

COUNTERTERRORISM TACTICS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION AND CIVILIAN ABUSE DURING CIVIL WARS

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# **Counterterrorism Tactics: The Relationship Between Leadership Decapitation and Civilian Abuse During Civil Wars**

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## **Abstract**

Does a relationship exist between leadership decapitation and the abuse of civilians during a civil war? This project creates a new data set in combination with existing data on leadership change and civil war termination to determine whether leadership decapitation in rebel groups that use terrorist strategies affects the likelihood of civilian abuse. A study is done on 44 cases of decapitation where the leader of a rebel group was arrested, killed, or replaced during the course of their respective nation's civil war. This project also conducted a case study on the behavior of a rebel group in the country of Algeria during their civil war. The results show that most groups utilize the same strategies before and after the decapitation of their leader and also attack the same targets. Looking at the short term after the date of decapitation, groups are more likely to utilize the same attack method and attack the same targets. The results also indicate that leadership decapitation does not alter the tactic utilized by a group during a civil war after the date of decapitation. Leadership decapitation also does not increase the likelihood of civilian abuse within one, two, or three months after the date of decapitation. If a group was abusing civilians before the death, arrest, or replacement of their leader, then they will continue to abuse civilians after the date of decapitation. Ultimately, understanding the causes behind the violent methods used by terrorist and rebel groups will help promote conflict resolution and prevent the use of violent means against civilians.

## **Keywords**

decapitation, leaders, civilians, abuse, civil war

## **Introduction**

Terrorism and Civil War are often studied separately but share common tactics. Both rebel groups and terrorist organizations are typically small organizations lacking vast resources, which are needed in conventional warfare. This is the cause for confusion when discussing rebel groups that utilize terrorist tactics. The structure of these organizations is the reason why their leaders are vital. The leaders of terrorist organizations and rebel groups have an important role in conflict processes and must accept responsibility for the behavior, failure, and relative success of the organization (Prorok 2015). For this reason, one of the most popular counterterrorism techniques used by governments across the world is leadership decapitation. Leadership decapitation of groups that use terrorist tactics is supposed to symbolize the capitulation of the group. But what does leadership decapitation mean for the targets of terrorism? Will there be less victims of terrorism if leadership decapitation occurs?

In November of 1975, civil war began in Angola after Angola had only recently become independent from Portugal. A power sharing agreement among the three main rebel organizations collapsed and each group declared their independence from Angola. These groups, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) engaged in a power struggle for control of Angola. Their ethnic differences and international pressures led to their fractionalization. In order to further their goals, UNITA engaged in the use of terrorist tactics and began abusing civilians. Jonas Savimbi founded UNITA and led the organization until his death on February 2, 2002 in an ambush. In the months preceding the death of Savimbi, UNITA engaged in civilian abuses through bombings and armed assaults. The day of his death, UNITA participated in an armed assault as well as a hostage taking which are strategies used by terrorists that ultimately abuse civilians (GTD). In the months following his death, UNITA engaged in more civilian abuses than they had previously. UNITA directly engaged in the deaths and abuse of more civilians before the death of their leader than after his death. Shortly after his death, a peace agreement was signed with the Angolan government and UNITA transformed itself into a political party (UCDP).

The civil war in Angola is in contrast to the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) because UNITA utilized terrorist tactics and abused civilians around the time of the death of their leader whereas the rebel group in Côte d'Ivoire did not. In September of 2002, civil war broke out in the country of Côte d'Ivoire after a coup by Northern Army officers. One of the main rebel groups fighting against the government was the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest, Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO). The MPIGO claimed to be a movement seeking to overthrow the government and to avenge the death of General Guei, the country's former military ruler (1999-2000) who was shot dead when the Ivorian conflict first erupted in September 2002. The leader of the MPIGO was Felix Doh until his death in 2003 after tensions between him and the opposing forces of Liberia and Sierra Leone worsened (UCDP). According to the Correlates of War, the conflict ended in 2004 but only after 200 military deaths and 2500 rebel deaths. Felix Doh was allegedly killed by government aligned Liberian mercenaries during a peace process started by France. It was thought that Doh's death did not have any impact on the peace process (Telegraph 2003). According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), The MPIGO did not engage in civilian abuses before or after the death of Doh. They also did not utilize terrorist tactics or abuse civilians during the Ivorian civil war.

The presence and absence of terrorism and civilian victimization during the civil wars in Angola and the Ivory Coast has led to questions about how variables overlap during a civil war. More specifically, how leadership change, terrorism, and civilian abuse function as strategies during a civil war. These conditions are important to consider because they can each have an impact on the civil war. This project focused on answering one main question: Is there a relationship between leadership decapitation and civilian abuse in civil wars?

This project is geared towards understanding political violence strategies. This project investigates when and why violent non-state actors use terrorism as a strategy to further their goals. An investigation was completed on the activity of terrorist organizations and rebel groups. The project includes an examination of: terrorism, conventional civil warfare, and interstate wars

in general. This study has focused on strategies used only in the context of civil war. One of the strategies used by rebel groups in civil war is terrorism.

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) define civil war as an internal conflict with at least 1,000 combat related deaths per year. In order to distinguish wars from massacres, both government forces and an identifiable rebel organization must suffer at least 5% of these fatalities. Civil wars are commonly associated with the death of humans and specifically, civilian abuse. It is estimated that since 1945, civil wars have caused the deaths of more than 16.2 million people. This number does not include the deaths from the indirect costs of internal conflict such as famine, disease, and the economic impact (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Tiernay (2015) studied rebel groups that used terrorist tactics during civil wars and his work defines leadership decapitation synonymously with leadership change. According to his work, there are three ways that leadership decapitation can be achieved. A leader can be killed, replaced, or arrested.

The word assassination applies to the murder of a leader by government forces or a rival rebel organization regardless of the legality of the activities of the group. Abbas al-Musawi of Hezbollah, a political and military Shiite Muslim organization in Lebanon, was killed on February 16, 1992. He was killed by Israeli forces and the lightning strike by helicopters also left his bodyguards, wife, and son dead.

Oscar Ramirez Duran of Sendero Rojo (Red Path) was arrested in 1999 after the previous leader of the original rebel group, Abimael Guzman of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), was arrested in 1992. Arrest as a decapitation method is the least common of the three because of the lack of permanence. The death of a leader almost always ensures replacement and the replacement of a leader opens up more possibilities and opportunities for that organization. The replacement of a leader can allow the group to conduct tactical shifts or engage in negotiations to end the conflict.

Leaders who are internally replaced have a complicated categorization because it is possible that they were forced to step down by the organization, they resigned, or were voted out of power. The rebel group Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) experienced the replacement of three leaders within a span of two years. Ernest Wamba dia Wamba was replaced in 1999 after the RCD began experiencing internal tensions and split into several different movements in 1999. He was succeeded by Emile Ilunga who was replaced in 2000. Ilunga was succeeded by Adolphe Omusumba, who was also replaced in 2001.

Leadership decapitation has an impact on terrorist activity. Jordan (2009) discovered that a group's age, size, and type are critical in identifying when decapitation will cause the cessation of terrorist activity. Carvin (2012) found general pronouncements on whether targeted killing is or is not an effective counterterrorism tactic. However, most research neglects to look at whether a variation in leadership changes strategies and/or influences groups to behave differently. It is for these reasons that it is viable to study whether different types of decapitation explain the decisions of these groups. This analysis is interested in whether leadership decapitation affects

the dynamics of terrorist tactics in civil war. More specifically, how does leadership decapitation in rebel groups affect civilian abuse?

This project includes the use of qualitative and quantitative analysis. A literature review was completed to study current knowledge on leadership decapitation, victimization in civil wars, and terrorism in civil wars. Quantitatively, this study will look at patterns of civilian abuse over time in relation to the date of the leadership change. The goal is to question when groups use certain strategies in the context of leadership decapitation. Are particular groups specializing in certain methods such as terrorism? And how does leadership decapitation affect civilian abuse? Most literature on leadership decapitation focuses on terrorism in general but does not consider how decapitation affects the nature of terrorism during civil wars. Ultimately, I find initial evidence to suggest that leadership decapitation does not systematically affect the tactics and targets of rebel groups using terrorism. Many groups continue to engage in the same types of attacks and focus on the same targets as they did before their leader was killed, arrested, or replaced.

## **Literature Review**

Previous studies have looked at the effectiveness of leadership decapitation as a counterterrorism strategy as well as the impact that terrorism has on civilians. They find mixed results. The most common theory is that killing leaders is not an effective counterterrorism strategy. Research has been conducted on the effectiveness of leadership decapitation and whether killing leaders can impact the outcome of wars. Throughout the course of the literature review, it was discovered that leadership change has an impact on the outcome of a civil war. When the leader of a rebel group is captured or killed, wars are more likely to end. This is because if the leader of a rebel group or an organization changes, then it is understood that this impacts the stability of a group as well as their will to continue fighting (Tiernay 2015).

In the last few years, the media's attention to civil wars has changed due to the level of technology now available to journalists and the media. Also, the public is fascinated with understanding how and why a nation would take arms against those within their borders. What is the mindset of those who engage in a civil war? During civil wars, rebel groups often utilize many tactics in order to win. And many of these tactics are similar to those used by terrorist organizations. Both civil wars and terrorist tactics often lead to civilian abuse and the deaths of many non-combatants.

It is logical to believe that targeting top terrorists would put an end to terrorism. After the death of Osama bin Laden in May of 2011, it was believed that his death would mean the end of Al-Qaeda. Although the leader was difficult to replace, his decapitation did not result in the capitulation of the terrorist organization. Especially after the decapitation of the leader of Al-Qaeda, current literature has presented mixed results in regards to the effectiveness of leadership decapitation in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns.

Polo & Gleditsch (2016) suggest that terrorism as a tactic can be helpful as a method of coercion for the government in asymmetric conflicts, as rebels are typically weak relative to the government. But terrorism can also help communicate the goals and resolve of a group when

there is widespread uncertainty. Consistent with Wood (2010), terrorism is used more extensively in civil wars by weaker groups. Groups with more inclusive audiences are more likely to focus on 'hard' or official targets, while groups with more factional audiences are more likely to attack 'soft' targets and civilians.

Leadership targeting of terrorist organizations has been a key feature of the counterterrorism policies of many nations. However, many scholars have maintained that that leadership decapitation is either ineffective or counterproductive.

For example, Jordan (2009) argues against the idea that the removal of leaders is an effective strategy in combating terrorism. She claims that not only is leadership decapitation not always successful but that existing empirical work is inadequate and for this reason creates her own dataset. She concludes that a group's age, size, and type are critical in identifying when decapitation will cause the cessation of terrorist activity. As a terrorist organization grows in size and age, it is much more likely to endure the removal of its leader. Organizations based on ideological beliefs are most likely to experience a termination of their activity after the removal of their leader, while religious organizations are more resistant to leadership decapitation.

Price (2012) argues that because terrorist groups amplify the importance of leaders, they are more susceptible to decapitation. He also addresses the dilemma that they face which is that their organizational characteristics (they are violent, clandestine, and values based) intensify the difficulties of leadership succession ultimately leading to the termination of the activities of the group. Contrary to Jordan (2009) he finds that leadership decapitation significantly increases the mortality rate of terrorist groups. Additionally, in contrast to Jordan, politically relevant terrorist groups are able to withstand attacks against their leadership significantly longer than other types of organizations. Consistent with Jordan's research, he finds that the effect of decapitation decreases with the age of the group.

The research of Johnston (2012) finds that wars are more likely to end when counterinsurgents kill insurgent leaders. Also, counterinsurgents that capture or kill the insurgent leaders are more likely to defeat the insurgency. The intensity of a conflict is likely to decrease after the decapitation of an insurgent leader. Leadership decapitation also increases the probability of government victory. Finally, terrorist activity from the organization is more likely to decrease after successful leadership decapitation. Regardless of the type of terrorist organization, leadership decapitation is successful.

If we believe that leadership decapitation in terrorist organizations does not lead to a cessation in behavior as Jenna Jordan does, then is it possible for leadership decapitation in rebel organizations to be effective? Does rebel leader decapitation cause groups to engage in (more) terrorism? More specifically, does rebel leader decapitation cause groups to change their attack method and/or their targets?

What is the effect of leadership decapitation in civil wars? There is not much literature available on rebel leaders and civil war termination. However, Tiernay (2015) specifically looks at leadership change in rebel organizations during civil wars and how that affects termination. He finds that a civil war is more likely to end when the leader of a rebel group is captured or killed.

A civil war is less likely to end if the rebel group is led by their founder. Lastly, if the leader of a state that presided over the beginning of the conflict is present, then the civil war is more likely to end than if a replacement leader is present as the head of the rebel group.

Why do rebel groups target civilians in civil wars? Rebel groups are logical in their behavior as well as in their decisions. They make decisions based on how they believe the government and their own civilian constituencies will respond to their behavior. Stanton (2013) finds that rebel groups that are challenging democratic governments are more likely to use terrorism. This is because they believe their opponents will be more sensitive to civilian losses and therefore, more likely to make concessions in response to their use of violence. Democracies are more sympathetic to the deaths of civilians than are other regime types. Rebel groups must also weigh the costs of violence before targeting civilians. Rebel groups that have more diverse civilian constituencies must choose lower-casualty civilian targets, in order to minimize the public's distaste of their behavior. Also, democracies have to be loyal to their constituencies since they are the ones who put them in power. The public is less likely to vote for a government that they believed did nothing to cease civilian abuses.

Wood (2010) finds that weaker rebel groups escalate violence in the face of indiscriminate regime counterinsurgency tactics and stronger groups employ comparatively less violence against civilians as regime violence escalates. Stronger rebel groups have the capability and the confidence to utilize strategies other than civilian victimization.

Rebel groups also target civilians in civil wars because civilian victimization is a method of recruitment for the organization. Rebel groups can promise civilians incentives to join their organization such as money, resources, and/or the promise of women. Community ties do have an impact on the decision to abuse civilians. High levels of abuse are exhibited by rebel organizations that are unable to police the behavior of their members because they are more ethnically fragmented, rely on material incentives to recruit participants, and lack mechanisms for punishing indiscipline (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006).

Rebel groups that believe that fear and intimidation will help them achieve their larger political objectives will use terrorism as a strategy however, they are less likely to win in the end. Fortna (2015) finds that not only do terrorists not win, civil wars involving terrorism last longer than other wars. Terrorism may be less effective against democracies, but even in this context, terrorists do not win.

In terms of civil war outcomes, Thomas (2014) states that rebel groups are both more likely to be granted the opportunity to participate in negotiations and more likely to be offered concessions when they execute a greater number of terror attacks during civil wars. This is known as rewarding bad behavior. The more civilians they abuse, the more likely the opposition group will offer negotiations. If we assume the government is sympathetic to the death of their constituents, then other than succumbing to the demands of the rebel group, the next best option is negotiation.

Rebel groups use terrorism during civil war because the benefits outweigh the costs. Rising battlefield costs incentivize attacks on civilians in the period immediately following the

accrual of losses. However, effective control over the territory and the sources of rebel financing place conditions on this relationship. If the rebel organization is receiving financial assistance from a democracy, then they are less likely to engage in terrorism. Wood (2014) investigates how the outcomes of discrete conflict interactions influence subsequent patterns of rebel violence against civilians. He discovers that the increase in battlefield costs incentivize attacks on civilians after the accumulation of losses. Also, factors that facilitate bargaining with civilians decrease the odds of rebel violence against civilians.

## **Theory & Hypothesis**

Leadership decapitation is a tactic used by governments as a counterterrorism strategy. However, civilian victimization is also a tactic used by rebel groups and/or terrorist organizations. This occurs when a group uses violence to target noncombatants. Groups that use more violence or victimize more civilians are more likely to have their needs met either in terms of a compromise or negotiation by the government or whoever they see as their enemy.

Regardless of the how the leader was removed, if the group was already participating in civilian victimization, then the removal of one of their leaders will incite more retaliation and can increase the likelihood that civilian victimization will increase. Groups that have experienced repression from the government, groups with a weak organizational structure, and groups that are competing with another rebel group or organization are more likely to increase civilian abuse after a leader is decapitated.

Looking at the most extreme of the decapitation types, a leader that is killed can have the most impact on a group. Within this, we are likely to see more civilian abuse from the group. Civilian victimization may increase as this may be a method for recruitment for the group or a method of coercion and intimidation as well as a way to force cooperation from the civilians. After their leader has been killed the group may also become more desperate to win.

Leaders who are replaced or are arrested highlight an interesting dynamic within the group. If a leader dies, he is not a threat to the integrity of the organization and he is therefore unable to provide secrets or information. However, if he is arrested or replaced, he may still be able to influence the behavior of the group. It is possible that arrests or replacements can lead to amnesty. The loss of a leader might make rebel groups reassess their attitude towards civilians either by choice or necessity.

Groups that have had a leader arrested usually want their leader returned and are willing to take more extreme measures to ensure that their leader is returned. Civilian victimization may also increase from the arrest of a leader because this is a way for groups to address the power asymmetry that may be present. They understand that the government is their audience and civilian victimization may be a cheap way to impose costs.

By Tiernay's definition, a leader who is decapitated is killed, replaced, or arrested. Understanding the definition of decapitation causes these question to arise: What is the reason for the change in leadership? Is it the shock to the organization or the actions of the government that lead to a change? Maybe they replaced the leader because they wanted to change their

strategy or because they wanted to negotiate a settlement. Culpable leaders are less likely to negotiate settlements and the removal of a leader tends to act as a catalyst to conflict termination (Prorok 2015).

After decapitation, rebel groups should use the same tactics against the same targets. Groups should continue to use the same tactics before and after a decapitation event for many reasons. Rebel groups may begin victimizing civilians and using terrorism when they want to make the government suffer in terms of public opinion (Thomas 2014, Fortna 2015) and when they are weaker relative to the government (Polo & Gleditsch 2016, Wood 2010). Both of these factors might be particularly true when a rebel group has recently lost their leader. So we should expect groups that were already using terrorism to maintain or even escalate their attacks, and those groups that were not using terrorism before to begin using it (escalation).

My theory was developed by investigating the nexus of political violence strategies – namely, when violent non-state actors mix strategies of terrorism, conventional civil warfare, violent resistance, and interstate wars.

I examine the following five hypotheses:

H1: Any type of decapitation will lead to an escalation in the number of groups using bombings and explosions as an attack method.

H2: Any type of decapitation will lead to an escalation in the number of groups using assassinations as an attack method.

H3: Any type of decapitation will lead to an escalation in the number of groups utilizing hostage taking/kidnappings as an attack method.

H4: Any type of decapitation will lead to an escalation in the number of groups targeting civilians.

H5: Any type of decapitation will lead to an escalation in the number of groups targeting government.

## **Research Design**

### **Data Collection**

I created my own dataset in combination with existing data from another article. The source from which I started my data collection comes from Michael Tiernay (2015). Tiernay's work focuses on the relationship between leadership change and the probability of conflict termination in civil war. I utilized a list of 44 decapitated leaders found in Tiernay's research. In his list, he presents the group name, country, removal type, and date of removal for each leader on the list.

I created a spreadsheet with the leader name, group, and year of decapitation organized by year from this list. The Global Terrorism Database was used to gather information about terrorist attacks perpetrated by rebel groups that had experienced leadership decapitation. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open source database including information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2015 (GTD 2016).

I then utilized GTD to track the number of attacks perpetrated by that group three, two and one month after the decapitation date. I also tracked the number of attacks three, two, and one month after the decapitation date. This was done in order to compare the number of attacks, target types, and methods used by the organization before and after the decapitation date.

## **Definition of Terms**

Tiernay defines leadership decapitation synonymously with leadership change. Decapitation in Tiernay's work occurs when a leader is killed, arrested, or replaced. It is also vital to mention that Tiernay looked at rebel groups that used terrorist tactics during civil wars. Hoffman (2006) develops a definition of terrorism which states: "Terrorism is thus violence – or equally important, the threat of violence- used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim" (Hoffman 2). This definition was used to ensure that the groups studied were actually engaging in terrorism. Because the behavior of all rebel groups is geared towards a political aim, the term terrorism applied to all of the groups used in this study.

For my research I created the variable *civilian target before* and *civilian target after* and defined it as private citizens/property, religious figures, journalists, businesses, tourists, educational institutions, and transportation before and after. Therefore, any time a group attacked any of these seven groups, I considered that civilian abuse.

I also created the variable *government target before* and *government target after*. For my government target variable I included police, military, government general, and government diplomatic. If any of these four groups were attacked, I considered this a government attack. I created this variable in order to study the entirety of civilians and governments that are targets of attack methods such as assassination and hostage taking/kidnapping.

For each leader type, I documented not only the number of attacks around the removal date, but whether they utilized certain attack methods on certain target types. I placed a 0 in my data if a group did not utilize that type of attack method or if they did not attack a certain target. I placed a 1 in my data if a group utilized that type of attack method or if they attacked a certain target before and after the removal date for the leader. For groups that did not engage in any behavior in the time period preceding and after the decapitation, they received a 0 for each variable. For groups that were not on GTD, they also received a 0 for each variable.

## **Methods of Analysis**

In order to analyze the data, I conducted a cross tabulation analysis for my variables. A cross tabulation table provides information about the relationship between two or more variables. I compared the use of particular tactics before and after the decapitation date. I also compared the use of certain tactics against civilian targets and government targets before and after the decapitation date. I wanted to know if tactics, targets, or both were impacted by the decapitation. When analyzing the cross tabulations, an emphasis will be placed on whether a group changed their tactic or their target. If a group did not participate in assassinations before nor after the decapitation date, then that is evident of fixed behavior and is not consulted for this research. Cross tabulation does not allow us to control for other factors that might influence the use of

terrorism in civil war, but these analyses do offer some initial evidence as to patterns of rebel group behavior before and after leadership decapitation.

## Findings

The use of bombings and explosions appears the most frequently as a method of attack for many groups. Table 1 corresponds with Hypothesis 1 and demonstrates a cross tabulation between the method of bombing before and after the decapitation date.

Table 1

		Bombings/Explosions After	
		No	Yes
Bombings/Explosions Before	No	32	1
	Yes	3	8

The results indicate that of 44 different decapitation occurrences, there is one instance where a group did not utilize bombings and explosions as a method before but utilized it as a tactic after the decapitation date. This occurred with the death of Abdurajak Janjalani from Abu Sayyaf on December 18, 1998.

There are three instances where a group changed their tactic by utilizing bombings and explosions before the decapitation date and then abstaining from the use of bombings and explosions after the decapitation date. This occurred with the deaths of Abu Ali Mustafa from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) on August 27, 2001, Jonas Savimbi from The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) on February 22, 2002, and Antar Zouabri from the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) on February 9, 2002.

Overall, only 4 of 44 rebel groups (9%) that used terrorism in the three months before and after a leader decapitation event changed their tactics in terms of bombings and explosions. 40 of 44 (91%) groups do not change their employment of these tactics. This means that decapitation does not increase the likelihood that rebel groups will conduct more bombings and explosions, and thus my first hypothesis is not supported. If a group was utilizing bombings and explosions before the decapitation event, then they are likely to use it after the decapitation. And if a group was not utilizing bombings and explosions before the decapitation event, then they are not likely to use it after the decapitation.

The use of assassination as a tactic is highlighted because it may potentially act as a form of retaliation. If the leader of the group is killed or arrested by members of the government or a rival organization, then is the rebel organization more likely to assassinate another leader? Table 2 corresponds with Hypothesis 2 and demonstrates a cross tabulation between the method of assassination before and after the decapitation date.

Table 2

		Assassinations After	
		No	Yes
Assassinations Before	No	36	3
	Yes	2	3

The results indicate that of 44 different decapitation occurrences, there are three instances where a group did not utilize assassination as a method before the decapitation date but utilized it after the decapitation date. They occurred with the replacement of Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress (ANC) in July of 1991, the assassination of Abu Ali Mustafa from PFLP on August 27, 2001, and the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK/Kadek) on February 15, 1999.

There are two instances where the group participated in assassinations before the decapitation and did not conduct assassinations after the decapitation. These two instances would disprove the theory about assassination as a form of retaliation. They occurred with the arrest of Francisco Garmendia of the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Freedom) (ETA) on March 29, 1992 and the arrest of Victor Polay of Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) on June 11, 1992.

Overall, only 5 of 44 rebel groups (11.3%) that used terrorism in the three months before and after a leader decapitation event changed their tactics in terms of assassinations. 39 of 44 (88.6%) groups do not change their employment of this tactic. This means that decapitation does not increase the likelihood that rebel groups will conduct more assassination, and thus my second hypothesis is not supported. If a group was utilizing assassinations before the decapitation event, then they are likely to use it after the decapitation. And if a group was not utilizing assassinations before the decapitation event, then they are not likely to use it after the decapitation.

Table 3 below corresponds with Hypothesis 3 and details a cross tabulation between the method of hostage taking/kidnapping before and after the decapitation date. Results on GTD show that Hostage taking/kidnapping is typically used against civilians so it is important to see whether groups used it as a tactic after decapitation.

Table 3

		Hostage Taking/Kidnapping Before	
		No	Yes
Hostage Taking/Kidnapping After	No	36	3
	Yes	1	2

The results indicate that of 44 observations, there are three groups that used hostage taking/kidnapping as an attack method before decapitation but did not use it after decapitation. This occurred with the decapitation of Sukhdev Singh of the Sikh Insurgents who was killed August 9, 1992, the death of Abdurajak Janjalani from Abu Sayyaf on December 18, 1998, and Antar Zouabri of the GIA who was killed on February 9, 2002.

There is also only one group that did not use hostage taking/kidnapping before decapitation but used it after decapitation. This occurred with the decapitation of Victor Polay of Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) who was arrested on June 11, 1992.

Overall, only 4 of 44 rebel groups (9%) that used terrorism in the three months before and after a leader decapitation event changed their use of kidnapping and hostage taking. This means that decapitation does not increase the likelihood that rebel groups will conduct more hostage taking/kidnappings, and thus my third hypothesis is not supported. 91% of groups do not change their tactic in regards to hostage taking/kidnappings. The results show that if a rebel group was using hostage taking/kidnapping as an attack method before decapitation, then they will likely use it after decapitation. If a group was utilizing hostage taking and kidnappings before the decapitation event, then they are likely to use it after the decapitation. And if a group was not utilizing hostage taking and kidnappings before the decapitation event, then they are not likely to use it after the decapitation.

The attack targets that are vital to this project are civilians and the government. Table 4 below corresponds with Hypothesis 4 and details the number of groups that targeted civilians before and after the decapitation date regardless of the attack method.

Table 4

		Civilians as Targets After	
		No	Yes
Civilians as Targets Before	No	30	2
	Yes	4	8

The results indicate that a total of six groups changed their tactics in regards to civilian targets. Four groups targeted civilians before the decapitation date but not after the date of decapitation. The change in target occurred with the decapitation of Antar Zouabri of the GIA who was killed on February 9, 2002, Sukhdev Singh of the Sikh Insurgents who was killed August 9, 1992, Oscar Ramirez Duran of the Red Path who was arrested on July 15, 1999, and Abu Ali Mustafa of the PFLP who was killed on August 27, 2001. Two groups did not target civilians before decapitation but targeted them after decapitation. The change in target type occurred with the decapitation of Subhi al-Tufayli of Hezbollah who was replaced May of 1991 and the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan of PKK/Kadek on February 15, 1999.

Overall, only 6 of 44 rebel groups (13.6%) that used terrorism in the three months before and after a leader decapitation event changed their tactics. This means that decapitation does not increase the likelihood that rebel groups will target civilians, and thus my fourth hypothesis is not supported.

The above table disproves Hypothesis 4. In Table 4, only 6 of 44 rebel groups (13.6%) that used terrorism in the three months before and after a leader decapitation event changed the nature of their target (to or from civilians). 86.4% of groups do not change their treatment of civilians as targets. The expectation was that groups would escalate the number of attacks against civilians after decapitation and this was not the case. This result proves that groups do not tend to change their target tactics. If a group was targeting civilians before the decapitation event, then they are likely to target them after the decapitation. And if a group was not targeting civilians before the decapitation event, then they are not likely to target them after the decapitation. Overall, decapitation does not seem to increase the likelihood that rebel groups will target civilians.

Table 5 corresponds with Hypothesis 5 and specifics the number of groups that targeted the government before and after the date of decapitation regardless of the attack method.

Table 5

		Government as Target After	
		No	Yes
Government as Target Before	No	29	3
	Yes	3	9

The results indicate that a total of six groups changed their tactics in regards to government targets. The results indicate that there are three instances where a group targeted the government before decapitation but did not after decapitation. This change in target type occurred with the decapitation of Xanana Gusmao of Fretilin who was arrested in November of 1992, Adolphe Omusumba of RCD who was replaced in 2001, and Jonas Savimbi of UNITA who was killed February 2, 2002.

There are also three groups that did not target the government before decapitation but targeted them after decapitation. This change in target type occurred with the replacement of Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress (ANC) in July of 1991, the replacement of Dhananjay Reang of the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) in 1993, and the death of Abdurajak Janjalani of Abu Sayyaf Group in December 18, 1998.

Overall, only 6 of 44 rebel groups (13.6%) that used terrorism in the three months before and after a leader decapitation event changed their targeting of the government (either they stopped or started targeting it). This means that decapitation does not necessarily increase the likelihood that rebel groups will target the government, and thus my fifth hypothesis is not supported. The expectation was that groups would escalate the number of attacks against the government after decapitation and this was not the case. If a group was targeting the government before the decapitation event, then they are likely to target them after the decapitation. And if a group was not targeting the government before the decapitation event, then they are not likely to target them after the decapitation.

It is also important to understand the other methods of attack that rebel groups use against civilians. Table 6 and Table 7 below compare the use of bombings and explosions as an attack method before and after the decapitation date with civilians as a target before and after decapitation.

Table 6

Civilians as Target Before			
Bombings/Explosions Before		No	Yes
	No	30	3
	Yes	2	9

Table 7

Civilians as Target After			
Bombings/Explosions After		No	Yes
	No	34	1
	Yes	0	9

In table 6, the results indicate that of 44 instances, three groups targeted civilians before decapitation and at the same time did not conduct bombings/explosions before decapitation. This occurred with the decapitation of Sukhdev Singh of the Sikh Insurgents who was killed August 9, 1992, Oscar Ramirez Duran of the Red Path who was arrested on July 15, 1999, and the death of Abdurajak Janjalani from Abu Sayyaf on December 18, 1998. What these groups had in common is that they were conducting armed assaults and hostage taking/kidnappings against civilians instead of bombings. Two of these groups, Sikh Insurgents and the Red Path, are the same ones who targeted civilians before the decapitation date but not after the date of decapitation.

Also, two groups did not target civilians before decapitation but at the same time conducted bombings/explosions in Table 6. This occurred with the decapitation of Subhi al-Tufayli of Hezbollah who was replaced May of 1991 and the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan of PKK/Kadek on February 15, 1999. These two groups also conducted armed assaults against the

government. These are also the same two groups that did not target civilians before decapitation but targeted them after decapitation.

Overall, Table 6 shows that only 5 of 44 rebel groups (11.3%) that used terrorism in the three months before a leader decapitation event changed their tactic as well as their target in regards to civilians and bombings/explosions.

In table 7, the results indicate that of 44 instances, one group targeted civilians after decapitation and at the same time did not conduct bombings/explosions after decapitation. This occurred after the decapitation of Jonas Savimbi from UNITA who was killed on February 22, 2002.

Overall, Table 7 shows that only 1 of 44 rebel groups (.02%) that used terrorism in the three months after a leader decapitation event changed their tactic as well as their target. Tables 6 and 7 indicate that the tactic of bombings/explosions is used against the same targets. When it is used against civilians before decapitation, it is also used against civilians after decapitation. Tables 6 and 7 support and confirm the notion that a decapitation event does not change the tactics of the rebel organization.

Table 8 and Table 9 below compare the use of hostage taking as an attack method before and after the decapitation date with civilians as a target before and after decapitation.

Table 8

		Civilians as Target Before	
Hostage Taking/Kidnapping Before		No	Yes
	No	32	7
	Yes	0	5

Table 9

		Civilians as Target After	
Hostage Taking/Kidnapping After		No	Yes
	No	34	7
	Yes	0	3

The results of Table 8 indicate that of 44 instances, seven groups targeted civilians before decapitation and at the same time did not conduct hostage taking/kidnappings before decapitation. This occurred with the decapitation of Abbas al-Musawi of Hezbollah who was killed on February 16, 1992, the arrest of Francisco Garmendia of ETA on March 29, 1992, the arrest of Victor Polay of MRTA on June 11, 1992, the arrest of Oscar Ramirez Duran of the Red Path in July 15, 1999, the arrest of Abimael Guzman of Sendero Luminoso in September 12, 1992, the assassination of Abu Ali Mustafa from PFLP on August 27, 2001, and the death of Jonas Savimbi of UNITA who was killed February 2, 2002.

Overall, Table 8 shows that only 7 of 44 rebel groups (15.9%) that used terrorism in the three months before a leader decapitation event changed their tactic as well as their target in regards to civilians and hostage taking/kidnappings.

The results of Table 9 indicate that of 44 instances, seven groups targeted civilians after decapitation and at the same time did not conduct hostage taking/kidnappings after decapitation. This occurred with the decapitation of Subhi al-Tufayli of Hezbollah who was replaced May of 1991, Abbas al-Musawi of Hezbollah who was killed on February 16, 1992, the arrest of Francisco Garmendia of ETA on March 29, 1992, the arrest of Abimael Guzman of Sendero Luminoso on September 12, 1992, the death of Abdurajak Janjalani from Abu Sayyaf on December 18, 1998, the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan of PKK/Kadek on February 15, 1999, and the death of Jonas Savimbi of UNITA who was killed on February 22, 2002.

Overall, Table 9 shows that only 7 of 44 rebel groups (15.9%) that used terrorism in the three months after a leader decapitation event changed their tactic as well as their target in regards to civilians and hostage taking/kidnappings.

Also, in Table 8 seven groups did not utilize hostage taking/kidnapping on targets before decapitation and in Table 9, there were also seven groups that did not utilize hostage taking/kidnapping on targets after decapitation. Four of the seven groups were the same: UNITA, Shining Path, ETA, and Hezbollah.

In both Tables 8 and 9, the number of groups utilizing hostage taking/kidnappings against civilians before and after the date of decapitation is 0. This means that of the 44 decapitations, none of the group attacked civilians after decapitation while also using hostage taking as a strategy after decapitation. Tables 8 and 9 indicate that the tactic of hostage taking/kidnapping is used against the same targets. When it is used against civilians before decapitation, it is also used against civilians after decapitation.

Tables 8 and 9 indicate that the tactic of hostage taking/kidnappings is used against the same targets. When it is used against civilians before decapitation, it is also used against civilians after decapitation. Tables 8 and 9 support and confirm the notion that a decapitation event does not change the tactics of the rebel organization.

Ultimately, these results provide initial evidence (not controlling for other factors that might influence a rebel group to alter its behavior) that leadership decapitation does not often lead to a change in the tactics or targets of terrorist attacks by rebel groups during civil wars.

## **Case Study**

I looked at the case of civil war in Algeria and studied rebel group behavior in this country. I chose Algeria because this nation suffered the loss of their population because of multiple massacres, the most extreme form of civilian victimization, during their civil war. The massacres were perpetrated by a rebel organization in Algeria. The nation was home to this rebel organization that was incredibly active in the 1990s until the early 2000s during the Algerian Civil War. They established a presence in France, Belgium, Britain, and Italy. This organization, the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA), experienced the decapitation of seven leaders in the same time period that they were engaging in the massacres. The GIA experienced the arrests of three of their leaders and the death of four leaders between 1993 and 2004. I wanted to know if the arrests and deaths of their leader caused them to behave differently. This is because the GIA

only experienced the arrest of one of their leaders while the rest of their leaders were killed. Do different methods of leadership decapitation cause different responses? Did they victimize more civilians? Did they change their strategy? Or did the decapitation have no effect on their behavior? Also, did the massacres correlate with the decapitation of any of the leaders of the GIA?

Kalyvas (1999) focuses on the rebel led massacres of civilians in Algeria and discusses the logic behind these actions. He studies the behavior of the GIA in the 1990s and argues that massacres are a rational strategy used by rebels aiming to maximize civilian support. Targeted terror is used to punish and deter defection by civilians in civil wars.

Kalyvas (2006) describes violence in civil wars as two fold. Indiscriminate violence is done without regard for the preferences or actions of individuals. Indiscriminate violence occurs when combatants are trying to gain control of territory. Selective violence describes violence directed towards targeted individuals. Selective violence occurs when the combatants have control of the territory and can target specific individuals who defect or are likely to do so. He shows that violence in a civil war against civilians has its own rationale and logic.

The GIA emerged in 1992 and was founded by Mansouri Miliani, a former member of another Algerian rebel group, MIA (Armed Islamique Movement) (UCDP). Miliani was arrested in July of 1992 and executed in May of 1993 for his role in the attack on the Algiers airport in August of 1992. In the months immediately preceding and following his arrest, the GIA was not active in terms of attacks. There were 0 incidents attributed to them around the time of his decapitation. However, in 1993, there were 311 total incidents in Algeria. In the months immediately preceding his execution, the GIA participated in 29 incidents. In the months immediately following his execution, the GIA participated in 21 incidents. The month of his execution saw an increase in the number of attacks from the previous month. Around the time of the decapitation of Miliani, especially after his death in 1993, the GIA had the same targets and used the same attack types. They utilized armed assault many times as a tactic against police and military which I consider to be a part of the government (GTD). Table 10 details the behavior of the GIA between the months of February and August of 1993.

Table 10 (Miliani)

Month	Number of Attacks	Attack Types	Target Type
February 1993	4	Assassination, Armed Assault	Government, Civilians
March 1993	18	Armed Assault, Assassination, Unarmed Assault	Government, Civilians
April 1993	3	Armed Assault	Government
May 1993 (death)	6	Armed Assault, Assassination	Government, Civilians
June 1993	2	Armed Assault, Assassination	Government, Civilians
July 1993	8	Armed Assault, Facility/Infrastructure	Government, Civilians
August 1993	11	Armed Assault, Assassination	Government, Civilians

The next leader of the GIA was Abdelhak Layada who was arrested in September of 1993 in Morocco. In the months immediately preceding his arrest, the GIA participated in 21 incidents. However, in the months immediately following his arrest, the GIA participated in 67 incidents. While the GIA increased the number of attacks after the decapitation of Layada, they did not change their tactics. They continued using bombings and armed assaults as their method of attack. They also continue to attack civilians and the government (GTD). Table 11 below details the behavior of the GIA in the time surrounding the decapitation of Layada.

Table 11 (Layada)

Month	Number of Attacks	Attack Types	Target Type
June 1993	2	Armed Assault, Assassination	Government, Civilians
July 1993	8	Armed Assault, Facility/Infrastructure	Government, Civilians
August 1993	11	Armed Assault, Assassination	Government, Civilians
September 1993 (arrest)	9	Armed Assault, Hostage Taking/Kidnapping	Government, Civilians
October 1993	13	Bombings/Explosions, Assassination, Armed Assault, Hostage Taking/Kidnapping	Civilians, Government
November 1993	23	Armed Assault, Assassination	Government, Terrorists/Non State Militia, Unknown
December 1993	31	Assassination, Armed Assault, Hostage Taking/Kidnapping	Government, Civilians, Unknown

The next leaders of the GIA, Mourad Sid Ahmed (alias Djaafar El Afghani-Feb 26 1994) and Ahmed Abu Abdullah (alias Sherif Ghousmi-sept 26 1994), were both killed in 1994 after the Algerian army intensively targeted Islamist bases. There were 13 incidents involving the GIA immediately before the deaths of Ghousmi and Afghani. There were 12 incidents involving the GIA immediately after the deaths of the GIA leaders (GTD). Tables 12 and 13 below detail the behavior of the GIA around the times of the deaths of Ghousmi and Afghani.

Table 12 (Afghani)

Month	Number of Attacks	Attack Types	Target Type
November 1993	23	Armed Assault, Assassination	Government, Terrorists/Non State Militia, Unknown
December 1993	31	Assassination, Armed Assault, Hostage Taking/Kidnapping	Government, Civilians, Unknown
January 1994	0	None	None
February 1994 (death)	2	Assassination, Armed Assault	Government, Civilians
March 1994	4	Assassination, Armed Assault	Government, Civilians
April 1994	1	Armed Assault	Government
May 1994	0	None	None

Table 13 (Ghousmi)

Month	Number of Attacks	Attack Types	Target Type
June 1994	0	None	None
July 1994	1	Hostage Taking/Kidnapping	Government
August 1994	12	Assassination, Facility/Infrastructure, Bombing/Explosion	Government, Civilians
September 1994 (death)	1	Hostage Taking/Kidnapping	Civilians
October 1994	6	Bombing/Explosion	Civilians, Unknown, Government
November 1994	4	Bombing/Explosion, Assassination, Hostage Taking/Kidnapping	Government, Civilians
December 1994	2	Assassination, Hijacking	Airports and Aircraft, Civilians

In late 1994, Djamel Zitouni became the head of the GIA. Under his leadership, internal strife led to the formation of semi-autonomous groups each controlled by local leaders. In 1996, he was killed by a rival organization (UCDP). In the months immediately preceding his death, the GIA participated in 0 incidents. In the months immediately following his death, the GIA participated in 0 incidents (GTD). By 1996, the Algerian Civil War intensified and some of the bloodiest massacres in Algeria had begun. Because of the strife that he created with his bloody reign, Zitouni was killed by a breakaway of the ex-GIA faction. In 1994, Zitouni had extended the reach of the GIA to France and engaged in battles with other rebel groups in Algeria such as the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). He believed that France was the source of power and legitimacy for the Algerian government. In 1996, the number of GIA militants who deserted increased which may explain the reason they were unable to engage in as many attacks.

Antar Zouabri led what remained of GIA until 2002 when he was killed by Algerian government forces. There were 9 incidents in which the GIA participated in the months

immediately preceding his death and 0 incidents in the months immediately following his death. By this time, Zouabri had organized massacres in villages in Algeria and the civil war was coming to an end. He was the longest serving of the eight leaders which the group had over its 10-year history. Table 14 details the behavior of the GIA around the decapitation of Zouabri.

Table 14 (Zouabri)

Month	Number of Attacks	Attack Types	Target Type
November 2001	2	Armed Assault	Civilians
December 2001	1	Armed Assault, Hostage Taking/Kidnapping	Civilians
January 2002	6	Armed Assault, Hostage Taking/Kidnapping, Bombing/Explosion	Government, Civilians
February 2002 (death)	1	Armed Assault	Civilians
March 2002	3	Armed Assault, Bombing/Explosion	Civilians
April 2002	1	Armed Assault	Civilians
May 2002	4	Armed Assault, Hostage Taking/Kidnapping	Government, Civilians

Zouabri's replacement was reportedly Rachid Abou Tourab (real name Rachid Oukali), who was killed in July of 2004 allegedly by his close aides. Several analysts argue that the organization became inactive due to the killings of its leaders and the imprisonment of many of its members (UCDP). Throughout the year of 2004, the GIA engaged in 2 incidents. These attacks were armed assaults against civilians. Table 15 details the behavior of the GIA at this time.

Table 15 (Tourab)

Month	Number of Attacks	Attack Types	Target Type
April 2004	2	Armed Assault	Civilians
May 2004	0	None	None
June 2004	0	None	None
July 2004 (death)	0	None	None
August 2004	0	None	None
September 2004	0	None	None
October 2004	0	None	None

Because they committed mass murders of civilians before and after the decapitation of their leader, results from the GIA case study suggest that neither the targets nor the attack types of the group changed. Except for in the case of Abdelhak Layada, they decrease the number of attacks after the decapitation of a leader. Abdelhak Layada was their only leader who was not killed during the civil war. It is quite possible that after the death of their leader, the GIA needed more time to regroup and plan their next steps. In order to do this, they were unable to execute as many attacks as they could have perpetrated with stable leadership.

## **Conclusion**

I have argued that leadership decapitation has an impact on civilian abuse and the types of strategies utilized by rebel groups during a civil war. I hypothesized that after the decapitation of a leader, civilian abuse during a civil war would increase. I also argued that any sort of decapitation will alter the strategy of a rebel group. With an existing data set from Michael Tiernay and a created dataset, I was able to test if a relationship existed between leadership decapitation and civilian abuse. Running a cross tabulation analysis on my created variables allowed me to study how different terrorist strategies are impacted by leadership decapitation. My empirical analysis shows results inconsistent with my expectations. Most rebel groups utilize the same strategies before or after the decapitation of their leader.

I also discovered that any type of decapitation does not necessarily lead to more overall attacks. Appendix 3 highlights the number of attacks perpetrated by each group before and after the decapitation of their leader. Most groups will exhibit the same behavior before or after the decapitation of their leader. They will conduct the same number of attacks, utilize the same attack methods, and attack the same targets. This study asked the question: Does leadership decapitation affect civilian abuse? The answer is no.

## **Policy Implications**

Because leadership decapitation is a widely used counterterrorism strategy, it is important for policymakers to understand the impact their decisions have on civil war outcomes and levels of civilian abuse. While it has been accepted that leadership decapitation as a counterterrorism strategy is ineffective or counterproductive, Johnston (2012) argues against this theory by presenting 46 cases of successful leadership decapitations. Neutralizing insurgent leaders significantly increases governments' chances of reducing violence, terminating wars, and defeating insurgencies. When attempting to reduce the amount of civilian abuse, it is important to acknowledge that each group is different and that groups behave differently. When countries are evaluating their anti-terrorism strategies, they need to utilize a tactic other than leadership decapitation if their goal is to avoid civilian abuse.

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Appendix 1. Original Data Building on Tiernay (2015)

<b>Country</b>	<b>Leader Name</b>	<b>Group Name</b>	<b>Decapitation Date</b>	<b>Decapitation Type</b>
Iran	Abdul Ghassemlou	Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)	July 13, 1989	Killed
Sri Lanka	Rohana Wijeweera	People's Liberation Front (JVP)	November 13, 1989	Killed
Somalia	Ahmad Silanyo	Somali National Movement (SNM)	April 18, 1990	Replaced
Lebanon	Michel Aoun	Lebanese Army	August 13, 1990	Replaced
Lebanon	Dany Chamoun	Lebanese Front	August 21, 1990	Killed
Israel	Subhi al-Tufayli	Hezbollah	May 1991	Replaced
South Africa	Oliver Tambo	African National Congress (ANC)	July 1991	Replaced
India	Kondapalli Seetharamaiah	Naxalites/People's War Group (PWG)	1991	Replaced
Israel	Abbas al-Musawi	Hezbollah	February 16, 1992	Killed
Georgia	Tengiz Kitovani	Anti-Government Alliance	March 1992	Replaced
Spain	Francisco Garmendia	Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	March 29, 1992	Arrested
Chad	Goukouni Guet	Movement for Development and Democracy [FANT] (MDD)	June 1992	Killed
Peru	Victor Polay	Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)	June 11, 1992	Arrested
India	Sukhdev Singh	Sikh Insurgents	August 9, 1992	Killed
Peru	Abimael Guzman	Shining Path (SL)	September 12, 1992	Arrested
Iran	Sadegh Sharafkandi	Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)	September 17, 1992	Killed
Indonesia	Xanana Gusmao	Fretilin	November 1992	Arrested
Algeria	Abdelhaqq Layada	Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA)	June 1993	Arrested
Chad	Abbas Koty	National Committee for Recovery (CNR)	August 22, 1993	Killed
India	Dhananjoy Reang	National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)	1993	Replaced

Azerbaijan	Georgy Petrosyan	Nagorno-Karabakh	June 15, 1994	Replaced
Djibouti	Ahmad Dini Ahmad	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD)	August 5, 1994	Replaced
Algeria	Cherif Gousmi	Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA)	September 26, 1994	Killed
Azerbaijan	Rovshan Javadov	Special Purpose Police Unit (OPON Forces)	March 17, 1995	Killed
Russia	Dzhokar Dudayev	Republic of Chechnya	April 21, 1996	Killed
Algeria	Jamel Zitouni	Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA)	July 16, 1996	Killed
India	Prem Singh Brahma	Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF)	1996	Replaced
Chad	Laokein Barde	Armed Forces of the Federal Republic (FARF)	April 1998	Replaced
Philippines	Abdurajak Janjalani	Abu Sayyaf	December 18, 1998	Killed
Ethiopia	Ibrahim Abdalla Mah	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	1998	Replaced
Burundi	Cossen Kabura	Palipehutu-National Forces of Liberation (FNL)	1998	Replaced
Turkey	Abdullah Ocalan	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)/Kadek	February 15, 1999	Arrested
Peru	Oscar Ramirez Duran	Red Path	July 15, 1999	Arrested
Congo	Ernest Wamba dia Wamba	Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)	1999	Replaced
Israel	George Habash	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	May 2000	Replaced
Congo	Emile Ilunga	Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)	2000	Replaced
India	Areambam Singh	United National Liberation Front (UNLF)	June 10, 2001	Killed
Israel	Abu Ali Mustafa	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	August 27, 2001	Killed
Afghanistan	Ahmad Shah Massoud	United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA)	September 9, 2001	Killed
Congo	Adolphe Omusumba	Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)	2001	Replaced
Angola	Jonas Savimbi	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	February 2, 2002	Killed

Algeria	Antar Zouabri	Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA)	February 9, 2002	Killed
Chad	Youssouf Togoimi	Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT)	September 24, 2002	Killed
Ivory Coast	Felix Doh	Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO)	April 25, 2003	Killed

Appendix 2. Original Data Building on Tiernay (2015)

<b>Leader Name</b>	<b>Group Name</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Removal Type</b>	<b>Attack Type Before</b>	<b>Attack Type After</b>	<b>Target Before</b>	<b>Target After</b>
Abdul Ghassem lou	KDPI	1989	Killed	None	None	None	None
Rohana Wijeweera	JVP	1989	Killed	Bombings, Armed Assault, Assassinations, Hostage Taking, Facility Attack	Bombings, Armed Assault, Assassinations, Hostage Taking, Facility Attack	Civilians, Government	Civilians, Government
Ahmad Silanyo	SNM	1990	Replaced	None	None	None	None
Michel Aoun	Lebanese Army	1990	Replaced	None	None	None	None
Dany Chamoun	Lebanese Front	1990	Killed	None	None	None	None
Subhi al-Tufayli	Hezbollah	1991	Replaced	Bombings, Armed Assault	Bombings	Government	Civilians, Government
Oliver Tambo	ANC	1991	Replaced	None	Armed Assault, Assassinations,	None	Government
Kondapalli Seetharamaiah	PWG	1991	Replaced	None	None	None	None
Abbas al-Musawi	Hezbollah	1992	Killed	Bombings, Armed Assault	Bombings, Armed Assault	Civilians, Government	Civilians, Government
Tengiz Kitovani	Anti-Government Alliance	1992	Replaced	None	None	None	None
Francisco Garmendia	ETA	1992	Arrested	Bombings, Armed Assault, Assassinations	Bombings, Armed Assault, Facility Attack	Civilians, Government	Civilians, Government
Goukouni Guet	MDD-FANT	1992	Killed	None	None	None	None

Victor Polay	MRTA	1992	Arrested	Bombings, Armed Assault, Assassinations	Bombings, Armed Assault, Hostage Taking, Facility Attack	Civilians, Government	Civilians, Government
Sukhdev Singh	Sikh Insurgents	1992	Killed	Hostage Taking	None	Civilians	None
Abimael Guzman	Shining Path	1992	Arrested	Bombings, Armed Assault, Assassinations, Facility Attack	Bombings, Armed Assault, Assassinations, Facility Attack	Civilians, Government	Civilians, Government
Sadegh Sharafkandi	KDPI	1992	Killed	None	None	None	None
Xanana Gusmao	Fretilin	1992	Arrested	Armed Assault	None	Government	None
Abdelhaqq Layada	GIA	1993	Arrested	None	None	None	None
Abbas Koty	CNR	1993	Killed	None	None	None	None
Dhananjoy Reang	NLFT	1993	Replaced	None	Armed Assault	None	Government
Georgy Petrosyan	Nagorno-Karabakh	1994	Replaced	None	None	None	None
Ahmad Dini Ahmad	FRUD	1994	Replaced	None	None	None	None
Cherif Gousmi	GIA	1994	Killed	Bombings, Assassinations, Hostage Taking, Facility Attack	Bombings, Assassinations, Hostage Taking, Hijacking	Civilians, Government	Civilians, Government
Rovshan Javadov	OPON Forces	1995	Killed	None	None	None	None
Dzhokar Dudayev	Republic of Chechnya	1996	Killed	None	None	None	None

Jamel Zitouni	GIA	1996	Killed	None	None	None	None
Prem Singh Brahma	BLTF	1996	Replaced	None	None	None	None
Laokein Barde	FARF	1998	Replaced	None	None	None	None
Abdurajak Janjalani	Abu Sayyaf	1998	Killed	Hostage Taking	Bombings	Civilians	Civilians, Government
Ibrahim Abdalla Mah	ONLF	1998	Replaced	None	None	None	None
Cossen Kabura	Palipehutu-FNL	1998	Replaced	None	None	None	None
Abdullah Ocalan	PKK/Kadek	1999	Arrested	Bombings, Armed Assault	Bombings, Armed Assault, Assassinations, Facility Attack	Government	Civilians, Government
Oscar Ramirez Duran	Red Path	1999	Arrested	Armed Assault	Armed Assault	Civilians, Government	Government
Ernest Wamba dia Wamba	RCD	1999	Replaced	None	None	None	None
George Habash	PFLP	2000	Replaced	None	None	None	None
Emile Ilunga	RCD	2000	Replaced	None	None	None	None
Areambam Singh	UNLF	2001	Killed	None	None	None	None
Abu Ali Mustafa	PFLP	2001	Killed	Bombings	Assassinations	Civilians	None
Ahmad Shah Massoud	UIFSA	2001	Killed	None	None	None	None
Adolphe Omusumba	RCD	2001	Replaced	None	None	Government	None
Jonas Savimbi	UNITA	2002	Killed	Bombings, Armed Assault	Armed Assault	Civilians, Government	Civilians
Antar Zouabri	GIA	2002	Killed	Bombings, Armed Assault, Hostage Taking	None	Civilians	None
Youssouf	MDJT	2002	Killed	None	None	None	None

Togoimi							
Felix Doh	MPIGO	2003	Killed	None	None	None	None

Appendix 3. Original Data Building on Tiernay (2015)

Leader Name	Group Name	Year	Removal Type	Attacks 3 Months Before	Attacks 2 Months Before	Attacks 1 Month Before	Attacks 3 Months After	Attacks 2 Months After	Attacks 1 Month After
Abdul Ghassem lou	KDPI	1989	Killed	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rohana Wijeweera	JVP	1989	Killed	28	54	44	34	4	2
Ahmad Silanyo	SNM	1990	Replaced	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michel Aoun	Lebanese Army	1990	Replaced	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dany Chamoun	Lebanese Front	1990	Killed	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subhi al-Tufayli	Hezbollah	1991	Replaced	3	1	1	1	2	3
Oliver Tambo	ANC	1991	Replaced	0	0	0	1	1	0
Kondapalli Seetharamaiah	PWG	1991	Replaced	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abbas al-Musawi	Hezbollah	1992	Killed	3	5	7	4	6	2
Tengiz Kitovani	Anti-Government Alliance	1992	Replaced	0	0	0	0	0	0
Francisco Garmendia	ETA	1992	Arrested	4	7	7	1	4	2
Goukouni Guet	MDD-FANT	1992	Killed	0	0	0	0	0	0
Victor Polay	MRTA	1992	Arrested	0	16	12	6	8	1
Sukhdev Singh	Sikh Insurgents	1992	Killed	1	0	0	0	0	0
Abimael Guzman	Shining Path	1992	Arrested	5	45	9	19	28	19
Sadegh Sharafkandi	KDPI	1992	Killed	0	0	0	0	0	0
Xanana Gusmao	Fretilin	1992	Arrested	0	0	1	0	0	0
Abdelhaqq Layada	GIA	1993	Arrested	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abbas Koty	CNR	1993	Killed	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dhananjay Reang	NLFT	1993	Replaced	0	0	0	0	1	0

Georgy Petrosyan	Nagorno-Karabakh	1994	Replaced	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ahmad Dini Ahmad	FRUD	1994	Replaced	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cherif Gousmi	GIA	1994	Killed	0	1	12	6	4	2
Rovshan Javadov	OPON Forces	1995	Killed	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dzhokar Dudayev	Republic of Chechnya	1996	Killed	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jamel Zitouni	GIA	1996	Killed	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prem Singh Brahma	BLTF	1996	Replaced	0	0	0	0	0	0
Laokein Barde	FARF	1998	Replaced	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abdurajak Janjalani	Abu Sayyaf	1998	Killed	0	1	2	5	0	2
Ibrahim Abdalla Mah	ONLF	1998	Replaced	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cossen Kabura	Palipehutu-FNL	1998	Replaced	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abdullah Ocalan	PKK/Kadek	1999	Arrested	2	0	0	12	3	1
Oscar Ramirez Duran	Red Path	1999	Arrested	0	0	4	0	0	1
Ernest Wamba dia Wamba	RCD	1999	Replaced	0	0	0	0	0	0
George Habash	PFLP	2000	Replaced	0	0	0	0	0	0
Emile Ilunga	RCD	2000	Replaced	0	0	0	0	0	0
Areambam Singh	UNLF	2001	Killed	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abu Ali Mustafa	PFLP	2001	Killed	1	0	0	0	0	0
Ahmad Shah Massoud	UIFSA	2001	Killed	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adolphe Omusumba	RCD	2001	Replaced	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jonas Savimbi	UNITA	2002	Killed	1	2	1	2	2	0
Antar Zouabri	GIA	2002	Killed	2	1	6	0	0	0
Youssouf	MDJT	2002	Killed	0	0	0	0	0	0

Togoimi									
Felix Doh	MPIGO	2003	Killed	0	0	0	0	0	0