

THE INFLUENCE OF HOST AND ORIGIN COUNTRY
DYNAMICS ON REFUGEE JOURNEYS

by

Tiffany Sau-Ting Chu

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
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
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
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DEDICATION

To the ladies who helped me find confidence: B.A.L.M.T.

Contents

List of Figures	10
List of Tables	11
ABSTRACT	14
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION	17
1.1 The Contemporary International Refugee Regime	19
1.2 Gaps in the Literature on Forced Displacement	23
1.3 Overview of the Dissertation	26
Chapter 2 HOSTING REFUGEES FROM A RIVAL STATE AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS	29
2.1 Introduction	29
2.2 How Immigrants and Refugees are Framed in Host Countries	33
2.3 Strategic Interstate Rivalry, Foreign Policy Objectives, and National Security	41
2.4 Relationship Between Refugees from Rival Countries and Changes in Respect for Human Rights	44
2.5 Research Design	51
2.6 Results	56
2.7 Robustness Checks	60
2.8 Conclusion	66
Chapter 3 MACRO-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF REFUGEE RETURN	71
3.1 Introduction	71
3.2 Phases of Refugee Displacement	75
3.2.1 Forced Displacement	75
3.2.2 Repatriation and Return Migration	76
3.3 How Conditions in Origin and Host States are Associated with Refugee Return	79
3.3.1 Host State Push Factors	83
3.3.2 Origin State Pull Factors	89
3.4 Research Design	95
3.4.1 Political Variables	96
3.4.2 Economic Variables	98
3.4.3 Physical Security Variables	98
3.4.4 Control Variables	101
3.4.5 Modeling Strategy	101

Contents – *Continued*

3.5	Discussion of Results	102
3.5.1	Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks	118
3.6	Conclusion	122
Chapter 4	THE EFFECT OF LEADER TURNOVER ON REFUGEE RETURN	125
4.1	Introduction	125
4.2	When Refugee Return Occurs	128
4.3	Leader Turnover as a Heuristic of Political Conditions in the Coun- try of Origin	131
4.4	Research Design	144
4.5	Discussion of Results	149
4.5.1	Robustness Checks	159
4.6	Conclusion	164
Chapter 5	CONCLUSION	168
5.1	Introduction	168
5.2	Review of the Empirical Chapters	170
5.2.1	Chapter 2 - Hosting Refugees from a Rival State and Respect for Human Rights	170
5.2.2	Chapter 3 - Macro-level Determinants of Refugee Return	171
5.2.3	Chapter 4 - The Effect of Leader Turnover on Refugee Return	172
5.3	Future Directions	174
5.4	Concluding Remarks	176
Appendix A	Supplementary Material to Hosting Refugees from a Rival State and Respect for Human Rights	178
A.1	Country reports	178
A.2	Summary Statistics	179
A.3	Robustness Checks	180
Appendix B	Supplementary Material to Macro-level Determinants of Refugee Return	189
B.1	Refugees and Returnees by Country	189
B.2	Summary Statistics of Count Portion, Main Models	206
B.3	Alternative Specifications	207
B.4	Removing Outliers - Afghanistan & Eritrea	211
B.5	Removing Outliers - Dropping Returnees Above 95th Percentile	217
B.6	All Directed Dyads	223
B.7	5 Year Risk Sample	229
B.8	10 Year Risk Sample	235

Contents – *Continued*

Appendix C Supplementary Material to The Effect of Leader Turnover on Refugee Return	241
C.1 Summary Statistics of Count Portion, Main Models	241
C.2 Pairwise Comparisons	243
C.3 Binary Leader Change Models	245
C.4 Interacting Civil Conflict with Turnover Types	246
C.5 Removing Outliers - Afghanistan & Eritrea	248
C.6 Removing Outliers - Dropping Returnees Above 95th Percentile . . .	250
C.7 All Possible Dyads	252
C.8 5 Year Risk Sample	254
C.9 10 Year Risk Sample	256
Bibliography	258

List of Figures

2.1	Predicted Change in Respect for Human Rights Given Strategic Rivalry	59
2.2	Predicted Change in Respect for HR Given Strategic Rivalry and Contiguity	63
3.1	Ratio of Individuals who Return or Resettle in a Third Country to Refugee Stocks	72
3.2	Comparing Civil Conflict in Host and Origin on the Number of Returnees	111
3.3	Conflict and Post-conflict Duration on Number of Returnees	113
3.4	Comparing Conflict Termination Types on the Number of Returnees	114
3.5	Comparing Civil Conflict in Host and Origin on the Number of Returnees, Accounting for Political and Economic Factors	116
4.1	Average Marginal Effect of Leader Turnover Types	154
4.2	Average Marginal Effects of Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers	157
4.3	Predicted Number of Returnees When Interacting Turnovers Signaling Stability with Civil Conflict	160
4.4	Predicted Number of Returnees When Interacting Turnovers Signaling Legitimacy and Policy Change with Civil Conflict	161
4.5	Predicted Number of Returnees When Interacting Combination of Turnovers with Civil Conflict	162
C.1	Pairwise Comparisons of Turnovers Signaling Policy Change	243
C.2	Pairwise Comparisons of Turnovers Signaling Legitimacy	243
C.3	Pairwise Comparisons of Turnovers Signaling Stability & Policy Change	244
C.4	Pairwise Comparisons of Turnovers Signaling Legitimacy & Policy Change	244

List of Tables

2.1	Distribution of Refugees from Rival Countries	54
2.2	Refugees from Strategic Rivals on Changes in Respect for HR	58
2.3	Refugees from Contiguous States & Strategic Rivals on Changes in Respect for HR	62
3.1	Comparison of Macro-level Indicators Between Host and Origin States	100
3.2	Summary statistics	103
3.3	Effect of Political Factors on Refugee Return	105
3.4	Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return	108
3.5	Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return	110
3.6	Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns .	112
3.7	Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Return	115
4.1	Regularity of Turnovers and Policy Change 2x2 Returnee Predictions	142
4.2	Turnovers with Foreign Assistance and Policy Change 2x2 Returnee Predictions	144
4.3	Returnees Based on Type of Leader Change	147
4.4	Summary Statistics for Archigos Sample	148
4.5	Summary Statistics for CHISOLS Sample	149
4.6	ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers	151
4.7	ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Turnovers	156
A.1	Summary statistics	179
A.2	Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Respect for HR Raw Score	180
A.3	Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Respect for HR Raw Score, Con- tinued	181
A.4	Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Change in Respect for HR over 3 Years	182
A.5	Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Change in Respect for HR Over 3 Years, Continued	183
A.6	Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Change in Respect for HR Over 5 Years	184
A.7	Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Change in Respect for HR Over 5 Years, Continued	185
A.8	Summary statistics for KGD Rivalry	186
A.9	Refugees from KGD Rivals and Change in Respect for HR	187

List of Tables – *Continued*

A.10	Refugees from KGD Rivals and Change in Respect for HR, Continued	188
B.1	Number of refugees and returnees by home country	189
B.2	Number of refugees and returnees by host country	197
B.3	Summary Statistics When Returnees > 0	206
B.4	Effect of Terrorism on Refugee Return	207
B.5	Alternate Variable Specifications	208
B.6	CIRI on Refugee Return	209
B.7	Types of Terrorism on Refugee Return	210
B.8	Effect of Political Factors on Refugee Return, Without AFG and ERI	212
B.9	Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, Without AFG and ERI	213
B.10	Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return, Without AFG and ERI	214
B.11	Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns, Without AFG and ERI	215
B.12	Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Return, Without AFG and ERI	216
B.13	Effect of Political Factors on Refugee Return, Without Values Above 95th Percentile	218
B.14	Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, Without Values Above 95th Percentile	219
B.15	Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return, Without Values Above 95th Percentile	220
B.16	Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns, Without Values Above 95th Percentile	221
B.17	Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Return, Without Values Above 95th Percentile	222
B.18	Effect of Political Factors on Refugee Return, All Directed Dyads	224
B.19	Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, All Directed Dyads	225
B.20	Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return	226
B.21	Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns	227
B.22	Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Return	228
B.23	Effect of Political Factors on Refugee Return, 5 Year Risk Sample	230
B.24	Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, 5 Year Risk Sample	231
B.25	Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return, 5 Year Risk Sample	232
B.26	Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns, 5 Year Risk Sample	233
B.27	Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Return, 5 Year Risk Sample	234
B.28	Effect of Political Factors on Refugee Return, 10 Year Risk Sample	236
B.29	Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, 10 Year Risk Sample	237

List of Tables – *Continued*

B.30	Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return, 10 Year Risk Sample . . .	238
B.31	Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns, 10 Year Risk Sample	239
B.32	Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Return, 10 Year Risk Sample	240
C.1	Summary statistics for Archigos Sample When Returnees > 0	241
C.2	Summary Statistics for CHISOLS Sample When Returnees > 0	242
C.3	ZiNB Results of Any Leader Changes	245
C.4	ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers Interacted with Civil Conflict	246
C.5	ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers In- teracted with Civil Conflict	247
C.6	ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, Without AFG and ERI	248
C.7	ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers, Without AFG and ERI	249
C.8	ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, Without Values Above 95th Percentile	250
C.9	ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers, Without Values Above 95th Percentile	251
C.10	ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, All Directed Dyads .	252
C.11	ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers, All Directed Dyads	253
C.12	ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, 5 Year Risk Sample .	254
C.13	ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, 5 Year Risk Sample .	255
C.14	ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, 10 Year Risk Sample	256
C.15	ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers, 10 Year Risk Sample	257

ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores relationships between refugee host and origin states, as well as conditions within these countries, to help explain host government behavior in the context of hosting refugees and when refugees are more likely to return to their country of origin. This project highlights the necessity to expand the scope of our studies of refugee displacement and return by considering contexts in *both* the origin and host nations, as well as the relationship between the two states.

I investigate these relationships and contexts in three essays. In the first, I argue the interstate relationship between the host and origin state helps explain variation in host government behavior upon the arrival of forcibly displaced populations. Host states engaged in a strategic rivalry with refugees' country of origin have an incentive to promote inclusive good-will action toward the exiled population of their adversary. The host state's willing cooperation with humanitarian organizations to provide for refugees is expected to also help increase the country's overall respect for human rights. In the absence of a strategic rivalry, host governments do not have an incentive to support refugee populations. Instead, the lack of cooperation with humanitarian organizations and accounts of mistreatment of refugee communities will be perceived unfavorably by the international human rights community. This leads to an overall decrease in respect for

human rights. I generally find support for these expectations.

In the second essay, I investigate how conditions in the host and origin state influence refugee return patterns. Adopting a push and pull framework from other studies of voluntary and forced displacement, I derive three hypotheses anticipating refugees are pushed to return when political, economic, and physical security in the host state is negative and pulled toward their country of origin when these factors are positive. The findings suggest conditions in the host and origin state must be included in theoretical and empirical models attempting to explain refugee return. Additionally, physical security seems to supersede the explanatory power over political and economic variables by serving as a strong push and pull factor for return.

A counter-intuitive finding from the second essay shows refugees are predicted to return in larger numbers during conflict compared to the post-conflict period in their country of origin. Building upon this relationship, I identify leader turnover as a factor that can motivate refugee return, even in the context of ongoing conflict. In the third essay, I argue leader transitions demonstrating policy change from the previous leader, stability, and legitimacy will provide updated information to observers (such as refugees, host governments, and humanitarian organizations) about safety in the country of origin. The findings show leader turnovers that signal forecasted policy change, that happen in accordance with established conventions of the state, and do not involve foreign assistance are associated with more refugees returning to their country of origin. The findings suggest a high profile political event like leader change is useful information for

actors monitoring the situation to gauge whether the country of origin has improved enough to encourage refugees to return.

Taken together, this dissertation illustrates the importance of considering both origin and host states to explain government behavior in the context of hosting and returning refugees. By systematically assessing conditions refugees are living through at the host and origin state level, relationships and trends emerge on what motivates refugee movement. This is useful to academics and policymakers who want to support refugee populations by understanding the dynamics in which refugees are operating in while in exile.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

In 2018, there were approximately 62 million individuals that fled their homes because of violence and persecution. About one third of these individuals were refugees, or people located externally from their country of origin and recognized and protected by international human rights treaties.¹ Formally, refugees are defined as “A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR 1967). The number of people who have been forcibly displaced has grown astronomically, especially since the end of the Cold War led into a period featuring the onset or escalation of several civil wars that displaced millions. In addition to “new” civil wars that are producing even more refugees in the 2010s, including the conflicts in Syria and South Sudan, refugees displaced by earlier wars remain in a state of protracted displacement where they continue to stay in their host countries, such as refugees from Afghanistan and Somalia.

¹The other two-thirds are internally displaced persons and asylum-seekers.

What solutions are there to forced displacement, particularly given so many individuals are affected and will continue to be a pressing global issue for the years to come? Existing scholarship and policymakers tend to make normative assumptions about how we treat refugee populations. There is a tendency to treat refugees as a vulnerable population without much agency in their ability to make decisions. While refugees certainly can be living in and face sub-optimal conditions while in their host state, refugees are capable of making decisions on their own. Individuals and organizations advocating for refugees and displaced populations should be able to listen to and believe in what refugees want to do in their own life, even if their assumptions or perceptions, especially of safety, do not hold for the refugees themselves.

This dissertation takes a step toward this direction by contributing to our knowledge of refugee situations by exploring how interstate relationships, specifically between host and origin states, improve our understanding of domestic political consequences of refugee movements, as well as shifting the focus toward what many consider to be the next step of a refugee's journey: return to their country of origin. In this introduction, I first provide background information on the international refugee regime and proposed solutions to forced displacement. Next, I briefly discuss gaps in the academic literature on forced displacement and refugee return. I then provide an overview of the dissertation chapters and how this project furthers our insight into refugee movements cross-nationally.

1.1 The Contemporary International Refugee Regime

The United High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) was created in 1950 to manage the millions of European refugees generated after World War II. A year later, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was created as a multi-lateral treaty that defined who is a refugee, determined what rights should be granted to individuals qualified for asylum status, and outlined the responsibilities of states hosting refugee populations. This document builds upon Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes the right of persons to seek asylum from persecution in other countries. This initial treaty was restricted to refugees in Europe that had been displaced as a result of World War II. In 1967, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees entered into international law, expanding the temporal and geographical range of the 1951 Convention by not limiting refugee protections to European refugees, but to all persons globally.

The international community identifies three solutions to refugee situations: (1) host state integration, (2) third-country resettlement, and (3) repatriation to the country of origin. After World War II, refugees were mostly resettled in a third country or integrated into the host nation. Most individuals who applied and were granted refugee status were fleeing political persecution in Communist states ([Barnett and Finnemore 2004](#)). These refugees did not want to return to their country of origin and preferred to be integrated into their asylum country. By the 1980s, the number of refugees rose, with most fleeing civil wars in their country of origin, with this pattern continuing to the present day. States hosting

these refugees were overwhelmed and under-resourced to accommodate the demand. Many of these states are developing themselves and cannot support their own citizens, let alone refugee populations. By 2016, ten countries hosted half of the world's refugees, yet accounted for just 2.5% of the global economy ([Al Jazeera 2016](#)). Moreover, some of these refugees did not want to be naturalized into another state, with many preferring to return to their country of origin at some point.

Third-country resettlement has always become the least likely option for refugees, with states offering this protection mostly being developed Western states with extreme vetting processes. In 2016, only 0.8% of refugees were resettled ([Ferris 2018](#)). The process of applying for resettlement can take months or years and separate families if some are granted resettlement when others are not.

The durable solution, repatriation, has become the preferred policy solution to refugee situations since the 1990s ([Hammerstad 2000](#)). This is seen as being reasonable given most refugees want to return when conditions in the country of origin are sufficient enough. Additionally, refugee return and reintegration into their country of origin is considered a critical step in the post-conflict reconstruction period ([Black and Gent 2006](#); [Stefanovic and Loizides 2011](#)). Yet, most refugees are staying in their host state rather than returning to their country of origin, with 2.5% of refugees in 2016 opting to return to their origin state ([Ferris 2018](#)). If refugees express preferences to return home ([Koser 1997](#); [Berlin Social Science Center 2015](#); [Bohnet 2016](#); [Alsharabati and Nammour 2017](#)), this begs the following question: what facilitates or inhibits refugee return?

In the academic and policy spheres, there are many critics of repatriation processes as observed in practice. First, by international law (UNHCR 1967), the repatriation of refugees requires four preconditions: (1) a fundamental change of circumstances in the origin state; (2) the decision to return by refugees is voluntary in nature; (3) a tripartite agreement is signed by the origin state, host country, and the UNHCR; and (4) the return process happens in safety and dignity. In reality, refugee returns do not meet all of these requirements. Moreover, repatriation as the preferred solution is heavily criticized for eroding rights for refugees since it allows host states to maintain temporary protection of displaced populations, rather than incentivizing host governments to channel resources toward integration (Barnett 2001a; Chimni 2004; Hathaway 2007; Adelman and Barkan 2011).

I provide definitions for how the term repatriation and return are used throughout this dissertation, especially since others outlets may use the terms synonymously. Beyond the four conditions addressed above for repatriation processes to start, there is also the assumption that with repatriation, refugees will begin rebuilding their lives upon their return to their country of origin. Additionally, there is an implicit assumption that the return is voluntary, or that the refugees themselves made the decision without being influenced by other actors, and that conditions in the country of origin are safe. For policymakers, international organizations, and scholarship on repatriation, “safe” conditions in the country of origin typically refers to the termination of armed conflict in the country of origin.

The next term that is occasionally used interchangeably with repatriation is

refugee return. Return more broadly captures refugee populations who make the journey back to their country of origin, whether or not this was of their own volition. Distinct from repatriation, there are no claims or assumption about the voluntariness of return in these contexts. Refugees could have been forced to go back to their country of origin or brought to a point where they felt they had no better option. The term “return,” as I use it here, does not make claims or assumptions about whether the refugees are assisted in rebuilding their lives in their country of origin. Oftentimes, refugees who return to their country of origin become internally displaced, as they might not be able to return to their home municipality, their could have been property was taken over by other internally displaced populations, or their home was completely destroyed by the war. There is also less of a temporal scope imposed on the process of refugee return—conflict does not necessarily have to have ended for refugees to return home. Rather, they may be returning while conflict is still ongoing.

Critics demonstrate how most “repatriation” processes do not meet standards of international law. Instead, we are simply observing refugee return or *refoulement*, the unlawful return of refugees to their country of origin by the host state. While many such commentaries rightfully point out these issues associated with repatriation to unsafe environments, there is a lack of understanding of the general conditions driving the timing and degree of refugee return processes. While there is vast scholarship on general determinants of forced displacement, why we observe forced displacement, and influences of refugee flows on domestic politics, there is less systematic research on refugee return. Most studies on repa-

triation and return study single cases, only focus on those who return, or limit the temporal scope to returns after conflict terminates in the country of origin. As refugee flows and settlements are constantly connected to national security risks in the host state (Adamson 2006; Bove and Böhmelt 2016; Polo and Wucherpfennig 2018), refugees are becoming increasingly vulnerable in their host state. Living in exile is not necessarily a safe haven, with host states restricting refugee rights (Verdirame 1999; Knudsen 2009; Zeus 2011), allowing or even forcing refugees to live in destitute conditions (Milton, Spencer, and Findley 2013), and leaving them vulnerable to violent attacks (Benček and Strasheim 2016; Savun and Gineste 2019).

1.2 Gaps in the Literature on Forced Displacement

This dissertation contributes to several under-explored areas I have identified in the literature on forced displacement, briefly discussed here. Each chapter will discuss relevant facets in more depth. First, studies on host state policies toward refugees tend to focus entirely on domestic factors that influence government behavior, with little to no attention paid to the ways in which international factors condition the impacts of hosting refugees. There is a lot of discussion regarding the compatibility of incoming refugee populations on host societies, such as whether incoming refugees will change the domestic balance of power of political and ethnic groups in a state (Koser 2000; Cederman et al. 2013; Zhou 2018). Moreover, there is also work linking refugee flows to domestic issues, such as

armed groups exploiting refugee routes (Lischer 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006) and how refugee populations test a state's capacity to respond to their arrival (Danneman and Ritter 2014; Wright and Moorthy 2018). Yet, there is small, but compelling, literature on the conditional nature of interstate relations between the host and origin state. While some have examined these the effects of these relationships in the context of refugee hosting, the dependent variable of these studies tends to be violence (Whitaker 2003; Salehyan 2008*ba*). From these studies, it is unclear if other political factors, such as respect for human rights, are also influenced by the arrival of refugees.

Given the breadth of studies on the domestic concerns of hosting refugee populations, the question of when and why refugees stay in their host state, rather than return, is comparatively unaddressed. Existing scholarship on refugee return either critically evaluates the process of repatriation (Chimni 1993; Barnett 2001*b*; Chimni 2004; Hathaway 2007; Adelman and Barkan 2011), investigates what happens domestically upon their return (Black, Eastmond, and Gent 2006; Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017; Schwartz Forthcoming), focuses on a single case (Eastmond and Öjendal 1999; Janzen 2004; Stefanovic and Loizides 2011; Joireman, Sawyer, and Wilhoit 2012), and/or limits the temporal scope to focus on dynamics of return in the post-conflict period only (Kibreab 2002; Black and Gent 2006; Eastmond 2006). There are few studies that highlight how refugees are returning at all points of the conflict in their country of origin (Stein and Cuny 1994; Stein 1997). Moreover, surveys of refugees demonstrate that the majority do want to return at some point, though it is unclear when or what circumstances

would make return more likely ([Berlin Social Science Center 2015](#); [Bohnet 2016](#); [Alsharabati and Nammour 2017](#)). Therefore, we are left with some gaps in the literature regarding general trends and patterns of refugee return, irrespective of whether the return was voluntary and under what conditions are refugees more or less likely to return.

Given this gap, we also lack a clear understanding of the beliefs and preferences of actors that influence patterns of refugee return. Host states, refugees, and international humanitarian organizations are expected to play a role in these processes ([Gerver 2016](#)), but less attention has been paid to the interaction of their preferences, how they overlap, and how they differ. Additionally, it is unclear which actors have the most or least agency in refugee return patterns. Until there is some baseline understanding of when and where these processes of return are likely to be undertaken, policies of how to best serve refugee populations may be limited to preexisting assumptions that are made about each of these actors' intentions.

Relatedly, there continues to be a normative belief that refugees should only return once conflict officially terminates in the country of origin. However, it is unclear, given the lack of a broad systematic overview of refugee return patterns, whether this is true in practice. While there are reports that refugees do return while conflict is ongoing or the situation in the country of origin, it is less clear how often this happens ([Stein and Cuny 1994](#); [Stein 1997](#); [Human Rights Watch 2002](#); [Amnesty International 2005](#); [Al-Khateeb and Toumeh 2017](#); [Amnesty International 2018](#); [Bassam 2018](#)). Given most refugees do want to return at some

point in time, there is a question of as to whether there are other dynamics in the country of origin that might promote return beyond, and even before, conflict termination. Moreover, developing a general understanding of when refugees return allows us to offer a better set of policy prescriptions for refugees and their return to countries of origin.

1.3 Overview of the Dissertation

This dissertation is comprised of three essays pertaining to the movement and hosting of refugees, and the necessity of understanding dynamics within and between the host and origin countries. The first essay, Chapter 2, investigates how the relationship between host and origin states conditions human rights practices in refugee-hosting countries. I develop an argument suggesting the presence of a strategic rivalry motivates host states to promote inclusive good-will action toward the exiled population of their enemy. This self-promotion and willing cooperation with international organizations serving displaced populations is translated into greater overall respect for human rights in the host state. Without the presence of a strategic rivalry, refugees are linked to national security issues in the host state and reluctantly cooperate with humanitarian organizations. This is associated with an overall decrease in respect for human rights. Using global data on refugee populations, strategic rivalries, and respect for human rights, I find states hosting refugees from a rival country experience increased respect for human rights, especially if the enemy state is their neighbor. On the other hand,

hosting refugees from a non-rival state is associated with decreased respect for human rights.

As Chapter 2 highlights, circumstances in the host state can be quite hostile toward refugee populations. This raises the question of why some refugees would want to stay in such an environment, while others might be motivated to leave the host state and return home. Chapter 3 starts to explore under what conditions refugees are returning to their country of origin. I adopt a push and pull framework used in a variety of studies on voluntary and forced migration to generate broad hypotheses concerning when refugees are more likely to return to their country of origin, motivated by macro-level factors of political, economic, and physical security. Using data on returnees collected by the UNHCR and macro-level information on host and origin states, results elucidate several interesting findings. First, I find that certain political, economic, and physical security considerations are important predictors of return and must be taken into when explaining such return occurs and at what magnitude. Second, host and origin countries cannot be treated equivalently, as host states tend to score more positively on macro-level indicators of security than origin states. Finally, physical security tends to supersede political and economic circumstances as a predictor of refugee return.

If refugees are returning while civil conflict is ongoing in their country of origin, are there other contexts or cues from the origin state that leads to refugee return? In Chapter 4, I examine how leader turnover provides refugees, host governments, and humanitarian observers with updated information about con-

ditions in the refugees' country of origin. I argue leader turnovers are a useful heuristic providing signals of policy change from the predecessor, stability, and legitimacy of the new leader's rise to power. With these signals, there is a re-evaluation of whether circumstances in the country of origin are conducive to encourage refugee return. I expect refugees to return in larger numbers when leader changes are associated with forecasted policy change, in accordance with established rules in the state, and without foreign assistance. Using the same data on returnees from Chapter 3 and data on leader changes, I generally find support for these expectations.

I close the dissertation with a chapter summarizing the findings of the three essays and encouraging future work that builds upon the results and limitations of this current project. Taken together, my dissertation provide insights into the challenges facing refugees in their host states and how these and other factors influence when refugees are more likely to return to their country of origin. Furthermore, I challenge normative assumptions by academics and policymakers of what is considered *safe enough* for refugees. As forced displacement continues to be a major global issue, understanding the conditions and contexts that refugee processes operate is a major step in helping find a more humane and sustainable solution to these crises.

Chapter 2

HOSTING REFUGEES FROM A RIVAL STATE AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

2.1 Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) estimates over 340 million people around the world are or have been refugees (UNHCR 2018b). In other words, a high volume of individuals crossed international borders because of war or human rights abuses in their country of origin and settled in another state. How host countries receive the arrival of refugees vary, ranging from accepting and a desire to grant refugees a better life, to more hostile exclusionary actions, such as deportations and securitization of borders.

For instance, over six million Syrians displaced by the civil war sought safe haven in another country. While most traveled to neighboring states, approximately 10-15% looked for asylum in Europe. There were a variety of responses from European countries due to the larger than average number of individuals hoping to gain access and sanctuary. The outlier was Germany, who accepted a substantial number of refugees compared to other countries in the region. Germany likely did this for a variety of reasons, including the legacy of its own

citizens seeking refuge at the end of World War II, a desire to boost their economy, having more resources to host than developing states, and a motivation to portray itself as a humanitarian safe haven within the European Union. Most of the other governments took a xenophobic approach and refused to take in many asylum seekers. Some states, such as Bulgaria and Hungary, went a step further by erecting border fencing and walls to deter asylum seekers from entering their borders. Overall, the range of responses and reasons behind why a state behaves in a certain way cannot solely be explained by domestic factors. Rather, another piece of the puzzle is the relationship between other states and how a particular host wishes to be viewed by the international community, such as Germany's desire to project a humanitarian image and believing an open door policy would facilitate other foreign policy objectives.

Academic scholarship investigating the link between refugees and host country security tend to pool sending countries together. Yet, there is variation in the relationship between host and origin countries of refugees that can impact the ways refugees and asylum seekers are framed by governments. In this chapter, I argue when a state takes in refugees from their strategic rival, there is an incentive to promote and boast of their humanitarian good-will action toward the exiled population because it will undermine the legitimacy of their rival for not protecting their own citizens, while also painting a picture that the state is willing to expend resources to help this population. This, in turn, will be associated with an increase in respect for human rights in the host country.¹

¹In this chapter, "less respect for human rights" is used synonymously with "more repression"

On the other hand, refugees from a non-rival are excluded from the host country because of the symbolic threat immigrants are believed to pose to the fabric of the host nation. Particularly since refugees are associated with negative security externalities of the country they fled, host states are wary of accepting this population into their borders. The in-humanitarian nature of the host state's stance toward refugees is expected to be associated with a decrease in respect for human rights generally.

One such example is the responses to Syrian refugees by the governments of Turkey and Lebanon. There are three and a half million registered Syrian refugees in Turkey and approximately one million in Lebanon. Both states are neighbors to Syria, yet, the framing of hosting Syrian refugees at the onset of the civil war differed. While there are several explanations, one, in particular, has been overlooked—the relationship between the host and home countries. Specifically, in the context of a strategic interstate rivalry, where there is competition between a pair of states, a perception of threat, and a belief that the other is an enemy, may lead to a more conciliatory response by the host state.

Turkey and Syria are involved in such a rivalry. Their history includes a series of water disputes, supporting terrorist organizations targeting their rival, and competing to be the region's superpower. At the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claimed the Syrian government, especially President Bashar al-Assad, were not acting humanely toward its citizens, and that their actions were constituted as "savagery" ([Al Jazeera 2011](#)). In

and "more respect for human rights" is interchangeable with "less repression."

turn, Turkey initially maintained a policy of creating an inclusive environment overall and opened a pathway for refugees to gain Turkish citizenship, under the guise of demonstrating to Syria that the Turkish government can treat both its citizens and non-citizen refugees in a manner that was superior to the actions of the Syrian government (Smith 2018). In the 2012 U.S. State Department Report on Human Rights Practices in Turkey, the Turkish government “responded robustly to the humanitarian needs of displaced Syrians, spending over an estimated one billion dollars on aid and assistance, primarily for the construction and administration of 14 camps in southeastern Turkey. In most cases, the level of assistance was acknowledged to be above international standards” (U.S. State Department 2012b).

In spite of their own contentious history, Lebanon and Syria are not considered interstate rivals by the definitions used in political science. The Lebanese government has been relatively inhospitable toward displaced Syrians in Lebanon by blocking pathways for refugees to become permanent residents (UNHCR 2018a), restricting the UNHCR’s operations (Amnesty International 2016), promoting repatriation (Bassam 2018), evicting Syrians from camps (Human Rights Watch 2018a), and framing their hosting of Syrian refugees as a threat to national security (Chehayeb 2017). In the 2012 U.S. State Department Report on Human Rights Practices in Lebanon, it stated that “The government does not officially recognize these [Syrians] as refugees, and it limits the freedom of movement for individuals who entered the country illegally....There were no refugee camps for Syrians” (U.S. State Department 2012a). Unlike Turkey, there is no incentive for Lebanon to

be cooperative with humanitarian organizations serving refugees or project themselves as a willing host to Syrians. Rather, Syrian refugees trigger the government of Lebanon to present their arrival as a threat to national stability and security

I argue that hosting refugees in the context of a strategic rivalry should be associated with greater respect for human rights in the host state, compared to in host countries without such a relationship with the origin country. I test my expectations using a global dataset of all countries from 1990-2010. I find statistical support for these expectations. The results suggest rivalrous interstate relations with refugee-sending countries provide an incentive to for host states to treat refugees benevolently and to cooperate with the UNHCR, which ultimately corresponds to improved overall human rights in the country.

2.2 How Immigrants and Refugees are Framed in Host Countries

Current policy debates on immigration tend to revolve around the question of whether newly arrived groups should be integrated or excluded from the fabric of the country.² These discussions regarding integration and assimilation intersect with other aspects of the nation, such as economic growth, political power, national identity, and physical security. With respect to immigration, political elites are in charge of promoting certain narratives over others and initiating strategies accordingly. While public opinion certainly plays a role in the process of policy formation and change, as well as which narratives become more salient, those in

²In this chapter, “immigrant” is defined as an individual who crosses an international border to settle in a different country.

positions of political power make the ultimate decision when crafting a specific policy regarding immigration.

The inflow of refugees, particularly in large numbers, often leads to questions about border security and the inability to keep unwanted individuals or violent actors out of a country. Research investigating whether hosting has positive or detrimental effects on the country are mixed. Some studies find hosting refugees have beneficial impacts domestically (Jacobsen 2002; Taylor et al. 2016) and can even surpass progress of voluntary economic immigrants who arrive at the same time (Cortes 2004). Alternatively, other studies find the arrival of refugees leads to resource scarcity (Martin 2005) and take a social and economic toll on host states (Akar and Erdoğan 2018; Hynie 2018; Jackson and Atkinson 2018). Economic costs include the financial burden of properly supporting infrastructure and livelihood needs for refugees and economic capacity to provide jobs (Dempster and Hargrave 2017), as well as potential risks to national security if their arrival prompts a security debate (Milton, Spencer, and Findley 2013).

Previous studies show how permeable borders make it easier for rebel groups to infiltrate the path of refugees and allow them foreign sanctuary (Salehyan 2008b) and a chance to harness their resources to increase their bargaining power (Bapat 2012). Governments respond in a variety of ways to securitize their borders and regulate cross-border flows. States construct physical barriers (Carter and Poast 2017), promote non-assistance of migrants traveling “illegally” (such as refusing to help migrants who fled by boat to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea) (Heller and Pezzani 2016), and participate in peacekeeping missions to stabilize

conflict areas to stem refugee flows (Uzonyi 2015).

Upon the arrival of refugees, two narratives emerge about how they fit into their host societies. An “inclusion narrative” typically frames immigrants as beneficial for destination societies. An example of a government promoting integration comes from Malaysia, where Filipinos are encouraged to immigrate in order to change demographic and political control toward Malay-Muslim parties (Sadiq 2005). Another is the return migration of Croatian, Bosnian, and Serbian refugees, with hopes to rebuild trust after the civil wars. The “exclusion narrative” argues immigrants are invading, will degrade the nation, and expose the country to violent instability. This narrative tries to invoke fear to promote pessimistic assessments of immigration in order to prioritize security (Pearlman 2013). Examples include some discussions of Mexican and Central American immigrants in the United States, Somali refugees in Kenya, Syrian and North African asylum-seekers in European states, and the Rohingya in Bangladesh.

More often than not, inclusion and exclusion narratives occur simultaneously within a country, with ongoing debates on how to deal with immigrants being a contentious issue. For instance, Blacks and Latinos are more likely than White Americans to think American “identity” is defined by assimilation while still being allowed to maintain ancestral cultural traditions (Schildkraut 2011). Returning to the example of Germany that was mentioned in the introduction, awarding over a million Syrians asylum status was not a popular decision with many German citizens. Rather, it was Chancellor Angela Merkel and the majority of the Christian Democratic Union party’s decision to grant displaced Syrians with refugee

status by framing the response as a humanitarian policy.

Regardless of the narratives being used by governments and publics alike, immigrants generally face adversity when integrating into their host country, mainly due to discriminatory policies (Dancygier and Laitin 2014). The crafting of refugee narratives tends to grow out of government debate while also being bolstered by how the general population perceives migrants. Studies argue this is often driven by reliefs regarding a “symbolic threat” immigrants pose to the fabric of a nation because as foreigners, they are inherently perceived as an out-group (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). The “threat” translates to a higher propensity for domestic populations to discriminate against immigrants economically, politically, and socially (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2016; Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013). The media promotes the “threat” by portraying immigrants as undocumented illegals, or even aliens, detainees, and engaged in low-skilled activities even though that is often inconsistent with actual immigrant demographics (Farris and Mohamed 2018).

The case of forced migrants, in particular refugees, adds a wrinkle into this debate of exclusion. Refugees, a subset of immigrants, are defined as “A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return

to it" (UNHCR 1967). Being a refugee is inherently "othering," since they hold citizenship from another country yet exist in a host nation as an out-group, often requiring aid and assistance (Zetter 2007). Permanent residents of the host state may be more willing to tolerate refugees because they are "deserving" of assistance and sanctuary since they are fleeing violence and persecution (Sales 2002; van Oorschot 2006; Petersen 2012).

From a normative perspective, countries often feel obligated to accept refugees in order to comply with international human rights norms and laws (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). While some governments ratify human rights treaties only as a front for compliance, the legitimacy of human rights regimes is reinforced with strong global civil society (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Murdie and Bhasin 2011). Taking in refugees falls under this broader normative support for the legitimacy of the international human rights regime. While the ratification of human rights treaties has been found to have no effect on changing respect for physical integrity rights (Hathaway 2002; Neumayer 2005), accepting refugees is one way states can espouse adherence to the human rights norm.

Domestic populations are more likely to support hosting refugees if they share ethnic ties (Kaufman 2015; Getmansky, Sinmazdemir, and Zeitzoff 2018), have close contact with refugees (Ghosn, Braithwaite, and Chu 2019), or empathize with their situation by previously experiencing conflict and displacement (Hartman and Morse 2018). Powerful images invoking emotion lead individuals to boost their support for refugees, though this tends to be a short-lived effect (Feldman et al. 2017). As refugees remain in host countries for a long time, public

attitudes toward hosting them become more likely to sour, with citizens resenting refugees for overstaying their welcome. This is the case in Lebanon, where Syrian refugees were at first welcomed but, over time, the Lebanese have become less hospitable (Ghosn and Braithwaite 2018). Thus, while refugees are often seen as an out-group in a host state, domestic populations are capable of being inclusive due to the plight of the situation, at least for a short period of time.

While the experiences of refugees invoke empathy toward their situation, refugees fleeing civil wars, specifically, are sometimes understood to open the pathway for negative security externalities to become associated with the arrival in a host state (Whitaker 2003; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations and rebel groups, can infiltrate refugee routes and find entry into host countries (Bove and Böhmelt 2016; Braithwaite and Chu 2018). Rebels engage in cross-border raids, which infringe on the sovereignty of the host state (Salehyan 2008a) and generate negative attitudes among citizens toward hosting these vulnerable populations (Ghosn, Braithwaite, and Chu 2019). While refugees themselves are almost never the perpetrators of violence, they are often scapegoated as the reason behind violence and insecurity in the host state (Savun and Gineste 2019). Right-wing and anti-immigration parties are known to capitalize on this association and politicize the issue of hosting refugees as one of national security.

When refugees are negatively linked to national security, some political elites and parts of the domestic population are less sympathetic to the necessity of providing sanctuary for refugees and are more inclined to change their attitudes

toward being exclusionary. In an experimental survey of U.S. citizens, [Adida, Lo, and Platas \(2017\)](#) find the influence of an “empathy” frame fosters positive attitudes toward refugees but is heavily mediated by partisanship. Attacks and protests against refugees by host state residents escalate when refugees are linked to security issues ([Benček and Strasheim 2016](#)). This could push moderate political elites to change their view about providing sanctuary for asylum seekers. Even though refugees are forcibly displaced from their homes, they are often characterized by political elites as only slightly more positively than a voluntary migrant. This is especially the case when the terms “refugees,” “asylum seekers,” and “(im)migrants,” are conflated and when, regardless of the circumstances, immigrants are labeled as entering “illegally.” Such was the case with reports about the asylum seeker caravan of individuals from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador attempting to enter the United States ([Schrank 2018](#)).

Another context in which citizens greater harbor resentment toward refugees, and subsequently pressure political actors to change refugee policy, concerns economic crises in the host country. Under these conditions, citizens of the host country develop grievances concerning refugees because of increased competition for scarce resources ([Fearon and Laitin 2003](#); [Collier and Hoeffler 2004](#)). Refugees can create or exacerbate scarcity problems because of the need to house and feed these additional people, which accelerates competition in areas that already have limited access to resources ([Martin 2005](#)). Resources provided to refugees can also include welfare assistance, often a system already under pressure, which becomes even more strained when taking in refugees ([McCarty 2013](#)). In Su-

dan, refugees were seen as a burden following an economic recession and relief agencies were criticized for prioritizing refugees over citizens of the host country (Ek and Karadawi 1991). However, when host countries are relatively wealthy and lack economic problems, refugees are less likely to be perceived as a burden (Wright and Moorthy 2018). Even though refugees can have many positive benefits for the host country (Jacobsen 2002; Adamson 2006), refugees and asylum seekers are often viewed as threats to economic and national security, rather than a vulnerable population deserving of assistance from host governments and populations (Messari and van der Klaauw 2010).

Existing scholarship on refugees and their association with instability tends to treat all refugee populations as being equivalent and failing to consider whether variation in the characteristics of refugees might impact how a host government reacts. Most studies focus on characteristics of the host country and its ability to finance the infrastructure needed to house refugees in order to negate any ill-will fostered among citizens who want to exclude refugees (Wright and Moorthy 2018). Other work focused on host state characteristics considers the permeability of borders (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). On the other hand, characteristics of the sending country, and especially the relationship between the host and origin countries, is less explored. In particular, the context of hostility produced by an interstate rivalry provides certain incentives for host states to find a way to embarrass their rival. The next section explores potential impacts of these relationships further by using strategic interstate rivalries as a framework for how the hosting and treatment of refugees can be received and leveraged differently in host

countries.

2.3 Strategic Interstate Rivalry, Foreign Policy Objectives, and National Security

Interstate rivalries are defined by a longstanding competition between a pair of states that are linked with a series of conflicts (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006) or perceived tensions and hostilities (Thompson 2001; Thompson and Dreyer 2011).³ In the context of a *strategic* rivalry, decision-makers in both states single out the other as an enemy that poses an actual or potential military threat.⁴ Three conditions are necessary for a strategic rivalry to exist: there must be competition between the states, a perception of threat, and a belief by each side that the other is an enemy (Thompson 2001; Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007).⁵ Due to the perceived and actual enmity between the two states, there is a higher propensity for strategic rivals to resort to military action to achieve their goals against one another and they are less likely to be able to resolve their disputes at all because of the heightened levels of mistrust.

Domestic political actors maintain rivalries by advocating for tougher stances against their rival and punishing leaders who take a dovish position against them

³Prominent examples of strategic rivals are India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, Ecuador and Peru, and Turkey and Greece.

⁴Another way to conceptualize rivalries is through a dispute-density method, where pairs of states are considered rivals if they fight many times over a period of time (Bennett 1997; Diehl and Goertz 2000). I utilize the strategic rivalry conceptualization because it takes into account that states perceive the other as an enemy.

⁵For example, while Germany and France compete with one another for leadership in the European Union, they do not perceive the other as a threat to their security.

([Tir and Diehl 2002](#); [Colaresi 2005](#)). Beyond the observable militarized relationship between the two countries, states involved in a strategic rivalry assume negative behavioral attributes towards the other, such as feelings of hostility toward their counterpart that feeds into a “culture” of rivalry and shapes their interactions ([Thies 2001](#)). The desire for vengeance clouds rational decision-making processes and can lead to protract problems between state rivals ([Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007](#)).

The context of a strategic rivalry heightens the awareness in both states of a hostile “us” versus “them” dynamic. Strategic rivalries are viewed as a background condition shaping how these states interact with each other. Immigration and refugee flows should be no exception in the context of a strategic rivalry, meaning that relationships between host and origin countries matter heavily in how migrants will be received at their destination country. For example, the narrative of Cuban refugees in the United States centers around providing safe haven for people suffering from an abusive, Communist regime ([Barnett and Finnemore 2004](#); [Bier 2016](#)). In the United States, Cuban immigrants are often able to start anew in a supportive and democratic environment free of persecution. Alternatively, asylum seekers fleeing violence in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala who end up in the United States are barraged with a media campaign highlighting the risk involved with accepting immigrants and the resultant promotion and implementation of an “aggressive deterrence strategy” that involved building more detention centers and an upsurge of deportations ([Hiskey et al. 2016](#)). Furthermore, refugees fleeing violence in Central America are often framed as illegal

immigrants that are taking over employment opportunities from United States citizens and threatens national security, rather than asylum seekers hoping to find international protection in the United States (Winders 2007; Camarota 2015).

Another group in the United States juxtaposed with Cubans are Haitians. During the violence and unrest in Haiti in the 1990s, many sought asylum in the United States yet most were turned away. Again, this is in contrast with Cuban refugees, who are overwhelmingly welcomed in the United States. Additionally, Haitians entering the United States were framed as economic migrants, rather than fleeing political persecution, making it more difficult for them to integrate because they were seen as posing a threat to economic security. Due to the strategic rivalry between the United States and Cuba, Cuban refugees are welcomed. Refugees from other states, however, are excluded.

Therefore, strategic rivalries provides a useful frame to potentially cast immigrants or refugees from a rival country in a better light. With regard to refugees, Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016) find host countries receive more refugees from a rival country than a non-rival. They argue accepting refugees from a rival is a proxy mechanism by which rival states can undermine the enemy regime. However, they do not explore the consequences for domestic policies and practices upon the arrival of refugees. I argue accepting refugees from a rival country provides an opportunity for host countries to make their adversary look bad by being hospitable to the exiled population. This benevolent treatment of refugees is likely to correspond to an overall improvement in human rights practices in the country as the host government seeks to further cement its superiority relative to their

rival. The next section further explores on how receiving refugees changes government behavior and how this effect may be conditional upon whether refugees arrive from a rival.

2.4 Relationship Between Refugees from Rival Countries and Changes in Respect for Human Rights

In general, a rise in perceived domestic challenges encourages governments to use repressive action to counter or eliminate a threat to the status quo (Davenport 2007). Repression is defined as “the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to the government’s personnel, practices, or institutions” (Davenport 2007). While the general public is assumed to prefer the state to use other means besides repressive action in efforts to address challenges and challengers (Ferejohn 1986; McFarland and Mathews 2005), this assumption does not always hold depending on domestic issues at the time (Kertzer and Brutger 2016). Particularly, when citizens are intolerant toward a certain group, they are more likely to support the suppression of (Hutchinson 2013). For example, American citizens support the government’s use of torture when it is directed at individuals perceived to be guilty of committing crimes of terrorism (Conrad et al. 2018). The context of the crisis linked to immigration issues influences how the public ultimately evaluates the situation (Tomz 2007;

[Davies and Johns 2013](#)). Citizens may also elect right-wing, anti-immigration parties, who are more likely to be restrictive. For instance, the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AFD) party made strong gains in German state elections in 2016 after Merkel announced Germany would take in a larger proportion of refugees compared to other states in the European Union.

A response by the government toward immigration issues intensifies when refugee issues are politically salient and when their arrival is associated with security issues in the state ([Warziniack 2013](#); [Zimmerer 2014](#)). For example, Pakistani officials increasingly extorted and harassed Afghan refugees ever since the terrorist group Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (the “Pakistani Taliban”) attacked an Army Public School in Peshawar at the end of 2014 ([Human Rights Watch 2015b](#)). However, this could have been an opportunity to re-frame the domestic issues surrounding the lack of freedom and fairness in the 2013 elections because Islamic terrorist organizations, such as Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, that instilled fear in the electorate ([Jalal 2014](#)). As domestic unrest tends to breed repression by the government ([Moore 2000](#); [Carey 2006](#); [Davenport 2007](#); [Franklin 2008](#); [Pierskalla 2010](#)), the arrival of refugees is often seen as a threat by domestic populations and pressure mounts on the government to take action. Indeed, as the number of refugees grows, the government is more likely to decrease respect for human rights ([Danneman and Ritter 2014](#); [Wright and Moorthy 2018](#)).

However, we might expect that the relationship between governments of the host and the origin country of refugees alters the likelihood that host governments will engage in repression. Domestic audiences oppose governments coop-

erating with the state's rival (Colaresi 2004). Therefore, hosting refugees from a rival allows host governments behave uncooperatively against their rival by acknowledging individuals are fleeing an abusive regime, and that the host is more capable of providing secure conditions. In turn, an overall improvement in respect for human rights is expected since the host country wants to be seen as being hospitable to its rival—and perhaps to the broader international community as well, to improve its reputation and further discredit its rival in the international system. In other words, the arrival of refugees from a rival country provides an opportunity for the host state to use improved human rights practices as a way to achieve foreign policy goals against their interstate adversary.

Increasing respect for human rights is not the only policy option governments adopt to undermine their rival. Salehyan (2009) discusses how states involved with a rival experiencing civil conflict are likely to host refugees produced by the conflict, foster an alliance and grant external support to the rebel group fighting their enemy, and provide safe havens for rebels within their territories so the rival state cannot access them easily. Salehyan argues rivals adopt these militarization activities to pursue the foreign policy goal of destabilizing their opponents without engaging in direct militarized conflict.

There are other options beyond indirect military action that are open to governments who are in a strategic rivalry situation. A host government will alter actions domestically as a means to embarrass their rivals in a form of “soft power” foreign policy action (Nye 2004). Broadly speaking, there is a substitution of direct military action against their rival for soft policy action that helps the state achieve

their goals (Most and Starr 1984; Morgan and Palmer 2000). Essentially, accepting refugees from their rival is a “soft power” policy where the host is acknowledging their adversary is engaging in oppressive behavior. The host government’s willingness to provide sanctuary to those fleeing highlights the failure of their rival government to legitimately protect and provide a safe environment for its citizens (Haddad 2008). The public nature of refugee flows also makes it easy for governments to openly discredit their rival regime (Teitelbaum 1984; Loescher 1994).

Therefore, when a country takes in refugees from a rival country, the host state will seek to promote hospitable policies and minimize repressive actions, which should also be received well by the international human rights community. This will be observable as a boost in respect for human rights.⁶

As an example of this logic, Ethiopia takes in many refugees from rival Eritrea. The history between the two states is riddled with turmoil, rooted in the history of decades of conflict with Eritrean rebels fighting to secede from Ethiopia. In spite of this violent history, the Ethiopian government started self-sufficiency and skill-building programs for Eritrean refugees within its borders (Fleming 2013). The government’s actions toward Eritrean refugees were praised by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres. Such practices have corresponded

⁶These practices are captured in *The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* by the U.S. State Department and *The State of the World’s Human Rights Reports* by Amnesty International, both published annually. These reports have a section on refugee and migrant rights in these states, which is then quantified in overall respect for human rights scores. Therefore, these reports do indeed reflect how refugees and migrants are treated within the country and will accordingly be reflected in the overall score. See (Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014) for information on how the latent variable model was developed and (Fariss 2018) for detailed information on how these reports are used to generate the latent variable.

to improved respect for human rights in Ethiopia more broadly. These efforts and the government's willingness to cooperate with the UNHCR was documented in the U.S. State Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Ethiopia: "The government generally cooperated with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees...During the year the government, in cooperation with UNHCR, opened two new refugee camps: Sheder, northeast of the town of Jijiga and My Ayni, in Tigray National Regional State, to accommodate up to 10,000 new Eritrean refugees." (U.S. State Department 2008). This leads to the following expectation:

Hypothesis 1 *A state is more likely to increase respect for human rights upon accepting refugees from a rival country.*

Conversely, the arrival of refugees from a non-rival state is expected to be associated with more abusive behavior by the host government. This is because the absence of a strategic rivalry does not provide a context where the host state has incentives to respect human rights as a way to help achieve a foreign policy objective. As discussed earlier, the presence of refugees increases the likelihood of resource scarcity, can be associated with political instability such as civil war and terrorism, and therefore can inspire feelings of fear and increased nationalism among the domestic populace. Even if refugees garner some empathy from host state citizens, the rise and political salience of refugee issues will likely prompt individuals to be less accepting toward refugees (Adida, Lo, and Platas 2017). This fosters xenophobic attitudes by domestic populations because of the perceived

threat associated with the arrival of refugees (Zhou 2018). Political intolerance reinforces support for the suppression of rights (Hutchinson 2013). This promotes nationalism, which subsequently augments human rights violations, especially in partial democracies (Yazici 2018). With refugees from rivals, the strides taken by host countries to accommodate the displaced are converted to an increase in respect for rights. On the other hand, refugees from non-rivals lead to more xenophobic behavior and promotion of support for the suppression of rights.

An example comes from refugee crises in Kenya and Somalia, who are not considered strategic rivals.⁷ The Dadaab Refugee Camp located in Dadaab, Kenya was one of several refugee camps established in the 1990s to house Somali refugees. Kenya took in many Somali refugees with few returning home because of continued violence in their home country (Hujale 2016). Subsequently, an uptick in terrorist attacks in Kenya was linked to the inflow of refugees, which lead the Kenyan government to close the Kenya-Somali border as a security measure (Kiama and Karanja 2013). The heightened insecurity experienced in Kenya associated with refugee flows created a political shock and an elevation in abuses of human rights. Physical integrity rights of refugees were repeatedly violated due to killings and rape by government security forces and police officers (U.S. State Department 2010). The same report also documented “The refugee influx and security threats emanating from Somalia, particularly those associated with the Dadaab refugee camps, severely strained the government’s ability to provide

⁷While Kenya is dealing with violence from Somalia, the perpetrators are non-state actors. Thus, Kenya does not have a strategic rivalry with the government, rather an issue with violent non-state groups.

security, which impeded the efforts of the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations to assist and protect refugees and asylum seekers.” The report highlights the ways in which the government made it difficult for humanitarian organizations to operate within Kenya. At one point, the government “ordered the IOM [International Organization for Migration] to stop transporting refugees from the border” (U.S. State Department 2010).

Moreover, the Dadaab camp implemented restrictive policies rendering refugees unable to leave the encampment and subject to arrest, detention, or expulsion if caught without special movement passes (Kerubo 2013). Because Kenya and Somalia are not traditionally considered interstate rivals, there was no opportunity for Kenya to gain key foreign policy benefits in terms of undermining Somalia’s government. Thus, the situation surrounding Somali refugees in Kenya became one of exclusion narrative, human rights abuses, discrimination, and securitization of borders that allowed for the an overall increase in repression by the Kenyan government.

The perception that refugees are related to the insecurity within a country is powerful and can permit the use of state repression. In a form of domestic diversionary conflict, governments can commit human rights abuses in the name of protecting the state from an enemy within their border (Tir and Jasinski 2008). Further, host governments do not have as many incentives to highlight hospitable behavior toward refugees when they do not come from a rival. We should expect governments hosting refugees from a non-rival to decrease their respect for human rights because they are more likely to face pressure to repress from their

fearful, xenophobic populations while also lacking foreign policy incentives to exercise restraint in their treatment of refugees. Therefore,

Hypothesis 2 *A state is more likely to decrease respect for human rights upon accepting refugees from a non-rival country.*

2.5 Research Design

In the previous section, two testable hypotheses are derived suggesting a link between refugees arriving from a rival or non-rival country and changes in respect for human rights in the host state. In order to test this association, I build a dataset with the host country-year as the unit of observation. All countries in the Correlates of War state system list are included from 1990-2010 ([Correlates of War Project 2011](#)). I limit the analyses to the post-Cold War for several reasons. First, refugees during the Cold War tended to come from Communist countries, while hosting countries were mostly democracies ([Barnett and Finnemore 2004](#)). By the end of the Cold War, most refugees were those fleeing civil war and the sheer scope of the refugee problem increased substantially ([Barnett 2001a](#)). Further, refugees during the Cold War were more likely to be educated and skilled whereas the post-Cold War refugees are often more poor and less educated, which makes hosting these populations less desirable from the standpoint of the state ([Toft 2007](#)). Since the end of the Cold War, potential host countries claim individuals are dishonestly trying to obtain refugee status and are not fleeing persecution

(Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Rather, they are “economic migrants” are only fleeing in pursuit of economic opportunity (Neumayer 2005; Zetter 2007). In order to account for these shifting dynamics, I only examine the post-Cold War period since the population of refugees is qualitatively different from the population after the Cold War.

The dependent variable for this analysis is the change in the host country’s respect for human rights from the previous year. I use the Latent Human Rights Protection Scores (Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014), which includes information on a state’s overall human rights practices derived from a variety of sources such as annual human rights reports published by Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department, quantitative indicators of repression such as the Political Terror Scale (Gibney, Cornett, and Wood 2014) and CIRI (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014), as well as the increasing standard of accountability overtime in human rights (Clark and Sikkink 2013; Fariss 2014). The score is a continuous value normalized around a mean of zero, with positive numbers indicating greater respect for human rights and negative numbers meaning lower respect. While these scores take into account a country’s overall respect for human rights, the country reports used to generate the scores address refugee, asylum-seeker, and migrant rights within the country. Therefore, these reports do indeed account for how a state treats refugee populations within their borders. However, the latent score does not disaggregate by different types of populations, which is why I discuss a *general* change in the score.⁸ To account for the change in respect for human

⁸Further explanation of reports and where to access them online can be found in Appendix A.

rights, I subtract the reported score of respect for human rights in year_t from the score in year_{t-1}. Accordingly, *change in respect for human rights* is a continuous variable, with higher values attributed to increased respect for human rights as compared to the year before and lower values associated with decreased respect as compared to the previous year. Since the dependent variable is continuous, I run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. However, the time-series cross-sectional format of the data requires methods that account for potential temporal dependence. Therefore, I include panel corrected standard errors to address bias that is introduced due to the structure of the data (Beck and Katz 1995).

My primary independent variable of interest is whether refugees are from a rival country. Refugee data come from the UNHCR (2018b), which collects information on the number of refugees in a host country and the country of origin. The data include country of asylum and country of origin. I then determine whether the host state and country of origin are considered strategic rivals as defined by Thompson and Dreyer (2011). I use the Thompson and Dreyer (2011) conceptualization because it defines rivalries as a perceived level of tension or hostility between countries, which is an important facet of the presented relationship. They derive their list of strategic rivals based on qualitative accounts, especially foreign policy histories of governments, belligerent public statements, and acts of aggression between countries. This is in contrast with other measures of rivalry, which denote two states as rivals only if they are involved in a certain number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) within a specified time amount of time (Bennett 1997; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006).

Table 2.1: Distribution of Refugees from Rival Countries

	Observations	Mean Number of Refugees	Std. Dev.
Refugees from rival	556	144113.6	394077.7
Refugees from non-rival	2599	49396.86	148149.9
Refugees from rival only	30	526834	724779.6
Refugees from non-rival only	2073	41073.44	102151.1
Refugees from both	526	204485.4	455567.2

I then produce four variables to capture whether refugees came from a rival state. The first two are dichotomous indicators of whether the state has refugees from a rival or a non-rival, coded 1 if the host country took in refugees from a rival or non-rival in a given year, respectively, and 0 otherwise. The second two variables are the logged number of refugees host countries take in from rival and non-rival countries. Since these variables are not mutually exclusive because states can host refugees from rivals and non-rivals simultaneously, I generate categorical and continuous variables indicating whether a state took in refugees exclusively from a rival, non-rival, or both, and how many refugees were accepted in each of these contexts. The count of refugees is logged because of the right skew of the data. Table 2.1 displays the number of observations in each category along with the average and standard deviation of the non-transformed number of refugees.

Control variables included in the analyses are based on findings from foundational articles of cross-national studies of human rights ([Poe and Tate 1994](#); [Hill and Jones 2014](#)). All control variables are lagged by one year. I include binary variables for whether or not the country of asylum is involved in an inter-state or civil armed conflict, respectively, generating at least 25 battle deaths that

year (Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016). Prior studies demonstrate a link between higher levels of repression when a neighboring state is involved in an intrastate conflict in order to stymie the threat of conflict contagion (Danneman and Ritter 2014). I include a dichotomous indicator of whether a contiguous state is involved in a civil conflict based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's definition of a civil conflict (Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016). Contiguity is measured as two states separated by a land or river border or separated by 12 miles of water or less (Correlates of War Project 2017; Stinnett et al. 2002). The presence of Transborder Ethnic Kin (TEK) in other states can lead to the emergence of rivalries with other states (Jenne 2014) as well as other domestic political issues that can lead to armed conflict (Cederman et al. 2013). Most of these studies stress that these ethnic groups must be relevant in order to have an influence in domestic politics of the host state as well as the choice of the country of asylum (Rüegger and Bohnet 2018; Rüegger 2019). To account for this, I include a binary variable indicating whether there are relevant TEK among the population of the host state (Vogt et al. 2015).

Other standard control variables are the wealth and size of the host country measured by logged GDP per capita and logged population (World Bank 2016). Regime type is a strong determinant of levels of repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Fein 1995; Davenport 2007), though typical indicators of regime type, such as a country's Polity score, are deemed an unfit measure of regime type with respect to repression due to endogeneity concerns (Hill and Jones 2014). Constraints on the chief executive are shown to be a better descriptive characteristic of democracy

(Gleditsch and Ward 1997) than the aggregate 21-point Polity scale since some of the other factors include repression systematically in its definition. Accordingly, I use Polity's executive constraints measure to capture the degree of democracy in a country (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers 2014). *Executive constraints* is coded 1-7, with 1 meaning the executive has unlimited authority and no limitations and a 7 translating to accountability groups having an effective authority equal to or greater than the executive. Finally, since refugees tend to flee to countries with better human rights records (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003), I include the host country's latent respect for human rights score from the year prior to observation. Full summary statistics of these variables are found in Table A.1 of Appendix A.

2.6 Results

Table 2.2 presents findings from the panel corrected standard errors OLS models, using the different operationalizations of whether host states take in refugees from a rival or non-rival. When using a binary indicator (Model 1), accepting refugees from a rival does not influence changes in respect for human rights. On the other hand, taking in refugees from a non-rival is negatively associated with a decrease in respect for human rights, though this is only statistically significant at the 0.1 level. Moving to Model 2, which uses the logged number of refugees, when a state accepts more refugees from a rival, we see an increase in respect for human rights. This is in support of Hypothesis 1, which anticipated this relationship because a host state can capitalize on the opportunity to publicize their hospitably toward

refugee populations while simultaneously undermining their rival by providing sanctuary for displaced populations of their enemy.

The opposite relationship is observed with respect to refugees from non-rival states. In both the binary (Model 1) and count (Model 2) operationalizations, a country taking in refugees from a non-rival is more likely to experience a decrease in respect for human rights the following year. This is in support of Hypothesis 2, which suggested the arrival of refugees will be met with skepticism and xenophobia, which allows and even encourages host governments to increase human rights abuses, particularly toward migrant populations. Furthermore, the absence of an interstate rivalry means a host state does not have incentives to enact or publicize hospitable behavior since there is no foreign policy objective to doing so.

Models 3 and 4 of Table 2.2 include the results of mutually exclusive categories of taking in refugees from a rival, non-rival, or both, with the baseline category as hosting no refugees. The relationship between rivalry and overall respect for human rights holds even when taking into account states accepting refugees from rivals. When taking in refugees solely from non-rivals, there is an expected decrease in respect for human rights only when there are large numbers of individuals entering the state. This could be due to a small inflow of refugees not generating a backlash whereas a high number of refugees incurs domestic debate about hosting. Interestingly, countries taking in refugees from both rivals and non-rivals have no statistically significant effect, though this does not hold for the binary indicator in Model 3. This could be because the effects of hosting

Table 2.2: Refugees from Strategic Rivals on Changes in Respect for HR

	Binary (1)	Number of Refugees (2)	Binary (3)	Number of Refugees (4)
Refugees from Rival	0.0102 (0.0092)	0.0018* (0.0009)	-	-
Refugees from Non-rival	-0.0128 [†] (0.0077)	-0.0025** (0.0009)	-	-
Refugees from Rival Only	-	-	0.0698* (0.0311)	0.0052* (0.0024)
Refugees from Non-rival Only	-	-	-0.0087 (0.0076)	-0.0019* (0.0009)
Refugees from Both	-	-	-0.0021 (0.0104)	-0.0008 (0.0010)
Interstate Conflict	-0.0459* (0.0230)	-0.0518* (0.0235)	-0.0447* (0.0228)	-0.0446 [†] (0.0228)
Civil Conflict	-0.0778*** (0.0133)	-0.0786*** (0.0134)	-0.0779*** (0.0134)	-0.0780*** (0.0134)
GDPPC (logged)	0.0099** (0.0032)	0.0093** (0.0034)	0.0098** (0.0032)	0.0094** (0.0034)
Population (logged)	-0.0125*** (0.0033)	-0.0105** (0.0038)	-0.0126*** (0.0033)	-0.0110** (0.0038)
Neighboring Civil Conflict	-0.0062 (0.0054)	-0.0054 (0.0054)	-0.0065 (0.0054)	-0.0056 (0.0055)
TEK	0.0006 (0.0095)	0.0016 (0.0096)	-0.0001 (0.0095)	0.0009 (0.0097)
Executive Constraints	0.0122*** (0.0022)	0.0120*** (0.0023)	0.0123*** (0.0022)	0.0120*** (0.0023)
Respect for HR _{t-1}	-0.0454*** (0.0082)	-0.0438*** (0.0085)	-0.0453*** (0.0081)	-0.0442*** (0.0084)
Constant	0.1339** (0.0500)	0.1110* (0.0529)	0.1332** (0.0504)	0.1170* (0.0532)
<i>N</i>	3201	3201	3201	3201


[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

from different countries are pulling the estimate in each direction, thus negating any relationship between refugees and respect for human rights.

In order to depict the relationship observed in the coefficient results, Figure 2.1 displays the predicted change in respect for human rights based on the number of refugees from a rival and non-rival country (results from Column 2). The graph demonstrates the more refugees a country takes in from a rival, the more likely the host government will increase respect for human rights overall. Further, countries taking in refugees from a non-rival country experience a decrease in general respect for human rights.

Almost all of the control variables behave the way the repression literature

Figure 2.1: Predicted Change in Respect for Human Rights Given Strategic Rivalry



predicts. Consistent with other studies, interstate and civil conflict are negatively associated with respect for human rights (Young 2013; Hill and Jones 2014). Unexpectedly, the wealth of a country decreases respect for human rights. The population of a country, whether a contiguous neighbor is experiencing civil conflict,⁹ and the presence of relevant TEK have no bearing on changes in respect for human rights in the following year.¹⁰ As the executive becomes more constrained, respect for human rights is higher (Hill and Jones 2014). Finally, governments with lower levels of respect for human rights in the year prior are more likely to

⁹Other contiguity specifications, such as expanding the water distance between countries, yield similar regression results.

¹⁰These results are consistent with other TEK variables, such as a count of relevant TEK groups and whether TEK is excluded in the host state.

make a change for the better in the following year compared to states who already score highly. One explanation for this finding is that countries with lower respect for human rights have room to make improvements compared to other states that regularly maintain high levels of respect for human rights.

2.7 Robustness Checks

There could be several alternative explanations for the observed relationship that hosting refugees from a rival country leads to an increase in respect for human rights and a decrease if refugees hail from a non-rival state. The first is contiguity. The majority of refugees flee to neighboring countries ([Schmeidl 1997](#); [Melander and Öberg 2006](#)). For instance, more than half of the Afghan refugee population resides in Pakistan, Kenya hosts the majority of Somali refugees, and Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon together host approximately 85% of the registered Syrian refugee population. While some try to obtain asylum in countries farther away, the bulk of refugees stay nearby because they lack resources to move further, they want to maintain close contact with their home state, and they desire to return as soon as possible ([Schmeidl 1997](#); [Crisp and Jacobsen 1998](#)).¹¹

With respect to interstate rivalries, most rivals also happen to be neighboring countries. Because of their close proximity, neighboring dyads are prone to iterative interactions that may develop into a hostile relationship. Since refugees tend to flee next door, externalities of the civil war can follow them into the host

¹¹The timing and number of returnees will be explored in the next two chapters of this dissertation.

country through cross-border raids by non-state groups or hostile origin countries (Salehyan 2008a).

Thus, it is unclear how contiguity influences the observed relationship between interstate rivalry, hosting refugees, and changes in respect for human rights. Table 2.3 presents the results of OLS regressions with panel corrected standard errors that take into account whether states are neighbors from the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity dataset (Correlates of War Project 2017; Stinnett et al. 2002). In Model 5, estimates show that whether refugees arrive from a neighboring country or further afield do not influence human rights abuses from the previous year. When accounting for how many refugees a state accepts, more refugees from a non-contiguous country leads to a decrease in respect for human rights whereas refugees from a neighboring state holds no association (Model 6).

Thus, being neighbors with a refugee-producing country does not hold any strong association with changes in respect for human rights. On the other hand, as countries host more refugees from a non-neighboring country, it becomes more likely that the host a state will decrease respect for human rights. A potential explanation for this correlation is refugees from further afield are considered more foreign to the host country whereas refugees from a neighbor are more likely to be a known population. For instance, the fervor of the European refugee crisis in 2015 could be because the Syrian civil war, located far away, was displacing vast numbers of civilians to countries where they do not have much contact or cultural similarity with the state. Turkey, neighbor to Syria, initially supported hosting Syrians with claims they were their “Muslim brothers” who needed their

Table 2.3: Refugees from Contiguous States & Strategic Rivals on Changes in Respect for HR


	Binary (5)	Number of Refugees (6)	Binary (7)	Number of Refugees (8)
Refugees from Contig.	-0.0075 (0.0088)	-0.0001 (0.0009)	-	-
Refugees from Non-contig.	0.0068 (0.0073)	-0.0018* (0.0007)	-	-
Refugees from Rival, Contig.	-	-	0.0112 (0.0095)	0.0019* (0.0009)
Refugees from Rival, Non-contig.	-	-	-0.0247 (0.0153)	-0.0023 (0.0021)
Refugees from Non-rival, Contig.	-	-	-0.0097 (0.0083)	-0.0010 (0.0010)
Refugees from Non-rival, Non-contig.	-	-	0.0072 (0.0071)	-0.0015* (0.0007)
Interstate Conflict	-0.04086 [†] (0.0224)	-0.03756 [†] (0.0218)	-0.0472* (0.0234)	-0.0499* (0.0239)
Civil Conflict	-0.0766*** (0.0130)	-0.0770*** (0.0128)	-0.0754*** (0.0133)	-0.0783*** (0.0131)
GDPPC (logged)	0.0100** (0.0033)	0.0105** (0.0033)	0.0097** (0.0034)	0.0097** (0.0034)
Population (logged)	-0.0136*** (0.0033)	-0.0109** (0.0036)	-0.0131*** (0.0033)	-0.0109** (0.0036)
Neighboring Civil Conflict	-0.0030 (0.0061)	-0.0055 (0.0058)	-0.0033 (0.0061)	-0.0049 (0.0060)
TEK	-0.0006 (0.0097)	0.0013 (0.0095)	-0.0006 (0.0096)	0.0015 (0.0095)
Executive Constraints	0.0120*** (0.0022)	0.0119*** (0.0022)	0.0125*** (0.0022)	0.0124*** (0.0022)
Respect for HR _{t-1}	-0.0462*** (0.0082)	-0.0444*** (0.0085)	-0.0452*** (0.0083)	-0.0438*** (0.0086)
Constant	0.1415** (0.0495)	0.1046* (0.0498)	0.1326** (0.0488)	0.1084* (0.0492)
N	3201	3201	3201	3201

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

help. Future research could tease out these relationships in more detail.

Turning to the next two models, I code whether refugees came from a rival and/or a contiguous state. Model 7 operationalizes these distinctions categorically whereas Model 8 examines the logged number of refugees that fall under these categories. The results reveal interesting patterns. First, the association between refugees from a rival state and an increase in respect for human rights seems to be driven by contiguous countries. With respect to non-rival states, accepting any refugees from a contiguous country shows no discernible pattern with changes in respect for human rights. However, when considering

Figure 2.2: Predicted Change in Respect for HR Given Strategic Rivalry and Contiguity



the number of refugees in Model 8, we see that it is refugees from non-rival non-contiguous states that are associated with a decline in respect for human rights, similar to Model 6.

The predicted change in respect for human rights given the number of refugees from rival and contiguous states is displayed in Figure 2.2. As the number of refugees from a contiguous rival rise, the more likely we are to observe the host state increasing respect for human rights in the subsequent year. The rest of the categories show a decrease in respect for human rights in the host state when more refugees arrive. These findings suggest the contiguous nature of a strategic rivalry translates to fewer human rights violations. Absent this context, the arrival

of refugees, especially in larger numbers and from non-contiguous countries, is associated with a decrease in respect for human rights.

I also run a series of robustness checks that examine different specifications of the dependent variable. The first is using the absolute human rights scores, rather than changes in respect. Tables A.2 and A.3 of Appendix A display results of models where the dependent variable is respect for human rights in year t and includes a lagged dependent variable in the list of covariates. The coefficient estimates are similar to the main results.

Next, I expand the window of time for changes in respect for human rights. Only examining changes from one year to the next could be too narrow of a window to produce meaningful alterations in human rights practices. I re-estimate the regressions using dependent variables accounting for changes in respect for human rights in a 3- and 5-year windows. The regression results can be found in Appendix A, with Tables A.4 and A.5 for the changes in 3 years and Tables A.6 and A.7 for changes over 5 years. The results corroborate the findings of the main results. Even when expanding the time frame, refugees from rival states are associated with an increase in respect for human rights whereas refugees from non-rival states lead host states to be more likely to abuse human rights. Refugees from neighboring countries do not have an influence on respect for human rights unless they arrive in large numbers from non-neighboring states. Finally, it is the context of refugees from neighboring rival states that lead host countries to respect human rights more, whereas refugees from non-contiguous rival states and refugees from non-rival states lead to a decline in respect.

The final robustness check concerns the rivalry indicator. In the main results, I specifically use Thompson and Dreyer's strategic rivalry because it captures the perception of threat, not just the number of militarized interactions between states. I also re-run the models using Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) specification of interstate rivalry. Their conceptualization of rivalry consists of four dimensions: spatial consistency, duration, militarized competitiveness, and linked conflict. Since the data ends in 2001, the sample is restricted to this year and may not be directly comparable to the main findings. The results of these models are found in Tables A.9 and A.10 of Appendix A.

The results of the models using the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) conceptualization of rivalry are not consistent with the main results presented in this chapter. While in some models the distinction leads to similar patterns as the main results, it is not consistent. Even when accounting for contiguity, there is no meaningful statistical relationship between hosting refugees and respect for human rights. This suggests the definition of rivalry matters for the association between taking in refugees from a rival and changes in respect for human rights. Most likely, since Thompson and Dreyer (2011) rely on the perception and belief that the other state is an enemy, and this belief is shared mutually between both countries, rivalries are more emotionally triggering and well-known in their conceptualization. Importantly, these rivalries are more likely to be known publicly, such that citizens support state actions. This distinction is important because the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) conceptualization relies on frequent military action in a period of time whereas states do not have to fight militarily to

be considered rivals in [Thompson and Dreyer \(2011\)](#). Further, since each country needs to perceive the other as a threat in Thompson and Dreyer's specification of rivalry, there can be instances where one country thinks the other is an enemy whereas the other does not even if they are often engaged in militarized disputes. Relating to the association with changes in respect for human rights given the arrival of refugees, the goodwill of accepting refugees from a rival will only be substantiated if both countries perceive the other as an enemy. Otherwise, there is no incentive to capitalize on embarrassing the origin state by improving respect for human rights.

2.8 Conclusion

Most quantitative studies investigating the relationship between refugees and security tend to find that refugees are associated with a higher propensity for civil conflict onset ([Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006](#)), one-sided violence against civilians ([Fisk 2018](#)), and repression in the host state ([Danneman and Ritter 2014](#); [Wright and Moorthy 2018](#)). While other studies show that accepting refugees is beneficial for the host in terms of political and economic gains ([Jacobsen 2002](#); [Cortes 2004](#); [Sadiq 2005](#); [Adamson 2006](#)), they tend to address specific cases that are not always generalizable to other situations. The findings of this study advance our knowledge regarding how human rights practices in host states are impacted by the arrival of refugees. Namely, accepting refugees from a strategic rival provides an incentive to boast about humanitarian practices toward these populations, which

can also garner good-will from the international community and are documented in human rights reports.

I find that the arrival of refugees from a rival state leads to boasting of good behavior by host governments because they are accommodating refugees. In this context, the government has an incentive to highlight their humanitarian action because there is a foreign policy objective to undermine their adversary and project their hospitality to the international community. By accepting refugees from their strategic rival, host states are able to tarnish the reputation of their adversary by highlight that their enemy is unable to protect its own citizens. This may also lead to the host state being more active in procuring funds from aid organizations and a productive working relationship with the UNHCR in order to implement assistance programs. While this was not directly tested in this chapter, future work can investigate whether and how some countries are more successful at obtaining monetary and institutional support or whether the host state provides more of its own resources for hosting refugees . This would be especially interesting over time when refugee situations become protracted and funds become limited.

On the other hand, refugees from a non-rival state are met with a decrease in respect for human rights. This is likely linked to the traditional theories of immigration that expect a response of xenophobia and discrimination because refugees pose a “threat” as an inherent out-group. While refugees are often considered more “deserving” than regular migrants for sanctuary, their arrival can be associated with negative security externalities. This subjects host countries to

implement policies designed to prevent individuals from seeking asylum within their borders or to incentivize repatriation. Across the globe, this is witnessed through closures of border crossings in Europe, the attempt to close down the Dadaab camp in Kenya, de-funding assistance to refugees in Lebanon, and implementing quotas on how many individuals are awarded refugee status in the United Kingdom and United States. These actions contribute to a negative impact on a country's respect for human rights since governments are deliberately enforcing measures to keep individuals out of their country.

This negative relationship between refugees and respect for human rights is most pronounced when refugees arrive from a non-contiguous country. A simple explanation is that refugees or immigrants from further away are more likely to be "incompatible" with the national culture in the host state. Domestic populations of the host state are more likely to view refugees as intruders when refugees are seen as being more culturally and socially "distant" ([Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2016](#)). For instance, refugees from the Middle East and Africa hoping to make it to Europe are often treated with disdain and met with "non-assistance" policies by potential host states ([Heller and Pezzani 2016](#)). Policies toward refugees are crafted under a framework of security, which can lead to more violations of human rights by the government. This is reflected in the statistical relationship found in the results.

How host governments promote their own behavior toward accepting or denying displaced populations is clearly being picked up by human rights monitors. States certainly have strong motivations to vocalize good behavior toward the

exiled population of their rival, which is observed as cooperative and positive behavior. Since governments have the foreign policy goal of undermining their rival, the government will purposefully act and broadcast this behavior. Conversely, states without such a foreign policy objective in mind must consider the costs associated with hosting refugees and will act in their self-interest, which tends to be characterized as xenophobic.

Another ramification is understanding the complexities of refugee burden sharing. The majority of refugees flee to neighboring countries, yet it seems states farther away tend to enforce tough policies barring immigrants from entering and are able to get away with it. In particular, countries farther away from conflict regions (i.e. Western states) tend to have strict and long bureaucratic vetting processes that may not grant asylum to the whole family. On the other hand, countries within a region experiencing violence are less capable of controlling cross-border flows and are the states hosting most refugees. For instance, Kenya announced they would close the Dadaab camp but after a backlash and a Supreme Court ruling, Dadaab kept the doors open. On the other hand, policies like the United State's "travel ban" are adopted to keep the already limited number of refugees from entering.¹²

While there are exceptions, such as Canada and Germany who promote their open border policy and increase their asylum seeker quota, there is domestic

¹²In the next chapter of the dissertation, I show how, since the end of the Cold War, 356 million people are or have been refugees. The majority of these individuals remained in host states, with 27 million refugees repatriating to their country of origin and only 3 million refugees resettled to a third country. Note third-country resettlement is the main avenue for refugees to be granted asylum in developed Western nations, such as the United States.

backlash to these stances. Right-wing anti-immigrant parties are collecting more of the vote share in these countries in response to their federal government's stance. While out of the scope of this chapter, future work can examine the variation in host government's policies—and how this changes given inflows of refugees—and the reasons behind this variation.

Chapter 3

MACRO-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF REFUGEE RETURN


3.1 Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of people who fled conflict and persecution and were forced to live elsewhere jumped from approximately 10 million to over 62 million individuals in 2018 ([UNHCR 2018b](#)).¹ Due to ongoing conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, South Sudan, and the Lake Chad Basin, the rate of displacement since the 2010s is the largest since the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began recording these statistics in 1960. In 2014, 24 people were forced to flee their homes every minute—four times the rate in the 2000s ([UNHCR Global Trends 2016](#)).

Meanwhile, some refugees are returning to their country of origin under a variety of circumstances. The UNHCR documents nearly 27 million refugees returned to their country of origin, either on their own accord or through formal repatriation programs ([UNHCR 2018b](#)). In doing so, individuals forfeit refugee status and its accompanying international and legal protections. While the option of third-country resettlement exists, the bureaucratic process is slow, not all

¹These figures take into account refugees, internally displaced persons, and asylum-seekers.

Figure 3.1: Ratio of Individuals who Return or Resettle in a Third Country to Refugee Stocks



family members may be granted this option, and it is highly selective. From 1989-2016, only a little over 3 million refugees were resettled. Figure 3.1 plots the ratio of individuals who returned to their country of origin or resettled in a third country to refugee populations in this time span. These numbers illustrate that resettlement in a third-country is a highly unlikely option for refugees. On the other hand, return is a more likely alternative for refugees who do not remain in their host country.

Refugee status is only a snapshot of the process of displacement. Obtaining refugee status is considered temporary protection until conditions in the country of origin are favorable enough for refugees to be returned, according to the Hand-

book on Repatriation and Reintegration (UNHCR 2004). To return refugees prior to improvement in conditions at home would constitute *refoulement*—a violation of international refugee law. Yet, countries hosting refugees are over-burdened with this task (Hynie 2018). While the UNHCR is sent into host countries to help alleviate the strain, the organization lacks the funds to properly manage refugee situations sufficiently (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). As refugee situations become protracted, resources aiding refugees dwindle, third-country resettlement options prove to be unlikely, and domestic politics and citizen attitudes in host countries grow increasingly xenophobic. In short, remaining in the host state often grows harder for refugees every day.² Additionally, surveys show that refugees overwhelmingly prefer to return to their country of origin at some point rather than stay in asylum forever (Koser 1997; Berlin Social Science Center 2015; Bohnet 2016; Alsharabati and Nammour 2017). Given all of these factors—international protection but lack of resources and increasingly negative views of refugees in host countries—we must ask the same questions refugees ask themselves: how and when does return become most likely?

This chapter contributes to our understanding of displacement by identifying under what conditions refugees are returning to their countries of origin. Currently, there is little systematic research regarding when repatriation or return

²For instance, Lebanon, the country with the highest ratio of Syrian refugees to native citizens, is no longer allowing Syrians who have entered since October 2015 to obtain refugee status. The UNHCR in Lebanon lacks the resources to provide basic aid provisions, including food, to registered Syrian refugees in the country, let alone those in the country that do not have refugee status. Moreover, citizen support for hosting refugees has declined. While initially empathetic to Syrians at the beginning of the war, over time, Lebanese citizens have hardened their beliefs and think refugees have overstayed their welcome (Ghosn and Braithwaite 2018).

migration happens. Existing scholarship focuses on when and under what contexts forced displacement occurs (Clark 1989; Schmeidl 1997; Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004; Adhikari 2013), the destinations of where individuals flee (Day and White 2002; Neumayer 2004; Moore and Shellman 2007; Rüegger and Bohnet 2018; Turkoglu and Chadeaux 2019), and the impacts refugee populations have on host countries and their citizens (Ek and Karadawi 1991; Jacobsen 2002; Whitaker 2002; Cortes 2004; Adamson 2006; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Dempster and Hargrave 2017; Ghosn, Braithwaite, and Chu 2019; Braithwaite et al. 2019). Building upon the body of work on the determinants of forced displacement, I account for political, economic, and security conditions in the host and origin countries. Unlike these studies, however, I contend host and origin countries cannot be examined as equals; origin countries will almost always be deficient in terms of conventional macro-level indicators of political, economic, and security. Instead, I argue positive changes in the circumstances in refugees' country of origin and negative shifts in the host state will lead to an increase in the likelihood and number of refugees who return.

Using data from the UNCHR on refugee returns since the end of the Cold War, empirical assessments suggest building a theoretical and empirical model of refugee return must take into account political, economic, and physical security conditions in both the host and origin state. Furthermore, refugee return movement seems to be most sensitive to physical security conditions in host and origin states, with civil conflict in the host pushing refugees out and ongoing civil conflict in the origin state deterring return. As refugee return continues to be a

salient question with respect to the current forced displacement crisis, this study provides an important foundation in explaining patterns of return and how to best serve these populations in the future.

3.2 Phases of Refugee Displacement

3.2.1 Forced Displacement

There are four phases of involuntary migration: initial flight, resettlement in asylum, repatriation home, and reintegration after return (Bascom 2002).³ The academic literature mostly focuses on initial flight and resettlement in asylum. Studies on forced displacement utilize theories of economic migration that take a rational actor approach in the decision to emigrate. They assume individuals have agency, which involves the capacity to reflect on their current position, devise strategies, and take action to achieve their desires (Bakewell 2010). While theories of economic migration assume an individual has time to come to a decision, in regards to forced displacement, people often need to make a quick decision to flee in hopes the destination is safer than if they stayed (Schon 2019).

Factors influencing the decision to flee are well covered in the literature. People leave their homes and become displaced when they feel they are in physical danger (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003). Schmeidl (1997) finds that civil wars with foreign military intervention are more likely to produce large and prolonged refugee migrations and that ethnic rebellions cause smaller flows rather than mass

³While these phases are helpful in conceptualizing stages of involuntary migration, it should be noted that not every displaced person goes through all steps.

exoduses. [Moore and Shellman \(2006\)](#) uncover that refugee flows are greater than the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) when there is state-sponsored genocide/politicide than during other forms of armed violence. Other factors influencing whether people are internally or externally displaced depend on the geographic distance of another country ([Moore and Shellman 2007](#)) and existence and size of transnational ethnic kin in another state ([Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009](#); [Rüegger and Bohnet 2018](#)), which both speak to the relative ease of deciding to stay versus flee.

3.2.2 Repatriation and Return Migration

As compared to studies of initial displacement, there are fewer systematic assessments considering when refugees return to their country of origin. Instead, academics and policymakers who discuss repatriation typically evaluate how the return of refugees is an imperfect process that requires more attention from host states and the UNHCR ([Chimni 2004](#); [Loizides and Antoniadis 2009](#); [Bradley 2013](#)). During the Cold War, resettlement in a third country was more common and accepted because the environment of bipolarity made it a political slight to return refugees back to communist countries, the volume of refugee flows was smaller, and refugees tended to be more skilled and educated ([Loescher 2001](#); [Barnett and Finnemore 2004](#); [Martin et al. 2005](#); [Toft 2007](#)). Since the end of the 1980s, refugee flows are growing in size and predominantly come from less developed countries, which leads many in host states to believe that refugees are

less likely to contribute to the host society, ultimately deterring many countries from devoting effort and resources toward accommodating the displaced (Bradley 2013). The few who are granted permanent resettlement tend to be more skilled and educated than their counterparts (McSpadden 2004).

As a result, repatriation is encouraged as the preferred solution for refugee problems. In fact, the UNHCR declared the 1990s to be the “decade of repatriation” (Hammerstad 2000). This shift away from third-country resettlement and host integration is heavily criticized, with claims that repatriation is eroding rights of asylum, preventing refugees from accessing safety in wealthy democracies, and states’ self-interests are motivating a seemingly unhumanitarian policy (Barnett 2001a; Chimni 2004; Hathaway 2007; Adelman and Barkan 2011). Yet, as discussed in the previous paragraph, hosting states do not find it in their self-interest to host refugees (Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004). This leads to the expectation, that, in general, host states will prefer to return refugees.

International law dictates four preconditions for refugee return processes: (1) there is a fundamental change of circumstances in the home country, (2) the decision to return is voluntary in nature, (3) a tripartite agreement is signed between the origin state, host country, and the UNHCR, and (4) that the return process happens in safety and dignity. However, repatriation in dignity and safety is rarely what transpires in reality. As host states are demanding refugees leave as soon as possible, the UNHCR is pressured to act (Barnett 2001b). Given wealthier and more developed states are the major donors to the UNHCR (Zeager and Bascom 1996), the organization is beholden to their demands and are unable to

force these countries into accepting more refugees. While a “safe” return is less likely, there are ethical challenges of refusing to help refugees return simply because they are returning to less than ideal conditions or to assist them regardless because some help is better than none (Gerver 2016).⁴

While the budget and operations of the UNHCR have expanded since the 1990s to accommodate the shift in policy towards repatriation (Hammerstad 2000), the UNHCR is still under-resourced to provide adequately for refugees. This leads to varying degrees of a “voluntary” return. A truly voluntary return is when a refugee has full control of the decision to return or to stay permanently in the host country. A less voluntary decision of return occurs when there are financial incentives, typically paid by the host country or an organization, that funds their return or staying in the host country and risking forcible return at some point in the future. Israel provided South Sudanese and Cote d’Ivorian refugees with an ultimatum to return “voluntarily” with a stipend or face detention or deportation without a stipend (Gerver 2014). Even though the South Sudanese refugees were concerned about poverty, crime, and violence, they returned because of the threat of detention. The least voluntary type of return happens when refugees are pushed to return by everything but the use of force, to the point that they really have no choice in the matter (Black and Gent 2006), which some argue is a form of *refoulement* (Chimni 1993; Hathaway and Neve 1997).⁵

⁴Activities of agencies can include facilitation, such as coordinating transportation and assisting in documentation for return, or to directly promote return by encouraging refugees to consider return as the viable solution to displacement, funding “go see” visits, and initiating local reintegration programs (Bradley 2013). Yet, some agencies refuse to provide these services if they believe conditions in the country of origin are not safe for their return (Gerver 2016).

⁵*Refoulement* is defined as the expulsion or return of a refugee to a place where her life or

Collectively, the literature suggests that in practice, refugees are not returning in accordance with international law and promoting repatriation as the solution for refugee situations put refugees in danger. Additionally, the literature ascribes normative assumptions that return must happen with safety and dignity. This neglects whether refugees have agency and the necessity to return under conditions prescribed by international law. In the next section, I develop expectations on when refugee return is more likely using a push and pull framework of host and origin states. Based on these factors, refugees, host states, and international organizations are more likely to promote return when conditions in the origin state are improving and deteriorating in the host state.

3.3 How Conditions in Origin and Host States are Associated with Refugee Return

In considering what factors likely influence refugee return, I start where most humanitarian observers, such as the UNHCR, would like to see with respect to refugee repatriation. Current discussions emphasize the need for repatriation to be conducted with accordance with the convention's call for "safety" and "dignity," as well as a voluntary decision by refugees. In practice, this is a utopic and optimistic view of the return process. While this would be ideal, most refugee returns do not reflect these dynamics in full ([Barnett 2001b](#); [Chimni 2004](#); [Adelman and Barkan 2011](#)). However, this does not mean we should not examine when freedom would be threatened and is prohibited by Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.

refugee return patterns are more or less likely. The issue with focusing too much on evaluating the process itself is that we may assume all refugees are coerced to return when that might not be the case. We may be missing what observers perceive as moments to push or pull refugees to return. Understanding what cues host states, humanitarian organizations, and refugees observe to push return can shift the focus towards providing policy recommendations for when to step in and deter return.

A problem with the discussion on refugee return is the competing preferences of actors dealing with refugee populations; this includes host states, international humanitarian organizations, and, of course, the refugees themselves. Host states differ in whether they accommodate refugees or not. Depending on these preferences, they treat refugees hospitably or find opportunities to decrease the number of refugees within their borders. If they tend toward the latter, many promote return because it is the preferred solution to protracted refugee situations ([Hammerstad 2000](#); [Long 2014](#)).

Organizations serving displaced populations are charged with protecting refugee rights and ensuring their safety. Since international legal norms of conflict-induced migration are weak, accountability of and mechanisms to deter malpractice by host states are lacking ([Hathaway and Neve 1997](#); [Hathaway 2007](#)). This leads organizations, like the UNHCR, IOM, and other NGOs to resort to advocacy and diplomatic tools to induce governments to provide protection for refugees, to varying degrees of success ([Robinson 1997](#); [Martin 2012](#)).

Normative practice assumes exile in a host state is inherently better than re-

turning to their country of origin (Chimni 2004; Toft 2007; Adelman and Barkan 2011; Zimmermann 2012; Gerver 2016; Yahya 2018). However, this is not true across all refugees. Survey data indicate 92% and 96% of Syrian refugees in Europe (Berlin Social Science Center 2015) and Lebanon (Alsharabati and Nammour 2017), respectively, would prefer to return at some point than naturalized in their host country or resettled in a third-country. This is not specific to the Syrian case. Other studies find similar patterns of Somali (Bloch and Atfield 2002; Fink-Nielsen, Hansen, and Kleist 2004), Burundian (Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017), South Sudanese (Gerver 2014; Bohnet 2016), and Bosnian refugees (Black 2002; Black et al. 2004; Nalepa 2012). This includes a desire to return while conflict has not officially terminated in the country of origin (Stein and Cuny 1994; Stein 1997; Koser 1997; Bohnet 2016; Lazareva 2016).

Taken together, there are competing and complementary viewpoints about the situation of refugees and when return migration should be promoted and happen. Across these perspectives, a critical factor increasing the likelihood of return is security. Security can be broken down into three broad categories identified in the literature to matter deeply for forced migration: political, economic, and physical (Bradley 2013; Ma and Chayavong 2017). At the micro-level, these factors influence decisions about staying or leaving because of the direct impact on the livelihoods of refugees. Host states and other observers involved with refugee populations use these same factors to determine when they can facilitate return.

Security conditions cannot be discussed without understanding the circumstances in the host state as well as the country of origin. Borrowing from studies

on voluntary and forced migration, I conceptualize patterns of return based on a “push and pull” framework (Todaro 1969; Todaro and Maruszko 1987; Borjas 1989; Massey et al. 1998; Sassen 1988; Clark 1989; Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989; Weiner 1996; Schmeidl 1997; Massey 1999; Moore and Shellman 2004; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Bakewell 2010; Fussell 2012; Turkoglu and Chadeaux 2019). This framework is useful in the context of refugee return for several reasons. First, it does not suffer from a selection effect of only considering countries that already produced refugees, as well as states that only produce returnees. Many refugees still stay in host countries even if other refugees return. Therefore, only examining cases where return happens will severely bias results. Second, push and pull factors highlight that refugees are influenced by conditions in origin *and* host states; one cannot model refugee movements without the consideration of circumstances in both places. This provides a more accurate depiction of the realities faced by refugees in assessing the timing of return. Refugees residing in the same host state, but from different origin countries, interpret their experiences and have diverging aspirations because of the variance in their histories (Kvittingen et al. 2019). Similarly, refugees from the same conflict will have different experiences compared to the state they settle in.

As with similar work on refugee flows, I conceptualize the number of refugees who return to their country of origin as the aggregated observable implications of the constrained choices of individuals deciding to move (Kunz 1973; Richmond 1988; Riddle and Buckley 1998; Van Hear 1998; Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Neumayer 2004; Moore and Shellman 2007; Turkoglu and Chadeaux 2019). Us-

ing [Moore and Shellman \(2007\)](#)'s cross-national analysis of refugee patterns as a theoretical starting point, this study investigates useful refugees, host states, and international organizations tend to respond to aggregate, macro-level information, even when there will be individual-level variation across refugees' risk assessments and responsiveness to circumstances.

3.3.1 Host State Push Factors

There is a vast literature on the politics of refugee populations within host states. Policymakers increasingly link migration to issues of national security ([Adamson 2006](#); [Bove and Böhmelt 2016](#)). Accommodating refugees can take a social and economic toll on states, especially since the majority of these countries are developing and lack resources to provide for their own domestic populations ([Akar and Erdoğan 2018](#); [Hynie 2018](#); [Jackson and Atkinson 2018](#)). While there are plenty of studies demonstrating the positive impacts of refugee communities on host societies ([Jacobsen 2002](#); [Cortes 2004](#); [Adamson 2006](#); [Taylor et al. 2016](#); [Salehyan 2018](#)) as well as types of governments who support the hosting of certain types of migrants and refugees ([Sadiq 2005](#); [Moorthy and Brathwaite 2016](#); [Chu 2019a](#)), host states are generally resistant of policies that would streamline permanent integration into their countries. Many states hosting a large number of refugees, such as Lebanon and Kenya, enact laws that bar refugees from being naturalized or *de facto* practice means very few are ever granted citizenship ([Ref World 1994](#); [Hägerdal 2018](#); [International Rescue Committee 2018](#)).

Moreover, the international community promoting repatriation as the preferred long-term solution to refugee crises affords host states the ability to be resolute about perceiving hosting as a temporary solution until conditions are safe enough in the country of origin. Even if host states are initially supportive of hosting refugees, changes in government and public opinion of refugee communities grow less supportive overtime (Dempster and Hargrave 2017; Ghosn and Braithwaite 2018). Given that many host states are the major donors to the UNHCR (Zeager and Bascom 1996), the organization is often beholden to their demands. While a “safe” return is less likely, there are ethical dimensions of refusing to help refugees make the journey back simply because conditions in the origin state are less than ideal or to help them regardless because some assistance is better than none (Gerver 2016).

Governments adopt a variety of policies to decrease the number of people who try to reach their borders proactively by constructing physical barriers (Avdan and Gelpi 2016; Carter and Poast 2017), crafting restrictive asylum policies (Bosswick 2000; Ivarsflaten 2005; Avdan 2014), or are uncooperative with organizations serving displaced individuals (Betts 2011; Heller and Pezzani 2016). Yet, studies show that asylum policies do not systematically impact refugees’ destination choice (Day and White 2002; Schaeffer 2010). Rather, restrictive policies tend to channel migrants away from legally applying for asylum and toward irregular methods, such as usually smugglers or entering states illegally (Czaika and Hobolth 2010).

Governments also take measures to limit livelihoods and deliberately foster

hostile conditions for refugee populations already settled within their borders. [Kuhlman \(1990\)](#) defines refugee integration into the host country as compatibility with host state cultural values, attaining an adequate standard of living, and a lack of worsening of the standards of living and economic opportunities for members of the host community. While some states may promote immigrant integration into host society ([Jacobsen 2002](#); [Sadiq 2005](#); [Adamson 2006](#)), others are likely to deter refugees from becoming permanent members of society. Additionally, host states are not unitary, with some portions of government or local communities being more supportive of refugees than others, and these distributions changing over time ([Whitaker 2002](#); [Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013](#); [Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015](#); [Getmansky, Sinmazdemir, and Zeitzoff 2018](#); [Ghosn, Braithwaite, and Chu 2019](#); [Braithwaite et al. 2019](#)).

When governments treat the hosting of refugees as a temporary policy, it increases the likelihood of refugees being portrayed as unwelcome outsiders. Those in exile in can experience feelings of exclusion and develop impressions that they do not belong in their host country ([Stefansson 2004](#)). This is because being in a foreign country can be characterized by a fall in social status, loneliness, and experiencing racism ([Fink-Nielsen, Hansen, and Kleist 2004](#)).

Feelings of exclusion are often linked to other negative experiences while abroad that then motivate return. A lack of economic opportunities, exposure to violence, and repressive action in the host country all feed into these emotions. While refugee status is supposed to be accompanied by basic human rights, such as freedom of movement and access to goods and services, such as education

and healthcare, with asylum status, host governments do not always honor international law (Verdirame 1999; Knudsen 2009; Zeus 2011). Conditions in refugee camps can be even worse than those in the origin state (Milton, Spencer, and Findley 2013). Koser (1997) finds Mozambican refugees were living in destitute conditions in Malawi, which made returning to Mozambique a viable option even though war in Mozambique was still ongoing. Host countries often impose restrictions on the movements and economic activities of refugees living in camps by not allowing them to leave the perimeter of the camps (Zetter and Ruaudel 2016). Those who opt to settle in cities are sometimes subjected to police round-ups and harassment (Hyndman and Giles 2011).

When there is a lack of economic opportunities, it is difficult for refugees to foster livelihoods in the host state. Without job opportunities, refugees can get lost in a sense of idleness and dependence on aid (Lehrer 2010; Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017). In a survey of returned Burundian refugees who had been hosted in Tanzania, one-third of returnees were unemployed while abroad, compared to 11% before fleeing Burundi (Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017). At the same time, when a host state is relatively poor, the government is more likely to engage in repression since they lack the capacity to accommodate refugees (Wright and Moorthy 2018). Therefore, precarious economic situations in host states can push refugees to return.

Violence in the host state is another potential “push” factor in the process of refugee return. Existing studies show how incoming migrants, when not integrated, can lead to disputes with populations living there. Fearon and Laitin

(2011) argue migrants threaten local populations in host states, which often escalates to low-level violent clashes between groups. Further, they claim that compared to the local populations, migrants have a relatively cheap alternative to war: return to their country of origin. The arrival of refugees can also lead to resource competition between citizen and refugee populations (Martin 2005). Thus, if threats of violence become great enough and/or resource competition comes to a tipping point, refugees may opt to return to their countries of origin. While Rwandan refugees in Zaire hesitated to return in the late 1990s, it was overcome by the greater fear of immediate danger posed by armed groups attacking their camps (Janzen 2004). This is because threats to their physical security is now because caused by actors in the host state. Even though refugees may still be in the cross-hairs of violence upon return, they might feel safer in a country they know compared to a hostile host state environment.

In response to security issues of refugees, host governments can try to contain the issue such that both refugees and domestic populations are supported, or they can respond in ways that will only exacerbate the issue further. Empirically, host states tend to opt for the latter, with governments more likely to use other repressive or violent actions upon the arrival of refugees (Danneman and Ritter 2014; Fisk 2018), especially if refugees can be linked to the spread of violence into the host state (Whitaker 2003; Lischer 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Savun and Gineste 2019). Even if government and public fears about the link between refugees and domestic issues are unfounded, these contexts provide an opportunity to blame refugee populations for these problems. When refugees are

scapegoated for domestic security issues, there are more attacks against refugees (Benček and Strasheim 2016; Savun and Gineste 2019) and domestic populations are supportive of repressive crackdowns by the government (Tir and Jasinski 2008; Hutchinson 2013; Braithwaite et al. 2019). For instance, Afghan refugees were driven out of Pakistan and Sri Lanka due to constant harassment by police (Abid 2015; Human Rights Watch 2015a; Ali 2016).

Beyond security risks, host governments may not have the political capacity to absorb refugees without straining the resources they need to accommodate their own citizens (Braithwaite 2010). In states hosting many refugees, such as Lebanon, it is difficult for the government to support both their own citizens while also providing for the needs of refugees (Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015). Domestic populations can become suspicious and resentful of refugees if they perceive refugees are getting more assistance (Ek and Karadawi 1991; Adhikari, Hansen, and Powers 2012).

As stated earlier, since repatriation is considered the preferred durable solution to protracted displacement, the hosting of refugees is often perceived by the host government to be a temporary policy (Hammerstad 2000; Barnett 2001a; Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Due to this perception, there is less incentive to funnel resources toward successfully integrating them into host societies. This is compounded by the fact that most states hosting refugees are neighbors to origin states, often less developed, over-burdened, and under-resourced to accommodate the numbers of refugees in their territory (Dempster and Hargrave 2017; Hynie 2018). This is likely to lead to refugees returning more on average in host

states with weaker political, economic, and physical security. Even if conditions are unsafe in their country of origin, we should not expect refugees to stay in host states countries that are politically, economically, or physically insecure.

This leads to the following “push” hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 *Host states characterized by weak security conditions are positively associated with refugee return.*

3.3.2 Origin State Pull Factors

Similarly, political, economic, and physical security in the country of origin matters greatly with respect to refugee return. Studies suggest that refugees compare conditions in the host and origin countries and decide which is the better place to reside (Koser 1997; Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004 2006 2007; Rügger and Bohnet 2018; Turkoglu and Chadeaux 2019). However, conceptualizing host and origin states as equivalents may be problematic. As these studies show, there is a selection effect where refugees tend to find asylum in host states that are proximate, wealthier, and more democratic states when compared with their country of origin. Moreover, in order to obtain refugee status, individuals must demonstrate credible fear for their physical safety, suggesting conditions in the origin state must be inherently worse than in the host state. As studies of civil war onset show, poorer and less democratic countries tend to have higher propensities for conflict onset (Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Vreeland 2008; Blattman and Miguel 2010).

There could be issues toward strictly comparing conditions in the host and origin states to elucidate patterns of return. Instead, an examination of conditions in the country of origin, without comparing factors directly to the host state, might be more appropriate. Discussions on the “right” time to return refugees typically call for substantial changes in security conditions in the country of origin. But what constitutes a “safe” environment?

A common distinguishing point used in the literature to mark a change towards “safety” is the end of the conflict that displaced refugees in the first place (Black and Koser 1999; Eastmond and Öjendal 1999; Bariangaber 2001; Black 2002; Kibreab 2002; Stefansson 2004; Bascom 2005; Black and Gent 2006; Black, Eastmond, and Gent 2006; Joireman, Sawyer, and Wilhoit 2012; Nalepa 2012; Bradley 2013; Adelman and Peterman 2014; Long 2014; Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017). This is usually when large scale repatriation programs are initiated by the UNHCR to help “pull” refugees to return to their country of origin. For instance, Burundian refugees felt more compelled to return after the signing of the peace agreement that ended hostilities between warring parties (Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017). Origin states can promote return at the end of the war by formally recognizing the rights of displaced people to return (Phuong 2005; Black, Eastmond, and Gent 2006; Joshi, Melander, and Quinn 2015) and exempting returnees from prosecution of all political offenses (Essuman-Johnson 2011). While some types of conflict termination, such as ending because of low activity, are less likely to stir some refugees to return, host states may pressure international organizations to persuade refugees that they must return and even offer monetary

assistance for the journey back (Bradley 2013). This was the case after the signing of the Dayton Accords, with many host states pushing Bosnian refugees to return because a peace plan was signed, even if refugees would have preferred to stay abroad (Walsh 1995; Blitz 1999; Eastmond 2006; Black, Eastmond, and Gent 2006).

However, we should not expect refugees to delay returning for significant international assistance or wait until the conflict to end (Stein and Cuny 1994; Stein 1997). Indeed, reports from and articles on Burundi (Amnesty International 2005), Syria (Al-Khateeb and Toumeh 2017; Bassam 2018), and Afghanistan (Human Rights Watch 2002; Amnesty International 2018) report how refugees return while conflict is ongoing, and particularly highlight how conditions are not necessarily safe for them upon return. Rather, refugees are returning at a variety of points in time due to political, economic, and physical security “pull factors” from the country of origin. This is because international actors, like humanitarian organizations and host states, are monitoring conditions in the country of origin for changes in security to gauge whether they can promote return without committing *refoulement*. Additionally, refugees themselves are constantly updating their beliefs using with information about conditions in their country of origin. This information comes from social networks including those who still reside in the country of origin, newly arrived refugees, and news stories (Koser 1997; Stefanovic and Loizides 2011; Chu et al. 2019).

Drawing upon the same indicators that pull refugees toward certain host countries (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004; Turkoglu and Chadeaux 2019), I expect origin states that are more democratic and wealthy

are more likely to “pull” refugees to return. Countries that are more democratic should allow for more participatory political processes that would translate to refugees potentially being a part of the political process upon return. Wealthier origin states would provide more opportunities to work. War destroys infrastructure, which limits economic opportunities for people (Adhikari 2013), but if origin states demonstrate they have a stronger economy, it could lead refugees and other observers to promote return (Appel and Loyle 2012).

I also expect the dynamics of the conflict and patterns of violence in the country of origin to motivate return. Physical security is arguably the most important consideration with respect to return, as observed with Syrian (Berlin Social Science Center 2015; Chu et al. 2019), Somali (Bloch and Atfield 2002; Fink-Nielsen, Hansen, and Kleist 2004), Burundian (Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017), South Sudanese (Gerver 2014; Bohnet 2016), and Bosnian refugees (Black 2002; Black et al. 2004; Nalepa 2012). For the most part, ongoing conflict will most likely deter refugees from returning.

The duration of the conflict is another consideration that impacts the rate of return. The longer the conflict lasts, the longer displaced persons are left in protracted situations that disrupt their economic and social livelihoods (Joireman, Sawyer, and Wilhoit 2012). Even if conflict continues in their origin state, staying in exile for a long time translates to limited access to educational and career options (Long and Oxfeld 2004). In the case of Northern Uganda, people who were displaced longer and settled farther away are more likely to be unable to reclaim property they once owned, lose more land, and experience more land-

related disputes upon returning (Adelman and Peterman 2014). Emotions play a role in individual-level decision making and can lead to more risk-accepting behavior (Pearlman 2013), which can lead refugees to return even if conflict is still ongoing. Displacement takes a severe toll on the well-being and can feed into decision-making about returning (Lehrer 2010). As a result, we should expect more refugees to return as conflicts drag on.

Simultaneously, host governments and domestic populations grow increasingly impatient the longer they are obligated to support these populations (Long 2014; Ghosn and Braithwaite 2018). Several refugee camps in Kenya established in the early 1990s primarily for Somali refugees were meant to be temporary and closed within a couple of years. However, most of the camps are still open today and operate well over its intended capacity (Hujale 2016). When Kenya proposed to close the Dadaab camp in 2016, which would result in the return of 260,000 Somali refugees, there was a backlash by the international humanitarian community that led Kenya's High Court to block the decision (BBC News 2017). The Pakistani government also regularly pushes Afghan refugees out by claiming enough time has past and conditions are sufficient for return (Human Rights Watch 2017). This all suggests that the longer conflict continues to rage in the country of origin, we should expect to see more refugees returning due to personal and external factors like the host state and humanitarian organizations encouraging repatriation.

Collectively, security factors in the origin state can pull refugees back to their country of origin. This can be an individual decision by refugees as well as one driven by host states and humanitarian organizations serving displaced popu-

lations as they monitor the situation in the origin state. On the aggregate, we should observe more refugees returning with higher levels of political, economic, and physical security in the state of origin.

This leads to the following “pull” hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2 *Origin states characterized by positive security conditions are positively associated with refugee return.*

In the previous discussion of push and pull factors from host and origin states, I treat only security considerations as absolute measures. A corollary to this discussion concerns refugee return patterns being more sensitive to *changes* in security dynamics. When shifts are observed, refugees can become pushed out of host states or pulled toward origin countries, depending on the direction of the change.

Political shifts, particularly changing regime type, are likely to influence conditions of security within a country as well as provide an incentive for individuals to flee (Vreeland 2008; Moore and Shellman 2004). In host states, negative changes in security, particularly upon the arrival of refugees, are critical in predicting the likelihood of scapegoating of refugee populations (Adamson 2006; Wright and Moorthy 2018; Savun and Gineste 2019). As a result of to these shifts, refugee return becomes more likely because conditions are getting worse for refugee populations and host governments may not be able or willing to guarantee safety for the displaced. Changes within the country of origin, like conflict dynamics, economic recovery, and transitions toward democracy, can lead to more refugees re-

turning. Even if refugees do not want to return to their country of origin yet, host states will use the opportunity to encourage return by claiming that conditions are getting better in the origin state and pressure humanitarian organizations assist.

Therefore, I expect *changes* in political, economic, and physical security conditions are associated with the number of refugees returning to their country of origin. This is because changes will translate into moments where refugees are pushed out of the host state or pulled toward their country of origin. This leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3a *Host countries experiencing negative shifts in security are negatively associated with refugee return.*

Hypothesis 3b *Origin countries experiencing positive shifts in security are positively associated with refugee return.*

3.4 Research Design

In order to empirically assess what macro-level factors influence the likelihood and size of return, I construct a directed-dyad level dataset that reflects every possible route that people may travel to seek refuge in another country from 1989 to 2016. My unit of analysis is the origin country-host country-year. However, including all possible directed-dyads may bias estimates, given some countries may never produce nor host refugees. Therefore, I only include directed-dyad host-origin country pairings where at least one refugee from an origin country is documented to have received asylum status in that particular host country since

1960. Countries in the analysis must be part of the Correlates of War Systems list (Correlates of War Project 2011).

The dependent variable is the number of refugees returning from a host country to their country of origin in a given year. Data on returnees come from the UNHCR (2018b), which defines returned refugees as “former refugees who have returned to their country of origin spontaneously or in an organised fashion” and returnees as “former refugees who have returned to their country of origin spontaneously or in an organised fashion.” The list of origin countries and the number of refugees and returnees produced can be found in Table B.1 of Appendix B. The list of host states, along with the number of refugees they host and the number of refugees who return, are listed in Table B.2 of Appendix B.

3.4.1 Political Variables

The quality of democracy is widely considered to influence whether countries will be hospitable toward forced migrants, as well as being a “goal” for post-conflict societies in order for individuals to foster better livelihoods and lasting security to prevail. I include two variables to capture the level of democracy in origin and host states. The first is the *polity2* variable from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014). Many studies on forced migration and civil conflict use this measure to operationalize the quality of democracy in a state (Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004; Rügger and Bohnet 2018). This variable is coded from -10 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic).

For an alternative specification of democracy, I use the *participatory democracy index* from the Varieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al. 2018). This variable is an interval scale with a range of 0 (low) to 1 (high). Countries scoring high on the participatory democracy index emphasizes that there is “active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral.” I use this variable to capture the extent to which refugees could access political processes in the country of origin upon return and in the host state. In the country of origin, refugees will likely want to play an integral part in this process and either want to or are encouraged to return because these practices exist in their country of origin. In the host state, a more open political process would allow refugees to express their grievances if needed.

A different variable related to political conditions and likely access to political processes is respect for human rights. I use the Latent Human Rights Protection Scores (Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014), which generates a score of a state’s overall respect for physical human integrity practices based on annual human rights reports published by Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department, other quantitative indicators of repression such as the Political Terror Scale (Gibney, Cornett, and Wood 2014) and CIRI (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014), and the increasing standard of accountability overtime by international observers of human rights practices (Clark and Sikkink 2013; Fariss 2014; Chaudry 2019). The score is a continuous number normalized around a mean of zero, ranging from -2.7 to 4.7. Positive numbers indicate a greater overall respect for human rights and negative numbers corresponding to less respect.

For each of these political variables, I test their effects on numbers of returnees with the value of the independent variable for each country in a given year, as well as the change in the value from the previous year.

3.4.2 Economic Variables

To capture a general sense of economic security in host and origin states, I rely upon the logged Gross Domestic Product per capita of a country (World Bank 2016), much like other studies on civil conflict and forced migration (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Moore and Shellman 2004; Rügger and Bohnet 2018; Turkoglu and Chadeaux 2019). Another variable that captures economic opportunity is the engagement rate produced by the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015).⁶ This variable calculates the share of permanent residents in a country that is “engaged” economically, such as legal employment, in some capacity. As a rate, the engagement rate ranges from 0 to 1. Similar to the political variables, I include the raw score for each of these variables as well as the change in the variable from the year before.

3.4.3 Physical Security Variables

Physical security is potentially the characteristic that most significantly influences refugee migration patterns. The main condition expected to drive expectations regarding physical security is civil conflict. Civil conflicts are the leading cause

⁶Economic variables such as employment rates and economic discrimination toward migrant communities would be ideal for this analysis, though many of this information is missing for a global sample.

of forced displacement and refugee flows since the 1980s. Therefore, I generate a battery of variables capturing civil conflict dynamics in the host and origin states. Since these variables are civil conflict specific, these models only include observations where civil conflict is ongoing in the country of origin, the ten years prior to the onset of conflict, and the years following conflict termination. Data on civil conflict are taken from the variety of available datasets from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016). Civil conflict is defined as an incompatibility between the government and an armed nonstate group where at least 25 battle deaths are recorded. The first is a simple binary indication of whether there is ongoing civil conflict in the origin and host state, respectively. In order to capture the evaluation of conditions in both states, I generate a series of 3 binary variables coded 0 if there is no civil conflict in either state and 1 if there is civil conflict in: (1) the host state only, (2) in the origin country only, and (3) in both states simultaneously.

I also include series of variables based off of the civil conflict dynamics in the country of origin. I only focus on the country of origin because international observers care more about this conflict in terms of returning refugees (UNHCR 2004; Black, Eastmond, and Gent 2006). The first such variable is conflict duration, which is the number of years the conflict has been ongoing up to year_t. Next, I generate a similar duration variable for post-conflict years, which is operationalized as the number of years since conflict has terminated. Finally, some conflict termination types might pull more refugees to return than others. Conflicts end-

Table 3.1: Comparison of Macro-level Indicators Between Host and Origin States

	Host Mean	Origin Mean	Host St. Dev.	Origin St. Dev
Polity	7.184	1.366	4.880	5.99
Particip. Democracy	0.515	.250	0.202	0.171
Respect for HR	1.214	-0.230	1.368	1.081
GDPPC (logged)	9.257	7.219	1.640	1.406
Engagement Rate	0.434	0.375	0.078	0.866
Civil conflict	0.113	0.298	0.316	0.457
Terrorist Events	16.330	36.231	75.266	180.919

ing in peace agreements guaranteeing rights or outright victories demonstrate a more assured outlook for conditions in the country of origin compared to other termination types, like ceasefires and low activity. Therefore, I generate a categorical variable to see if certain types of termination are more likely to pull refugees to return after conflict officially ends. I generate variables based on whether the conflict terminated by peace agreement, ceasefire, government victory, rebel victory, or low activity, taken from version 2 of the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset ([Kreutz 2010](#)).

Table 3.1 shows how, on average, host countries score more positively on macro-level indicators of political and economic security. This suggests directly comparing host and origin states, such as subtracting the difference between the two indicators, may be an inappropriate way to capture refugee return patterns. This is because models would likely show that refugees are always returning to worse conditions since origin states are inherently have worse political, economic, and physical security.

3.4.4 Control Variables

I control for several variables that influence the likelihood of refugee return. Countries closer together spatially more likely to experience return because of the ease and low economic cost of travel compared to countries located farther apart. Additionally, most refugees settle in states neighboring their origin country, which would subsequently influence the total number of people who return. Therefore, I include the logged minimum distance in kilometers between the dyad (Weidmann, Kuse, and Gleditsch 2010). I include the logged number of refugees from the country of origin residing in the host state to account for the size of the refugee population (UNHCR 2018b). I also include the logged population of host and origin countries (World Bank 2016).

The amount of time of refugees from a certain country of origin spend residing in a host state likely influences how host states behave toward refugees. States can grow weary over time after supporting refugee groups, which can serve as a push factor if governments no longer want to host refugees (Hujale 2016; Dempster and Hargrave 2017; Ghosn and Braithwaite 2018). To account for this, I include a variable capturing the number of years that at least one refugee from a particular country of origin has resided in the host state.

3.4.5 Modeling Strategy

All explanatory variables are lagged by one year such that all covariates are coded as 1 year prior to observing the incidence and number of refugees returning. I

account for time dependence by computing the length of non-return year spells, along with the squared and cubic versions of this variable (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Carter and Signorino 2010). Summary statistics for all variables included in the models are displayed in Table 3.2. Summary statistics when at least one refugee returns can be found in Table B.3 of Appendix B. Due to a large number of zeroes and count format of the dependent variable, zero-inflated negative binomial regressions (ZiNB) are used (Gelman and Hill 2007).

First, I run political, economic, and physical security variables separately to assess each of the effects independent of the other. I then run a final set of models that includes all three of these security factors to see if the results hold when accounting for all of these variables together.

3.5 Discussion of Results

I begin by discussing the results of models focused on macro-level political, economic, and physical security factors in host and origin countries before turning to the analyses taking into account all three conditions. ZiNB regression models provide two estimates: (1) the “inflate stage,” which estimates a logistic regression of the likelihood of a “non-event” and (2) the “count stage,” which estimates a negative binomial regression modeling the expected count given the dependent variable has surpassed 0. In terms of the dependent variable, the first stage (columns labeled $Pr(0)$) columns provide estimates on the factor change in the odds that refugee return never happens and the second stage (columns labeled

Table 3.2: Summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Returnees	144087	89.074	4259.531	0	776521
Polity, Origin	144087	.909	6.251	-10	10
Polity, Host	144087	6.022	5.689	-10	10
Polity Change, Origin	143744	.026	2.238	-18	15
Polity Change, Host	143998	.015	1.589	-18	15
Particip. Democ., Origin	144087	.244	.174	.011	.834
Particip. Democ., Host	144087	.457	.22	.011	.834
Particip. Democ. Change, Origin	143894	.001	.04	-.543	.414
Particip. Democ., Host	143889	.001	.035	-.543	.337
Respect for HR, Origin	144087	-.224	1.065	-2.703	4.705
Respect for HR, Host	144087	.884	1.426	-2.703	4.705
Change in HR, Origin	144084	.018	.164	-.876	.87
Change in HR, Host	144087	.023	.133	-.876	.87
GDPPC (logged), Origin	144087	7.094	1.4	4.19	11.659
GDPPC (logged), Host	144087	8.726	1.707	4.19	11.659
GDPPC Growth (logged), Origin	143326	4.63	.286	-.127	8.929
GDPPC Growth (logged), Host	142980	4.627	.279	-.127	7.083
Engagement Rate, Origin	138419	.368	.086	.119	.75
Engagement Rate, Host	142140	.414	.086	.119	.75
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin	134139	.001	.009	-.098	.124
Change in Eng. Rate, Host	137857	.001	.01	-.098	.124
Civil Conflict, Origin	119246	.467	.499	0	1
Civil Conflict, Host	119246	.15	.357	0	1
Civil Conflict, Origin Only	119246	.393	.488	0	1
Civil Conflict, Host Only	119246	.076	.264	0	1
Civil Conflict, Both	119246	.074	.262	0	1
Conflict Duration	119246	4.174	8.012	0	51
Post-conflict Duration	119246	3.607	5.854	0	26
Peace Agreement	72431	.289	.453	0	1
Government Victory	72431	.181	.385	0	1
Rebel Victory	72431	.099	.299	0	1
Low Activity	72431	.301	.459	0	1
Hosting Duration	144087	3.033	4.986	0	24
Population (logged), Origin	144087	16.49	1.462	12.622	21.029
Population (logged), Host	144087	16.576	1.405	12.622	21.029
Minimum Distance	144087	7.609	2.195	0	9.821
Refugees (logged)	144087	1.431	2.277	0	14.041
Years since last return	144087	10.619	7.117	0	24
Years since last return ²	144087	163.407	167.068	0	576
Years since last return ³	144087	2878.514	3745.052	0	13824

Count) columns represent the expected count when the number of returnees is not always 0. Across all models, the dispersion parameter, logged α , is positive and significant, meaning a model accounting for the zero-inflated nature of the dependent variable is appropriate.

Before delving into a deeper discussion of the results, it is worth noting that some of the changes in participatory democracy and engagement rate variables report large coefficients and standard errors. I believe a lack of variation in both the dependent and independent variable of change is producing these issues. I report these models and discuss the findings, though I would caution drawing any strong conclusions. Therefore, I cannot conclusively claim support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b, which suggested shifts in conditions would be associated with systematic patterns of return.

Table 3.3 presents the results of the models examining the relationship between political conditions and refugee return. Origin countries that are more democratic are more likely to experience refugees returning. This pattern emerges using both the Polity2 score as well as V-DEM's index of participatory democracy. Using the polity score, if at least 1 refugee returns, an extremely autocratic regime (-10) is expected to pull 1491 returnees, compared to 3643 for anocracies (0) and 8823 for full democracies (10).

Democratic host states are less likely to see any return; yet, if at least 1 refugee returns, more refugees tend to follow and in higher numbers. This suggests origin countries that democratic regimes are "pulling" refugees to return, even in small numbers. When democratic host states push refugees out, they do so in high numbers. Fully autocratic host states (polity score of -10) are predicted to push out 2664 refugees if at least one refugee returned, compared to 3491 for anocracies (polity score of 0) and 4346 for democracies. Therefore, there is no support for Hypothesis 1 about political security conditions in the host state. In fact, refugees

Table 3.3: Effect of Political Factors on Refugee Return

	(Model 1)		(Model 2)		(Model 3)		(Model 4)		(Model 5)		(Model 6)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Polity, Origin	-0.034*** (0.007)	0.092*** (0.028)										
Polity, Host	0.087*** (0.007)	0.034 [†] (0.020)										
Polity Change, Origin		-0.025** (0.008)	0.280*** (0.027)									
Polity Change, Host		-0.045*** (0.011)	0.016 (0.035)									
P. Dem., Origin					-0.982** (0.309)	3.484* (1.391)						
P. Dem., Host					3.213*** (0.238)	1.637** (0.620)						
P. Dem. Change, Origin							-2.073*** (0.515)	18.290*** (1.959)				
P. Dem. Change, Host							-1.921** (0.670)	0.956 (2.895)				
Respect for HR, Origin									0.028 (0.043)	-0.383** (0.143)		
Respect for HR, Host									0.553*** (0.039)	0.501*** (0.092)		
Change in HR, Origin											-1.456*** (0.158)	2.894*** (0.544)
Change in HR, Host											-0.921*** (0.165)	-0.843 [†] (0.443)
Minimum Distance	0.040*** (0.012)	-0.632*** (0.044)	0.075*** (0.011)	-0.618*** (0.043)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.697*** (0.049)	0.072*** (0.010)	-0.569*** (0.031)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.716*** (0.045)	0.077*** (0.011)	-0.641*** (0.043)
Refugees	-0.333*** (0.015)	0.275*** (0.036)	-0.290*** (0.014)	0.235*** (0.036)	-0.362*** (0.017)	0.285*** (0.037)	-0.273*** (0.011)	0.335*** (0.027)	-0.342*** (0.016)	0.249*** (0.036)	-0.274*** (0.013)	0.259*** (0.037)
Hosting Duration	-0.081*** (0.007)	-0.085*** (0.020)	-0.083*** (0.007)	-0.067*** (0.019)	-0.091*** (0.008)	-0.085*** (0.020)	-0.086*** (0.006)	-0.074*** (0.016)	-0.126*** (0.009)	-0.072*** (0.019)	-0.111*** (0.008)	-0.038 [†] (0.021)
Population, Origin	0.018 (0.039)	-0.102 (0.169)	0.006 (0.036)	-0.117 (0.132)	0.103** (0.037)	0.036 (0.149)	0.077* (0.031)	0.078 (0.114)	0.094** (0.034)	-0.242 [†] (0.139)	0.035 (0.036)	-0.013 (0.144)
Population, Host	0.108*** (0.032)	0.326** (0.105)	0.129*** (0.031)	0.314*** (0.087)	0.121*** (0.031)	0.302*** (0.089)	0.117*** (0.027)	0.306*** (0.076)	0.331*** (0.032)	0.537*** (0.096)	0.110*** (0.028)	0.302*** (0.080)
Constant	-0.459 (0.747)	3.950 (2.656)	-0.623 (0.712)	4.620* (1.949)	-2.375** (0.746)	1.135 (2.530)	-1.768** (0.625)	0.508 (1.776)	-4.880*** (0.685)	2.870 (2.260)	-0.678 (0.695)	2.513 (2.355)
$\ln(\alpha)$	2.357*** (0.056)	4820	2.260*** (0.057)	4778	2.270*** (0.057)	5657	2.113*** (0.050)	5655	2.238*** (0.057)	5166	2.146*** (0.056)	5165
N	174457	4820	173710	4778	182901	5657	182463	5655	166918	5166	166914	5165

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

are *leaving* democratic states, rather than staying there. On the other hand, there is some initial support for Hypothesis 2, with more democratic origin countries pulling more refugees to return.

Shifts in regime type, particularly toward democracy, might produce larger numbers of returnees. Models 2 and 4 display results of changes in Polity and participatory democracy from the year before, respectively. Increasing democratic performance in the origin state is associated with an increase in the likelihood of return and higher counts of returnees. Changes toward democracy in the host state have no meaningful influence on the count of refugees that return.

Models 5 and 6 in Table 3.3 show the results using respect for human rights as an alternative to level of democracy to capture features of the political landscape in host and origin states. Contrary to expectations, origin states with better human rights records are likely to see fewer refugees returning whereas host states that exhibit greater respect human rights are likely to see larger outflows of returnees. Origin states moving from a score of -1 to 1 on this measure leads to 2,403 fewer refugees returning to their country of origin. For host states, moving from a score of -1 to 1 leads to a predicted 5,749 increase in the number of refugees making the journey back. However, when I examine the change in respect from the previous year, it seems to comport with my expectations. Origin countries that improved their respect for human rights in the previous year are more likely to experience return and see higher numbers of refugees coming back.

On the other hand, host states who decrease their respect for human rights are associated with more refugees returning to their countries of origin. An ex-

planation for origin states pulling refugees to return could be that these states are emerging from conflict and are therefore do not score highly on these indicators, rather than refugees being attracted to return to these conditions. Additionally, host states tend to be more respectful of human rights, which is why refugees try to gain asylum in these countries. Therefore, it could be that more refugees are returning to origin states simply because a greater number of individuals fled to these respectful countries in the first place.

Moving to the relationship between refugee return and economic indicators, Table 3.4 shows the results of gross domestic product per capita and the engagement rate. The logged gross domestic product per capita in the country of origin has no meaningful influence on likelihood nor the number of refugees returning. Wealthier host states are more likely to have no refugees return to countries of origin, but, if refugees do return, it is in higher numbers. The average of gross domestic product per capita for host states (approximately \$6680 million) is expected to return approximately 10,500 refugees to their country of origin. Host states that are approximately two standard deviations above the mean in logged gross domestic product (approximately \$16200 million) are predicted to return about 52,000 refugees. Unexpectedly, changes in gross domestic product per capita has the opposite expected effect on the number of returnees. For both host and origin states, growth in gross domestic product per capita is associated with a small number of refugees returning.

Similarly, the engagement rate shows the opposite expected effect. Origin states with more individuals engaged in the economy are less likely to pull

Table 3.4: Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return

	(Model 7)		(Model 8)		(Model 9)		(Model 10)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
GDPPC, Origin	-0.032 (0.034)	-0.175 (0.109)						
GDPPC, Host	0.526*** (0.034)	0.528*** (0.079)						
GDPPC Growth, Host			-0.718*** (0.132)	-1.733** (0.635)				
GDPPC Growth, Origin			-1.332*** (0.100)	-1.368*** (0.244)				
Engagement Rate, Origin					1.358* (0.545)	-3.590* (1.703)		
Engagement Rate, Host					6.337*** (0.588)	5.490*** (1.634)		
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin							-18.310*** (2.864)	-49.972*** (7.871)
Change in Eng. Rate, Host							-8.268** (2.564)	23.566*** (6.582)
Minimum Distance	-0.045** (0.016)	-0.809*** (0.062)	-0.610*** (0.011)	0.069*** (0.042)	-0.706*** (0.014)	0.039** (0.054)	0.070*** (0.012)	-0.641*** (0.050)
Refugees	-0.379*** (0.019)	0.268*** (0.043)	-0.298*** (0.014)	0.280*** (0.043)	-0.314*** (0.014)	0.273*** (0.042)	-0.285*** (0.014)	0.258*** (0.045)
Hosting Duration	-0.096*** (0.008)	-0.072*** (0.020)	-0.076*** (0.007)	-0.083*** (0.021)	-0.118*** (0.009)	-0.098*** (0.024)	-0.083*** (0.007)	-0.056** (0.022)
Population, Origin	0.087* (0.037)	-0.040 (0.136)	-0.008 (0.035)	-0.244 [†] (0.141)	0.070 [†] (0.038)	0.008 (0.150)	0.029 (0.037)	-0.215 (0.160)
Population, Host	0.196*** (0.031)	0.425*** (0.088)	0.176*** (0.029)	0.440*** (0.107)	0.122*** (0.033)	0.380*** (0.096)	0.161*** (0.031)	0.451*** (0.112)
Constant	-6.300*** (0.768)	-0.784 (2.157)	8.053*** (0.911)	19.139*** (3.554)	-4.073*** (0.795)	1.063 (2.431)	-1.908** (0.677)	3.935 [†] (2.037)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.278*** (0.060)		2.173*** (0.059)		2.211*** (0.059)		2.197*** (0.062)
N		174595		5246		172243		5203
						156381		4648
								151582
								4614

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

refugees to return. Host states with higher engagement rates are more likely to push refugees out. With respect to changes, an increase in the engagement rate in the country of origin decreases the number of refugees returning whereas an increase in the host state leads to more refugees returning. Therefore, I do not find support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding economic security factors. One potential explanation for this finding is that the engagement rate only captures the legal employment of permanent residents of a country. If origin and host states are already at a saturation point regarding the employment of permanent residents, that suggests there will be fewer opportunities for refugees to participate

in the economy.

Next, I turn to a discussion of physical security indicators, operationalized as civil conflict in host and origin states. Recall that since I am examining civil conflict dynamics, I restrict the sample to observations where civil conflict in the conflict of origin is ongoing, the 10 years leading up to conflict onset, and the years after conflict termination.

Table 3.5 explores the relationship between refugee return and conflict occurrence in the host state and country of origin on the number of returnees. Civil conflict in refugees' country of origin is likely to experience at least one refugee to return. However, as expected, the count of refugees returning is small. Contrary to expectations, when the host state is experiencing civil conflict, refugees are more likely to stay in their host state. When accounting for the occurrence of civil conflict in either or *both* the host and origin states (Model 12), refugees are less likely to return under all conditions and will instead stay in the host state.

Figure 3.2 shows the expected number of returnees given these different sets of conditions related to civil conflict occurrence reported in Model 12. The greatest number of returnees is expected when neither the host nor home state is experiencing conflict, demonstrating the pull effect of the country of origin in the absence of ongoing conflict in either state. The other three conditions all report similar numbers of refugees returning. Interesting, the occurrence of civil conflict in only country of origin predicts 3,169 returnees, which is higher than if only the host is experiencing civil conflict (2,242 returnees) or both (2,521). This offers initial support for Hypothesis 2 about origin state conditions but not Hypothesis

Table 3.5: Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return

	(Model 11)		(Model 12)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Civil Conflict, Origin	-0.155 [†] (0.086)	-0.744* (0.289)		
Civil Conflict, Host	-0.278** (0.108)	-0.616* (0.298)		
Civil Conflict, Origin Only			-0.105 (0.088)	-0.942** (0.308)
Civil Conflict, Host Only			-0.145 (0.124)	-1.292** (0.402)
Civil Conflict, Both			-0.545*** (0.157)	-1.209** (0.412)
Minimum Distance	0.071*** (0.013)	-0.641*** (0.043)	0.072*** (0.013)	-0.633*** (0.041)
Refugees	-0.288*** (0.015)	0.265*** (0.043)	-0.288*** (0.014)	0.265*** (0.042)
Hosting Duration	-0.066*** (0.007)	-0.026 (0.021)	-0.066*** (0.007)	-0.026 (0.020)
Population, Origin	0.153** (0.047)	-0.190 (0.193)	0.151*** (0.045)	-0.192 (0.180)
Population, Host	0.121*** (0.031)	0.417*** (0.122)	0.117*** (0.031)	0.400*** (0.180)
Constant	-3.235*** (0.801)	4.015 (2.819)	-3.164*** (0.768)	4.379 [†] (2.637)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.191*** (0.058)		2.186*** (0.057)
N		119246		5165

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.


Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

1 about the host state, at least concerning physical security conditions.

Table 3.6 presents results of dynamics of the civil conflict in the country of origin. The duration of conflict has a negative influence on the number of returnees. As civil conflict progresses, fewer refugees are returning. This can be interpreted as most refugees returning within a few years of the conflict starting or refugees staying in host countries for a longer period time the more protracted a conflict is. Since this data cannot capture how long an individual has been in asylum, it is difficult to disentangle the exact mechanism.

Figure 3.2: Comparing Civil Conflict in Host and Origin on the Number of Returnees



Conflict termination is widely considered to be a strong pull factor for refugee return. Model 14 tests the relationship between the length of the post-conflict period on refugee returns. The results estimates a negative relationship with post-conflict duration. This suggests most refugees are pulled to return within the first couple years of conflict termination.

Figure 3.3 illustrates the predicted number of returnees over the length of conflict in the country of origin in the left panel and the duration of the post-conflict period in the right panel. Both graphs show that more refugees are expected to return early on, with return numbers dropping with every subsequent year. Interestingly, the graphs illustrate that refugees are predicted to return in higher numbers *during* conflict instead of during the years after conflict officially ends.

Certain types of conflict termination may produce more or less refugees. Ac-

Table 3.6: Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns

	(Model 13)		(Model 14)		(Model 15)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Conflict Duration, Origin	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.056*** (0.012)				
Post-conflict Duration, Origin			0.002 (0.011)	-0.175*** (0.031)		
Peace Agreement					-1.518*** (0.126)	0.256 (0.366)
Ceasefire					0.266* (0.124)	0.868* (0.339)
Govt. Victory					-0.767*** (0.109)	-0.226 (0.264)
Rebel Victory					-0.751*** (0.155)	0.206 (0.390)
Low Activity					-0.467*** (0.135)	-1.291*** (0.357)
Civil Conflict, Host	-0.312** (0.109)	-0.749** (0.281)	-0.253* (0.105)	-0.645* (0.274)	-0.260* (0.122)	-0.997*** (0.267)
Minimum Distance	0.067*** (0.013)	-0.660*** (0.045)	0.077*** (0.013)	-0.634*** (0.043)	0.058*** (0.015)	-0.746*** (0.048)
Refugees	-0.285*** (0.015)	0.274*** (0.043)	-0.284*** (0.014)	0.215*** (0.041)	-0.305*** (0.015)	0.264*** (0.038)
Hosting Duration	-0.067*** (0.007)	-0.026 (0.021)	-0.075*** (0.007)	-0.030 [†] (0.018)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.119*** (0.023)
Population, Origin	0.157*** (0.046)	-0.213 (0.183)	0.121** (0.039)	-0.501*** (0.145)	0.041 (0.049)	-0.183 (0.169)
Population, Host	0.135*** (0.032)	0.473*** (0.123)	0.117*** (0.029)	0.433*** (0.102)	0.165*** (0.035)	0.482*** (0.093)
Constant	-3.499*** (0.809)	3.456 (2.711)	-2.627*** (0.730)	9.135*** (2.207)	-1.177 (0.960)	3.763 (3.118)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.189*** (0.058)		2.145*** (0.057)		1.917*** (0.065)
N		119246		5165		72431
						2619


Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

cordingly, Model 15 assesses variation in how civil conflicts end in the country of origin, restricted to post-conflict years. Of the five types, only two report relationships with statistical significance. Figure 3.4 shows the expected number of returnees given each termination type. Ceasefires are associated with an increase in the number of refugees, with 8,236 refugees expected to return. While the literature on ceasefires compared to other termination types suggest ceasefires can


Figure 3.3: Conflict and Post-conflict Duration on Number of Returnees



be a tenuous form of peace (Fortna 2004), what could be happening is that host states are using the opportunity to claim combatants have reached some form of agreement and start to encourage return. Conflicts ending in low activity are less likely to pull refugees to return, with only 1,143 refugees expected to take the journey back. This makes sense given the conflict in the country of origin has not been resolved; rather fighting just peters out.

Finally, I turn to a discussion of models including variables accounting for physical, political, and economic security conditions. For these models, I vary the physical security variables and keep the political (polity and respect for human rights) and economic variables (logged gross domestic product per capita) constant. These models are presented in Table 3.7. It is important to include all these conditions together in one model as many prior studies demonstrate factors cannot be independently addressed in these models (Poe and Tate 1994; Hegre

Figure 3.4: Comparing Conflict Termination Types on the Number of Returnees



et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Vreeland 2008; Hill and Jones 2014).

Model 16 shows the results between refugee return and conflict occurrence in either or both the host and origin states. When controlling for the political and economic security factors, relationships change from Model 13. Figure 3.5 reproduces a graph similar to Figure 3.2 but with the estimates of Model 16. The least number of refugees are predicted to return when only the country of origin is experiencing civil conflict, with 3,309 returnees. Compared to contexts where both the origin and host state are not experiencing violence, the expected number of returnees is similar to when only the host country is experiencing violence, with approximately 11,700 refugees returning. When both states are experiencing civil conflict, the expected number of returnees is 7,289, which is higher than contexts where only the origin state is experiencing conflict but fewer than if only

Table 3.7: Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Return

	(Model 16)		(Model 17)		(Model 18)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Civil Conflict Origin, Only	-0.106 (0.122)	-1.268*** (0.342)				
Civil Conflict Host, Only	0.725*** (0.182)	0.065 (0.372)				
Civil Conflict, Both	0.321 (0.211)	-0.448 (0.456)				
Conflict Duration, Origin			-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.093*** (0.012)		
Post-conflict Duration, Origin					0.066*** (0.015)	0.001 (0.051)
Civil Conflict, Host			0.580*** (0.149)	0.504 [†] (0.274)	0.651*** (0.175)	0.438 (0.301)
Polity, Origin	-0.076*** (0.012)	0.032 (0.033)	-0.070*** (0.011)	0.049 (0.030)	-0.073*** (0.012)	0.047 (0.033)
Polity, Host	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.038 [†] (0.022)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.039 [†] (0.023)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.023 (0.023)
Respect for HR, Origin	-0.017 (0.064)	-0.910*** (0.143)	-0.084 (0.062)	-0.984*** (0.148)	-0.129* (0.065)	-0.716*** (0.146)
Respect for HR, Host	0.409*** (0.067)	0.417** (0.135)	0.426*** (0.066)	0.492*** (0.132)	0.409*** (0.065)	0.434** (0.134)
GDPPC, Origin	-0.061 (0.050)	-0.290* (0.125)	-0.048 (0.052)	-0.241 [†] (0.135)	-0.085 [†] (0.051)	-0.421** (0.144)
GDPPC, Host	0.509*** (0.048)	0.477*** (0.102)	0.498*** (0.048)	0.441*** (0.099)	0.518*** (0.049)	0.535*** (0.104)
Minimum Distance	-0.080*** (0.021)	-0.812*** (0.054)	-0.085*** (0.021)	-0.826*** (0.052)	-0.076*** (0.021)	-0.851*** (0.053)
Refugees	-0.399*** (0.027)	0.212*** (0.038)	-0.401*** (0.025)	0.181*** (0.036)	-0.394*** (0.026)	0.190*** (0.038)
Hosting Duration	-0.067*** (0.010)	0.011 (0.018)	-0.065*** (0.010)	0.023 (0.018)	-0.078*** (0.009)	-0.005 (0.018)
Population, Origin	0.114* (0.050)	-0.424** (0.093)	0.102 [†] (0.052)	-0.473** (0.092)	0.114* (0.053)	-0.477** (0.100)
Population, Host	0.258*** (0.044)	0.411*** (0.093)	0.277*** (0.043)	0.488*** (0.092)	0.263*** (0.044)	0.462*** (0.100)
Constant	-7.397*** (1.021)	6.252* (2.652)	-7.477*** (1.050)	5.548* (2.721)	-7.566*** (1.040)	6.703* (2.732)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.230*** (0.068)		2.201*** (0.068)		2.240*** (0.069)
N		89411 3440		89411 3440		89411 3440

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.


Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

the host state or either of the two states are going through conflict. This suggests

when host states are going through civil conflict, refugees are being pushed out of

Figure 3.5: Comparing Civil Conflict in Host and Origin on the Number of Returnees, Accounting for Political and Economic Factors



host states, even when the refugees' country of origin is also experiencing conflict. Moreover, the absence of conflict in the country of origin pulls refugees to return.

Turning to civil conflict dynamics in the country of origin, Model 17 estimates the same negative relationship between the duration of conflict and refugee return. However, the length of time since civil conflict ends has no bearing on the predicted number of returnees, with an average number of returnees hovering around 6,000 returnees each year.

In Models 17 and 18, civil conflict in the host country is positively associated with return, though this relationship is only statistically significant at the 0.1 level in Model 17. Therefore, I cannot make conclusive claims that physical security in the host state is a push factor.

With respect to origin states, states with a higher level of democratic are likely

to see at least one refugee return, though it has no influence on the count of returnees. Origin states with a lower overall respect for human rights and poorer countries are more likely to pull refugees to return. As noted before, this can be interpreted as refugees returning to precarious conditions and vulnerable governments.

For host states, more democratic countries are negatively associated with the count of returnees, except in Model 18. However, host states that exhibit an overall respect for human rights and those that are wealthier are more likely to push refugees to return. This does not support Hypothesis 1, which expected fewer refugees to return from wealthier and more democratic states.

The discrepancies in the findings between testing political, economic, and security factors separately and all together suggest that it is necessary to take into account all factors in models of refugee return. Given refugees, host states, and humanitarian organizations take into account all of these conditions, a fuller model specification is most likely more important, especially since the academic literature shows how many of these factors are related ([Hill and Jones 2014](#)).

Finally, the general control variables perform as expected. Countries closer together and with larger refugee populations from a particular origin state are more likely to see higher numbers of refugees returning. The longer a state has hosted refugees from a certain country of origin, the fewer refugees are expected to return. However, this relationship goes away in the models accounting for political, economic, and physical security considerations. The population of the origin state does not influence return patterns but host states with larger popula-

tions are more likely to see more returnees.

3.5.1 Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks

I run a series of models using alternate measures or other concepts that might influence refugee return. First, terrorist events in host and origin countries may impact refugee movement. In host states, refugees are occasionally linked to these events (Bove and Böhmelt 2016; Polo and Wucherpfennig 2018) and consequently this can change host state perceptions toward hosting refugees (Savun and Gineste 2019). In origin states, terrorism is a relatively common phenomenon and strategy employed by rebel groups during civil war (Stanton 2013; Thomas 2014; Fortna 2015). Moreover, terrorist attacks are often meant to target civilians (Kydd and Walter 2006), which can deter refugees and humanitarian organizations from encouraging return to origin countries where terrorism is pervasive. Therefore, I generate a variable capturing the logged number of terrorist events in host and origin countries from the Global Terrorism Database (START 2015).

Table B.4 of Appendix B shows the results of models exploring the association between terrorist events and refugee returns. Unexpectedly, as more terrorist events occur in the country of origin, the greater number of refugees are likely to return. Terrorist events in the host state decrease the number of returnees, significant at the 0.1 level. I also interact the number of terrorist events in the origin and host state to capture the effect of both states experiencing terrorist events, though there does not seem to be any conditional effect on return. I

also interact civil conflict with terrorist events, yet again, there is no conditional influence of ongoing civil conflict with the number of terrorist events on return. Therefore, terrorist attacks do not seem to operate as push and pull factors as expected in the theory section.

In order to try and explain this counter-intuitive finding, I break down types of terrorism into domestic and foreign attacks, with results reported in Table B.7 of Appendix B. The results suggest the findings for terrorism more generally are mostly driven by domestic terrorist events. The number of foreign terrorist attacks in both the host and origin states are not related to refugee returns. The more domestic terror attacks experienced in the country of origin, the more likely we are to observe larger numbers of refugees returning. Domestic terror attacks in the host state is negatively associated with refugee return, though this relationship is not statistically significant. This still does not explain why terrorism events in the country of origin are associated with greater numbers of refugees returning. A potential explanation could be that terrorist events are more likely to induce internally displaced flows or host states are more likely to push refugees to return if they are from a terror prone state.

Moving to another variable I test, refugees may be sensitive to the number of civilians killed by the conflict they are fleeing. I run a model with the logged number of civilian casualties in a year as a substitute for the indicator of ongoing civil conflict in the origin state, with coefficient estimates reported in Model 4B of Table B.5 of Appendix B. Results show that the more civilians killed by the conflict, the greater numbers of refugees returning. This could potentially be an

artifact of the scale of the civil conflict: larger scale wars are likely to produce more refugees and therefore experience a greater number of returnees.

I then assess the influence of inter-communal conflict (ICC) in host and origin states on return patterns. ICC data is taken from the Uppasala Conflict Data Program's Non-State Conflict dataset and is defined as an incompatibility between at least two non-state armed groups that accrued at least 25 battle deaths (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012; Pettersson and Eck 2018). I test for ICC because studies on refugee return suggest most disputes with returnee communities are with the domestic populations that stayed or with internally displaced persons who move into property that used to belong to refugees (Bradley 2013; Schwartz Forthcoming). Similar to models 11 and 12 of the main analysis, I code a binary distinction of ICC and a categorical variable capturing ICC in the host only, origin only, and both. Models 5B and 6B in Table B.5 of Appendix B show that ICC in the origin state is a deterrent of refugees returning, with fewer refugees returning if their origin state is reported to be experiencing ICC. ICC in the host state does not influence patterns of return. This is similar to patterns of civil conflict, where ongoing violence in the country of origin tends to deter refugees from returning yet violence in the host seems to push refugees out in similar numbers compared to no violence in either state.

In Table B.6 of Appendix B, I use a country's CIRI score (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014) as an alternative to Schnakenberg and Fariss (2014)'s latent measure of respect for human rights. An origin state's CIRI score, or its change, influences the number of returnees. Unlike the latent measure of respect for human

rights, an origin state's CIRI score, nor the change in the score from the previous year, is not related to the number of refugees who return. However, results are similar with respect to host states. Host states with a higher rated respect for human rights, according to CIRI, are more likely to return refugees. This again suggests that host states may, in general, may be more respectful of human rights, rather than acting as a push factor of return.

Given the highly skewed nature of the count of returnees, I check the robustness of results by removing some of the outliers. The top two origin countries with the highest number of returnees are Afghanistan and Eritrea. To ensure results are not driven by these two countries, I rerun the models removing all years where these two states are origin countries. The results can be found in Tables B.8-B.12 of Appendix B. Next, I omit observations that are above the 95th percentile of the distribution of returnees. This drops all directed-dyads in which over 19,400 refugees reportedly returned. These estimates are reported in Tables B.13-B.17 of Appendix B. Even when removing these outliers, results corroborate the main analyses and demonstrate similar substantive and statistical relationships.

I also run the same regression models of the main results on three different samples. The first is including all directed-dyads, with all countries having the potential to be a refugee-producing state and a country that hosts refugees. The other two samples only include origin states that experienced some form of organized conflict that produced 25 battle deaths or more, but may or may not have produced refugees. In the first sample, I include all conflict years as well as 5 years before and after the conflict. The next sample expands to a 10 year pre-

and post-conflict window. The full results are in Tables B.18-B.22 for all directed dyads, B.23-B.27 for the 5 year risk sample, and B.38-B.32 for the 10 year risk sample. Results are robust and in line with the findings from the main analyses.

3.6 Conclusion

Currently, forced displacement is one of the most pressing global issues. While the international community identifies three durable solutions to refugee crises, the return of the displaced to their countries of origin is the most preferred policy option. Most scholarship on refugee return focuses on evaluating the quality of policies and implementation of the process itself, reintegration upon return, or the impact of refugees who return on post-conflict processes. Yet, there is less knowledge regarding cross-national trends of refugee return patterns more generally. This gap is problematic given most refugees want to return to their country of origin at some point, and knowing when refugees are returning can help inform policies that support refugee preferences and agency.

This chapter fills this gap by investigating the relationship between macro-level political, economic, and physical security conditions in host and origin countries on the number of refugees that return to their country of origin. I expand the scope geographically and temporally compared to existing studies that tend to examine single cases in a specific time period by attempt to explain refugee return patterns globally. I adapt a “push and pull” framework used in other studies of voluntary and forced migration and derive hypotheses about political, economic,

and physical security conditions in host and origin countries that are expected to be associated with the numbers of refugees who return.

The findings of the empirical analyses suggest several facets must be taken into account when explaining refugee return patterns on the aggregate. Certain circumstances in the host and origin countries must be considered when developing expectations about when refugees are returning to their country of origin. The decisions made by refugees, as well as policies of host states, countries of origin, and international organizations, are not created based on circumstances in only the host or origin state. Second, political, economic, and physical security conditions in the host and origin countries must be considered concurrently, rather than independent of one another. This becomes extremely apparent when regression models incorporating all of these factors exhibit different statistical relationships than models treating these factors separately.

Third, physical security seems to supersede the explanatory power of political or economic factors when it comes to understanding the conditions under which refugees return. This could be due to the fact that macro-level factors used in the models, such as regime type and GDPPC, are not as strong of a push or pull factor than an individual's physical safety. Ongoing civil conflict in the country of origin has a strong dampening effect on the number of refugees who return. Yet, the results suggest refugees do return during conflict and do so in larger numbers than the post-conflict period. This is particularly puzzling given existing academic literature on refugee return restricts the focus to the post-conflict period ([Black, Eastmond, and Gent 2006](#); [Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017](#)).

Additionally, there is variation in the number of returnees based on how the conflict ended. Future research should explore why refugees might return during conflict as well as how conflict termination and the ensuing post-conflict period provides different incentives for refugees to return on the aggregate.

A limitation of the current study is the lack of information at the micro-level with respect to refugee decision-making, as well as characteristics of those who decide to stay in the country of asylum compared to those who end up returning. As refugee return is supposed to happen with “safety” and “dignity,” it is unclear how voluntary the decision to return was for repatriated refugees, or if they felt external actors such as host states and international organizations were heavily persuading refugees to return. While this study is able to show on average what tends to be shifting refugee return numbers, there is a lot of important information about return populations that remains unknown. There is also minimal understanding of how individual refugees process information about political, economic, and physical security as these conditions pertain to the timing of return. Future work can use survey data of refugees who are still in asylum and those who returned to investigate the differences between these two populations.

Chapter 4

THE EFFECT OF LEADER TURNOVER ON REFUGEE RETURN

4.1 Introduction

What motivates refugees to return to their country of origin? Are there contexts or cues from their country of origin that help inform this decision? Existing scholarship tackles questions of when and under what conditions initial forced displacement occurs, locations to which individuals flee, and the impact refugee populations have on host countries and their citizens. This chapter builds upon this work by investigating another part of the journey refugee populations can take: the return of displaced populations to their country of origin.

Refugees are defined by international law as “[a] person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside of the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR 1967). The same statute also defines and characterizes repatriation as a voluntary decision

by the refugee; entrusts the UNHCR, governments, and other organizations to play a role in the return of displaced refugees; and establishes that repatriation is facilitated and promoted as the preferred solution to refugee situations. In practice, repatriations are rarely purely voluntary and are more broadly referred to as refugees returning to their country of origin, with many returning “spontaneously” on their own accord or coerced into the decision based on a combination of pressures by host governments, a lack of livelihood abroad, and support from humanitarian organizations.

Refugee return is consequential for several reasons. For the refugees themselves, repatriated individuals give up international protections and assistance that come with asylum status. For host countries, the return of refugees to their country of origin means an alleviation of these pressures on their own resources and attenuating domestic tensions that came with hosting refugees. Indeed, repatriation is the preferred policy solution for refugee populations by the international community ([Hammerstad 2000](#); [Barnett and Finnemore 2004](#); [Toft 2007](#)) and the refugees themselves ([Stein and Cuny 1994](#); [Berlin Social Science Center 2015](#)), as compared to integrating into the host state or resettlement to a third-country, since the end of the Cold War.

For the country of origin, findings on return migration of refugees are mixed. Refugee return flows can indicate that conflict is close to an end and the start of the rebuilding process ([Black and Gent 2006](#)). At the same time, origin societies may not have the capacity nor resources to support their return ([Barnett 2001a](#); [Chimni 2004](#)). Returnees also vary in their preferences for the peacebuild-

ing process from populations who stayed within the country of origin (Adhikari, Hansen, and Powers 2012; Schwartz Forthcoming). But first, it is necessary to understand why and under what conditions refugees ultimately repatriated back to their country of origin, particularly since these contexts can help inform the impact of refugee repatriation on their country of origin.

Refugees make a judgment call on whether they should return to their country of origin or stay in the host nation based on pressures they feel by host states and humanitarian organizations as well as their ability to foster a livelihood in asylum. Assessing conditions in both the host and origin countries, refugees will think about which situation is the best option for their physical security. While there is usually some form of compromise built into a somewhat involuntary decision, refugees can decide to return rather than stay abroad. For the most part, refugees are most concerned with their security. Moreover, host states will look for windows of opportunity to promote return without being accused of *refoulement*. Humanitarian organizations servicing displaced populations will advocate on their behalf but realize they must work with refugees and host governments who have different agendas. While they look out for the best interest of refugees, host state pressure may lead these organizations to support refugee return when there is some positive progress in the country of origin. From the current literature, it is unclear what information or event is sufficient enough for return migration to be promoted except that decisions are made by comparing circumstances in the host and origin countries (Koser 1997).

I contend that a political event that can serve as a useful heuristic for observers

to gauge conditions in the country of origin are leader turnovers. In particular, I argue leader transitions demonstrating policy change from the previous leader, stability, and legitimacy will provide updated information to refugee populations, host countries, and humanitarian organizations that the country of origin has progressed toward a more secure political environment. Using a global sample of refugee returns and leader turnovers from 1989-2016, I test my argument and generally find support for the hypotheses presented. Results show leader changes conveying forecasted policy change, regularity with established rules, and leaders who come to power without foreign assistance attract more refugees to return. When combining policy change with stability and legitimacy, I find both stability and policy change must be present in order for larger numbers of refugees to return whereas legitimacy matters more than forecasted changes in policy trajectory. Moreover, while civil conflict decreases the number of refugees who return overall, these patterns of leader turnover still emerge. The findings suggest that what leader turnovers provide information to refugees, host states, and humanitarian about conditions in the country of origin that either heightens or limits the number of refugees who ultimately return.

4.2 When Refugee Return Occurs

Since the end of the Cold War, repatriation has become the preferred policy solution for refugee crises (Toft 2007; Bradley 2013). The two other policy options, integration into the host country and third country resettlement, are unsustain-

able given the sheer size of refugee populations and lack of resources of host states to accommodate refugees (Bradley 2013). With respect to refugee return, much of the academic and policy discussion focus on when violence in the country of origin ends (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Chimni 2004; Stefanovic and Loizides 2011). This is because, according to international refugee law, host states cannot commit *refoulement*, or return populations until conditions are safe enough in their country of origin. Furthermore, voluntary repatriation programs spearheaded by the UNHCR emphasize physical, legal, and material safety for returnees, but acknowledge in practice these three conditions are rarely met (UNHCR 2004).

Conflict termination is considered a clear signal by host governments and humanitarian organizations that the country of origin is in the initial stages of the peacebuilding period (Black and Gent 2006). This is typically when the logistics of large scale voluntary repatriation of refugee populations abroad begin to take shape. Origin countries promote return at the end of the war by exempting returnees from persecution for political offenses, as was done in Liberia (Essuman-Johnson 2011) and Sri Lanka (Ritorto 2017). Peace processes and agreements can formally recognize the right of displaced people to return (Joshi, Melander, and Quinn 2015; Black, Eastmond, and Gent 2006; Phuong 2005). For example, Burundian refugees felt more compelled to repatriate after the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord (Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017).

These discussions tend to only capture a partial picture of refugee return by focusing only on the post-war period. In reality, a large number of refugees return to their country of origin “spontaneously,” or without international assistance and

while violence continues to be a threat in the origin state (Stein and Cuny 1994; Stein 1997). Indeed, while civil conflict is ongoing, refugee returns are likely to occur, though the number of returnees is often small (Chu 2019b). What explains this relationship? Studies on migration theorize individuals have agency, or the capacity to reflect on their current situation, devise strategies, and take action to achieve their desired outcome (Bakewell 2010). Under the context of forced displacement, people flee to a safer location than if they stayed put (Schmeidl 1997; Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2006).

Therefore, the preferences of refugees regarding their next steps should be taken into consideration. Some refugees from Syria (Lazareva 2016) and South Sudan (Bohnet 2016) deliberately settle in neighboring countries to be near their homeland and always anticipated returning at some point, rather than journeying farther away to countries in Europe or to the United States. Surveys of Syrian refugees show over 90% prefer to return than stay in a host state forever (Berlin Social Science Center 2015; Alsharabati and Nammour 2017). Sometimes refugee preferences can clash with expectations of international organizations, who refuse to help refugees return before the country of origin is deemed safe (Gerver 2014), and host states that tend to want refugees to return as soon as possible.

The timing and circumstances necessary for refugee return being acceptable for all actors involved in the process is unclear.¹ While humanitarian organizations may consider the situation at in the country of origin to be worse for

¹“Actors” and “observers” involved in this process include host states, humanitarian organizations serving displaced populations, and refugees. For brevity, the use of the word “actors” for the rest of the manuscript reflects these actors.

refugees, conditions in exile may be inadequate or hostile for refugees to stay. At the same time, host states do not want to be accused of *refoulement* and may wait for the right opportunity to promote return without backlash.

Despite substantial research on refugee return once conflict subsides (Black and Koser 1999; Eastmond and Öjendal 1999; Bariangaber 2001; Black 2002; Kibreab 2002; Stefansson 2004; Bascom 2005; Black and Gent 2006; Black, Eastmond, and Gent 2006; Joireman, Sawyer, and Wilhoit 2012; Nalepa 2012; Bradley 2013; Adelman and Peterman 2014; Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017), there is still a gap regarding other contexts or cues that encourage return more broadly. The next section develops a theoretical argument on how refugees deliberate their options based on their current situation. Refugees constantly update their beliefs on their safety, livelihood, and well-being and must decide if they should stay in their host country or return to their origin state. One factor that helps update information used by refugees, host states, and international observers to gauge prospects for return is leader turnover. Leadership changes in the origin state, especially what the transition signals, provides information about the political climate in the nation of origin, which translates into variation in patterns of return.

4.3 Leader Turnover as a Heuristic of Political Conditions in the Country of Origin

I start with the assumption that refugees and humanitarian organizations care most about the safety of the individual (Ma and Chayavong 2017). Recent survey

and focus group data of Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon show their primary concern is physical safety, with all decisions motivated around this central concern for the individuals themselves and their family members (Chu et al. 2019). Additionally, approximately 40% of refugees surveyed were willing to return to Syria within the next couple of months, instead of staying in Lebanon or trying to reach another destination, due to violence generally subsiding in the country. This is not unique to Lebanon as a host of Syrian refugees. Other studies find similar patterns of Somali (Bloch and Atfield 2002; Fink-Nielsen, Hansen, and Kleist 2004), Burundian (Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017), South Sudanese (Gerver 2014; Bohnet 2016), and Bosnian refugees (Black 2002; Black et al. 2004; Nalepa 2012).

Similarly, humanitarian organizations are wary of supporting refugees who want to return while violence persists in the country of origin (Gerver 2016). Their mission is to protect refugees as well as their human rights of asylum in the host country. They are tasked with advocating on behalf of displaced individuals, particularly since many do not have rights nor agency to advocate safely in the host nation. These observers also monitor how host states treat refugees and will shame them for poor practices and if they are committing *refoulement*. Annual human rights reports produced by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the U.S. State Department documents on country practices have specific sections dedicated to the treatment of refugee and migrant populations in the reports (Chu 2019a). The reports praise positive behavior and chastise governments who neglect their duty to protect refugees.

At the same time, these organizations are cognizant of the realities of the situations of refugees such that they will do their best to fight for the best conditions for refugees while understanding harsh realities that lead to compromise. In the Handbook of Voluntary Repatriation, the UNHCR claims refugees should only return when there is physical, legal, and material safety, but recognizes that in practice, only some of these conditions need to be met for repatriation to happen (UNHCR 2004). Moreover, organizations will adapt to the needs of refugees. South Sudanese refugees in Israel were given the ultimatum of returning or face detention by Israeli authorities. Humanitarian organizations reluctantly assisted their return because of continued violence at in the country of origin (Gerver 2014). The UNHCR started to move operations to Syria when they observed many refugees were returning (Al-Khateeb and Toumeh 2017). Organizations even disagree with assessments at in the origin state—for example, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International heavily criticized the United Nations for working with the Pakistani government to return Afghan refugees when Afghanistan was unsafe and unprepared for their return (Human Rights Watch 2017; Amnesty International 2018).

Therefore, refugees and international observers assess safety for refugees with respect to the decision to return based on the extent of current or forecasted circumstances in the country of origin. I argue an event that signals information that can be used to update beliefs about the environment in the country of origin is leader turnover. The focus on leaders is derived from the distinct position the individual possesses as the figurehead of a state (Ahlquist and Levi 2011). Downs

and [Rocke \(1994\)](#) make the claim that citizens of every state have an interest in ensuring that their chief executive makes decisions that reflect their desires. In the country of origin, the leader and how power was turned over, reflects the extent of political turmoil and signals stability of conditions in the origin state.

Leader change is a useful heuristic for refugees, host governments, and humanitarian organizations aiding displaced populations in search of information about conditions in the country of origin. Leader turnover is a major political event. The nature of the leadership transition helps to infer the security environment in the origin state. In particular, leader changes demonstrating policy change from the predecessor, stability, and legitimacy provides information about whether circumstances are or will be progressing towards safety and better conditions such that refugee populations can make the journey back. First I will discuss how each factor can be associated with refugee return patterns independently and then explain expectations for transitions exhibiting a combination of these factors.

First, a leader's commitment to maintaining their predecessor's policies leads to refugees and humanitarian organizations to shape expectations about whether, upon return, refugees will be safe. Moreover, host countries can use the opportunity to encourage refugees to return given the leader is expected to shift policy trajectories from their predecessor. Refugees abroad have an idea who culpable leaders, or the leader they believe are responsible for the war that displaced them and its dynamics ([Croco 2011](#); [Prorok 2016](#)). New leaders differ from predecessors by having dissimilar preferences in policy areas, evaluate relevant informa-

tion differently, and less likely to be entrapped in policies started during their tenure (Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago 2015). This is particularly the case if a leader comes to power with different societal groups than their predecessor, this signals a potential change in policies of the government since new populations supported the new leader (Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll 2015). Candidates for executive power may campaign based off of how their government would deal with the conflict, as was the case in Colombia's 2014 presidential elections (Weintraub, Vargas, and Flores 2015). Governing elites in the country of origin may even promote return migration if the refugee/emigrant population will help consolidate the new government's power (Mylonas and Žilović 2017).

A change in the domestic governing coalition is often necessary to reignite or change expectations that would be necessary to end the war or come to an agreement (Stanley and Sawyer 2009). Given different domestic groups likely have divergent preferences regarding domestic and international issues, changes to policies are most likely when a leader who caters to different interests and preferences than their predecessor come to power (Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll 2015). Drawing support from different groups, the new leader likely signals coming policy agenda changes with respect to refugees. Predecessors may have become bogged down based on their own individual preferences towards a policy, information, and entrapment obstacles. On the other hand, change in the domestic governing coalition is often a necessary condition to kick-start the updating process (Stanley and Sawyer 2009; Ryckman and Braithwaite Forthcoming). Therefore, outsider changes, when the leader depends on the support from different domestic soci-

etal groups than their predecessor, could lead refugees to update their beliefs that living abroad is not necessarily a safer alternative. Rather, refugees are compelled to return to their country of origin. One example is Afghanistan. From 1993-1996, Afghanistan was in a period of “warlordism” (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). This period was marked by lawlessness, poverty, and violence as warlords fought each other for territorial control, and many individuals fleeing the countries and becoming refugees. The Taliban began to gain popularity, grow in strength, and instituted Taliban rule in 1996 with Omar as their leader. Since the Taliban drew support from different domestic groups than the previous leader, refugees started to return and were supported by the UNHCR. From Pakistan alone, over 150,000 individuals returned.

On the other hand, leaders that come to power with support from the same domestic societal groups as their predecessor are more likely to signal a commitment to status quo policies. A new leader from the same group will be associated with the regime that persecuted refugees (Prorok 2016). On the extreme end, when a state experiences a failed coup attempt, opponents are ousted and provide the pretext for their removal, which consolidates the leader’s hold on power and only bolsters the leader’s policy objectives (Powell, Chacha, and Smith 2018). In this context, leader transitions are less likely to alter beliefs about physical safety of repatriated populations, and thus return should be less likely.

For instance, many individuals, the majority being Tamils, fled Sri Lanka after the defeat of the LTTE. While the Sri Lankan government has made open declarations that refugees should feel safe to return without any political recourse

(Ritorto 2017), refugees are not returning because the Sri Lankan government represents the same regime that suppressed and targeted them. Then president Mahinda Rajapaksa is considered an “insider change” from his predecessor Chandrika Kumaratunga (Mattes, Leeds, and Matsumura 2016), who stands accused of gross human rights abuses during the civil war (Human Rights Watch 2015a). Thus, Tamils are wary they will be safe if they repatriate to Sri Lanka because the leader is linked politically to his predecessor that discriminately targeted them (Kandasamy 2017). Additionally, the Sri Lankan government has yet to fully restore ownership of land and property to those who have returned, even though the civil war ended almost ten years ago (Human Rights Watch 2018b). This demonstrates the government’s lack of commitment toward returnees in fulfilling promises. Therefore I anticipate the following:

Hypothesis 1 *Leader turnovers demonstrating policy change from the predecessor are positively associated with refugees returning.*

Second, signals of political turmoil in refugees’ country of origin demonstrate uncertainty of the direction the country is going towards. Especially if observers care greatly about the future of the country of origin and whether new policies will be enacted, how leader turnover occurs will show observers of the conflict whether the country of origin is heading in a positive and secure direction. In the context of negotiations, new leaders help overcome lags in the rational updating process, leading to a higher likelihood of negotiation between combatants (Ryckman and Braithwaite Forthcoming). This shows commitment to peace and

stability, albeit tentatively, which motivates host states to promote return because it shows armed groups are thinking about ending the conflict.

Turnovers that happen in keeping with the rules of the origin country's system is one way leader changes indicate stability in the country of origin. When there is a commitment to regulations and laws of the country, observers are more likely to encourage return migration. Vojislav Košunica's win in the 2000 presidential election and ensuing Otpor movement to oust incumbent Slobodan Milošević drew many refugees who fled to return to Yugoslavia, with over 760,000 individuals returning, compared to an average of 1,140 returnees per year in the five years leading up to the historic win. In Burundi, Pierre Nkúrúniziza's ascension to power in 2005 led refugees to start returning, especially since the government demonstrated a commitment to ethnic power-sharing and efforts to bring rebel groups to the negotiating table, with an increase of over 20,000 refugees returning from the previous year.

On the other hand, leader turnovers that occur outside of the rules of the country illustrate a lack of stability in the origin state. When leaders come to power in this way, refugees are less likely to return since turnovers of power are not occurring based off stipulated laws, suggesting continued political turmoil at home. In these contexts, new executives have a large incentive to engage in reputation-building, or coercive action, to prove their resolve ([Licht and Allen 2018](#)). When the president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Laurent Kabila, was assassinated in 2001, the number of refugees returning drops after several steady years of returnees trickling back to the DRC. This was most likely because his son and

successor, Joseph Kabila, in attempts to build his reputation, tried 135 people in a military tribunal investigating the assassination, with many observers believing the convicted defendants were innocent. When leaders use their coercive apparatus to suppress dissent (Albertus and Menaldo 2012), refugees will wait longer before returning. Moreover, humanitarian organizations will highlight continued insecurity and repressive action in the country of origin and host governments will not be able to encourage refugee return without being accused of *refoulement*. This leads to the following expectation:

Hypothesis 2 *Leader turnovers demonstrating stability are positively associated with refugees returning.*

Third, the legitimacy of a leader's ascension to power is crucial in gleaning information about stability and policy change. Leaders who rise to power through illegitimate means with the help of foreign actors do so against established conventions of transitions of power (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). If there is debate as to whether a leader came to power through legitimate means, domestic groups will question the ability of the government to exert power and enforce laws within their borders (Weber 1965; Rotberg 2004; Börzel and Risse 2010). This will increase the likelihood the new executive will foresee challenges to their rule. This is why violent groups carry out acts of spoiler violence leading up to elections since they understand the ability to achieve their objectives occurs during periods when policy change is up in the air (Kydd and Walter 2006; Braithwaite, Foster, and Sobek 2010; Findley and Young 2015). In states where governments

lack any ability to exert power because they are unable to control territory, it provides opportunities for other actors, particularly nonstate actors, to come in and fill the vacuum (Lake 2014). Leaders who come to power without much legitimacy because they required external assistance will need to demonstrate their resolve, typically through repressive action, to quell dissent from opposition groups (Licht and Allen 2018). Thus, executives who are unable to demonstrate or actually exercise control within its borders are unlikely to stir refugees to consider returning. Moreover, humanitarian agencies are less likely to allow refugees to return under these circumstances. For example, many observers do not support the return of Afghan or Somali refugees because their respective governments are unable to implement the rule of law and only have territorial control in small parts of the country (Amnesty International 2003 2013; Human Rights Watch 2017; Amnesty International 2018).

A way leader change indicates a lack of legitimacy is when foreign actors are directly involved with the deposition of the previous leader. Receiving external support is framed in the literature as a principal-agent relationship with questionable allegiances about whether they are acting on the interest of domestic populations or on behalf of their guarantors (Byman and Kreps 2010; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014). Therefore, new leaders who replace their predecessor with the help of foreign actors will be the figurehead of a government without much legitimacy since they were only able to gain control with this form of support (Call 2008; Cunningham 2010; Salehyan 2010). This was the case after the invasion of American forces in Afghanistan and Ahmed Karzai coming to power

with the help of the United States. When governance is shared or supported by other domestic and international actors, including humanitarian NGOs, civilians do not place faith in their governments to maintain rule of law (Autesserre 2010; Salehyan 2010; Lake 2014 2017). Refugees may believe new leaders are only a puppet for those who supported their ascension to power, regardless of whether it was through violent or nonviolent means as mentioned above if they received foreign support. In response, refugees will be wary that the new executive will be able to legitimately rule or be able to enforce the rule of law that would lead to the protection of refugees' physical safety. On the other hand, leaders who come to power without foreign assistance will have more domestic legitimacy, leading to refugees being more likely to return.

Hypothesis 3 *Leader turnovers demonstrating legitimacy are positively associated with refugees returning.*

Leader transitions that will most likely lead to policy changes can overlap with the other two factors of stability, based on regular transitions of power, and legitimacy, based on whether leaders required foreign assistance. Specifically, I expect a conditional relationship with respect to leader changes providing information about the potential for future policy changes, stability, and legitimacy. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 displays the expected size of the returnee flow based on the presence or absence of these conditions. With respect to leadership changes representing stability and policy changes in the country of origin, we should expect the most refugees to return compared to the other conditions. This is because a new leader

Table 4.1: Regularity of Turnovers and Policy Change 2x2 Returnee Predictions

	Regular	Irregular
Policy change	Most	Some
No policy change	Some	Least

who breaks away from the status quo of their predecessor who comes to power within the rules endowed by the constitution will demonstrate the most stable environment for refugees. If this happens, host countries can claim a peaceful transition of power happened with a new leader who does not represent the vision of the predecessor, and more reassuringly promotes return. Humanitarian organizations will say that while the situation in the origin state is not perfect, this is a step in the right direction. This was the case with the democratically elected Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who espoused different policies than her predecessor, Gyude Bryant, and led to the return of many refugees to Liberia. Her popularity among domestic populations and the international community ([Gerdes 2015](#)), as well as winning the election, helped demonstrate Liberia was moving in a positive direction.

Alternatively, leader turnovers that demonstrate unstable conditions and a lack of change from the prior leader are expected to have the least number of returnees. Organizations will be extremely wary that returned refugees will be protected or safe. Host states, even if they want to decrease the number of refugees in their borders, could not promote return given this type of turnover signifies an unsafe environment for refugees to consider return and would be committing *refoulement*. Therefore, I anticipate the following:

Hypothesis 4 *Leader turnovers demonstrating both stability and policy change from the predecessor is positively associated with refugees returning.*

With respect to legitimacy and policy change, we should expect a similar dynamic. When leader turnovers provide information to outside observers that the change was legitimate and the new leader will likely pursue different policies than their predecessor, this shows a positive change in conditions in the country of origin. Turnovers are considered less legitimate when the leader required foreign assistance to gain power. Host states can capitalize on the opportunity by claiming conditions have sufficiently changed enough for refugees to start returning. Refugees may believe this is enough positive progress to take the journey back, especially if they were living in suboptimal conditions in the host state. Organizations assisting refugee populations will be less likely to refuse help for refugees who want to return because they too are observing changes in the country of origin.

On the other hand, leader turnovers suggesting illegitimate rises to power with no policy change will severely limit the number of refugees who return. For example, when Iyad Allawi took office as the Prime Minister of Iraq in 2004 with continued help from the United States, refugees were extremely reluctant to return because of continued violence as well as a leader supported by a foreign government. This leads to the following expectation:

Hypothesis 5 *Leader turnovers demonstrating both legitimacy and policy change from the predecessor is positively associated with refugees returning.*

Table 4.2: Turnovers with Foreign Assistance and Policy Change 2x2 Returnee Predictions

	With Foreign Assistance	Without Foreign Assistance
Policy change	Most	Some
No policy change	Some	Least

4.4 Research Design

In order to test the relationship between the dynamics of leader changes and the number of returning refugees, I construct a dataset of country directed-dyad-years from 1989-2016. I use directed-dyad-years as the unit of observation instead of the origin-state year because conditions of the host states must be taken into account when explaining refugee return patterns (Chu 2019b). I do not do a dyadic approach because host states can produce refugees that are hosted in another state and I want to ensure that the directionality of return, host to origin country, is maintained. I report models that only include pairings of directed-dyads if, since 1960, there was a flow of refugees from an origin country to that particular host country. Countries included in the analysis must be part of the Correlates of War Systems list (Correlates of War Project 2011).

The dependent variable is the number of refugees returning from a host country back to their country of origin in a given year. This information is provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2018b). In the data, returnees are defined as “former refugees who have returned to their country of origin spontaneously or in an organised fashion.” This takes into account individuals who obtained refugee status and returned, and not those that are

asylum seekers or those who did not attain refugee status. This implies that additional individuals may have returned to their country of origin as well, but are not documented by the UNHCR because they did not complete or go through the process of obtaining official refugee status.

My primary independent variable is types of leader change in countries of origin. I produce a series of binary variables operationalizing leader turnovers and whether the transition demonstrated stability, legitimacy, or policy change from two datasets on world leaders: Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009) and Change in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS) (Mattes, Leeds, and Matsumura 2016). The baseline “o” category in all models is no change in leadership in that year.

For stability, I use the *exit* variable from Archigos. I generate *Regular exit*, coded 1 if a leader was removed in accordance with explicit rules or established conventions of the country, such as term limits or defeat in elections. *Irregular exit* is coded 1 if a leader is removed outside the established conventions of the state by domestic forces, such as coups or popular revolts.

I consider legitimate leader transitions to occur when the leader required no foreign assistance and illegitimate transitions when the leader was helped with foreign actors. *Removed with foreign support* is coded 1 if a leader was directly imposed by a foreign entity or a domestic group removed the leader with foreign support. Foreign-imposed information comes from the Archigos *exit* variable. I use the *exitcode* variable, which codes whether domestic groups, such as the military, protests, rebels, or other government actors received foreign support to

help depose the leader. *Removed without foreign support* is coded 1 when there were no foreign parties involved in the turnover of power.

Leader turnovers signaling future policy change occur when the new leader most likely has different preferences and support bases than their predecessor. From the CHISOLS data, I code *insider changes* as instances where the new leader comes to power with the same domestic societal groups and *outsider changes* when the leader comes to power with different support base as their predecessor.

Hypotheses 4 and 5 suggests a combination of policy change with stability and legitimacy will influence the expected number of refugees. Table 4.3 displays the number of observations and other summary statistics of these leader changes in the sample. It should be noted that there are only 78 instances of a leader change with foreign supporters helping an individual domestically linked to their predecessor. Moreover, in these 78 observations, there is no reported evidence of refugees returning to their country of origin. While this could serve as preliminary evidence that leaders who come to power with foreign support with no expected policy changes are the least likely to attract any returnees, the small-N size makes it difficult to make any conclusions. Because of these limitations, I cannot run the model with this full specification. Instead, I group all insider changes together and only differentiate foreign support with outsider changes.

I control for an array of other factors that could influence the number of returnees in a given year. First I control for whether a leader transition happens due to death unrelated to political circumstances. This is in line with other studies of distinguishing leader turnover types (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). I

Table 4.3: Returnees Based on Type of Leader Change

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Regular Outsider	7,621	174.152	6289.549	0	435790
Regular Insider	5,690	104.329	2263.244	0	98050
Irregular Outsider	2,572	139.836	4561.802	0	215566
Irregular Insider	1,017	50.853	969.630	0	29100
Outsider w/ No Foreign Support	9,850	141.562	5543.458	0	435790
Insider w/ No Foreign Support	7,613	87.795	2001.725	0	98050
Outsider w/ Foreign Support	484	611.322	10394.660	0	215566
Insider w/ Foreign Support	78	0	0	0	0
No turnover (baseline)	98,376	157.117	7815.991	0	1569248

also include a dummy variable for leadership transition in the host state.

I include several variables characterizing the directed-dyad relationship between the host and origin countries. The first is the logged minimum distance between the directed-dyad in kilometers ([Weidmann, Kuse, and Gleditsch 2010](#)) and the logged existing size of the refugee population in the host state ([UNHCR 2018b](#)).

I account for civil conflict in the country of origin, particularly since most refugees are fleeing this form of violence. I use the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Armed Conflict Dataset ([Gleditsch et al. 2002](#); [Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016](#)) to generate indicators of civil conflict in the origin state. I generate a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the country of origin is experiencing civil conflict where there is an incompatibility between the government and a nonstate group where at least 25 battle deaths are recorded, and 0 otherwise.

I also control for macro-level indicators of both the host and origin countries that are generally considered "push-pull" factors. These include levels of electoral democracy ([Coppedge et al. 2018](#)), logged GDP per capita ([World Bank 2016](#)), and

Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for Archigos Sample

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Returnees	170388	118.254	6205.408	0	1569248
Leader Change	170388	.144	.351	0	1
Regular Exit	170388	.116	.321	0	1
Irregular Exit	170388	.026	.16	0	1
Removed w/ Foreign Support	140990	.005	.072	0	1
Removed w/o Foreign Support	169663	.173	.378	0	1
Leader Death	170388	.011	.102	0	1
Minimum Distance, (logged km)	170388	7.607	2.185	0	9.821
Refugees (logged)	170388	1.517	2.334	0	14.603
Leader Change, Host	170388	.187	.39	0	1
Civil Conflict	170388	.284	.451	0	1
Electoral Democracy, Origin	170388	.413	.232	.015	.94
Electoral Democracy, Host	170388	.667	.261	.015	.94
GDPFC, Origin	170388	7.19	1.401	4.19	11.688
GDPFC, Host	170388	8.798	1.691	4.19	11.688
Population, Host	170388	16.553	1.448	11.87	21.044
Population, Origin	170388	16.484	1.488	11.144	21.044
Years since last return	170388	11.835	7.965	0	27
Years since last return ²	170388	203.5	208.969	0	729
Years since last return ³	170388	4008.602	5241.083	0	19683

logged population (World Bank 2016). All independent variables are lagged by one year such that refugee returns occur in the following year. To account for time dependence, I compute the length of non-return year spells, along with the squared and cubic transformations of the variable (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Carter and Signorino 2010).

Overall, the Archigos sample includes an N of 170,388 with 5,212 directed-dyad years where return occurs and an N of 116,568 with 3,605 directed-dyad years when using CHISOLS. This is because the CHISOLS data only covers turnovers up to 2008 whereas Archigos is coded to 2015. Summary statistics of all variables included in the models are found in Table 4.4 for the Archigos sample and Table 4.5 for the CHISOLS sample. Summary statistics for the variables restricted to whether at least one refugee returned in a given year can be found

Table 4.5: Summary Statistics for CHISOLS Sample

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Returnees	116568	153.462	7409.772	0	1569248
Leader Change	116568	.156	.363	0	1
Insider Change	116568	.067	.25	0	1
Outsider Change	116568	.089	.285	0	1
Regular Insider	116568	.055	.227	0	1
Irregular Insider	116568	.01	.101	0	1
Regular Outsider	116568	.072	.258	0	1
Irregular Outsider	116568	.025	.158	0	1
Insider change w/ and w/o FS	116568	.074	.261	0	1
Outsider Change w/ FS	116568	.005	.07	0	1
Outsider Change w/o FS	116568	.091	.288	0	1
Leader Death	116568	.011	.103	0	1
Minimum Distance, (logged km)	116568	7.592	2.207	0	9.821
Refugees (logged)	116568	1.318	2.282	0	14.603
Leader Change, Host	116568	.198	.399	0	1
Civil Conflict	116568	.287	.452	0	1
Electoral Democracy, Origin	116568	.394	.235	.015	.923
Electoral Democracy, Host	116568	.653	.269	.015	.923
GDPFC, Origin	116568	6.914	1.357	4.19	11.481
GDPFC, Host	116568	8.533	1.697	4.19	11.481
Population, Origin	116568	16.448	1.441	12.622	21.004
Population, Host	116568	16.573	1.367	12.622	21.004
Years since last return	116568	8.5	5.679	0	19
Years since last return ²	116568	104.509	106.102	0	361
Years since last return ³	116568	1467.508	1895.295	0	6859

in Tables C.1 and C.2 of Appendix C.

Since there are a large number of zeroes because return flows are relatively rare and given the dependent variable is the count of returnees, I use zero-inflated negative binomial models (ZiNB). I employ ZiNB, rather than a zero-inflated poisson, because the count portion of the sample is over-dispersed (Long 1997). I cluster standard errors on the directed-dyad.

4.5 Discussion of Results

Results of the ZiNB models are presented in a series of tables. ZiNB models provide two sets of coefficient estimates. The first is for the probability that return

does not occur (Pr(o) columns), with positive coefficients interpreted as the likelihood of a “non-event” being more likely and negative coefficients meaning a “non-event” is less likely. In terms of the dependent variable, a positively signed coefficient is interpreted as the independent variable increases the likelihood that no refugees return in a given year. The second stage (Count columns) accounts for the count element of the dependent variable once it has surpassed the “o” threshold. A positively signed coefficient is interpreted as the covariate being associated with a higher number of returnees given at least 1 individual returned that year. Moreover, ZiNB is the appropriate count model for these analyses since the dispersion parameter, logged α , is positive and significant for all models.

Table 4.6 presents results for the various specifications of what leader turnovers signal.² Model 1 tests whether inside or outside leader changes are associated with refugee returns. For insider changes, the likelihood that no refugees return is small. Yet, there is no statistically meaningful relationship in the size of the returnee flow, though the coefficient is negative. For outsider changes, there is no influence on whether we will see any return happen. However, if at least one refugee returns, we are more likely to see a high number of returnees. Insider changes are predicted to pull in 4,262 returnees whereas outsider changes are expected to have 13,053 refugees repatriating home. This shows support for Hypothesis 3. Outsider changes, which heuristically demonstrates an upcoming policy shift from the predecessor, entice larger numbers of refugees to return. In-

²Results of models with a binary specification of any leader turnover in the country of origin can be found in Table C.3 of Appendix C.

Table 4.6: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers

	(Model 1)		(Model 2)		(Model 3)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Insider Change	-1.078*** (0.154)	-0.230 (0.293)				
Outsider Change	0.064 (0.110)	0.954** (0.299)				
Regular Exit			-0.597*** (0.107)	0.525* (0.212)		
Irregular Exit			0.925*** (0.227)	-0.330 (0.402)		
Removed w/ Foreign Supp.					0.221 (0.527)	-1.511** (0.548)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp.					-0.380*** (0.099)	0.585** (0.217)
Leader Death	0.783*** (0.233)	-0.233 (0.626)	0.537* (0.249)	-0.537 (0.683)	0.662** (0.232)	-0.659 (0.698)
Minimum Distance	-0.027 [†] (0.016)	-0.767*** (0.053)	-0.047** (0.016)	-0.788*** (0.057)	-0.047** (0.016)	-0.784*** (0.055)
Refugees	-0.522*** (0.022)	0.209*** (0.036)	-0.490*** (0.018)	0.247*** (0.037)	-0.492*** (0.018)	0.252*** (0.036)
Leader Change, Host	0.100 (0.089)	0.064 (0.248)	0.040 (0.081)	-0.188 (0.226)	0.039 (0.082)	-0.164 (0.228)
Civil Conflict	-0.610*** (0.105)	-1.309*** (0.250)	-0.573*** (0.093)	-0.639** (0.243)	-0.537*** (0.093)	-0.734** (0.234)
Electoral Democracy, Home	-1.750*** (0.237)	-0.452 (0.634)	-0.982*** (0.275)	0.366 (0.786)	-1.079*** (0.272)	0.317 (0.771)
Electoral Democracy, Host	0.251 (0.238)	-0.300 (0.457)	0.707** (0.221)	-0.081 (0.496)	0.706** (0.219)	-0.052 (0.474)
GDPPC, Origin	0.117** (0.045)	-0.188 (0.135)	-0.027 (0.042)	-0.244* (0.123)	-0.038 (0.042)	-0.251* (0.121)
GDPPC, Host	0.488*** (0.043)	0.354*** (0.094)	0.473*** (0.041)	0.470*** (0.096)	0.469*** (0.041)	0.461*** (0.094)
Population, Origin	0.103* (0.042)	-0.184 (0.128)	0.138** (0.044)	-0.017 (0.151)	0.139** (0.044)	-0.009 (0.152)
Population, Host	0.156*** (0.037)	0.367*** (0.098)	0.189*** (0.035)	0.398*** (0.099)	0.188*** (0.036)	0.387*** (0.102)
Constant	-5.881*** (0.885)	4.377 [†] (2.236)	-6.758*** (0.818)	-0.386 (2.082)	-6.620*** (0.823)	-0.215 (2.084)
<i>N</i>	116568	3605	170388	5212	170388	5212
<i>ln</i> (α)		2.352*** (0.063)		2.341*** (0.056)		2.348*** (0.056)

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

sider changes, on the other hand, show no meaningful difference in the number of returnees, suggesting a continuance of the status quo in the government is less likely to alter refugee’s calculations about whether return is a viable option.

Model 2 shows the results of regular leader exits, suggesting stability, and irregular turnovers, suggesting instability. When a leader leaves office according to the regulations of the state, the probability that no refugee returns is low and we are more likely to see higher numbers of refugees returning in the subsequent year. Compared to years without leader turnovers, a regular exit is 45% more likely to witness at least one refugee return to their home country. On the other hand, irregular exits are not likely to prompt even one refugee to return nor does it influence the size of the return flow, though the coefficient is negatively signed as expected. The likelihood no refugees return when there is an irregular change is 152% higher than no leadership changes. This is in support of Hypotheses 1, which expected regular changes to be associated with more returnees because regular exits demonstrate stability at home and turnovers of power abiding by the rules of the system whereas irregular changes signaling political turmoil and therefore fewer refugees deciding to return. In the count stage, 8,574 individuals are expected to return after a regular exit, 3,607 after an irregular exit, and 5,004 during times of no changes, all else being equal. This suggests regular leadership exits are a meaningful pull factor from home that encourages refugees to return, whereas irregular changes are not.


Model 3 examines the influence of foreign support as a means of replacing a country's leader. Leaders removed with foreign support are no more or less likely to lead to return construed as a binary, though in the count stage, fewer refugees return. On the other hand, when a leader is removed without foreign support, we are likely to see at least 1 refugee return and the size of the return flow is higher

than in years when no leader turnover occurred. The percent change in the expected count for returnees given a leader is removed with foreign support is a decrease of 77.9% and an increase by 79.4% when the leader is removed without foreign support. Therefore, there is support for Hypothesis 2, which anticipated turnovers demonstrating the leader came to power through legitimate means encourages return whereas illegitimate rises to power decrease the likelihood of return. Whether foreign actors were involved with the turnover is a sign that the leader is incapable of coming to power without external sponsorship. This makes refugees and humanitarian governments wary about the ability of the government to maintain the rule of law and ensure safety. On the other hand, we do see that leaders who come to power without foreign support are much more likely to prompt refugee returns, due to the legitimacy of the government being able to wield power without foreign assistance. Therefore, there is evidence that there is a relationship between leader exits and whether the new executive had foreign assistance.

Figure 4.1 displays the average marginal effect of the various leader turnover types on the number of returnees while keeping all other variables at their means and takes into account both the zero-inflated and count stages of the model.³ Outsider changes, regular exits, and leaders removed without foreign support are predicted to observe more refugees repatriating than years without turnover. Alternatively, insider changes, irregular leader changes, and leaders removed with

³Pairwise comparisons of these predictions can be found in Figures C.1 and C.2 of Appendix C.

Figure 4.1: Average Marginal Effect of Leader Turnover Types



foreign support are expected to see fewer refugees returning.

Next, Table 4.7 presents the results of leadership changes sharing multiple characteristics. Model 4 shows the estimates for turnovers signifying combinations of stability and policy change. As expected, leaders who leave office in accordance with established rules who drew support from different domestic societal groups are associated with an increase in the number of refugees who return. There is no influence on the first stage on the likelihood of any return. When transitions occur regularly and the successor draws support from the same domestic societal groups, the likelihood at least one refugee returns is high but there is no impact on the number of returnees. Irregular turnovers of power, regardless of whether the successor drew support from the same or different groups, are more likely to have no refugee make the journey back. However, there is no influence on the number of refugees who decide to return to their country of origin.

This provides support for Hypothesis 4, which expected most refugees to return under the conditions of a regular outsider change since it signals a commitment to stability as well as forecasted changes in policy. Under these circumstances, 16,626 individuals are predicted to return, compared to fewer than 5,000 for the other three categories. This suggests turnovers conveying stability *and* changes in policy are required for refugees to return.

Model 5 shows results of leader changes conveying legitimacy and policy change. Recall that there was no variation with respect to insider changes with foreign support in the data (see Table 4.3), which is why foreign support is only disaggregated for outsider changes. In line with Hypothesis 5, leader changes more likely to enact policy change that did not need foreign support to enter office are associated with an increase in the number of refugees who return. 14,778 refugees are expected to return under these circumstances. On the other hand, leaders who required foreign support are associated with a decrease in those who make the journey back to their country of origin, with only 845 refugees predicted to return under this condition. Similar to Model 3, insider changes are likely to have at least 1 refugee return but has no influence on the count of returnees. From these results, leaders who enter office legitimately seem to matter most. Even if a leader is anticipated to break from their predecessor's policies, if the leader needed external support to enter office, observers, such as refugees and humanitarian organizations, are more reluctant to promote return. Even if host states might want refugees to leave, humanitarian organizations will be more inclined to pressure host states to continue their obligation to host because circumstances

Table 4.7: ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Turnovers

	(Model 4)		(Model 5)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Regular Exit, Outsider Change	-0.148 (0.117)	1.228*** (0.323)		
Regular Exit, Insider Change	-1.322*** (0.163)	-0.291 (0.309)		
Irregular Exit, Outsider Change	0.864** (0.277)	0.093 (0.447)		
Irregular Exit, Insider Change	0.656 [†] (0.392)	0.510 (0.850)		
Without Foreign Support, Outsider			0.031 (0.110)	1.049*** (0.303)
With Foreign Support, Outsider			0.212 (0.817)	-1.798** (0.641)
Insider Change			-1.080*** (0.154)	-0.229 (0.292)
Leader Death	0.617* (0.240)	0.171 (0.599)	0.785*** (0.233)	-0.226 (0.626)
Minimum Distance	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.760*** (0.054)	-0.028 [†] (0.016)	-0.769*** (0.054)
Refugees	-0.521*** (0.022)	0.207*** (0.037)	-0.522*** (0.022)	0.210*** (0.036)
Leader Change, Host	0.117 (0.089)	0.097 (0.243)	0.097 (0.089)	0.055 (0.247)
Civil Conflict	-0.690*** (0.105)	-1.288*** (0.250)	-0.622*** (0.105)	-1.305*** (0.250)
Electoral Democracy, Origin	-1.664*** (0.238)	-0.460 (0.630)	-1.726*** (0.237)	-0.435 (0.630)
Electoral Democracy, Host	0.240 (0.238)	-0.349 (0.459)	0.240 (0.239)	-0.352 (0.456)
GDPPC, Origin	0.120** (0.045)	-0.203 (0.135)	0.117* (0.045)	-0.193 (0.135)
GDPPC, Host	0.497*** (0.043)	0.357*** (0.095)	0.490*** (0.044)	0.361*** (0.093)
Population, Origin	0.114** (0.043)	-0.173 (0.132)	0.109** (0.042)	-0.175 (0.127)
Population, Host	0.152*** (0.037)	0.350*** (0.098)	0.157*** (0.037)	0.370*** (0.098)
Constant	-6.061*** (0.894)	4.563* (2.259)	-6.008*** (0.888)	4.203 [†] (2.225)
<i>N</i>	116568	3605	116568	3605
<i>ln</i> (α)		2.348*** (0.064)		2.350*** (0.063)

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

are not conducive for return.

Figure 4.2: Average Marginal Effects of Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers




Figure 4.2 shows the average marginal effects of the combination of leader turnover types compared to no leader change in a given year and incorporates both the binary and count portions of the model.⁴ From the left panel, regular outsider changes and outsider changes without foreign support, which signal stability and expected policy changes, and outsider changes without foreign support, are predicted to have the largest increase in difference in the number of individuals who return. The other conditions do not expect statistically different numbers of returnees compared to years of no turnover.

Moving to the right panel, turnovers conveying legitimate ascension to power and a higher likelihood of a different policy trajectory are expected to see more individuals returning. On the other hand, even if a leader derives support from

⁴Pairwise comparisons of these predictions can be found in Figures C.3 and C.4 of Appendix C.

different domestic societal groups than their predecessor, if they received foreign assistance, there is a sharp decrease in the number of refugees who return to their country of origin.

The control variables behave as previous literature expected. When a leader dies in office unrelated to political circumstances, the likelihood no refugee returns is high yet there is no influence on the count. The larger the refugee stock in a host state and the closer a host state is to the country of origin, the more likely we are to see returns in larger numbers. Civil conflicts are more likely to lead to at least one refugee returning, but not in large numbers. Leader changes in the host state do not have meaningful impacts on whether returns occur nor the size of the outflow. The more democratic the origin state is, the more likely we are to see return, but there is no influence on the count of returnees. If refugees are hosted in a country with electoral democracy, we are less likely to see any refugee return, though there is no bearing on the count of returnees. The wealthier the origin nation, the less likely we are to see refugees returning to their country of origin. The wealthier the host state, the more likely we are to see returns happening. While counter-intuitive, [Chu \(2019b\)](#) explains this is because on average, countries of origin score lower on macro-level conditions such as GDPPC because they are recovering from events like civil conflict. Finally, host states with larger populations are more likely to see more refugees returning whereas the population of the country of origin does not produce meaningful statistical relationships.


4.5.1 Robustness Checks

I run several robustness checks to see if the results are similar under different samples. First, given the high skew of the number of returnees, I rerun the models by removing some outliers. Afghanistan and Eritrea are the top two countries with the highest number of refugees. Tables 6 and 7 of the Appendix report models where I remove all observations where Afghanistan and Eritrea are countries of origin. Next, I remove observations that are above the 95th percentile of the distribution of returnees. The coefficient estimates are in Tables C.8 and C.9 of Appendix C. Results are robust to the main results.

The current sample includes all directed-dyads if there was a flow of refugees from an origin country to the host state since 1960. Tables C.10 and C.11 of Appendix C display models where all possible directed-dyads are included, with all countries in the international system having the potential to be a refugee-producing state and a state that hosts refugees. Regular exits are no longer associated with refugee return. This could be due to the over inflation of zeros since this sample includes directed-dyads where countries may never produce nor host refugees. However, when testing for combinations of leader turnovers, regular exits with an outside change do indeed lead to more refugees returning, and therefore match the results of the main models. All other regressions display similar relationships to the main models.

Next, since most refugees in the Post-Cold War period are fleeing civil conflict, I restrict the current dataset to only include countries of origin that experienced


Figure 4.3: Predicted Number of Returnees When Interacting Turnovers Signaling Stability with Civil Conflict



some form of organized conflict that produced 25 battle deaths or more. In the first sample, I include all conflict years as well as the 5 years leading to onset and 5 years after termination. These results are in Tables C.8 and C.9 of Appendix C.. The second sample is the same except I extend the years of pre- and post-conflict to 10 years, with coefficient estimates in Tables C.10 and C.11 of Appendix C. These different sample specifications corroborate the main findings.

Up to this point, I have remained agnostic about the role of civil conflict processes in this picture. However, as civil conflicts are events that produce the most refugees, this cannot be ignored. Leader turnovers could be part of the conflict termination process, which then leads to a higher number of refugees returning in the following year. I address this by interacting the civil conflict variable with the various leader turnover variables. The full results tables can be found in Ta-

Figure 4.4: Predicted Number of Returnees When Interacting Turnovers Signaling Legitimacy and Policy Change with Civil Conflict




bles C.4 and C.5 of Appendix C. To interpret the results more easily, I generate the predicted number of returnees under each of these circumstances. The results are presented as scatter plots in Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4, and Figure 4.5.⁵ Circles correspond to predictions when there is no conflict whereas squares correspond to ongoing conflict in the country of origin.

In general, there is a dampening effect of civil conflict across all models, where fewer refugees are returning when civil conflict is ongoing. With respect to turnovers conveying stability at in the country of origin, an interesting pattern emerges. Regular turnovers in the absence of conflict are expected to generate the most returnees. On the other hand, when conflict is ongoing, both regular and irregular transitions of power, as well as no leader changes, yield approximately

⁵For ease of legibility, confidence intervals have been omitted from the graph. For the statistical significance of specific variables, please see the corresponding results tables in Appendix C.

Figure 4.5: Predicted Number of Returnees When Interacting Combination of Turnovers with Civil Conflict



the same number of returnees. However, irregular exits during conflict are predicted to have an extremely small number of individuals returning. This suggests ongoing conflict impacts information about stability differently. Moreover, if an ongoing conflict is considered “unstable” and the absence of fighting is “stable,” these patterns bolster the arguments developed in the theory section. There is a spike in the number of returnees when conflict is absent and the turnover of power happens within the rules and regulation of the country. In other words, stable turnovers during conflict are not enough to boost the number of refugees who return. Alternatively, when there is an irregular transfer of power during the unstable period of civil conflict, conditions in the country of origin are clearly unacceptable for refugees to return.

Moving to turnovers with or without foreign assistance (left panel of Figure 4.4), the patterns are similar to Model 2 where, in general, leaders who come

to power with foreign support attract fewer refugees and leaders without help are expected to more refugees to return compared to no turnover. There are, however, slight differences in this distinction if a conflict is ongoing. If a leader comes to power with foreign support during conflict, fewer refugees are expected to return. On the other hand, leaders who come to power during conflict without foreign support are predicted to have the most refugees return, even compared to the absence of fighting. Therefore, leaders who come to power with the assistance of foreign actors convey that they are most likely unable to enforce the rule of law, especially during conflict.

The right panel of Figure 4.4 shows predictions based on insider and outsider changes. The only difference from Model 3 is clearly, outsider changes have an effect on return conditional on ongoing conflict. Outsider changes during conflict have approximately the same expected number of returnees as the other categories. On the other hand, outsider changes in the absence of conflict lead to an expected 28,008 individuals to return. Therefore, leader changes that are associated with future policy changes that happen during conflict may not be meaningful enough to encourage refugees to return.

Figure 4.5 displays the predicted number of returnees when combining policy change with stability (left panel) and legitimacy (right panel). As expected, regular outsider turnovers expect the most refugees to return when there is no civil conflict. Irregular turnovers that happen while conflict is ongoing is predicted to produce more returnees than if this type of turnover happened in the absence of conflict because this condition exhibits the most stable environment

for refugees. This could suggest irregular turnovers during conflict are linked to conflict dynamics in the country of origin.

Moving to the right panel, civil conflict has a dampening effect on the number of refugees who return in all of these circumstances. The starkest difference in the predicted number of returnees is outsider changes that did not require foreign support while conflict subsides. Yet, even if the country of origin is not experiencing civil conflict, outsider leader changes that require foreign support are expected to produce fewer refugees than all other conditions. This highlights the legitimacy of the new leader still matters in conveying information about the status of the country of origin and whether it is conducive to return.

4.6 Conclusion

The findings of the large-N, cross-national empirical test suggest refugee return patterns are sensitive to changes in the political environment in their country of origin. When leader turnovers in the country of origin demonstrate stability, legitimacy, and a higher likelihood of policy change from the predecessor, refugees abroad are responding by returning to their origin state. When investigating leader changes that embody a combination of these factors, policy change tends to matter more than stability and legitimacy is more likely to lead to more refugees returning than signals of policy change. These patterns emerge even when taking into account ongoing civil conflict in the country of origin.

These findings are relevant given most attention is centered on the factors

inducing flight, with less focus on alternative solutions to refugees. As industrialized countries continue to limit options for resettlement ([Hatton 2009](#)) and local integration into host countries is unsustainable because of the large number of refugees ([Hynie 2018](#)), other durable solutions must be taken into consideration. Given the majority of refugees want to return, understanding under what conditions refugees are more likely to return to will help shift resources toward returnees to assist with reintegration into their country of origin.

One limitation to the large-N analysis is the inability to know which actor is driving refugees to return: host states, humanitarian organizations, or the refugees themselves. While refugees are the ones making the journey back, it is unclear how voluntary the decision was. UNHCR data on returnees account for spontaneous returns, or when refugees return to their origin country without any form of assistance, and through a formal repatriation agreement or program moderated by the UN. It is unclear if host countries are pressuring the UN to formulate a repatriation agreement, as in the case of Pakistan returning Afghan refugees ([Human Rights Watch 2017](#)). Future research could survey returned refugees to gauge the voluntariness of return as well as current refugees to understand their preferences about return, what circumstances they would like to observe before return, how pressured they feel to leave by host states, and how helpful humanitarian organizations are with this process. Researchers can also interview humanitarian organizations working with displaced populations to understand their perspectives, as well as their role as they navigate host state demands and refugee needs.

This highlights the next step of refugee return, particularly what influences their return has on their country of origin. While a “successful” reintegration of returnees is considered to be a necessary condition for reconciliation and reconstruction (Black and Gent 2006), there are various obstacles to this conclusion. Origin countries may want to repatriate citizens who fled, but fear they lack the capacity to do so. The Nicaraguan government feared that they did not have the resources to sustain the return of refugees (Phillips 2004). Returnees can also lead to tensions with individuals who opted not to leave the country (Kibreab 2002). Repatriates are less likely to ask for assistance upon their return compared to those that stayed (Adhikari, Hansen, and Powers 2012). Even if returnees believe the government owes them reparations, they may lack confidence in the post-conflict government to provide assistance (Cantor 2011).

Moreover, the results of the current study show refugees are returning while conflict is ongoing. Future work can address whether return influences conflict dynamics in the country of origin. Refugees may harbor different preferences about the political direction of their country compared to domestic populations that stayed within the origin state (Schwartz Forthcoming). This can be consequential to the political climate since returnees can lead to new balances of power and political arrangements (Koser 2000). From other research, individuals affected by war violence are found to be more politically active and participate in community programs than those that identify as non-victims (Blattman 2009; Bellows and Miguel 2009). Therefore, understanding how returned refugees are a part of this process can help with the reintegration and rebuilding process of the

origin state.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction

Finding solutions for the millions of forcibly displaced persons is not a simple task. Yet, there are many ways academics and policymakers can contribute to a general understanding by studying the observable actions of governments and refugees. I break away from current assumptions that refugees are completely bereft of agency and are able to know what is best for their situation, even if this goes against normative beliefs of safety. With this in mind, this dissertation is an attempt to understand the consequences of some of these dynamics, particularly circumstances in the host nation and origin state for refugees and their journeys onward. Aside from the individual arguments and findings of each chapter, which are detailed below, I identify two broader contributions of this project to the fields of international relations and political science.

The first broader contribution is (re)introducing the relations between states in our understanding of refugee politics. [Putnam \(1988\)](#)'s seminal work on two-level games pushed international relations scholars to evaluate both international and domestic to help explain international behavior. The conceptual framework of using international and domestic levels to help explain observable patterns is

not constrained to certain types of phenomena. When understanding forced displacement, it is critical to engage both domestic and international considerations, especially when multiple states are involved. While monadic studies are useful in understanding certain research questions, this setup only provides a partial picture. A more holistic approach incorporates, at a minimum, both circumstances in the host and origin countries.

The second broader contribution is an improved understanding of how conditions in host and origin states influence refugee experiences and how decisions are made about their future. Scholarship up to this point has produced a great deal of work addressing why people flee their homelands (Clark 1989; Schmeidl 1997; Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004; Adhikari 2013; Schon 2019) and how the arrival of refugee populations affect a variety of outcomes in the host state (Ek and Karadawi 1991; Jacobsen 2002; Whitaker 2002; Cortes 2004; Adamson 2006; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Bove and Böhmelt 2016; Taylor et al. 2016; Dempster and Hargrave 2017; Polo and Wucherpfennig 2018; Ghosn, Braithwaite, and Chu 2019; Braithwaite et al. 2019), such as economic growth, political changes, and violence, in the host state. I build upon this literature by identifying conditions in the host and origin states that likely to push and pull refugees to make the journey back to their country of origin.

5.2 Review of the Empirical Chapters

Beyond the broader contributions of this dissertation, the three empirical chapters make more directed contributions through novel arguments and corroborated with empirical tests. The following sections highlights these arguments and contributions from these chapters.

5.2.1 Chapter 2 - Hosting Refugees from a Rival State and Respect for Human Rights

In this chapter, I develop an argument suggesting refugees from a a strategic rival will motivate host states to promote inclusive good-will action toward the exiled population of their adversary. By doing so, host states are openly shaming their rival in an attempt to undermine their adversary's legitimacy and discredit that government in the eyes of the international community. The self-promotion and cooperation with humanitarian organizations to host refugees will be associated with an increase in respect for human rights. On the other hand, the absence of a strategic rivalry between the host and origin state provides less of an incentive for host states to be willing to protect refugees, especially in the face of a xenophobic domestic public. This should lead to a decrease in respect human rights.

I test these arguments using data on the number of refugees a host states accepts from rival and non-rival country and changes in respect for human rights in the host state. I find support for my arguments; hosting refugees from neighboring rival states is associated with the strongest improvement in human rights

whereas refugees from a contiguous and non-rival state are related to the steepest decrease in respect for human rights.

The findings of this study show that the arrival of refugees is not always met with repressive action by the state (Danneman and Ritter 2014). In fact, there seems to be a conditioning effect once interstate relations are taken into account. At the same time, conditions for refugees in the host state are not necessarily rosy, especially since most refugees are not from strategic rivals. This leads to questions about how refugee populations interpret situations in the host state and whether there are other options besides staying in exile.

5.2.2 Chapter 3 - Macro-level Determinants of Refugee Return

Building upon Chapter 2, this essay explores one option refugees could take: return to their country of origin. Existing scholarship on refugee return tends to critically evaluate the lack of voluntary decision-making or limit the scope to the post-conflict period. Yet, there is little systematic knowledge about conditions and circumstances in host and origin countries that are, on average, more likely to lead to refugees returning.

To address this gap in the literature, I adopt a “push and pull” framework used in studies of voluntary and forced displacement as a conceptual foundation for when refugee return is expected. I contend refugees are pushed to return when political, economic, and physical security in the host state is weak and pulled to return when they are positive in the country of origin. However, I disagree with

prior studies that directly compare host and origin countries, as these states are not equivalent. I anticipate shifts in the origin and host nations can stimulate returns as a means to get around this selection issue.

I test my hypotheses on a cross-national dataset of origin and host states in the Post-Cold War period. The analyses suggest several factors to keep in mind when studying refugee return. First, explaining return must take into account political, economic, and physical security conditions in host and home states. Without taking these factors into account, there is an incomplete picture of the context refugees are operating in. Moreover, physical security tends to supersede the explanatory power of political and economic circumstances, serving as a strong push and pull factor for patterns of refugee return.

A puzzling finding from this analysis is that more refugees are expected to return during conflict, rather than the post-conflict period. This is intriguing given many studies on refugee return focus solely on the years after conflict official terminates in the origin state. This leads to questions about why refugees would return to their country of origin while conflict is ongoing and whether there are other factors in the origin state that might pull refugees to return.

5.2.3 Chapter 4 - The Effect of Leader Turnover on Refugee Return

After the counter-intuitive finding that refugees tend to return in larger numbers during conflict than in the post-conflict period, Chapter 4 identifies a political

factor in the origin state that might motivate return: leader turnover. Transitions in leadership can provide observers, such as refugees, host governments, and humanitarian organizations, with updated information about safety considerations in the country of origin. I argue leader changes are a useful heuristic providing signals of: (1) leader's commitment to maintaining their predecessor's policies, (2) political turmoil in refugees' origin state, and (3) legitimacy of the leader's ascension to power. Based upon this information, there is a re-evaluation of whether circumstances in the country of origin have changed enough to encourage refugee return.

Updated information is crucial in understanding why refugees are returning after specific types of leader change. As Chapters 2 and 3 point out, host states are over-burdened with the task of supporting refugee populations and will try to find windows of opportunity to alleviate that burden. Refugees in survey data consistently claim they want to return at some point, but it is unclear what conditions are "safe enough" to alter their decisions about staying in a host state. International humanitarian organizations serving refugee populations advocate on behalf of refugees and are constantly monitoring the situation in the country of origin. Leader turnovers, and what they signal to observers, can change how these three actors assess the situation in the country of origin and whether they will promote return.

I generally find support for my arguments, with results demonstrating more refugees are returning to their country of origin after leader changes signifying forecasted policy change, happen according to established rules of the state, and

the new leader did not require foreign assistance to rise to power. These findings suggest that ongoing conflict dynamics in the country of origin are not the only factors used to motivate return. Rather, a political change conveys enough information about conditions in the country of origin that promotes or suppresses return.

5.3 Future Directions

There are several limitations of this dissertation project, some of which will be addressed in future research. One issue is selection of examining refugee populations only. This dissertation focuses only on the forcibly displaced that cross international borders for safe haven. However, the majority of individuals remain in the country of origin as internally displaced persons (UNHCR 2018b). Therefore, this dissertation is only able to explain dynamics of the externally displaced.

Another issue, and arguably the main limitation of the analyses, lies in data quality. The returnee data used in Chapters 3 and 4 only provides information that a refugee returned to their country of origin in that year. Other potentially valuable information that is not included in this variable is how long the individual was displaced, if they applied for asylum or third-country resettlement, how voluntary the return journey was, and where the individual returned within their origin state. Many of these factors likely influence refugee return patterns, especially since refugee populations differ greatly in their preferences about the timing of return.

Finally, return to the country of origin is not the only option for refugees. Staying in the host state is the most likely outcome and third-country resettlement is least likely. But what makes refugees want to stay in host states despite poor conditions and increasing resentment from domestic populations? Many of these questions can be answered with survey data. With the new baseline knowledge of general patterns of refugee return provided in this dissertation, I plan to further explore these processes using data on Syrian refugees in Lebanon. With other collaborators, I plan to explore the preferences and efficacy of the three durable solutions to displacement, as well as refugees' beliefs and endorsements about prospects for peace in Syria. Using survey data collected of Lebanese residents who lived through the Lebanese Civil War, I intend to explore why some individuals fled while others did not and explanations for why some individuals took longer to return than others.

A logical next step for the dissertation is understanding the role, if any, returned refugees have on peace talks, conflict dynamics, and political processes once the conflict ends. With the One Earth Future Foundation, I plan on investigating some of these dynamics, particularly refugee political participation, in Colombia and the Balkans.

Another counter-intuitive finding I would like to explore more is explaining refugee return during conflict. As Chapter 3 shows, refugees do return during conflict and do so in larger numbers than the post-conflict period. In a working paper, I explain refugee return during conflict as an artifact of whether combatants target civilians through deliberate killings or sexual violence. When com-

batants engage in this behavior, refugees are less likely to return because they do not want to be victims and humanitarian organizations will strongly dissuade host states and refugees from returning to these conditions. The findings suggest when armed combatants perpetrate one-sided and sexual violence during conflict, fewer refugees return to their country of origin, especially if abuses are widespread geographically across the state.

5.4 Concluding Remarks

This dissertation demonstrates the importance of widening scope conditions for comprehending government behavior toward refugee populations and refugee journeys back to their countries of origin. By limiting our theories to a monadic level of analysis, we have been missing a critical part in explaining observable behavior that, as this dissertation shows, is affected by more than one state. Takeaways from each chapter show the relationship between origin and host states can lead to greater respect for human rights, conditions in both the host and origin state encourage or deter return, and political events in the country of origin are closely monitored by observers abroad. While most of the decision-making is done at the individual-level, especially in patterns of refugee return, we can observe at aggregated units of analysis the implications of these individual decisions. Therefore, it is important to listen to refugee voices and allow them to make decisions for what they believe is best for them, rather than what academics or policymakers believe is the best solution. My future work will be able to know

how refugees do this by testing the macro-level findings at the individual level, but for now, the findings of this dissertation provide a strong foundation for all researchers who care about understanding the journeys and livelihoods of refugee populations.

Appendix A

Supplementary Material to Hosting Refugees from a Rival State and Respect for Human Rights

A.1 Country reports

- Amnesty international - each country has a section on refugees' and migrant rights: www.amnesty.org/en/countries/
- U.S. State Department - each country has a section on refugee protection: www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/index.htm

A.2 Summary Statistics

Table A.1: Summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Change in Respect for HR $Y_t - Y_{t-1}$	3201	.027	.157	-.876	.87
Change in Respect for HR $Y_t - Y_{t-3}$	3173	.081	.372	-1.898	1.644
Change in Respect for HR $Y_t - Y_{t-5}$	3138	.135	.522	-2.353	2.24
Raw Respect for HR Score Y_t	3201	.382	1.256	-2.703	4.699
Raw Respect for HR Score Y_{t-1}	3201	.355	1.257	-2.703	4.686
Raw Respect for HR Score Y_{t-3}	3173	.3	1.259	-2.703	4.642
Raw Respect for HR Score Y_{t-5}	3138	.244	1.262	-2.703	4.578
Refugees from rival (binary)	3201	.174	.379	0	1
Refugees from non-rival (binary)	3201	.812	.391	0	1
Refugees from rival (logged)	3201	1.382	3.448	0	14.995
Refugees from non-rival (logged)	3201	6.542	4.083	0	14.934
Refugees from contiguous state (binary)	3201	.593	.491	0	1
Refugees from non-contiguous state (binary)	3201	.765	.424	0	1
Refugees from contiguous state (logged)	3201	4.545	4.651	0	15.244
Refugees from non-contiguous state (logged)	3201	5.034	3.731	0	13.661
Refugees from rival, contiguous (binary)	3201	.159	.366	0	1
Refugees from rival, non-contiguous (binary)	3201	.023	.151	0	1
Refugees from non-rival, contiguous (binary)	3201	.541	.498	0	1
Refugees from non-rival, non-contiguous (binary)	3201	.765	.424	0	1
Refugees from rival, contiguous (logged)	3201	1.285	3.364	0	14.995
Refugees from rival, non-contiguous (logged)	3201	.126	.98	0	11.162
Refugees from non-rival, contiguous (logged)	3201	3.837	4.359	0	14.934
Refugees from non-rival, non-contiguous (logged)	3201	5.029	3.729	0	13.661
Refugees from rival only (binary)	3201	.009	.096	0	1
Refugees from non-rival only (binary)	3201	.648	.478	0	1
Refugees from both (logged)	3201	.164	.371	0	1
Refugees from rival only (logged)	3201	.114	1.179	0	14.506
Refugees from non-rival only (logged)	3201	5.212	4.497	0	13.872
Refugees from both (logged)	3201	1.605	3.782	0	15.244
Interstate conflict	3201	.012	.111	0	1
Civil conflict	3201	.165	.371	0	1
GDPPC (logged)	3201	7.729	1.632	4.19	11.647
Population (logged)	3201	16.02	1.556	12.65	21.014
Neighboring civil conflict	3201	.518	.5	0	1
TEK	3201	.88	.325	0	1
Executive constraints	3201	4.715	2.141	1	7

A.3 Robustness Checks

Table A.2: Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Respect for HR Raw Score

	Binary (1A)	Number of Refugees (2A)	Binary (3A)	Number of Refugees (4A)
Refugees from rival	0.0102 (0.0092)	0.0018* (0.0009)	-	-
Refugees from Non-rival	-0.0128 [†] (0.0077)	-0.0025** (0.0009)	-	-
Refugees from rival only	-	-	0.0698* (0.0311)	0.0052* (0.0024)
Refugees from non-rival only	-	-	-0.0087 (0.0076)	-0.0019* (0.0009)
Refugees from Refugees from both	-	-	-0.0021 (0.0104)	-0.0008 (0.0010)
Interstate conflict	-0.0459* (0.0230)	-0.0518* (0.0235)	-0.0447* (0.0228)	-0.0446 [†] (0.0228)
Civil conflict	-0.0778*** (0.0133)	-0.0786*** (0.0134)	-0.0779*** (0.0134)	-0.0780*** (0.0134)
GDPPC (logged)	0.0099** (0.0032)	0.0093** (0.0034)	0.0098** (0.0032)	0.0094** (0.0034)
Population (logged)	-0.0125*** (0.0033)	-0.0105** (0.0038)	-0.0126*** (0.0033)	-0.0110** (0.0038)
Neighboring civil conflict	-0.0062 (0.0054)	-0.0054 (0.0054)	-0.0065 (0.0054)	-0.0056 (0.0055)
TEK	0.0006 (0.0095)	0.0016 (0.0096)	-0.0001 (0.0095)	0.0009 (0.0097)
Executive constraints	0.0122*** (0.0022)	0.0120*** (0.0023)	0.0123*** (0.0022)	0.0120*** (0.0023)
Respect for HR _{t-1}	0.9546*** (0.0082)	0.9562*** (0.0085)	0.9547*** (0.0081)	0.9558*** (0.0084)
Constant	0.1339** (0.0500)	0.1110* (0.0529)	0.1332** (0.0504)	0.1170* (0.0532)
<i>N</i>	3201	3201	3201	3201

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.3: Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Respect for HR Raw Score, Continued

	Binary (5A)	Number of Refugees (6A)	Binary (7A)	Number of Refugees (8A)
Refugees from contig.	-0.0075 (0.0088)	-0.0001 (0.0009)	-	-
Refugees from non-contig.	0.0068 (0.0073)	-0.0018* (0.0007)	-	-
Refugees from rival, contig.	-	-	0.0112 (0.0095)	0.0019* (0.0009)
Refugees from rival, non-contig.	-	-	-0.0247 (0.0153)	-0.0023 (0.0021)
Refugees from non-rival, contig.	-	-	-0.0097 (0.0083)	-0.0010 (0.0010)
Refugees from non-rival, non-contig.	-	-	0.0072 (0.0071)	-0.0015* (0.0007)
Interstate conflict	-0.0408 [†] (0.0224)	-0.0375 [†] (0.0218)	-0.0472* (0.0234)	-0.0499* (0.0239)
Civil conflict	-0.0760*** (0.0130)	-0.0770*** (0.0128)	-0.0754*** (0.0133)	-0.0783*** (0.0131)
GDPPC (logged)	0.0100** (0.0033)	0.0105** (0.0033)	0.0097** (0.0034)	0.0097** (0.0034)
Population (logged)	-0.0136*** (0.0033)	-0.0109** (0.0036)	-0.0131*** (0.0033)	-0.0109** (0.0036)
Neighboring civil conflict	-0.0030 (0.0061)	-0.0055 (0.0058)	-0.0033 (0.0061)	-0.0049 (0.0060)
TEK	-0.0006 (0.0097)	0.0013 (0.0095)	-0.0006 (0.0096)	0.0015 (0.0095)
Executive constraints	0.0120*** (0.0022)	0.0119*** (0.0022)	0.0125*** (0.0022)	0.0124*** (0.0022)
Respect for HR _{t-1}	0.9538*** (0.0082)	0.9556*** (0.0085)	0.9548*** (0.0083)	0.9562*** (0.0086)
Constant	0.1415** (0.0495)	0.1046* (0.0498)	0.1326** (0.0488)	0.1084* (0.0492)
N	3201	3201	3201	3201

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.4: Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Change in Respect for HR over 3 Years

	Binary (9A)	Number of Refugees (10A)	Binary (11A)	Number of Refugees (12A)
Refugees from Rival	0.0156 (0.0209)	0.0040* (0.0020)	-	-
Refugees from Non-rival	-0.0171 (0.0181)	-0.0050* (0.0020)	-	-
Refugees from Rival Only	-	-	0.1296* (0.0637)	0.0091 [†] (0.0050)
Refugees from Non-rival Only	-	-	-0.0091 (0.0176)	-0.0035 [†] (0.0021)
Refugees from Both	-	-	-0.0004 (0.0238)	-0.0015 (0.0022)
Interstate Conflict	-0.1380** (0.0498)	-0.1555** (0.0510)	-0.1358** (0.0496)	-0.1382** (0.0497)
Civil Conflict	-0.2721*** (0.0320)	-0.2747*** (0.0321)	-0.2723*** (0.0322)	-0.2727*** (0.0324)
GDPPC (logged)	0.0513*** (0.0086)	0.0496*** (0.0092)	0.0512*** (0.0086)	0.0501*** (0.0091)
Population (logged)	-0.0510*** (0.0082)	-0.0463*** (0.0094)	-0.0513*** (0.0082)	-0.0478*** (0.0094)
Neighboring Civil Conflict	-0.0186 (0.0121)	-0.0178 (0.0123)	-0.0191 (0.0121)	-0.0177 (0.0123)
TEK	-0.0186 (0.0218)	-0.0151 (0.0220)	-0.0199 (0.0218)	-0.0169 (0.0219)
Executive Constraints	0.0424*** (0.0055)	0.0422*** (0.0056)	0.0426*** (0.0055)	0.0420*** (0.0056)
Respect for HR _{t-3}	-0.1875*** (0.0248)	-0.1831*** (0.0257)	-0.1873*** (0.0248)	-0.1846*** (0.0256)
Constant	0.4412*** (0.1095)	0.3926*** (0.1156)	0.4398*** (0.1103)	0.4068*** (0.1167)
<i>N</i>	3173	3173	3173	3173

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5: Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Change in Respect for HR Over 3 Years, Continued

	Binary (13A)	Number of Refugees (14A)	Binary (15A)	Number of Refugees (16A)
Refugees from Contig.	-0.0258 (0.0172)	-0.0008 (0.0019)	-	-
Refugees from Non-contig.	0.0429** (0.0162)	-0.0014 (0.0017)	-	-
Refugees from Rival, Contig.	-	-	0.0103 (0.0220)	0.0042* (0.0021)
Refugees from Rival, Non-contig.	-	-	-0.0546† (0.0311)	-0.0039 (0.0043)
Refugees from Non-rival, Contig.	-	-	-0.0211 (0.0181)	-0.0027 (0.0024)
Refugees from Non-rival, Non-contig.	-	-	0.0402* (0.0162)	-0.0007 (0.0018)
Interstate Conflict	-0.1308** (0.0492)	-0.1270** (0.0479)	-0.1383** (0.0507)	-0.1555** (0.0521)
Civil Conflict	-0.2677*** (0.0313)	-0.2702*** (0.0309)	-0.2657*** (0.0319)	-0.2730*** (0.0315)
GDPPC (logged)	0.0506*** (0.0088)	0.0516*** (0.0090)	0.0507*** (0.0089)	0.0496*** (0.0093)
Population (logged)	-0.0547*** (0.0082)	-0.0499*** (0.0091)	-0.0537*** (0.0083)	-0.0500*** (0.0091)
Neighboring Civil Conflict	-0.0090 (0.0136)	-0.0155 (0.0130)	-0.0107 (0.0137)	-0.0146 (0.0134)
TEK	-0.0228 (0.0220)	-0.0182 (0.0216)	-0.0239 (0.0219)	-0.0180 (0.0216)
Executive Constraints	0.0421*** (0.0054)	0.0418*** (0.0054)	0.0428*** (0.0055)	0.0429*** (0.0055)
Respect for HR _{t-3}	-0.1893*** (0.0251)	-0.1871*** (0.0259)	-0.1877*** (0.0253)	-0.1852*** (0.0260)
Constant	0.4775*** (0.1077)	0.4194*** (0.1091)	0.4550*** (0.1067)	0.4294*** (0.1079)
N	3173	3173	3173	3173

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.6: Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Change in Respect for HR Over 5 Years

	Binary (17A)	Number of Refugees (18A)	Binary (19A)	Number of Refugees (20A)
Refugees from Rival	0.0130 (0.0251)	0.0051* (0.0024)	-	-
Refugees from Non-rival	-0.0107 (0.0235)	-0.0053* (0.0026)	-	-
Refugees from Rival Only	-	-	0.1624 [†] (0.0936)	0.0119 [†] (0.0071)
Refugees from Non-rival Only	-	-	-0.0007 (0.0236)	-0.0030 (0.0028)
Refugees from Both	-	-	0.0038 (0.0295)	-0.0010 (0.0027)
Interstate Conflict	-0.1562* (0.0635)	-0.1822** (0.0657)	-0.1536* (0.0632)	-0.1590* (0.0636)
Civil Conflict	-0.4436*** (0.0398)	-0.4481*** (0.0399)	-0.4437*** (0.0400)	-0.4451*** (0.0402)
GDPPC (logged)	0.0942*** (0.0124)	0.0919*** (0.0132)	0.0941*** (0.0124)	0.0929*** (0.0131)
Population (logged)	-0.0855*** (0.0108)	-0.0801*** (0.0124)	-0.0858*** (0.0108)	-0.0824*** (0.0125)
Neighboring Civil Conflict	-0.0310 [†] (0.0165)	-0.0314 [†] (0.0170)	-0.0317 [†] (0.0166)	-0.0310 [†] (0.0171)
TEK	-0.0482 [†] (0.0276)	-0.0432 (0.0277)	-0.0498 [†] (0.0275)	-0.0460 [†] (0.0276)
Executive Constraints	0.0657*** (0.0070)	0.0657*** (0.0071)	0.0660*** (0.0070)	0.0655*** (0.0071)
Respect for HR _{t-5}	-0.3195*** (0.0355)	-0.3139*** (0.0369)	-0.3192*** (0.0356)	-0.3165*** (0.0367)
Constant	0.6841*** (0.1315)	0.6327*** (0.1385)	0.6827*** (0.1325)	0.6528*** (0.1408)
<i>N</i>	3138	3138	3138	3138

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.7: Refugees from Strategic Rivals & Change in Respect for HR Over 5 Years, Continued

	Binary (21A)	Number of Refugees (22A)	Binary (23A)	Number of Refugees (24A)
Refugees from Contig.	-0.0400 [†] (0.0211)	-0.0013 (0.0026)	-	-
Refugees from Non-contig.	0.0716*** (0.0186)	0.0013 (0.0023)	-	-
Refugees from Rival, Contig.	-	-	0.0016 (0.0263)	0.0054* (0.0024)
Refugees from Rival, Non-contig.	-	-	-0.0795* (0.0392)	-0.0062 (0.0053)
Refugees from Non-rival, Contig.	-	-	-0.0251 (0.0237)	-0.0036 (0.0032)
Refugees from Non-rival, Non-contig.	-	-	0.0651*** (0.0192)	0.0023 (0.0023)
Interstate Conflict	-0.1512* (0.0632)	-0.1501* (0.0619)	-0.1551* (0.0646)	-0.1876** (0.0673)
Civil Conflict	-0.4377*** (0.0389)	-0.4407*** (0.0383)	-0.4343*** (0.0397)	-0.4440*** (0.0392)
GDPPC (logged)	0.0922*** (0.0126)	0.0936*** (0.0131)	0.0933*** (0.0128)	0.0910*** (0.0136)
Population (logged)	-0.0904*** (0.0109)	-0.0870*** (0.0121)	-0.0889*** (0.0111)	-0.0870*** (0.0121)
Neighboring Civil Conflict	-0.0168 (0.0185)	-0.0259 (0.0183)	-0.0201 (0.0185)	-0.0248 (0.0187)
TEK	-0.0534 [†] (0.0278)	-0.0500 [†] (0.0270)	-0.0557* (0.0276)	-0.0497 [†] (0.0270)
Executive Constraints	0.0653*** (0.0068)	0.0651*** (0.0067)	0.0658*** (0.0070)	0.0665*** (0.0069)
Respect for HR _{t-5}	-0.3206*** (0.0360)	-0.3210*** (0.0370)	-0.3193*** (0.0364)	-0.3180*** (0.0374)
Constant	0.7390*** (0.1275)	0.7078*** (0.1314)	0.7042*** (0.1297)	0.7177*** (0.1312)
<i>N</i>	3138	3138	3138	3138

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.8: Summary statistics for KGD Rivalry

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Change in Respect for HR $Y_t - Y_{t-1}$	1536	.03	.165	-.876	.774
Refugees from rival (binary)	1536	.098	.298	0	1
Refugees from non-rival (binary)	1536	.318	.466	0	1
Refugees from rival (logged)	1536	.93	2.967	0	15.244
Refugees from non-rival (logged)	1536	2.028	3.646	0	14.44
Refugees from contiguous state (binary)	1536	.543	.498	0	1
Refugees from non-contiguous state (binary)	1536	.672	.47	0	1
Refugees from contiguous state (logged)	1536	4.426	4.826	0	15.244
Refugees from non-contiguous state (logged)	1536	4.496	3.853	0	13.352
Refugees from rival, contiguous (binary)	1536	.069	.254	0	1
Refugees from rival, non-contiguous (binary)	1536	.033	.179	0	1
Refugees from non-rival, contiguous (binary)	1536	.157	.364	0	1
Refugees from non-rival, non-contiguous (binary)	1536	.209	.407	0	1
Refugees from rival, contiguous (logged)	1536	.654	2.559	0	15.244
Refugees from rival, non-contiguous (logged)	1536	.299	1.663	0	12.432
Refugees from non-rival, contiguous (logged)	1536	1.136	2.987	0	14.44
Refugees from non-rival, non-contiguous (logged)	1536	1.093	2.653	0	12.766
Refugees from rival only (binary)	1536	.033	.178	0	1
Refugees from non-rival only (binary)	1536	.252	.434	0	1
Refugees from both (logged)	1536	.066	.248	0	1
Refugees from rival only (logged)	1536	.328	1.867	0	15.244
Refugees from non-rival only (logged)	1536	1.437	3.052	0	14.44
Refugees from both (logged)	1536	.701	2.719	0	14.176
Interstate conflict	1536	.012	.108	0	1
Civil conflict	1536	.177	.382	0	1
GDPPC (logged)	1536	7.479	1.597	4.19	10.875
Population (logged)	1536	15.971	1.532	12.742	20.956
Neighboring civil conflict	1536	.536	.499	0	1
TEK	1536	.873	.333	0	1
Executive Constraints	1536	4.486	2.201	1	7
Raw Respect for HR Score Y_{t-1}	1536	.198	1.228	-2.61	4.275

Table A.9: Refugees from KGD Rivals and Change in Respect for HR

	Binary (25A)	Number of Refugees (26A)	Binary (27A)	Number of Refugees (28A)
Ref. from Rival	0.0012 (0.0128)	0.0021 (0.0017)	-	-
Ref. from Non-rival	-0.0129 (0.0107)	-0.0029 (0.0019)	-	-
Ref. from Rival Only	-	-	0.0503 [†] (0.0296)	0.0059* (0.0027)
Ref. from Non-rival Only	-	-	-0.0048 (0.0100)	-0.0006 (0.0018)
Ref. from Both	-	-	-0.0324* (0.0151)	-0.0028* (0.0012)
Interstate Conflict	-0.0446 (0.0500)	-0.0401 (0.0510)	-0.0543 (0.0509)	-0.0555 (0.0516)
Civil Conflict	-0.0980*** (0.0172)	-0.0994*** (0.0174)	-0.1014*** (0.0176)	-0.1029*** (0.0178)
GDPPC (logged)	0.0122* (0.0052)	0.0119* (0.0053)	0.0124* (0.0051)	0.0122* (0.0053)
Population (logged)	-0.0136** (0.0046)	-0.0133** (0.0049)	-0.0131** (0.0048)	-0.0133** (0.0050)
Neighboring Civil Conflict	-0.0018 (0.0075)	-0.0016 (0.0076)	-0.0029 (0.0074)	-0.0030 (0.0075)
TEK	-0.0102 (0.0144)	-0.0103 (0.0146)	-0.0094 (0.0144)	-0.0094 (0.0144)
Executive Constraints	0.0172*** (0.0032)	0.0169*** (0.0033)	0.0169*** (0.0032)	0.0168*** (0.0033)
Respect for HR _{t-1}	-0.0566*** (0.0125)	-0.0557*** (0.0131)	-0.0564*** (0.0126)	-0.0563*** (0.0131)
Constant	0.1214 [†] (0.0647)	0.1212 [†] (0.0665)	0.1130 [†] (0.0665)	0.1168 [†] (0.0679)
<i>N</i>	1536	1536	1536	1536

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.10: Refugees from KGD Rivals and Change in Respect for HR, Continued

	Binary (29A)	Number of Refugees (30A)	Binary (31A)	Number of Refugees (32A)
Ref. from Contig.	-0.0207 (0.0130)	-0.0019 (0.0013)	-	-
Ref. from N.-Contig.	0.0073 (0.0116)	0.0002 (0.0011)	-	-
Ref. from Rival, Contig.	-	-	0.0151 (0.0172)	0.0031 (0.0021)
Ref. from Rival, N.-Contig.	-	-	-0.0231 (0.0192)	-0.0017 (0.0023)
Ref. from N. Rival, Contig.	-	-	-0.0147 (0.0131)	-0.0034 [†] (0.0018)
Ref. from N. Rival, N.-Contig.	-	-	-0.0047 (0.0108)	0.0003 (0.0023)
Interstate Conflict	-0.0483 (0.0516)	-0.0481 (0.0521)	-0.0383 (0.0496)	-0.0354 (0.0496)
Civil Conflict	-0.0964*** (0.0167)	-0.0960*** (0.0167)	-0.0984*** (0.0175)	-0.1002*** (0.0173)
GDPPC (logged)	0.0109 [†] (0.0058)	0.0103 [†] (0.0060)	0.0121* (0.0051)	0.0112* (0.0050)
Population (logged)	-0.0149*** (0.0041)	-0.0142** (0.0047)	-0.0134** (0.0047)	-0.0145** (0.0051)
Neighboring Civil Conflict	0.0031 (0.0087)	0.0028 (0.0086)	-0.0026 (0.0068)	-0.0005 (0.0071)
TEK	-0.0069 (0.0157)	-0.0080 (0.0156)	-0.0083 (0.0149)	-0.0083 (0.0148)
Executive Constraints	0.0167*** (0.0031)	0.0164*** (0.0032)	0.0172*** (0.0033)	0.0170*** (0.0033)
Respect for HR _{t-1}	-0.0576*** (0.0121)	-0.0570*** (0.0128)	-0.0565*** (0.0126)	-0.0569*** (0.0131)
Constant	0.1523** (0.0552)	0.1498** (0.0563)	0.1171 [†] (0.0650)	0.1402* (0.0692)
<i>N</i>	1536	1536	1536	1536

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B

Supplementary Material to Macro-level Determinants of Refugee Return

B.1 Refugees and Returnees by Country

Table B.1: Number of refugees and returnees by home country

Country	Refugees	Returnees
Afghanistan	6801199	460846
Albania	237444	250
Algeria	165549	97
Angola	8013416	673064
Argentina	14838	122
Armenia	1810205	27
Australia	441	0
Austria	772	0
Azerbaijan	4044530	68096
Bahrain	3409	20
Bangladesh	481919	29962

Belarus	97474	0
Belgium	1068	0
Benin	6542	10
Bhutan	2127122	3
Bolivia	17418	475
Bosnia	455880	93
Botswana	1475	3
Brazil	18237	9
Bulgaria	76420	1
Burkina Faso	18403	13
Burundi	9907131	1207182
Cambodia	698627	52475
Cameroon	178920	542
Canada	1887	0
Cape Verde	330	0
Central African Republic	2594998	66396
Chad	3089218	539011
Chile	182656	5692
China	3467535	3857
Colombia	3648906	1122
Comoros	4617	1

Congo Brazzaville	406723	171708
Congo Kinshasa	10200000	695248
Costa Rica	5233	2
Croatia	3279267	95116
Cuba	542823	595
Cyprus	222	390
Czech Republic	50614	6
Czechoslovakia	13755	0
Denmark	322	0
Djibouti	75723	460
Dominican Republic	3931	0
East Timor	29027	32327
Ecuador	16167	3
Egypt	157911	16
El Salvador	2108202	32420
Equatorial Guinea	382768	10016
Eritrea	5010249	151508
Estonia	11984	6
Ethiopia	9649530	803832
Fiji	22081	0
Finland	106	0

France	1976	0
Gabon	2022	6
Gambia	49677	7
Georgia	320893	6257
Germany	9265	0
Ghana	430267	1301
Greece	3296	0
Guatemala	869218	41098
Guinea	162774	69
Guinea-Bissau	296293	56405
Guyana	8375	0
Haiti	407139	8725
Honduras	45153	66
Hungary	63156	9
India	289221	9
Indonesia	410300	7280
Iran	2098075	6704
Iraq	6307658	135834
Ireland	125	0
Israel	20564	6
Italy	2270	0

Ivory Coast	729165	284380
Jamaica	15288	1
Japan	2124	0
Jordan	32080	67
Kazakhstan	156176	14421
Kenya	160925	7812
Korea South	8655	0
Kosovo	0	0
Kuwait	16571	0
Kyrgyzstan	84139	1152
Laos	1484391	33276
Latvia	24410	0
Lebanon	137949	0
Lesotho	1261	125
Liberia	8387955	970249
Libya	27577	148960
Lithuania	12298	0
Luxembourg	11	0
Macedonia	137128	97081
Madagascar	3809	1
Malawi	8715	20018

Malaysia	7488	0
Mali	1234262	170449
Mauritania	1301285	49495
Mauritius	957	0
Mexico	100336	7
Moldova	117947	2
Mongolia	20871	0
Montenegro	15346	0
Morocco	37243	1
Mozambique	8568641	1290792
Myanmar (Burma)	4670140	5977
Namibia	24586	5941
Nepal	67911	4
Netherlands	1248	0
New Zealand	178	0
Nicaragua	963277	167896
Niger	103884	4450
Nigeria	784252	8183
Norway	128	0
Oman	617	3
Pakistan	1150752	115255

Panama	5298	378
Papua New Guinea	6216	0
Paraguay	1412	8
Peru	135147	163
Philippines	1342935	5
Poland	250920	1
Portugal	1097	0
Qatar	850	0
Romania	298878	181
Rwanda	14000000	3395502
Saudi Arabia	9842	0
Senegal	488852	4740
Sierra Leone	4002207	486350
Singapore	1144	0
Slovak Republic	7142	0
Slovenia	33745	0
Solomon Islands	1029	0
Somalia	4314763	106944
South Africa	310877	15756
South Sudan	1253674	3657
Spain	7711	1

Sri Lanka	3452460	84973
Sudan	14900000	1106037
Suriname	6254	3
Swaziland	1168	14
Sweden	563	0
Switzerland	742	0
Syria	175851	15
Tajikistan	730136	20209
Tanzania	16325	2041
Thailand	10923	3
Togo	721286	301583
Trinidad and Tobago	3349	0
Tunisia	37077	16
Turkey	2380255	745
Turkmenistan	18933	28
UAE	3305	0
USSR	3334482	1054
Uganda	2599700	612369
Ukraine	1450375	27
United Kingdom	2980	0
United States	32934	1

Uruguay	11283	1486
Uzbekistan	378320	48
Venezuela	60667	143
Vietnam	12100000	43160
Yemen	64756	1140
Yugoslavia	3080136	945673
Zambia	57631	16649
Zimbabwe	416665	206636

Table B.2: Number of refugees and returnees by host country

Afghanistan	617713	0
Albania	36992	440817
Algeria	219465	66596
Angola	451149	5897
Argentina	85175	3286
Armenia	3770602	73502
Australia	622607	5666
Austria	480252	8522
Azerbaijan	1763314	469
Bahrain	2238	11
Bangladesh	1868225	110223

Belarus	6428	22
Belgium	311613	5815
Benin	387296	166408
Bolivia	13314	29
Botswana	122186	41622
Brazil	135424	385
Bulgaria	25266	166
Burkina Faso	188474	40575
Burundi	5753812	658613
Cambodia	1730	814
Cameroon	2999400	293724
Canada	2605822	4073
Cape Verde	0	531
Central African Republic	1046663	196850
Chad	4311310	203554
Chile	21623	96
China	9129101	5212
Colombia	6208	446
Comoros	24	354
Congo Brazzaville	1498698	182349
Congo Kinshasa	13182927	2801057

Costa Rica	837358	68881
Croatia	23941	1989
Cuba	11092	5268
Cyprus	17194	320
Czech Republic	32958	922
Czechoslovakia	0	0
Denmark	262976	4587
Djibouti	167073	56230
Dominican Republic	12526	3553
East Timor	14	0
Ecuador	1365469	1036
Egypt	293610	10064
El Salvador	4592	1066
Equatorial Guinea	40000	0
Eritrea	7608	51
Estonia	533	0
Ethiopia	4956420	440417
Fiji	58	0
Finland	130377	1369
France	2874906	4547
Gabon	384009	15914

Gambia	220342	5993
Georgia	42528	324
Germany	6607726	108834
Ghana	718200	167732
Greece	117005	1725
Guatemala	392152	1143
Guinea	6577959	764077
Guinea-Bissau	259045	2877
Guyana	312	0
Haiti	8	7
Honduras	497965	121798
Hungary	81763	6059
India	4855507	116520
Indonesia	74746	47151
Iran	5789516	87120
Iraq	324477	259
Ireland	88533	983
Israel	97176	800
Italy	880152	5057
Ivory Coast	3058917	310109
Jamaica	499	128

Japan	121477	1162
Jordan	1127386	10379
Kazakhstan	158900	4880
Kenya	3501917	196561
Korea, South	5756	4
Kuwait	13558	918
Kyrgyzstan	150759	4329
Laos	2	1
Latvia	765	5
Lebanon	52302	1603
Lesotho	95698	84
Liberia	1551344	448765
Libya	17746	22182
Lithuania	8817	6
Luxembourg	3872	618
Macedonia	64975	252523
Madagascar	206	19
Malawi	5811445	1026630
Malaysia	2298862	6206
Mali	309770	7676
Mauritania	619855	49758

Mauritius	14	0
Mexico	1829473	43420
Moldova	1984	128
Mongolia	68	0
Montenegro	81402	1155
Morocco	13275	83
Mozambique	50918	151273
Myanmar (Burma)	0	1
Namibia	179637	26401
Nepal	2123172	14712
Netherlands	1039208	6927
New Zealand	40536	535
Nicaragua	165688	4074
Niger	580433	31216
Nigeria	392029	25754
Norway	389375	10374
Oman	989	524
Pakistan	4442744	456394
Panama	204844	2579
Papua New Guinea	266515	7279
Paraguay	3098	12

Peru	26692	396
Philippines	85158	2550
Poland	156486	780
Portugal	7621	1052
Qatar	1669	12
Romania	15651	856
Rwanda	1849723	396204
Saudi Arabia	533115	30730
Senegal	1218520	98272
Sierra Leone	578130	176800
Singapore	1372	224
Slovak Republic	4893	157
Slovenia	3726	5400
Solomon Islands	5016	0
Somalia	24455	13
South Africa	1129246	43664
South Sudan	799682	2465
Spain	90871	1159
Sri Lanka	3364	9
Sudan	14908507	1018351
Suriname	157	13

Swaziland	307409	17821
Sweden	1687804	11262
Switzerland	724649	49902
Syria	18712	817
Tajikistan	6968	11064
Tanzania	11537379	1930075
Thailand	2690339	100486
Togo	356901	2622
Trinidad and Tobago	357	1
Tunisia	6055	149021
Turkey	215396	21923
Turkmenistan	177209	13035
UAE	16302	4217
USSR	1482479	1114
Uganda	9379924	761704
Ukraine	44048	184
United Kingdom	1942225	11654
United States	9840636	7792
Uruguay	3200	94
Uzbekistan	217306	26
Venezuela	1476584	1710

Vietnam	203152	0
Yemen	1101637	36270
Yugoslavia	3077602	187904
Zambia	4080387	369443
Zimbabwe	1565472	151543

B.2 Summary Statistics of Count Portion, Main Models

Table B.3: Summary Statistics When Returnees > 0

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Returnees	3925	3269.92	25608.87	1	776521
Polity, Origin	3925	1.179	5.108	-10	10
Polity, Host	3925	2.904	5.842	-10	10
Polity Change, Origin	3898	.253	1.897	-16	14
Polity Change, Host	3924	.132	1.608	-16	15
Particip. Dem., Origin	3925	.223	.135	.013	.774
Particip. Dem., Host	3925	.314	.191	.013	.81
Particip. Dem. Change, Origin	3923	.007	.035	-.373	.241
Particip. Dem. Change, Host	3925	.003	.024	-.276	.241
Respect for HR, Origin	3925	-.689	.985	-2.703	2.868
Respect for HR, Host	3925	.045	1.151	-2.703	4.699
Change in HR, Origin	3924	.077	.18	-.604	.87
Change in HR, Host	3925	.025	.145	-.876	.87
GDPPC (logged), Origin	3925	6.525	1.24	4.19	10.032
GDPPC (logged), Host	3925	7.371	1.553	4.19	11.647
GDPPC Growth (logged), Origin	3913	4.659	.246	-.127	8.149
GDPPC Growth (logged), Host	3904	4.666	.249	1.992	5.979
Engagement Rate, Origin	3843	.359	.075	.119	.61
Engagement Rate, Host	3847	.37	.08	.121	.722
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin	3809	.001	.008	-.06	.061
Change in Eng. Rate, Host	3814	.002	.011	-.095	.087
Civil Conflict, Origin	119246	.467	.499	0	1
Civil Conflict, Host Only	119246	.076	.264	0	1
Civil Conflict, Host	119246	.15	.357	0	1
Civil Conflict, Origin Only	119246	.393	.488	0	1
Conflict Duration	119246	4.174	8.012	0	51
Post-conflict Duration	119246	3.607	5.854	0	26
Peace Agreement	72431	.289	.453	0	1
Ceasefire	72431	.227	.419	0	1
Government Victory	72431	.181	.385	0	1
Rebel Victory	72431	.099	.299	0	1
Low Activity	72431	.301	.459	0	1
Hosting Duration	3925	7.687	6.27	0	24
Population (logged), Origin	3925	16.446	1.089	13.096	21.004
Population (logged), Host	3925	16.594	1.392	12.988	21.014
Minimum Distance	3925	4.672	3.501	0	9.747
Refugees (logged)	3925	5.635	3.605	0	14.041
Years since last repatriation	3925	3.281	5.328	0	24
Years since last repatriation ²	3925	39.151	94.956	0	576
Years since last repatriation ³	3925	601.427	1896.479	0	13824

B.3 Alternative Specifications

Table B.4: Effect of Terrorism on Refugee Return

	(Model 1B)		(Model 2B)		(Model 3B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Terrorist Events, Origin	-0.014 (0.032)	0.477*** (0.080)	-0.034 (0.037)	0.455*** (0.088)	-0.100* (0.040)	0.633*** (0.127)
Terrorist Events, Host	0.001 (0.031)	-0.150 [†] (0.081)	-0.024 (0.040)	-0.177 [†] (0.103)	0.048 (0.037)	-0.172 [†] (0.090)
Terrorist Events, Origin X Host			0.013 (0.013)	0.013 (0.023)		
Civil Conflict X Terrorist Events, Origin					0.154** (0.048)	-0.200 (0.136)
Civil Conflict X Terrorist Events, Host					-0.132* (0.059)	0.041 (0.133)
Civil Conflict, Origin	-0.240* (0.105)	-1.762*** (0.267)	-0.240* (0.105)	-1.770*** (0.268)	-0.605*** (0.146)	-1.537*** (0.368)
Civil Conflict, Host	0.639*** (0.130)	0.581* (0.234)	0.645*** (0.130)	0.601** (0.229)	0.977*** (0.191)	0.522 (0.377)
Polity, Origin	-0.076*** (0.009)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.076*** (0.009)	-0.016 (0.022)	-0.075*** (0.009)	-0.020 (0.022)
Polity, Host	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.022)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.022)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.023)
Respect for HR, Origin	0.120 [†] (0.066)	-0.296 [†] (0.159)	0.121 [†] (0.066)	-0.293 [†] (0.158)	0.088 (0.066)	-0.264 [†] (0.158)
Respect for HR, Host	0.381*** (0.060)	0.118 (0.138)	0.383*** (0.060)	0.123 (0.137)	0.387*** (0.059)	0.118 (0.134)
Minimum Distance	-0.053*** (0.016)	-0.748*** (0.046)	-0.053*** (0.016)	-0.750*** (0.045)	-0.052** (0.016)	-0.740*** (0.044)
Refugees	-0.360*** (0.023)	0.249*** (0.038)	-0.360*** (0.023)	0.249*** (0.038)	-0.360*** (0.023)	0.249*** (0.037)
Hosting Duration	-0.119*** (0.010)	-0.058** (0.019)	-0.119*** (0.010)	-0.058** (0.019)	-0.118*** (0.010)	-0.050* (0.020)
GDPPC, Origin	0.025 (0.044)	-0.378*** (0.111)	0.024 (0.044)	-0.380*** (0.112)	0.020 (0.044)	-0.382*** (0.108)
GDPPC, Host	0.471*** (0.044)	0.385*** (0.098)	0.472*** (0.044)	0.389*** (0.098)	0.464*** (0.044)	0.380*** (0.096)
Population, Origin	0.108** (0.038)	-0.313** (0.113)	0.110** (0.038)	-0.309* (0.113)	0.123** (0.038)	-0.293** (0.108)
Population, Host	0.253*** (0.039)	0.420*** (0.091)	0.254*** (0.039)	0.422*** (0.091)	0.247*** (0.039)	0.423*** (0.085)
Constant	-7.070*** (0.864)	5.634* (2.382)	-7.093*** (0.865)	5.570* (2.379)	-7.089*** (0.866)	5.133* (2.321)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.233*** (0.062)		2.232*** (0.062)		2.228*** (0.062)
N		144543 3931		144543 3931		144543 3931

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.5: Alternate Variable Specifications

	(Model 4B)		(Model 5B)		(Model 6B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Civilian Casualties	-0.028 (0.017)	-0.243*** (0.039)				
ICC, Origin			-0.247* (0.102)	-0.991*** (0.213)		
ICC, Host			-0.015 (0.138)	-0.006 (0.249)		
ICC, Host Only					0.080 (0.146)	(0.291) (0.291)
ICC, Origin					-0.189 [†] (0.106)	-0.968*** (0.220)
ICC, Both					-0.591* (0.262)	-1.091** (0.403)
Civil conflict, Origin			-0.317** (0.104)	-1.460*** (0.244)	-0.317** (0.104)	-1.459*** (0.244)
Civil Conflict, Host	0.684*** (0.129)	0.698* (0.276)	0.678*** (0.125)	0.657* (0.258)	0.689*** (0.126)	0.670** (0.260)
Polity, Origin	-0.082*** (0.008)	0.025 (0.022)	-0.078*** (0.008)	0.034 (0.022)	-0.078*** (0.008)	0.035 (0.022)
Polity, Host	-0.016 [†] (0.009)	-0.041* (0.020)	-0.017 [†] (0.009)	-0.042* (0.019)	-0.018 [†] (0.009)	-0.043* (0.019)
Respect for HR, Origin	0.106 [†] (0.062)	-0.860*** (0.155)	0.038 (0.060)	-0.911*** (0.140)	0.041 (0.060)	-0.907*** (0.140)
Respect for HR, Host	0.423*** (0.054)	0.364** (0.127)	0.417*** (0.054)	0.326** (0.123)	0.422*** (0.054)	0.329** (0.123)
Minimum Distance	-0.058*** (0.016)	-0.762*** (0.049)	-0.054*** (0.016)	-0.742*** (0.048)	-0.055*** (0.016)	-0.743*** (0.048)
Refugees	-0.408*** (0.024)	0.235*** (0.036)	-0.405*** (0.024)	0.237*** (0.035)	-0.406*** (0.024)	0.236*** (0.035)
Hosting Duration	-0.087*** (0.009)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.085*** (0.009)	-0.009 (0.018)	-0.085*** (0.009)	-0.009 (0.018)
GDPPC, Origin	0.015 (0.040)	-0.165 [†] (0.100)	0.018 (0.040)	-0.158 [†] (0.096)	0.018 (0.040)	-0.159 [†] (0.096)
GDPPC, Host	0.496*** (0.043)	0.441*** (0.095)	0.484*** (0.044)	0.394*** (0.097)	0.484*** (0.044)	0.396*** (0.097)
Population, Origin	0.101** (0.038)	-0.222 [†] (0.118)	0.127** (0.040)	-0.106 (0.122)	0.129** (0.040)	-0.102 (0.124)
Population, Host	0.273*** (0.039)	0.441*** (0.096)	0.271*** (0.041)	0.417*** (0.096)	0.272*** (0.041)	0.416*** (0.096)
Constant	-7.584*** (0.868)	2.036 (2.491)	-7.887*** (0.888)	0.796 (2.428)	-7.951*** (0.892)	0.722 (2.458)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.326*** (0.064)		2.305*** (0.063)		2.307*** (0.063)
N		144087 3925		144087 3925		144087 3925

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last repatriation” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.6: CIRI on Refugee Return

	(Model 7B)		(Model 8B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
CIRI, Origin	0.087*** (0.023)	-0.049 (0.065)		
CIRI, Host	0.161*** (0.027)	0.191** (0.064)		
CIRI Change, Origin			-0.083*** (0.024)	0.088 (0.078)
CIRI Change, Host			0.010 (0.028)	0.029 (0.066)
Polity, Origin	-0.077*** (0.008)	0.053* (0.021)	-0.067*** (0.008)	0.056* (0.022)
Polity, Host	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.025 (0.022)	0.008 (0.009)	0.010 (0.020)
Minimum Distance	-0.062*** (0.017)	-0.812*** (0.054)	-0.063*** (0.016)	-0.800*** (0.054)
Refugees	-0.426*** (0.025)	0.228*** (0.037)	-0.415*** (0.024)	0.227*** (0.039)
Hosting Duration	-0.091*** (0.011)	-0.070** (0.022)	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.077** (0.024)
GDPPC, Origin	0.042 (0.042)	-0.293* (0.116)	0.037 (0.043)	-0.431** (0.136)
GDPPC, Host	0.556*** (0.042)	0.481*** (0.095)	0.652*** (0.041)	0.547*** (0.096)
Population, Origin	0.159*** (0.039)	-0.110 (0.128)	0.097* (0.039)	-0.052 (0.140)
Population, Host	0.279*** (0.040)	0.506*** (0.098)	0.182*** (0.036)	0.376*** (0.094)
Constant	-10.226*** (0.969)	-0.416 (2.770)	-7.322*** (0.892)	1.766 (2.631)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.336*** (0.065)		2.329*** (0.065)
N		126865 3384		124714 3314

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last repatriation" omitted from presentation.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.7: Types of Terrorism on Refugee Return

	(Model 9B)		(Model 10B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Domestic Terr., Origin	0.093** (0.035)	0.369*** (0.081)		
Domestic Terr., Host	0.044 (0.037)	-0.021 (0.097)		
Foreign Terr., Origin			-0.060 (0.070)	-0.198 (0.165)
Foreign Terr., Host			-0.034 (0.061)	0.045 (0.133)
Civil conflict, Origin	-0.406*** (0.108)	-1.789*** (0.259)	-0.347** (0.106)	-1.564*** (0.251)
Civil Conflict, Host	0.586*** (0.128)	0.509* (0.238)	0.680*** (0.128)	0.628* (0.259)
Polity, Origin	-0.086*** (0.009)	-0.002 (0.022)	-0.083*** (0.008)	0.017 (0.022)
Polity, Host	-0.016† (0.009)	-0.025 (0.022)	-0.016† (0.009)	-0.039† (0.021)
Respect for HR, Origin	0.130* (0.063)	-0.537*** (0.143)	0.052 (0.062)	-0.834*** (0.144)
Respect for HR, Host	0.428*** (0.056)	0.321* (0.141)	0.427*** (0.057)	0.374** (0.140)
Minimum Distance	-0.061*** (0.016)	-0.778*** (0.050)	-0.059*** (0.016)	-0.771*** (0.050)
Refugees	-0.397*** (0.024)	0.238*** (0.038)	-0.407*** (0.024)	0.230*** (0.037)
Hosting Duration	-0.092*** (0.010)	-0.034† (0.019)	-0.087*** (0.009)	-0.016 (0.019)
GDPPC, Origin	-0.024 (0.043)	-0.337** (0.107)	0.021 (0.041)	-0.152 (0.100)
GDPPC, Host	0.474*** (0.043)	0.408*** (0.098)	0.496*** (0.045)	0.431*** (0.106)
Population, Origin	0.088* (0.038)	-0.267* (0.116)	0.095* (0.039)	-0.246* (0.117)
Population, Host	0.258*** (0.040)	0.422*** (0.097)	0.278*** (0.040)	0.436*** (0.099)
Constant	-6.670*** (0.877)	4.592† (2.494)	-7.550*** (0.894)	2.691 (2.489)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.288*** (0.063)		2.323*** (0.064)
N		144087		144087

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last repatriation” omitted from presentation.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

B.4 Removing Outliers - Afghanistan & Eritrea

Table B.8: Effect of Political Factors on Refugee Return, Without AFG and ERI

	(Model 11B)	(Model 12B)	(Model 13B)	(Model 14B)	(Model 15B)	(Model 16B)
	Pr(o)	Pr(o)	Pr(o)	Pr(o)	Pr(o)	Pr(o)
	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count
Polity, Origin	-0.040*** (0.008)	0.097** (0.030)				
Polity, Host	0.089*** (0.007)	0.039* (0.020)				
Polity Change, Origin		-0.024** (0.008)	0.294*** (0.026)			
Polity Change, Host		-0.048*** (0.012)	0.009 (0.034)			
P. Dem., Origin			-1.168*** (0.320)			
P. Dem., Host			3.169* (1.468)			
P. Dem. Change, Origin			3.257*** (0.245)			
P. Dem. Change, Host			1.834** (0.628)			
Respect for HR, Origin				-2.045*** (0.539)	17.274*** (1.946)	
Respect for HR, Host				-1.837** (0.674)	1.595 (2.884)	
Change in HR, Origin					-0.013 (0.044)	
Change in HR, Host					0.560*** (0.039)	
Minimum Distance	0.045*** (0.012)	-0.621*** (0.045)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.549*** (0.010)	0.079*** (0.033)	0.005 (0.047)
Refugees	-0.352*** (0.015)	0.232*** (0.036)	-0.383*** (0.017)	-0.284*** (0.011)	0.310*** (0.028)	0.213*** (0.036)
Hosting Duration	-0.066*** (0.007)	-0.057*** (0.020)	-0.079*** (0.008)	-0.077*** (0.006)	-0.054*** (0.016)	-0.097*** (0.021)
Population, Origin	0.008 (0.038)	-0.092 (0.166)	0.103** (0.037)	0.076* (0.031)	0.055 (0.113)	0.048 (0.137)
Population, Host	0.118*** (0.034)	0.356** (0.113)	0.135*** (0.033)	0.124** (0.029)	0.316*** (0.082)	0.115*** (0.030)
Constant	-0.567 (0.787)	3.043 (2.862)	-2.712*** (0.780)	-1.949** (0.645)	0.518 (1.796)	-1.056 (0.716)
$ln(\alpha)$	2.389*** (0.059)	2.299*** (0.061)	2.333*** (0.059)	2.163*** (0.053)	2.301*** (0.061)	2.192*** (0.060)
N	169637	4442	176030	175601	158869	158865
		169000	5052	5050	4616	4615

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last repatriation" omitted from presentation.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.9: Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, Without AFG and ERI

	(Model 17B)		(Model 18B)		(Model 19B)		(Model 20B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
GDPPC, Origin	-0.098** (0.035)	-0.271* (0.117)						
GDPPC, Host	0.534*** (0.035)	0.567*** (0.084)						
GDPPC Growth, Host			-0.592*** (0.074)	-0.911*** (0.268)				
GDPPC Growth, Origin			-1.349*** (0.098)	-1.568*** (0.229)				
Engagement Rate, Origin					1.710** (0.606)	-5.205* (2.040)		
Engagement Rate, Host					6.025*** (0.569)	5.731*** (1.682)		
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin							-17.669*** (2.860)	-48.019*** (8.630)
Change in Eng. Rate, Host							-8.559** (2.761)	20.762** (6.907)
Minimum Distance	-0.035* (0.016)	-0.779*** (0.066)	0.083*** (0.012)	-0.559*** (0.043)	0.044** (0.014)	-0.715*** (0.057)	0.075*** (0.012)	-0.628*** (0.052)
Refugees	-0.401*** (0.018)	0.227*** (0.041)	-0.309*** (0.014)	0.237*** (0.043)	-0.330*** (0.014)	0.221*** (0.041)	-0.296*** (0.014)	0.230*** (0.045)
Hosting Duration	-0.081*** (0.008)	-0.040* (0.019)	-0.068*** (0.007)	-0.059** (0.020)	-0.101*** (0.009)	-0.069** (0.025)	-0.071*** (0.007)	-0.032 (0.021)
Population, Origin	0.113** (0.037)	0.004 (0.130)	-0.000 (0.035)	-0.286* (0.137)	0.069 [†] (0.038)	0.029 (0.145)	0.016 (0.037)	-0.289 [†] (0.159)
Population, Host	0.195*** (0.033)	0.411*** (0.090)	0.170*** (0.030)	0.418*** (0.109)	0.117*** (0.032)	0.401*** (0.087)	0.154*** (0.031)	0.459*** (0.115)
Constant	-6.440*** (0.796)	-1.225 (2.146)	7.443*** (0.852)	17.094*** (2.768)	-4.094*** (0.775)	0.728 (2.186)	-1.676* (0.687)	4.852* (2.055)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.337*** (0.065)		2.224*** (0.066)		2.232*** (0.062)		2.225*** (0.065)
N		167205		4689		165206		4648
						152509		4360
								147851
								4326

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last repatriation" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.10: Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return, Without AFG and ERI

	(Model 21B)		(Model 22B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Civil Conflict, Origin	-0.167 [†] (0.090)	-1.061*** (0.282)		
Civil Conflict, Host	-0.321** (0.116)	-0.884** (0.311)		
Civil Conflict, Host Only			-0.165 (0.129)	-1.406** (0.434)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only			-0.104 (0.092)	-1.210*** (0.301)
Civil Conflict, Both			-0.620*** (0.176)	-1.777*** (0.419)
Minimum Distance	0.077*** (0.013)	-0.618*** (0.043)	0.078*** (0.013)	-0.608*** (0.042)
Refugees	-0.293*** (0.014)	0.242*** (0.042)	-0.294*** (0.014)	0.243*** (0.041)
Hosting Duration	-0.058*** (0.007)	-0.004 (0.020)	-0.058*** (0.007)	-0.005 (0.020)
Population, Origin	0.168*** (0.044)	-0.075 (0.173)	0.162*** (0.043)	-0.096 (0.168)
Population, Host	0.131*** (0.033)	0.439*** (0.123)	0.127*** (0.032)	0.422*** (0.116)
Constant	-3.706*** (0.804)	1.693 (2.724)	-3.583*** (0.780)	2.331 (2.581)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.225*** (0.060)		2.222*** (0.059)
N		113572 4569		113572 4569

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.11: Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns, Without AFG and ERI

	(Model 23B)		(Model 24B)		(Model 25B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Conflict Duration, Origin	-0.015*	-0.068***				
	(0.007)	(0.016)				
Post-conflict Duration, Origin			-0.004	-0.181***		
			(0.011)	(0.031)		
Peace Agreement					-1.500***	0.401
					(0.122)	(0.342)
Ceasefire					0.243*	0.839*
					(0.123)	(0.331)
Govt. Victory					-0.826***	-0.119
					(0.113)	(0.290)
Rebel Victory					-0.511**	-0.173
					(0.189)	(0.463)
Low Activity					-0.348*	-1.170***
					(0.136)	(0.354)
Civil Conflict, Host	-0.335**	-0.941**	-0.282*	-0.870**	-0.282*	-1.153***
	(0.118)	(0.312)	(0.113)	(0.286)	(0.126)	(0.289)
Minimum Distance	0.073***	-0.639***	0.083***	-0.611***	0.064***	-0.725***
	(0.013)	(0.046)	(0.013)	(0.045)	(0.015)	(0.049)
Refugees	-0.294***	0.233***	-0.289***	0.192***	-0.310***	0.254***
	(0.014)	(0.042)	(0.014)	(0.041)	(0.016)	(0.038)
Hosting Duration	-0.058***	-0.001	-0.069***	-0.016	-0.037***	-0.124***
	(0.007)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.025)
Population, Origin	0.138**	-0.243	0.119**	-0.489***	0.036	-0.156
	(0.044)	(0.166)	(0.039)	(0.139)	(0.049)	(0.168)
Population, Host	0.138***	0.470***	0.125***	0.446***	0.160***	0.458***
	(0.033)	(0.121)	(0.031)	(0.101)	(0.035)	(0.095)
Constant	-3.330***	3.903	-2.758***	8.671***	-1.062	3.568
	(0.810)	(2.559)	(0.749)	(2.227)	(0.955)	(3.057)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.229***		2.181***		1.944***
		(0.061)		(0.061)		(0.067)
N		113572		4569		71328
						2486

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.12: Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Return, Without AFG and ERI

	(Model 26B)		(Model 27B)		(Model 28B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Civil Conflict, Host Only	0.716*** (0.186)	-0.017 (0.400)				
Civil Conflict, Origin Only	-0.056 (0.126)	-1.269*** (0.355)				
Civil Conflict, Both	0.203 (0.222)	-0.985* (0.457)				
Conflict Duration, Origin			-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.087*** (0.012)		
Post-conflict Duration, Origin					0.061*** (0.015)	-0.017 (0.052)
Civil Conflict, Host			0.538*** (0.156)	0.298 (0.286)	0.492** (0.158)	0.135 (0.310)
Polity, Origin	-0.076*** (0.012)	0.046 (0.032)	-0.073*** (0.011)	0.050 [†] (0.030)	-0.072*** (0.011)	0.061 [†] (0.032)
Polity, Host	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.042 [†] (0.022)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.040 [†] (0.023)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.025 (0.023)
Respect for HR, Origin	0.046 (0.068)	-0.746*** (0.153)	-0.043 (0.064)	-0.835*** (0.149)	-0.067 (0.066)	-0.508*** (0.149)
Respect for HR, Host	0.414*** (0.067)	0.440** (0.139)	0.436*** (0.066)	0.527*** (0.132)	0.412*** (0.065)	0.465*** (0.134)
Minimum Distance	-0.073*** (0.021)	-0.799*** (0.057)	-0.080*** (0.020)	-0.824*** (0.054)	-0.067** (0.021)	-0.834*** (0.054)
Refugees	-0.404*** (0.026)	0.198*** (0.040)	-0.407*** (0.025)	0.162*** (0.037)	-0.401*** (0.025)	0.163*** (0.038)
Hosting Duration	-0.060*** (0.009)	0.016 (0.019)	-0.056*** (0.009)	0.031 (0.019)	-0.070*** (0.009)	0.002 (0.019)
GDPPC, Origin	-0.070 (0.050)	-0.292* (0.123)	-0.055 (0.052)	-0.251 [†] (0.131)	-0.088 [†] (0.050)	-0.416** (0.143)
GDPPC, Host	0.495*** (0.048)	0.473*** (0.103)	0.486*** (0.048)	0.441*** (0.097)	0.501*** (0.049)	0.521*** (0.104)
Population, Origin	0.136** (0.049)	-0.318* (0.144)	0.112* (0.050)	-0.411** (0.144)	0.136** (0.049)	-0.368* (0.144)
Population, Host	0.270*** (0.046)	0.463*** (0.092)	0.286*** (0.044)	0.529*** (0.092)	0.270*** (0.045)	0.508** (0.099)
Constant	-7.854*** (1.033)	3.682 (2.620)	-7.710*** (1.047)	3.969 (2.597)	-7.953*** (1.027)	4.316 [†] (2.612)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.246*** (0.070)		2.228*** (0.070)		2.255*** (0.071)
N		86987		3177		86987
						3177

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

B.5 Removing Outliers - Dropping Returnees Above 95th Percentile

Table B.13: Effect of Political Factors on Refugee Return, Without Values Above 95th Percentile

	(Model 29B)	(Model 30B)	(Model 31B)	(Model 32B)	(Model 33B)	(Model 34B)
	Pr(0)	Pr(0)	Pr(0)	Pr(0)	Pr(0)	Pr(0)
	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count
Polity, Origin	-0.039*** (0.006)	0.068** (0.023)				
Polity, Host	0.085*** (0.006)	0.023 (0.018)				
Polity Change, Origin		-0.021* (0.010)	0.261** (0.030)			
Polity Change, Host		-0.041*** (0.009)	0.034 (0.027)			
P. Dem., Origin		-1.170*** (0.273)	2.734* (1.143)			
P. Dem., Host		3.112*** (0.226)	1.252* (0.564)			
P. Dem. Change, Origin				-2.731*** (0.545)	13.774*** (1.964)	
P. Dem. Change, Host				-2.352*** (0.694)	-0.940 (3.061)	
Respect for HR, Origin					0.035 (0.041)	-0.144 (0.131)
Respect for HR, Host					0.526*** (0.037)	0.393*** (0.090)
Change in HR, Origin						-1.490*** (0.151)
Change in HR, Host						-0.758*** (0.166)
Minimum Distance	0.060** (0.012)	-0.415*** (0.031)	0.085** (0.010)	0.084*** (0.010)	0.021 (0.014)	0.094*** (0.011)
Refugees	-0.340*** (0.015)	0.261*** (0.031)	0.263*** (0.012)	-0.282*** (0.011)	-0.357*** (0.016)	-0.274*** (0.012)
Hosting Duration	-0.069*** (0.006)	-0.045** (0.015)	-0.073*** (0.006)	-0.078*** (0.006)	-0.108*** (0.008)	-0.104*** (0.007)
Population, Origin	0.042 (0.033)	0.029 (0.136)	0.050 (0.032)	0.082** (0.030)	0.130*** (0.032)	0.067* (0.033)
Population, Host	0.098** (0.030)	0.255** (0.091)	0.188** (0.028)	0.104*** (0.027)	0.309*** (0.032)	0.096*** (0.026)
Constant	-0.817 (0.684)	0.996 (2.290)	-1.155† (0.647)	-1.681** (0.681)	-5.297*** (0.599)	-1.088† (0.641)
$ln(\alpha)$	2.259*** (0.057)	2.125*** (0.052)	2.160*** (0.057)	2.042*** (0.052)	2.169*** (0.058)	2.030*** (0.053)
N	173694	4649	172950	181453	163738	163735
		4609	5453	5451	4966	4966

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last repatriation" omitted from presentation.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.14: Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, Without Values Above 95th Percentile

	(Model 35B)		(Model 36B)		(Model 37B)		(Model 38B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
GDPPC, Origin	-0.053 [†] (0.031)	-0.171 [†] (0.099)						
GDPPC, Host	0.512*** (0.034)	0.485*** (0.075)						
GDPPC Growth, Host			-0.626*** (0.072)	-0.829*** (0.204)				
GDPPC Growth, Origin			-1.392*** (0.097)	-1.709*** (0.288)				
Engagement Rate, Origin					1.393** (0.521)	-4.032* (1.606)		
Engagement Rate, Host					5.797*** (0.518)	3.447* (1.404)		
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin							-15.633*** (2.845)	-39.427*** (10.020)
Change in Eng. Rate, Host							-8.786*** (2.550)	17.492* (7.121)
Minimum Distance	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.550*** (0.039)	0.083*** (0.010)	-0.422*** (0.025)	0.061*** (0.014)	-0.466*** (0.041)	0.084*** (0.011)	-0.449*** (0.031)
Refugees	-0.388*** (0.018)	0.283*** (0.026)	-0.290*** (0.011)	0.293*** (0.023)	-0.320*** (0.014)	0.265*** (0.033)	-0.281*** (0.012)	0.268*** (0.031)
Hosting Duration	-0.084*** (0.007)	-0.050** (0.016)	-0.068*** (0.006)	-0.049** (0.016)	-0.104*** (0.008)	-0.057** (0.019)	-0.075*** (0.007)	-0.028 (0.017)
Population, Origin	0.117*** (0.033)	0.033 (0.107)	0.051 [†] (0.029)	-0.030 (0.102)	0.090** (0.034)	0.054 (0.132)	0.063* (0.031)	-0.069 (0.121)
Population, Host	0.177*** (0.029)	0.338*** (0.073)	0.135*** (0.025)	0.235*** (0.066)	0.105*** (0.030)	0.295*** (0.086)	0.132*** (0.028)	0.304*** (0.086)
Constant	-6.408*** (0.720)	-2.449 (1.852)	7.512*** (0.799)	14.297*** (2.486)	-4.079*** (0.700)	0.488 (2.127)	-2.098*** (0.598)	1.970 (1.777)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.159*** (0.056)		1.997*** (0.049)		2.085*** (0.058)		2.041*** (0.053)
N		171461		5075		169348		5035
						154860		4494
								150116
								4463

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last repatriation" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.15: Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return, Without Values Above 95th Percentile

	(Model 39B)		(Model 40B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Civil Conflict, Origin	-0.143 [†] (0.074)	-0.719** (0.235)		
Civil Conflict, Host	-0.179 [†] (0.104)	-0.174 (0.293)		
Civil Conflict, Host Only			0.007 (0.124)	-0.382 (0.438)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only			-0.079 (0.079)	-0.781** (0.264)
Civil Conflict, Both			-0.451** (0.146)	-0.856* (0.374)
Minimum Distance	0.087*** (0.012)	-0.422*** (0.029)	0.087*** (0.012)	-0.421*** (0.029)
Refugees	-0.274*** (0.013)	0.288*** (0.031)	-0.274*** (0.013)	0.288*** (0.030)
Hosting Duration	-0.064*** (0.006)	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.064*** (0.006)	-0.013 (0.016)
Population, Origin	0.179*** (0.039)	-0.032 (0.148)	0.177*** (0.038)	-0.031 (0.145)
Population, Host	0.082** (0.028)	0.205* (0.092)	0.082** (0.028)	0.207* (0.091)
Constant	-3.132*** (0.697)	2.725 (2.341)	-3.132*** (0.689)	2.725 (2.293)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.028*** (0.056)		2.031*** (0.056)
N		119057 4976		119057 4976

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.16: Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns, Without Values Above 95th Percentile

	(Model 41B)		(Model 42B)		(Model 43B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Conflict Duration, Origin	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.054*** (0.010)				
Post-conflict Duration, Origin			0.009 (0.010)	-0.124*** (0.027)		
Peace Agreement					-1.478*** (0.125)	0.232 (0.313)
Ceasefire					0.272* (0.123)	0.984*** (0.270)
Govt. Victory					-0.790*** (0.111)	-0.362 (0.275)
Rebel Victory					-0.717*** (0.157)	0.284 (0.419)
Low Activity					-0.426** (0.135)	-1.069** (0.344)
Civil Conflict, Host	-0.207* (0.105)	-0.304 (0.285)	-0.178 [†] (0.104)	-0.281 (0.285)	-0.091 (0.120)	-0.077 (0.264)
Minimum Distance	0.085*** (0.012)	-0.436*** (0.029)	0.091*** (0.012)	-0.439*** (0.032)	0.072*** (0.015)	-0.484*** (0.035)
Refugees	-0.273*** (0.013)	0.287*** (0.030)	-0.270*** (0.013)	0.249*** (0.031)	-0.295*** (0.015)	0.293*** (0.030)
Hosting Duration	-0.065*** (0.006)	-0.011 (0.016)	-0.072*** (0.006)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.037*** (0.009)	-0.077*** (0.019)
Population, Origin	0.179*** (0.038)	-0.075 (0.141)	0.153*** (0.037)	-0.318* (0.132)	0.069 (0.045)	-0.063 (0.136)
Population, Host	0.093** (0.029)	0.250** (0.094)	0.090** (0.028)	0.273** (0.091)	0.130*** (0.035)	0.252** (0.090)
Constant	-3.265*** (0.712)	2.717 (2.269)	-2.839*** (0.692)	6.631** (2.081)	-1.148 (0.907)	3.084 (2.639)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.023*** (0.056)		2.013*** (0.056)		1.752*** (0.070)
N		119057		4976		72358
						2546

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.17: Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Return, Without Values Above 95th Percentile

	(Model 44B)		(Model 45B)		(Model 46B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Civil Conflict, Host Only	0.795*** (0.179)	0.482 (0.404)				
Civil Conflict, Origin Only	-0.067 (0.117)	-1.026** (0.326)				
Civil Conflict, Both	0.222 (0.208)	-0.606 (0.416)				
Conflict Duration, Origin			-0.021** (0.006)	-0.076*** (0.011)		
Civil Conflict, Host			0.551*** (0.146)	0.452 [†] (0.255)	0.538*** (0.146)	0.426 (0.265)
Post-conflict Duration, Origin					0.068*** (0.014)	0.015 (0.047)
Polity, Origin	-0.078*** (0.011)	0.015 (0.030)	-0.074*** (0.011)	0.025 (0.028)	-0.075*** (0.011)	0.027 (0.030)
Polity, Host	-0.017 [†] (0.011)	-0.056** (0.021)	-0.018 [†] (0.010)	-0.055** (0.021)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.041 [†] (0.021)
Respect for HR, Origin	0.062 (0.064)	-0.538*** (0.133)	-0.001 (0.060)	-0.616*** (0.131)	-0.044 (0.063)	-0.357* (0.140)
Respect for HR, Host	0.379*** (0.065)	0.331** (0.125)	0.390*** (0.064)	0.379** (0.120)	0.365*** (0.063)	0.308** (0.119)
Minimum Distance	-0.063** (0.021)	-0.629*** (0.044)	-0.067** (0.020)	-0.649*** (0.043)	-0.054** (0.021)	-0.646*** (0.043)
Refugees	-0.387*** (0.026)	0.267*** (0.030)	-0.392*** (0.026)	0.224*** (0.031)	-0.386*** (0.026)	0.233*** (0.032)
Hosting Duration	-0.066*** (0.009)	0.012 (0.016)	-0.064*** (0.009)	0.024 (0.017)	-0.076*** (0.009)	-0.001 (0.015)
GDPPC, Origin	-0.061 (0.046)	-0.235* (0.107)	-0.044 (0.049)	-0.178 (0.118)	-0.077 [†] (0.047)	-0.340** (0.124)
GDPPC, Host	0.520*** (0.048)	0.525*** (0.095)	0.510*** (0.048)	0.498*** (0.091)	0.533*** (0.047)	0.603*** (0.093)
Population, Origin	0.152*** (0.045)	-0.269* (0.124)	0.132** (0.046)	-0.343** (0.121)	0.150** (0.046)	-0.322** (0.122)
Population, Host	0.247*** (0.043)	0.361*** (0.080)	0.261*** (0.042)	0.417*** (0.082)	0.247*** (0.043)	0.398*** (0.088)
Constant	-8.004*** (0.962)	2.256 (2.264)	-7.879*** (0.973)	2.398 (2.263)	-8.111*** (0.967)	2.654 (2.346)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.133*** (0.067)		2.113*** (0.069)		2.137*** (0.070)
N		89294 3323		89294 3323		89294 3323

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

B.6 All Directed Dyads

Table B.18: Effect of Political Factors on Refugee Return, All Directed Dyads

	(Model 47B)	(Model 48B)	(Model 49B)	(Model 50B)	(Model 51B)	(Model 52B)
	Pr(o)	Pr(o)	Pr(o)	Pr(o)	Pr(o)	Pr(o)
	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count
Polity, Origin	0.013 [†] (0.008)					
Polity, Host	0.034*** (0.007)					
Polity Change, Origin		-0.018* (0.008)				
Polity Change, Host		0.285*** (0.027)				
P. Dem., Origin		0.015 (0.009)	1.277** (0.403)			
P. Dem., Host			4.340 [†] (2.253)			
P. Dem. Change, Origin			1.417*** (0.267)			
P. Dem. Change, Host				17.843*** (1.941)		
Respect for HR, Origin				2.957 (3.042)	0.276*** (0.045)	3.170*** (0.166)
Respect for HR, Host					0.331*** (0.042)	0.200*** (0.043)
Change in HR, Origin						-0.660 (0.160)
Change in HR, Host						-0.600*** (0.176***)
Minimum Distance	0.180*** (0.013)	-0.594*** (0.045)	0.165*** (0.013)	0.163*** (0.013)	0.174*** (0.015)	0.176*** (0.014)
Refugees	-0.480*** (0.021)	0.210*** (0.035)	-0.439*** (0.021)	-0.402*** (0.015)	-0.471*** (0.022)	-0.412*** (0.018)
Hosting Duration	-0.114*** (0.010)	-0.077*** (0.023)	-0.114*** (0.010)	-0.121*** (0.008)	-0.165*** (0.012)	-0.156*** (0.011)
Population, Origin	-0.157*** (0.041)	-0.477** (0.171)	-0.117** (0.040)	-0.051 (0.035)	-0.042 (0.039)	-0.110** (0.040)
Population, Host	0.008 (0.030)	0.340*** (0.091)	0.257** (0.086)	0.005 (0.028)	0.124*** (0.031)	-0.009 (0.029)
Constant	4.392*** (0.781)	10.250*** (2.869)	3.845*** (0.744)	2.578*** (0.675)	2.924 (3.023)	4.056*** (0.758)
$ln(\alpha)$	2.608*** (0.064)	2.523*** (0.069)	2.546*** (0.066)	2.342*** (0.058)	2.530*** (0.066)	2.411*** (0.067)
N	697219	4963	743853	5804	5309	692533
		4920	5806	5804	5309	5308

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last repatriation” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.19: Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, All Directed Dyads

	(Model 53B)		(Model 54B)		(Model 55B)		(Model 56B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
GDPPC, Origin	0.321*** (0.038)	0.157 (0.155)						
GDPPC, Host	0.262*** (0.037)	0.310** (0.097)						
GDPPC Growth, Host			-0.703*** (0.071)	-1.055*** (0.264)				
GDPPC Growth, Origin			-1.406*** (0.095)	-1.738*** (0.283)				
Engagement Rate, Origin					2.811*** (0.608)	-6.765*** (1.946)		
Engagement Rate, Host					3.889*** (0.495)	0.817 (1.511)		
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin							-14.166*** (3.128)	-39.968** (13.047)
Change in Eng. Rate, Host							-11.343*** (2.969)	4.791 (13.200)
Minimum Distance	0.162*** (0.015)	-0.715*** (0.062)	0.165*** (0.013)	-0.575*** (0.041)	0.171*** (0.015)	-0.647*** (0.055)	0.175*** (0.015)	-0.570*** (0.053)
Refugees	-0.508*** (0.023)	0.189*** (0.039)	-0.428*** (0.019)	0.244*** (0.039)	-0.447*** (0.020)	0.200*** (0.041)	-0.422*** (0.018)	0.189*** (0.039)
Hosting Duration	-0.129*** (0.011)	-0.084*** (0.024)	-0.113*** (0.010)	-0.080*** (0.022)	-0.153*** (0.012)	-0.096*** (0.026)	-0.122*** (0.010)	-0.054* (0.026)
Population, Origin	-0.135*** (0.041)	-0.540*** (0.164)	-0.143*** (0.036)	-0.412** (0.138)	-0.160*** (0.039)	-0.461** (0.160)	-0.148*** (0.044)	-0.582** (0.189)
Population, Host	0.043 (0.029)	0.397*** (0.087)	0.034 (0.029)	0.391*** (0.101)	0.000 (0.032)	0.396*** (0.096)	0.024 (0.030)	0.406*** (0.099)
Constant	-0.733 (0.807)	7.789** (2.869)	13.227*** (0.843)	21.380*** (2.795)	2.249** (0.793)	11.697*** (2.859)	3.572*** (0.829)	10.974*** (3.231)
$\ln(\alpha)$	2.512*** (0.062)		2.378*** (0.064)		2.487*** (0.069)		2.424*** (0.066)	
N	732934	5233	724271	5187	641242	4638	622068	4604

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last repatriation" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.20: Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return

	(Model 57B)		(Model 58B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Civil Conflict, Origin	-0.170 [†] (0.093)	-0.722* (0.300)		
Civil Conflict, Host	-0.079 (0.113)	-0.630* (0.306)		
Civil Conflict, Host Only			0.066 (0.134)	-1.389*** (0.410)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only			-0.109 (0.096)	-0.957** (0.321)
Civil Conflict, Both			-0.403* (0.162)	-1.223** (0.419)
Minimum Distance	0.143*** (0.016)	-0.642*** (0.044)	0.144*** (0.016)	-0.635*** (0.042)
Refugees	-0.371*** (0.018)	0.257*** (0.044)	-0.372*** (0.018)	0.260*** (0.041)
Hosting Duration	-0.091*** (0.008)	-0.018 (0.021)	-0.092*** (0.008)	-0.019 (0.020)
Population, Origin	0.082 [†] (0.050)	-0.297 (0.194)	0.084 [†] (0.047)	-0.280 (0.179)
Population, Host	0.023 (0.031)	0.391** (0.122)	0.020 (0.031)	0.380** (0.116)
Constant	-0.206 (0.823)	6.141* (2.775)	-0.226 (0.783)	6.101* (2.575)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.299*** (0.062)		2.295*** (0.061)
N		342523 5245		342523 5245

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.21: Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns

	(Model 59B)		(Model 60B)		(Model 61B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Conflict Duration, Origin	-0.018** (0.006)	-0.053*** (0.012)				
Post-conflict Duration, Origin			-0.007 (0.013)	-0.183*** (0.032)		
Peace Agreement					-1.728*** (0.139)	0.290 (0.394)
Ceasefire					0.356** (0.137)	0.841* (0.339)
Govt. Victory					-0.756*** (0.115)	-0.297 (0.269)
Rebel Victory					-0.711*** (0.156)	0.229 (0.402)
Low Activity					-0.582*** (0.144)	-1.213*** (0.355)
Civil Conflict, Host	-0.110 (0.114)	-0.747** (0.287)	-0.064 (0.112)	-0.615* (0.282)	-0.056 (0.127)	-1.018*** (0.283)
Minimum Distance	0.137*** (0.016)	-0.660*** (0.046)	0.149*** (0.016)	-0.632*** (0.043)	0.129*** (0.017)	-0.744*** (0.050)
Refugees	-0.367*** (0.018)	0.264*** (0.044)	-0.368*** (0.018)	0.210*** (0.041)	-0.378*** (0.019)	0.257*** (0.038)
Hosting Duration	-0.092*** (0.008)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.102*** (0.008)	-0.028 (0.018)	-0.071*** (0.011)	-0.120*** (0.023)
Population, Origin	0.074 (0.048)	-0.353 [†] (0.183)	0.046 (0.041)	-0.560*** (0.144)	-0.019 (0.050)	-0.296 [†] (0.152)
Population, Host	0.035 (0.032)	0.436*** (0.124)	0.020 (0.029)	0.409*** (0.103)	0.060 [†] (0.034)	0.438*** (0.095)
Constant	-0.247 (0.836)	6.298* (2.735)	0.450 (0.756)	10.472** (2.212)	1.800 [†] (0.986)	6.277* (2.926)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.295*** (0.062)		2.264*** (0.064)		1.995*** (0.069)
N		342523		5245		235650
		5245		342523		5245

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.22: Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Return

	(Model 62B)		(Model 63B)		(Model 64B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Civil Conflict, Host Only	0.769*** (0.200)	0.077 (0.378)				
Civil Conflict, Origin Only	-0.055 (0.131)	-1.308*** (0.333)				
Civil Conflict, Both	0.408 [†] (0.223)	-0.454 (0.439)				
Conflict Duration, Origin			-0.022** (0.007)	-0.090*** (0.012)		
Post-conflict Duration, Origin					0.056** (0.017)	0.004 (0.052)
Civil Conflict, Host			0.635*** (0.162)	0.530 [†] (0.278)	0.603*** (0.165)	0.443 (0.294)
Polity, Origin	-0.059*** (0.013)	0.013 (0.033)	-0.055*** (0.013)	0.027 (0.032)	-0.056*** (0.013)	0.027 (0.034)
Polity, Host	-0.026* (0.011)	-0.015 (0.022)	-0.025* (0.011)	-0.011 (0.023)	-0.022* (0.011)	0.004 (0.023)
Respect for HR, Origin	0.053 (0.067)	-0.967*** (0.147)	-0.014 (0.065)	-1.019*** (0.155)	-0.058 (0.069)	-0.783*** (0.168)
Respect for HR, Host	0.368*** (0.076)	0.387** (0.146)	0.384*** (0.075)	0.469*** (0.141)	0.360*** (0.074)	0.387** (0.138)
Minimum Distance	0.047 [†] (0.029)	-0.848*** (0.060)	0.039 (0.027)	-0.864*** (0.058)	0.050 [†] (0.029)	-0.882*** (0.060)
Refugees	-0.470*** (0.038)	0.210*** (0.037)	-0.469*** (0.036)	0.178*** (0.035)	-0.469*** (0.037)	0.184*** (0.037)
Hosting Duration	-0.092*** (0.011)	0.033 [†] (0.019)	-0.090*** (0.011)	0.043* (0.019)	-0.100*** (0.011)	0.018 (0.018)
GDPPC, Origin	0.081 (0.064)	-0.455*** (0.131)	0.085 (0.065)	-0.422** (0.142)	0.054 (0.065)	-0.595*** (0.146)
GDPPC, Host	0.425*** (0.055)	0.580*** (0.108)	0.413*** (0.055)	0.550*** (0.106)	0.436*** (0.055)	0.638*** (0.110)
Population, Origin	0.062 (0.061)	-0.386* (0.163)	0.038 (0.061)	-0.462** (0.166)	0.046 (0.063)	-0.458** (0.175)
Population, Host	0.162*** (0.043)	0.366*** (0.097)	0.180*** (0.043)	0.436*** (0.096)	0.161*** (0.044)	0.394*** (0.102)
Constant	-5.281*** (1.074)	6.527* (2.745)	-5.055*** (1.105)	6.463* (2.823)	-5.021*** (1.101)	7.698** (2.881)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.339*** (0.073)		2.309*** (0.075)		2.351*** (0.073)
N		255087 2678		255087 2678		255087 2678

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

B.7 5 Year Risk Sample

Table B.23: Effect of Political Factors on Refugee Return, 5 Year Risk Sample

	(Model 65B)	(Model 66B)	(Model 67B)	(Model 68B)	(Model 69B)	(Model 70B)
	Pr(o)	Pr(o)	Pr(o)	Pr(o)	Pr(o)	Pr(o)
	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count
Polity, Origin	-0.035*** (0.009)	0.112*** (0.034)				
Polity, Host	0.083*** (0.007)	0.037 [†] (0.021)				
Polity Change, Origin		-0.027** (0.009)	0.271*** (0.028)			
Polity Change, Host		-0.044*** (0.013)	0.013 (0.038)			
P. Dem., Origin		-1.094** (0.359)	4.272** (1.572)			
P. Dem., Host		3.062*** (0.252)	1.753** (0.635)			
P. Dem. Change, Origin				-3.457*** (0.619)	17.443*** (2.068)	
P. Dem. Change, Host				-1.719* (0.759)	1.250 (3.053)	
Respect for HR, Origin					-0.092 [†] (0.049)	-0.635*** (0.135)
Respect for HR, Host					0.553*** (0.041)	0.542*** (0.100)
Change in HR, Origin						-1.372*** (0.162)
Change in HR, Host						0.585 (0.585)
Minimum Distance	0.043** (0.013)	-0.631*** (0.045)	0.077*** (0.013)	-0.625*** (0.046)	0.072*** (0.011)	-0.903*** (0.176)
Refugees	-0.318*** (0.017)	0.277*** (0.038)	-0.278*** (0.015)	0.231*** (0.039)	-0.257*** (0.012)	-0.958* (0.469)
Hosting Duration	-0.069*** (0.008)	-0.075*** (0.022)	-0.071*** (0.008)	-0.055** (0.021)	-0.074*** (0.006)	-0.649*** (0.259)
Population, Origin	0.056 (0.042)	-0.290 [†] (0.166)	0.063 (0.039)	-0.198 (0.137)	0.136*** (0.034)	0.078*** (0.047)
Population, Host	0.078* (0.033)	0.271* (0.106)	0.103** (0.032)	0.299** (0.096)	0.092* (0.028)	0.256*** (0.040)
Constant	-0.805 (0.816)	7.775** (2.765)	-1.386 [†] (0.760)	6.130** (2.115)	-2.585*** (0.676)	-0.024 (2.576)
<i>ln</i> (<i>n</i>)	2.335*** (0.059)	2.265*** (0.060)	2.240*** (0.059)	2.101*** (0.053)	2.195*** (0.060)	2.135*** (0.059)
<i>N</i>	139875	4431	139211	4390	146489	5248
				5249	4751	128201
						4750

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last repatriation” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.24: Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, 5 Year Risk Sample

	(Model 71B)		(Model 72B)		(Model 73B)		(Model 74B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
GDPPC, Origin	-0.040 (0.040)	-0.106 (0.130)						
GDPPC, Host	0.521*** (0.036)	0.532*** (0.085)						
GDPPC Growth, Host			-0.833*** (0.151)	-1.864** (0.625)				
GDPPC Growth, Origin			-1.225*** (0.110)	-1.276*** (0.252)				
Engagement Rate, Origin					0.411 (0.615)	-4.777* (1.882)		
Engagement Rate, Host					6.234*** (0.589)	5.228** (1.866)		
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin							-20.129*** (3.224)	-53.777*** (8.499)
Change in Eng. Rate, Host							-5.788* (2.894)	20.391** (7.826)
Minimum Distance	-0.051** (0.017)	-0.831*** (0.065)	0.069*** (0.012)	-0.622*** (0.044)	0.037* (0.015)	-0.719*** (0.056)	0.072*** (0.014)	-0.652*** (0.053)
Refugees	-0.366*** (0.020)	0.264*** (0.046)	-0.286*** (0.015)	0.275*** (0.046)	-0.300*** (0.015)	0.268*** (0.045)	-0.271*** (0.015)	0.251*** (0.047)
Hosting Duration	-0.086*** (0.008)	-0.064** (0.022)	-0.064*** (0.007)	-0.068** (0.023)	-0.108*** (0.009)	-0.090*** (0.026)	-0.071*** (0.008)	-0.040 [†] (0.023)
Population, Origin	0.150*** (0.044)	-0.128 (0.147)	0.069 [†] (0.038)	-0.329* (0.140)	0.149*** (0.042)	-0.118 (0.149)	0.094* (0.040)	-0.347* (0.154)
Population, Host	0.169*** (0.033)	0.397*** (0.093)	0.150*** (0.031)	0.444*** (0.115)	0.096** (0.035)	0.345** (0.109)	0.135*** (0.032)	0.441*** (0.123)
Constant	-6.955*** (0.849)	0.684 (2.335)	7.009*** (0.988)	20.556*** (3.487)	-4.747*** (0.951)	4.232 (2.924)	-2.801*** (0.742)	6.195** (2.163)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.263*** (0.063)		2.173*** (0.063)		2.207*** (0.063)		2.199*** (0.066)
N		137230 4835		135662 4793		123044 4271		119600 4237

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last repatriation" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.25: Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return, 5 Year Risk Sample

	(Model 75B)		(Model 76B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Civil Conflict, Origin	-0.174*	-0.798**		
	(0.085)	(0.292)		
Civil Conflict, Host	-0.284**	-0.621*		
	(0.108)	(0.302)		
Civil Conflict, Host Only			-0.164	-1.321**
			(0.126)	(0.409)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only			-0.129	-1.004**
			(0.088)	(0.314)
Civil Conflict, Both			-0.555***	-1.269**
			(0.156)	(0.417)
Minimum Distance	0.071***	-0.639***	0.073***	-0.630***
	(0.013)	(0.044)	(0.013)	(0.042)
Refugees	-0.273***	0.274***	-0.274***	0.274***
	(0.014)	(0.043)	(0.014)	(0.041)
Hosting Duration	-0.071***	-0.031	-0.071***	-0.031
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.007)	(0.021)
Population, Origin	0.159***	-0.175	0.157***	-0.178
	(0.047)	(0.194)	(0.045)	(0.180)
Population, Host	0.114***	0.415***	0.110***	0.395***
	(0.032)	(0.124)	(0.031)	(0.116)
Constant	-3.195***	3.865	-3.115***	4.272
	(0.807)	(2.851)	(0.773)	(2.660)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.196***		2.191***
		(0.059)		(0.059)
N	116819	5016	116819	5016

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.26: Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns, 5 Year Risk Sample

	(Model 77B)		(Model 78B)		(Model 79B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Conflict Duration, Origin	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.057*** (0.012)				
Post-conflict Duration, Origin			0.002 (0.011)	-0.172*** (0.031)		
Peace Agreement					-1.377*** (0.125)	0.239 (0.364)
Ceasefire					0.344** (0.126)	0.983** (0.350)
Govt. Victory					-0.761*** (0.108)	-0.315 (0.269)
Rebel Victory					-0.664*** (0.152)	0.170 (0.385)
Low Activity					-0.447*** (0.134)	-1.313*** (0.359)
Civil Conflict, Host	-0.321** (0.110)	-0.764** (0.285)	-0.261* (0.105)	-0.658* (0.278)	-0.251* (0.124)	-0.955*** (0.276)
Minimum Distance	0.068*** (0.013)	-0.660*** (0.045)	0.078*** (0.013)	-0.633*** (0.044)	0.056*** (0.015)	-0.749*** (0.049)
Refugees	-0.270*** (0.014)	0.282*** (0.044)	-0.269*** (0.014)	0.222*** (0.042)	-0.282*** (0.015)	0.278*** (0.036)
Hosting Duration	-0.072*** (0.007)	-0.031 (0.021)	-0.081*** (0.007)	-0.036 [†] (0.018)	-0.050*** (0.010)	-0.132*** (0.023)
Population, Origin	0.159*** (0.046)	-0.212 (0.183)	0.124** (0.040)	-0.497*** (0.145)	0.056 (0.049)	-0.187 (0.162)
Population, Host	0.128*** (0.032)	0.476*** (0.124)	0.109*** (0.030)	0.432*** (0.103)	0.153*** (0.035)	0.470*** (0.092)
Constant	-3.425*** (0.818)	3.428 (2.745)	-2.557*** (0.735)	9.136*** (2.224)	-1.347 (0.955)	4.195 (3.053)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.194*** (0.060)		2.151*** (0.059)		1.900*** (0.068)
N		116819		5016		66442
						5016

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.27: Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Return, 5 Year Risk Sample

	(Model 80B)		(Model 81B)		(Model 82B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Civil Conflict, Host Only	0.769*** (0.178)	0.081 (0.382)				
Civil Conflict, Origin Only	-0.077 (0.122)	-1.268*** (0.343)				
Civil Conflict, Both	0.502* (0.207)	-0.315 (0.461)				
Conflict Duration, Origin			-0.023*** (0.007)	-0.090*** (0.013)		
Post-conflict Duration, Origin					0.058*** (0.015)	0.002 (0.053)
Civil Conflict, Host			0.672*** (0.145)	0.588* (0.273)	0.657*** (0.149)	0.539 [†] (0.306)
Polity, Origin	-0.068*** (0.012)	0.030 (0.033)	-0.064*** (0.012)	0.043 (0.031)	-0.067*** (0.012)	0.044 (0.034)
Polity, Host	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.039 [†] (0.022)	-0.018 (0.011)	-0.039 [†] (0.023)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.024 (0.023)
Respect for HR, Origin	0.118 [†] (0.070)	-0.729*** (0.147)	0.034 (0.067)	-0.839*** (0.155)	0.012 (0.067)	-0.538*** (0.151)
Respect for HR, Host	0.465*** (0.064)	0.465*** (0.139)	0.483*** (0.064)	0.538*** (0.136)	0.463*** (0.063)	0.480*** (0.141)
Minimum Distance	-0.074*** (0.021)	-0.818*** (0.055)	-0.078*** (0.021)	-0.832*** (0.054)	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.859*** (0.055)
Refugees	-0.367*** (0.026)	0.231*** (0.039)	-0.371*** (0.025)	0.193*** (0.038)	-0.365*** (0.025)	0.208*** (0.040)
Hosting Duration	-0.092*** (0.010)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.087*** (0.010)	0.006 (0.020)	-0.099*** (0.010)	-0.027 (0.019)
GDPPC, Origin	0.004 (0.050)	-0.184 (0.127)	0.016 (0.053)	-0.143 (0.139)	-0.020 (0.052)	-0.316* (0.148)
GDPPC, Host	0.517*** (0.048)	0.469*** (0.102)	0.505*** (0.048)	0.431*** (0.100)	0.527*** (0.049)	0.533*** (0.107)
Population, Origin	0.126* (0.050)	-0.399** (0.144)	0.111* (0.051)	-0.459** (0.147)	0.126* (0.053)	-0.448** (0.152)
Population, Host	0.250*** (0.044)	0.410*** (0.091)	0.270*** (0.043)	0.490*** (0.092)	0.257*** (0.044)	0.464*** (0.100)
Constant	-7.788*** (1.025)	5.513* (2.669)	-7.826*** (1.048)	4.968 [†] (2.732)	-7.974*** (1.055)	5.830* (2.780)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.239*** (0.070)		2.213*** (0.070)		2.253*** (0.072)
N		87116 3308		87116 3308		87116 3308

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

B.8 10 Year Risk Sample

Table B.28: Effect of Political Factors on Refugee Return, 10 Year Risk Sample

	(Model 83B)	(Model 84B)	(Model 85B)	(Model 86B)	(Model 87B)	(Model 88B)
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Polity, Origin	-0.039*** (0.009)	0.104** (0.034)				
Polity, Host	0.083*** (0.007)	0.033 (0.021)				
Polity Change, Origin			-0.029** (0.009)	0.270** (0.027)		
Polity Change, Host			-0.043*** (0.013)	0.013 (0.037)		
P. Dem., Origin			-1.295*** (0.352)	3.517* (1.569)		
P. Dem., Host			3.074*** (0.251)	1.772** (0.631)		
P. Dem. Change, Origin				17.466*** (2.058)		
P. Dem. Change, Host				-1.700* (0.762)		
Respect for HR, Origin					-0.137** (0.046)	-0.736*** (0.126)
Respect for HR, Host					0.536*** (0.041)	0.525*** (0.096)
Change in HR, Origin						-1.443*** (0.164)
Change in HR, Host						2.858*** (0.585)
Minimum Distance	0.041** (0.013)	-0.636*** (0.046)	0.074*** (0.012)	-0.629*** (0.046)	-0.724*** (0.045)	0.075*** (0.012)
Refugees	-0.339*** (0.017)	0.265*** (0.038)	-0.295*** (0.015)	0.226*** (0.038)	-0.355*** (0.017)	-0.274*** (0.040)
Hosting Duration	-0.062*** (0.007)	-0.065** (0.021)	-0.066*** (0.007)	-0.051* (0.020)	-0.098*** (0.008)	-0.092*** (0.008)
Population, Origin	0.042 (0.042)	-0.290† (0.166)	0.051 (0.039)	-0.186 (0.138)	-0.544*** (0.121)	0.098* (0.041)
Population, Host	0.096** (0.033)	0.284** (0.107)	0.118*** (0.032)	0.303** (0.097)	0.306*** (0.034)	0.093** (0.029)
Constant	-0.868 (0.809)	7.511** (2.753)	-1.390† (0.752)	5.846** (2.088)	-4.412*** (0.769)	-1.696* (0.772)
<i>In</i> (α)	2.339*** (0.058)	4595	2.260*** (0.059)	4554	2.195*** (0.060)	2.132*** (0.058)
N	150126	4595	149451	4554	138921	4932
			157237	5429	5428	4931

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last repatriation" omitted from presentation.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.29: Effect of Economic Factors on Refugee Return, 10 Year Risk Sample

	(Model 89B)		(Model 90B)		(Model 91B)		(Model 92B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
GDPPC, Origin	-0.072 [†] (0.039)	-0.172 (0.130)						
GDPPC, Host	0.514 ^{***} (0.036)	0.525 ^{***} (0.086)						
GDPPC Growth, Host			-0.673 ^{***} (0.081)	-0.884 ^{**} (0.277)				
GDPPC Growth, Origin			-1.274 ^{***} (0.100)	-1.341 ^{***} (0.225)				
Engagement Rate, Origin					0.828 (0.596)	-4.260 [*] (1.851)		
Engagement Rate, Host					5.869 ^{***} (0.594)	4.945 ^{**} (1.839)		
Change in Eng. Rate, Origin							-16.248 ^{***} (2.987)	-50.459 ^{***} (8.314)
Change in Eng. Rate, Host							-5.383 [†] (2.846)	21.953 ^{**} (7.472)
Minimum Distance	-0.048 ^{**} (0.016)	-0.820 ^{***} (0.064)	0.069 ^{***} (0.012)	-0.605 ^{***} (0.044)	0.038 [*] (0.015)	-0.714 ^{***} (0.056)	0.069 ^{***} (0.013)	-0.651 ^{***} (0.052)
Refugees	-0.392 ^{***} (0.020)	0.258 ^{***} (0.045)	-0.303 ^{***} (0.015)	0.269 ^{***} (0.044)	-0.322 ^{***} (0.016)	0.259 ^{***} (0.045)	-0.289 ^{***} (0.015)	0.246 ^{***} (0.047)
Hosting Duration	-0.075 ^{***} (0.008)	-0.054 [*] (0.021)	-0.062 ^{***} (0.007)	-0.067 ^{**} (0.022)	-0.098 ^{***} (0.009)	-0.078 ^{**} (0.025)	-0.066 ^{***} (0.007)	-0.035 (0.023)
Population, Origin	0.143 ^{***} (0.042)	-0.104 (0.144)	0.049 (0.038)	-0.327 [*] (0.140)	0.127 ^{**} (0.041)	-0.124 (0.148)	0.074 [†] (0.040)	-0.342 [*] (0.155)
Population, Host	0.186 ^{***} (0.033)	0.408 ^{***} (0.095)	0.162 ^{***} (0.030)	0.440 ^{***} (0.115)	0.115 ^{***} (0.035)	0.360 ^{***} (0.109)	0.150 ^{***} (0.032)	0.447 ^{***} (0.122)
Constant	-6.899 ^{***} (0.837)	0.424 (2.277)	6.686 ^{***} (0.885)	16.262 ^{***} (2.650)	-4.734 ^{***} (0.926)	3.859 (2.858)	-2.674 ^{***} (0.733)	5.936 ^{**} (2.143)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.271 ^{***} (0.061)		2.170 ^{***} (0.062)		2.210 ^{***} (0.062)		2.195 ^{***} (0.064)
N		147716		5014		146103		4969
						132737		4444
								129096
								4410

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last repatriation" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, $*$ $p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Table B.30: Effect of Civil Conflict on Refugee Return, 10 Year Risk Sample

	(Model 93B)		(Model 94B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Civil Conflict, Origin	-0.155 [†] (0.086)	-0.744* (0.289)		
Civil Conflict, Host	-0.278** (0.108)	-0.616* (0.298)		
Civil Conflict, Host Only			-0.145 (0.124)	-1.292** (0.402)
Civil Conflict, Origin Only			-0.105 (0.088)	-0.942** (0.308)
Civil Conflict, Both			-0.545*** (0.157)	-1.209** (0.412)
Minimum Distance	0.071*** (0.013)	-0.641*** (0.043)	0.072*** (0.013)	-0.633*** (0.041)
Refugees	-0.288*** (0.015)	0.265*** (0.043)	-0.288*** (0.014)	0.265*** (0.042)
Hosting Duration	-0.066*** (0.007)	-0.026 (0.021)	-0.066*** (0.007)	-0.026 (0.020)
Population, Origin	0.153** (0.047)	-0.190 (0.193)	0.151*** (0.045)	-0.192 (0.180)
Population, Host	0.121*** (0.031)	0.417*** (0.122)	0.117*** (0.031)	0.400*** (0.115)
Constant	-3.235*** (0.801)	4.015 (2.819)	-3.164*** (0.768)	4.379 [†] (2.637)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.191*** (0.058)		2.186*** (0.057)
N		119246 5165		119246 5165

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.31: Effect of Origin State Civil Conflict Dynamics on Refugee Returns, 10 Year Risk Sample

	(Model 95B)		(Model 96B)		(Model 97B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Conflict Duration, Origin	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.056*** (0.012)				
Post-conflict Duration, Origin			0.002 (0.011)	-0.175*** (0.031)		
Peace Agreement					-1.459*** (0.125)	0.242 (0.366)
Ceasefire					0.280* (0.122)	0.863* (0.339)
Govt. Victory					-0.741*** (0.109)	-0.230 (0.265)
Rebel Victory					-0.705*** (0.154)	0.198 (0.390)
Low Activity					-0.445*** (0.134)	-1.302*** (0.358)
Civil Conflict, Host	-0.312** (0.109)	-0.749** (0.281)	-0.253* (0.105)	-0.645* (0.274)	-0.261* (0.124)	-0.997*** (0.267)
Minimum Distance	0.067*** (0.013)	-0.660*** (0.045)	0.077*** (0.013)	-0.634*** (0.043)	0.057*** (0.015)	-0.747*** (0.048)
Refugees	-0.285*** (0.015)	0.274*** (0.043)	-0.284*** (0.014)	0.215*** (0.041)	-0.302*** (0.016)	0.263*** (0.038)
Hosting Duration	-0.067*** (0.007)	-0.026 (0.021)	-0.075*** (0.007)	-0.030 [†] (0.018)	-0.041*** (0.009)	-0.118*** (0.023)
Population, Origin	0.157*** (0.046)	-0.213 (0.183)	0.121** (0.039)	-0.501*** (0.145)	0.044 (0.050)	-0.184 (0.170)
Population, Host	0.135*** (0.032)	0.473*** (0.123)	0.117*** (0.029)	0.433*** (0.102)	0.166*** (0.035)	0.483*** (0.093)
Constant	-3.499*** (0.809)	3.456 (2.711)	-2.627*** (0.730)	9.135*** (2.207)	-1.347 (0.964)	3.765 (3.139)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.189*** (0.058)		2.145*** (0.057)		1.913*** (0.065)
N		119246		5165		68984
		5165		119246		2608

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.32: Physical, Political, and Economic Security Conditions on Refugee Return, 10 Year Risk Sample

	(Model 98B)		(Model 99B)		(Model 100B)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Civil Conflict, Host Only	0.725*** (0.182)	0.065 (0.372)				
Civil Conflict, Origin Only	-0.106 (0.122)	-1.268*** (0.342)				
Civil Conflict, Both	0.321 (0.211)	-0.448 (0.456)				
Conflict Duration, Origin			-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.093*** (0.012)		
Post-conflict Duration, Origin				0.068*** (0.015)	0.00 (0.051)	
Civil Conflict, Host			0.580*** (0.149)	0.504 [†] (0.274)	0.562*** (0.152)	0.440 (0.301)
Polity, Origin	-0.076*** (0.012)	0.032 (0.033)	-0.070*** (0.011)	0.049 (0.030)	-0.073*** (0.012)	0.047 (0.033)
Polity, Host	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.038 [†] (0.022)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.039 [†] (0.023)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.023 (0.023)
Respect for HR, Origin	-0.017 (0.064)	-0.910*** (0.143)	-0.084 (0.062)	-0.984*** (0.148)	-0.124 [†] (0.064)	-0.718*** (0.146)
Respect for HR, Host	0.409*** (0.067)	0.417** (0.135)	0.426*** (0.066)	0.492*** (0.132)	0.408*** (0.065)	0.434** (0.134)
Minimum Distance	-0.080*** (0.021)	-0.812*** (0.054)	-0.085*** (0.021)	-0.826*** (0.052)	-0.076*** (0.021)	-0.851*** (0.053)
Refugees	-0.399*** (0.027)	0.212*** (0.038)	-0.401*** (0.025)	0.181*** (0.036)	-0.393*** (0.026)	0.190*** (0.038)
Hosting Duration	-0.067*** (0.010)	0.011 (0.018)	-0.065*** (0.010)	0.023 (0.018)	-0.078*** (0.009)	-0.005 (0.018)
GDPPC, Origin	-0.061 (0.050)	-0.290* (0.125)	-0.048 (0.052)	-0.241 [†] (0.135)	-0.086 [†] (0.051)	-0.421** (0.144)
GDPPC, Host	0.509*** (0.048)	0.477** (0.102)	0.498*** (0.048)	0.441*** (0.099)	0.518*** (0.049)	0.535*** (0.104)
Population, Origin	0.114* (0.050)	-0.424** (0.150)	0.102 [†] (0.052)	-0.473** (0.153)	0.113* (0.053)	-0.478** (0.156)
Population, Host	0.258*** (0.044)	0.411*** (0.093)	0.277*** (0.043)	0.488*** (0.092)	0.262*** (0.044)	0.462*** (0.100)
Constant	-7.397*** (1.021)	6.252* (2.652)	-7.477*** (1.050)	5.548* (2.721)	-7.539*** (1.042)	6.717* (2.733)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.230*** (0.068)		2.201*** (0.068)		2.239*** (0.069)
N		89411 3440		89411 3440		89411 1 3440

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix C

Supplementary Material to The Effect of Leader Turnover on Refugee Return

C.1 Summary Statistics of Count Portion, Main Models

Table C.1: Summary statistics for Archigos Sample When Returnees > 0

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Returnees	5212	3865.894	35278.85	1	1569248
Leader Change	5212	.176	.381	0	1
Regular Exit	5212	.16	.366	0	1
Irregular Exit	5212	.02	.139	0	1
Removed w/ Foreign Support	4154	.006	.074	0	1
Removed w/o Foreign Support	5189	.204	.403	0	1
Leader Death	5212	.007	.085	0	1
Minimum Distance, (logged km)	5212	4.815	3.452	0	9.763
Refugees (logged)	5212	5.815	3.562	0	14.603
Leader Change, Host	5212	.153	.36	0	1
Civil Conflict	5212	.444	.497	0	1
Electoral Democracy, Origin	5212	.372	.181	.068	.906
Electoral Democracy, Host	5212	.525	.254	.02	.94
GDPPC, Origin	5212	6.724	1.253	4.19	10.032
GDPPC, Host	5212	7.728	1.679	4.19	11.647
Population, Host	5212	16.608	1.417	12.349	21.014
Population, Origin	5212	16.414	1.095	11.188	21.044
Years since last return	5212	3.164	5.609	0	27
Years since last return ²	5212	41.468	109.793	0	729
Years since last return ³	5212	707.041	2427.199	0	19683

Table C.2: Summary Statistics for CHISOLS Sample When Returnees > 0

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Returnees	3605	4962.195	41856.4	1	1569248
Leader Change	3605	.211	.408	0	1
Insider Change	3605	.123	.329	0	1
Outsider Change	3605	.088	.283	0	1
Regular Insider	3241	.123	.328	0	1
Irregular Insider	2872	.01	.1	0	1
Regular Outsider	3097	.082	.274	0	1
Irregular Outsider	2900	.02	.139	0	1
Insider change w/ and w/o FS	3288	.135	.342	0	1
Outsider Change w/ FS	2856	.005	.067	0	1
Outsider Change w/o FS	3147	.097	.295	0	1
Leader Death	3605	.01	.099	0	1
Minimum Distance, (logged km)	3605	4.825	3.484	0	9.763
Refugees (logged)	3605	5.687	3.668	0	14.603
Leader Change, Host	3605	.159	.366	0	1
Civil Conflict	3605	.428	.495	0	1
Electoral Democracy, Origin	3605	.36	.194	.068	.906
Electoral Democracy, Host	3605	.526	.26	.02	.921
GDPPC, Origin	3605	6.456	1.199	4.19	10.032
GDPPC, Host	3605	7.551	1.697	4.19	11.481
Population, Host	3605	16.605	1.41	13.228	20.994
Population, Origin	3605	16.306	1.087	13.096	21.004
Years since last return	3605	3	4.676	0	19
Years since last return ²	3605	30.857	69.095	0	361
Years since last return ³	3605	395.367	1139.976	0	6859

C.2 Pairwise Comparisons

Figure C.1: Pairwise Comparisons of Turnovers Signaling Policy Change




Figure C.2: Pairwise Comparisons of Turnovers Signaling Legitimacy




Figure C.3: Pairwise Comparisons of Turnovers Signaling Stability & Policy Change





Figure C.4: Pairwise Comparisons of Turnovers Signaling Legitimacy & Policy Change



C.3 Binary Leader Change Models

Table C.3: ZiNB Results of Any Leader Changes

	(Model 1C)		(Model 2C)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Leader Change	-0.364*** (0.103)	0.382 [†] (0.200)	-0.468*** (0.108)	0.284 (0.218)
Minimum Distance	-0.047** (0.016)	-0.794*** (0.057)	-0.031 [†] (0.017)	-0.785*** (0.054)
Refugees	-0.493*** (0.018)	0.249*** (0.037)	-0.521*** (0.022)	0.210*** (0.038)
Civil Conflict	-0.526*** (0.093)	-0.679** (0.242)	-0.616*** (0.105)	-1.392*** (0.253)
Leader Change, Host	0.042 (0.081)	-0.164 (0.227)	0.081 (0.091)	0.009 (0.258)
Electoral Democracy, Origin	-1.101*** (0.271)	0.416 (0.773)	-1.661*** (0.254)	-0.572 (0.688)
Electoral Democracy, Host	0.714** (0.220)	-0.077 (0.497)	0.278 (0.238)	-0.192 (0.460)
GDPPC, Origin	-0.038 (0.042)	-0.245* (0.123)	0.096* (0.046)	-0.207 (0.138)
GDPPC, Host	0.470*** (0.041)	0.484*** (0.095)	0.484*** (0.044)	0.369*** (0.098)
Population, Origin	0.135** (0.045)	-0.004 (0.156)	0.105* (0.045)	-0.192 (0.140)
Population, Host	0.190*** (0.036)	0.398*** (0.103)	0.153*** (0.037)	0.353*** (0.102)
Constant	-6.601*** (0.829)	-0.687 (2.127)	-5.760*** (0.895)	4.827* (2.284)
<i>N</i>	170388	5212	116568	3605
<i>ln</i> (α)		2.348*** (0.056)		2.357*** (0.063)

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

C.4 Interacting Civil Conflict with Turnover Types

Table C.4: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers Interacted with Civil Conflict

	(Model 3C)		(Model 4C)		(Model 5C)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Insider Change	-1.454*** (0.160)	-0.230 (0.335)				
Outsider Change	-0.243* (0.122)	1.637*** (0.378)				
Insider Change X Civil Conflict	1.581*** (0.290)	0.397 (0.546)				
Outsider Change X Civil Conflict	0.805*** (0.232)	-1.503** (0.520)				
Regular Exit			-0.871*** (0.120)	0.829** (0.267)		
Irregular Exit			0.302 (0.410)	-1.878* (0.757)		
Regular Exit X Civil Conflict			1.097*** (0.201)	-0.803† (0.431)		
Irregular Exit X Civil Conflict			0.639 (0.471)	1.696† (0.869)		
Removed w/ Foreign Supp.					-0.697 (0.546)	-0.550 (0.959)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp.					-0.764*** (0.112)	0.559* (0.249)
Removed w/ Foreign Supp. X Civil Conflict					1.472* (0.682)	-1.325 (1.028)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp. X Civil Conflict					1.212*** (0.178)	0.221 (0.435)
Civil Conflict	-0.804*** (0.110)	-1.188*** (0.260)	-0.720*** (0.096)	-0.556* (0.252)	-0.778*** (0.097)	-0.776** (0.237)
Leader Death	1.075*** (0.227)	-0.191 (0.570)	0.618* (0.257)	-0.784 (0.668)	0.912*** (0.229)	-0.649 (0.708)
Minimum Distance	-0.023 (0.017)	-0.747*** (0.054)	-0.044** (0.016)	-0.777*** (0.057)	-0.047** (0.016)	-0.783*** (0.056)
Refugees	-0.517*** (0.022)	0.204*** (0.036)	-0.489*** (0.018)	0.241*** (0.036)	-0.490*** (0.018)	0.254*** (0.036)
Leader Change, Host	0.101 (0.088)	0.081 (0.246)	0.045 (0.080)	-0.157 (0.225)	0.040 (0.081)	-0.161 (0.228)
Electoral Democracy, Origin	0.257 (0.232)	-1.704*** (0.610)	-0.361 (0.269)	-0.981*** (0.764)	0.449 (0.265)	-1.093*** (0.752)
Electoral Democracy, Host	0.278 (0.237)	-0.278 (0.454)	0.713** (0.220)	-0.122 (0.490)	0.750*** (0.219)	-0.005 (0.474)
GDPPC, Origin	0.122** (0.045)	-0.195 (0.131)	-0.022 (0.042)	-0.237* (0.121)	-0.032 (0.042)	-0.248* (0.120)
GDPPC, Host	0.479*** (0.044)	0.322*** (0.096)	0.469*** (0.041)	0.448*** (0.097)	0.469*** (0.041)	0.457*** (0.094)
Population, Origin	0.095* (0.041)	-0.170 (0.126)	0.128** (0.043)	-0.009 (0.148)	0.128** (0.043)	-0.019 (0.149)
Population, Host	0.147*** (0.037)	0.346*** (0.096)	0.186*** (0.035)	0.395*** (0.099)	0.187*** (0.035)	0.385*** (0.101)
Constant	-5.544*** (0.874)	4.634* (2.180)	-6.519*** (0.808)	-0.397 (2.033)	-0.023 (0.812)	-6.410*** (2.049)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.335*** (0.064)		2.335*** (0.055)		2.344*** (0.056)
N		116568		170388		170388

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.5: ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers Interacted with Civil Conflict

	(Model 6C)		(Model 7C)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Regular Exit, Outsider Change	-0.300*	1.750***		
	(0.127)	(0.388)		
Regular Exit, Insider Change	-1.566***	-0.239		
	(0.168)	(0.344)		
Irregular Exit, Outsider Change	0.088	-1.786***		
	(0.603)	(0.537)		
Irregular Exit, Insider Change	-0.923 [†]	-4.282***		
	(0.539)	(1.034)		
Regular Exit, Outsider Change X Civil conflict	0.432	-1.672*		
	(0.307)	(0.777)		
Regular Exit, Insider Change X Civil conflict	1.316***	0.195		
	(0.333)	(0.564)		
Irregular Exit, Outsider Change X Civil conflict	0.985	2.044**		
	(0.674)	(0.678)		
Irregular Exit, Insider Change X Civil conflict	1.766*	4.928***		
	(0.689)	(1.352)		
W/o Foreign Supp., Outsider			-0.227 [†]	1.665***
			(0.124)	(0.379)
W/ Foreign Supp., Outsider			-1.545*	-0.986
			(0.750)	(1.035)
Insider Change			-1.452***	-0.227
			(0.159)	(0.334)
W/o Foreign Supp., Outsider X Civil conflict			0.690**	-1.425**
			(0.235)	(0.535)
W/ Foreign Supp., Outsider X Civil conflict			3.267*	-0.541
			(1.337)	(1.244)
Insider Change X Civil conflict			1.578***	0.395
			(0.289)	(0.546)
Civil conflict	-0.798***	-1.184***	-0.807***	-1.194***
	(0.110)	(0.261)	(0.110)	(0.261)
Leader Death	0.815***	0.166	1.073***	-0.190
	(0.237)	(0.566)	(0.227)	(0.574)
Minimum Distance	-0.023	-0.748***	-0.024	-0.750***
	(0.017)	(0.054)	(0.017)	(0.054)
Refugees	-0.518***	0.201**	-0.516***	0.205***
	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.022)	(0.036)
Leader Change, Host	0.117	0.114	0.100	0.075
	(0.088)	(0.244)	(0.088)	(0.246)
Electoral Democracy, Origin	-1.653***	-0.373	-1.699***	-0.366
	(0.234)	(0.609)	(0.232)	(0.609)
Electoral Democracy, Host3	0.259	-0.31	0.272	-0.309
	(0.238)	(0.462)	(0.237)	(0.455)
GDPPC, Origin	0.122**	-0.202	0.122**	-0.199
	(0.045)	(0.132)	(0.045)	(0.131)
GDPPC, Host	0.488***	0.328***	0.480***	0.328***
	(0.044)	(0.096)	(0.044)	(0.096)
Population, Host	0.102*	-0.169	0.098*	-0.168
	(0.043)	(0.130)	(0.041)	(0.125)
Population, Host	0.148***	0.340***	0.147***	0.349***
	(0.037)	(0.096)	(0.037)	(0.096)
Constant	-5.727***	4.765*	-5.602***	4.572*
	(0.887)	(2.224)	(0.879)	(2.188)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.334***		2.331***
		(0.064)		(0.064)
N		116515		3605

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.
 Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted
 from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

C.5 Removing Outliers - Afghanistan & Eritrea

Table C.6: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, Without AFG and ERI

	(Model 8C)		(Model 9C)		(Model 10C)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Insider Change	-1.076*** (0.147)	-0.092 (0.292)				
Outsider Change	0.014 (0.107)	1.167*** (0.278)				
Regular Exit			-0.686*** (0.110)	0.536* (0.220)		
Irregular Exit			0.996*** (0.231)	0.600 (0.425)		
Removed w/ Foreign Supp.					-0.198 (0.896)	-2.012* (0.882)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp.					-0.537*** (0.106)	0.520* (0.207)
Leader Death	0.801*** (0.224)	-0.233 (0.519)	0.075 (0.243)	-0.904 (0.557)	0.306 (0.225)	-0.901 (0.582)
Minimum Distance	-0.021 (0.016)	-0.740*** (0.054)	-0.024 (0.016)	-0.754*** (0.055)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.755*** (0.055)
Refugees	-0.508*** (0.022)	0.198*** (0.038)	-0.505*** (0.022)	0.200*** (0.039)	-0.507*** (0.022)	0.202*** (0.039)
Leader Change, Host	0.072 (0.084)	-0.028 (0.205)	0.030 (0.087)	-0.152 (0.218)	0.020 (0.087)	-0.165 (0.216)
Civil Conflict	-0.556*** (0.111)	-1.539*** (0.254)	-0.640*** (0.109)	-1.648*** (0.251)	-0.578*** (0.111)	-1.660*** (0.253)
Electoral Democracy, Origin	-1.558*** (0.236)	0.223 (0.606)	-1.365*** (0.256)	0.020 (0.665)	-1.434*** (0.254)	0.063 (0.658)
Electoral Democracy, Host	0.288 (0.246)	-0.004 (0.467)	0.331 (0.246)	0.157 (0.473)	0.323 (0.246)	0.118 (0.474)
GDPPC, Origin	0.065 (0.043)	-0.264* (0.119)	0.054 (0.043)	-0.281* (0.122)	0.041 (0.043)	-0.291* (0.121)
GDPPC, Host	0.484*** (0.045)	0.336*** (0.101)	0.483*** (0.045)	0.346*** (0.103)	0.482*** (0.045)	0.353*** (0.104)
Population, Origin	0.130*** (0.039)	-0.046 (0.111)	0.139*** (0.040)	-0.057 (0.111)	0.139*** (0.040)	-0.048 (0.111)
Population, Host	0.156*** (0.038)	0.349*** (0.090)	0.148*** (0.038)	0.316*** (0.088)	0.149*** (0.038)	0.317*** (0.089)
Constant	-6.059*** (0.895)	2.445 (2.232)	-6.081*** (0.903)	3.265 (2.302)	-5.998*** (0.907)	3.129 (2.309)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.329*** (0.070)		2.332*** (0.069)		2.334*** (0.069)
N		113830 3255		113830 3255		113830 3255

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.7: ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers, Without AFG and ERI

	(Model 11C)		(Model 12C)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Regular Exit, Outsider	-0.173 (0.112)	1.387*** (0.304)		
Regular Exit, Insider	-1.312*** (0.156)	-0.178 (0.317)		
Irregular Exit, Outsider	0.860** (0.286)	0.552 (0.456)		
Irregular Exit, Insider	0.585 (0.368)	0.726 (0.762)		
Outsider Change, No Foreign Support			-0.002 (0.107)	1.252*** (0.279)
Outsider Change, Foreign Support			-0.379 (0.995)	-2.027* (0.888)
Insider Change			-1.077*** (0.147)	-0.090 (0.292)
Leader Death	0.626** (0.239)	0.171 (0.489)	0.800*** (0.224)	-0.235 (0.516)
Minimum Distance	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.733*** (0.054)	-0.022 (0.016)	-0.741*** (0.054)
Refugees	-0.507*** (0.023)	0.195*** (0.039)	-0.508*** (0.022)	0.198*** (0.038)
Leader Change, Host	0.091 (0.085)	0.009 (0.203)	0.072 (0.084)	-0.028 (0.204)
Civil Conflict	-0.640*** (0.111)	-1.530*** (0.252)	-0.570*** (0.111)	-1.547*** (0.255)
Electoral Democracy, Origin	-1.494*** (0.236)	0.156 (0.601)	-1.547*** (0.236)	0.227 (0.602)
Electoral Democracy, Host	0.280 (0.246)	-0.037 (0.467)	0.277 (0.246)	-0.056 (0.464)
GDPPC, Origin	0.068 (0.043)	-0.271* (0.120)	0.064 (0.043)	-0.266* (0.119)
GDPPC, Host	0.493*** (0.045)	0.341*** (0.102)	0.486*** (0.045)	0.339*** (0.100)
Population, Origin	0.140*** (0.039)	-0.039 (0.112)	0.134*** (0.039)	-0.043 (0.110)
Population, Host	0.151*** (0.038)	0.327*** (0.088)	0.156*** (0.038)	0.348*** (0.089)
Constant	-6.217*** (0.900)	2.748 (2.222)	-6.130*** (0.896)	2.458 (2.216)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.327*** (0.070)		2.327*** (0.070)
N		112538 3231		113777 3255

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

C.6 Removing Outliers - Dropping Returnees Above 95th Percentile

Table C.8: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, Without Values Above 95th Percentile

	(Model 13C)		(Model 14C)		(Model 15C)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Insider Change	-0.960*** (0.133)	0.105 (0.187)				
Outsider Change	0.079 (0.101)	0.876*** (0.224)				
Regular Exit			-0.631*** (0.104)	0.511** (0.171)		
Irregular Exit			0.995*** (0.216)	0.164 (0.360)		
Removed w/ Foreign Supp.					0.558 (0.736)	-1.131 (0.814)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp.					-0.466*** (0.099)	0.462** (0.159)
Leader Death	0.694** (0.223)	-0.525 (0.527)	0.075 (0.234)	-0.871 [†] (0.523)	0.259 (0.220)	-0.859 (0.543)
Minimum Distance	0.004 (0.016)	-0.465*** (0.035)	0.002 (0.016)	-0.467*** (0.036)	0.001 (0.016)	-0.469*** (0.036)
Refugees	-0.505*** (0.021)	0.254*** (0.027)	-0.500*** (0.021)	0.258*** (0.027)	-0.503*** (0.021)	0.260*** (0.027)
Leader Change, Host	0.102 (0.077)	0.073 (0.151)	0.079 (0.078)	0.054 (0.153)	0.073 (0.079)	0.054 (0.152)
Civil Conflict	-0.604*** (0.098)	-1.301*** (0.224)	-0.665*** (0.098)	-1.328*** (0.224)	-0.609*** (0.098)	-1.355*** (0.224)
Electoral Democracy, Origin	-1.703*** (0.218)	-0.564 (0.520)	-1.457*** (0.232)	-0.549 (0.543)	-1.535*** (0.230)	-0.526 (0.540)
Electoral Democracy, Host	0.136 (0.234)	-0.916* (0.402)	0.162 (0.235)	-0.839* (0.413)	0.163 (0.236)	-0.846* (0.413)
GDPPC, Origin	0.111** (0.039)	-0.144 (0.095)	0.099* (0.039)	-0.166 [†] (0.095)	0.089* (0.040)	-0.168 [†] (0.095)
GDPPC, Host	0.471*** (0.041)	0.306*** (0.069)	0.468*** (0.041)	0.305*** (0.070)	0.466*** (0.041)	0.309*** (0.070)
Population, Origin	0.153*** (0.033)	0.029 (0.082)	0.163*** (0.034)	0.025 (0.083)	0.162*** (0.034)	0.028 (0.083)
Population, Host	0.109** [†] (0.034)	0.124 [†] (0.067)	0.105** (0.034)	0.108 (0.068)	0.106** (0.034)	0.107 (0.068)
Constant	-5.868*** (0.807)	2.662 (1.839)	-5.963*** (0.809)	3.058 [†] (1.857)	-5.857*** (0.810)	3.013 (1.863)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.182*** (0.069)		2.179*** (0.068)		2.182*** (0.069)
N		116387 3424		116387 3424		116387 3424

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.9: ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers, Without Values Above 95th Percentile

	(Model 16C)		(Model 17C)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Regular Exit, Outsider	-0.132 (0.108)	1.097*** (0.253)		
Regular Exit, Insider	-1.191*** (0.142)	0.079 (0.199)		
Irregular Exit, Outsider	0.848** (0.261)	0.141 (0.361)		
Irregular Exit, Insider	0.609 [†] (0.349)	0.266 (0.704)		
Outsider Change, W/o Foreign Supp.			0.044 (0.101)	0.958*** (0.228)
Outsider Change, W/ Foreign Supp.			0.463 (0.766)	-1.166 (0.798)
Insider Change			-0.963*** (0.133)	0.102 (0.186)
Leader Death	0.546* (0.234)	-0.139 (0.525)	0.695** (0.223)	-0.518 (0.527)
Minimum Distance	0.003 (0.016)	-0.464*** (0.035)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.466*** (0.035)
Refugees	-0.501*** (0.021)	0.255*** (0.027)	-0.504*** (0.021)	0.254*** (0.027)
Leader Change, Host	0.115 (0.078)	0.089 (0.153)	0.101 (0.077)	0.069 (0.152)
Civil Conflict	-0.680*** (0.099)	-1.270*** (0.225)	-0.614*** (0.098)	-1.303*** (0.225)
Electoral Democracy, Origin	-1.622*** (0.219)	-0.580 (0.517)	-1.682*** (0.219)	-0.564 (0.519)
Electoral Democracy, Host	0.137 (0.235)	-0.894* (0.400)	0.127 (0.235)	-0.960* (0.401)
GDPPC, Origin	0.113** (0.039)	-0.160 [†] (0.095)	0.111** (0.039)	-0.145 (0.096)
GDPPC, Host	0.478*** (0.041)	0.305*** (0.069)	0.471*** (0.041)	0.308*** (0.068)
Population, Origin	0.166*** (0.034)	0.048 (0.083)	0.157*** (0.034)	0.028 (0.082)
Population, Host	0.109** (0.034)	0.123 [†] (0.067)	0.110** (0.034)	0.125 [†] (0.067)
Constant	-6.126*** (0.813)	2.444 (1.850)	-5.932*** (0.810)	2.688 (1.838)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.175*** (0.069)		2.180*** (0.069)
N		115097 3402		116334 3424

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

C.7 All Possible Dyads

Table C.10: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, All Directed Dyads

	(Model 18C)		(Model 19C)		(Model 20C)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Insider Change	-0.793*** (0.170)	0.510 (0.503)				
Outsider Change	0.257* (0.118)	1.125** (0.359)				
Regular Exit			-0.530*** (0.115)	0.288 (0.239)		
Irregular Exit			1.157*** (0.204)	0.112 (0.456)		
Removed w/ Foreign Supp.					0.299 (0.443)	-1.495*** (0.454)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp.					-0.320** (0.100)	0.410 [†] (0.222)
Leader Death	0.457 [†] (0.259)	-1.461* (0.715)	0.255 (0.249)	-1.201 [†] (0.723)	0.392 (0.244)	-1.366 [†] (0.734)
Minimum Distance	0.173*** (0.015)	-0.722*** (0.057)	0.174*** (0.015)	-0.717*** (0.058)	0.175*** (0.015)	-0.711*** (0.057)
Refugees	-0.694*** (0.026)	0.126*** (0.035)	-0.662*** (0.023)	0.152*** (0.035)	-0.665*** (0.023)	0.154*** (0.035)
Leader Change, Host	0.163 [†] (0.118)	0.052 (0.359)	0.081 (0.080)	-0.153 (0.213)	0.075 (0.079)	-0.157 (0.210)
Civil Conflict	-0.733** (0.105)	-1.504**** (0.254)	-0.741*** (0.095)	-1.088*** (0.265)	-0.669*** (0.094)	-1.106*** (0.256)
Electoral Democracy, Origin	-1.262*** (0.261)	-1.896* (0.756)	-0.556 [†] (0.285)	-1.597 [†] (0.942)	-0.640* (0.282)	-1.573 [†] (0.937)
Electoral Democracy, Host	-0.650** (0.242)	-1.246* (0.538)	-0.305 (0.224)	-0.932 (0.595)	-0.315 (0.223)	-0.961 (0.584)
GDPPC, Origin	0.422*** (0.046)	0.066 (0.145)	0.333*** (0.042)	0.191 (0.136)	0.323*** (0.042)	0.179 (0.134)
GDPPC, Host	0.316*** (0.041)	0.291** (0.095)	0.282*** (0.041)	0.356*** (0.097)	0.277*** (0.041)	0.345*** (0.096)
Population, Origin	-0.086* (0.039)	-0.513*** (0.127)	-0.128** (0.040)	-0.591*** (0.156)	-0.131** (0.041)	-0.581*** (0.158)
Population, Host	0.022 (0.033)	0.379*** (0.085)	0.033 (0.030)	0.414*** (0.081)	0.033 (0.030)	0.406*** (0.081)
Constant	-1.252 (0.883)	9.966*** (2.577)	-0.653 (0.806)	8.697*** (2.600)	-0.469 (0.813)	8.789*** (2.625)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.589*** (0.065)		2.564*** (0.059)		2.568*** (0.059)
N		448052		720254		720254
		3734		5352		5352

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for "years since last return" omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.11: ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers, All Directed Dyads

	(Model 21C)		(Model 22C)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Regular Exit, Outsider	0.049 (0.130)	1.182** (0.399)		
Regular Exit, Insider	-1.212*** (0.158)	-0.31 (0.305)		
Irregular Exit, Outsider	1.048*** (0.263)	0.176 (0.431)		
Irregular Exit, Insider	0.986* (0.415)	1.030 (0.927)		
Outsider Change, No Foreign Support			0.244* (0.120)	1.240*** (0.372)
Outsider Change, Foreign Support			0.480 (0.857)	-1.580* (0.658)
Insider Change			-0.792*** (0.170)	0.517 (0.503)
Leader Death	0.063 (0.270)	-0.253 (0.509)	0.461 [†] (0.259)	-1.447* (0.713)
Minimum Distance	0.165*** (0.016)	-0.745*** (0.059)	0.173*** (0.015)	-0.724*** (0.057)
Refugees	-0.669*** (0.026)	0.162*** (0.037)	-0.695*** (0.026)	0.126*** (0.035)
Leader Change, Host	0.173 [†] (0.090)	0.088 (0.231)	0.161 [†] (0.090)	0.048 (0.234)
Civil Conflict	-0.863*** (0.110)	-1.629*** (0.274)	-0.740*** (0.106)	-1.491*** (0.255)
Electoral Democracy, Origin	-1.200*** (0.250)	-1.936* (0.760)	-1.234*** (0.262)	-1.859* (0.756)
Electoral Democracy, Host	-0.594* (0.233)	-0.804 [†] (0.474)	-0.672** (0.243)	-1.318* (0.540)
GDPPC, Origin	0.412*** (0.048)	0.008 (0.150)	0.422*** (0.046)	0.061 (0.145)
GDPPC, Host	0.335*** (0.041)	0.326*** (0.096)	0.318*** (0.041)	0.295** (0.095)
Population, Origin	-0.018 (0.044)	-0.256 [†] (0.145)	-0.080* (0.039)	-0.504*** (0.128)
Population, Host	0.020 (0.034)	0.340*** (0.089)	0.022 (0.033)	0.381*** (0.085)
Constant	-2.406** (0.903)	6.139* (2.549)	-1.357 (0.888)	9.818*** (2.582)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.544*** (0.066)		2.589*** (0.065)
N		448052		3734

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

C.8 5 Year Risk Sample

Table C.12: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, 5 Year Risk Sample

	(Model 23C)		(Model 24C)		(Model 25C)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Insider Change	-1.038*** (0.186)	-0.549 (0.387)				
Outsider Change	-0.059 (0.117)	0.846** (0.305)				
Regular Exit			-0.638*** (0.113)	0.398 [†] (0.238)		
Irregular Exit			0.986*** (0.225)	-0.338 (0.399)		
Removed w/ Foreign Supp.					0.386 (0.516)	-1.474** (0.565)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp.					-0.359*** (0.104)	0.524* (0.237)
Leader Death	0.742** (0.260)	0.027 (0.664)	0.653* (0.267)	-0.406 (0.721)	0.690** (0.250)	-0.572 (0.728)
Minimum Distance	-0.035* (0.018)	-0.782*** (0.054)	-0.056** (0.017)	-0.805*** (0.058)	-0.057** (0.018)	-0.800*** (0.057)
Refugees	-0.511*** (0.025)	0.208*** (0.039)	-0.468*** (0.020)	0.251*** (0.039)	-0.471*** (0.020)	0.256*** (0.039)
Leader Change, Host	0.116 (0.098)	0.045 (0.264)	0.040 (0.088)	-0.261 (0.234)	0.037 (0.089)	-0.242 (0.234)
Civil Conflict	-0.480*** (0.111)	-1.346*** (0.289)	-0.441*** (0.101)	-0.633* (0.287)	-0.406*** (0.100)	-0.719** (0.276)
Electoral Democracy, Origin	-2.054*** (0.310)	-1.264 (0.824)	-1.058** (0.345)	0.187 (1.050)	-1.161*** (0.340)	0.149 (1.020)
Electoral Democracy, Host	0.267 (0.252)	-0.067 (0.486)	0.718** (0.229)	0.060 (0.525)	0.706** (0.227)	0.059 (0.505)
GDPPC, Origin	0.079 (0.051)	-0.171 (0.141)	-0.057 (0.046)	-0.206 (0.134)	-0.074 (0.046)	-0.222 [†] (0.132)
GDPPC, Host	0.470*** (0.046)	0.361*** (0.097)	0.455*** (0.042)	0.473*** (0.100)	0.450*** (0.042)	0.465*** (0.098)
Population, Origin	0.157*** (0.046)	-0.242 [†] (0.136)	0.191*** (0.049)	-0.076 (0.165)	0.197*** (0.049)	-0.056 (0.166)
Population, Host	0.151*** (0.039)	0.386*** (0.104)	0.175*** (0.036)	0.383** (0.104)	0.175*** (0.037)	0.373*** (0.107)
Constant	-6.310*** (0.931)	5.139* (2.307)	-7.235*** (0.875)	0.623 (2.248)	-7.146*** (0.873)	0.623 (2.232)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.294*** (0.066)		2.299*** (0.057)		2.308*** (0.058)
N		86927		3347		136565
				4940		4940

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.13: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, 5 Year Risk Sample

	(Model 26C)		(Model 27C)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Regular Exit, Outsider	-0.386** (0.126)	1.077** (0.339)		
Regular Exit, Insider	-1.375*** (0.212)	-0.765 [†] (0.445)		
Irregular Exit, Outsider	0.885** (0.273)	0.052 (0.447)		
Irregular Exit, Insider	0.725 [†] (0.379)	0.668 (0.841)		
Outsider Change, No Foreign Support			-0.111 (0.117)	0.940** (0.309)
Outsider Change, Foreign Support			0.330 (0.792)	-1.877** (0.664)
Insider Change			-1.039*** (0.186)	-0.545 (0.386)
Leader Death	0.853*** (0.248)	0.450 (0.619)	0.743** (0.260)	0.027 (0.663)
Minimum Distance	-0.034 [†] (0.018)	-0.775*** (0.054)	-0.036* (0.018)	-0.785*** (0.054)
Refugees	-0.511*** (0.025)	0.203*** (0.040)	-0.510*** (0.025)	0.210*** (0.039)
Leader Change, Host	0.142 (0.097)	0.105 (0.255)	0.112 (0.098)	0.033 (0.262)
Civil Conflict	-0.570*** (0.111)	-1.358*** (0.288)	-0.495*** (0.112)	-1.350*** (0.288)
Electoral Democracy, Origin	-1.981*** (0.316)	-1.477 [†] (0.836)	-2.019*** (0.310)	-1.267 (0.819)
Electoral Democracy, Host	0.257 (0.253)	-0.121 (0.493)	0.256 (0.252)	-0.128 (0.485)
GDPPC, Origin	0.087 [†] (0.051)	-0.180 (0.142)	0.079 (0.051)	-0.178 (0.141)
GDPPC, Host	0.485*** (0.046)	0.378*** (0.100)	0.472*** (0.046)	0.369*** (0.097)
Population, Origin	0.168*** (0.048)	-0.233 [†] (0.141)	0.166*** (0.047)	-0.230 [†] (0.136)
Population, Host	0.145*** (0.039)	0.360*** (0.101)	0.152*** (0.039)	0.389*** (0.104)
Constant	-6.539*** (0.937)	5.475* (2.279)	-6.488*** (0.936)	4.928* (2.301)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.289*** (0.067)		2.292*** (0.066)
N		86927		3347

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

C.9 10 Year Risk Sample

Table C.14: ZiNB Results from Types of Leader Turnovers, 10 Year Risk Sample

	(Model 28C)		(Model 29C)		(Model 30C)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Insider Change	-1.050*** (0.186)	-0.538 (0.385)				
Outsider Change	-0.061 (0.116)	0.880** (0.304)				
Regular Exit			-0.643*** (0.113)	0.428 [†] (0.235)		
Irregular Exit			0.978*** (0.228)	-0.347 (0.400)		
Removed w/ Foreign Supp.					0.349 (0.522)	-1.470* (0.571)
Removed w/o Foreign Supp.					-0.373*** (0.105)	0.544* (0.237)
Leader Death	0.737** (0.252)	0.005 (0.658)	0.627* (0.258)	-0.413 (0.722)	0.697** (0.242)	-0.577 (0.731)
Minimum Distance	-0.032 [†] (0.018)	-0.776*** (0.054)	-0.054** (0.017)	-0.800*** (0.058)	-0.054** (0.017)	-0.796*** (0.056)
Refugees	-0.522*** (0.025)	0.210*** (0.039)	-0.479*** (0.020)	0.252*** (0.039)	-0.481*** (0.020)	0.257*** (0.039)
Leader Change, Host	0.115 (0.097)	0.041 (0.263)	0.045 (0.087)	-0.262 (0.235)	0.042 (0.088)	-0.243 (0.234)
Civil Conflict	-0.526*** (0.111)	-1.319*** (0.287)	-0.482*** (0.101)	-0.599* (0.286)	-0.448*** (0.101)	-0.690* (0.276)
Electoral Democracy, Origin	-2.025*** (0.302)	-1.192 (0.819)	-1.006** (0.336)	0.287 (1.031)	-1.114*** (0.331)	0.232 (1.002)
Electoral Democracy, Host	0.293 (0.251)	-0.049 (0.485)	0.719** (0.230)	0.057 (0.525)	0.709** (0.228)	0.061 (0.504)
GDPPC, Origin	0.087 [†] (0.049)	-0.185 (0.141)	-0.050 (0.044)	-0.222 [†] (0.129)	-0.065 (0.044)	-0.235 [†] (0.127)
GDPPC, Host	0.479*** (0.045)	0.357*** (0.098)	0.464*** (0.042)	0.471*** (0.101)	0.460*** (0.042)	0.462*** (0.099)
Population, Origin	0.150** (0.046)	-0.229 [†] (0.135)	0.179*** (0.047)	-0.068 (0.159)	0.183*** (0.047)	-0.051 (0.160)
Population, Host	0.155*** (0.039)	0.382*** (0.104)	0.182*** (0.036)	0.385*** (0.104)	0.182*** (0.037)	0.375*** (0.107)
Constant	-6.357*** (0.929)	4.994* (2.310)	-7.205*** (0.866)	0.505 (2.219)	-7.110*** (0.865)	0.534 (2.206)
$\ln(\alpha)$		2.315*** (0.057)		2.323*** (0.057)		2.317*** (0.066)
N		94261	3383	146677	4987	146677

Note: Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.15: ZiNB Results from Combination of Types of Leader Turnovers, 10 Year Risk Sample

	(Model 31C)		(Model 32C)	
	Pr(o)	Count	Pr(o)	Count
Regular Exit, Outsider	-0.374** (0.125)	1.119*** (0.337)		
Regular Exit, Insider	-1.388*** (0.211)	-0.755 [†] (0.441)		
Irregular Exit, Outsider	0.884** (0.277)	0.049 (0.447)		
Irregular Exit, Insider	0.727 [†] (0.386)	0.673 (0.850)		
Outsider Change, No Foreign Support			-0.111 (0.117)	0.975** (0.308)
Outsider Change, Foreign Support			0.294 (0.798)	-1.880** (0.666)
Insider Change			-1.051*** (0.186)	-0.534 (0.384)
Minimum Distance	-0.030 [†] (0.018)	-0.769*** (0.054)	-0.033 [†] (0.018)	-0.779*** (0.054)
Leader Death	0.793** (0.249)	0.460 (0.612)	0.738** (0.252)	0.005 (0.658)
Refugees	-0.522*** (0.025)	0.205*** (0.040)	-0.522*** (0.025)	0.212*** (0.038)
Leader Change, Host	0.140 (0.097)	0.101 (0.254)	0.112 (0.098)	0.029 (0.262)
Civil Conflict	-0.618*** (0.110)	-1.329*** (0.286)	-0.542*** (0.111)	-1.322*** (0.286)
Electoral Democracy, Origin	-1.954*** (0.307)	-1.408 [†] (0.828)	-1.993*** (0.302)	-1.195 (0.813)
Electoral Democracy, Host	0.287 (0.252)	-0.100 (0.492)	0.281 (0.252)	-0.110 (0.484)
GDPPC, Origin	0.094 [†] (0.050)	-0.194 (0.142)	0.087 [†] (0.050)	-0.191 (0.141)
GDPPC, Host	0.492*** (0.045)	0.375*** (0.100)	0.481*** (0.046)	0.365*** (0.097)
Population, Origin	0.163*** (0.047)	-0.219 (0.140)	0.158*** (0.046)	-0.218 (0.135)
Population, Host	0.149*** (0.039)	0.356*** (0.101)	0.157*** (0.039)	0.386*** (0.104)
Constant	-6.590*** (0.933)	5.316* (2.277)	-6.531*** (0.933)	4.787* (2.304)
$\ln(\alpha)$		22.312*** 2 (0.066)		22.315*** 2(0.066)
N		94261		3383

Standard errors clustered on the directed-dyad.

Squared and cubed terms for “years since last return” omitted from presentation.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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