

WHAT KIND OF PEACE?  
CONFLICT TERMINATION, PEACEBUILDING STRATEGIES, AND THE POST-CIVIL  
CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

by

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

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
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## DEDICATION

To Casey and Sofi – the people who bring peace to my life.

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## ABSTRACT

Peace is often defined as the “absence of violence” which not only relegates it to the residual effect, but impacts how we understand the impact of different post-conflict elements. Though there is acknowledgment that conflicts terminate in different ways, very little is understood regarding the impact of that termination on the long-term peace outcomes. Utilizing a dependent variable that treats the post-conflict environment as more than a residual effect is necessary for better understanding the impact of conflict termination. Peacebuilding strategies are an important part of recovering from civil conflict and yet the connection between the way a conflict ends and the long-term peacebuilding outcomes remains under explored.

To understand the impact of the way in which the conflict is terminated on post-conflict peacebuilding success, this dissertation addresses the topic through a mixed methods approach. Chapter one introduces the dissertation, it’s purpose and an outline of the chapters. Following that, Chapter two reviews the literature on why civil conflicts recur and the dynamics that impact the post-conflict environment. It also addresses the creation of the term “peacebuilding” and its use in both scholarly and practitioner work. Chapter two concludes with the finding that a gap exists between connecting our understanding of the impact of conflict termination on long-term peacebuilding. Chapter three outlines the problems which must be addressed in the post-conflict environment and provides a new framework for understanding why different levels of peacebuilding success might be achieved. Chapter four contains empirical analysis of the a new dataset, the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Index designed to provide a new dependent variable on which to test termination theories. Chapter five contains a qualitative approach to understanding the impact of terminating a conflict through peace agreements by looking at two cities and their experience with post-conflict peacebuilding. The concluding chapter summarizes the

contribution of the dissertation and provides suggestions for future work. Overall, I find that conflicts terminated through peace agreements are more likely to result in peacebuilding success because the agreement itself provides the agenda and removes the uncertainty that comes with either rebel or government victory. The use of a non-binary dependent variable provides additional insight into conflict termination and the post-civil conflict peacebuilding process.

# Chapter 1 - Introduction

## 1.1 Introduction

The war in Bosnia was one of the most devastating conflicts of the post-Cold War era as it included sectarian divisions, systematic rape, geographic ethnic cleansing and genocide. After more than 20 years of recovery efforts, foreign investment, and statebuilding projects, Bosnia has never seen a recurrence of violence. By all standard measures, Bosnia is peaceful and serves as an example of the impact negotiated settlements can have on peace. The Dayton Accords implemented power-sharing provisions, which guaranteed each group (Bosniak, Serb, Croat) access to state power. Though there has been no return to violence since the end of the conflict, the assumption that Bosnia is “peaceful” may be an oversimplification of life after war. The following comment was made by an ethnic Serbian man living in Sarajevo when asked to describe the general mood in the country in 2012: “The hate is worse now that it was just after the war. It’s not getting better. It’s definitely getting worse.”<sup>1</sup> His comment reflects what seems to be true in a number of post-conflict states; violence hasn’t returned, but the social divisions that characterized the war remain intact and in many cases, stronger. Current conceptions of peace focus entirely around levels of violence, but it is becoming increasingly necessary to redefine this approach in order to better understand the impact of policy decisions and life after war.

Post-civil conflict peace is a complex concept and yet it is defined in the simplest of ways in civil war studies – war/conflict (based on battle deaths) or not war/conflict. The “not war” category captures all peace environments, even those which might miss the cutoff for war by 10 battle deaths. It equates a post-conflict environment in which people are afraid to talk about the

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<sup>1</sup> Julian Borger. “Bosnian war 20 years on: peace holds but conflict continues to haunt.” *The Guardian*, 4 April 2012. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/04/bosnian-war-20-years-on>.

conflict or interact with people from other groups with one in which former groups are completely integrated into all aspects of life and can discuss the war without fear of violence breaking out again. Civil wars are particularly damaging to a society because violence is not committed by some invader from far away, but instead by a neighbor or friend who suddenly sees you as category instead of a person. Peacebuilding policies and strategies are based on the outcomes of analyses which rely on this binary outcome which ultimately results in outputs based on incorrect assumptions. If we are to rely on statistical analyses and data collection to drive policymaking and public administration, we must reconsider our current methods and consider a new approach. This will allow us to reconsider our understanding of how conflicts could be terminated for the best outcome. The current findings suggest that negotiated settlements, which usually require external intervention provide result in the longest lasting peace. This is true if peace is defined as battle deaths, but is it still true if we define it around social integration, quality of life, and the removal of external forces? Based on the example above, it would appear that we need to further investigate our assumptions regarding the best way to terminate a conflict and we must redesign our peace variable in order to conduct the investigation.

## 1.2 Motivation for Research

The initial purpose of this research project was to study post-civil conflict peace and provide a new categorical system for understanding variation in the “non-conflict” cases. I created the Post-Conflict Peace Scale which was designed to reflect the population level perspective discussed above. Current approaches view post-civil war peace as achieved or not, while the following scale acknowledges that there are different levels of peace that countries may experience. The levels are ordered and could be considered phases of peaceful development as

discussed in the previous sections. The levels (categories) are as follows: Secure (low) – violence has ended, but people live in conflict-like conditions; Functional (medium) – experiences of the war are still visible and impact social interaction and access to services, but there is some transition to normalcy; Consolidated (high) – remnants of the war are rare and society has largely recovered. My hope had been to capture individual-level measures of the peace experience so as to understand peace on the ground as opposed to from the state perspective, which is the standard in the literature. However, after creating the scale and running various analyses, it became clear that I had not actually captured peace, but instead captured peacebuilding. I wanted to connect conflict termination type and peace outcomes, but what I created instead was an intermediary variable and one which should be part of a two-stage model connecting termination type and peace. It seems likely that trauma level is actually the appropriate measure for peace in the post-conflict setting, but this poses challenges in numerous ways including definition problems, lack of data, and data collection problems. While this is a long-term goal, it became clear that creating an index which captures post-conflict peacebuilding is an appropriate first step on the way to eventually capturing the ever elusive post-civil conflict peace. This dissertation focuses on civil conflict termination and its impact on peacebuilding.

The basic question this dissertation seeks to answer is: How does conflict termination type impact post-civil conflict peacebuilding outcomes?

### 1.3 Argument in Brief

I argue that the way in which a civil conflict is terminated impacts the long-term peacebuilding outcome. I consider peace agreements, ceasefires, rebel victory, government victory, and low scale (stalemate) and hypothesize that peace agreements are likely to result in high levels of peacebuilding progress. I hypothesize that both rebel victories and government

victories will result in mid-levels of peacebuilding progress. I hypothesize that low scale conflicts and ceasefires will result in the lowest levels of peace because the conflict has not actually been resolved, but merely dropped below the battle death threshold. I base my hypotheses on the ease-incentive framework, which I introduce as a way of understanding the post-conflict environment and the actions of post-conflict regimes.

## 1.4 Research Design and Methods

I utilize a mixed methods approach to investigate my research question. I created an original dataset designed to capture variation in post-conflict peacebuilding outcomes. I utilize multiple cross-national variables across 5 indicators to capture country-peace-years and use a fixed effects model to consider the connection between peacebuilding outcomes and termination types. I then utilize interviews collected in two different post-conflict cities to better understand how termination impacts peacebuilding at the local level.

## 1.5 Outline

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on civil conflict termination and conflict recurrence as well as a review of peacebuilding strategies and approaches. I review the creation of the term “peacebuilding” in 1992 and its subsequent uses over the past few decades. I review the peacebuilding literature on the five types of termination and note that negotiated settlements are expected to have the best peace outcomes while one-sided victories are less understood. After reviewing the scholarly literature, I review the practitioners’ take on peacebuilding and what must be done after a conflict to bring about recovery. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the different types of governance found in each termination type, specifically peace agreement coalitions, rebel victors, and government victors. I find that the peace agreement

coalitions are comprehensive, but complex and that though they bring with them a framework for peacebuilding, they also bring the challenges of working with the “other side.” The literature on rebel governance provides an important insight as it shows vast and varying differences in how rebels govern during conflict. This insight is important as those rebels with governance experience are likely to have an easier time governing after the conflict and implementing peacebuilding policies. Those groups that bring no experience with them will find governing challenging, which could directly impact the level of peacebuilding that takes place.

Chapter 3 outlines my theoretical foundation, the ease-incentive framework and my expectations regarding termination type and peacebuilding progress. Civil conflicts leave destruction of all kinds behind and create a post-conflict environment which contains certain issues that must be addressed in order to bring peace. In this chapter, I identify those problems left behind from the conflict and identify the solutions needed to resolve those issues. I base my framing of the post-conflict environment in both the scholarly and practitioner literature and propose a new framework for understanding resolution of these issues. I introduce the ease-incentives framework which is similar to the opportunity and willingness framework, but is modified to specifically address the decisions faced by post-conflict regimes. After identifying the solutions to the problems of the post-conflict environment and evaluating them based on their likely ease and incentive of being implemented, I consider the termination types themselves. I find that there is little variation in the expectations around ease and incentive for the termination types. I then consider the ways in which the different post-conflict regimes might address each of the solutions and find variation in the likelihood of peacebuilding success. I hypothesize that peace agreements will have high levels of peacebuilding progress while both

forms of victory will have moderate levels and stalemates and ceasefires have low or no peacebuilding progress.

Chapter 4 introduces the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Index based on operationalizing the solutions discussed in chapter 3. It then outlines the data on which the index is constructed, which is all civil conflicts terminated between 1989 and 2010. I capture all country-peace-years between 1989 and 2010 and exclude any conflict years in order to focus on the population of interest – post-conflict years in each country. I then outline the three versions of the Peacebuilding Index that I use to test its validity. I find that peace agreements have the best peacebuilding outcomes while rebel and government victories are less clear. Stalemates and ceasefires have varying to no impact, as expected and I conclude with a discussion of the results.

Chapter 5 compares two cities from post-conflict states, Belfast in Northern Ireland and Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I conducted interviews in 2013 in both cities, although at the time my focus was on peace categories. Despite the slight change in this research question, the responses provide important information for understanding peacebuilding measures and their impact. I consider both cities from the perspective of the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Index as well as look at a few variables that were not included in the index, namely sexual violence and tourism receipts. Finally, I conclude with my own ethnographic research on conflict tourism in each city and its relationship to termination and the peacebuilding outcomes. The concluding chapter discusses questions and concerns raised by the research as well as future agendas and options.

## Chapter 2 - From War to Peace: Understanding the Post-Conflict Environment

### 2.1 Introduction

The study of civil war termination, recurrence and post-conflict peacebuilding is a large, yet disconnected gathering of literature because of the framework utilized to explain “peace.” While much of the early study of conflict was focused on interstate interactions, the post-Cold War world has seen a sharp rise in the occurrence of civil wars and with it an ever-expanding literature (Gleditsch, et al 2002). The questions of how rebel groups mobilize, why individuals join them, and why both sides decide to fight dominated early scholarly studies. Civil conflict literature emanates from early works focused on explaining why civil wars occur and the environmental factors which made war possible (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, Horowitz 1985 and 2000, Gurr 1970). The causes of civil conflict remain a popular topic and the literature now spans almost every area of international relations, including the impact of climate change and the role of refugees on conflict onset.

The early focus on explaining conflict onset quickly transitioned into explaining how wars end and the causes of that termination. As civil wars became more prevalent, they also showed an alarming trend of recurrence which suggested that understanding how conflicts ended needed to be combined with understanding what caused or allowed conflicts to recur. Scholars sought to understand how to extend post-conflict peace by understanding what caused it to fail and in doing so relegated the concept of “peace” to the non-event or “residual” status (Klein, Goertz, Diehl 2008). Recurrence is understood as a return to violence between mobilized armed groups and the government, which ultimately causes peace to be defined as “the rest of the time”, which suggests that all peace is the same. Given that there are multiple categories for most other phenomena

discussed in political science including conflict (MIDS, UCDP) it seems not only odd, but inaccurate to describe “peace” as a singular experience/environment/event. Though many studies claim to explain causes of peace by utilizing the vocabulary of peacebuilding, these studies largely explain why violence returns rather than the development of peace.

The purpose of the following section is to review the existing literature on civil conflict termination and recurrence, peacebuilding strategies and impact, and the connecting of the concepts through a new framework for understanding peacebuilding and the post-conflict environment. These reviews demonstrate that the current literature addresses why conflicts begin, why they end, and why they recur, but does not yet clearly connect the conflict’s termination with variation in peacebuilding implementation. Very little is discussed regarding the different post-conflict governance structures and their impact on the implementation of peacebuilding mechanisms. After establishing the current knowledge regarding conflict termination and conflict recurrence, I will offer a new approach that connects termination type, the post-conflict environment (PCE) and peacebuilding outcomes. Though the arguments are based on the previously existing civil conflict literature, this dissertation does not seek to explain recurrence, but instead connects conflict termination types with different peacebuilding outcomes.

In answering the question, *why do some civil conflict terminations result in higher levels of peacebuilding implementation*, I argue that the way in which the war is terminated directly impacts the PCE. This idea is in no way a revelation by itself as many scholars have focused on civil conflict termination and its outcomes. However, by using termination type to consider peacebuilding outcomes instead of conflict recurrence, a new theoretical approach is required. Borrowing from the opportunity-willingness framework, I argue that each termination type results in varying forms of ease and incentive to implement peacebuilding strategies. The following

chapter connects current understanding of conflict cycles, termination outcomes, and approaches to peacebuilding with a new explanation of the post-conflict peace environment.

## 2.2 War: How Civil Conflicts End and Why They Recur

The civil conflict literature can be divided into two general tracks: causes of conflict onset and termination. Studies focused on explaining why conflict begins account for the first half of the “conflict curve”<sup>2</sup> and identify characteristics of the state which might enable, encourage, or cause groups to rebel against the state. This literature is important for understanding the main point of contention in the conflict and for identifying what must be addressed in order for violence to stop. Additionally, this literature often identifies environmental factors which survive into the PCE and directly impact efforts to recover from the conflict. The motivation or causes of civil conflict are generally confined to either greed or grievance (or both), with both requiring the opportunity to wage war. The grievance literature stems from Ted Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation (1970) which includes marginalization, political and social exclusion, repression of particular groups, and ethnicity issues (for example, Cederman, et al. 2013, Young 2013, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Gurr 2000, Horowitz 2000). The greed literature largely emanates from Collier and Hoeffler’s argument that poverty and economic exclusion lead to rebellion because conflicts provide economic opportunity, which has grown to include the existence of lootable resources and commodity trading prices as motivators (Buhaug, et al. 2011, Ross 2006, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, De Soysa 2002, Berdal and Malone 2000). Both possible causes require the opportunity to wage war, which has been considered via state and rebel group capacity as well as geographic advantages (Walter 2009, Cunningham

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<sup>2</sup> The conflict curve here refers to the Matthew Levinger’s adaption of the United States Institute of Peace’s graphic, created by Michael Lund.

2006, Buhaug 2006). The underlying theories regarding the causes of conflict will be briefly discussed below only as they relate to the PCE and conflict recurrence. It is important to consider the factors that impact conflict termination and the type of termination itself because it directly impacts the post-conflict environment and the peacebuilding strategies employed.

The second track addresses the mechanisms that both resolve conflicts and prevent recurrence of war. While some might argue that these are two separate tracks of literature, their shared dependent variable of “conflict” and theoretical approaches place them in the same line of research. Both tracks/branches rely on the presence of “conflict” or battle deaths as the outcome to be explained and both focus on the presence of violence. Termination studies seek to understand how wars end while the recurrence literature seeks to understand why those terminations don’t always hold. It should be noted that the focus is largely on conflicts resolved through negotiated settlements, an issue that will be discussed in later sections.

### 2.2.1 How Wars End

If the study of civil conflict is a rather new field, then the study of how civil wars end is even younger. Roy Licklider, one of the first scholars to focus specifically on how civil wars are terminated stated the purpose of the field when referring to one of his early frameworks (1992) “...it [the framework he proposed] did have the advantage of specifying that the reason civil wars end the way they do was interesting, that we were concerned with the consequences of such conflicts on people...and that the connections between these factors should not be ignored in our research” (pg. 11). He notes that there are two questions related to resolving civil conflicts: “why does the fighting end when it does and why doesn’t civil violence start again later (pg. 3),” which outlines the two tracks of scholarship in this area as well as their intersection. Initially, these questions were not treated separately and were instead combined as a means of addressing

recurrence. Early studies found that dispute issues, internal politics, third party involvement, battlefield outcomes (military balance and perceptions of the future), and the nature of the settlement impacted when civil wars terminated and if they recurred. These early findings set the research agenda that continues today.

A number of factors impact the duration and ultimately the resolution of conflict including rebel capacity, geography, third party intervention, severity of the conflict, and the nature of the conflict (separatist, guerilla, etc.) Scholars have acknowledged that conflicts end in either military victory or negotiated settlement, but recent studies have separated these out further. The new dataset from UCDP/PRIO identifies three main types of termination: victory, settlement, and other (Kreutz 2010, Gletisch et al. 2002). These categories are then separated further into type of victory (government or rebel), type of settlement (ceasefire or final agreement), and “other” outcomes (stalemate, withdrawal, transformation). In the post-Cold War era (1990-2005), conflicts result in settlements and “other” types of terminations approximately 40% of the time each, while conflicts are ended through military victories about 14% (Kreutz, pg. 246). These results are not entirely surprising as intervention has become more common and third party involvement most often leads to a negotiated settlement.

The study of civil conflict termination has produced largely divergent, though not incompatible results (Hegre 2004). The difficulty in determining when conflicts start, but specifically when they end creates variation in an already highly varied case pool. Studies of duration inherently include questions of termination type because the different termination processes can directly impact the length of the conflicts. Additionally, third party intervention can both shorten and lengthen conflicts, depending on how the intervention occurs and when it enters the conflict cycle. Studies of both duration and termination find that there are some

shared causes and processes that can shorten or lengthen the conflict. Economics play an important role as the financial capacity of both the rebel groups and the state impact the ability to continue fighting and (mis)perceptions about the other sides' ability to carry on are effected by the intervention of a third party (Buhaug 2006, Hegre 2004, DeRouen and Sobek 2004, Fearon 2004). Not surprisingly, when one group is clearly stronger than the other or receives help which tips the balance in favor of one side, conflict length is shortened (Buhaug, et al 2009).

Before reviewing the specific factors that lead to conflict termination, it is important to note the factors that contribute to conflict duration as they are related to the ways in which the conflict ends. Because most studies of post-civil war peace utilize survival or duration analysis, duration is an ancillary part and a number of factors have been identified as lengthening or shortening conflict. Drawing on the third-party intervention literature, numerous scholars have demonstrated that intervention on the part of one side over the other will shorten a conflict (Fearon 2004, Olsson and Fors 2004, Collier and Hoeffler and Soderbom 2004, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000). Following the same logic, that clear asymmetry will result in a shortening of the conflict as strong rebels with strong military ties are likely to lead to a shortened conflict as well (Cunningham, et al 2009). Misperception of that relative strength is likely to lengthen the conflict (Fearon 2004) just as intervention on both sides adjusts that perception and also leads to continuation of the violence (Regan 2002). Additionally, the presence of natural and/or lootable resources provides fuel for the conflict and increases the time to termination (Olsson and Fors 2004, Ross 2004, Collier and Hoeffler and Soderbom 2004). Low quality of life (Walter 2004) and low income combined with high levels of inequality are also likely to lengthen conflict (Collier, et al 2004). Geography creates challenges for the government and the ability of rebel groups to recede and regroup outside the government's reach can extend the conflict

indefinitely (Buhaug 2006, Cunningham et al 2009). The duration of the conflict directly impacts the PCE because the longer it goes on, the more divisive and destructive it can be, which results in more obstacles to achieving long-term peace. In the following sections I review the current findings on why conflicts terminate in either victory, negotiated settlement, or stalemate.

Conflict resolution mechanisms are an important part of understanding why civil wars terminate. Mediation and negotiation are the resolution mechanisms through which violence ends and they each provide results with mixed outcomes. Participation in either approach requires a willingness on the part of all sides to come to the table and consider making concessions. Civil wars likely to be terminated by mediation are those which are territorial, longer in duration, and higher in severity (DeRouen, et al., 2011). Additionally, mediation is most likely to result in termination if the mediator is viewed as credible (Maoz and Terris 2006), have an investment in the outcome (Kydd 2006), and bring the capacity and willingness to invest resources (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006, Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 1999). Location also seems to impact where mediation takes place with the Middle East drawing a great deal of mediation interest because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict while Asia sees the least amount of mediation efforts (Wallensteen et al. 2009). Despite the seeming positive impact of mediation on termination outcomes, mediators tend to be accepted in only the worst cases, no doubt due to the recognition given to a rebel group when the government accepts mediation (Wallensteen and Svensson 2014, Melin and Svensson 2009). Third-party intervention plays varying roles in resolving conflict and the form of intervention is important as it directly impacts the perceived power balance and ability to win (Regan, et al. 2009, Regan and Grieg 2008, Regan 2002).

### 2.2.2 Victory

Victory is associated with post-conflict stability because it often results in either the complete destruction or eviction of the opponent (Toft 2010). Additionally, wars are likely to be shortened when it is likely that a military victory will occur (Fearon 2004). Government ability to respond to conflict by mobilizing troops requires access to resources and a streamlined political system – countries that lack these capabilities are likely to struggle to respond and therefore experience a longer conflict (Herbst 2004). Recent studies have found that rebel rulers (during a civil war) often struggle to balance governance with maintaining their identity and conflict goals (Arjona, et al. 2015, Mampilly 2015).

Victories can be difficult to predict because while there are certain factors that favor one side over the other, these same factors can contribute to either side winning. For example, in a conflict with strong rebel groups victory is the most likely outcome, however either side could win because of the conventional nature of a strong rebel group (Cunningham, et al 2009). Because of the difficulty in separating strong rebel groups from conventional state militaries, other factors like the ability to retreat to the periphery and evade government assault can aid a weaker rebel group in continuing the conflict, which ultimately favors their outcome (Cunningham, et al 2009). Determining which side will be victorious is largely based on capacity, allies, geography, and international political input. For example, the Rwandan genocide was resolved through a complete military victory by the RPF, who remain the ruling party 20 years after the termination of the conflict. This is not only due to their consolidation of power in the post-war setting, but the continued support of other states. While scholars have argued that victory often results in greater post-war stability, no one has argued that it results in higher levels of justice or democracy indicating that it may not ultimately lead to long-term peace, but instead a tense stability.

### 2.2.3 Negotiated Settlements

The impact of negotiated settlements on peace outcomes remains unclear as studies have argued that various provisions promote peace, often in contradiction with one another and to building peace. While the field can clearly agree that the inclusion of power-sharing provisions seems to matter for peace, there is a lack of clarity regarding their actual impact. Analyzing the design and impact of peace agreements is a new yet quickly expanding area of research. The concept of power-sharing began with Arend Lijphart (1976), although he was not seeking to explain conflict management and civil war. The term has been adopted by civil conflict scholars and expanded to denote the sharing of various forms of state power. Walter's work on resolving civil wars analyzed the ways in which the conflict ended and noted that negotiated settlements were more likely to hold if a third party provided enforcement guarantees (1997, 2002). She argued that power-sharing agreements were not enough to convince combatants to commit to peace and addressing this argument has remained the focal point of the peace agreement literature. Hartzell and Hoddie have extensively tested the impact of specific power-sharing provisions and find that territorial (autonomy) and military (integration) forms do increase the likelihood of peace, while political (consociational democracy) forms seem less likely to have a lasting impact (1997, 2003, 2005, Hartzell 1999). Some scholars have argued that the inclusion of power-sharing provisions demonstrates a credible commitment to peace (Mattes and Savun 2009, 2010) and reduces fear for the future. The costliness of these provisions remains another disputed area in the design literature as some argue that costly signals demonstrate the greatest level of commitment (Hartzell and Hoddie 1997, Jarstad and Nilsson 2008) while others argue that it is the low cost signals that allow for

real demonstration of commitment because they are the easiest to implement (DeRouen, Lea, Wallensteen 2009).

Others argue that political power-sharing further solidifies separation of the identity groups and creates obstacles for finding “sustainable peace” (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Roeder (2005) provides an alternative argument and states that power-dividing in the form of cross-cutting legislatures and executives are more effective than those with group quotas. The debate between the impact of political power-sharing and its potential for creating lasting peace and the questions surrounding the outcomes of autonomy remain a key area for peace agreement studies and yet no resolution has been found. Ceasefires, though tentative settlements, provide an additional means through which conflict can be ended. They often serve as starting points for future negotiations and can either become institutionalized and expanded or simply serve as moments for rearming on both sides. Though negotiated settlements have become the common outcome in civil conflicts, their impact on peace remains murky.

#### 2.2.4 Stalemate

The concept of the stalemate comes from Zartmann’s determination that “mutually hurting stalemates” were most likely to result in negotiation or some movement towards peace (1989, 1995). Stalemates most commonly refer to conflicts which have not yet ended, but do not appear to have any opportunity for an outcome because neither side is strong enough to defeat the other. Stalemates can refer to conflicts which remain unresolved, but fall below the battle death threshold. Identifying a stalemate can be very difficult as each sides’ perception of their ability to win may conflict with their actual capacity for victory. Studies of stalemates come in the form of conflict management research and understanding how to resolve them, rather than what causes them to occur. Lack of intervention from an outside party as well as mobility and

geographic advantages (for rebels) often result in a lengthening of the conflict, which results in a stalemate. However, why these conflicts drop below the battle death threshold without any resolution remains unclear. Stalemates are often determined by the fact that they ultimately resulted in some form of negotiated settlement (Preston 2004, Stedman 1991), but this fails to capture those conflicts which remain unresolved even though violence has been reduced.

Though resolution of the underlying issues is extremely challenging to accomplish and capture, there are cases in which it is quite obvious that the conflict remains active. Post-conflict violence is an excellent indicator of a stalemate, although it can occur after any conflict (Boyle 2014).<sup>3</sup> Though the conflict may have fizzled, the issues and actors may transform, but remain committed to continuing the dispute.<sup>4</sup> Stalemates remain the most challenging area of civil conflict research because of their vague and dynamic nature, however they play the most important role in the PCE because of their direct relationship with the issues related to the conflict.

As noted in much of the literature, findings on why conflicts recur are varied, because scholars employ different definitions of conflict, include different time periods, and use varied models. While findings on recurrence are largely drawn from the previously discussed sub-sets of “peace” literature, there are a few general studies and findings which provide a standard approach to understanding conflict recurrence. It is important to note that in these studies, “recurrence” refers to a return to full-scale conflict meaning a particular battle death threshold.

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<sup>3</sup> As Michael Boyle notes, “...violence in post-conflict states is varied and is often driven by personal grievances and criminal purposes as much as the central political fault lines of the conflict itself...the chief political actors in the post-conflict period are often substantially different from those who were prominent during the war” (2014, pg. 7).

<sup>4</sup> Boyle notes, “...that the actors of the conflict themselves have changed or been transformed into less recognizable forms...these actors may no longer be fighting for goals related to the causes belli of the war itself...shifts in the incentives and organizational structures of the chief combatants, leading them to engage in violence for reasons sometimes only peripherally related to the original conflict” (2014, pg. 8).

These studies utilize the same underlying concepts and explanations as the duration literature and also largely mimic the theories regarding conflict onset. There are three general strands which are used to explain conflict recurrence: group (rebel or government) capacity and organization, third party role, and dynamics of the previous conflict.

The capacity literature runs the gamut from state capacity to geographic opportunity and encompasses both the greed and grievance arguments. The ability of the post-conflict state to provide both resources and security guarantees to the population at large and the former rebel group (Walter 2004) reduces the likelihood of a recurrence. An improving economy (Quinn, et al 2007, Walter 2004) addresses the issue of both greed and grievance as it provides resources which allow for general prosperity and growth and economic inclusion, which is often a key part of the grievance (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2009, Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Security Sector Reform (SSR) including exclusion through power-sharing in military and local security forces as well as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) (Toft 2010, Humphreys and Weinstein 2007, Spear 2002, Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) provide a measure of inclusion (Call 2012) and security. The ability of state forces to reach different geographic locations, coupled with the rebel groups' ability to evade and regroup, directly impacts the likelihood of recurrence as well (Buhaug 2006). Access to resources, including lootable goods (minerals, diamonds, timber), combined with changing prices of commodities all impact the likelihood of recurrence of conflict and interact with public goods provision and access to state resources to promote or mitigate a return to conflict? (Ross in *Beyond Greed and Grievance*). Additionally, inclusion in the political process, whether it be via power-sharing (Call 2012, Hartzell and Hoddie 2005) or democratic elections (Mukherjee 2006, Hegre and Sambanis 2004, Esty 1995) seem to reduce the likelihood of conflict, although the timing and nature of the democratic transition (Flores and

Nooruddin 2012, Paris 2004, Chandler 2000, Rothchild and Roeder 2005, Jarstad and Sisk 2008) can actually have a destabilizing effect as political power appears to be up for grabs. In summary, there are many factors which impact recurrence and a generalized understanding of what causes states to return to conflict requires both country and group level data because of the complexity of each environment.

Third party involvement is a literature unto itself, but it is worth noting a few key (and contradictory) findings as they are directly tied to the termination of conflict. While it seems obvious that intervention during the conflict on behalf of a particular side is likely to result in one-sided victory, the role of outside parties after the conflict ends is largely understood to be stabilizing or at least violence dampening (Regan 2002). Third parties who can act as security guarantors of negotiated settlements (Walter 2002, Walter and Snyder 1999) reduce the likelihood of conflict recurring because they can impose costs on groups defecting from the peace. The presence of outside security in the form of peacekeepers often results in peace holding, despite a few severe and well known cases of failure (Howard 2008, Fortna 2004, Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006). While outside investment in rebuilding post-conflict states can result in long-term peace (Quinn, et al 2007, Doyle and Sambanis 2000), the nature of the investment and the influence and role of the donors can be destabilizing or stagnating, which can result in a return to conflict either via the same group or through the empowerment of a faction or existing group (Toft 2010, Paris in *A Liberal Peace?*). The role of third parties is largely stabilizing because of the economic, political, and security help they can provide, but because they bring their own agendas, organizational constraints, and resource limitations to a recovering state, they can have both positive and negative impacts on the likelihood of recurrence.

The dynamics of the conflict itself are thought to play an important role in future conflict because of the devastating effect of violence on populations. In his early work on interstate conflict termination, Fred Ikle aptly states, "...the use of violence itself engenders new obstacles to the reestablishment of peace. Fighting sharpens feelings of hostility." (in Licklider, 1993, pg. 257). While this is different from the conditions which led to the conflict, some of the underlying causes continue through the conflict and can remain an issue after the conflict ends. Severity refers to both casualties and infrastructure damage, but also to the use of genocide and ethnic cleansing during the conflict (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, Walter 2004, Valentino et al 2004). While higher battle deaths are likely to result in recurrence, the use of genocide remains an unclear indicator. While it may lead to greater hostility and obstacles to reconciliation, it is often an effective way to change the demographics of parts of a country thereby reducing the ability of other groups or the government to pose a challenge. Additionally, the fear and trauma created by ethnic cleansing can lead the population to accept less than appealing peace terms in order to avoid returning to conflict. The longer a conflict continues, the more likely conflict is to recur (Fortna 2004, Walter 2004, Doyle and Sambanis 2000), although this may be a function of the changes which occur when violence continues for decades. Infrastructure remains unrepaired, social divisions become hardened and solidified, and third-party intervention is likely to occur, although it may not lead to resolution of the underlying issues. Others argue that conflict itself does not result in more conflict, but rather the failure to address the initial conditions of opportunity and poor living conditions directly impacts recruitment and therefore recurrence (Walter 2004).

### 2.2.5 Victory vs. Negotiated Settlement

While there is great interest in understanding the impact of both settlements and victories on post-conflict peace there are great theoretical differences in which should lead to greater peace. Monica Toft, the champion for one-sided victory as a better route to peace builds her theory on the “give war a chance” idea which suggests that allowing wars to resolve themselves through military outcomes will produce the best results for long-term peace because the power imbalances will be resolved (Luttwak 1999). Building on this idea, Toft argues that the post-conflict environment is about the balance of the risks of harm (costs of negotiating and defecting) and benefit (political and economic) for the parties involved (2010). She argues that negotiated settlements have a low likelihood of harm and high likelihood of benefits because of the structure of the agreements and what is generally included. Conversely, she argues that one-sided victories contain greater harm and lower benefits because there are no predetermined guarantees or protections, but instead a reliance on the governance capacity of the winner. While her ultimate argument regarding the need for security sector reform is completely correct and proven by a number of other studies (Yebleh 2016, Wulf 2004, USAID 2009) she also finds that rebel victories result in the creation of peace and democratization. Working mainly in the Cold War era, she does find some statistical support for her findings.

Peter Wallensteen addresses her data directly and points out a number of issues including the time period in which she is working (2015). Civil conflicts were not dominant during the Cold War era, but more importantly this era could be defined as the one in which the norm of democracy was battling against other forms of governance. Additionally, given that many of the conflicts of that era were specifically about regime type and governance structures, it is not entirely surprising that she might find a connection between rebel victory and democratization. Her argument that rebels are more likely to be interested in creating democracy than victorious

governments seems counterintuitive. It seems more likely that governments that just survived a conflict will seek ways to avoid experiencing the conflict again and though that might mean limited democratization, it still appears as a viable option. Wallensteen also notes the a problem with the amount of time that has passed and assigning causality to developments taking place after 20 years. In general, the impact of time on peace remains an undertested and unclear contributing factor to peace. While it is clear that the longer a post-conflict state is peaceful, the more likely it is to stay peaceful there are no clear explanations for the impact of time on peace outcomes. Both scholars pose interesting theories, but Wallensteen's critiques of Toft's findings suggest that they may not hold in the post-Cold War era and therefore her theoretical foundations may also struggle to survive. I will discuss Wallensteen's theory regarding negotiated settlements and peace in a later section.

## 2.3 Peace: Rebuilding after Conflict

In the following section, I discuss both the scholarly and practitioner approaches to building peace after conflict. I follow this with my own categorization of the post-conflict environment and compare across the three approaches. The term peacebuilding has a very specific meaning in most of the literature on civil war as it refers to peacekeeping missions that are mandated by the UN and contain 500 military personnel and a mandate to maintain peace to create a pathway to democracy. These missions are well known and have been studied as peacebuilding missions as well as peacekeeping missions (Barnett, Fang, Zurcher, 2014). The early definition of peacebuilding according to the UN relates to these missions as it requires structures and processes designed to avoid a return to conflict. However, peacebuilding is also merged with the concept of statebuilding and therefore can also refer to processes designed to create democracy or achieve "developed" status. The use of the term "peacebuilding" for these

processes has resulted in confusion in the literature's findings regarding which processes build peace and what is meant by the outcome variable of "peace." The dependent variable for peacebuilding success is almost always the binary conflict/no conflict outcome and yet others have used democracy measures to determine the success of peacebuilding. The combination of approaches in theoretical variation, conflation of definitions, and different outcome variables has resulted in a vast collection of literature that ultimately results in conflicting understanding of peacebuilding and how it works.

### 2.3.1 Peacebuilding: An International Agenda at the Local Level

The current concept of peacebuilding emanates from the foundational and much cited work from then Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace" (1992) provided an outline for increased involvement in peace operations and defined the term "post-conflict peace-building." The official definitions of each phase of conflict provided the foundations for the conflict curves discussed above and that vocabulary has become the standard for discussing peace operations. The document described peacebuilding as necessary to address the "...deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression" (par. 15) that will eventually "...consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people" (par. 55). While this document transitioned the term peacebuilding from a concept occasionally found in scholarly literature to a mission goal, it remained unclear and amorphous. As the 1990's saw the spectacular and public failures of numerous peacekeeping missions, the concept of peacebuilding was revisited as it became important for peacekeepers to do more than simply "keep peace." While numerous peacekeeping missions were successful, the public demand for more response to intrastate violence and genocide resulted in the creation of a follow-up report and new recommendations.

The “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” also known as the “Brahimi Report” (2000) reviewed the failures and proposed new ways of improving peacekeeping operations as well as building institutional support for peacebuilding efforts. The panel focused on Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR), national reconciliation, electoral assistance and building rule of law as well as the ways in which peacekeeping missions might be improved and made more robust. Though peacebuilding is still summarized as an important part of “having to assist communities and nations in making the transition from war to peace...” (pg. ix), it focuses entirely on peacekeeping missions and how they can better contribute to long-term peace. It suggests expanding the robustness of the missions, while creating an organization to manage peacebuilding operations, although the specificity of these missions remains unclear.

Following the events of 9/11 and increased concern about global security, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan convened the “High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change” to provide a new vision for 21<sup>st</sup> century collective security. The report entitled “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility” outlines slightly more specific purposes for peacebuilding in the outcome. It states that “...too little attention and too few resources to this critical challenge. Successful peacebuilding requires the deployment of peacekeepers with the right of mandates and sufficient capacity to deter would-be spoilers; funds for demobilization and disarmament, built into peacekeeping budgets; a new trust fund to fill critical gaps in rehabilitation and reintegration of combatants, as well as other early reconstruction tasks; and a focus on building State institutions and capacity, especially in the rule of law sector.” (pg. 5). Additionally, the report states, “Deploying peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces may be essential in terminating conflicts but are not sufficient for long-term recovery. Serious attention to the

longer-term process of peacebuilding in all its multiple dimensions is critical...When peacekeepers leave a country, it falls off the radar screen of the Security Council.” (pg. 71) It is important to note that throughout all of the UN documentation and policy, the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding is linked directly to peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, meaning it bears little connection to conflicts terminated by military victory or stalemate.

Figure 1. Summary of Key United Nations Documents Related to Post-Conflict Peacebuilding<sup>5</sup>

Title	Year	Impact on Peacebuilding Theory and Practice
Agenda for Peace	1992	Defined the conflict resolution cycle and post-conflict peacebuilding with vague and amorphous language. “Peacebuilding - action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict.”
Agenda for Development	1994	Connected development (a universal project for all countries) with post-conflict peacebuilding, thereby reducing the uniqueness of post-conflict states and their environment. “Development is the most secure basis for peace...Peacebuilding means fostering a culture of peace.” (par. 3 and 30)
Brahimi Report	2000	Emphasized importance of “peace operations,” which largely focused on peacekeeping, thereby making peacekeeping and peacebuilding synonymous though they are completely different processes. “All peace operations should be given the capacity to make a demonstrable difference in the lives of the people in their mission area.”
A More Secure World	2004	Created a link between peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and conflict recurrence and places the focus specifically on conflicts resolved through negotiated settlements. Though it calls for more long-term investment in the PCE to avoid relapse into war, it links only conflicts resolved through settlements to the peacebuilding agenda. “Resources spent on implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding are one of the best investments that can be made for conflict prevention – States that have experienced civil war face a high risk of recurrence.”
UNSCR 1645	2005	Established the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office tasked them with helping countries recover from war. Emphasized the need for local ownership of the process, but maintained the link between peacekeeping forces and the peacebuilding process. “[Purpose of the Commission is] to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development.” (par. 2b)
UN Peacebuilding Commission	2005-present	Expanded the concept of peacebuilding, but without any clear steps for implementation. Provides ongoing reports on peacebuilding activities in specific countries and expands the notion of peacebuilding beyond conflicts resolved through negotiation to instead include states experiencing any turmoil. Created a shift in viewing peacebuilding as limited to certain types of states and instead expanded it to include more transitioning states. “Efforts aimed at building peace do not have to follow armed conflict. The PBC can and should become engaged wherever national actors believe they could benefit from international accompaniment during difficult periods of political transitions.” (June 2015, pg. 2)

<sup>5</sup> “Resolution 1645 (2005).” United Nations Security Council “Fourth informal interactive dialogue – June 2015. Joint Summary of key outcomes by the President of the Security Council and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission.” June 25, 2015. Last accessed, August 14, 2015. URL: <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/oc/150709%20SC%20IID%2025%20June%20Joint%20summary-FINAL.pdf>.

There are four theoretical approaches to peacebuilding: liberal peacebuilding (democratization and capitalism), republican peacebuilding (social justice and social contract), governance and statebuilding as peacebuilding (stabilization), and alternative critiques (new colonialism) (Call 2012, Curtis 2012). Scholarly approaches to understanding post-civil conflict peacebuilding fall into one of the following categories: peacekeeping, democracy building, statebuilding and development, or conflict recurrence prevention through conflict resolution. I review the liberal peace literature and its critiques, because it has not only influenced the ways in which peacebuilding is studied and modeled in quantitative literature, but has been a driving factor in the development of peacebuilding theory and practice including the programs implemented in post-conflict states. It is at the heart of peacebuilding work and its influence on the study of civil conflict termination and post-conflict rebuilding cannot be overstated.

The liberal peace theory interacts with both the development and peacebuilding literature as it underlies both recovery from conflict and building sustainable conflict-resistant environments. Based on theories of democracy and peace, the theory is most often used to explain peace between states and state strength. Theories of liberal peace underlie both development goals and intervention mandates as they focus on institutionalizing democracy and building or converting the country to the liberal market economy. These theories have been translated into peacebuilding directives as can be seen in the peacebuilding missions of the 1990's. References are made to the value and necessity of democratization and market liberalization as contributors to peace in the foundational document on peacebuilding (*Agenda for Peace*, 1992). *An Agenda for Peace* includes the following statement, "There is an obvious connection between democratic practices - such as rule of law and transparency in decision-making - and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order"

(par. 59). The Brahimi Report followed this argument with the idea that “free and fair elections should be viewed as part of broader efforts to strengthen governance institutions” (par. 38). These documents demonstrate a commitment to democratization as part of the post-conflict recovery process, which is not necessarily incorrect, but fails to identify the context for implementing the system.

However, questions have been raised as to the validity of these assumptions and their application to post-conflict societies. For example, Roland Paris’ much cited work *At War’s End* (2004) proposes and demonstrates that missions which focus entirely on implementing democracy and marketization often fail to build the long-term peace outlined as the goal in the original UN definitions. While Paris does not dispute that democracy is an important part of building peace, he argues that the timing and sequencing of democratic institutions is crucial to ensuring that states become peaceful, and scholars have supported these hypotheses with statistical results and comparative analyses (Zurcher, et al 2013, Flores and Noruddin 2011, 2012, Brancati and Snyder 2011, 2013, Campbell et al 2011, Ponzio 2011, Jarstad and Sisk 2008, Richmond 2006, Reilly 2002). Transitioning states, whether it be from conflict or authoritarianism or both as is most often the case, are highly vulnerable to instability and failed transitions (Snyder 2009) which could result in violence or back-sliding. Numerous critics have used the peacebuilding missions of the 1990’s to demonstrate that the liberal peace thesis requires a number of environmental factors that recovering states rarely possess, including: stable institutions, legitimacy, and efficacy. Additionally, PCE’s may include the following obstacles to recovery: ultra-nationalism, elite manipulation, unclear control over resources, and other issues of instability and recovery that can be manipulated in a country transitioning from

post-conflict through democratization (Ponzio 2011, Jarstad and Sisk 2008, Chandler 2000).

Paris notes,

“The real shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding...include inadequate attention to domestic institutional conditions for successful democratization and marketization; insufficient appreciation of the tensions and contradictions between the various goals of peacebuilding; poor strategic coordination among the various international actors involved in these missions; lack of political will...on the part of sponsors to complete the tasks they undertake, and insufficient commitment of resources; unresolved tensions in relations between the military and non-military participants in these operations; limited knowledge of distinctive local conditions and variations across the societies hosting these missions; insufficient ‘local ownership’...and continued conceptual challenges in defining... ‘success’ and strategies for bringing operations to an effective close” (Paris in *A Liberal Peace?* pg. 39).

I note this particular theory here because it highlights the lack of attention to the specific environments which exist after conflict ends and which pose a **single starting point** approach to the resolving conflict. For example, to assume that using democracy to build peace in post-genocide Rwanda will involve the same process and outcomes as in Afghanistan or Bosnia seems unlikely. This well-known and foundational theory is at the heart of many peacebuilding strategies and yet it assumes away many of the environmental realities of the post-conflict state.

The concept of post-conflict peacebuilding has gained momentum in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and has become a focal point for both scholars and practitioners. As non-profit organizations multiply and seek to “build peace” throughout the world, scholarship on “peacebuilding” has grown exponentially. However, as noted above, the notion of peacebuilding remains amorphous and has grown to include democratization, market liberalization, human rights, gender mainstreaming, shared political power (although this often conflicts with democratization), civil society, rule of law, etc. While there is no question that the UN, its member states, and NGOs should be focused on the task of building peace, a number of critics have raised questions regarding the proposed approaches and outcomes of these organizations. For example, in a

review of post-conflict peacebuilding success, Tschirgi states “One of the persistent obstacles to more effective peacebuilding outcomes is the chronic inability of international actors to adapt their assistance to the political dynamics of the war-torn societies they seek to support” (Tschirgi, 2004, pg. i). While this report provides a critical look at peacebuilding, it still focuses largely on external factors like regional conflict and donor commitment. While these are important, they remain separated from the outcome of the conflict itself. The majority of studies take for granted that an international actor intervened, which focuses peacebuilding on countries whose conflicts were resolved via negotiated settlement. This selection bias reflects general policy approaches and program implementation, which denotes a failure in the peacebuilding agenda in general. The lack of any study linking conflict termination type to peacebuilding and studying their different outcomes rightly reflects the policy field, but wrongly fails to push forward the notion that peacebuilding is not limited to certain conflict termination types.

While scholarship has sought to explain the impact of peacebuilding on peace, it often explains the processes related to liberalization and peacekeeping and fails to connect the conflict itself with the peacebuilding process and its outcome. Liberalist underpinnings have left some to question whether the current approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding are really about rebuilding and strengthening the post-conflict society or about promoting the interests of the most powerful states, often the donor states (Sabaratnam in *A Liberal Peace?* Richmond 2006, Paris 2004, Lund 2003). Conflict prevention has become integrated with the concept of peacebuilding and while this is an important approach for holistically addressing conflict, it generalizes country and conflict specific context which must be included in any peacebuilding approach. In his critique of current approaches, Michael Lund notes that "Distinctions are often not made about the very different scales and levels on which conflict as well as peacebuilding

activity operates...and thus the very different consequences that can be expected for efforts at those differing levels" (pg. 22). This is one of the only references to the need for connecting conflict context and the post-conflict environment with peacebuilding strategies and goals. He notes that "peacebuilding is...largely approached as an expressive activity...rather than an instrumental activity..." (pg. 22). However, it is important to note that most discussions of peacebuilding refer only to conflicts resolved through negotiated settlements meaning they are completely missing those resolved via one-sided victory and those conflicts at a stalemate, which continue to burn, but at a lower level.

### 2.3.2 Practitioner Approach: Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction

The US Institute of Peace is largely devoted to addressing and resolving civil conflict and produces large quantities of research and guides focused around these issues. Working with the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, they created the *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (2009) which creates a field manual for rebuilding after conflict. This guide encompasses both the scholarly and practitioner recommendations regarding what is needed to create a functioning state. Though the end states identified in the guide "represent the ultimate goals of a society emerging from conflict" there is still a focus on statebuilding and how to create a strong and functioning state out of conflict. Though statebuilding is an important part of post-conflict rebuilding, a strong state is not necessarily a fair or just state and rebuilding governance and economy does not guarantee that the experience of the people on the ground will change or improve.

The framework identifies five “End States” that all states should be working towards and they are as follows<sup>6</sup>:

**Safe and Secure Environment-** ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence.

*Necessary conditions for success:* cessation of large scale violence, public order, legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence, physical security, territorial security

*Possible indicators of or steps to success:* separation of warring parties, enduring cease-fire/peace agreement, management of spoilers, intelligence, freedom of movement, border security, comprehensive public order system, interim law enforcement, interim judiciary, humane detention and imprisonment, disarmament and demobilization, reintegration of ex-combatants, security sector reform, security of vulnerable populations, protection of infrastructure, protection of war crimes evidence (6-37)

**Rule of Law-** ability of the people to have equal access to just laws and a trusted system of justice that holds all persons accountable, protects their human rights and ensures their safety and security.

*Necessary conditions for success:* just legal frameworks, public order, accountability to the law, access to justice, culture of lawfulness

*Possible indicators of or steps to success:* comprehensive public order system, interim law enforcement, interim judiciary, humane detention and imprisonment, transitional justice, horizontal and vertical accountability, equal access to justice, remedies for grievances, fairness, participation and communication, education and culture, legal framework assessment, short-term law reform, law reform process, content of new laws (7-63)

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<sup>6</sup> The following end states and their definitions are taken directly from pgs. 2-8 and 2-9 and reproduced verbatim here.

**Stable Governance-** ability of the people to share, access or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state.

*Necessary conditions for success:* provision of essential services, stewardship of state resources, political moderation and accountability, civic participation and empowerment.

*Possible indicators of or steps to success:* core service delivery, access and non-discrimination, host nation capacity, restoration of executive institutions and public administration, security sector reform, protection of state resources, national constituting processes, political governance and conflict management, systems of representation, legislative strengthening, civil society development, independent media and access to information, inclusive and participatory parties (8-97).

**Sustainable Economy-** ability of the people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a system of economic governance bound by law.

*Necessary conditions for success:* macroeconomic stabilization, control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to peace, market economy sustainability, employment generation

*Possible indicators of or steps to success:* control over illicit economic activity, management of natural resource wealth, reintegration of ex-combatants, infrastructure development, private sector development, human capital development, financial sector development, quick impact on employment, agricultural rehabilitation, livelihood development, monetary stability, fiscal management, legislative and regulatory framework (9-131)

**Social Well-Being-** ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement.

*Necessary conditions for success:* access to and delivery of basic needs, access to and delivery of education, return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, social reconstruction

*Possible indicators of or steps to success:* system-wide development and reform, equal access to education, quality and conflict-sensitive education, safe and voluntary return or resettlement, property dispute resolution, reintegration and rehabilitation, inter- and intra- group reconciliation, community-based development, appropriate and quality assistance, minimum standards for water, food, and shelter, minimum standards for health services (10-161).

The end states are held together by the following cross-cutting principles which should be the foundational guides for achieving the end states: host nation ownership and capacity, political primacy, legitimacy, unity of effort, security, conflict transformation, and regional engagement. These principles are important because they provide the theoretical foundation for identifying the end states and conditions and can be found throughout the scholarly literature on the topic.

### 2.2.3 Scholarly Approach: Understanding Quality Peace

The USIP guide is designed for all states recovering from conflict (and sets goals for all states in general), but the scholarly literature breaks recovery out by the way in which the conflict ended. In *Understanding Quality Peace: Peacebuilding after Civil War* (eds. Joshi and Wallensteen 2018) the authors focus specifically on post-accord states and define quality peace “in terms of whether the objectives of the peace process are achieved...and is based on the notion of successful peace processes that bring social, political, economic, changes in post-accord society and make peace more durable by, not only systematically addressing the commonly understood root causes of the armed conflict, but also, addressing the armed conflict-caused problems such as security issues related to governance” (9-10). From this concept of

agreement implementation, Wallensteen and Joshi argue that building peace via agreements includes addressing five major areas, define below:

**Post-War Security** – provide reliable security provisions through security sector reforms. Security must function to protect demobilizing groups while ensuring that they actually demobilize and address civilian concerns regarding access to and legitimacy of security forces.

*Existing Findings – Peacekeeping* - an important part of creating space for building security (Fortna 2008, Doyle and Sambanis 2007, Howard 2008, Joshi 2013, Nsia-Pepira 2014, Hultman and Kathman and Shannon 2016), but it can also pose security issues for local populations (Hultman and Kathman and Shannon 2013, Karim and Beardsley 2016, Wills 2009, Allred 2006, Grady 2010) and may not ultimately result in the protection of human rights (Murdie and Davis 2010). *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)* - discussion of DDR processes is largely case based and lacking its own dataset, but case work tends to show that DDR processes are important part of rebuilding trust and diffusing the security dilemma (Humphreys and Weinstein 2005, Knight 2008, Ozerdem 2009, Knight and Ozerdem 2004, Spear 2002 ), although it is not without its problems including inability of combatants to fully reintegrate and of societies to accept them, although there is a gendered dimension to this as well (Schuberth 2017, Verkoren and Willems and Kleingeld and Rouw 2010, Anna and Blattman and Mazurana 2011, Paes 2005). *Military power-sharing*- The sharing of power within security structures, often referred to as military power-sharing has proven to be a crucial element in reforming security structures and addressing issue of access and trust (Gilligan and Mvukiyehe and Samii 2013, Dzinesa 2007, Hartzell and Hoddie 2003).

*Third party roles* – a committed and trustworthy third party can provide security guarantees that

ultimately support security sector reform and contribute to trust-building (Walter 1997, 2002, Mironova and Whitt 2015).

**Governance** – develop mechanisms for resolving disputes related to access to power and resources through governance reforms. This must emanate from the local actors and not from “external intervenors” who impose a system on the actors, but fail to consult with and include them in the design.

*Existing Findings- Elections* – though democratization is an important part of creating access to political power for all, the holding of elections does not simply solve the problem and can in fact cause a recurrence of violence if held before the right conditions exist (Paris 2004, Chandler 2004, Flores and Nooruddin 2012, Brancati and Snyder 2012). Additionally, constraint of elites through the creation of real checks on executive power reduce the odds of civil conflict recurrence (Walter 2014). *Political powersharing-* requiring quotas or reserved positions in political bodies has received mixed reviews regarding its impact on peacebuilding when it is included in agreements and though some have found that it does contribute to longer peace, the impact of implementation is an important aspect of its success (Cammett and Malesky 2012, Mattes and Savun 2009, Mukherjee 2006, Hartzell and Hoddie 2005, Spears 2000).

**Economic Reconstruction** – contribute to rebuilding and opening of economic opportunities for marginalized segments of the population. This includes creating a functioning market which results in employment opportunities and foreign investment.

*Existing Findings-* rebuilding after civil conflict is a great challenge, made worse by the reality that the majority of states experiencing civil conflict are under-developed and poor before the conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, Collier 2003, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Kang and Meernik 2005). Economic power-sharing has received some attention and shows some ability to impact

peace, but the results are mixed and may be limited by region (Mehler 2009, Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). Rebuilding a post-war economy is the subject of an entire subfield of political economy and cannot be reviewed here, however the peacebuilding literature offers an insight into this issue. The need to stimulate market activity, draw foreign investment in the form of aid funding and private funding, create employment opportunities, and connect security and reconciliation to these processes are a foundational part of the liberal peacebuilding agenda. It assumes that free market liberalization combined with democratization will ultimately result in better peace outcomes. As with all peacebuilding processes, there are problems with timing and sequencing which can cause harm instead of recovery. While it is important to draw international support and stimulate the local market, it is important to ensure that corruption (both local and international) is accounted for and prevented through specific mechanisms.

**Reconciliation and Transitional Justice** – promote reconciliation. Transitional justice should serve to punish perpetrators while balancing the need for restorative justice and eliminating the capacity for future violence.

*Existing Findings*- transitional justice is largely comprised of the following mechanisms – amnesty, lustration, reparations, trials, and truth commissions (Binningsbo, Loyle, Elster, Gates 2012, Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 2011). The impact of the different mechanisms on long-term peace remain somewhat unclear given that many scholars focus on the concept of justice and how it can be addressed after conflict (Druckman and Wagner 2017, Call 2004, Kaminski, Marek M., et al 2006, Grodsky 2009, Thomas, Ron, and Paris 2010). Combinations of mechanisms seem to offer the best outcomes, although it is unclear why these particular combinations provide better support for peace than others (Olsen, Payne, Reiter 2010). It is unclear whether transitional justice mechanisms contribute to reconciliation or simply serve particular notions of

punishment. Additionally, there is concern that they hinder peace as they may seem unfair, exclusionary, or imposed from external actors who failed to stop the conflict. Their inclusion in peace agreements and their impact on peace seems to echo that of the other provisions in that sequencing and timing of implementation remains an unanswered question (Backer in Joshi and Wallensteen 2018). There is no cross-national dataset which considers reconciliation efforts at both the national and local levels and though transitional justice is often thought of as part of reconciliation, only a few of the mechanisms are focused on rebuilding trust (reparations, truth commissions). Example of reconciliation are completely based on case studies and often focus in “research zones” or the locations on which most studies focus thereby providing a skewed understanding of how reconciliation really works after conflict ends.

**Civil Society** – generate space for civil society to hold government accountable as well as provide goods and services to citizens when necessary. Social divisions are increased through low levels of trust, but local organizations can not only build trust on the local level, but also serve as checks on the government thereby addressing fears of future abuse.

*Existing Findings-* the role of civil society in post-conflict peace is perhaps the least studied and understood phenomena on this list and yet it is extremely important. There has been no cross-national, systematic study of civil society activities in post-war states and yet the literature abound with case studies on the importance of civil society in building peace. Similar to the issue around reconciliation, it is very difficult to track all of the organizations and individuals working to provide for the population, check the government, and advocate for rights both locally, nationally, and internationally. Civil society organizations face a number of challenges in being included in post-war rebuilding because they not only add more voices to the negotiations, but reduce efficiency and speed with which something can be accomplished. These

organizations must be viewed by external donors and actors as legitimate and important and supported without transforming the local groups into proxy actors for international agendas (Paffenholz 2015, Belloni in Jarstad and Sisk 2010, Paffenholz and Spurk 2006).

#### 2.3.4 Post-Conflict Governance: Decision-making Considerations

Governance is at the heart of civil conflict, whether it be related to the type of regime and its behavior towards the population or the governing authority over a particular territory.

Governance structures exist before the conflict, function during the violence, and are responsible for rebuilding after the conflict ends and therefore must be considered at all levels. While GDP is an environmental factor related to conflict onset, governance is the underlying cause of the conflict as it includes possible causes of conflict including repression, political exclusion, and territorial disagreement. In the following section, I review governance behavior of existing governments and rebel groups with discussion of the combination governments created through peace agreements. I do not discuss stalemates separately because they are the result of maintaining the status quo which inherently includes all other possible governance categories.

#### 2.3.5 Previous/Existing Government

Governments challenged during civil conflict are most commonly authoritarian and repressive to ensure control over various groups. Rebellion can be linked to a number of different elements including refugee movement, ethnic connections outside the state and demographics within the state, population size, poverty level, and resource accessibility (Collier 1999, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Saleyhan and Gleditsch 2006, Hegre 2006, Salehyan 2007, Gleditsch 2007, Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). Functioning democracies rarely experience civil conflict, although it can come as a result of creating a new

democracy due to uncertainty and power appearing to be “up for grabs” (Snyder 2000, Brancati and Snyder 2013). Repression is a common element of civil war onset and its recurrence in the post-conflict setting can recur without changes to the state institutions (Young 2013). An adherence to rule of law and the creation of institutions which protect it are an important part of rebuilding and avoiding recurrence because they remove the need for rebels to maintain militias in order to force elites to follow the new rules (Walter 2014). Democracies are generally accepted to be less repressive (Henderson 1991, Gartner and Regan 1994, Tilly 2006) which suggests that a government which participates in elections is more likely to avoid repression and value human rights. Some regimes adopt ideologies that require repression and the survival of these regimes in a post-war setting is unlikely to see a change in this approach (Ron 1997, Moore 2000, Poe et al. 2000, Davenport 2007, Herreros 2011). Without a transition from the previously repressive/discriminatory regime towards a democratic process there is little expectation that peacebuilding will take place.

### 2.3.6 Rebel Group Governance

In early studies of civil conflict, rebel groups were either freedom fighters seeking to end discrimination and repression or greedy war mongering groups seeking only to create financial benefits for themselves through conflict (Gurr 1970, Collier 1991, Collier and Hoeffler 2003). However, with the rise of civil conflict in the post-Cold War era there has been a move in scholarship to better understand the inner workings of rebel groups and their capacities for legitimacy. Their ability to govern was rarely considered in early scholarship because it was assumed that whomever won the war would then be constrained by the usual institutional limitations. However, this quickly became an untenable assumption given that most civil conflicts occur because of a failure to properly build institutions or rule of law and the

expectation that this practice would somehow constrain the new victor is unlikely. The governing tactics of the Taliban in Afghanistan clearly demonstrate the problems with the assumptions of institutional constraint as rulers can simply change the rules to match their own belief systems regarding rule of law. For this reason, we see a rise in new scholarship around the capacities of rebel groups to serve as governing bodies and their likelihood of creating peace. “Rebel governance” refers to the relationship between rebels and civilians in the context of a civil conflict in which the rebels serve as the governing authority (Huang 2016). Rebel groups often gain supporters because they fill the service provision gaps left by an ineffective or discriminatory government including social services, education, and security (Silverstein 2007). Many groups enter a conflict endowed with public administration skills and legitimacy as providers for a population. Some groups become so inundated with administrative responsibilities that they struggle to shed their previous identity for that of legitimate administrator (Herman 2017). Recent literature now reflects this reality more closely and provides new insights into rebel governance during war, which helps inform our understanding of their governance after war ends.

Transforming from a rebel group into a non-violent political actor is neither linear nor uniform as groups may transition between party and militia while others quickly transition away from armed mobilization and into political elites with a recognized party (de Zeeuw, ed. 2008). Though some groups limit their resources to supporters, inclusive rule is utilized by some groups to generate legitimacy amongst both domestic and external actors (Stewart 2018). The concept of order during civil conflict is directly related to the level of uncertainty experienced by locals and despite assumptions regarding rebel governance, groups can actually create highly ordered daily practices which reduce fear and uncertainty, although an adherence to human rights is not

likely to be part of the consideration. Rebel groups with short-term goals are less likely to seek legitimacy and therefore unlikely to create clear order while groups seeking regime change or territorial separation are likely to create clear institutional processes as they seek to create legitimacy they will need in the future (Arjona 2016). Rebel governance remains a complex issue and many variables contribute to the decisions made by the groups including the changing conflict dynamics and the philosophy of the leadership (Mampilly 2012). Ultimately, groups that rely on the civilian population for support and resources will create institutions that mimic the process of “statebuilding” which results in an incentive to “build on wartime institutions and experience and continue engage in social contractual...governance in the war’s aftermath” (Huang 2016).

### 2.3.7 Peace Agreement Coalitions

Peace agreements often create new combination governments which reflect the conflict dynamics as the previous regime and various combatant groups are included in varying levels of governance. Settlements which convert rebel groups into political parties and guarantee their participation in post-conflict elections result in lower instances of recurrence (Matanock 2011 and 2017). However, holding elections too early and before state institutions are strong enough to function can result in a renewal of conflict (Snyder 2000, Cederman, Hug, Krebs 2010, Collier et al. 2008, Brancati and Snyder 2011, Flores and Nooruddin 2012). Elections can also serve to institutionalize identity issues which were created during the war and which ultimately harm long-term transition towards complete democracy (Chandler 2000 and 2005, Paris 2004). Most of the peace agreement literature focuses on the crafting of the agreement and its provisions, which says little about the actual implementation or quality of the government. Hartzell and Hoddie’s work on power-sharing is well known and offers an insight into impact of including

political power-sharing and a reduction in recurring violence, but more recent work suggests that only those systems which limit the ability to mobilize and raise the cost of conflict are likely to result in longer peace (Gates, et al. 2016). None of the current work can tell us much about how the governments created by peace agreements function and make decisions as related to the agreement, as they become part of the cases included as democratic states. Given the varying nature of agreements and the political structures they create, there is still much to be learned regarding how the process of creating a peace agreement impacts the government formed as a result of the agreement.

## 2.4 Conclusion

The literature on peacebuilding approaches continues to expand while the strategies for addressing peacebuilding continue to grow and yet there is little connection between all of the different pieces. Scholarly work continues to look at case specific details that cannot necessarily explain larger trends, while practitioners seek to create manuals and guides that can be used anywhere and in any context without great concern for the dynamics created by the conflict. In the next chapter, I outline a new framework for understanding the post-civil conflict environment and the elements that must be addressed in order to start building peace. I then consider the impact of different types of conflict termination on peacebuilding outcomes and propose related hypotheses.

## Chapter 3 - Connecting War to Peace: Civil Conflict Termination and the Post-Conflict Peace Environment

### 3.1 Introduction

Civil conflicts leave devastation in physical, psychological, cultural, political, social, and economic terms. Recovering from that devastation is very difficult, but solutions do exist, as was discussed in chapter 2. Those solutions have varying levels of ease with which they might be implemented and varying levels of risk/reward/cost associated with them which impact how likely a post-conflict regime is to seek them. In addition to the costs associated with resolving each type of post-conflict problem, each post-conflict regime has its own challenges with making decisions and implementing peacebuilding because they are all different structurally. In this chapter, I consider the problems created by the conflict that need resolution in the post-conflict environment. I then propose the ease and incentive framework as a means for considering those costs and challenges associated with implementing peacebuilding and connect that with the incentives and challenges faced by post-conflict regimes. The purpose of this chapter is to utilize the ease-incentive framework to explain why I expect some conflict termination types to result in higher levels of peacebuilding progress than others.

#### 3.1.1 The Post-Conflict Environment

The way in which a conflict ends directly impacts the population's perceptions of security, provision of public goods, employment opportunities, healthcare, and opportunity. Because of the nature of civil conflicts, the civilian population experiences each phase of the war alongside the government and rebel troops and therefore has informed perceptions about the future. Unlike interstate conflicts which happen at the elite level, rebel groups are drawn from local populations and are often closely tied to particular communities and geographic areas.

Civilians are often targeted in the violence and play a role in determining whether or not the conflict ends. For example, during the Second Liberian Civil War, women from different religious and social classes gathered to demand an end to the war. When their demands went unmet, they confronted the negotiators and barricaded them in the negotiating rooms until a deal was agreed upon and the violence was halted. Conversely, citizens can demonstrate their dislike for movements towards peace and reconciliation. Without some form of popular support, civil wars cannot continue as both government and rebel forces would be depleted and unable to continue. The way in which a conflict ends leaves the population with particular perceptions about the future and their way of life.

Conceptualizing and operationalizing the levels comes from a consideration of what specifically must be addressed after conflict ends. There is no question that infrastructure, governance, and service provision are important, but they are important for all states including those that have not experienced civil conflict or are far removed from that experience. The following issues are created as a result of the conflict and I include their proposed solutions:

*Fear of return to violence* – The experience of conflict is devastating, no matter the duration and severity. However, the longer and uglier a conflict, the more likely people are to want to avoid violence in the future. The fear that conflict could start again causes people to avoid one another, remain concentrated in their conflict groups, and results in the maintenance of the security dilemma that likely contributed to conflict onset. *Neutralizing the security dilemma* occurs when the government rejects repressive tactics and values human rights and clearly demonstrates that commitment through its behavior.

*Social dysfunction based on separation and division* – Whether societies were integrated or segregated before the conflict, the violence and polarization result in separation and social

dysfunction including segregated neighborhoods/territories, lack of interaction amongst groups, and a general inability to move around the state. *Cooperation* occurs when people are able to interact with one another and freely return to their previous homes and travel throughout the state. Checkpoints and restricted movement are a hallmark of conflict because they are connected to security and territorial control – their removal indicate a return to normalcy and the ability of people to interact and return home.

*Lack of trust amongst groups/individuals* – Trust was most likely eroded prior to the conflict and could have contributed to the onset of violence. Either way, after experiencing violence at the hands of neighbors, the government and/or external actors acting on behalf of local interests the ability to trust other members of society is completely destroyed. Severity and duration of the conflict as well as the inclusion of identity issues are likely to contribute to further erosion of trust, but without it there can be no security or civic interaction.

*Reconciliation* is the practice of building trust within and between societies. This can happen at both the local and national levels and can include national healing processes (truth commissions, reparations, tribunals) and local interactions (sports, arts, education).

*Failure of local institutions* – Civil conflict is defined as state failure because the governance institutions failed to meet the needs of the people within the borders, but functionally during a civil conflict the institutions that provide public services fail to provide those services. This could include public utilities, education, asset management and identification, dispute resolution, and governance in general. This failure is not only caused by the challenge to the government, but the impact on the state economy to produce revenue as conflict impacts trading and economic output. *Economic opportunity* occurs when people have access to legal means for earning money. External actors often provide financial support at the end of a conflict, but it

comes with expectations and input. Economic opportunity indicates that external actors no longer control the market and that the people have regained control over the economic aspect of their lives.

*Anarchy (loss of law and order/security)* – Civil conflict is the very definition of anarchy in that the order and security imposed by the state has broken down with the challenge to the government. This breakdown includes violence at all levels of society and a lack of security forces capable of preventing violence. Hierarchy and order become based on armed groups and territory and there are no safety guarantees for anyone. *Providing public safety* occurs when a security force exists to prevent violence and ensure basic law and order. It also occurs when groups dissolve and fighters rejoin the population at large as civilians. The presence of a force is important, but local ownership of the force is crucial to finding lasting peace and the integration of former fighters into the population not only reduces the security threat, but gives the population the chance to begin healing.

It should be noted that public health is drastically impacted by conflict and that treatment for the physical injuries sustained because of the conflict should be included in the future, when more cross-national data are available. Additionally, the trauma that populations take with them from the conflict is long-lasting and perhaps the greatest barrier to building peace. Unfortunately, this is one of the least addressed issues in the post-conflict environment and there are very few data available about this for individual cases let alone cross-nationally. In the future, health factors should be included in this larger definition, but they have been excluded at present due to data availability.

The follow chart summarizes the many problems that exist in a post-conflict society and what is needed to resolve them.

Figure 2. Post-Civil Conflict Environmental Factors

<b><u>Environmental factor caused by conflict → Resolution or Solution</u></b>
Fear of possible return to violence → neutralize security dilemma
Social dysfunction of a divided population → cooperation through integration
Lack of trust amongst groups → reconciliation
Failure of institutions (state unable to function economically) → economic opportunity
Anarchy (loss of law and order/security) → enforcement of public safety

In the following figure, I summarize the scholarly and practitioner approaches (discussed in chapter 2) and include my own:

Figure 3. Summary of Post-Civil Conflict Peacebuilding Strategies

USIP	Joshi and Wallenstein	Sciabarra
Safe and Secure Environment	Post-War Security	Public Safety
Sustainable Economy	Economic Reconstruction	Local Ownership
Stable Governance	Governance	Neutralizing Security Dilemma
Rule of Law	Reconciliation and Transitional Justice	Reconciliation
Social Well Being	Civil Society	Social Integration

Conflict termination type is a new approach to understanding peacebuilding outcomes and an understudied area. While there is much focus on particular types of termination, as discussed above, and negotiated settlements in particular, few studies compare across termination types. An updated dataset from UCDP/PRIO utilizes their lower battle death threshold dataset and defines civil conflict termination (Kreutz 2016). The dataset inherently includes COW conflicts and is therefore more inclusive and informative as low-scale conflicts can still be devastating for populations. I utilize this dataset and its definitions, which I clarify below (Kreutz 2016).

*Peace Agreements* are the “first or last in a series of agreements, concerned with resolving or regulating the incompatibility...which is signed and/or accepted by all or the main parties active in last year of conflict” (pg.2).

*Ceasefires* “...do not include any resolution of the incompatibility...but are concerned with ending the use of force by the warring sides...” (pg.3).

*Government Victory* describes the government side “...manages to comprehensively defeat eliminate the opposition...” (pgs. 3).

*Rebel Victory* describes the exact same criteria as government victory, but with the rebel group as the victor.

*Stalemates*, I use the term “stalemate” here although in the UCDP dataset this category is categorized as “low activity.” This distinction is important because the term “stalemate” has a particular connotation in the conflict literature. Stalemates typically refer to ongoing conflicts in which neither side is able to make enough gains on the battlefield to win outright. The dataset defines them as conflicts with continuing activity that do not reach the UCDP fatalities threshold.

## 3.2 Connecting the Pieces: Termination and Peacebuilding Strategies


### 3.2.1 Opportunity and Willingness

Post-conflict peacebuilding has been addressed through a number of theoretical frameworks as discussed above, but it has not yet been discussed in terms of opportunity and willingness. While this framework is most commonly used to explain why groups decide to go to war and why others might join, it is missing from the discussion of peacebuilding. This must be caveated with the statement that it can be found in the recurrence literature as it is often used

to explain why groups return to conflict, although most often in the context of why they were able or willing to participate in the conflict in the first place. Because it is used to explain conflict initiation and expansion and because most peacebuilding processes are treated as givens with either poor implementation, lack of resources, or stalled because of a return to conflict it has not been considered. However, after a brief review of the framework and approach, I will demonstrate its use for understanding why we see different peacebuilding implementation after civil conflict.

The opportunity-willingness framework is one of the earliest approaches in the study of conflict and emanates from the work of Harvey Starr (1978) who builds on the ideas of the Sprouts (1968). They identified the “ecological triad” which consists of an entity, an environment, and the relationship between the entity and the environment. This construct matches the post-conflict environment perfectly as it consists of some form of government, the post-conflict environment of the state, and the relationship between the two. The following illustrates this relationship in the context of the post-conflict issues defined in a previous section:

Figure 4. Post-Conflict Governance and Peacebuilding and the Post-Conflict Environment



The ecological triad captures the post-conflict environment and identifies that some relationship exists between the government and the different peacebuilding mechanisms that can be implemented, but it does not offer a theoretical explanation of why the relationship varies and it is here that the opportunity-willingness framework offers a useful approach to understanding variation in the post-conflict peacebuilding environment.

The concept of opportunity (ability) and willingness (commitment) has undergone a theoretical transition as well. Starr defines opportunity as the “interaction possibility” which includes concepts of capacity, availability, and access while willingness defined as “decision to go to war” includes cost/benefit analysis, feasibility and variety of options, and perceptions of the decision-maker. These early definitions were expanded to include (opportunity) possibilities that exist and the distribution of those possibilities and (willingness) motivations and goals of decision-makers and the decision-making process (Starr and Most 1989). The concept further expanded to include “menus of choice” which used the rational actor assumption and cost/benefit

approach to describe the available options, their costs and benefits, and the factors that contribute to selecting one over the other (Russett and Starr 1992). The uncertainty that accompanies these two decision-making factors and the many pathways and calculations available to decision-makers results in outcome variation and demonstrates that political behavior is explained by both necessary conditions (Cioffi-Revilla and Starr 1995). Applications of the concept include expanding and operationalizing opportunity to include actual capabilities and willingness to regime type as well as a means for understanding why actors join a conflict (Joyce, Ghosn, Bayer 2013).


### 3.2.2 Post-Conflict Decision-making: Ease and Incentive

Opportunity and willingness provide a theoretical construct which must be transformed to explain decision-making related to governance. While the framework explains decisions to engage in conflict, in its current form it cannot help explain decision-making regarding peacebuilding. Opportunity describes the capacity to make a decision and the many options available, which is similar to the concept of “ease” in governance. Here the term “ease” refers to the cost (time, resources, complexity of bureaucracy) of implementing a policy. An authoritarian leader has greater ease in implementing a policy because he does not have to contend with complex bureaucratic checks unlike a democratic leader who must navigate varying levels and versions of decision-making checks and approvals. The concept of ease is closest to opportunity because it captures the capacity for implementing a decision which impacts the decision-making process itself. Willingness describes the commitment level of the decision-maker to a particular decision and is similar to the concept of “incentive.” Here the term “incentive” refers to the benefit (foreign aid, internal and external legitimacy) of implementing a policy. Just as a leader must consider his capacity and commitment to conflict, so must post-conflict decision-makers

consider the ease with which their policies can be implemented and the incentives for focusing on one policy over another. This is a new approach to understanding peacebuilding implementation because it acknowledges that post-conflict governments choose what to focus on and are not simply limited by resources, which is often assumed.

As discussed in previous sections, there is no shortage of guidance regarding what to do after a civil conflict occurs to bring about stability and eventually peace: hold elections, instill rule of law, rejuvenate the economic system, facilitate return and reintegration, etc. However, there is little discussion in the literature as to why different peacebuilding mechanisms are implemented or employed by different post-conflict regimes. There is an assumption that conflict dynamics (unresolved issues), lack of resources, external pressure, and other factors impact the types and levels of peacebuilding mechanisms implemented. There is a general lack of discussion of the choices that post-conflict governments make regarding the various peacebuilding strategies and why they make them. The purpose of this dissertation is to consider how termination type impacts peacebuilding outcomes because I assume that post-conflict actors consider the ease with which they can implement a strategy and the incentive/reward for doing so. The way in which a conflict ends directly impacts the post-conflict peace because it creates the starting point for the “new state.” A post-conflict environment during a peace agreement could be different from that of a new government based on rebel victory. In the following section, I outline each conflict termination and how it connects with the PCE factors identified above. In the following figure, I summarize the post-conflict environmental factors and their solutions in the ecological triad as I will discuss them in the next section.

Figure 5. Post-Conflict Environmental Factors and Peacebuilding Strategies



### 3.3 Conflict Termination and Expected Peacebuilding Outcomes

This chart denotes that the majority of variation in peacebuilding outcomes will be found in how each post-conflict regime approaches the different peacebuilding strategies.

Figure 6. Summary of Expected Ease-Incentive Outcomes and Termination Types

<b>Termination Type</b>	<b>Ease</b>	<b>Incentive</b>	<b>Peacebuilding Outcome</b>
<b>Peace agreement</b>	High	High	Medium
<b>Ceasefire</b>	Low	Low	Low/None
<b>Government Victory</b>	High	Medium	Medium
<b>Rebel Victory</b>	Medium	High	Medium
<b>Stalemate</b>	Low	Low	Low/None

#### *Termination and Peacebuilding Strategies*

Assuming that the ease-incentive framework holds, it is possible to theorize how different post-conflict governing groups might approach peacebuilding in specific areas. As noted above,

addressing all of the issues in the post-conflict environment is necessary, but regimes may include and exclude different peacebuilding strategies based on ease and capacity as well as the incentives attached to each. The following is a short summary of the issues to consider when addressing the post-conflict environment. These issues and their solutions will be operationalized in the following chapter.

*Anarchy – Public safety* – As the key issue that must be addressed after a civil conflict, there is both incentive to address this and an assumed ease given that external and internal actors are most interested in the resolution of anarchy. Providing security and public safety through peacekeeping, security sector reform, DDR, and other means are necessary to addressing the mobilization of the armed groups as well as the general safety and well-being of the population. I expect to see all actors implementing some measure of public safety strategies, no matter the way in which the conflict was terminated, except for stalemates. A stalemate indicates that the status quo has not yet changed and therefore it is unlikely that any security measures have been taken to improve public safety.

*Fear of return to violence – Neutralize security dilemma* – The fear of violence returning is not only related to conflict recurring, but also addresses the fear of post-conflict violence as retribution and continued repression by whomever takes over the new government. While the security dilemma is most often used to describe the problem between the government and rebel groups, there is also a dilemma between the population and the government as well as between groups within the population and this must be addressed. This can best be dealt with through a reduction in human rights violations by the regime as well as implementing a respect for rule of law. I expect this approach to meet with some challenges and some concerns regarding incentives. Implementing change in this area is likely to be challenging, no matter the post-

conflict regime because of the complexities of constraining the executive and creating a culture of respect for law based on a functioning legal system. Additionally, while I expect the incentives to be high, I also expect that the temptation to appear as though this is happening while seeking to circumvent it at the same time is equally high. Regimes seeking legitimacy will need to show that they are addressing this issue, but they are also likely to seek ways to get around constraints, especially if the regime has a history violating human rights.

*Lack of Trust – Reconciliation* – The population’s mistrust of one another after a conflict is not only real, but perhaps the most difficult aspect to overcome. Transitional justice is often considered the place in which national reconciliation takes place, although many have demonstrated that reconciliation is more likely to occur through local means. Trust building is a complex process that is not easily understood in non-conflict societies so it becomes that much more challenging in a post-conflict setting as there are incentives to keep people from reconciling and instead remaining loyal to groups or parties. I expect both ease and incentive to be in the mid-range for this issue as justice mechanisms are likely to be employed, but they are not all created equal and may not actually be used for reconciliation. Additionally, much like safeguarding human rights, I expect all regimes to want to appear like they are seeking reconciliation, but may not actually be working to build trust. There is a great incentive to appear as a regime focused on trust and rebuilding broken ties, but there is also an incentive to focus on legal retribution and maintaining separation between groups. The ease with which a strategy may be employed is also dependent on the level at which it takes place. National and international level efforts are actually easier than local efforts because external actors like to participate in peacebuilding and support high level/visibility actions. I expect that local level

attempts at trust are likely to be of less interest and more challenging to implement from the regime level.

*Institutional Failure – Economic opportunity* – Recovering the economy is a high priority for all regimes as it is necessary to surviving as a state. The ease of rebuilding an economy and therefore economic opportunity is low, especially in poor states because of the complexity. However, the incentive to rebuild is high for every regime as the stronger the economy, the more foreign investment can be attracted and the happier the population, which is important as regimes transition to democracy. I expect the outcomes here to be dependent on the post-conflict regime, its experience with governance, and connections to external actors.

*Social dysfunction – Integration and interaction* – Populations separate during conflict, either by leaving the country, moving to another part of the state or simply sequestering themselves from others via checkpoints and enclaves. For some civil conflicts, territorial separation and institutionalizing it is a foundational cause of the conflict. Creating opportunities for people to return from outside the state, return to their homes, and interact with people and opposing groups from the conflict is an important part of addressing the social dysfunction left behind after war. Unfortunately, I expect this to not only be difficult to do, but not viewed as highly rewarding for post-conflict regimes and therefore both low ease and low incentive. Allowing people to return and placing them back in their homes does carry some incentive as it could impact election results or change important demographics needed for power balance.

Figure 7. Expected Ease-Incentive Outcomes for Post-Conflict Problems and Peacebuilding Strategies

<b>PCE Problem</b>	<b>Peacebuilding Strategy</b>	<b>Ease</b>	<b>Incentive</b>	<b>Overall Likelihood of Peacebuilding Progress</b>
Anarchy	Public Safety/Security	High (2)	High (2)	High (4)
Fear of Violence	Neutralize Security Dilemma – prevent repression	Medium (1)	Medium (1)	Medium (2)
Lack of Trust	Reconciliation	Medium (1)	Medium (1)	Medium (2)

Institutional Failure	Economic Opportunity	Low (0)	High (2)	Medium (2)
Social Dysfunction	Integration and Interaction	Low (0)	Medium (1)	Low (1)

Numbers in parentheses denote a simple scoring system to help identify outcomes. High scores receive 2, medium scores receive 1, and low scores receive 0. The Overall category summarizes the points across the categories.

The previous section denoted that each type of post-conflict regime has issues of ease and incentive to overcome, although they are in different areas. While stalemates and ceasefires are expected to have low peacebuilding outcomes because of low ease and incentive, the other three termination types all have similar expectations of mi-level peace. They each have varying levels of ease and incentive based on the legacy they bring from the conflict. For this reason, **all of the expected variation for different termination types can be found in the section and figures below.**

The purpose of Figure 7 is to note that some strategies will be more difficult to implement than others and there will be greater incentive to implement some than others. For example, rebuilding the economy and creating economic opportunity for the population is something that most post-conflict governments will seek to do, but it is typically very challenging. I expect each strategy to carry different levels of ease-incentive for governments, but this is based entirely on how challenging it is to implement the strategy and the general perceived pay off. As stated above, each termination type’s regime carries with it particular goals and agendas that impact how the strategies are viewed. For example, while there is both incentive to address repression and a medium level of ease in doing so, some regimes may not think it is worth the effort, which would indicate that they have a low incentive for doing so while the ease remains medium. I note the different strategies and their ease-incentive structure simply to show that some are easier than others and some carry more perceived rewards than others. Each termination regime then takes this into account and makes its own determination.

### 3.3.1 Termination, Peacebuilding Strategies, and Peacebuilding Outcomes

Now that the ease-incentive structure is clear and the expectations for its application to the PCE problems has been discussed, it is time to put all of the pieces together and consider how termination type is likely to impact the implementation of peacebuilding strategies and ultimately, peacebuilding implementation and outcome. The following sections consider the likely peacebuilding outcomes for each type of termination, which will be tested empirically in the next chapter.

*Peace agreement-* Peace agreements should result in high levels of peacebuilding because they address the conflict and in the post-Cold War era usually provide a framework and incentives for rebuilding. These frameworks tend to include the provisions needed for peacebuilding including reconciliation mechanisms, respect for and protection of human rights, and democratization of some kind. While peace agreements do not usually address economic rebuilding of the state, the signing and eventual implementation of a peace agreement indicates stability and therefore makes the state more likely receive funding and investment because it appears to be less risky. The implementation of a peace agreement, which will always include security measures can result in the removal of peacekeeping forces and the opening up of movement within the state. There is a caveat with peace agreements however, which is that they must be implemented to have any real impact and implementation varies widely. A quick review of the *Peace Accords Matrix* (Joshi and Darby 2013) shows that implementation varies from 95% (Good Friday Agreement, 1998) to 7% (Abidjan Peace Agreement, 1996), which makes understanding the impact of peace agreements further challenging. Implementation and construction (provisions included) impact the ability of a peace agreement to impact

peacebuilding outcomes, but assuming the agreement is somewhat comprehensive and somewhat implemented, I expect peace agreements to result in high levels of peacebuilding success.

*Ceasefire-* Ceasefires are designed to be short term solutions to long-term problems and therefore are not expected to play an active role in peacebuilding. Unlike peace agreements, they do not contain frameworks for rebuilding, but instead focus entirely on security issues and creating space for further negotiation. Ceasefires are not likely to contain any measures regarding reconciliation, human rights or governance, and the existence of a ceasefire is likely to result in the retention of peacekeepers. Movement within the state is most likely still greatly restricted because violence has stopped, but groups have not necessarily demobilized or disarmed meaning checkpoints other movement barriers are still in place. Additionally, a state experiencing a ceasefire is still a risky investment for donors and investors and is not yet able to address economic issues. Ceasefires are not designed to build peace, but instead to create space for something else to come in its place and without regime change. I do not expect there to be any ease in making changes as the ceasefire was likely the best that could be achieved nor do I expect there to be any incentive to implement peacebuilding strategies as the parties are still calculating their goals and strategies and therefore I expect peacebuilding success to be low or non-existent.

### 3.3.2 Victory and Post-Conflict Peace

The impact of victory in civil conflict is a lesser understood dynamic as more conflicts are resolved through negotiated settlements in the post-Cold War era and yet it is an interesting set of cases. While much has been written about why and how rebels and governments decide to keep fighting or negotiate, less has been invested in understanding how these victors do after the conflict ends and they must now build peace. Victory carries with it different dynamics from

those of negotiated settlements as the victor has greater choice in how to proceed and yet, they must balance their post-conflict policies with seeking to avoid a return to violence. Victory provides an interesting space in which to consider post-conflict peacebuilding.

*Government victory* – In general and within the termination dataset, government victory occurs twice as often (24 conflict cases) as rebel victory (10 conflict cases), which is worth considering. A government victory is likely to result in medium peacebuilding success because it will be easier for the government to gain legitimacy and begin making reforms. Government victors will attract outside investment and donors because it is a known entity and cessation of violence will result in more confidence in markets. I expect government victors to be somewhat interested in reconciliation and the majority of transitional justice mechanisms employed in the post-Cold War era are actually amnesty, which allows the government to escape their behavior both during and before the conflict. It is in their interest to participate in reconciliation efforts as both a confidence building measure and a way of absolving themselves of wrongdoing both before and during the conflict. I would expect security to recover quickly under a government victor as the national security forces were strong enough to win a victory (most likely with the help of outsiders) and therefore simply need to be reconstructed in a way that actually provides security for all. The rebuilding of the security forces and clarity of order should result in a return to freedom of movement. Finally, the government victor is likely to adopt some measures which protect human rights to avoid a return to violence. This may take time, but it seems likely that it would be easier to be a little less repressive to avoid a return to violence. It is also possible that by winning they have so weakened their opposition that repressive tactics are no longer needed in the same way to ensure survival. For these reasons I suggest that government victory is likely to result in high levels of peacebuilding success.

*Rebel victory* – Rebel victory is a more complex phenomena to theorize because much would be dependent on the nature of the winning rebel group. Their ultimate goals and intentions are likely to play a role in how they approach peacebuilding. Additionally, their experience with governing during the conflict directly impacts their ability to govern later. For this reason, I expect peace outcomes to be medium with a rebel victor. They are not likely to inspire confidence from outside investors or donors because they are an unknown entity as a government. Additionally, peacekeepers are likely to stay longer as rebuilding security forces could be a long process of complete redesign which will impact freedom of movement as well. It is unclear whether a rebel group would be more likely to protect human rights and avoid repression, although it seems likely that for survival (just like the government victory) they would protect some measure of human rights. Reconciliation efforts are a larger question given that amnesty and TRCs might have to include pardoning government officials who committed previous crimes as trials can leave the victor open to new challenges. For these reasons it seems likely that rebel victory will result in medium levels of peace.

### 3.3.3 Stalemate and Post-Conflict Peace

Stalemates or low scale conflict seem unlikely to resolve any of the issues related to the conflict as they maintain the status quo. There is no driver for making change and it could be viewed as weakness for the government to make any changes regarding human rights or reconciliation in a situation that has not yet been resolved. Foreign investment is not likely to increase because of the risk and though foreign aid may be sent, it will be focused on humanitarian need, not economic rejuvenation. Security remains uncertain as well and though there may be peacekeepers, it is likely that freedom of movement is still highly restricted. Stalemates are likely to result in low forms of peace as I would not expect to see much movement on any peacebuilding measures.

Figure 8. Summary of Termination Type and Expected Peacebuilding Outcomes

<b>Termination Type</b>	<b>Public Safety (high)</b>	<b>Security Dilemma (medium)</b>	<b>Reconciliation (medium)</b>	<b>Economic Opportunity (medium)</b>	<b>Integration (low)</b>	<b>Expected Peacebuilding Outcome</b>
<i>Peace Agreement</i>	High (2)	High (2)	High (2)	High (2)	High (2)	<b>High (10)</b>
<i>Ceasefire</i>	High (2)	Low (0)	Low (0)	Low (0)	Medium (1)	<b>Low/None (3)</b>
<i>Government Victory</i>	High (2)	Medium (1)	Medium (1)	High (2)	Medium (1)	<b>Medium (7)</b>
<i>Rebel Victory</i>	High (2)	Medium (1)	High (2)	Low (0)	Medium (1)	<b>Medium (6)</b>
<i>Stalemate</i>	Low (0)	none	none	-----	none	<b>Low/None (0)</b>

The numbers in parentheses provide a simple scoring system with high=2, medium=1, and low=0. All scores of 8 and above are high, all scores between 7 and 5 are medium and all scores below 5 are low.

The purpose of Figure 8 is to connect the different types of strategies with the ease-incentive perception of each termination regime. Public Safety is both high in ease and incentive so I would expect to see most regimes seeking to implement it. As Figure 8 shows, I anticipate all types except stalemate to implement or start to implement public safety measures. Regarding the security dilemma (avoiding repression), I anticipate that it is somewhat challenging to address and perceived as somewhat important, therefore I would expect some regimes to be more likely to address it than others. I expect peace agreements to address it as avoiding repression and moving towards democracy is an important part of most agreements. However, I do not expect to see any effort in resolving repression for either a ceasefire or stalemate because ceasefires do not generally address the practices of the regime and stalemates do not change the status quo. I expect both rebel and government victors to see some rewards for avoiding repressive tactics and some ease in implementing policies which avoid them. However, I also expect some rebels and governments to see repression as a valuable means of establishing authority and depending on their existing operation structures, repression may be fairly easy to continue practicing. Though I anticipate integration to be something that is both challenging and not of great value to post-conflict regimes, I estimate that peace agreements are likely to address

this because integrating populations is often required by outside actors. I anticipate that both rebel victors and government victors will have similar approaches to this issue which is to say that based on their experience and constituent demands, they may have some challenges in integrating populations, but may see the value and vice versa. The goal of Figure 9 is to consider the likelihood of a strategy even being implemented based on its ease and the perceived incentives around it and then consider how each termination type impacts that ease-incentive baseline.

### 3.4 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to build on the literature from chapter 2 and construct a framework for understanding why I expect different peacebuilding outcomes for different termination types. The ease-incentive framework provides a means for considering how decisions are made and what risks/rewards/incentives are considered regarding implementing peacebuilding strategies. This chapter identified the strategies and identified how likely they were to be implemented based on expected ease-incentive calculations. The following chapter proposes hypotheses based on these assumptions, introduces the post-conflict peacebuilding index, and tests the hypotheses.

## Chapter 4 - Civil Conflict Termination and the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Index

### 4.1 Introduction

The concept of “peacebuilding” has morphed and changed since its inclusion in the “Agenda for Peace” and has become a popular buzzword among non-profits and policymakers when referring to anything in the post-conflict environment. It has come to encapsulate an enormous number of policies, initiatives, and development projects and has come to mean many things including statebuilding, stabilization and reconstruction, peacemaking, reconciliation, security sector reform, transitional justice, etc. While these concepts are part of peacebuilding, the lack of clarity around the concept has resulted in an uneven discussion of state attempts at peacebuilding and its connection to both conflict dynamics and conflict termination. A number of measures and indexes exist to attempt to capture the different dynamics taking place in the post-conflict environment and they demonstrate the need to capture and combine multiple processes.

Indexes have become a useful way to capture multiple dynamics and measure progress on a particular concept. For example, the concept of positive peace captures both post and non-post conflict states and defines a way in which people interact with each other as well as the government. This concept has become a part of the peacebuilding lexicon, specifically with peace practitioners. A few indexes exist which seek to capture the peacefulness of each state based on the concept of “positive peace.” The first is the *Global Peace Index* (Institute for Economics and Peace 2017) which ranks every country on a scale of more or less peaceful. It utilizes rule of law data that apply to all countries as well as additional global security issues including perceptions of criminality, homicide, incarceration, access to weapons, presence of

internal conflict, political terror, military expenditure, nuclear and heavy weapons, weapons exports, UN peacekeeping funding, and displaced people. These indicators capture a number of different elements of peacefulness, but most are not specific to what must be addressed after a civil conflict and some seem rather odd for defining internal peacefulness, like peacekeeping donor level. The index pulls from numerous sources including the UN, World Bank, and other sources. Though it captures peacefulness of a kind through its very accessible site and interactive map, the way in which the scale is constructed is more difficult to locate. The scale is constructed through discussion with a panel who determine the variables and weights to include in the scale. This large scale approach demonstrates some of the problems with attempting to capture too much data as it becomes difficult to determine what is causing somewhat peaceful states to either become more or less peaceful.

The Human Security Index (Hastings 2011) is a new and developing index designed to capture human security, which is defined as “the attainment of physical, mental, and spiritual peace/security of individuals and communities at home and in the world...” (pg. 4, “The Human Security Index: An Update and a New Release”). The index focuses around different “fabrics” of society as they relate to human security including economic, environmental, and social with the social fabric consisting of education and information empowerment, diversity, peacefulness, food security, health, and governance. It covers 232 economies and identifies in which countries human security is strongest. Built as a compliment to the Human Development Index (discussed below) the HSI combines data from existing datasets to create a singular picture of state level human security and creates a dependent variable against which different theories might be tested. While these indexes and datasets do capture data related to the concept of positive peace, they are not specific to post-civil conflict states, which creates a problem for understanding the unique

challenges faced by states and societies recovering from conflict. Both the HSI and the Global Peace Index are designed for all states and encapsulate elements of both conflict ridden and peaceful countries and though they consider the impact of conflict on a state and the people, they are not designed with this particular issue in mind. It is this gap that I seek to fill in this chapter. An index is needed which specifically considers the problems created by conflict and captures the measures taken to address those problems in the post-conflict setting. The Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Index seeks to address civil conflict specific outcomes and problems and connect recovery and peacebuilding implementation with conflict termination.

The remainder of the chapter is laid out as follows. First, I discuss the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Index and the elements that were included and why others were excluded. I explain the three variations of the index and summarize the elements and their roles. Next, I test my hypotheses from the previous chapter using cross-national data on civil conflicts terminated after 1989 and covering post-conflict years from 1990-2010. I investigate the connection between conflict termination and peacebuilding outcomes. I also test each version of the index to better understand the impact of the different forms of construction. Finally, I discuss the results of the tests and their implications for peacebuilding after civil conflict.

## 4.2 Operationalizing Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

Building an index requires a theoretical foundation based on what one is seeking to understand and the data that will best capture or represent each piece of the concept. I am seeking to understand peacebuilding outcomes after civil conflict ends and have constructed the index with this in mind. It is worth reconsidering the graphic from the previous chapter regarding where these concepts come from:

Figure 9. Summary of Post-Civil Conflict Peacebuilding Strategies

USIP	Joshi and Wallensteen	Sciabarra
Safe and Secure Environment	Post-War Security	Public Safety
Sustainable Economy	Economic Reconstruction	Economic Opportunity
Stable Governance	Governance	Neutralizing Security Dilemma
Rule of Law	Reconciliation and Transitional Justice	Reconciliation
Social Well Being	Civil Society	Social Integration

In the following section I operationalize these concepts and discuss those data were excluded and why. All indicators were scaled to 100 and combined within each index.

The unit of analysis for the index is *country-peace-year*. The purpose of this study is to begin considering and categorizing the state of peacebuilding in post-civil conflict countries. Using UCDP/PRIO's Conflict Termination dataset 2 (Kreutz, 2010) I include all civil conflicts with a termination date of 1989-2010. I then create a time series for each country that extends from the first termination date until 2010 meaning some countries have peace-years from 1990-2010 while others have peace years from 2006-2010. Years in which conflict occurs are coded as such and excluded from the analysis as the peace-years are the units of interest. This may appear to be selecting on the dependent variable, but I argue that it is not because my population of interest is countries experiencing peace and seeking to explain the variation within that population. I argue that peacebuilding cannot technically be taking place while conflict is active as it requires that peace exist first in order to build it. Additionally, my theory is focused on what happens after a conflict ends and the index was constructed with what I would expect to see in a post-conflict setting. I would need to consider and include a number of other factors to account for all of the dynamics taking place during a conflict and it would be a conflict management or resolution index as opposed to a peacebuilding index. The literature is very clear regarding what should take place after a conflict, even if it is less clear on the actual impact of

those policies. Future work will consider the relationship and index score for all years, but for this first cut I focused entirely on peace-years. If a conflict restarts after years of peace, it is coded as such and the subsequent peace years are included in the data.

Figure 10. Summary of Civil Conflict Cases and Post-Conflict Years

<b>Country</b>	<b>Conflict Years</b>	<b>Post-Conflict Peace Years</b>
Angola	1989-2002, 2004, 2007, 2009	2003, 2005-2006, 2008
Azerbaijan	1991-1998, 2005, 2008	1999-2004, 2006-2007, 2009-2010
Bangladesh	1989-1991, 2005-2006	1992-2004, 2007-2010
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992-1995	1996-2010
Burundi	1991-1992, 1994-2006, 2008	1993, 2007, 2009-2010
Cambodia	1989-1998	1999-2010
Central African Republic	2001-2002, 2006, 2009-2010	2003-2005, 2007-2008
Chad	1989-1994, 1997-2003, 2005-2010	1995-1996, 2004,
China	2008	2009-2010
Comoros	1989, 1997	1999-2006, 1998-2010
Congo	1993, 1997-1999, 2002	1994-1996, 2000-2001, 2003-2010
Croatia	1991-1993, 1995	1994, 1996-2010
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	1996-2001, 2006-2008	2002-2005, 2008-2009
Djibouti	1991-1994, 1999	1995-1998, 2000-2010
Egypt	1993-1998	1999-2010
El Salvador	1989-1991	1992-2010
Eritrea	1997, 1999, 2003	1998, 2000-2002, 2004-2010
Ethiopia	1989-1996, 1998-2010	1997
Georgia	1992-1993, 2004, 2008	1994-2003, 2005-2007, 2009-2010
Guatemala	1989-1995	1996-2010
Guinea	2000-2001	2002-2010
Guinea-Bissau	1998-1999	2000-2010
Haiti	1989-1991	1992-2003
Indonesia	1990-1992, 1997-2005	1993-1996, 2006-2010
Iran	1990-1991, 1993, 1996-1997, 2000-2001, 2005-2010	1992, 1994-1995, 1998, 2002-2004
Iraq	1989-1996, 2004-2010	1997-2003

Israel	1989-1996, 2000-2010	1997-1999
Ivory Coast	2002-2004	2005-2010
Kosovo	1998-1999	2999-2010
Laos	1989-1990	1991-2010
Lebanon	1989-1990	1991-2010
Lesotho	1998	1999-2010
Liberia	1989, 2000-2003	1991-2000, 2004-2010
Macedonia	2001	2002-2010
Mali	1990, 1994, 2007-2009	1991-1993, 1995-2006, 2010
Mexico	1994, 1996	1997-2010
Moldova	1992	1993-2010
Morocco	1989	1999-2010
Mozambique	1989-1992	1993-2010
Nepal	1996-2006	2007-2010
Nicaragua	1989-1990	1991-2010
Niger	1991-1992, 1994-1995, 1997, 2007-2008	1993, 1996, 1998-2006, 2009-2010
Nigeria	2004, 2009	2005-2008, 2010
Pakistan	1990, 1994-1997, 2004, 2007- 2010	1991-1993, 1998-2003, 2005
Panama	1989	1990-2010
Papua New Guinea	1990, 1992-1996	1991, 1997-2010
Paraguay	1989	1990-2010
Peru	1989-1999, 2007-2010	2000-2006
Romania	1989	1991-2010
Russia (Soviet Union)	1993-1994, 1999-2010	1997-1998
Rwanda	1990-1994, 1996-2002, 2009- 2010	1995, 2003-2008
Senegal	1990, 1992-1993, 1995, 1997, 2000-2001, 2003	1991, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004-2010
Sierra Leone	1991-2001	2002-2010
Slovenia	1991	1992-2010
Somalia	1989-1996, 2001-2002, 2006- 2010	1997-2000, 2003-2005
Spain	1991	1992-2010
Sri Lanka	1989-2001, 2003, 2005-2009	2002, 2004, 2010
Tajikistan	1992-1998, 1999, 2010	1999, 2001-2009
Trinidad and Tobago	1990	1991-2010
United Kingdom	1989-1991, 1998	1992-1997, 1999-2010
Uzbekistan	1999-2000, 2004	2001-2003, 2005-2010
Venezuela	1992	1993-2010

#### 4.2.1 Neutralizing the Security Dilemma

In civil conflict, the security dilemma is defined as the creation of anarchy as the government is challenged by a non-state actor thereby forcing both sides to increase (or seek ) security and ultimately engage with one another. Unlike interstate conflict, which focuses on security measures and arms increases, here the dilemma refers to the relationship between the state and the people and the fear on either side of attack. Following Gurr's grievance argument (1970), civil conflicts often come as a result of the persecution of a group by the government and include actions which are defined as repressive. By defining the security dilemma as the fear of persecution and the expectation that the higher the repression, the more likely a conflict will occur, I utilize the *Political Terror Scale* (Gibney, Cornett, Wood, Haschke, and Arnon, 2017) to capture if the security dilemma has been neutralized. Additionally, the adoption of human rights and avoiding repression indicates a move towards peace. The scale runs from 1-5 with 5 indicating low/no repressive actions to 1 indicating widescale use of repressive tactics. To make the index run from lows (poor peacebuilding) to high (good peacebuilding actions), I have to switch the scale to make 1 – high repression and 5 – low repression. To do this I converted everything by multiplying by 2 and flipping the scale: a score of 5 (originally - high repression) became a score of 2 (high repression), while a score of 1 (originally – low repression) became a score of 10. The range is from 2-10 and there are no half numbers. Originally I intended to keep the half numbers, which is why I chose a scale of 10, but they do not add enough to the understanding of the variable so I took the whole number as the final value (Example - 3.5 became 3 which transformed into 6).

#### 4.2.2 Social Integration

Social (re)integration is another challenging concept to capture as people may live near each other, but have little interaction. I chose to focus instead on the ability of people to move around interact with one another as movement is often restricted during a conflict. Both governments and rebel groups create checkpoints to control movement and though this is often for security, it also prevents people from interacting with one another, especially if they are in different groups. During civil conflict, neighborhoods may resort to guarding particular streets or restricting access to particular corners of a block in order to provide security. This results in physical and social separation and is highly disruptive, especially for communities which were integrated prior to the conflict. To capture this phenomena, I use the *CIRI Human Rights Dataset* (Cingranelli, Richards, Clay, 2014) and focus on the variables for domestic movement. Domestic movement captures the ability to travel within the country. A score of 1 indicates severe restriction of movement, a 2 indicates somewhat restricted, and 3 indicates unrestricted freedom of movement. I use the direct scores to identify the status of movement in the country. The ability to freely move about the country is a clear indication of peacefulness as conflict zones are rife with checkpoints, government restrictions, and concerns regarding safety while moving.

I also wanted to capture the ability of people to move in and out of the country as it is important for people to be able to return after conflict ends. One sign that a conflict has not truly ended or that the state is still unfriendly to certain groups is the restriction of allowing those groups to return. The ability to return after leaving a conflict is important as people lose assets, are separated from family, and often live in the precarious refugee status until they are able to return. This variable is also part of the *CIRI Human Rights Dataset* and is captured with the

same coding as the domestic variable – 1 – severely restricted, 2-somewhat restricted, 3-unrestricted.

#### 4.2.3 Reconciliation

As addressed earlier, reconciliation is often considered a subset and expected outcome of transitional justice. Measuring reconciliation is a very difficult task and given the many forms of transitional justice available, it is difficult to determine which mechanisms are for the purpose of justice and punishment and which are for the purpose of reconciliation and social healing. With that in mind and to account for whether or not reconciliation efforts have occurred, I use the *Transitional Justice Database* (Payne, Olsen, Reiter, 2010), which tracks all transitional justice mechanisms taking place within a country. Though transitional justice is not always akin to reconciliation, these measurements are standard for accounting for reconciliation as there is no large-scale database which accounts for local reconciliation. Given that amnesty accounts for the largest portion of transitional justice in the post-Cold War era (30% followed by trials at 13%) this is not entirely inaccurate to use as a proxy for reconciliation. The mechanisms included in the data are: amnesty (30%), trials (13%), TRC's (4%), reparations (3%), and lustration (2%). Amnesty is a challenging mechanism because it is often employed by the perpetrating government to excuse its behavior and buy-off government forces that might continue conflict. It is also used as a way to “erase” the events of the conflict, on both sides and asks citizens who have just survived horrific violence to accept this erasure in the name of peace. For this reason, any cases in which amnesty was applied were scored as not having experienced reconciliation. Though trials can also be viewed in a similar light, they do result in rulings and the use of the justice system and were therefore included in the data as a form of reconciliation. These data are for all cases found in the database and are not specific to my data, but show a

trend that is continued in my data. I account for whether or not transitional justice of some kind has occurred by coding a 1 for no process, 2 for a process in progress during the year, and 3 for the completion of the process by the time of the given year (*TJ*). If a conflict recurred or a new conflict started in the same state, I deemed the process to have ended and code the follow-on peace years as “no process” until a new one takes place. I also check to make sure that the processes are related to the conflict and not based on previous issues.

#### 4.2.4 Economic Opportunity

While civil conflicts can create economic opportunity for groups and individuals participating in the conflict, they largely destroy the economy of the state and the opportunity of citizens to participate in it. Infrastructure is destroyed and foreign investment (other than in rebel groups) often dries up and the average person is left without a means to earn money. Capturing economic opportunity can be challenging because of the data limitations, especially in “developing” countries where much of the economy is local and cash or barter based. For this purpose, I start by utilizing World Bank data and use the GDP Growth per capita (annual % in US\$) to account for economic opportunity. A growing economy indicates jobs, investment in the local economy and a measure of recovery as markets grow and the local population no longer relies on foreign aid and participates in the economy. I take the raw score from the World Bank, which includes negative numbers. I realize that negative growth (or a decrease is important to track), but to scale this to all positive numbers, I took the lowest negative number (-34.9) added it to all of the other GDP scores and then add 1 to ensure there were no 0’s. This allowed me to avoid subtracting points thereby overly weighting this factor and instead simply reduced the amount to which the indicator could contribute to the overall index. Missing values are treated

as 0s because it simply prevents the variable from contributing to the overall index. In many cases, these observations were eventually dropped because they were also missing polity scores.

Recognizing that GDP growth may not be sufficient for capturing economic opportunity on the ground, I also utilize the World Bank's *Total Unemployment (% of total labor force)* based on the International Labour Organization's estimates. This captures the percentage of unemployed people from the possible labor force. A strong economy will have low unemployment and will indicate economic opportunity for the average person. Missing values are dropped.

Enrollment in school is another indicator of economic opportunity as access to education is crucial for long-term high-paying work. I utilize the World Bank's *Primary School Enrollment (% net)* to capture the net percentage of eligible children enrolled in primary school. I did not include secondary because this may vary based on culture and I did not include gender elements as those need to be addressed separately. Missing values are dropped and there were many missing values for these data in particular.

To address these issues and include more data, I incorporated an existing index into my dataset. This can be risky because existing indexes have been calibrated in a very particular way and may not be translatable into another form of data. However, the *Human Development Index* (UNDP 2016) can be incorporated into my own because it is standardized and scaled, much like the rest of my data. By using it as an indicator of human development and acknowledging that it contains multiple data sources and elements, it is possible to treat it as a contributor to the index. What is important to note is that by using the HDI score itself, I am losing all of the variation that comes with the data encapsulated within the index. It include the following dimensions and indicators: long and healthy life (life expectancy at birth); knowledge (expected

years of schooling and mean years of schooling); and decent standard of living (GNI per capita (PPP \$)). These elements are all important in the post-conflict setting and valuable to any index that seeks to capture peacebuilding progress. Future work would include breaking this index down further and incorporating gender specific data

#### 4.2.5 Public Safety

To avoid confusing the security dilemma with public safety, which are directly related in the civil conflict context, I define public safety as the avoidance of conflict related violence. While the security dilemma focuses on actions taken the government, public safety focuses on actions taken by the people, either against the government or people within the state. Finding a post-conflict security measure that is complete and cross-national is quite challenging. The concept of Security Sector Reform, much like peacebuilding has come to encompass reforms beyond military and police and include judicial reform, building civil society, and democratic oversight (OECD 2007). Data on police reform and post-conflict crime are sparse and confined to case studies and while there are efforts to build a scholarly database on civil society, one does not exist yet that can be used for this kind of study.

For this purpose, I utilize the *Global Terrorism Database* (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2018) to capture the number of terror events taking place each year. Terror events, whether focused on government, police, or citizens create fear and maintain the experience of violence that existed during the conflict. Because civil conflict is personal and local, experiences with terrorism mimic those of the conflict and therefore a continuation of those instances suggests that public safety is low. The GTD captures daily, monthly and yearly terror events so I utilize a basic count of terror events for each year and each country. This dataset is particularly useful because there are no missing data – a 0

indicates that no events take place during that year. I included all forms of targets as attacks on government officials are often related to the conflict and maintain the violence and experiences of the conflict itself.

I wanted to include other measures, but lack of data is a real problem in constructing long-term post-conflict datasets. I could not use UCDP's *One-Sided Violence Dataset* (Eck and Hultman 2007) because those data are already captured by the GTD dataset and I wanted to avoid inflating the results. I had hoped to use the *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) Dataset* (Cohen and Nordas 2013), but it only extends five years out from the end of conflict and some of my cases extend out by 19 years. I would have lost most of my cases to use this dataset and therefore excluded it. I do address their data for Bosnia and Northern Ireland in the case study chapter. I also wanted to include the World Bank's *Tourism Receipts* as tourists are not likely to visit a place that is still experiencing conflict. Unfortunately, the data were so incomplete for this variable and all others related to tourism that it simply was not possible to include it without drastically altering the dataset and accompanying results. Loss of cases is an important concern in constructing a scale and a common problem. The loss of observations due to missing data causes validity issues as it arbitrarily removes cases which impacts the outputs of statistical tests. I was very careful about this when constructing the index, however I constructed multiple indexes to test the outcomes of reduced data and those results are discussed later in the chapter.

### 4.3 Constructing the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Index

The Index is designed to measure peacebuilding progress in a post-conflict setting and I utilize the theoretical principles stated above. However, there were many data based decisions that impacted the construction of the index, for example missing data which caused me to

drastically lose observations was of concern. Additionally, it seemed necessary to test different versions of the index to ensure that my results were not driven by invalid construction. For these reasons, I constructed three versions of the indexes which are outlined below.

Figure 11. Peacebuilding Indexes

	<b>Issue to be Resolved</b>	<b>Peacebuilding Strategy</b>	<b>Variable</b>	<b>Source</b>
Index 1				
	Anarchy	Public Safety	Terror Incidents/year	Global Terrorism Database
	Failure of Institutions	Economic Opportunity	GDP Growth annual percentage (US\$)	World Bank
	Fear of return to violence	Neutralizing Security Dilemma	Political Terror Scale	Political Terror Scale
	Loss of trust	Reconciliation	Transitional justice mechanisms	Transitional Justice Database
	Social division	Social Integration	Freedom of movement domestic	CIRI
Index 2	Social Well-Being	Combination of Above	Human Development Index	UNDP
Index 3	Failure of Institutions	Job creation	Total Unemployment (% of total labor force)	World Bank
	Failure of Institutions	Access to Education	Primary School Enrollment (% net)	

Each index builds on the other meaning Index 2 contains all of Index 1 plus the HDI and Index 3 contains all of the indicators in Indexes 1 and 2 plus two additional indicators.

I chose to construct three version of the index to test the components and see if the results changed. The addition of the HDI adds numerous social indicators that are not captured in the data in Index 1. I chose to create a third index because while I wanted to add the additional indicators for unemployment and enrollment, they were missing quite a bit of data and I wanted to test my hypotheses on a larger dataset first. This allows me to investigate the validity of my index as well and see if there are drastic changes between the different indexes and which might

serve as the best version. It also allows me to consider how the addition of these different indicators helps explain connections between conflict termination and peacebuilding outcomes.

#### 4.4 Research Design and Method

Based on the Conflict Termination dataset, I am left with 62 countries with peace-years that span 1990-2010, which are defined as panel data. My dependent variable is continuous, but linear because we might expect countries to “improve” over time and the data graphs show linear trends for most of the cases. This leads me to adopt the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, however it has a number of assumptions that must hold true for this method to function properly. Not surprisingly, the data violate an important assumption in that the error terms do not have a constant variance (they are heteroskedastic). To address this problem and acknowledge the though time is passing, the countries themselves are not changing as the observational units, I use a fixed effects model. I assume that unobservable factors which might impact the outputs are time-invariant and therefore select the fixed effects model. The goal is to avoid omitted variables which may correlate with the variables included in the regression. Given the limited control variables employed because of data availability, it is highly likely that there is omitted variable bias, which the fixed effects should resolve.<sup>7</sup> The effects control for within country variation and therefore any variables that do not change over time will be omitted – it is for this reason that I am not able to control for regional effects, which is acceptable as I do not hypothesize that region impacts peacebuilding outcome. Other than other possible peacebuilding

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<sup>7</sup> I conducted a Prais-Winsten test and found there to be large changes in the outputs from the OLS outputs, which were a cause of concern. I considered using the Panel Corrected Standard Errors model which calculates panel-corrected standard error estimates for cross-sectional time series models because they assume heteroskedasticity, but decided to use the fixed effects model instead. The PCSE can be effective, but it ignores unobserved heterogeneity and can result in omitted variable bias (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004). Concerned that I was limiting myself with only within-panel comparison, I also tested for random effects, and while the results differed slightly in coefficient size, the significance and signs remained the same across indexes and baselines.

contributors, I am particularly interested in how conflict termination impacts peacebuilding outcomes.

The independent variable captures the conflict termination type or outcome and refers to the way in which the conflict ended and I utilize the *UCDP/PRIO Conflict Termination Dataset* (Kreutz 2010). The termination categories are as follows: 1 = peace agreement, 2=ceasefire 3= government victory, 4 = rebel victory, 5=low activity/stalemate (conflict continues, but doesn't reach the UCDP threshold). The first version of the dataset includes an additional category of 6 which refers to conflicts which ended in ways not captured in the other categories. I have dropped these cases as I do not expect them to conform to my hypotheses and cannot control for the differences in their termination processes. Each country peace year is coded with the termination type of the preceding conflict meaning if a conflict ended in 1995 through a peace agreement, all subsequent peace years would be coded as being terminated by peace agreement.

#### 4.4.1 Control Variables

*Polity* – I utilize the *Polity IV* data (Marshall, Gurr, Jaggers, 2016) for level of democracy. Some would argue that the existence of democracy indicates a certain level of peacefulness, but many argue that the presence of elections merely indicate the presence of elections. I am interested to understand what impact the level of democracy has on the level of peace achieved. I expect countries with higher polity scores will have higher levels of peace and less recurrence of conflict. The scale runs from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic), with the expectation that states which score 7 and above are clearly democracies while those scoring below a 3 are authoritarian in some way. I use the raw polity score and in cases where no data are available, those cases were dropped. I account for change in polity each year by accounting for the amount of change in the polity score from year to year. Years which

experienced a large jump are the outliers as most states move up a single point and then hold that for a number of years. The majority of observations for this variable are 0.

*Years from Previous Conflict* – In this variable, I capture with a simple count the number of peace-years since the most recent conflict. The purpose of this variable is to account for conflict recurrence and new conflict onset and capture the impact of a return to conflict on the peacebuilding outcome.

*Severity* – The severity of a conflict is important because it stands to reason that the more severe a conflict, the longer it will take to recover. Infrastructure is likely to be highly damaged and lack of trust and presence of fear are not only high, but more ingrained because of the trauma experienced. I use the variable “Intensity Level” which I call “Severity” which defines whether the conflict was a 1 for minor (25-999 battle-related deaths in given year) or 2 for reached full scale war (1000+ battle-related deaths in a given year) status.

*Territorial Conflict*- I account for whether or not the conflict was over territory (1) or the regime type (2). I include this in the data because territorial conflicts are so difficult to resolve and often require a plan regarding autonomy or some kind of federal system to avoid recurrence. This variable captures conflicts that are often considered intractable (Fearon and Laitin 2011) as these conflicts are ultimately about identity between indigenous and migrant populations. It should be noted that the majority of the Asian cases on which their research is based were dropped because they never achieved any peace-years.

*Peacekeeping*- I account for whether or not a UN peacekeeping mission related to the preceding conflict is active during the peace-year. I code this as a dummy variable of 1 for active mission and 0 for no mission. The data come from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. I did not include non-UN missions, although those could be added at a later date to

capture other forms of peacekeeping which might help explain the peacebuilding outcomes. I include peacekeeping to account for additional security measures that may be in place during the peace-year.

*Foreign Aid*- I account for foreign support through the foreign aid variable of *Net ODA Received (% of GNI)* from the World Bank's data. This captures the percent of the GNI that is accounted for through foreign aid. The purpose of this control variable is to capture the impact of foreign aid on peacebuilding as aid can be used to both advance and stagnate peacebuilding policies.

*Elections*- I account for the impact of holding an election on the peacebuilding outcome as elections can both help and hurt peacebuilding efforts (discussion of the impact of elections in a post-conflict setting in chapter 2). I utilize the *National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset* (Hyde and Marinov 2012) which captures if and what type of elections were held during a given year. I utilize their existing Legislative and Executive dummy variables and create a third General variable which indicates that both types of elections took place in the same year. I do not run the General variable with the other two as they would be accounting for the same variance.

#### 4.4.2 Conflict Termination and Peacebuilding Process Hypotheses

The Peacebuilding Index captures the solutions to the problems found in the post-conflict environment and operationalizes them. It is the expected ease and incentives related to each of these solutions that creates the variation in peacebuilding progress outcomes. The variation is expected to come in when the conflict termination types are tested against the peacebuilding index because it contains the different solutions and they each carry with them differing incentives and ease for each type of termination. Chapter 3 proposed a chart which summarized

the expected peacebuilding outcomes for each termination type. Those expectations are captured in the hypotheses below:

*H1. Conflicts terminated through peace agreements are more likely to result in higher levels of peacebuilding progress because they have a framework in place and a system for implementation included in the framework.*

*H2: Conflicts terminated through ceasefires are more likely to result in lower levels of peacebuilding progress because there is no incentive to change the status quo and implement peacebuilding strategies.*

*H3. Conflicts terminated through government victory are more likely to result in mid-levels of peacebuilding progress because they may have great ease with which to implement peacebuilding, but may lack the incentive.*

*H4. Conflicts terminated through rebel victory are more likely to result in mid-levels levels of peacebuilding progress because though they may have incentives to implement change, they are likely to face challenges (low ease) in working through implementation.*

*H5. Conflicts terminated through stalemate are more likely to result in low levels of peacebuilding progress because there is no change in the status quo and there is no incentive to make changes and likely little ease because of the intractability.*

## 4.5 Analysis of Indexes

Table 1 presents the results which consider all of the possible factors impacting peacebuilding progress, using Index 1. I have held the stalemate as the baseline because I expect it to have least impact on peacebuilding. Table 2 presents the results for Index 1, but with ceasefires as the baseline. I expect them to have little impact on the peacebuilding outcomes and they are proportionate to the other outcomes. The original dataset began with the following distribution of cases: peace agreements – 192, ceasefires – 154, government victory – 144, rebel victory – 90, and stalemate – 165 for a total of 745 country-peace-years. Index 1 was designed to avoid losing cases and therefore has the widest form of cross-national data, but the fewest contributing variables (descriptive statistics for all indexes can be found at the end of the chapter). As a fixed effects model, the coefficients can be directly interpreted, although I am focused largely on the positive, negative, or neutral impact on the peacebuilding outcome.

Table 1. Peacebuilding Outcomes, Index 1 (Stalemate as Baseline)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Peace Agreement	38.01**	23.99**	31.37**	29.40**	31.38**	28.25**	31.44**	22.87*
	(9.24)	(9.24)	(9.10)	(8.96)	(8.81)	(9.88)	(8.81)	(10.72)
Ceasefire	23.68*	17.30*	19.31*	17.42*	16.90*	21.71*	17.46*	19.49*
	(8.17)	(8.11)	(7.78)	(7.66)	(7.82)	(8.91)	(7.82)	(9.47)
Governemnt Victory	45.90+	44.83**	44.27**	43.31**	42.98**	44.56**	42.01**	43.82**
	(16.79)	(16.27)	(15.37)	(15.12)	(2.69)	(14.54)	(16.00)	(14.75)
Rebel Victory	2.15	-6.53	-6.63	-8.24	-6.76	12.11	-6.66	10.77
	(12.82)	(12.34)	(12.24)	(12.05)	(12.23)	(11.87)	(12.23)	(11.93)
Territorial Conflict		-3.06	-5.47	-2.99				-2.37
		(9.32)	(9.03)	(8.90)				(8.61)
Severity		40.43**	12.55	11.78				15.94
		(9.36)	(11.22)	(11.03)				(11.69)
Polity		.51**			.46**	.30**	.45**	.31**
		(.07)			(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Change in Polity			.14	.38				
			(.64)	(.63)				
Years from Previous Conflict				1.19**	1.46**	1.07**	1.45**	Multi-Coll
				(.25)	(.26)	(.30)	(.26)	
General Elections					2.87			.09*
					(4.15)			(4.07)
Legislative Elections							2.98	
							(3.00)	
Executive Elections							2.06	
							(3.7)	
Peacekeeping						-14.71*		-14.71*
						(5.96)		(6.00)
Foreign Aid						.42**		.37**
						(.12)		(.13)
N	745	743	674	674	743	564	743	564
Standard errors in parentheses								
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01								

Results for Index 1 with the stalemate as a baseline indicate that peace agreements and government victories are likely to have higher peacebuilding success than stalemates while situations that end in rebel victory are no more likely to lead to peacebuilding success than stalemates. Ceasefires were likely to have a positive peacebuilding outcome when compared to stalemates, which is not surprising as ceasefires provide some form of intervention while stalemates do not. These findings confirm my hypothesis for peace agreements as likely to result in higher peacebuilding outcomes. They also begin the discussion on both rebel victory and government victory, which have different outcomes when compared to stalemates. Government victory is significant and positive in relation to stalemate while rebel victory has no impact when compared to stalemate, which could be interpreted to mean that one is preferable to the other, but I am not ready to make this claim until considering all of the tests. The results do provide a first step towards considering whether victory type matters, which the results suggest that it does. Polity is positive and significant while change in polity does not have an impact. This indicates that as post-conflict states become more democratic, they are likely to have higher peacebuilding outcomes. This is not surprising as we expect democratic states to have fewer terror attacks (although this is not always the case), higher GDP growth, and lower political terror scale results. I expect these results to hold throughout all of the models. Territorial conflict does not seem to have an impact which suggests that the type of conflict is not likely to impact peacebuilding outcomes. I will discuss my proposed reasoning for this in the discussion section. The years from previous conflict are also significant and positive, but they eventually drop off due to collinearity so I will simply interpret these as time away from conflict matters. Elections do not seem to have an impact and that could be because their impact is captured in the polity data. It is also likely the arguments discussed in chapter 2 regarding the lack of impact of elections on

building peace are showing up in the data. Elections may be a sign of moving towards democracy, but they do not appear to have any impact on peacebuilding success.

When the entire model is included, general elections do have a positive impact so it is possible that they do offer some indication of peacebuilding success. Foreign aid has a positive impact on peacebuilding which could mean that when direct assistance is offered, GDP growth takes place. It is difficult to connect foreign aid with other aspects of the index as they are not impacted by foreign aid support. Peacekeeping has a negative impact on peacebuilding, but this could be less about the impact of peacekeeping and instead related to the reality that peacekeepers are only sent to difficult situations, ones which would struggle to recover and implement peacebuilding because of the conflict. This would match the severity findings, which are positive and significant. The ceasefire data remain somewhat odd as I would not expect them to have any impact on peacebuilding, but it does suggest that a ceasefire is likely to have some kind of impact, which is worth considering. The results of Index 1 both confirm and add complexity to my assumptions.

Table 2. Peacebuilding Outcomes, Index 1 (Ceasefire as Baseline)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Peace Agreement	14.32 (8.07)	6.69 (7.97)	12.06 (7.84)	11.97 (7.71)	14.47+ (7.68)	6.53 (8.09)	13.98+ (7.68)	3.38 (8.51)
Government Victory	22.21 (18.33)	27.52 (17.59)	24.96 (16.63)	25.88 (16.36)	26.07 (17.49)	22.84 (16.59)	24.54 (17.51)	24.32 (16.73)
Rebel Victory	-21.53 (14.63)	-23.83+ (14.13)	-25.95* (13.85)	-25.67+ (13.62)	-23.67 (13.90)	-9.59 (13.85)	-24.12+ (13.90)	-8.72 (14.09)
Stalemate	-23.68** (8.17)	-17.30* (8.11)	-19.31* (7.78)	-17.42* (7.66)	-16.90* (7.82)	-21.71* (8.91)	-17.46* (7.82)	-19.49* (9.47)
Territorial Conflict		-3.06 (9.32)	-5.47 (9.03)	-2.99 (8.90)				-2.37 (8.61)
Severity		40.43** (9.36)	12.55 (11.22)	11.78 (11.03)				15.94 (11.69)
Polity		.51** (.07)			.46** (.07)	.30** (.07)	.45** (.07)	.31** (.07)
Change in Polity			.14 (.64)	.38 (.63)				
Years from Previous Conflict				1.19** (.25)	1.46** (.26)	1.07** (.30)	1.45** (.26)	Multi-Coll
General Elections					2.87 (4.15)			.09* (4.07)
Legislative Elections							2.98 (3.00)	
Executive Elections							2.06 (3.79)	
Peacekeeping						-14.71* (5.96)		-14.71* (6.00)
Foreign Aid						.42** (.12)		.37** (.13)
N	745	743	674	674	743	564	743	564
Standard errors in parentheses								
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01								

The results for Index 1 with ceasefires as the baseline provide different and somewhat confusing results.<sup>8</sup> Peace agreements suddenly have less impact on peacebuilding success when compared with ceasefires. Government victory also loses its significance from the previous model, which suggests that government victory may have more success than ceasefires, but not to any level of significance. While rebel victory becomes somewhat significant, but it also becomes less likely to result in peacebuilding success when compared to a ceasefire. Stalemates are highly significant, but as indicators of likely peacebuilding failures as opposed to successes when compared to ceasefires. This result is not surprising and confirms my expectations that stalemates do not result in peacebuilding because peace has not yet been achieved. The stalemates results indicate that the longer a conflict remains unresolved, the worse it is for peacebuilding, which is not surprising as it is difficult to build peace where none exists. Polity remains significant and positive, which is to be expected as we expect democracy to result in higher peacebuilding outcomes. Peacekeeping and foreign aid remain significant with peacekeeping causing a negative impact suggesting that when peacekeeping is in place, peacebuilding success is low or drops. It is also possible that the existence of peacekeepers indicates that peacebuilding cannot take place because the focus is entirely on security. Additionally, any country with an active UN peacekeeping force is likely to have challenges with economic growth and domestic movement as peacekeepers often control access to space. The foreign aid variable suggests that when aid is given, states are likely to achieve higher peacebuilding outcomes, whether this is because it injects money into the economy or allows for

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<sup>8</sup> The changing of signs when the baseline variable is changed is likely due to the case changes and the relationship between each variable and the baseline category. With index sign changes could indicate a number of issues including incorrect model specification, incorrect variable specification within the model or the incorrect model for the data given. I checked random effects outputs and the sign change occurred there as well so it is possible that one of the control variables is incorrectly specified or that an additional test needed to be run. While the sign change is of concern and should be noted, additional testing can be done in the future to stabilize the data and ensure that no assumptions have been violated.

implementing peacebuilding strategies, it clearly has an impact. Again, elections are not significant other than General elections in the full model which suggests that holding both forms of elections as opposed to one or the other is preferable. There were a number of cases in which only one type of election was ever held and this could be part of the problem in trying to build peace. The results of the two index tests suggests that more investigation is needed as the results varied. It was for this purpose that I chose to construct alternative versions of the index in order to see what might happen.

Table 3. Index 2 (Stalemate as Baseline)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Peace Agreement	67.91** (10.89)	117.42** (15.62)	123.76** (15.25)	123.37** (15.09)	59.09** (10.98)	8.27 (14.71)	58.75** (10.97)	9.29 (14.83)
Ceasefire	07.32 (11.91)	-13.35 (12.41)	-17.52 (12.28)	-18.38 (12.16)	-8.91 (11.73)	-13.74 (13.37)	-9.93 (11.77)	-9.45 (14.77)
Government Victory	10.96 (20.20)	15.80 (22.08)	13.42 (21.70)	13.67 (21.48)	11.36 (19.99)	9.66 (19.68)	8.75 (19.92)	19.68 (23.02)
Rebel Victory	52.18 (31.63)	101.69** (32.38)	108.03** (31.74)	106.45** (31.42)	43.91 (31.51)	-7.12 (32.40)	40.95 (31.39)	-3.29 (32.83)
Territorial Conflict		10.50 (17.75)	8.82 (17.44)	10.38 (17.27)				13.45 (18.55)
Severity		-106.40** (21.00)	-130.24** (22.26)	-132.47** (22.04)				Multi-Coll
Polity		.42** (.11)			.33** (.11)	.49** (.11)	.34** (.11)	.49** (.11)
Change in Polity			-.03 (.81)	.22 (.81)				
Years from Previous Conflict				.79** (.27)	.71* (.28)	.26 (.39)	.70* (.28)	Multi-Coll
General Elections					-1.62 (4.61)			-2.87 (4.92)
Legislative Elections							-3.66 (3.25)	
Executive Elections							4.67 (4.33)	
Peacekeeping						4.90 (12.55)		5.46 (12.60)
Foreign Aid						.13 (.28)		.12 (.28)
N	421	421	413	413	421	317	421	317
Standard errors in parentheses								
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01								

The results for Index 2 with stalemates as the baseline provide interesting results as well. Index 2 incorporates the Human Development Index results, which should give a better understanding of the impact of conflict termination on well-being. It should be noted that almost half of the cases have been dropped in order to add the additional indicator, which is a weakness of this index. Peace agreements are highly significant in the positive direction indicating that they are likely to result in higher peacebuilding success than stalemates. Government victory has no impact when compared to stalemates, which adds another piece of information for understanding how victory relates to peacebuilding success. The rebel victory results are interesting and unsettling at the same time. They are highly significant and positive with comparison to stalemates until control variables are added and then change signs and lose significance (see previous footnote). The low number of rebel victories (40) could contribute to this, although it seems more likely that multicollinearity could be occurring. It is also possible that this is capturing the diversity of rebel victory and the fact that rebels who govern do so in many different ways and with different types of experience. The severity of a conflict negatively impacts peacebuilding outcomes which suggests that it is hard to recover from a severe conflict, which is to be expected. Territorial conflict has no impact and neither does the change in polity. The polity score remains important and positive and significant, for the reasons addressed above. Elections do not have any impact here which could confirm the theories discussed in chapter 2 regarding elections and building peace. Peacekeeping and foreign aid do not seem to have an impact at all and this could be that states that require high levels of foreign aid or peacekeeping intervention are not captured in the HDI. The results of this set of tests suggests that the inclusion of the HDI has impacted the results, although it is not yet clear if it has provided a better model.

Table 4. Index 2 (Ceasefire as Baseline)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Peace Agreement	75.23** (14.91)	130.77** (19.92)	141.29** (19.58)	141.75** (19.38)	68.01** (14.81)	22.02 (17.46)	68.69** (14.83)	18.74 (18.10)
Governemnt Victory	18.28 (22.05)	29.16 (21.97)	30.95 (21.60)	32.06 (21.38)	20.27 (21.81)	23.41 (22.01)	18.69 (21.76)	29.13 (22.92)
Rebel Victory	59.50+ (33.23)	115.04** (34.64)	125.56** (34.04)	124.84** (33.69)	52.83 (33.07)	6.62 (33.76)	50.89 (33.00)	6.15 (34.50)
Stalemate	7.32 (11.91)	13.35 (12.41)	17.52 (12.28)	18.38 (12.16)	8.91 (11.73)	13.74 (13.77)	9.93 (11.77)	9.45 (14.77)
Territorial Conflict		10.50 (17.75)	8.87 (17.44)	10.38 (17.27)			.34** (.11)	13.49 (18.55)
Severity		-106.40** (21.00)	-130.24** (22.26)	-132.47** (22.04)				Multi-Coll
Polity		.42** (.11)			.33** (.11)	.49** (.11)		.49** (.11)
Change in Polity			-.03+ (.81)	.22 (.81)				
Years from Previous Conflict				.79** (.27)	.71* (.28)	.26 (.39)	.70* (.28)	Multi-Coll
General Elections					-1.62 (4.61)			-2.87 (4.92)
Legislative Elections							-3.66 (3.25)	
Executive Elections							4.67 (4.33)	
Peacekeeping						4.90 (12.55)		5.46 (12.60)
Foreign Aid						.13 (.28)		.12 (.28)
N	421	421	413	413	421	317	421	317
Standard errors in parentheses								
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01								

The results of Index 2 with ceasefires as the baseline provide a bit more information and as peace agreements once again hold as having a significant and positive impact on peacebuilding progress when compared with ceasefires. Government victory is positive, but not significant when compared with ceasefires. Rebel victory is positive and significant at varying times in comparison to ceasefires. The varying results between the two types of victory and within each type confirm my assertion that there may not be a general way of understanding victory as each regime brings its own set of experiences and challenges. Severity remains negative and significant indicating that the more severe a conflict, the more difficult it will be to find peacebuilding success. Territorial conflict becomes significant when elections are controlled for, which provides an interesting insight into territorial conflict. Though the elections themselves are not significant, this suggests that when elections are held, states recovering from territorial conflict are likely to achieve greater peacebuilding success. This suggests that elections do matter for peacebuilding, but in a less direct way than might be expected. The polity score remains positive and significant while the change in polity does not seem to have an impact. I assume this is because polity scores do not change drastically over time and therefore the change in polity variable simply does not capture much variation. Years from previous conflict seem to have some impact which suggests that with time, peacebuilding will become more successful, which is what we might expect. I have used a fixed effects model here which largely wipes out the impact of time, but this variable captures it and demonstrates that as countries continue to exist without conflict, the more likely they are experience peacebuilding success. This could be a very strong correlation that as states achieve peacebuilding success, the less likely they are to see recurrence of conflict, but these results cannot confirm that assertion. The control variables for elections, peacekeeping, and foreign aid

do not seem to have any specific impact although the general election variable has become negative, which is unexpected. The results of this analysis provide confirmation for my assertions regarding peacekeeping, but have raised more questions regarding the impact of the control variables and the two victory types.

Table 5. Index 3 (Stalemate as Baseline)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Peace Agreement	123.43** (13.75)	165.24** (19.69)	176.07** (19.13)	175.36** (18.68)	108.10** (13.46)	97.42** (14.62)	107.65** (13.50)	173.69** (23.97)
Ceasefire	6.14 (15.10)	-3.64 (15.64)	-10.38 (15.41)	-11.94 (15.06)	3.01 (14.38)	14.34 (16.07)	2.65 (14.49)	7.69 (17.40)
Government Victory	9.94 (25.51)	7.15 (27.83)	2.21 (27.23)	2.66 (26.60)	13.38 (24.51)	10.81 (23.89)	10.62 (24.52)	19.77 (27.12)
Rebel Victory	128.06** (39.94)	169.88** (40.81)	180.71** (39.83)	177.84** (38.90)	118.45** (38.64)	101.30** (38.05)	114.06** (38.63)	188.68** (42.28)
Territorial Conflict		-2.55 (22.37)	-5.52 (21.88)	-2.69 (21.38)				8.42 (21.86)
Severity		-105.52** (26.47)	-144.22** (27.92)	-148.26** (27.29)				-115.23** (29.34)
Polity		.72** (.13)			.59** (.14)	.70** (.14)	.60** (.14)	.71** (.14)
Change in Polity			-1.06 (1.02)	-.58 (1.00)				
Years from Previous Conflict				1.43** (.33)	1.35** (.34)	1.65** (.47)	1.36** (.35)	Collinear
General Elections					-7.74 (5.66)			-10.21+ (5.80)
Legislative Elections							-1.59 (4.01)	
Executive Elections							-2.23 (5.34)	
Peacekeeping						20.85 (13.14)		-6.80 (14.85)
Foreign Aid						.32 (.33)		.47 (.33)
N	421	421	413	413	421	321	421	321
Standard errors in parentheses								
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01								

Index 3 contains all of the components in Indexes 1 and 2, with the addition of primary school enrollment and % of labor force that is unemployed. Again, there is a loss of almost half of the cases from Index 1, which directly impacts the output as well (descriptive statistics at the end of the chapter). Peace agreements are again significant and positive in comparison to stalemates which suggests that they are more likely to result in peacebuilding success than stalemates. Rebel victory is positive and significant across all models when compared with stalemates, which provides the first complete confirmation for this variable. This indicates that rebel victory is more likely to result in higher levels of peacebuilding than a stalemate, which has interesting policy implications. This could suggest that helping rebels win is more important than allowing a conflict to burn out on its own. Of course, when the peace agreement data are taken into account, it would appear that peace agreements are the best option, but this assertion will be discussed further below. It is interesting that the addition of capturing unemployment and school enrollment would confirm rebel victory as positively resulting in peacebuilding progress. Government victory remains positive, but not significant when compared with stalemates which may simply mean that it does not prevent peacebuilding, but that it does not inherently result in better progress or better outcomes than a stalemate. Ceasefires change signs and are not significant when compared to stalemates, which may be indicative of their varying impact. Severity of the conflict remains negative and significant, which is to be expected. Years from conflict also remain positive and significant, although they again drop out due to collinearity in the full model. Polity remains positive and significant for all of the reasons discussed earlier. The change in polity has become negative, but is not significant. Elections are negative and general elections have some significance in the full model, which suggests that elections may not always support peacebuilding progress. It could be that elections are held in

place of implementing additional peacebuilding changes with the hope that holding an election is sufficient to appear as if progress is being made. Peacekeeping and foreign aid do not seem to have an impact although peacekeeping has a sign change between models. Ultimately, Index 3 does not challenge the results of previous indexes other than to provide confirmation for rebel victory as leading to peacebuilding success.

Table 6. Index 3 (Ceasefire as Baseline)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Peace Agreement	117.28** (18.82)	168.89** (25.11)	186.46** (24.57)	187.30** (24.00)	105.08** (18.16)	83.08** (19.65)	104.99** (18.25)	166.07** (29.72)
Governemnt Victory	3.80 (27.84)	10.80 (27.70)	12.59 (27.10)	14.60 (26.47)	10.36 (26.74)	-3.53 (26.67)	7.96 (26.78)	12.14 (27.00)
Rebel Victory	121.92** (41.96)	173.52** (43.69)	191.09** (42.72)	189.78** (41.71)	115.41** (40.54)	89.96* (40.27)	111.40** (40.61)	181.04** (45.87)
Stalemate	-6.14 (15.10)	3.64 (15.64)	10.38 (15.41)	11.94 (15.06)	-3.01 (14.38)	-14.34 (16.07)	-2.65 (14.49)	-7.61 (17.40)
Territorial Conflict		-2.55 (22.37)	-5.52 (21.88)	-2.69 (21.38)				8.42 (21.86)
Severity		-105.52** (26.47)	-144.22** (27.92)	-148.26** (27.29)				-115.23** (29.34)
Polity		.72** (.13)			.59** (.14)	.70** (.14)	.60** (.14)	.71** (.14)
Change in Polity			-1.06 (1.02)	-.58 (1.00)				
Years from Previous Conflict				1.47** (.33)	1.35** (.34)	1.65** (.47)	1.36** (.35)	Collinear
General Elections					-7.74 (5.66)			-10.21+ (5.80)
Legislative Elections							-1.59 (4.01)	
Executive Elections							-2.23 (5.34)	
Peacekeeping						20.85 (13.14)		-6.80 (14.85)
Foreign Aid						.32 (.33)		.47 (.33)
N	421	421	413	413	421	321	421	321
Standard errors in parentheses								
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01								

The results for Index 3 with ceasefires as the baseline provide similar results to those when stalemates are the baseline. Both peace agreements and rebel victory are positive and significant with relation to peacebuilding success. This indicates that peace agreements are more likely to achieve higher levels of peacebuilding success than ceasefires and rebel victories are more likely to achieve higher levels of peacebuilding success than ceasefires. Government victory continues to experience a sign change, but remains not significant which again could mean that there is too much variation in peacebuilding implementation with this kind of victory. Stalemates also experience sign changes when compared to ceasefires, but are not significant. Severity and polity remain significant with higher severity causing lower peacebuilding success and higher polity scores result in higher peacebuilding success. Everything else from the previous model holds and suggest that the control variables do not have much impact on the peacebuilding progress and that it is the way in which the conflict terminates that plays the largest role on peacebuilding success. I will discuss the overall results in the next section.

## 4.6 Discussion of Results

The results provided from the three indexes do offer some insights into the connection between conflict termination type and post-conflict peacebuilding. I chose to investigate three versions of the index to ensure that I did not make assumptions about conflict termination and peacebuilding progress based on a single model. The indexes demonstrated that while some termination types and control variables have clear relationships with peacebuilding, others have a more tenuous relationship that will need to be investigated in future work. While Index 1 contains the largest number of cases, it also provided a set of outlying results that did not conform with the trends in the other indexes. Index 2 provided an insight into the impact of adding human development indicators to the index itself, but with a large drop in cases. Index 3

provided additional scoring based on employment and enrollment data, although there was little change in the outcomes. I discuss each relevant finding below with particular focus on the termination types and their impact on peacebuilding success.

I hypothesized that peace agreements would have the greatest impact on peacebuilding success and throughout the 6 index tests, this was demonstrated to be true. Peace agreements were overwhelmingly positive and highly significant in creating peacebuilding success when compared to stalemates and ceasefires. Given that I did not expect peace agreement coalitions to have any more ease or incentive to implement peacebuilding, what is the cause of this very robust outcome? The assumption across the termination types is that each regime type will have some form of ease or incentive, which could ultimately be dependent on the structure of the regime and their previous experience. However, in the case of peace agreement coalitions, the peace agreement itself drives peacebuilding no matter what the regime looks like (see chapter 5 for case study illustration of this effect). The agreement must continue to be implemented in order for peace to hold therefore regimes have little choice regarding peacebuilding measures as they must prioritize those when governing. The addition of the peace agreement removes the uncertainty that comes with the ease and incentive structure because it remains a constant – it is not dependent on the coalition demographics. This leads to the first important finding from this work:

**Finding 1 – Peace agreements create a framework that are not dependent on regime experiences and background, but instead set the peacebuilding agenda and drive implementation of peacebuilding strategies, thereby bypassing the ease-incentive challenges.**

For those familiar with the literature on peace agreements, this is not a revelation, but this is the first time this has been confirmed using data other than the usual binary conflict data. The analyses presented here demonstrate that peace agreements do not just impact recurrence of conflict, but actually impact peacebuilding success. This could be taken to mean that peace agreements, when written properly can result in the improvement of the lives of those recovering from the conflict. This is a first cut at considering the impact of peace agreements on more than just ensuring conflict does not recur and more testing is needed, but this leaves us with new confirmation and more questions to investigate regarding peace agreements and building real peace.

The victory outputs were less clear and somewhat mixed, which actually matches what I expected. While there is no clear numerical value for “medium” level peacebuilding success, I intended it to mean that there would be some fluctuation within each victory type. This is largely because I was not able to control for the experiences, background, structure, and other elements of each regime type. Peace agreements create a unifying factor that effectively “zeroes out” the impact of the coalition, but one-sided victories do not have that same pre-set agenda or guide. They are reliant on the experience and attitudes of those who take power and impacted by the form of government they select. The literature reviewed in chapter 2 clearly outlined that rebel governance is highly varied and that those who govern during the conflict bring a different set of skills than those who only know the experience of managing an armed group. Similarly, while governments who win already have experience and existing institutions to build on, they either have to make major reforms or risk falling back into the patterns that led to the conflict. While there are some incentives for victorious governments to reform, there are also a number of other considerations that could impact their decision-making.

**Finding 2 – The impact of one-sided victories is largely dependent on the experience and knowledge of each regime which results in varied levels of ease-incentive when implementing peacebuilding and therefore, varied levels of peacebuilding success.**

The results suggest that rebel victories may result in better peacebuilding outcomes, which is counter to what I expected as I assumed that while their incentives for building peace might be high, they would have low levels of ease or challenges in implementation. This may still be true, but it appears that they are able to overcome those challenges and find some measure of peacebuilding success. I assumed government victors would have high levels of ease in implementing changes, one because they have existing institutions, but also because they are likely to be authoritarian (based on the findings in the literature that democratic regimes are rarely the targets of rebel groups). However, I assumed that they would have lower incentives to implement peacebuilding strategies because this would involve giving up power and holding themselves accountable. The results support this finding as government victories did not seem to have a clear or substantial impact on the peacebuilding success. This leads to another key finding based on the statistical results.

**Finding 3 – Though rebel victors may have more challenges to overcome (less ease), they are more likely to achieve peacebuilding progress and success than stalemates or ceasefires because there are high incentives to do so.**

**Finding 4 – Though government victors have greater ease in implementing peacebuilding policies, they have less incentive to do so and are less likely to achieve peacebuilding success than stalemates and ceasefires.**

Stalemates and ceasefires produced the expected outcomes when tested across the different indexes and with each other as the baselines. While there was one outlying case, in

general they either had no impact on peacebuilding success or had significant negative impact when compared with one another, which is to be expected. I discuss these two cases together because they are similar in that they do not change the status quo in any way and do not result in a new regime with the capacity to implement peacebuilding. Instead, ceasefires resolve only the security issues and stalemates indicate no resolution of any kind. I utilized these termination types as baselines because they were of least interest and had a fair distribution of cases which would not skew the other data. I assumed that there ease would be low or non-existent as there is no change in the status quo and therefore what was conflictual before remains conflictual. I also assumed that there was no incentive to implement peacebuilding because there was no clear winner and all sides are likely still trying to figure out where they stand what they might get through continued conflict. Without a transition away from conflict, there is no chance of implementing peacebuilding strategies. While this may not seem like a revelation (it's not), again this has been proven with something other than conflict data. The use of peacebuilding data as opposed to a single binary conflict variable demonstrates that states must keep moving towards peace and away from stop-gaps or momentary lapses in conflict – without a change in the status quo, there is no expectation of peacebuilding success.

The control variables provide interesting confirmation of existing expectations and insights into unexpected results. The polity variable's positive impact and significance on peacebuilding success came as no surprise as we would expect democratic states to have better peacebuilding outcomes. Democracies are also more likely to have lower repression (PTS scores), higher GDP growth, and fewer terror attacks (although this is less true in the post-9/11 era). It is possible that the index is capturing elements that are already endemic to democracy and that explains the relationship. Either way, the polity outcome is not surprising and instead

confirms what many believe to be true – democracy is an important part of building peace after conflict. This is interesting given the results of the elections and their lack of effect on peacebuilding success. This could be related to the theory that elections simply indicate you have held elections and do not imply that some peacebuilding step was taken (see summary in chapter 2). I excluded elections from the index because I do not see them as an indicator of peacebuilding because they are often rushed or institutionalize a system focused around the conflict identities, which is counterproductive. The mixed results on elections indicates that their impact on peacebuilding success is still unclear and more investigation is needed.

The conflict specific variables were not surprising either as severe conflicts results in lower levels of peacebuilding success demonstrating that it is harder to recover from severe conflict. The years from conflict variable denoted that as more time passes without violence, the more peacebuilding success the state is likely to achieve. As note earlier, this could be a spurious relationship in which implementing peacebuilding strategies increases peace-years, at least that is certainly the hope behind the peacebuilding agenda. I was not quite sure what impact the type of conflict would have on peacebuilding success, but from the results it appears that it matters very little. This is perhaps not surprising as the conflict termination type and severity accounts for the issues that would arise from the intractable conflicts related to territory. Similarly, the peacekeeping and foreign variables had very little impact on the outcomes. Foreign aid may not be sufficient for impacting peacebuilding strategies as it may not actually end up changing life on the ground. The presence of UN peacekeepers actually indicates that peace is not quite set so it is not surprising that it is largely negative and most significant as a negative contributor. The control variables provide an additional insight into the ways in which peacebuilding success is impacted.

## 4.7 Conclusion

The findings in this chapter confirm my original hypotheses although they also suggest that more investigation is needed. Peace agreements are important to peacebuilding because they set an agenda that does not rely on any single group or person and overcome the ease-incentive challenge. Rebel victories are more likely to result in peacebuilding success because of the incentive to do so while government victories are less likely to result in success because there may be no incentive or drive. Peace agreements provide that drive, which is why they are consistently more successful in achieving peacebuilding success. Chapter 5 investigates these phenomena further and considers additional case specific elements.

## Chapter 5 – A Tale of Two Cities: Finding Peace in Belfast and Sarajevo

### 5.1 Introduction

It was clear to me from the onset of this project and throughout all of its iterations that I needed to actually see what peace looked like in post-civil conflict states. It was my impression that despite the argument that avoiding recurrence for more than five to ten years indicated stable and lasting peace, problems still existed and were in fact masked by the implementation of peace agreements and external “approval” of the peace process. I decided to visit two highly lauded, yet suspicious locations over a two week period in October 2013 to collect data on the reality of peace on the ground. My research methodology for collecting qualitative evidence utilizes semi-structured interviews and ethnography. These approaches allowed me a sliver of insight into the post-conflict environment and confirmed my suspicions regarding our understanding of peace. Though the focus of the quantitative work has moved to peacebuilding, the data captured here are informative for understanding the peacebuilding progress as I will explain later in the chapter.

#### 5.1.1 Research Design

My initial research question focused specifically on civil conflicts terminated through negotiated settlements and I was particularly interested in agreements that imposed power-sharing. Though the scope of my inquiry has broadened, my research question hasn't changed – how does each conflict termination type impact the peace outcomes. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Ireland were of particular interest to me because of their classification as having achieved long-term peace meaning they had gone more than 5 years without a return to violence. There are numerous studies seeking to understand why violence broke out in these areas, what

led to peace, and the impact of the peace agreements themselves. All of these studies focus on understanding why conflict did not recur, but do not seek to understand the peace outcomes. These cases are of extreme interest to conflict resolution scholars and comprise a large portion of the case studies on peace agreements, power-sharing, and conflict resolution in general. Like much of the field, I wanted to better understand peace agreements and power-sharing, but from the perspective of the people on the ground. To that end, I constructed a list of questions to be administered through semi-structured interviews. Once I arrived and began interviewing participants, I realized that the list was too long and dropped more than half of the questions. I also realized that some of the questions would make it difficult to build rapport with the participants, which is an important consideration. Conflict is traumatic and asking people to relive any aspect of it requires creating an environment of trust, even if very minimal. Clinical questions focused on demographic data cause people to feel like subjects as opposed to participants and I wanted to build a feeling of trust so that the responses would go beyond the common narrative. Figure 12 captures the questions that were asked to all participants and which they all answered.

Figure 12. IRB Approved Semi-Structured Interview Questions
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Where are you from?</li> <li>2. Did you have any experience with the conflict?</li> <li>3. How would you describe or how do you feel about the process that ultimately resulted in the signing of the peace agreement?</li> <li>4. Do you believe the peace process succeeded in stopping violence?</li> <li>5. If you could change one aspect of the agreement, what would you change?</li> <li>6. List 3 adjectives that describe the type of peace that exists in the post-conflict environment</li> <li>7. Based on the following descriptions, please choose which type of peace best describes the current post conflict environment:</li> </ol> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">Secure peace – there are security forces in place that are able to respond to conflict-related violence, there is little access to basic services (water, electricity, housing, first aid), and there is an interim government in place, but it has yet to produce legislation</p>

Functional peace – security forces are able to respond to conflict-related violence and crime, there is limited access to basic services (water, electricity, housing, first aid), and there is a long-term government in place, but it has yet to produce legislation

Consolidated peace – security forces are well trained and ably respond to conflict-related violence and crime, there is access to a range of services (water, electricity, housing, health care, education), and there is a long-term government in place which produces meaningful legislation that has an impact on the lives of the citizens.

8. Do any of these categories accurately describe the post conflict environment? If not, what category would you add?
9. Is there anything else you want to add at all?

The interviews resulted in a number of additional questions, most of which I carried forward into all of the interviews. Figure 13 lists those additional questions, which focus more specifically on power-sharing and the agreements themselves as they relate to the peace outcomes.

Figure 13. Additional Interview Questions

1. Was the agreement imposed or was there widespread acceptance of it?
2. What role has power-sharing played in creating peace?
3. What is the biggest challenge facing the area today?
4. Has reconciliation happened?
5. Could there be a return to violence?

### 5.1.2 Participants

I interviewed 4 people in each location for a total of 8 participants over 10 hours. The selection of participants was not systematic as some were random selections while others were selected through referrals. A common thread for both locations was that I was told by numerous American scholars that people in both locations were wary of westerners coming in and talking about the war and that no one would want to talk to me. I arrived in Belfast without any connections or interviews scheduled and without much of a plan. I had contacted a few faculty members at Queen’s University and received a response for a graduate student studying the same topic, but no one was available for a meeting. I decided to take a free walking tour of Belfast and

was met by an adjunct lecturer at the university who also happened to be from the city and who worked with a community building organization focused on connecting children from the two opposing sides. He agreed to be interviewed and referred me to his organizational partner who was from the opposing side and also agreed to be interviewed. They provided both a local and non-profit view of the peacebuilding process. I also signed up for tours of the conflict neighborhoods, which are denoted by the key roads that run through them – Shankill (Protestant/Loyalist) and Falls (Catholic/Republican). I interviewed my tour guide in Shankill and one of the guides/managers in Falls. I scheduled two interviews in Sarajevo through referrals from a colleague who had worked in the region. Both guides were former combatants and ex-political prisoners who participate in various “conflict tours” of the neighborhoods. One participant worked for a non-profit while the other was a professor and he referred me to one of his colleagues who also agreed to be interviewed. My fourth participant was selected in the same way that I chose the first Irish interviewee, he was a tour guide offering free tours of Sarajevo.

While tour guides might seem like an odd place to find participants, they actually make excellent interviewees: they are knowledgeable of the events, are from the area and have had some experience with the conflict, speak English (an admitted limitation in Sarajevo), and are open to sharing their experiences. One caveat is that tour guides are accustomed to providing a narrative and being wary of being too biased so it was important to create an environment in which the interviewee could answer the question as themselves and not as a public figure.

Given the unsystematic approach I took to this very preliminary look at local peace, I do not have clear distributions across key areas. 7 of the 8 participants were men and 7 of the 8 participants were over 40 years old, although this was almost a requirement to find people who

had experienced the conflicts, which had been resolved more than 10 years prior. All participants are public figures as they either work for a non-profit organization (university, community organization) or with the public as a tour guide. All of the interviews took place in public settings, except for one interview in Belfast which took place in the interviewee's kitchen. Participants did not receive the questions ahead of time and while I did ask each person the same questions, because they were semi-structured interviews, each conversation followed its own path and structure. I had an equal distribution of viewpoints in Northern Ireland as two participants identified as Catholic/Republican and two identified as Protestant/Loyalist. In Bosnia, people are not as comfortable identifying themselves with a particular group, although the names are often an indicator. One interviewee was a non-citizen who had lived in the country for more than 10 years and worked with the Office of the High Representative while the other three were Bosniaks from Sarajevo, although they never specifically identified themselves as such. In Belfast, two of the interviewees were people working with a (now defunct) community building organization focused on connecting youth from both sides of the conflict. The other two interviewees were former combatants/political prisoners who now lead tours of the neighborhoods. 7 of the 8 participants had at least a college degree and all were employed in some capacity. All of the participants had been living in their respective city for at least 5 years and had some knowledge of the conflict, the peace agreement, and local/national peacebuilding efforts.

### 5.1.3 Ethnography

While interviews are a common approach in political science, ethnography is largely confined to area studies, anthropology, and geography because of its reflective and subjective nature. Standard ethnographic approaches seek to observe the phenomena of interest from the

perspective of the subjects or in this case the survivors living in post-conflict peace. This requires complete immersion in the culture including use of the local language, participating in local practice and customs, and collecting data in a systematic and pre-determined manner. I could not participate in this form of ethnographic data collection and instead recognized that I could only participate as an outsider. This provided a particular strength in that there is much to be gained from viewing the way in which a post-civil conflict society portrays itself to outsiders. An example of using tourism as an ethnographic subject can be found in *Itineraries in Conflict* (Stein, 2008) in which the tourist behavior of Israelis in the post-Oslo Accord era provided valuable insight into understanding the changing national identity and the role in which Palestinian space played in it. I participated in multiple tours focused specifically on the conflicts in each location and gleaned an insight into how the conflict stories are told, but more importantly how people live with those stories and memories and today. Post-conflict peace inherently contains the memories of the trauma and the experience of absorbing how people live with these memories in public spaces and how they are communicated to foreigners gave me insight into the post-conflict peace environment of each location.

## 5.2 Why Belfast and Sarajevo?

The post-Cold War era has seen a rise in civil conflict as well as rise in intervention and conflict resolution. Negotiated settlements have become the preferred method of resolving conflict from the perspective of major powers and a number of the conflicts of the era were resolved through peace agreements. At the same time, the concept of power-sharing, though not new became of great interest to the academic and policy circles. After the seeming success of the Ta'if Agreement which addressed the civil conflict in Lebanon, a similar model was used to resolve both the Bosnian conflict and eventually the long and slow burning Troubles in Northern

Ireland. The Bosnian civil conflict was ultimately resolved through the General Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Accords) while violence in Northern Ireland ended with the Good Friday Agreement. These agreements included all of the combative parties, were guided and administered by external actors, and included power-sharing measures. Both agreements were complex and required detailed and sequential implementation plans. Because of the similarities of these agreements and what they required in the post-conflict setting, these cases are often compared, however it is important to consider the conflict dynamics before continuing with the discussion.

### 5.2.1 Bosnia-Herzegovina – State Breakup and Formation

The conflict in Bosnia began with the slow breakup of Yugoslavia after the fall of the Soviet Union. Territories which had functioned within a federalist system saw the opportunity to become states rather than remain under the control of Serbia and began to hold elections which would ultimately result in referendum votes for independence. In 1991, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the dismantling of community regimes and parties throughout FSU countries, both Slovenia and Croatia voted in representatives who wanted to separate from Belgrade and focus on maintaining and strengthening autonomy for their states. This action resulted in Croatian Serbs holding their own referendum in which they sought autonomy from Zagreb. By mid-1991, both countries had declared their independence with international support and though both were opposed by Serbia, Croatia experienced the most conflict because of its sizable Serbian population which opposed the nationality change. Bosnia followed in early 1992 with a vote of its own and though Bosnian Serbs voted against independence, Muslim and Croatian Bosnians overwhelmingly supported independence and it was passed. Serbian paramilitary

groups began to form and Belgrade set about supporting these groups as they operated throughout the region. Conflict intensified as groups of Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks operated throughout the country, with alliances constantly shifting and the military and civilian death tolls growing. By 1993, Sarajevo which had hosted the Winter Olympics only 10 years prior had become a city under siege in which walking to the market could result in being shot by a sniper. Peacekeepers had operated in the country since 1992, but with little ability to stop conflict they were largely helpless to prevent conflict from intensifying. In 1995, the Srebrenica massacre took place just miles away from UN peacekeepers tasked with protecting civilians.

By December of 1995, NATO intervention in the conflict which included direct bombings of Belgrade resulted in peace talks and an eventual peace agreement, which is known as the Dayton Peace Accords. These agreements were not voted on by the people, but were instead negotiated by the heads of the different ethnic groups in conjunction with the US and EU negotiators. This set of agreements is perhaps one of the best known today and is a symbol of both comprehensive peacebuilding, the ability of peace agreements to become frameworks, and the concerns around relying on peace agreements to build peace. In a 2013 poll taken in Bosnia, when asked “If there was a referendum on Dayton tomorrow how would you vote?” resulted in a positive response rate in the following language breakouts: Bosnian – 39%, Croatian – 34%, Serbian – 65% with 25% of Bosnian respondents, 37% of Croatian respondent, and 18% of Serbian respondents not sure how they would vote (IPSOS 2015, reported in Morgan-Jones, Loizides and Stefanovic 2015). This suggests that support for the agreement could be waning although it never received completely widespread support. The Serbian response is not surprising as it received everything it wanted out of the agreement, short of allowing Republika Srpska to become independent and join Serbia.

The Dayton Peace Accords were designed to balance power and transition the state not only from conflict, but from its role as a part of the previous Republic of Yugoslavia. With multiple articles and annexes it created a complex governance system, gave territorial autonomy to Republika Srpska, overhauled the security sector, and created a new constitution, which is encompassed in Annex 4. The agreement included provisions regarding territorial powersharing, political powersharing, amnesty and prisoner release as well as elections and cultural practice in schools. It also created an extremely complex power-sharing system which institutionalized the identity groups as political parties and ensured that ethnic identity remained the main identifier when voting. Bosnia has a three-member presidential system, with each member representing one of the constitutive groups (Bosniak, Croatian, Serbian). Chairpersonship rotates between them every 8 months and it should be noted that the Serbian president is also the president of Republika Srpska, which the Bosnian executive branch has little control over. The legislative branch contains two houses, both of which have reserved seats for each of the identity groups. The House of Peoples (upper house) has 15 seats with each group receiving five seats while the lower House of Representatives has 42 members proportionally representing the three groups. The agreement put this system in place to ensure that no single group could take power from the others and yet it has become a symbol of institutionalized ethnic conflict and converting it into a political system. This approach has caused questions regarding the use of power-sharing in post-conflict states as it may serve to resolve conflict, but it may not result in the best long-term peace outcomes.

### 5.2.2 Northern Ireland – Separation and Desire for Unification

The conflict in Northern Ireland is similar to that of Bosnia in that it also emanates from the notion of state breakup and separation, although in a very different context. The origins of

the conflict in Northern Ireland begin with what is now the Republic of Ireland when it was under British rule and its eventual fight for independence. As Ireland moved towards autonomy and eventual statehood, Northern Ireland became an internationally recognized part of the United Kingdom, which those of Irish origins did not want. In 1949, Ireland officially becomes the Republic of Ireland and there is widespread desire to join the new state from those who identify as Irish in Northern Ireland. As it became clear that they would not be joining the Irish state, the Irish Republican Army formed in 1956 but what is now known as “The Troubles” did not begin until the start of the Catholic Civil Rights Movement in 1968. As the movement moved forward, Protestant paramilitary groups also formed in response to the IRA and by 1972’s Bloody Sunday, both sides had groups operating as violent non-state actors. Much like Bosnia, the Protestant side received support from an outside entity in the form of Great Britain, however its support was neither secretive nor hidden as it established direct rule in the region and specifically in Belfast. While conflict occurred at the neighborhood level between the groups, the British military was also involved in the conflict as it was considered a combatant by the IRA and its allied groups. Throughout the 1980’s and 90s’ multiple talks were held in an attempt to bring the slow and low burning conflict to an end with the 1994 ceasefire ending with a bomb in London. Talks are renewed in 1997 and in 1998 the Good Friday agreement is reached, which set forth the power-sharing government in existence today.

The agreement did not grant Northern Ireland the right to join Ireland, but it did recognize the need to share power between the main parties and ultimately remove the British government from the region. It included DDR (specifically focused on the IRA) and military power-sharing as well as power-sharing at the assembly level as well as prisoner release, culture in schools, and reconciliation. It effectively granted Northern Ireland autonomous status and

created an assembly made up of all parties to govern the territory. It was voted on in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and received support and was implemented in 1999. Unfortunately, the assembly created by Good Friday was unable to form and govern and by 2006 it became necessary to negotiate a follow-up agreement known as the St. Andrews Agreement. This agreement resulted in the creation of an executive with one seat allotted to Sinn Fein (Catholic party) and one seat allotted to the Democratic Unionist Party (Protestant party) and required they work together to govern. By 2013, the government was once again struggling and seeking the help of American mediator, Richard Haass to help break the deadlock. The assembly, located in the Stormont estate in Belfast keeps the city at the center of the political struggle. Though the British military posts have largely been closed and prisons have been emptied and either closed or turned into museums, the political deadlock continues.

Both of these conflicts have been classified as ethnic and territorial and there are elements of both in each. It is important to note that both were related to state formation, nationalism, and the fear of becoming a minority in a state that does not reflect the values and culture of the group. Both conflicts were fueled by outside(ish) entities who did not view themselves as outsiders, but instead as patriarchal states seeking to keep their rightful territories and protect their local constituents. While the Bosnian conflict began with a vote for independence, the Northern Irish conflict ended with a vote for peace and yet both entities are left with barely functioning governments and institutionalized ethnic politics. Both entities retain frustration and sorrow over the outcomes of the conflict with Bosnians lamenting the creation of Republika Srpska and the Republicans lamenting their continued division from the Republic of Ireland. Though the conflict dynamics were different in a number of ways, the outcomes have become quite similar. I have summarized the conflict dynamics in Figure 14.

Figure 14. Conflict Dynamics

	Northern Ireland	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Conflict years	1968-1998	1992-1995
Battle deaths	3,607	100,000
Cause(s) of conflict (summarized)	Constitutional status of Northern Ireland – unification with Republic of Ireland vs. unification with Great Britain	Breakup of Yugoslavia – determining new territorial borders for 3 different groups <sup>9</sup>
Identity Element <sup>10</sup>	Republican – Catholic Unionist/Loyalist – Protestant	Bosniak – Muslim Croatian – Catholic Serbian – Orthodox
External Intervention	No direct external intervention, but support provided to paramilitary groups by outside actors	Military intervention by NATO forces led by the US
Resolution Process	Multiple starts and stops with the US, Great Britain	Peace process led by US and EU
Peace Agreement(s)	Good Friday, 1998	Washington Agreement, 1994 Dayton Accords, 1995

I will address two key points related to the conflicts and my ultimate research question regarding termination type and peace outcomes.

First, the issue of identity and ethnicity regarding the two conflicts. Northern Ireland is often classified as a religious conflict, but the root cause of the violence is completely related to its status within the United Kingdom. Religion became a way to identify one's political beliefs, but it also became a tool by which people were forced into a single side and viewpoint.

Republicans seek unification with the Republic of Ireland while Unionists wish to remain connected to Great Britain and the conflict emanates entirely from this disagreement. Though discrimination, marginalization, exclusion, and repression compounded the problem, the core issue has not changed nor has it been entirely resolved. Republicans remain committed to

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<sup>9</sup> This summary is general because to date there are still multiple explanations and causes for the conflict, none of which have been agreed upon by the parties to the conflict (Dzidic, 2014). The impetus for the conflict was the breakup of Yugoslavia as the territory went from a highly unified, single state to a chaotic collection of territories and peoples seeking statehood.

<sup>10</sup> The identity elements of these conflicts are both different and similar. Please see my discussion of the causes and identity elements of the conflict for a more nuanced discussion of these issues.

unifying with Ireland while Unionists remain committed to reaming part of the United Kingdom and the transition that has occurred is merely the willingness to address these issues through political processes instead of violence means.<sup>11</sup>

The second issue is one of territory and identity as the Bosnian conflict was also about status and statehood and initially had no identity element as people from all three groups were eligible to participate in the vote for independence. The Yugoslav identity was so strong and unifying that the conflict caught most people off guard. After the successful (yet still bloody) successions of Croatia and Slovenia, it seemed likely that Bosnia would be next and though it was known that Bosnian Serbs did not want to separate from Serbia, their boycotting of the referendum vote ensured that it would pass. Conflict ensued as a result of the attack by Bosnian Serbs on both Bosniaks and Croatians and the eventual inclusion of Serbia in the conflict. The use of genocide against Bosniak men and the use of mass rape against Bosniak women confirm that while this conflict was not about religion, the ethnic identities associated with religion resulted in targeted killings and torture. The conflict was resolved by granting Bosnian Serbs an autonomous region of their own known as Republika Srpska. It has its own president (although the other two groups have their own presidents as well), sets its own policy agenda and is governed almost separately from the rest of the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). Ultimately, the Bosnian conflict was also about territory and unification versus separation.

These two conflicts in particular are wrapped up in identity and territory and the conflation of one issue with the other makes them worthy of comparison. Additionally, they were both resolved through negotiated settlements, although the American military intervention in the conflict most likely spurred the willingness of the Bosnian Serbs to participate in the

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<sup>11</sup> This section was written in 2013, far before the realization of Brexit and the issues it has created for the territory. It is unclear where things stand and what will happen as Brexit moves forward.

negotiations. The existing logic suggests that conflicts resolved through negotiated settlements are more likely to remain peaceful, when peace is defined as the absence of war. My suspicion that this is not necessarily correct led me to investigate the peace outcomes of two very well known conflicts which were resolved via these means. I selected Belfast and Sarajevo as the two cities in which to conduct my preliminary investigation because they are both the capitals of their territories and were the locations of much of the conflict and therefore have a memory and experience with the violence. These two cases provide the opportunity to consider whether or not settlements ultimately result in peace and if so, what kind of peace.

### 5.3 What Kind of Peace after Settlement: Belfast and Sarajevo

The interviews I conducted in Belfast and Sarajevo revealed that peace is more complex than we think, which is no surprise. Though themes and shared issues emerged, each person had a slightly different view of peace and of what was most important for the future of peace. I allowed the conversations to wander, but made sure to ask at least a few of the same questions. Summarized in Figure 15 are the responses which relate specifically to the questions of peace, reconciliation, and the post conflict environments. One comment from each participant is included and they are in random order in each section to ensure that responses cannot be connected to participants. The only exception to this rule is the adjective question in which I included all responses given by participants to collect a better picture of their description of the environment. I have tried to maintain the original transcription, but have made minor adjustments to grammar to fit into the format. I have not changed any of the key words or sentiments of the original transcriptions.

Figure 15. Questions on the Post-Civil Conflict Environment

	Belfast	Sarajevo
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Adjectives	fragile, uncertain, not perfect, not truly peace, welcome	corrupt, hopeless, unsustainable, artificial, forced, fragile, working, resilient, active, negative
Levels of peace	Functional, but some of the secure peace as well  Depends on your perspective, but maybe functional  Functional  Can't quantify it – None of the 3 are operating in NI – you can take aspects of each	mix of the three – I am not able to determine which one  functional  functional – very much  citizens are in functional/consolidated, politics are somewhere between secure and functional
Reconciliation	Some has happened, more would take place if unionists didn't pander  It's a work in progress  At the grassroots level in some areas  What, everybody hugging trees? – There has been acknowledgement by both communities that we can't go on killing each other	Trust among people is stronger than we think  Divisions here are much more malleable than is perceived – we have to build social trust  It will never happen – people interact, but there are still underlying trust issues  At the grassroots level – people interact, but not as much as before

The responses reveal that there is a lack of clarity as to the type of peace for the people living in the areas as well. Everyone enjoyed and paused at the adjective question because no one had ever asked them to describe the environment. It was much easier for the participants in Sarajevo to come up with adjectives than for the participants in Belfast as two of them did not provide any response to the question. Participants also generally had trouble selecting a particular type of peace, largely because of what they viewed as unresponsive and dysfunctional government. The reconciliation question was designed to capture their impressions of trust-

building and moving past the conflict. Sarajevans had quite a bit to say regarding divisions and trust and though they acknowledged that there were still divisions, they also suggested that these divisions do not prevent people from interacting or existing together. Belfast respondents were less comfortable suggesting that reconciliation has taken place or that the divisions no longer matter. From these responses, it would appear that Sarajevo is further along in building peace than Belfast, but both appear to be at the functional level. The next set of questions relates specifically to the termination of the conflict through settlements and the likelihood of violence returning as well as a follow-up question on power-sharing, because it is such a prominent part of the agreement and the governance structure. The results of the questions are listed in Figure 16 and include one response from each participant in random order.

Figure 16. Questions on the Peace Process and Peace Outcomes

	Belfast	Sarajevo
Impact of the peace process on building actual peace	<p>Inevitable outcome of international context – It ends conflict and has to be welcomed, no matter how imperfect it happens to be</p> <p>It gave the impetus to (to stop violence) – it’s genuine, most people voted for it</p> <p>It did have an influence – there was a commitment that people don’t want to return to violence</p> <p>It was a wholesome agreement – everyone came to the conclusion we are getting nowhere. It was time to bring the misery to an end</p>	<p>Peace was forced by outside actors – after 4 years of war, people were tired</p> <p>Was a bit forced by the international community, but it did help stop violence</p> <p>It wasn’t forced by external forces – everyone had a reason to go along with it in the end</p> <p>It was imposed from the outside. Dayton did end the war, but it created negative peace</p>
Could there be a return to violence	<p>People are still scared and nervous – we haven’t learned any lessons</p>	<p>At this moment – I don’t think anyone is ready to go to war. The state is very fragile.</p>

	<p>No way in the country we go back to war – no public desire to do this again</p> <p>People don't want violence, most are worried about paying rent, health, kids...the normal things</p> <p>If wars were fought by people over 40, you would have no wars</p>	<p>People are used to being upset and it's part of daily life – people accept it</p> <p>We can't wave a magic wand and fix it, but we should create space for those who want to actually make the country better</p> <p>Violence has transitioned from local to politics</p>
Impact of power-sharing on building peace	<p>As a Protestant, I feel sold down the river – there was a point when everyone was willing to make it work, but bits have been taken away and given to the nationalists</p> <p>It's power allocation, not sharing</p> <p>I think we have taken off the shackles of violence<sup>12</sup></p> <p>Unionists have been pulled to a position they don't want to be in – they will try to stymie the rate of change<sup>13</sup></p>	<p>We need a careful balance, but the ethnic criteria should be abandoned completely</p> <p>Power-sharing was completely designed around the interests of the signatories – as long as you have ethnified units, the country is living on borrowed time</p> <p>We have to have a power-sharing system, but how it has been implemented in the country is wrong</p> <p>It prevents development</p>

The peace process question refers to creation and implementation of the peace agreements and there were diverging feelings about them. The Belfast respondents were largely supportive of the agreement, but questioned how it had been implemented. All of the participants suggested that the elected officials had failed to fully implement the agreement and instead were focused on “cherry-picking” the provisions that suited them. Unlike the Dayton Accords, the Good Friday Agreement was actually put up for a vote and passed with over 71%

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<sup>12</sup> This participant never really acknowledged the power-sharing government, but instead focused on the implementation of the peace agreement. This quote was the comment most related to the question.  
<sup>13</sup> This participant never addressed the power-sharing government setup directly, but instead focused on the removal of Britain from all aspects of Northern Ireland.

approval, which is why there is a generally positive attitude towards it. The Dayton Accords were negotiated and finalized with the EU and the US as the final “approvers” and the population was never given the opportunity to vote on it, which could contribute to the largely negative view people have of it. Though not captured in the comments pictured here, respondents were very critical of the agreement and in fact one respondent said, “there is nothing good about Dayton.” This is not surprising given the way in which the agreement was constructed and should give us pause regarding intervention and forced settlements because they may not reflect how people feel.

Both groups shared a similar sentiment regarding a return to violence in that they did not think it was likely. This is important because this question alone addresses the issue of peacefulness for all other studies that use the binary, battle deaths outcome. If violence never returns, then these cases will be treated as the same and the provisions of the agreements will be treated as contributing to peace, when in reality they could be causing the biggest problems. Violence is the extreme response to a problem and as these answers demonstrate, people who have already experienced it will do tolerate dysfunction to avoid experiencing it again. That does not mean that they live in peace, it merely means they don’t want to go to extremes. Additionally, that unwillingness to return to violence places a massive amount of power in the hands of elites and they wield that power in way that prevents violence, but places people in cages because of fear. That does not seem to be a proper understanding of the concept of peace.

Both locations expressed dismay with the way in which the agreements were implemented. Sarajevans felt that the Accords were not meant to be permanent, but instead a vehicle through which a final constitution would be crafted. Instead, it became the constitution which institutionalized the ethnic groups, which every respondent disliked. When asked about

power-sharing, every respondent felt that while it was necessary in some capacity, but that it stagnated development and placed all of the power into the hands of the very elites who profited from the war. Republika Srpska was specifically mentioned by two respondents who stated that it was created through the use of genocide and ethnic cleansing and that the power-sharing agreement actually rewarded the Bosnian Serbs for those tactics. That being said, they were willing to live with it to avoid another outbreak of violence. Belfast respondents were not that interested in the power-sharing aspect. One respondent called it power allocation and felt that it was not power-sharing at all, but rather dividing power and giving it to a few individuals who though elected, did not represent everyone's wishes.

Though these interviews are not representative nor a random sample of people from either location, they offer some insight into the post-conflict peace experience. The connection of that experience or peace outcome is directly related to the negotiated settlements that resolved the conflicts and therefore should cause us to question our assumptions and prevailing attitudes regarding settlements and levels of peace.


### 5.3.1 Connecting to the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Index

The comments noted above were focused around the peace agreements themselves and their construction and implementation. From the responses it is clear that people are not quite sure which level of peace they are living in and unsure of how exactly to connect it with the agreements themselves. Before continuing, we should consider the scores of the two states on the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Index and subsequent peace categories.

The data from the previous chapter show that there has been little fluctuation between the peacebuilding index outcomes over the years. The reconciliation score (TJS) went from low to high and back to rather low because it reflects trials in process (66.7), largely for IRA members

that were completed (100). The GTD indicates that there was a substantial continuation of violence from 1992 and until 1994, after which there was a substantial drop. It begins to build again until the resumption of conflict in 1998 and its subsequent resolution in 1999. The UK's HDI score is not useful here as it captures the entire group, which is not representative of the situation in Northern Ireland. The components selected generally refer to the conflict in Northern Ireland, but again the GDP growth includes all of the United Kingdom and obscures the reality on the ground in Belfast. Security was always handled at the local level, although the British government was also considered a combatant in the conflict. The last three indicators demonstrate some of the challenges in doing national level data as they capture scores for the UK as a whole and do not specifically breakout Northern Ireland. For this reason, it scores between the two highest scores for human rights protections and lack of repression as well as domestic movement, even though movement was restricted in Belfast until 1998 and is still restricted in some neighborhoods. The UK economy grew at fairly regular rates and so the country scores rather high on the index, although it does not make it past the functional label. Interestingly, this matches what the respondents said regarding how they would label the current situation as 3 of the 4 respondents stated that they would describe the environment as functional (in 2013). Their responses match with what the data tell us should be going on in the location.

Figure 17. Northern Ireland Peacebuilding Index




Northern Ireland has a simple yet troubled governing system because it requires leaders from the two conflictual sides to not only share power with one another, but practice joint decision-making. Lovingly referred to as “Stormont” (so named for its location in Belfast) the government requires that both a unionist and a nationalist must make up the power-sharing executive to lead the assembly. This system has struggled multiple times and required intervention from mediators almost annually because there is still a lack of trust between the two main parties. The power-sharing agreement makes decision-making especially challenging because each part of the executive is held accountable by his voting block and so is particularly interested in protecting their interests. The Assembly does much of the legislating, but without an executive it cannot function and the government shuts down, which has also occurred multiple times. The structure of the power-sharing government may be designed to prevent conflict, but it has resulted in a reduction in ease when it come to implementing peacebuilding. Incentives are greatly reduced because each side is beholden to its ethnic constituency because the system institutionalized it. Northern Ireland’s drop in the Index reflects the troubled times

after the signing of the agreement and the challenge to implement peacebuilding with a complex and partisan government.

While in Belfast in 2013, I was told that many of the youth of today are more concerned with trying to find work and avoiding the heroin epidemic sweeping the city than they are with uniting with Ireland. Many are too young to remember the pre-Good Friday Agreement Northern Ireland and now find themselves trying to survive in a globalized world in which their neighborhood hasn't even caught up to its neighboring city. Since 1998 (the year of the signing of the Agreement), the suicide rate has almost doubled, with a large portion of the population coming from the adults who had lived through the hardest parts of the Troubles. Unfortunately, young people are also caught up in the suicide epidemic and it was unclear why, given that they had not experienced the actual conflict. Siobhan O'Neill, a researcher at the University of Ulster has established a link between suicidal behavior and trauma, which is not exactly surprising. She states, "When one person is traumatized, it will affect how they relate to everybody else...People who've been affected by the Troubles live in areas where there's high rates of crime and poverty. When you are a child...being parented by people who've been traumatized, you are going to be affected..." (McKee, Jan 20 2016). Dr. O'Neill noted that Northern Ireland had the highest rates of PTSD out of 28 countries on the World Mental Health Survey Initiative. This survey is a new attempt to start capturing mental health data, but it is limited and cannot be backdated, which poses a problem for doing historical research. Addressing trauma remains a necessary part of creating peace, but most peacebuilding initiatives are focused on statebuilding as opposed to trauma care. Future work will need to include trauma as a consideration and at some point, a variable in explaining or understanding peace and peacebuilding.

For the Bosnian case, I will refer to Index 1 as Bosnia drops out of Index 3 because it does not have enrollment data available and its HDI Scores only increase so Index 2 does not provide any new information. Bosnian peace-years in the dataset run from 1996-2010 and though it does not have a polity score, it does rather well on the index. It serves as an excellent example of how a state can move up and down the index as different components of the index change.

Figure 18. Bosnia-Herzegovina Performance on Peacebuilding Index



The GTD data indicate that immediately after the conflict ended there was a continuation of violence in 1996 (33 incidents) and 1997 (42 incidents), but with a reduction from there on out and almost no incidents by 2001. It experiences a reconciliation process from 1998 through 2010 which includes truth and reconciliation commissions, lustration, and reparations. The domestic movement (social integration) variable is one of the main causes of the change in the index score as it changes quite a bit from severely restricted from 1996-2000, to somewhat restricted from 2001-2003, to unrestricted from 2004-2006. However it reverts back to severely restricted from 2007-2008, which coincides with an important transitional justice (reconciliation) component. The year of 2007 saw the International Court of Justice rule the 1995 Srebrenica massacre constituted genocide, but does not hold Serbia responsible. That same year saw

Zdravko Tolimir arrested for his role in Srebrenica followed by a new High Representative taking office and the resignation of a prime minister over the High Rep. Violence was anticipated through each of these events and so travel was restricted, which perfectly illustrates how the index works.

Addressing a few variables excluded from the indexes, I wanted to use the *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) Dataset* (Cohen and Nordas 2013) because it was such a prominent part of the conflict. Muslim women were particularly targeted by Bosnian Serbs for the many reasons that rape is used as a weapon including shaming both the survivor and her community, forced pregnancy which also divides the community, collective punishment, and ethnic cleansing. Estimates place somewhere between 20,000-50,000 women as survivors of rape because of the conflict (Gadzo, al Jazeera online Dec 29, 2017). Women survivors of rape in Bosnia continue to struggle to find justice and fair treatment, even 25 years later. The SVAC dataset shows that assaults halted after 1995 and did not recur through the post-conflict+5 year standard they place on their data. This is an important part of peacebuilding as women's security is vital to creating a peaceful state. The data presented for the conflict years is both upsetting and not surprising all at once. The Bosnian case is an excellent reminder of the need to consider the component parts of the index and consider individual cases and components alongside large statistical analyses.

The mass rape and its impact on families and communities combined with massacres and battle deaths and physical displacements has left the population traumatized. There is little support for those who seek mental health counseling (Nelson 2003) and survivors of rape continue to be traumatized and ignored. Many women continue to interact with their rapists as they are part of the community and live in the neighborhood (Turton July 21, 2017). This is the

kind of trauma that needs to be accounted for when determining if peace has been achieved. If women still live in fear of their lives because their rapists (who were never tried because “war is messy”) live down the street, there can be no peace. There is no large-scale measure to capture how these women feel, how their families feel, or how the perpetrators feel (which seems unimportant, but is very important for understanding trauma recovery). Ultimately, if we want to understand whether peace has been achieved or not, we must measure levels of trauma at the individual level and understand how those are connected to the peacebuilding measures being implemented. The challenge with using trauma recovery as a measure of peace is that trauma cannot be cured and it takes a long time for the person to learn to manage it. In the meantime, we should be looking for ways to measure trauma and trauma recovery as a way to capture peace and understanding the impact of conflict termination type and peacebuilding outcomes.

Bosnia’s Dayton Accords were extremely complex as they were the combination and culmination of multiple agreements. They created one of the most complex executive structures in government, as previously discussed. In addition to navigating three presidents and multiple autonomous entities the government must also manage multiple prime ministers, ministries, and a parliament that is split between the Federation and Republika Srpska. Bosnia is a collection of territorial entities parading as a state. This creates enormous amounts of complexity when trying to pass a law or implement policy. The bureaucracy of the Bosnian state has become both an embarrassment and a frustration for Bosnians as they attempt to survive in an economy with high unemployment and little prospect for changing it. Voting takes place completely along ethnic lines because those are the categories that were used to create the system and the parties in the aftermath of the conflict. The presidency is allotted to the three main constitutive groups: Bosniak, Croat, and Serb and therefore people feel compelled to vote along ethnic lines to avoid

empowering another party. Because of this voting system, there is little incentive for those elected to make large changes or changes that impact the state because their position is almost guaranteed once they make it to the upper echelons of their group's party. The Accords were designed to stop conflict and create systems which would allow for state development and yet they were converted into the guidance documents for the governing of the state. It should also be noted that an additional bureaucratic figure looms large in Bosnian politics and that is the High Representative who is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Accords. While he does not intervene in executive or legislative decision-making, he is also responsible for implementing peacebuilding provisions and ensuring the agreement holds.

The complex picture painted here is an example of where the ease-incentive framework originated. Bosnia was the case I had in mind as I considered what might make a state living with a peace agreement coalition less successful on the Peacebuilding Index. There are no other states with the complex governance system of Bosnia which were created as a result of a peace agreement. That complex system makes it very difficult for legislation to pass which means that ease is greatly reduced. Additionally, because of the voting system there are few incentives to focus specifically on peacebuilding as it is more effective to focus on one's own party to stay in power. Bosnia is the case which defies the theory as it has very low ease in decision-making and very low incentive to implement peacebuilding, except for the High Representative, whose job is to implement peacebuilding measures. This is one possible explanation for Bosnia's general success and rank on the index, despite its challenging set up.

What becomes clear after looking closely at the index data for the two cases, is that termination type matters for long-term peacebuilding. Peace agreements create complex governance systems that often struggle to address issues and have little incentive to do so, but the

agreements themselves include mechanisms for building peace and must be implemented, which keeps progress moving forward. Both cases of Belfast and Sarajevo demonstrate that despite low ease in decision-making and lowered incentives to make large-scale change, the agreements themselves drive peacebuilding because people are committed to making them work. Conflicts resolved through either type of victory do not have this guiding mechanism and therefore must rely on the structure and nature of the regime.

## 5.4 Ethnography

The way in which a city presents itself to tourists provides a great deal of information about its past history and how it is dealing with the present. Belfast and Sarajevo were considered extremely dangerous and inaccessible at numerous points during their respective conflicts. Sarajevo experienced a siege from 1992-1996, with inhabitants running from snipers, struggling to find food, hiding from mortar shells, and which resulted in the loss over 10,000 people over four years from the city alone (BBC online, 2012). Belfast was the location of the majority of violence related to the Troubles with over 1000 people killed in the city during the conflict. Not having been to either location prior to conducting this research, I had no impression or understanding of the cities other than what I had read. I determined that the best place to start was to take a number of tours related to the conflicts and see what was covered. This provided the opportunity to observe how the conflicts were explained and to what extent – countries in conflict don't give tours and cities that have yet to come to grips with past conflict don't memorialize it (generally). I spent five days in each city in October 2013 and participated in three conflict tours in each location and the following reflects that specific time period. Because four of the tour guides are participants in my interviews, I will not include the names of the tours, but will instead focus on what they covered.

### 5.4.1 Belfast

One's first impression of the city of Belfast is that it looks exactly like any other city in the US or UK, in fact it looks far more peaceful than a number of US cities. One finds it hard to believe that one of the best known conflicts of the 20<sup>th</sup> century took place in what is a small and modern city surrounded by beautiful farmland. It now hosts one of the largest Titanic museums and shooting locations for the popular TV series "Game of Thrones." It is the home of the beautiful and grand Queen's College and numerous American and European companies have locations within the city. I started out with the free walking tour of "hidden Belfast" which completely avoids the neighborhoods associated with the conflict. This tour focused on the pre-war history of the city as well as some key cultural moments in the city. The Troubles were mentioned in passing, but were almost an afterthought as the tour did not include any bomb sites or mention of the area during the conflict.

I also took one of the "Red Bus" tours which covers all of Belfast and the surrounding areas. This tour provided the first insight into the status of the conflict. The bus drives along the peace wall, a wall which separates the main Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods. The wall is covered in murals and is often compared with the wall between the West Bank and Israel. The wall has in fact continued to grow upward with people from the Catholic side adding to its height, but the fact that a tour bus drives through and talks about the Troubles as a relic of the past with the wall treated more like a fun tourist spot suggests that the conflict has truly become a thing of the past, for all but the people living in those direct neighborhoods. The wall has become a symbol of resistance and civil rights movements as well as the securitization of suburban dwellings by government forces, but has now really become a place for murals and

general artistic sharing. However, the continued raising of the wall suggests that the people who live with it don't feel that it is a relic of the past and so I investigated further.

I toured both the Unionist (Protestant) and Republican (Catholic) neighborhoods to get a better understanding of what the actual communities were feeling. The rest of Belfast has shed the legacy of the conflict and moved forward with construction, tourism, and gentrification. I toured the Shankill (Protestant) neighborhood first and upon crossing the main highway that divides these two neighborhoods from the rest of Belfast, I was immediately inundated with British flags. Shankill road is the "main street" of the neighborhood and every shop and doorway was covered with the Union Jack and the colors of red, white, and blue. Every building wall is covered with murals and reminders of the conflict.

Entering this neighborhood is to enter the world of the Troubles and yet, it had an almost theme park quality – it felt forced. I was taken on a tour of the area by a former political prisoner/combatant who talked about the need for moving on from the conflict. We walked past Shankill Memorial park, which commemorates nine people killed by an IRA bomb in October 1993. The community was planning a week long remembrance of the event, which had occurred twenty years earlier. This seemed somewhat forced and my guide noted that he felt that there was too much effort to remember these events and that they should be allowed to dissolve into memory. He felt that trying to keep the conflict alive, even without violence was preventing the city from moving forward and was instead more concerned with the high unemployment and growing drug use taking place in the community. It was clear to me that he was ready to move on and wished that others would do the same.

The tour ends with a handoff between my guide and a guide from the Falls community, another former combatant/political prisoner from the Republican (Catholic) side. Much like

Shankill, every building contains a mural or remembrance flag, although there were only a few Irish flags flying. This tour was also similar in that it visited every location in which someone was shot, injured, arrested, etc. The detail with which the stories are told demonstrates that for the people who participated in the conflict, it continues to live. My Republican guide was not as concerned with memory and moving on, but instead shared something that has yet to be discussed in the scholarship around this conflict. He said that he had completely renounced Catholicism because of the reports of child molestation that had just been made public. This is quite striking given that this conflict is often explained as a religious one. Though he had renounced Catholicism, he remained as committed to united with the Republic of Ireland and to that end ensured that his children learned the Irish language.

I encountered this same attitude when I visited the city of Derry, the site of Bloody Sunday and the town to which the start of the Troubles is attributed. The guide of the Bloody Sunday tour, whose brother had been killed by police stated that he would not allow his children to speak English at home, but instead required them to speak Irish. This is a growing practice amongst Republicans who remain committed to unifying with Ireland and yet the religious aspect of their identity has all but disappeared. My Falls guide was a taxi driver who remained committed to the division, but did not express any interest in returning to conflict. For me, the conflict had become Disney-fied – an over the top presentation with a story that fit the common narrative regarding the conflict, but which showed no evidence of the conflict still existing. I felt the need for identity and purpose that came with keeping the conflict alive and yet I also felt the sadness of those still living as the inevitable march away from that identity continued.

#### 5.4.2 Sarajevo

I arrived in Sarajevo at 11 PM and as I wound my way up to the city, chatted with my taxi driver. He had been with the Bosnian forces in the conflict and had been driving a taxi since its conclusion. He suggested a few tours related to the conflict that I could take and wished me well with my research, which he said he found to be very interesting. I note this experience because one is touched by the conflict upon arrival and yet, there is no sense of animosity or hostility, but instead a sense of sadness. I started my time in Sarajevo with a free walking tour of the city because I frankly, had very little knowledge of what the city contained. Sarajevo is a large city that encompasses both the old and the new and the remnants of the Ottoman era abound. Unlike the tour general tour in Belfast, which avoided the conflict, this tour wove it into the story of the city. We moved from Basharshiya and the 15<sup>th</sup> century open market to the Markale market, which was the site of two massacres during the civil war. As we walked past the many newly opened mosques (care of the Qatari and Saudi governments) we also passed the Ottoman era Orthodox churches that have stood for centuries. Walking through any part of Sarajevo, one encounters a remembrance of the war be it a graveyard, a monument, or the Sarajevo roses. These “roses” are the crater marks left by mortars and filled with red resin to mimic the blood splatters that once existed in the city.

Unlike Belfast, the conflict experience is not limited to a few neighborhoods and is memorialized throughout the city. My guide had lived in the city during the siege as a child and was afraid every day that his mother left to go to work that she would not return. He talked about the pathways people took to try and avoid being shot by snipers and the instructions his mother had given him regarding hiding during a mortar attack. Despite this very real experience with the conflict, he was able to take people to these different locations because it was clear that the conflict was no longer living. He was not afraid to go to any location and was not nervous

about who might see him. Instead, he was reflective and contemplative regarding his experience and the impact of the violence on the city itself. There are no memorials of the conflict in Belfast, I think because it is either still real or because people would rather move on altogether. In Sarajevo, there is no avoiding the reminders of the conflict and yet there is an acceptance of these reminders because the city really is at peace and now focused on other issues like the failure of the politicians and finding a job – common concerns throughout the world.

I took two additional conflict tours, one which covered all of the areas encapsulated in the conflict including the 1984 Olympic stadium, which was riddled with bullet holes. If Belfast neighborhoods are the Disneyland of conflict locations, the Olympic venues in Sarajevo are the ancient ruins. Many of the facilities have become overgrown, covered with graffiti, and remain riddled with bullet holes. They look like ruins from an event that occurred centuries ago instead of the actual thirty years. Sarajevo is surrounded by hills and mountains, which were used by Bosnian Serbs and Serbian nationals to fire down into the city. Escape from the city was almost impossible, but as with any siege people seek to find a way out or to at least receive supplies. The Sarajevo Tunnel was built in 1993, after almost a year of the siege and was a way for supplies to reach the city and for civilians to exit. The tunnel has become a museum which explains the need for its construction as well as what people faced when trying to traverse it. The tunnel museum and walk through does not focus on the Serbs and their attacks, but instead focuses on the resilience of the people who refused to remain trapped. It focuses on the ingenuity required to build the tunnel while keeping it hidden and the suffering one had to tolerate to use it. Though the tunnel and the museum, created from the farmhouse where the tunnel originated are well maintained, they too retain the feeling of an ancient ruin or relic. The war they memorialize feels so far away and yet it was only twenty years ago that people were

using the tunnel to survive. From an outsider's perspective, the reminders and memorials of the conflict bring out a great sadness in the people who talk about them. There is no clinging to identity or defending the actions taken during the war, but rather a sadness for the war's occurrence.

Sarajevo has not sought to hide its scars, although it continues to update and rebuild buildings thereby slowly erasing the history of the conflict and yet it is memorialized everywhere. The famous Holiday Inn Hotel, which was one of the most dangerous locations in the city because of its proximity to "sniper alley" retained the bullet holes and broken roof corners it sustained due to mortar attacks. Though it has since been rebuilt, in 2013 it looked just as it did in 1995 at the end of the war. There is a willingness to live with the memory of the conflict and yet there is no nostalgia for it, unlike what I witnessed in the two neighborhoods of Belfast. Perhaps this is because of the difference in duration and severity of the conflicts. The Bosnian war was unexpected and came from a society that had functioned with single identity until the start of the war, which was so bloody and fast that it truly caught people off guard. I got the sense that even 20 years later people were still trying to make sense of what happened and why. Contrast that with Belfast, which had confronted the issue since the early 1900's and which had generally always lived in divided neighborhoods. That conflict spanned 30 years and resulted in fewer than 4,000 deaths and was limited to only a few locations throughout the territory. From my very short time in the two locations, it seems plausible that severity and duration of a conflict also impact not only the way in which a conflict is remembered, but the peace that follows it.

## Chapter 6 - Conclusion

The goal of this preliminary interview research was to see if there were in fact different levels of peace existing within the post-conflict environment. I found that even amongst four people living within the same city, there are different views of what type of peace exists and what are the causes of that peace. Additionally, I found that even amongst conflicts terminated through the same means and with similar post-conflict peace plans, there was variation in peace outcomes and perceived contributors to the level of peace. Moreover, the small ethnographic study demonstrates that populations have different relationships with their conflict history, which directly impacts the level of peace. The stark difference between those clinging to the conflict identity in Belfast versus those in Sarajevo who purposely set it aside in order to move forward demonstrates that we cannot assume that all settlements result in the same level of peace.

Figure 19. Summary of Findings for Belfast and Sarajevo

	Belfast	Sarajevo
Adjectives	Fragile, uncertain, not perfect, welcome	Fragile, corrupt, hopeless, forced, artificial, unsustainable, resilient
Levels	Functional or some aspect of each	Functional or mix of the three
Reconciliation	Grassroots level, work in progress	Grassroots level, not really
Impact of peace process (agreement) on peace	Commitment to stopping the violence	Imposed by the outside
Return to violence?	No/probably not	Unable to answer
Ethnographic Reflection	Conflict is not actually resolved, but most people have moved on, small group making a concerted effort to keep it alive	Conflict is largely resolved, but divisions are worse, but people actively suppress their anger or feelings about the war and its outcome to avoid returning to conflict

## 6.1 Contribution

The goal of this study was to investigate the impact of conflict termination types on peacebuilding success. I did this by building the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Index, which sought to go beyond the usual conflict variable of “peace/no peace” and instead consider

peacebuilding successes in the post-conflict environment. I also introduced a new way framework for understanding post-conflict regime decision-making. The ease-incentive framework builds on the opportunity-willingness framework and adjusts it to match the challenge faced when implementing policy as opposed to making foreign policy decisions. I defined the post-civil conflict environment based on the damage caused by civil conflict and identified solutions to resolve those issues. These solutions were then evaluated on the ease-incentive scale to determine how challenging they might be to actually implement. I then considered how civil conflicts terminate and the impact that has on peacebuilding success. Using the ease-incentive framework, I considered how likely they were to implement peacebuilding strategies based on how much ease they would face and their likely incentives to make changes. I used this to create my hypotheses which assumed that conflicts resolved through peace agreements would result in higher levels of peacebuilding success. My statistical results confirmed this hypothesis and through the case study chapter, I connected the findings to the reality that peace agreements create an agenda that cannot be adjusted and is not reliant on who is put in power. The case studies confirmed this and gave a nuanced view into how this works on the ground.

This was important for considering how different types of victories would impact peacebuilding. I assumed that both government and rebel victories would have inverse levels of ease and incentives and this would result in varying levels of peacebuilding success. The analysis indicated that rebel victories were more likely to result in peacebuilding success while government victories had mixed results. This both confirmed my hypotheses and challenged them as I did not expect rebel victory to result in high levels of peacebuilding success. This is

also a contribution to the field as there are still very few quantitative studies which show the success rebels can achieve regarding peace.

Ultimately, the contribution of this dissertation is a new approach to understanding peacebuilding. I found that the way in which a conflict terminates matters, but with a new framework based on the ability to implement peacebuilding policies. I introduced a new dataset which can be used in place of the usual binary conflict variable to better understand if particular policies work. I have confirmed existing understanding of peace agreements, but I have done so with new data and a new approach, which is valuable. This dissertation presents a new way to think about post-conflict peace and contributes to the literature moving beyond binary peace.

## 6.2 Future Work

This is a first cut at many things including testing termination types against something other than the binary conflict variable and creating a peacebuilding index. The index needs additional consideration and there may be other variables which should be included to ensure that it truly captures all of the peacebuilding successes. One challenge is how to include peace agreement specific data which are clearly indicators of peacebuilding success, but which are specific to peace agreements, like DDR. The largest problem is adding indicators with extensive cross national cases as to avoid losing data. This problem was clearly shown in Indexes 2 and 3 as the loss of cases did impact the results, although the key findings still held true. Additionally, more testing of the index and the independent variables is needed. I focused on a fixed effects model and checked to make sure that random effects were not better estimators, but there are number of other within and between case tests that could be run in the future. Cases could be split up further and investigation of each outcome individually would

allow for better understanding of why each termination type produces each outcome. There is little doubt that this is a first cut and more testing is needed in the future.

Despite these problems, I know that this is the direction in which the field must begin to go because we cannot continue to rely on a binary variable to capture peace and peacebuilding. That peace variable captures whether or not rebel groups and government have received what they wanted or have lost the capacity to continue fighting. It does not capture peace on the ground, but that is where we must begin looking if we are to continue producing studies which result in policy recommendations. It is known that the Dayton Accords have created a system in which a few elites control all of the political power and therefore access to resources for the entire population. Instead of moving away from identities which were imposed as a result of the conflict, people must continue participating in a categorizing system that prevents most people from running for office or challenging the system. Make no mistake, people are unwilling to return to violence because they simply can't imagine going back – they are choosing to live with a corrupt and dysfunctional system because they don't want violence, not because they like it.

It is clear that more research must be done around identifying and categorizing post-conflict peace. The Global Peace Index is an example of what can be done with time, money and technical expertise and it is the direction in which peace research must go if it is to contribute to real peacebuilding. Expanding the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Index that I have presented here would be an excellent place to start as it is specific to post-conflict recovery. Creating a cross-national dataset on DDR would be great use as these strategies are extremely important, but not well understood because of the lack of generalized data. Most importantly, surveys should be conducted in post-conflict societies to better understand the realities on the ground. My hope with this approach to data was to start capturing the peace experience at the local level, which is

impossible with national level data, which is all that is available in cross-nationally. The field should start conducting surveys in different cities and towns in post-conflict states to better understand how conflict termination and peacebuilding impacts the peace situation. This research has demonstrated that there is variation in the post-conflict environment and though this is a first cut, it should not be the last.

An important final space for future work is in the realm in trauma in the post-conflict setting. I began this research with the intention of indexing and categorizing post-conflict peace, but it became clear that I was not actually capturing peace, but peacebuilding outcomes. I realized that peace can only be measured by understanding the levels of trauma which still exist in a post-conflict setting. This poses massive challenges to data collection as it cannot be retroactively gathered and requires massive amounts of time and money to conduct surveys and interviews. The World Mental Health Survey Initiative (WHO 15) is a new attempt to capture the status of mental health around the world. While it deals with all kinds of mental health issues, it also captures data on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) which is the trauma that everyone involved in conflict will experience. There are additional types of trauma and recovery from that trauma to be investigated including recovering from sexual assault, loss of family members, displacement, etc. While these are all subsets of PTSD, they must be considered as well because each type of trauma requires its own treatment. Future work on peace must seek to capture and address trauma levels because this is where issues around peace truly live. Trauma recovery is rarely funded and not prioritized by governments or NGOs because it does not produce easy to report and visualize results. However, it is crucial to truly understanding peace and what causes peace to occur. If had a good measure of trauma, we could understand how power-sharing actually impacts the average person. We could understand how the different peacebuilding

strategies actually help people recover from the trauma of the conflict. This is the direction in which the field needs to go and hopefully through interdisciplinary work with public health and psychology, we can start capturing this very important measure.

### 6.3 Conclusion

This dissertation was meant to try a new approach at understanding peacebuilding and how it connects to the post-conflict environment. It may have created more questions than it answered, but it has confirmed important assumptions using new data and proposed a new framework for understanding post-conflict decision-making. It is meant to be a starting off point for a larger agenda focused on understanding the post-conflict state and how to build peace within it. The Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Index provides a new dependent variable and the results provide new avenues for investigation around conflict termination and peace. It provides the first stepping stone to finding the way to peace.

## APPENDIX A - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

### Index 1 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
-----+-----					
polity	743	-3.711978	23.80775	-88	10
yrsfromcon	745	6.908725	5.189137	1	21
General	745	.0899329	.2862778	0	1
Incompatib~y	745	1.641611	.4798494	1	2
IntensityL~l	745	1.296644	.4570852	1	2
-----+-----					
PkpingBi	737	.1424695	.3497684	0	1
ODA	574	9.166839	15.70895	-.675395	192.026
yrsfromcon	745	6.908725	5.189137	1	21

Outcome	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-----+-----			
1	192	25.77	25.77
2	154	20.67	46.44
3	144	19.33	65.77
4	90	12.08	77.85
5	165	22.15	100.00
-----+-----			
Total	745	100.00	

## Index 2 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Index2	421	270.1954	60.60875	113.7667	423.3759
polity	421	2.15677	13.53581	-88	10
yrsfromcon	421	8.408551	5.68744	1	21
General	421	.0902613	.2868967	0	1
Incompatib~y	421	1.650831	.4772745	1	2
IntensityL~l	421	1.251781	.4345528	1	2
PkpingBi	421	.0783848	.2690959	0	1
ODA	321	6.756799	9.638454	-.675395	72.06032
yrsfromcon	421	8.408551	5.68744	1	21

Outcome	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	80	19.00	19.00
2	94	22.33	41.33
3	93	22.09	63.42
4	40	9.50	72.92
5	114	27.08	100.00

### Index 3 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
-----+-----					
polity	421	2.15677	13.53581	-88	10
yrsfromcon	421	8.408551	5.68744	1	21
General	421	.0902613	.2868967	0	1
Incompatib~y	421	1.650831	.4772745	1	2
IntensityL~1	421	1.251781	.4345528	1	2
-----+-----					
PkpingBi	421	.0783848	.2690959	0	1
ODA	321	6.756799	9.638454	-.675395	72.06032
yrsfromcon	421	8.408551	5.68744	1	21

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