

EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF TEAM UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR ON BOUNDARY
SPANNING ACTIVITIES IN MULTITEAM CONTEXTS: A CONSERVATION OF
RESOURCES APPROACH

by

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

While recent research indicates that engaging in unethical behavior as a team can have positive effects on internal team processes, the relationship between unethical behavior and interactions with those outside the team is less clear. Research on boundary spanning suggests that teams with positive interpersonal relationships should be more motivated and effective at working interdependently with other teams. However, due to illicit foundations of these relationships, unethical teams may be apprehensive about exposure and sanctions, and seek to withdraw in multiteam contexts. Acknowledging this tension, the purpose of this dissertation was to model and test the positive and negative effects of team unethical behavior on boundary spanning in multiteam contexts. Utilizing conservation of resources theory (Hobfoll, 1989), I proposed that team unethical behavior increases both perceptions of team support and reputation maintenance concerns in teams, which in turn affect boundary spanning behavior in the form of interteam coordination and guard behavior. I then introduced a contextual moderator, interteam monitoring, to qualify these offsetting indirect effects; strengthening unethical behavior's effects through reputation maintenance concerns and weakening its effects through perceived team support. I then tested my hypothesized model in a lab experiment with 108 teams engaged in a highly interdependent multiteam task. Results did not support the hypothesized model. I conclude by discussing the potential explanations for the results and several limitations and directions for future research.

Examining the Effects of Team Unethical Behavior on Boundary Spanning Activities in
Multiteam Contexts: A Conservation of Resources Approach

Unethical behavior, or actions that are contrary to accepted moral norms in society, continues to be a popular topic in the both the management literature and popular culture (Treviño, den Nieuwenboer, & Kish-Gephart, 2014). This is due to not only the pervasiveness of behavior such as fraud, theft, and cheating in organizations, but also its clear negative impact on employees, customers, investors, and even society's economic progress (Harris & Bromiley, 2007). While unethical behavior can sometimes be attributed to the actions of one employee, many corporate scandals emerge from illicit behavior efficiently coordinated and concealed by groups and teams. For example, engineering teams at Volkswagen leveraged their knowledge to create a device that enabled vehicle owners to unknowingly cheat emissions tests, producing a scandal that was covered up for more than ten years (Ewing, 2016; Ewing & Bowley, 2015).

In the ethics literature, most research to date at individual and team levels has sought to determine *who* engages in unethical behavior and *why*. At the individual level, variables such as job satisfaction (Dalal, 2005), cognitive moral development (Rest, 1986), moral attentiveness (Reynolds, 2008), and the opportunity for financial gain (Jones, 1991) influence unethical behavior. At the team level, teams are more unethical when they are psychologically safe (Pearsall & Ellis, 2011) and have collaborative reward structures (Conrads, Irlenbusch, Rilke, & Walkowitz, 2013; Weisel & Shalvi, 2015), while they are more ethical under ethical leadership (Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009).

While identifying predictors is important, our understanding of what happens *after* an individual or team engages in unethical behavior remains limited. Given the fact that unethical behavior in the workplace shows no sign of slowing down (Matthews, 2012; Medland, 2016; Rushe, 2015), it is just as, if not more, important to determine how unethical behavior affects individuals, teams, and organizations. Understanding the process on the outcome side can also provide guidance on how to effectively manage in the wake of immoral behavior. Thus far, research has tended to focus on how unethical behavior is met with negative responses by those affected by the behavior. For example, detected unethical behavior is associated with lower performance evaluations by supervisors (Dahling, Chau, Mayer, & Gregory, 2012), and peer responses like ostracism (Quade, Greenbaum, & Petrenko, 2017) and revenge motives (Hung, Chi, & Lu, 2009). Research has also begun to explore affective, cognitive, and behavioral consequences for unethical actors themselves. This work largely focuses on outcomes that occur before the behavior is detected and sanctioned by others. In terms of affect, perhaps unsurprisingly, unethical behavior produces shame (Bonner, Greenbaum, & Quade, 2017). Indeed, dissonance produced by unethical behavior can spur cognitions such as moral disengagement and motivated forgetting of moral rules and past immoral behavior (Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011). However, recent evidence suggests that unethical behavior can also result in beneficial consequences. For example, people are more creative after telling a lie because they feel unconstrained by rules and norms (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014).

Research has similarly begun to unpack the consequences of unethical behavior at the team level. Spoelma, Chawla, and Ellis (under review) recently conducted a lab study

where participants were complicit in cheating behavior. The experimenters employed the use of a confederate, who overreported their performance on a sentence unscrambling task; ostensibly to increase the team's chances of receiving additional compensation. Results indicated that being complicit in unethical behavior increased team members' physiological arousal measured through the use of an electrodermal activity sensor. Because of the increase in arousal, unethical behavior led to an increase in psychological closeness for teams that received positive feedback about their performance (i.e., teams believed they were successful). According to the authors, acting unethically violates expectations for moral behavior which induces physiological arousal, and when positive feedback is received, this violation is appraised as a positive violation, increasing psychological closeness. The benefits of the strengthened bonds between team members then carried over to a future task and had a positive effect on team performance.

A limitation of Spoelma et al. (under review) is that it focused exclusively on processes *within* teams. Most teams in modern organizations do not exist in isolation, but rather exhibit interdependencies with their environment (Mathieu, Marks, & Zaccaro, 2001). Researchers have acknowledged that team processes fall into two general categories: intragroup processes and boundary spanning activities (Choi, 2002; Gladstein, 1984). Boundary spanning activities are a team's "actions to establish linkages and manage interactions with parties in the external environment" (Marrone, 2010, p. 914). For example, teams may need to manage impressions, search for information, and coordinate tasks with various organizational members to reach organizational goals and survive in complex task environments (Ancona & Caldwell, 1988; Gladstein, 1984; Mathieu, Marks, & Zaccaro, 2001; Sundstrom, DeMeuse, & Futrell, 1990). Boundary

spanning activities are important to study because they are key processes through which teams in multiteam systems execute interdependent tasks (Mathieu et al., 2001). The potential effects of unethical behavior on boundary spanning activities are more equivocal. Some research finds that positive internal processes like psychological closeness – processes that can stem from unethical behavior (see Spoelma et al., under review) – facilitate effective boundary spanning behavior (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Tesluk & Mathieu, 1999). At the same time, however, unethical teams are likely motivated to close themselves off from the environment in order to conceal their illicit behavior and protect their reputation. According to social networks research, relationships with other teams increase the likelihood that team members will defect and betray team secrets (Faulkner & Cheney, 2014). Moreover, the threat of being caught and punished tends to intensify with greater external interaction (e.g., Bertrand & Lumineau, 2016).

When taken together, team unethical behavior appears to develop rich interpersonal resources and have positive implications for cognition and behavior directed at members inside the team, but mixed implications for externally-directed behavior. Given the integral role of boundary spanning activities for multiteam system performance and the prevalence of unethical behavior in the workplace (Faraj & Yan, 2009; Vadera & Pratt, 2013), it is important to understand how unethical behavior either motivates or inhibits the functioning of teams within the larger system. I focus on the multiteam system context because these structures are increasingly used by organizations in complex environments because they optimize specialization and breadth, and are more agile than larger divisions or traditional organizational structures (Mathieu et al., 2001).

Therefore, the goal of this dissertation is to model and test potential benefits and drawbacks of unethical behavior on boundary spanning activities in a multiteam environment.

To unpack these processes and develop my hypothesized model, I utilize conservation of resources theory (COR; Hobfoll, 1989) as an explanatory framework. COR is a theoretical framework that proposes people (and teams) have a fundamental motivation to “obtain, retain, protect, and foster those things that they value” (Hobfoll, 2001, p. 341). Although COR has been largely utilized to model the individual experience of stress and well-being, it represents a useful framework to help uncover the countervailing effects of team unethical behavior on boundary spanning behavior. The notion of acquiring and protecting resources is embedded throughout research on team boundary spanning. As described by Faraj and Yan (2009, p. 604), “team boundary work includes acquiring information and resources and managing relationships with external stakeholders, as well as protecting team resources (including members’ time and energy) from competing external demands.” Through the lens of COR, teams actively manage their boundary to acquire and protect valued resources. Grounded in the theoretical rationale of COR, I argue that team unethical behavior represents an antecedent of boundary work, and employ mediating mechanisms to describe why unethical behavior affects resource accumulation and protection boundary behavior.

To this end, I focus first on how and why team unethical behavior produces two distinct cognitions that reflect how unethical behavior both generates and threatens valuable resources (see Figure 1 for a depiction of the full model). On one hand, team unethical behavior increases perceptions of team support, defined as “the extent to which

members believe that the team values their contribution and cares about their well-being” (Bishop, Scott, Goldsbury, & Cropanzano, 2005, p. 159). On the other, because of the illicit nature of how these resources were gained, unethical behavior also threatens a team’s external reputation. This will be evidenced by increased reputation maintenance concerns, defined as members’ “desires to retain the positive image that others have of them” (Baer, Dhensa-Kahlon, Colquitt, Rodell, Outlaw, & Long, 2015, p. 1641).

I then examine how these emergent cognitions influence team behavior directed at the environment. Specifically, I focus on coordination with other teams (resource accumulation) and guard behavior (protection). Interteam coordination refers to the process of aligning and synchronizing activities with other teams to facilitate information exchange and feedback, and is a key process by which teams procure resources, like materials and knowledge (Ancona & Caldwell, 1988). Guard behavior refers to actions intended to keep information and resources inside the team in order to protect the team and its image (Ancona & Caldwell, 1990). According to COR, the experience of resource gain and threat produces motivations to either continue acquiring valued resources or protect resources that one has already (Hobfoll, 1989). I propose that unethical behavior leads to a gain in resources and perceived team support, increasing a team’s coordination with other teams as a means to acquire resources like information and materials to reach task goals, while at the same time decreasing its guard behavior. However, unethical behavior also increases threat and reputation maintenance concerns, leading teams to use cognitive resources devoted toward coping with the threat, reducing their ability to coordinate and increasing their guard behavior; in effect closing themselves off from working independently with teams that could expose and sanction them.

Together, these two pathways result in an overall null effect of unethical behavior on boundary activities. However, I propose that the indirect and offsetting effects will be qualified by a contextual moderator – interteam monitoring. Monitoring in a multiteam environment reflects teams’ surveillance and awareness of other teams’ activities (c.f., Langfred, 2004). Drawing on the threat-to-self-esteem model of recipient reactions to aid (Fisher, Nadler, & Whitcher-Alagna, 1982), I propose that monitoring provides a contextual cue that influences the extent to which unethical behavior generates and threatens resources. Monitoring increases attention to normative ethical standards and the potential for unethical behavior detection and sanctioning by peers (Loughry, 2010), and, as such, strengthens the effects of unethical behavior on reputation maintenance concerns and neutralizes the effects of unethical behavior on perceptions of team support.

Overall, this dissertation aims to advance our understanding of the outcomes associated with team unethical behavior. By integrating COR, a theory largely used in the stress and well-being literature, with the ethics literature, I construct a model that illustrates how unethical behavior can have both positive and negative implications for teams in terms of boundary spanning behavior. In addition, I hope to qualify these countervailing pathways by proposing that these effects are moderated by structural levels of interteam monitoring. I test these predictions with a sample of 108 teams engaged in a multiteam lab experiment; a setting which enables me to examine causal relationships while avoiding the difficulties of both observing unethical behavior in the field (Thau, Pitesa, & Pillutla, 2014) and collecting field data on teams embedded in multiteam systems (e.g., sample size concerns, isolating key relationships of interest [Resick, Burke, & Doty, 2012]).

The rest of the introduction unfolds as follows. First, I provide an overview of COR in order to establish the theoretical groundwork for my conceptual model. Following this, I employ COR to develop arguments for my hypotheses concerning the effects of unethical behavior on perceived team support and reputation maintenance concerns, respectively. I then offer a short literature review of the boundary spanning literature, followed by my theoretical arguments for the indirect effects of unethical behavior on interteam coordination and guard behavior through perceived team support and reputation maintenance concerns. Finally, I introduce the threat-to-self-esteem model of recipient reactions to aid (Fisher et al., 1982) and argue that the indirect effects of unethical behavior on boundary spanning activities are qualified by the level of interteam monitoring in place.

Before beginning, I note a few boundary conditions that limit the generalizability of this work. First, in terms of unethical behavior, I am examining a single event that violates societal values, laws, or standards of proper ethical conduct but is intended to promote the functioning of the team (i.e., pro-group or prosocial unethical behavior; Thau, Derfler-Rozin, Pitesa, Mitchell, & Pillutla, 2015; Umphress, Bingham, & Mitchell, 2010; Vadera & Pratt, 2013) in addition to benefiting the offending team member. I am also examining an isolated episode of unethical behavior; teams have not engaged in unethical behavior in the past and will not act unethically in the future. Third, it is behavior that the team initially “gets away with,” and is not reported by anyone outside the team. Finally, it is behavior that is initiated by one team member, but is accepted and condoned by the rest of the team. Consistent with Li, Kirkman, and Porter’s (2014) model of work team altruism, I conceptualize team unethical behavior as a compilation

process, where certain individuals are likely to exhibit disproportional influence on team unethical behavior, and team members are not assumed to participate equally (i.e., isomorphism; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Li et al. (2014) acknowledged that when performing team altruistic behavior, members likely play different roles – some initiate the behavior, while others participate as followers. Both roles are fundamental for the emergence of team altruism. Similarly, and following past research (Spoelma et al., under review), I examine team unethical behavior where one team member initiates the illicit behavior and others in the team participate through their awareness, approval, and concealment of the behavior.

Theoretical Framework: Conservation of Resources Theory

The core principle of conservation of resources theory (COR) is that people “strive to obtain, retain, protect, and foster those things that they value” (Hobfoll, 2001, p. 341). These things of value – resources – are “objects, personal characteristics, conditions, or energies that are valued in their own right, or that are valued because they act as conduits to the achievement or protection of valued resources” (Hobfoll, 2001, p. 339). In this way, resources broadly include anything perceived to help teams reach their goals, including social support and reputation (Halbesleben, Neveu, Paustian-Underdahl, & Westman, 2014).

Because resources are valuable, people are particularly sensitive to when they are gained, threatened, or lost. Decades of research supports the notion that when work conditions provide resources, people respond positively and are engaged and satisfied, but when work conditions threaten resources, people experience negative outcomes,

including stress and psychological burnout (a perspective also supported by the Job Demands-Resources Model; see Bakker & Demerouti, 2007; Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner, & Schaufeli, 2001).

In recent applications of COR, scholars have applied the framework's potential for modeling countervailing effects of a variety of daily events and behaviors on resource processes. For example, in a sample of transit bus drivers, Baer et al. (2015) examined how the experience of feeling trusted results in resource gain (pride), but also resource threat (heightened reputation maintenance concerns) and loss (increased perceived workload). In addition, Koopman et al. (2016) constructed a model describing the offsetting intra-individual effects of performing OCB, finding OCB both increases positive affect (an indicator of the resource generation process) and decreases work goal progress (an indicator of the resource consumption process). In the context of work groups, Campbell et al. (2017) utilized COR to explain how high performers are a mixed blessing, as social comparisons produce benefits and threats to peer resources. While resource appraisals originate in individual cognitions, on this premise I argue that COR is useful for modeling countervailing effects of team unethical behavior on emergent cognitions that reflect resource gain and threat.

According to COR, these dynamic perceptions of resources have implications for ensuing behavior. Because the experience of resource loss is extremely aversive, people are not only *reactive* to changes (e.g., gain, threat, and loss), but they are also *proactive* in managing potential future threats to their resources. They do this through various resource investment strategies (Halbesleben et al., 2014). These investment behaviors can take many forms, but are guided by protection and accumulation motivations that depend

on appraisals of existing resource levels (Parker, Johnson, Collins, & Nguyen, 2013). When resources are gained in one domain (or at least, not threatened or lost), people are motivated to accumulate resources; a process whereby “people use available resources to exert control over the environment so as to gain new resources that equip them for future challenges” (Parker et al., 2013, p. 872). For example, Hunter et al. (2010) found that individuals’ perceptions of team resources, like cohesion, similarity, and familiarity, were positively related to work-to-family enrichment; a process whereby resources from one domain encourage resource acquisition processes in another. In contrast, when resources are threatened or lost, people become motivated to recover, and do this by using existing resources to protect themselves (Hobfoll, 1989). For example, when teams experience hindrance stressors, members protect themselves by engaging in avoidant coping and focus on their own individual responsibilities at the expense of the team (Pearsall, Ellis, & Stein, 2009). These two pathways inform gain and loss spirals. Specifically, the experience of resource gain enables teams to invest in accumulating more resources (i.e., gain spiral), while the experience of resource threats and losses causes teams to invest in protecting existing resources and produces defensive attempts to conserve resources (i.e., loss spiral; Halbesleben et al., 2014).

In the sections that follow, I argue that the relationship between team unethical behavior and members’ boundary spanning activities directed outside the team can be explained through COR. Namely, I consider interteam coordination to be a resource-acquiring behavior and guard behavior to be a resource-protection behavior and use COR to model unethical behavior’s countervailing effects – one through cognitions that reflect resource gain and another through cognitions that reflect resource threat.

Hypotheses Development

The Relationship between Team Unethical Behavior and Perceived Team Support

According to COR theorists, social support is a broad construct that reflects “social interactions or relationships that provide individuals with actual assistance or that embed individuals within a social system believed to provide love, caring, or sense of attachment to a valued social group or dyad” (Hobfoll, 1988, p. 121). In the management literature, this construct has been adapted to reference perceptions of support from specific sources, like the organization (Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchinson, & Sowa, 1986) or a supervisor (Shanock & Eisenberger, 2006). Likewise, perceived team support is “the extent to which members believe that the team values their contribution and cares about their well-being” (Bishop, Scott, Goldsbury, & Cropanzano, 2005, p. 159). Teams are perceived to be supportive when members can be relied upon to provide assistance for each other (e.g., help, opportunities, emotional support) and when members share a sense of attachment (Drach-Zahavy, 2004; House, 1981).

Perceived team support is a cognition based in individual-level perceptions but becomes an emergent, shared phenomenon as members are influenced by ambient stimuli and engage in joint tasks (Hackman, 1992). For instance, inputs like the level of training, knowledge, and resources a team is given from management can influence perceived team support (Pearce & Herbig, 2004). Perceptions of team support can also develop through the behavior of other team members. Recent evidence indicates that a single “extra miler” that consistently models helping behavior can increase team-wide norms for monitoring and providing backup behavior (Li, Zhao, Walter, Zhang, & Yu, 2015). This suggests that the direct experience of receiving aid and seeing other team members assist

each other creates shared perceptions that the team can be relied upon to provide assistance as demands arise.

According to COR, social support is a valued resource because it enables people to meet their needs to gain and preserve resources and protect their identity (Hobfoll, 1990). For example, perceptions of social support help one feel a part of caring relationships, satisfying the need to belong. Team support also generates team commitment and strong exchange relationships which increase team performance (Bishop, Scott, & Burroughs, 2000; Campion, Medsker, & Higgs, 1993). As a result, social support plays a key role in buffering against stress and strain (Cohen & Wills, 1985).

Being in a team where others act unethically to benefit the team should increase feelings that one has close relationships with competent and caring others who can be relied upon for task assistance for several reasons. Research on responses to unethical behavior indicates that pro-group unethical behavior signals that others in the team have positive intentions and a desire to help each other, even if it means breaking moral norms. For example, Levine and Schweitzer (2015) found that prosocial lying – a statement with the intent to deceive but that is beneficial for the target – was positively related to interpersonal trust. People also make inferences regarding the abilities of their unethical teammates that can inform perceptions of support. For instance, seeing others act in pro-group deviant ways increases perceptions that they are not constrained by norms, increasing observers' perceptions of the deviant's power (van Kleef, Homan, Finkenauer, Blaker, & Heerdink, 2012). Perceptions of team support following unethical behavior may even have socio-emotional roots. Recent research indicates that engaging in

unethical behavior with others is physiologically arousing, and increases psychological closeness in groups when the behavior is rewarded with positive feedback (Spoelma et al., under review).

People not only infer that others are benevolent and competent when they act unethically to benefit the team, but in line with self-perception theory (Bem, 1967), they likely infer these characteristics about themselves when they are complicit. Compared to self-serving unethical behavior, cheating to benefit others is rationalized more easily and is viewed as more morally justifiable (Wiltermuth, 2011). This enables people to feel competent when their actions produce outcomes that are not possible when remaining constrained by ethics. For example, several accounts of the fall of Enron document that feelings of competence and ability not only fueled illegal conduct by workgroups, but also were products of it (McLean & Elkind, 2003). Seeing themselves outsmart regulators with innovative methods of concealing illegal behavior fostered perceptions of being “above the law.” This self-perception is also noted by Katz (1988, p. 9) in his ethnographic account of adolescent shoplifters and vandalizers: “quite apart from what is taken, they may regard ‘getting away with it’ as a thrilling demonstrating of personal competence, especially if it is accomplished under the eyes of adults.” It stands to reason that unethical workgroups should feel similarly about their abilities to “outsmart” work rules and policies. In teams, this is likely to affect perceptions of team support, as these skills can be relied upon as teamwork demands arise.

Indirect support can also be gleaned from research on social support. For example, Halbesleben and Wheeler (2015) found that when people received OCB from their coworkers, they perceived greater coworker support. The authors proposed that

being helped increased the perception that the co-worker was a source for resources, whether task-related knowledge or emotional concern. This appears to extend to unethical behavior. For example, Bryant, Davis, Hancock, and Vardaman (2010) suggested that when supervisor pro-social rule breaking benefits employees, they may perceive increased organizational support. Overall, unethical teams are likely to infer that others on their team can be relied upon for support, leading to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Team unethical behavior positively affects perceived team support.

The Relationship between Team Unethical Behavior and Reputation Maintenance Concerns

Reputation maintenance concerns are “employees’ desires to retain the positive image that others have of them” (Baer et al., 2015, p. 1641). Reputation maintenance is a motivational state that guides goal choice and striving, which, in line with multilevel theory of team motivation, is functionally similar at individual and team levels (see Chen & Kanfer, 2006). However, at the team level, the target of the motivation is the team. Similar to personal reputation maintenance concerns, team members may be motivated to maintain their team’s positive reputation. Given membership in social groups (i.e., social identity) is a fundamental part of one’s sense of self and a source of self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), people concern themselves with the reputations of team entities and are driven to be associated with reputable teams (Cialdini et al., 1976).

In addition, at the team level, reputation maintenance concerns are shared among team members. This shared motivation emerges as teams experience common stimuli and work collectively toward goals. For instance, reputation maintenance concerns may emerge based on the task context and as a function of team interactions. Goffman (1959)

described how a wait staff unit at a restaurant would change their self-presentational “performance” depending on if they were in sight of customers or “backstage” in the kitchen. Because members depended on each other to maintain a positive reputation in the eyes of their customers – a single deviant could harm the team’s reputation – the team members would sanction each other if any members’ behavior was out of line.

In organizations where teams are dependent on others in their environment to secure resources for task performance, a team’s reputation is a valuable resource. A team’s reputation is the set of beliefs, perceptions, and evaluations about the team formed by another party (Bromley, 1993). As people have a fundamental motive to be perceived as respected and worthy (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), positive reputations are a valued resource because they signal to the self and others that one is well-regarded. A positive reputation is also a resource because it can facilitate exchange relationships at work, signals character and trustworthiness of future behavior, and facilitates the gain of future resources, like promotions, pay, and job security (Bromley, 1993). At the organizational level, reputation has been considered a “reservoir of goodwill” that can buffer firms from market decline during corporate crises (Jones, Jones, & Little, 2000). At the team level, good reputations can facilitate commitment and support from other teams (Marrone, 2010).

Because of the value of a positive reputation, people are sensitive to reputation threats and motivated to protect positive reputations. This protection motive is reflected by reputation maintenance concerns. Reputation maintenance concerns are particularly high in situations where there is a potential threat to one’s social image (Greenberg, Pyszczynski & Paisley, 1984; Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Leary, Barnes, & Griebel, 1986).

In these situations, people become preoccupied with maintaining their positive reputation and feel the need to preserve others' positive opinions of them. For example, Baer et al. (2015) found that feeling trusted by others increased one's reputation maintenance concerns because being trusted signaled one had a positive reputation and a trust violation could ruin this earned image.

In teams, reputation maintenance concerns should be heightened following unethical behavior. Research on stigma suggests that when unethical behavior is discovered by those outside the team, members of unethical teams become "marked" and are perceived to be devalued, spoiled, or flawed in the eyes of others. This is because moral character flaws raise doubts about the individual's full humanity (Goffman, 1963), leading to negative reactions by peers, like ostracism (Pryor, Reeder, & Monroe, 2012; Quade et al., 2017). This threat should increase reputation maintenance concerns among unethical teams. Research provides indirect support for this notion. For instance, Cavazza, Pagliaro, and Guidetti (2014) proposed that reputation maintenance concerns increase when there is the potential to be excluded by a social group; an assertion supported by the positive relationship between concealable stigmas and self-conscious concerns (Santuzzi & Ruscher, 2002).

Overall, because of the stigma of unethical behavior, I argue that unethical behavior threatens the team's reputation, evidenced by increased reputation maintenance concerns. Thus, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 2: Team unethical behavior positively affects reputation maintenance concerns.

Overview of Team Boundary Spanning Behavior

Research on team boundary spanning starts with the assumption that teams are dependent on others in their environment for information and resources to complete tasks (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The most common characterization of the relationship between a team and its environment (e.g., other teams) is one that views the environment as a “resource pool” (Kouchaki, Okhuysen, Waller, & Tajeddin, 2012). In this literature, resources include information, technology, and even other members, which are “inputs” that the team can use to accomplish its goals (c.f., I-P-O model; Hackman, 1987; Ilgen, Hollenbeck, Johnson, & Jundt, 2005).

Team boundary spanning, then, consists of a team’s “actions to establish linkages and manage interactions with parties in the external environment” (Marrone, 2010, p. 914). These actions include a wide range of team activities intended to manage the acquisition and protection of these resources, including negotiating deadlines with managers, updating interdependent teams on goal progress, collaborating with suppliers, and seeking information from subject matter experts. These activities can be directed at any stakeholder outside of the team’s boundary, including other teams within the same organization (e.g., Marks, DeChurch, Mathieu, Panzer, & Alonso, 2005), other organizations (e.g., Mathieu et al., 2001), customers (e.g., Bettencourt, Brown, & MacKenzie, 2005), and an organization’s surrounding community (e.g., Bartel, 2001). These behaviors are distinct from internal team processes, which reflect intrateam interactions (e.g., information elaboration; van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004).

Boundary spanning research can be traced back to a series of studies examining how research and development teams acquired necessary resources for technological

innovation (e.g., Tushman, 1977; Zmud, 1983). These early studies focused on the characteristics of team members in boundary spanning roles. For example, Tushman and Scanlan (1981) found that “communication stars” or those who had frequent communication with those outside their lab’s subunit tended to be more experienced and of higher status than those who did not have these links. Shortly after, boundary spanning was more formally introduced by Gladstein (1984), who acknowledged that group process models needed to be revised to distinguish intragroup processes from team boundary management activities. Gladstein provided evidence that internal and external processes can be distinguished empirically and by the team members themselves. This motivated Ancona and Caldwell (1992) to explore different forms of boundary activities between teams. Largely through inductive interview methods with new product teams, they identified 15 distinct activities, some of which include gathering information and resources, scanning, feedback seeking, informing, coordinating, negotiating, allowing entry, and filtering.

Since these seminal studies, research on boundary spanning has progressed sporadically and unsystematically (Faraj & Yan, 2009) and scholars have used several different taxonomies to categorize boundary spanning behavior. For example, Ancona and Caldwell (2007) discussed four types of boundary spanning behavior: ambassador, task coordinator, scout, and guard. More recently, Marrone (2010) detailed three categories of behavior: representation, coordination, and general information search. Offering yet another view, Faraj and Yan (2009) used Ancona and Caldwell’s taxonomy, but categorized behaviors into boundary spanning (e.g., ambassador, task coordinator, scout), boundary buffering (e.g., sentry, guard), and boundary reinforcement (e.g., team

identity). Of these three behaviors, they detail two as outward-facing – boundary spanning and boundary buffering; activities aimed at acquiring resources for the team and protecting those that they already possess, respectively.¹

While each of these taxonomies have merit, Faraj and Yan’s conceptualization is particularly relevant for describing resource processes and outcomes pertinent to COR (e.g., resource acquisition and protection). As a result, I focus specifically on how unethical behavior affects two exemplars of resource-acquisition and resource-protection boundary behavior: interteam coordination and guard behavior.

Interteam coordination is defined as the process of “orchestrating the sequence and timing of interdependent actions” (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001, p. 363). This behavior involves monitoring cross-team workflow, exchanging information and feedback, and adjusting actions to accomplish jointly set task goals (Marks et al., 2001; Marrone, 2010). For example, a product training team may need to coordinate with several organizational groups to learn about product updates, schedule trainings, ensure documentation accuracy, and distribute customer feedback to developers. Research indicates that interteam coordination is critical for team and organizational effectiveness (de Vries, Walter, Van der Vegt, & Essens, 2014; Hoegl, Weinkauff, & Gemueden, 2004; Marks et al., 2005).

In terms of antecedents, research at the organizational level has focused on how organizational structures and contextual factors influence interteam coordination. For

¹ Although Faraj and Yan (2009) use the term “boundary spanning” to refer to a specific subset of external behaviors, consistent with the broader boundary spanning literature, I use boundary spanning to refer to all types of external behaviors – including both those that engage and disengage the environment.

example, a team's network centrality (Tsai, 2000), the centralization of the hierarchical structure, informal lateral relations (Tsai, 2002), and organizational uncertainty and conflict (Joshi, Pandey, & Han, 2009) play a role. At the team level, scholars have examined the effects of tenure, functional, and demographic diversity (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992a; de Vries, Hollenbeck, Davison, Walter, & Van der Vegt, 2016; Keller, 2001; Reagans, Zuckerman, & McEvily, 2004), empowering leader behavior (Edmondson, 2003; Hirst & Mann, 2004; Marks & DeChurch, 2006), and teamwork quality (Hoegel et al., 2004). At the individual level, antecedents of individual interteam coordination include role structures, boundary spanning self-efficacy (Marrone, Tesluk, & Carson, 2007), social identity (Richter, West, Van Dick, & Dawson, 2006), and breadth of functional experience (de Vries et al., 2014).

In comparison, guard behavior is defined as activities “designed to keep information and resources inside the group and prevent others from drawing things outside the group” (Ancona & Caldwell, 2007, p. 39). This behavior primarily involves keeping information secret in order to protect the team or present a specific image of the team to other teams (Ancona & Caldwell, 1990). Guard behavior is an outbound information censoring activity that teams undertake to preserve core resources, either in response to or in anticipation of threats in the environment (Faraj & Yan, 2009).

A small amount of research has accumulated regarding the antecedents of guard behavior, typically regarding the nature of the project that the team is working on. Ancona and Caldwell (1988) suggested that guard behavior is heightened among teams that are in competition with one another, such as those who are developing the same product, or concerned about keeping new products secret. For instance, Lockheed

Martin's "Skunk Works" program exemplifies an extreme form of guard behavior, wherein units work in isolation to preserve secrecy (Ancona & Caldwell, 2007; Liebeskind, 1997). Guard behavior is also associated with other contextual factors, such as more involved managers (Guinan, Coopriider, & Faraj, 1998), lower resource availability (Ancona & Caldwell, 1990), and poor communication technology between teams (Guinan et al., 1998).

Taken together, these streams of research reflect how interteam coordination and guard behavior are shaped by both "top-down" contextual factors and "bottom-up" individual- and team-level affective, cognitive, and behavioral factors. While research has employed social network (Tsai, 2002), social identity (de Vries et al., 2014; Richter et al., 2006), and self-efficacy theories (Marrone et al., 2007) to build the nomological network, I hope to add to this body of work by utilizing COR to investigate the critical role of the team's perception of internal resources. Specifically, teams with high levels of resources should engage in boundary behaviors intended to accumulate resources, while teams with threatened resources should engage in boundary behaviors intended to protect resources.

The Relationship between Team Unethical Behavior, Perceived Team Support, and Team Boundary Spanning

When teams gain resources, according to COR, they invest these resources to gain new resources to equip them for future challenges (Hobfoll, 1989). In terms of boundary work, this means that teams will seek to acquire resources from their environment when they have high levels of support, and be less focused on buffering strategies aimed at

protecting resources. Here, I propose that high levels of perceived team support will increase resource-acquisition behavior and decrease resource-protection behavior.

First, team support enables teams to overcome the depletion of personal resources while engaging in resource-acquisition boundary work. Working with interdependent teams with different “thought worlds” (Dougherty, 1992) requires team members to expend effort, energy, and time to work through these differences in perspective, which can increase role overload when team members do not feel supported in their boundary spanning roles (Marrone et al., 2007). High levels of support buffer this depletion, as other members can be relied on to provide tangible and emotional support and to help with any neglected internal task activities.

Team support may also play a critical role in building self-esteem and meeting members’ relatedness needs, which in turn reduces uncertainty in social exchanges and frees members to spend less time on group maintenance functions and more time on task performance, including boundary spanning activities. When people have relatedness needs met by others, they become more willing to exert effort and abilities on the behalf of environments that satisfy these needs (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007). This idea is supported by research on norms of reciprocity and is in line with the tenets of COR, which proposes that resources tend to be invested where they can produce the largest future gain. Applied to interteam coordination, team members will be motivated to coordinate with other teams to acquire new resources (e.g., knowledge, expert opinions) to strategically invest in the team that has provided support in the past.

Together, these arguments explain why teams with high levels of team support are likely to perceive the challenges of working with other teams as opportunities rather than

obstacles. This view is supported by the challenge-hindrance stress framework, which suggests that high team support will prompt teams to view boundary work as an opportunity for growth and to gain more resources (e.g., a challenge appraisal), rather than a task that could result in resource loss and personal constraint or harm (e.g., a hindrance appraisal; LePine, Zhang, Crawford, & Rich, 2016). As mentioned earlier, guard behavior is a disengagement strategy which teams use when they perceive the environment as a threat to resources. Teams that perceive working with other teams as a “challenge” and not a “hindrance” will withdraw less from their environment. In this context, I expect that perceived team support will lead members to believe their teammates can be relied on to provide assistance, decreasing concern over protecting resources from the environment.

Additional support comes from the boundary spanning literature, where scholars have demonstrated how positive internal processes promote resource-acquisition boundary behavior. For example, Edmondson (1999) found that within-team psychological safety fostered a sense of interpersonal courage to take risks on behalf of the team in the form of boundary spanning activities. In addition, in a study of cross-functional new product development teams in the automotive industry, Hoegel et al. (2004) found that teamwork quality (i.e., communication, coordination, mutual support, effort) was positively related to interteam coordination and project commitment. These findings point toward a “spillover effect,” a phenomenon whereby teams develop positive or negative cognitive frames based on internal processes, and project these frames on their relationships with other teams (Keenan & Carnevale, 1989; Labianca, Brass, & Gray, 1998), facilitating resource acquisition.

In sum, I argue that unethical behavior will affect team boundary work by influencing perceptions of team support. Teams with high levels of support should be more likely to engage in resource-acquiring interteam coordination behavior and less likely to engage in resource-protection guard behavior, leading to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: Team unethical behavior has a positive indirect effect on interteam coordination behavior through perceived team support.

Hypothesis 4: Team unethical behavior has a negative indirect effect on guard behavior through perceived team support.

The Relationship between Team Unethical Behavior, Reputation Maintenance Concerns, and Team Boundary Spanning

According to COR, when team resources are threatened, team members focus efforts on protective investment strategies that aim to conserve existing resources (Hobfoll, 1989). In terms of boundary work, this means that teams will prioritize buffering strategies aimed at protecting resources over acquiring resources through spanning strategies. Therefore, reputation maintenance concerns should decrease resource-acquiring interteam coordination and increase resource-protecting guard behavior. This notion is supported by research in several areas.

First, boundary work will be affected because coping with reputation threats due to unethical behavior will divert cognitive resources toward concealing the moral stigma. In the stigma literature, when people experience reputation threats from concealable stigmas, they cope by social avoidance and attempting to “pass” as nonstigmatized

(Goffman, 1963; Pachankis, 2007). This will increase guard behavior, as it becomes important for teams to protect their image in the eyes of outsiders to keep knowledge of their illicit conduct within the team's boundary. Concealing moral stigmas may even lead to subconscious guard behavior. According to the preoccupation model of secrecy (Lane & Wegner, 1995), concealable stigmas activate cognitive processes that cause one to obsessively think about the stigma. When people try to conceal stigmas, they try to avoid thinking about the stigma as a way to free cognitive resources for "passing" and to prevent the stigma from slipping into conversation. However, when people try to *not* think about something, ironic monitoring processes unconsciously search for unwanted thoughts to avoid, ironically making stigma-related thoughts available and likely to return to conscious awareness, where they in turn have to be suppressed by intentional operating processes (Lane & Wegner, 1995). In effect, reputation maintenance concerns will activate guard behavior through conscious and unconscious processes as a coping strategy intended to conceal the unethical behavior from being revealed to those outside the team.

Concealing a moral stigma also increases distress and strain, as avoiding stigma-related "leakages" takes a lot of energy. For instance, people with concealable stigmas constantly worry about trying to control what is said and not said in social interactions (Crocker & Garcia, 2006; Wegner & Erber, 1993). In teams, this means monitoring one's own behavior and the behavior of others who are complicit in the stigmatized behavior. In this way, reputation maintenance concerns should increase guard behavior, but also tax cognitive resources, taking attention away from focusing on interteam coordination. Coordinating between interdependent teams requires a lot of information processing

effort (de Vries et al., 2016; Firth, Hollenbeck, Miles, Ilgen, & Barnes, 2015). Teams not only need to monitor their own internal processes, but they also need to attend to and anticipate the resource needs of other teams. In line with resource allocation theory (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989), teams have limited amounts of cognitive and attentional resources and as more resources are devoted toward the performance of one task, less will be available to allocate to other tasks. When faced with interteam coordination demands, unethical teams are challenged with dividing attention toward guard behavior aimed at concealing the stigma and giving high levels of cognitive resources toward the information processing demands requisite for coordination.

Research on the effects of stress in teams indirectly supports these tradeoffs. As acknowledged by COR, when resources are threatened, people experience stress. The experience of stress, in turn, creates social withdrawal, producing an inward focus and a reliance on internal communication ties as a coping strategy (Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003). For example, in a study of military units, Kalish, Luria, Toker, and Westman (2015) found that people who had higher levels of stress were less likely to form new communication ties with others, and instead maintained existing ties. Similarly, Pearsall, Ellis, and Stein (2009) found that when teams were faced with task-related hindrance stressors (e.g., role ambiguity), they engaged resource investment strategies of avoidant coping, which subsequently produced psychological withdrawal from the task.

In sum, I argue that unethical behavior will affect team boundary work by influencing reputation maintenance concerns, leading to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5: Team unethical behavior has a negative indirect effect on interteam coordination behavior through reputation maintenance concerns.

Hypothesis 6: Team unethical behavior has a positive indirect effect on guard behavior through reputation maintenance concerns.

The Moderating Effect of Interteam Monitoring

According to Hobfoll (1990, p. 467), resource appraisals “tend to follow real-world circumstances.” In this way, interpretations of resource gain and threat are influenced by the social context in which unethical behavior occurs. One social context that should affect resource appraisal following unethical behavior is interteam monitoring. Intrateam monitoring is defined as “team members’ surveillance and awareness of other team members’ activities” (Langfred, 2004, p. 386). In multiteam systems, interteam monitoring is functionally similar to intrateam monitoring, and reflects teams’ surveillance and awareness of other teams’ activities; awareness that enables teams to observe other teams’ actions and provide feedback and back-up behavior when needed (Marks et al., 2001; Marks et al., 2005). From an agency theory perspective, monitoring encourages agents to act in line with organizational objectives rather than self-interest (Loughry, 2010); an assertion supported by research linking monitoring to reduced levels of social loafing and other forms of counterproductive behavior (Welbourne, Balkin, & Gomez-Mejia, 1995). Team monitoring has also been shown to improve implicit coordination processes and increase teams’ abilities to synchronize their contributions (Kolbe et al., 2014; Marks & Panzer, 2004).

Despite its direct benefits, I argue that interteam monitoring can disrupt the free-flow of information and resources in multiteam systems when a team engages in unethical behavior. Monitoring alters the resource appraisal process following unethical

behavior, affecting team support and reputation maintenance concerns, and by extension, interteam coordination and guard behavior.

This process is informed by the threat-to-self-esteem model of recipient reactions to aid (Fisher et al., 1982). According to this model, the context in which one receives help influences the extent to which the help is perceived as self-supportive or self-threatening. Help is perceived to be supportive when it contains positive self-evaluative messages, aligns with cultural values (e.g., moral norms), or contains instrumental value. Being helped is perceived to be threatening when it makes one feel inferior, is inconsistent with cultural values, or is not instrumental in achieving goals (Deelstra et al., 2003; Fisher et al., 1982). In turn, supportive help increases favorable self-perceptions, positive evaluations of the helper, and willingness to reciprocate, while threatening help produces negative self- and other-evaluations and defensive behavior. According to this model, social contexts influence help appraisal by making salient certain elements that elicit self-threat and self-support (Nadler & Fisher, 1986); a notion also supported by social information processing theory (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978).

This model has implications for interpretations of resource gain and threat following a teammate's initiation of unethical behavior intended to benefit the team. When the aid is unethical, the level of monitoring is a social context that determines the degree to which the aid is perceived as supportive, affecting team support, and threatening, affecting reputation maintenance concerns. This is because monitoring (a) influences attention to how the behavior conflicts (or aligns) with moral values and (b) shifts how instrumental the aid is perceived to be. I propose that unethical behavior will

only increase reputation maintenance concerns when monitoring is high, and unethical behavior will only increase perceived team support when monitoring is low.

First, levels of monitoring will influence the degree to which unethical behavior is perceived to conflict with moral values. Moral judgments and concerns are largely dependent on salient relational ties (Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998; Leavitt, Reynolds, Barnes, Schilpzand, and Hannah, 2012; Rai & Fiske, 2011). One factor that influences the salience of relational ties in multiteam contexts is the extent to which teams are aware of other teams' activities (Luciano, DeChurch, & Mathieu, 2015). In highly monitored contexts, people pay attention to normative moral standards of who is watching them as a way to gain rewards and avoid punishments (Bourrat, Baumard, & McKay, 2011; Epley & Waytz, 2010). According to evolutionary social psychology, the tendency to act in socially desirable (i.e., ethical) ways while being monitored evolved as a way for groups to avoid being punished and exiled for antisocial behavior (Bering & Johnson, 2005). In large social groups, this "audience-approval motive" (Tetlock, 1992) means abiding by societal moral norms and refraining from unethical behavior which can harm cooperative relationships. In contrast, when teams are not being monitored, ethics such as ingroup favoritism, loyalty, and concern are likely to guide team members' moral judgements (Greene, 2014). In these contexts, ethical conflicts of interests are often neutralized, let alone recognized (Umphress & Bingham, 2011). Behavior that intends to benefit the group, advances the group's goals, and appears to be harmless is likely to be valued, even if it is unethical (Quade et al., 2017; Scott, Restubog, & Zagencyk, 2013; Weisel & Shalvi, 2015).

Based on this, the degree to which teams are monitored will affect how they respond to unethical behavior initiated by one of their teammates. When teams are being monitored and are motivated to uphold societal moral norms (i.e., of others in the multiteam system), they will view unethical aid as a threat because, through the lens of the threat-to-self-esteem model, being unethical when ethical behavior is expected conflicts with cultural (moral) values, such as that people should be treated with fairness and should not be harmed (Fisher et al., 1982). In contrast, when teams are not being monitored, teams may be attuned to a different set of team-centered ethics that guide their appraisal process and accept behavior that violates societal norms.

Second, levels of monitoring will influence the degree to which unethical behavior is perceived to be instrumental for team effectiveness. According to the threat-to-self-esteem model of recipient reactions to aid, help is instrumental (and supportive) when it increases the probability of future success and non-instrumental (and threatening) when it decreases the likelihood of future success (Fisher et al., 1982; Nadler & Fisher, 1986). In line with the rational choice theories of crime, the instrumentality of unethical behavior hinges on how the benefits gained from the behavior compare to the costs of apprehension or punishment less the probability of getting caught (Becker, 1968; Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Factors that increase the risks of getting caught, like the presence of monitoring and surveillance, increase the costs of unethical behavior and garner negative reactions to moral violations (Schwartz, 1968). When monitoring is high and teams are unethical, teams are likely to view unethical behavior as significantly more risky and uncertain than unethical teams in non-monitored contexts. When there is a greater likelihood that unethical actions will be undetected, the value of

the “benefits” unethical behavior can accrue for the team should generate supportive appraisals.

In sum, interteam monitoring contexts should affect the construal of unethical behavior as supportive and threatening through its effect on salient socialized values and instrumentality perceptions in the aid appraisal process. I propose that perceptions of team support and reputation maintenance concerns reflect self-supportive and self-threatening cognitions, respectively, that mediate aid and distal behavioral responses to the aid (e.g., boundary spanning activities); leading to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 7: The indirect effects of team unethical behavior on interteam coordination and guard behavior through perceived team support are moderated by interteam monitoring, such that: (a) the positive effect of team unethical behavior on perceived team support is weaker when monitoring is high and stronger when monitoring is low (see Figure 2), and in turn, (b) the positive indirect effect of team unethical behavior on interteam coordination through perceived team support is weaker when monitoring is high and stronger when monitoring is low, and (c) the negative indirect effect of team unethical behavior on guard behavior through perceived team support is weaker when monitoring is high and stronger when monitoring is low.

Hypothesis 8: The indirect effects of team unethical behavior on interteam coordination and guard behavior through reputation maintenance concerns are moderated by interteam monitoring, such that: (a) the positive effect of team unethical behavior on reputation maintenance concerns is stronger when monitoring is high and weaker when monitoring is low (see Figure 2), and in turn,

(b) the negative indirect effect of team unethical behavior on interteam coordination through reputation maintenance concerns is stronger when monitoring is high and weaker when monitoring is low, and (c) the positive indirect effect of team unethical behavior on guard behavior through reputation maintenance concerns is stronger when monitoring is high and weaker when monitoring is low.

Method

Sample and Experimental Design

For this study, I recruited 216 participants. The sample was undergraduate students at a large public university in the Southwestern United States who had voluntarily signed up to participate in this study in exchange for course credit and monetary compensation. They were on average 20.9 years old ($SD = 2.12$), 59% were women, and participants were mostly Caucasian (60.2%), Asian or Pacific Islander (17.6%), or Hispanic or Latino (15.3%). Participants were organized into 54 four-person multiteam systems each composed of two two-member teams, composing a sample of 108 teams.² All manipulations and constructs were operationalized at the team level of analysis. I used a 2 (team unethical behavior vs. control) \times 2 (interteam monitoring vs. control) between-team factorial design. I randomly assigned each session's participants to teams and teams to one of four experimental conditions.

² Multiteam systems are defined as “two or more teams that interface directly and interdependently in response to environmental contingencies toward the accomplishment of collective goals” (Mathieu et al., 2001, p. 290). While multiteam systems vary both in the size of each team within the system and the number of teams within the system, two component teams of two members each is the smallest possible multiteam structure. This structure has been utilized previously in lab experiments on multiteam systems (e.g., Cuijpers, Uitdewilligen, & Guenter, 2016; Marks et al., 2005).

Overview of Procedure and Tasks

An overview of how the study tasks, manipulations, and measures are sequenced is provided in Figure 3. Upon providing informed consent, participants were given a brief overview of the study. Following this, each team was sent to a separate study room to begin working on the first task. For this task, I gave teams 10 minutes to use the internet to plan activities and budget expenses for a two-day New York City vacation for a family of four (Appendix A). The purpose of this initial task was for the teams to build rapport and a sense that they are an interdependent unit with collective goals. All teams completed the task in similar amounts of time and performance was not assessed on this task.

After this, each participant was brought to an individual study room to work on an anagram task. They were shown to a computer and instructed how to use and navigate Skype to send instant messages to communicate with their teammate and the experimenter. I set up two separate chats for each participant: a private chat between the two teammates and a public chat between the two teammates and the experimenter. Once the participants felt comfortable with Skype, I introduced the task. Following Spoelma et al. (under review), participants completed a modified version of the anagram task created by Ruedy and Schweitzer (2010). In the original task, participants are given a set of scrambled anagrams that can create common English words when unscrambled (e.g., HACTW correctly solved would be WATCH). I modified this task by giving a unique set of 15 scrambled anagrams to each participant, and gave each team the shared goal of solving as many anagrams as they can in five minutes. In my instructions to this task, I told teams that it is against the rules to use outside aid – other than their teammate – to

solve the anagrams. In addition, I told the teams that to keep them motivated to do this task, they could each earn money based on their team's performance, which would be based on the sum of each members' individual score. I distributed the anagrams when both team members acknowledged that they understand the task instructions (Appendix B).

During this task, I manipulated interteam monitoring (see below). After five minutes, I ended the task and asked the teams to calculate their score using the private chat and to respond with their team score in the chat shared with the experimenter. During this part of the study, I introduced the unethical behavior manipulation. This manipulation was carried out using a confederate (see below). Unknown to the participants, during the anagram task they were communicating over Skype with a confederate and not their actual teammate. I did this by using two identical chats for each team: one between the confederate and the first team member, and another between the confederate and the second team member. After teams reported their score, they were told to wait briefly while their final payment was ostensibly calculated. After one minute, I delivered their performance feedback in-person. Specifically, I told each participant that their team performed well above average on the task compared to all the other teams in the study and because of this, they have earned \$3. I distributed the payment and then sent the participants a link over Skype to fill out a survey with the interteam monitoring manipulation check and the mediators.

After everyone completed the survey, I introduced the multiteam experimental task, the Cascade Manor negotiation exercise (Thompson, 1997; see also Naquin & Kurtzberg, 2009, and Peterson & Thompson, 1997). Cascade Manor is a multiteam

negotiation between a team of two members representing a real estate firm, Alki Corporation (the chief financial officer and V.P.), and a team of two members representing the City of Bainbridge (the chief planner and financial director). In this task, teams were instructed to negotiate an agreement between the parties regarding the development of urban residential housing that maximized the value for their client. To do this, they were given information concerning how their client values multiple issues, including the percentage of open space in the new development, the building inspector selected, building height, the number of local subcontractors employed for the project, the real estate tax rate, and the sales tax rate. The value alignments of these issues between the teams were designed to create distributive (open space, real estate tax), compatible (building inspector), trade-off (building height and local subcontractors), and betting issues (sales tax).

This information was distributed both within and between the component teams to form shared and unique elements. All members were given information on how their party values open space and which building inspector is selected. In addition, the City of Bainbridge financial director and Alki Corporation V.P. had information on how their parties value of local subcontractors, real estate tax, and sales tax revenue, while the City of Bainbridge planner and Alki Corporation CFO had information on the value of the height of the building. Each members' role information is included in Appendix C and the value alignment summary is shown in Appendix D.

I selected this task for several reasons. First, this task was a multiteam negotiation that had the fundamental elements of a multiteam system: a hierarchical goal structure and interdependence (Mathieu et al., 2001). The two component teams (Alki Corporation

and the City of Bainbridge) each had proximal goals (e.g., to maximize the total value earned for their client, earn as much of the “pie” on distributive issues as possible) but also shared a common goal of reaching an agreement and creating the most integrative value for both parties (e.g., one that takes advantages of trade-offs to maximize the amount of value that can be gained by each party; Beersma & De Dreu, 2002). The mixed-motive nature of the task also allowed for the observation of tradeoffs between team-level and multiteam-level goals, an important component of multiteam systems (Rico, Hinsz, Burke, & Salas, 2016). In addition, this task required intensive process interdependence, as each team needed to share and request information about interests, and combine and coordinate offers with members of the other team to most effectively perform. As noted by Thompson, Wang, and Gunia (2010; emphasis added), negotiation is an interpersonal decision-making process required *whenever objectives cannot be achieved single-handedly*. Given each member had unique information, team members also needed to work interdependently within each team to be effective. This task was also appropriate because negotiation commonly takes place within multiteam systems (Marks & Luvison, 2012) and is a fundamental way teams acquire and protect resources (Ancona & Caldwell, 1988). Finally, this task was practical because boundary spanning behaviors could be observed. Because negotiating with distributed information is a highly interdependent and conjunctive task, it was suitable for observing coordination behavior (Putnam, 1994; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993). The face-to-face nature of this task also provided a setting where teams likely felt the need to be more judicious in concealing undesirable information, making guard behavior a logical external behavior (De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, Van Kleef, & Kruglanski, 2007).

Participants were given 15 minutes to read through the task instructions and prepare for the task in their private study rooms. Following this, I brought both teams to a conference room where they worked face-to-face together on the task. They were given as much time as needed, up to 30 minutes, to come to an agreement.

I incentivized team and multiteam goals by informing participants that they could earn additional monetary compensation if they performed “above average compared to all the other teams in the study.” Specifically, if their own team’s agreement value was “above average,” they could earn a \$3 bonus, and if the combined agreement value of the two teams was “above average,” they could earn an additional \$3 bonus. In reality, each participant was rewarded with \$6 at the end of the study.

I video-recorded teams throughout this task with a hidden video camera and used these recordings to assess interteam coordination behavior. Teams were asked to write down their agreement (Appendix E). When the teams finished the task, I distributed surveys to assess guard behavior. Participants were invited to a debriefing session after all the data were collected.

Manipulations

Unethical behavior. Unethical behavior refers to actions that violate widely held moral principles (Treviño et al., 2014). In the ethics literature, cheating – “behavior accruing benefits to the self that violates standards or rules” (Shu et al., 2011, p. 330) – is a common operationalization of unethical behavior because cheating violates societal moral norms of honesty and fairness to others (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007).

Following Spoelma et al. (under review), I manipulated team unethical behavior by using a confederate to cheat on the anagram task to solve anagrams that contribute to the team's overall score. Specifically, when the anagram task ended and teams were asked to put their individual scores together, participants received messages from the confederate that either detailed that they used an outside source to solve anagrams or not (which, as noted in the procedure, was against the rules). In the unethical condition, participants were sent the following message via a private chat from the confederate: "hey i got 10. i googled a few but theres no way they'll know because i deleted my browser history. how many did u get? i can tell the experimenter" [*sic*]. In the control condition, participants were sent: "hey i got 10. how many did u get? i can tell the experimenter" [*sic*]. Once the participant responded with their individual score, the confederate sent a message to experimenter through the public chat with their combined team score ("we solved XX in total" [*sic*]). When this was received, I sent back a message requesting confirmation: "Thanks, so can you each confirm that your group's total score is XX anagrams?" The confederate then responded with "yes," and when the participant affirmed the score, I instructed the team to wait while their final payment was ostensibly calculated.

Interteam monitoring. Interteam monitoring refers to the level of surveillance and awareness of other teams' activities that teams have in a multiteam system (c.f., Langfred, 2004). In multiteam systems, monitoring can be enabled through technology that allows teams to electronically monitor each other's activity. For instance, in teams of military units, radar systems enable teams to monitor each other and distinguish allies and enemies (Luciano et al., 2015). Drawing upon the performance monitoring literature

(e.g., Alge, Ballinger, & Green, 2004), I manipulated interteam monitoring through video monitoring. Specifically, I told each team member that during the anagram task, to ensure the instructions are being followed and teams are working on the task, they could be monitored by a member of the other team. I then drew their attention to a webcam in the room that was aimed toward their workstation. The camera was angled so the screen could not be directly seen so teams would not be affected by potential social comparison effects and it was conceivable teams could commit unethical behavior that was not immediately detected. I also turned on a monitor that showed an identical live stream of a member of the other team. The video cameras were covered and the live streams were removed when the task was done. Participants not in the monitoring conditions were not told about this monitoring feature.

Measures

For the manipulation check and measures, participants responded on a scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*extremely*).

Interteam monitoring manipulation check. To check perceptions of interteam monitoring, participants were asked: “To what degree do you feel that you were being monitored by the other team during the anagram task?” I averaged members’ responses using a mean score to create a team-level manipulation check. With the uniform null distribution, which compares the observed item variance to variance expected from a null distribution with no agreement (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984) the median $r_{wg(j)}$ was 0.98 and the mean $r_{wg(j)}$ was 0.74, indicating strong within-group agreement and supporting aggregation (LeBreton & Senter, 2008).

Perceived team support. Perceived team support is “the extent to which members believe that the team values their contribution and cares about their well-being” (Bishop et al., 2005, p. 159). To measure perceived team support, I used the shortened perceived organizational support scale created by Eisenberger et al. (1986), and changed the referent to “my team” instead of “the organization” (Bishop et al., 2005). Participants completed a seven-item measure, consisting of items: “My team values my contribution to its well-being,” “My team strongly considers my goals and values,” “My team really cares about my well-being,” “My team is willing to help me when I need a special favor,” “My team shows very little concern for me” (reverse coded), “My team takes pride in my accomplishments” and “Help is available from my team when I have a problem.” Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was 0.86. I aggregated this measure in line with the direct consensus model, wherein the meaning of social support at the team level is in the consensus among team members’ individual perceptions of team support (Chan, 1998). Specifically, I created a mean value of perceived team support for each group. To justify aggregation, I calculated interrater agreement. The median $r_{wg(j)}$ was 0.93 and the mean $r_{wg(j)}$ was 0.72. This provides evidence for strong interrater agreement (LeBreton & Senter, 2008).³

³ In addition to $r_{wg(j)}$, ICC(1) and ICC(2) are typically reported to provide support for aggregation. These statistics provide evidence of the consistency of the aggregated measure across team members (Bliese, 2000). ICC(1) provides the percentage of variance in the variable that is attributed to within-team compared to between-team factors. ICC(2) estimates the reliability of the teams’ mean values in the sample. These ICC values did not reach significance for perceived team support or reputation maintenance concerns. However, in this context, ICCs are not as important for demonstrating support for aggregation as $r_{wg(j)}$, an indicator of within-group agreement. ICCs are traditionally used in field samples where teams are not necessarily independent of each other and researchers need to demonstrate that a significant amount of the variance in the focal construct is due to team factors and not other variables (e.g., organizational climate). My study was a laboratory experiment, so I know that aside from experiencing the same manipulations, teams were independent of each other. ICC statistics might not also be informative in my context because using the same confederate and manipulation for every team by design affected the amount of within-

Reputation maintenance concerns. Reputation maintenance concerns refer to a team's desire to retain the positive image that others have of their team. To measure reputation maintenance concerns, participants completed a four-item measure created by Baer et al. (2015) adapted to refer to one's team. Items included: "I'm concerned about protecting my team's image," "I worry about protecting my team's reputation," "I feel the need to preserve the opinion others have of my team," and "I'm pre-occupied with keeping others' views of my team's character intact." Cronbach's alpha for this scale was 0.92. I aggregated member responses to the team level with the direct consensus composition model (Chan, 1998) and again created a mean value of reputation maintenance concerns for each group. Providing evidence for moderate to strong interrater agreement, using the uniform null distribution, the median $r_{wg(j)}$ was 0.70 and the mean $r_{wg(j)}$ was 0.55 (LeBreton & Senter, 2008).

Interteam coordination. Interteam coordination refers to a team's efforts to orchestrate the sequence and timing of interdependent actions with other teams (Marks et al., 2001). To assess interteam coordination, counts of coordination behavior were coded using the video recordings of the teams completing the negotiation exercise. Coding video recordings to measure team behavior offers advantages over capturing these dynamics through self-report because recordings enable direct and objective measurement (Waller & Kaplan, 2016; Weingart, 1997). To more precisely operationalize interteam coordination, I relied on the MICRO-CO coding scheme for analysis of explicit coordination mechanisms in decision-making teams created and

compared to between-team variance. This naturally increased similarities across teams, which directly reduces ICC(1) (Bliese, 2000).

validated by Kolbe, Strack, Stein, and Boos (2011). This framework identifies several types of coordination statements and provides definitions and examples of these categories. For instance, providing instruction, addressing a team member, structuring the discussion, and asking questions are all manifestations of coordination (see Appendix F for the full taxonomy). Based on this taxonomy, I operationalized interteam coordination as counts of coordination behavior by members of one team directed toward members of the other team, which represents an additive index (i.e., sum) of the amount of interteam coordination by one team (Chan, 1998).

To code this variable, another management PhD student and I first conducted a two-hour training session, wherein we reviewed the construct definition and coding framework, and watched videos of teams performing the task to identify examples of the behavior. The unit of analysis for coding was identifiable thoughts or statements, which is ideal when interested in the content of the dialogue (Weingart, Olekalns, & Smith, 2004). In this session, we coded one practice two-team system together to establish coding accuracy and consistency. Following this, we independently coded the same random set of 13 two-team systems (24% of the sample). I then calculated several statistics to assess inter-rater reliability and agreement. According to Weingart, Olekalns, and Smith (2004), coders must meet two criteria of reliability: unitizing and interpretive reliability. Unitizing reliability is the degree of agreement regarding how many units should be categorized and is typically assessed with Guetzkow's U. This statistic calculates the difference between how many units were identified by an independent coder and the average of the two coders' estimates. Guetzkow's U for our ratings was .04, meaning that there was a 4% discrepancy between the total units estimated by either

coder and the “true” number of units (Weingart et al., 2004). This discrepancy is low and signifies unitizing reliability (c.f., Carton & Rosette, 2011; Dahlin, Weingart, & Hinds, 2005).

Interpretive reliability is how consistently labels were applied to units. We found that the category of “addressing” was not present in our sample, so there were three potential categories for each statement (instructing, structuring, and questions). Cohen’s Kappa indicates the level of agreement corrected for agreements due to chance and is the most common measure of interpretive reliability (Weingart et al., 2004). In the set of teams mutually coded, $\kappa = 0.63$, indicating substantial levels of agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). Because inter-rater reliability and agreement were established, the remaining 82 teams were divided between the two coders. Although coders were not blind to the general study hypotheses, they were blind to the experimental conditions and values of perceived team support and reputation maintenance concerns of each team.

Guard behavior. Guard behavior includes actions “designed to keep information and resources inside the group and prevent others from drawing things outside the group” (Ancona & Caldwell, 2007, p. 39). To measure guard behavior, because there is not a validated method for counting instances of guard behavior through direct observation, I had participants complete a three-item measure created by Ancona and Caldwell (1990). I adapted these items to be more relevant for an experimental context. Specifically, the items were: “Members of my team kept news about the team secret from the other team until the appropriate time,” “Members of my team avoided releasing information to the other team to protect the team’s image” and “Members of my team controlled the release of information from the other team in order to present the profile we wanted to show.”

Cronbach's alpha for this scale was 0.90. I aggregated members' responses to the team level using the referent-shift consensus model by creating the mean values of guard behavior for each team (Chan, 1998). The median $r_{wg(j)}$ was 0.83 and the mean $r_{wg(j)}$ was 0.67 using the uniform null distribution, providing evidence for moderate to strong interrater agreement (LeBreton & Senter, 2008).

Results

Manipulation Check

Interteam monitoring. Teams in the interteam monitoring conditions ($M = 2.47$, $SD = 1.22$) indicated a significantly greater level of agreement with the statement that they felt monitored by the other team during the anagram task than teams in the no interteam monitoring condition ($M = 2.06$, $SD = 1.08$), $F(1, 104) = 3.33$, $p = 0.07$, $\eta^2 = .03$. This manipulation check was neither influenced by the unethical behavior manipulation, $F(1, 104) = .25$, $p = 0.62$, $\eta^2 = .00$, nor by the interaction between unethical behavior and interteam monitoring, $F(1, 104) = .34$, $p = .56$, $\eta^2 = 0.00$. Cohen's $d = 0.36$, indicating a small effect.

Tests of Hypotheses

Table 1 provides correlations for study variables and Table 2 provides the means and standard deviations for experimental conditions. Although my variables are at the team level, teams are nested within multiteam systems and completed the negotiation task together. Because of this, it is possible that one team's interteam coordination and guard behavior values are non-independent from other teams within the same multiteam system. Non-independence violates key assumptions necessary to use OLS regression techniques. Therefore, before testing my hypotheses, I calculated the degree of non-independence

among teams within multiteam groupings. To do this, I calculated ICCs to compare the variance in each team's dependent variables that is attributable to within-multiteam system factors versus between-multiteam system factors. Providing evidence that the multiteam system nesting explained variance in the team-level dependent variables and that teams' dependent variables in the same multiteam system are correlated and non-independent, I found that teams' interteam coordination behavior was positively correlated, $r = .39$, and a significant amount of the variance in teams' interteam coordination behavior was a factor of their multiteam membership, $ICC(1) = .36$, $F(53, 54) = 2.12$, $p = .003$. In addition, teams' guard behavior was positively correlated, $r = .36$, and a significant amount of the variance in teams' guard behavior was due to multiteam membership, $ICC(1) = .37$, $F(53, 54) = 2.17$, $p = .003$.

Because of this, I accounted for multiteam-level effects by using multilevel modeling techniques. Specifically, I used random coefficients modeling in HLM 7.0, which accounts for the nested structure of the data (Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2004). Based on the ICC(1) values calculated above, 64% of the variance in interteam coordination behavior and 63% of the variance in guard behavior was influenced by team-level factors. Hypothesis 1 hypothesized that team unethical behavior positively affects perceived team support. To test this, I regressed perceived team support on team unethical behavior. As shown in Table 3, this effect was non-significant, $\gamma = -0.07$, $SE = 0.17$, $p = 0.70$, which does not support Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 predicted that team unethical behavior positively affects reputation maintenance concerns. I regressed reputation maintenance concerns on team unethical behavior to test this hypothesis. As

shown in Table 3, this effect was also non-significant, $\gamma = -0.12$, $SE = 0.20$, $p = 0.54$, failing to support Hypothesis 2.

Hypotheses 3 through 6 involved indirect effects and the regression coefficients are displayed in Table 3. To test these predictions, I used the product of coefficients method outlined by MacKinnon, Lockwood, and Williams (2004) and the bootstrapping tool using R created by Selig and Preacher (2008) with 10,000 bootstrapped samples to test whether the indirect effects differ significantly from zero. Hypothesis 3 proposed that team unethical behavior has a positive indirect effect on interteam coordination behavior through perceived team support. Using the approach detailed above, the 95% CI through perceived team support was not significant [-10.04, 14.60], which does not support Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 4 proposed that team unethical behavior has a negative indirect effect on guard behavior through perceived team support. The 95% CI of this effect through perceived team support was non-significant [-.17, .15], which does not support my fourth hypothesis. Hypothesis 5 proposed that team unethical behavior has a negative indirect effect on interteam coordination behavior through reputation maintenance concerns. Failing to support this hypothesis, the 95% CI of this effect through reputation maintenance concerns was non-significant [-9.43, 8.91]. My sixth hypothesis proposed that team unethical behavior has a positive indirect effect on guard behavior through reputation maintenance concerns. The 95% CI of this effect through reputation maintenance concerns was non-significant [-.15, .14], which does not support Hypothesis 6. Indirect effect estimates and confidence intervals for hypotheses 3-6 are presented in Table 4.

Hypotheses 7 and 8 involved moderated mediation and the regression coefficients are displayed in Table 5. Specifically, in hypothesis 7, I proposed that the indirect effects of team unethical behavior on interteam coordination and guard behavior through perceived team support are moderated by interteam monitoring, such that: (a) the positive effect of team unethical behavior on perceived team support is weaker when monitoring is high and stronger when monitoring is low, and in turn, (b) the positive indirect effect of team unethical behavior on interteam coordination through perceived team support is weaker when monitoring is high and stronger when monitoring is low, and (c) the negative indirect effect of team unethical behavior on guard behavior through perceived team support is weaker when monitoring is high and stronger when monitoring is low. To test Hypothesis 7a, I regressed the perceived team support on the terms for team unethical behavior, interteam monitoring, and the interaction between team unethical behavior and interteam monitoring. As shown in Table 5, the interaction term was non-significant, $\gamma = -0.03$, $SE = 0.30$, $p = 0.92$, failing to support Hypothesis 7a. A figure of the interaction plot is included in Figure 4. Hypotheses 7b and 7c involve moderated mediation, which is indicated by the significance of the product of the coefficient for the mediator on the interaction term and the coefficient for the dependent variable on the mediator (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). Because of this, I subsequently (and independently) regressed interteam coordination behavior and guard behavior on perceived team support. In multiplying these coefficients together, the 95% CIs of the indirect effects of the interaction on interteam coordination behavior through perceived team support [-.78, .87] and on guard behavior through perceived team support [-.18, .16] were non-significant, failing to support Hypotheses 7b and 7c.

In hypothesis 8, I proposed that the indirect effects of team unethical behavior on interteam coordination and guard behavior through reputation maintenance concerns are moderated by interteam monitoring, such that: (a) the positive effect of team unethical behavior on reputation maintenance concerns is stronger when monitoring is high and weaker when monitoring is low, and in turn, (b) the negative indirect effect of team unethical behavior on interteam coordination through reputation maintenance concerns is stronger when monitoring is high and weaker when monitoring is low, and (c) the positive indirect effect of team unethical behavior on guard behavior through reputation maintenance concerns is stronger when monitoring is high and weaker when monitoring is low. To test Hypothesis 8a, I regressed the reputation maintenance concerns on the terms for team unethical behavior, interteam monitoring, and the interaction between team unethical behavior and interteam monitoring. As shown in Table 5, the interaction term was non-significant, $\gamma = -0.24$, $SE = 0.39$, $p = 0.54$, failing to support Hypothesis 8a. A figure of the interaction plot is included in Figure 5. Hypotheses 8b and 8c involve moderated mediation. Similar to how I tested Hypotheses 7b and 7c, I subsequently (and independently) regressed interteam coordination behavior and guard behavior on reputation maintenance concerns. The 95% CIs of the indirect effects of the interaction on interteam coordination behavior through reputation maintenance concerns [-.91, .86] and on guard behavior through reputation maintenance concerns [-.35, .17.] were non-significant, failing to support Hypotheses 8b and 8c. Indirect effect estimates and confidence intervals for hypotheses 7-8 are presented in Table 6.

Supplemental Analyses

Two-team systems of teams took on average 1190.30 seconds (19.84 minutes) to complete the negotiation, with a standard deviation of 438.91 seconds (7.32 minutes). Because of this variance and the fact that the duration of the negotiation and counts of team interteam coordination behavior were positively correlated ($r = .59$), I conducted supplemental analyses where I controlled for the effects of negotiation duration on interteam coordination behavior. Tables of these regression analyses are shown in Table 7 (tests of hypotheses 3 and 5) and Table 8 (tests of hypotheses 7b and 8b). I included negotiation duration as a Level 2 predictor in the analyses and it was a significant predictor in all relevant analyses. Interestingly, while hypotheses 3 and 5 are still not supported, team unethical behavior still had a marginally significant effect on interteam coordination behavior when the terms for negotiation duration and the mediators are each included: when it was included in the analyses with perceived team support, $\gamma = -3.28$, $SE = 1.69$, $p = .05$; when it was included in the analyses with reputation maintenance concerns, $\gamma = -3.26$, $SE = 1.70$, $p = .06$.

I also included negotiation duration as a control in a test of hypotheses 7b and 8b. As shown in Table 8, negotiation duration was again a significant Level 2 predictor of interteam coordination behavior. Replicating the general effect found before, while these hypotheses were still not supported, team unethical behavior had a marginally significant direct effect on interteam coordination behavior. When the terms for negotiation duration, interteam monitoring, the interaction, and perceived team support were included, team unethical behavior had a marginally significant negative effect, $\gamma = -4.73$, $SE = 2.50$, $p = .06$. When the terms for negotiation duration, interteam monitoring, the interaction, and

reputation maintenance concerns were included, team unethical behavior also had a marginally significant negative effect, $\gamma = -4.72$, $SE = 2.51$, $p = .06$.

Discussion

In this dissertation, I aimed to expand our understanding of the effects of team unethical behavior. I used COR (Hobfoll, 1989) as my theoretical framework to model and test the potential benefits and drawbacks of team unethical behavior on boundary spanning activities. I proposed that team unethical behavior leads to emergent cognitions reflective of resource-accumulation and resource-protection motivations (perceived team support and reputation maintenance concerns) and these cognitions, in turn, influence boundary spanning behaviors aimed at gaining new resources and protecting existing team resources (interteam coordination behavior and guard behavior). I then proposed that a contextual moderator, interteam monitoring, strengthens and weakens these pathways. Using a laboratory experiment to test these general predictions, results did not support my theoretical model. In the section that follows, I discuss these results in greater depth and offer a number of possible reasons why my hypotheses were not supported. I also offer directions for future research based on my findings.

My first set of hypotheses anticipated that team unethical behavior would increase both perceived team support and reputation maintenance concerns. However, unethical teams did not report greater perceived team support or reputation maintenance concerns than ethical teams. In terms of perceived team support, it is possible that the multiteam context provided a setting where members did not appraise unethical behavior initiated by a teammate as a signal of benevolence and competence. Two arguments support this explanation. First, compared to the risks of acting unethically while working in isolation,

there are greater risks of detection and punishment when acting unethically while working closely with other teams (Aven, 2015; Bertrand & Lunimeau, 2016). The increased risk of getting caught affects the cost-to-benefit ratio of acting unethically and increases awareness of adverse consequences (Schwartz, 1968). Given people are risk averse (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), it is possible that team members focused on the risks of unethical behavior rather than its potential gains, precluding the behavior from being appraised as supportive.

Second, the presence of an outgroup likely affected how team members evaluated the actions of their ingroup members. Gino, Gu, and Zhong (2009) conducted a series of experiments to observe people who worked in the same group as someone who acted selfishly to benefit themselves. In one iteration of this procedure, the authors found that when there was not an outgroup member present in the room, participants followed the example of the ingroup member and mimicked their selfish behavior on the task. However, when there was a member of their outgroup present, participants felt guilt and compensated for the selfish ingroup member by taking significantly less money on the task. The authors argued that working in the presence of an outgroup member activated a self-categorization process that led members to feel responsible for their ingroup member's selfish behavior. Applied to the context of my study, it is possible that team emergent cognitions reflective of resource gain, like perceived team support, emerge only when unethical teams are working in isolation. Future research could test this idea more directly with a 2 (team unethical behavior vs. control) \times 2 (teams working in isolation vs. teams working in a multiteam system) experimental design.

Regarding reputation maintenance concerns, the fact that the teams were “one-shot” laboratory teams that did not have any prior experience with each other and would not have any future interaction might have influenced why there were no differences between unethical and ethical teams. For example, it is possible that unethical teams weren’t motivated to maintain their team’s reputation because they didn’t have enough time to identify with their team and develop a concern for its reputation. In addition, if members were aware that their team would be only together for the duration of the study, they might not be motivated put forth effort to defend their team’s reputation. I would expect that in teams with longer temporal stability where members had time to develop a concern for their team’s reputation and had more to lose by protecting it, reputation maintenance concerns would increase following team unethical behavior.

My second set of hypotheses examined the effects of team unethical behavior on team boundary spanning. Through perceived team support, I expected that team unethical behavior would have a positive indirect effect on interteam coordination behavior and a negative indirect effect on guard behavior. In addition, I expected that through reputation maintenance concerns, team unethical behavior would have a negative indirect effect on interteam coordination behavior and a positive indirect effect on guard behavior. Likely due to the non-significant effects of team unethical behavior on both perceived team support and reputation maintenance concerns (indirect effects tests partly rely on the coefficient of the effect of the IV on the mediator), these hypotheses were not supported.

Regardless, I did not expect that neither perceived team support nor reputation maintenance concerns would affect interteam coordination behavior. One possible reason for this is that my interteam coordination behavior measure assessed *quantity* of the

behavior, and not *quality* of coordination. Ancona and Caldwell (1992) acknowledged that measures of the nature or pattern of interteam communication tend to be better than frequency measures. Although I followed how past research has measured team coordination (e.g., Kolbe et al., 2014), it is possible that greater frequency of interteam coordination behavior is not reflective of high-quality, efficient coordination expected by teams with more support for each other. For instance, one reason why teams could have high interteam coordination behavior could be because they needed to restart the task several times. In this case, I would not expect perceived team support to be positively related to interteam coordination behavior. Future research might explore the quality of the coordination behavior more closely. One way to do this would be to use a scale that reflects coordination quality, like the coordination scale developed by Lewis (2003). Sample items adapted from this scale include “Our team worked together with the other teams in a well-coordinated fashion,” “Our team had very few misunderstandings about what to do when working with other teams,” and “Our team needed to backtrack and start over a lot when working with other teams” (reverse coded). I would expect perceived team support to have a stronger, positive effect on interteam coordination using this scale.

Interestingly, team unethical behavior had a significant negative direct effect on interteam coordination behavior. While I did not expect team unethical behavior to directly affect boundary spanning behavior on future tasks, this offers some support for (a) a stress perspective that teams view unethical behavior in this context as a hindrance stressor, motivating them to withdraw from the task (c.f., Pearsall et al., 2009), and (b) a resource allocation perspective that ruminating about and concealing the stigma-by-

association of working with unethical teammates consumes cognitive resources that draw away from complex task engagement (c.f., Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).

Also related to my second set of hypotheses, reputation maintenance concerns did have a positive effect on guard behavior. This supports COR's prediction that when teams experience threats to their reputational resources, they will become more guarding in their interactions with other teams to prevent further loss. I also expected that team unethical behavior would have a negative indirect effect on guard behavior through perceived team support, arguing that supportive teams would be less concerned about guarding their resources. However, perceived team support had a positive effect on guard behavior in my study. One potential reason for this could be that in a negotiation context, controlling the release of information through guard behavior can be a functional strategy that is beneficial for negotiation performance (e.g., as in the case of a weak BATNA; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2008). It is possible that teams with more resources are better able or more motivated to engage in guard behavior.

In addition, although I did not expect a direct effect of team unethical behavior on guard behavior in future tasks, there was interestingly no difference between unethical and ethical teams in terms of guard behavior. Related to the temporal stability issue raised earlier, because it was a one-shot negotiation, it is possible that unethical teams did not feel motivated to display guard behavior to "save face" and manage the impressions that other teams have of them. It is also possible that guard behavior was seen as an effective strategy to use on the negotiation task by ethical teams, as mentioned above. Future research might address this issue by examining guard behavior in teams with

longer temporal stability in non-negotiation contexts. I offer a study design for how scholars might test this in the field in the Limitations section.

My last set of hypotheses examined how levels of interteam monitoring strengthened or weakened these indirect effects. I expected that the indirect effects on boundary spanning through perceived team support would be weakened when interteam monitoring is high and stronger when monitoring is low. In addition, I expected that the indirect effects on boundary spanning through reputation maintenance concerns would be strengthened when interteam monitoring is high and weakened when interteam monitoring is low. These hypotheses were not supported. Although my manipulation check showed that the interteam monitoring manipulation did increase the perceptions of being monitored by members of the other team, this surprisingly did not significantly affect reactions to team unethical behavior.

One possible explanation is that my manipulation was not strong enough. I expected that monitoring would increase attention to normative ethical standards and the potential for unethical behavior detection and sanctioning by peers, shifting how instrumental the aid was perceived to be. Based on my results, there was no support for this shift. Because merely working interdependently with other teams shifts team members' attention and frame of reference (Luciano et al., 2015), it is possible that participants were already thinking about how their actions might be viewed by those outside the team. If this was true, it is possible that the presence of monitoring would not shift how they appraised unethical behavior unless it was a more invasive form of monitoring.

My results do not show the countervailing effects of team unethical behavior I hypothesized. It is possible that there are other moderators that elicit countervailing effects. One possible moderator is related to team personality composition. According to COR, certain personality traits affect reactions to resource gain and loss (Hobfoll et al., 1990). For instance, past research has shown that personality traits, like promotion and prevention regulatory focus, make individuals more sensitive to resource gains and threats, respectively (Koopman et al., 2016). In this vein, I would expect that teams high in extraversion would be likely to experience unethical behavior as a resource gain and teams high in neuroticism to experience unethical behavior as a resource loss. Another moderator might be environmental competitiveness. In highly competitive environments where there are implications for self-esteem and status based on performance (e.g., rivalries; Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, & Reade, 2016), unethical behavior may be viewed as a morally justifiable action. If this is the case, I would expect that members might view unethical behavior more positively in fiercely competitive environments than in cooperative organizational contexts. These are just a few of the directions future research could take to provide a more comprehensive test of the potential countervailing effects of team unethical behavior on boundary spanning behavior.

Although my theoretical model was not supported, this study still contributes to the literature. First, there is a theoretical contribution to the boundary spanning literature. Existing research has relied on social identity, social network, and self-efficacy theories to build their nomological net (Joshi et al., 2009). However, these theories do not adequately account for the notion that teams are motivated to acquire and protect their resources; an idea implicit throughout research on boundary spanning. For instance, Faraj

and Yan (2009, p. 604) commented that, “team boundary work includes acquiring information and resources and managing relationships with external stakeholders, as well as protecting team resources (including members’ time and energy) from competing external demands.” In contrast to existing theories used in this literature, COR accounts for myriad resource protection motivations. Some of these implications are seen in my results. For example, COR suggests that teams facing resource threats are motivated to protect their existing resources in their interactions with other teams (Halbesleben et al., 2014). Offering some support for this, in my data, team reputation maintenance concerns had a significant positive effect on guard behavior. Because of its ability to account for several boundary spanning behaviors, I suggest COR should be used for motivating hypotheses in future boundary spanning research.

In addition, this study makes a methodological contribution to the ethics literature. To date, the ethics literature overwhelmingly focuses on predictors instead of understanding consequences of unethical behavior (e.g., Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010). This is partly due to the difficulty of measuring unethical behavior in field and experimental contexts. For example, field measures are limited because the unethical behavior is often already known of and dealt with by authority figures (e.g., Bertrand & Lunimeau, 2016; Quade et al., 2017), limiting the insights to be gleaned about how undetected unethical behavior affects team functioning. In addition, experimental approaches to studying outcomes of unethical behavior are limited because they either only examine reactions to a peer’s unethical behavior (e.g., Ruedy et al., 2013) or allow their participants to self-select into the unethical behavior condition (e.g., Bonner et al., 2017; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014). I detailed an experimental method

through which one can randomly assign team unethical behavior through the use of a confederate. This opens up the potential for examining team unethical behavior as an independent variable in experimental contexts to better understand its effects on individual- and team-level outcomes in a context with high internal validity.

Limitations

This study has several limitations that should be considered. First, this study was conducted in a laboratory setting. Although this inhibits the external validity of these findings, this setting offers high internal validity and is ideal for claims regarding causal inference (Greenberg, 1987). While I was able to test the immediate consequences of team unethical behavior and how it influences interactions with other teams, there are features of this context that limit the generalizability of my findings. However, because of the issues I raised earlier that are a result of this methodology (e.g., “one-shot” teams), it is possible that more of my model would be supported if I tested this with a field methodology. One could test this model in the field with a three-wave survey study. It would be important to study this with a sample of teams that work interdependently with other teams to accomplish common goals (e.g., teams in a research and development lab). At Time 1, team unethical behavior and interteam monitoring could be measured. To measure team unethical behavior, one could use Mitchell, Baer, Ambrose, Folger, and Palmer’s (2018) cheating behavior scale and change the referent to the team (e.g., To what extent has your team: “made up work activity to look better,” “exaggerated work hours to look more productive,” “made up an excuse to avoid being in trouble for not completing work”). To measure interteam monitoring, one could adapt De Jong and Elfring’s (2010) team monitoring scale, with items such as “In this team we keep close

track of whether other teams perform as expected” and “In this team we check whether other teams meet their obligations to our team.” At Time 2, the mediators could be measured using the scales I employed in my study. At Time 3, interteam coordination and guard behavior could be measured. One could use Ancona and Caldwell’s (1992) measures of interteam coordination (e.g., To what extent does your team: “coordinate activities with external groups” and “keep other groups in the company informed of your team’s activities”) and guard behavior (e.g., To what extent does your team: “keep news about the team secret from others in the company until the appropriate time” and “control the release of information from the team in an effort to present the profile we want to show”). Although testing my theoretical model in a field context would decrease the ability to make causal claims, it would strengthen the generalizability of the findings.

One limitation of using COR in this context is its vagueness of what are considered resources and what are not. Resources in the theory are defined as “anything perceived by individuals to help attain his or her goals” (Halbesleben et al., 2014, p. 1338). This broad definition makes it difficult to specify the nature of resources, and some have raised issues that anything that holds value could be considered a resource (e.g., Gorgievski, Halbesleben, & Bakker, 2011). In this dissertation I considered perceived team support and reputation as resources because they help team members reach their goals. According to self-determination theory, needs like autonomy, relatedness, and competence are universally valued (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Both team support and reputation fulfil relatedness needs. For instance, perceiving that others on the team care and will offer support if task assistance is needed signals that one has positive, close relationships with others. In addition, good reputations are needed for fulfilling

relatedness needs—people with poor reputations (e.g., being known for acting unethically) tend to be ostracized by others and denied close relationships (Quade et al., 2017). It is important for research to specify the nature of their focal resources and how they are helping people and teams reach goals to be a true test and extension of COR.

Another limitation is that my manipulation of interteam monitoring was relatively mild. On a seven-point scale from *not at all* to *extremely*, teams in the monitoring condition responded on average to the statement that they felt monitored by the other team during the (anagram) task with a 2.47. The difference between monitored and non-monitored groups was marginally significant and corresponded to a small effect. Part of the issue could be because there is a potential difference between how much they *felt* they were being monitored compared to whether or not they could *actually* be monitored. To address this, I asked a subset of the teams to respond to the degree to which they could monitor a member of the other team. The mean response of teams in the interteam monitoring condition was 3.46, which is (a) higher than response using the other statement, (b) significantly higher than how teams in the no interteam monitoring condition responded to that statement, and (c) indicative of a large effect. Taken together, it is possible that teams were aware they *could* monitor other teams if they wanted to (and could be monitored) but largely did not *feel* they were being monitored. This could be due to how I structured my manipulation. For teams in the interteam monitoring condition, I had the webcam pointed toward participants but their computer screen could not be seen (this was done so unethical behavior could not be potentially immediately detected). It is possible that a more invasive monitoring could have produced a significant difference in felt monitoring between teams that were monitored versus not monitored.

Another limitation is that I do not have a manipulation check for my team unethical behavior manipulation. Although Spoelma et al. (under review) found that 85% of the participants in their manipulation check study said that looking up answers to help the group score better and receive more money was unethical, future research should include a manipulation check. This could be done by asking participants at the end of the study to respond on a scale from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree* to whether their team acted unethically during the anagram task. This check could also offer support for arguments that team unethical behavior is a shared, group-level construct by showing agreement statistics on this item.

Another limitation of this study is that the $r_{wg(j)}$ values for reputation maintenance concerns were low (the median $r_{wg(j)}$ was 0.70 and the mean $r_{wg(j)}$ was 0.55). Although this is evidence of moderate interrater agreement according to LeBreton and Senter (2008), this means 45% of the variance in the ratings is due to error. However, one of the factors that affects interrater agreement is the newness of the measure—previously validated and established measures are expected to have higher scores (LeBreton & Senter, 2008; Woehr, Loignon, Schmidt, Loughry, and Ohland, 2015). Since I adapted an individual-level reputation maintenance concerns measure to refer to team-level concerns, it is possible that the novelty of the scale in team contexts is contributing to the low interrater agreement values. In the case of low $r_{wg(j)}$ values, scholars suggest conducting sensitivity analyses, wherein data are analyzed with and without low agreement teams. As Biemann, Cole, and Voelpel (2012) write, “if the sensitivity analyses yield a similar pattern of results, researchers can be more confident that the mixing of high and low agreement groups was not a serious enough problem to disparage hypothesis testing” (p. 74). I

conducted these analyses and the results with and without low agreement teams were similar. This means that my hypotheses tests using aggregated reputation maintenance concerns were still appropriate, even though some teams had low $r_{wg(j)}$ values.

In addition, the ICC(1) and ICC(2) values of the team emergent cognitions I used in this study were not significant. While using a confederate in every team by design lowered between-team variability, decreasing ICC(1), it is potentially problematic that there was such low between-team variability to predict. I conducted a three-level variance decomposition of perceived team support and reputation maintenance concerns and found that 98.91%, 0.93%, and 0.16% of the variance in perceived team support, and 98.11%, 0.16%, and 1.74% of the variance in reputation maintenance concerns, were attributable to the individual, team, and multiteam levels, respectively. This means that there was very small variance to predict at the team level of analysis in my team emergent cognitions and could be one reason why my hypotheses weren't supported: there was not variance between teams in my focal constructs to predict and explain.

My analytical technique is also a limitation. It is possible to test all the relationships in my model simultaneously. However, I used random coefficients modeling using hierarchical linear modeling, which is limited in that it can only model one dependent variable at a time. While I did not find support for my hypotheses testing my model with a piece-meal approach, it is possible that there would be more support for relationships of interest if I were to examine all of my hypothesized links simultaneously. To do this, one might use a structural equation modeling framework, which enables analyzing multiple pathways at once.

Another limitation of this study is that my dependent variables are boundary spanning behaviors and not traditional performance outcomes. It would be interesting for future research to consider how interteam coordination and guard behavior influence both team-level and multiteam-level performance outcomes. I would expect that, in this negotiation context, coordination and guard behavior would be good for teams, as coordination creates more joint gain, but guard behavior creates more distributive gain. Providing some support for this notion, using random coefficients modeling to account for the nested structure of the data, I found that interteam coordination behavior had a significant, positive effect on a team's total value they earned from the negotiation ($\gamma = 1.63, SE = .67, p = .02$). However, guard behavior did not have a significant effect on a team's total value ($\gamma = -7.28, SE = 6.75, p = .28$). In terms of effects on the larger system, I would expect that interteam coordination behavior to be beneficial for both teams' performance and guard behavior to be detrimental for both teams' performance. However, testing this prediction would require modeling a team-level predictor of a MTS-level outcome, which introduces statistical concerns, such as modeling a Level-1 predictor on a Level-2 outcome (Preacher, Zyphur, & Zhang, 2010).

There are also several boundary conditions to my definition of group unethical behavior that limit the generalizability of this study. The first is that I considered behavior that violates societal values, laws, or standards of proper ethical conduct but is intended to promote the functioning of the team in addition to benefiting the offending team member. I would not expect unethical behavior to lead to perceptions of team resource gain if it were only benefiting the group member engaging in the action. I also examined an isolated episode of unethical behavior; teams had not engaged in unethical

behavior in the past and would not act unethically in the future. I would expect that teams which had acted unethically in the past might be more prone to guilt, also precluding resource gain appraisal. Third, I examined behavior that the team “got away with,” and was not reported by anyone outside the team. I would expect that behavior that is immediately detected would cause guilt and shame, causing members to engage in behaviors directed toward others to morally cleanse and exemplify their good traits (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Bonner et al., 2017). Finally, I examined behavior that was initiated by one team member but accepted and condoned by the rest of the team. I would expect that hidden unethical behavior would not create shared team-level emergent cognitions.

This study is also limited in that I did not find strong evidence for an effect of team unethical behavior on boundary spanning behavior. While I did find a significant negative direct effect of unethical behavior on interteam coordination, it is possible that my method prohibited me from stronger and more consistent effects on interteam coordination and guard behavior. It is also possible that unethical behavior has stronger effects on team boundary spanning behaviors directed at stakeholders with more power to reward or punish their behavior. While I examined coordination and guard behavior directed toward teams with equal power, teams also engage in representation boundary spanning activities. These behaviors are directed toward those at positions of greater power than the focal team and include “actions that persuade others of team decisions, request resources, and protect the group” (Marrone, 2010, p. 917). It would be interesting for future research to consider whether unethical teams’ boundary spanning behavior differs depending on the target. I would expect that unethical teams would be more

guarding, for instance, in their interactions with stakeholders with more power to sanction and reward than stakeholders with no power.

Another limitation is that I only examined outcomes of unethical behavior for the focal team engaging in the act. An interesting direction for future research would be to examine how one team's unethical behavior affects other teams. For example, it would be interesting to study how one team's unethical behavior affects another team's propensity to act unethically. The predominant view in the field is that unethical and deviant practices spread because of social information processing and social learning (e.g., Palmer & Yenkey, 2015; Robinson & O'Leary-Kelly, 1998). However, it is also possible that unethical behavior also spreads when teams are *not* aware of other team's illicit practices. According to general strain theory, strain from the pressure to achieve socially valued goals motivates people to commit crimes (Agnew, Piquero, & Cullen, 2009). Strains are caused from either the loss of positive stimuli, the presence of negative stimuli, or the inability to reach desired goals. In the case of competing groups, if one group acts unethically to gain an advantage, this puts pressure on other groups to achieve the similar level of performance. In this way, even though teams aren't aware of other teams' unethical behavior, they still may be likely to engage in unethical behavior to meet their goals. For instance, in the Tour de France, a large motivator of the US Cycling Team doping practices led by Lance Armstrong was to remain competitive with other teams who were doping (Hamilton & Coyle, 2013). In contrast to social information and social learning theories, general strain theory proposes that it is not necessary to be aware that other teams are acting unethically—simply feeling the strain from having to remain competitive is enough to provoke unethical behavior. It would be interesting for future

research to use this theoretical rationale to extend theory on how unethical behaviors diffuse among teams in organizations.

Conclusion

By integrating research on unethical behavior and team boundary spanning using COR, I proposed and tested a model examining the benefits and drawbacks of team unethical behavior in multiteam contexts. Overall, while the results did not support the model, I hope this work spurs more investigation into the complex relationship between a team's unethical behavior and its interactions with other teams.

Tables and Figures

Table 1. Study correlations.

| Variable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|------------------------------------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| 1. Team Unethical Behavior | | | | | |
| 2. Interteam Monitoring | 0.00 | | | | |
| 3. Perceived Team Support | -0.04 | -0.07 | | | |
| 4. Reputation Maintenance Concerns | -0.05 | -0.10 | 0.29** | | |
| 5. Interteam Coordination Behavior | -0.17 | -0.08 | -0.01 | 0.02 | |
| 6. Guard Behavior | -0.02 | 0.07 | 0.18 | 0.23* | -0.04 |

Note. $N = 108$ teams. Team unethical behavior was coded such that 0 = ethical behavior and 1 = unethical behavior. Interteam monitoring was coded such that 0 = no interteam monitoring and 1 = interteam monitoring.

** = $p < .01$

* = $p < .05$

Table 2. Means and standard deviations of experimental conditions.

| Experimental Condition | Perceived Team Support | Reputation Maintenance Concerns | Interteam Coordination Behavior | Guard Behavior |
|---|------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------|
| Team Unethical Behavior/Interteam Monitoring | 4.60 (.88) | 3.69 (.95) | 22.52 (10.04) | 4.60 (1.06) |
| Team Unethical Behavior/No Interteam Monitoring | 4.73 (.82) | 3.99 (1.22) | 21.59 (11.86) | 4.34 (1.19) |
| Team Ethical Behavior/Interteam Monitoring | 4.68 (.78) | 3.88 (1.03) | 23.56 (10.29) | 4.56 (1.52) |
| Team Ethical Behavior/No Interteam Monitoring | 4.78 (.76) | 3.98 (1.02) | 28.07 (11.41) | 4.49 (1.23) |
| Totals | 4.70 (.79) | 3.88 (1.05) | 23.94 (11.06) | 4.50 (1.25) |

Note. $N = 108$ teams. There were 27 teams per condition. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Perceived team support, reputation maintenance concerns, and guard behavior were measured on seven-point scales. Interteam coordination behavior is a count variable.

Table 3. Regression analyses for hypotheses 1-6.

| Variable | Perceived Team Support | Reputation Maintenance Concerns | Interteam Coordination Behavior | Guard Behavior | Interteam Coordination Behavior | Guard Behavior |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|----------------|
| Intercept | 4.73** (.10) | 3.94** (.13) | 27.18** (5.82) | 3.44** (.59) | 25.42** (3.80) | 3.40** (.49) |
| Team Unethical Behavior | -0.07 (.17) | -0.12 (.20) | -3.78 [†] (2.07) | -0.16 (.21) | -3.75 [†] (2.09) | -0.15 (.20) |
| Perceived Team Support | | | -0.29 (1.20) | 0.24* (.12) | | |
| Reputation Maintenance Concerns | | | | | 0.10 (.89) | 0.30** (.10) |

Note. $N = 108$ teams. Coefficient estimations are fixed effects with robust standard errors. Standard errors are in parentheses.

** = $p < .01$

* = $p < .05$

[†] = $p < .10$

Table 4. Indirect estimates and confidence intervals for hypotheses 3-6.

| Indirect Effect Pathway | Indirect Effect | LL 95% CI | UL 95% CI |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------|-----------|
| TUB → PTS → IC | 0.02 | -10.04 | 14.60 |
| TUB → PTS → GB | -0.02 | -0.17 | 0.15 |
| TUB → RMC → IC | -0.01 | -9.43 | 8.91 |
| TUB → RMC → GB | -0.04 | -0.15 | 0.14 |

Note. $N = 108$ teams. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.

Unstandardized coefficients are reported. Bootstrap sample size was 10,000. TUB = team unethical behavior. IM = interteam monitoring. PTS = perceived team support. RMC = reputation maintenance concerns. IC = interteam coordination. GB = guard behavior.

Table 5. Regression analyses for hypotheses 7-8.

| Variable | Perceived Team Support | Perceived Team Support | Interteam Coordination Behavior | Guard Behavior | Reputation Maintenance Concerns | Reputation Maintenance Concerns | Interteam Coordination Behavior | Guard Behavior |
|-----------|------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------|
| Intercept | 4.79** (.13) | 4.78** (.14) | 29.77** (6.03) | 3.46** (.54) | 4.05** (.16) | 3.99** (.19) | 27.75** (3.95) | 3.41** (.46) |
| TUB | -0.07 (.17) | -0.05 (.24) | -6.50* (3.09) | -0.28 (.29) | -0.12 (.20) | -0.01 (.30) | -6.48* (3.11) | -0.33 (.30) |
| IM | -0.12 (.14) | -0.10 (.19) | -4.55 (2.89) | -0.08 (.32) | -0.21 (.18) | -0.09 (.27) | -4.51 (2.90) | -0.12 (.32) |
| TUB × IM | | -0.03 (.30) | 5.43 (4.12) | 0.25 (.43) | | -0.24 (.39) | 5.46 (4.14) | 0.38 (.43) |
| PTS | | | -0.35 (1.22) | 0.24* (.12) | | | | |
| RMC | | | | | | | 0.08 (.88) | 0.32** (.10) |

Note. $N = 108$ teams. Coefficient estimations are fixed effects with robust standard errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. TUB = team unethical behavior. IM = interteam monitoring. PTS = perceived team support. RMC = reputation maintenance concerns.

** = $p < .01$

* = $p < .05$

Table 6. Indirect effect estimates and confidence intervals for hypotheses 7-8.

| Indirect Effect Pathway | Indirect Effect | LL 95% CI | UL 95% CI |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------|-----------|
| TUB × IM → PTS → IC | 0.01 | -0.78 | 0.87 |
| TUB × IM → RMC → IC | -0.01 | -0.91 | 0.86 |
| TUB × IM → PTS → GB | -0.02 | -0.18 | 0.16 |
| TUB × IM → RMC → GB | -0.08 | -0.35 | 0.17 |

Note. $N = 108$ teams. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.

Unstandardized coefficients are reported. Bootstrap sample size was 10,000. TUB = team unethical behavior. IM = interteam monitoring. PTS = perceived team support. RMC = reputation maintenance concerns. IC = interteam coordination. GB = guard behavior.

Table 7. Supplemental analyses of hypotheses 3 and 5.

| Variable | Perceived Team Support | Reputation Maintenance Concerns | Interteam Coordination Behavior | Interteam Coordination Behavior |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Intercept | 4.73** (.10) | 3.94** (.13) | 26.74** (4.87) | 25.14** (3.20) |
| Level 2 Predictor | | | | |
| Negotiation Duration | | | 0.01** (.00) | 0.01** (.00) |
| Level 1 Predictors | | | | |
| Team Unethical Behavior | -0.07 (.17) | -0.12 (.20) | -3.28 [†] (1.69) | -3.26 [†] (1.70) |
| Perceived Team Support | | | -0.25 (.97) | |
| Reputation Maintenance Concerns | | | | 0.11 (.72) |

Note. $N = 108$ teams. Coefficient estimations are fixed effects with robust standard errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. Negotiation duration is the duration of the negotiation in seconds.

** = $p < .01$

* = $p < .05$

† = $p < .10$

Table 8. Supplemental analyses of hypotheses 7b and 8b.

| Variable | Perceived Team Support | Perceived Team Support | Interteam Coordination Behavior | Reputation Maintenance Concerns | Reputation Maintenance Concerns | Interteam Coordination Behavior |
|---|------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Intercept | 4.79** (.13) | 4.78** (.14) | 28.32** (5.30) | 4.05** (.16) | 3.99** (.19) | 26.55** (3.52) |
| Level 2 Predictor | | | | | | |
| Negotiation Duration | | | 0.01** (.00) | | | 0.01** (.00) |
| Level 1 Predictors | | | | | | |
| Team Unethical Behavior | -0.07 (.17) | -0.05 (.24) | -4.73 [†] (2.50) | -0.12 (.20) | -0.01 (.30) | -4.72 [†] (2.51) |
| Interteam Monitoring | -0.12 (.14) | -0.10 (.19) | -2.69 (2.66) | -0.21 (.18) | -0.09 (.27) | -2.65 (2.66) |
| Team Unethical Behavior × Interteam Monitoring | | -0.03 (.30) | 2.88 (3.40) | | -0.24 (.39) | 2.90 (3.40) |
| Perceived Team Support | | | -0.30 (.99) | | | |
| Reputation Maintenance Concerns | | | | | | 0.09 (.72) |

Note. $N = 108$ teams. Coefficient estimations are fixed effects with robust standard errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. Negotiation duration is the duration of the negotiation in seconds.

** = $p < .01$

* = $p < .05$

[†] = $p < .10$

Figure 1. Conceptual model.




Figure 2. Plotted interactions of the proposed moderation hypotheses.




Figure 3. An overview of how the study tasks, manipulations, and measures were sequenced.




Figure 4. The moderating role of interteam monitoring on the relationship between team unethical behavior and perceived team support (Hypothesis 7a).





Figure 5. The moderating role of interteam monitoring on the relationship between team unethical behavior and reputation maintenance concerns (Hypothesis 8a).



Appendices

Appendix A: Vacation Planning Task

Your next task is to work together, using the internet, to plan a vacation to New York City for a family of four – 2 parents and their 2 teenage kids. The trip will be for 5 days in December (fly in on day 1 and out on day 5), and needs to stay under the budget of \$1,000 per day. The family has won free plane tickets, so you do not need to worry about a flight into NYC. They have also secured hotel reservations, and have paid for those already. Beyond that, you have a lot of flexibility in what activities, etc. you want to plan. Your goal is to schedule a full itinerary of activities for an adventurous family for 2 of the days you are in NYC while staying at or under the budget. Because you only have 10 minutes for this, your responses should take the form of what you will do for each day, for how long, and the approximate cost. Do not worry about finding specific places to eat, only budget for what you would spend.

For example, this is what a planned day for a vacation in Tucson could look like:

Monday: 8-12 – Hike Sabino Canyon (\$5)
 12-1 – Lunch (\$50)
 1-5 – Sonoran Desert Museum (\$80)
 5-6 – Dinner (\$70)
 6-9 – Movie at The Loft (\$35)

Please write your responses here:

Appendix B: Anagram Task Instructions

Team Member 1

The next task you will be working on together is one where your team will have to solve as many anagrams as you can in 5 minutes without any outside aid. The task is pretty straightforward. You will see letter strings jumbled up and need to unscramble them in order to make an English word. All the words are common words. For instance, EFOIFC would be correctly unscrambled to OFFICE.

For this task, your team can gain money based on your team's overall performance. You'll be able to communicate with each other over Skype in a private conversation window. Each of you are going to get a different set of 15 anagrams. Your team's overall score will be your combined performance out of 30. Does anyone have any questions? If not, type "ready" in this conversation. I will bring you the anagrams when everyone is ready.

| | | |
|----|---------|--|
| 1 | HACTW | |
| 2 | HGTIL | |
| 3 | DOREL | |
| 4 | GHNCAE | |
| 5 | UPECRIT | |
| 6 | ENBMRU | |
| 7 | SECECIN | |
| 8 | GRBUTHO | |
| 9 | ISNGATA | |
| 10 | NTAEMG | |
| 11 | OHNUEG | |
| 12 | HAECMIN | |
| 13 | SAWNRE | |
| 14 | IBNEDH | |
| 15 | TEUYBA | |

Team Member 2

Experimenter: The next task you will be working on together is one where your team will have to solve as many anagrams as you can in 5 minutes without any outside aid. The task is pretty straightforward. You will see letter strings jumbled up and need to unscramble them in order to make an English word. All the words are common words. For instance, EFOIFC would be correctly unscrambled to OFFICE.

For this task, your team can gain money based on your team's overall performance. You'll be able to communicate with each over Skype in a private conversation window. Each of you are going to get a different set of 15 anagrams. Your team's overall score will be your combined performance out of 30. Does anyone have any questions? If not, type "ready" in this conversation. I will bring you the anagrams when everyone is ready.

| | | |
|----|-----------|--|
| 1 | JNIPMUG | |
| 2 | HGITWE | |
| 3 | EOSHU | |
| 4 | RITCLAI | |
| 5 | SNEGMSRES | |
| 6 | LOCISA | |
| 7 | DOCRW | |
| 8 | WJLEE | |
| 9 | CRODRE | |
| 10 | MCONMO | |
| 11 | ITNREW | |
| 12 | SACOT | |
| 13 | VOIDASR | |
| 14 | SENTO | |
| 15 | SEUBISNS | |

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