the more influential screenwriting texts of recent years is Christopher Vogler's *The Writer's Journey: Mythic Structure for Storytellers & Screenwriters.* Vogler, a story analyst for a number of major Hollywood studios, explicitly based his text on the works of Joseph Campbell, and illustrates his thesis with numerous references to mainstream feature film.

By contrast, academic film critics tend to focus much more on what I would characterize as the *ideological* aspects of film. Ideology, while certainly containing a moral dimension, tends to deal more at a social than an individual level, and is preoccupied with questions of social equality and inequality that are widespread in societies but do not have the historically universal aspect of myth. Myths typically transcend all national and historical boundaries, and are thus ideally suited to a cultural form—film—which seeks out the widest possible audience.

Graeme Turner, drawing on Levi-Strauss, has pointed out that feature films will typically create an opposition of moral values expressed in binary terms.7 It is in the conflict between these moral positions that features typically express the central dramatic tension that, if successfully carried out, captures and holds the audience's attention. There is a further step in this process, however, that Turner does not sufficiently describe. In order to further the audience member's identification with the story, it is necessary to embody that opposition in the persons of a *protagonist* and an *antagonist*. The conflict between these two characters symbolizes the struggle between two moral positions, and the filmmaker will state his or her own position in the resolution of the conflict. I am necessarily stating this dramatic mechanism in its simplest form here. In many films, the situation is complicated by the presence of subplots and other narrative considerations.

While the dramatic and mythic aspects of features are the two most important considerations to keep in mind, there are two other interconnected points to be made. The first is that feature films are properly seen as an aspect of
popular culture rather than elite culture. As Turner has pointed out, the expansion of film studies in the 1960s and 1970s was marked by an influx into film analysis of scholars who had been trained in the analysis of literature, which is to say elite literature. Many of the attitudes they brought with them can still be seen in academic courses and film theory texts today, such as the prestige accorded European directors and "auteurist" American directors whose films reach a very limited audience.

Much of Latino film analysis is now being done by scholars whose graduate training was in literature programs, and while there has been a growing orientation toward popular culture, there are still considerable holdovers from the biases of literary analysis. One is an exaggerated prestige often bestowed on Latin American auteurist directors, whose work is strongly European influenced. Another is the prizing of films characterized by formal structural innovation, even though such films may not reach much of an audience. Another is the constant referencing of ideas drawn from literary critics such as Mikhail Bakhtin and Raymond Williams. While this referencing can on occasion lead to a useful insight, its more important effect is to lead the analyst further and further from the perspectives of the filmmakers themselves.

This last point leads me to the fourth and final observation I wish to establish here: the almost total divorce of film critics from the practical considerations which all successful filmmakers constantly keep in mind. Critics seem to be almost totally unconcerned with the commercial success or failure of a film, an attitude no serious filmmaker can afford, whether independent or studio-based. Filmmakers want to reach a broad audience, they want people to see their films, and a great deal of what they do is aimed to that purpose. In addition, any filmmaker who wants to keep on making films, and all do, has to be concerned with whether his or her current film is going to make money.

This lack of practical concern on the part of scholars has limiting effects on their analyses. One is that there is almost no attention paid to questions of why some Latino films are more successful than others. Another is a lack of understanding of the choices that screenwriters and directors make in the way that stories are presented. In addition, the divorce of analysts from the world of the filmmaker often leads to outright misinterpretations. A filmmaker, for instance, might choose to film in black and white because it is cheaper, not in order to capture a particular aesthetic feeling. Non-professional actors might be used
because one can’t afford to pay professionals, not for considerations of authenticity.

Until film scholars resolve to understand films from the perspectives of filmmakers, and to take into account real world constraints, they will continue to engage in misinterpretations and in unrealistic, unbalanced prescriptions for the types of Latino films they would like to see.

**Story Paradigms**

The argument to this point is that American feature films are mythic in nature, which is to say that at their cores are metaphorical stories based on universal or near-universal aspects of human existence. Latino films, as one type of American film, draw upon the same fundamental stories as other features, although certain stories tend to be found more often because of conditions particular to Latino society and history.

The parameters of one such mythic story have been developed in great detail by Joseph Campbell in *The Hero With a Thousand Faces*. That particular myth, referred to as “the hero’s journey,” is the basis for Vogler’s screenwriting text, cited above. As is by now well known, George Lucas was strongly influenced by Campbell’s book in creating the *Star Wars* trilogy (1977, 1980, 1983). In later years, Campbell would sometimes show clips from *Star Wars* to illustrate his points.

The hero’s journey is, however, only one of a number of these core myths, which I shall refer to as story paradigms. While I am not aware of any definitive cataloguing of these paradigms, I will list below some of the more obvious and popular ones, and list some well-known films that illustrate their use. It should be kept in mind that a given feature film may combine more than one paradigm in its story.

For purposes of identification, I will give each story paradigm the name of its best-known incarnation within the Western tradition, since that is what we are most likely to recognize. Equally suitable illustrations could be culled from non-Western cultural traditions, since all are based on recurring human conditions and dilemmas.

The paradigm of “Romeo and Juliet” is based on the situation of lovers whose union is opposed by their social groups. The clans of Shakespeare’s version are most likely to be replaced nowadays by ethnic groups. In *West Side...*
Story (1961), for example, the Juliet character is played by Maria, a New York Puerto Rican woman, while Romeo’s role is assigned to an ostensibly Polish American man. More recently, the American feature Zebrakhead (1992) and the Australian Flirting (1990) have explored this same paradigm with Black and Anglo characters. Mississippi Masala (1992) puts a slightly different spin to the story within the American context by making both lovers members of minority groups.

“Beauty and the Beast” remains one of the most popular story paradigms in American films, and not just in the literal retelling. The core story here deals with the necessity for the female character to effect a transformation in a “beastly” male in order to make their union possible. The quintessential American romantic comedy of recent years, When Harry Met Sally (1989), is so closely patterned on this model it might almost as well have been titled “When Hairy Met Sally.” Pretty Woman (1990) effectively combines this paradigm with a Cinderella story. Driving Miss Daisy (1989) is notable not only for putting the story in a racial context but for switching roles and making the female character the one in need of transformation. Within a Latino context, Salt of the Earth (1953) provides a case where the film’s major subplot revolves around a Beauty and the Beast conflict.

Greek myth is the source for another popular paradigm, the Odyssey story. Homer’s epic tells of the warrior-king who spent ten years trying to return home after the Trojan War. Perhaps the best known Odyssey story of more recent times is The Wizard of Oz (1939), but variations on the theme are legion. One of the more interesting contemporary film versions can be found in the politically incorrect Falling Down (1993), wherein Michael Douglas spends a day walking across Los Angeles, laying waste to all he encounters. Within the Latino context Born in East L.A. (1987), discussed below, presents a clear example of an Odyssey paradigm.

If there is a mother of all paradigms, and I believe there is, it is to be found in the basic “death-rebirth” story. Within the Western tradition the core telling of this paradigm is that of the death and resurrection of Christ. I think it is accurate to say that the immense resonance of this story, in both religious and secular versions, lies in its correspondence to the annual seasonal cycle in nature, as well as to the fundamental cycle of birth, growth, maturity, death, and recomposition of all life forms. Generally speaking, the form that this para-
digm takes in films is that of spiritual or emotional death and rebirth. However, in the recent comedy-fantasy *Groundhog Day* (1993), the story is given a more literal spin by having the protagonist relive a particular day until he gets it right. By making use of this dramatic device, Bill Murray's character is able to die a physical death and yet continue to finish the story. The filmmakers here cleverly amalgamated the death-rebirth theme with a "Beauty and the Beast" story.

The highly successful American feature *Ghost* (1990) also made use of this story paradigm, but with an interesting twist. Here the main character literally dies and is reborn as a ghost, but one who is still emotionally dead, as he was in life. Only by having the ghost be emotionally reborn is the story brought to a satisfying conclusion.

Several Latino films have drawn upon this story. Among them is the previously mentioned *Zoot Suit* (1981), where the character of Hank Reyna must die spiritually in prison before he can be reborn as a more complete human being. The films *American Me* (1992) and *El Norte* (1983), which is discussed below, also fall into this general category, as does the New York Puerto Rican *Crossover Dreams* (1985).

The Bible is of course a source of other story paradigms within the Western tradition. The story of David and Goliath can be seen as a paradigm of the underdog drama, which takes such diverse filmic variations as the classic western, *High Noon* (1952), the revisionist western, *McCabe and Mrs. Miller* (1971), and the many-sequelled *Rocky* (1976) fight pictures. Among Latino-oriented films, *The Ballad of Gregorio Cortez* (1982) stands as a clear example, as does Robert Rodriguez's low-budget independent actioner *El Mariachi* (1993).

The Celtic legends of King Arthur are another rich source of story paradigms. Chief among them is the love triangle story, embodied in King Arthur, his queen Guinevere, and her lover Lancelot. In its classic and most frequently encountered form, the triangle consists of two men and one woman. One of the most famous films of all time, *Casablanca* (1942), provides a close parallel. Here the woman in the middle is the wife of a powerful political figure, as in the Arthurian legend, but her passion is directed at her charismatic lover. As in the original story, the conflict is portrayed as one between duty and love. A very similar dramatic set-up drives the more recent *The Bridges of Madison County* (1995). *The Age of Innocence* (1993) reverses the sexual equation by putting the
man between two women, but the moral choice is essentially the same. Interestingly enough, in almost all versions of this story, duty wins out over love.

The Arthurian story of the search for the Holy Grail has also inspired a number of feature films. *The Fisher King* (1991) is a self-conscious retelling of that story, but less literal versions can be seen in such films as *Raiders of the Lost Ark* (1981) and *Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade* (1989).

The examples of story paradigms given here are not intended as an exhaustive list. Rather, they are presented to establish the argument that American features are basically mythic in nature. Most features, and particularly the more successful ones, have at their heart one of the classic story paradigms of the Western cultural tradition. While as adults we snicker at children's desire to have a story told over and over, our own behavior is not that different. We also like to hear the same stories. The main difference is that adults like to have minor variations in the telling.

In the remainder of this paper I will turn my attention to particular American Latino features in order to illustrate some of the paradigms noted. My contention is that an appreciation of the mythic nature of the feature film leads to questions and insights that are routinely left out of most analyses of these films. In the process, I will also attempt to point out other limitations of the critical literature that has been produced up to this point.

The three films I have chosen to concentrate on are *La Bamba* (1987), *El Norte*, and *Born in East L.A.*. One reason for selecting these films is that they are among the most popular and most widely discussed Latino features. As such, they have had considerable impact on audiences and on other Latino filmmakers. *La Bamba* and *Born in East L.A.* were both major commercial successes, while *El Norte* did well at the box office given its small budget and its preponderance of non-English dialogue.

A second reason for focusing on these particular films is that there is a significant body of published critical literature for each of them. In addition, each of the films illustrates the use of a different major story paradigm.

*Interpreting Latino Films: La Bamba*

There is a scene in the feature film *Barcelona* (1994) in which the two main American characters discuss literature. Their exchange goes like this:

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FRED: Huhn . . . Maybe you could clarify something for me. While I've been, you know, waiting for the fleet to show up, I've read a lot and—
TED: Really?
FRED: —and one thing that keeps cropping up is this about “subtext.” Songs, novels, plays—they all have a subtext, which I take to mean a hidden message or import of some kind.
Ted nods.
FRED: So subtext we know. But what do you call the meaning, or message, that's right there on the surface, completely open and obvious? They never talk about that. (Using his hand as a visual aid.) What do you call what's above the subtext?
TED: The text.
FRED: (Pause) Okay. That's right. . . . But they never talk about that.

My reaction to academic film analysis is often similar to Fred's. Much of the time it seems that the writer is trying so hard to come up with a sophisticated, non-obvious reading of the film that the more manifest content is virtually ignored. In the following comments I shall try to avoid this pitfall, which I believe can result in serious misreadings.

The major critical commentary on Luis Valdez's La Bamba has been developed by Rosa Linda Fregoso, so I will use her analysis as my point of departure. La Bamba is based on the life-story of Ritchie Valens, whose meteoric musical career was cut short by an airplane accident in 1959, when he was only 17. In writing the script, Valdez chose to put a major dramatic emphasis on the relationship between Valens and his older brother, Bob Morales.

In The Bronze Screen, the first book-length study of Chicano cinema, Rosa Linda Fregoso devotes considerable attention to the analysis of La Bamba. Since her argument is detailed and complex, I can provide only a distillation here of what I consider her major points. Essentially, Fregoso locates this film within a tradition of discourse most immediately traceable to the Chicano political movement of the 1960s and 1970s, with its heavy emphasis on questions of cultural identity. She states “By interweaving identity politics with other aspects of narrative discourse, Valdez’s films Zoot Suit and La Bamba established themselves as major documents of Chicano cultural identity politics.”

She goes on to argue that Valdez in this film posits Chicano identity as a social problem. Ritchie is “coded” in positive terms: he is highly successful in his career, he is the good son, he is responsible, supportive, and a good provider.
Bob is overwhelmingly coded in negative terms: he is a failure, he abuses his girlfriend, he is involved in substance abuse and criminal activity, and is generally irresponsible. However, Bob also represents cultural authenticity—he speaks Spanish and is in touch with his Mexican/indigenous cultural roots. The problem is that “Social mobility is barred for Chicanos who, like Bob, have resisted incorporation into dominant culture, for those who have retained their ethnic and cultural beliefs and values, their 'Chicanismo.' The more one is culturally assimilated, the greater the possibility of social mobility, as in the case of Ritchie.”

Furthermore, “La Bamba re-configures Chicano cultural identity in either/or terms. The only space for cultural vitality and 'Chicanismo' lies on the margins . . . La Bamba represents marginality (Bob's position) as a space of deviance and social pathology.”

While applauding what she sees as Valdez's critique of melting-pot ideology, Fregoso would have liked to see the film make a stronger case for the significance of cultural affirmation and engage in a larger critique of dominant ideology. She concludes her review of Valdez's films by saying:

The positive feature of cultural nationalism is the fact that Movement intellectuals excavated a historical past and constructed and reconstructed memories of a Mexican culture of struggle and resistance in order to develop a cohesive group identity that would shield them from racist ideology and oppression. Often, however, their retelling of stories re-constructed Chicano identity in a debilitating fashion, as the site of crisis and pathology. Given that cultural identities are not handed down as essences, the task remains for an identity politics able to re-construct subjectivities in ways that empower people as creative subjects of history. Cinematic representation plays a formidable role in such a project.

The major problem that I see here is that Fregoso is giving La Bamba an almost exclusively ideological reading. She is evaluating the film against the backdrop of issues that emerged from the Chicano Movement, and not seeing it as a drama. It is certainly true that Luis Valdez was an activist and even a Movement ideologist, and he does indeed bring issues from that experience into all of his work. However, interpreting his films only in ideological terms creates a serious imbalance and even misreading of those works. Valdez is also a dramatist, and as such is interested in creating a film that “works” dramatically. He wants to tell a good story, one which moves people. It is also important to keep in mind where Valdez was in terms of his career as a filmmaker. Zoot Suit had been a critical success for the most part, but not a commercial
success. He very much needed at that point to make a film which was a box-office success, and that meant coming up with a good story that would reach a general audience.

The first dramatic problem Valdez had to face was that the life of Ritchie Valens provided little obvious material for a gripping story. Success had come too quickly for Valens, and he had died early. Valdez comments:

The problem is that Ritchie had been dead for thirty years, and he was a cherished memory. Nobody wanted to say anything bad about him... "yeah, he was a nice guy, nicest guy who ever lived." I kept asking, C'mon, didn't he ever do anything wrong, he must have been human?...I wanted to know, Did he ever get laid, did he do drugs, how was he human? I was getting nowhere. It was all nada, until I talked to his half-brother, Bob. He was reluctant, but he did tell me they'd fought, and that it was Bob's fault. So I thought, well, at least there's a foundation, then, a relationship between brothers. And the real-life conflict between them, and Bob's conflict with realizing that the man who raised him and Ritchie was not Bob's biological father.

In seeking his story, Valdez was led in a mythological direction, but in a complicated sort of way. In interviews, Valdez equates the two brothers with the Aztec gods Quetzalcoatl and Tezcatlipoca. He says "There's [a] god of culture, Quetzalcoatl, the feathered serpent, who... surfaces in La Bamba as the figure of Ritchie Valens. He's an artist and poet and is gentle and not at all fearful. When my audiences see La Bamba, they like that positive spirit." Bob, on the other hand, is identified with Tezcatlipoca, who envied and corrupted Quetzalcoatl, and who introduced pulque, an alcoholic drink, into the world.

However, while unacknowledged by Valdez, it would appear the true operative myth here is the story of Cain and Abel. The biblical story would not only be familiar to American audiences, but it is tied in with a universal or near-universal aspect of family life, sibling rivalry. Here is a story that almost anyone might relate to in personal terms, perhaps even Luis Valdez and his less-famous musician brother Danny Valdez, who has a small role in La Bamba. Valdez has been quoted as saying "Below the foundations of our Spanish culture, we still sense the ruins of an entirely different civilization." In this particular case, it seems that that relationship has been inverted. Beneath the overlay of Aztec mythology, I sense the presence of a Christian fable that Valdez would
certainly have learned much earlier than the story of Quetzalcoatl and Tezcatlipoca.

In the biblical story, of course, Abel is slain by his jealous brother. Ritchie Valens, on the other hand, died in an airplane crash. On the surface, there seems to be little similarity, until we see how Valdez has told his story. He has Ritchie wearing a rattlesnake charm around his neck, a talisman bestowed on him by a Mexican shaman. The talisman is supposed to protect Ritchie, who has had nightmares about dying in a plane crash. During their climactic fight, Bob inadvertently tears the talisman from Ritchie's neck, and right before he does so he yells "I'll kill you."

The conflict and love-hate relationship between Ritchie and Bob provides the primary source of dramatic tension in the film, and elements of it are interwoven throughout the story. At the very beginning, for instance, we find Bob seducing Ritchie's quasi-girlfriend, Rosie. Bob's subsequent conflicts with Rosie heighten the tension between him and Ritchie, since they wind up living in close proximity.

At the same time, Bob's relationship with Ritchie is complex and not uniformly negative. Bob serves as Ritchie's confidant and informal advisor, and steps in at several crucial points in Ritchie's career to back him up. He is also present at Ritchie's first major recording session. Bob is the one who takes Ritchie on a spiritual journey to Mexico, where Ritchie receives the talisman from the shaman. The trip is also portrayed as the source of Ritchie's inspiration to record the song that would become his biggest hit, "La Bamba."

The relationship between the brothers enters in again right before Ritchie's death, when the two brothers reconcile via an emotional telephone conversation. By then, however, Ritchie's fate has been sealed. Bob remains in possession of the talisman, which he uses as a rattle to amuse his infant daughter. Presumably it will be passed on to her, as the representative of the next generation.

In the screenplay which Valdez wrote for the film, the film closes some thirty years later with Bob reminiscing about Ritchie, keeping his memory alive. This scene was cut from the final version, however.

Interestingly enough, both Fregoso and another analyst of the film, Victor Fuentes, refer to the story of Cain and Abel in their critiques. Both do so only in passing, and neither points out the significance of this myth in structuring the story and providing the central dramatic tension of the film.
Identity Politics and Transculturation

In focusing on the mythic element in *La Bamba*, I do not mean to imply that identity politics is not also a significant aspect of the film. Valdez does take a position here, but I do not believe that it is the position which Fregoso attributes to him. Rather than being one end of a negative polarity of assimilation/success vs. cultural resistance/failure, Ritchie Valens represents a model of success through transculturation, or cultural fusion. While Valdez has often spoken favorably about assimilation, the assimilation he has in mind does not seem to mean a wholesale discarding of one's cultural orientation. In one interview he states:22

The implication . . . is the melting pot somehow is the reduction of something that was more vital than something outside the pot. You throw in something and it all gets mixed up and becomes bland. I submit that the opposite might also be true—that whatever you pour into the pot adds another flavor. I used to think assimilation meant absorption, that you would no longer be yourself. But I think we are what we eat, so if the melting pot eats us, it’s gonna become us, also, in addition to whatever it is now.

Whatever the sociological validity of Valdez’s perspective,23 it seems clear that what is being proposed here is more of a cultural fusion than a straightforward cultural substitution. The key, after all, to Valens’ success as presented in the film is his taking of a traditional Mexican cultural form, the song “La Bamba,” and blending it with a United States cultural form—rock and roll. Indeed, I would press the argument further and say that Valdez is proposing transculturation as a solution both to a social dilemma and to an artistic dilemma. Ritchie Valens here functions as a symbol of the transcultural experience that Valdez himself is essaying in this film—telling a story about a Chicano subject in a way that will work for both Chicano and mainstream audiences. As Valens’ music crossed over to a general audience, so did Valdez’s film. In this connection, it is interesting to note that Valens’ music in the film was performed by that quintessential transcultural crossover band, Los Lobos.

The “appropriation” of Valens’ strategy by Valdez was no doubt facilitated by Valdez’s psychological identification with his subject. Valdez and Valens are, after all, contemporaries, with Valdez born in 1940 and Valens in 1941. Valdez gave Ritchie his own migrant farmworker roots, although according to his biographer “Ritchie was never a farmworker or migrant laborer.”24 Valdez is quoted in an interview as saying “Here’s a kid that had a guitar, who composed music,
who loved to perform. That's my story as well. That's what I used to do. I mean, I wasn't a rock and roll singer. I was something a little bit different—I was a ventriloquist actually. . . . So I understood what it was like to suddenly have a reputation and be poor at the same time. I understood that immediately about Ritchie.”

In yet another interview, Valdez says “There's that symbolism in *La Bamba*—it's pre-Colombian, but it's also very accurate in terms of the way that I view my own life. I've crawled through many of my own dead skins.” Indeed, one can almost see Luis Valdez as Ritchie Valens in a new skin—Quetzalcoatl reborn yet again.

*Ideology, Drama and Polysemy*

While Luis Valdez does stake out a position on the ideological question of identity politics in *La Bamba*, this says nothing about why the film was so successful with both Latino and mainstream audiences. Rather, this question must be addressed in dramatic terms. It is my contention that most people do not go to films in order to sort out their intellectual dilemmas, but in order to have an emotional experience, and to have familiar stories retold and familiar values reinforced (or, at most, marginally challenged).

The emotional effectiveness of *La Bamba* derives from the fact that it is an old and universal story, skillfully told in a modern version. Our emotions are engaged through the dramatic tension that ensues from the conflict between brothers who are portrayed as complex, flawed, and yet ultimately sympathetic characters. The emotional highpoint of the film comes toward the end, as it should, with Ritchie's death. We feel his death so strongly because it reminds us of our own mortality, and our own longings for immortality, but also because he was a talented and courageous individual who died before he was able to consummate either his musical career or his love for Donna.

A number of commentators on this film have focused on Valens’ success story as the core dramatic element. Rafael Perez-Torres, for example, characterizes the film in the following way: “*La Bamba* rests upon a tried and true Hollywood format: the audience wants to see an uplifting story about the success of a sympathetic and winning underdog.” Luis Valdez himself reinforces this view when he states in an interview “. . . this is a rock and roll story and . . . it's got a lot of human grit. . . . In many ways a classic American
experience: Poor boy using his talents to break through." It is in fact the case that Ritchie's success story provides the formal plot line around which the action of the film is structured, and there is a touch of the David-and-Goliath myth to be found here. However, there is little dramatic tension located there because the music industry Goliath succumbs too easily to Valens' assault.

It is for this reason that the "real" story of La Bamba is found in the Ritchie-Bob subplot, where the central dramatic tension plays itself out. A secondary reason is that the experience of sibling rivalry is far more universal for audiences than that of scaling the peaks of artistic and commercial success. As Victor Valle has noted, in reflecting on La Bamba, "It became apparent to me... that Valdez, like other Latino bricoleurs adept at juggling several languages and cultures, was capable of telling several stories simultaneously."

Put another way, Luis Valdez is able to have it both ways here by employing a strategy of dramatic polysemy, allowing a viewer to focus where he/she chooses. However, it is my contention that a dramatic as opposed to an ideological reading clearly reveals the core story to be sibling rivalry—the Cain and Abel myth. By centering the dramatic tension here, Valdez as writer and director guides us to a "preferred reading" of the text, one that allows us to understand the emotional impact and the general appeal of this story.

Another Film, Another Myth: El Norte

Another influential Latino film of the 1980s was Gregory Nava’s and Anna Thomas' El Norte (1983). Given the film's influence and its excellent quality, there has been relatively little critical commentary devoted to it.

El Norte tells the story of a Guatemalan Mayan brother and sister who are forced to flee their remote village because of repression from an alliance of government forces and large landowners. After their father is killed and their mother "disappeared" by soldiers, Enrique and Rosa embark on a dangerous journey through Mexico, eventually reaching Los Angeles in the fabled "North." Once there they are set up in menial jobs by their Chicano landlord, who also acts as an informal labor contractor. Although both are harassed at their job sites by "la migra," the Immigration and Naturalization Service, they seem to be getting by until Rosa comes down with an infection brought on by rat bites suffered during their journey north. At the dramatic climax of the film, Enrique must choose between remaining at her side or leaving for a Chicago job that
promises economic mobility and the possibility of legalization. Although he chooses to stay with her, Rosa dies, and at the end of the story Enrique finds himself trapped in a dead-end manual laborer job.

Like Luis Valdez, Gregory Nava represents the generation of Latino filmmakers who were strongly influenced by the ideological currents of the Chicano Movement. The search for roots that was part of that movement led many artists and other cultural workers back to the history of indigenous peoples in the Americas, and especially to the Aztecs and Mayans. In much the same way that Valdez drew on Aztec mythology in telling the story of Ritchie Valens, Nava decided to frame his story of contemporary Mayan refugees within a Mayan world view. From the Popol Vuh creation myth and other Mayan myths, Nava drew the concept of the two heroes of his story, a great deal of his symbolism, and a basic dualistic concept of the world. He also incorporated a strong cyclical element into the structure of the story, again drawing on Mayan concepts. At the end of the film, for instance, Enrique finds himself trapped much as his father was at the beginning of the film, and we see a juxtaposition of circular images from the beginning and end of the story (a water wheel, a cement mixer).

While acknowledging the multilayered complexity of El Norte, Rosa Linda Fregoso chose to focus her critique on the treatment of gender roles. As details of Indian nobility and cultural tradition are figured visually in Rosa's character as well as in her mother's, rather than in Enrique's, women then symbolize a distinct cultural system. Read allegorically, Rosa's death represents the impossibility of the survival of culturally distinct modes of apprehending social reality within another cultural system. The burden of cultural reproduction thus resides in the woman, in her spirituality and existence. Rosa symbolizes a "people's" tradition. This Western (Enlightenment) distinction between men, as agents of their own individual story, and women, as agents of cultural reproduction and tradition, is maintained and emphasized by the parallel structure of the narrative. Whereas the filmmakers intended to render a new-Mayan (alternative) vision of an indigenous worldview, El Norte's representation follows the conventional Western division of Nature/Culture, positing female subjectivity in the unknown, Mystery, Nature, and woman as the ground for cultural reproduction and maintenance.

By contrast, Victor Fuentes reads El Norte as an attack on the notion of the United States as the land of liberty, welcoming the oppressed of other lands. He argues that El Norte, as well as La Bamba and Born in East L.A., represent a
culture of resistance and affirmation in opposition to the modes of representa-
tion of Latinos in mainstream films.32

Another critic, Christine List, feels that the film suffers from a melodra-
matic style and a reliance on stereotyped villains (the Guatemalan landowners, 
the I.N.S.). She argues that the structure of the story will keep all but the most 
sophisticated viewers from seeing a connection between the oppression experi-
enced by Enrique and Rosa's family in Guatemala and the exploitation that 
they encounter in the United States. She would like to have seen the film deal 
more overtly with questions of imperialism, and provide a "more penetrating 
analysis of prolonged impoverishment in the Third World..."33 She concludes 
that a better ending would have had Enrique return to Guatemala to join the 
revolutionary forces there. Overall, her analysis represents just the sort of overly 
ideological approach that I am arguing against here, one that ignores the real-
world constraints on feature filmmakers and is almost totally divorced from 
their mindset.

There is no question that El Norte provides ample material for ideological 
readings. The filmmakers are clearly sympathetic to the "illegal immigrants" so 
demonized in recent American political rhetoric. But the film goes well be-
yond simply offering sympathy to the unfortunate, in that it locates the source 
of Rosa's and Enrique's travails in the workings of an increasingly globalized 
capitalist political economy. The exploiters of Indian labor in Guatemala are 
clearly identified as large landowners, "outsiders" who took over fertile lands 
from the indigenous communities. Anyone with knowledge of Central Ameri-
can countries knows that those "outsiders" are usually multinational companies 
and their local subsidiaries. At the same time, the exploitation of immigrant 
labor in the metropolis is also clearly delineated in the workings of such em-
ployers as textile sweatshops and large construction companies, complete with 
minority labor contractors and other intermediaries.

However, what I want to stress here is that the presence of these themes is 
not what makes the story "work" for most audiences. In fact, the filmmakers 
recognized that the perception of a film as "political" can severely limit its audi-
ence. As David Rosen has outlined in his account of the making of this film, 
"the filmmakers and distributors consciously attempted to depoliticize El Norte's 
image. The filmmakers had strong beliefs regarding the crucial issues posed by 
the film, but they didn't want it pigeonholed as a political movie. As Deutchman
[one of the distributors] pointed out, a film identified as political tends to be restricted in its audience appeal.\textsuperscript{34}

Despite the film's political messages, its lack of recognizable stars in the U.S., and the fact that it is mostly in Spanish (with some English and a Mayan language), \textit{El Norte} did quite well at the box-office and in home video release.\textsuperscript{35} That it did so is a testament to the success of the filmmakers in couching the ideological elements in a dramatic story that worked emotionally for its audiences, and that is built around a universal mythic story paradigm.

But what is that story paradigm? Despite the borrowings from classic Mayan myths, the answer is not to be found there, since American audiences are almost totally unfamiliar with those mythic sources. In an interview with Gregory Nava, he indicated that the only person he had talked to who really understood the formal mythic dimension of the film was Luis Valdez.\textsuperscript{36}

My contention is that the fundamental story paradigm underlying \textit{El Norte} is the most basic of all core stories, that of death-rebirth. There is a sort of parallel here with \textit{La Bamba}, in that beneath the overt indigenous mythic symbolism and the ostensible mythic source, there is a more familiar paradigmatic myth that serves to orient the audience to what the film is "really" about at a personal, universal level that digs beneath ideology to rest on a generally recognized moral bedrock.

The primary death-rebirth trajectory here is that of Enrique. At the climax of the story he is set to leave for the promised foreman's job in Chicago when his sister's friend Nacha brings him news of Rosa's illness. Nacha pleads with Enrique to go to Rosa, but he initially refuses, knowing that he will lose the economic opportunity if he does not leave immediately. When he asks Nacha to stay with Rosa in his place, Nacha responds in disgust that while Rosa may be gravely ill, Enrique is already dead. In a spiritual sense, of course, she is correct, and the story to that point has tracked the process by which the displaced immigrants have gotten further and further removed from the communal ties that bound them to each other back in their home village. When Enrique has a change of heart and chooses to stay by Rosa's side, he suffers economically but regains his humanity, and is in a sense spiritually reborn.

While Enrique's trajectory provides the central character arc\textsuperscript{37} of the story, the filmmakers have cleverly provided a second death-rebirth journey, that of Rosa. At a certain point in the story we see her cutting her ties to the past by
taking on a new hairdo and starting to dress in a contemporary "fashionable" style, much to her brother's disapproval and amazement. Right at the end of the film, however, we see Enrique gazing off into space, and through his inner eye we see Rosa back in the Guatemalan village, reborn, in traditional attire, returned to the only place where her true spiritual self can survive. Her journey is foreshadowed at the beginning of the film in yet a third death-rebirth cycle, at the funeral of their father. On that occasion, Rosa sings the following song:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{It's not true that we} \\
\text{Come here to live . . .} \\
\text{We come only} \\
\text{To sleep, to dream . . .} \\
\text{All things are lent to us,} \\
\text{in passing . . .} \\
\text{Tomorrow or the next day,} \\
\text{As you desire, giver of life,} \\
\text{We shall go home . . .}
\end{align*}
\]

So while the particulars of the Popol Vuh and other Mayan sources may not be familiar to Western audiences, the cyclical concept of time which the filmmakers derive from those texts dovetails perfectly with the death-rebirth paradigm with which those audiences might be acquainted. This is a testament to the universal nature of those core stories.

The Modern Odyssey: Born in East L.A.

After La Bamba, the most popular Latino film has been Cheech Marin's Born in East L.A. It tells the story of a Chicano from East Los Angeles, Rudy, played by Marin, who is picked up in an I.N.S. raid on a factory and taken to Mexico when the immigration officials refuse to believe that he is a citizen. The rest of the story is taken up with Rudy's attempts to return home, and the comic misadventures he has in the process. While in Tijuana he becomes romantically involved with Dolores, a woman from El Salvador. Eventually Rudy organizes a large number of would-be immigrants and leads a mass charge on the border, allowing him and Dolores to reach L.A.

One of the most extended commentaries on this film has been made by
Rosa Linda Fregoso, who provides a number of valuable insights. One of her emphases is on the manner in which Marin, as writer/director, "reverses the dominant society's codes of positive/negative value, and in so doing parodies both social and cinematic depictions of the Chicano as "other." She notes one particular sequence where Rudy attempts to cross the border by stowing away in the motor home of two middle class white Americans, only to end up in jail when the couple is busted as drug smugglers.

Fregoso also astutely notes Marin's complex cultural orientation in other respects. For example, while he shares with other Chicano and Latin American filmmakers a respect for everyday popular culture ("lo popular"), he is one of the few to also acknowledge the impact of commodified popular culture on the lives of people. There are several instances in the film where he incorporates or references American popular music, including his parody of Bruce Springsteen's "Born in the USA."

She goes on to note the significance of border imagery in Marin's film, finding points of similarity here with La Bamba:

In terms of the subject positioning of its main characters, Rudy and Ritchie, both films play with the precarious space of in-between-ness, the border, thereby positing forms of transgression in which existing borders forged in domination can be redefined. Figuratively, Chicano subjectivity is located in the difference from dominant white (U.S.) and Mexican cultures, but also in the similarities with both systems. Thus, Born in East L.A. and La Bamba portray the border as a site where identities and cultures intersect productively. Both films create the conditions for their main subjects, but also for their spectator subjects, to become border crossers.

In another major analysis of Born in East L.A., Chon Noriega focuses on the political and cultural implications of Marin's film. The themes that Noriega identifies include a critique of United States hysteria about immigration and the English-Only initiative in California; the film's insistence on Chicano "natives" in the U.S.; a reframing of the dialogue about immigration to take into account its multinational nature; and a shift from Chicano nationalism to a pan-Latino identity.

While both Noriega's and Fregoso's analyses are of significant help in deciphering the complex thematic meanings in a film which on first impression appears to be merely a light-hearted entertainment, their discussions are limited in ways that parallel my commentaries on La Bamba and El Norte. In
particular, I believe that they devote insufficient attention to the factors that make *Born in East L.A.* work as a drama, and that help us understand why it was as successful as it was. I am convinced that the film's appeal to a broad audience can not be explained in terms of its political perspective or cultural critique, but must be addressed through a more detailed exploration of the nature of its core story and of the workings of its narrative structure. As with the other films, such an exploration can begin with the identification of the basic story paradigm.

Interestingly enough, there has been a discussion of this film that attempts to locate it within a mythic paradigm. In his article, Eddie Tafoya argues that "the real brilliance of the film is not as much a matter of politics as of allegory, as *Born in East L.A.* is essentially the story from the Book of Exodus of the flight of Jews from Egypt into the Promised Lands—rewritten to a Chicano context." Interestingly though it may be, however, Tafoya's analysis fails because *Born in East L.A.* is not centrally about Rudy leading his people to the promised land—it is about his own desire to return home, and virtually all of the narrative is built around that quest. While there is a Moses-like flavor to the resolution of Rudy's drive, that only enters into the story briefly toward the end. The core story here is rather that of the Odyssey, one of the oldest recorded stories in the Western tradition. As Fregoso notes, Rudy's removal to Mexico "motivates the primary desire of the film's subject: Rudy's quest to return to East L.A. from Mexico (Tijuana). The task of the plot thus becomes the demonstration of the protagonist's ability to resolve those conflicts necessary for the final narrative equilibrium or closure." Chon Noriega has also pointed out the parallel to that other modern Odyssey story: "Like the deracinated character of another musical fantasy (Dorothy of *The Wizard of Oz*), Rudy pleads on several occasions, 'I just want to go home now, okay?'" Now while both Fregoso and Noriega recognize the core element of the story, they do not sufficiently explore its implications. One of the keys to understanding the Odyssey story is that while "home" provides the objective, the telling is primarily concerned with the protagonist's adventures along the way. Odyssey stories are thus adventure stories, and an additional element in many of them has to do with the changes that take place in the protagonist as a result of those adventures. The journey and its adventures then become the vehicles for the protagonist's character arc. In the case of Dorothy, this point
has been elaborated in Salman Rushdie's brilliant exposition of the film version of *The Wizard of Oz*:\(^{46}\)

All three, Scarecrow, Tin Man and Lion, are in Eliot's phrase, hollow men . . . Perhaps it is because they are all hollow that our imaginations can enter them and fill them up so easily. . . . Gradually, however, we discover that, along with their 'straight man', Dorothy . . . they embody one of the film's messages—that we already possess what we seek most fervently.

Noriega in particular seems to have a real blind spot concerning the importance of Rudy's character arc. At one point he states "As a picaresque hero, Rudy experiences a number of unrelated adventures without an essential transformation of character."\(^{47}\) And again, "As a *picaro* (rascal, rogue), Rudy does not change as much as his circumstances change around him."\(^{48}\) On the contrary, Rudy undergoes two fundamental transformations. One is the change from a purely individualistic orientation to a collective consciousness. Whereas Rudy's dilemma had resisted all of his individualistic efforts, it immediately yields to the collective, clearly indicating the writer's moral position.

The second profound transformation in Rudy's character is a result of the film's major subplot, Rudy's romantic relationship with Dolores. This particular subplot has its own distinct story paradigm, that of Beauty and the Beast. As noted earlier, this core story has to do with the necessity for a "beastly" character, almost always the male, to change before he can be united with his desired mate. In *Born in East L.A.*, the base line for Rudy's character arc is provided early in the film, when he is seen ogling and then making suggestive comments to a sexy French woman who somehow has made her way to the barrio. By the end of the film, Rudy's character has moved from lust to love, the transformation being effected in classic fashion by the film's "Beauty," Dolores.

Marin's narrative strategy, then, was to combine two standard story paradigms, each acting as a vehicle for a particular character transformation of the protagonist. However, even a well chosen narrative will not "work" for an audience if the audience does not care what happens to the protagonist. Screenwriters typically give a great deal of thought to ways of making a protagonist sympathetic in stories where the audience is invited to identify with that protagonist. Here, there are at least four factors that help to make Rudy sympathetic: 1) he has been wronged, 2) he is funny and self-deprecating, 3) he is
creative, as expressed through his music and his ability to come up with ploys to achieve his ends, and 4) he becomes more and more empathetic as the film progresses and his character changes.

That this film successfully crossed over to a mainstream audience speaks to the effectiveness of Cheech Marin’s narrative strategies. Ordinarily we would not expect that given the recent political climate in the United States one could get a mainstream audience to root for someone leading a mass invasion across the U.S.-Mexico border, and yet that appears to be what happened. As Rosa Linda Fregoso notes, “Born in East L.A. teaches us that the cultural struggle must also be fought and won on the commercial screen.”

Conclusion
My argument has been that most academic film analysis is partial and unbalanced, in that it divorces ideological analysis from the dramatic and mythic dimensions of feature film stories. Most academic critics seem out of touch with the concerns of working filmmakers, and particularly with how such filmmakers conceive of narrative structure.

In addition, a great deal of academic writing on film fails to sufficiently account for practical considerations in the art of feature filmmaking. When one reads books and articles written by the filmmakers themselves, one gets a very different “take” on the nature of features and on how and why creative decisions are made as they are. A quote from a recent book by director Sidney Lumet illustrates the point:

I once asked Akira Kurosawa why he had chosen to frame a shot in Ran in a particular way. His answer was that if he’d panned the camera one inch to the left, the Sony factory would be sitting there exposed, and if he’d panned an inch to the right, we would see the airport—neither of which belonged in a period movie. Only the person who’s made the movie knows what goes into the decisions that result in any piece of work. They can be anything from budget requirements to divine inspiration.

On the Latino side, Robert Rodriguez’s book about the making of El Mariachi gives us a host of insights into some of the practical considerations that went into that film:

As we were driving to one of the locations, we passed a really cool place. It was a buildingless door. It looked as if the whole building had been knocked down but the metal door and its door frame remained in perfect working
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condition. Carlos said he had seen it a while back and wanted to show it to me. I told him we can't pass up the chance of using freaky locations free of charge like this. We got out and I chose to use it for yet another shot of the dream sequence. When in doubt have dream sequences!... For the dream scene I had the kid bounce the basketball that I think later will turn into a human head. We have this foam rubber human head and we might as well use it somewhere.

We can only suppose what constructions might have been placed on this dream sequence by the academic imagination if Rodriguez had not preempted them with his down-to-earth explanation.

The Rodriguez quote also serves to point to another imbalance in a great deal of academic film analysis, and that is the inordinate amount of attention given to symbolic analysis. Not only is much of this analysis on shaky ground in the absence of direct knowledge of what was in the filmmaker's mind, but most of it is so convoluted that it has no bearing on what a general audience will perceive on viewing the film. Whereas readers of literary novels may be attuned to the use of subtle symbolism, feature film audiences will be far more affected by characterization and story development. Again, this does not mean that filmmakers do not consciously make use of symbolism. Many do, but my point here is that this is not what makes the film "work," because it is not what creates the audience response. To place the weight of an analysis on symbolic explication leads us into areas of minor importance in understanding the impact of a film.

Finally, I would like to address the frequently encountered calls for Latino films to offer a more in-depth analysis of social issues, and to be used as a sort of cultural "weapon" against a social system generally perceived to be oppressive and exploitative of Chicanos. My feeling is that narrative films are a blunt weapon when used for this purpose. If they are too explicitly political and ideological, they will turn people off as preachy or didactic. A self-consciously political film that does not reach an audience is a self-contradiction. The more sophisticated filmmakers will sometimes put their social messages in as subtexts, but in so doing one walks a fine line. If the messages are coded too subtly, they will be communicated only to the already-convinced. If the statement is too broad or general, it will have little specific political impact. Generally speaking, documentary films and books are both better suited as forms of media to these types of purposes. This is not to say that the attempt to make films that work at multiple levels should not be made. Indeed, I feel that both El Norte
and *Born in East L.A.* serve as sophisticated examples of what can be done along these lines. The point here is that our expectations as to what can be accomplished politically through feature films needs to be more limited and more realistic.

The corollary to this argument returns to the belief that feature films "work" best at the mythic and emotional levels. As such, their primary function at the moral level is to reinforce worthwhile but uncontroversial values such as love, compassion, empathy, and courage. As they have in the past, the best Latino features will continue to move us emotionally, and to remind us of those basic human values which we all acknowledge, but so frequently fail to live up to in our day-to-day lives.

**NOTES**

1. For a general discussion of this theme, see Jon Boorstin's *Making Movies Work* (Los Angeles: Silman-James Press, 1995).
5. Myth is the story form traditionally used by societies to express their most profound moral "truths." Less weighty teachings are generally carried in the form of fairy tales, fables, or "tall tales," with their simpler moral messages and flatter, less developed characters. Following this distinction, more "serious" films can be said to follow the mythic tradition, while less serious, "escapist" films are similar to these other, less complex story forms. A "serious" film can, of course, as easily take on a comedic as a tragic tone.
9. The fact that Natalie Wood was cast in the role of Maria is particularly ironic given the film's anti-prejudice stance.
WHAT GETS LEFT OUT OF LATINO FILM ANALYSIS

13 Ibid., p. 46.
14 Ibid., p. 48.
18 Danny Valdez played a major role in formulating the project that resulted in the film. (Ken Kelly, op. cit., p. 103) In the Kelly interview, Luis Valdez also acknowledges experiencing sibling conflict with another brother. (Ibid., p. 93)
20 Luis Valdez, La Bamba: The Ritchie Valens Story (Screenplay dated September 30, 1985). The script was originally entitled Let's Go!
22 Ken Kelley, op. cit., p. 111.
23 In my book Beyond Aztlan (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1988), I make an argument contrary to Valdez's optimistic projections. See especially chapter 6.
26 David Savran, op. cit., p. 20.
27 Rafael Perez-Torres, "Chicanos in Film: A New Portrayal?," Estos Tiempos (Fall, 1988), p. 28.
29 Victor Valle, op. cit., p. 262.
31 Rosa Linda Fregoso, op. cit., p. 110.
35 Ibid., p. 36.
36 Interview with Gregory Nava by the author, September 29, 1990.
Character arc is the way in which a character changes during the course of the story.


Chon Noriega, "'Waas Sappening?...’,” *op. cit.*, p. 110.


Chon Noriega, "'Waas Sappening?...’,” *op. cit.*, p. 110.


Rosa Linda Fregoso, *op. cit.*, p. 64.


CHICANOS IN THE NORTHWEST AND THE MIDWEST UNITED STATES: A HISTORY OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL COMMONALITY

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Introduction

Chicano political history has tended to focus on the states of the American Southwest. This is not surprising, since it is in this region that the Chicano population is most concentrated and the emerging impact of Chicano politics most pronounced. However, scholars are recognizing that important Chicano communities exist in geographic areas outside the Southwest. Research indicates that these communities have developed their own distinct strategies for influencing the political system and furthering Mexican Americans' social and economic goals. Much can be learned by comparing Chicano political experiences elsewhere in the country with those of southwestern Chicanos.

This article presents an overview of Chicano communities in two significant regions, the Midwest and Pacific Northwest. In both regions, there are sizable Chicano populations that have a sense of group identity, and that take an interest in common issues such as bilingual education, workers' rights and benefits, immigration reform, and expansion of voting rights. Moreover, Chicanos in these regions are not simply taking cues from southwestern Chicano leaders. Rather, they have taken an interest in these issues because they are confronting similar political, and socio-economic circumstances as Chicanos in the Southwest.

Two theses are presented in this paper. The first is that Chicanos in different regions of the United States, faced with similar socio-economic and demographic forces, have developed many political strategies in common. Several tactics illustrating this point are the establishment of state commissions and community centers, and the creation of farm worker organizations. All have been popular among Chicanos in the Midwest and Northwest as well as the Southwest. The second thesis is that Chicano leaders, who have previously concentrated on Southwest developments, can learn from political and eco-
nomic innovations of Chicano communities elsewhere in the country. This research has found that National Chicano organizations have effectively networked with local Chicano groups and communities in the Midwest and Northwest while also influencing local, state and regional public policies. This suggests a developing capacity to politically mobilize Chicano communities nationwide while this group is more recognized as a national constituency with a national agenda.

The first part of this article surveys Chicano history in the Midwest and Northwest with an emphasis on World War II, which created preconditions for Chicano protest activity in the 1960s, also described later in this paper. Section two describes Chicano organizational activities to achieve this community’s goals, noting preferences for interest group politics in the Northwest and Midwest as opposed to electoral strategies used in the Southwest. Finally, a critical look at Chicana political participation is presented.

**Historical Overview**

Mexican immigration into the Pacific Northwest and Midwest regions greatly increased during the first thirty years of the 20th century. Factors behind this increased Mexican migration were harsh economic and political conditions under the Porfirio Díaz regime, the chaos engendered by the Mexican Revolution, and later violent conflict between the church and Mexican government. These events forced thousands to flee to the United States where the expanding economy promoted perceptions of greater job security. In addition, new U.S. immigration laws, which limited cheap labor from Eastern Europe and Asia, were generally favorable to Mexican immigrants seeking work. Other factors promoting Mexican migration were the use of Mexican workers as strikebreakers in some industries, and the connecting of Mexican railroads with the North American rail system which facilitated the movement of Mexican laborers into the U.S.

Throughout Texas in the first decades of the century, there were hundreds of recruiters called *enganachadores* who represented North American companies eager to sign up men to work in the Midwest and Pacific Northwest. The Texas-Mexico border hosted an elaborate network of employment agencies and labor recruiters. By the 1920s, Mexican labor was a major factor in the Midwest and Pacific Northwest agricultural economies. Not surprisingly, Mexican com-
munities throughout the U.S. were negatively impacted after 1930 by the Great Depression, as well as by repatriation and deportation programs. The impact was felt especially in the Midwest, where Mexican communities around the Great Lakes Region, were large.⁵

**World War II and the Civil Rights Movement**

As the decade of the 1930s ended, Mexican communities in the United States were already undergoing dramatic social, economic and political changes. World War II proved a pivotal event in the development of the country's Mexican American community. The war led to a surge in community solidarity, and produced another generation of leaders who were bicultural and from working-class backgrounds.

More than 300,000 Mexican Americans served in World War II, fighting in all major campaigns in Europe, the Pacific, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.⁶ Mexican American women also made key contributions during the war. In defense plants, they labored as riveters, crane and forklift operators, welders, and assemblers. These women also worked in other industries supporting the war, as railroad section workers, roundhouse mechanics, shipyard workers, meatpackers, farmworkers, seamstresses, nurses, secretaries, pipe fitters, janitors, and translators.⁷ Their wartime contributions were not confined, however, solely to work in defense plants and domestic industries. Mexican American women also enlisted in the military; some of them served overseas prior to the end of the war.⁸

Meanwhile, thousands of other Mexican American women and men aided the war effort through volunteer activities such as organizing war bond drives, working with the Red Cross, cultivating victory gardens, and collecting scrap metal for armaments.⁹ Besides Mexican American contributions on the battlefield and in defense work, Mexican *braceros* were used extensively during World War II in agricultural industries of the Midwest and Pacific Northwest.¹⁰ Braceros were desperately needed because of severe labor shortages created by the war and increased demand for agricultural products to feed the army.

As Mexican Americans adjusted to peacetime after 1945, they were again confronted with reminders of their pre-war, second-class, status. Their hopes for a better life had soared during and immediately after the war. But, their expectations later plummeted due to the realities of racism. Mexican American
military veterans were denied entrance to bars, restaurants, barber shops, movie houses, pool halls, parks, and churches. Such racist acts were commonplace throughout the Midwest and Northwest. Not surprisingly, these veterans and former defense workers felt betrayed, but not dispirited, by the country they had served so loyally.

In the war's aftermath, Mexican Americans lost patience with unpaved streets, segregated housing, inadequate sewage facilities and the lack of recreational services. Now this group was taking action to remedy problems and correct injustices facing their communities. A consequence of the war was that Mexican Americans now viewed themselves as a national group, sharing particular issues and concerns. On the battlefield, Mexican American service personnel from various states had met each other for the first time, and learned that Mexicans were victims of racial discrimination regardless of residence. For example, many Mexican Americans from the Midwest were stationed in the Southwest, while some Southwestern Mexican Americans reported for duty in the Northwest.Thus, the war brought Mexican Americans from distant areas physically together and promoted greater awareness of their ethnicity and cultural solidarity.

During World War II Mexican Americans developed greater political awareness and leadership. The "new outlook" of Mexican Americans in both the Midwest and Northwest was that they had earned the right to be treated as first-class citizens, since they had fought and worked side-by-side with Anglos on the battlefield and in defense plants. In order to provide effective leadership for their communities, they formed organizations that fought to abolish remaining vestiges of overt discrimination. Mexican Americans sought to eliminate unfair political practices such as poll taxes and literacy tests, as well as jury exclusion. They also challenged discrimination in labor unions, education and restrictive housing covenants.

In the Midwest, Mexican Americans created new political and social organizations including veterans groups such as the Latin-American Veterans, the Mexican-American Servicemen's Association, the Mexican G.I. Club, the Catholic War Veterans, and the Mexican American Veterans. Also, these trailblazers formed civic groups. Among these associations were the United Betterment Club, Civic Councils for Mexicans, and the Latin American Social Club.11 In the Pacific Northwest, Spanish American Clubs, the Mexican American Fed-
eration and the Latin American Association were formed in Mexican communities. Most community-based organizing, however, in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho focused largely on migrant worker issues during the 1940s and early 1950s.12

The post-war period also witnessed changes in the demography of the Mexican community in the Midwest and Northwest. Mexican Americans, from many walks of life, divided into various subcultures. There were in rural areas, for example, Mexican braceros, and native-born migrant workers. Mexican Americans were also divided by first, second and third generations as well as age. Despite a common ethnic and cultural background, Mexican Americans had diverse interests. Socio-economic interests were based on class, occupation, and educational achievement, while cultural interests were identified by religion, language, and degree of acculturation. Political views were manifested in ideology, citizenship status, geography, and gender. As a result of this complex segmentation, a variety of political, social, and cultural organizations were formed by Mexican Americans between 1940 and 1960. Mexican American activism and organizations in the 1940s and 1950s prepared the way for a period of social protest, called the Chicano Movement.

The Chicano Movement

The Chicano Movement emerged in both the Midwest and Pacific Northwest during the late 1960s and early 1970s. This movement offered Chicanos more political opportunities, new challenges, new organizers, and a cultural ideology. The Chicano Movement also produced, for some, greater political and gender consciousness as well as cultural pride.

Similar economic and political forces to those which shaped the Chicano Movement in the Southwest, were also found in the Northwest and Midwest. Among the political issues underlying the movement were the war in Vietnam, the hypocrisy of the two major political parties, and the Civil Rights Movement. In addition, Chicanos mobilized to correct socio-economic problems such as: inferior education, job discrimination, denial of student and parental rights in the schools, abuse of migrant workers, and the grape and lettuce boycotts that called attention to exploitation of farm workers in these regions.

This new generation of Chicanos tended to view their Mexican American predecessors as overly accommodationist. Chicano leaders were impatient with
the slow progress that came with voter registration, and get-out-the-vote strategies of traditional electoral politics pursued earlier. It was evident that the previous generation had won important political victories while fostering social progress. However, young Chicano leaders still saw racism permeating American education, politics, health care, housing, the labor market, and services.

Many Southwestern Chicano leaders, including Corky Gonzales, spoke many times in the Midwest and Northwest. César Chávez visited the Northwest frequently in the 1970s, where he promoted unionization of farmworkers and increased awareness of the inhumane working conditions on farms in the region. José Ángel Gutiérrez taught in the early 1980s at an Oregon state university in Monmouth, Oregon, near Portland, and organized political action in the state. Chicano leaders also hosted numerous conferences and workshops to discuss strategies for achieving social, economic, and political equality for Chicanos in both regions.13

Chicano student organizations in the Midwest sponsored dozens of state and regional conferences during the late 1960s to try to formulate a political and cultural agenda. José Juárez, a student leader from South Bend, Indiana, described this activity noting Chicano student conferences in Kansas, Ohio, Nebraska, Michigan, Indiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa. “We discussed and debated several issues and strategies to oppose the war in Vietnam, police brutality in our community, the oppressive tactics of the immigration service, and the lack of adequate housing and health care, as well as political powerlessness.”14

Some examples of Chicano student conferences that were held during these years included one on April 4, 1970, when the Mexican American community held a Youth Conference at Michigan State University. Over 300 young people attended the conference, the first of its kind in Michigan. Workshop subjects included education, the military and the draft, civil rights, community organizing, and Cinco de Mayo activities. Also in 1971, over 100 Chicano students attended a conference at Kansas University in Manhattan to discuss issues, including the grape and lettuce boycotts. Three years later, a conference held at Chicago State University was entitled “Urban Education and the Latino Community.”

Educational issues and concerns in both regions were similar to those of Southwest Chicanos. Their demands included: enrollment of Chicano stu-
ents in higher education, creation of Chicano Studies programs, a more equitable distribution of scholarships and financial aid, hiring of Chicana/o professors, counselors, and administrators, expansion of bilingual and migrant education programs. In response to resistance by the educational establishment in the Midwest and Pacific Northwest, Chicano students organized walk-outs, sit-ins, marches and other forms of protest. John Mendoza, a student at the time, notes: "We protested against low reading scores, the high percentage of drop-outs among our youth, and the lack of Chicano staff." Mendoza added that most teachers believed that all Mexicans were poor students, and did not have the intelligence to attend college.

The Chicano student movement gained additional momentum in the early 1970s. For example in April of 1970, 150 persons demonstrated at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana, to protest the low number of Chicano students on campus. Students presented college administrators with a list of demands ranging from establishment of a Chicano Studies program to creation of Chicano outreach projects.

In the Northwest, students at Washington State University (WSU) presented eleven demands to the school administration on May 19, 1970. These demands were aimed at eliminating racist practices at the school. Workshops on eliminating racism were also organized at the same time. When the university denied student demands, a strike resulted. The following year, Chicano students and faculty pushed for larger student enrollments from Chicano communities. Also on April 6, 1970, a proposal for a Chicano Studies program was submitted to the Dean of Letters, Arts and Sciences. Chicano Studies classes and a bachelor's degree in this area, through the Comparative American Cultures Department, continue to be offered at WSU.

Around the same time, Chicano students were making their presence known at other Washington state campuses. At WSU, classes were held on the UFW grape boycott and workshops on eliminating racism featured visits by César Chávez, Luis Valdez, the Chicano playwright and screenwriter, and the Chicano poet, Ricardo Sánchez. Similar events were repeated in Oregon and Idaho.

Chicano student activism resulted in the creation of numerous student groups. Ramiro Gonzales of Saginaw, Michigan, described several groups at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, called Los Trabajadores de la Raza, a graduate student group, and an undergraduate student group, Chicanos at
Michigan (CAM). Meanwhile, Michigan State University had started Movimiento Estudiantil Chicanos de Aztlán (MEChA). Other organizations existed such as La Nueva Generación at Saginaw Valley State, and the Chicano Club at Delta College. Wayne State University in Detroit had the Chicano/Boricua Studies Club.

In addition to student organizations and activities, Chicano/a faculty, staff, and administrators formed educational groups. In Michigan Chicanos formed the Association of Chicanos for College Admissions (ACCA). The membership was composed of Chicanos working in admissions, financial aid, and as student counselors. A number of Michigan colleges were represented within ACCA.21 The extensive tradition of Chicano student organizations continues today in the Midwest, with dozens of groups and alliances. “The Hispanic of Today Conference,” for example, sponsored its Seventh Annual meeting in the Midwest in 1996.

Moreover, both the Midwest and Northwest have seen publication of numerous Chicano newspapers since the late 1960s. Newspapers play important roles because they raise political consciousness, bring issues to the fore, and offer possible solutions to problems confronting communities.22 Whether through newspapers or other mass media, Chicano student organizing in the 1960s and 1970s promoted a more aggressive and politically conscious community while developing new leadership.

The Chicano student movement changed the political landscape in the Midwest and Pacific Northwest. Among the changes were the emergence of influential parents’ organizations in the schools, a growing membership in La Raza Unida Party and the Brown Berets, as well as publication of dozens of Chicano newspapers. Brown Berets had several chapters in the Midwest, including affiliated groups in Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Kansas, Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Iowa. This group also appeared in the Pacific Northwest. As early as 1969, Brown Berets had three chapters in Washington state, two in Seattle and one in Yakima County. According to one source, by 1970 Brown Berets had around 200 members in Washington.23

Another outcome of Chicano activism of the 1960s and 1970s was a stronger effort to penetrate U.S. electoral and party politics, and to create more aggressive interest groups. Some of these organizations now actively pursue Chicano issues in the Midwest and Northwest. Also, many Chicano student
leaders of the 60s and 70s found a role in the communities of these two regions. Meanwhile, in a consistent effort to engage in electoral and party politics, litigation has been filed to protect Chicano voting rights in the Midwest and Pacific Northwest.

**Interest Group and Electoral Politics**

In Washington state, according to the 1990 census, Chicanos and Latinos are over four percent of the population. These groups also comprise four percent of Oregon’s residents, and 5.3 percent of Idaho’s. Chicanos and Latinos are therefore slightly less than five percent of the total population in the Pacific Northwest. However, there are non-metropolitan areas in all of these states where Chicanos make up more than 30 to over 50 percent of a city’s or county’s residents. In spite of these numbers at the local level, barriers such as citizenship, ability to speak English, voter registration and a large Latino population under eighteen years of age, pose serious obstacles to Chicano electoral participation and political representation.

The Midwest has a similar pattern as Pacific Northwest states. Illinois has the largest concentration of Mexican-origin people, who make up only 5.5 percent of the state’s population. The other midwestern states have even smaller concentrations—Kansas has a Chicano population of only 3.3 percent; Ohio’s is only 0.5 percent. However, as in the case of the Pacific Northwest, there are cities in non-metropolitan areas of the Midwest where Chicanos constitute at least one third to over half the residents in these small towns.

Trends in Washington, in particular, indicate continued growth among people of Mexican-origin because of the expanding agricultural sector. Concentrated Chicano communities are found throughout the Northwest in areas where irrigated agriculture exists because this type of farming is very labor-intensive. The Columbia Basin in central Washington, with large concentrations of Chicanos, is an example of this type of farming. In Oregon similar areas include the Willamette Valley in the west, the Hood River Valley in the central part of the state, and the Magic Valley off the Snake River in eastern Oregon. In southern Idaho, Chicano communities are located along the Snake River, where irrigated agriculture is also dominant. As irrigated agriculture expands in both Oregon and Idaho, the need for agricultural laborers is expected to increase. Chicano farm laborers can be expected to supply this need,
and this economic fact will promote larger Chicano populations in Oregon and Idaho as it already has in Washington. Timber companies of the Northwest employ both Mexicans and Chicanos. This industry's reliance on Mexican and Chicano workers can only add to the growth of this population in the region.

Chicano communities of the Midwest have a history that goes back to the early decades of this century. The tendency is for relatives and friends to continue to migrate into these established communities. Chicanos first entered the Midwest by finding agricultural employment in rural areas and later factory work in large cities. With developing Midwest communities, more Chicanos in professional fields such as law, business, higher education, and medicine are attracted to this area.

Chicano leaders in both regions have created a multitude of associations and agendas to address their concerns at the federal, state and local levels of government. The next section will focus on activities of a number of Chicano interest groups and discuss the range of electoral strategies in the two regions. We will see how, in rural areas of the Midwest and Northwest, farm worker unions have been instrumental in addressing problems in Chicano communities.

Farm Worker Organizations
To enhance Chicano political power at state and local levels, farm worker associations have been organized to lobby and promote favorable legislation. These farm labor groups have also worked through the courts to change unfair labor laws affecting agricultural workers. In the Northwest, such groups include the United Farm Workers of Washington State (UFWWS), the Idaho Farm Workers Association, and Oregon's Pineros y Campesinos Unidos Del Noroeste. In the Midwest, groups include Obreros Unidos in Michigan, the Farm Worker Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC) in Ohio, the Beet Workers Defense Committee, and the Nebraska Association of Farm workers. Besides these groups, Chicano communities, along with religious organizations, unions, and other political allies, have established a network of service agencies, which include migrant councils, and migrant service centers.

Beyond these activities, farm workers and their supporters have led economic boycotts in the Midwest and Northwest. UFWWS, a union which
affiliated with the United Farm Workers of America (UFWA) in early 1994, has also been lobbying and protesting in Olympia, Washington, to try to win collective-bargaining rights, health-care legislation for agricultural workers, and protection of farm workers' interests in the state capitol. UFWWS was initially founded by Tomás Villanueva, the group's first president. Rosalinda Guillén became the state coordinator for the union in 1995, and Guadalupe Gamboa, an attorney, is now the state director for the UFWWS, previously having served as director of Evergreen Rural Legal Services in eastern Washington.

The UFWWS recently conducted a successful national and international boycott against Chateau Ste. Michelle and Columbia Crest Wines, both owned by United States Tobacco (UST). This boycott led to farm worker elections at Chateau Ste. Michelle, and recognition of UFWWS as the farm workers' representative in future collective bargaining negotiations. In late 1995, UFWWS won a labor contract with Chateau Ste. Michelle providing a number of benefits to farm workers. This contract was renewed again in June of 1997. With this recent victory, UFWWS has launched a campaign against the apple industry. Pending the outcome of the strawberry strike in Watsonville, California, the UFWWS expects to make an aggressive effort against the state's apple industry soon, with substantial assistance from the AFL-CIO. Finally, UFWWS has been successfully struggling for the past nine years to have farm workers covered under state labor laws, to win health benefits for farm laborers, and to secure improved working and living conditions for these people. Such efforts have helped give definition to political and economic struggles of the Chicano community in eastern Washington. Chicano residents and the community at-large now better understand socio-economic issues affecting farm laborers in Washington.

In Oregon, Pineros y Campesinos Unidos Noroeste (PCUN) has been promoting a consumer boycott of a frozen fruit and vegetable processing company, Northwest Packing and Canning Company (NORPAC). PCUN, which has also organized strikes against Oregon strawberry growers, has gained a membership of four thousand. Members receive a range of services such as immigration counseling, and legal assistance for those seeking job benefits.

In Ohio, the FLOC succeeded in its economic boycott of Campbell Soup products. Founded by Baldemar Velasquez in 1967, the FLOC started as a reform movement trying to improve working conditions for Midwest farm work-
ers. The FLOC's establishment coincided with the UFW's emergence in California and it also modeled itself after the UFW. Once established, the FLOC called for a consumer boycott of all Campbell Soup products including such Campbell subsidiary products as Vlasic pickles, Swanson's frozen dinners, and Pepperidge Farm foods. During the seven year boycott, the FLOC found broad support among organizations and people from many different backgrounds. The boycott effort reached a new peak in 1984, when the National Council of Churches said it would endorse the boycott if Campbell did not resolve the labor dispute. Campbell finally agreed in January of 1985 to meet with the FLOC; on May 13, the FLOC and Campbell signed a formal statement of understanding. History was made when the FLOC signed three-year labor contracts with Campbell Soup and its Ohio tomato growers, as well as its Michigan Vlasic pickle growers, in February of 1986. The contracts gave FLOC farm workers a new set of labor rights and benefits. Finally, workers won recognition of their right to unionize, and a voice in determining wages, benefits, and grievance procedures.31

State Commissions

By the early 1970s, Chicanos in the Midwest and Northwest pushed for establishment of state commissions or advisory committees to address issues of special concern. These commissions were to function in advising governors, legislators, and state agencies on policy matters, while also carrying out needed research. Eventually, all states in the Midwest adopted various forms of Chicanos affairs commissions.32 In December 1969, Oregon's governor established the first Advisory Committee on Chicano Affairs. Washington state formed the Governor's Commission on Mexican American Affairs two years later; Idaho established its commission in 1987.33

The creation of these agencies was a political breakthrough for the Chicano community because state-sponsored commissions formally acknowledged Chicanos as an important political constituency. For Chicanos, commissions were a significant improvement over token appearances by elected officials at community fiestas, or state-issued proclamations about "Hispanic Month." These commissions have served as clearinghouses for information, particularly for state documents and data, and have provided direct contact with governors' offices. Chicanos have utilized commissions for greater media access, while
having greater opportunities to testify before governmental bodies. These agencies are also excellent for cultivating leadership. Important issues have been explored by the commissions. These have included: education, youth problems, affirmative action, farm worker rights, immigration, police relations, economic development, drug and alcohol abuse, and voting rights.34

Other positive political developments growing out of state commissions have been appointments of commission members to state boards and departments, and as advisors to state governors. George Gómez, of Topeka, Kansas, explained that appointments of Mexican Americans and other Latinos to other state offices was a critical turning point for the community. Gómez noted that Latinos were making decisions that impacted all state residents and not simply their own community. This, said Gómez, made it clear that “Mexican Americans were qualified to make critical policy decisions about issues not labelled ‘Hispanic’.” 35

One example of Chicano state appointments in the Northwest is Jesse Berain, who left the Idaho House of Representatives in the summer of 1995 to be appointed to the Governor’s cabinet as director of the Office of the Aging.36 In Washington, Chicanos have been appointed to head three different departments—Employment Development, Licensing, and Veterans Affairs—and also to act as citizen advisors to the governor, according to Margarita Sugiyama de Mendoza.37 In Oregon, Anabelle Jaramillo has held the position of Citizens’ Advisor to the Governor, after serving as director of the Commission on Hispanic Affairs in Oregon.38

There are some Chicano community members, nevertheless, who have contended that state commissions have failed to deal with community problems. These people argue that commissions are often supported by “soft” funding, which has led to elimination of some commissions, and reduced staff for others. Staffing problems render these agencies useless. An additional problem is that subsequent elections may bring a new governor or new party majority in the legislature, which may lead to a lack of continuity, preventing commission appointees from becoming long-term advocates for the Chicano community. Other weaknesses of commissions are that they lack female and youth representation; geographical diversity among members; and input from rural areas. Research staff limitations and minimal representation of other Latino groups are other noted drawbacks. Finally, the middle-class and professional background
of most commissioners has inhibited serious attention to such issues as employment, benefits for farm laborers, gang violence, AIDS, spousal abuse, immigration and teenage pregnancy.

**Community Centers**

The emergence of Chicano community centers was critical in expanding Mexican American political awareness after World War II. Many of the centers' original founders in the post-war period were veterans and defense workers, whereas Chicano students were in the forefront of the development of community centers during the 1960s and 1970s. These agencies often provide free tax services, assistance in filing police complaints, help in processing immigration papers, and voter registration. Some centers also have free lunch programs for children and senior citizens as well as day care for working parents.

Neighborhood centers have helped bring to the fore a new set of community leaders—the center directors and their board members. These individuals have varying degrees of power, and their political influence may be based on the size of their budgets, and ability to control program funding. They may also regularly meet with Anglo business and political leaders, and they are often sought out by the press regarding the community's opinions on many issues.

Midwest and Northwest Chicanos have struggled for private, state, county, and federal funding of community-based centers. Chicanos believe such agencies are important because they improve employment opportunities, work for better housing, promote a higher quality of education, increase health care services, and provide support for senior citizens. In many places, centers have been particularly important in serving as cultural bridges between foreign-born Latin Americans and U.S. social, political, and economic institutions.

Two notable community centers in Washington state are the Centro de la Raza in Seattle, and the Centro Campesino in the city of Granger, located in the lower Yakima Valley. The Centro de la Raza is one of the oldest and largest Latino community centers in the Northwest. According to Roberto Maestes, the center's director, there are seventy full-time staff members and at least two hundred regular volunteers. The Centro de la Raza had its beginnings in the fall of 1972, when students and their parents, along with a few school teachers, occupied the abandoned Beacon Hill School near downtown Seattle. Presently, the center functions as a meeting place for community advocates, and provides
an array of services. Maestes describes the Centro as a civil rights organization concerned with salient issues such as community empowerment, crime, education and national and regional outreach. Programs of the Centro include housing assistance, senior services, a food bank, English as a Second Language (ESL) classes, a José Martí child development center, and a job readiness and placement program. The Centro is also involved in economic development projects designed to meet Latino small businesses needs in the Seattle community. Besides the center's local projects, the Centro's International Relations and Community Outreach Department maintains contacts with international peace organizations. In addition, this department promotes cultural and educational exchanges as well as hosting foreign dignitaries.

The Centro Campesino in the lower Yakima Valley, focuses its services and activities on Mexican-origin people in this non-metropolitan area. Ricardo García directs the center, which also operates a Spanish-language radio station, KDNA. Also located in the two-story building of the Centro Campesino are offices dedicated to immigration assistance, ESL classes, alternative schooling for adolescents, and housing referral services. There are conference rooms in the main building as well, and adjacent to this building is a community meeting hall. Through the radio station and his public involvement, García has kept in the limelight many issues of particular interest to the Chicano community in eastern Washington. The Centro Campesino provides a model of a rural community-based organization structured to provide services and be an advocate for Chicanos.

Hundreds of other community centers have been established in the Midwest. One such agency, the Guadalupe Center, located on Kansas City's Westside, is involved in education, social services, health awareness, cultural heritage, and recreational programs. The center has also established programs involved with job placement, anti-gang activities, immigration counseling, alternative high schools, adult basic education, teen pregnancy, AIDS/HIV education and counseling, senior citizen outreach, and aid to the homeless. Recently, the center established a new component called the Policy Analysis Center, which carries out research and disseminates information on the local Chicano population. The philosophy of "knowledge as power" underlies the center's policy research. By developing accurate demographic information on the community, for example, the Guadalupe Center equips itself to address social problems.
In addition to community centers, Chicanos in the Midwest established several research institutes devoted to providing information and public policy recommendations to elected and appointed officials. One such “think tank” is the Latino Institute, founded in 1974 and based in Chicago. The Latino Institute is a non-profit organization promoting Latino progress through research, scholarly training, and political advocacy; its efforts pursue two main goals. The first is helping Latinos work on their own behalf to become better informed and organized, as well as involved, in the fight for equity in the larger community. A second goal is increasing Latino representation and influence in Chicago’s political, cultural, and economic power structures.42

The Julian Samora Research Institute, located at Michigan State University in East Lansing, is the only Latino research center at a major university in the Midwest. It was established in 1989 out of the recognition that most social science research has failed to consider issues pertaining specifically to the Latino community. The institute carries out research which examines the social, economic, educational, political, and health conditions of Latinos in the Midwest; transmits its research findings to other academic institutions, government officials, community leaders, and to interested citizens in the private sector. The organization also provides technical expertise and support to Latino communities in their efforts to develop policy responses to local problems.43

Women’s Organizations
As already noted, Mexican American women have been significant in the politics of their communities in the Northwest and Midwest. They have also formed their own entirely female organizations, because their concerns have largely been ignored by both Anglo and Mexican American male leaders. Paula Jasso of Topeka, Kansas, explained: “Women were involved in the community prior to World War II. In addition, Mexican American women were in the forefront of the Chicano Movement. Yet, many issues affecting women have not been fully addressed.” These issues include wage and job discrimination, family planning, domestic violence, lack of prenatal care, sexual harassment, and the lack of educational opportunities. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the development of a strong women’s movement for resolution of these problems. The period from the 1970s through the 1990s has continued with the expansion of Mexican American women’s associations in the Northwest and Midwest.
In “A Cultural Profile and the Status of Chicanas in the Northwest,” Luz Maciel Villaroel and Sandra Fancher Garcia write that: “Chicanas as a group in the Northwest continue to experience cultural, political and economic oppression as well as discrimination.” Maciel Villaroel and Fancher Garcia add that the economic exploitation, oppression, and discrimination experienced by Chicanas not only comes from relations with Anglo men and women, but also develops from relations with Chicanos. Oral interviews conducted by Maciel Villaroel and Fancher Garcia in Washington and Oregon found that women in the Northwest from urban or rural areas, young or old, light skin or dark skin, indicated having experienced discrimination based on race and gender. A major concern among Chicanas in the Northwest, according to Maciel Villarroel and Fancher Garcia is the lack of equal access to public services, education, health, employment, politics and legal institutions. Problems with access to services is compounded by the fact that unplanned pregnancies are high among Chicanas, according to Fancher Garcia and Maciel Villaroel. From their interviews in the Northwest, these researchers learned that abortions are not options for Chicanas. Many Chicana interviewees were hesitant to speak about it, and for them the main issue was not just choice, but rather whether abortion is a moral or immoral choice. The problem of pregnancy must be discussed in combination with the issue of education for Chicanas, given high Latina dropout rates and high teen pregnancy rates at the national level.

Studies have demonstrated that women who believe they have control over their lives and view pregnancy as a matter of choice have few unplanned pregnancies. According to Fancher Garcia and Maciel Villaroel, many Chicanas in the Northwest are not in this group. Census data for the Northwest reveals a higher incidence of poverty for Chicanas who are single parents. This incidence of poverty is much higher than for non-Chicanas who are also single heads of families.

Other observations by Fancher Garcia and Maciel Villaroel as well as this article’s authors are that Chicanas have frequently served as leaders of groups and movements in the Northwest. These include the United Farm Workers of America, the Mexican American Women’s National Association (MANA), Mujeres de Oregon, the Oregon, Washington, and Idaho Commissions on Hispanic Affairs, and the Oregon Council for Hispanic Advancement (OCHA). In the Midwest, some of the leading Chicana organizations include: the Mexi-
can American Women's National Association (MANA), the Mexican American Women's Business and Professional Club, and Adelante Mujer.46

Over the past twenty years Chicana organizations in the Northwest and Midwest have sponsored hundreds of conferences, seminars and other forums. Major conferences, for example, have been held in Kansas City, Kansas; Lansing, Michigan; Chicago, Illinois; and St. Paul, Minnesota. These meetings have addressed subjects such as networking, role models, leadership development, assertiveness training, financial support for higher education, and employment discrimination as well as campaign and lobbying skills.

**Advocacy Organizations**

Besides organizing themselves, Chicanas have worked through advocacy organizations. In the Northwest, statewide advocacy organizations exist in Idaho, Oregon, and Washington. The Washington State Council of La Raza (WCLR), which is headquartered in Yakima City, is a local chapter of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) in Washington, D.C., which has some 150 affiliates nationwide.

Directed at present by Tony Sandoval, the WCLR was created in 1989 as a statewide Chicano advocacy group. The major focus of the WCLR has been public education. According to Sandoval, the WCLR has worked with local educational agencies to promote parent involvement programs that are culturally sensitive. This group has also advocated recruitment of Chicano/a teachers, administrators, and counselors for public schools in Washington.47

In support of these activities, WCLR conducts annual conferences and legislative receptions. The council uses conferences as forums to bring interested individuals and agencies together to address issues significant to Chicanos. Also during these meetings, individuals are recognized who have made contributions to the Chicano community. At the first annual conference of the WCLR, Governor Booth Gardner, and Superintendent of Public Instruction, Judith Billings, were featured speakers. The conference provided workshops on education, public access, and public policy.

In addition to conferences, the council organizes annual legislative receptions. These receptions allow state legislators, state and local officials and interested citizens to meet on a one-on-one basis. The council also brings in community representatives to discuss Chicano issues in the state, and to press for
solutions to community problems.48

IMAGE is an advocacy group with chapters in all three Northwest states—Oregon, Idaho, and Washington. This group, which is particularly active in Idaho, consists of public employees at local, state and federal levels. Leo Puga, who directs IMAGE in Idaho, notes that this organization has a national office in Washington, D.C., and promotes advancement of Mexican American government workers.49 IMAGE's main goals are to improve job and educational opportunities for Mexican Americans. Recently, IMAGE in Idaho has lobbied the state legislature to pass a farm worker rights bill. This group has also promoted voter registration and citizenship campaigns for undocumented Mexicans in Idaho. IMAGE, in fact, has been closely linked to the state's Commission on Hispanic Affairs and the Idaho Migrant Council.

In Oregon, Latinos have created an advocacy organization known as OCHA (the Oregon Council for Hispanic Advancement). It began in 1983 when the United Way chapter of the Columbia-Willamette region created a project to address Latino human service needs in the area. Thirteen committees were created addressing such issues as youth services, the judicial system, health, housing, media relations, business development, religion, education, the arts, labor issues, and community demographics. The committees continued to meet until 1985, when a conference was called to report their findings. OCHA grew out of this effort.50

Under María Elena Campisteguy Hawkins' direction, OCHA prioritized four service areas: education, health, employment and economic development, while developing greater resources. In education, OCHA conducts the Oregon Leadership Institute (OLI). Another of this group's education services is a high school retention program, Proyecto Adelante. OCHA's involvement in the health field consists of the Oregon Hispanic AIDS project (OHAP), which has attempted to inform Latinos/as about the disease. OCHA also has a job bank and has created workplace training and workshops for Latinos. OCHA has addressed economic development issues by purchasing a downtown Portland building with the aim of establishing a central location for Chicano business people in the city.51

In the Midwest, too, Chicanos have established local advocacy groups that have direct ties to national groups such as IMAGE and the National Council of La Raza. For example, in April of 1970, over 300 midwestern representatives
met at the University of Notre Dame to establish a regional civil rights organization. Delegates, including over 100 students, formed the Midwest Council of La Raza (MWCLR), which took the lead in differentiating issues of special concern to midwestern Chicanos.52

Another advocacy organization is the Midwest Voter Registration and Education Project (MWVRP), which was founded in 1982 to encourage voter registration and balloting among Chicanos.53 The MWVRP sponsored many voter registration programs in the 1980s, and later merged with an East Coast voter registration project to form the Midwest-Northeast Voter Registration and Education Project. This organization will host its 15th annual Hispanic Leadership Conference in Chicago in October of 1997.

**Migrant Councils**

During the War on Poverty in the mid-1960s, agencies were created to provide farm workers in the Northwest with services. In Washington state, day care assistance was provided by the Washington Council on Migrant Affairs, and education programs were administered by the Washington State Migrant Educational Organization. These two agencies merged in 1968 to form the Northwest Regional Organization (NRO).54 In 1983 the NRO's programs were discontinued and the Washington State Migrant Council (WSMC) was incorporated to provide services to farm workers. Carlos Díaz has been the first, and only director of this agency. WSMC, today, is a large organization with twenty-six centers, over 900 employees and a twenty million dollar budget. Services are provided to over 10,000 families in fourteen counties.55

The Migrant Head Start program has been one of the primary projects operated by the WSMC. Currently, it provides educational opportunities for children, adolescents, and adults. This agency also administers programs in health care, substance abuse, and pre-teen outreach.

Besides its service role, the WSMC also works to promote the interests of Washington's Chicano community. For example, it has assisted school districts in recruitment of teachers and school administrators. The extensive resources of the National Head Start program aid the council in addressing many social, psychological, and health problems of children. The WSMC offers these resources, as well as its staff's expertise to school districts and other community agencies.56
In the late 60s and early 70s the Colorado Migrant Council (CMC), directed by Lalo Delgado, began sending staff to assist Chicano leaders in the Pacific Northwest with the organization of similar migrant councils.\textsuperscript{57} Services such as health and job training were being promoted. The oldest incorporated migrant council today in the Northwest is the Idaho Migrant Council (IMC). The IMC became a public agency in 1971, after the CMC had instigated the development of other migrant councils in Idaho, Wyoming, Washington, Oregon, and Montana in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{58}

Housing is the IMC's major concern. Since 1972, the housing division has spent over 2.5 million dollars on single family homes for migrants and an additional five million dollars on various types of low-income housing. To accomplish all this, the IMC staff has used a combination of resources from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), foundations, banks, public corporations, the state's "Home" program, and various finance agencies. IMC director, Beto Fuentes, notes that, in addition to providing services to farm workers, his agency also acts as a community advocate.\textsuperscript{59} According to Fuentes, IMC works on behalf of farm-worker children once they enter school. The IMC has advised on litigation against several Idaho public school districts. The 1995 Farm Worker Rights bill, which was considered by the Idaho legislature, presents another example of the IMC's advocacy work.

Washington and Idaho have created strong migrant councils offering extensive networks, numerous community services, and well-staffed centers in agricultural areas of these two states. On the other hand, the Oregon Chicano community does not have such migrant councils where one agency provides multiple services to agricultural laborers at nearby multiple sites. Oregon's Chicano community is more dependent on a combination of federal, state, and county agencies. Migrant councils' multiple functions are conducted by the farm worker group PCUN (Pineros y Campesinos Unidos, Noroeste). PCUN has a small full-time, highly trained staff providing farm worker services. Whereas PCUN cannot provide as extensive a range of services as Washington and Idaho migrant councils, it does have advantages of obtaining steady funding from membership dues. Therefore, Oregon farm workers are not dependent on grants from corporations and government agencies as are Washington and Idaho Migrant Councils.

Oregon farm workers typically are confronted with problems seeking out
multiple agencies for assistance with housing, education, health care, and other needs. Oregon's county-level community action agencies have been attempting to provide some of these services. However, many times all they can do is make referrals.

The lack of a single agency providing multiple services to agricultural laborers at locations near farm working communities goes beyond simply rendering effective and efficient services. Migrant councils have the capacity to hire trained staff in medical, business and educational fields as well as provide opportunities for staff development. These organizations are active agents in the political socialization of a younger generation of Chicana and Chicano leaders in the Northwest, as was the case with the War on Poverty experience in this region. Chicanos in Washington and Idaho have seen a number of Mexican-origin individuals elected and appointed to local city councils, county commissions, school boards, and state agencies. Oregon, although having some appointed Chicano and Chicana officials, by comparison, has not demonstrated a similar capacity to make much headway in local and state elections so far. It may take another decade for local and state Chicano representation to yield concrete and extensive results.

Like the Northwest, the Midwest has had an influx of thousands of migrant farm workers since the late 1940s. Major issues facing these farm workers have been and continue to be low wages, lack of medical insurance, inadequate housing, high infant mortality rates, pesticide poisoning, and child labor. Over the years, Mexican American leaders have pressured almost every Midwest state legislature to establish effective migrant councils. These agencies, in turn, have allocated funds for educating migrant children, and for providing health care, adult bilingual education, job training, and adequate housing. In addition to these state agencies, some local Midwest communities have also created support service networks for migrant farm workers.

Electoral Politics and Voting Rights
Chicano leaders in the Midwest and Northwest face serious electoral obstacles denying them a meaningful voice in politics. Racial gerrymandering, at-large election systems, barriers to voter registration, insufficient bilingual voting materials, and the fact that many potential Mexican voters are not citizens, pose serious problems for Chicano politics. In recent years, Chicano commu-
nities have challenged electoral practices in many midwestern cities, including Chicago and Detroit, to name a few. Chicanos have also spearheaded redistricting reforms in the region during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s as well as numerous voter registration efforts. These efforts have been sponsored by many groups such as the League of Mexican American Voters of Illinois; and the Chicano Political Education Group.

Lawsuits were filed pertaining to voting rights violations in Yakima County, Washington, by the ACLU office in Seattle in 1991 and 1992; more investigations occurred in 1995 and 1996. In Idaho, litigation was initiated by Chicanos in challenging the 1990 state plan for redistricting. Chicano groups also appeared before the Idaho State Legislature both in 1990 and in 1980 concerning political redistricting.

Chicanas have been instrumental in organizing voter registration, and political campaigns in numerous Chicano communities. Most community leaders agree that women make up the organizational backbone of nearly all Chicano local and state campaigns. Women have walked precincts, addressed and stuffed envelopes, designed and printed campaign materials, staffed phone banks, and organized the community for voting on election day. “There is no doubt that women have played a key role in the development of Mexican American politics,” says Nancy Barcelo of Iowa City, Iowa. She also noted that women have traditionally had broader networks in the community than men. Most men’s networks revolve around work, whereas Mexican American women are linked to neighborhood organizations such as church and school groups. In Portland, Oregon, for example, Luz Bazán Gutiérrez coordinated a regional voter registration campaign in 1989 and 1990, while directing the Northwest Community Projects. Bazán Gutiérrez worked in areas of Oregon, Washington, Idaho and Montana. Although grants for this effort were received from a number of foundations and churches, initial support was obtained from the Southwest Voter Research Institute in San Antonio, Texas.

Partly as a result of voter registration and education efforts, Chicanos in the Northwest and Midwest have elected members of their communities to public office; in other cases Chicanos have been appointed to city council and school board seats. Within both major parties, Chicanos are making their presence known. For example, Jesse Berain, a Republican state representative from southern Idaho, has served two terms in the house of representatives, receiving im-
important campaign assistance from the GOP after having worked for the party for years. Another Chicano legislator from Oregon, Rocky Barilla, held a legislative seat during the mid-1980s. In Washington, Emilio Cantú, also a Republican, represents the predominantly white and upper middle class Bellvue community. Only Margarita Prentice, in Washington, serves as a Democratic state senator with a significant nonwhite population in her south Seattle district. To win elections, she has forged a multi-ethnic coalition.

Outside of Yakima County the election of Chicanos to local government positions is uncommon. However, the city of Othello in Adams County recently had an Mexican American businessman, Samuel Garza, appointed to the city council. Garza ran unopposed for his seat later in 1994. In the city of Pasco, in Franklin County, Luisa Torres was appointed to the city council in 1990, but was defeated in an election the following year. In 1993, Conrado Cavasos ran for the Pasco City Council, but was convincingly defeated. The Pasco School District elected a conservative Mexican American to the school board in 1993. This person received support from conservative white residents who have opposed Chicano student programs in the district.

In Idaho, Abe Vasquez, a Republican, was elected to the Canyon County Board of Commissioners. In southern Idaho, along the Snake River, where concentrated Chicano communities exist, Chicanos have won city council positions as well as the mayor's office. In Oregon, the election of state and local government officials in recent years, has been less common than in the states of Washington and Idaho.

Despite efforts to register Chicanos, many cities in the Northwest have low numbers and percentages of registered voters who are Spanish surnamed. Low voter turnout is another problem that partly explains the fact that few Chicanos hold elective office in the Northwest even though they often account for 20 to over 50 percent of the population in many non-metropolitan communities.

Mexican Americans' political progress in the Midwest suffered several setbacks in the 1930s and 1940s due to the Great Depression, the deportation and repatriation programs, as well as World War II. Yet by the 1960s and 1970s, Chicanos were again electing candidates to local, state and national offices. By 1985, there were over 450 elected Chicano officials in the Midwest—mostly at the local level. Chicanas, in particular, have broken new ground in the Midwest with elections to dozens of local and county-level offices, includ-
ing those of Mary Simon to the Flint, Michigan, School Board, Irene Hernandez to the Cook County (Illinois) Board of Commissioners, and Frances García to the city council in Hutchinson, Kansas. García later served as mayor, making her the first Mexican American woman to hold such a post in the United States. García noted that: "Mexican American women have always played a critical role in the politics of our community." She observed how prior to World War II, women were involved in many organizations and activities. However, after the war, women's political visibility greatly increased. "To the outside world, Mexican American women appear to be invisible because men generally are the spokespersons. Nothing could be further from the truth." Mexican American women have moved from campaign workers to political officeholders in the last two decades.

**Conclusion**

This research has revealed that Midwest and Northwest Chicanos have identified with many political strategies and movements of Southwest Chicanos. At the same time, these communities outside the Southwest have sought to achieve their goals in light of realities of their own demographic and political circumstances. This situation has tended to bring emphasis to interest group activity as opposed to electoral strategies in these two regions. However, many issues and concerns are still shared in common among Chicanos in all three regions—the Midwest, Northwest and Southwest. These circumstances have opened up possibilities for the creation of a national agenda for this group, while also making it more evident that Chicanos are a national constituency. Recent attacks on bilingual education, undocumented immigrants, affirmative action, and women's rights have sounded an alarm for Chicanos to organize on a national scale. In addition, coalition building with other groups confronted with similar attacks has become more urgent.

The common culture, political experience, and socio-economic circumstances shared by Chicanos in the Midwest, Northwest and Southwest gives impetus to national mobilization. This study has found that national Chicano organizations have networked in all three regions, achieving concrete results in terms of favorable public policies and responsive political leaders. This situation suggests more possibilities for Mexican-origin people within the United States.
At the same time, the authors wish to recognize this study's limitations and suggest future research agendas for these regions. This brief demographic description of the Midwest and Northwest is not meant to be definitive, but rather to suggest that electoral strategies in these regions, particularly for state and federal offices, have serious limitations for Chicanos. Because some areas of both regions are growing quickly, further demographic studies are needed not only to count individuals in these communities but also to assess the educational achievement, socio-economic characteristics and family structure of this group. The migrant labor stream in the Midwest and Northwest has long delivered many Chicanos and Mexicanos to these areas. Explanations as to the growth of Chicano populations in urban areas of the two regions should also be researched and evaluated. The census has shown that a large percentage of the Chicano population in both regions is dominantly Spanish-speaking. This situation has implications for government services and marketing done by the private sector. To facilitate further research on the Midwest and Northwest, more comparative studies of the Southwest, with cases from other regions having significant Chicano populations, might be pursued.

Finally, the nature and scope of Chicano organizational activity in the Midwest and Northwest, like that in the Southwest, is most important. However, this article has focused specifically on interest groups. The authors realize that this is a standard unit of analysis in Political Science; specific topics may not be adequately discussed when limited to interest groups. One such subject is the empowerment of women and Chicanas. Studies have shown that Chicanas, particularly from lower socio-economic backgrounds, establish linkages to their communities via the family. In attempting to confront the everyday struggles of family life, Chicanas may engage in issues like the adequacy of park facilities in their communities, or participate in functions of local churches that may provide social services to their families. This work is unpaid and unrecognized. However, this unpaid labor develops skills in negotiating, fund raising, and neighborhood organizing. Undoubtedly these are necessary political skills. This road to empowerment is significant for a large segment of the population, but has been neglected in studies of Chicanas and other groups in general. Although the authors have attempted to describe Chicana political participation, we realize that this is a very limited sample of Mexican American women who engage in the political sphere as part of their everyday life struggle.
NOTES

1 The authors greatly appreciate all of the support from numerous community leaders who enriched this article with their invaluable insights and knowledge on the post-World War II development of the Mexican American community in the Midwest and Pacific Northwest. In addition we wish to thank Stuart Anderson for his excellent editing and helpful suggestions on our manuscript. Finally, this article is dedicated to our colleague, Ricardo Sánchez, and the loving memory of Gloria Ramírez Santillán.

2 The terms Mexican American and Chicano are used interchangeably in this paper. "Mexican American" is used in describing Mexican-origin people in the United States. "Chicano" generally is used as a self-descriptive term for people of Mexican descent in this country, and it is a term that emerged as a result of the Chicano Movement in the 1960s. Chicano also reflects a more politicized group of Mexican-origin people. Latino refers to all people of Latin American descent in the U.S.


After the early period of Spanish/Mexican exploration in the Pacific Northwest, Mexicanos first entered this region in significant numbers in the mid-19th century. In the 1850s, Mexican arrieros, or muleteers, conducted business in the mining camps of southern Oregon. By the late 1860s Mexican sheepherders were grazing sheep in eastern Oregon while Mexican cowboys were gaining a reputation as cowhands in Oregon's ranches. See Gilberto García, "Mexicanos in Othello, Washington: The Excluded Chapter in the History of Adams County," forthcoming in Revista Apple, 1995.

As Mexicans became permanent laborers in the Northwest and Midwest, they took the first steps toward developing stable communities. Many Mexican workers, for example, returned to Texas, Mexico, or the Southwest to find brides or to bring established families to their new homes in the north. Literally thousands of Mexican children were born in the Midwest or Northwest during the first quarter of the century. The presence of wives and children transformed Mexican neighborhoods from areas inhabited by transient males to full-fledged, multigenerational communities of men, women and children.


6 Raúl Morín, Among the Valiant: Mexican Americans in World War II and Korea, Borden Publishing Company, Alhambra, California, 1966. Many Mexican American men and women serving in the military, showed themselves to be people of great physical courage, demonstrated by the numerous military medals awarded to them as well as the media attention focused on their heroic actions. Their actions on the battlefield brought increased respect and pride to their communities.

One instance of military enlistment by a Mexican American woman, was that of Victoria Archuleta Sierra. Born in La Junta, Colorado, in 1924, she came with her family to Pocatello, Idaho, where they settled permanently. She enlisted in the Army at Pocatello and served with distinction as a nurse during World War II. See Erasmo Gamboa, "Voces Hispanas/Hispanic Voices of Idaho," Boise, Idaho: Idaho Commission on Hispanic Affairs and Idaho Humanities Council, 1992.


For information on the Pacific Northwest braceros see Ibid., Gamboa, Mexican Labor and World War II. For information on the Midwest braceros see: Gopher Historian, Fall, 1971, Minnesota Historical Society, p. 18; and Interview with John Quintana, 6-10-87. (Mr. Quintana came to the Midwest as part of the bracero program.) and Ibid., Valdés, Al Norte, chapter 5.

Interviews with Ben Franco, Omaha, Nebraska, August 18, 1985, Joe Terronez, Silvis, Illinois, June 21, 1986, Felisa Ruiz, Kansas City, Missouri, February 24, 1987, and Hazel Gómez, Topeka, Kansas, February 9, 1987. All four of these individuals were active with the post-war civil rights movement for social and economic equality for Mexican Americans.


Interview with Erasmo Gamboa, Professor of Chicano Studies and History at the University of Washington, October 6, 1996.

Interview with José Juárez, South Bend, Indiana, August 13, 1986. This student leader discussed the political climate on college campuses during this time: Chicano students and community leaders realized that the graduation of Mexican Americans from college was key to broadening the cultural and political agendas in the community. There were many protests throughout the Midwest regarding access and retention of Chicano students in higher education.


Interview with Louis Gonzales, East Chicago, Indiana, August 2, 1986.


The schools which comprised ACCA were the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, Wayne State University in Detroit, Oakland University in Pontiac, Delta Community College, Eastern Michigan University in Ypsilanti, Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan University in Lansing, and Saginaw Valley State University.


*Ibid., Estrada, (forthcoming) “Political Mobilization and Representation in Mexican Origin Communities in Eastern Washington.”*

For reference materials on the Northwest demographics and Chicano voting data see:


For reference material on Midwest demographics and data on Chicano voting see:


“Profiles, Political/Demographic, Hispanics in the City of Chicago,” Midwest Voter Registration Education Project, 1983.

“Profiles, Political/Demographic, Hispanics in Ohio,” Midwest Voter Registration Education Project, 1983-84.

“Profiles, Political/Demographic, Hispanics in Michigan and Wisconsin,” Midwest Voter Registration Education Project, 1983-84.


Interviews with Mary Gonzales, April 25, 1995, Baldimar Vasquez, Toledo, Ohio, September 2, 1985; and Ella Ochoa, North Platte, Nebraska; Ramon Ramirez, president and Mary Gonzales, staff member of Pineros y Campesinos Unidos, Noroeste, Woodburn, Oregon, April, 25, 1995; Rosalinda Guillén, Coordinator for United Farm Workers of Washington State, Sunnyside, Washington, March 24, 1995; and Rogelio Valdez, Complaints Investigator with Monitor Advocate Unit, Idaho Department of Employment, Boise, Idaho, May 2, 1995. All of these individuals are extremely active in organizing and union-
izing farm workers in their respective states.

29 Interviews with Mario Compean, Madison, Wisconsin, July 7, 1986; Olga Villa Parra, South Bend, Indiana, August 30, 1985; and Gloria Cardenas Cudia, Rockford, Illinois, April 1, 1987. Some of these groups in the Midwest include the Ohio State Migrant Council, Western Kansas Migrant Health Project, Oklahoma Rural Opportunities Development Corporation, Illinois Migrant Council and Midwest Farm Worker Employment and Training, Inc.

30 Ibid., Valdés, Al Norte, chapter 8.


32 These Midwest commissions include the Governor’s Council for Spanish Speaking Peoples (Wisconsin); Commission on Spanish-Speaking Affairs (Ohio); Oklahoma Commission on Mexican American Affairs; Mexican American Commission (Nebraska); Spanish Speaking Affairs Council (Minnesota), Spanish Speaking Peoples Commission (Iowa); Commission on the Status of Spanish Heritage Peoples (Indiana); Commission on Spanish-Speaking Affairs (Michigan); Governor’s Advisory Council on Hispanic Affairs (Missouri); and Advisory Committee on Mexican American Affairs (Kansas).

33 Interviews with Lydia Guerra, director of the Idaho Commission on Hispanic Affairs, March 29, 1995; Annabelle Jaramillo, Oregon Citizens’ Advisor to the Governor and former Director of the Oregon Commission on Hispanic Affairs, March 27, 1995; and Jaime Gallardo, administrative assistant to the Washington Commission on Hispanic Affairs, Olympia, Wash., May 17, 1995.

34 Interviews with Leticia Patino, Columbus, Ohio, September 1, 1985; Jose Trejo, St. Paul, Minnesota, July 1, 1986; Francisco Rodriguez, Madison, Wisconsin, August 7, 1986; Miguel Teran, Des Moines, Iowa, July 18, 1986; Rudy Perales, Lincoln, Nebraska, August 17, 1985; Anabelle Jaramillo, Oregon’s Citizen’s Advisor to the Governor, Salem, Oregon, March 27, 1995; Lydia Guerra, Director of the Idaho Commission of Hispanic Affairs, Boise, Idaho, March 29, 1995; Jaime Gallardo, Olympia, Wash., May 17, 1995. All of these individuals served as executive directors of the commissions in their respective states.


36 Interview with Jesse Berain, Boise, Idaho, April 9, 1995.

37 Interview with Magarita Sugiyama de Mendoza, former citizens advisor to the Governor of Washington State, May 15, 1995.

38 Interview with Anabelle Jaramillo, Oregon Citizens’ Advisor to the Governor, March 27, 1995.

39 Interview with Roberto Maestes, Director of Centro de la Raza, and Stella Ortega, Chair of the Washington State Commission on Hispanic Affairs, Seattle, April 20, 1995.


41 Some of the centers include El Centro Cultural Hispano and Chicano, El Centro Servicios Para Mexicanos, Chicano Awareness Center, La Clinica Benito Juárez, El Centro de la Causa, La Casa Aztlán, the Chicano and Indian American Cultural Center, El Centro Pan Americano, Spanish Center, Spanish-Speaking Information Center, Mexican American
Culture Center, El Centro de Western Kansas, Hispanic Center of Indianapolis, Guadalupe Center, Hispanic Center of Western Michigan, and El Centro de la Comunidad. These organizations provide, among other services, employment referrals, medical advice, social and educational opportunities, immigration and naturalization assistance, and recreational facilities.

42 Written correspondence with Sylvia Puente, Director of Research and Documentation, Chicago, Illinois, January 5, 1995.

43 Written correspondence with Refugio I. Rochín, Director of the Julian Samora Institute, East Lansing, Michigan, May 4, 1995.

44 Interview with Paula Jasso, Topeka, Kansas, September, 1994.


46 Other women's groups noted in the Midwest are: Mujeres Unidas, Las Mujeres de la Esperanza, El Grupo de Mujeres Latinas, Mujeres Latinas en Acción, the Mexican Ladies Association, the Hispanic Women's Network, the Hispanic Women's Forum, the Alliance of Latin Women of Waukesha (Wisconsin), and Las Mujeres Unidas de Michigan.

47 Interview with Tony Sandoval, Yakima City, November 22, 1994.

48 Interview with Tony Sandoval, November 22, 1994.

49 Interview with Leo Puga, President of IMAGE of Idaho, Boise, May 23, 1995.

50 Interview with María Elena C. Hawkins, President of OCHA, Portland, OR, May 12, 1995.

51 Interview with María Elena C. Hawkins, May 12, 1995.

52 Interview with Ricardo Parra, South Bend, Indiana, October 10, 1985. Parra was one of the key organizers and leaders of the MWCLR. Another group formed in 1971 was the Latin American Congress (Congreso Latino). On January 16, 1971, 810 people representing 45 organizations in the Milwaukee area met to establish a central organization to coordinate the various activities and services to better serve the people of the community. Citation from: Latin American Convention, July 16, 1971, published by Latin American Union for Civil Rights, Inc.

53 Interview with Juan Andrade, Toledo, Ohio, September 2, 1985. Andrade, for the past seven years, has served as the director of the MWVRP.

54 Interview with Ricardo García, Past Director of the Northwest Regional Organization, Granger, Wash. May 30, 1995.


58 Interview with Beto Fuentes, Director of the Idaho Migrant Council, Boise, Idaho, May 24, 1995. Today the IMC also administers programs in Wyoming and Montana. Four-
teen IMC Migrant Head Start centers are currently operating in Idaho, Wyoming and Montana. The Head Start centers provide not only educational programs for children but also provide children with physical and dental exams, and nutritional programs. Head Start parents are assisted by IMC in seeking medical services for children with disabilities.

Interview with Beto Fuentes, May 24, 1995.

Ibid., Miller “Community Action and Reaction.”

Interview with Juan Cardena, Muscatine, Iowa, June 20, 1986. Some of these community groups include Las Clinicas Migrantes Regional, Ohio State Texas Migrant Council, Committee on Migrant Relations, Western Kansas Migrant Health Project, Migrants in Action, La Escuela de Migración de Emporia (Kansas), Council of Agricultural Workers and Low-Income Families of Kansas, United Migrant Opportunities Service, Inc., Associated Migrant Opportunity Services, Migrant Legal Action Program, and Midwest Farmworker Employment and Training, Inc.

Other cities which have seen Chicanos challenge electoral results include: Philadelphia, Milwaukee, Dodge City (Kansas), Scottsbluff (Nebraska), Omaha, Topeka, East Chicago, Cleveland, and Kansas City.

Interviews with Robert A. Ruiz, Kansas City, Kansas, August 14, 1985, and Juan Andrade, Toledo, Ohio, September 2, 1985. Other groups which have sponsored Chicano voter registration in the Midwest include: the United Mexican-American Voters of Kansas, Iowa, and Missouri; the Alianza Chicana de Iowa; the Wisconsin Voter Education Project; the Mexican American Voters of Nebraska; and the Concerned Mexican American Voters of Kansas.

Interview, with Luz Bazán Gutiérrez in Yakima City, September 10, 1994, former director of Northwest Community Projects' voter registration drive.

Interview with Beto Fuentes, Caldwell, Idaho, June 29, 1995.

Interview with Nancy “Rusty” Barcelo, Iowa City, Iowa, June 26, 1986.

Interview with Luz Bazán Gutiérrez, Yakima City, October 29, 1995.

Interview with Annabelle Jaramillo, March 27, 1995.

Daniel Estrada, “Chicano Politics in the Northwest,” unpublished manuscript.

Information on elected officials in Idaho was obtained from the 1995 Directory of Idaho Government Officials, Boise, ID: Association of Idaho Cities.

Ibid., Estrada, “Political Mobilization and Representation in Mexican Origin Communities of Eastern Washington.”


Interview with Frances García, Hutchinson, Kansas, January 27, 1987.

The Mexican-Origin Population in the Midwest, by State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Mexican-Origin Population</th>
<th>Percent Mexican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>11,430,602</td>
<td>623,688</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>5,544,159</td>
<td>66,736</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>2,776,755</td>
<td>24,386</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>2,477,574</td>
<td>75,798</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>9,295,297</td>
<td>138,312</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>4,375,099</td>
<td>34,312</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>5,117,073</td>
<td>38,274</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>1,578,385</td>
<td>29,665</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>10,847,115</td>
<td>57,815</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>4,847,115</td>
<td>57,615</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>58,333,828</td>
<td>1,146,980</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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</table>

The Mexican-Origin Population in the Pacific Northwest, by State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Total Latinos</th>
<th>Percent Latino</th>
<th>Mexican-Origin Population</th>
<th>Percent Mexican Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>4,866,700</td>
<td>214,570</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>155,864</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>1,006,749</td>
<td>52,927</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>43,213</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>2,842,321</td>
<td>112,707</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>85,632</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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