

ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES AND THE NETWORK GOVERNANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

By

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	8
LIST OF FIGURES	10
ABSTRACT	11
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	13
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW	26
INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE STUDY OF NETWORKS	26
1970s – 1980s	27
1990s – 2000s	31
GOVERNANCE AND COORDINATION OF WHOLE NETWORKS	34
Network Governance in the Public Sector	34
Network Governance in the Nonprofit Sector	42
VALUES AND NETWORK GOVERNANCE IN THE PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT SECTORS	53
Values, Structure and the Effectiveness of Organizations	54
Competing Values across the Public, For-profit and Nonprofit sectors	58
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH CONTEXT	62
HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT	62
HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM	65
THE ROLE OF INGOS WITHIN THE HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM	67
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODS	74
RESEARCH DESIGN	74
CASE SELECTION	75
DATA COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT	83
CHAPTER FIVE: THE STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NETWORK GOVERNANCE AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS.....	85
CHARACTERISTICS OF NETWORK GOVERNANCE	86
Members	86
Representation.....	87
Voting rules.....	88
Purpose of coordination	88
Form of coordination	89
ANALYSIS.....	91
SUMMARY	98
CHAPTER SIX: FORMS OF NETWORK COORDINATION AND THE BALANCING OF INTERNAL TENSIONS	105
INTERNAL NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS	106

Network level competencies.....	106
Size.....	106
Trust and goal consensus.....	107
Resource disparity.....	108
ANALYSIS.....	110
SUMMARY.....	113
CHAPTER SEVEN: BOARD STRUCTURES, VALUES, ORIGINS AND CHANGE	115
ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES AND NETWORK BOARD STRUCTURES.....	118
Value identification and coding.....	118
Value clusters and meaning	122
Value clusters and board structures.....	128
VALUES AND THE MULTIPLE EXPLANATIONS OF NETWORK BOARD STRUCTURES.....	134
Funding and resource dependence	134
Age.....	135
Region.....	137
Philosophical origin	137
ANALYSIS.....	140
SUMMARY.....	150
CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION	153
Implications for theory.....	154
Implications for practice	161
Limitations and implications for future research.....	162
APPENDIX A: HUMANTIARIAN INGOS: REGISTRIES, DATABASES AND CASES	166
A1: DONOR COUNTRY REGISTRIES OF HUMANITARIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.....	166
A2: INTERNATIONAL DATABASES OF HUMANITARIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.....	168
A3: STUDY CASES OF HUMANITARIAN INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (INGOs).....	169
APPENDIX B: VALUES DATA.....	172
B1: VALUE DEFINITIONS AND FREQUENCIES	172
B2: VALUE DISTRIBUTIONS ACROSS VALUE CLUSTERS AND FISHER'S EXACT TEST OF ASSOCIATION.....	176
APPENDIX C: TRUTH TABLES.....	179
C1: TRUTH TABLES FOR EACH OF FOUR STRUCTURAL OUTCOMES.....	179
REFERENCES	181

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: Case Identification and Selection Process	78
Table 4.2: Network and Organization Size.....	82
Table 4.3: Network and Organization Philosophical and Political Origins.....	82
Table 5.1. Network Governance Characteristics: A Summary of Categories and Distributions..	91
Table 5.2. Network Governance Characteristics: Tests of Association.....	92
Table 5.3: Network Members, Representation and Voting Rules	93
Table 5.4: Network Members, Representation and Purpose of Coordination	96
Table 5.5: Network Members, Representation and Form of Coordination	97
Table 5.6: Forms of Network Governance: A Summary	101
Table 6.1: A Test of Association between Size and Form of Coordination	107
Table 6.2: A Test of Association between Philosophical Origin and Form of Coordination.....	108
Table 6.3: A Test of Association for Resource Disparity and Form of Coordination.....	109
Table 6.4: Form of Coordination Disaggregated by Resource Disparity, Size and Purpose of Coordination.	113
Table 7.1: Network and Organization Values: Sources and Frequencies.....	120
Table 7.2: Value Distributions at Each Phase of the Value Grouping Process	124
Table 7.3: Value Clusters with Values Listed by Frequency at Each Phase of the Grouping Process	125
Table 7.4: A Fisher's Exact Test of Association for Value Clusters and Board Structures as Indicated by Purpose of Coordination.	129
Table 7.5: Values and Board Structures: A Summary of Findings.....	133

Table 7.6: A Multi-variate Analysis of Board Structure: Descriptive Statistics and Coding of Variables 139

Table 7.7: A Multi-variate Analysis of Board Structure: Prime Implicants and Associated Cases for each of Four Board Structures..... 142

Table 7.8: A Multi-variate Analysis of Board Structure: A Summary of Theme Interpretations and Coverage 152

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 5.1. Summary of a two dimensional network governance structure.99

Figure 6.1. A two dimensional network governance structure with the internal network characteristics associated with a network’s form of coordination.114

Figure 8.1. The multiple levels of network governance structures and the factors that influence their design.154

ABSTRACT

This study asks the following questions: What explains the governance structures of inter-organizational networks? Are the multiple levels of network governance studied in the public (forms of coordination) and nonprofit literatures (network boards) related or do they respond to different driving influences such a dominant stakeholder group (Brown, Ebrahim and Batliwala, 2012) or the need to balance internal tensions (Provan & Kenis, 2008)? And are the values outlined in a network's vision, mission and values statements related to the governance structures they adopt?

From this comparative case study of 41 humanitarian INGO networks, using a mixed methods research design, I find evidence for the following conclusions. First, the structural dimensions of network governance do indeed appear to cluster around two key components, the structure of the network board and a network's form of coordination, and these two dimensions are only loosely related. Second, while a network's form of coordination appears to be most related to internal dynamics related to size and resource disparities within the network; values, as well as philosophical and regional origins combine with age to provide the best explanation for why a network board is structured the way that it is. Although a balanced funding structure does appear to allow some secular networks to decentralize. And only when a network is sufficiently small and homogenous do factors such as the purpose of network coordination appear to impact how it is coordinated. And third, the values expressed by humanitarian INGO networks appear to vary along two dimensions (i.e. their general orientation and their approach to humanitarian action) although these dimensions are generally consistent with a three sector value trichotomy: Aligning with either a market, public or non-profit sector value system.

In general, these findings support the propositions from the most recent theories of network governance in both the public (Provan & Kenis, 2008) and nonprofit (Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012) literature. However, some extensions are proposed. First, the results of this study support the proposition that a network's purpose influences the form of coordination it adopts. This contrasts with other empirical tests of this proposition. Second, the detailing of the various network governance characteristics that comprise the general network board structure expand and add clarity to the discussion of network forms. Specifically, how members are represented on a network board appear to be closely related to the purpose of coordination adopted by the network. And finally, nonprofit organizations appear to express values from the market, public and nonprofit values systems. However, each network tends to express a set of values consistent with just one of these value systems. And these values appear to be related to how the network is structured. Specifically, values appear to serve as a filter through which other environmental factors such as philosophical origins, regional culture and the era can influence the structure and functioning of a network. This moves forward the values discussion within these literatures by expressly connecting values to structure, which itself has been linked consistently to issues such as strategy and effectiveness.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

What explains the structure of inter-organizational network governance? Are the multiple levels of network governance such as board structures and forms of coordination interrelated? And are the values outlined in a network's vision, mission and values statements related to the governance structures they adopt?

Networks have become an increasingly prevalent form of organizing in the 21st century (Raab & Kenis, 2009). They have been seen as an alternative to markets and hierarchies; relying on cooperation and norms of reciprocity to coordinate and govern relationships among autonomous organizations (Powell, 1990). Initially, public administration scholars and others considered networks to be advantageous because they allow for greater specialization, innovation, speed and flexibility in providing services and responding to the publics' needs while also allowing for decision-making to be decentralized to the most appropriate level for citizens (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004). However, for nonprofit scholars, this non-hierarchical, collaborative form of organizing is simply seen as consistent with the values central to the sector (Enjolras, 2009; Rothschild & Milofsky, 2006) and the default form of organizing. While initially participants from both sectors focused on the benefits of this form of organizing, scholars and practitioners quickly began to experience some of the potential pitfalls as well. Specifically, scholars noted the difficulties and costs related to generating goal consensus (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979), fostering collaboration (Sanyal, 2006) among competing organizations, and exercising sufficient oversight (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).

In addition, observers of both public and nonprofit organizations have noted a great deal of variation among the organizational networks studied in their particular fields. Specifically, they note that organizations collaborate and form networks for a variety of reasons

(Galaskiwicz, 1985; Oliver, 1990) from coordinating services (Aiken & Hage, 1968; Aldrich, 1976; Morrissey, Tausig & Lindsey, 1985; Provan & Milward, 1995) to advocating for national and international policy change (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Young, 1991, 1992). The structure and governance of these relationships also varies from highly formal, centralized networks brokered by a single network coordinator to informal, spider webs of relationships with organizations mutually adjusting to the needs of the particular relationship with no single organization responsible for the network's overall coordination.

Scholars from both sectors have argued that some networks and network structures may be more effective than others (c.f. Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012; Provan & Milward 1995; Turini, Cristofoli, Frosini, & Nasi, 2010; Wong, 2012) depending on their purpose and environment. However, researchers from different traditions have emphasized different aspects of network structure. For example, while public administration scholars tend to focus on how networks are brokered and coordinated (Provan & Kenis, 2008), nonprofit scholars have given more attention to which stakeholders are involved in the process of governing (Abzug & Galaskiewicz, 2001, Rehli & Jäger, 2011) and how these differences impact the legitimacy, strategy and architecture of the network (Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012). Despite these differences, one finding appears to be consistent. Researchers from both the public and nonprofit sectors consistently find that networks perform better when some form of centralized coordination is present (Provan & Milward, 1995; Wong, 2012). Less clear is what activities and responsibilities are actually centralized and which control mechanisms are used (Kenis & Provan, 2006) for motivating members and monitoring performance.

Despite growing interest, few empirical studies have been done on goal-directed, inter-organizational networks as a distinct form of organizing (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007).

Especially, lacking are studies which focus on understanding their structure and functioning (Raab & Kenis, 2009). In their review of the whole network literature, Provan, Fish and Sydow (2007) point specifically to a lack of studies focusing on the particular coordination and governance mechanisms adopted by these networks. One explanation for this lack of work is that there is still not consensus in distinguishing goal-directed networks from other formal organizations and from serendipitous social structures (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Raab & Kenis, 2009), while others have also commented on the methodological challenges in bounding these networks and collecting data for a large number of networks especially over time (Provan et al, 2007).

Despite the challenges, it is important for researchers to develop a better understanding of this form of organizing and the unique benefits and challenges it may bring. One reason is that networks are being used more and more to address the complex, global problems of an increasingly interdependent and interconnected world (Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001; Young, 1989). Second, leaders and participants in these organizations see structural changes as one tool for responding to changes in the global environment and improving their legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness (Biberson & Jean, 1999; Gnaerig & MacCormack, 1999; Henry, 1999; Offenheiser, Holcombe & Hopkins 1999; Salm, 1999). However, networks are not all structured and governed in the same way and some forms may be better than others in managing certain tensions while in turn creating their own distinct challenges. Finally, leading and managing not only within an organization but also across organizations in a collaborative environment can add a great deal more complexity to an already challenging job (O'Leary & Bingham, 2009). By better understanding this form of organizing, leaders and managers will be

able to make better decisions regarding the structures they choose as well as be more equipped to perform within this operating environment.

For the purposes of this paper, a network is defined as “three or more legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal” (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 231). Scholars have discussed the structure and governance of goal-directed, inter-organizational networks from a variety of theoretical perspectives within the public and nonprofit literatures. As is common, the varying contexts and perspectives have led researchers to focus on different aspects of these networks. For example, researchers have argued that resource dependence (Hudson & Bielefeld, 1997, Provan, 1984), network identity (Young, 2001a; 2001b), strategy (Young, Koenig, Najam & Fisher, 1999), transaction costs (Jones, Hesterly & Borgatti, 1997), stakeholder accountabilities (Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012), and relational dynamics among network members (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013) are all important in explaining network governance structures. While it sometimes can be challenging to reconcile research from these diverse perspectives, this pluralistic approach has been encouraged by scholars (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007) due to the multi-dimensionality of the phenomenon being investigated.

Two recent articles, one in the public administration and one in the nonprofit literature, offer well developed propositions building on the general trends in their respective fields. Provan and Kenis (2008) represent much of the current thinking about network governance structures within the public administration literature which has been heavily focused on community service delivery networks especially in the health and human services sector. While they acknowledge two dimensions to network governance (i.e. form of coordination and how coordination is governed), in their recent theoretical contribution, they focus heavily on the form of coordination

and offer propositions regarding under what conditions each of three ideal types of coordination (shared, lead organization, network administrative organization (NAO)) is likely to be most effective. Drawing ideas from bounded rationality, transaction cost economics, and resource dependence, they suggest four key characteristics of networks are important for determining whether a particular form of coordination is likely to be effective: Size, trust, goal consensus, and network level competencies.

In addition to networks of community service organizations, the nonprofit literature has expanded its attention to international advocacy networks (c.f. Foreman, 1999; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Wong, 2012; Young, 1991; 1992) and networks spanning national and international borders (Hudson & Bielefeld, 1997; Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001, Oster, 1996; Young, 1989). Brown, Ebrahim and Batliwala (2012) exemplify this work. Like Provan and Kenis (2008), they distinguish between the network broker and the governance of that broker. However, in their study of ten such networks, each network had what Provan and Kenis (2008) term an NAO structure. Instead of distinguishing between an NAO and other forms of network coordination, Brown and colleagues focus primarily on how the NAO itself is governed, how this impacts its role within the network and the potential success different network structures will have in implementing particular strategies. Specifically, they argue that the boards of an NAO are designed to meet the needs of the dominant stakeholders that elect them; either, donors, members, or constituents. In turn, these boards are greatly influential in establishing the purpose of network coordination and the role of any network broker that may exist. Unfortunately, given the nature of their study, they only briefly describe how the structures of NAO boards differ, and do not analyze this aspect of the network directly; nor do they offer much explanation regarding

how and why the needs of different stakeholder groups may vary or why some stakeholders and not others may be seen as the dominant group.

While network governance research in the public administration and nonprofit management literatures have taken different approaches, the fact that they also attempt to understand complementary aspects of these multi-level governance structures, suggests the two streams of research may be integrated. In fact, in a number of important reviews of the nonprofit governance literature, leading scholars have called for a greater integration of governance research from the two sectors (Cornforth, 2012; Stone & Ostrower, 2007). From just a cursory review, it is clear that both lines of research are interested in the same or very similar phenomenon. Both lines of research have identified many of the same dimensions of the phenomenon (i.e. the form of coordination and the governance of this coordination). However, these distinct perspectives have led researchers to focus the majority of their attention on explaining only part of the overall structure. It is also clear that to extend the work of these scholars, it is important to consider both the internal dynamics (bounded rationality, trust, interdependence and power differences) as well as the external environments (resource dependence, legitimacy and stakeholder accountabilities) of networks involved in a variety of activities. While Provan and Kenis (2008) suggest internal dynamics influence how networks are coordinated, Brown and colleagues (2012) argue that external factors, in the form of accountabilities, influence who makes decisions, how these decisions are made and what is ultimately the focus of a network's coordination efforts.

One issue that has not been adequately addressed by either group has to do with how organizations become members and which accountabilities are deemed most important. These are important questions for a number of reasons. For network coordination, the size of the

network is thought to matter. How organizations become members could have a direct impact on the size of a network and is therefore important for understanding how the network is coordinated. Additionally, within the public and nonprofit sector, organizations are accountable to a wide variety of stakeholders. Therefore, understanding which stakeholders are most important and why could have significant implications for the governance of the network its form of coordination and the role of a network broker. In addition to resources and legitimacy (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997), scholars have suggested strategy (Brown & Moore, 2001), identity, and values may also influence which organizations can become members, and which accountabilities are most salient to a network (Brilliant & Young, 2004; Young, 2001a; 2001b). However, their influence on network governance structures has not been well investigated.

Strategy has long been associated with structure within the study of organizations and organizing (Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Chandler, 1962; Young, Koenig, Najam & Fisher, 1999). However, the impact of strategy has not been as thoroughly investigated within the nonprofit and networks literature (Ogliastri, Jäger & Prado, 2016). While Provan and Kenis (2008) do not address strategy directly, it is incorporated within their discussion of network level competencies, where different strategies may result in different forms of interdependence and thus make certain forms of coordination and governance more likely to be effective. However, for them, strategy is just one factor influencing interdependence and in a recent study Kenis, Provan & Kruyen (2009), did not find a relationship between network level tasks and the design of the network. Another factor that could impact the nature of interdependencies has to do with the types of organizations within the network. For example, it is likely that networks with organizations filling a variety of roles would have different interdependencies than networks where organizations are differentiated purely by location (Bazzoli, Shortell, Dubbs, Chan &

Kralovec, 1999). On the other hand, Brown and colleagues (2012), while focusing specifically on advocacy networks, differentiate strategies by the target and style of the network's advocacy campaigns. However, it is unclear whether particular stakeholder accountabilities are what lead to these strategies or whether they simply enhance their chance of being effective. It is also unclear why these scholars consider one set of accountabilities to be more important than another.

Another possible explanation for why networks accept the members and forms of accountability that they do could be based on their values. For example, a network that values efficiency and unity over flexibility and diversity could have different criteria for which organizations can become members and which accountabilities are considered most salient. These could in turn impact how a network is coordinated and governed. It is also likely that values have an impact on what strategies are deemed appropriate by network members. Especially since the discussion of values has become an important part of the strategic planning process of both public and non-profit organizations (Bryson, 2011).

Values are a much less studied aspect of inter-organizational networks. However, with the perceived invasion of 'private sector' values into the public sphere (Van der Wal, de Graaf & Lasthuizen, 2008), and the alternative forms of informal organizing found in social movements (Chen, Lune, & Queen II, 2013) public and nonprofit sector researchers have begun giving the topic of organizational values greater attention.

Organizational values are considered important for a number of reasons. First, as a key component of organizational culture, values and shared value systems are seen as important for an organization's overall effectiveness (Weiner, 1988). In general, values are understood to form the foundation of evaluating what is right and wrong (Van der Wal, Huberts, Heuval & Kolthoff,

2006). Values have also been linked, at least theoretically, to both strategy and structure. Specifically, organizational values are considered to help guide organization decision-making both regarding what to do and how to do it (Rokeach, 1973). Because of their importance, discussing and documenting an organization's values is seen by both scholars and practitioners as an important part of the strategic planning process; especially for public and nonprofit organizations (Bryson, 2011, Kernaghan, 2003) where mission is thought to play more of a guide than profits in decision-making (Moore, 2000).

Underpinning much of the recent discussion on values in both the public administration and nonprofit management literatures is the concern that 'private, for-profit, sector' values are infiltrating public and nonprofit organizations (Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007; Sanders, 2015). While there is evidence that some values such as accountability, expertise, reliability, efficiency and effectiveness are common to organizations across sectors, other values appear to be sector specific (e.g. private sector values: profitability, innovation and honesty; public sector values: lawfulness, incorruptibility, impartiality) (Van der Wall et al, 2008). In addition, public management scholars have discussed the challenges of managing tensions among competing public values (Van der Wal, de Graaf & Lawton, 2011) and how structures are used to balance such tensions as 'unity' versus 'diversity' (Saz-Carranza & Ospina, 2011), 'efficiency' versus 'responsiveness' (Jäger & Beyes, 2010) and 'empowerment' versus 'control' (Khazanchi, Lewis & Boyer, 2007).

Despite the strong theoretical link between strategy, structure and values made in the literature, there have been few empirical studies exploring the connection between the values espoused by inter-organizational networks of nonprofits in their values statements and their governance and coordination structures. However, it is the assertion of this study that

organizational values are what guide both the strategies and governance structures adopted by networks of international humanitarian non-governmental organizations (INGOS) and these values are often codified in various forms of vision, mission and values statements.

In this study I respond to the calls of public and nonprofit scholars by bringing together the public administration and nonprofit literatures to further our understanding of network governance at its multiple levels. Specifically, I ask what factors help explain the different governance arrangements of goal-directed, inter-organizational networks?

- Are the various dimensions of network governance structure interrelated? For example, is there a relationship between a network's purpose for coordination and either its board structure or form of coordination?
- Are internal factors, such as size, trust, resource disparities and interdependencies, best at explaining the structure of network coordination and external factors such as primary accountabilities best at explaining network board structures?
- Are values a factor in any of these choices either through differences in network membership, perceived interdependencies, stakeholder accountabilities or some other mechanism?

In the next chapter (Chapter 2) I present a more complete review of the literature on inter-organizational networks. After providing a brief historical overview of inter-organizational relations and networks, I focus the discussion on the governance and coordination of inter-organizational goal-directed networks in both the public and nonprofit sectors before turning to recent developments in the study of values within these literatures.

Governance scholars have noted the importance of understanding the institutional context in which networks operate because this context provides the highest level of governance for

these multi-level organizational forms and is likely to have an impact on all subsequent levels (Stone & Sanderfort, 2009). Guided by these ideas, in chapter 3, I provide an overview of the international humanitarian sector focusing on the evolution of various philosophical discussions and sector wide governance arrangements as well as the growing importance of international humanitarian non-governmental organizations within these discussions.

In chapter 4, I describe the research design for this study and explain the rationale for utilizing a comparative case study design with a mixed methods approach to data collection and analysis. I then conclude the chapter by explaining the case selection and data collection processes used for this study. In particular, the case selection process was designed in an attempt to identify networks most embedded within the international humanitarian context and data collection focused exclusively on archival and secondary source data found on organizational websites.

Chapters 5 – 7 present the substance of the study. In Chapter 5, the first set of analyses focus on the relationship among five key network governance characteristics and provide support for the conclusion that network boards are multidimensional and take on four distinct forms. These four distinct forms vary along three key dimensions: Which organizations are considered eligible to be legitimate members; how they are represented in network level decision-making including what decision rules are established; and the purpose of network coordination. However, the relationship between these four types of boards and the network's form of coordination is limited.

Given the lack of relationship between a network's board structure and form of coordination, the second set of analyses, found in the Chapter 6, focus on understanding what explains a network's form of coordination. Specifically drawing from the work of Provan and

Kenis (2008), the analysis investigates the relationship between the various contingency factors discussed by these scholars and the structure of network coordination (i.e. Shared, lead or NAO). From this analysis, I conclude that the size, resource disparity and to a lesser extent a network's purpose of coordination each play a role in understanding its form of coordination.

Finally, in the third set of analyses, found in chapter 7, I return to the structure of network boards and investigate whether the values espoused by these networks are related to the four types of network boards previously identified. From these analyses, I conclude that values are related to network board structures in the international humanitarian sector. Specifically, it is determined that networks generally fit within one of four distinct value profiles. These value profiles vary along two dimensions. The first dimension appears to capture whether a network has a technical versus social approach to humanitarian work. The second dimension appears to capture a network's orientation toward the environment with its target for change being either focused on institutions and systems or towards the individual and local communities. The institutionally focused, technical approach is characterized by values such as efficiency, innovation and measurable results (effectiveness) and is related to a highly centralized network where the purpose of coordination is focused on the implementation of programs worldwide. Values such as accountability and professionalism characterize the institutionally focused, social approach which appears to be related to a decentralized network structure where network coordination focuses more on setting standards to which its members must adhere rather than actual program implementation. Networks with an individual orientation can also be distinguished between a technical or social approach. Values such as human dignity, solidarity, and compassion are dominant within an individually oriented, social approach to humanitarianism. Networks expressing these values often utilize a centralized form of

coordination. However, their purpose for coordination is focused more on support services in the network rather than directly overseeing program implementation. On the other hand, the individually oriented, technical value profile is characterized by a decentralized network where values such as expertise and capacity building are dominant. It was also noted that these networks are often highly embedded within a profession or other social movement other than just having a purely humanitarian focus. However, while an association between a network's value statement and governance structure exists, this analysis does not provide clear evidence as to which comes first or whether a third factor is driving both decisions. For example, do values influence a network's decisions on strategy and governance as suggested by values theorists, or might a network's strategy or structure influence the values it espouses as a means of legitimizing the network to its various stakeholders as suggested by a natural, open systems perspective?

Finally, after observing this association between values and governance structure, I conducted a final, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of network board structures incorporating variables grounded in a variety of alternative explanations. From this final analysis, it is observed that network values along with three complementary causal conditions, philosophical origins, region and age, offer a strong and coherent explanation of the network governance structures for approximately 90% of the cases in this study.

In chapter 8 I summarize these findings and draw conclusions for both theory and practice especially focusing on thoughts for further studies of values and network governance.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE STUDY OF NETWORKS

In the 1960s, research on organizations began moving away from conceptualizing organizations as closed systems, recognizing that much of what impacts an organization's structure, processes and ultimate success has to do with how the organization interacts with the external environment (Scott & Davis, 2007). This open system understanding (Katz & Kahn, 1966), and the theories that coincided with it (e.g. exchange theory, power dependence and co-optation) guided researchers toward an in depth look at inter-organizational relationships. The idea being that an important way in which organizations interact with the external environment is through their relationships with other organizations.

As researchers continued to study these networks of inter-organizational relationships, scholars began identifying them as a 'third form of organizing', governed through trust, social norms and social embeddedness rather than through hierarchy or contract law (Powell, 1990). While the vast majority of network studies continue to focus on how these relationships impact particular organizations (see Borgatti & Foster, 2003; and Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greves & Tsai, 2004 for reviews), a consistent line of research has formed, focused on understanding these networks as a whole (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007). However, this work has been heavily concentrated within the public administration and nonprofit literatures rather than in the broader literature on organizations.

From these studies, we have learned that networks come in a variety of shapes and sizes and are used for a number of different reasons. Also, while networks face many of the same organizing challenges as more traditional organizations, they can also pose a unique set of challenges for coordination and governance, which may require a different set of skills and

arrangements. Studies have associated the use of these structures with different dependencies and environmental conditions, with different internal organizational characteristics, with different strategies and occasionally with different identities, cultures and values. However, in piecing together the sparse literature on this topic, it is the assertion of this study that while all of these factors are inter-related, in many ways the strategy, structure and governance of these inter-organizational goal-directed networks can be traced back to the values espoused by their members and often codified in various forms of vision, mission and values statements.

1970s – 1980s

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, researchers approached the study of inter-organizational relations from a variety of perspectives. For example, using a resource dependence lens, studies demonstrated how organizations with greater resources coming from outside a local community were able to extract more resources from a local United Way agency (Pfeffer & Leong, 1977; Provan, Beyer & Kruytbosh, 1980) and remained less embedded in local resource exchange networks (Galaskiewicz, 1979) thus maintaining their independence. Conversely, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) found that organizations more dependent on government financing were more likely to adopt policies such as affirmative action and implement government requests that required forfeiting higher profits. And similar results were found by Provan (1982) with regard to organizational dependence on a United Way agency

Researchers also found support for the idea that organizations use their relationships to manage uncertainty whether it be by only forming ties to those most similar to them in background (Galaskiewicz & Shatin, 1981) operating philosophies or values (Hall, Clark, Giordano, Johnson & Van Roekel, 1977), filling boards with representatives from problematic parts of the environment (Burt, 1980; Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Selznick, 1949) or

simply allowing substantial donors a place on a nonprofit's board (Rehli & Jäger, 2011; Zald, 1967). Conversely, researchers also found evidence that donating to particular highly esteemed nonprofits was a strategy used by corporations for gaining legitimacy and acceptance from problematic parts of the environment (Galaskiewicz & Colman, 2006). And choices of who to donate to were greatly impacted by an organization's network of acquaintances (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989) as well as its general position within the network (Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991).

In addition to looking at inter-organizational relations from the perspective of the organization to understand how organizations use their networks to access resources, reduce uncertainty and maintain legitimacy, scholars also began looking at whole sets of inter-dependent organizations as social action systems arguing that these networks "exhibit the basic properties of any organized form of collective behavior" (Van de Ven, 1976, p. 24). While organizations may be a part of the system in order to access resources, gain legitimacy or reduce uncertainty, research from the collective action perspective was most interested in understanding the structure of the system as a whole and how it is coordinated and controlled (Van de Ven, Walker & Liston, 1979).

Early theoretical work following this systems approach offered ideas about when a coordinating agency would be likely to emerge in a system based on the size, levels of interdependence, organization awareness and standardization in a network (Litwalk & Hylton, 1962) as well as discussing various distributions of autonomy and control between the central office and network members based on the dimensions of goal agreement, inclusiveness of decision-making, division of labor and commitment to a leadership system (Warren, 1967). However, in his early review and theoretical development of the topic, Provan (1983) noted that

while scholars had studied the forms of networks hypothesized in earlier studies (e.g. United Way federations, NCAA, trade associations, multi-hospital systems), the emphasis was rarely on understanding the differences between the systems themselves and more on how these networks evolved (Stern, 1979) or handle conflict (Molnar & Rogers, 1979; Stern, 1981). He went on to argue that even among coordinating agencies, there are important differences regarding their role and governance structures that had not yet been fully explored.

During the 1980s, the idea of coordinating and governing inter-organizational relationships was being addressed from a number of other theoretical perspectives. However, from these perspectives, a central coordinating organization was less of a concern. Rather, arguing from a transaction costs perspective, Ouchi (1980) distinguished between a market and clan form of governing inter-organizational relationships. According to him, the clan form of governance relies on a strong sense of shared values and norms within the group while the market form of governance was ultimately governed by contract law. He argues that the clan form of organizing was most likely to be used when both goal congruence and performance ambiguity are high while the market form of governance was most appropriate when both were low. Coming from a sociological perspective, Granovetter (1985) expanded this argument by pointing out that all economic transactions are embedded in social relations. These social relations play an important role for coordinating and governing economic activity not just in the clan form of governance. Building on these ideas, Coleman (1988) drew from the concept of social capital and argued that when organizations in a network are highly interdependent and operate within a closed network, norms can be enforced by the entire network. If an actor violates these norms, the whole network is aware and can avoid interacting with the violator until reparations are made. In contrast, Coleman (1988) did not consider sparse, open networks to

have this same capability. Because these ideas were being developed out of different traditions, they did not focus on the emergence and structure of a coordinating agency like Litwalk and Hylton (1962) or Provan (1983). However, each perspective seemed to be discussing a similar, yet less understood form of organizing; leading Powell (1990) to identify ‘networks’ as a distinct form of organizing based on cooperation among interdependent organizations and governed by various forms of social norms and relationships rather than on contracts or hierarchical authority.

At the same time, Oliver (1990) was presenting her refined categorization of rationales for why and when organizations are likely to form various types of inter-organizational relationships. According to her, organizations form ties for five reasons: To balance a perceived asymmetry in the environment, to demonstrate reciprocity regarding the need to coordinate, to achieve efficiencies, to create stability in the environment, and to gain legitimacy. She applied these ideas to help explain aspects of a variety of inter-organizational networks ranging from federations of voluntary associations to ties between corporate-financial interlocks. Interestingly, a key distinction between the types of relationships she identified has to do with the sector of the economy in which an organization operates. For example, except for trade associations, which are found across the sectors and are specifically embedded within a particular policy context, Oliver (1990) identified three types of networks studied by scholars within the non-profit and public sectors (i.e. voluntary agency federations, joint programs and agency-sponsor linkages) and two types in the for-profit sector (i.e. joint ventures and corporate-financial interlocks). This categorization underscores another leading idea of the day. Specifically, with the primary difference between joint programs and joint ventures or agency-sponsor linkages and corporate-financial interlocks being the sector in which these relationships operate, the institutional context is an important factor in the formation of inter-organizational relationships and there may be

important differences across the sectors leading organizations to form different types of relationships and govern them in different ways.

1990s – 2000s

Research on inter-organizational relationships and networks has exploded since 1990 (Raab & Kenis, 2009). With this increase in popularity, the literature on networks has grown quite extensive and questions began being raised regarding the theoretical foundations and development of the field (Salancik 1995). In response, a series of comprehensive literature reviews (c.f. Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve & Tsai, 2004; Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2006; Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007) and special editions of journals (Academy of Management Journal, 2004; Academy of Management Review, 2006; Public Administration Review, 2006) began to emerge, both in the for-profit and public administration literatures, attempting to make sense of the wide variety of studies being published. From these reviews, it was made clear that the study of networks had come a long way. However, differences remained regarding how to make sense of the evidence and where to go next.

In their review of the antecedents and consequences of networks, Brass and colleagues (2004) found evidence suggesting that prior experience in alliances and joint ventures made it easier for firms to enter in to new ones (Ahuja, 2000; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996) and prior ties between firms or their representatives made it more likely they would continue working together – up to a point (c.f. Chung, Singh & Lee, 2000; Fichman & Levinthal, 1991). In addition to having experience in cooperative, inter-organizational relationships, network studies found additional evidence of the importance of cultural and institutional contexts (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004, 2008; Saxenian, 1994) as well as power differences (Ostrom, 1990; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992, 1994) for influencing what types of relationships can

and are formed; the role of ‘conveners’ in the form of entrepreneurs or government agencies in mobilizing cooperative action (Doz, Olk & Ring, 2000; Human & Provan, 2000; Wood & Gray, 1991); the importance of norms and rules of behavior (Coleman, 1990; Klijn & Kopprnjan, 2006; Kogut, 2000; Ostrom, 1990) as well as monitoring (Sydow, 2004) and sanctioning mechanisms (Coleman, 1988; Gulati, 1995) for keeping a network together.

In addition to gaining a greater understanding of how networks form and are kept together, Brass and colleagues (2004) also identified considerable work documenting the importance of networks and network structures for explaining a variety of positive outcomes such as access to more diverse information (Burt, 1992, 2004) greater innovation by firms (Ahuja, 2000, Powell et al, 1996; Shan Walker & Kogut, 1994), better chances of survival (Hager, Galaskiewicz & Larson, 2004; Uzzi, 1996, 1997) and better performance (Podolny, 1993, 1994; Baum, Calabrese & Silverman, 2000), both for individual organizations (Rowley, Behrens & Krackhardt, 2000) and for networks as a whole (Alter & Hage, 2003; Provan & Milward, 1995).

While the review by Brass and colleagues (2004) demonstrated the complexity and importance of networks for organizations, Borgatti and Foster (2003) focused their review on responding to Salancik’s (1995) criticism that network research was not being guided by theory. Specifically, they distinguish between four streams of research based on their explanatory goals and explanatory mechanisms. They argue that broadly speaking, network researchers are trying to explain why organizations are the same or why some perform better than others. They pursue these questions by explaining outcomes either by an organization’s position within a larger network environment or through its specific ties to other actors. While this typology is useful for making sense of a rapidly expanding network literature, scholars note that studies falling within

the same quadrant of the typology still explain their findings based on a variety of theoretical mechanisms (Contractor, Wasserman & Faust, 2006) and that network structures generally only tell part of the story (Galaskiewicz, 2007).

Another critique of the network literature, came from Provan, Fish & Sydow (2007), pointing out that the vast majority of network research is being done at the organization and dyadic level of analysis and more work needs to be done at the whole network level. Additionally, they stress the need to “distinguish between networks as a perspective (often using social network analysis as a methodology and simply capturing any relational embeddedness of organizational action) on one hand and networks as a form of governance on the other” (p. 481). For example, while relationships of all types matter for explaining individual and organizational outcomes (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Brass et al. 2004), network governance refers back to earlier work by Van de Ven, Walker and Liston (1979), Ouchi (1980), Coleman (1988), Ostrom (1990), Powell (1990), and others conceiving of networks as a social system with a distinct form of governance based on relationships and social norms rather than hierarchical authority or contract law. Based on this argument, they define a network from a network governance perspective as “three or more organizations connected in ways that facilitate achievement of a common goal” (p. 482). From this definition, researchers must ask questions not just about the relationships and characteristics of organizations comprising the network, but also about the overall structure and functioning of the networks, such as the mechanisms being used to coordinate interactions toward the common goal, how governance issues such as fostering commitment, managing conflict, and maintaining accountability and legitimacy take place as well as how these dimensions change and evolve over time. Only then can a theory of networks as a distinct form of organizing be developed.

GOVERNANCE AND COORDINATION OF WHOLE NETWORKS

While the majority of recent network research still focuses on organizational networks rather than network organizations (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Raab & Kenis, 2009), there has been steady progress in thinking on the topic of whole network governance, especially within the public and nonprofit literatures. The growing importance of networks and network governance in the public sector is often attributed to the rise of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) “with its market-based prescriptions providing rationales and templates for the marketization of public goods and services and ‘privatized’ regulation” (Isett, Mergel, LeRoux, Mischen & Rethemeyer, 2011, p. i159). In this policy environment, government agencies no longer produce public services themselves, but rather govern networks of private entities to produce public services on behalf of government (Milward and Provan, 2000). Many times these private entities are non-profit agencies that receive a portion of their funding from government contracts, but for-profit and public agencies are also often involved. In addition to providing public services, within this new philosophy, private organizations are also granted greater legitimacy and involvement in policy development. This fusion of both service provision and policy-making led some public administration scholars to see governance networks as unique from either policy networks or collaborative service delivery networks, which had been studied as focusing on only one or the other of the two objectives (Isett et al, 2011).

Network Governance in the Public Sector

Initially, public administration scholars and others considered networks to be advantageous because they allowed for greater specialization, innovation, speed and flexibility in providing services and responding to the publics’ needs while also allowing for decision-making to be decentralized to the most appropriate level for citizens (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).

However, researchers have documented that these networks vary on a number of important dimensions including the purpose of the collaboration (Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2006; McGuire, 2006; Milward & Provan, 2006), the amount of autonomy conceded by member organizations (Provan, 1983), as well as how these networks are governed and coordinated. And not all networks embody such positive characteristics. Also, operating within these structures has presented new challenges for managers, requiring a unique set of skills (McGuire, 2006) from those needed in a hierarchical setting. Especially challenging for public administrators operating in these environments has been encouraging autonomous and often competing organizations to work together (Bunger, 2013) and maintaining sufficient oversight and accountability over services, paid for with public funds but produced by private organizations (Fernandez, 2007). Now, after nearly 30 years of research, many scholars caution administrators not to use networks unless other forms of organizing are not deemed adequate (Huxham, 2003; Provan & Lemaire, 2012).

In their review of the network and collaborative governance literature, Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) developed a framework for making sense of a growing number of studies. For them, networks and collaborations consist of structures and processes which interact and evolve within a context of initial conditions, contingencies and constraints such as environmental turbulence, resource scarcities, power imbalances and competing institutional logics, in order to produce some form of outcome. In this framework, they identify three aspects of network structure: Membership, the relationships among the member organizations, and the governance structure. This governance structure again consists of two parts; whether a network coordinating entity exists and if so, whether or not this network broker is governed by the network members themselves or by an outside entity or group of people (Provan, 1983).

Students of networks and collaborative governance have taken a variety of approaches to studying this form of organizing and acknowledge the importance and interrelation of each approach. Some have taken a social psychological or managerial approach focusing on the roles and functions of key individuals in getting a group of actors to work together (Agranoff & McGuire, 1999, 2001; Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013; Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2007; Wood & Gray, 1991). Others have taken an institutional perspective, paying attention to the beliefs, rules, norms and processes in place that may be facilitating or impeding a group of actors from achieving a common goal (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2006; Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips, 2002, Ostrom, 1990; Reay & Hinings, 2009; van Raaij, 2006). Finally, others have taken a structural approach to understanding network governance (Isett & Provan, 2005; Provan, Huang & Milward, 2009; Provan, Isett & Milward, 2004; Saz-Caranza & Ospina, 2011, Sydow & Windeler, 2003). Underlying the structural perspective is the idea that certain social and organizational structures are likely to be more effective than others for specific groups, under certain conditions, for managing certain tensions and implementing particular strategies. However, it is important to note that the structures under investigation can be both formal and informal¹.

Centralized versus decentralized integration

A consistent focus of network governance research from the structural perspective is the tension between centralized and decentralized integration. As discussed above, early scholars of inter-organizational relations began asking questions about when a central organization would

¹ Formal structure refer to the structures often found in organizational charts relating to “elements such as goals, specialization of tasks and division of labor, ... and designated authority relationships (Bryson, et al. 2006, p. 48). Informal structures refer to the patterns of relationships often uncovered through social network analysis.

form among a group of autonomous organizations to coordinate network activities, what exact roles this organization would play in the network and what the overall structure of the network would be (Litwak & Hylton, 1962; Warren, 1967; Van de Ven 1976). While these scholars began focusing on the coordination of work within a nonhierarchical system of inter-organizational relationships, later scholars were more interested in understanding how social relationships and social embeddedness could be used instead of contracts and hierarchy for discouraging opportunistic and other negative behaviors. For these scholars, work was coordinated by the members and this could best take place among a tightly knit group of organizations (Colmen, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Ouchi, 1980).

As studies continued being conducted within the health and human services sector and other contexts, scholars found that it was easier to get organizations to work together if they are differentiated, because they were less likely to see each other as competitors, especially when they were each receiving funding from the same public source (Morrissey, Tausig & Lindsey, 1985). These researchers also found that creating a central organization to coordinate activity was easier than re-wiring the network (Morrissey, Calloway, Bartko, Ridgely, Goldman & Paulson, 1994) especially when the system was older and had already developed a structured pattern of relationships among its members (Johnsen, Morrissey & Calloway, 1996). However, these same researchers also noted that with environmental pressures, including geographic proximity, impacting the pattern of relationships, centralizing some activities may be good, but issues of service-delivery and coordination should be left to lower levels in the network (Fried, Johnsen, Starrett, Calloway & Morrissey, 1998). This idea was reiterated by Provan and Sebastian (1998) who found that clients perceived a network to be most effective when a small differentiated group of organizations works together in clusters to fulfill client needs. And

Bazzoli, Shortell, Dubbs, Chan and Kralovec (1999) found evidence suggesting that high differentiation generally leads to low centralization, due to the strain placed on a central organization in dealing with so many unique parts. However, in their influential study of mental health networks across four cities, Provan and Milward (1995) found that rather than decentralized service integration, a key factor for network effectiveness from the perspective of clients was having a stable and centralized coordination system where fiscal control of state funding was done in conjunction with what has now been termed a lead organization; in that not only did the organization coordinate the network, but it also provided services putting it in better position to monitor the performance of the other members. In addition to the centralization of some coordination and monitoring functions, some studies have suggested that central broker organizations are also useful for promoting the legitimacy (Human & Provan, 2000) of the network and serving as a repository for network knowledge along with other managerial functions, especially within large highly dispersed and differentiated networks.

Commitment, trust and managing tensions

In addition to investigating how best to coordinate work in a network through a balance of differentiation versus standardization and centralization versus decentralization, network governance researchers are also investigating some of the 'softer' aspects of network coordination and governance such as fostering commitment, building trust and negotiating consensus. The generally accepted idea underlining the majority of network and collaborative governance research is that it is relationships of trust, shared norms and overall social embeddedness that allow networks to operate successfully (Coleman; 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995; McGuire, 2006; Ostrom, 1990; Powell, 1990; Sydow & Windeler, 2003)

Early on, Bazzolli, Hramata and Chan (1998) noted that successful network leaders spent a great deal of time documenting problems, assessing needs, listening to and educating stakeholders, and generally creating trust and a shared understanding of values among network members and supporters. While, scholars generally agree that these tasks are not necessarily the sole responsibility of a central organization it is often a core set of central players that are involved (Lemaire, 2012). In general, scholars have explored the idea that repeated interactions among network members facilitates trust (Gulati, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). However, in their study of a health and human services network, Provan, Nakama, Veazie, Teufel-Shone and Huddleston (2003) noted that building trust among network members is difficult to do and takes considerable time. Other studies have identified a number of ways in which central network actors have impacted the trust, values and goal consensus within the network. For example, Owen-Smith and Powell (2004) found evidence suggesting that central actors in a network can set a tone of cooperation and information sharing simply by being recognized for not using their central position for self-serving purposes. And while Provan and colleagues (1980) noted that powerful organizations can soften their use of power by adhering to norms of cooperation, Van Raak and Paulus (2001) suggest that lower power disparities among network members make it more likely that members can and will negotiate mutually satisfactory outcomes and rules of behavior.

Consistent with these findings and other research (e.g. Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997), Agranoff and McGuire (2001) identified four key tasks for managing within a network setting. Specifically, they argue that network conveners/orchestrators/managers need to activate networks by identifying and incorporating the right people and organizations to be involved. They need to help frame the network by helping to build a shared network identity and culture as

well as define key roles and leadership positions. In addition, they need to continually foster commitment (mobilize) to the network and facilitate productive and purposeful action (synthesize) among the members. One way they suggest this can be done is by having a central organization with paid, professional staff overseen by a diverse board which is designed to facilitate greater collaboration (McGuire 2006). Subsequent studies have found evidence supporting these ideas. For example, in their study of four immigrant networks, Saz-Carranza and Ospina (2012) found that brokers were able to balance the unity/diversity tension and facilitate action by framing a common identity around a shared goal while also promoting the value of diversity within the network allowing members to own private sub-goals and accept each other's differences. Additionally, in their study, Paquin and Howard-Grenville (2013) showed how network orchestrators developed their skills in fostering member interactions allowing them to adjust from a strategy of simply encouraging serendipitous encounters to strategically bring together members they felt would benefit from working together.

Recently, building on these general lines of research, Provan and Kenis (2008) have offered a set of propositions suggesting under what conditions particular forms of network coordination are most likely to be effective. Specifically, they argue that there are three ideal forms of network coordination: Shared, lead organization and network administrative organization (NAO). A shared governance structure is similar to the networks discussed by Ouchi (1980) and Coleman (1988) and others in that they consist of a set of tightly knit organizations with no central coordination. A lead organization structure, is a centralized network structure, where the central broker is also a service providing member of the network. This is similar to the structure of the most effective network in Provan and Milward's (1995) study on network effectiveness. The network administrative organization (NAO) structure is also

generally considered a centralized network structure. However, unlike the lead organization structure, this central broker is not itself a member of the network but exists solely to facilitate the work of the other network members who in turn may or may not make up the board governing the organization (Provan, 1983).

According to Provan and Kenis (2008), each network coordination structure can be effective; however, under a different set of four contingencies. These four contingencies are size, need for network level competencies, trust and goal consensus. For small networks, with a high level of trust and goal consensus throughout the network and little need for network level competencies, a shared governance structure is thought to work well. In moderate sized networks with a low degree of trust and goal consensus and a moderate need for network level competencies, a lead organization structure is thought to be effective. And finally, in large networks with a moderate to high degree of trust and goal consensus as well as a high need for network level competencies, an NAO structure is thought to be best.

In addition to each of these structures being effective under different conditions, each structure is thought to manage three key organizational tensions (i.e. inclusion vs. efficiency, internal vs. external legitimacy and flexibility vs. stability) in different ways. Specifically, Provan and Kenis (2008) propose that while a shared governance structure is likely to promote inclusiveness the two brokered forms are likely to promote efficiency with the NAO being the best at balancing the tension. Likewise, they propose that the shared governance form will promote internal legitimacy while the two brokered forms are more likely to promote external legitimacy with the NAO being best at balancing the tension. Finally, the shared governance form is proposed to promote flexibility while the two brokered forms promote stability. While each of these propositions builds on prior research, few of them have been explicitly tested. In

the following analyses, we will test the first set of propositions (contingencies for effectiveness) and will remain cognizant of the second set of propositions (balancing tensions) as we evaluate the potential relationship between values and network structure.

Network Governance in the Nonprofit Sector

Collaborations and the network form of organizing have been seen by many as the natural form of organizing within the nonprofit sector due to its grounding in values such as volunteerism and reciprocity (Enjolras, 2009; Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). However, just like in the public sector, concerns about the infiltration of professionalization and managerialism have caused many scholars to reflect more critically on how nonprofits are organizing internally and with each other in the form of networks (Maier & Meyer, 2011; Maier, Meyer & Steinbereithner, 2016). Networks and inter-organizational relations have been studied in the form of voluntary agency federations (Litwalk & Hylton, 1962; Oliver, 1990; Pfeffer & Leong, 1977, Provan, Beyer & Kruytbosch, 1980; Van de Ven, 1976; Warren 1967) for some time. However, in 1990s, interests broadened to advocacy networks (Young, 1991, 1992) as well as networks spanning multiple political boundaries (Oster, 1992, 1996), especially international boundaries (Hudson & Bielefeld, 1997). Similar to the public administration literature, nonprofit scholars have given significant attention to the centralization versus decentralization question and the role of network coordinating organizations. However, while the public administration literature has taken a predominantly managerial perspective, focusing on the role of the conveners/orchestrators/managers and the ability of a central organization to coordinate, integrate and monitor collective action; nonprofit and private sector scholars have also brought issues of legitimacy, accountability, strategy, identity, and democratic decision-making more deliberately in to the discussion.

Centralization versus decentralization and the role of network brokers

Drawing heavily from early network studies, Young (1989) reinvigorated a discussion in the nonprofit literature regarding the possibility of changing environmental factors pushing voluntary federations to centralize and standardize operations. Specifically, he argued that environmental factors such as population mobility, the reputational interdependence of local offices, and the global integration of economies, politics and problems were putting pressure on voluntary agency federations to centralize and standardize operations. In addition, he notes that a need for career paths for professional personnel and an overall push towards professionalization was contributing to the trend. Despite these pressures, he also comments on some potential restraining factors in this evolution. Particularly, he notes internal politics, as well as a desire for flexibility, responsiveness, volunteerism, and a concern for legal liability as obstacles slowing down the process of centralization.

Picking up on this interest in centralized versus decentralized control of local nonprofit offices, Oster (1992) began considering the relationship between central headquarters and local offices with regard to the securing of funding from local offices to pay for headquarter expenses as well as the placing of territorial boundaries on their operations. In her study of 55 nonprofits based in the United States, she concluded that a reliance on national level fundraising increased the likelihood of centralizing governance while the number of local operations and their reliance on volunteers increased the likelihood of decentralization (Oster, 1996). Building on these contributions and expanding them to an international context, Hudson and Bielefeld (1997) offered propositions from a resource dependence perspective as to what types of centralization and decentralization is likely to take place under certain environmental conditions. Specifically they argue that an organization's structure (i.e. unitary corporation, federation, coalition or social

choice network) is a function of the level of resources available in a local market and the level of environmental variation across those markets; with more available local resources and greater environmental variation leading to less centralization in organizing across international boundaries.

Picking up from these discussions of the environment and network structure, students of nonprofits began studying how managers in network coordinating organizations were handling the centralization versus decentralization and other tensions inherent to a network form of organizing. Focusing on international advocacy associations and transnational social movements, Young (1991, 1992) suggested that decentralized federations would need to rely on charismatic leadership and heavy use of solidarity and purposive incentives rather than material benefits to coordinate action. However, he suspected they would eventually succumb to forces for centralization. Later on Selsky (1998) argued that the form the network takes is related to how the central organization responds to tensions and challenges it faces in the environment. Taking a prescriptive approach, Connor, Kadel-Taras and Vinokur-Kaplan (1999) suggest that these central organizations should take a greater support role within networks; serving as conveners, facilitating planning and sharing information in order to build the capacity of the network to engage in collective action. These ideas coincide with Brown and Kalegaonkar's (2002) observation regarding the growing importance of support organizations in the NGO sector.

Taking a slightly different perspective, Grossman and Rangan (2001) suggest that a network coordinating organization can do things that counterbalance a local branch's draw towards autonomy. Specifically, in their study of five U.S. based organizations, they found that a coordinating organization's ability to create a national/international brand and provide valued support services help encourage local organizations to forgo some autonomy and work in a more

centralized and standardized manner. Standley (2001) complemented this argument when she found that a coordinating organization's ability to build trust among its members as well as convince them of access to greater resources was enough to encourage members of three out of four voluntary health associations to forgo some autonomy and focus on national level goals over local goals. Additionally, from her in-depth case study of one support oriented network coordinator, Sanyal (2006) offers insights as to why centralized control by these support organizations may be advantageous or necessary. Specifically, she suggests that while a supportive and decentralized governance structure allows for local responsiveness, increased legitimacy, innovation, and program coherence at the local level, it also brings about challenges for a central coordinator such as not being able to find appropriate collaborators, difficulty in transmitting values across the network, and generally creates distance between a central office and the local context, allowing donors to co-opt partners. And Wittberg (2013) expands on these insights, in her study of faith-based umbrella organizations in the United States.

Nonprofit and Network Boards

Another aspect of network governance structure that has been acknowledged by scholars but rarely investigated (see Rehli & Jäger, 2011 for an exception) as part of the network governance discussion are network boards (Provan, 1983; Cornforth, 2012). Early on, in his discussion of federations as inter-organizational networks, Provan (1983) distinguished between federations with management organizations governed by the members (participatory) and those governed by an outside entity or group of individuals (independent). As research on inter-organizational relations and networks progressed, the discussion of differences in these board structures has been given little attention (Cornforth, 2012). However, boards have been studied extensively within the nonprofit literature more broadly, which like networks, have been

rationalized as a form of organizing based on democratic principles and social norms (cf. Enjolras, 2009; Powell, 1990).

In a review of the nonprofit and public governance literatures, Stone and Ostrower (2007) identify four key areas of interest among nonprofit governance scholars. Specifically, they identified scholarship regarding board roles and responsibilities, board structure and composition, board-staff relationships, and board effectiveness. Of particular interest to this study is the work on board roles and responsibilities and board structure and composition in that these parallel the topics discussed in the broader governance literature regarding the role of network coordinating organizations and network structures. Albeit, the literature on board-staff relations has some parallels to the support versus control discussion regarding network coordinating organizations.

While, researchers have documented a variety of roles and responsibilities which boards can fill (Brown & Guo, 2010), scholars generally agree that most of these revolve around four major functions: Developing and assessing strategy, protecting the mission and monitoring performance, overseeing the executive director and top management, as well as fundraising and public relations (Bradshaw, 2009; Stone & Ostrower, 2007, Cornforth, 2012). Scholars have approached these topics from a variety of perspectives; some suggesting that different theories are appropriate for different types of nonprofits (Miller-Millesen, 2003) or for nonprofits operating in different environments (Bradshaw, 2009).

Recently, both Bradshaw (2009) and Ostrower and Stone (2010) have argued for a contingency approach to understanding what particular set of roles different boards will play. Specifically, in their study using data from the *National Survey of Nonprofit Governance* Ostrower and Stone (2010) found support for the idea that different governance frameworks help

explain different configurations of organization, environment and board characteristics. Notably, internal organizational characteristics and board attributes had the widest relationship with different forms of board engagement. Specifically, characteristics such as size and professionalization showed strong positive relationships with certain internally oriented roles, but were negatively associated with external roles. Finally, the influence of environmental factors was more focused and related to the externally oriented roles of boards. From these findings, they conclude that a resource dependence perspective was better supported than an agency perspective. However, in their study of 501(c)(3) organizations registered in New York, Callen, Klein & Tinkelman (2010) found evidence supporting both agency theory and resource dependence theory. Specifically, they found that boards filled more of a monitoring role when organizations operated in stable environments but more of a boundary spanning role when organizations were operating in less stable environments. These findings are consistent with Bradshaw's (2009) theorizing as well as conventional wisdom regarding the effect uncertainty has on the forming of inter-organizational ties (Oliver, 1990). However, other scholars continue to work towards integrating the two perspectives rather than apply them contingently (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois & Jegers, 2012).

Closely related to board functions (Brown, 2005; Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 2003), board structures (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) have been another focus of nonprofit governance research for some time. Traditional aspects of board structure that are regularly investigated are the size of the board, how boards are elected and appointed as well as the composition of the board especially with regard to race, gender, education and social status (see Ostrower & Stone, 2006 for a review).

Rationales used to explain these structures have ranged from internal factors such as the size, strategy (Brown & Iverson, 2004) and origins of the organization as well as the role the board plays in relation to top management. External factors such as dependence on a particular resource stream (Pfeffer, 1973; Rehli & Jäger, 2011), accountability to particular stakeholder groups (Andrés-Alonso, Cruz & Romero-Merino, 2006; Ospina, Diaz & O'Sullivan, 2002) or based on an organization's claims to legitimacy (Abzug & Galaskiewicz, 2001; Guo & Musso, 2007; Zald, 1967), have been considered as well.

In an early study of board characteristics among local YMCAs, Zald (1967) found evidence to support the ideas that 1) boards of local nonprofits represent the demographics of the area they serve. 2) The effectiveness of a nonprofit is related to the composition of its board. And 3) as demographics shift, nonprofits in areas with less affluent and educated boards are likely to suffer. Later, in his study of hospitals, Pfeffer (1973) again found support for a relationship between nonprofit boards and their environment. However, in addition to board composition being related to an organization's social context, Pfeffer (1973) found evidence that both the size and composition of boards are related to their function and this function is heavily influenced by the organization's sources of funding. Specifically, larger boards drawing from key demographics in the community were found among organizations dependent on private funds while smaller boards focusing on internal monitoring issues were found in organizations with a larger amount of government funding. This distinction laid the ground work for a long-running discussion among nonprofit and network scholars, regarding the legitimacy and accountability of these organizations.

Grounded in de Tocqueville's (1956) observations regarding America's democratic participation in public life, research on nonprofit boards continued to focus on how

representative nonprofit boards are of their communities (Abzug, 1996; Abzug, DiMaggio, Grey, Useem & Kang, 1993; Abzug & Galaskiewicz, 2001; Bolduc, 1980; Brown, 2002; Guo & Musso, 2007; Kissane & Gingerich, 2004). The idea being, not only is community representation an affirmation of American civil society, it was thought that proper representation provided legitimacy to these civil society actors as they participated in public life, especially when they are active in advocating for policy changes. However, as the discussion of legitimacy has developed in different scholarly fields and in different contexts, different forms of legitimacy have been defined and discussed (cf. Suchman, 1995). Scholars are now asking questions such as legitimacy for whom, on what basis and how is legitimacy created (Lister, 2003, Meyer & Buber & Aghamanoukjan, 2013). This discussion has been especially pronounced among international advocacy associations, transnational social movements and international humanitarian NGOs (Nelson, 1997), where it is difficult to support claims of representation through traditional mechanisms such as board representation. Now, in addition to distinguishing claims to legitimacy based on substantive and symbolic representation (Guo & Musso, 2007), scholars also distinguish between pragmatic, moral, cognitive and regulatory legitimacy; each thought to be demonstrated in different ways through governance structures (Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012) and other organizational symbols (Lister, 2003). For example, in their study of 55 American INGOs, Pallas, Gethings & Harris (2015), found evidence supporting the idea that organizations select what basis of legitimacy they want to claim and often target these claims to specific stakeholder groups such as donors and employees.

A similar discussion has developed around the idea of accountability (Coule, 2015). Initial conceptions of accountability within the nonprofit governance literature focused on issues of finances, internal controls and regulatory compliance (Ebrahim, 2003; Ospina, Diaz &

O'Sullivan, 2002; Young, Bania & Bailey; 1996), and were most often approached from a principle-agent perspective (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois & Jegers, 2012). However, just as with legitimacy (Atack, 1999, Bäckstrand, 2006; Collingwood & Logister, 2005; Edwards, 1999; Lister, 2003) questions of accountability grew as nonprofits became more engaged in public service delivery, international development and political advocacy (Edwards & Hulmes, 1996a; Jordan & Tuijl, 2000). It was recognized quite early on that these organizations are accountable to a variety of stakeholders (Najam, 1996) each of which may have a different understanding of an organization's accountability or what it means to be effective (Provan & Milward, 2001). Rather than accountability being something objective, it became understood that it is actually embedded in relationships with the demands and mechanisms used to demonstrate accountability being constructed as part of the relationship (Ebrahim, 2003; Herman & Renz, 1997); with one such mechanism for demonstrating both legitimacy and accountability and fostering the relationship with stakeholders being through the structure, composition and role of the board in overseeing and protecting the mission and top management.

Grounded in this understanding, Brown and Moore (2001) suggest that one important factor for organizations in determining to whom they are accountable and how, is their strategy. Focusing specifically on international nongovernmental organizations, these scholars suggest that while service delivery organizations are most accountable to donors and service regulators, capacity-building and policy influencing INGOs are more accountable to beneficiaries and political constituencies respectively. Brown and Iverson's (2004) study of 132 nonprofits supports this argument in that they found a significant relationship between organizational strategy and board structures. However, Bruton and Williamson (2005) suggest that

organizations must respond to a variety of stakeholders at the same time which creates contradictory demands requiring particular organizational structures to manage these tensions.

The debate on this topic is ongoing. For example, in their study of Spanish INGOS, Andres-Alonso, Cruz and Romero-Merino (2006) found that having a strong institutional donor is more important than a particular board structure for helping organizations develop strong financial control mechanisms. However, Ossewaarde, Nijof and Heyse (2008) argue that when organizations focus on accountability and legitimacy to external stakeholders the ability to accomplish their true mission is inhibited. Similarly, arguing from a social capital perspective, Titeca and Vervisch (2008) illustrate through case studies of three Ugandan community associations, how linking capital (ties to powerful, institutional actors) can negatively impact community associations and their democratic governance in particular. However, from their study of 16 Chinese Canadian nonprofit organizations, Knutsen and Brower (2010) identify at least five strategies used by these organizations for managing instrumental and expressive accountabilities to a variety of internal and external stakeholders. Also, Ospina, Diaz and O'Sullivan (2002) documented how identity based non-nonprofits negotiated accountability with their key constituencies and used these relationships and structures as they negotiated accountabilities with other stakeholder groups. Taking these ideas further, Coule (2015) argues that compliance based accountability goes against the logic of non-profit organizing and that an expressive, values-based accountability is a greater source of legitimacy yet challenges the instrumental logic of principle-agent theories.

Building on this general line of inquiry, Brown, Ebrahim and Batliwala (2012) in their study of 10 international advocacy NGOs, put forth a series of propositions linking the concepts of accountability, legitimacy, strategy and governance structure for this form of network.

Broadly, they argue that the primary accountability (stakeholder) of a network shapes its overall governance arrangement. Specifically, they suggest that a networks' primary accountability is either to its donors, members or beneficiaries. With donors as a primary stakeholder, the network is likely to make claims of normative legitimacy and utilize the network coordinating organization as a clearing house to enable information sharing among members. On the other hand, when the primary stakeholders are the network members, the network is likely to claim technical legitimacy and utilize the network coordinating organization to coordinate activities across the members. Finally, when beneficiaries are considered the dominant stakeholder, legitimacy is based on representation and the network coordinating organization will be used to provide technical support to the members and beneficiaries themselves. For these scholars, the effectiveness of any given network, is a matter of matching the structure of the network with a particular set of strategies, targets and time frames. And the balance of autonomy and centralization is a function of dependence, uncertainty and environmental norms and pressures. However, while in this theory, the mechanism linking stakeholder accountability, claims to legitimacy and the role of the central organization is the network board, there is little specific discussion of the structure and composition of these boards and how their differences cater to specific groups or why one stakeholder might be considered more important than another. This is indicative of the recent literature in general. However, in a rare study of this topic, Rehli and Jäger (2011) found that networks with greater reliance on institutional donors are more likely to have boards selected by management, while networks that rely on volunteers are more likely to use a member elected board. In the subsequent analyses, we explore these issues particularly focusing on whether or not there are consistent groupings of board characteristics, central office roles and primary accountabilities.

VALUES AND NETWORK GOVERNANCE IN THE PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT SECTORS

While, the relationship between strategy and structure has not been as thoroughly investigated within the nonprofit and networks literature (Ogliastri, Jäger & Prado, 2016), it has been well documented in the organizations literature more broadly (Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Chandler, 1962; Young, Koenig, Najam & Fisher, 1999). In an earlier contribution drawing from this literature, Brown and Moore (2001) suggest that strategy drives an INGO network's choice of structure, accountabilities and claims to legitimacy. Specifically, they discuss the implications of these ideas for three commonly adopted strategies among international humanitarian NGOs: Service delivery, capacity-building and advocacy.

Drawing from another growing line of research within the organizations literature, Young (2001a & 2001b) suggests that one factor influencing national and international nonprofit associations' strategy and structure are their identities (Albert & Whetten, 1985). Specifically, he argues that coming to a consensus regarding organizational identity is 'essential' to developing both long-term strategies and making structural choices. Brilliant and Young (2004) expanded this argument; asserting that not only must nonprofit organizations adapt their strategies to changing environments, these adaptations must remain consistent with an organizations' identity in order for them to be successful. These assertions have been supported in studies of INGOS responding to changing government priorities in Belgium (Molenaers, Dewachter & Dellepiane, 2011), France (Cumming, 2008), Spain (Martinez, 2009) and the US (Gerstbauer, 2010). However, others have argued that strategies are nothing more than a tool to build consensus and assert legitimacy among key stakeholders (Harris, Dopson & Fitzpatrick, 2009); similar to the development of certain scripts among network members in establishing their identity and claims to legitimacy (Drori, Honig & Sheaffer, 2009). These parallel assertions by scholars are not

surprising considering that in her study of the Indian NGO sector, Jakimow (2010) describes how negotiating the meaning of key values is an important part of an organization's process of defining its identity as well as playing a role in the strategic planning process of both public and non-profit organizations (Bryson, 2011).

Organizational values are considered important for both strategy and identity for a number of reasons. First, as a key component of organizational identity and culture, values and shared values systems are seen as important for an organization's overall effectiveness (Weiner, 1988). In general, values are understood to form the foundation from which to evaluate what is right and wrong (Van der Wal, Huberts, Heuval & Kolthoff, 2006). Values have also been linked, at least theoretically, to both strategy and structure. In that they help guide organization decision-making both regarding what to do and how to do it (Rokeach, 1973). Because of their importance, discussing and documenting an organization's values is seen by both scholars and practitioners as an important part of the strategic planning process; especially for public and nonprofit organizations (Bryson, 2011, Kernaghan, 2003) where mission is thought to play more of a guide than profits in decision-making (Moore, 2000). And managing by values rather than by instruction or objective is being put forward by scholars as the best approach for handling an increasingly complex public environment more and more reliant on nonhierarchical forms of organizing (Dolan and Garcia, 2002; Kernaghan, 2003; Wagner, 2014).

Values, Structure and the Effectiveness of Organizations

In relation to strategy and structure, organization scholars have generally discussed values in the context of tensions between specific competing values (Van der Wal, de Graff & Lawton, 2011) and the role of structure in managing these tensions. For example, nonprofit scholars utilizing the Competing Values Framework (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983) have focused

on three such tensions: internal versus external focus, control versus flexibility and means versus goals. In their action research study, Grabowski, Neher, Crim and Mathiassen (2015) helped a nonprofit organization design a structure that allowed for a tightly controlled and centralized structure for internal services, while allowing flexibility for parts of the organization with an external focus. Where values came in to the discussion was in determining which were internal and which were external services based on perceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. And in a rare study specifically analyzing structures and the values used in organizational decision-making, Heyse (2013) focuses specifically on the ends versus means tension and demonstrates through a comparative case study of two international humanitarian NGO networks how different structures are related to decision-making prioritizing either a means or ends value system.

As discussed above, Provan and Kenis (2008), in their thinking specifically about forms of network coordination, identify important tensions regarding internal versus external legitimacy, efficiency versus inclusiveness and flexibility versus stability, and propose that certain structures will be more aligned with certain of these values than others. Specifically, the scholars conclude that the shared governance form favors inclusiveness, flexibility and internal legitimacy while the two brokered forms (lead and NAO) favor efficiency, stability and external legitimacy. However, they suggest that the NAO is better at balancing the tensions than the lead organization.

Building on these ideas but focusing specifically on the role of the central office, Saz-Carranza & Ospina (2011) identified the tension between unity and diversity that had to be managed in the four NAO governed networks they studied. Jäger and Beyes (2010) discuss the tension between an economic rationale and social mission in their study of a community bank with over 400 local autonomous branches and a support oriented coordinating organization.

Specifically, the central organization focused on efficiency and pushed for centralization of many functions while local offices reminded the central organization of their mission and commitment to local communities in their effort to maintain a level of autonomy. And focusing specifically on promoting innovation, Khazanchi, Lewis & Boyer, (2007) discuss the structural tension of allowing autonomy and flexibility as well as maintaining control and efficiency. However, overall, the research linking values and either strategy or structure is quite thin. And more studies including a wider spectrum of values and structural nuance are still needed.

Researchers have also linked identities, cultures and values to how organizations interact with external stakeholders. For example, in her study of 1,126 participants from 88 organizations, Brickson (2005) identifies three distinct identity orientations: individualistic, relational and collectivist that help explain different methods of interacting with stakeholders. Similarly, Jones, Felps and Bigley (2007) develop a typology of stakeholder culture “ranging from individually self-interested (agency culture) to fully other-regarding (altruist culture)” (p. 137), with instruments developed and validated to measure an organization’s position on such a continuum (Chen, 2015).

While these scholars focus on broadly classifying organizational cultures and identities and attributing them to types of stakeholder relations, others have given more attention to specific values or types of values that make up these broader categorizations (Rokeach, 1973; Hofstede, 1985; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman & Gupta, 2004). For example, Dolan and Garcia (2002) distinguish between economic-pragmatic, ethical-social and developmental organizational values claiming that an organization’s value profile can be meaningfully and parsimoniously mapped out according to these three dimensions. Using this typology to analyze the values of 3,018 public sector employees in Spain, Esteve, Grau and Valle (2013) found that

pragmatic values were dominant among the sample as well as ethical values to a lesser extent. However, the exact profiles varied across gender, education and level in the organization. And, in her study of six nonprofit social welfare programs, Nevile (2009) found that a good match between managers and clientele values was related to an organization generating positive outcomes; with this relationship being confined to instrumental (process) values and not to ethical or outcome values.

However, coming from a more critical perspective, Yip, Twohill, Ernst & Munusamy (2010) point out from their case study that while developing a shared sense of identity and values is useful for bringing people together, managing personnel and meeting client needs, it can create blind spots causing nonprofits from meeting the needs of other groups that do not share the same values. From their case study, Fenton and Inglis (2007) compliment this insight by pointing out that values do not mean the same thing to everybody and thus can bring about unity or fragmentation within an organization; particularly between levels in an organization (Van der Wal, 2014). This poses a significant challenge for international organizations and networks due to the fact that researchers have found differences in public values across political, geographic, ethnic (Dolan, Díez-Pinol, Fernández-Alles, Martín-Prius, & Martínez-Fierro, 2004; Munene, Schwarz & Smith (2000) and temporal (Omurgonulsen & Oktem, 2000) boundaries. For example, scholars have found stark differences between African and Western European cultures. Specifically, in analyzing two global surveys, Munene, Schwarz & Smith (2000) found that while Western Europeans value egalitarianism and a management style emphasizing self-reliance and consultation with subordinates, African cultures prefer hierarchy, embeddedness and mastery and a management style of formal rules and reliance on superiors in reaching decisions.

Competing Values across the Public, For-profit and Nonprofit sectors

Another, developing line of investigation has focused on whether or not there are consistent differences in the values across public, for-profit and non-profit organizations. Driving much of this research in both the public administration and nonprofit management literatures is the concern that ‘for-profit’ values are infiltrating public and non-profit organizations (Chen, Lune, & Queen II, 2013; Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007; Sanders, 2015; Van der Wal, de Graaf & Lasthuizen, 2008). This is a concern, because for many scholars, the distinguishing factor among the three sectors is the values in which they are grounded (Enjolras, 2009). Specifically, for-profit organizations are thought to be grounded in competition and efficiency, public organizations are thought to prioritize control and standardization, while nonprofits are considered to favor participation (Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2006; Helmig, Hinz & Ingerfurth, 2015).

As part of a long-term research agenda on the topic, Van der Wal, Huberts, Van den Heuvel and Kolthoff (2006) conducted a comprehensive review of both the administrative and business ethics literature. From this review, they identified a wide array of values². However, focusing on what they considered the most prominent, they identified a set of approximately 20 values with some linked exclusively to one of the two sectors and others discussed meaningfully in both. Subsequently, using a survey of 382 managers across the Netherlands, Van der Wal, De Graaf and Lasthuizen (2008) found evidence suggesting that some values such as accountability, expertise, reliability, efficiency and effectiveness are common to organizations across sectors,

² Van der Wal, Huberts, Van den Heuvel and Kolthoff (2006) drew from two Masters theses deducting 538 values in the public sector literature (Vermeulen, 2003) and 210 in the business literature (Haarhuis, 2004). Using a survey format within the US, Jørgensen and Bozeman (2007) found 72 registered values.

while other values appear to be sector specific (e.g. private sector values: profitability, innovation and honesty: public sector values: lawfulness, incorruptibility, impartiality).

Building from these initial findings between public and for-profit values, nonprofit scholars have investigated whether differences exist between the public and non-profit sectors. In their study of 312 respondents in local public and nonprofit organizations in eastern Virginia, Miller-Stevens, Taylor & Morris (2015) found significant differences for only 4 of the 20 values investigated. Specifically, nonprofit managers reported a higher prioritization for altruism, generosity, charity and individualism. However, in their study of key informants from German hospitals, Helmig, Hinz and Ingerfurth (2015) found no differences in values across the sectors.

Various explanations have been given for these non-findings. Jørgensen and Bozeman (2007) have suggested that public and government are not synonymous and that many organizations serve the public good and are therefore likely to uphold a certain amount of public values. From a nonprofit perspective, Knutsen (2013) argues that while there is an ideal nonprofit model of organizing, organizations must compromise this form of organizing and adopt business and government practices and values in order to be self-sustaining.

Another perspective is that while many of the same values are espoused across sectors, it is not the value itself that is in contest, but how it is understood. For example, while Van der Wal, De Graaf and Lasthuizen (2008) found no differences in the acceptance of many values such as accountability, expertise, reliability, efficiency and effectiveness, we know from the literature that a common question asked in discussions of accountability and effectiveness is ‘accountability and effectiveness for who? (Herman & Renz, 1997; Lister, 2003; Maier & Meyer, 2011; Provan & Milward, 2001). Building from a distinct theoretical perspective and using a different methodology, Jørgesen and Isaksson (2015) did find differences between 50

public and private organizations in the UK and Scandinavia. Specifically, while many of the previous studies on this topic surveyed individual respondents working within the various sectors, these researchers analyzed organizational value statements in line with recommendations from Kernaghan (2003). Additionally, while previous studies focused on a similar list of values to those first identified by Van der Wal and colleagues (2006, 2008), Jørgensen and Isaksson (2015) analyze differences in statements of expertise, trustworthiness and goodwill before focusing specifically on how organizations in each sector demonstrate goodwill towards their clients. They distinguish between three forms of expressing goodwill: attention, devotion and concord. *Attention* has a ‘me’ focus and is expressed by showing concern for a particular group. *Devotion* has a ‘you’ focus and is expressed in an organization’s dedication to and confidence in the people it supports. Finally, *concord* captures a ‘we’ attitude and working with beneficiaries. Utilizing this approach, the researchers found that private organizations expressed considerably more *attention* goodwill while the public organizations expressed more *concord* goodwill. Both sectors were equal in their expression of *devotion* goodwill. Not only are these findings interesting for giving us new ways to think about sector differences in values, they also parallel the earlier studies by Brickson (2005) which distinguished between individualistic, relational and collectivist identities and Jones, Felps and Bigley (2007), which developed a typology of stakeholder culture “ranging from individually self-interested (agency culture) to fully other-regarding (altruist culture)” (p. 137). Particularly, each of these three studies appears to be picking up on the same issue in that what is distinctive about different values, identities and cultures is how they view and relate to others. Therefore, in the final set of analyses, I not only explore the wide range of values used by humanitarian INGO networks in their values statements but am also attentive to how these terms are used in reference to particular stakeholders. I then

explore the relationship between the values espoused by these networks of humanitarian INGOs and the forms of governance they adopt.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH CONTEXT

Previous scholars have suggested the importance of understanding network governance within its unique policy context. The idea being that the policy context is already one level of governance and any additional layers are likely to be impacted by this higher level (Stone & Sanderfort, 2009). While studying networks across sectors allows researchers to understand how these unique policy contexts impact network level governance, studying networks within a single context allows the impact of this context to be held relatively constant in order to focus on network level characteristics such as stakeholders, strategies and values.

In this study, I look at inter-organizational, goal-directed networks operating internationally within the humanitarian sector. The international humanitarian sector provides a good context in which to study networks for a number of reasons. First, it is a growing and increasingly important global policy context for inter-organizational networks to operate in (Boli, 2006). Second, there continues to be a vigorous and public debate surrounding appropriate goals, strategies, values and accountabilities within the sector (Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Fisher, 1997, Marangos, 2009) making many of the issues at the heart of this study salient and potentially more amenable to study. Third, since the 1990's observers have noted the frequent use of network structures to organize work across international borders (Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001). However, since these observations there have been some high profile examples of these networks changing their governance structures for a variety of reasons (e.g. Save the Children, Action Aid International).

HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT

Humanitarian actors operate within a truly global context both environmentally and politically (Smith, Pagnucco & Romeril, 1994; Tvedt, 2002). As we transitioned from the era of

the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), policy makers and other observers noted a number of trends regarding the successes and challenges of the past 15 year experiment in coordinated global development. First, while the goal of reducing extreme poverty rates by half was met five years ahead of the 2015 deadline there are still over 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty and, inequality appears to be on the rise. Even more concerning is that this inequality is not only found across countries but also within them. For example, recent analysis suggests the majority of the poor are now found in middle income countries (UNECOSOC, 2014a). While the causes and implications of this trend must be better understood, it is clear that strategies for addressing poverty will have to account for these changes. Second, increases in both social and environmental shocks have led many to question the sustainability of the gains already achieved. For example, environmental shocks such as floods, droughts, earthquakes and volcanoes can annihilate gains in agriculture and infrastructure that take communities decades to develop. Additionally, social forces such as mass urbanization as well as internal and cross-border conflicts can also jeopardize gains, inhibit future development and lead to humanitarian crises (UNECOSOC, 2014a). Each of these factors requires unique strategies, skills and resources.

These global trends are anticipated to continue over the near future and we are already noticing an increase in the frequency and complexity of humanitarian crises (Burkle, Martone & Greenough 2014). For example, due to climate changes, the frequency and severity of extreme natural events are increasing as are their toll on human populations (IPCC, 2012). In 2013 there were over 330 natural disasters reported claiming over 22,000 lives, affecting nearly 100 million people and causing over \$100 billion in economic loss. This was the fourth consecutive year breaking these thresholds and the projections for 2014 continue to trend upward (UNGA, 2014).

Not only are extreme natural events increasing, their severity is being compounded by on-going social trends. For example, it is anticipated that 54 percent of the world's population resides in urban areas and this is expected to surpass 65 percent by 2050; with the greatest increases expected to take place in the developing regions of Africa and Asia (UNDESAPD, 2014). Couple this with the fact that over half of the natural disasters are occurring in developing Asian countries, it is clear how the convergence of these 'mega-trends' can compound the severity of natural events on human development. A recent example of the convergence of these trends is Typhoon Haiyan which made landfall in the Philippines on 8 November 2013 affecting over 14 million people and which came less than a month after a nearby earthquake measuring 7.2 on the Richter scale. The earthquake and tsunami that hit Japan in 2011 killing over 15,000 people and causing leaks at a nuclear plant is another example of how social trends and policy choices can exacerbate the effects of natural disasters.

The nature of man-made crises is also changing and may be becoming more severe. For example, it is estimated that at least one fifth of humanity lives in countries experiencing significant violence, political conflict, insecurity and societal fragility (UNECOSOC 2014b). While the number of wars between states may be on the decline, the number of internal conflicts is on the rise. In its report on global trends, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reported that by the end of 2013, approximately "51.2 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or human rights violations." Of these, approximately 33.3 million were internally displaced (IDPs) (UNHCR, 2014). The situations in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Palestine, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central Africa Republic are all examples of these complex, man-made crises. This shift from cross

boundary conflicts to internal conflicts raises significant challenges for international policy makers; where state sovereignty continues to be a fundamental tenant.

The convergence of these trends continues to complicate development as well as place an increasing burden on the humanitarian community in responding to the growing needs.

According to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, “In 2014, 52 million people were targeted to receive international humanitarian assistance through the inter-agency appeal process and a record \$15.6 billion was requested for humanitarian action in 25 countries” (UNGA, 2014 p. 2). This is in addition to the fact that in both 2012 and 2013 the funding appeals went unmet by over \$4 billion each year (Development Initiative, 2014a). Increasing strains on the system have led stakeholders at all levels to call for changes in how the international community pursues development and responds to humanitarian situations (UNGA, 2014).

HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM

As the nature and understanding of humanitarian crises has evolved, so too has the humanitarian sector’s response. In looking back over this evolution, Korten (1990) suggested that organizations within the humanitarian system had gone through four generations of humanitarian organization. The first generation he identifies focused on relief and welfare. The second generation focused on community development. The third generation redirects its attention towards institution and policy change, and in the fourth generation, Korten (1990) hopes for a focus on global change through international social movements. While others have noted similar trends in the literature (Hailey, 1999), some scholars have questioned the clarity of this progression arguing that each of these strategies have been present within the humanitarian system simultaneously with humanitarian organizations pursuing one or multiple of these strategies based on their goals, values, theories of change and accountabilities. However, on their

websites, some humanitarian organizations have attributed changes in their thinking on these topics to changes in the way they do things (cf. Food for the Hungry, Action Aid International).

As a sector, ideas from each of these ‘generations’ can be seen. For example, since 1990 there has been a significant effort by donors, the United Nations (UN) and INGOS to make the humanitarian system more efficient in its responses through increased technical innovation, coordination, accountability, transparency, standardization and scalability. In addition to enacting (1991) and improving (2005) the United Nations Cluster System, which serves as a coordination mechanism for international actors converging on a humanitarian crises to share information, there have also been a number of initiatives such as the signing of the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (1994), the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (2003), the INGO Accountability Charter (2006), and the Core Humanitarian Standard (2014) which promote professionalization by addressing issues of accountability and transparency to both beneficiaries and donors as well as projects such as the SPHERE project (1997) and the LEGS project (2007) which are designed to improve quality and standardization across humanitarian actors by setting minimum standards for many of the common humanitarian activities such as providing food, water, shelter and treating animals.

At the same time, organizations have used political tactics such as advocacy and lobbying to bring about a humanitarian agenda which focuses more on reducing the severity of disasters and increasing the resiliency of populations through a better understanding of root causes, risk mitigation, bottom-up changes in development strategy and inclusive decision-making (Bryer & Magrath, 1999; The Global Council of the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness, 2012; UNISDR, 2014).

THE ROLE OF INGOS WITHIN THE HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM

Humanitarian INGOS have contributed significantly on both sides of the discussion and their role in the system continues to grow. While complete information regarding the size and composition of the INGO community are notoriously difficult to assess (Anheier, 2005; Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001; Morton 2013; Taylor et al. 2012), there is a fair amount of agreement that since the 1970s, the number of NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance has greatly increased (Boli, 2006; Lindenberg & Bryant 2001) and so has their overall influence in the system (Hailey, 1999; Lindenberg, 1999; Smith, 1993).

As part of the first phase of their study on the State of the Humanitarian System, ALNAP researchers “revealed more, and more diverse, agencies than expected”; estimating approximately 4,400 active humanitarian NGOs worldwide (Taylor et al., 2012, p. 9). However, others are quick to note that once the ‘briefcase’ NGOs are removed, the number is closer to 260. While the number of INGOS with annual budgets over \$10 million was estimated to be at 143 (UNOCHA, 2013) the industry continues to be dominated by a small handful of ‘mega-INGOs.’ For example, in one analysis from 2008 to 2010, researchers found that the five largest INGOS made up 37% of all INGO humanitarian expenditures and the largest 33 INGOS made 71% of INGO humanitarian expenditures (Taylor et al., 2012).

One of the traditional roles of INGOS within the humanitarian system has been that of implementation or service delivery. In this capacity, INGOS implement activities that range the spectrum of humanitarian activities from search, rescue and food distribution to healthcare and education system support as well as livelihood creation and all aspects in between. Funding for these activities come from a mix of sources depending on the organization. However, of the approximately \$18 to \$22 billion spent annually on humanitarian assistance since 2008, INGOS

manage approximately 35% to 40% either through their direct fundraising or through the implementation of projects funded by other actors in the system (Development Initiatives, 2014b; Taylor et al. 2012). When the entire budgets of INGOs are considered, the largest INGOs manage budgets greater than many of the official aid budgets of countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Morton, 2013). And while all sources of humanitarian assistance are growing, recent data suggests that private funding is growing at a faster pace than official assistance and INGOs have been estimated to raise 80% to 90% of these private funds historically (Stirk, 2014). This growth is exemplified, in a recent study, where it was estimated that the budgets of a sample of 31 INGOs had increased by over 25% from 2006 to 2011 (Development Initiatives, 2014b). However, it is unclear whether funding is increasing equally for all INGOs. Additionally, as non-traditional donor countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Turkey) increase their aid contributions, it is unclear whether they will adopt funding strategies similar to OECD countries or whether their distinct histories and positions within the global community will influence them to pursue different funding mechanisms.

In addition to their contribution with regard to fundraising, fund management and service delivery, INGOs are becoming increasingly influential with regard to system coordination, the policy process and the global governance of aid (Biberson & Jean, 1999; Hailey, 1999; Morton, 2013). As far back as the mid-1990s, INGOs were beginning to engage in advocacy work (Lindenberg & Bryant 2001). They were drawn to this work as the nature of complex emergencies was being increasingly experienced and better understood. Many humanitarian INGOs adopted the view that, “in addition to undertaking programmes in developing countries to address the symptoms of poverty, CSOs [civil society organizations] should also be involved in addressing the underlying causes of poverty” (Morton, 2013 p. 332) which they saw as often

being structural (Bryer & Magrath, 1999). Over the past 25 years, INGOs have included a full range of activities within their advocacy strategies from outreach and direct lobbying to research and education. Over this time period they have been attributed with a number of important achievements such as being leaders in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Jubilee 2000 campaign for Debt Relief (Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001).

In addition to participating in specific campaigns, INGOs have gained increased representation within decision-making entities regarding a broad spectrum of policy issues. Besides the fact that most humanitarian INGOs enjoy General Consultative Status with ECOSOC, they are represented at the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), have access to the Bretton Woods (e.g. World Bank and International Monetary Fund) institutions and other large donors through established forums such as NGO working groups and are one of the most influential 'major groups' accredited at the United Nations to participate in World Summits. Additionally, INGOs participate in close working relationships with many of the United Nations (UN) agencies such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), where these working relationships often revolve around funding, coordination, advocacy and policy development. For example, INGOs often receive funding from these UN agencies to implement specific projects as well as receive support with logistics and customs clearance on their independently funded projects, they coordinate with UN agencies regarding needs assessments, project targeting and project development and they collaborate on awareness and fundraising campaigns especially through the Common Humanitarian Action Plan and the Consolidated Appeal Process which are important forums for

raising funds from international donors in response to an emergency. In addition, INGOs have an influential role in coordinating the overall response to emergencies. For example, Save the Children International is the co-chair of the education cluster and NGOs are almost always represented on the review boards which review and approve funding applications as part of UNOCHA's emergency response fund.

As their role and influence has grown, INGOs have contributed to some significant changes within the aid system as a whole. Some of these changes have been driven by humanitarian values promoted by INGOs based on their role 'on the ground' working with the world's most vulnerable and impoverished citizens. For example, INGOs have been credited with helping to place "human development at the centre of the international development effort" (ECOSOC, 2014b) through their high profile presence at a number of World Summits and conferences in the early 1990s including the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. Since then, INGOs have continued to provide an important voice at UN hosted World Summits, as well as at High Level Forum of the OECD's - Development Assistance Committee. Their advocacy campaigns regarding hunger, income inequality, violence against women, access to healthcare and climate change have certainly helped to frame the discussion regarding the post-2015 agenda (e.g. UNGA 2014). However, other changes, while being pushed by INGOs, were seen as responses to criticisms regarding their role in perpetuating the structures responsible for violence and inequality (Collingwood & Logister, 2005; Fisher, 1997; Lister, 2003).

INGOs' impact on the international aid system has not been one way. Over the past 25 years as INGOs have gained greater voice and become more integrated within the system of global governance, they have felt the need to make changes in their goals and how they operate (Biberson & Jean, 1999; Gnaerig & MacCormack, 1999; Henry, 1999; Lindenberg 1999;

Lindenberg & Bryant 2001; Offenheiser, Holcombe & Hopkins, 1999; Salm, 1999). This sense of need has come from a variety of places. First, there was a sense of a growing need due to changes in the global environment after the Cold War and the rise of the neo-liberal philosophy of privatizing government services (Lindenberg & Dobel, 1999). Second, there was a sense that the humanitarian INGO market was becoming more globalized and competitive; both because of the rise in the number of INGOs and their growing dependence on government funding (Biberson & Jean, 1999). Third, there has been an increasing number of attacks on their legitimacy based on issues of accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness (Collingwood & Logister, 2005). And finally, new systems and structures were needed as INGOs began adopting new humanitarian strategies (Lindenberg and Bryant, 2001; Young et al, 1999).

As we entered the era of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), leaders of the largest INGOs were already working with researchers and academics to assess the changing global environment and develop strategies to adapt to and influence these changes (Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001, Salm, 1999). While these leaders shared similar understandings of the key challenges, they were developing distinct strategies for how to adapt. As part of this process, many humanitarian international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) revisited their vision, mission and values statements and tried to make the link between these statements and what they do and how they do it. For example, while the leaders of Médecins Sans Frontières International (MSF) were focusing on maintaining independence from government donors, avoiding bureaucratization and increasing technical expertise and legitimacy in order to stay true to the organization's philosophy of being a solidarity movement (Biberson & Jean, 1999), the leaders of Save the Children Alliance were primarily cognizant of the changing market ecology and focused on increasing their professionalization and international presence in order to maintain

their superiority in what was perceived as an increasingly oligarchic industry (Gnaerig & MacCormack, 1999). Other large INGOs such as CARE International chose to focus on the issue of globalization and the critiques to their legitimacy by developing a shared vision across confederation partners, increasing 'Southern' representation in decision-making as well as improving the efficiency of their service delivery (Henry, 1999) while others, like the leaders of OXFAM, claimed to be focusing on their desire to be more effective in advocacy by integrating globally while maintaining representative legitimacy and improving their human resource systems to accommodate a highly professionalized and global staff (Bryer & Magrath, 1999; Offenheiser, Holcombe & Hopkins, 1999).

Since those early discussions, we have witnessed many of these organizations work to implement these strategies. For example, Save the Children International (SCI) has reported coming to the end of a long process of expansion and centralization (Save the Children International, 2013) bringing nearly all of its field offices under the control of a network secretariat and acquiring smaller specialty organizations such as MERLIN in order to strengthen its expertise across the sectors of intervention. At the same time, organizations such as CARE International, OXFAM International and MSF International, claim to have maintained their confederation or social movement structures while working to expand representation. Additionally, organizations such as, ActionAid International and ACORD have made efforts not only to decentralize but have also shifted their headquarters from 'Northern' donor countries to Africa in order to demonstrate their accountability to 'Southern' communities. Despite the variation in structures and rationales of these high profile cases, the network form of organizing still appears prevalent among INGOs (Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012, Yanacpulos, 2005) albeit with potentially significant variations in structure and governance.

With this general understanding of INGOs and the humanitarian context in mind, we now turn our attention to answering the questions driving this research. Specifically, how are networks of humanitarian INGOs being coordinated and governed today? What factors are impacting the leaders of these networks to choose certain forms of governance and coordination over others? And specifically, do values play a role in these choices?

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODS

RESEARCH DESIGN

To begin answering the questions outlined above, I chose to conduct a comparative case study using a concurrent, embedded, mixed methods research design (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). This design was chosen for a number of reasons. First, while certain network characteristics discussed in the literature can be easily observable and quantifiable, the relevance and categorization of other characteristics of interest are less clear. Data regarding such characteristics are found in narrative form across a variety of source documents. Because it was often not clear from prior research how to categorize such information, I employed an inductive and iterative approach to develop useful and relevant categories for describing, comparing and contrasting cases. When possible and appropriate, basic statistical analyses were used to assess whether or not specific characteristics of the cases were associated. However, at times, the number of meaningful categories used to describe a specific set of characteristics were too great or the interactions among variables too complex to allow for sufficient statistical power in performing the analyses of these associations. In these cases, various alternative methods such as triangulation, the creation of tables and graphs based on clustering techniques found in Ucinet 6 (Borgatti, Evertt & Freeman, 2002), as well as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) using Tosmana (Cronqvist, 2016), a software program that allows for the incorporation of multi-categorical explanatory variables in analyses focused on identifying prime implicants and casual conditions, are used to facilitate and enhance interpretations.

A second reason for this approach is due to the fact that the identification and categorization of values inherently requires interpretation. While I ground my analysis in prior literature through the use of previously applied definitions and theories, prior research does not

provide definitions for every value observed. Also, the way in which terms are used in a particular context can vary. Therefore, my interpretations and coding were also influenced by my own experiences in the humanitarian industry, by how a value is expressed by a particular organization and how other organizations in the same industry express similar or contrasting values. Furthermore, while I do compare the frequencies of specific values being expressed, these comparisons are grounded in a qualitative and interpretive style with a focus on uncovering themes among a specific set of values.

Finally, by utilizing a comparative case study with a mixed methods design, I hope to develop a more rich and nuanced understanding of cases than is available through a purely quantitative approach. This can help to clarify the meaning of observed associations among network characteristics, and suggest ways to elaborate propositions as to why certain relationships exist; increasing the confidence in specific conclusions drawn from the analysis.

CASE SELECTION

While humanitarian INGOs have grown in prominence, data about these organizations is not easily obtainable due to widely varying definitions used across political jurisdictions and among scholars as well as variation in record keeping across countries (Salamon, Sokolowski and Associates, 2004). One source often used by scholars is the Union of International Associations (UIA) Yearbook of International Organizations. This database contains records of over 67,000 organizations and has a number of meaningful categories of information that are potentially populated. The current database allows a variety of search features and may be the most comprehensive tool for high level analysis. Unfortunately, access to the database is expensive and it is not clear that the categorizations used to describe organizations would be useful based on the definition of humanitarian INGOs used for this study.

Recently, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) commissioned a group of researchers from Humanitarian Outcomes to produce a bi-annual State of the Humanitarian System report. In this study, they define the system as “the network of interconnected institutional and operational entities through which humanitarian assistance is provided when local and national resources are insufficient to meet the needs of a population in crises” (Stoddard et al., 2013 pg.8). This definition is the basis of my research because of its ability to capture a wide variety of organizational networks which are all considered part of the same global policy context. Because the definitions of the two studies are the same, I chose to bound the population and identify cases in a similar manner as well.

I began case identification by finding a list of humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in each of the major donor countries. In most cases, I found a suitable list of registered or funded NGOs on the Development Cooperation site of a country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) or similar agency. If such a list was not available, I relied on the membership list of the national umbrella organization representing Humanitarian NGOs in the country. Finally, in a few cases, I had to rely on reports of universities or think tanks which were referenced by the MFA or similar government agency of a country (Appendix A1 provides the list of registries and when they were last accessed).

Because these registries contain a wide variety of NGOs and other civil society actors both locally and internationally focused, I needed a way of identifying only the international humanitarian actors. To do this I compared the national registries with five additional registries: three registries from umbrella organizations representing the international humanitarian NGO community, the list of all NGOs receiving funds from the European Commission Office for

Humanitarian Assistance (ECHO) for the 10 year period 2004-2013 as well as the registry of NGOs included in the State of the Humanitarian System study commissioned by ALNAP (Appendix A2 provides the list of databases, their description and their location. All registries were last accessed 10/21/2014).

From the country registries 2237 possible entries were identified before removing duplicates. Using Microsoft Excel, I first sorted the entire list of entries alphabetically. I then went through the list by hand and grouped together entries that referred to the same organization but were not found together due to the use of acronyms, different languages or other such inconsistencies. I then removed all duplicates. An entry was considered a duplicate if it referred to the same organization or international network. For example, MSF-Holland and MSF-France would be considered duplicates and only one entry representing MSF would be retained. However, next to each retained entry a record was kept indicating the total number of times the organization or network was listed. The same process was followed for the international registries

After sorting and analyzing the entries, the following groupings were identified: 1) United Nations organizations (UN), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCs), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), or other international governmental organizations (IGOs); 2) Organizations or networks identified only once on any registry; 3) Organizations or networks identified more than once on either the national or international registries but not on both; 4) Organizations or networks with one entry on both sets of registries; and 5) Organizations or networks with at least one entry on both sets of registries and more than one entry on at least one set of registries (either national or international) (Table 4.1 summarizes the results).

Organizations with at least one entry on both sets of registries and more than one entry on at least one of the sets were selected as cases for this study. This group was chosen for three reasons. First, because these organizations were found on both sets of registries it is likely they are actively involved in humanitarian work and not simply registered on a database because of their nonprofit status. Second, after reviewing the organizations which were identified on both sets of registries it appeared that organizations mentioned more than once on at least one of the lists possessed a greater international identity and were likely to be most embedded in the international humanitarian system and therefore the most relevant for this study. Finally, for pragmatic reasons, 106 organizations seemed an adequate set of cases for the study. Comparing these numbers to those reported by SOHS researchers and the United Nations it seems reasonable that each of us have identified a substantively similar group of organizations and networks.

Table 4.1: Case Identification and Selection Process

Case Classifications	National Databases	International Databases	Total Entries	Organizations
Total Entries	2237	691	2928	
UN, IFRCRCS, ICRC or IGOs	39	27	66	25
Organizations identified just once on any of the registries	1556	258	1814	1814
Organizations identified more than once on either the national or international registries but not on both.	204	18	222	92
Organizations with one entry on both sets of registries	82	82	164	82
Organizations with at least one entry on both sets of registries and more than one entry on at least one of the registries	356	306	662	106
UN -United Nations organizations				
IFRCRCS - International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies				
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross				
IGO - international governmental organizations				

Once a meaningful group of organizations was identified, attention was given to determining the nature of the cases and availability of data. After reviewing the websites of each organization, I determined that five organizations no longer existed or did not have sufficient data. These organizations were excluded from further analysis³.

As previously mentioned, networks are defined as “three or more autonomous organizations working together for a common goal” (Provan & Kenis, 2008 p. 231). However, in reviewing the descriptions of the remaining 101 organizations, it was not always clear how ‘autonomous’ organizational members are. For example, in comparing inter-organizational configurations with nearly the same structures, one group may consolidate all operations and identify itself as a single entity while another may refer to its offices as closely affiliated but distinct legal entities. After reviewing these cases, some of the variation appeared to be due to different national laws; however, this was not always the case. Because of this variation I chose to interpret ‘autonomy’ broadly by classifying an organizational structure as a network if on the websites and in published material, three or more offices had their own boards and were reported on as independent entities even if they were eventually consolidated. Based on this loosening of the definition, 33 of the cases identified were classified as networks and 68 as organizations or partnerships. However, in reviewing the websites for general information, I discovered that 29 of the remaining 68 organizations were members of larger networks similar to the 33 originally

³ Of the 5 organizations, 2 had been acquired by other organizations, 1 was temporarily shut down due to accusations of fraud and has subsequently reopened under a different name and 2 were departments or subsidiaries of larger organizations and unit specific data proved difficult to acquire.

Identified⁴. Because the focus of this study is on networks, I included the larger networks rather than the individual organizations as part of this study thus leaving us with 37 organizations and 41 networks. While I present descriptive information on the full set of cases, the 41 networks are the focus of analyses in the rest of the study. (Appendix A3 provides a list of all organizations and networks in the study)⁵.

The identified organizations and networks vary widely in their size (Table 4.2) as well as political and philosophical backgrounds (Table 4.3) and appear to cover a significant swath of the INGOs active in the humanitarian system and discussed in the academic literature. Of the 78 cases, over half (53) claim a secular philosophy. While they originate from 19 different countries, 36 identify the United States or United Kingdom as their origin with 38 originating in the rest of Europe; only four originated outside these countries⁶. With regard to origins, there did not seem to be a substantive difference between the organizations and networks. On the other

⁴ In three cases the organization in my sample was the single organization from the network to be identified thus I simply used the larger network as the case. However, 26 of the organizations in my original sample turned out to be members of 4 larger networks. However, for one reason or another they did not share a common name. The four larger networks to which these organizations were members are ACT Alliance, Caritas International, INTEGRAL Alliance and Alliance 2015.

⁵At each phase of the study, I began by comparing the networks to the remaining organizations not only across dimensions of size and origins, but also with regard to characteristics such as values. The reason for these comparisons was primarily to remain vigilant regarding the possibility that some differences may influence the choice regarding organization versus network governance structures. Based on these comparisons, it does not appear that networks and organizations vary significantly in the values they express. Rather, networks appear to be formed for reasons such as increased size, scope, reach etc.

⁶ 1 Bangladesh, 1 Japan, 1 Tanzania, 1 Venezuela

hand, while the ranges varied considerably, the networks do tend to be larger than organizations. Specifically, estimated annual budgets⁷ for all cases ranged from approximately \$3 million to \$2.8 billion. However, the estimated median budget for networks (\$283,200,000) was substantially higher than for organizations (\$39,300,000). Similarly, the number of countries reached by each organization or network in 2014 ranged from 2 to 164 with networks reaching a median number of 63 countries while the median number of countries reached by organizations was 22. Finally, the number of recognized members in the networks ranged from 3 to 164 with a median of 17 members per network.

⁷ The budget numbers are all estimates. Estimating annual budgets was quite challenging; especially for the networks. Not only were numbers reported using different currencies but they also used different fiscal years. To make the numbers more comparable, I chose the fiscal year that covered the largest portion of 2014. In cases when the fiscal year ended on June 30, I used the 2014/2015 fiscal year. In all cases, I converted the amounts to USD using the historical exchange rate as of 12/31/2014 on x-rates.com/historical. For networks that did not present network wide numbers either in financial statements or annual reports, I compiled the annual reports from as many of the network members involved in funding projects as I could locate (compiling all organizations would result in considerable double counting since in most humanitarian networks, projects implemented by one member are funded by a different member. When members were involved in multiple types of operations, such as churches, I only used the amounts related to international humanitarian relief or development projects.

Table 4.2: Network and Organization Size

Cases	N	Annual Budgets (<i>\$ amounts in millions</i>)			Number of Members			Number of Countries		
		Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med
Organizations	37	\$6.6	\$434.6	\$39.3	1	2	1	2	72	22
Networks	41	\$2.9	\$2,809.0	\$176.1	3	164	17	13	164	63
Total	78	\$2.9	\$2,809.0	\$135.0	1	164	3	2	164	40

Table 4.3: Network and Organization Philosophical and Political Origins

Cases	N	Philosophical Origins		Political Origins						
		Secular	Faith-based	USA	UK	Italy	Germany	France	Other (Europe)	Other
Organizations	37	29	8	10	6	6	3	2	9	1
Networks	41	23	18	9	11	2	4	4	8	3
Total	78	53	25	19	17	8	7	6	17	4

DATA COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT

With the cases identified, I began my analyses by collecting data and familiarizing myself with each case, identifying key dimensions and developing the categories and classifications that are the subject of the analyses reported below. Data for this study were obtained exclusively from publicly accessible information found on organization and network websites. Due to the nature of the information sought, the initial phase of data collection consisted of gathering published documents such as audited financial statements, annual reports, strategic plans, constitutions, by-laws and charters as well as various other promotional materials. For consistency, the primary criterion in gathering data was that it pertain to the 2014 period. While the format and availability of specific information varied, I was able to obtain audited financial statements and annual reports for each case. All of this information as well as screen captures of relevant web-pages were stored and cataloged using QSR International's NVivo 10 qualitative data analysis software. This data management software was not only helpful for coding value statements, but also provided a mechanism for documenting where data used in the construction of other variables was obtained.

Using this data, and revisiting categorizations as necessary, I conducted three sets of analyses focusing on the three inter-related questions that form the basis of this study. The first set of analyses (found in Chapter 5) focuses on the question of whether or not the various dimensions of network governance such as membership, board representation and form of coordination are interrelated to form a single set of distinct network forms or whether the multiple levels of network governance vary independently? The second set of analyses (found in Chapter 6) focuses on understanding what factors may impact the form of coordination adopted by a network. Specifically, do the contingency factors proposed by Provan and Kenis (2008) to

impact the effectiveness of a network structure, help explain the form of coordination ultimately adopted? Finally, the third set of analyses (found in Chapter 7) focuses on understanding whether or not the values expressed by networks in their values or similar statements (i.e. statement of beliefs or statement of principles) are in anyway related to a network's governance structure and purpose of coordination in particular. I begin with the first two sets of analyses not only to assess the validity of the most current theories regarding network governance in both the public and nonprofit literatures, but also to develop a better understanding of the structural dimensions not adequately addressed by these theories.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NETWORK GOVERNANCE AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS

Within the nonprofit governance literature, scholars generally focus on boards and their role in setting strategy, monitoring the performance of the organization, controlling top management as well as fundraising in their communities (Cornforth, 2012). However, as discussed previously, network governance, while having similarities to nonprofit governance, takes place at multiple levels. For example, Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) identify three levels of network governance: The member organizations, the form of coordination and network level decision-making forums such as boards or committees. Two levels have been given the most attention in the literature: Board structures and the form of coordination. And, as we have seen from the literature review, the composition, responsibilities and structures at each level vary. While some scholars have argued that these characteristics vary together in predictable ways based on such things as a dominant stakeholder group (Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012) and resource munificence across the environment (Hudson & Bielefeld, 1997), there is still debate as to what drives variation in each aspect of governance. Therefore, rather than assume the co-variation of network governance characteristics and immediately classify networks as belonging to a particular, predefined network form, I begin by assessing whether or not the various dimensions of network governance structure are related and indeed reflect commonly used network classifications within the literature. Not only does this give us greater confidence when talking about the broad types of networks, it also gives us a more complete picture of network governance at multiple levels and allows us to better focus efforts towards integrating the multiple governance literatures that have historically focused on only one or another of these dimensions at a time.

CHARACTERISTICS OF NETWORK GOVERNANCE

In reviewing the various descriptions of the networks in this study, five characteristics of network governance seem especially relevant for understanding an overall governance structure. Specifically, 1) who is allowed to be a member of the network? 2) Are members represented on the network board and if so, who represents them? 3) what voting rules are used for making decisions? 4) What is the focus or purpose of network coordination? And 5) what form of coordination do networks adopt? To code this information, I reviewed all the documents collected in QSR International's NVivo 10 qualitative data analysis software and coded information relating to each of these five characteristics. After, reviewing the data and returning to websites to fill in missing information, I coded the information as follows.

Members. This variable refers to which organizations a network perceives as its legitimate members. For example, humanitarian INGOs work in a wide variety of countries either through an office 'on the ground' or through a local partner. However, not all offices or local partners are recognized as legitimate members of a network. In my early analysis, I identified four groupings of networks based on who are recognized as legitimate network members. However, conducting a series of subsequent analyses and not finding important differences between two of the groupings, I collapsed them down to three. The first grouping, *Funder*, refers to networks where the legitimate members of the network are funding organizations. As the name suggests, the main role of these organizations is to raise money and fund projects, organizations or activities. These organizations have very little to no responsibility for on the ground implementation. Rather, the responsibility for implementing projects is generally left to a single entity such as the network secretariat or lead agency. The second grouping is labeled *Funder/Implementer*, in these networks, member organizations are

responsible for both raising funds and overseeing the implementation of activities and projects on the ground.

In the final two groupings, I identified a set of networks where members, were not required to be self-sufficient regarding funding; although this was encouraged. Rather, these organizations are considered legitimate network members based on their ability to do work ‘on the ground’, even if they are almost completely dependent on other members in the network for their funding. In general, for these organizations to be considered network members, they must demonstrate a certain threshold of organizational capacity and commitment to the network. The difference I originally focused on in the fourth grouping was that some networks recognize two distinct categories of members based on their roles as either a funding organization or an implementing organization. With different legitimate roles in the network, different criteria can be applied for network membership and unique contributions can be appreciated and coordinated. However, as I conducted subsequent analyses, the differences among these two groups of networks were minimal and I eventually collapsed them in to a single category which I label *Implementer* (see Table 5.1 for descriptive statistics).

Representation. The literature on inter-organizational relations has noted that who represents an organization in a collaborative relationship is an important factor impacting the success of the relationship and board composition has been a topic of much interest for nonprofit scholars for some time (Ostrower & Stone, 2006). Specifically, representatives need to have the requisite knowledge, skills and decision-making ability for the particular task of the collaboration. The networks in this study vary on who represents member organizations in group decision-making forums. Six categorizations were originally identified. First, *Independent* networks are networks where the coordinating body is governed by a board of individuals who

are themselves not directly affiliated with a member organization (see Provan, 1983, independent federations). The next three network types are networks where the coordinating entity is governed by representatives from legitimate members either through a *Board Member*, *Executive Director* or *Both* (executive director & board member). These are similar to the participatory federations and coalitions described by Provan (1983). In addition to these four groupings, four networks report a blended governance form. Specifically, these are independent boards with a minority representation from members either in the form of a board member (*Independent w/BDs*) or executive director (*Independent w/EDs*). However, because there are so few cases of these networks in comparison to the other groupings and because the four networks were found to be more similar to their fully participatory counterparts rather than with each other, the blended networks were grouped with their participatory counterparts (i.e. *Board Member* or *Executive Director*) for the remainder of the study (see Table 5.1 for descriptive statistics).

Voting rules. Another aspect of network governance captured in this study has to do with how much voice member organizations have on the boards of the network broker. In particular, after reviewing the various governance structures utilized by these networks, there appeared to be an important distinction among participatory boards where the more financing a member contributes, the more representation that member has on the board (*Funding_Rep*) and boards where each member has an equal voice (*Equal_Rep*). In this study, 7 of the 30 (23%) fully participatory networks have voting rules allowing larger funders to have more voice in network decision-making while the remaining networks allow equal rights to all members or utilize an *independent* network board (see Table 5.1 for descriptive statistics).

Purpose of coordination. The role of the network broker is a key part of network governance and scholars continue to discuss the advantages and disadvantages to different

strategies for what and how much to coordinate across network members (Brown and Kalegaonkar, 2002; Sanyal, 2006). However, in their study of international advocacy networks, Brown, Ebrahim and Batliwala (2012) suggest that the role of a network broker is a function of the network's dominant stakeholder group which also drives the general structure and composition of the board as well as the overall structure of a network. In light of this discussion, I created a variable (purpose of coordination) cataloging what is the main focus of coordination for each network either through a broker or by the members themselves in the case of the three (3) shared governance networks. In 13 of the 41 networks (32%), the purpose of coordination is to oversee nearly all aspects of network programming and implementation from the design and monitoring of projects to the management of funding and human resources (*Implementation*). In seven cases (17%), the coordination focuses on setting standards, strategies and protocols for project implementation as well as the occasional coordination of specific joint activities among the members. However, the ultimate implementation of 'on the ground' activities is left for the members to oversee (*Standard Setting*). The focus of the seven cases (17%) in the third grouping is primarily on information sharing among members coordinating joint activities such as preparing a group proposal for funding or coordinating resources on the ground such as personnel and office space (*Joint Activities*). Finally, for the 14 cases (34%) in the fourth grouping the major role of the network broker is to provide support to network members. This support comes in a variety of forms such as trainings or technical expert visits to help improve the capacity of network members as well as funding and representation at the international level (*Support*) (see Table 5.1 for descriptive statistics).

Form of coordination. Finally, as discussed previously, scholars within the public and nonprofit sectors have focused on different aspects of network governance. While nonprofit

scholars such as Brown, Ebrahim and Batliwala (2012) focus primarily on the structure of boards, public sector scholars generally focus on the relational structure of a network and in particular their different forms of coordination. However, it is unclear whether or not a network's form of coordination is related to these other dimensions of network governance.

A network's form of coordination was coded according to Provan and Kenis' (2008) typology of network governance. Specifically, they distinguish between three ideal forms of network coordination: Shared, lead and network administrative organization (NAO). *Shared* or 'participant-governed' networks are networks "with no separate and unique governance entity" (p.234), leaving the members to coordinate and govern themselves. *Lead* organization networks are networks where "all major network-level activities and decisions are coordinated through and by a single participating member" (p. 235). Finally, *NAO* brokered networks are networks where "a separate administrative entity is set up specifically to govern the network and its activities" (p. 236). While the *shared* network form is considered the simplest and easiest, only three (3) of the 41 networks in this study utilized this form. The rest (38 of 41) utilize some form of network broker. Specifically, in this study 26 (63%) networks have established an *NAO* as the network broker while 12 (29%) rely on a *lead* organization to coordinate and govern the network. (see Table 5.1 for descriptive statistics).

Table 5.1. Network Governance Characteristics: A Summary of Categories and Distributions

Variable	Variable Categories				Total
Members	Funders 10	Funder/ Implementers 15	Implementers 16		41
Representation	Independent 11	Board Member 12	Both 5	Executive Director 13	41
Voting Rules	Independent 11	Funding_Rep 7	Equal_Rep 23		41
Purpose of Coordination	Implementation 13	Standard Setting 7	Joint Activities 7	Support 14	41
Form of Coordination	Shared 3	Lead 12	NAO 26		41

ANALYSIS

Once a set of relevant network governance characteristics was identified and coded, I conducted Fisher's exact tests to determine the statistical significance of the associations between each pair of characteristics (see Table 5.2 for a summary of the results). A Fisher's exact test was used because of its ability to handle small sample sizes and skewed data. Then after reviewing these results, I created a series of three-way tables to help better understand the complex set of relationships among sets of characteristics.

From reviewing the results of the two-way tests of association, I was able to make a number of important preliminary observations. First, the type of *members* recognized by a network appears to be important for understanding an overall network governance structure, with a significant relationship ($p < .05$) reported between it and three of the four other network governance characteristics. Second, while the type of members a network recognizes is related to the most other governance characteristics, a network's *purpose of coordination* shows the strongest relationship to those dimensions to which it is related; Specifically, *members* and

representation. And finally, while in general the various dimensions of network governance appear to be strongly related, a network's *form of coordination* does not appear to be strongly related to the other dimensions. In fact, the only other governance characteristic to which it shows a statistically significant relationship is the type of *members* a network recognizes. And unlike the other statistically significant relationships, this relationship is only significant at the $p < .05$ level.

Based on these initial observations, there does appear to be two distinct and independent aspects of network governance. Consistent with Brown, Ebrahim and Batliwala (2012), the type of members a network recognizes is related to the composition of the network board and a networks' purpose of coordination and in turn there also appears to be a strong relationship between the composition of the board and the voting rules it adopts. However, this cluster of network characteristics does not appear to be closely related to a networks form of coordination, which is the general focus of public sector scholars (e.g. Provan and Kenis, 2008).

Table 5.2. Network Governance Characteristics: Tests of Association

	Network Members	Representation	Voting Rules	Purpose of Coordination
Representation	$p = .002$			
Voting Rules	$p = .195$	$p = .007^a$		
Purpose of Coordination	$p = .000$	$p = .000$	$p = .145$	
Form of Coordination	$p = .034$	$p = .120$	$p = .498^b$	$p = .193$

^aTest only used the 30 networks *not* utilizing an Independent board.

^bTest only used the 27 networks *not* utilizing a Shared form of coordination.

With these initial observations in mind, I created a series of tables to better understand the particular pattern of relationships among these governance characteristics. The first table helps unpack the relationship between a network's members and who and how members are represented on a network board (see Table 5.3). The results of the bi-variate analysis (see Table 5.2) suggest that who is recognized as a network member and how they are represented is quite

strongly related. Yet while a board's particular voting rules are related to how a member is represented on the network board, it is not directly related to the type of members a network recognizes.

Table 5.3: Network Members, Representation and Voting Rules

Representation	Members			Total
	Implementer	Funder/ Implementer	Funder	
Independent	7 (44%)	1 (7%)	3 (30%)	11 (27%)
Board Members	2 (12%)	3 (20%)	7 (70%)	12 (24%)
	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>6</i>
Both	1 (6%)	4 (27%)		5 (12%)
	<i>1</i>			<i>1</i>
Executive Directors	6 (38%)	7 (47%)		13 (32%)
Total	16	15	10	41

Note. Numbers in *italics* indicate the number of cases with *Funding_Rep* voter rules.

In reviewing the specifics of the relationship between network members and representation more closely, it appears that, *funders* demonstrate a strong preference for being represented by their board members in network level decision-making and not by their executive directors. Conversely, *funder/implementers* show a preference for using executive directors to govern their network boards although they also use a dual governance structure more than expected by chance. Finally, similar to *funder/implementers*, *implementer* networks show a tendency to rely on their executive directors for network level governance. However, these networks also rely on governance from independent board members more than other types of network members. In addition to the relationship between members and representation, Table 5.3 sheds light on the relationship between representation and voting rules. Specifically, 6 of the 7 (85.7%) networks with voting rules that give preference to larger funders also rely on board

member representation in network governance and the 7th case has adopted a tiered network governance system, utilizing both board member and executive director representation.

The next table (Table 5.4) helps unpack the relationship between a network's *members*, their *representation* on the board, and a network's *purpose of coordination*. In the bi-variate analysis reported in Table 5.2, these three dimensions showed the strongest relationships among the five governance characteristics and appear to form the core of a single level of network governance.

Specifically, in reviewing Table 5.4 we see that networks of *funders* appear to make implementation and programming the primary focus of network coordination (10 of 10 or 100%) in addition to being represented either through an independent board (3/10 = 30%) or by board members representing their respective member organizations (7/10 = 70%). Conversely, *implementer* networks generally focus coordination on providing support services to members (13/16 = 81.25%) and govern these network brokers through either an independent board (7/16 = 43.75%) or by the members represented by their executive directors (6/16 = 37.5%). Finally, *funder/implementers* appear to differ in their purpose for network coordination. Specifically, when board member representatives are assigned to govern the network either alone or as part of a tiered governance structure, network brokers tend to fill a standard setting role (7/7 = 100%). However, when the purpose of coordination is focused primarily on information sharing and joint activities, network boards appear to be populated primarily by the executive directors of the individual network members (6/7 = 86%).

Again, these relationships and the distinct forms of governance that appear to exist among these networks are consistent with those observed by Brown and colleagues (2012). Specifically, the *funders* (which are generally represented by their board members) and

funder/implementers with board member representation on the network board fit the description of ‘Mission-based’ networks which they describe as being focused on achieving network level goals and use a network broker to coordinate across affiliates. The group of *funder/implementers* with executive director representation appear to fit Brown and colleagues’ description of ‘Movement-based’ networks which they describe as networks focused on serving others and which use network brokers primarily for information sharing. Finally, the networks of *implementers* generally fit the description of ‘Constituent-based’ networks, which focus on serving the needs of their constituents and whose brokers provide a primarily support function.

Table 5.4: Network Members, Representation and Purpose of Coordination

Members	Representation	Purpose of Coordination			
		Implementation	Standards Setting	Joint Activities	Support
Funder	Independent	3 (23%)			
	Board Member	7 (54%)			
	Both				
	Executive Director				
Funder/ Implementer	Independent			1 (14%)	
	Board Member		3 (43%)		
	Both		4 (57%)		
	Executive Director			6 (86%)	1 (7%)
Implementer	Independent	1 (8%)			6 (43%)
	Board Member	2 (15%)			
	Both				1 (7%)
	Executive Director				6 (43%)
	Total	13	7	7	14

Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

The final three-way table (Table 5.5) focuses on unpacking the relationship between a network's *form of coordination* and its *members with representation* included given the distinction between networks of funder/implementers with board member representation and those with just executive director representation. Unlike the strong and clear relationship between *members, representation* and *purpose of coordination* (see Table 5.4), the relationship between *members, representation* and *form of coordination* is less clear. However, two patterns are noticeable. Specifically, 50% of the *lead* organization brokered networks ($6/12 = 50\%$) are found among *funder* networks which make up only 24% ($10/41 = 24.4\%$) of the cases in this study. And all three networks with a shared form of coordination are utilized by networks of *funder/implementers*. Although two of these networks coordinate activity solely through their executive directors while one has established a formalized structure with multiple forums for coordination: One for the executive directors and one for board member representatives.

Table 5.5: Network Members, Representation and Form of Coordination

Members	Representation	Form of Coordination		
		Shared	NAO	Lead
Funder	Independent			3 (25%)
	Board Member		4 (15%)	3 (25%)
	Both			
	Executive Director			
Funder/ Implementer	Independent			1 (8%)
	Board Member		2 (8%)	1 (8%)
	Both	1 (33%)	3 (12%)	
	Executive Director	2 (67%)	4 (15%)	1 (8%)
Implementer	Independent		5 (19%)	2 (17%)
	Board Member		2 (8%)	
	Both		1 (4%)	
	Executive Director		5 (19%)	1 (8%)
Total		3	26	12

Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

SUMMARY

Before moving on to the next series of analyses, it is useful to summarize what we have learned so far regarding the relationships among the variety of network governance characteristics identified for this study. First, the bi-variate relationships identified in Table 5.2 are consistent with there being two distinct literatures on network governance (i.e. one in the public and one in the nonprofit literatures), in that there does appear to be at least two distinct and independent dimensions to network governance. Specifically, there appears to be a strong and consistent relationship among what types of organizations networks recognize as legitimate *members*, the forms of network level representation they adopt (*representation* and *voting rules*) and the network's *purpose of coordination* and the combination of these distinct characteristics make up a single distinct network form. However, unlike the other four dimensions of network governance that are strongly interrelated to make up the structure of a network's board, in this study, a network's *form of coordination* appears to vary independently. (Figure 5.1 offers a visual summary of these observations).

The relationships among the governance characteristics in the first dimension are consistent with the relationships proposed by Brown, Ebrahim and Batliwala, (2012) and suggest that both the structure and composition of a network's board and the role of the network broker are related to a network's primary accountability or, as defined in this study, who is recognized as a legitimate network member. Additionally, this analysis suggests two possible ways in which network board structures accommodate the desires of a dominant stakeholder group. Specifically, through the form of representation in network level decision-making and the voting rules adopted. However, there is still little understanding as to why networks make the choices they do regarding who can be a network member or what is to be the purpose of coordination.




Figure 5.1. Summary of a two dimensional network governance structure.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (see Table 5.2)

Unlike Brown and colleagues (2012) however, from this analysis, it seems reasonable to distinguish four rather than three types of network boards, with each type being most easily distinguished based on its purpose of coordination and the broker's role in the network (implementation, standard setting & joint activities, joint activities & information sharing and support: Both technical & funding). As mentioned above, in their earlier work, Brown and colleagues (2012) choose to distinguish between three network forms based on the dominance of one of the three identified stakeholder groups. However, while I also identified three distinct types of network members, the results of this analysis suggest the importance of distinguishing between four network forms based on the unique combinations of members, representation and purposes of coordination that exist. And the four unique forms these combinations create appear similar to the general network forms described in the literature as federations, confederations, coalitions and support organizations. Table 5.6 depicts this summary in the form of a 2x2 table with networks placed in a particular category based on their identified *purpose of coordination*⁸.

⁸ A network's *purpose of coordination* was used to categorize networks because it is the characteristic most strongly associated with both *members* and *representation* and therefore appears best suited to proxy an overarching network form.

By presenting the data in a 2x2 table, we begin to see what appears to be two key dimensions underlying a particular form of network. First, there appears to be differences across networks regarding a top-down versus a bottom-up orientation to humanitarian work. And second, there appears to be differences with regard to network coordination being centralized versus decentralized. Specifically, we notice that the top two quadrants share a similar preference for network governance in that both groups (Confederations and Federations) tend to govern their networks using board member representatives from each of the member organizations $((4+3+9)/(4+3+9+4)=80\%)$. In addition, 6 of the 7 (86%) networks that give greater voting rights to members with more resources are found in these top two quadrants. In contrast, networks in the bottom two quadrants (Coalitions and Support Organization) show a strong preference for network governance through Executive Directors of individual members $((6+7+1)/(6+7+1+1+6)=66.67\%)$.

Comparing the left and right quadrants, we notice that all three networks using a *shared* form of coordination are found in the left two quadrants while 10 of the 12 (83%) networks using a *lead* form of network coordination are found on the right. Similarly, 10 of the 11 (91%) networks with independent boards are found in the right two quadrants. Together, these observations suggest possible systematic differences between a command versus support approach (top and bottom) to governance and between a centralized versus decentralized coordination (right to left) style.

Organizations forming networks fitting the profile in the top right quadrant, appear to come together to centralize implementation and programming. These networks tend to limit membership to organizations that can contribute funding to the network and coordination is typically governed by representatives from each of the network member boards or in some cases

by independent board members. This form of network is most similar to what has been described as federations in the literature (Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012; Hudson & Bielefeld 1997, Provan, 1983; Warren, 1967).

Table 5.6: Forms of Network Governance: A Summary

Governance Characteristics							
Standard Setting (Confederations)				Implementation (Federations)			
Purpose of Coordination	Fund./			Fund./			
Members	Fund.	Imp.	Imp.	Fund.	Imp.	Imp.	
		7		10		3 ^a	
Representation	Exec. Dir.	Both	Brd. Mbr.	Ind.	Exec. Dir.	Brd. Mbr.	Ind.
	4		3		9		4
Funder Voting Rule	3			3			
Form of Coordination	Shared	NAO	Lead	Shared	NAO	Lead	
	1	5	1	7		6	
Joint Activities (Coalitions)				Support (Support Organizations)			
Purpose of Coordination	Fund./			Fund./			
Members	Fund.	Imp.	Imp.	Fund.	Imp.	Imp.	
		7			1 ^a	13	
Representation	Exec. Dir.	Both	Brd. Mbr.	Ind.	Exec. Dir.	Brd. Mbr.	Ind.
	6			1 ^a	7	1 ^a	6
Funder Voting Rule				1 ^a			
Form of Coordination	Shared	NAO	Lead	Shared	NAO	Lead	
	2	4	1	10		4	

Note: While the *Form of Coordination* does show some relation to the other four dimensions, it is not considered to be a strong and consistent relationship like the others.

^aNetwork characteristics uncharacteristic of the network form. Six networks display a hybrid structure with at least one governance characteristic inconsistent with its network form.

Organizations forming networks similar to the profile in the top left quadrant appear to focus on setting common strategies, standards and protocols for themselves and other network members. Like the first group of networks, these networks are most often governed by board member representatives from each network member. However, unlike the first group, they often

utilize a second level of governance where the Executive Directors come together and provide oversight and advice to a network broker in addition to the board member representatives. Also, in these networks, unlike the first group of networks, members are not only required to raise funds, they also maintain control of project implementation. These networks are most similar to what has been termed confederations by previous scholars (Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012; Lindenberg & Dobel, 1999). Brown and colleagues refer to both of these groups as ‘Mission-based’ networks. However, while the two types of networks appear to allocate a great deal of authority to a central network broker they vary significantly in their level of centralization, the types of members they recognize and the mechanisms used to establish accountability and control.

Similar to the profile in the top left quadrant, the profile in the bottom left quadrant depicts networks that consist of organizational members that can raise their own funding as well as implement projects and activities. However an important focus of network coordination in these networks is on implementing joint activities such as applying for funding or coordinating activities on the ground rather than on standard setting and governance. And these networks tend to govern through the coming together of their Executive Directors rather than through board member representation. Networks fitting this profile are similar to what others have termed coalitions (Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012; Hudson & Bielefeld, 1997) and exemplify what Brown and colleagues term ‘movement-based’ networks and have depicted as having a more dense pattern of relationships among members rather than the more centralized network structure by which they depict the first two network types.

In the bottom right quadrant of Table 5.6, we find a network profile where the role of the network broker is predominantly to support the network members either through funding,

technical and administrative support or both. To be a legitimate member of these networks, the focus appears to be less on an ability to raise funds and more on demonstrating a certain level of organizational capacity and a commitment to the network. Often times, members of these networks will have different roles with some focusing on fundraising and others on implementation. These networks appear to be most similar to what others have termed support organization networks (Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012; Lindenberg & Dobel, 1999), where the relationships among members may look more like a spider web of often short-term project based relationships supported by a central broker organization. Brown and colleagues term this form of network a ‘constituent-based’ network.

Finally, before beginning the next set of analyses, I want to highlight two things. First, while the clusters of network forms appear consistent and can be described according to the two dimensions of top-down versus bottom-up governance and centralized versus decentralized coordination, we do observe that 6 of the 41 (14.6%) networks appear to have a hybrid structure; not fitting a single profile completely. In particular, three (3) of these networks, while demonstrating most of the characteristics of an implementation focused network (federation), do appear to recognize non-funding organizations as legitimate members of their networks. One (1) of these networks generally fits a support focused profile, although legitimate members appear to be limited to *Funder/Implementers*. A second support focused network appears to be utilizing a two-tiered governance structure as well as giving members that contribute greater amounts of funding a more prominent voice in governance decisions. And finally, a network focusing on coordinating joint activities appears to govern the network with independent board members, more similar to a support oriented network. Second, despite the consistency of the relationships among the network board characteristics, the fact that these board structures do not appear to be

strongly associated with their *form of coordination* suggests that these two levels vary independently and are likely explained by different factors. Based on this last observation, in the next two chapters I will focus on understanding first what drives the form of coordination adopted by a network and then what explains their board structure and general network form.

CHAPTER SIX: FORMS OF NETWORK COORDINATION AND THE BALANCING OF INTERNAL TENSIONS

In the first analysis, we identified what appears to be four distinct network forms based on a consistent pattern of associations across a variety of network governance characteristics related to their general board structures (i.e. membership, board representation, voting rules and the purpose of coordination). However, the analysis also suggests that the form of coordination adopted by these networks to facilitate collective action (i.e. *form of coordination*) is not directly related to the other dimensions of network governance. Therefore, in this chapter, we turn our attention to better understanding what factors influence a network's form of coordination. Specifically, we analyze whether internal factors such as size, trust, resource disparities and interdependencies, help explain the structure of network coordination?

In their theoretical contribution, Provan and Kenis (2008) suggest that depending on the size, level of trust and goal consensus among its members and their need for network level competencies; certain forms of network coordination are more likely to be effective. While, they do not suggest these conditions are what lead to any specific form of coordination, if we assume network members are strategic actors and willing to restructure their networks to best fit their needs and environments as network leaders claim (cf. Biberson & Jean, 1999; Gnaerig & MacCormack, 1999; Henry, 1999; Offenheiser, Holcombe & Hopkins 1999) then we are likely to find certain network structures more frequently in situations where they are able to be most effective.

To investigate whether or not any of these contingencies can help explain a network's form of coordination, I first conducted a series of Fisher's exact tests of association between each

proposed contingency and a network's form of coordination. I then reviewed combinations of the most strongly associated contingencies to identify the most complete and suitable explanation.

INTERNAL NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS

Network level competencies. Provan and Kenis (2008) describe network level competencies as types and quantities of tasks needed to be coordinated by the network. This description coincides quite well with what I have described as a network's purpose of coordination. In our earlier analysis, we identified four (4) primary focuses of network coordination (i.e. Implementation, standard setting, joint activities and support). However, there was not a direct, significant relationship between these purposes of network coordination and the form of coordination used by a network (see Table 5.2). However, in reviewing the overall findings in Table 5.6, we did note that the majority of *lead* organization networks do appear among networks focused on coordinating *implementation* and member *support*, while networks that choose to use a *shared* coordination structure appear to focus exclusively on *standard setting* and conducting *joint activities*.

Size. Size is also considered an important contingency impacting the effectiveness of a particular form of coordination. The idea being that the more members there are in a network, the more difficult it is to coordinate. Size can be measured in multiple ways such as through annual budgets or number of countries reached. However, in this study, size is measured by the number of legitimate members in the network. This measure best captures the challenges for decision-making, coordination and trust building as discussed by Provan and Kenis (2008). A legitimate member was identified based on the number of organizations with a vote in a general assembly or recognized as a unique entity in a network's annual report or website for networks with independent boards. After reviewing the distribution of network sizes in the sample, networks

were divided in to three categories, 3-5 members, 6-15 members, and >15 members. Unlike the purpose of coordination, a Fisher's exact test result of $p = 0.000$ indicates that a strong nonrandom relationship exists between network size and a network's form of coordination (see Table 6.1). Consistent with theorizing by Provan and Kenis (2008), smaller networks appear to coordinate the network through a *shared* or *lead* organization structure while moderate sized and larger networks appear to use an *NAO* form of coordination most often. However, the *lead* form of coordination does still appear among all sizes of networks.

Table 6.1: A Test of Association between Size and Form of Coordination

Size	Form of Coordination			Total
	Shared	NAO	Lead	
>15		19 (73%)	3 (25%)	22 (54%)
6 - 15	1 (33%)	7 (27%)	3 (25%)	11 (27%)
3-5	2 (67%)		6 (50%)	8 (19%)
Total	3 (100%)	26 (100%)	12(100%)	41 (100%)

Note. Fisher's exact $p = 0.000$. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

Trust and goal consensus. The final contingencies suggested by Provan and Kenis (2008) are trust and goal consensus. Relational constructs are difficult to measure, especially using secondary data. To overcome this challenge, network scholars have utilized proxy variables that have been shown to have a level of association with other relational constructs (Raab, Mannak & Cambre, 2015). Within the nonprofit literature, there has been considerable discussion regarding the distinction between faith-based (FBOs) and secular organizations (Bielefeld & Cleveland, 2013; Wittberg, 2013). A meaningful distinction can also be made between faith inspired networks and networks embedded within a larger institutional structure such as a religious denomination or community. While faith inspired networks may have a common belief system and identity holding them together, networks embedded in a larger institutional structure also have an added layer of governance on which to rely when problems occur. Based on this logic,

one might suspect that networks embedded within a particular religious denomination or other philosophical institution will have higher degrees of trust and goal consensus than other similar networks: not only are they likely to share a common set of values and identity, but they also have the security of a higher level of institutional governance to fall back on. Likewise, it may also be that faith-based organizations share a higher level of trust and goal consensus than their secular counterparts. Following this rationale, I constructed a crude proxy of trust and goal consensus based on a network's identity either as *secular* (low trust & low goal consensus), *faith-based* (moderate trust & goal consensus) or *institutional* (high trust & goal consensus) (see Table 6.2 for frequencies and a Fisher's exact statistic). However, with a Fisher's exact calculated p -value of 0.633 there does not appear to be a meaningful relationship between a networks philosophical origin and its form of coordination.

Table 6.2: A Test of Association between Philosophical Origin and Form of Coordination

Philosophical Origin	Form of Coordination			Total
	Shared	NAO	Lead	
Secular	3 (100%)	14 (54%)	5 (42%)	22 (54%)
Faith-based (FBO)	0	5 (19%)	4 (33%)	9 (22%)
Institutional	0	7 (27%)	3 (25%)	10 (24%)
Total	3 (100%)	26 (100%)	12(100%)	41 (100%)

Note. Fisher's exact $p = 0.633$. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

Resource disparity. Finally, a dominant theme in the study of network governance has been the impact of resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1976; Saz-Carranza, Iborra & Albareda, 2016). Specifically, Provan, Beyer and Kruytbosch (1980) found different forms of power in the form of resource dependence and independence allowed community organizations to access greater amounts of resources. And more recently, Saz-Carranza, Iborra and Albareda (2016) found that various forms of resource dependence influenced the structure of network administrative organizations (NAOs) in mandated networks.

So far in this study we have not considered resource disparities. However, it was noted that *funder* networks were more likely than others to have established decision-rules giving members with more resources greater voice in decision-making. We also noted a similar relationship between *funder* networks and the use of a *lead* organization as a network broker. These observations lead us to suspect that resources may be a factor influencing the network structures of the humanitarian INGOs in this study; at least among certain types of networks. Therefore, I constructed a variable capturing the proportion of a network's resources contributed by the largest member. This captures the dominance of a single actor in a network and perhaps the dependency of other members on this organization. Because of the variability of the data, I do not feel confident in the precision of some of these observations. Therefore, I grouped networks in to the following three groupings: <26%, 26%-50%, >50% allowing for more confidence regarding the accuracy at this level of precision. With a Fisher's exact calculated *p*-value of 0.000, there does appear to be a meaningful relationship between the resource disparity within a network and the form of coordination it adopts (see Table 6.3). In particular, while the *NAO* is the most common form of coordination, it appears that *lead* organizations are used more often than other forms of coordination (9/12 = 75%) when a single network member contributes over 50% of the network's resources.

Table 6.3: A Test of Association for Resource Disparity and Form of Coordination.

Resource Disparity	Form of Coordination			Total
	Shared	NAO	Lead	
> 50%	1 (33%)	2 (8%)	9 (83%)	12 (29%)
26%-50%	1 (33%)	17 (65%)	3 (25%)	21 (51%)
< 26%	1 (33%)	7 (27%)	0	8 (20%)
Total	3 (100%)	26 (100%)	12(100%)	41 (100%)

Note. Fisher's exact $p = 0.000$. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

ANALYSIS

Based on the bi-variate analyses, it appears that *size* and *resource disparity* are the best at helping us understand the largest number of cases regarding a network's *form of coordination*. However, these bi-variate analyses do not fully explain the form of coordination adopted by a network nor does the lack of a significant relationship necessarily indicate that the other proposed contingencies do not impact how networks are coordinated. To unpack these relationships further, I constructed two four-way contingency tables. One focusing on a network's form of coordination disaggregated by *resource disparity*, *size*, and *purpose of coordination* (see Table 6.4) and one disaggregated by *resource disparity*, *size*, and *philosophical origin* (not shown here do to its lack of analytical leverage)⁹.

In reviewing the relationships among network size, resource disparity, purpose of coordination and form of coordination, a clear yet complex pattern of relationships emerges. As expected from the bi-variate analyses, there is a stark difference between networks where one member controls over 50% of the resources and networks where there is less resource disparity. Specifically, 9 of the 12 (75%) networks with high resource disparity use a *lead* form of network coordination while 24 of the 29 (82.7%) networks with lower resource disparity use an *NAO* form of network coordination. When size is included in the analysis, we note that of the five (5) networks with low resource disparity not using the *NAO* form of coordination, 3 (3/5 = 60%) were small networks with only 3 to 5 members. Conversely, of the 3 networks with high resource disparity not using a *lead* form of coordination, the two networks with 6 or more members

⁹ While a significant relationship was identified between *Network Members* and *Form of Coordination*, it was determined that the relationship is a result of the close relationship between *Network Members* and *Size* and the relationship between *Size* is much stronger a theoretically relevant.

adopted a *NAO* form of coordination while the one network with 3 to 5 members adopted a *shared* form of coordination. Finally, by including purpose of coordination in the table, we are reminded of our earlier observation that when a network chooses not to use the *NAO* form of coordination, it appears that networks with an implementation or support orientation choose to use a *lead* form of coordination, while networks with a standard setting or joint activity orientation choose to use a *shared* form of coordination. In fact all three *shared* coordination networks are utilized by networks with an overall decentralized network profile. Only two networks with a *lead* coordination structure fit these profiles and they have high resource disparity.

Based on this analysis, it appears that among the networks in this study, the form of network coordination adopted by a network is in large part influenced by balancing the tensions placed on it by its size, resource disparities and purpose for coordination. When resource disparities are high, networks show a strong preference for using a *lead* form of coordination and appear only to move away from this form of brokered coordination at times when the network has a larger number of members and when the purpose of the network is standard setting or coordinating joint activities. When resource disparities are lower, networks tend to choose a *NAO* form of coordination. However, it appears that when networks are also small, they will retain a *lead* or *shared* form of coordination depending on whether the purpose of the network pushes it to centralize or decentralize. Using this rationale, it appears we have a fairly reasonable explanation for the network structures adopted by 39 of the 41 (95%) cases in this study. However, two cases stand out by not following this rationale consistently¹⁰. In particular, we see

¹⁰ The case is considered explained if it fits the logic of at least two of the three explanatory variables. The two unexplained cases fit only one of the three explanations.

that one case (CBM) has high resource disparity (>51%), a centralized approach to humanitarian work (Implementation) and only a moderate number of members (6-15) yet has adopted a NAO form of coordination. The second case (ADRA), while having low resource disparity (26-50%) and a large size (>15 members) still chooses to maintain a *lead* form of network coordination presumably because it is consistent with its centralized (Support) approach to humanitarian work or because earlier in its history there was greater resource disparity within the network.

Table 6.4: Form of Coordination Disaggregated by Resource Disparity, Size and Purpose of Coordination.

Resource Disparity	Size	Purpose of Coordination			
		Implementation	Standards	Joint Activities	Support
>50%	>6 members	LEAD 2 <i>NAO 1</i>	NAO 1		LEAD 3
	3-5 members	LEAD 2	LEAD 1	LEAD 1	
				SHARED 1	
≤ 50%	>6 members	NAO 6	NAO 4	NAO 4	<i>LEAD 1</i> NAO 10
	3-5 members	LEAD 2		SHARED 1	
			SHARED 1		
	Total	13	7	7	14

Note: cases in *italics* do not conform to the explanations and interpretations presented below.

SUMMARY

So far, our analyses have focused on evaluating propositions from two distinct lines of research, one focusing on board structures and broad network forms (Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012) the other on forms of network coordination (Provan & Kenis, 2008). In Chapter Five we concluded that while there was a high level of association among four of the five identified network governance characteristics, there was not an immediately obvious relationship between a network's board structure (i.e. the combination of the four related governance characteristics: members, representation, voting rules, and purpose of coordination) and how network coordination takes place. With this understanding in mind, in Chapter Six, we turned our attention specifically to understanding what factors help explain the various forms of network coordination adopted by these networks. We were guided in large part by the propositions laid out by Provan and Kenis (2008) and in general found evidence to support their assertions. Specifically, the results of this analysis support the idea that the form of coordination

adopted by a network is primarily a function of balancing internal network tensions related to its size and resource disparities. However, unlike Kenis, Provan and Krueger's (2009) findings, the purpose of coordination established by the network board does appear to play a role in a network's form of coordination; albeit the impact appears greatest when networks are small and have limited resource disparity or when the resource disparity is so high that the benefits of a lead organization outweigh other members' loss of autonomy. (Figure 6.1 depicts these relationships visually).




Figure 6.1. A two dimensional network governance structure with the internal network characteristics associated with a network's form of coordination.

This leads us to the final set of analyses where we try to better understand why networks adopt their specific board structures with a particular interest in understanding whether or not the values espoused by these networks in their statements of beliefs, values or principles has an impact on a network's choices regarding the purpose of coordination it settles on and the types of members it accepts as legitimate.

CHAPTER SEVEN: BOARD STRUCTURES, VALUES, ORIGINS AND CHANGE

Now, with a better understanding of the multiple levels of network governance structures and the internal factors that appear to influence a networks form of coordination, we turn to the final analysis, which focuses on the following question. What factors help explain the multidimensional board structures networks adopt, and do the values outlined in each network's statement of values, beliefs or principles have an impact on these choices? Answers to this question move us beyond prior research, which has focused primarily on issues of strategy (Brown and Iverson, 2004), resource dependence (Pfeffer, 1973; Rehli & Jäger, 2011) and accountability (Brown and Moore, 2001) without addressing what guides a network to adopt certain strategies, become dependent on particular resources or accept specific forms of accountability.

Within the humanitarian sector and among the cases in this study in particular, all organizations and networks are focused in some way on helping people in need and reducing or eliminating the cycle of poverty. However, under this broad umbrella, humanitarian actors have taken different approaches with many changing and adjusting their approaches over time (Hailey, 1999; Korten, 1990; Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001). Along with changing approaches to humanitarian work have come changes in organizational and network structures. However, we know very little as to why networks make the choices they do regarding their governance and coordination. For example, why do some networks choose to organize collective network activities around the implementation of a single joint program across a multitude of diverse countries while others prefer to limit collective action to setting standards for members to follow, coordinating particular joint activities to gain efficiencies or providing support services while allowing individual members to develop their own strategies and priorities for programming? Or

why do some networks limit network membership to self-sufficient organizations willing to contribute funding to the network while others broaden membership to a wider variety of organizations, some of which are entirely dependent on the network itself for financing or even have different strategies for implementing an overarching goal?

Early on, scholars noted that organizations form relationships for a variety of reasons ranging from the need to increase bargaining power and achieve efficiencies to increasing legitimacy and demonstrating norms of reciprocity (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Oliver 1990). Subsequently, these and other rationales have been offered as explanations for why networks of humanitarian INGOs adopt the structures they do; from resource dependence and uncertainty reduction (Hudson & Bielefeld, 1997, Rehli & Jäger, 2011) to network strategy (Brown & Moore, 2001; Young, Koenig, Najam & Fisher, 1999;), network identity (Brilliant & Young, 2004; Young, 2001a) or both (Young, 2001b). However, there has been very little empirical evidence to support many of these assertions.

One theory in particular that has not been well explored has to do with the role values may have in these decisions. In an important contribution to the values literature, Rokeach (1973) defines values as “enduring belief[s] that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state existence” (p. 5). This definition naturally leads to the question of whether or not an organization’s values make some forms of governance socially preferable to others. Based on this logic, organizational values have been garnering increased attention among public and nonprofit scholars (Chen, Lune & Queen, 2013; Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007; Miller-Stevens, Taylor & Morris, 2015). One reason for this interest has been the concern that ‘private sector’ values may be infiltrating the public and nonprofit sectors and these values may lead to changes

in what and how things are done (Sanders, 2015). While researchers have been able to categorize values in different ways (Dolan & Garcia, 2002; Jorgensen & Isaksson, 2015; Van der Wal, de Graaf & Lasthuizen, 2008), and identify some differences among the sectors regarding their values (Jorgensen & Isaksson, 2015; Van der Wal, de Graaf & Lasthuizen, 2008), little work has been done to link these differences to how organizations, and networks in particular, govern and coordinate their activities. This is interesting, especially within the nonprofit sector, because of the importance many scholars and practitioners place on vision, mission and values statements during their strategic planning processes (Bryson, 2011) as well as in developing and negotiating organizational identities (Jakimow, 2010). To begin addressing this gap, I investigate whether or not the values espoused by humanitarian INGOs are related to the types of network governance structures identified in prior research and unpacked further in this study.

There are a number of reasons why we should expect organizational values to impact how networks are governed. Broadly speaking, values impact decision-making by making some options appear more preferable than others (Rokeach, 1973). They may also limit what options are even considered by decision-makers when scanning the environment. Within group decision-making and among organizations in particular, the values, beliefs and principles adopted by the organization provide members a bank of accepted rationales from which to justify their position during any given discussion. And this connection is made particularly clear when leaders are justifying an organization's mission and strategies which themselves have been shown to impact organizational structures (Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Brown and Iverson, 2004; Chandler, 1962). Finally, the stated values of an organization can in some ways serve as a social contract between an organization and both its internal and external stakeholders; outlining the standards to which the organization accepts being held to account. With these ideas in mind, we expect that

humanitarian INGOS will vary in the values they present in their vision, mission and values statements and that differences in these statements are likely to coincide with differences in the governance structures they adopt.

In particular, based on our review of the literature, it seems likely that networks will vary in the degree to which they adopt values consistent with a public, private or nonprofit value orientation or at the least in the orientation towards those they serve. And based on these differences, it is reasonable to suspect that networks will adopt different board structures. For example, while networks adopting a more private sector value orientation are likely to emphasize efficiency, allowing fewer members and focusing on a single program; networks with a public sector orientation may be more concerned with a consistent and fair process for decision-making and focus more heavily on group standard-setting rather than direct implementation. Finally, networks with a nonprofit orientation are expected to emphasize the importance of the individual and their participation in their own development consistent with the findings of Jørgensen and Isaksson's (2015) and these values are likely to lead to network structures that are more decentralized and inclusive.

ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES AND NETWORK BOARD STRUCTURES

Value identification and coding. Given that this is a fairly new line of inquiry and guidance regarding what values to concentrate on and how to define them is generally broad, I followed an inductive approach to categorizing values and grouping networks in to distinct value clusters. To begin, I identified a single source document outlining the officially adopted values of each organization and network in the study. In selecting these documents, I gave primacy to documents that have explicitly gone through some form of approval process, searching documents in the following order: strategic plans, legal documents such as charters and articles

of association, annual reports, promotional material, and finally web pages. When a statement of values was not available, I substituted it with a statement of principles or beliefs¹¹. I did this for each network and organization in my original sample. In the end, I coded 78 statements of values, principles or beliefs. Twelve (12) come from strategic plans, 17 from annual reports, 19 from other published documents and 31 from websites. On average, I coded 6.64 values per document with a low of two values and a high of 14 (see Table 7.1).

¹¹ While scholars often distinguish between values, principles and beliefs (Capell, Canhilal, Lutz & Ossenkop, 2013), others have noted that in practice the ideas in these various documents are often the same or similar (Kernaghan, 2003).

Table 7.1: Network and Organization Values: Sources and Frequencies

Purpose of Coordination	Cases	Frequencies			Source				Label		
		Average Number of Values	Low	High	Strategic Plan	Annual Report	Published Material	Website	Values	Principles	Beliefs
Organizations	37	6.38	2	13	6	10	6	15	20	14	3
Total Organizations	37	6.38	2	13	6	10	6	15	20	14	3
Implementation	13	8.77	5	13	2	4	2	5	11	2	0
Standard Setting	7	7.57	6	14	1	0	3	3	4	3	0
Joint Activities	7	5.43	3	9	1	0	3	3	0	5	2
Support	14	5.57	2	12	2	3	4	5	8	4	2
Total Networks	41	6.88	2	14	6	7	12	16	23	14	4
Total	78	6.64	2	14	12	17	18	31	43	28	7

Through the content analysis of these 78 (37 organizations and 41 networks) statements using the coding function within QSR International's NVivo 10 qualitative data analysis software, I coded values using an iterative process that began with the 20 values presented by Van der Wal, de Graaf and Lasthuizen (2008). As I encountered new values or terms, I developed a working definition for the value based on sector resources, dictionary definitions, the academic literature, and context before continuing to code. After completing each round of coding, I reviewed the list of values for similar definitions being used for different words as well as for terms that appeared to encompass multiple ideas. For example, while many networks claim to value collaboration or partnership, in reviewing my original coding, it became clear that there were differences in how these terms were being used. Specifically, some networks value collaboration with other INGOs and government agencies, some saw collaboration as being done with local communities or even with donors, volunteers or other members of their particular network. In instances like these, I created value categories distinguishing between these various usages and then recoded the documents. I continued this process until, based solely on the definitions and how values were worded in the documents, I did not feel comfortable combining any more terms and I could not detect any terms containing multiple ideas. In the end, I identified 71 distinct values¹² and coded 518 distinct value statements (236 (45.6%) for

¹² While this is similar to the number of values (72) identified by Jørgenson & Bozeman (2007), not all values are the same in the two studies.

organizations, 282 (54.3%) for networks) (see Appendix B1 for a list of all values including definitions and frequencies)¹³.

Value clusters and meaning. After finalizing the coding of each value statement, I exported a matrix of binary values from NVivo10 containing 41 rows (one for each network) and 71 columns (one for each value) where a '1' indicates that a network expressed a value and a '0' indicates that the value was not expressed by the network. I then used Ucinet 6 (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002) to calculate the Jaccard similarity coefficient for each pair of networks (i.e. rows). The Jaccard similarity coefficient is grounded in set theory and calculates the size of the intersection between two sets divided by the size of the union of the two sets. Or, in other words, the proportion of cases in which x_i equals y_i given that either $x_i > 0$ or $y_i > 0$ or both. This is an appropriate measure of similarity for two reasons. First, in this analysis we are comparing sets of values with the assumption that each value is a part of a value set representative of a distinct identity, culture or logic thus a significant overlap in values between two networks suggests the two networks are both at least partial members of a particular culture or value logic. Second, the Jaccard similarity coefficient focuses solely on values where at least one of the two networks is a member of the value set rather than including in the similarity calculation values expressed by neither network.

Using the matrix output from this calculation of similarities, I then used the interactive option of the CONCOR function to partition the networks by maximizing within group similarities and across group differences. After reviewing the distribution of cases and

¹³ As mentioned in Chapter 4, the primary purpose for including organizations in this analysis was to broaden my understanding of the various terms and values being used by humanitarian INGOs and to stay alert to the possibility of certain values being found among networks or vice versa.

prioritizing parsimony, I settled on a four (4) cluster solution. Once a four cluster solution was established, I followed a four step process for grouping values based on the cluster[s] in which each is most prevalent. I did this in order to gain an understanding of the values that make up each of the distinct value clusters and to begin discovering what might be their underlying themes (see Table 7.2)¹⁴.

Networks expressed 59 of the 71 values I identified overall and on average each value was expressed by approximately 5 (4.78) networks. In the first step, I identified values that showed up exclusively in one cluster (*1Group 100%*). While twenty-five (42.4%) of the values were expressed by networks from only one cluster, these values were expressed relatively infrequently (average expressions 1.4 times). In the second step, I identified values where 50% or more of the networks expressing the value were grouped in the same value cluster (*1Group $\geq 50%$*) and less than 50% in any other cluster. There were 20 (33.9%) such values and on average, these values were expressed by 7.4 networks each. In the third step, I identified values where more than 70% of the expressions came from networks in no more than two groups (*2Groups $> 70%$*). There were 12 such values and on average, these values were expressed by 6.83 networks each. In the final step, I identified two values where over 90% of the networks expressing them were grouped in to no more than three value groupings (*3Group $> 90%$*), essentially suggesting that one value grouping was not inclined to express that particular value.

¹⁴ I choose to group networks based on value similarity rather than group values based on network similarity because the nature of the analysis is predominantly inductive and I was more concerned with finding networks with similar value profiles than identifying particular value clusters. However, after conducting the grouping based on networks, I grouped values using a similar process. The results of the QCA analysis were consistent although 9 of the 41 networks received a different value coding.

There were only two such values (i.e. Sustainability and Environment). These two values were expressed a total of 17 times and appear to be similarly likely to appear in at least three of the four clusters. This is not surprising given the prevalence of these values within the humanitarian sector and society in general.

Table 7.2: Value Distributions at Each Phase of the Value Grouping Process

Grouping Phases	# of Values	Expression of Values			
		Frequency	Average	Min	Max
1Group 100%	25	35	1.40	1	5
1Group \geq 50%	20	148	7.40	3	17
2Groups >70%	12	82	6.83	2	17
3Groups >90%	2	17	8.50	7	10
Total	59	282	4.78	1	17

Based on this grouping process, I created a second table listing the individual values together in their respective value clusters, arranging them from most to least frequently expressed and calculating a Fisher's exact test of association for each value expressed five (5) or more times (see Table 7.3). By grouping the values in this way, I began making sense of the groupings and developing an understanding of what may be the underlying themes driving these differences.

Table 7.3: Value Clusters with Values Listed by Frequency at Each Phase of the Grouping Process

Approaches to Humanitarianism						
	Technical			Social		
	Value Cluster 1			Value Cluster 2		
Orientation	1Group 100%	1Group ≥50%	2Groups >70%	1Group 100%	1Group ≥50%	2Groups >70%
Institutional	Humanitarian	Effectiveness	Accountability	Neutrality	Transparency	Accountability
	Equality	<i>Collaboration</i>	Integrity	Courage	Impartiality	Integrity
	Honesty	Efficiency	Empowerment	Democratic	Professionalism	Empowerment
	Local Context.	Innovation	Evidence-based	Humanity	Independence	Evidence-based
	Lawfulness	Learning Org.		Pro-poor		
		Commitment	Collegiality			Gender
		Bearing Witness	Excellence			
		Inclusion	Diversity			Solidarity
						<i>Social Justice</i>
						Partnership
					Humility	
	Value Cluster 3			Value Cluster 4		
Individual	Spirituality	Expertise	Gender	Stewardship	Human Dignity	Collegiality
	Volunteer	Capacity		Unity	Compassion	Excellence
	Growth	Building		Local Capacity	Participation	Diversity
	Sharing			Responsiveness	<i>Service</i>	
	Optimistic			Connecting	Subsidiarity	Solidarity
	System			People		
	Change			Self-fulfillment	Freedom	<i>Social Justice</i>
	Civil Society			Proactive		Partnership
	Serviceability			Flexibility		Humility

Note: For values expressed 5 or more times, **Bold** values associated with cluster[s] ($p < .05$), *Italicized* values associated with cluster[s] ($p < .10$) based on a Fisher’s exact test.

As discussed above, public and nonprofit scholars in particular have voiced concern that private sector values are making their way in to public and nonprofit organizations. Enjolras (2009) and others describe the differences among the public, private and non-profit sectors; claiming that the private sector is grounded in market principles with an emphasis on efficiency (Isett et al., 2010) and innovation (Van der Wal, de Graaf & Lasthuizen, 2008), while the public sector focuses on hierarchy, redistribution and the public good (Jørgenses & Bozeman, 2007) and the third-sector values collective action, individualism (Miller-Stevens, Taylor & Morris, 2015) and democratic principles (Rothschild & Milofsky, 2006). In reviewing the value clusters from this study, I found what appears to be strong similarities between the value clusters and the three sector trichotomy of values discussed in the literature. However, rather than a three sector distinction, in my analysis, I identified four clusters with two clusters resembling third-sector values; however in slightly different ways. Specifically, one cluster suggests a set of third-sector values emphasizing results and technical skills similar to the private sector and one reflects a third-sector more focused on social processes similar to values attributed to the public sector.

Specifically, while there is some overlap in the values expressed by the first two clusters (e.g. accountability, integrity, empowerment and evidence-based) similar to what was found by Van der Wal, de Graaf and Lasthuizen (2008), the two clusters appear to align with private, market and public sector values respectively. The first cluster, with dominant values such as *effectiveness*, *efficiency*, and *innovation*, appears to correspond with what much of the literature describes as private sector values while the second cluster (cluster 2), with dominant values such as *transparency*, *impartiality* and *professionalism* corresponds much more to how public sector values are described. Interestingly, there also appears to be a difference in values regarding relationships. While the first cluster expresses a value for *collaboration* with other equals such

other public and private organizations as well as sharing a value for internal *collegiality* with cluster 4, the second cluster appears to share a value for *partnership* with local communities, again similar to cluster 4.

Additionally, with values such as *volunteer growth*, *civil society* (cluster 3), *unity*, *participation* and *subsidiarity* (cluster 4), the final two clusters show similarities to how the third-sector is described in the literature. However, other dominant values within each cluster suggests some important differences. For example, the most frequently expressed value distinguishing cluster 3 from the other value clusters is its emphasis on *expertise* and along with it *capacity building* and *serviceability*. In this study, the definition of *expertise*, “to act with competence, skill and knowledge” (p. 470), comes from Van der Wal and colleagues (2008). It is distinguished from *professionalism*, which is defined as ‘to act according to professional norms and standards’. In this way, *expertise* captures a value on technical skills which can be used to help others (*serviceability*) or taught to others (*capacity building*) in order for them to help themselves while *professionalism* (cluster 2) captures the idea of adhering to institutionalized standards and norms common to a bureaucracy and not necessarily a trait to be transferred.

In contrast, the most frequently expressed values distinguishing cluster 4 from the other clusters are *human dignity* and *compassion*. *Human dignity* is ‘to act with respect towards each individual acknowledging their inherent value’. This was the most frequently expressed value by the networks in this study and is clustered with complementary values such as a value for *service*, and an emphasis on a network’s *subsidiarity to local capacity* and *responsiveness* to locally led development (*participation*).

Human dignity can be most usefully contrasted with *impartiality* which is defined as “to act without prejudice or bias toward specific group interests” (Van der Wal et al., 2008; p. 470),

which is a defining characteristic of cluster 2. Rather than focusing on the inherent value of each individual, *impartiality* emphasizes an equal concern by the humanitarian organization for the needs of every individual. However, while cluster 2 and cluster 4 can be differentiated through their expression of either a value for *human dignity* or *impartiality*, the two groups have values in common such as their commitment to *solidarity* distinguishing them from clusters 1 and 3, which appear to share a common preference for *innovative*, technical solutions that can be evaluated based on metrics of *efficiency* and *effectiveness*.

Based on this interpretation, I distinguished what appear to be two dimensions to the value sets expressed by humanitarian INGOs. The first dimension appears to distinguish networks based on whether they express values in line with a technical approach (e.g. effectiveness, efficiency and expertise) or a process prioritization including solidarity and a social justice approach to humanitarian problems. The second dimension appears to capture differences among networks regarding their orientation; either being focused at the individual level or the institutional level similar to distinctions made by Korten (1990) and other observers of the humanitarian sector. (see Table 7.3).

Value clusters and board structures. With these observations in mind, I then conducted a Fisher's exact test of association between network value clusters and the network board structures identified in prior analyses¹⁵. In reviewing Table 7.4, there does appear to be a

¹⁵ The variable *purpose of coordination* was used to proxy the multidimensional construct of network board structure. This variable was chosen because of its strong correlation to both other dominant characteristics, *members* and *representation*, and because it allows for the use of a single variable to capture each of the four identified board structures rather than using the combination of *members* and *representation* to recreate these four categories. It also avoids the problem of when a network has governance characteristics common to differing forms of governance.

meaningful relationship between a network's values and its general board structure, measured by the purpose of coordination. Specifically, what we see is that 50% or more of the cases in each value cluster share a common board structure. Specifically, 6 of the 11 (54.5%) networks in *value cluster 1* utilize a board structure designed to oversee the centralized implementation of programming across countries. Five (5) of the 10 (50.0%) networks in *value cluster 2* utilize a board structure designed for the implementation and oversight of a centralized standard setting function. Four (4) of the seven (7) (57.1%) networks in *value cluster 3* utilize a board structure designed to oversee the information sharing function and the coordination of joint activities. And eight (8) of the 13 (61.5%) networks in *value cluster 4* utilize a board structure designed to oversee support to local offices either technically, financially or both. And, with a p -value of 0.002 as calculated by a Fisher's exact test, the observed relationship appears to be statistically significant. Based on these observations, there is reason to suspect that a nonrandom relationship exists between values and the network board structures of these humanitarian INGO networks.

Table 7.4: A Fisher's Exact Test of Association for Value Clusters and Board Structures as Indicated by Purpose of Coordination.

Value Clusters	Purpose of Coordination				Total Networks
	Implementation	Standard Setting	Joint Activities	Support	
Cluster 1	6 (46%)	1 (14%)	3 (43%)	1 (7%)	11 (27%)
Cluster 2	2 (15%)	5 (71%)	0 (0%)	3 (21%)	10 (24%)
Cluster 3	1 (8%)	0 (0%)	4 (57%)	2 (14%)	7 (17%)
Cluster 4	4 (31%)	1 (14%)	0 (0%)	8 (57%)	13 (32%)
Total	13 (100%)	7 (100%)	7 (100%)	14 (100%)	41 (100%)

$p = 0.002$. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

The analysis thus far has followed an inductive approach by 1) developing a catalogue of values expressed by humanitarian INGOS in their statements of values, principles or beliefs, 2) grouping networks together based on their similarity in the values they express, 3) analyzing the values associated with each value cluster to uncover what may be the underlying themes

associated with each. And 4) determining whether a relationship exists between the value clusters and the governance structures these networks adopt.

Based on this series of analyses, I have drawn some preliminary conclusions. First, there does appear to be sets of distinct and meaningful value profiles expressed by humanitarian INGOs. It appears that these profiles can be described as existing along two dimensions: whether a network values an outcomes oriented, technical approach or process oriented, social approach to solving humanitarian problems similar to what has been identified by others such as Heyse (2013) and whether a network values an institutional orientation versus an individualistic orientation similar to Jørgensen and Isaksson's (2015) distinction between 'attention' and 'concord' goodwill. Within these four value clusters, a dominant form of network governance appears to exist (see Table 7.5).

Specifically, networks in the first value cluster appear to value a technical or 'ends' guided approach with an institutional orientation to humanitarianism and express a set of values similar to those labeled by many as market or private sector values. The dominant board structure among these networks is a structure where the purpose of coordination is to centralize implementation and programming. Network members are those organizations able to commit funding to the network. These members are generally represented by a board member from their respective boards. And, it is often the case that members contributing more funding to the network are given greater representation on the network board.

In the second value cluster, networks appear to value a social/process approach to humanitarianism, again with an institutional orientation; expressing a set of values similar to those labeled as public sector values. The dominant board structure among these networks is a structure where the purpose of coordination is to set standards for the members and at times

coordinate joint activities. Members are generally limited to those organizations that can not only raise their own funding but also oversee their own programming internationally. Coordination among these members is often governed through a multi-layered board structure with board member representatives meeting to make decisions on high-level governance issues and executive directors meeting to develop recommendations for higher level approvals as well as coordinate with each other regarding implementation of higher level mandates. However, similar to the first group, member organizations contributing greater funding to the network are often given greater representation on the network board and single tier governance through board member representation is also common.

The values in the third cluster appear consistent with a technical approach to humanitarianism. However there appears to be an orientation towards the individual rather than institutions such as the promotion of volunteers and an active civil society. The dominant board structure among these networks is the least centralized of the four value clusters with the purpose of coordination often being limited to the sharing of information and perhaps the facilitation of joint activities among its members, who are again responsible for both raising funds and implementing programming, and when a network broker exists these brokers are generally governed by the executive directors of the various members.

Networks in the fourth and final value cluster express values in line with a social approach to humanitarianism along with an orientation towards the individual where the INGO supports local leadership in their pursuit of an organization and country specific strategy for humanitarian activities. The dominant board structure among these networks is one where a network broker provides technical and funding support to autonomous or semi-autonomous local offices. These brokers are most often governed by independent boards or by the executive directors of the

individual members who appear to gain membership less based on their ability to raise funds and more based on their ability to implement activities and express commitment to the network (see Table 7.5 for a summary).

Table 7.5: Values and Board Structures: A Summary of Findings

Value Cluster	Approach	Orientation	Dominant Values	Board Characteristics			Cases included in the Value Cluster
				Purpose of Coordination	Network Members	Board Representation	
Cluster 1	Technical	Institutional	Effectiveness, Efficiency, Collaboration, Innovation, Organization Learning, Integrity	Implementation & Programming	Funders	Board member representatives, (<i>Larger funders have greater representation</i>)	CBM, PLAN, SCI, BRAC, HI, GOAL, WAG, A2015, INTEGRAL, WCI, SOS-CVI^a
Cluster 2	Social	Institutional	Accountability, Transparency, Impartiality, Professionalism, Integrity, Solidarity	Standard Setting & Joint Activities	Funder/ Implementers	Multi-level: Board member & executive director representation or just board members (<i>Larger funders have greater representation</i>)	AMREF ^a , AAI ^a , TdH, OXFAM, CARE, ACF, MSF, ACT, TI, MdM^a
Cluster 3	Technical	Individuals	Expertise, Capacity Building	Joint Activities & Information Sharing	Funder/ Implementers	Executive director representatives	HPI, SP^a, VSF, SAM-I, JOIN, FFP, HELPAGE
Cluster 4	Social	Individuals	Human Dignity, Compassion, Participation, Solidarity	Support: Technical and Funding	Implementers	Independent boards or executive director representation	IRC, IAS, WVI ^a , IRW, CFA, AVSI, CARITAS, FyA, HfHI, ADRA, AA, SA, HIV

Note: **Bold** cases display the governance structure dominant to the value cluster.

^a Indicate the six (6) cases that did not fully fit within their respective governance structure profiles.

VALUES AND THE MULTIPLE EXPLANATIONS OF NETWORK BOARD STRUCTURES

Despite the relative coherence of the findings and their consistency with ideas already put forward in the literature, organizational values by themselves do not appear to provide us with a full understanding of why networks adopt the board structures that they do. In fact, as we saw in Table 7.4, only 23 of the 41 (56%) networks appear to utilize the dominant governance structure within each value profile. This suggests there is more to a network's board structure than just its values. With this in mind, I coded variables for a number of complementary and sometimes alternative explanations for why networks choose the structures they do and performed a final set of multi-variate analyses to better determine the extent to which values influence network board structures (see Table 7.6 for descriptive statistics and tests of association between these variables and network board structure).

Funding and resource dependence. Early in the study of networks and network governance, resource dependencies were recognized as having an important influence on network structures and operations (Provan, Beyer & Kruytbosch, 1980) and nonprofit boards (Pfeffer, 1973). From this perspective, organizations are seen as being dependent on their environment for resources. The more dependent an organization is, the more likely it is to make decisions in line with the interests of those on which it is dependent rather than in its own best interests. To manage these dependencies, organizations are expected to adopt one of two strategies. Either they adopt structures and practices designed to stabilize and increase the certainty in a relationship or they work to reduce their dependency by diversifying their access to a particular resource. Based on this logic, nonprofit scholars have offered propositions regarding the centralization versus decentralization of cross boarder networks (Hudson and Bielefeld, 1997, Oster, 1992, 1996) and in their study of humanitarian INGOS, Rehli and Jäger (2011)

found a significant relationship between an organization's reliance on volunteer support and the use of boards elected by members compared to management appointed boards which were more common among INGOs reliant on government funding.

In line with this logic, I created a variable (*FUND*) by coding cases based on the percentage of a network's funding coming from institutional donors such as national and international governmental organizations, compared to receiving funding from private sources such as memberships, donations, investment earnings and entrepreneurial endeavors. After reviewing the distribution of cases and considering the lack of precision in some of the budget numbers, I divided the networks in to three groups. In the first group, labeled '*Private*' and coded as '1', are the 16 networks that received less than 40% of their funding from institutional sources during their fiscal year 2014. In the second group, labeled '*Balanced*' and coded as '2', are the 10 networks that received from 40% to 60% of their funding from institutional sources during their fiscal year 2014. Finally, in the third group, labeled '*Public*' and coded as '3', are the 14 networks that received 60% or more of their funding from institutional sources during their fiscal year 2014 (see table 7.6 for descriptive statistics). By coding networks in this manner, we can assess the relative dependence a network has on the two most common types of funding as well as those networks that have been able to achieve a balance and are thus less likely to be dependent on either set of stakeholders.

Age. Another consistent finding among organization scholars is that as organizations and networks become older, they have a tendency to become more formalized with greater power and responsibility given to a central broker (Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012; Young, 1989). In addition, organization scholars have noted that an organization's origins have an impact on its original structure as well as its subsequent evolution and likelihood of following this centralizing

tendency. In these instances, the effects of origin have been attributed to such things as the era in which an organization is formed as well as its political, institutional, cultural and philosophical origins (Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012).

In order to capture the age of a network as well as be sensitive to the different eras of international humanitarian work, I created a variable (*AGE*) by grouping networks in to three categories capturing not only the age of the network, but also the general era in which it was formed. These cut-offs were chosen for two reasons. Besides there being natural breaks in the data, observers of the international development (Hailey, 1999) and humanitarian sector (Korten, 1990) have noted that the dominant logic within the sector has evolved since World War II. The first era, ending in the mid-1960s has been characterized by a relief and welfare logic with a focus on providing resources to those in need. This was followed by what some describe as a focus on local community and rural development where the focus is on mobilizing a community to work towards a common goal and an improved future. This logic appears to have lost prominence by the mid-1980s when the focus shifted towards changing national and international institutions and systems, often through advocacy, in order to provide a just and level playing field for the world's poor. Since then, some have argued that we are entering a new phase of development focused on mobilizing global communities and social movements. However, it may be too early to fully understand this most current transition. Based on this understanding, I coded networks into three distinct groupings. In the first group, labeled '*Old*' and coded as '1', are the 16 networks founded prior to 1965. In the second group labeled '*Mid*' and coded as '2' are the 13 networks founded between 1965 and 1985. Finally, in the third group labeled '*Young*' and coded as '3' are the 12 networks formed after 1985. While in some cases, organizations in these networks may be much older, because the network is the focus of this

study, I use the formation of the network rather than the age of the oldest organization in my coding.

Region. Another way to measure the cultural, institutional and political origins of a network is based on the geo-political region from which it originates. Regions can be outlined in a variety of ways. In identifying relevant regional groupings for this analysis, I took a number of issues in to consideration. First, the QCA software used for the analysis does not allow more than four categories per variable. Second, while political regions are important, I am also interested in cultural origins and at times political boundaries and cultural boundaries are not perfectly aligned. Based on this logic, I created a variable (*REGION*) by categorizing networks based on their political origin as being from either the United States (n=9) coded as '1', the United Kingdom and Ireland (n=13) coded as '2' and Europe (n=19). I then, divided the networks from Europe in to those coming from a culture rooted in a Germanic language (n=10) coded as '3' and those from a culture rooted in a Romance language (n=9) coded as '4'¹⁶ (see table 7.6 for descriptive statistics).

Philosophical origin. Finally, another measure of origin, which I have used throughout this study and which is particularly relevant to the non-profit sector, has to do with the philosophical origin (*PHILO*) of the network. The rationale for the potential importance of this distinction is

¹⁶ The distinction between Germanic and Romance languages is similar to other broad distinctions made regarding European countries and in many ways parallels a northern versus southern European distinction. In general entire countries fit within a particular cultural region. Countries coded as Germanic are Austria (n=1), Germany (n=4), Netherlands (n=3), Sweden (n=1). Countries coded as Romantic are Belgium (n=1), France (n=4), Italy (n=3). Switzerland is rooted in both cultures. Therefore, I coded the two networks originating in Switzerland based on the dominant language used by the particular network (Terre des Hommes (TdH) is coded as Romantic; ACT Alliance is coded as Germanic).

two-fold. First, a consistent distinction made in the literature has to do with the difference between faith-based (FBOs) and secular organizations and the reasons for this distinction is wide-ranging and varied. In addition to this distinction, based on my understanding of the humanitarian sector and these cases in particular, I also find it important to distinguish between Faith-based organizations that are attached to a particular religious denomination or philosophically driven organization (*Institutional*) and those that claim to be merely inspired by a particular faith (*FBO*). As I discussed in chapter 6, one reason for this further distinction is due to the fact that networks embedded within a larger institutional framework are likely to have access to additional controls and safeguards governing their relationships and there is also likely to be a greater deal of trust among these organizations based on a shared set of values. Based on these distinctions, *Institutional* (n=10) networks are coded as '1', *FBOs* (n=9) are coded as '2', and *Secular* (n=22) networks are coded as '3' (see table 7.6 for descriptive statistics the results of Fisher's exact tests of association between each variable and board structure).

Table 7.6: A Multi-variate Analysis of Board Structure: Descriptive Statistics and Coding of Variables

Variable	Variable Categories and QCA Coding				Association with STRUCTURE			
	Med	Low	High					
STRUCTURE ^a				1 Implement 13	2 Standard Setting 7	3 Joint Activities 7	4 Support 14	
VALUE ^b				Cluster 1 (Tech./Inst.) 11	Cluster 2 (Soc./Inst.) 10	Cluster 3 (Tech./Ind.) 7	Cluster 4 (Soc./Ind.) 13	<i>p</i> = 0.002
FUND	50%	<1%	99%<	Private 17	Balanced 10	Public 14		<i>p</i> = 0.746
AGE	1975	1865	2010	Old (<1965) 16	Mid (1965 – 1985) 13	Young (1985<) 12		<i>p</i> = 0.210
REGION				US 9	UK 13	Europe – Ger. 10	Europe – Rom. 9	<i>p</i> = 0.438
PHILO				Institutional 10	FBO 9	Secular 22		<i>p</i> = 0.017

Note: Tests of association calculated using a Fisher’s exact test.

^aAs summarized in Table 5.6, board structure is multi-dimensional. However, there is a high level of consistency among the board level characteristics and a network’s ‘purpose of coordination’. Therefore, governance structures are labeled according to the ‘purpose of coordination’ they are most associated with. Only six networks exhibit structural characteristics associated with more than one ‘purpose of coordination’. In these cases, the network is coded according to its ‘purpose of coordination’.

^bValues are labeled according to cluster numbers used in previous discussions. These clusters and their dimensions are further described in the Tables 7.4 & 7.5.

ANALYSIS

After coding variables in to what was determined to be useful yet parsimonious categories capturing many of the common explanations for network structure found in the literature, I ran four distinct QCA type analyses, one for each type of board structure identified, using Tosmana (Cronqvist, 2016), a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) software package inspired by Charles Ragin's fsQCA (Ragin, Drass, & Davey, 2006). The analyses focus on answering two main questions. First, how many of the 23 cases where values and board structure align continue to show values as part of a prime implicant for explaining board structure once other explanatory variables are included in an analysis? Second, what other variables or combinations of variables emerge as being important for explaining board structure? Do any of them appear to provide a more powerful or plausible explanation? And do these explanations compliment or contradict an explanation based on values?

QCA is a method of analysis that bridges qualitative and quantitative approaches (Ragin, 1987). It is ideal for small to intermediate N research and for theory building because of its ability to handle causal complexity and equifinality (Fiss, 2007). It draws on the fundamentals of case-study research using a set-theoretic approach (Ragin, 1987, 2000) to examine conditions both within and across cases in order to find the different combinations of factors that explain sub-sets of cases, acknowledging the likelihood that more than one combination can lead to the same outcome. QCA is, thus, well-suited to this particular analysis because, rather than trying to assess the net effect of a variety of variables on the likelihood of a network adopting a particular structure, we are trying to understand the variety of different reasons why networks adopt particular governance structures as well as which explanations may help explain the greatest number of cases.

QCA begins by using “truth tables,” which show all theoretically possible combinations of conditions that relate to a particular outcome and the number of cases present for each combination. Then, using a series of simplifications taking in to consideration counter-factuals, QCA software identifies the least complex set of conditions that can account for not only the presence of an observed outcome, but also its absence. Tosmana (Cronqvist, 2016) was chosen for this particular analysis specifically because it allows for the incorporation of multi-categorical explanatory variables in an analysis rather than having to create a separate dichotomous variable for each category¹⁷. However, unlike fsQCA (Ragin, Drass, & Davey, 2006) which provides ‘complex’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘parsimonious’ solutions and reports coverage and consistency scores for each recipe, Tosmana focuses on identifying ‘Prime Implicants’ (the most simplified set of causal conditions that explain a particular case or set of cases) and coverage and consistency scores must be calculated by hand. Table 7.7 reports the results of the four analyses based on each board structure measured by each network’s purpose of coordination (See Appendix C for the ‘truth tables’ reported for each analysis).

¹⁷ Creating a dichotomous variable for each category results in many impossible logical combinations which slows down analysis and can make the results more cumbersome to interpret (Lasse, 2003)

Table 7.7: A Multi-variate Analysis of Board Structure: Prime Implicants and Associated Cases for each of Four Board Structures

Themes	Outcome: Implementation		Outcome: Standard Setting		Outcome: Joint Activities		Outcome: Support	
	Prime Implicants	Cases	Prime Implicants	Cases	Prime Implicants	Cases	Prime Implicants	Cases
VALUES & PHILO Other Notables REGION & AGE	VALUE{1} AGE{2}	GOAL, BRAC, HI	VALUE{2} REGION{4} FUND{3}	ACF	VALUE{3} PHILO{1}	SAM, SP, JOIN	VALUE{4} PHILO{1}	ADRA, SA, FyA, CARITAS, AVSI, AA AA, HIV
	VALUE{1} AGE{1} REGION{2}	PLAN, SCI			VALUE{3} REGION{3,4}	SAM, VSF, JOIN	VALUE{4} AGE{3} REGION{2}	
PHILO & AGE Other Notables VALUES, FUND & REGION	PHILO{2} AGE{1}	<u>WVI</u> , HPI, CBM	PHILO{3} AGE{1} FUND{2}	OXFAM, TdH, CARE			PHILO{2} AGE{2} REGION{1}	FFP, HfHI
	PHILO{2} REGION{3}	CBM, IAS	REGION{4} FUND{1}	MSF				
AGE			PHILO{3} AGE{3} FUND{1}	WAG	VALUE{1} AGE{3} REGION{3}	A2015, WCI	VALUE{2} PHILO{1}	ACT
			AGE{3} REGION{1}	CFA	PHILO{2} AGE{3} REGION{2}	INTEGRAL	VALUE{2} AGE{3}	ACT, TI
CHANGE	PHILO{3} AGE{1} FUND{3}	<u>AMREE</u> , IRC, SCI						
	AGE{2} REGION{2} FUND{1}	<u>IRW</u> , <u>AAI</u> , BRAC						
Unexplained Other Notables HYBRID							VALUE{2} AGE{2} FUND{2} PHILO{3} REGION{3} FUND{1} VALUE{3} REGION{2}	<u>MdM</u> <u>SOS_CVI</u> HELPAGE

Conditions in **Bold** are considered the cohesive element within each identified theme. *Italicized* cases report being in the midst of a structural transition. Underlined are the five cases reported previously as having a hybrid governance structure.

At first glance, the results presented in Table 7.7 suggest a large variety of causal conditions or combinations of causal conditions (prime implicants) that can presumably explain the same outcomes. For example, the results of the analysis show eight (8) distinct combinations of causal conditions that explain a board structure established to oversee the *support* of network members and four (4) combinations that explain a board structure overseeing the coordination of *joint activities*. However, after reviewing the pattern of combinations and the cases associated with each combination, I identified four distinct yet interrelated themes that help to make sense of the results and I have arranged the conditions and the associated cases according to these themes with themes explaining the greatest number of cases at the top.

The first theme, and the most relevant theme for this particular analysis, has to do explicitly with values. Specifically, seven different combinations of conditions show the predicted VALUE condition as an important aspect of the causal combination with these seven prime implicants covering 17 of the 41 cases (42.5%). And in answer to the first of our guiding questions, values do appear to remain the primary explanation of governance structure for 17 of the 23 (73.91%) cases we originally identified as having a match between values and structure.

However, values are not the only important aspect of this first theme. Rather, it is also important to note that 9 of the 11 (81.81%) cases in this theme with a board structure overseeing *support* or *joint activities* also report originating from a larger institution or denomination (i.e. PHILO{INSTITUTIONAL}). In contrast, the six (6) cases with either a board structure overseeing *implementation* or *standard setting* report secular origins (i.e. PHILO{SECULAR}).

Additionally, it is also worth noting that all but two of these 17 cases were founded before 1985 (the time when government funding of INGOs began to increase dramatically). And, when REGION is part of the prime implicant, the UK originating networks are centralized and the

European networks are decentralized. However, the youngest UK networks appear to adopt a *support* over an *implementation* focused governance structure. Finally, funding is only a factor in one case in this theme and does not appear to provide much information when just looking across this first theme.

The second theme I identified, which is characterized by five distinct combinations of conditions covering ten ($10/41 = 24.4\%$) unique cases, appears to be most related to two conditions: Age and Philosophical origins. However, a more in depth analysis also suggests that values, funding and region continue to play a role as well. Like the cases in the first theme, all but one of the cases in this second theme were founded before 1985 (i.e. AGE{notYNG}). Also, like the first theme, a network's philosophical origins appears to be an important factor in explaining board structure. However, rather than there being a distinction between *institutional* and *secular*, the distinction is between *FBO* and *secular* networks. Specifically, all six of the FBOs in this theme report utilizing a centralized governance structure, with network boards overseeing either the *implementation* or *support* functions. In contrast the four secular networks all report utilizing a decentralized board structure involved with *standard setting*.

In addition to the two most prominently identified conditions in this theme, a review of the less mentioned conditions brings out some additional insights. Specifically, the six remaining networks I initially identified as having a match between their values and governance structure are found among this second set of ten cases; this includes all four secular networks. However, in addition to these four secular networks reporting values more consistent with a decentralized structure, these networks also report having a balanced funding structure or one dependent primarily on private funding. Thus the similarities between the first two themes with regard to *values*, *region*, *philosophical origins* and *age* suggest that while values were not always

identified as part of the causal combinations, it definitely appears to be part of the explanation. And a picture is beginning to develop where philosophical origins, regional origins and values all appear to be influencing the structure of networks that have been around for more than a short amount of time. And there is some evidence that developing a balanced funding structure facilitates the pursuit of more social/process oriented values among secular networks.

The third theme I identified, containing five prime implicants covering seven (7/41 = 16.3%) unique cases, is most notably characterized by *age*. Although, a more careful analysis suggests that the other patterns we see developing among the other conditions such as values, philosophical origins and regions are not contradicted. Unlike the previous two themes, which are populated by networks founded prior to 1985, the seven networks in this theme were all founded after 1985. And while at first glance, the values and board structures of these networks do not appear to match, a closer analysis suggests that perhaps these networks are developing boards consistent with their values, but either the newness of their relationships or some other influence is slowing this convergence.

For example, the five networks with decentralized governance structures, all express values more consistent with a centralized structure (4 are part of value cluster 1 associated with an *implementation* focused board; 1 is part of value cluster 4 associated with a *support* focused board) and originate from regions and philosophies that would generally support these values. However, in reviewing the annual reports and other documents related to these cases, it is clear that each of the members of these networks are still figuring out just how best to work together. For example, in their Annual Report, Water Aid Global (WAG) discusses how it has created an independent legal structure for its secretariat. However, given the resource disparities in the network, the organization itself is being housed and funded by its largest member until the role

of the secretariat and its funding sources can be more fully worked out. Similarly, INTEGRAL, in the secretariat's annual report, gives less attention to network outcomes and more attention to discussing the deliberation processes underway to determine how best the members of this relatively young network can work together to respond more efficiently in emergency situations. This apparent mismatch between values and governance structures along with what we know about age and formalization as well as what we see in their annual reports, suggests that we should expect to see the structures of these networks continue to evolve as the members work to find a match between their values and governance structures in general. In these cases, the decentralization of these networks does not appear to reflect decisions based on values or philosophy, but rather on the newness of the networks and what appears to be a lack of familiarity in working together.

The story is similar for the two *support* oriented networks which both express values strong on accountability and consistent with a *standard setting* focus. However, in these cases, it appears that the origins and funding of the networks may be impacting the development of these networks. For example, the ACT alliance is embedded in an institutional structure related to the Worldwide Counsel of Churches. As with the rest of the institutionally embedded networks, ACT reports a support oriented board structure with a large and diverse membership. However, it is also important to note that of all the institutionally embedded networks, the ACT alliance has the most elaborate set of policies, procedures and templates on their website for members to use giving the impression that while the ACT secretariat provides plenty of support to its members, it has also developed quite a role in standard setting similar to what its' values would suggest. For TI, the divergence appears to be much more related to financing, with so much of the networks

funds coming through the secretariat. However, another possibility is that the accountability focus of TI's values could be more related to what it expects of others rather than of itself.

The fourth theme, containing two prime implicants covering four ($4/41 = 9.8\%$) unique cases, is notably characterized by 'change'. As has been noted throughout this study, network board structures are multi-dimensional and while these dimensions often coalesce in predictable ways, this is not necessary. Rather, network leaders can adopt board structures that utilize aspects of various typical structures in unique ways. Or, in times of transition, some dimensions may be easier to change or may even be necessary to change before others. In this study, we identified five cases that appeared to have adopted these hybrid type structures (See Tables 5.6 and 7.7). Interestingly, of the four (4) networks in this fourth theme, two (2) have these hybrid structures identified earlier; with these and an additional case (IRW) reporting in their annual reports that they are in the process of a deliberate and dramatic structural transformation. Only one of the uniquely identified networks (IRC) does not appear to be in transition.

Probably the most well-known transition has been that of AAI, which is moving from a project based INGO governed much like other *implementation* focused networks, to a social movement INGO focused on empowering its local offices to become independent, moving its headquarters from Europe to South Africa and restructuring itself to be more like a network focused on *support* or *standard setting*, with all offices having a voice in electing the network board, and decentralizing the control of programming away from the secretariat back to the local offices. A big part of this transition has been guided by AAI's deliberate attempt to rethink its values, which are now consistent with those of *value cluster 2*, and each aspect of its new structure has been rationalized in its official documents back to these values. However, as of this study, the transition process is ongoing with the most discussed aspect of the transition being the

development of network offices to what is deemed a minimum level of professional and financial independence in order for them to be granted full membership privileges (ActionAid International, 2010).

AMREF is going through a similar transition albeit less dramatic. Guided by values consistent with *value cluster 2* and a 10 year strategic plan scheduled to be renewed in 2017, that focuses on community empowerment rather than program delivery, AMREF reports working with its members in Europe and North America encouraging and holding them accountable for activities regarding awareness raising just as much as with its members in Africa. In this way, the network is moving away from a top-down, *implementation* focused structure more towards an egalitarian *support* or *standard setting* focus where all members are being held accountable for fulfilling their specific roles. For example, even though the offices in Africa are wholly owned subsidiaries, they have their own advisory boards and representation on the network board. And while the European and North American offices are legally independent, they each are given equal coverage in the network annual report where they report their awareness raising and other activities in their home countries rather than reporting on the projects they funded, which were in fact implemented by their network members (AMREF, 2007)

Finally, IRW also reports going through a structural change. However, unlike AAI and AMREF which have adopted values consistent with a more decentralized governance structure and are working to change their structures to match these values, IRW continues to maintain the same core values which are consistent with *value cluster 4* and its previous network structure. However, the structural changes it is implementing appear to be consistent with those of *value cluster 1*. Specifically, after working with strategic consultants, the network has elected to consolidate all implementation under its *lead* organization as well as establish a network board

with one vote per member. However, as with other networks focused on implementation, representation appears to be limited to only those self-sustaining members that are able to contribute funding to the network. Although the lead organization reports being committed to supporting offices in becoming self-sustaining.

In the final theme reported in Table 7.7 are three additional cases which do not appear to fit neatly in to one of the four complementary themes involving values, age and philosophical origin. And for the purposes of this analysis are labeled as unexplained. However, it is worth noting that both SOS_CVI and MdM are coded as having hybrid structures not fitting well into any of the identified governance structures.

SOS_CVI's governance structure is the most complex structure within this study. While SOS_CVI adopts values highly consistent with *value cluster 1*, it recognizes all of its offices, whether they are financially independent or not, as legitimate members of the network. It also has a two tiered board structure, one populated by board member representatives of its members with voting rules that provide for larger financial contributors to have a greater voice, and one populated by executive directors with more equal representation and voting rules. Finally, the role of the network broker is described as being one of support as well as standard setting and enforcement. All in all, SOS_CVI reports having two of its four governance characteristics as resembling a *support* focused structure (Legitimate Members, Purpose of Coordination), and two resembling a *standard setting* focused structure (Board Representation & Voting Rules).

Although the values espoused by MdM are consistent with *value cluster 2*, it also has a hybrid structure. The history of MdM is one of staying true to its values. Specifically, the leaders of MdM used to be a part of MSF. However, according to their history, they formed their own INGO due to philosophical differences. Specifically, MdM chose to maintain a more simple

structure with less standardization. Therefore, what makes it unique from *standard setting* networks like MSF is that while legitimate members of the network appear to be limited to organizations that are self-sustaining financially, coordination appears to be done through its executive directors albeit with the French organization leading in this coordination and the network broker reports providing more of a support function to its members rather than a standard setting function, which would be consistent with its values.

SUMMARY

Before turning to a discussion of these findings and those from previous analyses, I would like to summarize the results of this last analysis as reported in Table 7.8. First, after reviewing the results of the four discrete analyses focused on network board structures, I identified four distinct yet interrelated themes that help make sense of 37 of the 41 (92.8%) cases with a consistency of 97.37% ($37/38 = .9737$). In support of the initial findings from the bivariate analysis between network values and board structures, values remain an important part of the overall explanation of network board structure even when including variables capturing a variety of other dominant explanations from the literature. However, factors such as age and philosophical origin and region appear to play an important role in the explanation as well. Specifically, values appear to be the dominant explanatory condition across the first theme, which accounts for 17 of the 41 (41.5%) cases in the study. However, the explanation of these cases is enriched by observing the distinction between networks grounded in a religious denomination or philosophically oriented institution and those with secular origins. Specifically, I noted that the secular networks in this theme display an institutional or systems focused orientation while those grounded in a philosophical institution displaying an orientation towards the individual. The second theme, which helps explain 10 more of the 41 cases (24.4%)

compliments the first theme in that age and philosophical origins are again a major part of the story. Specifically, similar to the cases in the first theme, all but two of the networks in this theme were formed before 1985. However, rather than distinguishing between institutionally embedded and secular networks and their relation to a bottom-up or top-down orientation, in this theme FBOs appear to prefer centralized governance structures while secular networks show a preference for decentralized networks. Additionally, those FBOs founded before 1960 show a preference for a top-down implementation structure while those formed between 1960 and 1985 report using a bottom-up support oriented structure. Finally, while values was not identified as part of any of the prime implicants in this theme, six (6) of the ten (10) cases in this theme report a match between their values and board structure suggesting that values still plays an important part of the explanation.

Age and values help explain the cases in the next two themes as well. However, the overarching explanation for these 11 cases is 'change'. Specifically, the seven (7) cases in the third theme are all young and while their values and board structures do not appear to match based on this particular analysis, a deeper reading of their annual reports and other documents suggests that these networks are still evolving and providing indications of making choices which will bring their board structures more in line with what would be expected based on their stated values. The four unique cases in the fourth theme are relatively established. However, for various reasons, three of these four networks have elected to attempt a significant change to their network structures either based on a dramatic philosophical shift in their values and approaches to humanitarian work or because of the current tensions and challenges being faced by the network that could not be adequately addressed within the current structure. Being in the midst of this change process has contributed to these networks having a mismatch between their values

and board structures. However, there appears to be plenty of reasons to believe that these networks will continue their transformation towards a congruence between their values and structure over time. The three cases in the final theme are left as unexplained. However, it is worth noting that two of these three appear to have developed hybrid structures making them more difficult to classify.

Table 7.8: A Multi-variate Analysis of Board Structure: A Summary of Theme Interpretations and Coverage

Dominant Themes	Other Notable Observations	Cases	Coverage	Consistency
VALUES & PHILO{INST v. SEC}	AGE(notYNG), REGION	17	.415	1.00
PHILO{FBO v. SEC} & AGE{notYNG}	VALUES, REGION, FUND	10	.244	1.00
AGE{YNG}	Evolving	7	.171	1.00
AGE{notYNG}	Transformation	4	.098	0.75
Unexplained	Hybrid	3		
		41	.928	.974

CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

I began this study with three driving questions: 1) What explains the governance structures of inter-organizational networks? 2) Are the structures of their boards and their form of coordination related? And 3) do their values, as outlined in their vision, mission and values statements have an impact on these choices? From my in depth analysis of the 41 networks of humanitarian INGOS in this study, I find evidence for the following conclusions. First, the results of this study support the proposition that a network's purpose influences the form of coordination it adopts. This contrasts with other empirical tests of this proposition. Second, the detailing of the various network governance characteristics that comprise the general network board structure expand and add clarity to the discussion of network forms. Specifically, how members are represented on a network board appear to be closely related to the purpose of coordination adopted by the network. And finally, nonprofit organizations appear to express values from the market, public and nonprofit values systems. However, each network tends to express a set of values consistent with just one of these value systems. And these values appear to be related to how the network is structured. Specifically, values appear to serve as a filter through which other environmental factors such as philosophical origins, regional culture and the era can influence the structure and functioning of a network. This moves forward the values discussion within these literatures by expressly connecting values to structure, which itself has been linked consistently to issues such as strategy and effectiveness. Figure 8.1 depicts the observed relationships between the primary constructs in the study.




Figure 8.1. The multiple levels of network governance structures and the factors that influence their design.

Implications for theory. This study is grounded most heavily in two theories of network governance one from the public administration literature (i.e. Provan & Kenis, 2008) and one focused on the nonprofit sector (i.e. Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012). Both theories focus on network governance. However, while Provan and Kenis (2008) focus on a network's form of coordination, Brown, Ebrahim and Batliwala (2012) focus primarily on network boards; linking them with network membership and the role of the network broker.

The findings of this study generally support and integrate these two dominant theories while incorporating a greater number of governance characteristics and adding additional insight as to why these structures are chosen. First, there is good reason for studies of network governance to focus on these two components of governance separately. Of the five dimensions of network governance identified and analyzed in this study, a network's form of coordination is the only dimension that does not appear to be related to the others. In fact, the governance dimensions regarding 1) which organizations are perceived as eligible to become network members, 2) how members are represented on network boards both through the types of people

representing them as well as 3) what types of voting rules may exist, and 4) the purpose of network coordination are all strongly related; clustering into four distinct network forms, varying along two dimensions: centralization versus decentralization of activities and a bottom-up versus top-down logic of authority.

These two dimensions of network structure appear to respond to different influencing factors. Consistent with Provan and Kenis's (2008) thinking, a network's form of coordination appears most related to issues of size and the resource disparities within a network. However, I was not able to find support for their propositions regarding trust and goal consensus. And unlike their later study (i.e. Kenis, P., Provan, K. G., & Kruyen, P. M., 2009), the results of this analysis support the proposition that a network's purpose can influence member perceptions of interdependency and the form of coordination they adopt. However, this is most evident among smaller networks with high resource disparity.

The results of this study also build on the findings of Brown, Ebrahim and Batliwala (2012). Specifically, they confirm their observations regarding the strong and consistent relationship between a network's legitimate members, the structure and composition of the board as well as the role of the network broker. However, rather than interpreting these relationships as all stemming from a network's primary accountability, in this study, I ask why some networks choose to acknowledge certain stakeholder groups rather than others as being most dominant, and how do boards differ based on this choice? In particular, I asked whether values had a role in these decisions. Based on my analysis, it appears that along with philosophical and regional origins, values combine with age to play an important role in explaining a network's board structure including who it see as its dominant stakeholder. However, the relationship between values, philosophical & regional origins and age and their impact on network board structures is

quite complex. And while together these four variables provide a convincing story of board structure, the nature of this analysis does not rule out the importance of funding as well. Nor does it preclude the possibility that the types of members seen as legitimate impact a networks values rather than vice-versa. However, there is reason to suspect that values serve as some form of filter through which the other external factors make their impact on network structure felt.

As has been discussed throughout this paper, within the public and nonprofit sector, the discussion of values has been largely related to the perceived co-mingling of values from each of the three sectors: for-profit, public and non-profit. The results of this study suggest that within the international humanitarian sector organizations vary in their values with some adopting values similar to the for-profit sector, while others appear to have adopted values more in line with either a public sector or nonprofit logic. And each value profile appears to be related to one of four distinct network governance structures.

In particular, my analysis suggests that a network's values can be described as varying along two dimensions. The first dimension appears to capture differences across networks with regard to their approach to solving humanitarian problems. While some networks express values consistent with a technical approach, others express values more supportive of a social or process based approach. This distinction is similar to the means versus ends distinction observed by Heyse (2013) in her comparison of two such humanitarian INGOS.

The second dimension appears to capture a network's general orientation towards the environment and stakeholders. While some networks express values suggesting an orientation towards changing systems or institutions others express values interpreted as an orientation towards individuals. For example, networks showing a focus on institutions or systems express values such as a concern for improved efficiencies and innovation or greater accountability,

impartiality and professionalism. On the other hand, networks showing a focus on individuals express values such as volunteerism, expertise, human dignity, freedom and participation. In many ways these distinct orientations reflect similarities to what Brickson (2005) described as individualistic, relational and collectivist identity orientations or Jørgensen and Isaksson's (2015) distinction between attention, devotion and concord goodwill, where an *attention* goodwill suggests an organization's 'me' focus in its concern for others while *concord* goodwill suggests a 'we' focus.

Combing these dimensions, I describe the first value profile as being an institutional, systems oriented and technical value system. The values most dominant within this grouping are values attributed to a private/market-based value system with values such as effectiveness, efficiency and innovation being most common. The governance structure most often associated with this value profile is a highly centralized governance structure with membership limited to those organizations that are self-sustaining and able to contribute funding. These members are most often represented on network boards by their board chairpersons and it is not uncommon for members that contribute greater funding to also be given greater voting rights on the network board. Within these networks, the purpose of coordination and the role of the board is to oversee, the development and implementation of a coherent program across countries as well as many general management and support functions.

The second value profile, can be described as an institutionally oriented social/process based value system. The values most dominant within this grouping are values often attributed to the public sector such as accountability, professionalism and impartiality. The governance structures these networks often adopt are less centralized than the first grouping in that network coordination rarely focuses on implementation, but rather, is more focused on setting standards

for network members, which like the first grouping is limited to self-sufficient organizations. Also, like their institutionally oriented counterparts, members are generally represented by the board chairperson in network governance forums and members with greater financing are often given a greater voice in decision-making. However, different from the first grouping, many of these networks have established additional governance forums for executive directors to meet, coordinate and contribute to the network wide governance process.

The third and fourth groupings seem to share an orientation toward the individual and both groups show similarities to a stereotypical nonprofit value profile along with both being heavily dominated by faith-based organizations (FBO). However, what differentiates these two groupings is their preference for either technical or social solutions. For example, group three, with an individually orientated and technical value system, is dominated by values for expertise and capacity building. These networks tend to be the least centralized of the four groupings with network coordination revolving around information sharing as well as the coordination of joint activities. Membership in these networks can be broader at times. However, members with fewer resources appear to participate in fewer network activities and with fewer partners. Members of these networks are almost always represented by their executive directors in network level decision-making, which tends to be a one vote per member system rather than giving greater voting rights to larger members.

Finally, the fourth grouping, with an individually orientated, and social/process focused value system, is dominated by values such as human dignity, compassion, participation and subsidiarity. These networks are often highly centralized. However, network coordination is generally focused on providing support; both financial, technical and administrative, to members, rather than implementing a common program across countries. The boards overseeing these

networks often consist of independent board members representing outside constituencies. However, there also appear to be a substantial number of networks that are governed by the executive directors of their member organizations with an equal vote given to each member. In these networks, membership is often quite broad with the criteria for membership focused more on adherence to a mission or value system rather than being self-sufficient financially.

A network's philosophical and regional origins also appear to play an important role in influencing a network's choice of governance structures. Specifically, we made three observations. First, networks embedded in some form of philosophical institution, usually a religious denomination, overwhelmingly express values consistent with a traditional nonprofit logic and a focus on individuals rather than institutions. And consistent with these values these networks overwhelmingly adopted governance structures with a bottom-up logic of control. In contrast, secular organizations appear to express an institutional focus through their values (either market or public institutions) and appear to adopt structures consistent with these logics. A second observation is that networks of Faith-based organizations (FBOs) that are relatively well established (e.g. not founded after 1985) appear to adopt more centralized structures and the values consistent with them. However, there are multiple possible explanations for these findings. Including the possibility of different levels of trust or network closure between secular and institutionally embedded networks, different strategies for humanitarian work and perceptions of local capacity or just the simple existence of an additional layer of governance that may be influencing these networks to adopt the values and the centralized structures that they do. And third, a network's region of origin appears to influence its governance structures as well. Specifically, while the US and UK tend to have centralized structures, networks originating in Europe appear to be more decentralized.

Finally, as has been noted consistently in the literature, age appears to have an important influence on network structure. In particular the size and role of the network broker. Once organizations commit to working together, they appear to go through quite a lengthy process of establishing the extent of their relationships as well as how to structure and fund any necessary coordination. During this time, it appears that these networks are more decentralized than their values or origins may suggest. However, over time, we expect that these networks will evolve in to alignment with their stated values.

This research also has implications for nonprofit governance research more broadly. Leading up to this study, research on nonprofit governance has generally been guided by resource dependence theory, agency theory and most recently contingency theories that attempt to specify when and under what conditions which of the two earlier theories is most appropriate (Brown & Gup, 2010; Cornforth, 2012; Miller-Millesen, 2003; Ostrower & Stone, 2012). While these theories offer insights into the various roles boards fill and how internal and external factors impact these roles and the composition of the board, to my knowledge, none of these studies have incorporated values and origins in to their analysis. However, based on the results of this study, this appears to be an important oversight. While both internal and external factors likely do impact the role and composition of the board, it is also likely that an organization's values impact the structure and functioning of its board as well as other strategic decisions; either directly by setting parameters on what is seen as good or appropriate, or indirectly by filtering how network members see and understand their environment. For example, a values explanation could enrich answers to such questions such as why might a nonprofit allow itself to develop one dependency versus another? Why do nonprofits in the same industry perceive some stakeholders

to be more salient than others? And what guides board members, as *principals*, to choose to monitor, reward or support their executive directors (*agents*) in a particular way?

Finally, if values do indeed provide answers to these and similar questions, then a natural follow-up question becomes, which values are most effective and why? A question like this is likely to evoke strong opinions and tension among those that believe in a more relativistic approach to values and world views. However, perhaps research on this topic might shed light not on which values are more effective than others, but rather what does effectiveness look like within each value system? In what contexts are these views most appropriate? And how can performance within and across these views be monitored and assessed? These and related questions are interesting especially given the observations of numerous scholars that public, for-profit and non-profit values appear to be ‘infiltrating’ each other’s space and to some extent organizations within the nonprofit sector appear to be expressing values from each of these logics or at least adopting the language to express different ideas (Chen et al, 2013; Enjolras, 2009, Isett et. al., 2011; Jørgenson & Bozeman, 2007).

Implications for practice. Vision and mission statements have been given considerable attention by nonprofit scholars and practitioners alike and are seen as important parts of a nonprofit’s strategic planning process. However, while values are often included in what organizations refer to as their Vision, Mission, Values statements, in general, much less attention is given to values, and in practice, values statements are often addressed toward the end of the process when fatigue may be setting in and everyone just wants a final product to present. For example, in two recent texts on governance and strategic planning for public and nonprofit organizations, the importance and development of both vision and mission statements were given their own sections or chapters while values was not explicitly addressed in either.

Underemphasizing the importance of values may have implications for an organization. For example, mission statements express *why* an organization exists. Vision statements express *what* type of future the organization would like to see. And in many ways these statements provide direction, focus and goals for an organization and send signals to those outside the organization regarding its purpose and commitment to a sector or problem. However, while these statements signal *what* an organization is working towards, values are more related to *how* an organization intends to go about achieving those goals. And in many cases the *how* is just as important as the *what* for decision-making. At the level of the board, values may help guide who should be allowed to participate on the board or its committees, what voting privileges they should have as well as what the relationship between an administration or secretariat and others in the organization is supposed to be. At the organizational level, values may guide decision-making not only regarding a theory of change, but also on the day to day issues of management like motivating volunteers or disciplining poor performance among employees. And whether implicit or explicit, values are what guide behavior in complex and uncertain situations, when data and deliberation are not available and results may not be easily measurable. Because of the importance of values to many of the issues that face nonprofits and across international networks of nonprofits, taking time to dialogue regarding core values and linking these values to other strategic decisions may prove to be beneficial.

Limitations and implications for future research. As with most network studies, two limitations of this study are related to the number of cases and the fact that it is based on cross-sectional data thus lacking consistent data regarding changes over time and limiting the ability to discuss issues of causation. However, given the in-depth and inductive nature of the study, the

moderate number of cases allowed more time and resources for developing a full and rich contextual understanding of each case and its evolution.

Another potential limitation of this study is that throughout the qualitative coding process only one researcher was available to validate the definitions of values and interpret value statements in to value coding. To minimize this shortcoming, I attempted to utilize value definitions already developed in the literature and as much as possible use the descriptions of values used by the networks themselves in defining additional value codes. However, at times I had to rely on my own interpretations of very similar values to determine what were different ways of expressing the same value and which were indeed different values being expressed. While, I have experience working in and studying the international humanitarian sector, my background can also lend bias to my interpretations. However, to the greatest extent possible I have attempted to be transparent in all my coding decisions and interpretations. Additionally, the fact that the vast majority of the findings in this study are consistent with prior research or theorizing offers some robustness to the validity of these interpretations. However, it is reasonable to suspect that another researcher with a different background may come to different interpretations of the data. And being able to confirm my interpretations with those involved in the governance of these networks would be useful.

Based on this discussion, some directions for future research present themselves. First, a prominent conclusion drawn from this study is that within international networks of humanitarian nongovernmental organizations a dialogue is ongoing between the organizational logics of the public, private and nonprofit sectors. As network values evolve in this discussion, governance structures are also likely to evolve. Based on this interpretation, it would be useful for future studies to take an in-depth look at whether or not this sequencing of events is indeed

accurate and if so, how does the co-evolution of values and governance structures take place?

This would potentially be interesting given the observation that it may take considerable time for governance structures to evolve in to structures that are consistent with a network's values and the longer a network is able to maintain its core values the greater the chance that structures and values will align.

A second conclusion that was put forward based on the findings of this study and their relationship to prior scholarship is that certain organizational logics appear to lend themselves to different forms of control. While theorizing on this topic is quite developed (Kenis & Provan, 2006), there is very little empirical work to support this thinking. Future studies investigating the link between network values, network leadership and the control mechanisms used would be a particularly relevant next step in this discussion.

A third area of potentially fruitful research could focus on the relationship between value orientations and network efficiency and effectiveness. As we have noted in this study, networks operating within the same sector and context and focusing on a relatively similar goal have adopted significantly different approaches to achieving these goals. Are each of these approaches equally efficient? Are they equally effective? Are some approaches more successful than others for addressing different aspects of the broader humanitarian problem? If so, how can we understand these relationships?

Finally, a fourth area for future research could focus on the connection between network values and fundraising. Specifically, are different value orientations related to different funding mixes? The results of this analysis suggests that while internal funding disparities are a factor in the form of coordination a network adopts, the source of funds does not appear to be a major factor in choices of board level structures. However, other studies have found contradictory

evidence. Therefore, we would all benefit from more studies focused on unpacking these relationships as well as developing a better understanding of how organizations and networks adjust their fundraising to be more consistent with their particular value orientation or vice versa?

Addressing these areas of research could not only help develop our understanding of international networks of humanitarian nongovernmental organizations, but could help develop our understanding of networks and nonprofit organizations more broadly.

APPENDIX A: HUMANITARIAN INGOS: REGISTRIES, DATABASES AND CASES

A1: DONOR COUNTRY REGISTRIES OF HUMANITARIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Country	Agency or Organization	Location	Date Last Accessed
Australia	AUSAID	http://aid.dfat.gov.au/ngos/Pages/accredited.aspx	10/27/2014
Austria	ADA	http://www.entwicklung.at/en/funding/humanitarian-aid/	10/27/2014
Belgium	BDC	http://diplomtie.belgium.be/en/policy/development_cooperation/partnerships/non_governmental/actors/recognized_ngos/	10/27/2014
Canada	Cida	http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/fWebprojDataEn?Readform	10/27/2014
Czech Republic	MFA & CzDA	http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/development_cooperation_and_humanitarian/humanitarian_aid/introductory_information.htm	10/27/2014
Denmark	Danida	http://openaid.um.dk/en/organizations/20000	10/27/2014
Finland	MFA	http://www.formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=69806&contentlan=2&culture=en-US	10/27/2014
Germany	Venro	http://venro.org/mitglieder/mitgliederdatenbank/	10/27/2014
Iceland	MFA & ICEIDA	http://www.mfa.is/media/throunarsamvinna/Iceland's_International_Development_Cooperation_MFA-ICEIDA.pdf	10/27/2014
Ireland	IrishAid	https://www.irishaid.ie/media/irishaid/allwebsitemedia/20newsandpublications/publicationpdfsenglish/irish-aid-2013-annual-report.pdf	10/27/2014
Italy	Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo	http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdgcs/italiano/Partner/ONG/ONG.asp	10/27/2014
Korea	NCNK	http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/ROK_NGO_Issue_Brief.pdf	10/27/2014
Luxemburg	Cercle de Cooperation	http://cercle.lu/ong-actives-en-cooperation/	10/27/2014

Country	Agency or Organization	Location	Date Last Accessed
Netherlands	MFA	http://www.ngo-database.nl/index.php?ngo_encode=MzU%3D&username=guest@ci din.nl&password=9999&lang=en&year=2012	10/27/2014
New Zealand	MFA – New Zealand Aid Program	http://www.aid.govt.nz/webfm_send/663/	10/27/2014
Norway	Norad	http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/Norwegian-aid-statistics	10/27/2014
Poland	Polish Aid	https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Humanitarian,aid,2013,1675.html#aid2013	10/27/2014
Slovakia	MVRO	http://www.mvro.sk/en/members/full-members	10/27/2014
Slovenia	SLOGA	http://www.tuditi.si/?subpageid=24	10/27/2014
Spain	AECID	http://www.aecid.es/EN/aecid/our-partners/ngdo/accreditation	10/27/2014
Sweden	Sida	http://www.sida.se/English/Partners/Civil-society-organisations/How-to-cooperate/Applying-for-funding-through-an-organisation-with-framework-agreement/	10/27/2014
Switzerland	SDC	https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/en/home/partnerships-mandates/partnerships-ngos.html	10/27/2014
UK	DIFD	https://www.gov.uk/programme-partnership-arrangements-ppas	10/27/2014
USA	USAID	http://www.pvo.net/usaidth/pvo.asp?All=YES&INCVOLAG=YES&I NCSUM=YES	10/21/2014

A2: INTERNATIONAL DATABASES OF HUMANITARIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Database	Description	Website
International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)	As the only global alliance of humanitarian NGOs, ICVA supports NGOs that protect and assist people in emergencies by bringing their work and views to the attention of governments, UN and international agencies, and others.	https://icvanetwork.org
NGOVoice	VOICE stands for Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies. It is a network representing 82 European non governmental organizations (NGOs) active in humanitarian aid worldwide. Unlike its members, VOICE is not operational.	http://www.ngovoice.org
InterAction	InterAction is an alliance organization in Washington, D.C. of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Our 180-plus members work around the world. What unites us is a commitment to working with the world's poor and vulnerable, and a belief that we can make the world a more peaceful, just and prosperous place – together.	http://www.interaction.org
European Commission (ECHO)	Recipients of humanitarian funding from ECHO for the years 2004 through 2013.	http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/funding-evaluations/funding-humanitarian-aid/grants-and-contributions
ALNAP's: The State of the Humanitarian System Study.	The State of the Humanitarian System (SOHS) report provides a system level mapping and assessment of international humanitarian assistance. Authored by Humanitarian Outcomes.	http://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/gdho/search

A3: STUDY CASES OF HUMANITARIAN INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (INGOs)

Abbreviation	Name	Type	Website
ACT	ACT Alliance	Network	www.actalliance.org
AAI	ActionAid International	Network	www.actionaid.org
ACF	Action Contra la Faim	Network	www.acf-international.org
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency	Network	www.adra.org
ACDI/VOCA	ACDI/VOCA	Organization	www.acdivoca.org
A2015	Alliance 2015	Network	www.alliance2015.org
AMREF	Amref Health Africa	Network	www.amref.org
AA	Anglican Alliance	Network	www.anglicanalliance.org
AARJ	Association for Aid and Relief Japan	Organization	www.aarjapan.gr.jp/english
ASF	Avocats Sans Frontières	Organization	www.asf.be/en/
BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee	Network	www.brac.net
CARE	CARE International	Network	www.care-international.org
CARITAS	Caritas Internationalis	Network	www.caritas.org
CFA	ChildFund Alliance	Network	www.childfundalliance.org
CBM	Christoffel Blindenmission	Network	www.cbm.org
CISP	Comitato Internazionale Per Lo Sviluppo Dei Popoli	Organization	www.developmentofpeoples.org
CU	Concern Universal	Organization	www.concern-universal.org
CoH	Convoy of Hope	Organization	www.convoyofhope.org
COOPI	Cooperazione Internazionale	Organization	www.coopi.org/en
COSV	Coordinamento delle Organizzazioni per il Servizio Volontario	Organization	www.cosv.org/?lang=en
DACAAR	Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees	Organization	www.dacaar.org
DRC	Danish Refugee Council	Organization	www.drc.ngo
FA	Farm Africa	Organization	www.farmafrica.org
FTC	Feed the Children	Organization	www.feedthechildren.org
FFP	Food for the Poor	Network	www.foodforthe poor.org
FyA	Fe y Alegria	Network	www.feyalegria.org/en
GC	Global Communities	Organization	www.globalcommunities.org
GGF	GlobalGiving Foundation	Organization	www.globalgiving.org
GOAL	GOAL	Network	www.goalglobal.org

Abbreviation	Name	Type	Website
GVC	Grupo di Volontariato Civile	Organization	www.gvc-italia.org
HfHI	Habitat for Humanity International	Network	www.habitat.org
HI	Handicap International	Network	www.handicap-international.org
HPA	Health Poverty Action	Organization	www.healthpoveryaction.org
HPI	Heifer Project International	Network	www.heifer.org
HKI	Helen Keller International	Organization	www.hki.org
HELPAGE	HelpAge International	Network	www.helpage.org
HELP	Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe	Organization	www.help-ev.de/en/
HAI	Hilfswerk Austria International	Organization	www.hilfswerk.at/hwa/english
ICU	Instituto per la Cooperazione Universitaria	Organization	www.icu.it
INTEGRAL	Integral Alliance	Network	www.integralalliance.org
ICMC	International Catholic Migration Committee	Organization	www.icmc.net
HIV	International HIV/AIDS Alliance	Network	www.aidsalliance.org
IMC	International Medical Corps	Organization	www.internationalmedicalcoprs.org
IRC	International Rescue Committee	Network	www.rescue.org
IRW	Islamic Relief Worldwide	Network	www.islamic-relief.org
JOIN	Johanniter International	Network	www.johanniter.org
MALTA	Malteser International	Organization	www.malteser-international.org/en
MSH	Management Sciences for Health	Organization	www.msh.org
MSI	Marie Stopes International	Organization	www.mariestopes.org
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières	Network	www.msf.org
MdM	Médecins du Monde	Network	www.medecinsdumonde.org/en
MI	Medico International	Organization	www.medico.de/en
MC	Mercy Corps	Organization	www.mercycorp.org
MAG	Mines Advisory Group International	Organization	www.maginternationala.org
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council	Organization	www.nrc.no
INTERSOS	INTERSOS – Organizzazione Umanitaria O.N.L.U.S.	Organization	www.intersos.org/en
OXFAM	OXFAM International	Network	www.oxfam.org
PLAN	Plan International Worldwide	Network	www.plan-international.org
PAH	Polish Humanitarian Action	Organization	www.pah.org.pl
PU-AMI	Première Urgence – Aide Médicale Internationale	Organization	www.premiere-urgence.org/en

Abbreviation	Name	Type	Website
RI	Relief International	Organization	www.ri.org
SA	Salvation Army	Network	www.salvationarmy.org
SAM-I	Samaritan International	Network	www.samaritan-internaional.eu
SP	Samaritan's Purse	Network	www.samaritanpurse.org
SCI	Save the Children International	Network	www.savethechildren.net
SNV	SNV International	Organization	www.snv.org
SOS-CVI	SOS Children's Villages International	Network	www.sos-childrensvillages.org
TdH	Terre des Hommes International Federation	Network	www.terredeshommes.org
JDC	The American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee	Organization	www.jdc.org
IAS	The Association for International Aid Services	Network	www.ias-intl.org
AVSI	The Association of Volunteers in International Service	Network	www.avsi.org
HALO	The Hazardous Areas Life-Support Organization Trust	Organization	www.halotrust.org
TI	Transparency International	Network	www.transparency.org
VSF	Vétérinaires Sans Frontières International	Network	www.vsf-international.org
WCI	War Child International	Network	www.warchild.org
WAG	WaterAid Global	Network	www.wateraid.org
WVI	World Vision International	Network	www.wvi.org

APPENDIX B: VALUES DATA

B1: VALUE DEFINITIONS AND FREQUENCIES

Value	Definition	Organizations	Networks	Total
Human Dignity	to act with respect towards each individual acknowledging their inherent value	13 (43.3%)	17 (56.7%)	30
Transparency	to act openly, visibly and controllably (Van der Wal et al., 2008).	11 (42.3%)	15 (57.7%)	26
Accountability	to act willingly to justify and explain actions to the relevant stakeholders (Van der Wal et al., 2008).	8 (32.0%)	17 (68.0%)	25
Collaboration	to work with multiple higher level actors (international, experts, government) to realize shared goals (cooperation).	13 (59.1%)	9 (40.9%)	22
Integrity (Incorruptibility)	to act according to moral principles and without prejudice and bias toward private interests (Van der Wal et al., 2008).	5 (25.0%)	15 (75.0%)	20
Participation	to act to include those being benefited in decision-making (Carnegie)	14 (70.0%)	6 (30.0%)	20
Sustainability	to act to achieve long-lasting changes	8 (44.4%)	10 (55.6%)	18
Impartiality	to act without prejudice or bias toward specific group interests (Van der Wal et al., 2008). Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions (OCHA).	7 (41.2%)	10 (58.8%)	17
Independence	to act with autonomy from political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented (OCHA).	9 (56.3%)	7 (43.8%)	16
Effectiveness	to act to achieve desired results (2008 Van der Wal).	6 (37.5%)	10 (62.5%)	16
Social justice	to act out of commitment to a just society (Rights-based) (Van der Wal et al., 2008).	5 (31.3%)	11 (68.8%)	16
Innovation	to act with initiative and creativity (to invent or introduce new policies or products) (Van der Wal et al., 2008)..	8 (53.3%)	7 (46.7%)	15
Expertise	to act with competence, skill and knowledge (Van der Wal et al., 2008)..	6 (42.9%)	8 (57.1%)	14
Professionalism	to act according to professional norms and standards	5 (35.7%)	9 (64.3%)	14

Value	Definition	Organizations	Networks	Total
Empowerment	to act to support the autonomy and self-determination in people and communities	7 (50.0%)	7 (50.0%)	14
Efficiency	to act to achieve results with minimal means (Van der Wal et al., 2008).	6 (42.9%)	8 (57.1%)	14
Solidarity	to stand in solidarity in a common search for justice. We seek to understand the situation of the poor and work alongside them	2 (16.7%)	10 (83.3%)	12
Environment	to act out of commitment to nature and the environment (Van der Wal et al., 2008).	5 (41.7%)	7 (58.3%)	12
Learning Organization	to act to continually improve work and systems	3 (33.3%)	6 (66.7%)	9
Compassion	to act out of compassion for a hurting and broken world – feeling the feelings and emotions of others and being motivated to act.	1 (11.1%)	8 (88.9%)	9
Neutral	to not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature (OCHA).	6 (75.0%)	2 (25.0%)	8
Humanitarian	to act according to institutional principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality & independence (ICRC).	7 (87.5%)	1 (12.5%)	8
Collegiality	to act loyally and show solidarity towards colleagues (Van der Wal et al., 2008).	0 (0.0%)	8 (100.0%)	8
Partnership	to interact with others in accordance with equality, shared responsibility and complementarity.	3 (42.9%)	4 (57.1%)	7
Capacity Building	to act to strengthen the skills and capacity of the local partners and people in project countries.	2 (28.6%)	5 (71.4%)	7
Service	to serve the neediest people of the earth; to relieve their suffering and to promote the transformation of their condition of life.	2 (28.6%)	5 (71.4%)	7
Commitment (Dedication)	to act with diligence, enthusiasm and perseverance (Van der Wal et al., 2008).	1 (14.3%)	6 (85.7%)	7
Local Contextualization	to act to ensure that projects are implemented in respect of local cultures.	6 (85.7%)	1 (14.3%)	7
Stewardship	to act as custodian rather than owner of all resources entrusted to the organization	1 (16.7%)	5 (83.3%)	6
Unity	to act towards a state of being united or joined as a whole.	4 (66.7%)	2 (33.3%)	6
Holistic	to act in a manner that addresses all aspects of a problem	5 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	5

Value	Definition	Organizations	Networks	Total
Social Responsibility	to act out of an obligation to benefit society at large	5 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	5
Excellence	to act toward improving quality	3 (60.0%)	2 (40.0%)	5
Honesty	to act truthfully and comply with promises(Van der Wal et al., 2008).	3 (75.0%)	1 (25.0%)	4
Equality	to act towards the sameness in status, rights opportunities	3 (75.0%)	1 (25.0%)	4
Responsiveness	to act in accordance with the preferences of citizens and customers , (Van der Wal et al., 2008).	3 (75.0%)	1 (25.0%)	4
Humanity	to address suffering wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings (OCHA).	3 (75.0%)	1 (25.0%)	4
Bearing witness	to advocate on behalf of the world’s poor and deprived.	1 (25.0%)	3 (75.0%)	4
Freedom	to act to promote individual freedom and liberty	1 (25.0%)	3 (75.0%)	4
Inclusion	to act for disadvantaged groups to be included in socioeconomic life (Carnegie)	1 (25.0%)	3 (75.0%)	4
Diversity	to act out of a commitment to diverse cultures employed by an organization	2 (50.0%)	2 (50.0%)	4
Self-fulfillment	to act to stimulate the (professional) development and well-being of employees (Van der Wal et al., 2008).	3 (75.0%)	1 (25.0%)	4
Subsidiarity	to act according to the handling of matters by the smallest, lowest or least centralized competent authority.	1 (25.0%)	3 (75.0%)	4
Local Capacity	to act in acknowledgement that everyone has something to contribute from their experience. (diversity)	3 (75.0%)	1 (25.0%)	4
Gender	to act in consideration of gender roles	1 (33.3%)	2 (66.7%)	3
Protection	to act towards the protection of the vulnerable (women, children, disabled)	3 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3
Evidence-based	to act based on data and science-based information	1 (33.3%)	2 (66.7%)	3
Spirituality	to prioritize the need for prayer and contemplation	0 (0.0%)	3 (100.0%)	3
Civil Society	to act to prioritize the involvement of local associations and nongovernmental organizations in the democratization and development process	2 (66.7%)	1 (33.3%)	3
System Change	to act in accordance with the preference towards changing systems	2 (66.7%)	1 (33.3%)	3

Value	Definition	Organizations	Networks	Total
Courage	to act with bold decisions and taking stances with determination	0 (0.0%)	2 (100.0%)	2
Humility	to act in recognition of the small part being played by an organization	0 (0.0%)	2 (100.0%)	2
Peace	to act towards a state of freedom from or the cessation of war or violence.	2 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2
Pro-poor	to act in a manner that prioritizes the poor	1 (50.0%)	1 (50.0%)	2
Lawfulness	to act in accordance with existing laws and rules (Van der Wal et al., 2008).	1 (50.0%)	1 (50.0%)	2
Flexibility	to be able to adjust to changing circumstances	1 (50.0%)	1 (50.0%)	2
Optimistic	to act with hope for the future	1 (50.0%)	1 (50.0%)	2
Serviceability	to act helpfully and with quality service towards citizens and customers (Van der Wal et al., 2008).	1 (50.0%)	1 (50.0%)	2
Volunteer Growth	To act towards the growth and learning of those volunteering/serving	0 (0.0%)	2 (100.0%)	2
Do No Harm	to act toward the prevention of negative effects	2 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2
Sharing	to act to promote the responsibility to share skills and resources	0 (0.0%)	1 (100.0%)	1
Proactive	to prepare in advance to respond to problems	0 (0.0%)	1 (100.0%)	1
Democratic	to act in accordance with democratic principles	0 (0.0%)	1 (100.0%)	1
Hope	to act to promote the idea of god’s care for the less fortunate	1 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1
Connecting People	to act towards linking the have and have-nots across cultures	0 (0.0%)	1 (100.0%)	1
Local Ownership	to act with the acknowledgement of local authorities	1 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1
Entrepreneurial	to take financial risks in the hope of profit;	1 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1
Market-based solutions	to act using market-based instruments that encourage behavior through market signals rather than through explicit directives.	1 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1
Community	to act with a priority for whole communities.	1 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1
Donors	to act in a manner that values donors.	1 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1
Sharing Knowledge	to prioritize sharing information with others.	1 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1
Total Value Statements		236	282	518
Total Cases		37	41	78
Average Value Statements per Case		6.38	6.88	6.64

B2: VALUE DISTRIBUTIONS ACROSS VALUE CLUSTERS AND FISHER’S EXACT TEST OF ASSOCIATION

Values	Value Clusters				Total	p-value
	1 (n=11)	2 (n=10)	3 (n=7)	4 (n=13)	N = 41	
Human Dignity	3	3	0	11	17	0.001
Transparency	3	9	0	3	15	0.000
Accountability	8	7	1	1	17	0.001
Collaboration	5	3	0	1	9	0.058
Integrity	7	5	0	3	15	0.023
Participation	1	1	1	3	6	0.823
Sustainability	1	4	2	3	10	0.441
Impartiality	2	6	2	0	10	0.005
Independence	1	6	0	0	7	0.001
Effectiveness	8	2	0	0	10	0.000
Social justice	0	4	2	5	11	0.078
Innovation	5	2	0	0	7	0.012
Expertise	3	0	4	1	8	0.013
Professionalism	3	5	0	1	9	0.047
Empowerment	3	2	1	1	7	0.667
Efficiency	6	1	0	1	8	0.010
Solidarity	0	5	0	5	10	0.007
Environment	1	2	2	2	7	0.767
Learning	4	2	0	0	6	0.031
Organization						
Compassion	0	0	2	6	8	0.005
Neutral	0	2	0	0	2	
Humanitarian	1	0	0	0	1	
Collegiality	3	2	0	3	8	0.592
Partnership	0	2	0	2	4	
Capacity	1	1	3	0	5	0.042
Building						

Values	Value Clusters				Total	<i>p</i> -value
	1 (n=11)	2 (n=10)	3 (n=7)	4 (n=13)	N = 41	
Service	0	0	2	3	5	<i>0.075</i>
Commitment	3	0	1	2	6	0.404
Local Contextualization	1	0	0	0	1	
Stewardship	0	0	0	5	5	0.004
Unity	0	0	0	2	2	
Holistic	0	0	0	0	0	
Social Responsibility	0	0	0	0	0	
Excellence	1	0	0	1	2	
Honesty	1	0	0	0	1	
Equality	1	0	0	0	1	
Responsiveness	0	0	0	1	1	
Humanity	0	1	0	0	1	
Bearing witness	2	1	0	0	3	
Freedom	0	1	0	2	3	
Inclusion	2	1	0	0	3	
Diversity	1	0	0	1	2	
Self-fulfillment	0	0	0	1	1	
Subsidiarity	0	1	0	2	3	
Local Capacity	0	0	0	1	1	
Gender	0	1	1	0	2	
Protection	0	0	0	0	0	
Evidence-based	1	1	0	0	2	
Spirituality	0	0	3	0	3	
Civil Society	0	0	1	0	1	
System Change	0	0	1	0	1	
Courage	0	2	0	0	2	
Humility	0	1	0	1	2	
Peace	0	0	0	0	0	

Values	Value Clusters				Total	<i>p</i> -value
	1 (n=11)	2 (n=10)	3 (n=7)	4 (n=13)	N= 41	
Pro-poor	0	1	0	0	1	
Lawfulness	1	0	0	0	1	
Flexibility	0	0	0	1	1	
Optimistic	0	0	1	0	1	
Serviceability	0	0	1	0	1	
Volunteer	0	0	2	0	2	
Growth						
Do No Harm	0	0	0	0	0	
Sharing	0	0	0	1	1	
Proactive	0	0	0	1	1	
Democratic	0	1	0	0	1	
Christian	0	0	0	0	0	
Hope	0	0	0	0	0	
Connecting	0	0	0	1	1	
People						
Local Ownership	0	0	0	0	0	
Entrepreneurial	0	0	0	0	0	
Market-based	0	0	0	0	0	
solutions						
Community	0	0	0	0	0	
Donors	0	0	0	0	0	
Sharing	0	0	0	0	0	
Knowledge						

Note: Fisher's exact tests of association were performed on values expressed by 5 or more networks.

APPENDIX C: TRUTH TABLES

C1: TRUTH TABLES FOR EACH OF FOUR STRUCTURAL OUTCOMES									
REGION	AGE	PHILO	VALUE	FUND	IMPLEMENT	STANDARD	ACTIVITY	SUPPORT	
v1	v2	v3	v4	v5	0	0	0	0	id
1	1	1	4	3	0	0	0	1	ADRA
1	1	2	3	1	1	0	0	0	HPI
1	1	2	4	1	1	0	0	0	WVI
1	1	3	2	2	0	1	0	0	CARE
1	1	3	4	3	1	0	0	0	IRC
1	2	1	3	1	0	0	1	0	SP
1	2	2	3	1	0	0	0	1	FFP
1	2	2	4	1	0	0	0	1	HfHI
1	3	2	4	1	0	1	0	0	CFA
2	1	1	4	1	0	0	0	1	SA
2	1	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	PLAN
2	1	3	1	3	1	0	0	0	SCI
2	1	3	2	2	0	1	0	0	OXFAM
2	2	2	4	1	1	0	0	0	IRW
2	2	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	BRAC
2	2	3	1	3	1	0	0	0	GOAL
2	2	3	2	1	1	0	0	0	AAI
2	2	3	3	3	0	0	0	1	AGE
2	3	1	4	1	0	0	0	1	AA
2	3	2	1	2	0	0	1	0	INTEGRAL
2	3	3	1	1	0	1	0	0	WAG
2	3	3	4	3	0	0	0	1	HIV
3	1	1	3	1	0	0	1	0	SAM
3	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	CBM
3	1	3	1	1	0	0	0	1	SOS_CVI
3	1	3	2	3	1	0	0	0	AMREF
3	3	1	2	2	0	0	0	1	ACT

3	3	1	3	2	0	0	1	0	JOIN
3	3	2	4	2	1	0	0	0	IAS
3	3	3	1	3	0	0	1	0	A2015, WCI
3	3	3	2	3	0	0	0	1	TI
4	1	1	4	2	0	0	0	1	FyA
4	1	1	4	3	0	0	0	1	CARITAS
4	1	3	2	2	0	1	0	0	TdH
4	2	1	4	3	0	0	0	1	AVSI
4	2	3	1	2	1	0	0	0	HI
4	2	3	2	1	0	1	0	0	MSF
4	2	3	2	2	0	0	0	1	MdM
4	2	3	2	3	0	1	0	0	ACF
4	3	3	3	3	0	0	1	0	VSF
NOTE: Because the recipe for each case is the same across the four models, I only report them once along with each of the four outcome variables.									

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